Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 96/14
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE RAGUE LA RAYE
YEAR 1996
Public sitting
held oD T.hursday 19 September 1996, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
PresideDt Bedjaoui presiding
iD the case coDcerniDg Oil Platforms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. UDited States of America)
Preliminary Objection
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNEE 1996
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 19 septembre 1996, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, Président
en l'affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières
(République islamique d'Iran c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
ExceptioD préliminaire
COMPTE RENDU - 2 -
Present: President Bedjaoui
Vice-President Schwebel
Judges Oda
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Weerarnantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Kororna
Vereshchetin
Ferrari Bravo
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Judge ad hoc Rigaux
Registrar Valencia-Ospina - 3 -
Présents M. Bedjaoui, Président
M. Schwebel, Vice-Président
MM. Oda
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Ferrari Bravo
Mme Higgins,
M. Parra-Aranguren, juges
M. Rigaux, juge ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier - 4 -
The Government o:E tb.e Islamic Republic o:E IraD. is represented by:
Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Iran-O.S. Claims Tribunal,
as Agent;
Mr. S. M. Zeinoddin, Head of Legal Affairs, National Iranian Oil Company,
Mr. James R. Crawford, Whewell Professer of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professer of International Law, University of Geneva,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, Avocat à la Cour de Paris, Member of the New York Bar,
Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professer of
International Law, Emeritus, University of Cambridge,
Dr. N. Mansourian, Legal Advisor, Bureau of International Legal Services of
the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Dr. M. A. Movahed, Senior Legal Advisor, National Iranian Oil Company,
Dr. H. Omid, Legal Advisor, National Iranian Oil Company,
Dr. A. A. Mahrokhzad, Legal Advisor, National Iranian Oil Company,
Mr. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, Avocat à la Cour, Frere Cholmeley, Paris
as Counsel.
T.he Government of the United States o:E America is represented by:
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
as Agent;
Dr. John H. McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Department of
Defense,
Professer Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rubin Professer of International Law, New
York University School of Law, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran est représenté par :
M. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, agent de la République islamique d'Iran auprès du
Tribunal des réclamations Etats-Unis/Iran,
comme agent;
M. s. M. Zeinoddin, chef du service juridique, National Iranian Oil Company,
M. James R. Crawford, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la
chaire Whewell à l'Université de Cambridge,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Genève,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour, Paris, membre du barreau de New York,
cabinet Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Derek w. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite de droit
international, ancien titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'Université de
Cambridge,
M. N. Mansourian, conseiller juridique, bureau du service juridique
international de la République islamique d'Iran,
M. M. A. Movahed, conseiller juridique principal, National Iranian Oil
Company,
M. H. Omid, conseiller juridique, National Iranian Oil Company,
M. A. A. Mahrokhzad, conseiller juridique, National Iranian Oil Company,
M. David S. Sellers, solicitor, cabinet Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour, cabinet Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
comme conseils.
Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique est représenté par :
M. Michael J. Matheson, conseiller juridique en exercice du département
d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
comme agent;
M. John H. McNeill, conseiller juridique principal adjoint du département de
la défense des Etats-Unis,
M. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la
chaire Rubin à la faculté de droit de l'Université de New York, - 6 -
Mr. John R. Crook, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,
U.S. Department of State,
Dr. Sean Murphy, Counselor for Legal Affairs, United States Embassy, The
Hague,
Mr. Jack Chorowsky, Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, United States
Department of State
Commander Ronald D. Neubauer, JAGC, United States Navy,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Allen Weiner, Attache (Office of the Legal Counselor), United States
Embassy, The Hague
as Counsel. - 7 -
M. John R. Crook, conseiller juridique adjoint pour les questions concernant
l'Organisation des Nations Unies au département d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
M. Sean Murphy, conseiller pour les affaires juridiques à l'ambassade des
Etats-Unis aux Pays-Bas,
M. Jack Chorowsky, assistant spécial du conseiller juridique du département
d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
Le capitaine de frégate Ronald D. Neubauer, Judge Advocate General's Cor,ps,
de la Marine des Etats-Unis,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Allen Weiner, bureau du conseiller juridique, attaché à l'ambassade des
Etats-Unis aux Pays-Bas,
comme conseils. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Today the Court will resume its public hearings on
the preliminary objection of the United States of America in the case
concerning Oil Platfor.ms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America). I now call upon the distinguished Agent of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Mr. Mohammed Hussein Zahedin-Labbaf, to open the
pleadings on behalf of his Government.
Mr. ZAHEDIN-LABBAF:
In the Name of God the Merciful and Compassionate.
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour and
privilege for me to appear before the Court today in this important case
as Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. This case concerns violations by the United States of provisions
of a bilateral treaty between Iran and the United States, the 1955 Treaty
of Amity. These violations of the Treaty of Amity occurred when in
October 1987 and April 1988 US naval forces attacked and destroyed three
sets of Iranian commercial oil installations situated on Iran's
continental shelf in the Persian Gulf and owned and operated by the
National Iranian Oil Company.
3. In bringing this case before the Court, Iran submits that each of
these attacks constituted a serious violation by the United States of
important provisions of the Treaty of Amity, and that the Court's
jurisdiction to rule on such claims is firmly established by
Article XXI (2) of the Treaty - the Treaty•s compromissory clause.
4. The United States, in contrast, has objected to the Court's
jurisdiction in this case. It contends that the 1955 Treaty of Amity is,
contrary to its title, exclusively concerned with commercial matters, and
is not designed to deal with the use of armed force by one of the parties
against installations of the ether.
CR 96/14 - 9 -
5. Starting from this premise, the United States has taken the
position that the case that Iran has introduced is essentially a case
arising under the United Nations Charter, and that what Iran is trying to
do is to obtain a general condemnation of the United States for its role
in the Iran-Iraq war. The United States argues that it is not the role
of the Court to be dragged into disputes of this kind between two
parties.
6. It has to be said at the outset, Mr. President, that this is a
complete mischaracterization of Iran's case.
7. Let there be no further misunderstandings. While it is of course
a matter of public knowledge that Iran has a long list of complaints for
the wrongs done and sufferings caused by the United States during the
Iran-Iraq war, such matters are not before the Court in this case. What
Iran has brought before the Court is a purely legal case arising out of
very particular incidents - and one that is grounded in specifie
provisions of the Treaty of Amity which Iran maintains the United States
has breached by attacking the ail platforms. The provisions at issue
include Article I, which provides that there shall be firm and enduring
peace and sincere friendship between the parties; Article IV, which sets
forth a standard of fair and equitable treatment by one party to the
nationals and companies of the other, and to their property and
enterprises; and Article X, which provides for freedom of commerce and
navigation.
8. In Iran's view, the United States' attacks on the platforms
violated each of these provisions. Accordingly, Iran's case entails not
only a claim for satisfaction in the form of a declaration stating that
the United States violated its treaty obligations in destroying the
platforms, but also compensation for the substantial damages that Iran
CR 96/14 - 10 -
suffered as a result of the destruction of commercial installations
belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company, a joint-stock company
organized and existing under the commercial laws of Iran.
9. Representatives of the National Iranian Oil Company are here
today as part of Iran•s delegation. With the Court•s leave, I will ask
the head of the National Iranian Oil Company's Legal Affairs Department,
Dr. Zeinoddin, to follow me. Dr. Zeinoddin will describe for the Court
the commercial nature of the platforms and their economie importance to
Iran. He will also describe the heavy financial, commercial and economie
consequences of the US attacks to Iran•s oil industry.
10. In an effort to support its assertion that the Treaty of Amity
is exclusively a commercial treaty and therefore has no role to play in
connection with the claims that Iran has introduced, the United States
has also argued that the Treaty was designed to protect US commercial
(and particularly oil) interests in Iran and that this shows that its
abject and purpose was solely commercial. The United States ignores what
the Treaty says. It is a treaty of amity. It contains a specifie
obligation in Article I concerning firm and enduring peace and sincere
friendship and this language has implications far beyond the purely
commercial sphere. But the United States also ignores the importance of
the Treaty in its historical context. While I will leave to Iran•s
Counsel a detailed explanation of how the United States' contentions are
misconceived from the historical point of view, let me make the point now
that the international oil industry has as much a strategie component as
a commercial one. If one aspect of the 1955 Treaty of Arnity was to
protect US oil interests in Iran, as the United States maintains,
nonetheless the Treaty had as much a strategie importance as a commercial
one. And it will be seen that the history of the Treaty bears this out.
CR 96/14 - 11 -
~1. To the extent that the Treaty also addressed commercial matters,
it is Iran's position that the platforms attacked by the United States
were commercial installations. It is also Iran's position that these
installations were either engaged in the production of oil and gas when
they were destroyed or were in the process of being repaired - after
earlier Iraqi attacks - so that production could resume. The oil
produced from these platforms was vital to Iran's economy. These were in
no way military facilities. Indeed, as Dr. Zeinoddin will explain, these
installations were wholly inappropriate for use as military installations
of the kind alleged by the United States. It is equally undeniable that
Iran suffered commercial damage as a result of the attacks. In such
circumstances, the US attacks must give rise to a question of
interpretation and application of the Treaty.
~2. To place these issues in perspective, Mr. Bundy - following
Dr. Zeinoddin - will examine the historical background to the Treaty and
will show that the Treaty was clearly intended to have both strategie and
commercial importance. Mr. Bundy will also examine the development of
the platforms in the context of the Treaty, as well as those particular
aspects of the background to the US attacks and of the attacks themselves
which have a special relevance to the issues confronting the Court.
~3. In making this factual presentation, Iran is mindful, of course,
that the Court has separated the jurisdictional phase of the case from
the merits, and that these proceedings are devoted to the preliminary
objection on jurisdiction, without the need to decide at this stage
whether or not the US attacks actually constituted breaches of the
Treaty. For this reason, we will attempt to confine our presentation to
issues that are relevant to the Court's jurisdiction, and will enter into
ether matters only in so far as they are actually necessary in order to
Π96/~4 - ~2 -
make the case as a whole more easily understood. As to any ether facts
relating to the merits, Iran respectfully reserves its right to address
these issues as appropriate at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. It
is at that stage of the proceedings that Iran will answer the multitude
of false accusations made by the United States beth in its written and
its oral pleadings concerning alleged Iranian actions in the Persian
Gulf. Iran will restrict itself now to denying such accusations. But it
is important to stress one point, however obvious - that it is Iran which
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. It is the United
States which does not want such issues to be discussed on the merits, and
which seeks, in introducing such issues in the jurisdiction phase - where
they are strictly irrelevant - to avoid a full and proper analysis of the
merits.
14. Because this is the jurisdictional phase, Iran•s counsel will
focus on the legal aspects of the United States' preliminary objection.
Following Mr. Bundy, Professer Condorelli will examine the specifie
provisions of the Treaty invoked by Iran in order to demonstrate that a
genuine dispute as to their interpretation and application exists between
the Parties. Professer Crawford will then show that the legal
requirernents for the Court•s jurisdiction under the compromissory clause
of the Treaty have been satisfied and that the United States• objection
must therefore fail.
~5. Iran brings this case in full confidence that the Court is a
court of law and that the Parties come before it as equals to seek
justice. For years, the United States and us companies have relied on
the Treaty of Amity as claimants before the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, United States courts and ether tribunals. The United States
has relied on it also in this Court. New, as Respondent, the United
CR 96/~4 - 13 -
States seeks to avoid recourse to the Treaty. But international law is
not a one-way street, Mr. President, and it is in this spirit of equality
that Iran submits its claims to the Court.
16. Before calling upon Dr. Zeinoddin, I would like to end by making
three points. First, as I have pointed out, Iran suffered severe
financial and commercial damage as a result of the destruction of its oil
platforms at the hands of US naval forces in October 1987 and April 1988.
It should be remembered that these damages were inflicted at a critical
stage of Iran•s history and at a time when Iran•s territorial integrity
was at risk due to an illegal aggression and invasion.
17. In this context, let no one forget the findings of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations: that this war - which caused
the loss of hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives and hundreds of
millions of dollars of damage to Iran's economy - was begun by an illegal
invasion followed by continuous occupation of Iranian territory during
the conflict. The Secretary-General held that such actions entailed the
full responsibility of Iraq for the conflict.
18. The Secretary-General's Report began by noting that:
"the war between Iran and Iraq, which was going tc be waged for
so many years, was started in contravention of international
law, and violations of international law give rise to
responsibility for the conflict".
It went on to note that the specifie concern of the international
community in this context was "the illegal use of force and the disregard
for the territorial integrity of a Member State". The Report found that
the "outstanding event" under these violations was
"the attack of 22 September 1980 against Iran, which cannet be
justified under the Charter of the United Nations, any
recognized rules and principles of international law or any
principles of international morality [and thus] entails the
responsibility for the conflict" .
CR 96/14 - 14 -
The Report pointed out that Iraq's explanations for its actions on 22
September 1980 "do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the
international community" and added that Iraq•s aggression against Iran
"which was followed by Iraq•s continuous occupation of Iranian territory
during the conflict" was "in violation of the prohibition of the use of
force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens" 1• It is
against this background that the US attacks on Iran's oil platforms must
be considered.
19. The second point I want to make concerns the United States•
characterization of the dispute before the Court, which in many ways
ignores the Secretary-General's findings. The Agent of the United States
characterized the dispute before the Court as involving: "combat
operations" and described these attacks as "part of a series of hostile
engagements between United States and Iranian forces that occurred during
the course of an international armed conflict" {CR 96/13, p. 61). It was
actually suggested that such a characterization of the dispute before the
Court was accepted by Iran. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Iran
vigorously contests this characterization of the dispute for a number of
reas ons
1. This characterization ignores the fact that Iran was acting in
self-defence in the face of an aggressor who was illegally
occupying part of its territory.
2. It ignores the fact that the United States had as a minimum, beth
under the Treaty of Arnity and under international law, a duty of
strict neutrality in such a situation. There was at no stage a
state of armed conflict between Iran and the United States.
1See Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security
Council resolution 598 (1987), 9 December 1991 (S/23273), para. 5 (Iran's Memorial,
Exhibi t 42) .
CR 96/14 - 15 -
3. It implies that the attacks on the platforms were a part of a
series of hostile engagements between Iranian and United States
forces, whereas it is Iran's position that these were unprovoked
attacks on civilian and commercial facilities.
In short, Iran disputes not only the United States' version of these
events but also the United States' characterization of the dispute before
the Court. Iran's claim, by contrast, relates only to the specifie United
States attacks on the specified civilian facilities.
20. The third point I want to make before concluding is a more
cheerful one. Iran is pleased to note the United States' announcement
that it is willing to appear in this Court on the merits in the event
that the Court finds that it has jurisdiction (CR 96/12, pp. 13 et seq.).
It is true that the United States made this announcement this week in
terms which appeared to threaten the Court with onerous evidentiary
proceedings which would tax its limited resources. In addition, the
intention of the United States to produce vast quantities of evidence was
made with a view to deterring the Court from hearing any evidence at all.
But that aside, Mr. President, this is a court of justice, to which
parties to the Statute are entitled to come. The Court, while no doubt
pleased that beth Parties are ready to resolve their disputes on the
merits by the submission of evidentiary materials, will not be deterred
by the prospect that it has to do justice in respect of their dispute.
That is its function. And it is no more inappropriate for Iran to bring
this dispute under the Treaty of Amity than it was for Iran to bring the
Aerial Incident case, which Iran is pleased to record was settled
amicably.
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Iran was one of the early
members of beth the League of Nations and the United Nations. Iran
CR 96/14 - J.6 -
remains deeply committed to the principles of those bodies, to the rule
of law and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Iran has show.n this
through the establishment of the Algiers Declarations, by its compliance
with the Judgement of the Court in the Diplomatie and Consular Staff case
as a result of which that case was withdraw.n from the Court, and through
the work of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Such actions show a
firm commitment to the obligation to settle disputes peacefully and a
strong confidence in the rule of law. It is with such commitment and
such confidence that Iran has submitted this case to yeu.
Mr. President, that concludes my opening statement. I would ask yeu
to call upon Dr. Zeinoddin, who will continue with the next part of
Iran' s presentation. Thank yeu.
The PRESIDENT: Thank yeu very much, Mr. Mohammed Hussein
Zahedin-Labbaf. I now give the floor to Dr. Zeinoddin.
Mr. ZEINODDIN:
J.. Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Court, it is my task
to assist the Court in describing the commercial significance of this
case to Iran. The National Iranian Oil Company is a commercial entity
formed under the commercial code of Iran for commercial purposes and in
which the Government is the shareholder. The National Iranian Oil Company
is responsible for the exploration, production and marketing of all of
Iran•s cil, activities which entailed the construction and use of the
platforms which were attacked by the United States• military forces on
J.9 October 1987 and J.8 April 1988.
2. The Court will not need reminding that cil is the life blood of
Iran's economy, and these platforms were of a vital commercial and
economie importance to Iran. Their purpose was to gather cil from a
CR 96/14 - 17 -
series of inter-connected oil wells drilled into the underlying oil
fields. The oil would then be pumped from the platform by undersea
pipeline to the nearest facilities for the storage and/or loading onto
tankers for sale on the world's markets. The platforms were complex
structures containing sophisticated equipment representing hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of investment. Between them, the platforms hit
and destroyed by the United States had an oil production capacity of over
500,000 barrels of oil per day, and were the sole means available for
exploiting the underlying oil field reserves. Thus, any damage to or
destruction of such platforms would be certain to cause substantial
lasses, not only in internai costs of new investment to rebuild the
platforms, but also in loss of revenues due to the disruption of oil
experts, possible, or rather inevitable, damage to the underlying oil
reserves, and environmental damage including a huge discharge of oil into
the sea. In the event, the cost of rebuilding only one of these platforms
amounted to over 500 million dollars.
3. The commercial importance of these platforms is borne out by
briefly recalling the history of their development. These platforms_, as
well as ether Iranian offshore platforms in the Persian Gulf had been
built, and the underlying oil fields exploited, through joint venture
agreements entered into between the National Iranian Oil Company and
foreign, principally United States~oil companies, in the late 1950s and
early 1960s following the signing of the Treaty of Amity.
4. The joint exploitation of the oil fields continued right up until
the Islamic Revolution. During the Revolution, the foreign oil companies
who were involved in joint venture agreements with the National Iranian
Oil Company left Iran and were not in a position to resume their
activities under these agreements. Nevertheless, they were able to make
CR 96/14 - ~8 -
claims, for hundreds of millions of dollars, for their lest interests.
As Mr. Bundy will explain in more detail after I have spoken, many of
these claims were presented before the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. It is significant that in bringing these claims the United
States companies relied on provisions of the Treaty of Amity in arder to
justify their claims, alleging that the events surrounding the Islamic
Revolution amounted to an unlawful taking and requesting compensation
under the terms of Article IV (2) of the Treaty of Amity. The companies
also produced affidavits by United States officials who were involved in
the negotiation of the Treaty to the effect that the Treaty was in part
specifically designed to protect oil interests, in particular, United
States oil investments in Iran. The huge size of the United States
companies' claims in these cases also emphasizes the commercial value of
the platforms in question, and of the underlying oil fields. The
National Iranian Oil Company eventually paid in the arder of hundreds of
millions of dollars in settlement of the United States oil companies'
claim relating to two of the platforms in question in this case.
s. Following the Revolution, and the departure of the oil companies,
the National Iranian Oil Company continued to exploit the oil fields and
to use the oil platforms for the production of oil, i.e., for commercial
purposes. This situation remained unchanged during the war imposed upon
Iran by Iraqi aggression. Indeed, these offshore fields had a particular
economie importance during the war because many of Iran's mainland
oilfields were close to the frontline and were thus exposed to the
calamities of the war and continued bombardment. Moreover, several of
Iran's main cil facilities and export centres, old and new, such as
Bandar Imam, Abadan, and Kharg Island in the same region were subject to
constant attack. However, the platforms at issue in this case were
CR 96/~4 - l9 -
farther from the frontline and were thus relatively secure - at least
during the early years of the war.
6. It was no doubt with these considerations in mind, and in an
effort tc internationalize the conflict, and to attempt ta destroy the
basis of Iran's economy - its ail, that Iraq began in 2986 to 1987 ta
carry out indiscriminate attacks throughout the Persian Gulf on all kinds
of shipping, but in particular against any facility that was connected in
any way with Iran's ail industry. Iraq's capacity tc make such long
range attacks far dawn the Persian Gulf to where the cil platforms at
issue were located had also increased. Because of their critical
importance to the economy of the country, these platforms were an obvious
target, particularly in view of their inability to defend themselves
against any military attacks. Small security forces were put on the
platforms in an effort ta provide sorne moral comfort for the ail company
personnel working there, and ta help them evacuate in the event of Iraqi
attack. However, such measures were necessarily very limited. As I
mentioned, the platforms were extremely vulnerable. They are static,
basically unable to defend themselves, and highly dangerous for obvious
reasons - the presence of cil and gas in substantial quantities on the
platforms themselves.
7. Despite Iraqi attacks on individual platforms, and the danger to
personnel, the National Iranian Oil Company exerted every possible effort
tc repair the platforms and tried strenuously ta keep them in production
because of their vital economie importance.
8. It was against this background that the first attack by the
United States military forces took place on l9 October 1987, against two
platform complexes in the Reshadat field. This attack effectively put an
end to production from bath the Reshadat and Resalat fields. The second
CR 96/14 20 -
attacks took place on 18 April 1988 against the Salman complex and
against the Central Nasr production platform. In each of these attacks,
the platforms were bombarded by massed United States naval forces. In
two of the attacks, United States forces then boarded the platforms to
lay explosives in order to complete the destruction. The people on the
platforms simply had_no way to defend themselves against such force. The
attacks in fact caused loss of life and injuries to personnel stationed
on the platforms. They also caused massive economie damage to Iran, not
only in the immediate loss of oil revenues, but also in the huge costs of
rebuilding the platforms, costs which are still being felt by Iran today.
9. The United States has tried to justify the first attack against
the Reshadat platform on the basis of an alleged Iranian missile attack
against the Sea Isle City, a vessel stationed in Kuwaiti waters, seme
four days earlier. And the second attacks, on 18 April 1988, were
allegedly a reprisal against the fact that the Samuel B. Roberts, a
United States military vessel, hit a mine in the Persian Gulf east of
Bahrain sorne days earlier. Iran will not address these allegations in
detail because they are essentially matters for the merits. However, I
will make a few brief points in response to the United States' allegation
that these platforms were sorne kind of military installations. While
this is also a matter for the merits, I want to explain to the Court why
such a contention, which Iran of course denies, is on its face
implausible. Such platforms are quite small, and are packed with complex
equipment. As a general rule, they were operated by 10-15 oil company
personnel - technicians, drilling experts and so on, responsible for
maintenance and repair work. It is not feasible to install missiles or
any ether kind of sophisticated military equipment on such small areas,
and totally impractical to use them as a base for attacks. The very idea
CR 96/14 - 21 -
is absurd not because of physical limitations of the platforms and their
extreme vulnerability, but also because of the high level of danger that
would be involved in having any kind of explosive material on such
platforms. The small number of security personnel posted on these
platforms were simply there to act as look-cuts to provide early warning
of attacks and to provide sorne comfort and support to the oil company
personnel in the light of Iraqi attacks. These platforms could not
possibly be used for any military purposes of the kind contended by the
United States.
10. In short, these platforms were not and could not be military
installations. They were used for commercial purposes, and this is just
one of the reasons why Iran contends that these attacks were not carried
out by way of lawful self-defence, but were designed to cause the maximum
financial, commercial, and economie damage to Iran.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I have referred to certain
facts from the perspective of the company who owned and operated these
platforms, and I have tried to emphasize the commercial significance of
these platforms, the nature of the activities carried out on them, and
the enormous magnitude of the damage suffered by the Iranian oil
industry. In Iran's view, these matters only confirm the applicability
of the Treaty of Amity to this dispute.
12. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, that is all I
wanted to say with regard to the background to this case. I will now
hand over to Mr. Bundy who will present you with a more detailed
appreciation of the facts and of their relevance to the issues of
jurisdiction currently before you. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Zeinoddin. I now give the
floor to Mr. Rodman Bundy.
CR 96/14 - 22 -
Mr. BONDY:
THE FACTS RELEVANT TO JURISDICTION
Introduction
Mr. President, Members of the Court, may it please the Court. I am
honoured to appear before you today on behalf of the Islarnic Republic of
Iran in this important case.
Now, as Iran•s Agent has explained to you, my task is to lay before
you the factual considerations which are relevant to the question of
jurisdiction. I stress the word "jurisdiction" because the nature of
these proceedings is such that it is neither necessary, nor appropriate,
for me to trespass on to the merits.
OUr distinguished opponents have shown no similar reservations about
discussing the merits. Commander Neubauer presented the views of the
United States at sorne length and in sorne detail on several issues of fact
relating to the Iran-Iraq war and the attacks on the platforrns.
Professer Lowenfeld argued that Iran could not rely on Article X (1)
of the Treaty of Amity, which provides, as you know, for freedom of
commerce and navigation, because "whatever their normal function, the oil
platforrns involved in the present case were being used ... for guiding
arrned attacks on shipping in the Gulf - hardly a commercial activity"
(CR 96/12 p. 55).
Mr. Matheson added that the Court's decision in the Nicaragua case
on the same freedom of commerce clause that appears in the Treaty of
Amity has no application here because "we are dealing with platforrns that
have no relationship to maritime commerce and were in fact being used for
military purposes" (CR 96/13, p. 63). And Dr. Murphy made the same
point. He asserted that the platforms and the oil facilities attacked by
CR 96/14 - 23 -
the United States in this case had no linkage tc maritime commerce unlike
the installations that were subject tc attack in the Nicaragua case (CR
96/~3, pp. 42-42).
Mr. President, Members of the Court, those kinds of issues are
clearly matters for the merits. They are squarely in dispute between the
Parties and they have not been proved by the United States. Sc it is no
use, I would submit, for Mr. Chorowsky tc try tc reassure us that the
United States has not asked the Court tc resolve any factual issues which
are in dispute and which are at the heart of the merits, for that is
precisely what the United States has done (CR 96/~3, pp. 54). As the
example I have just cited sc clearly shows, in order to support its
preliminary objection the United States asks the Court tc assume, despite
the evidence tc the contrary, that the platforms were not engaged in
commercial activities, but rather were being used as bases tc attack
neutral shipping when they were destroyed by the United States. New we
will prove that that was not the case, but we will do so at the
appropriate time - which is at the merits.
Elsewhere, the United States asks the Court to accept that the
attacks on the platforms were part of a series of hostile engagements
between Iran and the United States which constituted armed conflict
(CR 96/23, pp. 25-62). As Iran's Agent has stated, Iran disagrees.
There was no state of armed conflict between Iran and the United States
and Iran had absolutely no desire tc engage US forces. If anything, the
evidence that has already been produced in the written submissions
demonstrates that Iran sought to avoid confrontation with the
United States (Iran•s Memorial, Exhibits 44 and 55). It was the
United States which attacked and destroyed a defenceless set of
CR 96/24 - 24 -
commercial oil platforms. This was not "armed conflict". And if it was
an "engagement", it was a singularly unilateral one.
Now, although there are many such issues that have been raised by
our opponents, I do not intend to follow them down the same factual
paths. This is not because Iran does not wish to take up these issues on
the merits or accepts what the United States has to say about them, but
rather out of deference to Article 79 (5) of the Rules of Court - a
provision which Mr. Chorowsky neglected to mention in his exposé on
Article 79 the other day. It provides, as the Court is well aware, that
statements at these hearings should be confined to matters that are
relevant to the preliminary objection. So, accordingly, I shall
concentrate on the factual issues which Iran believes to be genuinely
relevant to the question of jurisdiction, and I shall comment on other
factual matters only to the extent that it is necessary to restore sorne
balance to what the United States has said.
* * *
As the Court is aware, Iran's claims relate to the destruction by
the United States in October 1987 and April 1988 of several oil platforms
which, as Dr. Zeinoddin has explained, were owned and operated by the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) . These platforms were engaged in the
commercial production of oil and gas from Iran's continental shelf when
they were attacked. Now I will be explaining in due course the layout of
the platforms and the installations. But only two of those
installations, platform R7, in the Reshadat complex and the control room
at the Salman complex were undergoing repairs at the time they were
attacked. These were repairs that were necessitated by earlier Iragi
bombardments. The other platforms were operational. Iran maintains that
CR 96/14 - 25 -
these attacks of the United States breached specifie provisions of the
1955 Treaty of Arnity between the two countries.
Aside from taking issue with the commercial nature of the platforms,
the essence of the United States' objection is that there is no
connection, no connection whatsoever, between the Treaty and Iran's
claims. This argument resurfaces repeatedly throughout the preliminary
objection and we have heard it again in the first round presentation of
our distinguished opponents. Let me quete one of the ways in which the
United States characterizes this assertion and this is from the
preliminary objection:
"Iran•s efforts to recast the 1955 Treaty addressing purely
commercial and consular matters, as addressing the fundamental
issues of war and peace fly in the face of the ter.ms of the
1955 Treaty and its history as well as the jurisprudence of the
Court." (Preliminary Objection, para. 3.0~; emphasis added.)
New, it will fall to my colleagues, Professors Condorelli and
Crawford, to demonstrate the fallacies of this argument based on the
ter.ms of the Treaty and the Court's jurisprudence. In so far as the
facts are concerned, what I propose to do is to test the United States'
contentions against the historical background of the case, including the
history of the Treaty. In Iran's submission, this analysis will support
the following four propositions:
(i) contrary to the United States' assertion, the Treaty of Amity was
not solely concerned with commercial or consular matters, but it
had a far wider strategie importance of which the undertaking to
maintain peaceful and friendly relations was an essential element;
(ii) the off-shore oil installations which the United States destroyed
in this case represented precisely the kind of facilities that the
Treaty was designed to protect;
CR 96/14 - 26 -
(iii) the oil platforms in question were engaged in commercial
operations when they were destroyed and fell squarely within the
scope of the Treaty•s provisions even under the United States'
reading of the Treaty; and
(iv) the United States' attacks on the platforms consequently give rise
to fundamental questions relating to the interpretation and
application of the Treaty, and this is true whether these attacks
are viewed in isolation or in the overall context of the
United States' conduct in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq
war.
In order to place these matters in perspective, it may assist the
Court if I adopt a generally chronological approach to the facts. This
involves focusing on four main series of events:
(i) first, I shall examine the factual context within which the Treaty
of Amity was signed in ~955. For it is this context which sheds
light on the object and purpose of the Treaty's individual
provisions;
(ii) second, I shall review the subsequent development of Iran•s
off-shore oil industry, including the platforms that are the
subject of these proceedings. It will be seen that one of the
purposes of the Treaty was to encourage and protect this
development, not solely for commercial purposes as the
United States would have the Court believe, but also for
fundamental political and strategie reasons;
(iii) the third section of my presentation will address very briefly,
and I assure the Court it will be brief, on sorne of the background
facts relating to the Iran-Iraq war. While I do not propose to
treat these matters in detail whatsoever, it is necessary to touch
CR 96/~4 - 27 -
on certain events in order to correct the highly coloured version
of the facts presented by the United States at these hearings;
(iv) finally, I shall say a few words about the attacks themselves and
the United States' alleged justification for them.
Once again, I stress that in undertaking this exercise my purpose is
not to examine whether the United States actually breached the provisions
of the Treaty. This is clearly reserved for the merits. Rather, my
intention is to show that there are genuine questions, genuine questions
of interpretation and application of the Treaty sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the Court under the terms of the Treaty's compromissory
clause.
* * *
Now with that introduction, Mr. President, let me turn to:
1. T.he .fact:ua1 backgroUZld wi t:hin w.hicb t:he Treat:y o.f Ami t:y was signed
In his intervention on Tuesday, Mr. Crook conveyed the impression
that there was nothing particularly remarkable about the signing of the
Treaty of Amity in 1955. He claimed that it had a purely commercial,
practical character and that there were no high politics or strategy
involved (CR 96/13, pp. 8, 10). With due respect, this account of the
historical context in which the Treaty was signed does not do justice to
the very important and real political and strategie interests that were
at stake at that time.
The Treaty of Amity was signed on 15 August 1955 during what was a
highly sensitive period for Iran and the United States in their
relations, when fundamental strategie questions were as important as if
not more important than commercial considerations. Contrary to Mr.
Crook's suggestion, shortly before the Treaty there had been in fact a
fundamental shift in the Parties' political relations, and this played a
CR 96/14 - 28 -
key role in the political background of the Treaty. It was not simply
that the Shah needed a beost to his régime, as Professer Lowenfeld
suggested the ether day (CR 96/12, p. 53). Rather, it was that the
United States was intent on strengthening its relations with Iran across
the board, as a result of changes in the Iranian Government that had
happened shortly before the onset of the Cold War. Any proper
interpretation of the Treaty cannet be divorced from this particular
context.
Four years earlier in 1951, the Iranian Parliament, with the support
of Dr. Mossedegh's National Front, had passed an act nationalizing Iran's
oil industry, which up to that point, as the Court will be aware, had
been exclusively owned and operated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
This event provoked a serious international crisis which involved the
United States and other countries.
The Court will be aware of the political events that followed these
developments, particularly in view of the fact that proceedings were
brought before the Court in 1951 relating to the nationalization of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. As has been acknowledged by US officials, in
August 1953 Dr. Mossedegh was deposed as a result of a coup organized and
financed by the CIA - about as drastic a shift in relations as one can
imagine - and the United States was well on its way to establishing a new
relationship with Iran under the Shah that would form one of the
cornerstones of its foreign policy for the next twenty-five years.
In addition to reinstating the Shah, the United States had two main
objectives. The first was to prevent Iran from falling under the Soviet
Union's sphere of influence during a particularly sensitive period of the
Cold War. The second was to develop Iran's oil industry, but not simply
for commercial purposes, but also for fundamental political and strategie
CR 96/14 - 29 -
reasons which included the need to provide for a flow of income to the
Shah in order to prop up his régime and to ensure a secure source of oil
to the West. These two policies were interrelated, and each was based on
its own set of political considerations and each was served by the
signing of the Treaty of Amity.
To this end, the United States embarked on three initiatives.
First, in 1954, several major US oil companies became involved for the
first time in Iran's oil industry through participation in a new
"Consortium Agreement" with NIOC. This Agreement replaced the old
arrangements that had previously existed under the Anglo-Iranian Company,
and subsequently, ether cil agreements were signed between NIOC and US
oil companies including the agreements that led to the construction of
the platforms at issue in this case. Second, the United States took the
lead in the creation of the Baghdad Pact - otherwise known as CENTO - a
strategically oriented military alliance between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and
Pakistan which was created in 1955 and which Iran adhered to later in the
year. Third, in August 1955, amidst these events the United States
cemented relations with Iran by signing the Treaty of Arnity, the
negotiation of which had actually started in July 1954. It was no
accident that these three events coincided.
With respect to the Consortium Agreement, it represented one of the
most important oil agreements in the world. While the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company had previously held concessionary rights over virtually all of
Iran's oil industry, these interests had been transferred to NIOC as a
result of Iran's nationalization policy, and a consortium of
international cil companies, in which American companies commanded a 40%
share, was formed for the purpose of purchasing Iranian oil at favourable
priees and operating the oil industry.
CR 96/14 - 30 -
One of the ironies of this case is that for several years during the
1980s, NIOC and most of the major oil companies that were parties to the
Iranian oil agreements were engaged in litigation relating to these
agreements, and this was litigation that was heard just down the hall.
In all of these cases, all of them, the oil companies stressed the
linkage between the signing of the Treaty of Amity and the development of
Iran's oil industry in the 1950s.
In particular, the companies were at pains to show that one of the
purposes of the Treaty was to protect US oil investments especially after
the signing of the Consortium Agreement in 1954. The Court will find, as
Dr. Zeinoddin has mentioned, in Iran's written pleadings affidavits
prepared by two of the US negotiators of the Treaty and they expressly
confirm that the Consortium Agreement was an important part of the
political background of the Treaty negotiations (Exhibit 5 to Iran•s
Observations).
The oil companies were correct, Mr. President: one of the purposes
of the Treaty was to provide for the protection of investment in Iran's
oil industry. But that does not mean that the Treaty was exclusively
concerned with commercial matters as our distinguished opponents would
have the Court believe. For oil and strategie interests go hand in hand,
and the interests of the American oil companies that were being protected
in Iran in the l950s were as much strategie in nature as commercial. In
ether words, the Treaty of Amity, as its name suggests, was designed to
deal with fundamental issues involving peace, friendship and security as
well as commercial relations.
The evidence for this conclusion is derived from official us
Government documents which have been annexed to Iran•s pleadings (see
exhibits 4-7 to Iran's Observations). As these documents show, US
CR 96/14 - 3l. -
companies at the time actually had little interest from the commercial
point of view in becoming involved in Iran's oil industry in the l.950s.
At the time, their petroleum requirements were amply covered by ether
sources of supply, and there was a reluctance of sorne of the US major oil
companies to become involved in Iran for fear of alienating ether
regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, in which they had a significant
stake.
The US Government took a fundamentally different view. The matter
was of such importance that it was discussed at the highest levels of the
American Government. And as a result of this debate, considerable
pressure was placed on US oil companies to become involved in Iran•s oil
industry despite their reluctance to do so.
If the Court refers to Exhibit 7 to Iran's Observations, it will
find a copy of a letter dated 2S January l.954 from the Acting United
States Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Standard Oil Company of
California, which at that time, if I am correct, was the largest American
oil company, which sums up how the United States viewed the Iranian oil
situation. This was at the same time the Treaty was being negotiate~.
That letter leaves no doubt that the United States Government deemed the
participation of US oil companies in Iran's oil industry to be absolutely
essential to the security interests of the United States. Not only was
it thought that this participation would permit oil revenues to flow to
the new Iranian régime, the "friendly" Iranian régime, but it would also
contribute to protecting Western interests in the petroleum resources of
the Middle East in general.
Now the response of the American oil companies echoed the same
theme. So that when the vice-president of Standard Oil Company wrote
back to the Secretary of State, he observed that from the strictly
CR 96/l.4 - 32
commercial point of view, Standard Oil Company had no real interest in
becoming involved in Iran, but it would do so because it was conscious of
the large national security interests involved, those were the words that
he used (exhibit 7, to Iran's Observations).
Now, because the pricing mechanisms of the purchase of Iranian ail
by US companies under the Consortium Agreement would have violated
American anti-trust laws, the US Government sought a specifie anti-trust
exemption for participating companies so that they could collaborate in
the Consortium and in the development of Iran's ail industry. But as the
US national security-council noted at the time, the enforcement of
American anti-trust laws was deemed to be far less important to national
security interests of the United States when fostering development of
American companies in Iran's ail industry (Exhibit 7, p. 52 to Iran's
Observation) .
So, if it is true as the facts demonstrate, that the Treaty of Amity
was in part designed to protect US oil interests in Iran's oil industry,
then it must also be true that this was as much for strategie reasons as
commercial cnes.
*
* *
This leads me to the ether important event that affected Iran-us
relations at the time. For just as the Treaty of Amity was being
negotiated and the Consortium Agreement put into place, the United States
was also working to establish a military alliance in the region, an
alliance that came to be known as the Baghdad Pact.
As you can see from the first illustration that you will find in
your folder, the negotiation of the Baghdad Pact extended the reach of
regional security arrangements, anchored by the NATO alliance in the
CR 96/14 - 33 -
west, along virtually the entire southern flank of the Soviet Union.
These events coincided with the Berlin crisis of June 1953, the end of
the Korean War, the coming to power of a Republican administration under
President Eisenhower in Washington, and the succession to power of
Premier Kruschev in the Soviet Union - hardly a normal political
environment as Mr. Crook has sought to portray.
In April 1954, a mutual defence agreement was signed between Turkey
and Pakistan. In July 1954, negotiations comrnenced over the Treaty of
Amity. In February 1955, a further defense agreement was entered into
between Turkey and Iraq and Iran adhered to that in October 1955 thus
completing the Baghdad Pact.
And, as a matter of fact, Iran adhered ta the Baghdad Pact just two
months after it signed the Treaty of Amity. For just as the United
States was anxious to have Iran join a regional security arrangement, so
also was it intent on concluding its own Treaty of Amity with Iran ta
counter Soviet influence in the country and ta strengthen political
relations with Iran based on principles of peace and friendship. Ta the
extent that the Treaty was also expected to encourage American companies
to invest in Iran (commercial activities) this was perceived as
advantageous in that it would encourage Iranian-US interdependence and
would assist the Shah in regenerating Iran's economy, thus strengthening
his régime.
It was against this background that the Treaty of Amity came into
existence. Given the importance that Iran played in US strategie
thinking at the time, it was no accident that the Treaty of Amity
contained a separate provision not found in virtually all of the ether
United States' Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties: namely, the
provision that appears in the Treaty•s very first article stipulating
CR 96/14 - 34 - •.
that "there shall be firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship
between the United States of America and Iran". This particular formula
of words chosen by the parties was no accident. It was the direct
product of the historical setting in which the Treaty was signed.
And that is not to say that the protection and development of Iran's
oil industry had no commercial dimension. Clearly it did. But the
Treaty of Amity addresses both strategie and commercial matters, and oil
embodies the two. So the fact that commercial issues are also dealt with
in the Treaty hardly creates an impediment to the Court's jurisdiction in
this case, particularly when it is recalled that the oil platforms that
were attacked and destroyed by the United States were constructed for the
purpose of engaging in commercial activities and were so engaged when
they were attacked.
By stressing the supposedly "purely commercial" nature of the
Treaty, the United States really raises a false problem. At the end of
the day, the installations that the were attacked in October 1987 and
April 1988 were both strategie and commercial in nature. And they were
even linked to maritime commerce by virtue of their connection by
pipelines to storage and export facilities on Lavan and Sirri Islands
close to the Iranian mainland coast. So the dual aspect of the Treaty,
the security, peace and friendship aspect and the commercial aspect,
provides additional support for the proposition that Iran•s claims give
rise to fundamental questions of interpretation and application of the
Treaty which this Court has jurisdiction to rule on.
Mr. President, I turn now to the second part of my intervention,
which deals with the development of Iran•s off-shore oil industry,
including the platforms in question in this case.
CR 96/14 - 35 -
2. T.be àevelop.ment of Iran' s offshore industry i:ncludi:ng the platforms
i:n question
The conclusion of the Consortium Agreement and the signing of the
Treaty of Amity ushered in a new phase in the development of Iran's oil
industry. In 1957, two years after the Treaty was signed, Iran enacted a
Petroleum Act which opened up off-shore areas in Iran's continental shelf
for exploration and production by NIOC in participation with foreign oil
companies. The first off-shore agreement was signed in 1958 between NIOC
and an American oil company, AMOCO. Now, pursuant to this agreement,
four fields were discovered up here in the northern portion of the
Persian Gulf in the vicinity of Kharg Island.
This was followed, in January 1965, by the conclusion of two further
agreements between NIOC, on the one hand, and a group of oil companies
including American participants, on the ether. And these are the
agreements have a direct bearing on this case.
The first of these was a Joint Structure Agreement between NIOC and
a group headed by the Phillips Petroleum Company (American company),
pursuant to which a joint star company called IMINOCO was formed to
explore for, and exploit, petroleum resources lying further south in the
Persian Gulf. Now, it was in this area here. IMINOCO's efforts were
successful, and two significant oil fields were discovered - the Rostam
field, which was subsequently renamed Reshadat after the Revolution, and
the Rakhsh field, which is there, which was subsequently renamed Resalat
after 1979; the position of those fields within Iran's continental
shelf, which is this boundary here, can clearly be seen on the map. A
reduced version of that map is the second map in your folder. A series
of production, service and drilling platforms were constructed on both of
these fields, and commercial production began from Reshadat in 1969 and
Resalat in 1971.
CR 96/14 - 36 -
Now, I am going to place on the screen behind me a diagram of the
Reshadat and Resalat complex which is No. 3 in your folder, and with the
Court's indulgence, Mr. President, I would like to spend a few minutes
explaining how these platforms operated because this aspect of the case
has a direct bearing on the military actions that the United States took
in October 2987, because these were the installations that were attacked
on 19 October 2987. Now, as I have said, there were two main complexes,
Reshadat (R7) and Resalat (Rl), both of which consisted of three
inter-connected platforms (as a drilling platform, a service platform and
a production platform) and the two fields lay about 29 kilometres apart
from each ether. A further platform (which is labelled R4), up here,
also existed and it had drilling, service and production facilities as
well. Now, together, this series of platforms serviced a total of sorne
40 separate oil wells with a production capacity of up to 200,000 barrels
of crude oil a day - a significant commercial operation by any standard.
The only reason why this R7 platform was not producing oil in
October 2987 when it was attacked was because it had previously been
attacked by Iraqi warplanes and was in the course of being repaired. In
fact, on the day that the United States attacked the place, Iranian oil
workers were engaged in replacing a generator that had been destroyed by
the Iraqi bombardments earlier in the year.
As can be seen from the diagram, the lay-out of the facilities was
such that all of the oil produced from either Resalat, over here, or
Reshadat field here, passed through a central platform on the Reshadat
(R7) complex, before it was piped on by an undersea pipeline to the
storage and loading facilities at Lavan Island, and you will see Lavan
Island on the map that is in your folder, No. 2. So even if it was
necessary to show a link with "maritime" commerce to fall within the - 37 -
scope of Article X (l) of the Treaty of Amity, a proposition which the
United States bas advanced, but with which Iran does not agree with, and
which the language of Article X does not support - and by the way, which,
in our view, the Court in no way endorsed in the Nicaragua case - that
link nonetheless existed. These platforms were linked to loading and
storage facilities for export on Lavan Island and this can clearly be
shown on the evidence.
Because of the nature of their design, the Court will appreciate
that if the Reshadat complex was put out of action, then that would have
a knock-on effect of preventing oil pumped from Resalat over here of
being able to be shipped to the mainland because all of the Resalat
production had to pass through these platforms before being pumped on. I
mention this point because when the United States attacked these
platforms in October 1987, it concentrated its attack exclusively on
these platforms here - it did not even go after the Resalat field. The
R4 platform was not intended to be attacked but if you read the US
documents, it was spotted during the engagement and was destroyed as what
US military comrnanders called a "target of opportunity". By doing this,
by concentrating its attack on these central platforms in Reshadat, the
United States maximized the commercial damage that was inflicted on Iran,
since_production, as I have shown, was stopped from both the Reshadat and
the Resalat fields. No oil could be transmitted for export from either
field as long as the central Reshadat complex was out of action.
Mr. President, if one is trying to inflict maximum economie damage
on an adversary, this tactic makes a certain amount of sense. But when
you consider that the rationale for the United States• actions was
ostensibly to prevent the recurrence of alleged Iranian attacks against
neutral shipping, said to be emanating from these platforms, it is - 38 -
curious that the United States did not deem it necessary to destroy the
ether platforms in the complex as well, particularly those at Resalat.
On the face of it, one would have thought that it would have been equally
possible for Iran to launch so-called "attacks" from the Resalat
platforms as well, so that simply destroying the Reshadat platforms would
not solve the problem, if there really was a problem. Iran would submit
that the United States• focus on the central Reshadat platforms raises a
serious doubt as to the credibility of the United States' claims that its
actions were taken solely out of self-defence. Instead, the US attacks
had all the hallmarks of economie retaliation against Iran and certainly,
this is a plausible view of the facts, although the determination of the
issues such as these is very much a matter for the merits.
As I have mentioned, there was a second Joint Structure Agreement
signed in January 1965 which is also relevant to this case. This was
between NIOC and four US oil companies (Atlantic Refining Company, Murphy
Oil, Sun Cil and Union Oil Company of California) and these companies
formed another joint stock operation called, LAPCO, which carried out
operations which lead to the discovery of the Sassan field, which is.
right dow.n here. That field was subsequently renamed Salman - which is
what appears on your map - after the Revolution, and commercial
production started from that field in 1968.
As you can see, the Salman complex was located south of Reshadat and
Resalat and south of Lavan Island. It consisted of seven connected
platforms linked to sorne 38 wells with a production capacity of over
220,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Again, a substantial commercial
operation. A photograph of the Salman complex appears as number No. 5 in
your folder and it may give the Court an idea of the magnitude of the - 39 -
facilities that were involved. This complex was one of the installations
attacked by the US Navy in April ~988.
The ether offshore facility attacked in April ~988 was the Nasr
complex dawn here. It had been known as Sirri (after the nearby island),
that is Sirri Island there, prier to the Revolution, but it had its name
changed to Nasr. It was developed through a different set of contractual
arrangements between NIOC and the French company, Elf Aquitaine. This
field was also located within Iran's continental shelf and had a
production capacity at the time it was destroyed of roughly 100,000
barrels of crude cil per day. As the United States• own documentary
exhibits, that were attached to their preliminary objection, reveal the
Nasr platform was producing substantial quantities of crude cil when it
was destroyed.
As yeu can see from the diagram I am placing on the screen, this is
the Nasr complex, it consisted of seven multi-well platforms inter-linked
with each ether by underground pipelines. Platform A, which is this one
right in the middle, included a central production platform, a well
platform and a flare system and yeu will see that in the photograph which
appears as No. 7 in your folder, No. 6 being a reduced version of this
diagram. Once again, it was this central structure, Platform A, that was
the focus of the United States' attacks in April 1988. It is also
apparent that it was from Platform A that the cil was piped back to the
loading, storage and export facilities on Sirri Island, by virtue of an
underground pipeline, but the only difference in these facilities from
what was at stake in the Nicaragua case was the length of the pipeline.
Once again, the choice of targets by the US Navy is revealing. For
just as the oil that was produced at the Reshadat and Resalat platforms
passed through a central platform before being pumped to the export - 40 -
facilities, so also did oil produced from these seven platforms, all have
to be transferred via Platform A before making its way to Sirri Island.
Conseguently, if Platform A was knocked out of commission, as it was in
April 1988 by the United States, then no ether production from any of the
ether six platforms would have been possible, thus, again inflicting
maximum economie damage on Iran and its oil experts.
It will be a matter for the Court at the merits stage to consider
why the United States chose this central platform alone to attack, and
left the ethers untouched. But the reason why I emphasize the lay-out of
these facilities at this stage is because is sheds light on the motives
behind the United States' actions and, in our view, highlights the close
nexus that exists between Iran's claims and the individual provisions of
the Treaty. Aside from being an overtly unfriendly and unpeaceful act,
the United States' focus on the central platforms in each instance must
raise at least a legitimate issue sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the
Court as to whether that action was consistent with the United States'
obligation to Iran to guarantee freedom of commerce and navigation and to
accord fair and equitable treatment to Iran's companies and their
property.
Mr. President, that concludes the second part of my intervention,
the third and fourth parts will be somewhat shorter, but with your
permission I would suggest that, perhaps, this is the appropriate time
for the customary morning break.
The PRESIDENT: Please continue your statement until its end.
Mr. BUNDY: By 1979, each of the platforms that I have been
discussing had been producing oil in commercial quantities for several
years. The Reshadat, Resalat and Salman complexes had, in fact, been - 41 -
jointly owned as I have described by US cil companies pursuant tc
contractual arrangements which gave them a right tc a portion of the cil
produced. These contracts were scheduled tc run until roughly the end of
this century.
At the beginning of 1979, Iran underwent a fundamental political,
religious and social revolution which affected all aspects of Iranian
society. It is not necessary tc dwell at length on these matters since
they are public knowledge. Virtually all us companies departed from
Iran, and the commercial operation of the offshore oil fields which I
have described was assumed by NIOC acting alone.
Despite the fact that relations between the two countries
deteriorated, two matters during this period warrant mention at this
stage. The first is that neither Party teck any steps to terminate the
Treaty of Amity, which remained in force between the Parties - as this
Court, as well as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, has already recognized.
The second point, is that the Parties were also able tc provide for a
mechanism for settling disputes that had arisen up through 1980 by
conclusion of the Algiers Declarations in January 1981.
One of the outcomes of the Algiers Declarations was the
establishment as everyone knows of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. While I
do not propose tc divert this Court's attention from this case tc the
proceedings of the Tribunal, there is one aspect of those proceedings
which has a bearing on the jurisdictional issues confronting the Court
here, and which confirms the close connection that exists between the oil
platforms and the Treaty of Amity.
Following the events of 1979 and the establishment of the Tribunal,
a number of US oil companies brought claims before the Tribunal for
losses arising out of the fact that they were no longer able to operate - 42 -
in Iran under their original contractual arrangements. Amongst these
companies were the Phillips Oil Company which, I noted a few moments ago,
had been one of NIOC's partners in the Reshadat and Resalat operations,
and the four US oil companies comprising the LAPCOGroup that had made up
the foreign contingent producing oil with NIOC from the Salman field.
The claims of all of these companies were broadly similar in nature,
although the amounts ranged from hundreds of millions of dollars in the
case of the Reshadat (IMINOCO) operations to well over $ 1 billion in
connection with the Salman (LAPCO) agreement. The claimants all asked for
the value of their share of the oil from the fields that would have been
produced up until the year 2000, when the contracts were set to expire -
in other words, during and beyond the period in which the production
facilities from which that oil was supposed to be produced were attacked
and destroyed by the United States. NIOC settled all of these cases.
The practical consequence of these settlements is that the US oil
companies have all been compensated as if their contractual right to
produce oil from the platforms that had been destroyed here has been
recognized to the end of the century, while NIOC, on the ether hand, has
been deprived of the same production by virtue of the destruction of the
platforms that took place in ~987 and ~988. Whether this is "equitable
treatment" within the meaning of Article IV of the Treaty of Amity, will
be a matter for consideration at a later stage.
As part of their claims, each of the US oil companies invoked the
Treaty of Amity, particularly Article IV thereof, as providing for the
relevant standard of compensation for the Tribunal to apply. Ican
assure you, Mr. President, as someone involved in those proceedings, that
not a day of hearings went by down the hall when the US oil companies did - 43 -
not invoke the Treaty of Amity tc the offshore cil operations that are an
issue in this case.
Nor were the cil companies lacking the support of the United States
Government in making out their cases. For 1983 and l984, in anticipation
that the Tribunal would be faced with the question of whether tc apply
the Treaty of Arnity tc the cases before it, the Legal Adviser tc the
State Department, at the request of the US Congress, prepared two
memoranda supporting the applicability of the Treaty of Amity tc the cil
cases before the Tribunal. Those memoranda may be found in Exhibits 94
and 95 tc Iran's Memorial.
While there is much of interest in those documents, ·it is striking
that one of the assertions raised by the State Department in the 1983
memorandum was that Iran's conduct in allegedly ceasing cil experts from
Iran tc the United States after the Iranian Revolution violated Article X
of the Treaty of Amity, which as yeu know guarantees freedom of commerce
and navigation. This is a revelation (Exhibit 94, p. 1407 and Notes 20
and 21). Apparently, under the United States' reasoning, if Iran halted
cil experts tc the United States - including experts from the offshore
fields in issue here - then this would constitute a breach of Article X
of the Treaty of Amity. But if the United States destroys the very same
platforms that make that production possible, then this not only does not
constitute a breach according to the United States, but it does not even
give rise tc a question of interpretation and application of the Treaty
sufficient tc vest this Court's jurisdiction.
The double standards are really quite striking. When it suits its
interests, the United States has no hesitation in invoking the Treaty;
but when the tables are turned and the United States finds itself in the
position of a Respondent, its colours change and the provisions of the - 44
Treaty have no more relevance despite the fact that the very same oil
installations are involved.
In any event, Iran did not halt oil experts to the United States
after the Islamic Revolution. To the contrary, the United States
remained one of the largest purchasers of Iranian oil right up until the
time that the platforms were first attacked in October 1987. For example
on 26 October 1987, this is just one week after the US attacks on the
Reshadat complex, the White House issued a "fact sheet" documenting the
fact that US purchases of Iranian oil during the first seven months of
1987 were over $1 billion, with 600,000 barrels of oil a day, a day,
being sold to the United States during July 1987 alone (Exhibit 1 to
Iran's Observations).
Those are significant quantities of crude oil sales and they attest
to the high level of oil-related commerce that existed between the
Parties at the time the platforms were attacked. I need hardly add that
this oil was exported by tanker - in other words, by maritime commerce.
With the destruction of the platforms no further production from the
underlying fields, let alone shipments of oil to the United States or
elsewhere, was possible. Freedom of commerce - even maritime commerce -
was fundamentally impaired. Shortly afterwards, the United States
implemented a trade embargo against Iran prohibiting such sales. But at
the time the platforms were attacked, there was a substantial bilateral
trade in oil .
Mr. President, Members of the Court, Iran believes that the factual
background that I have reviewed shows very clearly that the Treaty of
Amity was designed to address beth strategie issues, such as the
obligation of peace and sincere friendship, and commerce, such as the
protection of oil and gas operations from Iran•s offshore fields. Each - 45 -
of these issues is clearly brought into play by Iran's claims, thus
demonstrating that genuine questions of interpretation and application of
the Treaty of Arnity are at issue here.
* * *
3. Background to the Attacks themselves
I would now like to turn, Mr. President, to the background events
that occurred prier to the attacks on the platforms. Ordinarily we would
not dwell on these issues because, as the United States itself admits,
they are really more properly deferred until the merits stage.
Nonetheless, the presentation of the facts that you heard on Monday
afternoon was so self-serving and selective, that sorne comment is called
for.
As to its selectivity, we find it extraordinary, as the Agent of
Iran has already indicated, that the US representatives did not refer to
perhaps the single most important fact relating to the background of the
dispute and this was the finding contained in the ~99~ Report of the
Secretary-General attributing responsibility for the Iran-Iraq conflict
on Iraq. Suffice it to recall that Iran was fully justified in adopting
measures in self-defence against Iraq's aggression. And this fact must
constantly be borne in mind in evaluating the conduct of the States
concerned which led up to the attacks on Iran's oil platforms.
The second striking aspect of the presentation made by
Commander Neubauer was his characterization of US policy with respect to
the war. In Commander Neubauer's words, "the United States desired the
war to end without victor or vanquished" (CR 96/~2, p. 25), and that
statement echoed official declarations made by the United States
Government during the war to the effect that the United States professed
to be neutral. This was an attitude which even if it had been true, - 46 -
would have ignored the fact that Iraq was the aggressor in the war and
that Iran, that was the victim of that aggression, was linked by a Treaty
of Amity to the United States.
Iran has furnished a compendium of evidence in its written pleadings
which contradicts this characterization of the US role in the war. While
I do not propose to recanvas that evidence at this juncture, let me
remind our colleagues what US Government officials themselves were saying
about the US policy of neutrality.
"The Reagan and Bush administrations supported Iraq against Iran. "
Those were the words of Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State
and National Security Adviser (Iran's Memorial, Exhibit 45).
"It was pretty obvious that the United States was tilting towards
Iraq." That was the conclusion of William Colby, the former Director
of the CIA (Iran's Memorial, Exhibit 51).
"We [the United States] wanted to ensure that Iran did not win the
war. In other words, we became de facto allies of Iraq. " That came
from Lawrence Korb, a former US Assistant Secretary of Defence during
the relevant period (Iran's Memorial, Exhibit 51).
There is a great deal more in the public record attesting to the
United States' support for Iraq and its predisposition to treat Iran with
hostility. And at the merits stage, evidence of this conduct will be
relevant because it will show the true purpose behind the destruction of
the platforms. And that, in turn, will show that by reference to the
actual terms of the Treaty - terms like "peace and sincere friendship",
"unreasonable measures", "fair treatment", "freedom of commerce" - that
the United States was in breach. If these Treaty concepts are to be
applied to a party's conduct, yeu cannet ignore the motive behind that
conduct and that is what gives these events their relevance. - 47 -
The third aspect of Commander Neubauer's presentation calling for
comment was his description of the "Tanker War". Although the Commander
rightly pointed out that Iraq was responsible for introducing the tanker
war to the Persian Gulf, he went on to blame Iran for interfering with
merchant shipping and for taking steps that led to the attacks on the
platforms.
Once again these allegations are all to do with the merits. For
present purposes I need only recall the words of the very influential
United States Senator, Senator Sam Nunn, who had this to say about the
Tanker War just four months before the first attack on Iran's platforms
took place in 1987. Senator NUnn stated:
"the challenges to freedom of navigation originate with
Kuwait's ally Iraq. It is difficult to justify US action
when America is indirectly protecting the interest of Iraq who
started the 'Tanker War'." (Exhibit 32 to Iran•s Memorial.)
It is also worth remembering that Kuwait, which was one of the Gulf
Co-operation Countries to which Commander Neubauer referred the ether
day, did subsequently apologize to Iran for its role during the Iran-Iraq
the war.
The final point I wish to make on these background facts concerns
the evidence that the United States claims it will produce at the merits
stage. As Iran's Agent has indicated, Iran welcomes the declaration by
the United States that it intends to appear for the merits if the case
continues, and Iran looks forward to exchanges on the evidence at that
time.
How complicated those proceedings will be remains to be seen. But
merely because significant issues of fact and law may be in dispute is
scarcely a reason for the Court to decline jurisdiction now. Iran has
every confidence that the Court is well equipped to handle issues of fact
and law, even if they are complex. - 48 -
That being said, a ward of caution should perhaps be raised with
respect to the factual allegations advanced by the United States on
Monday. We were told that the United States has "compelling" evidence on
a number of points. We were also reminded by Commander Neubauer of the
very tragic incident involving the destruction of an Iranian civilian
Airbus by and American warship, the USS Vincennes, shortly after the
second attack on Iran's oil platforms. In that incident the initial
position of the United States was also that compelling evidence existed
to show a number of things: first, that the airplane was descending in a
dive, an attacking dive on the Vincennes when it was attacked, that it
was emitting a military electronic signal rather than a civilian signal
from the aircraft itself, that it was outside its assigned air corridor
when it was shot dawn, that United States warships had not penetrated
into Iran's territorial waters when they fired the missile shooting-down
the aircraft, and that, in fact, US vessels at that time were responding
to a distress signal from a third-party merchant vessel, that allegedly
had been attacked by Iran.
Each and every one of those factual assertions was subsequently
shawn to be erroneous by United States Defense Department officiais
themselves. And I do not propose to say more about the airbus matter
because the case has been settled. But it is important to bear in mind
that what the United States says about facts cannet always be accepted at
face value without a careful examination of those facts. And that is
what we trust we will be able to pursue at the merits stage.
4. T.he Attacks on the Platfor.ms of 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988
I now turn to the last portion of my presentation, Mr. President,
with your permission, concerning the actual attacks on the platforms of - 49 -
October ~987 and April ~988. Let me start with the attack of ~9 October
~987 on the Reshadat complex.
According to the United States, the attack on the Reshadat complex
was in response to what was alleged to be the firing of an Iranian
Silkworm missile from the Fao Peninsula that hit a US flagged merchant
vessel, the Sea Isle City, which was located just off the Kuwaiti coast
south of Kuwait City (Preliminary Objection, pp. 17-18). Now, the
following points are relevant in considering that claim. And it was an
Iranian missile that hit the Sea Isle City.
First, of course, the Fao Peninsula lies in Iraqi territory. There
was fighting there between the two countries at the time. This was Iraqi
territory.
Second, absolutely no proof has been furnished by the United States
for the allegation that it was an Iranian missile that was fired.
Third, US Government sources themselves refute the idea that Iran
had Silkworms on the Fao Peninsula from whence the missile is said to
have come. If the Court turns to illustration No. 9 in its folder, it
will see a diagram of the situation provided in an official State
Department bulletin which shows that Iran had no missiles in the area.
That diagram indicates that to the extent Iran possessed Silkworms, they
were all located near the Strait of Hormuz. Now the date of this
diagram, which has been included in Iran•s written submissions, is
October 1987, precisely the time that the United States now alleges
Iran's Silkworms were located up on the Fao Peninsula.
Fourth, the maximum range of a Silkworm, as confirmed by this State
Department map, is 85 kilometres. US weapons experts and Jane's Defence
Weekly have placed the effective range of a silkworm actually at much
lower range: usually 40 kilometres (Iran•s Observations, Annex 1, - 50 -
p. ~7). As illustration No. 10 in your folder shows, the closest point on
the Fao Peninsula to the Sea Isle City was 95 kilometres. So even on the
United States' own evidence, Iran could not have hit the Sea Isle City
with a Silkworm, if it had Silkworms in the area, which it did not.
Fifth, it is public knowledge, on the ether hand, that Iraq
possessed Silkworms, including cnes that could be launched from planes,
and which had been used against third parties earlier in the year
(Exhibit 68 to Iran's Memorial). And, of course, one should not forget
the Iraqi missile attack against the USS Stark, in which 37 American
soldiers tragically died, which illustrated the Iraqi policy of "shoot
first, identify the target later". So it was entirely piausible that the
missile attack relied on by the United States originated from Iraq. It
certainly would not have been the first time that Iraq tried to
"internationalize" the conflict, and not the last time Iraq took
aggressive measures against Kuwait.
Finally, there is the strange choice of targets by the United States
on which to mete out its revenge. For if the United States really did
consider that it was obligated to take measures out of self-defence
against Silkworm attacks, why did it not go after the missile sites
themselves? Why did it instead destroy a virtually defenceless set of
oil platforms sorne 600 kilometres away, which were in no position to put
up no resistance whatsoever? And why, as I discussed earlier, did it
concentrate only on the central platform of those facilities to the
exclusion of ethers?
On 19 October 1987, the United States launched a massive attack
against the Reshadat platform. Four of the most sophisticated destroyers
in the us Navy were deployed, together with a guided-missile cruiser, F-
14 fighters and a radar plane. The platforms had a handful of personnel - 51 -
on them who were carrying out repairs to the facilities necessitated, as
I have said, by earlier Iraqi attacks.
The personnel were given a few minutes to leave, and then firing
began. No resistance was put up. This was followed by a raiding force
from the United States warships which planted demolition charges, further
destroying the installations.
And I think it's instructive Mr. President, if I just paste-up for a
moment photographs of the platforms after their attack (11 and 12 in the
folder). As yeu can see the destruction was complete.
New, this leads me to the second series of attacks on 18 April 1988
against the Salman and Nasr platforms. The immediate precursor to this
event was the hitting of a US naval vesse!, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, by
a mine on 14 April 1988 in the Central Persian Gulf east of Bahrain
(folder No. B).
The United States has assumed the mine to be Iranian although it
never produced evidence to this effect. Four days after '· the Roberts his
the mine, United States attacked the Salman and Nasr platforms.
As described in Iran's written pleadings, the United States had in
fact been planning these military operations well before the Roberts ever
hit a mine, and they were designed to have a far wider purpose than
simply destroying the platforms in question. As the US naval commander
who led the operation has recounted, the operation - which was named
"Operation Praying Mantis" - began ten months earlier with extensive
planning in California (Exhibit 80 tc Iran's Memorial). The objectives
of the exercise, according to the US Navy, were stated tc be the
following - and, this is important - I am going to quete from an official
navy report of this incident. After the Roberts hit the mine what was
the United States Navy•s plan: - 52 -
"Sink the Iranian Saam - class frigate Sabalan or a
suitable alternative.
Neutralize the surveillance posts on the Sassan [Salman]
and Sirri [Nasr] gas/oil separation platforms and the Rahkish
Gas/cil separation platforms, if sinking a ship was not
practicable." (Ibid., p. 68.)
Note this last instruction, Mr. President. The platforms were
originally not the intended target of the US operation. The sinking of
the Iranian frigate, the Sabalan, or a suitable alternative was the main
goal. The platforms were only to be targeted "if sinking a ship was not
practicable". And not only the fact that ten months planning went into
the attacks, but also the fact that the platforms were not to be attacked
if an Iranian warship could be sunk, seriously undermine the credibility
to the US contention that it destroyed the platforms out of self-defence.
A large number of warplanes, helicopters and nine US warships were
involved in the operation, together with an aircraft carrier standing by.
The attacks on both the Salman and Nasr platforms took place
simultaneously. Once again, the Iranian personnel were given five
minutes to abandon the platforms, and in fact heavy fire from the US
warships commenced at the Salman installations even before the personnel
were able to evacuate, despite their plea to be given more time. This
was followed by the landing of marines which planted explosives on the
platforms. Once again, the Court can see photographs of the Salman and
Nasr platforms after they were attacked in its folder (Nos. ~4 and 15).
No resistance was offered by the Iranian personnel - a fact which is
not surprising given that the platforms were not military installations
and the Iranian personnel had no means to defend themselves. As the US
Commander of one of the attacks confirmed, the Nasr platform was an
active oil-producing platform when it was hit - in other words, it was a
commercial operation (Iran's Observations, Exhibit 80). - 53 -
The assault on the platforms was not the end of the engagement. The
US Navy was still on the lookout for Iranian ships which had been their
intended target in the first place. Three US warships found a lone
Iranian patrol boat, the Joshan, and it was sunk by six missiles, killing
ll Iranian sailors and injuring 33 ethers. Meanwhile, three more US
warships went after the Sabalan, but could not find it. Instead, they
discovered the Iranian frigate, the Sahand, well up the Persian Gulf in
the Strait of Hormuz, which was threatening no one. It was bombed and
sunk by US aircraft with help from nearby naval vessels. Forty-five
Iranians were killed and 87 injured. Then later the Sabalan was located
further north, and it too was bombed with still more casualties.
So there you have it, Mr. President. In one day, the United States
set out to sink one Iranian warship in reprisal for an incident that Iran
was not responsible for, but wound up destroying two sets of platforms
having an oil capacity of over 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day as
well as half of Iran's navy The US forces did not even suffer a scratch.
As was aptly summed up by the British newspaper the Guardian at the time,
"it seems as if local American Commanders were looking for a fight and
needed only the slightest pretext from the Iranians" (Exhibit 83 to
Iran•s Memorial).
* * *
5. Conclusions
Mr. President, Members of the Court. Those are sorne of the
essential facts. If it has been necessary to tackle these issues in more
detail than would ordinarily be expected during a jurisdictional hearing,
this is because there has been a need to correct the imbalance presented
by the us pleadings and to emphasize the close jurisdictional nexus that - 54 -
exists between the attacks on the platforms and the Treaty of Amity,
including the history of the Treaty.
While Iran is convinced that it can demonstrate on the merits that
the US actions constituted breaches of the Treaty of Amity, at this stage
of the proceedings it need not go sc far. The question is whether the
United States' actions give rise tc genuine questions of interpretation
and application of the Treaty. Iran submits that based on the history of
the Treaty, the development of the offshore cil platforms in issue here,
and the attacks themselves, the answer is clear. The Court has
jurisdiction.
And that concludes my remarks Mr. President. Professer Condorelli
is tc follow me, I appreciate the extra time that has been allocated to
me tc finish my presentation. Would this be an appropriate time for a
short break before Mr. Condorelli takes the floor?
The PRESIDENT: Thank yeu very much, Mr. Rodman Bundy. The hearing
is suspended for a break of 15 minutes.
TP,e Court adjourned from 1.1.50 a.m. to 12.15 p.m.
The PRESIDENT : Please be seated. I now give the floor to Professer
Luigi Condorelli tc continue the oral pleadings of Iran.
M. CONDORELLI
Introduction
Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les Juges, c'est un grand
honneur pour moi de me présenter une nouvelle fois devant votre haute
juridiction. Mon vŒu le plus sincère est de pouvoir aider la Cour à
accomplir son importante mission de régler le présent différend
conformément à la justice et au droit international. - 55 -
La tâche qui m'a été confiée est de démontrer que le différend entre
la République islamique d'Iran et les Etats-Unis, dont votre Cour est
saisie, relève bien de l'interprétation et de l'application du traité
d'amitié de 1955 entre l'Iran et les Etats-Unis (TA de 1955) et peut être
donc réglé sur sa base. Cette démonstration permettra ensuite au
prochain plaideur de la Partie iranienne, le Professeur Crawford, de
mettre en évidence que la Cour jouit de la pleine compétence pour régler
le différend au fond, conformément aux provisions du paragraphe 2 de
l'article XXI du traité d'amitié de 1955.
Mon exposé s'articulera en deux parties.
La première me permettra de présenter le traité dans son ensemble.
Je releverai d'abord qu'il s'agit d'un accord international dont il est
incontroversé qu'il est en vigueur. Je constaterai après cela que rien
ne saurait empêcher l'Iran de se prévaloir de tous les droits que le
traité lui confère, tant au moyen de ses normes matérielles que de celles
relatives au règlement des différends. Ensuite, j'identifierai les
caractéristiques générales du traité, son objet et son but, en en
analysant le texte, le préambule, ainsi que les circonstances qui ont
présidé à sa négociation et à sa conclusion. Enfin, je discuterai les
principes et méthodes à utiliser pour son interprétation.
Dans la deuxième partie de cette plaidoirie, demain matin avec votre
permission, je centrerai l'attention sur les trois articles du traité
(les articles I, IV, paragraphe 1, et X) dont l'Iran est convaincu qu'ils
sont directement pertinents afin d'évaluer l'illégalité des attaques
armées lancées par les Etats-Unis contre les plates-formes pétrolières de
la NIOC dans le golfe Persique. L'analyse permettra de constater que ces
attaques tombent effectivement dans la sphère d'application du traité,
les Etats-Unis ayant violé leurs obligations établies par les - 56 -
dispositions évoquées du traité envers l'Iran; le différend au sujet de
ces attaques, dont la Cour est saisie, porte donc justement sur
l'interprétation et l'application du traité; de ce fait, la clause
compromissoire du traité donne incontestablement à votre haute
juridiction la plénitude de la compétence pour son règlement.
PREMI:ÈRE PARTI:E
l. Le traité de 1955 était en vigueur aux moments pertinents et l'est
encore aujourd'hui
Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, en attaquant
la première partie de ma plaidoirie, je dirai tout de suite que je
n'aurai nullement besoin de m'attarder sur la question préliminaire de
savoir si le traité d'amitié est ou non en vigueur. Il me suffit
d'observer que les Etats-Unis n'ont soulevé aucune contestation à ce
sujet, ni par écrit, ni oralement. La thèse sur laquelle les Etats-Unis
insistent tout au long de leurs plaidoiries est qu'une "reasonable
interpretation" du traité' permettrait de constater que "there is no
relationship between the Treaty and the claims contained in Iran's
Application" 2 • L'agent de la Partie adverse a parlé dans la mêmeveine
de 1' absence de "reasonable connection" {CR 96/13, p. 63) . Il est donc
évident, Madame et Messieurs les Juges, que, du fait mêmede prétendre
que le traité est inapplicable en l'espèce parce qu'il ne couvre pas la
matière objet du présent différend, les Etats-Unis admettent comme allant
de plano que par ailleurs le traité lie toujours les Parties.
Les raisons qui imposent à la Partie adverse pareille reconnaissance
sont tellement évidentes que l'on comprend aisément pourquoi nos
contradicteurs n'ont pas songé un seul instant à soutenir la thèse
1USPO, p. 32, par. 2.10.
0 USPO, p. 2, par. 4; p. 4 0,par. 3. J.S. - 57 -
contraire. C'est que depuis la révolution iranienne de 1979 la
permanence des liens conventionnels résultant du traité d'amitié de 1955
a été l'une des pièces maîtresses de la politique américaine envers
l'Iran et l'un des outils fondamentaux pour le règlement des différends
opposant les deux Parties.
En effet, dans tout le contentieux qui s'est développé entre les
Parties depuis la révolution iranienne, et notamment dans le contentieux
judiciaire, les Etats-Unis ont régulièrement fait valoir que le traité
était en vigueur, donc parfaitement applicable; et - il convient de le
souligner - ils ont toujours eu gain de cause, sans la moindre exception.
Ainsi, déjà en 1980 votre Cour leur a donné raison dans son arrêt
sur le fond de l'affaire du Personnel dip~omatique et consulaire des
Etats-Unis à Téhéran, en soulignant avec fermeté gue les dispositions du
traité «continuent à faire partie du droit applicable entre les
Etats-Unis et l'Iran» 3• Ensuite, à de très nombreuses reprises le
Tribunal des réclamations Etats-Unis/Iran a fait de même, tant avant
qu'après les faits qui sont l'objet du présent différend. Mais ce n'est
pas tout : tant avant qu'après les faits en cause, divers tribunaux
internes américains ont également reconnu que le traité est en vigueur et
qu'il continue d'être applicable dans les relations entre les parties 4 •
Une citation spécifique mérite à ce sujet la toute récente décision
du 25 avril 1996 de la United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dans l'affaire Calgrath, qui applique une
disposition du traité pour régler un différend se rapportant à des
événements des années 1992-1995 en prenant soin d'observer que:
3
Affaire du Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran, arrêt,
24 mai 1980, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 28, par. 54.
• Mémoire de l'Iran, p. 56, par. 2.06, et note 176. - 58 -
"Although the signatories have not always lived up to the
obligations imposed by the document, the United States State
Department takes the position that the Treaty is 'in full force and
effect and (haS) not been terminated by either party ... 1 •"5
Monsieur le Président, il est extrêmement rare qu'un traité
international entre deux Etats ait formé l'objet d'un corpus
jurisprudentiel aussi fourni et cohérent, établissant sans exception sa
permanence en vigueur, et ceci malgré les tensions et les difficultés qui
ont pu caractériser les relations entre les parties pendant les derniers
temps. Et il est aussi parfaitement remarquable, que ces décisions,
toutes ces décisions, tant internationales qu'internes, ont toujours
accueilli sur cette question le point de vue officiel des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique, qui ont donc régulièrement et pleinement bénéficié - tant en
leur faveur directement qu'en faveur de leurs ressortissants - des
avantages découlant du traité.
2. Rien n'empêche l'Iran de faire valoir aujourd'hui devant la Cour tous
les droits que le traité de 1955 lui confère contre les Etats-Unis.
Il est donc indiscutable que le traité lie toujours les Parties: les
Etats-Unis ne prétendent d'ailleurs pas le contraire. Il s'ensuit
logiquement que l'Iran a le droit incontestable d'en invoquer les
dispositions à son avantage devant votre Cour.
Il convient que j'insiste sur les droits que l'Iran tire du
traité de 1955, du fait même que celui-ci est toujours en vigueur. De
toute évidence, ces droits restent intacts, même s'il est vrai qu'à un
moment donné la partie iranienne s'était efforcée de démontrer, devant le
Tribunal des réclamations Etats-Unis/Iran des différends que le traité
avait cessé d'être en vigueur à cause des violations graves dont
5
Civ.lgr5232 (MBM), Opinion Ltdand Ordernk of April 25,n ~996,Bap. S6,erus SD NY, reproduitek Agedans 95
Mealey•s International Arbitration Report, vol. ~~. Issue n° 5, p. ~-4. - 59 -
s'étaient rendus responsables les Etats-Unis dans les années 2979-2980 6•
Le Tribunal, en effet, avait réfuté la thèse iranienne, avait jugé que le
traité était resté en vigueur et avait donc consenti aux Etats-Unis de
continuer à tirer avantage de ses dispositions'. En conséquence, les
Etats-Unis ne sauraient s'opposer maintenant à ce que l'Iran bénéficie
également des droits que le traité lui accorde et qu'il exige à son tour
le respect par la Partie adverse des obligations correspondantes. Il
faut que je souligne dans ce contexte une donnée juridique importante
le préambule du traité base explicitement les relations entre les parties
sur ce qu'il appelle la "reciprocal equality of treatement".
En somme, du fait même d'être en vigueur, le traité lie également
les parties et ses dispositions doivent être respectées par chacune
d'elles de bonne foi et, j'insiste sur la formule préambulaire que je
viens de citer, "on the basis of reciprocal equality of treatement". Les
Etats-Unis, ayant toujours soutenu avec plein succès que le traité
continue d'être en vigueur, ne seraient évidemment pas recevable s'ils
prétendaient aujourd'hui le contraire devant votre Cour. Quant à l'Iran,
la thèse de !•_extinction du traité - que la partie iranienne avait jadis
avancée -n'ayant pas été retenue par la justice internationale, rien ne
saurait faire obstacle à ce qu'il retire maintenant, lui aussi, les
bénéfices découlant de l'application du mêmetraité, dont il a dû
supporter le poids sans interruption. Il va de soi que, parmi ces
bénéfices, il y a celui de pouvoir mettre en branle les procédures de
règlement des différends prévues par le traité; face à certaines
allégations de la Partie adverse prétendant que des violations du traité
d'amitié seraient imputables à l'Iran, et non pas aux Etats-Unis, il
• Iran Observations and Submission, p. 45 ss.
7 Supra, note précédente. - 60 -
convient de rappeler à toute fin utile ce que votre Cour a eu l'occasion
d'élucider en ~980 au sujet du mêmetraité, dans son arrêt sur l'affaire
du Personnel diplomatique et consulaire, c'est le paragraphe 53. Votre
Cour a dit ceci :
"De toute manière, aucune violation du traité commise par
l'une ou l'autre des parties ne saurait avoir pour effet
d'empêcher cette partie d'invoquer les dispositions du traité
relatives au règlement pacifique des différends. "8
Ce sont là des concepts juridiques de caractère élémentaire sur
lesquels il n'est pas utile d'insister encore, tant ils sont évidents.
Les Etats-Unis, d'ailleurs, se gardent bien de mettre en doute le droit
de l'Iran de tirer maintenant avantage à son tour des dispositions du
traité. Quant aux objections de la Partie adverse suivant lesquelles en
l'espèce l'invocation du traité devant vous serait tardive, je laisse sur
ce point à mon collègue le professeur Crawford le soin de les réfuter
tout à l'heure, dans le cadre de sa plaidoirie sur les aspects de
procédure de la présente affaire.
3. L'objet et le but du traité de 1955 à la l~ère des circonstances
ayant présidé à sa négociation et à sa conclusion
J'en viens maintenant au traité lui même, afin d'en identifier avant
tout les caractéristiques d'ensemble. Il s'agit là d'une question
importante, qui mérite d'être éclaircie à titre préliminaire, vu qu'elle
forme l'objet d'un désaccord fondamental entre les Parties au présent
différend.
En effet, l'Iran est convaincu que le traité a une portée bien plus
large que les seules relations strictement économiques, commerciales et
consulaires entre les Parties, puisqu'il vise également à leur imposer
Affaire du Personnel diplomatique ee consulaire des Eeaes-Unis à Téhéran, C.I.J. Recueil
1980, p. 28, par. 53). - 61 -
des obligations attenant aux relations politiques réciproques. Par
contre, la Partie adverse soutient devant la Cour que le traité serait
"purely commercial and consular"; qu'il n'aurait pour objet que des
intérêts commerciaux des ressortissants des deux pays sur le territoire
de l'autre et certaines questions consulaires; que toutes ses
dispositions seraient, encore une fois, "wholly commercial and consular",
donc inapplicables pour le règlement d'un différend portant, en
substance, sur la légalité de l'emploi de la force dans les relations
internationales.
Pourtant, le titre que les Parties ont concordé de donner au traité
est déjà un indice significatif, puisqu'il affiche que le traité ne
s'occupe pas seulement de relations économiques et de droits consulaires,
mais couvre également l' «amitié», l' "amity" c'est-à-dire les relations
amicales entre les cocontractants.
Cet indice, Monsieur le Président est remarquablement conforté par
l'analyse du préambule, préambule qui souligne avec force que le but
poursuivi par les parties en concluant le traité va bien au-delà de
l'économie, du commerce, des investissements et des relations
consulaires : les parties ont exprimé ouvertement dans le préambule
l'intention de viser plus haut et plus large, en faisant de leur traité
un instrument couvrant l'ensemble de leurs relations. En effet, le
préambule indique que l'intention à laquelle le traité répond est, en
tout premier lieu, de "emphasize", donc de consolider, renforcer,
développer les relations amicales entre les parties, ce qui de toute
évidence ne se limite pas au commerce; elles ont souhaité également
réaffirmer - je cite les mots du préambule - "the high principles in the
regulation of human affairs" (des affaires qui, me semble-t-il, ne
sauraient être entendues comme les seules affaires d'argent!) C'est - 62 -
seu~ernen après que figurent, dans le préambule, les finalités d'ordre
plus strictement économique, commercial et consu~aire.
Ces remarques concernent le but et l'objet du traité, tels qu'ils
apparaissent mis en exergue par le préambule, mais elles sont d'une
grande importance au vu du rôle primaire qu'il faut justement assigner au
préambule à fin d'identifier l'objet et le but d'un traité afin
d'interprétation, comme le consacre d'ailleurs la "Règle générale
d'interprétation" codifiée à l'article 31, alinéa 1, de la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traités.
Il faut rappeler aussi, dans ce contexte, ce que votre Cour a
sou~igné maintes fois : il est nécessaire de prendre en considération le
préambule d'un traité international afin de déceler l'objet et le but
poursuivi par les parties contractantes et pour en interpréter les
dispositions. Ainsi, pour ne citer que deux précédents jurisprudentiels,
dans l'arrêt du 27 août 1952, dans l'affaire des Droits des
ressortissants des Etats-Unis d'Amérique au Maroc, la Cour a déclaré
qu'i~ fallait, pour interpréter les dispositions de l'acte d'Algésiras
de 1906, tenir compte des buts de ce traité, tels qu'ils sont énoncés
justement dans le préambule 9• Egalement, la Cour s'est référée au
préambule pour identifier la nature juridique et l'interprétation du
mandat de l'Afrique du Sud sur le Sud-OUest africain, dans son arrêt du
21 décembre 1962 sur les exceptions préliminaires 10•
Monsieur le Président, je n'ai pas l'intention de discuter ici la
question générale de savoir si le préambule d'un traité peut constituer à
lui seul la source d'obligations précises pour les parties; il est par
'C.I.J. Recueil 2952,p. ~96 et suiv.
" C.I.J. Recueil 2962, p. 330 et suiv. Voir aussi l'arrêt du 26 novembre ~984 dans
l'affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci,
C.I.J. Recueil 2984, p. 428. - 63 -
contre indiscutable- selon l'enseignement de votre jurisprudence- que
le préambule est utile pour interpréter le texte du traité et pour
identifier les obligations prescrites par ses dispositions. Autrement
dit, l'Iran n'a pas prétendu et ne prétend pas maintenant que la Cour
pourrait, sur la base du seul préambule du traité, décider si les
Etats-unis ont violé ou non envers l'Iran leurs obligations
conventionnelles. En revanche, l'Iran soutient fermement qu'il y a une
parfaite correspondance entre le préambule et le texte du traité, en ce
sens que le texte reprend et traduit en obligations bien déterminées
l'ensemble des buts résultant du préambule, y compris celui relatif au
développement des relations amicales.
Il suffit d'un coup d'oeil au texte des articles du traité pour que
s'impose le constat que le traité en question n'est justement pas "purely
commercial and consular" comme le dit la Partie adverse : il faut nier
l'évidence pour ne pas voir son article premier et pour ne pas s'incliner
devant le langage parfaitement contraignant qu'il emploie lorsqu'il
prescrit que "there shall be [il ne dit pas "there should be"!] firm and
enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of
America and Iran". Pourtant, de par sa position prioritaire même, de par
son libellé ferme, de par sa portée large, l'article premier exprime
nettement la volonté des cocontractants de ne pas limiter la sphère
d'application du traité aux seules relations économiques, commerciales et
consulaires. Je me limite ici à cette seule observation au sujet de
l'article premier, sans anticiper sur l'examen détaillé que j'en ferai
dans la deuxième partie de ma plaidoirie, étant donné qu'il s'agit pour
le moment d'identifier exclusivement les caractéristiques d'ensemble du
traité et l'ampleur de son objet. - 64 -
Soit dit en passant, ce n'est pas seulement grâce à l'article
premier que le traité révèle sa vraie nature d'instrument conventionnel
couvrant des relations bien plus larges que celles de nature purement
commerciale. L'article II, par exemple, s'occupe de garantir, entre
autres, certains droits fondamentaux aux ressortissants de chacune des
Hautes Parties contractantes se trouvant sur le territoire de l'autre, et
ceci bien au-delà du domaine des activités économiques et commerciales
il y est question ainsi de la liberté d'association, de la liberté de
conscience et de religion, du droit de mener des activités
philanthropiques, éducatives, scientifiques, de la liberté d'information,
de communication (al. 2), ainsi que du droit de recevoir Un traitement
humain et équitable en cas d'arrestation et, plus en général, du droit de
bénéficier de la manière la plus constante de la protection et de la
sécurité (al. 4). Encore, l'article III accorde les garanties découlant
du principe du due process of law, et ceci dans tous les domaines
touchant à la vie de la personne, et non seulement en matière strictement
économique.
L'analyse que je viens de présenter a été centrée - comme il
convient- sur le texte du traité lui-même (y compris son préambule), qui
est bien évidemment décisif pour identifier sa sphère d'application. Les
éléments recueillis étayent sans l'ombre d'un doute la thèse présentée
par l'Iran et condamnent comme insoutenable, ici aussi sans l'ombre d'un
doute, la thèse des Etats-Unis relative au caractère strictement
commercial et consulaire du traité. Les choses étant donc parfaitement
claires, l'Iran n'aurait pas besoin de chercher des confirmations de sa
position dans le rappel des "circonstances dans lesquelles le traité a
été conclu", qui constituent notoirement de simples "moyens
complémentaires d'interprétation" des traités internationaux, comme - 65 -
l'exprime l'article 32 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des
traités et comme la Cour - votre Cour - l'a rappelé à maintes occasions,
y compris tout dernièrement, dans l'arrêt du 25 février 2995, dans
l'affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales
entre Qatar et Bahrein, au paragraphe 40 de cet arrêt.
Toutefois, ex abundanti cautela, il est opportun de revenir
rapidement sur ce que l'Iran a déjà abondamment illustré par écrit et que
mon collègue, maître Bundy, vient de mettre au clair de façon détaillée
dans sa plaidoirie : l'analyse historique démontre parfaitement qu'en
négociant et en concluant le traité, les Etats-Unis se proposaient des
buts politiques et stratégiques d'une portée bien plus large
qu'exclusivement commerciale. Il s'agissait de mettre en place avec
l'Iran des relations spéciales, capables de l'attirer définitivement dans
l'orbite occidentale et de le soustraire à jamais à l'influence
soviétique.
L'Iran a également montré que ce contexte historique explique en
particulier pourquoi le traité contient l'article premier, obligeant les
parties contractantes à maintenir à l'avenir des relations amicales et
pacifiques : une disposition qui - comme on le verra plus tard - n'a
trouvé sa place que dans quatre traités bilatéraux d'amitié conclus par
les Etats-Unis, sur un total de plus de deux dizaines. L'Iran a souligné
en particulier, et avec force, les témoignages de source officielle
américaine indiquant que l'inclusion dans quelques-uns seulement de ces
traités bilatéraux de la clause en question n'est pas du tout "customary" - 66 -
dans la pratique conventionnelle des Etats-Unis et qu'elle a pour but de
rendre plus étroites les relations économiques entre les Etats-Unis et
les Etats concernés 11•
Ces affirmations, Monsieur le Président, ne sont pas une invention
de l'Iran : c'est le Département d'Etat des Etats-Unis d'Amérique qui les
a faites dans un document que l'Iran a produit devant la Cour, en tant
qu'annexe 10 de ses observations écrites à l'exception préliminaire des
Etats-Unis, et qui se référait au traité avec la Chine du 4 novembre 1946
(l'un des trois autres traités d'amitié dont l'article premier est le
frère jumeau de l'article premier de notre traité), un document dans
lequel tout est écrit, et il est donc - je le dis avec tout le respect -
étonnant de voir plusieurs des plaideurs de la Partie adverse s'évertuer
à affirmer, contre l'évidence probatoire, que l'article premier du traité
serait une clause de routine, qui traînerait constamment dans la plupart
des traités de ce genre .
La vérité est tout autre, Monsieur le Président : la vérité est que
les négociateurs américains avaient voulu l'inclusion dans le traité
d'amitié avec_l'Iran de cette disposition, qui est inhabituelle dans ce
genre de traités, parce qu'ils lui assignaient intentionnellement un sens
et un effet précis : celui de resserrer les liens politiques entre les
parties. Le document que je viens de citer le dit noir sur blanc: "the
inclusion of this paragraph is appropriate in view of the close political
relations between China and the United States" (c'est le document à
propos de l'accord avec la Chine). Entre autres, il résulte en
particulier des travaux préparatoires que le texte de l'article premier
du traité avec l'Iran fut proposé par les Etats-Unis et accepté par
départements od'Etattides Etats-Unisan,annexé par pl'Iranphe(pièce2~0).inVoirquaussiminfra,dumnote 39
(texte relatif) . - 67 -
l'Iran. Comment mettre en doute, face à de pareilles preuves, confortées
par les admissions explicites et officielles de la Partie adverse, que la
portée du traité d'amitié de ~955 avec l'Iran transcende les seules
relations commerciales et consulaires ?
Pourtant, les Etats-Unis essaient d'étayer contre toute
vraisemblance leur allégation suivant laquelle la portée du traité de
1955 n'irait pas au delà du domaine strictement commercial et consulaire.
Et dans leurs écritures ils ont mêmeprétendu à cette fin que l'Iran
aurait reconnu devant le Tribunal des réclamations Etats-Unis/Iran la
non-pertinence du traité au sujet des questions ayant trait à l'emploi de
la force, comme la tentative d'action de commando lancée par les
Etats-Unis en ~980 en connexion avec l'affaire du Personnel diplomatique
et consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran 12• Or, l'Iran pense avoir démontré
13
dans sa plaidoirie écrite du 1er juillet 1994 que l'allégation de la
Partie adverse est erronée, puisqu'elle est basée sur une citation
amputée de la thèse iranienne de l'époque. En effet, si l'on analyse
"!•ensemble des documents de source iranienne présentés dans l'affaire
Amoco International Finance, on s'aperçoit aisément que, bien au
contraire, la partie iranienne avait soutenu devant le Tribunal que le
raid armé des Etats-Unis avait constitué une violation tellement grave du
traité de 1955, qu'il en avait engendré l'extinction. Le Tribunal avait
refusé d'admettre que le traité avait pris fin, il est donc évident que
l'Iran peut maintenant s'en prévaloir et en invoquer l'application
concernant les attaques armées américaines de 1987 et 1988 contre les
plates-formes pétrolières iraniennes puisque rien dans sa conduite
antérieure ne rend inadmissible une telle requête à votre Cour, puisque
'"USPO, p. 46, par. 3.29.
" Op. cit:.,p. 45. - 68 -
rien ne plaide dans le sens que l'Iran aurait admis devant cet autre
Tribunal que le traité n'est pas applicable dans ce genre de situations.
Je note au passage que dans leur présentation orale les plaideurs de la
Partie adverse n'ont pas repris cet argument : sans doute, la
démonstration qu'avait offerte par écrit l'Iran leur a paru convaincante.
Ce sont, Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les Juges, les
Etats-Unis en revanche qui, dans leurs exceptions préliminairesl 4,
admettent implicitement la pertinence du traité de 1955 pour évaluer des
actes d'emploi de la force! En effet, de façon incidente, la Partie
adverse accuse l'Iran d'avoir violé le principe de la liberté de
navigation (dont il est question à l'article X du traité en question), du
fait d'avoir mouiller des mines dans des eaux internationales et d'avoir
attaquer des navires marchands, au cours du conflit avec l'Iraq. Par
contre, soutient la Partie adverse, je cite : «all the action by the
United States were taken to advance freedom of navigationl 5».
Dans une phase ultérieure de la présente procédure, l'Iran aura
souhaitablement l'occasion de montrer combien, tant l'accusation lancée
contre l'Iran que l'auto-justification avancée par la Partie adverse,
sont infondées. A ce stade, il suffira de remarquer que tant l'une que
l'autre impliquent clairement la reconnaissance que le domaine
d'application du traité va bien au-delà des relations commerciales et
consulaires, puisque les Etats-Unis admettent qu'à la lumière de l'une de
ses dispositions, il est possible de qualifier de légale ou d'illégale la
force employée en l'espèce par les Etats-Unis ou l'Iran. C'est cela
exactement que l'Iran demande à votre Cour de bien vouloir dire : l'Iran
se réjouit donc de constater qu'en substance, au-delà des positions de
" Op. cie., p. so.
"Ibid., p. 49, par. 3.34. - 69 -
façade, les Etats-Unis partagent son point de vue quant à la portée large
du traité de 1955 et à son aptitude à couvrir les actes d'emploi de la
force.
Une dernière remarque à ce sujet. La thèse des Etats-Unis, que je
viens de qualifier de «position de façade», fait fi de la jurisprudence
de votre Cour qui, dans son arrêt du 27 juin 1986 dans l'affaire des
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, a
décidé qu'une série d'attaques armées américaines en territoire du
Nicaragua constituaient la violation d'obligations résultant d'une
disposition du traité d'amitié entre les Etats-Unis et le Nicaragua -
l'article XIX de ce traité-là- qui est la soeur jumelle de l'article X
du traité avec l'Iran. Je reviendrai avec plus de détails sur ce point
dans la deuxième partie de ma plaidoirie, lorsque je me pencherai,
justement, sur l'interprétation de l'article X, relatif à la liberté de
commerce et de navigation. Pour l'heure, je me limiterai à relever gue
les distinguo dans lesquels s'est lancé- avec beaucoup d'habileté, il
faut le reconnaître- l'un des plaideurs de la Partie adverse,
Mr. Murphy, n'enlèvent absolument rien à l'importance et à la pertinence
de ce précédent, gui conforte incontestablement le point de vue de
l'Iran : votre jurisprudence confirme on ne peut plus nettement gue les
dispositions du traité d'amitié Iran-Etats-Unis, à l'instar de celles
identiques du traité d'amitié Etats-Unis-Nicaragua sont parfaitement
utilisables pour évaluer la légalité ou non d'actes d'emploi de la force
par une partie portant préjudice aux intérêts, protégés par le traité
d'amitié, de l'autre partie. - 70 -
4. Les principes à utiliser pour l'interprétation des dispositions du
traité de 1955
En discutant de la nature et de l'étendue des obligations découlant
du traité de 1955, j'ai déjà évoqué certains principes (ou méthodes)
d'interprétation qui sont particulièrement pertinents dans notre affaire.
C'est le cas, notamment, du principe de l'interprétation dite
«téléologique», qui demande d'apprécier la signification des dispositions
de tout accord international en tenant compte de l'objet et du but de
celui-ci {tel qu'il résulte, en particulier, du préambule). C'est le cas
aussi du recours aux «moyens complémentaires d'interprétation».
Deux autres grands principes méritent également d'être mis en
évidence à ce stade, avant d'analyser de façon ponctuelle les trois
dispositions du traité sur lesquelles se fonde la requête de l'Iran dans
la présente affaire. Il s'agit du principe dit de l'«effet utile», ou
«effectiveness» (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) et du principe de
l'interprétation dite «contextuelle», qui impose de tenir compte de tout
l'«environnement» juridique d'un traité, y compris le droit international
général, pour l'interpréter. Dans ses écritures, la Partie iranienne a
pris la liberté d'illustrer avec beaucoup de détails l'assise et la
portée de ces principes, qui jouissent d'une reconnaissance universelle
tant dans la jurisprudence que dans la doctrine 16 : de ce fait, je pourrai
me limiter ici à un rappel qui sera d'autant plus bref que la Partie
adverse ne semble, pour l'heure, vouloir en contester ni la validité, ni
la pertinence.
Le principe de l'«effet utile» est, comme l'a défini votre Cour dans
son arrêt du 3 février 1994 17, dans l'affaire du Différend territorial
10
et Mp.o42e et suiv.n, p. 72 et suiv.; Observations et (Submissions) de l'Iran, p. 23 et suiv.
17
par.ffSl.. du Différend territorial (Jamalliriya arabe libye=e/Tcb.ad), C.I.J. Recueil l.994, - 7~ -
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad) : «l'un des principes fondamentaux
d'interprétation des traités constamment admis dans la jurisprudence
internationale». Ce principe impose d'interpréter toute clause
conventionnelle, comme le dit l'ancienne sentence arbitrale : «so as to
give it a meaning rather than so as to deprive it of meaning» 18•
Autrement dit, en cas de doute sur l'interprétation d'une disposition
d'un traité, l'interprète doit choisir entre plusieurs sens possibles
celui qui permet d'accorder à cette disposition un effet et de lui donner
application, plutôt qu'un autre sens qui la priverait de toute utilité,
9
qui la viderait de toute portée juridiqué •
Il est tout à fait remarquable que, dans l'arrêt à peine cité de
1994, votre Cour, dans l'affaire du Différend territorial (Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne/Tchad), dans cet arrêt, le principe en question a joué
pour votre Cour un rôle essentiel dans le règlement du différend
territorial qui opposait la Libye au Tchad et qui portait justement sur
l'interprétation d'un traité d'amitié. C'est en s'en inspirant apertis
verbis de ce principe que votre Cour a décidé de choisir l'interprétation
de l'article 3 du traité d'amitié et de bon voisinage du 10 août ~955
entre la France et la Libye que prônait le Tchad. En effet, cette
interprétation donnait â l'article en question un «effet utile», alors
que l'interprétation suggérée par la Libye aurait privé «totalement»
(c'est le mot qu'utilise votre Cour) d'effet certaines parties de la
disposition 20 • J'ajoute d'ailleurs que votre Cour a raisonné de façon
très similaire encore plus récemment, dans
18
complètea dansanobservations jade l'Iran,26p. A42 . vol. 20, 1926, p. 587. Voir la citation plus
., !?our la doctrine en ce sens, voir les citations contenues dans observations de l'Iran,
p. 43, note 99.
2
° C.I.J. Recueil 1994, cit., par. 47 Cet passim) de l'arrêt. - 72 -
son arrêt du ~5 février ~995 dans l'affaire de la Délimitation maritime
et des questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahrein 21•
Le principe de l'«effet utile» est donc une clé parfaitement fiable,
qu'il conviendra d'utiliser sans hésitation par la suite, afin
d'interpréter les articles pertinents du traité de ~955. Il en va de
mêmepour l'autre principe évoqué précédemment, suivant lequel un traité
doit être interprété à la lumière de son contexte; contexte dont fait
partie, comme le consacre l'article 3~, alinéa 3, lit. c, de la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de ~969, «toute règle
pertinente de droit international applicable dans les relations entre les
parties», y compris donc, bien évidemment, le droit international général
et la Charte des Nations Unies.
Les écritures iraniennes, ici aussi, ont cité un grand nombre de
précédents jurisprudentiels et d'opinions doctrinales établissant le
caractère incontesté de ce principe 22• Au vu de l'unanimité qui règne au
sujet de la pleine validité du principe en question, il serait fastidieux
pour votre Cour que je m'attarde dans des citations qui pourraient être
fort nombreuses. Je voudrais pourtant me limiter à signaler ici deux
points.
Le premier est que, contrairement à ce que semble craindre l'un des
plaideurs de l'autre côté de la barre, M. Crook, l'Iran n'a absolument
rien à objecter au bien-fondé des remarques qu'il a présentées au sujet
de l'article 31, alinéa 3, lit. c, de la convention de Vienne sur le
droit des traités (CR 96/13, p. 20-21) . Il est indiscutable, en effet,
que cette disposition proclame exclusivement un principe d'interprétation
des traités et n'élargit d'aucune façon, en tant que telle, la compétence
21
C.I.J. Recueil J.995,p. 19, par. 35.
22Supra, note 17; voir spécialement les observations de l'Iran, p. 24·27, et notes
pertinentes. - 73 -
de votre Cour. Il est également indiscutable gue seules les règles
«pertinentes» du droit international en vigueur sont à utiliser pour
interpréter les traités. Parfaitement d'accord sur toute la ligne, M.
Crook : les Parties à la présente procédure conviennent donc -d'ailleurs
elles ne pourraient pas faire autrement - que votre Cour a la mission de
prendre en considération toute règle pertinente du droit international,
en dehors le cas échéant du traité lui-même, pour interpréter les
dispositions de celui-ci. Toutes les dispositions de celui-ci, toutes
les dispositions du traité de 1955, bien entendu : y compris, cela va de
soi, l'article I ! En somme, pour déterminer la signification de cet
article, votre Cour devra avoir recours aux règles de droit international
en vigueur entre les Parties gui sont «pertinentes» afin de déterminer ce
que veut dire "firm and enduring peace" et ce gue veut dire "sincere
friendship".
Le deuxième point, le voici il convient de rappeler gue le principe
consacré à l'article 31, alinéa 3, lit. c, de la convention de Vienne a
été appliqué à plusieurs reprises par le Tribunal des réclamations
Etats-Unis/Iran, et sur demande précise du demandeur américain, justement
à fin d'interprétation du traité qui nous intéresse ici.
Parmi les sentences pertinentes 23, celle de 1987 dans l'affaire Amoco
International Finance 2~ mérite une citation explicite. Dans ce cas, la
question de l'utilisation du droit international général afin de combler
les lacunes du traité (en l'espèce, celles de l'article IV) avait formé
l'objet d'un débat judiciaire très serré entre la partie iranienne et la
partie demanderesse, Amoco. On notera cependant que les deux parties
23
Pour les références,observations de l'Iran, p. 26, note 59.
24 Amoco International Finance Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., sentence
N°3~0-56-3 du 14 juillet 1987, par.88-100 (~5 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports, 1987 II,
p.189 ss.). - 74 -
concordaient pleinement quant à l'idée qu'il fallait avoir recours au
droit international général dans ce but, celui-ci devant être conçu comme
«incorporé» dans le traité de 1955 25 : il y avait cependant désaccord
concernant le contenu du droit coutumier en vigueur aujourd'hui en
matière d'expropriation d'intérêts économiques étrangers. Or, avant de
trancher le point litigieux, le Tribunal se lance dans un obiter dictum
particulièrement heureux, dans lequel on reconnait bien la griffe du
Président, le regretté Professeur Michel Virally. Cet obiter dictum
dont il ne faut pas oublier qu'il a été dicté en songeant spécifiquement
à notre traité - représente, à mon sens, la formulation la plus accomplie
et la plus satisfaisante du principe relatif à l'utilisation du droit
international général dans l'interprétation des traités internationaux.
Permettez-moi, Monsieur le Président, de citer intégralement le passage
pertinent de la sentence :
"As a lex specialis in the relations between the two
countries, the Treaty supersedes the lex generalis, namely
customary international law. This does not mean, however, that
the latter is irrelevant in the instant case. On the contrary,
the rules of customary law may be useful in arder to fill in the
possible lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of
undefined terms in its text or, more generally, to aid
interpretation and implementation of its provisions. "26
Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les Juges, dans la
prochaine analyse des dispositions du traité qui sont pertinentes pour le
règlement du présent différend, il faudra garder soigneusement en mémoire
ce principe, tel que l'a identifié le Tribunal des réclamations
Etats-Unis/Iran en 1987, et ce pour l'appliquer spécifiquement à notre
traité : c'est bien au droit international général qu'il faut donc avoir
recours chaque fois qu'on décèle des lacunes dans les dispositions du
25Par. 87 de la sentence.
" Paragraphe l.l.2 de lasentence . - 75 -
traité, ou chaque fois qu'on y rencontre des termes et des concepts non
précisément définis par le même traité.
Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les Juges, avec votre
permission, je voudrais interrompre ici ma plaidoirie pour la reprendre
demain matin. Merci.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur
Luigi Condorelli pour votre exposé. Je déclare close la séance de ce
matin et la Cour reprendra ses audiences publiques demain matin à
10 heures.
L'audience est levée à 13 h 05.
Audience publique tenue le jeudi 19 septembre 1996, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, président