Exposés écrits

INTERNATIONALCTFJUSTICE

PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS

APPLICATIONFOR REVIEW

OF JUDGEMENT No. 273 OF THE UNITED
NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVETRIBUNAL

COUR INTERNATIOEE JUSTICE

MÉMOIRES. PLAIDOIRIES ET DOCUMENTS

DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION
DU JUGEMENT No 273 DU TRIBUNAL

ADMINISTRATIF DES NATIONS UNIES CONTENTS -TABLE DES MATIÈRES

f
Request for AdvisoryOpinion - Requêtepour ans consultatif

Dossiertransmitted by the Secretary-Ceneral of the United Nations (65,.
pars. 2, of the Staiut-) Dossier transmis par le Secrétairegénéral es
Nations Unies (art. 65, par. 2, du Statut)

INTRODUCTOR YOTE .................
Part 1of the dossier. Documents relating to the proceedings leading to
the request by the Committee on Applications for Review of
Administrative Tribunal Judgements for an advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice in relation to Judgement No. 273 of
the Administrative Tribunal .............
A. Documents of the Twenlieth Session of the Commiltee on
Applications for Review ofAdministrative Tribunal Judgements
B. the Comntittee on Applications for Review of Administrativehy
Tribunal Judgements al ils Twentieth Session ......
C. Documents suhmitted to the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal: Case No. 257: Mortished against the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations ............
Part 11of the dossier. Documents relating to the repatriation grant
scheme ....................
A. Documents of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly .
B. Documents of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly . .
C. Documents of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly . .
D. Documents of the Twelfth Sessionof the Consultative Commit-
tee on Administrative Questions (1952) ........
E. Documents of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly .
F. Documents of the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly
, G. Documents of the Twenty-fifth Session of the Consultative
H. Documents on the Forty-first Session of the Consultative Com-
mittee on Administrative Questions (1974) .......
1. Documents of the Twenty-ninth Session of the General
Assembly . .......... ...
J. Documents of ihe'~iirty-6rst Session of the Geneil Assem-
bly .....................
K. Documenis of thc Forty-cighth Session of the Consultaii\c
Committce on Adminisirati\c Questions (1978) . .
L. Documents of the Thirty-third Session of the Ccnrral ~rsem-
bly .....................
M. Documents of the Thirty-fourth Session of the General As-
sembly . . ..............
N. Documents of the 'Thirtv-fifthSession of the General Assemblv
O. ment of repatriation gant scheme on I January 1951cees...lish-X CONTENTS

Page
CONTEN~ OF THE DOSSIER(under this heading are listed the titles of the
documents reproduced, while the titles of those not reproduced are
mentioned in the text) ................ 14
Application dated 15 June 1981 submitted by the United States of
Americain accordance with Article II, paragraph 1,of the Statute of
the Administrative Tribunal. ............. 14
Memorandum dated 23 June 1981 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the Secretary of the Committ.e ..... 15
Letter dated 23 June 1981from Mr. Sylvanus A. ~iewul, counsel for
MI. Mortished, addressed to the Secretary of the Committee with
comments on the application presented by the United States of
America .................... 15
Report of the Committee . . ...... . 25
Transcript of the proceedings of ibe'first meeting (clo.ed) 28
Transcnpt of the proceedings at the second meeting (closed part..43
Transcript of the proceedings at the second meeting (open pa. . 62
Tribunal administratif: Jugement no273 .......... 66
Wrinen Staternents- Exposés écrits

1. L ~ R OF 30 NOVEMBE1R 981~OM THE SECRETARY-GENE RFALHE
UNITEDNATIONS TO THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE INTUINA~ONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE ................. 99
STATEMEN O F MR. IVORhm MORTISHED ........ 100
Part 1 ..................... 100

A. Summary of pleadings ............. 100
B. Explanatory note ............... LOI
Part II. Background. ............... 103
A. The repatriation grant ............. 103
1. Nature and origin .... ........ 103
2. Evolution of the staff niles on the repatriation gr.ntIO8
B. The oroceedines hefore the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal ....... .......... 113
C. Action taken hy the secretary-&neral pursuant to Judgement
No. 273 .................. 115
D. Action hefore the Committee on Applications for Review of
AdministrativeTribunalJudgements ....... 116
E. Concerning the proceedings before the International Court of
Justice. .................. 123
Part III. Elaboration of pleadings........... 124
A. lnasmuch as the procedure by which the advisory opinion was
requested allows a memher State which was not a party to the
original proceedings hefore the Administrative Tribunal to
request a reviewof thejudgement of the Tribunal, il is legally
defective hecause:
1. It impinges upon the authonty of the Secretary-General
under Article 97 of the United Nations Charter as chief
administrative officer of the Organization, and conflicts
with Article 100of the Charter regarding the "exclusively
international character" of the Secretari..... 124
2. It nolates the general principles governing judicial re-
new .................. 126 Page
3. It imposes in a hilateral dispute a condition of legal and
practical inequality upon one of the parties. . 131
B. Apart from the legal defects of the Article IL procedure, the
Committee's decision to re uest the Court's advisory opinion
is legally defective, fore(following reasons:
1. The Committee receivedan application whichin substance
did no1fall within the lems of Article Il of the Statute of
the Tribunal and in form violated Article II of the
Committee's Provisional Rules of Procedure, and acted
favourably on the legally defective application .... 134
2. The committee in ils proceedings violated the following
fundamental principles of natural justice: audi airerom
3. The committee failed Io adopt a uniform interpretation of 135
Article Il in the present case in which the applicant is a
member State ............... 138
4. The members of the Commitlee at its twentieth session
lacked the competence for. or else failed to perform the
functions required of the committee. ....... 139
5 There is nothing exceptional about Judgement No. 273,
other than that a member State does not likeil, to warrant
recourse to the Court for an advisory opinion .... 140
C. In relation to the question submitted to the Court hy the
committee:

1. To take the position that the Court's function is confined
tion in ludgement No. 273 and whether the tribunalurisdic-
committed an error of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter ...... ... . 141
2. Conceming thecontention thai the Tribun2 committi an
error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, Io
adjudge and declare:
IoJ Thal the committee had no leeal basis for determin-
.-, ing that the Tnbunal commited an error of ldw
relating Io the provisions of the Chancr 143
(b, The Tnbunal did no1commit an error of law relating
to the provisions of the Charter ....... 143
(i) ludgement No. 273 performed a judicial function,
namelythe settlementofa specificdisputebetween
the Secretarv-General and Mr. Mortished.-a
function whiihis not conferredupon the ~eneral
Assembly hy the Charter . . . . 144
(ii) The Tribunal was bound to and did rightiy take
in10 account the whole legal régimeestablished
hy the General Assemblyas embodied in the staff
regulations, the staff niles, and the Statute of the
Tribunal itself ... . 144
(iii) Nothing in the ~nited ~ation; charter prohibits
the Tribunal from denying retroactive eiïect 10a
particular decision of the General Assembly in
(iv) The Tribunal was ~~arranted in holding that. ,145
the application of General Assembly resolution CONTENTS

Page
341165should no1prejudice the acquired right of
Mr. Mortished to the payment of a repatriation
grant without evidence of relocation . 148

3. Concerning the contention that the Administrative Tribu-
nal exceeded ilsjurisdiction or competence. to- -iudge and
declare:
(a) That the committee had no basis, none whatsoever,
for impugning the jurisdiction or competence of the
Tribunal with respect to Judgement No. 273 ...
(b) The Tribunal did not exceedilsjurisdiction or compe-
tence in Judgement No. 273 ........
D. Further, on the question submitted by the Committee, to
adjudge and declare:
1. That the question submitted to the Court contains the
following misconception of the Judgement, namely, that it
had determined that General Assembly resolution 341165
"could not be given immediate effect"; in fact, the Judge-
ment only held that the resolution should not prejudicethe
acquired nghts of staff members and was on that account
absolutely "warranted". ...........
2. Even if the Court agrees that Judgement No. 273 had
determined that General Assemblyresolution 341165could
not be given "immediate effect", the Judgement would still
be warranted ...............
Annex 1. The Assistant Secretary-General for Personnel Services to
Mr. Sylvanus A. Tiewul, counsel for Mr. Mortished .....
Annex II. The Secretary, Committee on Applications for Review
of Administrative Tribunal Judgements, to counsel for Mr. Mor-
tished .....................

2. WRITIENSTATEMEN Of THE GOVERNMEN OFT THE UNITEDSTATE Sf
AMERICA .....................
1. Introduction ..................

A. Question presented ..............
B. The Court's jurisdiction ............
C. The Court's discretion .............
1. The parties to the dispute are unchanged ......
2. The secretariat's ri hls and status are undiminished. .
3. Staff member's rigils an no1 prejudiced by his position
before theCommittee. ............
4. Gere are important reasons why the Court should exercise
jurisdiction ................
II. Summary of the case ...............

A. History of applicant's claim to the United Nations repatria-
B. Principal legalobjections to the Judgement of the Administra-
tive Tribunal ................

III. History of repatriation grant ............
A. The origin and adoption of the staffregulation concerning the
repatriation grant: conception to 1950. ....... Page
B. Developments relating 10the repatriation grant: 1950to 1976 171
C. General Assembly action from 197610 date concerning the
repatriation grant eligibility requirement of actual relocation 173
IV.Legal objections to the Tribunal's Judge....... 178

A. Uto payment of the repatriation grant without evidence of
relocation required by staff niles in force at the lime of their
separation ................. 178
I The rep~triationgrant hîs ülways ken intended only for
cxpîtnate staB who rclocîtc from the country oflast duty
station upon separation from United Nations service. the
requirement wîs consistent with the basic
crienoid oreelnibitiaf hc grdnt... : .. 179
2. Theconsiderations advanced bv the Admin~straTrihu-
tion or sustain the findingofan acquire10rthe grantloca-
without evidence of relocatio.... .181
3. In finding that applicant had an acquired right, ihe~hbu-
na1failed to give the weight required by Article 101of the
United Nations Charter to the intent of the General
Assembly in ils actions regarding the g..... 184
B. Resolution 341165legally barred repatriation grant payment
without evidence of relocation and the Administrative Tribu-
nal was no<authorized to refuse to give it e....t 185
1. Resolution41165was a decision of the General Assembly
under Article 101of the Charter whicb required termina-
evidenceof relocation and cancelled transitional Staff Rule
109.5(/). .................~. 185
2. The Administrative Tribunal erred and exceeded 11sJuns-
diction in failing 10 give effect to resolution 341165
V. Conclusion .................. 191

3.EmÉ ÉCRIT DU GOUVER~MEN TEu RÉPUBLIQUEFRANÇAISE . . 192
1. La saisine de la Cour............. 192
II. La validitéd~ -ugement no273 ........... 195
A. Le problème dela juridiction ou de la compétencedu Tribu-
nal. ................. ,195
B. la Charte..................oit concernant lesdisposit197s de

1. bléegénéralen............nules résolutionsde I'A.s199
2. Le Tribunal a fait une application mdu princ&'des
droits acquis............... 202

Written Commenb - Observationsécrites

1.O~VATION~ ÉCRITFSDU GOUVERNEME NETLA PUBLIQUE FRAN-
ÇNSE ..................... .213
2. WRI~ COMMENT OF THEGOVERNMEN O F THEUNITE DTATES OF
Amnlc~ .................... ,214 II. The defectivenessof the Tribunal'sJudgement .....

A . Errorof law relatingto the United Nations Charter ... 217
B . The Tribunal exceededils jurisdiction ........
II. Conclusion .................. 218

Readingof the AdvisoryOpinion ......

Correspondence . Correspondance
No a 1-41 ........... '..WRITTENSTATEMENTS

EXPOSÉS ÉCRITS 1.LETTER OF 30 NOVEMBER 1981 FROM THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
TOTHE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

for Rencw of Administrative Tribunal Judgements for an Advisory Opinion ons
the Annlication for Rcview of Judeement No. 273 of the United Nations
~dmi&trative Tribunal. "
In connection with that request and as required by paragraph 2 of Article II
of the Tribunal's Statute and pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 66 of the
Statute of the Court, 1 have instmcted Mr. Suy to transmit to you, under
separate cove30copies of a statement setting forth the news of Mr. lvor
P. Mortished, the Applicant 10 whom the above-mention4 Judgement of the
Administrative Tribunal relates.
(Signed)KurtWALDHEIM APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

STATEMENT OF MR. IVOR PETER MORTISHED

Part 1

We respectfully request the Court to agudge and declare:

A. That inasmuch as the procedure by which the advisory opinion was
requested allows a memher State which was not a party to the original
proceedings hefore the Administrative Tribunal to request a review of the
Judgement of the Tribunal, it is legally defective because:

1. It impingesupon the authority of the Secretary-General under Article 97
of the United Nations Charter as Chief Administrative Officer of the
Oreanization. and conflicts with Article 100of the Charter reeardine the L
"e~clusivelvi'nternational ch.racter"~of ~he~ ~~r~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
2. It violates the general principles governingjudicial review.
3. It imposes in a bilateral dispute a condition of legal and practical

inequality upon one of the parties.
B. That apart from the legal defects of the Article II procedure, the Commit-
tee'sdecision to request the Court's advisory opinion is legallydefective, for
the following reasons:

1. The Committee received an application which in substance did not fall
within the terms of Article II of the Statute of the Tribunal and in form
violated Article II of the Committee's Provisional Rules of Procedure,

and acted favourahly on the legally defective application.
2. The Committee in its proceedings violated the following fundamental
principles of natural justice: audi alteram partem, and nemojudex in
causasua.
3. The Committee failed to adopt a uniform interpretation of Article II in
the present case in which the Applicant is a member State.
4. The Members of the Committee at its Twentieth Session lacked the
competence for, or else failed to perform the functions required of the
Cornmittee.
-~ ~~~~~~~~~-~
5. There 1snothingcxwptional about Judgcment No. 273,othsr than that a
memher State docs not likc it.IO warrant recouse ti~the Court for an
Advisory Opinion.

C. That in relation to the question suhmitted to the Court by the Committee:
1. The Court's function is confined to determining whether the Tribunal
exceeded ils jurisdiction in Judgement No. 273,and whether the Tribu-
na1committed an error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter.

2. Concerning the contention that the Tribunal committed an error of law
relating to the provisions of the Charter, to afidge and declare:
(a) that the Committee had no legal hasis for determining that the

Tribunal committed an errorof law relating to the provisions of the
Charter:
(b) that the'Tribunal did not commit an error of law relating to the
provisions of the Charter, for the following reasons:
(i) Judgement No. 273performed a judicial function, namely, the

settlement of a specificdispute hetween the Secretary-General WRITTEN STATEMENTS 101

and MI. Mortished-a function which is not conferred upon
the General Assembly by the Charter;
(ii) the Tribunal was hound to and did rightly take into account
the whole legal régimeestablished hy the General Assembly as
embodied in the Staff Regulations, the Staff Rules, and the
Statute of the Tribunal itself;
(iii) nothing in the United Nations Charter prohibits the Tribunal
from denying retroactive effect ta a particular decision of the
General Assembly in relation to the Staff;
(iv) the Tribunal was correct in holding that the application of
General Assembly resolution 341165 should not prejudice the
acquired right of Mr. Mortished to the payment of a repatria-
tion grant without evidence of relocation.

Concerning the contention that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or
competence, to adjudge anddeclare:
(a) that the Committee had no basis, none whatsoever, for impugning the
jurisdiction or competence of the Trihunal with respect 10 Judgement
No. 273;
(6) that the Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction or competence in Judge-
ment No. 273.
D. Further, on the question submitted hy the Committee, to adjudge and
declare:

1. That the question submitted to the Court contains the following
misconception of the Judgement, namely that it had determined that
General Assembly resolution 341165"could not be given immediate
effect"; in fact, the Judgement only held that the resolution should not
prejudice the acquired rights of staffmembersand was on that account
absolutely "warranted".
2. Even if the Court agrees that Judgement No. 273 determined that
General Assembly resolution 341165 could not be given immediate
effect, the judgement would still be "wamanted".

1.This statement is submitted to the International Court of Justice (hereafter
referred to as the "Court") pursuant to Article 66(2)of the Statute of the Court,
in respect of the application for an advisory opinion on Judgement No. 273 of
the Administrative Tribunal, submitted to the Court by the Committee on
Review ofAdministrative Tribunal Judgements on 13July 1981.
2. The Statement is submitted on behalf of Mr. Mortished, who was the
Applicant in the proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal leading ta
Judgement No. 273.
3.The Statement isin three pans, including this part containing the Summary
of Pleadings and this Explanatory Note.
4. Part II contains background information on the developments leading to
the present Application before the Court, and consists of five Sections.
5. SectionAgivesan account of the nature and originof the repatriation grant
and the evolution of the Staff Rules on the repatriation grant. This account, in
the view of MI. Mortished, will show the legal basis of his entitlement to the
repatriation grant without the need for endence of relocation, which the
Administrative Tribunal oronerlv took into account in Judeement No. 273.
6. Section B e~amines'ihe'~rkeedin~s before the ~dmi~istraii\e Tribunal,
and sels out the grounds for the Tribunal's decision. In the vicw of MI. Mor-
tished. such an examination of ihe proceedings beforc the Tribunal and the102 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

Tribunal's decision,will show not only that the Tribunal neither committed an
error of law relating to the provisions of the United Nations Charter nor
exceeded its jurisdiction or competence, but also that Judgement No. 273 was
"warranted. This is elahorated upon in the suhsequent argument, in Part 111.
7.Section C contains informatron on the action taken hv the Secretaw-
~-. .. - .rsuant to ludeement No...... ~h-s-inf- ~ ~~----~--~~~~-~-hat tLe
two parties to JudgemenïNo. 273, namely MI. Mortished and the ~ecretary-
General of the United Nations, do not challengethe judgement of the Tribunal

but on the contrary would have complied with it but for the intervention of a
member State.
8.Section D reviewsthe actions taken hy the Comrnittee on Applications for
Review of Administrative Ttihunal Judeements. The review reveals the leeal
deficienciesin the proceedingsof the cornmittee as wellas in the decisionsta&
hy it; these deficienciesare further elahorated upon in the argument (Part III).
9.SectionE, finally,provides information on the position of MI. Mortished in
relation to the proceedings before the Court. This information reinforces the
contentions of MI. Mortished regarding the defectsof the various aspects of the
procedure contained in Article II of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal.
10.Part III of the Statement contains an elahoration on the pleadings of MI.
Mortished as set forth in Part 1A.

II. In SectionA of Part III we respectfullyrequest the Court to address itself
to the legalmerits of the procedure hy whicha member State is allowed to apply
for a review of an Administrative Tribunal judgement-to which the member
State wasnot a party and upon which thetwo parties have expressedno desireto
ohtain an advisory opinion. Our request to the Court in this Section is for the
Court merely to adjudge and declare that the procedure, to the extent that it
allows such an intervention, is legally defective. Such an adjudication and
declaration hy the Court would itselfconstitute sufficientsatisfaction. Wedo nor
therefore specificallyrequest the Court to declineto render the advisory opinion
requested from il on this ground. But the Court may, suomofu, decide to decline
from rendering an advisory opinion.
12.In Section B of Part III we further request the Court to adjudge and

declare that the Committee's decision itself was legally defective. The Court's
affirmative declaration on this contention would similarly constitute sufficient
satisfaction. This is similarly without prejudice to the Court's right to decline
from rendering an advisory opinion.
13.Our requests under Parts III A and B. for the Court only to give an
affirmativedeclaration on the legal defects of the Article II procedure and the
Committee'sdecision rather than to declineto render an advisory opinion on the
ground of those legal defects, are guided hy the following considerations. The
Court did consider the Article 11 procedure acceptable in its 1973 Advisory
Opinion, albeit with some resewations. This procedure, as noted hy Iudge
Aréchaga in the 1973 Opinion (p.243). had been instituted hy the General
Assemhly in 1955in response to the Court's own "thinly veiledsuggestions" in

ils 1954Advisory Opinion. But whileaazpting the Article 11procedure in 1973,
the Court did no1 consider al1 aspects of the procedure as satisfactory. In
particular, President Lachs had stated in his declaration appended to the
AdvLForyOpinion of 1973:
"the choice ought surely to lie between the existing machinery of control

and one which would be fne from difficulty and more effective. I see no
wmpeiling reason, either in fact or in law, why an improved procedure
could no1 be envisaged." (P. 214.)
The controversy surrounding the adoption of the Article II procedure hy the
General Assembly (which is recounted in the argument), as well as the
resewations expressed hy the Court in 1973, were part of the general back- WRITTEN STATEMENTS 103

ground to the Committee's decision to request this advisory opinion. These
resewations provided the inspiration for, inreralia, the request ofMr. Mortished
for an officialverbatim transcript of the Committee's proceedings-which was
acceded to and constitutes an improvement in the machinery forjudicial review.
Our re uests in Parts IIIA and B are thus for action by the Court, whichwould
in itse8 respond 10 the apprehensions of the staff regarding the Article 11
procedure by pointing the way 10 further improvernents.
14.Our submissions in Section C of Part IIIdeal with the specificobjections

raised against Judgement No. 273, on the basis of which the Committee
requested the Court's advisory opinion. We respectfully request the Court, in
rendering ifsadvisory opinion, 10restrict ifs function to a determination on the
validity of those two specific objections-that is, whether the Tribunal had
committed an error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, and whether
it had exceededits jurisdiction or cornpetence, in Judgcment No. 273.We then
request the Court to adjudge and declare that the Tribunal had neirher
committed an error of law relating to the provisions of the charter, nor exceeded
ils jurisdiction or competence, in Judgement No. 273.
15.Our final submission, in Section D of Part III, addresses the question as
submitted to the Court by the Committee, namely whether Judgement No. 273
was "warranted in detennining that General Assembly resolution 341165of 17
December 1979 could not be given immediate effect in requiring, for the
payment of repatriation grants, evidence of relocation to a country otber than
thecountry of the staff member'slas1duty station?"^ wecontended in Section

C, this was not the question that should have been submitted to the Court.The
questions submitted to the Court should instead have been those dealt with in
Section C. To the extent that the Court considers it necessary 10deal with the
question as submitted, we respectfully request the Court to find that this
question contains and betrays a misconception of Judgement No. 273. We
request theCourt to rule that Judgement No. 273didnotdetermine that General
Assembly resolution 341165could not be given immediate effect, but only
determined that the resolution should not prejudice the acquired rights of staff
members. Furthermore, even if the Court agrees that Judgement No. 273 had
denied "immediate effect" to resolution 341165,we respectfully request the
Court to adjudge and declare that the Judgement would still be "warranted",
that is to say, correct, inasmuch as the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and
applied the rules and regulations pertinent to the claims of Mr. Mortished.

Part II. Background

A. The Reputriarion Cranr

1. Nature and origin

16.The legal régimegoverning the repatriation grant scheme is contained in
-t~ ~ Renulation 9.4. Annex IV to the Staff Reeu-~t~ ~~. ~.d Staff~ ~ ~ ~ ~.~. ~
17.SI& ~cgülaiion 941 adopted hy the~cneral Assembly in circumstancrs
reviewedin paragraphs 21-31 below, provides:

"The Secretary-General shall establish a scheme for the payment of
repatriation grants within the maximum rates and under the conditions
specifiedin Annex IV to the present Regulations."

18.Annex IV, to which StaK Regulation 9.4 refers, stipulates:
"ln principlc, the repatriation gmnt shüll be payable to staff mcmbers
whom the Organization is obligatcd to repatriaic. The rcpdtnütion grant

shall not, however, be paid to a staK mcmber who is summürilydismissed.104 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

Dttailed condirions and definitions relaiing io eligibilityshall bcdetemined
by the Secretary-General The amouni of the grani shall be proponional to
thc length of service with ihe Uniicd Nations, as follows:

Staff member with
neither a spouse
nor a dependent child
al time of separation
Staff member with
Years of continuous a spouse or dependent Professional General
serviceaway from child at time and higher Service
home country of separation categories category

(Weeks of Pensionable Remuneration Iessstaff
assessment, where applicable)

II ......... 26 15
12or more 28 16

(Annex IV to the Staff Regulations, ST/SGB/Staff Regulations/Rev.l3, 23
February 1981 .)
19.Staff Rule 109.5,wbich the Secretary-General adopted punuant to Staff
Regulation 9.4 and Annex IV, provides:

"Rule 109.5

Payment of repatriation grantsunder regulation 9.4 and Annex IV to the
Staff Regulations shall be subject to the following conditions and defini-
tions:

(a) 'Obligation to repatnate', as used in Annex IV to the Staff Regula-
tions, shall mean the obligation 10 return a staff member and his or her
spouse and degendent children, upon separation, at the expense of the
United Nations, to a place outside the country of his or ber duty station.
(b) 'Home country', as used in Annex IV to the Staff Regulations, shall
mean the country of home-leaveentitlement under Rule 105.3or sucb other
country as the Secretary-General may determine.
(c) Continuous service away from the staff member's home country
shall, for the purposes of this nile, excludeseMce before 1Ianuary 1951.If
al any time the staff member was considered to have acquired permanent
residencein thecountry of his or her duty station and subsequently changed
from such status, the staff member'scontinuous servicewill be deemed to
have commenced at the time the change was made. Continuity of such
serviceshall not be considered as broken by periods of specialleavewithout
pay or in partial pay, but full months of any such periods shall not be WRlWEN STATEMENTS 105

credited as seMΠfor the purpose of calculating the amount of the grant
payable; periods of less than one calendar month shall not affect the
ordinary rates of accmal.

(d) Payment of the repatriation grant shall be subject to the provision by
the former staffmember ofevidenceof relocation away from the country of
the last duty station. Evidence of relocation shall be constituted by
documentary evidence that the former staff member has established resi-
dence in a country other than that of the last duty station.

(e) Entitlement to repatriation grant shall cease if no claim for payment
of the grant has been submitted Iwo years after the effective date of
separation.
/fJ (Cancelled).
I~I ~avment of the renatriation aant shall be calculated on the~ ~ ~ ~ ~
.", ~ ~~,~ ~~~~ ~, ~ ~ ~ ~ -~~ ~ ~~~~
of the staff membeis pensionable remuneraiion. the amount of whjch,
exclusiveof non,residcnt's allouance or language allowance. if any, shall bc
suhject to staR asscssment aaiording to the applicable schedulcof rates set
fotih in staff regulation 3.3 (6).

(h) Payment shall be at the rates specified in Annex IV Io the Staff
Regulations.
fil No oavments shall be made to local recmits under Rule 104.6.to a
st&fme~~~~~-~..ab~ndo~s-~~s or he~ ~ ~~~orto r~~ st-~fmember,who ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
residing at the time of separation~in his or her home country ;hile

performing officialdulies, provided that a staffmember who, after serviceat
a duty station outside his or her home country, is transferred to a duty
station within that country may be paid on separation a full or partial
repatriation grant al the dikcretion of the Sccretary-Gcneral.
(1, A dependent child. for the purpose of repatriation grant. shall mean a

child recoenizedas deoendcni undcr Rule 103.24(hi ai the time of thc staiï
member'sUseparation'fromservice.The repatriation grant shall be paid at
the rate for a staff member with a spouse or dependent child Io eligiblestaff
members regardless of the place of residence of the spouse or dependent
child.

(k) Where both hushand and wifeare staffmembers and each isentitled,
on separation, to payment of a repatriation grant, payment shall be made to
each, at single rates, according to their respective entitlements, provided
that, where dependent children are recognized, the first parent to be
separated mayclaim payment at the rate applicable to a staiïmember with a

spouse or dependent child. In this event, the second parent. on separation,
may claim payment at the single rate for the period of qualifying seMce
suhsequent thereto, or, if eligible,at the rate applicable to a staff member
with a spausc or dependent child for the whole period of his or her
qualifying service, from which shall normally be deducted the amount of

the repatriation grant paid to the first parent.
(1) Loss of entitlement to payment of return travel expenses under Rule
107.4 shall no1 affect a staff member's eligihility for payment of the
repatriation grant.
/mi In the event of the death of an elieihle staff member. no oavment

.~~~l -~ made unl-ss~ ~ ~e .s~a -u~v~vine sDo-~,.- one or~m~re d-~en~ ~ ~ ~ ~
chjldren whom the United Nations ir ohligüted to rctum to thcjr hoLe
country. If there is one such su~vor. payment shüll be made al the single
raie; if thcre are Iwo or more such survivors. payment shall be made at the
rate applicable to a staffmcmber mih a spouse or depndent child."

20. Paragraph (fJ w,hich is indicated above as cancelled and on which the
claim of Mr. Mortished before the Administrative Tribunal partly relied had
provided as follows:106 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

"(f N otwithstanding paragraph (d) ahove, staff members already in
service before I July 1979shall retain the entitlement to repatriation grant
proportionate to the years and months of service qualifying for the grant
which they already had accrued al that date without the necessit of
production of evidence of relocation with respect 10 such quali&ing
senice."

21.The repatriation grant is closely linked with the "salaries and related
allowances" of staff members, in the context of which it originated. From the
history of its establishment, as indicated in paragraphs 22-31 below, it emerges
that the grant itself, ils size and time of payment are, part and parcel of the
financialemoluments that accrue to senice in the Organization by staffmembers
whom the Organization is ohligated to repatriate.
22. Prior ta the establishment of the repatnation grant scheme, an expatria-
tion allowancehad been in place hy the United Nations beginning 16June 1947,
payable annually to staff members serving outside their home countries.
Authority for the payment of the expatriation allowance had been derived from
General Assembly resolution 13 (l),part IV, paragraph 20, which stated:

"In determin~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ... account should be taken of the soecial
ractors affeciing service in th~ sccrctariat... and the additional expenses
which a large proportion of ihe siaff will incur by living away from thcir
own country ..."
23. In 1949 the Secretary-General estahlished a Committee of Experts on
Salary, Allowance and Leave Systems 10undertake a comprehensive review of
the structure of salaries and allowances system. That Committee recommended
the replacement of the expatriation allowance with a single lump-sum payment
al the temination of a staff member's period of senice. 11did so on the ground
"that upon leaving the Organization and being repatnated to his homecountry,
a staff member isfaced with certain extraordinary expenses, and that such
expenses would fully justify papent of a special lump-sum grant". These
extraordinary expenses, the Committee of Experts considered, would anse for
the following reasons:

"(O) the loss, during United Nations service,of professional and business
wntacis with the home country referred to in subparagraph (c) of
qaragraph 106 above'; (6) the necessity of giving up residence and
Iiquidatin obligations in a foreign country; and (c) the ex nses which a
staffmem%erwill normally have to meet in re-estahlishing rmself and his
home on return to his own wuntry." (See 08fciol Recordrof the Ceneral
Assembly. FourthSessionF . ifth Commitfee,Annex. VolumeII, Report of the
Committee of Experts on Salary, Allowance and Leave Systems(A/C.5/331
and Corr.1, para. log).. .
24.The Comniittec of Experts rccognizcd thecombination of al1of the abovc
factors as the hasis for the repatriation grant Thus. it conceived the rütionale for
the repatriation grant scheme as king 10 case the financial difficulticsfollowing
the tehination of service with the United Nations, of which only one elemed
was relocation to one's home country

'Sub~.raa..~h c of.ara..a~h 106 had mentioned:
"lr, Theprogrcrsivcand wnour lorsolprolcçsionalorbusincrsconiacisuiih ihr
homecountryandihcrcsuliinginncasingdilficuliy infindingsuitableemploymeni in
ihehomecouniry ifuork wiihihc Uniid Nations rhouldhe reminated " WRlTTENSTATEMEm 107

25.The Committee also recommended a scale for the determination of the
amount of the repatriation grant. The scale was to be dependent upon the
marital status of the staff member and upon the number of years of continuous
serviceaway from the home country.
26.The idea ofthe Committee of Experts to replacetheexpatriation allowance
with the repatriation grant was accepted by the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and BudgetaryQuestions (hereafter referredtoas "ACABQ). In
its report to the General Assemblyin 1950,the ACABQ acceptecithe viewof the
Committee of Experts that the purpose of therepatriation grant should betoease
the position of staff memben leaving the Organization.
27.The ACABQ, however, recommended a cul in the amounts proposecihy
the Committee of Exoerts bv reducine to half the number of weeks of
peuionahle rernunerati'on. Its-revised rkommendation was to determine the
amount of the repatriation grant as follows:

Staff member with Staff member with
Years of neither a wife, a wife, dependent
continuous dependent husband hushand or dependent
serv~ce or dependent child child at time of
away from at time of termination termination
home country (weeks of salary) (weeksof salary)

After 2 yean
3 years
4 years
5 years
6 years
7 years
8 years

9 years
10years
Il years
12yean

SeeGeneral Assembly, Oficial Record. Fffh Session.Supplemenl No. 70
(A/1313), para. 70.
28.The rsommendations of the ACABQ were first considered by a Sub-
Committee which the Fifth Committee of the General Assemhlyestablished for
that purpose. The SubCommittee agreed on the replacement of theexpatriation
allowance system with the system of repatnation grants. In addition, !he Sub-
Committee agreed that a two-year transition period should be pronded for
durine which staff members would have the option of continuine to receivethe
expathation allowance or accruing seMce credit toward the repa;riation grant '.
The Siih-corn mit tee~.r.~~owas suooorted hv the F~~ ~ ~~~ ~tt~~~-~u-ine the
discuss~onsin the Filth Comm~ttee. ..numbe; ol dclcgations raised the isüc al
assuringjustice by providing for the transitional arrangements recomniended by
ihe Sub-Committa: the protection of acquired tights of stafl was also men-
iioned. Other delegarions pointed out that u~hilstthc Gcncrd Aswmbly had a
legalriht to chanie the staff regulations, it also had a moral obligation to treat
.
th; staf?in a just and equitable~manner.
29.Following the discussion, the Fifth Committee recommended to the

'The transitionperiowas to rununtil I January1952108 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

General Assembly the adoption of a draft rrsolution on the salary. allowanccs
and leave system of the United Nations--including repatriation grants
30.The General Assemblyadopted the recommendîtion in resolution 470(V)
of 15 Dccember 1950, whichprovidcd in relevant part
"The Secretary-General shall establish a wheme for the payment of
repatriation grants in accordance with the maximum rates and conditions
specifiedin Annex II to the present regulations."

31. In resolution 590 (VI)of 2 February 1952,the General Assemhlyadopted
--~ised staff rgulations incorporating the new Staff Regulation 9.4 and Annex
IV, respectively.

2. Evolurionofthe SlaflRules on rheRepalriarionGrant

33. Follouing the promulgation by the Secretary-Cienerÿlof Staff Kule 114,
vanous minor revisionsof the repatriation grant wheme were introduced hy the
Secretary-General in amendments to the Staff Rules. These are noted in
document No. 93 in the Dossier.
34.Over the years, the Secretary-General, within the framework of the

Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (hereafter referred to as
"CCAQ)', kept the repatriation grant system under continuous survey.
35. In May 1952, the CCAQ considered the repatriation grant system. It
proposed a number of principles on which payment of ihe repatriation grant
should be based. The purpose behind theseprincipleswas "to provide a basis for
uniformity in administration [within the common system]". In reference to the
requirement of relocation, the CCAQ stated that the repatnation grant "should
be paid ... regardless of whether the staff member is actually repatriated.
However, the organization is not considered obligated where the staff mem-
ber voluntarily assumes the nationality of the country of duty station"
(CORD/R.124, pp. 6-7). The CCAQ principles were incorporated by al1 the
organizations into their Staff Rules and Regulations, and consistently followed.
36.These pnnciples and the practiee of paying the repatriation grant were
communicated 10the General Assembly,whieh raised no objection. Subsequent
ta the introduction of the principle and practice of paying the repatriation grant
without the requirement of evidence of relocation, the General Assembly on

several occasions considered the regulations on the repatriation grant. In 1974,
for example,with a viewto eliminating discrimination betweenstaffmembers on
grounds of sex, the General Assembly in resolution 3353 (XXIX) amended

' The CCAQis a subsidiarybody of theAdiiiinistrativeCornmitteeon Coordination. WRlTTEN STATEMENTS 109

Annex IV to the Staff Regulations hy suhstituting the word "spouse" for the

words "wife", "dependent hushand throughout the Regulations.
37.Again in 1976,after a reviewof the United Nations salary system by the
International Civil Service Commission, the General Assembly decided (reso-
lution 311141of 17 December 1976) that terminal payments, including the
re~atriation erant. which had been calculated in terms of "base salarv or waee"
sh'oidbe deïermhed insiead in ierms of "pensionable remuneraiion less sïaff
assesrment". Further, the Gencral Asscmhly. in the sîme resolution. îmended
AnnexIVofthe SiaffRegulations iocreaie a separaie scaleofentitlemeni for staff
members with neiiher a spouse nor a dcpcndent child ai lime of sepdrdiii~n.
38.Ai ils thiriy-ninth session,the CCAQ required its sccrctariat io rc\,iewthe
repatriation grani system and the conditions of entiilemcni to ihc grÿnt. The
CCAQ secretîriat dischargcd this m;indate in ils report CCAQ SEC 325 PER.
of 6 .May 1974 The rcport examined ihc question wheiher the grdnt should bc
paid to a staff membcr uho diJ not repsiriaie ro his her home countr). Thc
CCAQ secretanai was of the view ihat since the purpose of the grînt wîs Io
assis1the staff member and his fdmily to rc-estahlish themselves in their home
country. il should ordinarily not be paid 10 a staffmember who remained in the
country of his last duty station after ierminaiion of seruce. The view wns also
cxprcssed that thc United Nations would noi be in a position IO know whcre a
staff member actually resided after retirement, nor would it have an accurate
procedure for verificationof such residence.The rcport pointed out instances of
the difficultiesthat would attend the relocation requiremenl. For example, the
staffmember mav have two or more residencesaftersenaration from service:the
addr&s Io which pensions were pajd may noi necessiinlybe the address of ihe
residenceof the staff membcr;and if pdyment of the grani was dependeni upon

actual repatriation it could lead IO possihle deception by the staff mcmber.
Finally. it was notcd thai a staff mcmber may be indecisite as IO his place of
residence especially after retirement-which wouldput an indefinite delay on
payment pending the persoual decision of residence by the staff member. The
CCAQ secretariat concluded for these reasons that the enforcement of a
relocation requirement would cost unnecessary time and expenditure to the
United Nations, and that it would therefore not be feasibleto make payment of
the grant dependent on evidence of repatriation.
39. In its report to the International Civil ServiceCommission in 1978,the
CCAQ examined possible changes in the conditions of entitlement to the
separation payments including the repatriation grant (CO-ORD/R.1263/Add.3).
The CCAQ observed that an obligation to repatriate the staffmember at the end
of service was assumed by the organization on recruiting a staff member who
was a national of a country other than that of the duty station. Refetring to the
position which the 1949Committee of Experts had taken on this matter, the
CCAQ stated the purpose of the grant as being Io assis1the staK member in
meetingthe extraordinary expenseson leavingthe organization and retuming 10
his/her home wuntry. The CCAQ also noted the belief of the vanous organiza-
tions that the concept of the grant, as evolved over the years, and as applied in
the varying circumstances under which the grant was paid, adequately re-
sponded to employment policieslaid down by their respectivegoverning organs.
40. Thus, until 1978, the scale and conditions of entitlement remained
essentially the same from the original provisions governing the grant: staff
members who were eligiblefor the repatriation grant included those whom the
Organization was "obliged to repatriate" and the amount payable was depen-
dent upon the number of years of continuous service away from the staff

member's home country; the grant was payable whether or not repatriation or
relocation to a place outside the country of the last duty station took place; it
wasnot part of theconditions of eligibilitythat the staffmember should produce
zvidenceof repatriation or relocation.110 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

41. In resolution 311141of 17 December 1976(refcrrcd to in para. 37 abovc)
the Gencral Aswmhly had also mandated the ICSC:
"to examine, in the light of the news expresscd in the Fifth Committee

(a) The conditions for the provision of terminal payments (for example.
repatnation grant, termination indemnities). in particular on retircment,
and the possihility of estahli\hing a ceiling for the maximum aggregate of
entitlements 10these .a.ments."
42. In Iinewith this mandate the ICSC undenook a reviewof the repatriation
grant. among other topics. in its 1978report to the Gencral Aswmhly (Al33130).
This re\iew focused on the followinc iwo issues: lu,the justification for the
progressivescaleof amounts of the and (b) the appropriateness of paying
the grant to a staK member who, upon separation, did not return to his/her
home country (see para. 181,ibid.).The ICSC noted the purpose of the grant as
king a replacement of the previously existing expatriation allowance. Il took
the position that the progressive scale of the grant gave il the characteristics of
"an earned service benefit as well as an adhoc suhsidy" (para. 182, ibid.).
43. Concerning the element of repatriation as a condition for obtaining
payment, the lCSC considered that a strict interpretation of the term "repatria-
tion" meant that the grant should not be paid to a staKmember who remained in
thecountry of thelastduty stationor toastaflmember who relocatedto acountry
other than his home country, sincethe objective of the grant was to assis1in the
renatriation of the staKmember. But. like the CCAO. the ICSC reconnizedthat
thérc would k praciical difficulti& in monitoring the movemen~sand the
rçsidencesof former st~Kmembersafter separation fromservice.Thewdificulties
were pointcd out hy the representatives of the various organimtions:
"The representatives of the organizations...pointed out to the Commis-
sion the practical dificulties they would have in keeping track of the
movements of a former star member after he had left the service.The fact
that he had used his entitlement 10 repatriation travel would not be
wnclusive, since he might travel 10his home country but return immedi-
atelyaftemards to settle in his last duty-station country or go to some third
country." (Para. 184,ibid.)

44 The ICSC. however.dmded that the grant should not be paid io a staff
member who. on separation, remained permanently in the country of his last
duty station But 11also concluded that an international administrative netwo~k
for-monitoring the movements of former staff members, for the purpose of
verifying relocation, would be neither feasible nor desirahle. The ICSC thus
recommended that payment of the grant should he made conditional upon a
declaration of intent (rom the staff member:
"That requirement should come in10eKect(rom 1January 1979for new
staK members. If the organizations consider that some period of grace
should be allowed to servingstaKmembers who may already have planned
the place where they will reside after their separation on the assumption
that they will receive the grant, CCAQ should agree on a common
transitional measure." (Para. 186,ibid.)

45 In rcsolution 331119of 19December 1978,the Gcncral Assemhly agrced
wth the ICSC recommendation. The repatriation grant would no! be paid to a
staff memberwho remained at the last duty station afterseparation [rom wrnce.
The General Aswmbly funher decided that evidenceofactual rclmtion mus1 bc
produced hy the staKmember, suhject to terms IO be csiahlished hy the ICSC:
"(Thc General Assemhly)Decidesthat payment of the repaination grant
to entitlcd staK members shallbe made conditional upon ihc presentatlon WRlTTEN STATEMENTS 111

by the staffmembcr of evidenceof actual relocation. subject to the terms to
be established by the Commission."

46. In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the ICSC
considered the terms for the implementation of resolution 331119,in ils report
submitted to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly. in 1979
(A/34/30). The ICSC decided that the former staff member must provide
documentary evidence of his/her residence in another country. and that the
official request for the repatriation grant by the staff member must be made
within two years after separation from service.In regard to staff members who
retired after the new provision came in10effect but who had an expectalion of
receivingthe grant under the existing rules, the ICSC relied on advice from the
legal advisors of various organizations, including the Legal Counsel to the
Secretary-General. Supported by the jurispmdence of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, and by the opinions of the Legal Counsels that an
acquired right to the grant existed, the ICSC wncluded that entitlements to the
repatriation grant already earned by staff members wuld not be affected
retroactively by the new Staff Rule. However, entitlements accming after the
date of the change were ta be subject Io cornpliance with the new condition
(paras. 23 and 24, ibid.).
47. The Commission promulgated these terms in the document
.CIRC/GEN/39:
"The followingmodifications to the terms of entitlement to the repatria-
lion grant are established by the International Civil SeMce Commission in
pursuance of paragraph 4 ofisection IV of General Assembly resolution
331119:

(O) with effectfrom I July 1979payment of the repatriation grant shall be
subject ta the provision by the former staff member of evidence of
relocation away from the country of the last duty station;
(b) evidence of relocation shall be constituted by documentary evidence
that the former staff member bas established residence in a country
other than that of the las1duty station, such as a declaration hy the
immigration, police, tax or other authorities of the country, by the
senior United Nations official in the country or by the former staff
member's new employer;
(c) payment of the grant may he claimed by the former staff member
within two years of the effectivedate of separation;
(d) notwithstandingparagraph (O)above, staffmembersalready in seMce
hefore I July 1979shall retain the entitlement to repatriation grant
proportionate to the years and months of service qualifying for the
grant wbich they already had accrued al that date without the necessity
of production of evidence of relocation; the exerciseof any additional
entitlement accrued after that date shall. however, be subject 10 the
conditions set out in paragraphs (O) to (c) ahove."
48. It should te noted, in passing, tbat the position taken by the ICSC with
regard to the effectivedate of its terms (para. (d) of CIRC/GEN/39), was in
accordance with its own obligation to respect acquired rights-as contained in
Article 26 of its Statute. That Article reads:

"The Commission, in making its decisions and recommendalions, and
the executiveheads, in ap lying them, shall do so without prejudice to the
acquired rights of the staff under the staff regulations of the organizations
concerned."
49 The Secretary-Gcneral ndopted the terms prescnbed by the ICSC and
promulgated the decision in an Administrative Instmction (ST1A11262)of 23 WRllTEN STATEMENTS 113

55.At the 60th meetingof the Fifth Committee held on 27 November 1979the
Under-Secretary-General for Administration, Finance and Management, in an
attempt to dissuade the Fifth Committee from pressing fonvard with the draft
resolution proposed by the United States, pointed out that the ICSC decision
had been based upon the mandate given to it in General Assembly resolution
3311'19H. e further pointed out that:
". ..in a number of agencies, the ICSC decision had been considered and
accepted hy the respective legislative organs when they had adopted the
revisions to their respective skiff rules and regulations. In the United
Nations, the lCSC decision had already ken incorporated into the Staff

Rules. The provisions contained in part II of draft resolution A/C.
5134lL.23would have the effectof revoking a decision whichwas in process
of implementation by the agencies of the common system." (A/C.
5/34/SR.60, para. 59.)
In his view, the adoption of the draft resolution would hinder the ability of the
ICSC to discharge authoritatively its task of regulating and coordinating the
conditions of serviceapplied by the United Nations and the specializedagencies.
He adverted to the disparity which the resolution would introduce in10 the
common system, as follows:
"
ifthe Gener~iAs\emhly, whosecompetcncedid not extend beyond the
United Nations proper. were to rescind the ICSCdmsion in respectofstaff
mernbersof the Orianization. the resultina disparity in the practices of the
common system would be contrary to- the objéctives underlying the
mandate of ICSC. Such a decision would also inevitably be viewed by the
United Nations staffas discriminatory treatment and would lead 10appeals
to the AdministrativeTrihunal with al1the potential consequencesthat such
action might entail." (A/C.5/34/60, para. 60.)

56. Finally, the Under-Secretary-General pointed out the practice of the
United Nations to implement poljcy changes in the least disruptive manner
"either in order to respect acquired rights or simply to ensure a smooth
transition from one set of arrangements to another" (para. 61, ibid.).The draft
resolution, by its drastic and categorical nature, ran afoul of this practice.
57.The Fifth Committee al the 62nd meeting held on 28 November 1979,
adopted the draft tex1as pr~pos~d. The draît resolution stated the following:

"Decidesthat effectiveIJanuary 1980no staffmember shall beentitled to
any part of the repatriation grant unless evidence of relocation away from
the country of las1duty station is provided."
58. On the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, the General Assemblyon
17 December 1979adopted the draft tex1as resolution 341165.
59. In the Administrative Instruction, ST/A1/269 of 21 December 1979,
resolution 341165was prornulgated hy the Secretary-General with effect from
I January 1980. The Secretary-General amended Rule 109.5 by deleting
subparagraph (f) thereof, to implement the decision adopted by the General
Assembly.

B. TheProceedingsBeforethe UnitedNations AdministrafiveTribunal

60. The circumstances which led Mr. Moriished to filean application kfore
the United Nations Administrative Tribunal arc not in dispute. They are as set
forth on pages 2 to 5 ofludgcment No. 273 of the Tribunal.
61. Thecontentions of Mr. Mortished as wellas those of the Respondent are
also set forth on pages 5 to 7 of that Judgement.114 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

62. Based upon these contentions the Tribunal mled for Mr. Mortished on
two separate grounds. First, it look judicial notice of the personnel action form
issued by the Officeof Personnel Servicesto Mr. Mortished at the time of his
transfer from ICA0 to the United Nations, which had stated: "service recog-
nized as continuous from 14Febmary 1949"and "Credit towards repatriation
grant commences on 14 February 1949"; and consequently held (p. 9) that:

"Although tbese statements do not appear in the letter of appointment
itself, they nevertheless un uestionably constitute the explicit recognition
by the United Nations O? entitlement to the repatriation grant, and
validation for that purpose of more than nine years' service already

completed with ICAO.
In the Applicant's case,a formal referenŒwas thus made at the lime of
appointment to the repatriation grant and to the principle of the relation-
ship between the amount of that grant and length of service.As a result, the
Applicant is in the position noted by the Tnbunal in Judgement Nos. 95
and 142 cited above, namely, that special obligations towards him were
assumed by the United Nations."

63. Sewndly, after reviewingthe history and developments in relation 10the
repatriation grant up to and including the adoption of General Assembly
resolution 341165,the Tribunal observed that whatever link there might have
been between actual repatriation and the payment of the grant was broken in
Staff Rule 109.5 (a). The Tnbunal then went on to state as follows (p. 18):

"at no lime did the General Assembly contemplate supplementing or
amending the provisions relating 10the repatriation grant wntained in the
StalïRegulations. Nor did the Assemblyexamine the tex1of the StaffRules
in force since I July 1979.and it never claimed that there was any defect in
the provisions introduced on that date which diminished their validity. The
Assembly simply stated a principle of action which the Secretary-General
acted upon in establishing a new version of Staff Rule 109.5which, from

1 January 1980, replaced the version previously in force on the basis of
which the applicant could have obtained the repatriation grant."
64.The Tribunal then posed the question before it in the following terms
(p. 18):

"The question therefore anses whether the Applicant can rely on an
acquired right, failure to recognize which would giverise 10the obligation
to compensate for the injury sustained."

In answer to this question the Tribunal stated @p. 18-19):

"The Tribunal has been required 10consider on a number of occasions
whetheramodification inthe pertinent rulescould affectan acquired right. It
has held that respect for acquired rights.cames..witi.it the obligation to
respecttherightsof thestaff memberexpresslyjiipulated iRthewntract. The
Tribunal pointed out, in paragraph VI above, that entitlement to the
repatriation grant had been explicitly recognized al the lime of the
Applicant'sappointment, together with the relationship betweenthe amount

of the grant and the length of service. The Tribunal also pointed out in
paragraph VI1 above that ai the time of the Applicant's entry on dnty,
payment of thegrant did not requireendence ofrelocation to awuntryother
than that of thelast dutvstation. Further. IheTrihunal held that resDectfor
acquired rightsalsomeansthat al1thebenéfitsand advankges dueto ihestaff
....er for~-~r-~~es.....ered befor- ~ ~ - ~~.e in10 for~ ~ ~~ ~~~ .~ - ~~- nile
remain unaffected Therepatriation grani iscalculated according to lengthof
service.The amouni ofthegrant 1s'proporiionalto the lcngth ofservicc with WRllTEN STATEMENTS 115

the United Nations'.asstated inAnncxIVto iheStaff Regulations This Iink
u~ascxplicitlyreaffimed inStaRRule 109.5(11.whichrcferqio'ihe ycarsand
monihs ofscrvicequalifying for thegrani which(stdffmembers]alrc~dyh3d
accmed' asof 1July 1979.Consequentlv, thelink estahlishedby theGeneral
Assembly and the kretary-General bétweenthe amount of ihe grant and
length of service entitles the Applicant to invoke an acquired right,
notwithstandine the lems of Staff Rule 109.5 which came in10 force on
1 1anuary 1980 withthc ilelciion of subparagraph (1, concerning thc
transitiondl s)stcm As in the sase of Judgemcnt No. 266 (Cupio,, il is
incumheni upon the Tribunal to asms thc L.on,equenccsof an). failurc tu
recognize an acquired right.
XVI.By making payment of the Applicant's repatriation rant condi-
tional on the production of evidenceof relocation, the ~esponlent failedto
recognize the Applicant's acquired right, which he held hy virtue of the
transitional svstem in force from 1Julv to 31 December 1979and set forth
in Stafi ~ule.109.5If)."

65.The Trihunal then ruled, on the hasis of the foregoing, that an injury had
been perpetrated on Mr. Mortished as a result of a disregard of his acquired
rights-this disregard being manifested in the deletion of suhparagraph (f)of
Staff Rule 109.5. Thus, having recognized that General Assembly resolution
341165 had been given immediate effect by the Secretary-General to delete,the
transitional system which had accorded respect to Mr. Mortished's acquired
rights, therehy causing him injury, the Tribunal went on to rule that Mr. Mor-
tished was "entitled to compensation for that injury", the compensation10 be
assessed "al the amount of the repatriation grant of which payment was
refused".

C. Action Takenby the Secrerary-GeneraP l ursuantro JudgemenrNo. 273

66.Judgement No. 273 was rendered by the Tribunal on 15 May 1981.
According to Article II of the Statute of the Trihunal:
"If a member State, the Secretary-General or the person in respect of
whom a judgement has been rendered by the Trihunal (including any one
who has succeeded to that person's rights on his death) objects to the
judgement on the ground that the Tribunal has exceededilsjurisdiction or
competence or that the Tribunal has failed to exercisejurisdiction vested in
il, or has erred on a question of lawrelating to the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations, or has committed a fundamental error in procedure
whichhas occasioned a failure ofjustice, such member StaietheSecrelary-
General or the person concerned may, within 30 daysfrom rhedureof the
judgemenr,make a wrirren applicorionto rhe Commitreeesrablishedby
paragroph 4 of rhis article asking the Comnrirreeto requesran advisory
opinionof rhe InrernorionolCourrof Justiceon rhemarrer ..." (Emphasis
added.)
The Secretary-General did not avail himselfof this provisi10initiale a request
for the advisory opinion of the Court.
Furthemore, according to Article 12of the same Statute:

"The Secretary-General or the applicant may apply to the Trihunal for a
rension of a judgement on the basis of the discoveryof some fact of such a
nature as to be a decisivefactor, which fact was, when the judgement was
given, unknown to the Tribunal and also to the party claiming revision,
always provided that such ignorance was not duc 10 negligence. The
application mus1k made within 30 days of the discovery of the fact and116 APPLICATIO NOR REVIEW

within one year of the date of the judgement. Clerical or arithmetical
mistakes injudgments, or errors arising therein from any accidental slipor
omission, may at any lime be corrected hy the Trihunal either of its own
motion or on the a~..ication of any of the parties."
The Secretary-General has not a.vailedhimselfof this provision to apply to the
Tribunal for a revision of Judgement No. 273.
68. Lastly, under Article IV of the provisional rules of procedure of the
Committee
"Article IV

1.Theother party to the proceedings before theAdministrativeTrihunal
or the parties in those cases where the application is made by a member
State may, within seven days from the date on which the copy of the
application is sent by the Secretary, submit in writing to the Secretary ils
comments with respect to the application.
2. Comments of a party, or parties, shall be suhmitted in sixcopies in any
one of the fiveofficialla-gua-es of the United Nations."
69 Following the application of the United SlaicsGovernmeni for a rcvicwof
Judgemeni No. 273,hou.ever,ihr Scyrctary.Generüladvised ihc Commiti~ ihat
he was not availing himselfof his right to suhmit comments on the application
(Dossier,doc. No.%).
70.Apart from the Secretary-General not having in any way questioned or
impugned the Judgement, theOfficeof Personnel Servicessought from the Office
of Legal Affairs the latter's advice as to the scope of the Judgement. The
Secretary-General subsequently took the position that the Judgement applies
only to Mr. Mortished because of the statement in the Judgement to the effect
that "special obligations towards him were assumed hy the United Nations".
Accordingly,the rights of three other staffmembers, from whom payment of the
repatriation grant was withheld, to file appeals before the Administrative
Trihunal were preservedfor the pcriod of 90 days as of the lime the Judgement
would have become final (Annex 1).

D. Action before the Commitreeon ApplicationsJor Reviewof Administrative
Tribunal Judgemenis

71.On 15June 1981the United States in a communication addressed to the
Acting Legal Counsel, applied to the Committee on Applications for Reviewof
Administrative Trihunal Judgements to request an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice on Judgement No. 273.
72.A copy of the United States communication was sent to the parties to the
proceedings hefore the Administrative Tribunal on 16 June 1981 and to the
members of the Committee on 25 June 1981.
73.The Committeemet on 9 and 13July 1981.According to the Report of the
Committee (A/AC.86/25) as well as the transcript of its proceedings, the
Committeewas composed of 29member States. However, no officialrecord was
taken or kept of the members of the Committee present at the Committee's
meetings.To elicit this information, a request dat22 October 1981,wasmade
hy counsel for Mr. Mortished addressed to the Secretary to the Committee, in
responseto whichthe latter supplied thefollowing"unofficial" lis1of the member
States which werepresent (see Annex II). They were represented as follows:
Canada - Mr. Philippe Kirsch
France - Mr. Michel Lennuyeux-Comnène
Germany, Fed. Rep. of - Dr. Karl Borchard WRIïTEN STATEMENTS

Greece - Mr. Dimitri G. Rallis
Honduras - Dr. Mario Carias
Malaysia - Mr. A. W. Omardin
Morocco - Mr. Rachid Lahlou
Pakistan - Mr. Adamou Seydou
Portugal - Mr. Fernando Andresen
Romania - Mt. Ion Diaconu
Senegal - Mr. Balla Mandau Dia
Tunisia - MI. Hamda Kbaier
USSR - MI. Yury Gregoryevich Petrov
United Kingdom - MI. Michael F. H. Stuart
United States - MI. Robert B. Rosenstock
Zimbabwe - MI. Eubert Paul Mashaire
74.As noted in paragraph 69 above, the Secretary-General, by a memoran-
dum dated 23June 1981,advised the Cornmitteethat he wasnot availinghimself
of his right under Article IV of the provisional rules of procedure of the
States (A/AC.86/R.99).mments on the application presented hy the United
75.In a letter dated 23 June 1981 to the Secretarv of the Committee. Mr.
Sylvanus A. Tiewul, counsel for Mr. Mortished, communicated commen'tson
the application presented by the United States (A/AC.86/R.100). In the same
letter. the Committee was requested to allow counsel for Mr. Mortished to be
present during ils proceedings, and, if necessary, to make statements in ex-
planation of or in addition to his written comments in defence of Mr. Morti-
was further requested by counsel for Mr. Mortished iusessions be open,mittee
that ils proceedings be recorded, and that an officialtranscript be produced and
made available within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the proceedings.
76.The Committee was alsoinfonned that the President of the StaffCommit-
tee of the Staff Union at the United Nations Headquarten had sent a letter
dated 29June 1981requesting that a representative of the Union k admitted as
an observer to the delibetations of the Committee.
an official transcript (docs. A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I; A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2; and
A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2/Add.l+alt ihouantained its practice of holding
closed meetings. -
78.On the issue of the participation of counsel for Mr. Mortished and of a
Star Union renresentative. the Committee at ils first meetinp.deferred a decision
but proceeded'with ils consideration of the United States a plication-without
the participation of counsel for Mr. Mortished, or AUn!ion representa-
tive. At its second meeting, the Cornmittee reverted to the question of counsel's
ils deliberations. During the discussions on the issue, some members of theom
Committee supported the participation of counsel for Mr. Mortished and his
righi to make statements. For example, Mr. Stuart of the United Kingdom
stated:
"In the past il has been the practice of the Committee to consider
ap lications for review in closed session, without allowing to be present
eit er the Representative of the Secretary-General, qua litigant in the case
under consideration, or the counsel of the staff member involved. In the
past, however. the applications for review have always ken made by staff
members. and the prewnt casc ir the tirsi in which a memberState has made
providés for this right of member States, but il has in the pas1 beenunal118 APPLICATIO FNOR REViEW

suggested ihat exercise of the nght by a member Süiic might put the staK
member ina posiiion of inequaliiy before the Commiitee. since a memher
State isboih iudre and advocate in theww. whcrcasthe swlimcrnbcr isnoi
represented kf&e the Committee.
The lntemational Court, moreover, has said that it would have to give
careful thou-~t ~ ~~his areument if a case ever arose.
~ ~ ~~~..st ....numbe; of-~a-~~-~-e~ ~ ~~ ~~~-~~-~te aool-,s.for the
reuew isunlikclyto bcgreat: historysccmsto bear ihatoui. &thai asit may,
the concessionto Mr. Mortished'scounsel whichI think WC should makc in
thepresent casewouldnot beconceded asa right, nor would it beaprecedent
for caseswherethe application wasmade by a stalimember. 1hopethat this
point willhelo to reisiure those memhers of the Committee who have ken
ieluctant to make the concession.
The more important argument, however, is that unless we agree to the

aitendance of Mr. Mortished'scounsel and to hearing a statementfrom him,
there is a real danger that the lntemational Court may decline to give an
advisory opinion. It would, 1suggest, be highly undesirable that weshould
agree Io request an advisory opinion, only to have the Court refuse to give
one?

Statements in support of the admission of Mr. Mortished's counsel were also
made by Mr. Rallis of Greece (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, pp. 4-9, Mr. Seydou of
Niger (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I, p. 18),Mr. Kbaier of Tunisia (ibid.), and Mr. An-
dresen of Portugal (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, pp. 18-20).
79. In opposiTioi to the request of M-r:Mortished, Mr. Rosenstock of the
United States had stated:

"We are not required to decide that the Administrative Tribunal has
exceededilsjurisdiction. Weare not required to decidethat the Administra-
tive Tribunal has erred on a question of law relating to the Charter. The
issue of the Tribunal's having exceeded ils jurisdiction and erred on the
question of law relating to the Charter has been placed before this
Committee in the application, to which referencehas already been made.
What this Committee is obligated to decide is not whether thal application
is right or wrong-much lessother questions-but merelywhether there isa
substanlial basis forthe application. The issuestherefore are primarily the
authority of the Administrative Tribunal and questions of law relating to
the Charter, and it seemsto us ihat a case can be made that, once we have
accepted the written material fromthe counsel for Mr. Mortished, there are
not issues before us uniquely within the competence of Mr. Mortished's
counsel on which he must be heard in order for justice in fact 10bc done."
(A/AC.Bo(XX)/PV.1,p. 16.)

80.The Committee decided, by 5 votes to 2 witb 9 abstentions, against the
participation of counsel for Mr. Mortished, (see A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, p. 16).
81. In the course of the debate on the participation of counsel for Mr. Mor-
tished, a numher of delegates made statements-such as that just quoted
abov&n the scope of the Committee's functions. The United States delegate,
for instance, again stated:

"we are not here to litigateor passjudgement upon al1of the issuesinvolved
in the case; we are here to decide wbetber or not there is sufficientment in
the concem that the Administrative Tribunal has or may have exceededils
jurisdiction, or committed an error of law in relation to an interpretation of
the Charter.. ." (p. 29, A/AC.8600()/PV.l).

Subsequently be reverted Io this issue in the following lems: WRITTEN STATEMENTS 119

"it is not necessaryfor this Committee to reach any conclusions with regard
to whether or not the Administrative Tribunal has in faci committed an
error of law withrelation to the Charter. ..Nor is il necessaryto conclude
that the Administrative Tribunal has erred or exceeded ils jurisdiction or

competence;rather, weneed merelyindicate that there is a substantial basis
in these issueswhich the United States delegate has presented and that they
are sufficientlyserious 10 merit the advice of the International Court of
Justice." (Ibid., p. 32.)
And again:

"As has ken suggestedcarliçr. uh3t is invol\ed here is not a decisiun by
ihis body that the Administratlvc Tribunal hai committed one of the four
errors Iistcd in Article II of the Staiute" (ai p. 3of A AC.R6(XX)PV.2).

82.Mr. Diaconu of Romania also stated, on this same issue:
"We needpronounce only on the question whether there is a substantial
basis, a hasis in fact, for referring the request to the Court for an advisory
opinion. That is Ourtask. As to the other questions, il willbe for the Court
to look into them because othenvise we ourselves would be deciding the
matter. If weal1Saythat the Tribunal bas committed an error, then what is
the International Court to Say?If we,here, al1say that the Court [sic] has,
for example,exceededits competence,wewould be sayingwhat the Court is
supposed to say." (At p. 37, ibid.)

83. On the other hand, some of the representatives on the Committee, like
counsel for Mr. Mortished in his written comments (doc. A/AC.86/R.100, p. 9),
maintained that the auestions of error of law relatinr! to the orov~sionsof the
United Nations chaiter and of excess of jurisdictionor comktence were not
before the Committee. Mt. Lennuyeux-Comnène of France, for example,
pointed out that those two grounds had no1been invoked by the United States
in ils application:

"1 n~-~~~~t~ ~ in ils a~~ri~ation the United States does not exolicitlv
invoke any of thesc grounds. in any case. il certainl) makçs no refercnce 10
an error in prosedure or to a Mure by the Tribunal tu exerciscjurisdiction
vested in il. It'does no1claim that the Tribunal e~ceeded11sjurisdiction or
competence ..." (see pp. 38-40or A AC 86tXX) PV.1).

84.Although the representative of France agreed with other representatives
that
"the Committee isnot a court of law;it isnot compelent tojudge the caseal
issue; it can only decide whether the United States application is well
founded" (ibid p..,38-40)

he proceeded to argue that the application was nor well founded (pp. 38-42,
ibid.).
85.The Committee returned to the issue of the participation of ~r. Morti-
shed'scounsel at its secondmeeting. After further discussion on thejssue as well
as on some of the other issues raised in the application, the Committee decided
hy 5 votes to 2 in favour with9 abstentions to exclude Mr. Mortished's counsel.
86. It appears from the lranscri that the Committee's decision to exclude
counsel for Mr. Mortished was taken on the basis of the argument that the
Committee would not itself decide the merits of the application, with regard to
the grounds of error of law and excess of jurisdiction. Thus, in explaining his
vote against the participation of counsel for Mr. Mortished, MI. Lahlou of
Morocco stated:

"My delegation voted against the proposal for the followingreasons: we 120 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

feltthat wewereconsideringan application suhmitted by the United States.
The applicant is present here and is in the position to defend the casebefore
the Committee. Therefore what weare discussineis not the substance of the
Mortished case because, if that were so, the presence of counsel for
Mr. Mortished and of Mr. Mortished himself would have been necessary.
What we are considering is simply the United States application, and 1
think that in suhmitting its application, the United States delegation knows
how matters stand and is capable of defending its case." (P. 21 of
A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2.)
87. Other statements in explanation of vote were made as follows:

Mr. Seydou of Niger:
"At this stage, 1should like to explain my position. Niger seesno reason
why counsel for Mr. Mortished should not attend our proceedings as an
observer, without participating in them, because we consider, first, that his
presence could ohviate any misunderstanding that might suhsequently
anse-perhaps not during Our discussion but during the process upon
whichwehaveemharked in consideringthe application made hy the United
States-and, secondly,that Mr. Mortished's presenceshouldnot be accom-
panied hy any statement from him, sincewe are not considering the merits
of the case. As we are only considering the application made hy the United
States, we feelthat Mr. Mortished has no reason to intervene and that any
individual or delegate who digresses from the application that has been
suhmitted, and entersinto the merits of the Mortished case, could be called
to order by the Chairman. Therefore Mr. Mortished should have no say in
this discussion." (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, p. 17.)

Mr. Andresen of Portugal:
"The decisions that we shall be taking here relate to the exerciseby the
Administrative Tribunal of its powers, as well as the Tribunal's relations
with the General Assemhly. They will have a direct effecton an individual.
We have listened with the utmost interest to the arguments of the United
States and other delégations as to why this matter should be suhmitted to
the International Court. 1do not wish to go into any details, but 1suhmit
that perhaps Mr. Mortished's counsel would have presented arguments on
why it should not be submitted to the Court.
The clear imbalance between a memher State that is a member of this
Committee and an individual would suggest to us that it would have been
prudent for Mr. Mortished's counsel to be present here. That is why we
voted in favour of the proposal to that effect." (Ibid., pp. 18-20.)

88. On the issueof the attendance of a representative of the Staff Union raised
the Committee. The Committee ignored the issue and thus implicitly excludedn hy
such an attendance.
89. On the merits of the United Statesapplication, the Committee considered
these indirectly, as shown in paragraphs 81-84ahove, in the context of the issue
of the participation of Mr. Mortished's counsel;but it also considered the merits
of the application on their own. The United Stateshad invited the Committee to
find the application meritorious on the grounds that the Tribunal had not given
due weight to the actions of the General Assemhly and tbat, by failing to give
such "due weight" to the actions of the General Assemblythe Tribunal bad ipso
facto violated Article 101of the Charter.
90. In their staiemcnis various rcpresentaiivessimilarly based their viewof ihe
meriis of the application on the notion ihat ihc Tribunal had set aside a Ciencrül
Assembly resoluiion Thus the following siaiements wcre made: WRlTTEN STATEMENTS

Mr. Stuart of the United Kingdom:

"The situation confronting us is one in which the General Assemblyhas
said one thing clearly and unambiguously and the Administrative Tribunal
has taken a dtîïerent viewof the matter. If wewere not to decideto reauest
an advisory opinion, we would-as the representative of ~akistan' has
pointed out-be deciding in eiTecttbat the Administrative Tribunal was
right and the General Assembly waswrong. 1do no1think it would be right
for us.in this Committee IO take such a weighty decision. If we did so, it
would meau that Ibis Committee, as a subsidiary body of the General
Assembly, was making a judgment on an issue on which the General
Assembly itself had decided diîïerently." (P. 3, A/AC.860<X)/PV.2.)

Mr. Rallis of Greece:
"My delegation's opinion is much in line with what hasjus1been said by
the representative of the United Kingdom. The case before us involves a
contradiction between a decisionof the General Assemblyand a Judgement
of the Administrative Tribunal?1do not wishto gointo the substance of the
matter, because we shall not be deciding that here, but 1think it would be
useful to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.
Nol to do so could constitute a prejudgement of the matter." (Ibid., pp. 4-
5.)

Mr. Dia of Senegal:
"We have before us the Administrative Tribunal's Judgement, which is
based on the principle of acquired rights, and we also have General
Assemblvresolution 341165.in whichit was decidedthat effective I Januaw
1980no ;taîïmcmber shall be entitled to any pan of the repatriation grani
unlessevidenceofrelocation away from the country of the last duty station
.. =. -.--- .
It was on the basis of this General Assemblydecision that the Secretary-
General took the position which we know he took-and we al1know that
he had no alternaiive.

Consequently, and as the United Statesnote emphasizes,the issuethat is
Administrative Tribunal gave due weight to the actions of the Generalse, the

AssThe States that are members of the Committee did not oppose the
adoption of resolution 341165 at the time. Without making a value

judgment concerning the merits of this resolution, the Committee can
hardly fail to give due weight to a decision in which its members
participated. My delegation therefore feels that it is only right to ask the
International Courtof Justiceto givean advisory opinion onthe Judgcment
if only to ensure that the Secretary-General does not find himself in a
similar situation again in the future." (Ibid., pp. 21-22.)
Mr. Diaconu of Romania:

"With regard to the question before us, we proceed from the assumption
that the General Assembly'sresolutions in this field are binding and that
thev must be comnlied with bv al1United Nations bodies. In this instance it
isdear that the Gretarv-General ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~cretariat orooerlv followed un
the General Assembly's;esolution byfirst inîorporii& ii'intkc ta^ ÜuÏ&
and subsequently ensuring its implementation. Itis Ourbelicfihai clear-cul
resolutions ofihe United Naiions Gencral Assemblycdnnol be cour.iered
hy the use, as in this case, of interpretations, conceptions of legal
constmctions which could nullify the content of these resolutions and WRlTïEN STATEMENTS 123

law relating to the provisions of the Charter necessarily meant that the
Committee also felt that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction or compe-
tence. ln his own words:
''1wishmerelyto explain that wevoted in favour of the question that had
been put to the Committee on the basis that it did not hy any means
exclude,but rather subsumed, the other ground of exceedingjurisdiction or
competence." (Ibid., p. 46; seealso, ibid., p. 48.)

94.The Chairman disputed the interpretation of the vote of the Committee
whïch the United States representative advanced. The Chairman stated:
"1 wish to recall that, after deliberating on the matter for some time, the
Committee decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court on the
hasis of one of the grounds included in Article II." (Ibid., pp. 49-50.)

95.Following this statement, the United States delegate requested that the
additional ground of excess of jurisdiction be put before the Comrnittee (p. 51,
ibid.). At his repeated requests the Chairman put the following additional
question before the Committee:

"The United States aoolication also invokesthe eround that the Tribunal
has exceeded~t~jurisdi~iionor competence. 1stheCommittce of the view
ihït there is a suhsianiial hasis for requcsting an advisory opinion irom ihs
Iniemïtiondl Court of Justice on that ground?' (Ibld., p. 54.)
96. By 10 votes in favour to 2 against. wiih 6 ab$ientions. ihc Cornmittee
immediaiel}answrred that question in the aflirmaii\e, wiihout any discussionof
ulhat the Tribunal's jurisdiction or cornpeience covercd or did not cover (ibtd.,
pp. 55-59).
97. On the issue of the formulation of the question to be suhmitted to the

Court for an advisory opinion, the representative of France had proposed that
the Committee amend the formulation of the question to be submitted to the
Court, as contained in the United States application, by substituting the words
"could not be given immediate effect" with the words "could not take effect
retroactively" (ibid.,pp. 52-53).After the decision,he withdrew hisproposal and
disassociated himself from the decisions taken hy the Committee (ibid., p. 60).
98.The Committee went on to agree that the request for an advisory opinion
should be on the question as submitted by the United States, namely:
"1s the judgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in
Judgement No. 273, Mortished v. the Secretary-General, warranted in
determining that General Assemhlyresolution 341165of 17December 1979
could no1 be given immediate effect in requiring, for the payment of
repatriation grants, evidence of relwation to a country other than the
country of the staffmember's last duty station?" (Ibid., p. 63.)

E. Concerningthe Proceedings beforethe International Courtof Justice

99. On 20July 1981the Secreiary of the C:ommitiec(nformed Mr Monishcd
and his counsel by cable that the Cornmiitcc had decided on 13July 1981to
gran! the a~~lication of the United States for a request of the Court's advisoiy
opinion.
1Oû.Bya letter dated 29 July 1981the Secretary of theCommitteetransmitted
to MI. Mortished and his counsel copies or the transcript of the Committee's
proceedings at its twentieth session.
101.By a letter dated 17September 1981the Legal Counsel to the Secretary-
General communicated to Mr. Mortished's wunsel a copy of a letter dated 10124 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

August 1981from MI. A. Pillepich,Deputy-Registrar of the Court.The letter of
the Denutv-Reeistrar of the Court wnîained information on the Order of the
Court Bxi& 30%ctober 1981as the time-limit within which written statements
we. . . .. . --.... -... ... -o. -. ..
102.By a Ieiter dated 23 Septembcr 1981addressed to the kgal Counsel Io
the Secretary-General. counsel TorMr. Mortished referred to the failure until
17 September 1981 10 communicate to either MI. Mortished or himself the
information on the time-limit for filinga statement. He requested an additional
one month, namely until30 November 1981,to compensatefor part of the time
los1as a result of the failure of wmmunication. The time factor. the letter stated.
was imnortanl in view of the lime constraints under which internal vol un tee^
counsei work.
103.Bya letter dated 24September 1981addressed to the Registrar, the Legal
Counsel to the Secretary-General informed the Court of the request for an
extension of the time-limit for filing a written statement and expressed the
support of the Secretary-General for the extension.
104.Bya cable dated 6 Oclober 1981,the Registrar of the Court informed the
Legal Counsel to the Secretary-General of the Court's decision to extend to 30
November 1981the time-limit for the filingof a written statement.

Part iII. Eliboration of Plesdings

A. Inosmuchas rhe Procedureby n,hichihe Adirsory Opinion War Reque.ried
Allo>ila Memkr SruteWhichWu no1a Parr)' IO iheOriginalProceeJings beJorr

rheAdminislraliveTrrbwiul IOReuursra RPVIZH.~th ~eJudeemenrof iheTrthuwl.

1. It impinges upon the authority of the Secretary-General under Article 97 of
the United Nations Charter as Chief Administrative Officerof the Organi-
zation, and conflicts with Article 100 of the Charter regarding the
"exclusivelyinternational character" of the Secretanat.

105.According to Article 97 of the United Nations Charter:

"The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the
Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He
shall be the chief adminisrrutiveoflcer of the Organizaiion." (Emphasis
added.)
106. As Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization the Secretary-
General appoints staff to the secretariat and promulgates staff mles and
administrative instmctions for the mnning of the secretariat, subject only to
"regulations" established by the General Assemhly(Article 101of the Charter).

The appointment of staffis effectedby a contract between the Secretary-General
as chie administrative officerand the person concerned. Although this contract
incorporates statutory elements by reference to the Staff Regulations and Staff
Rules, ils contractual and personal characteristics remain: detailed conditionOF.
service are negotiated and concluded on a case by case hasis; each contract
stipulates ils own duration and soon.The settlement of disputes ansing out of a
staff member's contract is therefore a primary responsibility of the Secretary-
General in his capacity as the chief administrative officerof the Organization.
Towards the discharge of this function the Secretary-General has established
internal machinery to consider staff appeals-namely the Joint Appeals
Board-to make recommendations 10him which he may accept or reject. But
further recourse may be had to the Administrative Tribunal of the United WRITTEN STATEMENTS 125

Nations, ifthe interna1machinery failsto achievea satisfactory settlement of the
dispute. In that event, the Secretary-General appears as respondent before the
Administrative Tribunal in the same capacity as Chief Administrative Officerof
theOrganization. Whenthe Administrative Tribunal has rendered itsjudgement,
the Secretary-General may, if he does not wish to accept and implement the
judgement, apply for its review.(See Article 11of the Statute of the Tribunal.)
107.The procedure contained in Article II of the Statute of the Trihunal
allows a member State to inject itself into a dispute between the Secretary-
General and his staff. It allows any member State to force the Secretary-General
to refrain from accepting and implementing an otherwise final and binding
judgement. We suhmit that such an intervention by a member State impinges
upon the position of the Secretary-General as Chief Administrative Officer of
the Organization, contrary to Article 100of the Charter.
108.In fact, in the dehates leading to the adoption of Article 11,a number of
delegates had raised this same objection (among others) to the procedure
exemplified inthe instant case. Thus, Mr. Menon of India had stated:

"1suggestthat this is not only against the principlesofjurisprudence and
the ordinary requirements of law, legal proceedings and equity, but also
contrarv to the Charter itself. It is contrarv to Article ..0.oa-.rraoh .. of
the Charter, which says:
'Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclu-
sively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-
Generaland the staiï and not seekto influencethem in the dischargeof their
responsibilities'." (General AssemGly.Oflcial Records, Tenrh Session, 8
November 1955,p. 280.)

MI. Nincic of Yugoslavia had also stated:
"We wuld not-nor can we even now-see how the right of States to
initiale the reviewprocedure can be brought in10conformity with either the
spirit or the letter of Article 100of the Charter, and in particular with the
obligations of memher States to 'respect the exclusively international
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staiï'."
(Ibid., p. 286.)

Another reference to this had also heen made hy MI. Holmhack of Sweden:
"there is a danger that the proposal for granting a member State whichwas
not a party to a case judged hy the Trihunal the right to make an
application against the Tribunal's decision in that case may lead to a
situation in which members of the secretariat will be influenced in the
discharge of their respnnsihilities-and that is contrary to the spirit of
Article 100of the Charter" (ibid., p. 287).

109.Judgement No. 273 resolved a dispute between MI. Mortished and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as the Chief Adminis-
trative Officer of the Organization and employer of MI. Mortished. As the
information contained in paragraphs 60 and 61 above shows, this dispute
spanned over a two-year period during which Mr. Mortished and similarly
situated staff expressed concern on the subject of repatriation grant payments.
IIO.The intervention by a member State in disputes hetween the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and his staff-as in the instant case-has the
automatic e+ct of preventinp the Secretary-General, contrary to his wishes,
from accepting and honounng a particular judgement of the Trihunal. We
Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities,contrary to the above-
cited provisions of the United Nations Charter.126 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

111.Furthemore, paragraph 1 of Article 100 states that:

"ln the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the Staff
shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any
other authority extemal to the Organization. They shall refrain from any
action which might. reflect on their position as international officials

responsible only to the Organization."
II2 The procedure which ihs inierventionofa member Statc brings intoaction
cntails thai ihe staff mcmkr suhmit wriitcn obsçrvationq on the applicationof

thai Siaie to the Commitiee on Applicaiions for Rcview oi Administrati\c
Tribunal Judgcmcnis. (Sec.Article IV of ihr Commiitec's Provisional Rules of
Procedure.) in stating his observations, a staff member in whose favour a
judgement has been rendered will necessarilychallenge the viewsof the member
State concerned regarding the judgement; he might for instance request the
Committee 10 dismiss the application as lacking a substantial basis. He might
furthemore be tempted to lobby members of the Committee towards accepting
hispoint of view.Andeven ifsuch astaffmemberweretodesist fromany lobbying
of the members of the Committee toward his viewpoint, wesubmit that the mere
fact of having to challenge the applicant government, and the processof pursuing

this challenge through the necessarily adversary character ofjudicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings,jeopardizes the staffmember inthe performance of hisduties
as an international official,contrary to paragraph 1of Article 100.

2. It violates the general principles governingjudicial review.

Il? We contend that this nrocedure allowine a third nartv to raise obiections

United Nations Organization. The United States, though a member State of the

United Nations. was not the em~lover of Mr. Mortished and therefore no1privy
to the contraci which was th& sibject-matter of the proceedings beforë the
Tribunal. Nor was the United States Dartv 10those Droceedines.
115.Thus, the United States had nô leial right or'standing';n respect of the
contractual di-~-r~~~etween Mr.~Morti--.- a~~-~-~-~ ~~etarv-General ,f -~e ~
United Nations. The judgement rendered in that dispute~is res judicara as
between Mr. Mortished and the Secretary-General. The United States does no1
derive any legal rightsnor incur any legal obligations in consequence of that
judgement.
116.Not only did the United States have no legal interest in the proceedings:

its intervention gratuitously infringed on the rights of the parties to the original
proceedings-particularlyon the rights of Mr. Mortished, in whose favour a
judgement has ben rendered by a bonajde judicial body and accepted without
question by the Respondent, the Secretary-General. The vindication of
Mr. Mortished's legal rights has thus been compromised, undermined, and
delayed by this gratuitous intervention. As argued in paragraph 110above, this
gratuitous intervention also prevents the Secretary-General from honouring a
iudgement of the Administrative Tribunal which the Secretary-General himself
Is Lot questioning.
117.In its Advisory Opinion of 1973,the Court adverted 10the propriety of
the initiation of proceedings for the review of Administrative Tribunal judge-

ments hy a member State no1 party to the original proceedings before the
Tribunal. The Court left that question open al the time, stating that
"these arguments introduce additional considerations which would cal1for closeexamination by the Court if it should receivea request for an opinion
resulting from an application to the Commitlee by a member State"
(p. 178).

118.As noted in paragraph 108 above, the propriety of proceedings king
initiated by a member State had also been questioned by several delegations in
the debates leading to the adoption of Article II of the Tribunal's Statute. In
fact, MI. Bihin of Belgium had submitted a draft resolution proposing that the
legalityof that procedure be referred Io the lnternational Court of Justice for an
advisory opinion:

"The Belgian delegation has submitted to the General Assemblya draft
resolution (AlL.199) under which the lnternational Court of Justice would
be requested to give an advisory opinion on the draft resolution recom-
mended by the Fifth Committee. ...
States of the United Nations the right to initiate the review ofAdministra-
tive Tribunal judgements. II may be asked whether the recognition of this
nght would be in keeping with the Charter. In any case, it is inconceivable
that a State no1 a party to a dispute before the Administrative Tribunal
should be able to challenge a decision which is satisfactory to both parties.
In addition to these considerations, the actual legal basis of the draft
resolution must be examined. The Assembly cannot adopt it unless it is
certain that it complieswith law. Nearly half the countriesthat look part in
the discussions asserted the contrary, and the most serious doubts were
expressed, especially with regard to the conformity of the draft with the
letter and the spirit of the Charter, with the Statute of the International
Court of Justice and with the statute of the Administrative Tribunal, and
with regard Io ils consistencywith the contractual obligations of the United
Nations towards ils staff members . ..
Neither the Secretary-General nor the qualified representativesof United
Nations staff members consider ilnecessaryto organize a reviewprocedure
for Administrative Tribunal judgements. In any case, the question involves
the verv interests of the international oreanization and of ils staff. and is
sufficie~tlyimportant for al1 the tke ah al1 the care it deserves to be
devoted to il." (Grneru1 Assembly.ODrial Rerordï. Tenrh Sess~un. 8
Novemher 1955,p. 277.)

119.These arguments weresupported by a number of delegaies. For instance,
Mr. Menon of India:

"Last year, the General Assembly decided to accept the principle of
judicial review. My delegation voted for the acceptance of that princi-
ple-as a matter of compromise, in order to obtain agreement on the
resolution at that lime. We stand by our acceptance of the principle of
jprocedures now proposed are in consonance with that pnnciple. saying that the
My delegation questions that and does not agree that the procedures
proposed by the Fifth Committee are consistent with the principle of
judicial review.We say further that they are not consistent with the Statute
of the International Court of Justice or with the Charter of the United
Nations. .. .
Now the dispute in these matters-the cause of action, in legalterms-is
between the Secretary-General, as the employer in this case, and the staff
member. The member State does not enter into this at all, and 1think that it
is an elementary principle ofjurisprudence that you cannot at the stage of
an appeal bring into court a party that is not a party to the proceedings.A128 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

judicial proceeding is a continuous matter, and if you want to introduce
another party you must do it through judicial proceedings.
Here a member State is giventhe initiative to intervene, and the dispute is
noi between the member State and the staff member. The dispute, as it is
referred to theTribunal, is hetweenthe Secretary-General, on the onehand,
and the staffmember on the other, and the introduction of a third party in a
dispute ispossiblein civildisputes only by a process known asamicuscuriue
(ftiend of the court). That is not the position that isclaimed by the member
State. The member State becomes a litigant and-at this stage, not the
original stage-the member State is introduced as a party and has rights
which are not only full rights but even more than full rights in this c....
Therefore, whether one looks at it from the point of viewof the Charter,
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, or the elementary
principles of civilized jurispmdence, or of the equities in the case, the
procedure recommended, namely, the setting up of a political committee to
decide whether there should be a review or not, is a violation of the
decisions taken last year (resolution 888 (IX) and of the principles of
judicial review).
Therefore we cannot support the draft resolution recommended hy the
tion, we are, however, prepared at this stage to support the Belgian draft
resolution (AlL.199). It is a very much more moderate draft resolution."
(Ibid pp . 279-281.)

Mr. Tarazi of Syria in support of the Belgian proposal:
"11willbe remembered that, after the discussion in the Fifth Committee,
we were faced with a situation in which the attitude finally adopted by the
Committee did no1meet with the approval ofal1the delegations. Those who
disapproved wereprompted bylegalscmples, as the United States represen-
tative hasjust said. Despite the doubts voicedby delegations which did not
believe in the possibility of having recourse to the International Court of
Justice and did not recognize the Court's right to pronounce on Adminis-
trativeTribunal judgements, either by way ofhearing appeals, or by way of
rendering advisory opinions, the Fifth Committee adopted the draft
resolution now before the General Assembly.
The Belgian representative, in submitting his .delegalion's draft, has
attempted to carry the study of this question further. 1consider the draft
resolution reasonable, wise and moderate. Il is designed to dispel al1the
misgivingswhich might arise subsequently, if the General Assemblywereto
adopt the draft resolution proposed by the Fifth Committee." (Ibid.,
p. 285.)
Further, Mr. Nincic of Yugloslavia had argued:

"My delegation has never, for itspart, ken convinced of the necessityor
the desirahility of instituting a review procedure on the judgements of the
Administrative Tribunal. Indeed, we fail to discern anything in our
experience with the working of the Tribunal that would point to the
usefulness of such a change in the Tribunal's Statute. On the other hand,
there is little doubt in our minds as to the disadvantages and even the
potential dangers of the proposed change.
However, even ifwe had heen prepared to accept the principle ofjudicial
review,as a majority of the members of this Assemblyhave ken prepared
to do, we could not but have been disturbed by the form the proposal has
taken-the form in which it emerged from the Special Committee, and in
which it has since been endorsed by the Fifth Committee ...
Moreover, the very fact that a State, that isto say, a party which had not WRITTEN STATEMENTS 129

taken part in the previous stages of the proceedings, should appear in the
review stage, can hardly be viewed as being in keeping with the generally
accepted principles of judicial procedur...
Whatever our viewson the actual merits of the case,wecannotbut admit
that rhere have been few instances in the history of the United Nations
where a proposal has given rise to such serious doubts conceming its legal
aspects. Nor do 1 think tbat any of us, bowever we may feel as to the
substance of the matter, would wish to embark upon a course with such
clearly far-reaching implications for the secretariat of the United Nations
soundness so many of us doubt so strongly.hole, a course whose legal
The least we can do. therefore. before we ro anv further in this matter. is
to tryIO make sure <ifthe legal ground up<n uhfch ne stand. That. as WC
sec itisthe purpose of the Relgiandrdfi resoluiion in seeking the ddvisur)
opinion of ihe Iniernationdl Court or Justice.(Ihid.p 286.)

And, MI. Holmback of Sweden had also argued:
"None of the parties that can appear before the Administrative Tribu-
nal-that is, the Secretary-General and the members of the Secretariat-has
expressed the view that a review procedure is called for, and the Staff
Council has furthermore stated that il has not ken convinced that a review
procedure must he established. The Administrative Tnbunal is not in a
position to retain a member of the Secretariat wbom the Secretary-General
wants to dismiss. The Secretary-General can dismisshim notwithstanding
the opinion of the Tribunal. What the Tribunal can do is to give him
compensation, ifit considers his dismissal unfounded. Such compensation,
however, can influence the budget of the United Nations to a very small
degree. Finally, the right of the General Assembly to replace a member of
the Tribunal upon the expiration of his three-year lem is, according to our
view, a sufficient means of control in regard to the Administrative
Tribunal." (Ibid p. ,87.)
120.These arguments had ken swept aside by a majority of the General
Assemhlyat the lime. But the dangers pointed out so persuasive1 are now fully
manifested in the instant case. These dangers liein the fact that tKeintervention
of a member State not . .tv to the or-einal case clearlv undermines the iudicial
process.
121.Although the Court has jurisdiction under Article 65 of its Statute to
render an advisory opinion, Article 65 of the Statute is permissiverather than
mandatory in character, and the Court may decline where compelling reasons
oppose the exerciseof this jurisdiction.
122.In its 1973 Advisory Opinion the Court expressly stated that: "in
exercisingthisdiscretion, the Court has alwaysbeenguided bythe principle that,
as a judicial body, it is bound to remain faithful to the requirements of its
judicial character even in givingadvisory opinions" (p. 175).Thus it considered
Article II are of such a character as should lead it to decline to answer they
request" (ibid. O)n.y after it satisfied itself that the procedure prescrihed in
Article 11 did not run counter to the requirements of the Court's judicial
character did it consent to render the advisory opinion.
123.Judge Dillard stated further in the 1973Advisory Opinion that compel-
lingreasons against rendering an advisory opinion wouldexist ifdoing so would
weaken the integrity of thejudicial process(p. 230).In his declaration appended
to the Court's opinion, President Lachs also stated:

"1 would go further than the Court's observation that il does not
consider the procedure instituted hy Article II of the Tribunal's Statute as 130 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

'free from difficulty'@ara. 40), for neither the procedure considered as a
whole nor certain of its seoarate staees can in mv viewbe accented without
resene Not surpnsingly. ihe legis~arivehistory of the provisioi in question

re~ealsthat thcy were adoptcd against a background of divided viewsand
legal controversy.
There would, perhaps, be little point in adverting to this problem if the
sole choice for the future appeared 10 lie between judicial control of the
kind exemplifiedhy the present proceedings and no judicial control at all.
That. however. does not. in mv view. have to be the case. for the choice
oughi surely IO lie betw&n the éxistingmichineryof controi and one which
would be freefrom difficultyand more effective.1 see no compelling reason,
either in fact or in law, why an improved procedure could not be
ennsaged." (P. 214.)

124.The Court's aualified accentance of the Article 11orocedure in iu ~ ~3 ~
Advisory Opinion wàs hîsed on 11;efaci ihat the procedurégave the same nghts
to staff members as it gave to the kcretary-General. thesrbring thepartirs ro
judgementrof the AdminirtrativeTribunal. Il stated ihat:
"The mere fact that Article II prnvides for the possihility of a member
State applying for the review of a judgement doesnor alter rheposirionin
regard to the initiationof review proceedinga ssbetweena staffmemberand
theSecrerary-General.Article II. theCourtemphasizesg ,ivesthesamerights
to staff membersas it does10 the Secretary-Ceneralto apply to the Com-
mitteefor the initiation of review proceedings. (P. 178, emphasis added.)

125.We contend that the Court found the procedure acceptable asbetweena
sraffmemberand theSecrerary-Genera lrecisely because the staff member and
the Secretary-General would in every case be the parties 10 the judgement in
question. But the Court did not therehy accept the notion that an application
from a member Statenot party to the original case could also be acceptable. In
fact, the premise on which il accepted the 1973application-that the procedure
gave the same rights in that regard to the parties to the case-indicates that it
would consider an anolication from a member State not oartv to the case as
presenting an unsatisfâctory situation. Thur, it isour cont+tioithat the prîsenl
requcst for an advisory opinion Fallsshort of the conditions undcr which the
Court accepted the Article II procedure in the 1973Opinion. ünd further, that

unlike the 1973application. this request does no1 confom with fundamental
principles of the judicial process.
126.We thus pray the Court to mle that the application of the United States,
leading to the reauest for the Court's advisorv opinion. violates fundamental
princiiles of the-judicial process in so far as k overrides the wishes, and
prejudicesthe legalrights of the parties to the dispute-a dispute which hasbeen
settled in a judgement that is binding on the parties and that has furthemore
been accepted by them.
127.Furthemore, weCnntendthat an intervention injudicial proceedingscan
only be hased on the existenceof a legalright or interest in those proceedings. In
the South WestAfrica cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa:Liberiav. SouthA/rica),
I.C.J. Reporrs1966, page 6, this Court addressed the question of the Applicants'
"legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claim", and stated as
follows:

"Il is a universal and necessary, but yet almost elementary princi le of
procedural law that a distinction has to be made between, on the oneland,
the right 10activate a court and the right of the cour10 examine the merits
of the claimiand, on the other, the plaintiffparty's legalright in respect of
the suhject-matter of that which it claims, which would have to be
estahlished to the satisfaction of the Court. WRlTTENSTATEMENTS 131

... in a disputecausingthe activation of a jurisdictional clause. the
substanriverightsthemselves which the disputies about.mustbe soughtfor
elsewhere than in this clause.or insomeelementapart from il,-and must
therefore be esrablishedaliunde vel aliter. Jurisdictionalclausesdo not
determinewhetherpartieshavesubstantiverights,but only whether, ifthey
have them, they can vindicate(hem by recourseto a tribunal." (P. 39,
emphasis added.)

128.TheCourt then went onto mle, after an examination of provisions of the
mandate granted hy the League of Nations to South Africa over the territory of
South West Africa, and of the individual rights of the former memkr States of
the League in so far as an "invigilatory function" over the mandate was
concemed-that

"the Applicants (the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia) cannot k
considered to have estahlished any legal right or interest appertaining to
them in the subject-matter of the present claims, and that, accordingly, the
Court must decline to give effect to them" (p. 51).
129.In the present case,we contend that the Article II procedure only confers
on member States a jurisdictional right to activate this Court for the purpose of
rendenng an advisory opinion; but it does not confer any legal rights in the
subject-matter of the original dispute. We contend, further, that no such legal
rights exist on the part of the Applicant in the subject-matter of the dispute
between Mr. Mortished and the Secretary-General of the United Nations
Organization. No such legal rights,appertaining to the United States were
estahlished at any point during the proceedings hefore the Committee, and no
such legal rights can he estahlished hy the United States before this Court. We
therefore pray the Court to ap ly the principles established in the South West

Africa cases to this case as welr

3. It imposes in a bilateral dispute a condition of legal and practical inequality
upon one of the parties.

130.The procedure estahlished hy the General Assemhly in Article II of the
Tribunal's Statute contained an inherent legal inequality and resulted, in the
present case, in a prejudice to Mr. Mortished. Although a party to the pro-
ceedings before the Tribunal, Mr. Mortished nonetheless had no legal right
to appear or to be represented before theCommittee on Applications for Review
of Administrative Tribunal Judgements. Much as he indicated a clear interest to
berepresented by his counsel, any appearance or representation that he might
have ohtained would only have.been at the discretion of the Committee.
131.The manner in which the Committee treated the specificrequest for his
counsel to be allowed to follow the proceedings of the Committee introduced a
further inequality into the nature of the procedure. First, the Committee after
taking up the issue of the attendance of Mr. Mortished's counsel decided to
postpone a decision on it but proceeded throughout its entire first meeting to a
consideration of the United States application; when the Committee returned to
the issue at its second meeting, it decided ta deny Mr. Mortished's counsel the
right tobe present at the Committee's proceedingsor to make any statement to
the Committee, on the legally irrelevant argument that he had nothing to say
which would be uniquely relevant to the proceedings of the Committee. In
contrast, the applicant for reviewwas not only alloweà to be present before the
Committee; the verbatim transcript of the Committee's proceedings showsthat
it exercised the weight of its presence topropel the Committee into decisions
wncerning Judgement No. 273 prejudicial to the interests of MI. Mortished.
132.Second, even though Mr. Mortished was entitled under Article IV of the132 APPLlCATlONFORREVlEW

Committee's provisional rules of procedure to suhmit written comments on the
application within sevendays, he had suhsequently no opportunity Io elahorate
upon these. Moreover, such comments as he submitted related only Io the
ground implicitly contained in the application, namely that the Tribunal erred
on a question of law relating to the pronsions of the Charter. Mr. Mortished
had no opportunity Io comment upon the second hasis for impeaching the
validity of Judgement No. 273 which was surreptitiously introduced during the
proceedings of the Committee and voted upon.
133.Third, the procedure prescrihed in Article 11 of the Statute produces
hefore the International Court of Justice a situation in which Mr. Mortished,
unlike the applicant for renew and unlike the Respondent in Judgement
No. 273,has no direct accessto the Court: he mus1approach the Court through
the Secretary-General who was the Respondent in the proceediugs before the
Tribunal. Even if it were possible to separate the position of the Secretary-
General qualitigant from the position in which the Secretary-General stands in
relation Io the Court-a separation that we contend is fictional-the procedure
nonetheless imposes upon Mr. Mortished an inequality in relation Io the
Applicant for review. This inequality, namely the lack of direct access 10 the
Court, is not a nominal inequality. In the present instance, the reality and
injurious eITectof this inequality was manifested: (i) in that the Order of the
Court dated IOAugust 1981which fixedthe lime-limit for filingstatements was
not communicated to Mr. Mortished and to his counsel until 17 Septemher
1981-some six weeks later; and (ii) the request of Mr. Mortished's counsel for
compensatory time was communicated to the Court as a request hy counsel for
an extension of the time-limit.
134.Fourth, the applicant for review is legally entitled to request that the
Court conduct oral hearings and, if the Court decidesto do so, Io appear hefore
the Court. Although it is the Court which decides whether or not to hold oral
hearings, it remains the case that the applicant for a renew as well as the
Respondent are legally entitled to request oral argument, whereas Mr. Mor-
tished isnot. Further, in the event that the Court decidesto hold oral argument,
Mr. Mortished is, unlike the applicant for reviewand the Respondent, incapa-
ble, hy virtue of Article 34 of the Statute of the Court, of appearing &fore the
Court.
135.The procedure established hy the General Assembly in Article 11 also
places MI. Mortished in a position of practical inequality. The time-limit
allowed Mr. Mortished hy the Committee's mles of procedure for filing
observations on the application is insufficient for the purpose. According to
Article IV of the Committee's provisional p lesof procedure:

"1 The other pariy to the procrrdings kfore the Administrative Tnhu-
nal. or the parties in those caseswherc the application ismade hya member
State mayi within seven days from the ahte on which the copy of the
Gmments wiih reskct io thc applicaiion.hmit in writi-e to the Secretary its
2.Comments of a party, or parties. \hallhe suhmiited in sixcopies inany
one of thefiveofficiallanguagesof the United Nations." (Emphasis added.)

As MI. Mortished has pointed out (A/AC.86/R.100, p. 16):

"Whilc this opporiunity for me 10 suhmit comments is appreciated, the
time-limit imposed hy your Commitiec's rules 1stotally unrealistic where
transatlantic correspondencc is involvcd and places me ai a major dis-
advantage.
By good fortune, your letter, sent hy rapid means, reached me here in
Switzerlandon 17June 1981. Mywritten comments must in principle reach
you, in sextuplicate, by 23 June 1981. 1 do not, as does the other party WRtWEN STATEMENTS 133

authorized to comment and the applicant for review, possessan officeor
Frmanent mission in NewYork with the facility of direct communication
with your Commitlee. 1am thereforeendeavouring to have Mr. Tiewul, the

Headquarters staff member who was my counsel in the proceedings before
the Tribunal, submit to you in good lime comments on my behalf."
The prejudice to MI. Mortished would have been even more pronounced were
he based in some other part of the world where communications are less rapid
than from New York to Geneva.
136.Furthemore, even ifMr. Mortished and101his counsel wereadmitted to
the proceedings of the Committee, the practical inequality would remain with
respect to the extent to which they could realistically affect the proceedings or
decisions of the Committee.
137.Finally, MI. Mortished, having been dragged into these proceedingsby a
member Slate which was not a party to Judgement No. 273, has to expend
considerable effort to protect his ri hts without the benefit of resources
anywhere near those at the disposa1oftheapplicant.
138.The Court has stated that it will articipate in the procedure estahlished
for a review of Administrative ~rihunaf~udgements by rendering an advisory
opinion if the requirement of equality of the parties is satisfied (see, e.g.,
Judgments of the Administrative Tribunalof the IL0 upon Complaints Made
against Unesco, Advisory OpinionI ..C.J. Reports 1956,p. 84;Constitutionof the
Maritime Safety Comrnitteeof the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization. Advisory Opinion.I.C.J. Reports 1960. p. 153; Application for

Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nalionr Administrative Tribunal,
AdvLForyOpinion.1.C.J. Reporrs1973, p. 178).
139.In the Advisory Opinion of 1956,the Court thus considered at the outset
the question of whethef the fact that, (i) only one party to the Administrative
Tribunal Judgement cwld institute the reviewproceedings, and (ii) the officials
in whow favour the Judgement in question had been given could not appear
before the Court, imposed a condition of inequality upon the parties. It agreed
to givean advisory opinion only afler il was satisfiedthat the answer to the two
queslions was in the negative. Similarlyin its AdvisoryOpinion of 1973(Fasla),
even thougb the issue of inequality did not anse hecause the Applicant for
renew was the staff member, the Court however dealt with the inequality that
would be presented where the Applicant for review was a member State. It
observed in this connection @. 178):
"The Court does not overlook that Article II provides for the right on
individual member States to objst to a judgement of the Administrative
Tribunal and to apply to the Committee to initiale adnsory proceedings on
the matter; and that during the debates in 1955 the propriety of this
provision was questioned by a number of delegations. The member State, il
was said, would not have been a party to the prmdings before the
Administrative Tribunal, and to allow il to initiate proceedings for the
review of the judgement would, therefore, be contrary to the general
pnnciples governing judicial review. To confer such a right on a member
State, it wasurther said, would impinge upon the rights of the Secretary-
General as chief administrative officerand conflict with Article 100of the

Charter. It was also suggested that, in the case of an application b a
member State. the staff member would be in a oosition of ineaualitv be&re
theCommitteé.Thesearguments introduce additional consideiaiiois which
would cal1for closeexamination bv the ~ourt if it s~ ~ ~ ~~ceivea r~~u~ ~.~
for an opin& resulting froiin aiplication io the Committcc by a member
State The Court is no1therefore to be understood as hcre expressing any
opinion in regard10 any future proceedingsinstituted under Anicle II by a
member State."134 APPLlCATtO NOR REVIEW

140.In the present case, the inequality imposed upon MI. Mortished has
continued to run Fom the origination of the United States application. This
inequality stands in sharp contrast with the legal rights and political weight
enjoyed by the applicant in this whole process of review.
141.To sum up the instances of this inequality, on the one hand: MI. Mor-
tished was excluded from the proceedings of the Committee and his request to
participate denied; he had no opportunity to comment upon one of the grounds
on which the Committee held that there was a substantial hasis for the
Application notwithstanding the opportunity under Article IV of the Commit-
tee'sProvisional Rules of Procedure to suhmit written comments; the verbatim
records of the Committee's proceedings showthat the Committee hardly gave
any weight, let alone equal weight, to the written comments submitted hy him
and on his hehalf. That the written comments of Mr. Mortished were not given
any weight at al1appears not only from the Committee'sfailure to consider them
but also from the attitude taken in the Committee that MI. Mortished's counsel
had nothing to say that would be uniquely relevant to the work of the
Committee. Furthemore, although he submitted written observations through
the Secretary-General, he could not as he had requested elahorate upon these
orally, or indeed initiale a request to the Court for oral hearings to be held.
142.On the other hand: the Applicant for reviewwho was no1a party to the
proceedings before the Administrative Tnbunal was not only a member of the
Committee; it exzrcisedvoting power on the question whether ils own applica-
tion had a suhstantial basis. Beyond the Committee, the United States which
was the applicantfor reviewdoes no1depend upon the goodwillof the Secretary-
General to transmit ils observations to the Court; it is also entitled to request
and to participate in oral hearings before the Court. The factthat it may or may
no1 voluntarily waive this legal right in no way diminishes MI. Mortished's
position of inequality.

B. Aparrfrom the Legal DeJectsof the Article II Procedure, the Commiiiee's
Decisionro RequesrrheCourr'sAdvisory Opinion Is Legally Defecrivef,or rhe
FollowingReasons:

1. TheCommittee receivedan appliçdiion whichin suhsiÿnccdid no1FaIlwiihin
the icrms of Article II of the Staiuic of ihc Tribunal and in rom \iol<itcd
Article II of the Commiiiee's Provisional Rulcs of Prosedurc, ïnd actcd
favourahly on the legally defective application.
143.According to Article II, paragraph 3, of the Committee's Provisional
Rules of Procedure:

"3. The application shall contain the following information in the order
specified:
(a) The number and date of the judgement concerning which a review is
desired, and the names of the parties with respect to which the
judgement was rendered.
(b) The full name of the applicant for review, and his address for the
purpose of the proceedings. If the applicant for reviewis one who has
succeededto the rights of the person in respect of whom thejudgement
was rendered on the latter's death, this fact together with supporting
endence including relevant data pertaining to the succession shall be
set forth.
Ic, A siit&nent setiing forthtnderailthe grounds of ihç applicÿtion uiidcr
Ariiclc II. pdrdgraph 1.of the Statutc of ihe Administr~tiveTnbunal
and the supporting argumcni. (d) A text of the legal question or questions on which il is desired that an
advisor. .uinion should be reauested from the International Courtof
lustice.
(e) A lis1 of any documents which are submitted in support of the
application.
144.Article II, paragraph 3 (c), of the Committee's Rulesof Procedurestipu-
lates that the application should set forth in detail the grounds under Art@ Il
of the Statute of the Tribunal on which the judgement is king questioned.
The grounds set out in Article II are in very clear and specificterms. They are:

"that the Tribunal has exceeded ils jurisdiction or compelence or that the
Tribunal has failed to exercisejurisdiction vested in it, or has erred on a
question of law relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, or has committed a fundamental error in procedure which has
occasioned a failure of justice".
145.Contrary to the clear requirements of this provision, the United States
application did not set forth in any detail the relevant grounds under Article 1I
of the Siatute of the Tribunal on which thejudgement was king challenged. In
the second paragraph of ils application, il appears that the application was
instead based upon the following ground:

"Judgement No. 273raises a question of lawrelating to the provisions of
the Charter of a constitutional dimension within the ambit of Article II of
the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal which is of sufficientseriousness
and magnitude to ment seeking the advice of the International Court of
Justice."
146.The fact that the judgement "raises a question of law relating to the
provisions of the Charter" is not suficient to hring it within the ambit of Article
II of the Statute. Many judgements of the Administrative Tribunal have raised
questions of law relating to the provisions of the United Nations Charter: see,
for example, Judgement Nos. 57, 66, 67, and 70, among others. To fall within
the ambit of Article II of the Statute, the application must be specificallybased
on the ground that the Tribunal has erred on a question of law relating 10 the
provisions of the Charter. As the United States application failed to meet this
requirement, we submit that it should have ken rejected hy the Committee.
147.Furthermore, Article II, paragraph 3 (c), of the Committee's Rules of
Procedure requires that the application set forth in detail the supporting
argument. No attempt at doing so was made in the United States application.
lnstead the application repeatedly raised the question whether the Tribunal
"gave due weight to the actions of the General Assemhly". That the Tribunal
gave or did not givewhat the United States considers to be "due weight" to the
actions of the General Assembly is not one of the four grounds on which the
Committee may request an advisory opinion.
148.Far from founding ils request on one or more of the four grounds
specifiedin Article II, the United States application only referred generally 10
"constitutional dimensions", "the relevanceof Article 101of the Charter", and
"the authority of the General Assemhly". Important as these issues are in
themselves, they cannot be substituted for the specific grounds required by
Article II of the Tribunal's Statute.

2. The Committee in its proceedings violated the following fundamental prin-
ciples of natural justice:audi alicramparrem, and nemojudex in causa sua.
149 Inlinewiih the xtiled jurisprudcnse of the Court (seeparas. 122and 123
abote) ihat the requirements of iis judiciül characier must be mît in every136 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

request for its advisory opinion, we suhmit that the threshold question which the
Court should consider is whether or not therequirements of ils 'udicialcharacter
are met in the present instance. We respectfully request the d ourt to conclude
that the requirements of itsjudicial character were not met, on the ground that
the Committee, which is a quasi+judicial body and performs quasi-judicial
functions, nonetheless violated the following principles of natural justice:
150. Audialrerampartem: This universallyacceptedprinciple ofjustice applies
to al1judicial andior quasi-judicial proceedings. It is also estahlished in the
jurisprudence of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal as well as other
international trihunals. For example, in Keeneyv. the Secrerary-Generao l f the

UnitedNations (Judgement No. 6),the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
struck down a decision of the Secretary-General which it othenvise considered
justiciable, because of a violation of this principle:

"wh~ ~ ~~~~-tatements of ca~~~~~.~i~ -~~hv -,e S~-r~~a~~G~ ~ ~ ~for the
termination of [ihcApplicani's]iemporary-indefinitecon&actare in styleof
conclusions raiher than causes and lack the specitinty nhich the Tnbunal
regards as desirahle, thcy undoubiedly constituie adequate reasons for
termination.
However, inosmuch as Mrs. Keeney was aI no rimein a positionroplead
direcrlyto thesraremenfs of causefor rerminationassignedby theSecrefory-
General.an essenriae l lemento,o.oceduraldueorocess is lackin.." .Emo.a-
sis added.)
The Tribunal rinds ihat thc applicaiion of Mn. Keeney is well founded
and urders that the decision contested hy ihc Applicant be rescinded in

accordance with Article 9 of the Statute of the Tribunal." (P. 25.)
151.The principle is also reflected inArticle IV (cited inpara. 68above) of the

Committee's Provisional Rules of Procedure.
Furthermore, Article VI1 of the Rules specifiesthat:

"The Committee may at any time invite additional information or news
on any point with respect to which it considers such information or views
nécessaryprovided that in such cases the same opportunity to present
additional information or views is afforded to al1parties to the proceed-
ings."

152.In the present case, Mr. Mortished had expressly requested that the
Committee gant him the opportunity to participate in the proceedings of the
Committee and to make such statements as might be necessitated in the course
of the proceedings. The Committee initially failed to take a decision on the
request and yet proceeded to consider the merits of the application; later it
denied the request. By so doing, the Committee violated the principle of audi
alteramoartem.
153. hile the aoolicant for ~-vi.wwas~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~o~m--tee and had
am& opportunity~~ elahorate upon and IOiniroduce an addiiional gound not
coniained in thc application, Mr. Mortished wasdcnicd the same opportuniiy in
contravention of Article VI1of thc Committee's Rulcs of Procedure

154.Furthermore, the attitude in the Commiitee that MI. Mortirhed's coun-
sel had nothing to say which would be relevant to the work of the Committee
casts serious doubtson the question of the extent Io which his written comments
wereexamined hy the Committee. As the Court may note, the transcript of the
Committee's proceedings does not reveal any examination of those written
comments. We submit that the Committee treatcd the right of Mr. Mortished
under Articles IV and VI1 of ils Rules of Procedure as a ourelv formalistic
matter and failed to make any actual evaluation of the comméntsmade hy him
and on his behalf. WRI~EN STATEMENTS 137

155.We submit further that the decisions and approach taken by the
Committee violated the premise on which the Court has found certain features
of the Article II procedure acceptable, when il noted in its 1973Opinion that
"the decisions of the Committee are reached after an examination of the
opposing views of the interesled parties" (p. 176). As shown above, the
Committee did no1 so examine the opposing news of the interested parties
before adopting ils decisions.
156.Nemojudex incausasua:Il isa universallyaccepted principle of law that
apariy to adisputeshould no1al the same time bejudge in that dispute. Thus, in
re Mauch (Judgment No. 27), in which the Medical,Adviser of the IL0 had
participated in a decision of the Medical Committee to confirm certain
the Organisation's decision no1to re-engagethe applicant was partly based-the
IL0 Administrative Tribunal stated:

"while no statutory provision was violated, it is nonethelessregrettable that
the Medical Adviser should have participated as a full member of the
Medical Committee to whichhis own decisionwas appealed,and it appears
highly undesirable that the Medical Adviser should thus have become a
judge in his own cause" (p. 5).
The Trihunal weni on 10 awîrd compensation ru the applicant "for ihc moral
prejudice resuliing from the equivocal explanlition given of the failure tore-
engage her" (p.6).
157.In the present case the Committee is a "subsidiary organ" (p. 174, 1973
Advisory Opinion) of the General Assembly which had ado ted resolution
341165.The proceedings of the Committee show tbat ils memgers considered
themselves a oriori obl-aated to s..oort the actions of the General Assemblv.
For example:'

Mr. Dia (Senegai):
"The States that are members of the Committee did no1 oppose the
adoption of resolution 341165 at the time. Without making a value
judgment concerning the merits of this resolution, the Committee can
hardly fail to give due weight to a decision in which its members
participated. My delegation therefore feels thatt is only right to ask the
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the Judge-
ment, if only to ensure that the Secretary-General does not find himself ina
similar situation again in the future." (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2, p. 22.)

Mr. Stuart (United Kingdom):
"At the Thirty-fourth Session of the General Assembly, in 1979, the
United Kingdom was originallyone of the sponsors in the Fifth Committee
of the draft resolution which later became resolution 341165.Operative
paragraph 3 of part IIof that resolution contains the ruling relating to the
repatriation grant which Judgement No. 273 of the Administrative Tribu-
nal has set aside. ..
Operative paragraph 3of part II of the resolution was not originally part
of the draft resolution, and when the Fifth Committee adopted an
amendment to make il so the United Kingdom delegation in that Commit-
tee withdrew its sponsorship because of certain doubts which we enter-
tained on the specificissue of the repatriation grant. Those doubts arose in
part from Our concem to preserve the integrity of the common system.
Other organizations had already accepted a different interpretation of the
rules relating to the repatriation grant, an interpretation which has now
ken supported by the Administrative Tribunal. We also had doubtsabout138 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

the arguably retrospective nature of the ruling embodied in operative
paragraph 3 of part II of resolution 341165.
In the end, after Our initial hesitations, we supported the resolution on
the grounds that the grant had always been clearly intended as a repatria-
lion grant, not as a lump-sum pension or a resettlement grant. Having
reached that conclusion. and having supported the relevant paragraph of
the resolution in 1979,mydelegation now supports the request made by the
United States delegation for an advisory opinion from the International
Court." (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.l, pp. 21-22.)

Mr. Lohlou(Morocco):

"1wanted tn speak later, but 1have been inspired somewhat by myfriend
Mr. Stuart of the United Kingdom; I think that he made some referenceto
the work of the Fifth Committee, and whenever the Fifth Committee is
mentioned 1 always want to Say something. 1 should therefore like to
indicate my first reaction, my preliminary reaction, taking into aaount
three or four elements, and firstly this resolution 341165which as adopted
by the Fifth Committee but in an atmosphere that was, shall we Say,
somewhat lively. It is true that there was a general consensus on this
resolution but, naturally, il must be pointed out that this was not easy to
achieve." (A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I, p. 26.)
158.Whilst it isrue that the Committee is not required to take a finaljudicial
decision as Io whether or not Mr. Mortished had any acquired rights, the
Committee was supposed to decide on the merits of the United States applica-
tion impartially. Asevidenced by the statements in the Committee, the members
of the Committee werenot in a position to act impartially. On thecontrary, they
considered the decision of the General Assemblythat the Tribunal had allegedly
failedto givedue weight toas their own and considered themselvesduty bound a
priori "never to agree" with the Tribunal. In doing so, the Committee violated
the principle ofnemojudex in causasua.
159.Apart from the Committee's ownviolatioii of nemojudex incausasua the
United States itself,as the applicant beforethe Committee, should not have been
permitted by the Committee to participate in the decisionon its own application.
The active role of the United States in the Committee'sdecision in itselfviolated
the principle ofnemojudex incausasuri.

3 The Committcc failed to adopt a unilorm interpreiatlon of Ari~cle II in the
prcsent case in which the spplicant is a mcmber Staie
160.In its Advisory Opinion of 1973,the Court stated with respect to the
uniform interpretation of Article II:

"Other than whai may be derived fromthe present proceedings, there is
no information before the Court regarding the critena followed by the
Committee in appreciating whether there is 'a substantial basis' for an
application. The statistics of the Committee's decisions may appear to
suggest the conclusion that, in applications made by staff members, it has
adopted a strict interpretation of that requirement." (P. 177.)

Although itdid not consider that this Pdct in itself rendcred the procedure
incompatible wiih the requircments ofihc judicial process. it also staicd 177)
that:
"lt would, on the other hand,be incompatible with these principlesif the
Committee were not to adopt a uniform interpretation of Article II also in
cases in which the applicant was not a staff member."140 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

Nevertheless, the Committee mus1decide that there is "a substantial hasis" to
the application on the grounds raised. In order to corne to that conclusion, we
suhmit that there mus1be a prima facieshowing that there has ken an error of
lawrelating to the provisions of the Charteror that theTrihunal has exceededits
jurisdiction or competence. Thedetermination that sucha prima faciecaseexists

is one chat can only be made hy a legal body, which the Committee is not.
167.It isclear that the Committee ascomposed at itstwentieth sessiondid not
have the requisite expertise to perform the ahove functions which, as the Court
itself has stated, are "quasi-judicial" (see Advisory Opinion of 1973, p. 176).
Evenif the Committee could be said to have ken comptent, an examination of

the trariscript of the Committee's proceedings showsthat noattempt whatsoever
was made to establish such a prima facie showing on the grounds alleged.
Instead, general statemenis were made h) this and thît represëntative as 10-the
suppossd undesirability of the Tnhunal's ruling It was repeatedly alleged that
iliç Tribunal had exceeded its iunsdiciion without an iota of discussion of the
content of thejudgement or théscope of the Trihunal's jurisdiction. Similarly,il

was repeatedly allegedthat the Trihunal had committed an error of law without
any examination of the pertinent Staff Regulations and Rules which the
Tribunal had applied. Moreover, whilst the United States application was based
on the crucial premise that the Trihunal had ruled "that General Assemhly
resolution 341165of 17 December 1979could not be given immediate effect",

there was no discussion of the question of whether this was in fact the tenor of
thejudgement. Neither was there any discussion, beyond the invocation of this
or that provision of the Charter, of the specific respects in which those
orovisions mav have been violated. Indeed. the oroceedines in the Committee
;aise senous doubts as to the familiarity ofihe &ajority of;epresentatives with
the Tribunal's Judgement.

168.In view of the foregoing, we request the Court to declare that the
Committee failed to perform its function of examining the merits of the United
Statesapplication.The Court may also on its own decide that the proper course
of action for it is to decline from rendering the advisory opinion requested.

5. There is nothing exceptional about Judgement No. 273, other than that a
member State does not like it, to warrant recourse to the Court for an
advisory opinion.

169.As the Court itself recognized in its Advisory Opinion of 1973 "the

legislativehistory of Article L1shows that recourse to the International Court of
Justice was to be had only in exceptional cases" (I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 177).
The fact that the Committee has hitherto adopted a strict interpretation of the
terms of Article II of the Trihunal's Statute affirms this nrooosition.
170.Whilst the Committee itself~de~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~-an ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ed to
,, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
it hasihe rçquisitcixceptional character, in doing so itis not Icfiunhampered io
rely on purely suhjeciive iriieria. Ils determination ihat the case on which an
application is made of an exceptional character can be open to objeciive
evaluation in reference 10the judgement proposed to be reviewed.
171.In the present case, the issue before the Trihunal was whether Mr. Mor-
tished had an acquired right to the repatnation grant, and if so whether in

applying General Assemhly resolution 341165the Secretary-General was or was
not hound bv Staff Reeulation 12.1to ensure that this acauired rieht was not
= ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~he ~ribunil held that eiven the nature~of~t~ ~~e~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~erant as
set out in the Staff Rules promulga~d in pursuance of Staff ~egulation4.4 and
Annex IV. Mr. !viortished had an acquircd right IO the grant without the necd

for evidencc of relocation. We submit ihat there is nothing cxceptional about
this finding.The Tribunal has in several other instünces found thît an ûcquired
right existed in the face of a General Assemhly resolution: see, e.g., Capio v. WRITTEN STATEMENTS 141

Secrerary-General of rhe Unired Notions, Administrative Tribunal Judgement
No. 266, 1980.
172.Having found that an acquired right existed in the present instance,
the Tribunal proceeded to apply Staff Regulation 12.1 to the effect that the
Secretary-General'simplementation of the Regulation should not prejudice that
right. There is nothing exceptional about the application of Staff Regulation
12.1so as to preclude the application of new General Assembly resolutions to
staiïmembers wbo had acquired a right before the adoption of the resolution.
173.Far frombeing an exceptional ruling, the likelihood that the Tribunal
would decide in this manner was quite predictable in the light of the established
jurisprudence of the Tribunal and of other international tribunals. As theICSC
had noted, the Legal Counsels of the various agencies had expressed the view
that a measure along the lines of General Assembly resolution 341165,without
provision for a transitional arrangement, would no1 be consistent with Staff
Regulation 12.1and with thejurisprudence of the vanous tribunals on acquired
rights. The ICSC was itself persuaded of the force of this view. The same view
was reiterated by the Under-Secretary-General for Administration, Finance and
Management before the Fifth Committee. Thus, far from king an exceptional
case, Judgement No. 273 dealt with a straightforward legal question-in a
manner predicted by the Legal Counsels of the organizations concerned.
174.Funhermore, as stated in paragraph 70above, the Secretary-General has
so far taken the position that Judgement No. 273 obliges him 10 pay the
repatriation grant only to Mr. Mortished by virtue of the fact that section VI of
the judgement referred specificallyto the "special obligations" assumed hy the
Organizationtowards Mr. Mortished when he transferred from the ICA0 to the
United Nations. It is not in dispute that if the Organization has assumed
"special obligations" towards Mr. Mortished, these obligations should, as the
Judgement declared, be respected. We respectfully submit that such a situation
fallsoutside that class of extraordinary cases for which Article 1I of the Statute
was intended.
175.Only the following can be said to be exceptional about the Judgement:
the fact that a member State ohjects to the Judgement or, more precisely, 10a
mistaken conce tion of the Judgement, namely, that the Tribunal decided that
General ~ssem&~ resolution 34,165 should not be given immediate effect. We
submit that this is insufficient to bring the case within the class of exceptional
cases for which Article II of the Tribunal's Statute was intended.

C. inRelation ro rhe Question Submirted to the Courr by rhe Commitree.

1. To iake the position thai the Court's funciion is confined to deiermining
whether the Tnbunal exceeded ils jurisdiction in Judgsmeni No. 273 and
whether the Tribunal committed ;in error of law reliitingio the provisions of
the Charter.
176.The Committee's finding that there was a "substantial basis" to the
application of the United States was based specificallyon the following two
grounds: (i) that the Administrative Tribunal committed an error of law relating
to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and (ii) that the
Administrative Tribunal exceeded ils jurisdiction or competence.
177.We snbmit that in rendering ils advisory opinion the Court's functionis
limited 10answering the specificobjections raised against Judgement No. 273,
on the hasis of which the Committee requested the advisory opinion. Tbus, the
Court is only requifed 10determine whether or not the Administrative Tribunal
exceeded ils jurisdiction or competence, and whether or not it committed an
error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, in Judgement.No. 273. It142 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

need not follow the path of distraction byenquiringinto what is "warranted or
not warranted, into what is "immediate" or not immediate, etc.
178.The Court has always held that ils function in cases of this nature is
limited to answering the questions placed hefore il, and the specificobjections

raised inrelation to thejudgement in question. Thus, in the Advisory Opinion of
1973-which was also based on two of the four grounds laid down in Article 11
of the Statute of the Tribunal-the Court stated, in reference to Article 1I (at
p. 184):

"Consequently, the Committee is authorized to request, and the Court to
give, an adnsory opinion only on legal questions which may properly he
considered as falling within the lems of one or more of those four
'grounds'.Again, under Article 65of the Court's Statute, its competence to
giveadvisory opinions extends only to legalquestions on which its opinion
has been requested. The Court may iuterpret the terms of the request and
determine the xope of the questions set out in it. The Court may also take
into account any matters germane to the questions suhmitted to it which
may be necessary to enable it to form its opinion. But in givingits opinion
the Court is, inprinciple, bound hy the terms of the questionsformulatedin
the request (VotingProcedureon Questionsrelating 10Reports and Petitions
concerningthe Territory of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J.
Reports 1955, pp. 71-72; Judgmentsof the Administrative Tribunalof the

IL0 upon Complainrs Made against Unesco, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J.
Reports 1956,pp. 98-99). In the present instance, the questions formulated
in the request refer to only two of the four 'grounds' of challenge specified
in Article 11 of the Administrative Tribunal's Statute, namely, failure to
exercisejurisdiction and fundamental error in procedure. Consequently, it .
is only objections to Judgement No. 158hased on one or otherof those two
grounds which are within the terms of the questions put to the Court."

179.This same mling had ken made hy the Court in its two earlier Advisory
Opinions (1955 and 1956) citedin its 1973Advisory Opinion. It is thus a well-
estahlished pnnciple, as the Court reiterated in 1973(at pp. 207-208),that it is
the duty of an international tnhunal "not only to replyto the questions as stated
in the final submissions of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points
not indicated in those submissious".
180.The Court has been asked to determine whether ludgement No. 273was

warranted-this question king hased on the contentions that the Tribunal in
giving that Judgement committed an error of law relating to the provisions of
the Charter, and exceededitsjurisdictiou or competence. But this Court has not
beenasked to revieweveryaspect and everyholding of that case;for example,the
Court has no: ken asked to determine whether or not MI. Mortished had an
acquired nght to the payment of a repatriation grant withoutthe need to produce
evidence of relocation. Indeed, as stated by the Court in the 1973 Advisory
Opinion:

"the proceedings kfore the Court are still advisory proceedings, in which
theta& of theCourtisno:to retry thecasebut 10 reply to thequestionsput 10
it regardingthe objections whichhave beenraised to the Judgemenrof the
Administrative TribunaP' (p.182,emphasis added).

181.Consequently, we suhmit that thecourt's function is limited to replying
.. ...7-...i~.~~.he~ ~ - ~~~~~ministrative Tribunal exceededits iurisdiction in
Judgement No. 273, and whether it comm,ttcdan error of law ;elating to the
provisions of the Charter. In order io dixhargc ihis funciion. it is sufficientio

consider the contentions set out in suhsections 2 and 3 helow WRITTEN STATEMENTS 143

2. Conceming the contention that the Tribunal committed an error of law
relating to the provisions of the Charter, to adjudge and declare:

(a) Thal ~heCmmittee had no legal bmk for dererminingthot the Tribunai
commi~fed an error of law reloringto theprovisionsof the Charter.
182.In order to make such a determination, it would have been necessaryfor
the Committee to make a prior determination on what the correct law was. But
the Committee was-in view of ils composition-hardly comptent to make
such a legaldetermination. In any case the Committee did no1make the slightest
effort to ascertain the correct law, having failed to examine the pertinent rules
and regulations necessary for this purpose, and having also failed to admit al1
interested parties to its proceedings and to hear submissions from them. The
Committee could therefore no1have had any legal basis, and did no1estahlish
any such legal basis,for concluding as it did, that the Tribunal had committed
an error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter.
183.Instead of basing ils findingon an analysisof the legalissuesraised by the
application as well as on the pertinent mies and regulations, the Committee
proceeded on the basis of a patent misconception or lack of conception about
Judgement No. 273:namely that the Tribunal had "set aside" a resolution of the
General Assembly (see p. 21. A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I); that il had invalidated a
decision of the General Assembly (ibid.,p. 32); that it had "limited the
authority" of the General Assembly (ibid.p. 46); that il had "shown lofty
disregard" for the General Assembly and failed to apply an "absolutely crystal
clear" resolution of the General Assembly (p. 30,A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2). These
charges werelevelledal the Tribunal merelybecause il had not decided the case
according to the "absolutely crystal clear" notion of the resolution thatsome
representatives had.
184.Far from examining the pertinent regulations and mles in force before
coming to conclusions, mëmbcri of the Committcc considcred the basic issue
involved in Judgemcnt No.273-thal or respect for acquired righls-IO bc
irrclc\ant to ihcir deliberaiions For instance. vanous deleaates stated that. "we
are not obliged to decide whether or not MI. Mortished has or does not have
entitlements" (the United States, 16of A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I); "what we now
want-what I should like to put Lard as my first reaction-isno1to agree,
nevertoagree that thequestion should beregardedasaquestionof acquired right.
In our opinion, acquired right has no place in personnel management in the
secretariat..."(Morocco, ibid.p. 26);"1am no1surethat ilisnecessaryal al1for
usto gointo thequestion, interesting though it maybeand relevantthough itmay
be to differentstagesofthematter, asto whether or not MI. Mortished had a right
and what the content of that right was" (the United Statibid.p. 29);"1 would
not wish to comment on the question as to what exactlyis meanl by an acquired
ri ht or what isnot meant by that term, particularly in the presentcircumstances,
wfere we are only required to consider the application presented by the United
States" (Niger, p. 26 of AIAC.86 XX)/PV.2). The Committee thus failed to
address the fundamental question OZwhetherthere was a prima faciecase for the
view that the Tribunal's ruling requiring respect for acquired rights could
conceivably be regarded as an error of law. We submit therefore that the
Committee's findingonerror of law relating to the provisions of the Charter was
totally without foundation.

(b) TheTribwal didnorcommitanerrorof Iawrelating 10 rheprovisionsof the
Charter.
185.Although the Court indicated in ils 1973Advisory Opinion that where a
judgement has been challenged on the ground of error of law relating to the
provisions of the Charter, it may be calledupon to reviewthe actual substance of WRI~TEN STATEMENTS 145

any pertinent regulation passed by the General Assembly, or any rule passed by
the Secretary-General under authority delegated hy the General Assembly. On
thecontrary, it examined at great length the range of StaKRegulations and StaK
Rules pertinent Io the case. One of these niles and regulations was StaK
Regulation 12.1,which required that amendments to the Staff Regulations shall
be "without prejudice to the acquired nghts of staff members". This StaK
Regulation, which assumes the cbaracter of a grundnorm in relation to al1
subsequent staff regulations and staff rules, is wellestablished in the administra-
tive and judicial practice of the United Nations system. The Tribunal thus
rightly took Regulation 12.1into account in considering the implementation of
General Assembly resolution 34/16hn the basis of which the Secretary-
General had promulgated an amendment of the Staff Rules aKectingthe rights
of MI. Mortished. The judgement of the Tribunal was thus "warranted in
constming resolution 341165,or the amendment to the Staff Rules caused by
that resolution, as king subject to the respect for acquired rights require011f
amendments to the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules.
191.Thus, in taking the whole legal régimein10account, and in considering

General Assembly resolution 341165as being subject to the acquired nghts of
Mr. Mortished, the Tribunal acted in full compliance with the powers and
directives of the General Assembly.

(iii) Nothing in the United Nations Charter prohibits the Tribunal from
denying retroactive effect to a particular decision of the General
Assembly in relation to the Staff.

192.Another way of looking at Jud ement No. 273 isthat il determined that
General Assembly resolution 341165siould not be given retroactive eKect.We
submit tbat the United Nations Charter-above al1legalinstmments-does not
prohibit the Tribunal from making such a determination.
193.The principle against retroactive legislation is an established part of the
administrative law of international organizations, as developed by the various
international tribunals on the hasis of specific legislative provisions and of
general principles of law. Thus, Wilfred Jenks stated in his booThe Prospects
of InrernationalAdjudicorion (Stevens& Sons, 1964):

"The Leagueof Nations, International Labour Organisation, and United
Nations Administrative Tribunals have frequently had recourse to general
principles of law in the process of developing the international administra-
tive law applicable to the legal relations between international organiza-
tions and persons in their service. The general principles derived from
municioal law analoeies whichthev have invoked includethe orohibition of
nonltIher. nenzo,ud;r tnre sua,audralreromporrem,resjudd><iru the pro-
hibition ofretroactivity", etc (pp 310-311. see also Jenks,The Proprr
L<iwomf InrernaoonolOr~onimrion~ (Stevens & Sons, 1962). pp 51-62)
194.Dr. M. B. Akehurst also nofed, in an article entitled "Unilateral
Amendment of Conditions of Employment in International Organizations", 40
Brirish Year Book of lnfernofionalL<rw 286 (1964). al 329-330:

"The principle of non-retroactivity... seems fairly well established. In
many cases it is provided for in amendment clauses inserted in Staff
Regulations; and an amendment clause safeguarding acquired rights,
whatever other effectsit may or may not bave,will alwoysbeinferpreredso
osIo prevenrretroacriveamendments (Emphasis added.)
However, international administrative tribunals have often applied the
principle of non-retroactivity despite the absence of any clause limiting the
organization's power of amendment."146 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

195.A statutory or legislative expression of that principle, such as in Staff
Regulation 12.1 ofthe United Nations-which has equivalents in Article XV of
the ICA0 Staff Regulations; Article 14.5of the IL0 Regulations; Regulation
301.121of the FAO, Regulation 13.01of the IAEA; Regulation 12.1of IMCO;
Regulation 12.1of UNESCO; Regulation 12.1of UNRWA; Regulation 12.1of

WHO; Regulation 12.1of ITU; Regulation 12.3of WMO; Article 114.2of the
ECSC Règlement généra(l1956);and Regulation 24 (b) and Annex II of the
OECD-xrtainly precludes retroactive application to the staff of decisions
adopted hy, in this case, the General Assembly.
196.Even inthe absenceof a statutory basis,the principle of non-retroactinty
has a legalanchor in the "general pnnciples of law" referred 10in Article 38(1)
(c) of the Court's own Statute, and applied~~y international administrative
tribunals.
197.Thus, in Khamis v. the United NationsJoinrSraf PensionBoard (Judge-

ment No. 108.October 1967bwhich involved an avvlication to restore a vrior
period of serv'iceto the applicant's pension scheme on the hasis of a subsequent
amendment to th~ sta~f~niles-the ~ ~ ~-~~ed Nations Administrative Tribunal
explvred the possible application of the pnnciplc of non-retroactivity indepen-
dently of thestatutory provisions relatingto thecase.TheTnbunal hadcxamined
the pnnciple and ilspossiblcapplication quoting MaxmellontheInterprerarionof
Sraiutes-although it later decided that the facts of the case did not cal1it into
play:

"the pnnciple of law ngainst retroactive conriruciion relaies mainlyto cases
when certain acquired nghts are disturbed or denied.

XI. The result of the amendmcnt before the Tribunal is that a penod of
senice whichcould not be rcstored for pension benefit bccomeseligiblefor
restoration. The amendment does notaffect or take away any vested or
accrued right but on the other hand recognizesas eligihlefor restoration a
prior period of service not hitherto taken in10account for such benefit.
XII. The Tribunal finds that neither the text of Article XXXVIl nor the
pnnçiples gowrning non-retroaciivity contradict the application of the
amendcd Article XII to the Applicant " (P 231 )

Thus, ifthe amendment had affectedor taken away any vestedor accmed nghts,
ils avdication would have been refused as king in violation of the vrincivle of
non:ietroactivity. .

198.In an earlier case, Puvrez v. the Secretary-Generalof the International
Civil Aviation Organizarion (Judgement No. 82)-involving the applicant's loss
of entitlement 10 a dependency allowance in the light of a new definition of
dependency introduced hy an amendment to the ICA0 SeMce Codethe
United Nations Administrative Tribunal considered the principle of non-
retroactivity embodied in Article XV of the Servicecode. It stated:

"Article XV mean~ ~~~n~v that no amendment of the reeulations mav
affect~~---~~~~~~~.nd ad--kaees -~cr~ - ~ ~ - ~ staff mem&r for~ ~ ~~ ~
rendered before the entry into force of the amendment. Hence, no
amendment may have an adverse retroactive ekt in relation to a staff

member, but nothing prohibits an amendment of the regulations where the
effectsof such amendment apply only to benefitsand advantages accruing
through seMce after the adoption of such amendment." (P. 86.)

Here again, it is quite clear that if the amendment had violated the principle of
non-retroactivity, the Tribunal would have refused to grant it such effect.
199. Similarly, in Manckiewicz v. theSecrerary-Generao l f the ICA0 (Judge-
ment No. IIO), which involved the same issue as in the Puvrez case, the
Administrative Tribunal considered the amendment in question as being only WRlTTEN STATEMENTS 147

prospective in operation and therefore valid-with the clear implication that it
would have been invalid if it had retroactive effect.
200. Lastly, inQueguiner v. the Secretary-Generoo l f rheInter-Governmenral
Maritime ConsultariveOrganizarion (Judgement No. 202twhich involved the
applicant's loss of an education grant for his son as a result of an amendment to
the education grant system-the United Nations Administrative Tribunal

referred to the Puvrer case and re-assened the pnnciples of non-retroactivity:
"An amendmenr cannohtave an adversreerroacriveeffecrin relationro a
stafmember, but nothing prevents an amendment 10the Staff Rules where
the effecu of such amendment apply to benefits and advantages accming
through service after the adoption of such amendment." (4.322-323;
emphasis added.)

201.The IL0 Administrative Tribunal has also applied the principle of non-
retroactivity in a number of cases. Thus, in re Sherif (Judgment No. 29). the
Tribunal mied that the requirement in the IL0 Staff Regulations that amend-
ments must be subject 10acquired rights, meant that

"up to the date of amending the Regulations in force, there shall be no
interference with the application of the said Regulations to an officialand
that the amendedRegularionssholi have no retrospectiveeffect" (p.6,
emphasis added).
Again, in re Poulaind'~ndeci (Judgment No. 51), the IL0 Tribunal stated:

"the entitlement to the [non-resident's] allowance actually paid IO the
complainant at the former rate constituted an acquired right within the
meaning of Staff Regulation 301.121 [ofthe FAO], which, under the most
restrictive interpretation, has the same scope as the principle of the
prohibition of retroactivit...
... the decisionimpugned isillegal in sofor as it rerroactivelycancelsthe
entitlementro thenon-residenr'sallowancear the levela: whichit wasfxed
before26 Jwle 1959and the ca»tplainr iswelbJounded on rhispoint." (P. 5,
emphasis added.)

And in re Lindîey (Judgment No. 61). the IL0 Tribunal, while noting that
statutory provisions "may be modifieda1any lime in the interest of the service",
went on to rule that such modifications are

"subjecr.nevertheless.ro rhe principle of non-rerroactiviryand ro such
limirorionsas the competentauthoriryitse(fmay place upan its powersto
modijy them" (p. 7, emphasis added):
202. Thus, ifGeneral Assemblyresolution 341165isshown to have ken given
retroactive effectin the manner in whichit was applied by the Secretary-General
to Mr. Mortished, il follows that the application would be legally improper.

203. Before the Administrative Tribunal, it had been argued on behalf of the
Respondent that the Secretary-General had applied the resolution prospectively
because the resolution itself had prescribed a future date, namely, I January
1980,for entering into force, and because the Secretary-General had applied it
only 10 staff members who separated from serviceafter that date.
204.However, Mr. Mortished had accmed the maximum allowable credit
towardsa repatriation grant during his first 12years of service.Under the lawas
it existed before 1 January 1980, hecould have separated from service at any
lime between 1969 and 1980 and been entitled to the erant without the
encumbrance of having to produce evidence of relocation. This fact has never
been disputed by the Secretary-General. In paragraph 24 of his Answer before
the Tribunal he took the following position:148 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

"24.Thc Kcspondcnt docs no! dirpuic the Appiicdnt's plca (pxragraph
IOA)or sioicmcnt (paragraph 23)thai thc repatriation schemeIregulaiion~,
rules xnd adrninistrûiivc prsctice) in cffcct prior to Gcneral Ashcmbly
resolution 34 165 alloucd rcpairiation grmi pxyrncnrs withoui 3ctual
rclocaiion and Iigrccsthai ihis u3s conristeni uith (albcit no1requirsd h))
ihe StaiTReeulaiions ~romule3ied bv the As~crnblv The Rcsoondent also
agrees that The th pl ka nwtould have been entitkd to receiAve the grant
without evidence of relocation if there had been no change in the Staff
Regulations or Rules ..."
205.AstheTribunal thus noted inparagraphl (pp. 6-7)of ludgement No. 273,
the Secretary-General conceded that MI. Mortished had an entitlement to the
repatriation grant prior ta I January 1980.The "taking away" of that "right
acquired under existing law", as was done with effectfrom 1January 1980,was
thus retroactive innature. In statutory law,a ruleisregarded as havingretroactive
effects,or the application of a rule is retroactive, ifit "takes away or impairs any
vestedright acquired underexistinglaws, orcreates anewobligation, or imposesa
newduty, or attachesa newdisabilityin respect to transactions or considerations
already past" (Craies on Statuie Law, 6th ed., p. 386).
206.In the present case, Mr. Mortished's full entitlement had already been
accrued during his first 12 years of service, under a law which entitled him to
payment without the obligation to produce evidenceof relocation. These first 12
years of service for which credit was accrued were "transactions or considera-
lions already past". The fact that Mr. Mortished had to await the day of
separation from service in order to claim pajment was legallyimmaterial, once
the entitlement had accrued under the law.

(iv) The Tribunal was "warranted" in holding that the application of
General Assemblyresolution 341165should not prejudice the acquired
right of Mr. Mortished to the payment of a repatriation grant without
evidence of relocation.
207. In posing the question whether Judgement No. 273 was warranted "in
determining that General Assembly resolution 341165 could no1 be given
immediate effect", the Committee did not directly impugn the finding of the
Tribunal that MI. Mortished had an acquired right to the payment of a
repatriation grant. In fact, the Committee did no1 purport ta question that
specificfinding, sinceit was solelypreoccupied with the question of "immediate
effect". In any case, that ruling is not one of the issueson which the Committee
requested the Court's advisory opinion.
208. Furthermore, this Court has maintained that ils function in rendering
advisory opinions should not be equated with the ordinary appelate function;
nor is il part of the Court's function to retry the case, or ta re-open factual
findings (Advisory Opinion of 1973,p. 182).The advisory opinion is thus to be
seen as serving a higher function than the usual appelate function of ordinary
courts-the latter beingalso above the re-opening of factual findings.Therefore,
the International Court of Justice in rendering an advisory opinion is twice
removed from the factual disputations of the parties.
209.We contend that the Tribunal's finding that Mr. Mortished had an
acquired right is, in relation ta the Court, a finding of fact; and that it is
therefore not the function of the Court to re-open the question whether pr not
Mr. Mortished had an acquired right. The Tribunal has found, and the Court
need only take cognizance of that fact, that such a right existed. The function of
the Court isthus ta determine whether ornot Judgement No. 273was warranted
in holding that General Assembly resolution 341165should be applied without
prejudice to the acquired nght of Mr. Mortished. WRlTTEN STATEMENTS 149

210.Although the Tribunal's determination of the existence of an acquired
right may be regarded as a legal exercise,inasmuch as that determination was
anterior to the determination of the ultimate issue before the Tribunal, the
existenceof an acquired right stood in relation to that ultimate issueas a factual
situation stands in relation10 ils legalconsequence.
211.A findingof fact maybedefinedas "a determination ofa fact hy thecourt,
averred hy one party and denied by the other, and founded on evidencein case.
A conclusion hy way of reasonable inference from the evidence" (Black's
Law Diciionary, Revised 4th ed., 1968,p. 758); and again, "A Tact,as distin-
guished from the law, may be taken as that out of which the point of lawanses,
that whichisasserted to be or not to he, and is to be presumed or proved to be or
not to be for the purpose of applying or refusing to apply a rule of law" (ibid.,
p. 706).
212. The assertion hy Mr. Mortished that he had an acquired right to
payment of the repatriation grant without evidenceof relocation, was denied by
the respondent, and proved before the Tribunal as afact; out of that fact arose
the point of law regarding respect for that acquired right. The Tribunal's
finding that an acquired right existed was thus a finding of fact no1subject to
revieu~inan ad\,isiry opinion. In any case.as srgued above. thai findinghas no!
ken placed kfore ihe Couri in the question submitted by the Committce
213 Thus. the auçsiion wheiher Judeement No. 273 was "warranied" falls 10
be determinéd,no; hy referenceto the Gestion whether Mr. Mortished did have
an acquired right, but, rather, by referenceto the question whether the Tribunal
was justified or correct in ils ruling that this acquired right mus1he respected in
spite of resolution 341165.
214. If,contrary to the contentions in paragraphs 207-212above, the Court
considers that the Committee in questioning whether Judgement No. 273 was
warranted also thereby questioned the Tribunal's finding that an acquired
right existed, and if the Court also considers itself called upon to examine the
validitv of that findi-.. we contend that the Jud-ement was warranted on that
ground.
215.The Tribunal in Judgement No. 273 thoroughly examined, first, the
contractual relationship between Mr. Mortished and the United Nations;
mnd, the history behind the repatriation grant, and finally, the mles and
regulations established to regulate payment of the grant. This examination led il
to conclude that Mr. Monished was entitled to the grant. The Tribunal noted
that at the lime of Mr. Mortished's appointment to the United Nations on 30
July 1958, the United Nations explicitly recognized his entitlement to the
repatriation grant-which had been instituted under General Assembly resolu-
lion 470(V)of 15December 1950and in fact validated for that purpose his nine
years' servicealready completed with ICAO. Thus the Trihunal ruled, on that
basis, that a specialobligation towards Mr. Mortished had heen assumed by the
United Nations in respectof the repatriation grant (p. 9 of Judgement No. 273).
Although the importance of that ruling cannot be denied or overlooked, the
findingon the existenceof an acquired right was no1based on that ruling alone,
but also on the specificStaff Rules governing the repatriation grant during the
period in respect of which Mr. Mortished claimed his entitlement.
216.TheTribunal established that any link betweenthe repatriation grantand
return "10 the home country" was hroken in the Staff Rules as early as 1953,
through Staff Rule 109.5 (a)-which had defined "obligation to repatriate" as
meaning "the obligation to return a staff member and his or her spouse and
dependent children, upon separation, al the expense of the United Nations to a
place outsidc the country of his or her duty station". II found that the literal
meaning of the term "repatriation" was thus ahandoned in the rules in force as
of 1953,and noted that the General Assembly had raised no objection to that
legalfact (seep. 10of Judgement No. 273).Thus, the Staff Rules established 10150 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

regulate the schemeof repatriation grants wereno1hased on a literal interpreta-
tion of the term "repatriation".
217.TheTribunal went on to note that the rulesof certain specializedagencies
in fact did not require evidenceof relocation. In the case of the United Nations,
the Legal Counsel had stated that the practice of not requiring evidence of
relocation wasconsistent with the StaffReeulations. While the StaffRulesof the
United Nations werethemselvessilent on the issue,the practice of not requiring
such evidence was consistently followed for nearly 30 years. Although the
Tribunal did not consider il necessary to rule in abstracto on the question
whether such a practice could generate a legal entitlement, we submit that the
practice of the Organization was sufficient in itself to establish such an
entitlement. As this Court indicated in its Advisory Opinion of 1956(p. 92). the
practice of an Organization "should serve as a warning" against an exclusively
literal interurelation of its rules, and mav in fact be considered to have modified
relevant ruies.
218. Evenmore significantly, the Tribunal based the existence of an entitle-
ment to the repatriation grant, "and the respective roles of the General
Assembly and the Secretary-General in defining ils juridical rules of applica-
tion", on the Regulations and Rules actually promulgated for that purpose
(p. II of the Judgement). Thus, under Staff Regulation 9.4, enacted by the
General Assembly itself through resolution 590 (VI) of 2 February 1952:"the
Secretary-General shall establish a scheme for the payment of repatriation
grants within the maximum rates and under the conditions specifiedin Annex IV
to the present Regulations." Annex IV then stated that "derailedconditionsand
definirionsrelating ro eligibility shall be determinedby ihe Secretary-GeneraP'
(emphasis added).
219.The Tribunal went onto note that Annex IV stipulated certain elements
to be taken into account by the Secretary-General in his determination of the
"detailed conditions and definitions relating to eligibility", including the follow-
ing:that the amount of the grant should be proportional to the length of service
with the United Nations; that il should be calculated on the basis of a scalegiven
in the annex. taking account, inter alia,of the number of years of continuous
semce away from the home country up to an upper limit of 12 years, and
excluding from eligibility a staff member who is summarily dismissed from his
post. In addition, in determining the detailed conditions relating to eligibility,
the Secretary-General was to be guided by the followingstipulation contained in
Annex IV:

"ln principle, the repatriation grant shallbe payable to staff members
whom the Organization is obligated to repatriate."

The Tribunal look account of this stipulation, noting that it left the Secretary-
General with a margin of discretion by the use of the term "in principle", and
further that eligibilitywas torise on the basis of the Organization's obligation
to repatriate the staff member, rather than on the basis of actual repatriation.
220. Furthermore. the Tribunal went on to observe that Staff Regulation 9.4
and Annex IV to the Staff Regulations "which expressly acknowledge that the
repatriation granl scheme falls within the scope of the mie-making authority of
the Secretary-General" werestillin force, sinceno newprovisions on ihat system
had been added to the Staff Regulations hy the General Assembly al either its
thirty-third or thirty-fourlh sessions;and further, th"the question whethetrhe
~pplitant isentirledrorelyonacquired rights doesnorariseinrespecrof theStaf
RegulaiionswhichfaIl wiihin the comperenceof ihe General Assembly, even
though the subject of the application is closely related to the decisions on the
repatriation grant taken by the General Assembly" (p. 12 of the Judgement,
emphasis added). WRlmEN STATEMENTS 151

221 As appean lrom the events up to the promulgation of the document

CIRC/GEN/39. the Secrewry-General had full authonty IO determine the
'.detailcd conditions and delinitions relatine Io elieibilitv" of staff memben io
the payment of a repatriation grant. Firsi, ïhe Sec;etary:General's authority in
this respect was established or conferred hy the General Assembly under Staff
Regulation 9.4 and Annex IV. Second, the General Assembly had in Annex IV
to the Staiï Regulations stipulated certain elements to be considered by the

Secretary-General in the discharge of that function. Third, the General Assem-
bly had causednew elementsto be added by the ICSC, through another grant of
authority Io that body under resolution 331119. As appears from sectionA of
Part 11, al1thesenew elementswere embodied in the document CIRC/GEN/39.
General Assembly resolution 331119did not take away or diminish the authority

previously granted to the Secretary-General under Staff Regulation 9.4 and
Annex IV-which had themselvesnot been amended-but had only added new
parameten within which that authority was Io be exercised.
222. Thus, the Secretary-General, on the strength of, and in compliance with,
Staff Regulation 9.4 and Annex IV of the Staff Regulations, General Assembly
resolution 331119and CIRC/GEN/39, and after due notice to the staffthrough

Administrative Instruction ST/A1/262 of 23 April 1979,announced the amend-
ment of Staff Rule 109.5in circular STISGBIStaff RuleslllRev.5 of 22 Aueust
1979.in order "to make the navment of'the e~antcondition'al unon oresentafion
if actual&idence of relocat;ori wiihrrsl>eciToperio& r>reliRihiiriy <i;rsinga/rer 1
July 1979" (emphasis added). The restnction of this new condition 10periods of

eligihility ansing after thc enactment of the amendment, wÿs no doubt in
consideration of the standard mandaiing respect for acquired rights, conrained
in Staff Regulation 12.1and Staff Rule 112.2(a) as wsll as in Article 26 of the
ICSC's Stalute.
223.The Tribunal noted that in making the amendment to the Staff Rula in
1979in line with the ICSC recommendation, the Secretary-Generaladopted the

sameposition asthat of the ExecutiveHeads of the specializedagencies(p. 16of
the Judeement). and further. that this was the first lime that a orovision of the
Staff ~Ülesack"owledged tliat entitlement to the repatriation kant might exist
r~i~ ~ut evidenc~ ~f~r~.ocation ~e~-~~----ided~ ~ ~
224. It followed on this examination of the background IO the rulec governing
the repatriation grant, and particularly of the spccific terms of the new rulcs

promulgated by the Secretary-General in compliancp with the guidelines estah.
Iished by the Gencral Aswmhly and the International Civil ServiceCommission,
that Mr. Mortished,

"having rnlered on duiy before I July 1979.falls inIo the caiegory defined

in subparagraph (/) quoted above. [The Tribunal] notes that the penod of
service wmpleted by the Applicant before thÿt date. in ICA0 and in the
United Nations, far exwds the upper limit. 12years.of the rale ofyean of
service rendering a staff member elipible for the grant contained in Annex
IV io the Staff Regulations. Consequentl). under ihe terms of Staff Rule
109.5l/J quoted nbove, the Applicant retains hisentitlcment to the amount

of the grant withoui the need, as regards that period of service. Io produce
evidence of relocation." (P. 16of the Judgcment.)

225. The Tribunal's finding that MI. Mortished had an acquired right was
thus wtrect in terms of the aoolicable law. The aoolicable rules eovernine the

reoatriation erant had~ ~ ~~er made navment of théirant conditi&al on asual
~/patnaii~".fuflhermore. the tran;ii;onal syst&~e%blishcd under Siaff RU^
109.5(/,. when the condition requinng evidenceof relocation for future periods
of entitlement wasiniroducrd, prerrved previous penods of entitlcment already
accmed under the old rules--such as the enlitlement of Mr. Monishcd.152 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

3. Conceming the contention that the Administrative Tribunal exceeded ils
jurisdiction or competence, Io adjudge and declare:

(a) That the Committee had no bais, none wharsoever.for impugning the
jurisdiction or comprtence O/ the Tribunal with respect to Judgement
No. 273.
226.In order for the Committee 10 have come 10 the conclusion that the
Tribunal exceededilsjurisdiction or competence, il was necessaryto examinethe
Statute of the Tribunal and the specificprovisions which define the Tribunal's
junsdiction or competence. However, the Committee did no1 engage in any
discussionof the source and extent of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Nowherein the
Transcriptof Proceedingsisthere any referenceto, or analysisof,thesubstance of
the Tribunal'sjuridiction orcomqetence. Not having examined the content and
outer limitsof the Tribunal'sjuridiction, the Committee was no1in a position to
mle on thequestion whether theTrihunalex~ded itsjurisdictionorcompetence.
Theonly referencesto thequestion ofjurisdiction orcompetencewerethose made
by the United States delegate, as an inferenceor deduction from the contention
that the Tribunal had committed an error of law. They were the following:

"It is our conclusion that in ils conclusion the Administrative Tribunal
haserred on a question of lawrelating to the Charter of the United Nations,
in particular Article 101,and involving the very status of decisions of the
General Assembly; and that in so doing it has exceeded its jurisdiction of
competence;" (p. 32, A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I)
and again:

"an error of lawin connection with the Charter which involvesa limitation
on the authority of the General Assemhly is in and of itself an excess of
jurisdiction orwmpelence" (ibid., p. 46).
227.We suhmit that an inference of excess of jurisdiction cannot be made
from an error of law, even if such error of lawexisted. As the Court itselfstated
in its 1956Advisory Opinion (p. 87):

"The circumstance that the Tribunal may have rightly or wrongly
adjudicated on the merits or that it may have rightly or wrongly interpreted
and applied the law for the purposes of determining the merits, in no way
affectsitsjurisdiction. The latter is to bejudged in the light of the answer 10
the question whether the complaint was one the merits of which fell to be
determinal by the Administrative Tribunal in accordance with the provi-
sions governing ils jurisdiction. That distinction between jurisdiction and
merits is of great importance in the legal régimeof the Administrative
Tribunal."
228. In his separate opinion in the 1973 Advisory Opinion, Judge Dillard
(whilst in agreement with the decision of the Court but seeking to deal with
"matters of emphasis": see p.230).dealt with the question of inferring excessof
jurisdiction from an error of law, as follows (p. 237):
"Although the meaning and scope of the third ground must await
possible future interpretalion, it yet seems clear, on the face of it, that the
contention that the Tribunal has 'erredon a question of law relating to the
provision of the Charter of the United Nations' wouldno1cal1directly into
play the issue of whether the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has
failed to exerciseit, but rather that of wherherirha correctlyappliedtheIaw
it is comperenrto adminisier." (Emphasis in text.)

229.Sincx the Commitiee's Findingof excess ofjuridic~ion depended solely
upon such an inference. wesubmit that a prunaforte case that the Tribunal had WRllTEN STATEMENTS 153

exceeded its jurisdiction or competence in Judgement No. 273 was not estab-
lished.
230. It has already been argued in Section B (1) above that the question of
excess of jurisdiction had not been property placed before the Comrnittee; il
sbould therefore not have beenentertained.Apart from that, when that question
was added to the ground on which the Committee had made ils finding of
"substantial basisw-this king the finding that there has been an error of law,
which was itself erroneous-there was absolutely no discussion of what that
additional question entailed, before the Committee proceeded. precipitously, to
vote on it. Instead, the discussion focusedon matters not relevant to the issueof
there was a substantial basis to the view that the Tribunal had exceeded itsat
jurisdiction or competence only after ascertaining the content and full extent of
such jurisdiction or competence. Since il did not ascertain the limits of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction or wmpetence we submit that il had no basis for ils
conclusion.

(b) The Tribunaldid not exceed its jurisdictionor competence in Judgement
No. 273.
231. In order to determine whether or not the Tribunal exceededilsjurisdic-
tion or competence, it is necessary,as already noted in paragraph 226above, to
examine the relevant nrovisions in the Statute of the Tribunal concerni-e the
~"bunal's jurisdiclion'or competence.
232.According to Article 2 of the Statute of the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal:

"Article2
1.The Tribunal shall be competent to hear and ass judgement upon
applications alleging non-observance of contractO Pemployment of staff
members of the Secretariat of the United Nations or of the terms of
appointment of such staff members. The words 'contracts' and 'terms of
appointment' include al1pertinent regulations and rules in forceat the lime
of alleged non-observance, including the staff pension regulations.
2. The Tribunal shall be open:
(a) to any staffmember of the secretariat of the United Nations even after
his employment has ceased, and to any person who has succeeded to
the staff member's rights on his death;
(b) to any other person who can show that he is entitled to rights under
any contract or terms of appointment, including the provisions of staff
regulations and rules upon which the staff member could have relied.

3. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Tribunal has competence,
the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Tribunal.
4. The Tribunal shall not be competent, however, to deal with any
applications where the cause of complaint arose prio101January 1950."
233. Of the 13 other Articles of the Statute of the Tribunal, none of
them-xcept Article 14which has no bearing to Judgement No. 273-adds to
or subtractsfrom thesubject-matter of the Tribunal's jurisdictionor competence
as defined in Article 2.
234.Thus, as indicated in Article 2 above, the Tribunal's jurisdiction or
competenceconsists of hearing and passingjudgement on "applications alleging
non-observance of contracts of employment of staff members of the secretariat
of the United Nations or of the terms of appointment of such staff members".
The words "contracts" and "terms of appointment" are then defined 10includei54 APPLICATIONFOR REVIEW

al1pertinent regulations andrules inforce nt the time of the olleged non-
observance,including the staff pension regulations" (emphasis added).
235. Il is not in dispute that Mr. Mortished fellwithin the category of persons
to whom the Tribunal "shall be open", as laid down in paragraph 2of Article 2.
It is also not disputed that Mr. Mortished's application was an application
allegingnon-observance of a contract of employment and therefore an applica-
tion over which the Tribunal was invested with subject-matter jurisdiction or
competence. It cannot also be questioned that in hearing and passingjudgement
on such an application, the Tribunal is entitled, indeed, required,to take in10
account "al1 pertinent regulations and rules in force at the time of the alleged
non-observance".
236.Staiï Regulation 12.1, which the General Assembly itself had promul-
gated, was one such pertinent regulation in force al the time of the Mortished
case. This regulation provides that any amendment 10 the Staiï Regulations
should be "without prejudice to the acquired rights of staiïmembers". It cannot
be disputed that in hearing and passing judgement on the Mortished case the
Tribunal was entitled to take this particular regulation into account as well.
Similarlv. the Tribunal was entitled 10take into account Staff Rule 112.2faJ.
which Provides that amendments to the Staiï Rules must be in accordance wiih
the Staff Regulations, and hence with acquired rights.
237.These are matters indis utahly within thejurisdiction and competence of
the Administrative Tribunal o!the UnitedNations. Thus, in hearing and passing
judgement on the Mortished case-a case properly hrought before the Tribunal,
and clearlywithin itsjurisdiction or competenethe Tribunal did exactlywhat
it was comptent to do: no more and no less. We snbmit therefore that it is
entirely erroneous, to allege that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or
comptence in Judgement No. 273.

D. Further,on the QuestionSubmittedby the Committee,to Adjudgeand
Declore:

1. That the question submitted to the Court contains the followingmisconcep-
tion of the Judgement, namely,that il had determined that General Assembly
resolution 341165 "could no1 be given immediate eiïect"; in fact, the
Judgement only held that the resolution should not prejudice the acquired
rights of staiï members and was on that account absolutely "warranted".

238.The question submitted to the Court by the Committee states that Jud-
begivenimmediateeiïect". ThischaracterizationofJudgemenn 3411Nto. 273isanother
expression of the misconception that had polluted the Committee's decision
on the issue of "error of law relating to the provisions of the Charter9'-
namely,that theTribunal had "set aside" a resolution oftheGeneral Assembly,or
invalidated that resolution, or limited theauthority oftheGeneral Assembly,etc.
239. However, a dispassionate analysis would show that the Tribunal did
none of thesethings allegedby the Committee. Resolution 341165of the General
Assembly was neither set aside nor invalidated by the Tribunal, in Judgement
No. 273. Nor did that Judgement determine that the resolution could not be
given immediate eiïect. On the contrary, the Tribunal did recognize that there
had in fact ken an amendment to the Staff Rules, on the basis of resolution
341165,and that the new mle came into forceon 1 January 1980.Thus, the legal
force of resolution 341165was not in dispute; what was at issue, rather, was the
violation of the acquired rights of MI. Mortished, as a result of the manner in
which the Secretary-General applied resolution 341165.
240.The real question before the Tribunal, therefore, was whether or no1
General Assemblyresolution 341165should be applied so as not to prejudice the WRITIEN STATEMENTS 155

acquired nght of Mr. Mortished Io the payment of a repatriation grant without
evidence of relocation. The Tribunal had nghtly held, at pages 8-9 of the
Judgement. that both the Secretary-General and the General Assembly were
bound to respect the acquired rights of staff members in the same way, in
making any amendments to the Staff Regulations or Staff Rules.
241. If the question before the Trihunal were to be looked at in terms of the
point in lime al which resolution 341165was to be giveneffect(as the Committee
chose to do), we could do so to the extent that this provided us with the time-
frame for determining when respectfor acquired nghts beginsand when it ends.
But it would be legally impermissihle to ignore the acquired rights of staff
members in determining the point in lime for the application of the resolution.
In other words, the time-frame for the coming into force of amendments to the
staff rules or re ulations may be an aid for determining the question of respect
for acquired rig[ts, but not a suhstitute for the legalstandard mandating respect
for acquired rights. .
242.Thus, if the question before the Trihunal were to be reformulated in
lems of the time-frame for the application of General Assembly resolution
341165, that question could be reformulated in several ways, as follows:
Mr. Mortished's acquired nght to the payment of repatriation grant to...";cor,
"whether resolution 341165should be given immediare effectso as tu violate
MI. Mortished's acquired right to the payment of a repatriation grant..."; or
"whether resolution 341165should begivenprospecriveeffectasto accord respect
to Mr. Mortished's acquired rightto the payment of a repatriation gant .. .".
But each of these formulations would only be an aid to the solution of the basic
question of respect for acquired rights, rather than a formulation necessitated
hy any mandatory requirement as to the point in lime for enforcing new staff
wles.
243.The Tribunal quite correctly chose not Io regard the self-imposed time-
frame of application in the resolution as dis ositive in itself. The Tribunal
considered the time-framefor the application oPresolution 341165whenit posed
the question whether Mr. Mortished's entitlement to the payment of a repatcia-
lion grant "can have been effaced retroactively hy the Secretary-General's
deletion of subparagraph (f lof Staff Rule 109.51in pursuance of resolution
341165" (p.17 of the Judgement). By posing the question in this way, the
Trihunal implicitly recognized the fact that resolution 341165was already in
force; in other words. it recognizedand accepted the facl that resolution 341165
had already been given "immediate effect" by the Secretary-General. What was
at issue, then, was the legal consequence of this fact, in so far as the rights of
Mr. Mortished wereconcerned. The time-frame for the application of resolution
341165, that is, the question of whether that resolution was to be given
retroactive, immediate, or prospective e&t. was not the basis for the Tribunal's
decision in Judgement No. 273.
244. Rather, the hasis for that Judgement was the violation of the acquired
rights of MI. Mortished as a result of the application of resolution 341165to
refusepayment ofhis repatriation grant already accruedover more than 12yean
of service. Thus, profeeding on the basis of the legirlalivecriteria for deciding
the case, the Trihunal only held that the application of General Assembly
resolution 341165should not prejudice the acquired right of MI. Mortished to
the payment of a repatriation grant. The dispositivepan of Judgement No. 273
States,at page 19of the Judgement:
"By making payment of the Applicant'srepatriation grantconditional on
the production ofevidenceof relocation, the Res ondent failedto recognize
the Applicant's nght, which heheld hy virtue orthe transitional system in
forcefrom I July to 31Decemher 1979and set forth in StaffRule 109.5 (f).156 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

The stand taken hy the Respondent has had the effectof depriving the
Applicant of payment of the repatriation grant. Recognizingthat the
Applicantwasenfifledtoreceivethargrunrontherermsdefnedin Staff Rule
109.5 (fJdespirethefact thattheruleniasnolongerinforce onihedateof ihe
Applicant'sseparutionfrom the United Nations,the Tribunalfnds rhat the
Applicant sustainedinjuryastheresultof a disregardof Staff Regulation 12.1
andStaff Rule 112.2(a). The Applicantis thusenrirledto compensuiiofnor
thutinjury.(Emphasis added.) The injury should he assessedat the amount
of the repatriation grant of which payment was refused. Accordingly, the
Trihunal mles that the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant, as compen-
sation, a sum equal to the amount of the repatriation grant calculated in
accordance with Annex IV ta the Staff Regulations."

245.It isquiteclearthat thisrulingwasno1concernedwithdeprivingresolution
341165of its immediate effect. The fact that resolution 341165had been given
immediate effect hy the Secretary-General was already a matter of record. Far
from denying or repudiating this fait accompli, the Trihunal recognized it and
proceededta declarethe legalconsequenceofthe actions of theSecretary-General
in giving immediate effect ta resolution 341165(as required hy the General
Assembly), namely, the violation of the acquired rights of Mr. Mortished.
246. Furthersupport for the foregoing argument can also he derived from the
"Statement of Policy" issued by the Administrative Tribunal at ils second
plenary meeting, held on 14Decemher 1950(AlCN.5lR.2, 18Decemher 1950).
This statement of policy also conformed with Article 9of the Tribunal's Statute.
TheTrihunal in that statement spelt out the powers necessaryfor the exerciseof
its judicial functions as follows:
"3. The powers necessary to the attainment of these objectives include:

(a) the ordering of the rescission of administrative decisions on cases
within the competence of the Tribunal;
(b) the awarding of compensation in cases in which the rescission of such
decisions is impossible;
(c) the preservation of the equitahle rights of interested parties arising out
of the proceedings of the Trihunal.
Among these latter equitable rights may be compensation for necessary,
reasonahle and unavoidahle costs of litigation."

247.If the Trihunal had sought ta deny immediate effectta resolution 341165
it would have proceeded, as provided under paragraph 3 (a) of its Statement of
Policy, hy ordering the rescissionof the Secretary-General'sdecision implemen-
ting that resolution, and the reinstatement of Staff Rule 109.5 (f). But the
Tribunal did no1 proceed in that manner. Instead, it proceeded as provided
under paragraph 3 (b); that is ta say, il refrained from ordering the rescissionof
the Secretary-General's decision, which was hased on resolution 341165,and
awarded compensation in respectof the resulting injury to Mr. Mortished-this
injury king the legal consequence of the "immediate effect" of resolution
341165.In any case, we suhmit that the Tribunal's judgement cannot rightly be
considered ta have determined that General Assembly resolution 341165could
not be given immediate effect.

2. Even if the Court agrees that Judgement No. 273 had determined that
General Assembly resolution 341165could not he given "immediate effect",
the ludgement would still he warranted. '

248.In requiring respect for acquired rights the import of Staff Regulation
12.1and Staff Rule 112.2 (a) is that suhsequent amendments ta the mles and
regulations shallnot be made retroactive or operate with retroactive effect. WRlTTEN STATEMENTS 157

249. Legally, a requirement that a new Staff Rule or Regulation be applied

with immediate effect does not automatically render inapplicable Staff Regula-
lion 12.1. "Immediate effect" can, in law, only mean "as soon as al1relevant
leeal orovisions oermit". In the case of Mr. Mortished. the relevant leeal
p&vis'ionsdid noipermit the application to him ofGeneral Assemblyresolutkn

~41,~~~.~nce he had alreadv~ ~ ~ ~ his entir~-en~ -le~ ~~ b~f~re th~ ad-n~ ~- ~ ~ ~~ ~ . ~~-~~
of this measure. On the other hand. the resolution could be given immediate
ciTecihy prohibiting credii towards the grant in rcspeci of pcnods ofwrvice alter

1lanuary 1980,for staffmemben who would have failed to producecvidence of
relocation.
250. Even in the absence of an express regulation such as Staff Regulation

12.1, the general principle against retroactive legislation would still operate to
preclude the violation or impairnent of any rights acquired under pre-existing
law. Thus, if by "immediate effect" the Committee meant that the acquired

rights of Mr. Mortished should have been ignored, we suhmit that the Tribunal
would have been justified in refusing to adopt such interpretation.
251.Alternatively, the Tribunal could have interpreted resolufion 341165as

not being intended to commit an illegality. This is the only interpretation that
could be adopted in order to rescue the resolution from outright illegality.In line
with the principle of interpretation that ur resmagisvaleurquamperear, it is the
interpretation that the Tribunal should have adopted and did adopt. Such an

interpretation would entai1 that resolution 341165 be deprived of or denied
"immediate effect" in so far as such effect would have constituted an illegality,
that is to say, a violation of the acquired rights of staff members.

252. Thus, we submit that even if the Tnbunal had decided that resolution
341165should not be given "immediate effect", that decision would still have
been warranted.

(Signed) Sylvanus A. TIEWUL,

25 November 1981 Counsel for Mr. 1.P. Mortished APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

Tilt Assisi~sr SFCRETARY-(~EN~ FOR Pn<SOSSEIS .ERVICF SO
SYLVANU AS.Tit.wu~, COUNSE LOR Mn. M~RTISI~~U

9 November 1981

1 refer to your letter of 19 October 1981requesting information on action
taken hy the Administration in respect of Judgement No. 273 of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal (Mortished against the Secretary-General) and
requesting a copy of any opinion written by the United Nations Officeof Legal
Affairs conceming this Judgement.
In relation to your request for information on action taken in respect of the
Judgement, no action is king taken by the Administration in respect of the
Tribunal's Judgement until the Judgement becomes fin(seeArticle II of the
Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal). All rights of staff are,
however, king preserved sinceit has been decided no1to invoke time-limitsfor
making requests or appeals conceming payment of repatriation grants without
production of evidenceof relocation fromthecountry of lastduty station if
requests or appeals are made no later than three months from the date when the
Tribunal's Judgement becomes final.
You have also asked for a wpy of any opinion that the Officeof Legal Affairs
may have prepared conceming the Judgement. 1cannot accede to this request.
Legal Officeopinions providing advice to the Administration are, as a matter of
policy, considered to be privileged and not to be released to staff or their legal
advisers.

(Signed) James O. C. JONAH,

Assistantectetary-General
for Personnel Services. WRlïTEN STATEMENTS

THESECRF~ARC YO, MMIT~E ON APPLICATION FSR REYIEW OF ADMINISTRA~VE
TIUBUNAJL UDOEMENT TO,COUNSE LOR MR. MORTISHED
23 Octoher 1981.

This is in reply to your letter22fOctoher 1981 requesting information
concerning participation in the twentieth session ofthe Committee on Applica-
tions for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements.
The transcripts of the proceedings at the first and second meetings of
the twentieth session of the Committee on Applications for Review
(A/AC.86(XX)/PV.I-2 and PV.2lAdd.l) contain the names of the representa-
tivesof members of the Committee that made interventions dunngthe meetings
of the Committee. The transcripts are the only official record availahle of
participation in each of the two meetings held dunng the session. For easy
reference 1 am listing hereunder in alphabetical order the members of the
Committee and the names of their representatives as contained in the trans-
cripts:
Canada - Mr. Philippe Kirsch
France - Mr. Michel Lennuyeux-Comnène
Gemany, Fed. Rep. of - Dr. Karl Borchard
Greece - Mr. Dimitn G. Rallis
Honduras - Dr. Mario Carias
Malaysia - Mr. A. W. Omardin
Morocco - Mr. Rachid Lahlou
Ni er - Mr. Adamou Seydou
~afistan - Mr. Kemal
Portugal - Mr. Fernando Andresen
Senegal - Mr. Balla Mandau Dia
Tunisia - Mr. Handa Khaier
USSR - Mr. Yury Gregoryevich Petrov
United Kingdom - MI. Michael F. H. Stuart
United States - Mr. Robert B. Rosenstock
Zimbabwe - Mr. Eubert Paul Mashaire

The unofficial,and not necessarilycomplete, attendance sheets indicate that
the following members also participated in the meetings of the Committee
without making any intervention:
Thailand - Mr. Vichien Chensavasdijai
Oman - Mr. Seifeddin Ahmed Sulaiman

(Sizned) Alexander BORGOLIVIER,
Secretary,
Committee on Applications for Reviewof
Administrative Tribunal Judgements. 2. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1.INTRODUCnON

A. Question Presented

The Commitiee on Applications for Review of Administrati~e Tribunal
Judgements (Committee on Applications) has requested an advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice (Court), on 28 July 1981.with respectto thc
following question:
"1s the judgement of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in

Judgement No. 273, Mortished v. the Secrerary-Cenerai, warranted in
determining that General Assemblyresolution 341165of 17December 1979
could not he given immediate effect in requiring, for the payment of
repatriation grants, evidence of relocation to a country other than the
country of the staff memher's lastduty station?"

B. nie Court's Jurisdiction

The authority for invoking thejurisdiction of the Court to render an advisory
opinion is found in theStatute of the Court, which provides in Article 65 (1):
"The Court may give an adnsory opinion on any legal question al the
request of whatever body may be authorized hy or in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to make such a request."

The Gcneral Assembly. pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2. of thc Charter of
the United Nations. so authorized the Committee on Applications in Article II
of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal iresolution 957 tX) 11955)).
The Committee on Applications consideredan application submitted'hy the
United States on 15 June 1981 (UN doc. A/AC.86/R97). The United States
objected to Judgement No. 273 on two of the grounds listed in Article II,
paragraph 1,of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal: that the Administra-
tive Tribunal had erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations and that the Tribunal had exceeded its
jurisdiction or competence.
The Committee, composed of those memher States the representatives
of which served on the General Committee of the most recent regular session
of the General Assemhlv. found. al ils twentieth session. that a substantial
basis for the legal ohjeciions raiied by the application existed and requested
the Court's advisory opinion on the ahove-stated question (UN doc.
A/AC.860<X)/PV.2/Add.I).

C. ïbe Coort's Discretion

The Court has reoeatedlv stated that. althoueh its nower to eive advisorv
opinions isdiscretio~ary under Article65'01its ~Gtute. 8nlycom$lling rîaso&
would justify refusal of such a requestiqal Consequrnres /or Yares O/ rhr
ConrinurdPresenrr u/ SuurhAfiica in Namihia (South West Afrira, noriv~th- WRITTEN STATEMENTS 161

standing Security Council Resolution276 (1970). Advisory Opinion. I.C.J.
Reports 1971. p. 16,al p. 27CertainExpensesof the UnitedNations(Article 17.
paragraph 2. of theCharter), AdvisoryOpinion,I.C.J. Reports1962, p. 151,al p.
155;Judgmentsojthe AdministrativeTribunalof theIL0 uponComplaintsMade
against Unesco.Advisory Opinion. I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 77, al pp. 85-86.
The Court has decided that there was no compelling reason for refusing a
previous request from the Committee on Applications for Review of Adminis-
trative Tribunal Judgements made pursuant 10Article II of the Statute of the
Tribunal, made on the application of a staiîmember. Application forReviewof
JudgementNo. 158 of the United Nalions AdministrativeTribunal. Advisory
Opinion.I.C.J. Reports1973, p. 166, al p. 178.The Court has also previously
granted a request for an advisory opinion on an administrative tribunal
judgement made hy the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational.

Scientific and Cultural Organization, acting upon a resolution proposed hy a
member State. Judgmentsof the Administrative Tribunal of the IL0 upon
ComplaintsMade against UnescoI,.C.J. Reports1956, p. 77;I.C.J. Pleadings,
Judgmentsof the AdministrativeTribunal of the IL0 upon ComplaintsMade
against Unesco, pp. 58-67. The United States submits that there are no
compelling reasons for refusing this present request.
The Committee's present request for an advisory opinion does mark the first
lime such reviewhas been initiated by formal application from a member State.
In ils 1973Advisory Opinion proceedings, the Court recalled certain arguments
against initiation of review hy a member State. These, in hrief, are that for
reviewto be initiated by a member State application to the Committee (1)would
be contrary to the general principles of judicial review extending the right of
appeal only to those who were parties below, (2) might impinge upon the rights
of the Secretary-General as Chief Administrative Officer and conflict with
Article 100of the Charter and (3) would place the staiîmember in a position of
inequality before the Committee on Applications'. In rendering ils opinions in
1973.the Court stated that "[tlhese arguments would cal1for close examination
by the Court if it should receive a request for an opinion resulting from an
application to the Committee by a member State". (Applicationfor Review of
JudgementNo. IS8 of the United Nations AdministrativeTribunal, Advisory
Opinion.I.C.J. Reports1973, at p. 178).A closeexamination shows that none of
these concerns provides a basis for declining to exercisejurisdiction in this case.

1. THE PARTIES 'IO THE DISPUT A REUNCHANGED

The first argument appears hased on the assumption that the parties to the
review are different when the process is initiated within the Committee on
Applications by a member State than when it is initiated by the Secretary-
General. However, the controlling legal principle on this question has ken
stated hy the Court:

"the parties to [a].dispute before the Tribunal are the staff member
concerned and the United Nations Organization, represented by the
Secretary-General, and these parties willbecome bound by thejudgment of
the Tribunal ...As this final judgment has binding force on the United
Nations Organization as the juridical person responsihle for the proper

'Someof these conoernswere alsoraid ina letterfromcounrefor MI.Monished.
addrad 10the Secretarof theCornmitte on Applications(UN doc.A/AC.86/R.100)
and were diwursed a1 the Committee'smeetingsof 9 and 13 July 1981(UN doc.
A/AC.86tXX)/PV.Iand UN dw. A/AC.86(XX)/PV.2).162 APPLICATIONFOR REVlEW

obsrvance of the contract of senice, that Organization becomes legally
bound to carry out the judgment and to pay the compensation awarded to
the slaffmember. It follows that the General Assembly,as an organ of the
United Nations, mus1 likewise be hound by the judgment." (Efleci O/

Awards of CompensationMade by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal.AdvisoryOpinion,I.C.J. Reports1954, p. 47, al p. 53.)

It also follows that the party is no1 the Secretary-General, but the United

Nations, and that a Committee of the Assembly, as an organ of the United
Nations, may act for the Organization without that juridically changing the
parties. When the Assembly'sCommittee acts at the initiative of a member State
or at the initiative of the Secretary-General to seek review of a judgement

affectingthe United Nations and potentially binding upon it, the request for the
advisory opinion is made by the Committee of the United Nations. At the
advisory opinion stage, the Secretary-General may submit viewson behalf of the
Organization and member States may submit news in their own behalf,

pursuant to Article 66 of the Court's Statute, without that changing the parties
from ajuridical point of view.See,e.g., Judgmenisof theAdministrativeTribunal
of the IL0 upon ComplaintsMade againsr Unesco,AdvisoryOpinion, I.C.J.
Reports1956, p. 73, at p. 80.

Even ifthe arties were technically cbanged, the issuesin cases falling within
Article II of tReTribunal's Statute can, as in the present case, lx such that the
Assemblvand the member States are entitled to review. bv the United Nations
wincinaiiudicial orean. of their s~-~~antial leeal obiectibn; to a iudeement of an
,~~ ~ ~ ~
~di~;iist;ative ~nb;nal created by the ~ssehblybcfore a&G;ng'io be bound
by il This form of "judicial rcview", while diiierent from genersl proclices,
would violate no fundamental principle of judicial proccss and was considered
by the Assemblyto be a necessaryform of reviewinthe specialcircumstanas of

an international organization wmorised of sovereim States such-as the United
Nations. As the Court has stated:'

"the comnatihiliiv or ot~erwie of an..~en~ ~s~ ~,~-~re~ ~ -,-~~~~he ~
~uircm~nis of ihe judicial process depends on the circumstances ;"d

conditions of each particular sysicm" (Applicarion/ur ReviewofJudgemenr
No. 158of the Uniied NarionsAdministrativeTribunal. Advis0r.vOpmion.
I.C.J. Reports1973, al p. 176).

The second concern is not a compelling objection as a matter of fact in this

.-.. .. a~ ~ ~at~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~lv. ~~, ~~~. Secretarv-,ineral has~ ~i~ ~ ~o ...
objection ihat thescprocedures violate his prcrogatives or independenceas Chief
Administrative ORcer of the United Nations. In fact. the United States had
consulted with the secretariat to ensure that there was no concern tbat the

United States application to the Committee on Applications interfered with
or in any way diminished the autbority of the Secretary-General (UN doc.
A/AC.86O<X)/PV.I, pp. 31-35). Nor should such application conflict with
Article 100. The member State action in such a case is to brine before the

~u~h~ ~ ~-~ ~mmittee of theGeneral Assemblva a.es~ ~n~of ~er~ ~cerror of law
in a maiter ofconccrn to the Assembly;if thécornmittee agrees, ilrequestsihe
United Nation's principaljudicial organ to provide an advisory opinion on the
legalquestion.The independencc of the Sccretary-Gencral and the international

character of the staffdo not r uirethat questions of errors of law injudgements
which would bind the ~ener7 Assembly and its members be reviewed only at
the initiative of a staff member or the Sëcretary-General 3. STAFF MEMBER R'IGHT ASRE,NOTPREIuDICED BY HISPOSITIO NEFORE,
THE COMMITIEE

The third concern is similarly not compelling. The Committee on Applications
is not a judicial body taking action on the merits of the staff member's case.
Rather, the function of the Committee is

"merely to make a summary examination of any objections to judge-
ments of the Tribunal and to decide whether there is a substantial basis for
the application Io have the matter reviewed by the Court in an advisory
opinion" (Applicalion jor Review of Judgemenl No. 158 oj the United
Nations Adminislralive Tribunal. Adviîory Opinion, I.C.J. Reporls 1973at
p. 176).

Whether the application is that of a member State or of the Secretary-General,
the Committee is essentially determining whether the Organization, itself, has
serious enough douhts to warrant staying the final e&t of the judgement
pending an advisory opinion from the Court. nie procedures followed by an
authorized committee of the General Assembly in reaching such a decision
concerning ils own interests and prerogatives need nbejudicial'. There should
be no requirement that the staffmember and the member State be in a position
of equality in such a process.
The staff member's interest in an equal hearing is more wmpelling when il is

his own application which may be denied, which is no1 the presenl case. It is
significantly more compelling when the second judicial procedure is reached, the
procedure before the Court itself'.As the Court has stated:
"there is no necessary incompatibility belween the exercise of these
Iscreening]functions by a political body and the requirements of thejudicial

'Theprocedura of thiscommitteeof the GeneralAsxmbly. includingthe manncrin
which the dclibcraiionsof IhcCommntiecwcrcinilidid and conduncd; shouldno1bc
gemme inwnstdcnng a requeîiforanadvtroryoptntan ThcComtIcc ISauthonzedIo
rcuurslan advisorvooinion Aoobrar,onfur Reutewof Judn~men!No 158of rhr Untrcd
NC&~ AdminLr~roriv~ribunoi'Adviror~Opinion.héCommilteehasdonc 6. byway of
a raoluiionplrd in accordanccwiih niln of prdurc The rcsolutionmusi be
prerumed IO hsvcbccn val~dlyadoptd. kxol Comequences/oS r lorO/ rheContinued
Prrrïncr. of SuurhAlriru in Namika ISourhWpsrAfrdcol n~lwtlklmdSPNI~~ C~VMÇII
~es&tioi276 119?0~.Advisorv0,v;nion.I.C.JR~PO ~971,p. 16.atp.22.
'The Unitcd States is conMcni thdi the Couri will ahic toassure ihai its own
pr-dings providcthe intcrerledpartics wiih the essentialcqualiOyportunity10
ruhmii "althe -~~~~~~~ rel~ ~ ~ ~~ ~hc auestionswhichhavebecnrcfrrr2' for rriview.
Aoolieoriofor Reviewof Judpemenr o. 158of theUniredNorioAdminLrrrariveribunal.
A;ivirorojinion,1.C.i R~P~ILP1973,a1p..iSl.
In this conneetion, the United Statcs rmlls the recommendationof the General
and theSsretaw-General shouldno1makeoralstatementsbeforethelntcmationalCourt
of JustiŒin &y prdings undn ATticleII. Howevcr,should the Court deem it
desirableto have the benefitof the oral expressionof viewsof the staffmember.the
Seeretary-Gencral.and intemted memberStats on any or al1aspectsof thc questions
refemd foran advisory opinion.ncithcrthat mmmendation nar the Statutcand Rules
of the Court should be a bar. The Secretary-Generalwuld includecounxl for the
applicantasa membcrof a wunsel tcamsentby the Sccntary-Gencraland wuld allow
applicant'swunxl Io speak withoutuintrol king exercisedby the Secrctary-General.
Thiscould pe asviablelor,oral argumenas for writtenviews.Altcmativcly.the Court
mzghtaval itselfofthepossibilityopenedbyArticMesand 68ofits Latute ta =ivethe
staffember'sviewson anyissuesonwhichthe Courtwishcsto inviteoralwmmcntsby
the Secretary-General,the intcrestedmemberStates, and thestaffmemberwnŒmed.164 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

process, inasmuch as these functions merely furnish a potential link
between the two procedures which are clearly judicial in nature" (ibid.).

The Committee's affirmative decision is

"merely a necessary condition for the opening of the Court's advisory
jurisdiction. It is then for the Court itself to reach ils own, unhampered,
opinion as to whether the objections which have been raised against a
judgement are well founded or no1and to state the reasons for itsopinion."
(Ihid.,at p. 177.)
Nevertheless, Mr. Mortished's written comments on the application of the
United States were receivedby the Committee in a letter from his counsel (UN

doc. A/AC.86/R.1001).

4. THERE AREIMPORTAN REASONS WHY THE COURTSHOULD EXERCISE
~URlSDiCIlON

Where, as in the present case, the issues go to such matters as the intent and
effect of General Assembly decisions taken under Article 101 of the Charter,
and the extent of the jurisdiction with regard to those decisions granted the
Administrative Tribunal hy the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and
the staff members are not exclusively concerned. The memher States and the
General Assembly have important and distinct interests. It was such interests
and concerns with decisions of the League of Nations Administrative Tribunal
in 1946,and similar concerns with decisions ofthe United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal in 1953which were beforethe Court in 1954.when it advised the
General Assembly that the proper redress for such concerns of memher States
and the Assembly was 10 provide in the Statute for judicial review.The Court
stated:

"There csn be no doubt that the General Asçemblyin the exercise of its
power could have set up a tribunal without giving finality 10 ils judge-
ments." (Efict of Awaràs of CompensationMade by the UniredNotions
AdminisrroriveTribunal.AdvisoryOpinion,I.C.J. Reports1954, al p. 58.)

It further stated:

"There can be no doubt that the Administrative Tribunal is subordinate
in the sense that the General Assembly can abolish the Tribunal by
repealing the Statute, that it can amend the Statute and provide for review
of future decisions of the Tribunal and that it can amend the Staff
Regulations and make new ones. There is no lack of power to deal
effectively with any problem that may arise." (Ibid.,at p. 61.)

'TheCornmittee on Ao~licationsitselfconsiderd theouestioolMr.Mortished beine

?fierdiruriing ihecumpciingCiiniidrraiionrihuro&hiy.did ihi Cohm8iimdktde 1;
<.enytheapplicationIoappcarbcforc ilsubrniiirby Mc.Muriirhd's cnunwl IInoird
ihai rushan anne3nncc wouldno1arrirl in ils iaik. whirhuar onlv IOdcode whcihrr
therewara subsiantia~basisfor theobistions raisbv theUnited tat taos~liiation.The
uf5Mr. Mortirhrd'scounsclon ~hichhemusisldcbehcard inordereforjuriiirinlJci tubc
dunc"(UN doc.AlAC 86iXXi PVI. o Ibi Funher.ihc vicw w3rcrorerrd ih~iiuchan
appc3T"nccrnighik preiudicialby bvink ihr irnp;rrnon ihaiinhcaring c~n~rl. ihe
Cornrniiicehad disrcgardd iir rialu, and ~ttcmptd inappropriaiclgiridm1 wiih ihc
suhçianccof ihemailcr (US dx. A A<:86 PV ?. p 7) WRITTEN STATEMENTS 165

The review procedure which the General Assembly did estahlish through
ArticleII of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal was the culmination of a
long history with the vexing problem of objections to Administrative Tribunal
judgements by the member States and representative bodies of international
organizations. In adopting the procedure, the United Nations had the benefitof
the precedentestablished by the lnternational Labour organisation for reviewof
ils Administrative Tribunal judgments, the benefitof the Court's advice,and the
benefit of further extensive studyithin the United Nations during which the
precise issueof applications hy member States wasconsidered at length.Agenda
Item 49,Oficial Records, Tenth Session, Annexes.It would be a severesetback

werethe procedure now deemedimproper in the precisecircumstance for which
it was designed. Such a decision would also put in question the status of
Judgement No. 273 of the Administrative Tribunal'.
The statement made by the Court in 1973is equally sound in the circum-
stances of the present case:

"A refusal by the Court to play ils role in the systemofjudicial reviewset
up by the General Assembly would only have the consequence that this
system would not operate preciselyin those cases in which the Committee
has found that there is a substantial basis for the objections which have
been raised against a judgement." (Applicaiionfor Reviewof Judgement
No. 158 of the UnitedNations AdminisirativeTribunal, AdvisoryOpinion,
I.C.J.Reports1973, at p. 177.)

The United States suhmits that the objections which might be raised against
initiation of the reviewprocedure by formal member State application are not
persuasive and are heavily outweighedby the difficultiesthat would becaused if
review bythe Court were unavailable. Therefore, the United States urges that
the Court agree to provide the advisory opinion requested by the United
Nations Committee on Applications for review of Administrative Tribunal
Judgements.

II. SUMMARY OF THE CASE

A. History ofApplicant'sClaim to the United Natious Repatriation Grant
Applicant, Mr. Mortished, a former staff member of the United Nations
Organization, is of Irish nationality. He was firstemployed by the International

CivilAviation Organization on 14February 1949as a translator/interpreter. On
5August 1958,he transferred to the United Nations as a translatorlprecis writer
and was givena permanent appointment. The Letter of Appointment provides:
"You are herehy offered a permanent appointment in the Secretariat of
the United Nations in accordance with the terms and conditions specified

' Byrnoluiion957 (XI018 Novcmhrr1955.iheGencralAsumbl) amcndedtheSiaiuie
of ihr Administrati\cTribunal.iniroducingthere\icw prmdurc. Ariiclc 10.nsamcndrï).
nowmakcs ihelinalilofAdminisiraiivcTnbunsliudeemcniscxr>rersrlubicctio Ariidr
II. Incares in which theCornmilteeon Appli&iio~s has deiemin;d ihai ihere is a
suhsisntidl arisfor objmti10ajudgcmcni on therpn~ficdgroundr.andhssdccidcdio
requesian arlviroryopinion. ihcSiaiuieonlyproviforlhe Tnbunrl'sjudgemcnt10 k
conRmcd"in conrormiivuiih ihconinionof ihcCourt" Ihe Asscmblv aDDearSta have
decidedihat ihc ~nttcd-Naiiuns aRd iltc Ccnîrÿl Acîmhly will noi.k.bound hy an
r~içisunlcrrihc Couri ru>imnsihc Adminirlraiii~cTrihundlon ihc law of ihr matier166 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

belowand subjectto the provisions ofthe StaffRegulations and StaffRules,
io~etherwirhsuchamendmenrs as mov,,~om rim~ ~ IO rimehc moder~ s~ch~~~.
~iafl~e~uloriini ondsurhSroflRule~ ...Acopy of the SraKRcgulationsand

Staii Rules is transmitted herewith." (Emphasis supplicd.)
Pnor to Mr. Mortished's transfer,the United Nations Officeof Personnel sent

him a letter stating that his employment with the United Nations would be
considered a transfer. providing a salary figure and noting that an attacbed
Annex would provide particulan concerning a "post adjustment" allowance
payable under the Staff Rules. The Annex, in which the officehad crossed out

inapplicable provisions, described various allowancesrelevant to the commence-
ment of employment, including the installation grant, dependency allowance,
education grant, pension fund participation, travel and moving allowances. It
did not mention the repatriation grant.
Just prior to Mr. Mortished's entry on duty, on 4 August 1958,the United

Nations Officeof Personnel executed a personnel action form. Various remarks
by the Officewere made in a footnote to the designation of MI. Mortisbed as a
"Permanent Appoin~.ent", among which were the following:

"Service recognized as continuous from 14 February 1949.
Enriiled ro Installation Grant and Dependency rate.
Cred~r toward repatriation grant commences on 14 February 1949.

Enrir/ed to transportalion of household effects.
Next home leave entirlemenr in 1960." (Emphasis supplied.)

As respondent's brief recounts (paras. 4 and 5). on 21 December 1979,in
responseto hisprevious inquiry, the applicant wasadvisedof the substance ofthe
proposed General Assemblyaction to require al1claimants to provideevidenceof
relocation as a condition for payment of the grant, as of I January 1980.

Applicant did not take advantage of an offer made at that time by the
Administration to waive the three-month notice oenod for resianation or
terminationofservice, whichwouldhavepermitted apPlicantto ~esi~nëffective31
December 197~andthe~~~-~enve the b~nef~t~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~r navmenl of the
r-. ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~
repatriation grant under the transitional Staff Rule in effect until tbat date.
At the time of applicant's separation from service, the Staff rules in ekt
punuant 10the directive of the General Assemblyin resolution 341165required
ihe submission of evidenŒof relocation in order to establisb eligibility for the

repatriation grant. Applicant refused to submit evidence of ~locaiion and
sought payment of the repatriation grant upon his resignation in Apnl 1980.
Respondent refused to pay and consented to direct submission of applicant's
appeal to the Administrative Tribunal. Under the Staff Rules, applicant has up
to two years from the date of separation (i.e., until Apnl 1982) to relocate,

submit evidence,and claim the benefit.There is no indication in the record that
be plans to do so.
The Administrative Tribunal, in Judgement No. 273, of 17 December 1979,
found that applicant, who had completed 12years of expatriate servicewith the

United Nations well before resolution 341165was adopted by the General
Assembly, had acquired the ngbt to receive the grant without complying with
the Staff Rule requiring the submission of evidence of actual relocation.

B. Principal Legal Objectionsto îhe Jndgemeotof tbe Administrative
Tribd

United Nations staff members cannot properly be deemed to have acquired a
nght to al1or partof the United Nations repatriation grant without submitting
endence of actual relocation when reauired bv the Staff Rules in force at the
time of their separation from United ~âtions sérvice.Thegrant was adopted by WRlTïEN STATEMENTS 167

the United Nations General Assembly in 1950to help defray the expenses of
those expatriate United Nations staffmembers who relocated from the country
of their las1duty station upon termination of lengthy serviceout of their home
country. That original purpose was acknowledged hy the Administrative Tri-
bunal in ils own judgement. That purpose was never modified by the General
Assemhly. The record contains repeated confirmation that the grant was not a
delayed expatriation grant and that payment of the grant to staffnot relocating
upon separation would be inconsistent with the purpose of the grant, illogical,
and possihly even discriminatory against non-expatriate staff.
Over the years, the Secretariat enga ed in the administrative practice of
paying the grant to expatriate former staimembers claimingthe benefitwithout
requiring them to submit evidence that they had actually relocated. This was
justified by the alleged practical difficulty of estahlishing a system of tight
control. This practice was not reflected inthe Staff Rules or othenvise formally
hrought to the attention of the General Assemblyfor many years.The Assemhly
challenged the practice and adopted resolutions in 1978and 1979to bring it to
an end. By requiring evidence of relocation, the General Assemblyexercisedits
rieht and resoonsibilitv under Article 101 of the United Nations Charter to
rGuire the in;plementaiion of the Asscmbly'seïrlier decisions establirhing the
grant in a Id.hion whichassurcd ih3i it would he p3id only Io those intended to
be eligible.There arc no spccial aspects to the ïpplic~ni's contrait or rmploy-
mcnl circumstances thai would compel iarving oui for him ün acquired righi tu
be excepted frorn this requirement.
The Administrative Tribunal, in harring the Secretary-General from carrying
out this directive of the General Assembly ina plicant's case,failed to givedue
weight to the most reasonable interpretation orthe basic criterion for eligihility,
that, "in principle, the grant shall be payable IO staff members whom the
Organization was ohligated to repatriate". In resolving any amhiguity the
Tribunal might have perceived in this standard, it failed to give the weight
required by the Charter to the readily ascertainahle intent of the General
Assembly. Instead, il gave undue weight to a number ofdouhtful factors which
do not legally sustain the extraordinary conclusion that the applicant had
acquired the right to receive a benefit without providing the documentation
required hyprudent administration and General Assemhlydecision. In doing so,
the Administrative Tribunal erred on a auestion oflaw relatine to Article 101of
the Charter and iieiliended thc concept of "acquircd nghts" Gyond thc hounds
ofpnorjunsprudence and ihc requirements ofsound ini~rnational orgdnilation
public policy.
Whatever room for argument might have existed had the Secretary-General
imposed the evidentiary requirernent on his own authority was legallyforeclosed
when the General Assemhly adopted resolutions 331119 and 341165. The
Assemhly'sdecisionswerevalid and, particularly in the latter case.unamhiguous
exercisesof its authority under Article 101of the Charter. Byresolution 331119,
the Assembly bound the Secretary-General 10 make a change in the prior
administrative practice and, by resolution 341165,compelled him to delete from
the books, a transitional Staff Rule, adopted only six months earlier, which had
made an exception to the evidentiary requirement for staff members like
applicant who had been in serviceprior to the effectivedate of the Assembly's
decision Io require evidence. These resolutions hound not only the Secretary-
General, but also the applicant, whose original Letter of Appointment had
expresslyincorporated the Staff Regulations, Staff Rules and any amendrnents
thereof into bis contract. It also hound the Administrative Tribunal which is
required to apply General Assemhly decisions under Article 101and the Staff
Regulations and Staff Rules as they existed at the lime of applicant's separation
from service.
To the extent that the Administrative Tribunal construd resolution 341165as168 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

somehow not dealing with applicant's situation, il erred on a question of law
relating 10theCharter. To theextent that the AdministrativeTribunal refused 10

honour resolution 341165because 10do so would allegedly violate applicant's
acquired nghts, it committed additional errors of law relating to Article 101of
the Charter and exceeded ilsjurisdiction by engaging in unauthorized judicial
review of the decisions of the General Assembly taken pursuant to that same
article.

III. HISTORY OF REPATRlATlON GRANT

A. The Origin and Adoptionof the Staff Regulation concerning the
Repatriation Grant: Conceptionto 195û

In 1949,a Committee of Experts on Salary, Allowance and Leave Systems,
after having comprehensivelyreviewedthe salary and allowances system of the
United Nations, recommended that the temporary systemof yearly expatriation
allowance then in effect be replaced with the payment of a terminal or end of
service lumpsum repatriation grant to defray the expenses incurred hy a staff
member who, upon termination of service with the Organization, actually
relocates 10his home country.
The purpose of the expatriation allowance had been to mitigate certain
disadvantages associated with expatriated employment, e.g., increased expenses
associated with living for the first time in a foreign country; the insecurity of

tenure which waî thought to bemuch greater in international civil servicethan
in the case of most national services; and the progressive loss of business
contacts in the home country, which increasesthe difficultiesof finding suitable
employment there upon termination of United Nations employment (OBfcial
RecordF, Fourth Session, Annex 10 Summary Records of Fifth Committee,
Vol. II,UN doc. AjC.51331and Corr.1). The Experts Committee felt, however,
that base salaries (plus allowances such as education grants) should be estab-
lishedal a levelsufficientto allow expatriated statimembers to meet their usual
expenses after the initial installation peno(ibid.at para. 107,p. 2).
The Experts Committee recognized that a terminal grant was warranted
since:
"upon leavingthe Organization and beingrepairiatedtohishomecounrry a
staff member is faced with certain extraordinary expenses, and ... such
expenses would fullyjustify payment of a special lump-sum grant at that
time" (emphasis supplied) (ibid.,al para. 108,p. 2).

The Committee cited the followingexamples of such extraordinary expensesand
their causes: (a) the loss, during United Nations service, of professional and
businesscontacts with the homecountry and the resulting increasingdifficultyin
finding suitable employment in the home country if work with the United
Nations should be terminated; (b) the necessity of giving up residence and
liquidating obligations in a foreign country; and(c) the expenseswhich a staff
member will normally have to meet in re-establishing himself and his home on
return to his owncountry (ibid.)The Experts Committee feltthe substitution of
the repatriation grant for the expatriation allowance was in the interest of both
economy and administrative simplicity as well as in the interest of the staff
member who would receive it at the lime when it was really needed. The
Committee proposed:

"that thegrant shouldbepayableIo al1sraflmemberswirhrespect IO whom
theOrgonirationir obligared IO undertakereparriarion to the home country.
Staff members who are terminated by summary dismissal should no1 be WRI~EN STATEMENTS 169

eligihle. The amount of the grant should Vary with the length of service with
the United Nations .. ." (Emphasis supplied.) (Ibid., para. 109, p. 2.)

Thus. as ori-~~all, conceived..~h~-eran~ ~as inte~d~d onlv to meet~~xwn.~~
associatrd wilh actual rrp3iriation. and rligibility uds rrldied to thai purpose.
The purpose. as conceivcd by ihe Expîrts Cummitice, has been citcd frequcntly
and continucr IO he the rationale for ihe grant'(crsept thai "rcpalriation" uas
subpequentl) defined as "relocdtion"~.
Thr Sesrerdry.Gcncr3l's report to ihe GéncrdlAssemhly in 1949on thr uork
of the Committee of Experts siated thüi ihe Secrciarv.General was dronnine his
recommendation that Che temporary system of expatriation grants 'bé made
permanent and that he "accept[edl" the recommendation that the expatriation
grant system be replaced by a system of repatriation grants (Oficial Record?,
Fourth Session, Annex to Summary Records of Fifth Committee, Vol. II, UN
doc. A/C.5/331/Add.l and Corr.2, para. 17). However, the Secretary-General
recommended the following wording for the new Staff Regulation:

"Subject to such conditions and rates as may be prescribed by the
Secretary-General, the United Nations shall pay a repatriation grant to a
staff member who is separated from the Secretariat following a period of
seMce at an official duty station outside his own country." (Ibid., at
para. 31.)

This wording would clearly have transfonned the new repatnation grant into a
delayed expatriation grant hy removing the linkage to repatriation. Significantly,
this recommendation was no1 adooted. Instead. the General Assemhlv ulti-
mately adopted the wording originaily used by the Committee of Experts,which
contained that linkage.
Dunng the Fifth Committee's consideration of the Committee of Experts
recommendation, at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, the Chainnan
of the Committee of Experts stated that he wished to speak about certain
characteristics of the Committee of Experts report which were not reflected in
thedraft resolntion suhmitted by the Secretary-General. After some remarks on
classification of posts, children's allowances, and education grants, he turned to
the question of the expatriation allowance and emphasized. inter alia:
"that the Committee had proposed the establishment ofa repatriation grant
which would enahle those officiaisreturning home to meet the often

' See Reportof rhe Sc..rriury<;~nrr<Ofira<ilRen>r<lr, ighircnihSession.Annexes.
Agcndditem66. UN dcw A CS 979.para 13. p 18.whcre. in aJiscuoion of ihc grani
and thc wrvice bcncfir.rhhtsiur)~nd pupore of thc.dranarr rsrlairil as iollowç.
"[ulnlikethe earlierexpatriationallowance.whichit replaced, therepatriation grant
was estahlishedas a terminal paymentdesignedto providecompensation for the
extraordinaryexpendituresincurredbystaRmemkrs at thetimeoftheirseparation
fromtheserviceandre-esroblishmenifnlheirhomeeounrrvartera~rolon-edabsence"
(emphasissupplied).
Sec alsothefollowingdocumentsthat haverefend expresslyto thegrant'spurpaw king
Iodeiraythecxtraordinaryexpensesincurredinthecourseofactualrepatriationandjor 10
the 1949 Experts Commitiee'sstatcment of the purpose: UN doc. A/C.S/SR.IM3(18
Novemkr 1963),para. 36.p. 202;Re ort oj theInlernationolCivilServiceCommision,
Ofiial Records,Thirty-firstSasion. lupp. No. 30.UN doc. A/31/30(1976),para. 266;
Report oj the Forry-eighthSessiondthe CCAQ(1978).UN doc. CO-ORDINATION/
R.1263/Add.3,para. 14.p. 5; Reporof rhclnternariowlCivil ServiceCornmimion(1978).
Oficia Rlecorb, Thirty-thirdSessionSupp. No. 30,UN doc A/33/30,para. 178.at pp.
59-M.170 APPLICATIOF NORREVIEW

wnsiderable expensesarising al that time" (UN doc. A/C.S/SR.227 (1949),
para. 16,p. 230).
In 1950.the AdviçorvCommittee on Administrative and Budeetarv Ouestions
..%wed ihe ~xnek Cornmittee's recom~en~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~accent~- the bcncinle of
the grant as "a lump.sum~ robepaid tortaflmrmbcrsonhe<n~ . reparriorrdIO,the~r

home countries to cover costs of reçsiïblishing themwl\es"; üccepted the
purposç of the proposed grant. "to rase the position of staffmemhers leavingthe
Orianization" and to "supplement the termination indemnities to staffmembers
retÜrningro rheir home Ciuntries"; and recommended the adoption of a less
generous scale of payments than that proposed by the Experts Committee
(emphasissupplied). First Reportof 1950to theCenerolAssemblyof theAdvisory
Committeeon Administrativeand BudgetaryQuestions(Oficial Records, Fifth
Session, Supp. No. 7A, UN doc. A/1313, paras. 68, 69 and 70). The Secretary-
General's 1950report to the General Assembly on the question, in arguing for
the higher scale of payment recommended by the Experts Committee, now
appeared to accept the nature of the grant as limited to repatriation:

"the Secretary-General desires to emphasize the viewthat monies repaid by
the Pension Fund when a staff member leaves the secretariat, and any
termination indemnity 10 which he may be entitled, are completely irrele-
vant to the repatriation grant. In his opinion, staff members should not be
obliged to dissipate Pension Fund payments in the expense incurred in
settling down anew in theirown countries; neither should these payments be
used as an argument for reducing the amount of the repatriation grant 10
staff members whose circumstances warrant such a payment. In short, the
Secretary-General takes the view that if the permanent expatriation allow-
ance which he has supported before the General Assembly on previous

occasions and which the staff ovenvhelmingly favour, is to be replaced hy a
repatriation grant, the rates for the latter mus1 be adequate 10 avoid an
inequity 10 staff uprooted from their home countries. He consequently
favours the scale of rates recommended by the Committee of Experts."
(Oficial Recordr, Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda item 39, UN doc.
Aj1378, para. 12, pp. 82-83.)

When the Fifth Committee considered this latter recommendation, the view
was expressed that it would be inappropriate in principle to adopt the higher
payment scale in order to mitigate the impacl of the salary reduction caused by
the discontinuation of the expatriation allowance since the repatriation Brant
was in no way intended to be part of a staff member's salary .Furthemore,
even though a salary reduction was king effected by the elimination of the

'The representativefromthe UnitedKingdomelaboratedon the grant'spurposeby
statingthat

"[tlheeliminationoftheexpatriationallowancewouldofcoursemeanthat the take-
Butthe burpaseof [therepatnation]allowancewasIo facilitatesfrthc$return of staff
mernbersto theircountryof originafterterminalionof service.It wastherefore an
errortoconsiderihatallowanae as an inlegralpartof theirlake-homepay ..."(UN
doc.A/C.S/SR.265,para.50,p. 179).

Similarly,theCanadiandclcgatenated that
"[tlhc scaleof the repatriationgran1proposed by the Sub-Committeemight be
inadequatebut the Committeeshouldcenainly no1 on that account support an
incorrectprinciplc[i.e..thatthegrantwasintendedIobe a partofthestaffmember's
salaryr (ibid.at para.76.p.81). WRI'ïïEN STATEMENTS 171

expatriation allowance, il is worth noting that il was the considered new of the
Committee of Experts and the Secretary-General (after discussion with the Legal
Department) that "the adoption of theCommittee's recommendations would
not violate any acquired rights" (UN doc. A/C.5/SR.228, para. 46, p. 239).The
Fifth Committee fully accepted the Experts Committee rationale for the
repatriation grant but recommended the reduced payment scale (Report of the
Fi/ih Commitree,Oficial Records. Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda item 39, UN
doc. A/1732, para. 16, p. 115). The General Assembly adopted the Fifth
Committee's recommendation in resolution 470 (V)of 15December 1950,which
amended the Provisional Staff Regulations to provide:

"The Secretary-General shall estahlish a scheme for the payment of
repatnation grants in accordance with the maximum rates and conditions
specified in Annex II 10 the present spen'fiedregulations.

ln principle, the repatnation grant shall be payable 10 staff members
whom the Organization is ohligated 10 repatnate, except those terminated
by summary dismissal. Detailed conditions and definitions relating to
eligihilityshall be determined by the Secretary-General. The amount of the
grant shall Vary with ihe length of service with the United Nations
(exclusive of periods when an expatriation allowanΠwas received). The
maximum rates payable shall be as follows: ..."

B. Developmentrelating to the Repa~ation Grant: 19M ta 1976

nie SÎcretary.Gencr~i took immediate action to impicment resolution 470
(V) hy informing the staR of the sanie in Inromaiion Circular ST/AFS/SEP-
Al72 (20 Deccmber 1950). which provided that
"[rlhe principle 013 repatnation grant has ken established. the grantin he
parable in sraflmemhersreiurnrdor UnitedNarionse.rpensero ihr~rhome
counir~rs" (cmphasis supplied) (ihid..para. II, at p. 7)

Shortly thereafter, with effect from I January 1951, the Secretary-General
promulgated rules providing detailed conditions and definitions relating 10
eligibilityfor the grant. This first set ofstaff niles provided no repatnation grant
would be paid to a staffmember whoseduty station al the limeof separation was
his home country; the niles, as amended in 1952 and in force to date, have
presewed that general rule, but pronded the Secretary-General with discretion
10make exceptions under certain n'rcumstances'.
In 1952 the Consultative Committee on Administrative Ouestions (CCAO).
a subsidiary committee.of the Administrative Committeeon ~oordination~
(ACC), considered questions of unifonn administration of the repatriation grant

' Containedoriginallin Rule114 (e)(1January 1951)e;ktive 1March1952through
I July 1979,in Rule 109.5(f)(1December1952);from I July 1979Io present,in Rule
109.5 (i)(22August1979).
'The ACC is the body whereinter-organizationconsultations areheld among the
agreementepursuantIoArticles57and 63IoftheCharter.TheCCAQdealswith,atiointerolio,
personnelarrangementsand 8dministrativerelationships.172 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

accorded in a number of agencies in the United Nations family. The United
Natioris Secretariat prepared a working paper for this purpose, subject to
further reviewwithin the United Nations Secretariat, proposing, inter aliathat
the United Nations take the viewthat the grantshould be paid to a staffmember

"no1 actually repalriated, Le.,(a) he remains in the country of the official
duty station; (b) he travels to a country other than his home country"
(<;onditionsof Eligibilityfor RepatriationGrant (1952). CCAQ, Twelfth
Session, UN doc. CO-ORD/CC/A.l2/13).
This secretariat paper asserted that actual repatriation should no1 be an
eligibility requirement, mainly for reasons of administrative convenience, i.e.,
"particularly sinceil would be impossibleto control the final placeof residence"
(ibid.).However, when the CCAQ reported on ils Twelfth Sessionto the ACC,
it did not address explicitlythe question of paying the grantto thosremaining at

their las1duty station, but only proposed and requested that the ACC concur in
principles which, inter aliaprovided that:
"(a) The United Nations regulation provides that the granl is payable
where the organization is 'obligated to repatriate'. This language has been
followed by FA0 and UNESCO. The IL0 and WHO have adopted the
criterion, 'sewing at a duty station outside of the home country'. It is felt
that the ILO-WHO formulation is more descriptive of the intent. Without
proposing changes in regulations, it is proposed that other organizations
undertake to reflect this concept in their niles.
(b) In the light of (a),it is believed that the grant should be paid after
two years' sewice abroad. rezardless of the conditions of se~aration
(including resignation but exchding summary dismissal) and rcgardless
also of whether the staff member is actually rcpatnated " (Report uf the
T~telfthSersiono/ CCAQ (1952). UN doc CO-ORDINATION, R.124 )

While the CCAQ's preference for the ILO-WHO formula was understandable,
its assertion that it was "more descriptive of the intent" than the FAO-Unesco-
United Nations formula is remarkable in light of the United Nations General
Assembly'srejection of the ILO-WHO formula which had been recommended
by the secretariat in 1949 (supra,p. 169).
Although respondent's brief for the Administrative Tribunal indicated that
the CCAQ had "adopted these principles (Respondent's brief, para. II), in
Tact,it had only proposed them and requested the concurreno cfetheACC. The
documents made available in this case contain no indication that such concur-
rence was ever given. Furthermore, the principle that actual relocation is not
required was never incorporated into either the StaB Regulations or Staff Rules.
Apparently, however, the General Assembly accepted part of the CCAQ's
suggestions when, in the permanent Staff Regulations adopted in 1952, it
indicated that repatriation referred to the relocation of staff to any place outside
the country of the last duty station:

"(a) 'Obligation to repatriate' as used in paragraph 4 of Annex IV to the
Staff Regulations shall mean obligation to return of a staffmember and his
dependents, upon separation, at the expense of the United Nations, to a
place outside the country of his duty station." (Staff Regulation 109.5 (a)
(adopted 1 December 1952 and effective 1 March 1952), UN doc.
ST/AFS/SGB/94.)
This early change in the regulations modified the meaning of "repatriation" in
the sense of providing that relocation away from the last duty station to any
third country, as opposed to one's home country, was sufficient to satisfy the
eligibilityconditions of the grant. However, the recommendation to define the
grant as payable without referenceto relocation was not adopted by the General WRITIENSTATEMENTS 173

Assembly or incorporated intothe stalimles despite the CCAQ's proposal that,
"[w]ithout proposingchanges in the regulations, [the United Nations and] other
organizations undertake to reflect this concept in their rules".
In 1964the CCAQ, considering it inequitable that an expatriate stalimember

should lose what it called "his entire accrued repatriation grant entitlement"
when posted in his own country, agreed that "accrued entiilement" in years (up
to a maximum of 12) should be reduced by one year for each completed six
months of service in the home country upon reporting there; but in the event of
subsequent reposting abroad, credit should be restored at therate of one year for
each completed six months serviceabroad (Reporrof theTwenry-Ffih Session of
the CCAQ (1964), UN doc. CO-ORDINATION/R.45I, paras. 32 and 33).
Although it was not incorporated into the Staff Rules, the Secretary-General has
implemented the CCAQ suggestion as an exercise of his own discretion.
In 1974,the CCAQ, with a viewto studying eligibility requirements of certain
allowances (including the repatriation grants) that dilierentiated on the basis
of sex, reviewed the history of the repatriation grant, noted the continuing
relevance of the grant's original purpose and acknowledged that the grant
should only be paid in the case of actualrepatriation. Il explained, in fact, that
only the practical difficulties of administering this logical requirement prevented
it from recommending that evidence of actual repatriation be required to

establish eligibili'.

C. Cheral Assembly Action from 1976to Date concerning the Rcpairiaiion
Cmnl Eligibility Requirement of Actusl Relocation

At its thirty-first session (1976), the General Assembly adopted resolution
31/141 which changed the hasis for calculating certain terminal payments,
including the repatriation grant, and funher requested the International Civil
SeMce Commission (ICSC)2 to reexamine in the light of the viewsexpressed in

' Inparagraph14ofthe documentrequestingcommentsfromorganizations,the CCAQ
stated:
"The umc rmsiiningwould wm Io xpplyio ihc qucsilunof whriher ihc grani
shouldk paidonly ircpairiaiiunactuallyoccurs Thewholepurporeo/rhcyr<inri, IO
u<~L<ihrrrraflmembcr und hufanlit)IV ~P-L.JIO~/inI~C hvnw <#,unIriindi./eiirl,
rhm ISnologi<-ai~wr~jficorioio)uiyde gr<inrroo croflnwmhrr .ho rrnwln,nrhe
counrrjo/his lardur,,rrorionApplyingihr logirIrhowcver.lrau hi wiihpraciical
dificullieThe organi~alionsha\cno ua) ofknouinguhcrc a sta&memkr actuall)
readcsaficr he leaw serviceand infaci ihcreare a numkr of casciinuhvh siail
haveiwoor morercsidcnŒs The wrrciarni of ihc PensiunFundha, recordsof the
addresses10whichpensionsare paid but theseare not ncccssarilythe resideneesof
ihc pcnsroncrr Onc could mske piymcnt of ihc grmi dependeni upon aciunl
rcpdiri.iiioniravclbu1ihiswuuldonlrnsurc thai theorganimtnoninrurrc idcrosi
repatriationandpaytheirownfarne backtIothedutystalionornd10anyotherplaceIn
uhtch thcyiniendIorcridc In man) mçcç aafai ihe inmeal leming wr\icedo no1
wallyknawwhcmihcy wilrcvdr and io tic ihcgranrio ariuîl rrpdinaiaiinuould
lrad lu reauesfor keîoinuthccniiilcmrntun the booksoendineiwr<onaldccistons
ofthesta8memkr. ~o;afihese reasons.CCAQ~ecretaRatdodis thefeasibilityof
attemptingto make paymentof the grant dependent on evidenceof repatnation."
(CCAQ Secremrial, ReporriorioGranr (1974).UN doc. CCAQISECI325 (PER).)
(Emohasirsuo..ied.)
TheGcncralAswmblyeslablirhcdihelCSCbyrcsoluiionr3W?(XXVIt)(I9D~emher
1972)and 3357(XXIX)(18Dcccmkr 1974)io regulatr ~nd coordin~icihr condlitonof
wrvicc of ihcUN commonsystcm The ICSC pnmanly a recommcnduiorybody174 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

the Fifih Commiiiee ai the current session, the "conditions for the provision of
terminal payments (for example. repaination grnnt. tcrminaiion indcmnities)".
This requesl was prompied by the concerns expressed by numerour delegations
in the Fifth Committeë as to the propriety of paying the grant to those who,
upon separation, remained in thecountry of their lait duty station'.
In 1978,the ICSC concluded that paying thegrant to those who remained in
the country of their las1duty station was inappropriate and expressed the firm
belief thattheerant should be naid onlv 10those who actuallv left the countrv of
their las1duiy~iaiion to rereidc. incluaing those who wcni Coplaces other than
their home couniries'. The ICSC expressed ils objections to paying the grant 10

a non-repatriating staff member in the following terms.
"Striçily speaking. ii was clear thai to do so would hc inconsisteni wiih
the siaied purpose of the grani. The staff member who remained in the
couniry OF lhe las1duty station incurred none of the expcnses ofdislocation

and reinsiallaiion which the grani was intended to mni (or none more than
would be incurred by a non-expatriate staff member, who would no1 be
eniitled 10 the gant in any case). The staff member who removed 10 a
countrvother than the home countrv. either to work there or to retire there.
did in& exn-~,-s o~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~dinstallation. ~~~ th~~ ~. strict oumse of
the grant was not complied with. Tosa). rharrhesrufJmembprhadeo;nedrhe
enrrrlemenrio rhegrunr rhroughha>,ingheenexparriaie duringhi1 serviceand
should receive ir uponseparorionwher~verhe weni. rhpn.would hero change
rhenature of rheëntitlemenr and ro make ii a kind o/deferred exparriution

'The Austriandclegaienoied thedsirability of
"a revicwofthcconditionsundrr uhicheniitlcmcntsio ihaigraniarow including
uhcihcr iiwasappropnaieio payIhegranl ioa statïmcmkr who . remained inihc
countryofihcduiysiaiionîftcr reliremcnl"(UNdw.A/C 5/3I,SR.32.pars.46.p. 9)

TheCanadiandelegalion
"sharcd ihc concemsciprcsrcd by the repraenialnve01Austna wlth regard 10 ihc
aymcniof rcpainaiion benefiüto employceswhodtd noi tnlaci retum io thcir
Eomecounincs" (UN da. AiC S/3I/SR34. pra 14.p 4)

The tklgian rcprcuniaiivc.implioilyprcsumingihataciiÿilrclowiionai verylcsri was
requiml. rcquertcdihc Commission 10 "dalde whetherthe eniire indemnilyshould hc
paid 10 a staffmcmberreinnng 10 a country oihcrihan hiscouniry01origin" (ihid.ai
para 14.8. Y)., ,
'Thc ommirrionalso cramind ihs ~usrificaiionfor increaringihc amount of grani
u-th the numhr 01yearsof wrvice if Ihegrmi was in fact intendcil 10 cuver spîcific
excepiionalrrwtilemcnicrpînses. Il notedthai ihc rani hadihcinconsi<ien< t harrcieris-
iisr 01 both an eamd servicebencfit and an 0% hoc subsid) IIronçidrrsd ihat ils
progressivenatureuas dur to ihcgrani'rintroduciionas a subsliiuleforthecxpainaiion
allowanceand ais" io the nnflucnce 01 the progressivepaiicm 01 many oiher such
~ndrmniiic( scg .wvcranŒpayof UnitedStai'seivilwrvice). The Commission.convincd
thai ihc grant'soriginalpurpow war siillvalid.
"klie\cd lhcrc uould k logic in sundardi7ing the ceplnalion gran1 as a Rai
amauni or as ihcquivaIrnt of a numkr ofdays'daalyrubrirtrnu allowance orrhe
raieao~hcobk io~k oloce ro whrehrhr former rr<ilïmemhermoved al ihe umc
timc.;idiübted Ihe &dom ofeiiminatiie.cntirely?romthe salari svrtcmal1traŒof
a vparai8onkncfii reflccttnglengihof shiΠThc urrriiurioofiuih anentiilemeni
.. .wouldconsiituic a malor relormof ihe ulary systm. whichuould necd in hc
conridcrd- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~i.forrxamolc.of Ihedcerccofimaortanocio k nivenio leneih
of wrviŒin the c&t&t of the blicy to be ;doplid &garding carcc;or shorl-tcïm
mploymcnl." (Emphasisrupplied.) (Reportof theICSC (1978).Oficiol RecordF,
Thirly-thirdSession,Supp.30, UN dm. A/33/30, para. 182,p. 61.) WRITTEN STATEMENTS 175

allowance, so raising the question of possible duplication Mth that part of

the margin included in base salary which isdefined as compensalion for
expatriation.
..........................
The Commission ...did believe,however,that ropay repatriation granr to
o person who remoinedpermanently in lhe counrry of his losr duly srorion
was incomporiblewirh rhe purpose of the grant and could also be seen as
discriminarory by non-exparriare staff members." (Emphasis supplied.)
(Report of the ICSC (1978), Oficial Recordr, Thirty-third Session, Supp.
No. 30, UN doc. A/33/30, paras. 183-185,pp. 61-62.)

Notwiihsianding ihis. the ICSC considered ilimpraciicable to require evidcnw
of relocation due to the sixn~ficantdiîïiculties of administratively monitonng
staff members' movementsifter separation. It also considered that

"the proportion of staff membe~ who did no1return 10their home country
on separation was in any case very small; the lCSC was of the opinion that
the setting up of cumbersome water-iight controls would not be warranted"
(ibid., at para. 186,p. 62).

Therefore, the ICSC thought that grants should not be paid only to ihose who
supplied evidence of actual relocation to prove their eligibility. Instead, il
recommended relying on the staff member's good faith guarantee of his
intentions hy conditioning the grant upon the staff member's signature of a
declaralion providing that he or she inteuded not to remain pemanently in the
country of the las1duty station.
At its thirtv-third session.in 1978.the General Assemblvameed that the erant
should not-~b-- r-i- ~o staff~-~~~~~~~~ at their last -utv station, but reiected the
recommended dcclaraiion of inieni 2 an insufficientguaraniee againsi abuse of
the grani'. Instead. iidecided that paymeni of the grant should be conditioned
upon the presentation by staff of evidenceof actual relocaiion. and inresolulion
331119 (19 December 1978)accordingly providcd in operative paragraph 4 of
section IV

"ihai paymeni of the repatnation gran1 IO entitled staff members shall be
made conditional upon the presenration by the staffmember of evidenw of
aciual relocation. subject to the rems IO be esiablished by the [ICSC]"

When this proposal was introduced, the representatives from Barbados and
Belgium, expressly questioned whether the phrase providing for the ICSC's
establishment ofcertain lems could be interpreted in derogation of theevidenŒ
requirement (UN doc. A/C.5/33/SR.56, para. 37,p. II (Barbados) and para. 50,
p. 14 (Belgium)). The Japanese delegation, which CO-sponsoredand presented
thisdraft resolution on behalf of al1the sponson, reassured the Fifth Committee
that the language did not permit any such dilution of the thmst of the
requirement, and in any event, the ICSC was accountable to the Fifth
Committee. In this regard, the Japanese delegate

"explained that the final phrase of paragraph 4 was considered necessary
because certain ambiguous circumstances could anse in whichmore specific
guidelineswould prove necessary.For example,would a staff member who
presented evidenceof relocation years after his repatnation still be entitled176 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

to a gant? Or, should a staiï member who needed the grant to pay for
Many such situations could arise, but he trusted that the Commissioncation?
would be able Io draw up appropriate conditions and terms. However, he
assured the representative of Belgiumthat the phrase in question in no way
diluted the thrust of the decision in paragraph 4 but merelyprovided for ils
administrative implementation. Moreover, the Commission would inform
the Fifth Committee of the terms and procedures il estahlished." (Ibid., at
para. 51, p. 1.)

Howeber. in dralting the terms. ihc ICSCerceedzd the sçope oithis mandatc
as clarificd b) the Japanese delegatc, by proi,iding that siiiialready in servicc
before I July 1979(the eflèctivedate of the conditions specificd in resolurion
331119)would remain "entitled" (sic), withoutthe production of evidence, to
that portion of the grant attributable to the period of their servicebefore 1July
1979.The Secretary-General adopted these terms to govern the United Nations
staff inan Administrative Inst~ction of 23April 1979(UN doc. ST/AI/262) and
eventually incorporated them into the StaffRulesas rules 109.5(d) Io 109.5(f),
which provided as follows:
"(d) Payment of the repatriation grant shall be subject to the provision
by the former staffmember of evidenceof relocation away from the country
of the las1 duty station. Evidence of relocation shall be constituted hy
documentary evidence that the former staff member has established resi-
dence in a country other than that of the las1duty station.
(e) Entitlement to repatriation grant shall cease if no claim for payment
of the grant has been submitted within two years after the effectivedate of
separaiion.
(f) Notwithstanding paragraph (d) ahove, staff members already in
servicebefore 1July 1979shall retain the entitlement to repatriation grant
proportionate to the years and months of servicequalifying for the grant
which they already had accrued at that date without the necessity of
production of evidence of relocation with respect to such qualifying
service." (UN doc. ST/SGB/Staiï Rules/l/Rev.S (22 August 1979))

The lCSC appears to have ben prompted to disregard ils limited discretion
under the mandate given by the General Assembly hy the viewexpressed by the
legal advisers of several organizations that there was an acquired right to the
portion of the grant "already earned which "could not be affectedretroactively
by the changing of the rule". The ICSC apparently thought this viewwas further
supported hy the opinion it requested from the Office ofthe Legal Affairs of the
United Nations secretariat, which found that the Staff Rules and payment
practices (e.g., the practice of not requiring evidence) gave nse to valid and
enforceahle entitlements and obligations (Report of the ICSC (1979). Oficiril
Records,Thirty-fourth Session, Supp. No. 30, UN doc. A/34/30, paras. 23 and
24, p. 7). That opinion, in relevant part, provided
"The history of the repatriation grant as well as the wording and
[payment]schedule ...suggestthat the number of years of expatriate service
was considered by the General Assemblyto be the most significantelement
of the entitlements. Although the General Assembly definedthe recipients
of the grant by reference to the definition of those entitled to repatriation
travel,.there is no express or implied provision to the eiïect that only those
who actually made use of the travel entitlement should receive the grant.
In Annex IV of the Regulations, the General Assemblyspecificallyleft it
to the Secretary-General to establish the conditions for payment of the
repatriation grant, and the Secretary-General did this by promulgating staff
le 109.5and also by establishing a practice in an agreement within the WRlTTEN STATEMENTS 177

Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions. Staff mle 109.5If),
which even provides for discretion 10pay the grant 10persons whose final
serviceiswithin their homecountry and who could no1therefore be entitled
to repatriation travel, was-like al1Staff Rules-reported to and noted by
the General Assembly,which mus1accordingly have deemedthat rule to be
consistent with the intent and purpose of the Regulation." (Opinionof the
Osce of Legal Affairs, appearing in Report of the ICSC. Note by the
secretariar (1979),UN doc. A/C.5/34/CRP.8.)

In 1979, al the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the Fifth
Committee conducted extensive debate concerning the terms recommended by
inappropriate, for reasons stated below, the terms providing for entitlement
without evidence to a proportionate part of the grant. Certain delegations
expressed the view that the terms were a distortion of the General Assembly's
original intent in establishing the grant, as well as ils reasons for adopting
resolution 331119. (Statements of United States and Spanish delegations, UN
doc. A/C.5/34/SR.46. para. 65, pp. 13-14, and SR.47, para. 38, p. 9 (1979),
respectively.) The ICSC was considered, hy certain representatives, to have
exceeded that resolution's mandate regarding the establishment of terms by
whichit was intendedthat the lCSC would no1derogate from the requirement of
evidence and tight linkage to actual relocation (ibid.). Certain delegations
expressedthe unequivocal beliefthat the legalopinion on whichthe Commission
relied was completely wrong.(Statements of Australian and United Kingdom
representatives, UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.47, paras. 5-7, p. 3 and para. 34, p. 8,
respecti~ly.) The Australian delegate, in a particularly strong criticism of that
legal opinion, stated that:

"As indicated in the [legalopinion], staff rule 109.5had been reported to
and noted by the General Assembly, whichmust accordingly have deemed
the rule to be consistent with the intent and purpose of the staffregulation.
His delegation noted, however, that nowhere in the document was il stated
that the repatriation grant waspayable whether or not thestaffmember was
repatriated. Staff mle 109.5(f) [relettered 109.5(i) when the transitional
mle was adopted as 109.5(f)] indeed gavethe opposite impression, inthat
it gave the Secretary-General discretion to pay a grant to a staff member
who at the time of separation resided in hishomecountry ..That in no way
implied endorsement of the idea of paying a repatriation grant to a person
who was not repatriated.
The legalopinion, in fact, appeared to assume that repatriation grant was
equivalent to something like the payment of travel costs on retirement. The
term 'repatriation', however, clearlysignifieda return to one'shomeland. Il
was impossibleto interpret the rule as meaning that the repatriation grant
would be paid to any staff member who was entitled to be repatriated,
irrespectiveof whether or not he was repatriated. For reasons of language,
common sense and even law, the opinion given by the Office of Legal
Affairs was wrong."

Several representatives expressed the doubt that the repatriation grant
involved any acquired nghts (e.g., statements of Japanese, US, Spanish and
USSR delegates, UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.46, para. 87, p. 19 (Japan), para. 66,
p. 14(US), and SR.47,para. 38, p. 9 (Spain) and SR.62, para. II, p. 3 (USSR)),
with the Australian delegation stating unequivocally in this respect that
"[tlhe fact that in the past [the repatriation grant] had been incorrectly
applied did not confer an unchangeable entitlement" (UN doc.
A/C.5/34/SR.47, para. 6, p. 3).178 APPLICATION FOR REVlEW

Many members of the Fifih Commitiee wereof the opinion ihat ihe gant was
never inlcndcd io be paid to staff who afier separation did no1 relocate away
from the country of iheir last duty station and were unwilling to support the
controversial ICSC provision. This view was variously stated hy represen-
tatives from the United States (UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.46, paras. 65 and 66,
pp. 13-14), Italy (UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.46, para. 69, p. 151, Australia
(UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.47, paras. 3-6,pp. 2-3),Syrian Arab Republic (UN doc.
A/C.5/34/SR.47, para. 15, p. 5). United Kingdom (UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.47,
para. 34, p.8),Spain (UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.47, para. 38, p. 9) and the USSR
(UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.55, para. 9, p. 3).Only the Japanese delegation expressed
willingness to support the ICSC decision, and then with regret, because of
doubts that acquired rights to the grant existed in the case of present staff
membersand becauseit wasfeltthat the gant should be paid in accordance with
mles in force at the lime of actual repatriation (UN doc. A/C.5/34/SR.46,
para. 87, p. 19). The Committee adopted the view that the grant was never
intended to be paid without relocation in recommending to the General
Assemblya resolution correcting the ICSC'sinterpretation and implementation
of resolution331119.On 17December 1979,the General Assemblyaccordingly
adopted resolution 341165 which, in operative paragraph 3 of section II,
prondes

"that effectiveI January 1980no staffmember shall be entitled to any part
of the repatriation grant unless evidence of relocation away from the
country of the last duty station is pronded.

This resolution was implemented, with eiïect from I January 1980,by Adminis-
trative Instruction ST/A1/269 (21 December 1979). The Staff Rules were
subsequently amended with ekt from 1January 1980,to reflectthis action by
deleting Staff Rule 109.5(f) ,he transitional staff mle which had provided the
exception from the evidence-of-relocation requirement for the portion of the
grant allocable to periods of seMce before I July 1979.

IV. LEGAL OBJECTIONS TO THE TRIBUNAL'S
rnGEMENT

A. UNted NationsSiaîi MembersCaonot Hate an Aquird Righito Payment of
the Repatriation Grant withoutEvidenceof Reloration RequiredbySiaiï Rulesin
Force at the Tie of Their Separation

For reasons of language, common sense and law, United Nations staff
memberscannot be properly deemedto have acquired a right to al1or part of the
United Nation's repatriation grant without suhmitting evidence of actual
relocation. There are no special elements in the relationship of the United
Nations Organization with the applicant, Mr. Mortished, which would justify
finding thal he had acquired such a nght where other staff members generally,
who also had extensive seMce prior to I July 1979, had not. In mling that
applicant had acquired such a right, the Administrative Tribunal fmstrated the
intent of the General Assembly as to the nature of the grant king pronded
pursuant to the Staff Regulations. Instead, it reliedimproperly on wmparatively
action; the linkage made in the Staff Regulations and Rules between length ofel
seMce and the amount of the grant; administrative practice of uncertain origin
and extent; a short-lived transitional Staff Rule repudiated and reversed by the
General Assembly on the first opportunity it had to do so; and alleged180 APPLICATIONFOR REVIEW

record indicates, brought at the time to the attention of the Assemblyas oficial
United Nations secretariat policy and practice. This omission is the more
significant in viewof the fact that the Staff Regulations were amended al that
lime ta pick up a part of the CCAQ recommendation, Le., defining "repatria-
lion" more broadly to include relocation to an. .lace outside the country of las1
duty station.
Other features of the Staff Rules adopted and modified from lime to time
indicate that the grant continued to be defined in principle by reference to
relocation of the expatriate employee from the country of his las1duty station.
For example, there was the general rule that the grant would not be payable 10
an employee whose duty station al the time of separation was his home
country; together with the provision allowing the Secretary-General discretion
to make exceptions from that general mle. It is significant that the Staff Rules
have always allowed a staffmember two years from date of separation to claim
this benefit, while allowing shorter periods for other termination benefits, such
as the travel erant. and vestine some benefits in the staff member automati-
member was seta do something to qualify other than separate from serviceas antaff

exTheriSecretary-General'sreport on the repatriation grant in 1963indicated no
backsliding from the clear understanding that the grant, "unlike the earlier
expatriation allowance, which it had replacer, was established as a terminal
payment to compensate staff for expenditures incurred "al the time of their
separation from the service and re-establishment in their home country".
Eventually, the documents of the CCAQ itself came to reflectan acceptance of
the nature and purpose of the grant which clearly link-edit to repatriation. The
1974 CCAQ document admitted that "there was no logical justification for
paying the grant to a staff member who remains in the country of his las1duty
station". The ICSC, charged by the Assembly in 1976with examining the grant
after several delegations had expressed concern with ils king paid to staff
members who did not relocate from the country of las1duty station, reached
conclusions in 1978 which confirmed the continuing validity of the original
purpose of the grant, expressed the belief that the payment of the grant to a
person who did not relocate was "incompatible" with that purpose and could be
seen as discriminatory by non-expatriate staff members. The ICSC could not
have ken clearer as to the nature of the grant when il stated:

"To say that the staff member had earned the entitlement to the grant
through hanng teen expatriate during his service and should receive it
upon ieparation whereveÏhe went ... would be 10change the nature of4he
entitlement."

The remaining history confirms what preceded. The ICSC recommended that
some statement of intent to relocate be required, but the General Assembly
decided that more was needed, that evidence of actual relocation should be
provided bythestaffmember claimingthegrant to assure that itwasimplemented
in a manner which respected the basic and constant intent of the Assembly
that only relocating employees were eligible. The ICSC, influenced by a legal
opinion providcd by the United Nations Secretariat which used language of
"entitlement" not justified by the prior record, suggested the transitional rule,
which was quickly implemented by the secretariat, allowing staff to receive
repatriation grants proportionate to the years of service prior to the
General Assembly decision without the necessity of producing evidence of
relocation. TheGeneral Assembly'sswiftrejectionof this iseloquent evidenceof
ils unwillingnessto abide evena transitional systemfor paying the gant without
actual relocation. WRllTEN STATEMENTS 181

2. THECONSIDERATIO NOSVANCE DY THE ADMINISTRATT TREIBUNAD LO NOT
OWRCOM~ THE GRANT'S LINKAGE .ro ACTUALRELOCATIO NR SUSTAIN THE
FINDING OF AN ACQUIRED RIGHT TO THE GRANTWIINOUTEVIDENC~ OF
RELOCATION

Despite the unusually detailed, lengthy, and explicit record concerning the
meaning and intent of the repatriation grant, the Administrative Tribunal
reached the conclusion that the applicant had acquired the righteive the
gant without complying with the Staff Rule, adopted by the Secretary-General
in response 10the Assembly's mandate in resolution 341165,requiring submis-
sion of evidence of actual relocation. In effect, the Tribunal held that staff in
applicant's situation had acquired a right to payment of the grant in the very
circumstances in which the CCAQ Iiad said (in 1974)that there would be "no
logicaljustification inpaying the grantV'-the verysame circumstances which the
ICSC described (in 1978)as "incompatible" with the grant's purpose. This is an
extraordinary result which would require extraordinary strong justification. The
United States submits that applicant and the Administrative Tribunal have
sustained the burden and that the Tribunal's unwarranted finding has created a
conflict with decisions of the General Assembly under Article 101where none
should reasonably exist.
The elements adduced in the critical paragraphs of itsjudgement in which the
Administrative Tribunal explains ils conclusion, paragraphs XV and XVI, are:
(1)entitlement to a repatriation grant had been explicitly recognizedat the time
of applicant's appointment;)there was also a recognized relationship between
the amount of the grant and the length of ser(3)payment of the grant "did
not require evidence of relocation" at the lime of applicant's entry on duty: and
(4)the link between the amount of grantand the length of serviceculminated in
applicani holding an acquired right to the grant without production of endence

of relocation "by virtue of the transitional system in force from I July 10 31
December 1979and set forlh in Staff Rule 109.5 11)".These elements form the
siaied basis for the Tribunal's finding rhai appl;&nt uar ..enIOtreceive
ihat grani oii the isrms detined in Siaf Rule if,despite th2 fact thar rule
u,as no longer in force on ihe date of iipplisant's sepïraiion from the United
Naiions". Indi\idually and cumul;itively. howevcr, they do not susiain ihc
Tribunal's conclusion.
The first of the elements, the notation on his personnel action form relating to
the reuatriation erant', which was cited bv the Administrative Tribunal in an
appaknt attem5 10 treat applicant as special case, is most reasonably
intemreted as a mere recoenition of a credit of his nnor vears servicewithICA0
in th; calsulaiion of the &painaiion grant ior which applicani might or mighi
not bc eligiblç upon terminütion of his United Nations service.The notaiion is
absolutel) sileni on the lems and conditions of eltgibility for thc griint. II
appcars on a seconJary document. iiJocumcnt on which other bencfitr are
marked with the word "entitled", while the repatriation grant reference is only
to a "credit" toward the grant includina his years with ICAO. It is the tyve of
notation which routinely-would appea; in ihe personnel file of an empioyee
transfemng from one international organization 10 another. There is no
evidence that the lems and conditions 10 be met in order to acquire an
entitlement to the repatriation grant were the subject of any special discussions
with applicant al the time. Applicant's contract itself stipulated that his
appointment was subject to the Staffles and Regulations and such amend-
ments as may from time 10 lime he made to them. Thus, there are no special
features to applicant's employment record which would create a contractual
entitlement for him to specific terms and conditions of eligibility for the

'Supro,p.166."Credittowardrepatriationgracammcnçes on14 February1949."182 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

repatriation grant despite specific Staff Rules and controlling interpretations of
the long-standing Staff Re~ulations to the contrary'. Nor are there surrounding
facts and circumstances inapplicant's case which. under prcvious Adminisir&
tive Tnbunal judgements. would support ;Ifinding of specialized obligations of
the organiz?tion to applicanl notwiihstanding the failurc of ihc Rulcs in force to
so provide'.
The second element, the linkage made in the regulations between length of
service and amount of grant, is susceptible of at least two interpretations:either
that length of service was an element to be taken into account in figuring the
amount of grant a staff member would receive were he othemise eligible upon
retirement, or that the progressive increments in the repatriation grant were
deferred compensation which applicant and similarly situated staff members
earned through each creditable year of expatriate service. 11is submitted that the
former is a more natural interpretation and the history of the grant makes it

clear, as it was to the ICSC in 1978, that the former was in fact the intended
meaning of the Staff Regulation and pre-1979 Staff Rules. The concept of an
expatriation grant, albeit deferred, was explicitly rejected. Further, other
features of the grant render the "earned annual increment" theory untenable.
Many of these werecited in respondent's brief, but ignored hy theTrihunal. For
example, other termination benefits may be progressive, without an entitlement
arising merely by virtue of length of service. If the entitlement accrued to,the
staff member as somethinnearned for each of the creditable vears of exnatnate
service, summary dismissal should not cancel it; loss of deferred but already
earned benefits would be a rather extraordinary punitive element in a summary
personnel action. Nor would it seem reasonable for the Secretary-General to
enjoy the discretion, upon posting an expatriate employee to his home country,
to deprive him of one year ofan earned entitlement for every six months service
in the home country, or, as appears to have been the pre-1964 practice, to
deprive him of al1pnor years' entitlements at the outset of such a posting.
The most reasonable interpretation of the linkage between amount of grant
and length of seMce is that it is just a formula for calculating the amount, and
no more. One can reasonably infer that the General Assembly recognized that

'The AdministrativeTribunal'sremark"that respectforacquiredrightscarrieswithit
contract', suggeststh& it mayconsiderapplicanttohaveraeeotirraer&l"buired right"
through the personnelform notations 10 ;nriw a repainaiion granl regardlrssof the
Rulcrand Regulat~onrin cKcçifrom tlmc Io tImcrelaling IOcnicna forrligibiliiyand
rwuiremcnü of nroof. Nomal rules ofconiracl formaitonand intrmrciation uould no1
suilain sucha &clusion; nor wouldthe wcll-develocediurispmden&of the administra-
trieinhunals Underihai)unrprudcnce.contrsctualprovision,hdvc heen round iocrraic
acquircdnghis only whercthe nghts am cxprsïly stipulaicdinihe contract of cmploy.
ment itwlf 3c. the leiicr of annointmcnt. and alT~rtthe ocrsonal simus of cach
member<.g., nature of hiscoiiract, salaj, grade" (United'~ations Administrative
Tribunal (UNAT) Judgemenl No. 19, Koplm, para. 3); where they are a detennining
consideration In acceptanceof the contract (UNAT Judgement No. 202. Queguiner,
AdministrativeTribunalofthe IL0 (ILOAT)JudgmentNo.391,p.rede L7)and whichcannot,
ihereforebe changedunilaterally(Kaplun,suprn,para. 3). Under this jurisprudence, the
notations on applicant'spersonnelform regardingthe repatriation grantwould not be
sufficient.
UNATJudaementNo. 95.Sikand UNATJud~ementNo. 142. Bhairocharvva . hese
urcr ~nvolvcd-veryexplicil diwusionr or ~or&~ondrnm uiih ihc stall mrmbîr
Addiiionall).ihcswndardresmbhshcdb the SskonddnJBhiirrarhor)ia caws forfinding
a romal --~~"auonfromhie-~~ ..rrunaizd ededlinesnd mutu~lundcrsi~ndincruould
nit be salisficdbvan" &Lralizable nracticesuch the admini;trativcnracticc'adopted
fordoc~mentingk~~~ationgrant eligibility. WRlTïEN STATEMENTS 183

difficultiesof repatriation and the related expenses could be greater the longer
the expatriate serviceand that the Assembly was willingfor the Organization Io
pay a progressively larger share of those relocation expenses for longer-term
employees. No implications as to entitlement to receive the grant itself are
logically drawn from this method of calculating the amount.
The third element, that payment of the grant did no1 require evidence of
relocation at the lime of applicant's entry into United Nations service, is no1
persuasive evidence of the nature of the grant or the requirements for legal
entitlement generally or for applicant in particular either at that lime or upon
applicant's separation from United Nations service. First it is not al al1clear
that, at the time applicant entered into service or even by the time his United
Nations service terminated, any significant numbers of staff members had laid

claim 10the grant who did no1actually relocateL.Second, applicant finished his
fint 12 yean of creditable employment in 1961; yet the Secretary-General's
report in 1963' would not have encouraged applicant to assume that be had
b&n progressivelyearning annual deferred compensation forexpatriation which
would be his property to collect upon separation from United Nations service
should he decide to remain in the countw of his final ~ostina. Nor is it clear in
what year of applicant's employment an administratioi pracfice not reîlected in
the Rules would have become such a decisiveterm of applicant's appointment as
to overcome the contrary indications about the repatriation grant detailed
above.
Admittedly, the administrative practice over the yearshad ken verylax about
documentation required to establish that a penon was someone whom the
Or anization was "obligated to repatriate"; but that did not change the
dekition of eligibility for the benefit or preclude future improvements in
verifying eligibility for that henefit. The failure Io require actual evidence of
relocation was generallydefended over the years for practical reasons relating to
the difficulty of establishing a tight system of control. The issue raised by the
administrators was not "who was entitled" but, rather, what documentation or
evidence should the claimants have to submit to establish that they met the
criteria of eligibility. The Administrative Tribunal's finding would grant staff
"acquired righls" to lax administration of a termination henefit by the secretar-
iat itselr: it would elevate such practice over a specificdecision of the General
Assembly adopted prior to the staff member's retirement. To transfom lax
enforcement practice by the secretariat in10 a source of rights superior to the
decisions of the General Assembly under Article 101would be a serious error of
law relating to the Charter.
The Tribunal's reasoning regarding the fourth element, the elïect of the
transitional mle itself. isunsound. The transitional Staff Rule 109.(f) of I July
1979 is understood by the Administrative Tribunal to be the Rule by viriueof
which applicant held an acquired right to the repatriation grant regardless of the
contrary Rule in force, pursuant to General Assembly decision, upon bis
separation from service. That transitional rule, as has ken noted above, was
adopted by the Secretary-General upon the basis of an ICSC recommendation
which the General Assembly did not accept as within the ICSCs mandate. The

para. 186.p.62;see,supra.pp. 174-175.cordr, Thirty-third=on. UN dm. Aj33130,
Supro.footnote.p.169:

"Unlike the earliercr~atriationallowance.which il revlaced.the re~atriatian
gran!W~S îçtahl~<hc ds; tcrmln~lp~jrnent desincd 10 pruttdecornpnMtion for
ihc rxiraordinary crpcndiiurcr incurrchy stai rnrmberr di the timc of ihcir
.thsenc"nfrom serviccandrei,tdbl~rhrncntinthcirhomecountry afiîr prolongcd184 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

Assembly specifically examined the transitional rule, found it wanting, and
repudiated it through resolution 341165,swiftly and categorically. The transi-
tional rule was not on the books at the time applicant washired; it wasnot on the
books durine anv portion of aoolicant's .irieinal 12 vears of emolovment
creditahle to\;ardthé ~e~atriation'grant,and it ;as no1the rule on the'hioks at
~~~.~ ~ehe leftthe Oreanization. Further. had itkn the ruleat an,o~ ...-~~~me~
prior to his retiiemeni. IIwould, by the chpress terrns uf applicant's Letter of
Appointment, have kn subject Io such îmendments as might from lime 10time

be made. Even under the prior jurisprudence of the international organization
administrative tribunals, an acauired right to the continued enioyment of a staff
rule would not be deemed to anse in the circumstances of this case. That juris-
onidence aooliesonlv 10rulesin forceat the lime servicecommences. which were
o~ ~~ ~ ~.~îonal and de~ ~ ~e~imoortance in acceotine emolovmént that the
employec's rcliance will be protccied'. The Rules ;elatrng 18 e~;~ibili~for the
repatnation gant on the books at the tirne of applicdnt's transfer to thc United
Nations did no1 provide Cor ertablishing entitkment to the grant without

relocating. It was nevercontended that applicant wasaware of the administrative
practice relating 10documenting eligibility, understood it to provide entitlement
merely upon &tirement after ëxpatriate service without reference to actual
relocation or coiisidered that it was of decisiveimportance 10him in accepting
emolovment. Had he so understood and relied uoon il. he would not have kn
jusiifie'd.
A number of other elements recited bythe Tribunal appear Io be questionable,
although it is not clear from the Judgement to what extent theTrihunal reliedon
them. For example, the Tribunal cites the early breaking of the link between
eligibility for the grant and actual reparriarion. However, the link to actual

relocorion is the issue. and that was not hroken al any lime in the Staff
Regulations. The Tribunal also refers to the alleged margin of discretion in
definingeligihilityleftto the Secretary-General hythe Regulation'suseoftheterm
"obligated to repatriate" rather than such a term as "relocated. However,as the
above history and analysis have demonstrated, the wording of the Staff
Reeulation contains no ambi~..tv,~ufficientto convert the erant in10~ ~ ~ ~which
entitlemeni accrues simply by years of expîtriaie service. without relocütion
Finally. the Adininistrati\e Tribunal cites the hçt ihat no new elemeni was
expresslysdded to theslaII Regulïtions by theürnerîl Assemblyin 1978or 1979
and asserts thai the Assembly didno1examine thetran4tional StaffRuleor find it

deficient.However, the form-erisutterly unremarkable in light of the fact that the
Assembly understood the administrative practice 10requiÏe correction, no1 the
Staff Regulation establishing the repatriation grant. The assertion that the
Assemblvdid notexamineor findthetransitional ruledeficient isolai.lvinc,rrect
and inexplicable.

3. 1\ Fi~nisc rHnr APPLICANIHAI> AN AACQUIRC RDIGHI. iiit TRIBUNAL
FAILI:ITO GIM THE WLIGHT REQUIK~ IY AR~CICIO1 OF THE UN111u I*;A~o\s
CiiARrkR 10 TllF INT~!NTOF THI:GENCRAA LSBMBLY IN ITSACTIO% SIGAKUlNG

Pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, it is the General Assembly
which establishes and can amend the fundamental terms and conditions of staff
employment which the Secretary-General is required to implement. The terms of

'Such a rulehas ken heldto k unalterablewithrespcclto thosestaRmcmkrs to
whomit appliesand who were reasonablyentitledto expectthat theconditionof service
containedthereinwouldcontinue (Inre de Los Cobos and Wenxer (ILOATJudgment
No. 391);inreGuhinand Nemo (ILOAT Judgment Na. 429)). WRllTEN STATEMENTS 185

em loyment of the Staff,including applicant, acknowledge this by expressly
mating al1appointments subject to the Regulations and Ruleamendments
which may be made in them from time to time. The Statute of the Tribunal also
reilectsthis bygranting to the Administrative Tribunal jurisdiction over disputes
"alieging non-observance... of contracts of employment... or terms of

appointment which include pertinent regulationsand inforce at thetimeof
allegednon-observance"emphasis supplied). A primary task of the Administra-
tive Tribunal in approaching a question of the alleged non-observance of the
regulations and rulesmust beto understand what theymean in lightof the intent
of the General Assembly'sdecisions.
Even in cases where there are alternative constructions which might, with
equal reason,be placed on the words of the relevant Regulations, Rules,
authorized standard terms of appointment, and routine personnel docu-
mentation, the Tribunal is obliged to give great weight to the intent of the
Assembly.This is particularly so where the Assemblyhas spoken directly to the
question at issueand ils intent isreadilyascertainahle from the officialrecords as
well as from the context of its actions.
The Judgement rendered by the Administrative Tribunal in this caset
fulfil this requirement. It does not respect the Assembly's intent and under-
standing of the repatriation grant which isso evident from the record of the
grant's history.

B. Resolution 341165Legally Barred Repatriation Grant Payment Without
Endene of Relofation and the AdministrativeTribunWB not Authorized to
Refuse<O GiveIIEffect

The United Nations Committee on Applications for Review ofAdministrative
Tribunal Judgements, in requesting an advisory opinion, found that there was a
substantial basis for objection to thejudgement not only on the ground that the
Administrative Tribunal erred on a question of lawrelating to the Charterof the
United Nations, but also on the ground that the Administrative Tribunal
exceeded its jurisdiction. The United States believes that the Adminisirative
Tribunal's decision was no1warranted on both grounds, but is convinced that,
to so find, the Court need not reach the question of the ultimate limits of the
Administrative Tribunal's jurisdiction with regard to General Asxmbly de-
cisions. The United States comments on thejurisdictional issue are offered with
this qualification in mind.

1. RESOLUTIO3 41165 WAS A DECISION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBL YNOER
ARTICLE101 OF THE CHARTER WHlCH REQUIRET DERMINATIO ONTHE PRACTICE
OF PAYING ~PATRIATION GRANTSWITHOUT E~OENCE OF RELOCATIO NND
CANCELLET DRANS~TIONS ATAFFRULE109.5 (fl
Although the Administrative Tribunavs reasoning is no1clear, it appears to
entail the notion that the Secretary-General was neither hound nor permitted

to carry out the repatriation grant resolutions of the General Assembly,
particularly resolution 34/1-55,sinceto do so would violate the allegedacquired
rights ofa staffmember. TheTribunal's treatment of"thefundamenta1 principle
of respect for acquired rights", cites StaffRegulation 12.1and Staff Rule 112.2
(a) for the proposition that "the Secretary-General is bound to respect the
acquired rights of staff membein the same way as the General Assembly"
(emphasis supplied) (Judgement No. 273, para. IV). This assertion, which
overlooks the fundamental differencesin the situation of the General Assemhly
and the SecretaryGeneral with regard to the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules,
appears to be at the heart of the Administrative Tribunal's treatment of the WRITTEN STATEMENTS 187

there must have been agreement on a concept in that respect" (ibid., at
para. XII).

While the Administrative Tribunal does no1 make mention of this case in
~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Judgemeni No. 273. iis effort to charactenze~lhe Assembly action in resolution
341165would appear io be aimcd ai the proposition thai. while wtting out a
"prinnple of action". resolution 341165was not explicit or definiie enough to
constitute a controlling decision or "principle" regarding the transitionalstaff
. .
mle.
In seeking to avoid dealing with resolution 341165as a decision aiTectingthe
short-lived transitional staff rule, the Tribunal went well beyond its decision in
Champoury, which dealt with an Asxmbly decision taken under Article 17. In
Judgement No. 273, the Tribunal attempts to avoid the clear intendment of a

decision taken by the Assembly under Article 101.In this, il has erred.
Neither the Charter of the United Nations, the practice of the Assembly, nor
the .prior jurisprudence of the administrative tribunals imposes a requirement
that Assembly action under Article 101 he taken in any specificrom, such as a
resolution expressly supplementing or amending the Staff Regulations or
expresslyfinding that a mle or practice of the Secretary-General was defective'.

The fact ihat resolution 341165 was not worded as a change in the Staff
Regulations and did not contain an expressreference to the transitional staffrule
is neither a legal defect preventing the resolution from constituting a decision
regarding that rule under Article 101nor evidencethat the Assembly intended to
stop short of such a decision. The wording of resolution 341165 is itself

unambiguous and categorical:

"Deodes ihat effective I Janudry 1980 nosioflmemhershullheenrirled ru
unyporr of the repatnation grant unless evidena oirelocation away from
the country of the last duiy \talion i\ provided " (Emphasis supplied )

Rules of construction leave no room for legitimate doubt that this decision was
aimed at overmling the transitional rule. If resolution 341165did not have thal
meaning, it would have had no meaning:only the rule in 109.5 (f) of I July 1979
would have allowed some staffto receive someDart of the arant without evidence
of relocation notwithstanding the new general rule iR 109.5 ,(d) requiring

evidenceof relocation. Were there some textual amhiguity, the legislativehistory
and context of resolution 341165would make it crvstal clear that the General
As~..-lv~~as ta-~ne~ ~ ~-~ - decision Io tem~-~te thgadm~ ~strative ,ia& -~ -~
paying ;II or any part of the repaination grant withoui evidence of actual
relocation by the staff member separating from United Nations service. It was

doing so. iurihermore, in full awarencss ihat the claim ofacquired rights mighi
he advanced. There is no reasonable basis for concluding thal, in adopting
resolution 341165,the General Assembly intended to do anything other than
exercise ils authority under Article 101 to reject specificallyand unequivocally
the applicahility of the transitional system set out in Staff Rule 109.5 (f) of 1
July 1979'. In so doing,the Assembly look an action which was in fact intended

'The United Nations AdministrativeTribunaliwlf has heretoïorcconsistentlyheld
that, the resolutionsof the General Assemblyconrtitute part of thc conditions of
cmploymrnt or ihc staR mcmkrs io whom ihcy apply eYrn kïorç bcing fonall)
incorpoaied in10 the Star Rrgulaiians.(UNATJudgcmcnir No 249. Smith. pan VI.

Nu. 67. Ilorru.ri 01.oara 5. No 236. Relchumbcr. mra. XVI.No. 237. PoHdI.cura.XII
Thé ~dminis1rati;e~ribhal's statemeni inparigraphXIVthat th; ~ssembiydidnoi188 APPLICATIO FOR REVIEW

to be and, as a matter of United Nations Charter law, is controlling as to the
interpretation and application of the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules relating
to the repatriation grant. This is the casewhether thedecision of the Assemhly is
characterized as confirming the intent of earlier Assemhly decisions on the
repatriation grant; removing any ambiguity and, with il, prior discretion which
the Secretary-General may have thought he had; ending an administrative
practice which constituted an unauthorized abuse with respect to which the
patience of the Assembly had finally run out; or, as is least likely,changing the
meaning of the StaffRegulation on the repatriation grant.

2. THEADMINISTRATIT VREIBUNAE LRRED AND EXCFEDEID TSJURISDICTIO IN
FAILING +O CIVEEFFECT TO RESOLUTION 341165

To the extent that the Administrative Tribunal's judgement depends on the
attempt to characterize resolution 341165as somethingother than an Assembly
decision on the transitional rule under Article 101of the Charter, the Trihunal
has erred on a question of law relating to provisions of the Charter. To the
extent that the Administrative Tribunal has refused to honour the General
Assemhly resolution despite its decisional nature because to do so allegedly
would violate a staffmember'sacquired rights, the Tribunal's action constitutes
an exercise of judicial reviewof the decisions of the Assembly. Thus, the issue
arises as to the authority of the Administrative Tribunal to exercise such
jurisdiction.
The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal does not vest in that body any
power ofjudicial reviewof decisionsof the General Assembly.As noted earlier,
Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Statute allows the Tribunal only:

"10 hear and passjudgement upon applications allegingnon-observance of
contracts of employment of staiimembers of the secretariat of the United
Nations or of the terms of appointment ofuch staff members. The words
'contracts'and 'terms of appointment' include al1pertinent regulations and
rulesin force a! the time of allegednon-observance ,ncluding the staff
pension regulations." (Emphasis supplied.)

Not only is the Statute silent as to any grant of authority of judicial reviewof
General Assembly decisions, but the legislativehistory of Article 2, paragraph
1, which grants the Administrative Trihunal ils jurisdiction, precludes any
attempt to derive such authority by implication. During the consideration of
Article 2, paragraph 1, of the draft Statute by the Fifth Committee of the
General Assembly, on 2 November 1949,the United States representative was
explicil:

"The United States delegation wished to emphasize the importance of
clearly understanding the relationship between the authority of the Trihu-
nal and that of the Assemhly ilself. It wanted to be sure that the Tribunal
would no1 he in a position to challenge the authority of the General
Assembly in making such alterations and adjustments in the staff regula-
lions as ci~'cumstancesmight requir. ..
The United States delegation interpreted the second sentence of para-
graph 1, Article 2, of the draft statute as giving full assurances on that
point. The Tribunal would naturally bear in mind the General Assembly's
intent and no1 allow the creation of any such acquired rights as would
frustrate the measures which the Assembly considered necessary. On that
assumption, the United States delegation was prepared to withdraw its WRITTEX STATEMENTS 189

proposed amendment to Article 2 of the draft statutet." (UN doc.
A/C.5/SR.214, paras. 25 and 26, pp. 180-181(2 Novemher 1949).)
The United States view was supported by other delegations, contradicted by

none, and incorporated in the Fiftb Cornmittee's report to the General Assembly
in the following terms:
"ln connection with Article 2, as amended, two points were made in the
course of the discussion regarding the Tribunal's competence:

. . . . . . . . . . . .
(hl Thtt ihe Tnhunal would have 10 respect ihe authoriiy of ihe Genertl
Assemhl) io makc such alierttions and adjusirnenis in the siaiïreguldtions
as circumstances rnight require. Il was understood ihai the Tribunal would
ksr in rnind the tieneral Assembly's intent not to sllow the creaiion of an)
such acquired rights as would frustrate measures which the Assembly
considered necessary .. ." (Oflcio Records, Founh Session, Annexes,
Agenda item 44, UN doc. Al1127 and Corr.1, para. 9, p. 168.)

Even without such a clear legislative history, there would be strong reason for
caution in imputing to the Administrative Tribunal aulhority of judicial review
over explicit decisions of the General Assembly taken under Article 101. The
crisis attendingthe 13judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the League
of Nations in 1946remains an instructive episode as to the sensitivity surround-
ing the relationship of an administrative tribunal with the decisions of the
international organization's legislative body. The League Assembly decided no1
to give eiïect to those awards, hecause of the conviction that the Tribunal had
disregarded the clear intent of a pnor Assembly decision2. This history was

fairly fresh in the minds of the international community at the time the General
Assembly adopted the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United
Nations, as the ahove-cited excerpts from the legislative history of that Statute
make clear.

' The UnitedStateshad proposed thefollowingnewparagraph:

'Noihing in thir Siaiuir shrll bc cunsirueinany way as a limitationon tlic
authorii) oftheGçnîral A>rmblyor 01iheSa-rciary-Gencralacting on inriructions
of the Gcneral Aswmbly lu alter ai any time the rulrs and rcgulationi of the
OTganiuiionincludtng.but no! Iimitd Io. the authoriiy io redure salarier3lluw-
an=, and othcr benrlitrio whichrtallmcmben may have been rntitled.(UN dw
AiCS/l..4/Rcv I and Cun 1 (4OLiukr 1949))
'In that incident,th Leaye's SupenisoryCommissionfound that:
"il wasiheundoubtedintentionof theAssemblythat thedecisions. ..shouldapply
toall ofiicialsoftLeagueand not onlyto thov whose contractsexpresslyreserved
thepossibilityoftheirmodificationbytheAssembly. The Secretary-Generaland the
Director ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~national Labour Office in.aoolvine the decisionsto the
~molakants. have therefare correctly interbreted'ihéAssembly resolution
. .asccpianceof the findingsof the ~dininiiiriiive Trihunalwouldpu1ilsdwiiiun
ahovc ihe auihont) of the Asvmbly . " (ICJ Pleodingr.Efleri of Abord of
Compnsorion Mude hi. ihe Unirr.diVuriunAdminüiroiiw Trtbwol. pp 222-2231

rejated the Tribunal'sinterpretationof the priorAssemblyresolutionand asserledthat:

"we think ifis withinthe oowerof the Assemblv.which can bestiniemret ifsown
Jeçisionshya legislaiivercsolution.to declareihai iheawardr mrdr b) iheTribunal
arc invalidand arcofno cKwiboih becausethe) ,oughi io sciasidethc Arrembly'r
Icgislaii\eaci anbecausr.df ihcir miriskcnconcluni>n acto ihc inicntionof ihat
xi" f~hid/190 APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

The League action was criticized and the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal was found to be an independent judicial organ, the judgements of
which may be binding upon the General Assembly unless overturned tbrough
review provided for in the Statute of the Tribunal (Effecl of Awardr of
Compensation Made by ihe United Nations Adminisiralive Tribunal, Advisory
Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 1954,at p. 47). However, the Tribunal has not been and
should not be found independent in the sense of king authorized either to
substitute its interpretations of Staff Regulations forhose made by the General
Assembly or to refuse to give effect to other explicit Assembly decisions made
under Article 101prior Io ilsjudgement. Sucb authority would flowneither from
a reasonable understanding of the intent of the Assembly in establishing the
Administrative Tribunal's jurisdiction, nor from the judicial nature of the
Tribunal. Judicial review of the acts of the legislature is not within the
jurisdiction of every judicial body. The correct rule in this regard has been
expressed by the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisa-
tion whicb bas held that it was not competent to rule on the legality of a
resolution of an international organization's Plenipotentiary Conference which
changed the position of a staff member under the rules and regulations. It
further held that decisions taken by the executiveauthorities of the organization
in pursu.ince of that rcsoIut~on. expressly approved by the Plenipotentiary
Conference. were not open in contentious proceedings before the Tnbunîl
1ILOAT Judement No. 209 11973).Lind~ev v /ni~rnaiional Teleruniniunicarions
Union). u . ,,
The United Nations Administrative Tribunal was required by Article 2,
paragraph 1,of ils Statute, to base ils judgements on "al1 pertinent regulations
and rules in force at the lime of alleged non-observance". At the lime of the
alleged non-observance, the staff rule in force, pursuant to an explicitdecision of
the General Assembly under Article 101of the Charter, was the rule requiring
that, as of I lanuary 1980,"no staffmember shall be entitled to any part of the
repatriation grani unless evidence of relocation away from the country of the
last duty station is provided". During the period (ending in February 1961) in
which the complaining staff member, Mr. Mortished, had established the
maximum 12 years ofcredit for the calculation ofa repatriation grant (should he
be eligible for one on retirement), there was no staff regulation or mle which
stated that a staff member would be entitled to any portion of a repatriation
grant without reference to actual relocation. During only a brief period, from I

expresslythpurported to entitle a retiring staff member to a repatriation grant
without reference to actual relocation. Mr. Mortished was given the opponunity
to retire during the period of applicability of that transitional mle, but chose to
delay until the transitional rule was terminated. The Administrative Tribunal,

thatveis at the lime of actual retirement, the lime when an "obligation torvance,
repatriate" (relocate) can finally be judged, and eligibility established'. In so

'It is intcresting tonote that. in a oserelatingto calculationof pensionnghts. the
UnitedNations Administrative Tribunahladearlierheldthat rctirmcnt benefiuaccrue
on thefirstdayof rctirerncnt:

dateTan whichretirementbenefitsaccrue,sinceoneand theramea6cial in one and
the sameorganizationcannotbebothinserviceandinretirement.Cansequently,no
retirementbenefitaccruedto the Applicintbelon IJanuary 1970."

Thisdecisionresulted in the Applicant'spensionking calculatedat a more favourable
rate whichlook elTectIJanuary 1970(UNATJudgemcntNo. 141, Majid, para.1). WRlTTEN STATEMENTS 191

doing,the Administrative Tribunal exceeded ilsjurisdiction. It did so not only in
basing its Judgement on considerations other than those specifiedin the second
sentence of Article 2, paragraph 1, of ils Statute, but also in failing either to
respect the General Assembly'sdecisions as authoritative interpretations of the
nature of the repatriation grant or to give effect to resolution 341165as an
explicitAssembly decisioncompellingtermination of the 1July 1979transitional
nile. These actions also constituted errors on questions of law relating 10 the
Charter of the United Nations.

V. CONCLUSION

nie Assembly decisions which are controlling in this case were explicit and
contradicted no express provision of the Staff Regulation on the repatriation
grant in fore at any lime during the grant's history. To the contrary, the
decisionswereconsistent with the undisputed intent of the repatriation grant, an
intent onginally expressedwith the adoption of the grant in 1950and reaffirmed
in a number of ways dunng the years prior to the I July 1979transitional nile.
The decisions of the Assembly were neither arbitras. nor capricious. They do
not shock the juridical conscience or cause injustice. Thus, the Administrative
Tribunal exceeded ils jurisdiction and otherwise erred on a question of law
relating to the Charter, and was not warranted in its Judgement. In these
circumstances, the Court need not reach the question of whether there are ever
circumstances in which the Administrative Tribunal would be lawfullyentitled
to refuse 10giveeffect to'a decision of the General Assembly on a staff matter.
Such circumstances clearly do not exist in this case.
For the reasons stated above, the United States suhmits that the Administra-
tiveTribunal, inJudgementNo. 273,Mortishedv. theSecretary-General,was no1
warranted in determining that General Assembly resolution 341165 of 17
December 1979could no1be givenimmediate effectin requiring, for payment of
repatriation grants, evidenceof rela'ation to acountry other than the country of
the staffmember's las1duty station. 30 novembre 1981.

Seprévalantde la faculté quilui est ouverte par l'article 66,paragraphe 2, du
Statutde la Cour et~c~ ~~r-ém~n~ ~ - ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~t~~~~~~~ ~u~ a~é~é adresséenar lettre
r-~ ~-----
en date du IO août 1981 du Greffe de la Cour internationale de Justice, le
Gouvernement de la République entend d'unepart présenterun certain nombre
de remarques concernant les modalitiésde saisine de la Cour dans la présente

affaire, d'autre part démontrer queles griefsarticulésà l'encontre du jugement
no273 du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies ne sont pas établis.

1. LASAISINE DE LA COUR

1. Aux termes de l'article65 de son Statut:

«I. La Cour peut donner un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique,
à la demande de tout organe ou institution qui aura été autorisé parla

Charte des Nations Unies ou conformémentàsesdispositions à demander
cet avis. )>

Conformément à la jurisprudence constante de la Cour, comme d'ailleurs i
celle de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, cetic disposition e5t
purement permissiveet,

«en vertu de ce texte, le pouvoir que la Cour possèdede donner un avis

consultatif a un caractère discrétionnaire. Dans l'exercicede ce pouvoir
discrétionnaire, laCour a toujours suivi le principe selon lequel, en tant
qu'organe judiciaire, elle doit rester fidèleaux exigences de son caractère
judiciaire, mêmelorsqu'elle donne des avis consultatifs (voir par exemple

Jugements duTribunal administratif de I'OIT sur requétescontre l'Unesco,
avis consulratif. C.I.J. Recueil 1956, p. 84; Composition du Comiréde la
sécuritémaririme de I'Organisarion inrergouvernemenialeconsulrarivede la
navigarion maririme. avis consulrarif. C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 153))) (C.I.J..

avis consultarif. Demandede réformarion dujugemeni no 158 du Tribunal
aahinisrrarifdes Narions Unies, 12juillet 1973, Recueil 1973, p. 175).

En particulier, le caractère permissif de l'article 65 de son Statut «donne à la
Cour le pouvoir d'appréciersi les circonstances de l'espèçesont telles qu'elles
doivent la déterminerà ne pas répondre à une demande d'avis» (C.I.J.. avis

consulrarif. Inrerprérariondestraitésdepaix conclusavecla Bulgarie. la Hongrie
er la Roumanie (première phase), 30 mars 1950, Recueil 1950, p. 72; avis
consulrarif, Certainesdépenses des Nations Unies, 20juillet 1962, Recueil 1962,
o. 155).

'loutefois, selon une jurisprudence non moins constante, «il faudrait des
raisons décisivespour déterminerla Cour à opposer un refus» à une demande
d'avisconsultatif (C.I.J.. avisconsulrarif.Jugemenrsdu Tribunal adminisirarifde
I'OIT sur requérescontre l'Unesco. 23 octobre 1956, Recueil 1956, p. 86; voir

également, C.I.J., avis consulrarif, Inrerprérarionsdestrairésdepaix conclusavec
la Bulgarie. la Hongrie er la Roumanie(première phase), Recueil 1950, p. 71, ou
Conséquenceju sridiques pour les Erarsde la présencecontinuedel'Afrique du Sud ExPoSe ÉCRIT DE LA FRANCE 193

en Namibie.nonobstantla résolution 276 (1970) du Conseilde sécurité 2,1juin
1971, Recueil1971, p. 27,etc.).
II reste cependantque:

«la Cour,étantuneCour dejustice, nepeut sedépartirdes règlesessentielles
qui régissentsonactivitéde tribunal,même lorsqu'elledonne desavisconsul-
tatifs)) (C.P.J.I.avis consulratif,Slaiur de la Carélieorientale,23 juillet
1923, série B no5, p. 29).
Or dans la présenteespèceon peut se demander si lesmodalités retenuespour
saisir la Cour répondent aux ((exigencesde son caractère judiciaire» et si la
rédactionde la question ooséeest conforme auxréplesétabliesnar lestextes aui
réeissent sa com&ten&. D'une oart. en effet-la demande orieinaire de
réiormationémané d'un Etat mem&e et non d'une partie au jugeme$ devant le
Tribunal; d'autre part, la question poséepeut, du fait de sa formulation, susciter
m.. .-....-. ....--.P~
2. Ce sont lesEtats-Unis d'Amérique quiont saisi le Comité desdemandes de
réformation des jugements du Tribunal administratif (ci-aprèsle «Comitédes
demandes de réformation») par une demande datée du 15juin 1981.11s'agit là
du premier cas où un Etat membre se prévaut dela faculté quiluiest ouverte par
l'article II, paragraphe 1, du statut du Tribunal administratif. de saisir le
Comité,
Or. la conformitéde cette disoosition a la Charte des Nations Unies et au
~131; de la Cour inirrnaiionale dc Justice a édans Icpassécontesike. La Cour
a cllc.mémerésuméI'rnscmbledes difficulicsque soulcve cette prosédurr dans
les termes suivants:

«La Cour n'oublie pasque l'article II donne aux Etats Membres ledroit
de contester un jugement du Tribunal administratif et de demander au
Comitéd'entamer une procédure consultative en la matièreet elle relève
qu'au coursdesdébatsde 1955un certain nombre de délégations ont misen
cause l'opportunité de cette disposition. On a dit que, I'Etat Membre
n'ayant pas étépartie àl'instancedevant leTribunal administratif, l'autori-
ser à engager une procédure envue de la réformationdu jugement serait
contraire aux principes généraux régissanltes recours judiciaires. On a dit
en outreque le faitde conférerun tel droit àun Etat membre constituerait
un empiétementsur les droits du Secrétaire général, queist le plus haut
fonctionnaire de l'organisation, et contreviendrait à l'article 100 de la
Charte. On a également émis l'opinion qu'en cadse demande présentée par
un Etat membre le fonctionnaire serait dans une position d'infériorité
devant le Comité. Cesarguments font intervenir des considérationsaddi-
tionnelles que la Cour devrait soigneusement examiner si elleétaitun jour
saisied'une requêtepour avis consultaiif sur demande adresséeau Comité
par un Etat Membre. »(C.?.J.,avisconsultatij.Demandederéformationdu
jugemenrn'158du TribunaladminisrratifdesNarionsUnies, 12juillet 1973,
Recueil1973, p. 178.)
De I'avisdu Gouvernement français, la présenteaffairefournit l'occasiond'un
tel examen, notamment en ce qui concerne la compatibilitéde la procédure
suivie avecleprincipe de l'indépendancedes fonctionnaires internationaux ainsi
qu'aveclecaractèreexclusivementjudiciaire de la procédurede réformationdes
jugements du Tribunal administratif.
3. De mêmel,a formulation mêmede l'uniquequestion poséea la Cour ne va
pas sans entraîner certaines difficultés.
En effet, les motifs de contestation desjugements du Tribunal administratif
des Nations Unies sont limitativement énumérép sar I'article II du statut de
cette juridiction. Ils sont au nombre de quatre:

«i) le Tribunal «a outrepassésa juridiction ou sa compétence»;194 DEMANDEDE REFORMATION

ii) il «n'a pas exercé sajuridiction»;
iii) il «a commis une erreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la
Charte des Nations Unies)); ou
iv) il «a commis, dans la procédure, uneerreur essentiellequi a provoqué
un mal-jugé.))(C.I.J. Recueil1973, p. 183-184.)

Or. comme la Cour l'a rappelédans ses deux avis consultatifs de 1956et de
1973,sa compétence en matiere de réformation des jugementsdes Tribunaux
administratifs de l'OIT et des Nations Unies est strictement limitéepar les
termes des articles XII et II de leur statut respectif et, en 1956, la Cour a
constatéque

«Le statut du Tribunal administratif aurait pu prévoird'autres raisons de
contester la décisiondu Tribunal que cellesénoncéed sans l'articleXII. IIne
l'a pas fait. C'estla raison pour laquelle, en conséquence, laCour, dans le
cadre de cet article*,

n'a purépondre à la deuxièmequestionque lui avait poséele Conseilexécutifde
l'Unescodans lesaffairesDuberg et autres (C.I.J.. avisconruliaiij,Jugemenrsdu
Tribunal administrarijde1'OITsur requéres conrrel'Unesco. Recuei1 l956,p. 99;
voir aussi C.I.J. Recueil1973, p. 188).
En la présenteespice, la question formuléepar le Comité desdemandes de
réformation nese rattache à aucun des quatre motifs énumérépsar l'article II,
paragraphe 1, du statut du Tribunal puisqu'ellese borne à mettre en cause la
«légitimité))de la position adoptée par le Tribunal dans son jugement no 273
concernant l'affaire Moriished c. le Secréraire générd ale /'Organisariondes
NarionsUnies en cequi concerne la portée dela résolution341165de l'Assemblée
générale endate du 17décembre1979.
D'une part cette question n'indique pas les motifs sur lesquels le Comité des
demandes de réformations'estfondépour déciderque la demande présentée par
les Etats-Unis d'Amérique«repose sur des bases serieusesa. De ce fait, la Cour
pourra éprouver desdifficultésparticulièrespour exercer sajuridiction; en effet,
dans lesdeux autres cas où ellea été saisied'une demande de réformationd'un
jugement d'un Tribunal administratif international, elles'estconsidérée comme
liéepar le libellédes questions formuléesdans la requéte(C.I.J., avisconsulraiij,
Jugemenisdu Tribunaladminis(rarijdel'OIT surrequéres conrrel'Unesco. 23oc-
tobre 1956, Recueil1956, p. 98-99;Demandederéformaiiondujugemenino158du
TribunaladminisrraiijdesNarionsUnies, 12juillet 1973,Recueil1973, p. 184),
appliquant du reste une jurispmdence qui a une portée plus large (voirpar
exemple C.I.J. Recueil1955, p. 71-72).
D'autre part, et d'unemanière plus généraleencore, on peut s'interrogesrur la
signification exacte de l'adverbe «légitimement», qui est employé dans la

demande d'avis et l'on peut penser que si le terme «légal» renvoie au mot
«droit)), l'adjectif «légitime» évoquedavantage le mot «pouvoir» que des
phénomènesproprement juridiques. Dans cesconditions, on peut sedemander si
la présentedemande d'avis porte réellementsur une «question juridique» au
sens des articles 96 de la Charte des Nations Unies et 65 du Statut de la Cour.
4. Si le Gouvernement de la Républiquea estimé utilede présenter ces
quelques remarques en ce qui concerne tant la validitéen droit de la procédure
suivie dans la présenteespèceque la compétencede la Cour pour donner l'avis
consultatif demandé. il s'en remet entièrement à la saeesse de la Haute
Juridiction pour ce qui est des suitesàdonner àla requête.~Ïsouli~neseulement
aue cette affaire oermet de ré..r définitiveme~ ~~ ~ r~~~èmesirn....snts ---r
lèsquels~'hésitati;"est permise.depuis l'adoption par I'Asscmbléegénéralee .n
1955.des amendements au statut du Tribunal administratildcç Nations Unies
organisant une procédurede réformationdcç jugcmcnis de ccitc juridiciion. EXFQSC 6CRtTDE LA FRANCE 195

II. LA VALIDITG DU JUGEMENT No 273
5. La Cour«peut interpréterles termes de la requèteet préciserla portée des
questions qui y sont posées))(C.I.J.. avisconsulfariJ Demandede rbformariondu
jugement no158 du Tribunal adminisfrafijdes Nations Unies, 12juillet 1973,
Recueil1973,p. 184).
II lui appartient de déterminer si dans la présente affaireelle pourrait, en
s'inspirant de cette jurisprudence, interpréter la question poséede façon à la
rattacher aux seuls motifs de réformationénumérà l'article 11du Statut du
Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies.
Bien qu'elle ne soit liée ue par le li@lléde la question et ne soit pas
juridiquement tenue de se rérerà la transcription des débats des séancesdu
Comitédes demandes de réformation, laCour pourrait dans ce cas interpréter
la question qui lui est soumise par référànce document. Selon ce dernier,
sur des bases sérieusesdans la mesure où cet Etat soutenait, aune part, que
le Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies aurait commis une erreur de
droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies et, d'autre
part, que le Tribunal aurait outrepassé sa juridiction ou sa compétence
(doc. A/AC.86/O(X)/PV.2, p. 25 et 32).
Dans cesconditions, le Gouvernement de la République limiterases observa-
tions sur lefond aux deux motifs de réformationque k Comitédesdemandesde
réformation sembleavoirretenus: d'unepart, lajuridiction ou la compétencedu
Tribunal; d'autre part, l'erreur de'droit concernant lesdispositions de la Charte
*desNations Unies.

A. Le problèmede la juridiction ou de la compétencedu Tribunal
6.11ressort clairement des travaux préparatoires de l'article II du statut du
Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies et de lajurisprudence de la Cour que
lesmotifs de réformation énuméront un caractère limitatifet qu'ilsne sont pas
interchangeables.
Le texte retenu constitue un compromisentre les Etats qui souhaitaient faire
porter la réformation sur «toutes questions de droit importantes que soulèvele
jugement)) (cf. la proposition de la Chine, des Etats-Unis et de l'Irak au Comité
spécialchargéd'étudier la questionde la réformation desjugementsdu Tribunal
administratif, doc. A/AC.78/L.6/Rev.I) et ceuxqui proposaient de limiterlescas
d'ouverture de la procédurede réformation aux motifs prévuspar l'articleXII
doc. A/2909, notamment n" 48 et suiv., et celui de la Cinquième Commission,ial,
notamment n" 15,21 et 33). La solution finalement adoptéeconsisteàénumérer
certains motifs précissur le fondement desquels les jugements peuvent être
contestés,étant cependant entendu que deux nouveaux cas d'ouvertur- le
non-exercicede lajuridiction et l'erreurde droit concernant lesdispositions de la
Charte des Nations Unies- ont été ajoutéàs ceux que retient l'articleXI1 du
statut du Tribunal administratif de I'OIT: l'excèsde compétence et l'erreur
essentielledans la procédure suivie.
IIest donc clair que la procédure de réformationn'apas été conçue comme un
appel contre lesjugements du Tribunal et que la Cour n'a pas pour mission
«de refaire le procès maisde donner son avis sur les questions qui lui sont
soumisesau sujet des objections soulevéescontre lejugement. La Cour n'est
donc pas habilitéeàsubstituerson opinion àcelleduTribunal sur lefond de
l'affaire tranchéer celui-ci. Son rOle est de déterminers'il ressort des
circonstances deP'epice, concernant le fond ou la procédure, qu'une
contestation formuléecontre lejugement pour l'un desmotifs mentionnésà
I'article II est fondée))(C.I.J.. avis consulrariJ Demandede rbformaiiondu196 DEMANDE DE REFORMATION

jugement no158du Tribunalodminisrrarifdes Narions Unies, 12juillet 1973,
Recueil 1973,p. 187-188).
IIen r2sulte que la Cour ne saurait interpréterune Jemïnde d'avis consultatif
fondre sur l'un des sas d'ou%crturede la procédurede réformation prcvus par
l'article1du statut du Tribunal commc lui ouvrant la possibilitéde statuer sur
les autres cas d'ouvertureEn effet, les développementsconsacréspar la Cour à
sapropre compétence lorsqu'elle est saisiesur le fondement de l'article XII du
statut du Tribunal administratif de l'OIT semblent en tous points transposables
à l'hypothèseoù un avis consultatif est demandé sur la base de l'article II du
statut du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies. En 1956,la Cour a déclaré:

((L'article XII du statut du Tribunal administratif prévoit unedemande
d'avis consultatif la Cour dans deux cas clairement définis. Lepremier se
présente quand le Conseil exécutif conteste une décisiondu Tribunal
affirmant sa compétence; le second quand le Conseil exécutif considère
qu'une décisiondu Tribunal est viciéepar une faute essentielle dans la
procéduresuivie. La demande d'avis consultatif présentée conformément à
l'article XIIn'estpas un appel quant au fond dujugement. Elle selimiteà une
contestation de la décisionduTribunal affirmant sacompétenceou àdescas
de faute essentielle dans la procédure. En dehors de cela, il n'y a aucun
recours contre les décisionsdu Tribunal administratif. Une contestation de
l'affirmation de sa comr>étencene oeut êtretransforméeen une nrocédure
contre la facon dont lieompttenie a étéexercée oucontri le fond de li
décisi<> n.(C'I.J.. ubi.5ronwltarif. Jugr~irrnctdu Trihunal administruri/ dr
1017'sur rrqdres ~.onrre1Unrcn>.23octohre 1956.Rrt.u<,il1956. p.98-99.)
Et. en 1973,la Haute Juridiction a considéréque
«le texte de l'article II comme l'historique de son élaboration démontrent
que l'on avait entendu limiter les possibilitésde contester lesjugements du
Tribunal administratif aux motifs précis envisagésdans l'article» (C.I.J..
avisconruliatif. Demande de réformationdu jugemenr no158 du Tribunal
adminisrroiifdes Notions Unies, 12juillet 1973,Recueil 1973,p. 188.)

De même,dans la présente affaire, une contestation de la compétence du
Tribunal administratif ne saurait être transformée en une procédure plus
généraled'appel contre le jugement no273.
7. 11est exact cependant que l'article II, paragraphe 1,du statut du Tribunal
administratif des Nations Unies n'estpas rédigéexactement de la mêmemanière
que l'article XII du Tribunal administratif de l'OIT. La première de ces
dispositions viselescas dans lesquelsleTribunal «a outrepassésajuridiction ou
sacompétence», tandisque la secondeconcerne la contestation d'«une décision
du Tribunal affirmant sa compétence*.
II convient cependant de ne as attacher trop d'importance à cette différence
de rédaction. II ressort en e%et des discussions du Comité spécial chargé
d'étudier la questionde la réformation desjugementsdu Tribunal administratif
et des débatsde la Cinquième Commission en 1955qu'en prévoyantle premier
motif de réformation desjugementsdu Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies
les Etats participant à la discussion se référaientbien au premier motif de
contestation des décisionsdu Tribunal de l'OIT. Au surplus, la Cour elle-même
a assimiléles deux dispositionssur ce point, parlant dans les deux casd'«excès
de compétence*(C.I.J. Recueil 1973,p. 185et 189).
Dèslors, il est à nouveau légitimede transposer au cas de l'es* la position
de la Cour concernant les termes «compétentpour connaiire~ employésdans la
demande d'avis de 1956.Ceux-ci
((signifient qu'il s'agit de déterminer si le Tribunal administratif était
juridiquement qualifié pour examiner les requêtesdont il était saisi et EXWSÉ ÉCRIT DE LA FRANCE 197

statuer au fond sur les prétentions qui y étaient énoncées.Le fait que le
Tribunal aurait bien ou maljugéau fond, qu'il aurait bien ou mal interprété
et appliquéle droit pour juger au fond n'affectepas sa compétence.Celle-ci
doit êtreappréciéeen recherchant si la requêteétàitde cellesdont l'examen
au fond relèvede la connaissance du Tribunal administratif selon les dis-
positions gouvernant la compétence de celui-ci» (C.I.J., avis consulratij.
Jugements du Tribunal administrati/de /'OITsur requétescontre l'Unesco,
23 octobre 1956,Recueil 1956, p. 87).

S'agissant du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies sa compétence est
déterminéepar l'article 2 de son statut aux termes duquel - si l'on fait
abstractiondes compétencesrarionepersonae et rotione remporisqui ne sont pas
en cause ici :

(cI. Le Tnbunïl est compétent pour connaiirc des requétcsinvoquant
I'inobservntion du contrat d'engïgernent des fonctionnaires du Secretaria1
des Nations Unies ou des conJ~tionsd'cmploide cesfonctionnaires. et pour
statuersur lesditesrequètes.Lestermes «contrat» et «conditions d'emploi»

comprennent toutes dispositions pertinentes du statut et du règlementen
vigueur au moment de I'inobservation invoquée,y compris les dispositions
du règlementdes pensions du personnel.),
IIest, en l'es@, difficilementcontestable que la requètede M. Mortished qui
sefondait expressément sur plusieurs dispositions du statut du personnel (et,

notamment ses articles 9.4 et 12.1 ainsi que sur son annexe IV) et sur des
dispositions réglementairesadoptéespar le Secrétaire général en applicationdu
statut du personnel, ainsi que sur les termes mêmesde son propre contrat
d'engagement, corresponde parfaitement tant aux termes qu'à l'esprit de cet
article. II n'est donc mèmepas besoin, a cet égard, dese référera I'interpréta-
[ion relativement extensive de la notion de «compétence»que la Cour a adoptée
dans son avis consultatif de 1956,pour constater que la compétencedu Tribu-

nal administratif des Nations Unies oour seorononcer sur la reauête de
~ ~Mo~tished n-é~ ~~ ~~ douteuse~ ~ ~ .~~~en'avait d'aille~ ~ ~té~ontestée~ ~ ~un
monicnt par lc ~ecrét;ireginéral durïni 13prockdure dsvani le Tribunal
Du reste. la demande présentéepar les Fiais-Unis au Comii? des deniandei Je
réformationne Taitelle-mémeaucune allusion a une quelconque contestation dc
la compétencedu Tnbunal adminisiratil Jans cette affaire (doc AIACR6 R97)
et la tinscriotion des débats du Comité établitque ses membres ont procédé à

une assimilaïion contestable entre I'éventuelleerreur de droit qu'auraiicommise
le Tribunal et l'excèsde compétence qui lui est imputé. C'est ainsique le
représentant desEtats-Unis a indiqué que, dans son esprit, la question posée au
Comitéquant à l'erreur de droit qu'aurait commise le Tribunal concernant les
dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies «n'exclut aucunement, mais au
contraire englobe, I'autre motif selon lequel le Tribunal a outrepassé sa
juridiction ou sa compétence» (A/AC.86/(XX)/PV.Z, p. 26).

Mais I'article II du statut a une portée très préciseL . eTribunal administratif
n'a en l'espècenullement méconnu ce texte et excédésa juridiction ou sa
cornpétencc. Des lors. et en admettani que la question de la compétencedu
Tnbunal pour se prononcer sur la requcie de M. Mortished ait iic posée ii Iï
Cour. Ic Gouiernement de 13 Réouhliaue n'a aucun doute sur la reoonse uu'il
convient de lui apporter.

B. Le problèmede l'erreur de droit concernant les dispositionsde la Charte

8. Comme le prohlémede I'exccsde compétencedu Tnbunïl, celui de l'erreur
de droit qu'ilaurait commisc en ce qui concerne lesdispositions de la Charte des
Nations L'nies nésr pas directement évoquépar la question soumi\e iila Cour
internationale de Juitice198 DEMANDE DE R~FORMATION

Cela apparait d'autant plus clairement que la question poséepar leComitédes
demandes de réformation. loin de viser la Charte des Nations Un~e-~~~~s son
ensemhle ou certaines disposilions présixs deîellc-ci. se bornr à demander à~la
Cour si le Tribunal adminisiratif des Nations Unies pouvait

«légitimementdéterminerque la résolution341165de l'Assembléegénérale
en date du 17défemhre 1979.qui subordonne le paiement de la prime de
raoatriement à la présentation de pièces attestant la réinstallation du
foiclionnaire dans un pays autre quecelui de son dernier lieud'affectation,
ne pouvait prendre immédiatementeffet)).

Ce qui est allégué,ce n'est donc en aucune manière la Charte des Nations
I'Aç~~mhléeeénéralecation faitepar le Tribunal administratif d'une résolutionde
. . -~--
Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement français est à nouveau conduit à
remarquer que la demande présentée semble procéded r'une confusion entre la
procédure deréformationtellequ'elle est organisée par l'articleII du Statut du
Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies et les procéduresd'appel que I'on
rencontre dans lesdifférentsdroits internes des Etats, cequi n'estconforme ni au
texte ni à l'esprit de cette disposition (voir no5 ci-dessus).
Comme le Gouvernement français l'a déjà montré,le texte de l'article II,
paragraphe 1,du statut du Tribunal administratif résulted'un compromis entre
les Etats partisans d'une large ouverture des motifs de réformation des
jugements et ceux qui entendaient les restreindre au maximum. Cela est plus
particulièrementvrai s'agissantde I'xerreur de droit concernant lesdispositions
de la Charte des Nations Unies».
Cette expression est apparue pour la première fois durant les travaux du
Comitéspécialchargé d'étudierla question de la réformationdesjugements du
Tribunal administratif et dans une proposition de compromis déposéepar les
représentantsde la Chine, des Etats-Unis, de l'lrak, du Pakistan et du Royaume-
Uni (doc. A/AC.78/L. 14et Corr.2). Le représentantde ce pays en a expliqué la
portée au nomdes coauteurs:

«Dans I'esprit des auteurs, la formule «erreur de droit concernant les
dispositions de la Charteu visait non seulement le cas où le Tribunal
administratif aurait apparemment malinterprétéla Charte, mais aussi lecas
où, en interprétant et en appliquant certains des articles du statut du
personnel, il aurait apparemment agi d'une façon incompatible avec les
dispositions du chapitre XV de la Charte.» (Rapport du Comité spécial,
doc. Af2909, n" 72.)

IIs'agissaitdoncde donner satisfaction auxEtatsqui souhaitaient que I'erreur
de droit figurât dans les motifs permettant la réformation d'un jugement du
Tribunal, tout en enfermant celle-ci dans des limites relativement étroites
puisqu'ellene peut s'apprécier qu'en relation avec le texte suprême del'organi-
sation, la Charte des Nations Unies. Comme l'ont indiquélesauteurs du projet
commun revisé,il s'agissait, conformémentà I'esprit généralde la réformede
1955, «de limiter la réformation à des cas exceptionnels» (rapport de la
Cinquième Commission,A/3016, no15).
IIest du reste significatifque le représentantdes Etats-Unis, I'undes Etats les

qu'il se ralliait à la proposition commune de conciliation tout en regrettant que

la Cour fût ainsi empêchéd ee connaître detoute question de droit qui pourrait
se poser (doc. A12909, no 80: dans le même sens,voir les interventions des
représentants de la Chine et de I'lrak, égalementcoauteurs du projet, ibid.,
no85). Du reste, lesexemplesd'«erreurs de droit concernant lesdispositions de EXPOSÉÉCRIT DE iA FRANCE 199

la Charteii donnéspar le même délégué américainra sttachaient tous, très
directement, à un article précisde la Charte (les articles 97, 100ou 101 ; ibid.,
-II O',.
Ainsi. cn dépit desatiirmations contraires dc certains Etats (voir par exemple
les documents A 3016, no 21. ou A AC.78 SRIO, p. 3. etc.). il semble que
I'intcrprkation de cettc expression donnée par les çoautcurs dc la proposition.
qui Gnfère à celle-ci un sens utile et conforme à l'esprit de conciliation dans
lequelelleavait été formulée,doiveêtre retenue:une «erreur de droit concernant
les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies* n'est pas n'importe quelle
erreur au'aurait ou commettre le Tribunal administratif dans l'aoolication du
droit en'vieueur:'elledoit avoir un raooort étroitavec l'anolicatio~de la Charte
sans qu'ilConviennepour autant d'ex;&r que le~ribunal'iit directement viréou

appliquéun article précisdc la Charte; en paniculier le lait pour le Tribunal
d'avoir omis d'appliquer iellr ou iellediposiiion de la Chane relcvcde cc motil
de réformation.
9. C'est dans cet esprit que, de l'avis du Gouvernement français, il convient
d'apprécier la portée de la question poséeen l'espèceà la Cour en ce qui
concerne l'erreur de droit qu'aurait commise le Tribunal.
On peut dégagerles principaux griefs qui ont étéformulésa l'encontre dela
solution retenue par le jugement n"273 du Tribunal administratif des Nations
Unies de trois documents:

- l'opinion dissidentede M. Herbert Reis, membre suppléantde la formation
de jugement (doc. ATlDECl273, p. 23-31),
- la demande présentéepar les Etats-Unis d'Amérique au Comité des
demandes de réformation(doc. A/AC.86/R.97),
- les débats de ce Comité(doc. A/AC.86/(XX)/PV.I et 2).

Bien que les erreurs de droit imputéesau Tribunal n'aient pas toujours été
articulées très clairement, une analyse rapidede ces textes permet de constater
qu'il est principalement reprochéau jugement contesté
-' d'unepart d'avoir écarté l'application de la résolution341165de l'Assemblée
générale,
- d'autre part d'avoir à tort appliquéau cas du requérant lanotion de «droits
acquis».

Le Gouvernement français examinera successivementcesdeux points. IItient
cependant à préciser que,si le premier de ces griefs peut assez facilement être
rattaché aux «dispositions de la Charten, pour les raisons précideinment
exposéescela lui paraît plus douteux s'agissant du second. Ce n'est que parce
que, dans les déclarations critiquant lejugement du Tnbunal, les deux moyens
ont en généralétéconfondus qu'il formulera des observations sur ce dernier
,oint.
En réalitéi.lapparait que Irjugement no273du Tribunal administratif n'a pas
écarté l'application de la resolution 341165de I'Assembléc gcneraleet qu'ila fait
une application particuliérementmodérée dela notion de adroits acquis».

10. Il n'est nas contestéoue le Tribunal administr~tif des Nati.~~~~~ie-. c-.é~ ~ ~ ~
par une rcsolhon def~s~mhlée gé&le. doit appliquer lesdécisionsdecclle-
ciet le problime que pose la présentcaiTairen'cri pas de savoir si,dans certaines
hypothéxs. il pourrait érilner l'application de iel ou tel texte. II tient bien.
plut6t. au fait que. pour trancher la requétede M. Mortished, le Tnbunal s'est
trouvéen présencede deux résolutionsde l'Assemblée généraà lepremièrevue D'une pari, par le paragraphe 3 de la section II de la résolution 341165,

I'Assembléegénérale a décidé
«que, avec effet au 1" janvier 1980, lesfonctionnaires n'ont droit à aucun
montant au titre de la prime de rapatriement à moins qu'ils ne présentent
des piècesattestant qu'ils se réinstallentdans un pays autre que celuide leur
dernier lieu d'affectation».
D'autre part, l'article 12.1 du statut du personnel, annexéà la résolution590
(VI) de l'assembléegénérale, précise:

gLesdispos~tionsdu présentsiatut pavent Cirecomplétées ou amendées
par I'Asremblk générale.sin\ préjudicedes droits acqua des Conciion-
naires.»
Or, le Tribunal a constaté que la résolution341165pouvait porter atteinte à un
droit acquis par M. Mortished - en l'espècecelui de recevoir la prime de
rapatriement sans avoir àproduire de piècesattestant qu'il se réinstallaithorsde
Suisse,pays de sa dernière affectation.
En I'espffe, ce droit de M. Mortished découle,de l'avisdu Tribunal, de son
contrat et de la disposition 109.5 f) introduite dans le Règlementdu personnel

en 1979; mais l'article 12.1 du statut du personnel ne fait aucune distinction
entre lesdroits des fonctionnaires, selon qu'ilsont été «acquis» sur le fondement
de textes adoptés par l'Assemblée généralo eu sur la base de dispositions
réglementaires établiespar le Secrétaire généraolu de toute autre manière.
A ce stade du raisonnement, il n'importe pas de déterminersi le Tribunal
administratif a eu raison de considérerque le requérantavait «acquis» le droit
contesté:comme leGouvernement francais l'aindioué.ceoroblème ne concerne
pi5 une «disposition de la charte des galions ~ni;s>pet.31~surplus. il établira
que, dc toute müniére.telest bien lecas; ilsuilii icide con~taterque IcTribunal
devait appliquer deux décisionsdc l'Assembléegcncrïlc qui nc semblaient paî i
premièrevue compatibles.
Dans ces conditions, le Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies aurait pu
songeràécarter l'applicationde I'undesdeuxtextesconcurrents: peut-étre serait-
il alors tombé souslecoup des critiques qui lui sont adresséesd'avoir «empêché
quedesdécisionsde l'Assemblée généralen adoptéesenapplication del'article101
de la Charte«prennent pleinement effet» (demande présentée par les Etats-Unis
au Comité des demandesde réformation.doc. AlAC.86lR.97. o. 2).
~- ~ ~~~ -'est nas le oarti retenur~~~~ ~~ribunil nuisak ce dérniérs'estoour
l'essentielefforcede concilier ces deux résolutionséts9&surerde la confokité
des décisionsdu Secrétaire général avecces mêmesrésolutions.
II. Si leTribunal administratif des Nations Unies doit mettre en Œuvreles
décisionsdel'Assembléegénéralei,l doit lesappliquer toutes. II ne peut faire un
tri arbitraire entre ellei. Organe iudiciaire, il doit appliquer le droit de
I'Organisation sans se substituer aui organes chargésde l'élaborer.
Quant àceux-ci,ils sont, en vertu d'un principe absolument générad le droit,

liéspar les règles qu'ils ont établies aussi longtempsqu'ils ne les ont pas
abrogées.Comme l'avait déjà déclaré devan t Cour en 1954M. le professeur
Reuter, représentantdu Gouvernement de la République,dans l'affairerelative
à I'Effetde jugements du Tribunaladministrari/des Nations Unies accordant
indemnité:
«Le Gouvernement français ne saurait admettre qu'une autorité - si
élevé soit son rang - soit en toute circonstance et par principe maîtresse de
ne tenir aucun compte de sespropres décisions))(C.I.J. Mémoires.plaidoi-
ries et documents. o.3371.

Dans son avis consultatif, la Cour 3 d'ailleurs partagéatte opinion puis-
qu'cllea considéré que I'Assmblécgénérale. qua i établi IçTrihunïl administra-
iien tant qu'org3ncjudiciaire. est I~éc par lesjugements de celui-ci,quand bien EXFOSG6CRlT DE LA FRANCE 201

mèmeilluiest loisibled'en déciderlasu pression (cf. C.I.J., avisconsultatif,Effet
dejugementsdu Tribunaladministrathes Nations Unies accordant indemnité,
13juillet 1954passim et, notamment, Recueil1954, p. 53, 56et 61). De plus, la
Cour a estiméque lorsque l'organisation des Nations Unies a contracté cer-

taines obligations«l'Assembléegénérale n'a pas d'autre alternative que de faire
honneur àces engagements* (ibid.,p. 59; voir aussC.I.J.. avisconsultatij,Cer-
tainesdépensed sesNations Unies, 20juillet 1962,Recueil1962, p. 169).
De même,dans son jugement na 273, le Tribunal administratif des Nations
Unies a considéréque l'Assembléegénérale. qua i adoptél'article 12.1du statut
du personnel, étaitliéepar cette disposition -au moins aussi longtemps qu'elle
ne l'avait pas abrogée - et a dès lors considéréqu'elle devait elle-même
respecter ses propres engagements (no IV du jugement no 273) d'autant plus
certainement au'«à aucun moment l'Assemblée eénéralne'a envisagéde com-
pléterou de modifier les textes du statut du peÏsonnel relatifs à la prime de
rapatriement (ibid.noXIV).
Dès lors, il appartenait au Tribunal administratif d'interpréter la résolu-
tion 341165d'une manière qui fût compatible avec la précédente décision de
l'Assemblée généras lur laquellecelle-cin'étaitpas revenue; c'estce qu'il a fait
en considérant que,lorsqu'elle a adopté ce texte, l'Assembléegénérale«s'est
bornéeàénoncerun principe d'action>) (ibid.noXIV), dont leSecrétairegénéral
devait tenir compte, mais sans perdre de vue l'ensembledes textes applicables.
Le Gouvernement fransais reconnaît qu'en interprétant ainsi la section II,
paragraphe 3, de la résolution341165le Tribunal administratif n'a sans doute
pas pris totalement en compte les travaux préparatoiresde cette disposition qui
semblent indiquer que les Etats souhaitaient que le principe qu'elle posesoit
appliquédèsle 1"janvier 1980àtous lesfonctionnaires desNations Unies quelle
que soit la datede leur entréeen fonctions. IIreste que la solution retenue par le
Tribunal est la seulequi permette de concilier lesdeux décisionsde l'Assemblée
généraleque celui-ci devait appliquer en conservant à chacune d'elles un effet
utile- puisque le Tribunal administratif, qui admet que la résolution341165
constitue une «décisionde l'Assembléegénérale))(jugemenn te273, noXIV), ne
conteste aucunement que celle-cis'applique immédiatementà tous les fonction-
naires qui n'avaient pas accompli douze ans de serviceau 1" janvier 1980(étant
entendu que, selon le cas, elle s'applique totalement ou partiellement).
Au surplus, on peut observer que l'examen des travaux préparatoires d'un
texte, quel qu'il soit,ne s'imposepas nécessairementàl'interprèteet la Cour elle-
mêmea, plusieurs fois, écartéle recours à cette méthoded'interprétation (cf.
C.P.J.I., avisconsuiratt~Compétence de la Commissioneuropéennd eu Danube,
8décembre1927, sérieAI5 n"25, p. 31, ouC.I.J., avir consultatij.Conditionsde
làhission d'm Erat commeMembre desNotions Unies, 28 mai 1948, Recueil
1948, p. 63).
En revanche, l'interprétationretenue est conforme au principe essentielselon
lequel «tout instrument international doit ètre interprétéet appliqué dans
l'ensemble du système juridique en vigueur au moment où l'interpretation a
lieun (C.I.J., avis consultatif, Coriséquencejsridiques pour les Etats de la
présence continuede l'Afriquedu Sidden Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain)nonobs-
tant la résolutio276 (1970) du Conseildesécurilé ,1juin 1971, Recueil1971,
p. 31; voir aussiC.I.J. Recueil1956,p. 91). Conformémentàcesprescriptions et
à celles de l'article 2 de son propre statut, le Tribunal administratif a pris en
considération l'ensembledes règlesédictées par l'Assemblée généraleae ptpli-
cables à la situation de M. Mortished.
12. Loin d'écarter l'applicationd'une résolutionde I'Assembléegénérale,le
Tribunal administratif a, au contraire, imposéau Secrétairegénérale l respectde
l'ensemble des textes en vieueur adootésnar l'Assemblée.
comme la Cour interniGona~edejustiiel'a rappelédans son avis consultatif
de 1954,la Charte organise un systèmerelativement complexeencequi concerne202 DEMANDE DE R~FORMATION

lescompétencesrespectivesde l'Assembléegénérale etdu Secrétaire général en
matièrede personnel:

«Lorsque le Secrétariat a étorganisé, unesituation s'estprésentéedans
laquelle les rapports entre les fonctionnaires et l'organisation ont étérégis
par un ensemble complexe de règles.Cet ensemblecomprenait le statut du
personnel, établipar l'Assembléegénéralepour définirles droits et obliga-
tions fondamentauxdu personnel, et lerèglementdu personnel, établipar le
Secrétaire généraplour donner effet au statut du personnel.» (C.I.avU
co~~sultatij, m dejugementsdu Tribunalaaininisfratijdes Nations Unies
accordantindemnité, 13juillet 1954,Recueil1954, p. 57; voir aussi p. 60.)
Ainsiilapparait que, conformémentaux termesde l'article101.paragraphe 1.de
la Charte des Nations Unies, le Secrétairegénérlst subordonnéa I'Assemblk
généralepour la fixation des règlesgénérales applicablesau personnel, étant
cependant préciséqu'il lui.a.partient d'en fai..application aux fonctionnaires
dans chaque cas particulier.
Dans lejugement contesté,le Tribunal administratif a également rappeléces
principes fondamentaux (iugernent no 273, no III), dont il a fait une stricte
ao=lication.
Débarrassé desdigressions néressairespour répondreaux arguments échanges
par les parties sur des points de détail.raisonnement du Tnbunal peul étre
résuméainsi:

i) l'article9.4 et l'anneIV du statut du personnel prévoientque la fixation
des conditions et des modalitésde versement de la prime de rapatriement
relèventde la compétencedu Secrétairegénéral;
ii) à la suite des débats de l'Assembléegénéraleet de la Commission de la
fonction publique internationale, le Secrétaire généraal pré,n 1979,à
quelles conditions cette prime serait dorénavant verséeaux fonctionnaires;
iii) lorsqu'il a établi un nouveau texte à la suite de l'adoption de la résolu-
tion 341165par l'Assembléegénéralel,e Secrétaire général devait également
tenir compte du principe du respect des droits acquis, garanti par I'ar-
ticle 12.1du statut du personnel (et rappelépar la disposition 11a)du
règlementdu personnel);
iv) pur n'avoir pas opéréla nécessaire conciliation entre ces deux textes,
emanésl'unet l'autrede l'Assembléegénéralel,eSecrétairegénéraalcommis
une illicéitédont l'organisation doit réparer les conséquences domma-
geables pour M. Mortished.
En prenant cette décision,IeTnbunal administratif a écal'application d'une
mesureréglementairedu Secrétairegénéran lon pas parcequ'ellemettait en Œuvre
une r&solutionde 1'Asrmblée générale mais.au contraire, parce qu'elle ne
traduisait que partiellemeni l'ensembledesdirectivesde l'Assemgénéralequi.
aux termes del'article 101, paragraphe 1, de la Charte, s'imposent au cbefde
l'administration. II n'a don= commis aucune «erreur de droit concernant les
dispositionsde laCharte desNations Unie» maisa-conformément àson statut
et notamment aux articles2et 9de celui--i ordonnéla réparationdu préjudice
subi par M. Mortished du faitdeserreurs commisespar leSecrétairegénéralene
qui concerne sa propre compétence,telle qu'elle estfixéepar la Charte.

2. LETRIBUNA ALFAIT UNE APPLICATION MOU/.R~X
DU PRIKCIPF. DESOKOlTS ACQUIS

13. Eidnt arribé a cette conclusion. le Gouvernement de la République
considerequ'il devraitCireinutile po13 Cour d'examiner plus avant 13validité
du iugernentno273du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies. II ranwlle aue
celiez a déclaréque ~xmsB BCRI DE LA FRANCE 203

((letextede l'article 1I [dustatut de ceTribunal] comme l'historique deson
élaboration démontrent queI'on avait entendu limiter les possibilitiésde
contester les jugements du Tribunal administratif aux motifs précis envi-
sagésdans l'article» (C.I.J., avis consulraiij, Procédure deréformuriondu
jugement no158du Tribmuladminisirurifdes Narions Unies, 12juillet 1973,
Recueil 1973,p. 188):

Lesmots ayant un sens,ilneconvient pas de transformer lecontrôle de «l'erreur
de droit concernant lesdispositionsde la Charten en une réappréciation globale
par la Cour internationale de Justice de toutes les règlesjuridiques appliquées
par le Tribunal (voir supra, n' 6 et 7). En particulier, la Haute Juridiction ne
semble pas compétentepour trancher la controverse entre les trois membres
composant la formation dejugement d'une part et le membre suppléantd'autre
part el relative à l'application faite en l'es* du principe du respect des droits
acquis des fonctionnaires.
ïe seul problèmeque la Cour pourrait peut-être examinerà cet égard serait
celuide la conformitéde ce principe lui-mêmeaveclesdispositionsou l'espritde
la Charte des Nations Unies. Encore faut-il remarauer aue cela reviendrait à
rechercher si une décision de l'Assembléegénéralé -.en l'occurrence l'ar-
ticle 12.1du statut du.personnel- est valide au regard de principes supérieurs,
ce que les adversaires du jugement contesté reprochent précisément - mais à
tort (cf. supra, no9) - au Tribunal administratif d'avoir fait ...
Quoi qu'il en soit, il ne parait pas douteux que ce principe n'est en
contradiction avec aucune disposition de la Charte des Nations Unies, et qu'il
est, au contraire, rendu nécessairepar l'esprit des articles consacrésau fonc-
tionnement du Secrétariat.'
Conformément à la célèbre formulede la Cour,

((lesdroits et devoirs d'uneentitételleque l'organisation doivent dévendre
des huis et dn fonctions de celle-ci. énoncés-ou impliquép sar son acte
constitutif ei développés dans la pratique* (C.I.J.. avisron>ulrarl/.Répara-
riundesdonrmaues SII~JSau ser>,iceder Narions Untes. II avril 1949.Renieil

Et I'on ne saurait admettre qu'une entitécrééepour assurer le respect du droit
dans les relations internationales puisse, dans ses rapports avec ses agents, se
situer en dehorsou au-dessusdu droit. Le Gouvernement francais partage sur ce
point l'opinion du Tribunal administratif de l'OIT selon lequel, si les organes
directeurs d'une organisation - il s'agissait de la FA0 - pouvaient modifier
sans restrictions la situation des fonctionnaires, cela signifierait

«qu'aucun contrôle ne peut êtreexercésur lesrelations d'un organe exécutif
tel que le Conseil avec le personnel de l'organisation ei il est vain de
chercher à savoir si ces relations sont conformes à des rèelementsaue le
Conseil n'a nul besoin d'observer. Comme ~ ~D~recteu~ ~ ~ ~a0-daAs s.s -~-
rapports aveck personnel, est assujetti au contrôic du Conscil. cela signifie
que le contrat du f~~iionnnirc nc donne ë celu;-CIaucun droit que le
Conseil nc pourrait annulcr. ci cn particulier que son salaire lui est verséà
titre gracieux et non pas en vertu d'un contrat. De l'avisdu Tribunal. tel
ne saurait ètrele droitu (TAOIT. jugement no323, Cunnolli-Burrisrt(no5,
c. FAO).

C'est aussice que disait déjàleTribunal administratif de la Sociétédes Nations
dans son premierjugement, lorsqu'ilconsidéraitque la portéede l'article 117du
statut du personnel du BIT qui autorisait l'administration àmodifierlestatut du
personnel
«n'a pu êtrede livrer le fonctionnaire à l'arbitraire de l'administration,
puisque, au contraire, I'existenced'un statut s'inspire de la nécessitéde204 DEMANDE DE REFORMATION

donner aux membres du personnrl. pour Icprkscntcl I'n\cnir.des garanties
légitimesquant jla stilb~liet aux conditions dc leur emploi» (TASdN. 1.
di Palmadi Castiglione).
On peut admettre que c'estàjuste titre que, dans son opinion dissidentejointe
au jugement no 273 du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, M. Reis
rappelle

«qu'un juriste éminenta soulignéque les droits acquis des fonctionnaires
internationaux devaient êtreprotégés dansla mesure où il étaitde l'intérêt
publicde garantir la stabilitéde cesdroits (Hans W. Baade, «The Acquired
Rights of International PublicServants)), 15AmericanJournalof Compara-
tiveLaw (1967), 251, 299)))(AT/DEC/273, p. 31).

Mais, précisément, M. Baade,dans l'article cité, admetque l'existenced'une
fonction publique compétente et indépendantec ,equi implique un revenudécent
et une situation raisonnablement stable, constitue un cintérètpublics (ibid.).
Le respect des droits acquis des fonctionnaires est d'ailleurs impliqué par
l'article 101, paragraphe 3, de la Charte des Nations Unies elle-mème,aux
termes duquel:
<<3.La considérationdominante dans le recrutcmcni ci la fixation des
conditions d'emploidu personnel doit étrcla nécessité d'assureri I'Organi-
sation lesserv~cesde personnes possédantIcsplus hautcs qualitésde travail.
de compétence etd'intégrité.))

Du reste, la Cour internationale de Justice, qui a admis que les fonctionnaires
pouvaient faire valoir des sdroits ou expectatives légitimes)) (C.I.J. Recueil
1973, p. 205),a déclaré qu'il convenait,ans ce domaine, de s'inspirerdu but en
vue duquel les textes pertinents ont étéadoptés,
«à savoir l'intention d'assurerà l'organisation les servicesd'un personnel
compétent et intègreendotant celui-cide garanties appropriéespour tout ce
qui concerne l'observationdes contrats d'engagement et desdispositionsdu
statut du personnel» (C.I.J., avisconsuliarij,Jugementsdu Tribunaladmi-
nisiroff de l'OIT sur requérescontrel'Unesco, 23 octobre 1956, Recueil
1956,p. 98).

II n'estpas nécessaired'établiricique le respect des droits acquis constitue un
principe générad ledroit (voir M. Ssrensen, «Le problèmedu droit intertempo-
rel dans I'ordre international», rapport à I'lnstitut de droit international,
AnnuaireIDI, 1973,notamment p. 2).et ilsuffitde rappeler que la Cour en a fait
application à plusieurs reprises et qu'il est,en tout cas, conforme à la Charte.
II est du reste important de rappeler que, lors des débats préalables à
l'adoption du statut du rsonnel en 1951,l'article 12.1(repris de I'article28du
statut provisoire) n'a Et l'objet d'aucune discussion, ni devant le Comité
consultatif des questions administratives et budgétaires,ni devant la Cinquième
Commission (une question du délégué de I'lnde sur le sens précisdes mots
«droits acquis))est demeuréesans reponse; cf. comptes rendus analytiques des
séancesde la Cinquième Commission, Documenrsofficielsde l'Assemblée géné-
rale, sixiémesession, p. 307), ni devant I'Assembleegénérale.Ceci témoigne
clairement de la conscience commune qu'avaient les Etats Membres de la
nécessitéde garantir la stabilitéde la condition juridique des fonctionnaires.
Dès lorsque le principe du respect des droits acquis est conforme à la Charte
et prévupar le statut du personnel, il appartenait au Tribunal administratif des
Nations Uniesde lemettre en Œuvredans lecas précisqui lui était soumiset il ne
pouvait pas le vider de sa substance.
Le Gouvernement de la République répète qu'à son avis la manièredont le
Tribunal a appliqué I'article 12.1 du statut du personnel ne relèvepas de la EXPOSE ECRlT DE LA FRANCE 205

compétencede la Cour. Néanmoins,tout en étant convaincu que cela excède
clairement les limites dans lesquellesla présente instance est circonscritepar les
termes mêmesde l'article II, paragraphe 1,du statut du Tribunal, le Gouverne-
ment de la République,par souci de répondreà certaines objections qui ont été
émises,montrera dans lesparagraphes qui suivent que le Tribunal administratif
a fait de ce principe une application particulièrement modéréel,ui donnant, en
quelque sorte, un sens «minimal».
Le recours à la notion de «droits acquis» était,en effet, au cas particulier
doublement justifié.D'une part, le requérant jouissait en l'espèced'un droit
contractuel à la prime de rapatriement. D'autre part, le Tribunal a pu,
pratiquement, réduire l'applicationdu principe àceluide la non-rétroactivité des
règlesjuridiques. Bienentendu, la solution retenue par leTribunal administratif
des Nations Unies se serait imposéeaforriori s'ilavait appliquélajurisprudence
du Tribunal de I'OIT en matièrede droits acquis.
14. Comme l'a relevéle Tribunal dans le jugement contesté,M. Mortished,
qui, comme tout fonctionnaire, étaitliéà l'organisation des Nations Unies par
un contrat d'engagement, se trouvait dans une situation juridique spécialeen ce
qui concerne la prime de rapatriement. En effet, un document - que l'on peut
considérer commeun complémentde son contrat - lui reconnaissait un droit à
la prime de rapatriement à compter du 14 février1949 (date de son premier
engagement à I'OACI) (cf. le jugement ne 273, n" VI). En d'autres termes,
l'organisation a reconnu à M. Mortished un droit à la prime de rapatriement
dèsson entréeen fonctions et celui-cipouvait donc, dèscettedate, compter sur le
seul fait qu'à la cessation de ses fonctions il recevrait cette prime dont le
versement luiavait été expressément et personnellemengtaranti.
Dans ces conditions, pour M. Mortished au moins, et, éventuellement,pour
les autres fonctionnaires qui auraient reçu les mêmesassurances, le droit au
versement de la prime de rapatriement est un droit contractuel (en mêmetemps
qu'il est, d'ailleurs, un droit statutaire- voir infra, no15). Comme tel, le
Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies était inévitablementconduit à lui
reconnaître lecaractèred'undroit acquis, conformément d'ailleursàsajurispru-
dence constante et àcelle des autres tribunaux administratifs internationaux.
Dès 1953,IeTribunal administratif interprétaitlesdispositionsde l'article28du
statut provisoiredu personnel etdeI'article12.1du statut actuelcommesignifiant
que les éléments contractuelsde la situation juridique des fonctionnaires «ne
peuvent êtremodifiéssans l'accord des deux.parties» (TANU, 19, Kaplan);
quelques années plustard, il précis;iitqu'une lettre d'engagementcomportant
certaines réservesau droit d'amendement de l'administration «a permis que des
amendements au règlementprovisoire prennent effetàl'égarddu requérant,à la
dans la lettre d'engagement elle-même»tt(TANU, 84, Youngc. Secréraire générales
deI'OACI;voir aussi lesjugements no53, Wallach;63,Hilpern;68, Bulsara;185,
Lawrence). Et il en va de mémes'agissant de la jurisprudence du Tribunal
administratif de I'OIT (voir, par exemple, TAOIT, 292, Molloy c. Euraconrrol;
368, Elsenel Elsen-Drouorc. OEB; 369, Nuss c. OEB), bien que celle-ci soit
beaucoup plus laxisteen lamatière (voirinfra,no21).Aucun de cesjugements n'a
jamais étécontesté,ni par leSecrétairegénéra nli par un Etat Membre, s'agissant
des décisionsdu Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, ni par le Conseil
d'administration du BIT pour ce qui est des jugements de celui de l'OIT.
C'est que, en réalité,il s'agit d'une application limitéede la notion de droits
acquis. Comme on l'a écrit:
,
«Even though an international civil servant cannot argue that his
conditions of service may never be modified, he can at least invoke one of
the most fundamental principlesof international law -pacro suntservanda.
This is the basic ru-e or one of the basic rules-of interndtional law,and206 DEMANDE DE RÉFORMATION

an International Organization, set up by a treaty, cannot act in a manner
contrary to the very rule of law from which it derives its own existence.»

(aBien qu'un fonctionnaire international ne puisse prétendre que ses
conditions d'emploi ne peuLentjamais étremoditiées, il peut au moins se
fonder sur l'un des pnncipcs les plus fondamentaux du droit international

-pacta suni servanda.Cëci consiitue la règlede base - ou l'une desrègles
de base - du droit international et une oraanisation internationale. établie
par un traité.ne peut agird'une maniérecontraire àla règle mêmà elaquelle
elle doit d'exister. 0) (M. R Akehunt, The LOk, GoverningEmployment in
InrernutionulOrgunirations, Camhridgç Un~versityPress, 1967.p 238.)

La Cour internationale de Justice a du reste consacré cette façonde voir en
rappelant que

<<certainesobligations de I'0rg;iniwiion peuvent étrecontr~ctces par le
Secrétairegcnéralsous I'autontédu Conseil de récuritcou de I'Assemblkc
généraleet I'Assemblk ~énérale «n'a pas d'autre altçrnative Quede laire
honneur à sesengagements» (C.I.J., a& consuliari/,Certaines dépensesdes

Nations Unies,20juillet 1962,Recueil 1962,p. 169).
IIen va ainsi pour lesengagementscontractuels pris par leSecrétairegénéravlis-
à-vis des fonctionnaires. En l'espèce, leSecrétaire générala,yant donné des

assurances formelles à M. Mortished en 1958, ne pouvait revenir sur ses
engagements vingt-deux ans plus tard ou en paralyser totalement les effets.
15. 11 est vrai que I'on pourrait soutenir que M. Mortished s'est vu
reconnaître, en 1958,le droit à la prime de rapatriement mais non le droit à son
versement,dans lecas où, au moment où ilpouvait y prétendre,il ne répondrait
pas aux conditions nécessairespour en béneficier.L'objectionest assez formelle

car, précisément,au moment où le droit à la prime lui a été reconnu,son
versement n'était, depuis plusieurs années, soumis àaucune autre condition que
la cessation des fonctions (cf. lejugement no273, noVII).
Par conséquent,le droit à la prime de rapatriement découlaità la fois des
textesen vigueur(l'article 9.4et l'annexeIV du statut du personnel) et du contrat
du requérant.Quant au droit inconditionnel à son versement. il résultaitd'une

pratique ancienne de l'organisation. Et la Cour internationale de Justice a
clairement admis qu'une telle pratique constituait un «élémentpertinent pour
l'interprétation descontrats» d'engagement des fonctionnaires internationaux
(C.I.J., avisconsuliatif.Jugemenisdu Tribunaladminisiratifde l'OITsur requéies
contre l'Unesco,23 octobre 1956,Recueil1956.p. 91-92).
Alors qu'il l'aurait pu,le Tribunal administratif a cependant estiméqu'«eu

égardà la situation propre du requérant» il n'avait pas à se prononcer sur la
question de la valeur obligatoire de la pratique dont il a relevé l'existence
-iuuement n" 273. noVIII).
En effet, après avoir constaté que «dès 1953. le lien entre la prime de
ranatnement et le retou~~-~~~s la r~rt~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~mou r~ns~le~~-~- ~-n-~-~ - ~
p&sonneln,(disposition 109.5 il, jugement no273. n° VII). LX qui constituait une
traduction en quelque sorte négativcrde sctte pratique. leTribunal d notéqua

la suite de longuesdiscussionsle Secrétairegéncral LIétéamené.le 22aoùt 1979.
à modifier la disposition 109.5 f) de façon à ce que
«les fonctionnaires avant nris leurs fonctions avant le 1" iuillet 1979
~ ~~- ~~,~~ ~ , ~ ~ ~~~~- ~- ~~~~~~- ~ ~ . ~ ,- -~ ~ ~
conservent Içdroit au moniaiit de la prime qui correspond aux années et
aux moisde serviceouvrant droit àladite prime dei6accomplis i cette date.
uns avoir j.produire. en ce qui concerne cettc pknode de service. unepiéce
attestant leur changement de résidence» (cf. jugement n0273, n0Xll).

Mêmeen admettant que,jusqu'à cettedate, ilexistait unedissociation entre le
((droit à la prime» et le «droit au paiement» de la prime, ilest clair que l'un et EXPOS~ ~CRIT DE LA FRANCE 207

l'autre se confondent partir de la publication du nouveau texte de la disposi-
tion 109.5du règlementdu personnel par la circulaire ST/SGB/SR/I/Rev.5. par
laquelle,agissant sur lesinstructions de l'Assembléegénéralet laCommission
de la fonction publique internationale, le Secrétaire généraal «consolidé» la
pratique antérieureM. Mortished, qui depuis le 14février1961-soit douze ans
après son entréeau servicedes organisations du système desNations Unies -
avait acquis ledroit au montant maximalde laprimede rapatriement, a,au moins
dufait de lanouvellerédactiondela disposition 109.5du règlementdu personnel,
acquis égalementun droit au versement de cette somme.
«En établissant un nouveau textede la disposition 109.5,texte qui, àdater du
I" janvier 1980,a remplacéletexte antérieurementen vigueur sur la base duquel
le requérant pouvait obtenir la prime de rapatriement)) Üugement no 273,
n9XIV) et en lui refusant le bénéfice,le Secrétaire généraa l bien, comme
le constate le Tribunal administratif, porté atteinte à un droit acquis par
M. Mortished.
Sansdoute, si l'onadmet que le«droit au paiement» estdistinct du «droit àla
prime» - ce qui ne s'impose aucunement - doit-on admettre aussi qu'à la
direrence du second le nremier n'était Das un droit contractuel oour le
r~ ~ ~ant. S~ ~~esoect ne's'en imoosait Das moins au SecrétaireeéRérae in
application du principe, non moins csrentiel. de la non-rétroactivitedes reglcs
)undiqucs Ondoit 3 nouveau constater que lcTribunal. s'y réicranten I'çspécc.
a fait une application tout ii fa11limiléeJr la notion de droits aiquis qui, comme

l'a déclaréle Tribunal administratif de l'OIT, «dans son interprétation la plus
restrictive.se confond avec le orinc-pe ~énéle la non-rétroactivité»(TAOIT,
51, Poulaindilndecy c. FAO).
A ce point de vue également,le Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies se
borne àappliquersa jurisprudence, traditionnelle en cedomaine, et que,jusqu'à
présent,ni le Secrétaire généranli aucun Etat Membre n'ont remise en cause.
Ainsi,en 1961,leTribunal avait déclaréque arien n'interdit unemodification du
règlementdont les effets ne s'appliquent qu'auxbénéficee st avantagesliésaux
servicespostérieursà l'adoption de celle-ci» (TANU, 82. Puvrez c. Secrétaire
générad l e I'OACI).Et, tout récemment,il a indiquésans ambiguïté:
«Le respect des droits acquis signifie qu'il ne peut ètre portéaucune
atteinte à l'ensemble desbéneficeset avantages revenant au fonctionnaire
pour lesservicesrendus avant l'entréeen vigueurd'une nouvelledisposition
réglementaire.))VANU, 266, RosemilleCupio; voir aussi, par exemple,
TANU, 110, Mankiewiczc. Secrétairegénérad l e I'OACI; 202, Queguiner
c. Secrétaire générdal I'OMCI; 237, Pon~ell).

(Les autres tribunaux administratifs internationaux appliquent les mime prin-
cipes; toir. par exemple,TAOIT. 29, Sherfi.. OIT, TAOEA. 13. Alii~ii: u\ .
Com. rec. OCDE. 40, Merigo; CJCE. aff.69 63, (ùpituineGp ..\lor~'~/ct Corn
CEEA, Rec. X, p. 494; TA~Banquemondiale, 1, de Merode et as.,etc.).
Dans cette acception limitée l'assimilantà la non-rétroactivitédes règles
juridiques non facorables, le principe des droits acquis est d'applicaGon
absolument généraliséteant en droit international que dans les droits internes
des Etats et la Cour internationale de Justice a eu l'occasion d'en faire
application à maintes reprises. On peut mèmeconsidérerqu'elle ena fait usage
dans son avis consultatif relatif à l'effetde jugements du Tribunal administratif
des Nations Unies accordant indemnitélorsqu'elle a déclaréqu'«il n'y a pas de
motifs de droit sur lesquels l'Assembléegénéralepuisse se fonder pour reviser
desjugements dijàprononcés par ce tribunal)(C.I.J. Recueil1954,p. 56) ou que
l'Assembléegénérale pouvait prévoir«la revision des décisions futures du
Tribunal),(ibid.p. 61). Il n'ya aucune raison de penser que ce principe n'estpas
applicable dans d'autres domaines et il paraît clair qu'une règlequi s'imposeà
l'Assembléegénérale est, afortiori,opposable au Secrétaire général.208 DEMANDE DE REFORMATION

Quel que soit le parti que I'onadopte, M. Mortished, compte tenu de la durée
de ses services,avait un droit acquis au versement de la prime de rapatriement,
qu'il le tienne de son contrat, ou de la pratique de l'organisation ou des
décisionsdu Secrétaire généralP.ar ailleurs le Tribunal administratif a fait, en
l'espèce, uneapplication particulièrement prudente du principe du respect dù
aux droits acquis des fonctionnaires internationaux puisque, .elon le parti que
I'onadopic. il l'aïssimilésoit au rebpectdrs droits conlractuels, suit icelui de 13
non-r2truactivitcidcs rCelcs.l'un ci l'autre bien étahlis Sauf i orivïr Je toute
signification l'article 12y1du statut du personnel, le Couveriement français
éprouvelesplus grandes difficultés àimaginer quel sensplus restreint leTribunal

aurait pu lui donner.
16. 11 lui apparaît en outre que le Tribunal aurait abouti aux mêmes
conclusions s'il avait retenu la définition. infinimentplus large, que donne par
ailleurs le Tribunal administratif de l'OIT à la notion de droits acquis.
Lajurisprudence de cette juridiction - à laquelle se réfèreM. Reis - a subi
une évolution qu'il est inutilede retracer ici. Dans son état actuel, elle est
clairement résumée par lejugement no391,Los Cobosel Wenger c. OIT,que cite,
précisémentl,'opinion dissidente:

«Un droit est acquis si son bénéficiairepeut en exiger le respect
nonobstant toute modification de texte. Telest lecas, notamment, dans une
double hypothèse.
D'une part, il y a lieu de considérer comme acquis undroit conférépar
une disposition statutaire ou réglementaireet assez important pour avoir
déterminé un agentà s'engager au service d'une organisation. Réduirece
droit sans le consentement de son titulaire, c'est porter atteinte aux
conditions d'emploi sur le maintien desquelles les fonctionnaires peuvent

compter.
D'autre part, le caractère acquis de droits résulte aussi des clauses
contractuelles qui les prévoient etque lesparties ont tenu pour intangibles.
IIs'ensuitaue tous lesdroits contractuels ne sont oas acauis. .uss.nt-ilsde
nature pécuniaire:encore faut-il que lesparties aient excluexprcssémenlou
implicitement leur restriction Si le pnncipe du paiement d'une indemnité
pcut faire I'ohjetd'un droit acquis. il n'en est pas nkessairçment de mème
du mode dc cslcul de la prestation due. c'est-a-diredc son montJnt u

Ce système - qui est combiné avecles principes de la non-rétroactivitédes
règlesmoins favorables et du non-bouleversement de l'économie généraldeu
contrat. que le Tribunal administratif applique généralement-, et qu'il vient
d'étendreencore en admettant que le respect des droits acquis s'oppose àce que
le bénéficiaire d'un droit en soit «privé arbitrairement» (TAOIT, 462, Vyle c.
FAO) - , faittrèslargement appel a la subjectivitédu juge. (Et ilen va de même
pour le raisonnement suivipar le Tribunal administratif de la Banque mondiale
dans sonjugement no1,de Merodeel as., qui repose sur une distinction entre les
adroits essentiels))ou «fondamentaux» et ceux qui ne le sont pas.)
Quoi qu'il en soit, il est tout à fait certain que le droit de M. Mortished au

versement de la prime de rapatriement litigieuse n'aurait pas manqué d'être
reconnu si leTribunal s'était fondé sur cettejurisprudence - dont il a d'ailleurs
esquissé l'applicationdans certaines décisions récentes (cf.TANU, 195,Sood;
237, Powelf): l'importance relative de la somme en jeu (faible au regard du
budget global de l'organisation mais non négligeablepour un fonctionnaire qui
prend sa retraite), le fait que le problèmeait été évoqu(é et régléa)u moment de
I'eneaeement. la loneueur des services du reauérant et bien d'autres facteurs
a~ ~~&~. très'vraisemblablement. emoortéla'conviction du iuee (le T,~~-~a~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~
adminisiratif dc 1'01.1a ' du reste Üdmi;que la simplediminution du monlant de
la retraite. la suppression du droit i promotion. Je la pnme d'expatriatiun. de
l'indemnité pourfrai$dëducation desenfants ou du rcmbourscmcnt des frais de EXWSBECRITDE LA FRANCE 209

voyagepour congésdans les foyersconstitueraient autant d'atteintes àdesdroits
acquis - voir par exemple: TAOIT, 365, Lamadie (n"2) etKraanen c.IIB; 429,
Gubin elNemo c. Eurocontrol; 441, Pherai c.OEB, etc.).
IIn'appartient certainement pas à la Courde rentrer dansde tellesconsidéra-
tions, mais le Gouvernement français a voulu établirà titre subsidiaire que non
seulement le Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies n'a commis en l'espèce
aucune erreur de droit, mais encore qu'il a adoptéune solution qui demeure en
retrait par rapport a la construction prétorienne plus audacieusedu Tribunal
administratif de l'OIT.
17.De l'avisdu Gouvernement de la République, réformerlejugement no273
du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, ce serait, en fait, rejeter la quasi-
totalitié de la.iuri.prudence administrative internationale relative aux droits
acquis.
Ce serait aussi, d:une certaine manière, admettre une évolutiontout à fait
contestable du ((régimecommun» dont, chaque annéeavec plus de vigueur,
l'Assemblée généraldeemande le renforcement. Le Secrétaire généradle l'Or-
ganisation des Nations Unies a, en effet, étéle seul chef d'une administration
d'une organisation du systèmedesNations Unies à revenir sur le mécanismede
transition ordonnée prévu en 1979 et qui demeure en vigueur au sein des
institutions spécialisées,n interprétant de facon rigide le sens de la résolu-
tion 341165de l'Assemblée générale. Cela ed stu reste directement contraire à la
lettre et à l'espritde nombreuses recommandations et décisionset, notamment,
de la résolution331119(à laquelle la résolution341165fait référence) où l'As-
sembléegénérale

«Prie instamment les autoritéscompétentes de toutesles organisations
qui appliquent le régimecommun des Nations Unies de s'abstenir de
prendre des mesures qui ne contribuent pas au renforcement et au
développementde ce régime)).

Ce serait enfinencourager le Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies à faire
cela mème qui lui est reproché: refuserd'appliquer certaines résolutionsde
l'Assembléegénéralealors qu'il lui appartient de contràier que le Secrétaire
généralles met en Œuvre,sans exclusiveet dans leur ensemble. C'est ce que le
Tribunal a fait dans lejugement contesté.

* *

18.En définitive,le Gouvernement de la République françaises'enremet à la
sagesse de la Cour en cequi concerne sa compétencepour connaître de la
présentedemande. Au fond, il estimeque le Tribunal administratif des Nations
Unies n'a pas outrepassésa juridiction ou sa compétenceet n'a pas commis
d'erreur de droit concernant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies et
demande à la Cour, si elle retient sa compétence,de répondreen ce sens à la
question qui lui a étéposée.

Le directeur des affairesjuridiques
du rninisterc des rel3tions ettérieiires.

(Signé) Gilben GL~LLAUME.
Le conseil,

(Signé) Alain PELLET,
agrégé des facultéd se droit,
professeur à l'universitéde Paris Nord