CR 2006/12
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 8 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 8 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-Presi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc AhmedMahiou
Kre Milenko ća
Couvrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
AlKh.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
MM. Ahmed Mahiou,
KMrilenko ća, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
coagment;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la fact de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Master in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
cocomnseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
coagment;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djeri ć, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Minneapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. PhD. (Cambridge), Walther-Schücking Institute, University of Kiel,
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdji ć, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebi ć, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Institut Walther-Schücking, Université de Kiel,
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets today to begin the hearing of the first
round of oral argument of Serbia and Montenegro. In the same way as Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia and Montenegro will dispose for this purpo se of ten sessions. I now give the floor to the
Agent of Serbia and Montenegro, Mr. Radoslav Stojanović.
STMO.JANOVI Ć: Merci, Madame le président. Je commencerai avec un discours
d’introduction sur notre plaidoirie.
L’ INTRODUCTION
1. Et tout d’abord, Madame le président, permettez-moi de vous fé liciter, au nom de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, de mon gouvernement et au nom de mon équipe, pour votre élection à la
présidence de cette honorable Cour qui est la plus prestigieuse institution judiciaire. Permettez-moi
également de saisir cette occasion et de féliciter les nouveaux membres de la Cour de leur élection.
2. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur pour moi de prendre la
parole devant vous aujourd’hui, mais permettez-moi de vous dire que je ne le fais pas sans peine et
affliction. Car, en tant qu’agent je suis chgé de défendre mon pays contre une accusation du
crime le plus grave de la civilisation moderne.
3. Cette guerre a fait beaucoup de victimes et de destructions, et qui plus est, elle a engendré
le manque de confiance ainsi que l’intoléra nce, voire la haine entre les peuples de
l’ex-Yougoslavie. Cela est malh eureusement évident encore aujour d’hui, plus de dix ans après la
fin des guerres. Cela engendre en moi-même une so rte de peur pour l’avenir des Etats créés après
le démembrement sanglant de la Yougoslavie.
4. Le requérant a exposé deva nt cette Cour une façon de voir les événements des années
quatre-vingt-dix en ex-Yougoslavie. Cette vision est liée à l’histoire entière des relations entre les
groupes ethno-nationaux qui participaient à ce conflit. Cette histoire a été sanglante à un tel point
que la Yougoslavie est devenue une exception pa r rapport à l’histoire mondiale en général.
Malheureusement, cette histoire comprend aussi la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine de 1992-1995.
5. Les événements en Bosnie-Herzégovine lors de la guerre sont l’objet de ce procès. Nous
n’avons pas l’intention de nier les crimes, tout au contraire, comme je démontrerai un peu plus tard, - 11 -
sans égard aux problèmes internes et la crise, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a commencé en 2000 de se
diriger vers la confrontation avec le passé et la punition des crimes. Cependant, l’objet de ce
procès devant cette Cour n’est pas le prononcé des peines aux auteurs des crimes, ce qui est la
tâche du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et des tribunaux nationaux. Ce procès,
avec tout le respect que j’ai pour une décision judiciaire et surtout pour une décision de votre Cour,
ne pourra contribuer à la prise de conscience du passé et apportera l’approfondissement des
problèmes entre les nations surtout en Bosnie-Herzégovine.
6. Pendant la guerre en Bosn ie-Herzégovine, de graves crimes ont été commis. Le peuple
musulman bosniaque a subi de pires souffrances car il avait ses victimes dans la guerre avec les
Serbes, avec les Croates et même dans un conflit intramusulman en Bosnie occidentale. Nous
avons vu et entendu des choses atroces dans ce prétoi re lors de ce procès, mais la question qui se
pose est de savoir si les allégations du requérant sont exactes. Nous allons démontrer que le
requérant a présenté de nombreuses allégations inexactes.
7. Madame le président et Messieurs les j uges, avant de répondre à toutes ces questions, la
Cour doit déterminer si elle peut se prononcer sur cette requête. Afin d’être certaine qu’elle a la
compétence à connaître de la présente affaire, la Cour doit déterminer si le défendeur avait accès à
la Cour au moment du dépôt de la requête et si la Cour avait par rapport au défendeur, la
compétence en application de l’article IX de la c onvention sur le génocide. Nous allons démontrer
que le défendeur n’avait pas accès à la Cour et que la compétence ne peut être établie en
application de l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide. Le manque de la compétence devrait
mettre fin à ce procès, cependant nous allons dé battre sur le fond car la Cour a décidé de
déterminer la compétence ensemble avec le fond de cette affaire, ce qui nous donnera l’occasion de
démontrer que les allégations du requérant ne peuvent être acceptées.
8. Ce procès concerne l’ét ablissement de la responsabilité de l’Etat pour le génocide.
Premièrement le requérant doit dé montrer que les événements et les crimes allégués ont eu lieu et
deuxièmement que ces événements, allégués par le re quérant, peuvent être attribués au défendeur.
Nous allons démontrer que le requé rant ne peut démontrer ni l’un ni l’autre. Enfin, si la Cour
établit que les crimes étaient commis, elle devra les qualifier juridiquement. La qualification
juridique est la tâche de chaque Cour, c’est également la tâche de cette Cour qui est aussi l’organe - 12 -
judiciaire principal des Nations Unies. Les actes criminels qui étaient commis en
Bosnie-Herzégovine sont des actes graves, mais la question de leur qualification juridique est une
question juridique que cette Cour devra déterm iner. S’agissant du génocide, le Tribunal pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie a adopté une conception large de ce crime, mais malgré cette conception large, le
Tribunal n’a pas trouvé que le génocide ait été co mmis en Bosnie-Herzégovine, sauf à Srebrenica.
Le jugement du général Krstić rendu dans l’affaire Srebrenica est fondé sur une théorie particulière,
contestée par la doctrine et qui, de plus, n’est pas suivie par d’autres chambres du Tribunal.
9. Je veux souligner que nous sommes, par notre position dans ce procès, obligés de nous
défendre et donc de nier des allégations du requéra nt, mais en aucun moment nous ne voulons nier
les souffrances des victimes que nous ne pouvons et ne voulons pas oublier.
10. Madame le président, je suis certain que je n’ai nul besoin de rappeler que l’histoire des
Balkans est chargée de tragédies. Nous avons commencé à croire que nous avions dépassé cette
histoire lorsque des millions de gens à Belgrade et dans la Serbie entière ont renversé le dernier
régime communiste en Europe qui a fait beaucoup de mal à son propre peuple. Malheureusement,
ce régime a laissé derrière lui un héritage plein de lourdes dettes, y compris le présent procès.
11. Je me trouve moi-même dans une situati on paradoxale: je dois dé fendre, devant cette
Cour, le régime auquel j’étais opposé depuis le début. En effet, j’étais l’un des treize fondateurs du
premier parti d’opposition en Serbie , le parti démocrate, fondé en1989. Il s’agit d’un parti qui
avait auparavant une tradition presque centenaire terminée lorsque les communistes sont montés au
pouvoir en 1945. Nous, l’opposition en Serbie, nous avions des conflits avec le régime criminalisé,
nous avons aussi subi les attaques et les chantag es des organisations crimin elles qui permettaient
l’enrichissement des criminels aux dépens des intérêts d’un peuple appauvri.
12. En même temps, nous n’avions pas d’autres ressources sauf les donations bénévoles des
membres et des partisans de notre parti. Le ré gime faisait tout pour empêcher l’union des partis
d’opposition qui, unis, auraient pu déjà en1990 gagne r les élections et renverser le régime de
Milosevic. En effet, lors des premières élections «démocratiques» du 9 décembre 1990, le parti au
pouvoir n’a gagné, malgré tous les avantages fina nciers et la propagande dans les médias, que
42,5 % de voix. - 13 -
13. Plus tard, je donnerai une image détaillée de la lutte futile de l’opposition serbe qui avait
choisi l’opinion antimilitariste et qui était, par c onséquent, pour la solution pacifique des conflits
politiques en Yougoslavie. L’opposition lutta it contre les prémisses de base du système
communiste, contre la criminalisation de la soci été et pour une administration démocratique et
responsable. J’aimerais convaincre cette Cour que je vais sortir de ma position paradoxale par mon
obligation professionnelle de contribuer, avec mes collègues, par cette défense, à découvrir la
vérité. Je souligne que sans la vérité on ne peut s’attendre à la justice que nous attendons de cette
Cour honorable.
Le renversement du régime en Serbie le 5 octobre 2000
14. Enfin, le 5 octobre 2000, un nombre imposant de plusieurs millions de Serbes a libéré la
Serbie du pouvoir du régime de Milosevic. C’éta it en même temps un grand soulagement pour la
communauté internationale, car elle a été libérée des soucis concernant l’établissement de la paix et
de la sécurité dans les Balkans.
15. La question qui se pose maintenant est de savoir ce que l’opposition serbe a trouvé dans
les institutions de l’Etat dans lequel elle a pris le pouvoir. Le grand soutien du peuple serbe n’a pas
pu détruire immédiatement tous les éléments criminels de la société, les organisations extrémistes
et surtout elle ne pouvait rétablir immédiatement l’économie détruite de notre pays, trouver le
travail pour un million de chômeurs et trouver la solution pour un million de retraités qui en
majorité vivaient dans une misère totale. De plus, elle n’avait pas les moyens d’assurer un
logement acceptable et digne de ce nom pour des centaines de milliers de réfugiés et encore moins
faire revenir en Serbie des centaines de milliers de jeunes gens qui avaient quitté la Serbie et
émigré partout dans le monde. Tout était détru it: le système de l’éducation, le système de
l’assurance, le système juridique. La corruption ré gnait partout. Tout ce que je viens d’énumérer
montre que le nouveau Gouvernement serbe a hér ité, en2000, d’un Etat dont le système ne
fonctionnait pas. L’opposition a donc hérité d’un chaos total.
16. L’opposition démocratique en Serbie est, soutenue par le peuple, montée au pouvoir mais
elle ne disposait pas d’importants outils du pouvoir, à savoir la police et l’armée. En effet, un
grand nombre d’employés dans ces deux institutions provenaient de l’ex-régime et sabotaient les - 14 -
décisions du nouveau pouvoir. Par conséquent, le nouveau régime avait beaucoup de difficultés à
imposer la politique pouvant apporte r des solutions aux problèmes intérieurs et qui était conforme
au droit international. En tout cas, le nouveau pouvoir tendait à remplir les obligations de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro envers la communauté internationale.
17. Ainsi, le nouveau régime démocrati que a immédiatement montré sa volonté de
s’acquitter de ses obligations envers la co mmunauté internationale. Celle-ci a répondu
positivement en montrant qu’elle était prête à l’ai der dans la solution des problèmes hérités de
l’époque précédente. Le nouveau pouvoir a t out de suite commencé à arrêter les personnes
accusées par le procureur du Tribunal pénal intern ational pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) et de les
extrader au Tribunal. Ainsi, le nouveau pouvoir n’a pas hésité à arrêter et transférer au TPIY
l’ancien président de la Serbie et de la Yougoslavie, SlobodanMilosevic. D’autres hauts
fonctionnaires de la Serbie-et-Monténégro ont ét é arrêtés ou se sont rendus volontairement et ont
tous été transférés au Tribunal. Nous pouvons cité le président de la République de Serbie,
MilanMilutinovic, certains chefs de la police secrète ainsi que plusieurs ministres et chefs de
l’état-major de l’armée yougoslave.
18. La Serbie-et-Monténégro a rempli dans les deux dernières années une grande majorité de
ses obligations envers le Tribunal pénal interna tional pour l’ex-Yougoslavie qui concernaient la
libération des témoins de l’obligation du secret d’Etat et du secret-défense afin de leur permettre de
contribuer, par leurs témoignages, à l’établi ssement de la vérité sur les événements en
Bosnie-Herzégovine dans la guerre qui a eu lieu de 1992 à 1995. Jusqu’à cette date plus de trois
cent cinquantepersonnes, membres de la police et de l’armée ont été libérées de l’obligation du
secret d’Etat et du secret-défense. Par ailleurs, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a communiqué au Tribunal
plus de mille documents. La Serbie-et-Monténég ro n’a jamais eu aucun avertissement du Conseil
de sécurité en raison de non respect des obligations internationales car elle n’a jamais failli à se
conformer aux obligations qui lui ont ét é imposées par une chambre du Tribunal pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie.
19. Je veux aussi souligner que la Serbie-e t-Monténégro a pris la décision d’ouvrir ses
archives d’Etat justement pour établir la vér ité et pour permettre l’établissement de la
responsabilité individuelle des auteurs de ces actes criminels. - 15 -
Les mesures du nouveau gouvernement pour normaliser la situation en Serbie
20. Le nouveau gouvernement démocratique en Serbie est en train de s’acquitter de ses
obligations qui lui incombent sur le fondement de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité concernant la
formation du TPIY, car il a délivré au Tribuna l les individus qui occupaient des positions
principales dans l’ancien régime de la Se rbie-et-Monténégro. La coopération de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro avec le Tribunal de La Haye n’est pas uniquement basée sur l’obligation de
l’Etat envers les NationsUnis mais égalemen t sur la détermination du nouveau gouvernement de
démontrer sa volonté à établir la vérité et à j uger toutes les personnes soupçonnées des violations
graves du droit international.
21. Il ne s’agit pas d’une t âche facile et simple pour le nouveau gouvernement qui avait au
sein de son propre Etat les groupes criminels organisés, liés à certaines institutions étatiques. La
détermination à éliminer les organisations crimine lles en utilisant les instru ments juridiques et en
établissant l’état de droit en Serbie-et-Monténégro a coûté la vie au premier ministre du premier
gouvernement démocratique serbe après la chute du communisme, docteurZoranDjindjic. Le
procès contre ses meurtriers est actuellement en cours à Belgrade.
22. Le nouveau gouvernement démocratique en Serbie a constitué une Cour spéciale,
chargée de juger les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l’humanité et les organisations criminelles.
Ceux qui ont commis les crimes sur les territoires de l’ex-Yougoslavie, de la Croatie, à travers la
Bosnie-Herzégovine, jusqu’au Kosovo sont traduits devant la justice. La plupart de ses malfaiteurs
ont déjà été condamnés. Ceux qui ont fusillé les six jeunes Bosniaques en filmant l’exécution, dont
l’enregistrement vidéo, diffusé à la télévision da ns le monde entier, nous a été montré dans ce
prétoire, sont jugés par cette cour. Ce film a dénoncé les assassins qui, jusqu’à ce moment, se sont
promenés en toute liberté, mais qui dès la découverte de cet enregistrement vidéo ont été arrêtés. Il
y aura malheureusement sans doute d’autres cas se mblables à l’avenir. Rappelons qu’encore
aujourd’hui l’on découvre des criminels de la de uxième guerre mondiale qui ont réussi à se cacher
pendant plus de soixante ans.
23. Cependant, la volonté politique de la Serbie démocratique de nos jours est évidente: la
Serbie-et-Monténégro veut à tout prix libérer la société des gens qui s ont devenus dangereusement
agressifs dans la guerre (ou, t out simplement, sont nés dangereux) et qui sont, par conséquent, - 16 -
dangereux pour le développement de la vie normale en Serbie. Malheureusement, il s’agit d’une
tâche à longue durée, pour les générations actuelles mais également pour les générations futures.
24. Les années quatre-vingt-dix ont été marquées par les guerres abominables en
ex-Yougoslavie. Mes collègues et moi, nous étions contre la guerre. Donc, je ne voudrais pas
continuer la guerre des paroles. Nous sommes pers uadés que la vraie paix devrait être établie par
nous-mêmes et non par quelqu’un d’autre. Il fa udrait donc confronter des points de vue, avouer
des maux commis, chercher ensemble la vérité et les causes de ces maux et montrer la bonne
volonté des uns et des autres. Nous sommes prêts pour le dialogue de toute façon; qu’il y ait une
décision sur le fond ou non. Nous ne fuyons pas des responsabilités et nous sommes prêts à
chercher une solution par le dialogue. Je suis d’av is que c’est la seule voi e vers la paix durable,
vers de bonnes relations avec nos voisins et vers la coopération.
25. Aujourd’hui la Serbie démocratique est en train de négocier avec l’Union européenne sur
les accords de partenariat et de coopération. C’ est là que nous voyons notre voie et qui est la voie
où nous ne pouvons nous engager sans la Croatie et sans la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Tôt ou tard nous
allons nous diriger tous vers le s intégrations euro-atlantiques. Et comment prendra-t-on ce même
chemin si l’on s’accuse mutuellement de crimes di fférents qui sont en fait la négation de la
civilisation dans laquelle nous aimerions vivre ensemble ?
26. J’ai peur de l’avenir, car l’on peut bel et bien s’attendre aux problèmes dans les conflits
politiques éventuels portant sur les différends issu s du passé qu’on est en train de vouloir régler ou
qu’on voudra régler devant les c ours nationales et internationales. Il serait donc nécessaire
d’établir une communication constante entre les Etats concernés par ces différends afin de pouvoir
résoudre les problèmes dans les dialogues directs. Je suppose qu’aujourd’hui il est possible de le
faire car je ne peux imaginer que nous n’avons p as tiré les leçons de notre passé récent dans lequel
on a manqué plusieurs occasions parce qu’on refusa it les négociations directes. Ces négociations
auraient pu aboutir à un compromis grâce auquel on éviterait la transformation des conflits
politiques en conflits armés.
27. J’ai peur des phénomènes qu’on peut observer en Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie et Serbie.
Ces phénomènes sont des indicateurs clairs que des groupes extrémistes créés sur les plates-formes
nationalistes et religieuses existent encore. - 17 -
28. Je crains que la décision de n’importe quelle cour (nationale ou internationale, y compris
la Cour internationale de Justice, et sans ég ard si la Cour accepte ou rejette la demande du
requérant) ne résulte dans une augmentation de l’ extrémisme général. Je n’ose pas exprimer ici
mes craintes liées à la naissance d’une atmosphère politique dans laquelle des groupes extrémistes
arriveraient à attirer et faire bouger les masses. La présence internationa le est par conséquent
encore nécessaire en Bosnie-Herzégovine afin d’atténuer des passions et des idées nationalistes qui
pourraient être réveillées par ces organisations extr émistes (qui, malheureusement, existent encore
sur le territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie) dans le peuple.
29. En raison de mes craintes concernant l’avenir des relations de nos peuples, j’ai déjà lancé
plusieurs fois des propositions visant une solu tion diplomatique de nos conflits. C’est
indubitablement la seule voie qui peut aboutir a ux positions acceptables pour les deux côtés. De
plus, cette voie diplomatique minimiserait le da nger de l’extrémisme. Certes, il est impossible
d’exclure complètement l’apparition de la haine, mais elle serait plutôt orientée vers son propre
gouvernement, ce qui est sans doute moins grave que l’extrémisme xénophobe dirigé vers d’autres
groupes nationaux ou religieux.
30. Je ne veux pas pourtant dire que j’ai peur de perdre ce procès. Peut-être s’agit-il de ma
déformation professionnelle: je suis professeur de droit international et j’ai un respect profond
vis-à-vis de la Charte des NationsUnies et par c onséquent, vis-à-vis de la Cour internationale de
Justice dont le Statut est une partie constitutive de la Charte. Pour cette raison je n’ai aucune peur
de la décision de cette Cour, tout au contraire j’ai beaucoup de confiance en son sens de justice.
31. Je dois rappeler que depuis la fin de la gue rre en Bosnie-Herzégovine et en Croatie plus
de dix ans se sont écoulés. Il est important de s ouligner ce fait car l’on dit souvent que trop peu de
temps s’est écoulé depuis la fin de la guerre pour qu’une réconciliation puisse avoir lieu. Je dois
souligner que peu de temps après la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale, la Yougoslavie était pleine
de touristes allemands, des compétitions sportives avec des Allemands étaient organisées et les
relations économiques avec l’Allemagne étaient très développées. Bien que je ne connaisse pas de
rapports officiels de la police yougoslave de l’ époque, je sais que des incidents particuliers
impliquant les touristes allemands n’ont pas eu lieu, aucune voiture ou autobus allemand n’a été
démoli et, bien évidemment, il n’y avait pas de bagarre. - 18 -
32. En conséquence je considère que, dans notre cas actuel, il serait temps de commencer les
négociations et le dialogue menant vers la réconciliation des peuples qui, en même temps,
éliminerait toute possibilité d’un nouveau conflit dans la région.
Le processus de réconciliation
33. La réconciliation ne signifie pas l’oubli. Tout au contraire ! Il ne faut pas oublier le mal
qui a été commis. Cependant la réconciliation ne signifie pas le droit à la vengeance. La
vengeance est la justice barbare, malheureusement celle-ci est toujours présente dans les relations
humaines, individuelles ou collectives. Mais j’aime rais encore une fois répéter que la justice est
lente mais atteignable. Tout malfaiteur doit êt re jugé et cette image doit s’engraver dans la
mémoire des futures générations.
34. Le processus de réconciliation qui a été in itié en Serbie, Croatie et Bosnie-Herzégovine
devrait montrer que la justice doit être rendue premièrement par la condamnation des individus
coupables des crimes. La justification de ces i ndividus, si souvent entendue, selon laquelle «leur
seul but était la protection de leur peuple» ne peut excuser les actes commis. Les auteurs
individuels des crimes doivent donc être jugés et punis pour les crimes commis et afin d’atteindre
cet objectif, chaque groupe ethno-national devrai t décider de traduire devant les instances
judiciaires tous ceux qui ont commis des crimes pour «défendre leur peuple».
35. Je suis d’avis que nous, les ex-Yougosla ves, devons et pouvons réaliser ce qui a été
réalisé en Europe après la deuxième guerre mondial e. Je pense que le moment est arrivé où nous
pouvons le faire à condition que nous fassions des efforts. Malheureusement, jusqu’à présent nous
n’avons pas fait suffisamment d’efforts. Ma proposition reste la même, que la Cour internationale
de Justice rende la décision sur le fond ou qu’elle ne la rende pas, nous devrions commencer, après
le prononcé de la décision de la Cour ou même avant, un dialogue sur la réconciliation nationale.
36. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je voudrais rappeler ce que l’agent adjoint du
requérant a déclaré dans son discours le 27février2006. M evan den Biesen a déclaré que «the
1
Respondent never advanced any «[s]ubstantive or serious initiative for any «amicable solution» » .
Cette déclaration tout simplement ne correspond pas à la vérité. Le défendeur a pris l’initiative afin
1
CR 2006/2, p. 26, par. 29. - 19 -
de trouver un règlement amiable, mais la réponse qu’il a obtenue du requérant était un rejet sans
appel.
37. Un certain nombre de nos initiatives a été même porté à l’attention de la Cour. Par
exemple, dans notre lettre dans laquelle nous avons informé la C our du retrait de notre demande
reconventionnelle, nous avons avan cé deux raisons principalesde ce retrait: premièrement nous
avons souligné que : «[n]ew facts have put the issu e of jurisdiction into a different perspective and
introduced conclusive evidence that this Court did not have and does not have jurisdiction over the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ratione personae». Deuxièmement, nous avons indiqué que
«The withdrawal of the counterclaim is supported by the fact that the new
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia strongly believes that the period of
conflicts and disputes must be left behind, and that the two countries have to move
toward an era of cooperation and amicable resolution of pending disputes.» 2
38. Nous pouvons citer d’autres tentatives du règlement à l’amiable que nous avons portées à
la connaissance de la Cour. Ainsi dans sa lettre à la Cour en date du 22 octobre 2003 et en réponse
à la lettre du requérant, notre agent a écrit «[w]e w ould like to reiterate one more time that Serbia
and Montenegro is ready at any time ⎯either directly, or with the assistance of neutral
3
mediators ⎯ to start negotiations on a peaceful settlement of all outstanding disputes» .
39. Le 24 novembre 2003, encore en réponse à une lettre du requérant, le défendeur a soumis
à la Cour la lettre dans laquelle il a écrit «We w ould also like to reiterate that Serbia and
Montenegro has been taking steps towards reconciliation.» 4
40. Nous avons pris l’initiative à plusieur s reprises car nous sommes persuadés que les
négociations sont le meilleur chem in vers la réconciliation. De puis le début de mon engagement
dans ce procès j’ai continué les efforts de mes prédécesseurs afin de persuader la
Bosnie-Herzégovine qu’un règlement diplomatique serait le meilleur chemin vers la réconciliation
qu’un procès judiciaire. J’ai considéré et je c onsidère toujours que les négociations diplomatiques
peuvent nous mener vers une solution acceptable pour le s deux Parties. De l’autre côté la décision
judiciaire, sans égard à son verdict, pourrait provoquer l’insatisfaction de l’une ou de deux Parties.
2
Lettre de l’agent de la Yougoslavie au greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice du 20 avril 2001.
3Lettre de l’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro au greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice du 22 octobre 2003.
4Lettre de l’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro au greffier de la Cour internationale de Justice du
24 novembre 2003. - 20 -
41. Nous n’avons jamais posé les conditions du dialogue. Nous avons uniquement cherché
l’occasion de présenter notre point de vue à l’au tre côté. Nous n’avons jamais obtenu cette
occasion.
42. Comme je l’ai dit, Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, le requérant ignorait ou
rejetait nos initiatives. Permettez-moi de présen ter juste quelques exemples des rejets que nous
avons rencontrés.
43. En 2003, M. Softic, l’agent du requérant , a déclaré que la Bosnie-Herzégovine n’a aucun
intérêt de trouver un accord avant le prononcé de l’ arrêt de la Cour dans ce procès. Ensuite,
en2004, M.SulejmanTihic, à l’époque le repr ésentant des Musulmans en présidence de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine, a déclaré que «la présente re quête est une question où aucune transaction ne
pourrait être envisagée et que la Serbie-et-Monténég ro ne peut que reconnaître qu’elle a participé
dans l’agression et dans le génocide en Bosn ie-Herzégovine. Ce serait la seule transaction
acceptable.» 5
44. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je pense qu’il était approprié et équitable que
la Serbie-et-Monténégro fasse le premier pas vers la réconciliation et vers le règlement à l’amiable.
Nous l’avons fait, nous avons retiré notre demande reconventionnelle et nous avons renouvelé nos
demandes d’un règlement à l’amiable. Je souhaite réitérer encore une fois notre volonté de régler à
l’amiable le litige qui nous oppose à la Bosnie-Herzégovine.
45. Madame le président et Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi de souligner plusieurs choses
qui ont l’air optimiste. Premièrement, c’est le re tour des réfugiés dans leurs villages et villes en
Bosnie-Herzégovine. D’après les informations de UNHCR de 1996 et jusqu’en septembre 2005 le
nombre total de personnes qui sont retournées dans les endroits où ils vivaient avant le
commencement de la guerre s’élève à 453464 dont 209 672 Musulmans bosniaques,
86581Croates, 153160 Serbes et 4051 autres (UNHCR; Municipal authorities; OHRBrcko
district; DP Associations and NGO). Cela réveille un certain optimisme car conformément à
l’article 1 de l’accord de Dayton (Dayton Peace Agreement, Ann. 7, Art. 1) «Le retour prochain des
5
Le journal Danas, 29 juillet 2004, p. 8, reprise de la déclaration du journal de Sarajevo Dnevni avaz. - 21 -
réfugiés et de personnes déplacées est un but tr ès important de la solution des conflits en
Bosnie-Herzégovine.»
46. En Serbie il y a encore plusieurs centai nes de milliers de réfugiés provenant du Kosovo,
de Croatie, mais également de Bosnie-Herzégovine. Encore actuellement environ 150 000 réfugiés
de Bosnie-Herzégovine se trouvent en Serbie. Vous avez cela dans le dossier des juges.
47. Dans son discours d’inauguration, le nouv eau président de la Serbie, BorisTadic, a
exprimé plusieurs notes optimistes que j’utiliserai pour finir cette déclaration préliminaire qui
elle-même pourrait être vue comme assez pessimiste.
«Nous saluons et soutenons l’avance ment de tous nos voisins vers les
intégrations européennes et euro-atlantiques car c’est une garantie de l’avenir stable et
paisible de toute notre région. Pour cette raison il faut développer des relations solides
avec nos voisins, des relations fondées sur le respect mutuel. C’est le point crucial
dans la politique extérieure de la Serbie-et-Monténégro.
La coopération avec le Tribunal internati onal de LaHaye est une priorité de
notre politique intérieure et extérieure car elle est une avant-condition de toutes les
intégrations européennes et euro-atlantiques et car elle confirme notre attachement aux
valeurs européennes.
L’histoire des actes criminels dans les Balkans est longue et dans ce sens tous
les peuples de cette partie de l’Europe du sud-est doivent les uns aux autres les
excuses historiques. La confrontation av ec les actes criminels commis par soi-même
est toutefois la condition de la vie commune avec les voisins ainsi que de
l’établissement des valeurs européennes dans notre partie de l’Europe.»
48. La Serbie-et-Monténégro considère que jusqu’au commencement du débat sur les
mérites elle a le droit de s’attendre à ce que la Cour examine la question de sa propre compétence
dans ce procès.
49. A ce propos et tout d’abord, M.Saša Obradovi ć, coagent exposera les inexactitudes
factuelles dans les écritures du requérant et dans les différents rapports auxquels le requérant se
réfère.
Nous présenterons ensuite nos arguments relatifs à la compétence, au génocide et à
l’imputabilité des événements en Bosnie-Herzégovine à la Serbie-et-Monténégro.
Je vous prie, Madame le président, de donner la parole au coagent M.Sasa Obradovic.
Merci. - 22 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Stojanovi ć. I now call the Co-Agent of Serbia and
Montenegro, Mr. Obradović.
OMBr. ADOVI Ć:
S OURCES OF EVIDENCE
Introduction
1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, I am honoured to appear for the
first time before the International Court of Justice as a representative of my country ⎯ Serbia and
Montenegro. Following the introductory speech of our Agent, and before turning to matters of
procedure, I would like to submit to your attention some observations regarding the allegations and
the evidence submitted by the Applicant. This seems particularly appropriate in the light of the
grave assertions advanced by the applicant State.
2. First of all, I will try to establish some clear examples of false and inaccurate allegations
contained in the Applicant’s written submissions.
3. Noting that such allegations are based on certain documents, quoted mainly accurately by
the applicant State, it is my further task to dem onstrate that those documents cannot be considered
as credible evidence in any judicial procedure.
4. Furthermore, I challenge some sources of evidence proposed by the Applicant for the first
time in the oral proceedings.
5. The general purpose of this presentation is to demonstrate that the vast amount of
documentation submitted by the Applicant does not fulf il the required standard of proof, set out in
the Judgment of this honourable Court in the Corfu Channel case, as follows: “The proof may be
drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt.”
Some examples of incorrect allegations of the applicant State
A. The attack on Zvornik
6. Madam President, allow me to start with th e first example. In the Reply, the applicant
State quoted information from the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts (the
6
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18. - 23 -
Bassiouni Commission) that in the town of Zvornik “2,500 men were killed on 9 and
10 April [1992]” . 7
7. To begin with, let us see what was r eally stated in the Report of the Bassiouni
Commission. The document reads: “According to one report, 2,500 men were killed on 9 and
8
10 April.” The report that was referred to in the Fi nal Report of the Bassiouni Commission is the
declassified document of the United States Department of State, No. 94-60. However, this United
States document that is supposed to be the key ev idence on the crimes committed in Zvornik in the
time described by Ms Dauban as the beginning of ethnic cleansing cannot be found in annexes to
the United Nations Commission of Experts’ Final Report.
8. Since the key document was missing, we deci ded to investigate the matter further, and the
Office of the Prosecutor of the International Cr iminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia kindly
assisted the Government of Serbia and Monten egro by providing the requested declassified
document of the United States Department of State, which in the meantime had been transferred to
the Prosecutor’s database, together with other materials of the Bassiouni Commission. As a result,
the research could be continued and the Court can see today that the “key document” is actually a
record of an anonymous Bosnian refugee’s witness account. That was clearly stated in the warning
given in paragraph 4 of the United States declassified document, as follows:
“This report on the debriefing of a Bosn ian refugee is being provided because it
meets current criteria for firsthand information on the situation in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The allegations of atrocities have not yet been confirmed by
separate accounts. Please note that this information is raw data that has not been
subjected to an editorial or analytical review process, and it should be carefully
9
assessed for accuracy and validity prior to further use.”
9. The Applicant has failed to provide any information on the circumstances under which the
statement of that anonymous refugee was given, or any further information in this regard.
10. Madam President, for the last 12 years the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor has been
making significant efforts to investigate crimes committed in the town of Zvornik. It is certain that
numerous witnesses must have been examined, and th at the best investigation equipment has been
7
Reply, Chap. V, p. 100, para. 64 and p. 256, para. 433.
8Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. X, para. 387. (This document can be found in
the Peace Palace Library.)
9United States Department of State, declassified document No. 94-60, para. 4 (folder with new public documents,
Vol. III, doc. No. 1); emphasis added. - 24 -
used on the site. Nevertheless, in the Amended Indictment against Mr. Slobodan Milosevic dated
21April2004, it was alleged that “[i]n Zvornik town, (on 9 April 1992), 15 Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat males were executed by Arkan’s soldiers” 10. The same allegation appeared in the
Consolidated Indictment against MsBiljana Pl avsic dated 7 March 2002, to which she pleaded
guilty. No ICTY judgment with findings about events in Zvornik has so far been rendered.
11. The Respondent thus considers that it is obvious that the allegation of 2,500 men killed
in Zvornik on 9 and 10 April 1992 is a clear example of an enormous exaggeration.
B. The alleged massacre at the Zvornik hospital
12. This example does not stand alone. The A pplicant has very often alleged crimes that
have never happened. If we keep our attention to the evidence related to th e town of Zvornik, we
will also find an allegation that a horrible mass acre took place at the local hospital in the second
half of May 1992. The Applicant claims that Se rb soldiers shot 36 Muslim adult patients on the
hospital grounds and broke necks and bones of 27 Mu slim children. This allegation is repeated
three times in the Applicant’s written submissions:
⎯ firstly, it appears in the Memorial 11, based on the information from the Third United States
Submission to the United Nations 12;
13
⎯ secondly, it is repeated in the Reply , Chapter V, based on the information given in the letter
of the Permanent Representative of Austri a to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General 14;
15
⎯ thirdly, it is for the second time repeated in the Reply , Chapter VIII, based on the information
contained in the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts 1.
10
ICTY, case IT-02-54-T, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Amended Indictment (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
dated 21 April 2004, Schedule A, para. 16. (This document is available at www.un.org/icty.)
11
Memorial, p. 32, para. 2.2.2.10.
12Third United States Submission to the United Na tions, No. S/24791, dated 5 November 1992 (Annex32 to
Part 2 of the Memorial).
13Reply, Chapter 5, p. 123, para. 142.
14Letter of the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
S/25613, dated 13 April 1993, pp. 9 and 10 (folder with new public documents, Vol. III, doc. No. 2).
15Reply, Chapter 8, p. 640, para. 295.
16
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. IV, para. 369 (Peace Palace Library). - 25 -
13. Having read the three sources carefully, one might assume that all of them have been
based on the account of only one witness. Is it the same person? Although the answer to this
question should have been given by the Applicant, which presented the allegation to the Court, the
following facts point to such a possibility.
14. Chronologically, the first of the three s ources used by the Applicant is the Third United
States submission, published on 5 November 1992. According to this document, the statement
relating to this crime was taken from “a former employee of the Zvornik medical center . . .”.
15. The second source is the Austrian Submis sion, published on 13 April 1993. According
to this Submission, the statement relating to th e massacre was given again by a refugee who was a
former employee of the Zvornik medical centre: “witness was working as an X-ray assistant”. In
addition, it is stated that the witness, before giving the statement to an Austrian official, also gave a
statement to a United States diplomat. Although th is witness alleged that he was standing about
50metres from the place of execution, he coul d not give precise information on the number of
victims.
16. The third source, the United Nations Fina l Report, is actually based on another report,
submitted by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute from ⎯ and it is very indicative ⎯ Austria, the
report that was sent to the United Nations Commission of Experts on 6 April 1994.
17. In spite of these reports, the alleged mas sacre in the Zvornik hospital has never appeared
among the crimes described in the ICTY indictments. It was mentioned only once by the protected
witness B 1780 at the trial of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic , but the witness said that he had not been an
eyewitness to the massacre, although he had been a patient at the same hospital. The person who
told him about the alleged killings of three ch ildren was “Ramo, the X-ray technician who had
worked in the Zvornik hospital” 17.
18. The respondent State considers that the three reports mentioned by the applicant State
cannot be used as evidence before the Court, because it remains unknown even who was the
witness who gave the original information on the alleged crime to the different international bodies.
1ICTY, case IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, transcripts, 29October 2003, p.28255 (folder with
new public documents, Vol. III, doc. No. 17). - 26 -
We may only assume that his nickname was Ramo. Therefore, the credibility of this testimony
cannot be examined before this Court.
19. On the other hand, Serbia and Montenegro has submitted to the Court several documents
(Annexes41-47 of the Counter-Memorial), as strong confirmatory evidence that such a crime has
never been committed.
20. For the purpose of this oral procedure, I would only like to remind you of the statement
18
of the protected witness KG, which can be found in Annex45 of the Counter-Memorial . This
statement was given on 27December 1994 to the investigating judge of the Zvornik court,
Mr.Vaso Eric, in accordance with the rules of th e criminal procedure of the former Yugoslavia.
The witness was a doctor who worked at the Paediatric Department of the Zvornik Medical Centre.
She said that the Paediatric Department had 12 Musl im children who could not be returned to their
parents because of the outbreak of fighting. All t hose children were treated in a professional way.
After a few months, the children were sent back to their parents thanks to the efforts of the
International Red Cross. At the time of her testimony, four children from the Zvornik Social
Centre, who had previously also been in the hosp ital, were in the Rehabilitation Centre in Igalo,
Republic of Montenegro. Their stay in Igalo was sponsored by the Norwegian Embassy. No
Muslim child died in the hospital. No one maltreated children at the paediatric ward.
C. The killings at the Prijedor detention facilities
21. The examples of the false and inaccura te allegations in the Applicant’s written
submissions are numerous. In the Reply the applic ant State presented an incredible estimation that
19
“fifty to sixty people died in Trnopolje every day” . Trnopolje was a detention facility in the
Prijedor municipality. The estimation was based on th e Despatch of the Bureau of Public Affairs
20
of the United States Department of State, dated 12 April 1993 . From Annex46 to Part2 of the
Memorial, the Court can see that the original sour ce for this allegation was again a statement of an
18
Annex 45 to the Counter-Memorial, Vol. II, p. 431.
1Reply, Chapter V, p. 210, para. 330.
2Despatch of the Bureau of Public Affairs of the United States Department of State, dated 12 April 1993, No. 15,
p. 245 (Annex 46 to Part 2 of the Memorial). - 27 -
anonymous witness. If this estimation was true, and bearing in mind that Trnopolje existed for
about four months, the number of victims according to this source would have to be at least 6,000.
22. However, the judgment rendered in the ICTY Stakic case found that 28 people altogether
had been killed in Trnopolje . 21
23. The numbers of victims in the other two detention facilities in the Prijedor
municipality ⎯ Keraterm and Omarska ⎯ were magnified too. The Applicant’s Reply contains an
allegation that “the number of prisoners killed at Keraterm was at least ten per day during the
22
approximately three months that the camp was operated” . The claim relies on the Final Report of
the Bassiouni Commission of Experts 23. At the same time, the Reply contains an allegation that
“the estimates of prisoners killed at Omarska vary between at least 1,000 and 5,000” 24. The source
25
is again the United Nations Final Report , as well as a book by Mr.Roy Gutman A Witness to
Genocide.
24. No ICTY judgment has found any evidence that could confirm the estimations alleged by
the applicant State. Six judgments have so far d ealt with horrible events in Omarska and Keraterm
and unfortunately, the two detention facilities de finitely were the places where atrocities were
committed 26. However, in the light of the facts esta blished in these six judgments, the killings in
the Prijedor were committed sporadically and against individuals who were not a significant part of
27
the group . The killings were neither committed on such a large scale nor so systematically as the
applicant State wants to portray by quoting the Bassiouni Commission’s Final Report and other
documents made in a similar way.
21ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgement, 31 July 2003, paras. 226-227
(www.un.org/icty).
22Reply, Chapter V, p. 219, , para. 353.
23Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VIII, para. 1932 (Peace Palace Library).
24Reply, Chapter V, p. 226, para. 369.
25
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Annex VIII, para. 1795 (Peace Palace Library).
26
Tadic Judgement of 7 May 1997, Sikirica et al. of 3 September 2001, Kvocka et al. of 2 November 2001, Stakic
Judgement of 31 July 2003, Banovic Judgement of 28 October 2003 and Brdjanin Judgement of 1 September 2004.
27
For example, see ICTY, Sikirica et al . case, Judgement on Defence Motio n to Acquit, 3 September 2001,
para. 95. - 28 -
The credibility of the Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
25. Madam President, let me briefly explai n now why the Respondent considers that the
Final Report of the United Nations Bassiouni Commission of Experts of 28 December 1994 cannot
be treated as a reliable source of evidence in any judicial procedure.
26. The United Nations Commission of Experts was appointed on 26 October 1992 pursuant
to Security Council resolution 780 of 6Oct ober 1992. The Commission commenced its activities
in November 1992 and concluded them in Apr il 1994. In May 1994, the database and all
information gathered by the Commission were forw arded to the Office of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Tribunal.
27. The probative value of the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission depends on the
probative value of the original sources that were in corporated in the report. The Applicant often
tried to present certain facts as being establishe d by the United Nations Final Report. This report
actually, in most instances, contains the information coming from external sources.
28. Although the Commission’s findings award equal weight to all information, regardless of
its sources, it is obvious that the original sources did not employ the methodology of investigation
that would guarantee the accuracy of their allegations.
29. For that reason, the Commission of Experts itself noted, in paragraph6 of the
Introduction to Annexes of the Final Report, that “[w]ith some exceptions, the information and
allegations contained therein have not been verified”.
30. Also, in paragraph 11 of the same document, the Commission concluded:
“It was not the Commission’s intention or part of its responsibility to prepare
cases for criminal prosecution or to pronou nce upon the guilt of individual persons.
These are tasks for prosecutors and judges, who will form their own views after
thorough investigation and deliberation, in accordance with the ‘rule of law’.”
31. The Prosecutor of the International Crim inal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, who
keeps all materials of the Bassiouni Commission, has never used any part of the Final Report as
evidence before the ICTY Chambers . Actually, the Final Report was never meant to be used as
evidence at all, in any proceedings. It was rather an initial attempt to collect materials so as to
convince the Security Council to take a more r obust action in connection with the events in the
former Yugoslavia. - 29 -
32. In the Judgment of 19 December 2005, in the case concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo, the Court, faced with a vast amount of evidentiary materials, found that
“The Court has not only the task of deciding which of those materials must be
considered relevant, but also the duty to determine which of them have probative
28
value with regard to the alleged facts.”
33. Thus, when the Court decided to accept th e Report of the Porter Commission, which had
obtained evidence in credible manner “by examinati on of persons directly involved, and who were
subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in assessing large
amounts of factual information”, the Court noted that the Report, since its publication, had not been
challenged to its credibility, which had been accepted by both Parties . 29
34. The Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission of Experts does not have that quality. It
cannot be more credible or reliable than the or iginal reports upon which it was based. Those
reports, however, were often ⎯ on the Commission’s own account ⎯ unverified, unverifiable,
unreliable, inaccurate and/or incomplete. The following statement by the Commission itself, taken
from Annex I.A to the Final Report should suffice to illustrate these claims:
“Since the submitting sources did not always provide sufficient information to
support their allegations, the incidents re ported and entered into the database
frequently lacked necessary information. Difficulties in data entry and analysis
occurred because of the following common problems of the reports received:
(1) sources upon which reports were based we re usually not verifiable because many
reports did not disclose original sources;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(4) reports of the same incident sometimes varied significantly in important details;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(6) numbers of victims or other variables were often reported within large ranges;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(7) names of victims, witnesses and perpetrators were often intentionally omitted from
the reports . . .”0
28Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of th e Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, para. 58.
29Ibid., para. 61.
30Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, S/1994/674, Annex I.A, para. 21(Peace Palace
Library). - 30 -
35. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, the Respondent considers that, in
spite of enormous efforts of the members of the United Nations Commission of Experts and their
staff, the Final Report cannot be treated as a relia ble source of evidence before the Court. Each
piece of information contained in the Final Report must be evaluated with a view to its source, on a
case-by-case basis. At any rate, such presentation should be the task of the applicant State.
The credibility of the States’ submissions to the United Nations
36. The same principle should apply to all St ates’ submissions, regardless of whether they
served as sources for the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission, or were directly cited in the
written submissions of the applicant State. In the case of the United States and Austrian
submissions that concern the alleged killings committed in Zvornik, I believe that their unreliability
has already been clearly demonstrated.
37. The next example can be found in the Memorial. Invoking the Report to the United
Nations submitted by the Permanent Representative of Canada on 10 March 1993, the Applicant
alleged that “[a]t the beginning of April 1992, mo re than 1,000 Muslim civilians were killed by
31
Serb paramilitary forces in Bijeljina” . According to the cited Repor t, this information was based
on “a credible Canadian source” 3.
38. There has not been any confirmation of this allegation for the last 13 years. The ICTY
Prosecutor charges Mr.Slobodan Milosevic with “[ t]he killing of at least 48 Bosnian Muslim
and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children in the town of Bijeljina on 1-2 April 1992” 33. The
two other accused before the ICTY, Mr.Radovan Ka radzic and Mr.Momcilo Krajisnik, face the
same charges. Thus, it follows that the number of killings that the ICTY Prosecutor found to have
occurred in Bijeljina is 20 times less than stated in the Applicant’s source ⎯ the Canadian Report.
31Memorial, p. 30, para. 2.2.2.2.
32Report to the United Nations submitted by the Perm anent Representative of Canada on 10 March 1993,
No. S/25392, p. 14 (Annex 25 to Part 2 of the Memorial).
33ICTY, case IT-02-54-T, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Amended Indictment (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
dated 21 April 2004, Schedule A, para. 1 (www.un.org/icty). - 31 -
What can be inferred from the ICTY indictments?
39. Madam President, I would now turn to the probative value of the ICTY indictments. It
should be noted that each indictment is a docum ent based on evidence that we cannot see. The
ICTY indictments are not the evidence as such, and nothing can be confirmed by them. Therefore,
the Respondent cannot accept the Applicant’s position, often expressed in the Reply, and repeated
here by Ms Karagiannakis, that allegations can be confirmed by the ICTY indictments 3.
40. However, the Respondent considers th at the ICTY indictments can be used as
argumentum a contrario in a case when the Applicant’s allegations are not contained in them. The
ICTY Prosecutor’s Office has a duty to prosecute and to try to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
serious violations of international humanitari an law committed in the former Yugoslavia since
1991. The alleged killing of more than 1,000 civilia ns in Bijeljina, if it had really occurred, should
surely be defined as a crime against humanity and should be a matter for an indictment.
41. Still, for more than ten years, the investigation teams of the ICTY Prosecutor have had at
their disposal all documents and sources of information on which Bosnia and Herzegovina based its
written submissions in this case. They have had the possibility to conduct investigations, interview
victims and witnesses, review documents from St ate archives. The co-operation between the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovi na and the Prosecutor of the ICTY has never been questioned
and a failure of the Federation authorities to provi de all relevant information on the alleged crimes,
committed by the Serb forces, to the investigators of the Tribunal is beyond imagination. And still,
no single ICTY indictment mentions the alleged killing of 1,000 men in Bijeljina.
The reports of Mr. Tadeus Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights
A. The attack on Kozarac
42. Madam President, there is no evidence that more than 1,000 civilians were killed in
Bijeljina, just as there is no evidence for anot her unsupported allegation that 5,000 people were
executed in the town of Kozarac, in Prijedor municipality.
43. In this context, the Applicant alleged:
34
See Reply, Chapter V, p. 138, para. 180; CR 2006/3, pp. 39-40, paras. 8-13 (Ms Karagiannakis). - 32 -
“On or around 25 May 1992, Serbian artille ry began to shell the town of
Kozarac, followed by an attack by tanks and infantry. The town was virtually
destroyed and of the population of 15,000, around 5,000 are estimated to have been
35
executed by the Serb forces.”
44. This allegation was based on the report of Mr. Tadeus Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur
36
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, dated 17 November 1992 .
45. However, the ICTY judgment in Brdjanin case, dated 1 September 2004, did not confirm
this allegation. It was stated in paragraph 403 of the judgment that “[t]he Trial Chamber is satisfied
that at least 80 Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed when Bosnian Serb soldiers and police
37
entered the villages of the Kozarac area” .
46. The Applicant’s counsel, Professor Franck, considers that the facts established by the
38
ICTY should assist the Court in or der to reach its own conclusions . Let us then see how the
nature of the attack of the Serbian forces on th e Kozarac area has been established in the ICTY
judgment in the Stakic case.
To start with, the conflict in the Kozarac area commenced after the Muslim personnel at the
checkpoint near the village Hambarine had opened fi re on a car with six soldiers, four Serbs and
two Croats, killing two and wounding four of them.
Second , it was followed by an attack of extr emists among Muslim population on a military
column of the Republic of Srpska army at the village of Jakupovići near Kozarac.
Third , at that time 1,200-1,500 armed members of the Muslim unit called the “Green Berets”
were present in the Kozarac area.
Fourth , the units of the army of the Republic of Srpska asked for the handover of weapons in
order to secure the area before making a search for perpetrators, but Muslim units refused to
comply.
Fifth , there was severe fighting in Kozarac, which took place on 25 and 26 May, and
naturally, it should be concluded that a certain number of the victims were Muslim combatants.
35
Memorial, p. 32, para. 2.2.2.11.
36Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
Mr. Tadeus Mazowiecki, dated 17 November 1992, No. S/24809, p. 8, para. 17d (Annex 33 of Part 2 to the Memorial).
37ICTY, case IT-99-36, Prosecutor v. Radislav Brdjanin , Judgement, 1 September 2004, para. 403
(www.un.org/icty).
38CR 2006/5, p. 19, para. 34 (Prof. Franck). - 33 -
Sixth , the summary report from the 1stKrajina Co rps of the Republic of Srpska army of
27 May 1992, quoted in paragraph 147 of the Stakic judgment, indicated that five Serbian soldiers
39
had been killed and 20 wounded during the operation .
47. There is no doubt that the army of the Republic of Srpska abused its right to self-defence.
The Stakic judgment finds that disproportionality and th e use of armed force against the civilian
population rendered this attack illegal. Such a findi ng about the events in Kozarac is still far from
the initial thesis of the Applicant, that the Serbianforces intended to destroy, in whole or in part,
the group of Muslims, as such.
Madam President, I think that it is a good time now for a short break, if you agree?
The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. The Court will rise for ten minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.35 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Mr. Obradović.
OMBr. ADOVI Ć:
B. Hambarine
48. Madam President, referring to the same Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights, the Applicant claims that probably as many as a
40
1,000 people died in the attack of Serbian forces on the village of Hambarine in May 1992 .
49. That assertion is once again incorrect. The Stakic indictment before the International
Criminal Tribunal mentioned “a number of pe ople killed in Hambarine from May through
July 1992” 41. The known names of the victims have been listed in the Annex to the indictment, and
we can see today that there are altogether 11 names. The Prosecutor added that “[t]he victims
included other persons whose identities at this time are either not known to or cannot be confirmed
39
ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v . Milomir Stakic , Judgement, 31 July 2003, pp. 40-46, paras. 139-158
(www.un.org/icty).
4Reply, Chapter V, p. 85, para. 22.
4ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Fourth Amended Indictment dated 10 April 2002, Annex,
para. 44/3 (www.un.org/icty). - 34 -
42
by the Prosecution” . The Fourth Amended Indictment was dated 10 April 2002, almost ten years
after the attack on Hambarine had taken place.
50. If, after a long-term investigation of the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office, including all
available documentation as well as numerous witnesses and expert-reports, merely 11 names of the
victims are known, the respondent State considers that it is impossible that a total number of
victims in Hambarine was “as many as 1,000”.
51. All this, however, shows that the reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Mr.Tadeusz Mazowiecki, were based on the same sources of
information as the Final Report of the Bassiouni Co mmission, and for that reason, they cannot be
treated as a reliable source of evidence.
52. In this regard, the Respondent fully ag rees with the observation of the ICTY Trial
Chamber in the Stakic case, given in the judgment of 31 July 2003, that:
“most witnesses sought to tell the Chamber what they believed to be the truth.
However, the personal involvement in traged ies like the one in the former Yugoslavia
often consciously or unconsciously shapes a testimony.” 43
53. It is well known that testimonies before th e Trial Chambers are still more incontestable
than those before the investigators, the same as the testimonies before the investigators who
possess all necessary experience and equipment for criminal cases are more reliable than those
given to observers, such as the distinguished United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights.
The incorrect references to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
54. As stated in the Reply, the Applicant alle gedly has “the consistent approach to this case”
that the evidence presented as a rule “originates from independent sources” 44.
55. However, the Applicant several times refe rs to the Report of the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, dated 27April1993, in orde r to show examples of ethnic cleansing 4. The
Applicant is creating an impression that specific allegations are to be found in the United Nations
42Ibid.
43
ICTY, case IT-97-24, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 15 (www.un.org/icty).
44Reply, Chapter VIII, p. 466, para. 5; also, CR 2006/02, p. 27, para. 37 (Mr. van den Biesen).
45Memorial, p. 30, para. 2.2.2.2; see also p. 46, para. 2.2.5.2; also p. 49, para. 2.2.5.10. - 35 -
Human Rights Committee Report, although Annex 26 to Part 2 of the Memorial clearly shows that
these allegations are contained in a docum ent written by the applicant State and submitted to the
Human Rights Committee, which has never confirmed those allegations.
56. The Respondent will try to avoid any deba te on the credibility of the Applicant’s own
sources made during wartime, but this example clearly demonstrates that great caution is necessary
in examining each piece of information presented by the Applicant in this case.
The credibility of the NGOs’ reports
57. Madam President, I have so far demonstrated that various United Nations bodies, tasked
with gathering information on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, even though acting with the
best of intentions, did not employ adequate inv estigative methods and consequently their results
cannot be considered as reliable. Likewise, if the United Nations bodies lacked the necessary
capacities for a proper investigation in wartime, th is even more applies to many non-governmental
organizations and their various reports and letters. Let me present one clear example.
58. In the Reply, the Applicant alleged that “[c]hildren ranging from babies to five year olds,
were thrown into ovens by the guards... [T] hose mothers who resisted giving up their children
were killed on the spot.” 46
59. The Applicant did not even say where and when that alleged monstrous crime had been
committed. Once again the applicant State quoted the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission
”47
of Experts. That allegation is situated in Annex VIII of the Final Report, entitled “Prison Camps ,
where the alleged conditions in the camp called Ci glane are described. Having read that paragraph
and the corresponding note No. 3329, we can find the or iginal source of that allegation. It was an
anonymous witness statement included in the report from the ad hoc non-governmental
organization called Women’s Group Tresnjevka, dated 28 September 1992.
60. Even today the name of that witness is unknown. Such a testimony has never appeared
in any of the cases before the ICTY. Consequent ly, the Respondent considers that this allegation
remains unproven.
46
Reply, Chapter V, pp. 132-133, para. 164.
4Final Report of the United Nations Commission of E xperts, Ann.VIII, p. 260, para. 2190 (Peace Palace
Library). - 36 -
61. The shortcomings of testimonies given to non-governmental organizations in wartime
were clearly shown in the ICTY Milosevic case. Namely, on 11 September 2003, a witness,
Mr.Isak Gasi, spoke about his statement given to the Danish Helsinki Committee in Copenhagen
on 7 May 1993, in relation to the notorious crimes committed in Brcko. His testimony before the
ICTY Trial Chamber shows how his previous statement was misinterpreted in the subsequent
NGOreport and points out the shortcomings in the process of translation and making of the
report 4. Accordingly, Mr. Gasi said that he had seen 14 to 15 people killed in the town of Brcko,
but not at all that he had seen between 300 to 400 persons executed in the town square, as it was
stated in the Danish Helsinki Committee su bmission to the United Nations in May 1993.
Furthermore, Mr. Gasi stressed that he had never stated that the executions had been ordered by the
head of the police in Brcko, in spite of the fact th at such allegation also appeared in the report. He
explained that he had only mentioned who had been the commander of the police at that time and
emphasized that he had never received the written record of his statement given to the Committee
in the original language.
62. Nevertheless, this report of the Danish Helsinki Committee was included in the Final
Report of the Bassiouni Commission, which states: “The witness also reported that he saw
between 300 to 400 persons executed in the town s quare, under the order of the head of police and
49
the deputy head of police.”
63. There is no doubt that a similar mode of testimony was used as a source for the allegation
50
given in the United Nations Final Report and repeated in the Reply, which states that between
51
3,000 and 5,000 people had been killed in the Luka Camp in Brcko . If we compare it with the
charges of the ICTY Prosecutor in the Milosevic indictment 52, claiming that approximately
30-35Bosnian Muslim prisoners were executed in the Luka Camp, the enormous discrepancy
becomes obvious.
48
ICTY, case No.IT-02-54, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, transcripts, 11 Sep. 2003, pp. 26447-26448 and
26452-26453 (folder with new public documents, Vol. III, doc. No. 16).
49
Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. III.A, para. 390 (Peace Palace Library).
50Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Ann. III.A, para. 396 (Peace Palace Library).
51Reply, Chapter V, p. 240, para. 398.
52ICTY, case No. IT-02-54-T, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Amended Indictment (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
dated 21 April 2004, Schedule B, para. 6 (www.un.org/icty). - 37 -
The credibility of the media reports
64. As it has already been presented, the medi a war reports were a very important source of
the Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission. The footnotes with the Report on Sarajevo ⎯
Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo ⎯ show that the entire Report was based almost
exclusively on media coverage.
65. Also, the source of information on the alleged rape of 40women from Brezovo Polje 53
was the report published in the United States Depart ment of State Despatch, which was entirely
based on information from an article of the Croatian weekly Globus. That allegation has never
appeared in any indictment before the International Criminal Tribunal.
66. However, the Applicant sometimes quoted media reports in its written submissions as
independent sources of evidence. An example can be found in the part of the Reply which deals
with the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995.
“Compelling evidence exists that the entire operation was orchestrated by the
commander of the Yugoslav Army, General Mom čilo Perišić. One month after the
fall of the enclave, the United States daily Newsday carried the following report:
‘Intelligence officials from two western countries and from Bosnia
said that the commander of the Yugoslav army, General Momčilo Perisic,
was on a mountaintop across the border in Yugoslavia, sending
instructions and counsel to General Ratko Mladi ć, the commander of
Bosnian Serb military forces. The radio conversations, intercepted by
intelligence agencies, took place befo re, during and after the battle for
the enclave captured by the Serbs on July 11.
“Mladi ć and Perisic conferred constantly about their strategy and
what they were doing”, said one of the western officials, who like all of
the intelligence officers interviewed asked to remain unidentified . . .’
According to a senior Bosnian government official, who also spoke on
condition of anonymity, several hundred Yugoslav infan54ymen fought alongside
Bosnian Serb soldiers when they attacked the enclave . . .” .
67. No fact may be judicially established based only on the media report. The media reports
could serve merely to illustrate a fact, which w as previously established on the basis of other
evidence. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), the Court held that the media reports, even when they are fully objective and
reliable, should be treated
53
Memorial, p. 43, para. 2.2.4.5.
54
Reply, Chapter VIII, pp. 595-596, para. 203,. - 38 -
“not as evidence capable of proving facts, but as material which can nevertheless
contribute, in some circumstances, to corr oborating the existence of a fact, i.e., as
illustrative material additional to other sources of evidence” . 55
68. However, there is no other source of ev idence that GeneralPerisic lead the operation
around Srebrenica in July 1995. If the intelligence officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina had
really had any intercepted radio conversation between General Perisic and General Mladic “before,
during and after the battle”, the Applicant would sure ly have submitted that material to the Court,
as it has been done in the case of the alleged telephone chat of Mrs. Ljiljana Karadzic, a wife of the
56
former President of the Republic of Srpska . Instead of such evidence, the Applicant submitted to
the Court only the extract from the Tosovic diary, in which we can find that GeneralPerisic
allegedly had a “quick lunch” with General Mlad ic and his officers on 8 January 1994, 18 months
57
before the attack on Srebrenica .
69. The Respondent considers that the Newsday article and similar material, based on the
alleged statements of anonymous persons, cannot be treated as obj ective and reliable source at all,
and consequently, it cannot contribute to corroborating the existence of facts in this case.
The credibility of the wartime statements of the Bosnia and Herzegovina officials
70. Madam President, “from the point of view of morality”, the Respondent can agree with
the position of the Applicant’s distinguished Deput y Agent that there is no relevant difference
between 100,000 and 200,000 killed 58. But just for that reason, the Respondent cannot understand
the persistent intention of the Applicant to magnify the number of war victims.
71. According to Mr. van den Biesen’s new estimation, it is clear that the statement given to
the New York Times by Mr.Haris Silajdzic, the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina on
14November1992, which contained the allegati on that 100,000 people, mainly Muslims, had
already been killed as a result of Serbian aggression 59, cannot be taken as accurate. The conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina continued for the next th ree years, causing significant loss of life. Ten
years after the war, on 15 December 2005 , Mr. Mirsad Tokaca, the President of the Research and
55I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 40, para. 62.
56
Folder submitted by the Applicant on 16 January 2006, doc. No. 4.
57
Ibid., doc. No. 1.
58CR 2006/2, p. 45, para. 60 (Mr. van den Biesen).
59Application, para. 87A. - 39 -
Documentation Centre from Sarajevo, stated that the confirmed number of the population losses in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is 93,837 (among them, 54,190 soldiers). He estimated that the final and
total number of the war victims could be around 100,000, i.e. the same figure that Mr. Silajdzic had
already claimed in November 1992. Of course, all the victims are not Muslims, there is a
60
significant number of Serbs among victims ⎯ 24,216 . Who killed them? It may be also that
from the point of view of morality, the Serbs in Bo snia and Herzegovina expect the answer to this
question from Mr. van den Biesen, who should be representing them as well in this case.
72. The Research and Documentation Centre from Sarajevo is an independent and
multi-ethnic association establishe d in March 2004. Its study, P opulation Losses in Bosnia and
61
Herzegovina 1992-1995 , is based on the examination of na mes and data of all victims, and
supported by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Embassies of several States, but not by the
Bosnian Government.
73. This current estimation, based on the mo re reliable research, completely cancels the
validity of figures contained in the Memorial, wh ich allegedly were compiled by the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Institute for Public Health in February 1994, as well as the alleged figure of “around a
quarter of a million . . . mainly Muslim but also Croat” victims 62.
74. Finally, we have to ask ourselves why the Applicant in its written submissions
exaggerated the number of victim s, and now continues to insist on those documents which could
not be confirmed either by the judgments or the indi ctments of the International Criminal Tribunal.
Why are the 100,000 victims not enough for Mr.va n den Biesen, who tries to find more death
63
records even among those who moved out from Bosnia during the conflict , and why is it so
difficult to say how many Serbs were killed and who killed them? The only possible answer may
be that the Applicant, having failed to demonstrate a clear proof of the required mens rea for the
crime of genocide, needs to maintain the allegati ons of the high number of victims, in order to
create evidence of the destruction of a reasonabl e substantial number of the group relative to its
60
G. Klepic: “Mirsad Tokaca: A Hundred Thousand Killed? ”, Glas Srpske, Banja L uka, 17/18 December 2005;
S. Gojkovic: “Mirsad Tokaca: 93,837 People Killed”, Nezavisne novine, Banja Luka, 16 December 2005; (folder with
new public documents, Vol. II, docs. Nos. 7 and 8).
61
This document can be found at www.idc.org.ba/project/populationlosses.
62Memorial, p. 14, para. 2.1.0.8.
63CR 2006/2, p. 45, para. 59 (Mr. van den Biesen). - 40 -
total population, as a factor from which the genocid al intent may be inferred. Without such
exaggeration of the number of victims, the Applicant, prima facie, would fail to fulfil the necessary
elements of genocide required by the Convention.
New sources of evidence used by the Applicant in the oral proceedings
A. Judicial notice of notorious facts
75. It seems that the Applicant finally, at the stage of the oral proceedings, became aware of
the lack of credibility of its documentary materials. The Final Report of the Bassiouni Commission
has been rarely mentioned in the previous days. Instead of the demonstration of clear and hard
evidence, Professor Franck asked the Court to take judicial notice of the alleged crimes as
notorious facts without requiring further proof. He based that request on th e Court practice in the
64
Fisheries jurisdiction and Nuclear Tests cases .
76. However, the notoriety of the facts about the common knowledge on the Norwegian
65
system of delimitation in the North Sea cannot be compared with an issue whether the crimes
which constitute acts of genocide were committed. The notorious fact that France carried out tests
66
of nuclear devices in the territory of French Polynesia is the fact of the same certainty as the fact
that there was a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The Court, however, should
not be able to take a judicial notice of the lega lity of nuclear tests, because it should not be a fact,
but a legal conclusion based on certain evidence. Existence of a crime, even when it can be an
element of any other specific crime, must be the result of the legal findings. If a crime was treated
as a notorious fact, a court would be needless. Fo r that reason, the Respondent considers that the
request for taking a judicial notice that, for instance, thousands of women were raped in Bosnia and
67
Herzegovina , without any evidence for so massive a scal e of violation, denies the role of the
Court.
77. But the best refuting explanation why Professor Franck’s proposal for taking judicial
notice of massive crimes as notorious fact cannot be treated seriously, has been given at the same
64CR 2006/3, pp. 23 and 24, paras. 11 and 12 (Prof. Franck).
65
I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 138-139.
66I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 9, para. 17.
67CR 2006/3, p. 23, para. 11 (Prof. Franck). - 41 -
session by Ms Karagiannakis, who referred to the very strict requirements under which the ICTY
had taken judicial notice of adjudicated facts:
⎯ no dispute between parties;
⎯ no judicial notice of judicial notice;
⎯ no judicial notice of facts established in a plea agreement;
⎯ no judicial notice of factual findings from appealed judgments 68. It seems that these criteria are
very reasonable and in accordance with the rule of law and should be applied in the present
case.
B. Videomaterials
78. Before the opening of the oral hearings, the Applicant provided the Court with 23 video
materials. In this regard, a few general observations are in order. Some of the video materials are
the well-known broadcasts about the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia. A couple of them
have been made in Dutch, and unfortunately, we cannot understand their contents. The Respondent
was provided yesterday with the Applicant’s explan ation about the origin of the video materials
shown in the courtroom, so it is difficult now to give a proper analysis of them.
79. However, it is easy to conclude that most of these materials are the author’s creations,
which cannot have a clear probative value. They are often based on prejudices in relation to the
role of the main actors in the conflict. Above all, a lot of video materials were made in order to
evoke public emotions. Each film contains more the attitudes of its director than the views of a
person who talks about events. The words used by the persons who were directly involved in the
events are most often only fragments cut out from their interviews.
80. Madam President, apart from these gene ral observations about documentary films
provided as evidence, I am compelled to say a few words about the video showed by the Applicant
in this courtroom picturing the brutal execution of six young men in Trnovo. It is clear that the
Applicant addressed those scenes to the Court for emotional reasons. If the Respondent followed
the same approach to the presenta tion of evidence, the next video material would show the scenes
of the bodies of Serbian soldiers decapitated by the members of the unit called “El-Mujahed” (also
68
CR 2006/3, p. 51, para. 67 (Ms Karagiannakis). - 42 -
known as “Holy Warriors”) in the Kamenica camp n ear Sarajevo. In that case, the Respondent
would, in the same manner as the Applicant, refer to the ICTY indictment against Mr. Rasim Delic.
However, the Government of Serbia and Mont enegro will not follow the way chosen by the
Applicant. Instead, I would like to confirm to th e honourable Court that the perpetrators of the
execution in Trnovo have been arrested. Acco rding to the documentation available to our
delegation, they were not members of the Se rbian police or any other body of Serbia and
Montenegro. The trial before the War Crimes Pane l of the District Court in Belgrade is under way
and some of the accused have already pleaded guilty. Her Honour Gordana Bozilovic, President of
that Trial Chamber, was sitting in this courtroom during the first session in the present case, behind
the delegation of Serbia and Montenegro, together with the President of the District Court in
Belgrade and the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes of the Republic of Serbia.
C. ICTY materials
81. Madam President, I would like now to express briefly some of our views about the way
in which the Applicant has so far used the different ICTY documents in this case:
⎯ The Respondent of course cannot accept the positio n that the indictments of the International
Criminal Tribunal can confirm the Applicant’s allegations.
⎯ It is also inappropriate that factual findings in the ICTY cases which have not been concluded
can be taken as the sources of evidence in this case. The Rule 61 decisions and the decisions
on defence motions to acquittal contain only facts presented by the Prosecutor.
⎯ If the ICTY pre-trial and inter-trial decisions were enough to establish the facts in the case
before the International Court of Justice, we could ask ourselves why the defence still exists in
the criminal procedure before the ICTY. Fort unately, such a treatment of evidence is not
known in the ICTY procedure. A fact contained in the ICTY pre-trial or inter-trial decision
cannot be used as an adjudicated fact in another case.
82. Furthermore, the Respondent cannot accept th at the facts contained in plea agreements
may constitute evidence before this Court, as th ey do not constitute evidence in the procedure
before the ICTY. The reason is that the so-called factual basis for the plea agreement is not always
the original statement given by the accused. For example, the Applicant has so far cited frequently - 43 -
the Factual Basis for a Plea of Guilty in the ICTY case of Ms Biljana Plavsic 69. It is well known
that that statement of facts has been prepared by the ICTY Prosecution Office. MsPlavsic’s
defence agreed on that statement in order to reach the plea bargain. However, that statement (or
factual basis) has not been used as evidence in any other trial before the ICTY. Only in the Stakic
case, that factual basis was filed by the Prosecutor, but there was no procedural possibility that the
Chamber would treat it as reliable evidence without a direct testimony of MsPlavsic in the
courtroom, and consequently the factual basis had to be withdrawn from evidence 70. It should also
be noted that, after the plea bargain, MsPlavsic was sentenced to 11years’ imprisonment, while
Mr.Stakic, who had not made the plea agreemen t with the Prosecutor, was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Conclusions
83. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, after the brief presentation of the
incorrect allegations of the applicant State, it is my duty to conclude:
A. It is not true that Serbian forces executed children in the Zvornik hospital, as well as it is not
true that children were thrown into ovens else where. This kind of allegations was the worst
type of war propaganda, with its only aim to s hock the conscience of mankind and to portray
the enemy as a bloodthirsty barbarian.
It is not accurate that 2,500 Muslim men were killed in Zvornik on 9 and 10 April, or that
5,000people were killed during the attack on Ko zarac, or that 1,000 Muslim civilians were
killed in Hambarine, or that another 1,000 were killed in Bijeljina. The crimes were
committed, but the number of victims was tens of times less than it was alleged in the
submissions of the Government of Bosnia a nd Herzegovina to the International Court of
Justice.
It is not true that 50 to 60 people died in Tr nopolje every day, or that ten prisoners were killed
daily in Keraterm, or that 5,000 people were ex ecuted in the most notorious Omarska camp.
69
For example, see CR 2006/6, p. 29, para. 8 (Prof. Franck).
7ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, para. 550. - 44 -
There is no evidence that between 3,000 and 5,000 people have been killed in the Luka camp in
Brcko.
I have established only some examples of the fa lse and inaccurate allegations of the applicant
State. These false allegations are numerous and can be found thro ughout the Applicant’s
written submissions. Together with unspoken data about the terrible crimes committed against
Serbian civilians and war prisoners, they significantly change the general picture of the Bosnian
conflict.
B. These improbable allegations should demonstrate that their sources cannot be taken as reliable
sources of evidence in this case.
C. Consequently, the Respondent considers that the Applicant has not managed to reach the
standard of proof requested in the case before the International Court of Justice.
84. Madam President, I would like to express the great remorse of the people and the
Government of Serbia and Montenegro for all victims of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
regardless how many they were. It was not my intention today to deny that crimes indeed took
place. Is there any difference to a person killed in the village of Hambarine whether the total
number of victims was 1,000, as claimed by the Applicant, or 11 as listed in the indictment before
the ICTY? Nevertheless, this great discrepancy is important to illustrate that the documents used
by the Applicant are not credible and conseque ntly, that the accusations based on them are ill
found.
I would like now to conclude my pleadings. Thank you, Madam President, for your kind
attention, and I would respectfully ask you to give the floor to Professor Tibor Varady.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Obradović. I give the floor to Professor Varady. - 45 -
VMAr. ADY:
ISSUES OF PROCEDURE
1. Introduction
1.1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court. May it please the Court. It is,
once again, an exceptional honour and privilege to a ppear before this Court. I would also like to
give expression of my respect for the colleagues representing the Applicant for their presentations.
1.2. My colleagues, Professor Zimmermann, Mr.Djeri ć and myself, we would like to
address the procedural side of this complex case. But let me start our presentations with some
information of a more technical nature. We have envisaged submitting this part of the
Respondent’s presentation during the remainder of this morning, and tomorrow morning.
1.3. As a further technical matter, and fthe sake of clarity, let me mention the following
regarding names and designations. Both the Ap plicant and the Respondent are successor States of
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the “SFRY”; we shall refer to the predecessor
State as the “former Yugoslavia”. Furthermore, at the time when the Application was submitted,
the name of the Respondent was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the “FRY”. In
February 2003, the FRY changed its name and beca me Serbia and Montenegro. We shall use both
designations ⎯ the “FRY” and “Serbia and Montenegro” ⎯ depending on the time period to
which we are referring and using the name which was official at the given moment.
1.4. We would also like to refer in an abbreviated form to three judgments of this Court,
which are of a particular importance in the procedural history of the cases arising from the
Yugoslav conflicts. We shall refer in an abbrev iated form to the “1996 Judgment on Preliminary - 46 -
71 72
Objections” , to the “2003 Revision Judgment” , and to the “2004 Legality of Use of Force
Judgments” 73.
1. Raising issues of procedure
1.5. Approaching issues of procedure, I do not want to disregard the fact that in this case
fundamental humanitarian issues are at stake, and th at the allegation pertains to genocide, probably
the greatest crime known. I could argue, of course ⎯ without departing from the truth ⎯ that the
perception of the dramatic years of recent hist ory presented by the Applicant was a perception
couched in terms of adversarial pr oceedings with the aim of prevai ling over the other party. But I
have to agree with the Applicant, that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first half of the last decade of
the twentieth century was ma rked by a unique tragedy ⎯ and was also marked by grave crimes.
Such a setting commands due respect.
1.6. Madam President, responding to the remarks made by our colleagues on the side of the
Applicant, let me say that the procedural issu es we are raising are not mere technicalities which
would detract us from a simple and straightforwar d path towards substance. The questions we
would like to address pertain to the most fundame ntal precondition of proceedings before this
honoured Court, determined by the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the Court.
1.7. Let me also add that this is not a simp le and straightforward case; and, what is also
significant, this is a case in which substance and procedure are closely intertwined. The conflict
was marked with different perceptions and asp irations regarding statehood and dissolution of
statehood. The picture is not as simple as the one de picted by the Applicant. This was not just a
conflict between Serbs and non-Serbs. It is well known and uncontested, for example, that in some
regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina ⎯ like the Mostar region ⎯ most violence took place between
Muslims and Croats. Conflicts between Muslims and Croats also yielded a number of ICTY
71The Judgment of 11 July 1996 in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (II).
72The 3 February 2003 Judgment on Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11July1996 in the Case
concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), I.C.J. Reports 2003.
73Eight Judgments of 15 December 2004 in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force decided between Serbia
and Montenegro as Applicant, and eight NATO Member countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) as Respondents, I.C.J Reports 2004. - 47 -
indictments ⎯ like the indictments prompted by the Lašva Valley confrontations. In the Biha ć
region, a long and acrimonious battle was fought be tween two Muslim factions. During the years
of the conflict, state-like structures emerged and disappeared, parallel with shifting ethnic
confrontations and alliances, while statehood and dissolution of statehood were on the banners of
all participants.
1.8. This hallmark of the conflict also became the core of the jurisdictional problem. It is
exactly the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the circumstances of the formation
of new States, which gave rise to conflicting pe rceptions regarding membership in the United
Nations and treaty status, the critical issues regarding access and jurisdiction.
1.9. Furthermore, a scrutiny of the procedural setting of this case shall also reveal that this
legal dispute between two sovereign States, Bosn ia and Herzegovina on one side, and Serbia and
Montenegro on the other side ⎯ neither of which existed when the conflict began ⎯ is simply not
a matching articulation of the actual conflict fought between Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
1.10. Let me add, Madam President, that it is know n that the stakes in this case are daunting.
The question is whether the balance sheet of the twentiethcentury would show Serbia and
Montenegro being the one and only State convicted for genocide. But the gravity of the substance
does not diminish the importance of verification of the very foundations of the right to proceed.
1.11. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, let me also say that we are
advancing our views on jurisdiction even at this stage, because it was not possible to take a
conclusive position on these issues earlier and be cause it is our sincere conviction that the
Respondent was not a party to the Statute, and had no access to the Court when the Application
was submitted. We also trust that the Res pondent never became bound by ArticleIX of the
Genocide Convention. Serbia and Montenegro did no t consent to the jurisdiction of this honoured
Court in this case.
2. The actual conflict found no matching expression in this dispute
1.12. Before turning to specific issues, let me once again refer to the drama from which our
case was born. There is no doubt that a human tragedy took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The - 48 -
estimates and dimensions of the events vary quite considerably. The numbers may be
controversial, but whichever estimate should one take, this is a tragedy. It is also a fact that the
devastations were not caused without guilt. There was a war which was, like every war, conducive
to aberrant behaviour, but the fact remains that there were crimes, and there were perpetrators,
people guided by hatred or fanaticism, who committed crimes.
1.13. Let me say, Madam President, that the responsibility of these individuals is a rather
straightforward matter. But things are becoming much more complicated ⎯ and sometimes
perplexing as well ⎯ when attempts are being made to perc eive the issue in terms of a dispute
between States. Not every tragedy can be articul ated as a dispute between States, subject to the
jurisdiction of this honoured Court. The actual conflict we are facing was an ethnic conflict, the
dividing lines between the warring parties were ethnic dividing lines. The propaganda which
fuelled the conflict, and managed to separate pe ople, not only from each other, but also from
common sense, was an ethnic propaganda.
1.14. In the Memorial of the Applicant, the part entitled “The Facts” starts with the following
allegation:
“Since late 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovi na has been the scene for acts of
violence and destruction, the evil brutality of which has been calculated and aimed by
Serbs to eliminate the lives, liberty, dignit y, religion and culture of the Muslim and
74
Croat people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
We do not agree with these allegations, but we do agree that since 1991, a brutal conflict emerged
between Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The conflic t damaged all participating ethnic groups, and the
plight of the Muslims, that is of the Bosniacs, may have been the most difficult of all.
1.15. It is known, Madam President, that the ethnic groups that faced each other during the
conflict were confronted earlier, as well, in the course of history. At the same time, it is also
known that the States that are facing each other be fore this Court did not even exist when the
conflict began. Neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor the FRY existed in late 1991 or early 1992.
1.16. While the conflict lasted, States and state-like structures were emerging and
disappearing, and so did borders, as well as disput es about borders, about s overeignty, continuity
and secession. The legal character and the standi ng of the emerging structures remained for a long
74
Memorial of 15 April 1994, para. 2.1.0.1. - 49 -
time volatile and controversial. The ethnic dividi ng lines during the conflict may have been quite
clear, but they have not been mirrored in the dividing line between the States, Parties to the present
dispute. This is what makes this case so unus ual and detached from natural paths in search of
justice before the Court.
1.17. The question arises whether the cause, which inspired the Application in 1993, has
become the cause of the States which are facing each other today before this Court. The question
also arises whether consequences allocated in a judgment could possibly be allocated between the
actual participants and along the dividing lines of the actual conflict.
1.18. In its Memorial of 15 April 1994, Bosn ia and Herzegovina submitted that “[s]pecific
persons were targeted precisely on account of their adherence to an ethnical or religious group and
that attacks on these groups was precisely a means to attain the end of clearing entire areas of their
75
Muslim population” . The Memorial continues by stating that acts prohibited by the Genocide
Convention were committed by Bosnian Serbs, and that the authorities of the FRY aided and
76
abetted such acts .
1.19. The armed conflict came to an end. An element of the solution which was accepted
was that the Bosnian Serbs and their entity, the Republika Srpska, became an integral part of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was confirmed in the Dayton Peace Agreement, which was signed
on 14 December 1995 in Paris. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as a part
of this Agreement. The Agreement and the Constitution have established two entities of about
equal size, which now constitute the State of the Applicant. According to Article1(3) of the
Constitution: “Bosnia and Herzegovi na shall consist of the two En tities, the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.”
1.20. In spite of this new reality, the claim ⎯ following the dividing lines of the original
conflict ⎯ still advances grievances against the Repub lika Srpska, now a constitutive part of the
applicant State. For example, in its Reply of 23April 1998, the Applicant alleged that: “The
75
Memorial, p. 7, para. 1.3.0.4.
7Memorial, p. 7, para. 1.3.0.5. - 50 -
77
creation of ‘Republika Srpska’ has been imposed through the use of force and genocide .” The
conclusion suggested by the Applicant is that “[s]uch a situation cannot have any legal validity” 78.
1.21. Madam President, there are further circumstances contributing to doubts as to whether
the actual conflict, which took place between 1991 and 1995, could find a fitting judicial resolution
between those States which are now appearing as Applicant and Respondent before this honoured
Court. We would like to point out that the Republika Srpska ⎯ covering about one half of the
country of the Applicant ⎯ has strongly and consistently opposed this lawsuit. On
1October2003, the Parliament of the Republik a Srpska adopted a Declaration which states,
inter alia:
“The Claim of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the International Court of Justice
is, de facto , a claim against the Republika Srpska and against the essence of the
Dayton Peace Agreement. The Republika Sr pska and the Serbian people in Bosnia
and Herzegovina cannot be an Entity, a part of the State of the Claimant, and at the
same time the accused party ⎯ this is simply not possible.
Life in common of all people of Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be built on
the basis offered by the Da yton Peace Agreement, by the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while the said Claim cannot contri bute to reconciliation either in Bosnia
79
and Herzegovina, or in the Region.”
In this Declaration, the Parliament of the Republika Srpska asks from the Presidency and the
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to place on their agenda the question of the claim against
Serbia and Montenegro submitted to the International Court of Justice.
1.22. It has to be said that the Declaration of the Parliament of the Republika Srpska of
1October 2003 was challenged by the repr esentatives of the Bosniak people in the
RepublikaSrpska. They initiated a procedure to establish that the Declaration, as well as the
initiative to place the issue on the agenda of the Pr esidium and of the Parliament of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, impairs vital interests of the Bosni ac people. This motion reached the Constitutional
Court of the Republika Srpska, which rejected it on 10 June 2005, and upheld the legitimacy of the
80
Declaration .
77Reply of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 23 April 1998, para. 82.
78
Reply, para. 83.
79This Declaration was published in the Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, No. 63/05.
80Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Re publika Srpska was also published in the Official Gazette of the
Republika Srpska, No. 63/2005. - 51 -
1.23. A further event demonstrating how controve rsial the matter is in the applicant State, is
the request submitted on 12 December 2005 to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
by Mr. Borislav Paravac, one of the three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In this request, Mr.Paravac is seeking the C onstitutional Court of Bosn ia and Herzegovina to
declare that the Application submitted to this C ourt represents a violation of the Constitution of
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8.
1.24. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, we are, of course, aware of the
fact that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not reached a decision as yet. We
do not intend to discuss here the legitimacy of the Application under the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The point we want to make is that it is evident that there is a clear and deep divide
between the two constituent entities of the applicant State regarding these proceedings. Just as it is
evident that the Parties to this dispute are not identical at all with the parties to the conflict.
1.25. The truth of the matter is that, today, a judgment on the merits would find the
Republika Srpska ⎯ the alleged perpetrator ⎯ in the position of the Applicant and the alleged
victim, and the recipient of possible damages to be paid. The same judgment would find
Kosovo ⎯ clearly a part of the FRY during the Bosnian conflict ⎯ in the position of the
Respondent, the alleged perpetrator, and possible debtor of damages.
1.26. Madam President, the controversies a bout States, which only came into being during
the conflict, incongruities between the setting of th e actual conflict and the setting of this legal
dispute yielded, quite understandably, a most complex situation and serious difficulties in
articulating the substance of the problem as a legal dispute between States.
1.27. On 20 March 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovi na initiated proceedings against the FRY for
alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. It has practically been forgotten that several
months later, on 15 November 1993, another ta ntalizing attempt was made to articulate the
predicament as a legal dispute between States, subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Bosnia and
Herzegovina sent to the General Assembly and to the Security Council of the United Nations a
“Statement of Intention” in which it declared its “solemn intention” to in stitute legal proceedings
8The submission of this request to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reported in
practically all daily papers in Bosnia and rzegovina. For example, in the Sarajevo paper OSLOBOĐENJE of
13 December 2005. - 52 -
against the United Kingdom before the Internationa l Court of Justice for violating the Genocide
Convention. The key grievance stated in the “Sta tement of Intention” of the Applicant was the
82
arms embargo, which was perceived as aiding and abetting genocide . This effort was abandoned.
1.28. Parallel with these vari ous endeavours, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, the “ICTY”, was establishe d, with the mission to establish individual
responsibility and to punish those who committed crimes. The Bosnian conflict has been the
subject-matter of a major part of the activities of the ICTY.
1.29. Madam President, the task of the ICTY is simpler in the sense that the cases submitted
to the ICTY have been structured along the dividing lines of the actual conflict. The distribution of
the roles in the proceedings mirrors the conf lict, and consequences are reaching the actual
perpetrators. The dispute brought before this Court does not have the benefit of a clear-cut setting.
1.30. This is a dispute between States that had been formed during the conflict, but the
borders of which do not reflect the dividing lines of the conflict. There is no reason to regret this;
this means that intolerance and ethnic partition di d not prevail. One of the reasons behind the
Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, and one of the ai ms of the international community was exactly
to bring about a Bosnia and Herzegovina which is the common State of Bosniacs, Serbs, Croats and
others who fought against each other between 1991 and 1995, rather than to create sovereign States
along the dividing lines of the conflict. This wa s the right approach. But one of the logical
consequences of this approach is that the actual parties to the conflict did not and could not find an
alter ego or matching representation in the newly emerging States which are now juxtaposed before
this Court.
3. During earlier phases of these proceedings it was not possible to take a conclusive position
on key procedural issues
1.31. The emerging problem is not only that of articulating the substance of the dispute
between parties other than the actual participants to the conflict. The dilemmas and controversies
regarding the personality and the standing of the s ubjects emerging from the conflict have also had
a clear impact on the issues of access to the Court and jurisdiction.
82
See General Assembly, Security Council, United Nations doc. A/48/659, S/26806, 26 November 1993. - 53 -
1.32. Madam President, distinguished Member s of the Court, it is well known that the
process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavi a created two narratives: one espoused and
promoted by the former Government of the FR Y, and another one espoused and promoted by
Bosnia and Herzegovina and other successor States.
1.33. The essence of the position taken by the former Government of the FRY was the
following: we stayed on course. We are a foundi ng Member of the United Nations. We remained
a Member of the United Nations, and a party to international conventions continuing the
personality of the former Yugoslavia. We remained the same State from which others have tried to
secede (or did secede). Hence, our admission to th e United Nations is beside the point, and no
scrutiny under Article 4 of the Charter is needed, since we never ceased to be a Member. Due to
continuity, we remained a Member of the United Nations, and we remained a party to the treaties to
which the SFRY was a party.
1.34. Contrary to this perception of the former Government of the FRY, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and other successor States advanced a di fferent narrative. The essence of this second
narrative is the following: the former SFRY disso lved. Nobody continued the identity of the
former Yugoslavia ⎯ hence nobody seceded either. There are five equal successors, five new
States. As we had to seek admission to the Un ited Nations, and had to go through an Article4
scrutiny in order to become a Member of the Un ited Nations, the FRY has to do the same; as we
had to submit notifications of succession or accession in order to become a contracting party to the
treaties, the FRY has to do the same.
1.35. Today it is clear what was the reality. But what is clear today was uncertain for almost
a decade. The relationship between the newly emerging States and the former Yugoslavia to which
they all belonged, the process of dissolution, ques tions of continuity and discontinuity, remained
controversial for too long. Controversies did not only mark the positions taken by the emerging
new States themselves. For a quite considerable period clear-cut answers were not given by those
international organizations and authorities eith er, whose standpoint had to represent a point of
support and reliance before this Court.
1.36. At various moments of these proceedings various facts and perceptions were
accessible. Various international authorities, whic h were invited to qualify the emerging situation, - 54 -
took various positions. A unique and unorthodox situation yielded more ambiguity and evasion
than straight answers. As it was stated by the Court in the 2004 Legality of Use of Force
Judgments:
“[t]he legal position of the Fe deral Republic of Yugoslavia within the United Nations
and vis-à-vis that Organization remained highly complex during the period
1992-2000. In fact, it is the view of the Court that the legal situation that obtained
within the United Nations during that eight -year period concerning the status of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, remained ambiguous and open to different assessments. This was due,
inter alia, to the absence of an authoritative dete rmination by the competent organs of
the United Nations defining clearly the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
vis-à-vis the United Nations” .83
4. The need to face issues of access and jurisdiction
1.37. This status which remained much too long undefined, is obviously of critical
importance. If the FRY had continued the personality of the former Yugoslavia, then it would have
remained a Member of the United Nations, it would have remained a State party to the Statute, and
it would have remained bound by international conve ntions to which the former Yugoslavia was a
party. If there was no continuity, then the FRY ha d to do what other successor States did: to seek
admission to the United Nations as a new State, and to undertake appropriate actions in order to
become bound by international conventions. We are respectfully submitting that, as this Court has
already determined, the FRY was not a Member State of the United Nations, was not a party to the
Statute and did not have access to the Court when the Application was submitted. We are also
submitting that the FRY did not remain or become bound by any treaty provision which would
establish the jurisdiction of this Court.
1.38. Madam President, distinguished Member of the Court, we are, of course, aware of the
fact that this is not the first time that questions of jurisdiction have emerged in this case. Questions
pertaining to jurisdiction were raised during various phases of the proceedings in this case, and they
were also raised in other related cases arising from the Yugoslav conflict in which jurisdiction was
dependent on the same issue ⎯ that of continuity or discontinuity, the position and treaty
membership of the FRY between 1992 and 2000.
8Case concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), para. 64. Exactly the same
text can be found in the other 20Legality of Use of Force Judgments as well: in para. 63 of the cases with France,
Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in para. 62 of the cases with Germany and the United Kingdom. - 55 -
1.39. There is no res judicata bar which would disallow the Court to address the issue of
access and jurisdiction if it appears to be justified. Such a bar is not posed by the 1996 Judgment
on Preliminary Objections. Arguing that the issue of jurisdiction cannot be reopened, the Applicant
endeavours to draw support for its position from the Judgment of the Cour t of 25March 1999 in
the case between Cameroon and Nigeria. The App licant suggests that this case shows that the
84
position once taken by the Court cannot be changed during subsequent proceedings .
1.40. In the 1999 Cameroon v. Nigeria Judgment the Court opted, indeed, not to change
what was decided earlier. But there is a very si mple reason for this. Nothing else was possible in
the given procedural setting, because the inherent limitations were set by the request itself. The
Cameroon v. Nigeria case relied upon by the Applicant is a case where interpretation was sought.
As the title of the case clearly indicates, the request was made for interpretation . A request for
interpretation is just a request for that, for explaining a “yes” or a “no” ⎯ not for revisiting the
conclusions and changing a “yes” to a “no”.
85
1.41. The Applicant also referred to the Corfu Channel case . But this case provides no
support to the Applicant’s contentions, as it does not settle at all the question of finality of
judgments on preliminary objections. As a matter of fact, this case may very well be cited as a case
in which the Court proceeded to re-raise the i ssue of jurisdiction in the merits phase. The
Applicant actually relies on the third phase of the Corfu Channel case. In this third phase 86the
Court did, indeed, refuse to revisit an earlie r finding on jurisdiction which was challenged on the
same grounds as the ground submitted earlier. It is important to add that this earlier finding was
the finding reached in the merits phase, rather than in the preliminary objections phase.
1Th2e. Corfu Channel case yields an opposite conclusion, however, if one focuses on the
exact situation we are facing in our case, that is , if we are investigating the treatment of the
jurisdictional issue in the merits phase, after the pr eliminary objections were rejected. In the first
phase, the Court rejected preliminary objections, a nd decided to move to the merits phase. But in
the second phase of this case, the merits phase, the Court did address new objections raised
8CR 2006/3, 28 February 2006, p. 14, para .9 (Prof. Pellet).
85
CR 2006/3, 28 February 2006, p. 16, para. 13 (Prof. Pellet).
8The Corfu Channel case, Assessment of the Amount of Compensation, Judgment of 15 December 1949,
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 244. - 56 -
regarding jurisdiction, in spite of the existence of an earlier judgment on preliminary objections,
and after due consideration, it reached one more conclusion on jurisdiction . 87
1.43. Explaining that the Corfu Channel case does not settle the question whether judgments
on jurisdiction may have res judicata effects, Shihata points out and stresses that when the specific
objection to jurisdiction was raised in the merits phase, this objection was not dismissed on grounds
of res judicata, “[t]hough it was invoked after a decision affi rming the Court’s jurisdiction to deal
88
with the case generally” .
1.44. It is important to point out that when it opted to reconsider jurisdiction during the
merits phase of the Corfu Channel case, after a judgment rejecting the preliminary objections, the
Court did not even feel the need to invoke the we ll-established entitlement of the Court to examine
its jurisdiction proprio motu . It simply investigated an objection to jurisdiction raised by the
Respondent during the merits phase, which objec tion did not figure among those raised in the
preliminary phase.
1.45. Madam President, returning to our case, let me stress that the complexity of our case
mirrors the complexity of the conflict. Th is case has a most complicated and unorthodox case
history, because an unconventional and unpredic table sequence of events produced a most
complicated and truly unorthodox case. Questions were recurring under different perspectives. On
the grounds of what was visible and ascertainable earlier, it was not possible to take a clear position
“without legal difficulties”.
1.46. This is why, referring to positions taken earlier in various cases between 1992 and
2004, including the Revision case, the Court pointed out in its 2004 Legality of Use of Force
Judgments that it was not in a position to take a definitive position before 2004. The Court stated:
“The Court did not commit itself to a definitive position on the issue of the legal
status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavi a in relation to the Charter and the Statute
in its pronouncements in incidental pr oceedings, in the cases involving this issue
89
which came before the Court during this anomalous period.”
87
Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 26.
88Ibrahim Shihata, The Power of the In ternational Court to Determine Its Own Jurisdiction, M. Nijhoff Publ.,
p. 76.
89Case concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), para. 74. Exactly the same
text can be found in the other 2004Legality of Use of Force Judgments as well: in para. 73 of the cases with France,
Germany, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in para. 72 of the cases with Germany and the United Kingdom. - 57 -
1.47. The status of the FRY with regard to treaties, including the Charter and the Statute,
during the “anomalous period” between 1992 and 200 0, is of a decisive relevance regarding
reconsideration of the issue of jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to imagine a situation
in which the reinvestigation of the issue of ju risdiction would be more appropriate and more
needed. A reconsideration of jurisdiction proprio motu is further justified by the fact that, after a
long period in which the taking of a definitive positio n on the critical issue was impeded by lack of
information or by procedural constraints, such a position was taken in 2004. In the 2004 Legality
of Use of Force Judgments the Court stated unequivocally:
“[f]rom the vantage point from which the Court now looks at the legal situation, and in
the light of the legal consequences of th e new development since 1 November 2000,
the Court is led to the conclusion that Se rbia and Montenegro was not a Member of
the United Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the present
90
proceedings before the Court on 29 April 1999” .
1.48. It is in this context that the logic of the ICAO Council Judgment finds full justification.
Indeed, in its letter to the Parties of 12 June 2003 the Court referred to this Judgment, and cited it
stating:
“[a]s the Court has emphasized in the past, [it] is entitled to consider jurisdictional
issues proprio motu, and must ‘always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction’ ( Appeal
relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 52).”
In the same letter of 12 June 2003, the Court added:
“It thus goes without saying that the Court will not give judgment on the merits
of the present case unless it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction. Should Serbia and
Montenegro wish to present further argument to the Court on jurisdictional questions
during the oral proceedings on the merits, it will be free to do so.”
1.49. This course of action ⎯ mentioned in the letter of th is honoured Court as a permitted
option ⎯ is the one we intend to take. We sh all respectfully present facts and arguments
demonstrating that the FRY did not have access to the Court when the Application was submitted;
and furthermore, it did not remain bound by Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and it never
became bound by ArticleIX either. Since Artic leIX of the Genocide Convention is the only
professed basis of jurisdiction, it follows that this honoured Court has no jurisdiction in this case.
9Case concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), para. 79. Exactly the same
text can be found in the other 2004 Legality of Use of Force Judgments as well: in para. 78 of the cases with France,
Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and in para. 77 of the cases with Germany and the United Kingdom. - 58 -
5. The approach we have followed
1.50. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, there is one more point I would
like to make within this introductory statement. The Applicant raised the question of our litigation
strategies.
1.51. Let me say that no judicial instance inspires more dedication and requires more
professional integrity than the International Court of Justice. My colleagues and I, we have been
overwhelmed by the opportunity to present arguments before this Court, and we have sincerely
tried our best to attain the requisite standard. We cannot, of course, judge ourselves, but let me put
before you in all frankness our approach to this case, and to all our cases before this honoured
Court.
1.52. Madam President, after the people of Se rbia and Montenegro brought to an end the
Milošević régime, our position towards the United Nations and treaties was not the only issue
which had to be rethought and revi sited. The new Government w as faced with a daunting number
of crucially important issues since the fall of 2000. Our country had to reconsider the basic
premises on which it was functioning, including rela tionship of the FRY with its neighbours, with
the international community, and with the entire past decade. Many things were changed or
redirected ⎯ and many things still have to be changed or redirected.
1.53. At a number of critical junctures, the new Government of the FRY opted to follow the
position taken by the majority of States in the international community ⎯ including that of the
Applicant.
1.54. In this context, we reconsidered our position towards the assumption of continuity with
the former Yugoslavia and towards the proposition of automatically continued membership in the
United Nations and in treaties. Abandoning the pr oposition of continuity, which was professed by
the former Government, meant that we had to submit to the procedure of admission of new
members ⎯ and this also meant that we could not claim treaty membership on grounds of
continuity. Instead, we had to submit a request for admission to the United Nations as a new
Member as other successor States did, and we had to submit notifications of succession or
accession to treaties as other successor States did. - 59 -
1.55. We accepted a status and all of its consequences. This meant that we could not and did
not continue the perception of the Miloševi ć Government in our cases before this honoured Court
either. We accepted instead a perception endorsed by the great majority in the international
community, and we have stood by this percepti on both before this Court and before other
international authorities and organizations.
1.56. Before this Court, we have presente d our perception in a consistent way. We
communicated the same perception in all cases irrespec tive of our role as applicant or respondent,
and we have been asking the Court to decide on jurisdiction considering the same facts and the
same analysis ⎯ and this is what we shall respectfully endeavour to do during these proceedings as
well.
1.57. We shall point out two reasons, each of which is sufficient to yield the conclusion that
this honoured Court has no jurisdiction in this case. First, we shall demonstrate that the FRY (now
Serbia and Montenegro) had no access to the Court at the relevant moment when the Application
was submitted. The second reason leading to the conc lusion of lack of jurisdiction in this case is
that Serbia and Montenegro never became bound a nd is not bound by ArticleIX of the Genocide
Convention, which is the only purported ground of jurisdiction. Given that in our case the issue of
treaty membership is interlinked with the question of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, there
are more imaginable ways in which links with a treaty could have possibly been maintained or
created. We shall cover all ground, and we shall demonstrate that there is no conceivable way in
which Serbia and Montenegro could have either remained or become bound by ArticleIX of the
Genocide Convention.
1.58. Concluding my introduction, I would like to submit to you the schedule of our
presentations. Our first speaker tomorrow morning will be our counsel and advocate Mr.Djeri ć.
He will address issues of access. After him, I shall endeavour to demonstrate that the FRY ⎯now
Serbia and Montenegro ⎯ did not remain bound by Article IX of the Genocide Convention. Our
counsel and advocate Professor Zimmermann will c ontinue to demonstrate that Serbia and
Montenegro never became bound by ArticleIX in a ny way, by way of treaty action or otherwise.
After his speech I would like to add some concluding remarks. We intend to conclude this part of - 60 -
the Respondent’s presentation by the end of the morning session tomorrow. Madam President,
distinguished Members of the Court, thank you very much for your kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Varady. The Court now rises and will resume its
hearings at 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.
The Court rose at 12.55 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Wednesday 8 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding