Documents présentés à la Cour après la fin de la procédure écrite (Documents déposés par les Parties à la demande de la Cour)

Document Number
11311
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Document

PLEADINGS,ORAL
-

NORTHSEACONTINENTAL
SHELFCASES
(FEDERAL REPUBLICOF GERMANYIDENMARK;
FEDERAL REPUBLICOF GERMANYINETHERLANDS)

VOLUMEII

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

MÉMOIRES,PLAIDOIRIESETDOCUMENTS

AFFAIRESDU PLATEAU
CONTINENTAL DE LA MER

DU NORD
(RÉPUBLIQUEFÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNEIDANEMARK;
RÉPUBLIQUEFÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNEIPAYS-BAS)
VOLUMEII SECTIONB

DOCUMENTSFILED BY THE PARTIES AT THE
REQUEST OF THECOURT

SECTION B

DOCUMENTS DÉPOSÉS PAR LES PARTIEA LA
DEMANDE DE LA COUR -
l

l

DOCUMENTSFILED BY DENMARK 303

1. DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE AGENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF DENMARK '

1. Excerpts/rom a ConfidetitialReportof27October 1964 on ihe Danish-Germari
Negoriarions NiBonnon 15-16 Ocruber 1954, on the Demarcationofihe Conii-
nenfal Sheÿ'beiweenDenmarkandGermany

1. On the initiative of Germany, negotiations took place in Bonn on 15-16
October 1964,between a Danish and a German Govemment Oficial Delega-
tion on the dernarcation of the Continental Shelf between Denmark and
Germany .

............................
2. The two delegations now turned to the question of establishing the end
point ofa Danish-Gerrnan demarcation line at the outer Iirnit of the territorial
waters. The two delegations submitted sundry &arts, which were studied and
commented upon.
The Danish delegation said that for practical reasons the demarcation line
of the Continental Shelf should begin as a continuation of the dividing line
between the Danish and the Gerrnan territorial waters. This dividing lin-and
the sea demarcation line-had been deterrnined by the Frontier Delimitation
Cornmittee in 1921. However, as the dividing line was not hmly established
since it shouId foll~wshiftings of the ListeDyb Channel, the Danish deltga-
tion, in order to avoid possible complications, suggestedthat the starting point
should be the line of sight described by the Frontier Delimitaticin Cornmittee

from the eastern Lighthouse of Sild through the two western lighthouses of
Sild which formed the outer section of the demarcation line between Danish
and German territorial waters.
Eurthermore, the Danish dclegation said it intendedto use the line described
by the Frantier Delimitation Committee from R~ma Flak southwards to its
point of intersectionthe sea demarcation linelthe territorialwater linebeing
taken as a basis line, andthat the Danish delcgation foresaw that Germany,
as far as she was cuncemed, would use the continuation of that line to the
north-west point of Sild as a basis line.
Without committing itself the Gerrnan delegation was of the opinion that
the idea of using the northwest point of Sild asa starting point in Germany
was acceptable, but it hadto reserve its opinion on the Danish basis line from
Rom@Flak since, prima facie, it seerned doubtful whether this would be in
accordance with sub-article (3)of Articlesix of the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf.

The discussions were concluded by the parties agreeingto consider the Itgal
and the geographiçal aspects of the problem for the purpose of subsequent
negotiations.
............................
3. In anorher confidential conversation, the leader of the German delegation
said thatasfar ashe was conoernedhe saw no possibility of reaching a Danish-

- -
l See pp.162 and 212. Seealso No. 47, p. 389, infra.304 NORTH SEA CONTINENTALSHELF

German agreement on the entireContinental Shclf of the North Sea, but, on
the other hand,he would attach much importance to a limited agreement
king reached,viz. an agreemen wthichcomprisedonlythe startingpoint of
the shelf demarcationlineand the part of thesea which was closest to the
Coast.
In replythe Danishdelegationsaidthat thiaspect would have tobe çlosely
considered. DOCUMENTS FlLED BY DENMARK 305

2. Excerpts /Tom a Confidetriiahbte of 17 Febr~rary 1965 to rhe Danish
Foreign Mjnisreron the Sland ofthe Negolialiow nsith the Federalepublic of
Gerrnany

THE CONTINENTALSHELF : LINE!OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN DANISH AND
GWMAN SHELF AREAS
Summury

En Octokr 1964, the first Danish-Gerrnan negoiiations weraheld in Bonn
at a civil-servant level on the establishment of the line of demarcation between
the Danish and the Gerrnan shelf areas. The Danish delegation adhered to the
median line principle as basis of delimitation, which principle was acceptable
to Germany as far asthe Baltiç is concerned, whereas the German delegation

rejected that principas a criterioofthe establishment of the Danish-German
shelf demarcadion line in the North ka, where Germany had to demand to
have a shelf area largerthan that shc would obtain according to the rnecüan
line principlc. However, Germany could accept-and wished to have-an
agreement on the North Sea Continental Shelf line of demarcation next to the
Coast,which lfne might be establishedon the basis of the median line principle
subject to such practically rnotivated deviations as concrete circumstances
might make natural.
Germany expects that further negotiations will be made, prcferably with a
view to an agreement on the above minor part of the sheIf line of demarcation
in the North Sea next to the coast.
............................
2. On 15 and 16 October 1964, on the initiative of Germany, negotiations
took place in Bonn between a Danish and a German civil-servant delegation
on the delimitationOF the shelfareas of the States, first and foremost in the
North Sea,but the lines of demarcation in the BaItic were also discussed.
............................
Germany would not contest that in certain instances and ta certain entent,
in particular as Faas areas close tthe coast are conccrned, the equidistance
principlemighl be adequate and couId result in a reasonable division.

............................
Tnthecourseof confidential talks betweenthe heads of the Danish delegation
and the German delegation, the head of the latter said that there were no
practical possibilities of a Ranish-German agreement king obtained about
the entire North Sea Continental Shelf line of demarcation on the basisof
the equidistance principle, but that Germany was ready and attached impor-
tance to making an agreement on a small part of the Iine next to the coast.
............................
The negotiations brieflytouched upon the question of the end point of the
North Sea Continental Shelf lin@of demarcation at the outer limits of the
territorial waters. The Danish delcgation suggested for practical reasons that
rhe.shelfline of demarcation should commence as a continuation of.the delimi-
tation of Danish and German territorial waters irrespective ofthe fact that
that delimitation isnot the median line; sincethe line of demarcation isto follow
the natural changes of the Lister Dyb Water Way, it was also suggested that NORTH SEACONTINENTAL SHELF

the demarcation basis should be the unchangeable line of sight which the
Border Commission used in 1921 to define the outermost section of the line
of demarcation. The German delegation did not immediately state its attitude
to this Danish proposal, andreserved the right to consider it.
Finally, the question of applying certain (Danish).base lines in connection
with the establishment of the sheif delimitation line in the North Sea was
touched upon.
3. At a meeting heldto deal with the question ofcuntinuing the negotiations
with Gmany and attended by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Public Works, and the Danish Syndicate which has
hieengranted an exclusiveconcession to explore and exploit deposits of hydro-
carbons in the Danish underground and the Continental Shelf, the represen-
tative of the Syndicate said that it was not actually or concretely interested in
having established a Danish-German equidistance line of demarcation in the
North Sea area next to the coast, because in view of the results of the explo-
rations made in that area and in view of other information available itwas
to be assumed that there was onlylittle likelihood of finding deposits of gas or

oil there; the Syndicatewould not be particularly active there. However, the=
were appreçiably greater possibilities of finding depositsgas or oil further
to the West,Le., towards the middle of the North Sea in the border regions
adjacent to Germany, the Nethcrlands, and Great Britain. The Syndicate is
particularly interested in that area, which area would natutally be lost if the
German aspirations were realized.
............................
The Syndicate agreed-and positively recommtnded-that the negotiations
with Gerrnany be continued about the starting points of the lines of demarça-
tion of the Baltic and the North Sea, but Syndicate advised against negotia-
tions on a small section of the line of demarcation of the North Sea next to
the coast; the Syndicate said that Danish-German negotiations on that subject
-possibly resulring in an agreement-caused misgivlngs, since Germany
might use suchan agrwment as a basis and an ,argument for claiming that
the line of demarcation should deviate from the lequidistance principle from
the western end pointagreed upon.
............................
6. Accordjngly, this Departrncnt of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsfinds
that the situation can be described as follows:
(a)Germany wishes and expectsthat the Danish-German negotiations on
the Continental Shelf be continued. This expectation can be supportedby the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, according to which the line of demarca-

tion is principally tlx established through agreement hbetween the parties.
In this connection it shouldbe remernbered that the communiqut published
after the initial negotiations unreservedlyenvisaged additional negotiations.
It mvst be presumedthat Gerrnany wiil categorically adopt the point of
view that as long as both parties stand firmon their fundamenial points of
view, it wilt not be p~ssible to negotiate on the establishment of the entire
Danish-Gerrnan North Sea Continental Shelf line of demarcation, and that
as fasas the North Sea is concerned the negotiations should be limited to the
problem of establishing a smatl part of the line of demarcation next to the
Coast.
............................
(bJ Seen frorn a Danish shelf-economic point of view (exploitation and
utilization) is not necessaryto establish the line of demarcation close to the
coast ofthe North Sea. 1 DOCUMENTS FILED BY DENMARK 307

............................
(f) Asregards the misgivingsexpressedbythe Concessionaireswith reference
to further negotiations with Germany on a line of demarcation in the North
Sea next to the coast-corresponding to the point of view formerly adopted
by the Netherlands-it should be noted in the first instance that the adviser
to the Ministry of Foreign Afïairs on international law is, if anything, of
opinion that negotiations-and possiblyan agreement-on this point will not,
seen from the legal point of view-prejudice Denmark's position as regards
the further course of the line of demarcation, in which connection it should
be noted that in a possible agreement Denmark should emphasize her point
of view on the course of the part of the line of demarcation which is not to be
established through the agreement. Another point is that whereas the informa-
tion which has been givenby the Concessionaire Syndicate-to the effect that
seen from a shelf-economic point of view it would be of interest to establish
the line of demarcation-must be an essential factor of the deliberation.
............................
7. Summing up, Denmark should. .. continue the negotiations with the
Federal Republic of Germany on the line of demarcation of the shelf areas of
these two States. ..
In the event that this conclusion is acceptable, this Department would
further suggest

that during the negotiations Denmark should continue to maintain the equi-
distance principle,
that nevertheless negotiations may be made on a practical and appropriate
delimitation with referenΠto the establishment of the end point of the
shelfdemarcation line at the outer limits of the territorial waters, regardless
of whether the resulting line would be a median line or not (Denmark
will thereby for practical reasons deviate from the equidistance principle
only over a geographically short section of the line of demarcation),

that the negotiations may comprise the subject of an agreement on a short
section of the shelf demarcation line in the North Sea next to the coast, NORTH SEA CONTlNENTAL SHELF

3. Excerptsfrotn a CotifidentialReport of31 March 1965 ontheDanish-Gertnan
Negotiations in Copenhagenon 17-18 March 1965, on the Demarcation of the
ContitrentalSheif between Denmark and Gernianyand Recommendation on the
Next Step

(Translation)

I. bitroduction

The DanishIGerman negotiations about the demarcation of the Continental
Shelf, which were cornmenced in Bonn in October 1964, were continued in
Copenhagen on 17-18March 1965.
............................

TheNorth Sea
As during the negotiations in Bonn, the discussions were focused on the

conditions in the North Sea. Both parties gave to understand that their points
of view as regards the principles of division of the Continental Shelf of the
North Sea were unchanged; Denmark maintained that the division should be
made in accordance with the equidistance line principle, whereas Germany
considered the concave configuration of the German Coast of the North Sea
a special circumstance which entitled Germany to expect that the demarcation
line should be drawn according to other criteria. However, the two delegations
agreed not to continue the discussions on the principles governing the drawing
of the demarcation line which had taken place in Bonn, since it was found
that such discussions would not lead to a result. Tnsteadthe delegations agreed
at once to attempt to bring about an agreement on the establishment of the
demarcation Iine of the Continental Shelf in the coastal area of the North
Sea on the basis of what would be expedient in practice, so that the result of
the discussions would not prejudice the respective views of the parties as
regards the principles governing the division of the Continental Shelf of the
North Sea outside the coastal areas.
The Danish delegation expressed the view that the course of the Danish-
German sea demarcation line and the dividing line between the territorial
waters of the North Sea should not be solely decisiveat the establishment of
the starting point of the shelf demarcation line. The reason was that due to
special geographical circumstances in the area, the frontier was constantly
undergoing a change. It is true that the said sea demarcation line and the

dividing line were definedin 1921 by the International Frontier Delimitation
Committee set up under Article 111of the VersaillesTreaty, but that Committee
had also laid down that the sea demarcation line and the dividing line in Lister
Dyb should follow the natural shifts of the channel. Such shifts occurred
constantly and has, as was known, been the object of the exchange of certain
Danish-German Notes during the period from 1935to 1941.For the purpose
of finding a fixed point it seemed natural in these circumstances to make the
1921 provisions the starting point, hence the Danish delegation deemed it
reasonable and practical to define the shelf demarcation line in the coastal
region as a continuation of the outmost part of theterritorial watcr demarcation
line defined in 1921,which, in the description of the frontier, is unequivocally
and clearly indicated as an unchangeable line, viz. the line of sight from the DOCUMENTS RLED BY DENMARK 309

Eastern Lighthouse of List through the centre point of the line between the
two Western Lighthouses of List; thereby the starting point of the shelf
demarcation line-would be the point of intersection of the line of sight andthe
outer limit of the territorial waters. In the nature of the case, it was in al1
circumstances necessary in practiceto disregard the question of fluctuations of
the courses of the sea demarcation line and the dividingline; the shelfdemarca-
tion line had to be established as a definite line. It was said that the Danish
delegation realized that the establishment of the shelf demarcation line did
not prejudice the course of the frontier. (It was not said directly, but it must
presumably be admitted that today it is not clear exactly what course the out-
most western part of the Danish-German frontier takes, and whether the said
line of sight is at al1a part of the actual frontier. Lister Dyb may have shifted
so much northward that this is no longer the case. However, the problem is of
minor interest in practice, and its solution may probably be left in abeyance

for the time being.)
The German delegation agreed that it was necessary to establish a "point a
quo", and it also agreed that the changes resulting from the natural shifts of
the Lister Dyb Channel had to be disregarded. As regards the sea demarcation
line and the dividing line, the Danish proposa1 about the shelf demarcation
line must be deemed to be one of several possible solutions. For example, the
German delegation might consider a shelf demarcation line calculated on the
basis of the equidistance line principle and on the basis of the natural coastal
line, which shelf demarcation line would take a northern course. To illustrate
this point, the German delegation produced a chart (which is attached to this
Report) in which the continuation of the territorial water dividing line (the
line of sight), and also the said equidistance line had been drawn. (As regards
the latter line, the German chart used a fictitious line from the Northwest
Point of Sildto a low-water point on R0m0; the starting point of the equidis-
tance line was the point of intersection of the outer limit of the territorial

waters and the perpendicular bisector of the said Sild-R0m0 line.)
The German delegation emphasized that the chart did not represent a
German proposal, it only represented theoretical possibilities.
The Danish delegation emphasized that it endeavoured to find a practical
line and was ready to negotiate about such a line with due regard to the actual
conditions in the coastal area, but that it would not be able to agree to any
line which might leavethe impression that Denmark had deviated from funda-
mental points of view. Accordingly it could agree with the German delegation
that there were possibilities other than a continuation of the said line of sight,
although the Danish delegation found that it was to be preferred as the most
natural one. On the other hand, the Danish delegation could not accept the
method applied in the German chart for the purpose of establishingthe starting
point of the equidistance line of the chart. In the view of Denmark, it was
justifiableto dcmand that the calculation of the shelf demarcation line should
be made from base lines as stated in Article six of the Geneva Convention of
29 April 1958,with reference to the Continental Shelf, and Denmark had to
insist that the line from Rom0 Flak to the Northwest Point of Sild be applied

as the basis of calculation if the starting point and the innermost part of the
shelf demarcation line were to be established according to an equidistance
principle.
The German delegation could not accedeto the Danish points of viewrelative
to the line from R0m0 Flak to the Northwest Point of Sild, and maintained in
this comection that an equidistance calculation-in accordance with the
Convention on the Continental Shelf(in whichcomection the German delega-310 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

tion presumably alluded to sub-article (3) of Article six of the Convention)-
should be made on the basis of fixed,visible points on land.
The Danish delegation as well as the German delegation refrained from
sifting these diverging points of view,which werehardly completely cleared up
during the discussions, and with mutual regard to the existing differences of
opinion, the two delegations finally succeeded in agreeing on a shelf demarca-
tion line extending in a straight line in the western direction from the point of
intersection of the outmost part of the territorial water dividing line as defined
in the Frontier Description of 1921(in other words, the line of sight between
the Eastern Lighthouse of List and the centre point between the two Western
Lighthouses of List) and the outer limit of the territorial waters to the nearest
point on the coast, which, according to the equidistance calculation has
Blaavands Huk as a "base point" on the Danish coast. It was agreed that the

starting point of the shelf demarcation line should be defined with reference
to the Frontier Description of 1921, whereas the western end point of the
part of the demarcation line shouldbe indicated completely concretelythrough
geographic CO-ordinateswith reference to the location of the point in relation
to the Danish coast and the German coast. However, the Danish delegation
made the reservation that-in relation to the Press and otherwise-it would
feel entitled to maintain that the point is an equidistance point.
In this connection it was clearly understood by both parties that a protocol
should be drawn up relative to the signing of the agreement on the part of the
demarcation line, in which protocol the parties should reserve their respective
points of viewas regards the principles of establishing the line of demarcation
betweenthe Danish and the German Continental Shelf Area, so that it would
be made quite clear that this agreement could not in any way be deemed to be
prejudicial to the course of the Danish-German shelf demarcation line in the
North Sea, to the Westof the part of the line of demarcation established in the

agreement.
The delegations then proceeded to discuss the wording of the agreement on
part of the demarcation line. The German delegation produced a draft which
evidently had been prepared on the lines of the corresponding German-Dutch
agreement dated 1 December 1964, which draft was accepted by the Danish
delegation after a few minor alterations had been made in it. It was agreed that
the agreement should be prepared in the Danish and in the German language,
both languages being original languages. With regard to the procedure in
practice it was agreed that after the conclusion of the negotiations the Danish
delegation should prepare a Danish text and submit it-through the Embassy
in Bonn-to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs for approval. It was
further agreed that the Danish Hydrographie Department should calculate the
geographicCO-ordinatesof the westernend point of thepart of the demarcation
line, and these calculations should be communicated to theGerman Ministry of
Foreign Affairs for verification in Germany. It was agreed that the agreement
should be signed in Bonn. As regards the wording of the protocol to be at-
tached to the agreement it wasagreed that each party should prepare a draft to

be shown to the other party before the signing of the agreement.
III. TheLineof Demarcationof the ConrinenralShelf withinthe Outer Limits of
the Territorial Waters

During the discussions, the German delegation said that in connection with
the establishment of the shelf demarcation line in the coastal area they would
like that an arrangement be made with regard to the Continental Shelf between
the natural coast line and the outer limits of the territorial waters, since the DOCUMENTS.FILED BY DENMARK 311

shiftings of the sea demarcation line and the territorial water dividing line,
after the shifting of the Lister Dyb Channel, made it difficultto establish how
far northward or southward, respectively,German and Danish concessionaires,
respectively, would beable to carry out their activities. The Danish delegation
was of opinion that that problem was not of any major practical importance,

and, at any rate, it found it difficulttoiscuss that problem during the present
negotiation, one reason being that the necessary concrete particulars of the
changes of Lister Dyb during recent years werenot available.
Thereupon the German delegation dropped that question.

VZZ.Statement to the Press
At the finalphase of the negotiations, the delegations prepared the following
joint statement to the press:

In October 1964,and in March 1965,negotiations took place between a
Danish delegation and a German delegation about the line of demarcation
of the part of the Continental Shelf in the North Sea situated outside the
Danishand the German sovereigntyterritories. Asa result of these negotia-

tions, the two delegations agreed upon a draft agreement which will now
be submitted to the two Governments for approval. It is expected that the
draft agreement after being approved by the Governments willbe.signedin
Bonn, the agreement is to be ratified.
According to the draft an approximately 30nautical mile long part of a
line of demarcation is to be drawn to a point situated equally distanced
from Blaavands Huk and the Island of Sild; during the negotiations, a
final agreement could not be reached on the further course of the line of
demarcation. The two negotiating parties have reserved their points of
view with regard to the principles relevant in this respect. The German

delegation has suggested that negotiations should be made within the near
futureabout the further course of the line of demarcation. This proposal
will be considered by Denmark.

VIZZ.Thefollowing enclosures are attachedfor information:
(1) Draft of a Danish-German agreement on the Continental Shelf (German
text) 2,
(i) Draft of a Danish-German agreement on the Continental Shelf (Danish
text) 2,

(3) German chart
(The line of demarcation foreseen in the agreement extends from point S to
point Br. 7, 6.)

X. Recomrnendation
This Department recommends that the Government

(1) approve the agreement with Germany referred to in this Report;

lThe lengthof the part of the line of demarcation was measuredonly roughly
at the preparation of the staternent; a more exact indication would be approxi-
mately 25 nauticalmiles.

Substitutedby an English versionat The Hague, 3 Novernber1965,see p. 312,
infra. I

l
312 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF
TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY CONCERNING THE DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE
NORTH SEA NEAR THE COAST

The Kingdom of Denmark and
The Federal Republic of Germany,
Considering that a delimitation by mutual agreement of the continental shelf
adjacent to their territories near the coast is urgently required,
have agreed as follows:
Article 1

The boundary between the Danish and the German parts of the continental
shelfof the North Seanear the coast shall run in a straight line starting from the
the connecting line between the List East beacon and the central point of the
connecting line between the two List West beacons reachesthe high seas, and
ending at point . .O ..' ..." N, . .O. .'..." E of the European Datum System
(inaccordancewiththeDanish geographicalCO-ordinates . .O..' ..."N, ." ..'."
E and the German geographical CO-ordinates ..O ..'.." N, .." ..' ..." E).
Article 2

The present Treaty shall also apply to Land Berlin provided that the Govern-
to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark within three months of theation
date of entry into force of the Treaty.

Article 3
1. The present Treaty is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification
shall be exchanged as soon as possible in Copenhagen.
2. The present Treaty shall enter into force on the day after the exchange of
instruments of ratification.
Done at Bonn, ... 1965in duplicate in the Danishand German languages, both
texts being equally authentic.
For the Kingdom of Denmark: For the Federal Republic of Germany :

. . ...

. .DOCUMENTS FILEDBY DENMARK NORTH SEA CONTINENTALSHELF

4. Excerpfsfroma Report of21 March 1964 on the TrilateralDanisA-Dufch-

German Negolialio nnsThe Hagueon 28 February 1956, on theDemarcarion
beiween theParfsofthe ThreeSrareof theContinenralSheuBebw theNorfh Sea

(Translaiion)
.............................

Riphagcnsaidthat al1parties agreed that newnegotiations should k made on
the basisof the German aide-mémoire.
With regard to the objectof the ieegotiations, the ?ietberIands would ap-
preciate, however, if the German delegation wouldexplain the meaning of the
proposal in theGerman aide-mémoire1about the negatiations at which the
respective legal points of viofthe parties were to lx "ausgeklarnmert". At
the closeof the German-Dutch negotiations about an agreement on the com-
mon shelfdemarcation line in the area nearest the coastpartyhad defined
in the so-called "Gemeinsame Verhandlungsniedwscih tripotnt of view
with regard to the further course of the demarcation line, whIch point of view,
as far asthe Netherlandareconcerned, was that the demarcation lwas to be
established in accordancewith the equidistance principIe. Thwas still the

position whenthe German aide-mhmoire was delivered in December 1965, and
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Anairs hadwondered whether Gemany was
now ready to make an agreement under which the demarcationline was to be
established according to theequidistance principle, if only such an agreement
did not contain any referencetherdo.
Truckenbrodfanswered that by the said passage of the aide-mémoireGer-
many had had in mlnd that there was but slight possibility of agreeintheon
demarcation line between the Continental Shell areof theth Stateson a
legal basis;Denmark and the NetherIands insisted that the demaration line
should be established in accordanm.with the equidistance principle, a principle
which the Federal Republic had not found and still did not findit possible to
accept sinceitsapplication to the German Bay, as a consequenoe of thcon-
figuration of the coast, wouldlead to unreasonable results. Germany would
definitely refuse to take criteofa legal nature into consideratjon during
future negotiations, but Germany heldthat if there was a wilIto reacom-
promise it would be expedient to keep the respective legal pooftview out
of the discussions.
..............................

1 Dated 8 December 1965 and reproducedinthe Dani& Cuuuter-Mernorial,1,
pp. 165-166, DOCUMENTSFILED BY DENMARK

5. Excerpt from a Report Dated II September 1964from the DanishEmbassy in
Botin to the DanishMinislry of ForeignAfairs

What wishesthe Federal Republic intend to state during the coming Danish-
German negotiations Dr. Sympher would not venture to say-this would only
be decided when Professor Meyer-Lindenberg had returned from leave by the
end of September-but he did Saythat from the outset it was clear to the Aus-
wartiges Amt that a deviation from the equidistance principle near the Coast
where exploitation of possible natural resources would be considerably easier
than further out in deep waters, politically would be quite inacceptable to
Denmark. In al1 possibility, the German wishes would concentrate upon a
deviation further out in the North Sea.316 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

6. Excerptsfronl a Sumtnary,Dated 11 February 1965,of a Meeting Helditzthe
DanishMinistry of Foreign Affairs onII January1965, to Discuss the Probletns
Connected wilh the Delimitation of the Continetital Slielf of Dentnark- .,

.(T~ati~latio~)+ . .............. . .
In the meeting participated:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ,

Assistant Under-Secretary of State T. Oldenburg
Head of Department : . P. Frellesvig
Head of Section: K. Sommer
Secretary : F. M0rch
Ministry of Public Works:

Head of Department : P. Bang Christensen
The'A. P.'MoIIerCotnpaniesLtd.'(Coi~cessionaires) '

Managing Director 1. Hoppe
Manager 1. Kruse
1. Mr. Oldenburg opened the meeting by outlining the problems under
discussion. After the initial Danish-German negotiations in Bonn in October
1964there wasa clear and not unfounded expectation on thepart of the Federal
Republic towards continuednegotiations but it wasto bc a condition that these
negotiations mainly-in actual fact perhaps exciusively-were to deal with the
question of agreement on the starting point of the Danish-German North Sea
continental sheifboundary on the outer boundary of the territorial waters and a
smaller part of the continental shelf boundary from the starting point plus the

question of a practical, generally phrased debition of the rnedian line as
Danish-German continental shelf boundary in the Baltic.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was inclined to think that if possible one
more round of negotiations with Germany should be undertaken, but the
question wouldnaturally arise whether the Danish side would be at al1ready to
negotiate about a "short boundary line" in the North Sea which decidedly,on
the part of Germany, was the primary object of the negotiations. If the answer
was in the negative it seemed doubtful whether there was adequate basis for
fresh negotiations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not adopted any
specificview but regarded with some favour negotiations respecting "the short
boundary line in the North Sea", interalia, becauseit wished firstlyto manifest
the willingness of Denmark to solve the problems of the continental shelf
boundary through diplomatic means, partly to avoid that the negotiations
already initiated should end quite negatively.
As matters stood, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would draft a report to the
Minister, in order to obtain his, or possibly the Government's resolution that
negotiations should continue and in this connection it was but natural and
desirable that not only the Ministry of Public Works but also the Danish
consortium representing the concessionaire were given an opportunity of
stating their views.
............................

3. Mr. Hoppe declared that the concessionairewhollyapproved of the idea of
further Danish-German discussionsand quite agreed to having the problem in DOCUMENTS FlLED BY DENMARK 317

comection with the determination of the starting point of the Danish-German
shelf boundary in the North Sea discussedduring those talks. To the mind of
the concessionaire, the question was not of the utmost importance, but it was
presumably a matter on which Denmark and Germany could reach agreement
and which would have to be settled sooner or later.
On the other hand, he was against negotiations or possible agreement
respectinga short boundary line in the North Sea. This might offerGermany an
argument and a springboard for claiming the drawing of a boundary deviating
from the median line respecting the area Westof a short boundary line. That
Germany and the Netherlands had achieved agreement upon a similar line was
due to the fact that the authorities in Germany had been under pressure from

German oil companies who wanted to commence drillings in the boundary
area as soon as possible. Such considerations, however, did not apply to the
Danish-German North Sea boundary area near the coast where the chances of
finding oil or gas were slight and where the concessionaire did not expect to
undertake any future great activity.
Under these circumstances the concessionaire wasof the opinion that at the
present time a Danish-German agreement conceming a short boundary line in
the North Sea was not to be thought of. This matter should thus await the
determination of the boundary between, on one side, the Danish and, on the
other side, the British, Norwegian and possibly Netherlands shelf areas.
Naturally, he was aware that especially a possible Danish-Nctherlands agree-
ment mightcausea strong reaction on the part of Germany; but the concession-
airethought that Danish-Netherlands discussionsshould be opened in a foresee-

able future; incidentally, it would be important to have these boundaries
determined the more so as these boundary areas seemed to offer the largest
possibilities of gas or oil resources.
............................
4. The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that it
would presumably be difficult to discuss the starting point of the North Sea
continental shelf boundary without discussingthe course of a certain part of the

boundary line from the above point. 1f agreement with Germany were possible
respecting a line stretching a good distance westwards, it might be said to have
a certain interest also from a Danish point of view, especially if the parties
could agree to draw the Iine up to so great a distance from the coast that it
would reach-and possibly go beyond-the point where the general direction
of the boundary according to the equidistance principle changes from north-
Westto southwest, i.e., the first point which under the above principle would
.have Blavandshuk as its nearcst point on the Danish wast. Naturally it would
be of great importance, if Germany would accept a line embodying this change
of direction but aprior this did not seem very probable; on the other hand, it
was obvious that the Danish side would have to avoid a line beyond the first
"bl&vandshuk-point" which was not in agreement with the equidistance
principle. Within the three-mile limit, the boundary (theboundary between,the
intemal waters and the territorial waters) was defined by the Border Commis-
sion after the reunion in 1920and the determination of the actual course of this

boundary was a question of applying the Border Commission's definition and
this question should not form part of the actual Danish-German continental
shelf discussions. NORTH SEA CONnNENTAL SHELF

7. Excerpts from Mitrutes Dated 26 March 1965front a Meeting Held in the
DanishMinistry of ForeignAffairson 22 March1965 withRepresentativesof the
Danish Concessionaires

1. In the meeting participated:

Assistant Under-Secretary of State: T. Oldenburg
Managing Director, The A. P. Maller Companies Ltd. 1.Hoppe
Manager, The A. P. Msller Companies Ltd. 1. Kruse
Head of section, Ministry of Foreign Mairs K. Sonmer
2. Mr. Hoppe said that the press communiquéhad caused the concession-
aires to view the outcome of the negotiations with some concem; Mr. A. P.
Msller was worried over the development of the matter. Thus, the consortium
was concerned that an agreement had been entered into concerning the North
Sea shelf boundary in the coastal area, since an agreement of this nature might
give the impression that Denmark did not stand firm on the equidistance
principle.

Mr. Oldenburgaccounted for the Danish-German negotiations, at the same
time making Mr. Hoppe acquainted with the sketch map submitted by the
German delegation. As regards the question of the advisability of an agree
ment with Germany concerning the part of the boundary near the Coast, it
should be taken into consideration that, irrefutably, special circumstances
existed around the Danish-German sea frontier and the territorial waters
demarcation line in the North Sea which it was natural and reasonable to have
elucidated through an agreement. Our own interpretation of the words of the
Geneva Convention respecting "special circumstances" presupposed that this
problem was solved through an agreement. This had now happened. The
course of the boundary line agreed upon was-well in conforrnity with Danish
thinking-motivated by concrete conditions and formed a practical, reasonable
solution; in this connection it should be remembered that the western termina-
tingpoint oftheline was an equidistance point. It had thus been made clear that
none of the parties-not Denmark either-had prejudiced their principles or
waived their claims. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that in accordance
with the view-point of its legal advisor on international law the Ministry of
Foreign Mairs had thought it advisable to manifest its willingness as far as
possibleto seekagreementrespectingthecontinental shelfthrough negotiations.

This point was of importance in a possible lawsuit. DOCUMENTS FiLED BY DENMARK

8. Tex1of n Report Dated 16 Jlrtre1965from the DanishEtnbassyinBonnto the

Danish Ministry of ForeignAflairs

During a conversation yesterdayconcerning other matters, the Embassy took
the opportunity to rernind Mr. Sympher that whereas the Federal Republic is
able to outline on a rnap with complete precision what the wishes ofDenrnark
respecting the delimitation of the North Sea are, Denmark is not in possession
of material enabling her in the same way to illustrate clearly what the German
claims amount to. So far, al1we have is Professor Meyer-Lindenberg's rather
vague statement in Bonn during the talks in October 1964to the effectthat the
Germans would likea delirnitation according to the principle of parity. On this
background the Ernbassy asked if-and ifso when-the Federal Republic

intended to dehe her clairns more explicitly.
Mr. Syrnpher answered that no such definition would be made in the near
future. Auswartiges Amt was of the opinion that the possible lawsuit (rnen-
tioned in the Embassy cable No. 136) was solely to ascertain whether or not
according to customary international law, the equidistance principle was ap-
plicable in the delimitation betweenthe Netherlands, the Federal Republic and
Denrnark. If the decision of the Court turned out in favour of the Danish/
Nethcrlands view-viz. that the above principle isapplicable-the onlyquestion
left would be the purely practical one of letting the hydrographic experts
calculate the relevant CO-ordinatesand incorporate them in a supplernentary
. agreement to the already existing Gerrnan-Netherlands and Gerrnan-Danish
treaties on the determination of a partial boundary.

Should the decision of the court, on the other hand, be in favour of the
German point of view-viz. that in this case the equidistance principle is not
applicable-the consequences would bethat the entire problem should become
the subject of renewed bilateral negotiations based upon the maxim that in this
context the principle of equidistance is irrelevant. Not until then-Le.,at the
commencement of a fresh round of negotiations-will the Gerrnan delegation
seecause to defineits wishes respccting thedclimitation more precisely. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

II.DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE AGENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE NETHERLANDS

6 November 1968.

NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LED UP TO THE TREATY OF 1 DECEMBER 1964 BETWEEN
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
CONCERNING THE LATERAL DELIMITATION OF THE COMINENTAL SHELF NEAR THE
COAST

At the Public Sitting held on 1 November 1968 the Court called upon the
Agents of the Parties to make available to the Court, in so far as the
information is in their possession or can be obtained by them, any minutes,
notes or reports which would indicate the bases on which the Parties deter-
mined the delimitation agreed upon in the negotiations which led up to the

above-mentioned Agreement, especially with reference to the reasons why the
exact terminal points were fixedas they are, rather than at some points nearer
to or farther from the coastline.
In reply the Agent for the Governrnent of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
has the honour to supply the followinginformation and documentary material :

NOTES VERBALES

1. Note Verbale of the Netherlands Government, 21 June 1963. Text

reproduced in Annex 2 to the Memorial of the Federal Republic. Corrected
translation reproduced in Annex 8 to the Counter-Memorial of the Nether-
lands2.(Seealso para. 16, last sub-paragraph, of the Netherlands Counter-Me-
morial 3.)
2. Note Verbale of the Federal Government, 26 August 1963. Text and
translation reproduced in Annexes 9 and 9A to the Counter-Memorial of the
Netherlands 4.(See also para. 28 of the Netherlands Counter-Memonal

No other Notes have been exchanged between the two Parties on this
subject, except communications on dates, places, and such-like available for
negotiations and communications on exploration activities on the shelf.

JOINT MINUTES

Joint minutes have been made on two occasions only :

24June 1964,the Joint Report of a working group (see sub 6 below).
4 August 1964, the Joint Minutes of the final stage of the negotiations (see
slrb8 below).

l P. 162,supra.Seealso p.212, sirpra.
1. p.378.
1, p.316.
'1, pp. 379-381.
1, p321. DOCUMENTSFILED BY THE NETHERLANDS 321
REPORTS
l
Following the exchange of the Notes mentioned sub 1 and 2, discussions
between delegaiions representing the two Parties took place six times, on the
dates givenbelow.(Seealsoparas. 29and 30, pp.17-18,of the Netherlands Corn-
ter-Mernorial '.) The Netherlands delegation delivereaReport to the Minister
for Foreign Affairsof the Kingdom on four of these discussions, i.e., not on
the two occasions when Joint Minutes weresigned.
Inthe Annexesta bernentioned beloware reproduced the literal textsand the

translations of those passagesofthe delegation Reports which indicate the bases
on which theParties determined the coastal continental shelf boundary.
3. First Netherlands-German discussions regarding the demarcation of the
continental shelf, held in Bonn on 3 and 4 March 1964.Relevant part of the
Report in Annex A; translatioin AnnexB.
4. Continued discussions, held at The Hague on 23 March 1964. Relevant
part of the Report in Annex C; translation inAnnex D.
5. Thirdroundof discussions, held in Bonn on 4 June 1964.
Relevant part of the Report in AnnexE; translation in Annex F.
5. Meeting of a Netherlands-Gerrnan working group in Bonn on 24 June
1964.Joint Report in Annex G; translation in Annex H.
7. Fourth round of discussions,held in TheHague on 14July 1964.Relevant
part of the Reportin Annex J; translation in Annex K.
8. Final discussions, held in Bonn on 4 August 1964. Joint Minutes and

translation reprodriced in Annexes 4 and 4A to the Mernorial of the Federal
Republic 2.

1, pp. 321-322.
1, pp.102-104. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

Annex A

VERSLA VGANDE NEDERLANDS-DU BTSREEKINCENINZAKE AFBAKENING VAN
HET CONTPNENTAALPLATEAU, CEHOUDEN INBO~N OP 3 EN 4MAART 1964

............................
Prof: Meyer-Lindenbers stelt vervolgens de vraag wat er moet gebeuren,
indien men niet tot een oveceenkornst zou kunnen komen? Tndiende kwestie
voor eenscheidsgerechtzouworden gebracht, heeft Duitsland naar zijn mening
niets te verliezen, Van Nederlandsezijde wordt de vraag gesteld in welke
richting men zich dan langs die weg uitbreiding van het Duifse voor-el
stelt.
Nog eens geeftde nuitsevoorzifteruiting aan,zijn teleurstelling die des te
sterker wordt gevoeld daar tegenover de Duitse openbare mening, gezien de

mate van Europese samenwerking, toch zou kunnen rnoeten worden aange-
voerd dat met Nederland en Denemarken zodanigoedebetrekkingen worden
onderhouden dateen redelijke oplossing vanzelfspremagdworden geacht.
Prof. Meyer-Lindenberg vraagt aan Prof, Riphagen of de, Nederlandse
delegatie de gedachte der proportionazovewillen betrekken in hanr over-
wegingen inde komende weken.
Prof.Riphagerizet hierop uiteen dat de Nederlandse delegatie daags tevoren
voor hct eerst kennis heeft kunnen nemen van de Duitse suggesameedie
gedachtengang uiteraard nooit eerder anndacht heeft besteed. De Nederlandse
delegatie heeft gerekend met:egans ander gesprek waarin men zich zou
bezighouden met kwesties, verband houdende met het afbakeningsvraagstuk
op basisvan de cquidistantie-lijn (het puacquo bij de Eemsmonding).
Prof. Meyei--lindenberg herhaalt zijn eerder gedaneverzoek OFde Neder-
landsedelegatie de Duitse gedachte in Den Hanogeens wil voorleggen en

nagaan of het proportionaliteitsbeeegnianvlaardbaar criterium zou kun-
nen vormcn. Als uitgangspunt voor een verdere bespreking stelt hij voor
averleg orntrent hz.g.punctum a quo van de door Nederland voorgestane
equidistantie-lijn, evenwel "sans prkjudice" t.a.v. het verder gebruik van het
beginsefvan equidistantie.
Pro$ Riphagenvsaagt de Duitse voorzitter of hij eraccoord km gaan
die kwestie op een volgende bijecnkomst ter sprake te brengen aangezienzijn
delegatie eerst gaarne gelegenzoudhebben overleg te plcgen omtreeen
aantaIder ksproken gezichtspunten.
Prof M.eyer-Lindenbergzegt hiermede accoord te gaan. DOCUMENTSFILED BYTHENETHERLANDS 323

REPOR T N THENETHERLANDS-GER DM~SCUSSLO RNBARDING THE DEMARCA-
nON OF THE CONTINENTSA HLELFH,ELD INBONN ON 3 AND 4 MARÇH 1464
............................

= Professor.Meyer-Linknberg next asked what was.to be done if.agreement
was not reached. He thought that Gerrnany had nothing ta [oseif it should be
decidedto submit the question to asbitration. The Neihesidemuntered
by asking in what way Germany envisaged sharebeingincreased If arbitra-
tion were resorted to.
The Gernian Chnirrnanonce more gave vent to his great disappointment,

aggravated as it wasby the fact that, in view of the largemeasure of European
CO-operation,the German public shouldbe able to zake for granted that
relations with the Netherlands and Denmark were such as te noadoubt
about a reasonable solurion befound without tomuch dificulty.
ProfessorMeyer-Lindeabergasked ProfessorRiphagen whether the Nether-
lands delegation would consider discussingthe idea of proportionaIity in their
consultations duringthe coming weeks.
Professo Riphagelt then explained that the German suggestion had ken
mooted for thefirstirne only the day kfore and that, understandably, the
Netherlands delegation had never given any thought to such an idea. The
Netherlands delegation had counteon having discussions oa completely
different nature, dealing with such quesasthe demarcation problemon
the basis of the equidistance line ("'puacquo" near the Ems estuary).
Profusor Meyer-Lindenbergrepeated kis earlier req,eagain asking the

NetherIands delegation to explain the German idea to its Ministry in The Hague
and to investigate whether the principle of proportionalibe made an
acceptable criteriHe.suggested thar the so-called "puncauquo" of the
equidistance line advocated by the Netherlands could sasthe point of
departure for future discussions, without prejudice, however, ta the further
application of the principle of equidistance.
Professor Riphagen asked the German Chairman whethcr he would rnind
bringingup this questionfor discussianfuture meeting becausebis delega-
tion would rathcr& given an opportunity first to discanumber of the
points raisedat the present meeting.
PrafessoMeyer-Lindenbergsaidthat he would do so.
.....*..*.....,........... f. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

Annex C

VERSLA GAN DE VERVOLGBESPREKINGENTUSSEN DE NEDERLAND ESEDUITSE
DELEGATIESBETREFPENDE DE AFBAKENING VAN HET CONTINENTAAL PLATEAU IN
DE NOORDZZ EEHOUDEN TE 's-GRAVENHA OGP23 MAART 1964

....... i . f . . l i i i i . . , * . , * * . . *

De Yoorziffer van de Diritse delegariegeetekennen dat bij de bepaling
van de basislijn het Borkumer Rif dient te worden betrokken.
Deze opvatting wordt door de Nederlnndse delegoriebestreden met een
herhaling van het rads eerder vermelde beroepop de beide Eems-Dollard-
overeenkomsten, waarbij ook de grens van de territoriale zeewerd vastgesteld.
Aan Duidse zijde concretiseert men daarop de opvattingen en verIangens
in dier voege, dat nu ook voortzettvan het gemeenschappelijkexploitatie-
regime mals dat thans geldt in de Eemsmonding, ter sprake komt.
Men acht het tenslotte toch wenselijker het over een scheidingeensnte .
wotden welke b.v. als "aunctum a auo" zou kunnen hebben het wnt. waar
de werklijn (groene ~ijn'voorkornend op Eernsmonding-kaastkhorende bij

de aanvullende overeenkornst bij het &mis-Dollard-verdrag) de buitengrens
der territoriazee snijdt.
Prof Meyerdiirdenberg vat het door de Dujtse delegainde loop van deze
bespreking naar voren gebrachte samen en stelt voorals hypothesc aan te
nemen dat naar Duitse opvatting de laagwaterlijn (basislijn) ongeveer loopt
van het Borkurner Rif in zuid-zuid-westelijke richting om daarna noordelijk
van Rottumeroog en Rottumerplaat langs Schiermonnikoog te koersen.
Nadat het Duirsedelegafie-/id,Pro$ Dr. Kiifter, had betoodal de mini-
mum-corrcctie ophet eqüidistantie-beginseltoch welmoet zijneen aîbakenings-
techniek, die voorkomt, dat een gerneenschappelijkeDeens-Nederlandse gens
ontstaat waar Duitsland geheel buiten valt, vraagt de Duitse Vo'oorzitteraan-
dacht voorde merkwaardig situatiedie ontstaat door conaequente eoepassing
van het equidistantie-principeaanzienvan de verdelingvanhet continentaal

plateau in de Noordzeeteweten dat daar de verhoudjng tussen de aanliggende
landen prjmair wordt gesteld en de relatie tussen tegenovelkaarIiggende
landen van secundaire betekenis zou zijn. Waarom,zo vraagtProf. Meyer-
Eindenberg,zou Iuseraleafbakening de voorrang genieten?
Prof.Riphagen repliceert daarop dat Nederland daook met Noorwegen in
overleg zou dientn te ireden.
Om 12.30 uur wordt dc bespreking onderbroken voor een lunchpauze.
De Duitse gasten gebniiken op uitnodiging van de Nederlandse deiegatie
het dejeuner in restaurant ROYAL. Tijdens de lunch kornde delegatie-

voorzitters overeen, nlvorensweer in voltallige vergaderjng bijeen te
komen, eersteen gesprek "à deux" te hebben.
Om 4 uur worden de besprekingen voortgezet.
Prof. Riphagenstelt resurnerend vast dat thana duideisjdat het.puntA
op de kaart van de Eernsmonding behorende bide aanvulIende overmnkornst
bij het Eems-Dollard-verdrag van 8 april 19eenequiéistant-puntisTegen-
over het door Nederland ingenomen standpunt d'atpunt A uitgangspuntzou

bhoren te zijnvoor het trekken van een equidistant-aftiaken iinggslijn,
blekendat men aan Duitse zijdetenminste punL' als hetwenselijke"punctum
a quo" beschouwt. DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE NETHERLA~JS 325

Voorts, aldus de NederIandse Voorzitter, is duidelijk geworden dat de

Duitse delcgatie de basislijnacht te lopen vanaf het Borkumer Rif en verder
zoals hierboven reeds eerder is aangeçeven.
De Duifse delegarie-voorz onftvfouwt dan een naar zijn rnening wellicht
bruikbare wcrk-hypothese voor de vaststelling van de afbakeningslijn welke

zou kunnen aanvangen in punt C" (eerdergenoemde kaart Eernsmonding)
orn vandaar te lopen naar het zuidelijkstepune op de equidistancc-lijn voor de
bepaling waarvan het betwiste gebied in de Eems irrelevant is; die lijn zou zich

vervolgens over een zekere lengte volgens het equidistantie-beginsel kunnen
voortzettenom tenslotte westwaarts af te buigen naar een punt op de afbake-
ningslijn met Engeland.

Gezien het gevorderde uur is deze werk-hypothese niet verder in bespreking
gekomen.
In het gesprek dussen de delegafie-leb iditensde vergadering bleek dat

Prof. Meyer-Lindenberg in gedachten heeft, dat het noordelijkste punt, waar
de afbakeningslijn westwaarts zouafwijken van de equjdistance-lijn, ongeveer
op de 5% breedte-graad zou liggen e, het zuidelijkste punt, waasvandaan -

wederom inafwijking van de equidistance-lijn - een rechte lijn zou worden
getrokken naar het punt C", ongeveer halverwegetussen het zojuisr genoemde
noordelijkste punt en de kust zou liggen.
Voorts bleek dat hij persoonlijk wel enig begrip had voor de gedachte, dai,

indien men zou willen pogen te kamm tot een andere verdelingvan hetNoord-
zae-plateau dan die welke voortvloeit uit de toepassing van het equidistance-
beginsel, dit slechts in een multilateraal overleg tussen alle aanliggende staten

zou kunnen worden verwezenlijkt.
In deze gedachtengang zou de bilaterale regeling tussen Nederland en Duits-
land - voorzover afwijkende van het equidistance-beginsel - dan ook alleen

betrekking kunnen hebben op de door de Eems-situatie geschapen rnoeilijkheid.
. * .. .* . .. .. . .. .. m . .. .- . .. .. . NORTH SBA CONTINENAL SHELF

l

Anncx D

REPOR TN THE CONTTNWD EISCUSSION BESTWEE NHE NETHERLAND ANSI)
GERMA DNELEGATIO ON SHE DEMARCAT IFNTHE CON~NENTA LHECF IN
THE NORTH SEA,HELD AT THEHAGUE ON 23 MARCH 1964

. ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . -. . * . . .. . . .
The Chairrvianof rhe Germon delegatiori stated that the Borkumer Rif
should be taken into consideration when determining the baseline.
TheNeiherlundsdelegosionopposed this contention and again invoked the
Ems-Dollard agreements l in which the boundary of theterritorial sewas
also determined.
TheGermata del~guriothen formulated its views and wishessuch a way,
that the continuation of the joint exploitation system, in inrthe Ems
estuary, also came up for discussion. En fact, both delegations considered it
more dcsirable ta reach agreement concerning a dernarcatien line starting at
the point where the working line (the green lineon the map of the Ems

estuary annexed to the suppIementary agreement totheEms-Dollard agree-
ment) intersects the outer boundary of the terrisea.al
Professor Meyer-Litzdenbergsummarizedthe points raised by the German
delegation duringthe discussionsand proposed that it be as ahypothesis,
that accordingtcthe German view the low-water line (base line) ran approxi-
mately in a south-south-wcsterly direction from the Borkumer Rif and then
north of Rottumeroog and Rottumerplaat and past Schiermonnikoog.
When Professor Kafier,a rnernberof the German delegation, had argued
thaithe minimum correction ofthe equidistan~ pi-incipleshould be a delimita-
tion-technique preventina common Danish-Netherlands border, that would
completely excludeGerrnany,from king created, the GermanChairman called
attention to theurious situation that would arise if the equidistance principle
were applied consistentto the division of the cbntinental shelf in the North
Sea, namely that thc relationship between adjacencountries would be of
prirnary importance and that the rclationship between counIyingopgosite
eaeh othcr would beof secondary importance. Why, asked Professor Meyer-
Lindenkrg, should preference be given to lateral delimitation?

Professor Riphagen replied that in that case the Netherlands would also
have toget into contact with Norway.
At 12.30p.m. the discussions wereadjournforlunch.At the invitation
of the Netherlands delegation tGerman guestsIunche dtthc"Royal"
Restaurant. Duringlunch the chairmen of the delegations agreedto talk
matters over together, before the discussionin plenary session were
resurned.
The discussions wereresumed at 4 o'clock.

l The agreementmentioned onthis pagare: Ems-DollardTreaty3 April1960;
sae para, 29of the N~therlandsCounter-Mernorial0, p. 321). Supplementary
Agreement, 14 May 1962; see Annexes 16 and 16A of the German Memorial
(1, pp. 141-149).
For a definitionthe"greenlime"mentionedon thispageçeeArticle of the
Supplementary Agreement.The map aitached to that Agreement is notin the
written pleas, but theand itsorthern termination pointCwillalsobefound
on thernap in the GermanMemorial @,p. 100). DOCUMENTSFILED BY THE NETHERLANDS 327
Summing up, Professo Rriphagen stated that jt was now clear that point A

on the rnap of the Ems estuary accompanying the supplemenrary agreement to
the Ems-Dollard agreement lof 8April 1960was an equidistant point. Though
the Netherlands had adopied the standpoint that point A should be the point
fromwhich the equidistant delimitation line should be drawn, ithad become
apparent that the Germans considered that at least point L' was the desirabIe
starting point.
The Netherlands chairman went on to state tht it had also become clear
that the German ddegation regarded the baseline as running from the Bor-
kumer Rif and thenceas indicated above.
The Chairman of ihe Gerinan delegalion then described wbat he thought
might be a usable working-hypothesisfor the determination of the delimitation
line, which might begin at point Ç" (see above-mentioned map of the Ems

estuary) and run from there to the southernmosc point on the equjdistance
line,for the determination of which the disputed area in the Ems estuarywas
of no relevance; the line might then continue for some distance according to
the equidistance principle and finally tusn westward to a point on the British
boundaryline.
This working-hypothesis did not corne up for discussion in view of the late
hour.
During the discussionbetween the chairmen of the delegutions in between
sessions it transpired that Professor Meyer-Lindenberg thought that the nor-
thernmost point, where the delimitation line would turn west from the equidis-
tance line, would lie approximately on the 55th parallel of latitude and thar
the southernmost point-whenceagain deviating frorn the equidistance line,
a straight Iincwould be drawn to point C"-would lie approxirnately halfway

betweenthe northernmost point just referred ta and theCoast.It also transpired
that personally he could understand that, if there was a desire to attempt to
divide the North Sea Shelf in any manner, other than by applying the equidis- .
tance principle, it çouldonly be done bywayof multilateral discussionsbetween
ail the adjacent States. Accordingly, the bilateral arrangement between the
Netherlands and Gecrnany-in so far as it differed from the equidistance
principle-would onIy concern the difficulties arising out of the situation in
the Ems estuary.
......,....... ....., ..... n..

l See map iaerted as p.336, infrd,between the presentdocumentarymaterial,
forpoints A, L'and C" referreto above on this pageand on p.330, infra. DOCUMENTSFILED BY TIIE~NETHBRL~WDS 329
Iiggingvan de eindpunten van her eerste lijnstuk doch bij gebreaan nauw-
keurige en juiste gegevens voor de positiebepaling komt men overeen een
kieine deskundigengroep inte stellen voor het vaststellen van een kaart hou-
dende de juiste ligging en het verloovan de lijnstukken ztials die overeen-
komstig het Nederlandse en het Duitse voorstel zouden kunnenworden ge-

trokken.
Besloten wordt hiervoor aan te wijzen aan Duitse zijde een nog naderte
noemen hydrograbche deskundige en Dr. Treviranus; aan Nederlandse zijde
Ktz. Tr.W. Langeraar, Hoofd van de Afdeling Hydrografie van het Ministerie
van Uefensie (Marine) cn Mr. G. Hubée.
ProJ Meyer-Lindenbergstelt voor dat de deskundigenwerkgroep op korte
terrnijn bijeenkomt ehet resultaatvanhaar arbeid zo spoedig rnogelijkvoor-
legtaan de voorzitters van beide delegaties.
Nadat men hetmove erweer eens zal zijn geworden over de uiteindelijke
richting van het eerste lijnstuk zullen de twee voorzifters een ontwerp-tekst
kunnen voorbereiden ter afsluiting van een overeenkomst inzake het oerste
gedeeltevan de Nederlands-Duitse afbakeningslijn. NORTH SEACONTINENTAL SHELF

Annex F

REWRT ON THE DISCUSSIO BNETWEE TNENETHERLAN DND G~RMAW DELE-
GAnONs ON THE DELIMITAT IF THB DUTCH AND GERMAN PARTS OF THE
CONTINENT SHLEL FNTHE NORTH Su, HELD IN BONN ON THURSDA 4YJUWE
1964

............................
The German Chairtnairalso referred to the discussion on the point at which
the demarcation line should begin-the "punctum a quo"-athe first course
of that line. He stated that he woultaknow wherethe Dutch delegation
stood with regard to these questions, after their consultations in the Nether-
lands.
Professo Rriphagen stated that the questions had ken subrnitted to the

Netherlands Government, which had scrutinized them closely. In respect of
the "punctum a quo", the Netherlands Governrnent proposedthat Point C"
on the Chart attachedtothe Supplementary Agreement to the Ems-Dollart
Convention of 8Aprjl 1960be taken asthe beginningofthe boundary line.
From C" a straight line should be drawn to Point Q, firspointin sea
equidistant from the nearest Dutcli and German Low-water points. The lines
wnnecring point Q and the latter points would not intersect the Ems-Dollart
"boundary zone".
............................
Prof~ssarMeyer-Lindenbergwas of the opinion that for the time being the
delegations couId concentrate on the problem of fixing the point at which
the boundary line between the Neiherlands and Germany is to bend the
course ofthe first part thereof. He stated categorically that any line drawn
from Point C" may never prejudice German rights aocommon boundary
linewith England.Onlyarelativelyshort part of theline could run esuidistant;
it would then have tcurvewestwards towards the British demarcation line.

............................
The discussions were resumed at 4 o'cIockin the afternoon, the points dealt
with king the "punctum a quo" and the first part of the demarcation Line.
ProfessoMreyer-linde~ibergstated thatthe German delegation also ptoposed
that Point C"on the Chart attached to the Supplementary Agreement to the
Ems-Dollart Convention of 8 April 1960 be taken as the beginning of the
boundary line.
Sn order toplot the course of the first part of the demarcation line, the
German suggestion was thatwo additional lines should be drawn, aline
joiningL' andA a perpendicular linethrough C"' on to LAn.equidistance
line should thelx plotted, based on the "dry" Borkum Reef points on the
German side, and on the "Schildgronden" (near Rottumeroog and Rottumer-
plaat) and "dry" points lying farther westward on the Netherlands side.
The equidistance line thus pIotted intersects the perpendicular aine ae
pointX, whichis esrimated to lie some 10 nautical miles away from point C".
In the opinion of tGerman Government, the lénC" X could be taken as

the first parof the Netherlands-German demarcation line. The German
-
Seemapinsertedap. 336, infbctweenthe presendocumentarymaterial for
pointsA,L' andC" referretoon p.327, suprand above othis page. DOCUMENTSFlLED BY THE NETHERLANDS
331
Çovemment would be prepared toconsider an extension of the line based on
the equidistance principle up to approximately latitud54"N. provided that
the demarcation line would then veerwestwards to meet the British demarca-
tion line.
The delegatiansthen questioned each other as to the exact location of the
terminal points of the first part of the line, butnoidetailed andaccurate
data were available, it wasdecided to form a srnall groupof specialists to plot
the exact position andcourse of the various Partof the demarcation lineas

suggestedin the Netherlands and the Gerrnan proposals. The German mernkrs
of the wotking group were to be Dr. Treviranus and a hydrographer to be
nominatecllater. CaptainW. Langeraar, Head of the Hydrography Department
of the Ministry of Defence (Navy) and Mr. G. Hubte were to repreçent the
Netherlands.
Professor Meyer-Lindenbergsuggested that the workinggronp meet in the
near future and that it submit the results of its activittosthe chairman
of the delegationas soon as possible.
Once agreement would have ken reachedon the course of thTirstpart of
the demarcation line, the chairman could prepara draft text oan agreement
on the first part of the Netherlands-German demarcation line.
'...*....'....'......'..'..I DOCUMENTSFILED BY THENETHERLANDS 333

Borkum-Riff: rp= 53"37'04"
= 6"35'24"
RottumerplaatWest: p = 53O33'22"
3.= 6'25'33''
Simonszand: cp= 53"32'31J'
A = 6"M'W"

Aus der Anlage zum Zusatzabkommen zum Ems-Dollart-Vertrav. 8.April

1960
PunktA : p = 53"37'52"
A = 6"33'52"
Punkt L': rp= 53'34'22''
2 = 6"1S'00"
Punkt c": y = 53'36'21"

Punkt E, :

minktE,:

hnkt E3 : NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHEW

The'Nktherlands-Gernîan working party, cornposedof CaptainW. Langeraar
(Royal Netherlands Navy), Dr. G. HuEe, 1st Secretdry of Embassy (Nether-
lands), Dr. Grüssner,Counsellor of Legation, 1st Class (Germany) and,Pr.
Treviwnus, Counsellor of iegation, 1st Class (Germany), met at Bonn 24
June 1964 to fix-as they had been invited to do at the meeting of the Nether-
lands and German delegations of 4 June 1964-a linestarting at the well-
known point c" (in accordance with the Annex to the Ems-Dollart Supple-
mentary Agreement of 14 May 1962) and thence initially running seawards
along the line perpendicular to the line connecting poinandA L' (in accor-
dance with the Annex to the Ems-Dollart Supplementary Agreement). Frorn
the point where the perpendicular intersects the equidistance line drawn from
the sea to the Borkum Reef points on the other side, the line should follow
the abeve-mentioned equidistance line up to about latit54"N.
The latest charts were used for plotting the Iines in accordance with the
working group's instructions.
The workingparty reached ageernent on the location of the initial points
to be used for plotting the lines; the co-ordinofthese initial points are to
befound in the Annex to this Report.
The line thus drawnruns from point c" straight to poiEl, thence straight
to point E, and from there straight to point E,. PoiE, is the intersection
point oftheperpendicular to points A anL'and the above-mentioned equidis-
tance line which, in the section In question, shoulddrawn on the basis of
the starting points of the Borkum Reef and RottumerpIaat West. Point E,
isthe nearest point of fracture of this equidistance line, where the Simonszand
point must be taken instead of the RottumerpIaat West point.

Point E, is the point where this equidistancc line and the line of latitude
54'N inte&ct.
The CO-ordinatesof points E,, E; andÉ, are to be found in the Annex tu
this Report.
It was agreed that the co-ordinates of poinEl,E2and E, derived experi-
mentally from the chartcourd be subsequently checked arithrnetically by the
two parties.
A chart showing theabove-mentioned points andIines is attached to this
Report; the purpose of the chart is merdy to elucidate the results obtained.

Bonn, 24 June 1964. DQCUMEWTSFILEDBY THE NtiTHERLANDS

Borkum-Reef: rp = 53"37'W'
= 6'35'24"
RottumerpIaatWest: p = 53'33'22"
A = 6'25'3.3"
Simonszand: q = 53"32'311'
A.= 6"ZO'OO"

Fromthe Annexto theSupplementaryAgreementto theEms-DollariConven-
tion (8April 1960)
Point A: rp= 53"37'52"
A.= 6"33'52"
PointL': rp= 53"34*22"

A = 6"16'00"
PointC": q = 53"36'21"
1.= 15~24'48''

Point E,:

Point E,:

Point E,:336 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHEW

i

'l Note hy IhAgentOCTh= Nclhcdands:
1

Thrmgiwl map sitachcdlath=JoinlRcpori(Anncx11)cannotberrorodmd
el &or1noiia.bu1 lioinlr El. F.,andrhoun on ihc iwp aieaom Irom
inrigniliamnffiions ~iiualcdar indicaichn ihc final manaltschcdio
the Tmtpd 1 -ber IW(0cricral Mcrnoira1.p Iwb DOCUMENTS FILEDBY THENETHERLANDS

VERSLA GAN TEDEN HAAC GEHOUDEN BESPREKINCEN OP 14JULI 1964TUSSEN
DELEGATIESVAN NEDERLAN DNDE BONDSREPUB LEREKFBAKENING VAN HET
NEDERLANDS EE DUITSE DEEL VAN HET CONTINENTAAL PLAT INDE NODRDZEE

............................
Nadat Prof.Riphagen de besprekingen omstreeks 10 uur heeft geopend,
maakt hij melding van de ontvangst van het gemeenschappelijk rapport met
bijlagenvan de Nederlands-Duitsewerkgroep,welke hct eerste gedeelte van
de ahkeningslgn tot de 54ebreedtegaad in kaart heeft gebrenhde cotirdi-
naten daarvan heeft vastgesteld.afschrifvan het rapport alsbijlagaan

dit verslag gehecEen enkelewijzigingin hetrapporen een aantal correcties
van geringe omvang op de vaststelling der coordinaten zullen in overIegtussen
kide werkgroepdelegatiesworden aangebracht. De Dultse delegatiedeelt meda
de Nederlandse correctiinbeginsel te aanvaarden.
De Voorzitler van de Duitsdelegolidistribueert ondedeaanwezigen de
ontwerptekstenvan een overeenkomst ter vaststelling van het eerste gedeelte
van de afbakeningslien een protocol houdende een gerneenschappeliver-
slag van de arbeid der twee delegaties waarin tevens de rechtsstandpunten der
twee regeringen zijn neergelegd.
............................
Aangezien ProJ Meyer-Lindenbergvanaf 7 augustus 1964 VOQrlange-tijd
afwezig zal zijkomt men overeen dat de Voorzitter vade Nederiandse

delegatieen een enkel lid daarvan, na goedkeusing van de ontwerp-teksten
door de Ministes van BuitenlandZaken, zo rn~gelijkv6br genoemde datum
naar Bonn zullen komen ter parafervan de overeenkomsten ondertekening
van het protocol.338 NORTH SEA CONTINENTASHELF

REPOR TN THEDISCUSSIO HESLDINTHE HAGUE ON 14JULX 1964BETWEEN
THE ~)FLEGA~ONS OPTHENETHERLAN DSD THEFEDERAR LEPUBLI CN THE
DEMARCATI OPNTHE NETHERLAN DSD THEGERMAP NARTS OF THECONTI-
NENTAL SHELFINTHE NORTH SEA

..............................
When, at aboutO1o'clock,ProfessRiphagenhad opened the proceedings,

he statehehad received the joint reportannexefrom the Netherlands-
Gerrnan working group that has mapped the first part of the demarcation
lineup tothe 54th degreeof latitude and has fixedthe CO-ordinates.A copy
of this report is annexed to the present dOneorntwo alterations will
bemade in the report aadnurnber of minor corrections wiIl btothee
CO-ordinateafteconsultations have taken pIace between the delegations of
the twa working groups.The Cerman delegation stated that ,it accepted the
Netherlands amendments in principle.
The Chairmanofthe Germandelegafion distributed cofidraft texts of
an agréementon the determination of the firstpart of the demarcation lin$
and a protocodcontaining the joint reporwork of the two delegations,
inwhich the legal standpoofthe two govemments were expounded.

..............................
Since ProfessMreyer-lindenberwas to lx absenfor a long period as
from 7August 1954,it was agreed that the chairmaonenmember of the
Netherlands delegation should go to Bonn when the draft hadtheen
approvedby the Netherlands Ministcr for Foreign Affairs, before the above
date if possibtoinitial the agreement and sign the protocol. DOCUMENTSPIED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBCIC OP GERMANY 339

III. DOCUMENTS FKED BY THE AGENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE FEDERAC REPUBLIC OF CERMANV

on the German-Netherfands-Msh negotiotions, submiiteto the Inrernsiional
CourtofJusrice,put-suantto ihe Presidenf'srequesamade ai the pubJicsitting,
heldon I November 1968,tu makeavailable tothe Court, iSQfar as rheinforma-
tion isin thpossession of the Agenls or can be obtained by tkem, any minutes,
notes or reports which would indicate tbases on which fke Parfies defermined
thedelimifationagrecduponinihenegoriafions whichled uptothepartial boudary
rreafies,especiallwith reference tu thereasonswhy the exact fermina!poinls
were fixed as fheyare,rather thanai soinepoints nearerto orJariher from the

coastlinel.

S. Noie Verbalefram theNefherlandsEmbassy in Bonn to the Germon Federal
Foreign Ofice D,ated 21 June 1963

[XeeAnnexesSand2,4 iothe Memurial, 1, pp. 96-97;Annex 8 IO fhe
Netherlands Couriter-Metnorial1,p. 378.1

2. NoieVerbalefrum the GernraraFederalForeignOfice, Daied 26 August 1963

[See Annexes9 and 9A fofheNetherlands Counfer-Mernoria!,
I,pp. 379-38J1.

P.162,supra. See:alsoJNo.54,p.392, injia.340 NORTH SEA CONTINENTALSHELF

3. NoieVerbale from the NefkerlandsErnbassyinBonil, Dated 30 January1964
(Una bridged)

(Translation)

The Royal Netherlands Embassy presents its compliments and has the
honour to referto Note No. V 1-80/52/3 from the German FederaI Foreign
Office,dated 26 August 1963, in which the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany proposes negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the
course of the boundary between their two parts of the continental shelf off
the Coast of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic, and wishes to draw
the attention of the Federal ForeigOffic te the following matter.
Although it can be expected that the proposed consultations will lxhegun
in the not too distant future, it must be assumed tht it willno doubt be several
months before a final agreement is reached.
It. wilnot have escapcd the attention of the Federal Govemment +t in
recent months interested oil companies have been taking more steps with a
view to wmmencing drilling operations in the abovementioned aren.
The fact that there is still ao rclevant IegisIation appltoathisarea and
governing the extraction of natural resources from beneath the continental
shelfisan encouragement to the companies concerned to continue their efforts,
which could lead to an uncontrolled andheuce probably inefficient hunt for
oiland gas.
In order to rectify this trend and to prevent drilling work from being carried

out at points the status of which may bethe subjwt offorthcoming negotiations,
the Embassy, on behalf of its Government,requests the FederaI Foreign
Officeto seekthe assistanceofthe FederalGovernrnentin reaching anarrange-
ment io the effecthat the two Parties refrain from issuinglicencesfor drilling
operations on the part of the continental shelf lying directly westwardof the
so-called equidistance lineas more closely defined in the Embassy's Note
No. 7099 of 21 June 1963, until an agreement on the delimitation of mutual
rjghtson the shelf has ben concluded.
The Embassy would very much appreciateit if the Federal Foreign Office
would inform it whether the Federal Government is preparedto makesuch
an arrangement. DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE FEDERAL REPIJBLICOF GERMANY 341

4. Note Verbalefrom the GertnariFederalForeignOfice, Dared4 February1964

(Translaiion)

The German Federal Foreign Officepresents its compliments to the Royal
Netherlands Embassy and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Em-
bassy'sNote No. 1523of 30 January 1964and to reply as follows.
As already expressed in discussions, the Federal Government, too, would
like an early commencement of Netherlands-German negotiations on the

determination of their mutual boundary on the continental shelf. The Federal
Foreign Ofice will take the liberty of suggesting a date for'such negotiations
to the Royal Netherlands Embassy as soon as possible.
The proposa1of the Royal Netherlands Government that until the conclusion
of a contractual agreement on this question both Parties should refrain from
issuing licences for drilling operations on the part of the continental shelf
lying directly westward of the so-called equidistance line, has been forwarded
without delay to the appropriate German authorities. The Federal Foreign
Office willcommunicate the Federal Government's reply to this proposal to
the Royal Netherlands Embassy as soon as possible. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

5. Notes of 19 Febrlrary1964
(Excerpt)

(Translation)

GERMAN CONTINENTAL SHELF IN THE NORTH SEA
DELLMiTATION IN RELATION TO THE NETHERLANDS

1
The Netherlands Govemment has notified the Federal Foreign Officeof its
readiness to open negotiations on the determination of their mutual boundary
on the continental sheif. It has suggested that there should be an initial ex-
change of viewsin Bonn on 3 and 4 March 1964.The Netherlands delegation
will be led by Professor Riphagen, legal adviser to the Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
The negotiations will probably be dificult and prolonged, due to the fact
that-

1. the German and the Netherlands viewpoints differ as to the course of the
boundary in the Ems estuary and in coastal waters, so that with regard to
the Netherlands there is not even a firm basis from which to draw the

continental shelf boundary seawards;
2. according to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 1958Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf, the boundary of the continental shelf between neigh-
bouring States shall be the rnedian line, provided that those neighbouring
States do not otherwise agree. Apart from the fact that for the reasons
given in sub-paragraph 1 above the Netherlands and the German views
differon the course of this rnedian line,it would inany event beunfavourable
to us to take themedian line as the basis. Although under Article 6, para-
graph 2, of the Convention the median line would only constitute the
boundary where no "special circumstances" exist which wouldjustify an-
other boundary line, the Netherlands will nevcrtheless probably take the
standpoint that under suchan arrangement the onus of proof of the existence
of such special circumstances rests on the State seeking a boundary line
other than the median line .. .

As soon as there are signs of agreement with the Dutch, negotiations should
be opened with the Danish Govemment on the delimitation of the continental
shelf.
Negotiations on the delimitation of the German continental shelf must also
be conducted with Great Britain. The British Embassy suggested the same
on 15 February 1964.But Anglo-Gerrnan negotiations should not be opened

until the Netherlands-German and Danish-German negotiationshave produced
tangible results. DOCUMENTSFILELI BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLICOF GERMANY 343

6. Summnrized Minutes, Dated 16 March 1964, of the Rretlrerlnn&-Germon
Negoiiafioiïs on thDelimitalionofflic LonfinenfaSheu of the Norili SeaHeId
inBonn on 3 and4 Murch 1964

(Translation)

Bofh sides, whilst stating that the talks were non-binding, agreed that an
atterngt shouldlx made to bring about a voluntary agreement between neigh-
bouring States on the bowndary on the continental shelf.
However, whereasthe Netherlands delegation, as had already beenexpressed
in the Note Verbale of 23 June 1963, conçidered the equidistance principle
pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 2, second sentence, ofthc Geneva Convention
as an appropriate basisfor an agreed delimitation of the boundary... Mini-
steriddirigent Professor Dr. Meyer-Lindenberg, supported by the represen-
tativcs of the federal ministries and the Laetider stated that Germany,aci
count of her positionin the North Sea area, the length of her coastline, the
investments made and other achievernents in this respect, was entitled to
equal treatment in her rclationship with her neighbours Denmark and the
Netherlands in the question of their respectivareasof the continental shelf,

The Netherlands proposed cutting off of Germany from the middle of the
North Sea was clearly unjusi. Germany had postponed negotiations with
Denmark and Britain togivethe Netherlands an opportunity to negotiaia fair
settlement first on a bilateral basis.
Profaso Riphngen pointed out thatan equal sharing of the North Sea shelf
would have to includeBritain, Norway and Belgiumand could only be achieved
by means of muItilatera1 negotjations. A restriction of negotiations to the
Netherlands, Germany and Denmark could not be justificd on geographical
grounds.
At the start of the second daofnegotiations Professor Riphagen stated that
he had ken told by The Hague that the Netherlands Governrnentsaw no basis
for negotiation inthe equal-area principle. Onthe contrary, the discussions
should bc based on the equidistance principle.
The configuration of the Gerrnan coastline did not constitute a special
circumsiance that could justify a delimitation varying frorn the principle of
equidistance. The Netherlands saw no occasion to cornpensateher neighbour,

who was both large and had greater natural resaurces, for any advantage the
Netherlands may have from the course of her coastlinc. Furthermore, their
parrnership wirhin the EEC ensured that the sources of power open to one
State would also benefit its neighbours.
The value of the partial areas of the continental shelf was, after all, still
unknawn, and their size really had nothing to do with the length of national
coastlines.
Moreover,theNetherlands couldnot consideranyequal apportionment ofthfi
North Seaarea,if only on account of Belgiurn.
With regard to the area of the Ems estuaw the Netherlands delegatiun were
willingto discuss how the equidistant boundary line should begin.
Professor Br. Meyer-lindenberg expressedthe German disappointment over
thjç attitude and pointed out that the subsidiary question of drawing the
boundary on the basis of the equidistance principwas of no particulaï conse-344 NORTH SEA CONTINENTALSHED
quence at this stage of the discussions. main objectiveatthe moment was
rather for the Netherlands and Gerrnanto arriveatan equitable delimitation
by way of agreement. Itwas not seen why Germany ,n important country
adjacent to the North Sea, should be limited to a disproportionately small

portion of the continental shelf area on account ofbend.in her coastline,
Professo Mreyer-Lindenberg then pr~posed that the German area of the
North Sea should be deterrninedinproportion to the length of the Coast(with
the lengthof the coastlines being in ratioof 385: 273: 245 km. the sizes of
the areas accruing to the Netherlands, Gerrnany and Denmark would be
approximately 57,000, 44,000, and 40,000 sq.krnrespectively.,
He pointed out that irwas already dificult to keep the German companies
conŒrned from making exploratory driilings in the disputed area. In the long
run they could not be heldback, particularly as twaseno legalpossibility of
preventing them. This courd produce most unpleasant consequences, not anly
for the iiegotiations but for relations betwcen the two counfries.
ProJesso Riphageri siated that nothing could be said abtheNetherlands
views with regard tothe determination of the boundary in the mourh of the
Ems until the next meeting, which was fixedfor 23 Marçh1964at 9.30a.m. in
the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. DOCUMENTS FlLED BY THE FEDERALREPUBLICOF GERMANY 345

7. Minutes of Conclusions of the Netherlands-GerrnanNegotiations on the
ContinetitalShelf Held in The Hague on23 March 1964
(Translation)

Professor Riphogen stated that these were still non-binding preliminary
discussions. He still had no instructions as to how to reply to the German
proposal of 4 March that year (sharing of North Sea shelf in proportion to the
lengths of Germany's coastline and those of her neighbours).
Professor Meyer-Lindenberg again outlined the reasons why an early agree-
ment on the lateral determination of the shelf boundary would be in their
mutual interests.

The two delegations then discussed the possibilities of connecting the shelf
boundary with thetermination point of the lateral coastal sea boundary (point a
quo). The German delegation upheld its reservations in respect of the applica-
tion of the equidistance principle, while the Netherlands delegation started
from the contents of the Note Verbale of the Netherlands Embassy dated 21
June 1963.Different views emerged on several points in connection with the
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions on the Continental Sheif and on the
Territorial Sea, as wellas with the question of how baselines should be drawn.
TheNetherlands delegation consideredthat Borkum Riff might be included as a
point of departure for equidistance-line boundaries. Variations were also dis-
cussed which could ensue from the arrangement provided for in the Supple-

mentary Agreement to the Ems-Dollart Treaty, especially whether the point a
quo could lie on the line A-Cii-LI of that Supplementary Agreement. The
German delegation also mentioned in particular the historic title, which, as
"special circumstances" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Geneva Con-
vention, it wasfelt shouldbe taken into consideration in drawing the boundary
line.346 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

8. Notes of 6 April1964
(Excerpt)

(Translation)

The talks with the Netherlands on the determination of the continental shelf
boundary werecontinued in The Hague on 23 March 1964.
............................
As regards the northern or north-western termination point of the Nether-
lands-German shelf boundary, the German delegation must realize that any
willingness on the part of the Netherlands Government to allow Germany
access to the middle of the North Sea cannot lead to concrete concessions, if
only on grounds of domestic policy, unless it is certain that corresponding
concessions will be made by Demark as well.It will therefore only be possible
to discussthe northern (or north-western) part of the Netherlands-German shelf
boundary, and hence the problem of a Gerrnan share of the subsoil beneath the
middle of the North Sea, in multilateral negotiations with the participation of
Denmark and, possibly, Great Britain.

The aim of the negotiations in their present phase is therefore to determine
the Netherlands-German shelf boundary to such an extent seawards from the
point a quo-which is still to be agreed-that,on the one hand, our clain~to
access to the middle of the North Sea is not prejudiced and, on the other, the
German oilcompanieswill beable to commencedrillingoperations at the points
near the Coastin which they are at present mainly interested. DOCUMENTS FlLED BY THE FEDERALREPUBLICOF GERMANY 347

9. Mitlutes, Dated 4 June 1964, of the Cotrclusionsof the Netherlarids-Gern~an
NegotintionsHeld inBonnotz4 June1964

' (Excerpt)
(Translation)

Professor Riphagetzsaid he had been instructed to state that with regard to
the determination of the Netherlands-German boundary in the North Sea
continental shelf area it was only possible to digress from the principle of
equidistancelaid down in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelfin the area near the coast, taking into account the existing
agreements on the Ems estuary. Moreover, it was the Netherlands view that
there did not appear to be any special circumstances which might justify a
modification of the further course of the lateral boundary, as claimed by
Germany.
Professor Dr. Meyer-Litrderrberg regretted that the bay situation of the
Federal Republic was not recognized as a special circumstance by the Nether-

lands. Going by the genesis of the Geneva Convention this was a typical case
for the application of the special circumstances clause.The Netherlands wereat
liberty to seek a voluntary agreement, which wasthe first step envisaged by the
Convention (Article 6, paragraph 2, first sentence), independently of its inter-
pretation of the term "special circumstances" ...
The Netherlands delegation argued that the Geneva Convention also laid
down guidelinesas to the composition of any voluntary agreement, and that in
the opinion of the Netherlands these were bound to lead to the application of
the equidistance principle as an equitable method of apportionment, as there
were no opposiog special circumstances. The Netherlands Government was
prepared to submit this differenceof opinion on the interpretation of Article 6
of the Geneva Convention, together with the Federal Republic, as a legal

question to the International Court of Justice.
Professor Dr. Meyer-Lindenbergsaid that Germany wasnot afraid to put the
matter to arbitration, which could onlyend in her favour, but first it had to be
absolutely certain that there could be no voluntary agreement between the
countries concemed. In the .German view, however, the delimitation of the
continental shelf was to littoral countries of the North Sea, and particularly to
Germany, not a problem that could be solved on a purely bilateral basis with
neighbouring countries, in this instance the Netherlands. On the contrary,
multilateral agreements werenecessaryto achieveanadequateapportionment of
the middle of the North Sea. He suggested that as an initial step they should
solve the problem of the Ems estuary by drawing a partial boundary line
between Germany and the Netherlands near the coast, so as to enable oil
com~anies of both countries to exdore and ex~loit that area in the next few
yearS.This arrangement did not imply recogni;ion of the principle of equidis-
tance as an eauitable criterion for amortionment. The German side ex~resslv

reserved its leial standpoint, stating that the line could therefore only bedraG
up to a certain distance from the coast, say, as far as the 54th latitude. The
further determination of the boundary would have to be the subject of a future
settlement on a multilateral basis which should be effected in accordance with
other criteria than the principle of equidistance.- Equidistance line, constructeo dn the
base pointsA and LI (~asternand
Nestern terminal pointsof the
boundary-area"descri'bedin the
~ollart-Treaty)greement to the Ems-

----- basis of Borkum Riffnstructedon the

the Netherlandsne as proposeb dy

. . NORTH SEA CONTINENTALSHFlF

JO. Joint Report ofCernmn-NefherlandsWorkfrigGroug,Dared 4 June 1964
I

[See Annex H of theNefherlnndsdocumentaiion ,p. 334-335,supra.]

II. Noies of8 July 1964

Subjecb:Continental Shelf of the North Sea; Delimitation in relation to the

Netherlands.
Enclosure: Diagram (se ep. 348-349,s~cpra)..- ., -. .

The talks with the Netherlands concerning the laterai delimitation of the
German and Netherlands shareof the continental shelf of the North Sea have
reacheda stage where the early initialling of a partial agreement would seem

possible.
The talks centre around the following questions:

I 1. The cansequencesensuing for thecourse of the shelfboundary in thecoastal
areafrom the divergentmutual views on the course of the boundary in the
Ems estuary;
2. Germany's accessto the middle of theNorth Sea, which is what our demand
for an appropriate area of the North Sea shelf amounts ta in practice.

Ad 1:
The shelf area near the Coastin which recent dsilling operations have struck
minera1depasits; isat prcsent an object of speciai inferest to the German (and
Netherlands) mineral oil indusrry. This rendersdetermination ofthe boundary
urgent at leasfor that part of the shefor, failing such delimitation, politically
undesirable incidents in the boundary area could not be permanently avoided.
The difierencesof opinion between us and the Netherlands about themethod of
dividing the North Sea shelf among the mastal States, which, at least at the
present time, still impede the fulfilment of the Gerrnan request for an ap-
propriate area of the North Sea shelf (see cornrnentson item 2),are of only
minor importance for the;coastal area.
According to our concept, the . . . Zioundaryline shouId end at the 54th
paraflel and, in its furthecourse which will probably be a subject~f future
multilateral negotiation, turn westward towards the middlc of the North Sea.

A partial boundary of the siiggestedlength would in our viewprejudice neither
Gerrnany nor the-Netherlands withregard to future negotiations on Germany's
access to the middle of the North Sea. 1

NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SlELF

13. Excerpt of 10 Augusi 1964ofthe Paper Prepared ibyritefideral Fororeîgn
Ofice for Submission io theCabinet

(Trundarion)

DELMATION OF THE CONïINENTAL SHELF OF THE NORTH SEA IN RELATION TO
THE NETHERLANDS

The Federal Government's procIamation of 20 January 1964 has made it
clear that the Federal Governrnent, by virtue of ihe evolution of general inter-
national law,considers theexploration and exploitation the natural resaurces
of the seabed and subsoil of the submarine zone adjacent to the German
maritime coast to be an exclusive sovereign right of the Federal Republic of
Gerrnanyand thatit makes the delimitation of the ,Germancontinental shelfin
relation to the continental shelveof other States subject to agreements with

those States.
Following that proclamation, a German delegation headed by the Fedederal
Foreign Officelast Marçhbegan negotiations with a Netherlands delcgation
about the laterat delimitation of the German and Netherlands continental
shelves. The negotiationswere concluded on 4 August 1964when the enclosed
draft treaty concerning the lateral delimitaiion of the coniinental shelf near
the coast wasinitialled. Asshownon theençlosed diagram (1)the draft provides
for the boundary to be drawn from the coast into the North Seaup to the 54th
parallel,Le.,alength of 25 nautical miles.
No agreement could be reached during the negotiationon the further course
of the boundary line, since the Netherlands, referring to the Convention on the

Continental Shelfsignedin Geneva on 29 April 1958(but not yet ratified either
by them or by the Federal Republicof Germany), lays claim tu the portionas
rnarked in the ençlosed diagram of the North Sea (2), so that, witha cor-
responding portion allocated to Denmark, Germnny would receive only the
area ... within the German Bight for subsoil expjoitation. According to the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf the rnethod of apportionment as
shown in the diagram isto be applied only if thStare csncerned do not am
otherwise and if no specialcircumstancesexist such as are claimed to prevbyl
the Gerrnan side inview of the configuration of the Gerrnan North Seacoast in
the form of a bay. Further negotiations will have'to be held, first of al1wiih
Denmark, and then probably at multilateral Ievel, togain acceptance for Our
daim for a larger share of thc North Sca shelf affordiusaccess to the rniddle
of the North Sea.
However, in vicw of the drilling operationsfor narural gas started by a

German syndicate this surnmer in the western part of the German Bight, an
early settlement of the boundary problem in the coastal arm was urgently
required. Hence the first step wato agree with the Netherlandson the partial
boundar Iaid down in the present draft treait doesnot prejudice the further
course of the boundary in view of the reservations stated hyboth parties in the
attachedJoint Minutes of the Negot iations o4 August 1964,and itclarifiethe
situation in the areanear the Coaston which the German minera1oil industry
setsgeat hopes in view of the large naturagas depositsfound inthe Nether-
lands northern province of Groningen.
a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * .....-.- DOCUMENTS FlLED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLICOF OERMANY 353

14. JointPress Communiqué of 1 December 1964

(Trnnslation)

The Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of
the Netherlands concerning the lateral delimitation of the Continental Shelf
near the Coast was signed in Bonn on 1 December 1964by the State Secretary
of the Federal Foreign Office, Professor Carstens, and the Netherlands Am-
bassador, Baron van Ittersum. The Treaty establishes a partial boundary
between the German and the Netherlands share of the continental shelf of the
North Sea beyond the coastal sea which runs from the coast approximately 25

nautical miles north-westwards as far as the 54th parallel and clarifies the
situation near the coast.

15. Memorandutn regarding the Netherlands-German Treaty of 1 Decetnber
1964 concerning theLateral Delimitation of the CotztinentalShelfof the North
Sea Near the Coast '

(Excerpt)

(Translation)

During the negotiations agreement could not yet be reached on the further
course of the boundary line.
In view of the drilling operations for natural gas started this summer in the
western part of the German Bight by a syndicate consisting mostly of Cerrnan
6rms an early settlement of the boundary problem, at least in the area near the
coast, was urgently required. It was therefore necessary as a first step to agree

upon the partial boundary as laid down in the present draft treaty; this bound-
ary clarifiesthe situation in theareanear the coast on which, inviewof the large
deposits of natural gas found in the neighbourhood in the Netherlands north-
eastern provinceof Groningen, theGerman mineral oil industrysetsgreat hopes.
The boundary does not, however, prejudice the question of the further course
of the boundary.

l ScleAnnexes 3 and 3A to the Mernorial1, pp.98-101. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

16. Nofes of 6 October 1964

(Excerpt)

(Tra~islation)

CONïINENTAL SHELF IN THE NORTH AND BALTIC SEAS
DELlMlTATiON IN RELATiON TO DENMARK

1
It had been stated in the notes that after termination of the talks with the
Netherlands concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf near the coast

relevant talks would have to be started with Denmark in further preparation for
a multilateral conference to be held on the apportionmcnt of the continental
shelfoftheNorth Sea. Asnegotiations with the Netherlands havebeenconcluded
(a treaty concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf near the coast was
initialled on 4 August 1964and willpresumably besignedthis month), 6rst talks
with Denmark are to beheld on 15and 16October 1964in Bonn.

II
As far as can be judged at this stage, the talks with Denmark will notbe of
the same economic importance as those with the Netherlands, as so far there
areno definitesuppositions that any mineral oil and natural gas deposits worth
prospecting are to be found in the German-Danish boundary area.

17. Joint Press Con~tnuniquo éf 16 October 1964

(Translation)

A German and a Danish delegation met in the Federal Foreign Office in
Bonn on 15and 16October to discuss problems involved in the delimitation of
the continental shelfinthe North Sea. During those talks a useful exchange of
viewstook place in a good neighbourly atmosphere.
The negotiations will be continued in the near future. DOCUMENTS FlLED BY THE FEDERALREPUBLIC OF GERMANY 355

18. Minutes of the Conckrsiorrsof the Negotiations on the Delimitation of the
ContinentalShelf in tlie North Sea Between Germanyand Denmark, Held in
Bonnon 15 and 16 October 1964

(Excerpt)

. .an.l. .on. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

minutes of the talks held with the Netherlands in favour of an equal appor-
tionment of the North Sea shelf between Germany and Denmark, whilst the
Danish delegation put up the equidistance principle as the method to be
basically applied.
Since the Geneva Conference in its Article 6 did not codify customary
from an equitable apportionment of areas of equal size whereby in the middleng
of the North Sea a joint solution, perhaps according to the sector principle,
would probably have to be sought by way of consultation among al1littoral
States concerned. Even paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention
prescribed, as the first step, voluntary agreement for which in the German
seen why the determination of the lateral boundary should have priority overt
the apportionment of the shelf among States lying opposite each other for
which provision wasmade in paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Convention. The
portion of the continental shelf due to Germany was not any more distant
fromGreat Britain than was the Danish. After all, Professor Meyer-Lindenberg
case in which the concept of "special circumstances" applied, as had, inter alia,
beenrecognized by an unsuspected witness like M. François, so that, alter-
natively, the equidistance principle should be modified in favour of Germany.
On the other side, Viceeudenrigsrad Oldenburg made the following com-
ments :
The equidistance principle, he said, had long been recognized as a principle
German delegatehadnot made any general reservations).Without the Conven- (the
tion having been ratified, the equidistance principle constituted the foundation
for the Danish claim to a share of the shelf to be determined on the basis of
geographical realities, as had already been promulgated at national level in a
Danish ordinance. A principle of equal apportionment of the North Sea shelf
inrelation to other States either. Moreover, the Danish margin for negotiation
had already been extremely narrowed down as a result of arrangements made
with Great Britain and Norway (median lines according to the equidistance
principle). Article 6, paragrap2,first sentence, of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf was no pactum de contrahendo. "Special circumstances"
which was a codification of customary sea law, were, in the light of the genesis
of the Convention, to be understood as meaning only entirely abnormal
configurations and situations (islands, sandbanks, deviating boundaries of the 356 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF
coastal sea). The Danish Government felt likewise compellcd to abide by its
claim in the face of Parliament and public opinion.
After these basic comments there was, on the basis of charts and texts of
boundary agreements, a discussion of the question from which point of the
outer boundary of the coastal sea the lateral shelf boundary in the North Sea
would have to start. The Danish delegation promised to provide access ao
map of the boundary area between Sylt and Rom, to the text of an agreement
concluded in 1941concerning the shifting of the lateral boundary of the coastal
sea, as well as records about the drawing of the baseline in 1921between Sylt
and a point called Romo Platt, and suggested that the intersection of the outer
boundary of the co+ta! sea and a lin?+todrawn pursuant to the 1921agree-
'ment in extension of a line connecting two fixed points on the Isle of Sylt
should be taken as the point a quo, since the constant shifting of the charnel
in the List Depression would not admit of a permanent fixation of the lateral
boundary of the coastal sea DOCUMENTS FlLED BY THE FEDERALREPUBLIC OF GERMANY 357

19. Report by the P1enipotentiar.yof ktd Schlesivig-Holsteitz, iti His Capacity
as Member of tlze Germatt Delegatioti, ro His Land (Provincial) Goi~ertitnetit.
Dared 31 March 1965

(Excerpt)

(Translatiori)

In their introductory statements the heads of delegation pointed out that
the legal positions of the two countrics were fully upheld. As those positions
were taken as known, the delegations soon got down to the concrete task of
finding a suitable boundary on the continental shelf near the coast.
After joint and separate discussions, the point "Sn fixed in the boundary
description of 1921 and constituting the point of interesection of the line
connecting the Sylt East lighthouse and the middle of the two beacons of the
Sylt West lighthouse with the line delimiting the territorial sea (3-nautical-mile
boundary) was chosen as a suitable point of departure.
It was then agreed that the partial boundary near the coast sliould be a
straight line from point "S" approximately 30 nautical miles roughly WNW

as far as a point equidistant from the island of Sylt and Kap Blaakvandshuk.
In terms of CO-ordinates,this provisional termination point of the Danish-
German boundary line near the coast lies roughly 55'10'13" North and
7'33'13" East according to a provisional German calculation (whereas the
Danes, using different maps, fixed the probable position at 55'10'07" North
and 7'33'13" East). In addition it was agreed that an accurate calculation
would bemadein Denmark (and incorporated in theEuropean Datum System),
and that the Federal Republic would check its data.
Possibly, the Danish side will again state in a special exchange of letters
through the Danish Embassy in Bonn that this termination point does not
prejudice either of the contracting Parties with regard to the further course of
the boundary line. The German delegation thought it was not necessary to
repeat the statement, but also that it could not do any harm. The possibility
of Gerrnan access to the middle of the North Sea is not prejudiced by the
present arrangements and statemcnts.
It was also decided thatin viewof the technical details still to be cleared up,

the agreed draft treaty (the draft of which is attached) should no longer be
initialled but signed by the Danish Embassy and the German Federal Foreign
Officein Bonn after the conclusion of the Danish-German calculations.
At the end of the first day of the negotiations, Minister Oldenburg sur-
prisingly announced that Netherlands-Danish boundary negotiations were
already envisaged for the next few months. Ministerialdirigent Dr. Trucken-
brodt immediately made it clear that Germany laid claim to the area of the
continental shelfin question as far asthe middle of the North Sea. The German
sidetherefore intendedto open negotiations with the Netherlands and Denmark
as soon as possible on thefurther course of the partial boundary. In this respect
it would have to be considered whether it would be more expedient to discuss
the disputed boundary questions trilaterally or at a conference of al1littoral
States of the North Sea. Moreover, the Federal Republic reserved the right
to appeal to an arbitral tribiinal should such discussions fail. This problem
was again raised by the head of the German delegation on 18 March 1965,358 NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

who suggestedtripartitetalksbetweenGermany,theNetherlandsandDenmark
as soon as possible.

20. JointPressCornnuiniguéof18 March 1965

[See Annexes8 and 8A to theMernorial1,pp. 114-115.1 DOCUMENTS FiLED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 359

21. Notes of lApriI1965
(Excerpt)
(Trarislation)

DANISH-GERMAN TREATY CONCERNING THE DELIMiTATTON OF THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF OF THE NORTH SEA NEAR THE COAST

1
The attached draft letter is to be sent to the Head of the Federal Chancellery
asking him to circulate it among the members of the Cabinet to gain their
approval for the signature of the Danish-German treaty concerning the
delimitation of the continental shelf of the North Sea near the coast.
The treaty deals with questions relating to the lateral delimitation of the
continental shelf as between neighbouring States. The negotiations with the
Netherlands last year failed to produce agreement on the principle on which
lateral delimitation shoulbe based; nor was such agreement possible in the
recent negotiations with Denmark.

The Danish and Netherlands Governments take the standpoint that
the delimitationshouldbe based on the principle ofequidistance,according
to which the boundary on the continental shelf would constitute a line
equidistant from the nearest points on the baseline (the baseline is a
coastal line drawn for practical purposes without consideration for small
inlets, from which the breadth of the coastal sea is measured).
We,however,feelthatthe equidistanceprinciple cannot beautomatically
applied to the apportionment of the continental shelf of the North Sea on
account of Germany's baysituation andthe resultant specialcircumstances
in the North Sea area.
Taking the treaty with the Netherlands as a model, the two delegations
confined themselves to an agreement on a partial boundary of approximately
30 nautical miles. This partial boundary is described in greater detail in the
letter to the Head of the Federal Chancellery.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III

The question of the further course of the proposed boundary line in the
North Sea was left open. Both sides agree that this question is not prejudiced
by the arrangement made.360 NORTH SEA CONTINEN~AL SHELF

22. Protocol to the Danish-GertnanTreaty concerningthe Delirnitatiorrof the
ContinentalShelfof the North Sea Near the Coast l,Dafed 9 Jurie1965

[See Annexes 7 and 7A to the Metnorial,1,pp. 112-113.1

23. Mernorandumregardingthe Danish-GermanTreaty 'of 9 June 1965 coti-
certiit~gthe Delimitation of the Continental Slzelf of the North Sen Near the
Coast

(Translation)
This treaty is basically the same asthe corresponding treaty with the Nether-
lands signed on 1 December 1964 (Treaty between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the lateral delimita-
tion of the continental shelf near the Coast, printed in Bundestag document
No. IVl3087 T).e first section of the Danish-German boundary laid down in

the treaty is approximately 30 nautical miles long. It starts at the point where
German territorial waters, Danish territorial waters, and the high seas meet,
and runs from there in a north-westerly direction to a point equidistant from
Sylt and Kap Blaakvandshuk. No agreement could yet be reached on the
further course of the shelf boundary.

se; Annexes6 and 6A to the Mernorial,1,pp. 109-111. DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 361

24. Aide-Mémoireof 8 December 1965 addressed to:the[DanislzEmbassy, Bonn

(Translatiotz) '
The Federal Government suggests that the negotiations conceming the
delimitation of the two countries' shares of the continental shelf in the North
Sea of which the first stage was concluded with the signature of the Gerrnan-

Danish Treaty of 9 June 1965,be continued. The legal views ofthe two delega-
tions concerning the principle on which delimitation should be based and on
which agreement could not yet be reached, should in the opinion of the Federal
Governrnent be excludedfrorn such negotiations.
The Federal Government would, however, be prepared to subject the
aforernentioned legal problern to arbitral decision before entering into any
further negotiations. Should the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark
prefer the latter method the Federal Government would suggest that the
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands be invited to participate in
the negotiations on the details of organization and procedure of the arbitral

proceedings as provided for under item 3 of the Final Protocol to the German-
Danish Treaty on Arbitration and Conciliation of 2 June 1926 in the event
that the practical implications of a difference of opinion between contracting
Parties extend beyond the individual case under discussion.

(An idet~ticalaide-mémoire washandedover to the Netherlatlds Embassy in
Botlnott tiresatne day.) NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

25. Notes of 8 March1966
(Excerpt)

GERMAN SHAREOFTHE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE NORTH SEA ;
GERMAN-DANISH-DUTCH TALKS IN THE HAGUE ON 28 FEBRUARY 1966

(Translation)

On 28 February 1966a German, a Danish and a Netherlands delegation
held talks in The Hague on the subject of apportioning the (eastern) part of
the continental shelf of the North Sea. The Netherlands delegation was led by
Professor Riphagen, legaladviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,theDanish
delegation by Min. Asst. Dir. Paludan, head of the European Division, while
the German delegation was headed by the undersigned.

1

1. The following background data of the talks are put on record:
(a) By aide-mémoire of8December 1965it had been suggested to the Embas-
sies of Denmark and the Netherlands in Bonn that the negotiations be
continued excluding the legal issue (applicability of the so-called principle

of equidistance) or that (alternatively) the legal issuebe subjected to
arbitral decision.
(b) In talks which the Minister had in Paris in mid-December 1965with the
Foreign Ministers of Denmark and the Netherlands it was agreed that the
negotiations should be resumed (Note St. S. 1 2192165of 18 December
1965).
(c) It was then suggested to the Netherlands Embassy that the negotiations
becontinued at bilateral level in mid-February, whereupon the Nether-
lands Embassy immediately replied that the Netherlands Government
wouldpresumablynot agreeto the suggesteddate inview oftheforthcoming
marriage of the Crown Princess. Much to Our surprise we were then at
short notice invited to come to The Hague for discussions, together with
the Danes, on 24 February. We accepted the proposa1in spite of the short
notice, after consultation with the federal ministries and Laender con-
cerned, in order to avoid givingthe impression that we were not interested
in expediting the matter.

2. It then became obvious at the tripartite talks held in The Hague on
28 February that the Danish and Netherlands interpretation of the results of
the discussions among the three Foreign Ministers differed from ours. While
we are of the opinion that the subject-matter itself, i.e., the possibility af
compromise solution, requires renewed negotiation, the Danes and the Dutch
do not expect any results from further negotiations on the subject. The Dutch
delegation stated emphatically on severaloccasions that the Netherlands would
not agree to any arrangement providing for the determination of the boundary
line in deviation from the principle of equidistance; the Danes put it a little
more flexiblybut intimated also that deviation from the said principle would

be equally out of the question for them. Both delegations contended that no
new aspects had arisen to induce their countries to change their attitudes.
They suggested a more detailed discussion of the forum at which a possible DOCUMENTSF~LED BY THE FEDERALREPUBLICOF GERMANY 363

Legaldisputesliouldbesettledand stated that they thoughtthe Jnternational
Court of Justicein The Hague tobe the onlyeligibleone.
We repliedthatwe had no instructionsto continuthenegotiations along
thoselines and reservedthe rightto referoncemoreto the materialquestions
in thenextphase ofnegotiations(envisagedFarmid-May). Neverthelesswedid
not object ta iîrstexcllangeof views on the questionasto whetaepossiMe
legal dispute should be brought before a bilateraor trilateral) arbitral
tribunalor TheHague Court

Document file FR
Document
Document Long Title

Documents présentés à la Cour après la fin de la procédure écrite (Documents déposés par les Parties à la demande de la Cour)

Links