CR 2004/25
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2004
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 16 June 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Shi presiding,
in the case concerning Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2004
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 16 juin 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,
en l’affaire relative à Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: President Shi
Vice-President Ranjeva
Judges Guillaume
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Tomka
Judges ad hoc Fleischhauer
Sir Franklin Berman
Registrar Couvreur
- 3 -
Présents : Shi, président
M. Ranjeva, vice-président
MM. Guillaume
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Tomka, juges
MM. Fleischhauer,
sir Franklin Berman, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is represented by:
Mr. Thomas Läufer, Director General for Legal Affairs and Legal Adviser, Federal Foreign Office,
H.E. Mr. Edmund Duckwitz, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Agents;
Mr. Jochen Frowein, Director emeritus of the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law Heidelberg, Professor of Public International Law, University of
Heidelberg,
Mr. Christian Tomuschat, Professor of Public International Law, Humboldt-University of Berlin,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law at the University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas) and the European University Institute of Florence,
as Counsel;
Mr. Daniel Erasmus Khan, Privatdozent, Visiting Professor at the University Bayreuth,
Mr. Andreas Paulus, University of Munich,
Ms Karin Oellers-Frahm, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law
Heidelberg,
Ms Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Head of the Public International Law Division, Federal Foreign
Office,
Mr. Reinhard Hassenpflug, Federal Foreign Office,
Mr. Götz Reimann, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany,
as Advisers;
Ms Fiona Sneddon,
as Assistant.
The Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Alexander Goepfert, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Düsseldorf, Special Commissioner
of the Principality of Liechtenstein,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Roland Marxer, Ambassador, Director of the Office for Foreign Affairs of the Principality
of Liechtenstein
as Advocate; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République fédérale d’Allemagne est représenté par :
M. Thomas Läufer, directeur général des affaires juridiques et conseiller juridique du ministère
fédéral des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Edmund Duckwitz, ambassadeur de la République fédérale d’Allemagne auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agents;
M. Jochen Frowein, directeur émérite de l’Institut Max-Planck pour le droit public comparé et le
droit international à Heidelberg, professeur de droit public international à l’Université de
Heidelberg,
M. Christian Tomuschat, professeur de droit international public à l’Université Humboldt de
Berlin,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assas) et à l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence,
comme conseils;
M. Daniel Erasmus Khan, Privatdozent, professeur invité à l’Université de Bayreuth,
M. Andreas Paulus, Université de Munich,
Mme Karin Oellers-Frahm, Institut Max-Planck pour le droit public comparé et le droit
international à Heidelberg,
Mme Susanne Wasum-Rainer, chef de la division du droit international public du ministère fédéral
des affaires étrangères,
M. Reinhard Hassenpflug, ministère fédéral des affaires étrangères,
M. Götz Reimann, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne à La Haye,
comme conseillers;
Mme Fiona Sneddon,
comme assistante.
Le Gouvernement de la Principauté de Liechtenstein est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Alexander Goepfert, Freshfields Bruckhaus, Deringer, Düsseldorf, commissaire spécial
de la Principauté de Liechtenstein,
comme agent;
S. Exc. M. Roland Marxer, ambassadeur, directeur de l’office pour les affaires étrangères de la
Principauté de Liechtenstein,
comme avocat; - 6 -
Mr. Dieter Blumenwitz, Professor of Public International Law, University of Würzburg and
Munich,
Mr. Thomas Bruha, Professor of Public Law, University of Hamburg,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge,
member of the English and Australian Bars, Member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Gerhard Hafner, Professor of Public International Law, University of Vienna, Associate
Member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Malcolm Forster, Professor of International Law, University College, London, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, London,
Ms Juliane Hilf, member of the Chamber of Lawyers of Germany, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer,
Cologne,
Ms Lucy Reed, member of the State Bar of New York, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, New York,
as Advocates;
Mr. Daniel Müller, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant at the University of
Paris X-Nanterre,
Mr. Stephan Wittich, Assistant Professor at the University of Vienna,
as Advisers;
Ms Nadine Heider, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Cologne,
Ms Gabriele Klein, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Düsseldorf,
as Assistants;
Mr. Thomas Dillmann, ECC Kohtes Klewes,
Mr. Thomas Pütz, ECC Kohtes Klewes,
as Information Officers. - 7 -
M. Dieter Blumenwitz, professeur de droit international public aux Universités de Würzburg et de
Munich,
M. Thomas Bruha, professeur de droit public à l’Université de Hambourg,
M. James Crawford, S. C., professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire Whewell à
l’Université de Cambridge, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et d’Australie, membre de
l’Institut de droit international,
M. Gerhard Hafner, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Vienne, membre
associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Malcolm Forster, professeur de droit international à l’University College de Londres,
Freshfields Bruckhaus, Deringer, Londres,
Mme Juliane Hilf, membre de la chambre des avocats d’Allemagne, Freshfields Bruckhaus,
Deringer, Cologne,
Mme Lucy Reed, membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York, Freshfields Bruckhaus, Deringer,
New York,
comme avocats;
M. Daniel Müller, attaché temporaire d’enseignement et de recherche à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre,
M. Stephan Wittich, professeur adjoint à l’Université de Vienne,
comme conseillers;
Mme Nadine Heider, Freshfields Bruckhaus, Deringer, Cologne,
Mme Gabriele Klein, Freshfields Bruckhaus, Deringer, Düsseldorf,
comme assistantes;
M. Thomas Dillmann, ECC Kohtes Klewes,
M. Thomas Pütz, ECC Kohtes Klewes,
comme attachés d’information. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. This morning the Court will
hear the first round of oral argument of Liechtenstein. I give the floor first to
Dr. Alexander Goepfert, Agent of Liechtenstein.
Mr. GOEPFERT:
1. NTRODUCTION TO THE TEAM
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear
before you today as the Agent of the Principality of Liechtenstein. On behalf of Liechtenstein, may
I express our appreciation to Professor Carl-August Fleischhauer and Sir Franklin Berman for their
willingness to serve as judges ad hoc.
2. This is a case of paramount importance for Liechtenstein, because its sovereignty and
neutrality are being denied by Germany under international law. Moreover, the international law
issues at stake are such that the importance of the case extends far beyond Liechtenstein.
3. I am also honoured to introduce to you the persons representing Liechtenstein, who will
submit to you our arguments supporting your jurisdiction over the Application filed on
30 May 2001, and the admissibility of that Application.
4. Ambassador Roland Marxer, Director of the Office for Foreign Affairs of the Principality
of Liechtenstein will speak first. After I make a short further introductory statement concerning the
true nature of this case, the five advocates who will follow certain of them already well known
to you are Professor James Crawford, Professor Dieter Blumenwitz, Professor Thomas Bruha,
Professor Gerhard Hafner, and Professor Alain Pellet.
5. In this matter I am further accompanied by counsel, including my law partners
Professor Malcolm Forster, Dr. Juliane Hilf and Ms Lucy Reed, together with the advisers and
assistants to the advocates and counsel.
6. To take care of administrative details, I note that we have provided a judges’ folder
containing copies of key materials referenced and that full citations to all references appear in the
written version of our submissions. - 9 -
7. It is my pleasure to introduce Ambassador Marxer. Mr. President, I would ask you to call
upon Ambassador Marxer.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Goepfert. I now give the floor to Ambassador Marxer.
M. MARXER :
2. NTRODUCTION
Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges,
1. C’est un grand honneur pour moi de me présenter aujourd’hui devant vous au nom de mon
pays, la Principauté du Liechtenstein, dont je suis le directeur du ministère des affaires étrangères.
2. Avant toute chose, je tiens à renouveler les assurances de la grande estime de mon
gouvernement pour la République fédérale d’Allemagne et à préciser que nous avons la ferme
conviction que la solution que vous apporterez à la présente affaire renforcera la confiance entre les
deux pays.
3. Monsieur le président, vous n’ignorez pas que ce n’est pas la première fois que le
Liechtenstein saisit la Cour. Il reconnaît le rôle éminent qu’elle joue dans le règlement pacifique
des différends entre Etats, tout spécialement en assurant une protection effective des petits Etats
comme le Liechtenstein contre les actes illicites commis par des Etats plus grands.
4. Le Liechtenstein est une monarchie constitutionnelle, devenu un Etat indépendant il y a
presque deux cents ans, en 1806, après l’effondrement du Saint-Empire romain germanique. D’une
superficie de 160 kilomètres carrés, il compte environ trente-cinq mille habitants. Voisine de
l’Autriche et de la Suisse, la Principauté est à quelques kilomètres seulement de la frontière
allemande. En tant que membre du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Espace économique européen, elle
entretient des relations économiques et politiques étroites avec les autres Etats européens. En
outre, Membre des Nations Unies, d’un certain nombre d’institutions spécialisées et de
l’Organisation mondiale du commerce, elle participe activement aux relations internationales au
plan mondial.
5. Le Liechtenstein a réussi à préserver sa neutralité durant les deux guerres mondiales. Cela
n’a pas été chose aisée, surtout durant le second conflit mondial, face à la forte pression exercée par - 10 -
le Reich allemand. La Principauté n’en a pas moins été le seul Etat européen qui n’a pas reconnu
l’accord de Munich consacrant l’annexion illicite de la Tchécoslovaquie par l’Allemagne nazie.
6. Il va de soi que le Liechtenstein attachait une importance toute particulière au principe de
neutralité. Mais la non-reconnaissance de l’accord de Munich a été également motivée par des
considérations d’ordre historique et géographique. Un certain nombre de familles
liechtensteinoises, au premier rang desquelles la famille princière, possédaient de vastes propriétés
foncières et des biens importants en Tchécoslovaquie, notamment en Moravie et en Bohème, qui
font aujourd’hui partie de la République tchèque, un des deux Etats successeurs de l’ancienne
Tchécoslovaquie.
7. Lundi dernier, l’Allemagne a cru bon de comparer la prétendue inaction du Liechtenstein
à la suite des confiscations des biens de ses ressortissants par la Tchécoslovaquie aux négociations
fructueuses qu’a menées la Suisse avec ce pays . Cette comparaison n’a pas lieu d’être. En effet,
le Liechtenstein est loin d’être resté inactif. Tout comme la Suisse, il a, au contraire, rapidement
essayé de négocier avec la Tchécoslovaquie. Mais, contrairement à ce qui s’est produit pour la
Confédération helvétique, le nouveau régime tchécoslovaque a rejeté la demande du Liechtenstein
que, à la différence des gouvernements précédents, il refusa de reconnaître. Le Liechtenstein n’a
pas même pas été admis à participer aux négociations auxquelles l’Allemagne a fait référence lundi
2
dernier . Depuis lors, et jusqu’à ce jour, le Liechtenstein a, sans succès, multiplié les tentatives afin
de trouver une solution à son différend avec la Tchécoslovaquie et ses Etats successeurs. Comme
vous le savez, le prince ― qui possède la grande majorité des biens en question ― a, avec
persévérance mais sans aucun succès, tenté de faire valoir ses droits devant les tribunaux
tchécoslovaques. J’ai le regret d’ajouter que, depuis 1998, les choses se sont encore compliquées
du fait que la République tchèque s’est appuyée sur la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle
3
allemande dans l’affaire du Tableau de Pieter van Laer .
1CR 2004/24, p. 30, par. 82 (M. Frowein).
2
Ibid.
3 Déclaration écrite de la République tchèque du 26 mai 1999 concernant la déclaration de la Principauté du
Liechtenstein du 25 mai 1999, mémoire du Liechtenstein, vol. III, annexe 44, p. A495 (traduction du Greffe), p. 36-37 du
texte français. - 11 -
8. Monsieur le président, je ne reviens sur ces faits historiques que parce que l’Allemagne a
jugé utile de les évoquer lundi dernier. Je ne saurais cependant trop insister sur le fait que, malgré
les allégations contraires et répétées de l’Allemagne, notre différend avec l’ancienne
Tchécoslovaquie, et aujourd’hui avec ses Etats successeurs, ne constitue pas le litige que la
Principauté a soumis à la Cour. Celui-ci concerne ― et concerne seulement ― l’application, faite
récemment par l’Allemagne, du régime des réparations de guerre aux biens appartenant au
Liechtenstein et à ses nationaux. Ces actes, de l’Allemagne, sont contraires aux principes
fondamentaux du droit international, ce que l’Allemagne persiste à refuser de reconnaître et, encore
moins, d’y remédier, malgré les occasions que le Liechtenstein s’est efforcé de ménager à cette fin,
par exemple lors des deux rounds de consultations diplomatiques à ce sujet, dont le dernier a eu
lieu en juin 1999.
9. Ces consultations n’ont abouti qu’à une déclaration commune reconnaissant l’existence
4
d’un différend qui pourrait être soumis à la Cour . Bien qu’il ne m’appartienne pas de discuter des
questions juridiques qui vont vous être présentées par les avocats du Liechtenstein, je tiens à
souligner que cette déclaration commune du Liechtenstein et de l’Allemagne, en elle-même,
démontre que cette situation sérieuse constitue un différend entre les deux Etats ― contrairement
aux allégations faites par la Partie allemande dans ses exceptions préliminaires . 5
10. Permettez moi, Monsieur le président, de clore ma présentation en insistant sur le fait que
le Liechtenstein ne peut considérer les actes de l’Allemagne que comme, à la fois, une grave mise
en cause de sa souveraineté et des droits résultant de son statut de neutralité, et une atteinte à ses
droits de propriété et à ceux de ses nationaux.
11. Madame et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre bienveillante attention et je
vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir donner à nouveau la parole à
M. Alexander Goepfert, agent du Liechtenstein.
The PRESIDENT : Thank you, Ambassador Marxer. I now give the floor to Dr. Goepfert.
4Observations écrites du Liechtenstein, annexe 48 (traduction du Greffe), p. 67 du texte français.
5CR 2004/24, p. 20-21, par. 39-44 (M. Läufer). - 12 -
Mr. GOEPFERT:
3. Introduction the true nature of the case
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, as Ambassador Marxer has indicated,
my purpose in returning to the podium is to refocus these proceedings on the true nature of the
dispute between Liechtenstein and Germany. I must do this because, on Monday, Germany
addressed a case that is not the case before you. If there is any “artificial construct” or “lack of
clarity” or “l’atmosphère artificielle” , I regret to say it is on the part of Germany.
2. You heard the distinguished Agent and counsel for Germany state again and again
that Liechtenstein has not identified the international legal basis on which Liechtenstein rests its
claims . Perhaps Germany thinks if it repeats this enough, it will become true. It is not true.
3. It is the heart of Liechtenstein’s case that Germany bears international responsibility for
infringing Liechtenstein’s neutrality and sovereignty by allowing Liechtenstein assets to be treated,
for the first time in 1995, as German external assets for purposes of the Settlement Convention.
This is what this case is about.
4. Let me be equally clear as to what this case is not about. This case is not about the Beneš
Decrees. This case is not about the legality of the Beneš Decrees. This case is not about
Liechtenstein’s dispute with Czechoslovakia now the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic over property belonging to Liechtenstein and its nationals. This case is not about
compensation for the Czechoslovak confiscations. This case is not about just one painting.
5. Yes, Liechtenstein does have disputes with the Czech and Slovak Republics, but those
disputes are not before this Court. Yes, the Czechoslovak expropriations and the Beneš Decrees
must be understood, but only as background. Germany pretends not to understand, but it is not
complicated. With your leave, I will walk you through this again but, I hope, without following
Germany’s example of venturing too far into the merits.
6For example, CR 2004/24, p. 13, para. 11 (Mr. Läufer); p. 44, para. 119 (Professor Tomuschat); p. 56. para. 146,
(Professor Dupuy).
7Ibid., p. 12, para. 5 (Mr. Läufer). - 13 -
6. Ambassador Marxer has mentioned the historic connections between Liechtenstein and
Czechoslovakia. In 1945, in Beneš Decrees Nos. 12 and 108, the new Government of
Czechoslovakia expropriated the property not just of German nationals but also of Liechtenstein
citizens calling it “property of persons belonging to the German people” . According to these
Decrees, the confiscation was not for reparations from Germany, but explicitly for internal political
reasons related to social justice and land reform.
7. No State contemplated that Liechtenstein property could be equated with German property
for purposes of the German reparations régime under the Settlement Convention.
8. This situation changed dramatically as of 1995. The German courts and, as a
consequence of those court decisions, the German Federal Government as well for the first time
treated the Liechtenstein property as German external assets, subject to the reparations scheme in
the Settlement Convention.
9. Germany’s stubborn refusal to acknowledge the nature of Liechtenstein’s case is perhaps
9
best illustrated by this statement of the Agent on Monday : “Germany was however obliged, in
order to regain a position as a sovereign State to promise in the Settlement Convention that it
would not sit in judgment over past confiscations.” This statement is only correct if it is limited to
confiscations for the purpose of German war reparations. The German courts could only take
refuge in Article 3 (3) of Chapter 6 of the Settlement Convention if they had already concluded that
the property in question had indeed been taken not only as German property but as “German
external assets” seized for the purpose of reparation . As I have just explained, Beneš Decrees
No. 12 and No. 108 expressly were not for the purpose of reparations.
10. Mr. President, honourable Members of this Court, it was only in 1995 that, for the first
time, Germany and not Czechoslovakia and not any other State in the world treated the
Czechoslovak measures against Liechtenstein property as reparation measures effected against
German external assets. This is an assertion which not even Czechoslovakia or its successors has
ever advanced. Furthermore, before the European Court of Human Rights, in a case between
8Decree No. 12 of 21 June 1945 and Decree No. 108 of 25 October 1945 (Memorial of Liechtenstein (ML),
Anns. 6 and 7).
9CR 2004/24, p. 15, para. 17 (Mr Läufer).
10
Settlement Convention, Ch. 6, Art. 3 (1) and 3 (3). - 14 -
different parties and involving different claims to those now before you, Germany has declared that
these measures were defensible, and went even further to assert that Germany now considers
Liechtenstein citizens to be “persons belonging to the German people” in the ethnic meaning of the
term .1
11. Czechoslovakia now the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic had absolutely
nothing to do with the treatment of Liechtenstein property as German war reparations. This was a
unilateral action by Germany.
12. So, beginning in 1995, we have Germany treating Liechtenstein property as German
external assets for the purposes of the Settlement Convention. This is what we mean by Germany
“including” Liechtenstein in the reparations régime, the phrase Professor Tomuschat claimed,
unconvincingly, not to understand on Monday . 12 We mean Germany’s “application” of the
Settlement Convention reparations régime to that property.
13. It is elemental in international law that one State may not use, or treat, the property of a
neutral State as war reparations. Liechtenstein submits and will prove, at the merits stage
that Germany is internationally responsible for bringing the property of Liechtenstein and its
nationals under the Settlement Convention umbrella of German external assets seized for
reparations purposes.
14. Whatever else it does, Germany’s infringement of Liechtenstein’s sovereignty and
neutrality causes moral injury to Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein seeks a declaratory judgment to this
effect.
15. Germany’s evident disdain of Monday for the concept of economic damages was not
warranted. By including Liechtenstein property within the German reparations régime, Germany
has obtained a very considerable economic advantage vis-à-vis Liechtenstein. Contrary to what
13
Professor Tomuschat stated on Monday , Germany still owes substantial sums to the Czech and
Slovak Republics as war reparations, as it does to other Allied and associated Powers of the Second
World War. If this issue were closed, there would have been no purpose for the 2000 Agreement
1ML, Ann. 36 (judges’ folder, tab 4).
1For example, CR 2004/24, p. 37, para. 105; p. 43, para. 117 (Professor Tomuschat).
13
CR 2004/24, p. 43. para.117 (Professor Tomuschat). - 15 -
between Germany and the United States concerning the Foundation, “Remembrance,
14
Responsibility and the Future”, which we have included in the judges’ folder .
16. It is striking that Germany only adopted this peculiar new position concerning
Liechtenstein after the revocation, in 1990, of Article 5 of Chapter 6 of the Settlement Convention,
which imposed on Germany an international law duty to compensate the owners of German
external assets for losses resulting from the use of such property for reparation purposes.
17. At the risk of venturing into issues of substance, I must emphasize that, if Germany’s
interpretation were correct that it can lawfully treat Liechtenstein property as German external
assets settling German war reparation debts, this would mean that any State with reparation claims
against Germany and there are many could regard itself as entitled to seize Liechtenstein
property in their territory, and such property may be found in such States. Moreover, it cannot be
the case that one State can settle unilaterally its accounts with another State with the assets of the
citizens of a third State.
18. As a further result, Liechtenstein faces for the first time the alarming prospect that the
holders of Liechtenstein property in former Czechoslovakia may now legitimately dispose of that
property by channelling the disposal to Germany. Should they do so, the nationals of Liechtenstein
would be debarred from successfully restraining that wrongful disposal in the German courts, and
in any jurisdiction in which German judgments are recognized, and would be so debarred entirely
by reason of the unjustifiable legal position taken by the courts and other public agencies of the
Federal Republic of Germany in and after 1995.
19. This cannot be right in international law. Liechtenstein calls on this Court to say so, at
the phase of the merits.
20. Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, I thank you for your kind attention. I
ask you please to call upon Professor Crawford to open the substantive pleadings on behalf of
Liechtenstein.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Goepfert. I now give the floor to Professor Crawford.
1Judges’ folder, tab 8. - 16 -
Mr. CRAWFORD:
4./5. The dispute before the Court and the Court’s temporal
jurisdiction over the dispute
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you on behalf of the
Principality of Liechtenstein.
2. My task is twofold. First I have to demonstrate that there is a legal dispute which has been
brought to this Court by Liechtenstein, and here I respond to what was said by the learned Agent
for Germany on Monday. Secondly, I will demonstrate that this legal dispute this dispute
falls within your temporal jurisdiction under Article 27 (a) of the European Convention for the
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Here I will respond to what has been said by Professor Frowein.
These two tasks are closely connected. As soon as one understands what this dispute is about, one
sees immediately that Germany’s objection based on lack of temporal jurisdiction must fail.
A. The dispute brought before the Court
Two preliminary points
3. I turn then to my first task, which is to analyse the dispute brought before the Court, and to
show that it is a legal dispute. I need to make two preliminary points, both I am afraid rather
elementary.
(1) It is for the Claimant to formulate the case; Germany ignores the case Liechtenstein
has actually brought in favour of another
4. The first point is, quite simply, that it is for the Claimant to present its case, and for the
Respondent to reply to that case. It is an error that advocates sometimes make, to imagine the case
they would like to have been brought before the Court and eagerly to refute that case, showing all
its weaknesses. But this is not advocacy, it is a form of public wish fulfilment. The real case
stands, if only because it has never been addressed.
5. Germany’s Preliminary Objections committed this error in a persistent and evident way 15.
They attacked the case Germany believes Liechtenstein should have brought, the case it wishes
Liechtenstein had brought, a case developed by Germany with only an indirect and passing
1See e.g., Preliminary Objections of Germany (POG), paras. 59-60. - 17 -
resemblance to the actual case, a case Germany believes it can win. And it is striking that on
Monday counsel for Germany barely let the word neutrality pass their lips or the concept of moral
injury. All that was at stake, they said, was a “modest” interpretation of the Settlement
16
Convention the word was Professor Tomuschat’s . This “modest” interpretation turned
Liechtensteiners into Germans for present purposes, and Liechtenstein assets into “German external
assets”. But apparently we are not supposed to mind.
6. Of course if this dispute brought to the Court was Liechtenstein’s dispute with
Czechoslovakia, Germany’s task would be simple. Czechoslovakia has not been annexed by
Germany, the Munich Agreement of 1938 was void, and anyway Czechoslovakia has ceased to
exist, this time voluntarily. You cannot have an international legal dispute with a non-existent
State.
7. Then if the dispute which has been brought to the Court was Liechtenstein’s disputes with
the Czech and Slovak Republics, well they exist, but Germany is not a party to them. It is the
wrong Respondent. How silly Liechtenstein is to have brought a case against the wrong
Respondent!
8. Similarly, on this hypothesis, temporal jurisdiction would be a problem; the dispute with
Czechoslovakia arose in 1945 when the expropriations occurred, long before the European
Convention of 1957. And so on and so on, right down to Monetary Gold.
9. But all such hypotheses are beside the point. It is for Liechtenstein to formulate its case,
and it is a case against Germany. Liechtenstein as Applicant was entitled to bring this very specific
case before the Court, based as it is on real facts and real actions of Germany occurring in the past
decade. That case should be assessed in its own terms and in due order by the Court, if I may say
so respectfully. If you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, will hear our case, we will be
grateful, and will submit to your judgment; we will even put up with the concerted torrent of
17
adjectives from counsel opposite, “strange” from Professor Frowein , “étrange” from
1CR 2004/24, p. 44, para. 121 (Professor Tomuschat).
1Ibid., p. 22, para. 46 (Professor Frowein); also CR 2004/24, p. 12, para. 8 (Mr. Läufer). - 18 -
18 19
Professor Dupuy , and from Professor Tomuschat that annihilating adjective “modest” . All
Germany asks is its modest interpretation, to treat us as German and then it cannot understand
our case!
(2) Germany asks the Court to dismiss the case on the merits at the stage of Preliminary
Objections, contrary to the Court’s practice and Rules
10. This brings me to my second preliminary point, which concerns the proper relation
between jurisdictional objections and the merits. For Germany’s Preliminary Objections have a
second persistent failing: they attempt to have the Court decide the merits of the case in
Germany’s favour at this preliminary stage in other words, they attempt a premature rejection of
the case. And we heard more of the same on Monday. Germany’s Agent called for us to make out
“the international legal basis on which Liechtenstein wishes to rest its claims” — that is to say, to
make out its case on the merits 20. In French he lamented “l’absence d’une quelconque base
21
juridique concevable”, and again he went on to speak at some length on the merits . For their part
Germany’s counsel repeatedly made conclusory assertions relating to the merits of Germany’s
position and the demerits of Liechtenstein’s, on which the Court is now supposed to act. For
example I paraphrase, the precise references are in the transcript: there has been no change of
position ; Germany has always been consistent ; the Settlement Convention is clear ; what 24
courts say in their decisions is irrelevant under international law ; for decades Germany has not
owed any other State any war reparations ; Germany had “no information whatsoever” as to a
27
Liechtenstein property ; there is no possible basis for the German national authorities including
28
courts to concern themselves with title to expropriated property , and so on, and so on. Now no
18
CR 2004/24, p. 46, para. 125 (Professor Dupuy).
19
Ibid., p. 44, para. 121 (Professor Tomuschat).
20
Ibid., p. 12, para. 5 (Mr. Läufer).
21
Ibid., p. 19, para. 38 (Mr. Läufer).
22
Ibid., pp. 23-25, paras. 54-58, p. 26, para. 63 (Professor Frowein).
23
Ibid., pp. 12-13, para. 8 (Mr. Läufer).
24
Ibid., pp. 44-45, para. 121 (Professor Tomuschat).
2Ibid., p. 33, para. 95, p. 31, para. 87 (Professor Frowein).
2Ibid., p. 43, para. 117 (Professor Tomuschat).
2Ibid., p. 25, para. 59, p. 27, para. 69 (Professor Frowein).
2Ibid., pp. 25-26, para. 62, p. 33, paras. 94-95 (Professor Frowein). - 19 -
doubt each of these assertions can be discussed; in fact, we dispute each of them. But the present
point is that they are all assertions as to the merits.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in taking this line Germany misunderstands the
well-established procedure of this Court. When a preliminary objection is lodged, the case on the
merits is automatically suspended: Article 79 (3) of the Rules. The Court thereafter cannot
proceed to the merits, unless either it dismisses the preliminary objections entirely or,
exceptionally, joins them to the merits under Article 79 (7).
12. At least three of Germany’s Preliminary Objections are particularly evident examples of
attempts to get the Court to pronounce on the merits. These are the first — that there is no dispute;
the second — the plea of domestic jurisdiction, and the fourth — that the claim is not substantiated.
I will leave to colleagues the task of dealing with the second and the fourth Objections, but I need
to say something about the first.
The substance of the first Preliminary Objection
13. In doing so I wish to make three main points. The first is historical: this dispute arose in
fact in the period after 1995. The second is diplomatic, but has clear legal consequences. In the
discussions and correspondence that then took place, Germany accepted that there was a dispute.
The third is straightforwardly legal: the disagreement which then arose qualifies as a dispute
within the meaning of Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the Court. It is not a dispute about the content
of German law. It is not an attempt to appeal from a decision or decisions of a German court, or
for that matter from a decision of the European Court of Human Rights under a convention on
which Liechtenstein does not and cannot rely here before this Court. Rather it is a disagreement
arising from a conflict of positions between two States over the treatment by one of them of the
status, rights and claims of the other.
(1) The dispute arose after 1995
14. First then, as a matter of history, the dispute arose after 1995. It arose following the
discovery in Germany of a painting which had been lent to a German municipal gallery for the
purpose of an exhibition lent in 1991. The reigning Prince claimed the painting. The matter
was taken to the German courts, which decided, eventually, that the painting could not be claimed. - 20 -
In the course of the German court processes, Liechtenstein raised the issue, in a graduated way, at
the inter-State level. In an aide-memoire of 4 October 1995, Liechtenstein expressed concern at the
apparent position taken by the municipality of Cologne a State entity that Liechtenstein
assets were to be considered as German assets, and it asked Germany to ensure that such a position
was not supported or avowed by its agencies . But in their decisions of 10 October 1995 and
9 July 1996 the German civil courts dismissed the claim on the basis of Article 3 (3) of Chapter 6
of the Settlement Convention, that is to say, on the express basis that the property in question
constituted “German external assets” whose seizure was beyond examination in German courts.
The details of those judgments are set out in the pleadings and I will not repeat them . The 30
internal processes within Germany culminated in a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in
January 1998, affirming those decisions based on the Settlement Convention . 31 After due
consideration, Liechtenstein raised the issue formally at the inter-State level in an aide-memoire of
3 June 1998 . The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, according to the aide-memoire,
“constitutes a violation of the legal status guaranteed by virtue of international law
both with respect to the Liechtenstein Head of State and the State of Liechtenstein
itself . . . Regardless of the recognition of the independence of courts, [the
Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein] cannot accept the legal injury caused
thereby.”
Liechtenstein accordingly sought talks at the diplomatic level as soon as possible, and two rounds
of talks were held, on 10 July 1998 and 14 July 1999. The diplomatic correspondence is set out in
the pleadings.
15. The record shows clearly, then, that this specific dispute arose between Liechtenstein and
Germany in the 1990s. It concerned Germany’s increasingly emphatic acceptance of the
proposition that property of Liechtenstein citizens could rightfully be treated as “German external
assets” for the purposes of the Settlement Convention, with adverse consequences both for the
individuals concerned and for Liechtenstein itself as a neutral State. Moreover this German
position, originally adopted in the course of litigation concerning a single painting, became a
2ML, Anns. Vol. III, p. A413.
3See ML, paras. 3.17-3.25.
31
ML, paras. 3.26-3.30 and Ann. 32.
3ML, Ann. 41, Vol. III, p. A481. - 21 -
general position, applicable to Liechtenstein as such and to all the Liechtenstein property. It was
maintained and adopted by German officials, who declared that they had no option but to remain
loyal to the decisions of their own courts. There was no hypothesis here; there was no attempt to
explain away the van Laer decision as based on its own special facts; there was no suggestion, as
there seems to have been in the Nottebohm case, that the individual concerned had German
affiliations, was an enemy alien in disguise. Unlike Nottebohm, the individuals had never been
German nationals. What the German courts decided for the one case the German Government
made its own position, categorically.
16. Before 1995 there is no trace in the historic record of a dispute between Liechtenstein
and Germany on this issue. After 1995, and especially after 1998, the situation is entirely different.
As a matter of simple history that is when the dispute arose.
(2) Germany acknowledged the existence of a dispute
17. I turn to my second main point: Germany acknowledged in the subsequent discussions
that there was a dispute.
18. Thus during the consultations the head of the German delegation expressly recognized
that:
“contrary legal opinions have been created and this divergence of opinion would
continue to exist . . . A solution could only be found at a higher level. There was a
possibility of an exchange of aides memoires prior to a possible further round or
otherwise a settlement by judicial decision without any further steps.” 33
Thus Germany acknowledged that there was a divergence of legal opinions on a concrete question
and that it “would continue to exist”. Moreover one solution was “a settlement by judicial decision
without any further [diplomatic] steps”. And now it is said there is no dispute.
19. One may compare the acknowledgment by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in
his letter to his Liechtenstein counterpart of 20 January 2000. The letter acknowledges as a fact
that “the German Government does not share the legal opinion” of the Government of
34
Liechtenstein . The letter continues: “In the event that you feel additional talks are required to
discuss these claims, I would suggest that this be done on the level of specialized senior officials in
3Observations of Liechtenstein (OL), Ann. 48.
3ML, Ann. 45, Vol. III, p. A503. - 22 -
continuation of the consultations of 10 July 1998 and 14 June 1999.” Thus the German Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fischer, acknowledged the existence of the Liechtenstein claims and of a
divergence of legal opinion over those claims. In doing so, of course, Mr. Fischer was facing the
facts. That makes it even stranger that Germany now alleges that no dispute exists between the two
States.
(3) The record discloses the existence of a dispute between Liechtenstein and Germany
20. I turn to my third point which, in the light of what I have said, can be brief. The record
discloses the existence of a legal dispute between the two States. In this context I need hardly
remind the Court of its constant jurisprudence. Under Article 38 of the Statute, your “function is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted” to you. And you have
always defined a dispute broadly: it is “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal
35
views or interests between parties” . Here there is a disagreement on a point of law. There is a
conflict of legal views; indeed that is manifest. There is also a conflict of legal interests. It may
be in Germany’s interests to resolve its disputes with the Czech and Slovak Republics as to the
post-war treatment of Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia. Although Germany denies that it
has changed its position, it is common knowledge, it is a matter of current record, that these
disputes have not been formally resolved, that their informal steps towards their resolution have
been taken in the recent past. Well, that is a matter for Germany. But what is clear to
Liechtenstein and has been made clear in a series of diplomatic démarches including, for
example, the Note Verbale of 10 June 1997 is that any efforts by Germany in this direction
cannot be at the expense of Liechtenstein and cannot treat the rights and interests of Liechtenstein
and its nationals as if they were German rights and interests.
21. Nor is it the case that the conflict of legal views which is brought to this Court relates to
a purely historical or abstract controversy. The present dispute is about subsisting rights and
interests. Germany does not plead mootness (by analogy with the Nuclear Tests cases), nor (by
analogy with Northern Cameroons) does it plead that the dispute has been definitively settled by a
3See case concerning East Timor, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 99, para. 22, with references to earlier decisions.
3ML, Ann. 39, Vol. III, p. A477. - 23 -
competent body. The dispute has not been settled so far as Liechtenstein is concerned.
Liechtenstein is the bearer of its own rights and the custodian of its own interests, and it is entitled
not to have them compromised by being treated as German through some strange perversion of the
Mavrommatis principle. Similarly it is entitled not to have them “settled” by some strange
perversion of the Settlement Convention. This, Liechtenstein says, Germany has done — and if
Germany denies doing so, that only adds one more element of disagreement on a point of law or
fact, of conflict of legal views and interests, to the array of disagreements disclosed by the
diplomatic correspondence.
Conclusion
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court, to summarize, in the years after 1995 Germany
took the position that it was entitled vis-à-vis Liechtenstein to treat the Liechtenstein property as
“German external assets” covered by the Settlement Convention, while at the same time denying
any obligation to compensate Liechtenstein in the event that it did so as it did. Liechtenstein
denied this claim as soon as it was made, and has done so consistently since. It denied that the
Settlement Convention could lawfully be applied to Liechtenstein. Any such application,
irrespective of whether actual harm was caused to specific individuals, involved an injury to
Liechtenstein as a sovereign and neutral State. But in addition, harm was threatened and caused to
Liechtenstein nationals. Now that is a legal dispute, if ever there was one. Moreover it is a dispute
between these two States. For these reasons Germany’s first Preliminary Objection must be
rejected.
B. Germany’s argument of temporal jurisdiction: Article 27 (a) of the European Convention
23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the third Preliminary Objection,
Germany’s claim that the present dispute falls outside the Court’s temporal jurisdiction. This
Objection is based on Article 27 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes, which provides as follows: “The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to:
(a) disputes relating to facts or situations prior to the entry into force of this Convention as between
the parties to the dispute; . . .” As between Germany and Liechtenstein the Convention came into
force on 18 February 1980, which is thus the critical date for present purposes. - 24 -
24. Now the Parties agree that on 18 February 1980 no actual dispute had yet arisen between
them concerning the application of the Settlement Convention to the Liechtenstein property. That
is true both as concerns the van Laer painting and the Liechtenstein property generally. The
German courts had never been confronted with the issue, and the question how they would apply
the Settlement Convention to the Liechtenstein property had never been resolved; indeed it had
never been publicly raised. I put the matter neutrally. In fact Liechtenstein claims that there was
an understanding between the two States that the Settlement Convention did not apply, or at any
rate that this was a position which Liechtenstein was entitled to believe that Germany was taking.
If the question had arisen if Germany had ever applied the Settlement Convention to
Liechtenstein property, in a particular case or in general issues of compensation under the
Convention would have arisen. But that did not happen for the good historical reason that the
claim that Liechtenstein assets were “German external assets”, though considered internally by
German lawyers, was never raised by Germany in any public forum.
25. Now Germany does not disagree that, if a dispute arose, it did so in the 1990s. But it
argues vehemently, through Professor Frowein, whose overdue accession to the Bar I welcome, but
this is irrelevant . The non-existent dispute may have arisen in 1995 but it concerned facts and
situations dating from 1945. Evidently Liechtenstein has been asleep these 50 years, deeply, like
Sleeping Beauty. We’ve had Grimm’s stories, I think we’ll introduce Sleeping Beauty. For
50 years Liechtenstein has been asleep, deeply comatose. Liechtenstein has failed to notice the fact
or situation concerning Germany until, in a new variation on the fairy tale, it is the Prince who is
brought back to life, not by a kiss but by a decision of the civil court of Cologne! Not so much
amour as amour propre.
The Court’s approach to temporal objections
26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, before I deal with the German arguments on this
point I need to outline the applicable legal test for temporal jurisdiction. For you have a settled
jurisprudence on temporal objections, and Professor Frowein did not dispute that this jurisprudence
3CR 2004/24, pp. 22-23, para. 48 (Professor Frowein). - 25 -
applies equally to Article 27 (a) of the Settlement Convention. Allow me to summarize the
position briefly.
27. The issue first arose before your predecessor, the Permanent Court, in Phosphates in
38
Morocco . The question was whether a dispute which arose from a Moroccan decree of 1920 and
a decision of the Moroccan Mines Department in 1925 had arisen before the critical date of 1931.
Professor Roberto Ago, as he then was, argued that the breach was only committed when local
remedies were exhausted. The Permanent Court disagreed (as, I might say, the International Law
39
Commission was later to disagree ). According to the Permanent Court:
“If, by establishing the monopoly, Morocco and France violated the treaty
régime of the General Act of Algeciras of . . . 1906, and of the Franco-German
Convention of . . . 1911, that violation is the outcome of the dahirs of 1920. In those
dahirs are to be sought the essential facts constituting the alleged monopolization and,
consequently, the f40ts which really gave rise to the dispute regarding this
monopolization.”
28. Italy argued that, irrespective of the legality of the decrees themselves, the decision of
the Mines Department gave rise to a continuing wrongful act, and to a denial of justice which was
committed after 1931. But again the Court disagreed:
“In its Application the Italian Government has represented the decision of the
Department of Mines as an unlawful international act . . . That being so, it is in this
decision that we should look for the violation of international law a definitive act
which would, by itself, directly involve international responsibility . . . In these
circumstances the alleged denial of justice, resulting either from a lacuna in the
judicial organization or from the refusal of administrative or extraordinary methods of
redress designed to supplement its deficiencies, merely results in allowing the
unlawful act to subsist.” 41
29. In other words, in a State responsibility case, limits on temporal jurisdiction are to be
applied not by looking at the source of the obligation said to have been violated, nor by looking at
the surrounding factual situation, but by asking what is the “fact with regard to which the dispute
arose”, the “definitive act which would, by itself, directly involve international responsibility”, on
the case presented in the Application. The authoritative French text of the Judgment is even
381938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74.
39See ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annexed to General Assembly
resolution 56/83, 12 December 2001, Art. 44 (b); cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility as adopted on First Reading
(1996), Art. 22.
40
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
41Ibid., pp. 28-29 (emphasis added). - 26 -
clearer: it refers to the situations or facts “qui doivent être considérés comme générateurs du
42
différend” . If that definitive act, that “fait générateur”, to adopt the concept of Roberto Ago
which was adopted by the Commission, occurs before the critical date then there is no jurisdiction;
if subsequent to it, then there is. The point was likewise expressed by the Permanent Court in the
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case when it said: “The only situations or facts which
must be taken into account from the standpoint of the compulsory jurisdiction . . . are those which
43
must be considered as being the source of the dispute” . And the Court went on to distinguish
between the source of the rights relied on by the Claimant and the source of the dispute; what
matters is the point at which the rights are denied. And this must be so, otherwise the 1957
Convention and similar instruments, would produce the result that old rights, old treaties, would
become enfeebled by lapse of time, even in relation to recent denials of those rights or to recent
breaches.
30. The point is equally clear from this Court’s jurisprudence, going back to the Right of
Passage case. The rights in question there were certainly old rights. They went back to the
Maratha period of India before colonization. India denied that the rights had ever existed; it also
claimed that its denial of the rights in 1954, if they existed, was lawful. But the Court held that the
whole dispute, including the dispute as to the very existence of rights going back to the eighteenth
century, only concerned a situation which arose in 1954. You said:
“It is clear from the material placed before the Court that before 1954, passage
was effected in a way recognized as acceptable to both sides. Certain incidents
occurred, but they did no44lead the Parties to adopt clearly-defined legal positions as
against each other . . .”
So, although there may be some lack of agreement between the parties, and even “minor incidents”,
it is only when the parties “adopt clearly-defined legal positions” that the dispute arises, and it
arises in relation to the triggering event, not the whole legal and factual matrix against the
background of which the event is to be understood.
42Ibid., p. 23.
431939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 77, pp. 81-82 (emphasis added).
44
Ibid., pp. 34-35 (emphasis added). - 27 -
31. In best common lawyer’s fashion, Professor Frowein sought to distinguish the Right of
Passage case. He did so on the ground that there was a common position in 1954 as to the right of
45
passage which was only denied by India at that time . But that is not true and it is not what you
said. What you said was that, although there were earlier symptoms of disagreement, which
occurred before the critical date, the situation had been managed up to that date. You said that the
crucial fact or situation with respect to which the temporal objection or the temporal reservation
operates, only arises when the dispute is triggered by a denial of the right, in this case the right of
passage, leading the parties to “adopt clearly-defined legal positions as against each other”. That
was the focal point of the dispute, the fait générateur. It was with respect to that fact or situation
that the dispute arose.
32. The point can be demonstrated equally from what you said in the provisional measures
phase in the NATO cases. The situation there was like that in Phosphates in Morocco and quite
unlike that in the present case. The Kosovo bombing campaign had started before the critical date
and had already given rise to a dispute. By definition that dispute related to facts or situations prior
to the critical date. You emphasized in your Provisional Measures Order that there were no “new
disputes, distinct from the initial one” which related to facts or situations after the critical date . 46
But the relevant fact or situation there was the immediate crisis in Kosovo leading to the bombing
campaign; it was not the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389!
The Court’s test applied: Germany’s legal arguments
33. Against this background I turn to the facts of the present case. The position is clear.
This dispute was triggered was triggered by decisions of German courts, and subsequently by
positions taken by the German Government, in the period after 1995. That was its focal point. It is
true that the background situation and the legal rights and obligations of the Parties had an older
source. But that is irrelevant, just as it was irrelevant in the Right of Passage case. As you said in
Right of Passage, “[t]he facts or situations to which regard must be had in this connection are those
47
with regard to which the dispute has arisen . . .” This dispute arose in the 1990s with regard to
45CR 2004/24, p. 27, para. 68 (Professor Frowein).
46I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 134-135, para. 29.
47
I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 35. - 28 -
the conduct of organs of the German State. It was only then that Germany actually decided to treat
the Liechtenstein property as falling within the Settlement Convention, as “German external
assets”, to quote the language of that Convention. In this respect I would draw your attention to the
survey of German case law and doctrine which is Appendix 1 to Liechtenstein’s Written
Observations. This shows the fact quite clearly, and indeed Germany does not seem to dispute it.
To borrow again your language, “[i]t was from all of this that the dispute referred to the Court
arose; it is with regard to all of this that the dispute exists. This whole, whatever may have been
the earlier origin of one of its parts, came into existence only after [the critical date]” .48
34. Now Germany resists this conclusion with three arguments.
(1) The Court will have to examine transactions and events occurring before 1980
35. First, Germany claims that in order to resolve the present dispute the Court is going to
have to investigate and analyse transactions and events occurring before 1980, and also to explore
the meaning of treaties concluded before that date, especially, of course, the Settlement
Convention. As Germany put it in its written pleadings: “[t]he case brought before the Court could
not be decided without judging upon the reparations regime established in 1945 and thereafter” 49.
But the present dispute did not arise because of the reparations régime, any more than Phosphates
in Morocco arose because of the Treaty of Algeciras. Or as Germany put it on Monday, this case
50
could not, it said, be decided without adjudicating upon the Beneš Decrees . But the present
dispute did not arise because of the Beneš Decrees and, as Professor Pellet will shortly show, it
does not require you to adjudicate upon them. It was the decision by Germany to apply the
Settlement Convention to the Liechtenstein property which gave rise to the dispute, and that is the
essential fact. Of course in dealing with the dispute the Court will have to inform itself as to the
reparations régime. But in the Right of Passage case, the critical date for which was in the 1950s,
the Court clearly dealt with the régime of passage between Goa and the Portuguese enclaves, and in
doing so had regard to treaties and practice going back to the eighteenth century. Nonetheless it
did so with respect to a dispute which it held only arose in 1954, when the legal positions of the
4Ibid. (emphasis added).
4POG, para. 96.
50
CR 2004/24, p. 48, para. 130 (Professor Dupuy). - 29 -
parties crystallized following the outright denial by India of the right claimed by Portugal. As the
Court noted, the dispute between India and Portugal did not arise because of the right of passage; it
arose because the right had been denied. And that is the case here.
(2) The distinction between the source of the obligation and its breach is irrelevant and
unworkable here
36. Secondly, Germany asserts that “[i]n the present case it is quite impossible to make a
meaningful distinction between the source of the rights alleged by Liechtenstein and the source of
the alleged dispute” . But in the Right of Passage case, where again the source of the rights was
not beyond doubt, the Court had no difficulty in drawing that distinction and it did so even with
respect to the aspect of the dispute that involved India’s outright denial that there were any rights.
Similarly, here there is a clear distinction in principle between the legal situation in which the
Parties were placed, which arose partly before the critical date, and the event which caused the
dispute, which was its actual source, which arose well after that date.
37. Professor Frowein complains vehemently that the effect of Liechtenstein’s interpretation
52
is to nullify the temporal objection entirely . That is not so. The Court has given a reasonable
interpretation to temporal limitations, neither delving too far back into the history of disputes, a
history which let us face it underlies so many international conflicts in Europe and
elsewhere, nor focusing on the other hand exclusively on the latest diplomatic manifestation of a
well-established fact or situation which is at the heart of a dispute. It looks at the focus of the
dispute as a whole, not its various ingredients considered in isolation. Far from nullifying the
temporal exception this gives it due effect, which is the aim of all treaty interpretation.
(3) The change of position argument
38. Thirdly, Germany denies, vehemently, that there was any change in its position after
1980. It is said to follow from this that any dispute which arose after 1980 was only the
manifestation of something which must have existed before. You will have noticed that this put
Professor Frowein in a somewhat difficult position. He denied vehemently that there was a
5POG, para. 77.
5CR 2004/24, p. 31, para. 86 (Professor Frowein). - 30 -
common position before 1980 . He said you could not exercise jurisdiction over this non-existent
54
dispute because the non-existent common position must relate to facts or situations before 1980 .
And then Germany accuses us of being hypothetical!
39. I should first of all observe that the change of position argument is part only of
Liechtenstein’s claim, and not its exclusive basis, as Professor Frowein apparently believes.
Liechtenstein claims that for Germany to treat Liechtenstein assets as “German external assets” for
the purposes of the Settlement Convention is a violation of international law in the specific
situation which faces us here. We do not put forward encyclopaedic categories of claims relating
generically to the treatment by national courts of stolen assets; we do not engage in general debate
as to conflict of law theory, interesting though it is. We say that in this specific context in which
these two States were placed after 1990, for Germany to do as it did is a violation of our rights.
The debate about change of position is an aspect of that specific context, and it is of course a debate
for the merits.
40. But let us consider three possibilities. Let us assume first of all that German and
Liechtenstein had actually agreed in a treaty, before the critical date, that the Liechtenstein assets
were not to be considered German external assets for the purposes of the Settlement Convention.
Then in 1998, after the critical date, the Federal Constitutional Court refuses to give effect to that
agreement. In such a case the temporal limitation would not apply. The source of Liechtenstein’s
rights would go back to the agreement, but the source of the dispute would be recent. And, as far
as I can tell, Professor Frowein expressly accepts that . 55
41. Then let us take the opposite case. Let us assume that the matter was never considered
before 1980, so there was no common position. That, Professor Frowein vehemently said, is the
56
truth , although it is not a truth he wants you to take into account for the purposes of the third
Preliminary Objection. On that basis, on the assumption that the matter had never been considered
before the critical date, the source of Liechtenstein’s rights will have to be found elsewhere, in
53CR 2004/24, p. 26, para. 63 (Professor Frowein).
54Ibid., p. 26, para. 63 (Professor Frowein).
55
Ibid., p. 28, para. 74 (Professor Frowein).
56Ibid., p. 26, para. 63, p. 29, para. 79 (Professor Frowein). - 31 -
general international law. But a fortiori in this case the focus of the dispute will be the denial of
those rights. Of course, at this stage they are claimed rights, clearly not of the merits. And that
denial occurred in the 1990s.
42. And now we have a third possibility, that there was no formal agreement as to the legal
situation, but something like a common assumption that Liechtenstein assets are not “German
external assets” for the purposes of the Settlement Convention. Such an assumption would no
doubt have influenced the Parties in their behaviour until 1990. Then, in 1995, Germany
contradicts the assumption. Is the position any different? Of course it is not. Still the focal point
of the dispute, the situation or fact to which the dispute relates, le fait générateur, is not the
underlying legal and factual grounds of the right that is claimed but the situation or fact in which
the right has been denied. It is as simple as that.
Conclusion
43. Mr. President. Members of the Court, in the situation in which it was placed in 1980 or in
1990, it was not incumbent upon Liechtenstein to anticipate what German courts might do, or what
attitude the German courts might adopt, in the event that a case involving the Liechtenstein
property were to arise. The present dispute concerns the question whether Germany was entitled as
a matter of international law to treat any item of Liechtenstein property as “German external
assets” covered by the Settlement Convention. The German judicial and executive positions, taken
in the 1990s, were the necessary and sufficient source or cause of the international dispute that then
immediately arose its fait générateur. For all these reasons, Liechtenstein submits that the
Court has temporal jurisdiction to deal with the present case.
Mr. President, I would now ask you to call on Professor Blumenwitz who will deal with
Germany’s second Preliminary Objection, concerning domestic jurisdiction.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Crawford. I now give the floor to
Professor Blumenwitz. - 32 -
Mr. BLUMENWITZ:
6. Germany’s domestic jurisdiction argument
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear
today for the first time before this Court. In my presentation I shall deal very briefly with the issue
of domestic jurisdiction. For the convenience of the Court, I recall Article 27 (b) of the European
57
Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes , according to which the provisions of this
Convention shall not apply to “(b) disputes concerning questions which by international law are
solely within the domestic jurisdiction”.
2. As to Article 27 (b) itself, there is little to add to what my learned colleague
58
Professor Frowein said on Monday . Article 27 (b) refers to the concept of domestic jurisdiction
under international law ; there is no question of any subjective assessment by the respondent
State. It also requires and this has not been addressed by Professor Frowein that the dispute
in question be one which, as a matter of international law, is solely within the domestic jurisdiction
of the respondent State.
(a) Domestic jurisdiction in the case law of the Court
3. In applying Article 27 (b), it is useful to refer to the case law of this Court. Both this
Court and its predecessors have been consistent in their treatment of the domestic jurisdiction
exception. You have refused to allow the plea of domestic jurisdiction to be used to convert issues
of the merits into preliminary or jurisdictional issues. Domestic jurisdiction is a genuinely
jurisdictional plea it applies only, solely, to those cases where it is exclusively a matter for the
respondent State to decide what is to be done in relation to the subject-matter of the dispute. Thus
the Permanent Court in the case of the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees 60 rejected the plea
even in a case involving conferral of nationality a matter prima facie within the reserved domain
5United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 320, No. 4646, pp. 243 et seq.; judges’ folder No. 1.
5CR 2004/24, p. 31, para. 87 (Professor Frowein); see also Observations, pp. 25-37, Ch. 2.
59
See generally on this concept G. Guillaume, Art. 2, para. 7, in: J.-P. Cot/A. Pellet (ed.), La Charte des Nations
Unies, 2nd ed. (1991), Paris: Economica.
60
1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 4. - 33 -
of the State — on the basis that France’s conferral of nationality was disputed on international law
grounds. The Court said in a famous passage:
“when once it appears that the legal grounds (titres) relied on are such as to justify the
provisional conclusion that they are of juridical importance for the dispute submitted
to the Council, . . . the matter, ceasing to be one solely within the domestic jurisdiction
of the State, enters the domain governed by international law” . 61
There is a nice contrast in this passage between the term “provisional” and the consequence:
once the provisional conclusion is reached that the arguments are of juridical importance for the
dispute, then the matter definitively ceases to be one of domestic jurisdiction.
4. Although Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees concerned the competence of the
League Council under Article 15 (8) of the Covenant, the principle has been applied in the context
of contentious cases by this Court, which has never upheld an objection based on the argument of
domestic jurisdiction under international law 62.
5. For example, in the Interhandel case, the United States submitted that the seizure of shares
of a Swiss company, which was allegedly controlled by a German company was, according to
international law, a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. This Court
confined itself to considering:
“whether the grounds involved by the Swiss Government are such as to justify the
provisional conclusion that they may be of relevance in this case and, if so, whether
questions relating to the validity and interpretation of those grounds are questions of
63
international law” .
6. In the Right of Passage case, this Court stressed that the existence of a dispute “on the
plane of international law” was in and of itself sufficient to preclude a matter falling within the
domestic jurisdiction. In its Judgment on the merits, the Court held that the mere assertion by India
that the rights claimed by Portugal did not exist was not a basis for invoking its domestic
jurisdiction. The point was that the Court could only determine that the rights did not exist “after
first establishing its competence to examine the validity of these (Portuguese) titles” . 64
61Ibid., p. 26.
62See also the Advisory Opinion “Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania”,
I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 65 et seq., pp. 70-71, on Art. 2 (7) United Nations Charter, I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp. 6 et seq.,
I.C.J. Reports 1957, pp. 125 et seq.
63
I.C.J. Reports 1959, pp. 6 et seq., p. 24.
64
I.C.J. Reports 1960, pp. 6 et seq., pp. 32-33. - 34 -
(b) The Court’s test applied to the facts of the case
7. The question is therefore whether the arguments of Liechtenstein may provisionally be
considered to be “of juridical importance for the dispute”. If so, then the dispute is definitively not
within Germany’s domestic jurisdiction.
8. So, what is the dispute? Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, as you have
heard, it is a dispute concerning Germany’s treatment of certain property claimed by Liechtenstein
under international law. Germany through its official organs refused to decide Liechtenstein’s
claims relying on another rule of international law, that is contained in the Settlement
65
Convention . Liechtenstein disputed the application of the Settlement Convention: in its view,
Germany’s interpretation of the Convention was wrong, and anyway Liechtenstein is not a party to
the Convention and is not bound by it. Germany rejected Liechtenstein’s protests and affirmed, in
categorical terms, the decisions of the German courts. The arguments raised by Liechtenstein are
all based on international law. In due course, it will be for you to decide on them. But it is
undeniable that they are provisionally of juridical importance to the dispute presented before you.
Germany purported to act on a certain basis under a treaty. On various grounds, Liechtenstein
challenged its rights so to act. That is what the dispute is about. It is not about something
intrinsically or inherently German.
9. On Monday, Professor Frowein explicitly acknowledged that international legal issues
66
arise in this case , and he referred repeatedly to the Settlement Convention, an international
treaty . But at the same time he claimed that international law was silent as to the obligations of
68
third States in relation to the confiscated property . And he introduced the purely hypothetical
argument that the outcome of the German court decisions in question might have been the same, if
69
no international rule had been invoked . Here, Mr. President, distinguished Members of the
Court, I must stress that questions of the fate of the painting under the rules of private international
law were not argued before the German courts, nor were they raised in the bilateral consultations.
65Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation of 26 May 1952 as
amended on 23 October 1954, Bundesgesetzblatt, 1955, Part II, pp. 406-459, judges’ folder tab 2.
66CR 2004/24, p. 32, para. 89 (Professor Frowein).
67
Ibid., p. 32, para. 91 (Professor Frowein).
68
Ibid., p. 33, para. 93 (Professor Frowein).
69Ibid., p. 33, para. 94 (Professor Frowein). - 35 -
They have no bearing whatsoever on the present dispute, which is based entirely on the principles
of public international law.
10. Professor Frowein cited no authority for his proposition that international law is not
concerned with the reasoning of municipal courts but only with the results of the decisions. And
this is not surprising since there is no authority to that effect. Under international law any
statement capable of being attributed to the State may have an international law impact. For
example, unlawful discrimination may be revealed much more by what a court says than by the
actual outcome of the case. And this is even more true if the offending statement is subsequently
adopted by the Government at the international level as happened in the present case.
11. On Monday, Professor Frowein argued that, because there is no rule of public
international law applicable to the treatment of property in the domestic courts of any State,
therefore the matter falls within Germany’s domestic jurisdiction . That argument is strongly
reminiscent of India’s fifth preliminary objection in the Right of Passage case that Portugal’s
71
asserted rights did not exist or were not reasonably arguable . Such an assertion is clearly a matter
for the merits.
12. It is relevant that in the two rounds of diplomatic consultations on the present dispute,
Germany at no time argued that this was a matter within its domestic jurisdiction . Instead, it72
sought to justify its conduct as valid and lawful under international law, or at any rate as involving
an arguable construction of the Settlement Convention. The issue was not whether this was a
matter for Germany alone, but whether neutral property seized as a result of a war could be treated
by German courts as “German external assets” which were “seized for the purpose of reparation or
73
restitution” as a result of the Second World War.
70CR 2004/24, pp. 33 and 34, paras. 93 and 97 (Professor Frowein). See also POG, p. 65, para. 109. See also
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), decision of January 28, 1998 in the proceedings
concerning the constitutional complaint of Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein – 2BvR 1981/97 – II, 1 of the Reasons
for the decision.
71I.C.J. Reports 1960, pp. 32-33.
72See report, second round of bilateral consultations on 14 June 1999 in Vaduz in the matter “Decision of the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) of 28 January 1998 (Kalkofen Judgment)”,
Observations, document deposited in the Registry of the Court according to Article 50 (2) of the Rules of Court,
15 November 2002. The first round of talks in this matter had taken place in Bonn on 10 July 1998.
73See Article 3, para. 3, and para. 1 of Chapter 6 of the Settlement Convention regarding “German external assets
or other property, seized for the purpose of reparation or restitution, or as a result of the state of war . . .”. - 36 -
13. Finally, Germany argues that its courts did not definitively decide that the Czech position
on the Settlement Convention was correct; they merely deferred to it, as they were obliged to do
under the Convention. But, whether one State must defer to the alleged views of a second State on
such a question, in face of the claim of a third State, is transparently one which arises on the plane
of international law. It is not a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the forum State.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I wonder whether it would now be suitable to have the
usual short break. After the break, would you be kind enough to call upon my colleague and friend
Professor Bruha. Thank you very much for your kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Blumenwitz.
The Court will now adjourn for ten minutes, after which I will call on Professor Bruha to
take the floor.
The Court adjourned from 11.15 to 11.30 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I now give the floor to Professor Bruha.
Mr. BRUHA:
7. Germany’s fourth Preliminary Objection
1. Mr. President, distinguished judges, it is a great honour and a personal pleasure for me to
appear for the first time before this Court. I shall deal with the fourth Preliminary Objection of
Germany, which is that Liechtenstein has not sufficiently substantiated its claims.
2. In the oral pleadings on Monday, my esteemed colleague Professor Tomuschat, among
others, reshaped the Liechtenstein case into one entirely different from the one actually before you.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that he finds insufficient substantiation. If it were
Liechtenstein’s case that Germany must be, in the words of Professor Tomuschat, “held responsible
for the financial losses suffered by Liechtenstein in 1945 at the hands of the Czechoslovak
74
authorities” , then substantiation could have posed a problem. But as has already been explained,
the nature of Liechtenstein’s case is entirely different.
7CR 2004/24, p. 35, para. 102 (Professor Tomuschat). - 37 -
3. In other words, Germany argues we have not substantiated their case. But we have
substantiated our case, as I will show.
4. I will make two main points on substantiation. First, Liechtenstein’s Application meets
the requirements of the Court’s Statute and Rules. Secondly, despite Germany’s increasingly
dramatic protests on Monday, Germany transparently understands the object and scope of
Liechtenstein’s claims. Thirdly, if there were in fact a lack of sufficient evidence for our case,
which there is not, this would not be a preliminary matter but instead a question for the merits
phase.
A. Liechtenstein’s Application meets the requirements of the Court’s Statute and Rules
5. Professor Tomuschat described the Application as being “tainted by such profound flaws”
that the minimal requirements set out in Article 40 (1) of the Statute and Article 38 (2) of the Rules
75
“cannot be deemed to have been met” .
6. But, Mr. President, Members of the Court, Article 40 (1) of the Statute and Article 38 (2)
of the Rules of Court do not require an exhaustive statement of facts and grounds on which the
claim is based in the application, but only a “succinct” one. This Court made this clear in the
76
Cameroon/Nigeria case . This is precisely what the Application does in the present case. It
contains “a succinct statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is based” and
77
provides I cite my colleague Professor Tomuschat at least a “prima facie” overview of the
factual and legal issues to be argued and developed in the course of the proceedings. Liechtenstein
has clearly indicated the underlying grounds for its claims against Germany, by describing the
series of judicial decisions, subsequent conduct, and diplomatic exchanges, as well as the
underlying factual and historical background. Similarly, it has set out the main legal grounds on
which its claim is based.
7CR 2004/24, p. 35, para. 100 (Professor Tomuschat).
76
See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 318, para. 98.
7CR 2004/24, p. 38, para. 106 (Professor Tomuschat). - 38 -
B. Germany understands the object and scope of the present dispute
7. I turn to my second point. Professor Tomuschat opened his intervention on Monday by
stating dramatically that there is such a “definite and incurable lack of substantiation” in
78
Liechtenstein’s Application that Germany cannot even “organize its defence” . But the detailed
way in which Germany has prematurely defended itself on the merits of our claims in its
Preliminary Objections and again on Monday belies this accusation.
8. Many of Germany’s observations patently go to the merits. To mention a few of these, in
its Preliminary Objections, Germany contends that Liechtenstein has not demonstrated any
79
interference by Germany with the Liechtenstein property , that it has distorted the German case
80
law concerning the Settlement Convention of 1952 , that it has improperly substantiated its claim
as far as it invokes diplomatic protection , and that it has not established any violation of
82
Liechtenstein’s neutrality and sovereignty .
9. Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, if these contentions have any relevance
at all to the present stage of the proceedings, it is only to demonstrate that Germany evidently has
no serious problem in understanding the claim. For example, Germany states in its Preliminary
Objections:
“Liechtenstein contends . . . that it . . . suffered direct damage through the
conduct of German authorities, primarily its courts. It claims that Germany violated
its sovereignty as an independent third State as well as its status of neutrality during
83
the Second World War.”
Such a statement shows without the shadow of a doubt that Germany has understood the
Application. Germany has clearly grasped that it is Germany’s treatment of Liechtenstein property
as German external assets under the Settlement Convention in the 1990s and entirely as a result
of German court decisions, subsequently endorsed by the German authorities which is the
cornerstone of the present dispute. Germany clearly grasps that this constitutes the internationally
78
CR 2004/24, p. 35, para. 100 (Professor Tomuschat).
79
Preliminary Objections of Germany (POG), paras. 121-124; CR 2004/24, pp. 35-36, para. 102
(Professor Tomuschat).
80
Ibid., paras. 125-130; CR 2004/24, p. 37, para. 105 (Professor Tomuschat).
81Ibid., paras. 131-142; CR 2004/24, pp. 40-41, paras. 110 and 111 (Professor Tomuschat).
82Ibid., paras. 143-149; CR 2004/24, p. 44, para. 120 (Professor Tomuschat).
83
Ibid., para. 143. - 39 -
wrongful act of which Liechtenstein complains, and that this is the “very essence” of the present
dispute.
10. Equally, it is not open to Germany to argue, at this preliminary stage, that it is not able to
“organize its defence”. Even if they could be heard to say this, the difficulty only arises for them
because they have in mind a particular defence to a case which is not Liechtenstein’s actual case.
This is revealed by Germany’s rather specific complaints of lack of substantiation. In the
Preliminary Objections and again on Monday, we heard about the following alleged deficiencies in
the Liechtenstein case:
the attribution to Germany of the losses sustained by Liechtenstein and its nationals ; 84
the reality and nature of these losses ; 85
86
the interpretation of the jurisprudence of the German courts ;
the conclusion to be drawn from Germany’s endorsement of this case law ; and fifthly,87
88
the violation of Liechtenstein’s neutrality and sovereignty .
These examples merely serve to reinforce the fact that the aspects referred to clearly belong to the
merits phase, not its admissibility.
C. Lack of sufficient evidence is not a preliminary matter
11. I come to my last point lack of sufficient evidence is not a preliminary matter. Once
the claimant State has met the threshold of substantiation set out in the Court’s Statute and Rules,
which Liechtenstein has done, the respondent State may not properly ask, by way of preliminary
objections, for more and more factual evidence. The test of the sufficiency and validity of a claim
are to be met, as relevant, at the merits and quantum phases, not at the phase of preliminary
objections.
12. It is true that Germany has consistently complained about the level of detail provided by
Liechtenstein in relation to the identity and nationality of the owners of the confiscated property.
84
CR 2004/24, p. 37, para. 105 (Professor Tomuschat); POG, paras. 119-120.
85
Ibid., p. 38, para. 106 (Professor Tomuschat) and pp. 56-57, para. 146 (Professor Dupuy): POG,
paras. 138-142.
86
Ibid., pp. 36-37, para. 104 (Professor Tomuschat); POG, paras. 123 and 125.
87Ibid., pp. 36-37, para. 104 (Professor Tomuschat); POG, paras. 126-128.
88Ibid., p. 44, para. 120 (Professor Tomuschat); POG, paras. 143-149. - 40 -
On Monday, Professor Tomuschat repeatedly charged Liechtenstein with failing to identify all of
the Liechtensteiner victims and their assets affected by its allegedly wrongful acts, and concluded
that we have failed to articulate any basis for the exercise of diplomatic protection. But this is not
the case.
13. In Annex 49 to its Memorial, Liechtenstein provided Germany with its list of persons
who were the victims of the 1945 confiscation measures in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, as
89
explained in the Memorial , the vast majority of the property confiscated was that of the reigning
Prince of Liechtenstein and his family. Germany itself acknowledges that, as far as the Prince is
concerned, it has sufficient information in order to present its defence. As a courtesy for both
Germany and the Court, Liechtenstein annexed to its Observations its updated list of victims as 90
well as details of the confiscated assets. Whether Liechtenstein is now in a position to prove in all
cases the existence of heirs of Liechtenstein nationality 91does not matter. At the admissibility
stage, it suffices that even one person on the list possesses Liechtenstein nationality and so falls
into the category of persons eligible for diplomatic protection. This is indisputably the case as to
the Prince, and to most other persons on the list.
14. In the Cameroon/Nigeria case, Nigeria made a similar objection to aspects of
Cameroon’s Application, an objection which the Court dismissed in the following words:
“As regards the meaning to be given to the term ‘succinct’, the Court would
simply note that Cameroon’s Application contains a sufficiently precise statement of
the facts and grounds on which the Applicant bases its claim. That statement fulfils
the conditions laid down in Article 38, paragraph 2, and the Application is accordingly
admissible. This observation does not, however, prejudge the question whether,
taking account of the information submitted to the Court, the facts alleged by the
Applicant are established or not, and whether the grounds it relies upon are founded or
not. Those questions belong to the merits and may not be prejudged in this phase of
the proceedings. 9”
In Liechtenstein’s respectful submission exactly the same considerations apply here.
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, before closing let me make two ancillary points.
89
See e.g. Memorial, paras. 1.20-1.21.
9Observations of Liechtenstein (OL), 15 Nov. 2002, Ann. 48.
91
CR 2004/24, p. 40, para. 110 (Professor Tomuschat).
92
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, para. 100. - 41 -
16. First, I should refer to Article 53 (1) of the Statute, which provides that: “Whenever one
of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call
upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim”. It goes without saying that by “deciding in
favour” of the requesting party the Court is called upon to pass a judgment on the merits. By
analogy the expression “fails to defend its case” can be transposed to a situation where a State
presents a claim but does not substantiate it. In such a case, it belongs to the Court to decide in
favour of the other party on the points which have not been substantiated to its satisfaction. But
this must be done at the merits stage, when the Court has the opportunity of hearing the parties
present their cases in full, and not as a matter of admissibility. Indeed, in such a case in which the
claimant State has failed, despite having argued its case in extenso, to establish necessary factual
elements to the Court’s satisfaction, on those points the respondent State is entitled to judgment on
the merits by way of a res judicata, definitively resolving those aspects of the matter once and for
all. This is something which the Court cannot do at the preliminary objections stage; it cannot
give judgment on the merits when the merits are suspended in accordance with Article 79 (5) of the
Rules of Court.
17. Secondly, I should refer as the Court did in the Cameroon/Nigeria Judgment to the
right of the Applicant, until the end of the proceedings, to make later additions to the statement of
the facts and grounds on which a claim is based, a right acknowledged by this Court in its
jurisprudence . The only limit is “that the result is not to transform the dispute brought before the
94
Court into another dispute which is different in character” . But Germany does not allege that
Liechtenstein has so transformed the dispute in the present case.
Conclusion
18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in conclusion, Liechtenstein’s arguments on the
alleged lack of substantiation may be summarized in two simple propositions:
(i) First, the substantiation in the Application meets the requirements of the Statute and the
Rules of Court.
9Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 318, para. 98.
94
Ibid., pp. 318-319, para. 99; see also e.g.: PCIJ, Judgment, 15 June 1939, Société Commerciale de Belgique,
Series A/B, No. 78, p. 173 or ICJ, Judgment, 21 Nov. 1959, Interhandel, I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 21. - 42 -
(ii) Secondly, Germany’s fourth Preliminary Objection is unfounded, as Liechtenstein has
properly substantiated its claims in law and in fact.
Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, thank you for your attention.
Mr. President, I would ask you to call upon Professor Hafner to continue Liechtenstein’s
presentation.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Bruha. I now give the floor to Professor Hafner.
Mr. HAFNER:
8. Exhaustion of local remedies
A. Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court. It is a great honour for me to appear today for the
first time before this honourable Court.
2. The purpose of my intervention is to address the sixth Preliminary Objection of Germany,
namely the contention that Liechtenstein’s claims are inadmissible due to the non-exhaustion of
local remedies. I will show that there are three grounds on which it can be concluded that this
German objection is totally unfounded.
3. In the present proceedings, Liechtenstein raises claims against Germany primarily on its
own account, and additionally on account of its citizens. As to the former the claims brought by
Liechtenstein directly on its own account, or the so-called “direct claims” I will first
demonstrate that the local remedies rule does not apply. With regard to diplomatic protection, the
position is different. Even if the rule were applicable in such cases, I will secondly show that there
were no local remedies available in Germany for Liechtenstein nationals in the present dispute.
And thirdly, I will deal with the paradoxical German argument that the Liechtenstein nationals
would have been required to exhaust local remedies in Czechoslovakia for violations suffered in
Germany. - 43 -
B. The local remedies rule is not applicable in that the claims submitted by Liechtenstein are
predominantly claims for direct injury
4. Mr. President, Members of the Court, permit me now to turn to the first issue, that
concerning the direct injuries suffered by Liechtenstein an issue that Germany did not find
95
necessary to discuss in its oral pleadings. In its Application Liechtenstein raises claims against
Germany primarily on its own account, as Germany’s conduct directly violated Liechtenstein’s
own rights as a sovereign State and as a State which was neutral during the Second World War.
5. It is generally accepted that the local remedies rule is restricted to cases of diplomatic
protection, but is not applicable to cases where a State is directly injured in its State-to-State rights.
This distinction was endorsed by this Court in the Interhandel 96 and ELSI 97 cases and is
98 99
unanimously accepted in international judicial and arbitral practice as well as in doctrine . This
Court had a recent opportunity to decide on this issue in the Avena case and I will return to this
case shortly.
6. Germany has time and again deliberately misstated Liechtenstein’s claim. It consistently
ignores the fact even in its oral pleadings that these two forms of direct injury caused to
Liechtenstein by Germany, namely the injury to Liechtenstein’s sovereignty and violations of the
law of neutrality, form the essential part of Liechtenstein’s claim. By ignoring this aspect of
Liechtenstein’s claims concerning direct injury, Germany makes a further attempt to present the
case as being different to that which Liechtenstein is actually pleading.
7. That the local remedies rule is not applicable in cases of violation of the laws on neutrality
has been recognized in practice; the Liechtenstein observations 100quote a substantial number of
cases and practice to this effect so that there is no need to repeat them here.
95See also ML, Chap. 4.
96I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 28.
97I.C.J. Reports 1989, para. 52.
98The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) case; ITLOS 1997, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 38, 1999, p. 1323,
para. 98; Air Service Agreement Arbitration, 1978, 18 United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, p. 431,
para. 30; case concerning the Heathrow Airport User Charges, 1992, 102 ILR, p. 279.
99T. Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, British Year Book of International
Law 35, 1959, 84-88; C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 108-132, 1990, Dugard, Second report on
diplomatic protection, United Nations Doc. A/CN.4/514, paras. 21-23; S. Wittich, Direct Injury and the Incidence of the
Local Remedies Rule, Austrian Review of International and European Law 5, 2000, 121.
100Observations, paras. 6.26-6.32. - 44 -
8. Liechtenstein also claims that its sovereignty was injured by Germany, in that the latter
extended the scope of the Settlement Convention, which according to its terms is restricted to
German external assets only, to include the Liechtenstein assets as well. That such conduct
amounts to a violation of a State’s sovereignty is widely accepted in the doctrine, including the
German doctrine . 101
9. Many international disputes contain elements of both diplomatic protection and direct
injury, and the present case is of such a “mixed nature”. This ensues from the fact that more than
one concurrent rule of international law may be breached by one and the same conduct. If one
102
examines Liechtenstein’s submissions as a whole, in particular as set out in the Memorial , it will
readily be seen that the direct injury inflicted by Germany upon Liechtenstein in violating
Liechtenstein’s sovereignty and neutrality is essential to Liechtenstein’s claim. In this regard,
Liechtenstein’s claim is similar to that brought by the United States against Iran in the Diplomatic
103
and Consular Staff case . The Court considered the United States claim to be one of direct injury,
even though private individuals were also affected by the violation. Likewise, in the Nicaragua
case , Nicaragua claimed reparations as parens patriae for its citizens and, thus, exercised
diplomatic protection. Again, no Nicaraguan citizen was required to exhaust local remedies before
Nicaragua could pursue its claim.
10. The most recent case where this view was endorsed is the Avena case . Mr. President,
Members of the Court, in your Judgment on the Avena case you asserted that Mexico based its
claims not solely on the injuries caused to the Mexican individuals, but also on the injuries “it has
101Hermann Weber, Anmerkung zur “Liechtenstein-Entscheidung” des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom
28 Januar 1998, 36 Archiv des Völkerrechts 188, 192 (1998); K. Doehring, Völkerrechtswidrige Konfiskation eines
Gemäldes des Fürsten von Liechtenstein als “deutsches Eigentum”. Ein unrühmlicher Schlusspunkt, 18 Praxis des
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 1998, p. 466; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Völkerrechtswidrigkeit der
Konfiskation eines Gemäldes aus der Sammlung des Fürsten von Liechtenstein als angeblich “deutsches” Eigentum,
16 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 410 (1996); id., Nachwirkung der Kontrollratsgesetzgebung
und die deutsche Souveränität Zu den Urteilen über die “Bodenreform” und zur Fortgeltung des Klagestops nach dem
Überleitungsvertrag, in “Liber Amicorum Günther Jaenicke Zum 85. Geburtstag” 975, 983-4
(V. Götz/P. Selmer/R. Wolfrum eds. 1998).
102
ML, pp. 87-108.
103Diplomatic and Consular Staff, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 6.
104
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 19.
105Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment of
31 March 2004, paras. 40 et seq. - 45 -
itself suffered, directly and through its nationals”. This direct injury resulted from the violation by
the United States of the obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963. The Judgment emphasized that the duty to exhaust local remedies did not apply.
For these reasons, you did not find it necessary to deal with Mexico’s claims of violation under a
distinct heading of diplomatic protection, so that you dismissed this objection by the United States
to admissibility . This Judgment corroborates that, despite the mixed nature of a claim raised in a
dispute between two States, the direct injury suffered by a State suffices to dispose of the necessity
to exhaust the local remedies.
11. For these reasons, the nature and subject-matter of the present dispute and the legal
relationship of the norms and obligations invoked by Liechtenstein and breached by Germany
essentially concern direct rights of Liechtenstein. Therefore, since Liechtenstein has suffered
injury in it own rights, and the local remedies rule is not applicable.
C. The exercise of diplomatic protection
12. Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the local remedies rule, I will nevertheless deal
with the two arguments relating to the exhaustion of local remedies which were raised by Germany
as legal impediments to the admissibility of Liechtenstein’s claims: on the one hand, the futility of
local remedies, on the other, the flawed argument as to the exhaustion of local remedies in
Czechoslovakia, or now in the Czech Republic.
13. Even if and in so far as the local remedies rule were considered to be applicable to the
present claim, there is no ground for denying the admissibility of the claim before this Court.
Germany quite correctly concedes, and my learned colleague Professor Tomuschat confirmed last
Monday 107 that, as far as the Pieter van Laer painting is concerned, local remedies have been
exhausted. Germany itself asserted that decisions of the Federal constitutional court that had dealt
with this matter cannot be challenged any more within the German legal system . These German
106
Ibid.
107
CR 2004/24, p. 58, para. 148 (Professor Tomuschat).
10POG, para. 191. - 46 -
statements leave no room for any doubt that the requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies
was fully complied with at least in relation to that particular item of property.
14. However, with regard to other Liechtenstein property, its owners do not need to exhaust
local remedies when those remedies are ineffective, the exercise of exhausting such remedies
would be futile or the opportunity to do so does not exist. This view is confirmed in case law as
109
well as in doctrine quoted in extenso in Liechtenstein’s Observations . In the recent work of the
International Law Commission on diplomatic protection, this exception to the rule of exhaustion of
local remedies met with overwhelming support that reflects a general conviction concerning the
existence of such an exception . 110
15. Indeed, any recourse to local remedies in Germany by Liechtenstein nationals would be
futile. Can a Liechtenstein citizen reasonably be expected to resort to German local remedies if the
Constitutional Court already delivered a negative decision in a case of the same kind? No
Liechtenstein national applying to a German court would obtain a decision different from that of
the Federal Constitutional Court in the Pieter van Laer case. Once the Federal Constitutional Court
had reached a decision, no other decision can be expected from another German court in cases
relating to subjects involving the same legal reasoning.
16. The rule that there is no obligation to resort to domestic remedies if a different decision
could not reasonably be expected has gained overwhelming recognition in international judicial
111
practice, as well as in international authorities .
17. As, for instance, the Human Rights Committee repeatedly has stated, wherever the
jurisprudence of the highest domestic tribunal has decided the matter at issue, thereby eliminating
any prospect of success of an appeal to the domestic courts, domestic remedies need not be
112
exhausted in any similar case in the future . Likewise, the Commission under the European
Convention on Human Rights has established a consistent practice according to which “une
10Observations, paras. 6.7-6.11.
110
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 54th session 2002 (United Nations
doc. A/57/10), p. 139, para. 181.
11See for instance John Dugard, Third report on Diplomatic Protection, United Nations doc. A/CN.4/523, p. 16.
112
Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, United Nations doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992
(1994). - 47 -
jurisprudence bien établie peut constituer une circonstance particulière de nature à dispenser un
requérant, selon les principes de droit international généralement reconnus, d’épuiser les voies de
recours internes” . In other words, it is not necessary to have recourse to domestic tribunals if the
result must inevitably be the repetition of a decision already pronounced.
18. That no other decision in Germany can reasonably be expected transpires also from the
discussions between representatives of Germany and Liechtenstein. In these discussions, the
German delegation pointed out that the German executive had taken cognizance of the decision of
its supreme court. They said they were bound by that decision and would also be bound in
relation to any future cases .14
19. Furthermore, Germany asserted the non-existence of available local legal remedies. As
115
Professor Tomuschat reiterated last Monday , Germany justified this non-existence by arguing
that the claim affects immovable property situated outside German jurisdiction and that “only the
116
local judiciary is competent to rule on issues connected with the ownership of real estate” .
However, this legal reasoning is irrelevant for the present dispute, since Germany denied the
jurisdiction of German courts on a different ground, namely by applying Article 3 of Section VI of
the Settlement Convention. Germany could do so only because it declared Liechtenstein property
as belonging to “German external assets” for the purposes of the Settlement Convention.
20. In any event, this additional German argument only corroborates the non-existence of
local remedies in Germany to which Liechtenstein citizens could have resorted.
21. For all these reasons, a failure to exhaust local remedies can under no circumstances be
invoked by Germany as a bar to the admissibility of Liechtenstein’s claim.
D. Germany’s reference to local remedies in Czechoslovakia
22. Finally I turn to the rather bizarre argument raised by Germany that Liechtenstein
citizens should have resorted first to judicial devices in former Czechoslovakia before
11A et al. v. Germany, Appl. N. 899/60, Collection, Vol. 9, p. 9.
114
ML, para. 3.51.
11CR 2004/24, p. 59, para. 152 (Professor Tomuschat).
116
POG, p. 59, para. 193. - 48 -
117
Liechtenstein could exercise diplomatic protection against Germany on their behalf . In his oral
pleading, Professor Tomuschat focused on this argument that he qualified a “juridical
118
innovation” . Nevertheless, in Liechtenstein’s view, such a legal requirement cannot be
maintained.
23. This argument must fail, it must fail, because the idea behind the local remedies rule
and Professor Tomuschat stated it quite rightly 119 is to allow the State to bring its own conduct
towards that individual into conformity with what is required by international law. For this reason
alone, it is only German courts which could have been resorted to in order to produce such an
effect. It would be totally foreign to the system of diplomatic protection if the exercise of this right
were made dependent on the exhaustion of local remedies of a State other than that which had
breached its international obligations or where the breach has occurred. In particular, judgments
of Czechoslovak courts could not have achieved the objective of the principle of exhaustion of
local remedies, namely to make good the wrongfulness of the acts of Germany. It is totally
irrelevant for the present case whether Liechtenstein citizens resorted to Czechoslovak courts. And
it is very illustrative that Germany was not able to substantiate its argument by any precedent case.
In this context, my learned colleague Tomuschat advanced the argument that “les ressortissants du
demandeur, qui a endossé leurs réclamations, auraient pu empêcher les préjudices qui leur ont été
120
infligés en ayant recours aux moyens disponibles dans l’Etat qui a causé les préjudices” .
Whatever the value of this argument may be, its reasoning is not defensible since it was Germany
that caused the injuries of which Liechtenstein complains in this case and the decision of the
Constitutional Court made any further local remedies redundant.
24. In this context, Professor Tomuschat tried to minimize Germany’s conduct by qualifying
it as “marginal” 121. Whether Germany’s conduct was “marginal” is a matter of subjective
11CR 2004/24, p. 59, paras. 151 et seq. (Professor Tomuschat).
118
Ibid., p. 59, para. 151 (Professor Tomuschat).
119
Ibid., p. 59, para. 151 (Professor Tomuschat).
12Ibid., p. 60, para. 153 (Professor Tomuschat).
121
Ibid., p. 60, para. 153 (Professor Tomuschat). - 49 -
appreciation; what for one State seems only marginal could for another be a matter of substantial
importance. What does, however, matter in this case is whether the conduct is in conformity with
international law.
E. Conclusion
25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in the light of all these considerations, the rule of
exhaustion of local remedies does not form a legal obstacle to the admissibility of this case before
the Court.
First, the rule of local remedies does not apply to the present case, as the claim is made in
respect of injuries predominantly suffered by the State of Liechtenstein itself.
Second, even if the rule of exhaustion of local remedies were considered in principle
applicable, this principle has been fully complied with as in the light of the decision on the
Pieter van Laer Painting no local remedies were available anyway.
Third, the argument put forward by Germany that Liechtenstein citizens should have resorted
first to judicial devices in former Czechoslovakia before Liechtenstein could exercise
diplomatic protection against Germany can under no circumstances be regarded as valid.
26. For these reasons Liechtenstein submits that the arguments raised by Germany with
regard to the principle of the exhaustion of local remedies have to be dismissed. Now, I would like
to ask you, Mr. President, to call on Professor Pellet in order to conclude the oral pleading. Thank
you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Hafner. I now give the floor to Professor Pellet.
M. PELLET : Thank you, Mr. President.
9. L’exception allemande fondée sur l’absence à l’instance des Etats successeurs
de la Tchécoslovaquie
Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges,
1. Il me revient de réfuter l’exception d’irrecevabilité que l’Allemagne croit pouvoir tirer de
l’absence à l’instance des Etats successeurs de l’ancienne Tchécoslovaquie, la République tchèque - 50 -
et la République slovaque — bien que cette dernière soit, bizarrement, négligée par nos
contradicteurs.
2. J’indique d’ailleurs d’emblée qu’étant donné que l’argumentation du Liechtenstein sur ce
point ne dépend en aucune façon de la manière dont le problème de la succession d’Etats pourrait
être posé et résolu, je parlerai indifféremment de «la Tchécoslovaquie» ou des «Etats successeurs»
à celle-ci, ou des «Républiques slovaque et tchèque» : quelle que puisse être leur part dans la
succession, ces deux Etats ne sont, de toutes façons, pas concernés par l’affaire dont la Principauté
de Liechtenstein a saisi la Cour.
3. L’Allemagne le conteste en affirmant que «les demandes du Liechtenstein obligeraient la
Cour à statuer sur les droits et obligations de la République tchèque en son absence et sans son
consentement» . 122 Les deux premières exceptions d’incompétence relatives d’une part à la
prétendue inexistence de tout différend entre les Parties à la présente procédure et, d’autre part, à
l’absence supposée de compétence de la Cour ratione temporis, vont d’ailleurs, sous une autre
forme, dans le même sens. Mon fréquent collègue et néanmoins toujours ami, James Crawford, a
déjà montré ce matin que la Cour ne pouvait s’arrêter à ces objections; j’y reviendrai
inévitablement; mais sous un angle différent.
4. En ce qui me concerne, il m’appartient de traiter plus particulièrement de l’usage que
l’Allemagne tente de faire de la jurisprudence de l’Or monétaire. Pour faire court, il me semble
qu’elle en fait une analyse convenable, mais une application à l’espèce totalement biaisée et
inacceptable.
5. Pour ce qui est du premier point, l’analyse, le professeur Dupuy, avant-hier, a fort bien
123
résumé votre jurisprudence ; il est inutile que j’y revienne : je ne ferais sûrement pas mieux, et la
leçon d’agrégation n’est pas un genre dans lequel j’excelle. Du reste, ces développements n’étaient
124
pas vraiment nécessaires : comme le Liechtenstein l’avait déjà indiqué dans ses observations , il
122Exceptions préliminaires (ci-après : EP), p. 93; repris in CR 2004/24, p. 45 (Dupuy).
123CR 2004/24, p. 49-53, par. 132-137.
124
P. 75, par. 5.4. - 51 -
n’y a pas de désaccord entre les Parties à cet égard et nous pouvons souscrire aux conclusions que
l’Allemagne tire de l’arrêt de 1954, éclairé par les affaires de Nauru 125et du Timor oriental 126:
«The jurisprudence of the Court concerning the indispensability of third parties
is crystal clear : If [and I stress this first «if»] the legal interests of a third State
constitute the «very subject-matter» of a dispute brought to the Court and the third
State is absent from the proceedings, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction on the
matter. Legal interests of a third State do constitute the very subject-matter of a
dispute if [and this is an important second «if»] the Court cannot decide on the claims
before it without prior determination as to the rights or obligations of the third
127
State.»
6. Là s’arrête cependant l’accord des Parties. Car les deux «if», les deux «si», constituent
des conditions sine qua non à l’accueil d’une exception préliminaire fondée sur la règle dite de «la
partie indispensable». Or, contrairement aux allégations de l’Allemagne, en l’espèce, ni l’une ni
l’autre de ces conditions (qui sont peut-être des manières différentes de dire la même chose) ne sont
remplies.
7. En outre, la Partie allemande néglige complètement «l’autre versant» de la jurisprudence
de l’Or monétaire, ce que l’on pourrait appeler son aspect «positif», en ce sens qu’il en résulte
aussi que la Cour a non seulement le droit, mais aussi le devoir de se prononcer sur la requête,
lorsque les droits d’un Etat tiers ne sont pas «l’objet même» de l’arrêt à intervenir, et quand bien
128
même les intérêts de cet Etat tiers pourraient être «touchés» ou un «intérêt d’ordre juridique»
pourrait être pour lui «en cause» 129ou si, comme dans l’affaire de Nauru, la décision de la Cour
130
risquait d’«avoir des incidences sur la situation juridique des deux autres Etats concernés» . Tel
est le cas en la présente espèce dans laquelle, contrairement aux dires de l’Allemagne, ni l’illicéité
des «décrets Beneš», ni le droit à des réparations de guerre de la Tchécoslovaquie, ne sont, en
aucune manière, «l’objet même» de la présente procédure (A et B). C’est à ces deux points que je
125
Arrêt du 26 juin 1992, Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (exceptions préliminaires), C.I.J. Recueil 1992,
p. 259-262, par. 50-55.
126
Arrêt du 30 juin 1995, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 101-105, par. 26-34.
127
EP, p. 103.
128 Cf. arrêts du 15 juin 1954, Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943, C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 32 ou du
13 septembre 1990, Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras) — requête à fin
d’intervention, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 116, par. 55.
129Cf. l’article 62 du Statut ou l’arrêt du 30 juin 1995, Timor oriental, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 104, par. 34.
130Arrêt du 26 juin 1992, Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 261, par. 55. - 52 -
m’attacherai d’abord, avant d’en venir aux conséquences qui en résultent en ce qui concerne la
compétence de la Cour (C).
A. L’illicéité des décrets Beneš n’est pas «l’objet même du litige»
8. Monsieur le président, selon mon contradicteur et ami Pierre-Marie Dupuy, la République
tchèque est, dans la présente affaire, une tierce partie indispensable car, affirme-t-il : «la
détermination du caractère, licite ou illicite, des faits d’expropriation imputables à la
Tchécoslovaquie est, en elle-même, un préalable indispensable à l’appréciation de la situation de
l’Allemagne par rapport aux décrets Beneš» . Cette affirmation repose sur une distorsion totale
de la question dont le Liechtenstein a saisi la Cour. Et cela m’oblige à revenir une nouvelle fois sur
l’objet même du différend que, volontairement ou non, l’Allemagne s’obstine à déformer.
9. Le Liechtenstein a un différend avec les successeurs de l’ancienne Tchécoslovaquie et
n’en fait nullement mystère. Il considère qu’il a été (et que nombre de ses ressortissants ont été)
victime(s) des décrets Beneš de 1945 qui ont entraîné la confiscation injuste des avoirs
liechtensteinois assimilés à tort à des biens allemands. Mais ce différend qu’il a avec les Etats
successeurs de la Tchécoslovaquie est tout à fait distinct de celui qui fait l’objet de la présente
procédure :
les Parties sont autres, cela va de soi; et,
surtout, leur objet est distinct.
