International Court of Justice
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
Denmark's Written Observations
on the Admissibility of Its Declaration of Intervention
I O February 2023
I. Introduction
I. On 16 September 2022, Denmark submitted to the Court a Declaration of Intervention
pursuant to Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Court in the Case concerning The
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation). While the Russian Federation pleaded to the
Court to reject it as inadmissible, Ukraine argued that it is admissible.
2. With the present observations Denmark wishes to share with the Court its understanding of
Article 63 of the Statute in order to demonstrate that it fully complied with all the requirements
(II). It then addresses the Russian Federation's main arguments presented in Written
Observations on the admissibility of the Declaration of Intervention Submitted by Australia,
Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, filed
on 15 November 2022 (III), before concluding (IV).
II. The Declaration complies with the requirements of the Statute
3. Article 63 of the Statute provides that
"1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned
in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith.
2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this
right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon in."
4. Article 82, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the Court provides that a declaration of a State's
desire to avail itself of the right of intervention conferred upon it by Article 63 of the Statute
shall specify the case and the convention to which it relates and shall contain:
(a) particulars of the basis on which the declarant State considers itself a party to the
convention;
(b) identification of the particular provisions of the convention the construction of which
it considers to be in question;
(c) a statement of the construction of those provisions for which it contends;
(d) a list of documents in support, which documents shall be attached.
5. A plain reading of these provisions indicates that every State Party to the Genocide
Convention has a "right" to intervene, as confirmed by the Court.1 In line with Article 82(2)
1 Haya de la Torre ( Colombia v. Pertt), Judgment, I.CJ. Reports 1951, p. 76; Co11ti11e11tal She[f (Tu11isia/Libya11 Arab
Jamahiriya), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.CJ. Reports 1981, p. 13, para. 21.
of the Rules, this right may be exercised in the present case if four objective criteria are fulfilled:
(a) The State must show that it has become party to the Genocide Convention;
(b) The intervention must identify the particular provisions of the Genocide Convention, the
construction of which is in question;
(c) The intervention must contain "a statement of the construction" of these provisions of the
Genocide Convention;
(d) The intervention must contain a list of documents in support.
6. Hence, the admissibility test is a simple one. The Court has to ascertain whether the object of the
desired intervention stems from a State Party to the Genocide Convention and whether the object of
the intervention is in fact the interpretation of the identified provisions of the Genocide Convention. 2
7. Denmark considers that it has fully complied with the admissibility requirements under Article 63
of the Statute and 82 of the Rules of the Court. As indicated in Paragraph 15 of its Declaration of
Intervention submitted to the Court on 16 September 2022, it became a party to the Genocide
Convention on 15 June 1951. Moreover, Denmark has announced to the Court its intention to assist
the Court's determination of the interpretation of Articles I, II, III, VIII and IX of the Genocide
Convention in Paragraph 16 of its Declaration.
8. The Russian Federation nevertheless objects to this straightforward analysis by advocating five
counter-arguments. However, a closer analysis reveals that none of them is based on the law. Rather, as
will be shown in the next section, the Russian Federation invites the Court to read into the Statute
additional requirements on admissibility for interventions under Article 63 of the Statute, which are
unfounded in the Statute.
III. The arguments of the Russian Federation are not based on the law
A. There is no subjective test about the genuine intentions of the intervener
9. In its first argument, the Russian Federation claims that the Declaration of Intervention is not
"genuine". Quoting several political statements of various intervening States in paragraphs 15-29, it
takes issue with the fact that the intervention was part of a concerted political strategy to help Ukraine
in the case.3 This, in the view of the Russian Federation, would reveal an intention of Denmark to
become a de-facto co-complainant.
2 Whaling ill the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaratio11 of /11terve11tion of New Zealand, Order of 6
February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 5-6, para. 8.
3 The Russia11 Federation's Written observation on admissibility of the Dec/aratio11s of intervention submitted by
Australia, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, 15 November 2022,
para. 19 (b), fn. 15-17 (hereafter: "Russian Federation's Written Observations").
2
10. The Russian presentation of the law is erroneous. The Court has used the expression of "genuine
intervention"4 in Haya de la Torre to describe how it operated the objective test to determine whether
the object of the intervention of Cuba was the interpretation of the Havana Convention (a "genuine"
intervention) or an attempt to re-litigate another case (not a "genuine" intervention). However,
contrary to the Russian observation in paragraph 15, the Court did not consider the text of the
declaration and the context within which it had been filed to establish the "genuine intention" of
Cuba. This semantic shift from an objective test (was the intervention "genuine"?) to a subjective
test (was the government's intention "genuine"?) does not have any basis in the case law of the Court.
Accordingly, and following explicitly from the case law of the Court, the political motivation of
Denmark underlying the Declaration of Intervention is irrelevant.5
11. Already in Wimbledon, the Court accepted that Poland as intervener shared the same arguments as
the applicants.6 Similarly, Denmark cannot be regarded as a "de-facto co-applicant", as alleged in
paragraph 34 of the Russian observations. As demonstrated above, Denmark did not submit a complaint
against the Russian Federation, did not advance any facts and claims against the Russian Federation on
which it asked the Court to hand down a judgment, and did not arrogate itself any other rights of a
complainant. The Russian Federation's first argument is therefore entirely unfounded.
B. There is no test verifying the effects of an intervention
12. In its second argument, the Russian Federation pleads that admitting the intervention would be
incompatible with the equality of the Parties and the requirements of good administration of justice.
It thereby shifts the test under Article 63 of the Statute from verifying the "object" of the intervention
to its "effects" on the case. That proposition is equally not supported by the law.
13. In Whaling in the Antarctic, the Court itself dismissed the very idea that an intervention would
affect the equality of the parties to a dispute if it stays within the limits drawn by Article 63 of the
Statute. When admitting New Zealand's intervention, the Court determined:7
"18. Whereas the concerns expressed by Japan relate to certain procedural issues regarding
the equality of the Parties to the dispute, rather than to the conditions for admissibility of
the Declaration of Intervention, as set out in Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the
Rules of Court; whereas intervention under Article 63 of the Statute is limited to submitting
4 Haya de la Torre Case, Judgment of June 13th, 1951, I.CJ. Reports 1951, p. 71, at p. 77.
5 Application of the Co11ve11tio11 011 the Prevention and Punishmellf of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v.
Myanmar), judgment of 22 July 2022, p. 19-20, para. 44; Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v.
Hondruas), Jurisdiction a11d Admissibility, Judgmenl, I.CJ. Reports 1988, p. 91, para. 52.
6 Case of the SS Wimbledo11,judgmen1 of 17 August 1923, P.C.I.J. Series A Nr. 1, p. 12, at p. 18.
1 Whaling in the Amarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, Order of 6
February 2013, I.CJ. Reports 2013, p. 3, alp. 9, paras. 18-19.
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observations on the construction of the convention in question and does not allow the
intervenor, which does not become a party to the proceedings, to deal with any other aspect
of the case before the Court; and whereas such an intervention cannot affect the equality of
the Parties to the dispute ;
19. Whereas New Zealand has met the requirements set out in Article 82 of the Rules of
Court; whereas its Declaration of Intervention falls within the provisions of Article 63 of the
Statute ; whereas, moreover, the Parties raised no objection to the admissibility of the
Declaration ; and whereas it follows that New Zealand's Declaration of Intervention is
admissible".
14. In other words, the Court confirmed that a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the
Statute that is limited to submitting observations on the construction of the convention in question,
cannot affect the equality of the Parties per se.
15. While acknowledging the existence of this order in paragraph 37 of their observations, the Russian
Federation takes issue, in paragraphs 39-44, with the fact that the high number of interventions would
nevertheless raise an issue of representativeness in the bench under Article 31 ( 5) of the Statute and, in
paragraph 49, become "unmanageable" for itself and the Court. According to the Russian Federation,
in paragraph 52, admitting several interveners would also run "entirely against the Court's previous
practice of admitting only one intervener per case".
16. However, to the best knowledge of Denmark the Court has never refused a declaration of
intervention with the reasoning that it had already allowed the intervention of another State, and
allowing a second one would therefore be inadmissible.
17. First, such an approach would be manifestly arbitrary. The Court has no power to declare an
intervention inadmissible because another State had already done so before. Such a restriction would
directly encroach on the "right of intervention" of every State Party to a convention whose construction
is at issue. It may well be the case that States were cautious to exercise this right in the past, leading to
very few interventions in the history of the Court so far. However, that is purely a matter of policy.
According to the law, all State Parties have the right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute at the
same time, if they so wish. Under the Genocide Convention, all State Parties can even invoke the
responsibility of another party for a breach of its obligations erga omnes to institute proceedings against
the other party.8 In such a situation, when the treaty embodies matters of collective interest, the late
Judge Can~ado Trindade called upon all State Parties to contribute to the proper interpretation of the
treaty as a sort of "collective guarantee of the observance of the obligations contracted by the State
8 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v.
Myanmar), Judgment of22 July 2022, p. 36, paras. 107-108.
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parties".9 In the present case, the fact that many other States felt the need to share their interpretation
of the Genocide Convention with the Court cannot deprive Denmark of its right to intervene under
Article 63 of the Statute on this important matter.
18. Second, it is a direct and inevitable consequence of numerous interventions that some judges in
the bench may hold the same nationality as an intervening State. However, that does not infringe the
equality of the parties. As recalled by the Court in para. 18 of its order in the Whaling case, the
interveners do not become party to the proceedings. Therefore, Article 31 (5) of the Statute, and
Articles 32 and 36 of the Rules, as quoted by the Russian Federation, do not apply. Moreover, all
judges are bound to uphold their neutrality and impartiality in accordance with Article 20 of the
Statute.
19. Third, Denmark acknowledges that the number of interveners in the present case is
unprecedented and may indeed present new organisational challenges to the Court. In line with
Article 30(1) of the Statute, the Court enjoys large discretion to organise the proceedings as it sees
fit. Denmark welcomes the decision of the Court to ask for written submissions of the interveners
with an identical deadline in order to streamline the process. In order to help in the good
administration of justice, Denmark also reiterates its willingness to coordinate its further action
before the Court with other interveners to contribute to an effective management of time of the Court
and both parties.
C. The Court may decide on admissibility of the intervention before considering Russia's
preliminary objections
20. In its third argument, the Russian Federation maintains that the Court has never allowed
interventions at the preliminary stage of the proceedings in which jurisdiction or admissibility of an
application was challenged. In paras. 53, it quotes six cases in support. In the first three instances
(Military and Paramilitary Activities, Nuclear Tests and Nuclear Tests (Request for Examination),
the Court is said to have discarded interventions in the respective phases relating to jurisdiction or
admissibility. In the second three instances (Haya de la Torre, Whaling in the Antarctic and
Wimbledon), the Court accepted interventions within the main phase, because - according to the
Russian Federation in para. 54 - the jurisdiction was not challenged in a separate stage.
21. It appears that the Russian Federation draws from this practice a duty of the Court to refrain from
deciding on the admissibility of the interventions before considering its preliminary objections.
Unfortunately, such a duty does not exist in the law and the alleged precedents do not support this view
either.
9 Separate Opinion of Judge Can~ado Trindade, attached to Whaling in the Amarctic (Australia v. Japan), Declaration
of Intervemion of New Zealand, Order of 6 February 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 33, para 53.
s
22. First, Article 63 of the Statute does not make any distinction between separate phases before the
Court. Rather, the opening word "whenever" indicates that a State is allowed to intervene in all phases
of the proceedings. I O Moreover, Article 82( 1 ), second sentence of the Rules sets out only an outer time
limit, i.e. a duty to intervene no later than the date fixed for the oral hearing. Again, the mention of an
"oral hearing" does not distinguish between separate phases of the Court - the intervention may be filed
before the oral hearings set for the jurisdictional/admissibility phase or before the merits phase. In
addition, the invitation to file a declaration "as soon as possible" in that provision confirms that the
filing of an Article 63 declaration is admissible at this stage of the proceedings.
23. The Russian Federation also advances an erroneous interpretation of the words "Convention in
question" in Article 63 of the Statute. In its view, it would be first for the Court to determine the
"dispute" pending before it before allowing Convention States to intervene. However, the role of the
Court in Article 63 of the Statute is restricted to verify whether the conditions enumerated in Art. 82(2)
of the Rules are complied with. Contrary to the Russian allegation, the Court did not determine first the
subject matter of the dispute in Haya de la Torre. 11 Rather, the Court only ascertained whether the
object of the intervention of the Government of Cuba was in fact the interpretation of the Havana
Convention in regard to the question whether Colombia was under an obligation to surrender the refugee
to the Peruvian authorities.
24. Second, in the first two cases quoted by the Russian Federation in support for such a duty (Military
and Paramilitary Activities and Nuclear Tests) the Court had actually decided to split the proceedings
into separate phases 12 before examining the admissibility of the subsequent interventions. In the
present case, the Court did not order under Article 79( 1) of the Rules to bifurcate the proceedings after
the filing of the Russian Federation's preliminary objection. Rather, it has allowed Ukraine to address
jurisdiction, admissibility and merits in one memorial. Accordingly, no authority can be drawn from
Military and Paramilitary Activities and Nuclear Tests for the present case: in those cases, there was a
separate jurisdictional/admissibility phase, in the present case there is none.
25. Third, even if the Court had bifurcated these proceedings, nothing in the case law supports a duty
of the Court to refrain from deciding on the admissibility of an intervention during the jurisdictional
phase. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the Court's jurisdiction depended on an understanding
of Article 36(2) and (5) of the Statute, and the merits touched upon questions of the UN Charter and
customary international law. El Salvador's Declaration of Intervention of 15 August 1984 addressed
mainly the latter and did not contain any statement on how it would construe Article 36(2) and (5) of
the Statute. Against that background, the Court dismissed the application "in as much as it relates to
10 Military and Paramilitary Activities i11 and against Nicaragua ( Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Intervention of El Salvador, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 223, at p. 234.
11 Haya de la Torre Case, J udgment of June I 3th 1951, I.CJ. Reports 1951, p. 71, at p. 77.
12 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America).
Provisional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 169, at p. 187, Point D (separating
jurisdiction and admissibility from the merits phase); Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Interim
Protection, Order of22 June 1973, I.C.J. Reports 1973, p. 135, at p. 142
6
the current phase of the proceedings" .13 As judge Singh, 14 judges Ruda, Mosler, Ago, Jennings and De
Lacharriere,15 as well as judge Oda16 explained, it had weighed in the Court that El Salvador's
declaration was mainly directed to the merits of the case, but insufficient with respect to the
jurisdictional question before the Court. This explanation is shared in doctrine. 17
26. Therefore, it appears that the Court rejected El Salvador's declaration as inadmissible during the
jurisdictional phase because and only insofar as it did not contain any construction of Article 36(2)
and ( 5) of the Statute as the jurisdictional base of the case. The Court did not find that no intervention
under Article 63 of the Statute could ever be admissible during a jurisdictional phase, as the Russian
Federation seems to read into the Court's order of 4 October 1986.
27. The same is true for the Nuclear Tests case. After having ordered a jurisdictional phase in June
1973, the Court declared in July 1973 Fiji's intervention of May 1973 admissible. However, it deferred
the consideration thereof to the merits as the intervention did not contain any construction of the
jurisdictional basis of the case.18 In other words, the Court was able to decide about the admissibility
of the intervention during the ongoing jurisdictional phase, but deferred it to the merits phase, as it
only dealt with issues relating to the merits.
28. Fourth, Nuclear Tests (Request for Examination) does not support the Russian argument either.
In that rather specific case, the Court had before it New Zealand's application from August 1995 and
four subsequent interventions under Article 63 of the Statute to re-examine para. 63 of its earlier
judgment in Nuclear Tests. Instead of separating the proceedings, the Court held a hearing in
September 1995 and rejected both the application and the four interventions in an order of October
1995. Hence, the only lesson from this case is that the Court has discretion to dismiss an application
together with purported interventions. However, the precedent does not entail a duty of the Court to
disregard an intervention prior to the examination of preliminary objections from the Defendant.
29. In conclusion, nothing in Article 63 of the Statute or in the Court's case law supports the Russian
view that the Court cannot deal with the admissibility of an intervention before deciding on the
Russian Federation's preliminary objection.
13 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Intervention
of El Salvador, Order of 4 October 1984, I.CJ. Reports 1984, p. 215, at p. 216.
14 Military a11d Paramilitary Activities i11 and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Intervention
of El Salvador, Separate Opinion of Judge Singh, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 218.
15 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Intervention of El Salvador, Separate Opinion of Judges Ruda, Mosler, Ago, Sir Robert Jennings, and De
Lacharriere, I.CJ. Reports 1984, p. 219.
16 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Intervention of El Salvador, Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, I.CJ. Reports 1984, p. 220.
11 Juan Jose Quintana, litigation at the International Court of Justice, Brill 2015, pp. 943-944.
18 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Application to Intervene, Order of 12 July 1973, I.CJ. Reports 1973, p. 324,
at p. 325.
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D. Denmark is entitled to address the Court's jurisdiction
30. In its fourth and fifth argument, the Russian Federation criticises that the declaration would in
effect address matters, which presuppose that the Court has jurisdiction and/or that Ukraine's
application is admissible. The Russian Federation complains, in particular, that the declaration
contains a construction of Article IX of the Genocide Convention on the jurisdiction of the Court. For
the Russian Federation, this makes the declaration inadmissible as it is written in a way that
presupposes that the Court has jurisdiction over the alleged dispute. Thereby, the Russian Federation
effectively maintains that a State may not intervene on questions of jurisdiction, as taking a position
on that point would "presuppose" that the Court has jurisdiction. In its fifth argument, it repeats this
point with more clarity, contesting Denmark's right to intervene on Article IX of the convention per
se.
31. In Denmark's view, this line of reasoning also runs contrary to Article 63 of the Statute and the
Court's practice.
32. According to Article 63 ( 1) of the Statute, a State Party may intervene on the "construction of a
convention". The plain wording refers to the entire Convention, including its compromissory clause,
as the case may be. Accordingly, nothing in the text suggests that a State may not offer its construction
of Article IX of the Genocide Convention to the Court.
33. That point is further strengthened by the object and purpose of Article 63 of the Statute. States do
not only have a legitimate interest in sharing with the Court their interpretation of substantive
obligations contained in a Convention at stake before the Court. It is of equal importance to be heard
on jurisdictional issues, as this may affect their own position before the Court in future cases relating
to themselves. Hence, an intervention under Article 63 of the Statue may cover both jurisdictional
and substantive aspects. •9
34. Subsequent practice of the Court points in the same direction. So far, the Court has never dismissed
an intervention because it was (entirely or primarily) directed to interpreting a compromissory clause.
Rather, in Military and Paramilitary Activities El Salvador's attempt to influence the jurisdictional
question before the Court was unsuccessful because the declaration had not complied with the formal
requirements under Rule 82(2)(b) and (c) for the great majority in the Court. Had it done so, it would
have been of interest to the Court, as expressly confirmed by Judge Oda.20 Moreover, Judge Schwebel
even found that the faults of El Salvador's initial declaration on jurisdiction had been healed by
19 MN Shaw (ed), Rose1111e's Law and Practice of the /11temational Court 1920-2015 (51h ed, Vol III, Brill Nijhoff
2016), p. 1533; H. Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Fifty Years of
Jurisprudence (Vol I, OUP 2013), p. 1031; A. Miron/C. Chinkin, "Article 63" in: Zimmermann/fams/OellersFrahmffomuschat
(eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd ed. OUP 2019), p.
1741, at p. 1763, note 46.
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Intervention of El Salvador, Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, I.CJ. Reports 1984, p. 220, at p. 221.
8
subsequent letters.21 Based on this reading, he was prepared to admit El Salvador's declaration on
jurisdictional matters.
35. It follows that Denmark correctly exercised its right to intervene under Article 63 of the Statute.
The fact that the intervention also addresses the compromissory clause under Article IX of the
Genocide does not render the intervention inadmissible.
E. The Declaration does not contain issues unrelated to the Genocide Convention
36. In its last argument, the Russian Federation refers to Denmark's arguments:
"Denmark refers to questions related to whether there is evidence that genocide has
been committed or may be committed in Ukraine, the doctrine of abuse of rights and the
principle of good faith in application of the Convention, the scope of due diligence to be
performed by the State that intends to accuse another State of genocide, issues of use of
force, and compliance with the Court's provisional measures order. "22
The Russian Federation alleges that this observation does not relate to the construction of the
Genocide Convention and contains an impermissible incursion into the interpretation or application
of other rules of international rules that are distinct from the treaty in question and derive from
different sources.
37. The argument is based on a misperception of Denmark's arguments. Clearly, the statements did
not introduce the issue of verifying allegations that genocide has been committed or may be
committed in Ukraine, the doctrine of abuse of rights, the principle of good faith in the
application of the Genocide Convention, the scope of due diligence to be undertaken by a State
Party that wish to take action pursuant to Article I, issues of use of force, or compliance with the
Court's provisional measures order as self-standing matters under international law. Rather, the
statements were part of the construction of Articles I, II, III, VIII and IX of the Convention.
21 Opinion of Judge Schwebel i11 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America) ( Declaration of Intervention of El Salvador), Order of 4 October 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 223, at
pp. 235-236.
22 The Russian Federation's Written Observations, para. 106 (c).Footnotes excluded.
9
38. Such technique is permissible, and necessary, under international law. According to Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, representing customary international
law ,23 the interpretation of a treaty may include:
"any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties."
According to the Report of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation of International law, the notion
of "relevant rules" includes customary international law, general principles of law and treaty law. 24
It follows that mentioning relevant case law of the Court, resolutions of the UN Human Rights
Council, the general principles of due diligence and good faith, and the UN Charter as interpretative
aids to Articles I, II, III, VIII and IX of the Convention cannot be disqualified as an "impermissible
incursion" as stated in paragraph 110 of the Russian observations. Rather, adhering to the principle
of systemic integration, it contributes to the required integral interpretation of international law as a
legal order.
39. Denmark finds further support for its position in the Court's order of 16 March 2022. In para.
58, the Court stated:
The acts undertaken by the Contracting Parties "to prevent and to punish" genocide
must be in conformity with the spirit and aims of the United Nations, as set out in Article
1 of the United Nations Charter. 25
40. It appears that the Court interpreted Article I of the Genocide Convention in light of Article 1 of
the UN Charter. In a similar vein, Denmark suggests that it is possible to interpret Articles I, II, III,
VIII and IX in the light of general principles of law and the UN Charter, as permitted by the principle
of systemic integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. Such operation does not
transcend the boundaries of Article 63 of the Statute, but stays within the requirement of constructing
the Convention at issue in line with accepted rules of treaty interpretation.
23 Application of the Co11ve11tio11 on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v.
Myanmar), Judgment of 22 July 2022, p. 31, para. 87: "The Court will have recourse to the rules of customary
illfemational law 011 treaty interpretation as reflected in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Co11ve11tio11 011 the Law of
Treaties of23 May 1969"; see also Application of the llllernational Convention On the Elimi11atio11 of All Forms of
Racial Discrimi11atio11 (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 4 February 2021, p.
24, para. 75 with further references.
24 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International
Law: Report of the Study Group of the ILC finalised by Mr. Martti Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, pp. 94-96.
https:l/legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a cn4 1682.pdf.
25 Allegations of Genocide under the Convention 011 the Preve11tio11 and Pu11ishme11t of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russia), Order of 16 March 2022, p. 13, para. 58.
10
IV. Conclusion
41. For the reasons set out above, Denmark maintains that its Declaration of Intervention fully
complies with the requirements under Article 63 of the Statute and Article 82 of the Rules.
42. The Court should therefore decide that the intervention is admissible and allow Denmark to
present its written observations in good time in order to exercise its right to intervene as party to the
Genocide Convention.
I I
Rm v
~ eke Pasternak ~
Observations écrites du Danemark sur la recevabilité de sa déclaration d’intervention