Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2015/20
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2015
Public sitting
held on Thursday 7 May 2015, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Abraham presiding,
in the case concerning Obligation to Negotiate Access
to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile)
Preliminary Objection
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2015
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 7 mai 2015, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,
dans l’affaire relative à l’Obligation de négocier un accès
à l'océan Pacifique (Bolivie c. Chili)
Exception préliminaire
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf
Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian
Judges ad hoc Daudet
Arbour
Registrar Couvreur
- 3 -
Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président
MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian, juges
M. Daudet
Mme Arbour, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of Bolivia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, former President of Bolivia, former President of the Bolivian
Supreme Court of Justice, former Dean of the Law School from the Catholic University of
Bolivia, La Paz,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. David Choquehuanca Céspedes, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Plurinational State of
Bolivia,
as National Authority;
Mr. Mathias Forteau, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,
member of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Monique Chemillier -Gendreau, Professor Emeritus of Public Law and Political Science,
University of Paris Diderot,
Mr. Payan Akhavan, LL.M. S.J.D. (Harvard) Professor of International Law, McGill University,
Montreal, Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg College of Oxford University, member of the State
Bar of New York and of the Law Society of Upper Canada,
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Hector Arce, Attorney -General of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Professor of
Constitutional Law, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, La Paz,
Mr. Reymi Ferreira, Minister of Defence of the Plurinational State of Bolivia,
H.E. Mr. Juan Carlos Alurralde, Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Plurinational State of
Bolivia,
Mr. Emerson Calderon, Secretary General of the Strategic Maritime Vindication Office
(DIREMAR), Professor of Public International Law, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés,
La Paz,
H.E. Mr. Sacha Llorenty, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations Headquarters
in New York,
H.E. Ms Nardy Suxo, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United Nations Office in Geneva,
Mr. Rubén Saavedra, Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR)in Quito,
as Advisers; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bolivie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé, ancien président de la Bolivie, ancien président de la
Cour suprême de justice bolivienne, ancien doyen de la faculté de droit de
l’Université catholique de Bolivie à La Paz,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. David Choquehuanca Céspedes, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Etat plurinational
de Bolivie,
comme représentant de l’Etat ;
M. Mathias Forteau, professeur à l’Université de Paris Ouest , Nanterre-La Défense, membre de l a
Commission du droit international,
M. Antonio RemiroBrotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur émérite de droit public et de sciences politiques de
l’Université Paris Diderot,
M. Payan Akhavan, L.L.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit international à
l’Université McGill de Montréal, professeur invité au Kellogg College de l’Université
d’Oxford, membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau anglais,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Hector Arce, Attorney-General de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie et professeur de droit
constitutionnel à l’Universidad Mayor de San Andrés de La Paz,
M. ReymiFerreira, ministre de la défense de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie,
M. Juan Carlos Alurralde, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie,
M. Emerson Calderon, secrétaire général du bureau stratégique de reconnaissance des prétentions
maritimes (DIREMAR) et professeur de droit international public à l’Universidad Mayor de
San Andres de La Paz,
S. Exc. M. Sacha Llorenty, représentant permanent de la Bolivie auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies à New York,
S. Exc. Mme Nardy Suxo, représentant permanent de la Bolivie auprès de l’Office des
Nations Unies à Genève,
M. Rubén Saavedra, représentant permanent de la Bolivie auprès de l’Union des
Nations sud-américaines (UNASUR) à Quito,
comme conseillers ; - 6 -
Mr. Carlos Mesa Gisbert, former President and Vice-President of Bolivia,
as Special Envoy and Spokesman;
Mr. José Villarroel, DIREMAR, La Paz,
Mr. Osvaldo Torrico, DIREMAR, La Paz,
Mr. Farit Rojas Tudela, Embassy of Bolivia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Luis Rojas Martínez, Embassy of Bolivia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Franz Zubieta, State Attorney’s Office, La Paz,
as Technical Advisers;
Ms Gimena González,
Ms Kathleen McFarland,
as Assistant Counsel.
The Government of Chile is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Felipe Bulnes S., Former Minister of Justice and Education of the Republic of Chile,
Former Ambassador of Chile to the United States of America, Professor of Civil Law, Pontificia
Universidad Católica de Chile,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Heraldo Muñoz V., Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile,
as National Authority;
Mr. Claudio Grossman, Dean and R. Geraldson P rofessor of International Law, American
University, Washington College of Law,
H.E. Ms María Teresa Infante C., Ambassador of Chile to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Co-Agents;
Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., Barrister, Bar of England and Wales, 20 Essex Street Chambers,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and
Development, Geneva, and University of Paris II (Panthéon- Assas), member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr. Ben Juratowitch, Solicitor admitted in Queensland and in England and Wales, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, - 7 -
M. Carlos Mesa Gisbert, ancien président et vice-président de la Bolivie,
comme envoyé spécial et porte-parole ;
M. José Villarroel, DIREMAR, La Paz,
M. Osvaldo Torrico, DIREMAR, La Paz,
M. Farit Rojas Tudela, ambassade de Bolivie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Luis Rojas Martínez, ambassade de Bolivie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Franz Zubieta, bureau de l’Attorney-General, La Paz,
comme conseillers techniques ;
Mme GimenaGonzález,
Mme Kathleen McFarland,
comme conseillers adjoints.
Le Gouvernement du Chili est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. FelipeBulnes S., ancien ministre de la justice et de l’éducation de la République du
Chili, ancien ambassadeur du Chili auprès des Etats- Unis d’Amérique, professeur de droit civil
à la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. HeraldoMuñoz V., ministre des affaires étrangères du Chili,
comme représentant de l’Etat ;
M. Claudio Grossman, doyen et professeur de droit international , titulaire de la chaire
R. Geraldson, American University, faculté de droit de Washington,
S. Exc. Mme María Teresa Infante C., ambassadeur du Chili auprès du Royaume des Pays -Bas,
membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme coagents ;
sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., barrister, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
cabinet 20 Essex Street,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et du
développement de Genève et à l’Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de l’Institut de
droit international,
M. Ben Juratowitch, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland), cabinet Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, - 8 -
Mr. Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of International Law, member of the Bars of New York
and the District of Columbia,
Ms Mónica Pinto, Professor and Dean of the Law School of the Universidad de Buenos Aires,
Argentina,
Mr. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., member of the English Bar, member of the Paris Bar, Essex Court
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Alberto van Klaveren S., Former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, Professor of
International Relations, Universidad de Chile,
Ms Ximena Fuentes T., Professor of Public International Law, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez and
Universidad de Chile,
Mr. Andrés Jana L., Professor, Universidad de Chile,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Professor, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, member of
the Bars of Virginia and the District of Columbia,
Ms Kate Parlett, Solicitor admitted in Queensland and in England and Wales,
Ms Alexandra van der Meulen, Avocat à la Cour and member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Ms Callista Harris, Solicitor admitted in New South Wales,
Ms Mariana Durney, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms María Alicia Ríos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Juan Enrique Loyer, Third Secretary, Embassy of Chile to the Netherlands,
as Advisers;
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereign Geographic, member of the North Carolina Bar,
as Technical Adviser. - 9 -
M. Harold Hongju Koh, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire Sterling, membre des
barreaux de New York et du district de Columbia,
Mme Mónica Pinto, professeur et doyen de la faculté de droit de l’Universidad de Buenos Aires,
Argentine,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, Q.C., membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de Paris, cabinet Essex Court
Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Alberto van Klaveren S., ancien vice -ministre des affaires ét rangères du Chili,
professeur de relations internationales à l’Universidad de Chile,
Mme XimenaFuentes T., professeur de droit international public à l’Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez et
à l’Universidad de Chile,
M. Andrés Jana L., professeur à l’Universidad de Chile,
Mme Nienke Grossman, professeur à l’Université de Baltimore (Maryland), Etats- Unis
d’Amérique, membre des barreaux de l’Etat de Virginie et du district de Columbia,
Mme Kate Parlett, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland),
Mme Alexandra van der Meulen, avocat à la Cour et membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York,
Mme Callista Harris, solicitor(Nouvelle-Galle du Sud),
Mme Mariana Durney, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme María Alicia Ríos, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Juan Enrique Loyer, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade du Chili aux Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ;
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereign Geographic, membre du barreau de Caroline du Nord,
comme conseiller technique. - 10 -
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit
aujourd’hui pour entendre le second tour de plaidoiries du Chili. Je donne à présent la parole à
M. Bethlehem.
Sir Daniel BETHLEHEM:
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Chile struggled to identify a coherent thread to
Bolivia’s argument yesterday. There was a gulf between their opening and closing speeches. The
Honourable Agent for Bolivia expressed the case for the first time in terms of a pactum de
contrahendo 1. We heard subsequently, however, that it is a “mere” pactum de contrahendo , with 2
counsel trying to downplay the significance of the request. We also heard a new theory of the case
yesterday, a theory of parallel obligation to negotiate, existing side -by-side with, but never
touching upon or engaging with, the 1904 Treaty. Parallel universes! Sliding doors! The
1904 Treaty and the pactum de contrahendo existing side-by-side but never intersecting. It is a
surreal reality; an exercise in legal dadism. We heard nothing fr om Bolivia about the terms of its
prayer for relief, to which Chile drew attention on Monday, and yet it is that prayer for relief that
makes the intersection inevitable. Bolivia is throwing arguments into the air in the hope that the
Court will catch on to something.
2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, y ou heard a great deal about the 1904 Treaty of
Peace and Amity from me on Monday 3. You heard virtually nothing of that Treaty from Bolivia
yesterday. There was no reference to the comprehensive terr itorial settlement of the Treaty. There
was no reference to Bolivia’s treaty -based right of access to the Pacific Ocean pursuant to
Article VI of that Treaty. What you did hear from Bolivia, though, was an affirmation that it
4
accepts that the 1904 Treaty was in force in 1948 and continues to be in force today . Indeed,
Bolivia relies on its Article VI treaty-based right of access to the Pacific Ocean day -in and day-out,
through sovereign Chilean territory and ports. This Treaty is therefore alive and we ll and the
1
CR 2015/19, p. 11, para. 6 (Rodríguez-Veltzé).
2Ibid., p. 52, para. 6 (Akhavan).
3CR 2015/18, pp. 33-46, paras. 1-57 (Bethlehem).
4
CR 2015/19, p. 40, para. 6 (Remiro Brotóns). - 11 -
governing font of Bolivia’s access to the Pacif ic Ocean today, as it was on 30 April 1948, the date
of the conclusion of the Bogotá Pact.
3. Professor Chemillier-Gendreau yesterday traced Bolivia’s theory of a parallel obligation
to negotiate back to a Note by the Chilean Foreign Minister Santa María of 26 November 1879 5.
We also had put on the screen a Note by the President of Chile of 7 January 1884 referring to a
right of access for Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean. Interestingly, we only had passing comment from
Professor Chemillier-Gendreau on the Transfer Treaty of 1895, although we subsequently had an
admission from Professor Remiro Brotóns about this, to which I will return shortly .
4. Mr. Wordsworth will have more to say about this theor y of parallel obligation in just a
moment. As a prelude to his comments, two preliminary observations are warranted.
5. My first observation in response to Professor Chemillier -Gendreau’s invocation of the
7
Notes of 1879 and 1884 is to invite you to read them for yourselves . She seeks to found a claim to
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean on these Notes, but that is not what those Notes say. They do
not talk about sovereign access, or about corridors or enclaves or coastal zones or special zon es, as
you heard from Professor Akhavan 8. They talk simply about access to the Pacific Ocean. Access
to the Pacific Ocean in perpetuity, the fullest and most unrestricted right of commercial
transit is what was afforded to Bolivia by Article VI of the 1904 Treaty. And, as the
1905 statements by the Chairman of the Bolivian National Congress and the Bolivian President, to
9
which I took you on Monday , indicate, Bolivia saw as one of its notable successes in the
negotiations leading up to the 1904 Treaty that it secured in the negotiations its autonomy in trade
and customs matters.
6. My second point is simple. It is that Bolivia cannot erect a sustainable claim based on
pre-1904 instruments. The 1904 Treaty drew a line, formally and comprehensively, under what
went before. It occupied the space. It was intended by the parties to be a definitive treaty of peace.
Nothing that went before is relevant.
5CR 2015/19, p. 29, para. 10 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
6
Ibid., p. 44, para. 16 (Remiro Brotóns).
7Ibid., p. 29, para. 10 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
8Ibid., p. 4, para. 51 (Akhavan).
9
CR 2015/18, p. 42, paras. 41-42 (Bethlehem). - 12 -
7. A brief comment is required on the 1895 Transfer Treaty. At paragraph 228 of its
Memorial, Bolivia says as follows:
“The obligation to negotiate in the present case arises from the legal
commitment made by Chile to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia. The
obligation was spelled out expressly in the 1895 Transfer Treaty and subsequent lega l
instruments, and repeatedly reaffirmed by Chile at intervals over the decades.” 10
8. This argument is developed further at paragraphs 338 and following in Bolivia’s
Memorial. Bolivia there asserts that Chile and Bolivia reached agreement that Bolivia sh ould not
remain landlocked and that Chile explicitly bound itself to transfer territory to Bolivia to provide it
with sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Bolivia’s reliance on the 1895 Transfer Treaty in its
written case is unambiguous. It is the very font of its claim.
10. We note, however, that, in his submissions yesterday, Professor RemiroBrotóns rowed
back from this claim, stating now that the 1895 Transfer Treaty was not a source of obligation but
only relied upon as a precedent to show that the Parties had agreed on a transfer of territory 11.
11. Chile notes this reluctant and even now half -hearted admission that the 1895 Transfer
Treaty was “wholly without effect”. Chile also notes that a pre- 1904 treaty that never entered into
force is not illustrative of anything of any enduring character whatever. It is a telling indictment of
Bolivia’s case that it is rooted in an instrument that never entered in to force. I note also that, quite
apart from its fail ure to enter into force, the 1895 Treaty is superseded and trumped by the 1904
Treaty. Further, as I observed on Monday, the 1896 Exchange of Notes, which provided that the
1895 treaties would be “wholly without effect”, are themselves subj ect to the excl usion in
Article VI of the Bogotá Pact 1.
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, you heard from Bolivia yesterday that the case that
it seeks to bring to you has nothing to do with the 1904 Treaty. It is a separate, parallel obligation
to negotiate, the subject-matter of the negotiations, and the outcome of the negotiations, being
separate and distinct from the 1904 Treaty. Professor Akhavan put it in the following terms: “A
10
Memorial of Bolivia (MB), para. 228.
11CR 2015/19, p. 44, para. 16 (Remiro Brotóns).
12
CR 2015/18, pp. 44-45, paras. 47-53 (Bethlehem). - 13 -
13
treaty may touch upon a dispute, without settling it.” I will return to this point in just a moment,
as it goes to the heart of the matter. An initial observation is warranted, however.
13. This dispute, this claim, that Bolivia brings to the Court is by any assessment highly
artificial in its packaging. This will be evident to you both from Chile’s submissions on Monday
and, indeed, from Bolivia’s submissions yesterday. There is no escaping the point. Bolivia seeks,
in its prayer for relief, an order from the Court that Chile must perform its claimed obligation to
negotiate “in good faith, promptly, formally, within a reasonable time and effectively, to grant
Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” 14. In the face of this prayer for relief, how
can Bolivia, with any credibility, simply side -step, simply fail to e ngage with, the 1904 Treaty,
with its comprehensive territorial settlement, which gives to Bolivia a treaty -based right of access,
in perpetuity, to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean territories and ports?
14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, however Bolivia packages its case, it should be
plain as day that the claim that Bolivia seeks to bring to the Court intersects fundamentally,
necessarily, unavoidably with the 1904 Treaty. Indeed, the veil was lifted on Bolivia’s case by
Professor Remiro Brotóns yesterday when he said that nothing prevents the renegotiation of a
treaty or the conclusion of a complementary agreement 15. True indeed! But here is the point.
What Bolivia is indeed seeking is a renegotiation of the 1904 Treaty or the conclusion of a
complementary agreement; and this by way of c ourt-ordered negotiations to compel a specified
result. We heard a lot of colourful language from Bolivia’s counsel yesterday about Chile’s
claimed hallucinations about the nature of Bolivia’s case, about th e floral wonders of the
Atacama Desert, and more. But it is Bolivia that is the contortionist here, desperately trying to
avoid any contact with the 1904 Treaty a s if it i s somehow toxic. Well, it is indeed toxic to
Bolivia’s case, as its contortions plainly evidence.
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Court is an instrument of judicial settlement.
Bolivia, however, through its endeavour to detach its claim from the 1904 Treaty, is coming to you
13
CR 2015/19, p. 54, para. 13 (Akhavan).
14MB, para. 500 (c).
15
CR 2015/19, p. 46, para. 25 (Remiro Brotóns). - 14 -
with an application to intercede between the Parti es as a compulsory mediator. It should not be
permitted to get away with such antics.
16. This brings me to Professor Akhavan’s point, on which this case must turn. He says, and
I repeat, that “[a] treaty may touch upon a dispute, without settling it”. With this sentence,
Professor Akhavan both acknowledged the connection between Bolivia’s claim and the
1904 Treaty and sought to minimize it. Professor Remiro Brotóns sought to do the same when he
caricatured Chile’s submissions with his observation that Chile argues that a single point of contact
16
with the 1904 Treaty would suffice to deny the Court jurisdiction . He further argued that the
effect of Chile’s argument would be to turn Article VI of the Pact into a black hole that would
swallow up everything that took place subsequently 17.
17. Let me not minimize the point. It is important. But it shows precisely the gaping hole at
the centre of Bolivia’s argument.
18. Professor Remiro Brotóns and Professor Akhavan admit the connection between
Bolivia’s case and the 1904 Treaty. The question that remains is what kind of connection? Is it the
single point of contact connection that Professor Remiro Brotóns would have the Court believe? Is
it a mere touch connection, as Professor Akhavan would urge on th e Court? Is it in some other
manner peripheral or ancillary or incidental or passing or remote or indirect?
19. The 1904 Treaty, and its comprehensive territorial settlement and treaty- based right of
access to the Pacific Ocean is hardly remote or periph eral or ancillary or incidental to Bolivia’s
claim that it seeks an order that Chile negotiate “to grant Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the
[sea]”. Bolivia’s claim goes to the very essence of the 1904 Treaty; to the core of its settlement;
to the matter that is governed by its terms.
20. To meet Bolivia’s argument, Chile does not need to identify where the line is between
peripheral, and merely incidental connections, that might escape the terms of Article VI of the Pact,
and inextricably intertwined connections, that require that a pre -1948 treaty or arrangement retains
a controlling hand on post-1948 conduct. Identifying such a line is an exercise of legal hypothesis
that lies in the realm of theoreticians. The critical appreciation is whether the connection here in
1CR 2015/19, p. 41, para. 8 (Remiro Brotóns).
1Ibid. - 15 -
issue, in this case , falls manifestly on one side of the line or the other, wherever that line may
ultimately be drawn.
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there can be no shadow of a doubt that the
connection between the 1904 T reaty and the subject -matter of Bolivia’s claim is direct, is
proximate, is central, is substantial. The sovereign right of access to the Pacific Ocean that Bolivia
claims would necessarily and unavoidably require modification of the 1904 Treaty. Bolivia
acknowledges as much through Professor Remiro Brotóns’ s assertion that nothing prevents
renegotiation of the terms of the 1904 Treaty or the conclusion of a complementary agreement.
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Bolivia attempts to address this central difficulty in
its case by advancing two arguments. First, it contends that a matter cannot be settled and in
dispute at the same time 18. Second, it contends, by reference to Article 27 of the OAS Charter and
Article XXXIV of the Pact, that absolute finality is required 19.
23. These assertions go to the same contention, namely, that, because Chile and Bolivia have
had exchanges and negotiations over the years about sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the
matter cannot be regarded as settled. N egotiations, in Bolivia’s contention, mean that nothing is
settled.
24. There are a number of points in response to this argument. First, I would simply recall
the submissions on Monday of Professor Pinto. Unlike the circumstances of the Nicaragua v.
Colombia case, the two limbs of Article VI of the Pact settled by arrangement between the
Parties and governed by a treaty in force mean different things 20. Bolivia was so focused on
searching for the cover of the Nicaragua v. Colombia Judgment that it failed to address whether the
circumstances of that case, circumstances to which the Court made explicit reference in its
Judgment, are germane to this case. They are not! Bolivia also failed to address at all whether the
matter of its claim is “governed” by the 1904 Treat y. I will not repeat Professor Pinto’s
submissions here, but simply recall that she addressed this issue in detail.
18
CR 2015/19, p. 55, para. 16 (Akhavan).
19Ibid., pp. 54-55, para. 14 (Akhavan).
20
CR 2015/18, pp. 25-27, paras. 17-19 (Pinto). - 16 -
25. Second, there is nothing in Professor Akhavan’s point on Article XXXIV of the Pact.
Article XXXIV is a jurisdiction al provision, addressing the jurisdiction of the Court to hear a
controversy. If the Court does not have jurisdiction in consequence of Article s V, VI or VII of the
Pact, the dispute settlement mechanisms of the Pact are exhausted.
26. Third, the meaning of the term “settled” was also addressed by Professor Pinto in her
21
submissions on Monday . As she noted, a matter is “settled” by arrangement if it is resolved by
that arrangement. As a matter of textual interpretation, the term “settled” does not conn ote or
require the end of any and all disagreement. In a legal context, that something is “settled” indicates
that the parties to the transaction have committed themselves to a binding legal instrument. In the
case of the 1904 Treaty, Chile continues to this day, and every day, to afford to Bolivia its in
perpetuity, fullest and most unrestricted right of commercial transit through Chilean territory and
ports. Chile is every day performing its obligations under the Treaty. These are settled obligations.
Bolivia, of course, wants to rely on continued performance of the 1904 Treaty by Chile. But it
wants to unsettle the Treaty too. There is a manifest lack of internal coherence to Bolivia’s claim.
27. Fourth, Bolivia relies on the fact of exchanges and negotiations over the years to contend
that the matter in issue in these proceedings is somehow unsettled. I will be brief on this point, and
I will end with it, as others following me will address it further. The point is, however, important
enough to bear repetition. This case is about the sanctity of treaties and the without prejudice
character of political negotiations. This is not a merits point. It goes to considerations of
jurisdiction now in issue. Negotiations do not create jurisdiction. Bo livia cannot unsettle a treaty
that, as of 30 April 1948, governed the matter in issue in these proceedings by resorting to
inconclusive negotiations.
28. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my submissions this afternoon.
Mr. President, may I invite you to call Mr. Wordsworth to the Bar.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne maintenant la parole à M. Wordsworth.
2CR 2015/18, p. 26, para. 18 (Pinto). - 17 -
Mr. WORDSWORTH:
C HILE ’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá applied to Bolivia’s Claim
I. Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will be developing four points in response to
Bolivia’s submissions of yesterday.
2. First, on characteri zation of the matter before you, both P arties are evidently agreed that
identification of the real issue in the case is a fundamental part of the function of the Court at this
preliminary phase. There are differences in what Chile and Bolivia say is the weight to be placed
on the Applicant’s own characterization of its claim, but the central point is that Bolivia ultimately
wants you to characterize its claim by focusing only on parts of its Application, and without saying
anything more, or without paying anything more than a passing glance at the relief that is sought.
That is not a tenable approach, and the relief that Bolivia seeks is vital to the Court’ s task of
identifying the real issue in the case, and the real matter before it.
3. Secondly, Bolivia wishes you to focus on what is said to be a parallel track of
negotiations, portrayed as if the se had an existence independent of the 1904 Treaty. In particular,
Bolivia places a notably new weight on exchanges on negotiations up to 1948, aiming to establish
that the matter of sovereign access to the sea was not settled by the 1904 Treaty as of 1948 . Yet,
the mere fact of negotiations, and still less exchanges about negotiations, cannot somehow unsettle
a pre-existing treaty. If it were otherwise, States would simply never be willing to talk with each
other. It is only if the given negotiations le ad to an agreement that changes the pre- existing legal
situation that there can be said to be an unsettling of the pre-existing legal situation, that there can
be said to be an unsettling of what has gone before. And although Bolivia contends that a pactum
de contrahendo was reached, the critical point is that nowhere in the pre -1948 documents can it
point to any such pactum, or to any agreement of any kind that has the effect of displacing the key
juridical fact that, as of 1948, the matter of whether Bolivia had sovereign access to the sea was one
settled in, and governed by, the 1904 Peace Treaty. - 18 -
4. Thirdly, the focus on the allegedly parallel track of negotiations both before and after
1948 is a diversion away from the point that, looked at objec tively, the relevant exchanges all
concerned the matter of Bolivia’s access to the sea. As to this:
(a) At all material times, the nature of Bolivia ’s access to the sea has always remained, and still
remains, a matter settled in and governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty.
(b) Bolivia has no answer to this basic point, which is not solved by highlighting up on the screen
the words “independently of” as frequently as Bolivia is able. Whatever the point behind those
words may have been, Bolivia is not now seeking access to the sea that is independent of the
legal situation settled in and governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty.
(c) To the contrary, the sovereign access to the sea that Bolivia seeks in its claim without any
doubt requires that the settlement reached i n the 1904 Peace Treaty be revised, whilst there is
no hint in any of the documents that Bolivia relies on of any intention to establish the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the matters settled in and governed by the
1904 Treaty.
5. Finally, Bolivia has no answer to the point that it is substance here, not form, that counts.
It is self -evident that, if the words referring to the alleged obligation to negotiate were removed
from Bolivia’s prayer for relief, the Court would lack jurisdiction by virtue of Article VI of the Pact
of Bogotá. The question for the Court thus ultimately comes down to whether you can change the
nature of a matter otherwise caught by Article VI by putting the words “ obligation to negotiate ”
before it. Chile submits that you cannot, and that the attempt to do so is pure artifice.
II. The correct characterization of the claim
6. I turn to the details on these four points, starting with what was said yesterday about the
correct characterization of the issue before you in this case.
7. My friend Professor Forteau put some extracts from Bolivia’ s Application on the screen,
reading out paragraphs 1, 2 and 31, but not 32, which is the key paragraph on which I focused on
22
Monday now on your screens . [ Slide on] And I say key paragraph because this is the part of
2CR 2015/19, pp. 18-19, paras. 14-15 (Forteau). - 19 -
Bolivia’s pleading that identifies in the most ready and also incontrovertible way that, like it or not,
the current claim is on a collision course with the 1904 Peace Treaty.
8. To recall, as follows from w hat Mr. Bethlehem has just said, Bolivia cannot contest the
juridical fact that the 1904 Peace Treaty is in full force and effect between the P arties and
establishes that Bolivia’ s access to the sea is non -sovereign in nature. The claim, and the
1904 Treaty, are thus indeed set on a collision course, as I said on Monday. And however much
my friend Mr. Akhavan may refer to parallel lanes, a suggestion that the traffic in Tehran is not in a
constant state of collision does not constitute an explanation of w hy we are wrong to say that
Bolivia’s claim inevitably seeks and requires the revision of what was settled and is governed by
the 1904 Peace Treaty 23. Likewise, Professor Forteau’s protestation that there has been “une
24
déformation aussi radicale qu’inacceptable de la demande de Bolivie” . Well, there most certainly
has not been we are just reading the words on the page that Bolivia has put up before you, and
the supposedly parallel lanes necessarily converge at the point that one reads the relief that Bo livia
25
in fact claims. Indeed Bolivia’s invocation of the concepts of lex specialis and lex posterior
confirms that it well knows that the alleged lanes could not stay parallel.
9. Three of my colleagues from the Bolivian side also say “pacta sunt servanda”, as if that
26
were an answer . It is not.
(a) First, in fact, Bolivia is saying that some are pacta sunt servanda, and some are not, and
notably not when it comes to the settlement reached in the long-standing 1904 Peace Treaty.
(b) Secondly, a reiteration of basic principles misses the point of this jurisdictional phase, which is
not whether there is an obligation to negotiate that Chile must perform. Rather, the question is
whether the existence and performance of that alleged obligation is an issue over which this
Court has jurisdiction. And it is not, because it concerns a matter that was, as of 1948, settled
in and governed by the 1904 Treaty. And, even if it were correct to look beyond 1948, the
short point is that everything on which Bolivia r elies after that date concerns the same matter
23CR 2015/19, p. 51, para. 4 (Akhavan).
24
Ibid., p. 18, para. 11 (Forteau).
25Ibid., p. 52, para. 6 (Akhavan).
26
Ibid., p. 27, para. 2 (Chemillier-Gendreau); pp. 47-48, para. 27 (Remiro Brotóns); p. 51, para. 5 (Akhavan). - 20 -
that was, in 1948, settled and governed by the 1904 Treaty, and Bolivia can point to no
intention of the Parties to establish the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court.
10. The other materials that I took you to in opening, in particular those concerning Bolivia’s
2009 Constitution and its 2013 Bond Offering, also confirm that the current claim aims at and
27
seeks the revision of the settlement in the 1904 Peace Treaty .
11. Professor Forteau had nothing to say about these materials, adopting instead the line that
28 29
what counts is what is said in any given application . As with Bolivia’s Written Statement , that
is not a fair reflection of the jurisprudence. I note that the most relevant passages of Nuclear
30
Tests were passed over, while the passage from Diallo that was cited concerns the quite separate
issue of admissibility of new claims 31, and the passage from Certain Interests in Polish Upper
Silesia concerned the Court’s refusal to reformulate a party ’s submissions in circumstances where
claims supporting them had not been properly set out 32. All quite different.
12. And I should add that, as a matter of basic proposition, it is of course not the case that it
is up to an applicant to characterize as it sees fit the precise lines of a given dispute or the real issue
in the case. Were it otherwise, the jurisdictional limitations in provisions such as Article VI of the
Pact or indeed, to take another example, Article 288 of UNCLOS as considered by the Annex VII
tribunal in the recent Mauritius v. United Kingdom award, could be bypassed by the carefully
formulated claims of any given applicant. There is no shortage of examples where, in recent years,
claimants before this and other international courts and tribun als have sought to repackage their
territorial or other claims so that they suddenly become claims under UNCLOS, or under
long-standing human rights treaties such as the CERD, and Chile submits that such claims have
2CR 2015/18, pp. 50-52, paras. 18-24 (Wordsworth).
2CR 2015/19, pp. 20-21, para. 21 (Forteau).
29
Written Statement of the Plurinational State of Bolivia on the preliminary objection to jurisdiction filed by Chile
(WSB), paras. 13 and 20.
30
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 262, para. 29; and Nuclear Tests
(New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 466, para. 30.
3Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2010 (II), p. 656, para. 39.
3Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Ju dgment No. 7, 1926, P. C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 7, pp. 34-35. - 21 -
quite correctly been approached with ver y considerable caution when it comes to assessing the
issue of jurisdiction.
13. On the question of characterization, Professor RemiroBrotóns did come back to the
2009 Constitution, but he was unable to address our point 33. He accepted that Article 267 of the
Constitution sets out “sovereign access to the sea as a permanent and inalienable objective” of
Bolivia 34, but he appeared t o characterize this as a matter of policy 35, and, curiously, he said that
the 1904 Treaty was protected by Bolivia ’s Constitution through general provisions on the
hierarchical status of treaties 36.
14. Well, that is entirely inconsistent with a plain reading of the Constitution and the
Bolivian statements and other documentation that I took you to in opening that have followed on
37
since the Constitution .
15. Professor RemiroBrotóns also said, by reference to the transitional provisions in the
Constitution, that the treaties that were to be challenged before international tribunals were
38
investment treaties alone . I note that there is no document reference to support the point that was
being made. But, in any event, the Supreme Resolution of the President of Bolivia appointing
Bolivia’s Honourable Agent in this case makes it crystal clear that this case was brought to
vindicate the alleged “right” set out in Article 267 of Bolivia’s Constitution 39.
16. The Court will also recall that Bolivia ’s 2013 offering memorandum for bonds now
on the screen again and at tab 37 of your judges’ folder makes clear that: (i) this case has been
brought in fulfilment of the constitutional mandate in Article 267, that is the first sentence; (ii) that
the 1904 Peace Treaty is viewed by Bolivia as the impediment to the exercise of its alleged
3Cf. CR 2015/18, pp. 50 -52, paras. 18-24 (Wordsworth); see Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of
Bolivia, 7 Feb. 2009; POCh, Ann. 62, pp. 926 and 929, Art. 267 and Ninth Transitional Provision.
3CR 2015/19, p. 45, para. 18 (Remiro Brotóns).
35
Ibid., p. 45, para. 18 (Remiro Brotóns).
36
Ibid., pp. 45-46, para. 22 (Remiro Brotóns).
3CR 2015/18, pp. 50-52, paras. 18 -24 (Wordsworth); see also Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia, Plurinational
Constitutional Declaration No. 0003/2013, made in Sucre on 25 Apr . 2013; POCh, Ann. 72, pp. 1025-1027, Sec. III. 11,
considering Bolivian Law on Normative Application Statement of Reasons, 6 Feb. 2013; POCh, Ann. 71, p. 1003,
Art. 6.
3CR 2015/19, p. 45, para. 21 (Remiro Brotóns).
3Bolivian Supreme Resolution 09385, 3 Apr . 2013, attached to the letter from David Choquehuanca, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, to Philippe Couvreur, Registrar of the International Court of Justice, Apr. 2013; POCh,
Ann. 72, p. 1007. - 22 -
constitutional right to sovereign access to the sea ; and (iii) that, consistent with this and the
40
President Morales 2011 speech that I took you to on Monday , the current claim has been
brought 4. Bolivia elected to ignore this memorandum in its first round, although it neatly confirms
that the “matter” before you is indeed the same “ matter” settled and governed by the 1904 Peace
Treaty.
III. The position prior to 1948
17. I move on to Bolivia ’s new emphasis on the documents prior to 1948, which evidently
reflects the concern that, if Chile is right to s ay that the relevant matter was, as of 1948, settled in
and governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty, that makes good our jurisdictional objection.
18. On Bolivia’s case what was settled and governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty, on the one
hand, and whether there is a pactum de contrahendo under which Chile is obliged to transfer to
Bolivia a part of Chile ’s coastal territory, on the other hand, are different matters existing in
parallel. Bolivia relies on 11 documents in the pre -1948 period to say that this alleg ed pactum
existed prior to signature of the Pact of Bogotá. But it is clear at a glance that none of them comes
close to establishing a pactum de contrahendo the effect of which might be to undermine Chile’s
central proposition at this jurisdictional phas e which is that, as of 1948, the relevant legal landscape
was governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty.
19. The first document that you were referred to, now up on the screen, was a Chilean
42
memorandum of 9 September 1919 . Chile says that it “is willing to make all efforts for Bolivia to
acquire an access to the sea of its own ” by ceding a part of Arica, and that “independently of” the
1904 Treaty, “Chile accepts to engage into new negotiations to fulfil the longing of the friendly
country, subordinated to the v ictory of Chile in the plebiscite ” as established by the Treaty of
Ancón 4. This is a statement of a willingness to make all efforts, not a pactum de contrahendo.
40Speech delivered by President Evo Morales on Bolivia’s Day of the Sea, 23 Mar . 2011, available at
http://www.diremar.gob.bo/node/265, tab 32 of Chile’s judges’ folder of 4 May 2015, pp. 5 and 6.
41See CR 2015/18, pp. 51-52, paras. 21-22 (Wordsworth); see also Bolivia, Offering Memorandum for
government bonds, 22 Aug. 2013, available at: h ttps://www.bourse.lu/instrument/listdocumentsdVal=
201919&cdTypeVal=OBL, tab 35 of Chile’s judges’ folder of 4 May 2015, p. 33.
42
Chilean Memorandum of 9 September 1919, MB, Ann. 19.
43
Chilean Memorandum of 9 September 1919, MB, Ann. 19, paras. IV and V. - 23 -
20. [ Slide o n] You were then taken to a short extract yesterday from the Minutes of
10 January 1920, concerning Chile’s being “willing to make all efforts ”, “independently [of] what
has been established under” the 1904 Treaty to open negotiations “aimed at fulfilling the aspiration
44
of its friend and neighbour” . It is sufficient to take you to the opening and closing sections of the
document, that show what was really happening and this is at tab 39 of our new and enviably
slimline judges’ folder. In the first paragraph, you see that the Ministers had “agreed to open these
meetings in order to exchange general ideas on how to put into practice these lofty goals ” 45, that is
goals concerning strengthening ties between the two States. Then you see in the penultimate
paragraph, over the page at tab 39, the following : “ the present declarations do not contain
46
provisions that create rights, or obligations for the States whose representatives make them” .
21. So, the suggestion that this document might establish a pactum de contrahendo is at best,
one might say, a little far -fetched. It was said by Bo livia yesterday that it was “ remarkable” that
Chile had “completely ignored the 1920 Act ” 47. But w hat is remarkable is that in relying on this
document, Bolivia failed to draw the Court’s attention to this rather important statement of its legal
value.
48
22. [Slide on] The next document relied on was a letter of 6 February 1923 , tab 40 of the
folder, in which Chile ’s Foreign Minister acknowledged receipt of Bolivia ’s proposal for
“revision” of the 1904 Treaty, “for the purpose of opening a new international situation” 49. Chile
responded that it would not revise the 1904 Peace Treaty, but referring to Chile’s statements before
the League of Nations, indicated that Chile maintained “ the purpose of listening ” to Bolivia ’s
proposals to conclude a new pact “ which responds to the situation of Bolivia, without modifying
the Treaty of Peace” or “interrupting the . . . continuity of the Chilean territory ” 50. So, the
reference to this listening exercise evidently adds nothing whatsoever.
44“Acta Protocolizada”: Act of 10 January 1920, MB , Ann. 101, p. 394
45“Acta Protocolizada”: Act of 10 January 1920, MB, Ann. 101, p. 393.
46
“Acta Protocolizada”: Act of 10 January 1920, MB , Ann. 101, p. 402.
47CR 2015/19, p. 56, para. 19 (Akhavan).
48Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs’ Note of 6 February 1923, MB , Ann. 48, referred to in CR 2015/19, p. 31,
para. 14 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
49
Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs’ Note of 6 February 1923, MB , Ann. 48, p. 209.
50Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs’ Note of 6 February 1923, MB , Ann. 48, p. 210. - 24 -
23. That leads one to the Leag ue of Nations documents, to which Bolivia interestingly did
not refer yesterday. And t here one finds statements of Chilean willingness to negotiate, but not on
51
the subject of sovereign access .
24. There were a series of exchanges between the States in 19 23, but Bolivia did not take
you to all of them. [Slide on] On 12 February 1923, the Bolivian Foreign Minister recalled that
Chile would not agree to recogni ze “the revision ” of the 1904 Peace Treaty and the Bolivian
Minister added that, “my country’s maritime claim cannot be situated outside the legal background
of the Treaty of 1904” 52. Well, quite so.
53
25. [Slide on] That leads me to the next document on which Bolivia relied on Wednesday .
It is a letter of 22 February 1923 from Chile ’s Foreign Minist er to Bolivia, expressing optimism
that Bolivian “aspirations” could be met “if they restrict themselves to ask [for] a free access to the
sea and they do not assume the form of the maritime vindication that Your Excellency’s note
54
suggests” . The Court wi ll have seen that the word “sovereign ” is noticeably absent from that
communication.
26. [Slide on] The next document , tab 43, is a memorandum of 23 June 1926 55. It was
submitted on behalf of Bolivia on Wednesday that: “Le Chili dans un mémorandum du
23 juin 1926 propose alors le transfert à la Bolivie d’une partie du territoire d’Arica.” 56 The
sentence on the screen, now highlighted, is the evidence for that proposition, but the Court will also
wish to consider the next sentence: [Phased slide] “ None of these formulas deserved to be
57
accepted.”
27. The next document Bolivia relied on was the proposal made by the United States
Secretary of State Kellogg to Peru and Chile in 1926 in the context of seeking to find a solution to
51
See, e.g., Statement by the Delegate of Chile at the 22n d Plenary Meeting of the League of Nations,
28 Sep. 1921, MB, Ann. 160.
52
Note from Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile, to
Luis Izquierdo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, 12 Feb. 1923; POCh, Ann. 40, p. 597.
53CR 2015/19, p. 31, para. 14 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
54Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs’ Note of 22 Feb. 1923; MB, Vol. II. Part I, Ann. 50, p. 215.
55
Chilean Memorandum of 23 June 1926; MB, Vol. II, Part I, Ann. 20.
56
CR 2015/19, p. 31, para. 15 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
57Chilean Memorandum of 23 June 1926; MB, Vol. II, Part I, Ann. 20, p. 95. - 25 -
the dispute between those tw o States over Tacna and Arica 58. The proposal was that they sell
Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Two points. A proposal by the United States Secretary of State could
not create rights for Bolivia nor obligations for Chile. In addition, the Kellogg proposal is
evidently inconsistent with there being any prior pactum de contrahendo. [Slide on] That same
point flows from Chile’s response to the Kellogg proposal (tab 44).
(a) Chile recalled that, in the 1904 Peace Treaty, Bolivia “renounced having a seacoast, demanding
as more suitable for its interests, compensation of a financial nature and means of
communication” 59. It noted that Bolivia wished to be involved in the negotiations concerning
Tacna and Arica and it added : “Neither in justice nor in equity can justification be found for
this demand which it formulates today as a right.” 60
(b) In language incapable of creating legal obligations, Chile said that it had “not rejected the idea
of granting a strip of territory and a port to the Bolivian nation” and went on to describe the
61
question of whether it would do so as “ pending” . Bolivia seeks to make much of that word,
but on no reading of this document was there any pending question about whether Bolivia had a
right to sovereign access in territory that has never belonged to it. The pending question was
whether Chile would decide to grant such a right, in a departure from the status quo. Chile
indicated that it agreed “to consider, in principle, the proposal ” 62. The wording hasn’t made it
up on to your sli de, but let me just read it from the Memorial, Annex 22, page 109: “In this
sense the Chilean Government agrees to consider, in principle, the proposal, thereby giving a
new and eloquent demonstration of its aims of peace and cordiality.” Hardly a pactum de
contrahendo.
28. [Slide on] As to the 1929 Protocol to the Treaty of Lima, at tab 45, Chile and Peru there
agreed that neither of them would “ without a prior agreement between them, cede to any third
58
CR 2015/19, p. 31, para. 15 (Chemillier -Gendreau), referring to Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg’s
Memorandum of 30 Nov. 1926; MB, Vol. II, Part I, Ann. 21.
59
Chilean Memorandum of 4 December 1926; MB, Vol. II, Part I, Ann. 22, p. 107.
60Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid., p. 109. - 26 -
63
Power the whole or a part of ” Tacna or Arica . Bolivia now says that, if they agreed this, then
there must have been a pending question between Bolivia and Chile “ainsi que la nécessité de la
64
régler en dehors des termes du traité de 1904” . That is just assertion and, if it were right, it would
mean that there was also a pending question with Peru as the Protocol applies to both Tacna and
Arica. In any event, there is no hint here of a pactum de contrahendo between Bolivia and Chile,
and moreover the Protocol shows that, going forward, Chile did not and could not confer an
unconditional right on Bolivia to sovereign access to the sea through Arica, because it could not
give effect to such a right without the consent of Peru. [Slide off]
29. The last episode prior to 1948 on which Bolivia relies is the exchanges leading up to the
1950 Exchange of Notes, and you were invited by Professor Chemillier-Gendreau to refer to
65
Annexes 58-68 of Bolivia’s Memorial . The first thing to note is that only the first two of those
annexes are dated prior to 1948, and the second point is that Bolivia cannot credibly say that the se
constituted an agreement, let alone one concerning an obligation of result. Nor could it be said that
they unsettled anything at all.
30. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there was no pact um de contrahendo in 1948 and
Bolivia’s new claim to the contrary is one that you can readily and properly reject at this
jurisdictional phase.
31. At the same time, the mere fact that there were exchanges about negotiations could not of
itself unsettle the existing legal position, as established in the 1904 Treaty. To the contrary, as I
said in opening, they merely identify that there was an established legal position, i.e., that
established by the 1904 Peace Treaty, that Bolivia was seeking to shift. The matter of whether
Bolivia had a right to sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean was, as of 1948, one settled in, and
governed by, the 1904 Peace Treaty.
63
Supplementary Protocol to the Lima Treaty, signed on 3 June 1929; MB, Vol. II, Part. I, Ann. 107, Art. 1,
p. 423.
64CR 2015/19, p. 32, para. 17 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
65
Ibid., para. 18 (Chemillier-Gendreau). - 27 -
IV. The position as from 1948
32. As to the documents that Bolivia relies on in the period post -1948, these provide an
important response to the point that Bolivia was making yesterday on characteri zation: that, as
introduced by Bolivia’s Agent, the matter before the Court relates to a pactum de contrahendo and
66
not the 1904 Peace Treaty . If that were the case then, of course, one would expect the 1950 and
1975 exchanges, of which we heard so much yesterday, to have at least some plausible
resemblance to such a pactum. The trouble for Bolivia is that they do not.
33. The Court may have picked up yest erday that Bolivia is rather coy about what these
documents on which it places such reliance in fact say.
34. In its N ote of 1 June 1950, Bolivia proposed, this is tab 46, that [ slide on]: “ the
Governments of Bolivia and Chile [should] formally enter into direct negotiations to satisfy
67
Bolivia’s fundamental need to obtain its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean” .
35. The key document for Bolivia is then Chile ’s response of 20 June 1950, to which
Professor Chemillier-Gendreau and others referred yesterday 68. Yet, this was not included in the
judges’ folder or shown on your screens. Chile did not accept Bolivia’s proposal, but stated instead
that it was this is tab 47 [slide on]:
“willing to formally enter into direct negotiations aimed at find ing a formula that will
make it possible to give to Bolivia a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean of its own,
and for Chile to receive compensatio69of a non- territorial character that effectively
takes into account its interests” .
36. Now, supposing for jurisdictional purposes that this exchange somehow establishes an
international agreement, it is not even plausibly the pactum de contrahendo that is said by Bolivia,
for the purposes of characterization, to be the relevant matter.
37. Two further points on this exchange: first, notwithstanding the reference in the Note of
70
20 June 1950 to “safeguarding the legal situation established by the Treaty of Peace of 1904 ” , the
exchange still concerns in substance the same matter settled in and governed by that Treaty, the
66CR 2015/19, p. 11, para. 6 (Rodríguez Veltzé).
67
Ambassador of Bolivia’s Note No. 529/21 of 1 June 1950; MB, Vol. II, Part I, Ann. 109A, p. 431.
68CR 2015/19, p. 32, para. 19 (Chemillier-Gendreau) and pp. 57-58, para. 22 (Akhavan).
69Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile’s Note No 9 of 20 June 1950; MB, Vol. II, Part I, Ann. 109B, p. 433.
70
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile’s Note No. 9 of 20 June 1950; MB, Ann. 109 B, p. 433. - 28 -
matter of Bolivia’s access to the sea; and, secondly, there is no hint here of any intent to bypass
Article VI of the Pact or otherwise to establish the jurisdiction of the Court.
71
38. Precisely the same points apply with respect to the 1961 Trucco Memorandum , as well
as the exchanges coming out of the 1975 Act of Charaña, about which we heard so much
72
yesterday . Again, the Court was referred to, but not actually shown, the documents on which
Bolivia has placed such weight in its written and oral pleadings.
39. The principal document on which Bolivia relies is dated 19 December 1975, when Chile
set out guidelines for a negotiation between the two States concerning the cession of territory as is
now on the screen, and at tab 48. Time is too short perhaps to read it all for now but you have the
basic point from paragraph (c): “ (c) As His Excellency President Banzer stated, the cession to
Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast linked to Bolivian territory through a territorial strip with the
same type of sovereignty would be considered.” 73
40. Thus, the Court will see when it returns to this document that the same three points apply
once more: there is no plausible suggestion of any pactum de contrahendo which can somehow
now be portrayed as constituting the real matter at issue in this case ; there is no hint of any
intention to establish compulsory jurisdiction; and the matter at issue is that of Bolivian access to
the sea, that is in substance the same matter settled in, and governed by, the 1904 Peace Treaty.
41. Now o f course we accept the reference in paragraph (b) of this document to not
“containing any innovation to the stipulations of the [1904 Treaty]” 74, but the role here of the Court
is to look at the documents that Bolivia relies on objectively, and to assess whether these establish
the existence of a substantively different matter that would no longer be caught by Article VI.
They do not; but, in any event, the “without containing any innovation to” type wording could not
assist Bolivia. The critical quest ion for the purposes of Article VI remains whether Bolivia ’s
claim, as now formulated, requires revision of the matter settled in, or governed by, the 1904 Peace
Treaty. It does.
71
Memorandum from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July 1961;
POCh, Ann. 48.
72CR 2015/19, p. 11, para. 4 (Rodríguez Veltzé); p. 19, para. 16 (Forteau); p. 32, para. 17
(Chemillier-Gendreau); p. 33, para. 21 (Chemillier-Gendreau); p. 56, para. 18 (Akhavan).
73Foreign Relations Minister of Chile’s Note No. 686, 19 Dec. 1975; MB, Ann. 73, pp. 302-303.
74
Foreign Relations Minister of Chile’s Note No. 686, 19 Dec. 1975; MB, Ann. 73, p. 302. - 29 -
42. Finally, under this heading, I want to tu rn briefly to the 1983 resolution of the OAS,
75
which was referred to a number of times yesterday , alongside a statement by the Chilean
representative to the OAS of 12 November 1986 76. The 1983 resolution was, in relevant part
and this is at paragraph 2, of tab 49 [slide on]:
“2. To urge Bolivia and Chile, for the sake of American brotherhood, to begin a
process of rapprochement and strengthening of friendship of the Bolivian and Chilean
peoples, directed toward normalizing their relations and overcoming the difficulties
that separate them — including, especially, a formula for giving Bolivia a sovereign
77
outlet to the Pacific Ocean . . .”
43. And the same three points apply: not even plausibly a pactum de contrahendo that could
constitute the relevant m atter, no substantively different matter and no hint of an intention to
establish jurisdiction.
44. Indeed, the Chilean representative stated at this meeting that “ the boundaries between
Chile and Bolivia were fixed once and for all by an international tr eaty that was freely signed by
both countries in 1904” 78, and further, as you can see from tab 50, that [slide on]:
“Any negotiations with Bolivia aimed at satisfying Bolivia ’s longing for
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean through Chilean territory is a matter for solution
directly between Bolivia and Chile, and might possibly require the participation of
Peru . . . [He said that] [a] ny negotiations of this type must also be the result of a
process; a process that involves improving and normalizing the relations between our
79
two countries . . .”
45. When it comes to the all -important question of characteriz ation of the real issue in the
current claim, it is difficult to conceive of anything further away from the pactum de contrahendo
that Bolivia asserts as being the relevant matter.
75
CR 2015/19, p. 13, fn . 6 (Rodríguez Veltzé); p. 19, para. 16 (Forteau); pp. 35-36, para. 29
(Chemillier-Gendreau).
76CR 2015/19, pp. 35-36, para. 29 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
77OAS resolution AG/Res. 686 (XIII-0/83), adopted on 18 Nov. 1983; MB, Ann. 195, pp. 723-724.
78
Statement by Mr . Schweitzer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, at the Fourth Session of the General
Committee of the General Assembly of the OAS, 18 Nov. 1983; POCh, Ann. 55, p. 781.
79Ibid. - 30 -
46. There are many such statements made by Chile before the OAS, to which you were
80
not alerted yesterday ; and, as reference was made to the Chilean intervention on
12 November 1986 81, I should note that the Chilean repr esentative then stated in terms to
the OAS tab 51 [slide on]:
“Here, I want to recall the Chilean opinion [in] this regard: there is no territorial
dispute between Bolivia and Chile because our borders were determined through the
[1904 Peace Treaty] . . . whose intangibility we hold. From the aforementioned it can
be followed that international organ[s] do not have any jurisdiction to consid82 any
matter relating to an issue already settled through a bilateral treaty.”
47. So, as with the unopposed statement of Minister Trucco 83, the express position of Chile
was that the existence of the 1904 Treaty e xcluded any submission to third- party jurisdiction,
while, for the purposes of characterization of the real issue before you, there is once again a critical
absence of the pactum de contrahendo which Bolivianow says that this case is all about.
V. Substance, not form
48. I move to my final point, which is that it is indeed substance, not form, that counts in this
jurisdictional context.
49. There was no come back on my analogy on Monday to the approach of international
84
courts and tribunals to jurisdiction ratione temporis , but I should identify that the point that it is
substance here that matters is one that stems from the careful wording of Article VI.
50. The question of whether a matter is settled or not leads inevitably to the identification of
the relevant matter and to the question of whether a given claim under Article XXXI of the Pact
cuts across the status of that matter as one that is set tled. Thus, what is important is the desired
80
See, e.g., statement by the Chilean Representative at the Sixth Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the
OAS, 24 Oct . 1979; MB, Ann. 202, p. 738; statement by the Foreign Minister of Chile at the Second Session of the
General Commission of the General Assembly of the O AS, 6 June 1990; MB, Ann. 214, pp. 778-779; statement by the
Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Chile at the Second Session of the General Commission of the General Assembly
of the O AS, 7 June 1994; MB, Ann. 218, p. 789; statement by the Foreign Minister of Chile at the Fourth Plenary
Session of the General Assembly of the O AS, 4 June 1996; MB, Ann. 220, p. 795; statement by the Foreign Minister of
Chile at the Fourth Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the O AS, 3 June 1997; MB, Ann. 221, p. 798; and
statement by the Foreign Minister of Chile at the Fourth Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the O AS,
6 June 2000; MB, Ann. 223, p. 803.
81CR 2015/19, p. 36, para. 29 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
82
Statement by the Chilean Representative at the Third Session of the General Assembly o f the O AS,
12 Nov. 1986; MB, Ann. 208, p. 758.
83
CR 2015/18, pp. 60-61, paras. 55-56 (Wordsworth).
84Ibid., p. 59, para. 51 (c) (Wordsworth). - 31 -
legal outcome of the given claim, not the particular formulation of the mechanism by which that
desired outcome is to be reached. For jurisdictional purposes, it can make no practical difference,
and there is no reason for any principled legal distinction, between (i) a claim for the revision of a
matter settled by arrangement and (ii) a claim for judicially prescribed negotiations that lead
inevitably to the same result.
51. Bolivia recognizes this, and has therefore sought to establish the existence of an entirely
fictive pactum de contrahendo that post-dates the signature of the Pact in an attempt to shore up the
argument that there is a new, post -1948 matter that is not settled by the 1904 Peace Treaty. But,
there are two points here:
(a) For the purposes of the current exercise of characterization of the relevant matter, th e Court is
empowered by Article VI to test whether Bolivia can point to, at least plausibly, the asserted
pactum de contrahendo. It cannot, and it follows that this non-existent pactum cannot redefine
the matter that is now before you.
(b) Secondly, even if it were to be assumed in Bolivia ’s favour that the existence of this pactum de
contrahendo is anything more than wishful thinking, that would not alter the position that the
revision of the settlement established by the 1904 Peace Treaty remains as the central and
inevitable outcome of the pleaded claim such that the cla im cannot somehow be characteriz ed
as containing a new or different matter to that settled in, and governed by, the 1904 Treaty, that
is the matter of whether Bolivia has a right of sovereign access to the sea.
52. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention, and ask you to hand
the floor to Professor Dupuy.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne la parole à M.le professeur Dupuy.
M. DUPUY :
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l ors du premier tour de ses
plaidoiries, la Bolivie a tenté de vous persuader que vous n’aviez pas besoin, dès le début de cette
affaire, de vérifier que vous aviez compétence pour examiner sa requête ; comme si elle avait
oublié combien la Cour elle-même a inlassablement rappelé, tout au long du développement de sa - 32 -
jurisprudence, combien elle ne pouva it exercer sa fonction judiciaire qu ’à la condition d ’en avoir
reçu mandat par le consentement explicite des Parties 85.
2. A vrai dire, à la sortie de l ’audience d’hier matin, il devenait presque un peu difficile de
savoir exactement quelle était l ’argumentation de la Bolivie, tant un certain nombre de
contradictions et de confusions, aussi bien matérielles que temporelles, étaient apparues entre ses
divers conseils. Devrions-nous considérer qu ’existait ab initio, c ’est-à-dire, sans doute, comme
incitait à le penser hier ma collègue et amie le professeur Chemillier -Gendreau, dès l’attaque du
port d’Antofagasta, le 14 février 1879, un droit, c ’est-à-dire un titre territorial de la Bolivie à un
86
littoral maritime ?
3. Ou bien serions-nous plus simplement, ma is de façon bien différente, en présence d’ une
obligation de négocier à raison de l ’existence d ’un nouvel accor d intervenu entre les Parties,
distinct du traité de 1904 dont il nous a été assez dit que la Bolivie ne demandait pas l ’annulation ?
Selon une terminologie jusque-là inusitée par nos contradicteurs, un pactum de contrahendo, pour
parler comme mon collègue, le professeur Akhavan, un pacte dont on ne sait pourtant ni quand ni
comment il aurait jamais été conclu 87?
4. A moins qu’il s’agisse non pas d’un pacte, par définition conventionnel, mai s plutôt d’un
engagement unilatéral du Chili, constitué à raison de la sédimentation d ’un certain nombre de
déclarations, voire d’échanges diplomatiques entre les deux Etats ? Mais alors, de cet engagement,
on ne sait toujours pas davantage à partir de quel moment ses différents éléments constitutifs sont
réputés avoir atteint la phase de cristallisation nécessaire à la formation d ’une obligation juridique,
au-delà de simples pourparlers diplomatiques ? Doit -on se situer avant ou après 1904 ?
Antérieurement ou postérieurement à 1948 ? Quand, au juste, aurait eu lieu cette métamorphose
insolite, soudaine ou progressive, ce passage aléatoire des tâtonnements incertains de la diplomatie
à la rigueur intransigeant e du droit ? Aucune réponse n’ est donnée à cet égard par le demandeur
dans cette affaire.
85
Affaire relative à l’Incident aérien du 27 juillet 1955 (Israël c. Bulgarie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 142 ;
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c.Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.Recueil 2007 (II),
p. 852, par. 51.
86CR 2015/19, p. 29, par. 10 (Chemillier-Gendreau).
87
Ibid., p. 51, par. 4 (Akhavan). - 33 -
5. Pourtant, la réponse à ces interrogations n ’est nullement insignifiante, Mesdames et
Messieurs les juges ! Il y va , d’ores et déjà, de votre compétence, toujours fondée sur le seul
consentement des parties, pour connaître d’ une requête dont la Bolivie a voulu souligner à
suffisance que l ’objet serait distinct de celui identifié par le Chili. Il est, par conséquent,
indispensable de revenir aux données, fondamentalement simples, du problème posé par la requête
comme à celles de l ’objection qu ’elle suscite de la part du Chili quant à votre propre
compétence (I). On rappellera ensuite que l ’appréciation de celle-ci, en application de l’article VI
du pacte de Bogotá, ne saurait être jointe au fond compte tenu du cadre juridique sur la base duquel
vous avez été saisis (II).
I. Les données fondamentales du problème
6. Le problème simple qui se pose à la Cour à ce stade préliminaire est de savoir si la
question soumise par la requête de la Bolivie était ou non déjà réglée par le traité de paix de 1904,
en vigueur lorsque le pacte de Bogotá a été signé, en 1948.
7. Et pour y donner réponse, il est nécessaire pour la Cour de se livrer à la caractérisation de
la demande bolivienne. Cette question, nos distingués contradicteurs l ’ont suffisamment répété
hier matin, concerne l e problème de savoir si la Bolivie dispose d ’un droit d ’accès à
l’océan Pacifique dont le Chili aurait l’obligation de négocier les modalités avec elle.
8. Or, il se trouve que cette « question» de l ’accès de la Bolivie à la mer, le terme de
«question» étant ici à prendre au sens de l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá, a reçu une réponse, agréée
d’un commun accord par les deux pays. Ce sont, en effet, l es termes du traité de 1904 qui
l’apportent, sans équivoque possible. La frontière existant entre les deux pays ne permet pas
d’accès direct, ou «pleinement souverain», du territoire bolivien à l ’océan. Et les deux Parties,
prenant en compte le caractère enclavé du territoire bolivien, ont établi un droit de transit
commercial au bénéfice de la Bolivie. La situation n’a pas changé depuis lors.
9. Alors, pour tenter de la contourner, la Bolivie s ’est livrée devant vous, mercredi dernier,
avec une créativité à laquelle on doit rendre hommage, à une tentative, nouvelle quant à elle, de
dédoublement des obligations s ’imposant au Chili. Nous étions, jusqu’ ici, habitués par ses
écritures à voir invoqué le traité de 1895. Las ! On nous dit à présent que ce traité n’est désormais - 34 -
tout au plus qu’un indice, un simple fait déclaré révélateur, dans la tentative menée par la Bolivie
pour constituer une sorte de continuum historique dont les origines restent mystérieuses mais dont
les effets sont déclarés déterminants. C’est lui, semble-t-il, ce continuum, sur lequel s’appuieraitun
autre consentement du Chili que celui établi en 1904 : non plus un traité jamais entré en vigueur, ni
en 1895 ni après, mais, désormais, un pactum de contrahendo 88.
10. Or, nous l ’avons entendu hier, ce pactum devrait être constitué, selon la Bolivie, par
l’amalgame de déclarations unilatérales et d ’échanges de notes. Quoi qu’il en soit, la Cour n’a pas
besoin de se livrer ici à la dissection délicate de cette chimère composite en l ’examinant au fond et
à fond, si je puis me permettre ici de jouer sur les mots.
11. A supposer même que certains de ses éléments (ce qu ’ils ne font pas) aient pu constituer
la matière d ’un engagement unilatéral ou contractuel conclu par le Chili, la Cour s e souviendra
combien le professeur Chemiller-Gendreau a insisté dans sa plaidoirie d’hier sur l’échange de notes
de 1950, sur le mémorandum Trucco de 1961, ou, plus encore, sur les prises de position
89
diplomatiques intervenues entre les deux pays entre 1975 et 1977 , rejointe à cet égard par le
professeur Akhavan 9…
12. Or, Monsieur le président, si l’on cherche vraiment à trouver un point commun entre ces
faits hétéroclites, on n’en trouvera qu’un seul. C’est que ces faits, quelle que soit leur qualification,
sont tous postérieurs à 1948, date de signature du pacte de Bogotá. Il en résulte, en application du
seul instrument sur la base duquel vous êtes saisis, et parce que, manifestement, la question mise en
cause par la requête de la Bolivie est bien la m ême que celle réglée par le traité de paix, traité en
vigueur en 1948, que la Cour internationale de Justice n’a pas compétence pour en connaître, et ce,
par détermination de l’article VI du pacte.
13. Il est, je pense, inutile à ce stade de revenir sur l e contenu et les im plications de cette
disposition. Je vous renvoie à cet égard aux propos du professeur Moníca Pinto qui n’ont d’ailleurs
pas reçu de démenti par mon ami le professeur RemiroBrotóns hier matin. Je ne reviendrai pas
88
CR 2015/19, p. 52, par. 8 (Akhavan).
89Ibid., p. 32, par. 19 et suiv. (Chemillier-Gendreau).
90
Ibid., p. 58, par. 23 et suiv. (Akhavan). - 35 -
davantage sur l’artificialité de la thèse bolivienne, déjà évoquée devant vous par Daniel Bethlehem,
cet après-midi.
14. Oh, b ien entendu, sans être prophète, il est vraisemblable que nos contradicteurs et
néanmoins amis vous diront demain que les précédents constituant cet a ssemblage à prétention
conventionnelle s’inscrivent dans la longue durée ; et que certains d ’entre eux remontent à une
époque qui est antérieure à 1948. Ils vous diront cela, sans pour autant être à même de vous
prouver que la «masse critique» de cet improbable engagement avait déjà été atteinte avant que le
pacte adopté à Bogotá n’ait été signé. C’est, d’ailleurs, devant le constat de cette improbabilité, au
sens propre du terme, que la Bolivie tente d’établir ce continuum historique dont on ne sait quand il
a débuté ni quand il a pris consistance.
15. Mais alors, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, ici survient une
question ! Si la Bolivie était tellement certaine que le traité de paix de 1904, tout en restant en
vigueur, s’était, en quelque sorte, vu doubler, comme dans les rues de Marseille, de Naples ou de
Téhéran, par un autre engagement prenant le pas sur lui, dont mes collègues de l ’autre côté de la
barre vous disaient pourtant hier qu ’il était parallèle 91, pourquoi, mais pourquoi donc la Bolivie
a-t-elle cru bon de ne pas ratifier le pacte de Bogotá avant 2011 ?
16. Et pourquoi, l ’ayant enfin ratifié, a -t-elle maintenu cette réserve vraiment jusqu ’à la
veille du dépôt de sa requête ? Deux semaines à peine ! Pourquoi, s ’agissant précisément,
rappelons-le, d’une réserve destinée à faire obstacle à l ’application de l ’article VI du pacte de
Bogotá ? Une réserve subordonnant l’application de celui-ci à l’appréciation par son propre auteur
92
de la question de savoir si l ’arrangement en cause «touche aux intérêts vitaux d ’un Etat» ! Une
réserve dont le contenu avait provoqué le commentaire dubitatif du s ecrétaire général de l’OEA.
17. Pourquoi avoir maintenu une telle réserve sinon parce que la Bolivie savait fort bien que
l’article VI est bien toujours l ’obstacle incontournable se dressant en l ’occurrence, et compte tenu
de l’existence et du contenu du traité de 1904, à l’encontre de votre compétence ? Alors, faute de
91CR 2015/19, p. 51, par. 4 (Akhavan).
92
«La délégation de la Bolivie formule une réserve en ce qui concerne l’articVI car elle estime que les
procédures pacifiques peuvent également s’appliquer aux différends issus deoquestions résolues par arrangement entre les
parties, lorsque pareil arrangement touche aux intérêts vitaux d’un Etat», onglet nssier de plaidoiries du premier
tour du Chili, p. 24, 54 et 55. - 36 -
mieux, et parce que les contraintes de sa nouvelle Constitution comme les déclarations de son
président rendaient indispensable une initiative, politique autant que juridique, il a fallu que la
Bolivie fabrique un ersatz de convention pour contourner celle, pourtant bien réelle, qui lui barrait
le chemin de la Cour.
18. Et si la Bolivie a tant tardé à retirer sa réserve, c ’est bien parce qu’elle voulait jusqu’au
bout se préserver des termes implacables de l ’articleVI. Et si elle s’ est finalement résolue à la
retirer, ce n ’est nullement «pour dissiper tout doute s ur l’applicabilité ou non du pacte à ses
93
relations avec le Chili », ainsi que le disait aimablement mon ami Remiro Brotóns , mais parce
qu’elle savait bien que cette réserve serait de toute façon dépourvue d ’effet à l’égard du seul Etat
qui compte en l’occurrence, à savoir le Chili ; celui-ci avait, en effet, par une déclaration dépourvue
de toute ambiguïté, indiqué à deux reprises dont la dernière au moment de la ratification du pacte
par la Bolivie, en 2011, qu’ il faisait objection à une telle réserve, ain si que lui en fait droit la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités. Encerclée par le pacte, la Bolivie s’est alors résolue à
tenter une sortie, en essayant de refouler les termes du traité de paix de 1904 pour mieux le faire
oublier.
19. Peut-on a lors considérer que la Cour pourrait attendre, pour se prononcer sur sa
compétence, que les deux Parties en viennent à considérer le fond du différen d ? Et bien non !
Selon la République du Chili, la réponse à cette question est manifestement négative, Mesdames et
Messieurs de la Cour, et ceci en raison du cadre juridique à l’intérieur duquel la Cour a été saisie.
II. Le fondement invoqué de la compétence de la Cour impose que l’objection
présentée à son encontre par le Chili soit examinée à titre préliminaire
20. Contrairement à ce qui s’ était présenté à vous lors de l ’objection à la compétence de la
Cour présentée par la Colombie dans l’affaire qui l’opposait au Nicaragua, objection que vous avez
examinée dans votre arrêt souvent cité de 2007, il n’ y a pas ici dédoublement de la base de
juridiction de la Cour, le pacte, d’ un côté, le Statut de la Cour , d’autre part. Ici, il n ’y a qu’un
fondement sur lequel le demandeur appuie sa demande. Il se réduit à l ’invocation du pacte. Ce
sont par conséquent s es dispositions qu ’il convient d ’appliquer. Il n’y a aussi, au -delà de la
93CR 2015/19, p. 44, par. 17 (Remiro Brotóns). - 37 -
chimère fabriquée par la Bolivie, qu ’un seul traité applicable et un traité dont les dispositions,
contrairement à celles du traité de 1928 entre le Nicaragua et la Bolivie, sont dé pourvues de toute
équivoque aussi bien pour ce qui se réfère à leur contenu qu ’à leur validité au moment de la
signature du pacte, en 1948.
21. Monsieur le président, vous nous avez engagés à éviter d’inutiles répétitions lors de notre
second tour, et je ne vais pas redire ici les raisons pour lesquelles n ous ne nous trouvons dans
aucun des deux cas de figure identifiés par la Cour en 2007 comme faisant exception au droit qu’a
l’Etat auteur d ’une objection à ce que celle -ci soit véritablement examinée par la Cour à titre
préliminaire 94.
22. Le seul test pour vérifier la compétence de la Cour est celui de savoir si le traité
apportant les réponses que nous savons aux questions soulevées par la requête bolivienne était ou
non en vigueur en 1948. Et la Bolivie elle-même reconnaît que c’était bien le cas tout en essayant
de faire prévaloir sur ce traité réel un pactum improbable.
23. Or, j’y insiste, v érifier le test de compétence précité correspond à la satisfaction de
l’objection chilienne. Et ceci n ’équivaut en rien à entrer dans la substance d ’une revendication
bolivienne fondée sur l ’allégation d’existence d’un droit dont elle se prévaut sans même savoir
nous dire quand il serait né ! Alors même que la date de son apparition est pourtant capitale pour
vérifier si oui ou non vous avez compétence en cette affaire!
24. La Cour ne rencontrera par conséquent nul obstacle ici à consacrer un autre droit,
purement procédural, quant à lui : celui qu’a l’auteur d’une objection préliminaire d’obtenir, à titre
préalable, un arrêt relatif à cette objection . Rappelons que la Cour est d ’autant plus incitée à se
prononcer in limine litis que dans le cadre du pacte de Bogota, l’ articleXXXIII de celui-ci déclare
qu’au cas où les parties ne se mettraient pas d ’accord sur la compétence de la Cour au sujet du
litige, elle-même décidera «au préalable» de cette question.
25. Une ultime raison, cependant, non pas accessoire mais fondamentale, paraît devoir
conduire à l ’examen et à la consécration, à titre préliminaire, de l’objection déposée par la
94 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 51 ; CR 2015/19, p. 44, par. 17 (Remiro Brot óns) ; C R 2015/18, p. 63, par . 6
(Dupuy). - 38 -
République du Chili, au-delà même des dispositions de cette lex specialis que constitue le pacte de
Bogotá.
26. Et cette raison est tout simplement à trouver dans le caractère, toujours consensuel, de
votre compétence.
27. N’était-ce pas, déjà, votre devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, qui
reconnaissait dans l’affaire des Concessions Mavromatis en Palestine que sa compétence ne saurait
subsister en dehors des limites dans lesquelles le consentement du défe ndeur a été donné 95 ? Ainsi
que le notait un commentateur averti de cette jurisprudence, une telle considération vaut d’ autant
plus lorsque la Cour est confrontée à une objection formulée par ce défendeur ; et elle justifie à elle
96
seule qu’il y soit répondu avant toutes choses, comme, du reste, ce défendeur y a droit ainsi que
97
vous l’avez encore rappelé en 2007 .
J’en ai ainsi terminé, Monsieur le président, et je vous prie de bien vouloir céder la parole au
professeur Harold Koh.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Eu égard au fait que l’audience a
commencé tout à l’heure un peu après 16 heures 30, le Chili peut quelque peu déborder au- delà de
18 heures, mais je demande aux orateurs qui restent du côté du Chili de ne pas dépasser
18 heures 10. Je donne la parole à M. Koh.
Mr. KOH:
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, on behalf of Chile, I am honoured to appear before
you to underscore what is really at stake in this hearing.
2. The presentations thus far make cl ear that you may grant Chile’s p reliminary objection
without determining the merits. Bolivia entered two binding treaties with Chile: the bilateral
Peace Treaty of 1904 98 and the multilateral Pact of Bogotá of 1948 99. On its face, the former
95Affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt n 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A n 2, p. 16.
96
G. Abi-Saab, Les Exceptions préliminaires dans la procédure de la Cour internationale , 1967, p. 35.
97 Différend territor ial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 51.
98Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on 20 Oct. 1904 (the 1904 Peace
Treaty), tab 1 of judges’ folder. - 39 -
settled and governed Bolivia’s claim ed right of sovereign access to the Pacific. Forty-four years
later, the latter, Article VI, expressly excluded from this Court’s jurisdiction any matter “settled” or
“governed” by a treaty in force in 1948, thereby divesting this Court of jurisdiction ov er Bolivia’s
100
Application .
3. But what risks would this Court incur, if instead it were to grant jurisdiction or join
jurisdiction to the merits ? Bolivia styles its claim as about Chile ’s alleged obligation to negotiate
sovereign access to the sea. Bolivia’s novel claim has broad implications for the sanctity of treaties
and the ability of nations to engage freely in diplomatic discussions without prejudice to what
already has been settled.
4. In Article VI, all High Contracting Parties to the Pact of Bogotá agreed that this Court
should not intrude upon the sanctity of existing treaties by taking jurisdiction over matters
previously settled or governed by treaty. Yet claiming an independent “ obligation to negotiate”,
Bolivia now asks this Court to order Chile to renegotiate to change Bolivia’s non-sovereign access
through Chilean territory into sovereign access. To grant Bolivia ’s request would disrupt stable
borders agreed upon in a bilateral treaty concluded more than 110 years ago.
5. Yesterda y, Bolivia supported its supposed obligation to negotiate by citing various
diplomatic exchanges before and after 1948. What Bolivia misse d is that when the High
Contracting Parties concluded the Pact of Bogotá, they sought not to end such exchanges, but to
direct them to diplomatic, and not judicial, fora. As Professor Pinto reviewed, in 1948, the parties
101
to the Pact chose to look forward, not backwards . They never foreclosed future diplomatic
discussions regarding matters of mutual interest already settled or governed by treaty 10. Although
the parties permitted certain matters to come to the Court, they consciously refused to allow any
single State unilaterally to reopen a matter already settled by arrangement or governed by a treaty
in force. Thus, Bolivia’s claim of a historically continuous right of sovereign access to the Pacific
that preceded and survived the 1904 Treaty belongs in diplomatic negotiating rooms. Not before a
99American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, signed at Bogotá on 30 Apr . 1948 (entry into force 6 May 1949) (the
Pact of Bogotá), tab 3 of judges’ folder.
100
Pact of Bogotá, tab 3 of judges’ folder, pp. 4, 32 and 33, Art. VI.
101CR 2015/18, pp. 22-23, paras. 8-9 (Pinto).
102
Ibid., p. 27, para. 22 (Pinto). - 40 -
Court that has no jurisdiction to consider such long- settled matters on the unilateral application of
one State.
6. If Bolivia had wanted to secure a legal obligation by Chile to negotiate in the future on
sovereign access, it could have included in the 1904 Treaty an explicit treaty clause obliging both
Parties to negotiate i n good faith in the future on that matter . Instead, Bolivia asks this Court to
exercise its jurisdiction to imply a judicially mandated obligation to negotiate to a particular fixed
result. In such lopsided negotiations, the two nations are not free to e ngage in diplomatic
discussions without prejudice. What Bolivia pointedly demands is not a good- faith obligation of
process, but a predetermined obligation of result.
7. Under Bolivia’s theory, every negotiation creates two parallel tracks. Every time a nation
concludes a treaty that settles one matter, it can incur a shadow set of obligations to negotiate with
regard to a second matter that was not resolved to the opposing party’s satisfaction. Once a nation
begins any diplomatic discussions on this s econd track, it creates a new basis — a pactum de
contrahendo — for claiming this Court’s jurisdiction. Yesterday, Mr. Akhavan claimed this theory
“does not lead to a precedent of general application in international law” 103. But two dire
consequences would follow.
8. First, Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá would be washed away. That article protects
sovereign boundaries from unilateral challenge before the Court. But under Bolivia’s theory, no
matter subject to negotiations would ever be settled. Almos t any boundary treaty, such as the
1904 Treaty of Peace that forms the basis of the two countries’ daily relationship, could be
judicially reopened simply by virtue of the P arties sitting down at the diplomatic table. As
Sir Daniel reviewed, the 1904 Treaty addressed not just a comprehensive territorial settlement, but
a series of other forward -looking arrangements and commitments designed to strengthen political
and commercial ties 104. If Bolivia could have this Court review the territoria l settlement aspect of
the 1904 Treaty, why could it not force judicial review of other elements of that Treaty as well?
9. Second, the Pact of Bogotá was designed to bring closure not just to territorial issues, but
to a long list of other historical controversies. The fact that two S tates may negotiate on a treaty
10CR 2015/19, p. 52, para. 6 (Akhavan).
10CR 2015/18, pp. 37-38, paras. 19-26 (Bethlehem). - 41 -
matter that was settled before that date does not create jurisdiction for this Court to reopen that
settled matter. Otherwise, Latin American S tates could not freely negotiate about any matter
already settled or governed before 1948 without the risk of creating the very jurisdiction they had
already excluded. Fear of litigation would create a perverse, freezing effect on States ’ willingness
to negotiate on such matters. Bolivia’s theory would chill diplomati c dialogue, and continually
thrust this Court into the midst of delicate diplomatic discussions that fit poorly with its judicial
function.
10. Under Bolivia ’s novel theory, by clever pleading, applicants could manufacture
jurisdiction in this Court reg arding previously settled matters. And this Court can expect to hear
many more preliminary objection sessions like the one yesterday, replete with snippets of speeches,
ministerial statements, and diplomatic exchanges as reasons to avoid the jurisdictiona l bar of
Article VI. Notwithstanding Mr. Akhavan’s effort to underplay, Bolivia’s theory would doubtless
encourage unilateral attempts to re- litigate the continent’s history and borders. The careful limits
established by the Pact of Bogotá would become increasingly meaningless.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the stakes here are larger than the interests of just
these two Parties. The two treaties relevant to jurisdiction are part of a larger treaty network that
binds Bolivia and Chile 105. The Pact of Bogotá succeeded in barring existing territorial settlements
and other settlement matters from being reopened at the sole initiative of one State. But as
Sir Daniel recounted, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries , at least 12 separate treaties
Bolivia settled disputed boundaries not just with Chile, but also with all four of its other
neighbours 106. May Bolivia now come before this Court to seek an order directing renegotiation of
all of those other borders as well? And even if Bolivia did not, could those other regional partners
also come to the Court seeking an order directing renegotiation of their borders?
12. This Court has announced that [slide on]
“the clear purpose of [Article VI] was to preclude the possibility of using [ these
procedures], and in particular judicial remedies, in order to reopen such matters as
10CR 2015/18, p. 55, para. 33 (Wordsworth). See also Chile’s preliminary objection, fn. 88.
10CR 2015/18, p. 35, fn. 69 (Bethlehem). - 42 -
were settled between the parties to the Pact , because they had been the object of an
107
international judicial decision or a treaty” .
How many such settled matters might there be ? Should they all now be subject to judicial
re-examination? What about other pre -1948 boundaries that involve other Latin American
countries who are not before the Court today ? And if the matter of whether Bolivia has a right to
sovereign access, which was plainly settled by the 1904 Treaty, could be reopened by this Court,
why not also any of the many other matters that all had thought resolved?
13. Mr. President, Members of the Court : the stability of borders within Latin America is a
regional achievement, achieved at high cost. Respect for treaties, borders, the rule of law, stability,
require that Chile and its Latin American neighbo urs, including Bolivia, live up to their treaty
commitments. Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá embodies that respect.
14. At bottom, Bolivia ’s case turns on unravelling and destabilizing established legal
structures designed to preserve regional borders and preserve friendly relations. Those structures
are fundamental not just to the peaceful bilateral relatio nship of these countries, but to their
regional co-operation.
15. To allow applicants to avoid Article VI by jurisdictional sleight- of-hand would
encourage other countries in the region to attempt unilaterally to reopen settled matters whose
adjudication the Pact foreclosed. It would undermine a regional legal framework designed to
promote stability and peaceful co-operation. It would chill useful discussions of difficult issues in
diplomatic fora, where these two countries have periodically held talks. It would permit litigants to
enlist this Court in delicate diplomatic matters.
16. In closing, Mr. President, Members of the Court : Bolivia invites this Court to unsettle
what has long been settled, and to manufacture jurisdiction to govern judicially what a binding
treaty has long governed. Accepting Bolivia’s invitation would undercut the sanctity of binding
treaties, and the ability of nations to engage freely in diplomatic discussions. It would undermine
respect going forward for binding treaties and international law as a basis for regional stability,
peace and co-operation in Latin America. To preserve that respect, this Court should grant Chile ’s
Preliminary Objection, by confirming — based on the materials before it — that Bolivia ’s
10Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 858, para. 77; emphasis added. - 43 -
Application raises a matter “settled” and “governed” by binding treaty at the time that the Pact of
Bogotá was concluded.
17. I thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, and ask you to invite the Honourable
Agent to the podium for his closing remarks. Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Koh. J e donne maintenant la parole à Son Excellence
Monsieur Felipe Bulnes, l’agent de la République du Chili.
Mr. BULNES:
C HILE S CONCLUSION BY THE A GENT AND FINAL SUBMISSIONS
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court , I conclude by recalling that in our 1904 Peace
Treaty Bolivia and Chile:
(a) re-established peaceful relations 20 years after the end of the War of the Pacific;
(b) delimited in full our boundary, in such a way that Bolivia had no right to coastal territory; and
(c) agreed that Bolivia would in perpetuity have unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean, over
Chilean territory and its Pacific ports. Ever since, Bolivia has made, and it continues to make,
extensive use of this perpetual and full right of free transit.
2. For the better part of a century Bolivia has aspired to change the settlement reached in
1904 and gain sovereign access to the sea.
3. Bolivia has always and still now describes this aspiration as one for “ historical
vindication”, for territory l ost in a war that ended in 1884 10. In Article VI of the Pact,
Latin American countries agreed to look forward, and to exclude unilateral claims to the Court for
historical vindication.
4. You have seen that when Bolivia signed the Pact in 1948, and again when it ratified it in
109
2011, that it entered a reservation . It knew that a claim designed to change the settlement
reached in the 1904 Peace Treaty would be outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
10Speech delivered by President Evo Morales on Bolivia’s Day of the Sea, 23 Mar. 2011; judges’ folder, tab 32,
pp. 5 and 6. See also statement by H.E. Mr. Choquehuanca, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Fourth Session of
the General Assembly of the OAS, 5 June 2012; judges’ folder, tab 34, pp. 13 and 14.
109
Chamber of Deputies of Bolivia, Legis lature 2011-2012, 38th Session, 24 Mar. 2011; judges’ folder, tab 33,
pp. 31 and 32. - 44 -
5. Until Bolivia unilaterally commenced this case, this jurisdictional exclusion was common
ground between Bolivia and Chile, and it was fundamental to Chile ’s decision to ratify and remain
party to the Pact 110.
6. Most importantly, Bolivia ’s request for relief asks the Court to order Chile to agree to
change the settlement reached in the 1904 Peace Treaty. It asks the Court to order Chile to cede its
territory to Bolivia, to change Bolivia’s access to the sea from non-sovereign, to sovereign. That is
111
a necessary result of the pactum de contrahendo that Bolivia’s Agent and counsel emphasized .
7. Article VI, and I finish, prevents Bolivia abusing the Pact in this way, and all of the parties
to the Pact have entrusted the Court with preventing States from advancing artificial claims of this
kind that are crafted to try to attract jurisdiction that is in substance lacking.
8. On those foundations, I have the honour formally to read Chile ’s submission, which is
that:
“The Republic of Chile respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that the claim brought by Bolivia against Chile is not within the jurisdiction of the
Court.”
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I sincerely thank the Court for its careful attention
to this sensitive matter. I equally thank the Registrar and his staff for the smooth conduct of these
proceedings and the Court’s interpreters, transcribers and translators for their outstanding work.
10. Mr. President, that concludes Chile’s case.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur l’agent. La Cour prend acte des conclusions finales dont
vous venez de donner lecture au nom du Chili. La Bolivie présentera son second tour de plaidoiries
le vendredi 8, demain, à 15 h. Elle disposera à cet effet d’un maximum de 1 h 35.
L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 18 h 10.
___________
11Chilean National Congress Chamber Debate, Background of Decree No. 526 American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement (1967) ; POCh, Ann. 49, Vol. 3, pp. 738 and 739; and Cham ber of Deputies of Chile, 42nd Session,
12 May 1965; judges’ folder, tab 31, pp. 11-14.
111
See, e.g., CR 2015/19, p. 11, para. 6 (Rodríguez Veltzé).
Audience publique tenue le jeudi 7 mai 2015, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président, dans l’affaire relative à l’Obligation de négocier un accès à l'océan Pacifique (Bolivie c. Chili) - Exception préliminaire