Uncorrected
Non corrigé
CR 2009/24
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LHAAYE
YEAR 2009
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 1 December 2009, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada, presiding,
on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)
_____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2009
Audience publique
er
tenue le mardi 1 décembre 2009, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
sur la Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
des institutions provisoires d’administration autonome du Kosovo
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdmekta
Judges Shi
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
M. Tomka v,ice-président
Shi MM.
Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Grejugesood,
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Republic of Serbia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Dušan T. Bataković, (PhD in History, University of Paris ⎯ Sorbonne, ParisIV),
Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to France, Vice-Director of the Institute for Balkan
Studies and Assistant Professor at the University of Belgrade,
as Head of Delegation;
Mr. Saša Obradović, Inspector General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Serbia,
as Deputy Head of Delegation;
ProfessorMarcelo G.Kohen, Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, Gene va, Associate Member of the Institut de
droit international,
ProfessorMalcolm N.ShawQC, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law,
University of Leicester, United Kingdom,
ProfessorDr.Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of International Law,
University of Potsdam, Director of the Potsdam Center of Human Rights, Member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, S.J.D. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, MikijeljJankovic & Bogdanovic,
Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Čedomir Radojković, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Olujic & Rabrenovic, Belgrade,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Serbia in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Ms Katherine Del Mar, Research and Teaching Assistant, Department of Public International
Law and Organization, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva,
Mr.FelixMachts, Assistant at the Walter-Schücking Institute of International Law,
University of Kiel,
Mr. Marko Milanović, LL.M. (Michigan), PhD cand. (Cambridge),
as Advisers;
Mr. Marko Brkić, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Serbia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Dina Dobrković, LL.B.,
Mr. Miroslav Gajić, LL.B.,
Ms Vesna Verčon Ivić, Third Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Serbia,
as Assistants. - 5 -
La République de Serbie est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. Dušan T. Bataković, docteur en histoire de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne
(ParisIV), ambassadeur de la République de Serbie en France, directeur adjoint de
l’Institut des études balkaniques et maître assistant à l’Université de Belgrade,
comme chef de délégation ;
M. Saša Obradović, inspecteur général au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
de Serbie,
comme chef adjoint de délégation ;
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit international à l’Institut de hautes études
internationales et du développement, Genève , membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M.MalcolmN.Shaw, Q.C., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Leicester
(Royaume-Uni), titulaire de la chaire Robert Jennings,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit international à l’Université
de Potsdam, directeur du centre des droits de l’homme de l’Univ ersité de Potsdam,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Vladimir Djerić, S.J.D. (Michigan), avocat au cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanović,
Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Čedomir Radojkovi ć, ambassadeur de la République de Serbie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat au cabinet Olujić & Rabrenović, Belgrade,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de Serbie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Katherine Del Mar, assistante d’enseignement et de recherches au département de droit
international public de la faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève,
M. Felix Machts, assistant à l’Institut de droit international Walter-Schücking de l’Université
de Kiel,
M. Marko Milanović, LL.M. (Michigan), doctorant (Cambridge),
commceonseillers ;
M. Marko Brkić, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade de la République de Serbie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Dina Dobrković, LL.B.,
M. Miroslav Gajić, LL.B.,
Mme Vesna Verčon Ivi ć, troisième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République de Serbie,
commaessistants. - 6 -
The authors of the unilateral declaration of independence are represented by:
H.E. Mr. Skender Hyseni,
as Head of Delegation ;
SirMichael Wood, KCMG, member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
ProfessoSreaDM. urphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law,
George Washington University,
Mr.Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel ;
H.E. Mr. Nexhmi Rexhepi,
Ms Vjosa Osmani,
Mr. Qerim Qerimi,
Ms Albana Beqiri,
Mr. Qudsi Rasheed, member of the English Bar,
as Advisers . - 7 -
Les auteurs de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance sont représentés par :
S. Exc. M. Skender Hyseni,
comme chef de délégation ;
SirMichael Wood, KCMG, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et membre de la Commission
du droit international,
Professeur Sean D. Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire
de la chaire de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
M.Daniel Müller, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseils ;
S. Exc. M. Nexhmi Rexhepi,
Mme Vjosa Osmani,
M. Qerim Qerimi,
Mme Albana Beqiri,
M. Qudsi Rasheed, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
comme conseillers . - 8 -
The Republic of Albania is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Gazmend Barbullushi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Albania
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Professor Jochen Frowein,
Professor Terry D. Gill,
as Legal Advisers ;
Mr. Gentian Zyberi,
as Co-Adviser ;
MsLedia Hysi, Director of Legal Affairs and International Law at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
Mr. Sami Shiba, Director for Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
Mr. Genc Pecani, Minister Plenipotentiary at the Embassy of Albania in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Federal Republic of Germany is represented by:
Ms Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Legal Adviser, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin;
H.E. Mr. Thomas Läufer, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;
Mr. Guido Hildner, Head of Division, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin;
Mr.Felix Neumann, Counsellor, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Abdullah A. Alshaghrood, Ambassador of the Kingdom of SaudiArabia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Head of Delegation ;
Mr. Mohammad I. Alaqeel, Counsellor,
Mr. Fahad M. Alruwaily, Counsellor,
as Members of Delegation . - 9 -
La République d’Albanie est représentée par :
S. Exc. M.Gazmend Barbullushi, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de
l’ambassade d’Albanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M. Jochen Frowein,
M. Terry D. Gill,
comme conseils ;
M. Gentian Zyberi,
comme co-conseil ;
Mme Ledia Hysi, directrice des affaires juridiques et du droit international au ministère des
affaires étrangères de l’Albanie ;
M.Sami Shiba, directeur pour le Kosovo, la Macédoine et le Monténégro au ministère des
affaires étrangères de l’Albanie ;
M. Genc Pecani, ministre plénipotentiaire à l’ambassade d’Albanie au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
La République fédérale d’Allemagne est représentée par :
MmeSusanne Wasum-Rainer, conseiller juridi que au ministère fédéral des affaires
étrangères à Berlin ;
M. Thomas Läufer, ambassadeur de la République fédérale d’Allemagne auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas ;
M. Guido Hildner, chef de division au ministère fédéral des affaires étrangères à Berlin ;
M.Felix Neumann, conseiller à l’ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au
Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Abdullah A. Alshaghrood, ambassadeur,
comme chef de délégation ;
M. Mohammad I. Alaqeel, conseiller,
M. Fahad M. Alruwaily, conseiller,
comme membres de la délégation. - 10 -
The Argentine Republic is represented by:
H.E.Ms Susana Ruiz Cerutti, Ambassador, Head of the Legal Adviser Office, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Head of Delegation ;
H.E.Mr.Santos Goñi Marenco, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands;
Mr.Fernando Marani, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Argentine Republic in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Republic of Austria is represented by:
H.E.Mr.Helmut Tichy, Ambassador, Deputy Legal Adviser, Federal Ministry of European
and International Affairs;
H.E. Mr. Wolfgang Paul, Ambassador of Austria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
H.E. Mr. Werner Senfter, Deputy Ambassador of Austria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Republic of Azerbaijan is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the
United Nations;
Mr. Elchin Bashirov, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;
Mr. Tofig Musayev, Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations,
as Counsellor .
The Republic of Belarus is represented by:
H.E.MsElenaGritsenko, Ambassador of the Republic of Belarus to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Head of Delegation ;
Mr.AndreiLuchenok, Counsellor of the Embassy of Belarus in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Plurinational State of Bolivia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento, Ambassa dor of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to
the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
MsRimac Zubieta, First Secretary, Embassy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia in the
Kingdom of the Neterlands;
Mr.ErickAndrés Garcia, First Secretary, Embassy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia in
the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Mr.LuisRojas, Third Secretary, General Dire ction of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. - 11 -
La République argentine est représentée par :
S. Exc. Mme Susana Ruiz Cerutti, ambassadeur, chef du bureau du conseiller juridique du
ministère des relations extérieures,
comme chef de délégation ;
S. Exc. M. Santos Goñi Marenco, ambassadeur de la République argentine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.FernandoMarani, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de la République argentine au
Royaume des Pays-Bas.
La République d’Autriche est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. l’ambassadeur Helmut Tichy, conseiller juridique adjoint au ministère fédéral des
affaires européennes et internationales ;
S. Exc. M. Wolfgang Paul, ambassadeur d’Autriche auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
S.Exc.M.Werner Senfter, ambassadeur adjoint d’Autriche auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
La République d’Azerbaïdjan est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. Agshin Mehdiyev, représentant permanent de l’Azerbaïdjan auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies ;
M.Elchin Bashirov, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.Tofig Musayev, mission permanente de l’Azerbaïdjan auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies,
comme conseiller .
La République du Bélarus est représentée par :
S.Exc.MmeElenaGritsenko, ambassadeur de la République du Bélarus auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme chef de délégation ;
M. Andrei Luchenok, conseiller à l’ambassade du Bélarus au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
L’Etat plurinational de Bolivie est représenté par :
S. Exc. Mr. Roberto Calzadilla Sarmiento, ambassadeur de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
MmeRimac Zubieta, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M. Erick Andrés Garcia, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie
au Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.Luis Rojas, troisième secrétaire à la direction générale des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères. - 12 -
The Federative Republic of Brazil is represented by:
H.E.Mr.José Artur Denot Medeiros, Ambassador of Brazil to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands;
Mr.José Akcell Zavala, First Secretary, Embassy of Brazil in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Republic of Bulgaria is represented by:
Mr. Zlatko Dimitrov, Head of International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Head of Delegation ;
Mr. Danail Chakarov, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Ivan Yordanov, Political Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Nedialtcho Dantchev, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;
Mr. Krassimir Bozhanov, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Republic of Burundi is represented by:
Maître Thomas Barankitse, Legal Attaché;
Mr. Jean d’Aspremont, Associate Professor, Universities of Amsterdam and of Louvain,
Mr. Alain Brouillet, former Senior Lecturer, Un iversity of Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), and
former First Secretary of the International Court of Justice,
as Counsel .
The People’s Republic of China is represented by:
H.E.MsXue Hanqin, Ambassador to ASEAN, Legal Counsel of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Head of Delegation ;
Mr.Guan Jian, Deputy Director-General, Treaty and Law Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Qu Wensheng, Counsellor, Embassy of China in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, - 13 -
La République fédérative du Brésil est représentée par :
S.Exc.Mr.José Artur Denot Medeiros, ambassadeur du Brésil auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas ;
M.JoséAkcellZavala, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Brésil au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
La République de Bulgarie est représentée par :
M.ZlatkoDimitrov, chef de la direction du droit international au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
comme chef de délégation ;
M. Danail Chakarov, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères ;
M. Ivan Yordanov, conseiller politique au ministère des affaires étrangères ;
M. Nedialtcho Dantchev, conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de Bulgarie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas ;
M. Krassimir Bozhanov, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères.
La République du Burundi est représentée par :
e
M Thomas Barankitse, attaché juridique ;
M. Jean d’Aspremont, professeur associé aux Universités d’Amsterdam et de Louvain,
MA .lanrouillet, ancien maître de conférences à l’Université de Pais
(Panthéon-Sorbonne) et ancien premier secrétaire de la Cour internationale de Justice,
comme conseils .
La République populaire de Chine est représentée par :
S.Exc.MmeXueHanqin, ambassadeur auprès de l’Association des nations de l’Asie du
Sud-Est, conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la Chine,
comme chef de délégation ;
M.GuanJian, directeur général adjoint au dé partement des traités et du droit du ministère
des affaires étrangères de la Chine,
MQ . uWensheng, conseiller à l’ambassad e de Chine au Royaume des Pays-Bas, - 14 -
Mr. Hu Bin, Deputy Division Director, Treaty and Law Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Qi Dahai, First Secretary, Embassy of China in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Members of Delegation .
The Republic of Cyprus is represented by:
H.E.Mr.James Droushiotis, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands;
ProfessorVaughan Lowe QC, member of the English Bar, Chichele Professor of
International Law, University of Oxford,
as Counsel and Advocate ;
Dr. Constantinos Lycourgos, Senior Counsel of the Republic of Cyprus,
Ms Mary-Ann Stavrinides, Senior Counsel of the Republic of Cyprus,
Mr. Alexandros Markides,
as Counsel ;
Mr. Polyvios G. Polyviou,
as Counsel and Advocate ;
Dr. Claire Palley,
as Counsel ;
Professor Colin Warbrick, Honorary Professor at the Birmingham Law School, University of
Birmingham,
Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst,
as Advisers ;
Mr. Levon Arakelian,
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
as Counsel . - 15 -
M.Hu Bin, chef adjoint de division au dépa rtement des traités et du droit du ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Chine,
M. Qi Dahai, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de Chine aux Pays-Bas,
comme membres de la délégation .
La République de Chypre est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. James Droushiotis, ambassadeur de la République de Chypre auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, QC, membre du barreau d’Anglet erre, professeur de droit international à
l’Université d’Oxford (chaire Chichele),
comme conseil et avocat ;
M. Constantinos Lycourgos, conseil principal de la République de Chypre,
Mme Mary-Ann Stavrinides, conseil principal de la République de Chypre,
M. Alexandros Markides,
commceonseils ;
M. Polyvios G. Polyviou,
comme conseil et avocat ;
Mme Claire Palley,
comme conseil ;
M. Colin Warbrick, professeur honoraire à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Birmingham,
Mme Elizabeth Wilmshurst,
comme conseillers ;
M. Levon Arakelian,
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
comme conseils . - 16 -
The Republic of Croatia is represented by:
Ms Andreja Metelko Zgombić, Ambassador, Chief Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Croatia;
H.E.Mr.Josip Paro, Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands;
Ms Mirta Mandić, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of De partment in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and European Integration;
Ms Snježana Sremić, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
European Integration.
The Kingdom of Denmark is represented by:
H.E.Ambassador Thomas Winkler, Under-Secretar y for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Head of Delegation ;
Mr.MichaelBraad, Head of the Department for International Law, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. David Michael Kendal, Deputy Head of the Department for International Law, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
H.E.MsKirsten Malling Biering, Ambassador of Denmark to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Alternates ;
Professor Ole Spiermann, University of Copenhagen,
Mr. Jacques Hartmann, Head of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Christian Nygård Nissen, Royal Danish Embassy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsLisbeth Holm Ravn, Junior Assistant, Royal Danish Embassy in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Lisbeth Funck Hansen, Junior Assistant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Katrine Rosenkrantz de Lasson, Junior Assistant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Tom Elkjær Kristensen, Junior Assistant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers . - 17 -
La République de Croatie est représentée par :
Mme Andreja Metelko-Zgombić, ambassadeur, conseiller juridi que principal au ministère
des affaires étrangères et de l’intégration européenne de la République de Croatie ;
S.Exc.Josip Paro, ambassadeur de la Ré publique de Croatie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas ;
Mme Mirta Mandić, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef de département au ministère des affaires
étrangères et de l’intégration européenne ;
Mme Snježana Smerić, ministre plénipotentiaire au ministère des affaires étrangères et de
l’intégration européenne.
Le Royaume du Danemark est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Thomas Winkler, sous-secrétaire d’Etat aux affaires juridiques,
comme chef de délégation ;
M.Michael Braad, chef au département du droit international du ministère des affaires
étrangères,
M.David Michael Kendal, chef adjoint au dé partement du droit international du ministère
des affaires étrangères,
S.Exc.Mme Kirsten Malling Biering, ambassadeur du Royaume du Danemark auprès du
Royaume aux Pays-Bas,
comme suppléants ;
M. Ole Spiermann, université de Copenhague,
M. Jacques Hartmann, chef de section au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.Christian Nygård Nissen, ambassade du Royaume du Danemark au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
Mme Lisbeth Holm Ravn, assistante, ambassade du Royaume du Danemark au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
Mme Lisbeth Funck Hansen, assistante au ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Katrine Rosenkrantz de Lasson, assistante au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Tom Elkjær Kristensen, assistant au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers . - 18 -
The Kingdom of Spain is represented by:
Professor Concepción Escobar Hernández, Legal Adviser, Head of the International Law
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation,
as representative of Spain ;
H.E. Mr. Juan Pratt y Coll, Ambassador of Spain to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Professor Araceli Mangas Martín, Professor of International Law, University of Salamanca,
Professor Carlos B. Jiménez Piernas, Professor of International Lax, University of Alcalá de
Henares,
Professor PazAndrés Saénz de Santamaría, Profes sor of International Law, University of
Oviedo,
Professor Jorge Cardona Llorens, Professor of International Law, University of Valencia,
as Counsellors ;
The United States of America is represented by:
Mr. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
as Head of Delegation and Advocate;
H.E. Ms Fay Hartog Levin, Ambassador of th e United States of America to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands;
Mr. Todd F. Buchwald, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,
U.S. Department of State,
Mr. Peter Olson, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Mr. John D. Daley, Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
Ms Kristen Eichensehr, Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
Ms Karen K. Johnson, Deputy Legal Counsellor, U.S.Embassy in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. John J. Kim, Legal Counsellor, U.S. Embassy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Emily Kimball, Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
Ms Anna M. Mansfield, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Mission to the United Nations and other
International Organizations, Geneva, - 19 -
Le Royaume d’Espagne est représenté par :
Mme Concepción Escobar Hernández, conseiller juridique et chef au département du droit
international du ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération,
comme représentante du Royaume d’Espagne ;
S. Exc. M. Juan Prat y Coll, ambassadeur du Royaume d’Espagne auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas ;
M. Araceli Mangas Martín, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Salamanque,
M.CarlosB.Jiménez Piernas, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Alcalá de
Henares,
M.Paz Andrés Saénz de Santamaría, professeur de droit international à l’Université
d’Oviedo,
M. Jorge Cardona Llorens, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Valence,
comme conseils .
Les Etats-Unis d’Amérique sont représentés par :
M. Harold Hongju Koh, conseiller juridique du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique,
comme chef de délégation et avocat ;
S. Exc. MmeFay Hartog Levin, ambassadeur des Etats-Unis d’Amérique auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.Todd F. Buchwald, conseiller juridique adjoint chargé des questions concernant les
Nations Unies au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
MP. eter Olson, conseiller juridique adjo int chargé des questions européennes au
département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
M. John D. Daley, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
MmeKristen Eichensehr, assistante spéciale du conseiller juridique au département d’Etat
des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
MmeKaren K. Johnson, conseiller juridique adjoint à l’ambass ade des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. John J. Kim, conseiller juridique à l’amba ssade des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
Mme Emily Kimball, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
Mme Anna MM. ansfield, conseiller juridique adjoint à la mission des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique auprès de l’Organisation des Nati ons Unies et dans d’autres organisations
internationales à Genève, - 20 -
Mr. Phillip M. Spector, Senior Adviser to the Legal Adviser, U.S. Depart
ment of State,
Mr. Jeremy M. Weinberg, Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
as Counsel .
The Russian Federation is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Kirill Gevorgian, Ambassador,
as Head of Delegation ;
Mr. Maxim Musikhin, First Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands;
Mr. Ivan Volodin, Acting Head of Section, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Konstantin Bersenev, First Secretary, Fourth European Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
Ms Anastasia Tezikova, Third Secretary, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Ms Ksenia Gal, Assistant attaché, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Republic of Finland is represented by:
Ms Päivi Kaukoranta, Director General, Legal Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Professor Martti Koskenniemi, University of Helsinki;
H.E. Mr. Klaus Korhonen, Ambassador of Finland to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Mr.KaiSauer, Director, Unit for U.N. and General Global Affairs, Political Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
MsSariMäkelä, Legal Counsellor, Unit for Public International Law, Legal Service,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
MsMiiaAro-Sanchez, First Secretary, Embassy of Finland in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The French Republic is represented by:
Ms Edwige Belliard, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-LaDéfense, Member
and former Chairman of the United Nations International Law Commission, Associate of
the Institut de droit international; - 21 -
M. Phillip M. Spector, conseiller principal du conseiller juridique du département d’Etat des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
MJ.eremyW. einberg, avocat-conseiller au département d’Etat des Etats-Unis
d’Amérique,
comme conseils .
La Fédération de Russie est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. Kirill Gevorgian, ambassadeur,
comme chef de délégation ;
M.Maxim Musikhin, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de la Fédération de Russie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
MmeIvan Volodin, chef de section en exerci ce au département juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères ;
M.Konstantin Bersenev, premier secrétaire, au 4 edépartement européen du ministère des
affaires étrangères ;
MmeAnastasia Tezikova, troisième secrétaire au département juridique du ministère des
affaires étrangères ;
MmeKseniaGal, attaché adjoint au département juridique du ministère des affaires
étrangères.
La République de Finlande est représentée par :
Mme Päivi Kaukoranta, directeur général du servi ce des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères ;
M. Martti Koskenniemi, professeur à l’Université d’Helsinki ;
S. Exc. M. Klaus Korhonen, ambassadeur de Finlande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M. Kai Sauer, directeur de l’unité des Nations Unies et des affaires internationales générales
au département des affaires politiques du ministère des affaires étrangères ;
MmeSariMäkelä, conseiller juridique à l’unité de droit international public au service des
affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères ;
MmeMiia Aro-Sanchez, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de Finlande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
La République française est représentée par :
MmeEdwige Belliard, directeur des affaires ju ridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères
et européennes ;
M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense, membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit in ternational, membre associé de l’Institut de
droit international ; - 22 -
Mr. Mathias Forteau, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense;
Ms Sandrine Barbier, Chargée de mission, Directorate of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
and European Affairs;
Mr.Antoine Ollivier, Chargé de mission, Directorate of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
and European Affairs.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is represented by:
H.R.H.Prince Zeid Raad Zeid Al Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan to the United States of America,
as Head of Delegation ;
H.E.Dr.Khaldoun Th.Talhouni, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands;
H.E.Mr.Waleed Obaidat, Counsellor, Director of the Legal Directorate of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;
Mr. Mahmoud Hmoud, Counsellor of Political and Legal Affairs, Embassy of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan in the United States of America;
Mr.Akram Harahsheh, Third Secretary, Emba ssy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in
the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Kingdom of Norway is represented by:
Mr. Rolf Einar Fife, Director General, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
as Head of Delegation;
H.E.MsEva Bugge, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of
Norway to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Mr.OlavMyklebust, Acting Director Genera l, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Martin Sørby, Deputy Director General, Le gal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs;
Mr. Jo Høvik, Senior Adviser, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Irvin Høyland, Minister (Legal Affairs), Royal Norwegian Embassy in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands. - 23 -
M. Mathias Forteau, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense ;
Mme Sandrine Barbier, chargée de mission à la direction des affaires juridiques du ministère
des affaires étrangères et européennes ;
M. Antoine Ollivier, chargé de mission à la direction des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères et européennes.
Le Royaume hachémite de Jordanie est représenté par :
S.A.R. le prince Zeid Raad Zeid Al Hussein, ambassadeur du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie auprès des Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme chef de délégation ;
S.Exc. M. Khaldoun Th. Talhouni, ambassadeur du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie auprès
du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
S.Exc. M.Waleed Obaidat, conseiller, dir ecteur au département des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie ;
M. Mahmoud Hmoud, conseiller chargé des ques tions politiques et juridiques à l’ambassade
du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique ;
M.Akram Harahsheh, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Royaume de Norvège est représenté par :
M. Rolf Einar Fife, directeur général, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume de
Norvège,
comme chef de délégation ;
S.Exc.MmeEva Bugge, ambassadeur extraord inaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume de
Norvège auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.OlavMyklebust, directeur général en exer cice au département des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume de Norvège ;
M.Martin Sørby, directeur général adjoint au département des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume de Norvège ;
M.Jo Høvik, conseiller principal au départ ement des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères du Royaume de Norvège ;
M.Irvin Høyland, ministre (affaires juridiques), ambassade du Royaume de Norvège au
Royaume des Pays-Bas. - 24 -
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is represented by:
Dr. Liesbeth Lijnzaad;
Professor Dr. Niels Blokker;
Professor Dr. René Lefeber;
Mr. Tom van Oorschot;
Mr. Siemon Tuinstra;
Mr. Michel van Winden;
Ms Daniëlle Best.
Romania is represented by:
Mr. Bogdan Aurescu, Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
H.E. Mr. Călin Fabian, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Mr. Cosmin Dinescu, Director-General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Ion Gâlea, Director, Directorate-General of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Felix Zaharia, Principal Private Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs;
MsAlina Orosan, Second Secretary, Directorat e-General of Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs;
Ms Irina Niţă, First Secretary, Embassy of Romania in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is represented by:
Mr.Daniel Bethlehem QC, Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
as Counsel and Advocate ;
Mr. Kanbar Hosseinbor, Deputy Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland;
MrJ.amesCrawford, S.C., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocate ; - 25 -
Le Royaume des Pays-Bas est représenté par :
Mme Liesbeth Lijnzaad ;
M. Niels Blokker ;
M. René Lefeber ;
M. Tom van Oorschot ;
M. Siemon Tuinstra ;
M. Michel van Winden;
Mme Daniëlle Best.
La Roumanie est représentée par :
M. Bogdan Aurescu, secrétaire d’Etat du ministère roumain des affaires étrangères ;
S. Exc. M. Călin Fabian, ambassadeur de la Roumanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.CosminDinescu, directeur général des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires
étrangères ;
M.IonGâlea, directeur à la direction géné rale des affaires juridiques du ministère des
affaires étrangères ;
M. Felix Zaharia, directeur de cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères ;
MmeAlinaOrosan, deuxième secrétaire à la direction générale des affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères ;
Mme Irina Niţă, première secrétaire à l’ambassade de Roumanie au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord est représenté par :
M.Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth, représentant du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord,
comme conseil et avocat ;
M.Kanbar Hosseinbor, représentant adjoint du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord ;
M.James Crawford, S.C., professeur de droit inte rnational, titulaire de la chaire Whewell à
l’Université de Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseil et avocat ; - 26 -
Mr. Sam Wordsworth,
Ms Shaheed Fatima,
as Counsel ;
Dr. Tom Grant, Research Fellow at the Lauterpach t Centre for International Law, University
of Cambridge;
Ms Alice Lacourt, Legal Counsellor, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
Ms Joanne Neenan, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
Ms Joanna Hanson, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
Ms Helen Fazey, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is represented by:
Dr.Alejandro Fleming, Deputy Minister for Europe of the Ministry of Popular Power for
Foreign Affairs;
Dr. Agustín Pérez Célis, Ambassador of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Mr.Carlos Herrera, Director of Control a nd Management in the Cabinet of the Deputy
Minister for Europe;
Dr. Alfonso D’Santiago, Director of Multilateral Treaties, Office of Legal Department,
Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs;
Mr.JorgePetit, Third Secretary (Legal and Multilateral Section of the Embassy of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in the Kingdom of the Netherlands).
The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Ha Huy Thong, Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;
Dr. jur. Nguyen Thi Hoang Anh, Director-General, Department of International Law and
Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
MsNguyenThiThanhHa, LL.M. (Harvard), MinisterCounsellor, Permanent Mission of
Viet Nam to the United Nations (New York);
Mr.PhanDuyHao, S.J.D., Legal Expert, Depa rtment of International Law and Treaties,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. - 27 -
M. Sam Wordsworth,
Mme Shaheed Fatima,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge ;
MmeAliceLacourt, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth ;
MmeJoanneNeenan, jurisconsulte adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth ;
Mme Joanna Hanson, ministère des affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth ;
Mme Helen Fazey, ministère des affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth.
La République bolivarienne du Venezuela est représentée par :
M.AlejandroFleming, Secrétaire d’Etat aux affaires européennes au ministère du pouvoir
populaire pour les relations extérieures ;
S. Exc. M. Agustín Pérez Célis, ambassadeur de la République bolivarienne du Venezuela
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M.CarlosHerrera, directeur du contrôle et de l’administration au cabinet du Secrétaire
d’Etat aux affaires européennes ;
M.AlfonsoD’Santiago, responsable des traités multilatéraux au bureau du conseiller
juridique du ministère du pouvoir populaire pour les relations extérieures ;
M. Jorge Petit, troisième secrétaire (division des affaires juridiques et multilatérales de
l’ambassade de la République bolivarienne du Venezuela au Royaume des Pays-Bas).
La République socialiste du Viet Nam est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. Ha Huy Thong, ambassadeur de la République socialiste du Viet Nam auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
Mme Nguyen Thi Hoang Anh, docteur en droit, directrice générale au département du droit
international et des traités internationaux du ministère des affaires étrangères ;
Mme Nguyen Thi Thanh Ha, LL.M. (Harvard), ministre-conseiller à la mission permanente
du Viet Nam auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (New York) ;
M.PhanDuyHao, S.J.D., expert juridique au département du droit international et des
traités internationaux du ministère des affaires étrangères. - 28 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.
The Court meets today to hear oral stat ements and comments by Members of the United
Nations relating to the request for an advisory opinion submitted to the Court by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on the question of the Accordance with International Law of the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo, as well as to hear an oral contribution from the authors of the unilateral declaration of
independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo.
On 8 October 2008, by resolution 63/3, the Ge neral Assembly of the United Nations decided
to request an advisory opinion from the Court. Th e text of the resolution was transmitted to the
Court by a letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 9October2008 and
received in the Registry by facsimile on 10 October 2008. I shall ask the Registrar to read from the
operative paragraph of that resolution the ques tion on which the Court is asked to render an
advisory opinion.
The REGISTRAR: “Is the unilate ral declaration of independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”
The PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the Registrar
notified forthwith the request for an advisory opini on to all States entitled to appear before the
Court.
By an Order dated 17October2008, the C ourt decided that the United Nations and its
Member States were likely to be able to furnish information on that question. By the same Order,
the Court fixed, respectively, 17 April 2009 as the time-limit within which written statements might
be submitted to it on the question, and 17July 2009 as the time-limit within which States and
organizations having presented written statements might submit written comments on the other
written statements in accordance with Article 66, para graph 4, of the Statute. By the same Order,
the Court also decided that
“taking account of the fact that the unila teral declaration of independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo of 17 February 2008 is the
subject of the question submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion, the authors of - 29 -
the above declaration are considered likely to be able to furnish information on the
question”.
It therefore further decided “to invite them to make written contributions to the Court within the
above time-limits”.
By letter dated 20 October 2008, the Registrar informed the United Nations and its Member
States of the Court’s decisions and transmitted to them a copy of the Order. By letter of the same
date, the Registrar informed the authors of th e unilateral declaration of independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Koso vo of the Court’s decisions, and transmitted to
them a copy of the Order.
Pursuant to Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute, on 30 January 2009 the Secretary-General
of the United Nations communicated to the Court a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon
the question, which was subsequently placed on the Court’s website.
By letters dated 8 June 2009, the Registra r informed the United Nations and its Member
States that the Court had decided to hold heari ngs, opening 1 December 2009, at which they could
present oral statements and comments, regardless of whether or not they had submitted written
statements and, as the case may be, written comments. The letter further indicated that the authors
of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo could present an oral contribution.
By letter of the same date, the authors of th e unilateral declaration of independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo were also informed accordingly.
The Registrar invited the United Nations and its Member States, as well as the authors of the
unilateral declaration of independence by the Pr ovisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo, to inform the Court by 15 September 2009 as to whether they intended to take part in the
oral proceedings.
Written statements were filed, in the order of receipt, by the following participants: Czech
Republic, France, Cyprus, China, Switzerland, Ro mania, Albania, Austria, Egypt, Germany,
Slovakia, Russian Federation, Finland, Poland, Luxembourg, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Serbia, Spain, Islamic Republic of Iran, Estonia, Norway,
Netherlands, Slovenia, Latvia, Japan, Brazil, Irela nd, Denmark, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Maldives,
Sierra Leone, Bolivia, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The authors of the unilateral - 30 -
declaration of independence by the Provisional Ins titutions of Self-Government of Kosovo filed a
written contribution.
Written comments on the written statements and contribution were filed, in the order of their
receipt, by: France, Norway, Cyprus, Serbia, Argentina, Germany, Netherlands, Albania, Slovenia,
Switzerland, Bolivia, United Kingdom, United States of America and Spain. The authors of the
unilateral declaration of independence by the Pr ovisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo submitted a written contribution regarding the written statements.
As I indicated a moment ago, the Court is meeting today to hear oral statements and
comments relating to the request for an advisory opinion, as well as to hear an oral contribution
from the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government of Kosovo. In this regard, the Court has been informed that the following
participants, set out in speaking order, wish to ta ke the floor during the current oral proceedings:
Serbia, the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government of Kosovo, Albania, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, China, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Spain, United States
of America, Russian Federation, Finland, Fran ce, Jordan, Norway, Netherlands, Romania, United
Kingdom, Venezuela, and Viet Nam.
The specific arrangements for the hearings ha ve been made known by the Registry to the
participants I have just mentioned by means of various communications. The schedule of the
hearings has also been made public by a press release. This morn ing, the Court will hear Serbia;
and this afternoon, the Court will hear the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence by
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. Both Serbia and the authors of the
unilateral declaration of independence by the Pr ovisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo will speak for a maximum duration of three hour s, and all the other participants in the oral
proceedings will speak for a maximum of 45 minutes each.
Before inviting Serbia to address the Court, I would add that, in accordance with Article 106
of the Rules of Court, the Court has decided that the written statements and written comments
submitted by Member States of the United Nations in the current advisory proceedings, as well as
the written contributions submitted by the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence by - 31 -
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, are to be made accessible to the public
with effect from the opening of the present heari ngs. Further, these written submissions will from
today be posted on the Court’s website, to allo w for consultation of both the original language
version and the unofficial translation, as submitted to or prepared by the Registry. In addition, the
text of the oral statements and comments, as well as the oral contribution of the authors of the
unilateral declaration of independence by the Pr ovisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo, will be placed on the Court’s website.
Now I give the floor to H.E. Mr. Batakovi ć. Your Excellency Mr. Batakovi ć, you have the
floor.
BAMT.AKOVI Ć :
INTRODUCTION
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur, ainsi qu’une très haute
responsabilité que de représenter mon pays, la Serb ie, devant l’organe judiciaire principal des
Nations Unies, lors de ces audiences publiques.
2. L’Assemblée générale des NationsUnies a saisi votre Cour, afin de lui demander de
rendre un avis consultatif relatif à la conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale
d’indépendance des institutions provisoires d’admi nistration autonome du Kosovo. Cette question
revêt un intérêt majeur pour les NationsUnies, ainsi que pour l’ensemble de l’ordre juridique
international, puisque la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance n’est qu’une tentative pour mettre
fin au régime juridique international établi pour le Kosovo par le Conseil de sé curité, en vertu de la
résolution 1244 de 1999.
3. La déclaration unilatérale d’indépe ndance constitue ainsi un défi à relever pour
l’organisation internationale et son autorité, tout particulièrement relativement à sa capacité future
d’agir avec succès pour la réalisation de l’un de ses principes fondamentaux, le maintien de la paix
et de la sécurité internationales.
4. La déclaration unilatérale d’indépendan ce est également un défi pour l’ordre juridique
international, fondé sur les principes de souverain eté et d’intégrité territo riale des Etats. C’est - 32 -
pourquoi la grande majorité des Etats s’est opposée à la sécession et a adopté une position
défavorable à la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance du Kosovo.
5. Monsieur le président, le positionnement des NationsUnies à l’égard de la déclaration
unilatérale d’indépendance revêtira une importance fondamentale, non seulement au regard de leurs
agissements concernant la situation au Kosovo, ma is aussi pour l’ordre juridique international dans
son ensemble. Je crois que nous convenons que la position des Nations Unies doit être fondée sur
le droit international. Votre avis consultatif aura une portée primordiale pour l’Organisation et
servira de guide à ses organespolitiques ⎯l’Assemblée générale, le Conseil de sécurité, et le
Secrétaire général ⎯ lorsque ceux-ci devront prendre des décisions.
6. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, il n’est point besoin de souligner que la
question dont vous êtes saisis est vitale pour mon pays. Le Kosovo forme le berceau historique de
la Serbie et constitue l’un des piliers essentiels de son identité. Les Serbes du Kosovo sont devenus
de facto une minorité dans leur propre pays. Bien qu e la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
des institutions provisoires d’administration autonome du Kosovo représente une violation
flagrante de sa souveraineté et de son intégrité terr itoriale, la Serbie a décidé de réagir à cette
décision illégitime et illicite d’une manière responsable et pacifique, ayant recours aux procédures
existantes au sein des NationsUnies 1. Toutefois, la Serbie est déterminée à persister dans la
défense de son intégrité territoriale et de sa souvera ineté, tout en faisant preuve de flexibilité dans
la recherche de solutions pratiques, susceptibles de faciliter la situation actuelle. Suivant cette ligne
de conduite, la Serbie a soutenu le projet du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies en vertu duquel la
mission de l’Union européenne pour le Kosovo ⎯ EULEX ⎯ se déploie conformément à la
résolution 1244 et ceci, sous l’autorité du représentant spécial.
7. Monsieur le président, le Kosovo se trouve sous administration de l’ONU depuis
l’adoption de la résolution1244 en1999. Je voudr ais rappeler que cette résolution a fait suite à
l’emploi illicite de la force armée par certains Etats contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie ;
intervention qui a causé, rappelons-le, un nombre considérable de victimes civiles. C’est le Conseil
de sécurité lui-même qui a mis en place une présence internationale civile et de sécurité au Kosovo.
1Cf., par exemple, le discours du président de Serbie BorisTadić à l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU,
Nations Unies, doc. A/63/PV.5 (le 23 septembre 2008), p. 29. - 33 -
Toutefois, le Conseil de sécurité n’a pas supprimé, il ne saurait le faire d’ ailleurs, la souveraineté
de la Serbie au Kosovo. Bien au contraire, la résolution1244 a mis en exergue la nécessité de
préserver l’intégrité territoriale de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie ⎯ la Serbie ⎯ sur la
province du Kosovo, ce qui a été par la suite réaffirmé par la pratique des NationsUnies
après 1999.
8. La résolution1244 prévoit que le statut futur de la province sera déterminé par un
processus politique. Tout règlement définitif doit être atteint de manière pacifique par voie de
négociations. Naturellement, ce règlement doit r ésulter de l’accord des parties et doit être
également soutenu par le Conseil de sécurité.
9. Malheureusement, les négociations concernant le statut du Kosovo, entreprises dès la fin
de2005, étaient dès leur commencement destinées à l’échec, notamment en raison de la partialité
du négociateur principal Martti Ahtisaari et de la position de certains Etats membres du groupe de
contact, qui ont encouragé l’indépendance du Kosovo, la présentant comme l’unique option 2. Le
succès des négociations était donc menacé, malgré l’attitude des plus flexibles de la Serbie, qui a
proposé divers règlements pour le Kosovo. Elle a même offert au Kosovo la possibilité d’exercer
d’une manière autonome presque toutes les prérogatives de l’autorité étatique et même de pouvoir
3
devenir membre des institutions financières internationales . La Serbie rejette l’affirmation selon
laquelle toutes les alternatives de négociations ont été épuisées; non seulement parce que les
négociations de Vienne étaient biaisées depuis le début, mais aussi parce qu’elles ont été menées
durant deux ans et demi, ce qui constitue une pé riode brève par rapport à la durée de négociations
dans d’autres situations où la paix et la sécurité internationales ont été menacées.
10. Monsieur le président, l’histoire de la crise n’est pas uniquement celle des négociations
et des conflits armés, mais aussi celle des douleurs et des souffrances subies par les habitants de la
Serbie, notamment par les citoyens du Kosovo, toutes origines nationales confondues. La Serbie
démocratique condamne et regrette sincèrement les tragédies et les douleurs provoquées par ceux
qui opéraient au nom de la Yougoslavie et de la Serbie durant le conflit du Kosovo, notamment les
graves violations des droits de l’homme de la population albanaise au cours des années 1998-1999.
2
Observations écrites de la Serbie, par. 100 et suiv.
3Observations écrites de la Serbie, par. 117. - 34 -
Nous considérons d’une extrême importance la poursuite pénale de vant les tribunaux nationaux et
internationaux de tous ceux qui ont perpétré de s crimes durant ce conflit. En Serbie, plusieurs
membres de l’armée et de la police ont été déjà jugés et condamnés pour des crimes commis au
Kosovo.
Dans ce contexte, nous sommes obligés de men tionner que pendant le conflit de 1998-1999
le groupe paramilitaire albanais, la soi-disant «armée de libération du Kosovo» a perpétré des
crimes graves à l’encontre des Serbes et d’ autres communautés nonalbanaises, tout comme à
l’encontre des Albanais loyaux aux autorités de la Serbie. Nous ne pou vons non plus passer outre
le fait que la situation actuelle concernant les dr oits de l’homme de la population non albanaise au
Kosovo est très grave et que leurs droits et lib ertés fondamentaux se voient sérieusement menacés
dans leur essence. L’on veut pour preuve la pr atique constante de déplacement forcé de la
population serbe et autre nonalbanaise. Après la mise en place de l’administration internationale
en juin1999, environ 60% des Serbes ont été exilés hors du Kosovo, tout comme environ 66%
des Roms et environ 70% des habitants du Gora (la communauté de Goranci). Les villes
principales du Kosovo, à l’exception d’une seule, ont été vidées de toute population serbe et
nonalbanaise après1999. La ville de Priština a été complètement nettoyée ethniquement, et ceci
après la mise en place de l’administration interna tionale. Les déferlements orchestrés de violence
ethniquement motivée ont eu pour cible la communa uté serbe. Le pogrom entamé en mars 2004,
qui a mené au déplacement forcé d’environ 40 000 Serbes en deux jours seulement, n’a pu être
arrêté que par l’intervention militaire des forces in ternationales. Trente-cinq églises serbes ont été
détruites en mars2004, et environ 170églises situ ées dans toute la province ont été détruites ou
fortement abîmées depuis 1999. Les églises et les monastères du Kosovo sont les seuls monuments
culturels en Europe, dont plusie urs d’ailleurs sont inscrits sur la liste du patrimoine mondial, qui
doivent être protégés par les forces militaires intern ationales en raison de la menace réelle de
destruction existante dans cet environnement hostile. Plus de 1300 civils serbes et non albanais ont
été portés disparus, et le nombre de tués ces dix dernières années a atteint le même chiffre. Les
crimes ethniquement motivés commis par des extr émistes albanais demeurent pour la plupart
impunis. - 35 -
11. Cependant, l’objet de cette affaire n’a pas trait aux violations des droits de l’homme, tant
celles commises il y a une ou deux décennies que cell es du présent. L’objet de cette affaire ne
porte pas non plus sur le statut futur du Kosovo. La demande de l’Assemb lée générale auprès de
cette honorable Cour vise un avis consultatif relatif à la conformité au droit international de la
déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance des institu tions provisoires d’administration autonome du
Kosovo.
12. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance est
une tentative afin de mettre un terme à l’administra tion de l’ONU et à la souveraineté de la Serbie
sur sa province méridionale, ainsi que d’imposer l’indépendance comme règlement unilatéral pour
le Kosovo. Elle est contraire au droit international, puisqu’elle déroge non seulement au principe
fondamental de l’intégrité territoriale des Etats, mais aussi à la résolution contraignante du Conseil
de sécurité 1244 et au régime juridique international établi pour le Kosovo par cette résolution. La
République de Serbie est convaincue que les Nati onsUnies et la communauté internationale
trouveront une réponse adaptée à ce défi qui porte atteinte aux fondements mêmes de l’ordre
juridique international. Nous sommes persuadés que l’avis consultatif de la Cour constituera
l’ossature juridique essentielle de cette réponse.
13. Nous sommes confiants que, une fois la Cour ayant apporté son éclairage juridique sur la
question, les conditions seront créées pour atteindre un compromis sur le statut futur du Kosovo;
un compromis grâce auquel le Gouvernement de la Serbie et les autorités albanaises du Kosovo
pourront trouver un terrain d’entente, contribuant ainsi à consolider la paix et la stabilité dans les
Balkans occidentaux. Cette opportunité ne doit en aucun cas être gâchée. Notre vŒu le plus cher
et le plus sincère est que l’avis consultatif soit perçu par tous les acteurs concernés comme un
encouragement à s’engager de bonne foi dans un processus visant un règlement respectueu
x du
droit international ; ceci dans l’intérêt du Kosovo, du reste de la Serbie et de la région tout entière.
Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre aimable attention et je
vous saurais gré de bien vouloir appeler à la barre M. Djerić.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, Mr. Bataković for his presentation. I now give
the floor to Mr. Djerić. - 36 -
DMJr.RI Ć: Thank you Mr. President.
JURISDICTION , ADMISSIBILITY ,SCOPE OF THE QUESTION ,AND
BINDING NATURE OF THE APPLICABLE LEGAL RULES
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is a very great personal pleasure for me to have
the honour once again of appearing before this honourable Court. In my presentation today, I will
deal with a set of what may be called “preliminary questions”:
⎯ first, the jurisdiction and admissibility in the present case;
⎯ second, the terms and scope of the question before the Court, in particular the issue of who are
the authors of the unilateral declaration of independence (“UDI”); and
⎯ finally, I will address the question of applicability of the international legal régime established
by resolution 1244 (1999) to all actors in Kosovo.
Jurisdiction and admissibility
2. Mr.President, a great majority of States participating in the present proceedings accept
that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Ge neral Assembly request for an advisory opinion
4
and that there are no reasons that would prev ent it from exercising its advisory jurisdiction . We
believe that this matter has been sufficiently di scussed in various written submissions and that the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the request have been convincingly established. It
is significant to note at this stage that only two States have challenged the jurisdiction of the Court.
3. The first challenge to the Court’s jurisdicti on is that the question of the UDI’s legality is
not a genuine legal question because international law does not prohibit secessions or declarations
5
of independence . Serbia and other States have alread y demonstrated that this objection is
groundless 6, particularly because it confuses the nature of the question before the Court with a
possible answer to that question. Simply put, saying that something is not prohibited or not
regulated by international law is providing it with a legal qualification, which, in itself, is an
answer to a legal question. Finally, even assuming arguendo that the UDI is not prohibited or
regulated by general international law, it was adopted in a legal setting that is clearly regulated by
4
See Written Comments of Serbia, para. 47, Note 43.
5
Written Comments of France, para. 9.
See, e.g., Written Comments of Argentina, para. 12 et seq. - 37 -
the international legal régime established by Security Council resolution1244 (1999). The
question of the UDI’s compatibility with this set of international norms is obviously a legal
question.
4. A related objection to the jurisdiction of the Court is that the question of the UDI’s
legality is only a question of national law, falli ng within the domestic jurisdiction of the State
concerned 7. However, as has been demonstrated by the very comprehensive discussion of various
applicable international rules during the written phase of the present proceedings, it is clear that the
8
UDI is not solely a matter of the national law of Serbia but is also a question of international law.
As such, it is, to quote the Court, “by its very nature” within the Court’s competence and not a
matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction ( Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950 , pp.70-71) 9. It
therefore clearly follows that th e Court has jurisdiction to deal with the request of the General
Assembly in the present case.
5. Mr.President, turning to the issue of propr iety of the Court’s exercise of its advisory
jurisdiction, I would like to recall the Court’s emph atic statement that the request for an advisory
opinion “represents its participation in the activiti es of the Organization, and, in principle, should
not be refused” ( Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First
Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950 , p. 71; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commi ssion on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1999(I) , pp.78-79, para.29). Only where there are “compelling reasons” related to the
10
propriety of the exercise of the Court’s judicial function, should the Court decline the request .
This is an exceptionally high standard: not just any reasons, but only “compelling” ones, may lead
to the refusal of the opinion.
7Written Statement of Albania, para. 41 et seq.; Written Comments of Albania, paras. 35-36.
8As a matter of national law, the Government of Serbia has annulled the UDI, see Written Statement of Serbia,
para. 6.
9
See also C. Tomuschat, “Article 36”, in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the In ternational Court of
Justice ⎯ A Commentary (2006), p. 637.
10
Certain expenses of the United Nati ons (Art.17, para.2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20July1962,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p.155; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I) , pp.78-79, para.29; Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.Reports2004 (hereinafter:
“Wall”), p. 157, para. 45. - 38 -
6. Those raising the issue of propriety of the Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction in the present
proceedings, on the one hand, question the motives of the General Assembly in requesting the
advisory opinion 11 and, on the other, challenge the usefulness of such an opinion 12. Serbia, as well
as other States, has already responded to these two claims 13, but an additional comment is
warranted here.
7. What needs to be mentioned is that the Cour t has consistently declined to enquire into the
motives that led a United Nations orga n to request an advisory opinion 14. In this context, I would
just like to say that those questioning the motives of the General Assembly in fact put in doubt the
bona fide nature of resolution 63/3, as well as the good faith of the majority that voted in its favour.
8. I need not spend much time describing the interest of the General Assembly and of the
15
United Nations Organization in the question before the Court, as this interest is self-evident . I
would like to point to a simple fact that, according to the Secretary-General, the UDI has presented
a significant challenge to the authority of the United Nations and its administration in Kosovo 16. It
seems rather bizarre to say that the General Assembly does not have an interest in such a situation.
Not only does the Assembly fund UNMIK, but it al so has responsibilities in relation to the powers
and functions of organs of the United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and
17
security, to mention just a few of its relevant competences . The object of its request is, to quote
your opinion in the Western Sahara case, “to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General
1Further Written Contribution of the authors of the UDI, para.1.12 et seq ; Written Comments of the United
States, pp. 10-12; Written Comments of France, para. 6; Written Comments of Albania, para. 39 et seq.
1Written Comments of France, paras. 7 et seq.; Written Comments of Albania, para. 43.
1See Written Comments of Serbia, para.57 et seq.; Argentina, para.12 et seq; Written Statement of Cyprus,
para. 5 et seq.
1Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article4 of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, 1948, I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948 , p.61. See also Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a
State to the United Nations, Adviso ry Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950 , pp.6-7; Certain Expenses of the United Nations
(Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 155; Interpretation of the Agreement
of 25March1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980 , p.87, para.33; Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I) (hereinafter “Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons”), pp. 233-234, para. 13.
15
Written Statement of Serbia, paras.45 et seq , 71 et seq ; Written Comments of Serbia, paras.57-63; Written
Statement of Cyprus, para. 8 et seq.; Written Comments of Argentina, para. 14 et seq.
16
See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General on the Un ited Nations Interim Admini stration Mission in Kosovo,
UN doc. S/2008/211, 28 Mar. 2008, para. 30.
17
See Arts. 10 and 11 of the United Nations Charter; see also ibid., Art. 4. - 39 -
Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions” ( Western Sahara,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 26-27, para. 39).
9. Another challenge to the propriety of the Court’s advisory opinion in the present case is
that the General Assembly’s request should be re fused because the competent organs of the United
Nations have taken a neutral a ttitude towards Kosovo’s status 18. However, this claim is both
inaccurate and fails to appreciate the functions and roles of different United Nations organs.
10. The General Assembly has requested an opinion from the Court in the present case,
which obviously means that it has not taken a posi tion regarding Kosovo’s status. The Security
Council has not taken a position either, due to well-known political disagreements within the
Council. Indeed, an opinion from the Court on the legality of the UDI could be an important
element in the Council’s deliberations.
11. As for the Secretary-General, he has a dopted a status-neutral approach pending further
19
guidance from the Security Council . This is not a legal determin ation, but a political position.
This has nothing to do with the Court, which is the principal judicial organ of the Organization with
completely different functions and responsibilities under the Charter, and which is requested by
another principal United Nations organ to provide a legal opinion in the present case. Moreover, it
is apparent from the dossier submitted on behalf of the Secretary-General that he did not have the
benefit of legal advice in the present matter, which is an additional reason for the Court to provide
its legal guidance.
12. Mr. President, it has been claimed that an advisory opinion in the present case would be
20
devoid of any effect or useful purpose as it cannot have effect on Kosovo’s independence .
Contrary to what is claimed, however, the opinion of the Court will indeed have a useful purpose as
its primary function and effect is to guide the General Assembly and othe r United Nations organs
in their activity concerning the situation in Kos ovo in various matters within their competence.
This is the purpose of every advisory opinion ⎯ to provide the requesting organs with “the
elements of law necessary for them in their action” ( Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
18
Written Comments of France, paras. 7-8.
19
See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo,
UN doc. S/2008/354, 12 June 2008, para. 19.
20See Written Comments of France, para. 11 et seq.; see also Written Comments of Albania, para. 43. - 40 -
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), pp. 162-163,
para. 60). We have shown that the General Assembly would make a full use of the Court’s opinion
in relation to a number of matters 2. Similarly, the importance of the Court’s opinion for
deliberations in the Security Council cannot be underestimated.
13. The claim that the Court’s opinion will have no useful effect implies that the law may
simply be overruled on the basis of self-created so -called “irreversible” facts. Considering that
Kosovo is under international administration, which retains the ultimate administrative and security
power in the province, it is clear that ther e are sufficient instruments to implement the
consequences of any advisory opinion by the releva nt international authority. Thus, it appears that
the States making the claim that the Court’s opinion would be devoid of any effect or useful
purpose are in fact announcing that they are going to ignore legal determinations made by the
Court, if these are not in accordance with their current political position. Mr. President, this is not a
bona fide approach expected, indeed, required from Member States of the United Nations.
14. Finally, as a matter of law, the Court stated in an earlier case: “The General Assembly
has the right to decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs.”
(Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996(I) ,
p. 237, para. 16; Wall, p. 163, para. 61.)
It is precisely on this basis that the Court stated that it “cannot decline to answer the question
posed based on the ground that its opinion would lack any useful purpose” (Wall, p. 163, para. 62).
15. Thus, the Court has taken the firm position that it is not its task to assess whether the
opinion would be useful for the requesting organ (ibid.). This is a prudent approach since
otherwise the Court would have to substitute its judgment for that of the requesting organ.
16. It is therefore clear that there is no reason, let alone a compelling one, that would lead the
Court to decline an advisory opinion in the present case. Considering that Kosovo is under United
Nations administration, the Court will in the present case not only provide an advisory opinion that
21See supra, para.8; see also Written Statement of Serbia, para.84et seq ; Written Comments of Serbia,
paras. 61-63. - 41 -
is pertinent but would, at the same time, once again faithfully discharge its functions as “the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations” 22.
The meaning and scope of the question before the Court
17. Mr. President, I will now turn to the meani ng and scope of the question before the Court.
At the outset, let me say that the question is a narrow one inasmuch as it deals with the UDI and
does not address related, but clearly distinct issues, such as recognition. However, an examination
of the UDI’s legality still needs to address all various aspects of the UDI and their legality under
international law. The UDI is not merely a verbal act, a declaratory statement. Most importantly,
the UDI has been an attempt to create an independen t State, to violate Serbia’s territorial integrity
and to terminate or modify the international legal régime for the administration of Kosovo. All
these aspects of the UDI need to be analysed in order to determine whether the UDI is in
23
accordance with international law and this is what my colleagues will do today.
18. I will now turn to the issue of who actually adopted the UDI, which is also related to the
meaning of the question before the Court. According to its authors and some States supporting
them 24, the UDI was not an act of the Assembly of Kosovo and the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government, but allegedly “an act of the democratically-elected representatives of the people
25
of Kosovo meeting as a constituent body to establish a new State” . This is a claim that did not
appear prior to these proceedings.
19. Mr. President, both the Assembly of Kosovo that adopted the UDI and the President and
Prime Minister that endorsed it were establishe d as Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
under the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo. They gained their official status and legitimacy
on the basis of elections organized under the Constitutional Framework and resolution 1244 (1999).
They cannot now escape their obligations under these two instruments.
22Art. 92 of the Charter.
23See Written Comments of Serbia, paras. 43-45.
24
Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, para.6.01 et seq., and Further Written C ontribution of authors of
the UDI, para. 1.22 et seq.; Written Statements of Austria, para. 16, Estonia, p. 3, Finland, paras. 17-18, Germany, p. 25,
Netherlands, paras.3.3-3.4, Norway, paras.13-17, Poland,paras.3.40-3.41, UnitedKi ngdom, paras.1.12-1.13, United
States, pp.32-33; Written Comments of Al bania, paras.79 and 90; Germany, p. 7; Norway, para.9; Switzerland,
para. 3; United Kingdom, para. 24.
25Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, para. 6.01. - 42 -
20. The authors cite a number of procedural irregularities, as well as formal differences,
which distinguish the adoption of the UDI from the adoption of legal acts by the Assembly of
Kosovo 26. However, their argument suffers from one fatal problem to begin with: it does not
correspond to reality. It is contradicted by the transcript of the session 27; it is contradicted by the
28
views of the Kosovo authorities themsel ves at the time the UDI was adopted ; it is also
contradicted by the then views of those States that recognized Kosovo, although now they take a
different position 29. Finally, it is contradicted by the views of impartial international observers and
30
bodies .
21. First, the transcript of the Assembly of Kosovo session at which the UDI was adopted
expressly states that the Assembly was conve ned in accordance with the Constitutional
31
Framework , that is, as a provisional institution of self- government. There is no indication in the
transcript that this was a session of some ad hoc constituent body. Rather, it clearly shows that this
was a session of the Assembly of Kosovo, on which it first adopted its agenda and then proceeded to
adopt the UDI. After the UDI was adopted, the Assembly members signed its text, as did the
President and Prime Minister of Kosovo, who, in this way, endorsed the UDI.
22. In this context, it is important to note that the Albanian term used by the UDI for the
President of Kosovo, under which he put his signature to the UDI, is the same as the term used in
32
the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo: “Kryetari i Kosovës” . In contrast, the “constitution”
of the so-called “Republic of Kosovo” uses a di fferent term for “president”: “Presidenti i
33
Republikës së Kosovës” . This also indicates that the UDI was signed by the President of Kosovo
in his capacity of a Provisional Institution of Self-Government under the Constitutional Framework
for Kosovo.
26
Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, paras. 6.10-6.19.
27
See Written Comments of Serbia, paras. 33-34.
28Ibid., para. 35.
29Ibid., para. 38, notes 26-36.
30Ibid., para. 37.
31
Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, Ann. 2, p. 4.
32
See, e.g., Arts.1.5 (b) and 9.2.1 of the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo. The Albanian version is
available atttp://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/03albanian/A2001regs/RA200….
33
See, e.g., Art.84 of the Constitu tion of the so-called “Republic of Kosovo”, for the Albanian text see
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/Kushtetuta_sh.pdf. - 43 -
23. Moreover, at the time the UDI was a dopted, the President of Kosovo wrote to the
President of Germany that “ the Assembly of Kosovo declared Kosovo’s independence” 34. Thus,
according to the President of Kosovo himself, it was “the Assembly of Kosovo” that adopted the
UDI ⎯ not the “democratically-elected representatives of the people” or “a constituent body”.
24. This is also confirmed by statements of the United Nations Secretary-General and of the
European Union 3. This was also the view of States that have recognized the so-called “Republic
36
of Kosovo” .
25. However, contrary to all evidence, and for the purpose of the present proceedings, the
authors of the UDI argue that it was not adopted by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
but by some “constituent body”. Mr.President, th is is a self-serving construction that has been
devised in an attempt to place the UDI outside the international legal régime for Kosovo, as
supposedly this legal régime w ould not apply to such a “constituent body”. All the evidence,
however, points to the same conclusion ⎯ that the UDI was adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo
and was endorsed by the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo. But even if the UDI were an act
of a “constituent body” this would not change the conclusion that it is contrary to international law.
The binding force of the international le gal régime established by Security Council
resolution 1244
26. Mr.President, Security Council resolution1244 (1999) created an international legal
régime for Kosovo that imposes international obl igations upon all relevant actors in Kosovo ⎯
international obligations which have been violated by the UDI. However, in a last-ditch attempt to
defend the UDI, the authors and some States supporting them try to counter this obvious fact with
two arguments: first, that resolution 1244 (1999) only binds States and not the authors of the UDI;
and second, that UNMIK regulations are not international but domestic law.
27. I will demonstrate that both these arguments are untenable. I will first deal with the
37
claim that resolution 1244 (1999) does not bind the authors of the UDI . In the view of Serbia, the
34
See Written Statement of Germany, Ann. 2; emphasis added.
35
See Written Comments of Serbia, para. 37.
3See ibid., para. 38. - 44 -
38
Security Council can bind non-State actors and it has done so many times in its practice
including, as I will discuss in a moment, in the case of Kosovo. While the Charter is obviously
primarily concerned with obligations of Member States in the application of the Security Council
39
measures , there is nothing in it that would restrict Security Council action with respect to
non-State entities and individuals, if such action is necessary for the maintenance or restoration of
the international peace and security. This is evident from the text of Article41 of the Charter
which indicates that the Security Council “ may call upon the Members” to apply its measures not
involving the use of armed force. This clearly leaves open the possibility that there are measures
which do not require their application by Member States. Normally, the Security Council measures
are applied by States which by their internal legislation bind persons on their territory. But there is
nothing in the Charter that would restrict the Security Council to decide otherwise. In particular, in
a situation when a territory is administered by the United Nations, like Kosovo, and there is no
Member State that can exercise the territorial jurisdiction and implement Security Council
measures, there is simply no other way to achieve their goal other than to address them directly to
non-State entities in the said territory.
28. Mr.President, this is confirmed by practice. A leading commentary of the United
Nations Charter, when discussing whether individuals subject to international administrations can
be addressed by the Security Council measures having direct effect on them, concludes the
following:
“[T]he UN’s assumption of this... task has been widely welcomed by States,
and Article41 has thus evolved into a basis for the creation of direct legal effects in
the domestic sphere, conferring on the UN so me characteristics of a supranational
organization.” 40
37
Those espousing such view are not in agreement whether the Security Coun cil can bind non-State actors as a
matter of principle. Compare Further Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, paras. 5.70-5.71 (the Security Council
cannot bind non-State entities) with Written Comments of the United States, p. 35 (reserving the position but expressing
doubt that the Security Council can bind non-State entities), and Written Comments of the United Kingdom, para. 22 (the
Security Council can bind non-State en tities, but only with expl icit language as to the actors addressed and the
substantive content of their obligations).
38See, e.g., Security Council resolutions on Angola: resolution785 (1992), paras.6, 8 and 9, resolution793
(1992), para.4, resolution811 (1993), paras.2-4, resolution 864 (1993), paras.6-9, 11, 14, 16, as well as the first
preambular paragraph of section B; and on Afghanistan: resolution1193 (1998), paras.2, 6-9, 14-16; resolution1265
(1999), paras. 1-3, 5, 9, 10; resolution 1333 (2001), paras. 1-3.
39See, in particular, Article 25 of the Charter.
40J. Frowein and N. Krisch, “Introduction to ChapterVII”, in B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United
Nations: A commentary, Vol. I, p. 716, MN 45. - 45 -
29. All this shows that the Security Counc il can bind non-State actors. A related but
different question is how this should be done. There is nothing to suggest, as claimed by the
United Kingdom, that the only way to do so is to use explicit language both with regard to the
41
actors to be bound and the substance of their obligations . Rather, it is both prudent and in
accordance with the Charter to leave this choice to the Security Council.
30. Mr.President, the Security Council has introduced binding obligations for all actors in
42
Kosovo . It should be recalled that already its resolutions preceding resolution1244 (1999)
contain obligations expressly addressed to Kosovo leaders and to the ethnic Albanian community
43
in Kosovo. The authors of the UDI contend that these are only “political demands” . But this is
refuted by resolution 1203 (1998), in which the Security Council stated, in strong and unequivocal
language, that it
“[d]emands also that the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other elements of the
Kosovo Albanian community comply fully and swiftly with resolutions1160 (1998)
and 1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in
Kosovo” . 44
Significantly, the Security Council recalled its previous resolutions on Kosovo when adopting
resolution 1244 (1999) 45.
31. As far as resolution1244 (1999) is concerned, it set out basic principles of a political
solution to the Kosovo crisis, as well as the steps to reach such solution. The achievement of these
goals is simply impossible without the involvement of the Kosovo Albanian community and
without their compliance with the obligations set fo rth by the Security Council. For this reason,
resolution1244 (1999) contains both specific and general obligations binding on the Kosovo
Albanians or certain of their organizations. A sp ecific obligation is the requirement that “the KLA
46
and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions. . .” .
41See Written Comments of the United Kingdom, para. 22.
42
See the Written Statements of Serbia, para.505 et seq.; Argentina, para.116 et seq.; Romania, para.14;
Russia, paras. 24, 26, 72; Spain, para. 66 et seq.; and Written Comments of Serbia, para. 375 et seq.; Cyprus, para. 18.
43
Further Written Contribution of the authors of the UDI, para. 5.72.
44Security Council resolution 1203 (1998), para. 4.
45Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), preambular paragraph 2.
46Ibid., para. 15. - 46 -
32. The general obligations may be deduced from determinations made by the Security
Council, which inter alia concern the principles of a political solution for Kosovo and of a political
process that should lead to such a solution, as well as the creation of international civil and security
presences and their responsibilities. For example, the Security Council’s designation of the
principles and requirements on which to base a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, contained in
paragraph1 of the resolution, must be binding on all parties, including the Kosovo Albanians. It
would simply make no sense to bind the States concerned, including the FRY, but not one of the
two main parties to the conflict who is also a pa rty in the process of finding a political solution to
the crisis.
33. Similarly, when the Security Council deci ded that an international administration be
established in Kosovo 47, this a fortiori meant that all individuals in Kosovo must comply with this
determination and, consequently, must co-opera te with the United Nations administration and
comply with its decisions.
34. Mr. President, to contend that these determin ations are not binding on all relevant actors,
including the Kosovo Albanian community, is to jeopardize the fulfilment of resolution1244
(1999) and would clearly be contrary to the purpose for which it was adopted. It would also unduly
restrain the powers of the Security Council under the Charter.
35. Both the Security Council and its Member States have indeed confirmed that
resolution1244 (1999) created obligations bindi ng on all relevant actors, including the Kosovo
Albanians. As the United Kingdom representative poi nted out at the time of its adoption, “[t]his
48
resolution applies also in full to the Kosovo Albanians” . Subsequent practice of the Security
49
Council confirms this as well . For example, in its presidential statement of 24May2002, the
Security Council called on Kosovo’s elected leaders “to focus their attention on the urgent matters
for which they have responsibility, in accordan ce with resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 and
the Constitutional Framework” 50. This clearly indicates that Kosovo’s leaders were regarded by
47Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), para. 10.
48
UN doc. S/PV.4011, 10 June 1999, p. 18 (Mr. Greenstock).
49For more, see Written Comments of Serbia, paras. 381-386.
50UN doc. S/PRST/2002/16, 24 May 2002. - 47 -
the Security Council as having obligations under bot h documents. Of particular significance in the
context of the present proceedings is the fact that the Security Council has specifically and
repeatedly emphasized the obligation of the Kosovo Albanian leaders to respect the final status
provisions in resolution1244 (1999) 5. It is therefore beyond doubt that the Security Council
understood this resolution as imposing obligations on all actors, including the Kosovo Albanians
and their leaders.
36. This interpretation is shared by the Secr etary-General, who in a 2003 report stated that
“[a]ll local leaders should adhere strictly to resolution1244 (1999) and the Constitutional
Framework” 52. The same approach is also followe d by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Kosovo, as is evident, fo r example, from the Constitutional Framework for
Kosovo 53.
37. It is therefore clear that Security Co uncil resolution 1244 (1999) imposes obligations on
non-State actors, including the authors of the UDI, regardless of how they are characterized ⎯ be it
as the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, or Kosovo’s elected leaders or any other group
of individuals in Kosovo.
38. In addition, all actors in Kosovo are bound by UNMIK regulations. As has already been
discussed in Serbia’s Written Statement, the UDI violates the Constitutional Framework for
Kosovo and other relevant UNMIK regulations in various ways 54. In order to avoid this inevitable
conclusion, the authors and the States supporting them submit two arguments. First, they claim
that the UDI is not illegal because the relevant United Nations organs allegedly acquiesced to it and
this will be dealt with by my friend and colleague Professor Zimmermann. The second argument is
that the Constitutional Framework and other UNMIK regulations constitute domestic, not
51
See UN doc. S/PRST/2001/27, 5 Oct. 2001 and UN doc. S/PRST/2001/34, 9 Nov. 2001.
52Report of the Secretary-General on the United Na tions Interim Administra tion Mission in Kosovo, UN
doc. S/2003/421, 14 Apr. 2003, para. 55. For more, see Written Comments of Serbia, paras. 387-388.
53Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, Arts. 1.4. (Kosovo shall be governed in accordance with resolution 1244
(1999) and the Constitutional Framework) and 2 (a) (Provisional Institutions of Sel f-Government must exercise their
responsibilities in accordance with these two documents).
54See Written Statement of Serbia, para. 866 et seq. - 48 -
55
international law and, hence, the UDI has not violated international law . And I will now turn to
that argument.
39. Mr.President, it is, I hope, uncontroversia l that UNMIK is a subsidiary body of the
56
United Nations and that regulations adopted by UN MIK are acts emanating from a United
Nations subsidiary body. This means that these regulations are, by their very origin, of an
international nature. Further, the Special Repr esentative of the Secretary-General was empowered
to issue these regulations by the Security Council exercising its Chapter VII powers, and not by any
local authority. This means that their binding force also derives from the Security Council.
Therefore, both as regards their origin and as regards their binding force, UNMIK regulations
possess an international nature.
40. It is not contested that UNMIK regulations operate mainly at the local level of Kosovo.
But in this, they are not dissimilar from other international legal instruments, which unquestionably
may directly create rights and obligations for non-State actors 57.
41. Scholars also agree that UNMIK regulations and acts of other international
administrations are international acts and, as such, form a part of international and, specifically,
United Nations law. At the same time, they point ou t that these acts also form part of the domestic
58
legal order of the territory in question . But their dual character does not mean, of course, that
acts of international administrations are not part of international law. Indeed, no one has suggested
that this was the case, except the authors of th e UDI and three States that support their position 59.
55Further Written Contribution of the authors of the UDI, paras.5.66, 5.73 and 6.34; Written Comments of the
United States, pp.39-42; Written Comments of the Unite d Kingdom, para.32; Written Comments of the Netherlands,
para. 2.3.
56See Arts. 7 and 29 of the United Nations Charter.
57
See, e.g., common Art. III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
58
See M. Ruffert, “The Administrati on of Kosovo and East-Timor by the International Community”, 50 ICLQ
(2001) 613, p. 623; M. Bothe and T. Marauhn, “The UN Administration in Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality
and Limitations of Security Council-Ma ndated Trusteeship Administration”, in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the
International Community: A Legal Assessment 217, pp.228-229; L. von Carlow itz, “UNMIK Lawmaking between
Effective Peace Support and Inte rnal Self-Determination”, 41 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2003) 336, p.341; E. de Wet,
“The Direct Administration of Territories by the United Nations and its Member States in the Post Cold War Era: Legal
Bases and Implications for National Law”, 8 Max Planck UNYB (2004), p.331; R.Wild e, “International Territorial
Administration and Human Rights” in N.White and D.Klaasen (eds.), The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict
Situations (2005), pp.167 et seq.; C.Stahn, The Law and Practice of Internatio nal Territorial Administration (2008),
pp. 650-651; B. Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International Organisations (2008),
p. 335.
59
Further Written Contribution of the Authors of the UDI, paras. 5.66, 5.73 and 6.34; Written Comments of the
United States, pp.39-42; Written Comments of the Unite d Kingdom, para.32; Written Comments of the Netherlands,
para. 2.3. - 49 -
It is only the United States that makes a more developed argument in this regard, but their
argument assumes that UNMIK regulations must be domestic law because they operate at the
domestic level, replace existing laws and regulate local matters 60. However, this description,
which is not inaccurate as much as it is incomplete, misses the main point: UNMIK regulations are
issued by an international authority ⎯ a United Nations subsidiary organ ⎯ and they draw their
binding force from an international act ⎯ a binding Security Council resolution and, ultimately, the
United Nations Charter. Therefore, they are inte rnational law, while also functioning as local law
applicable to Kosovo.
42. Mr. President, in conclusion, let me summarize my argument:
⎯ first, the Court is competent to deal with th e General Assembly’s request for an advisory
opinion in the present case and there are no reasons why this opinion should be refused;
⎯ secondly, the authors of the UDI are the Prov isional Institutions of Self-Government in
Kosovo;
⎯ thirdly, regardless of how we characterize the au thors of the UDI, they are bound by Security
Council resolution1244 (1999) and UNMIK regula tions, which have been violated by the
UDI;
⎯ and finally, UNMIK regulations are part of intern ational law, and the UDI must also be judged
against their provisions.
43. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, with this I conclude my presentation.
I would like to thank you for your kind attention. Mr. President, I would appreciate it if you could
call Professor Zimmermann to the Bar.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Djerić. I now give the floor to Professor Zimmermann.
60
Written Comments of the United States, pp. 39-42. - 50 -
Mr. ZIMMERMANN:
T HE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE VIOLATES
SECURITY C OUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me start by, once again, expressing my honour to
appear before this Court. This is even more true so since these proceedings are of utmost relevance
for the functioning of the overall system of the United Nations and its ability to maintain and
restore international peace and security.
I. Introduction
2. Mr. President, this case is primarily, but not exclusively, about Kosovo. Before this Court
lies also the question whether the international status of a territory subject to United Nations
administration, established by the Security Counc il acting under ChapterVII, can unilaterally be
altered.
3. The Unilateral Declaration of Independen ce (UDI) does not constitute the first instance
where the authority of the Security Council has been challenged by unila teral action related to
Kosovo.
4. It was already in 1999 that unilateral military action was undertaken without Security
Council approval. It was resolution1244 which, af ter more than 70 days of unilateral military
action, finally restored the authority of the Security Council.
5. Yet, what you will hear from some other participants is the proposition that you should
interpret resolution 1244 as having opened the path for renewed unilateral action without Security
Council approval or endorsement ⎯ unilateral action taken by one party to the conflict and
supported by those very States that had acted unilaterally in 1999 in the first place.
6. It is up to this Court, as the principaljudicial organ of the United Nations, to decide
whether this really constitutes a tena ble interpretation of resolution1244⎯ Serbia respectfully
submits that it does not.
7. More specifically, I will now show that , in addition to running counter to general
international law, the UDI also violates resolution 1244 because, - 51 -
⎯ first, resolution1244 affirmed the territorial integrity of the FRY and clearly precluded the
unilateral separation of Kosovo;
⎯ second, an international legal régime was estab lished by resolution1244 and such régime
cannot be unilaterally destroyed;
⎯ third, the UDI cannot amount to the final settlement envisaged by resolution 1244;
⎯ fourth, the UDI encroaches upon the prerogatives of the Security Council under the Charter;
and finally
⎯ that the status-neutral approach of the United Nations Secretary-General vis-à-vis the UDI does
not, and cannot, amount to any form of acquiescence.
II. Resolution 1244 precludes the unilateral separation of Kosovo
8. Mr.President, let me start by demonstra ting that resolution1244 precludes the unilateral
separation of Kosovo.
9. Members of the Court, on 11June1999, one single day after the adoption of
resolution 1244, only one single day thereafter, the Security Council adopted resolution1246
pertaining to the international legal status of East Timor. Operative paragraph 1 of said resolution
provided for
“a popular consultation... in order to ascertain whether the E ast Timorese people
accept . . . a special autonomy for East Timor within the . . . Republic of Indonesia or
reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s
separation from Indonesia” 61.
10. In sharp contrast thereto, no such provision had been inserted in resolution1244. This
alone is telling. And it was done on purpose ⎯ on purpose because the inclusion of any clause
providing for the possibility of a unilateral sepa ration of Kosovo from the FRY, now Serbia,
explicitly or otherwise, would not have mastered sufficient support in the Security Council.
11. What is even more striking, rather than providing for a right of Kosovo to separate from
Serbia, resolution 1244 formally reaffirmed the territo rial integrity of Serbia. It thus precluded the
possibility of Kosovo unilaterally seceding. Instead, resolution1244 provided for a political
process to determine the future status of Kosovo by way of an agreed settlement to be endorsed by
61
Emphasis added. - 52 -
the Security Council. No hint of a referendum, not even by way of cross-reference, and no
reference to the right of self-determination can be found in resolution 1244.
12. Yet, the authors of the UDI, as well as the minority of States supporting their claim, want
the Court to believe that the Security Council, by adopting resolution 1244, wanted to depart from
62
fundamental rules of international law, which underpin the entire system of international law ,
namely, the guarantee of the territorial integrity a nd sovereignty of States. And they want you to
believe that the Council has done so without even expressly saying it.
13. Given the fundamental nature of the principl e of territorial integrity in international law,
which will be further addressed by my friend and colleague Professor Shaw, there was no need for
the Security Council, when adopting resolution1244, to decide that Serbia’s territorial integrity
must be safeguarded. Rather, the Council ⎯ firmly basing itself on general international law ⎯
simply reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, now Serbia.
14. It should thus come as no surprise that the r eaffirmation of Serbia’s territorial integrity is
to be found in the preamble of resolution 1244, ju st as, to provide but one example, the guarantee
of the territorial integrity of Iraq is also frequently referred to in preambular paragraphs of various
63
Security Council resolutions .
15. It is against this background that one has to consider the alleged neutrality of
64
resolution1244 as to the final status of Kosovo . The starting-point is that there is no right to
unilaterally secede under general international la w. The Security Council took note of that
prohibition by reaffirming Serbia’s territorial in tegrity and accordingly its title to the territory in
question. Had the Security Council really wanted to provide otherwise, it would have been obliged
to do so explicitly. Yet, it did not.
16. I will now further demonstrate that the adoption of the UDI also violated the legal régime
set up by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
62
See Written Comments of Serbia, paras. 412, 228 et seq.; Written Statement of Serbia, Chaps. 6 and 8.
63See Security Council resolutions1500 (2003), 1546 (2004), 1557 (2004), 1619 (2005), 1700 (2006),
1770 (2007), 1790 (2007) and 1830 (2008). See further the Writte n Statement of Serbia, para. 473; Written Comments
of Serbia, para. 413.
64See Further Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, paras.5.37 et seq .; ibid. , para.9.10; Written
Comments of United Kingdom, paras. 18 et seq. - 53 -
III. The UDI violates the legal régime set up by
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)
17. Mr. President, Members of the Court, unde r resolution 1244, and as explicitly confirmed
by UNMIK regulations adopted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the
supreme legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo is vested in UNMIK. It is
exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
18. The Constitutional Framework creating the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
reaffirmed the supreme legislative and administrative authority of the Special Representative in and
throughout Kosovo. It also confirmed that said Provisional Institutions of Self-Government could
not take action that are inconsistent with resolution1244 or the Constitutional Framework, thus
also rendering the UDI illegal under the legal régime provided for in resolution 1244. Accordingly,
for this reason alone, the UDI must be considered not to be in accordance with international law.
19. Several contributions have made attempts to circumvent this obvious hurdle. All of them
can however be easily refuted. For one, my friend and colleague Vladimir Djeri ć has already
demonstrated that, indeed, the UDI was ad opted by the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government, and not by some mysterious “constituent body”.
20. Besides, I will subsequently show that the UDI cannot amount to the final settlement
required to bring to an end the interim period provided for in resolution 1244.
21. Accordingly, the UDI not only violates ge neral international law and resolution 1244 as
such, but also runs counter to the legal framework created to implement resolution1244, and, in
particular, the Constitutional Framework setting up the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government.
22. This brings me to my next point, namely, the notion of “political settlement”, as provided
for in resolution 1244.
IV. The notion of “political settlement”
as contemplated in resolution 1244
23. Mr.President, resolution1244 contains a requirement that any change to the
international status of Kosovo, as forming part of the Republic of Serbia, must be part of a - 54 -
65
“political settlement” . Yet, “the terms of any eventual se ttlement must be mutually acceptable to
both sides” ⎯ must be mutually acceptable to both sides.
66
24. These are the words of then United States Ambassador Holbrooke . Serbia could not
agree more. And it is also obvious that, pending such a mutually acceptable settlement to be
endorsed by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, the status quo ante and Serbia’s title to
territory remain unaltered.
25. It is quite telling that certain States ha ve fundamentally modified their own previous
position, although the aims of the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians were well-known ever
since the early 1990s and although it was obvious that reaching such a settlement, including
reaching consensus in the Security Council, would not be easy. Indeed, the Security Council was
aware of it when it adopted resolution1244 and it was for this very reason that the validity of
resolution 1244 is not limited in time 67.
26. States supporting the UDI now argue that the unilateral declaration of independence,
even one not endorsed by the Security Counc il, was a possible scenario contemplated in
resolution 1244. If that was true, one might wonde r why the Security Council had then envisaged
negotiations between the parties in the first place, if one of the parties could terminate them at will
and why it had provided that the legal régime set up by resolution 1244 was to remain in place until
such time as the Security Council terminated it?
27. One might also ask why the Security Council had not spelled out the option of a UDI, as
it had done in the resolution I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation, if indeed, as claimed,
the Security Council had wanted to provide for such a possibility?
28. It should also be recalled that the Security Council had deliberately used the term
“settlement” to describe the outcome of the e nvisaged political process, which term it had
borrowed from Article2, paragraph3, and Article 33 of the Charter, which provisions in turn
themselves exclude unilateral action.
65
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), operative para. 11 (c), (f).
66Mr.Holbrooke (United States), UNdoc.S/PV.4258, 18 Ja n. 2001, p.9, Dossier No.96; see also Written
Comments of Serbia, para. 449.
67Security Council resolution1244 (1999), operative para.19; see also Written Comments of Serbia, paras.414
et seq.; Written Statement of Serbia, paras. 799 et seq. - 55 -
29. Besides, the term “settlement” is comm only used to describe solutions reached by
68
common accord . There is no hint whatsoever of an in dication that the Security Council had a
different meaning of the term “settlement” in mind when it used it in resolution 1244.
30. Given this ordinary meaning of the term “settlement”, there was accordingly no need for
the Security Council to further underline the necessity to reach a mutually acceptable solution by
additionally also using other terms such as “agreement”.
31. The fact that the Security Council, in ot her parts of resolution1244, uses such different
69
language is simply due to the fact that the Security Council, by using the term “settlement”, had
wanted to stress the need to reach a mutual acceptance by both sides, Serbia and the representatives
of the Albanian population of Kosovo, while the terms “agreement of the FRY” or “FRY’s
agreement”, as used in resolution 1244 elsewhere, refer to the acceptance by one party only.
32. Moreover, it is only such an interpretati on that is in line with the overall object and
purpose of resolution 1244, namely, to provide for a solution based on respect for international law,
in particular respect for the territorial integrity of States, while at the same time being acceptable to
both sides. It is indeed only such a mutually acceptable solution endorsed by the Security Council
that will, on the long term, guarantee enduring peace and stability in the region. It is only such an
agreed solution that is able to safeguard fundamental human rights for all members of the
population of Kosovo, including minorities.
33. Finally, the term “settlement”, unlik e the term “agreement”, also indicates the
comprehensive and long-lasting character of the solution to be reached.
34. Accordingly, given that no political settlement has been r eached, no institutions
established under a final settlement exist eith er. Moreover, under paragraph11, littera (f) of
resolution1244, any transfer of authority from the provisional authorities of self-government to
institutions established under a po litical settlement would have to take place under the auspices of
UNMIK. Yet, UNMIK has not taken any step providing for such transfer after it had become clear
that the plan proposed by Special Representative Ahtisaari would not be endorsed by the Security
Council.
68
See Written Comments of Serbia, paras. 436 et seq.; Written Statement of Serbia, paras. 750 et seq., 913 et seq.
6Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), preambular para. 9, operative para. 5. - 56 -
35. It has been argued that any such interpretation would lead to a de facto veto of Serbia as
70
to the content of the final settlement provided for in resolution 1244 . If that were to be true, how
could one then qualify the right the authors of th e UDI claim to have? One could refer to this
claim, to their claim, as some kind of a “super-veto” to not only prevent a certain solution, but even
to unilaterally impose their preferred option on both, the State that has title to the territory in
question, namely, Serbia, and the Security Council.
36. It should also be recalled that the inte rnational community has, over many years,
undertaken tireless efforts to settle certain territo rial problems on the basis of international law,
Cyprus and Palestine being examples at hand. The international community, led by the United
Nations and its organs, including th is very Court, has done so without giving in to unilateral
attempts to create a fait accompli on the ground, and the Court’s Opinion in the Wall case (Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004) being one of the most prominent and important examples.
37. Indeed, one should not be influenced by attempts to threaten the Court by an open or
hidden assumption that a solution based on interna tional law would be unworkable, or that one
should take into account so-called “realities” ⎯ and even less so “realities” created in violation of
general international law, the Charter and resolution 1244.
38. Following the very logic of the authors of the UDI, it may become possible to argue that
in the situations to which I have just referred to, namely, Palestine or Cyprus, the respective
situation has similarly reached a deadlock and that the international community should accordingly
give in to so-called “realities on the ground” ⎯ just as the authors of the UDI and its supporters
want this Court to accept the so-called “reality” allegedly created by the UDI. The dangers of such
proposition are self-evident I believe.
39. Mr. President, it has been argued that the negotiations required by resolution 1244 have
run their course. Let me just make two points in that regard on both procedure and substance.
40. As far as procedural matters are concerned, it is the Security Council that has started the
negotiation process under its auspices. The Counc il has not made any determination that the
7See further Written Contribution of the Authors of the UDI, paras. et seq.; Written Comments of the
United Kingdom, para. 17. - 57 -
process has come to an end, one way or the othe r. Indeed, while Special Representative Ahtisaari
and the Secretary-General have taken certain positions as to the chances of future negotiations, they
do not have the authority to make binding and final determinations in that regard.
41. In particular, Special Representative Ahtisaari only had a limited mandate to mediate in
the political process and not to arbitrate. While he had a mandate to make a proposal, a
recommendation, he did not have one to render decisions.
42. Besides, it is well-known that nego tiations were still undertaken after the
recommendation made by Special Representative Ahtisaari and there are no obstacles to start them
anew with a fresh impetus ⎯ in particular after the parties have received legal guidance from your
advisory opinion, which Serbia will fully take into account in its approach to bring about a
mutually acceptable solution.
43. Serbia also trusts, and indeed expects, that all other relevant actors, including the
Security Council and its members, will similarl y be guided by the outcome of these proceedings,
including with regard to the continued role of UNMIK vis-à-vis the local authorities in Kosovo.
44. It has to be noted, however, that such renewed negotiations must not only be based on
international law, but must also be facilitated in an unbiased manner. With all due respect to the
actors involved, it was certainly not helpful, to say the least, for the mediator appointed by the
Secretary-General to refer publicly to Serbia as a thief that had stolen Kosovo from the Albanian
Kosovo population, as if Serbia did not have a valid title to the territory ever since 1913. Indeed,
Special Representative Ahtisaari is on public record for having, inter alia, stated the following, and
let me quote:
“Let me give you an example how... I look at the Kosovo negotiations...
[L]et’s take an example, that Serbia is like a thief who has stolen the wallet from
Kosovo. And if I am a mediator, I am not advising them that could the Serbian thief
actually decide himself how much money he wants to give to the fellow whose wallet
he’d stolen . . . he has to give the whole damn wallet to you and then, most probably,
go to jail for what he did. . . . Everyone knew that independence was coming.” 71
Just imagine the havoc that such an approach might cause in other situations!
7Interview with Mr. htisaari, CNN, 10 December 2008, available at: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=z61yrrRoOmw(visited on 23 Nov. 2009); see Written Comments of Serbia, para.108 for the full text of the
interview. - 58 -
45. It is also telling that the then President of the United States, GeorgeW.Bush, publicly
declared that the only possible outcome of the ongoing negotiation process could be the
72
independence of Kosovo . He did so at a moment when a further round of negotiations had not
even started ⎯ negotiations which the United Stat es and others now call a bona fide attempt to
leave no stone unturned in the search for a mutually acceptable outcome 73.
46. As to the substance of the negotiations, let me reiterate that Serbia has offered the highest
degree of autonomy to Kosovo, framed in accordan ce with models generally perceived as having
been successful and legitimate in various regions of the world. It is also obvious that any
negotiated solution would lead to the necessary amendments to the Serbian constitution, which
would mean that such solution for Ko sovo would be constitutionally entrenched 74in addition to
being internationally guaranteed.
47. That brings me to my next point ⎯ namely, the role of the Security Council.
V. The final settlement for Kosovo and the role of the Security Council
48. Mr. President, it was the Security Council th at reinstated its primacy for the maintenance
of international peace and security after the unilate ral use of military force against the FRY by
adopting resolution 1244.
49. It was the Security Council which, ac ting under ChapterVII, adopted resolution1244
and created the current legal status of Kosovo.
50. It was the Security Council that decided th at resolution 1244 will continue to be in force
until the Council decides otherwise 75.
76
51. It was the Security Council that decided to remain actively seised of the matter .
52. It was the Security Council that started the political process for the settlement of the
future status of Kosovo 77.
72
The President’s News Conference With Prime Minister Sali Berisha of Albania in Tirana, Albania,
June 10, 2007, available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75342; see Written Comments of
Serbia, para. 113.
73
See, e.g., Written Statement of the United States, p. 82; Written Statement of the United Kingdom, para. 3.33 et
seq.; Written Statement of Germany, p. 27. See, for further details, the Written Comments of Serbia, para. 100.
74
Written Comments of Serbia, para. 118.
75See Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), operative para. 19.
76See Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), operative para. 21. - 59 -
53. And it is also for the Security Council to decide when this pro cess has come to an end
and to then endorse the outcome of the process.
54. As the Special Representative of the Secret ary-General stated with regard to the final
status of Kosovo:
“Its future status is open and will be decided by the UN Security Council. Any
unilateral statement in whatever form whic h is not endorsed by the Security Council
has no legal effect on the future status of Kosovo.” 78
79
⎯ a position that was subsequently reiterated time and again .
55. In the same vein, the Head of the Mission of the Security Council stated, on behalf of the
Council, after a visit to the area, in unequivocal terms:
“[n]o unilateral steps will determine Kos ovo’s final status. The United Nations
Security Council will, in consultation with all conc erned, ultimately determine
Kosovo’s final status.” 80
81
56. Let me note in particular that none of these statements was, in one way or the other,
made subject to certain conditions or limited in its scope, temporally or otherwise. Last but not
least, they were made specifically in light of the well-known aspirations of the Kosovo Albanian
leadership to strive for independence at all cost s and in disregard of international law. These
statements were also made in view of the Kos ovo Albanian leadership’s willingness to eventually
circumvent the competences of the Council under the Charter, should they not be able to secure a
settlement with Serbia and the required majority in the Security Council.
57. Indeed, as late as 2007, attempts were made to reach consensus in the Security Council
and to bring about a solution in line with the prerogatives of the Council under the Charter. Our
learned friends representing those States which made these attempts in 2007 now try to downplay
their own efforts. They simply do so because their proposals were not accepted by the Security
Council.
77
See Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), operative para. 11 (e).
78
Statement by Michael Steiner, Speci al Representative of the Secretary-General of 7 Nov.2002, Dossier
No. 187; also cited by Cyprus in its Written Comments, para. 6.
79See Written Comments of Serbia, para. 460.
80Report of the Security Council Mission to Kosovo a nd Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 14to
17 Dec. 2002, UN doc. S/2002/1376, 19 Dec. 2002, Ann. I, p. 17.
81For further examples see the Written Statement of Serbia, paras. 799 et seq. - 60 -
58. Let me pause for a second and consider what these very States would say about their own
2007 draft resolution, which was supposed to provide for a Security Council endorsement of a UDI
and the Ahtisaari plan in particular, had it been adopted.
59. You would now certainly hear from them that such a resolution had been necessary to
bring about a change in the status of Kosovo and th at it had been fully in line with the prerogatives
of the Council to do so. Yet, the draft resoluti on was not adopted by the Council and indeed not
even formally tabled because they knew it would not receive the necessary majority.
60. Mr.President, let me conclude this part of my presentation with a brief reflection. In
recent years the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, has provided for the administration of
certain territories directly by the United Nations. Such United Nations administration has proven
to constitute an important mechanism to maintain or restore international peace and security in a
given region.
61. On all occasions, the respective territorial States have given their consent to such United
Nations administration. The consent of Croatia w ith regard to Eastern Slavonia and the consent of
the FRY with regard to Kosovo are two pertinent examples. It would constitute a most dangerous
precedent not only with regard to ge neral international law, but also with regard to the system of
collective security provided for by the Charter, if States were now to learn that the setting-up of
such a United Nations administration constitutes nothing but a first step in a process of secession
by the territory concerned, otherwise not provided for in international law.
62. Indeed, one might wonder whether both, th e relevant members of the Security Council,
as well as the individual States concerned, would in the future accept such solutions, were the
Court to tolerate that such United Nations-led administration is nothing but a road towards
secession.
63. Let me now deal with my last point, namely, the allegation that the reactions of the
United Nations and its organs can be perceived as a tacit approval of the UDI.
VI. The alleged acquiescence of the United Nations
64. Mr.President, let me start with an obvious remark. Everybody in this Great Hall of
Justice is well aware that there is no consensus in the international community on the legality or, - 61 -
rather, illegality of the UDI. Indeed, the very request made by the General Assembly, as well as
the various written and oral statements made a nd to be made by Member States, including all
permanent members of the Security Council, are proof of this disagreement, including
disagreement on the interpretation of resolution 1244.
65. In such a situation, where there was a lack of consensus within the Security Council and
a lack of legal guidance, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative decided to take a
82
status-neutral approach . However, they remain, as everyone else, bound by resolution 1244.
66. Accepting the surprising thesis that this approach amounts to a tacit approval of the UDI
would clearly be at odds with this express position of “strict status neutrality”, which in fact is a
decision not to take a position pending further guidance by the Security Council. As has already
been discussed, the Security Council has not taken a position on the UDI due to political
disagreements within the Council. This cannot possibly be interpreted as acquiescence. To
contend otherwise would lead to almost absurd results, as illustrated by the following example.
67. Let me, arguendo, apply the argument to a situation where the Council is similarly not in
a position, given its composition and the voting re quirements under the Charter, to condemn an
illegal use of force, in particular, where one of the permanent members itself is involved, in one
way or the other, in such use of force. Would a failure to condemn such u se of force mean that the
Council has acquiesced in it? Certainly not.
68. Accordingly, the mere inaction and no n-condemnation of the UDI may neither be
perceived as amounting to acquiescence because the organs of the United Nations have clearly not
accepted the legality of the UDI in any relevant manner.
VII. Conclusion
69. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me summarize:
70. Resolution 1244 does not recognize a right of secession for Kosovo. Instead it reaffirms
the territorial title of the FRY, now Serbia. Accordingly, the UDI cannot amount to the final
settlement envisaged by resolution 1244.
8Letter dated 12 June 2008 from the Secretary- General to His Excellency Mr. Boris Tadić, UN doc. S/2008/354,
12June2008, Ann.I, Dossier No.88; see also the Repor t of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administration in Kosovo, UN doc. S/2008/354, 12 June 2008, para. 19. - 62 -
71. Any final settlement has to be agreed upon by the parties under the auspices of the
Security Council by way of negotiations. This excludes any form of non-consensual independence
for Kosovo, not endorsed by the Security Council.
72. Only the Security Council may make bindi ng determinations as to the conclusion of the
final status process.
73. The illegality of the UDI has not been reme died by any alleged form of acquiescence of
United Nations organs. While the Secretary-General takes a status-neutral approach due to the lack
of guidance, the Security Council itself was not and is not in a position to either welcome or
condemn the UDI, due to divergent views within the membership of the Council.
74. Let me once again stress that resolution 1244 reinstated the role and primacy of the
Security Council with regard to the maintena nce of international peace and security after a
unilateral military action. This would be reve rsed by accepting the legality of the UDI adopted by
one side without any form of Security Council endorsement and would at the same time
fundamentally challenge the very foundations of the system of collective security set up by the
Charter.
75. Doing so would also amount to awarding actors who were unwilling to continue with a
negotiation process in good faith, because they knew they were supported by a certain number of
States, and in particular by those States that had unilaterally used military force in 1999 and were
willing to disregard both the principle of territorial sovereignty, as reaffirmed in resolution 1244, as
well as disregard the Council’s pivotal role under the Charter.
76. The rules of international law which are applicable to situations where the Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, provides for the temporary administration of a part of the
territory of a Member State by the United Nations must uniformly apply to all States and in all
relevant situations. Otherwise the acceptability of such temporary administration for both, the
Security Council and the States concerned, would be significantly endangered. Yet, this can only
be done if the alleged possibility of unilateral se cession, as claimed by the authors of the UDI, is
rejected and by confirming that the UDI is not in conformity with international law. - 63 -
77. Mr.President, honourable Members of the Court, this brings me to the end of my
presentation. I very kindly thank you for your attention and that might eventually be the
appropriate time for the usual break.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Zimmermann for your presentation. Indeed I feel
that we are now just in the middle of the morn ing session and I wish to propose that the Court is
going to have a short recess of 15minutes and then we are going back to the presentation by
Professor Shaw.
The Court adjourned from 11.35 to 11.55 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I now give the floor to Professor Shaw.
Mr. SHAW:
T HE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE VIOLATES THE
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT
FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is indeed a pleasure and an honour to be
addressing the Court once again and this time on behalf of the Republic of Serbia.
2. This request for an advisory opinion centres upon resolution1244. That is indisputable.
But that is not all. The matter under consideration very much concerns one of the key principles of
international law and that is the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States. That
makes these proceedings of interest and concern for so many States, a significant number of whom
will be represented before the Court during the next ten days. Any real or perceived weakening of
the principle of territorial integrity as a conse quence of these proceedings would be a source of
considerable apprehension to the very many St ates in the world who face a challenge from within
and from without to their territorial integrity. The Court’s advice will, therefore, be eagerly
awaited and of significant weight and consequence.
3. My submissions to you will make the following points. First, the principle of respect for
the territorial integrity of States is a foundational principle of international law. Secondly, this
general principle of international law now applies to non-State entities. Thirdly, the principle was - 64 -
reaffirmed in the process leading up to and includi ng resolution1244. Fourthly, the principle of
territorial integrity cannot be rendered contingent by an argument based on a highly questionable
interpretation of resolution1244. Fifthly, an ille gal act cannot be converted into a legal act by
subsequent political activity. Finally, and in any event, the purported State of Kosovo still fails to
satisfy the required criteria of statehood.
I. The principle of territorial integrity
4. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of
States flows from the sovereignty and equality of States, the very cornerstones of international
83
law . Few principles in present-day international la w have been so firmly established as that of
territorial integrity which requires that the very te rritorial structure and configuration of a State be
respected. In addition to constituting one of the ke y elements in the concept of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity has been seen as essential in the context of the stability and predictability of the
international legal system as a whole.
5. The principle of territorial integrity h as been comprehensively affirmed, confirmed and
reaffirmed in a long series of international instruments, binding 84 and non-binding, ranging from
United Nations resolutions of a general 85 and of a specific character 86to multilateral, regional 87
and bilateral agreements. There can be no doubting the legal nature of this norm, and the centrality
of it in the international legal and political system. This Court has indeed recently referred to “the
central importance in international law and relations of State sovereignty over territory and of the
stability and certainty of that sovereignty” (case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau
83Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1949, pp. 4, 35.
84
See, e.g., Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
85
See, e.g., the Colonial Declarati on, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); the Declaration on Principles,
General Assembly resolution2625 (XXV); the Definition of Aggression, General A ssembly3314 (XXIV) and the
United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly resolution55/2 affirmed in the World Summit Outcome,
General Assembly resolution 60/1, para. 5.
86
For other examples, see Written Statement of Serbia, para. 440 et seq.
87
See, e.g., the Helsinki Final Act 1975; the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States 1992; and the
Charter of the Organization of American States, as am ended in 1967, 1985, 1992 and 1993. See Written Statement of
Serbia, para. 440 et seq. - 65 -
Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) , Judgment of 23May2008,
88
para. 122) .
6. This has not been denied by States in these proceedings. No State has impugned the
principle as such. On the contrary, many of th em have explicitly confirmed its existence and
89
importance . The United Kingdom, for example, in so doing, admitted that “international law
favours the territorial integrity of States in the in terests of stability and the peaceful settlement of
disputes, including disputes . . . within a State” 90. However, some States and the authors of the
91
UDI maintain that the principle only has application as between States . Whatever the position
may have been in the past, current international law now establishes the contrary.
II. The principle of territorial integrity applies
to non-State entities as well as to States
7. The authors of the UDI and some States have sought to divert the argument by claiming
that the principle of territorial integrity does not guarantee the permanence of a State as it exists at
92
any particular moment and that therefore the principle cannot operate to preclude declaration
s of
93
independence made by peoples or groups within existing sovereign States . It is simply limited to
protection from coercive action and interference of other States 94. The Republic of Serbia agrees
that the principle does not freeze the territorial configuration of a State at any given moment.
Consensual change is always possible. The rele vant parties may agree to alter the territorial
delineation of a State. Nothing prevents that. That is what is meant by peaceful settlement of
disputes by negotiation and agreement, a concept so central to international law that it may not be
lightly discarded. A point some have forgotten.
88See also the Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, para. 112.
89See Further Written Comments of Serbia, paras. 238-246.
90
Written Statement of the United Kingdom, para.5.11. See also Written Comments of the United Kingdom,
para. 4.5.
91
See, e.g., Written Statement of the United Kingdom, para. 5.9; Written Statement of Switzerland, paras. 55-56;
Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, paras. 8.06, 8.19 and 9.02 and Further Written Contribution of authors of the
UDI, para. 4.06.
92See, e.g., Written Statement of the United Kingdom, para. 5.9; Written Statement of France, paras. 2.6-2.8 and
Written Statement of the United States of America, p. 69.
93See, e.g., Further Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, para. 4.06.
94
Ibid., para. 4.13. - 66 -
8. Others appear to submit that contemporar y international law does not deal directly with
the non-State entities. Serbia maintains on the contrary that the principle of territorial integrity
does apply to such entities and the argument proceeds essentially as follows. First, the definition of
international relations in so far as the application of international law is concerned has widened to
include civil wars, violations of humanitarian la w, terrorism and the internal seizure of power 95.
Secondly, international law now increasingly addresses non-State entities directly. Even the
authors of the UDI admit, rather reluctantly it may be said, that the Colonial Declaration “may
perhaps be read as broadening the beneficiaries of the principle of territorial integrity so as to
96
include not just the State but the people of the State” . Whether it be resolutions concerning
terrorism 97, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery 98, or
resolutions dealing with specific internal conf licts, international practice now clearly regards
non-State entities as direct subjects of international law. The classical structure of international law
has changed and no State or other entity may seek now to cling to it in the face of established
evolution. The clock may not be turned back.
9. Thirdly, recent practice has shown a number of examples where non-State entities within
an existing State are directly addressed in the co ntext of internal conflict and with regard to
territorial integrity. Such examples show clear ly that the international community recognizes how
critical is the principle of territorial integrity a nd how the principle is deemed to apply not only to
third States but also to internal groups, however designated. For reasons of time, we will refer only
to a few situations and briefly.
10. Security Council resolution 787 (1992) in operative paragraph 3 called on “all parties and
others concerned to respect strictly the territo rial integrity” of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
affirmed that “any entities unilaterally declared or arrangements imposed in contravention thereof
will not be accepted” 99. Resolutions with regard to, for ex ample, the Democratic Republic of the
95
See Written Comments of Serbia, para. 254 and references contained therein.
96Further Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, para. 4.10.
97See, e.g., Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) and ot her resolutions cited in Written Comments of Serbia,
para. 257, footnote 292.
98Security Council resolution1540(2004) and other re solutions cited in Wri tten Comments of Serbia,
paras. 259-260 and footnote 295.
99See further, Written Statement of Serbia, paras. 442-452. - 67 -
Congo, Somalia and Sudan have also strongly reaffirmed the importance of the sovereignty and
100
territorial integrity of those States faced w ith internal conflict and secessionist endeavours . In
other words, the international community now accepts that non-State entities and groups within
sovereign States may be directly required to respect the territorial integrity of that State.
11. Fourthly, specific international and regi onal instruments concerning the protection of
minorities and indigenous peoples have in terms stated that the rights of such groups must be
achieved within the territory of the State in questio n and have further insisted that nothing in the
instrument in question may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to, inter alia , the
sovereign equality, the territorial integrity and po litical independence of States. This formulation
appears in, for example, the Declaration on Mino rities of 1992, the European Charter on Regional
or Minority Languages 101 and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 102,
while the recent United Nations Declara tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 103 refers
104
explicitly in this context to States, peoples, groups or persons .
12. It is, therefore, simply incorrect to mainta in that international law does not apply directly
to non-State entities nor that the norm of territorial integrity is today limited to third States alone.
Practice makes it very clear that such norm is now recognized as applying to non-consensual
situations of internal conflict and secessionist atte mpts. This has been most recently recognized in
the Report on the Conflict in Georgia of the Mission established by the Council of the European
105
Union .
13. The argument has been made that the principles of territorial integrity and
self-determination are co-equal principles with th e question of priority to be decided on a
106
case-by-case basis . My colleague and friend Professor Kohen will address the principle of
self-determination later this morning. I would simp ly make the point that the argument is, as a
100
See, e.g., resolutions1756(2007), 1771(2007), 1766(2007), 1772(2007), and 1846(2008); and
resolution1784(2007). See also resolutions1770(2007) a nd 1830(2008) with regard to Iraq, Written Statement of
Serbia, paras. 459-63. Other examples may be seen in Written Statement of Serbia, para. 475 et seq.
101
Art. 5.
102
Art. 21.
103
General Assembly resolution 61/295.
10Art. 46 (1).
10The Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission, Sept. 2009, Vol. II, pp. 136-137.
106
E.g., Further Written Contribution of authors of UDI, paras. 4.37-4.38. - 68 -
matter of international law, incorrect. The principles of territorial integrity and self-determination
fit together. Outside of the colonial and foreign occupation contexts, self-determination is
expressed in the form of rights within the sovereign State in question. Otherwise, the international
community would be faced with assertions of a right to secession that could predominate in law
over the right of national unity and territorial integrity ⎯ and there is no international practice that
supports that proposition.
14. But we need not restrict our considerati on to the establishment of the general principle,
for the question of Kosovo has been directly addressed by the international community and in ways
demonstrating clearly that the principle of territo rial integrity applies to the relevant communities
of that area. To this specific affirmation, we now turn.
III. Reaffirmation of the principle of territorial integrity in
the process leading up to and including resolution 1244
15. Mr.President, Members of the Court, Resolution 1244, the focus of these proceedings,
cannot be seen in isolation, particularly in so far as respect for the territorial integrity of Serbia, in
the form of the FRY, was concerned. Indeed, one of the constants of the whole process leading up
to the adoption of resolution 1244 was the reaffirmation of the territorial integrity of the FRY. This
cannot be ignored or minimized. It matters.
16. Security Council resolution1160 (1998), for instance, specifically affirmed the
“commitment of all Member States to the soverei gnty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia” and in operative paragraph 3, emphasized that the principles for a solution
of the Kosovo problem should be based on the terr itorial integrity of the FRY and an enhanced
status for Kosovo which would include a substantia lly greater degree of autonomy and meaningful
self-administration 107. Resolution 1203 (1998) made it crystal clear that these obligations went
beyond United Nations Member States, for it also demanded, Mr. President, demanded that “the
Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other elements of the Kosovo Albanian community comply
fully and swiftly with resoluti ons 1160 (1998) and 119 9 (1998)”. Both of these resolutions
reaffirmed the territorial integrity of the FRY.
10See also Security Council resolutions 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998) and 1239 (1999). See further Wr
itten
Statement of Serbia, para. 504. - 69 -
17. And so we come to resolution1244. This part of our pleading concerns only the
territorial integrity point. The Court has alr eady heard our more gene ral arguments. This
resolution, to restate the obvious, reaffirmed the sovereign title of the FRY, while establishing an
international presence to administer Kosovo. No one has argued that the intention or effect of
resolution1244 was to deprive the FRY of title to Kosovo and no party has denied that the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY was explicitly reaffirmed 108.
109
18. Resolution 1244 commenced by recalling its previous resolutions , in each one of
which, as we have seen, the Security Council had called for a political solution based on the
territorial integrity of the FRY and autonomy for Kosovo and had demanded that the Kosovo
Albanian leadership and community accept this . This process of reconfirmation is legally
significant. Resolution 1244 itself also reaffirmed “the commitment of all Member States to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of
the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2”. I shall return to these instruments.
19. In addition, preambular paragraph11 reaffi rmed “the call in previous resolutions for
substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo”, thereby, of course, further
confirming title of the FRY. Of course, the fact that such reaffirmations of territorial integrity are
contained in preambular clauses is not unusual, as my friend and colleague Professor Zimmermann
has already pointed out. In fact , extensive practice demonstrates it is very usual and no State has
argued that this means, therefore, that the te rritorial integrity of the particular State under
consideration was thereby rendered contingent or conditional.
IV. Reinterpretation of territorial integrity as a contingent principle
110 111
20. However, the authors of the UDI and some other participants have argued that the
reaffirmation of the FRY’s territorial integrity was intended as a time-limited guarantee only. It
was to apply to the so-called interim period only, to be discarded thereafter. A number of points
108
See also the UNMIK-FRY Common Document, 5 Nov. 2001, Written Statement of Serbia, para.517 et seq.
and Written Comments of Serbia, para. 281.
109
Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998) and 1239 (1999).
11Further Written Contribution of authors of UDI, paras. 4.16 and 5.14.
11See, e.g., Written Comments of the United Kingdom, para.17 and Written Comments of the United States of
America, p. 25 and following. - 70 -
will be made in response. First, in principle the territorial integrity of States cannot be truncated or
time barred or be made contingent upon recognition by the Security Council. Territorial integrity is
a foundational principle of international law and si mply cannot be fundamentally re-engineered in
such a cavalier fashion. Imagine the consequences for States generally if their territorial integrity
could suddenly be put in question by an ambi guous process of interpretation of international
instruments. The authors, and those supporting them, have put forward a dangerous, as well as a
legally incorrect, doctrine.
21. Secondly, there is no argument between the parties apparently as to the application of the
principle of territorial integrity during the in terim period of seeking a political solution to the
Kosovo problem. However, the strained argument that the application of the principle of territorial
integrity to the FRY suddenly ceases after the inte rim period is remarkable and unsustainable.
Thirdly, since the UDI cannot amount to a final settlement under the terms of resolution 1244, the
interim period has not come to an end, so that even on the arguments of the authors and other
participants, the territorial integrity of Serbia remains undiminished. Fourthly, the reference to
territorial integrity refers to the FRY “and the ot her States in the region”, so that any declared
interim character of such reaffirmation would necessarily impact upon other States in the region,
something that would cause some controversy no doubt.
22. Fifthly, the very terms in which the au thors and other participants argue their case is
flawed. The reaffirmation of the territorial inte grity of the FRY and other States in the region is
112
declared “as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2”. The Helsinki Final Act underlined
the territorial integrity of participating States in several of its declared Principles and this
reaffirmation was neither time limited nor contin gent nor conditional. It simply reflected a
foundational principle of international law.
23. Annex 2 calls for agreement to be reach ed on the basis of a number of principles.
Principle 8 dealt with the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
11See, e.g., Principle I: “The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as
well as all the rights inherent in and enco mpassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to
juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom a nd political independence” and Principle IV: “The participating
States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States”. See also Principles II and III. - 71 -
“providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sove reignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarisation of UCK”.
Thus the balance in the resolution is very clear. In so far as the interim process was concerned
there would be “substantial self-government for Kosovo” within the territorial integrity of the FRY.
Before and beyond the interim process, the territorial integrity of the FRY was reaffirmed. Change
was possible but only on the basis of consent. This position was indeed confirmed in the
UNMIK-FRY Common Document signed on 5December 2001 by the Special Representative of
113
the United Nations Secretary-General and the FRY . Indeed the whole focus of Principle 8 was
upon the requirement for “negotiations between the parties for a settlement”, thus explicitly
excluding unilateral action by any side.
114
24. The reference to the Rambouillet Accords in resolution1244 is instructive, for the
third recital of the agreement reaffirmed the commitment of the parties to the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations, as well as to OSCE principles, including the Helsinki Final Act,
which expressly reaffirmed the territorial integrity of the participating States 115. Further, the fourth
recital of the agreement expressly recalled the co mmitment of the international community to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. The authors of the UDI argue that the Rambouillet
Accords and the negotiations that led up to them ar e important, not for what they say, but for what
116
they do not say . In truth, Mr. President, Members of the Court, they have to argue that, for what
the Accords say is clear enough. Even though the circumstances of the time produced a document
that did not completely satisfy the FRY, the Accords did emphasize the territorial integrity of that
State.
25. The authors of the UDI argue that none of the texts emerging from the pre-1244
negotiations, including the failed Hill proposals a nd the Rambouillet Accords, expressly prohibited
Kosovo from declaring independence 117 and that the resolution itsel f did not expressly prohibit a
113
See Written Statement of Serbia, paras. 517-521.
114
UN doc. S/1999.648, 7 June 1999. See also Written Statement of Serbia, para. 336 et seq. and 781 et seq., and
Written Comments of Serbia, para. 425 et seq.
115
See also the reference to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.
116See, e.g., Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, para. 9.13.
117See, e.g., Further Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, paras. 5.02, 5.05 and 5.12. - 72 -
118
declaration of independence . But that is hardly unusual in a situation where the reaffirmation of
the FRY’s territorial integrity was a constant refrain and where the whole focus was explicitly upon
self-government or autonomy. It would in rea lity have been redundant to prohibit expressly any
attempt at unilateral independence, for the simple reason that it had been implicitly prohibited by
virtue of the very structures and principles declared and then accepted. Indeed, the very
construction and configur ation of negotiations leading to resolution1244 and of the resolution
itself and of subsequent practice was to find a way to establish an acceptable system of autonomy
within sovereign Serbia. And the refrain of this process was, until the events of early 2008, the
need for the agreement of the relevant parties, the central Government of Serbia and the Kosovo
Albanian community. It is impossible to disp ute the conclusion that the whole thrust of
resolution 1244 was for a consensual, negotiated settlement accepted by the Security Council 119.
26. One argument that has been put forward, th at the reaffirmation of territorial integrity
contained in resolution 1244 applied to the FRY but not to Serbia 120, may be swiftly dealt with. In
truth, no State has denied that Serbia is the leg itimate continuation of the FRY via the State Union
of Serbia and Montenegro from which Monteneg ro seceded in 2006. This was essentially
confirmed by this Court, in its J udgment of 26February 2007, in the Bosnia case and expressly
121
recognized, for example, in the German Written Statement in these proceedings .
27. In concluding this section of the pleading, we may observe that the foundations of the
case put forward by the authors of the UDI with regard to the matters under consideration are
indeed puny and fragile. They depend upon an absence of any explicit reference prohibiting a
unilateral declaration of independence and an extr aordinary interpretation of territorial integrity
which converts it into an interim or temporary norm capable of being re ndered contingent upon a
forced construction of an argued ambiguity in an international instrument.
118
See, e.g., Further Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, para. 5.19 et seq.
119
See, e.g., Written Statement of Cyprus, para. 98.
120See, e.g., Written Contribution of authors of the UDI, para.9.33 and Written Statement of the United States,
p. 74 et seq.
121Written Statement of Germany, p. 37. See further Written Statement of Serbia, para. 291 et seq. - 73 -
V. Recognition as such does not grant retroactive
legality or purge illegality
28. Mr. President, Members of the Court, some have argued that whatever the situation may
be as to the declaration of independence, subse quent developments have cured any illegality or
deficiency that may have occurred 12. This constitutes an attempt to divert the Court’s attention
from the question asked of it.
29. The issue before the Court concerns the le gality or otherwise of the UDI adopted by the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo on 17February 2008. Nothing more,
nothing less. That date therefore constitutes a critical date upon which the rights and obligations of
the relevant parties crystallized 123. Nothing occurring, or said to ha ve occurred, after that date can
affect the legality or otherwise of the UDI, which is the question before the Court.
30. Of course, beyond that, Serbia maintains that international law emphasizes that an illegal
124
unilateral act cannot produce legal consequences, ex injuria jus non oritur . The Supreme Court
of Canada in the Quebec Secession case, indeed, emphasized that
“international recognition is not alone constitutive of Statehood and, critically, does
not relate back to the date of secession to serve retroactively as a source of a ‘legal’
right to secede in the first place”
and, of course, continued “recognition, even if granted, would not, however, provide any
retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the Constitution of Canada or at
125
international law” .
31. If this were not so, the structure of the international legal system would be significantly
wounded. What is illegal cannot s ubsequently be rendered legal by the action of third parties. If
that proposition were not accepte d, unilateral illegal acts would flourish and undermine any sense
of an international legal order.
32. Accordingly, whatever the political impact of such recognitions as have taken place, and
it must be recalled that some two thirds of the St ates of the international community from all parts
122
See, e.g., Written Statement of the United Kingdom, para. 0.15 and Written Comments of the United Kingdom,
para. 46 (c).
123See Written Statement of Serbia, para. 986 et seq. and 1033 et seq., and Written Comments of Serbia, para. 501
et seq.
124See, for example, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 , separate opinion of Judge Elaraby, p.254para.3.1. See also the case concerning the
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 76, para. 133.
125[1998] 2 SCR 217, paras. 142 and 155. - 74 -
of the world have not recognized a State of Kosovo nor has the United Nations accepted it as a
member, the foundational principle of territorial integrity has not been modified nor has an
unlawful, unilateral and non-consensual secession been rendered lawful. The creation of a new
State is a mix of effectiveness and legality. Recognition as such cannot legitimate an illegal act nor
recharacterize that unlawful act as legal in either domestic law and in international law. In any
event, the question put before the Court by the General Assembly precludes any consideration of
such recognitions as have occurred.
VI. Failure to meet the requirements of statehood
33. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Serbia maintains that even if the UDI were lawful,
which of course is denied, the so-called “Republic of Kosovo” would in any event fail to fulfil the
factual requirements for statehood laid down in inte rnational law. This is so for three essential
reasons. First, the entrenched presence of intern ational organizations in Kosovo, such as KFOR,
UNMIK and EULEX with responsibilities that refl ect the competence of governance detracts from
the necessary criterion of effective government. Second, the roles of the United Nations
Secretary-General’s Special Representative and UNMIK detract from the necessary criterion of
capacity to enter into foreign relations. Thir dly, the manner of emergence of the so-called
“Republic of Kosovo” reflects an underlying illega lity which prevents the purported State from
being so regarded in international law. I w ill briefly address each of these points, but note and
emphasize at this point that all of the intern ational bodies concerned function, and continue to
function, explicitly within the framework of resolution 1244.
34. First, KFOR, established under resolution 1244 as a NATO-led force, continues to be the
126
ultimate military and security authority in the territory . It consists today of some 14,000 troops
and is mandated to establish and maintain a secure and safe environment in Kosovo and freedom of
127
movement for all citizens . EULEX was established by the European Union Council Joint Action
128 129
on 4February 2008 , and contrary to the wishes of the so-called “independent” authorities ,
12See Written Statement of Serbia, para. 975.
127
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm#objectives
122008/124/CFSP, as amended by Council Joint Action 2009/445/CSP, 9 June 2009.
12See Written Comments of Serbia, para. 510. - 75 -
with significant powers laid down specifically in the Joint Action inter alia to ensure the
maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and security including, as necessary,
130
through reversing or annulling operational deci sions taken by the competent Kosovo authorities .
As the United Nations Secretary-General has confirmed, EULEX operates under the overall
131
authority of the United Nations and w ithin the framework of resolution 1244 . Accordingly, it is
difficult to maintain that the so-called “indepe ndent” authorities exercise effective control as
understood and required in international law.
35. Secondly, UNMIK was established under resolution1244, with the United Nations
Secretary-General’s Special Representative at its head, with a wide authority to perform key
civilian administrative functions, and it conti nues to operate in the territory. Paragraph (i) of
Chapter 8 of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo 132 reserves
to the Special Representative inter alia the exercise of powers and responsibilities of an
international nature, approving the budget, monetary policy, concluding agreements with States and
international organizations in all matters within the scope of reso lution 1244 and external relations
with States and international organizations necessar y for the fulfilment of his mandate. It is
UNMIK which plays an important role, therefore, in the external relations of the territory, not least
133
with regard to international organizations . In these circumstances, it is impossible to maintain
that the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo have the required capacity to enter
into relations with foreign States as necessitated by the required criteria of statehood.
36. Thirdly, it is maintained that internati onal law now requires an aspirant State to emerge
in a manner not incompatible with the key principles of international law. For reasons that Serbia
has made clear this morning, and which include the violation of the general principle of territorial
integrity and the violation of Security Council resolution 1244, the so-called “Republic of Kosovo”
fails the legality test and thus cannot be said to have come to independence in a manner required by
international law. Its purported declaration of independence is thus tainted by illegality.
130
See Written Comments of Serbia, Art. 3.
131See, e.g., the Reports of the Secretary-Generon UNMIK of 10 June 2009 and 30 Sept.2009, S/2009/300,
para.6 and S/2009/497, para.3, respectiv ely. See also E. de Wet, “The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council
Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of EULEX”, 103 AJIL, 2009, p. 83.
132UNMIK/Reg/2001/9, 15 May 2001, as amended by UNMIK/Reg/ 2007/29 and UNMIK/Reg/2002/9.
133See, e.g., Written Statement of Cyprus, para. 176 et seq. - 76 -
VII. Conclusions
37. I may summarize my conclusions as follows:
(1) The principle of respect for the territorial itegrity of States is a foundational principle of
international law.
(2) This principle applies to non-State entities in a non-consensual context as well as to States.
(3)The principle of territorial integrity was reaffirmed in the process leading up to and including
resolution 1244 with regard to the FRY.
(4) Territorial integrity is not a time-limited or contingent principle and cannot and was not so
converted by the process leading up to and including resolution 1244.
(5) Recognition as such does not grant retroactive legality or purge illegality, what was illegal
remains illegal.
(6)In any event, the UDI fails to satisfy the cr iteria of statehood with regard to the factual
requirements of effective government and capacity to enter into relations with foreign States
and with the requirement of legality in the pro cess leading to the acquisition and recognition of
statehood.
38. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this concludes my pleading and I thank you for
your kind attention. I would be grateful , Mr.President, if you could now call upon
Professor Kohen.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Shaw, for your presentation. I now call upon
Professor Kohen.
M. KOHEN :
LES ARGUMENTS DE L AUTODÉTERMINATION ,DE LA NEUTRALITÉ JURIDIQUE ET DU
CARACTÈRE SUI GENERIS DU CAS DU K OSOVO DOIVENT ÊTRE REJETÉS
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les jug es, c’est un privilège et une haute responsabilité
de participer à cette procédure consultative, pourdéfendre la primauté du droit dans les relations
internationales. Je suis particulièrement reconnaissant au Gouvernement démocratique de la Serbie
de me fournir cette possibilité.
2. Je vais développer les trois propositions suivantes : - 77 -
⎯ premièrement, le principe du droit des peuples à dis poser d’eux-mêmes ne constitue pas un
fondement juridique à la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance ;
⎯ deuxièmement, le droit international n’est pas neutre face à cette déclaration ; et
⎯ troisièmement, l’argument du prétendu caractère sui generis du Kosovo ne change pas
l’application des règles pertinentes, lesquelles mènent au constat simple que la déclaration n’est
pas conforme au droit international.
A. Le principe d’autodétermination n’est pas un fondement
de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
3. Je vais commencer par expliquer pourquoi le principe d’autodétermination ne peut pas
servir de justification à la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance. Il n’y a pas lieu de s’appesantir
sur l’importance de ce principe fondamental du droit in ternational, que la Cour a déjà relevé par le
passé 134 et que la Serbie reconnaît pleinement. Il est bien connu que ce principe est souvent
invoqué, sans qu’il soit pour autant applicable à la situation considérée, ou qu’il le soit d’une
manière différente de celle revendiquée. Les mouvements séparatistes que l’on trouve partout dans
le monde invoquent tous le droit des peuples à disposer d’e ux-mêmes. Mais invoquer ce droit est
une chose, l’avoir en est une autre.
4. Dans la présente affaire, le principe de l’autodétermination est avancé d’une manière assez
timide par les séparatistes et ceux qui les soutie nnent. La déclaration du 17février2008 ne
135
mentionne même pas le droit à l’autodétermination . Certains participants, y compris les auteurs
de cette déclaration, vont même jusqu’à vous demander de ne pas vous prononcer sur la
136
question . Signaux assez tangibles du peu de conviction qu’ils ont dans la valeur juridique d’une
telle argumentation. Ceux qui l’invoquent le font soit comme justification à la soi-disant
134
Conséquences juridiques pour les Etat s de la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest
africain) nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité , avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 31, par. 52 ;
Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 31-32, par. 55-56 ; Timor oriental (Portugal c.Australie),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 102, par. 29 ; Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire
palestinien occupé, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p. 172, par. 88, et p. 199, par. 156.
135
Serbie, exposé écrit, annexes, vol. II, annexe 2 ; cf. D’Argent, Pierre, «Kosovo : être ou ne pas être», Journal
des tribunaux, Bruxelles, n6307, 2008, p.262 ; Jia, Bing Bing, «The Independence of Kosovo: A Unique Case of
Secession ?», Chinese Journal of International Law, 2009, vol. 8, n 1, p. 31-32.
136
Albanie, observations écrites, p.34, par. 61 ; auteurs, contribution écrite I, p. 157, par. 8.38 ; Etats-Unis
d’Amérique, observations écrites, p.21 ; Norvège, observations écr ites, p.3, par.8; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit,
par. 5.33, 6.65. - 78 -
137
«sécession-remède» , soit en raison de la référence faite à «la volonté du peuple» dans le projet
138
d’accord de Rambouillet , soit encore ⎯mais par peu de partic ipants à cette procédure ⎯
comme étant directement applicable au cas d’espèce 139.
5. Disons-le d’emblée: aucune résolution, ni du Conseil de sécurité, ni de l’Assemblée
générale, ni d’aucune organi sation régionale, ne reconnaît l’application du droit à
l’autodétermination aux Albanais du Kosovo ou à l’ensemble de la population de cette province
serbe. C’est un fait incontestable. Comme l’a affi rmé catégoriquement le Gouvernement suisse le
14avril2008, lors d’une interpellation parlementaire: «Le Kosovo n’a jamais obtenu le statut de
peuple ayant droit à l’autodétermination» 140.
6. Le constat est simple: chaque fois que l’ONU a estimé que le principe était applicable,
elle l’a explicitement invoqué. Elle l’a fait dans le contexte de la domination coloniale, raciste ou
étrangère 141; elle ne l’a, par contre, jamais fait ⎯ je dis bien, jamais ⎯ en faveur d’une minorité
nationale, religieuse ou linguistique à l’intérieur des Etats. Jamais donc à l’égard du Kosovo, alors
qu’elle s’est occupée explicitement de la question. Les occasions n’ont pourtant pas manqué pour
l’Organisation d’affirmer et de reconnaître ce droit, si elle avait estimé qu’il existait effectivement
137Finlande, exposé écrit, p.4-5, par. 9-10; Irlande, exposé écrit, p.2, 8- 10, par.27-32; Pologne, exposé écrit,
p.26, par.6.10; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, p.92(pour tant, dans ses observations écr ites, p.5-6, par.10, le
Royaume-Uni considère que la Cour ne devrait pas appliquer ce concept dans le cas d’espèce) ; Contra : Serbie, exposé
écrit, p.214-230, par.589-625,observations écrites, p.142-149, par.339-359; Argentine, exposé écrit, p.34,
par. 85-86 ; Chypre, exposé écrit, p. 36-38, par. 140-147 ; Espagne, observations écrites, p. 5-6, par. 8 ; Iran, exposé écrit,
p. 6-7, par. 4.1 ; Roumanie, exposé écrit, p.42, para. 147, p.44, para. 156; Ru ssie, exposé écrit, p.36-38, par.97-103;
Slovaquie, exposé écrit, par. 28.
138Allemagne, exposé écrit, p.39; auteur s, contribution écrite II, p.80, par. 4.40; Etats-Unis de l’Amérique,
exposé écrit, p. 64-67 ; Pays-Bas, exposé écrit, p. 7, par. 3.3 ; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, p. 69 ; Contra : Serbie, exposé
écrit, p. 125, par. 340 ; Argentine, exposé écrit, p. 39, par. 99 ; Argentine, observations écrites, p. 26, par. 60.
139Albanie, exposé écrit, p.39, par.74; auteurs, c ontribution écrite II, p.80-86, par.4.42-4.53; Pays-Bas,
observations écrites, p.5; Slovéni e, exposé écrit, p.2/3; Suisse , exposé écrit, p.21, par.7Contra : Serbie, exposé
écrit, p.208-214, par.570-588; Argentine, exposé écrit, p. 37, par.95; Argentine, observations écrites, p.26-27,
par. 59-61 ; Bolivie, observations écrites, p. 6, par. 17-18 ; Chypre, exposé écrit, p. 31, par. 123 ; Roumanie, exposé écrit,
p. 38, par. 131.
140
L’Assemblée fédérale, le Parl ement suisse, Interpellation, Problématique reconnaissance
du Kosovo, Réponse du Conseil fédéra l du 15.05.2008, disponible: sur
http://www.parlement.ch/F/Suche/Pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20083010 (Traduction : « Kosovo has never obtained
the status of a people entitled to a right to self-determination »).
141
Par exemple: résolution1724 (XVI) de l’Assemblée générale (AG), 20 décembre 1961 (Algérie),
AGrésolution1573 (XX), 19 décembre 1960 (Algérie), résolution322 du Conseil de sécurité (CS), 22novembre1972
(Guinée-Bissau), AG résolution3061 (XXVIII), 2 novembre 1972 (Guinée-Bissau), CS résolution356, 12août1974
(Guinée-Bissau), CS résolution 301, 20 octobre 1971 (Namibie), CS résolution 384, 22 déce mbre 1975 (Timor Oriental),
AG résolution2787 (XXVI), 6 décembre 1971 (Palestine), AG résolution3236 (XXIX), 22 novembre 1974 (Palestine),
AG résolution31/34, 30 novembre 1976 (A frique du Sud, Namibie, Zimbabwe , Palestine), AG résolution37/43,
3décembre1982 (Afrique du Sud, Na mibie, Palestine), CS résolution 556, 23 octobre 1984 (Afrique du Sud),
CSrésolution605, 22 décembre 1987 (Pal estine), CS résolution672, 12 octobr e 1990 (Palestine), CS résolution1435,
24 septembre 2002 (Palestine). - 79 -
un peuple séparé ayant droit à disposer de lui-même . Mais tout ce que le Conseil de sécurité a fait
a été d’imposer à l’Etat souverain d’entreprendre de négociations sur la question du statut futur du
Kosovo.
7. Il n’y a aucune ambiguïté dans ce domaine. Dans votre avis consultatif du 9 juillet 2004,
vous avez affirmé que «[s]’agissant du principe du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, la
Cour observera que l’existence d’un «peupl e palestinien» ne saurait plus faire débat»
(Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mu r dans le territoire palestinien occupé, avis
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p.182-183, par.118). Il s’en faudrait de beaucoup pour soutenir
une semblable assertion à l’égard d’un prétendu «p euple kosovar», qui n’a même pas été désigné
une seule fois de cette manière dans les résolutions pertinentes.
8. Ni la conférence de paix pour la Yougoslavie, ni la commission Badinter n’ont reconnu au
142
Kosovo un droit à l’indépendance . Les Albanais du Kosovo ont été traités comme les autres
minorités existantes dans les nouveaux Etats issus de la République socialiste fédérative de
Yougoslavie. La commission Badinter n’a p as reconnu le droit d’autodétermination aux
populations serbes de Croatie et de Bosnie-Herzé govine et il n’y a aucune raison juridique pour
traiter autrement les populations albanaises de Serbie 143.
9. A l’intérieur des Etats souve rains, le principe d’autodétermination s’applique à l’égard de
l’ensemble de la population, y compris les minorités et les peuples indigènes 144. Ceci constitue le
versant interne du principe. Comme mon estimé collègue et ami James Crawford l’a affirmé,
«outside the colonial context, the principl e of self-determination is not recognized as
giving rise to unilateral rights of secession by parts of independent States.
Self-determination outside the colonial context is primarily a process by which the
peoples of the various States determine th eir future through constitutional processes
without external interference. Faced with an expr essed desire of part of its people to
secede, it is for the government of the State to decide how to respond, for example by
insisting that any change be carried out in accordance with constitutional processes.
142Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 103, 239-240, par. 261-263, 651-652.
143Avis n 2 de la commission d’arbitrage pour l’ex-Yougoslavie, RGDIP, 1992, t. 96, p. 266 (11 janvier 1992).
144Résolution 61/295 de l’Assemblée générale, 13 septembre 2007, articles 3 et 46 ; Comité pour l’élimination de
la discrimination raciale, recommandation générale n 21, Le droit à l’autodétermintion, quarante-huitièmesession,
1996, Nations Unies, doc. A/51/18, par. 9 ; Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec [1998] 2 SCR 217, par. 126. - 80 -
In fact, no new State formed since 1945 outside the colonial context has been admitted
to the United Nations over the opposition of the predecessor State.» 145
10. Durant les négociations sur le statut futur, la Serbie a fait preuve de la plus grande
146
flexibilité, proposant le plus haut degré imaginable d’autonomie pour la province . Mais comme
il a déjà été montré précédemment, le représentant spécial, ainsi que certaines puissances, avaient
147
dès l’ouverture du processus l’idée de séparer le Kosovo de la Serbie .
a) La prétendue «sécession-remède» n’est pas une règle de droit international et de toute
manière, ses prétendues conditions ne seraient pas réunies
11. Conscients que le principe d’autodéte rmination dans son app lication généralement
reconnue ne permet pas de justifier la déclarati on unilatérale d’indépendan ce, les auteurs de la
déclaration et ceux qui les soutiennent se sont tournés vers une construction doctrinale fort
controversée. La Serbie, ainsi que d’autres Et ats, ont amplement démontré que la prétendue
«sécession-remède» ne constitue pas une règle de droit internatio nal. Elle ne trouve fondement ni
148
dans une interprétation correcte du paragraphe 7 de la résoluti on 2625 de l’Assemblée générale ,
ni dans les travaux préparatoires de cette résolution 149, ni dans la pratique des Etats 150. De toute
manière, même s’il s’agissait d’une règle con sacrée, ses prétendues conditions mentionnées par la
151
doctrine ne seraient pas réunies dans le cas d’espèce .
145Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law , 2 éd., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006,
p. 415 (Traduction : «en dehors du contexte colonial, le principe d’autodétermination n’est pas considéré comme donnant
lieu à un droit de sécession unilatérale par des composantes d’Etats indépendants. L’autodétermination en dehors du
contexte colonial est principalement un processus par leque l les peuples des différents Et ats déterminent leur futur à
travers des processus d’ordre constitutionnel, et sans interférence extérieure. Lorsqu’il fait face à un fort désir de
sécession d’une partie de son peuple, il revient au gouvernement de l’Etat de décider de la réponse, par exemple en
insistant sur le fait que chaque changement doit être condu it conformément aux processus constitutionnels. En fait,
aucun nouvel Etat formé depuis1945 en dehors du contexte col onial n’a jamais été admis aux NationsUnies contre
l’opposition de l’Etat prédécesseur.»)
146Voir le discours de M. Boris Tadic, président de la République de Serbie, le 27 novembre 2007 à Baden,
disponible à l’adresse suivante :
http ://www.predsednik.rs/mwc/default.asp?c=303500&g=20071127103315&lng=eng&hs1….
147
Serbie, observations écrites, p. 53-59, par. 101-114.
148Résolution 2625 (XXV) de l’Assemblée générale, 24 octobre 1970, «Déclaration relative aux principes du
droit international touchant les relati ons amicales et la coopération entre le s Etats conformément à la Charte des
Nations Unies». Voir : Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 214-221.
149
Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 221-224.
150Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 224-229 ; Corten, Olivier, «Déclarations unilatérales d’indépendance et reconnaissance
prématurées : du Kosovo à l’Ossétie du sud et à l’Abkhazie», RGDIP, 2008, t. 4, p. 726.
151Serbie, exposé écrit, p.214-240, pa r.589-653, observations écrites, p. 142-149, par. 339-359 ; Argentine,
exposé écrit, p.34, par.85-86; Chypre, exposé écrit, p. 36-38, par.140-147; Espagne, observations écrites, p.5-6,
par. 8 ; Iran, exposé écrit, p. 6-7, par. 4.1 ; Roumanie, exposé écrit, p. 42, par. 147, p. 44, par. 156 ; Russie, exposé écrit ,
p. 36-38, par. 97-103 ; Slovaquie, exposé écrit, par. 28. - 81 -
12. Les tenants de cette thèse oublient certaines données clés dans la question du Kosovo.
Ils oublient que les séparatistes eux-mêmes se s ont exclus du processus politique yougoslave en
proclamant leur indépendance pour la première fois en 1991, en créant leurs propres structures, en
boycottant les élections locales et fédérales et en refusant même tout contact avec les forces
152
d’opposition au régime de M.Milosevic . Ils oublient que durant toutes les années1990, les
partis politiques albanais étaient enregistrés et que leur participation aux élections aurait empêché
153
M. Milosevic d’arriver au pouvoir, et de s’y maintenir par la suite . Ils oublient que c’est l’UCK
qui a déclenché le conflit armé interne . Ils oublient finalement que le Conseil de sécurité et la
mission de vérification de l’OSCE ont aussi bien condamné la répression des autorités centrales
que les actes terroristes perpétrés par l’UCK, ainsi que les multiples cas de non-respect du droit
humanitaire et des cessez-le-feu par cette dernière 154.
13. Si la «sécession-remède» était envisag eable, pourquoi n’a-t-elle pas été invoquée
en1999, à savoir au pire moment de la situation en ce qui concerne les droits humains? Au
contraire, le 28septembre1999, le ministre fra nçais des affaires étrangères, HubertVédrine,
affirmait clairement que «les raisons qui avaien t conduit à s’opposer à l’indépendance du Kosovo
restaient aujourd’hui valables et qu’en particulier la position de l’administration américaine sur ce
155
point n’avait pas évolué» .
14. L’argument de la «sécession-remède» est définitivement contré par un autre constat : les
conditions de vie des minorités sont bien meilleures depuis dix ans dans les autres régions de la
Serbie qu’elles ne le sont au Kosovo. Comme la commission des questions juridiques et des droits
de l’homme du Conseil de l’Europe l’a indiqué en février 2008, «il convient de souligner qu’à de
nombreux égards, les minorités nationales jouissent d’ une bien meilleure protection de leurs droits
152
Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 102-108 et 236-237, par. 258-278 et 642-643.
153
Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 107-108, par. 273-278.
154Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 113-128, par. 290-348.
155Sénat, affaires étrangères, défense et forces armées, mardi 28 septembre 1999, disponible sur:
http ://www.senat.fr/commission/etr/d_etrg991002.html. - 82 -
156
en Voïvodine que partout ailleurs en Serbie» . A propos des municipalités majoritairement
albanaises de Preševo, Bujanovac et Medvedja, toutes proches du Kosovo, le commissaire aux
droits de l’homme du Conseil de l’Europe a affirm é en mars de cette année qu’«[à] l’exception des
Roms, qui continuent d’être marginalisés, les relations entre [l]es groupes ethniques [albanais,
157
serbes et roms] dans les trois municipalités sont stables dans l’ensemble et s’améliorent» . La
Serbie a en effet accompli des progrès de taille dans l’affirmation de la dé mocratie et dans la
protection des droits humains en général et des dro its des minorités en particulier. Au contraire,
malheureusement, les conditions de vie pour l es populations non albanaises au Kosovo restent
extrêmement difficiles. Je me bornerai à si gnaler que les personnes déplacées de souche non
albanaise sont toujours dans l’impossibilité de regagner leurs foyers; que des disparitions forcées
se sont produites en pleine administration du te rritoire par l’ONU et que le sort des personnes
concernées demeure inconnu 158; que des pogroms antiserbes se sont produits en2004 et que les
institutions provisoires d’administration autonome (je cite le représentant espagnol au sein du
Conseil de sécurité) «ont essayé d’utiliser [ces événements] pour servir leurs intérêts politiques,
revendiquant l’indépendance et le transfert des compétences de la MINUK» 159. Tout cela devrait
156
Conseil de l’Europe, rapport de la commission des ques tions juridiques et des dro its de l’homme, rapporteur
M.Jürgen Herrmann, «La situation de s minorités nationales en Vo ïvodine et de la minorité ethnique roumaine en
Serbie», 14 février 2008, assemblée parlementaire, doc. 115 28, p.22, par.111, disponible à l’adresse suivante:
http ://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc08/EDOC11528.htm (Version anglais:e«it
should be emphasised that in many respec ts national minorities enjoy a far better protection of their rights in Vojvodina
than anywhere else in Serbia»).
157Conseil de l’Europe, rapport par le commissaire aux droits de l’homme, M. Thomas Hammarberg, sur sa visite
en Serbie (13-17 octobre 2008), Strasbourg, 11 mars 2009, par. 165, disponible s:ur
https ://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CommDH(2009)8&Language=lanFrench&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorI
nternet=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679. (Version anglaise : «Relations between the
[Albanese, Serbian and Roma] ethnic gr oups are largely stable and improving throughout the three muni cipalities, with
the exception of the Roma who continue to be marginalized.»).
158
Rapport du Secrétaire général sur la Mission d’admi nistration intérimaire des NationsUnies au Kosovo,
16septembre 1999, Nations Unies, doc. S/1999/987, par.37; rapport du Secrétaire général sur la Mission
d’administration intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo, 23 décembre 1999, Nati ons Unies, doc. S/1999/1250, par. 16
et 70; rapport du Secrétaire général sur la Mission d’ad ministration intérimaire des NationsUnies au Kosovo,
3mars2000, Nations Unies, doc.S/2000/ 177, par.64; rapport du Secrétaire gé néral sur la Mission d’administration
intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo, 6 juin 2000, Nations Unies, doc. S/2000/538, par. 52-55 ; rapport du Secrétaire
général sur la Mission d’admi nistration intérimaire des NationsUnies au Kosovo, 18 septembre 2000, Nations Unies,
doc. S/2000/878, par. 41-42 ; rapport du Secrétaire général sur la Mission d’administration in térimaire des Nations Unies
au Kosovo, 15 décembre 2000, Nations Unies, doc.S/2000/1196, par.41; rapport du Secrétaire général sur la Mission
d’administration intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo, 2 octobre 2001, Nations Unies, doc. S/2001/926, par. 39.
159 e
M. Arias (Espagne), Conseil de sécurité, 4967 séance, 11 mai 2004, Nations Un ies, doc.S/PV.4967, p.17
(Version anglaise : «they attempted to use the violence for their own political objectives, calling for independence and the
transfer of UNMIK’s competencies»). - 83 -
choquer la conscience de la communauté internationale au même titre que les autres exactions
commises dans les Balkans.
15. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les j uges, en aucun cas la sécession ne constitue un
«remède» aux problèmes du Kosovo. Bien au cont raire, la déclaration unilatérale a aggravé les
tensions interethniques, ce qu’a reconnu l’ombudsman pour le Kosovo 16. Elle a creusé davantage
le fossé existant entre les communautés de la province d’une part, entre cette dernière et le reste du
territoire serbe d’autre part, divisant davantage le Conseil de sécurité, l’Union européenne et la
communauté internationale dans son ensemble.
16. Vous entendrez certainement cet après-midi un tableau idyllique de la situation des
populations non albanaises. Mais on ne vous parlera vraisemblablement p as des vrais problèmes,
ou l’on vous dira que la faute en incombe à Belgrade, comme si le Gouvernement serbe ⎯ qui
d’ailleurs n’administre pas le territoire ⎯ devrait se plier aux exigences séparatistes et reconnaître
une prétendue indépendance proclamée en toute illicéité.
b) Quelle que soit l’interprétation de l’exp ression «la volonté du peuple» employée à
Rambouillet, elle n’est pas le seul critère déterminant
17. J’en viens maintenant à l’expression «la volonté du peuple» utilisée dans les «accords de
Rambouillet» et dans d’autres textes, nota mment dans le cadre constitutionnel pour un
gouvernement autonome provisoire adopté par le représentant spécial du Secrétaire général 161.
18. Les «accords de Rambouillet» prévoyaien t, trois ans après leur entrée en vigueur,
l’établissement d’un mécanisme en vue d’un règlement définitif, «sur la base de la volonté du
peuple, de l’avis des autorités compétentes, des efforts accomplis par chacune des Parties dans la
mise en Œuvre du présent accord, et de l’acte final d’Helsinki». Outre l’ambiguïté délibérément
entretenue par l’emploi du terme «peuple», sa «volonté» n’apparaît ici que comme un critère parmi
d’autres pour l’ouverture d’un processus en vue de la détermination de la destinée du territoire.
S’il s’agissait d’un peuple ayant droit à l’autodéte rmination, le «peuple kosovar» aurait droit de
160Ombudsman Institution in Kosovo, «Eighth Annual Report 2007-2008», disponible à l’adresse suivante:
http ://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org, p. 37.
161Accords de Rambouillet, 7 juin 1999, NationsUnies, doc.S/1999/648; cadre constitutionnel pour un
gouvernement autonome provisoire, UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 mai 2001. Voir : Allemagne, exposé écrit, p. 39 ; auteurs,
contribution écriteII, p.80, par.4.4Etats-Unis de l’Amérique, exposé écrit, p. 64-67 ; Pays-Bas, exposé écrit, p.7,
par. 3.3 ; Royaume-Uni, exposé écrit, p. 69. - 84 -
décider de son sort indépendamment de l’avis des autres acteurs en présence ; or, ni Rambouillet ni
la résolution 1244 ne constitue un processus d’exercice du droit de ce prétendu peuple à disposer de
lui-même. Les NationsUnies n’ont en outre jamais envisagé une décision unilatérale. La
référence faite à l’acte final d’Helsinki vient encore confirmer cette appréciation : ce texte met en
effet l’accent sur le respect de l’intégrité territoriale et l’intangibilité des frontières.
19. Quant au cadre constitutionnel, le texte explique lui-même que le choix du statut futur du
Kosovo suivra un processus conformément à la résolution 1244, et que celui-ci «tiendra pleinement
compte de tous les facteurs en jeu, notamment la volonté du peuple» 162. Par conséquent, il n’ajoute
rien à la question et ne permet en aucune manière de justifier la déclaration unilatérale.
20. Dans leurs commentaires écrits, les Etats-Unis d’Amérique s’attribuent la paternité de
l’expression «la volonté du peuple» et citent le pr ésident Jefferson afin d’en expliquer la portée 163.
Mais cela ne fait nullement avancer la cause de la sécession, car il s’agit plutôt là d’une référence
au principe démocratique à l’intérieur de l’Etat . Nos amis états-uniens auraient certainement pu
citer la célèbre phrase du présidentAbraham Lincoln : «government of the people, by the people,
164
for the people» . Je m’aperçois bien sûr que, compte tenu de leur politique actuelle, cela aurait
été très embarrassant de citer cette phrase, pronon cée quelques mois après la bataille qui a marqué
le tournant dans son combat contre les sécessionnistes du Sud. Une sécession que le
président Lincoln considérait comme contraire tant à la Constitution qu’au droit des gens 165.
21. Revenons tout de même à la fin du XX siècle. Le ministre français des affaires
étrangères de l’époque, Hubert Védrine ⎯sans doute la voix la plus qualifiée pour expliquer le
contenu des «accords de Rambouillet» ⎯, a clairement affirmé que ces derniers «n’avaient pas
retenu l’organisation d’un référe ndum au Kosovo à l’issue de la période de transition, comme
l’avaient demandé les Kosovars, mais seulement une clause de rendez-vous afin de prendre en
162UNMIK/REG/2001/9, 15 mai 2001.
163Etats-Unis d’Amérique, exposé écrit, p. 29, note de bas de page 89.
164
«Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania», 19 n ovembre 1863, reproduit dans Lincoln, Abraham, Selected
Speeches and Writings, New York, Vintage Books, 1992, p. 405 (traduction : «Le gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple,
pour le peuple»).
165
«First Inaugural Address», 4mars1861, dans : Lincoln, Abraham, Selected Speeches and Writings , New
York, Vintage Books, 1992, p. 288-290. - 85 -
166
compte les souhaits de la population» . M.Védrine a réitéré cette idée après l’adoption de la
résolution 1244 : «Ni les accords de Rambouillet, ni aucun autre texte ne prévoient de référendum
167
sur l’indépendance.» .
22. Par conséquent, la simple référence à la prise en considération de «la volonté du peuple»,
parmi d’autres éléments, dans le cadre d’un processus politique, ne permet pas de justifier la
déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance.
B. Le droit international régit la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
et ne lui accorde aucun fondement juridique
23. J’en viens maintenant à l’argument avancé en dernier recours par les sécessionnistes et
leurs actifs supporteurs. Cet argument se décompose en deux points : l’un consiste à dire que les
déclarations d’indépendance ne sont pas régies par le droit international ; l’autre affirme que, dans
tous les cas, l’indépendance du Kosovo serait un fait irréversible.
24. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, s’il existait sur terre un seul territoire sur
lequel la sécession ne serait pas permise, ce territoire serait le Kosovo. En effet, outre les principes
fondamentaux et autres règles générales du droit in ternational contemporain applicables, dans le
cas d’espèce le territoire en question est soumis à un régime international établi par une résolution
du Conseil de sécurité, qui prévoit expliciteme nt la nécessité d’une nouvelle résolution pour que
168
soit mis fin à ce régime . Si l’on croit encore en l’existence et en l’utilité de l’Organisation,
personne n’a le droit de modifier et d’aller à l’enc ontre du cadre juridique défini par une résolution
obligatoire du Conseil de sécurité.
25. Messieurs les juges: imaginez-vous que l serait l’attitude des Etats qui défendent
aujourd’hui la déclaration unilatéra le d’indépendance, si la Serbie avait voulu modifier le régime
territorial établi par la résolution 1244, soit en redéfinissant la distribution des compétences entre la
Serbie et l’administration internationale, soit en me ttant fin unilatéralement à ce régime. On aurait
certainement soutenu que la Serbie n’était pas en mesure de procéder de la sorte, de tels
166Assemblée nationale, co mmission des affaires étrangères, compte rendu n o31, 13avril1999 (séance de
17 heures) ; disponible sur : http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/cr-cafe/98-99/c989931.asp.
167Assemblée nationale, co mmission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, compte rendu n o33,
22 juin 1999 (séance de 18 h 30) ; disponible sur : http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/cr-cdef/98-99/c9899038.asp.
168Résolution 1244 (1999), par. 19. - 86 -
agissements étant contraires à la résolution 1244. Mais selon ces mêmes Etats, que les institutions
provisoires du Kosovo proclament leur indé pendance n’est pas incompatible avec la
résolution 1244 !
26. Selon les tenants de la théorie de la ne utralité juridique face à la sécession, le droit
international reconnaît seulement à l’Etat le droit de prendre toutes les mesures possibles
169
respectueuses du droit pour maintenir son intégrité territoriale . C’est en effet une prérogative de
l’Etat, même si ce n’est pas tout. Si l’on appliquait cette proposition au cas du Kosovo, que se
passerait-il ? La résolution 1244 a établi un régime d’ad ministration internationale sur le territoire.
La Serbie se verrait ainsi matériellement privée d’exercer son droit à prendre toutes les mesures à
sa portée pour garantir son intégrité territoriale. Mais c’est précisément ici que la garantie du
respect de l’intégrité territoriale contenue dans la résolution 1244 trouve toute sa valeur. En aucun
cas les Nations Unies pourraient jouer le rôle de complices d’un mouvement sécessionniste qu’elles
n’ont jamais approuvé.
27. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les jug es, la répétition mécanique de la formule «la
création d’Etats est un fait qui n’est pas régi par le dr oit» ne reflète plus la réalité d’aujourd’hui.
C’est aussi le constat récent de l’opinion expe rte sur laquelle s’est basé le rapport de la mission
170
d’enquête internationale indépendante sur le conflit en Géorgie établie par l’Union européenne .
28. Le droit n’est en effet pas resté neutre lors de l’accession à l’indépendance de nombreux
Etats issus de la décolonisation: ces Etats avaient droit à leur création, en vertu du principe
d’autodétermination. Tous les nouveaux Etats cr éés après1945 sont nés de manière conforme au
droit international, soit par le processus de décol onisation, soit par des résolutions de l’Assemblée
générale, soit par la dissolution de l’Etat prédécesseur, soit ⎯en cas de séparation ⎯ par le
consentement de l’Etat parent. De même, le dro it international n’est pas resté neutre face à des
entités qui, bien que revêtant les attributs factuels d’un Etat, ne le sont pas, dans la mesure où leur
création est contraire au droit international. Exemples des déclarations unilatérales d’indépendance
considérées explicitement par les NationsUnies comme illicites sont celles du Katanga, de la
169
Royaume-Uni, observations écrites, p. 21, par. 44.
170Rapport de la mission d’enquête inte rnationale indépendante sur le conf lit en Géorgie, 30septembre2009,
disponible sur : http://www.ceiig.ch, vol. II, p. 136 et 137. - 87 -
Rhodésie, de Chypre Nord et des bantoustans. Par contre un exemple de déclaration unilatérale
d’indépendance considérée par l’ONU comme licite est celle de la Guinée-Bissau et du
Cap-Vert 171. Le principe du «Lotus» 172 n’a pas de place ici 173. Certes, le droit sans les faits ne
peut pas créer les Etats, mais les faits sans le dr oit non plus. Et nous sommes ici précisément dans
174
ce dernier cas de figure, les faits en moins car même l’effectivité du contrôle étatique fait défaut .
29. Dépourvus d’arguments juridiques, les partisans de la sécession vous invitent à tenir
compte d’une prétendue «réalité irréversible» 175. Mais de quelle réalité parlent-ils? Le fait est
que, malgré le soutien formidable ⎯ et c’est peu dire ⎯ des Etats très puissants, les pronostiques
des auteurs de la déclarati on unilatérale d’indépendance 176ne se sont pas concrétisés. Quelques
jours avant la déclaration unilatérale, M.Hash imThaci avait estimé qu’un Kosovo indépendant
recevrait «une reconnaissance internationale mass ive, issue d’environ cent pays, immédiatement
177
après sa proclamation» . La réalité est tout autre presque de ux ans après. En fait, il s’agit même
d’une situation encore moins effective que beaucoup d’autres situations semblables
d’autoproclamation illicite de l’i ndépendance. La seule autorité légitime pour administrer le
territoire se trouve toujours sur le terrain, la force internationale établie par le Conseil de sécurité
demeure l’autorité suprême incontestée en la ma tière. Les moyens pour rétablir pleinement la
légalité sont simples et à portée de main.
30. L’argument d’une prétendue «réalité irréversible», qui ne changerait pas même si la Cour
constate l’illicéité de la déclar ation unilatérale, constitue une te ntative ouverte d’imposer un fait
accompli. Or, si la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance n’est pas conforme au droit
171Serbie, observations écrites, p. 92-94, par. 206-211.
172 o o
Lotus, arrêt n 9, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n 10.
173
Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 350-356, par. 1017-1032.
174Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 332-338, par. 966-985.
175France, exposé écrit, p. 19, par. 1.13-1-14 ; Royaume-Uni, observations écrites, p. 2, par. 6.
176«Kosovo will proclaim independence on 17 February, Serbia says», EUObserver.com, 8 février 2008,
disponible sur http://euobserver.com/9/25629?rss_rk=1;«Serb President vows to preserve Kosovo», ElEconomista.es,
15 février 2008, disponible sur http://www.eleconomista.es/mercado-continuo/noticias/366438/02/08/Serb-
president-vows-to-preserve-Kosovo.html ; «Serbian president Tadic vows to preserve Kosovo», China Daily, 16 février
2008, disponible sur : http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-02/16/content_6460182.htm.
177
«Kosovo will proclaim independence on 17 February, Serbia says», EUObserver.com, 8 février 2008,
disponible sur: http://euobserver.com/9/25629?rss_rk=1 (Texte originel en anglais: ««massive international recognition
[from] about 100 countries» immediately after it is proclaimed»). - 88 -
international, il s’ensuit qu’elle ne produit p as d’effets. Comme l’affirmait votre prédécesseur
sir Hersch Lauterpacht :
«To admit that, apart from well-defined exceptions, an unlawful act, or its
immediate consequences may become suo vigore a source of legal right for the
wrongdoer is to introduce into the legal system a contradiction which cannot be solved
except by a denial of its legal character.» 178
31. Il est temps de mettre fin à un tel mépris. Il est temps de faire comprendre aux acteurs
internationaux que, quelle que soit leur puissance maté rielle, ils sont tous tenus au respect du droit
international. La qualification juridique d’un fait ou d’une situation fait aussi partie intégrante de la
réalité. Dans les circonstances de l’espèce, le s conséquences de votre qualification juridique
pourront même être appliquées plus aisément su r le terrain que dans d’autres contextes plus
difficiles de contrôle ou de prétentions territoriales illicites.
C. Le prétendu caractère sui generis du Kosovo ne justifie pas
non plus la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance
32. J’en viens maintenant à l’argument du caractère sui generis du Kosovo, qui se double de
l’affirmation insistante suivant laquelle la prét endue indépendance du Koso vo ne constituerait pas
179
un «précédent» . Ces arguments constituent l’aveu de la difficulté de trouver une justification
juridique. Ils proposent ni plus ni moins l’existence d’un droit uniquement applicable au Kosovo.
33. Si tout cas est un «unicum» (Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du
golfe du Maine (Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984 , p. 290, par. 81), dans
le sens où il est différent des autres 180, chacun doit être apprécié à la lumière des règles de droit
181
international général et spécial qui lui sont applicables . Or, le droit est fait de règles abstraites
qui s’appliquent à tous les membres de la société de manière égale. Les faits ou situations
178
Lauterpacht, Hirsch, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1947, p. 421
(Traduction: «Admettre qu’à part certai nes exceptions bien définies, un acte illicite ou ses conséquences immédiates
peuvent devenir suo vigore une source de droit pour l’auteur de l’illicit, équivaudrait à introdui re dans le système
juridique une contradiction qui ne peut être résolue que par le déni de sa nature juridique.»)
179Serbie, observations écrites, p.77-80, par.162-169; Argentine, exposé écrit, p. 26, par.60, observations
écrites, p.18-19, par.33-35; Chypre, exposé écrit, p.19, par.78, observa tions écrites, p.14-15, par.33. Contra :
Allemagne, observations écrites, p. 6 ; Danemark, exposé écrit, p. 6 ; France, expo sé écrit, p. 42-43 ; Japon, exposé écrit,
p. 8 ; Luxembourg, exposé écrit, p. 3, par. 5 ; Pologne, exposé écrit, p. 24, par. 5.2.5 ; Slovénie, exposé écrit, p. 2/3.
180Serbie, observations écr ites, p.67, par.128. Cf. aussi: Vollebae k, Knut, haut commissaire de l’OSCE pour
les minorités, «Address on Mino rity Rights in Kosovo», Humanitarian La w Centre Conference on Minority Rights in
Practice, Pristina, Kosovo, 11 septembre 2008, disponible sur : http ://www.osce.org/kosovo/13215.html, p.5.
181Serbie, observations écrites, p. 65-80, par. 124-170. - 89 -
concrètes exigent l’identification des règles applicables. Nos contradicteurs ne se sont même pas
mis d’accord pour établir une liste unique des éléments qui feraient du Kosovo un cas sui
generis 182. La Serbie a déjà réfuté l’un après l’au tre tous les éléments mentionnés à l’appui du
prétendu caractère sui generis . Pris isolément ou dans son ense mble, ils ne justifient pas la
183
déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance .
34. J’ouvre une parenthèse pour me référer brièvement à deux éléments historiques erronés
⎯ parmi d’autres ⎯ mentionnés dans des observations écrite s pour justifier le prétendu caractère
184
«sui generis» du Kosovo . Ils concernent le changement du statut du Kosovo en1989. Ce
changement a été effectué avec le consentement de l’Assemblée du Kosovo et il en va de même
185
pour la Voïvodine . La Cour constitutionnelle de la Yougos lavie a confirmé la conformité au
droit en vigueur du changement de statut 186. Contrairement à ce que les auteurs de la déclaration
prétendent 187, la Cour constitutionnelle n’était pas un or gane politique. Elle était bel et bien un
organe judiciaire composé sur une base égalita ire, y compris par un juge du Kosovo de souche
albanaise, et qui avait une longue histoire de révoquer la législation des républiques ⎯ y compris
celle de la Serbie ⎯ non conforme à la Constitution fédérale 18.
35. Je reviens aux considérations générales sur le caractère sui generis du Kosovo. C’est un
fait que chaque fois que quelqu’un essaie d’échapper à l’application des règles, on invoque le fait
d’être une exception. Ici, il n’y a aucune ex ception prévue par une quelconque règle qui soit
applicable. Le prétendu «cas unique» ou «sui generis» constituerait en fait un très mauvais
précédent. L’accepter sous une forme juridique serait la consécration de ce que nos amis
anglophones affirment avec sagesse : «Bad precedents make bad law.»
182
Serbie, observations écrites, p. 68-69, par. 133-134.
183Serbie, observations écrites, p. 68-77, par. 133-161.
184Finlande, exposé écrit, p. 5-6 ; auteurs, contribution écrite I, p. 51-58, par. 3.23-3.28.
185Serbie, exposé écrit, p. 76-77, par. 189 ; Serbie, observations écrites, p. 51-52, par. 97-98.
186
Serbie, observations écrites, p. 51-52, par. 97-98.
187
Auteurs, contribution écrite II, p. 38, par. 3.26.
188 Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répr ession du crime de génocide (Croatie c.Serbie) ,
exceptions préliminaires de la République fédérale de Yougosla vie, septembre 2002, disponible sur le site de la Cour à
l’adresse suiv:ante http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=73&case=118&code=cr…,
p. 104-109, par. 4.24-4.31. - 90 -
Conclusions
36. J’arrive, Monsieur le président, à mes conc lusions. Messieurs les juges, certains Etats se
sont exprimés devant vous ⎯ et je crains fort qu’ils ne continuent à le faire durant la phase orale ⎯
comme s’ils étaient dans une conférence internati onale pour discuter de l’avenir de la province
serbe du Kosovo. Mais nous sommes ici devant la plus haute juridiction internationale. La
question qui vous a été posée n’est pas de savoi r si l’indépendance du Kosovo représente une
bonne ou une mauvaise idée ⎯ et nous pensons qu’il s’agit d’une très mauvaise idée à tout point de
vue; la question juridique qui se pose est celle dsavoir si les organes locaux d’autonomie créés
par les Nations Unies pouvaient unilatéralement déci der de s’ériger en organes d’un prétendu Etat
indépendant.
37. Mes collègues ont démontré que la déclar ation unilatérale d’indépendance est contraire
au régime établi par la résolution 1244 et qu’elle porte atteinte à l’intégrité territoriale de la Serbie.
Je viens d’illustrer que le principe d’autodétermination ne lui fournit pas de justification, et
d’insister sur le fait que le cas du Kosovo est régi par le droit international et qu’il doit être
apprécié à la lumière des règles applicables.
38. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges,je vous remercie de votre attention et vous
prie, Monsieur le président, de donner la parole à M. Saša Obradovi ć pour la brève présentation de
nos conclusions.
The PRESIDENT: I thank you, ProfessorKohe n, for your presentation. I now call upon
Mr. Obradović.
OMBr. ADOVIĆ :
SUMMARY OF S ERBIA ’S LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is an exceptional privilege to appear
again before the principal judicial organ of the United Nations as a representative of the Republic
of Serbia. This morning, my learned colleagues have demonstrated that the UDI is contrary to
international law. My task now is to summarize our main arguments.
2. Mr. President, Serbia submits that international law does not remain neutral with regard to
the unilateral declaration of independence. Kos ovo is subject to an international legal régime - 91 -
established by Security Council resolution1244(1999) which provides for an international
administration of Kosovo, establishes a political process for the determination of the future status
and does not allow unilateral secessionist attempts, and reaffirms the territorial integrity of Serbia.
3. The authors of the UDI did not have the authority to issue such a declaration. That act did
not fall within their competences under resolu tion 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework
for Kosovo. Indeed, and by adopting the UDI, they blatantly violated these two instruments, as
well as other rules of international law.
4. The UDI is not in conformity, inter alia, with the following rules of international law:
⎯ firstly, the fundamental principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States which
precludes non-consensual secessions from independent States;
⎯ secondly, the rules of the international lega l régime established by Security Council
resolution 1244 (1999), guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Serbia, as well as providing for
the United Nations administration in Kosovo. Su ch a régime can be modified or terminated
only by the Security Council;
⎯ thirdly, the rules of the international legal régime established by resolution 1244 (1999), which
provide for a political process to determine th e future status of Kosovo that cannot be
terminated unilaterally or undermined by any of the parties concerned.
5. These rules of international law are not onl y applicable to the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government of Kosovo, but to all relevant actors in the province. Therefore, no matter which
body or group adopted the UDI, it violated international law.
6. It has also been demonstrated that th e principle of self-determination does not provide
support for the UDI. The Kosovo Albanians do not constitute a separate “people” entitled to
exercise the right of self-determination, nor does Kosovo constitute a self-determination unit
entitled to become a separate State. Furthermore, the so-called “right to remedial secession” does
not provide support for the proposition that the UDI is in accordance with international law. First,
its proponents have failed to prove the existence of such a rule in international law. Second, even
assuming that such a right exists (quod non), its various requirements a dvanced by its proponents
have not been met in the case of Kosovo. - 92 -
7. The recognition of the so-called “Republic of Kosovo” by a minority of States cannot
grant retroactive legality. We have demonstrated that the so-called “Republic of Kosovo” does not
possess an effective independent government, wh ich is a necessary criterion of statehood, as a
matter of fact.
8. Finally, I wish to emphasize that Kosovo does not constitute a sui generis case in which a
right to secession might exist. A number of simila r situations exist thr oughout the world and the
independence of Kosovo would certainly be used as a precedent by separatist movements. The
very idea that Kosovo would be considered a sui generis case shows that there are no sufficient
legal grounds that can otherwise be relied upon to justify its attempted sec ession from Serbia. It
should be emphasized that, as a matter of prin ciple, we must reject the idea that any
“exceptionality” could justify violations of law. As we have already commented, while each and
every case is unique in its own way, this does and should not prevent international law from being
applied.
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, th ese proceedings concern a question that is of
utmost importance for international law and the legal order of the United Nations. A matter of days
ago, you, Mr. President, affirmed that “[l]aw does not replace politics or economics, but without it
we cannot construct anything that will last in the international community” 18.
Serbia shares this vision. It is the very reason that we appear before you in the present
advisory proceedings.
10. The Republic of Serbia submits that:
(1) The International Court of Justice is competen t to give the advisory opinion in the present case
and that there are no compelling reasons that sh ould lead the Court to decline to give its
opinion; and, finally, that
(2) The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
of Kosovo dated 17 February 2008 is not in accordance with international law.
On behalf of the Serbian delegation, I am pleased to express our sincere gratitude for your
kind attention. Thank you.
18Speech by H.E.Judge HisashiOwada, President of the In ternational Court of Justice, to the Sixty-Fourth
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 29October2009, available on the website of the Court:
http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/1/15591.pdf, p. 6. - 93 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Obradović. This concludes the oral statement
and comments of Serbia. The oral proceedings will resume this afternoon at 3 p.m., in order for the
authors of the unilateral declaration of independe nce to be heard on the questions submitted to the
Court. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mardi 1er décembre 2009, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, sur la Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance des institutions provisoires d'administration autonome du Kosovo (Demande d'avis consultatif soumise par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)