Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2023/19
International Court
Cour internationale
of Justice
de Justice
THE HAGUE
LA HAYE
YEAR 2023
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 27 September 2023, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Donoghue, presiding,
in the case concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation:
32 States intervening)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2023
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 27 septembre 2023, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M
me
Donoghue, présidente,
en l’affaire relative à des Allégations de génocide au titre de la convention pour la prévention
et la répression du crime de génocide (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie ;
32 États intervenants)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
- 2 -
Present:
President Donoghue
Judges Tomka
Abraham
Yusuf
Xue
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Salam
Iwasawa
Nolte
Charlesworth
`
Brant
Judge ad hoc Daudet
Registrar Gautier
- 3 -
Donoghue, présidente
Présents : M
me
MM. Tomka
Abraham
Yusuf
mes
M
Xue
Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Salam
Iwasawa
Nolte
me
M
Charlesworth
M. Brant, juges
M. Daudet, juge ad hoc
M. Gautier, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of Ukraine is represented by:
HE Mr Anton Korynevych, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
as Agent;
Ms Oksana Zolotaryova, Director General for International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Marney L. Cheek, Covington & Burling LLP, member of the Bars of the Supreme Court of the
United States and the District of Columbia,
Mr Jonathan Gimblett, Covington & Burling LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia
and the State of Virginia, solicitor of the Senior Courts of England and Wales,
Mr Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale Law School, member of the
Bars of the State of New York and the District of Columbia,
Mr Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Professor at the University of Paris Nanterre, Secretary-General of
The Hague Academy of International Law, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
member of the Paris Bar, Sygna Partners,
Mr David M. Zionts, Covington & Burling LLP, member of the Bars of the Supreme Court of the
United States and the District of Columbia,
as Counsel and Advocates;
HE Mr Oleksandr Karasevych, Ambassador of Ukraine to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr Oleksandr Braiko, Department of International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Ms Anastasiia Mochulska, Department of International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Mr Dmytro Kutsenko, Department of International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,
Ms Mariia Bezdieniezhna, Counsellor, Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Paris Aboro, Covington & Burling LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York and of the
Bar of England and Wales,
Mr Volodymyr Shkilevych, Covington & Burling LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Mr Paul Strauch, Covington & Burling LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and the
State of California,
Ms Gaby Vasquez, Covington & Burling LLP, member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
- 5 -
Le Gouvernement de l’Ukraine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Anton Korynevych, ambassadeur itinérant, ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
comme agent ;
me
M
Oksana Zolotaryova, directrice générale du département de droit international, ministère des
affaires étrangères de l’Ukraine,
comme coagente ;
me
M
Marney L. Cheek, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême
des États-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M. Jonathan Gimblett, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’État de Virginie, solicitor près les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du
pays de Galles,
M. Harold Hongju Koh, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire Sterling, faculté de
droit de l’Université de Yale, membre des barreaux de l’État de New York et du district de
Columbia,
M. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, professeur à l’Université Paris Nanterre, secrétaire général de l’Académie
de droit international de La Haye, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international, membre du
barreau de Paris, cabinet Sygna Partners,
M. David M. Zionts, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême
des États-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Oleksandr Karasevych, ambassadeur de l’Ukraine auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Oleksandr Braiko, département de droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères de
l’Ukraine,
me
M
Anastasiia Mochulska, département de droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères de
l’Ukraine,
M. Dmytro Kutsenko, département de droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères de
l’Ukraine,
me
M
Mariia Bezdieniezhna, conseillère, ambassade de l’Ukraine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Paris Aboro, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York et
du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Volodymyr Shkilevych, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de
New York,
M. Paul Strauch, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia
et de l’État de Californie,
me
M
Gaby Vasquez, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP, membre du barreau du district de Columbia,
- 6 -
Ms Jessica Joly Hébert, member of the Bar of Quebec, PhD candidate at CEDIN, University Paris
Nanterre,
as Counsel;
Ms Caroline Ennis, Covington & Burling LLP,
as Assistant.
The Government of the Russian Federation is represented by:
HE Mr Gennady Kuzmin, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
HE Mr Alexander Shulgin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
HE Ms Maria Zabolotskaya, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations,
as Agents;
Mr Hadi Azari, Professor of Public International Law at the Kharazmi University of Tehran, Legal
Adviser to the Center for International Legal Affairs of Iran,
Mr Alfredo Crosato Neumann, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,
member of the Lima Bar,
Mr Jean-Charles Tchikaya, member of the Paris and Bordeaux Bars,
Mr Kirill Udovichenko, Partner, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
Mr Sienho Yee, Changjiang Xuezhe Professor of International Law and Director of the Chinese
Institute of International Law, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, member of the Bars of
the United States Supreme Court and the State of New York, member of the Institut de droit
international,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Dmitry Andreev, Counsel, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
Mr Konstantin Kosorukov, Head of Division, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
as Counsel;
Mr Mikhail Abramov, Senior Associate, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
Mr Yury Andryushkin, First Secretary, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
Ms Victoria Goncharova, First Secretary, Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
Ms Anastasia Khamenkova, Expert, Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation,
- 7 -
me
M
Jessica Joly Hébert, membre du barreau du Québec, doctorante au CEDIN, Université Paris
Nanterre,
comme conseils ;
me
M
Caroline Ennis, cabinet Covington & Burling LLP,
comme assistante.
Le Gouvernement de la Fédération de Russie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Gennady Kuzmin, ambassadeur itinérant du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Fédération de Russie,
S. Exc. M. Alexander Shulgin, ambassadeur de la Fédération de Russie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. M
me
Maria Zabolotskaya, représentante permanente adjointe de la Fédération de Russie
auprès des Nations Unies,
comme agents ;
M. Hadi Azari, professeur de droit international public à l’Université Kharazmi à Téhéran, conseiller
juridique auprès du centre des affaires juridiques internationales d’Iran,
M. Alfredo Crosato Neumann, Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement de
Genève, membre du barreau de Lima,
M. Jean-Charles Tchikaya, avocat aux barreaux de Paris et de Bordeaux,
M. Kirill Udovichenko, associé, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
M. Sienho Yee, professeur de droit international à Changjiang Xuezhe, directeur de l’Institut chinois
de droit international, Université des affaires étrangères de Chine à Beijing, membre des barreaux
de la Cour suprême des États-Unis et de l’État de New York, membre de l’Institut de droit
international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Dmitry Andreev, conseil, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
M. Konstantin Kosorukov, chef de division au département juridique, ministère des affaires
étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
comme conseils ;
M. Mikhail Abramov, collaborateur senior, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
M. Yury Andryushkin, premier secrétaire au département juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères
de la Fédération de Russie,
me
M
Victoria Goncharova, première secrétaire, mission permanente de la Fédération de Russie
auprès de l’Organisation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques,
me
M
Anastasia Khamenkova, experte, parquet général de la Fédération de Russie,
- 8 -
Mr Stanislav Kovpak, Principal Counsellor, Department for Multilateral Human Rights Cooperation,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Ms Marina Kulidobrova, Associate, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
Ms Maria Kuzmina, Head of Division, Second CIS Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation,
Mr Artem Lupandin, Associate, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
Mr Aleksei Trofimenkov, Counsellor, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation,
Ms Kata Varga, Associate, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
Mr. Nikolay Zinovyev, Senior Associate, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
as Advisers;
Ms Svetlana Poliakova, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
as Assistant.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is represented by:
Ms Wiebke Rückert, Director for Public International Law, Foreign Office of the Federal Republic
of Germany,
HE Mr Cyrill Jean Nunn, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr Lukas Georg Wasielewski, Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Mr Caspar Sieveking, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Johannes Scharlau, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Marius Gappa, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of Australia is represented by:
Mr Jesse Clarke, General Counsel (International Law), Attorney-General’s Department,
as Agent;
HE Mr Gregory Alan French, Ambassador of Australia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
- 9 -
M. Stanislav Kovpak, conseiller principal au département pour la coopération multilatérale pour les
droits de l’homme, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
me
M
Marina Kulidobrova, collaboratrice, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
me
M
Maria Kuzmina, cheffe de division au deuxième département de la communauté d’États
indépendants, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie,
M. Artem Lupandin, collaborateur, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
M. Aleksei Trofimenkov, conseiller au département juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Fédération de Russie,
me
M
Kata Varga, collaboratrice, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
M. Nikolay Zinovyev, collaborateur senior, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
comme conseillers ;
me
M
Svetlana Poliakova, cabinet Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners,
comme assistante.
Le Gouvernement de la République fédérale d’Allemagne est représenté par :
me
M
Wiebke Rückert, directrice de la section de droit international public, ministère des affaires
étrangères de la République fédérale d’Allemagne,
S. Exc. M. Cyrill Jean Nunn, ambassadeur de la République fédérale d’Allemagne auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents ;
M. Lukas Georg Wasielewski, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République fédérale
d’Allemagne,
M. Caspar Sieveking, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Johannes Scharlau, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Marius Gappa, ambassade de la République fédérale d’Allemagne au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de l’Australie est représenté par :
M. Jesse Clarke, General Counsel (droit international), services de l’Attorney-General,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Gregory Alan French, ambassadeur d’Australie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
- 10 -
Mr Stephen Donaghue, KC, Solicitor-General of Australia,
Ms Kate Parlett, member of the Bar of England and Wales, Twenty Essex Chambers,
Ms Belinda McRae, member of the Bar of England and Wales, Twenty Essex Chambers,
Ms Emma Norton, Acting Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
Ms Katherine Arditto, Second Secretary (Legal Adviser and Consul), Australian Embassy in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr Sam Gaunt, Multilateral Policy Officer, Australian Embassy in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the Republic of Austria is represented by:
HE Mr Konrad Bühler, Ambassador, Legal Adviser, Federal Ministry for European and International
Affairs of the Republic of Austria,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Katharina Kofler, Legal Adviser, Embassy of the Republic of Austria in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Haris Huremagić, Legal Officer, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of the
Republic of Austria,
Ms Viktoria Ritter, Legal Officer, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of the
Republic of Austria,
Ms Céline Braumann, Adviser,
Mr Gerhard Hafner, Adviser,
Ms Karoline Schnabl, Embassy of the Republic of Austria in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium is represented by:
Mr Piet Heirbaut, Jurisconsult, Director-General of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Belgium,
as Agent;
HE Mr Olivier Belle, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Belgium to the international
institutions in The Hague,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Sabrina Heyvaert, General Counsel, Directorate for Public International Law,
Ms Pauline De Decker, Attachée, Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of Belgium to the
international institutions in The Hague,
Ms Laurence Grandjean, Attachée, Directorate for Public International Law,
Ms Aurélie Debuisson, Attachée, Directorate for Public International Law.
- 11 -
M. Stephen Donaghue, KC, Solicitor-General d’Australie,
me
M
Kate Parlett, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles, Twenty Essex Chambers,
me
M
Belinda McRae, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles, Twenty Essex Chambers,
me
M
Emma Norton, juriste principale par intérim, services de l’Attorney-General,
me
M
Katherine Arditto, deuxième secrétaire (conseillère juridique et consule), ambassade d’Australie
au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Sam Gaunt, spécialiste des politiques multilatérales, ambassade d’Australie au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République d’Autriche est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Konrad Bühler, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique, ministère fédéral des affaires
européennes et internationales de la République d’Autriche,
comme coagent ;
me
M
Katharina Kofler, conseillère juridique, ambassade de la République d’Autriche au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Haris Huremagić, juriste, ministère fédéral des affaires européennes et internationales de la
République d’Autriche,
me
M
Viktoria Ritter, juriste, ministère fédéral des affaires européennes et internationales de la
République d’Autriche,
me
M
Céline Braumann, conseillère,
M. Gerhard Hafner, conseiller,
me
M
Karoline Schnabl, ambassade de la République d’Autriche au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique est représenté par :
M. Piet Heirbaut, jurisconsulte, directeur général des affaires juridiques, ministère des affaires
étrangères du Royaume de Belgique,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Olivier Belle, représentant permanent du Royaume de Belgique auprès des institutions
internationales à La Haye,
comme coagent ;
me
M
Sabrina Heyvaert, conseillère générale, direction du droit international public,
me
M
Pauline De Decker, attachée, représentation permanente du Royaume de Belgique auprès des
institutions internationales à La Haye,
me
M
Laurence Grandjean, attachée, direction du droit international public,
me
M
Aurélie Debuisson, attachée, direction du droit international public.
- 12 -
The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria is represented by:
Ms Dimana Dramova, Head of the International Law Department, International Law and Law of the
European Union Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria,
as Agent;
HE Mr Konstantin Dimitrov, Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Raia Mantovska Vassileva, Legal Adviser, Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
Ms Monika Velkova, Third Secretary.
The Government of Canada is represented by:
Mr Alan H. Kessel, Assistant Deputy Minister and Legal Adviser, Global Affairs Canada,
as Agent;
Mr Louis-Martin Aumais, Director General and Deputy Legal Adviser, Global Affairs Canada,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Rebecca Netley, Executive Director, Accountability, Human Rights and United Nations Law
Division, Global Affairs Canada,
Mr Hugh Adsett, Ambassador-Designate of Canada to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr Simon Collard-Wexler, Counsellor, Embassy of Canada in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr Kristopher Yue, Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is represented by:
Ms Mary-Ann Stavrinides, Attorney of the Republic, Law Office of the Republic of Cyprus,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Joanna Demetriou, Counsel of the Republic A’, Law Office of the Republic of Cyprus,
Mr Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford.
The Government of the Republic of Croatia is represented by:
Ms Gordana Vidović Mesarek, Director-General for European and International Law, Ministry of
Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia,
as Agent;
- 13 -
Le Gouvernement de la République de Bulgarie est représenté par :
me
M
Dimana Dramova, cheffe du département du droit international, direction du droit international
et du droit européen, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de Bulgarie,
comme agente ;
S. Exc. M. Konstantin Dimitrov, ambassadeur de la République de Bulgarie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
me
M
Raia Mantovska Vassileva, conseillère juridique, ambassade de la République de Bulgarie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
me
M
Monika Velkova, troisième secrétaire.
Le Gouvernement du Canada est représenté par :
M. Alan H. Kessel, sous-ministre adjoint et conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires mondiales du
Canada,
comme agent ;
M. Louis-Martin Aumais, directeur général et conseiller juridique adjoint, ministère des affaires
mondiales du Canada,
comme coagent ;
me
M
Rebecca Netley, directrice exécutive, direction de la responsabilisation, des droits de la personne
et du droit onusien, ministère des affaires mondiales du Canada,
M. Hugh Adsett, ambassadeur désigné du Canada auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Simon Collard-Wexler, conseiller, ambassade du Canada au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Kristopher Yue, deuxième secrétaire, ambassade du Canada au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Chypre est représenté par :
me
M
Mary-Ann Stavrinides, Attorney of the Republic, bureau de l’Attorney General de la République
de Chypre,
comme coagente ;
me
M
Joanna Demetriou, Counsel of the Republic A’, bureau de l’Attorney General de la République
de Chypre,
M. Antonios Tzanakopoulos, professeur de droit international public, Université d’Oxford.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Croatie est représenté par :
me
M
Gordana Vidović Mesarek, directrice générale chargée du droit européen et du droit
international, ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes de la République de Croatie,
comme agente ;
- 14 -
Ms Anamarija Valković, Head of Sector for International Law, Ministry of Foreign and European
Affairs of the Republic of Croatia,
as Co-Agent.
The Government of the Kingdom of Denmark is represented by:
HE Ms Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen, Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs (the Legal
Adviser), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Denmark,
as Agent;
HE Mr Jarl Frijs-Madsen, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Denmark to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Martin Lolle Christensen, Head of Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of
Denmark,
Mr Victor Backer-Gonzalez, Legal Adviser, Royal Embassy of Denmark in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Anna Sofie Leth Nymand, Intern, Royal Embassy of Denmark in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of the Kingdom of Spain is represented by:
Mr Santiago Ripol Carulla, Professor of International Public Law, Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
Barcelona,
as Agent;
HE Ms Consuelo Femenía Guardiola, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Emilio Pin Godos, International Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of
Spain,
Mr Juan Almazán Fuentes, Legal Adviser, Embassy of the Kingdom of Spain in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of the Republic of Estonia is represented by:
Ms Kerli Veski, Director General of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Estonia,
as Agent;
HE Mr Lauri Kuusing, Ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Dea Hannust.
- 15 -
me
M
Anamarija Valković, cheffe du service de droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères
et européennes de la République de Croatie,
comme coagente.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume du Danemark est représenté par :
S. Exc. M
me
Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen, ambassadrice, sous-secrétaire aux affaires juridiques
(conseillère juridique), ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume du Danemark,
comme agente ;
S. Exc. M. Jarl Frijs-Madsen, ambassadeur du Royaume du Danemark auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Martin Lolle Christensen, chef de section, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume du
Danemark,
M. Victor Backer-Gonzalez, conseiller juridique, ambassade royale du Danemark au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
me
M
Anna Sofie Leth Nymand, stagiaire, ambassade royale du Danemark au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume d’Espagne est représenté par :
M. Santiago Ripol Carulla, professeur de droit international public, Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
Barcelone,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M
me
Consuelo Femenía Guardiola, ambassadrice du Royaume d’Espagne auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagente ;
M. Emilio Pin Godos, conseiller juridique pour le droit international, ministère des affaires
étrangères du Royaume d’Espagne,
M. Juan Almazán Fuentes, conseiller juridique, ambassade du Royaume d’Espagne au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République d’Estonie est représenté par :
me
M
Kerli Veski, directrice générale du département juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères de
l’Estonie,
comme agente ;
S. Exc. M. Lauri Kuusing, ambassadeur de la République d’Estonie auprès du Royaume des PaysBas,
comme coagent ;
me
M
Dea Hannust.
- 16 -
The Government of the Republic of Finland is represented by:
Ms Kaija Suvanto, Director General, Legal Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Finland,
as Agent;
Ms Tarja Långström, Deputy Director, Unit for Public International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Finland,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Johanna Hossa, Legal Officer, Unit for Public International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Finland,
Ms Verna Adkins, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Finland in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of the French Republic is represented by:
Mr Diégo Colas, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French
Republic,
as Agent;
HE Mr François Alabrune, Ambassador of the French Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Hervé Ascensio, Professor, at the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr Pierre Bodeau-Livinec, Professor at the University Paris Nanterre,
Ms Maryline Grange, Associate Professor in Public Law at the Jean Monnet University in SaintEtienne,
University
of
Lyon,
Ms Anne-Thida Norodom, Professor at the University Paris Cité,
Mr Nabil Hajjami, Assistant Director for Public International Law, Directorate of Legal Affairs,
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic,
Ms Marion Esnault, Legal Consultant, Directorate of Legal Affairs, Ministry for Europe and Foreign
Affairs of the French Republic,
Mr Stéphane Louhaur, Legal Counsellor, Embassy of the French Republic in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Jade Frichitthavong, Chargée de mission for Legal Affairs, Embassy of the French Republic in
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Emma Bongat, intern, Legal Service, Embassy of the French Republic in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
- 17 -
Le Gouvernement de la République de Finlande est représenté par :
me
M
Kaija Suvanto, directrice générale du service juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République de Finlande,
comme agente ;
me
M
Tarja Långström, directrice adjointe de la section de droit international public, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la République de Finlande,
comme coagente ;
me
M
Johanna Hossa, juriste de la section de droit international public, ministère des affaires
étrangères de la République de Finlande,
me
M
Verna Adkins, deuxième secrétaire, ambassade de la République de Finlande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République française est représenté par :
M. Diégo Colas, directeur des affaires juridiques, ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères de
la République française,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. François Alabrune, ambassadeur de la République française auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Hervé Ascensio, professeur à l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne,
M. Pierre Bodeau-Livinec, professeur à l'Université Paris Nanterre,
me
M
Maryline Grange, maîtresse de conférences en droit public à l’Université Jean Monnet à Saint-
Étienne, Université de Lyon,
me
M
Anne-Thida Norodom, professeure à l’Université Paris Cité,
M. Nabil Hajjami, sous-directeur du droit international public, direction des affaires juridiques,
ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères de la République française,
me
M
Marion Esnault, consultante juridique, direction des affaires juridiques, ministère de l’Europe
et des affaires étrangères de la République française,
M. Stéphane Louhaur, conseiller juridique, ambassade de la République française au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
me
M
Jade Frichitthavong, chargée de mission juridique, ambassade de la République française au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Emma Bongat, stagiaire au service juridique, ambassade de la République française au Royaume
des Pays-Bas.
- 18 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
Ms Zinovia Chaido Stavridi, Legal Adviser, Head of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Hellenic Republic,
as Agent;
HE Ms Caterina Ghini, Ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Martha Papadopoulou, Senior Legal Counselor, Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Hellenic Republic,
Ms Evangelia Grammatika, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the
Hellenic Republic in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr Konstantinos Kalamvokidis, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Hellenic Republic in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of Ireland is represented by:
Mr Declan Smyth, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland,
as Agent;
Mr Frank Groome, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Ireland in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
HE Mr Brendan Rogers, Ambassador of Ireland to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Michelle Ryan, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland,
Ms Louise Hartigan, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Ireland in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of the Italian Republic is represented by:
Mr Stefano Zanini, Head of the Service for Legal Affairs, Diplomatic Disputes and International
Agreements, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic,
as Agent;
HE Mr Giorgio Novello, Ambassador of the Italian Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Attila Massimiliano Tanzi, Professor of International Law at the University of Bologna,
3 Verulam Buildings,
Mr Alessandro Sutera Sardo, Attaché Legal Affairs, Embassy of the Italian Republic in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
- 19 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
me
M
Zinovia Chaido Stavridi, conseillère juridique, cheffe du département juridique, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la République hellénique,
comme agente ;
S. Exc. M
me
Caterina Ghini, ambassadrice de la République hellénique auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagente ;
me
M
Martha Papadopoulou, conseillère juridique principale, département juridique, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la République hellénique,
me
M
Evangelia Grammatika, ministre plénipotentiaire, cheffe de mission adjointe, ambassade de la
République hellénique au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Konstantinos Kalamvokidis, deuxième secrétaire, ambassade de la République hellénique au
Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de l’Irlande est représenté par :
M. Declan Smyth, conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Irlande,
comme agent ;
M. Frank Groome, chef de mission adjoint, ambassade d’Irlande au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Brendan Rogers, ambassadeur d’Irlande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Michelle Ryan, conseillère juridique adjointe, ministère des affaires étrangères de l’Irlande,
me
M
Louise Hartigan, cheffe de mission adjointe, ambassade d’Irlande au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République italienne est représenté par :
M. Stefano Zanini, chef du service des affaires juridiques, des différends diplomatiques et des
accords internationaux, ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale de la
République italienne,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Giorgio Novello, ambassadeur de la République italienne auprès du Royaume des PaysBas,
comme coagent ;
M. Attila Massimiliano Tanzi, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Bologne, cabinet
3 Verulam Buildings,
M. Alessandro Sutera Sardo, attaché aux affaires juridiques, ambassade de la République italienne
au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
- 20 -
Mr Luigi Ripamonti, Counsellor, Service for Legal Affairs, Diplomatic Disputes and International
Agreements, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic,
Ms Ludovica Chiussi Curzi, Senior Assistant Professor of International Law, University of Bologna,
Mr Gian Maria Farnelli, Associate Professor of International Law, University of Bologna.
The Government of the Republic of Latvia is represented by:
Ms Kristīne Līce, Legislation and International Law Adviser to the President of the Republic of
Latvia,
as Agent;
Mr Edgars Trumkalns, Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Republic of Latvia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Mārtiņš Paparinskis, Professor of Public International Law, University College London, member
of the International Law Commission, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr Mamadou Hébié, Associate Professor of International Law, University of Leiden, member of the
Bar of the State of New York,
Mr Vladyslav Lanovoy, Assistant Professor in Public International Law, Université Laval,
Mr Cameron Miles, member of the English Bar, 3 Verulam Buildings,
Mr Joseph Crampin, Lecturer of International Law, University of Glasgow,
Mr Luis Felipe Viveros, PhD candidate, University College London,
Ms Elīna Luīze Vītola, Deputy Agent of the Government, Office of the Representative of Latvia
before International Human Rights Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Latvia,
Mr Arnis Lauva, Head of the International Law Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Latvia,
Ms Katrīna Kate Lazdine, Jurisconsult at the International Law Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Latvia.
The Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein is represented by:
HE Mr Pascal Schafhauser, Ambassador and Head of Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to
the Kingdom of Belgium,
as Agent;
Mr Sina Alavi, Senior Adviser.
- 21 -
M. Luigi Ripamonti, conseiller, service des affaires juridiques, des différends diplomatiques et des
accords internationaux, ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale de la
République italienne,
me
M
Ludovica Chiussi Curzi, professeure adjointe principale de droit international à l’Université de
Bologne,
M. Gian Maria Farnelli, professeur associé de droit international à l’Université de Bologne.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Lettonie est représenté par :
me
M
Kristīne Līce, conseillère en législation et droit international auprès du président de la
République de Lettonie,
comme agente ;
M. Edgars Trumkalns, chargé d’affaires par intérim de la République de Lettonie au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Mārtiņš Paparinskis, professeur de droit international public, University College London,
membre de la Commission du droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Mamadou Hébié, professeur associé de droit international, Université de Leyde, membre du
barreau de l’État de New York,
M. Vladyslav Lanovoy, professeur adjoint de droit international public, Université Laval,
M. Cameron Miles, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, cabinet 3 Verulam Buildings,
M. Joseph Crampin, chargé d’enseignement en droit international, Université de Glasgow,
M. Luis Felipe Viveros, doctorant, University College London,
me
M
Elīna Luīze Vītola, agente adjointe du gouvernement, bureau du représentant de la République
de Lettonie devant les organisations internationales des droits de l’homme, ministère des affaires
étrangères de la République de Lettonie,
M. Arnis Lauva, chef de la division du droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères de la
République de Lettonie,
me
M
Katrīna Kate Lazdine, jurisconsulte, division du droit international, ministère des affaires
étrangères de la République de Lettonie.
Le Gouvernement de la Principauté du Liechtenstein est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Pascal Schafhauser, ambassadeur et chef de mission de la Principauté du Liechtenstein
auprès du Royaume de Belgique,
comme agent ;
M. Sina Alavi, conseiller principal.
- 22 -
The Government of the Republic of Lithuania is represented by:
Ms Gabija Grigaitė-Daugirdė, Vice-Minister of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania, Lecturer at
Vilnius University,
as Agent;
Mr Ričard Dzikovič, Head of Legal Representation at the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of
Lithuania, Lecturer at Mykolas Romeris University,
Ms Ingrida Bačiulienė, Head of the International Treaties Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Lithuania,
as Co-Agents;
Mr Pierre d’Argent, Professor at the University of Louvain (U.C. Louvain), member of the Institut
de droit international, member of the Bar of Brussels,
Mr Gleider Hernández, Professor at the University of Leuven (K.U. Leuven),
Ms Inga Martinkutė, Advocate at MMSP, member of the Lithuanian Bar Association, Lecturer at
Vilnius University,
Mr Christian J. Tams, Professor at the University of Glasgow and at Leuphana University, Lüneburg,
HE Mr Neilas Tankevičius, Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Mindaugas Žičkus, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is represented by:
Mr Alain Germeaux, Conseiller de légation adjoint, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry for Foreign
and European Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
as Agent;
Ms Léa Siffert, Legal Adviser at the Embassy of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Deputy Agent;
HE Mr Mike Hentges, Ambassador of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of the Republic of Malta is represented by:
Mr Christopher Soler, State Advocate, Republic of Malta,
as Agent;
HE Mr Mark Pace, Ambassador of the Republic of Malta to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
- 23 -
Le Gouvernement de la République de Lituanie est représenté par :
me
M
Gabija Grigaitė-Daugirdė, vice-ministre de la justice de la République de Lituanie, chargée
d’enseignement à l’Université de Vilnius,
comme agente ;
M. Ričard Dzikovič, chef de la représentation juridique, ministère de la justice de la République de
Lituanie, chargé d’enseignement à l’Université Mykolas Romeris,
me
M
Ingrida Bačiulienė, cheffe de la division des traités internationaux, ministère des affaires
étrangères de la République de Lituanie,
comme coagents ;
M. Pierre d’Argent, professeur à l’Université de Louvain (U.C. Louvain), membre de l’Institut de
droit international, membre du barreau de Bruxelles,
M. Gleider Hernández, professeur à l’Université de Louvain (K.U. Leuven),
me
M
Inga Martinkutė, avocate au cabinet MMSP, membre du barreau de Lituanie, chargée
d’enseignement à l’Université de Vilnius,
M. Christian J. Tams, professeur à l’Université de Glasgow et à l’Université Leuphana de Lunebourg,
S. Exc. M. Neilas Tankevičius, ambassadeur de la République de Lituanie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Mindaugas Žičkus, chef de mission adjoint, ambassade de la République de Lituanie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est représenté par :
M. Alain Germeaux, conseiller de légation adjoint, directeur des affaires juridiques, ministère des
affaires étrangères et européennes du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg,
comme agent ;
me
M
Lea Siffert, conseillère juridique à l’ambassade du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme agente adjointe ;
S. Exc. M. Mike Hentges, ambassadeur du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Malte est représenté par :
M. Christopher Soler, avocat de l’État, République de Malte,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Mark Pace, ambassadeur de la République de Malte auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
- 24 -
Ms Ariana Rowela Falzon, Lawyer, Office of the State Advocate,
Ms Margot Ann Schembri Bajada, Counsellor, Legal Unit, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
and Trade of the Republic of Malta,
Ms Marilyn Grech, Legal Officer, Legal Unit, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and Trade
of the Republic of Malta,
Mr Matthew Grima, Deputy Head of Mission, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Malta in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Mary Jane Spiteri, Research and Administrative Officer, Embassy of the Republic of Malta in
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr Clemens Baier, Research and Administrative Officer, Embassy of the Republic of Malta in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the Kingdom of Norway is represented by:
Mr Kristian Jervell, Director General, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom
of Norway,
as Agent;
Mr Martin Sørby, Deputy Director General, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Norway,
as Co-Agent;
HE Mr Bård Ivar Svendsen, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
Ms Kristin Hefre, Minister Counsellor for Legal Affairs, Royal Norwegian Embassy in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
Ms Dagny Marie Ås Hovind, Adviser, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Norway,
Ms Frida Fostvedt, Adviser, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of
Norway,
Mr Zaid Waran, Intern, Legal Affairs, Royal Norwegian Embassy in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of New Zealand is represented by:
Ms Victoria Hallum, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand,
as Agent;
Mr Andrew Williams, Chief International Legal Adviser (acting), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade of New Zealand,
- 25 -
me
M
Ariana Rowela Falzon, avocate, bureau de l’avocat de l’État,
me
M
Margot Ann Schembri Bajada, conseillère au département juridique, ministère des affaires
étrangères et européennes et du commerce de la République de Malte,
me
M
Marilyn Grech, juriste, département juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères et
européennes et du commerce de la République de Malte,
M. Matthew Grima, chef de mission adjoint, conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de Malte au
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Mary Jane Spiteri, chargée d’administration et d’études, ambassade de la République de Malte
au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Clemens Baier, chargé d’administration et d’études, ambassade de la République de Malte au
Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Norvège est représenté par :
M. Kristian Jervell, directeur général du département des affaires juridiques, ministère des affaires
étrangères du Royaume de Norvège,
comme agent ;
M. Martin Sørby, directeur général adjoint du département des affaires juridiques, ministère des
affaires étrangères du Royaume de Norvège,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Bård Ivar Svendsen, ambassadeur du Royaume de Norvège auprès du Royaume des PaysBas
et
du
Grand-Duché
de
Luxembourg,
me
M
Kristin Hefre, ministre-conseillère aux affaires juridiques, ambassade du Royaume de Norvège
au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Dagny Marie Ås Hovind, conseillère au département des affaires juridiques, ministère des
affaires étrangères du Royaume de Norvège,
me
M
Frida Fostvedt, conseillère au département des affaires juridiques, ministère des affaires
étrangères du Royaume de Norvège,
M. Zaid Waran, stagiaire aux affaires juridiques, ambassade du Royaume de Norvège au Royaume
des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande est représenté par :
me
M
Victoria Hallum, sous-ministre, ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur de
la Nouvelle-Zélande,
comme agente ;
M. Andrew Williams, conseiller juridique en chef (par intérim) pour le droit international, ministère
des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur de la Nouvelle-Zélande,
- 26 -
HE Ms Susannah Gordon, Ambassador of New Zealand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Ms Elana Geddis, Barrister, Kate Sheppard Chambers, Wellington,
Mr Toby Fisher, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
Ms Jane Collins, Senior Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand,
Ms Hannah Frost, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr Bastiaan Grashof, Policy Adviser, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is represented by:
Mr René J. M. Lefeber, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Ms Mireille Hector, Deputy Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Annemarieke Künzli, Legal Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Marina Brilman, Legal Counsel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Robin Geraerts, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the Republic of Poland is represented by:
HE Ms Margareta Kassangana, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Łukasz Kułaga, Counsellor of the Legal and Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Poland,
Ms Paulina Dudzik, First Secretary and Legal Adviser, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Deputy Agents.
The Government of the Portuguese Republic is represented by:
Ms Patrícia Galvão Teles, Director of the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Portuguese Republic, and member of the International Law Commission,
as Agent;
- 27 -
S. Exc. M
me
Susannah Gordon, ambassadrice de Nouvelle-Zélande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents ;
me
M
Elana Geddis, avocate, Kate Sheppard Chambers (Wellington),
M. Toby Fisher, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),
me
M
Jane Collins, conseillère juridique principale, ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce
extérieur de la Nouvelle-Zélande,
me
M
Hannah Frost, cheffe de mission adjointe, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Bastiaan Grashof, conseiller politique, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas est représenté par :
M. René J.M. Lefeber, conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
me
M
Mireille Hector, conseillère juridique adjointe, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagente ;
me
M
Annemarieke Künzli, jurisconsulte, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Marina Brilman, jurisconsulte, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Robin Geraerts, juriste, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Pologne est représenté par :
S. Exc. M
me
Margareta Kassangana, ambassadrice de la République de Pologne auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagente ;
M. Łukasz Kułaga, conseiller, département du droit et des traités, ministère des affaires étrangères
de la République de Pologne,
me
M
Paulina Dudzik, première secrétaire et conseillère juridique, ambassade de la République de
Pologne au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agents adjoints.
Le Gouvernement de la République portugaise est représenté par :
me
M
Patrícia Galvão Teles, directrice du département des affaires juridiques, ministère des affaires
étrangères de la République portugaise, et membre de la Commission du droit international,
comme agente ;
- 28 -
HE Ms Clara Nunes dos Santos, Ambassador of the Portuguese Republic to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Mateus Kowalski, Director of the International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Portuguese Republic,
Mr Henrique Azevedo, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Portuguese Republic in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Ana Margarida Pinto de Seabra, Legal Intern, Embassy of the Portuguese Republic in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of Romania is represented by:
HE Ms Alina Orosan, Ambassador, Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Romania,
HE Mr Lucian Fătu, Ambassador of Romania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr Filip-Andrei Lariu, Attaché, Legal Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania,
Mr Eugen Mihuţ, Minister Plenipotentiary and Legal Counsellor, Embassy of Romania in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is represented by:
Ms Sally Langrish, Legal Adviser and Director General Legal at the Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Office, United Kingdom,
as Agent;
Mr Paul McKell, Legal Director at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, United
Kingdom,
as Co-Agent;
the Rt. Hon. Victoria Prentis, KC, MP, Attorney General,
Mr Ben Juratowitch, KC, member of the Bar of England and Wales, the Paris Bar and the Bar of
Belize, Essex Court Chambers,
Ms Philippa Webb, Professor of Public International Law, King’s College London, member of the
Bar of England and Wales, and the Bars of the State of New York and Belize, Twenty Essex
Chambers,
Ms Naomi Hart, member of the Bar of England and Wales, Essex Court Chambers,
Ms Susan Dickson, Legal Counsellor and Head of Europe and Human Rights Team, Legal
Directorate, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, United Kingdom,
Ms Ruth Tomlinson, Deputy Director and Head of International Law, Attorney General’s Office,
- 29 -
S. Exc. M
Clara Nunes dos Santos, ambassadrice de la République portugaise auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
me
comme coagente ;
M. Mateus Kowalski, directeur du service de droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères de
la République portugaise,
M. Henrique Azevedo, chef de mission adjoint, ambassade de la République portugaise au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Ana Margarida Pinto de Seabra, stagiaire en droit, ambassade de la République portugaise au
Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la Roumanie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M
me
Alina Orosan, ambassadrice, directrice générale des affaires juridiques, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Roumanie,
S. Exc. M. Lucian Fătu, ambassadeur de Roumanie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents ;M. Filip-Andrei Lariu, attaché à la direction des affaires juridiques,
ministère des affaires étrangères de la Roumanie,
M. Eugen Mihuţ, ministre plénipotentiaire et conseiller juridique, ambassade de Roumanie au
Royaume des Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord est représenté par :
me
M
Sally Langrish, conseillère juridique et directrice générale des affaires juridiques, ministère des
affaires étrangères, du Commonwealth et du développement du Royaume-Uni,
comme agente ;
M. Paul McKell, directeur juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères, du Commonwealth et du
développement du Royaume-Uni,
comme coagent ;
la très honorable M
me
Victoria Prentis, KC, MP, Attorney General,
M. Ben Juratowitch, KC, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles ainsi que des
barreaux de Paris et du Belize, Essex Court Chambers,
me
M
Philippa Webb, professeure de droit international public, King’s College (Londres), membre du
barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles ainsi que des barreaux de New York et du Belize,
Twenty Essex Chambers,
me
M
Naomi Hart, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles, Essex Court Chambers,
me
M
Susan Dickson, conseillère juridique et cheffe de l’équipe chargée de l’Europe et des droits de
l’homme, direction des affaires juridiques, ministère des affaires étrangères, du Commonwealth
et du développement du Royaume-Uni,
me
M
Ruth Tomlinson, directrice adjointe et cheffe de la section de droit international, bureau de
l’Attorney General,
- 30 -
Mr Michael Boulton, Assistant Legal Adviser, Europe and Human Rights Team, Legal Directorate,
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, United Kingdom.
The Government of the Slovak Republic is represented by:
Mr Metod Špaček, Chief of Staff at the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic,
as Agent;
Mr Peter Klanduch, Director of the International Law Department, Ministry of Foreign and European
Affairs of the Slovak Republic,
as Co-Agent;
HE Mr Juraj Macháč, Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Zuzana Morháčová, Assistant Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the
Slovak Republic,
Mr Jozef Kušlita, First Secretary, Embassy of the Slovak Republic in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Peter Nagy, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Slovak Republic in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of the Republic of Slovenia is represented by:
Mr Marko Rakovec, Director-General for International Law and Protection of Interests, Ministry of
Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia,
as Agent;
HE Mr Jožef Drofenik, Ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Daniel Müller, Lawyer at FAR Avocats,
Mr Andrej Svetličič, International Law Department, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the
Republic of Slovenia,
Ms Silvana Kovač, Directorate for International Law and Protection of Interests, Ministry of Foreign
and European Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia,
Ms Maša Devinar Grošelj, Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Nina Bjelica.
The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden is represented by:
Ms Elinor Hammarskjöld, Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Sweden,
as Agent;
- 31 -
M. Michael Boulton, conseiller juridique adjoint, équipe chargée de l’Europe et des droits de
l’homme, direction des affaires juridiques, ministère des affaires étrangères, du Commonwealth
et du développement du Royaume-Uni.
Le Gouvernement de la République slovaque est représenté par :
M. Metod Špaček, chef de cabinet du bureau de la présidente de la République slovaque,
comme agent ;
M. Peter Klanduch, directeur du département du droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères
et européennes de la République slovaque,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Juraj Macháč, ambassadeur de la République slovaque auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Zuzana Morháčová, conseillère juridique adjointe, ministère des affaires étrangères et
européennes de la République slovaque,
M. Jozef Kušlita, premier secrétaire, ambassade de la République slovaque au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Peter Nagy, deuxième secrétaire, ambassade de la République slovaque au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Slovénie est représenté par :
M. Marko Rakovec, directeur général du droit international et de la protection des intérêts, ministère
des affaires étrangères et européennes de la République de Slovénie,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Jožef Drofenik, ambassadeur de la République de Slovénie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Daniel Müller, avocat, cabinet FAR Avocats,
M. Andrej Svetličič, département du droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères et
européennes de la République de Slovénie,
me
M
Silvana Kovač, direction du droit international et de la protection des intérêts, ministère des
affaires étrangères et européennes de la République de Slovénie,
me
M
Maša Devinar Grošelj, ambassade de la République de Slovénie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
me
M
Nina Bjelica.
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Suède est représenté par :
me
M
Elinor Hammarskjöld, directrice générale des affaires juridiques, ministère des affaires
étrangères du Royaume de Suède,
comme agente ;
- 32 -
Mr Daniel Gillgren, Deputy Director at the Department for International Law, Human Rights and
Treaty Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Sweden,
as Co-Agent;
HE Mr Johannes Oljelund, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Dominika Brott, First Secretary, Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The Government of the Czech Republic is represented by:
Mr Emil Ruffer, Director of the International Law Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Czech Republic,
as Agent;
HE Mr René Miko, Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Pavel Caban, Head of Unit, International Law Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Czech Republic,
Ms Martina Filippiová, Legal Adviser, Embassy of the Czech Republic in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Pavel Šturma, Professor of Public International Law, Charles University Prague, former member
of the International Law Commission.
- 33 -
M. Daniel Gillgren, directeur adjoint du département du droit international, des droits de l’homme et
du droit des traités, ministère des affaires étrangères du Royaume de Suède,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Johannes Oljelund, ambassadeur du Royaume de Suède auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
me
M
Dominika Brott, première secrétaire, ambassade du Royaume de Suède au Royaume des
Pays-Bas.
Le Gouvernement de la République tchèque est représenté par :
M. Emil Ruffer, directeur du département du droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères de
la République tchèque,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. René Miko, ambassadeur de la République tchèque auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Pavel Caban, chef de section, département du droit international, ministère des affaires étrangères
de la République tchèque,
Mme Martina Filippiová, conseillère juridique, ambassade de la République tchèque au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Pavel Šturma, professeur de droit international public, Université Charles de Prague, ancien
membre de la Commission du droit international.
- 34 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets this afternoon to
hear the second round of oral argument of Ukraine.
For reasons duly made known to me, Vice-President Gevorgian and Judge Bennouna are
unable to sit with us this afternoon.
I now give the floor to Professor Harold Hongju Koh. You have the floor, Professor.
Mr KOH:
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE IX AND CHARACTERIZATION OF
THE DISPUTE BEFORE THE COURT
1. Madam President, Members of the Court: I am again honoured to appear before you on
behalf of Ukraine. As this hearing comes to a close, let us together take stock of where we are.
2. Nineteen months ago, Ukraine brought you this case, after Russia launched a full-scale
invasion of Ukraine that continues today, in a breathtaking display of aggression, atrocity, and war
crimes. Russia made clear its goals for this military action: to stop an alleged genocide, and to bring
the persons committing that genocide to trial. Russia took this and other actions citing many official
claims that Ukraine was committing violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. So the basis of
Russia’s action was unmistakable: that Ukraine and its officials were “committing” a “genocide” that
Russia was required to take actions to “prevent and punish” under Articles I and IV of the Genocide
Convention.
3. Ukraine immediately and strenuously denied Russia’s allegations, charging that Russia had
not assessed that a serious risk of genocide exists, and that Russia had systematically abused the
Convention by taking multiple unilateral actions: recognizing sham republics in Donetsk and
Luhansk, invading throughout Ukraine, brutalizing its citizens, and devastating its homeland, all for
the stated purpose of preventing and punishing a non-existent genocide.
4. So from the start, as Mavrommatis requires, there has been a sharp “disagreement on a point
of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests” over which this Court may exercise
jurisdiction
1
. Let me, first, review why a dispute undeniably exists that confers Article IX jurisdiction
1
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 2, p. 11.
- 35 -
on this Court, and second, reject Russia’s distorted legal theory, which argues that this Court may
not rule on the merits because of Russia’s use of force.
I. A dispute undeniably exists over which this Court has
Article IX jurisdiction
5. After the provisional measures hearing last March, you found that the difference between
the Parties’ positions on facts and law were “sufficient at this stage to establish prima facie the
existence of a dispute between the Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of
the Genocide Convention [and] jurisdiction pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention”
2
.
6. Russia’s self-serving evasions throughout this hearing only confirm your initial
understanding of this dispute. Even as Russia’s bombs rain down on Ukraine and its people, Russia
continues brazenly to deny your jurisdiction and ignore your provisional measures Order. Russia
claims that there is no legal dispute between these Parties, but these proceedings have shown why
this is nonsense.
7. My initial presentation described four textual features that define Article IX’s distinctively
broad scope
3
. First, Article IX broadly specifies that “any of the parties” to a dispute under the
Convention may submit it to the Court. As stated by five Members of the Court in DRC v. Rwanda,
under the Genocide Convention, “it is States who are the monitors of each other’s compliance”
4
. So,
last Wednesday, a landmark day in this Court’s history, 32 intervening States — who agreed to be
bound by your judgment — explained in a strong and unified voice why the dispute before you raises
a question of “interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the Convention that this Court must decide
under Article IX.
8. Russia’s counsel tried to dismiss these interventions as “puppeting” and “sheeplike”
behaviour that “pervert[ed]” Article 63 of the Court’s Statute
5
. In fact, the unanimity of these
2
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, I.C.J. Reports 2022 (provisional
measures Order of 16 March 2022), p. 223, paras. 47–48 (emphasis added).
3
See CR 2023/14, pp. 41–45, paras. 7–20 (Koh).
4
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, p. 72, para. 28.
5
See CR 2023/17, p. 53, para. 93 (Zabolotskaya); CR 2023/18, p. 54, para. 42 (Udovichenko); CR 2023/18, p. 73,
para. 64 (Tchikaya).
- 36 -
interventions reflects not a dark conspiracy, as Russia claims, but a “generality of the opinion which
appears to have been cherished by States parties” to the Convention
, regarding its proper
interpretation. There is a better explanation than conspiracy as to why 32 States have intervened to
confirm Ukraine’s legal interpretation, and none have intervened to confirm Russia’s — Russia’s
extreme conduct in Ukraine has so gravely abused the Genocide Convention that no other contracting
State will endorse Russia’s offensive theory. In granting 32 of these interventions as of right, this
Court not only rejected Russia’s absurd abuse of process claim
6
, but also encouraged joint
declarations and oral pleadings, recognizing there is nothing conspiratorial about law-abiding States
talking to one another to co-ordinate common legal positions. These interventions graphically
illustrate why, in addition to resolving this contentious dispute, your decision here will help to define
7
the scope of this Court’s power to stop the flagrant abuse of the world’s most important human rights
treaty.
9. Second, as the joint separate opinion in DRC v. Rwanda underscored, “Article IX speaks
not only of disputes over the interpretation and application of the Convention, but over the ‘fulfilment
of the Convention’”
8
. Russia would have you treat the word “fulfilment” as surplusage, and thereby
rewrite Article IX to strike out that critical word. But as long as “fulfilment” is there, the principle of
effet utile requires that the term be given distinct meaning independent of the clause’s other terms.
Indeed, in your own provisional measures Order in this case you expressly noted that direct
disagreement between the two Parties gives you prima facie jurisdiction to decide “whether the use
of force by the Russian Federation for the stated purpose of preventing and punishing alleged
genocide is a measure that can be taken in fulfilment of the obligation to prevent and punish genocide
contained in Article I of the Convention”
9
. Russia’s counsel falsely insisted that the term “adds
nothing”
10
. But as my initial remarks explained, adding “fulfilment”, defined as “accomplishment”,
6
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 410, para. 40.
7
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation: 32 States intervening), Intervention, Order of 5 June 2023, paras. 59–60.
8
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, p. 72, para. 28 (emphasis added).
9
Provisional measures Order of 16 March 2022, p. 223, para. 45 (emphasis added).
10
CR 2023/18, p. 63, para. 24 (Tchikaya).
- 37 -
“performance” or “completion” of treaty obligations
as that term is
used in Article 26, the good faith provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
11
—
or in French, “exécution”
12
,
—
codifies Russia’s duty to perform, execute and fulfil its treaty obligations with due diligence and in
good faith. Adding “fulfilment” ensures that the Court can review not just whether Russia, as a
contracting Party, has violated particular articles of the Convention, but also whether it has performed
in good faith its treaty obligations or instead misused or abused its rights or the Convention as a
whole.
13
10. Third, Russia has also created a dispute about “interpretation”, because the Parties
strenuously disagree about the meaning of their respective legal rights and obligations under the
Convention
14
.
11. Fourth, Ukraine and the 32 intervening States established that this dispute raises questions
of “application”. As you noted last March, there is a clear “divergence of views as to whether certain
acts allegedly committed by Ukraine in the Luhansk and Donetsk region amount to genocide” that
Russia became obliged to prevent and punish
15
. As the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case stated, “[t]he
principle of good faith obliges the Parties to apply [a treaty] in a reasonable way and in such a manner
that its purpose can be realized”
16
. By abusing the text and purpose of the treaty to make false
allegations, conduct sham recognitions and launch unlawful military invasions, Russia misapplied
the Convention — in the words of Chorzów Factory, “creating a situation contrary to” Articles I
and IV
17
. This case thus falls within what the Court in Bosnian Genocide called the “unusual feature”
of Article IX: “a broader group of disputes relating to” Russia’s responsibility for fulfilling its
11
Oxford English Dictionary, fulfilment, n. (3rd ed., 2016), accessed at https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/75295?
redirectedFrom=fulfilment#eid.
12
Larousse Dictionnaire Français, exécution, n.f. (online ed., 2018), accessed at https://www.larousse.fr/
dictionnaires/francais/ex%C3%A9cution/32065.
13
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS, Vol. 1155, p. 331, Art. 26.
14
Accord Written Observations on Preliminary Objections (WO) of Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and Sweden, para. 15; WO of Bulgaria, paras. 12–13; WO of France, para. 26; WO of
Germany, para. 17; WO of Greece, para. 31; WO of Italy, para. 29; WO of New Zealand, para. 31; WO of Norway,
para. 19; WO of Poland, para. 24; WO of Portugal, para. 24; WO of Slovenia, para. 13; WO of Spain, para. 43.
15
Provisional measures Order of 16 March 2022, pp. 222-223, para. 45.
16
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 79, para. 142 (emphasis
added); see also WO of New Zealand, paras. 17, 44–47.
17
Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, pp. 20–21.
- 38 -
obligations under the Convention
. Everyone, including Russia, agrees that a State that levels
allegations of genocide against another can ask the Court to resolve that dispute as “relating to” State
responsibility for genocide under the Convention. But if so, so too must a State like Ukraine be able
to resolve an issue relating to State responsibility for genocide by disputing pretextual allegations of
genocide and illegal actions taken on the basis of those false allegations.
18
12. Ukraine and the intervening States all further agree that Article IX’s distinctively broad
scope reflects both the erga omnes character of the Convention’s obligations and the Convention’s
historic object and purpose. This Court famously pronounced more than 70 years ago that the
Convention was adopted for “a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose”
19
. Granting this Court
broad Article IX jurisdiction helps to achieve that object and purpose. States offend the Convention’s
object and purpose when they ignore a genocide that is clearly occurring. But they also offend that
object and purpose when they falsely allege a genocide that is clearly not occurring, in order to seek
licence to illegally attack and invade an innocent neighbour.
13. On Monday, Mr Udovichenko presented a map of “Ukraine’s Legal Position” that
purportedly showed the vagueness of Ukraine’s theory of Article IX jurisdiction
20
. Instead, what his
chart well illustrated was the widely agreed-upon breadth of Article IX in five column headings that
happen to track the wording of Article IX: “abused”, “violated”, “misused”, “misapplied” and
“misinterpreted”
21
.
As his chart showed, this Court has Article IX jurisdiction not just when Russia
has (1) “violated” or (2) “abused” Articles I and IV of the Convention, but also when Russia has
(3) misinterpreted, (4) misapplied and (5) not fulfilled — misused — the Convention. Ukraine’s
claim regarding Russia’s failure of good-faith performance is plainly “related” to “fulfilment”; the
requirement that Articles I and IV be applied reasonably and in good faith is connected with, that is,
related to, “application”. To exercise jurisdiction, that is all you must find.
14. So the jurisdictional question here is simple: does the necessary “relationship” exist
between the dispute Ukraine brings — over Russia’s failure to fulfil its obligations to prevent and
18
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 114, para. 169.
19
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
20
CR 2023/18, p. 54, paras. 39-40 (Udovichenko).
21
Russian Federation, judges’ folder, second round (25 Sept. 2023), tab C, p. 94.
- 39 -
punish genocide in good faith — and “interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the Convention.
The answer is “yes”.
15. For that reason, as you will hear more from Mr Zionts, Russia has entirely fabricated its
contention that requests for a declaration of non-violation are alien to the Convention and to
international law in general
22
. As Cyprus put it last week, a State falsely accused of genocide “must
be afforded the opportunity to ‘clear its name’ . . . especially when an allegation of genocide is relied
upon to resort to armed force”
23
.
16. Mr Udovichenko mocked this assertion as a laughable “reputational” interest
24
. But as both
Lithuania and Cyprus explained, the capacity to bring such claims is an existential necessity for small
States who are at risk of unlawful, pretextual invasion
25
. As Cyprus explained, it is “crucial for [these
countries] that provisions in treaties are not left to the ‘own appraisal’ of any State party in order to
justify the use of force against other States, but are properly construed by States and ultimately by
this Court”
26
. In Nicaragua v. United States, the Court similarly explained that, while the respondent
“might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in [the applicant State],
the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect”
27
. To prevent
such unilateral appraisals from becoming entirely self-judging, Article IX must be read to empower
this Court to review State claims of unilateral power to assess, and to use force to prevent and punish,
a perceived genocide
28
.
II. The Russian Federation’s mechanical legal theory distorts the text, history,
object and purpose, and jurisprudence of the Genocide Convention
17. Madam President, Members of the Court, Russia’s counsel has offered a mechanical legal
theory arguing that this Court may not rule on the merits because of three fabricated “either–or”
propositions, relating to jurisdiction, breach and potential application of other rules of international
22
See generally CR 2023/13, pp. 91-95, paras. 4-31 (Udovichenko).
23
CR 2023/15, p. 61, paras. 9-10 (Tzanakopoulos).
24
CR 2023/18, p. 50, para. 19 (Udovichenko).
25
See CR 2023/15, p. 60, para. 4 (Stavrinides); CR 2023/16, p. 34, para. 2 (Grigaitė-Daugirdė).
26
Ibid., p. 60, para. 4 (Stavrinides).
27
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 134, para. 268.
28
See CR 2023/15, p. 62, para. 13 (Tzanakopoulos).
- 40 -
law. Their theory distorts the text, history, object and purpose, and jurisprudence of the Genocide
Convention.
18. First, Russia has repeatedly insisted that jurisdiction is precluded here, because the case
Ukraine brings before you is not really about Russia’s abuse of the Genocide Convention, but about
the legality of Russia’s use of force under the UN Charter and customary international law.
19. But in demanding that a dispute must either concern the use of force or the Genocide
Convention, Russia sets up a false dichotomy. The Court’s jurisdiction covers Russia’s use of force
in this context precisely because Russia used force as a chosen measure to execute its stated goal of
preventing and punishing genocide. The Court has regularly rejected similar claims by other
respondents that a relationship between use of force issues and the applicants’ claims brings a case
outside the scope of the relevant treaty. In those cases, this Court has appropriately rejected Russia’s
untenable position that the co-existence of use of force issues somehow renders a claim per se
inadmissible. Instead, the Court has carefully evaluated, as you should do again here, whether a
dispute exists under the treaty at issue over which you have jurisdiction, regardless of any role that
the respondent’s use of force might play in the ultimate resolution of the case.
20. In Oil Platforms, the Court rejected the preliminary objection of a P-5 Member of the
Security Council that the applicant’s claims fell outside the relevant compromissory clause because
“essentially, the dispute relates to the lawfulness of actions by naval forces . . . that ‘involved combat
operations’”
29
. The Court held that a “violation of the rights of one party under the Treaty by means
of the use of force is as unlawful as would be a violation by administrative decision or by any other
means. Matters relating to the use of force are therefore not per se excluded from the reach of the
Treaty”
30
. Here as well, connection to use of force issues creates no per se exclusion from the reach
of the Genocide Convention. By using force as its measure to prevent and punish genocide, it is
Russia that has placed its own use of force within the scope of the Genocide Convention. If any
examination of the legality of Russia’s use of force were to occur, it should happen at the merits, as
it did in Oil Platforms.
29
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (II), p. 810, para. 18 (internal quotations omitted).
30
Ibid., pp. 811-812, para. 21 (emphasis added).
- 41 -
21. More recently, in Georgia v. Russia, this Court similarly resisted Russia’s attempt to divest
the Court of jurisdiction because the applicant’s claims challenged use of force. Last week, Russia’s
Agent misleadingly claimed that “[b]ack in 2011, the Court ha[d] correctly decided that Georgia’s
claims rooted in the allegations of use of force did not pertain to racial discrimination”
31
. In fact,
what the Court squarely rejected was Russia’s argument that Georgia’s evidence of a dispute related
to the use of force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia somehow divested the Court of jurisdiction over a
dispute related to the interpretation and application of the race discrimination convention, the CERD.
Instead, the Court determined that “while the Georgian claims . . . were primarily claims about the
allegedly unlawful use of force”, Georgia had presented sufficient evidence of the existence of a
dispute between the parties related to the interpretation or application of the human rights treaty at
issue
32
. Similarly, Ukraine’s claims here centre on Russia’s allegations and actions based on another
human rights treaty at issue, the Genocide Convention. The mere existence of use of force issues has
never created a per se carve-out from this Court’s jurisdiction or admissibility that overrides the
Contracting Parties’ consent.
22. Second, Russia’s counsel attempted to erect a similarly sharp divide between Russia’s
breaches of the Convention and its duty to perform in good faith, which Russia characterized as only
relevant to conduct outside “the scope of the Convention”, whatever that means
33
. Again, this entirely
manufactured distinction in no way reflects reality. Mr Crosato conceded that the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros duty to act in good faith with respect to a treaty is about “performance” or,
as Article IX puts it, “fulfilment” of the treaty’s obligations
34
. Given that litigating about “fulfilment”
falls within the express terms of the Convention, how can litigating about performance in good faith
be an obligation that falls “outside” the Convention?
23. Or take this Court’s Genocide Convention jurisprudence. The 1999 Legality of Use of
Force case concerned NATO bombing to protect innocent civilians. Russia’s Agent cited many
public statements in April 1999 by various government policymakers — including myself —
31
CR 2023/13, p. 47, para. 50 (Kuzmin).
32
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v.
Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 120, para. 113.
33
CR 2023/17, p. 89, para. 75 (Crosato); see also CR 2023/18, p. 70, para. 53 (Tchikaya); WOU, para. 124.
34
CR 2023/17, p. 88, para. 72 (Crosato).
- 42 -
warning that Serbian leaders were committing “acts of genocide”
Without evidence, Russia’s
Agent called this a “pretext”
35
.
But Slobodan Milošović, the President of Serbia, was later indicted
by the ICTY for crimes against humanity, and for genocide in related conflicts
36
.
. That case offers no
parallel to Russia’s pretextual allegations of genocide without due diligence, which are at issue here.
37
24. For that reason, we must separate thoughtful legal analysis from the kind of political
diatribe we heard from Russia’s Agent on Monday. As Judge Nolte acknowledged in his separate
declaration to the provisional measures Order in this case: in the Legality of Use of Force case
38
,
“[i]t is true that, in 1999, certain respondent States came close to justifying their use of
force by stating that their actions were taken with the intent to prevent genocide . . . and
that certain of their officials made allegations of genocide in that context. However, such
justifications were not the stated purpose of the military operations by the respondent
States, nor was that purpose so perceived by the applicant State. That aspect was
therefore not the subject-matter of the earlier cases before the Court.”
39
25. As a legal matter, Judge Nolte observed, “neither the applicant State nor the respondent
States stated before the Court that the use of force by the respondent States had the purpose of
preventing an alleged genocide”
40
. So unlike Ukraine, Serbia did not allege that NATO allegations
of genocide were pretextual, nor did it invite the Court to consider whether it was responsible for
genocide. In the present case, by contrast, Judge Nolte noted Russia has “made allegations that
Ukraine is committing genocide and has affirmed that its ‘special military operation’ serves the
purpose of preventing genocide”, thereby “act[ing] in a way ‘that is capable of coming within the
provisions of the Genocide Convention’”
41
.
26. The Bosnian Genocide case also arose in an entirely different posture. This Court took
jurisdiction under Article IX after Bosnia and Herzegovina charged Serbia and Montenegro with
35
See CR 2023/17, p. 51, paras. 80-81 (Zabolotskaya); see also ibid., pp. 50-51, paras. 79, 82.
36
CR 2023/17, pp. 49, 51, paras. 68, 83 (Zabolotskaya).
37
See e.g. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Indictment (22 Nov. 2001); Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Case No. IT-01-54-T, Amended Indictment (22 Nov. 2002); Prosecutor v. Milošević et al., Case No. IT-99-37-I, Amended
Indictment (29 June 2001); Prosecutor v. Milošević et al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment (16 Oct.
2001).
38
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports
1999 (I), p. 124.
39
Provisional measures Order of 16 March 2022, declaration of Judge Nolte, p. 255, para. 6 (emphasis added).
40
Ibid., p. 254, para. 2; see also ibid., pp. 254-255, paras. 3-7.
41
Ibid., pp. 254-255, paras. 2 and 4.
- 43 -
committing genocide under the Genocide Convention
. Mr Crosato selectively quoted parts of
Bosnian Genocide to support his “either/or” claim that a case against a responding State must be
brought inside, not outside the Convention
42
. But just two paragraphs after the language he quoted,
in language oddly omitted from his presentation, the Bosnian Genocide Judgment stated that,
“[i]n order to determine whether the Respondent breached its obligation under the
Convention . . ., the Court will have recourse not only to the Convention itself, but also
to the rules of general international law on treaty interpretation and on responsibility
of States for internationally wrongful acts”
43
.
44
27. In short, this Court has rejected precisely the mechanical “inside/outside” distinction that
Russia’s counsel advocates.
28. Third and finally, there is nothing in this Court’s jurisprudence barring “other sources of
international law” from being consulted to help determine whether Russia has acted unlawfully to
prevent and punish genocide under the Convention. In Croatian Genocide, the Court took jurisdiction
under Article IX, and on the merits, dismissed both the Croatian claim and Serbian counter-claim on
the ground that neither side had provided sufficient evidence of the respondents’ specific intent to
commit genocide
45
. Mr Crosato emphasized the Court’s holding it would not consider a State’s
liability for war crimes falling short of genocide
46
. But what he admitted was that the Court
immediately followed with this caveat:
“That does not prevent the Court from considering, in its reasoning, whether a
violation of international humanitarian law or international human rights law has
occurred to the extent that this is relevant for the Court’s determination of whether or
not there has been a breach of an obligation under the Genocide Convention.”
47
42
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 600-603, 614-621,
paras. 13-14, 27-41; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 101-102, para. 140.
43
CR 2023/13, pp. 67-68, paras. 47-48 (Crosato); CR 2023/17, p. 78, para. 28 (Crosato); see also ibid., p. 80,
para. 36 (citing Robert Kolb, “The Scope Ratione Materiae of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ” in The UN Genocide
Convention: A Commentary, Paola Gaeta, ed., Oxford University Press 2009, p. 464).
44
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 105, para. 149 (emphasis added).
45
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v.
Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), pp. 128-129, 153, paras. 441-442, 522.
46
CR 2023/17, p. 78, para. 28 (Crosato).
47
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), pp. 45-46, para. 85. See also ibid., p. 68, para. 153; WOU, para. 140.
- 44 -
29. That is the situation here. As Latvia observed last week: “The concerns, institutions and
teleology of the Genocide Convention and the rules on the use of force expressed in the UN Charter
are . . . closely intertwined.”
48
Thus, the Genocide Convention’s preamble refers to “the spirit and
aims of the United Nations”
49
, whose Charter includes maintaining “peace and security”,
“suppres[sing] . . . aggression”, “reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human rights” and promoting the
peaceful settlement of disputes
50
.
30. As this case proceeds to the merits, the Court may be called on as it was in Croatian
Genocide to apply other sources of international law
“to decide a dispute [under the Genocide Convention . . . In so far as both of these bodies
of rules may be applicable in the context of a particular armed conflict, the rules of
international humanitarian law might be relevant in order to decide whether the acts
alleged by the Parties constitute genocide within the meaning of Article II of the
Convention.”
51
31. As the United Kingdom noted in its intervention:
“The ‘scope’ of other rules of international law that constrain [State] conduct
permitted by Article I [of the Convention] is not ‘indefinite’ . . . [or] extrinsic to the
Convention. Rather, they are embedded within it, consistently with the object and
purpose of the Convention. It is unthinkable that a State fulfilling its undertaking to
prevent genocide in good faith could do so through aggression or other international
crimes.”
52
Again, Russia’s counsel mocked this final statement. But that only confirms what we have all
witnessed on the battlefield these last 19 months: use of such illegal tools is not unthinkable to Russia.
But in due course, as the United Kingdom urged, this Court might decide to look to governing jus ad
bellum and jus in bello rules to decide whether such Russian use of force measures as aggression,
crimes against humanity or war crimes taken in the name of punishing genocide are ever compatible
with the Genocide Convention
53
. But such considerations are for the merits and pose no barrier to
this Court’s jurisdiction to reach that stage.
48
CR 2023/15, p. 80, para. 13 (Paparinskis).
49
Genocide Convention, preamble (judges’ folder, tab 2).
50
Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, Art. 1.
51
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (I), p. 68, para. 153.
52
CR 2023/16, p. 58, para. 12 (Prentis) (emphasis added).
53
CR 2023/16, pp. 57-58, paras. 10-11 (Prentis).
- 45 -
32. In sum, Russia’s mechanical legal theory artificially flattens the issues before you into
false dichotomies. This Court may take jurisdiction over a dispute that fits under Article IX’s various
heads of jurisdiction — whether or not it involves use of force — and on the merits may consider
other sources of international law to help determine whether Russia’s actions — including its use of
force — violate its obligations under the Genocide Convention.
33. Madam President, Members of the Court, on the eve of the 75th anniversary of the historic
Genocide Convention, it is time to reaffirm this Court’s commitment to your crucial role in deciding
the real issue before you: may a powerful State falsely accuse its neighbour of genocide, then use
illegal force to kill its citizens, devastate their homeland, and destabilize the global legal order, all
on the pretext of preventing and punishing genocide? However bloodless and antiseptic Russia’s
legal theory may appear, Russia is deploying that theory daily and unilaterally to destroy lives and
attack the global foundations of human rights law and the rule of international law for which the
Genocide Convention stands. The jurisdictional questions before you are neither close, nor are they
difficult. And while you deliberate, the world awaits a speedy hearing on the merits.
34. Distinguished judges, for these reasons, the Court should promptly dismiss Russia’s
preliminary objections and schedule a hearing on the merits. Madam President, it has been my honour
to appear before you. I thank you and I ask you to call my colleague Ms Cheek to the podium. Thank
you.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Koh. I now give the floor to Ms Marney Cheek. You have
the floor, Madam.
Ms CHEEK:
FIRST PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE EXISTENCE OF A DISPUTE
RELATING TO THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
I. The evidence of the Parties’ dispute
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you again on
behalf of Ukraine. This afternoon I will once again focus on the existence of a dispute between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation related to the subject-matter of the Genocide Convention.
- 46 -
2. In its second round of oral pleadings, Russia argues that this Court should ignore statement
after statement made by senior Russian officials referencing Ukraine’s alleged commission of
genocide. It argues that its reliance on genocide to justify its recognition of the so-called DPR and
LPR and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine is simply rhetoric. At the same time, it has no answer for
why its officials, including the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, have referred to the
Genocide Convention by name when justifying Russia’s.
3. Russia instead asks this Court to find that Article 51 of the UN Charter was the sole
justification for its actions in and against Ukraine. Russia asks you to disregard the words of its
President clearly stating that the purpose of Russia’s so-called “special military operation” was to
stop genocide
54
. Instead, Russia invites you to rely on Russia’s bare invocation of Article 51 in a
letter transmitted to the United Nations on 24 February 2022 — even though the same letter attaches
President Putin’s speech that declares the purpose of Russia’s actions against Ukraine to be genocide
prevention. In the alternative, Russia argued, for the first time in these oral hearings, that even if a
dispute regarding the subject-matter of the Convention existed at the time of Ukraine’s Application,
no such dispute exists today, and so Ukraine’s claims are devoid of object and should be dismissed.
4. Having heard Russia’s rebuttal on Monday, it remains the case that an objective examination
of the facts shows that at the time Ukraine filed its Application with this Court, the Parties had a
dispute related to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention.
5. My presentation this afternoon will proceed in three parts. First, I will demonstrate that on
the current record before the Court, there existed a dispute between the Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention at the time Ukraine filed its
Application. Second, I will explain how Russia’s letter to the UN Secretary-General regarding its
purported exercise of the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter does not negate
the Parties’ dispute with regard to the Genocide Convention, but, rather, affirms it. Finally, I will
address Russia’s new argument that Ukraine’s claims are without object because Russia has asserted
in these oral proceedings that it agrees with certain of Ukraine’s interpretations of the Convention.
54
See President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12).
- 47 -
A. The Russian Federation accused Ukraine of committing genocide in violation of the
Genocide Convention and invaded Ukraine to prevent and punish that alleged genocide
6. What should the Court make of Russia’s repeated references to genocide? In the words of
Professor Azari: “Regarding the statements of Russian politicians who used the term genocide, it
must be recognized that the simple reference to this term is insufficient to establish the existence of
a dispute under the Genocide Convention.”
55
But this Court should not disregard Russia’s statements
alleging that Ukraine was committing genocide.
7. Russia cannot credibly claim that its long-standing allegations of genocide against Ukraine
and its officials were mere “rhetoric[]” or simply “political”
56
. To start, Russia’s State organs and
officials have, for years, claimed that Ukraine and its officials are committing genocide in violation
of the Genocide Convention.
8. As for Russia’s Investigative Committee, not only did it explicitly claim that Ukrainian
officials were violating the Genocide Convention, but Russia’s domestic criminal code defines
genocide in nearly identical terms to the definition in Article II of the Genocide Convention
57
.
Therefore, when Russia’s Investigative Committee uses the term “genocide”, it means genocide as
that term is defined in the Genocide Convention. Russia has not shown otherwise.
9. On Monday, Russia again tried to dismiss the numerous statements of the Investigative
Committee by insisting that the Investigative Committee does not speak for Russia at the
“international level”
58
. But Russia’s complete failure to engage at all with the content of the
statements of the Investigative Committee is telling. I need not repeat each of the Investigative
Committee’s statements that I took you to last week
59
, but I include one example here on the screen.
As the Court will recall, the Investigative Committee has consistently and explicitly alleged that
high-ranking Ukrainian officials have acted in violation of the Genocide Convention
60
. Russia cannot
escape this fact, and it does not even try.
55
CR 2023/17, p. 66, para. 30 (Azari). See generally CR 2023/17, pp. 66-67, 68-69, paras. 30-32, 39-40.
56
CR 2023/17, p. 66, para. 31 (Azari).
57
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, No. 63-FZ of 13 June 1996, Art. 357, accessed at
https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Russian_Federation_Criminal_Code.pdf (judges’ folder, tab 3).
58
CR 2023/17, p. 67, para. 36 (Azari).
59
See generally CR 2023/14, pp. 54-57, paras. 27-36 (Cheek).
60
See e.g. Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Criminal Cases Initiated Against 20 High-Ranking
Officials of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (11 Sept. 2017) (MU, Ann. 14) (judges’ folder, tab 4).
- 48 -
10. More telling still, you heard nothing from Russia about the Investigative Committee’s own
efforts to publicize the results of its investigations, to use Russia’s words: “at the international
level”
61
. These efforts were amplified by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which published the
Investigative Committee’s English language book documenting its investigations, including its
allegations of genocide against Ukrainian officials — Russia calls it the “White Book of Crimes”
62
.
This book was published on the Foreign Ministry’s website, within its Foreign Policy section, as you
can see in the snapshot of the Russian Foreign Ministry website on the screen
63
.
11. Further, on 3 March 2022, just one week after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the
spokesperson for Russia’s Foreign Ministry highlighted its role in publicizing the Investigative
Committee’s reports and its conclusions. Regarding the Investigative Committee’s work, she
commented: “Do you think we have hidden it in a secret library? Of course not. It is available on the
Foreign Ministry website and . . . social media. We sent it to all our partner countries and
international organisations.”
64
The Investigative Committee’s consistent allegations that Ukrainian
officials were violating the Genocide Convention is plainly evidence of the existence of the Parties’
dispute.
12. Russia has had every opportunity to tell this Court that, no, it does not believe and it never
believed that Ukraine is committing genocide in Donbas in violation of the Genocide Convention.
Or to somehow explain why its officials repeatedly referenced the Genocide Convention specifically.
But it has not done so.
13. Russia’s arguments on the existence of a dispute suffer from a fatal flaw: Russia cannot
escape the facts. Russia has repeatedly advanced allegations of genocide against Ukraine, and has
expressly claimed that Ukraine and its officials are violating the Genocide Convention. Russia has
taken action against Ukraine on the explicit basis of preventing and punishing that alleged genocide.
61
See CR 2023/17, p. 68, para. 36 (Azari).
62
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, White Books on Crimes of the Western States and
Their Allies, accessed at https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/belye_knigi/ (judges’ folder, tab 5); see also Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation, Presentation of the English Version of Book “The Tragedy of Southeastern Ukraine.
The White Book of Crimes” (10 Feb. 2016), accessed at https://en.sledcom.ru/news/item/1015734.
63
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, White Books on Crimes of the Western States and
Their Allies, accessed at https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/belye_knigi/ (judges’ folder, tab 5).
64
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria
Zakharova, Moscow (3 Mar. 2022), p. 8, accessed at https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1802683/ (judges’ folder,
tab 6).
- 49 -
B. Ukraine opposed the Russian Federation’s allegations of genocide as well as Russia’s
reliance on those allegations to take unilateral action in and against Ukraine
14. Russia also has made various attempts to discount evidence that Ukraine opposed both
Russia’s allegations of genocide and Russia’s actions taken in and against Ukraine in reliance on
those allegations.
15. First, with regard to the statements by Ukrainian officials opposing the genocide
allegations of Russia’s Investigative Committee: Russia’s only comment on Ukraine’s statements
calling Russia’s allegations “groundless” and “a complete delusion” was to argue on Monday that
because the Investigative Committee is not acting at the international level, Ukraine’s opposition to
its accusations of genocide cannot be credited
65
. But I have already disposed of this issue. The
Investigative Committee has levelled inherently international allegations against high-ranking
officials of another sovereign State. Russia’s Foreign Ministry promoted those allegations. There is
no reason the Court cannot consider both the Investigative Committee’s statements and Ukraine’s
opposition to them as evidence of the Parties’ dispute.
16. Russia also had little to say about Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kuleba’s statement before
the UN General Assembly on 23 February — two days after Russia had recognized the so-called
DPR and LPR in reliance on its false allegations of genocide — Minister Kuleba called Russia’s
accusations “absurd”
66
. Professor Azari noted that Minister Kuleba did not mention genocide or the
Genocide Convention
67
. But as I noted previously, in context, it is quite reasonable to view Minister
Kuleba’s remarks as a comment on Russia’s view that it had recognized “DPR and LPR” in order to
bring a genocide in Donbas to an end.
17. Second, with regard to conduct, I urge the Court to consider the substance of Ukraine’s
opposition, since it involved denouncing Russia in the United Nations and fighting Russia’s
full-scale invasion launched in the name of preventing and punishing genocide. On Monday,
Professor Azari invoked this Court’s decision in Georgia v. Russia at paragraph 108
68
. He invoked
65
CR 2023/17, p. 69, para. 42 (Azari).
66
UN General Assembly Official Records, 76th Session, 58th Plenary Meeting, UN doc. A/76/PV.58 (23 Feb.
2022), pp. 2-3 (judges’ folder, tab 15).
67
CR 2023/17, p. 69, para. 43 (Azari).
68
CR 2023/17, p. 71, para. 49 (Azari), quoting Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2011 (I), p. 118, para. 108.
- 50 -
that paragraph in response to Ukraine’s conduct agreement and specifically with regard to Ukraine’s
actions in its own self-defence. But that paragraph is silent on the relevance of conduct when
assessing whether the parties hold opposing views such that a dispute exists regarding the
subject-matter of the treaty. That paragraph examined a Georgian decree focused on the use of force
rather than the subject-matter of that dispute, which was the CERD. It is irrelevant here.
18. As I set out last week, this Court has previously confirmed that the conduct of the parties
may be relevant to its assessment of whether or a not a dispute exists, particularly in cases where, for
various reasons, there have been no diplomatic exchanges between the parties
69
. That consideration
is quite relevant in this case.
C. Further evidence of the Parties’ opposed views
19. There is further evidence of the Parties’ opposed viewpoints. Russia criticizes the
statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on 26 February 2022. On Monday, Russia’s
counsel went as far as to accuse Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry of “fabricati[ng] . . . evidence”
70
.
Ukraine objects to that in the strongest terms.
20. As stated previously, the 26 February statement confirmed that a dispute between the
Parties had already crystalized. In any case, Russia’s principal point seems to be that even if it was
aware of the statement, it did not have time to react to it
71
. In the context of this case and the urgency
of the situation when this case was filed — not to mention the language of the compromissory clause
of the Genocide Convention which requires no consultation prior to seising the Court — Russia’s
argument does nothing to detract from the conclusion that Ukraine and the Russian Federation held
opposing views on the subject-matter of the Genocide Convention at the time Ukraine filed its
Application with this Court.
69
See e.g. Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (II), p. 850,
para. 40.
70
CR 2023/18, p. 54, para. 41 (Udovichenko).
71
See e.g. CR 2023/13, p. 57, para. 34 (Azari); CR 2023/17, p. 70, para. 46 (Azari).
- 51 -
21. Further, as a factual matter, the statement was published on the website of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
72
, across its social media channels
73
and shortly thereafter on the official Ukrainian
government portal
74
. The Parties are agreed that this statement was issued prior to Ukraine filing its
Application.
22. On Monday, Russia’s counsel relied on Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom in an attempt
to undermine the significance of this 26 February statement
75
. But the statements in Marshall Islands
of the applicant lacked specificity and were “hortatory”
76
in nature
77
. The factual distinction between
that case and the case before you here is readily apparent. In the present case, Russia made explicit
and direct allegations that Ukraine and its officials were committing genocide. Russia was aware —
or it could not have been unaware — that Ukraine opposed those allegations. Yet, in February 2022,
rather than remedying this disagreement and withdrawing its allegations of genocide against Ukraine,
Russia took action on the stated basis of bringing an alleged genocide to an end. Ukraine forcefully
opposed those actions.
23. Despite Russia’s continued insistence
78
, the objective question of whether the parties hold
opposite views with respect to the subject-matter of the treaty does not turn on whether the respondent
expressly and explicitly opposed the claims of the applicant State. The Court made this clear in
The Gambia v. Myanmar, adding that “[i]f that were the case, a respondent could prevent a finding
72
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on Russia’s False
and Offensive Allegations of Genocide as a Pretext for Its Unlawful Military Aggression (26 Feb. 2022), accessed at
https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-nepravdivih-ta-obrazlivih-zvinuvachen-rosiyi-v-genocidi-yakprivodu-dlya-yiyi-protipravnoyi-vijskovoyi-agresiyi
(judges’
folder,
tab
7).
73
MFA Statement on Russia’s False and Offensive Allegations of Genocide As a Pretext For Its Unlawful Military
Aggression, Facebook Post of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs / MFA of Ukraine, dated 26 Feb. 2022 (WOU,
Ann. 3) (judges’ folder, tab 8); MFA Statement on Russia’s False and Offensive Allegations of Genocide As a Pretext For
Its Unlawful Military Aggression, Twitter Post of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (@MFA_Ukraine), dated
26 Feb. 2022 (WOU, Ann. 4) (judges’ folder, tab 9).
74
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on Russia’s False
and Offensive Allegations of Genocide as a Pretext for Its Unlawful Military Aggression (26 Feb. 2022), accessed at
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-nepravdivih-ta-obrazlivih-zvinuvachen-rosiyi-vgenocidi-yak-privodu-dlya-yiyi-protipravnoyi-vijskovoyi-agresiyi
(judges’
folder,
tab
10).
75
See CR 2023/17, p. 70, para. 46 (Azari).
76
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (II), p. 853,
para. 49.
77
See ibid., pp. 853-854, paras. 49-51.
78
See e.g. CR 2023/17, pp. 61-64, paras. 5-21 (Azari).
- 52 -
that a dispute exists by remaining silent in the face of an applicant’s legal claims. Such a consequence
would be unacceptable.”
79
24. Professor Azari is not correct when he insists that Ukraine must prove “that before the
filing of the Application it claimed the violation of the 1948 Convention and that its claim was
manifestly opposed by the Russian Federation”
80
. The Court could not have been clearer in
Nicaragua v. Colombia: “It does not matter which one of them advances a claim and which one
opposes it. What matters is that ‘the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question
of the performance or non-performance of certain’ international obligations”
81
.
25. I also take note of Judge Crawford’s dissent in Marshall Islands, where he stated that
“[e]gregious conduct can create a dispute ipso facto, without the need for a letter before action or
other communication”
82
. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, whose stated purpose
was to stop a genocide in Donbas and punish the perpetrators, is a stark example of such egregious
conduct.
26. Russia’s allegations, and the actions it has taken in purported reliance on those allegations,
plainly fall within the subject-matter of the Genocide Convention: namely genocide, and the
prevention and punishment thereof. Ukraine has opposed these allegations and the actions Russia has
taken in reliance on those allegations, and Ukraine did so before filing its Application. Consistent
with the Court’s well-established standards, this is sufficient to establish the existence of a dispute
between the Parties related to the Genocide Convention.
27. This Court found at the provisional measures stage that the evidence demonstrated prima
facie the existence of the Parties’ dispute
83
. Russia has presented no evidence since the Court’s Order
that undermines that prima facie conclusion. On the other hand, Ukraine has supplemented the record
79
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v.
Myanmar), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2022, p. 505, para. 71.
80
CR 2023/17, p. 60, para. 3 (Azari) (unofficial translation). See also CR 2023/13, p. 48, paras. 2, 11-12 (Azari).
81
Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 26, para. 50; see also Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), separate opinion of Judge Donoghue, p. 333, para. 11.
82
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (II),
dissenting opinion of Judge Crawford, p. 1100, para. 17.
83
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, I.C.J. Reports 2022, p. 223, para. 47.
- 53 -
with additional evidence that confirms that, by the time of Ukraine’s Application, there was a dispute
between the Parties related to the Genocide Convention.
II. The Russian Federation’s reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter does not
negate the existence of a dispute between the Parties relating to
the Genocide Convention
28. Russia thus turns to Article 51 of the UN Charter. According to Russia’s counsel,
Professor Yee, “the rights and obligations of the Parties surrounding the special military operation
or Russia’s recognition of the DPR and LPR arise under the right of self-defence under Article 51 of
the UN Charter and relevant customary international law, over which the Court has no jurisdiction”
84
.
29. But it is this Court’s role, not Russia’s, to objectively characterize the specific dispute
brought to it by Ukraine
85
. Objectively, that dispute relates to Russia’s actions for the stated purpose
of preventing and punishing genocide — a subject governed by the Genocide Convention. One piece
of evidence of that dispute, as Russia notes, is its one-paragraph letter from Russia to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, which refers to Article 51 of the UN Charter and attaches
President Putin’s speech of 24 February 2022
86
. That cover note is devoid of reasoning. But the
speech of Russia’s President, transmitted to the United Nations as an annex, expressly declares that
the “purpose” of the so-called “special military operation” is to “stop a genocide”
87
. That is the key
jurisdictional fact. Russia cannot avoid it by hiding behind references to Article 51. We heard many
references to Article 51 on Monday, but I encourage the Court to look at the short letter from
Mr Nebenzia to the Secretary-General that Russia on Monday called “decisive”
88
. This is the
84
CR 2023/13, p. 87, para. 26 (Yee); see also CR 2023/17, pp. 82, 85, paras. 42-43, 58 (Crosato); CR 2023/18,
pp. 42, 45, 46, paras. 27, 37, 39 (Yee).
85
See Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (II),
pp. 849-850, para. 39; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), pp. 26-27, para. 50 (citing Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74; Questions
Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 442,
para. 46; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v.
Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 84, para. 30; Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 271, para. 55; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 476, para. 58).
86
Letter Dated 24 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/2022/154 (24 Feb. 2022) (judges’ folder, tab 11).
87
See President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12).
88
CR 2023/18, p. 45, para. 35 (Yee).
- 54 -
language in its entirety on the screen. It identifies no “armed attack”. It specifies no particular
measure as being proportionate and necessary to respond to an armed attack. The letter simply refers
to an annex — that annex being President Putin’s address of 24 February 2022
.
89
30. Russia, like other States, has in other circumstances made reports to the Secretary-General
or the Security Council under Article 51. Russia did so in 2008 following its use of force in Georgia
90
.
In that report, Russia set out expressly its basis for acting in self-defence. And that report is on your
screen. It asserted:
“the use of force by the Russian side is strictly proportionate to the scale of the attack
and pursues no other goal but to protect the Russian peacekeeping contingent and
citizens of the Russian Federation from the illegal actions of the Georgian side and to
prevent future attacks against them”
91
.
31. These two letters to the United Nations are quite different. It is striking that when Russia
claimed self-defence in Georgia, it identified a specific alleged armed attack by Georgia, it defended
the proportionate nature of its defensive actions in response and it stressed that Russia’s military
actions “pursue[d] no other goal” than self-defence
92
. Russia’s 2022 letter to the United Nations with
respect to Ukraine does nothing of the sort.
32. Of course, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court does not need to examine the merits
of Russia’s assertion that its reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter shields it from liability under
the Genocide Convention. But for the purposes of jurisdiction, this letter is relevant in that it shows
that the only justification provided by the Russian Federation for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine
was a purported genocide occurring in Donbas. Russia’s 2022 letter simply incorporates
President Putin’s 24 February speech, which makes abundantly clear that Russia was not limiting
itself to purely defensive purposes and goals. To the contrary, President Putin’s speech explains that
the so-called special military operation had one purpose: “The purpose of this operation is to protect
people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv
89
Letter Dated 24 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. S/2022/154 (24 Feb. 2022) (judges’ folder, tab 11).
90
Letter Dated 11 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN doc. S/2008/545 (11 Aug. 2008) (judges’ folder, tab 13).
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
- 55 -
President Putin said that “to this end” Russia would take measures to “denazify Ukraine”
and to “bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians”
regime.”
93
.
94
33. Thus, as Judge Robinson observed: President Putin’s speech
“makes clear that, notwithstanding the possible defensive aims of the special military
operation, the operation has a clear protective aim; more specifically, it aims to protect
against alleged acts of genocide committed by Ukraine which . . . Russia considered to
be contrary to Ukraine’s obligations under the Genocide Convention”
95
.
Mr Nebenzia’s cover letter mentioning Article 51 of the UN Charter does not cancel out
President Putin’s stated purpose for Russia’s actions in Ukraine. To the contrary, the letter
incorporates President Putin’s stated purpose. And President Putin’s statement is the only
substantive explanation provided by the Russian Federation to the United Nations for Russia’s
actions.
34. In view of the unusual nature of Russia’s letter to the Secretary-General, it is doubtful
whether it qualifies, in either form or substance, as the report to the Secretary-General required by
Article 51 for all measures taken in self-defence. But the fundamental point at this stage of the
proceedings is that Russia’s reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter does not mean that a dispute
does not exist between the Parties relating to genocide.
35. The Court has consistently recognized, as it did recently in the Alleged Violations case,
that “[c]ertain acts may fall within the ambit of more than one instrument and a dispute relating to
those acts may relate to the ‘interpretation or application’ of more than one treaty or other
instrument”
96
. Even if Russia claims its actions fall within Article 51 of the UN Charter, that does
not exclude the same actions from also falling within the scope of the Genocide Convention.
Ukraine’s Application pertains to the Parties’ dispute under the Genocide Convention. As the Court
went on to note in Alleged Violations, it “cannot infer the subject-matter of a dispute from the political
93
President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12).
94
Ibid.
95
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, I.C.J. Reports 2022, separate opinion
of Judge Robinson, p. 247, para. 19.
96
See e.g. Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 27, para. 56; see
also Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, I.C.J. Reports 2022, p. 223, para. 46.
- 56 -
context in which the proceedings have been instituted, rather than basing itself on what the applicant
has requested of it”
.
97
36. As Professor Koh mentioned earlier, this is also not the first time the Court has been
presented with a dispute involving the use of force and assertions of a right of self-defence. In Oil
Platforms, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction over whether the use of force breached the
Treaty of Amity — even though the United States had not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction over
use-of-force disputes more generally
98
. In deciding whether the United States breached the Treaty of
Amity, the Court considered that the United States’ claims of self-defence was not an automatic
exclusion from jurisdiction, but a defence on the merits
99
.
37. Here, assuming for the sake of argument that there is a dispute between the Parties as to
whether Russia’s use of force was permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter, there is also a
dispute between the Parties under the Genocide Convention. That dispute relates to whether Russia’s
actions in and against Ukraine, for the stated purpose of stopping and punishing a genocide, violates
Articles I and IV of the Genocide Convention.
38. In other words, Russia’s reference to the right of self-defence under the UN Charter does
not re-define the dispute that Ukraine has brought to this Court, nor does it negate the existence of a
dispute relating to the Genocide Convention. The Court already considered Russia’s reference to
Article 51 and made this fundamental point at paragraph 46 of its provisional measures Order
100
.
There is no reason to reach a different conclusion now.
39. There is another way to frame this question, but the outcome is the same. Namely, the
Genocide Convention governs the prevention and punishment of genocide — whether through the
use of force or other measures. Russia has acted for the stated purpose of bringing a genocide to an
end and punishing its perpetrators. That action, for that stated purpose, falls squarely within the
subject-matter of the Genocide Convention. Ukraine contends that under the Convention, Russia has
97
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 28, para. 59.
98
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (II), pp. 810-812, paras. 18, 21.
99
See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 182-
183, paras. 41-43.
100
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, I.C.J. Reports 2022, p. 223, para. 46.
- 57 -
committed to certain undertakings pertaining to the prevention and punishment of genocide: Russia
has committed to act to prevent and punish genocide in good faith, without abuse and within the
limits of international law. Ukraine claims that Russia has acted for the stated purpose of preventing
and punishing genocide, but did so not in good faith, it did so abusively and beyond the limits of
international law. By acting in contravention of the undertakings it made under the Genocide
Convention, Ukraine claims Russia violated the Convention. Whether or not Ukraine and Russia also
have a dispute that relates to the UN Charter, the Court may assert jurisdiction over the dispute
brought by Ukraine under the treaty signed by both Parties that governs the prevention and
40. Finally, I note that Russia’s discussion of self-defence is not relevant to Ukraine’s claim
that Russia violated the Genocide Convention in connection with its recognition of the so-called
“DPR and LPR”. Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations justified Russia’s
recognition of the so-called “DPR and LPR” by claiming that “[i]n the light of the blatant
genocide . . . Russia could no longer remain indifferent to the fate of the 4 million people of the
Donbas”
101
. In this Court, Russia has suggested that its recognition of the so-called “DPR and LPR”
related to customary international law principles of self-determination. But that justification was not
clearly presented at the time.
41. In any case, the analysis remains the same. Even if the parties also have a dispute over
whether Russia’s act of recognition has a basis in some other principle of international law, there is
also a dispute concerning Russia’s recognition of the so-called LPR and DPR as a measure to prevent
and punish a genocide. That dispute relates to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
Genocide Convention. As such, it is within this Court’s jurisdiction, whatever else Russia may wish
to say about it on the merits.
III. Russia’s statements in these proceedings have not rendered
Ukraine’s claims moot or without object
42. The last topic I will address this afternoon is Russia’s new argument against jurisdiction,
pled for the first time in these oral pleadings. Russia asserts that, regardless of whether there was a
101
United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 76th Session: 58th Plenary Meeting, UN doc. A/76/PV.58
(23 Feb. 2022), p. 14 (judges’ folder, tab 15).
- 58 -
dispute at the time Ukraine filed its Application, there is no live dispute now
. Professor Yee relies
on the Court’s recent judgment in Chile v. Bolivia on this point
102
, where the Court stated with regard
to the parties’ dispute relating to the waters of the Silala:
103
“If the Court finds that the parties have come to agree in substance regarding a
claim or a counter-claim, it will take note of that agreement in its judgment and conclude
that such a claim or counter-claim has become without object. In such a case, there is
no call for a declaratory judgment.”
104
43. Neither Chile v. Bolivia, nor any of the other cases Professor Yee cited, applies to the
situation before this Court
105
.
44. Russia identified two purported points of agreement between itself and Ukraine. First,
Russia says that it agrees that it “has an obligation to perform its obligations under the Convention
in good faith”
106
. Second, Russia says that it agrees that the “Genocide Convention does not
authorize, confer a right or impose an obligation to use force to prevent or punish genocide”
107
.
45. But the alleged agreement between the Parties on these two points of law does not come
close to establishing that “the parties have come to agree in substance regarding a claim”. First,
Russia’s purported agreement that it must perform its obligations in good faith does not resolve any
claim. Ukraine alleges that Russia has not performed its obligations under Articles I and IV of the
Genocide Convention in good faith. Nowhere has Russia agreed with that claim. Put differently, even
if Ukraine and Russia agree on the interpretation of this aspect of the Convention, they do not agree
on its application and fulfilment. That dispute still exists.
46. Second, Russia’s statement that the “Genocide Convention does not authorize, confer a
right or impose an obligation to use force to prevent or punish genocide”
108
is not the only question
before this Court, and it has not been put to this Court in the abstract. Ukraine claims that Russia has
abused Articles I and IV of the Convention by taking unilateral action in and against Ukraine based
102
See e.g. CR 2023/18, pp. 42-43, para. 30 (Yee).
103
CR 2023/18, p. 43, para. 31 (Yee).
104
Dispute over the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala (Chile v. Bolivia), Merits, Judgment of 1 December
2022, para. 46.
105
CR 2023/18, pp. 43-44, paras. 31-32 (Yee).
106
CR 2023/13, p. 89, para. 35 (Yee).
107
CR 2023/13, p. 65, para. 36 (Crosato); see also CR 2023/18, p. 42, para. 30 (Yee); PORF, paras. 181, 226.
108
CR 2023/13, p. 65, para. 36 (Crosato).
- 59 -
on false allegations of genocide. In that regard, Ukraine asks this Court to find that Russia’s “use of
force in and against Ukraine beginning on 24 February 2022 violates Articles I and IV of the
Genocide Convention” among Ukraine’s other submissions
. Nowhere has Russia agreed that it
used force in violation of the Genocide Convention. There is no agreement on the application,
fulfilment or even the interpretation of the Convention on that point. Ukraine’s claims have not
become without object.
109
47. Nuclear Tests is of no assistance to Russia, either. There the Court relied on a legally
binding undertaking by France’s President
110
. That undertaking committed France to the precise, and
complete, relief that Australia and New Zealand sought before this Court. Nothing of the sort has
happened here.
48. To quote Professor Yee, “the key rule is that at the time of adjudication, there must be a
live dispute between the parties for the Court to proceed”
111
. Ukraine agrees, and this is a live dispute,
indeed. Russia has not agreed to a single one of Ukraine’s submissions. Simply put, a dispute exists
between the Parties related to the subject-matter of the Convention.
IV. Conclusion
49. Madam President, Members of the Court, let me offer a few concluding remarks. Russia’s
argument that the object of the dispute has disappeared is a variation on Russia’s theme: it believes
that it can say one thing in the Great Hall of Justice and quite another thing outside of this courtroom.
While Russia has argued here that there is no real dispute between the Parties and that it took action
in and against Ukraine for solely defensive purposes, its leadership has told the international
community another story.
50. Outside of this courtroom, senior Russian officials, and President Putin himself, have
fastidiously stuck to Russia’s genocide rationale, first articulated by President Putin in February
2022. The sole “purpose” President Putin identified for Russia’s so-called “special military
109
MU, para. 178.
110
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; Nuclear Tests
(New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 474-475, para. 53.
111
CR 2023/13, p. 89, para. 37 (Yee).
- 60 -
. “To this end”, he said,
Russia announced the objectives of “denazify[ing] Ukraine” and “bring[ing] to trial those who
perpetrated numerous bloody crimes”
operation” was to prevent and punish a purported genocide in Donbas
112
. At a briefing of the United Nations Security Council,
Russia’s representative announced that the “goal” was to stop genocide
113
.
114
51. Russia says in this Great Hall that its leadership did not invoke the Genocide Convention
by name. It says that genocide is just used by Russia, indeed, by all countries, as political rhetoric.
But Russia’s statements and actions outside of this courtroom tell another story. Russia did not just
use the word genocide, it acted on those words. It engaged in a full-scale invasion on the pretext of
stopping a genocide. Outside of this courtroom, Russian officials did invoke the Genocide
Convention by name. The Convention was relied upon by Russia’s Investigative Committee
115
. It
was referenced by Foreign Minister Lavrov in 2020
116
. It was highlighted two weeks ago by Dmitry
Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council
117
.
52. Russia stands before you in this Great Hall and ignores this evidence. On Monday, Russia
did not deny or contradict Medvedev’s statement. It did not tell you that its Foreign Ministry routinely
relies on its Investigative Committee and that its allegations of genocide are published at the
“international level”. It never explained why this Court should ignore the purpose and goal of
Russia’s use of force as stated by its President and communicated to the United Nations.
53. While Russia will say many things in this Great Hall of Justice, it did not contradict its
President. It will not denounce its Foreign Minister or discredit the Deputy Chairman of its Security
Council. I urge this Court to look at the evidence in the record and not just the words uttered in this
courtroom. The evidence before you demonstrates that a dispute exists between these Parties related
112
President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12).
113
President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12).
114
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Statement and Reply by Permanent
Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UNSC Briefing on Ukraine (23 Feb. 2022) (MU, Ann. 7) (judges’ folder, tab 19).
115
See, e.g. CR 2023/14, pp. 54-57, paras. 27-37; see also MU, paras. 36-37; WOU, paras. 38-40.
116
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers
to Questions During the Meeting with Members of the Association of European Businesses in Russia, Moscow (5 Oct.
2020), p. 19 (judges’ folder, tab 18).
117
Telegram Post of Dmitry Medvedev (Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council) (5 Sept. 2023) (judges’
folder, tab 16); see also TASS, Total Victory over Genocide-Promoting Kiev Only Possible Outcome of Special Op —
Medvedev (5 Sept. 2023) (judges’ folder, tab 17).
- 61 -
to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention. Russia’s first preliminary
objection should therefore be rejected.
54. Thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court. I now ask that you call upon
Professor Jean-Marc Thouvenin.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Ms Cheek. I now invite Professor Jean-Marc Thouvenin to address
the Court. You have the floor, Professor.
M. THOUVENIN : Merci beaucoup, Madame la présidente.
DEUXIÈME EXCEPTION PRÉLIMINAIRE :
LA COMPÉTENCE RATIONE MATERIAE
1. Madame la présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je reviens une dernière fois
évoquer devant vous la question de votre compétence ratione materiae, telle que vous pouvez
l’évaluer à ce stade incident de la procédure.
2. Lundi, la Russie vous a abreuvés d’approximations. Elle a tenté de transformer les demandes
de l’Ukraine en ce qu’elles ne sont pas, reconnaissant d’ailleurs ouvertement en travestir les termes
l’idée est forte, je la répète à l’aide de déductions douteuses, et, faussement naïve, elle a tenté
de vous faire voir des contradictions là où il n’y en a pas, à grand renfort de points d’interrogation.
Plutôt que d’assister la Cour dans sa tâche, nos contradicteurs se sont astreints à la compliquer. C’est
une tactique habituelle de la Russie.
3. Mais les volutes de l’écran de mauvaise fumée érigé par nos contradicteurs s’étiolent à peine
prononcées. Je ne les illustrerai donc que brièvement en évoquant trois points qui obsèdent
littéralement la Partie adverse, avant de revenir sur le rôle de la bonne foi, de l’abus de droit, et de
l’obligation d’agir dans les limites de la légalité internationale, dans le cadre de l’interprétation, de
l’application ou de l’exécution de la convention.
I. Les demandes de l’Ukraine portent exclusivement sur des violations
de la convention et relèvent de la compétence de la Cour
en vertu de l’article IX de la convention
4. Madame la présidente, la première idée aussi fixe que fausse de la Partie russe est que les
demandes ukrainiennes concerneraient tout sauf la convention. Croyant pertinent de répondre à ce
- 62 -
qui n’est qu’un mirage, M. Crosato oppose à l’Ukraine que la clause compromissoire ne peut pas
fonder votre compétence « beyond disputes regarding alleged breaches of the Convention itself »
« as Ukraine seems to suggest »
.
118
5. L’Ukraine ne suggère évidemment rien de tel. Le différend qu’elle porte devant vous
concerne exclusivement des violations de la convention et la responsabilité qui y est attachée.
6. Bien qu’il s’en défende
119
, mon contradicteur n’a pas d’autre choix pour donner vie à son
idée fixe que de réécrire les demandes de l’Ukraine, ce qu’il ne peut pas faire. Pour vous convaincre
que c’est sa réécriture qui prévaut, il a projeté sur vos écrans la liste des réparations sollicitées par
l’Ukraine dans son mémoire
120
. Mais, bien entendu, la seule question qui se pose ici pour savoir si
vous pouvez exercer votre compétence en vertu de la convention concerne les violations du droit
international que l’Ukraine demande à la Cour de constater, pas les réparations des dommages qui
en découlent. Or, toutes les violations alléguées par l’Ukraine dans les conclusions de son mémoire
entrent dans le champ de la convention. Comme vous le voyez, les conclusions b), c) et d) visent
spécifiquement et exclusivement des violations de la convention sur le génocide. L’Ukraine prie la
Cour
« b) de dire et juger qu’il n’y a pas d’élément crédible prouvant que l’Ukraine est
responsable de la commission d’un génocide en violation de la convention sur le
génocide dans les oblasts ukrainiens de Donetsk et de Louhansk ;
c) de dire et juger que l’emploi de la force auquel la Fédération de Russie recourt depuis
le 24 février 2022 en Ukraine et contre celle-ci emporte violation des
articles premier et IV de la convention sur le génocide ;
d) de dire et juger que la reconnaissance des prétendues “République populaire de
Donetsk” et “République populaire de Louhansk” le 21 février 2022 emporte
violation des articles premier et IV de la convention sur le génocide »
121
.
7. La première volute de fumée de M. Crosato se dissipe. Contrairement à ce qu’il a martelé
de diverses manières, l’Ukraine ne demande à la Cour de constater que des violations de la
convention. Je crois d’ailleurs que, si nous avions un tour supplémentaire de plaidoiries orales, nous
pourrions peut-être aboutir à un accord. Mon contradicteur a en effet indiqué que « if Ukraine’s
118
CR 2023/17, p. 73, par. 3 (Crosato).
119
Ibid., p. 77, par. 20 (Crosato).
120
Ibid., p, 75, par. 10-11 (Crosato).
121
MU, par. 178 (les italiques sont de nous).
- 63 -
suggestion is that Article IX somehow grants jurisdiction more generally to rule on breaches of
obligations not set forth in the Convention itself, the argument must be rejected »
. Je viens de le
rassurer : ce n’est pas ce que l’Ukraine suggère. Le différend qu’elle porte devant la Cour peut donc
être traité au fond.
122
8. Madame la présidente, j’en profite pour préciser que, bien évidemment, la violation de la
convention peut impliquer la violation d’autres règles de droit international. C’est du reste ce que la
Cour a indiqué dans l’affaire Croatie c. Serbie, citée de manière tronquée c’est une habitude
par la Russie
123
. La Cour y indique que la compétence que lui confère l’article IX
« n’empêche pas la Cour de rechercher, dans sa motivation, s’il y a eu violation du droit
international humanitaire ou du droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme, dans
la mesure où cela lui serait utile pour déterminer s’il y a eu violation d’une obligation
découlant de la convention sur le génocide »
124
.
9. Autrement dit, ce n’est pas parce que le moyen utilisé pour violer la convention est lui-même
une violation d’une autre règle de droit international que, pour autant, la violation de la convention
disparaît.
10. Cette évidence met à bas la logique russe qui, quand on la regarde de près, se réduit
finalement à soutenir ceci : dans le cas hypothétique où un État ordonnerait à ses troupes de pénétrer
sur le territoire d’un autre État, d’écraser sa résistance, et de massacrer l’ensemble d’un groupe
ethnique qui se trouve localisé sur son territoire, la convention serait inapplicable parce que, selon la
thèse martelée par M. Crosato, « the Genocide Convention does not regulate matters related to the
use of force and the recognition of States »
125
. C’est intenable.
11. Madame la présidente, on m’a reproché, on a reproché à l’Ukraine, d’avoir gardé le silence
sur la jurisprudence de la Cour à propos de l’article IX de la convention, comme si nous ressentions
une quelconque gêne de ce côté-ci de la barre
126
.
122
CR 2023/17, p. 78, par. 25 (Crosato).
123
CR 2023/13, p. 68, par. 49 (Crosato) ; CR 2023/17, p. 78-79, par. 28 (Crosato).
124
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2015 (I), p. 45-46, par. 85.
125
CR 2023/17, p. 77, par. 19 (Crosato).
126
Ibid., p. 74, par. 9 et p. 79, par. 30-31 (Crosato).
- 64 -
12. C’est d’abord le paragraphe 431 de l’arrêt sur le fond dans l’affaire relative au Génocide
en Bosnie, dont la Russie fait grand cas
127
. Il indique que « la responsabilité d’un État pour violation
de l’obligation de prévenir le génocide n’est susceptible d’être retenue que si un génocide a
effectivement été commis »
128
. Pour la Russie, puisque l’Ukraine dit qu’aucun génocide n’a été
commis, il ne saurait y avoir violation de la convention, l’affaire serait donc réglée
129
.
13. Mais ce que l’Ukraine dit est que la Russie a accusé et accuse l’Ukraine de commettre et
de laisser commettre un génocide comme prétexte pour invoquer sa responsabilité et engager des
actions sur son territoire et à son encontre
130
. L’affaire n’est donc pas réglée : la Russie n’a pas retiré
ses allégations de génocide, n’a pas reconnu les avoir invoquées comme pur prétexte pour justifier
de conduire des actions totalement incompatibles avec ce que requiert la convention, et n’a pas réparé
les dommages causés par son comportement illicite. Au contraire, elle continue, jour après jour, à
mettre en œuvre des actions en Ukraine pour prévenir ce prétendu génocide et en punir les auteurs.
14. Quant aux ordonnances sur les mesures conservatoires dans les affaires relatives à la
Licéité de l’emploi de la force, autre leitmotiv de la Russie
131
, elles se bornent à dire, ce qui est
possible seulement au stade des mesures conservatoires, que l’accusation de génocide portée alors
par la Serbie-et-Monténégro contre divers pays n’était pas plausible. Cela n’a aucune pertinence ici
puisque nous ne sommes pas au stade des mesures conservatoires. Quant aux arrêts sur les exceptions
préliminaires dans ces mêmes affaires, il est difficile de comprendre ce que la Russie en retire de
pertinent
132
. La Cour s’est bornée à juger que la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’avait pas qualité pour ester
devant la Cour au moment du dépôt de sa requête, sans rien dire de l’article IX. Là encore, il n’y a
aucun rapport avec la présente espèce.
127
Ibid., p. 75, par. 13 (Crosato).
128
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 221, par. 431.
129
CR 2023/17, p. 73, par. 2 et p. 76, par. 16 (Crosato).
130
EEU, par. 3.
131
CR 2023/17, p. 75-76, par. 14 (Crosato).
132
Ibid., p. 79, par. 29 (Crosato).
- 65 -
15. Pour être tout à fait complet, j’ajouterai que c’est toujours en vain que la Russie a adossé
sa thèse, lundi
133
comme la semaine dernière
134
, au paragraphe 147 de l’arrêt sur le fond dans l’affaire
relative au Génocide en Bosnie.
16. La Cour y indique qu’elle ne peut pas se prononcer, en vertu de l’article IX de la
convention, sur des griefs tirés de violations de conventions internationales et du droit international
coutumier, formulés sans lien avec la convention sur le génocide
135
.
17. Ce disant, la Cour répondait aux nombreuses conclusions du demandeur qui reposaient sur
une autre base de compétence que l’article IX de la convention. Dans son arrêt, la Cour a rejeté cette
autre base de compétence, et constaté qu’elle ne pouvait donc se prononcer qu’en vertu de
l’article IX. Elle en tira la conséquence qu’elle ne pouvait pas exercer sa compétence, établie
uniquement sur la base de l’article IX de la convention, à l’égard des conclusions du demandeur, qui
visaient exclusivement des violations des conventions de Genève, de traités relatifs aux droits de
l’homme, de la Charte des Nations Unies ou du droit international coutumier
136
.
18. Le contraste avec la présente affaire est donc saisissant puisque l’Ukraine ne vise pas
d’autre base de compétence que l’article IX de la convention, et ne demande rien d’autre à la Cour
que de constater des violations de la convention.
Madame la présidente, si le moment est venu, c’est un endroit opportun, si vous le souhaitez,
pour que j’interrompe mon discours et vous laisse prendre un peu de repos.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Thouvenin. I see that the next section of your speech is rather
short, so perhaps you could just complete that section and after that we will take a break.
M. THOUVENIN : Parfait, Madame la présidente, je vous remercie.
133
Ibid., p. 78, par. 28 (Crosato).
134
CR 2023/13, p. 67-68, par. 46-48 (Crosato).
135
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 104, par. 147.
136
Ibid., p. 62-64, par. 64.
- 66 -
II. Les relations entre la convention et le recours à la force
19. Madame la présidente, un autre point de fixation de la Partie russe qu’il me faut évoquer
rapidement est la relation entre la convention et le recours à la force, que mes collègues ont déjà
clarifiée, mais sur laquelle je vais revenir quelques instants.
20. Sur ce point, mes contradicteurs de l’autre côté de la barre ont prétendu me surprendre en
pleine contradiction en mettant côte à côte deux phrases que j’ai prononcées la semaine dernière. J’ai
dit, ont-ils rappelé, à la fois que l’article premier de la convention ne confère pas un droit de recourir
à la force, et que la convention n’interdit pas tout recours à la force
137
. Un premier conseil de la
Russie croit y déceler une « clear hesitance »
138
. Aurais-je suggéré que la convention conférerait un
droit de recourir unilatéralement à l’usage de la force
139
? Son collègue a pour sa part fait comprendre,
à sa manière, que la finesse de mon propos lui avait totalement échappé
140
.
21. Il est pourtant élémentaire. La Cour a jugé à deux reprises que les mesures qu’un État doit
et est en droit de prendre pour prévenir un génocide et en poursuivre les auteurs doivent demeurer
dans les limites de ce que le droit international permet. Il en découle qu’un État est en droit de
prévenir et punir un génocide en vertu de la convention en menant diverses actions, y compris en
recourant à la force si ce dernier se situe dans les limites de la légalité internationale
141
.
22. Par exemple, si le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies considère qu’une situation
génocidaire dans un pays particulier constitue une menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationale,
il peut décider d’autoriser le recours à la force pour mettre un terme à ce génocide. Chacun se souvient
à cet égard que, dans le cas du Rwanda, le Conseil de sécurité n’avait pas brillé par son efficacité ;
mais il avait adopté la résolution 929 (1994) autorisant le recours à la force au Rwanda pour prévenir
des massacres massifs qualifiés, on le sait, de génocide
142
. De là, les États parties à la convention sur
le génocide pouvaient sans aucun doute se mettre en action pour mettre un terme au génocide au
Rwanda, y compris, le cas échéant, en recourant à la force dans les limites fixées par le Conseil de
sécurité. Certains États l’ont fait, avec plus ou moins de réussite.
137
CR 2023/17, p. 85, par. 57 (Crosato).
138
Ibid. (Crosato).
139
Ibid., par. 58 (Crosato).
140
CR 2023/18, p. 53-54, par. 36-38 (Udovichenko).
141
Voir CR 2023/15, p. 62, par. 14 (Tzanakopoulos).
142
Nations Unies, résolution 929 du Conseil de sécurité, 3392
e
séance, 22 juin 1994, doc. S/RES/929 (1994).
- 67 -
23. De la même manière, une action de force dans le but affirmé de prévenir et punir un
génocide pourrait demeurer dans les limites de la légalité internationale si ledit recours à la force
militaire est une mesure de légitime défense, dès lors, bien sûr, que les conditions d’ouverture du
droit de légitime défense sont dûment remplies, et que les mesures prises sont effectivement des
mesures licites de légitime défense.
24. S’agissant de l’affirmation de la Russie selon laquelle, en conduisant les actions de
prévention et de punition d’un prétendu génocide en Ukraine, elle a agi en vertu de son droit de
légitime défense, il appartiendra à la Cour, mais seulement au fond, d’entendre ce que la Russie a à
en dire. La Russie aura alors tout loisir d’expliquer, si elle le souhaite, que ses mesures de prévention
et de punition du prétendu génocide sont aussi des mesures de légitime défense et que, par
conséquent, elle s’est acquittée de son obligation d’appliquer et d’exécuter la convention de bonne
foi, en utilisant tous les moyens raisonnables à sa disposition et en respectant les limites de ce que le
droit international permet. Et il reviendra à la Cour d’en juger.
25. Bref, la convention sur le génocide n’interdit pas tout recours à la force aux fins de son
exécution. C’est ce que j’ai indiqué la semaine dernière
143
. Il n’en demeure pas moins que la
convention, en tant que telle, ne confère pas un droit de recourir à la force. Elle oblige les États à agir
en vue de mettre un terme à un génocide, et leur confère une marge discrétionnaire dans le choix des
moyens qu’ils peuvent mobiliser à cette fin. Mais elle ne leur confère pas, en elle-même, un droit de
recourir à la force. Je reviendrai tout à l’heure sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire et sur l’abus de droit,
notions là encore élémentaires que mes contradicteurs peinent à concevoir mais ce sera, Madame la
présidente, si vous le souhaitez, après la pause.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Thouvenin. Indeed, this is an appropriate time for the
Court to adjourn for a coffee break of 10 minutes. The sitting is adjourned.
The Court adjourned from 4.30 p.m. to 4.50 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is resumed. So I now invite
Professor Thouvenin to complete his presentation. You have the floor, Professor.
143
CR 2023/14, p. 72, par. 25 (Thouvenin).
- 68 -
M. THOUVENIN :
III. La crainte infondée de la Russie relative à l’incorporation d’un nombre indéfini
d’obligations externes à la convention
26. Merci, Madame la présidente. Madame la présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, la
troisième idée fixe de nos contradicteurs, déjà traitée la semaine dernière
144
mais sur laquelle je dois
revenir, est que l’Ukraine voudrait incorporer dans la convention un nombre « indéfini »
d’obligations provenant de sources de droit international externes à la convention, et de ce fait, élargir
indûment la portée de l’article IX et la compétence de la Cour ratione materiae
145
. La Russie craint
que l’article IX devienne une forme de trou noir qui attirerait à lui toutes sortes de différends sans
rapport avec l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution de la convention ; bref, que l’article IX se
mue en une clause compromissoire universelle.
27. Mais, contrairement à ce que martèlent nos contradicteurs, il n’y a rien dans les écritures
de l’Ukraine
146
, et pas davantage dans ses observations orales, qui ressemble à une telle prétention.
Les États intervenants n’ont d’ailleurs pas décelé une telle suggestion dans les plaidoiries de
l’Ukraine
147
, et aucun n’a nourri la même crainte que celle exprimée par la Russie.
28. Il reste que les actions que les États parties à la convention peuvent engager pour mettre
en œuvre leur obligation de prévenir un génocide et en punir les auteurs en vertu de la convention
doivent demeurer, comme l’a affirmé votre Cour, « dans les limites de ce que l[eur] permet la légalité
internationale »
148
. Ce disant, vous n’avez fait qu’interpréter les articles premier et IV de la
convention en déterminant la mesure de ce qu’ils obligent et habilitent à faire. J’ai déjà traité ce point
la semaine dernière et n’y reviendrai donc pas
149
. Il suffit simplement de rappeler qu’en interprétant
ces dispositions, vous n’avez nullement incorporé dans la convention des règles de droit international
144
Ibid., p. 79-80, par. 51-56 (Thouvenin).
145
Voir EPFR, par. 83, 170, 215. Voir aussi CR 2023/13, p. 61, par. 7, p. 62, par. 16, p. 69, par. 53-54, p. 73,
par. 76, p. 76-77, par. 98 (Crosato) ; CR 2023/17, p. 77, par. 23, p. 81-84, par. 38-54 (Crosato) ; CR 2023/18, p. 66-67,
par. 34-37, p. 68, par. 42-43 (Tchikaya).
146
Voir EEU, par. 109, 129, 137-139.
147
CR 2023/15, p. 40-41, par. 14-16 (Donaghue), p. 66-68, par. 9-13 (Alabrune), p. 80, par. 14 (Paparinskis) ;
CR 2023/16, p. 57-58, par. 8-12 (Prentis).
148
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 221, par. 430.
149
CR 2023/14, p. 73-75, par. 29-35 (Thouvenin).
- 69 -
qui n’y sont pas. Votre Cour n’a pas davantage procédé à une « incorporation » interdite lorsqu’elle
a jugé que l’exercice de sa compétence sur la seule base de l’article IX ne l’empêche pas
« de rechercher, dans sa motivation, s’il y a eu violation du droit international
humanitaire ou du droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme, dans la mesure où
cela lui serait utile pour déterminer s’il y a eu violation d’une obligation découlant de la
convention sur le génocide »
.
150
29. Et il n’y a rien non plus qui ressemble à une incorporation débridée, dans un traité, de
règles externes à ce traité, lorsque, en application de l’article 31, paragraphe 3, alinéa c) de la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, la Cour interprète ce traité à la lumière de, je cite la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités : « toute règle pertinente de droit international applicable
dans les relations entre les parties »
151
.
IV. Interprétation, application ou exécution de bonne foi
de la convention
A. L’obligation d’interpréter, d’appliquer ou d’exécuter la convention de bonne foi
30. Madame la présidente, les points de fixation de la Russie étant maintenant derrière nous,
je me tourne à présent vers le rôle de la bonne foi dans l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution
de la convention.
31. Là encore, M. Crosato a été contraint de travestir les propos de l’Ukraine pour pouvoir les
réfuter, tout en reconnaissant que « Ukraine does not say so expressly »
152
. Selon lui, la thèse cachée
de l’Ukraine serait que, si un État n’exécute pas la convention de bonne foi, la juridiction de la Cour
en vertu de cette dernière peut s’étendre à des allégations de violations de règles extérieures au traité,
qui pourraient avoir un lien quelconque avec la mauvaise exécution du traité
153
. Et mon contradicteur
de répondre à cette thèse cachée que le principe de bonne foi n’est pas une source autonome
150
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2015 (I), p. 45-46, par. 85.
151
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, Recueil des traités, vol. 1155, p. 363, art. 31, par. 3, alinéa c),
23 mai 1969. Voir aussi CR 2023/15, p. 44, par. 5 (Ruffer), p. 51-52, par. 5 (Dramova), p. 76, par. 26 (Tanzi), p. 80, par. 14
(Paparinskis).
152
CR 2023/17, p. 88, par. 70 (Crosato).
153
Ibid.
- 70 -
d’obligations, et ne peut donc pas créer d’obligations pour les parties à la convention si ces
obligations n’y sont pas déjà consignées
.
154
32. Ce n’est pas ce que l’Ukraine plaide. L’Ukraine soutient que vous avez compétence en
vertu de l’article IX pour trancher un différend portant sur l’interprétation, l’application ou
l’exécution de la convention qui ne serait pas de bonne foi, c’est-à-dire qui serait contraire à son objet
et à son but, ou – mais si les deux aspects se cumulent c’est encore plus flagrant – qui serait
radicalement contraire aux fins pour lesquelles la convention a été adoptée. Un tel comportement
serait manifestement une violation de la convention. Et, bien évidemment, pour déterminer si la
Russie a violé son obligation d’interpréter, d’appliquer ou d’exécuter de bonne foi la convention, la
Cour pourra, si cela lui est utile, se référer à d’autres violations, sans que cela la conduise à
outrepasser les limites de sa compétence fixée par l’article IX.
33. Madame la présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l’Ukraine est parfaitement au fait
que la Cour a déjà jugé que le principe de bonne foi n’est pas en soi une source d’obligation quand
il n’en existerait pas autrement
155
. Mais lorsqu’un traité lie des parties, c’est le dictum de la Cour
dans Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros qui éclaire la place de la bonne foi dans leurs relations
conventionnelles :
« “Tout traité en vigueur lie les parties et doit être exécuté par elles de bonne foi.”
De l’avis de la Cour, ce dernier élément implique qu’au cas particulier c’est le but du
traité, et l’intention dans laquelle les parties ont conclu celui-ci, qui doivent prévaloir
sur son application littérale. Le principe de bonne foi oblige les Parties à l’appliquer de
façon raisonnable et de telle sorte que son but puisse être atteint. »
156
34. Le but de la convention sur le génocide est de débarrasser l’humanité du fléau que le
génocide constitue
157
. C’est dans ce but que les États parties se sont engagés à prévenir et punir le
crime de génocide. C’est ce but, conforme à l’intention des parties, qui doit présider à l’interprétation,
l’application ou l’exécution des articles premier et IV de la convention. L’Ukraine soutient qu’il ne
peut pas exister de comportement plus contraire à ces exigences que celui adopté par la Russie et
154
CR 2023/17, p. 88, par. 72 (Crosato).
155
Actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua c. Honduras), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 105, par. 94.
156
Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p. 78-79, par. 142.
157
CR 2023/14, p. 80, par. 55-57 (Thouvenin).
- 71 -
dénoncé par l’Ukraine dans la présente affaire. Et elle soutient, surtout à ce stade de la procédure,
que vous avez clairement compétence ratione materiae pour trancher ce grief au fond.
B. Abus de droit
35. Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, passant à l’abus de droit, il est apparent que l’argument
clé de nos contradicteurs pour tenter d’exclure ce grief de votre compétence ratione materiae consiste
à dire que la Russie a agi, et continue d’agir, en et contre l’Ukraine pour prévenir et punir un génocide
imaginaire, sans que la convention lui donne le droit de le faire, même si elle l’a invoquée pour s’en
justifier. Elle n’aurait donc, dit-elle, pas pu abuser d’un droit qui ne lui est pas conféré par la
convention
158
.
36. Mais force est de constater que la Russie retient de l’abus de droit une compréhension
passablement étriquée
159
.
37. Il est d’abord loisible d’aborder la notion d’abus de droit en considérant qu’elle qualifie
une forme de « lésion » du principe de bonne foi
160
, c’est-à-dire de violation de ce principe, comme
l’a indiqué Karl Strupp dans son cours spécial donné à l’Académie de droit international de La Haye,
ou encore, ce qui revient au même, qu’elle est un « corollaire du principe de bonne foi », comme
l’indique le dictionnaire du regretté Jean Salmon
161
. Dans cette perspective, l’invocation de l’abus
de droit est une autre manière d’aborder l’obligation d’interpréter, d’appliquer ou d’exécuter la
convention de bonne foi, que je viens d’évoquer.
38. Mais on peut aussi aborder l’abus de droit indépendamment, en estimant qu’il est
caractérisé, et je cite ici le cours spécial de Jean-Paul Jacqué, « lorsque l’État utilise certaines de ses
compétences pour une fin autre que celle prévue par le droit international »
162
.
39. Dans le même ordre d’idées, Georges Abi-Saab, toujours devant les auditeurs de
l’Académie mais cette fois à l’occasion de son cours général, professait à propos des contre-mesures
158
CR 2023/13, p. 77, par. 102 (Crosato) ; CR 2023/17, p. 85, par. 56 (Crosato).
159
CR 2023/17, p. 84-87, par. 55-67 (Crosato) ; CR 2023/18, p. 70, par. 52-53 (Tchikaya).
160
Karl Strupp, « Les règles générales du droit de la paix », RCADI, vol. 47, p. 559.
161
Dictionnaire Salmon, p. 3, note 94.
162
Jean-Paul Jacqué, « Acte et norme en droit international public », RCADI, vol. 227, p. 381.
- 72 -
que « le “détournement” de l’institution ou son utilisation comme prétexte à des fins inavouées
tombent sous l’interdiction … de l’abus de droit »
.
163
40. En l’espèce, le comportement de la Russie tel que dénoncé par l’Ukraine est l’exemple le
plus parfait d’un abus de droit en matière de prévention et de punition du génocide. La Russie utilise
certaines des compétences qui lui sont reconnues par la convention pour des fins totalement
étrangères, en fait radicalement contraires, à celles prévues par la convention. La Russie a détourné
la convention en l’utilisant à des fins aussi inavouées que terriblement dommageables, non seulement
pour l’Ukraine, mais aussi pour la communauté internationale, ce qui est un abus de droit caractérisé.
41. Au surplus, même à en rester à la vision étriquée de mon contradicteur, la réalité est que
la convention confère expressément aux États parties à la convention le droit de prendre certaines
actions en cas de survenance d’un génocide. L’article VIII consacre le droit de saisir les organes
compétents de l’ONU. La formule de l’article VIII est claire : « Toute Partie contractante peut saisir
les organes compétents ». Ce n’est pas un devoir, c’est un droit, ou une habilitation comme je l’ai
qualifiée la semaine dernière
164
, droit dont l’étendue n’est précisée ni dans l’article premier ni dans
l’article IV, mais spécifiquement dans l’article VIII. De même l’article IX confère un droit, celui
pour tout État, directement lésé ou non, d’agir pour mettre un terme au génocide en engageant la
responsabilité d’un État, et, éventuellement — mais c’est autre chose —, de saisir la Cour d’un
différend à cet égard.
42. La convention, tout particulièrement les articles premier et IV, habilite aussi les États à,
c’est-à-dire leur reconnaît le droit de, conduire d’autres actions qu’elle ne définit pas explicitement,
leur reconnaissant un pouvoir discrétionnaire, mais non illimité, d’en décider.
43. La Russie affirme douter que les Parties aient, au titre de la convention, le pouvoir
discrétionnaire de décider de la manière dont elles doivent s’acquitter de leurs obligations
165
.
44. Pourtant, la Cour a considéré que, s’il est clair que « [l]’article premier ne précise pas quels
types de mesures une partie contractante peut prendre pour s’acquitter de cette obligation »
166
, « [l]es
163
Georges Abi-Saab, « Cours général de droit international public », RCADI, vol. 207, p. 299.
164
CR 2023/14, p. 74, par. 32 (Thouvenin).
165
CR 2023/17, p. 86, par. 63 (Crosato).
166
Allégations de génocide au titre de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16 mars 2022, par. 56. Voir aussi CR 2023/15,
p. 78, par. 9 (Paparinskis).
- 73 -
parties contractantes doivent toutefois exécuter cette obligation de bonne foi, en tenant compte
d’autres parties de la convention, en particulier ses articles VIII et IX, ainsi que son préambule »
.
167
45. Et on retrouve la même articulation, à vrai dire évidente, dans l’affaire Djibouti c. France,
où la Cour a jugé que, si les termes de l’article 2 de la convention pertinente dans cette affaire
« donnent un très large pouvoir discrétionnaire à l’État requis, l’exercice de ce pouvoir
demeure soumis à l’obligation de bonne foi codifiée à l’article 26 de la convention de
Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités »
168
.
46. Autrement dit, aucun pouvoir discrétionnaire reconnu par une convention n’est sans
limites. S’agissant de la convention sur le génocide, la Cour en a déterminé la limite inférieure, un
« plancher » si l’on veut, en jugeant que les États doivent mettre en œuvre tous les moyens qui sont
raisonnablement à leur disposition
169
. La Cour a également déterminé la limite supérieure, ou le
« plafond », en interprétant la convention comme exigeant que toute action de prévention et de
punition d’un génocide se situe dans les limites de ce que permet la légalité internationale. Dans ces
limites, fixées par la convention elle-même telle que correctement interprétée, la convention
reconnaît aux États le pouvoir discrétionnaire, donc le droit, de déterminer et de conduire les actions
de prévention et de punition qui s’imposent à eux.
47. Ceci revient à dire, comme la Cour en a convenu, qu’
« [u]ne partie contractante peut recourir à d’autres moyens d’exécuter son obligation de
prévenir et de punir un génocide qui, selon elle, aurait été commis par une autre partie
contractante, par exemple en entamant des discussions bilatérales ou des échanges de
vues dans le cadre d’une organisation régionale. Cependant, la Cour souligne que, en
s’acquittant de l’obligation de prévenir le génocide, “chaque État ne peut déployer son
action que dans les limites de ce que lui permet la légalité internationale” »
170
.
48. C’est sur cette base que l’Ukraine soutient que le comportement de la Russie qu’elle met
en cause dans la présente affaire est non seulement une violation des articles premier et IV de la
convention tels qu’interprétés par la Cour, mais aussi un abus manifeste, en ce qu’elle a prétendu
167
Allégations de génocide au titre de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16 mars 2022, par. 56. Voir aussi CR 2023/15,
p. 79, par. 12 (Paparinskis).
168
Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale (Djibouti c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
2008, p. 229, par. 145.
169
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 221, par. 430.
170
Allégations de génocide au titre de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16 mars 2022, par. 57 (citant Application de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 221, par. 430).
- 74 -
s’acquitter de ses obligations au titre de la convention en déployant une action qui se trouve aux
antipodes de ce que lui permet la convention dans les limites de la légalité internationale, et qui est
radicalement contraire aux fins pour lesquelles la convention a été conclue. Il ne saurait exister d’abus
plus grave.
49. Mais à ce stade, l’Ukraine ne demande pas à la Cour de juger d’un quelconque abus. Elle
soutient simplement que son allégation à cet égard relève, comme les autres, de la compétence
ratione materiae de votre Cour.
50. Ceci conclut ma plaidoirie de ce jour. Madame la présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs de
la Cour, en pensant toujours au fil à retordre que je donne aux interprètes, dont je salue les prestations
toujours talentueuses, il me reste à vous remercier de votre patiente écoute, et à vous prier de bien
vouloir appeler à la barre M
e
Zionts.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Thouvenin and I now invite Mr David Zionts to address
the Court. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr ZIONTS:
THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH AND SIXTH PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS:
UKRAINE’S CLAIMS ARE ADMISSIBLE
1. Madam President, Members of the Court, I am honoured to appear before you again on
behalf of Ukraine. My task is to address Russia’s admissibility objections, which remain entirely
without basis.
I. Ukraine’s claims have not transformed the subject-matter of the dispute:
Russia’s third objection fails
2. I turn first to Russia’s third preliminary objection, regarding supposedly “new claims”. On
Monday, Russia’s counsel spoke at length about the Nauru case
171
. Yet he ignored the decisive
question in Nauru — whether “the subject of the dispute originally submitted to the Court would be
transformed if [the Court] entertained th[e] claim”
172
.
171
See CR 2023/18, pp. 34-35, 40, 41, paras. 3-6, 20, 23 (Yee).
172
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1992, p. 267, para. 70.
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3. Russia even faulted Ukraine for crystallizing the “overall subject-matter” of the dispute,
rather than parsing it into various specific “issues”
173
. One wonders how Russia expects the Court to
decide if the subject of the dispute has been transformed, without identifying the dispute’s
fundamental subject-matter.
4. To this overarching legal point, I add four brief factual ones.
5. First, Russia believes the Application does not refer to the subject-matter of the dispute as
Ukraine has summarized it during this hearing. On your screen is Ukraine’s concise crystallization
of the dispute that Russia’s counsel does not like, and next to it the first substantive paragraph of
Ukraine’s Application. The Court can decide whether there has been some radical transformation.
6. Second, I refer the Court to paragraph 27 of Ukraine’s Application, which identifies a “duty”
located in Article I of the Genocide Convention, and describes Russia’s conduct as something a State
“may not” do consistent with that duty. This, together with the parts of the Application I highlighted
last week, confirms that Ukraine has always claimed that Russia violated the Convention.
7. Third, Russia considers Ukraine’s reliance on Article IV inadmissible because the
Application purportedly did not concern anything “related to criminal punishment”
174
. Yet the
Application addressed prevention and punishment of genocide, and highlighted President Putin’s
speech of 24 February. That speech declared that the “purpose” of the so-called special military
operation was to stop the alleged genocide, and to “bring to trial those who perpetrated it”
175
.
8. Fourth, with respect to Ukraine’s non-violation claim — i.e. requesting a declaration that it
has not violated the Genocide Convention — Russia believes that Ukraine has “dropped its initial
claim that there are no genocidal acts in Donetsk and Luhansk” and now asserts only that “Ukraine
as a sovereign State is not responsible for them”
176
. This is not a remotely fair reading of the
Application or the Memorial. Russia omits that, in the Application, Ukraine requested a declaration
that no acts of genocide had been committed, “contrary to what the Russian Federation claims”
177
.
173
CR 2023/18, p. 38, para. 15 (Yee).
174
CR 2023/18, p. 40, para. 22 (Yee).
175
President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12).
176
CR 2023/13, p. 82, para. 11 (Yee).
177
AU, para. 30 (a).
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There is no mystery as to who the Russian Federation claims was responsible for committing
genocide — Ukraine.
II. A judgment on Ukraine’s claims would not be devoid of purpose:
Russia’s fourth objection fails
9. Madam President, Members of the Court, I will briefly return now to Russia’s fourth
objection, alleging that any possible judgment would be devoid of purpose. To maintain this
objection, Russia continues to ignore several of Ukraine’s submissions. It focuses on one request, for
the termination of Russia’s use of force, noting that this submission does not itself use the words
“genocide” or “Genocide Convention”
178
. But Ukraine claims that Russia’s use of force violates the
Genocide Convention
179
. Ukraine’s “termination” request simply seeks cessation of the act that
violates the Convention. As Ukraine has already explained, Russia’s reference to self-defence
establishes nothing about the inherent ineffectiveness of Ukraine’s requested order; at most, it raises
questions about the merits or perhaps the scope of relief.
10. In any event, Ukraine also requests other relief. Take Ukraine’s request for a declaration
that there is no credible evidence it is responsible for committing genocide. Since 2014, Russia has
alleged that Ukraine was committing genocide. Just last week, the Russian Agent disturbingly
accused Ukraine of planning a “final solution” for Donbas
180
. And when Russia launched its
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the stated “purpose” and “goal” of Russia’s use of force was to stop
this genocide
181
. In this context, the declaratory judgment Ukraine requests would have practical
effect. In the words of Chorzów Factory, “the legal position thus established [could not] again be
called in question”
182
. Would Russia truly persist in alleging that Ukraine violated the Convention?
Would Russia truly continue acting for the “purpose” and “goal” of stopping a genocide committed
178
CR 2023/18, p. 42, para. 29 (Yee).
179
MU, para. 178 (c)-(d).
180
CR 2023/13, p. 41, para. 18 (Kuzmin).
181
See President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022),
p. 8, accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12); Permanent
Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Statement and Reply by Permanent Representative Vassily
Nebenzia at UNSC Briefing on Ukraine (23 Feb. 2022) (MU, Ann. 7) (judges’ folder, tab 19).
182
Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 13, p. 20; see also Dispute over the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala (Chile v. Bolivia), Judgment of
1 December 2022, declaration of Judge Charlesworth, para. 19 (quoting Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v.
United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 34).
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by Ukraine, in the face of a judgment by this Court declaring there is no credible evidence that this
alleged genocide is occurring? The Court cannot assume so as a basis for declining to exercise its
jurisdiction.
11. Consider also Ukraine’s request for declarations that Russia’s use of force, and its
recognitions of the so-called “DPR and LPR”, “violate[] Articles I and IV of the Genocide
Convention”
183
. The fact that Russia violated the Convention through a use of force does not make
a potential judgment devoid of purpose. This Court had no such concern in Oil Platforms, where
as my colleagues already noted the applicant requested a declaration that a particular use of force
violated — not the UN Charter — but a treaty under which the Court had jurisdiction
184
.
III. Ukraine’s request for a non-violation declaration is proper and admissible:
Russia’s fifth objection fails
12. Madam President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the admissibility of Ukraine’s claim
requesting a declaration that it has not violated the Genocide Convention. It is worth noting the limits
of Russia’s objection to this claim. Russia does not object to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae
to assess Russia’s allegations that Ukraine is responsible for committing genocide. Russia makes the
more limited argument that the Court should treat Ukraine’s request for a declaration on this question
as inadmissible — that is, to decline to exercise jurisdiction the Court admittedly possesses
185
.
13. To be clear, Ukraine’s case is about more than Russia’s allegations of genocide in isolation.
The subject-matter of the dispute is Russia’s reliance on allegations of genocide to harm Ukraine.
Ukraine’s requested non-violation declaration is legally intertwined with this subject-matter: Ukraine
alleges that Russia relied on false allegations of genocide to act against Ukraine, without even having
credible evidence that those allegations are true
186
. Ukraine also seeks important additional relief,
183
MU, para. 178 (c)-(d).
184
See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 807, 811-812, 820, paras. 9-10, 21 and 53.
185
See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and United States of America), Preliminary Question, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 33; Northern
Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 37; Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 262, para. 55;
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 177, para. 29;
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 456, para. 120; Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela),
Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 6 April 2023, paras. 63-64.
186
See also CR 2023/15, pp. 36-37, paras. 14-16 (Rückert).
- 78 -
some of which I have just recounted. But questions about whether the Court should order all, some
or none of the relief that Ukraine requests, or should fashion some other remedies that the Court
deems appropriate, is a classic question for the merits, after the Court has weighed the facts and fully
interpreted the treaty. At present, the notable point is that Russia has no meaningful argument against
the jurisdiction of this Court. The Parties unquestionably disagree over Ukraine’s alleged
responsibility for genocide, and the Court has jurisdiction to resolve that disagreement. Full stop.
14. With this in mind, I turn to the question of the admissibility of that claim.
15. The Court can begin and end its analysis with Article IX’s text. Under its ordinary
meaning, if there is a dispute over responsibility for genocide, “any of the parties” to that dispute
may bring it to the Court. On Monday, Russia reiterated its view that only a State that accuses another
State of genocide may seise the Court. Russia’s counsel even invented a rule out of nothing: “the
claim shall be filed by a State that invokes responsibility of the other State”
187
. In other words,
according to Russia, in a dispute between two States over responsibility for genocide, only one of the
parties to that dispute may submit it to the Court. The disconnect between the treaty’s text and
Russia’s argument can end the discussion.
16. But if that were not enough, Russia makes four additional errors.
17. First, Russia relies on the travaux préparatoires to argue that the phrase “any of the
parties” was “merely editorial in nature” and so can be disregarded
188
. In light of the clarity of the
text, resort to the negotiating history is unnecessary
189
. But in any event, Russia’s selective
presentation of that history is misleading.
18. In an early draft, the compromissory clause would have provided in simple terms that
disputes shall be submitted to the Court — without any reference to who may submit the dispute
190
.
A series of amendments followed. The United Kingdom proposed that disputes would be referred to
this Court “at the request of any party to the dispute”
191
. This amendment was then consolidated with
187
CR 2023/18, p. 50, para. 16 (Udovichenko).
188
CR 2023/13, p. 92, para. 7 (Udovichenko).
189
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Arts. 31-32.
190
Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide and Draft
Convention, 24 May 1948, UN doc. No. E/794, pp. 56-57 (judges’ folder, tab 20).
191
Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Sixth Committee, United Kingdom:
Further Amendments to the Draft Convention, 16 October 1948, UN doc. No. A/C.6/236, p. 2 (judges’ folder, tab 21).
- 79 -
a Belgian proposal, yielding a joint amendment under which disputes would be submitted to the
Court “at the request of any of the High Contracting Parties”
. The Indian delegate “felt that that
change of wording did not improve the text” and proposed a formulation closer to the original
UK proposal: “at the request of any of the parties to the dispute”
192
. It was this reversion, from “any
of the High Contracting Parties” back to “any of the parties to the dispute”, that the French delegate
said could be accepted as “merely a drafting matter”
193
. In other words, the “drafting matter” was a
choice between two “anys”. Under either version, any party could turn to the Court. From this history,
there is no basis for inferring that the word “any” was “editorial” or otherwise unimportant.
194
19. Second, Russia cannot ground its admissibility objection in the Court’s jurisprudence.
Certainly there is no decision of the Court that rejects the admissibility of a non-violation declaration.
Even if there were no direct precedent, the alleged novelty of a particular type of claim is not a legal
reason for the Court to decline jurisdiction that has been duly conferred on it. In any event,
non-violation claims are not unprecedented. In the Rights of Nationals and Lockerbie cases, the Court
entertained such claims.
20. Russia accepted this point in the first round, saying merely that the Court “did not rule on
the disputed legal point”
195
. In the second round, Russia backtracked, suggesting that in Lockerbie,
the Court might have implicitly rejected Libya’s non-violation claim
196
. Merely glancing at the
dispositive paragraphs of the Court’s Judgment confirms that the Court dismissed all of the
United Kingdom’s objections and allowed all of Libya’s claims to proceed to the merits
197
. That
includes its non-violation claim.
192
Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Sixth Committee, Belgium and
United Kingdom: Joint Amendment to Article IX of the Draft Convention, 10 November 1948, UN doc. No. A/C.6/258
(judges’ folder, tab 22).
193
Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Sixth Committee, Summary Records of
Meetings 21 September-10 December 1948, UN doc. No. A/C.6/SR.61-140, pp. 428 n. 1, 437 (judges’ folder, tab 23).
194
Ibid., p. 431 (judges’ folder, tab 23).
195
CR 2023/13, p. 94, para. 23 (Udovichenko).
196
CR 2023/18, p. 49, paras. 7-10 (Udovichenko).
197
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 30,
para. 53.
- 80 -
21. Recall what Russia is saying: that a non-violation claim “is incompatible with the judicial
function of the Court”
198
. If that were so, surely the Court would have said something in Lockerbie
and Rights of Nationals — even on its own initiative — upon being asked to act beyond its judicial
function. Indeed, in Northern Cameroons, the Court raised proprio motu its concern that adjudication
“would be inconsistent with its judicial function”
199
. The Court’s silence in Rights of Nationals and
Lockerbie confirms that there is nothing judicially improper about the Court declaring a State to be
in compliance with its obligation, when that is in dispute.
22. Little needs to be said of the irrelevant differences Russia has seized on to distinguish these
cases. I will just note the oddity of Russia’s point that in Rights of Nationals, the issue did not have
the same “magnitude as genocide” or involve obligations erga omnes
200
. The magnitude of the issue
of genocide, and the erga omnes character of the obligations at issue, is a point in favour of broad
access to judicial resolution. This case illustrates why: a false allegation of genocide can form an
unjust basis for taking action against that State. By declaring that there is no credible evidence that
an alleged genocide is in fact occurring, the Court can resolve the factual issue at the heart of this
dispute that forms the predicate for Russia’s ongoing actions. As the Court noted in its provisional
measures Order in this case, it is mindful of its “own responsibilities in the maintenance of
international peace and security as well as in the peaceful settlement of disputes under the Charter
and the Statute of the Court”
201
. Far from Ukraine’s request being “incompatible with the Court’s
judicial role”, the Court is asked to discharge its most vital judicial responsibility.
23. Third, Russia objects that Ukraine’s claims may entail fact-finding, while conditions in
Donbas “make[] any fact-finding work on site very difficult, if not impossible”
202
. The notion that
fact-finding in Donbas is impossible would come as a surprise to the UN Human Rights Monitoring
198
CR 2023/13, p. 94, para. 20 (Udovichenko).
199
Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 37. See also Christian Tomuschat, “Article 36”, in The Statute of the International Court of Justice:
A Commentary (Zimmermann et al., eds., Oxford University Press 2019), p. 783.
200
CR 2023/13 , p. 96, para. 31 (a) (Udovichenko).
201
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, I.C.J. Reports 2022, p. 216, para. 18.
202
CR 2023/13, p. 93, para. 17 (Udovichenko).
- 81 -
. In any case,
a respondent’s assertion that fact-finding might prove difficult is not a ground for finding a claim
inadmissible before the facts are even at issue.
Mission in Ukraine
203
. And the OSCE
204
. And the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
205
24. Fourth, and finally, there is no reason to credit Russia’s concerns over the res judicata
effect of a judgment on a “patently incomplete set of evidence”
206
. This is just Russia’s speculation
about a future evidentiary record. Ukraine submits that the record, including many reports from the
bodies I just mentioned, will support a conclusion that there is no credible evidence of Ukraine’s
responsibility for genocide. But the Court will assess that for itself at the merits stage. When the
Court issues whatever judgment it finds supported and appropriate, there is nothing problematic
about that judgment being res judicata between Russia and Ukraine — a binding judgment, based
on the best available factual record and a full airing of the legal issues, is precisely the point of
referring disputes to the Court for a final resolution. An even more basic point, however, is that a
claim cannot be dismissed as inadmissible based on hypotheticals. The Court has ample tools to
address Russia’s professed concerns when, or if, they ever actually arise
207
.
IV. Ukraine has committed no “abuse of process”:
Russia’s sixth preliminary objection fails
25. Finally, Madam President, Members of the Court, regarding Russia’s sixth objection,
Russia has not identified anything close to the extraordinary circumstances that could constitute an
abuse of process by Ukraine.
26. Russia relies on a wilful misreading of Ukraine’s case in order to sow confusion. After
pointing to different statements made in different contexts, Russia’s counsel sarcastically asks, “So,
203
See e.g. OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine (1 February-31 July 2021) (23 Sept. 2021), para. 1 and
fn. 1, accessed at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/32ndReportUkraine-en.pdf (judges’
folder, tab 24). See also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
on the Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine (19 Sept. 2014), UN doc. No. A/HRC/27/75, paras. 7-8; OHCHR, Ukraine:
UN and OHCHR Reports, accessed at https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/ukraine.
204
See OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Status Report (24 Jan. 2022), accessed at
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/6/511045.pdf (24 Jan. 2022). See also OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine, Daily and Spot Reports, accessed at https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports?filters=&solrsort=score%20
desc&rows=50.
205
See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2020 (14 Dec. 2020), pp. 68-72,
accessed at https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/itemsDocuments/2020-PE/2020-pe-report-eng.pdf (judges’ folder,
tab 26).
206
CR 2023/13, pp. 93-94, para. 18 (Udovichenko).
207
CR 2023/15, p. 78, para. 7 (Paparinskis).
- 82 -
The answer is not difficult: both. The
dispute relates to Ukraine’s liability, because the Parties disagree over whether Ukraine is responsible
for genocide. And the dispute relates to Russia’s liability, because the Parties disagree over whether
Russia has misinterpreted, misapplied, mis-fulfilled and violated the Genocide Convention. Russia
cannot claim abuse of process by feigning confusion over Ukraine’s straightforward and consistent
case.
is it Russia’s or is it Ukraine’s liability we are looking into?”
208
27. Russia also cannot claim abuse of process just because it feels victimized by the legal
interpretations of 32 intervening States. At times, Russia complains that the interveners’
interpretations are too similar to Ukraine’s
209
. Other times, Russia complains that the interveners’
positions are too different from Ukraine’s
210
. The inconsistency of Russia’s position aside, neither
situation is an abuse. In the Whaling in the Antarctic case, New Zealand as the intervener explained:
“[W]e acknowledge that the points we make may differ in substance or in emphasis from those of
the Parties — that is entirely to be expected.”
211
The interventions this Court heard last week likewise
proceeded as Article 63 of the Statute envisions. Indeed, the interveners’ oral pleadings were
studiously focused on the questions of interpretation before the Court — in stark contrast to Russia’s
extraneous presentations about all manner of irrelevant topics. And if the Court finds that any of the
interveners’ submissions strayed beyond their authorized scope, it already said in its Order that it
would simply disregard such remarks
212
. Dismissing Ukraine’s case as an abuse of process plainly
would not follow.
28. Russia’s charges of hypocrisy against the interveners also fall flat. As Professor Koh
explained, the interpretive issues in this case are quite different from those in the Legality of Use of
Force cases. For that reason, and for all of its rhetoric, Russia could not identify a single statement
from those cases in which the interveners interpreted Articles I, IV or IX of the Convention
208
CR 2023/18, p. 53, para. 35 (Udovichenko).
209
See e.g. CR 2023/17, pp. 52, 53, paras. 89, 91 (Zabolotskaya); CR 2023/17, pp. 77-78, 80, paras. 22-23, 36
(Crosato); CR 2023/18, pp. 59-60, para. 2 (Tchikaya).
210
See e.g. CR 2023/17, p. 78, para. 24 (Crosato); CR 2023/18, p. 52, paras. 33-34 (Udovichenko).
211
Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), CR 2013/17 (corrected), p. 14, para. 3
(Ridings).
212
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Declarations of Intervention, Order of 5 June 2023, para. 99.
- 83 -
differently than they do now. Russia may speculate that “the interveners’ intent is purely
instrumental”
, but a complete answer to that charge is Article 63 itself. As the Statute requires,
each of the interveners agreed to be bound by the Court’s interpretation. The interveners are not
engaged in cheap talk — they have something important to say about important questions of law,
and they have willingly accepted the stakes of saying it here.
213
29. Ultimately, the historic interventions in this case are not an abuse, but a reflection of the
importance of the interpretive issues in this case. The Genocide Convention is a special treaty. It
establishes obligations erga omnes. And this case raises interpretive issues that are unique and
profound: whether the most noble human rights instrument may be repurposed for the most ignoble
ends.
30. Madam President, Members of the Court, this concludes my remarks confirming the
admissibility of Ukraine’s claims. I thank the Court for its attention and I now ask that you give the
floor to Mr Jonathan Gimblett.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Zionts. I now give the floor to Mr Jonathan Gimblett. You have
the floor, Sir.
Mr GIMBLETT:
THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER UKRAINE’S REQUEST TO HOLD THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLATING THE COURT’S BINDING
PROVISIONAL MEASURES ORDER
1. Madam President, Members of the Court: it is an honour to appear before you again on
behalf of Ukraine. I will respond to Russia’s limited remarks concerning Ukraine’s claim that you
have jurisdiction over Russia’s violation of the Court’s Order on provisional measures.
2. Russia’s brevity on this issue on Monday was really an excuse to duck some critical issues.
First and foremost, does Russia accept that it has a binding legal obligation to comply with the
Court’s Order? According to the statement by Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman of the Russian
President the day after the Order issued, Russia does not. In his words, Russia could not “take account
213
CR 2023/18, p. 56, para. 48 (Udovichenko).
- 84 -
. Whatever Russia’s lawyers may say here in
The Hague, we know that Mr Peskov’s words are a truer reflection of Russian government policy
because Russia has continued its full-scale military invasion of Ukraine since 16 March 2022 in
defiance of this Court’s Order to immediately suspend all military operations on the territory of
Ukraine. Indeed, as Ukraine’s Co-Agent will describe, Russia’s brazen non-compliance with that
Order has continued to result in civilian deaths and damage to critical infrastructure over the last
ten days of these hearings.
of” the Order because it had not consented to do so
214
3. On Monday, Russia sought to deflect attention away from this core issue by misstating
Ukraine’s position and misapplying the Court’s jurisprudence. As to Ukraine’s position, contrary to
the impression given by Russia, Ukraine is not asking you to rule on Russia’s non-compliance with
the provisional measures Order as part of this preliminary objections phase of the case. This is clear
from the submissions included in Ukraine’s written statement on Russia’s preliminary objections,
which asked you to “[a]djudge and declare that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the claims presented
by Ukraine as set forth in its Application and Memorial, and that those claims are admissible” and to
“[p]roceed to hear those claims on the merits”
215
.
4. Ukraine’s claim that Russia is violating the provisional measures Order and its request for
reparations was set forth in Ukraine’s Memorial. As I explained last week, Ukraine has demonstrated
that the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear Ukraine’s substantive claims on the merits and that those
claims are admissible
216
. As a matter of procedural efficiency, Ukraine’s expectation is that the Court
will address Russia’s non-compliance with provisional measures alongside the merits of Ukraine’s
substantive claims
217
. But also implicit in the submissions I just read to you is the notion that, even
if you were to uphold Russia’s preliminary objections as to Ukraine’s underlying substantive claims,
you can and you should exercise jurisdiction and proceed to the merits on Ukraine’s claim concerning
provisional measures
218
.
214
Sofia Stuart Leeson, Russia Rejects International Court Ruling to Stop Invasion of Ukraine, EURACTIV
(17 Mar. 2022), accessed at https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/russia-rejects-international-courtruling-to-stop-invasion-of-ukraine/
(judges’
folder,
tab
27).
215
WOU, para. 196.
216
CR 2023/14, pp. 92-94, paras. 8-15 (Gimblett).
217
See CR 2023/14, p. 92, paras. 9-10 (Gimblett).
218
See CR 2023/14, pp. 93-94, paras. 11-14 (Gimblett).
- 85 -
5. Russia voiced no objection on Monday or in its written pleadings on preliminary objections
to the Court exercising jurisdiction over Ukraine’s provisional measures claim if the Court finds it
has jurisdiction over the substantive claims. Most of the cases that it cited with approval were ones
in which the Court had found it had jurisdiction over the merits of an applicant’s substantive claims
and decided to address alleged violations of provisional measures at the same time. Such was the
case in Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, the 2019 Judgment of the Court in the ICSFT/CERD case, in
the Treaty of Amity case and in The Gambia v. Myanmar
219
. The Court may therefore take it as a
point of agreement between the Parties that it has jurisdiction to address Ukraine’s non-compliance
claim on the merits if it finds jurisdiction over one or more of Ukraine’s substantive claims.
6. Russia appears, however, to take the position that the Court will lack the power to address
its non-compliance with provisional measures if the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over
Ukraine’s substantive claims
220
. This is presumably the twisted way in which Russia hopes to
reconcile its refusal to heed the Court’s Order with its declared respect for the Court as an institution.
In Russia’s view, if the Court ultimately lacks the power to address Russia’s brazen non-compliance
with provisional measures, those measures will effectively become retroactively non-binding. But of
course that is incorrect the Court’s authority is not so transitory in nature.
7. The only support that Russia advanced on Monday in support of this position was its own
flawed interpretation of the Court’s rulings in Request for Interpretation of the Avena Judgment, a
case to which I referred in my remarks last week
221
. The point I was making then was that the Court
had found itself competent to address the United States’ violation of a provisional measures order in
that case even though it ruled that Mexico’s substantive claim was “outside the jurisdiction
specifically conferred on the Court by Article 60” of the Court’s Statute
222
. That finding on
jurisdiction is reflected in paragraph 45 of the Court’s 19 January 2009 Judgment in the case, shown
on the present slide
223
. Paragraph 51 of the same Judgment makes clear that, notwithstanding the
219
See CR 2023/18, pp. 57-58, paras. 54-58 (Udovichenko).
220
CR 2023/18, p. 57, para. 53 (Udovichenko).
221
See CR 2023/18, p. 59, paras. 61-63 (Udovichenko).
222
See CR 2023/14, pp. 93-94, para. 13 (Gimblett).
223
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 17, para. 45.
- 86 -
Court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction under Article 60, it was still able to address the United
States’ non-compliance by virtue of its “incidental jurisdiction to make findings about alleged
breaches of the Order indicating provisional measures”
.
224
8. In my remarks last week, I explained that this incidental jurisdiction is inherent in the power
to indicate provisional measures conferred on the Court by Article 41 of the Statute, and that
Article 41 would be deprived of its effectiveness if the Court lacked the power to address violations
of the provisional measures so indicated
225
. The absence of a specific reference in Article 41 to the
Court’s power to assess violations of provisional measures is neither surprising and nor is it an
obstacle to inferring the existence of such a power. It is not surprising because it is in the nature of
foundational documents like the Statute of the International Court of Justice that they typically do
not contain an exhaustive list of all the functions and powers of the institutions to which they relate.
It is not an obstacle because this Court has found on many occasions that powers not expressly
mentioned in an organization’s constituent instruments can nonetheless be implied based on the
functions accorded to the organization in question
226
. For example, in its 1949 Advisory Opinion in
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, the Court held that
“[u]nder international law, the Organization [that is, the United Nations] must be
deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties”
227
.
9. The language that I cited last week from Request for Interpretation of the Avena Judgment
is consistent with this understanding. In its attempt to distinguish the case, Russia completely misses
the point. Instead of focusing on the Court’s January 2009 Judgment explaining the basis on which
224
Ibid., p. 19, para. 51.
225
CR 2023/14, p. 93, para. 12 (Gimblett). See e.g. Karin Oellers-Frahm & Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 41”,
in The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Zimmermann et al., eds., Oxford University Press
2019), p. 1191, para. 113 (WOU, Ann. 11); Paolo Palchetti, “Responsibility for Breach of Provisional Measures of the ICJ:
Between Protection of the Rights of the Parties and Respect for the Judicial Function”, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale
(2017), p. 12 (WOU, Ann. 10); Pierre d’Argent, “Preliminary Objections and Breaches of Provisional Measures”, Rivista
di Diritto Internazionale (2021), p. 127 (WOU, Ann. 13).
226
See e.g. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1949, pp. 182-184; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (I), p. 79, para. 25; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168; Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1954, pp. 56-57; Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube,
Advisory Opinion, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 14, pp. 63-65; Competence of the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal
Work of the Employer, Advisory Opinion, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 13, pp. 18-21.
227
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949,
p. 182.
- 87 -
it could exercise jurisdiction over non-compliance with the provisional measures order, Russia
pointed you to language in paragraph 44 of the July 2008 provisional measures Order in that case,
which has nothing to do with the issue at hand. Specifically, Russia showed you the language now
on the screen, which reads:
“Whereas the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of Article 60 of the Statute is not
preconditioned by the existence of any other basis of jurisdiction as between the parties
to the original case; and whereas it follows that, even if the basis of jurisdiction in the
original case lapses, the Court, nevertheless, by virtue of Article 60 of the Statute, may
entertain a request for interpretation”
228
.
10. This passage merely explains how it is that the Court could exercise Article 60 jurisdiction
over the substantive claim advanced by Mexico — a request for interpretation — even though the
basis for jurisdiction in the original Avena case, a claim arising under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, had lapsed
229
. It has nothing to do with the Court’s jurisdiction to address a
subsequent alleged violation of provisional measures in the Interpretation proceedings. The
conclusion that Russia’s counsel drew from this irrelevant passage that use of the word “lapsed”
indicates that “jurisdiction in the ‘original’ case is still a must” is equally beside the point
230
. In
short, the present case involves no request for interpretation, Article 60 is not in play and nor is its
relationship to an original basis for jurisdiction.
11. Evidently, then, Russia has failed to engage with Ukraine’s position that the Court has
jurisdiction to address Russia’s non-compliance with the Court’s provisional measures Order, even
if it lacks jurisdiction over Ukraine’s substantive claims. Russia similarly failed on Monday to
address a separate basis for the Court’s jurisdiction outlined in my remarks last week and expanded
upon by Mr Williams, the representative of New Zealand last Wednesday
231
. That is that Ukraine’s
claim that Russia has not complied with the Court’s binding provisional measures Order, and owes
reparations as a result, is a distinct claim arising directly under Article IX of the Genocide
228
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of
16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 323, para. 44.
229
See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures,
Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 312, 323, paras. 1, 44.
230
See CR 2023/18, p. 59, para. 62 (Udovichenko).
231
CR 2023/14, p. 93, para. 12 (Gimblett); CR 2023/16, pp. 44-48, paras. 6-23 (Williams); see also Written
Observations on Preliminary Objections of New Zealand, paras. 16-22.
- 88 -
Convention. By ceding to the Genocide Convention, Russia assumed an obligation to comply with
its mandatory dispute resolution procedures and to do so reasonably and in good faith. Ukraine’s
claim that Russia has violated that obligation by failing to comply with provisional measures ordered
by the Court, which Russia contests, is therefore a dispute relating to the interpretation, application
or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention, falling directly within the Court’s jurisdiction under
Article 36 (1) of the Statute.
12. To sum up, at this stage of the proceedings Ukraine is asking you to find that you can
exercise jurisdiction over Russia’s non-compliance with provisional measures. The Parties appear to
agree that you can do so if you find jurisdiction over any of Ukraine’s substantive claims. For the
reasons I have outlined, Ukraine submits that you also may exercise jurisdiction under Articles 36
or 41 of the Statute even if jurisdiction over the substantive claims is lacking.
13. Madam President, that concludes my remarks. I respectfully request that you call next
Ms Oksana Zolotaryova, the Co-Agent of Ukraine, who will deliver some closing remarks and read
the submissions of Ukraine.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Gimblett. I now invite the Co-Agent of Ukraine, Ms Oksana
Zolotaryova, to address the Court. You have the floor, Madam.
Ms ZOLOTARYOVA:
CONCLUDING STATEMENT AND FINAL SUBMISSIONS OF UKRAINE
1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, I am honoured to stand before you
to make concluding remarks and present the final submissions of Ukraine.
2. Last week, the Agent of Ukraine recalled that “five hundred and seventy-three days ago,
Russia launched a brutal, full-scale military assault on Ukraine”
232
. He explained that Russia has
inflicted this devastation on Ukraine for an express, clearly stated purpose: preventing genocide and
punishing the perpetrators of genocide
233
. As Ukraine has explained, when Russia acted for this
specific purpose, it placed its own acts within the framework of the Genocide Convention. This Court
232
CR 2023/14, p. 34, para. 2 (Korynevych).
233
See CR 2023/14, p. 34, para. 3 (Korynevych).
- 89 -
plays a vital role in safeguarding the Genocide Convention, guaranteeing its compliance, and
protecting it from abuse. That is why Ukraine is here.
3. Today, as this hearing comes to a close, it has been 581 days since Russia unleashed these
horrors. Here in The Hague, Russia paints itself as a victim. In Ukraine, Russia has continued to
show its true colours.
4. Last Tuesday in The Hague, we stood before you and pled our case. Last Tuesday in
Ukraine, Russia unleashed a drone attack on the city of Lviv in western Ukraine. The attack killed a
civilian and burned down the warehouse of a Roman Catholic charity
234
. The UN Humanitarian
Coordinator for Ukraine “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms [the] Russian airstrike”
235
. She said
that a “vital humanitarian facility, which contained approximately 300 tons of relief supplies, was
burned to the ground”
236
.
5. Last Wednesday in The Hague, the Court heard historic legal arguments from 32 intervening
States. The very next morning in Ukraine, people across my country woke up to cruise missiles.
Russia targeted civilian infrastructure across the country, causing blackouts in Rivne, Zhytomyr,
Kyiv, Dnipro and Kharkiv
237
. In Kyiv, the Russian missile attack injured a nine-year-old girl. Russia
is reminding us that this winter, it will try again to terrorize our people and freeze us into submission.
6. This past weekend in The Hague, Russia prepared what I can only call a propaganda show.
Over the weekend in Ukraine, Russia launched airstrikes in the Kherson region, killing at least two
civilians and injuring many more
238
.
7. This Monday in The Hague, Russia made its final plea to escape your jurisdiction. Monday
morning in Ukraine, we surveyed the damage from an overnight attack on the port of Odesa, a blatant
attack on Ukraine’s economy and its ability to feed the world with its grain. Russia launched this
234
Illia Novikov, Russian Drone Attack Western Ukraine City Sparks an Inferno at a Warehouse and Kills 1, PBS
(19 Sept. 2023), accessed at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russian-drone-attack-western-ukraine-city-sparks-aninferno-at-a-warehouse-and-kills-1.
235
UN Ukraine, Statement by the Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine, Denise Brown, on an Attack that
Destroyed the Caritas-Spes Warehouse in Lviv (19 Sept. 2023), accessed at https://ukraine.un.org/en/246490-statementhumanitarian-coordinator-ukraine-denise-brown-attack-destroyed-caritas-spes.
236
Ibid.
237
Olena Harmash and Tom Balmforth, Russia Hits Ukrainian Energy Facilities in Biggest Attack in Weeks, Kyiv
Says, Reuters (21 Sept. 2023), accessed at https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blasts-heard-kyiv-other-parts-ukraine2023-09-21/.
238
VOA News, Zelenskyy Describes Visit to the West as “Very Productive” (24 Sept. 2023), accessed at
https://www.voanews.com/a/deadly-russian-attacks-target-ukraine-s-kherson-region/7281947.html.
- 90 -
attack on the evening of Yom Kippur, a Jewish holy day, in an important city for Ukraine’s Jewish
community. On the same day, Russia stood in this Court and repeated its slander that Ukrainians are
neo-Nazis.
8. Madam President, Members of the Court, we turned to you a year and a half ago because
we were in dire need of protection. We still need your protection today. Russia’s lawyers have
lectured us, saying that States must wait years before the Court can decide a case about whether
genocide is taking place
239
. Ukraine does not have that luxury of time. When Russia used its false
allegations of genocide as a pretext to attack us, we had no choice but to come to this Court
immediately.
9. We have been brutally attacked based on false allegations of genocide. Russia has repeatedly
claimed that Ukraine violates the Genocide Convention. Russia’s President said it clearly, repeated
by official after official: it is attacking to prevent and punish genocide
240
. Preventing and punishing
genocide is the subject of the Genocide Convention. Russia is a party to the Genocide Convention.
It agreed to your jurisdiction over disputes relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of
the Genocide Convention. It was completely logical for Ukraine to invoke that jurisdiction and bring
its dispute under the Genocide Convention to this Court.
10. Russia tries to cloud the issues, distort Ukraine’s claims and ignore objective reality. Russia
professes not to understand Ukraine’s case, but Ukraine’s case is straightforward. Russia has made
false allegations of genocide under the Genocide Convention. It used those allegations as a pretext
to recognize the so-called DPR and LPR, and to use force in and against Ukraine. Russia is abusing
its rights under the Convention, and abusing the Convention as a whole. Russia is not performing its
obligation to prevent and punish genocide in good faith. Russia is failing to act within the limits of
international law when it acts to prevent and punish genocide. It is obvious why Russia tries to make
the case seem more complicated than it is. But, when the Court looks at the actual dispute, and
Ukraine’s actual claims, the jurisdiction of the Court is clear.
239
See e.g. CR 2023/13, p. 93, para. 15 (Udovichenko).
240
President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12); see generally
CR 2023/14, pp. 57-59, paras. 40-45 (Cheek).
- 91 -
11. Russia also works hard to ignore its own stated purpose for the full-scale invasion. Last
week, the Agent of Ukraine highlighted the specific words of the Russian President, which Russia’s
Agent and counsel had ignored
241
. This Monday, the Court gave Russia six hours. Russia used this
for propaganda and irrelevant arguments. Not once did you hear Russia acknowledge
President Putin’s statement of purpose for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. So I have no choice but
to recall the actual, stated purpose of Russia’s actions. I quote: “The purpose of this operation is to
protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by
the Kiev regime.”
242
I quote again: “We had to stop that atrocity, that genocide of the millions of
people who live there and who pinned their hopes on Russia, on all of us.”
243
Russia quickly
dismisses this as providing “a wider context of the situation, where genocide was mentioned among
other factors”
244
. We should not let Russia be evasive. This was not a “mention”. It was not “wider
context”. It was not a “rhetorical” statement
245
. It was the only stated purpose of the Russian full-scale
invasion of Ukraine: to stop a purported genocide.
12. I would also prefer not to recall the hateful words of the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s
Security Council. But Russia’s Agent and counsel were afraid of those words as well. Does Russia
truly expect the Court to ignore a high-ranking Russian official, who states clearly that Russia is
acting to punish the perpetrators of genocide under the Genocide Convention? He mentioned the
Convention by name
246
. He said that this is the reason why the so-called “special military operation”
continues
247
. Russia did not deny that this statement reflects official Russian policy. It could not
241
See CR 2023/14, p. 35, para. 8 (Korynevych).
242
President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 8,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12) (emphasis added).
243
President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24 Feb. 2022), p. 6,
accessed at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (MU, Ann. 6) (judges’ folder, tab 12).
244
CR 2023/17, p. 35, paras. 6 and 8 (Zabolotskaya).
245
See CR 2023/13, p. 52, para. 14 (Azari); CR 2023/17, p. 66, para. 31 (Azari).
246
Telegram Post of Dmitry Medvedev (Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council) (5 Sept. 2023), accessed
at https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/383 (judges’ folder, tab 16); see also TASS, Total Victory Over Genocide-Promoting
Kiev Only Possible Outcome of Special Op — Medvedev (5 Sept. 2023), accessed at https://tass.com/
politics/1670035 (judges’ folder, tab 17).
247
Telegram Post of Dmitry Medvedev (Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council) (5 Sept. 2023), accessed
at https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/383 (judges’ folder, tab 16); see also TASS, Total Victory Over Genocide-Promoting
Kiev Only Possible Outcome of Special Op — Medvedev (5 Sept. 2023), accessed at https://tass.com/
politics/1670035 (judges’ folder, tab 17).
- 92 -
this is the official Russian policy. Only in this Great Hall does Russia’s Agent ignore it, while its
senior leadership continues to repeat it in the public sphere.
13. Madam President, Members of the Court, when it comes to the critical facts of this case, it
is Russia’s silence that speaks volumes.
14. However, silence would have been preferable to what the Court had to listen to on Monday.
This is a court of law, not a platform for propaganda. Yet Russia used its time to tell astonishing lies.
Russia disgraced this institution with a conspiracy theory that there were no killings in Bucha
248
.
Tragically, the mass summary executions were all too real. This is not Ukraine’s word against
Russia’s. It is the conclusion of the United Nations. Recently, the United Nations’ Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found:
“Evidence collected shows a widespread pattern of summary executions in areas
that Russian armed forces controlled in 17 localities of the Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv,
and Sumy regions, with the highest number in the Kyiv region, including in the town of
Bucha.”
249
15. Russia also blamed Ukraine for the missile attack on the Kramatorsk railway station that
killed 59 civilians. The United Nations Commission disagreed
250
. So did the OSCE
251
. Human Rights
Watch also conducted an extensive investigation, and concluded: “[A]ll evidence points to Russian
forces having fired the Tochka-U missile with cluster munitions on the Kramatorsk train station”
252
.
16. Finally, the Russian Agent said that “Ukraine now dares to say the evacuation of
children . . . were ‘abductions’”
253
. This is not just what Ukraine says. The International Criminal
Court says it, too
254
. It understands the forcible deportation of children from their homeland is not an
“evacuation”. It is an international crime. That is why the ICC issued arrest warrants.
248
See CR 2023/17, pp. 46-47, paras. 55-59 (Zabolotskaya).
249
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
Ukraine, UN doc. A/HRC/52/62 (15 Mar. 2023), pp. 8-9, para. 53.
250
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
Ukraine, UN doc. A/HRC/52/62 (15 Mar. 2023), pp. 8-9, para. 31.
251
See OSCE, Interim Report on Reported Violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human
Rights Law in Ukraine (22 July 2022), paras. 43-46, accessed at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/d/523081_0.pdf.
252
Human Rights Watch, Death at the Station Russian Cluster Munition Attack in Kramatorsk: A Human Rights
Watch and SITU Research Investigation (21 Feb. 2023), accessed at https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/
2023/02/21/death-at-the-station/russian-cluster-munition-attack-in-kramatorsk.
253
CR 2023/17, p. 44, para. 45 (Zabolotskaya).
254
See ICC, Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants Against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and
Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova (17 Mar. 2023), accessed at https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judgesissue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.
- 93 -
17. Russia’s whole presentation was built on a foundation of similar lies. But we are not here
to play Russia’s games. We are here to address the Court’s jurisdiction, which is plainly established.
Russia appears eager to argue about the facts. So is Ukraine. That is what the merits stage is for.
18. Russia is angry that 32 States intervened to present their interpretation of the Genocide
Convention. Russia may not like those interpretations. But the historic presentations you saw last
Wednesday was a really good day for international law. It showed Article 63 of the Statute operating
as intended. State after State recognized the importance of the Genocide Convention, offered their
views on the questions of law not politics and agreed to be legally bound by your interpretation.
19. To Russia, the fact that so many parties to the Genocide Convention interpret it the same
way must be a conspiracy. But there is a simpler explanation: so many States agree with Ukraine’s
interpretation because it is correct. And so many States intervened because they saw the extraordinary
danger of a different interpretation, under which States may callously abuse their solemn obligation
to prevent and punish genocide.
20. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, in the provisional measures Order
that Russia continues to defy, you recalled the Court’s essential role in peacefully resolving disputes.
Seventy-five years ago, the drafters of the Genocide Convention recognized that role as well. That is
why they decided to grant this Court jurisdiction that would be as wide as possible. It is in that spirit,
mindful of the Court’s role in the United Nations system, and mindful of the true object and purpose
of the Genocide Convention, that Ukraine has come to you. We have a dispute with Russia that
relates to the interpretation, application and fulfilment of the Genocide Convention. Your jurisdiction
to resolve that dispute is clear. Your judgment remains urgently needed.
21. I now have the honour to present Ukraine’s final submissions:
“On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in its written and oral
pleadings, Ukraine respectfully requests the Court to:
a. Dismiss the Preliminary Objections filed by the Russian Federation on 3 October
2022;
b. Adjudge and declare that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the claims presented by
Ukraine as set forth in its Application and Memorial, and that those claims are
admissible; and
c. Proceed to hear those claims on the merits.”
- 94 -
22. This concludes Ukraine’s oral pleadings and its submissions.
23. On behalf of Ukraine, allow me to thank the Registry for its assistance. I thank the
interpreters and the staff of the Court for their professionalism during these proceedings. And finally,
Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention in this
important matter.
24. We are in your hands.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Co-Agent of Ukraine. The Court takes note of the final
submissions that you have just read out on behalf of your Government.
This brings us to the end of the hearings on the preliminary objections of the Russian
Federation in the case concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation: 32 States intervening). I
thank the representatives of the two Parties and the intervening States for the assistance they have
given to the Court through their presentations in the course of these hearings. In accordance with
practice, I shall request the Agents of the Parties and the representatives of the intervening States to
remain at the Court’s disposal to provide any additional information it may require.
The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Agents of the Parties and the intervening States
will be advised in due course as to the date on which the Court will deliver its Judgment. As the
Court has no other business before it today, the sitting is now closed.
The Court rose at 6 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 27 septembre 2023, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Donoghue, présidente, en l’affaire relative à des Allégations de génocide au titre de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie ; 32 États intervenants)