Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
Cour internationale InternationalCourt
deJustice ofJustice
LAHAYE THE HAGUE
Audiencepublique
tenuelejeudi7mars2002,à10heures,au Palaisdela Paix,
sous laprésidencdeM. Guillaume,présiden, uis deM. Shi, vice-président,
en l'affairedela Frontière teretmaritimeentrele CamerounetleNigéria
(Camerounc.Nigéria; Guinéeéquatoriale(intervenant))
COMPTE RENDU
YEAR2002
Publicsitting
heldon Thursday7March2002,at 10am., at thePeace Palace,
Presidentuillaumeand Vice-President hipresiding,successively,
in the caseconcerningtheLand and MaritimeBoundaty betweenCameroonandNigeria
(Cameroon v.Nigeria: EquatorialGuineaintervening)
- --
VERBATIM RECORDPrésent: M. Guillaume, président
M. Shi,vice-président
MM. Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby,juges
MM. Mbaye
Ajibola,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffierPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Judgesad hoc Mbaye
Ajibola
Registrar Couvreur Le Gouvernementdela Républiquedu Cameroun est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. AmadouAli,ministre d'Etatchargéde lajustice, gardedessceaux,
commeagent;
M.Maurice Kamto, doyende la facultédes sciences juridiques et politiquesde l'universitéde
YaoundéII, membrede la Commissiondu droit international, avocat aubarreau de Paris,
M. PeterY. Ntamark, professeuràlafacultédes sciencesjuridiques etpolitiquesde l'Universdeé
Yaoundé IIB , arrister-ut-Law,membre de1'InnerTemple, ancien doyen,
commecoagents,conseils etavocats;
M.Alain Pellet, professeurà l'universitéde Paris X-Nanterre, membreet ancien président dela
Commissiondudroit international,
commeagentadjoint,conseilet avocat;
M.Joseph MarieBipoun Woum, professeur à la facultédes sciencesjuridiques et politiques de
l'universitéde Yaoundé II, ancienministre, ancien doyen,
commeconseillerspécialet avocat;
M.Michel Aurillac, ancienministre,conseillerdYEtahonoraire, avocatenretraite,
M.Jean-Pierre Cot, professeuà l'universitédeParis1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne), ancien ministre,
M.MauriceMendelson,Q. C., professeur éméritd ee l'université deLondres, Barrister-ut-Law,
M.Malcolm N. Shaw,professeur à la faculté de droitde l'universitéde Leicester, titulaire de la
chairesir Robert Jennings, Barrister-ut-Law,
M.Bruno Simma, professeur à l'université de Munich, membre de la Commission du droit
international,
M. Christian Tomuschat,professeur à l'universitéHurnbold de Berlin,ancien membre et ancien
présidentde la Commission du droit international,
M.Olivier Corten, professeuà la Facultéde droitde l'universitélibre deBruxelles,
M.Daniel Khan, chargé de cours àl'Institut de droit internatle l'Universitéde Munich,
M.Jean-Marc Thouvenin, professeur à l'université de Paris X-Nanterre,avocat au barreau de
Paris,sociétd'avocatsLysias,
commeconseilsetavocats; TheGovernmentofthe Republicof Cameroonis representedby:
H.E.Mr. Amadou Ali, Ministerof StateresponsibleforJustice,Keeperof the Seals,
as Agent;
Mr. Maurice Kamto,Dean, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Universityof Yaoundé II,
memberofthe InternationalLaw Commission,Avocatat the Paris Bar, LysiasLaw Associates,
Mr. PeterY. Ntamark,Professor, Facultyof Law and Political Science, Universityof Yaoundé II,
Barrister-at-Law,memberofthe InnerTemple, formerDean,
as Co-Agents,CounselandAdvocates;
Mr. Alain Pellet,Professor, University of Paris X-Nanterre, membrnd former Chairmanof the
InternationalLawCommission,
as DeputyAgent,Counseland Advocate;
Mr. Joseph-MarieBipoun Woum,Professor, Faculty ofLaw and PoliticalScience, Universityof
YaoundéII, formerMinister,formerDean,
as SpecialAdviserandAdvocate;
Mr. Michel Aurillac,formerMinister, Honorary Conseillerd'État,retiredAvocat,
Mr. Jean-PierreCot,Professor, University ofPari1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne), former Minister,
Mr. Maurice Mendelson,Q.C.,EmeritusProfessor Universityof London,Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. Malcolm N. Shaw, Sir Robert Jennings Professorof International Law, Faculty of Law,
UniversityofLeicester, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr. Bruno Simma, Professor, University of Munich, member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Christian .Tomuschat, Professor, Humboldt Universityof Berlin, former member and
Chairman, InternationalLawCommission,
Mr. Olivier Corten, Professo, aculty of Law,Universitélibre deBruxelles,
Mr. Daniel Khan,Lecturer,InternationalLawInstitute,UniversityofMunich,
Mr. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Professor, University of Paris X-Nanterre, Avocatat the Paris Bar,
LysiasLawAssociates,
as CounselandAdvocates; SirIan Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister-ut-Law, ancienmembre de la Commission du droit
international,
M. EricDiamantis,avocatau barreau de Paris,Moquet,Bordes& Associés,
M. Jean-Pierre Mignard,avocataubarreau de Paris, soé'avocatsLysias,
M. JosephTjop, consultanàla sociétd'avocatsLysias, chercheurau Centrede droit international
deNanterre (CEDIN), Université Paris X-Nanterre,
commeconseils;
M. PierreSemengue,général d'armée, contrôleur généraalrmes es,ancienchef d'état-majordes
armées,
M. JamesTataw, généradle division, conseiller logistique,ancien chef d'état-major dle'arméede
terre,
S.Exc. MmeIsabelleBassong, ambassadeurdu Cameroun auprès des pays du Benelux et de
l'Unioneuropéenne,
S. Exc. M.Biloa Tang, ambassadeur du Cameroen France,
S. Exc. M.Martin BelingaEboutou, ambassadeur, représentant permadtu Cameroun auprèsde
l'organisation desNations UniàsNew York,
M. EtienneAteba, ministre-conseiller, chargé d'affairesai.à l'ambassade du Cameroun,
à La Haye,
M. RobertAkamba, administrateur civil principal, chade mission au secrétariat général de la
présidencede laRépublique,
M.Anicet Abanda Atangana, attachéau secrétariat générdale la présidencede la République,
chargédecours à l'UniversideYaoundéII,
M. ErnestBodo Abanda,directeurducadastre,membredela commissionnationaledesfrontières,
M.OusmaneMey, anciengouverneurdeprovince,
Le chef Samuel Moka Liffafa Endeley, magistrat honoraB,arrister-at-Law, membredu Middle
Temple(Londres),ancienprésidendte lachambreadministrativedelaCoursuprême,
MeMarcSassen,avocatetconseiljuridique,sociétéPetten,Tideman& Sassen(La Haye),
M.Francis Fai Yengo, ancien gouverneur de province,directeur de l'organisation du territoire,
ministère del'administration territoriale, .
M.Jean Mbenoun, directeurde l'administration centrau secrétariatgénérle la présidencede
la République, Sir Ian Sinclair, K.C.M.G., Q.C.,Barrister-at-Law, formermember of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Eric Diamantis,Avocatat the Paris Bar, Moquet, Bor&eAssociés,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Mignard,Avocatatthe Paris Bar,LysiasLawAssociates,
Mr. Joseph Tjop, Consultant to Lysias Law Associates, Researcher at the Centre de droit
internationaldeNanterre(CEDIN), Universityof Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
General Pierre Semengue, Controller-Generalof the Armed Forces, former Head of Staff of the
Armed Forces,
Major-GeneralJamesTataw,LogisticsAdviser,FormerHead ofStaffofthe Amy,
H.E. Ms Isabelle Bassong, Ambassadorof Cameroonto the BeneluxCountriesandto the European
Union,
H.E. Mr.BiloaTang, Ambassadorof Cameroonto France,
H.E. Mr. Martin Belinga Eboutou, Ambassador, PermanenR tepresentative of Cameroon to the
United NationsinNewYork,
Mr. Etienne Ateba, Minister-Counsellor, Chargé d'affairea.i. at the Embassy of Cameroon,
The Hague,
Mr. Robert Akamba, Principal Civil Administrator, Chargé de mission, General Secretariatofe
Presidencyof the Republic,
Mr. AnicetAbandaAtangana, Attaché to the General Secretariatof the Presidencyof the Republic,
Lecturer, Universityof Yaoundé II,
Mr. Ernest Bodo Abanda, Director of the Cadastral Survey, member, National Boundary
Commission,
Mr. Ousmane Mey, former ProvinciaG l ovemor,
Chief Samuel Moka Liffafa Endeley, Honorary Magistrate, Barrister-at-Law m,ember of the
Middle Temple (London), former Presideno tf the AdministrativeChamber of the Supreme
Court,
Maître MarcSassen,AdvocateandLegalAdviser,Petten, Tideman & Sassen(TheHague),
Mr. Francis FaiYengo,formerProvincialGovemor,Director,Organisationdu Territoire,Ministry
of Territorial Administration,
Mr. Jean Mbenoun, Director, Central Administration, Generaecretariatof the Presidency of the
Republic, M.Edouard Etoundi, directeur de l'administratinentrale au secrétariat générallaeprésidence
de la République,
M.RobertTanda,diplomate, ministère desrelations extérieures
commeconseillers;
M. Samuel Betah Sona, ingénieur-géologue, expert consultantl'erganisation desNations Unies
pour le droitde lamer,
M.Thomson Fitt Takang,chef de service d'administration centrale au secrétariatgénéral de la
présidencede la République,
M.Jean-Jacques Koum, directeur de 17exploratiso,ciétnationaledeshydrocarbures (SNH),
M.Jean-Pierre Meloupou, capitaine de frégate c,hef de la division Afrique au ministèrede la
défense,
M. Paul Moby Etia, géographe, directedre l'Institutnational de cartographie,
M.AndréLoudet, ingénieur cartographe,
M.AndréRoubertou, ingénieur général de17armementh ,ydrographe,
commeexperts;
MmeMarieFlorence Kollo-Efon, traducteur interprète principal,
commetraducteurinterprète;
Mlle Céline Negre, chercheuaru Centre de droit international de Nant(CEDIN),Universitéde
ParisX-Nanterre
Mlle Sandrine Barbier, chercheuau Centre de droit internationalde Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
de ParisX-Nanterre,
M. Richard Penda Keba, professeur certifiéd'histoire, cabinet du ministrede la justice, ancien
proviseurde lycées,
commeassistantsderecherche;
M.BoukarOumara,
M.Guy RogerEba'a,
M. Aristide Esso,
M.NkendeForbinake,
M.Nfan Bile, Mr. Edouard Etoundi, Director, Central Administration, General Secretariat hfe Presidencyof
the Republic,
Mr. RobertTanda,diplomat,Ministryof Foreign Affairs,
asAdvisers;
Mr. SamuelBetah Sona, Geological Engineer, Consulting Expetrot theUnited NationsfortheLaw
oftheSea,
Mr. Thomson Fitt Takang, Department Head,Central Administration,General Secretariat of the
Presidencyof theRepublic,
Mr. Jean-Jacques Koum, Directorof Exploration, National Hydrocarbons ompany (SNH),
Commander Jean-Pierre MeloupouH , eadof AfiicaDivisionat the Ministryof Defence,
Mr. PaulMoby Etia, Geographer, Director,nstitutnationalde cartographie,
Mr. AndréLoudet,CartographicEngineer,
Mr. AndréRoubertou,MarineEngineer, Hydrographer,
asExperts;
Ms MarieFlorenceKollo-Efon, Principal Translator-Interpreter,
as Translafor-Interpreter;
Ms CélineNegre, Researcher, Centre d'étudesde droit internationalde Nanterre (CEDIN),
Universityof ParisX-Nanterre,
Ms Sandrine Barbier, Researcher, Centre d'études dedroit internationalde Nanterre (CEDIN),
Universityof ParisX-Nanterre,
Mr. Richard PendaKeba, Certified Professorof History, cabinet of the Minister of State for
Justice,formerHeadof High School,
asResearchAssistants;
Mr. BoukarOumara,
Mr. GuyRogerEba'a,
Mr. AristideEsso,
Mr.Nkende Forbinake,
Mr.NfanBile, M.Eithel Mbocka,
M.Olinga Nyozo'o,
commeresponsablesde la communication;
MmeRenéeBakker,
MmeLawrence Polirsztok,
MmeMireilleJung,
M.NigelMcCollum,
MmeTeteBéatriceEpeti-Kame,
commesecrétairesdela délégation.
Le Gouvernementde laRépubliquefédérale duNigér eitreprésentépar :
S.Exc.l'honorable Musa EA . bdullahi, ministred'Etat, ministre de la Justice du Gouvernement
fédéral du Nigéria,
commeagent;
Le chef RichardAkinjideSAN, ancien Attorney-General de la Fédération, membre du barreau
d'Angleterre et du pays Galles,ancien membrede laCommissiondudroit international,
M.AlhajiAbdullahi IbrahimSAN, CON, commissaire pour les fiontieres internationales,
commission nationale des frontièrdu Nigéria,ancienAttorney-Generalde la Fédération,
commecoagents;
Mme Nella Andem-Ewa, Attorney-Generalet commissaire àlajustice, Etatde CrossRiver,
M.IanBrownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., membre de la Commission du droit international,membre du
barreau d'Angleterre,membrede l'Institutde droit international,
SirArthur Watts, K.C.M.G.,Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, membrd ee l'Institutde droit
international,
M.James Crawford,S.C.,professeurdedroit internationalàl'universitédeCambridge, titulaire de
la chaire Whewell, membredes barreaux d'Angleterreet d'Australie,membre de l'Institut de
droit international,
M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire à l'Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationalesde Genève, membre del'Institutde droit international,
M.Alastair Macdonald, géomètra e, ciendirecteurde I'OrdnanceSuwey,Grande-Bretagne,
commeconseilsetavocats;
M.TimothyH.Daniel, associé, cabineD t .J. Freeman, Solicitors,City de Londres, Mr. Eithel Mbocka
Mr.Olinga Nyozo'o,
asMediaOficers;
MsRenéBakker,
Ms LawrencePolirsztok,
MsMireille Jung,
Mr.Nigel McCollum,
MsTeteBéatriceEpeti-Kame,
asSecretaries.
TheGovernmentof theFederalRepublicofNigeriais representedby:
H.E.the HonourableMusaE.Abdullahi, Ministerof StateforJustice of theFederal Government of
Nigeria,
asAgent;
Chief RichardAkinjide SAN,Former Attorney-Generalof the Federation, Memberof the Bar of
Englandand Wales,former Memberof the InternationalLawCommission,
AlhajiAbdullahi IbrahimSAN,CON,Commissioner, International Boundaries, National Boundary
CommissionofNigeria, Former Attorney-Generao lf the Federation,
as Co-Agents;
Mrs.Nella Andem-Ewa, Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, Cross Riv Setrate,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,C.B.E., Q.C., Member of the InternationalLaw Commission,Member of the
EnglishBar,Memberofthe Institute of International Law,
Sir Arthur Watts,K.C.M.G., Q.C., Member of the English Bar, Member of the Institute of
International Law,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge,
Memberofthe EnglishandAustralian Bars, Member of the Institute ofInternationalLaw,
Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Honorary Professor,GraduateInstitute of InternationalStudies, Geneva,
Memberofthe InstituteofInternational Law,
Mr.Alastair Macdonald,LandSurveyor, Former Director,OrdnanceSurvey,GreatBritain,
as CounselandAdvocates;
Mr.TimothyH.Daniel,Partner,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,Cityof London, M.AlanPerry, associé, cabinet D. J. Freeman, Solicitors, teLondres,
M.David Lerer,solicitor,cabinetD.J.Freeman, Solicitors,Cityde Londres,
M.Christopher Hackford,solicitor,cabinet. J. Freeman,Solicitors,City de Londres,
MmeCharlotte Breide,solicitor,cabinetD. J. Freeman, Solicitors, City de Londres,
M.NedBeale,stagiaire, cabinetD.J. Freeman, Solicitors, City de Londres,
M.Geoffrey Marston, directeurdu département des étude jsridiques au SidneySussex College,
UniversitédeCambridge, membredubarreaud'Angleterre etdu Pays deGalles,
commeconseils,
S.Exc. l'honorable Dubem Onyia, ministrd'Etat,ministre des affaires étrangères,
M.Maxwell Gidado, assistant spécial principal du présidep ntur les affaires juridiques et
constitutionnelles, ancienAttorney-General et commissaire Justice,Etat d'Adamaoua,
M.Alhaji DahiruBobbo,directeur général, commission nationa dles frontières,
M.A. O. Cukwurah, conseil adjoint, ancien conseiller en matire frontières(ASOP)auprèsdu
Royaumedu Lesotho, ancien commissaire pour les frontières inter-Etats, commission nationale
des frontières,
M. 1Ayua, membrede l'équipe juridique duNigéria,
M. F.A.Kassim, directeur générdaluservicecartographique delaFédération,
M.Alhaji S. M. Diggi, directeur des frontières internationales, commission nationale des frontières,
M.K.A. Adabale,directeur pourledroit international et le droitcomparé,ministère de lajustice,
M. A.B.Maitama,colonel, ministère de ladéfense,
M.JalalArabi,membredel'équipe juridique duNigéria,
M.Gbola Akinola, membrede l'équipe juridique dN uigéra,
M.K. M. Tumsah, assistant spécialu directeur généradle la commission nationale des frontières
etsecrétairedel'équipejuridique,
M.AliyiuNasir,assistant spéciadluministredYEtatm, inistre de laJustice,
commeconseillers;
M. ChrisCarleton, C.B.E., bureau hydrographiquduRoyaume-Uni,
M.DickGent,bureau hydrographiqueduRoyaume-Uni,
M.Clive Schofield, unitderecherche sur les frontières internationales, UniveeDurham,
M.ScottB. Edmonds, directeurdesopérations cartographiques I, ternational MappingAssociates, Mr. AlanPerry,Partner,D. J. Freeman,Solicitors, CityofLondon,
Mr. David Lerer, Solicitor, D.J.Freeman, Solicitors, City of London,
Mr. Christopher Hackford, Solicitor, . J. Freeman, Solicitors, CitLondon,
Ms Charlotte Breide, Solicitor,D.J.Freeman, Solicitors, Cityof London,
Mr. Ned Beale,Trainee,D. J. Freeman, Solicitors,City ofLondon,
Dr. Geoffrey Marston,Fellow of SidneySussexCollege,University of Cambridge;Memberofthe
Bar ofEnglandand Wales,
as Counsel;
H.E. the Honourable DubemOnyia,MinisterofState for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Maxwell Gidado,Senior SpecialAssistantto the President (Legaland Constitutional Matters),
Former Attorney-General and Commissione for Justice, Adamawa State,
Alhaji DahiruBobbo, Director-General, National Boundary Commission,
Mr. A. O. Cukwurah, Co-Counsel, FormerUN (OPAS) Boundary Adviser to the Kingdom of
Lesotho, Former Commissioner, Inter-State Boundaries, National Boundary Commission,
Mr. 1.Ayua,Member, NigerianLegalTeam,
Mr. F. A.Kassim, Surveyor-Generao l f the Federation,
Alhaji S. M.Diggi, Director(International Boundaries), National Boundary Commission,
Mr. K.A.Adabale,Director(InternationalandComparative Law) Ministryof Justice,
Colonel A. B.Maitama,Ministry of Defence,
Mr. JalalArabi,Member, Nigerian Legal Team,
Mr. Gbola Akinola, MemberN , igerianLegalTeam,
Mr. K. M. Tumsah, Special Assistantto Director-General, National Boundary Commission and
Secretaryto the LegalTeam,
Mr. AliyuNasir,Special Assistant tothe Ministerof State for Justice,
asAdvisers;
Mr. ChrisCarleton,C.B.E., UnitedKingdomHydrographic Office,
Mr. Dick Gent,UnitedKingdomHydrographicOffice,
Mr. Clive Schofield, International Boundaries Researchnit,Universityof Durham,
Mr. ScottB.Edmonds,DirectorofCartographieOperations, International Mapping Associates, M.RobertC.Rizzutti,cartographe principal,International MappingAssociates,
M.BruceDaniel,International MappingAssociates,
MmeVictoriaJ. Taylor,International MappingAssociates,
MmeStephanieKim Clark,InternationalMappingAssociates,
M. Robin Cleverly, Exploration Manager, PAGroup,
MmeClaireAinsworth,NPAGroup,
commeconseillersscientifiqueset techniques;
M.Mohammed Jibrilla, experten informatique, commission nationaledesfrontières,
MmeCoralieAyad, secrétaire, cabinet D.J.Freeman, Solicitors, Cityde Londres,
MmeClaireGoodacre, secrétaire, cabine Dt.J. Freeman,Solicitors,City deLondres,
MmeSarahBickell, secrétaire, cabinetD.J. Freeman, Solicitors, Cityde Londres,
MmeMichelleBurgoine, spécialisteen technologie de l'information, cabinet D. J.Freeman,
Solicitors, Cityde Londres,
commepersonnel administratif:
Le Gouvernementdela Républiquede Guinéeéquatoriale,qui est autoriséea intervenirdans
l'instance,est représenpar :
S.Exc. M. Ricardo MangueObamaNYFube,ministre dYEtat,ministre du travail et de la sécurité
sociale,
commeagent et conseil;
S.Exc.M. RubénMayeNsue Mangue, ministrede la justice et des cultes, vice-présidentde la
commission nationale des frontières,
S.Exc. M. CristobalMafianaEla Nchama,ministre des mines etde l'énergie,vice-présidentde la
commissionnationaledes frontières,
M.DomingoMbaEsono, directeur national de la société nationale de pétrole de
Guinéeéquatoriale, membre de lacommissionnationaledesfrontières,
M.AntonioNzambiNlonga, Attorney-General,
commeconseillers;
M.Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit international public à l'université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assas) eà l'Institutuniversitaire européen de Florence, Mr.RobertC.Rizzutti,SeniorMapping Specialist, InternationaMl appingAssociates,
Mr.BruceDaniel, International Mapping Associates,
MsVictoriaJ. Taylor,InternationalMapping Associates,
MsStephanie Kim Clark, International Mapping Associates,
Dr.Robin Cleverly, ExplorationManager, NPA Group,
MsClaire Ainsworth,NPAGroup,
as Scientificand TechnicalAdvisers;
Mr.MohammedJibrilla,ComputerExpert, National Boundary Commission,
MsCoralie Ayad, Secretary,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors, CityLondon,
MsClaireGoodacre, Secretary,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors, Cityof London,
Ms SarahBickell, Secretary,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors, CityLondon,
MsMichelleBurgoine,ITSpecialist,D.J. Freeman, Solicitors,City of London,
asAdministrators.
TheGovernmentof theRepublic ofEquatorialGuinea,whichhas beenpermitted to intervenein
the case,isrepresentedby:
H.E.Mr. Ricardo Mangue ObamaN'Fube,Ministerof StateforLabor andSocial Security,
asAgentand Counsel;
H.E. Mr. RubénMaye Nsue Mangue, Ministerof Justice and Religion, Vice-Presidentof the
National Boundary Commission,
H.E. Mr. CristobalMafianaEla Nchama, Ministerof Mines and Energy, Vice-Presidentof the
National Boundary Commission,
Mr. Domingo Mba Esono, National Director of the Equatorial Guinea National Petroleum
Company, Memberofthe National Boundary Commission,
Mr.AntonioNzambiNlonga,Attorney-General,
asAdvisers;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public InternationalLaw at the University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas) andatthe European University InstituinFlorence, M. DavidA. Colson, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau de 1'Etatde Californie et du barreau dudistrict de
Columbia,
commeconseilset avocats;
SirDerekBowett,
commeconseilprincipal,
M.DerekC. Smith, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau du district de Columbia et du barreaude 1'Etat
deVirginie,
commeconseil;
Mme Jannette E.Hasan, membre du cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb,Greene & MacRae, L.L.P.,
Washington,D.C., membre du barreau du districtde Columbia et du barreau de 1'Etat de
Floride,
M. HervéBlatry, membredu cabinet LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene& MacRae, L.L.P.,Paris, avocatàla
Cour,membredubarreau de Paris,
commeexpertsjuridiques;
M.CoalterG. Lathrop, SovereignGeographicInc., Chape1Hill, CarolineduNord,
M.AlexanderM.Tait,Equator Graphics,Silver Spring, Maryland,
commeexpertstechniques.Mr. David A. Colson,LeBoeuf, Lamb,Greene & MacRae,L.L.P.,Washington,D.C.,memberof
theCaliforniaStateBarand DistrictofColumbiaBar,
as CounselandAdvocates,
SirDerekBowett,
asSeniorCounsel;
Mr.DerekC.Smith, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green &e MacRae,L.L.P.,Washington, D.C., membeorf the
District of ColumbBarandVirginiaStateBar,
as Counsel;
MsJannetteE. Hasan, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene& MacRae,L.L.P.,Washington, D.C., membeo rf
the District of ColumBar andFlorida State Bar,
Mr.HervéBlatry,LeBoeuf,Lamb, Greene & MacRae,L.L.P.,Paris, Avocatà la Cour,memberof
the ParisBar,
asLegalExperts;
Mr.CoalterG.Lathrop,Sovereign Geographic Inc.,hape1Hill,North Carolina,
Mr.AlexanderM.Tait, EquatorGraphics,Silver Spring, Maryland,
as TechnicalExperts. Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanest ouverteetje donnela parole, aunom
de la République fédéraldeu Nigéria,au professeur James Crawford. You have the floor,
Professor Crawford.
Mr. CRAWFORD:
THE MARITIMEBOUNDARY: CAMEROON C'SAIMLINE(S)
MEASURED AGAINST THEPRACTICE OF THEPARTIES
1. Good moming, Mr.President, Members of theCourt, in this presentation 1will do three
things:
(a) First1will tellthe picaresque storyofCameroon'sclaim line.
(b) Secondly,1will recall andillustrate the historyofthe maritimeareas in question,in particular
the history of the oil practice. That history is relatively consistent and intensely practical,
qualities that distinguishitto a markeddegree fromCameroon'claim line.
(c) Thirdly, Mr.President, Members of the Court, 1 will outline the maritime claims and
agreements between thevarious Statesfionting onthe westernsegment ofthe Gulf ofGuinea.
inparticular1will focuson the two treaties recently concby Nigeria with itsneighbours,
EquatorialGuinea andSaoTome andPrincipe,inthe lightof Cameroon'sobservations of last
week.
Cameroon's claim line: a line in search of itself?
2. As the Court will be aware, Cameroon did not put forward any claim line in its
Application. It simply calledon the Court to delimit the maritimeareas to the south of Bakassi
consequent uponits determinationof disputed issuesofland sovereignty. The first indicationof its
claim linewas the sketch-map, entitledligné equitab "-e when1Saythosewords, 1put them
in invertedcommas-, whichyou can see on the screenand in tab 89 in your folders. That was
included inseveralplaces in Cameroon's Memorialin 1995. It was presumablyan attemptto be
accurate. After all,a maritime claimline before this Court is aous thing, and whatever the
positionwith its Application, Cameroonhadhad timeto get it rightin the Memorial, whichter
al1theprimary statementof the case. Onedoes not expect an applicant inan optionalclause case
toannounceits claimfor the firsttime initsReply. 3. Indeed, the Courtnotedthe problem itself, when inthe PreliminaryObjectionsJudgment
it raisedof itswnmotion the question whether"the dispute between the Partieshas been defined
with sufficient precision for the Courtbevalidly seisedof it" (para.110). The Court'sanswerto
its own question was,yes, on the whole; although severalMembersof the Courttook a different
view. The Court's conclusion,and the mere fact ofthe Court's question, implied a lack of
precisionon the partof Cameroon which was remarkable at the post-Memorialstage.
4. That was,however,notthe half ofit. As withTunisia's offering inthe Tunisia/Libyacase
(this istab 90) the Court was toget a sheafof lines. Exceptthat inthe Tunisia/Libyacase thelines
were presented asalternatives. Tunisia did not suggestthey were al1to be awarded; that would
have been inconsistent. By contrast,in theseproceedings Cameroonhasfired outto sea a selection
of lines like arrowsfrom a quiver, sometimes singly,sometimes in pairs, al1in slightly different
directions and with differing degrees of imprecisionand error, al1 of them presented as the
equitable solution.
5. Let us lookat Cameroon's sheaf of equitablelines,which we will successivelypresent on
the screen now, transposedon a singlemap for the purposeof comparison. Again, this is tab91 in
your folders. This isthe originalligne équitableof Cameroon'sMemorial; we can cal1itthe 1995
line. It is shown as a purple line on the map, whichis now overlain on an accurate French
base-map which was, however, not used inCameroon's Memorial.
6. Then in its Reply, six years after its Application, Cameroon presentedfor the first time
what it said was an accuratedepiction of its line. About time, ou might think. But unfortunately,
as Nigeria pointed out in itsRejoinder,it wasnot one depictionbut two, or rather a descriptionin
the text and a different depiction in theaphics. You can see them on the screennow. Thegreen
line marked CR2000(A) was the line shownrepeatedlyon Cameroon'sReply map. The black
line marked CR 2000(B)was theline describedinthe text. Cameroon nowsaysof course,through
Professor Pellet,that the described line, the black li, as the one they intended. Mr. President,
how were we to know? The green line (CR 2000 (A))was pretty well consistent with the 1995
map line, as you can see. The black line was new. There was no indicationin the Reply that
Cameroon was proposinga new line; it purportedto re-present the "ligne équitable"as presented
in its Memorial. Moreoverboththe map line and the textline, the blackand the green lines,were referredto at the sametime in Cameroon's submissions inthe Reply atparagraph 13.01 (c).Sothe
Court had no way of telling which line was claimed. Insteadof one ligne équitablewe had
plusieuresligneséquitablesp,lus oumoins.
7. Moreover the difference was not trivial. There wer7 e,400km2of valuable and for the
most part already granted Nigerian oil-lands between thtewo lines, the black line and the green
line. Mr.President,Members of the Court, one might have wondered, by this time, whether the
claim wasa seriousone, whetherit had beenproperly considered. Ifit was considered,why could
they not getitright?
8.In fact Cameroondid notnoticethe error for another eight months after the publication of
its Reply. It was only after Nigeriahad pointed it out in the Rejoinder, in January 2001, seven
yearslate,that Cameroon finallyandunequivocally identifieda claimIine. This is the 2001 line,
which isthe blue line shown on the map and depictedCL2001(corr.). "L" here stands for letter
becauseitwas ina letterto the Courtthat Cameroon finallyput fonvarda definitive line. In a way,
that was appropriate.After al1therehave been so many lettersto the Court from Cameroondunng
this proceedingthat it was appropriate that its maritime clabe finallyannouncedin a letter. As
part of your reform programme, Mr. President, perhaps we could do away with the forma1
pleadings and simplyhave an exchangeof correspondence! But at least weknew where wewere,
at last.
9. Let me pause for a momentwith the line CL2001(corr.). The Court will note that this
line proceededfurtherout to sea from point K. It proceededto a point which wehave called for
conveniencepoint "L". Now pointL is almost exactly 200 nautical miles from thenearest point on
the land boundary claimed from Cameroon, that is East Point. Cameroondid not botherto tell the
Court that, butit is true. So fromCameroon'spoint of viewit was arationalpointto stop. Nigeria
has givenyouthe CO-ordinates of pointL. Cameroon objectsto this, but itseemstobe appropriate;
afteral1itwas easytoread the CO-ordinatea sndthe Courtis entitledtoknowthem.
10.Butnow,Mr. President, theline haschangedagain. 1amnottrying to showthe Court an
unauthorized video. But,with thilsine, a motionpictureseemsthe appropriate medium! Actually
the linehaschangedin three ways duringthe firstround. First, Cameroon now tells us that it does
not stopatpoint "L" butkeeps ongoing outto deepwater. Secondly,the line has been bentfurther towardsNigeriaaround point1,in orderto go around EquatorialGuinea's maritime boundary with
Nigeria. Nigeriahas been compensatedfor this forcedexchangeof maritime territory by a little bit
further south. In fact thereare Nigerian oil wellsinthe area Professor Pellet claimed for Cameroon
last week, but none in the area he gave us in retum. So Cameroon got the better of the forced
exchange. Youcan see thesefurthermodifications on thescreen.
11. Thirdlyand for the momentfinally, Cameroonhas cawed out a square, a white box, it is
a sort of geographical maritime non liquet,on which itsays the Court should notrule. You can see
it onthe screen. The Cameroonline entersthe whitebox and it emerges fromthe other side. What
it does while it is in the box, no one knows. The Court will no doubt recall that in old maps they
used to put serpents in the sea where they did not know what was going on in order to scare
mariners away: well, we couldput a serpent inthe white box. Perhaps the Court is supposedto be
scared awayfromenquiryas well!
12.Wecan cal1thisnew ensembleof changesCO 2002 (P). We awaitfurther developments.
13. Mr.President, Members ofthe Court, it is true that in litigation a party's claim may be
developed and refined within the pleadings. New documents may be revealed, new information
may come to light. But that is not the situation here. The maritime positions of the Parties here
developed over 40 years. The information as to concessions and wells, set out in Nigeria's
Counter-Memorial and in further detail in the Rejoinder, was public, commercially available
information. Professor Pellet complainedthat we had not referenced Ourinformation. In fact we
had. We deposited with theCourt relevant extractsof the Bulletin of the Association ofAmerican
Petroleum Geologists for theyears 1958to 1990. Subsequentinformation came fiom the scouting
services, in particular IHS Energy, formerly known as Petroconsultants, whose information is
commerciallyavailable in the industry. The informationconcems an industry which has invested
billions of dollars ininfiastructure inthe now disputed area,andwhich is stronglyrepresented with
offices and representatives in eachof the two Parties' countries. The information did not come
froma strangeland, or fromsome hitherto secret archive. It shouldhave beentaken intoaccount in
establishinga claim line. Yet the firsttime that Cameroonunequivocally specifiedits newlitigious
claim was in a letter to the Registrarafter the completionof Nigeria's Rejoinder. And now it has changedthe line yet again. This is quite extraordinary. The Court should draw the appropriate
conclusion.
14. The appropriate conclusion, MrP. resident, Members of theCourt, is that Cameroonis
manufacturing a dispute by a claim which is unrelated to the real dispute between the Parties,
which is unrelated tothe law, which is unrelatedto the facts. In Australia,asidyesterday,this
would be called an ambit claim, an extravagantclaim made with a view to expandingthe
jurisdiction of the Court. My fiiend and colleague, Professor Abi-Saab, will show shortlyhow
Cameroon's ambit claim is completely unsustainableas a matter of law, having regardto the
Court'sconstantjurisprudence andto the actual geography.In whatfollows, 1 willsetthe sceneby
settingout in summaryformthehistory ofthe region bothin terms of actual economic activityand
intermsof the negotiationsbetweenthe variousconcernedStates.
ThepracticeofthePartiesinthe areaindispute
15.Mr. President, Membersof the Court,in my introductoryspeechyesterday1showedhow
the maritime dispute between Cameroon andNigeria couldonly be resolved as between thecoasts
facing onto the area in dispute. 1also showedhow the west-facingcoast of Cameroon, opposite
the east coast of Bioko,has absolutelyno relevance to the presentcase. The area betweenthese
two coasts which you see on the screennow, and in tab 92, is irrelevant to this dispute. The
maritime areas between these coasts appertain exclusivelyto Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea.
Furthersouth, theyappertainalsoto Sao Tomeand Principe. Nigeriahas no claimto any of them,
and their delimitation betweenthe States concerned can have no effect on the delimitationto be
achievedin the sectorwhich doesconcern Nigeria,to theWestof Bioko.
16.Turningthento the north-eastemsector of theGulfof Guinea,which isthe only sectorof
interestto the Court,the graphicyou can see on the screen- tab93- has an equidistanceline
shown between Biokoand the mainland. Thatis the EquatorialGuinea's claim line,as the Court
has been informed. It is obviousthat the location of that equidistance line is unaffected by any
issueconcemingland territorybetweenNigeriaand Cameroon.
17.In its Counter-Mernorial,Nigeriaoutlined the history ofhydrocarbondevelopmentin the
area, a subject on which Cameroon had previously been silent (Counter-Mernorialof Nigeria, paras. 20.13-20.17). It is worthpointing outthat a State partyin a case broughtunder the optional
clause has at least the normalobligation to providerelevant informationto the Court in relationto
its claim: actually,there is the burden of proof. Cameroon hasnot provided the information in
respect ofthe maritime claims,despite its numerous pleadings,forma1and informal,authorizedand
unauthorized, epistolary and other.
18. Even in its Reply, Cameroon provides only scanty information. The most significant
element was its map R25, entitled "Concessions pétrolières camerounaises et nigériane -s
chevauchements" (Reply of Cameroon, p.437, mapR25). You can see this map on the screen
now; it is tab 94. The mapshows, by a heavydashedand doaed line,Cameroon'sstatedlimit of
operationsin the disputedarea. The situation is, in principle, confirmby the data whichNigeria
has added to the map. The Cameroon installations arein purple, the Nigerian in green.These
items are basedon public information and they show the extent of the installations, wellsand
pipelinesin the area.
19.It is the case that thereare two areasof overlapping licences,one in the north, onein the
south. The areasof overlapareshown in blueon Cameroon's mapR25. And they arenowshown
on the graphic on the screen and intab 94,which comesfrom the Rejoinder.. In fact thereare no
actual Cameroon activitiesin the southern endof overlapping licences; there are no Cameroon
installations there andno Carneroon wellshavebeen drilledthere. The areaof overlap is a limited
one; it was the area that the Parties realized was a matter for negotiation, but- as 1 said
yesterday - entirely withoutprejudice tothequestionof sovereignty over theBakassi Peninsula.
As this graphic shows,Cameroon as a coastal Statehas never asserted or acted upon the
claimsto maritime territory which it nowmakesas a litigantbefore the Court.
20. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, in its Rejoinder, Nigeria traced in detail the
development of offshore licensing in thiasrea in the 40years fi-om1960to 1999. Cameroon did
not botherto disclosethis information- frompublicly available sources. 1 am not goingto take
the Court throughit againintedious detail; you can seeit graphically displayedin the Appendixto
Chapter10of the Rejoinder. The only pointsthat need tobe made hereare, first, that themarginal
area of overlap arose in 1977,and that apartfrom that the practicehas been consistent; secondly,that the practice is of long standing and has beenan obvious basis for relianceand conduct,
including the conductofthird parties,in relationto the offshoreea.
21.The graphic youcan nowsee on the screenis tab 95. It showsthe offshore installations
of Cameroon (in purple), Nigeria (in green) and Equatorial Guinea(in yellow). That is the
situationas at 2000. You can see EquatorialGuinea'sZafiro field in the bottom left-hand corner,
asalsothewells associatedwith Nigeria's Ekanga field.
22. This graphic, tab 96, is the licensing situation offshoreas depicted in Nigeria's
Rejoinder,taken from thesame public sources.
23. Cameroon argues that the oil practice is unilateral, recent,secret, inconsistent and
unlawfùl. Let me dealbriefïy withtheseclaims.
24. First, it is not unilateral. Youcan see it has been engaged in by al1three States in the
region.
25. Second,it is notrecent. Itgoes backto amodus vivend ofithelate 1950swhich hasbeen
in place since then. It is true that some licences along the oil practiceline are more recent, and
ProfessorKamto valiantlysoughtto make somethingof this. But aswe have shownin everycase
theselicences coveredareas already previously licensedunder other designations. Letme take,for
illustrativepurposes, the position in 1979. This is f?omOurRejoinder and is also at tab 96. It
shows theslight overlapwhich 1haveillustrated. The licenceareas arecomprehensiveand theygo
downto the equidistanceline with Equatorial Guinea.
26. Third, the oil practice is not secret. The licencesare awarded publiclyafter advertised
tenderingrounds, in accordancewithnormal oil industry practice. Thefacts are publishedby the
scoutingservices and in the oil industry literature. This is shown on the excellentFrench nautical
maps which Cameroonhas annexedand used for other purposes, buton which it did not botherto
depict itsclaim line. As you can tell from this graphic, whichis tab 97,the installations are close
together. The dates attachedto the various installationsshow that the activity took place over a
verylongperiod oftime. Everyone waswellawareof it.
27. Fourth, the practice is not inconsistent, certainlynot at in any significant way. The
developments shownin the Appendixto Chapter 10 of the Rejoinder demonstratea high levelof - 25 -
consistency. Thesmall areas of overlap of licences1 have already shown you. From the graphic
on the screenyou can see a clear illustrationof its comparative consistency.
28. Fifth and finally, it was not unlawful. Professor Kamto took you to the Minutes of
meetings in 1991and 1993 in an attempt to demonstrate that Nigeriadid not inform Cameroon of
its activities. In facteachide knew well what the other was doing. The documents he cited-
you can read them for yourself- demonstrated the opposite of his contention; that is, an
agreement thateach party was fiee to exploit itsown resources alongthe commonmaritime border.
That was a continuing activity.
Existingmaritimeboundaries
29. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1 turn now briefly to describe the position with
respect to maritime boundary claims, negotiations and agreementsas between the States in the
region. Again,virtuallynone ofthis information hasbeenprovided by Cameroon,which presentsa
maritime claimas devoid of diplomatichistoryas it is ofthe history ofoil activity.
(a) Nigeriaand Cameroon
30. Let me deal with the Parties themselves first. As the Court observed in its 1998
Judgment, "Cameroonand Nigeria entered into negotiationswith a view to determining the whole
of the maritime boundary"'. If 1 may Sayso with respect,that is true. But it is important to see
precisely what the two Parties were negotiating about. They were not, 1repeat not, negotiating
about Cameroon's claim linein any of its versions, or anything remotely like it. They were
concerned with three issues: the Maroua Declaration,the existence of areas of overlapping
licences- which 1have alreadyshown you- and the location ofthetripoint.
31. You can see this, for example, fiom the Minutes of the third session of the
Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Meeting of Experts on Boundary Matters, held in Yaoundéfiom 11 to
13August 1993. Asto the maritime boundary beyondpoint G, the Minutes recordthe following:
'I.c.J.Reports1998,p.2atp.322, para110. "(B)DETERMINATIONOFTHE TRI-POINT BETWEEN CAMEROON, NIGERIA
AND EQUATORIALGUINEA
The Cameroonian Delegation stressedthe need to determine the tri-point
between Nigeria,CameroonandEquatorial Guineainorderto enableeach of thethree
countries to exploit itsatural resources in the area in peace. It argued that the
absenceof Equatorial Guinea atthis forum should notprevent CameroonandNigeria
fiom exchanging constructive viewson the proposa1 .. . The Nigerian side, on its
part, expressed its reservations conceming the examination of the proposa1in the
absence of Equatorial Guinea. The two parties then agreed that a tripartite meeting
should be convenedto examine theissueofthe determinationofthetri-point."2
This was a year before Cameroon's Application. The passage shows quite clearly that the
Parties- who had goodknowledgeof each other's position s acceptedthat therewas a tripoint
with Equatorial Guineaand were concerned only with itsprecise location as well as with their
freedomto develop their resources alongthe border. These are the issueswhich the Partieshad
identifiedfor negotiation. This wasthe negotiationthat the Court talkedabout Therewas a clear
acceptanceby the two Parties that therewas a defacto maritime border inthe area,even though
there was a dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula itself. Thatwas the situation when Cameroon
brought its Application.
(b) EquatorialGuineaand SaoTomeand Principe
32.1tum now to the situation between Equatorial Guinea and SaoTome andPrincipe. The
Treaty of 26 June 1999between those two States confirms the de facto median line boundary
between them. That lineis depicted onthe screen and on tab98. As far as we know, Carneroon
has neverprotested atthatline. If ithas protested,it has not bothered totellyou.
(c) Nigeriaand Equatorial Guinea
33. The next maritime boundary situation, and the most importan t the westernhalf of the
Gulf, is that between Nigeria and Equatorial uinea. Negotiations betweenthese two Statesover
their common maritime boundarywere long and difficult. The processwas outlined in Nigeria's
pleadingsand 1will notrepeat the details. 1would howevermake severalpoints aboutthe eventual
Agreement of 2000. First, as 1 have said, negotiations forthe Agreement began in 1990 and
2~ejoinderofNigeria,Ann.N173. extended over 15 forma1negotiating sessions3. Cameroon knew of the negotiations; they were
reported in the general and specialist press as wellas in Ourpleadings. Nigeria had, and has, the
conscientious belief that it was not required to stop negotiating a maritime boundary with
Equatorial Guineajust because Cameroonhad made a new claim againstNigeria before the Court.
The Govemment of Equatorial Guineawas insistent that negotiationsproceed; it repeatedly sent
high-level multi-Ministerdelegations and it was well advised. The suggestion that it was coerced
is bizarre.
34. At the time the line eventually included in the Agreement of 2000 was agreed on
between theparties, neither of the parties to that Agreement knewthe actual extent of Cameroon's
maritime claim. The actual line agreed on between Nigeriaand Equatorial Guinea was agreed on
before Cameron's Reply wasfiled- in anyevent,the Replycontained amanifest contradiction.
35. Theeventual line can be seen on the screen and in tab 99 of your folders. The irregular
configurationof the line around points (ii) to (v) is due to the need to ensure that the line respects
existing installations ofboth parties in the Ekangaand Zafiroregion- both Parties have protested
the other's activitiesin thatregion. Respect for al1existing installationswas one of the cardinal
principles onwhich the negotiations proceeded.
36. Thesituation canbe seen more clearlyfiom the graphicwhich is tab 99. This showsthe
Treaty lineinrelation tothe wells drilledby bothparties. TheCourt willnote the Ekanga field and
the EquatorialGuinea's Zafirofield just on the other side. Agreement onthe location of the line
was reachedwithout referenceto any Cameroonclaim, andwithout anyknowledge by either party
as to precisely where the claim line was. The Treaty was signed by Presidents Obasanjo and
Mba Sogo on 23 September 2000 at Malabo- not, 1 think, a scene for a coerced treaty (see
Rejoinder of Nigeria, Ann.NR 174). In accordance with Article 7.3, theTreaty was provisionally
applied fromthat date. However, it was agreedthat it wouldnot be ratified untilthe parties and the
companies concernedhad agreed a unitization arrangement forthe Ekanga field, which straddles
the boundary. This has nowbeen done.
j~ejoinderof Nigeria,para. 10.33. 37. TheTreatyis expressedtobe a partial delimitation. Theend ofthe partial lineis point (i)
whichyou can see on the screen. Youwill note that it stops well short of the point whichhas for
manyyears been the actual defacto tripoint with Cameroon, apoint whose existencethe parties
themselves had acknowledged, even ifits precise location remained to be formally fixed. In
accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty, the parties' respectiveclaims to the north and east of
point(i) are maintained pending the outcomeof the present proceedings. The southemmostpoint,
which is point (x), is on the equidistanceline between Equatorial Guineaand Sao Tome and
Principe agreed between them by treaty in999.
(4 NigeriaandSaoTome andPrincipe
38. Finally1should Saya briefword aboutthe negotiations betweenNigeria and Sao Tome
andPrincipe. Thesewere alsodifficult,in that Nigeriawas not prepared toacceptthat archipelagic
baselines should be treatedas equivalentto coastalfiontages for delimitation purposes, whereas
thatwas theposition maintainedby SaoTome and Principe, whichis an archipelagic State.
39. The JDZAgreement accordinglypreservedthe parties' respectiveclaims andestablished
ajoint developmentzone in the area ofoverlapping claims. This isthe area shownin red lines on
thescreenandintab 100. TheJDZAgreement has been ratified and is now in force.
40. Mr.President, Membersof the Court, Nigeria makes no apology for continuing to
negotiate agreements withits island neighbours in the western part of the Gulf of Guinea,
negotiations of which it informed theCourt at each stage of the written and oral proceedings
conceming the maritime boundary. Cameroon's unilateral Applicationto the Court, with an
entirely new and completely unclearclaim, could not be allowed suddenly to freeze those
negotiations. Nor could itput an endto the clear and consistent practif igeria, Cameroon and
Equatorial Guineato the north. As thatpractice demonstrated, therewas atripoint beyond which
Cameroonhad never made an effectiveclaim. Indeed,outsidethe pleadingsin this case,it has to
thisday nevermadesuch aclaim.
Mr. President, Membersof the Court, that concludes this presentation otfhe history and the
positionsof the Parties.wouldnowaskyou to cal1upon ProfessorAbi-Saabwho will critiquein more detail Cameroon's new claimline in the context ofthe applicable internationallaw. Thank
you, Sir.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou very much, Professor Crawford. Je donne maintenant la
paroleauprofesseur GeorgesAbi-Saab.
M.ABI-SAAB : Merci,Monsieurleprésident.
LADÉLIMITATIOM NARITIME
CRITIQUE DE LA ((LIGNEÉQUITABLEB DU CAMEROUN
1.Monsieur le présidentM, adameet Messieursde la Cour, mespropos ce matin se divisent
en deux parties:
La première consisteen une critiquede la constructionde ce que le Cameroun appelle«la
ligne équitable))pour effectuelra délimitationdes zones maritimesrelevant de la compétencedes
deux Parties; tandisque la seconde partie examinera l'«équité»de cette ligneà la lumièrede la
jurisprudence.
Critique de la construction de la ligneéquitable
2. Pource qui est de la première partie, la ligne réclpaer leCamerounpose de nombreux
problèmes. L'un d'eux, etnon le moindre, est celui de son identification. Carc,omme l'asi bien
démontré mon collègue et am li,professeur Crawford,cette ligne emprunte une configuration
quelque peu différente chaque foiqsu'elleapparaît dansune pièce de plaidoiries du Cameroun, et
quelques foisdanslamême pièce, et celausqu'a laprocédure orale.
3. Cependant,dans toutesses configurations, l'allure généradle cette lignereste la même,
reflétant une construction réfractaire aux principesaetx méthodes dudroit de la mer, tels qu'ils
ont été élaboré etsappliquésjusqu'ici. C'est donc aux prémissem s êmesde cetteligne soi-disant
«équitable»q, uemes critiques sont adresséep,lutôt qu'àses détails etsonparcoursprécis.
4.Ces critiques portent principalementur cinq point:
1. lanature même de la ligne;
2. les côtes pertinentes utilisour saconstruction;
3. letraitement réservé aux îldsans cetteconstruction; 4. la définitionde lazone pertinentepour la délimitatio;t enfin
5. laméthodesuiviedans laconstructionde cetteligne.
1. Lanaturede la ligne
5. Ma premièrecritiques'adresse à la naturemêmede cette ligne. Car, ainsique le Nigéria
l'a expliquédans son contre-mémoire (p.609-611, par. 23.13-23.17)et dans sa duplique (p.423,
par. 9.1-9.2), ilne s'agitpas d'une((lignede délimitation)),md'une((ligned'exclusion».
6. Une ligne de délimitationa pour fonctionde séparerles zones maritimes relevant de la
compétence nationaledesdeux partiesdont lescôtessont adjacentesousefont face,que cesparties
soient des parties contractantes ou des partiesà une instance juridictionnelle,comme dans la
présenteaffaire. Mais le but que se donne la ligne camerounaise esttout autre et autrement
ambitieux.
7.Dans le golfedeGuinée,leNigériasetrouveen présencede troisEtats, dontles côtessont
adjacentes ou font face à ses propres côtes,à savoir: le Cameroun, la Guinée équatoriale et
SaoTomé-et-Principe.
[Vous voyez la configuration généralseur l'écran etsous la lettre A dans le dossierde
plaidoiries; projection lettre
8. La ligne camerounaise auraitpour effetinéluctablenon pas d'effectuerune délimitation
entre leszones maritimes relevantdes deux Parties à la présenteinstance,mais entre le Nigéna,
d'une part,et tous les autres Etats côtiers dugolfede Guinéepris globalement, d'autrepart. C'est
dans cesens qu'il s'agitd'une ligne d'exclusion, carelle a pour but de mettre le Nigéria hjeu,
ou de l'exclurede toute délimitation subséquendtanslegolfede Guinée.
[Projection,égalementsouslettre A]
9. En fait, le Cameroun s'arroge ainsile droit de parler au nom desdeux autres Etats, sans
leur autorisation, etmêmecontre leurvolonté,dans une opération de délimitatiog nlobale avec le
Nigéria;tout en gardantpour plus tard, c'est-à-direaprès l'exclusionduNigéria,la délimitationde
la zone indivise issue de cette première opération.Ce qui ne cadre pas du tout avec la notion
techniquede délimitation,qui estparessence inte partes. 10. Il est vrai qu'il n'est pas exceptionnel, dans les délimitationsmaritimes, que d'autres
Etats de la région puissentavoir desprétentionsqui touchent ou chevauchent la zone pertinenteoù
s'opèrela délimitation.C'est lesensdu paragraphe 130,que le Cameroun cite dans son mémoire,
de l'arrêtde la Cour dans l'affaire duPlateau continental (Tunisie/Libye) (C.I.J.Recueil 1982,
p. 91, par. 130);pour arguer que de telles tiercesprétentions n'empêchenp tas la Cour d'opérer la
délimitation entre lesParties.
11. 11est également vrai que,mise àpart la protection formelle des intérêtdses tiers par
l'effet relatif de lasjudicata (article59 du Statut de la Cour), lesjuridictions internationales ont
pu pallier lerisque de préjuger les droits des tie,n arrêtant lligne de délimitationjuste en deçà
des zones de possible chevauchementavec les intérêts des Etats tiers. Mais cela est-il possible
dans la présenteaffaire,notammentsi l'on suitla ligne camerounaise ?
12.Un simple regard sur la carte suffitpour nous convaincre que, vue sous cet angle, cette
ligne serait mort-née,carà peine ellequitte sonpoint de départ,le point G,elle entredans le champ
d'attraction de l'île de Bioko, c'est-à-dire qu'elle empiètedéjàsur les droits, ou du moins les
prétentions, dela Guinée équatoriale.
13. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'une situationoù la ligne de délimitation divise l'essentielde la
zone pertinente,mais s'arrête à sa périphérie, ola présencedes droits et des prétentions des tiers
commence à se faire sentir. Ici,le tiers est omniprésent dèsdébut. Et cette présence devientde
plus en pluspesante, cependantque celledu Cameroundevientde plus enplus éphémère s,i tant est
qu'elle continue d'exister,avec le mouvementde cette ligne soi-disantéquitablevers le sud-ouest,
dans des régions où chaque point est plus proche des côtes des îles de Bioko et de
Sao Tomé-et-Principe, etlou des côtes nigérianesque des côtes camerounaises qui sont censées
générercetteligne et la légitimer.
14. Uneconséquence decette construction illogiqueest que la ligne camerounaisepréempte
toute délimitation entrleNigériaet les deuxEtats dont les côtes font faceà ses côtessans entrave,
la Guinéeéquatorialeet Sao Tomé-et-Principe,dans des zones qui sont en chaque point plus
proches, etplus intimement liéesauxcôtes de ces trois Etats qu'aux côtes camerounaises. Et c'est
dans ce sensque cette ligneest une ligned'exclusion. 15. Une telle macro-délimitation sans procuration des intéressés, forcluant pour le Nigéria,
mais également pourles deux autres Etats, toute possibilitéde futures délimitations, alorsque la
positionréciproquede leurs côtes appelle une délimitationselonle droit de la mer; une telle ligne
est-ellecompatibleavec le droit international?
Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieursde la Cour,je me permets de vous laisser avec
cettequestion.
2. Lescôtes pertinentes
16. J'aimerais m'adresser maintenant aux prémisses ou aux paramètres mêmesde la
construction de la ((ligne équitable)) camerounaise, à commencer par la notion de ((côtes
pertinentes))quisont prises en considération pour lesbesoins decette construction.
17. Les articles 15,74 et 83 de la conventionde MontegoBay, qui traitent de la délimitation
des zones maritimes de compétence nationale, comme auparavanltes articles correspondants des
conventions de Genève de 1958,parlent tousde ((délimitation ..entre des Etats dont les côtes sont
adjacentesou se font face)).
18. Les côtes adjacentessont des côtes qui se touchent et se continuent. Elles décrivent une
situationoù laligne de lafrontièreterrestre débouchesur la mer àun point sur la mêmecôte. Alors
que les côtes qui se font face sont par définitiondes côtes ((opposées))(en anglais ({opposite
toasts))). Mais qu'elles soient parallèles ou à un angle (variable évidemment), ces côtes entre
lesquelles la délimitation aura lieu, doive«se faire face)),c'est-à-dire doiventêtreen position de
vis-à-vis l'une del'autre,pouvoir se regarder sansentrave.
19. C'est donc seulement les côtes (ou plutôt les parties des côtes) nigérianes et
camerounaises qui correspondent aux qualificatifs((adjacents))ou qui «se font face)),ainsi que je
viensde l'esquisser, et seulement celles-ci, qui constituent les côtes pertinesour les besoins de
la délimitation et qui serviront de paramètres pour la déterminationde la zone pertinente,
c'est-à-direla zoneà délimiterentre les deux Parties. [Vous avezla région doncici sousA3 dans
le dossier desplaidoiries.]
[Projection égalementsous lettre A] 20. Si nous examinons les côtes du Nigériaet du Cameroun qui donnent sur le golfe de
Guinée,il est clair qu'elles ont un rapport d'adjacence dans la régionoù la frontièreterrestre se
termine, c'est-à-dire aux alentoursde Bakassi (à l'est selon le Nigéria, à l'ouest selon le
Cameroun).
21. Mais dès qu'ons'éloignede cette régionrelativement exiguë, vers l'ouest pour la côte
nigériane,jusqu'à Akasso (où la côte change dedirection entournant vers le nord-ouest, donnantle
dos au golfede Guinée),ou vers l'estpour la côte camerounaise,(qui tourne rapidement en arcvers
le sud)jusqu'à cap Debundsha, cescôtes répondent à la descriptiondes ((côtesqui sefont face)). A
cap Debundsha commence l'effet d'obstructionde l'île de Bioko, dont la pointe nord-est forme,
avec le capDebundsha, un détroit dont les eauxsont totalementépuisées dans les eauxterritoriales
respectivesdes deux Etats;ou, en d'autrestermes, ceux de la Chambre de la Cour dans l'affairedu
Golfe de Maine, (C.I.J.Recueil 1985,p. 336, par.221) «un point ..où il n'y a plus...d'étendues
maritimesdépassantles 12milles àpartir de la laisse de bassem..»
[Projectionégalementsous lettreA]
22. Au-delà de cepoint, la côte camerounaise se dirigeant vers le sud jusqu'à la frontière
avec la Guinée équatoriale, est totalemen otbstruéepar la grande île de Bioko, appartenant à la
Guinéeéquatorialeet portant sa capitale. Il n'y a plus de vis-à-vis entre cette partie de la côte
camerounaise et la côtenigériane. Parconséquent, cette partiede la côte camerounaise,dèsle cap
Debundsha,ne peut êtrequalifiéejuridiquement comme relevant des côtes camerounaises ((faisant
face))aux côtes nigérianes; end'autres termes, elle ne peut plus être prise encompte en tant que
«côte pertinente))pourles besoinsde la constructionde la lignede délimitation.
23. Or, le Cameroun, non seulement inclutcette partie de ses côtes dans ce qu'il considère
comme les côtes pertinentes pour les besoinsde la délimitation,mais il s'approprie en plus toute la
façade continentale dela Guinéeéquatoriale, ainsiqu'unebonne partie dela côte gabonaise.
24. Par quelle prouesse d'imaginationjuridique peut-on arriver àune telle représentation?
En bonnepart à traversun traitement fantaisistedes îles; ce quim'amènà mon prochain point. 3. L'effet desîles
25. Monsieurleprésident,Madame et Messieursde la Cour, cen'est pasdans ce prétoire que
j'ai besoin de rappeler lafameuse injonctionde la Cour en 1969,selon laquelle «il n'estjamais
question de refaire la nature)) (Affaires du Plateau continentaI de la Mer du Nord,
C.I.J.RecueiI1969,p. 49, par.91). Or,la ligne camerounaisenon seulementrefait radicalement la
géographie physique du golfe de Guinée,en y éliminantle chapelet important d'îles qui le
sectionne presqueau milieu de haut enbas; mais elledéfaitégalementla géographiepolitique des
côtesqui l'entourent, en appropriantIescôtes continentalesde la Guinéeéquatorialeet du Gabon
au Camerounpour les besoinsde la construction dela ligne, soi-disantéquitable,commeje viens
de l'expliquer.
26. Quant aux îles,l'existence de l'île deBioko, uneîle importante par sa surface etsa
population, qui porte lacapitale de la République de laGuinée équatoriale, l'existencdee cette île
toute proche des côtes des Parties, est tout à fait ignoréepar la «ligne équitable)),et cela sur
plusieurs registres
- premièrement,j'ai déjàmentionné quela ligneignore totalement son effet d'écran, qui cache
une partie importantedes côtes camerounaises,si on les regarde à partir des côtes nigérianes,
leurôtant ainsila qualitéde côtespertinentes;
- deuxièmement,elle n'exerce aucune influence sur le parcours de la ligne dans les deux
premiers secteursG-HetH-1,secteurH-1qui sembleparadoxalementplusproche deBiokoque
des côtescamerounaises;
- troisièmement, elle n'estpas priseencomptedansle calculdeproportionnalité(calculfauxpar
ailleurs, commej'essayerai de le démontrer dans un instant),en vue de situer le point1sur la
ligne tiréepar le Cameroun dans ce but, entre Bonny et Campo; une ligne qui, traverse
paradoxalement l'île de Bioko (et que vous voyez sur l'écran et ans le dossier de plaidoiries
sous A4).
27. 11en est de mêmep , lus au Sud,pour les lignes transversalesqui enjambentl'archipelde
SaoTomé-et-Principea ,rchipelqui constitueun Etatindépendant.
28. Pour la «ligne équitable))camerounaise,il ne s'agit donc pas de concéderun effet
quelconque àces îles, carseulesles côtes continentalescomptent. Et cescôtessont amalgamées enun seul ensemble en faveur du Camerounface au Nigéria. On en revient ainsi àla logique de la
ligned'exclusion.
29. Mais cela ne saurait prévaloiren droit. Car aussi bien la conventionde 1982 que la
jurisprudence constante, sont très claires sur ce point. Il suffit de rappeler le paragraphe 185 du
récentarrêtde la Cour dansl'affaire Qatar c.Bahreïn où il est di:
((Conformémentau paragraphe2 de l'article 121 de la convention de 1982sur
le droit de la mer, quireflètele droit international coutumier,les îles, quelle que soient
leur dimension,jouissent à cet égarddu même statut,et par conséquent engendrentles
mêmesdroits en mer que les autres territoires possédant la qualité de terreferme.»
(C.I.J. Recueil2001,par. 185 .)
30. Il est vrai que dans certainesdécisionsjudiciaireset arbitrales internationales, les effets
des îles sur la construction d'une ligne d'équidistance aétémodéré.Mais en l'absence d'autres
circonstances pertinentes ou spéciales,cela ne s'est produit que par rapport a des îles qui
appartiennent à l'un ou àl'autre des Etatspartiesà la délimitation,et seulementdans des situations
ou la configuration particulière des côtes aurait projeté de manièrepar trop exagéréele fiont
maritime de 1'Etatauquel les îles appartiennent versles côtes de l'autre Etat,dans le calcul de
l'équidistance.
3 1.Dans de telles situations, si les îles sont au large de 1'Etatcôtier, l'organejuridictionnel
pourrait leur attribuer moins qu'un effet total, tel que l'a fait la Cour dans l'affaire du Plateau
continental (Tunisie/Libye),par rapport auxîles Kerkennah (C.I.J. Recueil 1982,par. 128-129). En
revanche,si les îles se trouvent du ((mauvaiscôté))d'une ligne d'équidistanceconstruite sans prise
en considérationdes îles, c'est-à-direque les îles appartenant un Etat se trouventjuste devant les
côtes de l'autre Etat, la solution adoptée parfois, teldans l'arbitrage fi-anco-britanniquede la
Merd'Iroise, pour ce qui est des îles anglo-normandes qui sont situées toutprès des côtes
françaises, cettesolution est celle de l'enclave. Maisdans les deux cas de figure, il s'agit des îles
appartenant à l'une des partiesà la délimitation, îlesqui en avançant lafaçade maritime de 17Etat
auquel elles appartiennent dans une configuration particulière,affectent de manièreexagéréela
répartition de lazone pertinente entre cesles deux parties, si la délimitation est effectupar une
ligned'équidistanceleurattribuantpleineffet.
32. 11s'agit donc toujours de modérer leseffets des îles dans le déplacementde la façade
maritime ou descôtes pertinentes des parties,et entreces parties. 33. Mais cette modérationdes effets des îles, ne saurait êtreenvisagéequand les îles
appartiennent à un tierce Etatàmoins qu'ily ait une autre circonstance pertinenteou spécialequi
pourraitlajustifier.
34.La raison enest quedansla situation où l'îleappartienàun tiers Etat,ilne s'agitplus de
corrigerou de modérerles effetsexagérés de la positiondes îles en tant qu'incident géographique
mineur,qui intervientdans la façade maritimede l'une ou l'autre des deux parties, Maisil s'agit
d'une nouvellefaçade maritimq eui entre en jeu, interrompantle tête-à-têtdees deux parties et
appelantainsi une autre délimitation,anslesens d'unedélimitation additionnelle.
35.Cela m'amène,Monsieur leprésident, Madame et Messieurd se la Cour,à mon prochain
point, celuide la définition lazonepertinentedanslaprésente affaire.
4. Ladéfinition de la zone pertinente
36.Une desfonctionsdescôtes pertinentes estde servirdeparamètrepourla définition dela
((zonepertinente)),c'est-à-direlazoneà délimiter entre les partsnprésence.
37. Sur ce sujet aussi, le Cameroun ne semble pasêtretrèssûr de son affaire. Dansson
mémoire(p. 453,par. 5.96),ildéfinitla zone pertinentedans la présente affaireains:
((11s'agitd'une zonesituéeau-delà de la limitedes 200milles marinsdes lignes
de base à partir desquelleson mesure la largeur des eauxtemtoriales par rapport aux
côtes continentales. La zonene peut exclurelesélémentg séographiquesdonnés par la
nature,y comprisle faitdela présencede l'île deBiokoet, plusau large, celledes îles
de Sao Tomé etde Principe. La zone estcelle indiquée par lecroquispage suivante.))
Et d'illustrer cette définitnar le croquisque vous trouvez surl'écran etsous la lettreB dans le
dossierdesplaidoiries (mémoire, p. 544) :
[Projection lettreBI
38. Quelquesremarquessur cette définition et sur ce croquis(qui par ailleursne coïncident
pas totalement).
39. En premier lieu, la définition comporte une erreur, ou plutôt un lapsus
important - peut-être freudien, car la zonese situenon pas au-delà de la limitedes 200 milles
marins,mais àl'intérieurde cettelimite.
40. Deuxièmement, lazoneest représentée danls ecroquisen forme rectangulaire, bordée au
sudparune ligne partant grossièremena tu milieu dela façade continentalede la côte de la Guinée équatoriale, quiest censéerefléterla ligne de200 milles marinsàpartir des côtes horizontales du
golfe de Guinée. Ce rectangle n'a pasde bordure verticaleàl'ouest, ce qui serait nécessaire pour
un calcul desurface en vue d'une éventuelle vérificatiodneproportionnalité.
41. Troisièmement,la ligne commenceau sud, commeje viens de dire, du milieu de la
façade continentalede la Guinéeéquatorialeet passe juste au-dessous del'île de Principe, presque
en l'effleurant, c'est-à-direà travers 17Etatarchipélagique de SaoTome-et-Principe, avant
d'évoluervers l'ouest en remontant doucement. En d'autrestermes, elle se trouve en pleine mer
territoriale et eaux archipélagiquesde deux autresEtats qui ne sont pas paàtla délimitation;ce
qui se passe de commentaires.
42. Cependant, dix pages plus loin dans le mémoire du Cameroun, nous rencontrons une
configuration totalement nouvelle de ce qui est appelécette fois-ci nébuleusement «l'aire totale
pertinente));notion reprise et retraitéede manièreun peu plus rigoureuse dans la réplique,qui la
décritcomme«ce que le Cameroun considèrecomme la zonepertinente au sens de lajurisprudence
de la Cour))(réplique duCameroun, p. 421, par.9.83). Selon la réplique,cette zone : ((recouvre
une aire comprise entre la ligne réelle descôtes partant'Akasso/Brass au Nigéria ..Ljusqu'au]
Cap Lopez au Gabon [où elle] est ferméepar une ligne droite allant de ce point à Akasso au
Nigéria))(ibid. [V).us avez la carte sur l'écranet elle figure sous la lettre C dans le dossierdes
plaidoiries.]
[Projection lettrel
43. Onaboutit ainsi, dans le mêmemémoire,puis dans laréplique, àune zone triangulaireet
non plus rectangulaire, dont lecôtévertical du triangle s'étendbeaucoup plus loin vers le sud,
jusqu'au CapLopez, c'est-à-dire cette fois au Gabon, et non seulementjusqu'au milieu de la côte
continentalede la Guinéeéquatoriale, comme pour le rectangle.
44. Ce qui interpelle immédiatement celui qui regardcette carte, c'est la question de savoir
s'il s'agitvraiment d'une ou de plusieurs zones pertinentes. Et si la répliquenous dit«la zone
pertinente ainsi définiese devise en trois secteurs)) (répliquedu Cameroun, p. 422, par.5),j'y
vois personnellement,en revanche,commepar ailleurs le mémoire duCameroun auquel la réplique
réfère,non pas trois secteurs d'une mêmezone, mais «trois zones différentes))(mémoire du
Cameroun, p. 553, par. 5.119); ce sont les mots du mémoire. Cependant, contrairement aumémoire, j'entendspar cela trois véritables «zones pertinentes),ans le sens technique du terme,
quisont différentesparce que impliquantdes délimitations enttrois ensembles différents7Etats.
Permettez-moi d'enfaireladémonstration.
45. Commeje viensde l'expliquer,une zone pertinente est déterminé par, ou en fonction
des côtes pertinentesdes parties la délimitation, côtes définàsleur tourcomme«adjacentes»ou
«sefaisant face)). Si nous appliquions ces définitiàs la «zonepertinente))qui nous estproposée
par le Cameroun, nous trouverions effectivement plusieurs,et non pas seulement deux côtes
pertinentes; et ces côtes bordent non pas useul, maisplusieursespaces maritimesrépondant à la
qualification juridiquede «zonepertinente)).
46. Et, commemon collèguele professeur Crawfordvient de décrireen détail le contexte
géographiquegénérad lu golfede Guinée, y compris les côtes et les îles etrapports entre elles,
là où ces rapports existent ou cessentd'exister,je me limiteraà énumérelres différentes zones
pertinentesqui en résultent, etqui sontau nombre de trois [vous les trouverezdans le dossierdes
plaidoiriessouslalettre D 1,2, 31.
[Projection lettreDl
47. En premier lieu, etc'est l'évidence mêmiel,y a une zone pertinentequi commence dans
la région d'adjacencedes côtes nigérianeset camerounaises sur lecôtéhorizontal du triangle au
nord du golfe de Guinée. Cependant, au-deld àe la région d'adjacence relativement exiguë autour
de lapéninsuledeBakassi, à l'est, la côte camerounaise change radicalemete direction en virant
brusquement vers lesud, se mettant ainsi en positionde vis-à-vis, ou decôte qui fait face, au
prolongement horizontal vers l'ouest dla côte nigériane au-delàde la région d'adjacence. Cette
premièrezone pertinente s'étendainsi vers I'ouest,sur la côte nigériane,jusqu'à Akasso et vers
l'est,commeje l'ai déjàindiqué,jusqu'au cap Debundsha sur lacôte camerounaise, avec comme
clôtureà l'est la ligne quiferme le détroitentre ce cap et la pointe nord-estde Bioko. Les côtes
nord etouest deBioko constituent la troisième côte pertinente de cette zone.
48. Au sud, cette zone convergevers un tripoint, au nord-ouest de Bioko, dont la position
exactedépendde celle du point terminalde la frontière terrestreentre leigériaet le Cameroun.
Maisce tripoint est confinédans des limites relativement étroi,tantdonnéla configurationdes
côtespertinentesetqu'uneautre zone pertinenteprendimmédiatement le relaisau sudetà l'ouest. 49. Les deux autres zones pertinentes résultentde l'effet de bissectrice qu'exercent les
chapelets d'îles dans le golfe de Guinée. En tant qu'écran diagonal, cesîles divisent le reste du
golfe en deuxzones pertinentes,avec deux façadesmaritimes desmêmesîles à I'est eàl'ouest.
[Projectionégalementsouslettre Dl
50. A l'est, la façade maritime des îles borde une zone pertinente avec, de l'autre côté,la
côtecontinentaleverticale de l'Afrique. Cette zone estbordéeau nord par la ligne de fermeture du
détroitentre lapointe nord-estde Biokoet le cap Debundsha surla côte camerounaise,et comprend
le segment decette côte allant du cap Debundsha jusqu'à la frontièreavec la Guinéeéquatoriale,
puis toute la façade continentale de la Guinéeégalement, et lapartie des côtes gabonaises qui
donnesur le golfe de Guinée.
51. Les côtes bordant cette zone est, n'ont aucun rapport avec les côtes nigérianes;elles
n'ont par conséquentaucune pertinencepour la délimitationdans la premièrezone pertinente au
nord. Et réciproquementl,es côtes nigérianesn'ontaucune pertinence pour la délimitationde cette
zoneest, qui estconfinéeaux Etats dontles côteslabordent.
52. La seule manièrepour le Cameroun de faire intervenirune partie de sa côte verticaleà
I'esten tant que côte pertinente dansla délimitationavec le Nigeria, c'est de prétendreque cette
côte génèreune zone horizontale de compétence nationale pour le Cameroun, qui s'étend à travers
la partie sud-ouestdu golfe de Guinée, chevauchantainsi avec la zone qui prolonge vers le sud les
côtes nigérianes,donc au-dessous deBioko.
53.Maiscette constructioninvraisemblable, mise àpart l'absence de vis-à-vis entreles côtes
concernées,assume au préalablequ'une telle zone camerounaisehorizontale puisse percer l'écran
infranchissableque constitue le chapeletd'îles, en passant entrel'île de Bioko et l'île de Principe,
pour aboutir, dans la troisièmezone pertinenteà l'ouest duchapelet d'îles. Ce qui est loin d'être
démontré, pour autant que cela soit démontrable. Etde toute manière, le Cameroun n'a pas
formuléune telle prétentiondont la Courserait saisie.
[Projectionégalementsouslettre Dl
54. La troisièmezone pertinente dans la régionest celle qui se trouvà l'ouest du chapelet
d'îles, au sud de la premièrezone qui culmine en untripoint au nord-ouest de Bioko. Cette zone
est bordéepar la côte nigérianeau nord, allant du point terminal de la frontière terrestreavec leCamerounjusqu'à Akasso,d'une part,et la façade ouest-sud-ouestde l'île de Bioko,prolongéepar
celles ouest-nord-ouestde Sao Tome-e-Principe,d'autre part. Au-delàdu tripoint, quimarque la
clôture nord de la zone, les côtes camerounaises n'ontaucune pertinence dans cette zone. La
méthodede constructionde la ligne«équitable»,qui s'ingénie àprolonger lazonede compétence
nationale camerounaisejusqu'aux tréfonds de cette zone pertinenteouest, est si fantaisistequ'elle
vaut ledétour,etjem'y arrêterai quelques instants.
5. Laméthodedeconstructiondela ligne
55. Monsieur leprésident,Madameet Messieurs dela Cour,permettez-moide rappeler que,
dans son mémoire,le Cameroun a commencépar nous présenterune zone pertinente de forme
rectangulaire, maisquand il arriveà la construction de la ligne,il nous présentecette fois-ci un
triangle beaucoup plusgrand issu de la fermeture de l'ensemble du golfe de Guinée,sous la
dénomination nébuleus deel'«airetotale pertinente)).
[Projection lettre
56.Peut-on déceler, àtraverscette hésitation terminologique,n certain embarras devant un
élargissementpar trop exagéréde ce que la répliqueappellera fermement par la suite la «zone
pertinente))(etje croisavoir démontrqu'elle enfermeenréalité troisones pertinentes) Mais cet
élargissement au-delàde tout ce qu'on aurait pu imaginecomme ((côtespertinentes)) était en fait
nécessairepour lesbesoins de laméthode fantaisiste utilipour laconstruction dela ligne.
57. Cette «méthode»consiste à choisir deux points sur la côte nigérianed'un côté, et
trois points sur la côte continentale verticaledu golfe de Guinéede l'autre, etirer des lignes
transversales entreces pointsà travers le golfe. Ces lignes sontcoupéespar un point dont la
positionsur la ligne estsupposéerefléter la proportion entre les longdses côtespertinentesdes
deux côtés, à la hauteur de la ligne. Cespoints sont reliéspour produire la soi-disant «ligne
équitable)).
58. Cette méthode,je doisl'admettre,est une fille d'une imagination fertile;elle ne résiste
cependantpas au premier examencritique, et cela à maints égards; lesdeux principaux sont en
premier lieule choixdes points d'ancragedeslignestransversales surles côtes,une questionreliée
à la déterminationdes côtes pertinenteset deleur longueur; et en second lieu,la techniquemême de tirer des lignes transversales, et la détermination de la ponu point bissecteur sur chacune
d'elles.
59. En ce qui concerne le choix des points d'ancrage des lignes sur les côtes du golfe de
Guinée,ces points ne peuvent figurer que sur les côtes pertinentes, c'est-à-dire lescôtes qui
bordent la «zone pertinente)à délimiterentre les Parties. Or,deux des trois points sur la côte
verticaledu golfe de Guinée sont bienloin du Cameroun, àCabo San Juan en Guinéeéquatoriale,
et Cap Lopez au Gabon. On ne voit pas de quelle manière cescôtes, et par conséquent les points
appuyés surelles et les lignestiréesde cespoints, peuventêtre «pertinents» pourla délimitation.
60. Et mêmepour la première ligne, dont les points d'ancrage sont Bonny sur la côte
nigériane etCampo au point terminal de la frontière terrestreentre le Cameroun et la Guinée
équatoriale,ces points sont arbitraires ou faux. Arbitraires, car le choix de Bonny, plutôt
qu7Akasso,ne se justifie guère logiquement, Bonnyse situant au milieu de la côte pertinente
nigériane;sauf grâceà la gentillessedu Cameroun,car,selon laréplique,
«le choix dYAkassoaurait eu pour conséquence d'orienterle tracéencore plus à
l'ouest, créant uneffetde fermeture vis-à-visdes côtes nigérianes,et aboutissant de la
sorteà un résultatinéquitable))(répliqueu Cameroun, p.425, par. 9.89).
61. Cela ne serait vrai, mêmesi l'on acceptait la méthode douteuse de calcul de
proportionnalitéqui sous-tendtout l'exercice,que si le choix de l'emplacement de l'autre pointde
l'ancragede la ligneà Campo,étaitcorrect. Or, il ne l'est pas,étant donque, commeje viens de
l'expliquer,la côte camerounaisesubit l'effetd'obstructionde'île de Bioko dèsle cap Debundsha
et jusqu'à la frontière avec la Guinée équatoriale à Campo et cesse par conséquent d'être
pertinente; ce qui rend Campo comme point d'ancrage égalementinéligible,au même titre que
Cabo San Juan etCap Lopez.
62. Mais c'est la technique même utiliséepour tirer ceslignes qui est viciée,et c'est mon
deuxièmepoint dans cette rubrique et qui est l'objet de ma seconde remarque. Ces lignes sont
censées refléter,ar la positiond'un point figurant sur leur tracé,la proportion des longueurs des
côtes pertinentes des Parties, mesuréesdes deux côtés du pointterminal de la frontière,usqu'à
l'emplacementde ces deux points.
63. Or, comme on vient de le voir, deux de ces trois lignes commencent du côté nigériaà
Akasso, mais elles aboutissentàdeux points de plus en plus distants de l'autre côté. En d'autrestermes, elles sont censées refléter la proportioenntre une distance fixed'un côtéet une distancequi
s'allonge de l'autre, cequi est illogique. Mais, de toute manière,comme ni l'une ni l'autre ne se
termine sur une côte pertinente, s'agissant de côtes des Etats tiers,et qui sont en plus cachéesdes
côtes nigérianespar les chapelets d'îles, ceslignes n'ont plus de sens comme indicateurs de
proportionentre deslongueurs des côtes pertinentes.
64. Il en est de même,pour la troisième ligneentre Bonny et Campo (qui aurait dû
logiquement, del'aveu du Cameroun, commencer également à Akasso), étantdonnéque la partie
de la côte camerounaise,du cap Debundshajusqu'à Campo, est excluedes côtes pertinentes pour
les besoins dela délimitation.
[Projection lettreEl
65.Pour pallierl'inclusion des côtesde la Guinéeéquatorialecontinentale et du Gabon(mais
pas de la partie non pertinente de la côte camerounaise),la répliquedu Cameroun nous dit que
chacune des deux lignes d'Akasso à Cabo SanJuan et à Cap Lopez «est diminuéedu segment en
pointilléssur la cart...correspondant à l'influence dela côte équato-guinéenne [ou gabonaises]ur
la longueur totale de la portion pertinente des côtes des deux Parties)) (répliquedu Cameroun,
p. 425,par. 9.91).
[Vous voyez les parties en pointilléssur l'écran etsous la lette E dans le dossier de
plaidoiries; projectionlettre E.]
66.Le Camerouninclut évidemment dans la mesure de la côtepertinente camerounaisetoute
la partie non pertinenteà partir du cap Debundsha, commeil ne déduitpas de la longueur de la
première lignelapartiede cette ligne qui traverse Bioko.
67. Mais assumantarguendoque tout cela soit exact,cette solution, soi-disant équitableq, ue
nous donne-t-elle comme carte ?
[Vousverrezlaréponsesur lYéCrae nt sous la lettFedans le dossier; projection lettreF.]
68. En fait, le Cameroun essaye, par ce stratagème,de transformer un golfeavec cinq Etats
côtiers en un golfe avec seulementdeux :lui-même et le NigériaE . t cela, en donnant un demi-tour
à sa côte, lui faisantéviterlargement l'effet d'obstructionde Bioko, en la faisantpivoter autourde
Bioko vers le sud-ouest, se confondant avec la ligne du chapelet d'îles pour le dépasserau sud.
C'est comme sionredessinait le golfe avecla ligne rouge plutôt qu'avec sa partie méridionale.Le -43 -
Cameroundéplace ainsisa côte, comme par un jeu de saute-moutonpar-dessus le chapelet d'îles,
de l'est l'ouest, pour la bonifier la partie obstruée palres îles, qui devient ainsi «côte pertinente))
par rapportà la côte nigérianejusqu'àAkasso. Pour cefaire, le Cameroun décale toutela façade
est dugolfe de Guinéevers l'ouest, etla ligne divisoireavec elle, tout en raccourcissant l'ouverture
du golfe.
69.Je me permets, Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieursde la Cour, de demander, si
cela n'estpas refaire la nature, qu'est-ce qui peut ?'De tellesacrobaties mentalesne mènent à
rien qu'onpuisse asseoir confortablementsur un raisonnementjuridique solideet compatible avec
le droit etlajurisprudence.
Monsieur le président, j'en arriveà ma deuxièmepartie qui prendra entre quinze et vingt
minutes. Je suis ((entrevos mains)).
Le PRESIDENT :C'estcomme vous préférezM , onsieur leprofesseur. Si c'est entre quinze
et vingtminutes, nous pouvonsinterrompre maintenantou dans quinzelvingtminutes. Vous faites
votre choix.
M.ABI-SAAB :Je préfère continuer.
LePRESIDENT :Alors,continuez.
M.ABI-SAAB :Merci.
L'«équitéd »e la«ligne équitable) )la lumière delajurisprudence
70.En fait, ces acrobatiessontjustifiées, nous dit-ondans lesécriturescamerounaises,par la
quêtede la ((solution équitable)), la seule normeo , u «Grundnorm» qui vaille en matière de
délimitation maritime. Comme si en droit on peutarguer que la finpeut justifier tous les moyens,
sans se soucier de la crédibilitédu raisonnement; ce qui aboutirait fatalement à une justice
purement d'espèce, la ((justice irrationnelle)) selonMax Weber. Mais cette solution, nous
réplique-t-on, estinspirée dela jurisprudence d'où sontdécoupées les pièces du puzzle utilisées
pour construire la ligne équitable. Voyonsdonc si cela est vrai, ou si les piècesdu puzzle sont si
déforméea su point de ne pluspouvoir se réclamer d'unetelle ascendance. 71. Avant d'examiner lajurisprudence et tester la pertinence des analogies, jeme permets,
cependant,Monsieur le président, derésumerla position du Cameroun à cet égard-et j'espère
que je ne ladéformepas. Le Cameroun énumèrd eans ses écrituresune longue liste de ce qu'il
considère, à la lumière de la jurisprudence, comme circonstances pertinentes(mémoiredu
Cameroun, p. 545-546, par. 5.98-5.99; répliqud eu Cameroun, p. 403-409, par. 9.54-9.62), liste
réduite àtrois,il est vrai,dans les plaidoiriesoraàsavoir, la longueur desa côte,sa concavité et
l'existence proche de l'île de Bioko. Le Cameroun considère que la conjugaison de ces
circonstances en l'espècesuffità établir, toujoursselon le Cameroun, ce qu'on pourrait appeler
(mais lestermes sont lesmiens) le caractère((uniquementinique))de laposition géographique des
côtes camerounaises. Les solutions adoptéespar la jurisprudence en prenant compte de ces
circonstancesdans les diversesaffaires, fonderaient,nouveauselon le Cameroun, laconstruction
fantasquede la ligne équitablequeje viens de critiquer.
1. Le plateaucontinentalde la merdu Nord(1969)
72. Alors, commençonspar le commencement, quiest en la matière 1969,avec l'arrêd t e la
Cour dans lesaffaires du Plateaucontinentalde la mer duNord (C.I.J.Recueil1969,p. 3). Ai-je
vraiment besoinde rappelerune fois encore les sages énoncéd se la Cour, selonlesquels «l'équité
n'impliquepas nécessairementl'égalité)e ),t qu'«iln'estjamais question de refairela nature)),mais
simplement «de remédier à une particulariténonessentielle d'où pourrait résulurne injustifiable
différencede traitement))ibid, p. 50-51,par. 91).
73. En d'autres termes, il s'agit seulement d'adoucirles effets d'incidents mineurs qui
produiraient des effets disproportionnéssi le principe et la méthodede l'équidistance sont
appliquésmachinalement;des opérationsesthétiques mineures pour arrondir lesangles et nonpas
pour changerou camouflerle visageou l'alluredusujet.
74.Etc'est exactementce qu'afait la Couren 1969dansces affaires.
[Vous voyez la solution de la Cour projetée là; elle se trouve sous la lettre G1 dans le
dossier;projection lettre] 75. Laposition de l'Allemagne dansces affaires était beaucoup plus«coincée» quecelle du
Cameroun dans la présente affaire, car sc aôte concave était plus exiguë,les frontièresavec le
Danemark et lesPays-Bas étaientbeaucoupplus rapprochéesde ces côtes.
76. La solution adoptéepar la Cour pour adoucir ouinfléchirlégèrementl'effet de la forme
concave dela côte sur les lignesd'équidistancedes deux côtés étaitd'ouvrir unpeu les angles du
triangle, parquelques degrésseulement, pour éloignerle point triple quelque peu vers lelarge; et
cela notamment qu'il existaitun point d'aboutissement qui s'imposait logiquement, surla ligne
d'équidistanceavec 1'Etatd'enface, le Royaume-Uni, et quise trouvait à une distance raisonnable
dutripointéquidistantnon corrigé.
77. On est loin de cetteconfiguration dans la présenteaffaire. Car ici, le triplepoint n'est
pas entre trois pays limitrophes qui bordent le golfe, maisentre deux Etats, dont les côtes sont
adjacentes, etles côtes d'untroisième, quileur font face. C'est Bioko,qui est ici dans laposition
du Royaume-Unidans le schémade 1969. Et la solutionque prône la ligneéquitableestautrement
plus ambitieuse,en fait extravagantecomparée àcelle de la Cour en 1969. Une solution qui n'a
jamais étéenvisagée ou avancée par leCameroun dans les négociations précédentes. Ces
négociationsenvisageaient toutes un pointtriple, mêmes'il y avait ou n'y avait pas d'accord sur
son emplacementexact. La ((ligneéquitable)) qu'ona maintenant ne veut plus de point triple, elle
veut forcer vers lesud et lesud-ouestjusqu'à200 millesmarins et mêmeau-delà.
78. C'est comme si l'Allemagne avait réclamé en 1969 un plateau continental quitraverse
les lignes de délimitationavec le Royaume-Uni et la Norvège,et passe entre les plateaux de ces
deux Etats versle large, dans l'AtlantiqueNord, en se gonflant tout au long du chemin,peut-être
jusqu'à l'Islande.Voyez lasolution quisortira de la solutionéquitable.
[Projectionégalementsous lettreG]
79. 11 est vrai que le Cameroun persiste à ne pas définir la zone camerounaise
qu'engendrerait la({ligneéquitable));et il a raison, car il ne peut pas le faire en l'absence de la
Guinéeéquatorialeet de SaoTomé-et-Principe. Mais sans ces deux Etats, l'exercice relèveraitun
peu du théâtrede l'absurde; car comment peut-on, sanssavoir la superficie de la zone réclamée,
vérifier l'équitédu résultat par le testde la proportionnalité,qui est l'argument principal duCamerounet la justification premièrede cette ligne désignée palre qualificatif équitabl? Mais
passons.
[Projectionlettrel
80.Cette zone camerounaise, bien que non définise, laisseentrevoirtout demême àtravers
les croquiset les arguments camerounais,et detoute manière, elle estconfinéepar des paramètres
géographiques inévitableq s,ui laissent apparaîtreune silhouette que vous trouverez à l'écran
sous la lettre dans ledossier- ayantla forme d'un cerf-volant, relativement dodduans larégion
d'adjacente, mais s'amincissantdans son mouvementvers le sud (au long de la ligneH-1),sous le
poids conjugué des deuxcôtésde la côte nigérianeet deBioko; s'amincissantdisais-je, maisnon
pas pour se mourir en un point triple, au nord-ouestde Bioko, mais pour traîner unetrèslongue
queue,qui commencecommeune mince ficelleau largede Bioko, maisqui vire abruptement dans
une direction sud-ouest,en se gonflanten queuede poisson,tout au long,jusqu'au point qui figure
sur la carte, mais qu'on n'a pas le droit de nommer point L. Alors, appelons-lele non-point
(comme dans lesnégociations diplomatiqueo sna desnon-papiers (nonpapers).
81. Le non-pointn'est pas là où il estpar hasard. 11està 200 milles, mesurés à partir des
côtes camerounaises. En plus, on nous dit que le non-pointn'est pas l'arrêtinal, car le plateau
continental au-dessousde la zoneva continuersa marche triomphale jusqu'aux plaines abyssales.
82. Maisje me permets de vous demander, Monsieur le président, Madam et Messieursde
la Cour, de regarder sur la carte où se trouve ce non-point, et decontempler les rapports de cet
endroitavecles côtes en présence.
83. Si nous appliquions, selon l'expressiode la Cour dans l'affaire du Plateau continental
(Libye/Malte) (C.I.J.Recueil 1985, p. 41, par.49) le critère ou la notion «de l'adjacence en
fonctionde la distance)),et même en comprenan lt distancedansun sens plus flexiblequ'unepure
équidistance, un simple regard suffit pour voqirue la région dunon-point est non seulement très
éloignée des côtes camerounaises,mais ne peut êtreconsidérée commle es prolongeanten aucune
manière. En fait, ellese trouve verticalement au-dessouset mêmeau-delà de l'extrémité ouestde
la côtenigérianefaisant faceau golfe de Guinée,au-delàmêmedYAkasso, à peineà 100 milles
marins de cette côte, alors qu'elle est toutfait décaléeloin au sud-ouest par rapportà la côte
camerounaise. Il est impossible de voir de quelle manière ellepeut êtreconsidéréecomme prolongeant naturellement cettecôte. Cette régionest beaucoup plus proche, étroitementliéeet
prolongeant plus naturellement les côtes nigérianeset celles de Principe que celles du Cameroun.
Et cela s'applique mutatis mutandià toute lazone à l'estde la ligneéquitable, dès lespoints K, J,
et même 1,si on remplace Principe par Bioko.
2. Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (1992)
84. Le Cameroun réplique en invoquant un autre précédent, celui de
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, oùle tribunal arbitral a accordé à ces deux îles au large des côtes
canadiennes, au-delàde la solutionde l'enclave,un couloirvers le largejusqu'à 200 milles marins.
[Vousavez le croquissous la lettreJ dansle dossier.]
[Projection lettreI
85.Mis à part les réservesqu'on peutavoir quantau caractère de précédendte cette décision,
il s'agitd'un contextegéographiqueradicalement différend t e celui de la présente affaire. La côte
pertinente canadienne était toute droite. Leîles obstruaientune toute petit partie de cette côte, et
le tribunal les a considérée,our ce qui est du couloir,comme si elles ont remplacé, surla façade
maritime canadienne, la partie de la côte qu'elles obstruaient; un couloir, de la simple ((largeur
d'ouverture côtière desîles))(décision,par.71),et de la mêmelargeur tout au long. Maisce qui
compte leplus et surtout, c'estqu'il n'y avaitaucune obstruction enface; et le tribunal ajoutait, «il
ne faut pas laisserune telle projection versle large empiétersur uneprojection frontale parallèle de
segmentsadjacents du littoralsud du Terre-Neuveouamputer leurprojection))(ibid., par. 70).
86. Dans la présenteaffaire en revanche la côte camerounaise est arrondie et l'île deBioko
qui l'obstrueest unetrès grandeîle.
87. Un couloir camerounais partant de la régiond'adjacence, aussi étroitqu'il soit, s'il suit
une tendance plutôt horizontale, amputerade manière radicale la zone prolongeant la côte
nigériane; et s'il développu ene tendance verticale, il amputera de la même façonles zones
prolongeant les côtes de Bioko et de Principeau sud, s'il arrive jusque là. De toute manière,il ne
sera pas le prolongement naturelde la côte camerounaise, car s'écartantde son axe droit vers le
large. Or, cet axe droit, c'est précisémenlt'axe du chapelet d'îles. Et c'est là que résidele
problèmedu Cameroun. Mais,hélas,onne saurait refairela nature, du moinspas par le droit. 88. C'est là queréside lalimitede l'équité égalemenMt.ais, en fin de compte, est-ceque la
situation géographiqudes côtes camerounaisesestvraiment ((uniquement inique))à la lumière de
lajurisprudence, au point de permettrede tels écarts des méthodes, règles et principes juridiques
pour arriverà la solution fantasquedela lignesoi-disant équita?le
3. Plateaucontinental(Tunisie/Libye)(1982)
89. La réponseest clairement négative. Car, cettC eour même a traité d'une affaire très
semblable, à laquelle elle a apportéune solutionqui n'a rieà voir avec l'extravagance de celle
prônéepar le Cameroun. Je meréfère, Monsieur le présiden Mt,adameet Messieursde la Cour, à
l'affaireduPlateau continental(Tunisie/Libye),quia été décidéepla arCour en 1982.
90. La position géographique de la Tunisien'étaitpas dissimilairede celle du Cameroun,
sauf pour l'inversionde la direction, nord-estpourla Tunisie, sud-ouestpour le Cameroun. [Vous
avez le croquis de la situation généralsous la lettre dans le dossier; projection lettrK.] Il
s'agissait également d'un golf(elegolfe de Gabès),avec la frontièreterrestre avec la LibàRas
Ajdir, beaucoup plusproche du creuxdu golfe que dans le cas du Cameroun, circonstance plus
aggravantepour la Tunisie. Aulargedu golfedeGabès,la Tunisieestceinturéepar deux chapelets
d'îles:lesplus proches sont les îles italiennesde Pantelleria et Lampedusa,àquelque distance,
la SicileetMalte. Aunord-nord-est, lescôtesitaliennes clôturentce quireste dela côtetunisienne.
91. La Tunisie a défenduun faisceau de lignes alternatives, construitespar différentes
méthodes,mais variant dans une fourchette étroitede 2 à 3O; ce qui lui aurait permis d'ouvrir
l'angle de la ligne au-delà de l'équidistance,lui donnant une plus grande ouverture vers l'est
méditerranéen, excipandtu mêmetype de circonstances pertinentesque celles avancéespar le
Cameroundans la présente affaire.
[Projection,également souslettreKI
92. Le faisceau de lignes tunisiennes,dans ses rapports avec les côtes libyennes, rappelle
étrangementla configuration dela((ligneéquitable» camerounaise avelca côtenigériane.
[Vousavez ici la carte renverséede la côtetunisiennepour montrer la trajectoirede la ligne;
projection,également souslettreK.] 93. Mais la Cour n'a pas suivi la Tunisiedans sa démarche. Au contraire, dans la première
des deux secteurs de la ligne, dans la régionadjacence à partir du point terminal de la frontière
terrestre, la Cour a tracé une ligne perpendiculaiàela côteà un angle plus étroitcôtétunisien
qu'une ligne d'équidistance(à26"plutôt que 42-43"qui aurait étél'équidistance)sur la base d'un
((modusvivenditacite))entrelaFrance et l'Italie,qui s'estformàpartird'une proposition italienne
d'«une ligne de démarcation entre lesbancs d'éponge libyenset tunisiens)) ,suite àun incident
en 1913 (C.I.J. Recueil 1982,p. 70, par. 93).
[Projection, également sous lettre
94. La Cour admet que «les éléments relatifsà un tel modus vivendi,reposant uniquement
sur le silence ou l'absence de protestation des autoritfrançaises..ne suffisent pas à prouver
l'existenced'une limitereconnueentre les deuxParties)). Mais elle ajoute toutefoisque
«adéfautde limites maritimes établiesd'un communaccord ou clairementdéfinies,le
respect du modus vivendi tacite, qui pendant fort longtemps n'a jamais été
officiellement contesténi d'un côténi de l'autre, autoriseày voir unejustification
historique dansle choix de la méthodede délimitation du plateau continentalentre les
deuxParties...)) (Ibid.,p. 70,par. 95.)
95.La Cour ajoute encore,de manière significative,qu'elle
«nepeut manquerde relever l'existenced'une lignedefacto se projetant deRas Ajdir
vers le nord-nord-està un angle de 26" environ, qui concrétisela manièredont les
deux Parties ont octroyéà l'origine des permisou concessions pour la recherche ou
l'exploitation d'hydrocarbures emer. Cette ligne entre des concessions adjacentes,
qui a étéobservée tacitement pendant des annéeest qui coïncide en outreà peu près
avec la perpendiculaireà la côte au point frontière appliquéedans le passé comme
limite maritime de facto, paraît êtreà la Cour d'une grande pertinence pour la
délimitation.)) (Ibid., p. 71, par. 96.)
96. Dans le deuxième secteur de la ligne, qui change de direction, parallèlement au
changement de direction de la côte aprèsle creux du golfe, cette ligne s'ouvre davantage sur le
large à un angle de 52" (ibid., p. 92-94, par. 133). Il esà relever cependant, ce qui n'est pas
mentionné dans l'arrêt, que cet angle, à un degré près, est celui d'une ligne frontière
tuniso-libyenne, se dirigeant vers un point triple d'équidistance avec Malte(ibid., p. 92-94,
par. 133).
97.Ainsi, dans une situation géographique semblableà celle du Cameroun,une côte concave
ceinturéepar des îles étrangèresau large proche, la Cour, plutôt que de céder à la tentation de
justice distributive aux dépensde la logique de la configuration géographiqu, tracéla ligne enfonctiondes accommodementset arrangements taciteset des tolérances mutuelles entrlees parties,
en matièrede pêche sédentaire et d'activitéspétrolières danle premier secteur à partir de la
frontière terrestre, ainsi qu'en fonctinu respectdes droits d7Etatstiers dans le second secteur
plus au large, en choisissant une trajecteuiviseun point triple d'équidistance aveletiers.
[Projection lettre A]
98. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieursde la Cour. Tout cela esttrèsloin de la
ligne fantasque du Cameroun,qui est construiteauméprisdesnotions et des règles essentiellesdu
droit internationalen la matière. Une ligne quiviseà compenserl'injustice de la natureprèsdes
côtes en s'appropriantde vastes zonesau large lointain. Or,les zones de compétence nationaleen
mer sont des accessoires. C'estlaterre qui dominela mer et les côtes qui génèrent cezsones; ou,
en d'autrestermes, ces zones sontcenséesprojeteret prolonger les côtes en mer. Pourcela, elles
doivent être adjacentea sux côtes, et, comme l'a dit la Cour, cette «adjacente» est jugée «en
fonction dela distance)), comprisedans un sens large. Et, en tout cas, ces zonesdoivent être
((intimement liées»auxcôtes qui lesgénèrent.
99.C'estaller contre toute cette conception que d'imagineurne ligne entraînantune zone qui
s'étouffe prèsdes côtes qui la génèrent, ais qui subit une résurrection miraculeusecomme le
Phénixqui renaît deses cendres - en s'éloignant de plus enplus de ces côtes, et en se décalant de
son axe, pour se situer dans une trajectoire plusproche et plus directement lia d'autres côtes.
Cela peut aller, selon mongrand amile professeurAlain Pellet, au pointoù une telle zone peut
s'interrompreet renaître plus loin. Mais comment peut-on fairecadrer cela avec la notionde
projection,de prolongement, delienintime, d'accessoire?
100. Peut-on vraiment soulager l'encombrement prèd ses côtes en octroyant des
alotissements lointainsau large, des îles d'eau imaginaires? Ne serait-ce pas compenser les
injustices de la nature enla refais?nt
101.La conventionde MontegoBay avaitprévuun mécanisme limité dejustice distributive,
à travers sa partie 11 qu'on a malheureusement diluéepar la suite, maispas à travers l'octroi de
zones compensatoires de compétenc exclusiveà titre individuel. 102.L'équité selonle droit (infralegem)ne veut pas dire l'arbitraire;elle s'accomplit parle
maniement raisonnable desnotions et des techniques quele droit nous fourniten gardantun esprit
d'équité enles interprétant.
Je vous remercie,Monsieurleprésident,MadameetMessieurs delaCour.
Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur.La séanceest suspendue pour
une dizainede minutes.
L 'audienceestsuspenduede II h 30 à II h 40.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. Owing to an important
commitment,the Presidenthas askedme to presideover theremainderof today's hearings,as well
as overtomorrow'shearings. 1nowgivethe floorto Professor Crawford.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Thank youverymuch,Sir
THE MARITIME DELIMITATION
1.Mr. Vice-President, Membersof the Court, althoughthis is Nigeria's final speech onthe
maritime boundaryin its first round,it is, if 1may quote Winston Churchill, "not the beginninof
the endbutthe end ofthe beginning". There remain three rounds of oralpleadingsdevotedto the
maritime boundary - 1detect a senseof regret in that statemen-, including EquatorialGuinea's
intervention.
2. Moreover Nigeria has the following difficulty. Cameroon, in this case, has throughout
declinedto argue in thealternative. Al1you haveon the maritime boundaryis its elaborate method
of construction of lines across the "Gulf as a whole", and the resulting "ligne équitable".
Cameroonis well awareof Ourcriticisms of this constructionline. In the Counter-Memorialwe
criticized it in principle on the basis of virtually every decided case on maritime boundaries in
history4. In the~ejoinder',we criticizedit again and in furtherdetail,making manyof the points
about relevantcoasts,relevant areas,and so on,which youhave alreadyheard fromme and which
Professor Abi-Saab has this moming so elegantly synthesized. But answer came there none, not
-
4~ounter-~emorialofNigeria, Chap1,23.
'~ejoinderof Nigeria,Chaps. 12-13. -52 -
fromany of Cameroon's counsel in the firstround. Carneroon has criticizedNigeria forarguingin
the alternative in terms of the relationof the Bakassi Peninsulato the maritime boundary. Butit
has declined entirelyto arguefor any alternative version of themaritime boundarythat meetsany
of the criticismswe have made of its "ligne équitable". It is true that it has changed its "ligne
équitable"but not in responseto Ourcriticismsbut in a search forsome form of accuracy. For
example,if oneaccepts - as it seems tome, withal1respect, onemust accept - that Cameroon's
west-facingcoastoppositetheeast coastofBiokoisirrelevant tothis delimitation, thenthereis still
a question - whatmaritimezones wouldbe generatedby Cameroon'srelevant coasts? Youcan
seethese againattab 11ofyour folders. We acceptthat Cameroonhas a relevant coast lookingon
to the area; it is the coast from Cape Debuntschato Rio del Rey. The Bakassi Peninsula has a
relevant fiontage of its own. Cameroon madeno attempt to argue what maritime zones these
coastswould generate in thecontextofthepresentproceedingsbetween Nigeriaand Cameroon. In
short,it has failedcompletelyto addressthe real issuebefore the Court.
3. This presents us with a dilemma. 1sNigeria to argue Cameroon'scase for a maritime
boundaryin termsof the relevant areaandthe relevantcoasts,in orderto refute it? As Cameroon's
exampleshowed,for one sideto constructan alternative argumentfor the otherrapidlydegenerates
to the level of parody, ifnot misrepresentation. Moreoverthis case is brought under the optional
clause and Cameroonis the Applicant. Our position is, andalways has been, that the maritime
zones should be delimitedby negotiations, includingwith Equatorial Guinea, in accordance with
therelevant provisionsof the 1982Convention. Bythe time any negotiationscan now commence,
the Court will have decided on sovereignty overthe Bakassi Peninsula, and on associated
questions, allowingthe Parties to addressthe maritime boundary anew. In these circumstances,
Cameroon's soleargument for maritime delimitation on a globalbasis having faiied,it is, as 1said
yesterday, opento the Courtto dismissCameroon'sclaim andto cal1on the Parties to agree their
maritimeboundary intherelevantareainaccordancewith the 1982Convention.
4. So far1have presentedonly oneside of thedilemma. Cameroon has completely failed to
argue the real maritime delimitation issues beforethe Court but has relied, uniquely, on a
completelyinadmissible method - a uniquely inadmissible method,as ProfessorAbi-Saabwould Say. Nigeria cannot be expected to constmct an alternative Cameroon argument whichdoes
addressthe real issues.
5. But, on the other hand,we do wantto assist theCourt, and 1accept that simply callingon
the Court to dismiss Cameroon's maritime delimitationclaim might be thought not to be very
helpful. Thus in this presentation, which is only the endof the beginning, 1 am going to try to
assist the Court by making a series of observations on the real issues- the relevant coasts, the
relevant areas, the specific scope of the Court's jurisdiction, the relevant circumstances, the
equitable result. For its part, Cameroon having specifiedits maritime line in a letter to the Court
last year,may perhaps, in the second or third or fourthround, address the actual issuesyou faceon
the maritime boundary. Orthen perhaps the Courtcan expect fürther correspondence ...
A. Theapplicablelawandthe roleof equidistance
6.So let me startthis series of, 1hopehelpful, observations by tuming to the applicablelaw.
1 have the comfort now that 1can talk about the applicable law in the absence of the relevant
author, because 1amgoingto refer to a lecturegivenby the President to the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly last year6. No doubt it is the case that what is said by the President onsuch
occasions does not bind the Court; we do not suggest otherwise. But he did, in his speech to the
Legal Committee, provide a succinct and, 1would Saywith respect, an accurate account of the
development of the international lawof maritime delimitationby the Courtover the last 20 years.
7. The President beganwith the remark, echoing whathad been saidjudicially by severalof
his predecessors, thatby 1985
"case law and treaty law [on delimitation of the continentalshelf and exclusive
economic zone] had becomeso unpredictable thatthere was extensive debate within
the doctrine on whether there still existed a law of delimitation or whether, in the
name of equity, we were not endingup with arbitrary solutions".
One thinks in this context, of course, of the incisive criticisms of Professor Prosper Weil. The
President then went on to say that the Court had responded to this criticism by proceeding "to
develop its case law in the direction of greatercertainty", beginning with Libya/Malta, through
Jan Mayen,to Qatar/Bahrain. Taken together,those decisions imply thatthe normal starting point
of the GeneralAssemblyofthe United Nations,NewYork1October2001.ational Courtof Justice, to the Sixth Committee will be an equidistance line, both in the case of opposite and adjacent coasts, and that
"consideration would then be given as to whetherthere are relevantcircumstances leadingto an
adjustmentoftheline". If 1may quoteagain:
"In al1 cases, the Court, as States do, must first determine provisionally the
equidistance line. It must then ask itself whether there are special or relevant
circumstancesrequiring this line to be adjusted with a view to achieving equitable
results. The legal rule is now clear. However, each case nonethelessremains an
individual one,in which the different circumstances invokedby the parties must be
weighedwith care."'
8. And the President, referringto other cases onthe Court's docket involving maritime
delimitation,went on to Say"[tlhe international communitymay rest assured thatthose caseswill
beadjudicatedinthe samespirit"'.
9. Evidencefor this approach,for this spirit,is to be foundin the Court'srecent Judgmentin
the Qatar/Bahraincase. 1refer inparticulartothe followingpassage:
"For the delimitation ofthe maritimezones beyondthe 12-mile zone it [that is
the Court] willfirst provisionallydrawanequidistance lineand then considerwhether
there arecircumstanceswhichmust leadtoan adjustmentof that line.
The Court. .. notes thatthe equidistance/specialcircumstancesrule, which is
applicable in particular as to the delimitationof the territorial sea,and the equitable
principleslrelevantcircumstancesrule, asithas been developedsince 1958in case-law
and State practice with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the
exclusiveeconomiczone,areclosely inte~~elated."~
10.The Courtthen proceededto ask "whetherthere are circumstanceswhich might makeit
necessaryto adjustthe equidistance linein orderto achieveanequitablere~ult"'~.
11. Equidistance, or simplified equidistance,has also been a feature of recent arbitral
decisions, for example the decision of the Court of Arbitration in the second phase of the
12.Lastweek,counsel for Cameroonrepeatedly accusedNigeriaof adoptingan unqualified
and unconditional formof equidistance,so that no factor of any kind could lead to the Courtto
'case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatarv.
Bahrain),Judgmentof 16March2001,paras.230-231.
1O
ibid., para.232.
"2001.40 ILM983. depart from a median or equidistance line. Like so many ofCameroon's arguments, this was a
parody of Nigeria's position. Counsel for Cameroon seemed throughout unwilling to confront Our
actual arguments; they tended rather to invent different arguments that Nigeria did not make,
which they could then happily refute. This was anotherexample.
13. Of course Nigeria accepts thatan equidistance or median line is only a starting point.
But it isa starting point in most cases. Consideration ofthe equidistance line helps to focus the
issues; it provides a base, not dependent upon subjective appreciation,from which to consider
what factorsmight need to be taken into accountin order to reach an equitable result between the
parties to the delimitation. Indeed that wasthe role it performed evenin the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, which my friend Professor Abi-Saab has already discussed. The Court may be
interested in the graphic on the screen, tab M, which transposeson to a map of Ourregion, in a
scaled form, the eventual results of the negotiations betweenthe three States, in the North Sea
context. Negotiatjons whichof coursefollowed thatdecisionand wereguided by it. It will be seen
immediately that the outcome of the decision- accordingto Cameroon the apotheosis of the
rejection of equidistance- supports nothing likethe extended projection off to the Westwhich
Cameroon implicitly claims against Nigeria. On the contrary, the axis of the area eventually
attributed by agreement to Germany was essentially based on equidistance. Moreover the
projection was a tapering one, based on the diminishing effect of the German coastline with
distance, as well as the effect of third States,h as the United Kingdom. It did not project that
coastline undiminished through areas in which other States' coasts were dominant - as
Cameroon's method seeksto do. Nor did it drive throughareasof long-established oil installations
and licences- as Cameroon seeks todo.
14.It is true that the decided cases acknowledge the possibilitythat some other method of
delimitation,not based on equidistance, may be appropriatein special circumstances. But in none
of the decisions, which have adopted geometrical or other constructions not based on adjusted
equidistance, has there been anything like the outcome that Cameroonseeks to achieve here.
Indeed looking at those decisions, one is struckby their similarity to modified equidistance lines;
and it seemsthat similarresults couldhave been achieved in such cases,using the approach inJan
Mayen and Qatar/Bahrain. 15. Moreoverthe element of arbitrariness which ProfessorAbi-Saabjust now referredto has
not been absent from someof those geometricaldecisions. Letme take one example. The Gulfof
Mainecase adopteda seriesof constructionlinesbased on a simplifiedmode1of the Gulfand of its
relation to the general directionof the Atlanticcoastline betweenthe American state of Maine and
the Canadian Province ofNova Scotia. One can see the point of doing so; the Gulf of Maine is
rectilinear relativeto the AtlanticCoast,the general direction of which is virtually a straight line
across the mouth of the Gulf. But having done that, having simplified thecoastal geography by
adopting a geometric method,the Chamber then thought it appropriate to take into account one
very small island,Seal Island,off the Canadiancoast12.The wholepoint ofthe initial construction,
wasto avoid theeffects of minor features. This waswhy the criticismof arbitrariness wasso often
laidat the Court'sdoor duringthat period.
16. Mr. Vice-President,Members of the Court, in the present case it is appropriate tostart
withan equidistance line, andthis for a number ofreasons. 1willgive five.
17.The firstis that the Court itself,in its morerecent decisions, has consistently adoptedthat
approach.
18. The second is that there are strong indications in the practice of the Parties, and of
Equatorial Guinea,that the equidistance line is thestarting point in delimitation, even if there may
bereasons for departingfromit to some extent.
19. The third reason is that while there may be situations inter partes, where some other
overall geometrical approach needs to be adopted, no international court or tribunal has ever
adopted such an alternative approach vis-à-vis third States concerned with the relevant area. No
international court or tribunal has abandoned equidistanceas a starting point in a case involving
third States. Even though an equidistance or median line may not be the conclusion of the
delimitation, itis a valid basis for the claims of coastal States. The third States in the Gulf of
Guinea whose coasts look on to the Cameroon claimline- Equatorial Guineaand Sao Tomeand
Principe - claim maritime zones on the basis of equidistance. Their claims may or may not be
ultimately justified. But they are not unreasonableor illegitimate. The Courthas nojurisdiction in
12
para222.Delimitationof the MaritimeBoundaryin the Guifof Maine Area,Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1984,pp.336-337, the present case to reject their equidistance claims. Mr. Pelletmay regard them as extravagant,the
Court has no jurisdiction to rejectthem. The Court cannot decided that those States may only
claim some lesser area. That being so, the Court's jurisdictionis confinedto waters thatare closer
to Cameroonand Nigeriathan they areto any other State.
20. In other words, the framework for this case is laid down by considerations of
equidistance vis-à-vis thirdStates which are not parties to this case. That is itself a reason for
applying an equidistance approach as between the States whichare parties to the presentcase, and
asking what relevant or special circumstances there maybe which would cal1for an adjustment of
that line andwhich remainwithin the sphereof the Court'scornpetenceinterpartes.
21. The fourth reason for beginning withan equidistance line is simply that this is the most
practical, predictable and objective way to proceed. In particularit avoids the risk of building in
assumptions fi-omthe beginning into the geometric model, which beg the question, effectively
For example,
predetermining the result. Cameroon's unique method is fullof such assumptions.
Cameroon's method assumesthat islandcoastalfrontagesareto be ignored,but as the Courtsaid in
Qatar/Bahrain:
"In accordance with Article 121, paragraph 2, of the 1982 Convention onthe
Law ofthe Sea,which reflects customary internationallaw, islands,regardless of their
size, in this respect enjoy the same status, and thereforegenerate the same maritime
rights, as other landerrit~r~."'~
22. In the present case,the islandsin question are populated islands,which are substantialin
size. The aggregate coastal fiontage of the island of Bioko is over 100nautical miles. A
constructionmethod, whichtakes no account of islands in the circumstances of the case, begs the
question entirely.
23. That brings me to my fifthreason for startingwith equidistance, which is that there is no
other approach on offer in terms of the relevant coasts of the two Parties. The point bears
repeating. Cameroonhas until now offered no methodologyof delimitation which relatesto the
relevant area, which involves the relevant coasts, whichconcems the dispute actually before the
Court. What ithas done is something entirely different, thatis to Say,to seek to cane up the pie of
I3~udgmentof 16March2001, para.185.the Gulf of Guineaby referenceto implicitcriteriaof its own, calculatedto give it whatit regards
as itsfair share. Moreoverit hasonesowithoutbothering totellthe Courtwhat is its fairshare.
24. But this is an impermissible method the Court has repeatedlyffirmed. For exarnplein
the North Sea ContinentaSl helfcases,you said:
"Delimitation in an equitable manneris one thing, but not thesame thing as
awardingajust and equitable shareof a previously undelimited area,even thoughin a
numberofcasesthe resultsmaybe comparable,or evenidentical."14
25. In theJan Mayencase, yousaid:
"The task of a tribunal is todefine the boundaryline between the areas under
the maritimejurisdiction of two States; the sharing-out ofthe area is therefore the
consequenceofthe delimitation, notviceversa.""
26. Both passages were cited with approval inthe Qatar/Bahrain~udgrnent'~. Other
statementsof the Courtto similareffect aresetoutin Ourpleadings'7.
27. IndeedinJan Mayenthe Court issued awarning againstapproaches whichare rather like
Cameroon'spresent construction method. Perhaps your warning gave Cameroon ideas! You said:
"judicial treatrnent of maritime delimitationdoes not involve the sharing-out of
something held in undivided shares ... Thus the law doesnot require a delimitation
based upon an endeavourto share out anarea of overlapon the basis of comparative
figuresforthe length of coastalfrontsand theareasgenerated bythem."ls
The lawdoesnotrequiredthat, yousaid.
28. The onlycommentone wouldmake is that Cameroon7smethoddoes not evenrise to the
level of the endeavour which you criticized and rejectedin 1993. This is because Cameroon's
method doesnotuserelevantcoastal fronts, andbecauseit refusesto tell you what isitsshare.
29. Subjectto these important qualifications,however, Carneroonstands before youas the
proponentof "the doctrine of the just and equitableshare", a doctrinecondemnedin theNorthSea
ContinentalShelf case and in viriually every subsequent caseIg. And this is the only doctrine
Cameroon propounds. It has no alternative. That being so, thereis no alternative to the Court's
'4~.~ ReJ.rt1969,p. 22, para. 18.
'5~.~ ReJ.rt1993,p. 67, para. 64.
I6~udgmentf 16March 2001,para. 234.
"~ee Counter-MernorialofNigeria, paras.21.10ff.
1IC..J.eport1993,p. 66, para.64.
I91.C Rep.rt1969,p. 22,para. 19; p. 29, para.39. classicalapproach, no alternativemethod for maritime delimitation betweenthese parties and their
facingcoasts has been proposed.
30. For al1these five reasons, Nigeria submits,the Court should begin with an equidistance
line drawn fiom the land boundary between thetwo States and proceeding to the point where it
meetsmaritime areas claimed by third States. It should then consider whether any modifications,
andif so, what modifications arejustified and requiredby the circumstancesof the case in order to
reachan equitable result.
B. Thescopeofthe Court'sdelimitationtask
31. Mr. Vice-President, Membersof the Court,you may perhaps have noticed that there are
notmany points of agreement in this case. On the maritime boundary, 1could find four. The first
point of agreement concernsa point of law. If the parties to a delimitation disputehave already
delimited their maritime boundary,in whole or in part, by a valid agreement, the agreement
applies. Article 74 (4) and Article 83(4) of the 1982 Convention specifically so provide. Of
coursethe Parties disagreeas to whetherthere was a valid agreement or agreements here, partially
delimitingtheir maritime zones. Mr.Brownlie hasalreadyaddressedthat question.
32. There are three other points of agreement as to the circumstances of the present case.
Thefirst is that,except onpoints ofdetail,neither Partyprotested the oil licensingand exploitation
activities of the other. The second is that, except in the very limited area1 showed you this
moming, there was and is no overlap between the Nigerian and Cameroonian oil concessions on
theirrespectivesides of the oil practice line. There was an overlap between Nigeriaand Equatorial
Guineawhich has been resolvedby the Agreement of2000. The third point of agreement concems
the extent of relevant Nigerian coastsup to Akasso, andthis brings me to the present section of this
presentation.
33. For 1turn now to consider in some more detail the scope of the delimitationtask which
facesthe Court. There arethree issuesto which 1 will draw your attention. One is the south-west,
at and beyond point L - which 1 cal1a point, my colleague Mr. Abi-Saab calls it anon points,o
we do not agree on that point. It alsorelates to Akasso,which is more orless the nearest pointon
the land to point. The second geographical issueis in the south; it relates to Equatorial Guinea.The thirdis in the east; it concemsthe extentof Cameroon's relevantcoasts. Takentogetherthese
threepoints delimit thescope ofthe Court'stask of delimitation. Indeed,we submit,they delimitit
rather precisely.
34. As the Court will see fiom this graphic, which is tabN in your folders, a point just
3
somewhatWestof Akasso marksthe pointwherethe Nigerian coastturns fiom southto south-west
facing. The Partiesagree that thecoastlinebeyond Akassois not relevantto this delimitation: that
is the thirdpoint of agreementin relation to the dispute. Nigeriahasa substantialcoastal frontage
to the Westof Akasso. It is about265 nautical miles. You will seemarked on the graphicthe
claimed maritimeboundaries of the coastal States to the west of Nigeria. The 200 nauticalmiles
limit, which you can see, fiom this coastline is uncontroversial. The lateral boundaries ofthe
States, Benin, Togoand Ghana, are unresolved. Nigeria's negotiationw sith Benin on theirlateral
maritime boundary,under my colleagueAlhajiDahiruBobbo, who isthe Chairmanof the National
Boundary Commission,are proceeding well. Here of course we arenot concemed with those
lateralboundaries: weare concemed with theouter boundariesof theexclusive economiczone.
35. As the Court has been informed, Cameroon now claimsa line extending indefinitely
beyond point L. As you can seefiom this tab, which is tabN, the line cuts right across Nigeria's
coastalfiontage. It extends acrossthejoint developmentzone with SaoTome and Principe,which
zone is, as1have explained, claimed in its entiretby SaoTome andPrincipe. Itthen extendsinto
waters which, becausethey are morethan 200nautical milesfiom Nigeria,Nigeriadoes notclaim,
and onlySao Tomeand Principe claims. It thencomesto perhapsatemporaryhalt ata point which
we will cal1 "MW. This is just on the point of entering the as yet undiscussed area of outer
continentalshelfbeyondthe 200nautical mileszones of al1of the Stateson the Gulf. The odyssey
of this lineis aremarkable one.It is Homeric, itis arueUlysses ofa line.
36. There are several pointsto be madehere. The first is thatpoint M couldnot be claimed
by Cameroon even if was the only State in West Afiica. PointM is in deep water. It is
350nautical milesfiom the nearest point on the coast which is claimedby Cameroon and still
further fiom actualterritory of Cameroon. Vis-à-vis Cameroon,it does not meet the criteriafor
outercontinentalshelflaid downin Article76of the 1982Convention. The linestops in SaoTome
and Principe EEZ,atpoint M. 37. In any event,it is obviousthat the Court's jurisdiction over the"ligne équitable",if it
could possiblyhave survivedup to pointL, must stop when theline hitsthe SaoTomeand Principe
claim line, which itesmore or lesssouthof Akasso. SaoTome andPrincipe's claim line has not
been withdrawn even vis-à-vis Nigeria, still less vis-à-vis CameroonC .ameroon's aspirationto
reach theopenAtlanticisthus doomedbythe factsof distance and depth.
38. Facedwith thisreality,it isnecessary to retreatbackalongCameroon's claim line, and as
a firstpoint ofwithdrawal1would liketo take you back tojustaroundpoint L. This is 86nautical
miles Ikom Akasso, lIOnautical miles from Principe, 200 nautical miles from East Point on
Bakassiand fùrther still from Cameroon. Onany possible assumptionit marks the outer limits of
any conceivable claimby Cameroon toan exclusive economiczone. But Cameroon claims points
on its line beyondpointL which, while more than 200 nauticalmiles from any possibly relevant
Coast,arewellwithin 200nautical milesof Nigeria,SaoTomeand Principeand EquatorialGuinea.
You can see this on the graphic on the screen, which uses200nautical mile arcs to demonstrate
where point L is located. It is tabN in your folders. Thesepoints completely overlap and cover
pointL, as wouldan arcdrawnfrom Bioko whichyou now see. 1simply recallthat aclaim beyond
point L is untenableunderthe law of thesea. A State cannot claimoutercontinental shelf within
another State's exclusive economic zone. Othenvise there would be incompatible claims to the
same seabed resource. The exclusive economic zone of course includesseabed resources. How
could Article56 of the 1982 Convention confer sovereign rights over thseeabed of the exclusive
economic zoneon a State,if Article76 (4) conferredthe sameexclusiverights on a different State
or States? How couldthe Commission on the Limitsof the ContinentalShelf have capacity to
decide on delimitationof claims, or to act in any way within200 nauticalmiles of the coasts of
third States? Article3 1(a) of AnnexII of the 1982 Convention is perfectlyclear on the point. So
the claim toaprojection beyond pointLfails.
39. So let us now continue Ourretreat upthe line. 1 would like tostop, briefly, ata point
which Cameroon itself noted lastweek, and which 1will cal1pointKI. As you recall, this is the
point where theline isclosestto the SaoTome andPrincipemedian line. It is less than 4 nautical
milesfromthat medianline. 40. Mr. Vice-President, Membersof the Court,in maritime delimitationyou do not delimit
lines, you delimitareas. You delimitareaswith lines. As you said in Jan Mayen,the task of the
Court is to "define the boundary line betweenthe areas under the maritime jurisdictionof two
States; the sharing-outof the areais thereforethe consequenceof the delimitati~n"~~.But what
area is shared out here? It is surely nota strip of 3 nautical miles,200 nauticalmiles away fiom
alleged Cameroonterritory. PointKI is 86nautical milesfiom Principe. Assume for the sake of
argumentthat the Courtwereto attribute point K, to Cameroon over Nigeria.It would notattribute
thatpointto Cameroonover SaoTomeand Principe. Soyou would not beawarding an areaat ail,
you wouldbe awardinga line.
41. Let me make the samepoint, perhaps lessfonnalistically. Cameroondeclinesto make
any claim to a maritime area. But Cameroon relies on the St.Pierre and Miquelon case as
precedentfor a projectionfroma coast,irrespectiveof its relative proximityto closer coastsof the
other party,or thirdparties. In fact itis theonlyprecedent forsuch a projection. Youhaveheard
Professor Abi-Saabexplain whythat decisionis irrelevantas a precedent here,even if it is correct
in principle in relationto the geographical context, which the Court of Arbitratioh nad to deal
with- that is, what it saw as the unimpededsouth-facingcoast of Newfoundland, including the
Frenchislands. Butwe can also look at the practicalities.A projectiona fewnautical miles wide is
good fornothing. It is completely impractical for commercial exploitationE . ven the 10.5nautical
mile mushroom stalk awardedby the Court of Arbitration in St. Pierre and Miquelon has been
criticizedas totally impractical.
42. Let us, however, for the sake of argument,take a width of exclusive economic zone
equivalentto the total coastal frontage of the Bakassi Peninsula t,at is,14nautical miles. You see
it on thescreen nowand in tab N of your folders. It shows aprojectionwiththe "ligneéquitable"
as its northem boundary. A claim to such a projection- and couldCameroon be claiming
less?- such a claim in substance and realityconcems maritime areas reasonably claimed by
Equatorial Guinea andSao Tome and Principe: they are the areas in purple on the screen. The
Courtshould recognizeand disallow that claimas a claimto the maritime areas of third States. It
-
''1.C.J.Report1993,p.67(para.64). is, with great respect, not thefunctionof the Courtto lend support to the maritimeclaims of an
optionalclause claimant,suchas Cameroon,vis-à-visthird Statesnot partiesto the optionalclause,
notpartiesto theseproceedings.
43. So, Mr. Vice-President,we now move back to the point where Cameroon's claimline
emerges mysteriously from the areasattributedto Equatorial Guineaunder the Agreementof 2000
andre-enters waters attributed toNigeriaby that Agreement. You can see thatpoint on the screen,
it is labelled-1 am sorry, this is thepoint where the claim lineemerges from areas within the
Equatorial Guinea equidistance line and enters waters which are claimed by Nigeria and not by
Equatorial Guinea. Cameroon argues thatthe Courtshould grant itthe line atpoint 1,and, indeed,
the linefiom wherethe 2000 boundary isdowntopointIl, ancilorpoints in between. Butthe Court
cannotdo that without first deciding that Cameroon is entitletdo the area which fallswithin the
zone attributedto Equatorial Guineaby the Agreementof 2000. There cannot be an enclave of
maritimeareasto the south. Therecanonlybe acontinuous line,or more exactlythe boundaryof a
continuous area of Cameroon maritimeterritory. Once the exclusive economic zone and
continentalshelfof Cameroon attributableto the coastlineto thewest of Debuntscha Pointstops, it
cannotbe mysteriously resurrected. Thus in orderto award any areas in this segment of the line,
the Court would haveto decidethat thereis a continuous stretchof Cameroonmaritime area in an
area specifically claimedby Equatorial Guinea and attributedto Equatorial Guinea by the
Agreementof 2000. This, clearly, the Court cannot do.
44. Counsel for Cameroon the otherday triedto avoid this by two stratagems,by the white
square, and by the forcedexchangeoftemtories. 1have alreadymentionedthemboth. Dragons or
no dragons,the white square isan obvious subterfuge: the Court cannot be seen to do indirectly
thatwhichit has no jurisdictionto dodirectly. Asto theforcedexchangeof territories, thebump in
the lineenablingthe Courtto "go around" EquatorialGuinea,thatis a devicetotally lacking in any
principled basis. Indeedit is unjustifiedeven in termsof Cameroon'sglobal allocationmethod. It
isanobvious subterfuge.Mr.Vice-President, Membersof the Court,you havejurisdiction in order
to delimit; you do not delimitin orderto havejurisdiction.
45. So, Mr. Vice-President,we now move backalong theligne équitableto the point, which
we will cal1point 12,where Cameroon's"ligne équitable"first meetsareas attributedto Equatorial Guinea under the Agreement of2000. Cameroon says, well, whitesquare or no white square at
least you have jurisdiction up to this point.t again this is based on a confusion. Cameroon
acceptsand emphasizes thatitisnot boundbythe Agreementof 2000. Pacta tertiis nec nocentnec
prosunt: this of course is the rule stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article34. Nigeriaagrees entirely. Cameronis neitherbound by,norcan it takeany advantage of,
the Agreement of2000. Thisfollows fiomthe strictly bilateralcharacterof the Agreementandthe
interpartescharacterof maritime delimitation.It is truethat an agreementcouldbe recognized by
third Statesso that maritime zones can comeby a processof recognition to have an erga omnes
character. But thathas not happened with respect to this line; you heard Carneroon Saythey
refused to recognize it. It equally follows thatthe Agreementdoes not involvea withdrawal by
Equatorial Guinea vis-à-vis Cameroon oa fnymaritime claim.
46. 1 can simply illustratethis point bytaking the Ekanga indentation, whiyou can see on
the screen, andattab N of yourfolders. As 1have explained, itis a small area which was claimed
by Nigeria and which is associated with severalNigerian wells. Consistentwiththe principleson
which the Agreementwas based,it was conceded by EquatorialGuinea to Nigeria. It is now the
subject of a unitization agreement.1Sayagainthat Cameroonhas neverprotestedat the grantingof
any licencesin this area or atthe drilling ofanywells. It is absolutelyclear that Equatorial Guinea
made no concessionto Cameroonof the Ekanga field. If you wereto award theEkanga field to
Cameroon - 1speakof coursehypothetically - suchanaward wouldnot bindEquatorial Guinea
whichwould be entitledtoclaimit and wouldno doubt doso; it wasvery reluctantto concedeit to
Nigeria. In short, EquatorialGuinea's equidistance lineis still in place vis-à-vis Cameroon,
notwithstanding the Agreement of2000. To the north of point (i) of course, it is still in place
vis-à-vis Nigeria aswell.
47. So finally, then, we retreat back to the poin- in this long retreat from pointM-
where Cameroon'sclaim linecrosses the EquatorialGuineaequidistance line. This is shown on
the screenwith ayellow arrow. It is clearfiom the recordthat the Equatorial Guinea equidistance
claim ismade erga ornnes,andnotjust vis-à-visNigeria;it applies to Cameroon as well as Nigeria.
The oil practice line which 1 illustrated this morning involved Equatorial Guineaas well as
Cameroon and Nigeria andwasbased on equidistance;it was a practice participated into thenorth of Biokoby al1three States. It is particularized in legislation of Equatorial Guinea and the claim is
unaffected by the Agreementof 2000. Accordingly, since the Court has precise informationas to
its location, the Courtcan delimit up to the tripoint, that is to Say, up to the point where the
Cameroon-Nigeria line, as you decide it to be, meets the equidistance line with Equatorial
Guinea- on the hypothesis, of course, thatyou decideto proceed with any delimitation. That is
the extentof the Court'sjurisdiction. In Oursubmission,that point will lie somewhereto the north
and eastof point (i) of the 2000 Agreement.
48.Mr. Vice-President, Membersof the Court,1turn to the third question affectingthe scope
of your task, which concerns the limitsof Cameroon's relevant coastin the east. This is not of
course an issue ofjurisdiction, but oneof determiningthe scope of Cameroon's relevant coastline
fionting on to the area in dispute. Nigeriahas already stated in its written pleadings, and through
ProfessorAbi-Saab,why it considers thatthe Cameroon relevant coaststops at Debuntschapoint2'.
That marks the tum in Carneroon's coastwhere it is opposite to the north-facing coastof Bioko,
less than 24 nautical miles away. The whole of the straight is territorial sea. Accordingly
Cameroon's relevant coast facing on to thearea in dispute withNigeria is to be drawn westwards
fiom Debuntscha Pointto the Rio del Rey,giving a coastalfiontage of30 nautical miles.
49. Cameroon did not discuss this issue in the first round. This was an aspect of its
all-or-nothingpreference for its global allocationmodel. Accordingly thereisnothing furtherto be
said onthe point at this stage. 1will be happyto comeback to it if Cameroon wishesto take issue
with it.
C. Equidistance and relevant circumstances
50. Mr. Vice-President, Members of the Court, 1 have already established that in this
situation the appropriate starting point in terms of any delimitation is to draw a provisional
equidistance or median line from the coast and then to consider whether any adjustment should be
made to that line having regard to any relevant or special circumstances. Because the land
boundaryis in dispute, itis necessaryto considerhowthe equidistance line wouldbe drawn both to
the Westand to the east of the peninsula. In fact, however, Bakassi as a separate unit makes
--
"~ejoinder ofNigeria, paras. 13.8-13.9. relatively littledifferenceto the overall situationin the Gulf; its coastal frontageis only 14nautical
miles. Even that coastal frontage produces a maritime claim 90 some per cent of which is against
third States. Muchmore significantis the effectof Equatorial Guinea, immediately offshore.
51.You can see both points veryneatly illustrated from the graphic on the screen, which is
tab P in your folders. This showsthe position of the median or equidistance lineas it would be if
the islands of Bioko and Sao Tome and Principe did not exist. And of course, under Cameroon's
method, theydo notexist. It callsfor a numberof comments. The first is that, as you can see, only
a very small maritimezone is attributable tothe Bakassi Peninsula as such. The second is that the
equidistance line drawnbetweenRio Muni and Cameroonin the south-east, whichis not an agreed
line, may well need some lateraladjustmentbecause of the precise locationof the boundary along
the coast. The third point is more important: itis that the overall effect ofthe median line as
between the two sides of the Gulf is not evidently disproportionat- if you take a line down the
middle of the gulf, itis not evidently disproportionate.
52. Now you can see on your screen,and also at tabP, the equidistance position with the
islands added. Thereis obviouslya major effect, and this correspondsto the point 1 have already
made as to the impact of islands in the middle of an area such as this Gulf in terms of attracting
maritime entitlements. The addition ofthe islands has a major effecton al1the mainland Statesand
territories, from Gabon al1the way round toNigeria. It has the least effecton Bakassi itself,which
loses only a tiny area at the tip of the zone of potential entitlementusing equidistance. Thereis a
very substantial effecton Cameroon,no doubt, but it is not unique. Moreover,such an effect is
inevitable withan island of substantial size located directly off the coast and belonging toa third
State: you will note that a significant proportionof the area Cameroon "loses" is occupied by the
land territoryof Bioko itself. There isno doubtthat Cameroonis squeezed - but leavingasidethe
inevitable andimmutable effect of the land tenitory of Bioko and its territorial sea, the squeezing
effect occurs between Biokoand Rio Muni, on the easterly side of the Gulf. Proportionately,
Cameroon loses little to the northand Westas compared with the area itlosesto the south and east
by reason of thecombined effectof Bioko andRio Muni. Tothe north andWestof Bioko there is
not much maritime space beyond the territorial sea at all- and what there is, as we have seen,
very fully occupiedby oil installations ofvariouskinds. 53. Rio Muniitself is affectedby the much smaller island ofPrincipe, considerably further
awayfiom its coasts than Biokois fiom Cameroon. SaoTome has a major effectalso on Gabon.
AndNigeria isaffectedas well,and significantly affected. You see the area in asort of dirty green
colour, approximatingto khaki, on the screen. This isthe area attributableto the islands on an
equidistancebasisthat would othenvise be a potential entitlement of Nigeria.It constitutes more
than40 per cent ofthe area shown in green onthe previous graphic. There is a significantcut-off
effect,with the equidistancelinepassing directlyinfrontof Nigeria'scoasts.
54. On the sectorto the eastof the Gulf, one might envisagea North Sea Continental Shelf
type solution as betweenBioko, Cameroon and Rio Muni, which coulh dave the effect of pushing
the notional tripointbetweenthe three tenitories furtherto the south-west. Butwhat a North Sea
Continental Shelfsolution inthis segment would not do - as ProfessorAbi-Saab'swonderfulred
arrow demonstrated - would be to shift continental shelf entitlement around Bioko to the
north-west. Thatis refashioning geography. In effect, Cameroon'sglobal projection systemis a
way of transfemng its geographical disadvantagein the waters betweenits longwest-facing coast
andthe island of Bioko,overthetop of Biokoandwellto the West.This isthegame of leap sheep;
1understand itis inFrench. In English,one leapsfiogs- but leapsheep or.fiogs,we are leaping
overhere, carryingOurcoastalfiontage behind us, if1can use another nurseryrhyme. Cameroon
thereby seeks to seize Nigerianwaters (already seriously impactedby Bioko). This is totally
unacceptable forthereasons already discussed.
55. Despiteitsgeographicaland legalirrelevanceto Oursituation, it has been worth while to
look at this comparisonin a little detail. It places Cameroon'ssituation in itsproper context and
perspective, andit shows how seriously Nigeria itselfis affected onits side of the Gulf by the
presenceof the twoisland States.
56. Mr. Vice-President, Members of the Court, 1tum then to the relevantcoastalfiontagesas
betweenthe two Partiesto the present case, whichyou can see in tab R. The questionis whether
theequidistance lineswhich willbe shown respectivelyto the eastorWestof theBakassi Peninsula
shouldbe adjusted,applyingtheby now standard methodologywhich 1 outlinedearlier.
57. Although Cameroon has not attempted to ask, let alone to answer this question,
ProfessorKamtolastweek did identifi severalrelevantfactors in terms of the delimitation: two of these werecoastal lengthsand the effect of offshore islands. There is of course a third,whichhe
did not regardas relevant, but merely special, associatedwith the practiceof the Parties. Letme
takethesepoints in order.
58.Asto coastal lengths,youwill seethatthe coastalfrontageshereare verymuchweighted
in favour of Nigeria. The distancefrom DebuntschaPointto the midpoint in the Rio delRey is
30 nauticalmiles, fromAkasso to the midpointin the CrossRiver Estuary is 114nautical miles.
Even if, forthe sake of argument, onetakes onlythe Coastup to Bonny,which is merely one point
in a straightcoastlinewithno specialfeatureattachingto it - the distanceis still 70nautical miles.
Moreover the effect of adding to Cameroon's undisputed coastal frontage the disputed coastal
fiontage of Bakassi- a proposition Nigeria,of course, does not accept- would not change
matters much: the resultwould stillfavourNigeria. Indeeda direct linefiom Debuntscha Pointto
East Point on Bakassi is hardly longerthan a line from Debuntscha Point to the Rio del Rey, as
Nigeria showed in its ~ejoinder~~.Thus there is no basis for an adjustment of the median line
adverse to Nigeria on the basis of disproportionate coastallengths. Indeed, there's quite a good
argumentforan adjustmentthe otherway.
59. Professor Kamto's second relevantor special circumstance was the effect of Bioko,
immediatelyoffshore. 1have already illustratedthis effect,which is substantial for both Parties,
Nigeria and Cameroon. Butthe problem is to find a principled basison which to "discount"the
effect of Bioko at Nigeria'sexpense. We arenot dealing withsmall islandssuch as Seal ~sland~~,
~ilfla'~,or Qit'at ~aradah",the effectof whichthe Court has discountedin earlier cases involving
the States with sovereigntyover those islands. Nor are we dealing with a small group of island
dependenciesof a State party, suchas the Channel Islands,which might possiblyjus@ an enclave
solution between thosetwo Parties. We are dealing with asubstantialisland State,the seat of the
capital of Equatorial Guinea, whichhas a substantialcoastal fiontage looking on tothe disputed
area. No doubt froma Cameroonianpoint ofview, Bioko is inthe "wrong place". But thatis its
"P.509,Fig. 13.4.
2Delimitationof theMaritimeBoundaryin the GuifofMaine Area,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,pp. 336-337,
para.222.
'4~ontinental~heiff~ib~anArabJamahirtjuiMalta),Judgment,Z.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 48, para.64.
"~ud~rnentof 16March2001,para.219. place in the world, unalterably. None of the decided cases suggest any solution of principleas to
how an island State such as Bioko mightbe given less than full effect, and of course there is the
further point that Equatorial Guinea is nota party to these proceedings. It is one thing to discount
the coasts of small islands belonging to States parties to a dispute. It is quite another to discount
the coastsof a largeisland State; a non-partyto the proceedings; andthis Court has never done so.
Rather, as we have shown in Ourwritten pleadings, youhave been notably careful to respect the
claimed positionsofthird States in maritime delimitation.
60. Mr. Vice-President,it is not just that Cameroonhas presented no argument whatever as
to how Bioko might be taken into accountas a relevant or specialcircumstance. The point goes
further. Itis very odd to talk abouta third State, interveningas a third State before the Court, as a
"relevant circumstance~~ at all. It is as if a husband wereto refer to his mother-in-law as a "relevant
circumstance"; we would al1know what wemeant of course, butit would not be a very creditable
remark. Professor Pellet referred to EquatorialGuinea7sclaims as exorbitant, but theyare at least
prima facie entitlements underthe law of thesea, and Cameroon has presented no theory by which
they canbe set aside. Mothers-in-law have entitlementstoo.
61.Finally, 1turn to the oil practice. This is undoubtedly a relevant circumstance,and for a
number of reasons. Before 1enumerate them, 1 should first note that Professor Kamto last week
did not deny that oil practice, provided it was open, public and lawful, could be a relevant
circumstance in maritime delimitation. Indeedhe argued that Nigeria's oil practice was not open,
public or lawful. 1have already dealtwiththat argument,which is quite frankly fanciful.
62.In any event, practiceof the parties,including oil practice, isplainly relevant,as you held
in ~unisia/~ib~T ah'~.only requirement is that the practice should be "sufficiently clear,
sustained and consistent", to usethe language of the Chamber in the Gulf of Mainecase2', or
"sufficiently unequivocal to constitute eitheracquiescenceor any helpful indication of any view of
either party as to what would be equitable differing in any way from the view advancedby that
26~ontinentalSheif (TunisiaILibyanArab Jarnahiriya),Judg1.C.J. Reports 1982, 71, para.96, p. 84,
para. 117.
"I.c.J. Reports 1984, p. 309,para. 146. party before theCourt", as you saidin ~ib~a/~alta~'. 1havealready shownthat the oil practice in
this areais,onany view, "sufficientlyclear, sustained andconsistent". Indeed it is unequivocal.
D. Conclusion: Cameroon's non-claim andNigeria' cslaim
63. Mr.Vice-President, Membersof the Court, 1 began this presentationby noting that
Cameron has yet presented no argument whatever fora maritime boundary properly so called,
beyondthe immediatearea of "point G. Its initial argument is thatthe boundaryshouldtakewhat
1might describeas a sharp right-hand turnat point G in order to regain the equidistance lineat
point H. Thatis a useful confirmationof the relevanceof equidistanceinshore,but of course there
is clear evidence ofacquiescenceinrelationtothe areasWestand south-westofthis point, and even
inshore, Carneroon's proposedline is flatly inconsistentwith the oil practice of the Parties; its
claim tomaritimeareasanywherenear pointHis purely notional.
64. Beyondpoint H, however, Cameroon'sline- bothin its orientation,its direction andits
underlined rationale - loses any semblanceofbeing a delimitation line based upon relevanc toasts
and relevantareas, and takes the form of a general maritime exclusionline operating unilaterally
against Nigeria. There isnothing more that needsto be saidasto the inadrnissibilityofthis line.
65. Nigeria reserves its position on any argumentsthat Carneroon may present next week
which wouldconcern actual maritime delimitation in the areawhich is actually in dispute between
the Parties, beingthe rather confined area which 1 depicted earlier in this presentation. In the
circumstances, because there is no argumentrelating to the allocationto Cameroon ofareas other
than on the basisof its global approach, it would inOurviewbe an appropriatedisposition ofthis
case if the Courtwere to reject Cameroon's "ligne équitable"on the basis that it doesnot involve
any actual maritime delimitation. 1 would respectfullyremindthe Court that your earlierdecision
tojoin the eighthpreliminary objectionto the merits is both consistent with this submission, and
*
allows fullscopefor this Courtsoto decide.
66. Altematively, if and to the extent that, as put forward by Cameroon,the line is
i
considered torepresentan actual maritime delimitationand notan exclusion line,in Oursubmission
the Courtshoulddecidethat the lineas a wholeentailsclaims againstthe Statesnotparties tothese
-- -
28c.J. Report1985, p.29, para.25. proceedings and is inadmissible. Cameroonis fond ofarguments about severability; its approach
is inseverable.
67. If, however,the Courtactually decidesto delimitthe maritime boundary,we respectfully
submit that jurisdiction to do so extends down to the Equatorial Guinea equidistance line and no
further.
68. Within the limits of its jurisdictionas between Nigeria and Cameroon, the appropriate
line, prima facie,is an equidistance line. The effects ofthat line, drawn inthe Rio del Rey on the
basis ofNigeria's sovereignty overthe Bakassi Peninsula,is as shownon the screen, and attab S in
your folders. Title overthe Bakassi Peninsulaitselfhas already beenestablished bymy colleagues.
Sothat is where westart.
69. Given the density of the oil practice of the Parties and the very substantial characterof
the vested rights existing onboth sides of the "common border", if the Court agrees with Nigeria
that this practice is determinative, it wouldbe appropriate for the Court to allow the Parties to
negotiate the precise location of the line in a way that would reflect each Party's existing
installations, as well as determiningthe tripoint with Equatorial Guinea ina manner binding upon
that State.
70. If, on the other hand, the Court were to hold that the oil practice here is not
determinative- and Cameroon apparentlyargues that it is not- and were to decide to proceed
with its own delimitation, there areno other relevant or special circumstances that would justifj
any modification of the boundary that would othenvise be drawn fiom the point on the coast
constituting the landboundary betweenNigeria andCameroon, in accordance withthe principle of
equidistance.
7 1.In particular,taking into account disproportionate coastal lengthsfavouring Nigeria, and
the impropriety - to put it at its lowest- of "discounting" the significantoffshore island of Bioko
belonging to the third Party, Equatorial Guinea, there are no special relevant circumstances
warranting a departure fiom the equidistance principle in Cameroon'sfavour, starting fiom the
point onthe coastwherethe landboundary terminates.
72. Mr. Vice-President, Membersof the Court. This is the end of the end of the beginning.
That concludes Nigeria's presentationin this first round on the maritime boundary. Tomorrowmoming,withyour permission,wewill turn to issuesof Stateresponsibility andcounter-claims. 1
thankyou foryour patientattention.
The VICE-PRESIDENT,Acting President: Thank you,Professor Crawford. This bringsto
a close this morning's hearings. The next Sittingwill be heldtomorrow moming at 10 o'clock.
The Courtwillnow rise.
TheCourtroseut 12.55am.
Audience publique tenue le jeudi 7 mars 2002, à 10 heures, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président, puis de M. Shi, vice-président, faisant fonction de président