Audience publique tenue le mercredi 8 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président

Document Number
091-20060308-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2006/12
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

CR 2006/12

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LAAYE

YEAR 2006

Public sitting

held on Wednesday 8 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Higgins presiding,

in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2006

Audience publique

tenue le mercredi 8 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,

en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU

____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presieitgins
Vice-Presi-Kntasawneh

Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren

Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov

Judges ad hoc AhmedMahiou
Kre Milenko ća

Couvrisrar

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -

Présents : Mme Higgins,président
AlKh.vsce-prh,ident

RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren

Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham

Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,

MM. Ahmed Mahiou,
KMrilenko ća, juges ad hoc

Cgoefferr,

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:

Mr. Sakib Softić,

as Agent;

Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,

as Deputy Agent;

Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of

the International Law Commission of the United Nations,

Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,

Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,

Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,

Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,

Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,

Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,

as Expert Counsel and Advocate;

H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,

Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),

Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,

Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,

Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,

Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -

Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :

M. Sakib Softić,

coagment;

M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,

comme agent adjoint;

M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,

M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,

Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,

M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la fact de droit de l’Université de Florence,

Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),

Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,

Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),

comme conseils et avocats;

M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,

comme conseil-expert et avocat;

S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,

M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,

M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),

M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,

M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,

Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,

M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de

Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -

Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,

Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),

as Counsel.

The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:

Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,

as Agent;

Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,

Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Co-Agents;

Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,

Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,

Mr. Xavier de Roux, Master in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,

Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,

Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,

Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,

Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,

Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,

Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),

Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -

Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,

M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),

cocomnseils.

Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,

coagment;

M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des

Pays-Bas,

M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,

comme coagents;

M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de

Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,

M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,

M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,

Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,

M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de

l’Institut Walther-Schücking,

M. Vladimir Djeri ć, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,

M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,

comme conseils et avocats;

Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,

Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),

M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -

Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,

Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,

Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. PhD. (Cambridge), Walther-Schücking Institute, University of Kiel,

Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,

as Assistants. - 9 -

M. Aleksandar Djurdji ć, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,

M. Miloš Jastrebi ć, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,

M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Institut Walther-Schücking, Université de Kiel,

Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,

comme assistants. - 10 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets today to begin the hearing of the first

round of oral argument of Serbia and Montenegro. In the same way as Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Serbia and Montenegro will dispose for this purpo se of ten sessions. I now give the floor to the

Agent of Serbia and Montenegro, Mr. Radoslav Stojanović.

STMO.JANOVI Ć: Merci, Madame le président. Je commencerai avec un discours

d’introduction sur notre plaidoirie.

L’ INTRODUCTION

1. Et tout d’abord, Madame le président, permettez-moi de vous fé liciter, au nom de la

Serbie-et-Monténégro, de mon gouvernement et au nom de mon équipe, pour votre élection à la

présidence de cette honorable Cour qui est la plus prestigieuse institution judiciaire. Permettez-moi

également de saisir cette occasion et de féliciter les nouveaux membres de la Cour de leur élection.

2. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur pour moi de prendre la

parole devant vous aujourd’hui, mais permettez-moi de vous dire que je ne le fais pas sans peine et

affliction. Car, en tant qu’agent je suis chgé de défendre mon pays contre une accusation du

crime le plus grave de la civilisation moderne.

3. Cette guerre a fait beaucoup de victimes et de destructions, et qui plus est, elle a engendré

le manque de confiance ainsi que l’intoléra nce, voire la haine entre les peuples de

l’ex-Yougoslavie. Cela est malh eureusement évident encore aujour d’hui, plus de dix ans après la

fin des guerres. Cela engendre en moi-même une so rte de peur pour l’avenir des Etats créés après

le démembrement sanglant de la Yougoslavie.

4. Le requérant a exposé deva nt cette Cour une façon de voir les événements des années

quatre-vingt-dix en ex-Yougoslavie. Cette vision est liée à l’histoire entière des relations entre les

groupes ethno-nationaux qui participaient à ce conflit. Cette histoire a été sanglante à un tel point

que la Yougoslavie est devenue une exception pa r rapport à l’histoire mondiale en général.

Malheureusement, cette histoire comprend aussi la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine de 1992-1995.

5. Les événements en Bosnie-Herzégovine lors de la guerre sont l’objet de ce procès. Nous

n’avons pas l’intention de nier les crimes, tout au contraire, comme je démontrerai un peu plus tard, - 11 -

sans égard aux problèmes internes et la crise, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a commencé en 2000 de se

diriger vers la confrontation avec le passé et la punition des crimes. Cependant, l’objet de ce

procès devant cette Cour n’est pas le prononcé des peines aux auteurs des crimes, ce qui est la

tâche du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et des tribunaux nationaux. Ce procès,

avec tout le respect que j’ai pour une décision judiciaire et surtout pour une décision de votre Cour,

ne pourra contribuer à la prise de conscience du passé et apportera l’approfondissement des

problèmes entre les nations surtout en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

6. Pendant la guerre en Bosn ie-Herzégovine, de graves crimes ont été commis. Le peuple

musulman bosniaque a subi de pires souffrances car il avait ses victimes dans la guerre avec les

Serbes, avec les Croates et même dans un conflit intramusulman en Bosnie occidentale. Nous

avons vu et entendu des choses atroces dans ce prétoi re lors de ce procès, mais la question qui se

pose est de savoir si les allégations du requérant sont exactes. Nous allons démontrer que le

requérant a présenté de nombreuses allégations inexactes.

7. Madame le président et Messieurs les j uges, avant de répondre à toutes ces questions, la

Cour doit déterminer si elle peut se prononcer sur cette requête. Afin d’être certaine qu’elle a la

compétence à connaître de la présente affaire, la Cour doit déterminer si le défendeur avait accès à

la Cour au moment du dépôt de la requête et si la Cour avait par rapport au défendeur, la

compétence en application de l’article IX de la c onvention sur le génocide. Nous allons démontrer

que le défendeur n’avait pas accès à la Cour et que la compétence ne peut être établie en

application de l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide. Le manque de la compétence devrait

mettre fin à ce procès, cependant nous allons dé battre sur le fond car la Cour a décidé de

déterminer la compétence ensemble avec le fond de cette affaire, ce qui nous donnera l’occasion de

démontrer que les allégations du requérant ne peuvent être acceptées.

8. Ce procès concerne l’ét ablissement de la responsabilité de l’Etat pour le génocide.

Premièrement le requérant doit dé montrer que les événements et les crimes allégués ont eu lieu et

deuxièmement que ces événements, allégués par le re quérant, peuvent être attribués au défendeur.

Nous allons démontrer que le requé rant ne peut démontrer ni l’un ni l’autre. Enfin, si la Cour

établit que les crimes étaient commis, elle devra les qualifier juridiquement. La qualification

juridique est la tâche de chaque Cour, c’est également la tâche de cette Cour qui est aussi l’organe - 12 -

judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. Les actes criminels qui étaient commis en

Bosnie-Herzégovine sont des actes graves, mais la question de leur qualification juridique est une

question juridique que cette Cour devra déterm iner. S’agissant du génocide, le Tribunal pour

l’ex-Yougoslavie a adopté une conception large de ce crime, mais malgré cette conception large, le

Tribunal n’a pas trouvé que le génocide ait été co mmis en Bosnie-Herzégovine, sauf à Srebrenica.

Le jugement du général Krstić rendu dans l’affaire Srebrenica est fondé sur une théorie particulière,

contestée par la doctrine et qui, de plus, n’est pas suivie par d’autres chambres du Tribunal.

9. Je veux souligner que nous sommes, par notre position dans ce procès, obligés de nous

défendre et donc de nier des allégations du requéra nt, mais en aucun moment nous ne voulons nier

les souffrances des victimes que nous ne pouvons et ne voulons pas oublier.

10. Madame le président, je suis certain que je n’ai nul besoin de rappeler que l’histoire des

Balkans est chargée de tragédies. Nous avons commencé à croire que nous avions dépassé cette

histoire lorsque des millions de gens à Belgrade et dans la Serbie entière ont renversé le dernier

régime communiste en Europe qui a fait beaucoup de mal à son propre peuple. Malheureusement,

ce régime a laissé derrière lui un héritage plein de lourdes dettes, y compris le présent procès.

11. Je me trouve moi-même dans une situati on paradoxale: je dois dé fendre, devant cette

Cour, le régime auquel j’étais opposé depuis le début. En effet, j’étais l’un des treize fondateurs du

premier parti d’opposition en Serbie , le parti démocrate, fondé en1989. Il s’agit d’un parti qui

avait auparavant une tradition presque centenaire terminée lorsque les communistes sont montés au

pouvoir en 1945. Nous, l’opposition en Serbie, nous avions des conflits avec le régime criminalisé,

nous avons aussi subi les attaques et les chantag es des organisations crimin elles qui permettaient

l’enrichissement des criminels aux dépens des intérêts d’un peuple appauvri.

12. En même temps, nous n’avions pas d’autres ressources sauf les donations bénévoles des

membres et des partisans de notre parti. Le ré gime faisait tout pour empêcher l’union des partis

d’opposition qui, unis, auraient pu déjà en1990 gagne r les élections et renverser le régime de

Milosevic. En effet, lors des premières élections «démocratiques» du 9 décembre 1990, le parti au

pouvoir n’a gagné, malgré tous les avantages fina nciers et la propagande dans les médias, que

42,5 % de voix. - 13 -

13. Plus tard, je donnerai une image détaillée de la lutte futile de l’opposition serbe qui avait

choisi l’opinion antimilitariste et qui était, par c onséquent, pour la solution pacifique des conflits

politiques en Yougoslavie. L’opposition lutta it contre les prémisses de base du système

communiste, contre la criminalisation de la soci été et pour une administration démocratique et

responsable. J’aimerais convaincre cette Cour que je vais sortir de ma position paradoxale par mon

obligation professionnelle de contribuer, avec mes collègues, par cette défense, à découvrir la

vérité. Je souligne que sans la vérité on ne peut s’attendre à la justice que nous attendons de cette

Cour honorable.

Le renversement du régime en Serbie le 5 octobre 2000

14. Enfin, le 5 octobre 2000, un nombre imposant de plusieurs millions de Serbes a libéré la

Serbie du pouvoir du régime de Milosevic. C’éta it en même temps un grand soulagement pour la

communauté internationale, car elle a été libérée des soucis concernant l’établissement de la paix et

de la sécurité dans les Balkans.

15. La question qui se pose maintenant est de savoir ce que l’opposition serbe a trouvé dans

les institutions de l’Etat dans lequel elle a pris le pouvoir. Le grand soutien du peuple serbe n’a pas

pu détruire immédiatement tous les éléments criminels de la société, les organisations extrémistes

et surtout elle ne pouvait rétablir immédiatement l’économie détruite de notre pays, trouver le

travail pour un million de chômeurs et trouver la solution pour un million de retraités qui en

majorité vivaient dans une misère totale. De plus, elle n’avait pas les moyens d’assurer un

logement acceptable et digne de ce nom pour des centaines de milliers de réfugiés et encore moins

faire revenir en Serbie des centaines de milliers de jeunes gens qui avaient quitté la Serbie et

émigré partout dans le monde. Tout était détru it: le système de l’éducation, le système de

l’assurance, le système juridique. La corruption ré gnait partout. Tout ce que je viens d’énumérer

montre que le nouveau Gouvernement serbe a hér ité, en2000, d’un Etat dont le système ne

fonctionnait pas. L’opposition a donc hérité d’un chaos total.

16. L’opposition démocratique en Serbie est, soutenue par le peuple, montée au pouvoir mais

elle ne disposait pas d’importants outils du pouvoir, à savoir la police et l’armée. En effet, un

grand nombre d’employés dans ces deux institutions provenaient de l’ex-régime et sabotaient les - 14 -

décisions du nouveau pouvoir. Par conséquent, le nouveau régime avait beaucoup de difficultés à

imposer la politique pouvant apporte r des solutions aux problèmes intérieurs et qui était conforme

au droit international. En tout cas, le nouveau pouvoir tendait à remplir les obligations de la

Serbie-et-Monténégro envers la communauté internationale.

17. Ainsi, le nouveau régime démocrati que a immédiatement montré sa volonté de

s’acquitter de ses obligations envers la co mmunauté internationale. Celle-ci a répondu

positivement en montrant qu’elle était prête à l’ai der dans la solution des problèmes hérités de

l’époque précédente. Le nouveau pouvoir a t out de suite commencé à arrêter les personnes

accusées par le procureur du Tribunal pénal intern ational pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) et de les

extrader au Tribunal. Ainsi, le nouveau pouvoir n’a pas hésité à arrêter et transférer au TPIY

l’ancien président de la Serbie et de la Yougoslavie, SlobodanMilosevic. D’autres hauts

fonctionnaires de la Serbie-et-Monténégro ont ét é arrêtés ou se sont rendus volontairement et ont

tous été transférés au Tribunal. Nous pouvons cité le président de la République de Serbie,

MilanMilutinovic, certains chefs de la police secrète ainsi que plusieurs ministres et chefs de

l’état-major de l’armée yougoslave.

18. La Serbie-et-Monténégro a rempli dans les deux dernières années une grande majorité de

ses obligations envers le Tribunal pénal interna tional pour l’ex-Yougoslavie qui concernaient la

libération des témoins de l’obligation du secret d’Etat et du secret-défense afin de leur permettre de

contribuer, par leurs témoignages, à l’établi ssement de la vérité sur les événements en

Bosnie-Herzégovine dans la guerre qui a eu lieu de 1992 à 1995. Jusqu’à cette date plus de trois

cent cinquantepersonnes, membres de la police et de l’armée ont été libérées de l’obligation du

secret d’Etat et du secret-défense. Par ailleurs, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a communiqué au Tribunal

plus de mille documents. La Serbie-et-Monténég ro n’a jamais eu aucun avertissement du Conseil

de sécurité en raison de non respect des obligations internationales car elle n’a jamais failli à se

conformer aux obligations qui lui ont ét é imposées par une chambre du Tribunal pour

l’ex-Yougoslavie.

19. Je veux aussi souligner que la Serbie-e t-Monténégro a pris la décision d’ouvrir ses

archives d’Etat justement pour établir la vér ité et pour permettre l’établissement de la

responsabilité individuelle des auteurs de ces actes criminels. - 15 -

Les mesures du nouveau gouvernement pour normaliser la situation en Serbie

20. Le nouveau gouvernement démocratique en Serbie est en train de s’acquitter de ses

obligations qui lui incombent sur le fondement de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité concernant la

formation du TPIY, car il a délivré au Tribuna l les individus qui occupaient des positions

principales dans l’ancien régime de la Se rbie-et-Monténégro. La coopération de la

Serbie-et-Monténégro avec le Tribunal de La Haye n’est pas uniquement basée sur l’obligation de

l’Etat envers les NationsUnis mais égalemen t sur la détermination du nouveau gouvernement de

démontrer sa volonté à établir la vérité et à j uger toutes les personnes soupçonnées des violations

graves du droit international.

21. Il ne s’agit pas d’une t âche facile et simple pour le nouveau gouvernement qui avait au

sein de son propre Etat les groupes criminels organisés, liés à certaines institutions étatiques. La

détermination à éliminer les organisations crimine lles en utilisant les instru ments juridiques et en

établissant l’état de droit en Serbie-et-Monténégro a coûté la vie au premier ministre du premier

gouvernement démocratique serbe après la chute du communisme, docteurZoranDjindjic. Le

procès contre ses meurtriers est actuellement en cours à Belgrade.

22. Le nouveau gouvernement démocratique en Serbie a constitué une Cour spéciale,

chargée de juger les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l’humanité et les organisations criminelles.

Ceux qui ont commis les crimes sur les territoires de l’ex-Yougoslavie, de la Croatie, à travers la

Bosnie-Herzégovine, jusqu’au Kosovo sont traduits devant la justice. La plupart de ses malfaiteurs

ont déjà été condamnés. Ceux qui ont fusillé les six jeunes Bosniaques en filmant l’exécution, dont

l’enregistrement vidéo, diffusé à la télévision da ns le monde entier, nous a été montré dans ce

prétoire, sont jugés par cette cour. Ce film a dénoncé les assassins qui, jusqu’à ce moment, se sont

promenés en toute liberté, mais qui dès la découverte de cet enregistrement vidéo ont été arrêtés. Il

y aura malheureusement sans doute d’autres cas se mblables à l’avenir. Rappelons qu’encore

aujourd’hui l’on découvre des criminels de la de uxième guerre mondiale qui ont réussi à se cacher

pendant plus de soixante ans.

23. Cependant, la volonté politique de la Serbie démocratique de nos jours est évidente: la

Serbie-et-Monténégro veut à tout prix libérer la société des gens qui s ont devenus dangereusement

agressifs dans la guerre (ou, t out simplement, sont nés dangereux) et qui sont, par conséquent, - 16 -

dangereux pour le développement de la vie normale en Serbie. Malheureusement, il s’agit d’une

tâche à longue durée, pour les générations actuelles mais également pour les générations futures.

24. Les années quatre-vingt-dix ont été marquées par les guerres abominables en

ex-Yougoslavie. Mes collègues et moi, nous étions contre la guerre. Donc, je ne voudrais pas

continuer la guerre des paroles. Nous sommes pers uadés que la vraie paix devrait être établie par

nous-mêmes et non par quelqu’un d’autre. Il fa udrait donc confronter des points de vue, avouer

des maux commis, chercher ensemble la vérité et les causes de ces maux et montrer la bonne

volonté des uns et des autres. Nous sommes prêts pour le dialogue de toute façon; qu’il y ait une

décision sur le fond ou non. Nous ne fuyons pas des responsabilités et nous sommes prêts à

chercher une solution par le dialogue. Je suis d’av is que c’est la seule voi e vers la paix durable,

vers de bonnes relations avec nos voisins et vers la coopération.

25. Aujourd’hui la Serbie démocratique est en train de négocier avec l’Union européenne sur

les accords de partenariat et de coopération. C’ est là que nous voyons notre voie et qui est la voie

où nous ne pouvons nous engager sans la Croatie et sans la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Tôt ou tard nous

allons nous diriger tous vers le s intégrations euro-atlantiques. Et comment prendra-t-on ce même

chemin si l’on s’accuse mutuellement de crimes di fférents qui sont en fait la négation de la

civilisation dans laquelle nous aimerions vivre ensemble ?

26. J’ai peur de l’avenir, car l’on peut bel et bien s’attendre aux problèmes dans les conflits

politiques éventuels portant sur les différends issu s du passé qu’on est en train de vouloir régler ou

qu’on voudra régler devant les c ours nationales et internationales. Il serait donc nécessaire

d’établir une communication constante entre les Etats concernés par ces différends afin de pouvoir

résoudre les problèmes dans les dialogues directs. Je suppose qu’aujourd’hui il est possible de le

faire car je ne peux imaginer que nous n’avons p as tiré les leçons de notre passé récent dans lequel

on a manqué plusieurs occasions parce qu’on refusa it les négociations directes. Ces négociations

auraient pu aboutir à un compromis grâce auquel on éviterait la transformation des conflits

politiques en conflits armés.

27. J’ai peur des phénomènes qu’on peut observer en Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie et Serbie.

Ces phénomènes sont des indicateurs clairs que des groupes extrémistes créés sur les plates-formes

nationalistes et religieuses existent encore. - 17 -

28. Je crains que la décision de n’importe quelle cour (nationale ou internationale, y compris

la Cour internationale de Justice, et sans ég ard si la Cour accepte ou rejette la demande du

requérant) ne résulte dans une augmentation de l’ extrémisme général. Je n’ose pas exprimer ici

mes craintes liées à la naissance d’une atmosphère politique dans laquelle des groupes extrémistes

arriveraient à attirer et faire bouger les masses. La présence internationa le est par conséquent

encore nécessaire en Bosnie-Herzégovine afin d’atténuer des passions et des idées nationalistes qui

pourraient être réveillées par ces organisations extr émistes (qui, malheureusement, existent encore

sur le territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie) dans le peuple.

29. En raison de mes craintes concernant l’avenir des relations de nos peuples, j’ai déjà lancé

plusieurs fois des propositions visant une solu tion diplomatique de nos conflits. C’est

indubitablement la seule voie qui peut aboutir a ux positions acceptables pour les deux côtés. De

plus, cette voie diplomatique minimiserait le da nger de l’extrémisme. Certes, il est impossible

d’exclure complètement l’apparition de la haine, mais elle serait plutôt orientée vers son propre

gouvernement, ce qui est sans doute moins grave que l’extrémisme xénophobe dirigé vers d’autres

groupes nationaux ou religieux.

30. Je ne veux pas pourtant dire que j’ai peur de perdre ce procès. Peut-être s’agit-il de ma

déformation professionnelle: je suis professeur de droit international et j’ai un respect profond

vis-à-vis de la Charte des NationsUnies et par c onséquent, vis-à-vis de la Cour internationale de

Justice dont le Statut est une partie constitutive de la Charte. Pour cette raison je n’ai aucune peur

de la décision de cette Cour, tout au contraire j’ai beaucoup de confiance en son sens de justice.

31. Je dois rappeler que depuis la fin de la gue rre en Bosnie-Herzégovine et en Croatie plus

de dix ans se sont écoulés. Il est important de s ouligner ce fait car l’on dit souvent que trop peu de

temps s’est écoulé depuis la fin de la guerre pour qu’une réconciliation puisse avoir lieu. Je dois

souligner que peu de temps après la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale, la Yougoslavie était pleine

de touristes allemands, des compétitions sportives avec des Allemands étaient organisées et les

relations économiques avec l’Allemagne étaient très développées. Bien que je ne connaisse pas de

rapports officiels de la police yougoslave de l’ époque, je sais que des incidents particuliers

impliquant les touristes allemands n’ont pas eu lieu, aucune voiture ou autobus allemand n’a été

démoli et, bien évidemment, il n’y avait pas de bagarre. - 18 -

32. En conséquence je considère que, dans notre cas actuel, il serait temps de commencer les

négociations et le dialogue menant vers la réconciliation des peuples qui, en même temps,

éliminerait toute possibilité d’un nouveau conflit dans la région.

Le processus de réconciliation

33. La réconciliation ne signifie pas l’oubli. Tout au contraire ! Il ne faut pas oublier le mal

qui a été commis. Cependant la réconciliation ne signifie pas le droit à la vengeance. La

vengeance est la justice barbare, malheureusement celle-ci est toujours présente dans les relations

humaines, individuelles ou collectives. Mais j’aime rais encore une fois répéter que la justice est

lente mais atteignable. Tout malfaiteur doit êt re jugé et cette image doit s’engraver dans la

mémoire des futures générations.

34. Le processus de réconciliation qui a été in itié en Serbie, Croatie et Bosnie-Herzégovine

devrait montrer que la justice doit être rendue premièrement par la condamnation des individus

coupables des crimes. La justification de ces i ndividus, si souvent entendue, selon laquelle «leur

seul but était la protection de leur peuple» ne peut excuser les actes commis. Les auteurs

individuels des crimes doivent donc être jugés et punis pour les crimes commis et afin d’atteindre

cet objectif, chaque groupe ethno-national devrai t décider de traduire devant les instances

judiciaires tous ceux qui ont commis des crimes pour «défendre leur peuple».

35. Je suis d’avis que nous, les ex-Yougosla ves, devons et pouvons réaliser ce qui a été

réalisé en Europe après la deuxième guerre mondial e. Je pense que le moment est arrivé où nous

pouvons le faire à condition que nous fassions des efforts. Malheureusement, jusqu’à présent nous

n’avons pas fait suffisamment d’efforts. Ma proposition reste la même, que la Cour internationale

de Justice rende la décision sur le fond ou qu’elle ne la rende pas, nous devrions commencer, après

le prononcé de la décision de la Cour ou même avant, un dialogue sur la réconciliation nationale.

36. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je voudrais rappeler ce que l’agent adjoint du

requérant a déclaré dans son discours le 27février2006. M evan den Biesen a déclaré que «the

1
Respondent never advanced any «[s]ubstantive or serious initiative for any «amicable solution» » .

Cette déclaration tout simplement ne correspond pas à la vérité. Le défendeur a pris l’initiative afin

1
CR 2006/2, p. 26, par. 29. - 19 -

de trouver un règlement amiable, mais la réponse qu’il a obtenue du requérant était un rejet sans

appel.

37. Un certain nombre de nos initiatives a été même porté à l’attention de la Cour. Par

exemple, dans notre lettre dans laquelle nous avons informé la C our du retrait de notre demande

reconventionnelle, nous avons avan cé deux raisons principalesde ce retrait: premièrement nous

avons souligné que : «[n]ew facts have put the issu e of jurisdiction into a different perspective and

introduced conclusive evidence that this Court did not have and does not have jurisdiction over the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ratione personae». Deuxièmement, nous avons indiqué que

«The withdrawal of the counterclaim is supported by the fact that the new
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia strongly believes that the period of

conflicts and disputes must be left behind, and that the two countries have to move
toward an era of cooperation and amicable resolution of pending disputes.» 2

38. Nous pouvons citer d’autres tentatives du règlement à l’amiable que nous avons portées à

la connaissance de la Cour. Ainsi dans sa lettre à la Cour en date du 22 octobre 2003 et en réponse

à la lettre du requérant, notre agent a écrit «[w]e w ould like to reiterate one more time that Serbia

and Montenegro is ready at any time ⎯either directly, or with the assistance of neutral

3
mediators ⎯ to start negotiations on a peaceful settlement of all outstanding disputes» .

39. Le 24 novembre 2003, encore en réponse à une lettre du requérant, le défendeur a soumis

à la Cour la lettre dans laquelle il a écrit «We w ould also like to reiterate that Serbia and

Montenegro has been taking steps towards reconciliation.» 4

40. Nous avons pris l’initiative à plusieur s reprises car nous sommes persuadés que les

négociations sont le meilleur chem in vers la réconciliation. De puis le début de mon engagement

dans ce procès j’ai continué les efforts de mes prédécesseurs afin de persuader la

Bosnie-Herzégovine qu’un règlement diplomatique serait le meilleur chemin vers la réconciliation

qu’un procès judiciaire. J’ai considéré et je c onsidère toujours que les négociations diplomatiques

peuvent nous mener vers une solution acceptable pour le s deux Parties. De l’autre côté la décision

judiciaire, sans égard à son verdict, pourrait provoquer l’insatisfaction de l’une ou de deux Parties.

2
Lettre de l’agent de la Yougoslavie au greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice du 20 avril 2001.
3Lettre de l’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro au greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice du 22 octobre 2003.

4Lettre de l’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro au greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice du
24 novembre 2003. - 20 -

41. Nous n’avons jamais posé les conditions du dialogue. Nous avons uniquement cherché

l’occasion de présenter notre point de vue à l’au tre côté. Nous n’avons jamais obtenu cette

occasion.

42. Comme je l’ai dit, Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, le requérant ignorait ou

rejetait nos initiatives. Permettez-moi de présen ter juste quelques exemples des rejets que nous

avons rencontrés.

43. En 2003, M. Softic, l’agent du requérant , a déclaré que la Bosnie-Herzégovine n’a aucun

intérêt de trouver un accord avant le prononcé de l’ arrêt de la Cour dans ce procès. Ensuite,

en2004, M.SulejmanTihic, à l’époque le repr ésentant des Musulmans en présidence de la

Bosnie-Herzégovine, a déclaré que «la présente re quête est une question où aucune transaction ne

pourrait être envisagée et que la Serbie-et-Monténég ro ne peut que reconnaître qu’elle a participé

dans l’agression et dans le génocide en Bosn ie-Herzégovine. Ce serait la seule transaction

acceptable.» 5

44. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je pense qu’il était approprié et équitable que

la Serbie-et-Monténégro fasse le premier pas vers la réconciliation et vers le règlement à l’amiable.

Nous l’avons fait, nous avons retiré notre demande reconventionnelle et nous avons renouvelé nos

demandes d’un règlement à l’amiable. Je souhaite réitérer encore une fois notre volonté de régler à

l’amiable le litige qui nous oppose à la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

45. Madame le président et Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi de souligner plusieurs choses

qui ont l’air optimiste. Premièrement, c’est le re tour des réfugiés dans leurs villages et villes en

Bosnie-Herzégovine. D’après les informations de UNHCR de 1996 et jusqu’en septembre 2005 le

nombre total de personnes qui sont retournées dans les endroits où ils vivaient avant le

commencement de la guerre s’élève à 453464 dont 209 672 Musulmans bosniaques,

86581Croates, 153160 Serbes et 4051 autres (UNHCR; Municipal authorities; OHRBrcko

district; DP Associations and NGO). Cela réveille un certain optimisme car conformément à

l’article 1 de l’accord de Dayton (Dayton Peace Agreement, Ann. 7, Art. 1) «Le retour prochain des

5
Le journal Danas, 29 juillet 2004, p. 8, reprise de la déclaration du journal de Sarajevo Dnevni avaz. - 21 -

réfugiés et de personnes déplacées est un but tr ès important de la solution des conflits en

Bosnie-Herzégovine.»

46. En Serbie il y a encore plusieurs centai nes de milliers de réfugiés provenant du Kosovo,

de Croatie, mais également de Bosnie-Herzégovine. Encore actuellement environ 150 000 réfugiés

de Bosnie-Herzégovine se trouvent en Serbie. Vous avez cela dans le dossier des juges.

47. Dans son discours d’inauguration, le nouv eau président de la Serbie, BorisTadic, a

exprimé plusieurs notes optimistes que j’utiliserai pour finir cette déclaration préliminaire qui

elle-même pourrait être vue comme assez pessimiste.

«Nous saluons et soutenons l’avance ment de tous nos voisins vers les

intégrations européennes et euro-atlantiques car c’est une garantie de l’avenir stable et
paisible de toute notre région. Pour cette raison il faut développer des relations solides
avec nos voisins, des relations fondées sur le respect mutuel. C’est le point crucial
dans la politique extérieure de la Serbie-et-Monténégro.

La coopération avec le Tribunal internati onal de LaHaye est une priorité de
notre politique intérieure et extérieure car elle est une avant-condition de toutes les
intégrations européennes et euro-atlantiques et car elle confirme notre attachement aux

valeurs européennes.

L’histoire des actes criminels dans les Balkans est longue et dans ce sens tous
les peuples de cette partie de l’Europe du sud-est doivent les uns aux autres les

excuses historiques. La confrontation av ec les actes criminels commis par soi-même
est toutefois la condition de la vie commune avec les voisins ainsi que de
l’établissement des valeurs européennes dans notre partie de l’Europe.»

48. La Serbie-et-Monténégro considère que jusqu’au commencement du débat sur les

mérites elle a le droit de s’attendre à ce que la Cour examine la question de sa propre compétence

dans ce procès.

49. A ce propos et tout d’abord, M.Saša Obradovi ć, coagent exposera les inexactitudes

factuelles dans les écritures du requérant et dans les différents rapports auxquels le requérant se

réfère.

Nous présenterons ensuite nos arguments relatifs à la compétence, au génocide et à

l’imputabilité des événements en Bosnie-Herzégovine à la Serbie-et-Monténégro.

Je vous prie, Madame le président, de donner la parole au coagent M.Sasa Obradovic.

Merci. - 22 -

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Stojanovi ć. I now call the Co-Agent of Serbia and

Montenegro, Mr. Obradović.

OMBr. ADOVI Ć:

S OURCES OF EVIDENCE

Introduction

1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, I am honoured to appear for the

first time before the International Court of Justice as a representative of my country ⎯ Serbia and

Montenegro. Following the introductory speech of our Agent, and before turning to matters of

procedure, I would like to submit to your attention some observations regarding the allegations and

the evidence submitted by the Applicant. This seems particularly appropriate in the light of the

grave assertions advanced by the applicant State.

2. First of all, I will try to establish some clear examples of false and inaccurate allegations

contained in the Applicant’s written submissions.

3. Noting that such allegations are based on certain documents, quoted mainly accurately by

the applicant State, it is my further task to dem onstrate that those documents cannot be considered

as credible evidence in any judicial procedure.

4. Furthermore, I challenge some sources of evidence proposed by the Applicant for the first

time in the oral proceedings.

5. The general purpose of this presentation is to demonstrate that the vast amount of

documentation submitted by the Applicant does not fulf il the required standard of proof, set out in

the Judgment of this honourable Court in the Corfu Channel case, as follows: “The proof may be

drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt.”

Some examples of incorrect allegations of the applicant State

A. The attack on Zvornik

6. Madam President, allow me to start with th e first example. In the Reply, the applicant

State quoted information from the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts (the

6
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18. - 23 -

Bassiouni Commission) that in the town of Zvornik “2,500 men were killed on 9 and

10 April [1992]” . 7

7. To begin with, let us see what was r eally stated in the Report of the Bassiouni

Commission. The document reads: “According to one report, 2,500 men were killed on 9 and

8
10 April.” The report that was referred to in the Fi nal Report of the Bassiouni Commission is the

declassified document of the United States Department of State, No. 94-60. However, this United

States document that is supposed to be the key ev idence on the crimes committed in Zvornik in the

time described by Ms Dauban as the beginning of ethnic cleansing cannot be found in annexes to

the United Nations Commission of Experts’ Final Report.

8. Since the key document was missing, we deci ded to investigate the matter further, and the

Office of the Prosecutor of the International Cr iminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia kindly

assisted the Government of Serbia and Monten egro by providing the requested declassified

document of the United States Department of State, which in the meantime had been transferred to

the Prosecutor’s database, together with other materials of the Bassiouni Commission. As a result,

the research could be continued and the Court can see today that the “key document” is actually a

record of an anonymous Bosnian refugee’s witness account. That was clearly stated in the warning

given in paragraph 4 of the United States declassified document, as follows:

“This report on the debriefing of a Bosn ian refugee is being provided because it
meets current criteria for firsthand information on the situation in

Bosnia-Herzegovina. The allegations of atrocities have not yet been confirmed by
separate accounts. Please note that this information is raw data that has not been
subjected to an editorial or analytical review process, and it should be carefully
9
assessed for accuracy and validity prior to further use.”

9. The Applicant has failed to provide any information on the circumstances under which the

statement of that anonymous refugee was given, or any further information in this regard.

10. Madam President, for the last 12 years the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor has been

making significant efforts to investigate crimes committed in the town of Zvornik. It is certain that

numerous witnesses must have been examined, and th at the best investigation equipment has been

7
Reply, Chap. V, p. 100, para. 64 and p. 256, para. 433.
8Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. X, para. 387. (This document can be found in
the Peace Palace Library.)

9United States Department of State, declassified document No. 94-60, para. 4 (folder with new public documents,
Vol. III, doc. No. 1); emphasis added. - 24 -

used on the site. Nevertheless, in the Amended Indictment against Mr. Slobodan Milosevic dated

21April2004, it was alleged that “[i]n Zvornik town, (on 9 April 1992), 15 Bosnian Muslim and

Bosnian Croat males were executed by Arkan’s soldiers” 10. The same allegation appeared in the

Consolidated Indictment against MsBiljana Pl avsic dated 7 March 2002, to which she pleaded

guilty. No ICTY judgment with findings about events in Zvornik has so far been rendered.

11. The Respondent thus considers that it is obvious that the allegation of 2,500 men killed

in Zvornik on 9 and 10 April 1992 is a clear example of an enormous exaggeration.

B. The alleged massacre at the Zvornik hospital

12. This example does not stand alone. The A pplicant has very often alleged crimes that

have never happened. If we keep our attention to the evidence related to th e town of Zvornik, we

will also find an allegation that a horrible mass acre took place at the local hospital in the second

half of May 1992. The Applicant claims that Se rb soldiers shot 36 Muslim adult patients on the

hospital grounds and broke necks and bones of 27 Mu slim children. This allegation is repeated

three times in the Applicant’s written submissions:

⎯ firstly, it appears in the Memorial 11, based on the information from the Third United States

Submission to the United Nations 12;

13
⎯ secondly, it is repeated in the Reply , Chapter V, based on the information given in the letter

of the Permanent Representative of Austri a to the United Nations addressed to the

Secretary-General 14;

15
⎯ thirdly, it is for the second time repeated in the Reply , Chapter VIII, based on the information

contained in the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts 1.

10
ICTY, case IT-02-54-T, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Amended Indictment (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
dated 21 April 2004, Schedule A, para. 16. (This document is available at www.un.org/icty.)
11
Memorial, p. 32, para. 2.2.2.10.
12Third United States Submission to the United Na tions, No. S/24791, dated 5 November 1992 (Annex32 to

Part 2 of the Memorial).
13Reply, Chapter 5, p. 123, para. 142.

14Letter of the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
S/25613, dated 13 April 1993, pp. 9 and 10 (folder with new public documents, Vol. III, doc. No. 2).

15Reply, Chapter 8, p. 640, para. 295.
16
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. IV, para. 369 (Peace Palace Library). - 25 -

13. Having read the three sources carefully, one might assume that all of them have been

based on the account of only one witness. Is it the same person? Although the answer to this

question should have been given by the Applicant, which presented the allegation to the Court, the

following facts point to such a possibility.

14. Chronologically, the first of the three s ources used by the Applicant is the Third United

States submission, published on 5 November 1992. According to this document, the statement

relating to this crime was taken from “a former employee of the Zvornik medical center . . .”.

15. The second source is the Austrian Submis sion, published on 13 April 1993. According

to this Submission, the statement relating to th e massacre was given again by a refugee who was a

former employee of the Zvornik medical centre: “witness was working as an X-ray assistant”. In

addition, it is stated that the witness, before giving the statement to an Austrian official, also gave a

statement to a United States diplomat. Although th is witness alleged that he was standing about

50metres from the place of execution, he coul d not give precise information on the number of

victims.

16. The third source, the United Nations Fina l Report, is actually based on another report,

submitted by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute from ⎯ and it is very indicative ⎯ Austria, the

report that was sent to the United Nations Commission of Experts on 6 April 1994.

17. In spite of these reports, the alleged mas sacre in the Zvornik hospital has never appeared

among the crimes described in the ICTY indictments. It was mentioned only once by the protected

witness B 1780 at the trial of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic , but the witness said that he had not been an

eyewitness to the massacre, although he had been a patient at the same hospital. The person who

told him about the alleged killings of three ch ildren was “Ramo, the X-ray technician who had

worked in the Zvornik hospital” 17.

18. The respondent State considers that the three reports mentioned by the applicant State

cannot be used as evidence before the Court, because it remains unknown even who was the

witness who gave the original information on the alleged crime to the different international bodies.

1ICTY, case IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, transcripts, 29October 2003, p.28255 (folder with

new public documents, Vol. III, doc. No. 17). - 26 -

We may only assume that his nickname was Ramo. Therefore, the credibility of this testimony

cannot be examined before this Court.

19. On the other hand, Serbia and Montenegro has submitted to the Court several documents

(Annexes41-47 of the Counter-Memorial), as strong confirmatory evidence that such a crime has

never been committed.

20. For the purpose of this oral procedure, I would only like to remind you of the statement

18
of the protected witness KG, which can be found in Annex45 of the Counter-Memorial . This

statement was given on 27December 1994 to the investigating judge of the Zvornik court,

Mr.Vaso Eric, in accordance with the rules of th e criminal procedure of the former Yugoslavia.

The witness was a doctor who worked at the Paediatric Department of the Zvornik Medical Centre.

She said that the Paediatric Department had 12 Musl im children who could not be returned to their

parents because of the outbreak of fighting. All t hose children were treated in a professional way.

After a few months, the children were sent back to their parents thanks to the efforts of the

International Red Cross. At the time of her testimony, four children from the Zvornik Social

Centre, who had previously also been in the hosp ital, were in the Rehabilitation Centre in Igalo,

Republic of Montenegro. Their stay in Igalo was sponsored by the Norwegian Embassy. No

Muslim child died in the hospital. No one maltreated children at the paediatric ward.

C. The killings at the Prijedor detention facilities

21. The examples of the false and inaccura te allegations in the Applicant’s written

submissions are numerous. In the Reply the applic ant State presented an incredible estimation that

19
“fifty to sixty people died in Trnopolje every day” . Trnopolje was a detention facility in the

Prijedor municipality. The estimation was based on th e Despatch of the Bureau of Public Affairs

20
of the United States Department of State, dated 12 April 1993 . From Annex46 to Part2 of the

Memorial, the Court can see that the original sour ce for this allegation was again a statement of an

18
Annex 45 to the Counter-Memorial, Vol. II, p. 431.
1Reply, Chapter V, p. 210, para. 330.

2Despatch of the Bureau of Public Affairs of the United States Department of State, dated 12 April 1993, No. 15,
p. 245 (Annex 46 to Part 2 of the Memorial). - 27 -

anonymous witness. If this estimation was true, and bearing in mind that Trnopolje existed for

about four months, the number of victims according to this source would have to be at least 6,000.

22. However, the judgment rendered in the ICTY Stakic case found that 28 people altogether

had been killed in Trnopolje . 21

23. The numbers of victims in the other two detention facilities in the Prijedor

municipality ⎯ Keraterm and Omarska ⎯ were magnified too. The Applicant’s Reply contains an

allegation that “the number of prisoners killed at Keraterm was at least ten per day during the

22
approximately three months that the camp was operated” . The claim relies on the Final Report of

the Bassiouni Commission of Experts 23. At the same time, the Reply contains an allegation that

“the estimates of prisoners killed at Omarska vary between at least 1,000 and 5,000” 24. The source

25
is again the United Nations Final Report , as well as a book by Mr.Roy Gutman A Witness to

Genocide.

24. No ICTY judgment has found any evidence that could confirm the estimations alleged by

the applicant State. Six judgments have so far d ealt with horrible events in Omarska and Keraterm

and unfortunately, the two detention facilities de finitely were the places where atrocities were

committed 26. However, in the light of the facts esta blished in these six judgments, the killings in

the Prijedor were committed sporadically and against individuals who were not a significant part of

27
the group . The killings were neither committed on such a large scale nor so systematically as the

applicant State wants to portray by quoting the Bassiouni Commission’s Final Report and other

documents made in a similar way.

21ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgement, 31 July 2003, paras. 226-227

(www.un.org/icty).
22Reply, Chapter V, p. 219, , para. 353.

23Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VIII, para. 1932 (Peace Palace Library).

24Reply, Chapter V, p. 226, para. 369.
25
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VIII, para. 1795 (Peace Palace Library).
26
Tadic Judgement of 7 May 1997, Sikirica et al. of 3 September 2001, Kvocka et al. of 2 November 2001, Stakic
Judgement of 31 July 2003, Banovic Judgement of 28 October 2003 and Brdjanin Judgement of 1 September 2004.
27
For example, see ICTY, Sikirica et al . case, Judgement on Defence Motio n to Acquit, 3 September 2001,
para. 95. - 28 -

The credibility of the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts

25. Madam President, let me briefly explai n now why the Respondent considers that the

Final Report of the United Nations Bassiouni Commission of Experts of 28 December 1994 cannot

be treated as a reliable source of evidence in any judicial procedure.

26. The United Nations Commission of Experts was appointed on 26 October 1992 pursuant

to Security Council resolution 780 of 6Oct ober 1992. The Commission commenced its activities

in November 1992 and concluded them in Apr il 1994. In May 1994, the database and all

information gathered by the Commission were forw arded to the Office of the Prosecutor of the

International Criminal Tribunal.

27. The probative value of the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission depends on the

probative value of the original sources that were in corporated in the report. The Applicant often

tried to present certain facts as being establishe d by the United Nations Final Report. This report

actually, in most instances, contains the information coming from external sources.

28. Although the Commission’s findings award equal weight to all information, regardless of

its sources, it is obvious that the original sources did not employ the methodology of investigation

that would guarantee the accuracy of their allegations.

29. For that reason, the Commission of Experts itself noted, in paragraph6 of the

Introduction to Annexes of the Final Report, that “[w]ith some exceptions, the information and

allegations contained therein have not been verified”.

30. Also, in paragraph 11 of the same document, the Commission concluded:

“It was not the Commission’s intention or part of its responsibility to prepare
cases for criminal prosecution or to pronou nce upon the guilt of individual persons.

These are tasks for prosecutors and judges, who will form their own views after
thorough investigation and deliberation, in accordance with the ‘rule of law’.”

31. The Prosecutor of the International Crim inal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, who

keeps all materials of the Bassiouni Commission, has never used any part of the Final Report as

evidence before the ICTY Chambers . Actually, the Final Report was never meant to be used as

evidence at all, in any proceedings. It was rather an initial attempt to collect materials so as to

convince the Security Council to take a more r obust action in connection with the events in the

former Yugoslavia. - 29 -

32. In the Judgment of 19 December 2005, in the case concerning Armed Activities on the

Territory of the Congo, the Court, faced with a vast amount of evidentiary materials, found that

“The Court has not only the task of deciding which of those materials must be
considered relevant, but also the duty to determine which of them have probative
28
value with regard to the alleged facts.”

33. Thus, when the Court decided to accept th e Report of the Porter Commission, which had

obtained evidence in credible manner “by examinati on of persons directly involved, and who were

subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in assessing large

amounts of factual information”, the Court noted that the Report, since its publication, had not been

challenged to its credibility, which had been accepted by both Parties . 29

34. The Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission of Experts does not have that quality. It

cannot be more credible or reliable than the or iginal reports upon which it was based. Those

reports, however, were often ⎯ on the Commission’s own account ⎯ unverified, unverifiable,

unreliable, inaccurate and/or incomplete. The following statement by the Commission itself, taken

from Annex I.A to the Final Report should suffice to illustrate these claims:

“Since the submitting sources did not always provide sufficient information to
support their allegations, the incidents re ported and entered into the database

frequently lacked necessary information. Difficulties in data entry and analysis
occurred because of the following common problems of the reports received:

(1) sources upon which reports were based we re usually not verifiable because many
reports did not disclose original sources;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(4) reports of the same incident sometimes varied significantly in important details;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(6) numbers of victims or other variables were often reported within large ranges;

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(7) names of victims, witnesses and perpetrators were often intentionally omitted from
the reports . . .”0

28Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of th e Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.

Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, para. 58.
29Ibid., para. 61.

30Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, S/1994/674, Annex I.A, para. 21(Peace Palace
Library). - 30 -

35. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, the Respondent considers that, in

spite of enormous efforts of the members of the United Nations Commission of Experts and their

staff, the Final Report cannot be treated as a relia ble source of evidence before the Court. Each

piece of information contained in the Final Report must be evaluated with a view to its source, on a

case-by-case basis. At any rate, such presentation should be the task of the applicant State.

The credibility of the States’ submissions to the United Nations

36. The same principle should apply to all St ates’ submissions, regardless of whether they

served as sources for the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission, or were directly cited in the

written submissions of the applicant State. In the case of the United States and Austrian

submissions that concern the alleged killings committed in Zvornik, I believe that their unreliability

has already been clearly demonstrated.

37. The next example can be found in the Memorial. Invoking the Report to the United

Nations submitted by the Permanent Representative of Canada on 10 March 1993, the Applicant

alleged that “[a]t the beginning of April 1992, mo re than 1,000 Muslim civilians were killed by

31
Serb paramilitary forces in Bijeljina” . According to the cited Repor t, this information was based

on “a credible Canadian source” 3.

38. There has not been any confirmation of this allegation for the last 13 years. The ICTY

Prosecutor charges Mr.Slobodan Milosevic with “[ t]he killing of at least 48 Bosnian Muslim

and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children in the town of Bijeljina on 1-2 April 1992” 33. The

two other accused before the ICTY, Mr.Radovan Ka radzic and Mr.Momcilo Krajisnik, face the

same charges. Thus, it follows that the number of killings that the ICTY Prosecutor found to have

occurred in Bijeljina is 20 times less than stated in the Applicant’s source ⎯ the Canadian Report.

31Memorial, p. 30, para. 2.2.2.2.

32Report to the United Nations submitted by the Perm anent Representative of Canada on 10 March 1993,
No. S/25392, p. 14 (Annex 25 to Part 2 of the Memorial).

33ICTY, case IT-02-54-T, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Amended Indictment (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
dated 21 April 2004, Schedule A, para. 1 (www.un.org/icty). - 31 -

What can be inferred from the ICTY indictments?

39. Madam President, I would now turn to the probative value of the ICTY indictments. It

should be noted that each indictment is a docum ent based on evidence that we cannot see. The

ICTY indictments are not the evidence as such, and nothing can be confirmed by them. Therefore,

the Respondent cannot accept the Applicant’s position, often expressed in the Reply, and repeated

here by Ms Karagiannakis, that allegations can be confirmed by the ICTY indictments 3.

40. However, the Respondent considers th at the ICTY indictments can be used as

argumentum a contrario in a case when the Applicant’s allegations are not contained in them. The

ICTY Prosecutor’s Office has a duty to prosecute and to try to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all

serious violations of international humanitari an law committed in the former Yugoslavia since

1991. The alleged killing of more than 1,000 civilia ns in Bijeljina, if it had really occurred, should

surely be defined as a crime against humanity and should be a matter for an indictment.

41. Still, for more than ten years, the investigation teams of the ICTY Prosecutor have had at

their disposal all documents and sources of information on which Bosnia and Herzegovina based its

written submissions in this case. They have had the possibility to conduct investigations, interview

victims and witnesses, review documents from St ate archives. The co-operation between the

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovi na and the Prosecutor of the ICTY has never been questioned

and a failure of the Federation authorities to provi de all relevant information on the alleged crimes,

committed by the Serb forces, to the investigators of the Tribunal is beyond imagination. And still,

no single ICTY indictment mentions the alleged killing of 1,000 men in Bijeljina.

The reports of Mr. Tadeus Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights

A. The attack on Kozarac

42. Madam President, there is no evidence that more than 1,000 civilians were killed in

Bijeljina, just as there is no evidence for anot her unsupported allegation that 5,000 people were

executed in the town of Kozarac, in Prijedor municipality.

43. In this context, the Applicant alleged:

34
See Reply, Chapter V, p. 138, para. 180; CR 2006/3, pp. 39-40, paras. 8-13 (Ms Karagiannakis). - 32 -

“On or around 25 May 1992, Serbian artille ry began to shell the town of
Kozarac, followed by an attack by tanks and infantry. The town was virtually
destroyed and of the population of 15,000, around 5,000 are estimated to have been
35
executed by the Serb forces.”

44. This allegation was based on the report of Mr. Tadeus Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur

36
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, dated 17 November 1992 .

45. However, the ICTY judgment in Brdjanin case, dated 1 September 2004, did not confirm

this allegation. It was stated in paragraph 403 of the judgment that “[t]he Trial Chamber is satisfied

that at least 80 Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed when Bosnian Serb soldiers and police

37
entered the villages of the Kozarac area” .

46. The Applicant’s counsel, Professor Franck, considers that the facts established by the

38
ICTY should assist the Court in or der to reach its own conclusions . Let us then see how the

nature of the attack of the Serbian forces on th e Kozarac area has been established in the ICTY

judgment in the Stakic case.

To start with, the conflict in the Kozarac area commenced after the Muslim personnel at the

checkpoint near the village Hambarine had opened fi re on a car with six soldiers, four Serbs and

two Croats, killing two and wounding four of them.

Second , it was followed by an attack of extr emists among Muslim population on a military

column of the Republic of Srpska army at the village of Jakupovići near Kozarac.

Third , at that time 1,200-1,500 armed members of the Muslim unit called the “Green Berets”

were present in the Kozarac area.

Fourth , the units of the army of the Republic of Srpska asked for the handover of weapons in

order to secure the area before making a search for perpetrators, but Muslim units refused to

comply.

Fifth , there was severe fighting in Kozarac, which took place on 25 and 26 May, and

naturally, it should be concluded that a certain number of the victims were Muslim combatants.

35
Memorial, p. 32, para. 2.2.2.11.
36Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,

Mr. Tadeus Mazowiecki, dated 17 November 1992, No. S/24809, p. 8, para. 17d (Annex 33 of Part 2 to the Memorial).
37ICTY, case IT-99-36, Prosecutor v. Radislav Brdjanin , Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 403
(www.un.org/icty).

38CR 2006/5, p. 19, para. 34 (Prof. Franck). - 33 -

Sixth , the summary report from the 1stKrajina Co rps of the Republic of Srpska army of

27 May 1992, quoted in paragraph 147 of the Stakic judgment, indicated that five Serbian soldiers

39
had been killed and 20 wounded during the operation .

47. There is no doubt that the army of the Republic of Srpska abused its right to self-defence.

The Stakic judgment finds that disproportionality and th e use of armed force against the civilian

population rendered this attack illegal. Such a findi ng about the events in Kozarac is still far from

the initial thesis of the Applicant, that the Serbianforces intended to destroy, in whole or in part,

the group of Muslims, as such.

Madam President, I think that it is a good time now for a short break, if you agree?

The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. The Court will rise for ten minutes.

The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.35 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Mr. Obradović.

OMBr. ADOVI Ć:

B. Hambarine

48. Madam President, referring to the same Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur

of the Commission on Human Rights, the Applicant claims that probably as many as a

40
1,000 people died in the attack of Serbian forces on the village of Hambarine in May 1992 .

49. That assertion is once again incorrect. The Stakic indictment before the International

Criminal Tribunal mentioned “a number of pe ople killed in Hambarine from May through

July 1992” 41. The known names of the victims have been listed in the Annex to the indictment, and

we can see today that there are altogether 11 names. The Prosecutor added that “[t]he victims

included other persons whose identities at this time are either not known to or cannot be confirmed

39
ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v . Milomir Stakic , Judgement, 31 July 2003, pp. 40-46, paras. 139-158
(www.un.org/icty).
4Reply, Chapter V, p. 85, para. 22.

4ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Fourth Amended Indictment dated 10 April 2002, Annex,
para. 44/3 (www.un.org/icty). - 34 -

42
by the Prosecution” . The Fourth Amended Indictment was dated 10 April 2002, almost ten years

after the attack on Hambarine had taken place.

50. If, after a long-term investigation of the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office, including all

available documentation as well as numerous witnesses and expert-reports, merely 11 names of the

victims are known, the respondent State considers that it is impossible that a total number of

victims in Hambarine was “as many as 1,000”.

51. All this, however, shows that the reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the

Commission on Human Rights, Mr.Tadeusz Mazowiecki, were based on the same sources of

information as the Final Report of the Bassiouni Co mmission, and for that reason, they cannot be

treated as a reliable source of evidence.

52. In this regard, the Respondent fully ag rees with the observation of the ICTY Trial

Chamber in the Stakic case, given in the judgment of 31 July 2003, that:

“most witnesses sought to tell the Chamber what they believed to be the truth.
However, the personal involvement in traged ies like the one in the former Yugoslavia
often consciously or unconsciously shapes a testimony.” 43

53. It is well known that testimonies before th e Trial Chambers are still more incontestable

than those before the investigators, the same as the testimonies before the investigators who

possess all necessary experience and equipment for criminal cases are more reliable than those

given to observers, such as the distinguished United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission

on Human Rights.

The incorrect references to the United Nations Human Rights Committee

54. As stated in the Reply, the Applicant alle gedly has “the consistent approach to this case”

that the evidence presented as a rule “originates from independent sources” 44.

55. However, the Applicant several times refe rs to the Report of the United Nations Human

Rights Committee, dated 27April1993, in orde r to show examples of ethnic cleansing 4. The

Applicant is creating an impression that specific allegations are to be found in the United Nations

42Ibid.
43
ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 15 (www.un.org/icty).
44Reply, Chapter VIII, p. 466, para. 5; also, CR 2006/02, p. 27, para. 37 (Mr. van den Biesen).

45Memorial, p. 30, para. 2.2.2.2; see also p. 46, para. 2.2.5.2; also p. 49, para. 2.2.5.10. - 35 -

Human Rights Committee Report, although Annex 26 to Part 2 of the Memorial clearly shows that

these allegations are contained in a docum ent written by the applicant State and submitted to the

Human Rights Committee, which has never confirmed those allegations.

56. The Respondent will try to avoid any deba te on the credibility of the Applicant’s own

sources made during wartime, but this example clearly demonstrates that great caution is necessary

in examining each piece of information presented by the Applicant in this case.

The credibility of the NGOs’ reports

57. Madam President, I have so far demonstrated that various United Nations bodies, tasked

with gathering information on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, even though acting with the

best of intentions, did not employ adequate inv estigative methods and consequently their results

cannot be considered as reliable. Likewise, if the United Nations bodies lacked the necessary

capacities for a proper investigation in wartime, th is even more applies to many non-governmental

organizations and their various reports and letters. Let me present one clear example.

58. In the Reply, the Applicant alleged that “[c]hildren ranging from babies to five year olds,

were thrown into ovens by the guards... [T] hose mothers who resisted giving up their children

were killed on the spot.” 46

59. The Applicant did not even say where and when that alleged monstrous crime had been

committed. Once again the applicant State quoted the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission

”47
of Experts. That allegation is situated in Annex VIII of the Final Report, entitled “Prison Camps ,

where the alleged conditions in the camp called Ci glane are described. Having read that paragraph

and the corresponding note No. 3329, we can find the or iginal source of that allegation. It was an

anonymous witness statement included in the report from the ad hoc non-governmental

organization called Women’s Group Tresnjevka, dated 28 September 1992.

60. Even today the name of that witness is unknown. Such a testimony has never appeared

in any of the cases before the ICTY. Consequent ly, the Respondent considers that this allegation

remains unproven.

46
Reply, Chapter V, pp. 132-133, para. 164.
4Final Report of the United Nations Commission of E xperts, Ann.VIII, p. 260, para. 2190 (Peace Palace
Library). - 36 -

61. The shortcomings of testimonies given to non-governmental organizations in wartime

were clearly shown in the ICTY Milosevic case. Namely, on 11 September 2003, a witness,

Mr.Isak Gasi, spoke about his statement given to the Danish Helsinki Committee in Copenhagen

on 7 May 1993, in relation to the notorious crimes committed in Brcko. His testimony before the

ICTY Trial Chamber shows how his previous statement was misinterpreted in the subsequent

NGOreport and points out the shortcomings in the process of translation and making of the

report 4. Accordingly, Mr. Gasi said that he had seen 14 to 15 people killed in the town of Brcko,

but not at all that he had seen between 300 to 400 persons executed in the town square, as it was

stated in the Danish Helsinki Committee su bmission to the United Nations in May 1993.

Furthermore, Mr. Gasi stressed that he had never stated that the executions had been ordered by the

head of the police in Brcko, in spite of the fact th at such allegation also appeared in the report. He

explained that he had only mentioned who had been the commander of the police at that time and

emphasized that he had never received the written record of his statement given to the Committee

in the original language.

62. Nevertheless, this report of the Danish Helsinki Committee was included in the Final

Report of the Bassiouni Commission, which states: “The witness also reported that he saw

between 300 to 400 persons executed in the town s quare, under the order of the head of police and

49
the deputy head of police.”

63. There is no doubt that a similar mode of testimony was used as a source for the allegation

50
given in the United Nations Final Report and repeated in the Reply, which states that between

51
3,000 and 5,000 people had been killed in the Luka Camp in Brcko . If we compare it with the

charges of the ICTY Prosecutor in the Milosevic indictment 52, claiming that approximately

30-35Bosnian Muslim prisoners were executed in the Luka Camp, the enormous discrepancy

becomes obvious.

48
ICTY, case No.IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, transcripts, 11 Sep. 2003, pp. 26447-26448 and
26452-26453 (folder with new public documents, Vol. III, doc. No. 16).
49
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. III.A, para. 390 (Peace Palace Library).
50Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. III.A, para. 396 (Peace Palace Library).

51Reply, Chapter V, p. 240, para. 398.

52ICTY, case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Amended Indictment (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
dated 21 April 2004, Schedule B, para. 6 (www.un.org/icty). - 37 -

The credibility of the media reports

64. As it has already been presented, the medi a war reports were a very important source of

the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission. The footnotes with the Report on Sarajevo ⎯

Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo ⎯ show that the entire Report was based almost

exclusively on media coverage.

65. Also, the source of information on the alleged rape of 40women from Brezovo Polje 53

was the report published in the United States Depart ment of State Despatch, which was entirely

based on information from an article of the Croatian weekly Globus. That allegation has never

appeared in any indictment before the International Criminal Tribunal.

66. However, the Applicant sometimes quoted media reports in its written submissions as

independent sources of evidence. An example can be found in the part of the Reply which deals

with the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995.

“Compelling evidence exists that the entire operation was orchestrated by the
commander of the Yugoslav Army, General Mom čilo Perišić. One month after the
fall of the enclave, the United States daily Newsday carried the following report:

‘Intelligence officials from two western countries and from Bosnia
said that the commander of the Yugoslav army, General Momčilo Perisic,
was on a mountaintop across the border in Yugoslavia, sending

instructions and counsel to General Ratko Mladi ć, the commander of
Bosnian Serb military forces. The radio conversations, intercepted by
intelligence agencies, took place befo re, during and after the battle for

the enclave captured by the Serbs on July 11.

“Mladi ć and Perisic conferred constantly about their strategy and
what they were doing”, said one of the western officials, who like all of

the intelligence officers interviewed asked to remain unidentified . . .’

According to a senior Bosnian government official, who also spoke on

condition of anonymity, several hundred Yugoslav infan54ymen fought alongside
Bosnian Serb soldiers when they attacked the enclave . . .” .

67. No fact may be judicially established based only on the media report. The media reports

could serve merely to illustrate a fact, which w as previously established on the basis of other

evidence. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United

States of America), the Court held that the media reports, even when they are fully objective and

reliable, should be treated

53
Memorial, p. 43, para. 2.2.4.5.
54
Reply, Chapter VIII, pp. 595-596, para. 203,. - 38 -

“not as evidence capable of proving facts, but as material which can nevertheless
contribute, in some circumstances, to corr oborating the existence of a fact, i.e., as
illustrative material additional to other sources of evidence” . 55

68. However, there is no other source of ev idence that GeneralPerisic lead the operation

around Srebrenica in July 1995. If the intelligence officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina had

really had any intercepted radio conversation between General Perisic and General Mladic “before,

during and after the battle”, the Applicant would sure ly have submitted that material to the Court,

as it has been done in the case of the alleged telephone chat of Mrs. Ljiljana Karadzic, a wife of the

56
former President of the Republic of Srpska . Instead of such evidence, the Applicant submitted to

the Court only the extract from the Tosovic diary, in which we can find that GeneralPerisic

allegedly had a “quick lunch” with General Mlad ic and his officers on 8 January 1994, 18 months

57
before the attack on Srebrenica .

69. The Respondent considers that the Newsday article and similar material, based on the

alleged statements of anonymous persons, cannot be treated as obj ective and reliable source at all,

and consequently, it cannot contribute to corroborating the existence of facts in this case.

The credibility of the wartime statements of the Bosnia and Herzegovina officials

70. Madam President, “from the point of view of morality”, the Respondent can agree with

the position of the Applicant’s distinguished Deput y Agent that there is no relevant difference

between 100,000 and 200,000 killed 58. But just for that reason, the Respondent cannot understand

the persistent intention of the Applicant to magnify the number of war victims.

71. According to Mr. van den Biesen’s new estimation, it is clear that the statement given to

the New York Times by Mr.Haris Silajdzic, the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina on

14November1992, which contained the allegati on that 100,000 people, mainly Muslims, had

already been killed as a result of Serbian aggression 59, cannot be taken as accurate. The conflict in

Bosnia and Herzegovina continued for the next th ree years, causing significant loss of life. Ten

years after the war, on 15 December 2005 , Mr. Mirsad Tokaca, the President of the Research and

55I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 40, para. 62.
56
Folder submitted by the Applicant on 16 January 2006, doc. No. 4.
57
Ibid., doc. No. 1.
58CR 2006/2, p. 45, para. 60 (Mr. van den Biesen).

59Application, para. 87A. - 39 -

Documentation Centre from Sarajevo, stated that the confirmed number of the population losses in

Bosnia and Herzegovina is 93,837 (among them, 54,190 soldiers). He estimated that the final and

total number of the war victims could be around 100,000, i.e. the same figure that Mr. Silajdzic had

already claimed in November 1992. Of course, all the victims are not Muslims, there is a

60
significant number of Serbs among victims ⎯ 24,216 . Who killed them? It may be also that

from the point of view of morality, the Serbs in Bo snia and Herzegovina expect the answer to this

question from Mr. van den Biesen, who should be representing them as well in this case.

72. The Research and Documentation Centre from Sarajevo is an independent and

multi-ethnic association establishe d in March 2004. Its study, P opulation Losses in Bosnia and

61
Herzegovina 1992-1995 , is based on the examination of na mes and data of all victims, and

supported by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Embassies of several States, but not by the

Bosnian Government.

73. This current estimation, based on the mo re reliable research, completely cancels the

validity of figures contained in the Memorial, wh ich allegedly were compiled by the Bosnia and

Herzegovina Institute for Public Health in February 1994, as well as the alleged figure of “around a

quarter of a million . . . mainly Muslim but also Croat” victims 62.

74. Finally, we have to ask ourselves why the Applicant in its written submissions

exaggerated the number of victim s, and now continues to insist on those documents which could

not be confirmed either by the judgments or the indi ctments of the International Criminal Tribunal.

Why are the 100,000 victims not enough for Mr.va n den Biesen, who tries to find more death

63
records even among those who moved out from Bosnia during the conflict , and why is it so

difficult to say how many Serbs were killed and who killed them? The only possible answer may

be that the Applicant, having failed to demonstrate a clear proof of the required mens rea for the

crime of genocide, needs to maintain the allegati ons of the high number of victims, in order to

create evidence of the destruction of a reasonabl e substantial number of the group relative to its

60
G. Klepic: “Mirsad Tokaca: A Hundred Thousand Killed? ”, Glas Srpske, Banja L uka, 17/18 December 2005;
S. Gojkovic: “Mirsad Tokaca: 93,837 People Killed”, Nezavisne novine, Banja Luka, 16 December 2005; (folder with
new public documents, Vol. II, docs. Nos. 7 and 8).
61
This document can be found at www.idc.org.ba/project/populationlosses.
62Memorial, p. 14, para. 2.1.0.8.

63CR 2006/2, p. 45, para. 59 (Mr. van den Biesen). - 40 -

total population, as a factor from which the genocid al intent may be inferred. Without such

exaggeration of the number of victims, the Applicant, prima facie, would fail to fulfil the necessary

elements of genocide required by the Convention.

New sources of evidence used by the Applicant in the oral proceedings

A. Judicial notice of notorious facts

75. It seems that the Applicant finally, at the stage of the oral proceedings, became aware of

the lack of credibility of its documentary materials. The Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission

has been rarely mentioned in the previous days. Instead of the demonstration of clear and hard

evidence, Professor Franck asked the Court to take judicial notice of the alleged crimes as

notorious facts without requiring further proof. He based that request on th e Court practice in the

64
Fisheries jurisdiction and Nuclear Tests cases .

76. However, the notoriety of the facts about the common knowledge on the Norwegian

65
system of delimitation in the North Sea cannot be compared with an issue whether the crimes

which constitute acts of genocide were committed. The notorious fact that France carried out tests

66
of nuclear devices in the territory of French Polynesia is the fact of the same certainty as the fact

that there was a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The Court, however, should

not be able to take a judicial notice of the lega lity of nuclear tests, because it should not be a fact,

but a legal conclusion based on certain evidence. Existence of a crime, even when it can be an

element of any other specific crime, must be the result of the legal findings. If a crime was treated

as a notorious fact, a court would be needless. Fo r that reason, the Respondent considers that the

request for taking a judicial notice that, for instance, thousands of women were raped in Bosnia and

67
Herzegovina , without any evidence for so massive a scal e of violation, denies the role of the

Court.

77. But the best refuting explanation why Professor Franck’s proposal for taking judicial

notice of massive crimes as notorious fact cannot be treated seriously, has been given at the same

64CR 2006/3, pp. 23 and 24, paras. 11 and 12 (Prof. Franck).
65
I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 138-139.
66I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 9, para. 17.

67CR 2006/3, p. 23, para. 11 (Prof. Franck). - 41 -

session by Ms Karagiannakis, who referred to the very strict requirements under which the ICTY

had taken judicial notice of adjudicated facts:

⎯ no dispute between parties;

⎯ no judicial notice of judicial notice;

⎯ no judicial notice of facts established in a plea agreement;

⎯ no judicial notice of factual findings from appealed judgments 68. It seems that these criteria are

very reasonable and in accordance with the rule of law and should be applied in the present

case.

B. Videomaterials

78. Before the opening of the oral hearings, the Applicant provided the Court with 23 video

materials. In this regard, a few general observations are in order. Some of the video materials are

the well-known broadcasts about the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia. A couple of them

have been made in Dutch, and unfortunately, we cannot understand their contents. The Respondent

was provided yesterday with the Applicant’s explan ation about the origin of the video materials

shown in the courtroom, so it is difficult now to give a proper analysis of them.

79. However, it is easy to conclude that most of these materials are the author’s creations,

which cannot have a clear probative value. They are often based on prejudices in relation to the

role of the main actors in the conflict. Above all, a lot of video materials were made in order to

evoke public emotions. Each film contains more the attitudes of its director than the views of a

person who talks about events. The words used by the persons who were directly involved in the

events are most often only fragments cut out from their interviews.

80. Madam President, apart from these gene ral observations about documentary films

provided as evidence, I am compelled to say a few words about the video showed by the Applicant

in this courtroom picturing the brutal execution of six young men in Trnovo. It is clear that the

Applicant addressed those scenes to the Court for emotional reasons. If the Respondent followed

the same approach to the presenta tion of evidence, the next video material would show the scenes

of the bodies of Serbian soldiers decapitated by the members of the unit called “El-Mujahed” (also

68
CR 2006/3, p. 51, para. 67 (Ms Karagiannakis). - 42 -

known as “Holy Warriors”) in the Kamenica camp n ear Sarajevo. In that case, the Respondent

would, in the same manner as the Applicant, refer to the ICTY indictment against Mr. Rasim Delic.

However, the Government of Serbia and Mont enegro will not follow the way chosen by the

Applicant. Instead, I would like to confirm to th e honourable Court that the perpetrators of the

execution in Trnovo have been arrested. Acco rding to the documentation available to our

delegation, they were not members of the Se rbian police or any other body of Serbia and

Montenegro. The trial before the War Crimes Pane l of the District Court in Belgrade is under way

and some of the accused have already pleaded guilty. Her Honour Gordana Bozilovic, President of

that Trial Chamber, was sitting in this courtroom during the first session in the present case, behind

the delegation of Serbia and Montenegro, together with the President of the District Court in

Belgrade and the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes of the Republic of Serbia.

C. ICTY materials

81. Madam President, I would like now to express briefly some of our views about the way

in which the Applicant has so far used the different ICTY documents in this case:

⎯ The Respondent of course cannot accept the positio n that the indictments of the International

Criminal Tribunal can confirm the Applicant’s allegations.

⎯ It is also inappropriate that factual findings in the ICTY cases which have not been concluded

can be taken as the sources of evidence in this case. The Rule 61 decisions and the decisions

on defence motions to acquittal contain only facts presented by the Prosecutor.

⎯ If the ICTY pre-trial and inter-trial decisions were enough to establish the facts in the case

before the International Court of Justice, we could ask ourselves why the defence still exists in

the criminal procedure before the ICTY. Fort unately, such a treatment of evidence is not

known in the ICTY procedure. A fact contained in the ICTY pre-trial or inter-trial decision

cannot be used as an adjudicated fact in another case.

82. Furthermore, the Respondent cannot accept th at the facts contained in plea agreements

may constitute evidence before this Court, as th ey do not constitute evidence in the procedure

before the ICTY. The reason is that the so-called factual basis for the plea agreement is not always

the original statement given by the accused. For example, the Applicant has so far cited frequently - 43 -

the Factual Basis for a Plea of Guilty in the ICTY case of Ms Biljana Plavsic 69. It is well known

that that statement of facts has been prepared by the ICTY Prosecution Office. MsPlavsic’s

defence agreed on that statement in order to reach the plea bargain. However, that statement (or

factual basis) has not been used as evidence in any other trial before the ICTY. Only in the Stakic

case, that factual basis was filed by the Prosecutor, but there was no procedural possibility that the

Chamber would treat it as reliable evidence without a direct testimony of MsPlavsic in the

courtroom, and consequently the factual basis had to be withdrawn from evidence 70. It should also

be noted that, after the plea bargain, MsPlavsic was sentenced to 11years’ imprisonment, while

Mr.Stakic, who had not made the plea agreemen t with the Prosecutor, was sentenced to life

imprisonment.

Conclusions

83. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, after the brief presentation of the

incorrect allegations of the applicant State, it is my duty to conclude:

A. It is not true that Serbian forces executed children in the Zvornik hospital, as well as it is not

true that children were thrown into ovens else where. This kind of allegations was the worst

type of war propaganda, with its only aim to s hock the conscience of mankind and to portray

the enemy as a bloodthirsty barbarian.

It is not accurate that 2,500 Muslim men were killed in Zvornik on 9 and 10 April, or that

5,000people were killed during the attack on Ko zarac, or that 1,000 Muslim civilians were

killed in Hambarine, or that another 1,000 were killed in Bijeljina. The crimes were

committed, but the number of victims was tens of times less than it was alleged in the

submissions of the Government of Bosnia a nd Herzegovina to the International Court of

Justice.

It is not true that 50 to 60 people died in Tr nopolje every day, or that ten prisoners were killed

daily in Keraterm, or that 5,000 people were ex ecuted in the most notorious Omarska camp.

69
For example, see CR 2006/6, p. 29, para. 8 (Prof. Franck).
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 550. - 44 -

There is no evidence that between 3,000 and 5,000 people have been killed in the Luka camp in

Brcko.

I have established only some examples of the fa lse and inaccurate allegations of the applicant

State. These false allegations are numerous and can be found thro ughout the Applicant’s

written submissions. Together with unspoken data about the terrible crimes committed against

Serbian civilians and war prisoners, they significantly change the general picture of the Bosnian

conflict.

B. These improbable allegations should demonstrate that their sources cannot be taken as reliable

sources of evidence in this case.

C. Consequently, the Respondent considers that the Applicant has not managed to reach the

standard of proof requested in the case before the International Court of Justice.

84. Madam President, I would like to express the great remorse of the people and the

Government of Serbia and Montenegro for all victims of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

regardless how many they were. It was not my intention today to deny that crimes indeed took

place. Is there any difference to a person killed in the village of Hambarine whether the total

number of victims was 1,000, as claimed by the Applicant, or 11 as listed in the indictment before

the ICTY? Nevertheless, this great discrepancy is important to illustrate that the documents used

by the Applicant are not credible and conseque ntly, that the accusations based on them are ill

found.

I would like now to conclude my pleadings. Thank you, Madam President, for your kind

attention, and I would respectfully ask you to give the floor to Professor Tibor Varady.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Obradović. I give the floor to Professor Varady. - 45 -

VMAr. ADY:

ISSUES OF PROCEDURE

1. Introduction

1.1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court. May it please the Court. It is,

once again, an exceptional honour and privilege to a ppear before this Court. I would also like to

give expression of my respect for the colleagues representing the Applicant for their presentations.

1.2. My colleagues, Professor Zimmermann, Mr.Djeri ć and myself, we would like to

address the procedural side of this complex case. But let me start our presentations with some

information of a more technical nature. We have envisaged submitting this part of the

Respondent’s presentation during the remainder of this morning, and tomorrow morning.

1.3. As a further technical matter, and fthe sake of clarity, let me mention the following

regarding names and designations. Both the Ap plicant and the Respondent are successor States of

the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the “SFRY”; we shall refer to the predecessor

State as the “former Yugoslavia”. Furthermore, at the time when the Application was submitted,

the name of the Respondent was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the “FRY”. In

February 2003, the FRY changed its name and beca me Serbia and Montenegro. We shall use both

designations ⎯ the “FRY” and “Serbia and Montenegro” ⎯ depending on the time period to

which we are referring and using the name which was official at the given moment.

1.4. We would also like to refer in an abbreviated form to three judgments of this Court,

which are of a particular importance in the procedural history of the cases arising from the

Yugoslav conflicts. We shall refer in an abbrev iated form to the “1996 Judgment on Preliminary - 46 -

71 72
Objections” , to the “2003 Revision Judgment” , and to the “2004 Legality of Use of Force

Judgments” 73.

1. Raising issues of procedure

1.5. Approaching issues of procedure, I do not want to disregard the fact that in this case

fundamental humanitarian issues are at stake, and th at the allegation pertains to genocide, probably

the greatest crime known. I could argue, of course ⎯ without departing from the truth ⎯ that the

perception of the dramatic years of recent hist ory presented by the Applicant was a perception

couched in terms of adversarial pr oceedings with the aim of prevai ling over the other party. But I

have to agree with the Applicant, that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first half of the last decade of

the twentieth century was ma rked by a unique tragedy ⎯ and was also marked by grave crimes.

Such a setting commands due respect.

1.6. Madam President, responding to the remarks made by our colleagues on the side of the

Applicant, let me say that the procedural issu es we are raising are not mere technicalities which

would detract us from a simple and straightforwar d path towards substance. The questions we

would like to address pertain to the most fundame ntal precondition of proceedings before this

honoured Court, determined by the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the Court.

1.7. Let me also add that this is not a simp le and straightforward case; and, what is also

significant, this is a case in which substance and procedure are closely intertwined. The conflict

was marked with different perceptions and asp irations regarding statehood and dissolution of

statehood. The picture is not as simple as the one de picted by the Applicant. This was not just a

conflict between Serbs and non-Serbs. It is well known and uncontested, for example, that in some

regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina ⎯ like the Mostar region ⎯ most violence took place between

Muslims and Croats. Conflicts between Muslims and Croats also yielded a number of ICTY

71The Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (II).

72The 3 February 2003 Judgment on Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11July1996 in the Case
concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), I.C.J. Reports 2003.

73Eight Judgments of 15 December 2004 in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force decided between Serbia
and Montenegro as Applicant, and eight NATO Member countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) as Respondents, I.C.J Reports 2004. - 47 -

indictments ⎯ like the indictments prompted by the Lašva Valley confrontations. In the Biha ć

region, a long and acrimonious battle was fought be tween two Muslim factions. During the years

of the conflict, state-like structures emerged and disappeared, parallel with shifting ethnic

confrontations and alliances, while statehood and dissolution of statehood were on the banners of

all participants.

1.8. This hallmark of the conflict also became the core of the jurisdictional problem. It is

exactly the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the circumstances of the formation

of new States, which gave rise to conflicting pe rceptions regarding membership in the United

Nations and treaty status, the critical issues regarding access and jurisdiction.

1.9. Furthermore, a scrutiny of the procedural setting of this case shall also reveal that this

legal dispute between two sovereign States, Bosn ia and Herzegovina on one side, and Serbia and

Montenegro on the other side ⎯ neither of which existed when the conflict began ⎯ is simply not

a matching articulation of the actual conflict fought between Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia

and Herzegovina.

1.10. Let me add, Madam President, that it is know n that the stakes in this case are daunting.

The question is whether the balance sheet of the twentiethcentury would show Serbia and

Montenegro being the one and only State convicted for genocide. But the gravity of the substance

does not diminish the importance of verification of the very foundations of the right to proceed.

1.11. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, let me also say that we are

advancing our views on jurisdiction even at this stage, because it was not possible to take a

conclusive position on these issues earlier and be cause it is our sincere conviction that the

Respondent was not a party to the Statute, and had no access to the Court when the Application

was submitted. We also trust that the Res pondent never became bound by ArticleIX of the

Genocide Convention. Serbia and Montenegro did no t consent to the jurisdiction of this honoured

Court in this case.

2. The actual conflict found no matching expression in this dispute

1.12. Before turning to specific issues, let me once again refer to the drama from which our

case was born. There is no doubt that a human tragedy took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The - 48 -

estimates and dimensions of the events vary quite considerably. The numbers may be

controversial, but whichever estimate should one take, this is a tragedy. It is also a fact that the

devastations were not caused without guilt. There was a war which was, like every war, conducive

to aberrant behaviour, but the fact remains that there were crimes, and there were perpetrators,

people guided by hatred or fanaticism, who committed crimes.

1.13. Let me say, Madam President, that the responsibility of these individuals is a rather

straightforward matter. But things are becoming much more complicated ⎯ and sometimes

perplexing as well ⎯ when attempts are being made to perc eive the issue in terms of a dispute

between States. Not every tragedy can be articul ated as a dispute between States, subject to the

jurisdiction of this honoured Court. The actual conflict we are facing was an ethnic conflict, the

dividing lines between the warring parties were ethnic dividing lines. The propaganda which

fuelled the conflict, and managed to separate pe ople, not only from each other, but also from

common sense, was an ethnic propaganda.

1.14. In the Memorial of the Applicant, the part entitled “The Facts” starts with the following

allegation:

“Since late 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovi na has been the scene for acts of
violence and destruction, the evil brutality of which has been calculated and aimed by
Serbs to eliminate the lives, liberty, dignit y, religion and culture of the Muslim and
74
Croat people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

We do not agree with these allegations, but we do agree that since 1991, a brutal conflict emerged

between Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The conflic t damaged all participating ethnic groups, and the

plight of the Muslims, that is of the Bosniacs, may have been the most difficult of all.

1.15. It is known, Madam President, that the ethnic groups that faced each other during the

conflict were confronted earlier, as well, in the course of history. At the same time, it is also

known that the States that are facing each other be fore this Court did not even exist when the

conflict began. Neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor the FRY existed in late 1991 or early 1992.

1.16. While the conflict lasted, States and state-like structures were emerging and

disappearing, and so did borders, as well as disput es about borders, about s overeignty, continuity

and secession. The legal character and the standi ng of the emerging structures remained for a long

74
Memorial of 15 April 1994, para. 2.1.0.1. - 49 -

time volatile and controversial. The ethnic dividi ng lines during the conflict may have been quite

clear, but they have not been mirrored in the dividing line between the States, Parties to the present

dispute. This is what makes this case so unus ual and detached from natural paths in search of

justice before the Court.

1.17. The question arises whether the cause, which inspired the Application in 1993, has

become the cause of the States which are facing each other today before this Court. The question

also arises whether consequences allocated in a judgment could possibly be allocated between the

actual participants and along the dividing lines of the actual conflict.

1.18. In its Memorial of 15 April 1994, Bosn ia and Herzegovina submitted that “[s]pecific

persons were targeted precisely on account of their adherence to an ethnical or religious group and

that attacks on these groups was precisely a means to attain the end of clearing entire areas of their

75
Muslim population” . The Memorial continues by stating that acts prohibited by the Genocide

Convention were committed by Bosnian Serbs, and that the authorities of the FRY aided and

76
abetted such acts .

1.19. The armed conflict came to an end. An element of the solution which was accepted

was that the Bosnian Serbs and their entity, the Republika Srpska, became an integral part of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was confirmed in the Dayton Peace Agreement, which was signed

on 14 December 1995 in Paris. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as a part

of this Agreement. The Agreement and the Constitution have established two entities of about

equal size, which now constitute the State of the Applicant. According to Article1(3) of the

Constitution: “Bosnia and Herzegovi na shall consist of the two En tities, the Federation of Bosnia

and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.”

1.20. In spite of this new reality, the claim ⎯ following the dividing lines of the original

conflict ⎯ still advances grievances against the Repub lika Srpska, now a constitutive part of the

applicant State. For example, in its Reply of 23April 1998, the Applicant alleged that: “The

75
Memorial, p. 7, para. 1.3.0.4.
7Memorial, p. 7, para. 1.3.0.5. - 50 -

77
creation of ‘Republika Srpska’ has been imposed through the use of force and genocide .” The

conclusion suggested by the Applicant is that “[s]uch a situation cannot have any legal validity” 78.

1.21. Madam President, there are further circumstances contributing to doubts as to whether

the actual conflict, which took place between 1991 and 1995, could find a fitting judicial resolution

between those States which are now appearing as Applicant and Respondent before this honoured

Court. We would like to point out that the Republika Srpska ⎯ covering about one half of the

country of the Applicant ⎯ has strongly and consistently opposed this lawsuit. On

1October2003, the Parliament of the Republik a Srpska adopted a Declaration which states,

inter alia:

“The Claim of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the International Court of Justice
is, de facto , a claim against the Republika Srpska and against the essence of the
Dayton Peace Agreement. The Republika Sr pska and the Serbian people in Bosnia

and Herzegovina cannot be an Entity, a part of the State of the Claimant, and at the
same time the accused party ⎯ this is simply not possible.

Life in common of all people of Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be built on
the basis offered by the Da yton Peace Agreement, by the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while the said Claim cannot contri bute to reconciliation either in Bosnia
79
and Herzegovina, or in the Region.”

In this Declaration, the Parliament of the Republika Srpska asks from the Presidency and the

Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to place on their agenda the question of the claim against

Serbia and Montenegro submitted to the International Court of Justice.

1.22. It has to be said that the Declaration of the Parliament of the Republika Srpska of

1October 2003 was challenged by the repr esentatives of the Bosniak people in the

RepublikaSrpska. They initiated a procedure to establish that the Declaration, as well as the

initiative to place the issue on the agenda of the Pr esidium and of the Parliament of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, impairs vital interests of the Bosni ac people. This motion reached the Constitutional

Court of the Republika Srpska, which rejected it on 10 June 2005, and upheld the legitimacy of the

80
Declaration .

77Reply of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 23 April 1998, para. 82.
78
Reply, para. 83.
79This Declaration was published in the Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, No. 63/05.

80Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Re publika Srpska was also published in the Official Gazette of the
Republika Srpska, No. 63/2005. - 51 -

1.23. A further event demonstrating how controve rsial the matter is in the applicant State, is

the request submitted on 12 December 2005 to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina

by Mr. Borislav Paravac, one of the three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this request, Mr.Paravac is seeking the C onstitutional Court of Bosn ia and Herzegovina to

declare that the Application submitted to this C ourt represents a violation of the Constitution of

Bosnia and Herzegovina 8.

1.24. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, we are, of course, aware of the

fact that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not reached a decision as yet. We

do not intend to discuss here the legitimacy of the Application under the Constitution of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The point we want to make is that it is evident that there is a clear and deep divide

between the two constituent entities of the applicant State regarding these proceedings. Just as it is

evident that the Parties to this dispute are not identical at all with the parties to the conflict.

1.25. The truth of the matter is that, today, a judgment on the merits would find the

Republika Srpska ⎯ the alleged perpetrator ⎯ in the position of the Applicant and the alleged

victim, and the recipient of possible damages to be paid. The same judgment would find

Kosovo ⎯ clearly a part of the FRY during the Bosnian conflict ⎯ in the position of the

Respondent, the alleged perpetrator, and possible debtor of damages.

1.26. Madam President, the controversies a bout States, which only came into being during

the conflict, incongruities between the setting of th e actual conflict and the setting of this legal

dispute yielded, quite understandably, a most complex situation and serious difficulties in

articulating the substance of the problem as a legal dispute between States.

1.27. On 20 March 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovi na initiated proceedings against the FRY for

alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. It has practically been forgotten that several

months later, on 15 November 1993, another ta ntalizing attempt was made to articulate the

predicament as a legal dispute between States, subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Bosnia and

Herzegovina sent to the General Assembly and to the Security Council of the United Nations a

“Statement of Intention” in which it declared its “solemn intention” to in stitute legal proceedings

8The submission of this request to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reported in
practically all daily papers in Bosnia and rzegovina. For example, in the Sarajevo paper OSLOBOĐENJE of

13 December 2005. - 52 -

against the United Kingdom before the Internationa l Court of Justice for violating the Genocide

Convention. The key grievance stated in the “Sta tement of Intention” of the Applicant was the
82
arms embargo, which was perceived as aiding and abetting genocide . This effort was abandoned.

1.28. Parallel with these vari ous endeavours, the International Criminal Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia, the “ICTY”, was establishe d, with the mission to establish individual

responsibility and to punish those who committed crimes. The Bosnian conflict has been the

subject-matter of a major part of the activities of the ICTY.

1.29. Madam President, the task of the ICTY is simpler in the sense that the cases submitted

to the ICTY have been structured along the dividing lines of the actual conflict. The distribution of

the roles in the proceedings mirrors the conf lict, and consequences are reaching the actual

perpetrators. The dispute brought before this Court does not have the benefit of a clear-cut setting.

1.30. This is a dispute between States that had been formed during the conflict, but the

borders of which do not reflect the dividing lines of the conflict. There is no reason to regret this;

this means that intolerance and ethnic partition di d not prevail. One of the reasons behind the

Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, and one of the ai ms of the international community was exactly

to bring about a Bosnia and Herzegovina which is the common State of Bosniacs, Serbs, Croats and

others who fought against each other between 1991 and 1995, rather than to create sovereign States

along the dividing lines of the conflict. This wa s the right approach. But one of the logical

consequences of this approach is that the actual parties to the conflict did not and could not find an

alter ego or matching representation in the newly emerging States which are now juxtaposed before

this Court.

3. During earlier phases of these proceedings it was not possible to take a conclusive position

on key procedural issues

1.31. The emerging problem is not only that of articulating the substance of the dispute

between parties other than the actual participants to the conflict. The dilemmas and controversies

regarding the personality and the standing of the s ubjects emerging from the conflict have also had

a clear impact on the issues of access to the Court and jurisdiction.

82
See General Assembly, Security Council, United Nations doc. A/48/659, S/26806, 26 November 1993. - 53 -

1.32. Madam President, distinguished Member s of the Court, it is well known that the

process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavi a created two narratives: one espoused and

promoted by the former Government of the FR Y, and another one espoused and promoted by

Bosnia and Herzegovina and other successor States.

1.33. The essence of the position taken by the former Government of the FRY was the

following: we stayed on course. We are a foundi ng Member of the United Nations. We remained

a Member of the United Nations, and a party to international conventions continuing the

personality of the former Yugoslavia. We remained the same State from which others have tried to

secede (or did secede). Hence, our admission to th e United Nations is beside the point, and no

scrutiny under Article 4 of the Charter is needed, since we never ceased to be a Member. Due to

continuity, we remained a Member of the United Nations, and we remained a party to the treaties to

which the SFRY was a party.

1.34. Contrary to this perception of the former Government of the FRY, Bosnia and

Herzegovina and other successor States advanced a di fferent narrative. The essence of this second

narrative is the following: the former SFRY disso lved. Nobody continued the identity of the

former Yugoslavia ⎯ hence nobody seceded either. There are five equal successors, five new

States. As we had to seek admission to the Un ited Nations, and had to go through an Article4

scrutiny in order to become a Member of the Un ited Nations, the FRY has to do the same; as we

had to submit notifications of succession or accession in order to become a contracting party to the

treaties, the FRY has to do the same.

1.35. Today it is clear what was the reality. But what is clear today was uncertain for almost

a decade. The relationship between the newly emerging States and the former Yugoslavia to which

they all belonged, the process of dissolution, ques tions of continuity and discontinuity, remained

controversial for too long. Controversies did not only mark the positions taken by the emerging

new States themselves. For a quite considerable period clear-cut answers were not given by those

international organizations and authorities eith er, whose standpoint had to represent a point of

support and reliance before this Court.

1.36. At various moments of these proceedings various facts and perceptions were

accessible. Various international authorities, whic h were invited to qualify the emerging situation, - 54 -

took various positions. A unique and unorthodox situation yielded more ambiguity and evasion

than straight answers. As it was stated by the Court in the 2004 Legality of Use of Force

Judgments:

“[t]he legal position of the Fe deral Republic of Yugoslavia within the United Nations
and vis-à-vis that Organization remained highly complex during the period
1992-2000. In fact, it is the view of the Court that the legal situation that obtained

within the United Nations during that eight -year period concerning the status of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This was due,

inter alia, to the absence of an authoritative dete rmination by the competent organs of
the United Nations defining clearly the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
vis-à-vis the United Nations” .83

4. The need to face issues of access and jurisdiction

1.37. This status which remained much too long undefined, is obviously of critical

importance. If the FRY had continued the personality of the former Yugoslavia, then it would have

remained a Member of the United Nations, it would have remained a State party to the Statute, and

it would have remained bound by international conve ntions to which the former Yugoslavia was a

party. If there was no continuity, then the FRY ha d to do what other successor States did: to seek

admission to the United Nations as a new State, and to undertake appropriate actions in order to

become bound by international conventions. We are respectfully submitting that, as this Court has

already determined, the FRY was not a Member State of the United Nations, was not a party to the

Statute and did not have access to the Court when the Application was submitted. We are also

submitting that the FRY did not remain or become bound by any treaty provision which would

establish the jurisdiction of this Court.

1.38. Madam President, distinguished Member of the Court, we are, of course, aware of the

fact that this is not the first time that questions of jurisdiction have emerged in this case. Questions

pertaining to jurisdiction were raised during various phases of the proceedings in this case, and they

were also raised in other related cases arising from the Yugoslav conflict in which jurisdiction was

dependent on the same issue ⎯ that of continuity or discontinuity, the position and treaty

membership of the FRY between 1992 and 2000.

8Case concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), para. 64. Exactly the same
text can be found in the other 20Legality of Use of Force Judgments as well: in para. 63 of the cases with France,

Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in para. 62 of the cases with Germany and the United Kingdom. - 55 -

1.39. There is no res judicata bar which would disallow the Court to address the issue of

access and jurisdiction if it appears to be justified. Such a bar is not posed by the 1996 Judgment

on Preliminary Objections. Arguing that the issue of jurisdiction cannot be reopened, the Applicant

endeavours to draw support for its position from the Judgment of the Cour t of 25March 1999 in

the case between Cameroon and Nigeria. The App licant suggests that this case shows that the

84
position once taken by the Court cannot be changed during subsequent proceedings .

1.40. In the 1999 Cameroon v. Nigeria Judgment the Court opted, indeed, not to change

what was decided earlier. But there is a very si mple reason for this. Nothing else was possible in

the given procedural setting, because the inherent limitations were set by the request itself. The

Cameroon v. Nigeria case relied upon by the Applicant is a case where interpretation was sought.

As the title of the case clearly indicates, the request was made for interpretation . A request for

interpretation is just a request for that, for explaining a “yes” or a “no” ⎯ not for revisiting the

conclusions and changing a “yes” to a “no”.

85
1.41. The Applicant also referred to the Corfu Channel case . But this case provides no

support to the Applicant’s contentions, as it does not settle at all the question of finality of

judgments on preliminary objections. As a matter of fact, this case may very well be cited as a case

in which the Court proceeded to re-raise the i ssue of jurisdiction in the merits phase. The

Applicant actually relies on the third phase of the Corfu Channel case. In this third phase 86the

Court did, indeed, refuse to revisit an earlie r finding on jurisdiction which was challenged on the

same grounds as the ground submitted earlier. It is important to add that this earlier finding was

the finding reached in the merits phase, rather than in the preliminary objections phase.

1Th2e. Corfu Channel case yields an opposite conclusion, however, if one focuses on the

exact situation we are facing in our case, that is , if we are investigating the treatment of the

jurisdictional issue in the merits phase, after the pr eliminary objections were rejected. In the first

phase, the Court rejected preliminary objections, a nd decided to move to the merits phase. But in

the second phase of this case, the merits phase, the Court did address new objections raised

8CR 2006/3, 28 February 2006, p. 14, para .9 (Prof. Pellet).
85
CR 2006/3, 28 February 2006, p. 16, para. 13 (Prof. Pellet).
8The Corfu Channel case, Assessment of the Amount of Compensation, Judgment of 15 December 1949,
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 244. - 56 -

regarding jurisdiction, in spite of the existence of an earlier judgment on preliminary objections,

and after due consideration, it reached one more conclusion on jurisdiction . 87

1.43. Explaining that the Corfu Channel case does not settle the question whether judgments

on jurisdiction may have res judicata effects, Shihata points out and stresses that when the specific

objection to jurisdiction was raised in the merits phase, this objection was not dismissed on grounds

of res judicata, “[t]hough it was invoked after a decision affi rming the Court’s jurisdiction to deal

88
with the case generally” .

1.44. It is important to point out that when it opted to reconsider jurisdiction during the

merits phase of the Corfu Channel case, after a judgment rejecting the preliminary objections, the

Court did not even feel the need to invoke the we ll-established entitlement of the Court to examine

its jurisdiction proprio motu . It simply investigated an objection to jurisdiction raised by the

Respondent during the merits phase, which objec tion did not figure among those raised in the

preliminary phase.

1.45. Madam President, returning to our case, let me stress that the complexity of our case

mirrors the complexity of the conflict. Th is case has a most complicated and unorthodox case

history, because an unconventional and unpredic table sequence of events produced a most

complicated and truly unorthodox case. Questions were recurring under different perspectives. On

the grounds of what was visible and ascertainable earlier, it was not possible to take a clear position

“without legal difficulties”.

1.46. This is why, referring to positions taken earlier in various cases between 1992 and

2004, including the Revision case, the Court pointed out in its 2004 Legality of Use of Force

Judgments that it was not in a position to take a definitive position before 2004. The Court stated:

“The Court did not commit itself to a definitive position on the issue of the legal
status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavi a in relation to the Charter and the Statute
in its pronouncements in incidental pr oceedings, in the cases involving this issue
89
which came before the Court during this anomalous period.”

87
Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 26.
88Ibrahim Shihata, The Power of the In ternational Court to Determine Its Own Jurisdiction, M. Nijhoff Publ.,
p. 76.

89Case concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), para. 74. Exactly the same
text can be found in the other 2004Legality of Use of Force Judgments as well: in para. 73 of the cases with France,
Germany, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in para. 72 of the cases with Germany and the United Kingdom. - 57 -

1.47. The status of the FRY with regard to treaties, including the Charter and the Statute,

during the “anomalous period” between 1992 and 200 0, is of a decisive relevance regarding

reconsideration of the issue of jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to imagine a situation

in which the reinvestigation of the issue of ju risdiction would be more appropriate and more

needed. A reconsideration of jurisdiction proprio motu is further justified by the fact that, after a

long period in which the taking of a definitive positio n on the critical issue was impeded by lack of

information or by procedural constraints, such a position was taken in 2004. In the 2004 Legality

of Use of Force Judgments the Court stated unequivocally:

“[f]rom the vantage point from which the Court now looks at the legal situation, and in
the light of the legal consequences of th e new development since 1 November 2000,

the Court is led to the conclusion that Se rbia and Montenegro was not a Member of
the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the present
90
proceedings before the Court on 29 April 1999” .

1.48. It is in this context that the logic of the ICAO Council Judgment finds full justification.

Indeed, in its letter to the Parties of 12 June 2003 the Court referred to this Judgment, and cited it

stating:

“[a]s the Court has emphasized in the past, [it] is entitled to consider jurisdictional

issues proprio motu, and must ‘always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction’ ( Appeal
relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 52).”

In the same letter of 12 June 2003, the Court added:

“It thus goes without saying that the Court will not give judgment on the merits
of the present case unless it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction. Should Serbia and

Montenegro wish to present further argument to the Court on jurisdictional questions
during the oral proceedings on the merits, it will be free to do so.”

1.49. This course of action ⎯ mentioned in the letter of th is honoured Court as a permitted

option ⎯ is the one we intend to take. We sh all respectfully present facts and arguments

demonstrating that the FRY did not have access to the Court when the Application was submitted;

and furthermore, it did not remain bound by Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and it never

became bound by ArticleIX either. Since Artic leIX of the Genocide Convention is the only

professed basis of jurisdiction, it follows that this honoured Court has no jurisdiction in this case.

9Case concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), para. 79. Exactly the same
text can be found in the other 2004 Legality of Use of Force Judgments as well: in para. 78 of the cases with France,

Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in para. 77 of the cases with Germany and the United Kingdom. - 58 -

5. The approach we have followed

1.50. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, there is one more point I would

like to make within this introductory statement. The Applicant raised the question of our litigation

strategies.

1.51. Let me say that no judicial instance inspires more dedication and requires more

professional integrity than the International Court of Justice. My colleagues and I, we have been

overwhelmed by the opportunity to present arguments before this Court, and we have sincerely

tried our best to attain the requisite standard. We cannot, of course, judge ourselves, but let me put

before you in all frankness our approach to this case, and to all our cases before this honoured

Court.

1.52. Madam President, after the people of Se rbia and Montenegro brought to an end the

Milošević régime, our position towards the United Nations and treaties was not the only issue

which had to be rethought and revi sited. The new Government w as faced with a daunting number

of crucially important issues since the fall of 2000. Our country had to reconsider the basic

premises on which it was functioning, including rela tionship of the FRY with its neighbours, with

the international community, and with the entire past decade. Many things were changed or

redirected ⎯ and many things still have to be changed or redirected.

1.53. At a number of critical junctures, the new Government of the FRY opted to follow the

position taken by the majority of States in the international community ⎯ including that of the

Applicant.

1.54. In this context, we reconsidered our position towards the assumption of continuity with

the former Yugoslavia and towards the proposition of automatically continued membership in the

United Nations and in treaties. Abandoning the pr oposition of continuity, which was professed by

the former Government, meant that we had to submit to the procedure of admission of new

members ⎯ and this also meant that we could not claim treaty membership on grounds of

continuity. Instead, we had to submit a request for admission to the United Nations as a new

Member as other successor States did, and we had to submit notifications of succession or

accession to treaties as other successor States did. - 59 -

1.55. We accepted a status and all of its consequences. This meant that we could not and did

not continue the perception of the Miloševi ć Government in our cases before this honoured Court

either. We accepted instead a perception endorsed by the great majority in the international

community, and we have stood by this percepti on both before this Court and before other

international authorities and organizations.

1.56. Before this Court, we have presente d our perception in a consistent way. We

communicated the same perception in all cases irrespec tive of our role as applicant or respondent,

and we have been asking the Court to decide on jurisdiction considering the same facts and the

same analysis ⎯ and this is what we shall respectfully endeavour to do during these proceedings as

well.

1.57. We shall point out two reasons, each of which is sufficient to yield the conclusion that

this honoured Court has no jurisdiction in this case. First, we shall demonstrate that the FRY (now

Serbia and Montenegro) had no access to the Court at the relevant moment when the Application

was submitted. The second reason leading to the conc lusion of lack of jurisdiction in this case is

that Serbia and Montenegro never became bound a nd is not bound by ArticleIX of the Genocide

Convention, which is the only purported ground of jurisdiction. Given that in our case the issue of

treaty membership is interlinked with the question of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, there

are more imaginable ways in which links with a treaty could have possibly been maintained or

created. We shall cover all ground, and we shall demonstrate that there is no conceivable way in

which Serbia and Montenegro could have either remained or become bound by ArticleIX of the

Genocide Convention.

1.58. Concluding my introduction, I would like to submit to you the schedule of our

presentations. Our first speaker tomorrow morning will be our counsel and advocate Mr.Djeri ć.

He will address issues of access. After him, I shall endeavour to demonstrate that the FRY ⎯now

Serbia and Montenegro ⎯ did not remain bound by Article IX of the Genocide Convention. Our

counsel and advocate Professor Zimmermann will c ontinue to demonstrate that Serbia and

Montenegro never became bound by ArticleIX in a ny way, by way of treaty action or otherwise.

After his speech I would like to add some concluding remarks. We intend to conclude this part of - 60 -

the Respondent’s presentation by the end of the morning session tomorrow. Madam President,

distinguished Members of the Court, thank you very much for your kind attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Varady. The Court now rises and will resume its

hearings at 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

The Court rose at 12.55 p.m.

___________

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le mercredi 8 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président

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