Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/11
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Monday 28 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 28 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident
KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crnçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes
Djngogshue,
RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:
H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
as Agent;
H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,
Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Counsel;
Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,
Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Assistants; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,
M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme conseils ;
M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,
Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,
MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des
affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme assistants ; - 6 -
Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;
Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -
MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;
M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,
MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agents;
MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,
Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,
Csounsel;
Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Asdvisers;
H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,
MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agents ;
M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,
M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,
M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseillers ;
S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -
Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,
as Diplomatic Advisers;
Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,
Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,
as Administrative Staff. - 11 -
M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,
comme conseillers diplomatiques ;
M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,
M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,
comme personnel administratif. - 12 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets today to hear the second round of oral
argument of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I shall now give the floor to the first
speaker, Professor Philippe Sands.
SMAr.DS:
Introductory statement
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, after the first round of oral hearings it is readily
apparent that this is a simple case, and we therefore will not need to detain you for the full amount
time allocated to us. The facts are central, and ProfessorMurphy will address the two key facts:
that the Respondent did object to the Applicant’s memb ership of NATO, and that it did not do so
on the basis that the Applicant was to be referred to in NATO differently than in paragraph2 of
United Nations Security Council resolution 817. He will then draw the legal consequences of those
facts, the plain violation of Article11(1) of th e Interim Accord. The facts are also central to
establishing why this Court has jurisdiction and why there are no obstacles to that exercise of
jurisdiction, issues that will be then addressed by ProfessorKlein. I will then address the
Respondent’s excuses for its actions, and our Agent will then close our second round.
2. By way of introduction, to frame what comes, it is appropriate to place these
straightforward issues in their context and to make a small number of preliminary observations,
including with respect to the manner in which the Respondent has chosen to argue its case. It is
apparent that the Respondent’s case is not an easy one. Throughout the written pleadings, and
again last week, its approach has been to complexi fy; so the arguments are in a state of constant
flux and one can understand that approach. In thei r shoes one would have done the same thing.
But what you heard last week was a fairytale. It was based on a series of artifices and improbable
myths as to what did and did not occur in 1993, 1995, 2007 and 2008. To give that fairytale some
colour, the Respondent relied on a number of observa ble techniques. It ignored facts that were
unhelpful. It constructed new facts. It pr ovided partial and misleading accounts of what had
happened. It misquoted and it misrepresented third party sources. It dug deep into historical - 13 -
1
matters ⎯ as far back as the 4th century BC ⎯ that are of no relevance whatsoever to this case. It
raised the spectre of this Court’s involvement in political matters. These and other techniques were
marshalled to encourage the Court towards a newspaper headline that reads: “World Court rules
that Greece did not object to Macedonia’s membership of NATO”. Mr. President, it is obvious that
such a headline would be preposterous. In support of this argument, the Respondent is required to
adopt an approach that ignores a parade of elephants trampling through this Great Hall.
3. The first elephant is the Badinter Opinion. It is there in relation to the repeated claim by
the Respondent that its objection was justified by the Applicant’s “irredentism”, the alleged desire
to annex part of the Respondent’s territory; th e word was used on no less than 27 occasions by the
Respondent last week. That is said to be at th e heart of its actions, and it is said to undermine
regional stability, yet another assertion for which there is not a shred of evidence before this Court.
What is the evidence of irredentism? What is the evidence that the Applicant’s constitutional name
is a threat to regional stability? There is none be fore this Court. It is mere assertion; bald
assertion, which has no basis in fact and no support from any third party source. To the contrary,
applying criteria set by the European Community ’s Foreign Ministers, the Badinter Commission
concluded on 14 January 1992 ⎯ nearly 20 years ago ⎯ that “the Republic of Macedonia has . . .
renounced all territorial claims of any kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law;
that the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ cannot theref ore imply any territorial claim against another
State” 2. Although we raised this point last Tuesday, the Respondent had nothing to say in
3
response . And that opinion, as you will know, was a basis for the negotiations that led to the
Interim Accord, as United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made clear in his
letter of 28 May 1993, to the President of the Unite d Nations Security Council. Now, the Court of
course is not bound in any way by the Badinter Opinion, but we do not see any basis on which you
could find that its authoritative conclusion has been displaced. [Plate 1 on] There is no evidence in
1CR 2011/8, p. 18, para. 21 (Telalian).
2Arbitration Commission on the Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No.6 on the Recognition of the Socialist
Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States, 14 Jan. 1992, United Nations doc. S/25855,
Ann. III, para. 5, 28 May 1993: AM, Ann. 33; see also AM, paras. 2.13-2.14; AR, para. 4.81.
3CR 2011/6, pp. 46-47, para. 79 (Murphy). - 14 -
support of the Respondent’s contrary claim. Quite the opposite, as the United States State
Department made clear in 2004, when it stated that:
“these leaders, this government, have expressed many, many times that they have no
territorial aspirations, their use of the name Macedonia for themselves does not have
any implications for any neighbours or neighbouring territories or peoples. That is
certainly a policy the United States has maintained, that they have maintained, and we
don’t see that those factors that were discu ssed 60 years ago come into play in any
4
way with our decision today.” [Plate 1 off]
That same view appears to be held around th e world, in capitals from Moscow to Beijing, from
Mexico City to Freetown and even in Athens itsel f, as an interview granted in the Athens media
last week by current Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos makes clear. The opinion of the
Badinter Committee stands totally unrebutted. It is the first elephant in this room.
4. The second elephant in the room is Mr.Nimetz, and I intend no disrespect at all in
drawing the image, quite the contrary. The R espondent was notably discreet about the Personal
Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General. It had almost nothing to say about him, but not
quite nothing. You will recall that last Monday I dr ew your attention to what Mr. Nimetz said on
18September1995, just five days after the In terim Accord was signed, and ProfessorMurphy
returned to the point on Tuesday 5. [Plate2on] In response to that, counsel for the Respondent
castigated us for focusing on “the recollection of a remark by Mr.Nimetz, who was not in the
Security Council and who, moreover, was not even addressing, in his remark, the question of what
6
the Applicant was to call itself” . Well, that response by counsel for the Respondent is not
accurate. It is an unfortunate and further exam ple of the Respondent’s semi-detached relationship
to evidence. Mr.Nimetz did address the question of what the Applicant was to call itself:
[plate 2.2 on] he said ⎯ and you can read it for yourselves ⎯ that “
[T]he people from [the Applicant’s] count ry, when they talk about themselves,
use their constitutional name, Republic of Macedonia. And we have found this to be
the case, that there is no requirement for them to use a name that they don’t accept.
7
But that doesn’t mean that the organization accepts the name.”
4USDepartment of State, Daily Press Briefing, 4Nov.2004, available at: h ttp://2001-2009.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/37819.htm.
5CR 2011/6, pp. 41-42, para. 66.
6CR 2011/8, pp. 54-55, para. 31 (Reisman); emphasis added.
7AR, para. 4.57; “Foreign Press Center briefing with Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, special White House Envoy
subject: Macedonia-Greek agreements”, White House Briefing, 18 Sep. 1995: AR, Ann. 87. - 15 -
Mr.Nimetz’s statement is as authoritative a stat ement as could possibly be given, given his role
first as the Special White House Envoy to the United States President, on the negotiation of the
Interim Accord in which he was very closely dir ectly and personally involved. He was well aware
of what the Security Council had and had not decided in 1993, he knew what the subsequent
practice was on the use of the constitutional name, and of course he knew how the Interim Accord
took up that practice, since he helped negotiate the instrument, including its Articles5 and11.
[Plate2.3on] On 15September1995, two days after the signing of the Interim Accord, the
President of the Security Council issued a statement ⎯ you can see it on the screen now ⎯ that
“commends both parties, the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy,
Cyrus Vance, and the United States envoy, Matthew Nimetz, for their efforts in bringing about this
8
important achievement, pursuant to Security Council resolutions817(1993) and 845(1993)” .
[Plate 2 off]
5. But, Mr. President, when Mr. Nimetz says “there is no requirement for [the Applicant] to
use a name that they don’t accept” he speaks with a particular and unique au thority. As with the
Badinter Opinion, the Court is not bound by what Mr. Nimetz has to say, but in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary ⎯ no evidence whatsoever ⎯ in the face of the conduct of the Parties and
third States and the United Nations and other in ternational organizations, there is simply no
evidentiary basis for concluding that the Applican t was not entitled to use its constitutional name
before the United Nations, every sp ecialized agency and every othe r international organization in
which both Parties are members.
6. Indeed, it might be said that the constant practice under resolution817 and the Interim
Accord ⎯ the use by the Applicant of its constitutional name in all of those organizations that I
have just mentioned, consistently for more than fifteen years, without objection from a single
secretariat or a single third State ⎯ that constant practice is the third elephant in the room.
Professor Murphy will return to this subject shortly.
8Statement by the President of the Security Council, 15 Sep. 1995, United Nations doc. S/PRST/1995/46: judges’
folder, tab 9. - 16 -
7. The fourth elephant is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the instrument that
sets out the rules of international law that we say govern this case. The Respondent had never
sought to invoke a right of suspension under the Vien na Convention, in whole or in part and it did
never alert us to any alleged material breach on our part before it objected in 2007 and 2008. For
present purposes, the key provision of that Conv ention is Article60, which is, of course, a
provision that this Court has had to deal with on numerous occasions, and, of course, one that you
9
dealt with very fully in your Judgment in the case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project .
I am sure you will need no reminder. But Para graph100 of the Judgment strikes us as being
particularly apposite, and we hope you will excuse us if we have taken the liberty of drawing on
that text and applying it to the instrument and to the facts of this case. [Plate3on] If one goes
through the exercise of replacing references to the 1977 Treaty with references to the 1995 Interim
Accord, and if one substitutes references to the words termination, denu nciation and withdrawal
with a reference to the word suspension and ma kes no other changes, the text would reads as
follows:
“The [1995 Interim Accord] does not contain any provision regarding its
[suspension]. Nor is there any indication that the parties intended to admit the
possibility of [suspension]. . . . Consequently, the parties not having agreed otherwise,
the Treaty could be [suspended] only on the limited grounds enumerated in the Vienna
Convention.” [Plate 3 off]
In our submission, that is, and would be in this case, an entirely accurate conclusion to draw. The
Respondent has never sought to jus tify its objection by reference to any rights or procedures under
the 1969Vienna Convention and so it is stuck w ith paragraph100 of your 1997Judgment. The
limited grounds of the Vienna Convention not ha ving been invoked, and the conditions for their
being invoked not having been satisfied, there was no lawful basis for the Respondent’s objection:
in plain breach of the clear language of Article 11. For the Respondent, there is no getting around
that difficulty. That is why we say this case is a simple one.
8. Mr. President, in exercising its judicial function, the Court is necessarily bound to engage
in an assessment of the facts as they actually exist in the record, the functio n is to sort its way
through the conflicting arguments and the contradicti ons, to set aside mere assertion and deal with
9
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, pp. 62-63, para. 100. - 17 -
the evidence on the record. The Respondent may be entitled to ignore the elephants, but the Court
cannot, and we trust it will not, do so. It will ex ercise its judicial function as it has always done,
and will not be put off by claims that it is allo wing itself to be “instrumentaliser par le demandeur”
10
as the Respondent’s counsel put it . That is not a fair charge. The Applicant is doing exactly what
the Respondent should have done, coming to the Court, where there is a belief that the other Party
is not fulfilling its legal obligations. And it is wh at both Parties expected when they agreed to
Article21 in 1995. The Applicant too could have taken matters into its ow n hands. It too could
seek to suspend those parts of the Interim Accord that have become inconvenient. But it did not
want to do so. It has followed the “rule of law” route: so we wrote to the Respondent, we alleged
material breach, and then we instituted these proc eedings, in exactly the manner provided by the
Parties in the text they agreed in the language of Article 21, which gives this Court a central role.
To criticize us for doing that is, in our submission, entirely inappropriate.
9. And to be clear, the only issue that the Parties did not wish the Court to address was the
difference over the name: resolution 817 of the Un ited Nations Security Council makes it crystal
clear that the Parties agreed that the “difference over the name” ⎯ the difference over the name
and not any other difference ⎯ is a matter for political settlement. It was never for the Court to
determine or rule on the name of the Applicant, but that is the only matter excluded. I express my
gratitude to Professor Burdeau, who has gone throu gh the exercise of checking the language of the
text in all other United Nations languages and it sp eaks of it in the singular in exactly same way.
That is the only matter that is excluded. And it is clear from that language that the difference over
the name is entirely distinct from other differences that may arise and are subject to the jurisdiction
of the Court. As Professor Klein will make clear ⎯ once again ⎯ the Respondent would have
been perfectly entitled to bring a claim to this Co urt that the Applicant was not fulfilling one of its
obligations, for example, the obligation to negotiate, as required by Article5. It could have done
that if it had wished to do so. The obligation to negotiate is a distinct and separate matter from the
difference over the name. Or the Respondent coul d have filed a counter-c laim, but again it chose
not to do so. It seems this was an eminently sensi ble decision, given that the Applicant plainly is
10
CR 2011/9, p. 19, para. 29 (Pellet). - 18 -
not in breach of Article 5 and has consistently ne gotiated in good faith with the Respondent. Once
again, the Respondent is silent. We drew to their attention the statement of Mr.Nimetz who
commended both Parties for, what he called, their “positive attitude towards moving forward on
11
[the name] issue” , that was just six weeks ago, and he is, frankly, best placed to express a view on
a claim that one Party has not engaged in good faith negotiations. All these approaches were
available to the Respondent, to raise the concerns that they have now bombarded you with. The
proper thing to do was not to take the law into its own hands. And to be very clear, on the exercise
of the judicial function, we do not see how your Judgment would need to touch in any way on
NATO decisions or actions, or on the continued nego tiations under Article 5, a point to which we
will return.
10. Mr. President, this brings me to the conclu sion of this introductory statement. Listening
to the Respondent’s counsel we were struck by their constant inconsiste ncy, which is the fifth
elephant in the room. They are simply unable to get their story straight. One moment they are not
going to invoke countermeasures, the next moment they do. One counsel expresses the view that
Article11 says one thing, then his co-counsel tells you that it says something else. The written
pleadings say the Respondent has never sought to suspend the Interim Acco rd, and then counsel
tells you that actually that is exactly what they di d: they partially suspended it. The Respondent’s
former Prime Minister says that he objected to the Applicant’s membership of NATO by exercising
a veto, but one of their counsel tells you that he is not telling you the truth. The Respondent’s
former Foreign Minister says that they acted to avoid the constraints of the Interim Accord to avoid
a charge of “political cowardice”, but counsel tell you the Accord was followed to the letter at all
times. They agree that we are allowed to use our constitutional name in our bilateral dealings with
them, under the 1995Memoranda on which they were completely silent, but they say we cannot
use our constitutional name with them if those bilateral dealings are taking place in the United
Nations. That is an absurd position to adopt. And they say that we have to call ourselves “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” before the United Nations and any of its organs,
including this Court; but then, as you heard for yourselves, on numerous occasions they are
1“Nimetz: No New Proposal”, VOA News, 9 Feb. 2011, available at: http://www.voanews.com/
macedonian/news/Macedonian-VOA-Macedonia-Greece-UN-Negotiations-Mathew-Niemitz-115695309.html. - 19 -
allowed to use the acronym “FYROM” or “ARY M”, which is not the provisional reference
12
described in resolution817, and has been the subject of official protest. It is difficult for us
simply to listen constantly to the use of the onym in that way, but as you will also know we
sought an understanding and we ha ve stuck with references to “Applicant” and “Respondent”,
precisely to avoid putting the Court in an uncomfortable situation. But the point is this,
Mr. President: their practice is flatly inconsistent with the claim that the only acceptable name for
the Applicant or anybody else to use is “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, that we are
not entitled to call ourselves the Republic of Macedoni a, whether in the United Nations or in any
other international organization, or before this Court; it is one contradiction after another.
11. Mr. resident, that concludes this introduction. I invite you now to call
Professor Murphy to the Bar. Thank you very much for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorPhilippeSands for his statement: and now I invite
Professor Sean Murphy to take the floor
Mr. MURPHY:
T HE RESPONDENT ’S BREACH OF A RTICLE 11 (1)OF THE INTERIM A CCORD
Introduction
1. Thank you, Mr. President. We listened attentively to the arguments of the Respondent last
week regarding the facts and the law associated with our claim that the Respondent violated
Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord. Those argumen ts generally restated the points set forth in the
Respondent’s written pleadings, which is to say th ere were considerable gaps, inconsistencies,
implausibilities, and regrettably some misrepresentations.
2. In particular, the Respondent remains incap able of confronting, in any serious way, the
indisputable evidence before you establishing the Respondent’s systematic and unrelenting
opposition to the Applicant’s membership in NAT O. Instead, the Respondent persists in
characterizing our claim as a claim against NATO itself, so as to then raise defences against a
fabricated claim that is not actually before this Court. Remarkably, the Respondent still insists that
12
AR, Ann. 42. - 20 -
the Applicant is prohibited from using its constituti onal name in its dealings with international
organizations, and further, conjures up in some dramatic way a change that occurred in the
mid-2000s ⎯ a devious plot that was hatched ⎯ which justified the Respondent’s conduct in
relation to NATO in 2007 to 2008. I say that is remarkable, because th e evidence quite clearly
shows that the Applicant has used the constitutional na me consistently in all of its external practice
since 1991 ⎯ a practice left untouched by resolution 817, and a practice accepted by the entire
universe other than the Respondent.
3. We have already thoroughly rebutted a ll of the Respondent’s points in our written
pleadings 13and in our first round presentation . We fully maintain our positions. Rather than just
repeat why the Respondent’s points are wrong, we think it is of more assistance to the Court to do
so in the course of identifying the ten central points upon which our claim rests.
Ten propositions established in the evidence and legal arguments before
the Court with
respect to the Respondent’s violation of Article 11 (1)
A. The Applicant was in the final stages of NATO’s admission process
4. Our first point. From 1995 to 2007, the Applicant proceeded with the various steps
necessary to be considered for admission to NATO and, by early 2008, was approaching the final
stage of that admission process 15. By the summer of 2007, NATO member States were poised to
invite the Applicant to accede to NATO. This is reflected in several statements by NATO
members in this time period, none of which have been contested by the Respondent 1.
B. Any NATO member State could object to the Applicant’s admission
5. Our second point. A decision to invite the Applicant to join NATO required a consensus
of all existing NATO member States at the April 2008 Summit; opposition by any single NATO
member State would preclude the Applicant from be ing invited. The Parties are in accord on the
requirement for consensus in NATO decision-making. The Parties are also in accord that a formal
13AM, Chaps. II (V), IV, and V; AR, Chaps. II & IV.
14
CR 2011/5, pp. 39-56, paras. 1-64 (Murphy); CR 2011/6, pp. 21-49, paras. 1-88 (Murphy).
15CR 2011/5, pp. 40-43, paras. 8-17 (Murphy).
16See, e.g., AM, para. 2.53. - 21 -
vote is never taken and never recorded within NATO, such that an objection by the Respondent
would not manifest itself in that manner. Yet there is equally nothing about the admission process
at NATO that precludes a member State from opposi ng admission of a new member. The process
is predicated upon the idea that any member State can, by expressing its opposition, object and
prevent the admission of a new member. The con sensus rule ensures that decisions, including
17
enlargement decisions, remain “the ultimate prerogative of the sovereign member states” . As the
NATO Handbook underscores, “[e]ach member count ry represented at the Council table ...
retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions” 18.
6. Article 11 (1) is concerned with whether the Respondent “objected”; it matters not for this
case whether that objection comes in the form of a “v eto”, either as that term is used formally or
informally. As for the use of that term at NATO, if by a “veto” one means a negative vote formally
cast by a member State that serves to block a decision that otherwise has a requisite majority, then
there is no such “veto” at NATO. Quotes of NAT O’s Secretary-General to the effect, which the
Respondent noted last week, are speaking to a “veto” in that sense. But, if the term “veto” is used
as in common parlance, so as to mean opposition by a member State that prevents a consensus
decision from emerging, then there is such a “veto” at NATO, as NATO itself has often
19
recognized .
7. I will not repeat our arguments on this point 20. However, I feel compelled to respond to
statements by the opposing Agent that may have left the wrong impression. Agent for the
Respondent stated last Thursday that “‘blocking’ or ‘vetoing’ a NATO decision is out of the
question” 21. In support of his position, the Agent pointed to a 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement,
a portion of which he included in your judge’s folder . [Plate 1 on] The portion of that Study that
he presented to you was as follows:
17
RCM, Ann. 145.
18Ibid,, Ann. 22, p. 33.
19See, e.g., RCM, Ann.15; see also “Canadian Defens e Minister Asks for Change in NATO Consensus on
Admitting New Members”: AR, Ann.153; “Time to Abolis h the National Veto on New NATO and EU Members,”:
AR, Ann. 78.
20CR 2011/5, pp. 52-53, paras. 51-54 (Murphy).
21CR 2011/8, p. 23, para. 8 (Savvaides). - 22 -
“Decisions on enlargement will be for NATO itself... Ultimately Allies will
decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join according to their
judgment of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North
Atlantic area at the time su ch decision is made... No country outside the Alliance
22
should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process of decisions.”
8. Three aspects of this language are worth noting. First, while the Respondent suggests that
this language somehow encompasses the Applicant, a complete reading of the Study demonstrates
that the country at issue in that final sentence was not the Applicant but, rather, a much larger and
more powerful country, considerably further north and to the east. Second, while that major power
outside the Alliance is not to have a “veto”, th e clear implication in this language is that existing
members within the Alliance do have the ability to oppose the admi ssion of new members. Third,
in any event, the concern expressed here is with a non-member blocking admission, a circumstance
clearly not at issue in this case. [Plate 1 off]
9. The Respondent’s Agent, though waxi ng quite eloquently about his own personal
involvement at NATO, unfortunately did not inform you of other, more relevant, parts of the
1995 Study. [Plate 2 on] By way of example, consider paragraph 30, which reads in part:
“Countries could be invited to join sequentially or several countries could be
simultaneously invited to join, bearing in mind that all Allies will decide by consensus
on each invitation, i.e. new Allies must join consensus for subsequent invitations . . .
Simultaneous accessions would avoid the possibility of veto by new members on
23
others joining at the same time . . .”
10. This passage confirms that, even in the context of a consensus decision, individual
member States of NATO can object to admission of a new member. Whether styled as a “veto” or,
as is done later in the same paragraph, styled as an existing member “closing the door” to a new
member, it makes no difference. The point is that it is eminently possible for a single NATO
member State to oppose the admission of a candida te State. So the idea that “NATO knows no
veto”, promoted heavily by the Respondent last week, is not quite accurate. [Plate 2 off]
22
CR 2011/8, p. 25, para. 16 (Savvaides).
2Study on NATO Enlargement, issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 3 Sept. 1995, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm - 23 -
C. The Respondent engaged in vigorous opposition to the Applicant’s admission
11. Our third point. During 2007 and 2008, the Respondent engaged in a vigorous,
24
systematic, diplomatic and public campaign against the Applicant’s admission to NATO . This is
not in dispute. Further, the Respondent con cedes that its position on NATO membership for the
25
Applicant changed in the mid-2000s . By the summer of 2007, the Respondent embarked on a
strategy to oppose the Applicant’s membership in NATO, and it did so exclusively because the
name difference had not yet been resolved to th e satisfaction of the Respondent. We took you
through several examples of the extensive ev idence of the Respondent’s opposition. On both
Thursday and Friday, we sat at our table and noted the remarkable silence of the Respondent on
this key issue. At no point, in its oral pr esentation, did the Respondent deny opposing the
Applicant’s admission to NATO. The words did not pass the Respondent’s Agent’s lips. They did
not pass the lips of the Respondent’s counsel.
12. The reason is likely that no one can doubt that the Respondent did oppose the
Applicant’s admission in NATO; the evidence speaks for itself and it takes many forms:
statements by the Respondent at formal NATO m eetings; statements by the Respondent to NATO
members in advance of NATO meetings; statements by the Respondent in its Parliament or with
parliamentary groups, confirming the position ta ken at NATO and with NATO members;
statements by the Respondent to the media or published in the media. Counsel for the Respondent,
last week, helpfully conceded: “The fact that these statements were made is uncontested” and “In
no way do we resile from them.” 26
13. I invite you to recall, in particular, the st atement of the Respondent’s Foreign Minister in
the Fall of 2007, when asked whether the Respondent was “willing to go to extremes, to exploit
Skopje’s prospects of accession to NATO, to use all the means and options at its disposal?”, she
answers simply: “Yes. The answer is yes.” 27 Two days later, the Foreign Minister says in an
interview that adhering to the Interim Accord, a nd thereby allowing the Applicant to join NATO,
2CR 2011/5, pp. 43-50, paras. 18-44 (Murphy).
25
CR 2011/9, pp. 54-55, paras. 23-24 (Crawford).
2Ibid., p. 48, para. 5 (Crawford).
2AM, Ann. 73. - 24 -
28
might be the politically easy path to take, but would be an act of “political cowardice” . Rather
striking: the Foreign Minister of a country sayi ng that following its international obligations is
“cowardice”. Counsel for the Respondent seems to think that such stat ements by the Foreign
Minister do not constitute evidence of the Respondent’s opposition but, with respect, the words
speak for themselves.
14. I invite you to recall as well, the Respondent’s lengthy aide mémoire at Annex 129 of the
Memorial. The Respondent concedes that it sent this aide mémoire to NATO member States, and
29
concedes that it was “intended” to communica te the Respondent’s views to those States . In the
aide mémoire, the Respondent states that “in addition to any accession criteria . . . [t]he satisfactory
conclusion of the [name] negotiations is a sine qua non in order to enable Greece to continue to
30
support the Euro-atlantic aspirations of Skopje” , and then it goes on further to say that this will be
“the decisive criterion” 31, a clear signal that without a resolution of the name issue, the Respondent
would object. Again, the fact of the Respondent’s strong opposition to the Applicant’s membership
in NATO, absent resolution of the name issue, is readily apparent.
15. And recall finally, the numerous statements repeatedly made by the Respondent’s
PrimeMinister vividly demonstrating the “strategi c goal” of the Respondent: as he put it: “Our
position, ‘no solution ⎯no invitation’, is clear. If there is no solution, our neighbouring state’s
32
aspirations to participate in NATO will remain unrealised.”
16. Now, how does counsel for the Respondent deal with these statements? Politicians
blowing smoke, they say; nothing with which this Court must concern itself. Really? Is that the
way this Court should treat a Prime Minister’s statements? If so, it will require a significant change
of direction in the Court’s treatment of facts a nd evidence, given that you have previously made
ample use of such statements when establishing a State’s wrongdoing. An example of this that
immediately comes to mind, though there are many others, is the case of Nicaragua v. United
States, your merits decision in 1986, which we raised last Monday and which Professor Crawford
28AR, Ann. 167.
29
CR 2011/9, p. 50, para. 11 (Crawford).
30
AM, Ann. 129; emphasis added.
31Ibid.
32AR, Ann. 97. - 25 -
studiously avoided in his presentation. In that case, the Court saw particular significance in
statements by the individual who is “constitutionally responsible for the foreign policy of” the State
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), I.C.J.Reports 1986 , p.92, para.170), even when made in the domestic sphere. Rather
than putting such statements down as “puffery” of some sort, the Court made extensive use of
33
evidence originating in a “national politi cal forum” (as the Respondent puts it) for proving a
State’s wrongdoing, including statements made by the President of the United States and other
senior United States officials, to Congress. And it did so to establish the fact of a policy that
violated United States obligations under international law 34.
17. By way of alternative argument, the Res pondent says all these statements are irrelevant
because they are not “NATO documentation”. It is a curious defence: Article 11 (1) is concerned
with the Respondent’s “objection” not that of NATO. Further, this Court has never required
evidence of a State’s malfeasance be recorded in some particular documentary form when finding
an international violation.
18. But if the Respondent wants NATO documentation, it need look no further than
Annex30 of its own Counter-Memorial. Th ere it will find a NATO document, issued on
3 April 2008, clearly stating that “the Greek delegation made it very clear that until the name issue
35
is resolved, it has not yet been resolved, that will not be possible” and further stating: “[t]he
Greek government has been very clear, including in this evening’s discussions, that until and unless
the name issue is resolved, there cannot be consensus on an invitation for the former Yugoslav
36
Republic of Macedonia to begin accession talks” .
33
CR 2011/9, pp. 49-50, para. 10 (Crawford).
34
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 21, para. 20 (“it was made clear, not only in the United States press,
but also in Congress and in official statements by the President and high United States officials, that the United States
Government had been giving support to the contras . . ..”); ibid., p. 70, para. 125 (“According to the President’s message
to Congress, this emergency situation had been created by ‘the Nicaraguan Government’s aggressive activities in Central
America’.”); ibid., p.90, para.169 (“The view of th e United States as to the legal effect of these events is reflected in,
for example, a Report submitted to Congress by President R eagan on 10 April 1985 in connection with finance for the
contras.”); ibid., p. 124, para. 241 (“It appears to the Court to be clearly established first, that the United States intended,
by its support of the contras, to coerce the Government of Nicaragua . . .”).
35RCM, Ann. 30, pp. 1-2.
36Ibid., p. 3. - 26 -
19. As my son typically says after he has thrashed me on the Nintendo, “game over”.
20. The singling out of the Respondent by NATO is telling. The Respondent invites you to
conclude that somehow the NATO membership, as a whole, decided against the Applicant’s
application independently of the Respondent, and in the absence of any objection by it. But the
Respondent is directly and repeatedly fingered by NATO and by other NATO member States as
37
having made an objection . This fact is substantiated in literally hundreds of contemporary press
reports. And it is really no surprise that all accounts point to the Respondent, given that the
Respondent itself repeatedly declared that it had objected; that it had single-handedly blocked the
Applicant’s entry into NATO. The Respondent ’s Foreign Minister said it in Brussels 38. The
Respondent’s Prime Minister said it at Bucharest; he said it simply and clearly: “Due to Greece’s
39
veto, FYROM is not joining NATO.”
D. The Respondent’s opposition has an “objection” under Article 11 (1)
21. Our fourth point. Under Article 11(1), the Respondent had a clear and unequivocal
obligation not to object. The relevant language is simple and direct and admits of no ambiguity.
By its conduct, the Respondent deliberately and unequivocally violated that obligation 40.
E. An objection under Article 11 (1) is only permissible in one limited circumstance
22. Our fifth point. Article 11 (1) carves out one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance where the
Respondent may lawfully object: only if the Applican t “is to be referred to in such organization or
institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817”.
37
AM, para. 2.61; AR, para. 2.22.
38
Ibid., Ann. 83; see also AM, Ann. 89.
39Ibid., Ann. 99; emphasis added.
40CR 2011/6, pp. 22-30, paras. 6-32 (Murphy). - 27 -
23. The Applicant’s admission to NATO w ould have been on the same terms as its
admission to the United Nations under resolution817 41. Indeed, the Applicant was already
participating in NATO programmes on th e basis of that provisional reference 42. There is no
dispute between the Parties on that point. Consequently, the Respondent had no basis for objecting
and should not have objected, just as it had not for many other internati onal organizations since
1995.
F. Respondent, on the facts, did not object for the reasons permitted in Article 11 (1)
24. Our sixth point. All of the evidence shows that the Respondent’s opposition in this
period was based upon its concern about non-re solution of the difference concerning the
43
Applicant’s name . There is no evidence that the Respondent’s opposition was based upon a
concern that NATO would refer to the Applicant by anything other than the provisional reference.
There is no evidence, in any of the Respondent’s many statements, that its opposition was based
upon a concern that, in communications with NAT O, the Applicant would call itself by its
constitutional name or that third States would do so 44. Indeed, there is no evidence of any Note
Verbale from the Respondent to the Applicant co mplaining about such practice within NATO in
the period leading up to April 2008.
G. The Applicant’s use of the constitutional name cannot justify an Article 11 (1) objection
25. Our seventh point. Even if the evidence showed that the Respondent’s opposition was
based upon a concern that, in the Applicant’s communications with NATO the Applicant would
call itself by its constitutional name. That con cern would not be a lawful reason for objecting
under the second clause of Article 11 (1) 45. The ordinary meaning of that clause is not addressing
46
the use of the Applicant’s constitutional name before international organizations . The
41AM, Ann. 69, p. 2.
42
CR 2011/6, p. 31, paras. 33-36 (Murphy).
43
CR 2011/5, pp. 51-52, paras. 45-49 (Murphy).
44CR 2011/6, pp. 32-34, paras. 40-43 (Murphy).
45Ibid., pp. 31-32, paras. 33-39 (Murphy).
46Ibid., pp. 34-37, paras. 44-51 (Murphy). - 28 -
Respondent thinks otherwise based upon an idiosyncratic view as to the meaning of resolution 817,
to which the second clause of Article 11 (1) refers, but the Respondent’s view has no support.
26. How should this Court interpret resolution817? ( Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 , p.53, para. 114.) The
language of resolution 817 nowhere says that the Applicant cannot use its constitutional name in its
dealings with the United Nations, nor that it must use the provisional reference. Indeed, there is no
language of any kind, in resolution817, directed at the Applicant. In your Advisory Opinion
relating to Kosovo, the Court carefully analysed certain Security Council resolutions, making sharp
distinctions between those that expressly address themselves to, and therefore imposed restrictions
on non-State actors and those that did not ( Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, General
List No. 141, paras. 114-118). Here, resolution 817 contains no language directed at the conduct of
the Applicant and none should be implied.
27. To the contrary, the resolution ma kes clear that the Council has “examined”
UnitedNations doc.S/25147, a document to which is annexed the application for admission filed
by the Applicant, in which the Applicant used its constitutional name, [plate 3 on]. Now, attached
to that application for admission to the United Nations, there was an appendix containing the
following declaration by the Applicant in this case. That declaration said:
“In connection with the appliction by the Republic of Macedonia for
membership in the United Nations, I have the honour, on behalf of the Republic of
Macedonia, and in my capacity as President, to declare that the Republic of
Macedonia accepts the obligations cont47ned in the Charter of the United Nations and
solemnly undertakes to fulfil them.” (Emphasis added.)
28. In other words, the Security Council, in resolution817, received and “examined” the
application for membership, which included this declaration in which the constitutional name is
used three times, and then proceeded to act favourably on the application 48, as did the General
Assembly. [Plate 3 off]
47
A/47/876-S/25147 (1993), in AM, Ann. 25.
4See also Note by the President of the Security Council, S/25545 (1993), in AM, Ann. 32. - 29 -
29. In considering the Respondent’s position, that the Council’s resolution ordered particular
conduct by the Applicant when engaging in its exte rnal relations, the Court will be aware that the
resolution was in the form of a recommendation to the General Assembly. Only by that latter
organ’s “decision”, adopted a day later, was the Applicant admitted to the United Nations; only
then, by the Assembly’s action, did the provisi onal reference become operative in the United
49
Nations .
30. What about the discussions leading up to the adoption of resolution817? When the
President of the Security Council circulated th e draft of what would become resolution817
containing the provisional reference, one might have expected him to say something like, if the
Respondent is correct, “this requires the country who has applied for United Nations membership
to call itself by a new name, at least when appear ing before the United Nations”, or something like
that. Well, there is no evidence before the Court th at such a thing happened, or that it did in fact
happen, as is clear from the following statement by Morocco, [plate 4 on] which held the Council’s
presidency at that time. This statement circulated with the draft of what became resolution817.
What does the statement say?
“the draft resolution envisages that the state have a provisional reference in the UN
(‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ ). This is not a matter of imposing a
name on the new state, or conditions for its admission to the UN, but it merely
concerns the manner in which it will be provi sionally referred to in its activity in the
United Nations (plaque, official documents, ‘bluebook’).” 50
31. This statement, contemporaneous with the adoption of the resolution, confirms the
resolution’s meaning and effect. [Plate 4 off] Ot hers involved in the nego tiation have attested to
the same. While counsel for the Respondent seeks to minimize the role of Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s
recollection of what resolution817 was all about, the compromise developed for resolution817
emerged from an initiative undertaken by a troika of European member States of the Security
Council at that time, including the United Kingdom. Ambassador Greenstock, as Under Secretary
of the United Kingdom Foreign Office, though b ased in London, was instructing United Kingdom
49
A/RES/47/225 (1993).
5AR, para. 4.42 and Ann. 12. - 30 -
diplomats in New York. This was hardly a matte r about which capitals were taking no interest.
51
Ambassador Greenstock’s statement is clear and it is not rebutted by any contrary evidence .
32. Practice at the United Nations under resolution817 between 1993 and 1995, when the
Interim Accord was concluded, also confirms that the Respondent was fully entitled to use its
52
constitutional name in its dealings with the United Nations . There are literally hundreds of
examples of the Applicant submitting letters a nd documents to the United Nations, or making
speeches before it, using its constitutional name, st arting from the very first day of the Applicant’s
53
admission to the United Nations in a speech by its President to the General Assembly , none of
these statements eliciting any objections from the United Nations Secretariat or from any third
States. Several of these communications are in evidence before you. For example, three weeks
after admission to the United Nations, the Applican t sent letters to the Secretary-General which, in
turn, were sent to the Security Council, in which the Applicant used its constitutional name 54. The
Secretary-General did not send the letters back to the Applicant unopened. The Security Council
did not send the letters back to the Secretary- General, chastising him for passing them along.
Indeed, when the Security Council later adopted resolution 845 (1993), it said nothing about what
the Respondent now regards as unlawful and devian t practice under resolution817. Nor has the
Council said so at any time since then 55.
33. The negotiating history of the Interim Accord does not support the Respondent’s theory
56 57
as to the meaning of the second clause . I will not repeat all our prior points on this .
Professor Sands noted at the outset of our presenta tion, Ambassador Nimetz’s 1995 statement that
confirms the practice that had emerged after resolution817 and it suggests that no change was
expected in that practice in the course of concluding the Interim Accord. I do want to draw the
51
Ibid., Ann. 58.
5CR 2011/6, pp. 37-41, paras. 53-64 (Murphy).
5See Statement of President Kiro Gligorov to the General Assembly, UN doc. A.47.PV.98, p. 22 (1993) (“At this
solemn moment, I am happy and excited to express, on behalf of ·the people and Government of the Republic of
Macedonia, our gratitude for the support demonstrated by the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United
Nations as an equal Member.”)
54
See AR, Anns. 33-34.
5Ibid., paras. 4.46-4.50.
5CR 2011/6, pp. 41-42, paras. 65-66 (Murphy).
57
See especially AR, paras. 4.51-4.61. - 31 -
Court’s attention to one point with respect to this negotiating history. The Respondent tries to
make something out of the language proposed by the Respondent toward the end of the Interim
Accord negotiations. This draft language would have written the sec ond clause of Article 11 (1) a
little bit differently so as to allow an objection “if the provisional reference under which [the
Applicant] is to be admitted to such organization s” differs from that of resolution 817. The reason
that that language was dropped in favour of what actually emerged as the second clause of
Article 11 (1) was not for the reason now advanced by the Respondent. Rather, as we pointed out
58
in our Reply , the draft language was rejected and what we now have was adopted because the
draft language did not reflect reality. The Appl icant is not “admitted” to an international
organization under the “provisional reference”: the Applicant is admitted to the organization based
on an application that bears its constitutional na me. Thereafter, the Applicant is provisionally
referred to in that organization by the provisional reference. At whatever future point when the
difference over the name is resolved, it is not envisaged that the Applicant must reapply to the
international organization under an agreed name; it is already a member of the organization. The
only change that will occur is that the provision al reference need no longer be used in that
organization.
34. Finally on this seventh point, the practi ce of the Parties subsequent to the Interim
Accord ⎯ from 1995 to 2008 ⎯ also does not support the Respo ndent’s theory as to the meaning
59
of the second clause of Article 11 (1) . Whether one looks at the Council of Europe or the OSCE
or at Unesco or at any of the numerous other organizations that the Applicant has joined from 1995
to the present, there has been no problem for an y of those organizations with the Applicant’s
consistent use of its constitutional name in communications with the organization, nor any concern
expressed by third States. Even in their bila teral relations, the Respondent accepts that the
Applicant is entitled to use its constitutional name 6. The Respondent, rather weakly, tries to
explain away this “bilateral” practice as just th at, bilateral, and therefore somehow not relevant,
although in the very next breath the Respondent d eclared as somehow relevant to Article 11 (1) the
58AR, para. 4.66-4.67.
59
CR 2011/6, pp. 42-43, paras. 67-68 (Murphy).
60Ibid., pp. 43-45, paras. 69-74 (Murphy). - 32 -
bilateral practice of more than 100States with the Applicant, in which those States use the
constitutional name. Apparently b ilateral practice does matter, so long as it is not that of the
Respondent.
H. Other reasons stated by the Respondent cannot justify an Article 11 (1) objection
35. Our eighth point . The Respondent continues to advance other reasons for why it was
entitled to object under Article 11(1), such as the Applicant’s alleged “lack of good
neighbourliness” or “irredentism”. These reasons ar e totally unsupported by the evidence and, in
any event, they are not permitted bases for an objection under Article 11 (1) 61.
I. NATO’s conduct is not relevant to the unlawfulness of the Respondent’s objection
36. Our ninth point . The decision reached by NATO at Bucharest is simply not at issue
before this Court. This case concerns exclusiv ely the legality of the Respondent’s conduct in 2007
to 2008 under the Interim Accord; that conduct is either lawful or unlawful regardless of the
positions taken by other States.
37. Nevertheless, the Respondent persists in its inaccurate characterization as to NATO’s
posture with respect to the Applicant prior to th e Bucharest Summit. Contrary to the repeated
assertions by the Respondent, there is simply nothing in the record ⎯ no evidence of any kind ⎯
stating that NATO adopted as a criterion for accessi on that the name difference be resolved, nor
that any requirement for “good neighbourly relation s” meant that the name difference must first be
resolved; there is nothing in the record to establish that 62. Counsel last Friday chastised us for a
“profound misunderstanding of the gravity of d ecision-making in the councils of the military
alliance” 63, and then proceeded to profoundly miscomprehend himself what NATO has actually
said about the relevance of the name difference to the Applicant’s membership in NATO. NATO’s
2006 Riga Summit Declaration does not say that resolution of the name difference is a requirement
for the Applicant’s membership. NATO’s December 2007 Communiqué does not say it . The
Secretary-General of NATO did not say it , nor say that resolvin g the difference was a
6CR 2011/6, pp. 45-47, paras. 75-82 (Murphy).
62
CR 2011/5, pp. 53-55, paras. 55-58 (Murphy); AR, para. 2.58.
6CR 2011/9, p. 45, para. 17 (Reisman). - 33 -
“performance-based standard”. Yes, NATO has acknowledged the existence of the name
difference. Yes, NATO has expected all candida te States to pursue “good neighbourly relations”.
But counsel for the Respondent have to engage in extraordinary connect-the-dots analysis, divining
all sorts of hidden meanings and sudden innue ndo in NATO’s statements, so as to reach their
ultimate conclusion, hardly a display of respect fo r the “gravity of decision-making in the councils
of the military alliance”. The reality is that, rather than setting up the name difference as a
membership criterion, NATO memb ers were pleading with the Res pondent in this time period to
stick to its obligations under the Interim Accord.
J. The Applicant is entitled to a declaration of a violation and that the Respondent conform
38. Finally, our tenth point. In light of the Respondent’s deliberate and knowing breach of
Article 11 (1), the Court should grant the relief that we request. We are asking you to declare that
the Respondent has violated its obligation under Article 11 (1); the violation is clearly established
on the facts and on the law. We further ask that you order the Respondent to immediately take all
necessary steps to comply with its obligation, including that it cease and desist from objecting in
any way to the Applicant’s membership in NATO. Yet our request extends beyond just NATO; by
its conduct, the Respondent has demonstrated a c onviction about Article 11 (1) that implicates the
Applicant’s position with respect to other international organizations, including most crucially the
European Union. As such, our request asks that you order the Respondent in a manner that
encompasses the Respondent’s conduct with respect to any international organization falling within
the scope of Article 11 (1).
Conclusion
39. Mr. President, before I conclude, allow me to note that senior leaders of the Respondent
have recently confirmed ⎯ once again ⎯ that the Respondent did in fact engage in what
constitutes an objection in the period leading up to and at Bucharest; indeed, they themselves
continue to refer to such conduct as a “veto.”
40. On 24January of this year ⎯ just two months ago ⎯ Mr.AntonisSamaras, the Leader
of the Respondent’s main opposition party, New Demo cracy, took to the floor of the Respondent’s
Parliament. New Democracy was the ruling party of the Respondent’s Government at the time of - 34 -
Bucharest, and Mr. Samaras was defending one of the foreign policy steps taken by the members of
his Government when they were in power. On the floor of the Parliament, he said: [plate 5 on]
“[I]n Bucharest they set the ‘red lines’ fo r the Macedonian issue. . .. Greece
clarified its position. It explained that it would accept one name for all uses, erga
omnes. It excluded the ethnological qualifier with a name that implies irredentist
claims. It put aside all proposals for double and triple names. It exercised a veto on
the entry of FYROM into NATO and the EU . . . . And today, we firmly stick to these
‘lines’.”64 (Emphasis added.)
24 January of this year.
41. The Respondent’s opposition ⎯ indeed, its “veto” ⎯ is fully confirmed in Athens today,
just as it was in the spring of 2008, as is the reas on for its opposition, a reason totally unrelated to
the manner in which NATO will refer to the Applicant. Moreover, consider again that final
sentence, which confirms that the “red lines” are se t; they will be adhered to in the future, casting
implications not just for the Applicant’s entry into NATO, but the European Union as well.
[Plate 5 off]
42. Well this is a most inconvenient and untim ely confirmation, so it is no surprise that the
Respondent’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dimitrios Droutsas, felt compelled to respond to
Mr.Samaras’s statement right away, emphasizing his concern about the use of the term “veto”.
What may be a surprise is that this Court itself features in what he had to say. This is what
Mr. Droutsas said on the same day in Parliament: [plate 6 on]
“Since we speak about veto, allow me to call upon everyone not to use this term
in relation to the issue of Skopje. However patriotic the use of this word might sound
it hurts our national interests in the case of Skopje before the International Court in the
Hague. You should have known that as a minister of the previous Government,
Mr.Samaras. And I genuinely call on you not to sacrifice everything on the altar of
easy impres65on and party politics, without any respect for the country’s real
interests.”
43. I ask the Court to note that the Foreign Minister does not deny that the Respondent
opposed the Applicant’s admission to NATO. He does not correct the stated justification for this
64Statement by Antonis Samaras, Leader of New De mocracy (Respondent’s main opposition party), Session of
the Greek Parliament, 24Jan. 2011. Both the video and offici al transcript (excerpt at p.39) are available at:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?searc…
=24%2F01%2F2011 .
65Statement by Dimitrios Droutsas, Respondent’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Session of the Greek Parliament,
2Jan2.011. Both the video and official transcri pt (excerpt is at pp9.4-95) are available at:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?searc…
=24%2F01%2F2011. - 35 -
opposition. All he does is urge that the term “veto” not be used b ecause that particular
characterization of what happened hurts the Respondent in its position before this Court. As one of
our learned opponents might say when waxing eloquently about young Hamlet, “thus conscience
66
does make cowards of us all” . [Plate 6 off]
44. But this is not the end. Mr. Samaras felt compelled to respond in turn. He knows what
happened at Bucharest; he is astounded that the Foreign Minister is running away from the truth in
its arguments before this Court. [Plate 7 on] Among other things, Mr.Samaras took to the floor
again in Parliament and said the following:
“I also heard that we never exercised a veto on the Macedonian issue. I think it
was your Minister who said that. Perhaps the word ‘Bucharest’ is unknown to him.
This is his problem. He doesn’t want to remember what happened then, who opposed,
67
who exercised the real veto.”
45. Mr.President, these proceedings demonstrate that Mr.Samaras is quite right. The
Respondent does wish to forget its conduct at Bucharest , at least before this Court. The
Respondent does wish to forget who opposed the Appli cant’s admission to NATO. And it wishes
to forget who exercised “the real veto”. [Plate 7 off]
46. The Respondent may wish to forget, but we ask that this Court not forget what the clear,
copious, and unequivocal facts demonstrate about the Respondent’s conduct in 2007-2008, and that
those facts establish a clear violation of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord.
47. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your patience. If it please the
Court, you may wish to have your coffee break at this time. Professor Klein will be the next up in
our presentation.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Sean Mur phy, for your statement. I believe this is
the appropriate moment for the Court to have a brie f coffee break. I just remind the audience that,
for the second round of oral pleadings by the Applicant, the time is from 10o’clock to 1o’clock
6Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1.
6Statement by Antonis Samaras, Leader of New Demo cracy (Respondent’s Main Opposition Party), Session of
the Greek Parliament, 24 Jan. 2011. Both the video and official transcript (excer pt is at p.126) are available at:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?searc…
=24%2F01%2F2011. - 36 -
and I hope we will be able to abide by that frame work. So the Court will have a short coffee break
of ten minutes. We come back at quarter to twelve.
The Court adjourned from 11.35 a.m. to 11.50 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court resumes its session. I now invite
Professor Pierre Klein to make his statement.
M. KLEIN : Merci, Monsieur le président.
Le différend n’entre pas dans le champ de l’exception contenue dans l’article 21,
paragraphe 2, il relève pleinement de la compétence de la Cour
et la requête est entièrement recevable
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, l’adage est bien
connu : on n’est jamais aussi bien servi que par soi-même. C’est sans aucun doute cette pensée que
nos estimés contradicteurs ont eue à l’esprit en développant leur argumentation relative aux
exceptions préliminaires dans la présente affaire. Dans l’une de ses plaidoiries de la semaine
passée, le professeur Pellet a indiqué à ce sujet que la Cour était confrontée à ce qu’il a appelé un
«nŒud gordien», qu’elle n’avait pas le pouvoir de trancher 68. Mais, en réalité, Monsieur le
président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, il n’y a de nŒuds dans ce dossier que
ceux que la Partie adverse s’est efforcée de nouer elle-même ⎯en y ajoutant au fil du temps
quelques boucles supplémentaires ⎯ pour tenter de persuader la Cour qu’elle n’était pas
compétente à l’égard du litige qui lui est soumis, ou qu’il sortait de ses fonctions judiciaires de se
prononcer sur ce litige. Ces nŒuds prétendument inextricables ne sont en fait pas bien difficiles à
dénouer. Et dès lors qu’ils n’existent pas, la Cour n’aura pas à se demander si elle peut ⎯ ou
non ⎯ les trancher. Je vous propose de vous en a ssurer successivement en ce qui concerne les
questions de compétence et de recevabilité.
2. Dans sa plaidoirie de jeudi passé, le professeurReisman s’est employé à convaincre la
Cour qu’elle était privée de compétence à l’égard du présent litige, car celui-ci conduirait
inévitablement la Cour à se prononcer sur le différend re latif au nom de l’Etat de l’Etat requérant.
68
Voir CR 2011/9, p. 18, par. 22 (Pellet). - 37 -
Or, comme vous le savez maintenant, il s’agit là d’une question qui est clairement exclue du champ
de la clause compromissoire contenue dans l’article 21, paragraphe2, de l’accord intérimaire, en
vertu du premier membre de phrase de cette disposition 69. Ainsi que j’ai eu l’occasion de l’exposer
70
la semaine dernière , l’Etat défendeur retient un critère particulièrement large pour l’interprétation
de cette clause. [Projection.] Je rappelle que, selon ce critère ⎯ et même si nos contradicteurs
71
paraissent avoir des doutes à cet égard , c’est bien celui qu’ils ont eux-mêmes identifié ⎯, le
différend relatif au nom, exclu de la compétence de la Cour, devrait inclure «tout litige dont le
règlement préjugerait, directement ou par implication, du différend relatif au nom 72». [Findela
projection.]
3. Nos contradicteurs pensent pouvoir tirer av antage du fait que la ligne d’argumentation de
l’Etat requérant sur ce point aurait évolué. Alors que la requête introductive d’instance indiquait
que «l’objet du litige ne concerne pas, de manière directe ou indirecte, le différend auquel il est fait
référence dans l’article5, paragr aphe1, de l’accord intérimaire» 73, ces termes («directement ou
74
indirectement») ne figurent plus dans la ré plique, qui garderait un «silence embarrassé» sur ce
point. Monsieur le président, il n’y a là aucun silence, et aucun embarras. Aujourd’hui comme
hier, l’Etat requérant maintient que la Cour n’a pas compétence pour résoudre le différend relatif au
nom ⎯ et seulement ce différend. Tous les autres litiges potentiels liés à quelque autre aspect de
l’accord intérimaire entrent par contre pleinement dans la compétence de la Cour ⎯ y compris, par
exemple, un différend quant à la manière dont les Parties s’acquittent de leur obligation de négocier
au sujet du nom.
4. Ce qui importe ici, ce n’est pas de savoir si la position du requérant peut avoir évolué
quant à l’existence d’un lien plus ou moins direct entre le présent litige et le différend sur le nom
mais bien, plus fondamentalement, de savoir si le critère retenu par l’Etat défendeur pour
l’interprétation de l’exception cont enue dans la clause compromissoire est le bon. En d’autres
69Voir CR 2011/8, p. 48, par. 7 et suiv. (Reisman).
70
Voir CR 2011/5, p. 58, par. 5 (Klein).
71
Voir CR 2011/8, p. 48, par. 7 (Reisman).
72RR, par. 3.13.
73Requête, p. 8, par. 10.
74Voir CR 2011/8, p. 49-50, par. 11 et 12 (Reisman). - 38 -
termes, suffit-il qu’il existe un lien, même indir ect, même «par implication» entre le litige porté
devant la Cour et le différend relatif au nom de l’Etat requéra nt pour qu’un tel litige soit d’office
exclu de la compétence de la Cour? L’Etat requérant soutient clairement ⎯ et il a toujours
soutenu ⎯ que tel n’est pas le cas, et que seul le différend relatif au nom lui-même ⎯ c’est-à-dire
à la détermination du nom ⎯ est exclu du champ de la clause compromissoire.
5. Le professeurReisman et moi-même vous avons invités, la semaine dernière, à suivre le
cheminement qui mène de l’articl2 e1, paragraph2 e, de l’accord intérimaire à la
résolution817(1993) du Conseil de sécurité, en passant par l’article5 de l’accord 75. Un
cheminement un peu long, peut-être, mais qui ne fait en rien du litige soumis à la Cour une affaire
horriblement complexe, comme essayent à toute force de le faire croire nos contradicteurs 76⎯
77
conformément, d’ailleurs, au scénario que nous avions envisagé .
6. Je vous rappelle à cet égard que l’article 21, paragraphe 2, permet de soumettre à la Cour
les différends relatifs à l’interprétation ou à l’exécu tion de l’accord intérimaire, «[à] l’exception de
la divergence visée au paragraphe1 de l’article 5». On peut déjà noter que la clause
compromissoire exclut «la divergence visée au paragraphe1 de l’article5» et non, par exemple,
«les différends relatifs à l’application du paragraphe1 de l’article5», ce qui serait une tout autre
chose. Aux termes de l’article 5,
«[l]es Parties conviennent de poursuivre les négociations sous les auspices du
Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conformément à la
résolution845(1993) du Conseil de sécurité, en vue de parvenir à régler le différend
mentionné dans cette résolution et dans la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil».
7. Le professeurReisman vous a proposé une l ecture particulièrement créative de l’accord
intérimaire sur ce point. Selon lui, ce n’est pas seulement à l’article5, paragraphe1, qu’il serait
fait référence au différend sur le nom, mais aussi «de manière centrale», pour reprendre ses termes,
78
dans l’article 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord . Monsieur le président, j’ai relu attentivement le texte
de l’article11. Je l’ai lu en français. Je l’ai lu en anglais. Et je n’y ai trouvé aucune mention
quelconque du différend sur le nom. Je ne suis d’ ailleurs pas le seul. Lorsqu’il a analysé l’accord
75Voir CR 2011/5, p. 57-58, par. 3 (Klein) ; CR 2011/8, p. 47-48, par. 4-6 (Reisman).
76
Voir CR 2011/8, p. 47, par. 3 (Reisman).
77
Voir CR 2011/5, p. 21, par. 14 (Miloshoski).
78Voir CR 2011/8, p. 52, par. 24 (Reisman). - 39 -
intérimaire devant vous il y a quelques jours, le professeur Abi-Saab a identifié trois catégories de
dispositions au sein de ce traité. La première éta it celle des dispositions concernant l’obligation de
régler le différend relatif au nom, et les modalités de ce règlement. Le professeur Abi-Saab incluait
deux dispositions ⎯et deux dispositions seulement ⎯ dans cette première catégorie de clauses:
l’article5, paragraphe1, de l’accord, et la pa rtie de l’article21, pa ragraphe2, qui y renvoie 79.
Aucune mention, par contre ⎯et pour cause ⎯ de l’article11. C’est donc une lecture pour le
moins fantaisiste du texte qui vous est suggérée par certains de nos contradicteurs, qui ne paraissent
guère avoir accordé leurs violons sur cette question. Il me semble de loin préférable de s’en tenir à
ce que l’accord prévoit vraiment sur ce point. Et ce qu’il prévoit, c’est de renvoyer, dans son
article 5, à la résolution 817 (1993) du C onseil de sécurité. Nulle part ailleurs ⎯ nulle part ⎯ ne
retrouve-t-on dans le texte de l’accord la moi ndre mention d’un différend à l’égard duquel la Cour
ne pourrait exercer sa compétence. La réso lution817(1993), pour sa part, mentionne la
«divergence [qui] a surgi au sujet du nom de l’Etat , qu’il faudrait régler da ns l’intérêt du maintien
des relations pacifiques et de bon voisinage dans la région» 80.
8. Il ne fait donc aucun doute que le différe nd exclu de la compétence de la Cour est bien
celui qui pour reprendre les termes de la résoluti on «a surgi au sujet du nom de l’Etat» requérant.
Rien de plus, rien de moins. C’est le différend relatif au nom, et lui seul, que le jeu combiné des
articles 21, paragraphe 2, et 5, paragraphe 1, de l’accord soustrait à la compétence de la Cour, parce
que c’est un différend purement politique. J’ai montré , la semaine dernière, que le texte même de
la résolution817(1993) permettait de faire claire ment la distinction entre ce différend, que les
Parties sont appelées par le Conseil de sécurité à régler, et l’utilisation de l’appellation provisoire
d’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine, retenue comme solution temporaire «en attendant que
81
soit réglée la divergence qui a surgi au sujet de son nom» . La résolution identifie ainsi, d’une
part, un problème : la divergence ou le différend au sujet du nom. Professeur Sands vous a rappelé
il y a quelques instants que les versions de la résolution817 dans les six langues officielles des
NationsUnies sont parfaitement cohérentes dans leur terminologie sur ce point. La résolution
79Voir CR 2011/8, p. 35, par. 14-15 (Abi-Saab).
80
Paragraphe 3 du préambule de la résolution.
81Résolution 817 (1993), par. 2. - 40 -
propose, d’autre part, une solution temporaire pour permettre l’admission de l’Etat requérant aux
NationsUnies, en dépit de l’existence de ce problème. Cette solution est l’utilisation d’une
dénomination provisoire. Et autant le présent di fférend concerne bien la question des obligations
que fait peser ⎯ ou non ⎯ cette résolution sur l’Etat requérant en ce qui concerne l’utilisation de
la dénomination provisoire (c’est-à-dire la solution retenue par la résolution) , autant il ne porte pas
sur la question du nom en tant que telle (c’est-à-dir e sur le problème identifié dans la résolution).
Les représentants et les conseils de l’Etat dé fendeur l’ont d’ailleurs très clairement admis à
plusieurs reprises devant vous la semaine pass ée. Je me limiterai à cet égard au discours
d’ouverture de l’agent de l’Etat défendeur, da ns lequel celle-ci a expressément reconnu que «la
82
Cour n’est pas ouvertement appelée à trancher la question du nom de l’Etat demandeur» .
9. La thèse de l’Etat défendeur ignore complète ment cette distinction fondamentale entre les
deux composantes de la résolution817(1993). Il est d’ailleurs particulièrement révélateur que
dans sa plaidoirie de la semaine passée, le professeur Reisman n’ait pas dit un mot ⎯ pas un seul
mot ⎯ de l’interprétation de la résolution 817 (1993) sous l’angle de la compétence. Il en a certes
parlé très longuement sous l’angle du fond ⎯ ce que la résolution requiert, ou non, du requérant en
83
ce qui concerne l’utilisation de la dénomination provisoire . Il vous a également présenté de très
nombreuses versions ⎯plus ou moins caviardées et retouchées ⎯ des clauses de l’accord
intérimaire, censées refléter les lectures qu’en faisa it l’Etat requérant. Mais sur les implications de
la structure et du contenu de la résolution 817 (1993) pour la détermination de la compétence de la
Cour, alors qu’il s’agit là du texte fondamental auquel renvoie l’accord intérimaire, rien, un grand
vide.
10. Il vous a été rappelé la semaine derniè re que la thèse du défendeur revenait en fait à
priver la Cour de toute compétence à l’égard de portions très larges de l’accord, voire de la faire
disparaître complètement. S’il fallait retenir l’interprétation de la clause compromissoire proposée
par la Partie adverse, répétons-le encore une fois, les différends relatifs à pas moins de onze clauses
de l’accord seraient d’office exclus de la compétence de la Cour, selon le propre comptage effectué
82
Voir CR 2011/8, p. 17, par. 19 (Telalian).
83Voir Ibid., p. 54-57, par. 29-44 (Reisman). - 41 -
84
par l’Etat défendeur . Près de la moitié de l’accord échapperait de ce fait automatiquement au
champ d’application de la clause compromissoire. Sur ceci, une fois encore, pas un mot de la
Partie adverse. Contre l’évidence la plus élémentaire, nos estimés contradicteurs préfèrent
continuer à prétendre que leur thèse ne contredit en rien le fait que l’article 21, paragraphe 2, donne
ce qu’ils continuent à appeler un «rôle central» à la Cour dans le contrôle de l’application de
l’accord 85. Et ils reprennent à cette fin la liste des dispositions ⎯ provisoirement, très
provisoirement ⎯ sauvées des eaux, en affirmant qu’un litige les concernant ne toucherait pas
nécessairement à la question du nom.
11. Mais le problème n’est pas de savoir si un litige relatif à ces di spositions toucherait
nécessairement à la question du nom. Il suffirait, à suivre la thèse de l’Etat défendeur, qu’un
éventuel litige présente un lien quelconque, même incident ou lointain, avec cette question pour
qu’il soit automatiquement «contaminé» si l’on peut dire par l’exception prévue dans l’article21,
paragraphe 2. Rappelez-vous du critère retenu par la Partie adverse directement ou par implication.
L’un des exemples retenus par nos estimés contradicteurs appara ît particulièrement malheureux à
cet égard. Le professeur Reisman a fait référence à l’article 8 de l’accord, qui impose aux Parties
de s’abstenir de poser des obstacles aux m ouvements de personnes et de biens entre leurs
86
territoires . Il a affirmé qu’un litige relatif à cette di sposition ne serait pas nécessairement relié à
la question du nom 87. Peut-être pas nécessairement, mais potentiellement en tout cas, par
implication, dès l’instant où serait établie une connexion avec le différend sur le nom. M. Reisman
semble avoir oublié ⎯sans doute parce qu’il s’agit d’un ép isode que l’Etat défendeur est peu
enclin à voir évoqué devant cette Cour ⎯ que c’est précisément en vue de faire pression sur l’Etat
requérant dans le contexte du différend relatif au nom que l’Etat défendeur lui a imposé un
embargo économique aux consé quences désastreuses en1994 88? Pourtant, s’il fallait suivre le
défendeur, le litige qui résulterait de l’adoption de telles mesures serait bel et bien exclu de la
compétence de la Cour dès lors qu’il présente un lien de connexité, par implication, avec le
84RR, par. 3.21 et CR 2011/5, p. 60, par. 9 (Klein).
85Voir CR 2011/8, p. 50, par. 15 (Reisman).
86
Voir Ibid., p. 52, par. 23 (Reisman).
87Voir Ibid.
88AM, par. 2.27. - 42 -
différend relatif au nom. Et il pourrait évidem ment en aller de même pour toutes les autres
dispositions de l’accord qui pourraient être reliées d’une manière ou d’une autre, par implication, à
ce différend. L’interprétation du premier membre de phrase de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, soutenue
par l’Etat défendeur se révèle dès lors plus inte nable que jamais. Et ce n’est certainement pas un
hasard si un auteur grec particulièrement proéminent qui a commenté l’accord intérimaire ⎯ avec
une autorité sur laquelle mon collègue le prof esseur PhilippeSands re viendra dans quelques
instants ⎯ n’a nullement retenu cette approche de la clause compromissoire, et lui a au contraire
89
reconnu une portée très large .
12. Je ne m’attarderai guère, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de
la Cour, sur l’autre argument d’incompétence soulev é par l’Etat défendeur, selon lequel la Cour ne
pourrait trancher le présent différend car cela lu i imposerait de se prononcer sur les droits et
obligations d’Etats et d’entités tiers à l’instance, en l’absence de leur consentement. L’argument
bâti par nos estimés contradicteurs sur ce point est tout entier fondé sur une vision des faits de la
cause dont on ne sait pas trop si elle relève du surréalisme ⎯ ce qui aurait au moins le mérite de lui
conférer une prétention artistique ⎯ ou du déni pur et simple de réalité. La prémisse du
raisonnement est en effet que l’ Etat défendeur n’a rien fait d’autre que de «se joindr[e] au
90
consensus déférant [l’]admission [du requérant] à l’OTAN» . Aucun comportement propre de
l’Etat défendeur, préalablement au sommet de Bucarest , ne peut être identifié. Un tel acte distinct
91
de la décision de l’OTAN, nous ont martelé les professeurs Pellet et Crawford, n’existe pas . Et la
Cour serait de ce fait irrémédiablement amenée à se prononcer sur un acte de l’OTAN, ce qu’elle
92
ne peut faire .
13. Mon collègue le professeur Sean Murphy vous a exposé il y a quelques instants ce qu’il
convenait de penser d’un tel scénario et de sa complète invraisemblance. Le professeurSands,
quant à lui, vous a détaillé ce conte de fées que se raconte la Partie adverse, comme pour se
rassurer, mais l’heure des contes est terminée, il est temps de revenir aux réalités, aux dures
89
ChristosRozakis, Political and Legal Dimensions of the Transiti onal Agreement signed in New York between
Greece and FYROM, Athènes, Sideris, 1996 (en grec), par. 3.5.
90
Voir CR 2011/10, p. 30, par. 36 (Pellet).
91Voir CR 2011/9, p. 15, par. 18 (Pellet) ; ibid., p. 53, par. 19 (Crawford).
92Voir ibid., p. 15, par. 19 (Pellet). - 43 -
réalités. Cet acte d’objection existe indéniablement, et il est clairement attribuable à l’Etat
défendeur, qui l’a revendiqué tant et plus par la voix de ses plus hautes autorités. Le fait qu’il
s’agit d’un comportement clairement individualisable et clairement attribuable à l’Etat défendeur
nous a d’ailleurs été confirmé au-delà de tout dout e par le professeur Crawford, qui a insisté sur ce
point à propos des différentes prises de positi on des autorités du défendeur: «governmental
93
institutions of Greece are not the same as NATO», nous a-t-il dit . Nous ne saurions mieux
exprimer les choses. Et c’est précisément pour cette raison que la Cour est pleinement habilitée à
se prononcer sur la compatibilité de ce comportement à l’article11, paragraphe1, de l’accord
intérimaire de1995, sans que cela la conduise pour autant à prendre position de manière
quelconque sur les décisions intervenues ultérieure ment au sein de l’OTAN. L’on se trouve donc
bien confronté ici à une situation similaire à celle s dont la Cour a eu à connaître dans l’affaire
Nauru et dans l’affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo . La Cour n’est en rien
contrainte de se prononcer sur les comportement s de tiers à l’instance comme préalables à la
détermination de la responsabilité d’une des pa rties à l’instance. La jurisprudence de l’ Or
monétaire n’est dès lors d’aucun secours à l’Etat défendeur. Et c’est bien pour cette raison, alors
même qu’ils nous reprochaient not re silence au sujet de cette jurisprudence, que nos estimés
94
contradicteurs ne se sont guère étendus sur ce point .
14. L’exception d’irrecevabilité avancée par l’Etat défendeur, aux termes de laquelle la Cour
devrait s’abstenir de rendre un arrêt car celui-ci serait dépourvu de tout effet pratique, est fondée
sur le même scénario. Là aussi, nos estimés contra dicteurs ont refusé de s’engager dans un débat
juridique digne de ce nom quant à la pertinence de l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional pour le
litige présentement soumis à la Cour. Et cela n’a rien d’étonnant, puisqu’un tel débat, s’il devait
avoir le moindre intérêt, peut difficilement s’engager sur des prémisses factuelles aussi incorrectes.
Je ne peux donc que réitérer le constat opéré par l’Etat requérant sur ce point : une fois la demande
rapportée à son objet exact, la construction éla borée par le défendeur pour en contester la
recevabilité tombe en poussière 95. Les enjeux concrets et pratique s de la présente affaire, on l’a
93Voir CR 2011/9., p. 48, par. 6 (Crawford).
94
Voir ibid., p. 15, par. 19 (Pellet).
95CR 2011/5, p. 64, par. 14 (Klein). - 44 -
amplement montré à ce stade, sont bien réels. C’est le cas tant par rapport à l’OTAN qu’à l’égard
d’autres organisations dans lesquelles l’Etat requérant pourrait solliciter son admission à l’avenir,
comme l’Union européenne, par exemple.
15. Reste enfin l’allégation d’interférence dans un processus politique ⎯ celui des
négociations sur le nom de l’Etat requérant ⎯, qui devrait elle aussi conduire la Cour à abdiquer
ses pouvoirs en l’espèce. Il convient tout d’abord de rappeler que l’Etat requérant a exprimé de
nettes réserves quant à l’introduction particulièreme nt tardive de cette dernière exception, en
contrariété avec les règles régissant la présentation des exceptions préliminaires. La Partie adverse
a visiblement choisi d’ignorer complètement ce léger inconvénient, puisque ses conseils n’en ont
pas dit un mot la semaine passée. L’Etat requérant ne peut donc que réitérer ses réserves sur ce
point, en invitant la Cour à écarter cette dernière exception en raison de sa présentation tardive.
16. A supposer que la Cour accepte néanmoins de l’examiner, et à titre subsidiaire, qu’il me
soit permis de rappeler brièvement pourquoi un arrê t rendu par la Cour dans la présente espèce
n’aurait en rien pour effet d’interférer dans le processus de négociation sur le nom. L’analyse de la
résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité à laquelle nous venons de nous livrer a très clairement
montré que le processus de négociation sur le nom, d’une part, et la question des obligations que
faisait éventuellement peser la résolution817 ( 1993) sur l’Etat requérant en ce qui concerne
l’utilisation de la dénomination provisoire, d’ autre part, sont deux questions bien distinctes 96. Une
fois encore, la Partie adverse entretient délibérément la confusion à cet égard. La détermination de
la portée de la résolution817 (1993) et de l’accord intérimaire en ce qui concerne la question de
l’utilisation de la dénomination pr ovisoire n’aura en rien pour effe t de trancher le différend relatif
au nom, ni d’imposer une conclusion au processus de négociations toujours en cours entre les
Parties à ce sujet. Nos estimés contradicteurs ont fait valoir à ce propos qu’«il n’appartient pas à
l’«organe judiciaire principal» des NationsUnies de délier» l’Etat requéra nt de son obligation de
97
négocier en vue d’arriver à une solution du différend sur le nom . L’Etat requérant ne l’a jamais
prétendu, et ce n’est nullement ce qu’il attend de la Cour, directement ou indirectement. Cette
obligation de négocier existait avant que le présen t litige survienne, et elle continuera à exister
96
Voir aussi CR 2011/6, p. 18-19, par. 14 (Klein).
97Voir CR 2011/9, p. 19, par. 28 (Pellet). - 45 -
après qu’il ait été réglé. Rien ne conduira donc la Cour à «interférer» dans un processus politique
et à porter de ce fait atteinte à l’«intégrité de la fonction judiciaire» si elle accepte de traiter au fond
de l’affaire qui lui est aujourd’hui soumise.
17. En conclusion, c’est pour l’ensemble des raisons qui vous ont été rappelées ce matin que
l’Etat requérant prie respectueusement la Cour de rejeter les exceptions d’incompétence et
d’irrecevabilité formulées par l’Etat défendeur.
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie
pour votre aimable attention. Je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir maintenant
passer la parole à mon collègue, le professeur Philippe Sands.
Mr.PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorPierre Klein for his statement. Now I invite
Professor Philippe Sands to take the floor.
SMAr.DS:
T HE RESPONDENT ’S BREACH OF ARTICLE 11 (1)CANNOT BE EXCUSED
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it remains for me to address the excuses put forward
by the Respondent to justify its violation. You will recall there were three: the Article 22 excuse,
the exceptio excuse, and the countermeasur es excuse. Now these have b een very fully pleaded by
now, and nothing we heard last week has caused us to depart from the very clear views that we
have already expressed, namely, that these creativ e legal arguments cannot get them off the hook,
and I will deal with them reasonably shortly.
2. As regards the Artic22 argument, this was dealt with exclusively by
Professor Reisman 9. One might have expected somebody on that side of the room to deal with the
practical application of Article 22, its melding to the facts of the case, perhaps Professor Crawford,
but this just never happened. So ProfessorReisman’s presentation was just left hanging, aptly
99
described as an “entr’acte” , a bit like the entr’acte in that wonderful Rodgers and Hammerstein
98
CR 2011/9, pp. 39-46 (Reisman).
99Ibid., p. 8, para. 52 (Crawford). - 46 -
show Cinderella; the one that always gets played at every live performance as a sort of
divertimento but never features in the final recorded version ⎯ in this case, that is your Judgment.
3. Counsel for the Respondent lamented that Article 22 was, to use his words, “something of
a latecomer to this case” 100. Well, if I were the host I would be surprised that this guest turned up
at all. There is a very simple reason we made no mention at all of Article22 in our Memorial,
beyond a reference to the fact of its existence, and that is because it is totally irrelevant. In
preparing for this case we fully researched th e academic literature on the Interim Accord.
Counsel’s words last week caused us to go back to these articles and check again ⎯ had we missed
something? But once again, we were unable to fi nd any commentator who considers Article 22 to
be remotely relevant to the core functions of the Accord. Now, if any such article might have been
expected to assist, it would have been that published by Professor ⎯ now Judge ⎯ Christos
Rozakis, in 1996, entitled, in English, “Political and Legal Dimensions of the Transitional
Agreement” signed in New York between Greece and FYROM. It appears to be only available in
Greek ⎯ we do have an informal translation into English and we would have no objection to
sharing it with the other side or the Court if th at would be helpful. The article was published
around the time Professor Rozakis served as the Respondent’s Deputy Foreign Minister 101. Given
his then position, we assume he was well placed to provide an authoritative commentary on the
Interim Accord. So if anyone might address Article 22, one would have expected it to have been
him. It is therefore noteworthy that he makes no mention of Article 22 at any place in his 77 page
book, and no mention either of any related right on the part of either Party to suspend or modify
any obligation in the manner sought by the Respondent. No other legal article that we have been
102
able to identify makes a material reference to Article 22, in any way that assists the Respondent .
100CR 2011/9, p. 39, para. 2 (Reisman).
101
Christos Rozakis, Political and Legal Dimensions of the Trans itional Agreement signed in New York between
Greece and FYROM, Athens, Sideris, 1996 [in Greek].
102
See, e.g., MichaelWood, “Participation of Former Yugos lav States in the United Nations and in Multilateral
Treaties”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law , (1:1997),p.1, available at:
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/wood_1.pdf; Nikos Zaikos, The Interim Accord: Prospects and
Developments in Accordance with International Law , available at: http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/
InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Zaikos.pdf; Aristotle Tzia-mpiris , The Name Dispute in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia after the Signing of the Interim Accord , available at: http://www.macedonian-
heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads /Interim_Tziampiris.pdf. - 47 -
There are similar provisions to Article22 in ma ny other international ag reements and nowhere
have we found support for their view and they have cited none.
4. ProfessorPellet complained that “nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre font une lecture
partielle et partiale, en voulant dissocier l’article 11 de cet instrument de son article 22” 103. Well,
in truth, he should be directing his critique to Ms Telalian’s former colleague at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Indeed, last week, when he w as in the room, he would not even have had to go
that far, he could have raised his concerns w ith Mr. Evangelos Kofos, counsel to the Respondent,
who was then sitting even closer to him, who happened to work in the same Ministry as
Professor Rozakis, and who has cited his book with approval, referring to Professor Rozakis as “a
distinguished jurisprude” 104. [Plate1on] Now, of particular interest, for present purposes, is the
fact that Mr.Kofos notes ProfessorRozakis’ statement that “any disappointments and impasses
which might arise on the way to an agreement over the name should not prevent the concurrent
implementation of the Transitional Accord,” and then ⎯ even more significantly ⎯ he quotes,
with approval, Professor Rozakis’ statement “[w]hat has already been agreed must not be used in
negotiations as a lever to gain adva ntages in the matter of the name” 105. So let us be clear:
ProfessorRozakis foresaw exactly what has happened in this case, that a party ⎯ the
Respondent ⎯ might take what has already been agreed ⎯ the obligation not to object in
Article 11 (1) ⎯ and use it “in negotiations as a lever to gain advantages in the matter of the
name.” Did ProfessorRozakis express the view that Article22 might be used to circumvent,
modify or condition “what has already been agreed”? He did not. Did Mr. Kofos criticize him for
that failure? He did not. Did MsTelalian, or any of her predecessors, take any steps to alert
ProfessorRozakis or Mr.Kofos that they had fallen into error? There is no evidence before this
Court that they did. In short, we have been able to find no support for the view adopted by
Professor Reisman that Article 22 is a central component of the Interim Accord. And that is why
we said nothing about it in our Memorial. [Plate 1 off]
103
CR 2011/8, p. 63, para. 12 (Pellet).
10Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name’: A Greek Perspective”, in Athens-Skopje: An
Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002, published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe rs, Athens, Dec.2003, Hellenic Foundation for
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), ISBN 960- 8356-05-9, pp.27-144; available in English at:
http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Ko…; judges’ folder, tab 14.
10Ibid., at p. 146, quoting from Professor Rozakis’ book, op. cit., fn. 101, at pp. 37-38. - 48 -
5. There is therefore good reason why Article22 was a latecomer. No one negotiating the
Interim Accord seems to have thought it was significant. I can therefore be very clear in
responding to the points raised by counsel in a presentation that was, all will have noticed, both
brief and incomplete in its effort to respond to th e arguments we made last week or in our written
pleadings. He did not address, as you will have noticed, the short-cut we identified that permits the
Court to deal with Article 22 in a straightforwar d way: unless the Respondent can show that as at
April 2008 there was a right or duty obliging it unde r NATO to object because the name difference
had not been resolved, then on its own case Article 22 is of no use to it. But, even on its own case,
the Respondent has not been able to show that its objection to our NAT O membership was based
on any criterion for NATO membership. You will recall that I drew your attention to the evidence,
that shows the Respondent’s objection was based on criterion that were “in addition to” those set
forth in any NATO documents 10. On that point too the Respondent was silent and we noted that
silence.
6. So, what did Professor Reisman have to say? He made four central points. First, that we
had not explained the effect of Article 22 10. That is simply wrong. If he cares to have a look at
paragraph 5.13 of our Reply, we set out an explanation that clauses of this type were not unusual in
international agreements. Then we gave a practical example in the field of defence procurement as
to how a provision that is aimed at providing that an agreement will not alter the rights and duties
of a third party can operate in practice. But you do not explain, he claims, how “the duties” of third
108
parties might be affected . In fact we thought it was rather clear from that paragraph of our
Reply: if State A supplies items to State B with restrictions on retransfer to other States, and then
State B supplies to the Respondent, State B has a duty ⎯ an obligation ⎯ to State A that is
covered by Article 22. And that goes in the same way for international obligations of the European
Union to a third party, given that the Respondent is a member of the EU.
7. Second, ProfessorReisman sought to address our point that the Respondent’s
interpretation of Article22 made no sense when c onsidered next to the provisos in Articles14
106
RCM, para. 7.35; AR, para. 2.11; CR 2011/6, p. 61, para. 28 (Sands).
107
CR 2011/9, p. 40, para. 9 (Reisman).
10Ibid. - 49 -
and 19 of the Interim Accord, that speak expressly to the rights of the Respondent. He explained
that these provisions deal with issues that are “ar eas”, to use his word, “in which European Union
member States have delegated their competences to the European Commission”, so it was, to take
his words again “natural, at least for the Greek draf ters of the Interim Accord, to provide explicitly
for such provisions, so as not to infringe upon the exclusive competences assigned to the European
109
Commission in these fields” . And he generously offered to us that, since the Applicant is not a
party to the European Union, we may not have been aware of these matters. With respect, the lack
of understanding is his. Putting aside the minor point that exclusive competences are vested with
the Community, not the Commission, the argument collapses simply by looking at other provisions
of the Interim Accord. Article 15, for example, deals with “economic relations”; it is hard to think
of an area in respect of which the European Economic Community had more exclusive competence
than this one, but it includes no proviso. The same may be said of Article16, that deals with
technical co-operation and, another example, Article 17, that deals with the environment, an area in
which the Community also has a high degree of exclusive competence. So th is explanation has to
be wrong, neat as it is, as anyone familiar with European Union law will instantly recognize.
8. Then Professor Reisman decided to meld Articles11 and22, yet again. Having just
110
criticized us for inserting words into the Interim Accord , he then did exactly the same thing. He
used various slides to show us how the Respondent had inserted the word “but” to link Articles 11
and 22 into a seamless, beautiful and helpful whole. Now, this exercise did have the great merit of
transparency, as was claimed, but counsel never adequately explained why he was entitled to insert
a word into a treaty that altered the meaning by having the clear effect of subordinating Article 11
to Article22 in a way that the drafters themselves did not do, as they had done in Articles 14
and 19. And he did not explain either why he felt able to remove nine crucial words from the text
of Article 22, the words that state that the Accord “is not directed against any other State or entity”.
In any event, the insertion and removals do not assist if we ⎯ Judge Rozakis and Mr. Kofos, every
other commentator and observer ⎯ are correct in considering that Article22 has no relevance to
Article 11 and to this case.
109
CR 2011/9, p. 41, para. 10 (Reisman).
11Ibid., para. 9. - 50 -
9. Then ProfessorReisman returned to the distinctions between different categories of
so-called “open” and “closed” international organizations. We have already explained the basis for
our view that this distinction is without merit 111. The sheer complexity of the argument does not
add to its attractiveness; I must confess that on the oral presentation I rather lost the thread when
he came on to fax machines, telephones and the re levance of the concept of scarcity. And, of
course, I found myself wondering into which categor y different bodies might fall. What about the
World Trade Organization, which seems to be both an “organisation à vocation universelle” and an
“organisation fermée”. Reading, rereading, a nd re-rereading did not add to the force of an
argument that is noteworthy for the fact that it ma kes reference to not a single authority in support
of the claim. And we still await an explanation as to the absurdity of the outcome: the Respondent
has a right to object in all international organiza tions at which its objection may have an effect ⎯
closed organizations ⎯ but no right where the objection has no effect ⎯ open organizations.
10. Of course, the effect of his argument is devastating for the Interim Accord and the
stability that it was intended to create. This is confirmed by him and we are happy to take the
confirmation that “every obligation in the treaty is potentially contingent on Article 22”, so that the
112
obligation in Article11 yields . On that approach, Article11 and every other provision just
becomes meaningless: either party is simply entitled to assert that it has as a right or duty under an
international obligation in force for it, and then it can override an obligation in the Interim Accord.
That is not a conclusion that was identified by ProfessorRozakis or Mr.Kofos, or apparently
anyone else on this planet. The idea that Article22 is a sleeping provision that can somehow be
invoked in January 2010, in the Counter-Memorial ⎯ fifteen years after the Interim Accord was
adopted and two years after the dispute arose ⎯ is not immediately attractive, given the destructive
effect that it has on the Accord. Professor Reisman simply chose to ignore thirteen years of
inconvenient practice; on the one hand, the Respond ent argues that we have been systematically
violating our obligations under the Accord, since 1995 and, on the other hand, he says that it was
only in 2008 that it finally found reason to act, with a public statement by the Applicant’s President
that was delivered . . . a year after the Respondent began to object and six months after
111
AR, paras. 5.25-5.28; CR 2011/6, pp. 57-58, paras. 20-21 (Sands).
11CR 2011/9, p. 43, para. 13 (Reisman). - 51 -
Bucharest 11! Ever inventive, counsel has come up with the right of pre-emptive pre-emption, the
right to act months before the information that generates the right has become known to you. One
can quickly imagine to what mischief such a theory could soon be applied.
11. In conclusion, Article22 cannot be the “g et out of jail card” that is claimed. In
paragraph 7.7 of its Counter-Memorial, the Respondent conceded that Article 11 (1) “limits a right
that Greece could otherwise freely exercise”. Prof essor Crawford recognized that Article 11 was,
to take his words, a “major concession by Greece” 114. Article22 was not intended to restore the
situation which pertained before that concession w as granted. Article11 either does or does not
limit the right, it either was or was not a major concession. And it certainly cannot be a concession
or a limitation that the Respondent is free to abrogate unilaterally on the basis of conditions that are
nowhere set out, by reference to a provision that its own senior Foreign Ministry advisers
considered to be of no relevance whatsoever. Article 22 does not assist the Respondent.
12. So I turn to the exceptio. As always, it was a real pleasure to listen to Professor Pellet,
who did not seem to appear too exhausted by his tussle with Professor Crawford over the privilege
of arguing this point. With vim and vigour, he battled, a Greek hero, a testament to formidable
talents, but perhaps also to the power of self-delusion.
13. Was I the only person in the Great Hall, late on Friday afternoon, as the cocktails des
juges approached, to be transported back in time, maybe to 1938 ⎯ and elsewhere in place,
somewhere to where the Acad emy Building was, perhaps ⎯ to imagine JudgeAnzilotti sitting at
the back of the lecture theatre, nodding sagely, as a brilliant and, it must be said, very youthful
115
ProfessorPellet expounded on the great future that lay ahead for the exceptio ? But then, as if
awoken from a dream, I was back in 2011 and the r eal world of the law court and law libraries and
matters at hand ⎯ confronted with the real world, not the world of myth and Gods and heroes.
Preparing for this hearing, we went through each edition of Professor Pellet’s very fine treatise on
international law, to see what he really thought about the exceptio, from the 1stedition ⎯
published in 1977 ⎯ to the 8th edition ⎯ published recently in 2009. In each case, the treatment
11CR 2011/9, p. 46, para. 18 (Reisman).
114
Ibid., p.23, para. 8 (Crawford).
11CR 2011/10, pp. 24-34 (Pellet). - 52 -
was short and, as I mentioned last week, entirely devoted to the manner in which the exceptio has
been picked up in Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Co nvention. So I, to be frank, did not recognize
Friday’s speech as bearing any relation whatsoever to what he wrote in any of those eight editions.
So perhaps we were getting a privileged previe w of what might appear in the next edition ⎯
Pellet’s 9th we might call it ⎯ an indication also of the hazards of simultaneously navigating the
worlds of academe and professional practice.
14. We expected half an hour on the exceptio and countermeasures, but we got a full hour.
Sometimes, Mr. President, less is more. We thought we would have nothing to add to what we said
in our written and oral pleadings. But something rather interesting happened. The Court will recall
that at paragraph8.2 of its Counter-Memorial the Respondent asserted, in respect of the exceptio,
and its entire case, that it had “never claimed any intent to suspend . . . in whole or in part”. The
116
point was repeated at paragraph8.40 of the Rejoinder . [Plate2on] So, the Court can well
imagine our surprise when Professor Pellet announced to the Court on Friday afternoon ⎯ late in
the day ⎯ that in fact the Respondent had effected a “suspension partielle” 117 as you can see on the
screen now. But then, a few minutes later, having upped the gear from third to fourth, he went
straight into reverse, which is always a dangerous thing to do. Perhaps he recognized he had fallen
into error ⎯ this is what he then says: [Plate 2.2 on] “il n’entrait nullement dans ses intentions de
mettre fin à l’accord intérimaire ou d’en suspendre l’exécution” ⎯ that is what he said, returning to
118
the line taken in paragraph8.2 of the Counter-Memorial and 8.40 of the Rejoinder .
Mr.President, you will understand that we are now somewhat confused as to what their case is.
Have they suspended, or have they not suspende d? One reading of Professor Pellet’s presentation
is that they have now dropped the exceptio argument, and that they are just arguing material breach
of treaty under Article60, but of course he ne ver actually said that and it would be truly
extraordinary for the Respondent to raise such a si gnificant new legal argument so late in the day,
having rejected it right up until Friday afternoon. But perhaps that is why he raised Article65,
paragraph5, claiming it to be available as a sh ield, to allow suspension in the absence of prior
11RCM, para. 8.2; RR, para. 8.40.
117
CR 2011/10, p. 28, para. 12 (Pellet).
11Ibid., p. 33, para. 26 (Pellet). - 53 -
notification 11. But his difficulty on that score is that Article65, paragraph5, begins with the
following words ⎯ it says “without prejudice to Article45”; so you go and take a look at what
Article45 says and it prevents a State from invoking a ground for suspending the operation of a
treaty under Article 60 if, after becoming aware of the facts, it has “expressly agreed that the treaty
is valid or remains in force or continues in operation”. So we were even further struck by the new
and additional inconsistency when ⎯ ten minutes later, after having raised Article65,
paragraph 5 ⎯ Professor Pellet did exactly that, he expressly agreed that the treaty is valid, remains
in force and continues in operation: “il n’entra it nullement dans ses intentions de mettre fin à
l’accord intérimaire ou d’en susp endre l’exécution”, he said. So , having raised Article65,
paragraph 5, he then cut off its head.
15. Another reading of Professor Pellet’s unusual presentation is that the Respondent is
somehow inviting the Court to meld the exceptio and Article 60 into something new, that would be
a wholly novel argument.
16. But there is a third possible reading, and this one strikes us as the most likely, and that is
that the Respondent is in total disarray; that it has lost the ability to maintain oversight of the
totality of its arguments ⎯ not surprising ⎯ given their improbability and their complication. That
is why the contradictions abound. In any event, we will listen with great care to what they have to
say on Wednesday, recognizing, Mr. President, that if they are to make yet another new argument
or new arguments we would fully expect to have a right to be heard on them. [Plate 2 off]
17. Whatever happens on Wednesday, the exceptio has had a jolly good outing, way beyond
what it merits. Now that it has been aired, we hope that the Cour t will put it back in the cupboard
and gently close the door, if that is not what Prof essor Pellet already did last Friday: and there we
hope it will remain, quietly resting, until its next outing, which by our calculation is a 73-year
event.
120
18. Finally, I come to countermeasures, treated as a sort of epilogue , and on which we can
be even briefer. For the reasons mentioned in the first round, the argument does not get off the
ground, and counsel did not give it wings last week. It just does not meet the conditions: there is
119
CR 2011/10, p. 29, par. 14 (Pellet).
12Ibid., pp. 34-39 (Pellet). - 54 -
no evidence before the Court to justify the conclusion that the Respondent is an injured State ⎯ it
would indeed be a truly remarkable thing if this Court could hold that a mere construction of a
statue, or the naming of an airport, or the naming of a stretch of a highway, could establish an
international injury in these circumstances. Counsel reminded us of his Agent’s submissions “que
la proportionnalité . . . doit également être mesurée à l’aune des manquements du demandeur à ses
121
obligations relatives au nom et aux négociations sur ce nom” . The remark caused us to enquire
how familiar counsel might actually be with the eviden ce before the Court. It is apparent that in
these cases we have to know the whole dossier, we have to read everything ⎯ every document ⎯
precisely to avoid making statements that get us into difficulty. But the annexes admit of no doubt:
in its Counter-Memorial, the Respondent annexed just nine Notes Verbales that were addressed to
the Applicant before 4 April 2008; that is the totality of the evidence on which they relay. Not one
of these alleges a material breach of the Interim Accord; not one of these alleges that the use of the
constitutional name before the United Nations viol ated the Interim Accord; not one of these
alleges irredentism; not one of these alleges a violation of Article5, paragraph1, of the Interim
Accord. A table setting this out is available in your judges’ folder at tab13. The Respondent
annexed no new Notes Verbales, dating from that period, from the Respondent to the Applicant in
its Rejoinder. So that is it, that is the evidence on which they rely: nine Notes Verbales, that is the
sum total of their case. And what do th ey raise in those Notes Verbales? Well ⎯ and I say this
with respect, particularly to the lady who owns the car ⎯ they can only be characterized as totally
trivial: for example, four of the Notes relate to the vandalism or theft of car licence plates on a car
that belonged to the Attaché at the Respondent’s Liaison Office in Skopje, and a fifth concerned
the rear licence plate of her spouse’s car 122. Mr. President, you cannot stand before the Bar of the
International Court of Justice in The Hague and allege, with a straight face, that damage to a car
licence plate, however regrettable, is something this Court should be dealing with. You cannot
stand before the Bar of this Court and allege that the use by the Applicant of its constitutional name
in communications with every international organization of which it has been a member since 1993
amounts to a material breach or violation of th e Interim Accord, in ci rcumstances in which the
121
CR 2011/10, p. 35, para. 31 (Pellet).
12See RCM, Anns. 41, 43, 44, 45 and 50. - 55 -
Respondent’s pleading does not contain a single Note Verbale addressed to the Applicant predating
April2008 that makes the claim or that indicates that it is entitled to take countermeasures. The
allegation is all the more implausible in the fa ce of the absence of objection by any of the
organizations or any of its members. Taken alongside the account written by Mr. Evangelos Kofos
that deals with the application of the Interim Accord in this relevant period and which fails to make
123
any mention of this offending act , the argument simply collapses.
19. Mr. President, the substantive conditions for countermeasures are obviously not met, and
the formal conditions for their invocation are obvious ly not met. Counsel made no real effort to
argue otherwise, and the argument provides no assistance to the Court or to the Respondent.
20. Mr.President, this is a simple case, one in which the facts inevitably lead to a simple
outcome. The Respondent did object, and for a reason that was not permitted by Article 11. That
objection is factually and legally distinct from any action of NATO. The Respondent’s objection
cannot be excused by any of the three grounds put forward by the Respondent: not by Article 22,
not by the exceptio, not by countermeasures. If either Part y had any concerns with the application
of the Interim Accord, the 1969 Vienna Convention provided the rules and mechanisms for dealing
with them, whether in terms of suspension, withdrawal or termination. What neither Party is
entitled to do is to take the law into its own hands, or circumvent the Vienna Convention; and this
is something that some of the delegation to my left’s own counsel recognize. [Plate3on]
Mr. President, writing in 2003 the situation was described in the following way by Mr. Kofos in the
foreword to the edited collection to which I have already referred:
“The 13th of October2002 marked the expiry of the Interim Accord between
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This Accord
had regularised relations between the two neighbour states for seven years of its
planned duration. Given that both countri es were apparently satisfied with the
Accord’s framework and the progress of its implementation, neither party declared
any intention of allowing it to lapse. It will, therefore, re main in force until it i124
replaced by a new, ‘final’ agreement, or until one of the two sides declares it void.”
(Emphasis added.)
12Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name’: A Greek Perspective”, in Athens-Skopje: An
Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002, published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe, Athens, Dec.2003, p.142; available in
English at: http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Ko….
12Evangelos Kofos and Vlasis Vlasidis, “Foreword” in Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002,
published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe rs, Athens, Dec. 2003, p. 11; availabl e in English at: http://www.macedonian-
heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Foreword.pdf; judges’ folder, tab 15. - 56 -
The Respondent has not declared the Interim Ac cord to be void, and according to its written
pleadings it has not purported to suspend it, after the little 180˚ about-turn and then re-about-turn, it
seems that it has not been suspended and remains fully in force today: and we invite you to so
judge, and to hold the Respondent to the obligations it undertook, both now and for the future.
I thank you once again, Mr. President and Members of the Court, for your patience and for
your kind attention, and invite you to ca ll to the Bar our distinguished Co-Agent,
AmbassadorNikolaDimitrov, who will bring to a close our second round of oral arguments.
[Plate 3 off]
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor PhilippeSands for his statement. I now invite
His Excellency Ambassador Nikola Dimitrov to make closing remarks and make final submission
on behalf of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Ambassador, you have the floor.
DMIr.ITROV:
Closing remarks
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I am honoured to appear for the first time before the
Court on behalf of my country, the Republic of Macedonia.
2. MinisterMilošoski elaborated upon the path my country has chosen since our
independence in 1991. It is the path of a small country in the heart of the Balkans, trying to do the
right thing in rather difficult circumstances and su rroundings, in its efforts to find its place in the
community of nations. This path was not free of major challenges, including the imperative to
build a functional democracy in our multiethnic so ciety based on rule of law, human rights and
market economy.
3. One of the main challenges since our birth as an independent State was our relationship
with the Hellenic Republic, our neighbour and the Respondent in th is case. Although it is not a
matter before this Court for resolution, the principal difference that divides us concerns the name of
my country, with all that implies to our nationality, our language and our identity. Due to the
Respondent’s opposition, we have suffered delays and setback s in our quest for international
recognition and legitimacy, often compromising the in terests for stability in the region. Several - 57 -
learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent refe rred to the purported “choice” of our name as our
125
crime . Yet for us, it was not a choice. Our name was the result of a long historic process;
indeed, born as Macedonians, speaking the Macedonian language, it is not as if we had alternative
identities to choose from. And we have never tr ied to monopolize the term, fully aware that for
different nations it can have different meanings, and not having any issue with the use of this term
by the Respondent to describe one of its own provinces.
4. No other country in the world is concerned with our name. Consequently ⎯ and I may
add, not surprisingly ⎯ a majority of the Members of the United Nations have established their
diplomatic relations with us under the name the “Republic of Macedonia”. They do so in part
because they believe such a step promotes our stability and the stability of the region. For the
Respondent, this fact is a grand strategy that we have been hiding 12. But we have hidden nothing;
we have consistently used our constitutional name, and that na me alone, in our bilateral and
multilateral relations since our country gained independence in 1991.
5. In 1995, we and the Respondent agreed in the Interim Accord to continue good faith
negotiations regarding the differenc e over the name and agreed to a series of obligations while
those negotiations were ongoing. It has not been a perfect relationship; the Parties have thus far
proven unable to settle the difference, as called for in Article5 of that Agreement. Nevertheless,
both Parties have acted in good faith in trying to do so, as the mediator ⎯ the supreme authority to
assess ⎯ Mr. Nimetz, has recently confirmed. I hope you will have noted, Mr. President, that we
have refrained from criticizing the Respondent’s conduct in those ne gotiations. I also hope that
you will understand that this is not because we deem the Respondent’s conduct to be above
criticism. However, we do not believe that this is the forum for name-calling, especially with
respect to a matter that is not before you.
6. What is before you is another articl e of the Interim Accord, which the Respondent,
regrettably, has violated. Our counsel have laid out for you the facts relating to the Respondent’s
unlawful objection under Article 11 and why its defences are without merit. I will not repeat those
arguments.
125
CR 2011/8, p. 33, para. 5 (Abi-Saab); CR 2011/9, p. 29, para. 26 (Crawford).
12CR 2011/9, p. 45, para. 18 (Reisman); ibid., pp. 54-58, paras. 24-30 (Crawford). - 58 -
7. I do wish, however, to emphasize two things. First, when the Respondent, in the months
leading up to and at the Bucharest Summit objected to our membership in NATO, it frustrated a
goal we have pursued since 1993 ⎯ 15years of difficult and challenging reforms ⎯ a goal of
immense importance for our own stability and for the stability of the Balkan region. As a
confirmation of the extent of our commitment to this organization, the men and women of our
military risk their lives on a daily basis in Afghan istan. There they operate without any problem
under a NATO flag ⎯ and without disturbing whatsoever the stability and the functionality of the
Alliance. To my country, as with many countries in the region, membership in the Alliance marks
the line of certainty and stability, a point of no return back to the years of fear and insecurity.
8. Second, I also wish to emphasize the Court’s central role in the implementation of the
Interim Accord. The two States before you recognize d that not all the issues dividing them could
be resolved immediately, but they did decide to settle what could be settled. In this sense, as a
legal framework, the Interim Accord has to a large extent normalized our relationship. In coming
to such an agreement, both States saw it as extr emely important that this Court serve as the
guardian of the Interim Accord, as the place to turn if one Party or the other failed to comply with
its provisions. For without this Court as a guide to the Parties as to the agreement struck in 1995,
there is nowhere else to turn, and the agreement, while a hallmark of progress and stability in the
Balkans, becomes empty rhetoric. Upon its conc lusion, the United Nations Security Council said
“the Accord will promote the strengthening of stability in the region” 12. The Council was right.
The Accord has done so. Our hope is that with the assistance of the Court, it will continue to do so.
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Respondent repeatedly asserts that our view of
the Interim Accord is one-sided. This is not correct. We fully recognize that the provisions of the
Accord were carefully negotiated between the Pa rties, creating a well-balanced régime for our
bilateral relationship. In agreed to its terms, my country undertook to ma ke numerous concessions
as part of the bargain. This is evidenced by ma ny of the agreement’s provisions. In agreeing to
Article11, we acquiesced in a situation wher e we would be referred to in international
organizations ⎯ in addition to the United Nations ⎯ by the provisional reference, an awkward and
12Statement by the President of the Security Council, 15Sep.1995, UN doc.S/PRST /1995/46: judges’ folder,
tab 9. - 59 -
unprecedented situation. Believe me when I say th at it is far from normal or comfortable to be
referred to in such settings by a placeholder reference, to be essentially designated as a ghost State.
Indeed, it is humiliating to be referred to on the basis of a former status, be it federal, be it colonial
or otherwise. Yet, this is what was agreed in 1995, to pertain as long as the difference over the
name is not settled. So there is nothing one-si ded about the Interim Accord, much less about
Article 11 itself.
10. Given that neither side was advantaged over the other by the Interim Accord, our request
that the Court keep both Parties on the path they set for themselves can have no effect on the
continued negotiations over the name difference. They will continue, and we will continue to
negotiate in good faith. We ask nothing more than a return to the situation that existed prior to the
Respondent’s breach of the Interim Accord in 2008. What we seek is a clear judgment that restores
legal stability, and confirms, as a distinguished le gal commentator put it, that “[w]hat has already
been agreed must not be used in negotiations as a lever to gain advantages in the matter of the
128
name” . If the Court issues a judgment in our favour , both sides will have the same burden, the
same context, the same incentives to continue to negotiate to settle the difference over the name of
my country. The effect of your judgment would si mply be to re-establish the régime agreed to
in 1995 and followed by both Parties for 13 years.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court. Bo th Parties signed the Interim Accord in 1995 to
put aside years of distrust and bilateral tension. The legal issues before you in this case may be
discrete, but the stakes for my country are very high. This case is not theoretical. Right now it has
affected us in relation to NATO, but the issue of European Union accession is already underway:
what this Court decides will have significant consequences for the stability and economic
well-being of my country.
12. By way of Article 21, the International C ourt of Justice was established as the guardian
of the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Accord. Pursuant to Article11, Greece
12Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name’: A Greek Perspective”, in Athens-Skopje: An
Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002, published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe rs, Athens (Dec. 2003), Hellenic Foundation for
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), ISBN 960-8356-05-9, p. 127 at 146, [quoting from Christos Rozakis, Political
and Legal Dimensions of the Transitional Agreement signed in New York between Greece and FYROM , Athens, Sideris,
1996 at pp. 37-38], available in English at: http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/
Downloads/Interim_Kofos.pdf: judges’ folder, tab 14. - 60 -
undertook not to object to our membership in in ternational organizations. It has broken its
promise. We therefore ask the Court to hold it to its obligations and uphold our rights. On behalf
of the Applicant, I would like to make it clear, in this courtroom, for the avoidance of all doubt that
we shall fully respect and abide by your judgment, regardless of its direction. I hope that we will
hear the same declaration on behalf of the Respondent on Wednesday afternoon.
13. Mr.President, on the basis of the evidence and legal arguments presented in its written
and oral pleadings, the Applicant requests the Court:
(i)to reject the Respondent’s objections as to the jurisdiction of the Court and the
admissibility of the Applicant’s claims;
(ii) to adjudge and declare that the Respondent, through its State organs and Agents, has
violated its obligations under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord; and
(iii) to order that the Respondent immediatel y take all necessary steps to comply with its
obligations under Article11, pa ragraph1, of the Interim Accord, and to cease and desist
from objecting in any way, whether directly or indirectly, to the Applicant’s membership
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and/or of any other “international, multilateral
and regional organizations and institutions” of which the Respondent is a member, in
circumstances where the Applicant is to be re ferred to in such organization or institution
by the designation provided for in paragraph2 of United Nations Security Council
resolution 817 (1993).
14. It remains for me to thank the Registry for ensuring the smooth running of these oral
hearings; the interpreters for their hard work and assistance, the distinguished members of our
delegation for their courtesy thr oughout the proceedings; and finally, Mr.President, Members of
the Court, to thank you for your kind attention. - 61 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, Ambassador Nikola Dimitrov, for his closing
remarks. The Court takes note of the final submissions which His Excellency has now read out on
behalf of the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace donia. On Wednesday, 30 March, from 3.00 p.m.
to 6.00p.m. ⎯ and, I repeat, from 3.00p.m. to 6.00p.m. ⎯ Greece will make its presentation of
the second round of oral argument and, in the me antime, the Court adjourns now until Wednesday
afternoon.
The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le lundi 28 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de l'accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995 (ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)