Uncorrected
Non corrigé
CR 2012/10
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2012
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 24 April 2012, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2012
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 24 avril 2012, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président,
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: Presient ka
Vice-Presipeúnltveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Sebutinde
Judges ad hoc Mensah
Cot
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Tomka,président
SepMúl.vvae-poé,ident
OwMada.
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
XuMe mes
Donoghue
Sebgutisnde,
MeMnsah.
jugesCot, ad hoc
Cgefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., Chichele Professor of Inte rnational Law, University of Oxford, Counsel
and Advocate,
MrA. lexOudeElferink, Deputy-Director, Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
Utrecht University,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University Pa risOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
Mr.PaulReichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., Member of the Bars of
the United States Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,
Mr.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.RobinCleverly, M.A., DPhil, C.Geol, F.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
Mr.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
Mr. César Vega Masís, Director of Juridical Affairs, Sovereignty and Territory, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Walner Molina Pérez, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Julio César Saborio, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs,
Ms Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Juridical Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.Martin Lawrence H., Foley Hoag LLP, Washi ngton D.C., Member of the Bars of the United
States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Masschusetts,
MsCarmen Martínez Capdevila, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma,
Madrid,
as Counsel; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, ambassadeur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M.VaughanLowe, Q.C., professeur de droit interna tional à l’Université d’Oxford, titulaire de la
chaire Chichele, conseil et avocat,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, directeur adjoint de l’Ins titut néerlandais du droit de la mer de l’Université
d’Utrecht,
M.AlainPellet, professeur à l’Université de Pari sOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit inte rnational, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Paul Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C. , membre des barreaux de
la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M.AntonioRemiroBrotóns, professeur de droi t international à l’Universidad Autónoma de
Madrid, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M.RobinCleverly, M.A., D.Phil, C.Geol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services du bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
M.JohnBrown, R.D., M.A., F.R.I.N., F.R.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services du bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
M. César Vega Masís, directeur des affaires juridiques, de la souveraineté et du territoire au
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Walner Molina Pérez, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julio César Saborio, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.Martin Lawrence H., cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux de la
Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,
Mme Carmen Martínez Capdevila, docteur en droit international public de l’Universidad
Autónoma de Madrid,
comme conseils ; - 6 -
Mr.Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
MsClaudia Loza Obregon, Second Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.Romain Piéri, Researcher, Centre for Inte rnational Law (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Yuri Parkhomenko, Foley Hoag LLP, United States of America,
as Assistant Counsel;
Ms Helena Patton, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
Ms Fiona Bloor, The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office,
as Technical Assistants.
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Professor of In ternational Relations, Universidad del Rosario,
Bogotá,
as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, former
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Prof essor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris , member of the New York Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the OPCW,
as Adviser;
H.E. Mr. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, Preside ntial High-Commissioner for Citizenry Security,
former Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, former
Minister of State,
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, member of the International Law Commission, - 7 -
M. Edgardo Sobenes Obregon, premier secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
MmeClaudia Loza Obregon, deuxième secrétaire de l’ambassade du Nicaragua au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.Romain Piéri, chercheur au centre de droi t international (CEDIN) de l’Université de
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Yuri Parkhomenko, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Mme Helena Patton, bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
Mme Fiona Bloor, bureau hydrographique du Royaume-Uni,
comme assistantes techniques.
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, professeur de relations internationales à l’Universidad del
Rosario, Bogotá,
comme agent et conseil ;
S.Exc.M.Guillermo Fernández de Soto, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, ancien
ministre des affaires étrangères,
comme coagent ;
M.James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.Rodman R.Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de NewYork,
Cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Marcelo Kohen, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Institut de hautes études internationales et
du développement de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, représentant permanent de la Colombie auprès de l’OIAC,
comme conseiller ;
S. Exc. M. Francisco José Lloreda Mera, haut conseiller présidentiel pour la cohabitation et la
sécurité des citoyens, ancien ambassadeur de la République de Colombie auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas, ancien ministre d’Etat,
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international, - 8 -
H.E. Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of Intern ational Law, former Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs,
Ms Mirza Gnecco Plá, Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, Counsellor, Embassy of Colombia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Legal Advisers;
CF William Pedroza, International Affairs Bureau, National Navy of Colombia,
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Mr. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño,
as Administrative Assistant. - 9 -
S. Exc. Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ambassadeur, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de droit inte rnational, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Mirza Gnecco Plá, ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, conseiller à l’ambassade de Colombie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
Le capitaine de frégate William Pedroza, bureau des affaires internationales, Marine colombienne,
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
M. Camilo Alberto Gómez Niño,
comme assistant administratif. - 10 -
Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. Cet après-midi, le Nicaragua va compléter le
premier tour de ses plaidoiries. Je passe maintenant la parole à M. le professeur Alain Pellet. Vous
avez la parole, Monsieur.
M. PELLET : Merci, Monsieur le président. Je ne pense pas qu’il faille que je dise «thank
you very much».
L E NÉCESSAIRE ENCLAVEMENT DES ÎLES COLOMBIENNES
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, il me revient aujourd’hui
d’expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles les îles, îlots et récifs sur lesquels vous reconnaîtriez la
souveraineté de la Colombie ne peuvent pas recevoir un plein effet compte tenu des circonstances
de notre affaire. (La question se pose différemment si, comme nous le pensons, les cayes en
question relèvent du Nicaragua.)
2. Deux précisions préliminaires sont de mise :
⎯ en premier lieu, cette présentation est faite « sans préjudice» de la décision que vous prendrez
sur la souveraineté ⎯ étant rappelé que le Nicaragua ne conteste pas celle de la Colombie sur
l’archipel de San Andrés aux fins de la présente instance, mais que nous n’admettons nullement
qu’il en aille de même s’agissant des îlots, cayes et récifs situés au nord de l’archipel ;
⎯ en second lieu, je ne vais pas évoquer le cas particulier de Quitasueño dont Alex Oude Elferink
vous a entretenu ce matin.
3. Au bénéfice de ces remarques, je procéderai en trois temps :
⎯ je résumerai d’abord brièvement les principes gé néraux s’appliquant à la délimitation maritime
autour des îles ;
je montrerai ensuite, un peu plus longuement :
⎯ que, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, l’archipel de SanAndrés (dont j’ai défini l’étendue
hier) ne peut prétendre à davantage qu’une mer territoriale de 12 milles marins, puis
⎯ que les petites cayes dont la Colombie revendique la souveraineté au nord de l’archipel
devraient, si elles lui appartenaient ⎯ quod non ⎯ être enclavées et ne bénéficier que d’une
zone maritime restreinte à trois milles marins. - 11 -
Section 1
Les îles dans le droit de la délimitation des espaces marins
(rappel sommaire)
4. Monsieur le président, je n’aime pas «faire cours» à la haute juridiction et elle n’en a
assurément pas besoin ⎯mais je crains qu’un rappel des principes élémentaires applicables à la
délimitation des espaces marins autour des îles soit nécessaire à l’intention de nos contradicteurs et
amis, car ils les ignorent avec une très grande constance.
5. En fait, j’ai l’impression qu’à ce stade pourtant avancé de la procédure, les Parties ne sont
d’accord à cet égard que sur un point: l’article121 de la convention de MontegoBay reflète le
1
droit coutumier et doit donc, en principe trouver applica tion. Mais elles diffèrent sur deux points
fondamentaux :
⎯ selon la Colombie, les îlets qu’e lle revendique comme siens au nord de l’archipel ont droit,
conformément au paragraphe2, à une mer territoriale, une zone contiguë, une zone
économique exclusive et un plateau continental, alors que ces rochers en réalité ne se prêtent
pas à l’habitation humaine ou à une vie économique propre ⎯ comme le
professeur Oude Elferink l’a montré ce matin ⎯ et qu’ils relèvent, par conséquent, du
paragraphe 3 de l’article 121 ; c’est une question de fait sur laque lle je reviendrai brièvement
tout à l’heure ⎯ mais une question qui n’a pas beaucoup importance puisque, de toute manière,
⎯ et c’est le second point ⎯,
⎯ la délimitation autour de ces formations in sulaires doit être faite, aux termes mêmes du
paragraphe2 de l’article121, «conformément aux dispositions de la Convention applicables
aux autres territoires terrestres»; or les circonstances très, très particulières de l’espèce
conduisent, conformément à une jurisprudence bi en établie, à ne leur donner qu’un effet très
limité, contrairement à ce que prétend la Partie colombienne.
6. Monsieur le président, il est certainem ent exact que, comme l’ a observé le Tribunal
international du droit de la mer,
«l’effet à attribuer à une île dans la délimita tion d’une frontière maritime dans la zone
économique exclusive et sur le plateau continental dépend des réalités géographiques
et des circonstances de l’espèce. Il n’existe pas de règle générale sur ce point.
1RN, p.104, par. 4.5; p.124, par.4.45; DC, p. 88-100, par.3.10; p.168, par.5.24; voir aussi CMC,
p. 329-330, par. 7.40-7.41. - 12 -
Chaque cas est unique et appelle un trait2ment spécifique, l’objectif final étant
d’aboutir à une solution équitable.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)
7. Il n’en reste pas moins que le rôle des îles dans la délimitation maritime (indépendamment
de leur qualification) a fait l’objet d’une jurisp rudence abondante et globalement ferme, dont il
résulte que des îles (même au sens du paragraphe 2 de l’article121) n’engendrent de droits au
profit de l’Etat dont elles relèvent que sur des étendues très limitées. Je me permets,
Monsieurleprésident, d’utiliser à nouveau, apr ès les avoir mis à jour, les tableaux que la
Roumanie avait établis dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime en mer Noire. Ils sont reproduits
o
sous l’onglet n 80 du dossier des juges et sont fort instructifs.
8. Ils établissent, sous une forme synthétique :
⎯ que les îles non côtières n’ont, dans aucune affaire comparable de délimitation maritime
tranchée jusqu’à présent par la Cour ou par un tri bunal arbitral, été prises en compte au stade
du tracé de la ligne provisoire de délimitation (qui est, en géné ral, une ligne d’équidistance)
⎯ c’est-à-dire lors de la première étape de toute délimitation maritime entre Etats adjacents ou
3
se faisant face ; et ces tableaux établissent aussi
⎯ que, lors de la deuxième étape, celle dans laquelle la cour ou le tribunal international saisi doit
se prononcer sur l’existence et l’effet de circonstances pertinentes «appelant un ajustement ou
un déplacement de la ligne d’équidistance proviso ire afin de parvenir à un résultat équitable»
(Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 101,
par. 120), ces îles se voient attribuer un effet toujours limité lorsqu’elles sont prises en compte
en tant que circonstances pertinentes.
9. Je reviendrai sur les plus frappants de ces exemples lorsque je discuterai l’application
concrète de ces principes à nos îles ou rochers. En tout cas, comme nous l’avons aussi montré dans
4
nos écritures , ces principes sont fortement ancrés dans la jurisprudence, quoiqu’en écrive la
Colombie.
2
Différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière maritime entre le Banglade sh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du
Bengale, (Bangladesh/Myanmar), T.I.D.M., arrêt du 14 mars 2012, p. 101, par. 317.
3 Voir DC, chap.6«Application of the principles a nd rules of delimitation: establishing the provisional
equidistance line as the first step in the delimitation», p. 197, p. 198-199, par. 6.3-6.7 ; RN, p. 168-169, par. 6.55-6.57.
4 RN, p.132-137, par. 5.18-5.26; p.182, par.6.79; p.187-199, par.6.91-6.110; voir aussi MN, p.241-246,
par. 3.104-3.110. - 13 -
10. Il reste cependant une question générale, abordée hier par Alex Oude Elferink, mais sous
un angle différent, et sur laquelle je crains de devoir m’arrêter à nouveau quelques instants. C’est
celle de savoir quel est, dans le cas présent, le rôle respectif des côtes continentales des Parties
d’une part, et des îles en question d’autre part. La Colombie, d’une part, dénie toute pertinence à sa
propre côte continentale et, d’autre part, réduit comme peau de chagrin l’effet de la côte du
Nicaragua en donnant, au contraire, une importance démesurée ⎯ pour ne pas dire extravagante ⎯
aux côtes de la poussière d’îles sur lesquelles elle revendique la souveraineté.
11. Selon la Partie colombienne: «Colombia’ s mainland coast is not relevant due to its
remoteness» 5. The reason for this would be that
«Nicaragua has not demonstrated any legal entitlement to continental shelf
rights situated more than 200 nautical miles from its coast, there are no areas of outer
continental shelf in this part of the Caribb ean, and natural prolongation is irrelevant to
Colombia’s 200nautical mile entitleme nts measured from its mainland and its
6
islands.»
Monsieur le président, c’est là une pure pétition de principe !
12. En réalité, la Colombie postule que les îles dont elle reve ndique la souveraineté
constituent une sorte d’écran ⎯ que dis-je un écran ? un mur, un rempart formidable ! ⎯ entre elle
et le Nicaragua, empêchant ainsi les plateaux c ontinentaux des deux pays de se rencontrer et, dès
lors, leurs revendications de se chevaucher. Mais, Monsieur le président, c’est prendre le problème
à l’envers ; l’ordre normal des choses consiste :
⎯ d’abord, à déterminer à qui appar tient la souveraineté sur les îles ⎯mais, je le rappelle,
j’admets ici, pour les besoins de la démonstr ation, qu’elles sont colombiennes (s’agissant des
cayes, pas de problème pour l’archipel) ;
⎯ ensuite, il faut déterminer quel peut être l’ effet des îles et rochers en question sur la
délimitation ; et
⎯ ce n’est qu’après cela que des chevauchements peuvent a pparaître entre les prétentions des
deux Etats à un plateau continental.
o
[Projection n 1.]
5
DC, p.225, par.6.56; voir aussi, par exemple, p.221, r.6.48; p.240, par.7.11, ou p.252, par.7.32. Voir
surtout CMC, p. 311-312, par. 7.5-7.7.
6DN, p. 161, par. 5.6. - 14 -
13. Le croquis qui est projeté à l’écran en ce moment illustre la manière qu’a la Partie
colombienne de mettre la charrue avant les bŒufs :
⎯ elle commence par décider, arbitrairement, que les îles éparpillées qu’elle revendique forment
un chapelet continu constituant une sorte de mur infranchissable s’opposant à tout accès du
Nicaragua à son plateau continental ;
⎯ le tour est joué: le Nicaragua ne peut revendiquer aucun plateau continental au-delà de cette
ligne ; donc, aucun chevauchement n’est possible ; et donc «Colombia’s mainland coast . . . has
no role to play in the present delimitation dispute» 7 («la côte continentale de la
Colombie…n’a…aucun rôle à jouer dans le cadre du présent différend portant sur la
délimitation»).
14. Mais ce n’est pas ainsi qu’il faut raisonner :
⎯ la première question à se poser (une fois résolu e celle de la souveraineté) est de savoir, comme
je l’ai rappelé il y a un instant, quel rôle peuvent jouer les îles et récifs dans la délimitation ;
⎯ comme je le montrerai, il ne peut être que limit é : conformément à la jurisprudence synthétisée
sous l’onglet n o 80 de vos dossiers, ils ne doivent pas être pris en considération pour tracer la
ligne provisoire d’équidistance ;
⎯ cela laisse largement au plateau continental du Ni caragua la possibilité de se déployer au-delà
des îles dont la Colombie lui dénie la souveraineté.
15. En d’autres termes, ce n’est pas par une opération divine que les îles contestées se
8
trouvent sur le plateau continental du Nicaragua ⎯or indiscutablement elles s’y trouvent : ceci
résulte de l’application normale des règles applicables en matière de délimitation maritime dans les
9
circonstances de l’espèce. C’est pour cela , même si ceci déplaît à la Colombie , que les
îles ⎯ toutes les îles en cause: celles de «l’archipel» comme les cayes septentrionales ⎯ se
trouvent «du mauvais côté» de la ligne proviso ire tracée au titre du premier temps de la
méthode-standard; c’est cette ligne qui, sauf circonstance pertinente allant en sens contraire, ou
disproportionnalité manifeste, constitue la frontiè re maritime entre les deux pays conformément
7
DC, p. 161, par. 5.6.
8 RN, p.12-13, par.27; p.89-90, par.3.37-3.40 (« B. The Geological Evidence of the Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf Areas Attributable to Nicaragua») ; p. 99, par. 3.63 ; p. 126, par. 5.4 ; p. 138, par. 5.27).
9DC, p. 166, par. 5.18 et p. 241-242, par. 7.13 ; voir aussi CMC, p. 331-332, par. 7.47. - 15 -
aux règles unanimement admises par le droit in ternational contemporai n de la délimitation
maritime.
[Fin de la projection n 1.]
16. Il n’en reste pas moins que, si les îles en question étaient colombiennes, ces îles
pourraient revendiquer une mer territoriale ⎯ mais une mer territoriale, et rien de plus, comme je
vais m’employer à le montrer maintenant. Et d’abord en ce qui concerne l’archipel de San Andrés.
Section 2
L’archipel de San Andrés
17. Je parle de «l’archipel de San Andrés», Monsieur le président, parce que, comme je l’ai
dit dans ma présentation d’hier, celui-ci a une certaine existence juridique ⎯pas dans la
conception, très abusivement extensive, que la Colombie prétend lui conférer; mais il est
mentionné sous ce nom dans l’artic le premier du traité de 1928 (appli cable aux fins de la présente
e
affaire) et le protocole de 1930 en fixe la limite occidentale au 82 méridien. Mais ⎯ et ce sont de
très grands «mais» :
⎯ mais, il s’agit uniquement de la limite au-delà de laquelle les îles de la région ne peuvent pas
être revendiquées par la Colombie ; et,
e
⎯ autre «mais», conséquence du précédent et tout aussi dirimant, le 82 méridien ne constitue
nullement une frontière maritime entre les deux pays ⎯ or c’est cette frontière que la Cour est
priée de bien vouloir fixer dans la présente affaire.
[Projection n o 2.]
18. Monsieur le président, nous ne contestons pas que, fussent-elles au milieu de l’océan, ces
îles eussent eu droit à un plat eau continental et à une zone économique exclusive délimitée
conformément aux règles, maintenant coutumières, reflétées par la convention de MontegoBay.
Mais, Monsieur le président, elles ne sont pas au milieu de l’océan : situées l’une et l’autre à plus
de 350 milles marins de la côte colombienne, San Andrés et Provide ncia se trouvent à un peu plus
de 100 milles de celle du Nicaragua et à 80 milles des Corn Islands 1. Dès lors, elles sont placées
sans aucun doute sur le plateau continental du Nicaragua (et dans sa zone économique exclusive) :
10MN, p. 169, par. 2.240 ; et p. 190, par. 3.11-3.12, ou RN , p. 67, par. 2.12; CMC, p. 338, point 6; DC, p. 238,
par. 7.8. - 16 -
à moins qu’elles aient été purement et simplement mises hors-jeu dès la première étape. La
question de la prise en compte des îles ne se pose que durant la deuxième phase de la délimitation
et, comme nous l’avons vu 11, la ligne provisoire résultant de la première étape, laisse, quel que soit
son tracé exact, la zone dans laquelle est située l’archipel au Nicaragua. N’en déplaise à nos
contradicteurs, il s’agit là d’une circonstance pertinente et tout à fait particulière qui doit conduire à
limiter drastiquement la zone maritime bordant les îles composant «l’archipel de San Andrés».
o
[Fin de la projection n 2.]
19. La Colombie s’en offusque et tente ⎯ mais en vain ⎯ de nier la pertinence des
précédents invoqués par le Nicaragua, qui trouvent ici à s’appliquer par analogie ⎯ étant
évidemment entendu qu’aucune de ces situations n’est identique à cent pour cent à celle qui nous
occupe. Mais la Partie colombienne a beau le contester, elles sont suffisamment comparables pour
que les principes appliqués par les cours et tribunaux internationaux ⎯et d’abord par la CIJ
elle-même ⎯ soient parfaitement transposables à notre espèce. Je m’en tiendrai aux précédents
12
discutés par la Colombie dans sa duplique . En revanche, je ne m’attarderai pas sur les exemples
13
de «pratique étatique» qu’elle y invoque : ils sont peu probants, comme nous l’avions déjà montré
dans notre réplique 14et comme M Reichler le redira tout à l’heure : rien n’empêche que, par voie
d’accord, deux Etats dérogent aux règles généra lement applicables en l’absence de traité ⎯ que je
viens de décrire brièvement sur la base de la jurisprudence reflétée dans les tableaux de l’onglet
no80 du dossier des juges. Ces règles ne s ont évidemment pas impératives; mais cette
jurisprudence conduit à penser qu’en l’absence d’exception conventionnelle l’enclavement de
chacune des petites îles composant l’archipel de San Andrés s’impose dans la présente affaire.
o
[Projection n 3.]
20. Jan Mayen d’abord. La Colombie souli gne que : «As for the mainland coast of Norway,
it was ignored because it was too far away, just as the mainland coast of Colombia is too far away
15
in this case.» Non, non, Monsieur le président, pas «j ust as...» («tout comme...») : Jan Mayen est
11
Voir supra, par. 13-15.
12
DC, p. 241-254, par. 7.12-7.35.
13Ibid., p. 254-267, par. 7.36-7.51.
14RN, p. 132-137, par. 5.18-5.26 ; p. 185-199, par. 6.85-6.110.
15DC, p. 202, par. 6.15. - 17 -
situé à 875kilomètres des côtes de la Norvège et à460kilomètres de celles du Groënland qui
lui-même se trouve à plus de 1300 kilomètres des côtes norvégiennes, ce qui constitue quand même
une belle différence ; au surplus : comme l’avait montré la Norvège dans ses écritures, de l’époque,
«Jan Mayen . . . occupies a position of geographical and geological independence. It forms part of
16
no region or sub-region» , tandis que l’archipel de SanAndrés est situé lui sur le «seuil
nicaraguayen» ⎯ the Nicaraguan rise. Voilà une différence considérable. Par ailleurs, dans l’arrêt
de1993, la Cour a entendu assurer aux deux Parties «un accès équitable aux ressources
17
halieutiques» , problème qui ne se pose pas dans notre espèce; comme la Colombie le souligne
elle-même avec vigueur: «In the present case, similar factors are not at work» 18, «Des facteurs
similaires n’entrent pas en ligne de compte dans la présente affaire.» En outre et surtout, la Cour a
retenu que la différence entre les longueurs des côtes constituait une circonstance pertinente qui l’a
19
conduite à procéder à un ajustement de la ligne au profit du Danemark ; or, la côte pertinente de
JanMajen est plus de deuxfois etdemie plus étendue que celles de l’ ensemble des côtes de
20 21
l’archipel et le rapport des côtes pertinentes était de 1 à 9 ; dans notre affaire il est de 1 à 20 .
o o
[Fin de la projection n 3. Projection n 4.]
21. Monsieur le président, malgré les em brouillaminis auxquels s’emploie la Colombie 22, on
peut tirer les mêmes conclusions de Libye/Malte. Bien que Malte fût une «île-Etat» bien plus
grande et peuplée que l’archipel de San Andrés, la Cour a jugé que la différence entre les longueurs
des côtes des Parties est «si grande qu’elle appe lle un ajustement de la ligne médiane, afin
23
d’attribuer à la Libye une plus gra nde étendue de plateau continental» ; le rapport entre les côtes
libyennes et maltaises était de1 à 8; il est, je le rappelle, dans notre affa ire de1 à 20; la côte
16
C.I.J. Mémoires, Délimitation maritime dans la région s ituée entre le Groenland et JanMayen
(Danemark c. Norvège), contre-mémoire de la Norvège, vol. I, p. 144, par. 484.
17
Délimitation maritime dans la région situ ée entre le Groenland et JanMayen (Danemark c.Norvège), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 79, par. 91.
18
CMC, p. 409, par. 9.75.
19Délimitation maritime dans la région situ ée entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c.Norvège), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 68-69, par. 67-69.
20Ibid., p. 65, par. 61.
21RN, p. 148, par. 6.12.
22DC, p. 243-245, par. 7.16-7.17.
23
Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 50, par. 68. - 18 -
pertinente de Malte mesure 44 kilomètres, soit plus de deux fois celle de l’archipel de San Andrés
en comptant large. Quant aux arguments que la Colo mbie tente de tirer de l’intervention de l’Italie
dans Libye/Malte, ils sont un rideau de fumée sans pertinence ici.
[Fin de la projection n 4. Projection n 5.]o
S2ai2n.t-Pierre -et-Miquelon maintenant. De même que l’archipel de SanAndrés est situé
sur le plateau continental du Nicaragua, de même les deux îles françaises se trouvent sur celui du
Canada ⎯avec deux différences il est vrai: elles sont plus proches de la côte canadienne que ne
l’est l’archipel de la côte nicaraguayenne mais ⎯ et ceci, d’une certaine manière, «équilibre» cela
⎯contrairement à ce qui est le cas dans notre affair e pour la côte colombienne, la côte française
n’avait évidemment aucune pertinence. Compte tenu de cette situ ation, le Tribunal aurait pu se
borner à enclaver le petit archipel français. Il ne l’a pas fait, il a considéré que,
«[c]omme elle dispose d’une...ouverture côtière [à laquelle ne fait obstacle aucune
côte canadienne opposée ou alignée latéraleme nt], la France a pleinement droit à une
projection frontale en mer, vers le sud, jusqu’à ce qu’elle atteigne la limite extérieure
de 200millesmarins, aussi loin que tout autre segment de la côte méridionale
adjacente de Terre-Neuve» . 24
o o
[Fin de la projection n 5. Projection n 6.]
23. On peut s’interroger sur le fondement ju ridique de cette solution en forme de poêle à
frire. La transposition de celle-ci à l’archipel de San Andrés accroît en tout cas les doutes que l’on
peut avoir à cet égard: le corridor qui viendrait à être décidé aboutirait non pas au vaste océan
(comme dans l’arbitrage de1992), mais à une étroite bande de haute mer cernée par des zones
soumises à la juridiction nationale des Etats rive rains de la mer des Caraïbes; cette solution n’a
guère de sens s’agissant du plateau continental et, pour ce qui est de la zone économique exclusive
nicaraguayenne, les droits appartenant à la Colomb ie en vertu de l’article 56 de la convention de
Montego Bay (qui reflète le droit coutumier) paraissent de nature à rendre cette solution inutile et à
rassurer la Colombie.
oo o
[Fin de la projection n 6. Projection n °7.]
24 Délimitation des espaces mar itimes entre le Canada et la République française, décision du 10juin1992,
Nations Unies, RSA, vol. XXI, p. 290, par. 70. - 19 -
24. Nos amis colombiens n’aiment pas non plus le sort réservé à l’île d’AbuMusa par la
sentence rendue le 19 octobre 1981 dans l’affaire de délimitation maritime qui opposait les émirats
de Dubaï et de Sharjah. On peut les comprendr e : certes, Abu Musa n’est pas San Andrés, mais la
sentence n’en est pas moins fort in structive aux fins du règlement de l’affaire qui nous occupe en
ce que
1) tout en admettant que les deux questions sont li ées, le Tribunal arbitral distingue celle des côtes
des deux Etats à prendre en considération (peu importe qu’elles soient adjacentes ou se fassent
face: les règles applicables sont les mêmes) et celle de l’effet à reconnaître à AbuMusa. Il
convient également de faire cette distinction dans notre affaire et de procéder en deux temps:
détermination des côtes pertinentes d’abord ; effet à reconnaître à l’archipel ensuite ;
2) le Tribunal arbitral de 1981 a conclu de son examen des circonstances pertinentes que «to allow
to the island of Abu Musa any entitlement to an ar ea of the continental shelf of the Gulf beyond
the extent of its belt of territorial sea w ould indeed produce a distorting effect upon
neighbouring shelf areas» 25 ; or
3) cet effet de distorsion (distorting effect) serait tout aussi marqué ⎯ quoique différemment ⎯
dans la présente espèce ; et
4) la Colombie souligne, dans sa duplique, qu’AbuMusa n’a pas été pleinement enclavée 26,
puisque le Tribunal s’est borné à tracer un arc de cercle de 12 milles marins dans la seule zone
faisant face à Dubaï, donc à l’est. Mais la Colomb ie omet de préciser que la zone marine de la
partie d’AbuMusa faisant face à l’autre émirat de OummalQaïwaïn avait, pour sa part, déjà
été délimitée par un arc de cercle équivalent à la suite d’un accord cette fois conclu entre
Sharjah et OummalQaïwaïn en1964 27. Le Tribunal arbitral n’a fait que compléter cet
enclavement dans sa sentence de 1981.
[Fin de la projection n o 7. Projection n 8.]
25 Différend frontalier entre Dubaï et Sharjah (Emirat de Dubaï c.Emirat de Sharjah) , décision du
19 octobre 1981, ILR, vol. 91, p. 677.
26DC, p. 52-253, par. 7.33.
27Seabed Boundary Agreement between the Rulers of Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn of 1964 in J.Charney and
L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (1993, 1996), vol. II, p. 1549-1555. - 20 -
25. Monsieur le président, la Colombie déploi e des trésors d’ingéniosité pour s’affranchir du
précédent de l’arbitrage franco-britannique de1977 et éviter à l’archipel de SanAndrés le
traitement réservé aux îles Anglo-Normandes dans cette importante sentence arbitrale. On
comprend bien son souci : dans cette affaire, des îles ⎯ bien plus considérables que celles formant
l’archipel tant par leur taille (environ quatre fois celle de San Andrés et Providencia) que par leur
population (plus de 160000 habitants) et leur importance économique (un PNB de plusieurs
milliards d’euros… ah, non, c’est des livres sterling, probablement… plusieurs milliards de livres,
28
ça marche aussi) ⎯ ont été entièrement enclavées dans les ea ux de l’Etat côtier. Et, de tous les
précédents invoqués dans notre affaire, c’est assurément celui qui s’en rapproche le plus.
26. Pour tenter de l’en distinguer, la Co lombie avance trois arguments (qui se recouvrent
d’ailleurs assez largement) :
⎯ en premier lieu, l’archipel est plus éloigné des côtes nicaraguayennes que les
îles Anglo-Normandes ne le sont des côtes françaises ;
⎯ en deuxième lieu, contrairement aux îles Anglo-Normandes, il ne se trouverait pas «du mauvais
côté» de la ligne médiane, pour la bonne raison que,
29
⎯ troisièmement, il n’y aurait pas de ligne médiane dans notre affaire .
27. Sur le premier point ⎯la distance des îles aux côtes ⎯ on ne saurait nier que
SanAndrés est plus éloigné des côtes du Nicaragua que les Ecréhous ne le sont de celles de la
Normandie:12kilomètres (un peu plus de sixmilles et demi) pour les îles Anglo-Normandes
«contre» 150kilomètres (soit 80milles) pour ce qui est de la distance entre LittleCornIsland et
San Andrés. Mais il y a aussi l’autre distance à pr endre en compte, celle des îles concernées avec
les côtes de la mère patrie ;
⎯ s’agissant des îlesAnglo-Normandes, elles sont situées à environ ⎯je prends à nouveau des
chiffres ronds ⎯ entre 90 et 150 kilomètres (soit entre 50 et 80 milles) des côtes anglaises du
Dorset ;
28
Voir MN, p. 247, par. 3.112 ; DC, p. 132, par. 5.19.
29Voir surtout DC, p.162-164, par.5.9-12; p.241- 242, par.7.12-7.13. Voir aussi CMC, p.331-332,
par. 7.43-7.48. - 21 -
⎯ pour sa part, SanAndrés est éloigné des cô tes colombiennes de 710kilomètres (environ
385 milles).
Ceci est intéressant à un double titre.
28. En premier lieu, il faut mettre ces chiffres en relation les uns avec les autres. Si l’on s’en
tient à des distances «moyennes» calculées en fonction d’un «centre» virtuel des deux groupes
d’îles («l’archipel de SanAndrés», d’une part, l es îles Anglo-Normandes, d’autre part), celles-ci
sont environ quatre fois et demi plus proches de la côte française que l’archipel de San Andrés l’est
de Little Corn Island ; mais l’archipel est aussi environ six fois plus éloigné de la Colombie que les
îles Anglo-Normandes le sont de l’Angleterre. En termes de proximité et d’appartenance, toutes
proportions gardées, les choses se présentent à peu près de la même manière.
[Fin de la projection no 8. Projection n 9]
29. En second lieu, ces distances établissent avec la clarté de l’évidence que l’archipel de
SanAndrés se trouve, assurément, du mauvais côté...du plateau continental ⎯je le dis de cette
manière puisque la Colombie s’irrite que l’on parle de ligne médiane. Et pourtant,
Monsieur le président ...
30. Pourtant, le plateau continental n’est nu llement borné par la limite des 200 milles marins
comme le professeurVaughanLowe l’a montré ce matin. Aux termes de l’article76 de la
convention des NationsUnies sur le droit de la mer, c’est le rebord externe de sa marge
continentale qui en constitue la limite dans une situation comme la nôtre et, sans que j’aie besoin
d’entrer dans la géomorphologie des fonds marins de la région ⎯MM.Cleverly et Lowe l’ont
décrite en tant que de besoin ⎯ il est clair que les îles formant l’archipel de SanAndrés sont
situées sur le plateau continental du Nicaragua, alors qu’elles n’entretiennent aucun rapport avec
celui de la Colombie.
31. Je sais, Monsieur le président, que nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre n’aiment pas non
plus cette manière de présenter les choses car, disent-ils, les îles en question ont, elles aussi, droit à
un plateau continental en vertu de l’article121 de la convention de1982. Comme l’a expliqué
justement la Cour d’arbitrage qui a tranché le différend franco-britannique sur le Plateau
continental, - 22 -
«le principe du prolongement naturel du te rritoire ne saurait être interprété comme
obligeant à considérer que le plateau continental situé au nord et au nord-ouest des îles
Anglo-Normandes relève automatiquement et nécessairement de ces îles plutôt que de
la République française» . 30
Il en va de même dans notre esp èce: rien n’oblige à considérer que le plateau continental situé à
l’est de l’archipel de SanAndrés relève, automatiquement et nécessairement, des îles qui le
composent plutôt que du Nicaragua. Et, comme je l’ai dit tout à l’heure, le principe posé à
l’article 121, paragraphe 2, ne trouve application que si les règles applicables en matière de
délimitation le permettent. En l’espèce, il convi ent d’abord de tracer la limite provisoire de
l’extension du plateau continental du Nicaragua ⎯ce qui doit être fait en faisant abstraction des
îles et rochers dont la Colombie revendique la souveraineté conformément à la jurisprudence
constante des cours et tribunaux internationaux. Et ce n’est qu’une fois ceci acquis que les îles
entrent en jeu à titre de circonstances pertinentes ; et c’est à ce stade qu’il convient de s’interroger
sur les caractéristiques qu’elles présentent et sur l’effet à leur reconnaître.
32. En l’espèce, il s’agit de deux groupes de petites îles, toutes très éloignées des côtes
colombiennes mais se trouvant en plein dans la zone des 200milles au large des côtes
nicaraguayennes auxquelles elles font face. Les cô tes pertinentes des trois plus grandes d’entre
elles ont respectivement treize, huit et un demi-k ilomètre de longueur (les autres étant négligeables
⎯moins d’un kilomètre au total); pour sa pa rt, la côte nicaraguayenne opposée est longue de
450 kilomètres. Et de plus ces îles n’ont aucun lien avec la Colombie continentale.
33. Dès lors, les raisons fondamentales qui ont conduit la Cour d’arbitrage de1977 à
enclaver les îles Anglo-Normandes, en ne les dotant que d’une mer territoriale d’une largeur
maximale de 12 milles marins, sont pleinement transposables en l’espèce :
«Si la présence des îles Anglo-Normandes auprès de la côte française permettait
de faire dévier le tracé de cette ligne médiane du milieu de la Manche, le résultat serait
une distorsion radicale de la délimitation, cr éatrice d’inéquité ... Non seulement les
îles Anglo-Normandes sont «du mauvais côté » de la ligne médiane passant au milieu
de la Manche, mais elles sont aussi totalement détachées géographiquement du
31
Royaume-Uni.»
30
Délimitation du plateau continental en tre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagn e et d’Irlande du Nord et la
République française, 30 juin 1977, Nations Unies, RSA, vol. XVIII, p. 227, par. 192.
31Ibid., p. 226, par. 199. - 23 -
Elles sont aussi totalement déta chées géographiquement du Royaume–Uni , comme le sont les îles
de l’archipel de la Colombie.
34. De même, dans l’affaire qui a opposé récemment le Bangladesh au Myanmar, le Tribunal
de Hambourg a reconnu que l’île de Saint-Martin est une «formation mar itime importante du fait
de sa superficie, de sa population et de l’ampleur des activités économiques et autres» 32. Il n’en a
pas moins estimé qu’
«en raison de sa localisation, donner à l’ île de SaintMartin un effet dans la
délimitation de la zone économique exclus ive et du plateau continental produirait une
ligne qui bloquerait la projection de la côte du Myanmar vers le large de telle manière
qu’il en résulterait une distorsion injustifi ée de la ligne de délimitation. L’effet de
distorsion que produit une île peut s’accroître de façon sensible à mesure que la ligne
s’éloigne de la côte, au-delà de 12 milles marins.
319. Pour ces motifs, le Tribunal décide que l’île de Saint-Martin ne constitue
pas une circonstance pertinente et que, pa r conséquent, il ne donnera aucun effet à
cette île dans le tracé de la ligne de délimitation de la zone économique exclusive et du
33
plateau continental.»
35. Même si la localisation de l’archip el de SanAndrés par rapport aux Parties qui
s’opposent dans notre espèce est évidemment diffé rente de celle des îles Anglo-Normandes par
rapport à la France et au Royaume-Uni ou de l’île de Saint-Martin par rapport au Bangladesh et au
Myanmar, ces considérations dans leur principe n’en sont pas moins, en tous points, transposables
à notre espèce. J’ai expliqué pourquoi l’archipel de SanAndrés ne se trouve en tout cas pas «du
bon côté» du plateau continental si l’on se place dans la perspective de la Colombie. Il est en outre
«totalement détaché géographiquement » de la Colombie. Et il est tout à fait apparent que si la
présence de l’archipel face à la côte nicaraguayenne permettait de faire dévier le tracé de la ligne
provisoire ⎯ qui doit l’être entre les plat eaux continentaux des deux Etats ⎯, le résultat serait une
distorsion radicale de la délimitation, créatrice d’iniquité.
36. Comme l’a noté la Cour unanime dans Roumanie contre Ukraine , il lui appartient en
effet, lors de la deuxième phase de la délimitation ⎯celle à laquelle nous no us intéressons en ce
moment, Monsieur le président ⎯, d’examiner «s’il existe des facteurs appelant un ajustement ou
32
Différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière maritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du
Bengale, (Bangladesh/Myanmar), T.I.D.M., arrêt du 14 mars 2012, p. 53, par. 151.
33Ibid., p. 101, par. 318-319. - 24 -
un déplacement de la ligne…provisoire afin de parvenir à un résultat équitable» ( Délimitation
maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. U kraine), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2009 , p.101, par.120) 3. Et,
faisant application de ce principe, la Cour a précisé qu’«[e]n cas de disparités particulièrement
marquées entre les longueurs des côtes, la Cour pe ut choisir de traiter cette réalité géographique
comme une circonstance pertinente qui exigerait de procéder à quelques ajustements de la ligne
d’équidistance provisoire» ( ibid., p.116, par.164) 35. Tel est assurément le cas en la présente
espèce, dans laquelle le rapport des côtes additionn ées des îles de l’archipel de San Andrés à celui
de la côte du Nicaragua est, je le rappelle encore une fois, de un à vingt. Il paraît donc équitable et
raisonnable de procéder avec l’archipel de la mê me manière que la Cour d’arbitrage de 1977 à
36
l’égard des (beaucoup plus importantes) îles Anglo-Normandes et d’enfermer les différentes îles
constituant l’archipel de San Andrés dans des enclaves s’étendant à 12 milles marins de leurs lignes
de base respectives. A cet égard, il n’existe aucune raison que l’équité de 2 012 diffère de l’équité
de 1977 ⎯et la solution est d’autant plus généreu se que, je le répète, le s îles Anglo-Normandes
avaient alors, et conservent aujourd’hui, une importance démographique, géographique et
économique bien plus considérable que celle des trois petites îles et des petits îlots composant
l’archipel de San Andrés.
o
[Fin de la projection n 9.]
Section 3
Les cayes septentrionales
37. Cette importance est, bien sûr, sans co mmune mesure avec celle des petites cayes situées
au nord de l’archipel de SanAndrés. Je serai plus concis en ce qui l es concerne, Monsieur le
président, pour trois raisons :
34Voir aussi Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameoun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée
équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 441, par. 288.
35Voir aussi Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 313, par. 157 ; Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 45, par. 58 ; Délimitation maritime dans la région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen
(Danemark c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 69, par. 69 ; Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le
Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 446, par. 301.
36Voir la sentence du 30 juin 1977, Nations Unies, RSA, vol. XVIII, p. 231, par. 202. - 25 -
1) comme l’a montré le professeur Remiro Brotóns hier, la Colombie ne peut se prévaloir d’aucun
titre de souveraineté sur ces formations maritimes ; ce que je vais dire à leur propos n’a donc
qu’un caractère subsidiaire ;
2) le raisonnement juridique qui s’applique à la délimitation des zones maritimes entourant
l’archipel de San Andrés s’applique a fortiori à ces très petits îlets ; et
3) les prétentions de la Colombie à leur égard sont encore plus saugrenues que ses revendications
d’espaces maritimes autour des îles composant l’archipel.
38. M. Oude Elferink a décrit ce matin, au point de vue géographique, l’ensemble des cayes
sur lesquelles la Colombie prétend exercer sa souveraineté ⎯ et qu’elle affecte aussi de considérer
comme un tout (prolongeant l’archipel de SanAndrés sans solution de continuité) 37. Plusieurs
conclusions peuvent être tirées de cette description :
1) il n’existe aucune espèce de continuité géogr aphique entre ces cayes ou groupes de cayes, ni
entre eux, ni avec l’archipel ;
o
[Projection n 10.]
2) il s’agit en réalité de quelques petits îlots isolés sans lien les uns avec les autres si ce n’est leur
présence sur le plateau continental du Nicaragua ; et les adroites représentations qu’en ont
données les cartographes de la Colombie n’y peuvent rien changer: ce n’est pas en entourant
ces cayes de cercles bleu foncé que l’on modifie la réalité : il s’agit de toute petites formations
insulaires isolées dans la mer des Caraïbes et très éloignées les unes des autres 38 ; et
3) il est difficile de ne pas considérer ces îlo ts comme des rochers au sens du paragraphe3 de
l’article 121 de la convention de Montego Bay.
o
[Fin de la projection n 10.]
La Colombie ne s’embarrasse pas d’une trop longue démonstration sur ce point: elle écrit
dans sa duplique : «A mere glance at the photographs that Colombia included in
its Counter-Memorial shows unequivocally that the islands [in question] cannot
39
possibly be considered to be mere «rocks»» . Je me contenterai donc de dire, tout aussi
37
Voir aussi RC, p. 105-110, par. 4.6-4.14 ; MN, p. 248-251, par. 3.115-3.122.
38
DC, p. 110, par. 4.14 ; MN, p. 248-251, par. 3.115-3.122.
39DC, p. 171, par. 5.27. - 26 -
40
cavalièrement , que c’est le contraire qui est vrai : un simple coup d’Œil aux photographies jointes
par la Colombie à ses écritures suffit à établir que ces très petites formations insulaires ne se prêtent
ni à l’habitation humaine (je veux dire à une occupation humaine durable et continue), ni à une vie
économique propre :
⎯ Roncador... [Projection n o 11.]
o
⎯ Serrana... [Projection n 12.]
o
⎯ Serranilla... [Projection n 13.]
⎯ Bajo Nuevo... [Projection n o 14.]
o
[Projection n 15.]
39. Mais outre la réponse légitime du berger à la bergère, il y a une autre raison pour laquelle
il me paraît inutile de refaire une longue démonstration: quand bien même ces cayes
appartiendraient à la Colombie (quod non), quand bien même elle devraient être considérées
comme des îles au sens du paragraphe 2 de l’article 121 ( quod non à nouveau), ceci ne changerait
strictement rien au fait que, dans les circonstan ces de l’espèce, elles ne devraient être dotées que
d’un espace circum-insulaire minimal: même s’ils appa rtenaient à la Colombie, ces îlots
minuscules ne sauraient priver le Nicaragua d’une part très considérable de son plateau continental.
Et je me permets de rappeler à cet égard, Monsieur le président, que, comme nous l’avons montré
plus en détail dans notre réplique, la reconnaissance de la souveraineté de la Colombie et d’une mer
territoriale de 12milles marins entraînerait dans chaque cas la perte de 450milles marins carrés
(833km²); il faut plus de 37milles marins de longueur de côte du Nicaragua pour produire la
même superficie de mer territoriale 41. Au vu de la jurisprudence dans des cas comparables ⎯ et je
42
pense en particulier au sort réservé à Qit’atJaradah dans Qatar/Bahreïn (dont on a parlé ce
43
matin), et à Alcatraz dans Guinée/Guinée Bissau (qui se sont vu reconnaître l’une et l’autre une
40Mais voir RN, p. 105-110, par. 4.6-4.14, ou p. 158, par. 6.29.
41Voir MN, p. 254-255, par. 3.129 ; et MN, vol. I, figure IV.
42
Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c.Bahreïn), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 108-109, par. 219, 220, 222 ; voir aussi RN, par. 6.64-6.65.
43
Délimitation de la frontière maritime entre la Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau , sentence arbitrale du
14 février 1985, Nations Unies, RSA, vol.XX, p.190, par.111, point a); voir aussi MN, p.257-258, par.3.133; et RN,
p. 214, par. 6.146. - 27 -
mer territoriale large de deuxmillesmarins et demi ), une zone de troismilles marins autour de
chacune de ces cayes constituerait une concession plutôt généreuse.
40. Monsieur le président, il me faut conclure et récapituler :
1) la première phase de la délimitation du plateau continental entre les Parties consiste à tracer une
ligne provisoire déterminant leur s droits souverains respectifs sans tenir compte des petites
formations insulaires se trouvant dans cette zone ;
2) l’ensemble des îles, îlots, cayes et récifs sur lesquels la Colombie revendique sa souveraineté
sont situés du «mauvais côté» de cette ligne, sur la partie du plateau continental du Nicaragua
dans la mer des Caraïbes, quelle que soit la façon dont on trace la ligne ;
3) l’attribution de la zone maritime à laquelle ch acune de ces formations insulaires peut prétendre
doit se faire île par île, rocher par rocher et non globalement comme le prétend la Partie
colombienne qui veut faire croire à l’existence d’un chapelet d’îles là où, en réalité, existent des
petits îlets éparpillés dans la mer des Caraïbes ;
4) compte tenu des circonstances de l’espèce, il serait totalement inéquitable de reconnaître à l’une
quelconque de ces formations davantage qu’une me r territoriale ; étant donnée leur importance
relative, les trois îles principales de l’archipel de SanAndrés peuvent bénéficier, peut-être,
d’une mer territoriale de 12milles marins. En revanche, une telle largeur en faveur des cayes
septentrionales aurait pour conséquence une amput ation tout à fait excessive des droits du
Nicaragua sur le plateau continental environnant.
Merci, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, de m’avoir à nouveau écouté avec attention et
e
bienveillance. Puis-je vous demander, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler M Reichler à
la barre.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Pellet. I give the floor to Dr. Reichler after a
short coffee break of 10 minutes. The hearing is suspended.
The Court adjourned from 3.50 to 4.10 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is resumed. Mr. Reichler, this is now your
moment, please take the floor. - 28 -
Mr. REICHLER:
C OLOMBIA ’S ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF DELIMITATION METHODOLOGY
AND THE INEQUITABLE SOLUTION IT PRODUCES
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, good afternoon. It is, as always, an honour for me
to appear before you.
2. I will address you on what is wrong with Colombia’s delimitation methodology and the
resulting delimitation line that Colombia asks you to adopt. This is a daunting challenge. Not
because it is difficult to point out the errors iColombia’s approach. But because there are so
many of them that it is difficult to point them all out in the time allotted to me by the Agent of
Nicaragua.
3. So I will get right into it. What is wrong with Colombia’s approach to maritime
delimitation between it and Nicaragua? Literally, everything.
4. Colombia purports to apply equidistance methodology to delimit an EEZ and a continental
shelf boundary between the islands it claims, and those of Nicaragua. This is their first mistake.
This is not a proper case for equidistance. An equidistance line ⎯ any equidistance line ⎯ will
inevitably fail to produce an equitable result in th at area. This is because the delimitation in the
western sector of the Caribbean Sea is between Nicaragua’s extensive mainland coast, which is the
dominant geographic feature in the area, and several small islands claimed by Colombia which lie
in front of Nicaragua’s coast, geographically de tached and very far removed from Colombia’s
mainland, and which, according to the case law a dopted by this Court and other international
tribunals, are entitled to no weight in the delimita tion of any maritime zones beyond the territorial
sea. For these reasons, as ProfessorPellet has explained, the equitable solution called for by
international law, as applied to the particular geographic circumstances of this case, is to draw
territorial sea enclaves around each of the islands over which, in the Court’s view, Colombia is
sovereign.
A. Colombia’s flawed approach to maritime delimitation
5. Mr.President, Colombia has not only used the wrong delimitation methodology; they
have also wrongly applied the equidistance formula they claim to be following. - 29 -
6. The Court has made it clear in several cases that maritime delimitation involves a
three-step process.
7. The first step is the drawing of a provisional delimitation line. The second step is to
consider whether there are any relevant circumstances that require an adjustment to the provisional
line, in order to achieve the equitable solution that international law requires. And the third step is
to conduct a proportionality/disproportionality test to determine whether the line equitably divides
the relevant maritime area between the two parties. This three- step approach has been endorsed
repeatedly by the Court, by arbitral tribunals a nd, most recently, by the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea in the Bangladesh v. Myanmar case 44.
8. Colombia purports to follow this three-step process. But do they? For their first step, they
draw an equidistance line between the small isla nds that they claim, which are geographically
detached and far removed from the Colombian main land, and the Nicaraguan islands lying just off
Nicaragua’s mainland coast. For their second step, they conclude that there are no relevant
circumstances justifying an adjustment of their provisional equidistance line.
tFeor. third step . . . wait a minute! There is no third step by Colombia, only the first
two. They completely ignore the third step in the application of well-established delimitation
methodology.
10. The third step, as I have said, is to c onduct a proportionality/disproportionality analysis
to determine whether the line resulting from the firs t two steps is equitable. This involves, as the
Court has repeatedly explained, and ITLO S has summarized in its recent judgment in
Bangladesh v. Myanmar, a comparison “between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the
ratio of the relevant maritime areas allocated to each Party” 45. This chart shows how ITLOS,
relying strictly on this Court’s precedents, applie d the proportionality/disproportionality test in
Bangladesh v. Myanmar. As you can see, the Tribunal measur ed the parties’ relevant coasts and
determined that the ratio between them was 1:1.42 in favour of Myanmar. Then it determined the
4Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 (hereinafter “Libya v.
Malta”), p.46, para.60; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009
(hereinafter “ Romania v. Ukraine” or “the Black Sea case”), pp.101-103, paras.116-122; Dispute concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),
Judgment, ITLOS, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter “Bangladesh v. Myanmar”), para. 240.
4Bangladesh v. Myanmar, para. 240. - 30 -
ratio between the relevant maritime areas that were allocated to each party by its proposed
delimitation line. This was 1:1.54 in favour of Myanmar. Since the difference between the two
ratios was not disproportionate, the Tribunal conclu ded that the delimitation line was equitable to
both parties.
11. Colombia’s failure to mention, let alone apply, the third element of delimitation
methodology ⎯the proportionality/disproportionality test ⎯could not have been a simple
oversight. My friends on the other side are learned and experienced counsel. It is not credible that
every one of them just happened to forget to apply the required test to determine whether
Colombia’s proposed delimitation line is e quitable. Why did they not perform a
proportionality/disproportionality test? Or did they? And if they did, why did they not show you
the results? Why did they omit them from both their Counter-Memorial and their Rejoinder? Are
they trying to hide them from you, or divert your attention from them? If the answers to those
questions are not already blindingly obvious, I trust that they will be by the time I conclude my
remarks.
12. But let me proceed step by step. Not only has Colombia failed to apply the required third
step in the delimitation process. It has applied the first two steps in a completely wrong manner.
B. Colombia’s delimitation line is wrong
13. Colombia has got the first step ⎯ the drawing of a provisional delimitation line ⎯
terribly wrong. This step has four parts: first, the determination of the parties’ relevant coasts;
second, the determination of the area to be delim ited, the so-called relevant area; and if, as
Colombia proposes, equidistance is the methodology to be used, the third part is the placement of
appropriate base points along each party’s relevant co ast; and then part four is the mathematical
construction of the provisional equidistance line using these base points. Because, as you will see,
Colombia got the first three parts wrong, the li ne resulting from the mathematical process in the
fourth part is necessarily wrong as well.
C. Relevant coasts
14. The analysis always begins with the identif ication of the relevant coasts. This is true,
regardless of which delimitation methodology is ultimately employed, whether equidistance, angle - 31 -
bisectors, parallels or meridians, or enclavement. Let us take a look at what Colombia considers
the relevant coasts, through a series of graphics assembled at tabs 85 and 86 of your judges’
folders. For Colombia, these are the relevant coast s: the west-facing coasts of its claimed insular
features, shown in red ⎯Albuquerque Cay, San Andrés, Providencia, and Quitasueño ⎯ and the
east-facing coasts of Nicaragua’s coastal islands, shown in blue: the Corn Islands, Roca Tyra, Ned
Thomas Cay, the Miskito Cays, and Edinburgh Cay. The problem here is that this is not a full or
an accurate picture of Nicaragua’s relevant coast . There is something missing from Colombia’s
picture. And here it is. What Colombia excludes from its picture is Nicaragua’s extensive
mainland coast, which is 453km long. Colombia pretends that Nicaragua’s mainland coast does
not exist. It wants Nicaragua’s mainland coast to disappear from the map. It wants the Court to
treat this case as if it were a delimitation solely between the small mid-sea islands of one State and
the small, fringing islands of another, which might appear, without more, to balance each other out.
But that is not this case. Here, Nicaragua’s fring ing islands, rocks and cays are closely backed up
by a very prominent coast, of which some of th ese features form an integral part, lying within
Nicaragua’s 12-mile territorial sea limit. For Colombia, Nicaragua’s relevant coast consists only of
the east-facing coasts of these small, coastal isla nds, and does not include Nicaragua’s extensive
east-facing mainland coast. There is no justification for this in geography or in law.
15. Now, there is no mystery here, Mr. President, in regard to why Colombia has taken this
approach. Its reason for denying the relevance of Nicaragua’s mainland coast is quite obvious. If
only Nicaragua’s islands are considered part of its relevant coast, the length of that coast is the sum
of the islands’ east-facing sides, a mere 24km. This is roughly equivalent to the length of the
relevant coast Colombia claims for itself; the sum of the west-facing coasts of Colombia’s insular
features is 21km. But if Nicaragua’s mainland coast is counted ⎯as it surely must be ⎯ the
equities change dramatically. Nicaragua’s relevant coast is 453km, as compared to Colombia’s
21 km, a ratio of more than 21:1.
16. Colombia struggles to explain its exclusi on of Nicaragua’s mainland coast. Their core
argument is that, because Nicaragua and Colombia ’s mainland coasts are separated by more than
400miles, neither is relevant to this delimitation. That is both wrong and a non sequitur. It is
wrong because both mainland coasts are necessarily relevant to the delimitation of the two States’ - 32 -
overlapping continental shelves, as ProfessorLowe has explained. And it is a non sequitur ,
because, even if Colombia’s mainland coast is i rrelevant to any delimitation within 200miles of
Nicaragua’s coast (since any areas lying within 200miles of Nicaragua are necessarily more than
200miles from Colombia), it does not follow that Nicaragua’s mainland coas t is irrelevant to a
delimitation within 200miles of itself. To the contrary, Nicaragua’s mainland coast generates a
potential entitlement to an exclusive economic zone out to a distance of 200miles from the
baselines from which its territorial sea is measured, and to a continental shelf extending at least that
far. That is indisputable under the Law of the Sea Convention and general international law
applicable to all States 46.
17. Colombia is wrong, therefore, to disregard Nicaragua’s mainland coast in its
identification of Nicaragua’s relevant coast for the purpose of drawing a provisional delimitation
line.
D. Relevant area
18. Colombia is not only wrong about the relevant coasts. It is also wrong about the relevant
area: the area to be delimited in this case. Here ag ain, the relevant area is to be identified prior to
and independently of the delimitation methodology la ter to be employed. As the Court has made
clear on numerous occasions, the relevant area is the area where the seaward projections of the
relevant coasts overlap 47. This is illustrated in the next series of graphics, which appear together at
tab87 of your judges’ folders. It is indisputable that Nicara gua’s mainland coast, including the
adjacent islands that form an integral part of it, generates a potential exclusive economic zone
entitlement out to a distance of 200 miles, as shown on your screens now, in the first graphic of this
series. So do the coasts of Colombia’s islands ⎯ namely, San Andrés and Providencia ⎯ that
qualify as true islands and are not mere “rocks”, as defined by Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Law
of the Sea Convention. This is the 200 mile potential entitleme nt of San Andrés and Providencia,
subtracting the areas that Colombia recognizes as pertaining to third States. Entitlement, of course,
46Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America) ,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, (hereinafter “ Gulf of Maine ”), p.294, para.94Maritime Delimitation in the Area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , (hereinafter “Jan Mayen”),
p. 59, para. 48.
47Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, (hereinafter
“Tunisia/Libya”), pp. 61-62, para. 75; Jan Mayen, p. 64, para. 59; Romania v. Ukraine, p. 97, para. 99. - 33 -
is not title. It is for the Court to determine title, by dividing the area of overlapping potential
entitlements equitably between the Parties.
19. This is the area of overlapping potential entitlements, where Nicaragua’s and Colombia’s
potential entitlements within 200 miles of Nicara gua’s mainland coast overlap. The purple area is
thus the relevant area where any delimitation with in 200 miles of Nicaragua’s coast would have to
take place. Defining the relevant area in this manner is entirely consistent with the Court’s prior
jurisprudence. It follows the approach repeatedly taken by the Court and arbitral tribunals
(Jan Mayen, p.64, para. 59; Romania v. Ukraine, p.99, para.110). But it is not Colombia’s
approach. This is how Colombia defines the releva nt area. What is wrong with this picture? For
Colombia, the relevant area, the area in dispute, does not extend westward of Nicaragua’s coastal
and fringing islands towards Nicar agua’s mainland coast; nor, mo re importantly, does it extend
eastward of its own insular features to the out er limit of Nicaragua’s 200-mile EEZ entitlement.
For Colombia, this area, now highlighted ⎯ to the east of San Andrés and Providencia -- is not in
dispute because it all belongs to Colombia, a nd Nicaragua has no entitlement. According to
Colombia’s Rejoinder: “The maritime areas lying east of the islands of San Andrés, Providencia,
Santa Catalina, Albuquerque and Quitasueño have nothing to do with Nicaragua. ” (Emphasis
48
added.) Why not? The area east of those features that Colombia has excluded from the relevant
area is within 200 miles of Nicaragua’s mainland coast, which means that Nicaragua by law has a
potential entitlement to it. Colombia cannot nullif y Nicaragua’s potential entitlement to the area
east of SanAndrés Island simply by assuming its own conclusion that the area has nothing to do
with Nicaragua, any more than Nicaragua can nullify Colombia’s potential entitlement by claiming
that it has nothing to do with Colombia.
20. Colombia argues that its so-called “ch ain” of unconnected islands, stretching from
Quitasueño in the north to Albuquerque Cay in the south, is “equivalent to a mainland coast” 49, and
therefore functions as though it were a contin uous landmass, the brick wall depicted by
ProfessorPellet earlier this afternoon, that bloc ks and shuts off the extension of Nicaragua’s
coastally-generated maritime entitlements approxima tely 150miles short of their 200-mile EEZ
48
RC, para. 5.48.
4RC, para. 5.46. - 34 -
limit under Article 57 of the Law of the Sea Convention, and more than 350 miles short of the limit
of Nicaragua’s continental margin under Article76. There is no precedent for such a drastic
cut-off of Nicaragua’s maritime entitlements, either in the case law or in State practice, both of
which I will address later in this speech.
21. To treat all of the disputed area where the Parties’ potential entitlements overlap as the
area to be delimited in this case is not, of cour se, to decide whether it belongs to Nicaragua or
Colombia. The equitable division of the area in dispute comes at the end of the delimitation
process, not the beginning. Colombia seeks to reverse this well-established process, by arbitrarily
defining out of the relevant area everything east of its so-called “chain” of islands, leaving all of
this area to Colombia by default. That is not a proper application of equidistance or any other
delimitation methodology. Here again, Colombia has got it wrong.
22. Colombia is also wrong in arguing that the relevant area as defined by Nicaragua
“disregards the rights of third States” 50. In fact, the relevant area, as defined by Nicaragua,
excludes those areas claimed by Costa Rica and Panama as a result of their delimitation agreements
with Colombia, and it excludes the area belonging to Honduras under the Court’s 2007 Judgment in
the case between Nicaragua and Honduras. More over, any delimitation between Nicaragua and
Colombia would necessarily be without prejudice to the rights of third States under Article59 of
the Court’s Statute 51, and, as both Nicaragua and Colombia agree, and the Court has already
observed in regard to Costa Rica, the interests of third States can be protected by terminating the
delimitation line with a directional arrow short of any area claimed by a non-party State 52.
50
RC, para. 5.67.
51Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 59. See also Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554, paras. 46, 49; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1994, p. 6, paras. 17, 63; Delimitation of the Continental She lf between France and the United Kingdom , (hereinafter
“Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case ”), Decision, 30June 1977, reprinted in United Nations, Reports of International
Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. 18, p. 3 , para. 28; Bangladesh v. Myanmar, para. 367.
52 “In the present case, Costa Rica’s interest of a legal nature may only be affected if the maritime
boundary that the Court has been asked to draw between Nicaragua and Colombia were to be extended
beyond a certain latitude southwar ds. The Court, following its jurisprudence, when drawing a line
delimiting the maritime areas between the Parties to the main proceedings, will, if necessary, end the line
in question before it reaches an area in which the interests of a legal nature of third States may be
involved (see Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2009, p.100, para. 112).” ( Application by Costa Rica for Perm ission to Intervene, Territorial and
Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 4 May 2011, para. 89.) - 35 -
23. In any event, in the Black Sea case, the Court was not troubled by the inclusion of some
third party entitlements in the description of the relevant area, because
“where areas are included solely for the purpose of approximate identification of
overlapping entitlements of the Parties to the case, which may be deemed to constitute
the relevant area (and which in due course will play a part in the final stage testing for
disproportionality), third party entitlements cannot be affected” ( Romania v. Ukraine,
p. 100, para. 114).
24. Applying the methodology employed by the Court in the Black Sea and other cases, the
area where the potential entitlements of Nicaragua and Colombia overlap measures 214,000 sq km.
That is the relevant area that must be equitably delimited by the Court.
E. Base points
25. This brings me to the matter of base points. These are only relevant if equidistance is the
delimitation methodology to be employed. For Nicaragua, which considers equidistance
inappropriate to the circumstances of any delimita tion within 200miles of its mainland coast, the
issue of base points, whose only function is to plot the equidistance line, does not arise. Colombia
advocates equidistance, and because of that, it needs to use base points. But, here again, Colombia
has erred. There is no justification for placing base points, as Colombia does, on Albuquerque Cay,
which we say is a rock but in any case is too insi gnificant to justify a base point, or on Quitasueño,
which is under water. The jurisprudence of this Court and other international tribunals does not
support the placement of base points on such insigni ficant features. Nor is it appropriate, in the
geographic circumstances present here, for Colo mbia to place base points on the islands of
San Andrés and Providencia.
26. The two most recent judicial decisions demonstrate this. In Bangladesh v. Myanmar,
where ITLOS expressly followed ICJ precedents , the tribunal decided that Bangladesh’s
St. Martin’s Island did not warrant a base point in the construction of the provisional equidistance
line beyond the territorial sea. The tribunal explaine d that if St. Martin’s Island were given a base
point, the island would have blocked the seaward projection of Myanmar’s coast, and the resulting
delimitation would be inequitable to Myanmar 53. As shown on the screen, and at tab88 of your
judges’ folders, St. Martin’s Island is a coastal island, located only 4.5 miles from the Bangladesh
53
Bangladesh v. Myanmar, para. 265. - 36 -
mainland coast, and forming an integral part of it. It measures 8 sq km, which is much larger than
all of the insular features claimed by Colombia except SanAndrés and Providencia. In fact,
St.Martin’s is more than four times larger th an all the other alleged Colombian features put
together. As you can see from these photographs, al so found at tab88, it is a substantial island
with an economic life of its own; it has more than 7,000 permanent inhabitants, and hosts more
than 300,000 tourists annually. If St. Martin’s di d not get a base point, because in the Tribunal’s
54
view “it would result in an unwarranted distortion of the delimitation line” , then neither should
Colombia’s insular features.
27. ITLOS cited and relied upon th is Court’s Judgment in the Black Sea case, among others,
in its decision not to place a base point on St. Mar tin’s Island, and not to give it any effect on the
delimitation line in the EEZ and continental shelf. In the Black Sea case, the Court likewise
refused to place a base point on Ukraine’s Serpen ts’ Island, because of the island’s small size and
its distance from the mainland coast. Serpents’ Island has a surface area of 0.17sqkm and a
circumference of approximately 2,000 m. But, smal l as it is, it is still larger than two of the insular
features where Colombia would place a base point . Serpents’ Island has a detachment of border
guards and a lighthouse. Yet, these factors were not sufficient, in the view of the Court, to merit
placement of a base point on that island. Dist ance from the mainland coast also counted against
placement of a base point. Serpents’ Island, the C ourt found, could not be considered a coastal or
fringing island because it was located 20miles offshor e. Colombia’s insular features, including
San Andrés and Providencia, likewise are not coastal or fringing islands; they are geographically
detached from Colombia and located hundreds of miles from its mainland.
28. A list of cases in which such non-coastal islands ⎯ some with permanent human
habitation and economic life ⎯ have been ruled ineligible for the placement of base points in the
construction of the delimitation line has already been provided by Professor Pellet.
29. Based on these judicial and arbitral precedents, Colombia is wrong to place base points
on any of the features where it purports to place them ⎯ Albuquerque Cay, San Andrés,
Providencia and Quitasueño ⎯ and, if these were eliminated, it would be unable, for the same
54
Bangladesh v. Myanmar, para. 265. - 37 -
reasons, to place any base points on East Cay, So utheast Cay, Roncador, Serrano, Serranilla or
Bajo Nuevo. With the exception of San Andrés a nd Providencia, all of these could be classified as
“rocks” under Article 121, paragraph3, but in any event they are tiny, insignificant and
uninhabitable features, except Quitasueño, which is under water. Under th e applicable case law,
none of them is a suitable location for placement of a base point in the construction of a provisional
delimitation line.
30. To summarize the discussion thus far, we have seen that Colombia has got the relevant
coasts wrong, most significantly in regard to the exclusion of Nicaragua’s mainland coast; it has
got the relevant area wrong, because it has excluded the area of overlapping entitlements ⎯ and
disputed claims ⎯ east of its claimed insular features and within 200miles of Nicaragua’s coast;
and it has placed base points on features where they do not belong. Thus, Colombia has erred in
regard to the first step of maritime delimitation methodology: it has got the provisional
delimitation line wrong. It has put it in the wrong place.
31. There is no Colombian mainland coast, or brick wall of Colombian islands opposite
Nicaragua’s mainland coast, capable of blocking its seaward projection to a distance of 200 miles;
and there is accordingly no justificati on for placing a provisional delimitation line ⎯ whose
distorting effects are all too obvious ⎯ in a location that would produce these blocking effects.
F. Relevant circumstances and the adjustment of the provisional delimitation line
32. Mr.President, Colombia fares no better in regard to the second step of the delimitation
process: adjustment of the provisional line based on relevant circumstances in order to achieve an
equitable solution. Colombia’s thesis is that it got the provisional delimitation line so perfectly
right that no adjustment is required, that there are no relevant circumstances, and that, therefore, the
provisional line constructed by Colombia should be adopted as the final delimitation line by the
Court. This is not a sustainable view. In the first place, as I have said, Colombia’s provisional
delimitation line is wrongly constructed and located in the wrong place. But even if, quod non, that
were not the case, the line is severely distor ted by Colombia’s islands in a manner highly
prejudicial to Nicaragua, such that relevant circ umstances exist sufficient to require rejection of
Colombia’s line in order to achieve an equitable solution. - 38 -
33. In assessing the distorting effects of minor maritime features, there is a dichotomy in
methodology, but a harmony in objective and result. In most cases, this Court and other tribunals
had determined a priori that minor features should not be taken into account in constructing even a
provisional delimitation line. I have already given two examples of this: Bangladesh v. Myanmar
and the Black Sea case. In the opinions of some commentators, however, the approach should be to
take into account, in the first in stance, every ma ritime feature ⎯ regardless of its small size or
location ⎯ and use it in the plotting of the provisional line; and then, after assessing whether these
minor features exert disproportionate effects on the line, to treat them as relevant circumstances,
exclude them from consideration, and adjust the line accordingly. Under either approach, the same
effect is achieved: the exclusion of the minor feature, and the removal of its influence on the
course of the final delimitation line.
34. Regardless of which approach is followed, it is a question of judgment for the Court to
determine whether the impact of an island on the delimitation line is so distorting ⎯ and
inequitable to the other party ⎯ as to warrant an adjustment to the line, either by excluding the
feature altogether, or by giving it substantially redu ced weight in the construction of the final line.
And this judgment can only be made in the contex t of the specific geographical circumstances of a
55
particular case . This point was very ably made by Sir Derek Bowett, in his article on Islands,
Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations : “The notion of
‘distortion’ is always linked to a perception of what the line would otherwise be, if the island did
not exist. A variation caused by the island which appears inequitable, given the location and size
56
of the island, will be regarded as a ‘distortion’.”
35. With Sir Derek’s sensible approach in mind, let us look at examples from the case law.
A review of these cases demonstrates that they all have a very important common element: in each
case where an island was found to cause the delim itation line to block or cut off the seaward
projection of the other State’s coast, the remedy was to ignore the island altogether, or, in rarer
cases, to give it such reduced weight so that its effect on the line would not be to block or cut off
55
Bangladesh v. Myanmar, para. 317.
5D. Bowett, “Islands, Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations” in J. Charney
and L. M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (1993), Vol. I, p. 144. - 39 -
the seaward projection of the other State’s coast. As I review the cases, this theme ⎯ common to
all of them ⎯ will stand out.
1. Distorting effects of small islands opposite mainland coasts
(a) Bangladesh v. Myanmar
36. We start with the most recent case, Bangladesh v. Myanmar, using graphics that can be
found at tab89 of your judges’ folders . Here is ITLOS’s explanation of why St.Martin’s Island
was given no weight at all in determining the ma ritime boundary beyond a 12-mile territorial sea:
“St. Martin’s Island is an important feature”, but
“because of its location, giving effect to St. Martin’s Island in the delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf would result in a line blocking the
seaward projection from Myanmar’s coast in a manner that would cause an
unwarranted distortion of the delimitation line” 57.
Here is what the Tribunal was referring to. You can see on your screens how an equidistance line
giving effect to St. Martin’s Island would have blocked and cut off the seaward projection of part
of Myanmar’s coast, represented by the red arrows. This is what the Tribunal called the “blocking
[of] the seaward projection from Myanmar’s coast in a manner that would cause an unwarranted
distortion of the delimitation line”. And this is what the Tribunal found necessary to avoid, in
order to achieve an equitable solution. You can now see on your screens how the Tribunal avoided
it. It enclaved St.Martin’s within a 12-mile territorial sea, and gave it no weight at all in
determining the portion of the boundary that was ba sed on equidistance, beyond 12 miles, or in the
remainder of the boundary which was based on a constant azimuth.
37. Here, and at tab90 of your judges’ folders, by way of comparison, is the effect of
Colombia’s proposed delimitation line, which is derived from its base points on Albuquerque Cay,
San Andrés, Providencia and Quitasueño, on the seaward projection of Nicaragua’s coast. It is
obvious from these graphics that the blocking or cut-off effect of Colombia’s islands on
Nicaragua’s seaward projection is far more severe than the blocking effect of St. Martin’s Island on
Myanmar’s seaward projection. By basing its delimitation line on these insular features, Colombia
has produced a line that not only cuts across Nicara gua’s coastal front, but runs almost perfectly
57
Bangladesh v. Myanmar, para. 318. - 40 -
perpendicular to the seaward projection of that coast for its entire length. Mr. President, this is the
ultimate in cut-off effect. It does not get any worse than this.
38. The blocking effect on the seaward projection of Nicaragua’s coast is just as severe if, as
in this graphic now on your screens, Albuquerque Cay and Quitasueño are ignored, as they must
be. What this graphic shows is the “distortion” produced solely by San Andrés and Providencia. It
is still a very severe cut-off of the seaward projecti on of Nicaragua’s coast. It is scarcely different
from the line Colombia has proposed, and just as inequitable. As you will see from the other
delimitation cases involving islands, to which I will soon come, in every one of those cases islands
that produced this kind of blocking or cut-off effect were ignored, and were not allowed to
influence the delimitation line, because of the inequitable result they would have produced, like this
one.
39. Colombia does not deny that its isla nds and cays block the seaward projection of
Nicaragua’s mainland coast. Indeed, this is Colombia’s central thesis: that its so-called “chain” of
islands along what it calls a north/south “axis” bloc ks Nicaragua’s extension eastward, depriving it
of any entitlement east of this alleged “chain” . Colombia’s argument can be summarized by
paraphrasing the immortal Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Nicaragua’s mainland coast is born free, but is
everywhere enchained. For Colombia, Nicar agua’s mainland coast has nothing to lose, except for
its chains ⎯ from which Nicaragua can never break free. We might refer to this perversion of the
classic exhortation by two eminent German philosophers as the “Colombianist Manifesto”. As a
legal concept, it is truly revolutionary. In fact, it is dialectically and materially opposed to what
this Court and other international tribunals have said the law is: islands are not allowed to block or
cut off the seaward projection of other States’ mainland coasts; when they have this effect, they are
discounted in the delimitation process.
(b) The Anglo-French arbitration
40. Let’s look at some other pertinent cases. Perhaps the most pertinent is the Anglo-French
Arbitration, also known as the Channel Islands case. Since Professor Pellet has already discussed
the significance of that case, there is no need for me to dwell on it , except to say that it illustrates
the point I have been making: when the islands of one State, “wholly detached geographically” - 41 -
from its coast ⎯ those are the words of the Court of Arbitration in that case 58⎯ when the islands
of one State stand in a relationship of oppositeness to the mainland of another State, it is inevitable
that those islands will have a blocking effect on the seaward projection of the other State’s
mainland coast, and thus render inequitable any delimitation line that is drawn between the
mainland and the islands. In those circumstances, the equitable solution is to enclave the islands.
As ProfessorPellet pointed out, the Channel Islands ⎯ especially Jersey and Guernsey ⎯ dwarf
Colombia’s islands of San Andr és and Providencia in terms of size, population, and economic
importance. And they are not nearly as detached geographically from the UnitedKingdom
mainland as San Andrés and Providencia are from Colombia.
(c) Qatar v. Bahrain
I41. Qatar v. Bahrain, the effect of the small Bahraini island of Qit’at Jaradah, lying
between the two States, and both opposite and in close proximity to the Qatar coast, was to push
the equidistance line toward that coast, blocking Qatar’s seaward projection. This is at tab91 of
your judges’ folders. The Court found that this feature distorted the delimitation line, and that the
cut-off of Qatar’s seaward projection was inequitabl e to Qatar, requiring that Qit’at Jaradah be
disregarded in the delimitation.
(d) Eritrea/Yemen arbitration
42. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, two Yemeni islands were given no weight in the
drawing of the line that was adopted as the bounda ry between the two States in the Red Sea. This
is depicted at tab 92 of your folders. The island of Jabal al-Ta’ir is located 62 miles off Yemen’s
coast, almost halfway between Yemen and Eritrea. The island of al-Zubayr is located more than
26 miles from Yemen’s coast. In terms of size, al-Zubayr is comparable to San Andrés and
Providencia. Nevertheless, both Yemeni islands were disregarded because of what was seen as
their distorting effects on the median line; they pushed it toward the Eritrean coast, cutting off the
seaward projection of that coast; this was inevitable because the median line was generally
perpendicular to Eritrea’s coastal projection for its entire length. The distance of the excluded
58
Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, para. 199. - 42 -
islands from Yemen’s coast was a significant factor. Equally small islands within Yemen’s
12-mile territorial sea were treated as coastal isla nds, integral to the mainland coast, and given full
weight in the delimitation 59. Unlike Colombia’s islands, the excl uded Yemeni islands were on the
right side of the median line between the two mainland coasts. But they were far enough from
Yemen’s coast and close enough to the median line to exert a significant effect on it, pushing it in
the direction of Eritrea’s mainland coast and blocking its seaward projection.
43. As these cases make clear, when small islands, removed from a State’s mainland coast,
are in a relationship of oppositeness to the mainla nd coast of another State, they will inevitably
push an equidistance line toward the other State’ s coast, blocking its seaward projection. This
illustration of the point is located at tab 93 of your folders. The central question becomes, how
significant are the islands in relation to the blocking or cut-off effect that results from their
influence on the delimitation line? As the jurisprudence shows, the smaller the island ⎯ or cay, or
rock, or reef ⎯and the farther it is from the mainland coast of the State to which it belongs, the
more likely it is to be ignored in the delimitation process. All of Colombia’s scattered, minor
features should be disregarded on this basis. Bu t even larger and more important islands, like the
Channel Islands and St.Martin’s Island, have been found to have a distorting effect on the
equidistance or median line, resulting in their being enclaved, and otherwise given no weight in the
construction of the delimitation line. These cases ha ve a particular application to San Andrés and
Providencia.
44. Geographic circumstances similar to those presented by San Andrés and Providencia
were analysed by Dr.Hiran Jayewardene in his study of The Regime of Islands in International
Law. “It is apparent that the introduction of an isla nd in a delimitation situation otherwise between
two broadly equal mainland coasts, causes an appreciable deflection of an equidistance
boundary.” 60 He continues: “As distances from the two coasts increase, the potential for inequity
also increases.” The inequity arises because, when islands are permitted to influence the
59
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime
Delimitation), 17 Dec.1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, 2001, (hereinafter “ Eritrea/Yemen”), para.151 (the islands in point are
Tiqfash, Kutama and Uqban).
6H. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law, 1990, p. 350. - 43 -
equidistance line, “their effect is magnified in direct proportion to the distance from the
61
coastline” .
45. This is how Dr.Jayewardene illustrates the increasing inequity produced by an island
belonging to one State, as it moves farther from that State’s coast, and clo ser to the coast of the
opposite State. You can find the illustration at tab 94 of your judges’ folders. We have coloured it
here for clarity. The significance of Dr. Jayewardene ’s point is easier to grasp when the figure is
rotated in this manner. Does this geographic situation look familiar? It is almost as if
Dr. Jayewardene had SanAndrés in mind. His illus tration demonstrates the inequity produced by
both San Andrés and Providencia, like other islands that are far removed from their mainland State
and located in closer proximity to the coast of anot her State. Dr. Jayewardene calls this situation a
“well-known example of special circumstances warranting an amelioration of the inequities which
62
may result from an equidistance line” .
2. Distorting effects of small islands adjacent to mainland coasts
46. Islands have also been disregarded for th eir distorting effects in geographic situations
where they lie adjacent to, rather than opposite, th e mainland coast of another State. As shown
here, and at tab95, Ukraine’s Serpents’ Island lies as much in a relationship of adjacency to, as
oppositeness from, Romania’s coast. The chart on your screens depicts the distorting effects
Serpents’ Island would have had on an equidistance line if it had been taken into account. It would
have distorted the line ⎯ shown in red dashes ⎯ by deflecting it across Romania’s coast, partially
blocking Romania’s seaward projection. Because of what the Court viewed as Serpents’ Island’s
relative insignificance and its distance from the coast, it was not allowed to produce this effect. As
you can see, the blocking effect produced by Serpents’ Island is not nearly as severe as the effects
of Colombia’s islands on the provisional equidi stance line Colombia has drawn between those
islands and Nicaragua’s mainland coast.
61
H. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law, 1990, p. 349.
62Ibid., p. 350. - 44 -
(a) NovaScotia/Newfoundland arbitration
47. Another case dealing with the distorting effects of a mid-sea island is
Newfoundland/Nova Scotia. This is at tab96 of your judges’ folders. In that arbitration, Nova
Scotia’s Sable Island, lying 88miles off its co ast, was given no effect. The graphic shows how
Sable Island would have defl ected the equidistance line across the seaward projection of
Newfoundland’s coast. As the graphic shows, the blocking effect was far from absolute.
Nevertheless, especially because of what the arbitr al tribunal called the “remote location” of this
island detached from Nova Scotia’s coast, the tribunal called attention to “the cut-off effect that the
63
provisional line has on the southwest coast of Newfoundland” . As this case illustrates, the farther
islands are situated from the mainland coast of the State exercising sovereignty over them, the
greater the distortion they are likely to cause to a delimitation line that takes them into account. If
88miles off the Nova Scotia coast is a “remote location”, likely to cause a distorting effect on a
delimitation line, then that would perforce apply to all of Colombia’s insular features, including
San Andrés, which range between 320 and 400 miles from Colombia’s mainland coast.
(b) Dubai/Sharjah arbitration
48. The common element in all of these cases involving islands ⎯ the need to prevent the
blocking or cut-off effects on the mainland coasts of neighbouring States ⎯ is also evident in the
Dubai/Sharjah arbitration. As Professor Pellet said, th e Tribunal gave no weight to Sharjah’s
island of Abu Musa in the delimitation line, and instead enclaved the island within a 12-mile
territorial sea. Abu Musa measures 12sqkm ⎯several times larger than most of Colombia’s
claimed features. Its effect on the equidistance line, had it been taken into account, is shown on the
graphic, which can also be found at tab 97. Abu Musa would have caused the equidistance line to
cut in front of Dubai’s coast, blocking Dubai’s seaward projection. Because of this distortion, Abu
Musa was given no effect in the delimitation. Th e case follows the same pattern as the others I
have mentioned: where islands cause the delimitation line to cut off the seaward projection of
another State’s mainland coast, they are given no weight in the construction of the delimitation
line.
6Limits of the Offshore Areas between Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, Second Phase , Award of
26 March 2002, ILR, Vol. 128, (hereinafter “Newfoundland/Nova Scotia”), paras. 5.14-5.15. - 45 -
3. Conclusion to be drawn from the case law
49. The conclusion to be drawn from the case law is this: whether they are characterized as
lying opposite or adjacent to Nicaragua’s mainland coast, the islands, cays, rocks, reefs and shoals
claimed by Colombia should be given no weight in the delimitation of the maritime boundary
between Colombia and Nicaragua. The only equi distance line they can produce is one that is
irreparably distorted, because it blocks the se award projection of Nicaragua’s mainland coast,
cutting it off about one quarter of the way out to the limit of Nicaragua’s lawful EEZ entitlement,
and leaving Nicaragua with an even smaller frac tion of its lawful continental shelf entitlement.
Given the sizes and locations of these insular features, and the distorting effects they have on the
delimitation line, they must either be ignored a priori in the plotting of the provisional line, or
treated as relevant circumstances and given no weight in determining the final delimitation line.
50. In sum, in addition to misapplying th e first element of deli mitation methodology and
getting the provisional line wrong because it used the wrong relevant coasts and the wrong relevant
area, Colombia has also misapplied the second element, and failed to properly adjust the
provisional line to remove the distorting infl uences of insular features. For these reasons,
Colombia’s proposed delimitation line cannot represent an equitable solution in this case. In fact,
as we shall now confirm, it comes nowhere close to an equitable solution.
4. The proportionality/disproportionality test
51. Colombia’s failure to propose an equitabl e solution is especially demonstrated when we
move to the third step of the delimitation pro cess, the proportionality/disproportionality test, which
Colombia so completely and conspicuously avoids performing. Colombia’s failure to apply this
element is a dead giveaway. It tells us in no un certain terms that they are fully aware that their
delimitation line fails the test, and cannot represen t an equitable solution. Why else do they not
perform the test?
52. Mr. President, here is what Colombia does not tell you, and hopes you will not ask about.
This is at tab 99 of your judges’ folders. It s hows the relevant coasts, a nd the relevant area where
the potential entitlements of the Parties overlap. The ratio of the relevant coastal lengths is 453 km
for Nicaragua to 21km for Colombia. That is a ratio of more than 21:1 in favour of Nicaragua.
The relevant area ⎯ the area of overlapping entitlements ⎯ measures 214,000 sq km. Colombia’s - 46 -
delimitation line divides this area by giving 154,000sqkm to Colombia, and 60,000sqkm to
Nicaragua, a ratio of 2.6:1 in favour of Colombia. This distribution not only fails the
disproportionality test, it insults it. This must be the most egregious case of disproportionality ever
put forward. In Jan Mayen and Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago, adjustments to the delimitation line
were required when the ratios of relevant co astal lengths were 9:1 and 8:1, respectively 6. Here,
the coastal length ratio is more than 21:1, while Colombia’s equidistance line gives a preponderant
share of the relevant area not to Nicaragua but to itself. Colombia gives itself more than two and a
half times the maritime area it gives to Nicaragua, despite having a relevant coast that is 21 times
smaller! Colombia’s line simply cannot be taken seriously under the jurisprudence of this Court.
(a) Colombia’s arguments on proportionality
53. In its Counter-Memorial, Colombia spends all of four pages on “The Equitableness of the
Delimitation,” the main point of which is to excuse itself from conducting a
proportionality/disproportionality test. Rather ast onishingly, Colombia sa ys “proportionality, in
terms of a correlation between the lengths of the re levant coasts of parties to a delimitation dispute
and the maritime areas appertaining to those coasts, has actually been employed very rarely and
65
with considerable caution” . Can they really be serious about dispensing with the
proportionality/disproportionality test in so cavalier a manner? This Court and other tribunals have
repeatedly stated that the final and indispensable element of delimitation methodology is a
proportionality/disproportionality test, to dete rmine whether the delimitation line produces an
equitable solution 66. Following these ICJ precedents, ITLOS, in its recent judgment in Bangladesh
67
v. Myanmar, performed just such a test .
54. The Counter-Memorial recognizes, at least in principle, that: “Any application of the
proportionality test in this case would hinge on a general appreciation whether an equidistance
64Jan Mayen, paras, 61, 68; Libya v. Malta, para. 68; Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between Barbados and
Trinidad and Tobago, Award of 11 April 2006, RIAA, Vol. XXVII, p. 214, (hereinafter “Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago”),
para. 352.
65CMC, p. 414, para 9.88.
66Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, (hereinafter, “Cameroon v. Nigeria”), para. 165; Jan Mayen, paras, 61, 68;
Libya v. Malta, para. 68; Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago, paras. 334, 335, 350, 352; Romania v. Ukraine, paras. 110, 164.
67Bangladesh v. Myanmar, paras. 240, 489-499. - 47 -
68
boundary produces a result which is manifestly disproportionate.” Sounds good. But then they
fail to run the test. Instead, they simply conclude ⎯without any calculations whatsoever ⎯ that
their proposed boundary line “cannot be said to produce a disproportionate result calling for any
adjustment” 69. On what basis do they reach this conclusion? None is provided. Of course, any
party can say its delimitation line is not disproporti onate. But what do the numbers show?
Colombia does not tell you.
55. One might think that Colombia was reserving its proportionality/disproportionality
analysis for the Rejoinder. Well, one would be wrong for thinking that. They did not address it in
the Rejoinder either. The Rejoinder devotes five pages to a subsection entitled “Geographic
Factors and Proportionality” but it mentions “proportionality” in only two paragraphs, one of which
states the truism that “maritime delimitation is not an exercise in distributive justice or in drawing
70
lines according to ‘nice calculations of proportionality’” . This, apparently, is Colombia’s excuse
for not conducting the proportionality/disproportionality test that the case law requires.
Colombia’s only other reference to proportionality is to cite Nicaragua’s Reply for the proposition
71
that “proportionality as such cannot produce a delimitation” . This is another truism and an even
weaker excuse for not conducting a proportionality/disproportionality test. Of course,
proportionality cannot produce a delimitation. But that does not mean it has no role in the
delimitation process. Still less, does it mean that a proportionality/disproportionality test can be
avoided altogether. The case law makes clear it cannot be.
56. But the issue now of Colombia’s non-performance of the test is moot. We have
subjected Colombia’s equidistance line to a proper proportionality/disproportionality test, and it has
failed miserably. The test shows, as you will have seen, that Colombia’s line is manifestly and
egregiously inequitable. It does not and cannot c onstitute the equitable solution that international
law requires.
68CMC, p. 415, para. 9.90.
69
CMC, p. 415, para. 9.91.
70RC, p. 310, para. 8.72.
71RC, p. 310, para. 8.73. - 48 -
57. The question necessarily arises: does Nicaragua’s proposed delimitation constitute an
equitable solution? The answer is: Yes, it does. As Professor Pellet explained, Nicaragua’s
proposed solution for the maritime areas within 200 miles of Nicaragua’s mainland coast is to
enclave San Andrés and Providencia within 12-mile territorial seas, and to enclave within 3 miles
any other features ⎯ all of them uninhabitable and incapable of economic life ⎯ that may be
found by the Court to belong to Colombia. This grap hic is at tab 99 of your folders. This solution
passes the proportionality/disproportionality test. As the Court is now well aware, the relevant
coasts are 453km for Nicaragua and 21km for Colombia, a ratio of approximately 21:1. The
enclaves proposed by Nicaragua would divide the relevant area as follows: 208,000 sq km for
Nicaragua, and 6,000 for Colombia. The ratio is 35: 1. While this allocation of maritime space is
somewhat more favourable to Nicaragua than the ra tio of relevant coasts, it is nevertheless close
enough not to be considered disproportionate un der the guidelines previously established by the
Court and other international tribuna ls. Absolute parity is not required but, if the Court wanted to
achieve it, it could do so easily simply by making minor adjustments to the sizes of the smaller
enclaves.
58. The bottom line is this. Colombia’s pr oposed delimitation is grossly disproportionate
and inequitable. Nicaragua’s proposal passes the proportionality/disproportionality test.
(b) Colombia’s reliance on State practice
59. In its Rejoinder, Colombia attempts to derive support from what it considers State
practice in regard to maritime delimitations involving islands. From the many delimitation
agreements States have reached, Colombia cherry picks a few that it say s support the thesis that
small islands should be taken into account. But State practice is replete with examples where such
islands have been disregarded entirely, enclaved, or given substantially reduced weight. Based on
his review of the State practice, here is what Sir Derek Bowett concluded from it, in the article to
which I referred earlier:
“There can be no obligation on parties to use islands, or low-tide elevations. If,
in fact, the parties consider the islands to distort the true geographical relationship, - 49 -
either because they are so small, or located in a position which makes them capable of
distorting an equidistance line, they are free to ignore them.” 72
As an alternative, according to Sir Derek: “t he parties can choose a quite different method of
delimitation which is not influenced by the islands as such” 73. One of these methods, identified by
74
Sir Derek, is enclavement .
60. Sir Derek’s study of State practice dem onstrates that islands have been allowed to
influence delimitations where
“they are closely linked to the coastal façade so as to in effect form part of it (for
example, the screen of islands off the Norwegian or Dutch coasts) or where islands
simply continue the line of coast already established by a mainland (for example, the
Orkneys and the Shetlands lying to the north of the United Kingdom) or where islands
balance each other so as to eliminate distortion (for example, the islands lying off the
75
coasts of New Caledonia and Australia)” .
61. But, Sir Derek continues:
“Conceptually, this leaves us with a set of circumstances which are different,
where there is no agreement to treat the islands as part of the coastal façade,
essentially unified with the mainland, and wher e the islands lie on one side only, thus
favouring the one party if equidistance is used. It is here that, taking the two
mainlands as the units which establish the basic geographical relationship, the islands
76
may be viewed as a potential ‘distortion’.”
62. This describes the situation before us in these proceedings. Colombia’s insular features
are not connected to or unified with the Colombian mainland. Colombia does not argue otherwise.
To the contrary, Colombia admits that the isla nds are geographically detached from it and lie on
one side only, favouring Colombia. That is precisely why they exercise such a “distorting” effect.
63. All of the examples from State practice cited by Colombia in its written pleadings reflect
the particular geographic circumstances that pertai ned in those situations, and are distinguishable
from those that are present here. Of greater in terest is Sir Derek’s conclusion drawn from his
analysis of State practice involving situations similar to ours:
72
D. Bowett, “Islands, Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations” in J.Charney
and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 1993, Vol. I, pp. 136-137.
73
Ibid., p. 137.
74
Ibid., p. 151.
75Ibid., p. 139.
76Ibid., p. 139. - 50 -
“The phenomenon of an island ‘straddling’ an equidistant line is not unknown.
More commonly it occurs between opposite coasts, but occasionally an island will lie
on or near a lateral boundary between adjacent coasts. In either case the potential for
77
distortion is considerable, if any form of equidistance is used.”
64. Colombia does not contest this conclusion. What it does, rather remarkably, is to deny
that its insular features straddle or lie on Nicaragua’s side of the median line between the two
States. Here are their exact words: “The plain fact is that Colombia’s islands do not straddle, or lie
on the wrong side of, any median line.” 78 Mr. President, I think the “plain fact” about the location
of Colombia’s islands is shown very clearly on this graphic. They quite obviously lie on
Nicaragua’s side of the line. That is why the distortion they produce is so considerable. This is at
tab 100.
65. There is still another problem with Colomb ia’s reliance on State practice to derive legal
principles different from the case law and it is obvi ous. Boundary agreements do not always or
necessarily reflect either party’s view of thei r respective legal entitlements. States negotiate
boundary agreements based on a variety of factors, including diplomatic and political ones.
66. Colombia persists, however, in invoking so-cal led State practice. It even cites what it
characterizes as a “regional practice”, based on its own agreements with Costa Rica, Panama, and
other States, notably not including Nicaragua. Acco rding to Colombia, these agreements reflect a
“regional practice” to accept equidistance boundari es giving full weight to Colombia’s small
insular features.
67. There are several reasons why this putativ e practice is inapposite here. First is the
general observation that it is dangerous to atte mpt to derive legal precedents from negotiated
agreements, which do not explain what legal princi ples were applied, or whether they were even
taken into account at all by the Parties. Sec ond, it should go without saying, and Colombia does
not deny this, that any agreement betw een Colombia and any third State is res inter alios acta in
77
D. Bowett, “Islands, Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations” in J.Charney
and L.M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 1993, Vol. I, p.141.
78RC, para. 5.18. - 51 -
regard to Nicaragua . But beyond these general precautions, a few other observations are in order
about Colombia’s agreements with other States.
68. Costa Rica still has not ratified its agreement with Colombia. As it made clear when it
attempted to intervene in these proceedings, it will not ratify that agreement until the Court rules in
this case. Costa Rica hopes that if the Court de termines that Nicaragua, not Colombia, is Costa
Rica’s maritime neighbour, it will then be relieved of what it has come to view as the bad bargain it
made with Colombia, and will be free to negotiate a new agreement with Nicaragua.
69. Still less does Colombia’s agreement with Panama evidence a regional State practice to
accord full weight to Colombia’s minor insular features. To the contrary, the agreed line appears to
give no weight at all to the nearest insular feature, claimed by Colombia, Roncador Cay.
Moreover, both Costa Rica and Panama negotiated boundary agreements with Colombia in regard
to the Pacific Ocean, as well as the Caribbean Sea. It cannot be discounted that trade-offs were
made in one negotiation to secure better terms in the other. Again, no regional State practice
emerges from these facts.
70. Finally, Colombia says that Nicaragua ne ver protested its agreement with Panama. So
fond of this argument is Colombia that it repeat s it several times in its written pleadings. But
repetition cannot substitute for relevance. The Colombia/Panama agreement was, and is, res inter
alios acta in regard to Nicaragua, whether or not Nicaragua chose to publicly condemn it.
Nicaragua cannot be prejudiced by that agreement. Its silence cannot be interpreted as
acquiescence.
71. I come now to my conclusions. There are eight:
1. Colombia has got the relevant coasts wrong. In particular, it has deliberately ignored
Nicaragua’s extensive mainland coast, comprising 453km. It pretends this is a delimitation
exclusively between small islands on both sides, when it is not. Nicaragua’s relevant coast is
more than 21 times longer than Colombia’s, and must be taken into account.
7“[B]ilateral treaties, under the principle res inter alios acta , neither confer any rights upon a third State, nor
impose any duties on it. Whatever concessions one State party has made to the othe r shall remain bilateral and bilateral
only, and will not affect the entitlements of the third State.” ( Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)
Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of 4 May 2011, para. 72.) - 52 -
2. Colombia has got the relevant area wrong. It has arbitrarily excluded the area east of its insular
features and within 200miles of Nicaragua’s mainland coast, where both Nicaragua and
Colombia have overlapping potential entitlements. The relevant area covers 214,000square
miles, and does not include areas claimed by third States.
3. Colombia has got the base points wrong. It has placed them on insignificant features that do
not merit base points under the well-established jurisprudence of this Court, and other
international tribunals.
4. Colombia’s provisional delimitation line severely blocks and cuts off the seaward projection of
Nicaragua’s coast, far short of its full 200-mile extension. By running parallel to the coast, and
perpendicular to its seaward projection, for its entire length, it creates a complete and total
blockage of that coast: an effect that is even more severe than those that have consistently been
regarded as distorting, disproportionate and in equitable in other delimitation cases involving
small islands on the one hand, and mainland coasts on the other.
5. Colombia’s proposed delimitation is manifestly inequitable to Nicaragua. The result is so
obviously unacceptable that Colombia cannot ev en bring itself to perform the required
proportionality/disproportionality test.
6. Colombia’s proposal and its flawed delimitation methodology must be rejected outright.
7. State practice does not support Colombia’s proposal. This is true generally, and with respect to
the so-called regional State practice that Colombia attempts to tease out of its own agreements
with neighbouring States. There is no established regional practice, and the cited agreements
do not support Colombia’s argument that neighbouring States have agreed to give full weight to
insignificant insular features as against an extensive mainland coast.
8. Finally, what Colombia has succeeded in demonstrating is that equidistance methodology, even
if correctly applied ⎯ which Colombia has failed to do ⎯ cannot lead to an equitable solution
in this geographic area, which involves an extensive mainland coast on the one hand, and small
islands, far removed and geographically detached from the State that is sovereign over them, on
the other. The equitable solution that is calle d for by international law in this geographical
situation, within 200miles of Nicaragua’s mainland coast, is the enclavement of Colombia’s
islands, within 12 miles for San Andrés and Providencia, and with 3 miles for the rest. - 53 -
72. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes my remarks, together with the first
round of pleadings of Nicaragua. I thank you for your kind and courteous attention, and wish you
all a good evening.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr.Reichler. This concludes the first round of oral
argument of Nicaragua. The Court will meet again on Thursday to hear the first round of oral
argument of Colombia. The sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 5.35 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mardi 24 avril 2012, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie)