Audience publique tenue le jeudi 8 juin 2006, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président

CR 2006/47

Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice

LAAYE THAEGUE

ANNÉE 2006

Audience publique

tenue le jeudi 8 juin 2006, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,

en l’affaire relative à des Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay

(Argentine c. Uruguay)

________________

COMPTE RENDU
________________

YEAR 2006

Public sitting

held on Thursday 8 June 2006, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Higgins presiding,

in the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay)

____________________

VERBATIM RECORD

____________________ - 2 -

Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident

RanMjev.
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal

Owada
Simma
Abraham
Keith

Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skjoteiskov,
BeTroáesz.

juiesesa, ad hoc

Cgoefferr,

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -

Present: Presideitgins
Vice-PresiKntasawneh

RanjevJaudges
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal

Owada
Simma
Abraham
Keith

Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc TorresBernárdez

Vinuesa

CoRuvrisrar

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -

Le Gouvernement de la République argentine est représenté par :

S. Exc. Mme Susana Ruiz Cerutti, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique du ministère des relations
extérieures, du commerce international et du culte,

comme agent;

S. Exc. M. Horacio A. Basabe, ambassadeur, dir ecteur général de l’Institut du service extérieur de
la nation, ancien conseiller juridique du ministère des relations extérieures, du commerce
international et du culte, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,

S. Exc. M. Santos Goñi Marenco, ambassadeur de la République argentine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

comme coagents;

M. Alain Pellet, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre

de la Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,

M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit international, University College, Londres,

M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales, Genève,

Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à la faculté de droit,

Genève,

comme conseils et avocats;

S. Exc. M. Raúl Estrada Oyuela, ambassade ur, représentant spécial pour les affaires
environnementales internationalesau ministère des affaires étrangères, du commerce international
et du culte,

comme conseil et expert;

S. Exc. M. Julio Barboza, ambassadeur, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de

Buenos Aires, ancien membre de la Commis sion du droit international des Nations Unies,

Mme Silvina González Napolitano, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de
Buenos Aires,

Mme Claudia Mónica Mizawak, procureurde la province argentine d’Entre Rios,

Mme Romina Picolotti, présidentedu Centre des droits de l’homme et l’environnement (CEDHA),

M. Daniel A. Sabsay, président de la Fundación Argentina para los Recursos de la
Naturaleza(FARN),

M. Juan Carlos Vega, avocat spécialisé dans laprotection internationale des droits de l’homme,

comme conseils et experts juridiques; - 5 -

The Government of the Argentine Republic is represented by:

H.E. Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, Ambassador, Legal Counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,

as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Horacio A. Basabe, Ambassador, Director of the Argentine Institute for Foreign Service,
former Legal Counsel to the Ministry of Fore ign Affairs, International Trade and Religious
Worship, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,

H.E. Mr. Santos Goñi Marenco, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

as Co-Agents;

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor of Public International Law, University of Paris X-Nanterre, Member of

the United Nations International Law Commission,

Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of International Law, University College, London,

Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva,

Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, University

of Geneva,

as Counsel and Advocates;

H.EM. r. Raúl Estrada Oyuela, Ambassador, Special Representative for International
Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Religious Worship,

as Counsel and Expert;

H.E. Mr. Julio Barboza, Ambassador, Professor of Public International Law, University of
Buenos Aires, former Member of the United Nations International Law Commission,

Ms Silvina González Napolitano, Professor of P ublic International Law, University of
Buenos Aires,

Ms Claudia Mónica Mizawak, Public Prosecutor, Entre Rios Province,

Ms Romina Picolotti, President of the Centre for Human and Environmental Rights (CEDHA),

Mr. Daniel A. Sabsay, President, Fundación Argentina para los Recursos de la
Naturaleza (FARN),

Mr. Juan Carlos Vega, international human rights lawyer,

as Legal Advisers and Experts; - 6 -

M. Elias Matta, ingénieur, directeur du centre de technologie de la cellulose, Univerisdad Nacional
del Litoral (UNL),

M. Lucio Janiot, chef du département de chimie du service d’hydrographie de la marine,

M. Alberto Espinach Ross, chercheur à l’Institut argentin pour la recherche et le développement de

la pêche (INIDEP),

comme conseils et experts scientifiques;

M. Ariel W. González, conseill er d’ambassade, bureau du conse iller juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères, du commerce international et du culte,

Mme Mariana Alvarez Rodríguez, secrétaire d’ambassade, bureau du représentant spécial pour les

affaires environnementales inte rnationales au minist ère des affaires étrangères, du commerce
international et du culte,

Mme Florencia Colombo, direction de la presse au ministère des affaires étrangères, du commerce
international et du culte,

M. Daniel Müller, chercheur, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),

Mme Ursula Zitnik,

comme délégués.

Le Gouvernement de la République orientale de l’Uruguay est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Héctor Gros Espiell, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès de la

République française,

S. Exc. M. Carlos Gianelli, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique,

comme agents;

M. Alan E. Boyle, professeur de droit international, directeur du Centre écossais pour le droit
international, Université d’Edinburgh,

M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Florence,

M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre du barreau de la
Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, membre du barreau du district de Columbia,

comme avocats;

S. Exc. M. Carlos Mora Medero, ambassadeur de la République orientale de l’Uruguay auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,

M. Gonzalo Fernández, secrétaire de la présidence de la République orientale de l’Uruguay,

S. Exc. M. José Luis Cancela, secrétaire général du ministère des relations extérieures,

M. Alberto Pérez Pérez, professeur à l’Université de la République de l’Uruguay, Montevideo, - 7 -

Mr. Elias Matta, Engineer, Director of the Centre for Cellulose Technology, Universidad Nacional
del Litoral (UNL),

Mr. Lucio Janiot, Director of the Chemistry Department, Naval Hydrographic Service,

Mr. Alberto Espinach Ross, Researcher, National Fisheries Research and Development

Institute (INIDEP),

as Scientific Advisers and Experts;

Mr. Ariel González, Embassy Counsellor, Legal Adviser’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Religious Worship,

Ms Mariana Alvarez Rodríguez, Embassy Secret ary, Office of the Special Representative for

International Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
Religious Worship,

Ms Florencia Colombo, Press Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and
Religious Worship,

Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),

Ms Ursula Zitnik,

Dselegates;

The Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay is represented by:

H.E. Mr.Héctor Gros Espiell, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the French

Republic,

H.E. Mr. Carlos Gianelli, Ambassador of the E astern Republic of Uruguay to the United States of
America,

as Agents;

Mr. Alan E. Boyle, Professor of International Law and Director of the Scottish Centre for
International Law, University of Edinburgh,

Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Florence, Florence,

Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Attorney at Law, Foley Ho ag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bar of
the United States Supreme Court, Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,

as Advocates;

H.E. Mr. Carlos Mora Medero, Ambassador of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,

Mr. Gonzalo Fernández, Secretary to the Presidency of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,

H.E. Mr. José Luis Cancela, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Alberto Pérez Pérez, Professor, University of the Republic of Uruguay, Montevideo, - 8 -

M. Edison González Lapeyre, professeur à l’ Université de la Ré publique de l’Uruguay,
Montevideo,

M. Roberto Puceiro Ripoli, professeur à l’Université de la République de l’Uruguay, Montevideo,

M. Gustavo Alvarez, ministre conseiller, directeur de la direction des affaires multilatérales,

ministère des relations extérieures,

M. Marcelo Cousillas, conseiller juridique à la direction nationale de l’environnement, ministère du
logement, de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’environnement,

Mme Nienke Grossman, avocat, cabinet Foley Ho ag LLP, Washington D.C., membre du barreau
du district de Columbia, membre du barreau de la Virginie,

M. Adam Kahn, avocat, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, membre du barreau du
Massachusetts,

M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre du barreau de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, membre du barreau du Massachusetts, membre du
barreau du district de Columbia,

comme conseillers;

M. Martin Ponce de Leon, ingénieur,sous-sécretaire d’Etatau ministère de l’industrie, de l’énergie et
des mines,

Mme Alicia Torres, ingénieur, directrice nationalede l’environnement au ministère du logement, de
l’aménagement du territoireet de l’environnement,

M. Eugenio Lorenzo, ingénieur, conseiller technique de la division de l’évaluation des impacts sur
l’environnement, ministère du logement, de l’am énagement du territoire et de l’environnement,

M. Adriaan van Heiningen, professeur, titulaire de la chaire J. Larcom Ober au département

d’ingénierie chimique à l’Université du Maine, Orono, Maine,

comme experts. - 9 -

Mr. Edison Gonzalez Lapeyre, Professor, University of the Republic of Uruguay, Montevideo,

Mr. Roberto Puceiro Ripoli, Professor, University of the Republic of Uruguay, Montevideo,

Mr. Gustavo Alvarez, Minister Counsellor, Director, Multilateral Relations Directorate, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Marcelo Cousillas, Legal Counsel, National Di rectorate for the Environment, Ministry of
Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment,

Ms Nienke Grossman, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bar of
the District of Columbia, Member of the Virginia Bar,

Mr. Adam Kahn, Attorney at Law, Foley Ho ag LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, Member of the

Massachusetts Bar,

Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bar

of the United States Supreme Court, Member of the Massachusetts Bar, Member of the Bar of
the District of Columbia,

Asdvisers;

Mr. Martin Ponce de Leon, Engineer, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Industry, Energy
and Mines,

Ms Alicia Torres, Engineer, National Director , Environmental Impact Assessment Division,
Ministry of Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment,

Mr. Eugenio Lorenzo, Engineer, Technical Consu ltant for the Environmental Impact Assessment

Division, Ministry of Housing, Territorial Planning and Environment,

Mr. Adriaan van Heiningen, Professor, J. Larc om Ober Chair, Department of Chemical
Engineering, University of Maine, Orono, Maine,

Esxperts. - 10 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open and the Court meets this

afternoon to hear the first round of oral observations on behalf of Uruguay.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Gros Espiell, the Agent of Uruguay.

M. GROS ESPIELL : Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, en me présentant devant la

Cour internationale de Justice à l’occasion de cette audience relative aux mesures conservatoires

demandées par le Gouvernement argen tin dans l’affaire relative à des Usines de pâte à papier sur

le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay) , je tiens, en ma qualité d’agent de la République

orientale de l’Uruguay à saluer et à rendre un hommage respectueux et confiant à la Cour

internationale de Justice, principal organe judi ciaire des NationsUnies, ainsi qu’à tous ses

membres qui représentent, dans leur ensemble, les grandes civilisations et les principaux systèmes

juridiques du monde.

L’Uruguay, conscient de l’indépendance de j ugement et de l’objectivité intellectuelle et

morale des juges qui la composent, a pleinement c onfiance dans la décision de cette Cour. Il est

certain qu’aujourd’hui, dans le cas qui nous intér esse et notamment en ce qui concerne les mesures

conservatoires demandées, la Cour agira en se basant sur le droit, fidèle à sa mission qui est de

juger selon le droit international dans le respect de la justice.

L’Uruguay possède une large et constante tradition d’observance du droit international.

Toute sa politique, internationale et intérieure, repose sur ce respect du droit. Pour illustrer

cette conduite dont l’Uruguay s’enor gueillit il convient de rappeler, ce qui est tout pertinent dans

cette circonstance, qu’il a été le premier pays du monde à reconnaître en 1921, la compétence de la

Cour internationale de Justice, en vertu des dispositions de l’article 36, paragraphe 2, de son Statut.

Cela atteste l’ancienneté de la bonne foi et de la confiance ininterrompue de l’Uruguay envers le

droit international et la résolution judiciaire des différends internationaux, et en particulier envers la

Cour internationale de Justice. Dans la long ue tradition des rapports qui unissent l’Uruguay à la

Cour, je me dois de rappeler la contribution de deux illustres juges de nationalité uruguayenne qui

en furent membres dans le passé : Enrique C. Armando Ugon et Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga.

Qu’il me soit permis de souligner en tout premier lieu la volonté permanente de l’Uruguay

de respecter et de préserver l’environnement. Telle a été sa conduite, non seulement par souci - 11 -

d’appliquer scrupuleusement le droit interna tional mais aussi en obéissant à un concept

expressément inscrit dans sa Constitution, sa législation et ses dispositions normatives

réglementaires et administratives.

L’Uruguay est un exemple en matière de respect de l’environnement. Cette affirmation n’est

pas un simple fait oratoire ou une déclaration politique. C’est une réalité que de nombreux rapports

d’experts ont constaté, ce qui place mon pays au premier rang, parmi les autres pays américains,

sur le plan du respect de l’environnement, et au troisième au niveau mondial. Cette donnée est

dûment attestée par l’ Index d’environnement durable de 2005, présenté au forum économique

mondial par le Yale Center for E nvironmental Law and Policy de l’Univ ersité de Yale et le Center

for International Earth Science Information Network de l’Université de Columbia.

Dans ce rapport, la Finlande occupe la première place au niveau mondial, suivie de la

Norvège et de l’Uruguay.

Parmi les pays membres de l’Organisation des Etats américains, l’Uruguay est situé au

premier rang.

Nous sommes fiers de cette réalité parce qu’elle met au grand jour la véritable image de

l’Uruguay et qu’elle oppose un démenti formel à une version erron ée, de pure propagande,

totalement dénuée de fondement, qui a été diffusée.

A cette affirmation radicale du respect de l’Uruguay pour l’environnement et le droit

individuel et collectif à un environnement sain et écologiquement équilibré, se joint la volonté de

préserver, de façon harmonieuse et cohérente, son droit au développement, qui lui aussi fait partie

des droits de l’homme, afin d’assurer sa croissan ce économique et sociale et son développement

humain.

*

* *

C’est au nom du respect qu’il porte au dr oit à l’environnement, poursuivant une ligne

politique constante, que l’Uruguay, dans une attitude de transparen ce et d’ouverture, s’est engagé, - 12 -

dans ce projet de construction de deux usines de pâte à papier su r son territoire, sur la rive du

fleuve Uruguay :

⎯ à ce que les usines, lorsqu’elles entreront en phase opérationnelle, ne génèrent pas de pollution;

⎯ à prendre toutes les mesures de protection et garanties pour qu’il ne puisse y avoir de pollution;

⎯ à soumettre le fonctionnement future des usines, comme condition inéluctable à la réalisation

du projet, à un processus de contrôle et de garanties maximales tout au long de leur existence;

⎯ à exiger l’observation des plus hauts standards existant dans le monde;

⎯ à imposer le respect scrupuleux de la législati on uruguayenne, qui est l’une des plus strictes du

monde en la matière;

⎯ à garantir l’application des dispositions pe rtinentes adoptées par la commission du fleuve

Uruguay (CARU);

⎯ à réaliser un monitorage constant et perman ent des conséquences environnementales du futur

fonctionnement des usines. L’Uruguay a proposé, et je le réitère aujourd’hui d’une manière

expresse, son offre de réaliser un monitorage conjoint avec l’Argentine;

⎯ à tenir l’Argentine informée de façon continue et complète par un dialogue constructif;

⎯ à toujours prendre en considération les préoccupa tions de l’Argentine dans le cadre du droit

international;

⎯ à retirer l’autorisation de fonctionnement des usines par des mesures radicales inflexibles si une

quelconque violation des conditions imposées par l’Uruguay et des standards maximaux requis

était constatée.

*

* *

Le droit uruguayen est très strict en matière de protection de l’environnement.

C’est la Constitution elle-même, c’est-à-dire la plus haute hiérarchie du droit uruguayen, qui,

dans son article47, établit que la «la protection de l’environnement est d’in térêt général» et que

tous doivent «s’abstenir de tout acte qui causera it une grave déprédation, destruction ou pollution

de l’environnement». - 13 -

Diverses lois ont développé et réglementé cette norme constitutionnelle et ont imposé

rigoureusement à l’Etat uruguayen le devoir de sa uvegarder et de protéger l’environnement,

d’éviter la pollution et d’interdire toute forme d’impact environnemental négatif.

L’Uruguay doit respecter son propre droit afin de sauvegarder l’environnement. Il l’a

toujours fait et restera inflexible sur cette position.

Mais il a le droit d’exiger la reconnaissance de ce devoir, de la présomption, de celui-ci, de

sa bonne foi avérée et constante dans la conduite de sa politique environnementale en ce qui

concerne ces usines de pâte à papier.

*

* *

La CARU, c’est-à-dire la commission administ rative du fleuve Uruguay, a été créée par le

statut du fleuve Uruguay, souscrit par l’Argentin e et l’Uruguay le 26février1975 et entré en

vigueur après ratification des deux parties.

Il s’agit d’un organisme binational à caractère in tergouvernemental. Selon le traité de 1975,

la prévention contre la pollution est l’une de ses co mpétences. L’Uruguay s’engage à agir dans le

cadre des compétences de la CARU en toute bon ne foi, ainsi qu’à respecter et exécuter ses

décisions légitimes.

*

* *

Les usines en construction seront de qualité se mblable, voire supérieure, à celle des usines

les plus modernes récemment construites et opéra tionnelles en Europe, et bénéficieront de la

technologie la plus avancée, conformément aux exigences établies par l’Union européenne.

Tout comme les usines européennes répondent aux exigences et aux standards de l’Union

européenne, celles en construction en Uruguay de vront, elles aussi, respecter scrupuleusement ces

mêmes exigences et standards. - 14 -

Il n’y aura donc aucun risque de pollution. Et il serait de mauvaise foi d’arguer, aujourd’hui,

l’éventualité d’un danger futur.

Rien n’indique qu’il y ait un risque de danger à venir. Et il n’y en aura pas non plus quand

les usines commenceront à opérer.

*

* *

La Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer, si elle est ime que les circonstances l’exigent, quelles

mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être prises à titre provisoire.

Il faut qu’il y ait préjudice irréparable et ur gence de la situation pour que soit prise une

décision immédiate.

Rien, dans la situation actuelle, n’autorise à considérer que les travaux de construction en

cours affectent un droit de la Partie demande resse, ni que ces travaux porteront atteinte pendente

litis au droit revendiqué.

Il n’y a, dans les présentes circonstances, aucune menace actuelle, ni imminente, ni à

caractère irréversible envers aucun droit.

Il n’y en aura pas non plus lors des trava ux de construction, période pendant laquelle les

usines ne tourneront évidemment pas, tout comme ce la ne risque pas de se produire ultérieurement

grâce aux spécificités techniques des deux usines, à le ur modernité et à leurs garanties de sécurité

maximale qui les placent au plus haut niveau scientifique, technologique et industriel du monde.

Pour l’Uruguay, il est donc clair que rien ne justifie, dans le cas présent et dans les

circonstances actuelles, l’adoption par la Cour d’une décision qui ordonnerait la suspension des

ouvrages en cours de construction.

Dans les circonstances qui entourent le cas présen t, l’ordre de suspendre les travaux dans les

deux usines signifierait, dans les faits, décider sur le fond et porterait un préjudice immédiat et très

grave, irréparable et irréversible, du fait que lad ite suspension empêcherait un investissement de

mille cinq cents millions de dollars qui est essentie l pour le développement productif et humain de

l’Uruguay, avant même que la Cour ne dicte pas sa sentence sur le fond. - 15 -

*

* *

L’Uruguay, premier pays d’Amérique en matière de respect de l’environnement et troisième

dans le classement mondial, est le principal intéress é par la garantie de la qualité et l’absence de

pollution des eaux du fleuve Uruguay.

Non seulement au nom du droit international et de la garantie d’un droit qui appartient à tous

les êtres humains, que ce soit en Argentine, en Uruguay ou partout ailleurs dans le monde, mais

aussi parce que les habitants de l’Uruguay, en pa rticulier dans la zone de construction des usines

sur la rive du fleuve Uruguay, sont les premiers et les plus directement concernés.

Il existe un droit de l’homme à un environneme nt sain, expression concrète du droit à la vie,

du droit à vivre.

L’Uruguay, Etat de droit, dont la vocation dé mocratique est aussi profonde que indéfectible,

prône le respect et la garantie de la pleine et intégrale jouissance de tous les droits de l’homme, à

commencer par le droit à la vie, qui est le fondement de tous les autres droits et, notamment, du

droit à vivre dans un environnement sain et non pollu é. C’est un pays, mon pays, qui vit la réalité

des droits de l’homme, non pas seulement co mme une expression normative, mais comme un

sentiment profond, respecté par le peuple et par le gouvernement qui, par ailleurs, lutte

efficacement contre la corruption, qui est marginale et minime, condamnée et punie.

Au nom de ces droits et pour la reconnaissance de leur existence et des bénéfices qu’ils

apporteront à tous, aussi argentins que uruguayens , l’Uruguay s’engage sans aucune réticence et

avec une absolue bonne foi.

*

* *

Si les ouvrages en construction étaient susp endus, cela affecterait de façon grave et

injustifiée, avec des conséquences vraiment catastro phiques, le droit de l’Uruguay à construire sur

son territoire, sous réserve des plus hautes ga ranties environnementales, des usines modernes et - 16 -

techniquement les plus avancées, qui sont absolument nécessaires à son développement

économique et humain.

Une mesure conservatoire de su spension des travaux en constr uction, prise en contradiction

avec le droit, serait un acte d’une extrême gravité, réellement catastrophique, qui porterait atteinte à

l’avenir du pays et aux droits humains de ses habitants.

C’est pourquoi l’Uruguay s’oppose fermement à la demande de l’Argentine d’une mesure de

suspension des ouvrages en construction pendant le déroulement de la procédure concernant ce cas

soumis à la décision de cette illustre Cour.

*

* *

Regrettablement, le Gouvernement arge ntin n’a pas empêché le blocage des ponts

internationaux qui relient l’Argentine à l’Uruguay, ce qui a interrompu la libre communication et la

circulation entre les deux pays.

Ces actions ont causé à l’économie uruguayenne des dommages énormes, dont l’évaluation

préliminaire est de quatre cents à cinq cents millions de dollars.

Ce blocage, conséquence de l’omission par le Gouvernement argentin en violation du droit

international, a aggravé le différe nd existant et a des projections su r la considération par la Cour

des mesures conservatoires de suspension des ouvrages demandées par l’Argentine.

*

* *

Pour terminer, je tiens à réitérer que l’Ur uguay continuera, comme il l’a toujours fait, à

respecter scrupuleusement l’environnement, en adopt ant et en faisant adopter toutes les mesures

pertinentes. - 17 -

Je serai suivi dans l’usage de la parole par mon distingué collègue, le professeur Alan Boyle,

qui envisagera la question de l’ impact environnemental des deux usines en construction en rapport

avec l’usage raisonnable et équitable des eaux du fleuve Uruguay selon le droit international.

Ensuite, le professeur LuigiCondorelli démontre ra que l’Uruguay a pleinement respecté le

statut du Fleuve Uruguay de 1975 tout au long du dé veloppement de cette affaire. En dernier lieu,

mon ami et collègue, M. Paul Reichler, prouvera que la demande de mesures conservatoires n’est

pas fondée. Les circonstances requises pour demander des mesures conservatoires sont

complètement absentes, et, d’autre part, l’adop tion de mesures conservatoires demandées causerait

des préjudices irréparables et catastrophiques aux droits de l’Uruguay et au futur de ses populations

et des êtres humains qui habitent sur son territoire.

Avec ces expressions finales, je vous prie, Ma dame le président, de donner la parole au

professeur Alan Boyle.

Mbeericoup.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur l’ambassadeur. I now call Professor Boyle.

Mr. BOYLE:

Introduction

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is an honour and a privilege to address the

Court this afternoon on behalf of the Republic of Uruguay. Argentina presented its case this

morning in graphic terms. It alleged a grave a nd imminent threat of irreparable damage to the

health of its people, to their economic welfare, and to the right of Argentina to make reasonable

and equitable use of the River Uruguay, a shared natural resource. It claims that the construction of

the two cellulose plants at the heart of this case ⎯ and I will refer to them for convenience as

ENCE and Botnia ⎯ has already caused economic loss to its tourist industry, and to property

values. It argues that if the plants are allowe d to commence operations they will irreversibly

pollute the river and damage the environment in Argentina. Madam President, this morning

Argentina presented some pretty bogus pictures of dark satanic mills which do not exist; the

reality, as I hope to show, will be rather diffe rent. Argentina has presented no evidence to - 18 -

substantiate any of its claims this morning, all of which Uruguay can and will contest at the merits

stage of the proceedings. The Court heard re ference this morning to the Hatfield Report

commissioned by the International Finance Corporation. Let me read out the actual conclusions of

that report to which Argentina did not draw a ttention: “Comments expressing concern that the

mills will cause catastrophic environmental damage are unsupported, unreasonable and ignore the

experience in many other modern bleached kraft pulp mills”; you can find that Madam President,

at page 2 of the Hatfield Report.

2. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is my task this afternoon to show that

Uruguay’s first priority in the management and operation of these very important plants is to

protect the health and welfare of all those who live near the River Uruguay, on both banks, and to

preserve the environment in both countries from harm . Although I have no wish to dwell on the

ultimate merits of this case, it is necessary to respond to Professor Sand’s arguments with regard to

imminent and irreparable pollution damage, so I hope you will bear with me if I do say something

about the environmental impact assessment and the prevention with pollution. Uruguay will

therefore argue that, because of the environmen tal impact assessments so far undertaken and the

regulatory controls and licensing conditions it has already placed on the operation of the two plants,

there is no likelihood of imminent, grave or irreparable harm or damage to Argentina.

3. Let me turn first to the geography of th e River Uruguay and its surrounding areas, and let

me take you, if I may to the map once more ⎯ if I may take you to the next map; I think the Court

probably knows where Uruguay is!

[Display maps at this point]

First, I will show first the direction of the flow of the river ⎯ this is actually quite

important ⎯ it runs from the north-east to the south-west ⎯ but just in case that is not absolutely

clear ⎯ that is from the top right-hand corner to the bottom left.

Secondly, you will notice the location of th e two plants, shown here as CMB, the ENCE

plant and Orion, the Botnia plant. You see they are adjacent to the to wn, around the town of

Fray Bentos with its drinking water inlet downstream from the two plants ⎯ that probably tells us

something. At this point the river remains navigable by ships that are large enough to transport the

wood pulp produced by the plants, and they are also close to the international bridge which - 19 -

provides the main road link between Uruguay and Arge ntina, and in this location both plants will

have ready access to sources of high quality, fast growing, timber in both countries.

Third, you will notice the breadth of the ri ver at this point: the River Uruguay is a

substantial navigable river, it is not a mere stream. It is deep, and the flow will quickly disperse the

plants’ low effluent discharges and minimize any environmental impact. There are no ecologically

sensitive areas downstream. You will also se e that the largest nearby Argentine town,

Gualeguaychu, is some 26km north-west of the pl ants. At the merits stage of these proceedings

Uruguay will show that the sites that have been c hosen are environmentally an excellent choice for

the plants.

Uruguayan environmental law

4. Now, Madam President, I would now like to give the Court a very short outline of how

Uruguay regulates and controls industrial polluti on and protection of the environment. Uruguay

takes environmental protection seriously. It has a modern and comprehensive system of

environmental law. It has an environmental agency ⎯ known as DINAMA ⎯ which is

specifically responsible on behalf of the Ministry of the Environment for ensuring that projects

with potentially significant impacts will comply with Uruguay’s laws and regulations on the

environment. In your folder, at tab13, you will find an affidavit from the National Director of

DINAMA, Engineer Alicia Torres. She testifi es that in accordance with its responsibilities,

DINAMA will continue its exhaustive review, licen sing, monitoring, and oversight programme for

the two cellulose plants proposed by Botnia and EN CE. Her affidavit sets out in some detail the

law relating to environmental protection in Ur uguay and the powers and responsibilities of her

agency. I will briefly summarize, if I may, the main points, and they are essentially seven.

5. Most importantly, environmental protec tion is a constitutional duty in Uruguay.

Article47 of the Constitution is in your folder at tab17. It provides the basis for regulating and

protecting the environment, and it deals specifically with water protection. In furtherance of these

constitutional rights and obligations, Uruguay has enact ed a series of laws and regulations. Other

laws and decrees, about which you will hear more , regulate environmental impact assessment and

water pollution. These laws and regulations will be found at tabs 18-21 of your folder. They - 20 -

include the following requirements relevant to the licensing and operation of the Botnia and ENCE

plants.

6. First, the Applicant is required to undert ake an environmental impact assessment; I will

refer to that for convenience as an EIA. This assessment must be accep table to DINAMA before

an authorization to proceed with construction can be issued ( Reglamento de Evaluacion del

Impacto Ambiental y Autorizaciones Ambientales , Decree 435/994 of 1994, now replaced and

extended by Decree 349/005 of 2005, at tab 18).

7. Secondly, no authorization to construct or operate industrial facilities may be issued if

DINAMA finds that there will be unacceptable impa ct on water quality, water resources, or on the

environment (Decree 253/79, Arts. 9 and 11 and Art. 17 of Decree 349/005, at tabs 19 and 20).

8. Thirdly, Decree253 of 1979 establishes water quality standards (Art.5), and sets

maximum effluent discharge limits (Art. 11). Any discharge in excess of those limits is prohibited.

The Minister of the Environment is authorized to establish new standards if necessary to protect the

quality of the water (Art. 14).

9. Fourthly, Decree 349 of 2005 provides that the plant operator must obtain a further

authorization before operations can begin. DI NAMA is empowered at this stage to include

additional safeguards not contained in previous au thorizations if necessary to ensure compliance

with applicable standards or to avoid a prohib ited environmental impact (Arts.23 and 24, at

tab 20).

10. Fifthly, in order to ensure that operating procedures continue to be state of the art and

provide the highest standard of environmental prot ection, industrial plants must request and obtain

a renewal of their authorization to operate ev ery three years. (Decree 349/005) And at each

renewal, DINAMA may impose further safeguards if necessary. It may also suspend allegedly

dangerous activities while the appropriate inves tigations are undertaken. (Law 17.283 Art.14,

tab 21.)

11. Sixthly, and finally, a monitoring plan must be approved to ensure compliance with

applicable standards and to ensure that th e quality of the river itself is maintained.

(EIA Reglamento, Art. 12.) - 21 -

12. Madam President, authorizations approved by the Ministry and the conditions attached to

those authorizations are in practice the most important tool for regulating and controlling sources of

potential environmental harm including these two plants. I do not in these proceedings wish to take

the Court in detail through the authorizations which have so far been granted. They all reflect the

information and commitments in each company’s en vironmental impact assessment. As I do hope

to show the Court later in my speech, these author izations contain detailed conditions intended to

ensure that the construction a nd operation of the plants will not harm the River Uruguay or cause

air or water pollution.

13. Madam President, it is of the utmost im portance to Argentina’s demand for provisional

measures to appreciate that neither plant has yet applied for or been granted an authorization to

operate, nor is either plant on the verge of doing so. Construction of the ENCE plant was

authorized in 2003, but on terms which require a further approval for operation following an

updated environmental impact assessment and submission of a series of environmental

management plans. The matters to be addressed in those plans are specified in similar detail in the

authorization for the Botnia plant. The only furthe r approval granted so far in respect of ENCE is

an environmental management plan for site preparation ⎯ you may bear that in mind when you

think of the photos you were shown this morning ⎯ and site preparation began only a few months

ago. Construction of the Botnia plant was aut horized in 2005. And to date the only further

approvals have been environmental management plans for the construction phase.

14. The Court should also know that Uruguayan environmental law has recently been

strengthened. As I indicated earlier, Decree 349 of 2005 confers powers of further approval on the

Ministry of Environment in relation to the operation of both plants. It is quite clear that as a matter

of Uruguayan law neither plant may begin ope rations until DINAMA is convinced that the

conditions for that approval can be satisfied.

15. The proposition advanced by Argentina that these plants present an immediate and

urgent threat of irreparable harm to the River Ur uguay must be seen in this context. Neither plant

may commence operations without further appr oval by DINAMA. The conditions under which

they will operate have been well defined, and on any reasonable vi ew are highly protective of the

environment, including the river, but they can s till be strengthened should that be necessary. - 22 -

Construction of the Botnia plant will not be comp leted until at least the middle of 2007, and of

ENCE until at least the middle of 2008. Argen tina has presented no evidence to suggest that the

construction works themselves present any threat to the river: they are not. DINAMA’s review of

monitoring the river so far ⎯ the results of that monitoring ⎯ has established that to date the

works in progress have caused no adverse impact on the river (DINAMA Affidavit, V.B.2, VI.A.4,

and VI.B.3.).

16. Argentina’s case on the merits must therefore rest entirely on the environmental risk

which she alleges will result from the eventual operation of the plants. Even then, Uruguay’s

management of this risk could violate Argentina’ s rights only if it could be shown that Uruguayan

controls on pollution emissions did not conform to a pplicable international standards. Of course,

Uruguay believes that they will conform, and independent studies through the International Finance

Corporation have corroborated th at conclusion. But whatever a hearing on the merits might

conclude, Argentina is in no position today to demonstrate an immediate and grave risk of

irreparable harm due to pollution or the risk of pollution from plants whose completion and

operation is far from imminent.

17. Both the recently updated legislation to wh ich I have already referred (Law17.283 of

2000 and Decree 349 of 2005) and the authorization process undertaken by DINAMA are evidence

of Uruguay’s strong commitment to environmental protection. They demonstrate its ability to

regulate and control environmental risks in a fl exible and precautionary fashion. Uruguay lacks

neither the will nor the means to tackle pollution or other environmental problems that might result

from the licensing of two pulp mills. Nor should it be suggested that the environmental risks to

Argentina have not yet been assessed: they have been.

The PRESIDENT: ProfessorBoyle, before you tu rn to your next point, might we have the

projector off, if you do not need it.

Mr. BOYLE: With pleasure, Madam President. - 23 -

Environmental impact assessment

18. Madam President, Members of the Court, I know turn to Article7 of the Statute of the

River Uruguay which provides the only basis on wh ich Argentina can substantiate its claims,

particularly those with regard to environmental impact assessment.

19. Uruguay will argue that the ENCE and Botnia EIAs show that there is no likelihood of

the plants causing any significant harm to Argentina or to the River Uruguay, either now, or in the

future.

20. It will also argue that an environmenta l impact assessment does not allow another State

to obstruct development until it can be proved conc lusively to its subjective satisfaction that no

harm will result or that the controls in place are adequate for that purpose.

21. ENCE and Botnia submitted extensive and detailed environmental impact assessments in

2003 and 2004. Both EIAs were substantially revised until DINAMA was satisfied. It is especially

relevant to emphasize that potential transboundary impacts on Argentina were fully considered in

accordance with Article11 of Decree435 of 1994, the then applicable decree. Representatives

from neighbouring towns in Argentina in Entre Ri os province made representations at public

hearings conducted by DINAMA, or submitted representations in writing. Both EIAs included

assessments of possible air and water impacts on Argentina. Most importantly, they included

environmental modelling of the whole river, not simply the Uruguayan side. Air quality, noxious

smells, and the combined impact of both plants on Argentine towns were also specifically assessed

(Ann.DINAMA-10, p.4, 6). Even on a wo rst case scenario, these assessments showed in the

estimation of DINAMA that emissions from the plants would quickly be diluted and remain largely

confined to the Uruguayan side of this very large river.

22. Nor was this the end of the environmenta l assessment process. Both plants are the

subject of applications for loans from the Intern ational Finance Corporation of the World Bank.

IFC regulations require applications of this kind to be supported by a full environmental impact

assessment. In the present case the IFC not only reviewed EIAs for each plant, but also

commissioned a “Cumulative Impact Study” ⎯ which I will refer to as the CIS study and a

summary of which you will find in your folder at tab 22. The CIS study extensively assessed the

possible combined impact of both plants on Gualeguaychu in Argentina, and on Argentine tourist - 24 -

resorts (pp. 29, 64, 65). It concludes that odours from the plants should have no significant impact

on tourism; that treated waste discharged into th e river will rapidly be diluted to undetectable

levels; that there will be no cumulative impact on Argentina; and that the impact on the river from

vessel traffic will not be significant due to co rresponding reductions of l og and woodchip exports

(p.71). AnnexC of the report assesses potential ai r pollution on Argentina. Using UnitedStates

Environmental Protection Agency techniques, it shows that during normal operations the potential

cumulative impacts are “well below the most stri ngent health standards, including World Bank

Standards” (pp. 25-29). Annex D provides similarly extensive assessment of water quality impacts,

principally in Uruguay, but also in Argentina. The Cumulative Impact Study and the Hatfield

Report fully corroborate the conclusions reached independently by DINAMA.

23. It is clear, Madam President, that thr oughout this very extensive and sophisticated

environmental impact assessment (EIA) process potential impacts on the river and on Argentina

have been fully considered by DINAMA, by the International Finance Corporation and, indeed, by

Argentina itself. As DirectorTorres’s affida vit shows, DINAMA has reviewed all of these

assessments and, where appropriate, has modified its response to the applications.

24. Nowhere in any of these assessments is there evidence to support Argentina’s claim that

the operation of these plants will cause irreversible damage to the ecosystem of the river, or to the

quality of its water, or in any other way deny Argentina the ability to make reasonable and

equitable use of the river. None of the assessments has provided any objective evidence of possible

effects on the health or welfare of the Argentine population. Still less do they show any reason to

envisage grave, imminent or irreparable damage to Argentina of a kind that would justify the grant

of interim measures.

25. The EIA process undertaken by Uruguay more than meets the requirements of Article 7

of the 1975 Statute. Article 7 requires notice to be given ⎯ as we heard this morning ⎯ when one

Party proposes works that may affect water quality. As Professor Condorelli will argue, that notice

was given. It provides that:

“Such notification shall describe the ma in aspects of the work and, where
appropriate, how it is to be carried out, a nd shall include any other data that will
enable the notified party to assess the proba ble impact of such works on navigation,
the regime of the river, or the quality of its waters.” - 25 -

The obligation envisaged here is not to carry out an environmental impact assessment, but to

provide the other Party with enough information to enable it to do its own assessment. Argentina’s

own evidence demonstrates that Uruguay has ind eed provided ample information to enable

Argentina to make that assessment, although it has clearly come to the wrong conclusions. But

there has been no failure on the part of Uruguay to follow the procedures of the 1975 Statute in that

respect.

26. Moreover, the various EIAs undertaken so far more than meet the requirements of

international law. Principle19 of the 1992 Ri o Declaration on Environment and Development

provides that: “Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for

proposed activities that are likely to have a signi ficant adverse impact on the environment and are

subject to a decision of a competent national authority.” The International Law Commission

interprets the phrase “significant adverse impact” in the following way: They say: “The harm

must lead to a real detrimental effect on matt ers such as, for example, human health, industry,

property, environment or agriculture in other States. Such detrimental effects must be susceptible

of being measured by factual and objective standards.” (ILC Report 2001, p. 388, Draft Articles on

Prevention of Transboundary Harm, Commentary to Article2, para.4). They did not say by

subjective and opinionated views. None of the assessments by DINAMA or by the IFC has

provided objective evidence that would meet even this threshold of potential harm, let alone one

focused on irreparable damage.

27. Uruguayan law prescribes very fully what should be addressed by an environmental

impact assessment. Neither in the Statute of th e River Uruguay nor in general international law is

there any basis for challenging the adequacy of the environmental impact assessments undertaken

by Uruguay. Using the terminology of the Lac Lanoux arbitration ((1957) 24 ILR 101) under the

International Law Commission, Uruguay has given a “reasonable place” to the interests of

Argentina when assessing the risk s posed by the ENCE and Botnia plants (1997 United Nations

Watercourses Convention, Art.17(2); 2001 IL C Principles on Prevention of Transboundary

Harm, Art. 9 (3)). - 26 -

The prevention of pollution

28. Now, Madam President, let me turn to the prevention of pollution. At the heart of this

dispute is the question whether the two plants will operate to the highest standards. If they do so,

they will minimize to the greatest possible extent the risk of pollution and environmental damage,

not only to Argentina, but even more immediately to Uruguay. Uruguay will show that these are

not substandard plants that would not be permitted in Europe or North America. On the contrary,

they will operate to the highest international st andards. The ENCE and Botnia authorizations

contain detailed conditions regarding air pollution. They also require the plants to meet the

following water pollution standards:

⎯ firstly, the plants must comply with Uruguayan water law, set out in Decree253/79. But

because cellulose plants may produce effluents that are not specifically covered in this Decree,

1
DINAMA has also imposed further conditions on discharges of these pollutants (Botnia AAP,

Ann. DINAMA-12, Sec. 2 (z); ENCE’s EIA, Ann. DINAMA-9, pp. 15-16);

⎯ secondly, the plants must comply with water quality standards agreed by Uruguay and

Argentina within the framework of the 1975 Statute on the River Uruguay, referred to for

convenience in my speech as “CARU standards”; and

⎯ thirdly, the plants must also comply with th e “best available techniques” laid down for similar

plants operating in the European Union, and re ferred to for convenience as “BAT standards”.

Now, in summary, I do not want to take the C ourt into the details of BAT, but in summary

BAT standards require comprehensive operationa l and technological controls for a specific

site, in order to ensure the smallest environmental impact practicable.

29. Now at this stage of the proceedings I am sure the Court will be relieved to know that it

is neither necessary nor appropriate to attempt to give the Court a detailed technical account of

these various pollution standards. It is enough simply to remind you that both authorizations

require ENCE and Botnia to comply with all of them. Botnia’s authorization specifically requires

it to build a cellulose mill that will meet BAT st andards. The ENCE mill must also do so in

accordance with its environmental impact asse ssment (ENCE authorization, 9October 2003,

Ann. DINAMA-11; Botnia authorization, 14 February 2005, Ann. DINAMA-12).

1
Such as absorbable organic matter (AOX –– principally chlorinated organic compounds), nitrogen and nitrates. - 27 -

30. As part of their review of the EIAs, DINAMA considered whether the plants would meet

European BAT standards. It is confident that they will (DINAMA affidavit, IV.A.5 and C.3).

Moreover, taking the European Community Dire ctive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and

Control as the relevant BAT standard, the Cumulati ve Impact Study of the International Finance

Corporation concludes that both plants would fully meet European requirements for Best Available

Techniques (CIS Report, Ann. A.),

31. That is also the affidavit evidence give n by Mr.Piilonnen, Director of Botnia South

America, which you will find in the judges’ folder at tab 16. He points out that as a result of using

BAT, the Botnia plant is expected to have less environmental impact than many other mills in

North America or Europe, that its emissions will be as low as or lower than Finnish mills ⎯ and

remember that Botnia is a Finnish company ⎯ and much lower than mills currently in use in

Argentina. In sum, he says, the Botnia mill has been designed as “a first class state of the art

facility”. The ENCE mill must meet the same standards and we would expect of it a similarly

excellent performance.

32. Now, Members of the Court may wonder why Uruguay would wish to impose on ENCE

and Botnia an obligation to meet standards set down by the law of the European Community. But

given Uruguay’s record of environmental protection that should not be surprising. The European

Union has extensive experience in regulating plants of this kind. Both ENCE and Botnia are

European companies with existing plants operating in Europe to EU standards. They have the

technology to meet this requirement. For all of the reasons affirmed by Mr.Piilonnen in his

affidavit, it is Uruguay’s belief that these are the highest operational standards for such plants.

When ENCE and Botnia apply for final authori zation to operate, it will be contingent on

confirmation that the plants as designed and constructed will meet European BAT standards.

Uruguay’s pollution obligations under the 1975 Statute

33. Madam President, now let me consider Argentina’s argument that Uruguay is in

breach ⎯ or will be in breach ⎯ of its obligations under the 1975 Statute with respect to pollution.

34. First, it must be noted that the Statute deals only with pollution of the River Uruguay and

protection of the aquatic environment. It says nothing about air pollution, or other forms of - 28 -

environmental damage to Argentine territory. Professor Condorelli will deal with the jurisdictional

implications of that point in his speech.

35. Secondly, the 1975Statute does not itself lay down detailed water pollution standards.

Instead, it refers the Parties to pollution standards agreed elsewhere. Article 41 of the Statute is the

relevant provision. For the purpose of preventin g pollution of the river, Article41 requires the

Parties to prescribe “appropriate rules and measures” , but it then goes on to say that these must be

“in accordance with applicable international agreem ents and in keeping, where relevant, with the

guidelines and recommendations of international technical bodies”. The principal rules and

measures applicable under Article41 are those a dopted by the Administrative Commission of the

River Uruguay, known as “CARU” (1975 Statute, Art.56 (a)). Decisions taken by CARU,

including the specification of water quality standa rds, require approval by both Argentina and

Uruguay (Statute, Art.56). CARU regulations repr esent an agreed standard, therefore, to which

both Parties have freely consented and by which they are both legally bound.

36. Thirdly, while Uruguay’s water quality st andards are similar to CARU’s, they are not

identical. CARU does not specify effluent limitati ons for industrial discharges; Uruguay in law

does; and in DINAMA’s view the effluent limitatio ns currently set out in the Botnia and ENCE

authorizations will be more than adequate to en sure that CARU water quality standards agreed by

both States and applicable to both States are not exceeded.

37. Finally, by requiring the Parties to prescribe rules that are in accordance with “applicable

international agreements”, Article41, as we heard this morning, has the effect of incorporating

standards set by the 2001Stockholm Conventi on on Persistent Organic Pollutants, otherwise

known, as I am sure everyone at the Court is well aware, as the POPSConvention.

MadamPresident, the POPS Convention stringently controls the dioxins and furans to which

ProfessorSands referred this morning. The tec hnology in use in these mills eliminates these

chemicals. They are simply not an issue. Both Argentina and Uruguay are parties to this widely

ratified multilateral agreement, whic h entered into force on 17May 2004. The Conference of the

Parties to the Stockholm Convention met for the first time in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in

May2005. The President of Uruguay, addressi ng the Conference, assured it of “Uruguay’s

commitment to complying with the terms of the Stockholm Convention, combining efficient - 29 -

management of resources with cleaner produc tion and transparent monitoring and controls” . You 2

will not be surprised to learn that compliance with the Stockholm Convention standards is

expressly required in the Botnia authorization of 2005. Madam President, those are once again

standards to which both Parties have agreed.

38. Madam President, Members of the Court, by its ratification and implementation of the

Stockholm Convention, by its insistence on the a pplication of European BAT standards, Uruguay

has shown its commitment to applying both the hi ghest and the most appropriate international

standards of pollution control to these two mills. In doing so it believes that it has met its

obligations under Article 41 of the Statute. Using for guidance the standard set by Article 7 of the

1997 United Nations Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of In ternational Watercourses, we

would argue that Uruguay has taken “all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant

harm to other watercourse States”. Uruguay recognizes that it has a duty to regulate and control the

risk of pollution from the ENCE and Botnia plants to the highest standard reasonably achievable.

It does not have to eliminate all risk, however hypothetical, nor is it bound to legislate for all harm,

however insignificant. If it can meet the best standa rds attained elsewhere in the world in order to

minimize the risk to Argentina, and indeed to itsel f, it will have done as much or more than can be

demanded of it in international law or under the 1975 Statute.

39. Nor can it be said that Uruguay’s use of the river is either inequitable or unreasonable

with regard to Argentina. In contrast to the Gabčíkovo case, Uruguay’s proposed use of the

River Uruguay for industrial purposes will have minimal impact on water quality, or on the ecology

of the “riparian area”, or on Argentina’s claim to sustain existing uses of the river. Article27 of

the Statute recognizes the right of each Party to exploit the waters of the river for domestic,

sanitary, industrial and agricultural purposes. Ur uguay has pointed out the economic and social

benefits which present and future generations of Uruguayans will derive from the operation of

these plants. Argentina has not proved that it will suffer any significant countervailing loss or

injury sufficient to outweigh these benefits. Bu t that is a matter that can be addressed on the

2
UNEP, Report of the Conference of the Parties of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants on
the work of its first meeting, para. 89. Available at:

http://www.pops.int/documents/meetings/cop_1/meetingdocs/en/cop1_31/COP… - 30 -

merits; at this stage it is enough simply to ob serve once again that there is no urgent risk of

irreparable damage to Argentina’s right to equitable and reasonable use of the river such as would

justify interim measures.

Monitoring

40. Madam President, Members of the Court, I will not detain you very much longer, but I

should say something about arrangements to m onitor pollution and environmental impacts from

these two plants. Uruguay takes very seriously the need to ensure that environmental impacts and

compliance with its laws are monitored comprehensivel y. That is why the authorizations issued to

both companies require their participation in extensive monitoring schemes, which will be overseen

by DINAMA and which we have already started.

41. That is also why, in 2004, the Argen tine and Uruguayan delegations to CARU adopted a

comprehensive monitoring plan to be carried out jointly. Implementation would ensure

enforcement of all pertinent CARU regulations and water quality standards. It would provide

Argentina with the capacity to regulate, to mon itor, to control water quality by virtue of its

representation on the Commission, on all of its sub-commissions, and at the technical level.

42. Moreover, in addition to participation in CARU monitoring and control, the Government

of Uruguay has invited Argentina to join Uruguay not only in monitoring water quality but also in

monitoring the construction and subsequent operatio n of the plants. The Government of Uruguay

earnestly desires that the two States together ensu re that the very strict environmental safeguards

already laid down are scrupulously observed.

43. Unfortunately, and to Uruguay’s great c onsternation, shortly before bringing this case

Argentina withdrew from CARU’s monitoring and c ontrol efforts, and it declined all the other

invitations made by the Government of Uruguay. This is perhaps not very responsible behaviour

for a State that claims to be concerned about maintaining the quality of the River Uruguay.

Concluding remarks

44. Madam President, Members of the Court, I come now to my concluding remarks. This is

not a dispute in which the Court has to choose between one party seeking to preserve an unspoiled

environment and another party recklessly pursuing unsustainable development, without regard to - 31 -

the environment, or to the rights and interests of neighbouring States. It is a case about balancing

the legitimate interests of both parties. It is a case in which Uruguay has sought ⎯ without much

co-operation from its neighbour ⎯ to pursue sustainable economic development while doing

everything possible to protect the environment of the river for the benefit of present and future

generations of Uruguayans and Argentines alike.

45. Were Argentina to succeed in its attempt to strangle the development of a modern wood

pulp industry in Uruguay it would set a precedent for all States everywhere, including itself. It

should not be forgotten that Argentina already operates its own wood pulp mills, few of which

meet the same high standards as those now under construction in Uruguay, or as others operating in

Brazil and Chile. Some of Argentina’s mills still use outdated chlorine bleaching technology. The

wood pulp industry in Latin America clearly needs to modernize to become less polluting than it is

at present. But, Madam President, it is Uruguay which is leading that modernization, not its

neighbour Argentina.

46. In a case of this importance the Court would expect me to draw its attention to some of

the leading cases. I will do so in one sentence. From the Trail Smelter arbitration, via Gabčíkovo,

to the MOX plant case, no international tribunal has ever suspended or found unlawful either the

construction or operation of modern industrial facilities, even when they may pose some risk of

environmental harm. That should not be surpri sing. The operation of nuclear power plants,

nuclear reprocessing facilities, or the carriage of oil and chemicals in bulk at sea, all pose

significant risks to the environment of other States, all are internationally regulated to a very high

standard, but they have not been prohibited by international law or constrained by the judgments of

international courts. Wood pulp plants do not re motely pose a risk of harm comparable to these

ultra-hazardous activities, provided they are properly run and properly regulated, as Uruguay’s are

and will be.

47. Given the very high standards to which the plants at issue in the present case will be built

and operate, Argentina has a very heavy burden of proof. It must establish the existence of an

urgent risk of irreparable damage meriting th e indication of interim measures. In Uruguay’s

submission, that burden of proof is nowhere near to being sustained on the evidence before the

Court today. - 32 -

I thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Boyle. I now call Professor Condorelli.

M. CONDORELLI :

L E STATUT DU FLEUVE U RUGUAY ET LES MESURES CONSERVATOIRES

1. Introduction

Madame le président, Messieurs les juges,

1. C’est un grand honneur pour moi d’apparaître enco re une fois devant votre Cour et je suis

très reconnaissant au Gouvernement de la République orientale de l’Uruguay de la confiance qu’il

m’accorde en m’autorisant à vous soumettre son poi nt de vue sur deux aspects de la demande en

indication de mesures conservatoires présentée par l’Argentine.

2. Les aspects sur lesquels porteront mes remarques sont étroitement liés à l’interprétation du

traité bilatéral dénommé «statut du fleuve Urugua y» de 1975: traité sur lequel se fondent tant

l’instance principale de l’Argentine que sa dema nde en indication de mesures conservatoires.

Concernant cette dernière dema nde, l’interprétation du statut joue de toute évidence un rôle

essentiel afin de déterminer la présence de deux des conditions nécessaires pour l’octroi de mesures

conservatoires. La première condition est celle de la compétence prima facie de la Cour à juger au

fond le différend qui lui est soumis; la seconde condition est celle dite du fumus boni juris : la Cour

ne peut accorder des mesures provisoires pour préserver des droits au cas où les prétendus droits

invoqués résulteraient déjà à première vue basés su r un fondement juridique clairement insuffisant,

voire si les allégations relatives à la violation d es droits en cause reposent sur des arguments dont

on peut aisément vérifier l’inconsistance, la demande principale se révélant alors prima facie

dépourvue de perspectives sérieu ses de succès. Je ne vais par contre pas m’occuper des autres

conditions nécessaires pour que la Cour accorde des mesures conservatoires: des conditions

e
qu’embrasse la notion générale de «periculum in mora». M Reichler les analysera tout à l’heure

de manière approfondie, sur la base des éléments factuels et juridiques qu’a exposés le professeur

Boyle et que je vais exposer moi-même. - 33 -

2. Lacompétence prima facie de la Cour sur la base de l’article60 du statut et les mesures
conservatoires

3. Madame le président, la vérification prima facie de sa compétence à décider du fond du

différend qui lui est soumis constitue pour votre C our une sorte de précondition indispensable pour

que des mesures conservatoires puissent être acco rdées. Depuis au moins les affaires sur la

Compétence en matière de pêcheries , votre jurisprudence est constante à requérir que l’instrument

invoqué comme fondant la compétence de la Cour «se présente comme constituant prima facie une

base sur laquelle la compétence de la Cour pourrait être fondée» ( Compétence en matière de

pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c.Isl ande), mesures conservatoires , ordonnance du 17 août 1972,

C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 16, par. 17).

4. Dans le cas présent la compétence de la Cour à juger au fond le différend qui oppose

l’Uruguay à l’Argentine a comme seule base la clause compromissoire de l’article 60 du statut : nos

contradicteurs, d’ailleurs, n’en invoquent aucune au tre. Il y a donc accord entre les Parties sur ce

point et l’article60, je le rappelle, dans s on premier paragraphe, d it que: «Tout différend

concernant l’interprétation ou l’application du tra ité et du statut qui ne pourrait être réglé par

négociation directe peut être soumis par l’une ou l’ autre des parties à la Cour internationale de

Justice.»

5. Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, l’Uruguay n’entend nullement contester que, à ce stade

de la procédure, c’est-à-dire aux fins de la décision sur les mesures conservatoires demandées,

l’article60 fonde bien, prima facie, la compétence de la Cour, mais exclusivement par rapport à

certaines des prétentions avancées par l’Argentine da ns sa demande principale. Quant à d’autres

prétentions, en revanche, le défaut de compétence de la Cour est manifeste : la Cour se doit donc de

refuser maintenant des mesures conservatoires de prétendus droits de l’Argentine dont il apparaît

exclu à priori qu’ils puissent être reconnus ensuite, au moment de l’examen au fond du présent

différend. L’Uruguay tient par ailleurs à déclarer qu’il se réserve le droit de faire valoir, le cas

échéant, à un stade ultérieur, que toutes les conditions ne sont pas remplies pour que la Cour puisse

exercer sa compétence sur la base de l’article60, pour ce qui est du fond du différend qui lui est

soumis.

6. Madame le président, il saute aux yeux que sur certains aspects de la demande principale

de l’Argentine la Cour est manifestement dépourvue de compétence : l’article 60 du statut, en effet, - 34 -

n’attribue pas à la Cour la compétence pour ré gler n’importe quel différend international opposant

l’Uruguay et l’Argentine! Comme l’indique on ne peut plus clairement son libellé, les seuls

différends couverts ratione materiae par la clause compromissoire en question sont ceux relatifs «à

l’interprétation ou l’application … du statut». Il s’ensuit que tout différend relatif à des prétentions

ne se fondant pas sur le statut échappe à la sphè re d’application de la clause compromissoire : par

conséquent, la Cour est dépourvue de la compétence pour en décider.

7. L’Argentine prétend que l’Uruguay aurait violé les articles 7 et suivants du statut. Suivant

l’indication donnée à l’article 7, les articles en question portent, d’une part, sur les projets relatifs à

la construction de nouveau chenaux ou à la modi fication des chenaux existants dans le fleuve

Uruguay (ce qui n’est de toute évidence pas pertinent aux fins du présent différend); ils portent

ensuite, d’autre part, sur «tous autres ouvrages suffisamment importants pour affecter la navigation,

le régime du fleuve ou la qualité de ses eaux…». D’après la teneur explicite des dispositions en

question, le terme «affecter» doit être interprété comme signifiant que le projet en question «peut

causer un préjudice sensible à l’autre partie».

8. Les usines de pâte à papier dont nous di scutons ne sont pas susceptibles d’affecter la

navigation ou le régime du fleuve : l’Argentine, d’ailleurs, ne le prétend pas. Le statut est donc

pertinent exclusivement en vue du «préjudice sensible» que ⎯ d’après la partie adverse ⎯ ces

usines risqueraient de lui causer par l’altération de la «qualité» des eaux du fleuve. Autrement dit,

tout différend relatif à des effets éventuels des usines autres que ceux relatifs à une éventuelle

altération de la qualité des eaux du fleuve, voire autres que ceux découlant directement par une

relation de cause à effet d’une telle alté ration, n’est clairement pas couvert ratione materiae par la

clause compromissoire prévue à l’article 60 du statut.

9. Or, il est facile de remarquer que tant dans sa demande principale que dans celle en

indication de mesures conservatoires l’Argentine tente d’élargir la sphère de compétence de la

Cour d’une manière qui apparaît déjà prima facie comme exorbitante par rapport à la portée de la

clause compromissoire résultant de l’article 60. Il le fait en demandant à la Cour de prendre en

3
considération les «conséquences négatives consid érables sur le plan social et économique» , voire

3Voir la demande en indication de mesures conservatires présentée par le Gouve rnement de la République

argentine, par. 7. - 35 -

les dommages risquant d’affecter le tourisme, le s valeurs immobilières urbaines et rurales, les

activités professionnelles, les taux de chômage, etc. J’observe aussitôt qu ’aucun début de preuve

n’a été administré par la partie adverse quant au sérieux de tels risques. Mais il y a plus, Madame

le président. En effet, des deux l’une: soit de tels événements constitueraient l’effet direct de

l’altération de la qualité des eaux du fleuve, dont l’Argentine aurait dû alors démontrer le caractère

imminent et irréparable (ce qu’elle n’a pas fait et ne saurait pas faire, comme le montrera

e
M Reichler, la mise en service des usines étant entre autres un événement encore bien lointain

dans le temps), et ils joueraient alors exclusivem ent le rôle d’éléments permettant de mesurer le

préjudice produit par la pollution des eaux; soit l’ Argentine les invoque de manière autonome par

rapport à l’altération de la qualité des eaux, à l’appui de sa demande relative aux mesures

conservatoires. Mais alors la Cour irait cl airement au-delà des limites de sa compétence ratione

materiae en les prenant en considération, puisqu’ils ne sont pas couverts par le statut.

10. Qu’il me soit permis d’insister sur ce point. Les droits qu’il est question de préserver par

des mesures conservatoires ne peuvent être que ce ux formant l’objet de la demande principale; et

cette protection ne saurait être accordée qu’à cer taines conditions, dont celle de la vérification

prima facie par la Cour de sa compétence à juger de cette demande. Or, dans le cas présent, en

alléguant des risques de dommages d’ordre écono mique et social autres que ceux qui pourraient

découler de l’altération des ea ux du fleuve, l’Argentine tente d’obtenir la protection à titre

provisoire de droits et intérêts que la Cour ne pourrait d’aucune façon reconnaître à l’avenir parce

qu’ils ne sont pas octroyés par le statut et ne tombent donc manifestement pas dans la sphère

d’application de la clause compromissoire de l’article 60.

11. Madame le président, des remarques du mê me genre doivent être faites par rapport aux

allégations de la partie adverse d’après laque lle les mesures conservatoires se justifieraient

également en vue des exigences de préservation de l’écosystème ou de la beauté des sites qui les

rend attrayants pour le tourisme, en vue du danger relatif à d’éventuelles émissions gazeuses et,

plus en général, en vue de la nécessité d’éviter des «préjudices transfrontaliers» 4. Ces assertions

non étayées n’ont aucune base sérieuse et sont même offensantes pour l’Uruguay qui ⎯ ainsi que

4
Ibid., par. 6. - 36 -

le professeur Boyle l’a montré ⎯ a pris et continue de prendre au sujet des usines toutes les

mesures les plus sophistiquées et les plus avancées, existant au niveau mondial, pour éviter tout

dommage écologique de quelque sorte que ce soit. Il faut observer de toute façon que d’éventuels

dommages transfrontaliers engendrés par les usines qui seraient de nature différente par rapport à

ceux découlant de l’altération de la qualité des eaux du fleuve ne sont pas régis par le statut: il

saute aux yeux que les différends qui pourraient naîtr e à leur sujet ne sont encore une fois pas

couverts par la clause compromissoire de l’article 60.

12. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, l’Uruguay tient à vous faire noter qu’il se

garde bien de contester l’existence d’obligations internationales en matière de protection de

l’environnement, notamment concernant les relations transfrontalières, bien plus larges et bien plus

nombreuses que celles que prescrit le statut. L’engage ment environnemental très fort et tout à fait

indiscutable de l’Uruguay, dont l’ambassadeur Gr os Espiell a parlé avec éloquence au début de

cette séance, a toujours placé cet Etat au premier plan dans la négociation internationale à ce sujet

et dans l’acceptation et dans le respect des obliga tions internationales pertinentes. Mais l’ampleur

des obligations primaires pesant sur tous les Etats dans ce domaine, qui heureusement se

développent de plus en plus, ne saurait modifi er la sphère d’application de la clause

compromissoire du statut de 1975. Celle-ci limite précisément la compétence de la Cour aux

différends entre les parties ⎯ en l’espèce ⎯ sur l’altération de la qualité des eaux du fleuve

Uruguay. D’éventuels litiges entre l es mêmes parties relatifs à d’autr es aspects de la protection de

l’environnement dans les relations transfrontalières ne sont de toute évidence pas justiciables en

vertu de l’article 60 du statut, mais relèvent le cas échéant, soit de la compétence de moyens de

règlement des différends prévus par des instruments internationaux distincts liant les parties, soit de

celle de mécanismes concordés exprès entre ell es dans le cadre du principe du libre choix des

moyens de règlement des différends consacré à l’article 33 de la Charte des Nations Unies.

13. Ces concepts ont été mis en évidence de façon extrêmement claire par la jurisprudence

de la Cour. Je me limiterai à citer un seul exemple, représenté par un obiter dictum exemplaire tiré

de l’arrêt en l’affaire Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Espagne cC . anada) , du

4 décembre 1998. Aux paragraphes 55 et 56, votre Cour avait dit ceci : - 37 -

«Il existe une distinction fondamental e entre l’acceptation par un Etat de la
juridiction de la Cour et la compatibilité de certains actes avec le droit international.

L’acceptation exige le consentement. La co mpatibilité ne peut être appréciée que
quand la Cour examine le fond, après avoir établi sa compétence et entendu les
deux parties faire pleinement valoir leurs moyens en droit.

Que les Etats acceptent ou non la juridic tion de la Cour, ils demeurent en tout
état de cause responsables des actes portant atteinte aux droits d’autres Etats qui leur
seraient imputables. Tout différend à cet égard doit être réglé par des moyens

pacifiques dont le choix est laissé aux par ties conformément à l’article 33 de la
Charte.» (Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Espagne c. Canada), compétence de
la Cour, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998 , p. 456, par. 55-56. La Cour a répété ces concepts
avec des mots presque identiques dans s on ordonnance du 2 juin 1999 dans l'affaire

relative à la Liceité de l'emploi de la fo rce (Yougoslavie c. Etats-Unis),
C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 921, par. 30-31. Voir aussi Activités armées sur le territoire du
Congo (nouvelle requête : 2002) (Répub lique démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda),

compétence de la Cour et recevabilité de la requête, arrêt du 3 février 2006, par. 127.)

Madame le président, je suis à votre disposition si c’est maintenant que vous souhaitez que je

m’interrompe ou si vous préférez que je continue.

The PRESIDENT: I think this would probably be a good moment for afternoon break and

we shall resume shortly.

M. CONDORELLI : Thank you.

The Court adjourned from 4.20 to 4.35 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Pleased be seated. Yes, Professor Condorelli.

M. CONDORELLI :

3. Les allégations argentines relatives aux violations par l’Uruguay des obligations prescrites
par le statut apparaissent déjà a première vue dépourvues de fondement: l’Uruguay n’a
pas violé ses obligations découlant des articles 7 à 12 du statut

14. Madame le président, Messieurs les jug es, je vais maintenant présenter à la Cour

quelques observations concernant les prétendu es violations par l’Uruguay de ses obligations

découlant des articles 7 à 12 du statut: d’après la Partie adverse, l’Argentine n’aurait pas été

correctement informée avant le début de la cons truction des usines, n’aurait pas pu évaluer les

informations pertinentes et n’aurait pas pu exercer son droit d’objecter à une telle construction . Je

5
Demande en indication des mesures conservatoires, par. 5. - 38 -

précise in limine que je suis pleinement conscient du fait que l’examen analytique de ces

prétendues violations relève du f ond du différend et devra donc être effectué lors de la prochaine

phase de la présente procédure. Mais il est néce ssaire d’évoquer dès maintenant cet aspect du

dossier dans un but limité qui est celui de mettr e en évidence qu’un examen sommaire des faits

permettrait à la Cour de cons tater déjà à ce stade que la de mande de l’Argentine manque de

perspectives sérieuses de succès, étant donné que les violations du statut dont l’Uruguay est accusé

se révèlent prima facie dépourvues de consistance: autremen t dit, l’Uruguay prie la Cour de

relever que la demande de l’Argentine n’a pas ⎯ ou du moins, il est fort douteux qu’elle ait ⎯ ce

fumus boni juris qui la rendrait idoine, en présence bien sûr d’autres conditions (par ailleurs

absentes elles aussi, comme le montrera toute à l’heure M eReichler), à justifier l’octroi de mesures

conservatoires.

The PRESIDENT: Professor Condorelli, I think it would be in your interest if you gave one

moment to my neighbour ⎯ whom I have inadvertently drow ned! And then you will have his

entire interest. Please now continue.

M. CONDORELLI : Merci.

15. Un examen cursif du dossier qui est sous les yeux de la Cour, permet de constater

aisément qu’en réalité l’Uruguay s’est acquitté de bonne foi des obligations que lui imposent les

articles 7 et suivants. Permettez-moi, Madame et Messieurs les juges, d’attirer l’attention de la

Cour sur les données principales qui le prouvent.

16. Concernant d’abord le projet ENCE relatif à l’usine CMB, le projet a été formellement

porté à l’attention de la CARU ⎯ la commission administrative bipartite prévue par le statut ⎯ le

8 juillet 2002, lorsque les représentants de l’usine ont fourni à la CARU les informations relatives 6.

Cela s’est passé plus de quinze mois avant que l’Uruguay ne donne son autorisation

environnementale préalable qui a permis à l’ENCE de commencer les travaux préparatoires de

construction. Pendant ces quinze mois, la CA RU a sollicité et reçu des informations

supplémentaires importantes et détaillées concernant l’usine, y inclus un rapport sur l’évaluation de

6
Pièce 2, CARU 1. - 39 -

7
l’impact environnemental . Le 21 juillet 2003, lors d’une audience publique organisée à

FrayBentos, l’Uruguay a divulgué officiellement les informations sur le projet et a donné aux

participants l’opportunité d’expr imer leurs points de vue. Certains membres de la CARU étaient

8
présents à la réunion. Ceux-ci ont préparé un ra pport qui a été soumis à l’ensemble de la CARU

et, le 10 octobre 2003, la CARU a approuvé son plan pour le contrôle et l’étude de la construction

de l’usine. Le même jour, l’Uruguay a donné son autorisation environnementale préalable pour

l’usine et l’a notifiée au président de la déléga tion argentine à la CARU, qui était à l’époque le

9
président de la CARU .

17. Lors de la réunion du 17 octobre 2003 de la CARU, les membres argentins firent valoir

leur désaccord quant à l’autorisation que l’Urugua y avait donnée pour le dé but de construction de

l’usine quelques jours auparavant. Les travaux de la CARU furent bloqués jusqu’à ce qu’une

décision politique prise au plus haut niveau par les Gouvernements de l’Argentine et de l’Uruguay

n’intervienne pour débloquer la situation. En e ffet, le 2 mars 2004, le ministre des affaires

étrangères de l’Uruguay, M. Didier Opertti, et son homologue argentin, M.Rafael Bielsa, ont

conclu un accord selon lequel l’usine pourra être construite comme prévu et l’Uruguay devra

fournir à l’Argentine les renseignements relatifs à sa construction et à son fonctionnement. D’après

l’accord, dès que l’usine sera opérative, la CARU pro cèdera au contrôle de la qualité de l’eau afin

10
de garantir le respect du statut . Mais je reviendrai en détail sur cet accord dans un instant.

18. J’en viens maintenant à l’usine Botnia. A ce sujet, l’Uruguay s’est entièrement acquitté

de ses obligations d’information. Le 29 avril 2004 , des représentants de l’usine ont rencontré la

11
CARU en fournissant les informations relatives à l’usine en question . Le 15 juin 2004, la CARU

a convoqué une deuxième réunion avec les représen tants de la Botnia qui ont présenté des

12
informations supplémentaires . En août 2004, une délégati on de la CARU s’est rendue en

Finlande pour examiner les usines de cellulose que Metsa-Botnia possède et gère et qui sont

7Pièce 2, CARU 2.

8Pièce 2, CARU 3.
9
Pièce 2, CARU 4 – CARU 5.
10
Pièce 2, CARU 6.
11Pièce 2, CARU 9.

12Pièce 2, CARU 10. - 40 -

semblables quant à leur structure aux usines en construction près de Fray Bentos. La délégation de

la CARU a rencontré aussi des fonctionnaires des agences finlandaises chargées de la protection de

l’environnement pour discuter des méthodes néce ssaires à assurer une réglementation et un

13
contrôle effectifs . En septembre 2004, des membres de la délégation argentine de la CARU, ainsi

que des techniciens de la province argentine d’Entre Rios, se sont rendus en Espagne pour

examiner l’usine de cellulose de Huelva possédée et gérée par ENCE, qui est semblable pour sa

14
structure à l’usine CMB qui est en projet près de Fray Bentos . Le 19 octobre 2004, la CARU a

organisé une autre réunion avec les représentants de l’usine Botnia pour discuter des questions

15
concernant le projet .

19. Sur la base des informations exhaustiv es fournies par l’Uruguay quant aux usines CMB

et Botnia, le sous-comité de la CARU compétent pour les questions de la qualité de l’eau et de la

prévention en matière de contamination de l’eau a rédigé un plan pour le contrôle de la qualité

environnementale du fleuve Uruguay dans les zon es où se trouvent les usines de cellulose. La

16
CARU a officiellement approuvé ce plan pendant la réunion du 12 octobre 2004 . Le

10décembre2004, le président de la CARU et chef de la délégation argentine a affirmé: «Il est

juste de reconnaître que le travail s’est surtout concentré sur l’adoption de procédures visant au

contrôle des usines de cellulose, comme il résulte des différents rapports. Et dans ce sens, les

responsabilités de la CARU ont été particulièreme nt importantes dans l’élaboration d’une méthode

de travail en plein accord avec les requêtes des ministres des affaires étrangères de nos pays.» 17

Enfin, le 21 décembre 2004, l’Uruguay a organisé une réunion publique concernant cette usine. Un

représentant de la CARU était présent et a rédigé un rapport successivement soumis à la CARU 1.

20. Madame le président, je pense qu’il convien t de souligner ceci : ce n’est qu’à la suite de

toutes ces démarches, de tous ces débats, de t ous ces échanges d’informations, de toutes ces

précautions que l’Uruguay a donné son autori sation environnementale préalable pour la

13Pièce 2, CARU 11 – CARU 12.
14
Pièce 2, CARU 8.
15
Pièce 2, CARU 13.
16Pièce 2, CARU 16.

17Pièce 2, CARU 17.

18Pièce 2, CARU 14. - 41 -

construction de l’usine Botnia, le 5 février 2005 . En somme, sur la base de l’ensemble des faits

rapportés, qui sont entièrement confirmés par la documentation soumise à la Cour par les deux

Parties, il est évident que l’Uruguay a respecté plei nement ses obligations découlant de l’Estatuto :

il a pris toutes les précautions possibles, il a communiqué à l’Argentine ⎯ par l’intermédiaire de la

CARU ou par d’autres canaux ⎯ l’existence de ces projets en les détaillant au moyen d’une

quantité impressionnante d’informations et il a fourni toutes les données techniques pour que

l’Argentine soit consciente de l’absence de dangers quant à leur impact potentiel sur

l’environnement du fleuve Uruguay.

21. Certes, les autorisations relatives au début de construction des usines ont été données par

les autorités uruguayennes sans le consentement préala ble de l’Argentine, c’est indéniable. Or, la

conviction ferme de l’Uruguay est que le statut n’accorde aucun droit de veto à chaque partie quant

à la réalisation par l’autre partie de ses projets de développement industrie l, lorsque celle-ci s’est

acquittée de bonne foi de ses obligations en matière d’échange complet d’informations dans le

cadre des procédures prévues par les dispositions du statut ou convenues par les parties. Jusqu’ici,

l’Uruguay était d’ailleurs convaincu que cette conception était fondamentalement partagée par

l’Argentine, comme le confirme d’ailleurs la prati que de trois décennies d’application du statut. Il

apparaît en revanche que l’Etat demandeur ait changé d’idée désormais. A vrai dire, cette nouvelle

conviction ne ressortait pas clairement des pièces écri tes présentées jusqu’ici devant votre prétoire.

Mais maintenant, après le fort discours des plai deurs argentins ce matin, et du professeur Sands en

particulier, tout est clair. Une réponse précise de la part de l’Uruguay s’impose. Elle viendra

demain. En attendant, cependant, permettez-moi de prier votre Cour de prendre en considération

l’accord bilatéral du 2 mars 2004, conclu par les ministres des affaires étrangères des deux pays,

auquel j’ai fait allusion il y a un instant. Un accord d ont la pertinence et l’incidence sont tout à fait

considérables, et qui a pourtant été ⎯ c’est étonnant ! ⎯ le grand absent dans les propos de

l’Argentine, ce matin.

22. L’existence de cet accord ne saurait être mise en doute, d’autant plus qu’elle a été

solennellement confirmée à maintes occasions: par exemple, dans les procès-verbaux officiels de

19
Pièce 2, CARU 15. - 42 -

la réunion extraordinaire de la CARU du 15 ma i 2004, qui figurent dans le dossier des juges

o
(document n 8); et plus important encore, dans son ra pport officiel sur l’état de la nation pour

l’année 2004, qui figure dans le dossier des juges (document n o10), le président argentin s’y est

référé en le qualifiant comme «un accord bilatéral mettant fin au différend concernant l’installation

d’une usine de pâte à papier à Fray Bentos ». Encore, d’autres documents gouvernementaux

argentins de haut niveau en font état, comme le rapport à la Chambre des députés du chef de

cabinet des ministres argentin de mars 2005, cita nt des mots tout à fait explicites du ministre des

affaires étrangères, M.Rafael Bielsa (document n o 11 dans votre dossier). M eReichler d’ailleurs

reviendra tout à l’heure sur cela.

23. Quant à la signification de l’accord bilatéra l, elle est claire et décisive: les deux

gouvernements ont convenu de considérer désormais clos le différend relatif à l’autorisation de

construction de l’usine, qui sera donc construite conformément à son projet; tant la construction

que, ultérieurement, la mise en service feront l’ objet d’un flux continu d’informations fournies par

l’Uruguay à l’Argentine, alors que la CARU contrôlera la qualité de l’eau afin de garantir le respect

des dispositions du statut. Madame le préside nt, il y a de quoi s’étonner grandement de voir

l’Argentine demander à votre Cour ⎯au titre des mesures conservatoires ⎯ d’ordonner la

suspension de la construction de l’usine CMB, alors que l’Argentine s’est justement engagée par un

accord international spécifique à considérer clos le différend relatif à l’autorisation donnée par

l’Uruguay pour une telle construction !

24. Madame le président, permette z-moi de dire que le principe pacta sunt servanda joue

aussi en faveur de cet accord. Il est vrai que l’accord bilatéral du 2 mars 2004 est intervenu après

l’autorisation de construire relative à CMB, mais avant celle concernant Botnia/Orion, qui est ⎯ je

l’ai rappelé ⎯ de février 2005. Mais, s’il était logique de penser, tout au moins du côté uruguayen,

que les deux cas parallèles allaient être soumis au même traitement juridique, en soi l’accord

de2004 ne pouvait pas régler d’avance un différend qui allait naître postérieurement. Ceci étant

admis, il faut aussitôt mettre en évidence ce qui resso rt clairement du dossier qui est sous les yeux

de la Cour: des documents officiels argen tins postérieurs au 5 février 2005, d’un poids

indiscutable, démontrent que l’Argentine a accepté d’assimiler les deux affaires et d’appliquer

aussi au cas Botnia le régime prévu par le même accord bilatéral. - 43 -

25. En ce sens témoigne le rapport du président Kirchner sur l’état de la nation pour 2004

er
(qui date du 1 mars 2005), lequel ⎯après avoir fait référence à l’accord bilatéral ⎯ couvre

explicitement le cas des deux usines, notamment pour ce qui est des modes de contrôle relatifs à

leur incidence éventuelle sur la qualité des eaux du fleuve. C’est un point sur lequel reviendra tout

à l’heure M eReichler.

e
M26. Reichler parlera aussi des déclarations o fficielles de mars 2005 du ministre argentin

des affaires étrangères, M. Bielsa, qui figurent dans le dossier des juges (documents n os9 et 11), où

il est question à nouveau de l’accord bilatéral de 2004, de la méthodologie de travail qu’il comporte

tant quant au projet de construction que de mise en service des usines, s’agissant du contrôle auquel

soumettre «les deux usines» : «las dos plantas», dit le document.

27. Une preuve ultérieure de cette assimilati on des deux cas, et de leur soumission au même

régime mis en place par l’accord bilatéral de 2004, pe ut être recueillie en se référant à l’expérience

du groupe technique de haut niveau (le GTAN) qui a été créé suite à l’accord et dans son sillage

afin de poursuivre par ce canal l’échange d’in formation qu’impose le statut, de manière à

surmonter les difficultés et les mésententes qui avai ent pesé sur la CARU. Or, il est important de

relever que le GTAN (ainsi que le détaillent les d éclarations de M. Ponce de León figurant dans le

o 20
dossier des juges (document n 15) et de ses annexes) a travaillé au même titre sur les deux usines

en recueillant à leur sujet une documentation littéralement monumentale.

28. Madame le président, ces remarques montre nt bien que, en attendant le règlement au

fond de l’affaire qui oppose les Parties, rien ne justifierait que la Cour accorde des mesures

conservatoires ordonnant la suspension de travaux relatifs aux usines, au sujet desquelles il apparaît

déjà prima facie que l’Uruguay s’est acquitté de ses obliga tions internationales telles que prévues

par le statut et par les accords bilatéraux postérieurs relatifs à son application.

29. J’en ai terminé, Madame le président. Je vous prie, en vous remerciant, de bien vouloir

e
donner la parole à M Reichler.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Condorelli. I now call Mr. Reichler.

20Pièce 3, GTAN 1 – GTAN 2. - 44 -

Mr. REICHLER:

Provisional measures are not warranted

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, I am honoured to appear before you today, and

proud to represent Uruguay in these proceedings.

2. It is my role to address the Court on the subject of why provisional measures are not

warranted in this case, and why Argentina’s petition should be denied.

3. Madam President, Members of the Court, there are three separate and independent

grounds on which Argentina’s request for provisiona l measures must be denied, and each of them

alone is sufficient to warrant denial of Argentina’s request.

4. First, Argentina has failed to show that th ere is presently an imminent or urgent need for

the provisional measures it has requested.

5. Second, Argentina has failed to show that its rights are threatened with irreparable injury.

6. Third, the particular provisional measures that Argentina has requested would, if indicated

by the Court, irreparably prejudice the rights of Uruguay that will be ultimately adjudged by the

Court.

7. I shall take up each of these points in turn.

I. There is no “imminent” threat to Argent ina’s rights or “urgent” need for the
extraordinary relief it has requested

8. Uruguay disputes that there is any threat to Argentina’s rights, let alone a threat that is so

imminent that there is an urgent need for the provisional measures that have been requested.

9. Article27 of the Statute of the Ri ver Uruguay expressly permits both Uruguay and

Argentina to use the river for industrial purposes. At the same time, in Articles40 to 43, the

Statute imposes on both States an obligation to protect the water against contamination, and to pay

compensation for any contamination that may occur. In ChapterXII, th e Statute establishes the

Commission for Administration of the River Urug uay (the CARU), whose principal purposes

include, as set forth in Article 56, the “Prevention of pollution” of the river, and the “Conservation

and preservation of living resources”. As my colleagues have described, CARU has exercised the

powers vested in it by the two States by issuing regulations that establish water quality standards - 45 -

that effectively set limits on the maximum levels of industrial discharges of particular chemicals

that may be deposited in the river without contam inating it. Accordingly, Uruguay recognizes that

it may not permit any industrial discharges into the river that exceed these jointly established

levels. The substantive right that Argentina seek s to vindicate in this case is its right to hold

Uruguay to its obligation not to allow the cellu lose plants that are now under construction to

contaminate the river in violation of the St atute and the regulations promulgated by the

Commission. As demonstrated by my colleague ProfessorAlanBoyle, Uruguay has taken all

appropriate and necessary preventative measures ⎯ and will continue to take all such measures ⎯

to fulfil this obligation.

10. Uruguay learned this morning from Professor Sands that Argentina now claims ⎯ for the

first time in the 31 years since the Statute came into being ⎯ that it has a procedural right under the

Statute, not only to receive notice and informati on and to engage in good fa ith negotiations, but to

block Uruguay from initiating projects during these procedural stages and during any litigation that

might ensue. Because the argument is new, and a ppears to contradict the interpretation that both

Parties, including Argentina, have previously given to the Statute, Uruguay will reserve its right to

reply to ProfessorSands’s argument until the second round. Today, I will focus my remarks on

Argentina’s substantive rights under the Statute.

11. As I shall describe later in my presenta tion, Argentina’s own officials and technical

experts have repeatedly and publicly acknowle dged, on numerous occasions, that the measures

taken by Uruguay, and by Uruguay and Argentina together through the CARU, are sufficient to

protect the Uruguay river against the contamination proscribed by the Statute. Thus, there is no

threat to Argentina’s right to pr otect the river against contamination, and there is certainly not any

imminent threat to that right.

12. Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that the cellulose plants now being built

in Uruguay could conceivably threaten Argentina’s ri ght, how might that occur? It might occur if

the cellulose plants were to discharge into the ri ver chemical contaminants that exceed the levels

permitted by Uruguay’s very strict environmental la ws, and in violation of the CARU regulations

that protect the quality of the water against contamination. This could occur ⎯ if at all ⎯ only

after the plants start operating. It could not occur ⎯ not even hypothetically ⎯ while the plants - 46 -

are still under construction, as they are now, because during construction they are not discharging

chemicals of any kind into the river.

13. Argentina acknowledges this in its Applica tion. At paragraph 21, Argentina lists the

various types of harm it might suffer from the tw o plants. Every type of harm listed would

result ⎯ if at all ⎯ only from operation of the plants, not fro m their mere construction. Argentina

admits this in the next paragraph, paragraph 22:

“In conclusion, in spite of the non-compliance by Uruguay of the procedures set
forth by the 1975 Statute, the information available to Argentina clearly establishes
that the placing in service of the CMB and Orion pulp mills will cause considerable
prejudice to the water quality of the River Uruguay and a considerable cross-border

prejudice to Argentina.”

14. The Application speaks only of harm to Argentina caused by “the placing in service” of

the two cellulose plants. Argentina’s Application does not allege ⎯ not anywhere in its

28 paragraphs ⎯ that any harm might befall Argentina as a result of the construction of the plants.

This cannot have been an oversight. If Argentin a truly felt that its rights were infringed by the

construction of the plants, it surely would have said so in its Application. The plants have been

under construction since the middle of 2005. Th e water quality was regularly monitored by the

CARU through the end of 2005, and by Uruguay since then. The results confirm that construction

of the plants has produced no chemical discharges and no contamination of the river. Argentina

has offered no evidence to the contrary.

15. Operation of the plants is not imminent. It is far from imminent. As shown in the

Sworn Declaration of Martín Ponce de Léon, Uruguay ’s Undersecretary of Industry (tab 15 in the

judges’ folder), the Orion plant, being constructed by Botnia of Finland, will not be ready to begin

operations before August 2007, which is 14 months from now. The CMB plant, being constructed

by ENCE of Spain, will not operate before J une2008, which is two years into the future.

Moreover, in both cases commencement of operations is cond itional. It is subject to significant

conditions precedent. As Professor Boyle stated, th ere are several more approvals required before

either plant can operate. The CMB plant currently has only a permit to move earth and prepare the

ground; it has not yet been licensed to commence the civil works, or install the machinery, let

alone to operate. The Orion plant has been licensed to construct the civil works, but not to install

the machinery or operate. Before either plant may proceed to the next stage, it must submit - 47 -

additional environmental impact data and demonstrate to the satisfaction of Uruguay’s

environmental regulatory agency, DINAMA, that sufficient protective and preventative measures

have been taken to assure that there will be no adverse environmental consequences, including no

contamination of the river in violation of Urugua yan law or the CARU regulations. Uruguay has

made it clear that only if these strict conditions are met will further approvals be issued.

16. Operation of the plants is also far from imminent because the financing for their

completion has not been secured, and it is subject to satisfaction of the very strict environmental

standards imposed by the World Bank and its re lated institutions. Both plants have sought

financing from the Bank’s International Finance Corporation and guarantees from its Multilateral

Investment Guarantee Agency. Argentina has brought its concerns about the plants to these

agencies. As a result, the financing institutions have been conducting their own comprehensive

environmental evaluation of the plants. Last month, they decided to appoint a new set of

independent technical experts to evaluate all of the environmental studies that have been made to

date, and to make recommendations that would assure that the plants operate in conformity with the

Bank’s own environmental requirements. Both plants agreed to co-operate with the new technical

study, and they are doing so. This is reflected in tab 3 of the judges’ folder, a recent press release

issued by the IFC. It is therefore possible th at additional protective measures will be required by

the World Bank and implemented by the plants before they operate. Indeed, just one month ago,

on 9May, the Acting Executive Director of the World Bank wrote to a member of the European

Commission, in a letter that can be found at tab 4 of the judges’ folder:

“While we are reassured by the technical competence of Botnia and their strong
reputation for environmental performance, IFC’s decision must be publicly credible

and therefore founded on an independent, fact-based assessment of the combined
environmental impacts of the two mills... IFC will finance the projects only if we
are certain that they can be operated in an environmentally and socially responsible
manner.” (Emphasis added.)

17. The eventual operation of the plants is thus highly contingent ⎯ upon the issuance of the

additional required permits by Uruguay and the financial commitments of the World Bank.

Moreover, any conceivable harm to Argentina is even more contingent ⎯ on the possibility that the

additional measures to protect the environment th at Uruguay or the Bank may require before the - 48 -

works are completed fail to satisfy Uruguay’s oblig ations under its own environmental laws, or its

obligations under the Statute and regulations promulgated thereunder by CARU.

18. This situation brings to mind the words of my very eminent colleague and good friend,

Professor Alain Pellet, in the case concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of

the Congo v. France). Addressing the Court, Professor Pellet argued (CR 2003/21):

“You have said on a number of occasions: ‘the possibility of... prejudice to

rights in issue before the Court does not, by itself, suffice to justify recourse to its
exceptional power under Article41 of the Statute to indicate interim measures of
protection’. In any event, by definition the existe nce of a mere possibility, here one
which is highly contingent, is incompa tible with the very notion of urgency.

Moreover, if the situation were to change , it would always be possible for the Congo
to submit a new request for the indicati on of provisional measures, as expressly
provided for in Article 75, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court . . .” (Emphasis added.)

19. Here, too, if the situation were to change ⎯ at any time in the next 14 months before the

Orion plant might be ready to begin operations ⎯ and if Uruguay were to eventually issue an

operations permit, and if that permit were not to incorporate sufficient environmental safeguards,

and if the World Bank were to finance the plants, and if the World Bank were to do so without

securing a commitment from them to comply with the Bank’s own environmental requirements,

then it would be possible for Argentina to submit a new request for the indication of provisional

measures under Article75, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, based on these new facts. This

morning, Professor Pellet suggested a definition of “urgency” that is incompatible with the position

he articulated in the case involving Congo and Fran ce. Today, he suggested that urgency is

demonstrated whenever the damage runs a reasona ble risk of occurring before the judgment of the

Court. He cited no authority for this proposition, which would all but eviscerate the requirement of

urgency that the Court, and Professor Pellet himself, have consistently defended prior to this case.

20. In the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), the Court

drew a clear distinction between construction of a project which did not in itself violate the rights

of another State, and operation of the project. At paragraph79 of its Judgment, the Court

observed:

“between November 1991 and October 1992, Czechoslovakia confined itself to the
execution, on its own territory, of th e works which were necessary for the
implementation of Variant C, but which c ould have been abandoned if an agreement

had been reached between th e parties and did not therefore predetermine the final
decision to be taken . . . Such a situation is not unusual in international law or, for that - 49 -

matter, in domestic law. A wrongful act or offence is frequently preceded by
preparatory actions which are not to be confused with the act or offence itself. It is as

well to distinguish between the actual commission of a wrongful act (whether
instantaneous or continuous) and the conduct prior to that act which is of a preparatory
character and which ‘does not qualify as a wrongful act’.”

21. The situation is analogous here. The wr ongful act, if it were to occur, would be the

contamination of the river by operation of the plants. In the language of the Gabčíkovo Judgment,

the construction of the plants, on Uruguay’s own territory, can be no more than “preparatory

actions which are not to be confused with the act or offence itself”. Hence, there is no basis for

Argentina’s request that the Court order the suspen sion of construction, and certainly there is no

basis at this stage of the proceedings.

T2he. Gabčíkovo Judgment is also pertinent because of its elucidation of the concept of

imminence of an alleged harm. To be sure, the C ourt was faced not with an application for

provisional measures, but a claim by Hungary that it was justified in terminating a treaty on

grounds that fulfilment of the treaty obligati ons posed a grave and imminent peril to the

environment. In rejecting Hungary’s claim, the Court explained at paragraph 54:

“‘Imminence’ is synonymous with ‘immediacy’ or ‘proximity’ and goes far
beyond the concept of ‘possibility’. As the International Law Commission
emphasized in its commentary, the ‘extremely grave and imminent’ peril must ‘have

been a threat to the interest at the actual time’.”

23. The Court continued in the next paragraph:

“The Court notes that the dangers ascribed to the upstream reservoir were
mostly of a long-term nature and, above all, that they remained uncertain... It
follows that, even if it could have been established... that the reservoir would
ultimately have constituted a ‘grave peril’ for the environment in the area, one would

be bound to conclude that the peril was not ‘imminent’ at the time at which Hungary
suspended and then abandoned the works relating to the dam.”

Finally, at paragraph 56 the Court concluded: “However ‘grave’ it might have been, it accordingly

would have been difficult, in light of what is said above, to see the alleged peril as sufficiently

certain and therefore ‘imminent’ in 1989.”

24. By the same reasoning, however “grave” th e alleged peril to Argentina might be from

future operation of the cellulose plants ⎯ and I shall address the gravit y of the peril in the next

section of my speech ⎯ it is difficult to see it, in June 2006, as sufficiently certain or immediate as

to satisfy the Court’s requirement that it be “imminent” or urgent. - 50 -

25. Argentina has argued in its request for inte rim measures, at paragraph 15, and again this

morning, that “continued construction of the plant s” should be suspended in order to avoid a “fait

accompli”. This is not a persuasive argument. Above all, it is contradicted by the Court’s Order on

interim measures in the case concerning Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark).

Finland asked the Court to order Denmark to su spend construction of a portion of the Great Belt

project, that did not itself threaten Finland’s rights on the ground that “completion of any one

element would reduce the possibilities of modifying ot her elements so as to enable effect to be

given to a judgment of the Court in Finland’s favour on the merits...” (para.30 of the Court’s

Order).

26. The Court unanimously rejected Finland’s request. The Court made it very clear that

Denmark’s continued construction of the works could not constitute a fait accompli because:

“no action taken pendente lite by a State engaged in a dispute before the Court with
another State ‘can have any effect whatev er as regards the legal situation which the
Court is called upon to define’, . . . a nd such action cannot improve its legal position
vis-à-vis that other State”.

The Court explained that “if it is establishe d that the construction of works involves an

infringement of a legal right, the possibility cannot and should not be excluded a priori of a judicial

finding that such works must not be continued or must be modified or dismantled” (para.31).

Thus, the Court concluded that “it is for Denmark, which is informed of the nature of Finland’s

claim, to consider the impact which a judgment upholding it could have upon the implementation

of the Great Belt project, and to decide whether or to what extent it should accordingly delay or

modify that project”. Likewise in this case, it should be for Uruguay to decide whether to risk

proceeding with the construction of the plants in lig ht of Argentina’s claim. If the Court, at the

conclusion of the merits phase, were to order the plants closed, or dismantled, Uruguay would have

to live with that result. Argentina’s counsel have not demonstrated that construction of the plants

would create a fait accompli.

27. It has been argued by counsel for Argentina that the Great Belt case supports their

request for an order suspending construction becau se of language in the Order suggesting that if

construction “which would obstruct the right of passage claimed were expected to be carried out

prior to the decision of the Court on the merits... this might justify the indication of provisional - 51 -

measures” (emphasis added). This is not a persuasive argument either. In the first place, in Great

Belt it was part of the construction itself that potentially threatened to “obstruct the right of passage

claimed” by Finland. In the present case, it is not construction of the plants that threatens

Argentina’s rights, but their eventual operation and the manner in which they may be operated,

which are neither certain nor immediate, and ther efore not sufficiently imminent to satisfy the

requirements for indication of provisional measures.

28. Moreover, as stated previously, the C ourt refused to order Denmark to suspend

construction work that was appurtenant to and an inte gral part of the allegedly offensive part of the

bridge, because those works would not in themselves threaten Finland’s claimed right of passage.

By analogy, since construction of the cellulose plants does not in itself threaten Argentina’s right to

be protected against contamination of the river, there is no basis for the Court to order the

suspension of construction.

29. Argentina’s request for provisional measures contrasts sharply with its Application. As I

stated earlier, the Application makes no claim that construction of the plants threatens the

environment; its only allegations of environmental harm are based on operation of the plants. The

request for provisional measures takes an entirely differ ent approach. Its thrust is that Argentina is

threatened by construction of the plants. This is hardly unin tentional. Argentina’s very capable

counsel recognize that allegations of harm resulting from operation of the plants could not serve as

the basis for a request for provisional measures ⎯ not when operation is not going to begin for at

least another 14 months, and it is subject to significant conditions precedent which are as yet

unfulfilled.

30. But what is the harm that Argentina alle ges that construction of the plants will cause?

This is described in paragraph7 of the request , which alleges: “Construction of the CMB and

Orion plants has already produced considerable negative consequences on a social and economic

level. The drop in tourism and real estate, urba n and rural property values must be pointed out in

particular.” This morning, my long-time friend Professor Marcelo Kohen placed great emphasis on

these so-called social and economic factors in atte mpting to show harm caused by construction of

the two plants. - 52 -

31. There are several compelling reasons why allegations such as these cannot serve as the

basis for provisional measures. First, these measures are plainly beyond the jurisdiction of the

Court. As Professor Condorelli has explained, the jurisdiction of the Court is based exclusively on

the Statute, and the Statute protects the Parties against contamination of the water. It has nothing to

do with tourism or real estate values. There is no valid argument here even for prima facie

jurisdiction with respect to these claims. Second, th ere is no evidence of real or threatened social

or economic harm. Allegations are not eviden ce. Unsupported opinions by impassioned local

residents are not evidence. Here again, the Great Belt case is instructive. Finland argued that the

construction of the Danish bridge had caused it eco nomic harm, in the form of reduced demand for

drill ships and oil rigs built in Finland that woul d not be able to pass through the Great Belt. The

Court rejected this argument because

“evidence has not been adduced of any invitati ons to tender for drill ships and oil rigs
which would require passage out of the Baltic after 1994, nor has it been shown that
the decline in orders to the Finnish shipya rds for the construction of drill ships and oil
rigs is attributable to the existence of the Great Belt project” (para. 29).

The Court’s conclusion in this regard applies with equal force to the circumstances presented here.

There is no evidence that actually links the allege d decline in tourism or property values to the

construction of the plants.

32. Third, even if the Court had jurisdicti on with respect to these claims of social and

economic harm, and even if there were tangible proof of harm, the suspension of construction

would not be appropriate because it would not alleviate Argentina’s stated concerns. If tourism and

property values have declined in Argentina because of the possibility that the cellulose plants might

one day operate in Uruguay, then a suspension of construction will not bring relief because the

possibility would still exist that the two plants will eventually operate. This possibility will remain,

at least through the merits phase of this case. Judge Oda expressed the same issue in his separate

opinion in the Great Belt case:

“[W]hile would-be purchasers of drill ships and oil rigs from the Finnish
shipyards must inevitably weigh the risk th at in the meantime the Court may give a

judgment adverse to the Finnish claim, that risk would have remained undiminished
even if the Court had indicated the pr ovisional measures requested, because their
indication would in no way have prejudiced the merits.” - 53 -

33. As we have seen, however, it is only the placing in service ⎯ that is, the operation ⎯ of

the plants that could even hypothetically affect the water quality of the river adversely.

Construction has not affected and will not affect the river or the quality of its water. Argentina has

offered no evidence of harm caused, or likely to be caused, by the construction of these plants.

34. For all of these reasons, Argentina has failed to show that there is an imminent or urgent

threat to the rights it claims in these proceedings. On this basis alone, its request for provisional

measures, and especially its request for a suspension of construction, must be rejected.

II. There is no threat of irreparable damage to Argentina’s rights

35. This case is not about a State that is exploding nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

36. It is about the construction and operation of industrial facilities that are state-of-the-art

replicas of the same facilities that have been operating for years in Europe ⎯ in Finland, in

Germany, in Spain, in Sweden and in the United Kingdom ⎯ in compliance with the very strict

European effluent and emissions standards th at meticulously regulate the operation of these

facilities. As Professor Boyle has demonstrated, the Uruguayan plants are the same as, if not

superior to, their European prototypes, and the Uruguayan environmental authorities have required

the two cellulose plants to be designed and ope rated in full compliance with European BAT

standards, so that their emissions will meet the same strict requirements that are enforced in

Europe. The technical capacity of Uruguayan environmental authorities to regulate and monitor

these facilities is well established and not cha llenged. Likewise, Uruguay’s commitment to

environmental protection and sustainable developm ent is unchallenged; as shown in tab 23 of the

judges’ folder, the World Economic Forum study ranks Uruguay first in the Western Hemisphere

in environmental protection. In the world at large, only Finland and Norway are considered

greener. Uruguay ranks third in environmental su stainability in the entire world. There is no

reason to doubt its commitment or its political role to guarantee that these plants will operate in a

manner that is environmentally responsible, a nd in particular, that does not contaminate the

River Uruguay or diminish its water quality.

37. Senior officials of the World Bank and th e European Union have confirmed this. Tab 5

in the judges’ folder is a letter from the Vice-Pres ident of Operations for the International Finance - 54 -

Corporation advising Argentina that these plants are “environmentally responsible” and that they

will “comply with the Best Available Techni ques (BAT) and the latest European Union

1999International Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) recommendations, with which

compliance is required for all pulp plants in Europe by 2007”. The IFC further advised Argentina:

“World-class safeguards will be required as a pre-c ondition of any financing IFC may provide. As

mentioned above, the plants are being designed to employ state-of-the-art techniques that will meet

BAT requirements.”

38. To the same effect, tab6 in the judges’ folder is a letter fro m European Commissioner

Peter Mandelson to the President of the World Bank stating: “Argentina should be satisfied with

the complete information made available and with the assurances given by Botnia that the highest

possible environmental standards will be met, as the World Bank’s own assessment also indicates.”

39. But the best evidence that the plants present no threat of irreparable damage to Argentina

comes from Argentina itself. Prior to initiati ng these proceedings, senior Argentine Government

officials and technical experts repeatedly issued formal and public statements confirming that the

plants present no threat of serious or irreparable injury to the River Uruguay or to Argentina itself.

They also confirmed, as Professor Condorelli has demonstrated, that Argentina and Uruguay

reached a bilateral agreement allowing for the cons truction and operation of these plants, and for a

monitoring and control system to assure that there would be no contamination of the

RiverUruguay or harm to the water quality. These statements were made by the President of

Argentina, by the Foreign Minister of Argentina, by the Minister of Health and Environment of

Argentina, and by the representatives of the Gove rnment of Argentina on the CARU. Argentina

has chosen not to bring these stat ements to the attention of the Court. Therefore, it falls on

Uruguay to do so. Because of their pertinence to the issue of irreparable harm, I hope the Court

will not consider it too burdensome for me to read aloud some of Argentina’s most definitive

statements on this subject.

40. This is the statement that was made on behalf of Argentina by its official member of the

CARU and chief technical adviser, Dr. Arma ndo Darío Garín, at the CARU meeting of

15 May 2004. It is recorded in the formal minutes of the CARU meeting. Argentina has submitted

to the Court an extract from these same minutes. Argentina chose not to bring to the Court’s - 55 -

attention the complete minutes, and especially chose not to bring before the Court the portion of the

minutes from which I shall read. But this is wh at Argentina’s official representative to the

Commission said, and it can be found at tab 8 in the judges’ folder:

“It must be pointed out, with complete and absolute emphasis that none of the

different technical reports evidence that the activity in question causes an irreversible
and unavoidable damage to the environment, at least of a sufficient level that would
warrant the suspension of the plant or oppositio n to its construction, at least with any

scientific basis . . . The truth is that we have to go forward on the basis of the reports
that we have and the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers.”

41. The Agreement reached by the Foreign Mini sters, to which Argentina’s representative to

the CARU made reference, was described by the Fo reign Minister of Argentina, Dr. Rafael Bielsa,

in an official statement to the Argentine Senate , which we have placed at tab9 in the judges’

folder:

“On 2 March 2004, the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Uruguay reached an
understanding on a course of action to give to this subject. That is, for the
Government of Uruguay to facilitate inform ation relative to the construction of the

plant, and in regard to the operational phase, instruct the CARU to proceed to carry
out a monitoring of the water quality of the River Uruguay in conformity with the
provisions of the Statute for the River Uruguay, especially its ChapterX, Articles40
to 43.”

42. This Agreement between the Foreign Mini sters of Argentina and Uruguay was described

by the President of Argentina, the Honourable Nestor Kirchner, as:

“a bilateral agreement which put an end to the controversy over the cellulose plant
installation in Fray Bentos. The agreem ent respects on the one hand the Uruguayan
national character of the works, which w as never challenged, and on the other hand
the existing regulations that regulate the waters of the River Uruguay through the

CARU. Likewise, it implies a work methodol ogy for the three stages of construction
of the project: the planning, the construction and the operation.”

The Argentine President’s statement that the Foreign Ministers of the two States had reached “a

bilateral agreement putting an end to the controve rsy” was included in his official report on the

State of the Nation for the Year 2004, and can be found at tab 10 of the judges’ folder. Thus, it is

notable that the chronology of events submitted by Argentina to the Court this morning makes no

mention whatever of the agreement which put an en d to the controversy. Indeed, it characterizes

the events of 2 March 2004 as nothing more than a commitment by Uruguay’s Foreign Minister to

furnish information about the plants to CARU. This suggests that the Court should treat

Argentina’s chronology with a degree of caution. - 56 -

43. For Uruguay’s chronology of events, I woul d refer the Court to the sworn declaration of

Martha Petrocelli, at tab 14 in the judges’ folder . The bilateral agreement reached by the Foreign

Ministers on 2 March 2004 was described by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Bielsa, in his

official statement to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. He reiterated that Argentina and Uruguay

had agreed upon the construction and operation of the cellulose plants subject to the regulation,

monitoring and control “through the CARU”. His statement can be found at tab 11 of the judges’

folder. This agreement, he said: “incl udes a work methodology for the three phases of

construction of the project: the planni ng, the construction and the operation. In this way,

comprehensive procedures of c ontrol were developed with regard to the River Uruguay that will

continue after the plants are in operation.” The Argentine Foreign Minister concluded: “Controls

on both plants will be greater than those our own country applies to our own plants on the

River Paraná, but nevertheless were accepted by Uruguay . . .”

44. In conformity with the Agreement of the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Uruguay,

and over the course of 2004, the CARU developed and adopted a “Plan for Monitoring the Water

Quality of the River Uruguay in the Areas of the Cellulose Plants”. The Plan was formally adopted

by the CARU at its official meeting on 8 November 2004. The adoption of the CARU Monitoring

Plan was considered of such significance by Argent ina that the President of Argentina highlighted

it in his official report on the state of the nation for the year 2004. As shown at tab10 of the

judges’ folder, there is a separate heading in the Argentine President’s report that reads:

“M’Bopicuá Cellulose Plant and Botnia Project”. The President reported that:

“In view of the ‘specific agreements of both Delegations at CARU’ regarding
the possible installation of cellulose plants along the River Uruguay a ‘Plan for

Monitoring the Water Quality of the Ri ver Uruguay in the Areas of the Cellulose
Plants’ was designed, that together with th e ‘Plan for Environmental Protection of the
River Uruguay’ contributes to maintaining water quality of this water resource . . .”

45. The Monitoring Plan was implemented by CARU during 2005. Samples were taken at

regular intervals from the areas of the river that c ould possibly be affected by the cellulose plants.

Analyses of the samples found no contamination from the construction of the cellulose plants and

no adverse effects on water quality. There was no da mage at all, let alone irreparable damage.

Thus, in March 2005, the Argentine Minister of H ealth and Environment reported as follows to the

Argentine Senate on the potential impact of the Uruguayan cellulose plants: “Considering the - 57 -

technology reported, our country is not likely to be affected , taking into account distances, the

river’s diluting capacity and the technologies involved.” (Emphasis added.) This is at tab 9 of the

judges’ folder.

46. In light of all of these statements by the most senior Argentine government officials and

technical experts, Argentina’s request for provisional measures alleging that continued construction

of the plants threatens it with irreparable harm is simply not credible, and it must be rejected.

Argentina’s request is further undermined by the fact that Argentina itself has at least ten cellulose

plants operating in its territory, and at least three of these plants employ an old technology based on

chlorine gas that is without a doubt far less frie ndly to the environment than the state-of-the-art

technology employed in the two new Uruguayan plants. Cellulose plants are no longer built with

the technology employed in these Argentine plan ts because of environmental concerns. Yet

Argentina not only allows all of its obsolete plants to continue operating; it allows them, including

the cellulose plant at Puerto Piray in Misiones Provin ce, to discharge their effluents into rivers that

form boundaries with other States, in that case in to the Paraná River that forms Argentina’s

boundary with Paraguay. As the environmentall y responsible Government that it is, surely

Argentina would not allow the cellulose plants in its territory to continue operating ⎯ or

discharging their effluents into rivers shared by neighbouring States ⎯ if they caused or threatened

grave or irreversible damage to the environment. Since the Argentine plants are in full operation

today, we must assume that Argentina has concl uded that they cause no such irreparable harm.

And since the Uruguayan cellulose plants are indisputably far friendlier to the environment than the

older, obsolete Argentine plants ⎯ indeed, the Argentine Foreign Minister has acknowledged that

they are subject to stricter environmen tal controls than the Argentine plants ⎯ we can understand

why all the responsible Argentine officials, from th e President down, have publicly declared that

the Uruguayan plants present no risk of harm to Argentina.

47. As Professor Boyle has demonstrated, Uruguayan environmental protection authorities

are requiring the plants to meet the very strict em issions standards of the European laws that will

go into effect in 2007, which are the strictest in the world. Thus, apart from the protection of the

River Uruguay afforded by the CARU and its M onitoring Plan, Uruguay’s own laws forbid the

plants from discharging chemicals into the river above acceptable levels, and forbid the plants from - 58 -

adversely impacting the water quality. Fu rther, Uruguayan laws allow DINAMA, the

environmental protection agency, to close the plants immediately if they violate these standards.

These laws fully protect Argentina’s right to be protected against contamination of the river.

Argentina does not challenge the existence or content of Uruguay’s laws.

48. Under the jurisprudence of this Court, Uruguay is entitled to a presumption by the Court

that it will enforce its own laws. This is the argument made by the Agent of France in the case

concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France. France argued that the Republic of Congo’s

request for provisional measures was unwarranted because, in the words of its Agent ⎯ pardon me

for reading from the English translation:

“We have simply stated what French law is; we have promised nothing, we
have said that French law does not allow the prosecution of a foreign Head of State;
that is not a promise, it is a statement of law. And also that French law subordinates

the jurisdiction of the French courts over act s committed abroad to certain conditions.
That too is not a promise, it is a statement of law. At the very most, but it would be
somewhat pointless to do so, we might prom ise that the French courts will respect
French law. But I think this might be taken for granted... ” (Emphasis added.)

(Order of 17 June 2003, para. 33.)

49. After quoting this portion of France’s argume nt, the Court concluded: “there is... no

risk of irreparable prejudice, so as to justify th e indication of provisional measures as a matter of

urgency” (para. 35). The same argument and the same conclusion apply to these proceedings. It is

to be taken for granted that Uruguay will respect and enforce Uruguayan law. Indeed, Uruguay’s

position is even stronger than that of France because it has done more than simply state what its

law is; it has promised both Argentina and this Court to enforce it.

50. For all of these reasons, Argentina has failed to show that the provisional measures it has

requested are required to protect it from irreversible harm.

III. The provisional measures requested by Argentina would irreparably prejudice the rights

of Uruguay that will be adjudged in this case

51. There is still another compelling reason to deny Argentina’s request. The provisional

measures Argentina seeks would irreparably prejudice ⎯ indeed they might destroy altogether ⎯

the very rights of Uruguay that will be adjudged in this case. Put simply, it is Uruguay’s sovereign

right to implement a sustainable economic developm ent project in its own territory that does not

violate Uruguay’s obligations under the Statute, or the anti-pollution st andards of the CARU, - 59 -

which were jointly developed by Uruguay and Argentina. This is the right of Uruguay that will be

adjudged by the Court at the merits phase of these proceedings.

52. But this right is likely to be rendered meaningless if the Court were to indicate the

provisional measures requested by Argentina. As shown in the declarations of Martín Ponce

deLéon and Timo Piilonen (tabs 15 and 16 in the j udges’ folder), if the Court orders Uruguay to

suspend construction of the plants pending its final judgment on the merits, the most likely

outcome is that they will never be built ⎯ at least not in Uruguay. The foreign investors who own

these plants ⎯ from Finland and Spain ⎯ have made this clear to the Government of Uruguay and

to their own shareholders. To them, as private corporations, this is a matter of economics. A

suspension of construction and a concomitant delay in commencement of operations would render

their investments uneconomical. For reasons of business necessity, the companies have advised

Uruguay that they cannot allow their huge investme nts of capital to lie dormant for the length of

time it might take the Court to decide this case. In today’s globalized economy, they would simply

move their investments elsewhere. Uruguay would be powerless to stop them. This is a simple

business reality.

53. The costs to Uruguay of losing these investments would be staggering. They are

described in the declaration of Martin Ponce de Leon, at tab 15 of the judges’ folder. In sum: the

plants represent the largest foreign investment in Uruguay’s history. The cost of construction alone

is $1.5 billion. The economic impact is dramat ic. Construction itself produces a major reduction

in unemployment by creating many thousands of new jobs. Once operational, the plants are

expected to have an economic impact of more than $350million per year. This represents an

increase of fully 2.0 per cent in Uruguay’s GDP. The plants will also positively impact the balance

of trade, by adding $600 million in new exports annually. The plants and related projects that they

spawn, including laboratories and university-sponsored research, will also bring huge scientific and

technological advances to Uruguay. These are criti cal to Uruguay’s hopes of advancing up to the

next rung on the economic development ladder. Su spension of the works and termination of these

investments will deprive Uruguay and its people of all of these economic and social benefits and

opportunities. In these circumstances, it is ex tremely difficult to understand ProfessorKohen’s - 60 -

argument this morning that an order suspending th e construction of the plants would be reasonable

and balanced, and would best take into account the interests of both Parties.

54. Article 41 is clear, and the jurisprudence of the Court is well established. The rights of

the respondent State are entitled to protection from irreparable prejudice as well as those of the

applicant State. As the Court explained in the case concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in

France:

“Article 41 of the Statute of the Court has as its object to preserve the respective rights
of the parties pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes that irreparable
prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial
proceedings; whereas it follows that the Court must concern itself with the

preservation by such measures of the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by
the Court to belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent ; and whereas such
measures are justified solely if there is urgency” (para. 22; emphasis added).

55. In that case, the Court rejected the applican t State’s request for provisional measures. It

must do the same here.

56. Madam President, Members of the Court, I would be remiss as counsel for Uruguay, and

probably never forgiven by my client, if I did not once in the course of my speech make reference

to the illustrious former President of the Court, of whose stature and achievements in international

law Uruguayans are most proud, DrE . duardoJimenezdAréchaga. PresidenJ timenez

deAréchaga addressed the extraordinary nature of provisional measures, and the very strict

standards that must be met before they can be issued, in his separate opinion in the case concerning

the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. He wrote: “before interim measures can be granted all relevant

circumstances must be present . . . Howeve r, to refuse interim measures, it suffices for only one of

the relevant circumstances to be absent.” (P. 16). The subsequent jurisprudence of the Court has

followed this approach.

57. As applied to the present case, Argentina’s request for provisional measures must fail if

either the alleged threat to its rights is not urgent, or, alternatively, if the harm allegedly threatened

is not irreparable. Argentina’s request must also be denied if indication of the requested

provisional measures would irreparably prejudice th e rights of Uruguay that are central to this

dispute. Any of these grounds would be in itself sufficient to deny Argentina’s request. But as we - 61 -

have seen, not one but all of what President Jimenez de Aréchaga called “the relevant

circumstances” are absent from this case.

58. First, Argentina has failed to show that there is an urgent threat to its claimed rights.

59. Second, Argentina has failed to demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm.

60. And Third, the provisional measures requ ested by Argentina would cause irreparable

prejudice to the rights of Uruguay that will ultimately be adjudged by the Court.

61. For each and all of these reasons, Uruguay r espectfully submits that Argentina’s request

for provisional measures must be denied.

62. Madam President, Members of the Court, this concludes Uruguay’s presentation this

afternoon. Thank you for your kind attention to my remarks and to those of my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Reichler. This statement concludes this afternoon’s

hearing. The Parties will be heard again in oral reply. Argentina will take the floor tomorrow

morning at 10a.m. and Uruguay in the afternoon at 4.30p.m. Each of the Parties will have a

maximum of two hours for its reply.

The Court now rises.

The Court rose at 5.55 p.m.

___________