Non- Corrigé
Unco rrected
CR 96/17
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 1996
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 24 September 1996, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Bedjaoui presiding
in the case concerning Oil Platfor.ms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)
Preliminary Objection
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNEE 1996
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 24 septembre 1996, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, Président
, en l'affaire des Plates-for.mes pétrolières
(République islamique d'Iran c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique)
Exception préliminaire - 2 -
COMPTE RENDU
Present: President Bedjaoui
Vice-President Schwebel
Judges Oda
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Ferrari Bravo
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Judge ad hoc Rigaux
Registrar Valencia-Ospina - 3 -
Présents M. Bedjaoui, Président
M. Schwebel, Vice-Président
MM. Oda
Guillaume
Shahabuddeen
Weeramantry
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Ferrari Bravo
Mme Higgins,
M. Parra-Aranguren, juges
M. Rigaux, juge ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier - 4 -
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is represented by:
Mr. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
as Agent;
Mr. s. M. Zeinoddin, Head of Legal Affairs, National Iranian Oil Company,
Mr. James R. Crawford, Whewell Professer of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professer of International Law, University of Geneva,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, Avocat à la Cour de Paris, Member of the New York Bar,
Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.E.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professer of
International Law, Emeritus, University of Cambridge,
Dr. N. Mansourian, Legal Advisor, Bureau of International Legal Services of
the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Dr. M. A. Movahed, Senior Legal Advisor, National Iranian Oil Company,
Dr. H. Omid, Legal Advisor, National Iranian Oil Company,
Dr. A. A. Mahrokhzad, Legal Advisor, National Iranian Oil Company,
Mr. David S. Sellers, Solicitor, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, Avocat à la Cour, Frere Cholmeley, Paris
as Counsel.
The Government of the United States of America is represented by:
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State,
as Agent;
Dr. John H. McNeill, Senior Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Department of
Defense,
Professer Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rubin Professer of International Law, New
York University School of Law, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran est représenté par :
M. M. H. Zahedin-Labbaf, agent de la République islamique d'Iran auprès du
Tribunal des réclamations Etats-Unis/Iran,
comme agent;
M. S. M. Zeinoddin, chef du service juridique, National Iranian Oil Company,
M. James R. Crawford, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la
chaire Whewell à l'Université de Cambridge,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Genève,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour, Paris, membre du barreau de New York,
cabinet Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite de droit
international, ancien titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'Université de
Cambridge,
M. N. Mansourian, conseiller juridique, bureau du service juridique
international de la République islamique d'Iran,
M. M. A. Movahed, conseiller juridique principal, National Iranian Oil
Company,
M. H. Omid, conseiller juridique, National Iranian Oil Company,
M. A. A. Mahrokhzad, conseiller juridique, National Iranian Oil Company,
M. David s. Sellers, solicitor, cabinet Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour, cabinet Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
comme conseils.
Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique est représenté par :
M. Michael J. Matheson, conseiller juridique en exercice du département
d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
comme agent;
M. John H. McNeill, conseiller juridique principal adjoint du département de
la défense des Etats-Unis,
M. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la
chaire Rubin à la faculté de droit de l'Université de New York, - 6 -
Mr. John R. Crook, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,
U.S. Department of State,
Dr. Sean Murphy, Counselor for Legal Affairs, United States Embassy, The
Hague,
Mr. Jack Chorowsky, Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, United States
Department of State
Commander Ronald D. Neubauer, JAGC, United States Navy,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Allen Weiner, Attache (Office of the Legal Counselor), United States
Embassy, The Hague
as Counsel. - 7 -
M. John R. Crook, conseiller juridique adjoint pour les questions concernant
l'Organisation des Nations Unies au département d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
M. Sean Murphy, conseiller pour les affaires juridiques à l'ambassade des
Etats-Unis aux Pays-Bas,
M. Jack Chorowsky, assistant spécial du conseiller juridique du département
d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
Le capitaine de frégate Ronald D. Neubauer, Judge Advocate General's Corps,
de la Marine des Etats-Unis,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Allen Weiner, bureau du conseiller juridique, attaché à l'ambassade des
Etats-Unis aux Pays-Bas,
comme conseils. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court will resume its public
hearings on the preliminary objection of the United States of America in
the case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v.
United States of America). I now call upon the distinguished Agent for
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Mohammed Hussein Zahedin-Labbaf to open
the reply of his Government.
Mr. ZAHEDIN-LABBAF: In the Name of God the Merciful and
Compassionate.
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, you have now heard the
written and oral arguments on the question before you, which concerns the
jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute submitted by the
Islamic Republic of Iran. In this morning's pleadings, counsel on behalf
of Iran will try to be as brief as possible in highlighting Iran's
responses to sorne of the points made by the distinguished counsel for the
United States of America yesterday. If Iran does not take issue with
each and every point raised, the Court will understand that this is not
because any of these points are conceded, but because Iran takes the view
that such matters are either not relevant or have already been adequately
dealt with in Iran's earlier written and oral pleadings.
2. I would ask the Court first to call upon Mr. Bundy. He will
respond briefly to certain comments made yesterday, concerning the
general context in which the 1955 Treaty of Amity was signed. Mr. Bundy
will show again that, far from being exclusively commercial, all the
evidence points to the 1955 Treaty of Amity as having a distinct
political and legal significance. Mr. Bundy will also briefly discuss
the new characterization of the factual dispute before the Court
presented by the distinguished Agent of the United States yesterday, and
CR 96/17 - 9 -
will explain why, however the United States seeks to characterize this
dispute, it still cornes within the Court's jurisdiction.
3. Mr. President, Professer Condorelli will then revisit the
question of the legal characterization of the Treaty of Amity, and its
applicability to Iran's claims. He will show that - with respect to each
of the provisions of the Treaty at issue in this case - a dispute exists
as to the interpretation and application of that provision sufficient to
vest the Court with jurisdiction.
4. Finally, Professer Crawford will show why the United States'
ingenious attempts to distinguish the Nicaragua case from this case do
not succeed and why the Court's findings in that case are fatal to the
United States' preliminary objection here. Professer Crawford will also
touch on Mr. Crook's analysis of Article XX (1) (d) of the Treaty of
Amity. He will show again that the United States' position on
Article XX (1) (d) is directly contrary to its position on the
inapplicability of the Treaty to this case.
5. Professer Crawford will then conclude by briefly summarizing
Iran's position, and I will then return to read to the Court Iran's final
submissions.
6. In the course of their speeches, counsel will refer to the
questions asked by Vice-President Schwebel and Judge Higgins, and Iran
will, however, also respond in writing to the questions asked by
Vice-President Schwebel and Judge Rigaux within the established
time-limit.
7. With the Court's leave, I ask you, Mr. President, to call upon
Mr. Bundy to take up Iran's reply. Thank you.
CR 96/17 - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Zahedin-Labbaf for your
statement. I now give the floor to Mr. Rodman Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY:
Factual Aspects Relevant to Jurisdiction
Thank you Mr. President, Members of the Court. In returning to the
factual elements that are relevant to the question of jurisdiction, I
shall start with the historical context within which the Treaty was
signed, and I will respond in this connection to points that were raised
by Professer Lowenfeld and Mr. Crook yesterday.
1. The Historical Circumstances in which the Treaty of Amity was Signed
Confir.m the Plain and Ordinary Meaning of the Treaty•s Terms
With respect to that background, let me first comment on its legal
relevance.
Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
recourse may be had to the circumstances in which the Treaty was
concluded as a supplementary means of interpretation to confirm the
meaning which results from the application of Article 31, or when the
interpretation according to Article 31 is either ambiguous or obscure, or
leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result.
As Professer Condorelli explained in Iran's first round
presentation, Iran believes that the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words that are used in the Treaty, in the light of its abject and
purpose, is clear for purposes of defining the scope of its application.
In Iran's view, an analysis of the text of the Treaty shows unequivocally
that the Court's jurisdiction is vested over Iran's claims in this case.
To the extent that Iran has introduced historical circumstances in which
the Treaty was concluded, this has been done to confirm the
CR 96/17 - 11 -
interpretation that flows from the ordinary meaning of the Treaty's
terms.
These circumstances cannot possibly support the virtually
non-existent meaning that our colleagues on the other side of the bar
attempt to impart to Article I of the Treaty. Nor can they confirm that
Article X (1) of the Treaty was intended to deal exclusively with issues
of maritime commerce to the exclusion of other kinds of commerce,
moreover, this historical context also cannot possible support a
restrictive interpretation of the compromissory clause. Instead, as we
believe we have demonstrated in the first round, and I shall again review
briefly in this presentation, the historical setting within which the
Treaty of Amity was signed shows that the Treaty, in fact, had a much
broader political and strategie purpose and application than the United
States has sought to convey.
It is important to note at the outset that Professer Lowenfeld does
not take issue with the geopolitical context within which the Treaty was
signed. He admits to having no difficulty with the fact that Iran and
the United States had just then entered into a new political
relationship, and that the Treaty coincided with the conclusion of the
strategically orientated Baghdad Pact, and that Iran's oil industry -
including its off-shore oil industry - the platforms at issue here - had
a strategie as well as an economie importance. His argument is rather
that none of this history supports the contention that Iran and the
United States consented to the jurisdiction of this Court regarding
future disputes involving the use of force (CR 96/16, p. 16).
I would like to test this proposition against the background facts
that are not in dispute between the Parties.
CR 96/17 - 12 -
First, when the Treaty was signed in 1955 Iran was just emerging
from the throes of a fundamental change of régimes which had been brought
about by the direct intervention of the United States. The documentary
evidence submitted with the written pleadings makes it abundantly clear
that the United States wanted to do all it could at that time to prevent
Iran from falling within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, and
to insure the free flow of oil supplies to the West. This was the
immediate context within which the Treaty was concluded.
Second - and this is an important point - the Treaty of Amity was
the very first bilateral agreement entered into between the Iran and the
United States following the overthrow of the Mossadegh government and the
reinstatement of the Shah. It was entirely appropriate, therefore, that
this Agreement set out the overall framework within which bilateral
relations between the two countries were to be conducted. Other
agreements dealing with specifie issues would follow, but the Treaty of
Amity was central in establishing a foundation based on peace and
friendship for the parties' relations, and in providing for recourse to
this Court, if any dispute over the Treaty's application or
interpretation should arise.
In the light of this new political environment, can it seriously be
disputed that the obligation of firm and enduring peace and sincere
friendship, which appears in Article I of the Treaty, was essential to
the development of this new relationship or was devoid of substantive
meaning?
Third, evidence taken from US sources themselves reveal that the
language used in Article I was designed to have a substantive meaning and
was not simply intended to reflect "vague aspirations of friendship".
This evidence also shows that the compromissory clause was intended to be
CR 96/17 - 13 -
broad, not restrictive. To support this conclusion, I would like to
refer to the following facts which are really uncontroverted.
(i) In negotiating a similar Treaty with China - one of just three
other treaties to include Article I in the treaty's text as it appears in
the Treaty of Amity with Iran - the State Department expressly confirmed
that it was not "customary" to include such a provision in Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation treaties to which the United States was a party.
The only reason why such a provision was deemed to be appropriate in the
China case was, as the State Department observed in its memorandum, "in
view of the close political relations between China and the United
States" (Iran's Observations, Exhibit 10).
I submit that this disposes of counsel's argument that Article I was
routine, an argument which the United States did not come back to
yesterday. If "close political relations" underlay the inclusion of
Article I in the China treaty, when a fortiori they must also have
dictated the inclusion of Article I in the 1955 Treaty with Iran. This
is particularly the case in view of the sensitive political and strategie
relationship that then existed between the United States and Iran.
(ii) The US negotiators of the Treaty also confirm that the American
oil investments at that time in Iran were "extensively discussed" in the
course of the Treaty negotiations and that the Consortium Agreement and
other agreements "was an important part of the political background of
the treaty negotiations" (Iran's Observations, Exhibit 5, pp. 2-3 of the
Bray affidavit) . As I already explained in my first round presentation,
the Consortium Agreement was founded on strategie considerations as much
as, if not more than, commercial ones - a conclusion which
Professer Lowenfeld has not disputed. In other words, strategie issues
CR 96/17 - 14 -
did play a role in the conclusion of the Treaty. It was not simply a
commercial and consular document.
(iii) The Treaty was signed at precisely the time that the United
States was working to establish the Baghdad Pact. In the light of the
geopolitical situation that existed at the time, it was absolutely
essential for the United States to have a firm and enduring commitment
from Iran of peace and friendship. That appeared in Article I.
(iv) The United States had no hesitation, no hesitation whatsoever,
in having Article I come within the scope of the Treaty's compromissory
clause.
Last week, Professer Lowenfeld asked how it would have been possible
for the United States to make its famous Connally Reservation with
respect to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, yet make
no similar reservation with respect to the Treaty of Amity (CR 96/12,
p. 48) . According to Professer Lowenfeld, the United States must have
considered that matters covered by the Connally Reservation fell outside
the scope of the Treaty, thus obviating the need to have a reservation.
Yet the US-China treaty, which I just discussed, shows exactly the
opposite. As is apparent from Exhibit 52 to the United States'
Preliminary Objection, the same issues arose in connection with the
Senate debates over the compromissory clause in the China treaty. A
State Department Memorandum prepared in connection with that treaty
acknowledged that no such reservation, no Connally Reservation, was made
in the treaty because:
"The Department of State feels that questions arising under
this treaty are matters which the United States would wish to
see submitted to the International Court of Justice, and it
would be in the public interest of the United States to be able
to bring, without restriction, before that Court any disputes
arising because of the interpretation or application by China
CR 96/17 - 15 -
of the provisions of the treaty in such a way as to be
detrimental to the interests of the United States."
(Preliminary Objection, Exhibit 52, p. 30; emphasis added.)
In other words, if China brought an issue of interpretation or
application of its treaty with the United States, which the United States
considered might be detrimental to its interests, the United States
wanted to make sure that it was able to submit that dispute to this
Court. Note the difference between the attitude of the State Department
then, and the attitude exhibited by the United States now. In this case,
Iran has submitted issues relating to the interpretation and application
of the 1955 Treaty of Amity which, from the United States' reactions
during these proceedings, are viewed as detrimental to the interests of
the United States. Yet now, contrary to the position that the United
States took in the China treaty, it feverishly attempts to prevent this
dispute from going to the Court, and this is directly contradictory to
the position that was adopted with respect to the identical language in
the China treaty.
(v) Finally, there must be recalled that the only genuine piece of
travaux préparatoires relating to the Treaty of Amity between the United
States and Iran and forming part of the historical context within which
it was concluded concern the proposa! to delete the words "or
application" from the Treaty's compromissory clause. Yet this proposal
was firmly rejected by the United States at the time precisely because it
might, and I use the words of the US Government, it might "seriously
curtail" the means for the settlement of disputes, and because the United
States "wanted to avoid any narrowing of the jurisdictional provisions"
(I.C.J. Pleadings, United States Diplomatie and Consular Staff in Tehran,
US Annex 50, pp. 232-253 and p. 153, note 14).
CR 96/17 - 16 -
In the light of these facts, it defies the record for the United
States now to assert that the historical context within which the Treaty
was signed supports its proposition that the Treaty was solely concerned
with commercial and consular matters, or that the Treaty's compromissory
clause must be read in a restrictive sense. At the end of the day, Iran
submits that the historical context fully supports its interpretation of
the Treaty.
Now let me turn next to the other Iran/US treaties that were cited
by our opponents yesterday.
2. The Lack of Relevance of the ether US-Iran Treaties Cited by the
United States
In his first presentation, Mr. Crook contended that the 1955 Treaty
of Amity was not an innovation, but rather part of a long "series" of
agreements between the United States and Iran or Persia dating back to
1856 (CR 96/13, p. 10). Yesterday, Mr. Crook again referred to these
agreements, and he chastised Iran for not having discussed them in our
first round presentation (CR 96/16, p. 27). I should only note at the
outset that the United States only raised these agreements for the first
time in their first round oral presentation; it had never been discussed
in the written pleadings. Nonetheless, let me respond with a few remarks
that I trust will show that those agreements had nothing to do and give
no support to the United States' position that it now adopts with respect
to the Treaty's interpretation.
First of all, there was hardly a "long span" or "evolving series" of
agreements between the two countries. There were just two such
agreements that Mr. Crook referred to yesterday, separated by an interval
of over 70 years.
CR 96/17 - 17 -
The first was a very early treaty signed in 1856 which provided
amongst other provisions that there would be "a sincere and good
understanding" between the parties. No matter how one tries to dress up
this kind of provision, it simply is not the same thing as providing for
a positive obligation of firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship
backed up by a compromissory clause. There was no compromissory clause
is the 1856 Treaty, and bearing in mind the circumstances in which it was
signed, this was hardly surprising. There was no Court to have recourse
to, and third party adjudication was rare.
The 1928 Agreement, which Mr. Crook termed "a more modern agreement"
(CR 96/13, p. 11), was in reality no more than a very rudimentary
exchange of notes - in fact a "provisional" agreement - regarding
commercial and consular matters. There was no provision in the 1928
agreement even remotely akin to Article I in the 1955 Treaty of Amity.
Nor was there a compromissory clause.
What there was instead was a series of references in the exchange of
notes, and particularly in paragraph 3 of that exchange, to the word
"commerce". These references make it abundantly clear that the parties
had no intention of limiting their agreement to "maritime" commerce.
With the Court's indulgence, Mr. President, I would like to read a very
brief extract from paragraph 3 of that exchange of notes which
illustrates the point:
"In respect to the reg~me to be applied to the Commerce of
Persia in the matter of import, export, and other duties and
charges affecting commerce as well as in respect to transit
warehousing and the facilities accorded commercial travelers'
samples . . the United States shall accord to Persia, on a
basis of complete reciprocity, a treatment not less
advantageous than that accorded to the commerce of any other
country." (Emphasis added.)
I trust the Court will see that this kind of arrangement might be
viewed as a kind of precursor to a "freedom of commerce" provision. Yet
CR 96/17 - 18 -
the paragraph which I have just cited is in no way limited to maritime
commerce; its scope is obviously much wider and covers commerce in
general.
So, if the 1955 Treaty is to be considered the "lineal descendent" -
those were the words we heard yesterday from Mr. Crook - of the 1928
exchange of notes (CR 96/13, p. 11; CR 96/16, p. 27), then not only is
there no reason to believe that the reference to "freedom of commerce" in
Article X (1) of the 1955 Treaty is limited to "maritime commerce", but
also the addition of a brand new Article I in the 1955 Treaty providing
for firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship represented a
fundamental innovation from what the parties had agreed in 1928 - it had
no counterpart in the 1928 Treaty. Similarly, the addition of a
compromissory clause providing for recourse to this Court represented a
major change from both of the previous agreements that Mr. Crook referred
to.
As for the treaties entered in after the Treaty of Amity was signed,
these are the ones referred to by Professer Lowenfeld for the first time
yesterday (CR 96/16, pp. 16-20), it is difficult to see how they provide
any more solace to the United States than the earlier treaties.
In the first place, none of these agreements represent travaux
préparatoires of the 1955 Treaty. Nor can they be viewed as relating to
the circumstances in which the 1955 Treaty was concluded within the
meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, simply because they all
post-date the conclusion of that Treaty. Renee, I would suggest that
their legal relevance for purposes of this case is really nil.
That being said, it is important to respond to Professer Lowenfeld's
point that the 1959 Agreement between Iran and the United States, on
cooperation, that was an agreement which dealt with certain security and
CR 96/17 - 19 -
defence matters, did not contain a compromissory clause, and that this
omission demonstrates that the parties did not intend to submit these
kind of disputes to third party adjudication (CR 96/16, p. 18).
With respect, Mr. President, the 1959 Agreement shows nothing of the
kind. That Agreement, as its Preamble and its text clearly show, was
intimately related to a whole series of other agreements relating to the
specifie undertakings that had been accepted by all the members of the
Baghdad Pact, a multilateral Pact. These agreements, and the
corresponding declarations which the Baghdad Pact members had earlier
signed, must be read together with the 1959 Agreement. As Article IV of
the 1959 Agreement provided, Iran and the United States undertook to
cooperate with the other Baghdad Pact members in accordance with a
multilateral declaration that had been made in London the year before,
the famous London declaration.
Because multilateral agreements were thus implicated, it would have
been entirely inappropriate for the United States and Iran to have
included a bilateral compromissory clause in that treaty. For that would
have raised the possibility that the adjudicatory body, this Court or an
arbitral tribunal, would have had to rule on obligations which directly
affected the other members of the Baghdad Pact, who are not only not
parties to the 1955 Treaty, but had certainly not given their consent.
So it follows that the mere fact that the 1959 Treaty had no
compromissory clause in no way affects the scope of the 1955 Treaty's
compromissory clause and has no bearing on the 1955 Treaty's
interpretation or application.
Much can be said for the other agreements entered into after the
1955 Treaty and cited by Professer Lowenfeld yesterday. They all dealt
with very specifie issues, such as air transport or investment
CR 96/17 - 20 -
guarantees. But as Professer Lowenfeld rightly pointed out : "Each
agreement had its own modality for resolution of possible disputes."
(CR 96/16, p. 20.) As Article V of the 1959 Agreement so clearly
provided, these provisions were without prejudice to the parties'
obligations under other pre-existing agreements. Consequently, neither
the compromissory clause appearing in the Treaty of Amity, nor its other
provisions were compromised in any way by the subsequent agreements
entered into by the parties which were very specifie agreements dealing
with specifie fields.
3. The Characterization of the Dispute
I turn next to the differences between the Parties over the
characterization of this dispute. This is an important point because one
of the central elements of the United States' thesis is that the Treaty
does not regulate the outbreak of armed conflict or the use of armed
force between the Parties (CR 96/13, p. 13).
The Court will have noted that the position of the United States on
this issue has changed during the course of these hearings. In the first
round, the distinguished Agent for the United States emphasized that the
attacks on the oil platforms were part of a series of hostile encounters
involving US and Iranian forces (CR 96/12, p. 17).
This description of events implied that there actually had been
"engagements" between the forces of the two countries, a conclusion that
was reinforced in Commander Neubauer' presentation when he described the
events in question as "a series of military engagements .. involving
Iranian and US armed forces" (CR 96/12, p. 28).
It was based on these factual premises that Mr. Crook was then able,
again in the first round, to advance an argument that the obligations set
out in the Treaty of Amity "cannat coherently be applied to situations
CR 96/17 - 21 -
involving armed conflict like those complained of here" (CR 96/13,
p. 25).
When it became clear that Iran disputed this characterization of the
dispute, particularly the view that there had been this series of
military engagements between the armed forces of the two countries,
because as you know Iran's position is that these were unilateral and
unprovoked attacks by the United States. But when it became clear that
Iran had challenged this characterization of the dispute, the
United States had to change its position. That is what we heard
yesterday. To the extent that its position that the Treaty of Amity did
not apply to a situation of "armed conflict" depended on a showing that
there actually was such a state of armed conflict at the time, this
necessarily gave rise to a disputed issue of fact. How could it be
proved that a state of armed conflict existed between the two countries
without going into the merits of that issue?
Consequently, yesterday, Mr. Matheson advanced a very different
proposition. He now says that it makes no difference, no difference
whatsoever, how these incidents are characterized; whether it was the
United States or Iran that initiated the incidents or whether any
particular incident involved an exchange of fire or simply an undefended
attack by one side on the other (CR 96/16, p. 9). It makes no
difference. What is important, according to Mr. Matheson, is that the
combat operations in question involved the use of armed force by at least
one of the Parties (ibid., p. 10). It does not have to be bath, just one
of the Parties. So that even if the use of armed force by the
United States against the ail platforms in this case was unilateral and
unprovoked, not really a case of armed conflict at all, the mere fact
CR 96/17 - 22 -
that armed force was used by one of the Parties would remove these
incidents from the scope of the Treaty of Amity.
Mr. President, this argument cannat be right. Taken to its logical
conclusion, it would lead to manifestly absurd results.
For example, for many years, just dawn the hall, the United States
and US companies have been arguing that Article IV, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty of Amity is applicable in arder to assess the standard of
compensation that is required in the event of a nationalization, in the
event of a taking of property belonging to a national of one party in the
territory of the other. Under the United States' current theory, had
that property been taken by armed force instead of by a legislative
decree, a nationalization decree, then the Treaty would no longer apply
since it could not be used in situations involving the use of armed
force.
Similarly, if freedom of commerce or navigation under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty was impaired by the implementation, let us
say, of a trade embargo, then the Treaty in principle would apply. But,
if the party that was impairing that freedom of navigation decided to use
armed force - for example, by employing a military blockade or by
forcibly interdicting the vessels of the other party, then this would no
longer come within the scope of the Treaty for the simple reason that the
use of force was involved.
Just as these propositions are clearly unreasonable, so also is it
untenable to maintain that the Treaty's other provisions, such as
Articles I, IV and X, do not apply when armed force is resorted to by one
of the parties. As Professer Crawford will explain later this morning,
the lack of merit in this aspect of the United States' argument has been
clearly exposed by this Court in the Nicaragua case.
CR 96/17 - 23 -
4. Discussion of Certain Disputed Facts
Mr. President, I turn now to the last part of my rebuttal which
involves responding very briefly to certain factual allegations that were
again raised by the United States at yesterday's session.
First, let me note for the record that Iran has not introduced in
these hearings any new factual material and, in particular, any new
diagrams. This was the gist of a complaint that was made against us
yesterday (CR 96/16, p. 12).
With the exception of illustration No. 1 in your folders, this is
the illustration you may recall showing the Baghdad Pact map, an
illustration that was fully described in our written pleadings, every one
of the other illustrations and diagrams that appear in the Court's
folders was produced in Iran's written pleadings. There is nothing new.
Second, the United States seems particularly sensitive over the
allegation that their attacks on the platforms were designed to cause
maximum economie and commercial damage to Iran (CR 96/16, pp. 12-13). We
will obviously come back to this issue if we proceed to the merits. Let
me just remind the Court of the remarkable coincidence that exists for
each attack: namely, that the United States forces happened to destroy
precisely those platforms, and only those platforms, that would cause oil
production from all of the other associated wells, platforms and oil
fields to be halted. The Court will able to judge for itself the
implications of this conduct.
As for the incident involving the Bea Isle City referred to by the
Agent of the United States yesterday, this was the incident that was the
precursor to the first set of attacks in October 1987, I was criticized
for failing to point out that the Faw Peninsula, which is that bit of
land in the northern Persian Gulf from which the United States says the
CR 96/17 - 24 -
missile originated, was part of Iraqi territory. We say two things in
response. First of all, I did note in my intervention last week that
fighting existed on the Faw Peninsula between Iranian and Iraqi forces
and it will obviously be an issue for the merits phase to sort out who
was where at what particular time. And second of all, one needs only
refer to illustration No. 10 in your folders - an illustration that has
been presented to the Court and to the United States - to see very
clearly that it is indicated on this illustration that the Faw Peninsula,
or parts of it, were in fact held by Iranian forces at that time. What
was more significant is what the Agent failed to address, for he declined
to address any of the other five very specifie arguments I had made
regarding the Sea Isle City incident, including the fact that on the
State Department's own evidence Iran had no missiles in the area and the
fact that the Sea Isle City was out of range of an Iranian attack, in any
event, no matter where Iranian forces were stationed on the Faw Peninsula
(CR 96/14, pp. 49-50). Once again, Iran looks forward to returning to
this issue if there is a merits phase.
Finally, we note that in response to Judge Higgins' question, the
United States now contains that its jurisdictional case does not rest on
the contention that the oil platforms were engaged or used for military
purposes at the time they were attacked (CR 96/16, p. 10). This is a
very different proposition from what we heard from Professor Lowenfeld
and the distinguished Agent last week (CR 96/12, p. 55; CR 96/17, p. 63).
This subtle shift in the United States' position is a double-edged
sword. If it can now be assumed for purposes of ruling on the
preliminary objection that the platforms were engaged in commercial
operations when they were attacked, then it is all the more difficult to
understand why that does not give rise, at the very minimum, to a
CR 96/17 - 25 -
justiciable issue under the Treaty of Amity involving, in particular,
whether such attacks constituted a violation of Article X (1) of the
Treaty providing for freedom of commerce.
In short, the United States cannot have it both ways. If the
characterization of the platforms is relevant for the purposes of the
preliminary objection, then the case must proceed to the merits where the
facts can be fully briefed. But if it is not, it is conceeded for the
purposes of argument that the platforms were involved in commercial
operations, then the Treaty of Amity's freedom of commerce clause and
other provisions are placed squarely in issue. Either way, the Court has
jurisdiction.
S. Conclusion
Mr. President, at this stage of the proceedings, I dont't believe it
is necessary for me to join issue with the United States over the rest of
the factual allegations that we have heard during the course of the past
week. These matters can await for further developments.
Let me simply thank the Members of the Court, and you Mr. President,
very sincerely, for the patience with which you have heard my arguments,
and ask, if you would, Mr. President, call on Professer Condorelli to
continue Iran's presentation. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Bundy, for your statement.
Je prie maintenant le Professeur Luigi Condorelli de se présenter à la
barre.
CR 96/17 - 26 -
M. CONDORELLI Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le Président.
Introduction
Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les Juges, comme l'agent
de la République islamique d'Iran l'a indiqué, la charge qui m'est
confiée dans ce deuxième tour de plaidoiries est de répondre à nos
éminents contradicteurs pour tout ce qui a trait à l'identification du
domaine d'application du traité d'amitié et à l'interprétation de ses
dispositions : notamment les trois auxquelles s'est référé l'Iran dans
son instance, en alléguant qu'elles ont été violées par les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique.
Il va de soi que le traité d'amitié - comme tous les autres traités
internationaux- est un instrument consensuel, il n'existe et ne lie les
parties que parce que celles-ci l'ont souverainement et librement
accepté. Au vu de l'insistance avec laquelle les plaideurs de la Partie
adverse reviennent sans cesse sur cette vérité élémentaire, qui fait
partie du b.a-ba du droit international, en la répétant de mille manières
différentes, vous pourriez penser qu'on fait grief à l'Iran de l'avoir
tout simplement oubliée. Mais ce n'est pas du tout le cas. Pour le
démontrer au-delà de tout doute, permettez-moi, Monsieur le Président, de
centrer autour du consentement la liste des questions auxquelles j'ai
l'intention de répondre dans le temps qui m'est imparti, en prenant en
considération bien entendu les objections et les doutes soulevés par la
Partie adverse.
Première question Les Hautes Parties contractantes ont-elles
consenti ou non à ce que la clause compromissoire du traité d'amitié
couvre la totalité des différends entre les parties relatifs à
l'interprétation ou à l'application du traité dans son ensemble?
Ont-elles voulu ou non que les différends portant sur les articles I, IV
CR 96/17 - 27 -
paragraphe 1, et X, paragraphe 1, soient soustraits à la compétence de
votre Cour ?
Deuxième question : Les Hautes Parties contractantes ont-elles
consenti à ce que le traité d'amitié protège leurs intérêts (tels que
contemplé par le traité lui même) contre tout agissement de l'autre
Partie, ou bien ont-elles voulu qu'une telle protection cesse en cas
d'emploi de la force ?
Troisième question : Les Hautes Parties contractantes ont-elles
soustrait l'interprétation des clauses du traité d'amitié (ou l'une ou
l'autre d'entre elles) aux principes normaux en matière d'interprétation
et d'application des traités internationaux ?
Quatrième question : L'article I du traité, est-il un ectoplasme
juridique, une pure apparence de règle de droit ? Les Parties n'ont-elles
pas consenti, en lui donnant un libellé approprié, à ce qu'il engendre
des droits et des obligations ?
Cinquième et dernière question : Qu'en est-il de l'article IV,
paragraphe 1, et de l'article X, paragraphe 1 ? Les Parties ont-elles
consenti à ce que ces dispositions soient la source de droit et
d'obligations entrant en jeu dans la présente affaire ?
Voilà, Madame et Messieurs les juges, la liste des questions
auxquelles j'ai, avec votre permission, l'intention de répondre, et ce
dans l'ordre dans lequel je viens de les énoncer.
1. Première question : Les Hautes Parties contractantes ont-elles
consenti ou non à ce que la clause compromissoire du traité de 1955
couvre la totalité des différends entre les parties relatifs à
l'interprétation ou à l'application du traité dans son ensemble ?
J'en viens donc à rna première question : Les Hautes Parties
contractantes ont-elles consenti ou non à ce que la clause compromissoire
du traité d'amitié couvre la totalité des différends entre les parties
CR 96/17 - 28 -
relatifs à l'interprétation et à l'application du traité dans son
ensemble ?
Monsieur le Président, je ne pense pas me rendre coupable de la
moindre audace interprétative si j'affirme que rien ne saurait justifier
une réponse, je ne dis pas négative, mais même seulement hésitante. Il
est indiscutable que les parties ont voulu que la clause compromissoire
ait exactement la même sphère d'application que le traité lui même :
c'est ce qu'elles ont dit apertis verbis, sans qu'aucune sorte d'indice
ne fasse transparaître une intention différente. Autrement dit, les
différends portant sur les articles I, IV, paragraphe 1, et X,
paragraphe 1, ne sont pas soustraits à la compétence de votre Cour, et
cela tout simplement parce que les parties l'ont voulu.
Je rappelle au passage, Monsieur le Président, qu'il existe des
traités dont les dispositions en matière de règlement des différends ont
une portée beaucoup plus restreinte. Par exemple - et c'est le cas le
plus connu - les articles 65 et 66 de la convention de Vienne sur le
droit des traités s'appliquent seulement aux différends portant sur la
partie V de la convention, et l'article 66 a) accorde à votre Cour la
compétence uniquement pour ce qui est des différends en matière de jus
cogens. Par contre, dans le traité de 1955, aucune restriction n'a été
prévue. L'article XXI, paragraphe 2, s'applique donc à toutes les
dispositions du traité, sans exception : c'est sur cela que les Hautes
Parties contractantes ont librement et souverainement convenu.
2. Deuxième question : les Hautes Parties contractantes ont-elles
consenti à ce que le traité de 1955 protège leurs intérêts {tels que
contemplés par le traité lui-même) contre tout agissement de l'autre
partie, ou bien ont-elles voulu qu'une telle protection cesse en cas
d'emploi de la force ?
Il est temps que je me penche sur ma deuxième question. Je vous la
rappelle les Hautes Parties contractantes ont-elles consenti à ce que
CR 96/17 - 29 -
le traité d'amitié protège leurs intérêts (tels que contemplés par le
traité lui-même) contre tout agissement de la Partie adverse, ou bien
ont-elles voulu qu'une telle protection cesse en cas d'emploi de la
force ?
Comme vous l'avez entendu, la Partie adverse répond maintenant à
cette interrogation d'une façon qui, grâce à la question heureusement
posée par Madame le Juge Higgins, est devenue bien plus claire
qu'auparavant. Et j'ajoute : encore plus étonnante qu'auparavant. Pour
les Etats-Unis, le seul fait qu'il y ait emploi de la force, même par
l'une seulement des Parties contre l'autre (et indépendamment de tout
état de guerre entre elles), ferait en sorte que cet emploi de la force
échapperait à l'emprise du traité d'amitié. Ceci même si les personnes
ou les biens frappés étaient par ailleurs sous la protection du traité.
Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, il convient de
s'entendre au moyen de quelques exemples très simples sur les
implications littéralement incroyables d'une telle thèse. Des exemples
qui s'ajoutent à ce que vient de vous proposer Me Bundy. Prenons
l'article II, paragraphe 4 : chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes
doit assurer "the most constant protection and security" aux
ressortissants de l'autre et doit leur accorder "reasonable and human
treatment" s'ils sont "in custody". Bien. Mais doit-on comprendre,
semble-t-il, que si l'une des parties décidait tout à coup de lancer une
opération militaire afin d'exterminer tous les ressortissants de l'autre
qui sont sous sa juridiction, cela ne poserait aucun problème du point de
vue du traité d'amitié ! Un autre exemple d'après l'article IV,
paragraphe 2, les biens des ressortissants de l'une des parties doivent
être protégés sur le territoire de l'autre, et ne peuvent être expropriés
qu'à certaines conditions. Mais si ces biens sont détruits, par exemple
CR 96/17 - 30 -
au moyen de bombes lancées par des avions militaires appartenant au
souverain territorial, le traité d'amitié ne pourrait-il pas être
invoqué !
Monsieur le Président, avec tout le respect, je dois avouer que la
conception de la Partie adverse m'apparaît carrément absurde. De plus,
elle est insoutenable pour diverses raisons que j'avais évoquées, à vrai
dire, dans ma précédente plaidoirie. Je suis surpris de constater que
nos honorables contradicteurs n'ont pas dédié un seul mot pour y
répondre. La Cour voudra bien, je l'espère, en prendre acte.
Il s'agit de deux arguments que je rappelle rapidement.
Le premier est que, dans leur exception préliminaire, les Etats-Unis
ont reconnu la pertinence du traité d'amitié pour évaluer des actes
d'emploi de la force, ceci dans le contexte de leur analyse de
l'article X, paragraphe 1 du traité. En effet, les Etats-Unis ont
allégué que le principe de la liberté de navigation, tel que prescrit par
l'article X, aurait été violé par l'Iran du fait du prétendu mouillage de
mines dans des eaux internationales; par contre, "all the actions by the
United States were taken to advance freedom of navigation" 1• Ces propos,
avais-je souligné, impliquent clairement l'admission que tout au moins
certaines dispositions du traité sont applicables afin d'apprécier la
légalité ou l'illégalité d'actes d'emploi de la force.
Quant au deuxième argument auquel la Partie adverse n'a pas daigné
répondre, le voici : dans l'arrêt du 27 juin 1986 votre Cour a décidé
-c'est un fait incontestable- que l'article XIX du traité d'amitié
entre les Etats-Unis et le Nicaragua (dont le libellé est identique à
celui de l'article X de notre traité) avait bel et bien été violé par les
Etats-Unis, lors d'attaques armées en territoire nicaraguayen. Monsieur
1 .
USPO, p. 49 et su~v.
CR 96/17 - 31 -
le Président, cela sert peu d'ergoter maintenant si dans ce cas-là les
attaques violaient la liberté de commerce ou la liberté de navigation
commerciale, ou si les dépôts de pétrole détruits faisaient partie
d'installations portuaires ou non : ce qui compte est que votre Cour a
interprété une disposition du traité d'amitié avec le Nicaragua (qui est
la soeur jumelle de notre article X) comme couvrant des actes d'emploi de
la force. Cette analyse de votre Cour contredit si frontalement la thèse
américaine suivant laquelle les traités d'amitié ne seraient pas
applicables aux actes d'emploi de la force, qu'on comprend bien pourquoi
nos contradicteurs ont préféré glisser sur ce point !
Je n'en dirai pas davantage concernant votre arrêt en l'affaire des
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci,
et concernant son influence quant à la présente affaire : le Professeur
Crawford reviendra sur certains autres de ses aspects. Je voudrais en
revanche dire deux mots concernant les critiques que m'a lancées mon
éminent collègue et ami, le Professeur Lowenfeld, lorsqu'il m'a accusé
d'avoir découpé le traité d'amitié comme un puzzle, pour en assembler
ensuite quelques éléments en laissant de côté les autres, de sorte que le
résultat de l'opération ne ressemblerait pas du tout à l'original.
Monsieur le Président, l'assemblage que vous propose à la place le
Professeur Lowenfeld oublie des passages hautement significatifs du
préambule, comme celui qui fait référence aux "high principles in the
regulation of human affairs" auxquels les Parties se déclarent liées.
Mais surtout oublie carrément- et bien arbitrairement- l'article qui
ouvre le traité et qui, de par sa position prioritaire, son libellé
ferme, sa portée large, affiche clairement et efficacement la volonté des
Hautes Parties contractantes de donner à leur traité une sphère d'action
dépassant celle des relations purement commerciales et consulaires. Je
CR 96/17 - 32 -
veux parler, bien entendu, de l'article I, qu'il est trop commode de
laisser de côté quand il s'agit de décrire de quoi le traité s'occupe.
Avec ou sans l'article I, reste toutefois la question fondamentale
que j'ai déjà posée : les biens et les personnes dont le traité se soucie
sont protégés par rapport à toute mesure que pourrait adopter à leur
encontre l'autre partie contractante. Reste cependant à celle-ci la
possibilité d'alléguer que cette mesure se justifie en l'espèce, au
regard de l'article XX, par exemple parce qu'elle est "necessary to
fulfill the obligations for the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential
security interests". Ce serait là- comme le Professeur Crawford l'a
déjà démontré et comme la Partie adverse le reconnaît désormais - une
question de fond : ainsi, par exemple, l'allégation de la légitime
défense. Mais il va de soi que, si la légitime défense justifie
certaines mesures, c'est que des actes d'emploi de la force, qui ne
seraient pas par contre en règle avec le régime de la légitime défense,
pourraient fort bien constituer des violations du traité d'amitié. C'est
justement cela que soutient l'Iran devant vous.
3. Troisième question : les Hautes Parties contractantes ont-elles
soustrait l'interprétation des clauses du traité d'amitié (ou l'une
ou l'autre d'entre elles) aux principes normaux en matière
d'interprétation des traités internationaux ?
Ayant terminé de discuter de la question n° 2 je passe à ma
troisième question.
Monsieur le Président la réponse est assurément négative. Et la
Partie adverse - du moins à première vue - ne prétend pas le contraire
elle a d'ailleurs parfaitement raison, puisque le traité qui nous
intéresse ici est un accord comme un autre, qui doit être interprété en
CR 96/17 - 33 -
utilisant tous les principes et critères habituels, tels qu'on peut les
dégager de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités.
Cependant, si l'on examine plus à fond les allégations de nos
contradicteurs, on s'aperçoit qu'il en va bien autrement. La Partie
adverse fait en effet des efforts désespérés pour convaincre votre Cour
que le principe de l'effet utile ne serait pas applicable dans notre cas.
Ces efforts sont à la mesure de la crainte - parfaitement justifiée, je
le dis en passant- qu'ils éprouvent à l'égard de ce principe, vu qu'il
rend difficilement acceptable leur thèse, non seulement pour ce qui est
de l'article I, mais aussi pour les articles IV, paragraphe 1, et X,
paragraphe 1.
Pour atteindre leur but, nos contradicteurs n'hésitent pas a adopter
une interprétation totalement erronée de l'opinion exprimée par votre
Cour dans son arrêt du 22 juillet 1952 en l'affaire de l'Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. il s'agit de l'arrêt sur lequel a attiré l'attention des
Parties M. le Vice-Président Schwebel. Pour M. Crook,
"The Court was there urged by one Party to give a
particular effect to a provision of an instrument on the basis
of the principle of effectiveness urged here by Professer
Condorelli. This Court did not agree, concluding that the
principle of effectiveness cannat supplant clear intention.
The same principle should control here "
Dans son intervention d'hier, M. Matheson a fait écho à cette analyse.
Monsieur le Président, avec tout le respect, ces propos ne tiennent
pas la route. L'Iran répondra bien entendu par écrit plus en détail à la
question posée par le Vice-Président Schwebel : je me limite donc ici à
une remarque rapide et essentielle.
Dans l'affaire en question, il ne s'agissait pas de
l'interprétation d'une clause d'un traité, mais bien de l'interprétation
d'une déclaration unilatérale d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire
de la Cour basée sur l'article 36, paragraphe 2, de votre Statut.
CR 96/17 - 34 -
S'agissant d'une déclaration unilatérale, la Cour a logiquement trouvé
indispensable de se pencher sur la détermination exacte de l'intention de
l'Etat qui l'avait émise, à savoir l'Iran. Le Royaume-Uni, par contre,
avait fait valoir que l'interprétation à choisir devait être basée sur le
principe d'après lequel "un texte juridique doit être interprété de
manière qu'une raison d'être et un sens puissent être attribués à chacun
de ses mots" (C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 105). C'est en somme le principe
de l'effet utile qu'on demandait à la Cour d'appliquer. La Cour, on le
sait, a répondu par la négative à cette demande. Mais attention! Elle
l'a fait en précisant très soigneusement ce qui suit:
«On peut dire que ce principe [le principe de l'effet
utile] doit s'appliquer en général quand il s'agit
d'interpréter le texte d'un traité. Mais le texte de la
déclaration de l'Iran n'est pas un texte contractuel résultant
de négociations entre deux ou plusieurs Etats. Il résulte
d'une rédaction unilatérale.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)
En somme, s'agissant de déterminer la portée d'une déclaration
unilatérale par laquelle un Etat s'engage à se soumettre à la juridiction
obligatoire de votre Cour, il est naturel qu'on se préoccupe d'identifier
ce que l'auteur de la déclaration a vraiment voulu. Mais il en va bien
autrement pour un traité, où il s'agit de déterminer l'intention commune,
telle qu'elle est consignée dans le texte négocié : un texte qui doit
être interprété objectivement, comme chacun le sait, et comme le proclame
le principe général d'interprétation figurant à l'article 31 de la
convention de Vienne. Le principe de l'effet utile est l'un des critères
d'interprétation- justement- objective et ne saurait donc être placé en
position subordonnée par rapport à l'interprétation subjective qui relève
des moyens complémentaires d'interprétation (article 32 de la convention
de Vienne). Je m'excuse, Monsieur le Président, de devoir énoncer devant
votre Cour de pareilles évidences.
CR 96/17 - 35 -
4. Quatrième question : l'article I est-il un ectoplasme juridique, une
pure apparence de règle de droit ? Les parties n'ont-elles pas
consenti, en lui donnant un libellé approprié, à ce qu'il engendre
des droits et des obligations ?
J'en viens, après avoir épuisé les questions générales relatives au
traité d'amitié dans son ensemble, à ma quatrième question.
Monsieur le Président, j'ai déjà dit ce qu'il fallait au sujet du
principe de l'effet utile et de la nécessité de le prendre en compte afin
d'interpréter l'article I je ne reviendrai pas sur cela, sinon pour
noter que la Partie adverse continue à refuser de voir dans l'article I
rien de plus qu'un simple "statement of aspiration". Autrement dit, un
souhait pour l'avenir, ayant à peu près la même valeur qu'un vŒu de bonne
santé ...
En revanche, je voudrais attirer l'attention de votre Cour sur
l'effort véritablement démesuré que mènent les plaideurs de la Partie
adverse pour tenter d'effacer, de faire disparaître, le caractère
contraignant de l'article I, tel qu'il se dégage, pourtant, tout
naturellement de sa formule énergique : "There shall be firm and enduring
peace and sincere friendship between the United States of America and
Iran." M. Crook s'est même exhibé dans une sorte, qu'il ne soit permis
de le définir ainsi, de double saut périlleux, consistant à soutenir que
"there shall be" signifie "there will be". Le raisonnement est quelque
peu laborieux : "there shall be" en anglais pourrait être, semble-t-il,
un simple futur, dépourvu du sens de l'obligation. La traduction
française «il y aura» le confirmerait. Ergo, "there shall be" veut dire
"there will be".
Monsieur le Président, tous les passages de ce raisonnement
surprenant sont erronés. Les membres anglophones de l'équipe iranienne
sont catégoriques, quant au premier point : "there shall be", à la
troisième personne, ne peut signifier autre chose qu'obligation. Le
CR 96/l 7 - 36 -
texte du traité d'amitié le confirme d'ailleurs amplement, vu qu'il
regorge littéralement, dans divers articles, de "shall", "shall be",
"shall not be", etc., toujours avec le sens de l'obligation. Une formule
exactement identique à celle de l'article Ise rencontre- j'y insiste
dans l'article X : "there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation"
j'aurais bien aimé un commentaire de la Partie adverse sur ce
parallélisme parfait entre les deux dispositions. Mais ce n'est pas
tout : la traduction française du traité d'amitié de 1955, publiée dans
le Recueil des traités des Nations Unies, porte toujours le futur pour
exprimer l'obligation (ce qui correspond d'ailleurs, comme chacun le
sait, à l'usage courant). De plus, la traduction française n'est pas
authentique et ne fait pas foi, alors que fait foi la version en Persan,
comme le prescrit la clause finale de notre traité. Or, on m'assure dans
l'équipe iranienne que la formule utilisée à l'article I n'est absolument
pas équivoque en Persan et exprime sans conteste, en Persan aussi donc,
l'idée de l'obligation : au prochain stade de la procédure votre Cour
voudra sans doute s'assurer de l'exactitude de cette affirmation, si elle
décide de repousser l'exception préliminaire de la Partie adverse.
Il ne vaut pas la peine d'insister encore sur la lettre de
l'article I, tellement les choses sont évidentes. Il faut par contre que
je m'arrête un instant sur l'argument avancé par le Professeur Lowenfeld
au sujet de l'interprétation contextuelle de l'article I. Comme vous le
savez, la position de l'Iran est que l'article I impose aux parties de se
conduire chacune à l'égard de l'autre, au minimum, comme le requiert le
droit international général relatif aux relations amicales et pacifiques.
Dans son analyse, l'Iran s'est appuyé sur la décision Amoco International
Finance du Tribunal des réclamations Etats-Unis/Iran. Mon éminent
collègue, le Professeur Lowenfeld, vous suggère que cette décision se
CR 96/17 - 37 -
référait à l'article IV, paragraphe 2; or, dans le cas de l'article IV le
renvoi au droit international en matière de conditions de légalité de
l'expropriation dépend d'une indication figurant dans le même article,
alors que dans l'article I un tel renvoi n'existe pas, d'après le
Professeur Lowenfeld.
Je voudrais suggérer à votre Cour que celle ainsi proposée n'est
rien d'autre qu'une pétition de principe. Le point de vue que l'Iran a
exposé est justement que l'article I impose, à la lettre, l'obligation de
maintenir des relations amicales et pacifiques, ce qui ne peut vouloir
dire autre chose sinon que les Hautes Parties contractantes se sont
engagées à ce que leurs relations soient, d'une part, conformes aux
principes de droit international sur les relations amicales et, d'autre
part, respectueuses de l'interdiction de la menace et de l'emploi de la
force. Ce sont là des standards de comportement parfaitement
identifiables pour les Etats, vu qu'ils sont prescrits par le droit
international en vigueur. Et ces standards de comportement, les parties
ont voulu les incorporer dans leur traité, du seul fait d'avoir
souverainement décidé d'en faire l'objet d'un engagement conventionnel.
Monsieur le Président, le traité d'amitié utilise d'ailleurs
fréquemment cette technique du renvoi afin de déterminer le contenu des
obligations qu'il prescrit : et ceci dans un nombre de cas bien plus
large que ceux des seuls articles I et IV, paragraphe 2. Ainsi, par
exemple, quand l'article X, paragraphe 2, parle de «haute mer», il ne
définit certes pas de quoi il s'agit : il fait donc renvoi au droit
international en vigueur pour que l'on détermine ce qu'est la haute mer,
aux fins de l'application du traité. La même chose quand diverses
dispositions du traité parlent d'agents diplomatiques et consulaires, ou
précisent (art. XVI, par. 3) qu'aux diplomates doivent être accordées
CR 96/17 - 38 -
"all exemptions allowed them under general international usage". Enfin,
dernier exemple : quand l'article XX spécifie que le traité ne fait pas
obstacle à l'adoption de mesures "necessary to fulfill the obligations
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security",
il ne détermine pas quelles sont ces obligations et fait donc renvoi à la
Charte des Nations Unies. Dans tous ces cas votre Cour, dans le cadre de
sa compétence telle que fixée par la clause compromissoire, devra bien
évidemment, en cas de différend, prendre en considération et appliquer
les diverses dispositions du droit international auxquelles le traité se
réfère. Ce point - je le rappelle à la Partie adverse - a été très bien
mis en évidence, exactement dans ces termes, par sir Robert Jennings,
dans son opinion dissidente jointe à l'arrêt de la Cour de 1986 sur
l'affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires (C.I.J. Recueil
1986, p. 539).
S. Cinquième question : qu'en est-il des articles IV, paragraphe 1 et X,
paragraphe 1 ? Les parties ont-elles consenti à ce que ces
dispositions soient la source de droit et d'obligations entrant en
jeu dans la présente affaire ?
J'en suis, Monsieur le Président, à ma dernière question. La voici
: qu'en est-il de l'article IV, paragraphe 1 et de l'article X,
paragraphe 1 ? Les Parties ont-elles consenti, oui ou non, à ce que ces
dispositions soient la source de droit et d'obligations entrant en jeu
dans la présente affaire ?
La réponse que donne à cette question la Partie adverse n'est pas à
vrai dire très claire, quant au point de savoir si les dispositions en
discussion peuvent être considérées comme établissant des obligations
je rappelle à ce sujet les propos de M. Crook suivant lequel en fait
l'article IV, paragraphe 1, ne serait pas "free-standing" et,
semble-t-il, l'article X, paragraphe 1, non plus : ce qui pose, à mon
sens, de sérieux problèmes au regard du principe de l'effet utile. Je ne
CR 96/17 - 39 -
reviens pas sur ce point, sinon pour observer que les Hautes Parties
contractantes ont bien consenti à ce que les dispositions en question
reçoivent le libellé contraignant qui les caractérise.
Deux remarques seulement au sujet des dernières affirmations de nos
contradicteurs à ce sujet.
La première concerne l'article IV. M. Crook nous fait le grief de
ne pas avoir répondu à son observation d'après laquelle il serait
inconcevable que cette disposition s'applique en cas d'emploi de la
force. Si l'emploi de la force est licite, observe-t-il, il serait
illogique de demander qu'il soit, par exemple, "reasonable".
Franchement, Monsieur le Président, cet argument est difficile à saisir
n'est-il pas vrai que tant le jus ad bellum que le jus in bello prévoient
toutes sortes de limitations et de conditions concernant l'emploi de la
force, afin d'éviter tant que faire se peut qu'il ne soit excessif,
disproportionné, causant des maux superflus, etc. : en un mot, qu'il ne
soit déraisonnable ?
La seconde remarque concerne l'article X, paragraphe 1.
Contrairement à ce qui résulte clairement de la lettre de cette
disposition, les Etats-Unis soutiennent que celle-ci ne couvre pas le
commerce, mais seulement le commerce maritime. Voilà une question
d'interprétation typiquement appartenant au nombre de celles que votre
Cour a la mission de régler grâce à l'article XXI, paragraphe 2, du
traité. Pour sa part, l'Iran continue à penser que, sinon dans la suite
de l'article X, dans beaucoup d'autres dispositions le traité regorge
littéralement d'applications diverses du principe de la liberté de
commerce : ainsi, par exemple, aux articles IV, paragraphe 4, V, VI, VII,
VIII, XI, etc. Quant à la question de savoir si ce principe, sur lequel
indiscutablement les Parties ont consenti à l'instar des de tous les
CR 96/17 - 40 -
autres articles du traité, peut être appliqué lors d'actes d'emploi de la
force, je l'ai déjà discutée auparavant. Je n'ai donc pas besoin d'y
revenir.
Conclusion
Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les Juges, j'en suis à ma
conclusion. La conclusion est que le traité d'amitié a été
souverainement accepté par les Parties tel qu'il est : à savoir, pourvu
d'une clause compromissoire large, qui couvre tout différend relatif à
l'interprétation et à l'application de la totalité de ses dispositions,
sans exception aucune : y compris donc l'article I, l'article IV,
paragraphe 1, et l'article X, paragraphe 1.
Je terminerai par une observation concernant la première plaidoirie
du Professeur Lowenfeld, qui a essayé de tirer l'eau au moulin de la
thèse de nos adversaires en se basant sur un court passage de votre avis
consultatif du 8 juillet dernier sur la Licéité de la menace ou de
l'emploi d'armes nucléaires. Il s'agit du paragraphe 33, dans lequel
votre Cour a indiqué que le droit applicable qui était le plus
directement pertinent pour traiter la question sub judice est le droit de
la Charte et le droit applicable dans les conflits armés. Dans notre
cas, dit le Professeur Lowenfeld, "the most directly relevant applicable
law" à la prétention de l'Iran n'est pas le traité de 1955, mais le droit
des conflits armés.
Avec tout le respect, cet argument n'en est pas un : il confond, à
mon sens, le rôle de la Cour dans les procédures contentieuses et dans
les procédures consultatives. Je m'en explique.
Dans le cas de l'avis consultatif, votre Cour devait chercher dans
tout l'univers du droit international toutes les normes susceptibles
d'être prises en considération afin de juger de la licéité ou non de
CR 96/17 - 41 -
l'arme nucléaire, que celles-ci soient plus ou moins directement
pertinentes : c'est bien ce qu'elle a fait.
Dans notre cas, il en va bien autrement : votre Cour n'est pas
appelée ici à connaître de toutes les règles qui pourraient théoriquement
fonder les prétentions iraniennes. Votre Cour ne peut faire application
en l'espèce que d'un seul traité, le traité d'amitié de 1955, et elle doit
dire si celui-ci est pertinent ou non, sans se préoccuper de la question
de savoir si d'autres règles, par exemple découlant d'autres traités ou de
la coutume internationale, seraient éventuellement mieux appropriés pour
régler le différend.
On revient donc à la case départ. L'Iran a invoqué le traité
d'amitié, que la Cour est indiscutablement compétente à interpréter et
appliquer parce que les Parties contractantes ont souverainement voulu
ainsi. La Cour ne saurait donc se soustraire à sa mission qui est, au
stade présent de la procédure, de dire si le traité d'amitié de 1955 est
pertinent ou non pour évaluer la demande de l'Iran. En cas de réponse
positive à cette question, je ne vois pas ce que la Cour pourrait faire
d'autre sinon décider de passer à l'examen de fond : et ceci qu'il existe
ou non d'autres règles théoriquement applicables, mais dont l'application
ne relève pas de la compétence de votre haute juridiction.
Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le Président, Madame et Messieurs les Juges,
de votre bienveillante attention. Je voudrais vous prier, si vous le
voulez bien, de donner la parole au moment que vous jugez opportun au
Professeur Crawford.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le Professeur Condorelli. L'audience
est suspendue pour une pause d'une quinzaine de minutes. Après quoi je
donnerai la parole au Professeur Crawford.
L'audience est suspendue de 11 h 30 à 11 h 40.
CR 96/17 - 42 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I now give the floor to Professer
James Crawford.
Mr. CRAWFORD: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of
the Court:
1. In this concluding part of Iran's reply, I will deal with three
matters which go to the jurisdiction of the Court under the compromissory
clause, Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. First, I will discuss
the United States' presentation of the Nicaragua case, in order to show
that that decision, in conformity with the general jurisprudence of the
Court, supports the Court's jurisdiction in the present case. Secondly,
I will refute the United States' arguments as to the threshold test for
jurisdiction in the light of the Bosnia case, and show how the United
States here persistently confuses issues of jurisdiction and
justification. Thirdly, I will address the persisting United States
argument based on what might be called lack of "subjective intent" on the
part of the United States to the adjudication of this dispute. In
conclusion, I will briefly summarize Iran's arguments at this stage.
I turn then to the United States' treatment of Nicaragua.
A. The United States Treatment of the Nicaragua decision
2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, different United States
counsel dealt with Nicaragua in different ways. Professer Lowenfeld was
rather dismissive. When a common lawyer refers to a decision of a court
and then immediately cites the leading book on precedent in that court,
one can easily infer that the decision was just wrong. Evidently
Professer Lowenfeld thought so (CR 96/12, p. 52), although the book he
cited, Judge Shahabuddeen's Lauterpacht Lectures, contains no hint of
CR 96/17 - 43 -
that view (see M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge,
1996) pp. 122-127 et passim).
3. I note in passing that Judge Nagendra Singh, whose "wise and
eloquent" words on jurisdiction Professer Lowenfeld also quoted
(CR 96/12, p. 57), presided over both the jurisdiction and merits phases
of Nicaragua and voted with the majority on both occasions.
4. Faced with this overwhelming difficulty, Dr. Murphy took a more
subtle line. As a common lawyer he sought to distinguish Nicaragua, to
show that it does not say what to all the world it appears to say. It
may have been rightly decided, he inferred, but rightly understood it
supported the United States' position here (CR 96/13, pp. 44-48)
S. I should note that on one point Professer Lowenfeld and
Dr. Murphy agreed. The Court's decision on the FCN treaty in Nicaragua
was, they implied, an accident. The Court, carried away with the
excitement of the optional clause arguments, took its eye off the ball of
the FCN treaty. Distracted by the larger, the majority failed to focus
on the smaller instrument (CR 96/12, p. 52, Professer Lowenfeld;
CR 96/13, pp. 35-47, Dr. Murphy). Mr. President, advocates are natural
egotists, and they sometimes appear to think that the Court is incapable
of giving independent attention to any point which has not been
expansively argued. If counsel ignores a point but the Court dealt with
it, the Court must have got it wrong. What impertinence! In fact, of
course, no fewer than five of the judges expressly distinguished between
the two sources of jurisdiction, upholding it under one and not the
other - and the point was obviously present to the mind of the whole
Court.
CR 96/17 - 44 -
6. Turning to more serious arguments, three points need to be made.
The first relates to the Court's decision on Nicaragua's "abject and
purpose" claim, and its relevance to the present case. The second
relates to the distinction between jurisdiction and merits in Nicaragua.
And the third relates to the Court's application of the FCN Treaty to
military operations and the use of force.
1. Nicaragua's "Object and Purpose" Claim
7. Much of Dr. Murphy's argument was vitiated by his equation of
Nicaragua's abject and purpose claim and Iran's claim under Article I of
the Treaty of Amity (CR 96/13, p. 38). There was of course no equivalent
to Article I in the FCN Treaty with Nicaragua. I note first that anyone
reading paragraphs 275 and 276 of the 1986 Judgment could have had no
doubt what the Court's decision would have been, that it would have
favoured Nicaragua, bad Nicaragua been able to rely on an article like
Article I. But it could not, and it sought to make up for that
deficiency by formulating a claim in terms not of any clause of the
treaty but of its generalized abject and purpose. The Court held that
such a claim fell outside the compromissory clause in the FCN Treaty
(I.C.J. Reports 1986, at pp. 135-136, para. 271), but it went on to
uphold it under the optional clause by reference to general international
law.
8. The present case is quite different. Iran relies on specifie
clauses of the Treaty of Amity, including Article I. There is simply no
analogy between a generalized abject and purpose claim under general
international law and a specifie claim under a specifie article of a
treaty. For that short but sufficient reason the whole of Dr. Murphy's
elaborate argument on the point (CR 96/13, pp. 37-39, 44-46) fails.
CR 96/17 - 45 -
2. The distinction between jurisdiction and merits in Nicaragua
9. Dr. Murphy further argued that on the basis of the Court's
decision in Nicaragua, this Court "can and ought to determine at the
jurisdiction phase whether - accepting the facts as pled by the claimant
- a claim has been stated that fits those provisions" (CR 96/13, p. 48).
Now, this is the language of the common law strike-out application, and
it finds no support whatever in what the Court said or did. It is
significant that all six references to Nicaragua in the United States
Preliminary Objection on this point are references to the merits phase
(viz., USPO, paras. 3.19, 3.20, 3.32, 3.39, 3.40, 3.41); there is not a
single reference by the United States on this point to the 1984 decision
on jurisdiction.
10. It is useful togo back to the Court's jurisdictional finding on
the FCN Treaty in Nicaragua. Dr. Murphy complained that the relevant
passage was "cursory" (CR 96/13, p. 47), and it was certainly brief.
After reciting the arguments of the parties, and the articles of the
Treaty on which Nicaragua had, however faintly relied, the Court said:
"Taking into account these articles of the Treaty of 1956,
particularly the provision in, inter alia, Article XIX, for the
freedom of commerce and navigation, and the references in the
Preamble to peace and friendship, there can be no doubt that,
in the circumstances in which Nicaragua brought its Application
to the Court, and on the basis of the facts there asserted,
there is a dispute between the Parties, inter alia, as to the
'interpretation or application' of the Treaty." (I.C.J.
Reports 1984, at p. 428, para. 83.)
That was all. But economy of speech does not entail economy of thought.
In Nicaragua, the reason why the Court was brief was because it could be.
The situation was, as the Court pointed out in its concluding passage,
"quite clear" (at p. 441, para. 111}. It was equally clear to most of
the Judges who, while disagreeing with the Court on the optional clause,
agreed with it on the FCN Treaty. Judge Ago expressed his "conviction"
CR 96/17 - 46 -
that the Treaty provided "a fully adequate basis to enable the Court to
move forward to the next stage of the proceedings" (at pp. 531-532).
Judge Jennings, while foreshadowing issues that would arise at the
merits, including under the security interests clause, equally had no
doubt about jurisdiction under the FCN Treaty (at pp. 556-557).
Similarly Judge Mosler (at p. 172). Judge Oda had more doubts, but was
prepared - if he will forgive the colloquialism - to go along with the
majority on the FCN Treaty (at p. 472). So the simple fact is that the
great majority of the Court thought that jurisdiction in that case was
clear. It is even clearer here, because of Article I of the Treaty of
Amity.
11. It is relevant to note that only one member of the Court
dissented on the basic principle of the Court's jurisdiction under the
FCN Treaty (see I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 339-348, Judge Schwebel). The
argument in that dissent closely resembles the United States argument
here, which gives an indication of the difficulties Dr. Murphy faced in
seeking to uphold but distinguish Nicaragua. By contrast Judge Ruda, the
only ether Judge to dissent on jurisdiction under the FCN Treaty, did so
for reasons that have no relevance to the present case (see I.C.J.
Reports 1984, pp. 163-165), and he voted with the majority on the FCN
Treaty at the stage of the merits (see I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 176-177).
12. The remaining point to be made concerns Dr. Murphy's valiant
attempts to argue that despite Nicaragua the Court has a discretion to
deal at the jurisdictional stage with issues of the merits, at least if
they have been fully argued and do not require the determination of
controversial facts (CR 96/13, pp. 47-48) - I am giving to the relevant
passage of Dr. Murphy's argument the only meaning I could discern, he
will forgive me if I have read it wrong. There are two answers, anyway,
CR 96/17 - 47 -
to the argument. First, the points have not been fully argued - Iran has
simply shawn that its case clears - I would say, vaults over - any
threshold test for jurisdiction the United States wishes to erect, quite
apart from being transparently sufficient under the Court's threshold
test. Secondly, the facts are in dispute. But anyway, the Court has no
such discretion. To the contrary, under Article 79, paragraph 3, of the
Rules the merits are formally suspended once a preliminary objection is
made and until it is disposed of - another provision of Article 79
Mr. Chorowsky forgot to mention. The Rules thus preclude the Court from
dealing with the merits while it is faced with a preliminary objection.
There is no question of any discretion to deal with any merits issue.
Or, as it were, to join the merits to the jurisdiction, which is
essentially what the United States asks you to do.
3. The Court•s Application of the FCN Treaty in Nicaragua
13. For completeness, I should refer briefly to the way in which the
Court applied the FCN Treaty to the use of force. For the United States'
argument that the Treaty of Amity has, a priori, no application to the
"combat operations of armed forces" (CR 96/16 p. 10, Mr. Matheson) is
also inconsistent with Nicaragua. It is obviously inconsistent with the
Court's decision on jurisdiction; as I have shawn, the Court treated its
jurisdiction as clear. But it is also inconsistent with the decision on
the merits. In that case the Court went ahead and applied the relevant
provisions of the FCN Treaty to the facts, without any reference to the
character of the US forces involved or the means of warfare adopted
(I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 48, 50-51, 52-53, paras. 80, 81-86, 91). It is
true that Nicaragua involved the CIA, not US naval forces, and that the
acts imputable to the United States involved mining, clandestine attacks
and overflight, not outright assaults by capital ships. But that cannat
CR 96/17 - 48 -
make a difference, and there is no suggestion that the Court thought it
did. A State is not free to violate an FCN Treaty if it does so by its
regular armed forces, as distinct from through covert operations, or if
it does so by sufficiently massive force. A fortiori, it is not free to
violate this Treaty of Amity, with its Article I.
14. In the context of discussing the character and scope of the
Treaty of Amity, I should note, in passing, Professer Lowenfeld's
observation that the recent US sanctions legislation directed against
Iran - the D'Amata Act as it is called - could not possibly be said to be
in breach of the Treaty of Amity (CR 96/12, p. 53). It may be thought
that, like a good advocate, Professer Lowenfeld was trying to win not
just one case but two. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Iran does
take the view that that legislation violates the Treaty of Amity - in
rather the same way as the United States in 1983 took the view that the
projected oil embargo by Iran against the United States - an embargo
never in fact implemented - was a clear violation of the Treaty (see
"Memorandum of Department of State Legal Adviser on the Application of
the Treaty of Amity to Expropriations in Iran", 13 October 1983,
reprinted in (1983) 22 International Legal Materials 1406 at
pp. 1407-1409, note 21; reproduced in Iran's Memorial, Exhibit 94).
Similarly this Court held that the US trade embargo against Nicaragua
violated the provisions of the FCN Treaty in that case (I.C.J. Reports
1986, pp. 69-70, 140-141, paras. 123-5, 279, 282). For the Court's
information, I should add that Iran last month commenced proceedings in
respect of the D'Amata Act before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
under the terms of the Algiers Accords, while expressly reserving its
rights under other instruments. I make the point here, Mr. President,
CR 96/17 - 49 -
for the record and to avoid the possibility that silence by Iran
following Professor Lowenfeld's statement could be taken as acquiescence.
B. The Threshold Test Eor Jurisdiction and
the Distinction between Jurisdiction and Justification
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I move now to the second
part of my presentation, concerning the appropriate threshold test for
jurisdiction under a compromissory clause. The United States more or
less reiterated its position in its reply, repeating its formula of
"reasonable connection". I say "more or less" because yesterday sorne
greater effort was made to distance the preliminary objection from
controversial factual assertions - at least as compared with the first
round. So the United States says, in response to Judge Higgins'
question, that it makes no difference to the Court's jurisdiction whether
the platforms were in exclusively commercial use or not (CR 96/16, p. 10,
Mr. Matheson) . It had to say that, of course - otherwise we would have
been treated to the spectacle of a party abandoning a preliminary
objection in response to a question from a judge!
16. But by parity of reasoning the United States has to accept that
the Court's jurisdiction does not depend on whether the United States
behaved neutrally in the Iran-Iraq war, whether its attacks on the
platforms were or were not provoked, whether Iran was acting in
self-defence, and so on (CR 96/16, p. 9, Mr. Matheson; p. 21, Professor
Lowenfeld). Thus the case was - like Grotius' great work - withdrawn
from every modern fact (cf. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomenon, 26)
But the withdrawal from consideration of all relevant facts made the
United States' legal position at this stage even less plausible - since
it amounts now to the claim that an unprovoked attack by naval forces of
one State party on a civilian commercial installation of the other State
CR 96/17 - 50 -
party, while that other State party is acting in self-defence against the
aggression of a third State, does not even get over the jurisdictional
threshold for a breach of the Treaty of Amity. The Court can decide for
itself on that.
17. In parenthesis, Mr. President, I should say that in Iran's view
too the Court's jurisdiction does not depend on any finding as to the
commercial or other use of the platforms. The Court has jurisdiction to
apply the Treaty of Amity to the facts as it finds them, including the
facts relating to the use of the platforms to the extent that they may be
relevant. The use of the platforms is not a jurisdictional fact: it is
a matter for the Court to consider in the exercise of its anterior
jurisdiction conferred in relation to the dispute as a whole by
Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.
18. There has also been a change in the authority relied on by the
United States for its "reasonable connection" test. Last week I showed
that the earlier United States mainstay in this regard - the Ambatielos
case - did not support the reasonable connection test (CR 96/15, p. 49).
The United States made no reply to this. Rather than returning to
Ambatielos, it relied on Bosnia. In the course of doing so, Professer
Lowenfeld accused Iran of quoting only paragraph 29 of the Bosnia
Judgment (CR 96/16, p. 23). In fact, however, we did refer to the
central paragraph, paragraph 33 (CR 96/15, p. 50). The point is
important because in paragraph 29 the Court was holding that there was a
dispute, whereas in paragraph 33 it held that the dispute arose under, or
"within the provisions of", the Genocide Convention (cf. also Bosnia,
Judgment of 11 July 1996, para. 30).
19. In the Bosnia case, Bosnia-Herzegovina pointed to a treaty, the
general language of which was arguably violated by alleged acts of the
CR 96/17 - 51 -
respondent State. The respondent State took issue with the facts, but
the Court simply referred the factual issues to the merits (Bosnia,
Judgment of 11 July 1996, para. 31, sub-para. 4). The respondent State
also took issue with the treaty provision relied on, arguing that despite
its general language there were unexpressed limitations in it: either it
did not apply in internal armed conflict, or it did not apply to
violations outside the respondent's territory, or it did not provide a
basis for State responsibility. The Court rejected these arguments
summarily. There was simply no textual basis for them, having regard to
the actual language of the Convention. As to the first, Article 1 of the
Convention applies to acts of genocide "whether committed in time of
peace or intime of war"; there was simply no basis for any exclusion
for cases of internal armed conflict (ibid., sub-para. 3). As to the
second, similarly there was no basis for a territorial limitation, which
was nowhere expressed in the Convention (ibid., sub-para. 5). Asto the
third, the reference in the Convention to state responsibility did not
"exclude any form of State responsibility" as the Court said (ibid. para.
32) .
20. In deference to Judges Oda, Vereshchetin and Shi, I should note
that they disagreed on this latter point, at least. But they did so on
the basis - as I read their declarations - of considerations special to
the Genocide Convention.
21. Now turning to the present case, it is Iran which calls in aid
general language in an applicable treaty to which the general language of
a compromissory clause applies. The United States seeks to exclude
jurisdiction by reading down that language by reference to unexpressed
limitations concerned with the "combat operations of armed forces". It
is the United States that is in the position that the respondent State
CR 96/17 - 52 -
was in Bosnia. Iran says that it has crossed the threshold of an
arguable case in relation to this dispute, the threshold test as
articulated by the Court in Ambatielos and Nicaragua. It does not ask
the Court for a definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions of
the Treaty, that will be a matter for the merits. It simply says that as
to the dispute - and I repeat for Professor Lowenfeld's benefit, the
words in paragraph 33 of the Bosnia Judgment - I hope I read them slowly
enough now - "the Parties not only differ as to the facts of the
case . and the applicability to them of the provisions of the
[Treaty] , but are moreover in disagreement with respect to the meaning
and legal scope of several of those provisions", including the
jurisdictional clause. There is - as the Court said in Bosnia,
"accordingly" - a dispute covered by that clause.
22. If in the Bosnia case the Court actually affirmed the general
language of the Convention, i.e., if it went on to interpret that
language in the face of implausible arguments to the contrary - and I
would point out that Bosnia-Herzegovina had urged it to do that - this
cannat detract from the decision that there was in that case a dispute
under the compromissory clause. And similarly here.
23. It remains to note the attempt by Mr. Crook to avoid the
consequences of the United States concession with respect to the security
interests clause, Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). I will not repeat what I
said on this on Friday (CR 96/15, pp. 57-61), since the only response
Mr. Crook now makes is to say that the Treaty "does not regulate the
conduct of military hostilities" (CR 96/16, pp. 35-36). Well, that begs
the question. If the Treaty has been violated and Article XX,
paragraph 1 (d), does not provide an excuse, then the United States will
discover that to that extent the Treaty does regulate such conduct, in
CR 96/17 - 53 -
the sense of rendering it unlawful - just as it discovered this, albeit
in absentia, as to the FCN Treaty in Nicaragua. What is implausible is
to suggest that there is an unexpressed stipulation - like the
unexpressed stipulation as to internal armed conflict on which the
respondent State relied in the Bosnia case - which excludes "military
hostilities" from your jurisdiction. And that implausibility becomes
total once one accepts - as the United States now does - that certain
military hostilities can be justified, at the level of the merits, under
paragraph 1 (d). The United States finds Iran's argument "dramatic" and
"creative" (CR 96/16, p. 35, Mr. Crook). To the aspiring advocate these
are satisfying words, but I would prefer to use the terms "elementary",
"obvious" and "logical". The Court had no difficulty with the point in
1984, so I regret to say that it is hardly creative to make it now.
24. Moreover the United States argument pointedly ignores the key
ward "necessary" in paragraph 1 (d), on which the Court placed such
emphasis in Nicaragua (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 141, para. 282). It is
only necessary measures which are not precluded by that paragraph; by
clear implication, unnecessary measures of the use of force may well be
precluded. And thus the other provisions of the Treaty can extend to,
can caver, pro tanto can regulate, such unnecessary measures. Of course,
whether the United States measures here were "necessary" we shall have to
wait and see.
C. The United States Restrictive Theory or Subjective Intent
25. Mr President, Members of the Court, I should in this third part
of my reply make a brief reference to Mr Matheson's repeated invocation
of a restrictive principle of consent to jurisdiction, based on the
intent of the parties and invoking the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (CR
96/16, p. 40). But as my colleague Professer Condorelli has explained,
CR 96/17 - 54 -
Anglo-Iranian concerned the interpretation of a unilateral declaration
made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, not the
interpretation of a treaty. The subjective intent of one or other party
to a treaty is essentially irrelevant to the interpretation of that
treaty. What matters is their common intent as expressed in the treaty
itself or, in a subsidiary way, in admissible extrinsic materials. Here
the compromissory clause is as broad as the Treaty itself, and there is
no rule of the restrictive interpretation of treaties generally. Such a
rule was expressly rejected in the drafting of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.
26. In short, what the parties "actually intended" - in the sense of
jointly intended - is to be extracted from the terms of the treaty
interpreted in accordance with international law. The only item of
travaux préparatoires of the treaty that either party referred to in
these proceedings was the debate over the inclusion of the words "or
application" in Article XXI, paragraph 2 (see CR 96/15, p. 44). The
eventual inclusion of those words speaks in faveur of the broad
interpretation of Article XXI paragraph 2. The US Senate debates were
not and are not part of the travaux préparatoires, whether of this treaty
or any other, because they were internal to one party and were not
communicated to - let alone agreed by - that other party, as the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31, paragraph 2 (b), requires.
Iran has cited them here simply to show that the ex post assertions by
the United States as to its understanding of the Treaty, or as to what it
"really intended", do not stand with the internal records of the
United States itself. But those records cannat contradict the actual
language of the Treaty read in accordance with the applicable rules of
treaty interpretation.
CR 96/17 - 55 -
D. Summary of Conclusions
27. Finally, Mr. President, in the fourth part of this reply, let
me briefly summarize the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this
phase of the case. Mr. Matheson yesterday identified and helpfully
identified three "basic questions" on which, he said, the debate turns
(CR 96/16, pp. 14-15). His third question logically cornes first. It
asks what is the standard or threshold for establishing jurisdiction
under a compromissory clause. On this point I have already shown that
the Court need only decide that the issues between the Parties raise bona
fide questions of interpretation or application of the treaty. The
actual task of interpretation and application, and any associated issues
of fact-finding, have to wait until the merits.
28. Mr. Matheson's ether two questions have ta be answered in the
light of this answer ta his third question - although, as I pointed out
on Friday, the answers the Court should give to those questions would be
the same even if, hypothetically, the Court were ta adopt the "dress
rehearsal" theory of jurisdiction propounded by the United States, the
"reasonable connection" or "close relationship" theory.
29. Mr. Matheson's first question relates ta the scope and character
of the Treaty. Here it is the United States which seeks ta make the
argument that the Treaty of Amity is both narrow in scope and routine in
character, and that, globally, it does not cover situations involving the
use of armed force by the regular forces of a State party. The United
States reclassifies this Treaty, one might say, as a Treaty of Vague
Aspirations, Maritime Commerce and Consular Rights. Iran says the Treaty
is what it proclaims itself to be, a Treaty of Amity, Economie Relations
and Consular Rights, and that it contains provisions responding fully to
each of its proclaimed abjects. Iran also says that, if an apparent
CR 96/17 - 56 -
breach has occurred of any particular clause of the Treaty by way of a
use of armed force by a State, that breach has to be justified or excused
under Article XX (1) (b) or by reference to general international law.
It is not excluded at the threshold, either from the scope of the Treaty
or from its compromissory clause. Justification of an apparent breach of
the Treaty is a matter for the merits. It is quite different from
jurisdiction.
30. But Iran also says that the very existence of the disagreement
between the Parties which I have just summarized is itself sufficient in
the circumstances to attract the Court's jurisdiction. The issue of the
scope of the Treaty arises on the facts of this case, and Iran's position
with respect to it is an arguable one. That is enough.
31. The same answer can be given to Mr. Matheson's second question,
which is whether the specifie provisions of the Treaty invoked by Iran
"regulate combat operations of armed forces" (CR 96/16, p 15). The
answer is that those provisions have apparently been breached by the
actions of the United States, or at the least, that it is arguable that
they have been so breached. It is true that precisely which provisions
have been breached and precisely why will be a matter for the Court to
determine at the merits phase, in the light of its determination of the
facts. But genuine questions as to the breach of each of those
provisions have been raised. That being so, the United States' argument
that its conduct does not violate the treaty because it involved "combat
operations of armed forces" is a question of justification, and not of
j urisdiction.
32. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Mr. Crook suggested
yesterday that on the Iranian view of the Treaty of Amity, the
maintenance of friendship between the United States and Iran "becomes a
CR 96/17 - 57 -
matter for the Court" (CR 96/16, p. 28). I suppose no two people ever
became friends as a result of a judgment of the Court deciding in favour
of one and against the other. No doubt the same is true for States. But
Mr. Crook misunderstands the role of the Court in the pacifie settlement
of disputes. The relations between the United States and Iran are less
troubled today, one would suggest, because Iran was able to bring the
Airbus case before this Court and because it was eventually resolved by
the parties "under the shadow of the law", as the phrase has it, but
amicably resolved. One at least of the calendar of issues between the
Parties has been resolved and the fact that there are other items on that
calendar does not affect that matter. This is the role of the Court
under the compromissory clause, to contribute to the settlement of
disputes by its pacifie means. Iran is confident that the Court will not
shirk that role in this important case.
Mr. President, I would ask you to call on the Agent to conclude the
case on behalf of Iran.
Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Crawford, for your
statement. I now can give the floor once again to the distinguished
Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Zahedin-Labbaf, to make his
final statement and to give the Court his Government's final submissions.
Mr. ZAHEDIN-LABBAF:
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, that concludes
Iran's presentation.
2. On a personal note, I would like to say that Iran has regretted
in these proceedings the absence of Professor Bowett, who is listed as
part of Iran's delegation and who assisted Iran throughout the written
CR 96/17 - 58 -
phase. Unfortunately, he was prevented from attending. Even without
Professer Bowett's assistance, however, I trust that Iran has shawn
conclusively that there are genuine questions of interpretation and
application of the Treaty at issue in this case, that the Court has
jurisdiction to deal with them, and that accordingly, justice will best
be served if this case proceeds to the merits so that the disputes
relating to the destruction of the oil platforms in question can be
resolved once and for all.
3. On behalf of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
of its delegation during these oral hearings, I would like to thank you,
Mr. President, and all the Members of the Court, for their patience and
attention. I would also like to thank the Registry and ether members of
the Court's staff who have assisted in the good functioning of these
important proceedings.
4. It only remains for me to read out the final submissions of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with Article 60, paragraph 2, of
the Court's Rules. These submissions are the same as those appearing on
page 77 of Iran's Observations and Submissions filed on 1 July 1994 and
are as follows:
* * *
In the light of the facts and arguments it has presented, the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran requests the Court to adjudge
and declare:
1. That the preliminary objection of the United States is rejected in
its entirety;
CR 96/17 - 59 -
2. That, consequently, the Court bas jurisdiction under Article XXI (2)
of the Treaty of Amity to entertain the claims submitted by the
Islamic Republic of Iran in its Application and Memorial as they
relate to a dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or
application of the Treaty;
3. That, on a subsidiary basis in the event the preliminary objection is
not rejected outright, it does not possess, in the circumstances of
the case, an exclusively preliminary character within the meaning of
Article 79 (7) of the Rules of Court; and
4. Any other remedy the Court may deem appropriate. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Zahedin-Labbaf. The Court takes note
of the final submissions which you have presented in the name of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. This brings us to the end of this series of
hearings. I thank the Agents, Counsel and Advisors for both Parties for
the help they have given to the Court as well as the spirit of courtesy
they have shown throughout these hearings. In conformity with the usual
practice, I would ask the two Agents to remain at the disposal of the
Court to provide any further assistance which it might need and, subject
to this, I declare that all proceedings on the preliminary objection in
the case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United
States of America) closed. The Court will now withdraw to deliberate.
The Agents of the Parties will be notified in due time of the date when
the Court will give its Judgment. There will be no other matters before
the Court today. The hearings are closed.
The Court rose at 12.20 p.m.
CR 96/17
Audience publique tenue le mardi 24 septembre 1996, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Bedjaoui, président