Opinion individuelle de M. Tomka

OPTNIONINDIVIDUELLEDE M. LEJUGETOMKA

Protection diplomatiqu- Disfinctirenfre droit de I'Etat el droit de /'in&-
vidu - Invoctltiondu drmirdc I'inClividudevarlt unejuridicriott itrrrirnutiunnlc
par 1'Etutde stlnurir~nulit Exception de non-kpuisenientdes voiesclcrccours
i~zternes.
Interprtiarior~de L'I'uhligulrd'informer en verlu de I'alDzkub) du puru-
graphe I de l'ur~icle36.
Obligotiunde cessalron- Carnctkrecontinu uu nondc iI'ucterllrci-e Non-

perfinence que les cas indivaduernnr pend~~ntcskvnni lesjuridiclions rnlernes
et de la rkparut~onuppropridepour I'obliga~ionde cessarlnn.

1. Ayant vote pour le dispositif du present arrEt, je voudrais, n6an-
moins, preciser ma position sur certains points de droil evoquts dans le
raisonnernenl de la Caur.

2. Le Mexique, en sournettant cette affaire B la Cour, pretend faire
valoir ses propres droits qui auraient Ctk violcs par les Etats-Unis ainsi
que son droit 5 la protection diplomatique de ses cinquante-deux ressor-

tissantsdont les droits individuels,selon lui:auraient kte de mernc violds
par les Etats-Unis.
3. Les Etats-Unis ont, en ce qui conccrne I'exercicede la protection
diplomatique, soulevk deux exceptions rila recevabilitk des rkclarnations
rnexicaines.Selon lapremiere exception,qui nous intkresseici, lademande
rnexicaine,doit Etrejugke irrecevable par la Cour parce que les voies de
recours intcrnes n'ont pas Cti:epuiskes et restent disponibles dans les
cinquante-dcux cas*
4. 11ressort du paragraphc 40 de I'arrGtque la Cour acccpte cette

exception des Etats-Unis 21larecevabilitkde la demande du Mexiyue [on-
d@e sur I'exercicede la protection diplomatique. La Cour y observe

ccqueIes droits individuels que les ressortissants mexicaiiis tirent de

I'alinkab) du paragraphe 1 de F'arlicle36de la convention de Vienne
sont des droils dont la realisatiori doit, en toutcascn premier lieu,
2tre recherchke dans lecadre du systkmejuridique interne des Elals-
Unis D.

La Cour cn conclul que
ci[c]en'est qu'une foisce processus men&Bson terrne et les voies de
recours intcrnes CpuisCesque le Mexiquc pourrait faire siennes des SEPARATEOPINION OF JUDGE TOMKA

Diplomatic protection - Distinciiun between rights of the Srare and indi-
vlrdu righ~s - Invocafion ofindil~iduurlights h&re un iniurnutionnl court by
Stare of nutimalily - Objection based on nun-exhau.rtir~onj'lr~cnlrunedies.

Interpretalionof theobiignliomfopruvidc infurmufivn unhr Arrirl~.36, puru-
graph I (b).
I Obligation of cessation- Whetherwrungfulact is ufu cuntmuingnirfurr: -
Panrlency ofindividuulcases before domestic courts uridform of vepurutic)nnot
porrinentto ohilgatinnofc~ssation.
i
1.Having voted in favour of the operative part of this Judgment,
I nonetheless wish lo clarify my position on certain points of law

mentioned in the Court's reasoning.

2. In bringing this case bcfbre the Court, Mexico seeks to assert its
own rights, which itclaims to have bccn violated by the United States, as
wellas its right to diplomatic protection of its 52 nationals, whose indi-
vidual rights are also alleged to have been violated by lhc Unilcd States.

3. The United States raised two objections to the admissibility of thc

Mexican clai~nsbasedon thc cxercise of diplomatic protection. The first
objection, that which concerns us hcrc, was that the Mexican claim
should bc held inadmissible by the Court on the ground that local
remedics had not been exhausted and were still available in the 52
CdSCS.
4. It would appear from paragraph 40 of the Judgment that the Court
accepts the United States objection to the admissibility of Mexico's claim
based on the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection. In that para-

graph, the Court observes that
"thcindividual rights of Mexicannationals under paragraph 1(b) of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention are rights which are to be
asscrted, at any rate in the first place, within the domcstic legal

system of the United States".

The Court concludes :

"Only when that proccss is completed and local remedies are
exhausted would Mexico be entitled to espouse the individual demandes individuellesde ses ressortissants par le micanisme de la
protection diplomatique w.

En d'autres termes, la demande du Mexique fondee sur la protection
diplomaticjucpourrait ZtreconsidCrCeirrecevableet l'cxccptiondes Etats-
Unis relative au non-Cpuisementdes voies de recours internes pourrait
presque atteindre son objectif. L'exception est nkanrnoins rejetke par la
Cour, mais pour une autre raison.
5. La Cour rejette l'exception parce qu'une telle exception ne s'ap-

plique pas a la demande prksentee par le Mexique en son norn propre
(mais je doute que les Etats-Unis aient vise dans leur cxccption la de-
mande du Mexique prksentkeen son nom proprc). .
6.Pour pouvoir statuer sur les violations allegules des obligations
dont les Etats-Unis Ctaient tenus envers les ressortissants rncxicains en
vcrtu du paragraphe 1de l'article36 de la convention de Vienne, la Cour
se refkre a - ce que j'appeilerais - une nouvelle thkorie, et n'invoque
pour l'irtayer aucune jurisprudence anterieure. La Cour cxptique que,
dans des circonslances toutes particuliires d'interdepcndance des droits
dc I'Etat et des droits individuels,1'Etat(dans notre cas le Mexique)peut,
en sournettant une demande en son norn propre, inviter la Cour a statucr
sur la violation des droitsdont ilsoutient avoir etk victime5 la Ibisdirec-

tement et 5 travcrs la violation des droits individuels confkrks a ses res-
sortissants par I'alinkabJ du paragraphe 1de l'article 36.
7. Dans la prtsente affaire,i mon sens, la Cour nepouvait arriver ;la
conclusion que lesdroits individuels des ressortissants mexicains avaient
et6 violCsque si elleacceptait lapsklcntion du Mexique selon laquelle cel
Etat exerqait son droil itla protection diplomatique. Pour etablir lavio-
lation des droits individuels (lesdroits des individus), iIfaut les invoquer
sur !a sc&neinternationale. Quand 1'Etacinvoyua lesdroits de ses natio-
naux, il prend fdit et cause, en son nom proprc, pour ces nationaux en
raison du prkjudice qu'ilsont subi; en d'autres termes, cet Etat exerce la
protection diplomatique. La raison principale pour le Mexique de sou-
rnettre I'affairc kla Cour Ctait le prkjudice allCguCqu'auraient subi ses
ressortissants. Ce sont ses ressortissants - et leur sorl - qui preoc-
cupent principalement leMexiquc. Afin de teurdonner unederniere chancc

dans le systkmejudiciairc des Etats-Unis, il itait d'importanm cruciale
d'ktablir les violations des obligations des Elats-Unis, en vertu de la
convention de Vienne, I'egardde ces ressortissants mexicainset Icprk-
judice qui leur est ainsi causk. J'estime que c'est davanlage la violation
dcs droits d'unindividu et le prkjudice qui Euiest cause que la violation
dw droit appartenant au Mcxique et le prejudice causk ainsi ri I'Etat qui
peuvent jouer un certain rile dans le cadre des procidures pinales aux
Etats-Unis.
8. Si on situe cette affaire dans le cadre de la protection diplomatiquc,
on ne peut nCgligert'exceptionsoulevtc par les Etats-Unis selon laquelle
les ressortissants rnexicainsn'ont pas Cpuisklesvoies de recours internes.

4. Face a cet argument des Etats-Unis, le Mexique souticnl que la AVENA AND OTHERS (SEP. Of'.'I'OMKA) 95

claims of its nationals through the procedure of diplomatic,protec
tion."

In other words, Mexico's claim based on diplomatic protection could be

regarded as inadmissible and the United Statesobjection based on the
failure to exhaust local remedies might appear to have succeeded. The
Caurknonetheless rejects the objection on a different ground.

5. The Court rejects the objection bccause such an objection does not
apply to the claim submitted by Mexico in its own name (although I
doubt whether the United States objection was directed at Mexico's
craim in its own name).
6. In order lo be able to rule on the alleged violations by the United
States of its obligations to Mcxican nationals under Article 36, para-
graph 1, of the Vienna Convention, the Court relies on what is in my
viewa novel doclrinc, without citing any prior jurisprudence in support

thereof. The Court explains that, in thc special circumstances of inter-
dependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights, the State (in
this case Mcxico)may,in submitting a claim in its own name, request the
Court to rule on the violation of rights which it claimsto have suffered
both directly and through the violationof individual rights conferred on
its nationals under Article 36, paragraph I (b).

7. In the prcsent casc, inmy view,the Court could only reach the con-
clusion that the individual rightof Mexican nationals had been violated
if it accepted Mexico's claimthat lhal State was exercising its rightto
diplomatic protection. In order for a violation of individual rights (the
rights of individual nationals), to be established, such rights have to be

pleaded befbrc an international court. When the State invokes the rights
of its nationals, it acts in its own name an their behalr, on account of the
wrong done lo them: in other words, that State exercises diplomatic,pro-
tcction. Mexico'smain reason tbr bringing the case before the Court was
thc allcgcd wrong donc to its nationals. It is its nationa-s and their
fate- with which Mexicois primarily concerned. In order to give them
a final chance within the United States judicial system, it was vital to
establish violationsby the United States of its obligations to Mcxican
nationals under the Vienna Convention, and the resullant injury to them.
In my view,it isthe violation of thc rights of an individual and the wrong
done to that individual, rathcr than the violation of a right of Mexico
and the resultant injury to that State, that may hava certain role to play
in thc context of criminal proceedingsin the United States.

8. If this case is viewed in the contcxt of diplomatic protection,
we cannot simply ignorc thc United States objection that the Mexican
nationals have railed roexhaustlocal remedies.
9. Faced with this argument on the part of thc United Stares, Mexicomajoritk des ressortissanls mexicains concernes ont, en vain, fotrnk dcs
recours aux Etats-Unis. I1ajoute que la doctrine de la carence prockdu-
rale a, de toute manikre, emp2chCla plupart d'enlre cux de hire valoir

leurs demandes, les klkmentsproduits n'ayant pas ktEprksentks au stade
antkrieur de la procedure - prkciskment parce que les autoritks ameri-
caines n'avaienl pas infonnk les interesses de leurs droits comme elles y
Ctaienl lcnucs par le paragraphe I de l'article 36.
Quant aux autres ressortissants, le Mexique prktcnd que les Etats-
Unis ont prbentk de faqon inexacte l'obligalion d'tpuisement des voies
de recours internes en laissanl cnlendre qu'il s'agissait d'une rkgle abso-
IUE.I1invoque I'opinion individuelle du juge Tanaka dans l'al'faircde la
BarcelotqaTraction, selon laquelle cla rkgle n'impose pas, semble-t-il,
aux intkressksd'engager une action manifestement illusoire et depourvue
de portkc, ni de tenter ;nouveau une action qui s'estdkjhr6vtli.e vainen
(Burcelona Truclion, Light and Po~~er Cowzpany, Limited, rlEuxi2me

pfiuse,urrCt, C.I.J.Recueil 1970, p. 145).Selon le Mexique, un ressortis-
sant Ctranger formant un recours judiciaire pour violation de I'articlc 36
n'aura jamais gain de cause aux Etats-Unis, car lcs juridictions des
Etats-Unis dkclarent soit que l'article 36 ne crCcpas de droit individuel,
soit qu'un ressortissant etranger qui a el@privk des droits qu'il tenait de
l'article 36,mais qui a en revanche beneticikde ceux prkvus par la Cons-
titution et les lois des Elats-Unis, nc peut Ctablir l'existenced'un prkju-
dice et donc obtcnir reparation. Le Mexique avance d'ailleurs que la
rCglcde I'kpuisementdes voiesde recours internes esl lirnilCcaux recours
juridictionnelx et que la recevabiliti: d'une reqdte devant la Cour n'est
pas assujettiea la condition prealable de l'kpuisernent des recours en
grgce.
10. La Commission du droit international cruiactueflcrnct~tprbpare un

projet d'articles sur la protection diplomatlquc formulequatrekxieptions
dont souffre la rkglede I'Cpuisementdes voics de recours internes. Seule
la premikc d'entre elles nous interesse dans la prCsentc afli~irc.Selon
cette exception, point n'estbesoin d'kpuiser les recours internes lorsqu'ils
n'assurent aucune possibilite raisonnable de reparation eficace. C'est au
demandeur qu'il revient de prouver
ccque,dans les circonstanccs dc I'esptce et eu egard au systime juri-

dique dc 1'Etat dkfendeur, il n'y a aucune possibilitk raisonnable
d'obtenir une reparation efficace>>(Rapport dc la Corn~nissiondu
droit international, 2003,Nations Unies, doc. N58110, p. 76, par. 3).
11. Le Mexique pritend que pas une seulejuridiction aux Etats-Unis

n'a fail droila un recours pour violation de l'article 36de la convention
de Vienne.
12. Si les Etats-Unis soulignent que, des cinquante-deux affaires invo-
quCesdevant la Caur par le Mexique, quasiincnt toutcs (riI'exceptionde
lrois, c'est-it-dire quarante-neuf) demeurent pcndantes, nombre d'entre
elles n'ayant pas encore dkpassi.le stadc du prcmier pourvoi en appel, ils
n'ont en revanche pas rCCutel'assertion du Mexiquecritiquant la pratique:maintains that the majority of the Mexican nationals concerned did file
appeals in the United States, unsuccessfully. Itadds that, in any evcnt,

the doctrine of procedural default prevented most of them from asserting
their claims, since lhc matters on which they reliedhad not been sub-
mitted at an earlier stage of the proceedings - precisely because the
American authorities had failed to inform those concerned of their
rights,as they had an obligation to do undcr Article 36, paragraph 1.
As for their other nationals, Mexico claimsthat the United States pre-
sented the obligation to exhaust local remedies incorrectly by implying
that itis anabsolute rulc. Mcxico relies on the separate opinion of Judge
Tanaka in the Barcelona Tracrconcase, according lo which: "Thc rule

does not seem to require from those concerned a clearly futile and poinl-
less activity, or a repetition of what has been done in vain." (Barcelona
Trac fion, Lighl and Power Crjnapuny,Limiludl,Secund Plla~e, Judgmenl,
I.C.J. Reporis 1970, p. 145.)According lo Mcxico, a foreign national
seeking a judicial remedy on the ground of a breach of Article 36 would
never succeed in the United States, since the United States courts hold
either that Article 36does not create an individual right, or that aforeign
national who has bccn dcnicd his Article 36 rights but given his consti-
tutional and statutory rights, cannot establish prejudice and thererore
cannot gel relief. Mexico further contends that the rule of exhaustion of

local remedies is restriclcdtojudicial remedies,and that the admissibility
of an application to the Court is not subject to the precondition of
exhausting clemency procedures.

10. The International Law Commission, which is currently preparing
draft artides on diplomatic protection, has framed four exceptions lo thc
local remediesrule. Only the first of these concerns us here. Under this
exception, there is no need to exhaust local remedies when they provide
no reasonable possibility of effective redress. It is for thc claimanl lo

prove

"that in the circumt;tanccsof thc case,and having regard to the legal
system of the respondent Statc,Ihere is no reasonable possibility of
an effcctivcrcdress" (Report of the lnternational Law Commission,
2003, United Nations doc. AESVlO, p. 93, para. 3).

11. Mexico claims that no single court in the United States has ever
granted ajudicial remedy for a violation of Article36 of lhc Vicnna Con-
vention.
12. Although the United Slatesmaintains that almost all of the 52cases

pul in issue by Mexico before the Court (save for three, leaving 49)
remairi pending, n~any of them not yet having gone beyond the first
direct appeal or the conviction, it has on the other hand failed to refutc
Mexico's criticismof the praclicc of thc United States courts of con- AVENA AND OTHERS (SEP.OP.TOMKA) 97

sislenlly refusing any form of relief for the violation of an obligation
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.

13. It would thus have been possible for the Court to conclude that
Mexico has shown that the condition of exhaustion of local remedies did
not apply in the present case to its claim under the head of diplomatic .

protection.

11. INTERPRETAR TIOTNONE TEMPORIS OF THE OBLIGATIO TNINFORM

UNDER ARTICLE 36, PAKAGKAP 1H(b)

14. I have misgivings as to the interpretation by thc Court of
Article36, paragraph 1 (6).According to that interpretation, which is

setout in paragraph 63 of the Judgment, the obligation under this sub-
paragraph to provide information to the individual arises only oncc it
is realized by the arresting authoritics that the person is a foreign
national, or once there are grounds to think that pcrson is probably a
foreign national.
I consider that this interpretaiion is not well founded. Were such an
approach to the interpretation of the norms of international lawto be
applied more widely, there isa danger that it might weaken the protec-
tion accorded to certain subjects (for example, children) under the pro-
cedures for safeguarding human rights or under international hurnanitar-
ian law.

15. The obligation laid on the receiving State by Article 36 of the
Vienna Convcnlion does not depend on the authorities of the said State
knowing that the person arrested is a foreigner. The obligation toide
information arisesas soon as a forcigncisdetained. Such an arrestcon-
stitutes an objectivefact sufficientin itselfto activateceiving State's
obligation.
16. Knowledge of the facts plays no role, either in respect of the
existence or applicability the obligation to providc inrormation under
Article36, paragraph 1 (b), or inrespect oftheviolation of that obliga-
lion. Ignorance isnot a circumstancepsccludingwrongfulness.Ignorantia
non excusai.The State authorities must show due diligencein the exercise

of their powers, and lhcrc is nothing to prevent them from making
enquiry, as soon as the arrest is made, in regard to the nationality of
the person detained. If that person claimsto aenational of the country
in which he has been arrested, he can no longer relyn the fact that he
was not informed of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the
Vienna Convention. Informing a person in custody that the Vienna
Convention accords him certain rights ifhe is a national of another State
is undoubtedly the best way of avoiding any breach td'the obligations
incumbent upon the authoritics of the receiving State under Article 36

8998 AVENA ET ALI'I'KE(OP.3ND. TOMKA)

sauraient justifier leurs omissions eninvoquant leursmepris ou erreurs de
jugerncnt.

17. La Cour declare qu'elle ne saurail accueillir la demande du Mc-

xique tendant rice que lesEtats-Unis d'Amerique cessent leurs violations
de I'article36de la convention de Vienne Bl'kgarddu Mexique et de ses
cinquante-deux ressorlissants, parce que le Mexiquen'a pas ktabli que les
violations des obligations des Etats-Unis en vertu de l'article 36auraient
eu un caractire continu (arr&t,par. 148).
18. Je partage cclle conclusion de la Cour. Mais la Cour y ajoute un
autre element. Elle observe que:

ctcomrneccscinquante-deux cas individuelsse trouvent actuellement
B dit'fkrentsstades de la proccdure pknale devant les juridictions
amkricaines, ils sont pendants; et la Cour a deja indique, en ce qui
lesconcerne, ce qu'ellcconsidere comme le remkde approprii, c'est-
8-dirc le rkexamen et la revision 5 raison de la violation de la
convention de Vienne),.

19. J'estime que le fait que les cas individuels soicnt pendants devant
les juridictions des Etats-Unis est sans pertinence pour I'obligation de
cessation. C'estlecaractti-e continu ou non de la violation qui est dCter-
minant pour I'existencede l'obligation de cessation. La Cour ne peuk
ordonner la cessation de l'acte illicile que si cet acte a un caractere
continu.

20. La rkfkrenceau fait que lescas soientpendants devant lesjuridic-
tions internes pourrait prCtera confusion en crkant l'imprcssion que la
demande du Mcxique relativea la cessation nc saurait 2tre accueilliepar
la Cour, &ant donne que le non-Cpuisement des voiesde recours internes
auxEtats-Unis soit rend la demande prkmaturce et de ce fait irrecevable,
soit ne permet pas deconstater que I'obligation encause a dijri CtCviolke.
Mais cette seconde hypothese cstclairement a exclurecar laCour, dans le
meme paragraphe 148, confimc que le reexamen et la rcvision sont le
remede approprii. en raison dc la violation (qui dcvait Ctre constatke
d'abord) de la convention de Vienne.
21. Le caractire du remPdeapproprit (ou de la riparation agproprike)

est de mEmesans pertinence en cequi concerne l'obligalion de cessation.

(Signt) Peter TOMKA.of the Convention. But those authorities cannot justify their omissions
by relying on their own mistakes or errors ofjudgment.

17. The Court states that it cannot uphold Mexico'sclaim requiring
thc United States to ceaseits violations or Article 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention with regard to Mexicoand its 52nationals, since Mexicohas not
established that the violations by the United States of its obligations

undcr Article 36 are conlinuing (Judgment, para. 148).

18. I share the Court's conclusion here. Yetthe Court adds a further
clement, observing:
"inasmuch as these 52individual casesare at various stages of crimi-

nal proceedings beforethe United States courts, they are in the state
of pendente Izle;and the Court has already indicated in respect of
them what it regards as the appropriate remedy, namely review and
reconsideration by reference to the breach of the Vienna Conven-
tion".

19. 1 consider that the [.act that individual eases are still pending
before theUnited Statescourts is not pertinent to the obligation of cessa-
tion. It is the continuing nature ortherwiseof the violation which deter-
mines whether the obligation of cessation exists. The Court can only
order the cessation of a wrongful act if that act continues.

20. The reference to the fact that the cases are still pcnding before
domestic courts might cause confusion by giving the impression that
Mexico's claimrequiringcessatioi~cannot be upheld by theCourt because
the failure to exhaust local remediesin theUnitcd Stareseither makes the
claim premature, and hencc inadmissible, or clsc precludes the Court
from finding that the obligation concerned has already been violated. Yet
this second hypothesis must clearly be rejected, since the Court, in lhe

same paragraph 148, confirms that what constitutes the appropriate
remedy is review and reconsideration by reference to thc breach of
thc Vienna Convention (a breach which lirst has to be established).
21. By the same loken, the naturc of'the appropriate remedy (or form
of reparation) is not pertinent to the obligation of cessation.