Corrigé
Corrected
CR20J2/28
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2012
Public sitting
lteld on Tuesday 4 December 20J2, at JOa.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the case concerning tMaritime Dispute
(Peru v. Chile)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNÉE2012
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 4 décembre20J2à JOheures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidencede. Tomka, président,
en l'affaire Différendmaritime
(Pérouc. Chili)
COMPTE RENDU -2-
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepulveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Orrego Vicufia
Registrar Couvreur -3-
Présents: M. Tomka, président
M. Sepùlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
MmesXue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges
MM. Gui11aume
Orrego Vicufia,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier -4-
The Government of the Republic of Peru is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Allan Wagner, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, former Minister of
Defence, former Secretary-General of the Andean Community, Ambassador of Peru to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Rafael Roncagliolo, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Special Envoy;
H.E. Mr. José AntonioGarda Belaunde, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Jorge Châvez Soto, Ambassador, member of the Peruvian Delegation to the Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar, Eversheds
LLP, Paris,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate member of the Institut de Droit International,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de
Droit International,
Mr. Tullio Treves, Professorat the Faculty of Law, State University of Milan, former judge of the
International Tribunal for the Lawf the Sea,
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Eduardo Ferrero, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, former Minister for Foreign
-·-------:•·.~~:=...Atfa1is,memiJerürt11<;=ï>erl.îvian=oeregat1ün~tü~tïle-:rïlirCi-ü1\Feüt1rerence:ün~t1-e=JSawü.ft1e.-sea~-
Mr. Vicente Ugarte del Pino, former President of the Supreme Court of Justice, former President of
the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, former Dean of the Lima Bar Association,
Mr. Roberto Mac Lean, former judge of the Supreme Court of Justice, former member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
H.E. Mr. Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador of Peru to Unesco,
as State Advocates; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Pérouest représentépar :
S. Exc. M. Allan Wagner, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures, ancien ministre
de la défense, ancien secrétaire généralde la Communauté andine, ambassadeur du Pérou
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Rafael Roncagliolo, ministre des relations extérieures,
comme envoyéspécial;
S. Exc. M. JoséAntonio Garcia Belaunde, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
S. Exc. M. Jorge Chavez Soto, ambassadeur, membre de la délégation péruvienne à la
troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieures sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
comme coagents ;
M. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l'Université d'Oxford, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Tullio Treves, professeur à la facultéde droit de l'Université de Milan, ancien juge du Tribunal
international du droit de la mer,
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G, membre du barreau d'Angleterre, membre de la Commission du droit
international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Eduardo Ferrero, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, ancien ministre des relations
extérieures, membre de la délégationpéruvienne à la troisième conférence des Nations Unies
sur le droit de la mer,
M. Juan Vicente Ugarte del Pino, ancien président de la Cour suprêmede justice, ancien président
de la Cour de justice de la Communauté andine, ancien bâtonnier, barreau de Lima,
M. Roberto Mac Lean, ancien juge de la Cour suprême de justice, ancien membre de la Cour
permanente d'arbitrage,
S. Exc. M. Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
ambassadeur du Pérouauprèsde l'Unesco,
comme avocats de l'Etat ; - 6-
Minister-Counsellor Marisol Agi.ieroColunga, LL.M., former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs on Law of the Sea Matters, Co-ordinator of the Peruvian Delegation,
H.E. Mr. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, Ambassador, Adviser ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
Mr. Juan JoséRuda, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Legal Adviser ofthe Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Mr. Benjamin Samson, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., New York University School of Law,
as Assistant Counsel;
Mr. Carlos Enrique Gamarra, Vice Admirai (retired), Hydrographer, Adviser to the Office for Law
of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Special Adviser;
Mr. Ramon Bahamonde, M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
l:-t Mr. Alejandro DeustuHf!,M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Jaime Valdez, Lieutenant Commander (retired), National Cartographer of the Peruvian
Delegation,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Mr. Paul Duclos, Minister-Counsellor, LL.M., M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Alfredo Fortes, Counsellor, LL.M., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. JoséAntonio Torrico, Counsellor, M.A., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
Mr. CésarTalavera, First Secretary, M.Sc., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
as Advisers; - 7-
Mme Marisol Agüero Colunga, LL.M., ministre-conseiller et ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieures sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer, coordonnateur de la
délégationpéruvienne,
S. Exc. M. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, ambassadeur, conseiller du ministère des relations
extérieuressur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
M. Juan JoséRuda, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, conseiller juridique du ministère
des relations extérieures,
comme conseils ;
M. Benjamin Samson, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., facultéde droit de l'Universitéde New York,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Le vice-amiral (en retraite) Carlos Enrique Gamarra, hydrographe, conseiller auprès du bureau du
droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
comme conseiller spécial;
M. Ramon Bahamonde, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Alejandro Deustua, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des relations extérieures, ".
M. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des relations
extérieures,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
Le capitaine de corvette (en retraite) JaimeVaidez, cartographe de la délégationpéruvienne,
Le capitaine de vaisseau (en retraite) Aquiles Carcovich, cartographe,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
M. Paul Duclos, ministre-conseiller, LL.M., M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des
relations extérieures,
M. Alfredo Fortes, conseiller, LL.M., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. JoséAntonio Torrico, conseiller, M.A., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. CésarTalavera, premier secrétaire,M.Sc., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ; -8-
Ms EvelyCampos Sânchez, Embaof Peruin theKingdomof the Netherlands,
Ph.D. candidate, Amsterdam Center for International Law, University
Ms Charis Tan, Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore, member of the New York Bar, Solicitor,
England andWales, Eversheds
Mr. Raymundo Tullio Treves, Ph.D. candidate, Max Planck Research School for Successful
Disputes Settlement, Heidelberg,
as Assistants.
The Government of the Republic ofCitile is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Albert van Klaveren Stork, Ambassador, former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ministry Foreign Affairs, Professorat the University of Chile,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Alfredo Moreno Charme, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile,
as National Authority;
H.E. Mr. Juan Martabit Scaff, Ambassador ofChile to the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
H.E. Ms Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, National Director ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry
Affairs, Professorat the University ofChile, member droit international,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and
Development, Geneva, and at the University(Panthéon-Assas), member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, member ofthe Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Jan Paulsson, Presidentternational Council for Commercial Arbitration, President of
the Administrative Tribunal of the OECD, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
....:.•:l'·'!~ ~(:)I?A:t.t.L2E'~!<::lY::~!::! i:Qg!:Q!il:P:_;~_Q,!,:.!!!1~..I!ê
·-··- ··-~·-·ofÇalifomli!. and the Distri~----·--~-~-ia·-··~---~··-----·-··-
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor oflnternational Law, University of Florence,
Mr. Georgios Petrochilos, Avocat à la Cour and Advocate Court, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
Mr.SamuelWordsw Oethe~ofthEnglisi1Bar, itiember oCthe Paris Bar, Essèx Court
Chambers,
Mr. Claudio Grossman, Dean,dson Professor of International Law, American University,
Washington Collegew,
as Counsel and Advocates; - 9-
Mme Evelyn Campos Sanchez, ambassade du Pérou au Royaume des Pays-Bas, doctorant à
l'Amsterdam Center for International Law, Université d'Amsterdam,
Mme Cl1aris Tan, avocat et solicitor (Singapour), membre du barreau de New York, solicitor
(Angleterre et Pays de Galle), cabinet Eversheds LLP,
M. Raymundo Tullio Treves, doctorant à l'International Max Planck Research School, section
spécialiséedans le règlement des différends internationaux, Heidelberg,
comme assistants.
Le Gouvernement de la Républiquedu Chili est représenté par:
S. Exc. M. Albert van Klaveren Stork, ambassadeur, ancien vice-ministre des relations extérieures,
ministère des relations extérieures, professeur à l'Université du Chili,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Alfredo Moreno Charme, ministre des relations extérieures du Chili,
comme membre du Gouvernement;
S. Exc. M. Juan Martabit Scaff, ambassadeur du Chili auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. Mme Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, directeur national, frontières et limites, ministère des
relations extérieures, professeur à l'Université du Chili, membre de l'Institut de droit
international,
comme coagents ;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du
développement de Genève et à l'Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de l'Institut de
droit international,
M. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l'Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers,
M. Jan Paulsson, président du Conseil international pour l'arbitrage commercial, président du
Tribunal administratif de l'OCDE, cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. David A. Colson, avocat, cabinet Patton Boggs LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux
de l'Etat de Californie et du district de Columbia,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit internationalà l'Université de Florence,
M. Georgios Petrochilos, avocat à la Cour et à la Cour suprême grecque, cabinet Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d'Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
M. Claudio Grossman, doyen, professeur titulaire de la Chaire R. Geraldson, American University,
facultéde droit de Washington,
comme conseils et avocats ; - 10-
H.E. Mr. Hernan Salinas, Ambassador, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Professor,
Catholic University ofChile,
H.E. Mr. Luis Winter, Ambassador, Ministry ofForeign Affairs,
Mr. Enrique Barros Bourie, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Julio Fa(mdez, Professor, University of Warwick,
Ms Ximena Fuentes Torrüo, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Andres Jana, Professor, University ofChile,
Ms Mariana Durney, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. John Ranson, Legal Officer, Professor oflnternational Law, Chilean Navy,
Mr. Ben Juratowitch, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Motohiro Maeda, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Special Adviser, Sovereign Geographie, member of the North Carolina
Bar,
H.E. Mr. Luis Goycoolea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Antonio Correa Olbrich, Counsellor, Embassy ofChile in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, Second Secretary, Embassy of Chile in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Kate Parlett, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales and in Queensland, Australia,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Assistant Professor, University ofBaltimore, Maryland, member of the Bars
ofVirginia and the Districtf Columbia,
=~==~==:~=~===~==-==~======================
-----------~-----Ms-Aiexandra-van-der-Meulen;Avocatà-la-eour-andîllember-ofthe-Barofthe-State-of-New-York;----
Mr. Francisco Abriani, member of the Buenos Aires Bar,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor oflnternational Law, University ofMacerata,
as Advisers;
Mr. Julio Poblete, National Division ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Fiona Bloor, United Kingdom Hydrographie Office,
Mr. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd.,
as Technical Advisers. - 11 -
S. Exc. M. Hernan Salinas, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique au ministère des relations extérieures,
professeur à l'Universitécatholique du Chili,
S. Exc. M. Luis Winter, ambassadeur, ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Enrique Barros Bourie, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Julio Faùndez, professeur à l'Universitéde Warwick,
Mme Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Andres Jana, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
Mme Mariana Durney, conseiller juridique au ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. John Ranson, conseiller juridique, professeur de droit international, marine chilienne,
M. Ben Juratowitch, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Motohiro Maeda, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, conseiller spécial, Sovereign Geographie, membre du barreau de Caroline
du Nord,
S. Exc. M. Luis Goycoolea, ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Antonio Correa Olbrich, conseiller à l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, deuxième secrétaire de l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
Mme Kate Parlett, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland (Australie)),
Mme Nienke Grossman, professeur adjoint à l'Université de Baltimore, Maryland, membre des
barreaux de l'Etatde Virginie et du district de Columbia,
Mme Alexandra van der Meulen, avocat à la Cour et membre du barreau de l'Etat de New York,
M. Francisco Abriani, membre du barreau de Buenos Aires,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associéde droit international à l'Universitéde Macerata,
comme conseillers ;
M. Julio Poblete, division nationale des frontières et des limites, ministèredes relations extérieures,
Mme Fiona Bloor, services hydrographiques du Royaume-Uni,
M. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd,
comme conseillers techniques. - 12-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. This morning the Court will
hear the continuationf the first round of oral argument of PeruI give the floor first to
Professor Vaughan Lowe.You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. LOWE:
NO AGREEMENT ON MARITIME DELIMITATION IN 1952
Introduction
1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. It is an honour to appear before you and
a privilege to have been entrusted with the presentation part of Peru's submissi~~s.
Peru's submissions today cover four broad points. First, we complete the historical survey. I shall
deal with the 1952 Santiago Declaration; Sir Michael Wood will deal with subsequent events up to
the 1970s; Professor Treves will cover Peru's position during anding UNCLOS III; and
H Mr. Bundy will deal with the recent conduct of the Parties. I shall roundsectionis by
considering the historical record in the light of the requirements of international law for the
establishmentf a maritime boundary. Professor Pellet will then explain the inequity of Chile's
claimed Iine.He will be followed by Mr. Bundy, who will address the starting-point of the
maritime boundary; and Professorellet will then return to close our first round submissions by
presenting our case on what wei the "outer trianglethe area that is within 200 miles of Peru
but more than00 miles from every other State.
2. So, let me begin with the 1952 Declaration of Santiago. In ali the detailed discussion of
that document, it is important9~0-~_sjghLQLth,e_Qn~_faç_t_thatjs_b_ o____h _i_ndisp_utahl~_and_cr.udaLin___
this case.The Santiago Declaration does not contain any provision that delimits the lateral
maritime boundariesf its signatory States.
What the Santiago Declaration says
3. The Declaration is set out in tab 22 of your bundle. [Graphie of whole of Declaration, to
zoom in on each paragraph as I mention it] You will see that its preamble asserts the responsibility
of governments for their people and for the protection oftheir natural resources. Nothing there has
any bearing on maritime delimitation. - 13 -
4.Point I of the Declaration asserts that geological and biological factors render the former
extent of the territorial sea and contiguous zone inadequate for the conservation, development and
exploitation of the marine resources ofthe signatories. Nothing on delimitation.
5.Point II proclaims "as a norm of ... international maritime policy" that each signatory has
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction out to a minimum of 200 miles from the coasts. You will
note that thisis a declaration of maritime policy, and that 200 miles is a minimum distance. In 1952
it was envisaged that the distance could be extended beyond 200 miles; but that did not happen.
6. And note also that as a matter of basic cartography, a minimum of 200 miles cannot be
obtained by using the tracéparallèle, which had been used in Peru's 1947 Supreme Decree, it can
only be gained by using the arcs-of-circles method, which had been used in Peru's Petroleum Law
of 1952. But there is nothing in point II on delimitation.
7. Point III says that the exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty extend to the sea-bed and
subsoil, as weil asto the water column. Nothing here on delimitation.
8. Point IV consists of two sentences, both of which concern the maritime entitlements of
islands. There is nothing here on delimitation- and I shaH come back to point IV shortly.
9. Point V says that the Declaration does not prejudice the right of inoffensive passage
innocent passage. Nothing there on delimitation.
1O. Point VI says that the principles contained in the Declaration will be applied in
subsequent agreements or conventions. Nothing there on delimitation.
11. So, it is only points II and IV that touch even on maritime entitlements. But neither of
them says anything that bears upon the maritime boundaries between States. And point IV is
concerned solely with the maritime zones of islands.
Point IV of the Santiago Declaration
12. [Bring point IV back on to screen] The two sentences of point IV form separate
paragraphs in the Spanish text. The first stipulates that islands generate 200-mile zones around
their entire coastal circumference. It is not only the west-facing coasts, facing away from the
mainland, that generate such zones. That point was important, particularly to Ecuador. But it has
no relevance to the delimitation of maritime boundaries. - 14-
13. The second sentence does not apply to ali islands. It applies only to those islands that are
"situated less than 200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone" of another State. If that
situation occurs, this second sentence stipulates that the "maritime zone of the island or group of
islands shall be limited by the parallel". So, islands are not in ali circumstances entitled to a full
200-mile reach, as the Court noted recently in itsNicaragua v. Colombia decision'.
14. So point IV is concerned with the maritime entitlement of islands. And no matter how
many times you read it, it is impossible to find in it anything more.
15. The Santiago Declaration, as the signatories expressly said in point II, was conceived as
a collective declaration of maritime policy addressed to third States, and not as a treaty -let alone
as a maritime delimitation treaty. It was concerned with rights over marine resources, not with
lateral maritime boundaries. Chile cannat escape the fact that it contains no agreement on the
course of the international maritime boundaries between the signatory States.
What the participants in the Santiago Conference aimed to do
16. Please let me try to bring into focus the kind of exercise that the drafters of the Santiago
Declaration were engaged in. The background is described in Chapter IV of our Memorial and
Chapter III of our Reply.
17. The temptation to view the work ofthe 1952 Santiago Conference in an anachronistic
manner must be avoided. What is relevant here is not the later developments whose origins might
be traced back to the conference, but what the States participating in the conference thought that
18. Professor Treves has explained the background in the Truman Proclamations- which
were also policy declarations that had to be implemented by legislation. He also recalled the
particular problems concerning whale and fish stocks in the south-east Pacifie, and the concern
over the impact of the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation-ofWhaling.
19. Sir Michael Wood has taken you through the early Peruvian and Chilean assertions of
jurisdiction over the waters contiguous to the coasts of the South American States and their
resources, and has mentioned the hostility of the rest of the world towards those claims- in
1Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19November 2012, para. 202. - 15 -
striking contrast to the general acquiescence in the United States claims which were, of course, no
less innovative at the time.
20. So, we have the threats to the whaling and fishing industries of the south-east Pacifie
States arising from the diversion of foreign fishing effort away from waters contiguous to the
United States and towards the waters contiguous to Ecuador, Peru and Chile, and arising also from
the move towards the imposition of catch limits on whaling; and we have the hostile international
reactions to the Latin American claims. If the Latin American States were not to abandon those
claims, they had to decide upon a strategy to defend them.
21. The connection between this background and the convening of the Santiago Conference
in 1952 is evident. Consider the very terms of the instructions of the Foreign Minister of Chile
concerning the convening of the Conference: as set out in Annex 111, in Volume III of Chile's
Counter-Memorial- tab 23 in your bundle:
"The Government of Chile, convinced of the necessity of protecting its industry
and the existence of whales in our maritime zones, considers that the time has come to
cali a conference in which Ecuador, Peru and Chile would take part, in order to study
the measures deemed necessary to modifYthe prohibitions that threaten the economy
of the aforementioned countries, while at the same time maintaining in force the
regulations concerning the protection of whales in order to avoid their decrease or
extinction in this part of the Continent."
22. Then there are the explicit tenus of the invitations to the conference sent out by Chile,
which the Court may wish to re-read. At Annex 64 to our Memorial [tab 24 in your bundle] you
will see Chile's invitation to Peru, dated 10 July 1952. The first three paragraphs say that Chile has
the honour to invite Peru
"to attend the celebration of a Conference oriented to conclude agreements regarding
the problems caused by whaling in the waters of the South Pacifie and the
industrializationof whale products.
The Governments ofPeru, Ecuador and Chile will participate in it.
Everything seems to point out the need for our countries to study the measures
that should be adopted in defence of their fishing industry in the face of the
well-founded claims by businessmen of the three countries as weil as the restrictive
dispositions ofthe 1946 Washington Convention, modified later in the Congresses of
London, Oslo and Cape Town."
23. The invitation is to "a Conference oriented to conclude agreements regarding the
problems caused by whaling in the waters of the South Pacifie and the industrialization of whale - 16-
products". No other purpose is stated for the conference. There is no suggestion whatever that the
conference would consider the question of maritime boundaries between the participating States.
There is no hint that the Peruvian delegation might, in the 25 days before the conference, consider
or consult within its own government on the question of international maritime boundaries and
come to Santiago with a mandate to agree on Peru's maritime boundaries. On 11 July 1952, Peru
accepted this invitation to "the tripartite Whaling Conference": see our Reply, Annex PR3, tab 25
in your bundle.
Chile's distortion of history
24. Peru made these and similar points in its Memorial and in its Repli. What is Chile's
response? In its Counter-Memorial, at paragraph 2.52, it says that Chile and Peru had decided to
act in concert in defence of their 200-mile claims and that they invited Ecuador to join them. It
says that ali tl1ree States decided to agree upon their maritime boundaries at the Santiago
Conference.
25. That is not what appears from the evidence. In fact, as you can see from Chapter III of
our Reply, at page 140 and following, it was Chile alone that invited Ecuador to the conference;
and it did so before it sent a separate invitation, framed in different terms, to Peru. Chile does not
explain why its invitations to Ecuador and to Peru were framed in different terms- a fact that
Peru only discovered more than half a century later, when Ch ile revealed the letter to Ecuador in its
Counter-Memorial.
---~~---------~---·------~--~----~--~--~----------------~- - --~---------~------~----~-·--~-----
copy of it in Annex 59 to its Counter-Memorial, with a translation of three of its six paragraphs.
The Court's translation service will no doubt provide the Court with a full translation, but we have
provided our own together with the text, in tab 26 in your bundle.
27. Paragraph l says that eh ile "convinced on the need to protect the industry and existence
of whales in our maritime zones, considers that the moment has arrived to summon a conference in
which Ecuador, Peru and Chile would participate".
2
MP, Chap. IV, Sec. II.B.7.
3RP, Chap. III, Secs. II.D-H. - 17 -
28. Paragraph 2 sets out the purpose of the meeting. Let me read it in full. It says that:
"In consequence, this meeting would have the purpose of studying such
measures it deems necessary in order to consider the prohibitions that threaten the
economy of the named countries, established by the 1946 Washington Convention,
and its modifications adopted at the London, Oslo, Cape Town and London
Congresses; this, however, whilst maintaining always the provisions referred to the
protection of such cetaceans as a means to avoid their extermination in this part of the
Continent."
It is crystal clear what the purpose of the meeting is: consideration of measures to protect the
interestsof the participating States in the whaling industry.
29. That pointis reinforced in paragraph 3, which says that:
"The participation of Ecuador in this conference is of great importance, since
the significant quantity of sperm whales existing in its maritime zone, particularly in
the region of the Galapagos Islands and [since] the provisional agenda states that the
determination of the Territorial Sea is set out as one of the objectives of the meeting."
H 30.1[8 vdteh to next slide]IThe matter was put beyond any doubt in the following paragraph,
paragraph 4, which set out the agenda for the meeting. It made no reference whatsoever to the
question of maritime boundaries. It referred to- and I quote the relevant passage in full-
"1. Territorial Sea. The legalization of the declarations of the Presidents of Chile and
Peru with respect to sovereignty over 200 miles of continental waters;
2. International Whaling Convention. Regulation concerning coastal hunting:
(a) Ongoing hunting ofBaleen Whales;
(b) Minimum size, and
(c) Minimum distance between land stations, and
3. Fishing Confederation ofthe South Pacifie."
31. The Court will see that what Chile said in 1952, when it sent its invitations, is not what it
says now. It is perfectly clear that when Peru and Ecuador were invited by Chile to a conference
on South Pacifie whaling, that is what the invitation was limited to. International boundaries were
not on the agenda; and it is ablatant attempt to rewrite history to suggest that they were. We wait
for our friends on the other side to explain why they now say that Peru was being invited to a
conference to settle maritime boundaries. - 18-
What happened at the Santiago Conference
32. Let me move on. The organization of the 1952 Conference similarly evidences the
limitf!d,scientific purposf!of the Santiago meeting. This is clear from the Mimites ofthe Inaugural
Session,whiclutrepl!bJisheci on the 9ffiçiaw~b~i ofethtPerman~ntÇommi fsrtheoSouth
Pacific,and are tab 27 in your bundle. The Minutes refer to the "Conference on the Exploitation
and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacifie", which was "convened by the
Government of Chile" - no suggestion here, you notice, of a joint approach from Chile and Peru.
The Minutes list the one Peruvian delegate, who was the Peruvian Ambassador to Chile, and his
four advisers, and the two Ecuadorean delegates, the chargé d'affaires and his colleague, along
with their Chilean counterparts.
33. The Minutes record the Chilean Foreign Minister's opening speech, in which he said that
the Government of Chile had convened the meeting at the initiative of the President of Chile "for
the purpose of considering the problems related to the natural production oftheir seas, specially, to
whale protection, hunting and industrialization, which are fundamentally connected to the feeding
situation of not only our peoples but also of a large part of humanity". He said that: "It is, thus,
nonnal that in order to preserve their common treasures the concerned Governments carry out a
5
joint action."
34. The emphasis is upon joint action, upon the common resource. It was an affirmation of
regional solidarity in the face of hostility to the 200-mile Latin American claims. Nowhere in his
speech is there the slightest suggestion that the conference would even consider carving up the
-------------------------------·-----------
permanent, international maritime boundaries.
35. It was the Peruvian Ambassador who responded to the Chilean Foreign Minister's
speech, applauding the good sense of the President of Chile in convening a meeting to consider
problems related to natural~produc tteioonthoPacific seas,·and, especially, the protection,
V· hunting and industrialization of whales. He sIld
4
Act of the Inaugural Session, available at <http://cpps.dyndns.info/joomla/index.php?
option=com content&view=article&id=134:acuerdo-santiago-1952&catid=84:conferencias&>temaccessed
22 November2012.
5/bid., pp. 258-259. - 19-
"our meeting is regional, because within the more and more collective general state of
international interests, the regional solidarity of countries, especially interested in a
definite aspect of economical cohabitation, has taken a new force. Their co-operation
and solidarity, in the protection of what constitutes biologically a common heritage,
strengthens the defence of their rights and ensures a fair development of their
resources." 6
There is not the faintest hint of any concern with international maritime boundaries between the
tl1reeStates.
36. But we need not rely upon inferences in order to determine the purpose of the Santiago
Conference. The conference adopted, as part of the same Minutes of the Inaugural Session, a set of
H Rules of Procedure. Chapter 1, Article 1, of those Regulations- it is tab 28, fen tl:l.escreen•
1-\" ~-reads as follows:
"Purpose of the Congress
Art. 1. In accordance with the invitation extended by the Government of Chile
to the Governments of Ecuador and Peru, it was agreed to hold a conference in
Santiago de Chile as from the llth to the 16th of August in order to study and solve
the problems related to the exploitation and conservation of the marine resources of
7
the South Pacific."
37. There then follows a set of Articles whose detail and precision in setting out the powers,
rights and duties of the committees, officers, delegates, and advisers- ali 17of them- would
have satisfied the most exacting functionaries of Byzantium. But there is absolutely nothing about
maritime boundaries, and nothing to indicate the possibility that the conference might consider the
question of maritime boundaries.
38. The conference benefitted from the establishment of two Commissions: the Juridical
Commission, and the Technical Commission. But there was nothing on cartography, nothing on
boundaries. Indeed, the draft of what was called the "declaration on continental shelf and the
waters which cover it" was not drawn up by either Commission: it was presented by Chile, to the
delegates whom ithad invited to this conference on whaling. It is in the Annex 56 to our
Memorial.
6
Act of the Inaugural Session, pp. 260-261.
7/bid., p. 261. - 20-
The drafting of point IV
39. The Ecuadorean chargéd'affaires in Santiago, Mr. Fernandez, was concerned by the Jack
of clarity in pagfChile's draft declarationThe Minutes of the First Sessioof the Juridical
1-1 Commission, Annex 56 to our Memorial, tab 29•[aRàOR tR.esoreea RQ\athrecordhim as saying in
V; relation to draft paragraph 3, which became point IV of the final declaration, that ./
"it would be advisable to clarify more article 3, in order to prevent any
misinterpretation the interference zone in the case of islands, and suggested that the
declaratione drawn on the basis that the boundary Iine of the jurisdictional zone of
each country be the respective parallel from the point at which the borders of the
countries touches or reaches the.
40. The purpose behind the redrafted point IV was "to prevent any misinterpretation of the
interference zone in the case of islands". Full stop! Indeed, a more general reference to the waters
off the coasts of the countries which had appeared in Chile's first draft was actually removed from
the text: point IV was amended so as to make explicit that it applied only to the case of island
territories.
41. How can Chile answer that? How can it explain the amendment of point IV, which it
says established the maritime boundary, so asto omit any reference to mainland coasts? How can
it explain the absence of even a single sentence in the records of the Santiago Conference
indicating that the participating States thought that they were negotiating their maritime
boundaries? And, the lame plea that it was too obvions to need to be stated is as self-serving as it is
absurd.
42. It is simply not credible that, if the parties had thought that they had settled the mainland
- =~~==::~maritime:=bounda ..ieesw:ul. hav:ewlfe:o: racemoL;iLin:the::records:::oLt··
Santiago Conference.
43. Weil, a drafting committee was formed composed of the Peruvian and the Chilean
delegates, who, after considering the Ecuadorian observation, prepared the final draft of point IV of
H the Santiago Declaration.The final text is in tab 301-EGra:f'if poiet I\q1 It is plain and
unequivocal. It applies "in the case of island territories". According to its own terms, it does not
apply anywhere else.
8
MP, Ann. 56. Chile has submitted a revised translation of this document. - 21 -
44. And it applies to the maritime entitlements of islands, saying that those entitlements are
confined by- do not extend beyond- the parallel of the coastal terminus of the land boundary.
The distinction between maritime entitlements and maritime delimitation is weil established in the
Coürt's jurisprudence- for example, in the Black Sea case the Court distinguished between the
entitlement of Serpents' Island to a maritime zone and the effect of the island upon maritime
delimitation9, and the Court followed the same approach more recently in its Nicaragua v.
Colombia Judgment 10•Point IV is concerned with the entitlements of islands.
45. There is documentary evidence that, at that time, Peru and Chile regarded point IV ofthe
Santiago Declaration as applicable only to the case·of islands. The 1955 Report of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of Peru's Congress, Memorial, Annex 96, tab 31, evidences a common
understanding in the parliament that point IV applied only to islandItrefers to the Declaration as
a document defining the international maritime policy of the three signatory countries and says that
paragraph 4 of the Declaration extends the 200-mile zone to their insular territory. And Peru's
Ambassador to Chile recorded in a letter dated 11July 1955, Reply, Annex PR 8, tab 32 in your
bundle, that "The Chilean Government thinks it is not convenient to expressly reserve paragraph 4
of said Declaration- Santiago Declaration- which in fact only applies the delimitation between
the maritime zones of the signatories to the case of islands."
46. The clarificatory text of point IV was the result of Ecuador's initiative. Ecuador has
islands inthe vicinity ofthe land boundary with Peru, and has the group of islands in the Galapagos
~ archipelago. You can see them in tab 33 in your bundle. 1[Grfii3 h ier c.ombined area is
somewhere over 9,500 sq km and their combined population is somewhere over 25,000 people;
and the potential 200-mile maritime zone around the Galapagos had three times the area of the
maritime zone generated by the mainland coast of Ecuador. One can see why Ecuador was
concerned with the question of islands.
47. Chile mentions in its Rejoinder (paragraph 2.71) two small Peruvian rocks, and the
Chilean feature of Alacrân, which is around a third the size of Serpents' Island. Ali of these are
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), I.C.JReports 2009, p. 61, paras. 76,
100, 114, 184-185, 188.
1Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012, paras. 114-130,
139, 163. -22-
immediately adjacent to the coast (Alacran has, in fact, been joined to the mainland by a short
causeway since 1967). The significance of ali of these, and of the other small rocks located a few
metres from the coast, in tenns of maritime entitlements and delimitation, is utterly negligible.
There is no mention of them in the record of the 1952 Conference, and there is no reason to
suppose that point IV was in any way concerned with them.
48. The fact that Chile now brings up this point highlights its desperate position. In its
Counter-Memorial, Chile admitted that "[i]n a factual sense the only islands affected by Article IV
of the Santiago Declaration are Ecuadorean" and it added, apparently without irony, "[b]ut that is a
purely factual matter. It is irrelevant to the proper legal interpretation of Article IV."1 It seems
that sometime after it had submitted its Counter-Memorial Chile realized just how unpersuasive its
attempt to portray point IV as the principle governing- indeed, establishing- the maritime
boundary between Peru and Chile is; and so it now seeks to suggest that point IV should be
applied to sorne minuscule coastal features in Chile and Peru that had never been even mentioned
in connection with point IV during the six decades following the Santiago Declaration.
49. But the purpose of point IV is plain. It contains two provisions, adopted in view of
islands whose maritime projections would have an effect distinct from that of the continental coast
off which they lie. Small coastal features have no such effects; the small Peruvian rocks and the
former coastal island of Alacran have no significant effects distinct from the effect produced by the
mainland coasts of the two States. Point IV is a provision concerned with the entitlement of
islands, and nothing more.
The Santiago Conference in snmmary
50. Let me summarize. In 1952 Chile, acting alone and on its own initiative, invites first
Ecuador, then Peru, to a conference "to conclude agreements regarding the problems caused by
12
whaling in the waters ofthe South Pacifie and the industrialization ofwhale products" ;
51. The hastily-convened conference is attended by small delegations- two people from
Ecuador, five from Peru, ten from the host, Chile- and a draft declaration prepared by Chile is
1CMC, para. 4.16.
12
Note No. 86 of 10 July 1952 from the Ambassador of Chile to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, MP,
Ann. 64. -23-
tabled at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of Monday 11 August. This is revised, and adopted
unanimously by the seven people present-(or more accurately, by those ofthem who bad voting
rights there, the three States)- at a meeting held 24 hours later, at 4 o'clock on Tuesday
12 August.
52. References to "Articles" are stripped out of the text, which refers-in point VI--to "the
principles contained in this Declaration". The Declaration says that it is a declaration of
international maritime policy. The tluee States declare their sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
resources of adjacent waters, emulating the approach taken by the United States in the Truman
Proclamations.
53. Nothing in the Declaration refers to maritime boundaries.
54. On Wednesday l3 August, the Technical Commission met. The following day, the
conference moved into plenary sessions, and what we now refer to as the Santiago Declaration was
among the texts adopted at the closing session on 18 August. The other instruments adopted along
with the Declaration On The Maritime Zone were the Agreement On The Organization Of The
Permanent Commission Of The Conference On The Exploitation And Conservation Of The
Maritime Resources Of The South Pacifie; the Joint Declaration On Fishery Problems In The
South Pacifie; and the Regulations For Maritime Hunting Operations (of Whales) In The Waters
OfThe South Pacific 13:-Ali ofthese, too, bad occupied the time and the attention of the handful of
delegates during that week. Ali the instruments underline the technical focus of the conference, on
the management ofwhaling and fishing.
55. At the Final Working Session, the Ecuadorean delegate said that it was unlikely that the
V· current government of Ecuador would V
"engage in definitive agreements at this time, not only because they are related with
topics of which its Government has not had a chance to have prior deep knowledge,
but also because for an outgoing Government that must hand over the Presidency in
just a few days to the legitimate successor, it is only natural that it wishes to give such
a sensitive responsibility to the new Presidentf the Republic".
13
See<http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=trlineage&lineage=Permanent%20Com…%
20Pacific >, accessed 18 October 2012. -24-
That passage appears on the website of the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific 1,and in
tab 34 ofyour bundle. It is an eloquent insight into the nature of the exercise.
56. This is the process that Chile would have you believe led to a binding legal agreement
between States fixing international boundaries between the three States. This is the process by
which Chile says that Peru casually and silently signed away its rights to ali of the waters of its
200-mile maritime zone south ofthe parallel.
57. But, on any reasonable reading, its plain that the Declaration on the Maritime Zone is
an initial step, a manifesto. It is not a self-executing instrument. Point VI declares that "for the
applicationofthe principles contained in [the] declaration", the participating States intend "to sign
agreements or conventions which shall establish general norms" to regulate and protect hunting and
fishing within their maritime zones.
58. The Court may wish to look again at Annex 91 to the Memorial, the instructions given by
Peru's Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chairman of Peru's delegation for the signing of the
Santiago Declaration: that gives a very clear picture of what Peru thought it was subscribing to. It
is tab 35 in your bundle. It contains no reference whatsoever to maritime boundaries. Indeed, in its
final paragraph it emphasizes that the Santiago Declaration is not a declaration of sovereignty out
to 200 miles, but is concerned with control measures "without implying full exercise of
sovereignty". Can anyone reading that document think for a moment that it is credible that the
Peruvian delegate was being instructed to sign a maritime boundary agreement? It is simply not
credible.
--5 9 ~d the Court may wish to look again at !!1 Tej~artite Act of 12 AgrilJ 95__,n_yvhich~-~-
Ecuador, Peru and Chile agree on the observations concerning the Declaration of Santiago that they
will transmit to the United States and the United Kingdom- that is Memorial, Annex 58, tab 36,
in your bundle.
1Act of the Final Working Session Celebratedby the JuridicaAffairsCommission during 14
and 16 August 1952, available at http://cpps.dyndns.info/joomla/index.php?optiocontent&view=
article&ide=134:acuerdo-santiago-1952&catid=84:conferencias&Itemid= 16> accessed012. - 25-
No evidence supports Chile's claim
60. Mr. President, there is not a shred of evidence that either of the delegates from Ecuador,
or any of the five from Peru, thought that they were being invited to a negotiation over the settling
of international maritime boundaries. And there is not a shred of evidence that when they Ieft
Santiago they thought that they hadjust fixed their international maritime boundaries.
61. Tellingly, there is nothing in the contemporaneous writings of jurists in Peru, or in Chjle,
that indicates that they considered that an international maritime boundary between the two States
had been fixed in 1952.
62. Nor is there any official contemporaneous document from Peru, or from Chile, that
suggests that a maritime boundary had been fixed. Chile's case is almost that the States must have
agreed on a boundary in their sleep, and woken up years Iater to realize the fact. But the argument
is absurd. A domestic court would scarcely infer the existence of an agreement to buy a
second-band car on the basis of the evidence that Chile has put forward. How much Jess should a
court find that two international maritime boundaries were concluded on the basis of this evidence.
CONCLUSION
63. Chile has had two rounds ofwritten pleadings in which it could have presented you with
evidence that Peru and Chile agreed upon a permanent, all-purpose maritime boundary in
August 1952. It has presented you with nothing. Instead, it has scraped through the record to find
every reference to a Iine or a parallel or a zone or a boundary, and has tried to convince you in its
vague and shifting pleadings that its montage of clippings somehow reveals a picture of a solemn
agreement between the Governments of two sovereign States to fix a permanent international
maritime boundary between them, extending over the high seas, for 200 miles from the shore. A
maritime boundary separating zones unrecognized- opposed even- by the overwhelming
majority of States in the world at that time, and having no basis in international law as it stood at
thattime.
64. Peru is confident that the Court will not slacken its grip on the principles and the criteria
that are applicable in this area. Agreement upon an international maritime boundary is not
something that one does inadvertently, accidentally. There are enough unsettled maritime
boundaries around the world, between actual or putative or potential States, for this to be a matter -26-
of continuing seriousness, and for the Court to adhere to the standards that it has set. Boundaries
are important things.If a State asserts that there is an agreement on a maritime boundary, it must
prove it. In our submission, Mr. President, Chile has not done so and cannot do so.
Unless I can help you further, Mr.resident, that brings my part of the submission to a close
and I would ask you to cali onir Michael Wood.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir. I give the tloor to Sir Michael Wood to continue. You
have the tloor.
Sir Michael WOOD:
CHILE'S RELlANCE UPON EVENTS BETWEEN 1954 AND THE 1970S
1. Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I shall now address Chile's arguments based on
what ittenns the "practice" of the Parties between 1954 and the 1970s. By referring to "practice"
Chile seeks to convey the impression of an overall pattern that, in its view, "confirms" the
existence of an agreement dating from 1952, an agreement set forth, according to Chile's lawyers,
in point IV of the Santiago Declaration. In their own words, "Chile's case is that Chile and Peru
fully and conclusively delimited their maritime entitlements in the Santiago Declaration of 1952."
Since, as Professer Lowe has just shown, this is not supported by the text of the Santiago
Declaration, Chile clearly feels the need to bolster its case by referring to a number of
. -·--··---·--··misc~lla nvents.sButyQJ!Qfl.nn_o_tç_onfir_m_Qrj_nt~rp.reLaJ _l.Qil=.exisJenLd.t:JJimitation_treatyJ:!JJ_tht:L
basis of so-called practice.
2. Even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that a uniform and consistent
practice could "confirm" an international maritime boundary not present in the text of 1952-
something we do not accept- the disparate materials invoked by Chile show nothing of the kind.
Chi le has not begun to show a consistent pattern of uniform practice, of the two States, that would
"confirm" that which is not otherwise there.
15
CMC, para4.1. - 27-
3. There is a common thread in Chile's arguments: by picking on loose and varied
terminology used in essentially technical contexts, Chile seeks to show that, in 1952, Peru and
Chile were ad idem as to the existence of an all-purpose maritime boundary agreement. But
however one looks at the so-called "evidence" relied upon by Chile, and however much it piles
supposed "example" on "example", when you examine it carefully, the house of cards collapses.
Chile's references to document after document, whether taken individually or together, are wholly
unconvincing. They fail to establish, and the onus is on Chile, that Peru and Chile concluded an
international maritime boundary agreement in 1952.
4. Chile's sole claim regarding the practice that it cites is that itfirms" a boundary from
1952. As we understand it, Chile has not and does not claim that this practice establishes a tacit
agreement. Nor does Chile, as we understand it, assert that the subsequent "practice" has somehow
modified the 1952 Declaration- it will anyway be recalled that a proposed article providing for
16
modification by subsequent practice was heavily defeated at the Vienna Conference in 1968 •
5. Great caution is required when looking at practice in order to confirm or establish
boundary agreements, in particular international maritime boundary agreements. The situation in
H in the present case is like that described by a Chamber ofthis Court in its 1992 Judgment~t Laed,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute case:
"[W]hile both customary law and the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties
(Art. 31, para. 3 (b)) contemplate that such practice may be taken into account for
purposes of interpretation, none of these considerations raised by Honduras can
prevail over the absence from the text of any specifie reference to delimitation. In
considering the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty, it is
appropriate to compare them with the terms gener17ly or commonly used in order to
convey the idea that a delimitation is intended."
6. During the period with which 1 am vdealing, from 1954 to the 1970s, the supposed
"subsequent practice" relied upon by Chile is to be found in a disjointed series of points. I shall
address them in turn. First, I shall look at what Chile has to say about the 1954 Agreement on a
Special Maritime Frontier Zone. Next I shall look at a series of miscellaneous elements between
1954 and 1967. Third, I shall consider what Chile has to say about the events of 1968/69
1United Nations, Official Records of the Conference on the Law of TreatiesFirst Session, Vienna,
26 Mar-24 May 1968,Vol. II, p. 215.
1Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening)I.C.J.ment,
Reports 1992p. 586, para. 380. -28-
concerning the "coastal lights". Then, 1 shall say a few words about Chile's own conduct, about
which Chileis remarkably reticent. And finally 1shaHtouch on the argument Chile seeks to make
based on its 1976 negotiations with Bolivia over access to the sea.
II. The 1954 Agreement on a Special Zone
7. 1 shall first deal with the two strands of Chile's arguments concerning the 1954
Agreement: the tenusof the Agreement itself; and the minutes of the Conference at which it was
adopted.
The Terms of the 1954 Agreement on a Special Zone
8. The text of the Agreement was adopted on 4 December 1954, at the Second Conference
on Exploitation and Conservationhe Marine Resources of the South Pacifie, held in Lima. The
main purposeof the 1954 Conference, Iikethat of 1952, which Mr. Lowe has just described, was to
reinforce regional solidarityhe face of opposition from third States to the 200-mil• claims
This is apparent from the very title of the conference, and from the fact that it was convened as a
follow-up to the 1952 Conference. The purpose of the conference was also clear from the main
instruments that were adopted, chief among which was the Complementary Convention to the
19
Declaration ofSovereignty on the Two-Hundred-Mile Maritime •
H V. 9. As this Court pointed out in RomaniaHUkraine, it is important to ascertain the purpose of
an agreement before drawing inferences as to its possible relevance to a delimitation dispute,
particularly when one side argues thatreement concluded many years before has the effect of
~···-----~---.--··----------··----------~-------------------~---------------~----------------------------
-~-----~-~ i-gJi~-g~~o'_~agnective_renunQiation"_Q[m ~ rlmittmotUj.tig_hmck (Mqar_i~time
1-1 (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2009, p. 88, para. 71t :MP4.98). The Agreement
on a Special Zone was by no means the most important agreement to be concluded at the
1954 Conference. Indeedt seems to have been something of an afterthought. The issue was only
20
added to the agenda late the day, at the October preparatory confereIts limited purpose
was to avert disputes involving artisanal fishermen on small vessels fishing near to the coast.
18
MP,paras4.82-4.87; para4.5, 4.9-4.10.
19
RP, Ann. 33.
2
°CMC, Anns. 35 and 36. -29-
1O.The 1954 Agreement seems to have had minimal effect in practice. Chile did not ratizy it
until 1967. It did not come into force until September 1967. And as is clear from its first article,
which begins "A special zone is hereby established, at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the
coast", the special zone established by the Agreement did not apply to fishing within the first
12 miles of the coast, which is where most coastal fishing took place. In fact, the small boats to
which the Agreement applied did not in practice venture more than a few miles beyond 12 miles.
It is, in this regard, significant that the incidents referred to in detail by Chile took place weil within
12 miles ofthe coast.)
11. Thus, the 1954 Agreement was a practical arrangement, of a technical nature, and of
limited geographical scope, not one dealing in any sense with political matters. This explains the
use of the parallel to identizy the "zone of tolerance", which could be identified by fishermen
without high-end technology. The zone was, to adopt the words of Article 74 of the Law of the Sea
Convention, a "provisional arrangement of a practical nature". And, as the Law of the Sea
Convention says, such arrangements are "without prejudice to the final delimitation". Moreover,
the zone was not depicted on maps. The Agreement contains no reference to the geographical
extent of the special zone out to sea. There is no mention anywhere in the Agreement of a special
zone extending out to sea for 200 nautical miles. The zone was only ever envisaged as relevant for
a short distance beyond 12 miles, where shore-based fishermen fished. It is wholly anachronistic to
think of this practical arrangement of a provisional nature, made in 1954, as applying throughout
a 200-mile fisheries zone or EEZ, let alone to the continental shelf.
12. Mr. President, may 1 ask you to turn to the text of the 1954 Agreement' , which can be
found at tab 37 in the folders? It will readily be seen that the aim of the Agreement was specifie
and narrow. The first preambular paragraph, immediately following the words "Considering that"
sets the scene:
"Experience has shown that innocent and inadvertent violations of the maritime
frontier between adjacent States occur frequently because small vessels manned by
crews with insufficient knowledge of navigation or not equipped with the necessary
instruments have difficulty in determining accurately their position on the high seas;"
21
MP,Ann.50. -30-
13. The reference to "the maritime frontier" is merely an acknowledgment that there would
of course in principle be a division of the inshore waters as between any adjacent States. It does
not imply that an agreed delimitation was in place. The preamble concludes by affirming that the
purpose of the Agreement is "to avoid the occurrence of such unintentional infringements, the
consequences ofwhich affect principally the fishermen".
14. Paragraph 1 contains the subordinate clause, upon which Chile places such weight and to
which 1shaH return in a minute. The paragraph reads:
"A special zone is hereby established, at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the
coast, extending to a breadth of 10 nautical miles on either side of the parallel which
constitutes a maritime boundary [el limite maritimo] between the two countries."
15. The main operative provision ofthe Agreement is its paragraph 2. You will see this now
on the screen. It reads as follows:
"The accidentai presence in the said zone of a vesse! of either of the adjacent
countries, which is a [small vessel manned by a crew with insufficient knowledge of
navigation or not equipped with the necessary instruments], shall not be considered to
be a violation of the waters of the maritime zone, though this provision shall not be
construed as recognizing any right to engage, with deliberate intent, in hunting or
fishing in the said special zone."
16. As you will see, ali that paragraph 2 says is that the acc·identalpresence in the special
zone of small fishing vessels shall not be considered a violation. It is not a fisheries agreement. It
says nothing whatsoever about the right to fish in particular waters.
17. Paragraph 3 of the Agreement deals with a quite separate matter, fishing or hunting for
whales within 12 miles of the coast, which is reserved exclusively to the nationals of each country.
----~=====.t8;ParagraphAconfirms:·:that;:Jikethe:otheragreements~concluded~ilL195A;=the=Agreement
is "deemed to be an integral and supplementary part of, and not in any way to abrogate" the work
ofthe 1952 Conference.
19. Mr. President, Chile's legal arguments based on the 1954 Agreement are difficult to
grasp. At one point, relying on paragraph 4, it claims that the 1954 Agreement is not merely- in
its view- a subsequent agreement relevant to the interpretation of the Santiago Declaration, but is - 31 -
so closely related to the Santiago Declaration asto be "deemed to be an integral and supplementary
part" of if2• Elsewhere, it asserts that the two have to be "read together" 23•
20. But the essence of Chile's argument seems to be that the final words of paragraph 1 of
the Agreement- "the parallel which constitutes a maritime boundary between the two
countries"- established an agreement among the States that issued the 1952 Declaration
regarding its interpretation, specifically, according to Chile, their agreement that the Declaration,
despite its silence on the matter, established an all-purpose maritime boundary along a parallel of
latitude out to 200 miles and even beyond.
21. Mr. President, Chile's argument is untenable:
First, because of the strictly limited object and purpose of the 1954 Agreement, and its very
limited application in practice. It would have been extraordinary if, in the text of a technical
agreement establishing practical arrangements to assist inshore local fishermen, the negotiators
had included language confirming the existence of an all-purpose maritime boundary
agreement out to 200 nautical miles, an agreement that had never previously been written
down.
Second, the reference to "the parallel which constitutes a maritime boundary" is in the specifie
context of an ad hoc, provisional and practical arrangement aimed at avoiding conflicts
involving artisanal fishermen. The parallel was a simple and easily located point of reference
for such fishermen. As paragraph 2 makes clear, the arrangement did no more than absolve
fishermen from sanctions if they accidently wandered into the zone of tolerance. Paragraphs 1
and 2 of the Agreement were not intended to deal with anything else.
Third, there is nothing in the language of the 1954 Agreement that reflects the intention of the
parties to agree an all-purpose international maritime boundary. Once again, Chile asks you to
read into the textthat which is not there.
4
22. Chile also seeks to reli on the wording of an aclaraci6n- clarification- adopted by
the Conference on the same day as the 1954 Agreement. This stated that "accidentai presence"
2CMC, para.4,6.
23
/bid., paras.4.1, 4. 24.
2/bid., paras.2.210,4.17. -32-
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of the Agreement "will be qualified exclusively by the
25
authoritiesof the country whose maritime jurisdictional boundary would have been passed" • The
use here of the term "maritime jurisdictional boundary" is to be understood in the context of the
practical arrangement that the Parties had reachedin the 1954 Agreement. For that arrangement,
they employed a parallel of latitude only as a reference point to create a zone of tolerance which
began 12 miles from the coast.
23. Neither the expression "maritime jurisdictional boundary", nor the clarification as such,
could transform the abject and plll·poseexpressly stated in the preamble to the 1954 Agreement
into something else. Nor could the clarification add provisions to, or otherwise modify, the
Agreement. It simply served to clarify which State was to determine that there had been an
"accidentai presence" in connection with the zone of tolerance. Nothing in the clarification
supports Chile's assertion thatthere already existed an all-purpose maritime boundary.
B. Minutes of Commission 1of the 1954 Conference
24. 1 now tum to Chile's arguments based on the minutes of Commission 1 of the
1954 Con~rence"J
8-51Chile's heavy reliance upon the minutes is revealing. lt is surely an admission that the
J2.s. textof the Agreement is far from supporting Chile's casejfhe minutes are not verbatim records
far from it. They are not even what, in the United Nations, would be termed summary records.
They simply note particular points that arasein the course of the Conference. They do not purport
...togivea.fhll andaccurate picture.ofalLthattranspired ..Their.value,ifanyisstrictlylimited.~~···
on 2 December 1954, in connection with the consideration of a quite different agreement, the
Complementary Convention- a Convention, incidentally, which Chile never ratified.
27. According to Chile, in its Rejoinder: "[i]n the course of negotiating the
1954 Complementary Convention and the 1954 Agreement ... , Chile, Ecuador and Peru agreed
25CMC, Ann. 40, p. 12.
26
/bid., Ann. 38. - 33-
that they had already delimited their maritime boundaries in 1952" 27• Chile continues "[t]his is a
point offundamental importance to these proceedings" 28•
28. Mr. President, this may be a fundamental point for Chile's efforts, in its Rejoinder, to
conjure up a maritime boundary agreement dating from 1952. It is also a fundamentally flawed
("') point. Chile invokes Article 31.3Yaf the Vienna Convention, which refers to "any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty ... ". They then say that the
alleged agreement "is an authentic interpretation of Article IV, of equal value and status to a joint
interpretative declaration or protocol" 2• In the Counter-Memorial the point is dealt with under the
h ea mg o travaux preparatozres . . 30 And a passing reference to estoppel is thrown in for good
31
measure •
29. But what Chile now claims, in its Rejoinder, and it is a very bold claim, is-
" .," \Y...l.:c:.>first, that the minutes show that in 1954 the delegates in Commission I understood that an
,---------~
all-purpose international maritime boundary was established by point IV of the Santiago
Declaration; and
second, that this supposed understanding amounted to a "subsequent agreement" regarding the
interpretation of point IV of the Santiago Declaration, within the meaning of the Vienna
Convention, to the effect that, notwithstanding its actual tenns, point IV embodied such an
agreement.
x 30. Chile's claims are unpersuasive. What emerges from a reading of the minute isthe fact
that the delegate of Ecuador was hoping to secure an agreement to extend point IV of the Santiago
Declaration, so that the principle stated therein was no longer confined to the maritime entitlement
of islands. The delegates of Chile and Peru, on the other band, were not prepared to accept any
extension of point IV, which for them was clear and satisfactory in scope, being confined to
islands.
27
RC, 2.87.
28RC, 2.88.
29Ibid.
3°CMC, paras.4.47-4.51.
31Jbid.para.4.51. - 34-
32
31. As we explained in our Reply ,the actual exchange between the delegates, as recorded
in the minutes, is anything but clear. You will find the minutes at tab 39 in the folders. In its
33
Rejoinder ,Chile draws attention to the fact that the delegate of Ecuador is recorded as having
moved "for the inclusion in [the Complementary Convention] of a complementary article clarifying
the concept of the dividing line of the jurisdictional sea, which had already been expounded at the.
34
Conference of Santiago, but which would not be redundant to repeat here" . Note that he referred
1-1 1/l< to clarifying a"concept"; he referred to that "concept" asthe~o oflltce eivpint Iine of the
jurisdictionalsea"; and he said it had already been "expounded" at the 1952 Conference. The
delegate of Ecuador did not refer to point IV of the Santiago Declaration. The tenn "the dividing
line of the jurisdictional sea" is scarcely an apt description of an all-purpose international maritime
boundary, covering sea-bed, subsoil, and water-column and ali the uses thereof. Chile's
explanation of the vagueness of the language amounts to nothing more than an assertion that the ·
1-1 numerous terms that occur in the minutesl>"iwere used interchangeably to refer to the maritime
boundary between the maritime zones of sovereignty and jurisdiction claimed by the three States in
the Santiago Declaration"35• That is a wholly unconvincing explanation.
32. There is a related paragraph in the minutes that Chile is careful not to cite. It is the
statement by the Chilean chairman of the Commission and it is quite revealing. 1quote:
"Since the Delegate of Ecuador insists on his belief that a declaration to that
effect should be included in the [Complementary] Convention, because Article 4 of
the Declaration of Santiago is aimed at establishing the principle of delimitation of
waters regarding the islands, Mr. PRESIDENT asks the Delegate of Ecuador if he
would accept, instead of a new article, that a record is in the Minutes of his
33. This statement by the Chilean Chairman reflects the actual tenns of point IV of the
Santiago Declaration. Point IV was indeed "aimed at establishing the principle of delimitation or
entitlementof waters regarding the islands"- only a principle, and regarding islandonly islands.
32
RP, paras. 4.13-4.18.
3RC, paras. 2.94-2.95.
3CMC, Ann. 38, p. 3 (revised translation submitted by Chile, 16 Nov. 2012).
35
RC, para. 2.91.
36
CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 38, p. 3; emphasis added. - 35-
34. Before leaving the minutes, 1 should draw attention to something else that Chile has
conveniently omitted to mention. At the first meeting of Commission 1,on 2 December 1954, the
Secretary of the Permanent Commission, Mr. Ruiz of Chile, placed on record that ali the
agreements signed at Lima, like those done at Santiago two years earlier, were subject to unilateral
withdrawal 37• That would have been extraordinary had it been thought that in 1952 the
participating States had concluded an international maritime boundary agreement. Treaties
establishing a boundary are the classic example of those which, by their nature, are not subject to
8
unilateral withdrawae •
III. Chile's reliance upon miscellaneous events between 1954 and 1968
35. Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 shall next turn to some miscellaneous events
between 1954 and 1968, relied upon by Chile.
A. The 1955 Supreme Resolution
39
36. First, Peru's Supreme Resolution of 12 January 1955 • Chile attaches much importance
to this in its Rejoinder 40,claiming that it confirms "the understanding that a maritime boundary was
in place between [Peru and Chile], on the basis of Article IV of the Santiago Declaration" 41• You
will find the Supreme Resolution at tab 40 in the folders.
37. Mr. President, this is yet another example of Chile giving more weight to, and reading
more into, an instrument than is justified by the text or the surrounding circumstances. A short
answer is that the Resolution cannot have "confirmed" any such understanding because, as we have
seen, there was none.
38. The need for clear cartography had become apparent as a result of the Onassis incident of
42
October 1954 , which had raised the issue ofthe precise outer limit ofPeru's 200-mile zone. That
was the reason for the 1955 Resolution. Not at issue were lateral delimitations.
3CMC, Vol. II, Ann. 38, p. 4 (complete translation submitted by Chile, 16 Nov. 2012).
38
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 251 (commentary (3) to draft Art. 53).
39
MP, Ann. 9.
40
RC, paras. 3.3-3.1O.
41
RC, para.3.2 (a).
42
MP, paras. 4.83-4.85. - 36-
39. Let us look at the text of the Resolution- it is at tab 40.
40. The preamble makes it clear that the Resolution is an instruction to the Peruvian
authorities responsible for cartographie and geodesie work. It recalls that it is necessary, in such
work, to specizy "the manner of determining the Peruvian maritime zone of 200 miles" referred to
in the 1947 Supreme Decree and the Santiago Declaration.
41. Paragraph 1then determines what that manner is. It describes the arcs-of-circles method,
1-i Il\ using language similar to that~Peru 19'52 Petroleum Law ("a tine parallel to the Peruvian coast
and at a constant distance of 200 nautical miles from it").
42. Paragraph 2 then resolves that
"[i]n accordance with clause IV of the Declaration of Santiago, the said line [that is to
say, the line parallel to the coast that is the outer limit of the 200-mile zone] may not
extend beyond that of the corresponding parallel at the point where the frontier ofPeru
reaches the sea".
43. There are a number of points to make about the Resolution:
First, within Peru's legal system a Supreme Resolution- despite its name- is low in the
hierarchy of legal norms 43• It is not an instrument to set forth the high policy of the State. The
Resolution was essentially an internai administrative instruction addressed to the relevant
Peruvian authorities.
Second, the purpose of the Resolution was narrow and technical- to determine, for the
purposes of the geodesie work of the Peruvian authorities, and for no other purpose, the precise
outer limit of the 200-mile "maritime zone" referred to in the 1947 Supreme Decree and the
------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------
establish the outer limit of the 200-mile "zone" vis-à-vis foreign whaling and fishing fleets.
Third, the Resolution contains no provision to the effect that !ines had to be shawn along the
parallels. If Peru had already established its lateral maritime boundaries along the parallels, the
Resolution would surely have provided that the !ines were to be drawn along parallels of
latitude corresponding to the land terminus with Ecuador and Chile. But it did not. Thus, no
44
perimeter was referred to in the Resolution, contrary to Chile's assertion •
4MP, p. 64, footnote 78.
4RC, para. 3.3. - 37-
Fourth, the chief purpose of the Resolution was to sas was already the case with
the Petroleum Law-the arcs-of-circles method should be used, in cartographie and geodesie
work, to establish the outer limit00-mile zone.
Fifth, ali that paragraph 2 did was to say where, and again I stress, in cartographie and geodesie
work, the depiction of the 200-mile outer limit line ("the said line") should end. It said nothing
about lateral maritime boundaries between Peru and its neighbours.
Sixth, paragraph 2 refers to point IV of the Santiago Declaration, which was only concerned
with the limits of the "maritime zone" in the vicinity of islands. A paragraph in a domestic
resolution could not change that, even if it had purportwhich it did not. Thus
paragraph 2 had no bearing on the maritime boundary between Chile and Peru.
(~e.cf A'Bi-h"vesa-d,thasolespurpose of the 1955 Resolution was to determine a method for
cartographie and geodesie work. It is therefore significant that at no stage did Peru's official
maps, before or after the Resolution, show boundaries along the lines of parallel, as would have
been expected ifChile's interpretation were correct.
B. Protocol of Accession to the Santiago Declaration (1955)
44. 1 now turn to the Protocol of Acto the Santiago Declaration, which was signed
on 6 October 1955. The purpose ofthe Protocol was to enable other American countries to accept
the "fundamental principles" and "norms" contained in the Declaration of Santiago. In fact, the
Protocol was never used; indeed, it never came into force.
45. The Protocol omitted point IV from the provisions to which other countries could accede.
The Parties have debated the significance of the submission at sorne length in the written
46
pleadings•
46. There is nothing, nothing in the negotiating history of the Protocol of Accession that
"confirms" a pre-existing all-purpose international maritime boundary between Peru and Chile.
The exclusion of point IV certainly did not do so. Moreover, Chile ignores the terms of its own
memorandum of 14 August 1955 to Ecuador regarding the draft•PIn that memorandum,
45
MP, Ann. 52.
4MP, 4.109; CMC, 3.121-3.126; RP, 4.55-4.59; RC, 3.11-3.15.
4CMC, Ann. 71. -38-
Chile refrained from referring to a maritime boundary that runs along a parallel, but was rather
careful to refer, more vaguely, to "the principle of the Parallel stipulated in the Declaration of
48
Santiago" as inapplicable to other countries. This refers to a method contained in point IV that, in
principle, could be used in the case of islands, not to any existing agreement regarding a boundary.
C. Fishing and whaling
47. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, Chile next tries to rely on its own proposais for an
"agreement that was not memorialized" with Peru in 1954-1955 49,and for a 100-mile-wide zone of
50
tolerance in 1961 • Neither proposa! led to an agreement.
48. According to Chile, in the first case the internai documents that Chile has presented to
the Court demonstrate both States' "understanding that their maritime zones had been delimited".
They do nothing of the kind. They show that Chile proposed to Peru a secret arrangement that
would have allowed their respective fishing companies to undertake "fishing activities within the
territorial waters contiguous to the Provinces of Tarapaca and Antofagasta in Chile, and the
51
Departments of Tacna and Arequipa in Peru" • There is no reference to an agreed maritime
boundary.
49. In the 1961 case, according to Chile, the Parties "confirmed ... the existence of a
'frontier line' dividing their respective maritime zones". In fact, Chile proposed to accept tolerance
of fishing by certain vessels "in the zone of maritime jurisdiction of both countries along the area
52
comprised between 50 miles to the North and to the South of the Chile-Peru frontier" • Again, the
Chile makes much of fishing incidents, which it tries to use to construct an implied boundary line,
again in the absence of any explicit facts to support its case. Chile asserts that these fishing
48
CMC, Ann. 71; emphasis added.
49CMC, para. 3.9.
50/bid.paras. 3.10-3.11.
51/bid.Ann. 114.
52/bid.Ann. 72. -39-
incidents show that "Peru was ready and willing to defend, by use of force if necessary, the
53
dividing Iines of the maritime zones [of Chile and Peru]" •
51. Chile tries to paint a picture whereby Peruvian communications regarding fishery
incidents recognize the existence of an all-purpose maritime boundary. Yet the language actually
used did no such thing. For example, the Peruvian memorandum to Chile following the
Diez Canseco incident in 1966, which took place very close inshore and not far from the
Peru-Chile land boundary, referred to "the frontier Iine", not to any international maritime
boundary 54• What is clear is that, in the Diez Canseco incident, the matter of concern was
unlicensed Chilean fishing in waters that would fall in Peru's territorial sea under both Parties'
present claims. Peru was fully entitled to enforce its laws in maritime areas that were undisputedly
within itsjurisdiction, even in the absence of a maritime boundary agreement.
52. In fact, ali the incidents referred to by Chile which took place prior to the establishment
of the coastal lights in 1968-1969, and which are referred to in the communications over fishing,
occurred in close proximity to the coast, and no more than a few miles from the land boundary
terminus. They have no relevance to a maritime boundary running along a parallel out to
200 nautical miles or even further 55• What the incidents do is to confirm that the installation of the
coastallights was meant to serve a very specifie purpose.
IV. 1968/1969 arrangements concerning coastallights
53. This brings me to another of the elements relied upon by Chile: the arrangements in
1968/1969 concerning coastallights.
54. Chile asserts, in the Rejoinder, that
"the contemporaneous records, in particular the 1968 Minutes and the 1969 Act ...
show ... that the Parties considered that a maritime boundary already existed and that
they were agreeing to erect the lighthouses to signal that pre-existing maritime
boundary" 56•
53
RC, para. 3.55.
54CMC, Ann. 75.
55CMC, Vol. VI, Appendix ("Peruvian Vessels Captured in Chilean Waters").
56RC, para. 2.130. -40-
55. Mr. President, that argument suffers from the same defects as those which I have just
considerThe lights were a practical arrangement for a very specifie purpose, to facilitate the
orientation of small local fishing vessels within a few miles of the coast, which for very practical
reasons took as a reference the parallel passinNo~1. It was notry marker
necessary, for that purpose, to take as a reference Pointnow seeks to
use this practical arrangement for inshore fishing boats to confirm an all-purpose maritime
boundary extending out toChile seeks to enlist the imprecise and non-technical
language found in certain documents to bolster its argument, in particular the use of expressions
Iike "maritime frontier" or "maritime boundary". These terms, used indifferently, do not indicate
"a definitive, all-purpose maritime bounda•yAnd they do not indicatets
that those who used them considered that point IV of the Santiago Declaration constituted an
international maritime boundary agreement, as Chile would have you believe. Moreover, none of
the 1968-69 documents refers in any way to the Santiago Declaration or the 1954 Agreement. The
arrangement on the lights was unconnected with those two instruments.
56. In arder correctly to identify the effects of the arrangements of 1968-69 concerning the
coastal lights, one must take into account the original agreement of the two States for setting them
up. That agreement contains a clear mandate of the two States, provides the context for what was
being agreed, and establishes the abject and purposeote from Peru's Ministry
t-ecl of Foreign Affairs of 6 February 1968 expressly mentiorn,.that "on the basis of the meeting held in
Lima" by representatives of the two States, it was convenient to build "posts or signs ... at the
---~--~-~=~-==poii1!-~t~~ tniea!ei_rtno~_lcotmmd~nfoo:-dli~rke~!___e
response was in si•ilar terms
61
57. The Peruvian Memorandum of 24 further clarifies that there was a
"signaling issue in the boundary close to Boundary Marker number 1" and that it was necessary
that the signaling "could be sighted from the sea" and "could be perfectly visible several miles off
57
RP,para.2.86.
5RCpar2. 145.
5MP,Ann.71.
6MP,Ann.72.
6RP, Ann. 10. -41-
the coasts". It is clear that this signaling arrangement had nothing to do with establishing a
maritime boundary or signaling a pre-existing maritime boundary. The concern of the two States
was to signal a point on land, visible by small fishing boats from the sea, "near" or "close" to
boundary marker No. 1 which, I note in passing, they recognized was not the terminus of the land
boundary.
58. Mr. President, Chile devotes a long passage in its Rejoinder to explaining that 'the lights
were to signal the maritime boundary, not the land boundary' 62• In doing so, they distort what
Peru, and Ambassador Pérezde Cuéllar 63, were saying. They were not, of course, saying that the
lights were not intended to assist small fishing boats, close to the coast, to locate themselves at sea.
What they were saying was that they did this by reference to a point on land 64•
59. In any case, this debate started by Chile is beside the point. What matters is the nature of
the arrangement. It is clear beyond doubt that the "lighthouses were constructed as a practical
solution for a specifie purpose" which concerned small fishing vessels, as Chile accepts 65, for a
short distance out to sea, and nothing more. The lights, and the correspondence that refers to them,
had no purpose or subject-matter other than that. Above ali, they did not and could not have the
purpose or effect of confirming a pre-existing all-purpose international maritime boundary
agreement extending to 200 nautical miles, and dating from 1952.
V. Chile's conduct
60. I now turn to Chile's conduct during the period in question. Chile says very little about
its own conduct, and one can understand why. Chile's conduct does not help its case.
A. No mention of a maritime boundary in Cbile's legislation
61. The absence of an agreed maritime boundary is evident from Chile's internallegislation.
In 1953, for example, Chile adopted a decree which defined the maritime jurisdiction of its
62
RC, paras. 2.132-2.144.
6RP, Vol. II, App. B.
6MP, Ann. 73.
6CMC, para. 3.6. See a1soRC, paras. 2.146-2.147. -42-
Directorate General of Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine 66 • No mention was made of an
existing maritime boundary with Peru in fixing the limits of the Directorate's maritime jurisdiction.
62. ln 1954, Chile submitted the Santiago Declaration to its Congress for approval, in a
7
Presidential Messagé • Once again, there was no indication that the Declaration had established a
maritime boundary- an omission which is inconceivable if Chile thought at the time that the
Declaration bad delimited what it now contends was "a comprehensive and complete boundary
68
between the Parties" •
63. Later in 1954, Chile enacted a Supreme Decree approving the Santiago Declaration. The
Decree was published in Chile's Official Gazette. Nowhere was it mentioned that the Declaration
69 70
had dealt with the establishment of maritime boundaries • In fact, the published version omitted
point IV of the Declaration, and was only corrected a year later. That omission might be thought
somewhat surprising if point IV had indeed established a maritime boundary, as Chile now claims.
64. In 1959, Chile's Ministry of Agriculture issued a decree concerning the regulation of
permits for foreign fishing vessels operating within its territorial waters 71• Once again, there was
no mention of a maritime boundary with Peru. A similar decree, issued in 1963, applied to Chile's
200-mile maritime zone; but it too did not refer to any existing maritime boundary with Peru for
purposes of identifying areas within which permits were required 72•
65. For the sake of completeness, 1 would just recall that, as we explained in the Reply 73,
there is no reference to an international maritime boundary in any Peruvian legislation. This is so
despite Chile's strenuous attempts to argue otherwise, and to interpret Peru's legislation differently
6MP, Ann. 29.
6MP, Ann. 92.
6CMC, para. 1.9.
6RP, para. 3.121.
70Supreme Decree No. 432: MP, Ann. 30.
7CMC, Ann. 117.
7MP, Ann. 31.
7RP, para. 4.92, fn. 465. -43-
B. Chile's 1964 legal opinion
66. Mr. President, I now turn to the Bazan legal opinion 74• This, you will recall, was given in
September 1964 by the Legal Adviser to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the request of
the Borders Directorate. Both the fact that a request was made and the legal opinion indicate that,
in 1964, twelve years after the Santiago Declaration, there was great uncertainty in Chile over the
existence of, and the legal basis for, an agreement between Peru and Chile on their maritime
boundary.
67. In his opinion, the Legal Adviser said that he believed "that it is possible to state that
75
such an agreement exists" - "it is possible to state ... ". At the same time, he noted that point IV
of the Santiago Declaration "does not constitute an express pact for determining the lateral
76
boundary of the respective territorial seas" • Likewise, the Legal Adviser noted that Article 1 of
the 1954 Agreement "does not involve a pact whereby the parties have established their maritime
boundaries" 77• He concedes that he "has not been able to determine ... when and how that
78
agreement was reached" •1ESkstek from RC, Ann. 47]t Interestingly, the Legal Adviser attached to
his opinion a sketch showing the effect of three possible alternative !ines which you will find at
tab 41 and on the screen. As I said, the Legal Adviser attached to his opinion a sketch showing the
effect ofthree possible alternative !ines: a parallel, a median line and a perpendicular. The sketch
shows the self-evident unreasonableness of the line along the parallel. [Sketch off]
68. It is impossible to reconcile the 1964 legal opinion with Chile's position in the present
proceedings. The legal opinion states clearly that the Santiago Declaration was not a maritime
delimitation agreement.
74
RC, Ann. 47.
7/bid.,p. 2, fourth para.
7/bid, p. 3, first para.
77
/bid, p. 4, first full para.
7/bid.,p. 5, first full para. -44-
VI. Negotiations in the 1970s between Chile and Bolivia
concerning Bolivia's access to the sea
69. Mr. President, 1 now turn, with your permission, to a new argument, raised for the first
H ·T time in Chile's Rejoinder"'ajjhisconcerns negotiations in the mid-1970s between Chile and Bolivia
about a Bolivian corridor to the sea.
70. Chile tries to show that, in the margins of these negotiations, Peru somehow accepted
that the maritime boundary between Peru and Chile went along the parallel through boundary
marker No. 1. This is not sustainable. Chile has produced no records of the consultations to which
it refers, and we are not aware of any. Chile's arguments are based on misleading "evidence",
including maps prepared by Chile, and not, as Chile seems to imply, by Peru. The picture that
Chile tries to paint of these negotiations is, to put it mildly, distorted. Chile states that Peru was
"specifically consulted on the matter" of the maritime zone appertaining to the corridor offered to
Bolivia, and that Peru "expressed no objection or reservation" about an alleged existing maritime
boundary 79• In fact, neither Peru's Note of 29 January 1976 80 nor Peru's "alternative proposai" to
81
Chile of 18 November 1976 mentioned a parai!el of latitude or suggested any method of maritime
delimitation for Bolivia's perspective maritime zone.
71. An example of Chile's attempts to distort reality can be found in Annex 87 in the
Rejoinder. At Annex 87 Chile included, as though it were part of Peru's alternative proposai to
Chile 8, a sketch-map showing two parallels at the extreme points of the coast to be ceded to
Bolivia as weil as shaded zones that do not retlect the text of Peru's Memorandum of
November 1976. That sketch-map was not annexed to Peru's proposai. Peru's Memorandum
H 1- the sketch-map that Chile has included in Annex &3tis a gross distortion of the Peruvian proposai.
72. The only sketch-map published by Peru was included in an official notice ofthe Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of November 1976. The same map was reproduced in an article written by
Ambassador Jose de la Puente Radbill, which Chile has used as the basis to create figure 72 in its
7RC, para.3.16.
80
RC, Ann. 26.
81
RC, Ann. 87 (Memorandum of 18November 1976 of the Embassy ofPeru in Chile).
82/bid. - 45-
Rejoinder. You will find a copy of the original Peruvian map at tab 42 and on the screen. As you
can see, this map has no parallel of latitude as a boundary for the maritime area to be granted to
Balivia. Indeed it shows three differently shaded zones that are consistent with the text of Peru's
"proposai", namely, a Bolivian corridor to the north of the Province of Arica, a land area under
V; shared sovereignty of the three StatesVanda tri-national administration in the port of Arica. The
paraliels of latitude that occur on figure 72 of the Chilean Rejoinder have been added by Chile.
When you look at the two maps together, the original and Chile's transformation, you can easily
see just how distorted Chile's representationis.
73. Mr. President, that concludes what I have to say about Chile's efforts to construct,
retrospectively, an international maritime agreement by praying in aid what it claims is the
"practice" of the Parties inthe period from 1954 to the 1970s.
74. I apologize for addressing so many miscelianeous points. Ifthere is an underlying theme
to what I have said, itis the uncertainty of Chile's position. Nothing is clear in Chile's case; ali is
doubt, ali is impressionistic. If one puts any one of Chile's disparate points under a microscope, it
vanishes. Yet, Mr. President, an international maritime boundary cannat be built on such shifting
sands. The mix of events and instruments relied upon by Chile cannat, by any stretch of the
imagination, be seen as having "confirmed", or established, an otherwise non-existent international
maritime boundary agreement.
75. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention. Professor Treves
will be our next speaker.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir Michael. Professor Treves will address the
Court after the break. The hearing is suspended for 15 minutes.
The Court adjournedfrom 11.35 to 11.55 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearings are resumed. Je donne la parole au
professeur Tullio Treves. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur. -46-
M. TREVES:
LA POSITION DU PÉROU PENDANT ET APRÈS LA TROISIÈME CONFÉRENCE
DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE DROIT DE LA MER
1. Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, la présenteplaidoirie examine
la position du Péroupendant et après la troisième conférencedu droit de la mer. Il en ressortira que
l'engagement du Pérou dans la conférence fut celui d'un Etat ayant encore à résoudre ses
problèmes de délimitationet que, en 1986, le Pérouapprocha le Chili en vue de trouver un accord
sur le problèmede la frontière maritime entre les deux Etats.
2. Le Pérou s'est également préoccupéde rendre son droit interne, et notamment sa
Constitution, compatible avec le nouveau droit de la mer tel qu'il étaitreflétépar la convention des
83
Nations Unies . Sur ce dernier point M. l'agent du Pérous'est déjàexprimé.
3. Cette période se caractérise par des changements rapides du droit de la mer. Ces
changements sont surtout la conséquencede l'impact de la troisième conférencedes Nations Unies.
Cette conférenceeut la duréeexceptionnelle d'une décenniede 1973 à 1982 (ou plus, si on compte
les travaux du comité préparatoire qui débutèrenten 1968) et s'acheva avec l'adoption de la
convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM).
4. Pendant ces années,le droit de la mer se transforma. Il passa d'une situation d'incertitude
quant à l'extension et à la nature des droits de l'Etat côtier à une reconnaissance généralede droits
souverains jusqu'à 200 milles et, pour ce qui est du plateau continental, mêmeau-delà.
notion de zone économiqueexclusive. Elle est devenue partie du droit coutumier par l'effet de la
pratique antérieureet contemporaine à la troisième conférenceet, notamment, de l'adoption de la
convention.
6. Pour les Etats d'Amériquelatine, et notamment pour les Parties au présentdifférend,cela
constitua un changement soudain. De prêcheursisolésd'un nouveau droit de la mer rejetépar la
majoritédes Etats, ils devenaient les protagonistes de la formation d'un nouvel ensemble de règles
généralesagrééesdisciplinant les mers et les océans.
83
RP,par. 17-19. -47-
La participation du Pérouaux négociationsde la conférenceportant sur la délimitation
7. La participation du Pérou à la troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la
mer fut active et enthousiaste.
8. Le Pérou vit dans l'acceptation de la zone économique exclusive la confirmation des
positions qu'il soutenait depuis longtemps. Dans le débatgénéraltenu à Caracas en juillet 1974, le
chef de la délégationpéruvienne, l'ambassadeur Juan Miguel Bakula, en se référantau «domaine
maritime» du Pérou,affirma que «[l]es pays qui sont en faveur d'une mer patrimoniale ou d'une
zone économique exclusive dont la largeur atteindrait 200 milles ont au fond le mêmepoint de vue
que le Pérouet défendent les mêmesintérêts» 84• Plus emphatiquement, le représentant du Chili,
affirma que «le Chili a étéle premier Etat à proclamer en 1947 que sa juridiction s'étendaitsur une
zone de 200 milles» caractérisée par le fait d'être «de caractère essentiellement
économique ... sans entraver la libertéde navigation et de survol>> 85•
9. Dans ce mêmesens, à la fin de la troisième conférencesur le droit de la mer, les chefs des
délégationsdu Chili, de la Colombie, de l'Equateur et du Pérouaffirmèrent conjointement :
«la reconnaissance universelle de la souveraineté et de la juridiction de l'Etat côtier
dans la limite de 200 milles consacrée par le projet de convention est un objectif
fondamental des pays membres de la [c]ommission permanente du Pacifique Sud,
86
conforme aux objectifs de base énoncésdans la [d]éclarationde Santiago de 1952» •
10. Du point de vue de la présenteaffaire, l'aspect le plus remarquable de la participation du
Pérouà la troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer est son engagement actif
dans le groupe de négociation7, dont la tâche étaitd'élaborerdes règles portant sur la délimitation
des zones maritimes.
11. Il faut rappeler que, en mêmetemps que le groupe de négociation7, pendant la septième
session de la conférence, en 1978, six autres groupes de négociation furent établispour s'occuper
des questions du «noyau dur» encore ouvertes. Les commissions et les autres enceintes de
négociation de la conférence n'en restant pas moins en fonction, les ressources de toutes les
délégations,y compris la péruvienne,se trouvèrent sous pression.
84Troisième conférencedes Nations Unies sur le droit de la merdocuments officiels,vol. 1, session plénière
37"session, p. 177, par. 45.
85Troisième conférencedes Nations Unies sur le droit de la merdocuments officiels,vol. I, session plénière
46 session, p. 229, par. 68.
86MP, annexe 108. -48-
12. Le Pérouparticipa activement aux travaux du groupe de négociation7 du débutà la fin.
L'ambassadeur Arias Schreiber, qui étaitalorschef de la délégation,nonobstant la nécessitéde
suivre simultanément les discussions dans d'autres enceintes de la conférence, choisit d'être
constamment présentdans ce groupe de négociation.
13. Le groupe de négociation7 étaitouvert à la participation de «tous les pays qui portaient
un intérêptarticulier à cette question», question qui étaitdéfiniecomme suit : «Délimitation des
frontières maritimes entre Etats quiont face ou sont limitrophes et le règlementdes différends
87
s'y rapportant»•
14. Ce qui précèdemontre clairement que le Pérouse considérait comme étant «un pays
ayant un intérêtarticulier» à la question de la délimitationde zones maritimes. S'il avait étéde
l'avis que tous ses problèmes de délimitation maritime étaient déjà réglésdès 1952 (comme
soutient maintenant le Chili), il n'aurait pas consacré à cette question le temps, l'énergie et
l'habiletéde négociateurdu chef de sa délégation.
15. Le rôle exercépar le Péroudans le groupe de négociation7 fut très actif. C'est dans
cette enceinte quee Pérouarticula pour la première fois sa position sur la délimitationde zones
maritimes. Il le fit dès les toutes premières réunions du groupe. Cette position est clairement
énoncéedans un document soumis au groupe le 24 avril 1978. Le document, que vous pouvez lire
sur l'écranet à l'onglet3 de votre dossier, se lit ainsi :
«La délimitationde la zone économiqueexclusive du plateau continental entre
Etats limitrophes ou qui se font face se fait par voie d'accord entre ces Etats et d'une
manièreconforme au principe de l'équité.A cette fin, on utilisera la méthodegénérale
·····~··~····~~=âe:Ia:l mig ne:ne:{)igIne:d'équidistru:et:lorsc t:î:iiite:·des::circoTfs...........
·······~~---~-~-~-----~---spéciales,-on88tiendr-a-compte-de-ces--circonstances-pour-assurer-I!applieation-du-·-----·--~··
principe de l'équité.»
~ojeetiOAtt
16. Cette position est toujours celle du Pérouaujourd'hui. Il est intéressantde noter que
H b p~ll\ \e&-U;q.e,leChili soutint au sein du groupe de négociation7 étaittrès proche. Une lecture de la
proposition duPérou montre qu'elle correspond à la position maintenant adoptée par la Cour
internationale de Justice, y compris dans son arrêt tout récent dans l'affaireicaragua
87Doc. A/CONF.62/63 du 18 avril 1978, troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer,
documents officiels, vol. IX, p. 183-184.
88
Doc. NG7/6 du 24 avril 1978, PR, annexe 61 (versions espagnole et anglaise). -49-
c. Colombie 89• Cette position a fait l'objet d'expositions détailléesdans d'autres plaidoiries de
l'équipepéruvienne. Je souhaite seulement souligner sa ressemblance frappante avec la position du
Pérou. Cela ressort notamment de la manière dont la Cour présentesa position dans l'arrêtportant
90
sur l'affaireCameroun c. Nigéria •
17. Les propositions avancées ultérieurement par le Pérouau groupe de négociation7 afin
d'aider les Etats engagés dans la négociation à trouver une solution acceptable pour tous 91 ne
changent pas la substance qui consiste à utiliser l'équidistance à moins que des circonstances
pertinentes n'exigent une solution différente pour faire en sorte que le principe d'équitésoit
appliqué.
18. Il serait absurde d'imaginer que le Péroun'avait pas d'intérêd t irect à obtenir l'adoption
d'une règle généralebasée sur l'équidistance. L'importance attribuée à ce sujet se trouve par
ailleurs confirmée par la déclaration du chef de la délégationpéruvienne à la plénièrede la
conférence en date du 30 avril 1982, le jour mêmeoù le texte de la convention fut soumis au vote.
92
Il se référaà la déclaration qu'il avait adressée à la plénièredeux ans auparavant en 1980 •
En choisissant, parmi les nombreux sujets examinésdans cette déclaration, de ne mentionner que la
position péruvienne concernant la délimitation, l'ambassadeur Arias Schreiber soutint que
t-t~.!" (cocn.ointementl-à.4unedéclarationécritede 1980) cette déclarationconstituait -je cite- «le cadre
93
de référencede la position du Pérom> •
19. L'engagement actif du Péroudans le travail de la conférence du droit de la mer pour ce
qui est de la délimitation est celui d'un Etat intéresséà obtenir des règles généralesclaires et
raisonnables sur ce sujet éminemment bilatéral. Et cela non seulement dans l'intérêtde la
communauté internationale, mais, surtout, dans son propre intérêt.
89Arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012, www.icj-cij.org, par. 190-193.
9
° Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria(Cameroun c. Nigéria;Guinéeéquatoriale
(intervenant)), arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil2p. 304 et suiv., notamment p. 441, par. 288.
91
Doc. NG7/14 du 8 mai 1978, RP, annexe 63; doc. NG7/34, RP, annexe 64. Voir aussi les documents présentés
conjointement avecle Mexique, NG7/36 et rev. 1 du 11 et 18 avril 1979, RP, annexe 67.
92
MP, annexe 107.
93
RP, annexe 107. -50-
Le mémorandum Bakula
20. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, l'importance que le Pérou
reconnaissait à la question de la délimitation,au vu des développements à la troisième conférence
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer el'engagemen st~éelégationdans la négociation
portant sur ce sujet, persuadèrent que le moment étaitvenu de faire une démarche auprès du
Chili pour lui proposer de négocierune frontière maritime.
21. A la suite d'une approche faite par le ministre des affaires étrangèresdu Pérou au
ministre des affaires étrangèresdu Chili à l'occasion d'une visite à Santiago, l'un des diplomates de
haut rang du Pérou,l'ambassadeur Juan Miguel Bakula, fut reçu le 23 mai 1986 par le ministre des
affaires étrangèresdu ChiliL'ambassadeur Bakula était porteur d'unmessage personnel» du
ministre des affaires étrangèresdu Pérou. Ce message soulignait que -cite- «l'objet de la
visite est liéà des propositions de la plus haute importales relations entre les deux pays»
22. L'ambassadeur Bakula présentala position du Pérouen exposant l'exigence de procéder
à la délimitationdes espaces maritimes entre les deux Etats, ce qui fut le seul sujet discutéau cours
de l'audience.
23. Comme l'avait demandé le ministre chilien, les propositions illustrées par
l'ambassadeur Bakula furent aussi soumises par écritavec une note diplomatique portant la date du
jour mêmede l'audience, le 23 mai 1986, sous la forme d'un mémorandum,qu'on connaît comme
le «mémorandumBakula» 95 -que vous trouvez dans votre dossier sous l'onglet n° 44. Il faut
souligner tout de suite que le mémorandumest un résuméde points avancésoralement, pas un texte
-~----~-----------~-~-----------·-------24à~--ae-s·--aettxeilte--lt-rpreser-té--dan -s·-fensrSsecriteses--~--------------
96
arguments détailléssur le mémorandumBakula . Au stade de la procédureoù nous nous trouvons
il est nécessairede se concentrer sur la question principale qui divise les Parties sur ce sujet.
25. Il s'agit de la question suivante : le mémorandumBakula est-il une proposition
(la première proposition) pour la négociationd'un accord de délimitationentre le Pérouet le Chili,
94
MP, annexe 76.
95MP,annexe 76.
96
MP, par.4.130-4.134; CMC, par. 1.39-1.43; RP, par.4.47-4.52; DC, par. 3.106-3.119. -51 -
comme le soutient le Pérou, ou est-il, comme l'affirme le Chili 97, une proposition pour la
renégociationd'une frontière maritime qui -comme le Chili le soutient- existait déjàentre les
Parties?
26. En fait, cette opposition de points de vue a étébâtie artificiellement par le Chili. Si on se
reporte au mémorandumBâkula, on constate que le Pérouproposait la négociationd'un accord de
délimitationet non la renégociationd'un accord existant. La phrase suivante du mémorandum,que
vous pouvez lire sur l'écranet qui se trouve à l'onglet n° 45 de votre dossier, est d'une importance
clef à l'appui de ce point de vue. La phrase se lit comme suit :
«L'une des questions qui mérite sans délai notre attention est celle de la
délimitationofficielle et définitivedes espaces maritimes, qui reflètent la proximité
géographique du Pérou et du Chili et font, depuis longtemps, l'objet d'une action
conjointe fructueuse.»
27. Avec cette phrase, le mémorandumindique clairement que, du point de vue du Pérou,il
n'y avait aucune délimitationentre le Pérouet le Chili, et qu'il s'agissait d'une question méritant
!'«attention immédiate»des deux Etats.
28. Bref, en l'absence d'un accord de délimitation, il étaitnécessaired'en négocieret d'en
conclure un. La nécessitéd'un tel accord étaitparticulièrement urgente au vu du nouveau droit de
la mer résultantde l'approbation de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer.
29. Se référanà t l'accord de 1954, le mémorandumparle
«[d'June formule qui, bien qu'elle ait rempli et continue à remplir l'objectif exprès
d'éviterdes incidents impliquant des «marins ayant une connaissance insuffisante de
la navigation», n'est pas adéquate pour satisfaire aux exigences de la sécuriténi à
celles de la bonne gestion des ressources marines».
30. Le mémorandum ajoute qu'«tme interprétation large pourrait générerune situation
notoire d'injustice et de risque, au détrimentdes intérêts légitimesdu Pérou,lesquels en sortiraient
gravement lésés».
31. Le Chili semble donner à cette phrase une grande importance en soutenant que la
possible interprétationextensive mentionnéedans le mémorandumse référaità des «accords en
98
vigueur entre les Parties» • En réalitéle mémorandumne précisepas de l'interprétationextensive
... -O-tA de quoi il s'agissait. Il ne se référaitcertainement pas à des accordsH Au plus, on peut le lire
p\...:~.
97
DC, par.3.107.
98DC, par. 3.108. -52-
comme se référantà l'accord de 1954. Mais pourquoi devrait-on donner une interprétation large à
un accord qui contiendrait, si on l'interprète ainsi, desnces» et «pourrait générerune
situation notoire d'injustice risque, au détriment des intérêtslégitimes du PérLa»?
mention de l'accord de 1954 dans le mémorandum, loin d'êtreune reconnaissance de sa nature
d'accord de délimitation, est une indication de l'absurditéinterprétation.
32. Il y a une confirmation ultérieurede l'inexactitude de la lecture chilienne de la référence
à l'accord de 1954 dansmémorandum Bâkula. Le Chili insiste sur l'affirmation que le Pérou,
quand il se réfèredans le mémorandum à l'accord de 1954, se réfèreaussi à la déclaration de
Santiago de 1952. Cela montrerait, des du Chili, que le Pérouinterprétait en réalitéles textes
de 1952et de 1954 «comme ayant établi une fronti•rEn fait le mémorandum Bâkula ne se
réfèrejamais à la déclaration de Santiago conjointement à l'accord de 1954. Comment pourrait-on
considérer une frontière comme établie par la déclaration de Santiago à laquelle on ne fait aucune
référence? Dans le mémorandum on ne trouve aucune trace de l'opinion que le Chili prêteau
Pérouselon laquelle il existait un accord de délimitation et la déclaration de Santiago y étaitpour
quelque chose. Le mémorandum ne mentionne la déclaration de Santiago que pour faire remarquer
que la loi péruvienne du pétrole datait de cinq mois auparavai1t: comme on le voit,un
point tout à fait mineur et sans rapport avec la thèse du Chili selon laquelle le Pérouaurait reconnu
dansle mémorandum que la déclaration de Santiago constituait un accord de délimitation maritime.
33. Evidemment, en préparant duplique, le Chili a cédéà la tentation de soutenir que le
mémorandum Bâkula considérait la déclaration de Santiago comme un accord de délimitation.
--·-··-- --=-·--IV-I~ai-s·Jls'àgiflaae·l~-positioi=t·aucliilLce·n'ét ~a--t-poinYlaposition3i_i1P~ro-iCeïiT952~11i.enT9Soà
l'époquedu mémorandum Bâkula et ce n'est pas la position péruvienneaujourd'hui.
34.La position du Pérou est reprise dans le mémorandum Bâkula en se référantà celle
présentée par l'ambassadeur Arias Schreiber dans le discours déjà mentionnétint à la
troisième conférence des Nations Unies suroit de la mer le 27 août 1980. Cette position, que
vous pouvez lire sur l'écranl'onglet n° 46 de votre dossier, avait étéformulée comme suit:
'[Projeter les versions fran'iJaÎseet anglaise.] •
9OC, par. 3.108 et 3.109. -53-
«A défautd'un accord exprès portant spécifiquement sur la délimitation de la
mer territoriale, de la zone économiqueexclusive et du plateau continental entre Etats
dont les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face ou lorsqu'il n'existe pas de circonstances
spéciales ou de droits historiques reconnus par les parties, la méthode de la ligne
médiane devrait être appliquée en règle générale,conformément à la deuxième
100
révision,car c'est la meilleure manièrede parvenir à une solution équitable.»
35. Le mémorandum ajoute que la démarche de l'ambassadeur Bakula constituait
«la première initiative diplomatique du Gouvernement péruvienpour présenterau Gouvernement
chilien sa position fondéesur les raisons et circonstances énoncéesdans les premiers paragraphes
du présentmémorandum»,en d'autres termes, la nécessitéde réserverune attention immédiateà la
délimitationde l'espace marin entre les deux pays.
36. On aurait pu s'attendre que le Chili répondeau mémorandumBakula en soutenant, selon
la position qui est la sienne dans le présentdifférend,qu'il n'y avait aucune nécessitéde négocier
une délimitationmaritime car la question étaitdéjàrégléedès1952.
37. Mais le Chili prit au sérieuxles points soulevéspar l'ambassadeur Bakula et ne les rejeta
pas. Dans un communiquéde presse publiéaprès la visite de l'ambassadeur Bakula, le ministère
chilien des affaires étrangèresfit savoir que le ministre chilien avait pris note de l'intérêtdu
Gouvernement péruvienpour des conversations portant sur les positions des deux gouvernements
101
relatives à la délimitationmaritime et que «la question serait étudiéeen temps utile» •
38. Il est vrai que par la suite le Chili ne fit aucune référenceau mémorandumBakula ou à la
conduite d'étudessur les sujets qui y avaient étésoulevés. L'objectif poursuivi par la démarchede
l'ambassadeur Bakula n'en fut pas moins atteint. Il en est résultéque la question de la délimitation
maritime figure à l'agenda bilatéralentre le Pérouet le Chili. C'est ainsi que le Pérouse référaaux
points soulevés dans le mémorandum dans sa note de protestation adressée au Chili
le 20 octobre 2000 102ainsi que dans la note du 19juillet 2004 103 dans laquelle il proposait au Chili
des négociationspour résoudrele différenden matièrede délimitation. Et c'est à la suite de cette
note que les ministres des affaires étrangèresdu Pérouet du Chili purent affirmer conjointement,
dans un communiquépubliéà Rio de Janeiro le 4 novembre 2004, que celle de la délimitationétait
100MP, annexe 107.
101
MP, annexe 109.
102
MP, annexe 77.
103MP, annexe 79. -54-
une question bilatéralede nature juridique à propos de laquelle les deux Etats avaient des positions
différentes10•
39. La périodeexaminéemarque la pleine prise de conscience par le Péroüde l'impact du
nouveau droit de la mer sur sa position, position qui passa de l'avancement de nouvelles
prétentions à la jouissance de droits correspondant à ceux qui étaientdésormais universellement
reconnus. Cela imposait une détermination des frontières maritimes, ce que le Pérouproposa au
Chili par la démarcheBâkula.
40. Cette démarcheet le mémorandumrestent un moment décisifdans les relations entre les
deux Parties au présentdifférend. A la lumière de cette démarche et du mémorandum, on peut
interpréterplusieurs aspects de la pratique chilienne après 1986 comme des efforts pour fabriquer
des élémentsà utiliser dans le différendavec le Péroudont l'existence étaitdésormaisadmise.
Merci, Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, pour votre attention et votre
patience. Puis-je vous demander de bien vouloir aimablement donner la parole au prochain orateur
de l'équipepéruvienne,MeBundy.
The PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur le professeur. 1 invite Mr. Bundy to continue in oral
presentation by Peru. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr.BUNDY:
THE RECENT CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES
theory that the 1952 Santiago Declaration delimited the maritime boundary between Peru and
Chile.
2. First, 1shaHdiscuss various unilateral steps that Chile began to take, after having received
the 1986 Bâkula Memorandum, to create the impression that a maritime boundary already existed
between the Parties. Following that, 1will turn to elements ofPeruvian conduct that Chile relies on
in an attempt to demonstrate a pre-existing boundary, and 1 shaH show that these elements do not
10MP, annexe 113. -55-
support Chile's thesis of such a pre-existing boundary. Lastly, 1will address the manner in which
each Party proceeded when it actually intended to enter into a maritime boundary agreement. In
Chile's case, this involves examining the 1984 Agreement it concluded with Argentina. And in
Peru's case, 1shall describe the maritime boundary that it agreed with Ecuador in May 2011 : and
in both instances, Chile's agreement in 1984 with Argentina and Peru's agreement in 2011 with
Ecuador, the Parties' conduct in entering into those agreements and the terms ofthose agreements
were very different than what they were with respect to the Santiago Declaration.
1. Self-serving condnct by Chile after the Bâkula Memorandum
A. Chile's cartographie practice
3. With that introduction, let me turn directly to the way in which, in recent years, Chile has
tried to manufacture a case that a maritime boundary exists along a parallel of latitude. 1will start
with examining how Chile's cartographie practice began to change in the 1990s, following the
v> Bakula MemorandumVwith respect to the boundary situation with Peru.
4. The first point to note is that, between 1952 and 1992, that is a period of 40 years, Chile
did not issue a single map or chart that purported to depict the maritime boundary with Peru.
H 1 [Place fig. 5.19 front Pont's Memorial on sereeH.] 1 Take, for example, Chile's Chart of Arica,
1J/ which is in the vicinity of the land boundary terminusVthat was published in 1973 - it is also at
tab 47 of your folders. There is no sign of a maritime boundary lying off of Point Concordia,
which is the terminal point of the land boundary. What there are are sorne dashed lines showing
the very short scope and Iimit of the range of the coastal lights that Sir Michael addressed earlier
this morning. And the same "no maritime boundary" situation is repeated over and over in Chile's
1-1 maps and charts during the 40-year period following the Santiago Declaration . ..AR4I refer, for the
Court at its convenience, as examples, to have reference to figures 5.20 and 5.23 in Peru's
Memorial. And these charts- these no boundary charts- are a telling indication that Chile did
not consider that such a boundary existed.
f-1 5. It was only in the 1990s that Chile began to alter its charts.J [Plaee figure 5.:64from Peru'g \
1'-4 .Memorial on sereen.] 1I have had placed on the screen, which is also in tab 48 of your folders, a
chart that was published in 1994. It shows, again, the Arica region. Inexplicably, however, there -56-
now appears- for the first time- a Iine on the map purporting to show a maritime boundary
between Peru and Chile. Why the change? Chile has not told us. When, therefore, a couple of
years later in 1998, Chile published a further large.;.scalechart ofthe Port of Arica showing another
dashed line out to sea along the parallel and changing the depiction of the land boundary- a
105
matter that I will deal with Jaterthis afternoon- Peru officially protested •
6. Now, similar inconsistencies appear with respect to information that Chile supplied to the
United Nations. In 1997, Chile notified the United Nations of its ratification of the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention. That notification referred to the boundary agreement between Chile and
Argentina, but made no mention of any similar agreement with Peru. In 2000, however,
Chile proceeded to deposit charts with the United Nations which referred for the first time to the
18° 21'S parallel of latitude as the maritime boundary between Chile and Peru. And, once again,
Peru\{,rotested 10•
7. And the same practice can be seen to be replicated with respect to Chile's National Atlas
and in its maps published by its Military Geographie Institute. And, again, for over 40 years after
the Santiago Declaration, Chile issued numerous official maps, but none of them showed a
107
maritime boundary with Peru • And that only changed in recent years when, again without
explanation, Chile's National Atlas included a chart and map depicting what was said to be a
"Limite Chile-Peru" extending out to seaalong the parallel of Jatitude 108•
8. These very Jatechanges in Chile's cartography were plainly self-serving. Chile knew full
weil that there was no boundary and, in any case, it was aware from the 1986 Bâkula Memorandum
And merely drawing a new Iine after 40 years of silence- merely drawing a Iine on a map-
could not create a boundary where none had previously existed.
105
See fig. 5.25 in Vol. IV ofPeru's Memorial and MP Ann. 77.
106
MP, Ann. 78.
10See figs. 5.9, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 included in Vol. IV to Peru's Memorial.
10MP, fig. 5.26. -57-
B. Chile's naval interdictions
9. A similar pattern can be seen from the evidence Chile relies on with respect to its naval
patrols and the interdiction of Peruvian fishing vessels.
10. In Volume VI of its Counter-Memorial, Chile provided a list of 309 instances where
Peruvian vessels were said to have been captured in Chilean waters. Apparent!y, Chile considers
that this seemingly impressive number of incidents somehow confirms the existence of a maritime
boundary along its claim Iine. But a close look at the facts reveals a very different picture.
11. Of these 309 cases Iisted by Chile, only 14 took place before the Bakula Memorandum
was delivered to Chile. Those 14 cases ali occurred in 1984.
1[Pla:eene'.vPen:tvia:nTea:mrnap of the 14 easss on serssn]'
12. What is striking about these incidents- and we have had them plotted on the map on
the screen, using the information from Chile's own annex- what is striking about these incidents
is their location. Ali but one of them are located below, or to south of, the equidistance line, and
even the last one virtually straddles that line, and ali of them occurred within 12 nautical miles of
the coast. The other incidents listed by Chile actually took place either during the 1990s, when
Chile began to change its maps, or after the year 2000, at a time when it is clear that a dispute over
the boundary existed between the Parties.
13. And, once again, this was the result of a very late and self-serving change in Chile's
practice- this time with respect to its rules of naval engagement, which Chile itself concedes,
with respect to such rules, that they were only modified in the 1990s to provide for naval
109
interdiction up to Chile's parallel of latitude claim • And you can see that at Figure 20 in Chile's
Counter-Memorial.
14. In short, Chile's conduct after 1986 stands in sharp contrast to its earlier conduct.
Previously, as my colleagues have explained, Chile's internai laws, its maps, the opinion of its
Foreign Ministry's Legal Adviser, in no way suggested that Chile considered the Santiago
Declaration to have established a maritime boundary with Peru. Chile's more recent conduct
represents nothing more than a belated attempt to build up a case that a boundary exists. But
unilateral conduct of this nature cannot create a boundary where none existed before.
109
See fig. 20 facing page 176 to Chile's Counter-Memorial. -58-
2. Chile's reliance on Peruvian practice
15. Rather than focus on its own actions which do not support its case, Chile prefers to take
aim at Peru's practice in an effort to show that Peru considered the maritime boundary to be fully
delimited. Apart from the legal deficienciesin this tine of attack that Sir Michael has exposed,
Chile's arguments are also factually misplaced.
A. No official Peruvian maps showing a maritime boundary
16. First, there is the question of Peru's cartography. Here, the plain fact, which Chile has
been unable to contradict, is that there is not a single official map issued by the Government of
Peru that has ever depicted a maritime boundary with Chile. And as 1noted, for a period spanning
sorne four decades, Chile's practice was actually exactly theme- no suggestion of a maritime
boundary.
17. As a result of this, Chile has been forced to forage in secondary sources, such as school
textbooks and the publications of private entities, to find maps that purport to show a maritime
boundary. And Chile argues Peru's Foreign Ministry somehow "authorized" sorne of these
110
maps • But, as Peru fully explained in its Reply, under a 1961 that is over 50 years ago
Peruvian Ministerial Resolution, any so-called "authorizations" did not imply approval of the
contents of such maps, which remained the exclusive responsibility of their authors, and that was
111
stated, and they did not somehow transfer private maps into official Governmentaps •
18. And as the Chamber of the Court observed in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali)
case which, as a statement of principle, I would suggest, is equally applicable to questions of
....---..--.----
__ _________ ___ rit dilimita,tio11___:__-·.-.__._ .._.---------------------------------------~--~----·--·--·-----···-----
"Whether in frontier delimitations or in international territorial conflicts, maps
merely constitute information which varies in accuracy from case to case; of
themselves, and by virtue solely of their existence, they cannat constitute a territorial
title, thats, a document endowed by international law with intrinsic legal force for the
purpo o~fes_t i~i_gbtlrritorial. rigl)ts." {fronJier. D[_,Judgr11entC.J. Repo. ..~ts
1986, p. 582, para. 54; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment of 19November 2012, para. 100.)
11See, for example, RC, para. 3.33.
111
RP, paras. 4.128-4.131. -59-
B. Other Peruvian conduct relied on by Chile
19. The other material Chile cites in an attempt to buttress its case is legally irrelevant and
mostly post-dates Pent's invitation to Chile in 1986 to negotiate the maritime boundary as weil as
the 2004 Joint Communiquéissued by the Parties' Foreign Ministers indicating that the two States
had a dispute over the issue ofthe maritime boundary.
20. Let me deal with four categories of conduct referred to by Chile, which our opponents
rely on to evidence the existence of a maritime boundary. These are: (i) Chile's reliance on the
division of Flight Information Regions (FIRs) between the two countries; (ii) the Parties' practice
relating to carrying out search and rescue missions (SARs); (iii) Navigational Warning Services
(NAVAREAs) put into operation by Peru and Chile; and (iv) the Parties' naval practice. And the
short answer to Chile's arguments is that none of these categories of activities has anything to do
H 'I with the establishment or recognition of international boundaries. 'Asà, in1fact, as a matter of
principle, Chile agrees with this proposition because in its Rejoinder it acknowledges that the
division of such zones is entirely separate from the delimitation of maritime boundariesll2, which
makes one wonder why they have put this material in.
(i) Flight Information Regions
21. With respect to the establishment of Flight Information Regions (FIRs), these are
irrelevant to the present case. FIRs are established under the framework of the Chicago
Convention and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for technical and operational
purposes relating to air traffic control. Legaily, neither the Chicago Convention nor ICAO deal
with the delimitation of maritime boundaries. It is that straightforward. Factually, the division of
FIRs between Peru and Chile did not remain constant foilowing the 1952 Santiago Declaration.
They were changed in 1962- which has been documented in Peru's pleadings, a fact which
scarcely supports Chile's contention that they have a bearing on the existence or course of a
maritime boundary between the Parties dating from 1952. Moreover, Lima's FIR extends weil .
113
beyond the 200-mile limit of Peru's maritime zones • And I suspect that that is the case with
many States' FIRs, they are not related to maritime boundaries.
112
RC, para3.79.
11RP,para.4.40. - 60-
(ii) Search and rescue
22. So then 1 turn to search and rescue operations, which are obviously aimed at the
protection of Iife at sea, not questions of maritime delimitation: and that is borne out very clearly
by paragraph 2.1.7 of the Annex to the Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, to which both
Peru and Chile are parties. That provides that "[t]he delimitation of search and rescue regions is
not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between St•tes"
(iiiNAVAREAs
23. Equally unavailing is Chile's reliance on these navigational areas (NAVAREAs), which
are areas that are designated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization and the
International Hydrographie Office for the promulgation of warnings about hazards to maritime
navigation.
24. Chile cites a 1975 Working Group Report from the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization for the proposition that so-called NAVAREAs and the NAVAREA
between Peru and Chile was a parallel of latitude that reflects what Chile asserts was their
115
"border" • But what our colleagues fait to note is that this report was simply part of a working
session that was considering a draft plan to establish a worldwide navigational system; this was not
any final agreement or any convention.
25. When one actually consults the subsequentMO/IHO Worldwide Navigational Warning
Service Guidance document that was published after the NAVAREA system was put into place, the
delimitation of NAVAREAs is specifically subject to a proviso that reads as follows: "The
···········.=~ ·.·rseu[cItii·J·E·Ha.nreas~Jtfiese·N~Y.AREA~I:I~~iof.reta!eil:=I~=~iüïa_1;ria:tCI1~·~)·~Jùâicetl1e··=====
116
delimitation of any boundaries between States." (Definitions, Section 2.1 )15)
•[Place map ftom this pttblieftOt1:sereen1
26. Similarly, the map in the IMO Guidance document- which is at tab 50 of your folders
and on the screen this shows the worldwide NAVAREAs and it has exactly the same disclaimer.
114
Para. 2.1.of the Annex to the InternationConvention on Maritime Search and Rescue,
Hamburg, 27 April 1979,405 UNTS 119; also publiclyavailableat <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
publisher.IM0,,,469224c82,0.html>, accessed012.
11RC, paras. 3.82-3.83.
11Publicly available at <http://www.iho.int/mtg docs/com wg/CPRNW/CPRNW Doc-review/AR%20706(17)
Final%20Draft.pdf.>,accessed 13Nov. 2012. - 61 -
The delimitation of such areas is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any
boundaries between States. And I would suggest this is not surprising: there are only
21 NAVAREAs around the world, and there are certainly many more coastal States and literally
hundreds of actual or potential maritime boundaries.
(iv) Naval practice
27. Chile also seeks support for its claim in co-operative efforts that were undertaken
between the naval forces of both countries in what was referred to as their naval frontier zone 11•
But, once again, there is a short answer to this argument, because in September 2003, the Chief of
the General Staff of the Chilean Navy- Chile's Navy- explained in a meeting with his Peruvian
counterpart that: "[t]he agreements between the Naval Zones are only intended to increase
co-operation in terms of maritime operations, without making any reference to treaties or boundary
issues", and the Chilean Chief of General Staffwent on to state that the agreement between the two
Parties' navies "does not address the nature of the boundaries or the scope of jurisdictional zones,
so it cannot prejudice, affect or amend them" 11•
28. Lastly, in its Rejoinder, Chile cites Peru's 1987 Regulation ofCaptaincies and Maritime,
Fluvial and Lacustrine Activities- that is a document which set out varions naval districts off of
Peru's coast. And Chile relies on part of that document in which it is stated that Peru's
southernmost Maritime District No. 31 covered an area from "the provinciallimit between Cm·aveli
and Camana (Parallel 16° 25'South) to the frontier boundary between Peru and Chile" 119• Based
on this language, Chile argues that the southern limit of this District No. 31 in Peru shows that the
projection of the relevant Peruvian coastline does not extend south of the parallel passing through
Hito No. 1 boundary, marker No. 1 on the land boundary 120• Now that argument founders for three
basic reasons.
29. First, these Peruvian regulations make no reference to a "maritime boundary" with Chile.
Rather, the southern limit of District 31 is defined as extending to the "frontier boundary" which, as
117
RC, para. 3.66.
118
RP, Vol. II, Ann. RP 89.
119RC, para. 3.67; emphasis added.
120RC, para. 3.68. - 62-
121
Peru explained in its written pleadings, was a reference to the land •Second, unlike the
{) northern limit of District N31V which was identified by a specifie parallel of latitude-
16° 25'south the southern limit the "frontier boundary"- is not identified by any tine of
latitude.That completely undermines Chile's argument that it coincided with the parallel of
latitude passing through Hito No. 1. That is pure wishful thinking. Third, at the end of the day
Chile has quite simply been unable to point to any piece of legislation issued by or by
Chile, for that matterindicating that a parallel of latitude is the maritime boundary between the
two countries.
30. It follows that none of the so-called evidence ofPeruvian conduct adduced by Chile in its
written pleadings supports the contention that a recognized maritime boundary has been in place
H i~\S since 1952. The material cited by Chile may be long in pages, butll:heyarashort in substance.
3. How the Parties acted when they intended to enter into
maritime boundary agreements
31. Now this, Mr. President, brings me to the final element of the Parties' conduct that I need
to address:the manner in which the Parties acted when they genuinely intended to enter into
maritime delimitation agreements. I shall first address the boundary agreement that Chile signed
with Argentina in 1984, before turning to Penl's more recent boundary agreement with Ecuador
concluded last year.
A; Chile's treatment ofits boundary with Argentina
............-·-~--..- 2.-W-ih-rspe_cttoChite:s:I!J:~_ri_tit!J:~~~o.ttl1_~ n1sth't.:~iti~::J\rg~~l~il1_~=~~(;)r(;)~~r(;)t-\;v()~tl_l~ii1J>O
a very different kind of instrument than the Santiago Declaration. The former is a delimitation
agreement; the latter is not. You will be able to see that by comparing their teSecond,
Chile's conduct followingthe conclusion of its agreement with Argentina was completely different
from its conduct relating to the Santiago Declaration. Let me just summarize the relevant facts.
12RP, para.4.32. - 63-
1[PIS:eePeru Memorial figunl 5.1 on sct=een]1
33. In 1984, Chile and Argentina concluded an agreement, Article 7 ofwhich fully delimited
the maritime boundary between them. The Court can see the course of that boundary on the map
on the screen, which is the map that was attached to the agreement itself and of which it fonned an
integral part. Both the 1984 Agreement and the map may be found in tab 51 of your folders. No
similar map depicting maritime boundaries was attached to the Santiago Declaration.
34. The 1984 Agreement indicated that the boundary delimited the sea, sea-bed and subsoil
between Chile and Argentina. So it was specifie in terms of the régimes that it purported to
delimit. It also specified the starting-point of the boundary, which was point A, the co-ordinates of
six points through which the delimitation line ran, and the endpoint. In contrast, nothing of the
kind exists with respect to the Santiago Declaration.
35. Moreover, unlike the Santiago Declaration, Chile and Argentina promptly registered the
agreement with the United Nations in June 1985, just one month after it came into force. In 1986,
Chile then issued a revised nautical chart which showed the boundary- an official chart- it is on
your screen and in tab 52. And again, that was in sharp contrast to Chile's practice with respect to
Peru. As I noted a few minutes ago, Chile did not issue a single map or chart purporting to show a
maritime boundary with Peru until1992, 40 years after the conclusion ofthe Santiago Declaration.
36. In the same vein, Chilean legislation frequently referred to the boundary agreement with
Argentina without mentioning any similar agreement with Peru we have documented this in our
written pleadings. For example, in 1990 Chile issued a decree- No. 704- relating to the
122
organization of its search and rescue operations by its Navy • That Chilean decree limited the
area of national maritime jurisdiction in the south to the waters lying west of the line established in
Chile's boundary agreement with Argentina. But in contrast, no mention was made to any
boundary agreement in the north. Other examples of this same kind of treatment, Chilean
~ legislation referring to the Argentine boundary but no boundary with Peniare set forth 111our
written pleadings- the references will be given with the text123•
122
RP, Ann. 26.
12See RP, paras. 4.92 and 4.100-4.106. - 64-
37. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these facts is that Chile considered that it
had a maritime boundary agreement with Argentina, but not with Peru.
B. The Peru-Ecuador delimitation agreement
38. Let me now turn to the delimitation agreement between Peru and Ecuador, which was set
out in an Exchange ofNotes dated 2 May 2011 12• Because that agreement was signed after Peru
125
filed its Reply, Peru has not yet discussed it. Chile's Rejoinder has addressed ;tbut does so in
what I would suggest is such an incomplete and inaccurate way that I need to set the record straight
as to what actually happened.
H t[Left haRdfig1:1rferom PM fig1:1re.2 on screenf
39. To place the matter in perspective, let me first review the relevant background. This
requires, I'm afraid, returning to point IV of the Santiago Declaration with the aid of the map that
now appears on your screen and in tab 53, depicting the coastal geography between Peru and
Ecuador.
40. As Professor Lowe explained earlier this morning, the first sentence of point IV of the
Declaration states that the 200-mile maritime zone declared under point II of the Declaration shall
apply to the entire coast of an island or a group of islands. The second sentence of point IV then
limits the maritime zone of an island or group of islands to the parallel at which the land frontier of
the States concerned reaches the sea if the island or group of islands is situated less than
200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone of a signatory State. This was not an
_att,purpose delimitation provision;itconcernedthe ..maritime entitlementofislands~s aonmdein~·~·
41. Peru has shown how the second sentence of point IV only applies to the situation
between Peru and Ecuador. For example, you can see from the map on the screen that Ecuador has
severa! islands- particularly Santa Clara and Puna, but there are others-which lie much closer
than 200 nautical miles from the maritime areas lying off Peru's coast. Under the second sentence
12RC, Anns. 39 and 41.
1RC, paras. 4.16-4-26. - 65-
of point IV, the maritime entitlements of those islands are limited by the parallel at the point at
which the Peru-Ecuador land frontier meets the sea.
42. In the past, Peru has consistently maintained that it has no boundary problem with
Ecuador. Peru fully accepted that the second sentence of point IV addressed the situation between
itself and Ecuador, and Peru's President reconfirmed Peru's position to this effect in a letter he
addressed to the President ofEcuador, which we filed on the record, dated 9 June 2010 12•
43. At the same time, Peru has also considered that point IV did not in and of itself constitute
a delimitation agreement- it simply set out a principle that applied between Peru and Ecuador
because of the presence of Ecuadorian islands near Peru's general maritime zone. Peru therefore
took the position that Peru and Ecuador needed to negotiate and sign a comprehensive, all-purpose
maritime boundary agreement.
44. That is what happened on 2 May 2011 when the Foreign Ministers of bath States
exchanged Notes ofldentical Content which delimited the course oftheir maritime boundary. You
127
will find a copy ofthose Notes in tab 54 ofyour folders •
45. That Exchange ofNotes, unquestionably constitute a maritime boundary agreement. The
tenn "maritime boundary" is used at paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the identical Notes for purposes of
specifying the course ofthe boundary. It is also clear that the purpose of the Exchange ofNotes
was not to confirm sorne pre-existing boundary, orto suggest that a maritime boundary had already
been delimited by the Santiago Declaration. Rather, the Notes involved the delimitation of the
maritime boundary de novo. Quite apart from the fact that the Notes make no reference to the
Santiago Declaration, paragraph 2 begins by stating the following- it is also in tab 55:
""'\ •[Piaee quote on sereen] 1
"In view of the existence of special circumstances in the area adjacent to the
land frontier between our two countries, the limit of the maritime spaces under
sovereignty or rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction of Peru and Ecuador, including
the water column as weil as the soit and subsoil, shall extend along the geographie
parallel 03° 23'33.96" S ... " (Emphasis added.)
The use of the ward "shall" ("se extendera" in the Spanish text) evidences the intention of
the parties to establish their maritime boundary by means of the agreement set out in the Exchange
126
RP, Ann. 81.
12RC, Anns. 39 and 41. - 66-
ofNotes, not by any other instrument. The reference to "special circumstances in the area adjacent
to the land frontier" was to the presence of Ecuador's islands situated in the vicinity of the land
frontier. In contrast, there are no such special circumstancesn the area to be delimited between
Peru and Chile.
46. The Notes contain a number of details relating to the boundary which are normally found
in delimitation agreements, but which had not been agreed by Peru and Ecuador before, and which
are conspicuously absent from the 1952 Declaration of Santiago. These include the following
elements:
the Notes contain a specificationof the maritime régimesthat were being delimited; in other
words, the column ofwater, the sea-bed and the subsoil (paragraph 2);
the precise starting-point of the maritime boundary, identified by WGS 84 co-ordinates
(paragraph 3);
the courseof the maritime boundary seaward of its starting-point, again identified by the exact
co-ordinates of the parallel of latitude it followed, together with the co-ordinates of the
starting-pointof the land boundary on the basis of which the parallel was established
(paragraph 2);
the end of the maritime boundary, which was described as extending to a distance of
200 nautical miles from its starting-point- the starting-point having been precisely
identified- (paragraph 4);
the course of the line delimiting the internai waters adjacent to the Parties' coasts lying
·la.n:awa< :ra,-inside,ofthestarrmg.:pointofthëinaro iiün edafYparagraphS) --
1[Piaee map from Vol. II, Ann. 39, p. 206 ofR{; on sereen]t
The Exchange of Notes also included- and it is now being projected on the screen, and is in
tab 56:
a graphie representationof the course of the maritime boundary in the form of a map that was
attached to the Notes and,ust like in the Chile/Argentina agreement, formed an integral part of
the agreement (paragraph 6); and - 67-
a stipulation that the understanding contained in the Notes will come into force on the date of
the last communication by which the Parties notify each other of the fulfilment of their
respective internai procedures (paragraph 7).
47. The agreement set forth in the Exchange of Notes dated 2 May 2011 came into force on
20 May 2011, and Peru and Ecuador jointly registered it with the United Nations Secretariat on
27 June 2011.
48. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I have taken the Court through the details of the
boundary established pursuant to the 2 May 2011 Exchange of Notes because Chile's Rejoinder
ignores themChile must realize that the Notes constitute a delimitation agreement, and that
nothing of the kind has ever been agreed between Chile and Peru.
Mr. President, at this point, I find myself in the unenvious position of competing with the
V!:>reol{unch i~tsiwoulnbe a convenient time for the Court, I would be pleased to break my
presentation here.
The PRESIDENT: Indeed, I think this is a convenient time to close the morning sitting.
You will be able to continue at 3 o'clock this afternoon.
The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 1.00 p.m.l'
'r
Audience publique tenue le mardi 4 décembre 2012, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire du Différend maritime (Pérou c. Chili)