97/15
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 1997
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 15 April 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Schwebel presiding
in the case concerning Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia)
_______________
VERBATIM RECORD
_______________
ANNEE 1997
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 15 avril 1997, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Schwebel, Président
en l'affaire relative au Projet Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros
(Hongrie/Slovaquie)
____________
COMPTE RENDU
____________ -2-
Present: Presidhentbel
Vice-PWeeeramantry
Oda Judges
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski
ValRegiastrarina -3-
Présents : M. Schwebel, Président
WeerVice-Pryésident
Oda MM.
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
jugeszek,
Skubijugewski, ad hoc
ValenMciGresffier, -4-
The Republic of Hungary is represented by:
H.E. Mr. György Szénási, Ambassador, Head of the International Law
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Dénes Tomaj, Ambassador of the Republic of Hungary to the
Netherlands,
as-Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law,
University of Cambridge,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the University Panthéon-Assas
(Paris II) and Director of the Institut des hautes études
internationales of Paris,
Mr. Alexandre Kiss, Director of Research, Centre National de la
recherche Scientifique (ret.),
Mr. László Valki, Professor of International Law, Eötvös Lorand
University, Budapest,
Mr. Boldizsár Nagy, Associate Professor of International Law,
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Reader in International Law, University of
London, School of Oriental and African Studies, and Global
Professor of Law, New York University,
Ms Katherine Gorove, consulting Attorney,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Dr. Howard Wheater, Professor of Hydrology, Imperial College,
London,
Dr. Gábor Vida, Professor of Biology, Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Dr. Roland Carbiener, Professor emeritus of the University of
Strasbourg,
Dr. Klaus Kern, consulting Engineer, Karlsruhe,
asvocates;
Mr. Edward Helgeson,
Mr. Stuart Oldham,
Mr. Péter Molnár,
asvisers; -5-
La République de Hongrie est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. György Szénási, ambassadeur, directeur du département du
droit international au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent et conseil;
S. Exc. M. Dénes Tomaj, ambassadeur de la République de Hongrie aux
Pays-Bas,
commeagent ;
M. James R. Crawford, professeur de droit international, titulaire
de la chaire Whewell à l'Université de Cambridge,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Assas
(Paris II) et directeur de l'Institut des hautes études
internationales de Paris,
M. Alexandre Kiss, directeur de recherches au Centre national de la
recherche scientifique (en retraite),
M. Lászlo Valki, professeur de droit international à l'Université
Eötvös Lorand de Budapest,
M. Boldizsár Nagy, professeur associé de droit international à
l'Université Eötvös Lorand de Budapest,
M. Philippe Sands, chargé de cours en droit international à
l'Université de Londres, School of Oriental and African Studies,
et Global Professor of Law à l'Université de New York,
Mme Katherine Gorove, juriste-conseil,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Howard Wheater, professeur d'hydrologie à l'Imperial College de
Londres,
M. Gábor Vida, professeur de biologie à l'Université Eötvös Lorand
de Budapest, membre de l'Académie des sciences de Hongrie,
M. Roland Carbiener, professeur émérite de l'Université de
Strasbourg,
M. Klaus Kern, ingénieur-conseil à Karlsruhe,
comameocats ;
M. Edward Helgeson,
M. Stuart Oldham,
M. Péter Molnár,
commenseillers ; -6-
Dr. György Kovács,
Mr. Timothy Walsh,
Mr. Zoltán Kovács,
as Technical Advisers;
Dr. Attila Nyikos,
assistant;
Mr. Axel Gosseries, LL.M.,
asanslator;
Ms Éva Kocsis,
Ms Katinka Tompa,
ascretaries.
The Slovak Republic is represented by:
H.E. Dr. Peter Tomka, Ambassador, Legal Adviser of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
asent;
Dr. Václav Mikulka, Member of the International Law Commission,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Emeritus Whewell
Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge,
Former Member of the International Law Commission,
asunsel;
Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor of International Law at the
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento,
United States of America, Former Member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X — Nanterre
and at the Institute of Political Studies, Paris, Member of the
International Law Commission,
Mr. W. Walter D. Sohier, Member of the Bar of the State of New York
and of the District of Colombia,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister, Member of the Bar of
England and Wales, -7-
M. György Kovács,
M. Timothy Walsh,
M. Zoltán Kovács,
comme conseillers techniques;
M. Attila Nyikos,
commesistant ;
M. Axel Gosseries, LL.M.,
commeaducteur;
Mme Éva Kocsis,
Mme Katinka Tompa,
commecrétaires .
La République slovaque est representée par :
S. Exc. M. Peter Tomka, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique du
ministère des affaires étrangères,
commeent ;
M. Václav Mikulka, membre de la Commission du droit international,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat;
M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite, ancien
titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'Université de Cambridge, ancien
membre de la Commission du droit international,
commenseil ;
M. Stephen C. McCaffrey, professeur de droit international à la
faculté de droit McGeorge de l'Université du Pacifique, Sacramento
(Etats-Unis d'Amérique), ancien membre de la Commission du droit
international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université de Paris X-Nanterre et à
l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris, membre de la Commission du
M. Walter D. Sohier, membre des barreaux de l'Etat de New York et du
district de Columbia,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., avocat au barreau d'Angleterre et
du pays de Galles, -8-
Mr. Samuel S. Wordsworth, avocat à la Cour au barreau de Paris,
Solicitor England and Wales, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Igor Mucha, Professor of Hydrogeology and Former Head of the
Groundwater Department at the Faculty of Natural Sciences of
Comenius University in Bratislava,
Mr. Karra Venkateswara Rao, Director of Water Resources Engineering,
Department of Civil Engineering, City University, London,
Mr. Jens Christian Refsgaard, Head of Research and Development,
Danish Hydraulic Institute,
as Counsel and Experts;
Dr. Cecília Kandrá_ová, Director of Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Lud_k Krajhanzl, Attorney at Law, Vyroubal Krajhanzl Skácel and
Partners Law Firm, Prague,
Mr. Miroslav Liška, Head of the Division for Public Relations and
Expertise, Water Resources Development State Enterprise,
Bratislava,
Dr. Peter Vršanský, Minister-Counsellor, chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Embassy of the Slovak Republic, The Hague,
asunsellors;
Ms Anouche Beaudouin, allocataire de recherche at the University
of Paris X — Nanterre,
Ms Cheryl Dunn, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Ms Nikoleta Glindová, attachée, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Drahoslav Štefánek, attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Assistants;
Ms Alexandra James,
ascretary. -9-
M. Samuel S. Wordsworth, avocat à la Cour, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Solicitor auprès de la Cour suprême d'Angleterre et du pays de
Galles,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Igor Mucha, professeur d'hydrogéologie et ancien directeur du
département des eaux souterraines à la faculté des sciences
naturelles de l'Université Comenius de Bratislava,
M. Karra Venkateswara Rao, directeur du Génie, section des
ressources hydrologiques, département du Génie civil, Université
de la ville de Londres,
M. Jens Christian Refsgaard, directeur de la recherche et du
développement à l'Institut danois d'hydraulique,
comme conseils et experts;
Mme Cecília Kandrá_ová, directeur de département, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
M. Lud_k Krajhanzl, avocat, membre du cabinet Vyroubal Krajhanzl
Skácel et associés, Prague,
M. Miroslav Liška, directeur de la division des relations publiques
et de l'expertise, entreprise d'Etat pour le développement des
ressources hydrauliques, Bratislava,
M. Peter Vršanský, ministre-conseiller, chargé d'affaires a.i. à
l'ambassade de la République slovaque, La Haye,
commenseillers ;
Mlle Anouche Beaudouin, allocataire de recherche à l'Université de
Paris X-Nanterre,
Mme Cheryl Dunn, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Mme Nikoleta Glindová, attachée, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Drahoslav Štefánek, attaché, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme assistants juridiques;
Mme Alexandra James,
commecrétaire.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The oral presentation of the
Slovak Republic resumes this morning and I call on Professor Mucha.
Mr. MUCHA:
Monitoring and Environmental Impacts of the Gabcíkovo
Section of the Project - 11 -
Mr. President, Members of the Court, my presentation today will be
brief. Its purpose is to complete main conclusions made by Mr. Mikulka
yesterday concerning Hungary's allegations as to adverse impacts of the
Gabcíkovo section of the Project by a few examples of how Hungary's
counsel have distorted the evidence to give an impression of adverse
impacts, in particular to water quality.
Bfutrst , in terms of the alleged groundwater level changes, I wish
to take a closer look on the Hungarian side of the Danube — in the
Szigetköz — comparing the pre-damming year 1992 with 1993, 1994, 1995,
and 1996 (after construction of the underwater weir). All the data on
which I shall base my conclusions are taken from Hungary’s data submitted
as part of the agreed Joint Monitoring Programme. The map of the wells in
Hungarian territory appears now on the screen (Judge's Folder No. 45).
The Court can see cross-sections 1 through 5 on this map on the Hungarian
side.
The Court can now see on the screen graphs of each of these
cross-sections covering the years from 1992 through 1996. Copies of these
graphs are also in the Judges Folder. They show the groundwater levels in
the wells in the cross-sections I have just shown you (Nos. 46 to 48 in
Judge's Folder). What do the graphs tell us ? Cross-section No. 3
indicates slight increases of almost no differences in groundwater levels
when comparing the pre-dam year of 1992 and 1996 (that is the situation
after the construction of the under-water weir near Dunakiliti). In the
period in between — for the years 1993 and 1994 — a decrease of
groundwater level occurred. This, of course, was because no measures in
the old riverbed had been carried out to allow water to flow into the
Hungarian side arms.
Cross-section No. 4 shows the extent of draining effect of the
Danube in the section without under-water weirs. These data directly
refute Hungary's claim of dramatic groundwater decreases throughout the - 12 -
area following the damming of the Danube in October 1992, and also show
how underwater weirs can remedy decreased groundwater levels.
Mr. President, I would like now to give a few examples showing how
the arguments of Dr. Kern and Professor Wheater relied on a misleading
use of scientific reports.
Professor Wheater made some specific points concerning the content
of mercury. He said that: (CR 97/12, p. 93): "Concentrations of mercury
in suspended sediment exceed limit values at all monitoring locations".
This gives a misleading impression. For the Joint Monitoring Report
states:
"Concentrations of mercury, the most toxic heavy metal, in the
suspended solids have reached the Lowest Effect Level (LEL) at
all stations, during the investigated period. In certain
stations the concentration of mercury reached the Severe Effect
Level (SEL). The mercury content of the bottom sediments is
lower than that of the suspended solids. Mean concentrations
were of the order of a few tenths of mg/l; while even the
maximal have not reached the severe effect level." (Tendency
and dynamics of Water Quality Changes of the Danube River and
its Tributaries (1989-1995), Extensive monitoring, Water
Quality Protection Working Group of the Transboundary Water
Commission, BRATISLAVA-BUDAPEST, December 1996, p. 13.)
Further along in the report, in Annex 4/1, the data are tabulated
for the period 1989-1995. Minimal, mean and maximal values at Bratislava
(upstream of the reservoir) are 0.2, 1.4, 7.4 mg/kg, respectively, and at
Komarno (downstream of the reservoir) are nearly the same (0.2, 1.5, 6.1,
respectively). This means that the reservoir has no impact on the content
of mercury in suspended sediments.
In terms of mercury content in water there has been an increase in
the maximal values in the Danube water at Bratislava, from 0.4 — pre-dam
period — to 0.8 ug/l (microgram per litre), — after the damming. The same
pattern is visible downstream of the reservoir at Medvedov for the same
periods. The scientific evaluation of these measured facts cannot be used
to show an impact of the Gabcíkovo structures. The data do not indicate
any significant influence of the reservoir and the source of mercury is - 13 -
evidently upstream of the reservoir, because the increase has been
recorded already in Bratislava.
Professor Wheater also claims that the PHARE Report has identified a
previously overlooked problem "the occurrence of high nitrite
concentration (NO2) which is highly toxic". He concludes on the basis of
this assertion: “In sum, the PHARE Report confirms Hungary's concerns for
groundwater" (CR 97/12, p. 91). This could not be further from the truth.
Professor Wheater has merely created a "problem" by taking a theoretical
statement from the introduction to the relevant section and presenting
this entirely out of context as a conclusion (PHARE/EC/WAT/1 Report,
December 1995, Vol. 2, pp. 7-3, Chap. 7.3 Identification of the Reactive
Processes). But Professor Wheater should have read further to see what
the PHARE Report’s conclusions would be as to whether this problem would
arise.
As the PHARE Report notes, the nitrite concentration measured in
April 1993 in 72 groundwater samples were all below drinking water limits
(0.1 mg/l).
I will now give one final example of a doubtful reference to
scientific reports by Hungarian counsel: During the site visit, Hungary
presented the groundwater level decrease as a negative impact of Variant
C, comparing the weekly girth growth of selected individual trees in
pre-dam and post-dam conditions (Illus. Hungarian posters No. 2.6).
Reference was made to the Joint Monitoring (National Annual Report of
Environmental Monitoring in the Szigetköz, 1997). However, the data
presented by Hungary as data from the Joint Monitoring were neither given
to Slovakia, nor included in the Hungarian national report. They were
not part of the Joint Monitoring.
And, in terms of Hungary's floodplain forest, I would like just to
recall an important question posed by the Court during the site visit:
"How much of the floodplain forest in the flooplain is cultivated?" The - 14 -
answer must be simple, but Hungary declined to give it. I do know,
however, that at least 65% of this forest is hybrid poplar (HR, Vol. 2,
plate 6.1). I know from the Slovak side that the vast majority of the
remainder is cultivated forest also.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, this has been a somewhat random
selection of points. What it shows is how misleading some of Hungary's
oral presentations have been.
I thank you very much for your attention and ask you to call on Sir
Arthur Watts.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you so much, Professor Mucha. I call now on
Sir Arthur Watts.
Sir Arthur WATTS:
Legal Justification of Variant C
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I should like now to respond to
various points made by counsel for Hungary regarding the legality of
Variant C.
The Court will recall the background (see CR 97/10, pp. 52-61).
Hungary's abrupt suspension, and then abandonment, of work in 1989 and
1990 left Czechoslovakia with a massive but now useless investment, with
virtually completed structures having to stand idle, and with the
original environmental and navigational problems which had given rise to
the 1977 Treaty unresolved.
Czechoslovakia sought to resolve matters through bilateral
negotiation, and through the involvement of third parties. Hungary was
not interested. But this left Czechoslovakia facing an impossible
situation on the ground. As a last resort, when all other alternatives
for joint operation had been shown to be unworkable because of Hungary's
unco-operative attitude, Czechoslovakia turned to Variant C. It was not
Czechoslovakia's preferred solution, but it was the only available - 15 -
solution; and in keeping as closely as was possible in the circumstances
to the original Treaty Project, Czechoslovakia was able to continue to
apply the 1977 Treaty in all its essentials. That, Mr. President, was
the gist of the situation.
The adoption of Variant C
Professor Dupuy devoted much time again last week to the question of
chronology. He sought to show that Variant C had been Czechoslovakia's
choice since 1989 (CR 97/13, p. 21).
He concentrated on just three points.
First, he noted Slovakia's acceptance that consideration had been
given to Variant C before November 1991, or even before July 1991 when
the decision had been taken to approve the initial financing and planning
of Variant C. Is that really so surprising, Mr. President? Complex
decisions cannot be taken without first considering the possibilities.
There is a world of difference between saying, on the one hand, "What are
the options and their implications?", and saying, on the other hand,
"Start drawing up detailed plans for that particular option, and here is
the money with which to do so"; and — if, Mr. President, you will allow
me three hands — saying, on yet a further hand, "We have seen the plans,
and we now go ahead with a particular option covered by those plans."
Mr. President, I believe that anyone remotely familiar with the way in
which government ministries work will recognize those three quite
distinct stages. Translated to our present concerns, they correspond to
the kind of work being done before July 1991; the decision to finance
detailed planning — but still only planning — on 25 July 1991; and
finally, actually proceeding with Variant C in November 1991. To say, as
Professor Dupuy did, that all acts of a government are attributable to
the State irrespective of the organ concerned does not, with great
respect, advance matters at all: one must still analyse the acts in - 16 -
question accurately — and if they were merely discussion, or
consideration, or planning, they do not suddenly become decisions or
decisive actions by saying that they were performed by some State organ.
Czechoslovakia did not actually proceed with Variant C until
November 1991.
Professor Dupuy's second point concerned Slovakia's acceptance of
the authenticity of certain documents. He mentioned three items.
(a) First, we have two newspaper reports. The first reports, on
2 November 1989, an interview with Mr. Oblozinsky (HR, Vol. 3, Ann. 60).
He was interviewed in his capacity as "representative of the investment
company" engaged in construction work on the Project: his views are not
attributable to Czechoslovakia. In any event, he was speaking only in
the context of being "prepared for every eventuality", and he ended by
saying, "should the government decide on" the construction alternative he
had outlined — thereby he was clearly showing that no such decision had
yet been taken. The second newspaper report was of a statement made on
behalf of the Czechoslovak Government and published in a newspaper on
31 October 1989 (HR, Vol. 3, Ann. 60). It says little: if Hungary
reneges on its treaty obligations, Czechoslovakia will be compelled to
implement a provisional technical solution exclusively on Czechoslovak
territory. So it is just a statement of a likely response to what
Czechoslovakia even then hoped might still be only a hypothetical
situation, setting out the principle which Czechoslovakia would,
inevitably, have to apply: it is far from evidence that any specific
application of that principle, such as Variant C, had already been
decided upon.
(b) Then there is the "International Law Analysis" of
29 October 1990 (HR, Vol. 3, Ann. 64). This was an annex to an opinion
of 29 November 1990 (HR, Vol. 3, Ann. 65). The two documents clearly
have to be read together. The second demonstrates that the Czechoslovak - 17 -
authorities were looking at a whole range of options — it lists 7,
Variants A to G (SM, paras. 5.14-5.23). Not surprisingly it was the "C"
variant which merited study from an international law point of view,
since it was the only option which did not involve joint — and therefore
agreed — action with Hungary. So accordingly, the legal analysis was put
in hand and the result annexed to the main paper. But what does all this
show, Mr. President? Certainly not that any decision in favour of
Variant C had by then been taken: rather, it shows the very opposite —
that, as late as 29 November 1990 all seven options were still being
considered and that no decision in favour of Variant C had yet been
taken. Professor Dupuy tries to get round this by saying that I would
well know, from my personal experience, that a document like this "Legal
Analysis" would only be produced by a legal service when the political
authorities were on the point of taking a decision. But, Mr. President,
it is not my experience that such a paper is prepared only when a
decision is imminent: in my experience, such papers are prepared well in
advance of any likely decision, and it would be exceptional to leave such
a paper to the last minute.
(c) Professor Dupuy's third point concerns yet another press
report. This time of what Mr. Meciar said in August 1990 (HR, Vol. 3,
Ann. 62). But all that Mr. Meciar is reported as doing is to urge "the
completion of the Gabcíkovo barrage": what is so terrible about that? —
after all, it was what the 1977 Treaty required! The rest — the
"substitute solution", what would "probably" be done "should [something]
not happen", and so on — is pure journalistic comment: as evidence it is
worthless.
So, Mr. President, the three items relied upon by Professor Dupuy
simply do not bear scrutiny as evidence for Hungary's view as to the true
date when a decision to adopt Variant C was taken. - 18 -
WheHrengary does have evidence, however, the problem is that
counsel for Hungary do not read it! Last week Professor Crawford
complained that the Court had never been allowed to see the building
permit which allowed Variant C to be proceeded with in November 1991.
Not only has the Court had a copy for nearly two years, it was submitted
by Hungary! (HR, Ann. 81).
It is, of course, easy to see why Hungary tries so hard to
establish, against all the evidence, that Variant C was decided upon and
implemented much earlier than mid- or late-1991 — unless that can be
established, Hungary's argument that Czechoslovakia had repudiated the
Treaty by virtue of such earlier acts, and Hungary's argument for a case
of necessity, fall completely away. The facts just do not support
Hungary's case. Czechoslovakia did not proceed with Variant C until
November 1991, and Hungary has produced no credible evidence or argument
to suggest otherwise. That point has already been decided by agreement
between the Parties, in the Special Agreement. That really ought to be
an end of the matter.
There is another point. Professor Nagy contends that there were
alternatives to Variant C, which Czechoslovakia could have adopted (CR
97/12, pp. 84-85). Let us look at them, Mr. President.
When Variant C was being considered it was one amongst seven
variants — Variant A, B, and so on, through to G (SM, paras.
5.14-5.5.23). But all those other options involved, in one form or
another, joint action with Hungary — and Hungary had by mid-1991 made it
abundantly clear that it was simply not interested in any form of joint
operation of the Treaty Project or of any variation of it: Hungary's sole
interest lay in negotiating the termination of the whole Treaty. So
those other variants had to be ruled out as realistic options — thanks to
Hungary, it must be said. What other options did Professor Nagy
offer? — "drop the whole Project" was one. Well, yes, Mr. President, - 19 -
Hungary would no doubt have been happy with that option: but what about
the Treaty which Hungary had entered into, committing it to the Project?
What about the real ecological disaster which would have been the result
of doing nothing more — acres of bare concrete; massive structures
standing idle, unused, and deteriorating; all the original problems of
flood control and so on left unresolved? Mr. President, not remotely a
realistic option.
Anything else? — yes, Mr. President, Professor Nagy suggested that
Czechoslovakia should have taken up Hungary's unilateral Application to
this Court (HM, Vol. 4, Ann. 102). But Professor Nagy omitted to
mention three points about that Application. First, it was filed on 23
October 1992, so was not in the least relevant to proceeding with
Variant C taken in November 1991; and, in practical terms, it was
scarcely any more relevant to the decision in October 1992 to put Variant
C into operation. Second, Hungary's Application was in substance only
concerned with the legality of Variant C, and did not cover the legality
of Hungary's own conduct under the 1977 Treaty: Czechoslovakia could
only have regarded that Application as unacceptably limited. Third, on
28 October 1992 — that is, only five days after Hungary's Application was
lodged — the Parties agreed, at the London meeting (SM, Vol. IV, Ann.
128), to refer the dispute to binding judicial settlement.
Czechoslovakia followed this up eight days later, on 5 November, when the
Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs took the initiative by sending
a Note Verbale to the Hungarian Embassy in Prague proposing negotiations
on a compromis to refer the matter by agreement to this Court (HM, Vol.
4, Ann. 104). And, as we know, those negotiations were duly successful.
So, Mr. President, I come back to where I started: Variant C was, in
the circumstances created by Hungary's conduct, the only effective option
open to Czechoslovakia. - 20 -
Hungary, however, pretends to see in Slovakia's position a hidden
plea of necessity by Slovakia — hidden, because the open admission of a
plea of necessity would, so it is said, leave Slovakia having to pay
compensation for the damage caused by the conduct dictated by the
necessity (CR 97/13, p. 26 (Dupuy)). Slovakia, Mr. President, has made
no plea of necessity in the legal sense, hidden or otherwise. Apart from
anything else, the plea of necessity, in the legal sense, would have to
start from the premise that Czechoslovakia's conduct had been prima facie
unlawful, and that is something which Czechoslovakia did not, and
Slovakia does not, accept. Czechoslovakia was indeed, as I have
explained, put in an impossible position by Hungary's unlawful actions.
Czechoslovakia had to do something, and it embarked upon what was in
effect the only lawful course open to it, namely the implementation of
Variant C. In a general, every day, sense, it was "necessary" for
Czechoslovakia to do so; but that is not the same as invoking the
technical legal doctrine of necessity as a justification for Variant C.
Slovakia has not done so, and does not do so now.
As to the suggestion that Slovakia was avoiding a plea of necessity
so as to avoid having to pay compensation, this flies in the face of the
facts — it is Czechoslovakia, and now Slovakia, which have suffered
enormous losses, and it is consequently Hungary, and not Czechoslovakia,
which needs to be looking for ways of avoiding having to pay
compensation.
What Variant C involved
Three weeks ago, Mr. President, I outlined what Variant C involved
(CR 97/11, p .15). I displayed a map showing at a glance how basically
similar Variant C and the Treaty Project were. That map is again on
screen behind me: a copy is No. 50 in the Judge's Folder. Put briefly,
Variant C involved the building of a dividing dyke along the left bank of - 21 -
the old river to retain the waters of the new, reduced reservoir, the
building of a complex of structures at _unovo to replace the functions
envisaged for Dunakiliti, and an associated small dyke to complete the
retention of the waters of the new reservoir.
Let me now put on the screen another map: a copy is No. 51 in the
Judge's Folder. This shows how much of the present system in the
Gabcíkovo section is identical with what was planned for the Treaty
Project: everything shown by the yellow line was agreed in the
1977 Treaty. It will again be readily apparent — given the omission of
the Nagymaros part of the Project — that what is now operating under the
label of "Variant C" is substantially what was agreed in the 1977 Treaty,
with those few modifications necessitated by Hungary's refusal to honour
its treaty obligations. The maps show clearly that Hungary's attempt to
portray Variant C as something totally new and different from the Treaty
Project has no substance.
Variant C has, of course, evolved over time, just as the Treaty
Project itself, as my colleague Professor Pellet has explained, was an
on-going process, adapted from time to time and it is in this context
that the references to a Phase I and a Phase II of Variant C have to be
understood: Professor Nagy, in particular, drew attention to this aspect
of the matter on 10 April (CR 97/12, p. 82). This Phase II is usually
taken to refer to structural developments to the system after the initial
structures were put in place. Strictly speaking these later developments
occurring after October 1992 are outside the scope of the questions put
to the Court, but let me nevertheless make four short points.
(1) The decision of the Czechoslovak Government authorized the
planning of "Variant C" full stop: nothing called Phase I or Phase II
formed part of the relevant policy decision.
(2) The initial structures comprising Variant C were constructed in
the belief that Hungary might resume compliance with its treaty - 22 -
obligations within a few years. As it became clear that this was not
going to happen, up-grading of construction standards became necessary.
(3) This was particularly the case after Hungary took the decision,
on 7 July 1993, to destroy the coffer dam at Nagymaros, so irrevocably
ruling out the eventual construction of the planned barrage at Nagymaros.
(4) "Phase II" has come to be used as a matter of convenience to
refer to those miscellaneous and essentially ad hoc adaptations, spread
over a number of years, and consequential upon the growing long-term
character of the system resulting from Hungary's refusal to return to the
Treaty.
Nor, Mr. President, do the so-called Phase II adaptations transform
the provisionally-conceived Variant C into something unalterable. Those
subsequent adaptations have no necessary implication for the permanent or
temporary nature of earlier measures. They are, indeed, entirely
consistent with Czechoslovakia's conception of Variant C as essentially
provisional — the "provisional solution", as the Special Agreement has
it. Of course, once Variant C was put into operation, it had to be
adequately constructed — makeshift structures which would be washed away
in the first flood would make no sense. But Czechoslovakia's purpose all
along was to get Hungary back to compliance with its obligations under
the 1977 Treaty, or at least some agreed variation of the joint
enterprise provided for in that Treaty. I must pause here,
Mr. President, to emphasize that point, since Hungary has categorically
denied it. The record is perfectly clear: all Czechoslovakia's
initiatives from mid-1989 onwards were directed towards some agreed form
of joint Project within the Treaty framework, and it is wholly wrong for
Hungary to assert — with emphasis — "that Czechoslovakia never accepted
that the 1977 Treaty be amended in any form" (CR 97/13, p. 51
(Crawford)). Czechoslovakia repeatedly put forward suggestions for joint - 23 -
schemes which differed from the Joint Project — that is, they would have
involved amendments to the Treaty Project — and it was Hungary's total
lack of interest in any form of continued joint participation in the
Project, and determination instead to negotiate only for its termination,
that prevented those initiatives from prospering. Professor McCaffrey
yesterday gave one clear example of this when he referred to the offer
contained in Czechoslovakia's Note Verbale of 30 October 1989 (CR 97/14,
p. 62). Let me add some others.
(a) In July 1991 Czechoslovakia proposed that there should be a
trilateral commission to study variants to be proposed by the Parties,
and Czechoslovakia submitted for consideration by the commission four
alternatives, any one of which would have made Variant C unnecessary (SC-
M, paras. 5.75 ff.; SR, paras. 9.12-9.22, and Ann. 96; CR 97/10, pp. 54,
58-59).
(b) Let me move on to 1992 — i.e. after Czechoslovakia proceeded
with Variant C in November 1991. In January 1992 Czechoslovakia urged
Hungary to seek a settlement through a tripartite commission of experts:
Czechoslovakia undertook to be guided by the commission's findings, and
even offered to suspend work on Variant C if Hungary would agree to
resume the Treaty Project on a jointly agreed basis (HR, para. 9.34).
(c) Even in April 1992, in responding to Mr. Andriessen's offer of
EC involvement through the establishment of a tripartite commission,
Czechoslovakia was not excluding modification of the Treaty (SM, Ann.
109; SR, paras. 9.36-9.43, especially 9.40). Professor Valki said
otherwise (CR 97/13, p. 38). But in quoting one sentence from the reply
which Czechoslovakia proposed that the Parties should jointly send, he
omitted to quote also the very next sentence; and the one sentence which
he did quote, he misunderstood — Czechoslovakia's concern was with the
possible significance of the assessments of the committee "as such",
i.e., the committee itself should not decide on modifications of the - 24 -
Treaty: this was for the Parties, in negotiations and this is made clear
in the sentence which Professor Valki did not quote: Czechoslovakia "is
prepared to use the conclusions drawn and recommendations made by the
committee as the starting point for any decisions made in relation to the
Project" — in no way can this be read as an a priori refusal to consider
modification of the Treaty.
Clearly, all those Czechoslovak initiatives were not just limited to
"the Treaty Project and nothing but the Treaty Project", as Hungary would
have the Court believe: it was, rather, Hungary's blunt and total
refusal to contemplate anything other than the termination of the Treaty
which ensured that no realistic Treaty amendment could be negotiated.
Had Hungary responded to any of the various proposals which
Czechoslovakia had put forward — proposals which, Mr. President, I would
remind the Court, included the readiness to postpone Variant C itself —
then Variant C could have been put off, and amendments to the Treaty
could have been negotiated, and if Hungary had shown any interest in
returning to the framework of the 1977 Treaty, Variant C would not have
excluded a return to some agreed joint variation of the Treaty Project —
albeit at a cost (and now, a very considerable cost as a result of
Hungary's unlawful conduct). But as Hungary causes time to pass without
any move on its part to resume its Treaty obligations, Hungary ensures
that what Czechoslovakia conceived as a provisional and reversible
variation of the Treaty Project increasingly assumes longer-term features
than Czechoslovakia envisaged.
Variant C as an approximate application of the Treaty
T hree weeks ago I explained why Slovakia regards Variant C as being
as close an approximation to the 1977 Treaty as it was possible for
Czechoslovakia to get. And I have again shown just a few moments ago how
similar Variant C and the Treaty Project are. It is difficult to - 25 -
imagine, Mr. President, in what way Czechoslovakia alone could have got
any closer to full performance of its obligations under the 1977 Treaty.
To use the language of this Court in its Advisory Opinion on the South
West Africa case (see CR 97/11, p. 11), Czechoslovakia "conform[ed] as
far as possible" to the agreed Treaty Project. Czechoslovakia did all it
could; that it could do no more was because Hungary would not let it.
Part of Hungary's complaint is that Variant C was adopted by
Czechoslovakia as a unilateral act. But the adoption of Variant C cannot
be looked at in isolation from the circumstances giving rise to it.
Those circumstances involved the 1977 Treaty, and Hungary's fundamental
breach of it. One could not, therefore, expect there to be agreement on
the approximate application of the Treaty to which Hungary's breach had
itself given rise.
The failure to appreciate the central importance of the fact that a
Treaty was concluded in 1977 is typical of much of Hungary's
argumentation. Hungary at times seeks to examine Variant C in the light
of general international law, as if the Treaty did not exist. This is an
absurd way of addressing the problem, and inevitably leads Hungary to
absurd conclusions. The analysis has to be the other way round. The
fact is that there was a Treaty; and even Hungary admits that it was in
force until May 1992 (CR 97/12, p. 76 (Sands)). In any legal analysis,
the Treaty must be in the forefront, and any relevant general rules of
international law fall to be considered in the light of the lex posterior
and lex specialis principles.
Mr. President, a State finding itself in the position in which
Czechoslovakia unfortunately found itself has the right to apply a treaty
as best it can: this is so even if, necessarily, that performance can
only be approximate. This right is well-founded on principle and in law,
and is reflected in State practice (see esp. SM, paras. 7.11-7.40; SR,
paras. 6.0 -6.45; CR 97/10, pp. 62-65; CR 97/11, pp. 10-16). - 26 -
Nevertheless, Hungary seeks to deny this. Its arguments are
unconvincing. The right of approximate application flows from the
principle that parties to a treaty must apply it in good faith. Hungary
does not — and indeed, cannot - deny that principle.
Slovakia also invokes the duty resting on States to mitigate damage.
Professor Dupuy sought to argue that this was not a primary rule of
conduct. But on the contrary, Mr. President, the obligation on a State
to mitigate is precisely a rule of conduct — it requires a State to act,
i.e., to conduct itself, in such a way as to minimize the loss for which
the other party, when it comes to the assessment of reparation — and
that may indeed be a secondary stage — will have to pay damages.
Professor Dupuy also denied that the principle was part of
international law; he dismissed the relevance of two decisions of the
United Nations Compensation Commission to which I had referred (CR 97/11,
p. 14). He said (CR 97/13, p. 29) that they only concerned private
claims, not claims by States, and were therefore nothing to do with
international law. Mr. President, most decisions of international claims
tribunals concern the claims of private individuals: and yet they are
part of the general corpus of international law. In the particular cases
which I cited, the United Nations Compensation Commission was absolutely
clear that it was referring to the principle of mitigation of damages as
a principle of international law: and I refer the Court to the passages
which I quoted (CR 97/11, p. 14). And of course, this is consistent with
the establishment by the Security Council of that Compensation
Commission to resolve disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability
"under international law" for damages suffered by foreign governments,
nationals and corporations (Security Council resolution 687 (1991),
paras. 16 and 19). Finally on mitigation of damage, Mr. President, I
note that Hungary itself thought sufficiently highly of the principle
that, in its Reply, it invoked it against Slovakia (HR, para. 3.163). - 27 -
As for the principle of approximate application itself, Slovakia has
shown that States, when faced with unco-operative conduct by a treaty
partner, have done their best to continue with the essentials of the
treaty, even if that has meant departing to some extent from the literal
application of the treaty's terms. Hungary seeks to distinguish the
various precedents to which Slovakia has drawn attention. These attempts
carry no conviction, Mr. President.
Thus, regarding this Court's practice when faced with a non-
appearing defendant State, Professor Dupuy pointed out that Article 53 of
the Statute authorizes the Court nevertheless to decide the case (CR
97/13, p. 28). Mr. President, Professor Dupuy invoked the spirit of
Molière's M. Jourdain; let me call up the spirit of Don Quixote — for
Professor Dupuy is tilting at windmills. I was not referring to the
Court's ability to decide the case — for Article 53 indeed gives it the
power to do so — but rather to Article 62 (2) of the Rules. This
requires a State objecting to the Court's jurisdiction to set out its
objections: here is indeed a case where the non-appearance of the State
prevents that provision being complied with. The point is that the Court
has not let itself be paralysed, but has found a way round the problem by
applying the Rules in such a way that their obvious essential purposes —
even if not their letter — can be met.
Looking more closely at the Court's practice, Mr. President, I would
draw attention to the Free Zones case (Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the
District of Gex, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 46). In that case the
Permanent Court had held hearings in 1929. Further hearings were held in
October 1930. The Statute required the composition of the Court to be
the same as it had been in 1929. But — the number of Judges still
available from the 1929 hearings had fallen below the quorum required by
Article 25 of the Statute. So what did the Court do, Mr. President?
Give up? Of course not: it could not apply the Statute literally, but it - 28 -
kept as closely as possible to its provisions. The Court decided "that
it had become necessary to reconstitute the Court, in conformity with the
principles of that Article" (at p. 106; emphasis added). Clearly, Mr.
President, an example of approximate application.
A second limb of Professor Dupuy's attack on any principle of
approximate application was to argue that one cannot compare the
continued functioning of a permanent international institution with the
operation of an ordinary bilateral treaty (CR 97/13, pp. 27-28). This
prompts two remarks, Mr. President. First, if a principle finds
expression in the way in which the institution functions, that same
principle can still be applied in other contexts: and indeed, a number of
principles upheld by this Court in relation to international
organizations are regularly regarded as being applicable — including by
Hungary in this case — in other contexts.
Second , the characterization of the 1977 Treaty as an ordinary
treaty is far from accurate. It is not just a "joint investment
treaty" — the point is not whether there was a joint investment, but what
the end result of that investment involved: and what it involved was a
quasi-permanent operational system of very considerable magnitude,
dealing with and related solely to a very specific territorial area
straddling the boundary between two States. Nor is it right to treat the
1977 Treaty as a building contract — nor, as Professor Crawford alleged
(CR 97/13, p. 40), did I ever say it was. On the contrary, I was at
pains to explain that the Treaty was "a rather special treaty" (CR 97/10,
p. 62); and I went on to explain why. Any attempt, whether for the
purposes of approximate application or for any other purposes, to treat
that Treaty as just an ordinary treaty is wide of the mark.
Further, Mr. President, the principle of approximation is not just
an aspect of international law relating to the law of treaties: it finds
its place in other fields as well. Thus in relation to the assessment of - 29 -
reparation, a return to the status quo ante cannot always be complete: in
the words of the Permanent Court in the Factory at Chorzów case, the
"essential principle contained in the notion of an illegal act ... is
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of
the illegal act" (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47). "As far as
possible", Mr. President: the notion of "close approximation" is inherent
in the Court's statement of the "essential principle" which it applied.
And so too, in relation to counter-measures, the Arbitral Tribunal in the
case concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 noted "that
judging the proportionality of counter-measures is not an easy task and
can at best be accomplished by approximation" (International Law Reports,
Vol. 54, at p. 338). So the notion of approximation, Mr. President, is
not only supported by principle and practice in the immediate field of
treaty application, but is consistent with the approach of international
law across a broader spectrum.
That reference to the Air Services arbitration serves to remind me,
Mr. President, that there was an assumption in Hungary's arguments at the
end of last week that the principle of approximate application was
Slovakia's sole legal argument (CR 97/13, p. 27 (Dupuy)), and that so
long as Hungary could undermine that principle, that would be the end of
Slovakia's attempts to provide a legal justification for Variant C. As I
have sought to demonstrate, Variant C is justified in law. But even if
this view does not commend itself to the Court, Slovakia would not wish
it to be forgotten that Slovakia has available an argument in the
alternative based on counter-measures. As I showed on 27 March
(CR 97/11, pp. 17-18), if it were necessary to rely on that argument, all
the conditions for its application would be met. And I note,
Mr. President, that in its oral arguments last week Hungary did not seek
to refute that conclusion. - 30 -
Hungary, of course, as is only to be expected, nevertheless takes
the position that Variant C was unlawful. And presumably, therefore,
Hungary in effect contends that Czechoslovakia should never have adopted
Variant C. Mr. President, that apparently simple proposition is worth
looking at a little more closely.
The Treaty was concluded in 1977. Work started. For a dozen years
work continued. Hungary did some work; so did Czechoslovakia,
especially at Gabcíkovo. Hungary watched Czechoslovakia carry on with
this work for ten years or so, saw the structure taking shape — virtually
to completion — and the agreed Project making good progress. Hungary
gave no hint of difficulties to come. In October 1988 the Hungarian
Parliament had unambiguously approved the continuation of the Project
(SR, paras. 7.13-7.17). As late as 6 February 1989 no less a figure than
the Deputy Chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers signed a
Protocol by which he reaffirmed Hungary's commitment to the 1977 Treaty
Project (SM, Ann. 9; SC-M, para. 5.14). And here, Mr. President, let me
interject the observation that we heard yet again last week, from
Ms Gorove (CR 97/12, p. 39; see also CR 97/4, p. 17 (Crawford)), that
this Protocol was agreed in 1988 and should therefore not be regarded as
representing Hungary's position in February 1989: what nonsense! — when a
very senior Government member signs a treaty, that treaty represents his
Government's position at the time when he puts his signature to it. I
therefore repeat — in February 1989 Hungary reaffirmed, at a very high
level, its commitment to the Treaty.
And then, within a few months — with no warning, no discussion, and
no justification — Hungary said "stop!". Mr. President, it was not
lawful for Hungary at that stage to call a halt to the Project, and turn
its back on it.
But that is what Hungary did. It left Czechoslovakia with massive
structures on its hands — virtually complete after expenditure of some - 31 -
2 billion US dollars, but now rendered useless by Hungary. So if Hungary
believes that Variant C should not have been adopted, what does Hungary
think should have happened? Just let all that investment stand idle and
go to waste? — with the environmental disaster which that really would
have represented? But, Mr. President, one thing is clear. Having agreed
to the Project by signing and ratifying a treaty, having for a decade
allowed the work to which it had agreed to proceed and having
participated in some of it, having stood by and watched Czechoslovakia
nearly complete the Gabcíkovo part of the Project, and having by a formal
treaty instrument and oral statements confirmed, up to the last moment,
its commitment to the Treaty Project, Hungary cannot be permitted
suddenly to bring the Project to a halt. Nor can Hungary be heard to
deny Czechoslovakia the right to make use of the structures in which
Czechoslovakia had invested so much — all the more so since the use
Czechoslovakia made of the structures was not some totally different use
from that originally envisaged, but was in fact simply the best variation
of that original plan which was possible for Czechoslovakia given the
circumstances of Hungary's default.
Variant C is neither a material breach nor a repudiation of the Treaty
nor a fundamental change of circumstances
Let me turn, finally, Mr. President, to questions of breach,
repudiation, and fundamental change of circumstances.
Variant C is, as Slovakia has consistently maintained, an
application of the 1977 Treaty — a limited but approximate and best
possible application because that was all that Hungary's conduct allowed
for. An application of the Treaty cannot be a breach of the Treaty.
Of course, as the very nature of a best possible, "approximate"
application implies, Variant C was bound to be different from the literal
terms of the Treaty. But the differences were all differences which were
solely consequential upon Hungary's refusal to perform the Treaty. I - 32 -
have explained this earlier, and the map behind me will remind the Court
of the points I then made. Hungary, Mr. President, cannot now be heard
to complain that Czechoslovakia was acting in breach of the Treaty, when
what Czechoslovakia was doing was to apply the Treaty subject to changes
necessitated by Hungary's breaches of its obligations under that same
Treaty.
Equally, Mr. President, an application of the Treaty cannot be a
repudiation. Hungary's assertion that by adopting Variant C
Czechoslovakia repudiated the 1977 Treaty is unconvincing. Let me
first make one general observation. Hungary de facto completely
abandoned the Treaty Project by mid-1990. Hungary is thus ill-placed to
argue that Czechoslovakia repudiated the Treaty when, over two years
later, it put into operation a variant which, far from matching Hungary's
abandonment of the Treaty Project, was designed, consistently with the
Treaty's essential aims, to be the closest possible application of it in
the circumstances caused by Hungary's unlawful abandonment — that was the
only repudiation of the 1977 Treaty, Mr. President, not Czechoslovakia's
good faith attempt to salvage what it could of the Project.
The "repudiation" of a treaty is not a term which is defined by the
Vienna Convention of 1969. But, although it will of course be a breach
of the treaty, in its normal meaning it clearly means something more than
a breach. I am ready to take Professor Crawford's comment as conveying
the right flavour — repudiation, he said, "is really more a turning away
from the treaty — a disposition . . . that the State has definitively
rejected the treaty as the basis for regulating its future conduct" (CR
97/13, p. 47). I too have used similar language, referring to a State
"turning its back on", or "walking away from" the Treaty.
As Hungary recognizes, at no time did Czechoslovakia expressly
repudiate the 1977 Treaty. But Hungary alleges instead that the adoption - 33 -
of Variant C amounted to an implicit repudiation of the Treaty by
conduct.
Variant C was certainly different in certain respects from the
Project as agreed under the 1977 Treaty. But, as I have already shown,
those differences were limited to those made indispensable by Hungary's
refusal to co-operate, they involved continued use of the structures
built as agreed under the Treaty for essentially those same purposes, and
they involved the closest possible good faith application of the Treaty
in the circumstances created by Hungary's default. It is difficult to
see how in these circumstances the adoption of Variant C could be
regarded as a repudiation of that Treaty.
Nevertheless, Mr. President, Hungary regards Czechoslovakia's
actions in December 1990, January 1991, 2 April 1991, 25 July 1991 and
November 1991 — dates chosen by Professor Crawford (CR 97/13, p. 48) — as
successive repudiations of the Treaty. And repudiation is a most serious
matter — as Professor Crawford says, it is "a more fundamental step
vis-à-vis a treaty than . . . even a material breach" (ibid., p. 47).
Where, then, was Hungary's reaction against such serious acts?
Repudiation, Mr. President, was never a charge made against
Czechoslovakia: and that being so, it is scarcely possible now to take
seriously Hungary's arguments that those actions amounted to
repudiations. Especially when none of those dates selected by
Professor Crawford corresponds with action by Czechoslovakia from which
its repudiation of the 1977 Treaty might plausibly be implied.
But really, Mr. President, all this scratching around for "evidence"
raises a more basic point. If Czechoslovakia had been putting Variant C
into effect earlier than November 1991, Hungary had only to look across
the river to see what was being done. This is, after all, a boundary
river, Mr. President: a riparian State can see quite well what is going
on on the opposite bank, or a short way upstream or downstream. - 34 -
Obviously Hungary saw nothing — at least, that must be the presumption
from the total lack of any evidence to the contrary.
Then, Mr. President, we have Hungary's clear assertion last week (CR
97/12, p. 76 (Sands)) that "At all times prior to May 1992 Hungary
accepted the Treaty was in force." What, then, about the repudiation of
that Treaty which Hungary now says took place as a result of
Czechoslovakia's conduct in 1990 and 1991? Clearly, Hungary's position
is totally inconsistent.
Even less can the adoption of Variant C be regarded as a repudiation
of the Treaty given that Czechoslovakia made it clear all along — as
Slovakia still does — that it regarded the 1977 Treaty as still valid.
And Variant C was conceived as provisional and reversible precisely so as
to allow for the eventuality that Hungary might be willing to resume the
implementation of its treaty obligations; and further, even after
adopting Variant C, Czechoslovakia continued to seek to reach agreement
with Hungary on ways of agreeing to some form of joint operation of some
variation of the Treaty Project which could meet the original objectives
of the Treaty. None of this is consistent with an implication that
Czechoslovakia was repudiating the 1977 Treaty: none of it meets
Professor Crawford's test of a "turning away from the treaty", or a
"disposition . . . definitively [to reject] the treaty as a basis for
regulating its future conduct". On the contrary it clearly shows that,
by word and deed, Czechoslovakia maintained the very opposite, namely
that the Treaty remained in force, that Variant C was adopted and
continues to operate within that framework, and that Hungary's return to
the Treaty framework was Czechoslovakia's objective.
Finally, Mr. President, I come to Hungary's argument that Variant C
constituted a fundamental change of circumstances (CR 97/13, pp. 49-51
(Crawford)). Professor Crawford spoke about political changes in Europe,
and economic changes of various kinds. Professor Crawford's eloquence - 35 -
did not, however, extend to any examination of the relevant law, such as
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. There the
basic rule is that a fundamental change of circumstances may not be
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, or
suspending its operation. To that basic rule there is an exception — but
being an exception, it must be strictly construed. The exception
requires that the change must relate to circumstances which constituted
an essential basis of the consent of the Parties — "the Parties", I would
note, that is both of them — to be bound by the treaty, and that the
effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of the
obligations still to be performed under the treaty. The changes to which
Professor Crawford refers do not meet either of those conditions: the
circumstances to which he referred did not constitute for both Parties an
essential condition for their consent; nor did the changes transform
radically — or even at all — the "extent" of the obligations still to be
performed. As for Professor Crawford's reliance on the economic and
political changes which lay behind the 1994 modification to Part XI of
the Convention on the Law of the Sea, all it shows is that such changes
may lead the parties to agree to changes to a treaty by which they are
bound: it has absolutely nothing to do with the doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus — on which Hungary's arguments are without any substance
whatsoever.
Conclusion
Mr. President, that concludes my response to Hungary's further
arguments on the legality of Variant C. I thank you, Mr. President,
Members of the Court, for the attention which you have accorded my
statement. I should be grateful if you would now call upon Mr. Jens
Refsgaard. - 36 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you so much, Sir Arthur. I call now on
Mr. Refsgaard.
MRr.FSGAARD:
Version C and the PHARE Project
Mr. President, Members of the Court
I have been asked to comment on what Professor Wheater had to say
about the PHARE project last week 1, as well as on Annexes 9, 12 and 13 to
Hungary’s oral pleadings during the second round. Apparently,
Professor Wheater and Dr. Kern asked both Hungary’s Professor Somlyody and
Professovranijn, formerly employed at the Dutch company,
Delft Hydraulics, the largest international competitor of my own firm, the
Danish Hydraulic Institute, to comment on my presentation of the Final
Report of the PHARE project. Their brief, two-page comments are set out
in these annexes.
Professor Somlyody points out that the PHARE study was prepared by a
"capable international consortium" and that "Well-known models of the
Danish Hydraulic Institute were applied in an integrated manner". He
notes the strong Slovak participation in the project, adding "it is a pity
that there was no Hungarian involvement".
Professor van Rijn refers to the PHARE models as "state of the art"
and suggests that the results produced may be reasonable in the light of
how much they have been calibrated. He is complimentary about the attempt
of the project to undertake the difficult task of modelling the transport
processes of graded sediments.
The criticism of both experts relate largely to omissions from the
report that they have seen. The equations and documentation that
Professor Somlyody found missing are of course all available. The project
files are so extensive that I would not be able to carry them all into
1
CR 97/13, pp. 13 et seq. - 37 -
this room. As illustration, I have brought just a small selection of the
more than 1,500 pages model documentation, which are full of equations.
I am concerned over Professor Somlyody’s reaction that my
presentation of the PHARE Report went well beyond its conclusions. It is
too bad he was not here for my presentation, since I certainly do not, as
he suggests, consider that everything can be quantified and managed, and I
certainly did not avoid discussing possibly harmful impacts of Variant C.
ProfessorvanRijn criticizes us for not having done sensitivity
analyses, but apparently he has overlooked the description of assessments
2
of model uncertainties contained in Volume 3 of the PHARE Report , since he
confined his observations to Chapter 10 of Volume 2.
I should point out here that the PHARE project had external reviews
in connection with two workshops with participation of the following
international experts:
1Professor Wolfgang Kinzelbach, Kassel University;
2Dr. C.A.J. (Tony) Appelo, Free University Amsterdam;
3Dr. Hans-Peter Nachtnebel, Universität für Bodenkultur, Wien;
4Professor Ludwig Luckner, Institut für Bodenkultur und Wasserwirtschaft,
Dresden;
5Dr. Stefan Bruk, Unesco, Paris;
6Professor Johann Schreiner, Norddeutche Naturschutz Akademi,
Schneverdingen.
I wish today to direct my principal remarks to Professor Wheater’s
presentation, where he pretended "to present a balanced picture" 3, and to
the misleading way in which the extracts have been assembled in Hungary’s
Annex 13 to the Judges’ folder.
Let me first turn to this Annex 13. Here, Hungary has picked out
single sentences and half paragraphs from the PHARE Report and presented
2
PHARE Report, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 3, pp. 6-35, pp. 7-31, pp. 8-25.
3
CR 97/13, p. 13 (Wheater). - 38 -
them out of context. The result is that the balance of the report
disappears. Let me show you two examples. The first of these texts is
now shown on the screen and they are also included in the Slovak Judges’
folder:
(Overhead transparencies # 1-2 - Comparison between Appendix 13 in
Hungarian material and original text in PHARE Report)
I.Regarding old sediments in the area now covered by the reservoir Hungary
quoted: "Some samples . . . showed relatively high contents of some
PAH’s" . Obviously, this sounds bad. However, read in its full context
the conclusion is completely different: "From the existing data no
general pollution has been detected. However, some samples from the
flood plain along the Danube river showed relatively high contents of
some PAH’s, which can be attributed to local pollution." 5 Local
pollution is related to the pollution of the surface water in the past
decades, not to the Gabcíkovo project.
II.Hungary quotes one sentence from the PHARE Report on the data
availability in the river branch system: "Only very scarce and not
very reliable data on flow and water levels in the river branch system
6
was available" , with the intention of showing that reliable models can
not be established. The reason for this lack of data is that the
hydraulics of the river branch system was basically changed in
May 1993, when the direct recharge commenced. This is not mentioned by
Hungary, who also deliberately omits the next sentence, reading:
"Therefore, a programme comprising measurements of discharges and water
levels at a number of locations was carried out under this project
7
during the summer 1994."
4
Hungarian material to Judges’ folder, Ann. 13-2.
5
PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 1, pp. 4-10.
6
Hungarian material to Judges’ folder, Ann. 13-2.
7
PHARE Project, Final Report , December 1995, Vol. 1, pp. 4-18. - 39 -
I could continue with more examples for the next hour. I should only
like to mention here that many of the sentences from the PHARE Report
which Hungary claims support its concerns are taken from the problem
identification sections, while the corresponding text from the concluding
sections are most often omitted.
As already highlighted in my presentation three weeks ago, and as
also confirmed by Professor Wheater, the PHARE Report does not speak of
only positive impacts. The Hungarian approach has been to select the
particular sentences which favour its case and say that only these
sentences are credible and then claim that the rest is not reliable.
Is this what Professor Wheater calls a "balanced picture"? It is
clearly a misleading selection.
I shall now turn to the key point in Professor Wheater’s pleading,
namely "that the conclusions of the PHARE simulations . . . are simply
unreliable" . I shall concentrate on the aspects relating to the reservoir
and the groundwater quality, which ProfessorWheater considers most
serious. In his series of arguments leading to this conclusion, he makes
four claims, which I shall address one by one.
The first claim is that our calculations of reservoir sedimentations
9
are "clearly flawed" . The PHARE project does not conceal the fact that the
data we had available on reservoir sediments were limited. Of course they
were — for the simple reason that the reservoir is new. But some data were
collected during the course of the PHARE project.
(Overhead transparency # 3 — Figure with comparison of measured and model
predicted flow velocities in the reservoir)
The first thing to check is whether the flow velocities are simulated
correctly. On the screen behind me the Court can now see results from
8
CR 97/13, p. 19 (Wheater).
9
CR 97/13, p. 17 (Wheater). - 40 -
velocity distributions along two cross-sections in the reservoir . 10 As can
be seen there is a very good agreement between model output and
observations.
(Overhead transparency # 4— Table with comparison of observed and
simulated sediment grain sizes in the reservoir)
The next thing to check is the sedimentation. If the Court looks at
the screen a table with a comparison of measured and predicted sediment
11
grain sizes is shown . As can be seen there is also a reasonably good
agreement between model output and measured sediment data. To claim that
the results are only "computer simulations, and not reality" 12 is
misleading.
Let me now examine Professor Wheater’s second claim, namely that "It
is assumed that most of the groundwater recharge comes from a small part
13
of the reservoir" . As the Court may recall from my last presentation this
14
is not an assumption, but a result of model calculations .
(Overhead transparency # 5 — Figure with simulated reservoir
sedimentation)
The model calculates the thickness and grain sizes of the
sedimentation at all points in the reservoir as indicated on this figure 1,
which the Court also saw three weeks ago.
(Overhead transparency # 6 — Figure with calculated leakage coefficients
in the reservoir)
On this basis, the so-called leakage coefficients are calculated with
results as shown on the screen now 1. For this calculation the well-known
10PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 2, Figs. 9.25 and 9.26.
11PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 2, Table 10.5.
12CR 97/13, p. 14 (Wheater).
13CR 97/13, p. 17 (Wheater).
14CR 97/10, p. 45.
15PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 3, Fig. 8.7.
16PHARE Report, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 3, Fig. 8.11. - 41 -
Carman-Kozeny theoretical formula is used, including a calibration factor,
which has to be assessed through comparison of model output and field
data, in this case groundwater level observations from a few wells near
the reservoir. Professor Wheater’s third claim is that this calibration
factor is an error indicating clogging 1. It is not. We are using the
same formula also for converting all texture data from aquifer sediment
samples to model parameters. Also for the aquifer we used a calibration
factor of about 10. This is theoretically justified by the fact that the
sediments are stratified or layered due to variations in flow velocities
during the sedimentation process. This has nothing whatsoever to do with
clogging!
Now, how can we then be sure that our model calculations are
reliable? We have used the groundwater level observations from a few wells
to assess the leakage calibration factor, so although we checked the model
output against data from more than 100 wells, and most often in similar
studies no more data are available, it may be argued that this in itself
is not sufficient for a true model validation. Let me instead show the
Court results from just one of the other model tests we made, namely
against measured discharges in the seepage canals.
(Overhead transparency # 7 — Table with measured and simulated discharge
in seepage canals)
The Court saw these seepage canals during the field trip. The
discharge in these canals originates from the flow of water through the
bottom of the reservoir. On the table on the screen 18you can see that
model predictions match measured data quite well at different locations
along the seepage canals. I must emphasize that this is a very powerful
test, because the discharge data have not been used at all in the
17
CR 97/13, p. 17 (Wheater).
18
PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol 2, Fig. 5.19. - 42 -
calibration process, and because it integrates the effects of reservoir
sedimentation, calculation of leakage factors and geological parameters.
Altogether, we have been able to check the model output against many
different types of data: groundwater level dynamics, discharges in
seepage canals and oxygen isotopes in groundwater. The model tests confirm
that the model predictions of the interaction between the reservoir and
the aquifer are quite accurate.
Professor Wheater’s fourth claim that calculations of the effects of
sediments on the chemical status of the infiltrating water have not been
19
carried out , is simply not true. Let me in this respect just refer the
Court to Chapter 5 in Volume 3 of the PHARE Final Report.
Consequently, I have to conclude that none of Professor Wheater’s
claims are founded on facts. They lack scientific integrity.
Professor Wheater also makes a great effort to link Variant C, high
manganese concentrations and groundwater pollution 20. Let me just put this
issue into the right perspective by mentioning a few facts:
1.The manganese concentrations in the order of 1 mg/l are found near the
reservoir 21 as shown by the special field investigations carried out by
the PHARE Project. The bio-geochemical model was able to simulate the
observed manganese concentrations quite well . 22
2.Manganese concentrations of the same order of magnitude have existed for
23
decades close to the Danube . Take as examples the two waterworks,
Rusovce in Slovakia and Vac in Hungary, both of which the Court saw
during the field trip. At both places manganese has always had to be
removed as part of the water treatment.
19
CR 97/13, p. 17 (Wheater).
20
CR 97/12, p. 94 (Wheater).
21
PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 2, Fig. 7.2f.
22
PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 2, Fig. 7.28.
23
See e.g., data on manganeese concentrations from the Surany Bank Filtered Well, HC-M, Fig. 3.2.2. - 43 -
3.Manganese occurs naturally and originates from the geological sediments
in the aquifer.
4.Manganese concentrations are easy to remove in water works. In my home
country, Denmark, the majority of water works have removed manganese
and iron for decades. In these years the Danish Government is spending
hundreds of millions of USdollars in preventing and remediating
groundwater pollution, but manganese is not an issue in this context.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, Variant C has not resulted in a
general increase in manganese concentrations, and manganese is not a
serious pollutant for groundwater. To indicate that the manganese
concentrations shown in the PHARE Report are signs of a beginning of
“degradation of groundwater quality” 24is a major distortion. I should
like to repeat the conclusion from my last presentation that the reservoir
does not constitute a threat to groundwater quality.
Let me also stress two of my other specific conclusions, which appear
to be important for this case:
1.PHARE model calculations supported by monitoring show that there are no
eutrophication or other water quality problems in the reservoir, due to
the short retention time.
2.The only critical situation for water quality in the Old Danube is the
summer season. The PHARE model calculations confirm that for days with
discharges at 400 m /s or more, no water quality problems will occur,
even in a situation with underwater weirs.
Let me now re-emphasize what I feel are the other important
points with regard to the PHARE Project and Variant C.
The PHARE Report frequently pointed at lack of further data as a
constraint for more accurate model calibration and validation. You never
see a scientist who states that he cannot benefit from more data. If the
24
CR 97/13, p. 19 (Wheater). - 44 -
data amount had been doubled, we would have said the same, the assessed
uncertainty would just have been less in certain fields. However, it is
important to put these comments in the PHARE Report in the right
perspective, namely that a very large amount of relevant data from the
25
project area exists . I have never seen so much data in my professional
life as I did on this Project.
Nobody has questioned one of the key conclusions from my
presentation three weeks ago, namely that both the EC Working Group Data
Report from November 1993 26 and the PHARE project confirmed that no
irreversible general ecological impactshave occurred since October 1992.
This important conclusion should not be thought to imply that I
claim that Variant C only has positive impacts, nor that the PHARE project
is "dismissing long-term concerns" 27. As stated also in my previous
presentation I did emphasize in my conclusions that the present operation
of Variant C has resulted in less dynamics of groundwater fluctuations as
well as changed flow conditions in the river branch system, which some
people consider positive and others negative. There is still plenty of
time to decide on the objectives for this area. And the Variant C barrage
system does not in itself pose constraints, on the contrary, it provides a
wide range of management possibilities.
Let me finally dwell briefly on the question of a water management
régime for the Danube. My background for this is, in addition to the
PHARE Project, my participation in the EC working groups which produced
25PHARE Project, Final Report, December 1995, Vol. 1, pp. 3-4.
26
Commission of the European Communities, Republic of Hungary, Slovak Republic, Working Group of
Monitoring and Water Management Experts for the Gabcíkovo System of Locks, Data Report - Assessment
of Impacts of Gabcíkovo Project and Recommendations for Strengthening of Monitoring System, Budapest,
2 November 1993.
27
CR 97/13, p. 19 (Wheater). - 45 -
the Working Group Report in November 1992 28 and the Report on Temporary
29
Water Management Régime in December 1993 . I should like to emphasize two
aspects:
1.It is not possible on a scientific basis to give exact figures on how to
share the water without previous agreement on ecological objectives.
As stated earlier, this is far from trivial, due to the fact that there
are competing interests — even this is true among differing ecological
objectives such as forestry, fishery, recreation and natural
conservation, which are often not compatible with each other.
2.No matter how much water the two Parties agree, in average, to put into
the Old Danube, into the river branch systems, etc., it will under all
circumstances be beneficial to adopt a more sophisticated operation
policy than the one presently applied. In particular, it will be
possible to get more "ecological value" for the same average amount of
water by ensuring better dynamics in the Old Danube, in the river
branch system, in the seepage canals and by the introduction of
carefully tested remedial measures.
Let me conclude by stating that the ambition of the PHARE team was,
by use of a genuine scientific approach, to move our understanding
significantly forward and to develop a useful tool. In my opinion we
succeeded in this. We had a free hand to adopt our methodology and to
present our conclusions, whether they were mostly black or mostly white.
We have not been subject to any influence censorship, and I can assure you
that we would not have accepted it either. Both personally and for my
28Commission of the European Communities, Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, Republic of Hungary,
Working Group of Independent Experts on Variant C of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Working Group
Report, Budapest, 23 November 1992.
29
Commission of the European Communities, Republic of Hungary, Slovak Republic, Working Group of
Monitoring and Water Management Experts for the Gabcíkovo System of Locks, Report on Temporary
Water Management Regime, Bratislava, 1 December 1993. - 46 -
organization there is too much at risk if our credibility and objectivity
in approach can be questioned on acceptable scientific grounds.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you very much for your
attention. I shall now ask you, maybe after the break, to call upon
Professor Alain Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Refsgaard. The Court will now
suspend for 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.30 to 11.55 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I call now on Professor Pellet.
M. PELLET : Thank you Mr. President.
6. LA TÂCHE DE LA COUR
LES CONSÉQUENCES DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ DE LA HONGRIE
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges,
1. En cette phase ultime des plaidoiries orales, il m'incombe de préciser la position de la
Slovaquie en ce qui concerne la tâche de la Courdans la présente affaire et les conséquences
qu’il convient de tirer de la responsabilité de la Hongrie.
Comme l’a relevé le professeur Dupuy, les conclusions des Parties, tout en étant
«diamétralement opposées», suivent le même schéma (CR 97/13, p. 57) et s’attachent
— dans un premier temps, à indiquer les ré ponses que les deux Etats attendent de la
er
Cour aux trois questions posées au paragraphe 1e l’article 2 du compromis;
— dans un deuxième temps, à déterminer les conséquences juridiques qui découlent de
ces réponses, comme le prévoit le paragraphe 2 de cette disposition;
— puis, dans un troisième temps, à pr éciser, je dirais même à nuancer, ces
conséquences, dans la perspective de l’article 5.
C’est ce schéma que je me propose également de suivre.
I. LES QUESTIONS POSÉES ÀLA COUR
(article 2, paragraphe 1, du compromis)
2. Monsieur le Président, dans son interv ention finale, M. l’agent de la Hongrie a
souligné avec force le caractère crucicrucial character») de la troisième question posée à - 47 -
l’article 2 du compromis (CR 97/13, p. 78). La Slovq auie partage cette opinion. Si, en effet, la
notification hongroise du 19 mai 1992 n’a eu aucun effet sur le traité, celui-ci demeure en
vigueur entre les Parties et les réponses apportées aux deux autres questions en découlent avec
la clarté de l’évidence :
— la Hongrie n’a pu suspendre ni, à fortiori, abandonner les travaux lui incombant en
vertu de ce traité, comportements qui le violent manifestement, et
— la Tchécoslovaquie était fondée à recourir à la variante C et à la mettre en service,
seul moyen qu’elle avait de s’acquitter de ses propres obligations conventionnelles; au pire, on
peut y voir une contre-mesure légitime.
Il convient toutefois de s’arrêter un instant sur la rédaction de l’alinéa c) de l’article2,
paragraphe 1, du compromis. Il y est demandé à la Cour de se prononcer sur les effets
juridiques d’un comportement précis de la Répub lique de Hongrie à l’égard du traité: la
notification de sa prétendue «terminaison». Il s’endéduit d’abord et avant tout, que la validité
du traité n’est pas, et ne peut pas être remi se en cause; et, ensuite, que celui-ci demeure
pleinement valide aujourd’hui sauf
— si une nouvelle norme impérative du droit international général était survenue, mais
ce n’est pas le cas et, visiblement à regret, laHongrie ne le prétend pas (cf. CR 97/6, p. 21 et
suiv. (M. Sands) ou CR 97/12, p. 67-68 (M. Sands), p. 95 et suiv. (M. Crawford)), ou bien
— si la notification hongroise du 19 mai 1992 avait pu y mettre fin.
La rédaction de cette disposition qui excl ut tout autre motif d'extinction du traité
disqualifie ainsi, si besoin était, la thèse soeue par le professeur Crawford tant le 7 mars que
le 11 avril (CR 97/6, p. 25 et suiv. et CR 97/13, p. 46 et suiv.), et qui se traduit par l’équation :
«répudiation + répudiation = extinction du traité». Ce’st simple et cela a l’air logique. Mais ce
ne l’est pas. Il y manque un paramètre fondamental: celui de la licéité; et, en réalité, ceci ne
nous mène nulle part: pour qu’une répudiation (que mon contradicteur a définie comme un
simple fait, licite ou non — voir ibid., p. 46; voir aussi CR 97/6, p. 29) puisse mettre fin au
traité, il faut qu’elle soit licite, sinon, comme je li ontré le 25 mars, le traité ne s’éteint pas,
il est tout simplement violé (cf. CR 97/8, p4. 3). Et je vois mal comment non-extinction + non- - 48 -
extinction pourrait être = terminaison. En re vanche, si on est en présence de ce que M.
Crawford a appellé une «répudiation licite», peu importe que l’autre Partie soit d’accord ou
non : de toutes manières, le traité prend fin, entout cas s’il est bilatéral. On est donc, après un
long et inutile détour, ramené «à la case départ»l:a Hongrie était-elle en droit de mettre fin au
traité ? La Slovaquie a montré que la réponse est négative.
3. Le traité est donc en vigueur. Et, s’il est en vigueur, les Parties doivent l’appliquer. Je
l’avais dit le 27 mars (cf. CR 97/11, p. 41-43 et 46); je le maintiens.
Je ne pensais d’ailleurs pas que cette affirmation, d’une extrême banalité, susciterait un
tel concert de louanges de la part de mes contradic eturs de l’autre côté de la barre ! Pourtant ils
ont rivalisé d’ardeur pour m’en féliciter : M. Kiss a relevé la clarté de mes propos (CR 97/12,
p. 21), James Crawford a loué my «customary clarity» (qu’il a, il est vrai nuancé par une
allusion à ma «véhémence» ...) (CR 97/13, p. 39,)et Pierre-Marie Dupuy lui même m’a donné
raison (ibid., p. 57). Monsieur le Président, ma modestie en aurait souffert si ces louanges
n’avaient pas été quelque peu intéressées. Elles l’éatient: leurs auteurs se sont en effet servis
de cette très banale constatation juridique debon sens comme d’un véritable épouvantail. Et le
concert de louanges débouche sur un véritabl e chŒur de pleureuses... L’objet de ces
lamentations ? : l’obligation où se trouverait laHongrie de devoir appliquer un traité qu’elle a
librement conclu, dont elle a exécuté une partie, insuffisante mais non négligeable, et dont la
mise en Œuvre soulagerait sa balance commercialeen lui permettant de bénéficier pleinement
d’une source d’énergie renouvelable et écologi quement recommandable et d’un projet qui
améliore considérablement l’environnement humain.
«Construire ou démolir» dit M. Kiss, comme si«construire» était la pire des choses (CR
97/12, p. 21). «There is no escape. If the Treaty is in force, Nagymaros must be built», se
lamente M. Crawford (CR 97/13, p. 40). «[T]out letraité et l’intégralité du projet» surenchérit
M. Dupuy, qui s’emploie à brosser un tableau proprement apocalyptique de cette éventualité.
Et, en point d’orgue, M. l’ambassadeur Szénás i conclut: «If the Treaty is somehow, some
way, despite of everything that has happened, still in force, the Parties are plunged back into
the midst of the problems that have bedeviled their relations for so long.» Ib(id., p. 79.) - 49 -
Et nos contradicteurs d’opposer «l’intrn asigeance de la Slovaque i» (CR 97/13, p. 57 (M.
Dupuy)) à la souplesse de la Hongrie, qui veut bi en tout sauf construire à Nagymaros (et cela
que le traité soit ou non en vigueur — cf. CR 97/5, p. 67 (M. Sands)), sauf faire fonctionner
Gabcíkovo, sauf conserver le système de barrage actuel (M. Dupuy parle de «l’interruption
définitive du fonctionnement de la varianteC» — CR 97/13, p. 62 — mais ne propose aucun
système de remplacement). Tout ... à condition que ce ne soit rien !
4. C’est cela, Monsieur le Président, le plusinquiétant dans la position de la Hongrie: on
voit assez bien ce qu’elle ne veut pas — c’est cequi existe et que vous avez vu lors de votre
visite sur les lieux il y a quinze jours —; mais ce qu’elle veut demeure une énigme.
N’en déplaise à la Hongrie, ce n’est pas sile traité est toujours en vigueur que les deux
Etats sont renvoyés aux problèmes qui ont empois onné leurs relations depuis dix-huit ans (cf.
CR 97/13, p. 79, agent, préc. n° 11), mais bien s’il ne l’est pas; car la source de ces problèmes,
ce n’est pas que le traité ait été et demeure en vigueur, mais bien que la Hongrie se soit
comportée comme si il ne l’était pas. Sur la basede votre arrêt, qui fermera définitivement la
longue parenthèse ouverte par la Hongrie en 1989, les deux Parties doivent se remettre
ensemble au travail dans le cadre du traité ecthercher ensemble des solutions de bonne foi aux
problèmes qui peuvent surgir et dont la procé dure devant votre Haute Juridiction a eu au
moins le mérite de montrer qu’ils étaient tr ès loin d’être insurmontables. Car aucune
catastrophe écologique n’est en vue, Messieurs le s Juges; la qualité des eaux souterraines n’a
jamais été aussi bonne; celle des eaux de surface etsconstante et pourrait encore s’améliorer si
la Hongrie s’en donnait les moyens; et les branches du Danube sont régénérées. Enfin, et ce
n’est pas l’aspect le moins important, le tra ité permet, par sa souplesse et sa flexibilité,
l’amélioration continue du projet et organiseà cette fin un processus de coopération constante
entre les Parties.
5. En disant cela, Messieurs les Juges, je n’aipas le sentiment de parler au nom d’un pays
«intransigeant», je décris une réalité quie suscite ni effroi, ni même inquiétude.
Mais la Slovaquie est prête à aller plus loin. Je l’avais déjà dit à la fin du premier tour
des plaidoiries orales: il n’est nullement impossible de revenir à l’application du traité, mais - 50 -
avais-je précisé, que «la Slovaquie ne se refuse pas à priori à des aménagements du traité»
(CR97/11, p.53). C’est dire que, tout en pens ant que le traité de1977 doit nécessairement
constituer la base des négociations prévues à l’article5 du compromis, la Slovaquie n’exclut
pas de procéder à la revision du traité, à londition toujours que la Hongrie établisse qu’il en
est besoin.
L’importance de la première conclusion de la République slovaque tient aussi à d’autres
raisons. Si vous ne déclarez pas, Messieurs de laCour, que le traité de1977 lie les parties et
les a toujours liées,toutesles installations existantes se trouveront dépourvues de base légale;
et les parties ne pourront que négocier «dans levide», sans autre directive réelle qu’une bonne
volonté d’autant plus hypothétique que les pr essions pour que les négociations échouent
risquent d’être fortes —des deux côtés, mais surtout en Hongrie semble-t-il, au moins à en
juger par certaines déclarations récentes du prmier ministre hongrois, qui a tenté de répondre
à une opposition aveuglée par son hostilité intransigeante à un projet qu’elle combat, en le
caricaturant (voirinfra, les conclusions de l’agent de la Slovaquie).
Le traité, lui, offre aux parties un guide solide; étant entendu qu’elles peuvent, d'un
commun accord, dans l’exercice de leur sagessesouveraine, lui apporter les modifications qui
paraîtraient utiles.
II. LES CONSÉQUENCES JURIDIQUES DES RÉPONSES DE LA COUR
AUX QUESTIONS POSÉES
(article 2, paragraphe 2, du compromis)
6. Monsieur le Président, le traité de 1977 etn vigueur; la Hongrie l’a violé; la question
se pose de savoir quelles conséquences découlent de ces constatations.
Dans son principe, la réponse est simple :
1 ° la Hongrie doit mettre un terme à son comportement illicite et cesser de faire obstacle
à l’application du traité, compte bien sûr tenu desa flexibilité —je veux dire de la flexibilité
de cet instrument— et des importantes po ssibilités d’évolution qu’il ménage, voire des
modifications qui pourraient lui être apportées par accord entre les parties à la suite de
négociations futures; - 51 -
2 ° la Hongrie doit réparer les conséquences dommageables de ses manquements, qu’il
s’agisse de ses suspensions et abandons illicites de travaux ou de sa répudiation formelle du
traité à partir de mai 1992; et
3 ° la Hongrie doit donner des garanties appropriées de s’abstenir d’empêcher
l’application du traité et le fonctionnement continu du système.
7. Quelques mots d’abord sur ce dernier point, les garanties.
Le professeurDupuy s’est borné à ironise r sur le fait «que la Slovaquie entendait se
prémunir contre un contrôle exclusif du c ours du Danube... par la... Hongrie» (CR97/13,
p.57), laissant entendre par là qu’après tout c’est aujourd’hui la Slovaquie qui exerce ce
contrôle grâce au barrage de _unovo. Certes, mais, compte tenu des errements passés de la
Hongrie, la Slovaquie est légitimement soucieuse d’obtenir l’assurance durable que son
partenaire n’empêchera plus le fonctionnement du projet.
C’est dans cette perspective que la Slovaquie a suggéré que cette garantie pourrait être
que la fermeture du barrage demeure à _unovo et j’avais indiqué qu’en le déclarant, qu'en le
décidant, la Cour ne remettrait pas en questoin l’idée d’exécution intégrale du traité, puisqu’il
s’agit de tirer, sur le plan des règles secondair, les conséquences de la situation actuelle qui
résultent des faits internationalement illicites de la Hongrie (CR97/11, p.47). Bien que la
Partie hongroise n’ait pas contesté ce point, il e ande peut-être quelques mots d’explications
complémentaires.
Selon la République slovaque, le maintien de la fermeture du Danube à _unovo serait
justifié non seulement en fait, mais aussi en droit.
En fait, la chose est assez évidente: le démantèlement des installations existantes de la
varianteC—que vous avez pu observer sur les lieux—, même s’il est techniquement
possible, serait fort coûteux et il n’en résulte rait aucun avantage ni pour la protection de
l’environnement, ni au plan économique. Je re lève d’ailleurs que la Partie hongroise s’est
montrée préoccupée de l’extension du bassin deretenue qui en résulterait (cf. CR 97/13, p. 39
(M. Crawford) ou p.59 (M.Dupuy)). Il va de soi que la Slovaquie, pour sa part, n’envisage
pas un instant d’exiger cette extension, inutile et onéreuse. - 52 -
Le maintien du barrage du Danube à _unovo se justifie également au point de vue
juridique. On peut y voir la conséquence normale de la licéité de la varianteC: et si, pour
toutes les raisons que vient d’exposer mon savant ami sirArthurWatts, celle-ci est licite, on
ne voit pas très bien quel motif justifierait son démantèlement qui créerait une injustice à
l'égard de la Slovaquie. Au surplus, ce maintien constituerait sans aucun doute l’assurance la
plus crédible contre le renouvellement des faits internationalement illicites qui sont à l’origine
de l’affaire qui nous occupe.
Ce raisonnement paraît d’autant plus lé gitime que les garanties ou assurances de
non-répétition, telles que les envisage l’article 46 duprojet de la CDI, ne sont pas un élément
de la réparation stricto sensu, ils sont une autre conséquence de la responsabilité quis’ajoute
aux diverses formes de la réparation. Elles «remplissent, dit la CDI, une fonction distincte et
autonome [...lorsqu’]il existe un risque que le ft illicite se reproduise» (cf. le commentaire de
l’article46 par la CDI in Annuaire de la Commission du droit international 1993, vol.II,
deuxième partie, p. 85). Et tel est le cas ici.
Il ne fait aucun doute que la Slovaquie est endroit d’obtenir l’assurance formelle que les
faits internationalement illicites de la Hongrie ne se reproduiront pas. Le maintien de la
fermeture du Danube à _unovo constitue une telle garantie. Mais il peut également être
envisagé que, dans le cadre des négociations à intervenir entre les Parties, la Hongrie donne
une assurance équivalente comptetenu des conditions actuelles du projet ou de celles,
nouvelles, qui pourraient résulter d’accords entre les Parties, voire même, le cas échéant, de
modifications qu’elles pourraient convenir d’apporter au traité. Mais ceci sort du cadre du
compromis.
8. Bien entendu, cette garantie, pour importante qu’elle soit, Monsieur le Président, ne
saurait tenir lieu de réparation.
J’ai dit, lors du premier tour des plaidoiries orales, que la réparation devait prendre la
forme d’unerestitutio in integrumd'abord (cf. CR 97/11, p. 44). Ceci n’a pas été contesté par
la Partie hongroise qui s’emploie elle-même à obtei nr de la Cour une décision de ce type ... en
sens opposé cela va de soi ! - 53 -
Le seul point de droit qui oppose les Parties à cet égard —mais il est de taille—
concerne la combinaison de la restitution en nature avec l'indemnisation. Le professeur
Dupuy a fait mine de s’étonner que j’ai indiqué que la restitutio in integrum n’était pas de
nature, en l’espèce, à effacer toutes les conséquences de l’acte illicite (CR 97/13, p. 59). Mon
contradicteur et ami est trop bon juriste pour queje puisse croire à un étonnement sincère... Ce
que je disais (cf. CR 97/11, p. 48) éta it, à vrai dire, fort simple: la restitutio in integrum
devrait se traduire, sauf si les Parties en conviennent autrement par voie d'accord, par la
reprisepar la Hongrie, à l’avenir, de ses obligations conventionnelles; mais cette reprise ne
dédommagera pas la Slovaquie des pertes que laTchécoslovaquie et elle-même ont encourues
du fait du comportement illicite passéde la Partie hongroise. Pour que la réparation soit
«intégrale» (cf. l’article 42, paragraphe 1, du projet de la CDI, rapport sur les travaux de sa
quarante-huitième session, A/51/10, p. 164), pour qu’elle «efface toutes les conséquences de
l’acte illicite» (cf.Usine de Chorzów, fond, C.P.J.I. série A n° 17, p. 47, arrêt du 13 septembre
1928), une indemnisation doit donc s’ajouterà la restitutio, constituée par la reprise par la
Hongrie de ses obligations en vertu du traité.
9. C’est pourquoi, Messieurs les Juges, la République slovaque vous prie de dire et juger
qu’elle a droit à une indemnisation complète au titre des pertes et dommages, y compris le
manque à gagner, occasionnés par les faits internationalement illicites de la Hongrie, le tout
assorti d’intérêts jusqu’au jour du paiement. Cette demande me paraît appeler quatre
remarques :
1 ° La Partie hongroise s’est plainte de ce quenous n’aurions pas précisé l’objet de cette
demande (CR 97/13, p. 59). C’est assez plaisantlorsque l’on constate qu’à aucun moment, ni
dans ses écritures, ni dans ses plaidoiries or ales, la Hongrie n’a donné la moindre liste des
préjudices dont elle dit demander l’indemnisation en ce qui la concerne, alors que, pour sa
part, la Slovaquie a présenté une liste raisonnblement détaillée des dommages qu’elle a subis
et elle prie la Cour de bien vouloir déciderque ce sont les catégories de dommages énumérées
au chapitre IX de son mémoire (MS, par.9.34-9.47, p. 364-370), dont l’indemnisation est due - 54 -
par la Hongrie. En outre, des intérêts doivent être versés sur ces sommes conformément aux
principes généralement applicables.
2 ° Vous remarquerez en passant, Messieurs de la Cour, qu’il s’agit de dommages précis,
quantifiables, certains. Il y a là un contraste sa isissant avec les positions floues de la Partie
hongroise qui vous demande de reconnaître un dr oit à réparation en sa faveur pour des
dommages futurs, incertains et éventuels, dont elle reconnaît qu’ils ne se sont pas produits
mais dont elle affirme qu’ils pourraient, peut-êe, survenir à l’avenir (cf. CR 97/6, p. 69 (M.
Dupuy); voir aussi MH, par. 8.26 et 8.31,p. 251 et 252 ou RH, par. 3.170-3.172, p. 178-179);
M. Dupuy est allé jusqu’à vous suggérer que laHongrie a droit à une indemnisation pour des
«risques» dont elle serait menacée par la variante C (CR 97/13, p.61 et 62). Je ne pense pas,
Monsieur le Président, qu’il soit utile de m’appesantir sur l’extrême nouveauté de ces
prétentions par rapport aux théories habituellement admises quant à la définition du préjudice
en droit international...
3 ° En troisième lieu, la Slovaquie pense qu’il et nécessaire, voire indispensable, que la
Cour détermine d’une manière aussi précise que possible quels sont les préjudices
indemnisables, ne fût-ce que du fait du mystère que la Hongrie entretient également à cet
égard. En revanche, et les deux Parties sontd’accord sur ce point (cf. CR 97/2, p. 24 (agent);
CR 97/6, p. 57-58; CR 97/12, p. 21-22 (M. Kiss) ; CR 97/13, p. 65-66 (M. Dupuy) et p. 84
(agent)), il serait certainement prématuré de fixer le quantumdes dommages subis par la
Slovaquie du fait des comportements illicites de la Hongrie: ceux-ci ne pourront être fixés
avec précision que lorsque la date de la mise enoeuvre effective du traité dans son ensemble
(modifié le cas échéant) aura été sinon atteinte, du moins décidée.
4 ° Quatrième remarque enfin : il paraît d’autantplus impossible de fixer dès maintenant
le montant des indemnités dues par la Hongrie à la Slovaquie que celui-ci dépendra et de la
date à laquelle le système de barrage prévu par le projet (qui aurait dû être pleinement
opérationnel en 1994) fonctionnera effectivement et des modalités de son fonctionnement.
III. LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE L’ARRÊT DE LA COUR
i)
(article 5 du compromis) - 55 -
10. Monsieur le Président, ceci me conduit à b aorder un troisième et dernier problème, qui
concerne, à vrai dire, moins le contenu de l’arrtêlui-même, que sa mise en oeuvre. Celle-ci est
envisagée et «canalisée» par l’article 5 du compromis.
En vertu du paragraphe premier de cette disposition, «[l]es Parties s’engagent à
accepter l’arrêt de la Cour comme définitif et obligatoire et à l’exécuter de bonne foi». Le
professeur Dupuy a cru pouvoir tirer des conclusionsassez surprenantes de cette clause, qu’il
présente curieusement comme vous invitant, Me ssieurs les Juges, à appliquer le droit de
l’environnement et le «droit fluvial international, le tout en vous inspirant des règles du droit
de la mer (CR 97/13, p. 63-64). Vaste programme ! Vous me permettrez d’y voir, plus
classiquement, une disposition-standard, que l’ontrouve dans la quasi-totalité des compromis
par lesquels une affaire vous est soumise, et qui se borne à rappeler la règle posée à l’article 60
de votre Statut.
Plus particulières sont certainement les dispositions des paragraphes2 et 3 de cet
article 5 du compromis. M. l’agent de la Hongrie en a fait l’exégèse vendredi dernier et nous
n’avons rien à y redire (CR 97/13, p. 83-84; voir aussi CR 97/12, p. 22 (M. Kiss) et, pour la
Slovaquie, CR 97/11, p. 53-54) — du moins tant que l’on s’en tient aux généralités. C’est sur
les modalités d’application de ces dispositionsqu’il subsiste sans doute quelques désaccords
entre les Parties; et en tout cas, quelques ambiguïtés, que je vais essayer de dissiper.
11. Les deux Etats présents devant vous s’accordent sur ce que j’appellerais le «contenu
minimal» des futures négociations.
Elles doivent porter, en premier lieu, su r l’évaluation des dommages subis par la
Slovaquie; mais, j’y insiste, Monsieur le Président,sur leur évaluation. En ce qui concerne la
consistance des préjudices indemnisables, il nousparaît indispensable que celle-ci soit fixée
aussi précisément que possible par l’arrêt que laCour va rendre. La haute juridiction dispose
de tous les éléments pour cela — en tous cas,la Slovaquie lui a exposé les siens et, comme je
l’ai dit il y a un instant, si la Hongrie s’est abstenue de préciser la nature des dommages dont
elle prétend avoir été la victime, c’est, tout simplement, parce qu’elle n’en a subi aucun. Au
surplus, ces préjudices hypothétiques ne seraient, de toute manière, pas indemnisables - 56 -
puisqu’aucun fait internationalement illicite ne peutêtre attribué à la Slovaquie. Or, le seul
fondement acceptable à l’obligation de réparer —leseul— pesant sur la Hongrie est le droit
de la responsabilitépour manquement(cf. CR 97/11, p. 49-53) et nile traité lui-même, auquel
les conseils de la Hongrie retrouvent soudainement un certain charme (cf. CR97/12
(M. Sands)), ni l’article 35 du projet de laCDI (cf. CR 97/4, p. 25 (M. Crawford) ou CR 97/5,
p. 67 (M. Sands); voir aussi CR 97/12, p. 64 (M. Nagy) ou CR 97/13, p. 26 (M. Dupuy)).
12. Le second point sur lequel les négociations doivent nécessairement porter concerne les
modalités du re-démarrage du projet — pas du «pr ojet original», du «projet» —, là où il a été
brutalement interrompu par la Partie hongroi se en 1989-1990. Il s’agit d’abord, c’est une
évidence, de déterminer la nature des travaux restant à effectuer, ce qui suppose que les Parties
se mettent d’accord sur la consistance future du projet et le calendrier de sa réalisation.
La consistance du projet ? J’ai dit, et je ne le retire pas, que la Hongrie devait
s’acquitter de ses obligations, de toutes ses obligations, en vertu du traité. Cela signifie, en
effet, d’abord, que Nagymaros doit être construit.Mais j’ai dit aussi que rien n’empêchait les
deuxParties, par voied’accord, de modifier le traité,si toutes deux y consentent. Mais, ceci, à
vrai dire, dépasse le cadre de l’article 5 du compromis. Il ne paraît en effet pas juridiquement
possible que la Cour décide, dans son arrêt, une modification d’un traité dont elle ne pourra
que constater la validité. Ce «scénario» est donc, en quelque sorte, «hors compromis» et je
l’évoque comme une possibilité ne serait-ce que parce que M. l’agent de la Hongrie l’a, lui-
même, envisagé la semaine dernière (cf. CR 97/13, p. 84-85).
En revanche, de toutes manières, le s deux Parties doivent négocier un nouveau
calendrier pour la reprise de l’application du traité puisque celui prévu tant dans l’accord
mutuelle de 1977 modifié en 1989, que dans le plan contractuel conjoint, est devenu obsolète
du fait du comportement illicite de la Hongrie.
Dans le même esprit, des négociations de vront porter sur les droits respectifs des
Parties sur l’énergie produite, cette question n’étant sans doute pas détachable de celle de
l’indemnisation, qui pourrait parfaitement être réglée en nature, par l’octroi, pendant une - 57 -
période à fixer, de tout ou partie de l’électricité à la Slovaquie. Les deux Parties devront en
outre préciser l’objet et les modalités de la propriété conjointe des ouvrages et installations.
13. Les Parties doivent aussi, c’est une autre évidence, régler les problèmes qui étaient en
suspens au moment de la répudiation du traité par la Hongrie. Et ceux-ci, j’en ai évoqué
quelques-uns hier, ne sont pas anodins, puisqu’ ils incluent certaines mesures nécessaires à
l’amélioration de l’ancien lit du Danube, dont l’ implantation des maintenant fameux seuils
subaquatiques ou la définition des modalités (et des limites) de la production d’électricité de
pointe.
Il faudra bien sûr aussi, et la Slovaquie en est tout à fait consciente, la Hongrie
probablement aussi, que les Parties s’accordentsur un mécanisme aussi précis que possible de
gestion des eaux. Toutefois, je souhaiterais faire deux remarques à cet égard :
1. En premier lieu, il n’est possible, dans ce domaine, que d’adopter des principes
généraux : cette gestion doit en effet tenir compte de toutes les circonstances hydrologiques et
climatiques et des besoins de l’environneme nt naturel notamment, circonstances qu’il est
absolument impossible de prévoir une fois pour toutes à l’avance. C’est d’ailleurs pourquoi un
système de surveillance «the monitoring», dont vousavez pu apprécier la sophistication et la
rigueur, a été mis en place: il est évident que si celui-ci laissait présager de quelconques
menaces pour l’environnement, des mesures corr ectrices devraient aussitôt être mises en
oeuvre; et l’on ne saurait trop répéter que c’est pourcela que le traité est souple et flexible et
prévoit une coopération constante entre les Parties, coopération dont il faut faire revivre les
mécanismes. En outre, la viabilité économique du projet doit être assurée.
2. En second lieu, cette question relève par ex cellence de l’accord des Parties. Je ne
crois pas que ce soit manquer de respect à la Cour que de le rappeler.
Dans sa plaidoirie de vendredi dernier, le professeur Dupuy affirmait que la Haute
Juridiction ne souhaiterait pas «se substituer aux parties pour descendre ... à l’étage des
cuisines» (CR 97/13, p. 66). Il appliquait cette cueriuse image au calcul de la réparation ce qui,
malgré tout, peut être décidé par un tribunal, si besoin est. En revanche, il est tout à fait clair
qu’il ne relève pas de la mission de la Cour, ni à vrai dire, de celle d’une juridiction quelle - 58 -
qu’elle soit, d’entrer dans les considérations infiniment techniques faisant intervenir des
paramètres scientifiques d’une extrême complexité et changeant, qu’implique la gestion des
eaux, qui doit tenir compte du volume des débits, de leur variations selon les saisons, les
besoins de la végétation, etc. D’autant moins quec ,omme je viens de le dire, il ne s’agit pas de
poser des principes généraux et abstraits, en tout cas il ne s'agit pas seulement de poser ces
principes, il s'agit aussi de procéder à une surveillance constante et de réagir aux
circonstances. Ceci n’est pas là la mission d’une juridiction.
* * *
14. Monsieur le Président, en écoutant nos contradicteurs la semaine dernière, j’ai souvent
eu le sentiment qu’ils s’étaient trompés de forum et confondaient le v ôtre avec un
Parlement ou, en tout cas, qu’ils se croyaient devant un amiable compositeur.
Ce n’est pas, Messieurs les Juges, je crois, vous faire injure que de rappeler que vous
êtes voués à l’application et à la défense du droi. ’est une noble tâche. Mais, dire le droit, ce
n’est pas le faire; et cela, nos amis hongrois semblent l’avoir fâcheusement oublié.
Ainsi, j’ai été très frappé d’entendre, ve ndredi dernier, le professeur Carbiener —-
avocat de la Hongrie, faut-il le rappeler ? et la fonction d’avocat est éminemment juridique —,
plaider «pour une rationalité nouvelle, intégratrice,issue des développements scientifiques»
(CR 97/13, p. 77).
L’article 38 de votre Statut, Messieurs lesJuges, est pourtant clair : votre «mission est
de régler conformément au droit internationalles différends qui [vous] sont soumis», pas de
mettre en oeuvre une «rationalité nouvelle», pas de vous ériger en législateurs d’un
développement durable (voir ibid., p. 63-64 (M. Dupuy), p. 76 (M. Carbiener) ou p. 78
(agent)), même si cette préoccupation, que laSlovaquie partage, est éminemment respectable
et ne saurait être négligée, mais seulement — et c’est important —, pour autant que, et dans la
mesure où, vous ne substituez pas votre jugement sur le droit au jugement en droit, qui est - 59 -
attendu de vous et pour lequel les Parties vous ontfait confiance par le biais du compromis du
7 avril 1993.
15. Malgré la caricature de ses positions qu’a tenté de faire la Hongrie, la Slovaquie,
comme l’a rappelé son agent à l’issue du premier tour (CR 97/11, p. 55), est particulièrement
soucieuse de la protection de l’environnement humain. Et elle est convaincue que c’est en
protégeant les habitants de la région, dans lesdeux pays, contre les inondations dévastatrices
causées par les caprices du Danube et du climat, en facilitant l’irrigation, en surveillant
soigneusement la qualité des eaux, de surface et de l’aquifère, et, bien sûr, en préservant le
patrimoine naturel remarquable des branchesdu Danube, que cette protection est le mieux, le
plus durablement, le plus raisonnablement, et leplus équitablement assurée. La Slovaquie est
convaincue aussi qu’une application raisonnable du traité de 1977, par les deux Parties
agissant conjointement au mieux de leurs intérêts communs, est la meilleure garantie du
développement durable qu’elle appelle de se s voeux autant que la Hongrie. Et elle est
convaincue également que si, par impossible, l’arrêt que vous allez rendre devait priver les
Parties du guide, à la fois ferme dans ses objec tifs et souple dans ses modalités de mise en
oeuvre, que constitue le traité, les deux Etaéprouveraient les plus grandes difficultés à
trouver un terrain d’entente: il leur manquerait le secours du droit.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie très vivement de
m’avoir écouté avec patience et bienveillance tout au long de ces plaidoiries, et je vous prie,
Monsieur le Président, de bien vouloir donner la parole à M. Peter Tomka, agent de la
République slovaque.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Professor Pellte. I call upon the distinguished Agent of
Slovakia.
TOMMr.KA:
Mr. President, Members of the Court, as we are now approaching the end of these
pleadings, I am anxious that the positions of th e Parties should not be misrepresented. It
would be quite wrong to see this as a case between a State — Hungary — which is concerned - 60 -
to protect the environment and a State—Slovakia—which is indifferent to the needs for
environmental protection. Slovakia has an envio rnmental record of which any State could be
proud. You have seen with your own eyes the complex monitoring arrangements now in
operation in and around Gabcíkovo. So the positi on is not that Slovakia takes refuge in
technical arguments based on treaty law, ignoringthe need for environmental protection. It is
rather that Slovakia seeks to preserve and pr otect the 1977Treaty because, in addition to
providing for sustainable development of the Da nube, it contains the means of preserving the
environment in this stretch of the Danube.
Mr.President, Members of the Court, th is is a case in which the Court must be
concerned not simply to resolve this particular dispute between the two Parties, but also to
clarify principles of law applicable to treaties generally. Let there be no mistake, States all
over the world will take careful note of what theCourt finds to be the law regarding a party's
freedom to suspend, or terminate, a treaty. If the Court should uphold Hungary's claim to
suspend, and then terminate, a treaty Hungary believes to be no longer in Hungary's interest,
then the effects of the Court's judgement would be very damaging.
Slovakia has demonstrated that Hungary was in clear, and fundamental, breach of the
1977 Treaty. We have shown that Hungary is unb ale to invoke "necessity" to excuse Hungary
from responsibility for that breach. Professor MCcaffrey has explained that, even on the basis
of Article33 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles, Hungary meets none of
the conditions for excluding wrongfulness.
But even if Hungary did satisfy those conditions—which Slovakia emphatically
denies—the effect would be topreclude wrongfulness. And that is all! It would not permit
Hungary to suspend or terminate the 1977 Treaty.
However, what I want to do now is to ask the Court to consider the consequencesof
Hungary's argument justifying termination of the 1977Treaty on the basis of a supposed
ecological necessity. They are consequences whih c should alarm this Court. For if Hungary's
arguments are upheld, then, in my submission, the very stability of treaties is seriously
challenged. - 61 -
The Court will see that, in essence, the Hunga rian thesis is this: "a State party to a
Treaty can suspend performance, or terminate the Treaty, whenever it believes its essential
interests may be affected by continuing performance".
I do not need to tell you that nothing even eotely like that proposition is contained in
the Vienna Convention. And for good reason. Ifaccepted by this Court, it would reduce the
binding force of treaties to an empty formula!
The Court will recall that Hungary defines its "essential interests" very broadly. For
Hungary it is not simply a threatto its natural resources. It includes any threat to its economic
interests (MsGorove, CR 97/3, p.73; Mr.Sa nds, CR 97/6, pp.10-11). Or threats to the
"ensemble" of its concerns (ProfessorDupuy, CR97/3, p.83). Or even situations where one
Party alleges the treaty has been based on " outmoded science" (Mr.Sands, CR 97/6, p.24).
So you can see that the concept of "essential intrests" is so broad that almost any reason will
allow a State to rid itself of unwanted treaty obligations.
And not much is required by way of proof that such "essential interests" are
threatened. Hungary's counsel have told us, again and again, that it is enough if Hungary
reasonably believed that damage to its interestsmight occur — notwill occur, mark you, just
might— in the distant future. For, so we are told, ecological damage by its very nature takes
many years to materialize. So the results of four years of monitoring, which show the
contrary, can be ignored: four years tell us nothing!
There are at least three answers to this.First, the whole point of having a sophisticated
monitoring system is to have an early warning th at the activity carries a risk. As our scientists
have shown, ecological damage, even long-term da mage, does not come "out of the blue": it
does not suddenly appear out of nowhere. Th ere are bound to be signs that something is
wrong, and the whole point of a monitoring systemis to give an early warning that something
may be wrong.
Second , the effects of the Gabcíkovo barrage, operating under VariantC, have been
carefully monitored by Slovakia for the past f our and a half years. And the results are - 62 -
markedly reassuring. They donot suggest that there is any realthreat to either Party. On the
contrary, compared to the "pre-dam" situation, there is some evidence of steady improvement.
Third , the law cannot be such as to allow a Party to suspend or terminate a treaty on a
mere suspicion that damage might occur in thedistant future. Let me remind the Court of the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles onthe Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (Report of the ILC 46th Se ss. 1994: UNGAOR, 49th Sess. Suppl.No.10,
A/49/10). On 4April1997, on the basis of these Draft Articles, the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly adopted a draft conventi on on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (United Nations Doc.A/C-6/51/NUW/WG/L.3, as amended).
Here we have a draft covering ecological damage.It contains the basic obligation not to cause
significant harm (Art.7). The word "significan t" was carefully chosen. And "significant"
cannot mean damage which has not occurred, or damage which is merely suspected as likely
to occur in the distant future. Even in emergency situations,provided for in Article28, the
threat of serious harm must be imminent. And in such situations States are obliged to take
measures to deal with the emergency in co-operation with other affected States. Nothing
could be further from Hungary's idea that it was free to take unilateralmeasures, even
suspending and then terminating, a treaty, simply upon an unproved fear of damage in the
distant future.
So, Mr.President, if you take this most recent attempt to codify the law in relation to
international watercourses—like the Danube —and you look at the risk of ecological
damage, nothing— I repeat, nothing—in the Draft Articles of the ILC or the new draft
convention gives any support to the Hungarian thesis.
And perhaps now, Mr. President, youwill allow me to say a word aboutlogic. It may
well be that the law and logic are not the samething. But where a party gives a court reasons
for its conduct the law expects those reasons—if they are to be believed—to withstand
logical analysis. - 63 -
I would ask the Court to examine the reasons given by Hungary to justify the
suspension, and later abandonment, of its perfomr ance of the Treaty — simply to see whether
they stand up to logical analysis.
As we have heard, Hungary professes to have feared an ecological disaster, resulting
from the Treaty-Project. Hungary says its princi pal concerns were two: the threat to the
drinking water supplies of Budapest; and to the ecosystem of the wetlands of the Szigetköz.
Let me take the first: the supplies of iking water to Budapest. Now, as Slovakia has
made clear, and I refer the Court back to Mr. Word sworth's statement, there is no basis in fact
for this fear of contamination. Any risk tothe water from the bank-filtered wells upon which
Budapest relies came from Hungary's own conduct in carrying out extensive and excessive
dredging of the riverbed downstream of Nagymaros prior to 1980.
Let me take the other alleged fear of Hunga ry: the fear of long-term damage to the
ecosystem of the Szigetköz, on Hungary's right-bank, near Dunakiliti. Now there one can see
a superficial link. Dunakiliti controlled the rateflow in the old riverbed of the Danube. So,
if the wetlands of the Szigetköz depended on an aedquate supply of water to the old bed of the
Danube, Dunakiliti was obviously important. ButHungary controlled Dunakiliti! The "tap"
was to be under Hungarian control.So, if a real threat emerged, all Hungary had to do was to
present that evidence to Czechoslovakia and agere to allocate more water to the old bed. And,
if Czechoslovakia unreasonably objected then, in the final analysis, Hungary had a remedy, for
Hungary controlled the "tap".
So, Mr.President, simply as a matter of logic, why stop building the "tap" that gave
Hungary ultimate control over the flow-rate? It simply does not make sense! It lacks all logic.
Mr. President, I hope you will forgive my shortexcursusinto logic. I think it may help
the Court to see that Hungary's conduct was not only unsupported by the facts, and the law —
it does not withstand logical scrutiny.
Mr. President, let me now turn to the two different "scenarios" painted by the
Hungarian Party.
(i)The 1977 Treaty is held by the Cour t to have been validly terminated by
Hungary - 64 -
If I take the first hypothesis which Hungary urges the Court to adopt, namely that the
1977 Treaty was validly terminated, then the consequences would be these.
First , Variant C would be deprived of its legal basis and its continued operation would
be regarded as unlawful by Hungary. So th e by-pass canal would have to be emptied,
navigation would be forced back into th e old Danube, the Gabcíkovo barrage would be
rendered useless, and all the pre-dam problemsof flooding, drying-out of the side-arms, poor
navigation, and so on, would re-emerge. After 20 y ears and billions of dollars we would be in
a worse position than where we started from!
Second , Slovakia would be placed in an impossible position in negotiations with
Hungary. For Hungary would realize that Slovk aia would have to keep Gabcíkovo operational
somehow—it could not accept that this large investment would stand idle and useless: and
so Hungary could force whatever conditions it liked on Slovakia. The threat is real. Let me
recall to the Court the words ofthe Agent for Hungary. "But what Gabcíkovo can and should
become depends on what must happen to Variant C, of which it is now part... It cannot
remain in that situation. If agreement cannot be reached as to its future, it must be
dismantled." (CR 97/13, p. 85.)
So you see that the future of Gabcíkovo itself would be in jeopardy. And Gabcíkovo is
part of the agreed Treaty-Project!
(ii) The 1977 Treaty is held by the Court to remain valid
I take, second, the scenario which H ungary bitterly opposes, namely that the
1977 Treaty is held to remain valid.
Hungary assumes that, in this case, it will be bound to complete the building of
Nagymaros, and it is this consequence Hungary finds totally unacceptable. But, Mr. President,
whilst formally, that may be the legal conse quence of finding the Treaty remains valid, we
need to bear in mind a number of factors.
First , there will have to be negotiations on the implementation of the Court's judgment.
But even apart from that, provided Hungary ca n give real evidence that construction of - 65 -
Nagymaros as originally planned will cause serious harm to Hungary, these negotiations can
be extended and there is nothing to stop the Parties from agreeing to revise the Treaty. At the
end of my opening statement in the first round, I pointed out how readily the dispute in this
case could have been settled on the basis of porposals put forward either by Czechoslovakia or
by Hungary in late 1989. Although the situa tion on the ground has changed since then,
Slovakia is prepared to take up these negotiati ons where they left off before they were
terminated by Hungary in early 1990, with th e aim of resuming joint operations on an
agreed-upon basis. The flexible attitude exprsesed by Czechoslovakia's new Prime Minister in
his letter of 15 February 1990 following the Ve lvet Revolution (HM, Vol. 4, Ann. 33) still
prevails.
Regrettably, Hungary's pleadings have sero iusly misrepresented the position at the time
and portrayed Czechoslovakia as intransigent and vehemently set against any change in the
Project. But Slovakia at these hearings — and inits written pleadings — has demonstrated the
contrary. If Hungary will put behind it this di storted picture of the positions of the Treaty
Parties in 1989, the two Parties can then sit down now and pick up the discussions where they
left off, although necessarily having to address the consequences of the changed situation on
the ground as well.
The fact is that negotiations have continually foundered because of rivalries within the
Hungarian Parliament and misinformation given to the Hungarian public. The problem is not a
new one. It is well-known that some cases are brought by the governments before the World
Court because of the limits imposed on the governments by parliaments.
As is also known, the Court's proceedings inthis case were accompanied by an effort to
find an out-of-court settlement, particularly si ce the fall of 1995. While substantial progress
was made, nevertheless not all aspects of a package deal were agreed on. I am not allowed
even to indicate the direction in which both Parties were leaning as they had a mutual
understanding that the positions of the Parties durnig the talks should not be disclosed for fear
of prejudicing their legal position before the Court. - 66 -
It is worth noting what the Prime Minist er of Hungary H.E. Mr. Gyula Horn has
recently said, for he explains some of the difficulties created internally in Hungary. Let me
add, before quoting him, that I have a great re spect for this man, a real statesman who so
greatly contributed to democratic reform in Hungary. And this courageous leader when
strongly criticized by the opposition in Parlia ment, for holding talks with Slovakia on a
possible out-of-court-settlement, on 10 February 1997, said:
"I must say that a lot of lies have emerged in the Gabcíkovo issue not only for the
time being, but throughout its history. One lieis that the Prime Minister has alone
entered into a secret agreement with PrimeMinister Me_iar. Neither is it true that
it deals with alleged construction of the downstream step at Esztergom. I want to
remind the honourable public that it was asserted in the past that there would be
no damage in the case of withdrawal fromthe investment, that the Austrian party
would not claim any compensation, that VariatnC is a 'paper tiger' and finally that
the hydropower plant at Gabcíkovo would not be accomplished. They had been
making those assertions for many years. The fact remains that these people
prevented the construction of an underwater weir in 1993, which was—though
temporarily—to solve the water supply of Szigetköz. The whole issue has been
accompanied by lies and distortions."
And he later concluded his statement on this issue by these words:
"I would like to emphasize: this issue n eeds to be resolved. This must be done
because of our own interests as well as international expectations. Neither the
Parliament, nor the Government can liberate themselves from responsibility
relating to this issue. My aim is to reach the most convenient settlement and I
hereby ask for support of all, who find thisState interest important." (Statement to
Parliament, 10 February 1997, reported (in Hungarian) in Observer Budapest KFT
- RTV Hírfigyelés(trans. by Slovak Foreign Ministry).)
So, to conclude on my first point, I w ould say that following the Court's judgment
negotiations will have to be held. Slovakia remains flexible and co-operative. But we need to
address the problems frankly, and hold talks whic h are not hindered by the internal politics of
Hungary.
Second , any decisions on Nagymaros would necessarily be taken aftercareful, expert
study of the problems feared by Hungary; and any a lternatives would also need to be studied.
So, whether Nagymaros is built as originally planned, or built elsewhere in a different form,
or, indeed, not built at all, is a question to be decided by the Parties some time in the future.
Not surprisingly, this matter has already beengiven some consideration in negotiations
for an out-of-court settlement. - 67 -
Third , Slovakia — as a Party relying on "approxima te application" of a treaty — can be
expected to be flexible about the best m eans of implementing the Treaty. The idea that
"approximate application" can serve in the ne gotiations for revising or adapting a treaty to
changing situations in not new. It is expressed by the distinguished commentator Rosenne in
his book on Breach of Treaty ( 1985, pp. 95-101) where, in a six-page discussion of the
doctrine of approximate application, he says:
"The doctrine of approximate application(in which faint echoes of cy-près can be
heard!) if skilfully used may serve asa prod to the renegotiation, reinterpretation
or readaptation of a treaty which in the general lines remains desirable to all
parties but which in its details cannot stand up to the wear and tear of daily life.
The doctrine is thus a constructive contribution to the general stability of juridical
relations which are to be coupled in appropriate cases with a carefully controlled
dose of peaceful change and adaptation."
As to the Gabcíkovo sector of the Treaty-Project, it can be assumed the Parties will
show equal flexibility. Provided the bypass canal and the Gabcíkovo Power-station and
Locks — both part of the original Treaty, and notpart of Variant C — remain operational and
economically viable and efficient, Slovakia is prepared to negotiate over the future roles of
Dunakiliti and Cunovo, bearing Nagymaros in mind.
But I emphasize that proviso. Slovakia cannot be expected to agree to discharges into
the old riverbed which would cause water qua lity problems in the reservoir and make the
Gabcíkovo power-station uneconomic.
There is also the objection made by the ocunsel for Hungary (Prof. Crawford, CR 97/13,
p. 55) that if the Treaty and Variant C are upheld as valid, then the project would be
transformed from the jointscheme envisaged by the Treaty into a purely unilateralscheme
operated and controlled by Slovakiaalone. Mr. President, there is no basis for this objection.
Under the Treaty many matters would remain matters for joint co-operation.
And, last, Hungarian counsel expressed th e fear (Prof. Dupuy, CR 97/13, p. 58) that the
Dunakiliti reservoir would be enlarged and Gabcíkovo would operate at peak mode. Mr.
President, these are really "scare tactics". Noone is going to extend the reservoir — a costly
business — without good reason. And no one is go nig to switch to peak mode if the evidence
of environmental damage is clear and accepted by both Parties. - 68 -
Finally, Mr. President, I must comment on Hungary's views on the Court's task. As I
understood the Hungarian Agent, he suggested that the Court should not attempt to establish a
detailed Water Management Régime. I agree entirel y. He appeared to suggest that the Court
should lay down "guide-lines" for the future negotitaions of the Parties, designed to help them
in implementing the Court's judgment. Again, I have no difficulty in accepting that idea, but
when we come down to details I may have so mewhat different views from my Hungarian
colleague.
The Agent of Hungary and I both agree thatit would not be appropriate for the Court to
attempt to lay down a Water Management Régi me. I would go even further and state that
figures, or percentages, of the volumes of watetro be allocated to the old river, the new bypass
canal, the Mosoni Danube, and so on, is a matter requiring detailed study and considerable
scientific expertise as the experts for ungary showed (Professor Wheater, CR 97/12, pp. 87-
96). I mean no disrespect when I say this is not a matter for this Court.
I also formed the impression that the Agen t of Hungary believed the Court should order
the Parties, or recommend to the Parties, to onduct a new EIA. But, Mr. President, we do not
need another vast, lengthy study of all aspects of the Project. What we do need, as I have
already suggested, is for Hungary to identify the problems it genuinely fears, and for those
problems to be jointly studied by the Parties.
I think we can both agree that there needs to be an accounting so that, guided by the
Court's findings on responsibility, the Parties cantry to reach a global settlement. Moreover
they will need to agree on how sums due are to be paid and, given that they are likely to be
large sums, the advantages of keeping Gabcíkovo productive are obvious. For Hungary's
entitlements to the electricity produced will help finance its obligations of compensation to
Slovakia.
Mr. President, time passes and, before read ing the final submissions of Slovakia, I
should like to say two things on behalf of the entire team of Slovakia. The first is by way of
tribute to our colleagues on the Hungarian team, for we very much appreciate the courtesy and
friendliness which has characterized their pleading. - 69 -
The second is by way of thanks to you, Mr. President, and to your predecessor, M.le
juge Bedjaoui, from both of whom Slovakia has received help and understanding throughout
these proceedings. And also I would thank all Me mbers of the Court and to the Registrar and
his staff for their patience and careful attentionto what has been a long, and often technical,
pleading. We shall await your judgment with confidence.
Thank you, Mr. President.
J'en viens maintenant aux conclusions finales de la République slovaque. Elles se lisent
comme suit :
Sur la base des éléments de preuve et des arguments juridiques présentés dans ses
écritures et ses plaidoiries orales, la République slovaque.
Prie la Cour de bien vouloir dire et juger :
1. Que le traité, tel qu’il est défini àlinéa premier du préambule du compromis entre les
Parties en date du 7 avril 1993, relatif à la construction et à l’exploitation du système
d’écluses de Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros et les instruments s’y rapportant, conclu entre la
Hongrie et la Tchécoslovaquie, à l’égar d duquel la République slovaque est l’Etat
successeur, n’a jamais cessé d’être en vigueuret le demeure, et que la notification, le 19
mai 1992, de la prétendue terminaison du tra ité par la République de Hongrie n’a eu
aucun effet sur la validité de celui-ci ;
2. Que la République de Hongrie n’était pas en droit de suspendre puis d’abandonner les
travaux relatifs au projet de Nagymaros ainisqu’à la partie du projet de Gabcíkovo dont
la République de Hongrie est responsable aux termes du traité;
3.3. Que la République fédérative tchèque et slovq aue était en droit de recourir, en novembre
1991, à la «solution provisoire» et de mettre ce système en service à partir d’octobre
1992 et que la République slovaque était et demeure en droit de continuer à mettre en
oeuvre ce système ;
4. Que la République de Hongrie doit dès lors mettre immédiatement un terme à toute
conduite qui empêche l’application de bonne fiodu traité de 1977 et qu’elle doit prendre
toutes les mesures nécessaires pour s’acquitter sans retard des obligations que lui impose - 70 -
ce traité, afin de faire en sorte que le tr aité soit à nouveau respecté, sous réserve des
modifications qui pourraient y être apportées par accord entre les Parties;
5. Que la République de Hongrie doit donner des garanties adéquates de s’abstenir
d’empêcher l’application du traité et le fonctionnement continu du système;
6. Qu'en conséquence de sa violation du traité de 1977, la République de Hongrie doit,
outre la reprise immédiate de l’exécution de ss eobligations en vertu du traité, payer à la
République slovaque une indemnisation complète au titre des pertes et dommages, y
compris le manque à gagner, occasionnés par ces violations, assortis des intérêts;
7. Que les Parties doivent engager immédiaetment des négociations en vue, notamment, de
l’adoption d’un nouveau calendrier et de mesu res appropriées pour la mise en oeuvre du
traité par les deux Parties et la fixation dumontant de l’indemnité due par la République
de Hongrie à la République slovaque; et que si les Parties ne peuvent parvenir à un
accord dans un délai de six mois, l’une ou l’autre d’entre elles pourra prier la Cour de
rendre un arrêt supplémentaire pour déterminer les modalités d’exécution de son arrêt.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, je vous remercie de votre attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr.Tomka. The Court takes note of the final
submissions presented on behalf of the Slovak Republic.
Before closing the Vice-President, Judge Bedjaoui and I have questions that we would
like to put to both Parties. May I first give the floor to Vice-President Weeramantry.
The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. President, I have a questions for both Parties.
It is as follows.
At the visit to the site, I inquired of both Parties what the relative cost might be of
purification of river water for drinking purposes, as compared with purification through the
system of bank-filtered wells. At the resumption of hearings, Hungary offered the reply that
the capital cost of such a venture would be two fold, and the operational costs five- to ten-fold.
I would like to have from both Parties some clarification as to the type of installations
required for this purpose, if it were to be undertaken, and an overall estimate in the broadest - 71 -
terms of likely capital and operational costs, ifit were on a scale sufficient to supply 85% of
the drinking water of Budapest.
Thyank.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Judge Bedjaoui, please.
M. BEDJAOUI : Merci, Monsieur le Prés ident. Je voudrais tout d'abord poser une
question aux deux Parties. C'est la suivante.
L'expérience de l'homme montre que sa relato in avec la nature n'est jamais neutre et que
toute action de l'homme sur la nature comporte des réactions d'intensité variable à plus ou
moins long terme.
Par ailleurs, la bibliographie publiée par l'Académie des sciences de Hongrie montre que
des études sur l'environnement ont été effect uées avant la conclusion du traité de 1977.
Ces deux observations permettent-elles de pens er que lors de la conclusion du traité les
Parties contractantes n'étaient conscientes d'aucun impact possible (négatif ou positif) sur
l'environnement? L'incorporation des artic les 15, 19 et 20 dans le traité de 1977 ne
montre-t-elle pas le contraire ?
J'aurais ensuite une question à adresser à la Hongrie. La voici.
La Hongrie peut-elle fournir quelques précisions sur la résiliation des contrats de droit
privé relatifs à la construction du projet Na gymaros, avec leur nombre, leurs dates de
résiliation et leurs modalités d'indemnisation éventuelle ?
Et puis ensuite, m'adressant à la Slovaquie, j'aurais deux questions. La première est la
suivante. Un conseil de la Slovaquie a indiqué que «les deux Parties convenaient souvent de
modifications appropriées au traité de 1977, à ses instruments connexes et au plan
contractuel conjoint».
Selon la Slovaquie, quelle est la force contraignante, à l'égard de chacune des Parties, de
ces modifications au plan contractuel conjoint ou aux instruments connexes ?
Et la deuxième question que j'adresse à la Slovaquie est la suivante. - 72 -
la Slovaquie a déclaré qu'elle a temporaire ment déjà abandonné le fonctionnement en
régime de pointe sur le barrage de Gabcíkovo,en l'absence d'un second barrage nécessaire en
aval prévu à Nagymaros.
La Hongrie soutient que la Slovaquie n'a pas abandonné en fait ce régime de pointe.
Par-delà cette controverse, quelles seraient le s conséquences de toutes natures, si le
barrage de Gabcíkovo ne fonctionne plus en régm i e de pointe et si la Slovaquie adopte à titre
définitif un fonctionnement au fil de l'eau ?
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, JudgeBedjaoui . The question I should like to put to
both Parties is this.
Having regard to the controversy over the usage of the term "original project", what, if
any, provisions of the Joint Contractual Plan orof other agreements concluded by the Parties
effectively introduced into the operative provisins of the 1977 Treaty or into the complex of
the governing obligations of the Parties precise specifications as regards:
(i)the withdrawal of Danube Waters andthe amount of water to be channelled into the
old Danube and its branches and canals after extraction from it was effected;
(ii)the measure, if any, ofpeak power production to be generated when the Project was
to come into operation?
(iii)the implementation of the obligations of Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the 1977 Treaty?
and when did they do so?
The written text of these questions will be made available as soon as possible. Both
Parties are invited to give their answers in wriig by Friday 25 April. It may be also recalled
that by 25April, Hungary is to submit any further observations on the PHARE Report. Any
comments by Slovakia on Hungary's observati ons on the PHARE Report will be due by
2 May.
This brings us to the end of the oral hearings in this case. - 73 -
I would like to thank the Agents, Counsel and Advisers of both Parties for the
excellence of the pleadings of which the Court has had the benefit as well as for the spirit of
courtesy that they have shown throughout these hearings.
In accordance with the usual practice, I w ould ask the two Agents to remain at the
disposal of the Court to provide any further asssitance it might need. Subject to that, I declare
the oral proceedings in the case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia)closed.
The Court will now withdraw to deliberate.The Agents of the Parties will be notified in
due course of the date when the Court will give its Judgment.
The sitting is now closed.
The Court rose at 1.15 p.m.
__________
Audience publique tenue le lundi 14 avril 1997, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Schwebel, président