10. Dans sa plaidoirie de lundi dernier, le professeur Dupuy s’est employé à dresser un
parallèle entre l’affaire de l’Or monétaire et celle qui nous occupe, entre lesquelles il a cru pouvoir
132
déceler une «très grande similitude» . Mais cette similitude n’existe que si, comme mon
contradicteur, on se trompe de différend; si l’on postule que le Liechtenstein vous demande,
Madame et Messieurs les juges, de condamner la Tchécoslovaquie «à travers» l’Allemagne ou
celle-ci en lieu et place des successeurs de celle-là. C’est ce que, tel le chat botté des frères Grimm,
dont il est un lecteur assidu, le professeur Dupuy voudrait vous faire croire. Mais ce n’est pas
131CR 2004/24, p. 53, par. 139; les italiques sont dans le texte.
132Ibid., p. 50, par. 133. - 53 -
mieux établi que ne l’étaient les vastes propriétés que le rusé félin attribuait à son maître, le
marquis de Carabas.
11. Or, ce que la Principauté reproche à l’Allemagne, ce n’est pas d’avoir confisqué certains
biens liechtensteinois, ni, moins encore, bien évidemment, l’illicéité des décrets qui ont été à
l’origine de cette confiscation. Contrairement aux allégations du professeur Dupuy qui, à trop lire
Grimm, en vient à faire preuve d’une imagination qui ne le cède en rien à celle des célèbres
conteurs, ce n’est pas la «responsabilité internationale» de la République tchèque «qui est en cause
en tant qu’Etat successeur de la Tchécoslovaquie» . 133 Et «[l]’Allemagne n’est pas
134
accusée … d’avoir reconnu illicitement des confiscations étrangères» ; elle nous dit d’ailleurs
elle-même, avec insistance, par la voix autorisée de son agent, qu’elle continue à ne pas reconnaître
135
la validité de ces décrets . Aussi bien n’est-ce pas ce qui divise les Parties.
12. Comme l’ont montré l’agent du Liechtenstein et le professeur Crawford tout à l’heure,
l’objet du présent différend est tout autre. Il avait déjà été exposé de manière concise au
paragraphe 20 de la requête du Liechtenstein puis, de façon plus précise et détaillée, dans son
mémoire 136 et, à nouveau, dans ses observations du 15 novembre 2002, notamment aux
paragraphes 1.7 et 1.8, 4.6 à 4.9 et 5.15 et suivants; mais l’Allemagne s’acharne à croire — ou à
vouloir — cet objet autre.
13. Il s’agit pourtant — et il s’agit exclusivement — de la décision, prise par l’Allemagne
en 1995 et constamment maintenue depuis lors, de considérer les avoirs liechtensteinois comme
tombant sous le coup de la convention de règlement du 26 mai 1952 amendée en 1954 :
le 10 octobre 1995, le tribunal régional de Cologne a considéré que :
«la disposition énoncée au paragraphe 3 de l’article 3 du chapitre sixième de la
convention sur le règlement est applicable mutatis mutandis en l’espèce car elle vise
manifestement à empêcher, sous quelque forme que ce soit, tout réexamen par les
juridictions allemandes des mesures prises en vertu des paragraphes 1, 2 et 3 de
l’article 3 du chapitre sixième de la convention sur le règlement» ; 137
133Ibid., p. 49, par. 131.
134Ibid., p. 54, par. 141.
135
Ibid., p. 13, par. 10, p. 19, par. 37 et p. 21, par. 42.
136Mémoire du Liechtenstein, p. 12-14, par. 13-16.
137Annexe 28 au mémoire du Liechtenstein (ci-après: «ML»), p. A260, par. 2, litt. b) aa) [traduction du Greffe],
p. 20 du texte français. - 54 -
à leur tour, la cour d’appel de Cologne, la Cour fédérale de justice puis la Cour
constitutionnelle fédérale ont endossé cette position, à peu près dans les mêmes termes, par des
décisions rendues respectivement les 9 juillet 1996 , 25 septembre 1997 139et 14 janvier 1998;
pour ne citer que cette dernière décision : il s’agit, dit la Cour constitutionnelle, d’«une mesure
prise à l’encontre des avoirs allemands à l’étranger au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article 3 du
140
chapitre sixième de la convention sur le règlement» ;
les autorités politiques ont fait leur cette thèse, qui contrastait totalement avec leurs positions
antérieures, tant devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme que durant les négociations
diplomatiques qui se sont déroulées entre les deux Etats.
14. Ces prises de position dépourvues d’ambiguïté sont présentées de manière assez détaillée
aux pages 69 à 84 du mémoire du Liechtenstein. Je me bornerai à citer la déclaration de l’agent de
l’Allemagne devant la Cour de Strasbourg, qui me paraît illustrer la position de ce pays :
«le fait que les juridictions allemandes soient parties de l’hypothèse que les biens
avaient été saisis à titre de biens allemands, n’est, en tous les cas, pas arbitraire et peut
se défendre. L’article 3 du chapitre sixième de la convention sur le règlement est
interprété trop strictement par le requérant si, par avoirs allemands à l’étranger, il
141
entend les avoirs des citoyens allemands.»
En réalité, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour : cette position de l’Allemagne ne peut nullement «se
défendre»; et l’un des enjeux de la présente procédure est de le déterminer, lorsque vous serez
conduits à examiner le fond de l’affaire.
15. Autrement dit, quelle qu’ait pu être sa position antérieure, depuis 1995, l’Allemagne
considère que les avoirs de la Principauté et de ses ressortissants sont soumis au régime des
réparations de guerre, au mépris et de la souveraineté du Liechtenstein, et de sa neutralité durant la
seconde guerre mondiale. Pour en décider, comme le Liechtenstein le lui demande, la Cour n’a nul
besoin de se prononcer sur la licéité des décrets Beneš. Celle-ci est indifférente aux fins du
règlement du présent litige : que les décrets soient valides ou non, les biens liechtensteinois, que
l’Allemagne estime maintenant soumis au régime des réparations, ne peuvent pas être soumis à ce
138ML, annexe 29, voir note p. A309, par.2, b) cc).
139ML, annexe 30.
140
ML, annexe 32, p. A356, par. 1; traduction du Greffe, p. 45 du texte français; les italiques sont de nous.
141ML, annexe 36, p. A431, par. C.2.a); traduction du Greffe, p. 15 du texte français. - 55 -
régime et c’est ce que le Liechtenstein demande à la Cour de constater. La seule question qu’il
vous pose, Madame et Messieurs les juges, est celle de savoir si l’Allemagne a pu, à bon droit,
considérer les biens liechtensteinois comme relevant du régime des réparations de guerre. Vous
pouvez y répondre sans vous interroger sur la conformité au droit international des décrets Beneš;
cette autre question n’est ni «l’objet même» 142du présent différend, ni une «condition préalable» 143
pour le trancher.
16. «Au pire», Monsieur le président au pire pour nous, au mieux pour l’Allemagne
cette affaire pourrait être comparée à celle du Détroit de Corfou dans laquelle la Cour a estimé
pouvoir condamner l’Albanie pour son manque de vigilance dans la surveillance du détroit alors
même que le «délit principal» avait été commis par un autre Etat, absent de l’instance, la
Yougoslavie. Ces deux faits internationalement illicites étaient à la fois liés et distincts, et la Cour
a estimé qu’elle n’était pas empêchée de se prononcer sur l’un — le fait consécutif, les «graves
144
omissions» de l’Albanie qui n’avait pas tenté de «prévenir le désastre» — alors même qu’en
l’absence de la Yougoslavie, il lui était impossible de se prononcer sur le fait illicite originaire, le
minage du détroit. La Cour a considéré celui-ci comme une donnée de fait (qu’elle n’avait pas à
qualifier juridiquement même s’il ne faisait aucun doute qu’il fût illicite), fait sur lequel s’est
«greffé» un autre fait internationalement illicite dont elle a tenu l’Albanie responsable.
17. Dans ses observations, le Liechtenstein a invoqué ce précédent pour établir que le fait
internationalement illicite qu’il reproche à l’Allemagne peut être reconnu comme tel par la Cour,
sans qu’elle ait à s’interroger sur les violations imputables à un autre Etat . Toutefois, à la
réflexion, il me semble que, dans la présente affaire, la connexité entre le comportement de la
Tchécoslovaquie d’une part, et celui de l’Allemagne d’autre part, est infiniment moins nette que les
liens qui existaient entre la responsabilité de la Yougoslavie et celle de l’Albanie dans l’affaire du
Détroit de Corfou. A l’inverse de la situation qui prévalait dans celle-ci, l’illicéité des faits
attribuables à l’Allemagne est indépendante de celle du fait commis par la Tchécoslovaquie.
142 Arrêts, 15 juin 1954, Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943, C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 32; 30 juin 1995,
Timor oriental, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 102, par. 28, et p. 104, par. 34.
143
Arrêt du 26 juin 1992, Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru, exceptions préliminaires, C.I.J. Recueil 1992,
p. 261, par. 55.
144
Arrêt du 9 avril 1949, C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 23.
145EP, p. 83-84, par. 5.22-5.23. - 56 -
18. Cette dissociation est d’autant plus évidente que le fondement des mesures décidées par
les décrets tchécoslovaques de 1945 n’est pas le régime des réparations de guerre. Les motifs des
unes et les motifs des autres sont différents.
19. Qu’il s’agisse du décret n 12 du 21 juin 1945 146 ou du décret n 108 du 25 octobre de la
147
même année , les biens confisqués étaient déterminés en fonction de l’appartenance de leurs
propriétaires au «peuple» allemand ou hongrois, sur une base exclusivement ethnique et sans
considération de nationalité. Il ne s’agissait nullement de réparations de guerre mais, aux termes
des décrets eux-mêmes, de la confiscation des biens des «ressortissants allemands et hongrois et
des traîtres et ennemis du peuple tchèque et slovaque» . 148 Du reste, la Tchécoslovaquie a
communiqué à l’agence interalliée des réparations des informations sur les biens allemands saisis
par elles et ces informations n’ont en aucune manière porté sur les confiscations réalisées par les
149
décrets Beneš .
20. En d’autres termes, l’Allemagne n’a nullement «endossé» le fait internationalement
illicite commis en 1945 par la Tchécoslovaquie au sortir de la guerre. Elle ne l’a pas «reconnu et
adopté comme sien» au sens de l’article 11 du projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour
fait internationalement illicite annexé à la résolution 56/83 de l’Assemblée générale des
Nations Unies. Elle a commis un autre fait illicite, distinct, en incluant les biens liechtensteinois
dans le régime des réparations réglementé par la convention sur le règlement de 1952, qui est sans
lien aucun avec les comportements de la Tchécoslovaquie derrière lesquels la Partie allemande
tente maintenant de s’abriter.
21. Du reste, il est révélateur qu’au cours des procédures qui sont à l’origine de la très
contestable position prise par l’Allemagne depuis 1995 et de la présente affaire, les cours et
tribunaux allemands ne se sont, en aucune manière, prononcés sur la licéité des décrets Beneš.
Bien au contraire, à l’image de la cour d’appel de Cologne, ils ont estimé qu’ils pouvaient se
146
ML, annexe 6.
147
ML, annexe 7.
148 o
Décret n 12 — ML, annexe 6; traduction du Greffe, p. 6 du texte français; voir aussi l’annexe 7, ibid., p. 9.
149 Voir le rapport de l’Agence interalliée des réparations 1949, cité dans le commentaire
d’Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1953, p. 1390 (note 10) or Helmut Slapnicka, Die
rechtlichen Grundlagen für die Behandlung der Deutschen und der Magyaren in der Tschechoslovakei 1945-1948,
Intereg, Prague, 1999, p. 19. - 57 -
prononcer sans avoir à examiner «la licéité ou la validité de la mesure de liquidation qui a été prise
150
à l’encontre d’avoirs allemands à l’étranger et sur laquelle l’action est fondée» . D’ailleurs, en
plaidoirie, lundi dernier, nos amis allemands y ont insisté :
«les tribunaux allemands ne se sont jamais prononcés sur le statut légal … d’aucun … avoir du
151
Liechtenstein situé en République tchèque ou en République slovaque» a dit l’agent de
l’Allemagne;
152
«Not a single word is devoted in these decisions to the substantive aspects of the case» a
renchéri le professeur Tomuschat.
22. De l’aveu de l’Allemagne, les tribunaux allemands n’ont pas estimé devoir se prononcer
sur la validité (ou non) des décrets tchécoslovaques. Vous n’êtes pas davantage appelés à
l’apprécier, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour : il vous suffira bien plutôt, au stade de l’examen au
fond, de déterminer si, en décidant que les biens confisqués (licitement ou non, là n’est pas la
question) relevaient du régime des réparations de guerre, l’Allemagne a agi conformément au droit
international; si, ce faisant, elle a, ou non, violé la neutralité et la souveraineté du Liechtenstein, si
elle s’est, ou non, injustement enrichie.
23. Nous sommes, Monsieur le président, bien loin du cas de figure des affaires de
l’Or monétaire ou du Timor oriental : dans ces deux cas, la Cour a été empêchée de se prononcer
parce que, pour ce faire, elle aurait dû, nécessairement, inévitablement, apprécier au préalable, dans
l’affaire de 1954, les droits de l’Albanie sur l’or monétaire pris à Rome, dans celle de 1995, la
licéité de la présence de l’Indonésie au Timor oriental. Ici, peu importe que les décrets Beneš
fussent ou non licites : de toutes façons, la position de l’Allemagne qui assimile les biens en cause
à des réparations de guerre (ce que la Tchécoslovaquie n’avait pas fait), porte atteinte aux droits de
la Principauté de Liechtenstein — c’est en tout cas ce que celle-ci vous demande de décider au
fond — et elle le fait en toute connaissance de cause, en sachant parfaitement qu’au stade du fond
150Décision du 9 juillet 1996, ML, annexe 29, p. A303; traduction du Greffe : p. 33, point 2.a); voir aussi la
décision du tribunal régional de Cologne du 10 octobre 1995, ML, annexe 28, p. A264, section 2.b.bb); traduction du
Greffe, p. 21 du texte français.
151
CR 2004/24, p. 19, par. 37.
152
Ibid., p. 37, par. 104. - 58 -
elle ne pourra pas invoquer l’illicéité des décrets (qu’elle tient pour acquise mais pour d’autres
raisons).
24. C’est d’ailleurs pour cela, Monsieur le président, parce que les motifs de la responsabilité
de l’Allemagne et de celle, éventuelle, des Etats successeurs de la Tchécoslovaquie sont distincts,
que nous ne sommes même pas dans la situation qui prévalait dans l’affaire de Nauru dans laquelle
la Cour n’a pas été empêchée de se prononcer sur la responsabilité de l’Australie alors même que
celle-ci était nécessairement identique à la responsabilité de l’Empire britannique et de la
153
Nouvelle-Zélande, et pour les mêmes raisons . Par contraste, la solution que vous serez conduits
à donner à la présente affaire, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, sera sans effet sur la question de la
responsabilité éventuelle des Républiques slovaque et tchèque :
que, dans votre futur arrêt au fond, vous reconnaissiez ou non la responsabilité de l’Allemagne
pour avoir inclus les biens liechtensteinois dans le schéma des réparations de guerre, ceci sera
sans incidence aucune sur la responsabilité (ou l’irresponsabilité) de ces deux Etats pour la
confiscation opérée par les décrets Beneš : que l’Allemagne ait, ou non, raison de considérer
que les biens en question relèvent du régime des réparations de guerre, la question de la validité
des confiscations opérées par les décrets demeurera entière (alors que, dans l’affaire de Nauru,
la question de la responsabilité du Royaume-Uni et de la Nouvelle-Zélande aurait, en fait sinon
en droit, été tranchée par l’arrêt que vous auriez rendu au fond, les mêmes causes produisant
les mêmes effets — les trois Etats intéressés ne s’y sont d’ailleurs pas trompés, qui ont décidé
d’indemniser conjointement Nauru pour une partie des préjudices qu’il alléguait);
à l’inverse, vous pouvez parfaitement vous prononcer sur la responsabilité de l’Allemagne sans
avoir à apprécier celle de la Tchécoslovaquie : que les confiscations auxquelles celle-ci a
procédées fussent ou non licites, l’Allemagne ne pouvait, de toute manière, les considérer
comme un élément du régime des réparations.
153Cf. l’arrêt du 26 juin 1992, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 261-262, par. 55. - 59 -
B. Les droits à réparation de la Tchécoslovaquie ne sont pas davantage
«l’objet même du litige»
25. En outre, et ce sera mon second point, la licéité (ou l’illicéité) des confiscations décidées
par la Tchécoslovaquie en 1945 est tout aussi indifférente pour répondre à la question de savoir si,
comme l’estime le Liechtenstein, l’Allemagne s’est ou non enrichie sans cause. Depuis 1945, ces
biens sont, de fait, sous le contrôle de la Tchécoslovaquie; ceci est un fait et un fait qui est demeuré
sans incidence sur «la richesse de l’Allemagne» aussi longtemps que celle-ci n’avait pas décidé
d’en faire un élément des réparations.
26. Par elle-même, la confiscation des biens liechtensteinois par la Tchécoslovaquie était
sans rapport avec les réparations et n’a d’ailleurs jamais été prise en compte à ce titre ni par
l’Allemagne jusqu’à la naissance du présent différend, ni par les Alliés, ni par la Tchécoslovaquie
elle-même. Ainsi que je l’ai rappelé il y a quelques instants, les décrets Beneš n’ont pas été
adoptés dans la perspective des réparations de guerre mais, comme l’indique le titre même du
décret n 12, en vue de procéder à «la répartition accélérée des terres agricoles des ressortissants
154
allemands et hongrois et des traîtres et ennemis du peuple tchèque et slovaque» . C’est la
décision de l’Allemagne de considérer que les biens liechtensteinois confisqués en vertu des
décrets Beneš entrent dans le cadre des réparations de guerre qui constitue l’enrichissement sans
cause dont la Principauté a lieu à se plaindre.
27. Pour le contester, l’Etat défendeur avance un curieux argument : la Cour, écrit
l’Allemagne dans ses exceptions préliminaires, «could not decide on any compensation due for
unlawful seizure of Liechtenstein property by Czechoslovakia without first determining the legal
relationships between Germany and a third sovereign State, namely the Czech Republic» . Cela 155
laisse songeur, Monsieur le président : la thèse de l’Allemagne (la nouvelle thèse de l’Allemagne)
repose sur l’idée que les biens qui sont l’objet du présent différend relèvent du régime des
réparations. Ce n’est pas la République tchèque qui le dit, ce n’est évidemment pas le
Liechtenstein qui le dit c’est l’Allemagne; et c’est cette position allemande qui est à l’origine de
toute l’affaire comme l’a d’ailleurs reconnu le professeur Frowein avant-hier : «the present
dispute» he said, «came into being because the German courts found [in 1995 and the next years
154ML, annexe 6, p. A.9; traduction du Greffe, vol. I, p. 6.
155
EP, p. 107, par. 174. - 60 -
this I add] that they were prevented by the Settlement Convention from looking into the
confiscation of the painting» 156 ceci, je le rappelle sans avoir besoin de se prononcer sur la
validité des décrets de 1945.
28. Et pourtant c’est ce même Etat qui vient affirmer devant vous que vous ne pourriez pas
vous prononcer parce que, pour ce faire, il faudrait que vous déterminiez que ces réparations sont
effectivement dues. En réalité, vous n’avez, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, rien à décider de ce
genre; il suffit bien plutôt que vous constatiez que l’Allemagne elle-même tient pour acquis qu’elle
est tenue à réparations envers les successeurs de la Tchécoslovaquie, ne fût-ce que, précisément,
dans les décisions prises par ses tribunaux nationaux entre 1995 et 1998. En incluant les biens
liechtensteinois dans ces réparations, elle allège d’autant le fardeau de la dette lui incombant à ce
titre.
29. J’ajoute que si l’Allemagne faisait erreur; si, contrairement à ce qu’elle dit et à ce
qu’implique le comportement de ses organes, elle ne devait pas de réparation à la Tchécoslovaquie,
la position qu’elle a prise en ce qui concerne les biens en question n’en serait pas moins
évidemment illicite : elle les aurait alors inclus dans une dette imaginaire, une dette «de chat botté»,
si bien qu’au lieu de devoir les restituer aux successeurs de la Tchécoslovaquie, elle se les serait, en
quelque sorte, appropriés. En tout cas, la position prise par ses organes judiciaires et politiques
serait entachée d’une grave illicéité puisqu’elle repose sur le fait (inexact) qu’il s’agit de
réparations de guerre qu’un Etat neutre aurait pu payer à sa place.
30. Au surplus, comme un très éminent conseil de l’Allemagne, ils le sont tous, l’a fait valoir
dans l’affaire relative à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force, il n’existe pas de parallèle entre les droits
et les obligations d’un sujet de droit; un Etat peut toujours renoncer à ses droits, mais ses
obligations s’imposent à lui objectivement. Je cite ce très évident conseil :
«It is trivial to note … that a State has a power of disposition over its rights, but
not over its obligations. In the case of a multilateral treaty which generates rights and
obligations in the relations between the different parties, transactions being effected
between two parties do not entail legal effects for third parties.» 157
156CR 2004/24, p. 25-26, par. 62.
157
(Serbie et Monténégro c. Allemagne), 20 avril 2004, CR 2004/11, p. 20, par. 39; voir aussi p. 19, par. 36
(Tomuschat). - 61 -
Il n’y a aucune raison que ce qui vaut pour les obligations assumées par la Serbie et Monténégro en
vertu de la convention sur le génocide ne vaille pas également pour celles qui s’imposent à
l’Allemagne en vertu de la convention de 1952, amendée en 1954.
31. En d’autres termes, Monsieur le président, si réellement la Cour estimait utile de
déterminer si oui ou non l’Allemagne doit des réparations aux Républiques tchèque et slovaque (ce
qui n’est pas nécessaire pour les raisons que j’ai indiquées), elle se prononcerait sur les obligations
de l’Allemagne qui, selon la Partie allemande elle-même, doivent et peuvent être déterminées
objectivement mais ne toucherait nullement aux obligations de ces deux pays dont les droits
éventuels seraient, au contraire, parfaitement préservés.
32. En outre, ici encore, la question de l’enrichissement sans cause de l’Allemagne qui est
un problème de fond est tout à fait indépendante de savoir si les confiscations décidées en 1945
par la Tchécoslovaquie étaient ou non licites. Ce n’est pas cette confiscation qui est à l’origine
d’un enrichissement de l’Allemagne; c’est la décision de celle-ci de celle-ci seule d’inclure
les biens en question dans le régime des réparations.
C. La Cour peut et doit se prononcer sur l’affaire, même si des droits des Etats successeurs de
la Tchécoslovaquie devaient être «touchés»
33. Monsieur le président, les droits d’aucun Etat absent de la présente instance ne sont
l’objet de celle-ci et il ne fait aucun doute que la Cour peut se prononcer sur la requête du
Liechtenstein sans porter atteinte aux droits des Etats successeurs de la Tchécoslovaquie et sans
avoir à apprécier leur responsabilité éventuelle à l’égard du Liechtenstein. Dans ces conditions,
puisqu’il n’existe entre les Parties aucun désaccord quant à l’existence d’une base de compétence
de la Cour en l’espèce l’article 1 de la convention de Strasbourg pour le règlement pacifique
des différends , la haute juridiction peut et doit se prononcer sur le litige que la Principauté lui a
soumis.
34. Il en va ainsi quand bien même les intérêts de certains Etats tiers pourraient être
«touchés». Ceci résulte très clairement de la jurisprudence de la Cour, et, plus précisément, du
précédent de l’Or monétaire dont il résulte que vous ne pouvez connaître d’une requête si les droits
d’un Etat tiers à l’instance forment l’objet même du litige, mais aussi, à l’inverse, que la Cour n’est
pas empêchée de se prononcer si les droits et intérêts d’un tiers peuvent être touchés. - 62 -
35. Le Liechtenstein a exposé de manière assez détaillée ce second aspect aux
paragraphes 5.5 et 5.6 de ses observations. Je me permets, Madame et Messieurs les juges, de vous
y renvoyer. Mais il me paraît nécessaire d’ajouter deux remarques.
36. En premier lieu, comme la Principauté l’a également montré dans ces mêmes
158
observations , ce principe doit trouver d’autant plus à s’appliquer en la présente espèce que
l’article 32, paragraphe 1, de la convention de Strasbourg de 1957 dispose : «La présente
convention demeure applicable entre les parties encore qu’un Etat tiers, partie ou non à la
convention, ait un intérêt dans le différend.»
37. Cette disposition, adoptée très rapidement après l’arrêt de l’Or monétaire (donc en toute
connaissance de cause), est un héritage direct de l’article 35 de l’Acte général d’arbitrage de 1928.
Elle n’a rien d’obscur : les parties à la convention de 1957 ont voulu éviter le genre d’objections
que soulève l’Allemagne. Aucun différend n’est complètement «étanche»; d’une manière ou d’une
autre, des Etats tiers, parties ou non à la convention, sont souvent intéressés à la solution d’un
litige. Il reste que les parties sont convenues que ceci ne constituerait pas un obstacle à la
soumission de tels différends à la Cour internationale de Justice. Et je ne vois pas en quoi ceci
constituerait une quelconque «Rechtsbeugung» comme l’avance le professeur Dupuy . 159
38. Bien entendu, ce faisant, les parties à la convention européenne n’ont pas entendu
déroger au Statut de la Cour et elles n’eussent pu le faire. Aussi bien ce n’est pas le cas; cette
disposition reflète simplement l’aspect de la jurisprudence de l’Or monétaire que l’Allemagne veut
oublier : la Cour n’est pas empêchée de se prononcer sur un différend à l’égard duquel une tierce
partie peut avoir un «intérêt». Au surplus, en prévoyant expressément, à l’article 33 (et pas à
160
l’article 32, comme M. Dupuy le laisse entendre , ce qui montre qu’il s’agit de problèmes
distincts), en prévoyant donc, à l’article suivant, une possibilité d’intervention en faveur des Etats
tiers qui estiment que leurs «intérêts légitimes sont en cause», les rédacteurs de la convention se
sont montrés parfaitement fidèles aux principes qui gouvernent la compétence de la Cour : la
possibilité d’intervention prévue aux articles 62 et 63 du Statut a précisément pour objet de
158EP, p. 77-78, par. 5.7 à 5.10.
159CR 2004/24, p. 56, par. 145.
160
Ibid. - 63 -
permettre à des Etats qui peuvent être intéressés par le règlement d’une affaire portée devant la
Cour mais dont les droits ne sont pas l’objet même du différend, de faire valoir leur point de vue.
39. Au demeurant, et ce sera ma seconde et dernière observation, Monsieur le président, il ne
faut pas exagérer l’intensité des intérêts que les Républiques slovaque et tchèque pourraient être
conduites à faire valoir en la présente espèce.
40. D’une part, je l’ai montré et n’y reviens pas, ni leurs droits, ni leurs obligations, ne sont
assurément l’objet même du différend dont le Liechtenstein a saisi la Cour. Et, d’autre part, ces
deux Etats ont, finalement, un intérêt très limité à la solution du litige :
la licéité des décrets Beneš n’est pas en cause;
les obligations de réparation que l’Allemagne peut avoir à leur égard ne le sont pas non plus
puisque seule est concernée la position que celle-ci a prise en ce qui concerne non pas le
principe des réparations mais la soumission des biens du Liechtenstein au régime des
réparations de guerre résultant de la convention de Paris de 1952 amendée en 1954. Et
d’ailleurs, plus précisément, leur soumission partielle puisque l’Allemagne considère les biens
en question comme relevant du mécanisme des réparations que pour autant que cela lui permet
de «bénéficier» de l’interdiction faite à ses tribunaux de se prononcer sur les questions de
réparation par l’article 3, paragraphe 3, du chapitre 6, de la convention de Paris. Mais
l’Allemagne se garde bien de «ressusciter» en faveur du Liechtenstein et des Liechtensteinois
spoliés, l’obligation d’indemnisation que posait l’article 5 de cet instrument, abrogé en 1990 au
161
prétexte que toutes les compensations en résultant avaient été versées . Même si ceci n’est
pas ponctué par une sonnerie de téléphone intempestive, je crains d’avoir trouvé la «belle au
bois dormant» — mais les baisers du prince ne la fléchissent point : cette belle endormie, c’est
l’obligation de réparer. Ce sera donc à vous, Madame et Messieurs les juges, de lui redonner
vie sous la forme appropriée dans l’arrêt que vous serez conduits à rendre sur le fond.
41. En conclusion, Monsieur le président, c’est un litige très authentiquement bilatéral qui a
été soumis à la Cour :
16Voir l’échange de notes du 28 septembre 1990, RTNU, n °28492. - 64 -
ce différend concerne la décision de l’Allemagne, et d’elle seule, d’inclure «certains biens»
dans le système des réparations sans, pour autant, envisager d’indemniser les ressortissants du
Liechtenstein concernés;
du même coup, se posent de graves problèmes de principe concernant la souveraineté du
Liechtenstein et son statut de neutralité durant la guerre, que la position adoptée par
l’Allemagne, et elle seule, depuis 1995, remet en cause;
pour trancher ces questions, il n’est nullement nécessaire que vous vous prononciez, Madame
et Messieurs les juges, sur la validité des décrets tchécoslovaques de 1945, dont la licéité est,
ici, indifférente; et,
dès lors, les droits des Etats successeurs de la Tchécoslovaquie ne sont en aucune manière
«l’objet même» du différend que le Liechtenstein vous a soumis.
42. Monsieur le président, mon intervention conclut le premier tour de plaidoiries de la
Principauté du Liechtenstein. Il ne me reste donc, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, qu’à vous
remercier très vivement, au nom de toute notre équipe, de la bienveillante attention que vous avez
bien voulu leur prêter.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. Your statement indeed brings to an end the
first round of oral argument by the Principality of Liechtenstein. I wish to thank each of the Parties
for the statements presented in the course of this first round of oral argument.
The Court will meet again tomorrow from 10 to 11.30 a.m. to hear the second round of oral
argument of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the end of tomorrow’s sitting, Germany will
present its final submissions. I recall that Liechtenstein will then take the floor on Friday 18 June
from 10 to 11.30 a.m., for its second round of oral argument, and will present its final submissions
at the end of this sitting.
Therefore, each Party will have a speaking time of one-and-a-half hours. I should
nevertheless like to remind both Parties that, pursuant to Article 60, paragraph 1, of the Rules of
Court, the oral presentations must be as succinct as possible. The purpose of the second round of
oral argument, I would add, is to enable each of the parties to reply to the arguments advanced
orally by the other party. The second round must not therefore constitute a repetition of past - 65 -
statements. It therefore goes without saying that the parties are not obliged to avail themselves of
the entire time allowed to them.
Thank you. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 1 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 16 juin 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Shi, président