Public sitting held on Monday 28 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugos

Document Number
142-20110328-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2011/11
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Non corrigé
Uncorrected

CR 2011/11

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LAAYE

YEAR 2011

Public sitting

held on Monday 28 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Owada presiding,

in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2011

Audience publique

tenue le lundi 28 mars 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,

en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta

Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov

Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue

Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas

Registrar Couvreur

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -

Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident

KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov

Crnçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes

Djngogshue,
RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc

Cgoefferr,

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -

The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:

H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,

as Agent;

H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,

Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,

Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,

Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,

Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Counsel;

Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,

Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,

Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,

MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,

Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,

as Advisers;

Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Assistants; - 5 -

Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme coagent ;

M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,

M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,

Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,

M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,

Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,

comme conseils ;

M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,

M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,

M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,

Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,

MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des

affaires étrangères,

comme conseillers ;

M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,

M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,

comme assistants ; - 6 -

Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;

Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -

MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;

M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -

The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,

MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Agents;

MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,

Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,

as Senior Counsel and Advocates;

Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,

Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,

Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,

Csounsel;

Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,

Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of

Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

Asdvisers;

H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -

Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,

MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme agents ;

M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,

M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

comme conseils principaux et avocats ;

M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,

M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,

comme conseils ;

M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,

M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université

Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

comme conseillers ;

S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,

Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -

Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,

as Diplomatic Advisers;

Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,

Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,

as Administrative Staff. - 11 -

M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,

comme conseillers diplomatiques ;

M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,

M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,

comme personnel administratif. - 12 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets today to hear the second round of oral

argument of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I shall now give the floor to the first

speaker, Professor Philippe Sands.

SMAr.DS:

Introductory statement

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, after the first round of oral hearings it is readily

apparent that this is a simple case, and we therefore will not need to detain you for the full amount

time allocated to us. The facts are central, and ProfessorMurphy will address the two key facts:

that the Respondent did object to the Applicant’s memb ership of NATO, and that it did not do so

on the basis that the Applicant was to be referred to in NATO differently than in paragraph2 of

United Nations Security Council resolution 817. He will then draw the legal consequences of those

facts, the plain violation of Article11(1) of th e Interim Accord. The facts are also central to

establishing why this Court has jurisdiction and why there are no obstacles to that exercise of

jurisdiction, issues that will be then addressed by ProfessorKlein. I will then address the

Respondent’s excuses for its actions, and our Agent will then close our second round.

2. By way of introduction, to frame what comes, it is appropriate to place these

straightforward issues in their context and to make a small number of preliminary observations,

including with respect to the manner in which the Respondent has chosen to argue its case. It is

apparent that the Respondent’s case is not an easy one. Throughout the written pleadings, and

again last week, its approach has been to complexi fy; so the arguments are in a state of constant

flux and one can understand that approach. In thei r shoes one would have done the same thing.

But what you heard last week was a fairytale. It was based on a series of artifices and improbable

myths as to what did and did not occur in 1993, 1995, 2007 and 2008. To give that fairytale some

colour, the Respondent relied on a number of observa ble techniques. It ignored facts that were

unhelpful. It constructed new facts. It pr ovided partial and misleading accounts of what had

happened. It misquoted and it misrepresented third party sources. It dug deep into historical - 13 -

1
matters ⎯ as far back as the 4th century BC ⎯ that are of no relevance whatsoever to this case. It

raised the spectre of this Court’s involvement in political matters. These and other techniques were

marshalled to encourage the Court towards a newspaper headline that reads: “World Court rules

that Greece did not object to Macedonia’s membership of NATO”. Mr. President, it is obvious that

such a headline would be preposterous. In support of this argument, the Respondent is required to

adopt an approach that ignores a parade of elephants trampling through this Great Hall.

3. The first elephant is the Badinter Opinion. It is there in relation to the repeated claim by

the Respondent that its objection was justified by the Applicant’s “irredentism”, the alleged desire

to annex part of the Respondent’s territory; th e word was used on no less than 27 occasions by the

Respondent last week. That is said to be at th e heart of its actions, and it is said to undermine

regional stability, yet another assertion for which there is not a shred of evidence before this Court.

What is the evidence of irredentism? What is the evidence that the Applicant’s constitutional name

is a threat to regional stability? There is none be fore this Court. It is mere assertion; bald

assertion, which has no basis in fact and no support from any third party source. To the contrary,

applying criteria set by the European Community ’s Foreign Ministers, the Badinter Commission

concluded on 14 January 1992 ⎯ nearly 20 years ago ⎯ that “the Republic of Macedonia has . . .

renounced all territorial claims of any kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law;

that the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ cannot theref ore imply any territorial claim against another

State” 2. Although we raised this point last Tuesday, the Respondent had nothing to say in

3
response . And that opinion, as you will know, was a basis for the negotiations that led to the

Interim Accord, as United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made clear in his

letter of 28 May 1993, to the President of the Unite d Nations Security Council. Now, the Court of

course is not bound in any way by the Badinter Opinion, but we do not see any basis on which you

could find that its authoritative conclusion has been displaced. [Plate 1 on] There is no evidence in

1CR 2011/8, p. 18, para. 21 (Telalian).

2Arbitration Commission on the Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No.6 on the Recognition of the Socialist
Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States, 14 Jan. 1992, United Nations doc. S/25855,
Ann. III, para. 5, 28 May 1993: AM, Ann. 33; see also AM, paras. 2.13-2.14; AR, para. 4.81.

3CR 2011/6, pp. 46-47, para. 79 (Murphy). - 14 -

support of the Respondent’s contrary claim. Quite the opposite, as the United States State

Department made clear in 2004, when it stated that:

“these leaders, this government, have expressed many, many times that they have no
territorial aspirations, their use of the name Macedonia for themselves does not have

any implications for any neighbours or neighbouring territories or peoples. That is
certainly a policy the United States has maintained, that they have maintained, and we
don’t see that those factors that were discu ssed 60 years ago come into play in any
4
way with our decision today.” [Plate 1 off]

That same view appears to be held around th e world, in capitals from Moscow to Beijing, from

Mexico City to Freetown and even in Athens itsel f, as an interview granted in the Athens media

last week by current Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos makes clear. The opinion of the

Badinter Committee stands totally unrebutted. It is the first elephant in this room.

4. The second elephant in the room is Mr.Nimetz, and I intend no disrespect at all in

drawing the image, quite the contrary. The R espondent was notably discreet about the Personal

Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General. It had almost nothing to say about him, but not

quite nothing. You will recall that last Monday I dr ew your attention to what Mr. Nimetz said on

18September1995, just five days after the In terim Accord was signed, and ProfessorMurphy

returned to the point on Tuesday 5. [Plate2on] In response to that, counsel for the Respondent

castigated us for focusing on “the recollection of a remark by Mr.Nimetz, who was not in the

Security Council and who, moreover, was not even addressing, in his remark, the question of what

6
the Applicant was to call itself” . Well, that response by counsel for the Respondent is not

accurate. It is an unfortunate and further exam ple of the Respondent’s semi-detached relationship

to evidence. Mr.Nimetz did address the question of what the Applicant was to call itself:

[plate 2.2 on] he said ⎯ and you can read it for yourselves ⎯ that “

[T]he people from [the Applicant’s] count ry, when they talk about themselves,
use their constitutional name, Republic of Macedonia. And we have found this to be
the case, that there is no requirement for them to use a name that they don’t accept.
7
But that doesn’t mean that the organization accepts the name.”

4USDepartment of State, Daily Press Briefing, 4Nov.2004, available at: h ttp://2001-2009.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/37819.htm.

5CR 2011/6, pp. 41-42, para. 66.

6CR 2011/8, pp. 54-55, para. 31 (Reisman); emphasis added.

7AR, para. 4.57; “Foreign Press Center briefing with Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, special White House Envoy
subject: Macedonia-Greek agreements”, White House Briefing, 18 Sep. 1995: AR, Ann. 87. - 15 -

Mr.Nimetz’s statement is as authoritative a stat ement as could possibly be given, given his role

first as the Special White House Envoy to the United States President, on the negotiation of the

Interim Accord in which he was very closely dir ectly and personally involved. He was well aware

of what the Security Council had and had not decided in 1993, he knew what the subsequent

practice was on the use of the constitutional name, and of course he knew how the Interim Accord

took up that practice, since he helped negotiate the instrument, including its Articles5 and11.

[Plate2.3on] On 15September1995, two days after the signing of the Interim Accord, the

President of the Security Council issued a statement ⎯ you can see it on the screen now ⎯ that

“commends both parties, the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy,

Cyrus Vance, and the United States envoy, Matthew Nimetz, for their efforts in bringing about this

8
important achievement, pursuant to Security Council resolutions817(1993) and 845(1993)” .

[Plate 2 off]

5. But, Mr. President, when Mr. Nimetz says “there is no requirement for [the Applicant] to

use a name that they don’t accept” he speaks with a particular and unique au thority. As with the

Badinter Opinion, the Court is not bound by what Mr. Nimetz has to say, but in the absence of any

evidence to the contrary ⎯ no evidence whatsoever ⎯ in the face of the conduct of the Parties and

third States and the United Nations and other in ternational organizations, there is simply no

evidentiary basis for concluding that the Applican t was not entitled to use its constitutional name

before the United Nations, every sp ecialized agency and every othe r international organization in

which both Parties are members.

6. Indeed, it might be said that the constant practice under resolution817 and the Interim

Accord ⎯ the use by the Applicant of its constitutional name in all of those organizations that I

have just mentioned, consistently for more than fifteen years, without objection from a single

secretariat or a single third State ⎯ that constant practice is the third elephant in the room.

Professor Murphy will return to this subject shortly.

8Statement by the President of the Security Council, 15 Sep. 1995, United Nations doc. S/PRST/1995/46: judges’

folder, tab 9. - 16 -

7. The fourth elephant is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the instrument that

sets out the rules of international law that we say govern this case. The Respondent had never

sought to invoke a right of suspension under the Vien na Convention, in whole or in part and it did

never alert us to any alleged material breach on our part before it objected in 2007 and 2008. For

present purposes, the key provision of that Conv ention is Article60, which is, of course, a

provision that this Court has had to deal with on numerous occasions, and, of course, one that you

9
dealt with very fully in your Judgment in the case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project .

I am sure you will need no reminder. But Para graph100 of the Judgment strikes us as being

particularly apposite, and we hope you will excuse us if we have taken the liberty of drawing on

that text and applying it to the instrument and to the facts of this case. [Plate3on] If one goes

through the exercise of replacing references to the 1977 Treaty with references to the 1995 Interim

Accord, and if one substitutes references to the words termination, denu nciation and withdrawal

with a reference to the word suspension and ma kes no other changes, the text would reads as

follows:

“The [1995 Interim Accord] does not contain any provision regarding its

[suspension]. Nor is there any indication that the parties intended to admit the
possibility of [suspension]. . . . Consequently, the parties not having agreed otherwise,
the Treaty could be [suspended] only on the limited grounds enumerated in the Vienna
Convention.” [Plate 3 off]

In our submission, that is, and would be in this case, an entirely accurate conclusion to draw. The

Respondent has never sought to jus tify its objection by reference to any rights or procedures under

the 1969Vienna Convention and so it is stuck w ith paragraph100 of your 1997Judgment. The

limited grounds of the Vienna Convention not ha ving been invoked, and the conditions for their

being invoked not having been satisfied, there was no lawful basis for the Respondent’s objection:

in plain breach of the clear language of Article 11. For the Respondent, there is no getting around

that difficulty. That is why we say this case is a simple one.

8. Mr. President, in exercising its judicial function, the Court is necessarily bound to engage

in an assessment of the facts as they actually exist in the record, the functio n is to sort its way

through the conflicting arguments and the contradicti ons, to set aside mere assertion and deal with

9
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, pp. 62-63, para. 100. - 17 -

the evidence on the record. The Respondent may be entitled to ignore the elephants, but the Court

cannot, and we trust it will not, do so. It will ex ercise its judicial function as it has always done,

and will not be put off by claims that it is allo wing itself to be “instrumentaliser par le demandeur”

10
as the Respondent’s counsel put it . That is not a fair charge. The Applicant is doing exactly what

the Respondent should have done, coming to the Court, where there is a belief that the other Party

is not fulfilling its legal obligations. And it is wh at both Parties expected when they agreed to

Article21 in 1995. The Applicant too could have taken matters into its ow n hands. It too could

seek to suspend those parts of the Interim Accord that have become inconvenient. But it did not

want to do so. It has followed the “rule of law” route: so we wrote to the Respondent, we alleged

material breach, and then we instituted these proc eedings, in exactly the manner provided by the

Parties in the text they agreed in the language of Article 21, which gives this Court a central role.

To criticize us for doing that is, in our submission, entirely inappropriate.

9. And to be clear, the only issue that the Parties did not wish the Court to address was the

difference over the name: resolution 817 of the Un ited Nations Security Council makes it crystal

clear that the Parties agreed that the “difference over the name” ⎯ the difference over the name

and not any other difference ⎯ is a matter for political settlement. It was never for the Court to

determine or rule on the name of the Applicant, but that is the only matter excluded. I express my

gratitude to Professor Burdeau, who has gone throu gh the exercise of checking the language of the

text in all other United Nations languages and it sp eaks of it in the singular in exactly same way.

That is the only matter that is excluded. And it is clear from that language that the difference over

the name is entirely distinct from other differences that may arise and are subject to the jurisdiction

of the Court. As Professor Klein will make clear ⎯ once again ⎯ the Respondent would have

been perfectly entitled to bring a claim to this Co urt that the Applicant was not fulfilling one of its

obligations, for example, the obligation to negotiate, as required by Article5. It could have done

that if it had wished to do so. The obligation to negotiate is a distinct and separate matter from the

difference over the name. Or the Respondent coul d have filed a counter-c laim, but again it chose

not to do so. It seems this was an eminently sensi ble decision, given that the Applicant plainly is

10
CR 2011/9, p. 19, para. 29 (Pellet). - 18 -

not in breach of Article 5 and has consistently ne gotiated in good faith with the Respondent. Once

again, the Respondent is silent. We drew to their attention the statement of Mr.Nimetz who

commended both Parties for, what he called, their “positive attitude towards moving forward on

11
[the name] issue” , that was just six weeks ago, and he is, frankly, best placed to express a view on

a claim that one Party has not engaged in good faith negotiations. All these approaches were

available to the Respondent, to raise the concerns that they have now bombarded you with. The

proper thing to do was not to take the law into its own hands. And to be very clear, on the exercise

of the judicial function, we do not see how your Judgment would need to touch in any way on

NATO decisions or actions, or on the continued nego tiations under Article 5, a point to which we

will return.

10. Mr. President, this brings me to the conclu sion of this introductory statement. Listening

to the Respondent’s counsel we were struck by their constant inconsiste ncy, which is the fifth

elephant in the room. They are simply unable to get their story straight. One moment they are not

going to invoke countermeasures, the next moment they do. One counsel expresses the view that

Article11 says one thing, then his co-counsel tells you that it says something else. The written

pleadings say the Respondent has never sought to suspend the Interim Acco rd, and then counsel

tells you that actually that is exactly what they di d: they partially suspended it. The Respondent’s

former Prime Minister says that he objected to the Applicant’s membership of NATO by exercising

a veto, but one of their counsel tells you that he is not telling you the truth. The Respondent’s

former Foreign Minister says that they acted to avoid the constraints of the Interim Accord to avoid

a charge of “political cowardice”, but counsel tell you the Accord was followed to the letter at all

times. They agree that we are allowed to use our constitutional name in our bilateral dealings with

them, under the 1995Memoranda on which they were completely silent, but they say we cannot

use our constitutional name with them if those bilateral dealings are taking place in the United

Nations. That is an absurd position to adopt. And they say that we have to call ourselves “the

former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” before the United Nations and any of its organs,

including this Court; but then, as you heard for yourselves, on numerous occasions they are

1“Nimetz: No New Proposal”, VOA News, 9 Feb. 2011, available at: http://www.voanews.com/

macedonian/news/Macedonian-VOA-Macedonia-Greece-UN-Negotiations-Mathew-Niemitz-115695309.html. - 19 -

allowed to use the acronym “FYROM” or “ARY M”, which is not the provisional reference

12
described in resolution817, and has been the subject of official protest. It is difficult for us

simply to listen constantly to the use of the onym in that way, but as you will also know we

sought an understanding and we ha ve stuck with references to “Applicant” and “Respondent”,

precisely to avoid putting the Court in an uncomfortable situation. But the point is this,

Mr. President: their practice is flatly inconsistent with the claim that the only acceptable name for

the Applicant or anybody else to use is “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, that we are

not entitled to call ourselves the Republic of Macedoni a, whether in the United Nations or in any

other international organization, or before this Court; it is one contradiction after another.

11. Mr. resident, that concludes this introduction. I invite you now to call

Professor Murphy to the Bar. Thank you very much for your attention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorPhilippeSands for his statement: and now I invite

Professor Sean Murphy to take the floor

Mr. MURPHY:

T HE RESPONDENT ’S BREACH OF A RTICLE 11 (1)OF THE INTERIM A CCORD

Introduction

1. Thank you, Mr. President. We listened attentively to the arguments of the Respondent last

week regarding the facts and the law associated with our claim that the Respondent violated

Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord. Those argumen ts generally restated the points set forth in the

Respondent’s written pleadings, which is to say th ere were considerable gaps, inconsistencies,

implausibilities, and regrettably some misrepresentations.

2. In particular, the Respondent remains incap able of confronting, in any serious way, the

indisputable evidence before you establishing the Respondent’s systematic and unrelenting

opposition to the Applicant’s membership in NAT O. Instead, the Respondent persists in

characterizing our claim as a claim against NATO itself, so as to then raise defences against a

fabricated claim that is not actually before this Court. Remarkably, the Respondent still insists that

12
AR, Ann. 42. - 20 -

the Applicant is prohibited from using its constituti onal name in its dealings with international

organizations, and further, conjures up in some dramatic way a change that occurred in the

mid-2000s ⎯ a devious plot that was hatched ⎯ which justified the Respondent’s conduct in

relation to NATO in 2007 to 2008. I say that is remarkable, because th e evidence quite clearly

shows that the Applicant has used the constitutional na me consistently in all of its external practice

since 1991 ⎯ a practice left untouched by resolution 817, and a practice accepted by the entire

universe other than the Respondent.

3. We have already thoroughly rebutted a ll of the Respondent’s points in our written

pleadings 13and in our first round presentation . We fully maintain our positions. Rather than just

repeat why the Respondent’s points are wrong, we think it is of more assistance to the Court to do

so in the course of identifying the ten central points upon which our claim rests.

Ten propositions established in the evidence and legal arguments before
the Court with

respect to the Respondent’s violation of Article 11 (1)

A. The Applicant was in the final stages of NATO’s admission process

4. Our first point. From 1995 to 2007, the Applicant proceeded with the various steps

necessary to be considered for admission to NATO and, by early 2008, was approaching the final

stage of that admission process 15. By the summer of 2007, NATO member States were poised to

invite the Applicant to accede to NATO. This is reflected in several statements by NATO

members in this time period, none of which have been contested by the Respondent 1.

B. Any NATO member State could object to the Applicant’s admission

5. Our second point. A decision to invite the Applicant to join NATO required a consensus

of all existing NATO member States at the April 2008 Summit; opposition by any single NATO

member State would preclude the Applicant from be ing invited. The Parties are in accord on the

requirement for consensus in NATO decision-making. The Parties are also in accord that a formal

13AM, Chaps. II (V), IV, and V; AR, Chaps. II & IV.
14
CR 2011/5, pp. 39-56, paras. 1-64 (Murphy); CR 2011/6, pp. 21-49, paras. 1-88 (Murphy).
15CR 2011/5, pp. 40-43, paras. 8-17 (Murphy).

16See, e.g., AM, para. 2.53. - 21 -

vote is never taken and never recorded within NATO, such that an objection by the Respondent

would not manifest itself in that manner. Yet there is equally nothing about the admission process

at NATO that precludes a member State from opposi ng admission of a new member. The process

is predicated upon the idea that any member State can, by expressing its opposition, object and

prevent the admission of a new member. The con sensus rule ensures that decisions, including

17
enlargement decisions, remain “the ultimate prerogative of the sovereign member states” . As the

NATO Handbook underscores, “[e]ach member count ry represented at the Council table ...

retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions” 18.

6. Article 11 (1) is concerned with whether the Respondent “objected”; it matters not for this

case whether that objection comes in the form of a “v eto”, either as that term is used formally or

informally. As for the use of that term at NATO, if by a “veto” one means a negative vote formally

cast by a member State that serves to block a decision that otherwise has a requisite majority, then

there is no such “veto” at NATO. Quotes of NAT O’s Secretary-General to the effect, which the

Respondent noted last week, are speaking to a “veto” in that sense. But, if the term “veto” is used

as in common parlance, so as to mean opposition by a member State that prevents a consensus

decision from emerging, then there is such a “veto” at NATO, as NATO itself has often

19
recognized .

7. I will not repeat our arguments on this point 20. However, I feel compelled to respond to

statements by the opposing Agent that may have left the wrong impression. Agent for the

Respondent stated last Thursday that “‘blocking’ or ‘vetoing’ a NATO decision is out of the

question” 21. In support of his position, the Agent pointed to a 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement,

a portion of which he included in your judge’s folder . [Plate 1 on] The portion of that Study that

he presented to you was as follows:

17
RCM, Ann. 145.
18Ibid,, Ann. 22, p. 33.

19See, e.g., RCM, Ann.15; see also “Canadian Defens e Minister Asks for Change in NATO Consensus on
Admitting New Members”: AR, Ann.153; “Time to Abolis h the National Veto on New NATO and EU Members,”:
AR, Ann. 78.

20CR 2011/5, pp. 52-53, paras. 51-54 (Murphy).

21CR 2011/8, p. 23, para. 8 (Savvaides). - 22 -

“Decisions on enlargement will be for NATO itself... Ultimately Allies will

decide by consensus whether to invite each new member to join according to their
judgment of whether doing so will contribute to security and stability in the North
Atlantic area at the time su ch decision is made... No country outside the Alliance
22
should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process of decisions.”

8. Three aspects of this language are worth noting. First, while the Respondent suggests that

this language somehow encompasses the Applicant, a complete reading of the Study demonstrates

that the country at issue in that final sentence was not the Applicant but, rather, a much larger and

more powerful country, considerably further north and to the east. Second, while that major power

outside the Alliance is not to have a “veto”, th e clear implication in this language is that existing

members within the Alliance do have the ability to oppose the admi ssion of new members. Third,

in any event, the concern expressed here is with a non-member blocking admission, a circumstance

clearly not at issue in this case. [Plate 1 off]

9. The Respondent’s Agent, though waxi ng quite eloquently about his own personal

involvement at NATO, unfortunately did not inform you of other, more relevant, parts of the

1995 Study. [Plate 2 on] By way of example, consider paragraph 30, which reads in part:

“Countries could be invited to join sequentially or several countries could be

simultaneously invited to join, bearing in mind that all Allies will decide by consensus
on each invitation, i.e. new Allies must join consensus for subsequent invitations . . .
Simultaneous accessions would avoid the possibility of veto by new members on
23
others joining at the same time . . .”

10. This passage confirms that, even in the context of a consensus decision, individual

member States of NATO can object to admission of a new member. Whether styled as a “veto” or,

as is done later in the same paragraph, styled as an existing member “closing the door” to a new

member, it makes no difference. The point is that it is eminently possible for a single NATO

member State to oppose the admission of a candida te State. So the idea that “NATO knows no

veto”, promoted heavily by the Respondent last week, is not quite accurate. [Plate 2 off]

22
CR 2011/8, p. 25, para. 16 (Savvaides).
2Study on NATO Enlargement, issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 3 Sept. 1995, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm - 23 -

C. The Respondent engaged in vigorous opposition to the Applicant’s admission

11. Our third point. During 2007 and 2008, the Respondent engaged in a vigorous,

24
systematic, diplomatic and public campaign against the Applicant’s admission to NATO . This is

not in dispute. Further, the Respondent con cedes that its position on NATO membership for the

25
Applicant changed in the mid-2000s . By the summer of 2007, the Respondent embarked on a

strategy to oppose the Applicant’s membership in NATO, and it did so exclusively because the

name difference had not yet been resolved to th e satisfaction of the Respondent. We took you

through several examples of the extensive ev idence of the Respondent’s opposition. On both

Thursday and Friday, we sat at our table and noted the remarkable silence of the Respondent on

this key issue. At no point, in its oral pr esentation, did the Respondent deny opposing the

Applicant’s admission to NATO. The words did not pass the Respondent’s Agent’s lips. They did

not pass the lips of the Respondent’s counsel.

12. The reason is likely that no one can doubt that the Respondent did oppose the

Applicant’s admission in NATO; the evidence speaks for itself and it takes many forms:

statements by the Respondent at formal NATO m eetings; statements by the Respondent to NATO

members in advance of NATO meetings; statements by the Respondent in its Parliament or with

parliamentary groups, confirming the position ta ken at NATO and with NATO members;

statements by the Respondent to the media or published in the media. Counsel for the Respondent,

last week, helpfully conceded: “The fact that these statements were made is uncontested” and “In

no way do we resile from them.” 26

13. I invite you to recall, in particular, the st atement of the Respondent’s Foreign Minister in

the Fall of 2007, when asked whether the Respondent was “willing to go to extremes, to exploit

Skopje’s prospects of accession to NATO, to use all the means and options at its disposal?”, she

answers simply: “Yes. The answer is yes.” 27 Two days later, the Foreign Minister says in an

interview that adhering to the Interim Accord, a nd thereby allowing the Applicant to join NATO,

2CR 2011/5, pp. 43-50, paras. 18-44 (Murphy).
25
CR 2011/9, pp. 54-55, paras. 23-24 (Crawford).
2Ibid., p. 48, para. 5 (Crawford).

2AM, Ann. 73. - 24 -

28
might be the politically easy path to take, but would be an act of “political cowardice” . Rather

striking: the Foreign Minister of a country sayi ng that following its international obligations is

“cowardice”. Counsel for the Respondent seems to think that such stat ements by the Foreign

Minister do not constitute evidence of the Respondent’s opposition but, with respect, the words

speak for themselves.

14. I invite you to recall as well, the Respondent’s lengthy aide mémoire at Annex 129 of the

Memorial. The Respondent concedes that it sent this aide mémoire to NATO member States, and

29
concedes that it was “intended” to communica te the Respondent’s views to those States . In the

aide mémoire, the Respondent states that “in addition to any accession criteria . . . [t]he satisfactory

conclusion of the [name] negotiations is a sine qua non in order to enable Greece to continue to

30
support the Euro-atlantic aspirations of Skopje” , and then it goes on further to say that this will be

“the decisive criterion” 31, a clear signal that without a resolution of the name issue, the Respondent

would object. Again, the fact of the Respondent’s strong opposition to the Applicant’s membership

in NATO, absent resolution of the name issue, is readily apparent.

15. And recall finally, the numerous statements repeatedly made by the Respondent’s

PrimeMinister vividly demonstrating the “strategi c goal” of the Respondent: as he put it: “Our

position, ‘no solution ⎯no invitation’, is clear. If there is no solution, our neighbouring state’s

32
aspirations to participate in NATO will remain unrealised.”

16. Now, how does counsel for the Respondent deal with these statements? Politicians

blowing smoke, they say; nothing with which this Court must concern itself. Really? Is that the

way this Court should treat a Prime Minister’s statements? If so, it will require a significant change

of direction in the Court’s treatment of facts a nd evidence, given that you have previously made

ample use of such statements when establishing a State’s wrongdoing. An example of this that

immediately comes to mind, though there are many others, is the case of Nicaragua v. United

States, your merits decision in 1986, which we raised last Monday and which Professor Crawford

28AR, Ann. 167.
29
CR 2011/9, p. 50, para. 11 (Crawford).
30
AM, Ann. 129; emphasis added.
31Ibid.

32AR, Ann. 97. - 25 -

studiously avoided in his presentation. In that case, the Court saw particular significance in

statements by the individual who is “constitutionally responsible for the foreign policy of” the State

(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of

America), I.C.J.Reports 1986 , p.92, para.170), even when made in the domestic sphere. Rather

than putting such statements down as “puffery” of some sort, the Court made extensive use of

33
evidence originating in a “national politi cal forum” (as the Respondent puts it) for proving a

State’s wrongdoing, including statements made by the President of the United States and other

senior United States officials, to Congress. And it did so to establish the fact of a policy that

violated United States obligations under international law 34.

17. By way of alternative argument, the Res pondent says all these statements are irrelevant

because they are not “NATO documentation”. It is a curious defence: Article 11 (1) is concerned

with the Respondent’s “objection” not that of NATO. Further, this Court has never required

evidence of a State’s malfeasance be recorded in some particular documentary form when finding

an international violation.

18. But if the Respondent wants NATO documentation, it need look no further than

Annex30 of its own Counter-Memorial. Th ere it will find a NATO document, issued on

3 April 2008, clearly stating that “the Greek delegation made it very clear that until the name issue

35
is resolved, it has not yet been resolved, that will not be possible” and further stating: “[t]he

Greek government has been very clear, including in this evening’s discussions, that until and unless

the name issue is resolved, there cannot be consensus on an invitation for the former Yugoslav

36
Republic of Macedonia to begin accession talks” .

33
CR 2011/9, pp. 49-50, para. 10 (Crawford).
34
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 21, para. 20 (“it was made clear, not only in the United States press,
but also in Congress and in official statements by the President and high United States officials, that the United States
Government had been giving support to the contras . . ..”); ibid., p. 70, para. 125 (“According to the President’s message
to Congress, this emergency situation had been created by ‘the Nicaraguan Government’s aggressive activities in Central
America’.”); ibid., p.90, para.169 (“The view of th e United States as to the legal effect of these events is reflected in,
for example, a Report submitted to Congress by President R eagan on 10 April 1985 in connection with finance for the
contras.”); ibid., p. 124, para. 241 (“It appears to the Court to be clearly established first, that the United States intended,

by its support of the contras, to coerce the Government of Nicaragua . . .”).
35RCM, Ann. 30, pp. 1-2.

36Ibid., p. 3. - 26 -

19. As my son typically says after he has thrashed me on the Nintendo, “game over”.

20. The singling out of the Respondent by NATO is telling. The Respondent invites you to

conclude that somehow the NATO membership, as a whole, decided against the Applicant’s

application independently of the Respondent, and in the absence of any objection by it. But the

Respondent is directly and repeatedly fingered by NATO and by other NATO member States as

37
having made an objection . This fact is substantiated in literally hundreds of contemporary press

reports. And it is really no surprise that all accounts point to the Respondent, given that the

Respondent itself repeatedly declared that it had objected; that it had single-handedly blocked the

Applicant’s entry into NATO. The Respondent ’s Foreign Minister said it in Brussels 38. The

Respondent’s Prime Minister said it at Bucharest; he said it simply and clearly: “Due to Greece’s

39
veto, FYROM is not joining NATO.”

D. The Respondent’s opposition has an “objection” under Article 11 (1)

21. Our fourth point. Under Article 11(1), the Respondent had a clear and unequivocal

obligation not to object. The relevant language is simple and direct and admits of no ambiguity.

By its conduct, the Respondent deliberately and unequivocally violated that obligation 40.

E. An objection under Article 11 (1) is only permissible in one limited circumstance

22. Our fifth point. Article 11 (1) carves out one ⎯ and only one ⎯ circumstance where the

Respondent may lawfully object: only if the Applican t “is to be referred to in such organization or

institution differently than in paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 817”.

37
AM, para. 2.61; AR, para. 2.22.
38
Ibid., Ann. 83; see also AM, Ann. 89.
39Ibid., Ann. 99; emphasis added.

40CR 2011/6, pp. 22-30, paras. 6-32 (Murphy). - 27 -

23. The Applicant’s admission to NATO w ould have been on the same terms as its

admission to the United Nations under resolution817 41. Indeed, the Applicant was already

participating in NATO programmes on th e basis of that provisional reference 42. There is no

dispute between the Parties on that point. Consequently, the Respondent had no basis for objecting

and should not have objected, just as it had not for many other internati onal organizations since

1995.

F. Respondent, on the facts, did not object for the reasons permitted in Article 11 (1)

24. Our sixth point. All of the evidence shows that the Respondent’s opposition in this

period was based upon its concern about non-re solution of the difference concerning the

43
Applicant’s name . There is no evidence that the Respondent’s opposition was based upon a

concern that NATO would refer to the Applicant by anything other than the provisional reference.

There is no evidence, in any of the Respondent’s many statements, that its opposition was based

upon a concern that, in communications with NAT O, the Applicant would call itself by its

constitutional name or that third States would do so 44. Indeed, there is no evidence of any Note

Verbale from the Respondent to the Applicant co mplaining about such practice within NATO in

the period leading up to April 2008.

G. The Applicant’s use of the constitutional name cannot justify an Article 11 (1) objection

25. Our seventh point. Even if the evidence showed that the Respondent’s opposition was

based upon a concern that, in the Applicant’s communications with NATO the Applicant would

call itself by its constitutional name. That con cern would not be a lawful reason for objecting

under the second clause of Article 11 (1) 45. The ordinary meaning of that clause is not addressing

46
the use of the Applicant’s constitutional name before international organizations . The

41AM, Ann. 69, p. 2.
42
CR 2011/6, p. 31, paras. 33-36 (Murphy).
43
CR 2011/5, pp. 51-52, paras. 45-49 (Murphy).
44CR 2011/6, pp. 32-34, paras. 40-43 (Murphy).

45Ibid., pp. 31-32, paras. 33-39 (Murphy).

46Ibid., pp. 34-37, paras. 44-51 (Murphy). - 28 -

Respondent thinks otherwise based upon an idiosyncratic view as to the meaning of resolution 817,

to which the second clause of Article 11 (1) refers, but the Respondent’s view has no support.

26. How should this Court interpret resolution817? ( Legal Consequences for States of the

Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security

Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 , p.53, para. 114.) The

language of resolution 817 nowhere says that the Applicant cannot use its constitutional name in its

dealings with the United Nations, nor that it must use the provisional reference. Indeed, there is no

language of any kind, in resolution817, directed at the Applicant. In your Advisory Opinion

relating to Kosovo, the Court carefully analysed certain Security Council resolutions, making sharp

distinctions between those that expressly address themselves to, and therefore imposed restrictions

on non-State actors and those that did not ( Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral

Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, General

List No. 141, paras. 114-118). Here, resolution 817 contains no language directed at the conduct of

the Applicant and none should be implied.

27. To the contrary, the resolution ma kes clear that the Council has “examined”

UnitedNations doc.S/25147, a document to which is annexed the application for admission filed

by the Applicant, in which the Applicant used its constitutional name, [plate 3 on]. Now, attached

to that application for admission to the United Nations, there was an appendix containing the

following declaration by the Applicant in this case. That declaration said:

“In connection with the appliction by the Republic of Macedonia for
membership in the United Nations, I have the honour, on behalf of the Republic of
Macedonia, and in my capacity as President, to declare that the Republic of

Macedonia accepts the obligations cont47ned in the Charter of the United Nations and
solemnly undertakes to fulfil them.” (Emphasis added.)

28. In other words, the Security Council, in resolution817, received and “examined” the

application for membership, which included this declaration in which the constitutional name is

used three times, and then proceeded to act favourably on the application 48, as did the General

Assembly. [Plate 3 off]

47
A/47/876-S/25147 (1993), in AM, Ann. 25.
4See also Note by the President of the Security Council, S/25545 (1993), in AM, Ann. 32. - 29 -

29. In considering the Respondent’s position, that the Council’s resolution ordered particular

conduct by the Applicant when engaging in its exte rnal relations, the Court will be aware that the

resolution was in the form of a recommendation to the General Assembly. Only by that latter

organ’s “decision”, adopted a day later, was the Applicant admitted to the United Nations; only

then, by the Assembly’s action, did the provisi onal reference become operative in the United

49
Nations .

30. What about the discussions leading up to the adoption of resolution817? When the

President of the Security Council circulated th e draft of what would become resolution817

containing the provisional reference, one might have expected him to say something like, if the

Respondent is correct, “this requires the country who has applied for United Nations membership

to call itself by a new name, at least when appear ing before the United Nations”, or something like

that. Well, there is no evidence before the Court th at such a thing happened, or that it did in fact

happen, as is clear from the following statement by Morocco, [plate 4 on] which held the Council’s

presidency at that time. This statement circulated with the draft of what became resolution817.

What does the statement say?

“the draft resolution envisages that the state have a provisional reference in the UN
(‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ ). This is not a matter of imposing a
name on the new state, or conditions for its admission to the UN, but it merely

concerns the manner in which it will be provi sionally referred to in its activity in the
United Nations (plaque, official documents, ‘bluebook’).” 50

31. This statement, contemporaneous with the adoption of the resolution, confirms the

resolution’s meaning and effect. [Plate 4 off] Ot hers involved in the nego tiation have attested to

the same. While counsel for the Respondent seeks to minimize the role of Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s

recollection of what resolution817 was all about, the compromise developed for resolution817

emerged from an initiative undertaken by a troika of European member States of the Security

Council at that time, including the United Kingdom. Ambassador Greenstock, as Under Secretary

of the United Kingdom Foreign Office, though b ased in London, was instructing United Kingdom

49
A/RES/47/225 (1993).
5AR, para. 4.42 and Ann. 12. - 30 -

diplomats in New York. This was hardly a matte r about which capitals were taking no interest.

51
Ambassador Greenstock’s statement is clear and it is not rebutted by any contrary evidence .

32. Practice at the United Nations under resolution817 between 1993 and 1995, when the

Interim Accord was concluded, also confirms that the Respondent was fully entitled to use its

52
constitutional name in its dealings with the United Nations . There are literally hundreds of

examples of the Applicant submitting letters a nd documents to the United Nations, or making

speeches before it, using its constitutional name, st arting from the very first day of the Applicant’s

53
admission to the United Nations in a speech by its President to the General Assembly , none of

these statements eliciting any objections from the United Nations Secretariat or from any third

States. Several of these communications are in evidence before you. For example, three weeks

after admission to the United Nations, the Applican t sent letters to the Secretary-General which, in

turn, were sent to the Security Council, in which the Applicant used its constitutional name 54. The

Secretary-General did not send the letters back to the Applicant unopened. The Security Council

did not send the letters back to the Secretary- General, chastising him for passing them along.

Indeed, when the Security Council later adopted resolution 845 (1993), it said nothing about what

the Respondent now regards as unlawful and devian t practice under resolution817. Nor has the

Council said so at any time since then 55.

33. The negotiating history of the Interim Accord does not support the Respondent’s theory

56 57
as to the meaning of the second clause . I will not repeat all our prior points on this .

Professor Sands noted at the outset of our presenta tion, Ambassador Nimetz’s 1995 statement that

confirms the practice that had emerged after resolution817 and it suggests that no change was

expected in that practice in the course of concluding the Interim Accord. I do want to draw the

51
Ibid., Ann. 58.
5CR 2011/6, pp. 37-41, paras. 53-64 (Murphy).

5See Statement of President Kiro Gligorov to the General Assembly, UN doc. A.47.PV.98, p. 22 (1993) (“At this
solemn moment, I am happy and excited to express, on behalf of ·the people and Government of the Republic of

Macedonia, our gratitude for the support demonstrated by the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United
Nations as an equal Member.”)
54
See AR, Anns. 33-34.
5Ibid., paras. 4.46-4.50.

5CR 2011/6, pp. 41-42, paras. 65-66 (Murphy).
57
See especially AR, paras. 4.51-4.61. - 31 -

Court’s attention to one point with respect to this negotiating history. The Respondent tries to

make something out of the language proposed by the Respondent toward the end of the Interim

Accord negotiations. This draft language would have written the sec ond clause of Article 11 (1) a

little bit differently so as to allow an objection “if the provisional reference under which [the

Applicant] is to be admitted to such organization s” differs from that of resolution 817. The reason

that that language was dropped in favour of what actually emerged as the second clause of

Article 11 (1) was not for the reason now advanced by the Respondent. Rather, as we pointed out

58
in our Reply , the draft language was rejected and what we now have was adopted because the

draft language did not reflect reality. The Appl icant is not “admitted” to an international

organization under the “provisional reference”: the Applicant is admitted to the organization based

on an application that bears its constitutional na me. Thereafter, the Applicant is provisionally

referred to in that organization by the provisional reference. At whatever future point when the

difference over the name is resolved, it is not envisaged that the Applicant must reapply to the

international organization under an agreed name; it is already a member of the organization. The

only change that will occur is that the provision al reference need no longer be used in that

organization.

34. Finally on this seventh point, the practi ce of the Parties subsequent to the Interim

Accord ⎯ from 1995 to 2008 ⎯ also does not support the Respo ndent’s theory as to the meaning

59
of the second clause of Article 11 (1) . Whether one looks at the Council of Europe or the OSCE

or at Unesco or at any of the numerous other organizations that the Applicant has joined from 1995

to the present, there has been no problem for an y of those organizations with the Applicant’s

consistent use of its constitutional name in communications with the organization, nor any concern

expressed by third States. Even in their bila teral relations, the Respondent accepts that the

Applicant is entitled to use its constitutional name 6. The Respondent, rather weakly, tries to

explain away this “bilateral” practice as just th at, bilateral, and therefore somehow not relevant,

although in the very next breath the Respondent d eclared as somehow relevant to Article 11 (1) the

58AR, para. 4.66-4.67.
59
CR 2011/6, pp. 42-43, paras. 67-68 (Murphy).
60Ibid., pp. 43-45, paras. 69-74 (Murphy). - 32 -

bilateral practice of more than 100States with the Applicant, in which those States use the

constitutional name. Apparently b ilateral practice does matter, so long as it is not that of the

Respondent.

H. Other reasons stated by the Respondent cannot justify an Article 11 (1) objection

35. Our eighth point . The Respondent continues to advance other reasons for why it was

entitled to object under Article 11(1), such as the Applicant’s alleged “lack of good

neighbourliness” or “irredentism”. These reasons ar e totally unsupported by the evidence and, in

any event, they are not permitted bases for an objection under Article 11 (1) 61.

I. NATO’s conduct is not relevant to the unlawfulness of the Respondent’s objection

36. Our ninth point . The decision reached by NATO at Bucharest is simply not at issue

before this Court. This case concerns exclusiv ely the legality of the Respondent’s conduct in 2007

to 2008 under the Interim Accord; that conduct is either lawful or unlawful regardless of the

positions taken by other States.

37. Nevertheless, the Respondent persists in its inaccurate characterization as to NATO’s

posture with respect to the Applicant prior to th e Bucharest Summit. Contrary to the repeated

assertions by the Respondent, there is simply nothing in the record ⎯ no evidence of any kind ⎯

stating that NATO adopted as a criterion for accessi on that the name difference be resolved, nor

that any requirement for “good neighbourly relation s” meant that the name difference must first be

resolved; there is nothing in the record to establish that 62. Counsel last Friday chastised us for a

“profound misunderstanding of the gravity of d ecision-making in the councils of the military

alliance” 63, and then proceeded to profoundly miscomprehend himself what NATO has actually

said about the relevance of the name difference to the Applicant’s membership in NATO. NATO’s

2006 Riga Summit Declaration does not say that resolution of the name difference is a requirement

for the Applicant’s membership. NATO’s December 2007 Communiqué does not say it . The

Secretary-General of NATO did not say it , nor say that resolvin g the difference was a

6CR 2011/6, pp. 45-47, paras. 75-82 (Murphy).
62
CR 2011/5, pp. 53-55, paras. 55-58 (Murphy); AR, para. 2.58.
6CR 2011/9, p. 45, para. 17 (Reisman). - 33 -

“performance-based standard”. Yes, NATO has acknowledged the existence of the name

difference. Yes, NATO has expected all candida te States to pursue “good neighbourly relations”.

But counsel for the Respondent have to engage in extraordinary connect-the-dots analysis, divining

all sorts of hidden meanings and sudden innue ndo in NATO’s statements, so as to reach their

ultimate conclusion, hardly a display of respect fo r the “gravity of decision-making in the councils

of the military alliance”. The reality is that, rather than setting up the name difference as a

membership criterion, NATO memb ers were pleading with the Res pondent in this time period to

stick to its obligations under the Interim Accord.

J. The Applicant is entitled to a declaration of a violation and that the Respondent conform

38. Finally, our tenth point. In light of the Respondent’s deliberate and knowing breach of

Article 11 (1), the Court should grant the relief that we request. We are asking you to declare that

the Respondent has violated its obligation under Article 11 (1); the violation is clearly established

on the facts and on the law. We further ask that you order the Respondent to immediately take all

necessary steps to comply with its obligation, including that it cease and desist from objecting in

any way to the Applicant’s membership in NATO. Yet our request extends beyond just NATO; by

its conduct, the Respondent has demonstrated a c onviction about Article 11 (1) that implicates the

Applicant’s position with respect to other international organizations, including most crucially the

European Union. As such, our request asks that you order the Respondent in a manner that

encompasses the Respondent’s conduct with respect to any international organization falling within

the scope of Article 11 (1).

Conclusion

39. Mr. President, before I conclude, allow me to note that senior leaders of the Respondent

have recently confirmed ⎯ once again ⎯ that the Respondent did in fact engage in what

constitutes an objection in the period leading up to and at Bucharest; indeed, they themselves

continue to refer to such conduct as a “veto.”

40. On 24January of this year ⎯ just two months ago ⎯ Mr.AntonisSamaras, the Leader

of the Respondent’s main opposition party, New Demo cracy, took to the floor of the Respondent’s

Parliament. New Democracy was the ruling party of the Respondent’s Government at the time of - 34 -

Bucharest, and Mr. Samaras was defending one of the foreign policy steps taken by the members of

his Government when they were in power. On the floor of the Parliament, he said: [plate 5 on]

“[I]n Bucharest they set the ‘red lines’ fo r the Macedonian issue. . .. Greece
clarified its position. It explained that it would accept one name for all uses, erga
omnes. It excluded the ethnological qualifier with a name that implies irredentist

claims. It put aside all proposals for double and triple names. It exercised a veto on
the entry of FYROM into NATO and the EU . . . . And today, we firmly stick to these
‘lines’.”64 (Emphasis added.)

24 January of this year.

41. The Respondent’s opposition ⎯ indeed, its “veto” ⎯ is fully confirmed in Athens today,

just as it was in the spring of 2008, as is the reas on for its opposition, a reason totally unrelated to

the manner in which NATO will refer to the Applicant. Moreover, consider again that final

sentence, which confirms that the “red lines” are se t; they will be adhered to in the future, casting

implications not just for the Applicant’s entry into NATO, but the European Union as well.

[Plate 5 off]

42. Well this is a most inconvenient and untim ely confirmation, so it is no surprise that the

Respondent’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dimitrios Droutsas, felt compelled to respond to

Mr.Samaras’s statement right away, emphasizing his concern about the use of the term “veto”.

What may be a surprise is that this Court itself features in what he had to say. This is what

Mr. Droutsas said on the same day in Parliament: [plate 6 on]

“Since we speak about veto, allow me to call upon everyone not to use this term
in relation to the issue of Skopje. However patriotic the use of this word might sound

it hurts our national interests in the case of Skopje before the International Court in the
Hague. You should have known that as a minister of the previous Government,
Mr.Samaras. And I genuinely call on you not to sacrifice everything on the altar of

easy impres65on and party politics, without any respect for the country’s real
interests.”

43. I ask the Court to note that the Foreign Minister does not deny that the Respondent

opposed the Applicant’s admission to NATO. He does not correct the stated justification for this

64Statement by Antonis Samaras, Leader of New De mocracy (Respondent’s main opposition party), Session of
the Greek Parliament, 24Jan. 2011. Both the video and offici al transcript (excerpt at p.39) are available at:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?searc…
=24%2F01%2F2011 .

65Statement by Dimitrios Droutsas, Respondent’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Session of the Greek Parliament,
2Jan2.011. Both the video and official transcri pt (excerpt is at pp9.4-95) are available at:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?searc…
=24%2F01%2F2011. - 35 -

opposition. All he does is urge that the term “veto” not be used b ecause that particular

characterization of what happened hurts the Respondent in its position before this Court. As one of

our learned opponents might say when waxing eloquently about young Hamlet, “thus conscience

66
does make cowards of us all” . [Plate 6 off]

44. But this is not the end. Mr. Samaras felt compelled to respond in turn. He knows what

happened at Bucharest; he is astounded that the Foreign Minister is running away from the truth in

its arguments before this Court. [Plate 7 on] Among other things, Mr.Samaras took to the floor

again in Parliament and said the following:

“I also heard that we never exercised a veto on the Macedonian issue. I think it
was your Minister who said that. Perhaps the word ‘Bucharest’ is unknown to him.
This is his problem. He doesn’t want to remember what happened then, who opposed,
67
who exercised the real veto.”

45. Mr.President, these proceedings demonstrate that Mr.Samaras is quite right. The

Respondent does wish to forget its conduct at Bucharest , at least before this Court. The

Respondent does wish to forget who opposed the Appli cant’s admission to NATO. And it wishes

to forget who exercised “the real veto”. [Plate 7 off]

46. The Respondent may wish to forget, but we ask that this Court not forget what the clear,

copious, and unequivocal facts demonstrate about the Respondent’s conduct in 2007-2008, and that

those facts establish a clear violation of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord.

47. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your patience. If it please the

Court, you may wish to have your coffee break at this time. Professor Klein will be the next up in

our presentation.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Sean Mur phy, for your statement. I believe this is

the appropriate moment for the Court to have a brie f coffee break. I just remind the audience that,

for the second round of oral pleadings by the Applicant, the time is from 10o’clock to 1o’clock

6Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1.

6Statement by Antonis Samaras, Leader of New Demo cracy (Respondent’s Main Opposition Party), Session of
the Greek Parliament, 24 Jan. 2011. Both the video and official transcript (excer pt is at p.126) are available at:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Praktika/Synedriaseis-Olomeleias?searc…
=24%2F01%2F2011. - 36 -

and I hope we will be able to abide by that frame work. So the Court will have a short coffee break

of ten minutes. We come back at quarter to twelve.

The Court adjourned from 11.35 a.m. to 11.50 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court resumes its session. I now invite

Professor Pierre Klein to make his statement.

M. KLEIN : Merci, Monsieur le président.

Le différend n’entre pas dans le champ de l’exception contenue dans l’article 21,
paragraphe 2, il relève pleinement de la compétence de la Cour

et la requête est entièrement recevable

1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, l’adage est bien

connu : on n’est jamais aussi bien servi que par soi-même. C’est sans aucun doute cette pensée que

nos estimés contradicteurs ont eue à l’esprit en développant leur argumentation relative aux

exceptions préliminaires dans la présente affaire. Dans l’une de ses plaidoiries de la semaine

passée, le professeur Pellet a indiqué à ce sujet que la Cour était confrontée à ce qu’il a appelé un

«nŒud gordien», qu’elle n’avait pas le pouvoir de trancher 68. Mais, en réalité, Monsieur le

président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, il n’y a de nŒuds dans ce dossier que

ceux que la Partie adverse s’est efforcée de nouer elle-même ⎯en y ajoutant au fil du temps

quelques boucles supplémentaires ⎯ pour tenter de persuader la Cour qu’elle n’était pas

compétente à l’égard du litige qui lui est soumis, ou qu’il sortait de ses fonctions judiciaires de se

prononcer sur ce litige. Ces nŒuds prétendument inextricables ne sont en fait pas bien difficiles à

dénouer. Et dès lors qu’ils n’existent pas, la Cour n’aura pas à se demander si elle peut ⎯ ou

non ⎯ les trancher. Je vous propose de vous en a ssurer successivement en ce qui concerne les

questions de compétence et de recevabilité.

2. Dans sa plaidoirie de jeudi passé, le professeurReisman s’est employé à convaincre la

Cour qu’elle était privée de compétence à l’égard du présent litige, car celui-ci conduirait

inévitablement la Cour à se prononcer sur le différend re latif au nom de l’Etat de l’Etat requérant.

68
Voir CR 2011/9, p. 18, par. 22 (Pellet). - 37 -

Or, comme vous le savez maintenant, il s’agit là d’une question qui est clairement exclue du champ

de la clause compromissoire contenue dans l’article 21, paragraphe2, de l’accord intérimaire, en

vertu du premier membre de phrase de cette disposition 69. Ainsi que j’ai eu l’occasion de l’exposer

70
la semaine dernière , l’Etat défendeur retient un critère particulièrement large pour l’interprétation

de cette clause. [Projection.] Je rappelle que, selon ce critère ⎯ et même si nos contradicteurs

71
paraissent avoir des doutes à cet égard , c’est bien celui qu’ils ont eux-mêmes identifié ⎯, le

différend relatif au nom, exclu de la compétence de la Cour, devrait inclure «tout litige dont le

règlement préjugerait, directement ou par implication, du différend relatif au nom 72». [Findela

projection.]

3. Nos contradicteurs pensent pouvoir tirer av antage du fait que la ligne d’argumentation de

l’Etat requérant sur ce point aurait évolué. Alors que la requête introductive d’instance indiquait

que «l’objet du litige ne concerne pas, de manière directe ou indirecte, le différend auquel il est fait

référence dans l’article5, paragr aphe1, de l’accord intérimaire» 73, ces termes («directement ou

74
indirectement») ne figurent plus dans la ré plique, qui garderait un «silence embarrassé» sur ce

point. Monsieur le président, il n’y a là aucun silence, et aucun embarras. Aujourd’hui comme

hier, l’Etat requérant maintient que la Cour n’a pas compétence pour résoudre le différend relatif au

nom ⎯ et seulement ce différend. Tous les autres litiges potentiels liés à quelque autre aspect de

l’accord intérimaire entrent par contre pleinement dans la compétence de la Cour ⎯ y compris, par

exemple, un différend quant à la manière dont les Parties s’acquittent de leur obligation de négocier

au sujet du nom.

4. Ce qui importe ici, ce n’est pas de savoir si la position du requérant peut avoir évolué

quant à l’existence d’un lien plus ou moins direct entre le présent litige et le différend sur le nom

mais bien, plus fondamentalement, de savoir si le critère retenu par l’Etat défendeur pour

l’interprétation de l’exception cont enue dans la clause compromissoire est le bon. En d’autres

69Voir CR 2011/8, p. 48, par. 7 et suiv. (Reisman).
70
Voir CR 2011/5, p. 58, par. 5 (Klein).
71
Voir CR 2011/8, p. 48, par. 7 (Reisman).
72RR, par. 3.13.

73Requête, p. 8, par. 10.

74Voir CR 2011/8, p. 49-50, par. 11 et 12 (Reisman). - 38 -

termes, suffit-il qu’il existe un lien, même indir ect, même «par implication» entre le litige porté

devant la Cour et le différend relatif au nom de l’Etat requéra nt pour qu’un tel litige soit d’office

exclu de la compétence de la Cour? L’Etat requérant soutient clairement ⎯ et il a toujours

soutenu ⎯ que tel n’est pas le cas, et que seul le différend relatif au nom lui-même ⎯ c’est-à-dire

à la détermination du nom ⎯ est exclu du champ de la clause compromissoire.

5. Le professeurReisman et moi-même vous avons invités, la semaine dernière, à suivre le

cheminement qui mène de l’articl2 e1, paragraph2 e, de l’accord intérimaire à la

résolution817(1993) du Conseil de sécurité, en passant par l’article5 de l’accord 75. Un

cheminement un peu long, peut-être, mais qui ne fait en rien du litige soumis à la Cour une affaire

horriblement complexe, comme essayent à toute force de le faire croire nos contradicteurs 76⎯

77
conformément, d’ailleurs, au scénario que nous avions envisagé .

6. Je vous rappelle à cet égard que l’article 21, paragraphe 2, permet de soumettre à la Cour

les différends relatifs à l’interprétation ou à l’exécu tion de l’accord intérimaire, «[à] l’exception de

la divergence visée au paragraphe1 de l’article 5». On peut déjà noter que la clause

compromissoire exclut «la divergence visée au paragraphe1 de l’article5» et non, par exemple,

«les différends relatifs à l’application du paragraphe1 de l’article5», ce qui serait une tout autre

chose. Aux termes de l’article 5,

«[l]es Parties conviennent de poursuivre les négociations sous les auspices du
Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conformément à la

résolution845(1993) du Conseil de sécurité, en vue de parvenir à régler le différend
mentionné dans cette résolution et dans la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil».

7. Le professeurReisman vous a proposé une l ecture particulièrement créative de l’accord

intérimaire sur ce point. Selon lui, ce n’est pas seulement à l’article5, paragraphe1, qu’il serait

fait référence au différend sur le nom, mais aussi «de manière centrale», pour reprendre ses termes,

78
dans l’article 11, paragraphe 1, de l’accord . Monsieur le président, j’ai relu attentivement le texte

de l’article11. Je l’ai lu en français. Je l’ai lu en anglais. Et je n’y ai trouvé aucune mention

quelconque du différend sur le nom. Je ne suis d’ ailleurs pas le seul. Lorsqu’il a analysé l’accord

75Voir CR 2011/5, p. 57-58, par. 3 (Klein) ; CR 2011/8, p. 47-48, par. 4-6 (Reisman).
76
Voir CR 2011/8, p. 47, par. 3 (Reisman).
77
Voir CR 2011/5, p. 21, par. 14 (Miloshoski).
78Voir CR 2011/8, p. 52, par. 24 (Reisman). - 39 -

intérimaire devant vous il y a quelques jours, le professeur Abi-Saab a identifié trois catégories de

dispositions au sein de ce traité. La première éta it celle des dispositions concernant l’obligation de

régler le différend relatif au nom, et les modalités de ce règlement. Le professeur Abi-Saab incluait

deux dispositions ⎯et deux dispositions seulement ⎯ dans cette première catégorie de clauses:

l’article5, paragraphe1, de l’accord, et la pa rtie de l’article21, pa ragraphe2, qui y renvoie 79.

Aucune mention, par contre ⎯et pour cause ⎯ de l’article11. C’est donc une lecture pour le

moins fantaisiste du texte qui vous est suggérée par certains de nos contradicteurs, qui ne paraissent

guère avoir accordé leurs violons sur cette question. Il me semble de loin préférable de s’en tenir à

ce que l’accord prévoit vraiment sur ce point. Et ce qu’il prévoit, c’est de renvoyer, dans son

article 5, à la résolution 817 (1993) du C onseil de sécurité. Nulle part ailleurs ⎯ nulle part ⎯ ne

retrouve-t-on dans le texte de l’accord la moi ndre mention d’un différend à l’égard duquel la Cour

ne pourrait exercer sa compétence. La réso lution817(1993), pour sa part, mentionne la

«divergence [qui] a surgi au sujet du nom de l’Etat , qu’il faudrait régler da ns l’intérêt du maintien

des relations pacifiques et de bon voisinage dans la région» 80.

8. Il ne fait donc aucun doute que le différe nd exclu de la compétence de la Cour est bien

celui qui pour reprendre les termes de la résoluti on «a surgi au sujet du nom de l’Etat» requérant.

Rien de plus, rien de moins. C’est le différend relatif au nom, et lui seul, que le jeu combiné des

articles 21, paragraphe 2, et 5, paragraphe 1, de l’accord soustrait à la compétence de la Cour, parce

que c’est un différend purement politique. J’ai montré , la semaine dernière, que le texte même de

la résolution817(1993) permettait de faire claire ment la distinction entre ce différend, que les

Parties sont appelées par le Conseil de sécurité à régler, et l’utilisation de l’appellation provisoire

d’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine, retenue comme solution temporaire «en attendant que

81
soit réglée la divergence qui a surgi au sujet de son nom» . La résolution identifie ainsi, d’une

part, un problème : la divergence ou le différend au sujet du nom. Professeur Sands vous a rappelé

il y a quelques instants que les versions de la résolution817 dans les six langues officielles des

NationsUnies sont parfaitement cohérentes dans leur terminologie sur ce point. La résolution

79Voir CR 2011/8, p. 35, par. 14-15 (Abi-Saab).
80
Paragraphe 3 du préambule de la résolution.
81Résolution 817 (1993), par. 2. - 40 -

propose, d’autre part, une solution temporaire pour permettre l’admission de l’Etat requérant aux

NationsUnies, en dépit de l’existence de ce problème. Cette solution est l’utilisation d’une

dénomination provisoire. Et autant le présent di fférend concerne bien la question des obligations

que fait peser ⎯ ou non ⎯ cette résolution sur l’Etat requérant en ce qui concerne l’utilisation de

la dénomination provisoire (c’est-à-dire la solution retenue par la résolution) , autant il ne porte pas

sur la question du nom en tant que telle (c’est-à-dir e sur le problème identifié dans la résolution).

Les représentants et les conseils de l’Etat dé fendeur l’ont d’ailleurs très clairement admis à

plusieurs reprises devant vous la semaine pass ée. Je me limiterai à cet égard au discours

d’ouverture de l’agent de l’Etat défendeur, da ns lequel celle-ci a expressément reconnu que «la

82
Cour n’est pas ouvertement appelée à trancher la question du nom de l’Etat demandeur» .

9. La thèse de l’Etat défendeur ignore complète ment cette distinction fondamentale entre les

deux composantes de la résolution817(1993). Il est d’ailleurs particulièrement révélateur que

dans sa plaidoirie de la semaine passée, le professeur Reisman n’ait pas dit un mot ⎯ pas un seul

mot ⎯ de l’interprétation de la résolution 817 (1993) sous l’angle de la compétence. Il en a certes

parlé très longuement sous l’angle du fond ⎯ ce que la résolution requiert, ou non, du requérant en

83
ce qui concerne l’utilisation de la dénomination provisoire . Il vous a également présenté de très

nombreuses versions ⎯plus ou moins caviardées et retouchées ⎯ des clauses de l’accord

intérimaire, censées refléter les lectures qu’en faisa it l’Etat requérant. Mais sur les implications de

la structure et du contenu de la résolution 817 (1993) pour la détermination de la compétence de la

Cour, alors qu’il s’agit là du texte fondamental auquel renvoie l’accord intérimaire, rien, un grand

vide.

10. Il vous a été rappelé la semaine derniè re que la thèse du défendeur revenait en fait à

priver la Cour de toute compétence à l’égard de portions très larges de l’accord, voire de la faire

disparaître complètement. S’il fallait retenir l’interprétation de la clause compromissoire proposée

par la Partie adverse, répétons-le encore une fois, les différends relatifs à pas moins de onze clauses

de l’accord seraient d’office exclus de la compétence de la Cour, selon le propre comptage effectué

82
Voir CR 2011/8, p. 17, par. 19 (Telalian).
83Voir Ibid., p. 54-57, par. 29-44 (Reisman). - 41 -

84
par l’Etat défendeur . Près de la moitié de l’accord échapperait de ce fait automatiquement au

champ d’application de la clause compromissoire. Sur ceci, une fois encore, pas un mot de la

Partie adverse. Contre l’évidence la plus élémentaire, nos estimés contradicteurs préfèrent

continuer à prétendre que leur thèse ne contredit en rien le fait que l’article 21, paragraphe 2, donne

ce qu’ils continuent à appeler un «rôle central» à la Cour dans le contrôle de l’application de

l’accord 85. Et ils reprennent à cette fin la liste des dispositions ⎯ provisoirement, très

provisoirement ⎯ sauvées des eaux, en affirmant qu’un litige les concernant ne toucherait pas

nécessairement à la question du nom.

11. Mais le problème n’est pas de savoir si un litige relatif à ces di spositions toucherait

nécessairement à la question du nom. Il suffirait, à suivre la thèse de l’Etat défendeur, qu’un

éventuel litige présente un lien quelconque, même incident ou lointain, avec cette question pour

qu’il soit automatiquement «contaminé» si l’on peut dire par l’exception prévue dans l’article21,

paragraphe 2. Rappelez-vous du critère retenu par la Partie adverse directement ou par implication.

L’un des exemples retenus par nos estimés contradicteurs appara ît particulièrement malheureux à

cet égard. Le professeur Reisman a fait référence à l’article 8 de l’accord, qui impose aux Parties

de s’abstenir de poser des obstacles aux m ouvements de personnes et de biens entre leurs

86
territoires . Il a affirmé qu’un litige relatif à cette di sposition ne serait pas nécessairement relié à

la question du nom 87. Peut-être pas nécessairement, mais potentiellement en tout cas, par

implication, dès l’instant où serait établie une connexion avec le différend sur le nom. M. Reisman

semble avoir oublié ⎯sans doute parce qu’il s’agit d’un ép isode que l’Etat défendeur est peu

enclin à voir évoqué devant cette Cour ⎯ que c’est précisément en vue de faire pression sur l’Etat

requérant dans le contexte du différend relatif au nom que l’Etat défendeur lui a imposé un

embargo économique aux consé quences désastreuses en1994 88? Pourtant, s’il fallait suivre le

défendeur, le litige qui résulterait de l’adoption de telles mesures serait bel et bien exclu de la

compétence de la Cour dès lors qu’il présente un lien de connexité, par implication, avec le

84RR, par. 3.21 et CR 2011/5, p. 60, par. 9 (Klein).

85Voir CR 2011/8, p. 50, par. 15 (Reisman).
86
Voir Ibid., p. 52, par. 23 (Reisman).
87Voir Ibid.

88AM, par. 2.27. - 42 -

différend relatif au nom. Et il pourrait évidem ment en aller de même pour toutes les autres

dispositions de l’accord qui pourraient être reliées d’une manière ou d’une autre, par implication, à

ce différend. L’interprétation du premier membre de phrase de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, soutenue

par l’Etat défendeur se révèle dès lors plus inte nable que jamais. Et ce n’est certainement pas un

hasard si un auteur grec particulièrement proéminent qui a commenté l’accord intérimaire ⎯ avec

une autorité sur laquelle mon collègue le prof esseur PhilippeSands re viendra dans quelques

instants ⎯ n’a nullement retenu cette approche de la clause compromissoire, et lui a au contraire

89
reconnu une portée très large .

12. Je ne m’attarderai guère, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de

la Cour, sur l’autre argument d’incompétence soulev é par l’Etat défendeur, selon lequel la Cour ne

pourrait trancher le présent différend car cela lu i imposerait de se prononcer sur les droits et

obligations d’Etats et d’entités tiers à l’instance, en l’absence de leur consentement. L’argument

bâti par nos estimés contradicteurs sur ce point est tout entier fondé sur une vision des faits de la

cause dont on ne sait pas trop si elle relève du surréalisme ⎯ ce qui aurait au moins le mérite de lui

conférer une prétention artistique ⎯ ou du déni pur et simple de réalité. La prémisse du

raisonnement est en effet que l’ Etat défendeur n’a rien fait d’autre que de «se joindr[e] au

90
consensus déférant [l’]admission [du requérant] à l’OTAN» . Aucun comportement propre de

l’Etat défendeur, préalablement au sommet de Bucarest , ne peut être identifié. Un tel acte distinct

91
de la décision de l’OTAN, nous ont martelé les professeurs Pellet et Crawford, n’existe pas . Et la

Cour serait de ce fait irrémédiablement amenée à se prononcer sur un acte de l’OTAN, ce qu’elle

92
ne peut faire .

13. Mon collègue le professeur Sean Murphy vous a exposé il y a quelques instants ce qu’il

convenait de penser d’un tel scénario et de sa complète invraisemblance. Le professeurSands,

quant à lui, vous a détaillé ce conte de fées que se raconte la Partie adverse, comme pour se

rassurer, mais l’heure des contes est terminée, il est temps de revenir aux réalités, aux dures

89
ChristosRozakis, Political and Legal Dimensions of the Transiti onal Agreement signed in New York between
Greece and FYROM, Athènes, Sideris, 1996 (en grec), par. 3.5.
90
Voir CR 2011/10, p. 30, par. 36 (Pellet).
91Voir CR 2011/9, p. 15, par. 18 (Pellet) ; ibid., p. 53, par. 19 (Crawford).

92Voir ibid., p. 15, par. 19 (Pellet). - 43 -

réalités. Cet acte d’objection existe indéniablement, et il est clairement attribuable à l’Etat

défendeur, qui l’a revendiqué tant et plus par la voix de ses plus hautes autorités. Le fait qu’il

s’agit d’un comportement clairement individualisable et clairement attribuable à l’Etat défendeur

nous a d’ailleurs été confirmé au-delà de tout dout e par le professeur Crawford, qui a insisté sur ce

point à propos des différentes prises de positi on des autorités du défendeur: «governmental

93
institutions of Greece are not the same as NATO», nous a-t-il dit . Nous ne saurions mieux

exprimer les choses. Et c’est précisément pour cette raison que la Cour est pleinement habilitée à

se prononcer sur la compatibilité de ce comportement à l’article11, paragraphe1, de l’accord

intérimaire de1995, sans que cela la conduise pour autant à prendre position de manière

quelconque sur les décisions intervenues ultérieure ment au sein de l’OTAN. L’on se trouve donc

bien confronté ici à une situation similaire à celle s dont la Cour a eu à connaître dans l’affaire

Nauru et dans l’affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo . La Cour n’est en rien

contrainte de se prononcer sur les comportement s de tiers à l’instance comme préalables à la

détermination de la responsabilité d’une des pa rties à l’instance. La jurisprudence de l’ Or

monétaire n’est dès lors d’aucun secours à l’Etat défendeur. Et c’est bien pour cette raison, alors

même qu’ils nous reprochaient not re silence au sujet de cette jurisprudence, que nos estimés

94
contradicteurs ne se sont guère étendus sur ce point .

14. L’exception d’irrecevabilité avancée par l’Etat défendeur, aux termes de laquelle la Cour

devrait s’abstenir de rendre un arrêt car celui-ci serait dépourvu de tout effet pratique, est fondée

sur le même scénario. Là aussi, nos estimés contra dicteurs ont refusé de s’engager dans un débat

juridique digne de ce nom quant à la pertinence de l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional pour le

litige présentement soumis à la Cour. Et cela n’a rien d’étonnant, puisqu’un tel débat, s’il devait

avoir le moindre intérêt, peut difficilement s’engager sur des prémisses factuelles aussi incorrectes.

Je ne peux donc que réitérer le constat opéré par l’Etat requérant sur ce point : une fois la demande

rapportée à son objet exact, la construction éla borée par le défendeur pour en contester la

recevabilité tombe en poussière 95. Les enjeux concrets et pratique s de la présente affaire, on l’a

93Voir CR 2011/9., p. 48, par. 6 (Crawford).
94
Voir ibid., p. 15, par. 19 (Pellet).
95CR 2011/5, p. 64, par. 14 (Klein). - 44 -

amplement montré à ce stade, sont bien réels. C’est le cas tant par rapport à l’OTAN qu’à l’égard

d’autres organisations dans lesquelles l’Etat requérant pourrait solliciter son admission à l’avenir,

comme l’Union européenne, par exemple.

15. Reste enfin l’allégation d’interférence dans un processus politique ⎯ celui des

négociations sur le nom de l’Etat requérant ⎯, qui devrait elle aussi conduire la Cour à abdiquer

ses pouvoirs en l’espèce. Il convient tout d’abord de rappeler que l’Etat requérant a exprimé de

nettes réserves quant à l’introduction particulièreme nt tardive de cette dernière exception, en

contrariété avec les règles régissant la présentation des exceptions préliminaires. La Partie adverse

a visiblement choisi d’ignorer complètement ce léger inconvénient, puisque ses conseils n’en ont

pas dit un mot la semaine passée. L’Etat requérant ne peut donc que réitérer ses réserves sur ce

point, en invitant la Cour à écarter cette dernière exception en raison de sa présentation tardive.

16. A supposer que la Cour accepte néanmoins de l’examiner, et à titre subsidiaire, qu’il me

soit permis de rappeler brièvement pourquoi un arrê t rendu par la Cour dans la présente espèce

n’aurait en rien pour effet d’interférer dans le processus de négociation sur le nom. L’analyse de la

résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité à laquelle nous venons de nous livrer a très clairement

montré que le processus de négociation sur le nom, d’une part, et la question des obligations que

faisait éventuellement peser la résolution817 ( 1993) sur l’Etat requérant en ce qui concerne

l’utilisation de la dénomination provisoire, d’ autre part, sont deux questions bien distinctes 96. Une

fois encore, la Partie adverse entretient délibérément la confusion à cet égard. La détermination de

la portée de la résolution817 (1993) et de l’accord intérimaire en ce qui concerne la question de

l’utilisation de la dénomination pr ovisoire n’aura en rien pour effe t de trancher le différend relatif

au nom, ni d’imposer une conclusion au processus de négociations toujours en cours entre les

Parties à ce sujet. Nos estimés contradicteurs ont fait valoir à ce propos qu’«il n’appartient pas à

l’«organe judiciaire principal» des NationsUnies de délier» l’Etat requéra nt de son obligation de

97
négocier en vue d’arriver à une solution du différend sur le nom . L’Etat requérant ne l’a jamais

prétendu, et ce n’est nullement ce qu’il attend de la Cour, directement ou indirectement. Cette

obligation de négocier existait avant que le présen t litige survienne, et elle continuera à exister

96
Voir aussi CR 2011/6, p. 18-19, par. 14 (Klein).
97Voir CR 2011/9, p. 19, par. 28 (Pellet). - 45 -

après qu’il ait été réglé. Rien ne conduira donc la Cour à «interférer» dans un processus politique

et à porter de ce fait atteinte à l’«intégrité de la fonction judiciaire» si elle accepte de traiter au fond

de l’affaire qui lui est aujourd’hui soumise.

17. En conclusion, c’est pour l’ensemble des raisons qui vous ont été rappelées ce matin que

l’Etat requérant prie respectueusement la Cour de rejeter les exceptions d’incompétence et

d’irrecevabilité formulées par l’Etat défendeur.

Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie

pour votre aimable attention. Je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir maintenant

passer la parole à mon collègue, le professeur Philippe Sands.

Mr.PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorPierre Klein for his statement. Now I invite

Professor Philippe Sands to take the floor.

SMAr.DS:

T HE RESPONDENT ’S BREACH OF ARTICLE 11 (1)CANNOT BE EXCUSED

Introduction

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it remains for me to address the excuses put forward

by the Respondent to justify its violation. You will recall there were three: the Article 22 excuse,

the exceptio excuse, and the countermeasur es excuse. Now these have b een very fully pleaded by

now, and nothing we heard last week has caused us to depart from the very clear views that we

have already expressed, namely, that these creativ e legal arguments cannot get them off the hook,

and I will deal with them reasonably shortly.

2. As regards the Artic22 argument, this was dealt with exclusively by

Professor Reisman 9. One might have expected somebody on that side of the room to deal with the

practical application of Article 22, its melding to the facts of the case, perhaps Professor Crawford,

but this just never happened. So ProfessorReisman’s presentation was just left hanging, aptly

99
described as an “entr’acte” , a bit like the entr’acte in that wonderful Rodgers and Hammerstein

98
CR 2011/9, pp. 39-46 (Reisman).
99Ibid., p. 8, para. 52 (Crawford). - 46 -

show Cinderella; the one that always gets played at every live performance as a sort of

divertimento but never features in the final recorded version ⎯ in this case, that is your Judgment.

3. Counsel for the Respondent lamented that Article 22 was, to use his words, “something of

a latecomer to this case” 100. Well, if I were the host I would be surprised that this guest turned up

at all. There is a very simple reason we made no mention at all of Article22 in our Memorial,

beyond a reference to the fact of its existence, and that is because it is totally irrelevant. In

preparing for this case we fully researched th e academic literature on the Interim Accord.

Counsel’s words last week caused us to go back to these articles and check again ⎯ had we missed

something? But once again, we were unable to fi nd any commentator who considers Article 22 to

be remotely relevant to the core functions of the Accord. Now, if any such article might have been

expected to assist, it would have been that published by Professor ⎯ now Judge ⎯ Christos

Rozakis, in 1996, entitled, in English, “Political and Legal Dimensions of the Transitional

Agreement” signed in New York between Greece and FYROM. It appears to be only available in

Greek ⎯ we do have an informal translation into English and we would have no objection to

sharing it with the other side or the Court if th at would be helpful. The article was published

around the time Professor Rozakis served as the Respondent’s Deputy Foreign Minister 101. Given

his then position, we assume he was well placed to provide an authoritative commentary on the

Interim Accord. So if anyone might address Article 22, one would have expected it to have been

him. It is therefore noteworthy that he makes no mention of Article 22 at any place in his 77 page

book, and no mention either of any related right on the part of either Party to suspend or modify

any obligation in the manner sought by the Respondent. No other legal article that we have been

102
able to identify makes a material reference to Article 22, in any way that assists the Respondent .

100CR 2011/9, p. 39, para. 2 (Reisman).
101
Christos Rozakis, Political and Legal Dimensions of the Trans itional Agreement signed in New York between
Greece and FYROM, Athens, Sideris, 1996 [in Greek].
102
See, e.g., MichaelWood, “Participation of Former Yugos lav States in the United Nations and in Multilateral
Treaties”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law , (1:1997),p.1, available at:
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/wood_1.pdf; Nikos Zaikos, The Interim Accord: Prospects and
Developments in Accordance with International Law , available at: http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/
InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Zaikos.pdf; Aristotle Tzia-mpiris , The Name Dispute in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia after the Signing of the Interim Accord , available at: http://www.macedonian-
heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads /Interim_Tziampiris.pdf. - 47 -

There are similar provisions to Article22 in ma ny other international ag reements and nowhere

have we found support for their view and they have cited none.

4. ProfessorPellet complained that “nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre font une lecture

partielle et partiale, en voulant dissocier l’article 11 de cet instrument de son article 22” 103. Well,

in truth, he should be directing his critique to Ms Telalian’s former colleague at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. Indeed, last week, when he w as in the room, he would not even have had to go

that far, he could have raised his concerns w ith Mr. Evangelos Kofos, counsel to the Respondent,

who was then sitting even closer to him, who happened to work in the same Ministry as

Professor Rozakis, and who has cited his book with approval, referring to Professor Rozakis as “a

distinguished jurisprude” 104. [Plate1on] Now, of particular interest, for present purposes, is the

fact that Mr.Kofos notes ProfessorRozakis’ statement that “any disappointments and impasses

which might arise on the way to an agreement over the name should not prevent the concurrent

implementation of the Transitional Accord,” and then ⎯ even more significantly ⎯ he quotes,

with approval, Professor Rozakis’ statement “[w]hat has already been agreed must not be used in

negotiations as a lever to gain adva ntages in the matter of the name” 105. So let us be clear:

ProfessorRozakis foresaw exactly what has happened in this case, that a party ⎯ the

Respondent ⎯ might take what has already been agreed ⎯ the obligation not to object in

Article 11 (1) ⎯ and use it “in negotiations as a lever to gain advantages in the matter of the

name.” Did ProfessorRozakis express the view that Article22 might be used to circumvent,

modify or condition “what has already been agreed”? He did not. Did Mr. Kofos criticize him for

that failure? He did not. Did MsTelalian, or any of her predecessors, take any steps to alert

ProfessorRozakis or Mr.Kofos that they had fallen into error? There is no evidence before this

Court that they did. In short, we have been able to find no support for the view adopted by

Professor Reisman that Article 22 is a central component of the Interim Accord. And that is why

we said nothing about it in our Memorial. [Plate 1 off]

103
CR 2011/8, p. 63, para. 12 (Pellet).
10Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name’: A Greek Perspective”, in Athens-Skopje: An
Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002, published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe rs, Athens, Dec.2003, Hellenic Foundation for
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), ISBN 960- 8356-05-9, pp.27-144; available in English at:

http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Ko…; judges’ folder, tab 14.
10Ibid., at p. 146, quoting from Professor Rozakis’ book, op. cit., fn. 101, at pp. 37-38. - 48 -

5. There is therefore good reason why Article22 was a latecomer. No one negotiating the

Interim Accord seems to have thought it was significant. I can therefore be very clear in

responding to the points raised by counsel in a presentation that was, all will have noticed, both

brief and incomplete in its effort to respond to th e arguments we made last week or in our written

pleadings. He did not address, as you will have noticed, the short-cut we identified that permits the

Court to deal with Article 22 in a straightforwar d way: unless the Respondent can show that as at

April 2008 there was a right or duty obliging it unde r NATO to object because the name difference

had not been resolved, then on its own case Article 22 is of no use to it. But, even on its own case,

the Respondent has not been able to show that its objection to our NAT O membership was based

on any criterion for NATO membership. You will recall that I drew your attention to the evidence,

that shows the Respondent’s objection was based on criterion that were “in addition to” those set

forth in any NATO documents 10. On that point too the Respondent was silent and we noted that

silence.

6. So, what did Professor Reisman have to say? He made four central points. First, that we

had not explained the effect of Article 22 10. That is simply wrong. If he cares to have a look at

paragraph 5.13 of our Reply, we set out an explanation that clauses of this type were not unusual in

international agreements. Then we gave a practical example in the field of defence procurement as

to how a provision that is aimed at providing that an agreement will not alter the rights and duties

of a third party can operate in practice. But you do not explain, he claims, how “the duties” of third

108
parties might be affected . In fact we thought it was rather clear from that paragraph of our

Reply: if State A supplies items to State B with restrictions on retransfer to other States, and then

State B supplies to the Respondent, State B has a duty ⎯ an obligation ⎯ to State A that is

covered by Article 22. And that goes in the same way for international obligations of the European

Union to a third party, given that the Respondent is a member of the EU.

7. Second, ProfessorReisman sought to address our point that the Respondent’s

interpretation of Article22 made no sense when c onsidered next to the provisos in Articles14

106
RCM, para. 7.35; AR, para. 2.11; CR 2011/6, p. 61, para. 28 (Sands).
107
CR 2011/9, p. 40, para. 9 (Reisman).
10Ibid. - 49 -

and 19 of the Interim Accord, that speak expressly to the rights of the Respondent. He explained

that these provisions deal with issues that are “ar eas”, to use his word, “in which European Union

member States have delegated their competences to the European Commission”, so it was, to take

his words again “natural, at least for the Greek draf ters of the Interim Accord, to provide explicitly

for such provisions, so as not to infringe upon the exclusive competences assigned to the European

109
Commission in these fields” . And he generously offered to us that, since the Applicant is not a

party to the European Union, we may not have been aware of these matters. With respect, the lack

of understanding is his. Putting aside the minor point that exclusive competences are vested with

the Community, not the Commission, the argument collapses simply by looking at other provisions

of the Interim Accord. Article 15, for example, deals with “economic relations”; it is hard to think

of an area in respect of which the European Economic Community had more exclusive competence

than this one, but it includes no proviso. The same may be said of Article16, that deals with

technical co-operation and, another example, Article 17, that deals with the environment, an area in

which the Community also has a high degree of exclusive competence. So th is explanation has to

be wrong, neat as it is, as anyone familiar with European Union law will instantly recognize.

8. Then Professor Reisman decided to meld Articles11 and22, yet again. Having just

110
criticized us for inserting words into the Interim Accord , he then did exactly the same thing. He

used various slides to show us how the Respondent had inserted the word “but” to link Articles 11

and 22 into a seamless, beautiful and helpful whole. Now, this exercise did have the great merit of

transparency, as was claimed, but counsel never adequately explained why he was entitled to insert

a word into a treaty that altered the meaning by having the clear effect of subordinating Article 11

to Article22 in a way that the drafters themselves did not do, as they had done in Articles 14

and 19. And he did not explain either why he felt able to remove nine crucial words from the text

of Article 22, the words that state that the Accord “is not directed against any other State or entity”.

In any event, the insertion and removals do not assist if we ⎯ Judge Rozakis and Mr. Kofos, every

other commentator and observer ⎯ are correct in considering that Article22 has no relevance to

Article 11 and to this case.

109
CR 2011/9, p. 41, para. 10 (Reisman).
11Ibid., para. 9. - 50 -

9. Then ProfessorReisman returned to the distinctions between different categories of

so-called “open” and “closed” international organizations. We have already explained the basis for

our view that this distinction is without merit 111. The sheer complexity of the argument does not

add to its attractiveness; I must confess that on the oral presentation I rather lost the thread when

he came on to fax machines, telephones and the re levance of the concept of scarcity. And, of

course, I found myself wondering into which categor y different bodies might fall. What about the

World Trade Organization, which seems to be both an “organisation à vocation universelle” and an

“organisation fermée”. Reading, rereading, a nd re-rereading did not add to the force of an

argument that is noteworthy for the fact that it ma kes reference to not a single authority in support

of the claim. And we still await an explanation as to the absurdity of the outcome: the Respondent

has a right to object in all international organiza tions at which its objection may have an effect ⎯

closed organizations ⎯ but no right where the objection has no effect ⎯ open organizations.

10. Of course, the effect of his argument is devastating for the Interim Accord and the

stability that it was intended to create. This is confirmed by him and we are happy to take the

confirmation that “every obligation in the treaty is potentially contingent on Article 22”, so that the

112
obligation in Article11 yields . On that approach, Article11 and every other provision just

becomes meaningless: either party is simply entitled to assert that it has as a right or duty under an

international obligation in force for it, and then it can override an obligation in the Interim Accord.

That is not a conclusion that was identified by ProfessorRozakis or Mr.Kofos, or apparently

anyone else on this planet. The idea that Article22 is a sleeping provision that can somehow be

invoked in January 2010, in the Counter-Memorial ⎯ fifteen years after the Interim Accord was

adopted and two years after the dispute arose ⎯ is not immediately attractive, given the destructive

effect that it has on the Accord. Professor Reisman simply chose to ignore thirteen years of

inconvenient practice; on the one hand, the Respond ent argues that we have been systematically

violating our obligations under the Accord, since 1995 and, on the other hand, he says that it was

only in 2008 that it finally found reason to act, with a public statement by the Applicant’s President

that was delivered . . . a year after the Respondent began to object and six months after

111
AR, paras. 5.25-5.28; CR 2011/6, pp. 57-58, paras. 20-21 (Sands).
11CR 2011/9, p. 43, para. 13 (Reisman). - 51 -

Bucharest 11! Ever inventive, counsel has come up with the right of pre-emptive pre-emption, the

right to act months before the information that generates the right has become known to you. One

can quickly imagine to what mischief such a theory could soon be applied.

11. In conclusion, Article22 cannot be the “g et out of jail card” that is claimed. In

paragraph 7.7 of its Counter-Memorial, the Respondent conceded that Article 11 (1) “limits a right

that Greece could otherwise freely exercise”. Prof essor Crawford recognized that Article 11 was,

to take his words, a “major concession by Greece” 114. Article22 was not intended to restore the

situation which pertained before that concession w as granted. Article11 either does or does not

limit the right, it either was or was not a major concession. And it certainly cannot be a concession

or a limitation that the Respondent is free to abrogate unilaterally on the basis of conditions that are

nowhere set out, by reference to a provision that its own senior Foreign Ministry advisers

considered to be of no relevance whatsoever. Article 22 does not assist the Respondent.

12. So I turn to the exceptio. As always, it was a real pleasure to listen to Professor Pellet,

who did not seem to appear too exhausted by his tussle with Professor Crawford over the privilege

of arguing this point. With vim and vigour, he battled, a Greek hero, a testament to formidable

talents, but perhaps also to the power of self-delusion.

13. Was I the only person in the Great Hall, late on Friday afternoon, as the cocktails des

juges approached, to be transported back in time, maybe to 1938 ⎯ and elsewhere in place,

somewhere to where the Acad emy Building was, perhaps ⎯ to imagine JudgeAnzilotti sitting at

the back of the lecture theatre, nodding sagely, as a brilliant and, it must be said, very youthful

115
ProfessorPellet expounded on the great future that lay ahead for the exceptio ? But then, as if

awoken from a dream, I was back in 2011 and the r eal world of the law court and law libraries and

matters at hand ⎯ confronted with the real world, not the world of myth and Gods and heroes.

Preparing for this hearing, we went through each edition of Professor Pellet’s very fine treatise on

international law, to see what he really thought about the exceptio, from the 1stedition ⎯

published in 1977 ⎯ to the 8th edition ⎯ published recently in 2009. In each case, the treatment

11CR 2011/9, p. 46, para. 18 (Reisman).
114
Ibid., p.23, para. 8 (Crawford).
11CR 2011/10, pp. 24-34 (Pellet). - 52 -

was short and, as I mentioned last week, entirely devoted to the manner in which the exceptio has

been picked up in Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Co nvention. So I, to be frank, did not recognize

Friday’s speech as bearing any relation whatsoever to what he wrote in any of those eight editions.

So perhaps we were getting a privileged previe w of what might appear in the next edition ⎯

Pellet’s 9th we might call it ⎯ an indication also of the hazards of simultaneously navigating the

worlds of academe and professional practice.

14. We expected half an hour on the exceptio and countermeasures, but we got a full hour.

Sometimes, Mr. President, less is more. We thought we would have nothing to add to what we said

in our written and oral pleadings. But something rather interesting happened. The Court will recall

that at paragraph8.2 of its Counter-Memorial the Respondent asserted, in respect of the exceptio,

and its entire case, that it had “never claimed any intent to suspend . . . in whole or in part”. The
116
point was repeated at paragraph8.40 of the Rejoinder . [Plate2on] So, the Court can well

imagine our surprise when Professor Pellet announced to the Court on Friday afternoon ⎯ late in

the day ⎯ that in fact the Respondent had effected a “suspension partielle” 117 as you can see on the

screen now. But then, a few minutes later, having upped the gear from third to fourth, he went

straight into reverse, which is always a dangerous thing to do. Perhaps he recognized he had fallen

into error ⎯ this is what he then says: [Plate 2.2 on] “il n’entrait nullement dans ses intentions de

mettre fin à l’accord intérimaire ou d’en suspendre l’exécution” ⎯ that is what he said, returning to

118
the line taken in paragraph8.2 of the Counter-Memorial and 8.40 of the Rejoinder .

Mr.President, you will understand that we are now somewhat confused as to what their case is.

Have they suspended, or have they not suspende d? One reading of Professor Pellet’s presentation

is that they have now dropped the exceptio argument, and that they are just arguing material breach

of treaty under Article60, but of course he ne ver actually said that and it would be truly

extraordinary for the Respondent to raise such a si gnificant new legal argument so late in the day,

having rejected it right up until Friday afternoon. But perhaps that is why he raised Article65,

paragraph5, claiming it to be available as a sh ield, to allow suspension in the absence of prior

11RCM, para. 8.2; RR, para. 8.40.
117
CR 2011/10, p. 28, para. 12 (Pellet).
11Ibid., p. 33, para. 26 (Pellet). - 53 -

notification 11. But his difficulty on that score is that Article65, paragraph5, begins with the

following words ⎯ it says “without prejudice to Article45”; so you go and take a look at what

Article45 says and it prevents a State from invoking a ground for suspending the operation of a

treaty under Article 60 if, after becoming aware of the facts, it has “expressly agreed that the treaty

is valid or remains in force or continues in operation”. So we were even further struck by the new

and additional inconsistency when ⎯ ten minutes later, after having raised Article65,

paragraph 5 ⎯ Professor Pellet did exactly that, he expressly agreed that the treaty is valid, remains

in force and continues in operation: “il n’entra it nullement dans ses intentions de mettre fin à

l’accord intérimaire ou d’en susp endre l’exécution”, he said. So , having raised Article65,

paragraph 5, he then cut off its head.

15. Another reading of Professor Pellet’s unusual presentation is that the Respondent is

somehow inviting the Court to meld the exceptio and Article 60 into something new, that would be

a wholly novel argument.

16. But there is a third possible reading, and this one strikes us as the most likely, and that is

that the Respondent is in total disarray; that it has lost the ability to maintain oversight of the

totality of its arguments ⎯ not surprising ⎯ given their improbability and their complication. That

is why the contradictions abound. In any event, we will listen with great care to what they have to

say on Wednesday, recognizing, Mr. President, that if they are to make yet another new argument

or new arguments we would fully expect to have a right to be heard on them. [Plate 2 off]

17. Whatever happens on Wednesday, the exceptio has had a jolly good outing, way beyond

what it merits. Now that it has been aired, we hope that the Cour t will put it back in the cupboard

and gently close the door, if that is not what Prof essor Pellet already did last Friday: and there we

hope it will remain, quietly resting, until its next outing, which by our calculation is a 73-year

event.

120
18. Finally, I come to countermeasures, treated as a sort of epilogue , and on which we can

be even briefer. For the reasons mentioned in the first round, the argument does not get off the

ground, and counsel did not give it wings last week. It just does not meet the conditions: there is

119
CR 2011/10, p. 29, par. 14 (Pellet).
12Ibid., pp. 34-39 (Pellet). - 54 -

no evidence before the Court to justify the conclusion that the Respondent is an injured State ⎯ it

would indeed be a truly remarkable thing if this Court could hold that a mere construction of a

statue, or the naming of an airport, or the naming of a stretch of a highway, could establish an

international injury in these circumstances. Counsel reminded us of his Agent’s submissions “que

la proportionnalité . . . doit également être mesurée à l’aune des manquements du demandeur à ses

121
obligations relatives au nom et aux négociations sur ce nom” . The remark caused us to enquire

how familiar counsel might actually be with the eviden ce before the Court. It is apparent that in

these cases we have to know the whole dossier, we have to read everything ⎯ every document ⎯

precisely to avoid making statements that get us into difficulty. But the annexes admit of no doubt:

in its Counter-Memorial, the Respondent annexed just nine Notes Verbales that were addressed to

the Applicant before 4 April 2008; that is the totality of the evidence on which they relay. Not one

of these alleges a material breach of the Interim Accord; not one of these alleges that the use of the

constitutional name before the United Nations viol ated the Interim Accord; not one of these

alleges irredentism; not one of these alleges a violation of Article5, paragraph1, of the Interim

Accord. A table setting this out is available in your judges’ folder at tab13. The Respondent

annexed no new Notes Verbales, dating from that period, from the Respondent to the Applicant in

its Rejoinder. So that is it, that is the evidence on which they rely: nine Notes Verbales, that is the

sum total of their case. And what do th ey raise in those Notes Verbales? Well ⎯ and I say this

with respect, particularly to the lady who owns the car ⎯ they can only be characterized as totally

trivial: for example, four of the Notes relate to the vandalism or theft of car licence plates on a car

that belonged to the Attaché at the Respondent’s Liaison Office in Skopje, and a fifth concerned

the rear licence plate of her spouse’s car 122. Mr. President, you cannot stand before the Bar of the

International Court of Justice in The Hague and allege, with a straight face, that damage to a car

licence plate, however regrettable, is something this Court should be dealing with. You cannot

stand before the Bar of this Court and allege that the use by the Applicant of its constitutional name

in communications with every international organization of which it has been a member since 1993

amounts to a material breach or violation of th e Interim Accord, in ci rcumstances in which the

121
CR 2011/10, p. 35, para. 31 (Pellet).
12See RCM, Anns. 41, 43, 44, 45 and 50. - 55 -

Respondent’s pleading does not contain a single Note Verbale addressed to the Applicant predating

April2008 that makes the claim or that indicates that it is entitled to take countermeasures. The

allegation is all the more implausible in the fa ce of the absence of objection by any of the

organizations or any of its members. Taken alongside the account written by Mr. Evangelos Kofos

that deals with the application of the Interim Accord in this relevant period and which fails to make

123
any mention of this offending act , the argument simply collapses.

19. Mr. President, the substantive conditions for countermeasures are obviously not met, and

the formal conditions for their invocation are obvious ly not met. Counsel made no real effort to

argue otherwise, and the argument provides no assistance to the Court or to the Respondent.

20. Mr.President, this is a simple case, one in which the facts inevitably lead to a simple

outcome. The Respondent did object, and for a reason that was not permitted by Article 11. That

objection is factually and legally distinct from any action of NATO. The Respondent’s objection

cannot be excused by any of the three grounds put forward by the Respondent: not by Article 22,

not by the exceptio, not by countermeasures. If either Part y had any concerns with the application

of the Interim Accord, the 1969 Vienna Convention provided the rules and mechanisms for dealing

with them, whether in terms of suspension, withdrawal or termination. What neither Party is

entitled to do is to take the law into its own hands, or circumvent the Vienna Convention; and this

is something that some of the delegation to my left’s own counsel recognize. [Plate3on]

Mr. President, writing in 2003 the situation was described in the following way by Mr. Kofos in the

foreword to the edited collection to which I have already referred:

“The 13th of October2002 marked the expiry of the Interim Accord between
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This Accord

had regularised relations between the two neighbour states for seven years of its
planned duration. Given that both countri es were apparently satisfied with the
Accord’s framework and the progress of its implementation, neither party declared

any intention of allowing it to lapse. It will, therefore, re main in force until it i124
replaced by a new, ‘final’ agreement, or until one of the two sides declares it void.”
(Emphasis added.)

12Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name’: A Greek Perspective”, in Athens-Skopje: An
Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002, published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe, Athens, Dec.2003, p.142; available in
English at: http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Ko….

12Evangelos Kofos and Vlasis Vlasidis, “Foreword” in Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002,
published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe rs, Athens, Dec. 2003, p. 11; availabl e in English at: http://www.macedonian-
heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/Downloads/Interim_Foreword.pdf; judges’ folder, tab 15. - 56 -

The Respondent has not declared the Interim Ac cord to be void, and according to its written

pleadings it has not purported to suspend it, after the little 180˚ about-turn and then re-about-turn, it

seems that it has not been suspended and remains fully in force today: and we invite you to so

judge, and to hold the Respondent to the obligations it undertook, both now and for the future.

I thank you once again, Mr. President and Members of the Court, for your patience and for

your kind attention, and invite you to ca ll to the Bar our distinguished Co-Agent,

AmbassadorNikolaDimitrov, who will bring to a close our second round of oral arguments.

[Plate 3 off]

The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor PhilippeSands for his statement. I now invite

His Excellency Ambassador Nikola Dimitrov to make closing remarks and make final submission

on behalf of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Ambassador, you have the floor.

DMIr.ITROV:

Closing remarks

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I am honoured to appear for the first time before the

Court on behalf of my country, the Republic of Macedonia.

2. MinisterMilošoski elaborated upon the path my country has chosen since our

independence in 1991. It is the path of a small country in the heart of the Balkans, trying to do the

right thing in rather difficult circumstances and su rroundings, in its efforts to find its place in the

community of nations. This path was not free of major challenges, including the imperative to

build a functional democracy in our multiethnic so ciety based on rule of law, human rights and

market economy.

3. One of the main challenges since our birth as an independent State was our relationship

with the Hellenic Republic, our neighbour and the Respondent in th is case. Although it is not a

matter before this Court for resolution, the principal difference that divides us concerns the name of

my country, with all that implies to our nationality, our language and our identity. Due to the

Respondent’s opposition, we have suffered delays and setback s in our quest for international

recognition and legitimacy, often compromising the in terests for stability in the region. Several - 57 -

learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent refe rred to the purported “choice” of our name as our

125
crime . Yet for us, it was not a choice. Our name was the result of a long historic process;

indeed, born as Macedonians, speaking the Macedonian language, it is not as if we had alternative

identities to choose from. And we have never tr ied to monopolize the term, fully aware that for

different nations it can have different meanings, and not having any issue with the use of this term

by the Respondent to describe one of its own provinces.

4. No other country in the world is concerned with our name. Consequently ⎯ and I may

add, not surprisingly ⎯ a majority of the Members of the United Nations have established their

diplomatic relations with us under the name the “Republic of Macedonia”. They do so in part

because they believe such a step promotes our stability and the stability of the region. For the

Respondent, this fact is a grand strategy that we have been hiding 12. But we have hidden nothing;

we have consistently used our constitutional name, and that na me alone, in our bilateral and

multilateral relations since our country gained independence in 1991.

5. In 1995, we and the Respondent agreed in the Interim Accord to continue good faith

negotiations regarding the differenc e over the name and agreed to a series of obligations while

those negotiations were ongoing. It has not been a perfect relationship; the Parties have thus far

proven unable to settle the difference, as called for in Article5 of that Agreement. Nevertheless,

both Parties have acted in good faith in trying to do so, as the mediator ⎯ the supreme authority to

assess ⎯ Mr. Nimetz, has recently confirmed. I hope you will have noted, Mr. President, that we

have refrained from criticizing the Respondent’s conduct in those ne gotiations. I also hope that

you will understand that this is not because we deem the Respondent’s conduct to be above

criticism. However, we do not believe that this is the forum for name-calling, especially with

respect to a matter that is not before you.

6. What is before you is another articl e of the Interim Accord, which the Respondent,

regrettably, has violated. Our counsel have laid out for you the facts relating to the Respondent’s

unlawful objection under Article 11 and why its defences are without merit. I will not repeat those

arguments.

125
CR 2011/8, p. 33, para. 5 (Abi-Saab); CR 2011/9, p. 29, para. 26 (Crawford).
12CR 2011/9, p. 45, para. 18 (Reisman); ibid., pp. 54-58, paras. 24-30 (Crawford). - 58 -

7. I do wish, however, to emphasize two things. First, when the Respondent, in the months

leading up to and at the Bucharest Summit objected to our membership in NATO, it frustrated a

goal we have pursued since 1993 ⎯ 15years of difficult and challenging reforms ⎯ a goal of

immense importance for our own stability and for the stability of the Balkan region. As a

confirmation of the extent of our commitment to this organization, the men and women of our

military risk their lives on a daily basis in Afghan istan. There they operate without any problem

under a NATO flag ⎯ and without disturbing whatsoever the stability and the functionality of the

Alliance. To my country, as with many countries in the region, membership in the Alliance marks

the line of certainty and stability, a point of no return back to the years of fear and insecurity.

8. Second, I also wish to emphasize the Court’s central role in the implementation of the

Interim Accord. The two States before you recognize d that not all the issues dividing them could

be resolved immediately, but they did decide to settle what could be settled. In this sense, as a

legal framework, the Interim Accord has to a large extent normalized our relationship. In coming

to such an agreement, both States saw it as extr emely important that this Court serve as the

guardian of the Interim Accord, as the place to turn if one Party or the other failed to comply with

its provisions. For without this Court as a guide to the Parties as to the agreement struck in 1995,

there is nowhere else to turn, and the agreement, while a hallmark of progress and stability in the

Balkans, becomes empty rhetoric. Upon its conc lusion, the United Nations Security Council said

“the Accord will promote the strengthening of stability in the region” 12. The Council was right.

The Accord has done so. Our hope is that with the assistance of the Court, it will continue to do so.

9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Respondent repeatedly asserts that our view of

the Interim Accord is one-sided. This is not correct. We fully recognize that the provisions of the

Accord were carefully negotiated between the Pa rties, creating a well-balanced régime for our

bilateral relationship. In agreed to its terms, my country undertook to ma ke numerous concessions

as part of the bargain. This is evidenced by ma ny of the agreement’s provisions. In agreeing to

Article11, we acquiesced in a situation wher e we would be referred to in international

organizations ⎯ in addition to the United Nations ⎯ by the provisional reference, an awkward and

12Statement by the President of the Security Council, 15Sep.1995, UN doc.S/PRST /1995/46: judges’ folder,

tab 9. - 59 -

unprecedented situation. Believe me when I say th at it is far from normal or comfortable to be

referred to in such settings by a placeholder reference, to be essentially designated as a ghost State.

Indeed, it is humiliating to be referred to on the basis of a former status, be it federal, be it colonial

or otherwise. Yet, this is what was agreed in 1995, to pertain as long as the difference over the

name is not settled. So there is nothing one-si ded about the Interim Accord, much less about

Article 11 itself.

10. Given that neither side was advantaged over the other by the Interim Accord, our request

that the Court keep both Parties on the path they set for themselves can have no effect on the

continued negotiations over the name difference. They will continue, and we will continue to

negotiate in good faith. We ask nothing more than a return to the situation that existed prior to the

Respondent’s breach of the Interim Accord in 2008. What we seek is a clear judgment that restores

legal stability, and confirms, as a distinguished le gal commentator put it, that “[w]hat has already

been agreed must not be used in negotiations as a lever to gain advantages in the matter of the

128
name” . If the Court issues a judgment in our favour , both sides will have the same burden, the

same context, the same incentives to continue to negotiate to settle the difference over the name of

my country. The effect of your judgment would si mply be to re-establish the régime agreed to

in 1995 and followed by both Parties for 13 years.

11. Mr. President, Members of the Court. Bo th Parties signed the Interim Accord in 1995 to

put aside years of distrust and bilateral tension. The legal issues before you in this case may be

discrete, but the stakes for my country are very high. This case is not theoretical. Right now it has

affected us in relation to NATO, but the issue of European Union accession is already underway:

what this Court decides will have significant consequences for the stability and economic

well-being of my country.

12. By way of Article 21, the International C ourt of Justice was established as the guardian

of the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Accord. Pursuant to Article11, Greece

12Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name’: A Greek Perspective”, in Athens-Skopje: An
Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002, published in Greek by Papazisis Publishe rs, Athens (Dec. 2003), Hellenic Foundation for
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), ISBN 960-8356-05-9, p. 127 at 146, [quoting from Christos Rozakis, Political
and Legal Dimensions of the Transitional Agreement signed in New York between Greece and FYROM , Athens, Sideris,
1996 at pp. 37-38], available in English at: http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/
Downloads/Interim_Kofos.pdf: judges’ folder, tab 14. - 60 -

undertook not to object to our membership in in ternational organizations. It has broken its

promise. We therefore ask the Court to hold it to its obligations and uphold our rights. On behalf

of the Applicant, I would like to make it clear, in this courtroom, for the avoidance of all doubt that

we shall fully respect and abide by your judgment, regardless of its direction. I hope that we will

hear the same declaration on behalf of the Respondent on Wednesday afternoon.

13. Mr.President, on the basis of the evidence and legal arguments presented in its written

and oral pleadings, the Applicant requests the Court:

(i)to reject the Respondent’s objections as to the jurisdiction of the Court and the

admissibility of the Applicant’s claims;

(ii) to adjudge and declare that the Respondent, through its State organs and Agents, has

violated its obligations under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Interim Accord; and

(iii) to order that the Respondent immediatel y take all necessary steps to comply with its

obligations under Article11, pa ragraph1, of the Interim Accord, and to cease and desist

from objecting in any way, whether directly or indirectly, to the Applicant’s membership

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and/or of any other “international, multilateral

and regional organizations and institutions” of which the Respondent is a member, in

circumstances where the Applicant is to be re ferred to in such organization or institution

by the designation provided for in paragraph2 of United Nations Security Council

resolution 817 (1993).

14. It remains for me to thank the Registry for ensuring the smooth running of these oral

hearings; the interpreters for their hard work and assistance, the distinguished members of our

delegation for their courtesy thr oughout the proceedings; and finally, Mr.President, Members of

the Court, to thank you for your kind attention. - 61 -

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, Ambassador Nikola Dimitrov, for his closing

remarks. The Court takes note of the final submissions which His Excellency has now read out on

behalf of the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace donia. On Wednesday, 30 March, from 3.00 p.m.

to 6.00p.m. ⎯ and, I repeat, from 3.00p.m. to 6.00p.m. ⎯ Greece will make its presentation of

the second round of oral argument and, in the me antime, the Court adjourns now until Wednesday

afternoon.

The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.

___________

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Monday 28 March 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)

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