Audience publique tenue le lundi 20 octobre 1997, à 11 h 40 , au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Weeramantry, vice-président, faisant fonction de président

Document Number
089-19971020-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
1997/23
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Non-Corrigé
Uncorrectecl

InternationalCourt Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

Publicsitting

held on 20 ûctober1997,at 11.40 a-m., at the Peace Palace,

Vice-&esident hbemmantzy, Acting Preçident,presiAing

in the case conceming Questionsof Intezpretation and Applicationof the
1971 MontrealConventionarisingfrcnntheAerial Incidentat Lockerbie

(LibyanArab Jamahiriya v. UnitedStates of America)

PreliminazyObjectians

VERBATlM RECORD

Audiencepublique

tenuele lundi 20octobre1997, à 11 h 40, au Palais de la Paix,

sous laprésidence deM. Weeramantry,vice-président
faisantfonctionde président

en 1 'affairerelative à des Questionsd'interprétationet dlapplicatian
de la conventionde &ntréal de 1971 résultantde l'incidentaérien de

Lockerbie (Jamahiriyaarabe libyennec. Etats-Unisd 'Amérique)

BrceptianspréliminairesPresent: Vice-PresidentWeeramantryA ,ctingPresident
President Schwebel
Judges Cda
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Rezek
Judgesad hoc SirRobertJennings
El-Kosheri

Registrar Valencia-OspinaPrésents : M. Weeramantry, vice-préside faisantfonctionde
présidenten l'affaire
M. Schwebel,présidentde la Cour
MM. Oda
Bedaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi

Fleisçhhauer
Korm.
Vereshchetin
Rezek,juges
Sir Robert Jennings
M. El-Kosher,ijuges ad hoc

M. Valencia-Ospina ,reffierIhe Cbwmment of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyaisrepresented by:

H. E. Mr. HamedAhrned Elhouderi,Ambassador, Secretaryof the People's
Officeof the Great SocialistPeople's LibyanArab Jamahiriya to
the Netherlands,

as Agent;

Mr. Mohamed A. Aljady,

Mr. Abdulhamid Raeid,

as Counsel;

Mr.Abdelrazeg El-MurtadiSuleiman, Professor of Public International
Law,Facultyof Law,University oB fenghazi,

Mr. IanBrownlie, C.B.E.,Q.C., F.B.A.,ChicheleProfessor of Public
InternationaL law,University of Oxford,

Mr. JeanSalmon,Professor of Law emeritus, Universitélibrede
Bruxelles,

Mr. EricSuy,Professor of InternationaL law,Catholic University of
Louvain(K. U. Leuven),

Mr. EricDavid,Professor of Law, Universitl éibrede Bruxelles,

as Counseland Aàvocates;

Mr. NicolasAngelet,Principal Assistant, Facultyof Law,Catholic
University of Louvain (K.U.Leuven),

Mrs.BarbaraDelcourt, Assistant, Facult of Social,Political and
EconomicSciences, Université librede Bruxelles;ResearchFellow,

Centreof InternationaL law andInstitute of EuropeanStudies,
Université librede Bruxelles,

Mr. Mohamed Awad,

as Advisers.

The -t of the UnitedStates of Americais represented by:

Mr. DavidR. Andrews,LegalAdviser, U.S.&partmentof State,

as Agent;

Mr.MichaelJ. Matheson, Principal DeputyLegalAdviser,U.S.Department
of State,

as Co-Agent;Le Gometnement de la Jamahiriyaarabe libyennesera représenté par :

S. Exc.M. HamedAhrned Elhouderi, ambassadeurs ,ecrétaire du bureau
populaire de la GrandeJamahiriya arabelibyenne populaire socialiste
aux Pays-Bas,

cme agent;

M. MohamedA. Aljady,

cme conseils;

M. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman,professeur dd eroitinternational
public à la facultéde droitde l'universitd ée Benghazi,

M. IanBrownlie, C.B.E.,Q.C., F.B.A., professeur dderoit international
public, titulaire de la chaireQ?ichele à l'universitdé'Oxford,

M. JeanSalmon, professeur émérit de droit à l'universitléibrede
Bruxelles,

M. Eric Suy,professeur de droitinternational à l'universitcéatholique
de Louvain (K.U.Leuven),

M. EricDavid,professeur dd eroit à l'universitl éibrede Bruxelles,

cm conseilset avocats;

M. NicolasAngelet,premier assistan àtla faculté dedroit de
l'Universitc éatholique de Louvai (K.U.Leuven) ,

Mme BarbaraDelcourt, assistante à la facultédes sciences sociales,
politiques et économiquesde l'Universitl éibre de Bruxelles,
collaboratrice scientifia quuCentrede droit internatione al
à l'Institut d'étudeseuropéennes dl e'Universitléibrede Bruxelles,

M. MohamedAwad,

cm conseil 1e..

Le Gowernement des Etats-Es d'Amérique serareprésenté par :

M. DavidR. Andrews,conseiller juridique du départementdlEtat
des Etats-Unis,

camne agent;

M. MichaelJ. Matheson, conseiller juridique adjop intncipaldu
département dlEtatdesEtats-Unis,

camne coagent; -6-

Mr. JohnR. Crook,Assistant LegaA ldviser,U.S. Departmentof State,

Mr. SeanD. Murphy,Counselorfor LegalAffairs,U.S.Embassy, The Hague,

Mr. OscarSchachter, Professorat the ColumbiaUniversitySchoolof Law,

Ms ElisabethZoller, Professorat the Universityof ParisII,

asCounsel andAdvocates;

Mr. JohnJ. Kim,Officeof the Legal Adviser,Departmentof State,

Mr. BrianMurtagh,U.S. Departmentof Justice,

as Counsel.M. JohnR. Crook,conseiller juridiqueadjointdu départementdlEtat
des Etats-Unis,

M. SeanD. Murphy,conseiller chargédes affaires juridiqueàs
l'ambassadedes Etats-Unisaux Pays-Bas,

M. OscarSchachter,professeur àla faculté dedroitde l'université
de Columbia,

Mme ElisabethZoller,professeurà l'universitéde Paris II,

cornnconseilset avocats;

M. JohnJ. Kim,du bureaudu conseiller juridiqu du départementd1Etat
des Etats-Unis,

M. BrianMutagh, du départementde la justicedes Etats-Unis,

cornnconseils. -8-

The ACTING PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets now to hear the second

round of oral submissionsby the United States of America,andthe first speakerwill be the Agent

of the United States.

Mr. ANDREWS:

1.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court. 1welcome the opportunity to respond to the

statementsmade bythe Governmentof Libyain responseto Ourargumentsin supportofthe United

States Preliminary Objections.

1.2.After listeningto the Libyanresponse, 1haveheard very littlethat is new andvery little

that is responsiveto the pointswe made lastweek. Wedemonstratedthat the Court shoulddispose
w
of the Libyan Application now at this stage. The Court lacksjurisdiction under the Montreal

Convention and, in any event, the claims made by Libyaare inadmissible. The Libyan response

largely ignored the oral submission made by the US team, and where it purported to respond, it

frequently distortedour positions. In its oral presentations, counsel for Libya revised some of its

earlierpositionsandthereby introducedimportantinconsistencies into Libya'scase. Theyreliedon

a number of different bodies of law, including the law of State responsibility, the peaceful

settlement of disputes, and human rights, al1 of which are outside the scope of this Court's

jurisdiction. Libyan counsel also repeatedmany of the sarne irrelevant and tendentious political

points that they raised in Libya'sattempt to obtain provisional measuresin 1992. In short, Libya
1
has not raisedanythingthatjustifies the continuationofthis casebeyondthe preliminaryobjections

stage.

1.3. Mr. President, the three speakers after me will examine in more detail the various

arguments and statements made by Libya'scounsel. My task here will be to respond briefly to

certain of the factually unsupportedstatementsthat weremade by Libya'scounsel in the course of

their presentations. Indeed, while this is my first appearancebeforethis honourableCourt,ust

confess surprise at the reliance placed by Ourdistinguished adversarieson speculative television

prograrns andothermediaaccountsconcerningthe Lockerbie incident.Fortunately,we do nothave

to delve into the factual accuracy of these materials, but,1 note that they are, in any event,

unsubstantiated and irrelevant to the issues before the Court. -9-

1.4.First, Mr. President, 1would liketo respondto Libya'scontinuedreference to supposed

threats of the use of force by the United States. The use of this emotional appeal is clearly

designedto supplementarguments lackingin legal content. Mr. Brownlielargely repeatsthe same

speech he gave on this subject in 1992 at the Court'shearing on Libya'srequest for provisional

measures. Mr. Brownlie's claims were unwarranted and irrelevant then, and they certainly are

now - five years later. 1 will not repeat al1 of the reasons why, but refer the Court to US

arguments made at the provisional measures stage of this case (CR 9214,pp. 55-57, in the case

concerning Questionsof InterpretationandApplicationof the 1971Montreal ConventionArising

FromtheAeriaZIncidentutLockerbie). Libya'sclaimsare based onahandful ofpublic statements

in 1992that simply confirmthat no decisionhad beenmade on any option,and that do not amount

to a threatof the use of force. TheUnited Stateshasthroughoutsoughta peaceful solutionthrough

action of the United Nations SecurityCouncil. It continuesto do so today, five years later,despite

Libya's continuedrefusal to comply with Council resolutions.

1.5.Second,Libya'scounsel referred to certain statements madeby regional organizations,

suggestinga lack of internationalsupportfor the SecurityCouncil'sdecisionswithregardto Libya.

As we have previously pointed out, the Security Council decisions were adopted by a broadly

representativeand properly constitutedCouncil. Many countries otherthan the United Statesand

the UnitedKingdomvoted in supportofthese resolutions. Moreover,inparagraph 13of resolution

748,the Councilprovidedfor a review ofthe sanctionsimposedon Libyaevery 120days. Through

16 such reviews - during which time the membershipof the Councilhas changed and included

membersofthe regionalorganizationsmentionedbyLibya - the sanctionshave remainedinplace.

In addition, during the five years that sanctions have been in effect, there has been widespread

adherenceto them by the international community. In anyevent, it is not for the Court to assess

the political supportthese sanctionsmay or may notenjoy; this is preciselythe sort ofcalculusthat

is lefi to the political organs such as the Security Council.

1.6. Mr. President, we will have three speakersand then 1will return to offer someclosing

remarks. Inthe course of Ourpresentations,we ask thatthe Court keepin mind certainunderlying

strands of Ourargument. First, it is not the United Statesthat is relyingon the SecurityCouncil

to precludethe Court fi-omexercising its properjudicial function; rather,it is Libyathat is seeking -10-

to annul clearand legallybinding Councildecisionsthroughan abuseofthe processes ofthis Court.

In its rush to get to the Court, Libya has failed to locate anyvalid claim under the Montreal

Convention, and, even if it had,the Council resolutions setforth the controlling law. Moreover,

theconsequenceofadoptingLibya's argumentswouldbeto disruptthe frameworkestablishedunder

theUnited Nations Charterfor addressingthreatsto internationalpeace andsecurity. Finally,Libya

has not put forth any rationale why the Courtshould prolongthis case and not dispose of Libya's

claims at thepreliminary objections stage. Mr. President,when al1is said and done, Libya'scase

is predicated on the groundless proposition thatit wasnlawfulfor the United States,when faced

withwhat itconsidereda threatto peace and security,to bringthe matterbeforethe UnitedNations.

*
1.7.Mr. President, 1now askthe Court's permission tocall Mr. John Crook to the podium.

The ACTINGPRESIDENT: Thankyou, Mr.Andrews. 1now cal1on Mr. Crookto address

the Court.

Mr. CROOK:

Montreai Conventionand Securify CouncilIssues

2.1. Mr. President, distinguished Members ofthe Court. Within the short time availableto

me this morning,1will discuss several issues regarding: (1) the Court'slackofjurisdiction under

theMontreal Conventionand (2) thestatusand effectof the SecurityCouncilresolutions. Nothing

the Court heard from the Libyan team last Friday affects the conclusion that the Court lacks

jurisdiction andthat Libya'sclaimsare inadmissible. However,afewpointscall for commentfrom

Ourside.

1. Montreal ConventionIssues

2.2. Mr. President, my comments on the Montreal Convention will be brief. We do not

believethat this Court hasjurisdiction underthe Convention,becausethere is no dispute regarding

its interpretation or application that falls within the scope of Article the dispute settlement

clause. The brevity of this part ofmy presentationoes not reflect any lesseningof our conviction

that the Court lacks jurisdiction. Instead,an be brief because Libya failed to respond to most

of the arguments made in Ourinitial presentation. - 11 -

2.3.Libya arguesthatthere obviouslyexistsa disputeundertheMontrealConventionbecause

Libya claims that the Convention applies to and regulates this situation while the United States

claims that itdoes not (Mr. David, CR97120,p.38, para. 4.7). This simplistic approachto what

constitutes a dispute, however, is inappropriate in light of the Court's recent jurisprudence,by

includingthe recent Oil Platformscase, where the Court found that "the Court cannot limit itself

to notingthat one of the Parties maintains thatsuch a dispute exists, andthe other denies it" (case

conceming Oil Platforms (IslamicRepublic of Iranv. United States), Preliminary Objections,

Judgment, 1C.J. Reports 1996, para. 16). It is also inappropriate in light of the language and

historyoftheCourt's mle onpreliminary objections,whichwe discussed lastweek.(CR97/19, pp.

47-51,paras. 6.8-6.22). The appropriate approach is forthe Court to consider at this stage whether

the provisionsof the Montreal Convention "laydown any noms applicable to this particular case

as we have shown the Montreal Convention does not (case conceming Oil Platforms (Islamic

RepublicofIran v. UnitedStates),PreliminaryObjections,Jwigment,I.C.J.Reports 1996.)

2.4. Libya further contends that even if the Oil Platformsapproach is applied, there is a

dispute underthe MontrealConventionbecauseLibya invokes provisionsof thetreaty that support

an alleged exclusive Libyan right to choose whether to "extradite or prosecute" (CR 97/20,

pp. 38-39,paras. 4.8-4.9, Mr. David). To that end, Libya announced for the first time last week

that it is relying on Artic1of the Convention. Libya, however, only touchedupon, butdoes not

fully address,the two fundamental propositionsof the United Statespresentedby Dr. Murphy last

week.

2.5. Our first proposition is that theMontreal Convention is not the exclusive means for

pursuingcriminaljurisdictionoverthosewho attackcivilaircraft. Rather,the Montreal Convention

isjust part, itisn additional componentin a broad mosaic of laws, conventions, andfora that are

available for addressing terrorist acts against civilian aircraft.fact, Libya concedes this point

when it acknowledged that the Montreal Convention does not expressly prohibit a State from

invoking a different mechanism than that envisaged in the Convention (CR 97/20, pp. 44-45,

para. 4.14,Mr. David).

2.6. Libya's theory is that any other mechanism,aside from Montreal, can be used only if it

doesnot setaside "ledroit commun",by which Libyaapparentlymeansnot customaryinternational - 12-

law but, rather, the Montreal Convention. This, too, is a significantconcession.is is because

the United States has not made use of any mechanism that is incompatible with therules of the

Montreal Convention. As Dr. Murphy explained,the Montreal Convention(like its predecessors,

the Tokyoand HagueConventions)is designedto increasethe numberof Stateswherejurisdiction

may be exercised over an offender. It is not designed to decreasethe ability of Contracting States

to exercise their own national criminaljurisdiction (CR 97/18, pp. 17-24, paras. 2.7-2.27)

2.7. Article 5,paragraph 3, oftheontreal Conventionmakesthis clear. It statesthat: "This

Convention does not exclude any criminaljurisdiction exercised inaccordancewith nationallaw."

The ordinary meaningof Article 5, paragraph 3, reinforced by its negotiatinghistory, makesquite

clearthatthe exerciseof national criminaljurisdiction isanalternativethat is fullycompatiblewith J

the "prosecute and extradite" mechanism of theMontreal Convention. Thus, under Libya'sown

theory of the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention, the United States position prevails.

Interestingly, Libya omitted fiom its oral presentation any reference to Article 5, paragraph 3.

2.8. The reason why Article 5, paragraph 3, preserves national criminal jurisdiction as a

means of combating aerial terrorism is readily apparent in the case now before the Court. The

chargesbrought againstthe two suspectsunderUS law (USPreliminaryObjections,para. 1.07)are

not limitedto Montreal Convention"offences". For example,they includethe crimeof conspiracy

(codified in United States Code, Title 18, section 371, reprinted in US Preliminary Objections,

Exhibit 7). In orderto maintainexistingmeansfor bringingsuspectstojustice, Stateswere leftfiee W

to exercise national criminaljurisdiction against persons who attack aircraft, whether or not the

particular charges involve "offences"within the meaning of the Convention.

2.9. The intent behind Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Montreal Convention is clear fromthe

negotiating history and associated materials regarding Article 3, paragraph 3, of the Tokyo

Convention,where the language prese~ing national criminaljurisdiction was first developed and

laterappropriatedfor use in the Montreal Convention(see,e.g., ICA0 SecretariatCommentaryon

theDraftConventionRelatingtoOffensesCommittedon BoardAircraft, Legal Committee, Twelfth

Session, LClWorking Draft No. 584 (1959); Message from the President of the United States

Transmitting The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committedon Board Aircraft

Signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963, Senate Exec. Doc. L, 90th Cong., 2d Sess (1968): - 13 -

"Paragraph3 providesthat this Conventiondoes not exclude any criminaljurisdiction exercised in

accordance with national law" and "was intended to reflect the fact that the jurisdiction over

offencesoracts committedon boardan aircrafiwhileinflightwas anadditionalconcurrentcriminal

jurisdictionwhicha Statecouldexercisewithoutprejudiceto other criminaljurisdictions that a State

might exercise under its national laws"; see also N. Joyner,Aerial Hijackingas anInternational

Crime pp. 136-138 (1974); A. Mendelsohn, In-FlightCrime: TheInternationaland Domestic

Picture Underthe TokyoConvention,53 Va. L. Rev. 509, 515 (explaining the use of a "mixed

basis" theory of jurisdiction in the Tokyo Convention,by which jurisdiction "may be predicated

upon the registration of the aircrafi, or uponany other basisprovidedfor in the municipallaw of

a contractingState")(emphasis added)).

2.10. Mr. President, the United States has never invoked the Montreal Convention in the

course of exercising its national criminaljurisdiction over the two Libyans. Libya contends that

this does not show the absence of a dispute under the Montreal Convention. Itcites the Court's

1988 Advisory Opinion on the United Nation Headquarters Agreement (CR 97/20, pp. 39-42,

para. 4.9, Mr.David). The case beforethe Courttoday, however, isverydifferent. Our argument

is not just that the United States did not invokethe Convention. Rather, it is that the Montreal

Convention does not and was never intended to preempt the exercise of Our national laws. US

exerciseof itsnationalcriminaljurisdiction, includingthe pursuit of diplomatic initiativesto obtain

custody of a suspect, cannot be regarded as potentially violating the Montreal Convention.

2.1 1.Our secondproposition is that a review of each of the articlescited by Libya does not

showthat any of them creates a right for Libya to prevent other Statesfiom seeking custody of an

offender. As we explained in Ourinitial presentation (CR97/18, pp. 24-31, paras. 2.28-2.47),al1

of these articles are designed to impose obligations on a State to take certain steps if an offender

tums up there. The steps that the State is obligedto take include eitherprosecuting or extraditing

the offender. These provisions, however, do not also impose obligations,expressly or implicitly,

on other States to refrain from taking actions pursuant to other global, regional, or national

instrumentsor in other fora to bring the offendertojustice. Moreover,when other articles of the

Montreal Conventionare taken into account, itis clear that the basicthrust of the Conventionis to - 14-

establishvariousforawhere an offendermightbe prosecutedandto allowStatesto workoutwhere

such prosecution shouldoccur, without any priority being givento onejurisdiction over another.

2.12. Libya'sreference for thet time to Article 1on Fridaydoes not changethis analysis.

Article 1 merely lists the categories of offences covered by the Convention, withoutcreating any
right by Libya to prevent other States from seeking custody of an offender.

2.13. Mr. President, Libya claims that the United States' resortto the SecurityCouncil

violates Libya'sallegedly exclusive right to prosecute or extradite. In the strongest terms, the

United States urges the Court not to accept this position. It could seriously harm the ability of

States toaise issues before the Security Council, the General Assembly, andother fora in many
-
important,sensitivereas (CR 97118, pp. 22-23, para. 2.23). Moreover,Libya'spositioniswholly

inconsistentwith the fundamental rights of States under the Charter. It should not be sanctioned
by this Court.

2.14. Libyaontends that the United States cannot be said to have met its obligationunder

Article 11 of the Montreal Convention. 1will not repeat al1of Ourpoints regardingthe general

nature of this obligation and its dependency on what is permissibleunder the national law of the

requested State (CR 97/18,pp. 28-31,paras. 2.39-2.47). However,1must stressthat US law,here

includingtheUnited StatesCodeandtheFederalRulesofCriminalProcedure,requiresaprosecutor

not to reveal sensitive evidence when doing so may compromise prosecutionof the case or may
prejudice the rights of the accused to a fair trial (United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment;
w
United StatesCode, Title 18,section 3500; US Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure,Rules 6 (e)

& 16).

2.15. At the same time, the United States has furnishedto Libya inthe indictmentdetailed

factual allegations regarding this situation, including: Libyan procurement of twenty prototype

timers; the storage of plastic explosives by one of the suspects in the Libyan Airlines Office in

Malta; airtravelto andfrom Malta bythe suspectson specified dates; diary entriesbyone suspect
about obtaining luggage tags from Airlta; and the departure of one suspect from Malta on

21 December 1988,using analias on a Libyan Airlines' flightat the same time as the boarding of

the AirMalta flight, which carried the unaccompaniedbag to Frankfthe bag that ultimately

destroyed Pan Am 103 (see US Preliminary Objections, Exhibit 1, Count One, paras. 1-22 and - 15 -

38-39). This informationprovidedample basis forLibyato conduct itsown investigationin Libya

had ittruly wished to do so. Article 11cannot be construed as obligatingthe United States to do

anything more.

2.16. In summary, Mr. President, Ourfundamental concems remain intact. The Montreal

Conventionis not the exclusivemeans by which offendersare broughttojustice. Yet, even if one

looksat the provisions of the Convention,it confersno right on Libyato prevent other States from

seekingcustody of an offenderwho turns up in Libya. There is no disputebeforeyou legitimately

involvingthe interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention.

II. Security Council Issues

2.17. As we explained last week, the Libyan application is not admissible because of the

binding actions taken by the Security Council in adopting resolutions 748 and 883. Under

Articles 25, 48 and 103 of the:Charter, Libya, the United States and the other Members of the

United Nations are obliged to cany these resolutions into effect. It is not the submission of the

issuetothe Security Councilthat is the heart ofthe position. It isthe factthatthe Security Council

has adopted binding resolutions. Professors David and Suy thus appear to misunderstand Our

position in this regard (CR 97/20, paras. 4.28 etseq.; CR 97/21, para. 5.5). - 16-

The Meaning of Resolutions 748and 883

2.18. The compulsory legal effect of resolutions 748 and 833 is clear. As 1explained last

week, resolution 731 established a series of demands that had beenexpressed in three documents

emanating from the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States as the

Council'sbenchmarks for assessing Libya's behaviourin relation to the bombing of PanAm 103

and of UTA 772. These included the demands that the individuals accused in the Lockerbie

bombings be transferred to the United Statesor the United Kingdom for trial. In resolution 731,

which did not draw upon the Council's binding powers, the Council simply "urged" Libya's

compliance with the demands of the three governments.

2.19. Resolution 748, a binding Chapter VI1 resolution, changed the legal situation. w

Paragraph 1 of resolution 748Statesthat the Council "Decidesthat the Libyan Government must

now compZywithout any further delay with paragraph 3 of resolution 731 regarding the requests

made" inthe three documentscontainingthe French,Britishand United Statesdemands (emphasis

added). The verb used is "decides". This showsthat this is a legally binding action ofthe Council

that must be carried into effect by Libya under Article 25 of the Charter. What must Libya do?

It "must now comply" with paragraph 3 of resolution 731. Libya must now respond fully and

effectively to the demands ofthe three governments. In resolution 731,the Council "urged". In

748, it decided that Libya must comply. Compliance does not mean counter-proposals. It means

action.

2.20. Professor Suy, however, asks the Court to read it differently. He resurrected an

argument that was rebutted at great length in Ourwritten PreliminaryObjections (US Preliminary

Objections, pp. 80 et seq.) and was subsequently not mentioned in Libya's mostrecent written

pleadings. This is the argumentthat the Court should reinterpretthe language of resolutions 748

and 883in new and unjustifiableways so as to relieve Libya of its dutyto transfer the accused for

trial and atthesarnetime to avoidthe need forthe Courtto explicitlyoverturn Libya'sresolutions.

Professor Suy contends (CR 97/21, pp. 5.19 et seq.) that the Security Council has not really

imposed a duty on Libya to transfer the accused individuals for trial in Scotland or the

United States. Rather, the Council only invited Libyato make proposals and negotiate withthe

Council in order to arrive at some procedurefor an eventual criminal trial agreeable to Libya. -17-

2.21. The SecurityCouncil does not see the ambiguity claimed by Libya. Professor Suy

claimedto find supportforhis reinterpretationin preambular paragraph 7 of resolution 883,which

"tooknote" of Libya'sstated intentionto encouragethe accused to appear for trial. His theory is

thatthe Council wouldnothave saidthis if it reallyfoundLibya's performanceto be unsatisfactory

and not in keeping with what the Council had required.

2.22. This ignores the central reality of resolution 883. Through that resolution, the

Security Council imposedsubstantialnew sanctionson Libya precisely because Libyahad not met

the Council'srequirements,particularly its obligationto transfer the accused fortrial. This is clear

throughout resolution 883. Its second preambular paragraph speaks of Libya'sfailure to comply.

Itsfourth preambular paragraphhighlightsthe Council'sdeterminationthat "thoseresponsible for

acts of international terrorism must be brought to justice". The first and second operative

paragraphs demand, again,that Libya comply withpast resolutions, imposestrong new sanctions

to encourage such compliance.

2.23. Operative paragraph 16of resolution 883 states explicitly what the Security Council

required. It says that the Council will consider immediate suspension of its sanctions "if the

Secretary-Generalreports to the Council that the Libyan Governmenthas assured the appearance

of thosecharged with thebombingofPan Am 103fortrial beforethe appropriateUnited Kingdom

or United States court". The Council could not be much more clear than that. Its resolutions

require the presence of the accused for trial, not Libyan counter-proposals.

2.24. Libya's proposed reinterpretation also flatly contradicts clear explanations of both

resolutiongiven when theSecurity Councilvotedonthem, when resolution 748was adopted. The

US representative spoke in terms that made clear that transfer for trial was required. He referred

to the need under it for Libya to "turn over the two suspects in the bombing fortrial either in the

United States or the United Klngdom" (SfPV.3063,31 March 1992,p. 66; US Exhibit 22). The

representative of Cape Verde explained his abstentionas partly based onthe fact that his country

did notpermit the extraditionof its nationals, and hewas thereforeconcernedby Security Council

measures inconsistent withthat principle (id., p. 46). The representativeof Hungaryexplained he

supported the resolution because he found Libya'sconduct - evidently including the sorts of - 18 -

negotiationsandcounter-proposalsdiscussedby the Libyan side - not to satisfythe requirements

of the Council'searlier resolution (id.,p. 76).

2.25. Similar statements were made when resolution 883 was adopted. The French

representativespoke then of the Council's requests that Libya"hand over the two suspects in the

attackon PanAm 103"(SPV.33 12,11November 1993,p. 42; US Exhibit33). The representative

of Spain spokeof the need forLibyato "do everythingnecessaryto ensure [hiswords]thatthe two

persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 do indeed appear before the Scottish

courts" (id., p.58). The representative of Venezuela spoke in similar terms (id., p. 62). These

supporters to the resolutions and in one case an abstainer, made clear what the resolutions

required - the transfer of the accused individuals for trial.

2.26. The proposed reinterpretation of the two Chapter VI1 resolutions is also quite

inconsistent with Libya's otherrecent positionsin this case. Before Professor Suy beganto speak

on Friday, Libyaportrayed the central issuebefore the Court as the Court's capacityto reviewand

annultheseresolutions. ThewholestructureandargumentofLibya'sObservationsandSubmissions

was in these terms. Thatdocumentmakes it abundantlyclearthat Libya understoodthe resolutions

to require the transfer of the accused for trial. Forample, paragraph3.1 thus statedthat "Libya

will show that the Court is perfectly weli able to examine the validity of SecurityCouncil

resolutionsandthere is nopointintakingrefugebehindthoseresolutions." Now, whywouldLibya

Saysuch things, unless it previously understoodclearly what the resolutions require?

2.27. The proposed reinterpretation is also inconsistent with the interpretations of the

resolutions adopted by others on the Libyan tearn. Professor Brownlie argued at some length

(althoughasMr. Mathesonwill show,not tovery greateffect)thattheCourtcanreviewthevalidity

of Security Council resolutions(CR 97/21, paras. 38, 44, 45, 61). Presumably he did so because

he saw the resolutions as requiring the transfer of the accused for trial, a requirementthat Libya

wished to set aside.

2.28. Mr. President, we do not Saythat one cannot cometo a better understandingof a legal

text through study and reflection. Butthe change of interpretationshere is so substantialand so

inconsistentwith the Applicant's previouspractice as to lead to serious doubts about itsvalidity.

TheproposedreinterpretationoftheSecurity Council'sresolutions doesnot conformtothelanguage - 19-

the Councilused, to the past understandingof the Parties, including Libya,the statementsmadeat

the time of adoption. The Council'sactionsin resolutions 748and 883wereclear andwere clearly

understood by Libya and the rest of the international community. These resolutions make clear

what Libya is obligedto do. There is no arnbiguity. There is certainly no reason forthis Courtto

decline to give the resolutions the effect the Security Council intended them to haveThe Court

should find Libya'sclaims inadmissible.

Attacks on the Powers andProcedures of the Council

2.29. Mr. President,this next sectionwill deal rather quickly with severalpoints, most made

by Professor David, attacking both the legal basis for the Security Council's actions and the

procedures followed by the Council. We anticipated and answered many of these in Our

presentations last week; the Libyan side did not reallyjoin issue with many of these arguments.

Should they decide to do so in their final rebuttal, the tactic would of course deny us the

opportunityto reply.

2.30. First,Professor DavidreiteratedLibya'sargumenttotheeffectthatthe Security Council

cannotalter any rights Libyahas underthe MontrealConventionunlessLibyaconsents(CR 97/20,

para. 4.14). 1 answered this line of argument last week (CR 97/19, pp. 9 et seq.). The

SecurityCouncil does have the power under the Charter, when acting under Chapter VII, to alter

existing rights under treaties. The consent of a State that is the target of measures under

Chapter VI1 is not required.

2.31. Professor David admittedthat the Council can sometimes affect rights under treaties

(CR 97/20, para. 4.18). The Lockerbie situation, however, is different in his view. It was not

sufficientlyextreme. Hence,the Council lackeda sufficientpredicateto act and accordingly, could

not validly exercise its Chapter VI1powers. Becausethe Security Councilcould notproperly act,

the Montreal Convention continuesto control. We fully answered this objection last week. The

Charter gives the Security Council, and not Libya, the power and the responsibilityto determine

whether there is a threat to peace and security and to determine what measures are necessaryin

response. We also showed how - although it is not legally relevant- there was ample - 20 -

justification for the Council'sactions (CR 97/19,paras. 3.57 et seq.). Libya did not respond at al1

to that part of my presentation.

2.32. Professor Davidalso repeatedLibya'sargumentsthat the MontrealConvention should

beviewed as superiortoLibya's obligationsunderthe Charterbecauseit isbotha lexposteriori and

alex specialis. Again, weshowed lastweek howthis analysisdisregardsthe centralposition of the

Charter in the post-war legal world (CR 97/19, pp. 10et seq.). It is also inconsistent with

Article 30, paragraph1,of the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. It would allow States

toevisceratethe CharterbyconcludingtreatiesinconsistentwithCharterprovisionsthey donotlike.

The Court should not adopt so dangerous a doctrine.

2.33. The samemust besaidforProfessor Salmon'sexhaustion ofremedies argument,aswas W

enlargedby Professor David(CR 97/20, para. 4.22). We showed lastweek whythe actions of the

Security CouncilunderChapter VI1arenotsubjectto arequirementforprior exhaustionof avenues

for peaceful dispute settlement (CR 97/19, p. 14). Professor Salmon did not respond to Our

analysis, instead invoking a 1972 Swiss legal opinion,that a State must refrain from imposing

sanctions until it has exhausted al1 available remedies for the peaceful settlement of disputes

(CR 97/20, para. 3.15).

2.34. It is not clear that the Swiss opinion reflects the law.The Award in the 1979

United States-FrenchCivilAviationArbitration showsthata Statecan inappropriatecircumstances

take unilateral measures that might otherwise be illegal to assist in bringing aboutthe settlement
w

of a dispute. But in any case, the Swiss opinion is irrelevant. It appears to be addressed to the

taking of countermeasures that would othenvise be illegal. It cannot be illegal for a State to

exercise its right under the Charter to apply to the Security Council for assistancein seeking the

peaceful resolution of aatter believed to threaten peace and security.

2.35.Professor David invokedthisargumentaswell,butnothinghesaidimpairsthe response

we made last week. Article 33 of the Charter did not require that Kuwait exhaustthe peaceful

means of dispute settlement with Iraq before it called on the Security Council for help under

Chapter VI1followingthe 1990invasion. ChapterVI1doesnot containan exhaustionof remedies

requirement. -21 -

2.36. The Libyan side has also sought to make much of Article 36, paragraph 3, of the

Charter,which providesthatinmakingrecommendationsforpeaceful settlementunder Chapter VI,

the Councilshouldtake intoconsiderationthat legaldisputes should "asa generalrule" be referred

to this Court. 1can do no more in responsethan to draw attentiontothe wordsused inthe Charter.

Thisprovision calls for the Councilto "take into consideration"the importantpotential role ofthis

Court in constructing recommendations under Chapter VI of the Charter. It is not a limit on the

power of the Court to act as required in a ChapterVI1situation.

TheRight to Apply to the Security Council

2.37. Mr. President, let me address here a recumng and somewhat imtating point madeby

Libya. BothProfessors Salmon and David denouncethe United States in ringingterms for failure

torespectinternationallawand forabusiveconduct. The core elementoftheirarguments,however,

is that it was abusive and contrary to international law for the United States to appeal to the

Securiiy Council to deal in a non-violent fashion with a situation seen by the United States and

other States to endanger peace and security. It cannot be that such conduct is a violation of

internationallaw. The United States,no less than any other State, has the rightunder the Charter

to bring such matters before the Council. It is not reasonable for Libya to denounce the

United States both for imagined threats of the use of force, and for seeking the peacefûl

involvementof the SecurityCouncil in accordance with the Charter.

2.38. Professor Salmonalsorepeated Libya'sargumentaboutofficialprejudgrnent, contending

thatthe accused cannotenjoya fair trial in Scotlandorthe United States. Lastweek, we described

in detail the human rights safeguards that would operate in any trial in the United States. The

Lord Advocate did so in greater detail for any trial that would take place in Scotland.

Professor Salmon did not address these United States or British explanations, instead repeating

Libya's pointsabout the supposed impossibilityof a fair trial. However, the position taken now is

inconsistentwith the views expressed in writing elsewhere by the governmentof Libya.

US Exhibit 31 includes the text of the 29 September 1993 letter fiom Mr. Almuntasser,

Secretaryof the GeneralPeople'sCommitteefor ForeignLiaison and International Cooperation,a

documentwhich Libya asked to have circulatedby the United Nations (US Exhibit 31,Annex II). - 22 -

That letter records Libya's views that the position, at least in Scottish courts, is "adequate and

acceptable" fromLibya'sstandpoint. Now, Professor Salmonnecessarily went todesperatelengths

to explain away this letter. He did not succeed indoing so.

2.39. Mr. President,1have come to the end. 1 again thank the Court for its courtesy and

attention. 1hope that 1have shownyou that nothing that was said by the Libyan side on Friday

affectsOurbasiccontentions,first,that this Courtdoes nothavejurisdictionbecauseof the absence

ofadisputeregardingthe interpretationorapplicationoftheMontreal Convention,and,second,that

Libya's claims are rendered inadmissible by the operation of binding resolutions of the

Security Council.

2.40. 1now suggest that the Court invite Professor Zoller to continue Ourrebuttal.

Thank you.

The ACTMG PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Crook. 1 now cal1on Professor Zoller to

address the Court.

Mme ZOLLER :

3.1. Monsieur le Président,Messieursde laCour, le Gouvernementdes Etats-Unisattendait

avec intérêltes arguments de la Libye sur la question des relations entre la Cour et le Conseil de

sécurité. Pourla raison très simplequ'avecce problème, nous sommes aucŒurde la demande

libyenne. Rappelons-nous, en effet, que ce que la Libye demande àla Cour, c'est le((respectde
w

[son] droitàce que la Conventionde Montréal nesoit pas écartéepar des moyens quiseraientau

demeurantencontradictionaveclesprincipesdelaChartedesNations Unies» (mémoire, p. 52,par.

3.3; les italiques sont de moi). Comme ces «moyens», ce sont les résolutionsdu Conseil de

sécurité,il est bien certain que pour satisfaire la demande libyenne, il fautr reprendre un

terme cher àla Libye - «écarter»ces moyens. Ce dont laLibye se plaint, c'estqu'onait «écarté»

la convention de Montréal;ce qu'ellevousdemande, c'est d'«écarter» lrésolutionsdu Conseilde

sécurité.A cejeu de l'«écarté», chacun choisit son droit, comm dans lejeu de cartes du même

nom où chaquejoueur peut, si l'adversaire l'accorde,écarter les cartesqui ne lui conviennentpas

et en recevoir de nouvelles (voir Le Grand Robert, Languefrançaise, tome 3, p. 724). En la

présente espèce, c'est exactement ce qula Libye sollicite de la Cour. - 23 -

3.2. La Libye vous demande de lui reconnaître le droit de choisir son droit. Et la raison

qu'elle invoque- parce qu'ilfaut bienun motifpourjustifier une prétentionaussi extravagan-e

c'est que ces résolutionssont entachéesd'excès depouvoir. C'est pourcela que la démarche

libyenne est d'uneaudace inouïe. C'est la premièrefois qu'unEtat vient devant la Cour pour lui

demander d'exercer un contrôle sur les actes du Conseil de sécurité. A ce formidable défi,le

Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a opposéune réponsenuancée. Il vous a expliquéque, pour des

raisonsquitiennent à larépartitiondescompétencescontentieusesetconsultatives,sivouspossédez

un pouvoirde contrôlejuridictïonnel sur lesactesdes organesde l'organisation,ce pouvoir nepeut

valablement s'exercerque dans un cadre consultatif. Le Gouvernementdes Etats-Unis se félicite

de voir que, tout au moins sur ce point, la Libyepartage nos vues. M. Brownlie,qui s'estprévalu

de la haute autorité doctrinalede sir Geralditzmaurice pour vous démontrerque vous aviez un

pouvoir de contrôle sur les actes du Conseilde sécurité,eu la main suffisammentheureuse pour

retenir des textes du grand juge anglais écrits en 1952et se référanjtustement à la procédure

consultative(CR 97/21,p. 36, par. 16,M. Brownlie). Pourcomblede bonheur,il enest de même

des analyses conduites par M. Skubiszewski,elles aussi, amplement rapportéespar M. Brownlie

(ibid., p. 39, par. 24). Pour les Etats-Unis,iln'estdonc pasdu tout questionque «la Course taise))

comme i'abrutalement asséné le conseilde laLibye,M. Suy (CR 97121,p. 16,par. 5.12, M. Suy;

les italiques sont dans le texte:). Il est questionque la Cour choisisse de parler dans un contexte

dignede sesfonctions detribunal etdenature à luidonnerl'assuranced'être entendueC. e contexte,

le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis pense qu'ilne peut être que celui de laprocédureconsultative.

3.3. La Libye n'apas répondu àcet argument. Ou plutôt, elle y a réponduen reformulant

sa demande, en en minimisant la portée. Pourelle, il ne s'agiraitpas du tout d'«annuler»les

décisionsdu Conseil de sécurité(CR 97/21, p. 19, par. 5.17, M. Suy); ilne serait question que de

les «interpréter» (ibid., CR 97/21, p. 27, par. 5.24); il ne s'agirait que d'«obtenir des

éclaircissements»(ibid., CR 97121,p. 15,par. 5.12). Mais de qui se moque-t-on? Pour satisfaire

la demandede la Libye, ilfautque laCour fassebien plus que d'interpréterlesrésolutions31,748

et 883 duConseil de sécurité.Il faut qu'ellelesécarte.C'estcela que la Libye demandeàla Cour.

Le conseil qui a parlé avantM. Suyvous l'atrès clairementrappelé. M. David vous a expliqué

qu'il s'agissait de «dire si, dans les circonstances de l'espèce,il est exact que les résolutions -24 -

invoquéesparles défendeurssont opposabZesà la Libye» (CR 97/20, p. 19,par. 4.43, M. David;

les caractères gras sont dansle texte, les italiques sont de moi).

«Opposables», Monsieur le Président. Retenonsbien le mot. Il méritequ'ons'y arrête.

Derrièreluise profile laremarquablehabilitéde notreadversairequi conàiprésenter entermes

anodins ce qui est en véune questioncapitale. La Libye vous fait croire sur un ton faussement

candide quetout ce qu'elle demande,c'est,non pasuneannulation,mais seulementunedéclaration

d'inopposabilité. Benoîte, ellevous explique qu'iln'ajamais été qpour elle de vous inviter

àtenir le rôle d'un censeurdu Conseil de sécurité.Elle vous demande seulem-ntdit-ell-

d'«interpréter» les résolutsu Conseil de sécurité. Pourun juriste formà la tradition de la
-
famille romano-germanique(civliawsystem),c'estun peu comme si ellevous disa:«Non, nous

ne cherchons pasà faire de vous un juge de l'excèsde pouvoir. Nous ne vous demandons pas

d'annulerl'actejuridique, nous vous demandons seulementde l'interprétercommepeut et doit le

faire lejuge ordinaire)). Bref, ellejoue sur une différenceimportante dans la traditionjuridique

continentale, la distinction entre l'inopposabilitéet la nullité.

3.4. Monsieur le Président,l'inopposabilitéetlanullité partagentlamêmenature l'unee

comme l'autrelasanctiond'unacte frauduleux. Maisc'estdans leurseffetsqu'ellessedifférencient

radicalement. L'inopposabilitéprive l'acte juridique d'effet seuleàel'égard decertaines

personnes(notammentlescréanciers)alorsque la nullitéconsistedans l'anéantissemenl'acteet

a des effets erga omnes. En présentantsa demande sur le terrain de l'opposabilité,elle veutvows

faire croire qu'ilne s'agitnullement pour vous de touàla validité des résolutidu Conseil

de sécurité.Il ne s'agiraitque de les priver d'eàl'égard de la Libye, tantentendu qu'elles

resteraientpar ailleurs valables en tous points. Mais ceraisonnementne tient pas,et ceciau moins

pour trois raisons.

3.5. En premier lieu, sur le plandes principes, l'effetdes résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité

. n'estpas divisible. Ou bienune résolutionest valablepourtous lesEtats, ou bien elle n'estvalable

pour aucun d'entre eux. Une résolutiondu Conseil de sécurité prisesur la base du chapitre

participe de la loi, pour ainsidire. En tant qu'elle est obligatoire,il est impossiblequ'elle puisse

être opposableàcertains Etats, maisnoàd'autres. En droit internationalcomme en droit interne,

la «loi» est la mêmepour tous soit qu'elle protège, soit qu'elle punisse.Elle ne peut pas être -25 -

opposable aux uns, inopposableaux autres. 11n'yaurait plus d'égalité entre les Etats s'ilen allait

différemment. C'estbien pourquoi vous ne pouvez pas satisfaire la demande libyenne. Vous ne

pouvez pas, sans introduire une divisibilité dansles effets des résolutions duConseil de sécurité,

dire qu'une résolution obligatoire estopposableà un Etat, mais non àun autre. Encore une fois,

ou bien les résolutionssontvalables pour tous, oubien ellesne sontvalables pour personne. Entre

les deux, il n'ya pas de moyen terme, contrairement à ce que tente de vous faire croire la Libye

en vous présentant l'inopposabilité comme une troisième voie entre l'absence de contrôle et

l'affirmationd'undroit de contrôlejuridictionnel.

3.6. En second lieu, sur le plan pratique, laprétention libyenne ne vous faire prononcer

qu'unesimple déclaration d'inopposabilité n'aaucun sens. Si les résolutions731, 748 et 883 du

Conseilde sécuriténe sonp tas opposables àla Libye,elles sontà toutes fins utiles privéesde tout

effetpratique. Ces résolutionssontadressées à la Libye intuitupersonae. C'est ellele destinataire

de ces actes. Si ces résolutionsne devaient plus luiêtre opposables, alors elles n'auraient lus

d'effetsjuridiques. Elles seraientécartéesexactementcommelerecherche laLibye,écartéescomme

si elles étaient entachéd'unexcès depouvoir. N'obligeantplus leur destinataire, les résolutions

seraientannuléesdefacto, maisnondejure. C'est bien pourquoi ladéclarationd'inopposabilité que

sollicitela Libye est la véritune déclarationde nullité etc'est pourquoi,au coeur de laprésente

affaire, il y a la question de savoir si vous avez ou non un pouvoir de contrôlejuridictionnel sur

les décisions des organes de l'organisation. Remercionsla Libye de nous avoir plantéle décor.

Nous sommes bien en présencedu tableau de René Magritte :«Ceci n'estpas une pipe.» Comme

lepeintre, la Libyeaffirme :((Cecin'estpas un recours en annulation)).Mais si,justement, c'estun

recoursen annulationparce que, pour satisfairelademande libyenne,il faudrait que vousdéclariez

les résolutions731,748 et 883 du Conseil de sécurité privées d'effe ptour leur destinataire, donc

emportant les mêmes effets que si vous prononciezleur nullité.

3.7.Latroisièmeraison qui exclut lathèselibyennede la simpledéclarationd'inopposabilité

tientà lanotionmême d'opposabilité .usensrigoureuxduterme, l'opposabilitéest l'aptitude d'un

acteà faire sentirdes effeàsl'égardde tiers. La notiond'opposabilitése conçoitparfaitementdans

le droitdes traités parcequ'ily a des tiers. Les traitéssontévidemmentinopposablesauxtiers (res

inter alios acta). Mais cette notion n'aaucun sens dans le droit de l'organisationinternationale. - 26 -

Les Etats Membres desNations Unies ne sontpas des «tiers»par rapport aux actes des organesde

l'organisation. Ce n'estpas en termes d'opposabilité, maisen termes d'obligationque se pose le

problème des rapports entre les Etatsmembres et les résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité. La Libye

est tenue par les actes qu'elleconteste. La question n'est doncpas de savoir si ces actes lui sont
opposables. Ils le sontnécessairementpuisqu'ilssont obligatoires. résulteque la demande

libyenne de déclarationen inopposabilité est sansobjet.

Monsieur le Président, Messieursj,e vous remercie de votre attention.

Avec votre permission Monsieurle Président,je vous prie de bienvouloir appelerre

M. Matheson.

The ACTING PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Zoller.1 give the floor now to

Mr. Matheson.

Mr. MATHESON:

Review ofCouncilDecisions; PreliminaryCharacterof US Objections

4.1. Mr. President,Distinguished Members of the Court, In my presentation this morning,

1will focus on two aspectsof Libya'sargumentsduring the first round of these proceedings: first,

concerning theauthoriîy of the Court to review decisions of the Security Council; and second,

conceming the preliminary character of the objections of the United States.
4.2. Mr. Crook has already shown, contrary to Libya's argument on Friday, that
-
resolutions 748 and 883do in fact obligate Libya to surrenderthe accused individualsfor trial in

the United States or the Unitedgdom,and that under the Charterthese resolutions supersede

any inconsistent obligations under the Montreal Convention. Professor Zoller has shown that

Libya's suggestionthat theCourtclarethese resolutions "inopposable"to Libya amounts in fact

to a request for annulment ofose decisions.

4.3. The United States, of course, has argued that the Court does not have the authority to
annul or invalidatedecisionsof the Council. In particular,the Court hasno authorityto review and

invalidatethe Council'sdeterminationthat a threatto the peace has occurredor its choiceof means

to deal with that threat under Chapter VII. 1 refer the Court in particular to the extensive - 27 -

argumentation of Professor Schachter that is contained in paragraphs 4.1 through 4.18 of the

Verbatim Recordfor 15 October.

4.4. In his presentation on Friday, Counsel for Libya did not address himself to

Professor Schachter'sarguments. Nor did he cite any case in which the Court had annulled a

decision of the Council or asserted the right to do so. Rather, he referred to a series of cases in

which the Court interpreted or applied Council decisions, or commented on the validity of such

decisions in the course of giving an advisory opinion. He suggested thatthese cases defeated a

principle of general "immunity"or "non-justiciability"of Councildecisions supposedly asserted

by the United Kingdom - and by inference, the United Statesas well.

4.5. Withrespect,we disagree. TheUnited Statesdoesnotassert thatthe Court is precluded

from applyingChapter VI1decisions of the Councilor assessingtheir legaleffect in the course of

deciding contentious cases within its jurisdiction. Nor do we assert that the Court would be

precluded from opining on the validity of Council decisions when properly asked to do so by a

request for an advisory opinion. Thus the Court cases cited by counsel for Libya are in no way

inconsistentwith anything argued by the United States,but ratherconfirm Ourview of the proper

scope of the Court's authority withrespect to Chapter VI1decisions of the Council.

4.6.CounselforLibyasuggestedthatsuchdistinctionsareimpossible,butgavenoconvincing

reason why this should be so. In particular, he ignored the significant differences between the

Court's contentious and advisory jurisdictions that were elaborated by Professor Zoller on

Wednesday (CR 97/19, pp. 32-45, paras. 5.1-5.17).

4.7. As Professor Schachter explained last Wednesday, the drafters of the Charter clearly

rejected proposals to give the Court the power to review decisions of the Council in contentious

cases, and the Court itself has recognizedthat itesnot have such a power. This does not mean

that the Council is infallibleor abovethe law. It simplymeans,as in many legal systems,that the

judicial authoritydoesnothaveasuperiorrightto overturndecisionsof the political authority. That

is the law and structure of the Charter, and attempts to evade that principle by invoking inherent

judicial powers must be rejected by the Court. To do otherwise, as Libya proposes, wouldplace

the Court in opposition to an essential element of the compact of 1945 that is embodied in the

Charter. - 28 -

4.8. Mr. President, 1 will now tum to Libya's arguments that the Objections of the

United States are not of a preliminary character. In its presentationon Friday, counsel for Libya

chose not to address the arguments presented on this point by the United States on Wednesday.

Therefore 1 can only refer the Court once again to the detailed argumentation found in

paragraphs 6.1 through 6.25 of the US presentation, which in Ourview completely answers the

Libyan arguments.

4.9. TheCourtwill recallthattheUnited Stateshassuggestedfourpossibleways of analysing

the present case, each of which results in the conclusion that the Libyan complaint should be

dismissedat thispreliminarystage. Ourfirst argument isthat the Court lacksjurisdiction overthe

claimsbrought by Libya, because Libya has not pointedto any conduct by the United Statesthat I

could possibly violate the Montreal Convention, and because any Libyan claim under the

Convention has been supersededby bindingdecisionsof the Security Council. Thisjurisdictional

argument is patently preliminary in character.

4.10. Our second argument is that Libya'sclaims are inadmissible since they are, on their

face,inconsistentwith bindingdecisionsofthe Council. The Court couldonly acceptthose claims

by reviewing and overturning the Council'sdecisions under Chapter VII, which we believe the

Court has no authority to do, and in any event, the Council's decisionsin the present case were

clearlylawful andwereabundantlyjustified bythe circumstances. Suchachallengeto admissibility

is also patently preliminary and within the scope of Article 79 of the Rules of Court.

4.11. Our thirdargument is that the Court shoulddeclineto grant the relief sought by Libya

because its claims have been rendered moot by decisions of the Council. In accordancewith the

Northern Cameroons case (case conceming The Northern Cameroons (Cameroonsv. United

Kingdom), PreliminaryObjections,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1963,p. 15), a decision of the Court

onthe Libyan claimsunderthe Montreal Convention wouldno longer haveany object or practical

effect in light of the decisions of the Council. Whetherthis isseen as an aspect of admissibility

or a separate grounds for objection, it is clearly preliminary in character under the Rules and

jurisprudence of the Court (CR 97/19, pp. 48-49).

4.12. Our fourth argument is that, even if the Court were to concludethat it has and should

exercisejurisdiction and that Libya'sclaims are admissible,the Court should nonetheless resolve -29 -

the case in substance now by deciding, as a preliminary matter, that the decisions of the Council

(which contain the law applicable to the situation)precludethe relief sought by Libya. We have

shownthat the Court has the authority to resolve the case on this basis at the preliminary phase,

andthat it shoulddo so in light:of the considerabledisadvantagesofconductingproceedingson the

merits that could have no purpose in light of the decisions already taken by the Council (see

CR 97/19, pp. 49, paras. 51-52).

4.13. The United States has already responded in detail to the Libyan argument, in its

Observations on the Preliminary Objections of the United States,that the US Objections are not

preliminary in character, because they would require the Court to consider matters of treaty

interpretationor other pointsof substantivelaw(CR 97/19, pp. 50-51). As we have shown,neither

theRules northejurisprudence oftheCourtsuggestthat suchmattersshouldbe avoidedindeciding

on preliminary objections, and in fact the Court hason recent occasionsenquired extensivelyinto

such matters in the course of ruling on preliminary objections.

4.14. Accordingly,the argumentpresentedby Counselfor Libyaon Friday,to the effectthat

theUS Objectionsare not preliminaryin characterbecause"thenature ofthe disputeis inextricably

bound up with the various issues of substance conceming the powers of the SecurityCouncil"

(CR97121, para. 65), is not correct. There is nothing in the Rules orjurisprudence of the Court

whichprecludes it fromconsideringpreliminaryobjectionsthat involveinterpretationoftheCharter

or analysis of the powers of the Council, and Libya has cited nothingthat would support such a

proposition. The legal effect of the decisions of the Council on the Libyan claims under the

Montreal Convention is a discrete legal question whichcan readily be resolved without involving

the Court in the factual and legal issues that would be presented at a merits phase. In the Oil

Platforms(case conceming OiYPlatforms(IslamicRepublic ofIranv. UnitedStates ofAmerica),

Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports1996) and Genocide (case concerning Application of the

ConventiononthePrevention and PunishmentoftheCrimeof Genocide,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports

1996) cases, the Court demonstratedthat nothing precludesit fromdealingwith such "substantive"

issues in disposing of preliminary objections.

4.15. A variation of this argumentwas presentedby counselforLibya on Friday - namely,

that certain of the Preliminary Objections of the United States in reality constitute merely a -30 -

"justificationof breaches oftreaty provisions"which, sayscounsel for Libya, "is clearlya question

of merits" (CR 97/21, paras. 74-78). Of course, the United States does not agree that Libya has

pointed to any conduct that could possibly constitute a breach by the United States of the

Montreal Convention,which isthe onlytreatyonwhichtheCourt'sjurisdiction couldevenarguably

be based.

4.16. Further,this is a basic mischaracterizationof the USreliminary Objections. The US

contentionthatthe Council'sdecisionshave supersededthe provisionsof the Montreal Convention

with respect to the investigation and trial of the accused in this case is notassertion that the

Council has justified a breach of the Convention, but that it has, in effect, substituted one set of

obligations for another. This is a classic preliminary question about the applicability of a source

of law which the Applicant alleges to have been breached. Nor is the Libyan argument a fair

characterizationof theUS contentionthat the Libyan claimsno longer haveany objector practical

effect, which is not the assertion of defenses to a treaty breach.

4.17. Butin anyevent, as we have shown,nothing inthe Rules orjurisprudence of the Court

precludes it from resolving a discrete issue at the preliminary phase merely because it has

substantive content or negates a substantive claim of the Applicant. Article 79 of theRules of

Court allows at the preliminary phase any "objectionthe decision uponwhich is requested before

any furtherproceedingsonthe merits",and permitsthe Courtto hear "al1questionsof lawand fact"

which bear on the issue. The Court should decide on whether to consider objections at the
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preliminary phase, not on the basis of arbitrary characterizationsof their substanceor type, but on

whethertheir considerationatthe preliminaryphase wouldassist inthe fair and efficientresolution

of the case. In the present case, no purpose would be served for the Court to conduct an arduous

merits proceeding, onlyto find that the case must in the end be dismissed on grounds that were

already established atthe preliminary phase.

4.18. Finally,on Friday counsel for Libyaattemptedto distinguishthe present case fromthe

Northern Cameroonscase for these purposesonthe groundsthat "thecircumstancesinthe present

case are in no way comparable" (CR 97/21, para. 59, Professor Brownlie). With respect, the

distinguishingelementscitedby counselfor Libyain no waynegatethesupportwhichtheNorthern

Cameroonsdecision gives to the comparable argument of the United States in the present case. - 31 -

NorthernCameroonsstandsforthe proposition thatwherethe relief soughtbythe Applicantwould

haveno practical effecton the rights and obligationsof the partiescauseof an interveningevent,

then ruling on the Applicant's claim wouldnot be within the properjudicial fùnction of the Court,

and insuch a case the Court should dismiss the claim at the preliminary stage, rather than labour

througha futile proceedingon the merits. This was true in the NorthernCameroonscase because

the TrusteeshipAgreementin questionhad beenterminatedby the General Assembly; it istrue in

the present case because any rights that Libya might have under the Convention have been

supersededby the SecurityCouncil. The fact that specificremedies havebeen requested by Libya

is irrelevant,ecausethoseremediesare eitherprecludedbythe Court'sdecisionsor would bemere

hypothetical declarationswithout practical purpose or effect.

4.19. Nor does it make any difference that the Council'sdecisions are, as Libya says, not

"irreversible". The hypothetical (and highly unlikely)possibility that the Council might at some

timerevokeresolutions 748and 883withoutresolvingthe matterofthetrial ofthe accusednomore

justifies aecision on the merits than the hypotheticalpossibility in the NorthernCameroonscase

that the General Assembly might have reversed itstermination of the Trusteeship Agreement.

4.20. What the Northern Cameroonscase shows is that the Court should not decide issues

in the abstract in a contentious case, but only in the context of present circumstances where that

decision has practical effect and a concrete factual setting. That propositionapplies equally well

to the present case,where a decision on the Libyan claims under the Montreal Convention could

have no concrete effect on the present rights and obligations of the Parties.

4.21. Mr. President,this concludesmypresentation. As always, 1amgratefulfor the Court's

attention and for the honour of appearing before it. 1 now suggest that the Court invite the

United StatesAgent, Mr. Andrews,to concludethe presentationofthe United Statesand to present

its forma1submission. Thank you,Sir.

The ACTING PRESIDENT: Thankyou, Mr. Matheson. Mr.Andrews, please. -32 -

Mr.ANDREWS:

5.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court,1will now offer a few brief closingremarks and

present the final submission of the United States. The speakers before me have dealtwith many

of the arguments raisedby the counsel for Libya and explained why these argumentsare incorrect

or, in many cases,simply irrelevant. There remains no impedimentforthe Courtto disposeofthis

case now, withoutthe need for further proceedings. 1 will not repeatthe substance ofthe earlier

presentations, but1will tryto place them in the context ofa few majorthemes that goto the heart

of this case.

5.2. First,as we indicated,the Court shoulddismissLibya's Applicationon the groundsthat

there is no dispute in this case regarding the interpretation or application of the Montreal

Convention. If the Court nevertheless believes it necessary to consider the relevance of the

Security CouncilresolutionstoLibya'sclaims,we notethatcounselforLibyahave madeconflicting

statementsaboutthe interpretationorreviewofCouncilresolutions. HoweverLibyancounseldress

their arguments, it is clear is that the ultimate object they seek is the annulment of binding

Security Council decisions through an abuse of the processes of this Court. As we have shown,

Libya referredto the Montreal Convention for the first time only after it was well known that the

draft of whatwas to become resolution 731was circulated tothe Members ofthe Council. Libya

filed its Applicationwith this Courton the sarnedaythatthe Secretary-Generalreportedthat Libya

had failed to comply with resolution 731. Libya also was aware that if it did not comply with
1

resolution 731,the Council would continue to examine the matter and consider further measures

to achieve Libyancompliance. In short, Libyafirst attemptedto use itsApplication forprovisional

measures as a way to disruptthe ongoing processes of the Council in addressingwhat itperceived

to be a threat to peace and security. Having failed in that attempt, Libya nowumsto the Court,

some five yearslater, to achievesomekind ofjudicial "stampof approval"on itscontinuingrefusa1

to complywiththose binding Councildecisions. This second attemptlikewiseshouldbe rejected.

The three Security Council resolutions (731, 748, and 883) reflect a process of discussion,

negotiation, debate, anddecision by the Council in the pursuit of its Charter responsibilities,and

they remain inplace pursuantto the regular reviews of the Council right up until today. The Court

should not countenanceLibya's attemptto disrupt this process. -33 -

5.3. Second, the consequence of adopting Libya's arguments would be to disrupt the

frameworkestablishedundertheUnited NationsCharterforaddressingthreatstointernationalpeace

and security. The Charter specifically assigns to the Council the power to determine what is a

threatto peaceand security andwhat measures shouldbe taken to addressthat threat. The fiamers

of the Charterdirectly consideredthe possibilityofjudicial review of bindingCouncil decisionsat

the San Francisco Conferenceand rejected such an approach. Accordingly,the proper role for the

Courtis notto "secondguess"the Council'sdeterminationshere,but,atmost,to exerciseitsjudicial

functionandapply the goveming law-the Councilresolutions. The Libyancounsels'distortions

notwithstanding,the United States is not sayingthat the Court cannot interpretCouncilresolutions

under any circumstances. Nor do we contestthat the Council is obligedto act in accordancewith

thePurposesand Principlesofthe Charterand withinthe limitsof itspower. Instead,we are saying

that the Court cannot annul binding decisions made by the Council in the context of this case.

5.4. Third,the Court should decidethe case now. None of Libya'sclaims can reasonablybe

said to fa11within the terms of the MontrealConvention. This is readily apparent at this stage in

the proceedings, and need not be held over to another stage. Even if the Court finds it has

jurisdiction in this case,the ultimate outcomeis clear. The Security Councilresolutions speak for

themselves. There is no mistaking, by anyone, includingLibya,that Libya is directed to surrender

the accused individualspromptly for trial in the United States or United Kingdom. The Council's

decisionsare obligatoryon Libya and the Council'sdeterminationasto the groundsfor its decision

and its required action are matters left to the discretion of the Council. Whatever questions are

raised in this respect can be dealt with by the Court in the present phase ofthis case. There is no

reason for the Court to put off its decision. A subsequent hearing to deal with possible questions

of interpretation would be an unnecessary prolongationof a case that has gone on far too long.

There is no doubt that the law of the United Nations Charter applies and that the Council

resolutions are clear, specific, and legally binding.

5.5. In closing,emphasize again that the Court should dismiss this case under any one of

four analyses: (1) that it lacksjurisdiction under the Montreal Convention,(2) that even if it had

jurisdiction, Libya'sclaimsare inadmissible,(3) that it shoulddeclineto grantthe relief soughtby

Libya becausethese claims have been renderedmoot by the Council's decisions, and(4) even if it - 34 -

hadjurisdiction and the ability othenvise to hear this case, it shouldnevertheless resolvethe case

in substance now by deciding, as a preliminary matter, that the Council'sdecisions preclude the

relief soughtby Libya. At the end of the day, Mr. President, Libya'scase is based onone amazing

proposition- that it was unlawfulfor the United States,when facedwith what it consideredto be

a threat to peace and security, to bring theter before the United Nations. The ironyin this is

ailtoo apparent. Formanyyears,theUnited Stateshasbeencriticizedfortakingactionunilaterally,

only to find that its efforts to address a serious situation through recourse to

United Nations-authorized, non-forcible sanctions would also be charged as an unlawful act.

5.6. Mr. President, distinguishedMembers of the Court1 thank you for your attention and

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patience. It has been a special privilege for me topear before this Court for the first time in

these proceedings, particularly in a case that has great significance for the maintenance of

international peace and security and collective responses to State-sponsoredterrorism.

5.7.1 now have the honour to confirm that the final submission of the United States of

America remains as set out in its Preliminary Objections,mely: the United States of America

requests that the Court uphold the objectionsof the United Statesto the jurisdiction of the Court

anddeclineto entertainthe caseconcerningQuestionsofInterpretationandApplicationofthe1971

Montreal Conventionarisingfrom the Aerial Incidentat Lockerbie (LibyanArabJamahiriyav.

United Statesof America). Thank you.

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The ACTING PRESIDENT: Thank youvery much, Mr. Andrews. TheCourtwill meet on

Wednesdayto hear the second round of oral submissions by Libya. The Court is now adjourned.

TheCourt rose at 1p.m.

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le lundi 20 octobre 1997, à 11 h 40 , au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Weeramantry, vice-président, faisant fonction de président

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