Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2015/22
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2015
Public sitting
held on Monday 28 September 2015, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Abraham presiding,
in the case concerning Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and
Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Preliminary Objections
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2015
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 28 septembre 2015, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,
en l’affaire relative à des Violations alléguées de droits souverains
et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
Exceptions préliminaires
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf
Judges Owada
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian
Judges ad hoc Daudet
Caron
Registrar Couvreur
- 3 -
Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président
MM. Owada
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Gevorgian, juges
MM. Daudet
Caron, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Professor of
International Law of the Sea, Utrecht University,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Emeritus Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former
member and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Director of Juridical Affairs,
Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Mr. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, Counsellor, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Claudia Loza Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Benjamin Samson, Ph.D. Candidate, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Defense,
Ms Gimena González,
as Assistant Counsel;
Ms Sherly Noguera de Argüello, Consul General of the Republic of Nicaragua,
as Administrator. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international, Oxford University, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur de l’Institut néerlandais du droit de la mer, professeur de droit
international de la mer, Université d’Utrecht,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur émérite à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre de l’Institut de
droit international,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. César Vega Masís, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, directeur des affaires juridiques, de la
souveraineté et du territoire au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils ;
M. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Claudia Loza Obregon, première secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Benjamin Samson, doctorant au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mme Gimena Gonzales,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Mme Sherly Noguera de Argüello, consul général de la République du Nicaragua,
comme administrateur. - 6 -
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Ms María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Francisco Echeverri Lara, Vice Minister of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as National Authorities;
H.E. Mr. Carlos Gustavo Arrieta Padilla, former Judge of the Council of State of Colombia, former
Attorney General of Colombia and former Ambassador of Colombia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, former President of the Constitutional Court of Colombia,
former Permanent Delegate of Colombia to UNESCO and former Ambassador of Colombia to
the Helvetic Confederation,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. W. Michael Reisman, McDougal Professor of International Law at Yale University, member of
the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, former avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Singapore,
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., member of the English Bar, member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Tullio Treves, member of the Institut de droit international, Senior Public International Law
Consultant, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP Milan, Professor, University of Milan,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, member and Special Rapporteur of the International Law
Commission, President of the Latin American Society of International Law,
Dr. h.c. Matthias Herdegen, Director of the Institute of International Law and Institute for Public
Law at the University of Bonn,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Juan José Quintana Aranguren, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW, former Permanent
Representative of Colombia to the United Nations in Geneva,
H.E. Mr. Andelfo García González, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom of
Thailand, Professor of International Law, former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, - 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. Mme María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, ministre des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Francisco Echeverri Lara, vice-ministre des affaires multilatérales, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
comme autorités nationales ;
S. Exc. M. Carlos Gustavo Arrieta Padilla, ancien juge au Conseil d’Etat de la Colombie, ancien
Attorney General de la Colombie et ancien ambassadeur de la Colombie auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, ancien président de la Cour constitutionnelle de
Colombie, ancien délégué permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’UNESCO et ancien
ambassadeur de la Colombie auprès de la Confédération helvétique,
comme coagent ;
M. W. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la
chaire McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, ancien avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York,
cabinet Eversheds LLP, Singapour,
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Commission du
droit international,
M. Tullio Treves, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseiller principal en droit
international public, cabinet Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt et Mosle LLP, Milan, professeur à
l’Université de Milan,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre et rapporteur spécial de la Commission du droit
international, président de la société latino-américaine de droit international,
M. Matthias Herdegen, docteur honoris causa, directeur de l’Institut de droit international et de
l’Institut de droit public de l’Université de Bonn,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Juan José Quintana Aranguren, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC, ancien
représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès des Nations Unies à Genève,
S. Exc. M. Andelfo García González, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume de Thaïlande, professeur de droit international, ancien vice-ministre des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller, ambassade de la République de Colombie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas, - 8 -
Ms Lucía Solano Ramírez, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Andrés Villegas Jaramillo, Co-ordinator, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Giovanny Andrés Vega Barbosa, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Ana María Durán López, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Juan David Veloza Chará, Third Secretary, Group of Affairs before the ICJ, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Rear Admiral Luís Hernán Espejo, National Navy of Colombia,
CN William Pedroza, International Affairs Bureau, National Navy of Colombia,
CF Hermann León, National Maritime Authority (DIMAR), National Navy of Colombia,
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Ms Charis Tan, Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore, member of the New York Bar, Solicitor,
England and Wales, Eversheds LLP, Singapore,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., New York University School of Law,
Mr. Renato Raymundo Treves, LL.M., Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle
LLP Milan,
Mr. Lorenzo Palestini, Ph.D Candidate, Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies, Geneva,
as Legal Assistants. - 9 -
Mme Lucía Solano Ramírez, deuxième secrétaire, ambassade de la République de Colombie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Andrés Villegas Jaramillo, coordinateur, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
M. Giovanny Andrés Vega Barbosa, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
Mme Ana María Durán López, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M. Camillo Alberto Gómez Niño, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M. Juan David Veloza Chará, troisième secrétaire, division des affaires portées devant la CIJ,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
le contre-amiral Luis Hernán Espejo, marine nationale de Colombie,
le capitaine de vaisseau William Pedroza, bureau des affaires internationales, marine nationale de
Colombie,
le capitaine de frégate Hermann León, autorité maritime nationale (DIMAR), marine nationale de
Colombie,
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
Mme Charis Tan, avocat et Solicitor (Singapour), membre du barreau de New York, Solicitor
(Angleterre et Pays de Galles), cabinet Eversheds LLP, Singapour,
M. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., faculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
M. Renato Raymundo Treves, LL.M., associé au cabinet Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt et Mosle
LLP, Milan,
M. Lorenzo Palestini, doctorant, Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement,
Genève,
comme assistants juridiques. - 10 -
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte.
La Cour se réunit aujourd’hui pour entendre les Parties en leurs plaidoiries sur les exceptions
préliminaires soulevées par la Colombie en l’affaire relative à des Violations de droits souverains
et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Colombie). Le juge Crawford s’est
récusé de l’affaire, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 17 du Statut de la Cour.
J’indique par ailleurs que, pour des raisons dont il m’a dûment fait part, le juge Tomka n’est
pas en mesure de siéger aujourd’hui.
Je relève que la Cour ne comptant sur son siège aucun juge de la nationalité des Parties,
chacune d’elles s’est prévalue de la faculté que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de l’article 31 du Statut
de désigner un juge ad hoc. Le Nicaragua avait initialement désigné M. Gilbert Guillaume ;
celui-ci ayant démissionné de ses fonctions le 8 septembre 2015, le Nicaragua a désigné
M. Yves Daudet. La Colombie a quant à elle désigné M. David Caron.
L’article 20 du Statut dispose que «[t]out membre de la Cour doit, avant d’entrer en fonction,
prendre l’engagement solennel d’exercer ses attributions en pleine impartialité et en toute
conscience». Et en vertu du paragraphe 6 de l’article 31 du Statut, cette disposition s’applique
également aux juges ad hoc.
Bien que M. Daudet ait été désigné juge ad hoc en d’autres affaires dans lesquelles il a fait
des déclarations solennelles, il lui faut, conformément au paragraphe 3 de l’article 8 du Règlement
de la Cour, en faire une nouvelle en la présente affaire.
Avant de les inviter à faire leur déclaration solennelle, je dirai quelques mots de la carrière et
des qualifications de M. Daudet et de M. Caron.
De nationalité française, M. Daudet est docteur en droit et agrégé de droit public et de
science politique. Il a occupé divers postes d’enseignement et de recherche en France
métropolitaine, en Martinique, à l’île Maurice, au Maroc et en Côte d’Ivoire. Il a été membre de la
délégation française au groupe d’experts, puis à la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le transfert
international de technologie. M. Daudet est secrétaire général de l’Académie de droit international
de La Haye et professeur émérite de l’Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), dont il a été premier
vice-président. Il a été désigné pour siéger en qualité de juge ad hoc dans l’affaire du Différend - 11 -
frontalier (Burkina Faso/Niger) et dans l’affaire relative à l’Obligation de négocier un accès à
l’océan Pacifique (Bolivie c. Chili). M. Daudet est par ailleurs membre du comité de rédaction de
l’Annuaire français de droit international, et membre de la Société française pour le droit
international et de la branche française de l’Association de droit international/International Law
Association. Il a publié de nombreux ouvrages et articles dans différents domaines du droit
international.
De nationalité américaine, M. Caron est titulaire d’un doctorat en droit international de
l’Université de Leyde et diplômé de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye. M. Caron est
doyen et professeur de la Dickson Poon School of Law du Kings’s College London depuis 2013. Il
a également été conférencier, directeur de recherche et directeur d’études auprès de l’Académie de
droit international de La Haye. M. Caron, qui a été président de l’American Society of
International Law de 2010 à 2012, est membre de l’Institut de droit international et, depuis 1991
(avec une interruption de trois années entre 2005 et 2008), membre du comité de rédaction de
l’American Journal of International Law. Il a également été président de l’Institute for
Transnational Arbitration et de la section de droit international de l’American Association of Law
Schools, membre du conseil exécutif de l’American Bar Association, section de droit international,
membre élu de l’American Law Institute, codirecteur de l’Institut du droit de la mer, et membre de
divers comités et groupes d’études de l’International Law Association. M. Caron exerce par
ailleurs les fonctions d’arbitre, de conseil principal et d’expert dans des arbitrages internationaux.
Il est spécialisé dans les questions maritimes et environnementales.
J’invite maintenant MM. Daudet et Caron à prendre l’engagement solennel prescrit par
l’article 20 du Statut et je demande à toutes les personnes présentes à l’audience de bien vouloir se
lever. Monsieur Daudet.
M. DAUDET :
«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes attributions de juge
en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et en toute conscience.»
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Daudet. Monsieur Caron. - 12 -
M. CARON :
“I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as judge
honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously.”
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Caron. Veuillez vous asseoir. La Cour prend
acte des déclarations solennelles faites par MM. Daudet et Caron.
*
Je rappellerai à présent les principales étapes de la procédure en l’espèce.
Le 26 novembre 2013, le Nicaragua a introduit une instance contre la Colombie au sujet d’un
différend relatif «aux violations des droits souverains et des espaces maritimes du Nicaragua qui lui
ont été reconnus par la Cour dans son arrêt du 19 novembre 2012 en l’affaire du Différend
territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), ainsi qu’à la menace de la Colombie de recourir à
la force pour commettre ces violations».
Pour fonder la compétence de la Cour, le Nicaragua invoque l’article XXXI du traité
américain de règlement pacifique signé le 30 avril 1948, dénommé officiellement «pacte de
Bogotá». Il souligne que le 27 novembre 2012, la Colombie a procédé à la dénonciation du pacte,
dénonciation qui, en application de l’article LVI de celui-ci, ne devait prendre effet, selon le
Nicaragua, qu’au terme d’un an, le pacte cessant ainsi de produire ses effets à l’égard de la
Colombie après le 27 novembre 2013. Le Nicaragua soutient que «[d]e surcroît et à titre
subsidiaire, la compétence de la Cour réside dans le pouvoir qui est le sien de se prononcer sur les
mesures requises par ses arrêts».
Par ordonnance du 3 février 2014, la Cour a fixé au 3 octobre 2014 la date d’expiration du
délai pour le dépôt du mémoire du Nicaragua et au 3 juin 2015 la date d’expiration du délai pour le
dépôt du contre-mémoire de la Colombie. Le Nicaragua a déposé son mémoire dans le délai
prescrit.
Le 19 décembre 2014, la Colombie, se référant à l’article 79 du Règlement, a soulevé
certaines exceptions préliminaires d’incompétence de la Cour. En conséquence, par ordonnance du - 13 -
19 décembre 2014, le président, considérant qu’en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe 5 de
l’article 79 du Règlement la procédure sur le fond était suspendue, et tenant dûment compte de
l’instruction de procédure V, a fixé au 20 avril 2015 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel le
Nicaragua pourrait présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclusions sur les
exceptions préliminaires soulevées par la Colombie. Le Nicaragua a déposé un tel exposé dans le
délai ainsi fixé, et l’affaire s’est ainsi trouvée en état pour ce qui est des exceptions préliminaires.
*
Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 53 de son Règlement, la Cour, après s’être
renseignée auprès des Parties, a décidé de rendre accessibles au public, à l’ouverture de la
procédure orale, des exemplaires des exceptions préliminaires et de l’exposé écrit sur ces
exceptions. En outre, conformément à la pratique de la Cour, l’ensemble de ces documents sera
placé dès aujourd’hui sur le site Internet de la Cour.
*
Je constate la présence à l’audience des agents, conseils et avocats des deux Parties.
Conformément aux dispositions relatives à l’organisation de la procédure arrêtées par la Cour, les
audiences comprendront un premier et un second tours de plaidoiries. Le premier tour de
plaidoiries débute aujourd’hui et se terminera le mardi 29 septembre. Chaque Partie disposera
d’une séance de trois heures. Le second tour de plaidoiries s’ouvrira le mercredi 30 septembre et
s’achèvera le vendredi 2 octobre. Chaque Partie disposera d’une séance de deux heures.
*
La Colombie, qui sera entendue en premier, pourra aujourd’hui, si besoin, déborder un peu
au-delà de 13 heures, compte tenu du temps consacré à ma déclaration liminaire et aux déclarations - 14 -
solennelles des juges ad hoc. Je donne à présent la parole à S. Exc. M. Arrieta Padilla, agent de la
Colombie. Monsieur l’agent, vous avez la parole.
Mr. ARRIETA:
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to address
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, as Agent of the Republic of Colombia. My
delegation’s task is to demonstrate that there is no jurisdiction in this case. Colombia does this
with the utmost respect, convinced that the Court will appreciate that a well-founded objection to
jurisdiction is an affirmation of confidence in the Court and in international law; but also
convinced that an invocation of the Court in circumstances in which there is manifestly no basis for
jurisdiction and no consent to jurisdiction is an abuse of international law and an abuse of the Court
itself.
2. I shall not comment on Nicaragua’s propensity to resort to the Court, or about its apparent
policy to use it as a first instance to solve matters with most of its neighbours that could have been
resolved by means of negotiation; but I would like simply to note that, on this particular occasion,
it has done so without any valid basis for jurisdiction whatsoever.
3. We agree with the proposition that “[r]ecourse to judicial settlement of legal disputes,
particularly referral to the International Court of Justice, should not be considered an unfriendly act
between States” , but we believe that the law-abiding status of a State is not measured in terms of
how many times it goes to court, but in terms of its good neighbourliness and its compliance with
international law. Colombia’s view, like that of the region, is that, as a matter of principle, judicial
settlement should only be resorted to when attempts at negotiation and other forms of direct
dialogue have been exhausted. Unfortunately, that has not occurred in this case.
4. Mr. President, I will not conceal my Government’s and my countrymen’s disappointment
with the maritime delimitation effected in the 2012 Judgment. It was, and continues to be, a source
of consternation, not only politically, but most painfully, from a human and social perspective.
This is particularly so for the inhabitants of the archipelago and especially for the Colombian
Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. Approved by the United Nations
General Assembly. Resolution No. 37/10 of 15 November 1982. - 15 -
Raizal people, whose symbiotic relationship with the sea, in which Nicaragua never had the
slightest presence, dates back centuries and who have always seen those areas as their ancestral
legacy and their birthright. The sketch-map included in the Court’s Judgment depicting the
maritime delimitation gave rise to serious concerns that the San Andrés Archipelago, which had
always been viewed as a national unit, had somehow been split apart, and that the local inhabitants,
who depend on the linkages between their islands for their living, had been deprived of access to
their traditional fishing grounds and, so, to a fundamental part of their cultural heritage. In
particular, the image of certain of Colombia’s islands as enclaves had a powerful psychological
effect and was resented by all Colombians.
5. But, notwithstanding, Colombia is absolutely committed to the rule of law, both internally
and externally. This is evidenced by our presence here today, to argue these preliminary
objections.
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Government of Colombia does not take lightly
Nicaragua’s grave accusations that our country has threatened to use force, or that Colombia has
failed to comply with your 2012 decision. We reject those accusations and, at the same time, we
are convinced that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain them, for the reasons which will be set
out in our preliminary objections, which will be further developed in these hearings. Yet, because
once preliminary objections have been raised the only depiction of events before the Court is that
presented by the Applicant, a few brief remarks correcting Nicaragua’s most serious
misrepresentations may be in order.
7. The Court will be relieved to know that the reality in the area could not differ more starkly
from Nicaragua’s account in its Application and Memorial. To date, there has not been one single
episode that could even come close to being construed as a breach of Colombia’s international
obligations, or as a threat or use of force in contravention of the United Nations Charter. It is
striking, really, to see how Nicaragua tries to portray itself as a victim.
8. Mr. President, Nicaragua’s Application came as a complete surprise and, quite frankly,
was very frustrating for Colombia, given the peaceful situation at sea and the Parties’ repeated
statements that they were intent on negotiating a treaty to implement the Judgment. Colombia is - 16 -
convinced that there was not and is not a dispute between the Parties, much, much less one that
could possibly form the basis of a case before this honourable institution.
9. Since November 2012, Colombia has been urging the negotiation and conclusion of a
treaty with Nicaragua, and has done everything necessary to incorporate the Court’s decision into
its legal system. In the same spirit, the Government filed a constitutional petition that ended with a
decision by our Constitutional Court, in which it ruled unambiguously that, pursuant to Article 94
of the Charter of the United Nations, judgments rendered by this International Court of Justice are
binding and cannot be disregarded .2
10. Colombia’s actions in the archipelago since November 2012 have had the purpose of
fulfilling its obligations in the area, protecting its archipelago and its people according to
international law. Not so Nicaragua. During the past two and a half years it has been unable to
control transnational crime in the area, it has failed to provide aid to local and international
navigation in the immediate vicinity of the archipelago, and it has tolerated some people’s fishing
practices, which have been undertaken using inhumane conditions and predatory methods which
threaten to break the delicate environmental balance of the San Andrés Archipelago.
11. Colombia has always believed that the post-judgment adjudication situation can be
addressed through good faith negotiations between the parties involved. It also believes that those
negotiations can lead to a treaty that implements the 2012 Judgment. As will be shown in these
proceedings, after the initial shock of the 2012 decision, all the actions of the Colombian
authorities have always been oriented toward the application of the decision and we have tried to
address those matters in a friendly and constructive manner.
12. Mr. President, as explained, Colombia’s denunciation of the Pact of Bogotá on
27 November had immediate effect with respect to the initiation of new procedures against
Colombia. Notwithstanding, Nicaragua filed its Application one year later, on 26 November 2013.
The timing of its Application was artificial and cynical. Not only was there no dispute at all at that
time, but Nicaragua had not even hinted to Colombia that they believed we were violating their
maritime spaces or threatening them with the use of force. Rather, Nicaragua files its Application
Preliminary Objections of Colombia (POC), Vol. II, Ann. 4, para. 9.10. - 17 -
on what it thought was the very last day, and, therefore, manufactured a dispute where none really
existed.
13. As noted by Colombia in its preliminary objections, Nicaragua’s case essentially
concerns Colombia’s compliance with the Judgment of 19 November 2012. This is clear from the
submissions set forth in the Application. Nevertheless, in line with its habit of evading the
consequences of weak arguments by changing its submissions throughout the proceedings,
Nicaragua has sought in its Memorial to distance itself from its initial formulation. But Nicaragua
has failed to change the true nature of the case. Indeed, the substance of its action is belied by two
fundamental facts: first, Colombia’s recognition that the Judgment is binding, as confirmed by our
Constitutional Court; and, second, Colombia’s continued availability and openness to dialogue has
been constant.
14. Now, Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court: it is important to explain what
was the actual situation as of the date of Nicaragua’s Application?
First, there were no complaints at all, of any kind from Nicaragua regarding Colombia’s
conduct prior to the lodging of its Application;
second, President Ortega himself had confirmed as much, and had even credited Colombia’s
President with the fact that the situation between the two countries at sea was calm and
peaceful;
third, Nicaragua’s senior military leaders has said that there had been no incidents at all at sea;
on the contrary, they repeatedly insisted that what was happening was a permanent
collaboration between the navies; and
fourth, the Heads of State of both countries were on record as repeatedly saying that the way to
deal with the maritime situation in the light of the Court’s 2012 decision was by means of
bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a treaty on a number of important matters. Those
include, among others, the protection of the historical fishing rights of the population,
environmental concerns including the all-important Seaflower Reserve, and the fight against
transnational crime, boundaries and other matters.
15. Now Mr. President, Members of the Court, pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 7, of the
Rules of Court, and Practice Direction VI, the statements and evidence that we will be presenting at - 18 -
these hearings will be confined to those matters that are relevant to the preliminary objections
raised by Colombia. We will not be entering into questions pertaining to the merits of the case and
hope that everyone will follow that rule.
16. Mr. President, Members of the Court, allow me now to outline the sequence of
Colombia’s first round of presentations. You can also find the order of these presentations under
tab 1 of the judges’ folders.
To begin with, Sir Michael Wood will explain why the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Pact
of Bogotá ratione temporis, which is Colombia’s first preliminary objection;
next, Mr. Rodman Bundy will present the facts which Colombia considers relevant for the
understanding of my country’s second and third preliminary objections;
following Mr. Bundy, Professor Michael Reisman will elaborate on Colombia’s second
objection: namely, that on the date of the filing of the Application, there was no dispute
between Nicaragua and Colombia with respect to the claims contained in the Application;
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina will then explain why, even if Article 31 of the Pact of Bogotá
was deemed to constitute a valid basis of jurisdiction, the precondition in its Article II had not
been fulfilled on the date of the filing of the Application, which is our third preliminary
objection;
and finally, Professor Tullio Treves will develop Colombia’s fourth and fifth preliminary
objections, according to which the Court has no inherent power or post-adjudicative
jurisdiction upon which Nicaragua can rely.
17. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and I would be
grateful if you would be so kind as to give the floor to Sir Michael Wood.
Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, Monsieur l’Agent. Je donne maintenant la parole à
Sir Michael Wood. - 19 -
Sir Michael WOOD:
F IRST PRELIMINARY OBJECTION : ARTICLE LVI OF THE PACT OF B OGOTÁ
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you, and it is a
special honour to do so on behalf of the Republic of Colombia.
2. As the Agent has just explained, I shall deal with Colombia’s first preliminary objection:
that the Court has no jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá because Nicaragua’s Application was
lodged after the transmission of Colombia’s notification of denunciation. This, we say, follows
clearly from the second paragraph of Article LVI of the Pact, a provision which Nicaragua largely
ignores.
3. Mr. President, Members of the Court, for convenience, the full text of the Pact of Bogotá,
in the four authentic languages (English, French, Portuguese and Spanish) is at the back of your
folders, at tabs 34 to 37. And Article LVI is also at tab 2, and is now, I hope, appearing on the
screen.
4. Article LVI reads:
“The present Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced
upon one year’s notice, at the end of which period it shall cease to be in force with
respect to the state denouncing it, but shall continue in force for the remaining
signatories. The denunciation shall be addressed to the Pan American Union, which
shall transmit it to the other Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures
initiated prior to the transmission of the particular notification.”
5. Mr. President, it is, of course, for the Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction, as is
clear from Article XXXIII of the Pact of Bogotá and was highlighted in your recent Judgment in
Bolivia v. Chile . The difference between the Parties turns on the interpretation of Article LVI, and
in particular on the interpretation of its second paragraph: “The denunciation shall have no effect
with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the transmission of the particular notification.”
6. That language could not be clearer and it is clear in all four authentic languages:
“procedures initiated prior to the transmission of the . . . notification”, not “procedures initiated
3Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, Judgment of
24 September 2015, para. 38. - 20 -
prior to the date when the Treaty ceased to be in force for the denouncing State”. The application
of the general rule of treaty interpretation reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties to Article LVI, taken as a whole, leads to only one conclusion: procedures that a
State may seek to initiate after the transmission of the notification are affected by the denunciation.
7. And this result is by no means unusual or surprising. When negotiating States intend that
jurisdiction remain for proceedings initiated between notice and the effective date, treaty practice
refers to the later date for jurisdictional purposes in clear and unambiguous terms. For example,
Article 40 (2) of the European Convention on State Immunity and Article 58 (2) of the European
5
Convention on Human Rights make express reference to the date on which denunciation takes
effect.
8. Nicaragua says that it “will demonstrate that Colombia’s strained reading of Article LVI
of the Pact of Bogotá militates against the object and purpose of the Pact (the settlement of disputes
efficiently and definitively), the principle of good faith and does not conform to the rules of treaty
interpretation”. It is striking, Mr. President, that the rules of treaty interpretation take third place in
Nicaragua’s thinking; the absence of any consideration of the “ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty” is remarkable. The rules of treaty interpretation are almost an afterthought, and
this is confirmed when one reads Chapter 2 of Nicaragua’s Written Statement. The conclusion
urged upon you by Nicaragua results from a misapplication of the accepted rules of treaty
interpretation. It ignores the actual wording of the second paragraph of Article LVI; it is
4European Convention on State Immunity, Art. 40:
“(1) Any Contracting State may, in so far as it is concerned, denounce this Convention by means
of notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. (2) Such denunciation shall
take effect six months after the date of receipt by the Secretary General of such notification. This
Convention shall, however, continue to apply to proceedings introduced before the date on which the
denunciation takes effect, and to judgments given in such proceedings.”
5
European Convention on Human Right, Art. 58 (1) and (2):
“1. A High Contracting Party may denounce the present Convention only after the expiry of five
years from the date on which it became a party to it and after six months’ notice contained in a
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, who shall inform the other High
Contracting Parties.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the High Contracting Party concerned
from its obligations under this Convention in respect of any act which, being capable of constituting a
violation of such obligations, may have been performed by it before the date at which the denunciation
became effective.” - 21 -
dismissive of the a contrario argument put forward by Colombia; and it deprives the second
paragraph of any effet utile.
9. Mr. President, to set the scene, I shall first say a few words about the Pact of Bogotá in
general, as well as about the practice of the parties to the Pact in the matter of denunciation. I shall
then address the central issue before you, the interpretation of Article LVI of the Pact in accordance
with the general rule of interpretation set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. And finally
I shall touch briefly on the travaux préparatoires of Article LVI.
The Pact of Bogotá: General
10. Mr. President, first a few words about the Pact of Bogotá. I am, of course, aware that
Members of the Court are very familiar with this instrument. I have noted, for example,
Judge Cançado Trindade’s account of the Pact in his separate opinion last week . 6
11. The Pact was concluded at Bogotá in 1948, during the Ninth International Conference of
the American States. It was undoubtedly a pioneering text. It was the culmination of a series of
agreements among the countries of the Americas, and the first to be open potentially to all of them.
The unique character of the Pact was plain to the negotiators in 1948. So far as concerns dispute
settlement, it went much further than the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS),
which itself only contained very general provisions.
12. The Pact contained far-reaching provisions whereby the parties consent to compulsory
dispute settlement. At the same time, however, the American States included important limitations
on those provisions, including the right to denounce the Pact with immediate effect upon consent to
jurisdiction.
13. We described the Pact of Bogotá in our written pleadings and today I shall only refer to
some salient features which need to be borne in mind when interpreting Article LVI.
14. The Pact has 60 articles divided into eight chapters. Chapters II through V deal with the
specific procedures of dispute settlement, including adjudication before this Court. The remaining
chapters contain important substantive obligations and undertakings.
6Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, Judgment of
24 September 2015; separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 54-58.
7POC, Vol. I, Chap. 3 and App. to Chap. 3 (Pact of Bogotá), paras. 3.5-3.7. - 22 -
15. For example, Article I contains a general yet central undertaking by the parties. It is now
on the screen. [The Pact itself is at tab 3.] As you will see, in this Article the parties reaffirm their
commitments in the United Nations Charter, and “agree to refrain from the threat or the use of
force, or from any other means of coercion for the settlement of their controversies, and to have
recourse at all times to pacific procedures.
16. Under Article II of the Pact, the parties are obligated to settle their international disputes
by regional procedures before referring them to the United Nations Security Council. Giving
priority to regional procedures was a matter of great importance to the American States, which of
course is reflected in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
17. In addition, Article II limits the parties’ consent to jurisdiction to disputes that could “not
be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels”. My colleague,
Mr. Valencia-Ospina, will address this point shortly.
18. Article VIII, also in Chapter I, protects the right of individual or collective self-defence
in the event of an armed attack as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.
19. The commitment of American States to the newly formed United Nations, in 1948, to the
non-use of force, to the right of self-defence under the Charter, and their commitment to regional
settlement before going to the Security Council, are hardly secondary matters under the Pact,
particularly when viewed in their historical context in 1948.
20. Article VII contains an important undertaking of the parties to limit their use of the right
of diplomatic protection vis-à-vis each other.
21. Article L shows that where it is alleged that a party to the Pact has failed to comply with
an ICJ judgment or arbitral award, it is not the role of the Court to monitor compliance, a matter
that Professor Treves will deal with later this morning. Rather, the article provides that
consultations between the relevant OAS foreign ministers are to be convened before resorting to an
outside mechanism, such as the United Nations Security Council.
22. Article LI states that the parties may agree to petition the United Nations
General Assembly or the Security Council to request an advisory opinion by this Court on a legal
issue, a request they shall submit through the OAS Council. - 23 -
23. Mr. President, I hope it is clear, from what I have said, that, in addition to the specific
procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Pact also contains substantive rights and
obligations of the utmost importance in inter-State relations. While the dispute settlement
procedures are important, so too are the substantive rights and obligations set forth in the Pact.
Denunciation practice under the Pact
24. I now turn to the denunciation practice under the Pact of Bogotá. The Pact currently has
14 Contracting Parties, out of the 35 members of the OAS. Two States El Salvador in 1973 and
Colombia in 2012 have denounced the Pact. You will find the original Spanish text of
El Salvador’s denunciation, with translations, at tab 4 in the folders. It is similar to Colombia’s
denunciation, in stating that the denunciation “will begin to take effect as of today”; “prend effet à
compter de ce jour”. No party to the Pact lodged any objection with the OAS to the terms of
El Salvador’s denunciation, or, indeed, reacted in any way within the OAS or elsewhere. Nor did
the OAS Secretariat express any reservations over the terms of the denunciation . 8
25. I now turn to Colombia’s denunciation of the Pact. You will find this at tab 5, and it is
coming up on the screen. On 27 November 2012, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia
transmitted to the depositary, the General Secretariat of the OAS, a notification of denunciation
pursuant to Article LVI of the Pact. The notification stated, and here I quote:
“that the Republic of Colombia denounces as of today the ‘American Treaty on
Pacific Settlement’” .9
The Minister for Foreign Affairs added unequivocally, citing the second paragraph of Article LVI,
that Colombia’s denunciation of the Pact took effect, and I quote:
8See also POC, paras. 3.31-3.32.
9POC, Vol. II, Ann. 15. The original text in Spanish reads:
“Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Su Excelencia, de conformidad con el artículo LVI del
Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas, con ocasión de dar aviso a la Secretaria General de la
Organización de Estados Americanos, a su digno cargo, como sucesora de la Unión Panamericana,
que la República de Colombia denuncia a partir de la fecha el ‘Tratado Americano de Soluciones
Pacíficas’, suscrito el 30 de abril de 1948 y cuyo instrumento de ratificación fue depositado por
Colombia el 6 de noviembre de 1968.
La denuncia del Tratado Americano de Soluciones Pacíficas rige a partir del día de hoy
respecto de los procedimientos que se inicien después del presente aviso, de conformidad con el
párrafo segundo del artículo LVI el cual señala que ‘La denuncia no tendrá efecto alguno sobre los
procedimientos pendientes iniciados antes de transmitido el aviso respectivo’.” - 24 -
“as of today with regard to the procedures that are initiated after the present notice, in
conformity with Article LVI, second paragraph, providing that ‘[t]he denunciation
shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures initiated prior to the
transmission of the particular notification’”.
26. The following day, the Secretariat for Legal Affairs of the OAS informed the Contracting
Parties to the Pact and the Permanent Missions of the other Member States of the OAS that on
27 November 2012 it had received the Colombian Note by which Colombia “denounced” the Pact
of Bogotá . No State party to the Pact including Nicaragua reacted in any way.
27. And yet it was one year later, on 26 November 2013, that Nicaragua filed its Application
in the current case, seeking to base the Court’s jurisdiction on the Pact of Bogotá.
Interpretation of Article LVI: General Rule of Interpretation
(Art. 31 VCLT)
28. Mr. President, Members of the Court, these facts are not disputed. What divides the
Parties is the legal effect of the transmission of Colombia’s notification. I now turn to the text of
the Pact, and in particular to Article LVI, second paragraph, to show that the transmission of
Colombia’s notification of denunciation terminated its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court with
immediate effect.
29. I must first recall the precise terms of Article LVI. As I have said, it is at tab 2, and it is
on the screen, and I would recall in particular the second paragraph:
“The denunciation shall have no effect with respect to pending procedures
initiated prior to the transmission of the particular notification.”
The key words are “transmission” and “notification”. The paragraph specifies the date of
transmission of the notification as the key date. It distinguishes between procedures initiated
before the date of transmission and those that might be sought to be initiated after that date.
30. I think that there is agreement that the applicable rules of interpretation are the customary
rules set forth in the Vienna Convention .11
31. And I need not recall the terms of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, though our
friends opposite seem largely to ignore it. Nicaragua indeed invites you to overlook the ordinary
meaning to be given to the actual terms of Article LVI, and instead have regard to its own
1POC, Vol. II, Ann. 16.
1Written Statement of Nicaragua (WSN), para. 2.6. - 25 -
subjective view of the object and purpose of the Pact and to its own peculiar notion of the
application in this case of the principle of good faith.
12
32. In its Written Statement and in its Memorial , Nicaragua claims to apply the rules of
treaty interpretation, but in fact, it disregards the ordinary meaning of the words actually used in the
second paragraph of Article LVI. Instead, it starts by addressing what it terms “the relationship
13
between Article XXXI and Article LVI” and then it addresses Article LVI, but only its first
paragraph . Nicaragua then moves swiftly on to apply its distorted version of the law to the facts,
15
followed by a short discussion of the object and purpose of the Pact to bolster its argument .
33. It is only later, when attempting to show the validity of its interpretation of Article LVI,
paragraph 1, that Nicaragua sees it fit to mention that Article LVI comprises two paragraphs. In
this way, it attempts to make the case that the second paragraph does not sit well with its own
interpretation of the first paragraph, which interpretation at this point is treated by Nicaragua as set
in stone.
34. But that is not how treaty interpretation works. You cannot interpret a treaty by first
discarding one paragraph that you do not like and then feign surprise when that paragraph does not
fit your subjective and partial views, views based on ignoring half of the relevant provision. That
is the fundamental flaw in Nicaragua’s position.
35. Colombia, on the contrary, has provided the Court with a proper interpretation of the
Pact, giving due effect to all of its relevant terms, interpreted in good faith and in the light of its
16
object and purpose .
36. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I shall now apply the general rule of treaty
interpretation to Article LVI , but at the same time address Nicaragua’s arguments . Let us 18
therefore start with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of Article LVI.
12
Memorial of Nicaragua (MN), para. 1.18; WSN, para. 2.6.
13WSN, paras. 2.7-2.8.
14WSN, paras. 2.9-2.10.
15
WSN, para. 2.11.
16
POC, paras. 3.14-3.57.
17POC, paras. 3.14-3.32.
18WSN, paras. 2.6-2.40. - 26 -
37. The first paragraph sets out the right of a State party to denounce the Pact, and the steps
it must take to exercise that right. A notification of denunciation is to be addressed to the
Secretary-General of the OAS (originally the Pan American Union), who then transmits the
notification to the other parties to the Pact. That is what happened in the present case, on 27 and
28 November 2012 respectively. Thereafter, the substantive obligations under the Pact continue
until the expiry of one year.
38. Then comes the second paragraph of the article. I will not read it again.
39. Mr. President, Nicaragua does everything it can to avoid dealing with the actual text of
the second paragraph. But the ordinary meaning of the text leaves no room for doubt. It is clear
from the text that procedures initiated after the transmission of the notification are not protected
from the effect of denunciation. The drafters, conscious of the need to protect procedures already
instituted before the transmission of the notification, stated that such procedures were not affected.
40. The two paragraphs of Article LVI have to be read together. The first paragraph
provides that denunciation as regards to the Pact’s substantive obligations such as those that I
referred to regarding non-use of force, the obligation to settle disputes peacefully, the obligation to
have recourse to the Meeting of Consultation takes effect after the expiry of the one year’s
notice. The second paragraph concerns the parts of the Pact dealing with specific procedures for
the peaceful settlement of disputes, namely Chapters II to V. It distinguishes between procedures
initiated prior to transmission of the notification of denunciation and those that might be initiated
after transmission of the notification. By virtue of the second paragraph, denunciation has no effect
on the former. But procedures that were not initiated prior to the transmission are not saved by the
second paragraph.
41. This interpretation, based upon the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms actually
used, allows the whole article, not just part of it, to have an effet utile, which is a fundamental
principle of treaty interpretation. Nicaragua is simply wrong when it asserts that Colombia’s
interpretation deprives the first paragraph of any meaning. It is Nicaragua’s interpretation that
deprives the second paragraph of any or all effet utile.
42. Mr. President, I now turn to two arguments made by Nicaragua. First, and I confess I
have not fully grasped this argument, Nicaragua makes the bold assertion that what it dismissively - 27 -
terms “the one-sentence second paragraph of Article LVI” “cannot defeat the Court’s jurisdiction
under Article XXXI and the first paragraph of Article LVI”; (those were its words). Article XXXI
is at tab 8 in the folders, and is now on the screen. Article XXXI as Members of the Court are
well aware is a treaty provision whereby the parties to the Pact accept the jurisdiction of the
Court in terms similar to the optional clause of the Court’s Statute.
43. Contrary to Nicaragua’s theory, the first paragraph of Article LVI says nothing about
consent to jurisdiction. It simply concerns the modalities of denunciation: how, addressed to
whom, when.
44. Nicaragua asserts that the second paragraph of Article LVI, and I quote, “does not
address ‘pending procedures’ initiated after a notice of denunciation has been circulated” and that
“Colombia’s a contrario reading of the paragraph . . . cannot stand against the express language of
Articles XXXI and LVI, first paragraph, which ensure the effectiveness of Colombia’s acceptance
of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction for twelve months after notification has been given.” That is
the end of the quote from Nicaragua.
45. This argument that the general provisions of Articles XXXI and LVI, first paragraph,
somehow trump the specific intent of the second paragraph of Article LVI would deprive the
second paragraph of its intended purpose and of all effet utile. It would lead to the remarkable
position that the Parties considered it necessary to state expressly that procedures initiated before
transmission of the notification would continue, but remained silent about procedures initiated after
transmission of the notification yet somehow intended that they too would continue. How could
the drafters have considered it necessary to make express provision in the first case, when one
might indeed have expected the procedures to continue, but then remained silent in the second case,
when the position would have been much less clear?
46. Nicaragua relies on the words “so as long as the present Treaty is in force” in
Article XXXI of the Pact. While ignoring the second paragraph of Article LVI, Nicaragua invokes
this short phrase in Article XXXI to bolster its claim that consent to jurisdiction subsists for
applications made during the one-year period following the transmission of the notification . 19
1WSN, paras. 2.16-2.18. - 28 -
47. Mr. President, the general terms of the treaty-based consent to jurisdiction under
Article XXXI cannot override the express terms of Article LVI, which specifically addresses the
effect of transmitting the notification of denunciation, and its second paragraph in particular, which
specifically deals with the question of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes following
such transmission. Article LVI is the governing provision, not Article XXXI.
48. In order to make its argument based on Article XXXI sound more plausible, Nicaragua,
characteristically perhaps, avoids citing the relevant sentence in full. The sentence in question
states that the jurisdiction exists “without the necessity of any special agreement so long as the
present Treaty is in force”. The purpose of this clause is to emphasize that consent to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the Pact does not require a special
agreement, a compromis. Its purpose is not to address the extent of the consent ratione temporis.
Its purpose is not to qualify or override the ordinary meaning of Article LVI, second paragraph. If
one reads the two provisions together, it is clear that the words “so long as the present treaty is in
force” mean, and can only mean, for so long as the relevant provisions of the Pact are in force in
accordance with their terms. Read thus, there is no inconsistency between Article XXXI and
Article LVI.
49. Nicaragua makes another argument based on its subjective view of the object and
purpose. Dispute settlement by the Court remains subject to the consent of States. However, as
Colombia explained in Chapter 3 of its Preliminary Objections , the object and purpose of
Article LVI is to set out the modalities and effects of denunciation. When progress is made in
terms of consent to adjudication in international law, States often insist on safeguards. Article LVI
of the Pact of Bogotá is just such a safeguard, and is fundamental to the structure and acceptability
of the Pact. Without an effective denunciation clause, the far-reaching provisions on peaceful
settlement of disputes, whether through this Court or otherwise, would not have been acceptable to
States.
50. There is nothing unusual about the fact that States are willing to consent to the
jurisdiction of the Court, but reserve their right to terminate such consent with immediate effect.
2POC, paras. 3.23-3.32. - 29 -
We see this with the optional clause and as one author has explained, this is “the price to be paid
for adherence by States to the optional clause. And it corresponds to the logic of a jurisdictional
system which is still largely based on unfettered sovereignty.” 21 [Available only in English.]
Interpretation of Article LVI: Supplementary Means of Interpretation
(Art. 32 VCLT)
51. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will now turn very briefly to the travaux
préparatoires of Article LVI of the Pact. Nicaragua in its wisdom has chosen to dismiss
summarily our account of the travaux préparatoires. At paragraphs 3.33 to 3.52 of our written
Preliminary Objections, we set out fully the relevant travaux préparatoires. These confirm that the
drafters of the Pact consciously chose to word Article LVI so as to limit with immediate effect the
initiation of new procedures against the denouncing States, including recourse to this Court, upon
the transmission of the notification of denunciation.
52. Nicaragua, in its Written Statement, argues that the meaning of Article LVI is identical to
that of Article 9 of the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration of 1929 . Mr. President,
Members of the Court, that is simply not the case. The language, of what later became, almost
word for word, the second paragraph of Article LVI, was added to the negotiating text, as we
explained in the written Preliminary Objections, in 1938 upon a proposal by the United States of
America . It did not exist in the 1929 Treaty. That this was a new issue was highlighted in the
text circulated, and was explained orally by Legal Adviser to the United States State Department,
24
Mr. Hackworth .
53. Despite this, Nicaragua asserts that the meaning of the text remained identical over the
20 years between 1929 and 1948. Had the text not been changed, Nicaragua would be right! But
the text was changed, attention was drawn to the change and the meaning of the draft Article was
altered accordingly.
2C. Tomuschat, “Article 36”, in A. Zimmermann et al., The Statute of the International Court of Justice. A
Commentary, 2nd ed., 2012, p. 678; MN 74.
2WSN, para. 2.37.
23
POC, Ann. 25 at p. 5.
24
Ibid., Ann. 24, Art. XXII at p. 203. - 30 -
Conclusion
54. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in short, it is Colombia’s submission that, in
accordance with the terms of Article LVI of the Pact of Bogotá, properly interpreted, the Court
does not have jurisdiction in respect of the proceedings commenced by Nicaragua on
26 November 2013. This is because the Application was lodged after the transmission of
Colombia’s notification of denunciation, which had immediate effect as regards new applications.
55. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes what I have to say and I thank you
for your attention. I request that you invite Mr. Rodman Bundy to the podium, to continue our
pleadings. Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne maintenant la parole à M. Rodman Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is, as always, a great
honour to appear before you today and again on behalf of the Republic of Colombia.
T HE FACTS RELEVANT TO COLOMBIA ’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
Introduction
1. Now the Court will recall that Colombia’s second preliminary objection is that, prior to
the filing of Nicaragua’s Application on 26 November 2013, there was no dispute between the
Parties with respect to the claims advanced in the Application that could trigger the dispute
resolution provisions of the Pact, including the Court’s jurisdiction . Colombia’s third objection is
that, even if a dispute could be said to exist, quod non, the Parties were not of the opinion that it
could not be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels. That is another
precondition contained in Article II of the Pact that must be satisfied before the dispute resolution
provisions can be resorted to .
2. My task this morning is to address the facts that are relevant to these two objections.
Professor Reisman and Mr. Valencia-Ospina will come back later to discuss the legal consequences
of the facts for jurisdictional purposes.
25POC, paras. 4.10-4.20.
26POC, paras. 4.21-4.73. - 31 -
3. Both Parties agree that the critical date for assessing whether a dispute existed and, if so,
whether the precondition of Article II of the Pact had also been fulfilled, is 26 November 2013, the
27
date of the filing of the Application . And as I will show, prior to that date there was not a whisper
of complaint from Nicaragua about Colombia’s conduct. In fact, Nicaragua’s highest military
officials had said precisely the opposite that there were no incidents or problems. Moreover,
senior political leaders on both sides, including the Heads of State of Nicaragua and Colombia,
were on record as saying that the implementation of the 2012 Judgment, and any related issues,
could be achieved through discussions with a view to reaching a treaty. That scarcely suggests
that, when Nicaragua abruptly filed its Application in November 2013, a dispute had arisen, let
alone one that could not be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels. In
fact, it was not until 13 September 2014 that is almost ten months after the Application was
filed that Nicaragua, for the first time, made any complaint to Colombia about alleged violations
of its maritime spaces or threats of the use of force.
The facts placed in their proper perspective
Prior to the Application, there was no dispute and, in any event,
the Parties were open to negotiations
4. The Judgment in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute case was rendered on
19 November 2012. And Nicaragua refers to the fact that, on that day, Colombia’s President
Juan Manuel Santos declared that the Judgment was “not applicable” and that, with respect to the
enclaving of two of Colombia’s islands, Colombia “rejects this aspect of the decision issued today”
(emphasis added) . Apparently, Nicaragua considers that these words somehow evidence the
existence not only of a dispute between the Parties, but one that could not be settled by
negotiations.
5. Regrettably, Nicaragua only filed a truncated English translation of the statement made by
President Santos, which gives a very misleading picture of what he actually said. I would
2POC, paras. 4.7-4.8; WSN, para. 4.31.
2WSN, paras. 3.6-3.7.
29
Ibid., paras. 4.34 and 4.35. - 32 -
respectfully invite the Court to read the complete version that was filed as Annex 6 to Colombia’s
preliminary objections, which places the President’s remarks in their proper context.
6. What actually happened is that, on 19 November 2012, President Santos discussed the
Judgment fully and frankly. It is true that the enclaving of Colombia’s islands was met with
disappointment in Colombia, especially given the historical unity of the San Andrés Archipelago
and Colombia’s presence in that area. But despite this, President Santos went on to emphasize not
once, but three times, that Colombia “respects the law”, that Colombia “will not discard any
recourse or mechanism available to us in international law, to defend our rights”, and that “[y]ou
may be sure that we shall act with respect for the law as has been our tradition . . .”. The
President also drew attention to a point mentioned by Colombia’s Agent earlier this morning:
namely, that he, as President, had a duty to respect Colombia’s Constitution, Article 101 of which
provides that boundaries must be established or modified by means of a treaty a process that
necessarily entails the need for negotiations.
7. Those statements of President Santos cannot possibly be read as closing the door to
negotiations with Nicaragua, and equally importantly Nicaragua did not view them as such. To the
contrary, in the months that followed, the political leaders of both States made it clear that the best
manner to deal with the situation arising out of the Judgment was via bilateral negotiations and the
conclusion of a treaty.
8. At the beginning of December 2012, Presidents Santos and Ortega met in Mexico City.
Two days earlier, Nicaragua’s President had declared that: “I want to shake hands with
President Santos and say that I and the people of Nicaragua [want] to fix this situation as fraternally
as brothers . . .” . For his part, President Santos immediately went on record after the Mexico City
meeting as follows:
“We expressed that we should handle this situation with cold head[s], in an
amicable and diplomatic fashion, as this type of matters must be dealt with to avoid
incidents. He [President Ortega] also understood.” 31
3MN, Ann. 31.
3POC, Ann. 9. - 33 -
President Santos then added: “The way to settle this type of situations is through
dialogue” , and “[i]f there is a problem, we will call each other” . 33
9. The Parties’ mutual intention to resolve matters relating to the Judgment bilaterally was
confirmed shortly afterwards. On 13 January 2013, Colombia’s Foreign Minister,
María Ángela Holguín, referred to the fact that a meeting had been held with President Ortega in
order “to open a dialogue and a door to avoid any confrontation and to establish a communication
channel” . One month later, President Ortega indicated that he would invite Colombia to establish
joint commissions to deal with the implementation of the Judgment. President Ortega also
confirmed that, in his discussions with President Santos in Mexico and during the Summit of
Latin American States in Chile, the two leaders, and I quote for President Ortega “had always
spoken of taking joint measures” . 35
10. In the meantime, the situation at sea was calm. For example, on 5 December 2012, the
Chief of Nicaragua’s Army, General Avilés, confirmed that Nicaragua was in communication with
36
the Colombian authorities, and that “there has been no boarding to fishing vessels” . In short,
there were no complaints emanating from Nicaragua in connection with the events at sea, and
channels of communication had been established at both the political and military levels.
11. That situation persisted throughout 2013. On 14 August 2013, President Ortega gave a
37
speech on the occasion of the 33rd Anniversary of Nicaragua’s naval forces . Not only did he
repeat that Nicaragua sought a dialogue with Colombia, he also stated that, despite what he called
the “media turbulence” and I think we have all seen media turbulence:
“[W]e must recognize that . . . the Naval Force of Colombia, which is very
powerful, that certainly has a very large military power, has been careful, has been
respectful and there has not been any kind of confrontation between the Colombian
and Nicaraguan Navy”.
President Ortega then continued:
3POC, Ann. 35.
33
WSN, Ann. 5.
3POC, Ann. 37.
3MN, Ann. 35 [available only in English]; see also POC, para. 4.50.
36
POC, Ann. 36, and see also Ann. 37.
3POC, para. 4.52. - 34 -
“And I [that is, President Ortega] am convinced that, the one who . . . has
determined that pacific activity is President Juan Manuel Santos. I am convinced, we
hope that this will continue in the same manner until we can reach the dialogue, reach
the negotiations so as to conclude the definitive agreements to apply the judgment
rendered by the Court in the month of November of last year. We are totally so
38
disposed.”
12. On the Colombian side, Foreign Minister Holguín responded positively to
President Ortega’s proposal for dialogue. On 10 September 2013, she stated that: “We would like
39
to speak with Nicaragua on a path toward a treaty”, and that, “[o]ur doors are undoubtedly open” .
Two days later, Nicaragua’s National Assembly endorsed President Ortega’s intention to engage in
a dialogue with Colombia to find mechanisms to the conclusion of a treaty with respect to the
40
Judgment .
13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, far from evidencing the existence of a dispute, let
alone one that could not be resolved by negotiations as Nicaragua alleges, those statements showed
a common desire by both Parties, just a few weeks before Nicaragua lodged its Application, to
resolve any matters relating to the Judgment by the negotiation of an appropriate treaty.
14. In its Written Statement, Nicaragua acknowledges that the Parties were open to
negotiations. However, it tries to explain away the relevance of this by contending that this
expressed openness did not concern the subject-matter of this dispute, which Nicaragua says is one
involving alleged violations of its maritime rights and the threat of the use of force . 41
15. That is an exercise in semantics that gains no traction. Prior to the deposit of
Nicaragua’s Application and even for a significant period afterwards there was no dispute
over any alleged violations of Nicaragua’s maritime spaces, or concerning a threat of the use of
force, that could have formed the basis of negotiations. That is because there were no claims from
Nicaragua at all; only statements from its political and military leaders that the situation was calm,
respectful and without incident. So, by the same token, there was no response by Colombia that
could have given rise to the level of a dispute.
38
POC, Ann. 11.
3WSN, Ann. 8.
4MN, Ann. 40.
41
WSN, para. 4.60. - 35 -
16. And indeed, even after Colombia proclaimed an Integral Contiguous Zone by
Presidential Decree No. 1946 on 9 September 2013 a decree that Nicaragua harps on in its
written pleadings Nicaragua did not raise any objections. The first time Nicaragua ever referred
to this zone was when it filed its Application in the case . 42
17. Nicaragua also claims that the public statements that were made by various officials
about matters that could form the basis of a treaty were unrelated to Nicaragua’s rights as
43
determined by the Court in its 2012 Judgment . But this too is incorrect. On 10 September 2013,
President Ortega himself expressed a willingness to reach a treaty with Colombia. As a published
report of President Ortega’s remarks indicated and noted at the time: “The ‘treaty’ proposed by the
Nicaraguan president to Colombia must include agreements for fishing, the environment, the fight
against drug trafficking ‘and all that applies in this area, which has already been decided by the
44
Court,’ . . .” . The reference to “all that applies in this area”, which has already been decided by
the Court, would obviously have included any Nicaraguan concerns it might have had relating to
the implementation of the Judgment, to the extent such concerns actually existed.
18. On 12 September 2013, Colombia’s President filed an application with the Colombian
Constitutional Court requesting the Court the Constitutional Court to rule on the
constitutionality of the dispute resolution provisions of the Pact of Bogotá in so far as the
determination of Colombia’s boundaries was concerned . That application focused on whether a
treaty was required in order to modify or establish a maritime boundary under Article 101 of
Colombia’s Constitution that is, as a matter of internal law.
19. Nicaragua argues that this step indicated that Colombia was of the opinion that no
negotiation was possible because Colombia wanted to await the Constitutional Court’s decision
before taking any further action . That contention is groundless. Not only did the step taken by
President Juan Manuel Santos provide a sound constitutional basis for continuing with diplomatic
42Application, paras. 10 et seq.
43WSN, para. 4.61.
44POC, Ann. 40.
45
POC, Ann. 2.
46POC, paras. 2.40-2.46, and see Anns. 2 and 4 thereto.
47WSN, paras. 4.44-4.45. - 36 -
negotiations, Nicaragua itself, in its written statement, filed a press report referring to the fact that
President Santos said, “in the meantime the government [Colombian Government] will try to
secure a new treaty with Nicaragua that satisfies both countries” . In the meantime. Indeed, the
day after the application to Colombia’s Constitutional Court was filed, Nicaragua’s President
restated his willingness to create a bilateral commission through which the Parties could work
together to conclude a treaty on the implementation of the Judgment . Nicaragua clearly had no
issue with the Constitutional Court proceedings in Colombia.
20. On 18 November 2013, that is just eight days before Nicaragua filed its Application
eight days the Chief of Nicaragua’s naval forces, Admiral Corrales Rodriguez, in response to a
question whether there had been any incidents, any conflicts with Colombia at sea, said the
following, and I quote just eight days before the Application: “There have not been any
conflicts and that is why I want to highlight that in one year of being there we have not had any
50
problems with the Colombian Navy.”
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court. That was the situation that existed when
Nicaragua filed its Application on 26 November 2013. There was no claim by Nicaragua that
51
could have been “positively opposed” by Colombia. And there was no dispute between the
Parties regarding either Colombia’s compliance with the Judgment or any of the events that
Nicaragua now complains of. To the contrary, the Parties had made it crystal clear that they were
in favour of negotiating a treaty to deal with the post-Judgment situation.
After the Application, both Governments still did not consider that there was a dispute and,
in any event, the Parties were open to negotiations
22. Even after Nicaragua filed its Application, its political leaders continued to declare that
negotiation of a treaty with Colombia was a Nicaraguan priority. On 29 January 2014, for
4WSN, Ann. 7.
4POC, Ann. 41.
50
POC, para. 4.53; Vol. II, Ann. 43 thereto, p. 355.
5South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 328. - 37 -
example, President Ortega stated that, together with President Santos, they had concluded that the
52
two States would sign agreements with respect to boundaries .
23. And, as I have said, for its part, Colombia required the conclusion of such a treaty as a
matter of domestic law and that was confirmed by the Constitutional Court’s ruling handed down
in May 2014, in which the Colombian Constitutional Court stated:
“[T]he decisions rendered by the International Court of Justice, on the basis of
the jurisdiction recognized by Colombia through Article XXXI of the Pact, cannot be
disregarded, in conformity with what is prescribed in Article 94 of the Charter of the
United Nations.” 53
Colombia’s Agent mentioned this earlier. The Constitutional Court also held that decisions of the
International Court of Justice with respect to boundaries had to be incorporated into domestic law
in the manner provided for by Article 101 of the Constitution: that is, by means of treaties.
24. One week later, Nicaragua’s President reiterated the need to establish a bilateral
commission “so [that] a treaty can come out of it that will allow us to respect, and put in practice
54
the judgment by the ICJ” . Thus, far from indicating that the Parties somehow stood on the brink
of a dispute, the record shows both before the filing of the Application and afterwards, that they
continued to be ready and willing to negotiate a treaty.
25. In the meantime, Nicaragua’s General Avilés, whom I referred to a minute ago, had
again confirmed that, according to the permanent communications that had been put in place
between the two countries’ navies and I quote from Nicaragua’s General “the area remains
without incidents” . This statement, which was made in March 2014, repeated what Nicaragua’s
military commanders had said before. It underscores the artificiality of the Application that
Nicaragua filed in November 2013, alleging that a dispute existed over violations of Nicaragua’s
maritime spaces and the threat of the use of force. That is completely contradicted by Nicaragua’s
own senior most military commanders.
26. Mr. President, it was only on 13 September 2014 that was almost ten months after the
Application was deposited and on Nicaragua’s interpretation of the Pact of Bogatá, ten months
52
POC, Ann. 45.
5POC, Ann. 4, para. 9.10.
5MN, Ann. 46. [Only available in English]
55
POC, Ann. 46. - 38 -
after Colombia’s denunciation of the Pact took effect that Nicaragua sent a Note Verbale to
Colombia which, for the first time, referred to any alleged infringements of Nicaragua’s sovereign
rights . That Note attached a list of so-called “incidents”, none of which had ever been referred to
before, and all of which were directly contradicted by the repeated assurances of the chiefs of
Nicaragua’s armed forces that there had not been a single incident at sea between the date of the
Court’s Judgment and the filing of the Application in November 2013 and, indeed, up until at least
March 2014, four months after the Application.
27. In these circumstances, Mr. President, distinguished Members, it cannot credibly be said
as a matter of fact that, as of 26 November 2013, there was a dispute between the Parties over the
events now complained of by Nicaragua. Nor does the record show that the Parties were of the
opinion that, to the extent a dispute somehow existed, it could not be settled by direct negotiations
through the usual diplomatic channels. Senior leaders of both countries had repeatedly emphasized
the desire to negotiate a treaty or treaties relating to the post-Judgment situation.
28. Mr. President, that concludes my presentation. I thank the Court for its courtesy and
attention, and I would ask whether, I am not sure after the coffee break or now, the floor could next
be given to Professor Reisman. Thank you very much,
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Bundy. La Cour va maintenant marquer une pause
de 15 minutes. L’audience est suspendue.
L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 25 à 11 h 40
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience reprend et je donne maintenant la
parole au professeur Michael Reisman. Monsieur le professeur.
Mr. REISMAN:
S ECOND PRELIMINARY OBJECTION : ABSENCE OF A DISPUTE
1. Thank you Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear
before you on behalf of the Republic of Colombia. My assignment is to explain why even if the
56POC, Ann. 17. - 39 -
Court were to find jurisdiction ratione temporis, whether under the Pact of Bogotá or under
Nicaragua’s second basis of jurisdiction Nicaragua’s claims would still fail your jurisdictional
requirements because they were not the subject-matter of a dispute at the time of application.
2. The law on this matter may be briefly summarized:
first, even if a putative respondent State is deemed to have consented to jurisdiction, that
jurisdiction is effective for a specific case only if there is a dispute;
second, the existence of a dispute is not determined by the subjective assumption of the
Applicant but is a matter for “objective determination” by the Court;
third, an objective determination of a dispute requires that the Applicant have indicated to the
Respondent, by some modality, the content of its claim, whether legal or factual, and,
reciprocally, that the Respondent have indicated, by some modality, its rejection of the claim;
and
fourth, the critical date for determining the objective existence of the dispute is that of the filing
of the Application.
3. It is hardly necessary to multiply authorities for the law here. From Peace Treaties on, the
Court has repeatedly confirmed that that there must be a dispute and that it is the Court which
makes the “objective determination” . As for the critical date for determining the objective
existence of a dispute as a condition for jurisdiction the Court held in Arrest Warrant: “The
Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its jurisdiction must be determined at the
58
time that the act instituting proceedings was filed.”
57Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion:
I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 270-271, para. 55;
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 476, para. 58; Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 84, para 30.
58Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 12-13, para. 26. The Court has emphasized that even for admissibility, the critical date is the
date of filing. Thus, the Court held in its 1988 Judgment on Border and Transborder Armed Actions: “The critical date
for determining the admissibility of an application is the date on which it is filed.” Border and Transborder Armed
Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports, 1988, p. 95, para. 66. The Court
maintained this view in the subsequent cases of Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I. C.J., Reports 1998 pp. 25-26, paras. 42-44; Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2011, pp. 84-85, para. 30; and Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.
Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J., Reports 2012, pp. 442 and 444-445, paras 46 and 54. - 40 -
4. Now, making an objective determination is challenging in the contemporary arena, when
many States are democratic and have rich communications ecologies. Then their robust internal
politics may produce a discordant chorus of many voices from different branches executive,
legislative and judicial from different departments and from different political factions. Some
of the voices may be speaking to domestic audiences while others are vying to shape a national
political policy rather than authoritatively addressing an external audience, as French authorities
59
did in Nuclear Tests . Equally relevant is the moment in time when the voices make themselves
heard: some of those voices may reflect initial disappointment with a judgment, to be succeeded
by acceptance of it.
5. When there is a chorus of domestic voices, an objective determination naturally looks, in
60
particular, to those of the respective chief executives, as you held in Georgia v. Russia . Common
views of the executives of both States on policy matters are particularly probative. Statements
made by military officials as to facts in their domain of expertise are probative as facts, as the
Court held in Congo v. Uganda . 61
6. Mr. President, Nicaragua’s Application fails all of these requirements. As I will explain in
a moment, the record, when fairly and “objectively” read, shows confirmation of such shared views
by the Presidents of Colombia and Nicaragua, a fact which belies the assertion that there was an
objective dispute. But first, permit me to correct Nicaragua’s misstatement of Colombia’s
argument as to the modalities of communicating for purposes of objectively establishing that there
is a dispute.
7. Colombia’s submission was that to fulfil the “objective” requirement, the counter-party
has to be informed of the other party’s grievance and claim. At several points in its Written
59Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 16, para. 34; Nuclear Tests
(New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 16, para. 35.
60
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 87, para. 37.
61As you held in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda):
“The Court will treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for this case and also
materials emanating from a single source. It will prefer contemporaneous evidence from persons with
direct knowledge. It will give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct
unfavourable to the State represented by the person making them (Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 41, para. 64). The Court will also give weight to evidence that has not, even before this litigation, been
challenged by impartial persons for the correctness of what it contains.” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005,
p. 201, para. 61.) - 41 -
Statement, Nicaragua attributes to Colombia the straw-man argument that I’m quoting Nicaragua,
“as a matter of international law no ‘dispute’ can exist until it has been in some way ‘constituted’
62
by the sending of a formal diplomatic Note” .
8. Mr. President, what Colombia actually argued and argues is that while international
law does not require a specific modality, “[g]iven Nicaragua’s failure to specify the subject-matter
of its allegations prior to the submission of its Application, or to raise a complaint, no objective
63
dispute existed between the Parties” . Now, a diplomatic Note can certainly accomplish this, but it
is only one of many possible modalities. What counts is that the counter-party be informed before
the critical date. If an application sufficed per se to constitute the objective existence of the
dispute, your jurisprudence on this matter would be pointless.
9. Indeed, the Court’s constant jurisprudence (jurisprudence constante) is particularly clear
on the need to demonstrate that the State against whom a complaint is made has had the
opportunity to react in some manner so that a “positive opposition of the claim of one party by the
64 65
other” actually materializes . To paraphrase what the Court held in Georgia v. Russia, but
substituting the names of the Parties in the instant case, what the Court needs to establish in order
to determine the existence of a dispute is “whether [Nicaragua] made such a claim [revealing a
disagreement on a point of law or fact between the two States] and whether [Colombia] positively
opposed it with the result that there is a dispute between them . . .” . 66
10. Mr. President, I turn to Nicaragua’s statement of the dispute. In its 2013 Application,
Nicaragua defined the “Subject of the dispute” in these words: “The dispute concerns the
62WSN para. 3.9; see also paras. 3.16-3.20.
63
POC, para. 4.14.
64
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 315, para. 89.
65See South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of 21 December 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1995, pp. 99-100, para. 22; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J., Reports 1998, p. 17, paras. 21-22; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 13, para. 27; Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 18, para. 24; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 40, para. 90.
66Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 85, para. 31. - 42 -
violations of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and maritime zones declared by the Court’s Judgment of
19 November 2012 and the threat of the use of force by Colombia in order to implement these
67
violations.” Mr. President, Nicaragua never raised any of these claims with nor otherwise
manifested them to Colombia prior to the submission of its Application. And it has submitted no
evidence to the contrary. Thus Nicaragua fails to show a key element of the requirement as to the
objective existence of the dispute.
11. Failing to adduce any evidence that it had raised its claims with Colombia before the date
of submission of the Application, Nicaragua cherry-picks statements made by Colombian officials
in an effort to show that Colombia was aware of or somehow intuited Nicaragua’s “phantom”
claims, rejected them, and hence there was a dispute. Nicaragua does this not only by selective
quotation, but also by putting a “spin” on the statements, taking them out of context and distorting
their meaning. But, logically, if Nicaragua failed to raise its claims against Colombia prior to the
submission of its Application, Colombia’s communications and statements could not have
addressed, let alone opposed non-existent claims. But that impossibility aside, the Colombian
statements which Nicaragua selects fail to support its assertion.
12. First, Colombia never stated, in terms that meet the Peace Treaties requirement, that “the
two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or
non-performance” 68of the Judgment. Nicaragua as Mr. Bundy pointed out reproduces a
sentence in which President Santos says that Colombia “emphatically rejects that aspect of the
69
judgment . . .” . I would respectfully invite the Court to review the entire text of
President Santos’s statement of 19 November 2012, which is in your folders. Mr. President, that
the President of Colombia disagreed with and was critical of parts of the Judgment as was the
Foreign Minister is no cause for surprise, neither are such statements internationally illegal acts,
nor do such public expressions of disappointment constitute a declaration of non-compliance with
the Judgment. No rule of international law requires a State to rejoice in an adverse judgment.
Nicaragua’s snippet of the President’s speech neglects to cite the President’s real message that
67
Application, para. 2.
6Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 74.
69
WSN, para. 4.35 - 43 -
“Article 101 of our Constitution says that ‘the boundaries fixed in the manner set forth in this
Constitution may only be modified by virtue of treaties approved by Congress, and duly ratified by
70
the President’.” Nor did Nicaragua quote the President’s statement in the speech that “we are
committed to find mechanisms and specific strategies, and to produce results including the
negotiation of treaties as may be necessary so that [the archipelago’s inhabitants] rights may at
71
no time be disregarded” . Mr. President, President Santos’s entire speech makes clear that, far
from a pronouncement of non-compliance with the Judgment, his message specified the modality
for implementation of the Judgment, which was to be by treaty, as required by Colombian
constitutional law.
13. Nicaragua similarly misrepresents Colombian statements which are alleged to be threats
to the use of force. When the Court reads them in full, it will see that they are no more than
political affirmations of the commitment to protect Colombian rights in Colombian areas. If such
routine political statements are henceforth to be taken as violations of the United Nations Charter,
the Security Council’s agenda and the Court’s docket will quickly become bloated with trivialities.
14. In any event, Mr. President, these are merits questions which the Court need not and
should not touch. The decisive point is that at no time up to the critical date of 26 November 2013
did Nicaragua once indicate to Colombia, by any modality, that Colombia was violating
Nicaraguan sovereign rights and maritime zones declared by the 2012 Judgment or that it was
threatening to use force. Not once. It was only almost 10 months after filing its Application that
Nicaragua, by Note Verbale, accused Colombia of these issues.
15. Nicaragua’s contention, Mr. President, that it had refrained from mentioning the alleged
72
threats because it did not want to interfere in Colombia’s election process is not worthy of
comment. I suggest that the real reason for Nicaragua’s failure to raise the issue is that there was
none! The Nicaraguan Navy had not reported any incidents and just before Nicaragua filed its
Application on 18 November 2013, Nicaraguan Admiral Corrales Rodriguez, eight days before the
70
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 6, p. 89.
7Ibid., p. 90.
72
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 17, p. 151. - 44 -
Application, reported that there have not been any conflicts . I will not repeat the quotation that
had been read by my colleague Mr. Bundy, but he said that there “have not been any conflicts” and
that “we have not had any problems with the Colombian Navy”.
16. On 14 August 2013, President Ortega announced this is worth, I think, reviewing:
“we must recognize that in the middle of all this media turbulence, the Naval Force of
Colombia, which is very powerful, that certainly has a very large military power, has
been careful, has been respectful and there has not been any kind of confrontation
between the Colombian and Nicaraguan Navy, thank God” . 74
17. It was many months after the Application that Nicaragua’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
requested its own navy to report any alleged incidents that may have taken place. Why and why
then? I suggest, Mr. President, in order to fabricate the impression that there was a dispute at the
time of its Application.
18. Peace Treaties teaches that a dispute exists objectively in “a situation in which the two
sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance
75
of certain treaty obligations” . Nothing in the record shows those required “clearly opposite
views” of the subject-matter of the Application at the time of Nicaragua’s filing.
19. Mr. Bundy has already referred to President Santos’s statement. Comparable views were
expressed by Nicaraguan President Ortega. In his speech on 14 August 2013, after referring to
drug trafficking, organized crime and the Seaflower Reserve, President Ortega announced:
“I am convinced, we hope that this will continue in the same manner until we
can reach the dialogue, reach the negotiations so as to conclude the definitive
agreements to apply the judgment rendered by the Court in the month of November of
last year. We are totally so disposed.” 76
Nicaragua’s Memorial quotes President Ortega on 9 May 2014 as follows:
“We propose to the government of Colombia, to President Juan Manuel Santos,
to work for a Colombian-Nicaraguan commission so a treaty can come out of it 77at
will allow us to respect and put in practice the judgment by the ICJ.”
73
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 43, p. 355.
74POC, Vol. II, Ann. 11, p. 118.
75Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 74.
76
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 11, p. 119.
77MN, p. 54 and Ann. 46, p. 441. - 45 -
Given the common view of the need for a treaty to implement the Judgment, one can appreciate, all
78
the more, Colombia’s surprise at Nicaragua’s Application on 26 November 2013 .
20. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the western Caribbean is a complex arena in which
Colombia, for decades, has performed critical international legal roles, including naval interdiction
of human trafficking and narco-trafficking, fishing conservation and environmental protection, in
addition to discharging its own sovereign responsibility to provide protection for the territory and
inhabitants of the Colombian archipelago. Unlike the removal of a border checkpoint in an
uninhabited desert, which may be quickly struck, dismantled and hauled away, the delimitation
decreed by the Court in 2012 was in a much more complex normative environment, one which
requires preparation and adjustments. Both Parties understood that this was to be accomplished by
treaty. The communications between the two governments and, in Colombia’s case, also within it,
confirm that the Parties recognize this fact.
21. The Colombian regulations with respect to the contiguous zone must be appreciated in
these terms. Up to the time of its Application, the most authoritative statements by high
Nicaraguan officials indicated a common view that the implementation of the 2012 Judgment was
in the process of being addressed by the counter-party and, thus, was not in dispute.
President Ortega’s statements show that he accepted that the implementation of the Judgment
would be by treaty and statements by the Nicaraguan military expressed satisfaction with the
comportment of the Colombian Navy. In parallel fashion, none of the statements by Colombian
officials, read in their entirety, said more than that the internal procedures necessary for
implementing the Judgment in an orderly fashion were in process, pending the completion of which
Colombian law would perforce continue to apply. But, Mr. President, for jurisdictional purposes,
the two critical points are that, as of the filing of its Application, Nicaragua had not voiced any
complaint whatsoever to Colombia with respect to these regulations; and that Colombia only
learned about Nicaragua’s views on their lawfulness or lack of it when it received the
Application.
7See, also, in this regard, the statement of the Foreign Minister: POC, Vol. II, Ann. 44 at p. 359. - 46 -
22. So for all of these reasons, Colombia respectfully submits that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over Nicaragua’s Application of 26 November 2013 for, on that date, there was no
dispute over the matters raised in the Application.
23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention and, Mr. President,
may I ask that Mr. Valencia-Ospina be called to address you.
The PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole à M. Valencia-Ospina.
Mr. VALENCIA-OSPINA:
THIRD PRELIMINARY OBJECTION : THE C OURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE
THE PRECONDITION OF ARTICLE II OF THE P ACT OF B OGOTÁ HAD NOT
BEEN FULFILLED AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE A PPLICATION
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Government of my country, Colombia, has done
me an honour with a deep personal significance by appointing me to plead on its behalf before the
highest judicial organ of the United Nations.
2. I have been assigned to address the question of the non-fulfilment of the precondition
imposed by Article II of the Pact of Bogotá. I will demonstrate that, at the time Nicaragua filed its
Application, the Parties were not of the opinion that the alleged controversy “[could] not be settled
by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels”, as Article II requires.
3. This third objection is raised as an alternative ground to the two already pleaded. It is
nevertheless closely linked to the second objection concerning the absence of a dispute. For while
it is true that these grounds are legally distinct, it is equally true that the Court has often relied upon
discussions and diplomatic exchanges such as those that take place during negotiations in
order to disclose the existence of a dispute at the critical date .
4. It is in fact undisputed that, prior to the belated Nicaraguan diplomatic Note of
13 September 2014, there were no exchanges between the Parties that addressed the alleged
violations of Nicaragua’s maritime zones, and much less on the purported threat of or use of force
by Colombia. But the Parties have been exchanging views all along on four important
79
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 15; Interpretation of
Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, pp. 10-12; Right of
Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 149. - 47 -
subject-matters that relate to: (a) the implementation of the 2012 Judgment; (b) the protection of
the historical fishing rights of the population of the archipelago of San Andrés; (c) the
conservation of the Seaflower Biosphere Reserve; and (d) the fight against drug trafficking in the
Caribbean Sea.
5. Nicaragua has asserted that the “subject-matters on which the parties kept the door open to
80
eventual negotiations are different from the subject-matter” of its claims . But Nicaragua cannot
have it both ways. It cannot, on the one hand, argue that there is an objective dispute by selectively
quoting the statements made by the Parties and, on the other hand, put this very same conduct aside
because it attests to the fact that negotiations are possible. Nicaragua’s move in favour of
jurisdiction must fail on either one of those two grounds. Either the conduct discloses the absence
of a dispute regarding the claims referred to in the Application, or it reveals that the precondition of
Article II of the Pact had not been fulfilled. Should the Court reject the second objection
concerning the absence of a dispute, it should still find that the statements made by the highest
representatives of both States and the meetings held between them in Mexico and Chile clearly
demonstrate that, at the time of the filing of the Application, the Parties did not think that direct
negotiations were not the way to proceed.
6. Before going further into the matters in contention, I wish to stress two important points
over which the Parties are in agreement:
first, as already affirmed by the Court in its 1988 Judgment in the Border and Transborder
Armed Actions case between Nicaragua and Honduras, Article II of the Pact constitutes a
81
precondition to all the procedures of the treaty ;
second, the critical date for assessing whether this precondition has been fulfilled is the date of
82
the filing of the Application . The Parties’ agreement on this second point can come as no
surprise to the Court in view of its conclusions in the 2011 Judgment in the Georgia v. Russian
8WSN, paras 4.53-4.65.
8Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 69, at p. 94, para. 62; POC, paras. 4.22-4.26; WSN, para. 4.9.
82
POC, paras. 4.7-4.9; WSN, para. 4.31. - 48 -
Federation case and the 2012 Judgment in the Belgium v. Senegal case . However, in view of
the opinions held on this issue, I wish to stress that, in the instant case, there is an additional
fundamental reason for admitting that the critical date can correspond only to the date of the
filing of the Application. The seisin of the Court having occurred at the very last moment
before the termination for Colombia of the Pact of Bogotá, the basis of jurisdiction under this
instrument has at the very least expired since then. Thus, it would be impossible for Nicaragua
to bring fresh proceedings after 26 November 2013. In other words, the situation is markedly
different from the one that the Court was confronted with in its 2008 Judgment in the
Croatia v. Serbia case, where it found that all the preconditions to jurisdiction were
84
concurrently fulfilled at a given moment in time after the filing of the Application . This
being said, the Parties also agree with the Court’s 1988 finding that, “[i]t may however be
necessary, in order to determine with certainty what the situation was at the date of filing of the
Application, to examine the events, and in particular the relations between the Parties, over a
85
period prior to that date, and indeed during the subsequent period” .
7. It is at this stage where agreement ends and disagreement starts. Nicaragua has indeed
contested both the meaning of Article II of the Pact and the characterization of the opinion of the
Parties put forward by Colombia in its preliminary objections. For Nicaragua, in the opinion of the
Parties must be interpreted as signifying in the opinion of one of them the Applicant that is to
say in Nicaragua’s own opinion.
8. In addition, Nicaragua has advanced what it claims to be an “objective” assessment about
the opinion of the Parties in order to conclude that both of them were of the good faith belief that
the alleged controversy could not be settled by way of direct negotiations. But Nicaragua’s own
assessment is located at the polar opposite of objectivity. Indeed, I will show that Nicaragua is not
only selectively quoting and misconstruing the declarations of Colombia’s highest representatives,
83Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 70, at p. 124, para. 130;
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II),
p. 444, para. 54 and pp. 445-446, paras. 57-59.
84
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2008, pp. 445-446, para. 96.
85
Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 95, para. 66. - 49 -
but also deliberately ignoring the statements made by its own President and military and
disregarding the steps taken by the two Presidents. Such omissions speak for themselves. For to
quote accurately its President would mean for Nicaragua to explicitly contradict itself, since he has
made it abundantly clear that negotiations were possible and indeed the way to proceed.
9. No prospective applicant which is required to fulfil the precondition of Article II of the
Pact would publicly declare, only two months prior to the seisin of the Court and the termination
for Colombia of the Pact, that diplomatic means are the way to proceed, if it genuinely thought
86
otherwise . Likewise, a State that has recently become an applicant would not publicly assert less
than two months after having filed its application that negotiations are still possible, if it thought
87
that that was in fact untrue . While the case law of the Court shows that “negotiations and
88
recourse to judicial settlement have been pursued pari passu” and, therefore, that the two means
are not mutually exclusive, the situation is of course different when a provision such as Article II of
the Pact is applicable. In situations such as the current one, the very fact that Nicaragua has
confirmed that negotiations were possible immediately before and after the filing of its Application,
demonstrates that the precondition had not been fulfilled at the critical date.
10. I will now proceed to address the meaning of Article II of the Pact before objectively
assessing the opinion of the Parties. In so doing, I shall rebut the arguments made by the Applicant
in its Written Statement.
The Meaning of Article II of the Pact of Bogotá
The condition presupposes that the Parties must be of the opinion that the controversy
“cannot be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels”
11. Article II of the Pact, which now appears on the screen, in its relevant part reads as
follows: “in the event that a controversy arises between two or more signatory states which, in the
opinion of the parties, cannot be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic
channels, the parties bind themselves to use the procedures established in the present Treaty”.
86POC, paras. 4.51-4.52 and Vol. II, Anns. 11, 40 and 41.
87Ibid., para. 4.56 and Ann. 45.
88
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 12, para. 29. - 50 -
12. Nicaragua has alleged that “Colombia conveniently overlooks” the authentic French text
of the same article which refers to “de l’avis de l’une des parties” . But, apart from the English,
what about the texts, also appearing on the screen, in Spanish “en opinión de las Partes” and
Portuguese “na opinião das Partes” which clearly refer to the opinion of the Parties? It is
rather Nicaragua that is the party that conveniently overlooks these three equally authentic texts,
which include Spanish, Nicaragua’s and Colombia’s own official language, in which the
90
Nicaraguan Senate and Executive incorporated the Pact into its domestic legislation . The
Applicant asserts that the phrase “in the opinion of the parties is, on its face, ambiguous”, and is
“susceptible to either of the interpretations advanced by Colombia and Nicaragua” . On the 91
contrary, what is definitely unambiguous is the fact that the three authentic texts drafted in the
Spanish, Portuguese and English languages use the plural “parties” and not the singular form of the
term.
13. To buttress its theory that the opinion of only one of the parties is all that is required,
Nicaragua resorts to the 1985 Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on the American
92
Treaty on Pacific Settlement . The Applicant goes even further and dares to criticize Colombia for
not having appended that Opinion to its preliminary objections . As a matter of fact Colombia, at
paragraph 4.40 of its preliminary objections, did refer to the 1985 Opinion, a document which
being in the public domain was identified by its documentary source at footnote 199 of the same
pleadings. But let our attention not be distracted by Nicaragua’s unfounded criticism, and let us
instead look more closely at what Nicaragua does in order to blatantly alter the conclusions of this
1985 Committee’s Opinion. Nicaragua contents itself with quoting in its Written Statement and
94
annexing thereto merely two paragraphs of the Opinion . However, such excerpts are simply
89WSN, para. 4.4.
90
La Gaceta, Diario Oficial, Año LIV, Managua, D.N., Nos. 100, 18 May 1950, p. 966; 118, 9 June 1950,
pp. 1138-1139; 121, 18 June 1950, p. 1162; 159, 2 August 1950, pp. 1514-1518; 160, 3 August 1950, pp. 1529-1533.
91
WSN, para. 4.19.
92Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of
Bogotá), Organization of the American States Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/Doc. 1603/85, 3 Sep. 1985, reproduced in Ann. 23 of
Nicaragua’s Counter-Memorial in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 423.
93WSN, paras. 4.24-4.27.
94Ibid., para. 4.25 and Ann. 2. - 51 -
descriptive of the personal views expressed by the Committee’s Rapporteur already in his report
dated 19 August 1985, and not a reflection of the Committee’s conclusions in the Opinion it
formally adopted ten days later, on 29 August 1985, which Opinion annexed the Rapporteur’s
95
report . Nicaragua does not quote, and does not include in its annexes, the Opinion’s clear
acknowledgment that the 11-member Committee as a whole rejected the amendment proposed by
the Rapporteur. As stated in the paragraph of the Opinion immediately following those quoted by
Nicaragua, which now appears on the screen:
“Although there was a motion by the Rapporteur that an adjustment in the text
be recommended to make it consistent with the French version . . ., the amendment
voted on for that particular phrase of the second paragraph of Article II was that it
[should] read ‘in the opinion of one of the parties’. That amendment carried the votes
of Drs. Leoro [Rapporteur], Vieira, Callejas-Bonilla, Rabasa and Waaldijk.” 96
In other words, the amendment was supported only by a minority of the full membership of the
Committee and, hence, it was rejected. Moreover, the phrase “in the opinion of the parties” in the
plural was kept in Article II of the complete text of the Pact adopted by the Committee and
97
reproduced as the concluding part of its Opinion . And yet, Nicaragua unashamedly feels free to
assert that “[i]t is thus clear that the conclusion reached by the Juridical Committee is that Article II
refers to the opinion of one of the parties to a dispute, not both of them exactly the opposite of
the proposition for which Colombia cites the 1985 Juridical Committee report” . 98
14. However, this is simply not so. What is crystal clear is precisely the contrary. Nicaragua
has grossly distorted the Opinion by advancing, as if it were the Committee’s interpretation, a
reading proposed by the Rapporteur which is precisely the one rejected by the Committee.
15. Moreover, to read Article II of the Pact as meaning that only the opinion of the Applicant
matters, as Nicaragua asserts, would lead to a manifestly absurd result. For what purpose would be
served by this prerequisite if its fulfilment were to depend solely on the opinion of the party that
95Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of
Bogotá), Organization of the American States Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/Doc. 1603/85, 3 Sep. 1985, reproduced in Ann. 23 of
Nicaragua’s Counter-Memorial in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 423.
96
Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of
Bogotá), Organization of the American States Doc. OEA/Ser.G, CP/Doc. 1603/85, 3 Sep. 1985, reproduced in Ann. 23 of
Nicaragua’s Counter-Memorial in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, pp. 431-432.
97
Ibid., p. 442.
98WSN, para. 4.27. - 52 -
seises the Court? Evidently Nicaragua feels compelled to insist on such reading because it is fully
conscious that in the opinion of Colombia direct negotiations were possible.
The condition presupposes an objective assessment of the opinion
of the parties
16. The precondition established in Article II of the Pact presupposes an objective
assessment of the opinion of the parties. As this Court stated in 1988, “the holding of opinions can
be subject to demonstration, and . . . the Court may expect ‘the Parties [to provide] substantive
evidence that they consider in good faith’ a certain possibility of negotiation to exist or not to
exist” . The Parties agree with this statement of principle. In practice, however, Nicaragua seeks
to demonstrate its bona fide opinion by relying solely on the fact that it is the State that has filed the
Application. In the Applicant’s own words: “Nicaragua was justified in forming the same view, as
100
the filing of the Application attests.”
17. According to the Applicant, Nicaragua had made in the 1988 Border and Transborder
Armed Actions case “an argument very much like the one Colombia now puts forward” . But 101
what Nicaragua had argued in that case was that the issue “is not whether one of the parties or both
of them must think that the dispute cannot be settled by diplomatic means but whether the dispute
102
can in fact be settled by such means” . Nicaragua’s contention constitutes yet another deliberate
misinterpretation of Colombia’s arguments. Colombia has clearly stated in its preliminary
objections that the language of Article II of the Pact of Bogotá “points to the importance of the
103
Parties’ opinion as to whether the controversy can or cannot be settled by direct negotiations” .
18. Moreover, Nicaragua has advanced the untenable proposition that Colombia’s analysis of
the Court’s jurisprudence relating to compromissory clauses, in treaties that provide for recourse to
the Court only in the case of a dispute that “is not” or “cannot be” settled by negotiations, is
104
“inapposite” . In its view, the subjective element embodied in Article II implies that it “cannot be
99Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 95, para. 65.
100WSN, para. 4.50.
101Ibid., para. 4.12.
102
Ibid.
103POC, para. 4.27.
104WSN, para. 4.3. - 53 -
105
analogized to those other compromissory clauses” . By characterizing Article II of the Pact as
“unique”, Nicaragua deludes itself by thinking that it can arrive at the conclusion that Colombia
106
simply cannot rely on any such jurisprudential precedent to interpret this provision .
19. In this respect, it suffices to emphasize that not even Nicaragua believes what it says. In
effect, Nicaragua finds it quite appropriate for itself to refer to the Court’s jurisprudence in order to
draw purported parallels between the current situation and both the 1988 Advisory Opinion
concerning the UN Headquarters Agreement and the 1980 Judgment in the Tehran Hostages
107
case . It is implausible to attempt such a comparison. In so far as the Advisory Opinion is
concerned, there had been extensive negotiations and consultations prior to the filing of the
corresponding request. Besides, for the United States its own Anti-Terrorism Act “ha[d]
superseded the requirements of the UN Headquarters Agreement to the extent that those
108
requirements [were] inconsistent with th[at] Statute” . Thus, the issue was not one of
non-applicability but clearly one of non-compliance with an international obligation. Moreover, in
that case the Court was confronted with a provision setting a lower threshold for previous
negotiations since the requirement was that the dispute “is not settled” rather than that it “cannot be
settled”. In relation to the Tehran Hostages case, suffice it to recall that, following United States
offers to negotiate, the Ayatollah Khomeini “solemnly forb[ade] members of the Revolutionary
Council . . . to meet the United States representatives” . Obviously, the very holding of hostages
in a diplomatic mission significantly impairs the prospect for further discussions since negotiations
with the receiving State are one of the mission’s key functions . 110
20. In reasoning on the basis of the jurisprudential distinction between provisions requiring
that the dispute “is not settled” and provisions requiring that it “cannot be settled”, what Colombia
has sought is to describe the appropriate standard against which the opinion of the Parties must be
105Ibid., para. 4.11 and paras 4.9-4.13.
106Ibid., para. 4.3.
107
WSN, paras 4.47-4.52.
108Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of
26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 23, para. 26.
109United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Tehran), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 15, para. 26.
110Art. 3, para. 1 (c) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. - 54 -
measured. Article II of the Pact falls squarely in the category of the “cannot be settled” dispute
provisions. Hence, the Parties must be of the good faith opinion that negotiations might not just be
impractical, but that they would be futile. In any event, even under the Applicant’s premise
according to which actual negotiations are not necessary to fulfil the precondition of Article II of
the Pact, the indisputable fact remains that the statements of the highest representatives of both
States and the steps that they have taken attest to their will to settle any alleged controversy by way
of negotiations.
The Parties were of the good faith opinion that the alleged controversy
could be settled by way of direct negotiations
21. I will now deal with the opinion of the Parties as expressed by their highest
representatives and military officials. The evidence, which was also discussed by Mr. Bundy,
shows that both Parties were of the opinion that negotiations were possible and indeed the way to
proceed. It is abundantly clear from the many declarations made by the President of Nicaragua that
the Applicant was never of the opinion that the controversy could not be settled by way of
negotiations.
22. The Applicant discusses the conduct of Nicaragua in a single paragraph 4.37 of its
Written Statement. Out of the numerous declarations made by its President, Nicaragua has chosen
to refer to only two: those made on 28 November 2012 and 10 September 2013. But neither of
those two declarations attest to the futility of negotiations. In fact, Colombia fails to understand the
reason why the November pronouncement by the President of Nicaragua that, “Colombia will
recognize the ruling of the International Court of Justice, because there is no other way forward”
implies that negotiations are useless . 111 Such characterization of the real meaning of the
Presidential statement is obviously in contradiction with the conduct of the Parties at that time, as
demonstrated by the constructive meetings between the Presidents of the two countries held soon
after in Mexico, in December 2012, and in Chile, in February 2013 . In fact, the Applicant has
itself admitted that “both Parties had made public statements keeping the door open to eventual
11WSN, para. 4.37.
11POC, para. 4.50. - 55 -
113
negotiations” . According to Nicaragua, it is only at a later time that Colombia shut the door to
negotiations . Therefore, the November statement by the Nicaraguan President cannot be read as
signifying that in the opinion of the Applicant negotiations were futile.
23. In relation to the declaration of 10 September 2013, Nicaragua does quote its President,
but once again it does so selectively . While the President of Nicaragua indeed remarked that
there is no question, as Colombia has repeatedly acknowledged, that “[t]he Court decisions are
obligatory”, the Applicant fails to mention that its President also stated, as shown on the screen,
that: “We agree that you can open a dialogue between the Government of Nicaragua and the
Government of Colombia, and that these negotiations may produce an agreement that allows us to
make the transition in an orderly manner” . 116
24. In an effort to demonstrate that Colombia “ha[d] shut the door to any negotiations”,
Nicaragua refers to events that occurred in the “two and a half months leading up to the
Application” . According to the Applicant, “pending the decision of the Constitutional Court,
118
Colombia was of the opinion that no negotiation was even possible” . However, the statements
made by the Colombian President and Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively on 15 and
18 September 2013 indicate that Colombia emphasized the need to conduct negotiations in order to
conclude a treaty that would implement the 2012 Judgment. The fact that the adoption of an
implementing treaty was one of the key points of Colombia’s position is also attested to by the
President’s speech of 9 September 2013 and the Foreign Minister’s declaration of the next day . 119
The need to wait for the ruling of the Constitutional Court cannot therefore be understood as having
rendered negotiations futile. In fact, it constituted an important step at the domestic level to give a
solid ground to the negotiations on the implementation of the 2012 Judgment.
113WSN, para. 4.5.
114Ibid., para. 4.5.
115
WSN, para. 4.37.
116
POC, para. 4.51 and Vol. II, Ann. 40.
117WSN, paras 4.38-4.52, Anns. 12 and 39.
118Ibid., para. 4.46.
119POC, paras 4.68-4.69. - 56 -
25. To measure the validity of the Applicant’s assumption that the complaint to the
Constitutional Court made negotiations useless, it suffices to check the declarations made by
Nicaragua’s Executive and Military before and after the Colombian statements of 15 and
18 September 2013. These declarations, which Nicaragua purposely ignored in its Written
Statement, provide concrete evidence of the bona fide opinion of the Applicant’s authorities up
until the filing of the Application, at the very least.
26. In this respect the official address made by the President of Nicaragua on
14 August 2013 is most enlightening. It shows not only that the relations between the two Parties
were good and that the Colombian navy was acting professionally, but also that negotiations
concerning the implementation of the 2012 Judgment and related issues were, in the opinion of the
120
Parties, possible . Let us look at the relevant parts of this declaration, now on the screen.
“Nicaragua respects and is ready to work together with Colombia in protecting
the [Seaflower] Reserve zone. We are ready to develop the dialogue, the negotiations
between Colombia and Nicaragua that will finally enable us to overcome that situation
so that we, Colombians and Nicaraguans, may work further for peace, for stability.
I [President Ortega] am convinced, we hope that this will continue in the same
manner until we can reach the dialogue, reach the negotiations so as to conclude the
definitive agreements to apply the judgment rendered by the Court in the month of
November of last year. We are totally so disposed.”
27. Likewise on 13 September 2013 that is to say after the filing of the complaint before
the Constitutional Court that allegedly had rendered negotiations useless the President of
Nicaragua affirmed that he was willing to create a national commission that would meet with a
commission from Colombia on the issue of implementation of the 2012 Judgment . In other 121
words, prior to the Colombian statements of 15 and 18 September 2013, Nicaragua was certainly of
the bona fide opinion that negotiations were possible.
28. These Colombian statements did not lead Nicaragua to change its opinion. Indeed, on
18 November 2013, the chief of the Nicaraguan navy made a statement concerning the absence of
any conflict with the Colombian naval forces stressing that the naval forces of the respective
122
countries maintained continuous communication . The Chief of the Nicaraguan army made a
120
POC, para. 4.52, Ann. 11.
12Ibid., para. 4.51, Ann. 41.
122
Ibid., para. 4.53, Ann. 43. - 57 -
similar statement on 18 March 2014, that is to say close to four months after the critical date . 123
Even more significantly, as the screen shows, the President of Nicaragua stated on
29 January 2014, in the immediate aftermath of the filing of the Application, that:
“I had the opportunity to discuss the issue with President Santos in Mexico
when Enrique Peña Nieto took office. We concluded that there will be a moment in
which we will sign agreements between Colombia and Nicaragua in order to establish,
properly, agreements to be ratified by the respective parliaments, these will refer to the
boundaries established by the Court . . . Afterwards, we will have to wait until
Colombia and Nicaragua discuss to reach an agreement that allows us to establish a
way, especially and I so said to President Santos, to guarantee all the rights of the
native population.” 124
If this was Nicaragua’s opinion merely two months after the filing of the Application, it is evident
that that must have been the Applicant’s opinion at the critical date. Moreover, on 9 May 2014, the
President of Nicaragua reiterated his proposal to create “a Colombian-Nicaraguan commission so
[that] a treaty can come out of it that will allow us to respect, and put in practice the judgment by
125
the ICJ” .
29. Declarations such as those just mentioned demonstrate that Nicaragua did not interpret
the Colombian statements of 15 and 18 September 2013 as having rendered negotiations futile. In
other words, Nicaragua’s conduct directly contradicts the characterization of the Colombian
statements made by the Applicant.
30. Notwithstanding Nicaragua’s insistence to the contrary, it is a fact that Colombia has not
“repudiated” the 2012 Judgment. The President and the Foreign Minister of Colombia have
emphasized that the problem is one of ‘applicability’ under domestic law and not one of
126
“compliance” . Nicaragua itself has included in its annexes statements of the Executive of
Colombia that confirm this distinction . 127 The Executive of Nicaragua was conscious that
Colombia was facing “a legal impairment in the application of the ruling” under its domestic
system . The issue of incorporation was not unknown to Nicaragua before the filing of the
123
Ibid., para. 4.57, Ann. 46.
124
POC, para. 4.56, Ann. 45.
12MN, para. 2.60, Ann. 46.
12POC, Vol. II, Anns. 12, 13, 39 and 42.
127
WSN, Anns. 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
12POC, Vol. II, Anns. 41 and 45; WSN, Anns. 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. - 58 -
complaint before the Constitutional Court and cannot therefore have led to a change of opinion in
129
its Executive .
31. In this context, it is easy to understand the declaration made by the Colombian Foreign
Minister who honours us today with her presence here as a reaction to the filing of the
Application by Nicaragua. As the Minister stated:
“It is not a big problem. The relations with Nicaragua will not be broken […]
We have [re]called our Ambassador for consultations because sometimes you do not
understand how they come to a decision as the last application which that country has
submitted in The Hague. I say this, because you go to the Court when all the instances
to solve a problem are exhausted.” 130
The Minister’s reaction underlines the fact that Colombia was completely taken by surprise by the
new additional case brought before the Court. While Nicaragua’s and Colombia’s highest
representatives had made it clear that negotiations were the way to proceed, the Applicant
unilaterally seised the Court on the very last moment before the termination of the Pact of Bogotá
for the Respondent. In this manner, Nicaragua wished at all costs to preserve the jurisdictional
avenue that it hoped was still available to it vis-à-vis Colombia, but in so doing, it failed to fulfil
the precondition of Article II of the Pact.
Conclusion
32. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will now sum up Colombia’s third preliminary
objection.
33. Nicaragua would have you believe that on the question of whether direct negotiations
were possible, the only opinion that matters is its own. To support this self-serving reading of
Article II of the Pact, Nicaragua has blatantly altered the content of the 1985 Inter-American
Juridical Committee’s Opinion. For, in spite of its assertion to the contrary, it is Nicaragua, not
Colombia, which has provided a reading of the provision that corresponds exactly to the one
rejected by the Juridical Committee.
34. Having supposedly deprived Colombia’s conduct of any legal value, Nicaragua would
also have you believe that, in its own bona fide opinion, negotiations were useless at the time of the
12POC, Vol. II, Ann. 12; NWS, Anns. 6 and 7.
13POC, paras 4.72-4.73 and Vol. II, Ann. 44. - 59 -
seisin of the Court. In fact, the Applicant infers such opinion from the very filing of the
Application. But what about the numerous statements made by its President that expressly
addressed the issue of the implementation of the 2012 Judgment and the viability of direct
negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels? Nicaragua either ignores them or selectively
cites them. Yet, the President of Nicaragua’s statements made on 14 August, 10 and
13 September 2013 and 29 January and 9 May 2014, conclusively demonstrate that the Applicant
was of the opinion that direct negotiations were possible before and after and, henceforth, at the
131
critical date .
35. Nicaragua has sought to deprive Article II of the Pact of any useful purpose. For if the
Applicant’s opinion was the only one that mattered, and the filing of an application could alone be
sufficient to substantiate such opinion, what would be left of this provision? What would be left of
the Court’s pronouncement in the 1988 Judgment that it “may expect ‘the Parties [to provide]
substantive evidence that they consider in good faith’ a certain possibility of negotiation to exist or
132
not to exist” ?
36. Nicaragua’s reading of Article II of the Pact conferring pre-eminence to the French text
over the three other authentic texts, coupled with its far from objective assessment of its own
opinion, certainly leads to a manifestly absurd result. There is simply nothing left of Article II of
the Pact and certainly not a meaningful precondition to be fulfilled prior to the initiation of the
Pact’s procedures.
37. In conclusion, for the reasons I have explained, the Court lacks jurisdiction over
Nicaragua’s Application because the precondition imposed by Article II of the Pact has not been
fulfilled.
38. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes my presentation. I respectfully ask
that you call on my colleague, Mr. Treves.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Valencia-Ospina. Je donne maintenant la parole au
professeur Tullio Treves.
13POC, Vol. II, Anns. 11, 40, 41 and 45; MN, para. 2.60, Ann. 46.
13Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 95, para. 65. - 60 -
M. TREVES : Merci, Monsieur le président. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs
les juges, c’est un grand honneur pour moi de plaider devant vous et je suis reconnaissant au
Gouvernement de la République de Colombie de m’en avoir donné l’occasion.
Q UATRIÈME ET CINQUIÈME EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES :LA C OUR N ’A PAS UN POUVOIR
INHÉRENT POUR JUGER DES DEMANDES DU N ICARAGUA
1. La présente plaidoirie porte sur les quatrième et cinquième exceptions préliminaires
soulevées par la Colombie. Ces deux exceptions sont distinctes car elles portent respectivement sur
l’inexistence d’un pouvoir inhérent de la Cour de juger sur une prétendue inexécution de l’arrêt
de 2012 et sur l’inexistence d’un pouvoir inhérent de surveillance sur l’exécution des arrêts. Nous
allons néanmoins traiter ces exceptions dans la même plaidoirie puisqu’elles soulèvent, dans la
plupart des cas, les mêmes questions. Ces questions ont trait à la base alternative de compétence
soulevée par le Nicaragua. Ainsi, elles n’ont pas de lien direct avec les trois premières exceptions
qui viennent d’être entendues par la Cour. Ni l’une ni l’autre n’est défensible car elles ne
fournissent pas une base de compétence à la Cour.
2. Ma tâche est de démontrer que, contrairement à ce que soutient le Nicaragua, dans la
présente affaire la Cour n’est pas compétente au titre d’un «pouvoir inhérent». Cette expression est
utilisée, dans les textes en français des arrêts de la Cour, plus fréquemment que «compétence
inhérente», terme plus similaire à l’expression «inherent jurisdiction» que l’on trouve dans les
textes anglais. Tant il en est ainsi que, dans la présente affaire, les services de la Cour traduisent en
français l’expression «inherent jurisdiction» utilisée dans les plaidoiries écrites par «pouvoir
inhérent».
3. Cette divergence linguistique couvre une différence de fond, subtile mais importante,
ayant trait à la question de savoir à quoi se réfère le terme «inhérent». L’expression «pouvoir
inhérent» implique que, au cas où il existe une compétence bien établie basée sur le consentement
des parties, celle-ci comprend certains pouvoirs nécessaires à son exercice. L’expression anglaise
semblerait, par contre, encourager la mauvaise interprétation que, même en l’absence d’une
compétence bien établie basée sur le consentement des parties, la Cour aurait une compétence lui
permettant d’agir à l’égard de parties dont le consentement manque. La version française est - 61 -
cohérente avec le Statut et le principe de la compétence consensuelle. Si on la lit comme le fait le
Nicaragua, ce n’est pas le cas de la version anglaise.
4. Le Nicaragua soutient que la compétence de la Cour à juger d’une alléguée violation de
l’arrêt du 19 novembre 2012 ou d’une violation des obligations dérivant de l’arrêt découlerait d’un
133
«pouvoir inhérent» (inherent jurisdiction) qu’aurait la Cour . Le Nicaragua invite la Cour à
exercer ce pouvoir inhérent pour examiner la situation créée par l’allégué comportement de la
Colombie qui, à son avis, «remet en cause le fond même» de l’arrêt de 2012. Ce pouvoir inhérent
134
constituerait une «base de compétence à titre subsidiaire en la présente affaire» .
5. La Colombie rejette l’allégation du Nicaragua et soutient que la Cour n’a aucun pouvoir
inhérent lui permettant de juger d’une affaire distincte, introduite après la conclusion d’une autre
affaire entre les mêmes parties et qui a fait l’objet d’un arrêt de la Cour.
6. La compétence à juger sur le fond d’un différend ne s’établit que sur la base des titres de
compétence prévus par le Statut. Cela vaut, notamment, pour les différends portant sur
l’inexécution d’un autre jugement. C’est ce qu’affirme notamment une étude doctrinale très
autorisée
«tout différend relatif à cette exécution doit être regardé comme un différend distinct
de celui réglé par le jugement. La Cour ne saurait dès lors s’en saisir sans un nouvel
accord des parties. Aussi a-t-elle jugé à plusieurs reprises qu’elle ne pouvait, ni ne
devait envisager l’inexécution de ses arrêts et ne s’est-elle prononcée sur cette
exécution que dans les cas où les parties lui avaient donné spécifiquement compétence
à cet effet.»135
7. L’affaire qui nous occupe correspond exactement à celles envisagées par l’étude que l’on
vient de citer : il s’agit d’une affaire portant sur un prétendu nouveau différend, qui requiert un
nouveau procès soumis aux règles ordinaires du contentieux, y compris les règles portant sur la
compétence. Je dis bien, prétendu nouveau différend puisque, comme l’a souligné mon collègue
Michael Reisman, il n’y a pas de différend d’ordre juridique dans cette affaire du fait que le
Nicaragua n’a pas rempli les conditions nécessaires à l’existence d’un différend à la date critique.
133EEN, par. 5.9.
134MN, par. 1.32.
135
G. Guillaume : «De l’exécuteon des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice» (1997), dans La Cour
internationale de Justice à l’aube du XXI siècle, Le regard d’un juge, Pédone, Paris, 2003, p. 179 (références omises). - 62 -
8. Dans la présente affaire il n’existe pas un accord des parties conférant à la Cour la
compétence pour s’occuper de l’exécution de l’arrêt de 2012 ou d’aspects de celle-ci. Il n’existe
pas non plus une disposition de cet arrêt prévoyant la division du procès en plusieurs phases.
9. En outre, l’on ne trouve dans le jugement de 2012 aucune trace d’une réservation de
compétence pouvant permettre de ressusciter la compétence de la Cour au cas où certaines
136
conditions devaient se vérifier à l’avenir, comme dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires .
L’obligation de se conformer aux arrêts de la Cour, consacrée à l’article 94, paragraphe 1, de la
Charte des Nations Unies et à l’article 59 du Statut de la Cour, ne saurait se substituer à une clause
permettant expressément de «réexaminer la situation» telle qu’on la trouve dans les deux arrêts
de 1974 sur les Essais nucléaires, respectivement aux paragraphes 60 et 63. Ces clauses des arrêts
de 1974 ont un caractère tout à fait exceptionnel, tandis que l’obligation de se conformer aux
décisions de la Cour est l’effet normal de tout arrêt de celle-ci. Faire de cette dernière obligation,
comme le voudrait le Nicaragua, une base de compétence serait tout à fait erroné car cela
permettrait de rouvrir toute affaire où une partie allègue que l’autre ne se conforme pas au
jugement qui l’a tranchée.
10. Les arrêts de la Cour que le Nicaragua invoque au soutien de sa position sur l’existence
d’un pouvoir inhérent (inherent jurisdiction) ne fournissent aucun appui à celle-ci. Ce n’est
certainement pas le cas de l’arrêt dans l’affaire de la Compagnie d’électricité de Sophia, que le
Nicaragua invoque dans son mémoire comme faisant autorité sur l’existence d’un tel pouvoir
inhérent .37 En effet, en acceptant les arguments présentés par la Colombie 138 le même
Nicaragua reconnaît que dans cet arrêt «la question du «pouvoir inhérent» ne s’est pas posée, fût-ce
implicitement» . 139
136 Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 272, par. 60 ; Essais nucléaires
(Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 477, par. 63, ainsi que Demande d'examen de la situation au
titre du paragraphe 63 de l'arrêt rendu par la Cour le 20 décembre 1974 dans l'affaire des Essais nucléaires
(Nouvelle-Zélande c. France) (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), ordonnance du 22 septembre 1995, C.I.J. Recueil 1995,
p. 297, par. 32.
137MN, par. 1.24, note 15.
138
EPC, par. 5.14.
139EEN, par. 5.3. - 63 -
140
11. Il ne s’agit non plus des arrêts sur les Essais nucléaires de 1974, ni de l’arrêt LaGrand
de 2001. Ces arrêts, tout en mentionnant des pouvoirs inhérents de la Cour, n’y trouvent pas une
base de compétence pour juger d’un différend donné.
12. En effet, dans les arrêts sur les Essais nucléaires, la Cour affirme que le «pouvoir
inhérent» qu’elle possède «l’autorise à prendre toute mesure voulue … pour faire en sorte que, si sa
compétence au fond est établie, l’exercice de cette compétence ne se révèle pas vain» . Ainsi, le 141
«pouvoir inhérent» ne peut s’exercer que dans le cadre d’une affaire à l’égard de laquelle la
compétence au fond «est établie» et non vice versa. Ce pouvoir ne saurait pour autant fournir la
base de cette compétence.
13. Dans l’affaire LaGrand, l’Allemagne soutenait que la Cour avait compétence pour juger
de l’inobservance de l’ordonnance du 3 mars 1999 portant mesures conservatoires. Elle faisait
valoir comme argument «accessoire et subsidiaire» que cette compétence relevait du pouvoir
inhérent de la Cour . 142
14. La Cour ne considéra pas nécessaire d’examiner l’argument accessoire et subsidiaire de
143
l’Allemagne. Elle accepta son argument principal , mais elle affirma néanmoins :
«Lorsque la Cour a compétence pour trancher un différend, elle a également
compétence pour se prononcer sur des conclusions la priant de constater qu’une
ordonnance en indication de mesures rendue aux fins de préserver les droits des
Parties à ce différend n’a pas été exécutée.» 144
15. Ce dernier passage de l’arrêt LaGrand, lu hors contexte, donne l’occasion au Nicaragua
de faire l’affirmation suivante :
«Il n’y a aucune raison de ne pas transposer mutatis mutandis la position de la
Cour concernant son pouvoir inhérent de se prononcer sur le non-respect
d’ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires aux différends découlant d’un
défaut d’exécution de ses arrêts.» 145
140LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 466.
141
Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 259, par. 23 (les italiques sont de nous) ;
Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 463, par. 23 (les italiques sont de nous).
142
LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 483, par. 44, où le texte français
exceptionnellement utilise «compétence inhérente» comme équivalent de «inherent jurisdiction»), et mémoire de la
République fédérale d'Allemagne, par. 3.02.
143
LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 484, par. 45.
144LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 484, par. 45 (les italiques sont
de nous).
145EE, par. 5.16. - 64 -
16. Cette affirmation manque de fondement. Elle ne tient aucunement compte de la
différence entre la détermination, dans un jugement sur le fond, adopté dans le cadre d’un différend
sur lequel la compétence est établie, du non-respect d’une ordonnance portant mesures
conservatoires et un différend ayant pour objet l’allégué non-respect d’un arrêt portant sur une
affaire déjà conclue et ayant la force de la chose jugée.
17. Aucun raisonnement par analogie n’est possible. La condition dont la Cour souligne la
nécessité en mentionnant ses pouvoirs inhérents dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires, à savoir
que sa compétence au fond doit être établie , n’est pas remplie. Le Nicaragua voudrait faire de
cette précondition à leur exercice, la conséquence des pouvoirs inhérents de la Cour. Ce serait
mettre la charrue avant les bœufs ! Il s’agit d’une véritable petitio principii.
18. Contrairement à ce que dit le Nicaragua, il existe ainsi une raison, une bonne raison en
effet, pour ne pas transposer à des différends portant sur le non-respect des jugements l’affirmation
de la Cour concernant la compétence en matière d’inexécution d’une ordonnance en indication de
mesures provisoires.
19. Les pouvoirs inhérents de la Cour fonctionnent dans le cadre de différends à l’égard
desquels sa compétence est établie sur la base d’un titre préexistant. L’on ne saurait les invoquer
pour établir une compétence autrement inexistante.
20. Le Nicaragua n’a pas voulu préciser si les pouvoirs inhérents qui, selon lui fondent la
compétence de la Cour, concernent un différend portant sur l’exécution de l’arrêt de 2012 ou sur
l’inobservance des droits dérivant de celui-ci, en soutenant qu’il s’agirait d’un «intéressant débat
juridique» qui appartiendrait au fond et serait sans importance pour ce qui est de la compétence de
147
la Cour . Il n’est pas nécessaire d’entrer ici dans cette discussion. Il n’en reste pas moins que la
prétention du Nicaragua de fonder la compétence de la Cour sur un «pouvoir inhérent» de celle-ci
est inextricablement liée à l’existence d’une connexion entre l’affaire conclue et la nouvelle affaire.
Il s’agit néanmoins de différends distincts pour chacun desquels l’existence d’un titre de
compétence est nécessaire.
146Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 259, par. 23 ; Essais nucléaires
(Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 463, par. 23.
147EEN, par. 5.9. - 65 -
21. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je voudrais maintenant partager
avec la Cour des réflexions qui renforcent l’argument que, dans la présente affaire en tout cas, la
Cour n’a pas un pouvoir inhérent de surveillance sur l’exécution de ses jugements.
22. Il faut remarquer tout d’abord qu’un tel pouvoir n’est pas prévu par le Statut. D’après ce
dernier, les seuls cas de compétence de la Cour concernant des arrêts ayant l’effet de la chose jugée
ont trait à l’interprétation et à la revision de ces arrêts (art. 60 et 61) et la seule mention dans le
Statut de l’exécution d’un arrêt se trouve à l’article 61, paragraphe 3, d’après lequel «la Cour peut
subordonner l’ouverture de la procédure en revision à l’exécution préalable de l’arrêt». Nous ne
nous trouvons dans aucune des situations envisagées par ces dispositions du Statut.
23. Qui plus est, l’article 94, paragraphe 2, de la Charte des Nations Unies, qui est dans vos
dossiers et devrait apparaître sur l’écran, prévoit une procédure à laquelle peut recourir la partie à
un litige qui considère que l’autre partie ne satisfait pas aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu
d’un arrêt rendu par la Cour. Cette procédure consiste en un recours au Conseil de sécurité qui,
«s’il le juge nécessaire, peut faire des recommandations ou décider des mesures à prendre pour
faire exécuter l’arrêt».
24. Compte tenu de cette disposition de la Charte, les Etats américains, afin d’éviter toute
divergence entre eux concernant les suites d’un arrêt de la Cour et pouvant impliquer des risques de
conflit, adoptèrent une lex specialis régionale pour ces divergences. Leur propos était de régler
celles-ci «au sein de la famille» sans recourir, si possible, au Conseil de sécurité. Cela s’explique si
l’on considère que, au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, les arrangements régionaux se
présentaient aux Etats des Amériques comme une protection supplémentaire à celle de la Charte
des Nations Unies.
25. La lex specialis régionale mentionnée est la procédure prévue à l’article L du pacte de
Bogotá. Cet article impose l’obligation de s’adresser à la réunion de consultation des ministres des
relations extérieures des Etats parties au pacte à tout Etat partie qui entend recourir au Conseil de
sécurité aux fins de l’article 94, paragraphe 2, de la Charte. La réunion des ministres des relations
extérieures du pacte de Bogotá est convoquée «afin que celle-ci convienne des mesures à prendre - 66 -
en vue d’assurer l’exécution de la décision judiciaire 148ou arbitrale». Le caractère obligatoire de la
procédure de l’article L comporte que, pour les Etats liés au pacte, le pouvoir de surveillance sur
les suites des arrêts de la Cour appartient au Conseil de sécurité et au conseil des ministres des
relations extérieures des Etats parties au pacte, et, partant, non à la Cour internationale de Justice.
26. Il me paraît important de souligner que quel que soit le point de vue que l’on adopte
quant au moment où la dénonciation du pacte par la Colombie déploie ses effets l’article L et le
manque de compétence de la Cour en matière de surveillance sur les suites de ses arrêts qui en
découle étaient en vigueur et, partant, obligatoires pour les Parties à la présente affaire au moment
de la demande du Nicaragua.
27. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je ne saurais conclure cette
plaidoirie sans souligner que suivre le Nicaragua dans sa revendication d’un pouvoir inhérent
pouvant fonder la compétence de la Cour dans la présente affaire serait un précédent dangereux.
Le principe selon lequel le consentement des parties est une précondition nécessaire pour établir la
compétence de la Cour en serait bouleversé. Et il serait présomptueux de ma part d’insister, devant
vous, sur l’importance dirais-je primordiale, dans le cadre d’ensemble du droit international, du
principe du consentement tel qu’incorporé dans le Statut de la Cour et d’autres instances
juridictionnelles, en tant que base de la compétence des cours et tribunaux internationaux.
28. Au vu de ce qui précède, la Colombie maintient ses quatrième et cinquième exceptions
préliminaires.
29. Cette phase des plaidoiries de la Colombie dans la présente affaire est ainsi terminée.
30. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, pour votre
patience et votre attention.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Voilà qui met un terme au premier tour
de plaidoiries de la Colombie. La Cour se réunira de nouveau demain mardi 29 septembre,
à 10 heures, pour entendre le Nicaragua en son premier tour de plaidoiries. L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 13 heures.
___________
14L’article L dit «juridique». Il s’agit d’une faute évidente comme il résulte des autres versions linguistiques :
anglais : «judicial» ; espagnol : «judicial» ; portugais: «judicial».
Audience publique tenue le lundi 28 septembre 2015, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président, en l’affaire relative à des Violations alléguées de droits souverains et d’espaces maritimes dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Colombie) - Exceptions préliminaires