Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2007/31
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2007
Public sitting
held on Friday 23 November 2007, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding
in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysia/Singapore)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2007
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 23 novembre 2007, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président,
faisant fonction de président
en l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks et South Ledge
(Malaisie/Singapour)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President
Judges Ranjeva
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Dugard
Sreenivasa Rao
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l’affaire
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
Dugard.
Sreenivasa Rao, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Malaysia is represented by:
H.E.Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Ambassado r-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Malaysia, Adviser for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister,
as Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit inte rnational, member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration,
Mr.James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, Professor of Public In ternational Law, Leiden University, associate
member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International La w, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Penelope Nevill, college lecturer, Downing College, University of Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, Head of Interna tional Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, Deputy Head 1, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsSuraya Harun, Senior Federal Counsel, Inte rnational Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federal Coun sel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, Federal C ounsel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsMichelle Bradfield, Research Fellow, Lauterpach t Centre for International Law, University of
Cambridge, Solicitor (Australia),
Coausnsel; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Malaisie est représenté par :
S. Exc.M. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, ambass adeur en mission extrao rdinaire, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, conseille r auprès du premier ministre pour les affaires
étrangères,
comme agent ;
S. Exc.Mme Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honorai re de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de droit inte rnational, membre de la Cour permanente
d’arbitrage,
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Leyde, membre
associé de l’Institut de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Penelope Nevill, chargée de cours au Downing College de l’Université de Cambridge,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, chef du département des affaires internationales, cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, pr emière adjointe au chef du département des
affaires internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Suraya Harun, conseiller fédéral principal au département des affaires internationales, cabinet
de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conse iller fédéral au départ ement des affaires
internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, conseiller fédéral au département des affaires internationales,
cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Michelle Bradfield, Research Fellow au Lauterpacht Research Center for International Law
de l’Université de Cambridge, Solicitor (Australie),
comme conseils ; - 6 -
Dato’ Hamsan bin Saringat, Director, State Economic Planning Unit, Johor State,
Mr.Abd. Rahim Hussin, Under-Secretary, Maritime Security Policy Division, National Security
Council, Department of the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
Mr.Raja Aznam Nazrin, Under-Secretary, Adjudi cation and Arbitration, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Malaysia,
Capt. Sahak Omar, Director General, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, Deputy Director 1, Land and Mines Office of Johor,
Dr.Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, Director of Acqui sition, Documentation and Audiovisual Centre,
National Archives,
Cdr. Samsuddin Yusoff, State Officer 1, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr.Roslee Mat Yusof, Director of Marine, Nort hern Region, Marine Department Peninsular
Malaysia,
Mr.Azmi Zainuddin, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Sarah Albakri Devadason, Principal Assistant Secretary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, Special Officer to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
MsHaznah Md. Hashim, Principal Assistant Secr etary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
as Advisers;
Professor Dato’ DrS. haharil Talib, Head of Special Research Unit, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
as Consultant;
Mr.Tan Ah Bah, Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of Survey and
Mapping,
Professor Dr.Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities, National University of Malaysia,
Professor Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Director of the Institute for Malaysian and International
Studies, National University of Malaysia,
Mr. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, Principal Assistant Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section),
Department of Survey and Mapping, - 7 -
M. Dato’ Hamsan bin Saringat, directeur de l’unité de planification économique de l’Etat de Johor,
M. Abd. Rahim Hussin, sous-secrétaire au département de la politique de sécurité maritime, conseil
de la sécurité nationale, services du premier ministre de la Malaisie,
M. Raja Aznam Nazrin, sous-secrétaire au département de la justice et de l’arbitrage, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Le capitaine Sahak Omar, directeur général du service hydrographique de la marine royale
malaisienne,
M. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, premier directeu r adjoint du bureau du territoire et des mines du
Johor,
M. Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, directeur des acquisitions, centre de documen tation audiovisuel des
archives nationales,
Le commandant Samsuddin Yusoff, premier officier d’état-major du service hydrographique de la
marine royale malaisienne,
M. Roslee Mat Yusof, directeur de la marine pour la région septentriona le, département de la
marine de la Malaisie péninsulaire,
M. Azmi Zainuddin, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de la Malaisie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Sarah Albakri Devadason, secrétaire adjointe pr incipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, assistant spécial du ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Mme Haznah Md. Hashim, secrétaire adjointe prin cipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
comme conseillers ;
M. Dato’ Shaharil Talib, professeur, directeur du service des études spéciales du cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
comme consultant ;
M. Tan Ah Bah, directeur de la topographie, ser vice des frontières, département de la topographie
et de la cartographie,
Mme Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, professeur, doyenne de la faculté des sciences sociales et
humaines de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, professeur, directeur de l’Institut d’études malaisiennes et
internationales de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, directeur adjoint pr incipal de la topographie, service des frontières,
département de la topographie et de la cartographie, - 8 -
Mr.Hasnan bin Hussin, Senior Technical Assist ant (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of
Survey and Mapping,
as Technical Advisers.
The Government of the Republic of Singapore is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-Large, Mini stry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Singapore, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Mr. S. Jayakumar, Deputy Prime Minister, Co -ordinating Minister for National Security and
Minister for Law, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
Mr. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Chairman of the United
Nations International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International
Law, University of Oxford, member of the Institu t de droit international, Distinguished Fellow,
All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member and former Chairman of
the United Nations International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’ap pel de Paris, member of the Rome Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel, Ch ambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic
of Singapore,
Mr. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Tan Ken Hwee, Senior Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore
,
Mr. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the
Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Daren Tang, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore, - 9 -
M.Hasnanbin Hussin, assistant technique principal du service des frontières, département de la
topographie et de la cartographie,
comme conseillers techniques.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Singapour est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tommy Koh, ambassadeur en mission ex traordinaire (ministère des affaires étrangères
de la République de Singapour), professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, ambas sadeur de la République de Singapour auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. S. Jayakumar, vice-premier ministre, mini stre coordinateur pour la sécurité nationale et
ministre de la justice, professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
M. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice de la République de Singapour,
M. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General de la République de Singapour,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Un ies, professeur émérite de droit international
public (chaire Chichele) à l’Univer sité d’Oxford, membre de l’In stitut de droit international,
Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Un ies, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Tan Ken Hwee, premier greffier adjoint de la Cour suprême de Singapour,
M. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la
République de Singapour,
M. Daren Tang, State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de Singapour, - 10 -
Mr. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
Mr. Parry Oei, Chief Hydrographer, Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore,
Ms Foo Chi Hsia, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Philip Ong, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Ms Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, Second Secretary (Political), Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in
the Netherlands,
Ms Wu Ye-Min, Country Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
as Advisers. - 11 -
M. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris X-Nanterre
comme conseils ;
M. Parry Oei, hydrographe en chef de l’autorité maritime et portuaire de Singapour,
Mme Foo Chi Hsia, directeur adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
M. Philip Ong, sous-directeur au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de Singapour,
Mme Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, deuxième secrétaire (affaires politiques) à l’ambassade de la
République de Singapour aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Wu Ye-Min, chargée de mission au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
cocomnseillers. - 12 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The sitting is open. Before
giving the floor to the representatives of Malays ia, I should like to pay a brief tribute to a
distinguished former Member of the Court who passed away during the night of
17 to 18 November.
Judge Raghunandan Swarup Pathak was born in 1924 at Bareilly, India. Further to his
studies in law and political science at Allahabad University, he practised as advocate before the
Supreme Court of India prior to his nominati on as judge at the High Court of Allahabad and
subsequently at the Supreme Court of India. Fr om 1986 to 1989, just before his election to this
Court, he served as Chief Justice of India. He was an active and highly regarded Member of this
Court from 1989 to 1991.
Let me also say how saddened I was to hear the news that Professor Julio González Campos
passed away during the night of 20 to 21November . He pleaded a number of times before this
Court, and was chosen as judge ad hoc in the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute
between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras) but had to resign
last year for health reasons. Professor González Campos was born in 1932 in Seville, Spain. He
enjoyed a long and eminent academic career focusi ng both on public and private international law.
He held a range of high-level academic positions in his country and was also elected member of the
Spanish Constitutional Court.
May I invite you to stand for one minute’s silen ce, as a tribute to the late Judge Pathak and
Professor González Campos.
The Court observes a minute’s silence.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. We will now begin today’s
hearings and I shall give the floor without further delay to Professor Crawford. You have the floor,
Sir. - 13 -
Mr. CRAWFORD:
E FFECTIVITÉS IN THE B RITISH PERIOD
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, befo re getting to the substance, I should like to
acknowledge the assistance of Ms Michelle Bradfield in the preparation of this speech.
2. It is my task to discuss effectivités in the British period which I take, for the sake of
convenience, to be the period from 1851 to the late 1960s.
3. Mr.President, having regard to your admonition about the length of reply speeches
administered at the end of the first round 1, I propose to make this presentation proportionate to the
new material presented by Singapore this week and not to the vehemence with which counsel
presented it. I can accordingly be very brief. I will deal with four topics: first, Britain’s so-called
lighthouse effectivités; second, the implications of the 1861 fishing dispute; third, the British and
Singapore legislation, and finally the overall a ppreciation to be drawn from Britain’s conduct
during this long period.
1. Britain’s so-called “lighthouse effectivités”
4. Last week I examined the nil effect of the use by a guest State of the territory of the host
State when consent had been obtained 2. Such use ceases to be adve rse to the host State for the
purposes of the acquisition of sovereignty. Mr. Bundy did not attack the principle ⎯ he studiously
refrained from accepting it, elementary though it is 3. Rather, he attempted to distinguish some of
the examples I cited, on the basis that there were detailed written arrangements in those cases . . .
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I am so sorry to interrupt you. Could I please
ask you to speak a little more slowly.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Yes, of course, Sir. ... there were detailed written arrangements in
4
those cases and that they did not span, as this one does, 130 years . No doubt the facts differ from
CR 2007/27, p. 68.
2
CR 2007/27, pp. 62-63, paras. 1-3.
CR 2007/29, p. 15, para. 28 (Bundy).
CR 2007/29, p. 15, para. 29 (Bundy). - 14 -
case to case but the basic principle is the same: conduct carried on with consent is not adverse to
the territorial sovereign for the purpose of the acqui sition of sovereignty. Moreover, the degree of
formality of the arrangements depends on the relations between the two States, on the size and
significance of the territory in question and, cruciall y, on the date of the arrangements: the older
arrangements tend to be much less formal and detailed. The range of possibilities can be seen from
the preamble to the Forei gn Jurisdiction Act of 1843 ⎯ language repeated in the better known
replacement Act of 1890. The preamble referred to foreign jurisdiction “acquired by Treaty,
Capitulation, Grant, Usage, Sufferance, and other lawful means” ⎯ this is as compendious as may
be, covering not only detailed treat y arrangements but much else besides. It is irrelevant in
international law how detailed or formal ⎯ the principle is that power or jurisdiction exercised by
consent is not conduct adverse to the host State. In fact the less detailed the arrangement, the more
the host State will depend on the protection of general international law. Singapore’s entire
argument as to effectivités in the British period assumes that Johor did not consent to the
construction and operation of the lighthouse. As soon as it is established that Johor did consent, the
position changes, and to go on and on about the details of its construction and operation, as Messrs.
Brownlie and Bundy did, is simply not to the point. The British understood this perfectly, which is
why at no stage did they ever lay formal claim to PBP, at no stage fly the Union flag, at no stage
publish maps showing it as a dependency of Singapor e. The Worshipful Master of the Lodge
“Zetland in the East” had no more capacity to clai m territory for the Crown by loose language than
the Acting State Secretary of Johor had to cede territory of Johor by signing a letter.
2. The 1861 fishing incident
5. My second point relates to the 1861 fishing incident. Sir Elihu explained last week that
the correspondence concerning a number of incidents involving fishermen in the early 1860s shows
two things: first, that Britain claimed no wa ters beyond the 10-mile be lt around Singapore and,
secondly, that Colonel Cavenagh’s letter of 15May1861 to the Temenggong shows that the
5
Governor was not claiming the waters of PBP as British . The Governor’s primary concern was
that Singapore residents might be being charged fo r fishing in Singapore waters within 10 miles of
5
CR 2007/26, pp. 49-50, paras. 49-50 (Lauterpacht). - 15 -
the main island. When it became clear that the fishing in question occurred not in Singapore waters
but around PBP the Governor’s approach changed completely ⎯ his concern now was that a
regulation in principle valid not be enforced in an oppressive manner. Nowhere did the Governor
refer to waters around PBP as waters of the colony.
6. Mr.Chao responded on Monday that, to the contrary, the correspondence “demonstrates
very clearly that the Singapore fishermen concer ned and the British officials in Singapore had the
clear understanding that the Temenggong possessed no jurisdiction and authority around PBP”. In
his view, the Chinese fishermen lied about where they had been fishing and said it was in the
vicinity of PBP rather than in shallow waters near a Johor village because they were afraid that if
they did not British authorities would not seek redress on their behalf 6. Their having lied, in his
view, made a theory about Singapore’s jurisdiction true.
7. Malaysia addressed this argument in its Reply: and what it said applies equally to
Mr. Chao’s discussion. There is no contradiction in the documents. There is no reason to suggest
the Chinese fishermen were lying about where they had been fishing that day or where they
commonly fished, “a little beyond Pulo Pikong and this side of Pedro Branco”. The fishermen
requested assistance from the Singapore authorities to protect them from attacks by subjects of the
Temenggong and from excessive levies exacted for fi shing. Colonel Cavenagh read the Chinese
complaint as being that they had been attacked in the area of PBP, and his response was to tell the
Temenggong to sort it out. This contrasts with the British treatment of fishing incidents in waters
within the 10-mile limit around Si ngapore. In those instances the British authorities reminded the
Temenggong in no uncertain terms that he and his subjects could not interfere with British subjects
in Singapore waters. Cavenagh’s le tter clearly shows that he did not consider the waters around
PBP were British. Nor is there any suggestion in the correspondence, unlike that concerning the
Temenggong’s licensing and levies for fishing in Singapore waters, that the Temenggong was not
entitled to operate a licence or levy a system for fishing in the area “a little beyond Pulo Pikong and
this side of Pedro Branco”.
6
CR 2007/28, p. 35, para. 27; RS, App. B, para. 20. - 16 -
3. The British and Singapore legislation prior to 1980
8. My third point concerns the British and Singapore legislation on which Singapore relies.
In fact it either supports Malaysia’s position or is neutral.
The 1852 and 1854 legislation
9. Singapore attempts to confuse the clear meaning of the 1852 and 1854 legislation which
established the Straits Lights System and provided th e collection of light dues to defray the cost of
Horsburgh lighthouse and other lights.
10. Mr.Bundy argued that some significan ce can be derived from the difference in
legislative treatment of PBP and 2½ Fathom Bank and that this was explained because Britain had
7
sovereignty over PBP and not over 2½ Fat hom Bank Light, which was a floating light . His
statement ⎯ which I will not read ⎯ is at paragraph40 of his speech (CR2007/29, p.17). It is
true that there is a difference in language, but Mr.Bundy’s explanation for it, that Britain was
sovereign over PBP but not over 2½ Fathom Bank light, can only be explained as a fit of acute
Pedrobrancism. A light buoy, like a lightship, is not a fixture: it is a moveable and there is no need
to legislate specially for property in it. Whether located on the high seas or in territorial waters, it
belongs, like a ship, to the person who installed it. All the legislation needed to do was to provide
for its management.
11. A further difficulty facing Mr.Bundy’s explanation is the 1912Ordinance which
repealed in part the 1854legislation. Section3 of that Ordinance, which is very similar to the
section of the 1852 and 1854Acts which vested the property of Horsburgh lighthouse in the
Government, reads as follows:
“The light-house known as the Horsburgh Light-house situate on the Island rock
called Pedra Branca at the eastern entrance of the Straits of Singapore and all such
other light-houses as are now established in or near to the Straits of Malacca or
Singapore together with the appurtenances thereof and all the fixtures apparatus and
furniture belonging thereto shall remain the property of and be absolutely vested in the
Government.” 8
By 1912 Singapore administered five lighthouses, two of them in Singapore, Sultan Shoal and Fort
Canning lighthouses, three not, Pulau Pisang, Cape Rachado and Horsburgh lighthouse. This, the
7
CR 2007/29, p. 17, para. 39 (Bundy).
8MM, Vol. 3, Ann. 90. - 17 -
section that I have read of the 1912 legislation, applied equally to all five. It is clear the
Government was vested with the property of all five lighthouses, irrespective of sovereignty.
Moreover, that legislation is clearly extraterritorial in effect, at least in part. It shows that the
alleged doctrine of colonial extraterritorial legislative incompetence ⎯ it is the first time I have
ever heard a Frenchman invoke the doctrine of colonial extraterritorial legislative incompetence, a
doctrine of extremely uncertain scope and one which was not established in British law until
1891 ⎯ was never applied to legislation concerning property over the Straits lights, whoever’s
territory those lights were located on. And I re fer the Court to the illuminating analysis of the
doctrine of colonial extraterritorial legislative incompetence by Professor O’Connell in the Law
Quarterly Review 9.
12. In any event the terms used in the Acts and Ordinances were not applicable to a light
buoy. The 1852 and 1854Acts refer to the “L ight-House, and the appurtenances thereunto
10
belonging . . .”, etc. . A mere light buoy does not have the ch aracteristics referred to. Similarly,
the 1912 Act does not include lights or beacons in the section on vesting property.
13. Last week SirElihu referred to the 1843Foreign Jurisdiction Act which allowed Great
11
Britain to legislate extraterritorially . Against this Mr. Bundy made two contentions.
14. I have already noted that the Act related to “power and jurisdiction acquired by Treaty,
Capitulation, Grant, Usage, Sufferance, and other lawful means”. We have shown that permission
was granted by Johor to build and operate the lighthouse. The Act is apt to cover such a case.
15. Secondly, Mr.Bundy states that the 1852law did not refer to the Foreign Jurisdiction
Act. But at common law the validity of an act do es not depend on its citing the source of power,
accurately or otherwise, a point made in passi ng by Lord Hoffman in relation to the British
Settlements Act in the Pitcairn Island case 12. The 1912 Singapore Ordinance makes no reference
to the source of power, yet on any view it has some extraterritorial application.
9See D. P. O'Connell, “The Doctrine of Colonial Extra-Territorial Legislative Incompetence” (1959) 75 LQR 318,
324.
10
MM, Vol. 3, Anns. 84 and 85.
11
CR 2007/24, pp. 49-50, para. 53; CR 2007/26, p. 46, paras. 36-37 (Lauterpacht).
12(2006) UKPC 47, para 11. - 18 -
16. You will find in your judges’ folder, for those of you who wish to pursue this arcane
topic further, an index to enactments relating to India compiled under the orders of the Government
of India. You will see ⎯ this is at tab177 ⎯ several references to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act:
the Government in India was clearly enabled to act under the 1843Act, which was very sensible
given the wide diversity of territorial arrangements encompassed under the rubric of “British
India”.
The lights dues legislation
17. I turn to the lights dues legislation. Mr. Bundy sought to cast doubt on the unambiguous
13
meaning of the 1957 and 1958 Acts . At issue is the change in wording from the 1957Act,
“navigational aids in the waters of the Colony” to the wording in the 1958 Act, lighthouses, buoys,
beacons and other navigational aids “in Si ngapore”‘ distinguished from Pedra Branca ⎯
Horsburgh ⎯ and Pulau Pisang, which are not in Singapore.
14
18. Mr.Bundy relied on a letter from the Singapore Master Attendant . The letter by
Mr. Rickard is hopelessly confused: it treats a lighthouse as if it were itself sovereign territory, as
distinct from the rocks on which it stands. But in any event it cannot prevail over the clear wording
of the Act.
19. Secondly, Mr.Bundy relies on the explan ations given in the Singapore Legislative
15
Assembly in relation to the changed wording of the 1958 Act . This speech does not mention
PBP, it refers only to Pulau Pisang. A speech wh ich does not mention the effect of the changed
wording for PBP and Horsburgh has no implications for present purposes. In accordance even with
modern principles of English statutory interpretation 16 ⎯ let alone those applicable at the time ⎯ it
cannot be used to affect or vary the plain meaning of the legislation in accordance with its terms.
20. The Acts speak for themselves. They do not demonstrate sovereignty over PBP, in fact
they do the opposite. Moreover, as I have said, it was for Britain, subsequently Singapore, to make
a claim for sovereignty over PBP ⎯ and you do not make a claim for sovereignty by internal
1CR 2007/29, pp. 20-21, paras. 52-55 (Bundy).
14
Singapore’s judges’ folder, Vol 2, tab 26.
1Ibid., tab 27.
1Cf. Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart (1993) AC 593. - 19 -
correspondence with a Master Attendant. To bracket Horsburgh with Pulau Pisang and to
distinguish them from lighthouses in Singapore is an odd way to make a claim to territorial
sovereignty.
4. An overall appreciation of British conduct over 115 years
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Singapore is fond of talking of the 150 years of the
administration of Horsburgh lighthouse. In fact mo re than twothirds of this time was the British
period and it is clear that Great Britain never anne xed or claimed the island and never acted as if it
17
was sovereign over it. This was the basis of Pavitt’s appreciation which I cited to you last week .
22. Mr. Bundy dismissed this in one sentence, no doubt because there was nothing more he
could say. Pavitt, Singapore’s Director of Marine, distinguished between navigational aids in
Singapore waters and those at Pedra Branca and Pula u Pisang. He continued: “Within Singapore
18
waters, the Board maintains Raffles, Sultan Shoal and Fullerton Lighthouses...” I will not
repeat what I said last week 19: it is sufficient to say that the meaning is clear and unqualified.
23. Mr.Bundy relies on a letter by Pavitt’s assist ant to discount Pavitt’s opinion, in effect
seeking to set the views of the subordinate against his experienced senior. But even if there was a
disagreement, the point is that it was Pavitt’s views which were published by the Singapore Light
Dues Board. The internal comments of his subordinate were not published until Singapore’s Reply
in this case. The further and central point is that what matters in this context is precisely published
comment, positions taken by Singapore or its o fficials in the public domain which reflect an
appreciation of Singapore’s role as lighthouse operator and/or as sovereign. And in this Britain
was consistent and Singapore was consistent after it until the critical date ⎯ and in the matter of
maps and legislation, long after.
17
CR 2007/26, pp. 69-70, paras. 47-51.
18
MM, Ann. 74.
19CR 2007/26, pp. 69-70, paras. 47-51. - 20 -
Conclusion
24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Singapor e has tried to dismiss the fact that Britain
never intended to acquire sovereignt y over PBP and in fact never did. But at every turn there is
clear evidence to this effect.
Mr.President, could I now ask you to call on Nico Schrijver to continue Malaysia’s
presentation?
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, ProfessorCrawford, for your
speech. I now give the floor to Professor Schrijver to continue the presentation.
Mr. SCHRIJVER: Thank you, Mr. President.
THE CONDUCT OF M ALAYSIA AND THIRD PARTY PRACTICE CONFIRM
M ALAYSIA ’S TITLE OVER THE THREE FEATURES
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, I now have the privilege of addressing
you on three issues in response to the interventions by Singapore in its second round. First, I will
deal with the conduct of Malaysia; secondly, w ith conduct by or involving third parties; and,
lastly, with the separate status of Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
I. Conduct of Malaysia
2. As to the conduct of Malaysia, Ms Malint oppi referred to what she called “a fundamental
20
inconsistency” in Malaysia’s pleadings, namely that we seek to demonstrate both an original title
and conduct reflecting the display of sovereignty over the three features. Mr. President, Malaysia
fails to see why this is contradictory.
3. During the first round of our oral pleadings, I distinguished five main categories of
Malaysian conduct with respect to the three features. These were:
⎯ concluding various treaties relating to ma ritime boundaries and management of marine
resources;
⎯ granting oil concessions;
⎯ issuing maps and charts;
20
CR 2007/29, p. 25, para. 2. - 21 -
⎯ enacting legislation; and
⎯ regulating fisheries and marine policing . 21
4. In its second round, Singapore labelle d these categories of conduct as “episodes” 22, but,
Mr. President, with the exception of the actual administration of the lighthouse, they were no more
episodic than the alleged British or Singaporean effectivités ⎯ in any event certainly prior to the
critical date.
5. Mr. President, I will now respond to Ms Malintoppi’s criticism of our examples of each of
these categories.
6. In the category of the conclusion of treati es, we have a difference of view regarding the
relevance of the Continental Shelf Agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia 23. The Agreement
was concluded in 1969, at the time when ⎯ in line with the emerging trends in the law of the
sea ⎯ nearly all coastal States also in the region ha d established a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea:
Indonesia, as early as 1960, Thailand in 1966, Malaysia in 1969. Singapore did not do so, since
there was no need in view of its semi-enc losed territorial waters. And Point 11 ⎯ the key point in
our discussions on the 1969 Continental Shelf Agre ement is only 6.4 nautical miles away from
PBP ⎯ already well within the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters generated by Pulau Batu Puteh.
7. MsMalintoppi claims that the 1969 Agreement “does not concern any of the disputed
islands which are not mentioned anywhere in its text” 24. But the following question immediately
poses itself: why should they? The brief 8-article Agreement relates to an extensive maritime area;
it does not mention any island. MsMalintoppi states: “By not including the area around Pedra
Branca, the parties to the Agreement recognized the fact that the island was not under the
25
sovereignty of either one of them.” This is quite a stretch of imagination, for two reasons. First
of all, Article 1 of the Agreement provides: “The boundaries of the Indonesian and the Malaysian
21
CR 2007/27, p. 12, para. 4.
22
CR 2007/29, p. 26, para. 4.
23CR 2007/29, p. 28, para. 11, and CR 2007/27, pp. 12-14, paras. 5-8.
24CR 2007/29, p. 28, para. 11.
25Ibidem. - 22 -
26
continental shelves in the straits of Malacca and the South China Sea are . . .” Second, the waters
surrounding the three features are covered by the Agreement.
8. Did the Agreement really not touch upon th e three features and the surrounding waters as
Singapore claims? On the screen ⎯ this graphic is also under tab 178 of your folder ⎯ we can see
Singapore Navy’s Patrol Sector F5 and the locati on of naval incidents depicted on the graphic
projecting the maritime boundary line at Point11 of the 1969 Continental Shelf Agreement
between Indonesia and Malaysia. Neither in 19 69 nor in 1975 did Singapore protest against the
Agreement as infringing on the territorial waters of PBP. The reason is simple: at the time
Singapore did not consider that it had any territorial interest in the area affected by the Agreement.
My 9. second category related to the granting of oil concessions 27. On Tuesday, Singapore
argued that “neither Pedra Branca, nor Middle Rock s, nor South Ledge are mentioned anywhere in
the Agreement” 28. Once again I pose the question: why should they? The area covered by the
concession included the area of the three features , as you can now see on the screen. It is also
under tab 179 of your folder.
M 10. third category was the issuing of maps and charts 29. By way of example, I referred
to the important Letter of Promulgation by Commodore Thanabalasingam and accompanying
chartlets. According to Singapore this letter of the Rear-Admiral and the attachments are “hardly
30
worthy of being described as a ‘display of sovereignty’ over Pedra Branca” . Moreover,
Singapore seeks to argue that this letter is inc onsistent with the conduct of Malaysia since no
request for the lowering of the ensign at the Horsburgh lighthouse was made, similar to the one
31
relating to the ensign at Pulau Pisang lighthouse . Earlier, my colleague SirElihu already
explained that the situation of Pulau Pisang is completely different from that of Horsburgh
lighthouse. And, as regards the 1968 letter, this was promulgated to the entire naval staff and fleet
commanders for their execution. The text of the letter and the accompanying chartlets were
26MM, Vol. 2, Ann. 16.
27CR 2007/27, pp. 14-16, paras. 9-15.
28
CR 2007/29, p. 28, para. 12.
29
CR 2007/27, pp. 16-17, paras. 16-21.
30CR 2007/29, p. 29, para. 14.
31Ibidem. - 23 -
32
available on each and every navy vessel . Each of the three features was included. As such it is
just another example of Malaysia’s display of sovereignty over its islands, its rocks, low-tide
elevations and maritime zones.
33
M 11. fourth category was the enacting of legislation , with special reference to the 1969
Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, by which the territorial sea of Malaysia was officially
extended from 3 to 12 nautical miles. On Tuesday , Singapore lamented, again, that “Pedra Branca
34
and its related features” are not mentioned at all . And I say again: why should they be
mentioned? None of the approximately 1,100 islands and rocks under the sovereignty of Malaysia
is mentioned. Furthermore, Singapore says “that the Ordinance does not specify the coast from
which the territorial sea is measured” 35. However, the Ordinance ma de specific reference to, as
well as even annexed, the relevant Articles of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, including those Articles addressing the issue of drawing the baselines.
L1am.ty, fifth category related to fisheries regulations and marine policing 36. The
official regulations of Malaysia also applied to the waters of the three features. They were
enforced by the Malaysian marine police and navy . Again, Singapore claims that there is no
documentary evidence of the regulation of fishing activities or of patrolling that is related
37
specifically to Pedra Branca . Obviously, Mr.President, this was not an area on which daily
reporting took place, but ⎯ as attested to in the affidavits of Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingam and
the two fishermen 38⎯ patrolling and fishing activities were c onducted. As to the legal effect of
private acts, such as fishing, Malaysia did not at all claim that they constitute conduct à titre de
souverain. Rather, they illustrate the perception of the economic users of the area that the waters
surrounding all three features belong to Malaysia. As such, they are pertinent for the present case.
32Affidavit of Rear-Admiral (rtd.) Dato' Karalasingam Thanabalasingam, CMM, Vol. 2, Ann. 4, p. 23, para. 69.
33
CR 2007/27, pp. 17-18, paras. 22-24.
34
CR 2007/29, p. 29, para. 15.
35CR 2007/29, p. 29, para. 16.
36See CR 2007/27, p. 18, paras. 25-27.
37CR 2007/29, p. 30, paras. 17-18.
38
Affidavit of Rear-Admiral (rtd.) Da to’ Karalasingam Thanabalasingam, C MM, Vol.2, Ann.4, pp.26-27,
paras.76-81; affidavit of Idris Bin Yu sof (translation), CMM, Vol.2, Ann.5, p.4, para.14; and affidavit of
Saban Bin Ahmad (translation), CMM, Vol. 2, Ann. 6, p. 4, para. 12. - 24 -
II. Practice by or involving third States
13. Mr. President, please allow me now to respond to Singapore’s arguments relating to the
conduct of or involving third States. I first of all would like to put on record that also in this final
stage Singapore failed to provide the Court with any example of third State recognition of
Singapore’s alleged sovereignty over one, let alone two or more of the three features. We can now
safely conclude that such third party recognition does not exist. The only piece of alleged evidence
that Singapore repeatedly mentions is the 2005 press release of the Philippines with respect to the
39
collision between two vessels at sea, “off Pedra Branca, Singapore” . My esteemed colleague
MsMalintoppi claims that “this document recognizes that Pedra Branca is part of Singapore’s
territory” 40. Apart from the fact that this singular incident took place 25years after the critical
date, MsMalintoppi opted for silence with respect to my question to clarify the meaning of this
alleged “recognition”, a word which is not used by the Philippines but only by Singapore itself.
14. MsMalintoppi also commented on various Dutch documents, some from the
41
nineteenth century, but others even dating back to the seventeenth century . Singapore continues
to argue that the particular episode in 1850 “rep resents evidence of the Dutch attitude that Britain
42
had sovereignty over Pedra Branca” . Mr. President, there is no need to repeat my four arguments
put forward during the first round, why the 1850 Dutch letter is certainly not an act of
recognition ⎯ a letter which, by the way, was not from the Dutch Resident, a high official in Riau,
43
as Ms Malintoppi in a minor mistake stated , but from the Dutch Secretary in Batavia. It is out of
all proportion to compare this brief correspondence ⎯ brief internal correspondence ⎯ between
two Dutch civil servants concerning the petty issue of extra payment for works carried out with the
official Letter of Promulgation of Rear-Admiral Thanabalasingam to his entire naval staff in 1968
concerning the extent of Malaysia’s territorial waters.
15. Furthermore, MsMalintoppi prompts me to make an observation on the translation and
44
the meaning of the Dutch word grondgebied . The English translation territory is not incorrect,
39CR 2007/29, p. 33, para. 27.
40
Ibidem.
41
CR 2007/29, pp. 31-32, paras. 21 and 23.
42CR 2007/29, p. 31, para. 22.
43CR 2007/29, p. 31, para. 21.
44CR 2007/29, p. 31, para. 22. - 25 -
but it should be noted that the word grondgebied has a rather generic meaning which can equally
be translated by the word area . Consultation in the Royal Library of the contemporary 1864
edition of the new dictionary of the Dutch language (Nieuw Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal)
45
provides other meanings of the word grondgebied, such as jurisdiction and city area . In sum,
there was nothing wrong with my colleague Sir Elihu using the expression “within the British
46
sphere of influence” .
16. Furthermore, it is simply not correct th at we “conveniently passed over in silence” the
47
1655 letter of the Dutch Governor of Malacca to the Netherlands East India Company in Batavia .
Professor Crawford provided an adequa te response during our first round 48. The gist of his
response, which I will not repeat, was that even if Singapore’s translation is more accurate, the
1655 Dutch letter shows that “the Dutch were careful not to antagonize the Johor ruler because of
his control over the Orang Laut, who could wr eak havoc on the shipping when they were not
49
fishing” .
17. As regards the practice of Great Britain, we can be very brief: both before and after
independence for Singapore there is not a shred of evidence that Great Britain perceived the three
features as forming part of Singapore. Full stop!
18. With respect to the practice, the interesting practice of Indonesia in the modern period, it
is simply a matter of fact that Indonesia in concluding three important treaties pertaining to
maritime boundaries with its neighbours had the firm perception that PBP, Middle Rocks or South
Ledge belonged to Malaysia ⎯ I am referring here to the 196 9 Indonesia/Malaysia Agreement
Relating to the Continental Shelves between the Two Countries, and to th
e 1970
Indonesia/Malaysia Territorial Seas Agreement, and to the 1973 Indonesia/Singapore
Agreement ⎯ note the title ⎯ Stipulating the Territorial Sea Boundary Line between Indonesia
and the Republic of Singapore.
45I. M. Calisch and N. S. Calisch, Nieuw woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal, Tiel: H. C. A. Campagne (1864).
46
CR 2007/26, p. 21, para. 45 (Lauterpacht); CR 2007/29, p. 31, para. 22 (Malintoppi).
47
CR 2007/29, p. 31, para. 23.
48See CR 2007/24, p. 61-2, para. 14.
49See CR 2007/24, p. 62, para. 15. - 26 -
19. From these instruments it follows that Indonesia not for a moment thought that another
State than Malaysia had sovereignty over the th ree features. As your predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, observed in the Eastern Greenland case of 1933 with regard to
treaties entered by Denmark with third States: “To the extent that these treaties constitute evidence
of recognition of her sovereignty over Greenland in general, Denmark is entitled to rely upon
them.” (Legal Status of Eastern Greenland , Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53 , p. 52.)
Likewise, Malaysia is entitled to rely upon treati es that constitute evidence of recognition of its
original title over PBP, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
20. Finally, Mr.President, there was no response from Singapore to Malaysia’s rather
extensive review of inter-State co-operation in the Straits aimed at ensuring maritime safety and
security of all shipping and commerce and protecting and preserving the marine environment
50
within the area of co-operation, including the relevant waters around PBP .
III. The separate status of Middle Rocks and South Ledge
21. Mr.President, distinguished Members of th e Court, in the final part of my speech, I
would like to turn to the issue of the separate status of Middle Rocks and South Ledge. In the
eighth point of his speech, Professor Koh reasserted that “for reasons of proximity, geology, history
51
and law, the three features are inseparable” . As Professor Koh knows, the number eight (“ba” in
the Chinese language) is normally a lucky number. Not this time.
22. First of all, proximity, as demonstrated in the first round, is not an argument 52. Mr. Chao
nevertheless asserted that on proximity I “quite erroneously cited dicta” from the Eritrea/Yemen
Arbitral Award 5. However, Singapore’s assessment of wh ether or not the Award is relevant
misses the point. PBP, Middle Rocks and South Ledge lie clearly outside the coastal belt of
Singapore. For Singapore there is no issue of proxi mity. Had the three features been lying within
the coastal belt of Singapore, it could have sought to make the argument that the features belonged
to Singapore. But as the Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen case observed, “there is no like
50CR 2007/27, p. 29, para. 61.
51
CR 2007/29, pp. 58-59, para. 9.
52CR 2007/26, p. 27, para. 16.
53CR 2007/28, p. 23, para. 18. - 27 -
54
presumption outside the coastal belt, where the ownership of the islands is plainly at issue” . And
here, Mr. President, the sovereignty over PBP, Middle Rocks and South Ledge is “plainly at issue”.
Therefore, Singapore cannot rely on the extension of its territorial waters from PBP, if its
sovereignty over PBP is not established.
23. As to geology , Singapore is right in observing that “the issue is not whether Pedra
55
Branca, Middle Rocks, South Ledge and Singapore Island form a group” . If so, indeed,
Singapore might seek to satisfy its apparent aspir ations of becoming an archipelagic State under
Part IV of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the S ea. However, the only issue is whether PBP,
together with Middle Rocks and South Ledge, form one group. As argued by Malaysia, this cannot
be concluded from the mere fact that the three feat ures have the same rock type. Contrary to what
Singapore claims, it is pertinent to point out that the mainland and other maritime features in the
area, including rocks at Point Romania and at Pulau Bintan in Indonesia, share the same geological
characteristics as well.
24. And with respect to navigation, in the second round of oral pleadings, Singapore
advanced the new proposition that “what determines whether a navigable channel exists is whether
commercial maritime traffic can safely use that route” 56. At this point, the argument by Singapore,
57
Mr. President ⎯ to use its own terminology ⎯ becomes “surreal”. For it would mean that a
channel would be navigable only if tankers or bulk carriers of a specific tonnage could pass through
them. Mr.President, this would be subjecting the description of the physical characteristics of a
channel to purely economic cons iderations, substituting nature by commerce. Singapore then
suggests that “[n]o prudent mariner will navi gate commercial vessels through such waters” 58.
However, the simple reason why commercial vessel s do not pass through the waters between PBP,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge is that this would lead to a longer route in comparison to the
straight passage through the Middle Channel.
54
Eritrea/Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Territorial Sovereignty and
Scope of the Dispute), 9 Oct. 1998, 114 ILR 1, pp. 123-124, para. 474.
55
CR 2007/28, pp. 23-24, para. 20.
56CR 2007/28, p. 24, para. 22.
57Ibidem.
58CR 2007/28, p. 24, para. 23. - 28 -
25. With regard to passage between Middle Rocks and South Ledge, Singapore now agrees
that there is a navigable channel. However, Singapore now alleges that passage is only possible
“provided both features are plainly visible, allowing a pilot to steer clear of South Ledge by sight”.
59
And at high water, according to Singapore, it would be dangerous . Singapore, however, ignores
that what matters with respect to passage through a channel is, above all, its depth. And the
channel is certainly deeper at high water than at low water. It is as simple as that. And whether or
not SouthLedge is visible is today hardly re levant now that most vessels are equipped with
Global-Positioning Systems (GPS) and other navigational aids.
26. In sum, the three features do not necessarily share the same fate. In accordance with the
Special Agreement between the Parties, your Court has been requested to pronounce on the
sovereignty of Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge individually, and not on the
sovereignty of the three features as a group. Jo hor had an original title over each of the three
features individually.
27. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this concludes my intervention on the conduct of
Malaysia and third party practice which confirm Malaysia’s original title over PBP, Middle Rocks
and South Ledge. I thank you for your kind atte ntion to my pleadings during these weeks and,
Mr. President, could I now respectfully ask you to call upon my colleague Professor Kohen.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank you, Professor Schrijver, for your
pleadings and call on Professor Kohen. You have the floor, Sir.
M. KOHEN :
L ES NOUVELLES BASES DE REVENDICATION DE SINGAPOUR
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les juges, dans son second tour de plaidoiries, Singapour
s’est vu obligée de développer un nouvel argumentaire juridique. Si formellement la «prise de
possession licite au nom de la Couronne britannique» est toujours là, l’accent n’est plus mis sur
l’acquisition d’un titre originaire par la Grande-Bretagne sur une terra nullius. Non. Maintenant, il
est question soit d’une renonciation de la Malaisie à son titre originaire, soit de l’établissement de
59
CR 2007/28, pp. 24-25, para. 25. - 29 -
la souveraineté par des prétendues effectivités qui devraient l’emporter non seulement sur un titre
originaire malaisien, mais même sur un éventuel titre originaire du sultan de Riau-Lingga 60!
Ainsi, il n’y a rien d’étonnant à ce que Singapour vous invite maintenant à trancher l’affaire sans
61
vous prononcer sur les titres originaires que les Parties elles-mêmes ont avancées .
2. Je comprends les doutes de la Partie adve rse à l’égard du titre qu’elle a invoqué. La
Malaisie n’éprouve pas les mêmes craintes. La Cour jugera de la cohérence et de la pertinence de
l’un ou de l’autre des titres revendiqués par les Parties.
3. Je me propose maintenant d’examiner ce qu’est dans la croyance de Singapour la pièce
maîtresse de son dossier : la lettre du secrétaire d’Etat suppléant de Johore du 21 septembre 1953,
qu’elle qualifie à tort de renonciation au titre ancien 62 et de reconnaissance du titre britannique
63
originaire . Nous prenons acte toutefois que Singa pore ne revendique pas cette lettre comme
valant un titre ou même comme constituant la racine d’un titre 64.
A. La correspondance de 1953
4. Singapour est confrontée à des problèmes insurmontables pour pouvoir tirer de cet
échange de correspondance le profit qu’elle prétend. Ces problèmes, les voici :
a) la personne des correspondants eux-mêmes ;
b) l’information transmise par le requérant de l’information ;
c) le contenu de la réponse et
d) le comportement des parties après l’échange de correspondance.
a) La personne des correspondants
5. Il convient de rappeler la nature à l’or igine triangulaire de cette correspondance. Le
secrétaire colonial de Singapour s’adressa au conse iller britannique de Johore, lequel à son tour se
tourna vers le secrétaire d’Etat suppléant de Johor e. La qualité des personnes qui interviennent est
d’une nature tout à fait particuliè re. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que Singapour est une colonie
60 CR 2007/28, p. 46, par. 21.
61
CR 2007/29, p. 51, par. 26 .
62
CR 2007/29, p. 41, par. 1 et p. 47, par. 16.
63 CR 2007/29, p. 47, par. 17.
64 CR 2007/29, p. 47, par. 16. - 30 -
britannique et que Johore une composante de la Fédération de Malaya, entité protégée du
Royaume-Uni. Comme l’a clairement expliqué TanSriGani hier, les questions relatives à la
conduite des affaires étrangères ⎯y compris les relations avec des composantes de l’Empire
65
britannique ⎯, ne relevaient pas des membres de la Fédération . Les questions de souveraineté
territoriale, inutile de le dire devant votre Cour , relèvent des affaires étrangères des Etats. Car,
malgré ce qu’ait pu croire un fonctionnaire colonial local, et malgré le fait que l’Etat protecteur de
l’une (la Fédération de Malaya) et la puissance co loniale de l’autre (Singapour) soit le même
⎯ le Royaume-Uni ⎯, Johore et Singapour ne constituaient pas des composantes d’un même Etat.
6. Alain Pellet lui-même a affirmé que c’était au Chief Secretary de la Fédération de Malaya
d’y répondre 66. Malheureusement pour Singapour, ce n’était pas lui ou même une autre autorité de
la Fédération qui a répondu, mais le secrétaire d’ Etat suppléant de Johore. Cet élément est déjà
décisif pour écarter toute valeur juridique en matiè re de souveraineté territoriale à la réponse du
secrétaire d’Etat suppléant. Nous sommes donc très loin d’une situation semblable à celle du
ministre norvégien des affaires étrangères Ihlen devant l’ambassadeur danois dans l’affaire du
Groënland oriental (Statut juridique du Groënland orient al, arrêt, 1933, C.P.J.I. série A/B n o 53,
p.71). Si comparaison il y a, cela devrait être plutôt avec la «lettre Hoffman» dans l’affaire du
Golfe de Maine , dont l’analyse de votre Cour a déjà été citée par mes amis NicoSchrijver et
67
Penelope Nevill (Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 307-308, par. 139).
b) L’information transmise par le requérant d’information
7. Singapour reconnaît que la demande d’information contenue dans la lettre Higham du
12 juin 1953 partait d’un faux postulat : que Pulau Batu Puteh avait été cédée par Johore en 1844.
C’est la Partie adverse elle-mêm e qui invoque l’existence d’une erreur. Mais Singapour vous dit
que «cette erreur tient à l’ajout manuscrit erroné de «Pedra Branca» sur une annexe qui, en réalité,
concernait PeakRock» 68. Pas du tout, Monsieur le président . C’est la lettre Higham elle-même
65
CR 2007/30.
66
CR 2007/29, p. 43, par. 8.
67CR 2007/27, p. 22, par. 36 (Schrijver) ; p. 35, par. 19 (Nevill).
68CR 2007/29, p. 43, par. 6. - 31 -
qui le dit. Je cite les passages pertinents de la lettre, que vous avez dans vos dossiers à
l’onglet 180 :
«It appears this rock [Pedra Branca] is outside the limits ceded by Sultan
Hussain and the Dato Tumunggong to the East India Company with the island of
Singapore in the Treaty of 1824 (extract at «A»). It was however mentioned in a 69
dispatch from the Governor of Singapore on 28th November 1844 (extract at «B»).»
8. L’erreur se trouve donc dans la demande d’information e lle-même, pas seulement dans
l’annexe ou par le fait que quelqu’un ait précisé dans cette annexe que «thisRock» signifiait
«PedraBranca». Par ailleurs, que l’on lise l’annexe avec ou sans l’additif «[PedraBranca]», le
résultat sera le même. La lettre fait croire que Johore avait cédé Pedra Branca en1844. Le fait
fondamental, qui vicie la demande d’information e lle-même et donc la réponse qu’elle induit, est
que la lettre Higham reposait sur une information erronée. En fait, il n’y a rien d’extraordinaire à
ce qu’un fonctionnaire d’un Etat protégé fasse conf iance de ce que l’informe son conseiller de
l’Etat protecteur. Le Royaume-Uni ne pouvait pas profiter d’une réponse obtenue de l’un des ses
sujets protégés, sur la base d’une information fausse qu’il lui avait transmise. En fait, j’avais déjà
évoqué cela lors du premier tour de plaidoiries, mais Singapour a préféré ne pas analyser cet
70
élément essentiel de la question lors de son second tour.
c) Le contenu de la réponse
9. Comme on le sait, la réponse laconique, sans aucune explication, ni quant au fond ni quant
aux démarches entreprises, est que «the J ohore Government does not claim ownership of
Pedra Branca» 71.
10. Singapour insiste que le mot «propriété» doit être compris comme synonyme de
«souveraineté» 72. Pour ce faire, la Partie adverse évoque plutôt ce qui relève du souhait de certains
fonctionnaires coloniaux à Singapour, à savoir la possibilité que la colonie étende ses eaux
territoriales. Mais ce qui compte, aux fins d’in terpréter la réponse, c’est plutôt ce que l’on a
suggéré au secrétaire d’Etat suppléant de Johore de faire. En effet, le secrétaire du conseiller
69Lettre du 12 juin 1953 adressée au conseiller britannique de Johore par J. D. Higham (MM, vol. 3, annexe 67 ;
MS, vol. 6, annexe 93) ; les italiques sont de nous.
70
CR 2007/25, p. 61, par. 84, CR 2007/29, p. 42-43, par. 6.
71
MM, vol. 3, annexe 69 ; MS, vol. 6, annexe 96.
72CR 2007/29, p. 44, par. 9. - 32 -
britannique à Johore évoque que le secrétaire d’Etat voudra bien consulter le commissaire des
domaines et des mines ainsi que le géomètre en chef [Commissioner for Lands and Mines and
Chief Surveyor]. Il évoque aussi ⎯ mais vaguement ⎯ toute autre archive existante, mais le fait
73
est que les seules autorités concernées qui y sont nommément citées sont ces deux là .
11. Monsieur le président, on ne consulte pas le commissaire des domaines et des mines ou
le géomètre en chef s’il s’agit de questions de souveraineté. Je le répète, la question de
souveraineté n’était même pas du ressort du secrét aire d’Etat. La seule chose pour laquelle le
commissaire du domaine et le géomètre en chef pouvaient donner des avis c’était précisément la
propriété, pas la souveraineté. On nous dira que dans le cas de Pulau Pisang il y avait une écriture
notariale [«indenture»]. Fallait-il qu’il y en ait eu une à PBP aussi ? Non, M onsieur le président.
On l’a vu pour PulauPisang: entre 1885, année de la permission du sultan, et 1900, année de
l’écriture notariale, il n’y avait que la permissi on du sultan à la construction le phare, sans que cela
ne signifie que Johore était le souve rain de l’île et la Grande-Bre tagne propriétaire du phare et des
installations connexes. La Malais ie vous a déjà expliqué les rais ons de cette écriture et je ne
reviendrai pas sur la question 74. Donc, on ne pouvait pas déduire de la seule absence d’une écriture
notariale que Johore n’avait pas la souveraineté sur PBP.
12. La réponse du secrétaire d’Etat suppléant ne peut se lire que comme désignant ce que le
mot signifie en termes juridiques. Propriété, non souveraineté. Par ailleurs, ce n’est pas la
première fois que la question de la propriété de t oute une île est ventilée devant votre prétoire. La
question s’est également posée dans l’affaire du différend El Salvador/Honduras , où il est
mentionné la vente par le Honduras des îles ElTi gre et ZacataGrande à des ressortissants des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique, à peu près à la même époque de la construction du phare Horsburgh. Bien
évidemment, il s’agissait de la propriété et non de la souveraineté, la quelle restait hondurienne
(Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et ma ritime, (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua
(intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 568, par. 352).
73
MS, vol. 6, annexe 95.
74CR 2007/26, p. 43, par. 26, aussi RM, par. 319-323. - 33 -
13. Le plus que Singapour puisse tirer de cette lettre est donc que Johore ne revendiquait pas
la propriété sur l’île, sur laquelle la présence du phare
ne laissait à vrai dire rien de disponible en
matière de propriété foncière.
14. Poursuivons encore notre analyse. Supp osons un instant, que nos amis et adversaires
aient raison, quod non, et que le mot «propriété» doive se lire comme «souveraineté». Supposons
encore, quod non, que le secrétaire d’Etat suppléant de Johore ait pu engager son Etat, déjà membre
d’une fédération, et donc la Fédération elle-même. Cela fait vraiment beaucoup à supposer,
Monsieur le président, mais fais ons quand même l’exercice. Comparons alors ce que le secrétaire
d’Etat suppléant de Johore a dit en1953 avec l’anal yse que votre Cour a faite dans l’affaire de
l’Interhandel sixans plus tard. La Cour, dans cette affaire, n’a pas donné d’importance à une
position claire prise au cours des échanges diplomat iques par l’une des parties et à son détriment,
mais qui ne correspondait pas à la réalité. En effe t, la Suisse faisait valoir que les Etats-Unis
eux-mêmes avaient admis que la compagnie Interha ndel avait épuisé les voies de recours internes.
Selon votre Cour :
«Il est vrai que les représentants du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis avaient émis
cette opinion à plusieurs reprises et notamment dans l’aide-mémoire annexé à la note
du secrétaire d’Etat du 11 janvier1957. Cette opinion reposait sur une appréciation
qui s’est révélée mal fondée. En réalité, la procédure que l’Interhandel avait introduite
devant les tribunaux des Etats-Unis était alors en cours.» ( Interhandel (Suisse
c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 27.)
15. C’est une note du secrétaire d’Etat des Etats-Unis (donc d’une personne spécialement
habilitée pour représenter les Etats-Unis, y compris pour conclure des traités en leur nom). Je
suppose que, malgré l’identité des noms des de ux fonctionnaires, nos amis de Singapour ne
voudront pas nous faire croire que le secrétaire d’Etat suppléant de Johore disposait des mêmes
prérogatives sur le plan international que le secrétaire d’Etat des Etats-Unis d’Amérique ! Même si
l’on pourrait prêter à ses propos la portée que veut Singapour, son affirmation serait donc «une
opinion qui s’est révélée mal fondée». En témoi gne le comportement qui a suivi, tant de la
Malaisie que celui de Singapour, comme nous le verrons dans quelques instants.
16. Dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine , la Cour n’a pas accepté non plus que des affirmations
étasuniennes, pourtant claires, relatives à la ligne médiane comme critère de délimitation aient fixé
une fois pour toutes la position du gouvernement de Washington : - 34 -
«il est peut-être vrai que l’attitude des Etats-Unis en matière de limites maritimes avec
le voisin canadien s’est caractérisée jusq u’à la fin des années soixante par des
incertitudes et par un certain manque de cohé rence. Cette remarque n’empêche pas
toutefois de constater que les faits allégués par le Canada ne permettent pas de
conclure que le Gouvernement d es Etats-Unis aurait par là reconnu une fois pour
toutes la ligne médiane comme limite des juridictions sur le plateau continental.»
(Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine
(Canada/Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p.307, par.138; les
italiques sont de nous.)
17. Que dire donc de la prétendue renonciation au titre de Johore que Singapour croit déceler
ici? Dans l’affaire des Pêcheries, votre Cour a placé la barre très haut pour pouvoir dégager un
abandon de la position propre ou l’acquiescement de celle de l’autre partie: «[O]n ne saurait
s’appuyer sur quelques mots empruntés à une note isolée pour en conclure que le Gouvernement
norvégien se serait départi d’une attitude que ses actes officiels antérieurs avaient nettement fixée.»
(Pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 138.)
18. Je connais l’objection de nos amis singa pouriens: Quelle attitude antérieure, nous
diront-ils ? Ni plus ni moins, Messieurs les juges, que l’autorisation donnée par Johore pour ériger
le phare Horsburgh. C’est au fond une question de bonne foi aussi. Cent cinquante ans de service
d’un phare pour lequel on a reçu une permission ne changent rien quant à la situation juridique
existante.
19. Dans la même affaire des Pêcheries :
«La Cour estime qu’il n’y a pas lieu d’ attacher trop d’importance aux quelques
incertitudes ou contradictions, apparentes ou réelles, que le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni a cru pouvoir relever dans la pr atique norvégienne. Elles s’expliquent
assez naturellement si l’on prend en considération la diversité des faits et des
situations au cours de la longue période qui s’est écoulée depuis 1812, et ne sont pas
de nature à modifier les conclusions auxquelles la Cour est arrivée.» (Ibid.)
20. Il y a encore d’autres affaires territorial es portées devant votre Cour dans lesquelles les
questions de souveraineté et de propriété étaient présentes, parfois entremêlées, mais ont toujours
été différenciées par vous. J’ai déjà mentionné le Différend frontalier (Bénin/Niger) à propos de la
75
propriété des ponts . J’ajoute aujourd’hui la citation suivan te tirée de votre arrêt dans l’affaire de
Certaines parcelles frontalières, qui peut, à certains égards, être d’un grand intérêt dans cette
affaire :
«La valeur à attacher aux actes invoqués par les Pays-Bas doit s’apprécier en
tenant compte du système complexe d’enclaves entremêlées qui existait. Les
75
CR 2007/27, p. 59, par. 40. - 35 -
difficultés que rencontrait la Belgique à découvrir les empiétements sur sa
souveraineté et à exercer celle-ci sur ces deux parcelles, entourées comme elles
l’étaient par le territoire néerlandais, sont manifestes. Dans une large mesure, les actes
invoqués sont des actes courants et d’un caractère administratif, accomplis par des
fonctionnaires locaux et sont la conséque nce de l’inscription par les Pays-Bas des
parcelles litigieuses à leur cadastre, contrair ement à la convention de délimitation.»
(Souveraineté sur certaines parcelles front alières (Belgique/Pays-Bas), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 229 ; voir RM, par. 289-292.)
d) Le comportement ultérieur des parties montre que rien n’a changé par rapport au titre
originaire
21. Singapour invoque que le contexte de la lettre Higham est constitué par la possibilité
d’étendre les eaux territoriales de Singapour pour y inclure les eaux autour de PBP. Pour nous,
c’est plutôt ce qu’on a demandé au secrétaire d’Et at suppléant de faire: aller regarder du côté du
commissaire du domaine et des mines et du géomètre en chef.
22. Admettons un instant, pour le besoin de la plaidoirie, que Singapour ait raison sur ce
point. L’évaluation de l’attitude des Parties au su jet des espaces maritimes sera alors de la plus
grande importance. S’il est vrai que Johore avait renoncé à son titre de souveraineté et que
Singapour s’est fiée à cette renonciation, le comportement des parties qui s’en est suivi devrait le
témoigner. Regardons donc ce que chaque partie a fait. La puissance coloniale d’abord, et
Singapour ensuite, d’un côté ; la Fédération de Ma laya avant et après son indépendance en 1957 et
sa transformation en Malaisie en 1965, de l’autre.
23. Que s’est-il passé au sujet des espaces maritimes ? La puissance coloniale a-t-elle étendu
la mer territoriale de Singapour pour inclure les eaux autour de PBP, comme le réclamaient les
deux agents britanniques sans succès? Non. Sing apour, a-t-elle étendu sa mer territoriale après
son indépendance ? Non. Singapour a-t-elle inclus les eaux autour de PBP lors de la délimitation
de la mer territoriale avec l’Indonésie dans le détroit de Singapour 76? Pas du tout. Au contraire, la
législation singapourienne relative aux phares a conti nué de traiter ensemble la situation du phare
Horsburgh et de celui de Pulau Pisang, les diffé renciant ainsi de ceux se trouvant dans les eaux
territoriales de Singapour, comme il ressort du Li ght Dues (Amendment) Ordinance 1958 et du
Singapore Light Dues Act 1969 77.
76
CR 2007/26, p. 71, par. 56.
77
CR 2007/26, p. 56-57, par. 4-7. - 36 -
24. Et que voit-on de l’autre côté du détroit de Johore ? La Malaisie a inclus les eaux autour
des trois formations dans sa mer territoriale, comme en atteste la lettre de promulgation du
commodore Thanabalasingam de 1968 78. Et, Monsieur le président, s’il y a un Etat qui a pris en
considération PBP aux fins de me surer l’étendue de son plateau c ontinental, cet Etat c’est la
Malaisie, pas Singapour, comme le démontre le fait que le point11 de la délimitation avec
l’Indonésie de 1969 se trouve à 6,4 milles nautiques de l’île, en fait, PBP étant le territoire le plus
proche du point 11 79. A cela s’ajoute qu’il n’y a eu qu’un seul Etat à inclure les trois formations
80
objet du différend dans une concession pétrolière en 1968 et que cet Etat c’est encore la Malaisie .
25. La pratique subséquente en matière d’ espaces maritimes permet donc de tirer deux
conclusions par rapport à la correspondance de 1953 :
a) que loin d’avoir abandonné sa souveraineté sur PBP, Middle Rocks et South Ledge, la Malaisie
l’a fait valoir dans l’aspect qui, compte tenu de leur caractère exigu et de leur nature, est le plus
important qui soit: en les prenant en consid ération aux fins de l’ étendue de ses espaces
maritimes ;
b) que la puissance coloniale d’abord, les autorités autonomes ensuite et enfin celles de la
République de Singapour, ont toujours fa it la sourde ore ille aux souhaits du Chief Surveyor et
du Master Attendant exprimés avant et après l’échange de correspondance. En effet,
contrairement à leur souhait, Si ngapour n’a jamais proclamé, ni n’a revendiqué avant la date
critique, une mer territoriale autour de Pulau Batu Puteh.
26. La similitude entre la prétention de Si ngapour d’une renonciation malaisienne due à la
correspondance de 1953 et la prétention nigériane d’un abandon de souveraineté du Cameroun à
Bakassi est frappante, à la différence près que Si ngapour ne peut même pas se targuer de quelque
véritable effectivité qui soit avant la date critique. Votre Cour rejeta la thèse du Nigéria se référant
aux négociations en vue de la délimitation d es espaces maritimes et l’octroi de concessions
pétrolières par le Gouvernement camerounais, «témoignant encore du fait qu’il n’avait pas
abandonné son titre malgré une présence nigériane significative sur Bakassi ou toutes effectivités
78
MM, annexe 76.
79
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia Relating to
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the Two Countries, 27 October 1969 : MM, vol. 2, annexe 16
80CR 2007/27, p. 14-16, par. 9-15. - 37 -
nigérianes contra legem » ( Frontière terrestre et maritime en tre le Cameroun et le Nigéria
(Cameroun c.Nigéria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2002 , p.416,
par. 223).
27. Le comportement subséquent des Parti es en matière d’espaces maritimes offre donc un
démenti catégorique à la thèse de Singapour d’une renonciation à la souveraineté malaisienne. Au
contraire, ce comportement démontre non seulement que la Malaisie a exer cé sa souveraineté sur
PBP, Middle Rocks et South Ledge, mais aussi que Singapour ne s’est pas comportée comme
souverain ni n’a réagi quand la Malaisie l’a fait.
28. Examinons maintenant les efforts de m on ami Alain Pellet pour tenter d’expliquer la
formule employée par l’Attorney-General, «we can claim [Pedra Branca] as Singapore territory» 81.
Tout d’abord, il a incorrectement traduit cette form ule, prétendant que cela voulait dire en français
«nous avons une revendica tion». Monsieur le président, pe ndant ces deux semaines je vous ai
infligé de suivre mon anglais de temps en temps et je m’en excuse, mais je crois être en mesure de
prétendre que la bonne traduction de «we ca n claim [Pedra Branca]» est plutôt «nous pouvons
revendiquer [Pedra Branca]» et non «nous avons une revendication». La réalité, à ce stade terminal
des plaidoiries, nous la savons déjà : il n’y avait même pas de revendication de souveraineté car le
Gouvernement britannique n’a jamais eu l’intention d’acquérir la souveraineté sur PBP.
Mr. President, maybe you wish to make a stop at this point.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Yes, I do wish to have a brief break for about
10 minutes. Thank you.
The Court adjourned from 4.25 p.m. to 4.55 p.m.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. It escaped me to thank you,
Professor Kohen, for your pleadings and I do so belatedly. Now . . . Oh, you have not finished. I
am so sorry!
81
CR 2007/29, p. 45, par. 11-12. - 38 -
M. KOHEN :
B. Il n’y a eu ni renonciation du titre ni acquiescement à une que
lconque
revendication singapourienne
29. Monsieur le président, les conditions po sées par le droit international pour établir un
abandon sont strictes, comme il ressort de la jurisprudence : primo, la renonciation ne se présume
pas ; secundo, elle doit être interprétée restrictivement et limitée à l’objet précis visé ; tertio, même
si l’on admet la possibilité d’une renonciation tacite, elle doit s’induire de faits qui n’admettent pas
une autre interprétation dans les circonstances d’espèce 82. Les affaires des Phares en Crète et à
Samos et du Groënland oriental que les Parties ont abondamme nt citées devant vous en
contiennent des exemples en matière de souveraineté territoriale, dans lesque ls la Cour a rejeté
l’idée d’une renonciation ou abandon ( Phares en Crète et à Samos, arrêt, 1937, C.P.J.I. série A/B
o o
n 71, p. 103-104 ; Statut juridique du Groënland oriental, arrêt, 1933, C.P.J.I. série A/B n 53,
p. 47).
30. Dans la présente affaire, la prétendue renonciation de 1953 n’en est pas une. Je résume :
⎯ premièrement, le secrétaire d’Etat suppléant de Joho re n’avait pas la capacité d’engager qui
que ce soit en matière de souveraineté territoriale ;
⎯ deuxièmement, la demande formulée par Higham, indiquant que Johore avait cédé PBP en 1844
contenait donc une sérieuse erreur qui ôte à la démarche toute efficacité juridique ;
⎯ troisièmement, le secrétaire d’Etat suppléant, après s’être informé auprès du commissaire du
domaine et des mines et du géomètre en chef, informe que Johore n’a pas la propriété sur Pedra
Branca ;
⎯ quatrièmement, la pratique subséquente des parties montre que la Fédération de Malaya et la
Malaisie non seulement n’ont pas abandonné le titre originaire, mais l’ont au contraire exercé.
Cette pratique montre également, que malgré les souhaits du Chief Surveyor et du Master
Attendant de Singapour, les organes compétents n’ont jamais étendu la mer territoriale de
Singapour autour des eaux de PedraBranca. Il en va de même du souhait du prédécesseur
82Affaire Campbell (Portugal/Royaume-Uni), sentence arbitrale du 10 juin 1931 (RSA, vol. II, p. 1156). - 39 -
lointain de M.Chao, l’ Attorney-General : «nous pouvons revendiquer PedraBranca» disait-il,
mais le fait est que ni le Royaume-Uni ni Singapour l’ont fait.
31. Pourquoi les autorités de l’époque ⎯ nous sommes dans les années 1950 ⎯ ne l’ont pas
fait ? Peut-être peut-on trouver l’ explication dans la position que le Royaume-Uni lui-même avait
avancée ici-même dans l’affaire des Minquiers et des Ecrhéous. Le Gouvernement britannique
écarta toute valeur, aux fins de la souveraineté, aux aides à la navigation. Par la même occasion, il
expliqua qu’il n’avait aucune ra ison de protester du fait que la France assurait l’établissement des
bouées et l’illumination des Minquiers, même à l’intérieur des 3 milles marins des îlots.
32. En voici l’explication :
«His Majesty’s Government have not objected to the establishment of these
buoys, being unwilling, unless in case of absolute necessity and in rebuttal of a direct
claim of right, to assert British sovereignty in opposition to a work of public utility
which per se prejudiced in no way British interests.» ( C.I.J. Mémoires, Minquiers et
Ecréhous (Royaume-Uni/France) , vol.1, p.555 (Extract from Foreign Office
Memorandum of 17 August 1905 to the Fren ch Government cited by the United
Kingdom in its Reply, 3 November 1952.))
33. Cette position du gouvernement britanni que exposée devant votre propre Cour
correspond à la même époque de celle de la correspondance de 1953. On peut ainsi mieux
comprendre l’absence de réaction des autorités br itanniques compétentes aux appels de certains
fonctionnaires locaux d’étendre la souverainet é à PBP du fait du service du phare. On peut
également comprendre les raisons pour lesquell es cet échange de correspondance peu orthodoxe,
n’a pas eu de suites. On peut également comprendre pourquoi l’argument de l’absence de
83
protestation durant cent trente ans avancé par RodmanBundy n’a aucune pertinence . Nous
persistons : comme la propre position officielle britannique le montre , il n’y avait rien à protester.
Un siècle et demi de service du phare ne permet pas de transformer un titre de propriété en titre de
souveraineté.
34. Prétendre une telle interversion unilatérale de titre équivaut à saper les bases mêmes de la
confiance réciproque entre les Etats et bouleverse la sécurité juridique. Je me suis déjà référé à la
situation dans laquelle une puissance mandataire voulait transformer unilatéralement son titre
d’administrateur en titre de souveraineté et à la manière dont votre Cour a rejeté cette prétention 84.
83
CR 2007/29, p. 23, par. 62.
84CR 2007/25, p. 62-63, par. 89. - 40 -
35. Inutile de répéter devant vous le dictum devenu classique de la relation titres/effectivités
que vous appliquez systématiquement dans votre jurisprudence relative au contentieux territorial
(Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986 , p. 586-587,
par. 63). Je me contenterai de dire que l’invitati on de Singapour à trancher l’affaire sur la base de
prétendues effectivités, sous couvert d’évoquer les hypothèses de l’absence de titre ou d’un titre
imprécis, dissimule mal son objectif de renverser la solution que vous avez fournie dans le cas où le
fait ne correspond pas au droit : il y a lieu de préférer le titulaire du titre.
36. «La Cour fait droit au principe ex injuria jus non oritur » (Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
(Hongrie/Slovaquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p. 76, par. 133), avez-vous affirmé il y a une
décennie. Personne ne saurait valablement se prév aloir d’un comportement qui dépasse l’étendue
de ses compétences pour créer de nouvelles compétences, pour transformer un fait contraire au
droit en droit. Ni l’échange de correspondance de 1953, ni les comportements ultérieurs des Parties
n’ont modifié la situation juridique existante au moment de la construc tion du phare Horsburgh, à
savoir Johore était le souverain sur Palau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge.
37. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, et vous prie de bien vouloir donner la parole à
ma collègue Penelope Nevill.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank you, Professor Kohen, for your
pleadings and give the floor to Ms Nevill. You have the floor, Madam.
Ms NEVILL:
S INGAPORE S CONDUCT AND THE MAP EVIDENCE
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, my brief presentation today will respond to the
points made by Singapore in its reply concerning Singapore’s conduct after 1965 and the map
evidence. - 41 -
I. Singapore’s lack of relevant conduct
2. In reply, Singapore made reference to Professor Crawford’s “machine-gun” attack on its
85
conduct, as if this was a point in its favour . But if we shoot at so many targets, it is because
Singapore has provided so many. It has performed many works in its administration of the
lighthouse, as well as a very limited number which it claims are non-lighthouse related. It lists
these repeatedly and at great length ⎯ as if to make up through the public words of counsel the
paucity and privacy of the facts. Malaysia has responded in detail to these claims of conduct in its
written and oral pleadings and, the Court will be relieved to hear, I will not do so again now.
3. Singapore attempts to elevate its lighthouse -related conduct to sovereign acts by reference
to Malaysia’s diplomatic protests in respect of the installation of a Vessel Traffic Information
System (VTIS) radar station in 1989 and a helicopter pad in 1991, comparing these instances to the
86
lack of protest of lighthouse-related activities before 1980 . Mr.Bundy said that experience is
something someone acquires after one needs it. Ce rtainly, it was only after the dispute arose in
1980 that Malaysia acquired the experience that Singapore considered its activities administering
the lighthouse as conduct à titre de souverain . Singapore’s position was contrary to Malaysia’s
understanding of the basis of Singapore’s activities on PBP. In light of the nature of the dispute,
which had by then arisen, it is hardly surprising that Malaysia protested such conduct. According
to Singapore, Malaysia is damned when it does not protest and damned when it does. But
Singapore cannot make non-sovereign, lighthouse -related activities into sovereign activities by
some reverse inference from protests made in these circumstances.
4. From his discussion of post-critical date protests, Mr.Bundy went on to say that the
constellation of activities Singapore carried out is more than enough to support the conclusion or
the inference that Singapore regarded itself as possessing sovereignty over PBP. The problem for
Singapore is that if it did regard itself as possessi ng sovereignty over PBP, as distinct from being
the administrator of the lighthouse on it, it did a ra ther poor job of showing it. In fact, one might
say it did not do the job at all. As we have shown, there is nothing in Singapore’s territorial sea
85
CR 2007/29, p. 20, para. 50 (Bundy)
8CR 2007/29, pp. 22-23, para. 59 (Bundy). - 42 -
delimitation with Indonesia, its 1969 Lights Dues legi slation, or in other representations of itself
after 1965 and before 1980 that PBP was Singapore territory.
5. Singapore’s reply to the point about its failure to delimit a territorial sea in the area of PBP
in its 1973 Agreement with Indonesia was to refer to an “authoritative study on maritime
87
boundaries” by Charney and Alexander of 1993 . Although Malaysia has already responded to
the arguments made by Singapore in its written pleadings 88, Singapore’s reply calls for some
comment. The first point to note is that the Ch arney and Alexander study was published well after
the critical date, and the authors note Singapore’s dispute over PBP with Malaysia in terms which
suggest that they have been advised on the matter by Singapore 89. But this is a relatively minor
point. The main point is that Singapore’s re ference to a 1993 secondary text on international
maritime boundaries cannot possibly answer its failur e in the agreement itsel f to either delimit
territorial seas with Indonesia in the area of PBP, or to reserve its position in this respect. If PBP,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge are considered by Singapore to lie in the entrance of Singapore
Straits, as Singapore has said 90, then the Agreement would have delimited the territorial sea
between it and Pulau Bintan in Indonesia. After all, the full title of the Agreement is the
“Agreement Stipulating The Territorial Sea B oundary Lines Between Indonesia and the Republic
of Singapore in the Strait of Singapore” 91. And it should be stressed that there was nothing
prospective about the conflict of maritime clai ms: in1973 Indonesia had already asserted a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea. Singapore cannot point to any aspect of the Agreement itself which
supports its reply that future delimitation was left open 92.
6. Regarding Pavitt’s representation that PBP was not in Singapore waters, Singapore says in
93
reply that he in no way said that Pedra Branca belonged to Malaysia . This rather ignores the
point that Pavitt ⎯ then Singapore’s long-standing Director of Marine ⎯ said, in effect, that the
87CR 2007/29, p. 25, para. 32 (Malintoppi).
88
RM, Vol. 1, paras. 324-328.
89
CMS, para. 6.70, citing Charney J. and Alexander L. (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1 (1993),
p. 1050.
90
For example, CR 2007/20, p. 18, para. 8; p. 19, para. 13 (Koh); p. 26, para. 19 (Chao).
91MM, Vol. 2, Ann. 18.
92CR 2007/29, p. 32, para. 25 (Malintoppi).
93
CR 2007/29, p. 22, para. 57 (Bundy). - 43 -
island did not belong to Singapore, in spite of wh at his assistant may or may not have thought, as
suggested by the internal corres pondence. Pavitt’s external statem ent, in a publication published
94
by the Singapore Light Dues Board, is clear : it indicates that PBP does not lie in Singapore
waters.
7. Nor did Singapore in reply explain its failu re to include PBP in representations of its
territory in the lists of its islands and islets in the Singapore Facts and Pictures publications and
elsewhere. Instead it cited from the Taba Award in which the Tribunal said, regarding the
omission of a boundary pillar from the 1909 Statistical Yearbook for Egypt, that the evidentiary
value of such publications is low 95. In that case, however, the Egyptian-Israeli boundary pillar
claimed by Egypt was marked on maps and trig lists published by Egypt and Britain during the
Mandate period 96. To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, omitting a boundary pillar from one edition of a
yearbook may be regarded as misfortune; to omit an entire island from all lis ts of islands and all
maps of your own territory for a period of over 140years looks like more than just carelessness.
The cumulative evidential effect of such omissions must be considerable.
8. If we compare Singapore and Malaysia’s conduct after 1965, Singapore cannot point to
any oil concessions being granted which include th e area of PBP, cannot point to any documents,
internal or otherwise, which show PBP and th e two features generating Singapore waters, cannot
point to territorial waters legislation including the waters of PBP, and cannot point to any
delimitations with third States which take PBP into account, or even to any reservation of rights in
that regard.
II. The map evidence
9. Looking now to the map evidence, Singapor e argues that Malaysia’s treatment of the
maps is inconsistent, on the one hand, inviting the Court to assign we ight to maps when Malaysia
thinks they support its case, but, on the other, ask ing it to disregard the six Malaysian maps which
97
Singapore alleges show PBP as appertaining to Singapore . Singapore misunderstands Malaysia’s
94See CR 2007/26, pp. 69-70, paras. 47-48 (Crawford).
95
CR 2007/29, p. 21, para. 56 (Bundy); Award of 11 September 1986, 27 ILM 1427.
96Ibid., p. 120, para. 235.
97CR 2007/29, p. 33, para. 28 (Malintoppi). - 44 -
argument. What Malaysia said is that the maps do not in fact show PBP as belonging to Singapore,
but show Horsburgh lighthouse as belonging to Singa pore. Indeed, the maps show Batu Puteh as
part of Malaya and then Malaysia, having been designed so as to ensure it is depicted on these
topographical maps of the south-eastern part of J ohor, showing the cartographers appreciation that
PBP, Middle Rocks and South Ledge are part of Johor. The maps do not support Singapore’s
claim because they cannot be read as the unequivocal statements of political attribution or
geographical fact which Singapore repeatedly asserts they are.
10. It is therefore a misapprehension to say, as Singapore suggested in reply, that “Where the
Parties disagree is on the role to be assigned to the official maps issued by Malaysia supporting
Singapore’s claim” 98, because this is not simply a disagreement over the role to be assigned to
these maps in law. Even so, the authorities on which Singapore relies call for some comment.
Singapore cites Max Huber’s general discussion of maps in the Island of Palmas Award. It
evidently wants the Court to focus on one aspect of his discussion, that official maps would be of
special interest when they do not assert the sovereig nty of the Government that issued them. The
maps produced by the United States in that case included maps published by the Netherlands which
99
excluded the Island of Palmas from Dutch possessions . Yet, in spite of the general proposition on
the weight of such maps, nothing turned on the maps in the outcome 100. Singapore again referred
101
to the discussion of disclaimers in the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Award . The
question there was the admissibility of the maps, the tribunal ending the discussion cited by
Singapore with the observation that although it might influence the weight to be assigned to it, a
102
disclaimer did not exclude a map’s admissibility . Malaysia has never disputed the admissibility
of the so-called admission against interest maps in this case, and it produced the maps in question
in its Memorial.
98
CR 2007/29, p. 34, para. 29 (Malintoppi).
99
Island of Palmas (Netherlands/USA), 4 April 1928, RIAA 831, Vol. II, pp. 853-854.
10Ibid., pp. 853-854.
10CR 2007/29, pp. 38-39, para. 45 (Malintoppi).
10Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding the delimitation of the Border between the State
of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1 January 2001, 41 ILM 1057, p. 1077, para. 3.28. - 45 -
11. Finally, as to the fact that no maps of Singapore exist prior to 1995 which portray PBP as
part of it, Singapore responds that the maps ar e not political maps, PBP is very small and
uninhabited, the maps’ geographical scope is limited and, in any event, none of the maps of
103
Singapore indicate that PBP belongs to Malaysia . Not one of these points disguises or
adequately answers why Singapore did not publish any maps, political or otherwise, showing PBP,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge as belonging to Singapore.
12. If, as we have established, Malaysia has original title to PBP, and Horsburgh lighthouse
was built and maintained with the consent of Johor, then it is necessary at some determinate time
prior to the critical date for Singapore to make an adverse claim to PBP. The fact is it never did
so ⎯ and the complete absence of Singapore maps before 1995 is one amongst several indications
of this.
13. In short, Singapore’s conduct in resp ect of PBP does not evidence its claim of
sovereignty, and this is supported by its failure, in its mapping conduct and in other key respects, to
act consistently with an understanding that it had sovereignty over PBP, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your continued attention. Mr. President,
can I ask you to call on Professor Crawford.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I th ank you, Ms Nevill, for your pleadings and
now give the floor to Professor Crawford.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Sir, the promises of counsel are not to be trusted! Yesterday I promised
you an early minute. I have to say, I think the early minute has already been taken and if you will
forgive me, I will go relatively slowly in this speech, even if it means that I trench on supper time.
THE PARTIES ’CLAIMS AND THE C OURT ’S JURISPRUDENCE
1. In its second round this week, Singapore went to great pains to present Malaysia’s claims
as unprecedented. It was suggested by Mr. Bundy that the Court had never decided in favour of a
103
CR 2007/29, p. 38, para. 43 (Malintoppi); p. 58, para. 8 (Koh). - 46 -
104
State in Malaysia’s position . I thought I would respond, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to
that suggestion by taking you through your jurisprudence and by providing guidance based on your
jurisprudence in relation to original title. I will do that by looking first at the Island of Palmas case
and then at your four most relevant decisions in contentious cases.
Part I. The jurisprudence of original title
Island of Palmas (1928) 105
2. So, starting with the Island of Palmas case. It was, of course, decided at a time when the
idea of the legal personality of indigenous kingdoms ⎯ I should say, non-European indigenous
kingdoms ⎯ tended to be devalued, and post-colonial effectivités were sometimes seen as the only
relevant consideration. Yet just as the British di d customarily deal with native rulers such as the
Temenggong or the Imam of Muscat, acquiring sove reignty through, not in despite of them, so
arbitrators had regard to their transactions, whether they referred to them as treaties or contracts.
These were themselves effectivités of the indigenous States or en tities. The Crawfurd Treaty was
an effectivité of our Johor, not of the Sultan of Lingga ⎯ which is why Singapore gave it so little
air time this week. Yet you are asked to say ⎯ by Singapore, the direct descendant of the
Crawfurd Treaty ⎯ that Johor should be so remarkably eff ective in the centre of the Straits and so
ineffective and non-existent at their eastern entrance!
3. In short, in order to ground their soverei gnty, the Powers which acted in this region had
recourse to cession agreements concluded with local authorities. This enabled Max Huber to assert
in the Island of Palmas case: “From the time of the discoveries until recent times, colonial territory
has very often been acquired, especially in the East Indies, by means of contracts with the native
106
authorities.” In that case, the decisive factor was that the Netherlands could prove that the
islands neighbouring Palmas ⎯ and they were not very close to it ⎯ were under their suzerainty
by virtue of contracts concluded between the Dutc h East India Company and the local princes, and
107
that the Island of Palmas, Miangas, depended on those princes . The Island of Palmas is an
10CR 2007/28 pp. 63-4, para. 9 (Bundy); CR 2007/29 p. 13, para. 25 (Bundy).
105
(1928) 2 RIAA 829.
10Ibid., 858.
10Ibid., pp. 857, 865-869. - 47 -
isolated mid-oceanic island, as you can see on your screen. But it was not terra nullius and it was
attributed to the Netherlands principally on the basi s that it fell within the scope of “contracts with
the native authorities”.
Minquiers and Ecrehos (1953)
4. I turn to the first of your Court’s decisions that I will review, theMinquiers and Ecrehos
case (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953 , p.47). Your Judgment is perhaps known for the following
statement, quoted by Singapore ⎯ and I quote: “What is of decisive importance . . . is not indirect
presumptions deduced from events in the Middle Ag es, but the evidence which relates directly to
the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups.” (Ibid., p. 57) Now, the contrast you drew in
that passage was between “indirect presumption s” and “direct evidence”, and it is entirely
appropriate, but it calls for the following comments.
5. As to the Minquiers and Ecrehos case itself:
⎯ First, despite that remark, the Court paid great attention to the actual evidence and transactions
of the Middle Ages, including transactions governed by feudal law, not international law. I
note especially your discussion of the Charter of 1203, which is, as far as I know, the most
authoritative discussion by a modern court of the institution of “frankalmoin” ⎯ (la franche
aumône) (ibid., pp. 60-62) ⎯ that there is an existence.
⎯ Second, the Court was not reluctant to draw inferences from the transactions which were
relevant to the outcome of the case, provided the inferences were “necessary or natural” (ibid.,
p. 66).
⎯ Third, the parties agreed, and the Court accepted, that the islands and rocks were not terra
nullius (ibid., pp. 52, 53).
⎯ Fourth, the dismemberment of the Duchy of Normandy in 1204, not a recent date, could not be
presumed to have established a French original title But this was not because of any a priori
reason, it was due to the incomplete, tem porary and partial implementation of that
dismemberment, as well as many subsequent contrary treaties (ibid., p. 57).
⎯ Fifth and finally, for that reason France had no original title. Britain did have original title over
both groups, and its original title in the case of the Ecrehos dated to the Middle Ages. It was - 48 -
expressly upheld (ibid., p. 67 (Ecrehos); ibid., p. 70 (Minquiers)). Given that both original title
and preponderant effectivités favoured Great Britain, no issue of conflict between them arose.
6. As to our case, by contrast with Minquiers and Ecrehos:
(a) First, we are concerned with the first half of the nineteenth century, and with transactions
governed by international law, not by feudal law or adat law.
(b) Second, substantial sources of evidence are available including expert evidence adduced by
Malaysia, as to the history.
(c) Third, it is, with all respect to my colleagues opposite, obvious that PBP was not terra nullius.
(d)Fourth, the dismemberment of the old Ki ngdom of Johor is well documented and was
accompanied by transactions recognizing the original title of Johor to islands in the Straits. It
was fully implemented. The continuity of that situation was, in turn, expressly recognized by
Great Britain in 1927 and Singapore in 1995.
Libya/Chad (1994) 108
7. I turn to the second of your cases, Libya/Chad: I need spend very little time on it. Libya
claimed an original tile by succession to lands to the south of a line described in a treaty of 1899
between Great Britain and France and unila terally drawn by France on the so-called livre jaune
map. Chad denied the existence of an original title although it eventually ⎯ through its counsel
Professor Higgins, as she then was ⎯ conceded that the disputed area, vast and remote, was not
terra nullius. But the Court found there was a subsequent treaty between Libya and France which
adopted the livre jaune line; that treaty title determined the matter and prevailed over whatever
109
might have been the legal status quo ante in the regions claimed by Libya . The Court, with what
seemed at the time to be considerable self-satisfaction, listed all the issues it did not need to decide.
I will revert to that when I talk about the issues that, in our respectful submission, you do need to
decide in this case.
10I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 6.
109
Ibid., pp. 38-39, para. 76. - 49 -
Indonesia/Malaysia (2002) 110
8. I turn to the next case, Indonesia/Malaysia. Not content with having been counsel for
Indonesia in that case, Professor Pellet then act ed more or less as counsel for Malaysia ⎯ but, I
111
think without fee! He gave you an extended account of Indonesia/Malaysia . I had already
analysed the key differences between the two and I am not going to repeat them 112. Let me take
just one contrast ⎯ a tale of two treaties. In Indonesia/Malaysia, Malaysia claimed a title of
succession from a third party, the United States, via a treaty, the 1930 Treaty, which both the
United States and Britain thought affected the two islands in dispute. But Indonesia was not a party
to the 1930 Treaty, and you protected Indonesia from its effects in accordance with the pacta tertiis
rule. Hence Malaysia had to prove its title as against Indonesia de novo, so to speak ⎯ which we
did, in significant part because the history of dealings in the region showed British and then
Malaysian involvement and Dutch and then In donesian non-involvement in these remote and
little-known islands. By contrast in the present case ⎯ as soon as it is established that the
Sultanates of Lingga and Johor adhered to the delimitation of sphe res of influence established by
the Anglo-Dutch Treaty ⎯ there is no third party . The delimitation of the Dutch sphere excluded
the three features; the correlative delimitation of the British sphere included them. The conduct of
all concerned made that clear. There was then an internal division within the British sphere,
immediately effected by the Crawfurd Treaty between the Honourable East India Company and
Johor, which dealt with islands in the Straits a nd left the three features to Johor. All these
transactions are opposable to Singapore as successor to Britain: the contrast is perfectly clear.
Nicaragua v. Honduras (2007)
9. Let me turn to your most recent decision, Nicaragua v. Honduras. The question whether
small off-shore islands were terra nullius was raised in that case as well and you said:
“the mere invocation of the principle of uti possidetis juris does not of itself provide a
clear answer as to sovereignty over the disputed islands. If the islands are not terra
nullius, as both Parties acknowledge and as is generally recognized, it must be
assumed that they had been under the rule of the Spanish Crown. However, it does
not necessarily follow that the successor to the disputed islands could only be
11I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 625.
111
CR 2007/29, pp. 47-56, paras. 18-39.
11CR 2007/27, p. 64, para. 5. - 50 -
Honduras, being the only State formally to have claimed such status.” 113 (Emphasis
added.)
It is “generally recognized” that the islands off the coast, such as those under discussion, which are
further from the coast than PBP, small and a pparently unknown to Nicaragua even in its
Application, were not terra nullius in 1821. “It must be assumed that they had been under the rule
of the Spanish Crown.” Why? Because Spain ha d sovereignty over the continent. Does this
assumption only apply to a colonial power such as Spain? Not to a long-standing non-European
States such as Johor? Is there any reason to believe that this assumption is only applicable in Latin
America, or in the context of uti possidetis, and not in Asia? The problem in Nicaragua v.
Honduras was that there was no Spanish attribution of the islands to one or other of the
administrative units. Here the Anglo-Dutch Tr eaty excludes any possible discussion about which
of the two Sultans had sovereignty.
Some conclusions from the jurisprudence
10. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this has been a compressed account, more
compressed than it might otherwise have been, but let me draw some genera l conclusions from this
brief review.
(a) The first is that each case depends on its own facts and claims; each case is its own case and
has to be decided on its own merits. The need for each party to prove its claims ⎯ applicable
in cases commenced by Special Agreement as well as unilateral Application ⎯ does not
produce, de jure or de facto, a presumption against original title. The State with the better title
prevails, it is as simple as that.
(b) Second, if either party has a clear treaty title opposab le to the other, then you give effect to that
title at once, ignoring any earlier original title whether derived from occupation of terra nullius
or from long-standing indigenous right, or whatever. That is what you did in Libya/Chad.
(c) Third, the mode of occupation applies only to terra nullius, as you said in Western Sahara.
The test for terra nullius is that set out in Western Sahara, a test of social and political
organization.
113
Judgment of 8 October 2007, para. 158. - 51 -
(d) Fourth, where the territory in question is not terra nullius, it still has to be shown that the
territory falls within the boundary of the claimant State or its predecessor: it might after all
have belonged to some third party, whether or not still existing.
(e) Fifth, if this cannot be shown, so that the position of the two claimant States is the same in
point of title, then the balance of effectivités prevails: that is the rule stated by the Chamber in
Burkina Faso/Mali 114. So in Indonesia/Malaysia, Malaysia could not show that the two islands
fell within the Sultanate of Sulu, thence Spain, thence the United States; so the 1930 Treaty, to
which Indonesia was not a party, or privy, could not be shown to have been Britain’s, thence
Malaysia’s, root of title. Hence effectivités prevailed, subject to the important point that the
history of dealing with the islands as between Britain and the United States shed considerable
115
light on the actual administration of the islands over a long period .
11. Mr.President, Members of the Court, Malaysia has shown that Great Britain and the
Netherlands proceeded on a basis of a division of the Sultanate of Johor, which had extended north
and south of the Straits and east and west of them too. The criterion of division was stated in
Article XII of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty. The Sulta n of Lingga and the Sultanate of Johor complied
with that division, reluctantly on both sides no doubt, but within a few years of 1824 it was
effective in the region. It established the criteri on for the allocation of territory between the Dutch
and the British spheres to which all concerned par ties adhered. Within the British sphere, Johor
included all the islands off its coasts, to considerable distances; certainly not limited to 3 nautical
miles. That is the lesson of the Ord Award, just as it is of the Kuria Muria Islands I showed you
yesterday. But above all it is the lesson of the Crawfurd Treaty. In denying to the Johor authorities
the capacity to deal with islands in the Straits, including uninhabited islands more than 3miles
offshore, Singapore denies both British practice and its own heritage.
12. In its reply, Singapore responded to this key argument in two ways.
13. First, it stressed the need for the explicit mention of the islands claimed 116. But they are
explicitly mentioned and shown as belonging to Johor, for example, in the 1842 official Dutch map
114
I.C.J. Reports 1896, pp. 586-587, para. 63.
11I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 683-684, para. 142.
11CR2007/20, p.47, para.7 (Pellet); CR2007/21, pp.10-11, paras.36-37 (Pellet) ; CR2007/28, pp.40-42,
paras. 9-12 (Pellet); CR 2007/28, p. 64, para. 13 (Bundy). - 52 -
and in the 1843 Singapore Free Press article. The British acknowle dged this when they sought
permission to build the lighthouse, as Marcelo Kohen has shown. But Mr. President, Members of
the Court, how often do you have to mention a clump of rocks before you cease to risk losing them
to the nearest foreign naval officer with a flag? There is no presumption of terra nullius; there is
no presumption of loss of territory ⎯ in fact, the presumption is the other way. Once it is clear
from the documents and the circumstances that particular features are included in a State ⎯
including an indigenous State ⎯ then other more general descriptions can be resorted to to
reinforce that position. The consistent refrain of “all the islands” in the statements I took you to the
other day 117remains relevant if, in terms or by clear implication, such statements cover the region
where the clump of rocks is located. There has to be a sufficient identification of particular
features as included in the State ⎯ and let us assume, for the sake of argument, that some specific
mention even of small geographical features is required, though it seems to me that assumption
should not be made. But even making it, here there is such mention, in official documents and
reliable statements of the period. And once we have it, concordant gene ral descriptions of the
extent of the State can also be taken into account . They do not cease to be evidence because they
fail to mention by name any one particular clump of rocks, given that they unquestionably include
them and given that the prior and subsequent history of dealing with offshore features of the Malay
Peninsula ⎯ the Crawfurd Treaty, the Ord Award ⎯ itself supports this conclusion. Counsel for
Singapore profess to be good at addition; in fact, th eir real speciality is subtraction, minimization,
the reduction of evidence, its reduction to absurdity.
14. Singapore’s second response is to resort to the argument of indeterminacy. For example,
the Agent, Mr. Koh said: “should the Court find that the title to Pedra Branca [was] indeterminate
118
at that time [i.e., 1847-1851], Singapore h as clearly shown that it has sovereignty” . But it is
necessary to distinguish between genuine indeterminacy, where some necessary proposition cannot
be established at all, and an argument which uses indeterminacy to undermine conclusions
reasonably reached on the evidence before the Court. The Court is not scared of inferences. The
former is acceptable and consistent with what the Chamber said in Burkina Faso/Mali and what
117
CR 2007/25, pp. 18-22, paras. 23-29.
11CR 2007/29, p. 59, para. 10 (Koh). - 53 -
you did in Nicaragua v. Honduras. In Nicaragua v. Honduras there was genuine indeterminacy
because neither party could show what the uti possidetis principle entailed offshore for the small
islets. Contrast this with a situation where ther e is a body of material before the Court, which on
the balance of probabilities, leads to a particular conclusion. The dossier is not silent: the position
might be arguable ⎯ anything is arguable with my colleagues opposite ⎯ but the balance
sufficiently clearly points one way rather than another. It is improper at that stage for a party,
having lost the argument on the substance, then to invoke indeterminacy and have a second bite at
the cherry ⎯ or if it was Mr. Bundy, it would be a second bite of the apple! After all, Singapore’s
119
case itself depends on inference, as Mr.Brownlie admitted . The determination of sovereignty
over very small features is not equivalent to a finding of guilt in a criminal case and there is no
room for a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Able counsel can cast doubt on virtually
every proposition. An approach treating indeterminacy as a joker in the forensic pack would be a
powerful solvent of territorial sovereignty.
15. Moreover, as you have observed, when it comes to the comparison of effectivités, rather
little may do, and there may be ⎯ there usually are ⎯ effectivités on both sides. It would be
incongruous if the especially rigorous standard applied to issues of primary title ⎯ the first stage of
the Burkina Faso/Mali test ⎯ but then a much looser and more indeterminate standard applied at
the second stage of comparison of effectivités . The same standard ⎯ reasonable demonstration on
the balance of the available evidence ⎯ should apply at both stages.
Part II. The issues for the Court
16. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this brings me to my second and, happily, even
briefer section of this presentation. There are in our view seven issues which the Court should
consider in this case. They can be seen on the screen and at tab183 in your folder. Let me take
you through the table.
17. For the reasons that I have explained, drawing on Libya/Chad, the very first question is
whether either Party has a treaty title opposable to th e other. The Parties ag ree that the answer is
no. But two comments are in order:
119
CR 2007/21, p. 35, para. 5. - 54 -
⎯ First, Singapore expressly does not rely upon a treaty title arising from the Johor consents of
1844, which were not a cession, or from the letter of 1953, which was not a cession and is not a
root of title.
⎯ Second, even in cases where there is no treaty title, the Court is sensitive as to the implications
that treaties, concluded by the competent authoriti es, may raise for any claim of original title.
In applying the Western Sahara test, you looked to external relations as well as internal
relations. Here the implications of the Treaties of 1824 support ⎯ powerfully support ⎯
Johor’s original title. But of course they do not create it.
18. As to the second question, the terra nullius question, in none of the five cases I have
discussed was it argued or held that the territory in question was terra nullius. A fortiori, a claim to
lawful occupation has never been held to prevail over original title.
19. As to the third question, we have explained at length why, if PBP was not terra nullius
in 1824 or 1847, it must have bel onged to Johor. This is not a case which is indeterminate in the
sense I have analysed above, in the proper sense of that term. Of course, Singapore says it is
indeterminate, but that is because their image is of Malaysia as a mere claimant to a title already
lawfully vested in them.
20. As to the fourth question ⎯ did PBP fall within the British zone under the 1824
Anglo-Dutch Treaty? ⎯ Singapore’s suggestion that PBP is in the Dutch zone is fanciful and
inconsistent with other aspects of the argument. It shows the extent to which they have been driven
by the recognition of the difficulty of their position.
21. As to the fifth and seventh questions ⎯ whether consent was given to the principal
effectivités in the case, that crucial question, and the issue of “confirmation of title” ⎯ these have
been authoritatively dealt with by my colleague Marcelo Kohen.
22. As to the sixth question, whether there was a public claim to sovereignty prior to the
critical date, we have shown beyond peradventure the absence of any public claim to PBP by Great
Britain in the period before 1962 and by Sing apore in the period between its separation from
Malaysia and the critical date. What can Singapore do in response? Produce letters from
subordinate officials in their Reply, which have never been published before. That being so there
was never any adverse possession to start with. - 55 -
23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I suggest with respect that to ask these questions in
this order is both logically and legally approte. Singapore jumbles them up: for example
Mr.Brownlie’s “lawful taking of possession” is a h ybrid of questions 2 and 6. You cannot have
occupation, in the legal sense, of features which were not terra nullius ⎯ but you can have control
of terra nullius without any intention to acquire sovereignt y. Mr. Brownlie’s approach to the case
fails on both grounds.
24. Counsel for Singapore this week tried to scare you by saying that a decision in favour of
Malaysia would be unprecedented. So would a decision in favour of Singapore. No State claiming
“by right or usance” ⎯ to borrow Lord Clarendon’s formula which I cited yesterday and which is
in tab167 ⎯ no State claiming “by right or usance” has ever been held to have lost its rights
merely by consenting to the use of its territory by another State. There is no case of a State
claiming what it says was terra nullius being held to have acquired s overeignty if the territory was
not in truth terra nullius. In other respects, too, Singapore’s case is unprecedented.
25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, j udges who are warned against setting precedents
have normally respondedin a robust manner ⎯ “that is our function”, they have said. I suggest,
with respect, that that is the appropriate response.
26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, may I thank the Court for its careful attention and,
Mr.President, ask you to call on the Agent to close Malaysia’s case and present its formal
submissions.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Professor Crawford, for your
speech. I now call on His Excellency Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Agent of Malaysia, to make
the closing statement on behalf of Malaysia.
KMAr. IR:
C LOSING STATEMENT BY THE A GENT OF M ALAYSIA
1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, the delegation of Malaysia values
greatly the opportunity it had in these three weks to explain to you Malaysia’s stand that
sovereignty over Pulau Batu Puteh; Middle Rocks; South Ledge, belongs to Malaysia. In these
closing remarks, I will not attempt yet again to summarize the extensive arguments already made - 56 -
by Malaysia’s counsel. But I do need to res pond to a few of the points made this week by
Professor Jayakumar.
On the question of the 1979 Map:
2. Professor Jayakumar suggested that the 1 979 Malaysian Map was a challenge to “the
existing legal order” 12. Later, the Agent for Singapore, Prof essorKoh, went so far as to call it
121
“infamous” . In fact Malaysia’s Map was a step to set out in a specific map, Malaysia’s
territorial waters and continental shelf boundaries, taking into account agreed boundaries with the
neighbouring countries, customary practice of bound ary delimitation and applicable principles of
international law. The purpose of the telegram of 20 December 1979 from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs addressed to Malaysian diplomatic missions abroad was to advise them that the Map was
not a fait accompli but a statement of position, accompanied by an express willingness by Malaysia
to negotiate any unresolved questions. The fact is that our colonial heritage had left us with
unresolved issues with all our seven neighbours ⎯ and the developing law of maritime jurisdiction
has added more. How else to resolve maritime and boundary issues than to set out a position after
due consideration and offer to nego tiate unresolved issues? It is a long process but it is an orderly
one. By contrast, Singapore never published maps showing what it now claims, and it negotiated
agreements with both Malaysia and Indonesia that ignored maritime boundaries it now claims. The
Court may decide for itself which of these two processes is preferable.
3. As to the stability of Malaysia’s relationship with Indonesia, in particular, the fact is that a
decision in favour of Singapore would impose anothe r maritime régime in the area, impacting on
existing maritime delimitation and jurisdiction betw een Malaysia and Indonesia. It would also
require a new territorial sea delimitation between Singapore and Indonesia, notwithstanding their
earlier Agreement. That brings into focus Singapore’s silence on its maritime claims.
4. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the operation of the lighthouse and
Singapore’s plans for the three features. In the fi rst round I said, and I now repeat, that Malaysia
has no wish to change the status quo in term s of the operation of the Horsburgh lighthouse.
120
CR 2007/28, p. 15, para. 18 (Jayakumar).
12CR 2007/29, p. 58, para. 5 (Koh). - 57 -
Professor Jayakumar alluded to the possibility of “some historic wrong” 122, but there was no such
wrong. I wish to underline that Johor’s consent for the construction and operation of the lighthouse
was sought and was willingly given, and in that r espect nothing has changed. The problem is of
recent origin. Singapore changed Britain’s longstanding policy ⎯ as reflected in Pavitt’s book 123
124
and in Singapore’s own Light Dues Act of 1969 . Singapore wants to redefine its status on Pulau
Batu Puteh by claiming sovereignty not only ove r Pulau Batu Puteh but also Middle Rocks and
South Ledge.
5. But, when Professor Jayakumar says that th is case is not about the right to operate the
lighthouse 125, that raises the question what it is about. You have heard about Singapore’s
reclamation plans ⎯ all Singapore says in response is that it is “a law-abiding country and is proud
126
of its record in this respect” . There is no specific denial of reclamation plans whatever ⎯ and I
would note that Malaysia was not even consulted by Singapore when Singapore commenced its
major reclamation works in the Straits of Johor without due regard for the boundaries of Malaysia
or the marine environment. And now ProfessorPe llet, counsel for Singapore, refers to the three
127
features as an “archipelago” , another questionable idea never suggested by Singapore before. So
the Court will, I hope, un derstand our concerns ⎯ which Singapore has done nothing to address
before you, but has in fact aggravated.
6. As to Singapore’s military presence, firs t Singapore admits having introduced military
radar communications equipment on PBP. Secondly, the so-called F5 patrol zone of 1975 bore no
specific relation to PBP at all. It was only since 1986 that a 24-hour guard has been mounted
around PBP. The effect is to make the region around the three features a no-go area.
Professor Jayakumar said, “Singapore has never arrested any Malaysian fishermen in Pedra Branca
128
waters” . The issue here is not about whether any Malaysian fisherman has been arrested: it is
122
CR 2007/28, p. 15, para. 16 (Jayakumar).
123
CR 2007/26, p. 68, para. 47 (Crawford).
124
CR 2007/26, p. 56, para. 5 (Crawford).
125CR 2007/28, p. 18, para. 31 (Jayakumar).
126CR 2007/28, p. 16, para. 21 (Jayakumar).
127CR 2007/23, p. 52, para. 13 (Pellet).
128
CR 2007/28, p. 17, para. 27 (Jayakumar). - 58 -
about Johor fishermen being completely prevente d from fishing anywhere near PBP, from taking
shelter on the island in bad weather and being deprived of their traditional fishing grounds.
7. With reference to the important letter of request from Governor Butterworth to build a
lighthouse on Johor territory: we have now heard, for the first time, that Singapore does not have
the Letters of Request from Governor Butte rworth. The proposal for a third round of
129
consultations ⎯ to which ProfessorJayakumar referred on Monday ⎯ was plainly not a
response to Malaysia’s specific enquiry in 1994. Nor does Malaysia have the Butterworth letters,
as we have said in our written pleadings. In all likelihood, the letters were received by the Sultan
and Temenggong in Singapore, where they were r esident at that time. Those residences in
Singapore are no longer there. Malaysian researcher s have searched all the Johor palaces in Johor
and the royal archive without success. So, what our counsel said about the letter last week is the
nearest, is the nearest the Court can come to the facts: I refer to the statements of Sir Elihu
130 131
Lauterpacht and Professor Kohen in this regard.
8. Then there is the issue of the 1953 letter from the Acting State Secretary of Johor. The
letter from the Acting State Secretary of Johor was manifestly not an instrument of cession or a
“disclaimer” of sovereignty because of its terms, and also because the Acting State Secretary of
Johor simply did not have the capacity to effect such a cession or disclaimer. Nor was it taken as
such at the time: it was never acted upon by either party. Singapore’s own uncertainty about the
letter ⎯ which is referred to, amongst other things, as a confirmation, a renunciation, a waiver, a
disclaimer and an estoppel ⎯ shows that Singapore cannot decide on any determinate view as to its
status. In fact, the 1953 letter had none.
Finally, I come now to my conclusion and submissions:
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as you will have observed, Malaysia has sought to
present its case fully and fairly. It has the vital in terests in security and co-operation in the region
of the Straits which I have mentioned already. But it has an equal interest in maintaining peaceful
and friendly relations between nati ons based on respect for international law. This is especially
12CR 2007/28, p. 14, para. 13 (Jayakumar).
130
CR 20007/24, p. 42, para. 35 (Lauterpacht).
13CR 2007/25, pp. 10-15, paras. 25-34 (Kohen). - 59 -
important for relations between immediate neighbours such as Malaysia and Singapore. That is
why Malaysia has come to this honourable Court to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute over
PBP, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
10. Many allegations have been made against Malaysia by our friends and colleagues
opposite. I have referred to certain points made by Professor Jayakumar last Monday which cannot
be left unanswered. Should there be any details left unaddressed, Malaysia reserves its position on
the points I have not dealt with expressly.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, on be half of the Government of Malaysia, counsel
for Malaysia, the Co-Agent and myself as Agent, I wish to thank you for your attention and interest
throughout this proceeding, as well as for the effici ency of the Registry. Likewise, we thank the
interpreters for a job well done.
12. I will now read Malaysia’s submissions:
Malaysia respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare that sovereignty over:
(a) Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh;
(b) MiddleRocks;
(c) SouthLedge,
belongs to Malaysia.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I thank the distinguished Agent for Malaysia.
The Court takes note of the final submissions which you have read on behalf of Malaysia, as it took
note on Tuesday 20 November of the final submissions of Singapore.
I am informed by Judge Keith that he wi shes to pose a question. A question addressed, I
believe, to Singapore, and I give him the floor.
Judge KEITH: Thank you, Mr.President. What response, if any, does Singapore wish to
make in reply to the submission made yesterday by the Attorney-General of Malaysia, expressly by
reference to provisions of the Johor Agreement of 1948 and the Federation of Malaya Agreement
of 1948, that the Acting State Secretary of Johor, to quote part of the submission, “was definitely - 60 -
not authorised” and did not have “the legal capacity to write the 1953 letter, or to renounce,
disclaim, or confirm title of any part of the territories of Johor”? Thank you, Mr. President.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Judge Keith. The written text of this
question will be sent to the Parties as soon as possible. Singapore is requested to provide its
written response to the question within one w eek as from the closure of the present oral
proceedings, that is to say, by Friday 30Nove mber 2007 at the latest. Any comments Malaysia
may wish to make, in accordance with Article72 of the Rules of Court, on the response by
Singapore must be submitted by Friday 7 December 2007.
This brings us to the end of these three weeks of hearings devoted to the oral argument in the
present case. I should like to thank the Agents, counsel and advocates for their statements. In
accordance with the usual practice, I shall request bo th Agents to remain at the Court’s disposal to
provide any additional information it may require. With this proviso, I now declare closed the oral
proceedings in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle
Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore).
The Court will now retire for the deliberation. The Agents of the Parties will be advised in
due course of the date on which the Court will deliver its judgment.
As we have no other business before us today, the sitting is closed. Thank you.
The Court rose at 6.05 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le vendredi 23 novembre 2007, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l'affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour)