WRITTEN OBSERVATIONSON APPLICATION
FORPERMISSION TO INTERVENE
OBSERVATIONS ÉCRITESSUR LA REQUÊTE
AFIN D'INTERVENTION OBSERVAl'lOSS DU COU.VERKEMENT DE LATUNISIE
SUR LA REQUETE A FIN D'INTERVEXTION
DU GOUVERNEMENTDE MALTE
En transmettant aux Parties la requète du Gouvernement de Malte a fin
(l'intervention en application de l'article 62 dii Statut de la Cour internationale
(leJustice, le Présidentde la Cour a fixeau 26 février198 Ile délaiimparti aux
I'arties pour présenter leursobservations écrites.
La préseiltenote a pour objet de formuler les observations du Goiiverne-
inent tunisien a ce stijel.
LeGouvernement tunisien comprend Lesraisons quiont conduit leGouver-
iiement de Malte a demander à intervenir et éprouve de la sympathie a leur
t,gard. II n'aurait donc pas souhaité faire objection. si l'admission de cette
ieq~iêteà. un moment aussi tardif de la procédure, netait pas de nature a
I'rovoquer inévitablemeiitdes retards considérablesdans le prononcéde I'arrét
rle la Cour, et si.par ailleurs. cette demande remplissait toutes les conditions
:iuxqtielles elleest subordonnée par leStatut et le Règlementde la Cour. IIvoit.
(tependant. sur ce dernier point également.Lincertain nombre de difficultéssur
lesquelles il estime devoir attirer respectueusement l'attention de la Cour et qui
leconduisent a penser que ces conditions ne sont pas remplies en I'espece.
L'arlicle81du Réglementde la Cour dispose qu'une requéte afin d'interven-
tion fondéesur l'article 62 du Statut dans Lincas déterminédoit spécifier :
<<LI)I'interetd'ordrejuridique qui, selon I'Etatdemandant a intervenir, est
pour luien cause :
h) l'objet précisde l'intervention;
C) toute base de cornpetence qui, selon I'Etat demandant a intervenir.
existerait entre lui ei les parto.s
Ilapparait approprie de considérer successivementchacune de ces prescrip-
iions. qui semblent toutes causer des difficiiltéspourla requête maltaise.
Bien que la requétecommence par admettre (par. 8) que (Malte est dans
irne position géographiquedifférentepar rapport à la Libye eta la Tunisie que
celle dans laquelle ces deux Etats se trouvent I'un par rapport a l'autre »,elle
c:ontin~ie(par. 9) en aflirmant qu'ccil est impossible d'établirune distinction
Iigide entre les principes et règlesjuridiques, ou les principes équitables, qui
:#'appliquentrespectivement aux situations d'Etats se trouvant dans des situa-
iions géographiquesdinerentes I'unpar rapport a l'autre)).
Cette dernière affirmation ne tient pas compte de la distinction clairement
t:tablie par la Cour dans les affaires du Plar~u.uofl~illeridel luinrr du Nord
r:ntre la situation juridique existant entre Etats limitrophes et celle existant
(:litre Etats se faisant face en ce qui concerne la délimitation du plateau
continental enire ces Etats (C.I.J. Rectieil1969. p. 36).distinction qui est
~iertinentedans ce cas.
Cette différencede droit et de fait met en question l'affirmation de Malte
selon laquelle ((ilest hautement probable que nombre de circonstances
-%ertinentes>)...influant sur la détermination de la limite entre la Libye et la
!iinisie sont égalementpertinentes pour la détermination des limites de Malte
avec ces deux Etats >(par. lO).Les circonstances pertinentes doivent varier en
!onction des différentes relations géographiques.Le Gouvernement de Malte266 PLATEAU CO~TINE~TAL
lui-niéme.d'aillerirs.attire l'attention sur sa sitriation trèsparticulière«epetit
Etat insiilaire)(par. 5).
[..reqtiéteindique clairement (par. 20) que <l'objet précisde l'intervention
de hIalte ... est de lui permettre d'exposer ses vues a la Cour sur les points
soulevt;~dans l'instance avant que la Cour se soit prononcée n.
Siun tel intérêdtans lesprincipeset règlesjuridiques discutésdevant laCour
pouvait constituer une base s~iffisantepour une intervention. il serait difficile
de voir comment to~~tEtat partie à un différendpourrait se voir refuser la
possibilitéd'intervention dans une affaire susceptible de donner application
ails niénies principes et règlesjuridiques. Plus particulièrement. tout Etat
côtier. ménietréséloignéde la Tunisie et de la Libye. partie B un différend
actuel ou potentiel relatif1 la délimitationde son plateau continental. aurait le
droit d'intervenir. On pourrait niêmes'interroger sur ledroit que la Tunisie ou
la Libyeaurait eu d'intervenir dans lesaffaires du PIutmti coii/iiiettiulde la iner
dirNord.
IIest vrai que la requêteinvoque un interètplus speciriq~ieen affirmant que
les limites entre les trois Etats coiivrrgeiii eiiii~ioiiii ~iiiiyueqiriresir P
d~;ierniiiie)>.La demande d'intervenir fondée sur le fail que la limite du
plateau continental de hlalte pourrait étre directementmise en cause par I'arret
de la Cour soulèvecependant. dans lescirconstances de la présenteafraire. les
difficultéssuivantes :
U) dans la mesure ou elle n'estpas autoriséeà intervenir. Xlaltcest protegee
contre tout effetde I'arrétde laCour par lesdispositions de l'article59 du Statut
de la Cour ;
6) au surplus. aucune des deus Parties ne suggère.en rail. dans ses conclu-
sions. une méthode qui pourrait avoir un eKetsur lesdélimitationsavec hlalte.
La Libye pose en principe que toute zone appartenant a un Etat tiers. ou
divisible entre la Tunisie ou la Libye et un Etat tiers. doit étreexclue de la
délimitation a effectuer entre les Parties dans la présente affaire (contre-
mémoirelibyen. par. 482). De son côte. la Tunisie a préciseque toute ligne de
délimitationentre la Tunisie et la Libye devra étre arrètee au point oii elle
coiiperait la ligne séparantleszones de plateau continental appartenant a l'une
ou l'autre des Parties de cellesappartenant a un oii plusieurs Etats leur faisant
face. et que son point extrémerestera donc indéterminéen attendant que cette
ligne soit elle-ineme déterminée(mémoiretunisien. par. 9.35). 1-eGouverne-
ment de Malte n'ayant pas pris connaissance des mémoires des Parties ignore
evidemrnent ce fait. mais la Cour le connait et il est respectueusement suggéré
que la Cour devrait en tenir compte en considérantla requête maltaise :
c) enfin si. contrairement a ce qui est dit plus haut. l'intervention de Xlalie
devait permettre a son gouvernement d'ètreentendu avant que soit rendu un
arrêtsusceptible d'avoir un effetsur la délimitationde son plateau continental
avec la Tunisie et la Libye. il deviendrait nécessaire. semble-t-il.que hlalte
établisse une « base de compétence ))qui existerait entre elle et les Parties.
comme il est prévua l'article81.paragraphe 2 cl, du Règlement de la Cour.
Malteest évidemment ausside cette opinion,puisque la requêtecontient une
déclaration(par. 22. répétéa eu paragraphe 24) selon laquelle elle ne cherche
pas a ((obtenir, sous couvert et au cours d'une intervention dans l'affaire
LibvelTlriiisie. un prononcé ou une décisionquelconque de la Cour au sujet
des limites de son plateau continental par rapport a ces deux pays ou a l'un
d'eux )>La requêteen déduitqu'<< il semble qu'aucune question de compétence
au sens strict de ce terme ne puisse se poser entre Malte et lePartiesa l'affaire
Libvc>T/ lrriisin. OBSERVATIONS DE LA TUNIS~E 267
Ceci ne serait vrai, cependant. que dans l'hypothouehlalte n'intervien-
3rait que pour êtreentenduesur les principes et règlesde droit internaiional
applicables à toute délimitation quellesque soient les situations géographiques
jes Etats intéressés.ce qui semble insufisajustifier une interventiaux
termes de l'article62 du Statiii pour lesraisons invoquéesprecédemment.
Le 25 février1981
(SigtzeSlim BENGHAZI.
agent du Gouvernement
de la Republique tunisienne. OBSERVATIOXSOF THE SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBI'AK ARAB
JAXIAflIRII'A OiV X.IAI.1'A'S 30 JANUARY 1981 APP1,ICATION FOR
PERhllSSIOK TO INTERVEKE
Introduction
1. On behalf of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ("Libya") 1
have the honour pursuant to Article 83 of the Rules of Court and the Order
made by the President of the Court on 6 February 1981 to submit the fol-
lowing Observations with respect to the 30 January 1981 Application oÎ the
Government of Malta (the "Application") for permission to intervene under the
terms of Article 62 of the Statute in the case concerning the Co~i~i~ie~zSileI]'
(Tiiriisiu/Libj~at mb Jut?iuliiriya).
2. The following Observations examine certain problems raised by the
Maltese fequest for permission to intervene. Libya is sympathetic to the
interest shown in these proceedings by Malta and would under other circum-
stances welcome the opportunity to learn the views of Malta on questions of
continental shelf delimitation. In this regard Libya recalls that Libya and Malta
have signed a Special Agreement on 23 May 1976 submitting the question of
the delimitation of the areas of their respective continental shelves to this
Court. and that the exchange of instruments of ratification awaits the agree-
ment of the parties to that Special Agreement as to the appropriate time and
manner for their exchange. Accordingly, Libya suggests that any views Malta
may haveconcerning her continental shelf boundaries may most appropriately
be presented in the course of the prospective LibyanIMaltese proceedings.
3. Moreover, Libya is constrained to indicate to the Court that the present
Maltese request does not conformwith theconditions required for an interven-
tion before the Court. In Libya's view, an application to intervene under
Article 62 of the Statute can be granted only if three conditions are fiiltilled. In
logical order. these conditions are:
(il that there is a valid link of jurisdiction between both parties to the
proceedings and the State applying to intervene ;
(ii) that the State applying to intervene has an interest of a legalnature in the
subject-matter of the proceedings :and
hi) that such an interest may be affected by the decision in the case.
4. It should be noted that al1three of théconditions indicated above must be
satirfied for an intervention under Article 62 to be justified, and that if even
one of these conditions cannot be satisfiedit musJ,follow that intervention is
not justified in law.Thus. e.g.. riyetiifrliewere a jurisdictional link between
the interveningState and both parties to the present piaceedings, intervention
under Article 62 would not be justified if there were no interest of a legal
nature or.there were siich an interest but that interest were not such as to be
capable of being affected in the pending case.
5. None of these conditions is infact satisfied by Malta'srequest. In Libya's
view. therefore, the Court should decide against the application seeking per-
mission to intervene in the present case. Reasons supporting this conclusion
are set forth below. OBSERVATIONS OF LIBYA
1. No Valid Link of Jurisdiction
6. In order to intervene in a proceeding pursuant to Article 62, a State
must demonstrate that it has "an interest of a legal nature which rnay be
affecled by the decision in the case" (An.62. para. 1).By virtue of the second
paragraph of Article 62. the Court rules upon the propriety of a request made
under Article 62. There is no doubt that the Court has jurisdiction to decide on
a request for an intervention. The intervention, however, cannot be adrnitted
unless the Court is satisfied that there existsa validjurisdictional link between
the parties to the proceedings and the intervening State. This issue must be
addressed before the other difficulties presented by the hlaltese application are
considered.
7. Article 81. ~jaragraph 2. of the Rules of Court sets forth a number of
elenlents to be supplied by a State applying to intervene under the terrns of
Article 62 of the Siaiute. In addilion Io specificalion of an interesl oa legal
nature which rnay be affected by the decision in a case pending before the
Court. a request for permission to intervene must also specify "any basis of
jurisdiction which isclaimed to cxist as between the Stateapplying to intervene
and the parties to the case" hrt. 81.para. 2(cl).
8. Malta attempts to circumvent its lack of any jurisdictional link with the
Parties to the present case by contending in paragraph 23 of its Application
that intervention "is not dependent on the existence ofa basis ofjurisdiction as
between the State seeking to intervene and the parties to the case':.To support
this conclusion. ivtafta points out that Article 8t (2(clof the Rules "did not
figure in any form in previous versions of the Rules" and "cannot of course
have created a new substantive condition of the grant of. . . permission" to
intervene.
9. hlalta's conclusion fails ta recognize that Article 62 of the Statute does
no1confer an independent title of jurisdictionupona partyseeking tointervene
in a case pending before the Court pursuant to a Special Agreement between
other States. In this context. hlalta appears to claim that jurisdiction to decide
on the admissibility ofan intervention. which is provided for by Article 62 of
the Statute. also extends to jurisdiction over the litigation itself. However. the
title oijurisdiction provided for by Article 62 only refers to its object: namely.
the admissibility of the intervention - just as the Court's jurisdiction in any
and al1cases to pronounce over its own jurisdictior~competei~ic ee la cor?~pLi-
ience) does no1 imply that the Court is also cornpetent to pronounce on the
merits of any given case. Corfir Clrairitelcase. I.CJ. Reporfs 1949, pages 23-
26 :cf.Noirebuhmcase. I.C.J. Reporls 1953. pages 119-120.
10. As the Court is well aware. itsjurisdiction is governed by Article 36 of
the Statute. The effect of that Articlis that unless the States concerned have'
made effective declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
itsjurisdiction isgoverned by Article 36 (\) which provide :s
"The jurisdiction of the Court comprises al1 cases which the parties
refer to it and al1 matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations or in treatiesand conventions in force."
h,lalia does noi possess any jurisdiclional link witboth Parties to the present
proceedings within the meaning of Article 36 (1 1capable of providing a basis
for intervention pursuant to Article 62. Indeed. none has been alleged in
hlalta's application.
I1. For this purpose nothing will sufice short of (i) adherence by a11three
States to one special agreement or to more than one. but identical. special270 CONTINENTAL SHELF
agreements or to the same treaty or convention, or (ii)acceptance by al1three
Statesof Article 36 (2)of the Statute of the Court without reservations affecting
the case ; or (iii) acquiescence by Tunisia and Libya in the intervention by
Malta (even though a problem would still then exist asto the limitation on the
subject-matter as described in Article 1 of the LibyaITunisia Special Agree-
ment).
12. Malta tries to brush aside the requirement of a "basis of jurisdiction".
Indeed, does not paragraph 23 of Malta'sApplication suggest that Article 81 of
the Rules is a superfluous provision ? Malta assumes that "the statement for
which subparagraph (cl[of Article 811provides is required [solelylas a matter
of information for the Court regarding the jurisdictional relationship (ifany) of
the States concerned". Left unsaid in paragraph 23, however, is a clear
implication that, if Malta's proposition is correct, it would be difflcult to
understand the reasons for the Court's adoption of Article 81(2)(c) of the new
Rules.
13. Moreover, it may be noted that Article 8 1 (2)(c) was adopted subse-
quent to this Court's consideration of the issue of intervention during the
course of the proceedings in the Niiclear Tests cases (A~istraliav.Frairce;New
Zealaird v. Fratice). I.C.J.Reporrs 1973. 1974. As shown in the following
paragraphs. the implication by Malta that a proper title of jurisdiction is not
required to support an application to intervene is inconsistent with several
declarations issued during the course of those proceedings.
14. ARer the commencement of the proceedings in the N~rclearTests cases,
the Government of Fiji submitted two applications to the Court requesting
permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute. In an interim decision,
the Court by a vote of 8 to 5 deferred consideration of Fiji'sapplication until it
had resolved two other issues to which the parties had been asked to confine
their observations at the preliminary stage of the procedure :(ilwhether it had
jurisdiction to enterfain the dispute between AustraIia and France and (ii}
whether the dispute brought by the Australian application was admissible.
15. Fiji'sapplication to intervene in the Nnclear Tests cases ultimalely failed
afier the Court found that the claims of Australia and New Zealand no longer
had any object. As a result, no proceedings existed before the Court to which
Fiji's application could relate. It must be ernphasized, however, that several
Judges issued declarations addressing other fundamental infirmities precluding
Fiji'sapplication for permission to intervene. In this respect (although they did
not concur with the Court's disposition of the cases thernselves),Judges Dillard
and Sir Humphrey Waldock observed, in a joint declaration. that
"the issue of Fiji'sintervention would have required examination in order
todetermine whether or no1 there existed a s~~jicie~ijturisdictiorial litik
'between Fiji and France to justify the former's intervention . . .0.C.J.
Reporrs 1974, p. 532).(Emphasis supplied.)
16. Judge Gros voted in favour of the Court's decision dismissing Fiji's
application for reasons other than ihose stated in the Order. Reaffirming an
earlier declaration, Judge Gros stated :
"The document filed by the Government of ~iii . . . could not in any
way be regarded as a request to be permitted to intervene, within the
meaning of Article 62 of the Statute, and the request should have been
disrnissed ilr liiiiitze."0.C.J. Reports 19p.,531.)
17. Judge Jiménezde Aréchagamade the following declaration concerning
the jurisdictional infirmities precluding Fiji'sintervention: OBSERVATIONS OF LIBYA 27 1
"ln my view. in order to be entitled to intervene under Article62 of the
Statute for the purpose of asserting a right as against the respondent a
State must be in a position in which it could itself bring the respondent
before the Court.
When Article 62 of the Statute was drafted, its authorç were proceed-
ing on the assurnption that the intervening State would have its own title
of jurisdiction in relationto the respondent. since the draft Statute then
provided for general compulsory jurisdiction. When that system was
replaced by the optional clause. Article 62 remained untouched. but it
must be interpreted and applied as still subject to that condition. Other-
wise. unreasonable consequences would result. in conflict with basic
principles such as those of the equality of parties before the Court and the
strict reciprocity of rights and obligations among the States which accept
itsjurisdiction."
Malta, however, Ilas failed to establish itçown titlof jurisdiction with respect
&O each of Libya or Tunisia. Moreover, Malta is decidedly not in a position
, where it could have brought both Libya and Tunisia before the Court in
respect of the dispute between Libya and Tunisia of which the Court is already
seized. The mere existence of a ratified Special Agreement between Malta and
oric of the Parties to the present case fails to cure this essential defect, and
would aho fail even when it is notified to the Court (in addition, that Special
Agreement isquite different in scope and object from the Special Agreement
between Libya and Tunisia).
18. Returning to the iVuclcwr Tcs!.ï cases:Judge Onyeama, in voting to
dismiss Fiji'sapplication, declared :
"The Court shouid have ... rejected [Fiji'sApplication] on the ground
that the condition of reciprocity of an obligation to accept the Court's
jurisdiction was wholly absent between Fiji and France." U.C.J. Reports
1974.pp. 531-532.)
Judge Sir Garfield Barwick also voted in favour of dismissal "solely for the
reasons expressed" by Judges Onyeama and Jimenez de Aréchaga "in iheir
declarations concerning the Fiji Order .. ." U.C.JReporrs 1974.p. 533). And
ludge Ignacio-Pinto declared :"There is no treaty link between France and
that State [Fiji]capable of authorizing such intervention on the latter's part."
The views expressed in the declarations of Judges Dillard, Waldock, Onyeama.
Jiménezde Arechaga and Barwick concerning jurisdictional infirmities barring
Fiji's application to intervene in the Nlicl~ar Te.st.5cases indicate that the
contention expressed by Malta in its Application - that no jurisdictional link
is required between the State seeking to intervene and the parties to a case
pending before the Court - is inconsistent with the jurisprudence of ihis
Court and should therefore be rejected.
19. In addition.ilmay readily be inîerred that Malta isso fully aware of the
proper construction of Article 62. and of the absence of any title ofjurisdiction
resulting therefrom, that its Government round it necessary to notify a second
declaration of unilateral acceptance of the Court'sjurisdiction to the Secretary-
Generai of the United Nations. If Malta's interpretation of Article 62 was
. correct, no unilateral declaration under Article 36 (2) MJOLI/~cver /IUIV hCei~
flecessary IOprovidc aj~rrisdic~ioriulli~rkbetween the parties 10the procedure
and the Smte requesting intervention. Yet Malta has submitted such a declara-
tion, which nevertheless also failsto satisfy the Statute's jurisdictional require-
ments as regards Libya and Tunisia.272 CONTINE;~TAL SHELF
20. In the present case Maita cannot invoke either of its own declarations
under Article 36 (2)as creating any basis ofjurisdiction. No unilateral declara-
tion of acceptance by kfalta can establish jurisdiction as against another State.
What is also required is a corresponding declaration by rheother Srore. since
the jurisdiction of the Couri is founded upon the common ground on which
the Parties have accepted that jurisdiction.
21. It is in this context that paragraph25(b) of Malta'sApplication. which
refers to the "second declaration", dated 2 January 1981and addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. should be read. This paragraph is
alleged to enlarge the scope of hlalta's acceptance of the cornpulsory jurisdic- '
tion of the Court in connection with proceedings relating to continental shelf
delimitations in the hlediterranean Sea. Based on that Declaration. hlalta
concludes in paragraph 25 fc)of its Application that "it follows that any State
can at any tirne start proceedings against Malta beiore the Court" in regard to
any such dispute.
22. But the converse is not true. and no reference is made by Malta to
the actual text of Article 36 (1) which states that recognition of the Court's
jurisdiction under the optional clause is only effective "in relation to any other
State accepting the same obligation . ..". At the time of the commencement of
the present case. neither Libya nor Tunisia had accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 36 (2) of the Statute. The lack of
accepfance by Libya or Tunisia ofthe jurisdiction of thecourt under Article 36
(2)of the Statute of the Court cannot be transformed into "acceptance" for the
purposes of that Article by a unilateral declaration by Malta that its [second]
declaration is "without the condition of reciprocity and without reservation" :
any such indication by Malta cannot satisfy a requirement which can only be
met or fulfilled by action by bothLibya andTunisia.In other words. Malta. as
any other State. cannot modify Article 36 (2)of the Statute by unilateral action.
23. hlalta's contention - "that any State can ai any time start proceedings
against Malta before the Court" concerning continental shelf delimitation in
the hlediterranean - is therefore beside the point. The new declaration of
hlalta has no more effect than a mere statement of intention not to assert lack
of jurisdiction if another State files a unilateral request on matters falling
within the scope of the new declaration. It may be noted however that. if
Malta indeed failed to raise jurisdictional objections in a given case. the
jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate that case would then be based on Malta's
acquiescence to jurisdiction in those proceedings. and not on its unilateral
declaration (whether old or new).
24. Although paragraph 2 1of hlalta's Application refers to "the prospect of
an early ratification" of the Special Agreement of 23 h4ay 1976 between Malta
and Libya. it is not correct (O infer that thisSpecial Agreement has not been
ratified by any one of the Parties. On the contrary. it has been ratified by the
competent constitutional authorities of both Parties. Instruments of ratification
are ready to be exchanged. and joint notification to the Registrar of the Court
effectuated when the Parties agreeon an appropriate tirne and manner in view
of the Special Agreemeiit and the Rules of Court and in light of the pending
and subsequent proceedings.
II. No Interestof a Legal Nature
25. As indicated in paragraph 3 above, not only rnust a State applying te
inteivene establish that there is a vatidjurisdictional link between itselfand the
parties to the procedure.itmust also - pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute - OBSERVATIONS OF LIBYA 273
demonstrate that it has "an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by
the de'cision in the case". Although nowhere in its Application does blalta
precisely set rorth what its interest of a legal nature is. paragraph 7 of the
Application apparently contends that intervention is proper because "hlalta's
interest in her Continental Shelf boundaries" is a suficient interest of a legal
character which may be aflected by the decision in the present proceedings. As
demonstrated below. however. Alalta'sclaimed "interest of a legal character"
- assuming it exists at al1- will not and indeed could not be affected by the
decision in the preseni case.
26. The actual text of the Special Agreement between Libya and Tunisia
requests the Court to indicate the principles and rules of international law (and
IO clarify the practical method for application of those principles and rules by
the Parties and their e.xperts) relating to the "delimitation of the area of the
continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahi-
riya" and of "the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the Republic of
Tunisia". In essence, the Special Agreement does not contemplate an actual
delimitation by the Court :nor does it envisage an ultimate delimitation by the
Parties and their experts ol'any oreas of cor~~itrenia llzelfotlirr thatiareas
apperroitrittg roLibya arrd orras appertai~zirrglo T~rnisia.These specific areas
constitute the very subject-matter of the present proceedings. Therefore. hlalta
has no interest of a legal nature in the subject-matter.
III.And No EffectWhich Could Exist
27. ivloreover. the decision to be rendered in this case as such. as well as the
practical method to be applied in accordance with that decision. will not affect
in a legal sense the interest of any other State including Malta. Indeed. the
interest alleged by klalta in ils Application is totally unrelated to the very
subject-matter of the decision as expressed in paragraph 1 of the Special
Agreement between Libya and Tunisia.
28. The litigation pending between Libya and Tunisia is a perfectly normal
case in which the interests of third parties are protected by the legallimitations.
both subjective and objective, inherent in the binding force of any judicial
decision - that is to Saythe resjudicata. No special protection is needed such
as that which would exceptionally be afforded by intervention. Therefore.
klalta's claim that it has an interest of a legal nature whicmay be affected by
the decision in the present case is implausible and fallsof its own weight.
29. lndeed can any inieresi in ils continental shelf boundaries justify blalta's
intervention in light of the admission in paragraph 22 of its Application that it
is not iblalta'sobject "to obtain any form of ruling or decision from the Court
concerning its continental shelf boundaries . . ." ? Instead. in suggesting the
"precise object" of the intervention. as required by Article8 1.paragraph 2 (6).
of the Rules. hlalta Statesonly the following :
"the precise object of hlalta's intervention in the LibyalTuriisia case
would be to enable &Ialta to submit ils iiiewlfo zheCourt on the issues
raised in the pending case. before the Court has given ils decision in that
case" (emphasissupplied).
The purpose of intervention in contentious proceedings. however. must be
more than merely to "submit views". Indeed. the very fact that this is the limit
of the conceded purpose for which permission to intervene is sought is
dispositive of the question whether there can be any Maltese legal interest
which could be affected by the decision in this case.274 CONTINENTAS LBELF
30. In addition. the issues indicated in paragraph13 and 14of the Maltese
Application as being "examples ofspecificissues that might arise in theLibyal
Tunisiecase. and be pronounced upon by the Court" are issues which wj11in
every likelihood differ in the Libya/'Tunisia context frorn the issues in the
Malta/Libya context. Would not consideration of the issues as relating to
hlalta and Libya therefore create extraordinary and disruptive difficulties in
the quite different context of a delimitation as between Tunisia and Libya ?
Such a result would appear to beunavoidable - and would be rendered even
the more unfortunate by the fact that Malta does not intend to be bound by a
decision in the present case in any event.
31. The Court will note that four of the six issuesset forth in paragrap13
and 14 of the hlaltese Application aie issues of general legal principles. To the
extent that such issuesconcern the applicable principles and rules of internatio-
nal law (or indced the new accepted trends in the Thkd Conference on the .
Law of the Sea mentioned in paragraph 14 of Malta's Application) then this
contention could hardly rise to the ievel required to permit intervention. since
on such a basis any coastal State in the world might intervene. Indeed. to
accepi such a contention would imply that any other coastal State in the world
would have beenjustified in applying to intervene in theNorth SeaConrinenral
Shelfcases. Only two issues(Nos. 1and 3 of para. 13)appear to bespecific to
hlalta. These are. however, entirely speculative and presuppose that the area
for delimitation in the present case includes areas bordering the shelf apper-
taining to Malta. In Libya's viewthis is simply not the case.'
32. 1tis still more dillicult to perceive what interest Malta seeks to protect
by applying to intervene in the pending case' in view of Malta's explicit
statement in paragraph 24 of the Application that "the intervention would not
seek any substantive or operative decision against either Party". In view of
such statements. can Malta reasonably claim that it has any interest of a legal
nature that would be affected by the decision in the present case ?Or isMalta's
limitation of the precise object of its atternpted intervention akin to an adrnis-
sion that it in fact possesses no interest of a legal nature capable of being
"affected by the decision" even the Court were to decide that hlalta could
intervene ? Such a limitation confirms that the decision can have no effect,
since no effect is contemplated or admitted by Malla.
33. The hlaltese Application could beviewed as in eîfect mistaking inter-
vention in contentious proceedings for appearance in advisory proceedings
under Article 66 of the Statute. Under the Application, hlalta would in essence
become a "quasi-party". Such a quasi-pany would be granted the right to an
audience to express its views on law and presumably on questions of fact
which may affect the rights of the parties (as if itwere an advisory proceeding).
but the quasi-party would also be permitted to insist that itsown rights are not
and cannot be affected by the Court's decision.This again confirmsthe absence
of an interest of a legal nature which could be affected by the decision in this
case. with respect tothe quasi-party. hlalta.
IV. Addltional Consideraiions
34.. In addition. and in confirmation of the foregoing analysis. it may be
supposed that the principles and rules of internationaLaw (not to mention the
role of relevant circumstances and new accepted trends which are not even
mentioned in the Special Agreement signed on 23 May 1976) will apply
differently in cases as different in substance as that of Libya and Tunisia on the
one hand and that of Libya and hlalta on the other. The former proceedings OBSERVATIONS OF L~BYA 275
relate to adjacent States;the latter proceedings would involve opposite States
(one of which is an island State).and not adjacent ones.
35. The only factor setting hlalta apart from other States of the world in this
regard is lhat areas of shelf which may be appurtenant to it may be in
proxirnity to areas of shelf appertaining to Libya. This might however also be
true for the other klediterranean States. yet any other such State would have
no betier claim than Malta to intervene in these proceedings under Article 62.
again for the simple reasons that there would be no interest of a fegal nature
which could be aiiected by the present proceedings as such, and that there
would be no independent title of jurisdiction between it and the Parties to this
case.
36. The question rnay well be asked as to whether the hlaltese Application
is not the more supererogatory in view of the fact that there now exists a
Special Agreement between Libya and hlalta which has been ratified by both
States for the purpose of bringing questions concerning the delimitation of
their respective continental shelves to the Court in an appropriate and orderly
time and manner. As to the Special Agreement. it must be understood that it
was precisely because the situations between Libya and Tunisia and between
Libya and hlalta were different. in rnany respects. that two Special Agreements
were considered.
37. hloreover. in Libya's viewthe Coun has ample power. in delivering its
Judgment in the present case. to safeguard any interests of third-party States.
No intervention by hlalta is necessary to ensure that this Court protects the
rights of third parties. That protection arises from the very 'nature of the
judicial function and as a normal incidence of judicial propriety. The "precise
objecta'of Malta's intervention may therefore be fully satisfied without undue
disruption of the present proceedings by intervention.
38. The Government of Libya therefore respectfully concludes that the
proposed Maltese intervention in the present proceedings could serve no useful
purpose, and isin any event not justified by any reason adduced in the Maltese
Application.
39. As indicated more fully above. the three conditions rnentioned in
paragraph 3 above. that a State applying to intervene under Article 62 of the .
State must satisfy, have nat been met :
(il there is no valid link of jurisdiction between the Parties io the present
proceedings and the State applying to intervene ;
(ii) the State making the application has no interest of a legal nature in the
subject-matter of the present proceedings ;and
(iii)such an interest, if it could be shown to exist at al]. would not be affected
by a decision in the present proceedings.
Accordingly. intervention by Malta in the.= proceedings is not justified.
(Signedl Kamel H. ELM,\GHUR.
Agent of the Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
Observations du Gouvernement de la Tunisie sur la requête à fin d'intervention du Gouvernement de Malte