ORAL ARGUMENTS
MINUTESOF THE PUBLICSiTTINGS
heldatthe Pear:ePalace, The Hague,
from26 Novernbero3 Decemher 1984,
Presideni Eliaspresiding
PLAIDOIRIES
PROC~S-VERBAUXDES AUDIENCESPUBLIQUES
tenuesau Palais de la Paix, d La Haye,
du26 novembreau 3 décembre1984,
sous la présidencede M. Elias LISTOFABBREVIATlONSUSED IN THEORALARGUMENTS
LM Memorialof the LibyanArab Jamahiriya
MM Memorialof Malta
LCM Counter-Memorialof the LibyanArab Jarnahiriya
MCM Counter-Mernorlf Malta
LR Reply of the LibyanArabJamahiriya
MR Replyof Malta
LISTEDESABRÉVIATTONS UTILISÉES
DANS LES PLAIDOIRIES
ML Mémoirede la Jamahiriyaarabelibyenne
MM Mémoirede Malte
CML Contre-mémoire la Jamahiriyalibyenne
CMM Contre-mémoide Malte
RL Répliquee la Jamahiriyaarabelibyenne
RM Repliquede Malte NINTH PUBLIC SI'ITING (26 XI 84, 3 p.m.)
Present: Presidenr ELIAS ;Vice-President SETTE-CAMARA ;udges LACHS,
Mo~ozov, NAGENDKA SINGH, RUDA, MOSLER, ODA. AGO, EL-KHANI,
SCHWEBEL JENNINGS ,E LACHARKIÈRE M,BAYE, BEDJAOUIJ,udges ad hoc
JIM~NE ZE ARECHAGA VALTICOSK ;egisrrorTORREB SERNARDEZ.
Alsopresent:
For the Governrnentof theSucialisi People'sLibjan ArahJamahiriya :
Mr. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman, Professor of International Law at the
University of Garyounis, Benghazi,s Agent;
Mr. Youssef Omar Kherbish, Counsellor at the Secretariat of Justice,
Mr. Ibrahim Abdul Aziz Omar, Counsellor at the People's Bureau for Foreign
Liaison, os Counsel;
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.E.E., Q.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of
lnternational Law at the University of Cambridge,
Mr. Herbert W. Briggs. Goldwin Smith Professor of lnternationaf Law
emeritus,Cornell University,
Mr. Claude-Albert Colliard, Honorary Dean, Professor of International Law
emeritus at the University Paris 1.
Mr. Keith Highet, Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars.
Mr. Gunther Jaenicke, Professor of International Law at the University of
Frankfuri-am-Main,
Mr. Laurent Lucchini, Professor of lnternational Law at the University of
Paris1,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, Professor of International Law at the University
of Paris 1,
Mr. Walter D. Sohier, Member of the New York and District of Columbia
Bars,
Sir FrancisA. Vallat, G.B.E.,K.C.M.G. Q .C., Professor emeritus of Inter-
national Law at the University of London. Counselund Advocates;
Mr. Mohammed Alawar, Assistant Professor of Geography, Al-Fateh
University. Tripoli,
Mr. Scott B. Edmonds, Instructor of Cartography and Director of Carto-
graphieServices at thUniversity ofMaryland,Baltimore County,
Mr. lcilio Finetti. Professor of Geodesy and Geophysics at the University of
Trieste,
Mr. Omar Hammuda, Professor of Geology, Al-Fateh University, Tripoli,
Mr. Derk Jongsma, Senior Lecturer in Geology at the Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam,
Mr. Amin A. Missallati, Professor of Geology, Al-Fateh University, Tripoli.
Mr. Muftah Smeida.Second Secretary, People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison,
Mr. Mohamed A. Syala, Surveying Department, Secretariat of Planning.
Tripoli,
Ms Victoria J. Taylor. Cartographer at the University of Maryland,
Baltimore County.274 CONTINENTAL SHELF
Mr. Jan E. van Hinte, Professor of Paleontology at the Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam. as Advisers;
Mr. Rodman R. Rundy, Member of the New York Bar,
Mr. Richard Meese. Docteur en droit,
Mr. Henri-Xavier Ortoli, Member of the New York Bar.as Counsel;
For the Governmenr of Malta :
H.E. Mr. Edgar Mizzi, Ambassador, as Agen! and Counsel;
Mr. Ian Brownlie. Q.C., F.B.A, Chichele Professor of Public International
Law, University of Oxford; Fellow of All Souls College. Oxford.
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C., Director of the Research Centre for Inter-
national Law and Reader in International Law, University of Cambridge,
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor at the University of Law, Economics and Social
Sciences, Paris,as Counsel;
Commander Peter B. Beazley, O.B.E., F.R.I.C.S., R.N. (Retd.), Hydro-
graphie Surveyor,
Mr. Georges H. Mascle. Professor of Geology, Dolmieu Institute of Geology
and Mineralogy, University of Grenoble.
Mr. Carlo Morelli, Full Professor of Applied Geophysics, University of
Trieste (from morning sitting of 4 February 1985 (IV)).
Mr. J. R. V. Prescott, Reader in Geography, University of Melbourne,
Mr. Jean-René Vanney, Department of Dynamic Geology, Pierre et Marie
Curie University, and Department of Teaching and Research, Sorbonne
University, Paris, as Scientifiund Technical Advisers;
Assisred hy :
Mr. Roger Scotto, Assistant Secretary, Oil Division, Office of the Prime
Minister, Malta.
Mr. Saviour Scerri, Petroleum Geologist, Oil Division, Office of the Prime
Minister. Malta,
Mr. Mario Degiorgio, Petroleum Geologist, Qil Division, Office of the
Prime Minister, Malta,
Mr. Tarcisio Zammit, First Secretary, Embassy of Malta to the Netherlands,
Miss M. L. Grech, Administrüiive Assistant. Office of the Prime Minister,
Malta. OPENING OF THE ORAL PROCEEDINCS
The PRESIDENT: The Court meets today for the oral proceedings in the
case concerning the Conlinentu/ Shelf,which was instituted by the notification
on 26 July 1982 of a Special Agreement signed on 23 May 1976 between the
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Malta.
This Special Agreement provided for the submission to the Court of a dis-
pute conceming the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two coun-
tries, and defined the Court's task more particularly in the first srticle.
Since the Court did not include upon the bench a'judge of either Libyan or
Maltese nationality, both Parties have exercised the right conferred on them by
Article 31 of the Statute of the Court to choose a judge ad hoc IOsit in ihe
case. The Court therefore sits with the participation of Judge Jiménez de
Aréchaga, designated by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and also of Judge
Valticos, designated by the Republic of Malta in succession to Judge
Castafieda, who previously participated in the proceedings bu1 has1 regret to
say, feltbliged to withdraw for reasons of health.
The solemn declaration required to be made by judges od hoc under
Article 20 and Article 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute was made by Judge
Jiménez de Aréchaga at a public sitting on 14 October 1983, and 1 now cal1
upon Judge Valticos to make a similar declaration. May 1 ask al1 present to
stand while the Declarationis made.
M. VALTICOS: Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et
exercerai mes attributions de jugeeri tout honneur et dévouement.en pleine et
parfüite impartialitéet en toute conscience.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. 1 place on record the solemn declara-
tion made by Judge Valticos. Judge Jiménez de Aréchagawill be able to join
us only a little later this afternoon.
The oraf arguments which are about ro be presented have been preceded by
written proceedings in which each Party has filed a Memorial, a Counter-
Memorial and a third pleading. a Reply, submitted at their specific request
under the terms of their Special Agreement. The case &came ready for hearing
when the Replies were duly filed on 12 July 1984.
Article 53 of the Rules of Court provides that the Courmay. after asceriain-
ing the views of the Parties, decide that copies of the Pleadings and docu-
ments annexed shall be made accessible to the public on or after the opening
of the oral proceedings. The Court has today taken a decision in that sense.
In accordance with Article II of the Special Agreement, and following
consultaiionwith the Parties, the Republic of Malta will present the case first. ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI
AGENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA
Mr. MIZZI:Mr. President. Members of the Court. Ir is my privilege io open
before this distinguished Court the case of the Republic of Malta in its dispute
- or as the other Party prefers to cal1 it. its "differe-ce"with the Socialist
People's Libyan Arab jamahiriya concerning the principles and rules of inter-
national law which are applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf
appertaining to Malta and that appertaining to Libya. The dispute extends also
to the way in which, in practice, the principles and rules identified by the
Court as applicable to the delirnitation of the continental shelf of the Parties
can be applied by ihem in this particular case. in order that they rnay, without
difficulty. delirnituch areas by an agreement ro be concluded in accordance
with the findings of the Court.
The dispute, or difference, which has brought our two countries before this
Court has been the only one to taint what has otherwise been an exernplary
relationship between friendly neighbours; a relationship which may more aptly
be described as brotherly. This does not rnean that there are no differences
of opinion, no differences of appreciation or of approach, between the
Governments of the two countries: no two States. just as much as no two indi-
viduats, are that much alike. lndeed one of the main factors contributing to the
excellent relations ihat exist betweenthe Parties is the recognition of. and res-
pect for. one another's individuality as a nation and as a sovereign State.
But the difference between the two Parties conceming the extent of their
coniinental shelf is of a very different category. It concern- indeed affects
very directly - the extent of their jurisdiction and of their very sovereignty.
For Malta, moreover. the issue has been both vital and urgent.
While the question may have ken equally important for Libya from the juri-
dical and perhaps even the political aspect. once it had taken a position in
conflict with that of Malta, the delimitation of its shelf with Malta has never
been on Libya's lis! of prioriries.
Malta's position has been quite the opposite. In the 1970s Malta had the task
of diversifying an economy which had for centuries been geared to service the
military requirements of stronger and bigger nations into an economy based on
manufacturing. agriculture, fïsheries, tourism and other peaceful activities. For
these Malta required - and stitl requires - both capital and sources of
energy, possibly of' its own. Its urge to find out whether the Maltese shelf
contained the mineral resources which could provide it with the necessary
sources of energy and of the resultant capital is too obvious to need further
justification or elaboration.
Hence the insistence by Malta in making such arrangements with neighbour-
ing States as would enable it to proceed with the exploration and exploitation
of the natural resources which nature - so little generous on land - may
have placed beneath the waters surrounding the Maltese Archipelago.
In the early 1970s, when technology had advanced sufficiently to permit
exploration further to the south of Malta. and when the exploration carried out
to the north and east of Malta, in shallower waters, had not been encouraging,
while at the sarne time the economic demands were increasing, the urge for
further exploration came to apply more particularly to the parts of the Maltese ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 277
shelf which faced Libya. Itwas also the pan which offered the best prospects.
Contrary to expectations, Libya chose to contest Maltais claim to a line equi-
distant between it and Libya: hence the present dispute which, at one stage,
seriously disturbed the relations between ihe two countries and brought co-
operation to a standstill.
1do not propose to recall any of those regrettable events, for these are now
things of the past, and ever since the Jamahiriya ratified, in 1982. the Special
Agreement of 1976 (1, pp. 5-8), the:two countries have again been closely co-
operating iogether for the welfare of their people. Itis not possible, however,
to avoid al1 reference to some aspects of the history of the dispute which is
before ihe Couri.
Thus it is important, in Malta's view, to recall that the dispute did not arise
in 1965. when Malta first informed the Libyan Government of its intention to
abide by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Nor did it
arise in 1966, when Malta enacted the Continental Shelf Act, 1966, adopting
the median line as the line delimiting its continental shelf from that of ils
neighbours, unless another line were agreed to. Libya, though fully aware of
Malta's intentions and of their subsequent implementation, raised absolutely no
objectioO nn. the contrary, since Libya had beenspecificaliy requested io state
whether or not it was "in full accord" with Malra's position concerning the
determination of its maritime boundaries, including, of course, the Malta-Libya
boundary, Libya's silence could only mean that Libya was "in full accord"
with thai position.
1myself recall going to Tripoli in those early days of Malta's independence
and being given, by the Libyan Government of the day. al1the help and infor-
mation the Maltese Government had requested to initiate the process for what
eventually became concessions for the exploration and exploitation of Malta's
continental shelf. There was not, then, the least doubt in anybody's rnind that
the appropriate boundary with Libya (as well as with Italy) was the median or
equidistant line.
Of course. at that tirne the need for an agreed boundary with Libya - or
with Tunisia - did not arise. Technologically the exploitation of the areas
north of a median line with Libya, or east of a median line with ltaly or
Tunisia, was not feasible in al1areas nearer Malta. What was urgent, therefore,
as far as Malta was concerned, was an agreement with Italy, and only with res-
pect to the area between Malta and Sicily. This agreement was in fact reached,
and. although it was only a provisional one, itwas sufficient to enable both
countries to ptoceed to the physical search for, and exploitation of,the natural
resources of their respective continental shelves; exploitation being obviously
limited to the areas which contained natural resources.
With respect to Libya the situation was quite different. As the Maltese
Minister of Justice and Parliamentiuy Affairs - quoted by Libya - said in
the Maltese Parliament during the debate on the Bill which eventually became
the Continental Shelf Act, 1966, the desirability of an agreement with either
Libya or Tunisia was not then relevant. To use his words: "In so far as Africa
is concemed, this matter [that is. delimitation by agreement] is not relevant
today." In the context of the Minister's statement, "today" meant July 1966;
and it is clear that at that time the area requiring an agreed delimitation line
was that facing Sicily.
This is why Malta took one course of action with respect to Italy and a dif-
ferent course of action with respect to Libya. and why it took no action at all.
at least at that time, with respect to Tunisia and the Pelagic Islands belonging
to ItaIy. 278 CONTINENTAL SHELF
With respect to Italy. Malta sought to reüch some form of an agreement deli-
miting the respective zones of jurisdiction in the area between Sicily and Malta.
With respeci to Libya, Malta gave notice al its intentionsfor the future and
soughi Libya's assent to the position it intended to adopt. Malta therefore sent
the Note Verbale of 5 May 1965.This Note, while giving due notice to Libya,
did not press for a formal agreement on a definitive line. The Note, however, did
put Libya on notice and, contrary to what Libya suggests by quoting from the
debates in the Maltese Parliament of July 1966,Malta had every intention in due
course to establish the boundary of its continental shelf in the direction of Libya.
This intention not only results very clearly from the facts just stated, but is
also confimed by the point made by the then Leader of the Opposition, Mr.
Mintoff, during ihe same debates in the Maltese Parliament and reproduced by
Libya in Annex 1 of its Reply (supra). Mr. Mintoff, in 1966,pointed out that:
"There is21 shaHow part in this area which divides Maltafrom Libya
which is so shallow as to permit it to be exploited for the purposes of
research for the exploration of oil, and 1 think that what the Government
meünt to Say when itsaid that the sea was deep was that the shallow part
was so much nearer to Malta that there should not be much cause for dis-
pute on this point between ourselves and Libya."
The shallow part refet-redto by Mr. Mintoff is the Medina Bank which is in
fact nearer to Malta than it is to Libya. On the other hand. the area where a
mediün or equidistant line would have been negotiated with Libya, had Malta
pressed for an agreement in 1966, would have been to the south of the "shal-
low area" known as the Medina Bank, and therefore at depths which then pre-
cluded exploitation. This is why Malta felt itirrelevant at the lime to initiate
negotiations with Libya. As far as Malta was aware Libya was "in full accord"
wiih Malta's views as to the principles and rules which governed delimitation
between the two countries.
There can therefore be no question as to what that position was and still is.
The position of Malta has always been that, as between opposite States, the
continental shelf of each of them extends up to the limits recognized by inter-
national law as pertaining to them until these meet and overlap. The areas of
overlap musi then be divided. and the dividing line indicated by equity and by
the legal principles flowing from the very concept of continental shelf, that is
entitlement on a basis of equality to a maximum natural prolongation and non-
encroachment, is the median or equidistant line.
This position was never contested by Libya until 1973. Even at the first
meeting held in July 1972 - some seven years after the Note Verbale of May
1965 - with the object of formalizing an agreement on the actual boundary.
the objection raised by the Libyan delegation did not concern the principles
and rules governing the matter as viewed by Malta. The objection concemed a
mere detail, namely, the use of the island of Filfia, to the south of Malta, as a
basepoint. lt was only ai a subsequent meeting - that of 23 April 1973 - that
Libya first departed from its implied acceptance of Malta's position and ad-
vanced its own concept and theory of proponionality, namely, that the com-
mon continental shelf was to be divided in proportion to the lengths of the
respective coastlines. The result was the proposal of that same date, and this
@ is reproduced as Figure 1 of the dossier' which Malta has prepared for the
' The folders thatwere speciallyprepared forthe use of theCourt by the Panies in
order IOillustrate thoral arguments havenot beenreproduced. If a map or illustraiion
included ina folderis reproducedin the maps volumeof the presentseries(V), ihisis
indicatedin themargin of thetext.[Note bythe Registry.] ARGUMENT OF MR. MlZZl 279
benefit of the Court. and which the Members of the Couri are respectfully
asked to use for ease of reference.
From the undisputed facts which occurred between 1965 end April 1973one
cannot but conclude that there was then no cause for dispute between Malta
and Libya conceming the extent of their continental shelf.
Of course, once Libya decided on a different course, the situation changed.
Indeed, at least on paper and by word of mouth, the position changed so radi-
cally that the Libyan claim was pushed to such extremes as to encroach on
waters over which Malta exercises uncontesteci jurisdiction, no1 only with res-
pect to rights relüted to the contigiious zone but also with respectIO the exclu-
sive fishing rights within a 25-mile limit.
At the same time, however, even after 1973, the Libyün conduct with respect
to other rnatters, such as concessions for petroleum activities, was quite differ-
ent. In fact, while these concessions were clearly indicative of a claim to
sovereignty south of the median line with Malta, they were on the contrary
indicative of hesitation and doubt in so far as they exrended northwardsof ihis
line.
The two Libyan concessions which encroached in pan on whai Malta consi-
ders to belong to it, are NC 53 in favour of Total Libya and the concession
made to Exxon on 29 September 1974. Apart from the doubts still unresolved
conceming the northern boundery of NC 53 - which. contrary to Libya's sug-
gestion in its Reply. have not been laid to rest- it is unquestionable, because
it results from Libya'o swn docuinentütion as presented to the Court, that in
both these concessions the undertaking by the licensee to carry out a "work
programme" was expressly restricted to such areas as not Io require either
Total or Esso to carry out operations in the areas north of the median line,
before the boundaries of the cori~inental shelf of Ljbya with neighbouring
States, including Malta, had been finally determined by agreement. Indeed. as
will be seen shortly, in the case of NC 53 the very boundary of this concession
was made coterminous with such an international boundary.
The words used in the case of Total Libya are: "after international bound-
aries have been agreed upon" (siriiraLR. Ann. 3-a): and in the case of Esso
Standard Libya Incorporated. the words used are :
"until such time as there has been a demarcation of the offshore area sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Libyan Arab Republic (as it then was) from
the offshore area subject to the jurisdiction of Malta".
Moreover, as has already been shown in Malta's written pleadings, both Total
and Exxon expressly stated in tl.ieir fomal communications to the Maltese
Governrnent that they had not carried out any activities in areas claimed by
Malta.
It is also worth noting, at this stage, that even if one were IO regard these
concessions as some form of a Libyan clairn and even if the extent and shape
of NC 53 were considered, for the sake of argument, to be those suggested by
Libya, even these concessions fall far short of the Libyan 1973 claim and are
also considerably less than what Libya is now claiming.
In contrast to what may be described as a Libyan attempt to stake a claim by
merely appearing to do so, Malta's conduct is clear evidence of ils consistent
claim to the tntire area facing Libya, up to the equidistanr line. Not only has
Malta given out concessions upto the very limits of its claim: ithas also in al1
its concessions imposed a work programme applicable to the entire area of the
concession. Moreover, in respect of a1least Blocks 14 and 16.whose southem
boundary is the median line itself - they are shown on Figure 2 of the dossier 280 CONTINENTAL SHELF
before the Court - this could not be otherwise. The same commitment, how-
ever. also applied to Blocks 9, 10 and Il as well as to the more northerly
Blocks 2, 3 and 4.
As to the Libyan concession NC 53, the question of dates appears to have
now been resolved: the Heads of Agreement were signed on 14 April 1974.
while the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement was signed in
October 1974 and came into force on 17 December 1974. The southem part of
this concession also appears topresent no problems; but both the western and
northern boundaries are still very rnuch undefined.
Although the map attached to the Libyan Law of 17 December 1974 - at
least as now reproduced by Libya - does give a shape to the concession simi-
@ lar to that which Libya reproduced as Map 11 of its Mernorial, neither the
Heads of Agreement nor the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement
establish any precise line. On the contrary, both these documents (with some
allowance for an evident omission in the Heads of Agreement as reproduced in
Annex 3-a of the Libyan Reply, supra) describe the western and the northern
boundary of this concession as a line corresponding to:
"the seaward lirnit of jurisdiction of the Libyan Arab Republic over the
sea-bed and subsoil underlying the Mediterranean Sea as established by or
pursuant to an agreement between the Libyan Arab Republic and any
other relevant Mediterranean State claiming jurisdiction over such sea-bed
and subsoil".
However, the work programme undertaken by Total with respect to this area is
limited to 6,000 square kilornetres, an area which very nearly corresponds to
the area shown by Petroconsultants as the area ofNC 53.
Far therefore from having laid to rest Malta's doubts about this Libyan
concession, the facts as they result from Libya's own documentation are un-
equivocally that the northern boundariesof NC 53 would only be defined in due
course when the Malta-Libya and Italy-Libya line will be agreed; and secondly
that both NC 53 and the Exxon concession were made without any commit-
ment on the part of the licensee to carry out any petroleum activities north of
the median line between Malta and Libya.
These facts further confirm Malta's submission that by their conduct the
Parties have indicated that themedian line is, to say the least, very relevant to
the final detemination of the boundary in the present case.
Libya sees in what it calls the "no-drilling understanding" "an important ele-
ment of mutual conduct that is relevant to the delimitation question". 1 have
tried hard to see the logic of the Libyan conclusion and 1 must admit that 1
could not find any. 1feel at the same time that Malta should not run the risk of
again being accused, without foundation. of avoiding al1 reference to the mat-
ter.1 have said "without foundation" because Malta has already answered the
Libyan allegation in Chapter 1 of its Reply. It was there pointed out that the
so-called understanding stems from a remarkcontained in the United Nations
Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council; and it was also pointed
out that Libya would have presented a more balanced picture of the situation if
it had quoted the Secretary-General's Report more fully. In fact, Libya failed
to quote the part of the Report which justified Malta in undertaking drilling
operations.
The [rue facts are that there is and canbe no evidence, whether written or
oral, of any such understanding, if by understanding is meant a binding com-
mitment, as Libya seems to imply. No such commitment was ever given or
irnplied, or indeed sought by eitherside. ARGUMEhT OF MR. MlZZl 28 1
It is, on the other hand, understandable that once Malta and Libya had
agreed to have the dispute settled peacefully by refemng it to the Court for
adjudication, both of thern were expected, if for no other reason out of respect
for the Court. to refrain from certain activities in delicate areas. There were
also other very practical reasons, not least of which the excellent relations
existing between the Parties, which counselled a similar course.
This conduct of self-restraint. however. was only to be expected in so far as
the dispute.was before the Court; and until the Special Agreement was ratified
not only was the dispute not before the Court but no progress towards its reso-
lution could be registered.
i do not wish to recall the unhappy history of the Special Agreement be-
tween 1976, when it was signed, and 1982 when it was ratified by Libya. As 1
have already said, these are things of the past and are better forgotten. ln the
circumstances, however, I cannot avoid recalling the promise which Libya
made - in my presence - that the Agreement would be ratified within a
week. That week turned îïrst into months and then into years.
Malta could reasonably be expected not to seek to enforce its claims while
the case was pending before the Court, as it now is; but as events tumed out,
no reasonable person could expect Matta to suffer passively the inactivity of
the other Party, even if Malta had in fact comrnitted iiself to do s- which it
had not.
So much, therefore, for the so-called "no-dnlling understanding".
I shall now, with your permission, Mr. President and Members of the Court,
go back for a moment to the events of 1973.
April 23 of that year is a very special day in the history of the dispute
before the Court. Although the meeting held on that day was not the first one
at which delegations from the two countries had met to establish an agreed
boundary, this was the very first occasion on which Libya conrested the vali-
dity of Malta's position. Even as late as a few months earlicr - in July 1972
- Libya had merely contested the use by Malta of a few particular basepoints,
nameiy those resulting from ihe use of Filfla, for the purpose of establishing
stranght baselines; and consequently Libya waç still. by its conduct, accepting
that the equitable and otherwhise appropriate dividing line was the median
line. But on 23 April a radical change took place in the Libyan position; and it
may be said that it was on that date that the present dispute first aroOn. that
date Libya tookthe position ihat the continental shelf between the two coun-
tries was to be shared between theni in proportion to the length of their respec-
tive coastlines. To use the very words of the tibyan delegation "the distance
between the two coastlines was divided in the same proportion that the two
shorelines bore to each other".
At the discussions held in Valletta and Tripoli during the ensuing monrhs, it
became increasingly clear that the change in the Libyan position was due to
the belief that this is what in essence had been decided by the Court in the
North Sea Conrinenral Shev cases. ln Libya's view the Court had, in ihose
cases, discredited equidisiance, whether as a principle or as a method, and
had decided that in order to satisfy equiiy delimitations had to refleci the ratio
between the lengths of the coastlines of the two States.
In justification of this thesis Libya quoted, at times ad nauseam. the words
of the 1969 Judgment "a reasonable degree of proportionality . .. between the
extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the
length of its coast". But Libya would not acept that-
1. The decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases did not indicate "a282 CONTINENTAL SHELF
reasonable degree of proporîionality" as a principle or mle of international law
applicable to deliniitation, butmerely as a factor which the Parties to that case
were to take into account in the course of the negotiations of the boundaries -
an element to which the Court accorded the last place among the factors to be
so taken into account; and
2. That in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases not only was the delimita-
tion to be effected between adjacent States but between States placed in very
special circumstances of adjacency, where the use of median or equidistant
lines would indeed have resulted in an inequitable delimitation.
Nor would Libya accept that other cases, particularly those between opposite
States, could be dealt with, and were as a rule dealt with, differently. It was
pointed out to the other side that the Court had, in the very same Judgment of
1969, given a clear indication of the application of the principles and rules it
had itself identified to the case of opposite States- as is the present case. In
paragraph 57 of the decision in the North Seo Coniinental Shelf cases, in fact,
the Court held that
"The continental shelf areas off, and dividing opposite States, can be
claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory.
These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be deter-
rnined by means of a median line."
The Maltese detegations had also invited their Libyan counterparts to look at
what other States had done, especially in comparable situations. At that rime,
that is around 1974-1975, 44 delimitation agreements had been signed between
States in various parts of the globe. Of these 22, or one-half, were between
opposite States and the other 22 were between adjacent States. In al1 but 9
delimitations the States concerned had relied on equidistance. In other words
equidistance had been applied by agreement in almost 80 per cent of the delimi-
tations so settled. This practice was constant whether the agreements were
entered into before or after the 1969 Judgment, and thus showed beyond the
shadow of a douht that Libya's interpretation of the North Sea Continental
Shelf Judgment w;is wrong. Conversely, no known case had applied any form
of proportionality, much less the form of proportionality advanced by Libya.
Even Germany, in its delimitations with Denrnark and the Netherlands, had for
the most part accepted equidistance, and any addition obtained through nego-
tiations after the 1969 Judgment was in no way related to proportionality.
The views of Malta and Libya, however, whether on the then only case form-
ing the jurisprudence on the subject or on State practice, which was already
quite substantial, remainecl so divergent that it was clearly impossible to reach
an agreement, except that of referring the divergence to the Court. Thus in May
1976 a Special Agreement was signed in Valletta where the Parties agreed to
refer their differences to the Court and agreed also toabide by its decision.
Mr. President, tliis brings me to the Task of the Cour!.
By the Special Agreement (1) the Court is requested to decide two things:
Firstly,
"what principles and rules of international law are applicable to the deli-
mitation of the area of the continental shekf which appertains to the
Republic of Malta and the area of continental shelf which appertains to
the Libyan Arab Republic";
and second ty,
"how in practice such principles and rules can be applied by the two ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZl 283
Parties in this particular case in order that they may without difficulty
delimit such areas by an agreement as provided in Article III".
The first request is intendedIO resolve the differences between the Parties as
to the principles and rules of international law which are applicable in the pres-
ent case; and although, quite naturally, these differences still exist - indeed
they are greater now thün they have ever been - there is no divergence
between the Parties as to the task cifthe Court in this respect.
By the second request the Parties have asked the Court to indicüte not only
which are the applicable principles and rules, but also how, in practice, these
can be applied by the Parties in order that the Parties may - w~irhou riffïculy
- establish the actual boundary by agreement.
The Parties had foreseen that if the decision of th5 Couri were lo be limited
- as in theNorih Seo ConiineniolShelf cases - to a mere enunciütion of the
applicable principles and rules of international law, there would remain the
possibility, or more likely the probability, that the disagreements beiween the
Parties would re-appear when itcame to drawing the line. Libya could not
accept that the line itself shouldbe drawn by the Court as, in its view, this was
preferably done by ügreemenl between the Parties. Malta on the other hand
was afraid that if room were left for argumentation as to the proper way of
applying the principles and rules identified by the Court as being applicable to
the case, the reference of the dispute to the Court would fiiil to achieve its
main objective.
In fact thepurpose of the reference is not that of obtaining an academic res-
ponse to the legal questions submitted to the Court, but the practical result of
an agreed boundary to enable both Parties to know with certainty the extent of
their respectivejurisdictions. The Parties did agree to draw the line ~hemselves,
but they also agreed that following the decision of the Couri this should be a
simple exercise: an agreement tn be reached, as the words of the Special
Agreement expressly provide, "without difficulty". This airn cannor be achieved
unless the Court were to state in the clearest possible terms how the exercise is
to te carried out.
Libya has since suggested that the task of the Coun in the present case is
more similar to that arising from the Special Agreements in the North Sea
Continental Shelfcases than to that assigned to the Coun in the Tuni.Na/Libya
case.
Malta submits that the request to the Coun contained in the Special
Agreement in the present case was specifically intended to give a second task
to the Court, in addition to that which it was given in the North Sea
Continental Shclfcases. The task (if the Court in those cases was very much in
the mincis of the Parties when they added what is very clearly a furrher task in
the present case: an additional iask having a very specific and important pur-
pose. at least for Malta. Moreover, in Malta's case the issue is a very urgent
one, and Malta cannot wait indefinitely for a clear indication of the areas sub-
ject to its jurisdiction.
The same situation apparently applied to Tunisia whose Special Agreement
with Libya was, with a few additions, a reproduction in Arabic and French of
what Libya had already agreed with Malta in English and Arabic. In the
T~rnisiatLibyocase the Court was also requested to iake rtccount of rnaiters
which it is not expressly requested so to do in the present case; but the pur-
pose of the request that the Court should indicate the practical way in which
the principles and rules it identifies as applicable may be applied by the
Parties, is in both cases identical: that of having a boundary established by284 CONTINENTALSHELF
agreement between the Parties, but established "without difficulty" on the basis
of the findings of the Court.
Having briefly stated Malta's position on this issue, 1may, with the Court's
permission, conclude with the words of the Court in the TunisiaILihyacase,
Malta agrees that also in the present case the whole controversy is of minor
importance "since [the Court] has in any case to be precise as to what it de-
cides". In the TunisialLibyocase the Court could not "agree with the repeated
reference of Libya to 'guidance' as defining the requirernents of what the Court
should specify". In the present case Libya has avoided the word "guidance",
but it is in substance repeating the views it held in the case with Tunisia.
Malta respectfully asks the Court to decide on this rnatter in the same way as it
did in the TunisialLibyacase.
Malta, however, agrees with Libya on one question conceming the task of
the Court. This concerns the extent of the Court's decision in view of possible
claims from third States. Malta agrees that the Court should not feel inhibited
frorn extending its decision to al1 areas which, independently of third Party
claims, are claimed by the Parties to this case. Indeed if the Court were to
exclude any area so claimed because of present or possible future claims by
ltaly it would - contrary to its own decision on the application by Italy to
intervene in the present case - be deciding on Italy's claims vis-à-vis either
Malta or Libya or both.
In Maltais view the proper course for the Court to take, and 1 say this with
great respect, is to recall expressly that the rights of third States are safe-
guarded by Article 59 of the Statute of the Court. The Court, however, could
not indicate any areas to which its judgment ought not to extend. First of al1
it is physically impossible for the Court to do so: in fact, the claims so far
advanced have not only changed severaf times but are also still very much
undefined. In any case there can be no guarantee that those are the only
claims to which the areas contested by rhe Parties to this case may be subjected,
or that ltalyis the only State that may advance a claim. Secondly, it is Malta's
submission that it would be legally wrong for the Court to refrain from adjudg-
ing on an area clairned by the Parties to the present case on the ground chat
third States have also indicated that they may Laya clairn to it. By so doing
the Court could be deciding - beyond its jurisdiction - that the claim by
the third State may be justified.
Whatever the adjudication by the Court as between Malta and Libya, the
rights of third States will rernain unaffected. Indeed, as Libya has pointed out,
if in such areas the Court will have indicated whether, as between Malta and
Libya, a particular area is tobe regarded as appertaining to either Malta or to
Libya, the third State would know beforehand to which of the two States it
ought to direct its claim when it decides to do so.
Malta, however, does not share Libya's view that the Court may distinguish
between those areas where there is no claim and the areas where there is one.
In Malta's view, if the Court were to make such a distinction it wouid run into
the very same difficulties it would encounter if itwere to decline to extend its
judgment to al1 areas claimed by the Parties. In fact, any distinction between
areas where there is a claim and areas where there is not would have no practi-
cal purpose and would be objectionable on jurisdictional grourids.
Such a distinction would have no practical purpose since it could be contra-
dicted by subsequent events. There can in fact be no end to claims by third
States untila final agreement covering al1 possible claims is entered into be-
tween al1 States in the area. Until this happens an area described by the Court
as free from claims may be subjected to a claim by a third State; and con- ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 285
versely an area subject to a claim at the time of the Court's decision may sub-
sequently cease to be so. A claim cciuldalso, as are Italy's clairns in the present
case, be so obscure and undefined that it would be prictically impossible to
define the area to which the claim refers.
In Maltais view, moreover. the Court should not make such a distinction. As
already submitted. it would be legally wrong for the Court to do so. In its
Judgment on Italy's application to intervene the Court said expressly rhar if it
were to identify areas to which Italy could lay a claim this would, to use the
Court's own words (see para. 30) :
"be tantamount to the Court's having made findings, first as to the exis-
tence of Italian rights over cet-tainareas. or as froin certain geographical
points or sets of points; and secondly as to the absence of such ltalian
rights in other areas, or as from certain geographical points or sets of
points".
It isalta's belief that al1that nceds to bedone to protect the rights of third
States, is an expresscaveal recalling that whatever is contained in the Judgment
in the case between Libya and Malta does not (indeed may not) affect the
rights of third States, whether they have or have not laid a claim to any of the
areas covered by the Court's decision. Anything beyond that could very well
amount to a finding with respect to such clairns. either ina positive or a nega-
tive sense and this must - for jurisdictional reasons- be avoided.
Mr. President and Mernbers of the Court, 1shall now tum to the differences
between the Parties that concem the issues of substance upon which the Court
has been tequesied io adjudicate by ihe Special Agreement.
These are: the identification of the principles and rules of international law
which are applicable to the delimitation in the present case and the way in
which the principles and rules so identified are to be applied in order that
Malta and Libya may, in practice and without difficulty, draw the line which
separates their respective continental shelf areas.
It is not my task to develop Malta's views on these matters. The case for
Malta wiH be more fully and more ably presented to the Court by my learned
friends and colleagues. My submissions will be limited to a very cursory and
quite bnef review of the main points of difference between the Parties in order
to present to the Court an outline of Malta's case. My contribution will there-
fore include a criticism of the Libyan written pleadings, but only in their
essentials, and will set out Malta's case in its broad outline.
The case for Libya - as it now :itands- has been set out and developed in
its written pleadings. Viewed from the legal aspect, Libya's case differs consi-
derably from the position taken by Libyan delegations during the discussions
that led to the signing of the Special Agreement. On the other hand. from the
practical point of view, that is in respect of the physical extent of Libya's
claim, there has been little change, if any, in Libya's quest for the lion's share
of the continental shelf between Malta and Libya.
The change in Libya's position as to the principles and rules applicable in
the case consists mainly of two developrnents.
The first is the introduction of anentirely new elernent : the physical features
called by Libya the "Rift Zone" and the "Escarpments-Fault Zone"; and Libya's
perception of natural prolongation in the context of the continental shelf.
The second is the attribution of a different role to proportionality: while
Libya had previously considered proportionality as the main principle or rule
goveming delimitation in the present case, it now appears to accept that pro-
portionality has a much more modest function.286 CONT~NENTALSHELF
But before exarnining these changes on their merits, it is pertinent to make
certain preliminary observations.
Until Libya filed its Memorial in April 1983. it had based its case exclu-
sively on proportionality and had attributed to proportionality the role of alegal
principle or rule. It is not in any way being suggested that Libya could nor, or
should not, have changed position or brought in new arguments. Libya was
perfectly free to do so. But the fact remains that it was not until 1983 that
Libya first advanced the view that physical features in the sea-bed and subsoil
were relevant to the delimitation of the Parties' continental shelf. Nothing of
any legal relevance - such as case law or State practice - had happened in
the meantine to justify such a radical change, and it may therefore be reason-
ably assumed that the reason for it was a realization that the legal basis pre-
viously adopted had ken wrong.
The second point that needs to be made - or rather repeated, because it has
already been made in the Counter-Memorial - concerns the names given by
Libya to the physical features which, according to Libya, are the termini of
Maltais physical natural prolongation, particularly the various and diverse phy-
sical features which Libya calls the "Rift Zone". There are, no doubt. various
and diverse geological and geornorphological features in the Pelagian Basin,
and there are areas - not just one area, but areas - within that Basin, in
which, according to some geologists at least, there has been rifting; there are
also areas - and again not just one but more than one area - where the nft-
ing is still active. But what Libya has done is to take one particular area -
the area which suits it - and cal1 itthe Rift Zone. The area which Libya desig-
nates by that name is, however, known to geologists, geomorphologists and
geographers, and is shown on al1 maps - not by the Libyan name - but by
the separate names of the separate features which Libya groups together. These
are the Pantelleria Trough, the Malta Trough, the Linosa Trough, the Malta
Channel and the Medina Channel. When the whole area - not the sea-bed
features, but the geographical area - is referred to by scientists, the name
generally used is the Sicily or Sicilian Channel.
Libya first baptized these features collectively by the name "Rift Zone" in
its Memorial. It then admitted quite frankly that itdid so, to quote Libya's
own words "for reüsons of simplicity" (1, LM, p. 29, para. 3.12). But Libya
has since been using that name as if the area were in fact known by that narne.
No one else, not even the Libyan scientists have used that expression in the
way Libya does. lndeed the authors of the Libyan Technical Annex attached to
its Memorial had clearly refused to do so. The Coutr will recall what Malta
pointed out in its Counter-Memorial, namely that Professor Fabricius declined
the paternity not only of the Libyan assertion that the nonhern lirnits of the
Pelagian Block are marked by the Rift Zone, but also of the name itself. Even
more recently, Professor Finetti, in the Libyan Reply refers to the area not as
the Rift Zone but as the Sicily Channel Rift Zone.
The third point to be made as a preliminary to more substantive observations
is that it is practically impossible for Malta not to refer to the so-called Rift
Zone by that name. Malta disagrees entirely with Libya's views on this matter
and must therefore refer ai leastto the Libyan concept called the Rift Zone in
order to contradict it. Moreover the Court by now knows exactly which area
one is referring to by the use of that name, and it would be inopportune and
probably also too cumbersome to refer to that area by some other expression.
The point 1 wish to stress here is that when Malta uses that expression it
does not do so - as Libya has suggested - because Malta accepts the exis-
tence of this zone, with the consequences Libya wishes to draw from that ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 287
acceptance, but merely because it is either compelled to use that expression
to rebut the Libyan submissions or, as Libya itself first used that narne, "for
reasons of simplicity" or convenience.
The Court. however, must not draw any other conclusion from the use of the
Libyan expression by Malta. Indeed itmay perhaps not be amiss to observe in
this connection that the repetitive use of particular expressions can have the
effect of producing an unconscious acceptance of what is intended to be
conveyed by those expressions. In extreme cases ir could even take the form of
brainwashing. Of course 1 am sure 1-ibya had no such intentions: 1 am simply
recalfing a psychological reality which has to some extent conditioned even
Malta's own way of expressing itself although, of course, itis not Malta's way
of thinking.
Having made these observations and clürified Malta's position, I shall, and
so will my colleagues, feel free to refer to the "Rift Zone" whenever we need
to refer to the areacalled by Libya by that name. At the same time we shall, at
least occasionally, place that expression in quotes in order that our position
may not be misundersiood.
With these preliminary observations out of the way, 1 can now, Mr.
President. turn to the substance of the issues which arise from Libya's use of
the physical features of submarine areas relevant to the delimitation.
The submissions which conclude the Libyan Memorial (1).as well as irs
Counter-Memoriül (II) and the Reply (supra) - and which therefore may be
taken to be the substantive submissions of Libya to the Cour! - surnmarize
the Libyan position on the physical features of the seâ-bed and subsoil of the
area which constitute the continental shelf between Malta and Libya in the fol-
lowing terms :
"A criterion for delimitation of continental shelf areas . . . can be
derived from the principle of naturai prolongation because there exists a
fundamental discontinuity in the sea-bed and subsoil which divide the areas
of the continental shelf into two distinct nütural prolongations extending
from the land territories of the respective Parties." (Submission No. 4.)
On the basis of that submission and of the other submissions in which Libya
sets out the principles and rules it believes to be applicable, Libya formulates
its last submission (Submission No. 9) in the sense that:
"The principles and rules of international Idw can in practice be applied
by the Parties so as to achieve an equitable result, taking account of the
physical factors and al1 the other relevant circumstances of this case, by
agreement on a delimitation within, and following the generül direction of,
the Rift Zone as defined in the Libyan Mernorial."
These submissions contain in a nutshell Libya's position on the physical fac-
tors whieh it derives from the geology and geomorphology of the region. The
Libyan case rests also on the geography of thearea; but this is something which
will be considered in other contexts. For the moment only the geology and geo-
morphology of the area which are regarded by Libya to be relevant are under
consideration. In respect of these physical features Libya asserts that the "Rift
Zone" constitutes a fundarnental discontinuity in the sea-bed and subsoil of the
submarine areas lying between Malra and Libya. From this fact, coupled with its
views of the relevant circumstances, Libya concludes that the delimitation should
follow the direction of the Rift Zone and should be contained within it.
To these submissions Malta replies. and believes it can show conclusively,
that Libya's case is untenable both in fact and in law.288 CONTINENTAL SHELF
Although no reference is made in the aubrnissions to the physical features
east of Malta which Libya calls the "Escarpments-Fault Zone". it is also
Libya's view that Malta's continental shelf terminates at these features, and
that al1 areas to the east of thern constitute a continental shelf be delirnited
between Libya and other States, that is Italy and presumably Greece. In
Malta's view this Libyan claim is not merely untenable, it is preposterous.
In view of the complexity of these issues 1 shall deal with them under three
separate headings :
1. The "Rift Zone" and the physical facts.
2. The "Rift Zone" and the law.
3. The "Escarpments-Fault Zone".
1. THE RIF^ ZONE" AND THE PHYSICAL FAOS
There are obviously several facts concerning the submarine area between
Malta and Libya on which scientists will readily agree; there are other facts on
which sorne scientists will agree; there arealso other facts which, though there
is not in their regard outright disagreement between scientists, are, however,
differenlly interpreted or evaluated, or are facts to which scientists will give a
different ernphasis. This is only natural. Moreover there is still. in respect of
the relevant areas much work to be done, both in research and study; and the
complete facts concerning several of the parts that make up the area are still to
be ascertained.
One must thereftrre be very careful in reaching conclusions on such limited
knowledge and it must be said that in most respects the scientists engaged or
quoted by the Panies take this cautious approach.
No so Libya. Libya rushes to the conclusion that the scientific facts show
clearly thai ~hereis such a fundamental discontinuiry in the submarine areas
between Malta and Libya that the "Rifi Zone" is in fact the southern limit of
the Maltese continental shelf and the northern limit of the Libyan shelf.
No such conclusion is reached by üny of the scientists engaged or quoted by
Libya. This conclusion is of Libya's making and, in Malta's view, completely
withoui scientific foundation. Al1 that the scientist- even the Libyan scien-
tists- say is that there is an area mosily to the Westand south-west of Malta,
and extending, but in a much reduced fom, to the south of Malta, in which
tectonic and other forces, including rifting. have produced troughs and lesser
grabens or channels. Some of these grabens are quite deep, while the channels
are rather shallow.
Quite naturally. for scientists ihese features may be very important for the
study of the region, and may even cal1 for special attention. But nowhere do
any of the scientists that have contributed to the case, whether through a direct
contribution or through their independent work. nowhere do any of them Say
that these features - even if they could be collectively called a rift zone -
are such that they divide the Pelagian Basin into two distinct and separate geo-
logical units. All they do is describe the features and try to identify their origin
and history.
When it cornes to statements such as "Libya has shown in its Mernorial and
Counter-Memorial that the Rift Zone constitutes a fundarnental discontinuity in
the areas of the continental shelf between Libya and Malta" (supra, LR, para.
5.21). or to the assertion that "This evidence shows that [the Rift Zone] cannot
be regarded as other than a fundamental discontinuity in the sea-bed and sub-
soi1 in areas of shelf lying between Libya and Malta" (supra. LR, para. 5.29).
it is Libya that is pratuitously asserting that it is so. None of these conclusions ARGUMENT OF MU. MIZZI 289
can be attributed to any of the scientists. They are al1 Libyan assertions to
which none of the scientists have subscribed.
On the contrary, Libya's advisers have had to disclaim the patemity of cer-
tain Libyan positions; and have also felt compelled to explain that a Libyan
position is not shared by scientists. Thus. in his contribution Lothe Technical
Annex to the Libyan Memorial, Professor Fabricius found it necessary to
describe one of the liinits of the Pelagian Block in the following terms:
"~he northem limits of the Hlock are defined by the Libyan Mernorial
as created by the Rift Zone running from the Strait of Tunis, across the
Pantelleria, Linosa and Malta Troughs and the Malta and Medina Channels
to the Weron Valley."
As a scientisi he could not but attribute the definition to Libya; he could not
say itwas his own, because it was not. Indeed. he also felt compelled to add:
"Other definitions adopted by some scientists place the northem bound-
ary of the Pelagian Block extending as far north as the Sicilian coastline."
(Para.3A of p. 1-4of the Technical Annex, 1.)
Professor Fabricius had also assisted Libya in the case with Tunisia, and he
could not have failed to recall that in that case even Libya had placed the
northem boundary of the Pelagian Basin much farther to the north than the
newly found Rift Zone.
The Libyan scientists, without distinction, frequently refer to the area be-
tween Malta and Libya by its well-known and established name of Pelagian Sea
or Pelagian Basin or Pelagian Block - as it is variously called; and the Rift
Zone, whether it is referred to by that name or by the name of the individual
features which Libya includes within that name, is considered ro be a part of
that whole area and not as being one of the boundaries of the area. To quote
but one instance from another Libyan scientist. Professor Finetti, one may pick
as a typical example the view expressed by him in his paper reproduced as part
of Annex 7 of the Libyan Reply (supra), There Professor Finetti says
"The Pelagian Basin is generally characterized by large areas having
flat orslightly deformed sea-bed morphology. However, cutting across the
sea-bed of the Pelagian Basin fi-omthe Egadi Valley to the Heron Valley
are the huge troughs of Pantellcria,Linosa and Malta and the Medina and
Malta Channels."
These features. which together make up the "Rift Zone" could not cut across
the Pelagian Basin if they constituted its northem boundary: they can cross it
only if they are part of it.
Similar views are to be found in other technical studies produced for Libya
or quoted by Libya. Moreover, the area through which the Rift Zone is
claimed to pass. is accepted without question as being a region with its own
proper name - the Pelagian Basin, Block or Sea; a simple name accepted by
al1 scientists. These facts. and their acceptance by scientists, contradicts the
Libyan view that the Pelagian Sea or Basin ends at the "Rift Zone". as well as
the Libyan contention that the area north of the "Rift Zone" is fundamentally
distinct from the area to thesouth of that zone.
There is also in the work of one of the Libyan experts, a more explicit
contradiction of these Libyan theses, and a confirmation of the Maltese view
that the Pelagian Block is indeed one block geologically. In his contribution to
the Technical Annex attached to the Libyan Memorial. Professor Fabricius
gave the following opinion : CONTINENTAL SHELF
"The block-like character of the sea-bed underlying the Pelagian Sea is
especially eniphasised by the deep escarpments to the east, forming a
natural border to the Ionian Basin and the Sirt Basin (or Rise) which
contain abyssal plains almost 4,200 rnetres in depth." (1, LM, Technical
Annex, p. 1-5.)
What expression could better describe the unity and compactness of the
Pelagian Basin, from Sicily al1 the way down to Libya. than the expression
used by Professor Pabricius to describe it, that is, its "block-like character"?
In view of this scientific evidence which contradicts rather than supports the
Libyan claims concerning the "Rift Zone" in the Sicily Channel, it is not at al1
surprising that while making these clairns Libya unwillingly has to accept the
basic continuity of the Pelagian Block. Of course itcannot do this directiy; but
there can be little doubt that itdoes so indirectly when it disregards or plays
down - for itcannot deny - the other areas of rifting cutting through other
parts of the Pelagian sea-bed and subsoil.
As Professor Mascle has shown. and as will be further shown during these
hearings. there has been rifting in much of the Pelagian Basin. The illustration,
@ Figure 3 of the dossier before the Court. shows a system of faults and also
where the rifting has taken place. Some rifting is still active in more than one
area; and the same illustration also indicates where this isso. It wiIl be seen
that the areas of faults, as well as of active rifting, are be found both in the
vicinity of Malta and to the south in the vicinity of Libya. This is accepted by
Libyan experts, such as Professor Fabricius, although he points to differences
in degree between the two; and the Libyan pleadings make no serious attempt
to deny the concliision of Professor Mascle.
Nor could Libya expect to show otherwise. As the paper prepared in 1981
by Christian Blanpied and Gilbert Bellaiche - a copy of which is included in
the Maltese dossier as Document A for the convenience of the Court - as this
paper shows, the rifting and other forces to which the Sicily Channel has been
subjected are in iio way unique. There are other faults, such as those which
have given rise the the Jarrafa Trough in the southern Pelagian Basin, which
are known to bepresently active and to have been active over the same time-
span as the PanteHeria, Linosa and Malta grabens. What Libya has done is to
divert al1attention to one particular area and give it a narne, in order to create
the impression thnt there is only one such area or zone in the region, that one
which it suits Libya to highlight.
Blanpied and Bellaiche have also pointed out in their study just referred to
that, while the northem grabens, such as those of Pantelleria and Linosa, have
ken the subject of previous work - covering the years 1964 and 1979 -
"little attention has been paid to the troughs located on the southeastem
end of the Tunisian platfom, that is, the Jarrafa and Tripolitanian Troughs,
except frorn a purely geornorphological aspect".
Now, Blanpied and Bellaiche conclude that the Jarrafa Trough - and their
study is limited exclusively to that feature- can conclusively
"be considered as an elernent of the intercontinental belt of grabens
defined by Illies (1969) that runs frorn Sardinia through the Strait of Sicily
to the Africaii grabens".
Libya's excuse for disregarding these physical features, much closer to its
coasts, is that they fall outside the disputed area. However, apart from the fact
that the area to be divided between Malta and Libya is the whole area lying ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 291
between the two countries, and the Jarrafa and Tripolitanian Troughs are there-
fore within the area in dispute, the point Malta is making is that the whole of
the Pelagian Basin is a geological continuum. Consequently it is very relevant
to establish whether or not there are in this whole area, and not merely in the
area chosen by Libya. physical features of such a nature as to destroy that
continuiiy. Clearly, if there are physical features which could have that effect,
and if that effect has legal consequences, they must be taken into account wher-
ever they are. because the same effect and the sarne legal consequences must
be given to thern whether they are in the vicinity of Malta or in the viciniîy of
Libya. It surely cannot be said - though this is what Libya does - that the
Sicily Channel rifting is relevant because it is nearer Malra than Libya, or the
Jarrafa-Tripolitania rifting is not because itis nearer Libya. What can. on the
contrary, be said is thal since the rifting to the south is accepted by both
Parties as not producing a fundarnental discontinuity in the shelf. the rifting in
the north, which is of an identical nature and has had the sarne origin and very
similar history, cannot have that effect.
Libya sees a contradiction in Maltais position concerning the southern
troughs. Libya says that by pointing to these grabens Malta contradicts its view
of the Pelagian Block as a geological continuum. The contradiction is in
Libya's position not in Mülta's. Malta considers that neither the Sicily Channel
rift zone, that is the northern troughs, nor the rift zone in the area of the
Jarrafa and Tripolitanian Troughs in the south, constitute a fundarnental dis-
continuity in the geology of the region, and is therefore perfectly logical in its
approach to the matter in issue. Libya, on the contrary, regards the northern
troughs as having the effect of destroying that continuity, but denies the sarne
effect to the southern troughs. Libyii looks at these feütures not objectively, as
Malta does, but in the perspective of its interests: hence [he blatani coniradic-
tions in the Libyan positions.
A very sirnilar contradiction is also evident between the position now taken
by Libya and that which Libya took in its case with Tunisia. Libya was then
bent on proving that itcould claim the whole of the Pelagian Basin directly to
the north of itscoastline - or landrnass - on the strength of what it called its
"northward thrust". It was therefore in Libya's interest io accept the truth
about that Basin, namely that itis a geological andgeomorphological unit.
The following quotations - al1 taken frornthe Libyan Counter-Mernorial in
the TunisialLich asea- will suffice to prove this point.
The first quotation-
"The continental shelf area concerned is basically undifferen~iated and
forms part of the Pelagian Basin, a distinct geologic and geographic unit
. . . without rnarked features that would affect delimitation . .." (P. 10,
para. 25.)
The second quotation frorn the Libyan Counter-Mernorial -
"We are here dealing with a simple shelf, a physiographic unit, part of
the Pelagian Basin." (P. 103, para. 233.)
The third quotation -
"The geologiciil evidence dernonstrates the existence of a single conti-
nental shelf . . That shelf fornis a portion of the Pelagian Basin which is
itself a geologic and geographic unit forming a component of the stable
Nonh African plate." (P. 158, para. 391.)
The final quotation -292 CONTINENTAL SHELF
"The entire Basin is a geologic and physiographic unit . . ."(P. 197,
para. 491.)
Libya dismisses these clear statements confiming the scientific view that the
Pefagian Basin is a single geological and geomorphological unit by the mere
excuse that in the TunisialLibyo case the relevant area was different from that
in the present case. There is no question that the area for delimitation in the
two cases is different, but it is clear from the parts of the Libyan pleadings just
quoted that Libya makes a clear-eut distinction. in those statements, between
the area for delimitation and the Pelagian Basin, of which the former is
expressly stated to be only a pan. The expressions "geologic and physiogra-
phic unit", "geologic and geographical unit" and "a distinct geologic and geo-
graphic unit" were. without the shadow of a doubt, used by Libya not to
describe the areas relevant for delimitation with Tunisia but to describe the
whole of the Pelagian Basin.
tn conclusion, Matta's submission on the geological and geomorphological
features of the area relevant for delimitation in the present case may be sum-
marized as follows :
. 1. The Pelagian Block or Basin is a geological and geomorphological unit
or continuum. Like most, if not all, other faults. ithas undergone tectonic and
other forces, including some which have caused rifting, in the case of the
region in question throughout much of the area comprised in it, but. this not-
withstanding, the Pelagian Block has retained its essential or basic unit.
2. The zone in rhe Sicily Channel, which Libya has called the Rift Zone, is
just one of such areas where there has been, among other effects, a rifting;
moreover this rifting, both in the Sicily Channel and in the Jarrafa and
Tripolitanian Troughs, is still somewhat active, though ithas been on the
decrease for several million years.
3. Neither the riftzone in the Sicilian Channel nor any other feature in the
Pelagian Basin, including other areas of rifting, are such as to disrupt the
essential or basic unity of the sea-bed and subsoil underlying the Pelagian Sea.
The Court adjourned from 4.33 p.m.to 4.48 p.m.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 had just finished dealing with the
aspect of the Rift Zone in its relation to the physical facts. 1 shall now deal
with the second aspect, the Rift Zone and the Law.
Libya claims that the Rift Zone in the Sicily Channel terminates the natural
prolongation of the land territory of Malta and that, consequentty. the Libyan
shelf rnay be regarded as extending nonhwards up IO that zone. To use other
Libyan expressions having more or less the sarne effect. Libya claims that
because of the existence of what it calls "these critical elements" the boundary
shoutd be within. and follow the general direction of, the Rift Zone.
This Libyan thesis is untenable in law even if it were Grueas a physical fact
- which it is not, as 1believe Malta has shown - that the troughs and chan-
nefscomprised in the Rift Zone did in fact consiituie a fundamental disconii-
nuity in the Pelagian Basin. In order to show this, the Rift Zone will be treated
as if it were in fact a feature which physically couldbe relevant to delimitation
and not. as Malta believes itto be, just one of several features of a similar or
comparable nature, origin, and even history, which are to be found in the ARGUMENT OF MR. Ml221 293
Pelagian Basin without. however, al'fecting its fundamental or essential unity.
In this part of my introduction to Malta's case 1shall try to show that even if
Libya were correct in its evaluation of the physical elements of the case. these
facts would still not lead to the legal conclusions drawn by Libya. In contem-
porary international law these facts are irrelevant to both entitlement and deli-
mitation, except, in respect of entitlement, in the special circumstances of very
wide shelves - which are certainly not those of the present case.
The Libyan argument rests, on the legal plane, on Libya's notion of natural
prolongation in the context of the continental shelf. Libya accepts thüt :
"The natural prolongation of the respective land territories of the Parties
into and under the sea isthe basis of tirle to the areas of continental shelf
which appenains to each of them." (Submission No. 2.)
And also that :
"The delimitation should be accomplished in such a way as to leave as
much as possible to each party al1areas of continental shelf that constitute
the natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea,
without encroachment on the natural protongation of the other." (Sub-
mission No. 3.)
As long as Libya does not embark upon its own interpretation of "natural
prolongation" as used in the various passages it quotes from judgrnents and
other authoritative sources, there is riomuch difference between the Parties in
this case on the principles and rules just enunciated. Malta could very well
subscribe to them as they are described in the Libyan Submissions. But as
soon as Libya starts developing its arguments based on natural prolongation, it
becomes clear that except as will be seen in the area of entitlement, Libya
identifies the legal concept of natural prolongation in the context of the conti-
nental shelf with the purely physical elements of the phenomenon known by
that name. Consequently for Libya, even such a physical feature as a trough or
a series of troughs and channels. could be sufficient to interrupt - not just
physically but also legally - the natural prolongation of the land territory of a
State into and under the sea.
In Malta's view this line of argument completely lacks support in intematio-
na1law and is in contradiction of the contemporary law of the continental shelf.
It is of course accepted that the continental shelf as a legal concept owes its
origin to physical considerations; but it is equally well established that, as a
legal concept, the continental shelf has never been equivalent to what a geolo-
gist or a geographer would consider as strictly falling under that name in a
scientific sense. As the Court had occasion to observe in both Judgments
concerning the delimitation of contiriental shelf areas - or rather in al1 three
Judgrnents concerning the delimitations of continental shelf areas - although
the legal concept derives from the natural phenomenon, it has, to use the
Court's own words, "pursued its nwn development" and this development
consisted in a "widening of the concept for legal purposes" (1982 Judgment,
pp. 45-46, paras. 41 -42).
Even in 1958, only a few years after the Truman Proclamation. the
constraint on the extent of the shelf was placed by the Convention of that year
not on the morphology of the sea-bed, much less on its geology. but on the
progress achieved by technoiogy, which was already advancing very rapidly,
with the result that there were in fact no definable limits to the extent of the
continental shelf that could be claimed by a State so long as the natural
resources of the =a-bed and subsoil could be expkoited.294 CONTINENTAL SHELF
The concept has since developed still further and the continental shelf now
extends at least up to 200 nautical miles from the coast unless the physical
phenomenon itselt' extends beyond that distance. Except in these latter, and
rather rare, cases, theextent of the natural prolongation of a State's territory
into and under the sea for the purposes of estabiishing the limits of the conti-
nental shelf now iiepends exclusively on distance. What is beneath the water
throughout that distance, no matter how deep, indented or deformed the sea-
bed may be, and even if the ocean floor is reached, a State rnay regard al1
those submarine areas as appertaining to it ipso jure, unless and until any such
areas may also be claimed by an equal and identical entitlernent by other
States.
This is, in the opinion of Malta, the present state of custornary international
law; it is now also reflected in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The continental shelf as a purely physical notion never did alone form the
basis of title to continental shelf rights:these derived from a legal concept
which always differed somewhat from the natural phenomenon. As time passed
and "the legal concept pursued its own development" by a "widening of the
concept", the physical elements gradually lost even the little relevance they
may have retained, until, as Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga concluded in the
TunisiaiLihya case, "the geological and geomorphological elements . . .[were]
leftout by the International Law Commission in 1956 and the Conference in
1958". These elements have now only the effect of extending the continental
shelf of a State beyond 200 miles from its coast, whenever the physical ele-
ments themselves extend beyond that distance.
To the question therefore which tibya puts in its Mernorial (1) at paragraph
6.08, that is whether natural prolongation, too, has lost al1 relevance, the
simple answer is: yes, it has, if by natural prolongation one intends, as Libya
does for certain purposes, the purely geological or geomorphological elements
that form the coritinental shelf as known to scientists. This view has been
confirmed by the most recent of judicial pronouncements namely the Judgment
in the Guif of Maine case. In that Judgment the Chamber, while recognizing
the contribution ti, the formulation of the law made by the Court in the 1969
Judgment, added that in the North Sea ContinentaI Shelf cases the Court had
"attributed more marked importance to the link between the legal institution of
the continental shelf and the physical fact of the natural prolongation than has
subsequently ken given to it" (para. 91); and later on, the Chamber expresses
the view that the concept of adjacency "can be credited with the ability to
express, perhaps better than that of natural prolongation, the link between a
State's sovereignty and its sovereign rights to adjacent submerged land" (para.
104).
Libya does not seem to argue against the proposition that the outer limits of
the continental shelf of a State may be defined by reference to a distance of
200 miles. In fact it is Libya's view that where there are "no problems of deli-
mitation with neighbouring States . . . entitlernent and delimitation (in terms of
absolute outer limits) go hand in hand"; and it goes on to add that
"whether the outer limits are defined in terrns of a 200-miles limit or the
outer edge of the continental margin, the correlation between entitlement
and outer limits exists precisely because no question of a boundary with a
neighbouring State is contemplated" (1, LM, para. 6.06).
These statements presuppose the acceptance by Libya that, when it is simply
a question of establishing the outer lirnits of the continental sheif of a State,
with respect not to another State but to the international community. and no ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 295
question of delimitation with anoiher State is involved, a State is entitle- as
Article 76 of the 1982 Convention provides - to a shelf 200 miles wide, irres-
pective of the physiography of the sea-bed, or beyond that distance if the outer
edge of its continental margin lies beyond it. When. therefore, itis merely a
question of entitlement, the outer Iimits of a shelf are determined, as a rule, by
distance alone.
But when the object of the exercise is the delimitiition of areas in respect of
which there are confiiciing claims Libya disiinguishes beiween -
(1) "a situation where neighbouring States are located on different
shelves, in terms of distinct natural prolongationii"and
(2) "a situation where neighbouring States are located on the sarne shelf.
and where the shelf area in question may be regarded as much the
natural prolongation of the one as of the other on the geological and
geomorphological evidence" (1, LM, para. 6.08).
According to Libya. in ihe first situation "the evidence of 'natural prolonga-
tion' isfiindamentally evidence of a geological and geomorphological charac-
ter and serves to establish the bnsis for the boundary between different
shelves". In the second situation the: physical structure of the shelf "may still
serve as a useful or determinant criterion for delimiting the shelf' but its role
"is that of a relevant fücror, not that of a limit to the arca of entitlement"(1,
LM, para, 6.09).
In order to evaluate the Libyan argument properly. and to answer it ad-
equately, Malta has iri al1 honesty tried to establish whcther Libya considers
the present case to fall under the first or the second of the situations which
Libya iuelf envisages. and which have just been described in Libya's own
words; but Malta has been unable to come to a definitive conclusion.
The Libyan formal subrnissions speak of a "fundamental discontinuity" such
as to "divide the areas of continental shelf into two distinct natural prolonga-
tions extending from the land territories of the respective Parties". This and
other statements to more or less the same effect, seem to place the present case
in the first category of situations described by Libya. But in its Reply, supra,
at paragraph 6.19, Libya takes offence because Malta has, according to Libya,
accused it of "suggesting that the Rift Zone should constitute the boundary
between the continental shelf areas appertaining to each of the Parties". In
the same context Libya explains that
"it has never advanced the proposition that the Rift Zone per se consti-
tutes a natural maritime boundary between the States. Rather, Libya's
position is that the Rift Zone provides critical physical elements for the
detemination of a boundary line which would be within and follow its
general direction."
This Libyan explanation seems to indicate that Libya places the present case
in the second category of delimitation situations, namely, one in which Malta
and Libya are located on the same shelf, and therefore the shelf area inques-
tion may be regarded as rnuch as the natural prolongation of Malta as of Libya
on the geological and geomorphotogical evidence; but there are what Libya
calls "critical physical elements [the "Rift Zone"] for the determination of a
boundary line which would be within and follow its general direction".
1 must cocfess that 1 am still somewhat doubtful as to which is in fact the
Libyan position; it could be that there is a third category of situations which
we have not heard about yet. We may, in fact, not have heard the last wotd on
the matter.296 CONTINENTAL SHELF
But whichever the category in which Libya will finally place the present
case it is clear that the Libyan argument is in any case seriously flawed
because -
(a} Libya has given a different meaning to natural prolongation according
to whether the concept is used in the context of the determination of
the outer limits ofa State's jurisdiction or in the context of a delimitation
between States; and
(h) in the context of delimitation between States, Libya identifies natural pro-
longation, even on the legal plane, with physical features and makes it
dependent on the geological and geomorphological structure of the sea-
bed.
Malta believes it can show - indeed that it has already shown in its written
pleadings - that nzithei of the above Libyan positions is legally tenable.
As regards the firstof these positions, it is Malta's view thata legal concept
cannot have different rneanings simply because it is placed in different
contexts; al1the more so when these two contexts - entitlement and delimita-
tion - though separate and distinct are, at the same time, intimately related. It
is true that the two concepts are quite distinct: in fact, as was noted in the
1969 Judgment, the Court "did not regard an equitable delimitation and a
determination of the lilnits of natural prolongation as synonymous" (p. 46,
para. 44). At the same time it is undeniable that unless a State can establish its
entitlement to an area there can be no question of a delimitation of that area
with another State. In other words, unless there is an overlap of entitlements
no question of delimitation can arise.
That is why Malta says that entitlement and delimitation always go hand in
hand. But if they do, and the one, delimitation, is at least in some important
respects, dependeni on the other, entitlement, how can the same concept (natu-
ral prolongation) have one meaning for mere entitlement and a different - a
completely different - meaning where conflicting entitlements cal1 for a deli-
mitation ?
The second Libyan position 1 have just referred to has. 1 believe, already
ken shown to be wrong, and 1 shall therefore limit myself to a very brief
recapitulation; and it is this: while the natural phenonemon was at the origin
of the legal concept of continental shelf, the two have never been identical and
the legal concept has pursued its own development by a widening of the
concept for legal purpuses. The physical elements have over the years gra-
dually disappeared altogether up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
Coast, and up to that limit the only relevant factor is distance. The Rift Zone,
therefore, whatever its true nature may be, is relevant for the determination of
the legal issues between the Parties.
This conclusion has the support of the jurisprudence and State practice.
Both this Court and the Court .of Arbitration in the Anglo-French
Continental Shelf case refused even to consider such natural features as the
Hurd Deep, the Jarrafa Trough and the Tripolitanian Furrow. With respect to
the Hurd Deep the Arbitral Court expressly held that "there was no intrinsic
reason why a boundary aiong this axis [i.e., the axis of the Hurd Deep] should
be the boundary". 'TheCourt regarded the location of such features as a matter
of chance - "a fact of nature", as the Court put it, which had no legal conse-
quence.
In the TunisialLib cyse the Court rejected categoncalIy the argument that
the delimitation of theareas of shelf appertaining to Tunisia and Libya should
be made by reference to their natural prolongation as this might be established ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 297
on geological or geomorphological considerations. The position taken by the
Court in the TunisialLibya case is very significant, since in that case both
Parties had based their case on scientific elements - Libya essentially on geo-
logy and Tunisia essentially on geomorphology - and both had requested ihe
Court to decide the case on that büsis. It is tme that the Court did not entirely
exclude that there may be cases where physical features might bea factor to be
taken into account; but the more important fact about that Judgment is that the
Court did not take account of any of the scientific elements submitted by the
Parties to the Court as a basis for its decision.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases neither geological nor geomorpho-
logical considerations were included among any of the principles and rules of
international law identified by the Court as applicable to delimitation. The phy-
sical and geological structure of the areas involved were indicated by the Court
merely as a factor to be taken into account by the Parties in their negotiations;
and the wording used by the Court in that connection suggests that the Court
was at least asmuch concemed about the natural resources which the geologi-
cal structure of the area could show to exist or not to exist, or to exist across
possible boundaries, as about the existence or otherwise of depressions.
In the Gulf of Maine case, even though geological factors were not signifi-
cant, the Chamber nevertheless did observe that
"a delimitation, whether of a rnaritime boundary or of a land boundary, is
a legal-political operation,and that it is not the case that where a natural
boundary is discemible, the political delimitation necessarily has to follow
the same line" (para. 56).
Tuming to State practice 1feel it can be said with confidence that, with but
one exception on which 1shall comment later, no delimitation out of the 80
cases known to have been made by agreement between States, takes account of
trenches, troughs, channels, deeps. depressions and other features, even where
these are of a kind which could mark the limits of the physical continental
shelf of the States concerned. As was pointed out in the Maltese Memorial, a
similar observation had earlier been made by the Court of Arbitraiion in the
Anglo-French case. The Court had held that :
"to attach critical significance toa physical feature like the Hurd Deep -
Hurd Deep Fault Zone in delimiting the continental shelf boundary in the
present case would run counter to the whole tendency of State practice on
the continental shelf in recent years" (p. 6. para. 10).
Malta has already indicated in its written pleading the delimitations in which
very significant features- some of which are much deeper and more important
than the rift zone in the Sicily Channel - played no part whatsoever. 1 shall
therefore limit myself to a brief refeirenceto the more important examples.
Though the depressions in the North Sea are not excessively deep - they
range ktween some 400 and 700 rnetres - it is welf known that none of the
delimitations between the several States that border this sea have given any
weight whatever to the geology or geomorphology of the region. On the contrary,
with the exception of a limited part of the delimitation between Germany and
the Netherlands and Germany and üenmark, al1 the delimitations have been
effected on the basis of equidistance.
The Cuba-Mexico agreement of 26 July 1976 takes no account of the
Campeche Escarpment and the Yucatan Channel, although they are some 3,000
metres deep; and the delimitation boundary is equjdistant from the two coun-
tries. 298 CONTINENTAL SHELF
The Cuba-Haiti agreement of 27 October 1977 ignores the Cayman Trough,
which is2,900 metres deep, and the two States expressly stated that they relied
on equidistance to el'fectthe delimitation.
The same may be said with respect to two other agreements in the Caribbean
Sea involving Colombia and the Dominican Republic (1 1January 1978) and
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela (3 March 1979). Neither of these
agreements takes account of such a notable structure as the Aruba Gap which
reaches a depth of 4.600 metres, and in both cases the delimitations relied not
on a physical phenomenon, the location of which is a mere accident of nature,
but onthe more equitable and the more reputable method of equidistance.
The examples of delimitations which treat depressions in the sea-bed as if
they were not there are not limited to areas outside the Mediterranean. lndeed
two of the delimitations which amply support Malta's submissions on the irre-
levance of physical features concern areas which are very closely linked to the
present case. 1 am referring to the Italy-Tunisia and the Italy-Greece agree-
@ ments: Te Court cün see these delimitations on Figure 4 of the dossier. The
delimitations have ken reproduced on a bathymetric map of the Central
Mediterranean in order that the Court may relate these delimitations with the
relevant physical features of thegion.
In the îïrst of these agreements, viz. that between Italy and Tunisia, the area
which was delimited includedno1 just parts of what Libya calls the Rift Zone
and which it invokes as the limit of the Maltese shelf, but the more geologi-
cally important sectors of that zone. By their agreement ltaly and Tunisia have
shown in the clearest possible way that the verysame structures which Libya
now considers as constituting a fundamental discontinuity in the sea-bed and
subsoil, were, for both ltaly and Tunisia, features which were totally irrelevant
for the purposes of clelimitation.
On the other side of Malta. that is ta the east, there is what is probably the
most important depression in theentire Mediterranean covering a huge area of
tens of thousands of square kilometres and reaching depths of over 4,200
metres. It is known as the Ionian Abyss or Abyssal Plain, and its name givea
clear indication of the nature of this unique feature of the Mediterranean.
Notwithstanding al1this, when ltaly and Greece agreed on a delimitation which
covers most of the areas of shelf common to them, they took absolutely no
notice of this feature even though geologically and geomorphologically it
dwarfs the Rift Zone into insignificance.
They drew a perfectly equidistant line which, as the Court may see on
@ Figure 4, runs right across the deepest central part of the Ionian Abyss, in
complete disregard of the geology and the geomorphology of the area. And if
this were not enough. Libya has made it clear that it regards part, indeed the
larger part, of this clepression as included in its own continental shelf, at least
in its relations with Italy and Greece. This Libyan claim proves beyond doubt
that Libya's own practice contradicts the position it has taken with respect to
the Rift Zonein the Sicily Channel and confirms the general State practice that
physical features are ignored in the process of delimitation. Of course tibya
does not apply the same standards to Malts, whether with respect to the "Rift
Zone" or the "Escarpments-Pault Zone"; but as evidence of State practice
Libya's approach to the Ionian Abyssal Plain (as well as to Jarrafa and
Tripolitania Troughs) is the clearest confirmation by Libya itself that physical
features are considered by States to be legally irrelevant.
The only exception to this practice of States is the Timor Trench or Trough.
There are, however, certain considerations about this physical feature of the
submarine area between Australia and the island of Timor which show it to be ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZl 299
quite different from any other feature so far encountered in areas delimited by
agreement, and to be therefore, to use legal jargon, a bad precedent.
The first consideration is the well-known one that in extent and depth there
are few features that are comparable. The Austru!ion Year Book of
International Law,1970-1973, 1975 (pp. 145-146), describes itas
"a huge steep cleft or declivity called the Timor Trough extending in an
east-west direction, considerably nearer to the coast of Timor than to the
norihem coast of Australia. It is more than 550 nautical miles long and on
the average 40 miles wide, and the sea-bed slopes down on opposite sides
to a depth of over 10,000 feet. The Timor Trough thus breaks the conti-
nental shelf between Australia and Timor, so rhat there are two distinct
shelves, and not one and the same shelf, separating the two opposite
coasts."
The nature of this Trough is the second consideration. In the view of
Australia, the Timor Trough is of such a kind that there isno common area
south of the Trough which could be divided between Timor and Australia; and
it would appear that this line of reasoning had been accepted by Portugal at the
time Timor was in pan a Portuguese possession. The argument, however, is
not accepted by Indonesia towhich State the whole of Timor now appertains.
It may usefully be recalled here that the delimitation so far agreed covers
only part of the submarine areas between the island of Timor and the northem
coast of Australia. There is stiil a gap, several miies wide and comrnonly re-
ferred to as the Timor Gap, which has still to be delimited. Australia, obviously,
wishes to close the gap by a straight line joining the two ends of the gap.
Indonesia, however, is understood to be pressing for a boundary on the basis
of an equidistant line. In this connection it is interesting to note that, in the
light of what the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported to have
said earlier this year, it would appear that lndonesia is basing its position on
contemporary law (the distance principle), while the delimitation already effec-
ted had been based on the concept of the shelf as it had developed in 1958 at
the time of the Second Conference (the exploitability principle). The report
containing the Minister's statement was carried in a Melbourne newspaper,
The Age, of 31 March 1984.
The third and very important fact about the Timor Trough is that geologi-
cally there is in fact not just two separate continental shelves, but each of
those shelves originally belonged io different continents, or rather to different
plates. Originally Australia and Timor were many thousands of miles apart and
they are only close together now because they have beeri inexorably moving
towards one another while the intervening ocean was pushed down the trough
into the earth's manrle. So in a very real scientific sense the Timor Trough
marks a fundamental discontinuity between Australia and Timor. The Timor
Trough is a "subduction zone" where ocean crust is being forced down into the
earth's mantle by plate tectonic motions.
The trenches that are comparable to it are the Pen-Chile Trench along the
West coast of South Arnerica, the Tonga-Kemadec Trench north of New
Zealand and the trenches off Japan. Nearer to the area in question in the
present case, the Hellenic Trench rnay very well be the result of tectonic
forces similar to those which formed the Timor Trench, that is to Say the plate
tectonic motions which brought the European and African plates together.
The depressions which Libya calls the Rift Zone are, however, a very dif-
ferent species. The sea-bed and subsoil of the area through which that zone runs
is al1part of the sarne continental block, part of the African plate. The inexor- 300 CONTINENTAL SHELF
able motions of the European and African plates towards one another and the
subsequent rnotions of those two plates, and the consequences of the forces
unieashed by those motions, could not have left the Pelagian Block unaffected.
But that Block remains a part of the African plate, a pre-existing continental
block, which, notwithstanding the immense forces to which it has been sub-
jected over millions of years, has retained its essentiaI continuity. I now pass
to the third element.
To conclude this part of my presentation on Libya's daim that Malta's
continental shelf is to be confined within two physical features of the sea-bed,
namely, what Libya calls the "Rift Zone" in the south and south-west and the
escarpments in the enst,1 shall now say a few words about the second of these
features.
As the Court can see by looking at Figure 5, or the bathymetric rnap aat
@ Figure 2 of the dossier presented by Malta for the convenience of the Court,
running frorn just south of the toe of the Italian peninsula, down the eastern
coast of Sicily in a south-easterly direction until it reaches midway between
Sicily and Libya and then, first in a south-westerly and then again in a south-
easterly direction almost right up to the Libyan coast, there is a scarp which is
one of the most remarkable features of the Meditemanean. Itis more than 700
kilometres long and the difference in level is between 1 to 3 kilornetres. From
Sicily to the north-east of Rasarrouq in Libya the scarp forms an abrupt transi-
tion between the epicontinental Pelagian Sea on the one hand and the deep
parts of the lonian Basin on the other. This is a brief but accurate description
of what is essentially one escarpment.
Libya, however, chooses to pick out one pari only of the escarprnent - the
one which lies east and souih-east of Malta - and in the most arbitrary man-
ner claims that Malta's continental shelf ends-ihere. This claim, as 1 have
already had occasion to remark, is not just unfounded, both in fact and in law ;
it is preposterous.
It must be observed in the first place that, in its remorseless attempt to
shrink Malta's continental shelf to the smallest possible area, Libya even
ignores the fact that the issue in this case is the delimitation of the areas of
shelf which appertain to Malta and the areas of shelf which appertain to Libya.
Consequently, as between Malta and Libya - and the case is limited to them
- the area east of the escarpments, that is the whole of the area and not just
the part chosen by 1-ibya, is only relevant to this case in so far as part of it
appertains to Malta and part of it appertains to Libya. To the extent, therefore,
that such an area may appertain to third States or is to be divided between
Malta and third States - and it is accepted that there are such areas - the
issue is one outside the Special Agreement between Malta and Libya and
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
So much so that, in its forma1 submissions at the end of each of its written
pleadings, Libya has not requested the Court formally to declare that Malta has
no continental shelf in the area east of the escarpments. Even Submission
No. 9, in which Libya suggests how in practice the principles and rules identi-
fied by the Court can be applied by the Parties, Libya refers only to the Rift
Zone and there is no reference whatsoever to what Libya had earlier called the
Escarpments-Fault Zone.
But Libya does suggest elsewhere in its pleadings that the area east of the ARGUhqENT OF MR. MlZZI 301
escarpments is one for delimitation between Libya and other States; and Malta
feels that the Libyan position should be shown to be absolutely without basis.
This Libyan position, in fact, is not just untenable; it ir;blatantly conira-
dicted by Libya's own claim to it and by the submission that other States
also could lay a claim to it- aI1,except Malta.
If the escarpments, whether physically or legally, had any relevance to the
delimitation of the areas east of tliem any such relevance would have to apply
equally to al1 the States of the area, and not just to Malta. If the escarpments
did in fact end the continental shelf of Malra on the scientific plane, and if the
legal and scientific concepts of the continental shelf were identical, then the
lonian Abyssal Plain appertains to no State - not to Malta, not to Libya, not
to Italy and not to Greece. But, of course, neither of these premises leading to
that conclusion is correct and consequently also the conclusion is wrong.
Although not enough is known about the escarpments which border the
lonian Basin from Italy down to Libya, it can safely be said that even scientifi-
cally, and taking the definition of the continental shelf beyond the 200-mile
limit as extending to "the outer edge of the continental margin", it cannot be
maintained - and Libya has not even suggested this - that even the deepest
part of the Ionian Abyss is not part of the continental shelf: much less can it
be said that the escarpments mark that outer edge.
On the other hand, if there is some doubt as to the physical nature of this
@ area. then it must be observed that, as can be seen from Figure 6 of the
Maltese dossier, an arc of circle with a radius of 200 nautical miles drawn
even from one basepoint on Malta will cover the whole of the area claimed by
Malta; whereas the same cannot be said of similar arcs of circle drawn from
any basepoint on the Libyan coasts. Thus Libya is clearly attempting to deny
Malta areas to which it could not itself lay a clairn unless physically they
could be regarded as a continental shelf beyond the distance of 200 nautical
miles. 1 need hardly add that if the area constitutes a continental shelf beyond
200 miles, because the natural phenomenon extends beyond that distance, ir
must a fortiori be a continental shelf within ihat distance and must therefore
also be part of Maltü's continental shelf,
Legally, of course, the Libyan claim is quite absurd and I do not feel 1need to
say much to make the point. Italy and Greece, and even Libya itself, regard the
escarpments as having no legal relevance whatsoever in so far as their entitle-
ments are concerned; andthe same rnust, by the same legal logic, apply to Malta.
Not surprisingly, Libya argues that it has a long Coast extending as far as
Egypt. 1s this relevant, one is bound to ask? If, as Libya appears to suggest,
both science and the law deny to Malta a continental shelf east of the escarp-
ments, is the law such as to enable Libya to overcome the scientific and legal
obstacles because its coasts are longer? It would be a strange law which did
that: a law not of equity or equitable principles, but a law ensuring that bigger
States become even bigger and smaller States are deprived even of what is
theirs.
This is not the law. Whether in international relations or as between citizens,
the law does not deserve to becalled by that name unless al1 were equal in itç
eyes. As Malta will subrnit when it cornes to the same theme pursued by Libya
under a different name, the fact alone of a longer coastline by itself generates
larger areas of continental shelf but does not, and cannot, entitlea State to any
privilege whatsoever, whether untier the guise of science or, as Libya does
elsewhere, under the guise of proportionality.
Libya is quite aware of this tmth. At the same time its objective is to see
that Maltagets the smallestpossible share of the shelf. Libya therefore resorts302 CONTINENTAL SHELF
to every kind of argument so long as itmight serve its purpose. The physical
features Libya calls the "Rift Zone" and the "Escarpments-Fault Zone" are
nothing else but an excuse for a partition of the areas between Malta and
Libya with more or less the same result - though not the reasoning - of
Libya's 1973 proposal, that is to Say "in the same proportion that the two
shorelines bore to each other".
Mr. President and Members of the Court, 1 shall now turn my attention to
the second main argument on which Libya rests its case. and that is -
The formal Libyan submissions summarize the Libyan position onproportion-
ality in the following terms :
"ln the particular geographical situation of this case, the application of
equitable principles requires that the delimitation should take account of
the significant difference in lengths of the respective coastlines which face
the area in which the delimitation is io be effected" (Subrnission No. 6) ;
and
"The delimitation in this case should reflect the element of a reasonable
degree of proportionality which a delimitation carried out in accordance
with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the
continental shelf areas appartaining to the respective States and the lengths
of the relevant parts of their coasts, account being taken of any other deli-
mitations between States in the same region." (Submission No. 7.)
These two submissions - which are in effect two different formulations of
what is essentially the sarne argument - may reasonably be taken to indicate
that Libya invokes proportionality in the form of a ratio of the lengths of
coastlines and attrihutes to it. if not the qualityof a principle or rule of law, at
least that of a necessary corollary - a requiremerit, Libya calls it - of equity.
There are several other parts in Libya's written pleadings which - as Malia
has already indicated in its pleadings - show that while Libya professes not
to accord to proportionality the role of an independent source of continental
shelf rights, in effect and as a matter of practice Libya relies on proportionality
effectively as a basis for delimitation, and not as itwould have us believe as a
"test" of the equities of a delimitation resulting from the application of the
principles and niles of international law which are applicable to the case.
Libya's dilemma is obvious. It cannot rely on proportionality as a principle
or rule or as an independent source of rights.
In other words, it cannot base the boundary line it seeks on proportionality.
At the same time Libya mus1 invoke proportionality as more than a mere test
and more than a mere factor for adjustment - the only roles jurisprudence has
attributed to it- because if it did so Libya would be left with no basis for
delimitation which proportionality could test or adjust, Libya is therefore com-
pelled to dress up the version of proportionality which it adopted for the 1973
proposa1with legal respectability and cal1it a test. In effect, however. the role
given by Libya to proportionality in this case is rnuch more significant and
determinant than a mere test, or as a factor which the Panies may Lake into
account.
Thus - to quote but one passage frorti the Libyan pleadings - at paragraph
6.90of the Libyan Mernorial (1) we find the following proposition. which is
typical of the Libyan approach : ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 303
"Although not a legal principle which itself gives rise to rights, propor-
tionality as a factor or guide is intimately connected with the concept of
the continentai shelf based on natural prolongation; itmay even be said
that it is the necessary logical consequence of this concept since ils pur-
pose is to ensure that each natural prolongation will be accorded its appro-
priate weight."
This passage is a very good txample of the role Libya attributes to propor-
tionality. In fact what Libya does, practically throughout its written pleadings,
is to develop pari yu.sstrits own version of natural prolongation, which is fun-
damentally based on the "Rift Zone". and its own version of proportionality,
which is essentially based on the ratio of the lengths of coastlines, in order-
and this is the object of the whole exercise - to arrive at a boundary which is
practically the same one Libya started from in 1973.
That there is no ralional or logical connection between the chance location
of a depression in the sea-bed, or any other like feature, and the equally cir-
cumstantial difference in the lengths of the coastlines of the two States, need
hardly be pointed out, much less stressed. The absence of any connection
whiitsoever is too obvious. But whai Libya would have us believe is ihai by
putting these two circumstances of nature together one obtains the legally
appropriate boundary based on equitable principles.
The true legal position must be the opposite : if two facts of nature happen
to coincide, this could be no mort: than i~rnere coincidence, and could there-
fore have no legal consequence. Unless the coincidence of two fucts has a
legal significance, and therefore in sorne way also a logical connection, such a
coincidence muçt remain meaningless and therefore without any relevance in
law. And if this is so when two circumstances happen to coincide, the logic of
the legal irrelevance of such a coincidence must apply with greater conviction
when the coincidence does not even exist in actual fact but has been artificially
set up by Libya to create the illusion of a connection.
The two facts which Libya claims to be intirnately connected, and which
Malta regards as a coincidence of Libya's own making, are natural prolonga-
tion and proportionality. Malta has already shown that the Libyan version of
natural prolongation is untenable on the facts and is contradicted by contempo-
rary international law :the "Rift Zone" cannot, whether in fact or on the legal
plane, be the basis of a delimitation. These arguments will also be developed
furiher during the oral hearings; but for the present what rernainsto be shown
is that the Libyan version and utilization of proportionality also lacks a legal
basis.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, the phrase "a reasonable degree of
proportionality . . .between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertain-
ing to the coastal State and the length of its coasts" was first used by the
Court in its 1969 Judgment. In order, therefore, to appreciate the true meaning
and purport of that expression one must, in the first place. examine the circum-
stances of the case in which it originated and any explanations the Court itself
rnay have given wiih respect to it.
The circumstances of the case are very well known and simple todescribe. It
was a case of three States on a concave coastline, with the State in the middle
- Gemany - hemmed in by the orher two, the Netherlands and Denmark.
Al1 the coricavity was practically to be found in the German coastline, while
the coastlines of the other two States had a more favourable configuration. It
was very clearly a case where the application of a rnethod or methods of deli-
mitation and the search for an equitable solution were very difficult.304 CONTINENTAL, SHELF
It was in these cir~curnstancesthat the Court indicated as a factor to be taken
into account by the Parties "an elernent of a reasonable degree of proportiona-
lity" between the extent of the shelf and the length of the coast. Moreover, as
the Court itself had, a few paragraphs earlier (para. 98), clearly stated, this
exercise was to have a very specific purpose. To use the Court's own words,
this factor was to be taken into account "in order to establish the necessary
balance between States with straight, and those with markedly concave or
convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions"
(North Sea ConrineritalShelf, Judgmeni, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52, para. 98).
It was thus made abundantly clear, from the very moment in which it was
first used, that the factor of a "reasonable degree of proportionality" was not
one of such general application as would make it a requirement in al1cases to
be taken into account. lndeed the Court mentioned only two cases in which
this was appropriate. It is not king suggested that these are the only two cases
in which some degree of proportionality may properly be required to rernedy
what would otherwise be an inequitable result. But its adoption is limited
exclusively to cases in which the application of the principles and rules of
international law to a particular case create an irnbalance or a distortion as a
result of the special circumstances of the case, and such imbalance or distor-
tion must be rernedied in order that an equitable result may be achieved.
Unless these conditions concur or, in other words, whenever the application of
the principles and rules of international law do not create an imbalance or dis-
tortion - an inequity -, the "element of a reasonable degree of proportiona-
lity" has no part to play.
In its written pleadings Malta has quoted rather extensively from the juris-
prudence to prove this pointa, nd 1 am sure that rny colleagues will again refer
to sorne of these when they pursue this matter further, and 1 shail not therefore
burden the Court with a further repetition. 1shall only refer, and very briefly,
to the latest case - that of the Guif of Maine - in which even though the
Chamber did take account of the difference in length of the coasts of the
Parties for a limited purpose, it declared expressly its awareness -
"of the fact that to take into account the extent of the respective coasts of
the Parties concerned does not in itself constitute either a criterion serving
as a direct basis fora delimitation, or a method that can be used to imple-
ment such delimitation" (para. 185).
The second point to be made - or rather recalled since it has been repeat-
edly made by both sides - is that equity does not mean or involve, much less
require, a refashioning of geography. Indeed equity as a legal concept can only
be applied within a legal framework; and, in the context of the continental
shelf, this framework must reflect the geography of the region. That is why
equity rnust respect geography and cannot refashion it.
Consequently, if a State which is entitled, by the applicable legal principles
and rules, to a given extent of shelf were to have its entitlement reduced, in
the name of equity. simply because an opposite State has a very long coast,
equity would be refashioning nature and geography, and the resuIt wouId be an
apportionment of shelf areas based not on equity - which ought to respect
geography - but on distributive justice: an objective which the Court has an
more than one occasion held not to be the function of equity in cases of deli-
mitation. This principles applies equally if, as often happens in the case of
island States, the extent of the shelf to which a State is entitled is several tirnes
its land territory.
The legal basis of continental shelf rights is to be found in the State's sover- ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 305
eignty ipso jure over the natural prolongation of its land territory into and
under the sea. For legal purposes the length of the coastline is immaterial and
the shelf rights of a Siateextend seawards from its coasts irrespective of rheir
length. Geographically this outward reach is regulated and constrained by the
configuration of the coast, including of course its length: but on theegal plane
a State is entitled to as much shelf as its coast can generate.
In order, therefore, that such entitlernent may terminate. the shelf must either
have reached the absolute limit recognized by international law - in most
cases the 200-mile limit would apply - or have encountered an equal entitle-
ment of another Stüte arising from that Staie's seaward reach from its coasts.
When this happens the areas in which the legally equal entitlement overlap
have to be divided. Such a division can only be equitable if itleaves to each of
the States concemed as much as possible of the areas of their respective natu-
ral prolongations. The same principle may also be stated in a negrttive form,
namely, that the division cannot be equitable ifit allows one State to encroach
upon the natural prolongation of the other State. Since there is an overlap, to
say that oneState must not encroach on the natural prolongation of the oiher
cannot be taken literally. since a total non-encroachment is impossible. The
principle can, therefore, have only one meaning and that is that the area of
overlap must be divided equally, as both this Court and the Court of
Arbitratian in the Anglo-French cases have held.
From the point of view of geography, the attributes of the two States may be
equal or unequal; and when the lengths of the coasts are unequal the attributes
will also differ in their extent. But this difference in extent, this inequality, is
not an operation of equity or the law, but the result, the natural result, of two
unequal facts producing unequal results.
The purpose of the "Trapezium Exercise", as Libya has called it. is exactly
that of showing how a longer coast naturally produces a larger area of shelf,
And the Court is invited again to look at the practical effects of a trapezium as
@ shown in Figure 7 of the dossier before it. But to give tiState an even larger
share than that allocated to it by nature would amount to a refashioning of
nature - a refashioniiig of geography.
Malta has, in its Counter-Memorial, drawn the attention of the Court to the
fact that on the basis of boundaries which respect the geography of the Central
Mediterranean and the rules of equity, and therefore on the basis of boundaries
broadly reflecting an equal division of areas between various States, Libya
would - without encroaching on the areas of shelf appenaining to others -
retain an area which is approximately nine times the area Malta would obtain
on broadly the same basis. Libya has taken this observation to rnean a recogni-
tion by Marta of a form of proportionality test (II, LCM, para. 6.33).
That was not, of course, the purpose of the facts given by Malta. What
Malta intended to show. and 1 believe Malta has shown, is ihat on the basis of
the appropriate method of equidistance which Malta believes to be applicable
in this case, the longer coastline of Libya generates a shelfby far larger than
the area of shelf which Malta's smaller coasrline is capable of generating.
That this is so has the best possible confirmation in Libya's own calcula-
tions. In footnote 4 of page 41 of its Counter-Memorial (II), Libya gives the
extent of the area which Malta's "trapezium construct" - to use Libya's phra-
seology - would allocate to Malta and to Libya respectively. According to
these caIculations, out of 288,074 square kilometres, Malta would get 47.848
and Libya 240.230 square kilometres. Malta has not taken the trouble to check
whether or not the Libyan calculations are exact - nor does it rnatter in
Malta's view whether the ratio between the areas is 1:5 or 1:9 or any other306 CONTINENTAL SHELF
ratio - because the object of the trapezium exercise is intended to show the
mathematical truth that in circumstances such as the present ones, a longer
coastline necessarily generatesa larger area of shelf; and this is precisely what
the Libyan figures show.
What Libya. by its calculations, has confirmed is that a longer coastline
generates a relatively larger area of jurisdiction than a shorter coastline. I said
a relatively larger area and not a proportionately larger area: neither in nature
nor in the legal concept of continental shelf is there any room for the kind of
proportionality Libya seeks to apply in the present case. Both nature and the
law give 10 Libya a substantially larger area of shelf than that which is allo-
cated to Malta. And this is as it should be; but what nature and the law have
allocated to Malta Libya must not covet.
In the footnote from which the Libyan cslculations have been drawn, Libya
not only mükes calculations which are so precise as to tum the "rest" of pro-
portionality inio an accurate mathematical exercise - which of course it
should not be - but refers also to landmass and again makes very precise cal-
culations between the landmasses of Libya and Malta and their relationship to
the areas which a trapezium exercise would allocate to the two Parties.
This is not the only place where Libya tries to draw legal conclusions con-
ceming continental shelf rights from the size of the landmass. ln fact a recur-
ring theme throughout Libya's pleadingsis that Libya is huge ;that not only has
Libya a very long coast but it also has a very large area of land territory behind
that coast. Malta, on the contrary, is very small and its coastline is very short.
The length of the coastline of a State, given normal circumstances, neces-
sarily affects the extent of the maritime rights it generates. Landmass, on the
contrary, has absolutely no bearing whatsoever - whether physically or
legally - on the size of the continental shelf, or of any maritime right of a
State. A Staie may have a huge landrnass and a very short coastline; but it is
only the coastline that matters. Only the coast generates maritime rights und
influences the extent of the areas over which they are exercisable. All the land-
mass behind the coast is completely irrelevant. The same is true about the
opposite case: a State may have a long coastline and only a few miles of hin-
terland. Thar State will have a very large continental shelf which bears no rela-
tion to the depth of its land territory.
An island. because it is surrounded by water and therefore its natural prolon-
gation extends in al1 directions, must, in normal circumstances, also generate
rights over the surrounding sea areas. which may also not be proportionate to
its size. But these are facts of nature, the realities of geography which -
according to the jurisprudence - must not be changed or refashioned.
These principles of internarional law apply to al1maritime rights; from the
territorial sea to the contiguous zone, from the exclusive economic zone to the
continental shelf. Both in customary international law and in jurisprudence
there has always been one part only of the land territory of a State which is
recognized as capable of generating maritime rights : the coast.
And it is only the coast and its configuration, including its length, which can
determine or influence the extent of the areas in which the State exercises
those rights. The landmass of the State is irrelevant.
From these brief submissions on the question of proportionality, the follow-
ing conclusions may be drawn :
1. Proponionality is not a principle or rule of international law applicable to
the delimitaiion or the continental shelf; nor is proportionality an independent
source of rights. ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 307
2. Proportionality merely expresses the criterion or factor for deterrnining
the reasonable or unreasonable - the equitable or inequitable - effects of
particular geographical features or configurations upon a delimitation which
would otherwise be indicated by the general configuration of the coasts of the
Parties. Proportionality rnay appear in the form of the ratio between the areas
of continental shelf to the lengths of the respective coastlines. But it may also
appear, and more usually does, as a factor for determining whether an equidis-
tance-line boundary is or is not reasonable or equitable in the particular geo-
graphical circumstances of a case.
3. Proportionality in the forrn of a ratio of coastsl lengths is no1a necessary
adjunct of equity and is not therefiire applicable in al1 cases: it may only be
invoked when circurnstances such as those recognized by the jurisprudence so
require, as in the North SECC IonrinentolSheifcases.
4. Finally, even when itis relevant to the attainment of an equiiable solu-
tion, proportionality does not take the form in which Libya envisages its appli-
cation, that is, a strict ratio between the extent of the shelf and the length of
the coastline. Proportionality "does not entai1 any nice calculations" as the
Arbitral Court expressed the concept; and landmass is, of course, irrelevant.
When the present case is exümined in the light of the propositions that have
just been set out, it will be found that proportionality - in its true meaning
and proper applicability - has no role to play in the delimitation of the shelf
areas appertaining to Maltü and those appertaining to Libya. The geographical
setting is a perfectly regular one :two States face one another with absoliitely
no islands in between or any other features which could create an imbalance or
a distortion. The differences between them generate by themselves a difference
in the extent of the respective contiriental shelf areas and any further accentua-
tion of such a difference would amount to a refashioning of geography.
Placed against this setting, the legal position that results is that of two naiu-
ral prolongations extending seawürds one towards the other: they rneet and
overlap and to conclude with the very words of the Judgment in which the
notion of proportionality was first mentioned, they "can therefore only be deli-
rnited by means of a median line". There are no islands, rocks or other minor
coastal projections creating disproportionately distorting effects: there are no
markedly concave or convex coasts causing an imbalance; there are no irregu-
lar coasts which need to be reduced to their truer proportions; and there is no
land boundary to complicate matters. There is only the sea, wilh its sea-bed
and subsoil. That submarine area is the natural prolongation of both States and
it belongs to both of them: but as these natural prolongations overlap they
have to be divided. Of course, since Libya has a longer coast itwill, by the
rnere seaward extension of that coast, retain a larger area that that which Malta
by reason of its shorter coastline can retain; but there is no inequity in that
natural division of the common areas that requires to be remedied. It is not
true, as Libya contends in its sixth formal submission, that :
"in the particular geographical situation of this case, the application of
equitable principles requires that the delimitation should take account of
thésignificant &fferenies in lengths of the respective coastlines".
That difference in lengths of coastlines produces by itself a delimitation which
takes account of the difference; but it does not require any further adjustments.
Any such adjustment would imply a refashioning of geography and if the
adjustment were to take the form which Libya seeks to obtain from the Court,
the refashioning would be such as to enclave Malta within Lin area even 308 CONTINENTALSHELF
smaller than would be justified by its existing fishing rights and extend
Libya's continental shelf almost right up to the Maltese territorial:Maltas
@ again invites the Court to look at the dossier, Figure 8, to see the effects of
Libya'sclaim.
Libya has accused Malta of expecting a larger share of the limited shelf of
the Mediterranean than its size warrants. As has been already pointed out, this
is no legal argument; it is the argument flatly rejected by the Court of a
sharing out according to size. But once the point been made, Malta feels it
ought to recall that nature has smiled upon Libya, both on land and in the sea,
and both with respect to the extent of the areas over which it has jurisdiction
and to the extent of the natural resources which those areas are known to
contain; and this is what the present dispute is al1 about. Because of its geo-
graphical position, the configuration and length of its coastline, and particu-
larly as it happens to be where the Mediterranean is at its widest, Libya can
safely expect a substantial part the continental shelf that is to be divided
amongst the severül litoral States without the need of looking for more.
Compared to what other Mediterranean States will ultimately get, Libya is cer-
tainly not disadvantaged. lndeed it would be inequitable if Libya were to be
@ given more than what nature in its bounty has allocated to it. Fig9rof the
Maltese dossier shows the extent of the Libyan continental shelf if the Central
Mediterranean sea-hed were to be divided on theasis of equidistance.
The Court rose ut6.06 p.m. TENTH PUBLIC SITïING (27 XI 84, 10 ü.m.)
Presenf :[See sitting of 26 Xt 84, Judge hchs absent.]
The PRESIDENT: The sitting is open. Before calling upon Dr. Mizzi 1have
to announce that for personal reasons, duly explained to me, Judge Lachs will
be absent from the hearing today.
ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI (cont.)
AGENT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA
Mr. MIZZI:Mr. President, Memkrs of the Court. in my statement yester-
day 1recnlled the main events in the history of the dispute which has brought
the Parties before the Court, and I gave in that context a brief account of the
conduct of the Parties, in so far aitis relevant to the decision of the Court.
1also indicated the main arguments on which the Libyan case rests; namely,
the Rift Zone and proportionality, and 1 tried ta show how the Rift Zone was
seriously flawed, both in fact and in law, and why proportionality had no part
to play in the present case.
I now come to the last part of my presentation in which 1 shall attempt to
give, in very broad terms. more disposition with respect to the issues which the
Parties have submitted for adjudication by the Court.
In rebutting the views expressed by Libya as to the principles and rules of
internationallaw applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf and of
the practical application of those principles to the present case, which are the
substantial issues between the Parties, 1 have already recalled several of the
views of the Republic of Malta on those issues. 1 shall thereforedo my best to
avoid repetition as much as possible. 1do, however, beg the indulgence of the
Court if some repetition will be found to be unavoidable.
The task of identifying the principles and niles applicable to the delimitation
of areas of continental shelf claimed by two or more States has been eased
considerably by the Court's Judgment in the Norfh Sea Continental Shelf
cases. Although the Court, in setting out those principles and rules, could not
but have had very much in mind the special circumstances - indeed the very
unusual circumstances - of those cases, the principles and rules identified by
the Court in general ternis appear to be of rather general application. They
have in fact been substanlially followed by the Court itself in the
TunisialLib caye and by the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French case.
In the Gulf of Maine case. the Chamber described the Court's decision in the
North Seo Continental Sheu cases as "the judicial decision which has made the
greatest contribution to the formation of customary law in this field"; and this
description cannot but mean an endorsement of the principles and rules first
enunciated by the Court in 1969.
The sarne may not, at least to the same extent. be said of the factors which
the Court held that the Parties were to take into account in the delimitation of
areas in the North Sea. These. in fact. appear to be conditioned by, and to
relate pariicularly to. the very special circumstances of those cases. At the310 CONTINENTAL SHELF
same tirne itwould not appear correct to say that the factors indicated by the
Court in those cases relate exclusively to thern and may not have a wider
application. A middle course appears to be the correct one to take. In other
words. while the factors indicated by the Court may also fînd application in
other cases, care must be taken not to rnistake thern for principles or rules or
to extend their application to circumstances to which they do not, and were
never intended to, apply.
Having made these preliminary observations, 1 can now pass on to a brief
review of the Court's findings in 1969 and their applicability in the present
case.
In the words of the Court's Judgment. the principles and rules of general
application are:
"(1) delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equi-
table principies, and faking account of al1 the relevant circumstances,
in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party al1those
parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of
ils land territory into and under the sea. without encroachment on the
natural prolongation of the land territory of the other;
(2) if, in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation
leaves to the Parties areas that overlap. these are to be divided be-
tween them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally,
unless they decide on a rtgirne of joint jurisdiction, user, or exploita-
tion for the zones of overlap or any part of thern" (I.C.J. Reporrs
1969, p. 53, para. 101 (C)).
The first requirement, that delimitation is to be effected by agreement is
satisfied, in the present case, by the undertaking contained in the Special
Agreement to determine the boundary by an agreement in accordance with the
findings of the Court.
Malia also accepts that the delimitation is to be effected in accordance with
equitable principles, and taking accouni of al1 relevant circumstances. These
principles. however. are not very easily ascertainable in practice. In fact, whai
constitutes or which are the equitable principles for the purposes of a delirnita-
tion of shelf areas has never been authoritatively defined; and it would be very
presurnptuous of me to try fo do so.The Court did, in its 1969 Judgment, give
some idea of what it meant by equity, but it did so more in a negative than in
a positive rnanner. and in the context of cases in which the normal method of
equidistance - as the Court accepted it to be - led to inequity in the special
geographical circurnstances of those cases. The Court did say, for example,
that "Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice".
But the two notions are often used interchangeably. and the one cannot be of
much help for an understanding of the other.
Perhaps the notion of equity defies the precision of a definition; and one
musr be content with the various authoritative statements that have been made
concerning itin the context of delimitation of shelf areas.
What appears to be less difficult to formulate is what equity is not or does
not irnply. Thus, equity does not justify a decisionex aequo et bono.
The equity that is to be applied in the determination of continental shelf
boundaries is not equity outside the law. Equitable principles rnust be found
within the legal frarnework applicable to the continental shelf and its delimita-
tion. The division to be effected, therefore, is not a sharing out of areas on the
basisof distributive justice.
In the second place equity does not necessarily rnean or imply equality. As ARCU~~ENT OF MR. MIZZI 31 1
the Court explained, "natural inequalities" such as those resulting from one
State having an "extensive coastline" and another State "a restricted coastline"
cannot be remedied hy equity (I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 49-50. para. 9f). More
generally the Coufl's position on this aspect is that "there can never be any
question of completely refashioning nature" (ihid p. 49, para 91).
To strike a more positive note, it may be said that equity is to be looked for
in the result rather than in the means to achieve it. When it is achieved it is
recognizable and accepted as such. But the means are not so readily identi-
fiable; neither are the consideratioiis to be taken into account. Itis the result
produced by a balancing-up of al1 such considerations that will determine the
equitableness of the result; but equity does not itself provide the meüiis to
achieve it.
The process is not always as difficult as it may sound to be: there are cases
where a single method, such as equidistance. will suffice ; there are others
where some adjustment to such a rnethod willbe sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of equity. But there are then other cases where equity is very elusive.
Itwas in the contexi of such a situation that the 1%9 Judgment indicated
the factors which the Parties were to tüke into account in their negotiations. ln
fact the Court did so - as clearly stated in the Judgment itself - because, in
view of the special circumstances of the North Sea delimitations, "equity
excludes the use of the equidistnnce method in the present instance, as the
method of delimitation" (ihid., pürii. 90). Consequently the Parties couid only
obtain an equitable delimitation by taking various factors into account or by
applying various methods.
In the particular instance of the North Sea delimitations the Court indicated
three factors to be taken into account :
"(1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the
presence of any special or unusual features ;
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable. the physical and geologi-
cal structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas
involved;
(3) the element of a reasonahle degree of proportionality. which a deli-
mitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought IO
bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas apper-
taining to the coasral S~ateand the length of ils Coast measured in
the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this
purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental
shelf delimitations between adjacent States in the same region" (ihid.,
p. 54, para. 101 (D)).
The last two factors which the Court described in the terms 1 have just
reproduced have already been considered at some length; and I do not intend
to take any more of the time of the Court thanis absolutely necessary to recall
the main conclusions which Malta has drawn with respect to the geology and
geomorphology of the shelf areasto be delirnited,and to the test of proportion-
ality.
On the geology and geornorphology of the region, Malta's position is that,
apart from the consideration that in contemporary international law these ele-
ments are legally irrelevant, the scientific evidence shows that :
(a) the Pelagian Basin. of which the areas to be delimited form part, iça geo-
logical continuum ;and
(b) neither the so-called "Rift Zone" in the Sicily Channel nor other areas of312 CONTlNENTAL SHELP
rifting, such as the Jarrafa Trough. disrupt the basic or essential unity of
the Pelagian Basin;
and therefore the physical and geological structure of the areas involved are
not even a factor to be taken into account: even if these elements had some
relevance in conremporary law.
As to natural resources, and their presence in the shelf areas to be delimited.
not enough is known to make this factor "readily ascertainable". The dispute
before the Court has prevented the area from being properly surveyed and
expiored. From what isknown, however, it may be said that if there is one
area to which Malta can lay a claim that is more likely than any other to
contain mineral deposits that area is to befound south of Malta. and more par-
iicularly in the vicinity of the equidistance line between Malta and Libya.
Nothing will. of course, be known for cewdinty before the two sides can tell
which are the areas subject to their respective jurisdiction. But the Parties are
before the Court because they are fairly confident that there are mineral depo-
sits in the area and the likelihood of that presence increases as one moves
further to thesouth of Malta.
For Malta. this factor is therefore of the utmost importance, since if Malta
were deprived of any part of the areas IO which it properly lays a clairn it
could happen that it will be deprived forever of the very possibility of owning
itsown resources.
On proportionality, Malta's position is that this factor only cornes into play
when the delimitation suggested by otherwise appropriate methods proves to
be inequitable in view of the special or unusual circumstances of the case; and
even when, in those circumstances, the test of proportionality becomes rele-
vant, it does not take the form Libya has given to its version of proportion-
ality. In other words al1 equity would require in such a case is "a reasonable
degree of proportionality" and not a ratio of lengths of coastlines. In the
present case. there is no inequity in a delimitation indicated by the method
derived diiectly from the very concepts of equality of entitlements and non-
encroachrnent, namely the method of equidistance whereby an equitable divi-
sion of areas is obtained. Such a line would give full effect to the seaward
reach of the opposite coasts according to their configuration, including their
Iengths which, by reason of their difference, generaie a relative, but also sub-
stantial, difference in the entent of the areas allocated respectively to Malta
and to Libya by a median line. There are no special or unusual features which
could affect that line on grounds of equity; indeed any adjustment of that line
coule not bedone without a refashioning of geography.
It rnay therefore be said that neither of these two factors - physical ele-
ments and proportionality - are relevant in the preseni case.
The other factor mentioned by the Court is, on the contrary, one which is of
a rather more general application, in the sense that a delimitation cannot be
effected without regard being had to the general configuration of the coasts of
the Parties and the presence or otherwise of special or unusual features.
Of course, when the Court directed the Parties in the North Sea Continental
Skelf cases to take account of these considerations, the Court must have had
very much in minci the special and quite unusual features of the coastlines of
the Parties tothose cases; and it would seem that the Court was referring to
those particular features in its recommandations to the Parties. To the extent
that this i$0. also this factor would not be applicable to the present case since
there are no "special or unusual features" "in the general configuration of the
coasts of the Parties" in this case. ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 313
However, the geography of the region and the configuration of the coasts of
the Parties. even when they are simple and normal as they are in the present
case, are not just relevant to the delimitation of the areas of shelf cornprised
within those coasts: they contain the key elements of the frarnework in which
the delirnitationcan properly be effected.
These considerations have been arnply discussed in Malta's written ptead-
ings and will again be presented by rny colleagues to the Court. 1 shall there-
fore lirnit myself to recalling the key elements of the present case in summary
form. These are :
(a) the coasts of Malta and Libya are opposite and are set at a considerable
distance from eüch other;
(hl there is an absence of intervening islands or other unusual features and the
relationship of the Maltese and Libyan coastlines is remarkable only in
tems of its nortnality;
{c) the primary elements of the geographical facts are uncomplicated and
consequently eaçh pertinent coast should be given its appropriate legal
significance on the basis of the distance principle and the use of control-
ling basepoints.
Apart from the factors set out hy the Court in 1969, no authoritative list
exists of the relevant circumstances which are to be taken into account in
drawing maritime boundaries; but ihere should be little doubt ihat the nurnber
of such circurnstances is not a restricted one, their relevance of course being a
matter for evaluation in the light of al1the circurnstances taken together.
In its writteo plcadings Malta has indicated what it believes to be relevant
circurnstances in the present case. In this context, the expression "relevant cir-
curnstances" is intended to refer to those circumstances which are not the key
elernents of the case rather than to al1 the circumstances tumped iogether; and
this is why Malta has referred to them as the "Other Relevant Factors". It is. in
any case, to these circurnstances that1 am now refemng.
Two of these circumstances are very rnuch connected with the process of
delimitation. These are: the conduct of the Parties and delimitations with third
States.The others affect more directly the entitlement of Malta to its continen-
tal shelf and the need to protect the sea and land territory subject to its juris-
diction.These are: security inierests, particularly for neutral States; and econo-
rnic and related factors. especially in the case of island-developing States.
1 shall not be dealing with these matters in any more detail than 1 have
already done with respect to the conduct of the Parties and delimitations with
third States. These aspects, as well as the other relevant circumstances I have
just recalled, will be treated more comprehensively by my colleügues. 1 also do
not wish to stray too much away from the main line of Matta's position on the
legal principles and rules applicable to delimitation in the present case. 1 do.
however, wish as Agent of the Republic of Malta, to stress the importance
Malta attaches to its security interests. Indeed, as a neuiral Siate Malta has a
special duty to protect and defend those interests. There is no difference
between the Parties as to the relevance of security interesis; nor could there
reasonably be any, since security was one of the vital considerations which
prornpted the Truman Proclamation and isstilla key element of continental
shelf rights. There is however a difference of approach since even in this
context Libya clairns greater security needs and tries to switch Malta's needs
to one direction only. that is, away from Libya. 1shall not stress the obvious.
narnely, that the security interests of States are equal and that an island's secu-
rity needs are al1 seawards and face al1directions, but 1shall recall once more314 CONT~NENTALSHELF
that Libya pushes its claims almost right up to the territorial waters of Malta
and the northern border of its "Rift Zone" encroaches even on that part of the
Maltese territory. Malta cannot but be, to put it rnildly, disturbed by this
approach.
Mr. President, the requirement of taking into account al1the relevant circum-
stances is an essential element of the principle that delimitation is to be effec-
ted in accordance with equitable principles, taking account of ail relevant cir-
cumstances. This principle, which is fundamental to al1 delimitations of conti-
nental shelf, owes its judicial affirmation to the Court's 1969 Judgment. That
Judgment has also authoritatively indicated the result which the application of
that principle must bring about. In the words of the Court, the application of
equitable principles and the taking into account of relevant circumstances,
must result in each Party being left with "as much as possible" of "al1 those
parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land
territory into and under the sea". The same result is also formulated by the
Court in a negative form, as if to emphasire the importance of this concept:
and its says the delimitation must be effected "without encroachment of the
natural prolongation of the land territory of the other".
The application of this principle in cases of adjacent coasts often creates dif-
ficulties mainly because the encroachment is a frontal one and, not infre-
quently, has a cutting-off effect. But in the case of opposite States, the contrary
is the rule. This is particularly true when there are "no islets, rocks or other
minor coastal projections which could have a distorting effect" and where the
distance between the opposite coasts is significant. In such cases, the overiap
is relatively equal and at some distance from the two coasts; and there is nor-
mally no cutting-off effect. To borrow again from the Court's Judgment of
1969, which emphasized - and not without reason - the distinction between
adjacent and opposite Coast :
"The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be
claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory.
These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited
by rneans of ;tmedian line." (I.C.J.Reporfs 1969, p. 36, para. 57.)
This is in fact the only way in the case of opposite States standing in a rela-
tionship of norrnality with one another in which each State can be left with
maximum areas of its naturai prolongation and with minimum encroachment
by the other State. It is also the only method which results in an equitable divi-
sion of the areas.
When in the TunisialLibya case the Court had reached a point in the delimi-
talion between the two States in which Libya and Tunisia became very nearly
opposite States, the Court - though giving only partial effect to the Ker-
kennah Islands - established an equidistance line between the two almost oppo-
site coasts.
The delimitation established by the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French
case departs from equidistance only with respect to the Channel Islands in view
of their very panicular position on the wrong side of the median line and - in
order to give a half effect to the Scilly Isles in view of their distorting effect
on an otherwise equitable equidistance line dividing the shelf between two
laterally related coasts.
In the Guy of Maine case, subject to an adjustment which the Chamber felt
was necessary in the special circumstances of the case, and which related to
areas where the coasts were lateral or adjacent, the Chamber expressly recog-
nized that in a geographical situation of opposite coasts ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZI 315
"the application of any method of geometrical origin, no matter which,
including that propounded in paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the 1958
Convention, can in practice only result in the drawing of a median delimi-
tation line" (para.216).
This is also in Malta's view the only practical way in which the principles
and rules of international law may be applied in the present case. The logic of
this conclusion is confirmed by the second paragraph of'the Court's dispositif
in the 1969 Judgment quoted above. It is there expressly provided that where
there is an overlap of narural prolongations - that is, of entiilements - that
overlap must be divided either as the Parties may agree or, failing agreement,
"equally". Inthis context "equally" does not necessarily mean equal parts. The
equality which is clearly intended by the Court is relative equality, dependent
mostly on the configuration of the coastlines, including iheir length. In fact the
Court uses the term equality in the context of two natural prolongations extend-
ing one towards the other and meeting in the middle; and it is clear, therefore,
that the equality the Court refers to is an equality of distance: and equality of
seaward reach of the two coasts; and equality which permits the configurütions
of the two coastlines to generate their appropriate extent of continental shelf
rights.
By stating what should be done when two entitlements claimed by opposite
States rneet and overlap, the Court has also indicated the practical way in
which the principles and rules of international law are to be applied to a deli-
mitation which is unaffected by special or unusual features and, of course,
when the Parties cannot agree on where to draw the boundary line. The areas
which overlap must be divided by a line which, in order to respect as fully as
is practicable the natural prolongalions of both States, and without encroaching
on the natural prolongation of the other. must be mid-way between the relevant
basepoints on their coastlines.
In support of the equitableness of this conclusion Malta has shown that this
practical method h3s ken accepted and acted upon by ü very large number of
States in comparable situations as reflected in the various delimitation agree-
ments to which Malta has made reference in its written pleadings. The impor-
tance of State practice lies in the fact that iis inconceivable that a method so
often used by States to determine the boundanes of their jurisdiction over such
vital matters as sovereignty and natural resources should not, as a rule. be
equitable.
It is true of course that no two situations are identical;but itis equally true
that many situations are comparablt:: and Malta believes to have shown - and
will confirm this evidence further during these proceedings that in most, if not
all, comparable situations States have adopted or relied on equidistance. This
practice cannot but mean a generül acceptance by States that a delimitation
based on equidistance is. as a rule, equitable. Where it is not, this is because of
the special circumstances of the case, in most cases the geographical configu-
ration of the coastlines in relation to the area to be delimited. Of course in
such cases resort must be had to an abatement, or only partial application of
that method, or even an outright exclusion of that method and the adoption of
another, or a combination of methods. But in the absence of these circum-
stances - and Malta believes that such is the present case - equidistance is
the method States have most frequently adopted.
Libya unwillingly accepts these facts, because they are undeniable. It has,
however, played down the role of equidistance in State practice and has in-
flated out of al1proportion any slight deviation from it. It has also in a nurnber316 CONTlNENTALSHELF
of cases tried io show - which is very often not the case - that the delimita-
tions related io coasts whose difference in lengths was not very marked. These
are, however, matters of detail and itis not proposed to deal wiih such matfers
ai this stage. Like several other matters1 have touched upon in my staternent.
Siate praciice and its importance in the present case, whether with reference to
the wide use of equidistance as a method of delirnitation or with reference Io
the irrelevance for the purposes of delimitation of the difference in the lengths
of coasitines and cif the geology and geomorphology of the sea-bed, will be
discussed more fully by my colleagues during the coming days.
They will show amongst other things that -
- State practice contradicts both arguments on which Libya's case mainly
rests, namely-
(a) that geological and geomorphological features control the delimitation of
continental shelf boundaries, and
(h) that proporticinality is a determinant factor in the delimitation process;
- on the contrary, Stste prsctice supports the equidistance method as the one
which is, in most cases, the equirable and thereforethe appropriate rnethod,
whether or not some slight modification or adjustment may, for special rea-
sons. be indicated.
My colleagues will ülso show that there is no foundation, indeed no ttwth, in
Libya's allegation that there has been a "trend away from equidistance" since
the Court's Judgmcni in the North Sea Continental Shey cases. When States
have departed from the method of equidistance they did so for reasons which
have nothing to do wiih ihat Judgment. In fact, as has ken shown in Malta's
written pleadings. ihe percentage of agreements which have relied on equidis-
tance as against those that have no[, has been higher since 1970 than it was
before 1969. This is eloquent evidence that ifone were to speak of a trend.
this trend has been towards and not away from equidistance.
The Libyan conclusion is a funher dernonstration of the Libyan misinierpre-
tation of the Court's 1969 Judgment. That Judgment did not in any way dis-
credii equidistance; it simply held that in the special circumstances of three
adjacent States in which one OP $hem was hernmed in by the other two,
equidistance could not be the sole method of delimitation - not that it was
not an appropriaie method - but could not in those circumstances be the sole
method of delimitation.
As ihe Court may have noted, 1have referred to the Judgment in the North
Seu Continental Slielfcases more than to any other judicial pronouncement.
and I have also quoied from it more extensively than from any other source. 1
have done this with a purpose. As the Chamber in the Guif of Maine case has
recently recalled, ille 1969 Judgment has made the greatest contribution to the
formulation of the law on the subject; and that fact is by itself sufficient to
explain why 1have resorted to that Judgment more than to any other decision.
But 1 also wanted to bring oui the fact that the 1969 Jugdment, which Libya
considers to have discredited equidistance, has done nothing of the kind.
That Judgment merely stated that the equidistance method was not manda-
tory under customary international law and that in the special circumstances of
the cases before thc Court it could notbe applied as the sole method of delimi-
tation. It fufIy recognized, however, that in rnost cases equidistance was quiie
appropriate and, indeed, that as between opposite States it was the only pos-
sible method, except where special circumstances otherwise demanded.
The 1969 Judgment, therefore. fully supports Malta's position wiih respect ARGUMENT OF MR. MIZZ~ 317
to Libya, where the case is one of opposite States in a setting undisturbed by
abnormalities.
At the same time 1 believe IO have also shown that Malta's position is
equally supported by the other judicial or arbitral decisions. namely. the
Judgments in the TunisialLibya case and in the Gulf of Maine case, and the
decision of the Court of Arbirration in the Anglo-French case.
The validity of equidistance as an equitable method of delimitation in a large
and varjed number of cases is further contïrmed by State practice. State prac-
tice shows, beyond doubt, that equidistance is not just the simplest method but
is also. in most cases, the more equitable. It is also the most adaptable IO the
variations and adjustments which might be necessary in view of the special
geographical situations of pafiicular cases. It may, in fact, be said that the
slight adjustments or variations to which the method has been subjected both
by the courts and by States, have, rather than discrediting, enhanced the vali-
dity, importance and adaptability of this method.
In the present case it is Matta's submission that equidistance is the method
most appropriate for the delimitation of the shelf areas appertaining Io Malta
and Libya respectively. This method reflects the conduct of the Parties al least
between 1965 and 1973; it gives appropriate and just weight to such important
relevant circumstances as the equal need of both States IOprotect their security
interests and tomeet their economic and related requirements; above all, equi-
distance respects, more than any other method, the geographical circumstances
of the present case and the consequential entitlement of the two States to conti-
nental shelf areas as generated by the configuration of their respective coasts.
including of course the lengths of those coasts.
In conclusion 1may assert, with confidence, that -
(i) the principles and rules of international law appricableto the delimitation
of the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to Malta and Libya
are that the delimitation shallbe effected on the basis of international law
in order to achieve an equitable result;
(ii) in practice. the above principles and rules are applied by means of a
median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on
the baselines of Malta, and the low-water mark of the coast of Libya.
Mr. President, distinguished Judges. 1 have come to the conclusion of my
staternent. Before leaving the rostrum, however. 1 wish to give to the Coun,
and to OUI friendly opponents, an indication of the distribution among counsel
of the various aspects of Malia's case.
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht will start with the Special Agreement that has brought
the Partiesbefore the Court, and the task of the Court. He will then deal with the
physical facts of the case, with particular reference to the Libyan presentation of
those facts. He will also discuss State practice in relation to equidistance, geo-
graphy and the problem of thirdStates and non-geographical relevant factors.
Professor Weil and Professor Brownlie will examine the major legal issues
which divide the parties. Professor Weil will discuss, in particular, the process
of delimitation, natural prolongation, distance and equidistance; while
Professor Brownlie will examine the question of lengths of coasts and territo-
rial magnitude, and that of proportionality.
Mr. Lauterpacht will then sum up the case for Malta and 1 shall conclude the
first round for Malia with afew words.
Mr. President, 1 have finished. May it please the Court to call on Mr.
Lauterpacht. 1 thank you all.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Mizzi. 1now call upon Mr. Lauterpacht. ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT
COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA
Mr. LAUTERPACHT: Mr. President and Members of the Court, may 1
begin by expressing my pleasure and sense of privilege at once again appear-
ing before you.
You have just heard a clear and compehensive re-staiement of Malta's case
presented by the Agent for Malta. Certainly the view could be taken thar Malta
might conclude its oral argument with that statement. It has dealt concisely and
succinctly with the principal elements of the case - already so fully canvassed
in the writtenpleatlings. One rnight indeed say, that after such an overture who
needs an opera. On the other hand. the view might be iaken that, because the
Statute contemplates a stage of oral proceedings, respect for the Court requires
that each side present a statement of its case which goes beyond a summary
recapitulation of its written position. It is, therefore. in accordance with that
view that counsel for Malta now seek to develop their case in a way that they
hope will, even at this juncture,provide the Court with further assistance.
It falls to me to deal first with a preliminary question. namely, the task of
the Court in the light of the Special Agreement. After that 1 shall go on to cer-
tain substantive aspects of the case, which 1 shall outline in more detail after
deaiing with this firs stbject.
Permit me, therefore, to begin with some reference to the nature of the task
before the Court. C)nthis matter, the Parties appear to disagree on one question
and almost to agree on another. The question on which they disagree isthat of
the degree of particularity wifh which the Court should express its conclusions
regarding the questions put to it in the Special Agreement. The question on
which the Parties largely agree is that of the relationship between the claims of
ihird parties and the content of the Court's judgment.
May 1 speak first of the question on which the Parties disagree. It is this:
how precisely should the Court describe the consequences which will flow
from its treatment of the substance of the case?
Malta has expressed its view of the task of the Court in the Mernorial in the
following words :
The task,
"is to identify the principles and rutes of international law applicable to
the delimitation of the continental shelves of the two Parties with effec-
tively the same degree of particularity as those principles were identified
in the TunisialLibya Judgment. The Court should indicate the boundary
which. in its view, would result from the application of such method as
the Coun may choose for the Parties to achieve the relevant determina-
tion."(1. MM. p. 11, para. 22.)
Libya, however, is evidently apprehensive about the prospect of the Court
stating its conclusions so precisely. Itis worried, to use the words of the
Libyan Reply. lest
"The Court .. . conceive its role as prescribing for the Parties a single
method of delimitation having the degree of precision of, for example, the
equidistance meihod." ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 319
The Libyan reply continues :
"Libya dissents from such a view, for it would leave to the Court
virtually no choice at al1 other than to sanction the application of a pre-
ordained method, such as Malta's application of equidistance." (Sirpra.
LR, para. 1.05.)
Malta submits that this apprehension on the part of Libya is misconceivcd. It
is, of course, tme that in the present case Malta sees an application of equi-
table principles reaching an equitahle result as involving the use of equidis-
rance. This is a rnatier which 1 shall develop further when 1 turn trzthe sub-
stance of Maltais case. But it remains a fact that Libya has rejected
equidistance in favour of resting the whole of its case on the proposition that
the Court should discharge its rask by declaring that the line should fa11
"within, and following the general direction of the Rifi Zone". Malta's submis-
sion is that there is nothing in the situation which obliges. or entitles, the
Court to reach so vague and general a conclusion as that advocated by Libya.
For this submission there are two reasons: first, itmust be borne in mind
that a conclusion expressed even word for word in the tenns of Libya's final
conclusion would not in practice saiisfy the terms of the Special Agreement.
What is Libya's contention? I read from Libya's ninth submission, which
appears in identical terms in its Memorial, Counter-Memorial and Reply :
"The principles and rules of international law can in practice be applied
by the Parties so as to achieve an equitable result, taking account of the
physical factors and al1 the other relevant circumstances of this case, by
agreement on a delimitation within, and following the general direction of,
the Rift Zone as defined in the Libyan Memorial."
With this must be compared the relevant words of the Special Agreement,
narnely, the second phrase of Article I (1, p. 5):
"The Court is requested to decide . . . how in practice such principles
and rules can be applied by the two Parties in this particular case in order
that they may without difficulty delimit such areas by an agreement as
provided in Article III."
1am bound to draw attention particularly to the words "without difficulty".
Libya's ninth submission, when using the words "can in practice be apptied by
the Parties" makes no mention of the requirement that the principles and rules
should be such that they may be applied "without difficulty". Yet these words
would not have been inserted in the Agreement if the Parties had not intended
that they should introduce into the case some identifiable element of ease.
One thing, however. is plain beyond the need for elaboraiion. lt is thal a
direction by the Court which instmcts the Parties, without more, to draw a line
"within, and following the general direction of, the Rift Zone" would be a
prescription for conrinuing difficulty and tension. It would in no way advance
the settlement of the dispute between the two countries. There would be room
for disagreement upon two major categories of points:
First, what is the "general direction" of the Rift Zone "as defined jn the
Libyan Mernorial". The range of possibilities is evidently large. The Rift Zone,
as illustrated by Libya, is an extensive area and it does not run in one direction
only. The clearest depiclion of the concept appears in Figure 4 of the Libyan
Mernorial, page 132. The Court can readily sec the scope that exists for argu-
ment about the question of "general direction".320 CONTINENTAL SHELF
Second, there would also be room fbr argument as to how far any line
should run and as to the points at which it should lurn and terminale.
The Court will bear in mind that the Libyan proposa1 of April 1973. which
was described in paragraph 4.34 of the Libyan Mernorial (1) and is depicted in
Figure I of Mafta's dossier, is riline which is constructed on the basis of
proportionality - as conceived at that time by Libya. Libya has in no way
receded frorn its contention that proportionality remains relevant and has,
indeed, gone so far as to argue that a Rift Zone line satisfies the test of pro-
portionality.
This being so, it is evident that if the Court should, for example, accept the
idea of some Rift Zone line and then leave it to the Parties to reach an agree-
ment on so general a basis. Libya is likely to seek to introduce into the
construction of that line the changes in direction- no less than nine in num-
ber - which rnay be perceived in the line which it proposed in 1973 as a line
of proportionality. And thwe nine changes of direction may be seen in Fig-
ure 1. Such a proposal would clearly be one productive of controversy. It is to
guard against that kind of risk that the Court should establish with a much
greüter degree of precision than that for which Libya contends, the elements
which the Court considers shoiild be taken into account in the construction of
the line.
I turn. Mr. Presidenl, to the second reason why the Court should not accept
the Libyan invitation to limit its task to the kind of general identification
cor?:ernplated in the ninth Libyan submission. The Court will bear in mind the
point already made in Malta's pleadings, especially its Memorial. that there is
a close similarity between the Special Agreement in this case and the one in
the TunisialLibya case which was the subject of the Court's Judgment of 1982.
The dispositif ofthai Judgment stands, in the subrnission of Malta. as a pre-
cedent for the kind of way in which the Court should approach its task in
this case. (In saying this, of course, 1 need hardly add that 1 am in no way
commenting on the recent Tunisian Application for interpretation of the
1982 Judgment.)
The dispositij of the 1982 Judgment is divided into three sections. In
the first, section A. at page 92, the Court states the applicable principles
and rules for the delimitation; in the second section. B, at page 93, the Court
identifies "the relevant circumstances to be taken into account in achieving an
equitable delimitation"; and in the third section. C, at pages 93 to 94, rhe
Court sets out in detail the "practical method for the application of the afore-
said principles and rules of international law in the particular situation of the
present case". There then follows. in some detail, a description of the two sec-
tors into which the Court divided the area of delimitation, and as the Couri
said: "each requiring the application of a specific method of delimitation in
order to achieve an overall equitable solution".
The justification for this degree of precision is demonstrated with striking
force by one passage in Judge Schwebel's separate opinion in the recent Gulf
of Maine case. The Court will recall thatthe operative part of the decision of
the Charnber, defining precisely the course of the single maritime boundary,
was adopted by four votes to one, including the vote of Judge Schwebel.
Nonetheless, he delivered a separate opinion in which he indicated clearly that
he would have identified a different line - not radically different, but sorne-
what different. The way in which Judge Schwebel explained why he was pre-
pared to set aside his preferred conclusion in favour of the one which attracted
the support of the other three majority Members of the Chamber isparticularly ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 32 1
relevant here and with your leave, Mr. President. 1 should like to read to the
Court the relevant but brief passage in Judge Schwebel's separate opinion.
After stating that he has voted for the Chamber's Judgment because he was
generally in agreement with its reasoning. he added this further reason :
"because 1 recognize that the factors which have given rise to the differ-
ence berween the lines are open to more than one legally - and certainly
equitably - plausible interpretation...
On a question such as this, thelaw is more plasticthan formed. and ele-
ments of judgment. of appreciation of competing legal and equitable
considerations, are dominant. It is easier to criticize than to construct ..
White 1 am convinced of the equity of my concluçion. nevertheless 1am
not prepared to maintain that the Charnber is necesssarily wrong and that
the line which its position on the test of proportionality has produced is
inequitable. On the contrary. it is to be expected that differences ofjudg-
ment on the application of equitable principles will arise, which at times
rnay not admit of confident conclusions of law." (I.CJ. Reports 1984,
p. 357.)
Now, Mr. President, that passage recognizes very clearly that in a situation
where the relevant circumstances were established virtually to the point of
agreement, there could still be good faith doubt about their reflection in terms
of a specific boundary line. If, therefore, the terms of the Special Agreement in
the present case are to be satisfied, it is clear that something a good deal more
exact is called for than the very general conclusion advocated by Libya.
To conclude this consideration of the task of the Court, 1 may mention the
aspect on which the Parties appear to be in agreement, namely, the relationship
between the Court's Judgment and rhe position of third States, and for al1prac-
tical purposes this rneans the position of Italy.
The Libyan position in this regard is stated in its Reply. paragraphs 1.06 and
1.07. There it says
"the task entrusted to the Court can lead to a judgment which, . . .should
extend to al1 the areas of ccintinental shelf relevant to a delimitation
between Libya and Malta" (supro, LR, para. 1.06).
Malta agrees with this statement.
But Malta does not agree with the statement which follows in the next para-
graph (para. 1.07) of the Libyan Reply, which is to the effect that a distinction
may have ro be made between khat part of the area in which there are no
claims by third States. and that part or parts in which theres such a clairn.
Malta does not believe that the application by ltaly to intervene in the
present proceedings should be perrnitted to complicate the task of the Court or
of the Parties. The basis of the Court's jurisdiction in this case is the Special
Agreement and the limits of the Court's task are set by that agreement. The
situation contemplated by that article is essentially and exclusively a bilateral
one between Libya and Malta. These States, king Parties to the Special
Agreement, have the right to ask the Court to identify the principles and rules
of international law applicable ro the delimitation of the continental shelf
bundary throughout its length between them. The fact that a third State rnay
make a claim which touches partof the area affected by the bilateral delimita-
tion is quite irrelevant. Wirh the greatesi of respect, not only to the Court as a
whole but also to its individual Members who expressed a varïety of differing
opinions in relation to the intervention proceedings earlier this year, 1 must
stress this point.322 CONTINENTAL SHELF
1t is an unquestionable rule of law - enshnned indeed in the case law of
the Court as well as the relevant convention that two States sharing a common
continental shelf delimitation problem are entitled to proceed to a bilateral
delimitation by means of a negotiated treaty. There is no rule of law which
says that they must take into account between themselves the claims, actual or
potential, of third States. If they reach an agreement which a third State
believes affects its interests adversely, that third State may negotiate with
each or both of the contracting States, as circurnstances require. That. indeed,
is precisely tbe situation which ltaly and Tunisia created when they agreed
upon their continental shelf boundary in the area of Lampedusa, Linosa and
Lampione - an area which, as one independent and careful author has put it
is "located in maritime space that seemingly should be divided between
Tunisia and Malta" (Kart, "Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf', 71 Amtericon Journal of Iniernationol Law, 642. 647 (1977)). Malta's
rights having been affected by this settlement between ltaly and Tunisia, it is
now up to Malta to resolve the matter with each or both of those countries.
It is also the situation - as is less frequently recalled - that obtained
between the Federal Republic of Gemany, on the one hand, and Denmark and
the Netherlands respectively, on the other, as a result of the conclusion on
31 March 1966 between Denmark and the Netherlands of the agreement by
which those two States established an equidistance boundary between them in
areas of the North Sea to which the Federal Republic of Gemany laid claim
(see 1.C-l. Reporrs 1969, pp. 14 and 18). Subsequently, in the light of the
Coun's 1969 Judgment, the Federal Republic negotiated an adjustment of the
boundary with each of the other two States.
If that is the position in relation to treaty settlements, it ben no Iess so in
relation to judicial settlement. The duty of the Court (as, with respect, I
understand it) is to aid the actual Parties to the dispute which has been submit-
ted to it to resolve their differences. And if in so doing it takes into account
what are no more than claims by third parties, then it steps outside the juris-
diction conferred upon it by the Parties.
It is, of course, understandable that the Court would not wish to be seen as
doing anything which specifically and absolutely prejudices the rights of third
States.
Those nghts - such as they rnay be - can adequately be safeguarded by
adherence to the approach which the Court set out in its Judgment of 21 March
this year; there. ai pages 26 and 27 the Court said, speaking of the judgment
that itwiHgive in this case:
"The future judgment will not merely be limited in its effects by Article
59 of the Statute: it will be expressed, upon its face to be without preju-
dice to the rights and titles of third States."
By using words such as these, the Court may, in Malta's submission, quite
properly answer the questions put to itin Article 1 of the Special Agreement
with regard to the whole of the line necessary to divide the area of continental
shelf appertaining to the two Parties respectively.
It will, of course, then be necessary for Libya and Malta to negotiate an
agreement "in accordance with the decision of the Court" - as is prescribed
in Article Ili of the Special Agreement. At that time, Italy will. of course, be
fully entitled to invite either or both of the Parties to negotiate with it on the
boundary of those parts of the continental shelf which it may clairn to affect i;
and Italy willbe equally free to propose that if any dispute remains unresolved
it should be submitted to this Coun. It is only at that stage. if it is ever ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 323
reached, and not before. that the Court may properly assess rhe nature and
extent of Italy's claims vis-&-visLibya and Malta.
The Court adjourncd from 11.15 a.m. to 11.30 o.m.
Mr. President and ~Membersof the Court, I turn now from the task of the
Court, conceived in terms of the Special Agreement, to another important
threshold question, namely, that of'the task of the Court conceived in the
terms of application of law.
The question is: what is the basic rule of law applicable tu this case? In
answering this question, the Parties have shown a similarity of approach. Both
have referred to the role of the Court as being to apply equitable principles in
order to achieve an equitable result.
The double-barrelled invocation of the word "equitable" in relation to the
performance of a judicial function based, as Article 38 of the Statute reminds
us. on the application of law, requires a moment's consideration. even in front
of the very Court whose own jurisprudence has made the dominant conttibu-
tion to this concept of "the application of equitable principles leading to an
equitable result".
1venture to ernbark upon this consideration because there are. 1shall submit,
two important elements which need to be borne in rnind:
The first is that ian equitable result is tabe pursued through the channel of
the application of equitable principles, the factors or circumstances relevant to
that pursuit cannot be limited to those which are exclusively physical in nature
- whether geographical, geological or geomorphological. Equity is not a mat-
ter that can be determined through blinkers or shutters. Equity involves taking
a view of the matter as a whole by reference to every factor which is adduced
as bearing on the faimess, reasonsblzness or justice of the result.
The second element which bears re-statement is that. notwithstanding the
latitude with which the formula of what 1 may call for convenience the "equi-
table principles/equitable results" concept vests the Court. it is nonetheless
important to note the existence and character of State practice relevant to the
probiem.
So having stated why in my submission it is pertinent to examine the mean-
ing of the "equitable principles/equitable results" doctrine, 1should like, Mr.
President, with your leave. briefly to recapitulate its judicial history. 1 realize
that no one is better acquainted with this history than are the Members of this
Court. Nonetheless 1 hope that you will bear with me while I seek to recaH
two things: first, thal we are dealing with equity within the frümework of law;
and second, that as initially conceived, and even as subsequently applied, the
concept of equitable principles does not involve any arbitrary or artificial res-
triction of relevant equitable factors.
The starting point is. of course, the Court's Judgrnent in the North SPQ
ConfinentalSheif cases.
The first mention of "equitable principles" appears in paragraph 55 of the
Judgment when. in a passage where the Courr was dealing with the evolution
of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, the Court
stated in the broadest terms that "current legal thinking" was and remained
"governed by two beliefs", of which one was that delimitation should be effec-
ted on "equitable pnnciples", Interestingly enough, the Court cited no specific
source for the origin of this importarit concept.
The next mention of "equitable principles" appears in paragraph 85 of the
Judgrnent which, relying on the observations (such as they were) in the earlier324 CONTINENTALSHELF
paragraph. asserted the existence of "certain basic legal notions", of which the
first was that delimitation must be the object of agreement and "that such
agreement must bearrived at in accordance with equitable principles".
Thus far nothing had been said in the Judgment about the content of rhese
"equitable principles". However, in paragraph 85 (h) the Court came to the
point by saying: "the parties are under an obligation to act in such a way that,
in the particular case, and taking a11 the circumstances into account. equitable
principles are applied" (emphasis added). Admittedly, this sentence does not
actually state what an equitable principle is, but it does provide guidance as to
how the concept operates by stating unequivocally that in the particular case
al1the circumstances must be taken into account.
Shortly afterwards, when affirming in paragraph 88 that "it is precisely a
rule of law that calls for the application of equitable principles". the Court
gave another indication of the breadth of considerations which should deter-
mine the content of any particular delimitation :
"11must however be noted that the mle [the rule of equity] rests also on
a broader basis. Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its
decisions must by definition be just, and therefore in that sense equitable."
The reference here to the word "just" is important because, once again, the
criterion is stated in broad terms without any qualification and this approach is
maintained in a passage which, though often cited, has sometimes not been
appreciated in its full significance. It appears in paragraph 9:
"Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never be any
question of completely refashioning nature .. .Equality is to be reckoned
within the sanie plane, and it is not such natural inequalities as these [Le.,
absence of access to the sea or unequal length of coastlines] that equity
could remedy ."
Now. the important point to observe is that the sentence which 1 just quoted
reads: "Equaljtyisto be reckoned within the same plane." It does not read:
"Equity is to be reckoned within the same plane." In other words. the Court
was not saying that the equities of the situation had to be assessed exclusively
in lems of geographical inequalities. "Equity" was conceived of as being a
broader concept.
And this is clearly shown when one tums to the next two paragraphs, 92 and
93. There the Court first said that "the problem is one of defining the means
whereby the delimitation can be carried out in such a way as to be recognized
as equitable" and then it went on to stale in paragraph 93 :
"ln fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may
take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable
procedures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of ali such
considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance on one to
the exclusion of aH others. The problem of the relative weight to be accor-
ded to different considerations naturally varies with the circumstances of
the case."
Accordingly. in the next paragraph (para. 94) the Court identified as some of
the aspects to be taken inIo account, the geological, the geographical and "the
idea of the unity of the deposit".
Finally. inparapraph C, 1 of the disposit thefCourt referred to the need to
take into account "al1relevant circumstances".
In concluding these references to the Norih Sea Conlinenta1 Shelf. it is inter- ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 325
esting to note that despite the faci that the Court discussed specifically the
application of "equitable principles", it did not more than allude, virtually inci-
dentally, to the purposes of such application. Evidently the Court assumed that
the transition from "equitable principles" to an "equitable solution" was self-
evident, for the only reference made to the solution was in paragraph 92 where
the Court spoke of "results" in the following terms:
"if is necessary to seek not one method of delimitation but one goal. It is
in this spirit that the Court must examine the question of how the conti-
nental shelf can be delimited when it is in fact the case that the equidis-
tance principle does not provide an equitable solution."
Now, Mr. President, 1 turn from tlieNorth Seo Continental Shelfcases to the
Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, which built on and added to the North
Sea Conrinental Shpif Judgment in some helpful respects.
First, it provided for thefirst time a synonym, other than the word "reaso-
nable", for the expression "equitable character". At paragraph 84 the decision
spoke of "the appropriateness - the equitable character - of the method".
Now this identification between appropriateness and equitable character,
alrnost casual. but for al1that the more striking, lies at the heart of the matter.
It shows that "equity" in this context is not a technical concept but is equiva-
lent to "appropriateness" and hence may be identified with other comparable
tenns such as justness, fairness or reasonableness. Al1 of these are large
concepts, the application of which is not restricted by any arbitrary exclusion
of specific classes of consideration.
Second, going on now with the Anglo-French decision, the Tribunal when
considering by reference to equitable considerations the effect of the Channel
Islands upon delimitation, iritroduceti into its analysis a number of factors, like
the following: the political relation of the islands to the United Kingdom (para.
183); the limits of the territorial seas and the coastal fisheries of the two sides;
the potential of an extension of the territorial sea of the islands from 3 to 12
miles (para. 187); navigation, defence and security interests, as well as "geo-
graphical, political and legal circumstances of the region" (para. 188).
1 pass from the Anglo-French case to the Court's own Judgment in the
TunisialLibya case. The particular significance of the Judgment in the present
context lies, first, in the express acknowledgment of the unsatisfactory nature
of the use of the word "equitable" as qualifying both "principles" and "result"
in the "equitable principle/equitable solution" context. The Court said :
"The result of the application of equitable principles must be equitable.
This terminology, which is generally used, is not entirely satisfactory
because it employs the terrn eqilitable to characterize both the result to be
achieved and the means to be applied to achieve this result. It is, however,
the result which is predominant; the principles are subotdinate to the
goal." (Para. 70.)
Next, the Judgment is of value for the emphasis which it lays on the associa-
tion between "equity" and "justice". "Equity" says the Court, "as a legal
concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice" (para. 71).
However, in paragraph 107 of the Judgment, the Court stated that it could
not take into account economic factors to which both Parties had referred in
their pleadings. 1respectfuily submii that the Court should not lose the present
opportunity to clarify the scope of this paragraph. Malta contends that this
paragraph need not and should not be read as a total exciusion of the relevance
of economic considerations to the determination of an equitable result. For one326 CONTINENTALSHELF
thing, such an exclusion would run counter to the whole philosophy underiying
the concept of an equitable solution. An equitable solution is one which is fair,
just, reasonable or appropriate by reference not to some arbitrary selection of
factors but by reference to al1 circumstances which could influence an objec-
tive observer in assessing the rnerits of the situation. Toclude economic fac-
tors when, as is evident virtually beyond the need for reassertion, the present
case is one about access to economic resources and nothing else, would be to
exclude the single most relevant consideration.
No less to the point, the words actually used by the Court in the
TunisiulLihya Judgment do not need to be read as excluding the relevance of
economic considerations inthe present case.
The Court appears to have been influenced by the view that the considera-
tions invoked in that case were "variables which unpredictable natural fortune
or calamity, as the case may be, might at any time cause to tilt the scale one
way or the other". "A country", said the Court, "might be poor today and
become rich tomorrow as a result of an event such as the discovery of a
valuable economic resource." However, the facts of the present case do not
bring it within the area of unpredictabiliiy contemplated in these lines. It is a
fact that in resource terms Malta is poor and that unless the resources believed
to lie in the area embraced particulariy in the southern part of Malta's claimed
area are developed for the benefit of Malta, its resource position is unlikely to
change significantly. lt hardly needs to be said that Libya is in a totally dif-
ferent position. It has vast onshore resources. It is already developing its off-
shore resources both in the area of its continental shelf identifiable as a result
of the 1982 Judgment, and in the area lying to the south of Malta's claimed
line. In addition,of course, there are substantial offshore resources to the east
of the area affected by the delimitation with Malta. There is nothing to stop
Libya making use of the revenue from these resources over their foreseeable
life-span so as to develop and diversify its economy and thus eliminate the
structural weaknesses in it which Libya has mentioned in its Counter-
Memorial. Little such opportunity is open to Malta; the main elements in its
economy are tied to activities which are much more exposed to the adverse
consequences of recession in other countries than is the sale of oil on the scale
which is open to Libya, even in the harshest of times.
Tuming, Mr. President, from the TunisioiLibya case to the next case, it is
appropriate to pass to the Judgment of the Chamber of the Court in the GuIfof
Maine case. This contains what the Chamber described as a "more precise
reformulation" of the relevant rules in the following terms:
"delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria and
by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the
geographic configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an
equitable result" (para. 112 (2)).
For present purposes what matters are the closing paragraphs of the Judgment,
from paragraph 232 onwards.
In dealing with the third, or outer, segment of the line, the Charnber ac-
knowledged that this segment is "the one of greatest interest to the Parties, on
account of the presence of Georges Bank". It was the real subject of the dis-
pute "from the viewpoint of the potential resources of the subsoil and also, in
particular, that of fisheries that are of major economic importance" - those
are the words of the Chamber. Accordingly, the Chamber continued :
"Some enquiry whether, in addition to the factors provided by the geo- ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 327
graphy of the Gulf itself, there are no others that should be taken into
account, is therefore an understandable step. It might well appear that
other circumstances ought properly to be taken into consideration in assess-
ing the equitable character of the result produced by this portion of the
delimitation line, which is destined to divide the riches of the waters and
shelf of this Bank between the two neighbouring countries." (I.C.J.
Reports 1984, p. 340, para. 232.)
"These other circumstances" said the Chamber, consisted of the data on
"human and economic geography": and the Chamber said, such data müy:
"berelevant to assessment of the equitable character of a delimitation first
established on tlie basis of criteria borrowed from physical and political
geography" (ibid.).
The Chamber therefore examined the effect of its proposed delimitation
upon both fishing and petroleum activities.Itconsidered that they could not be
taken into account as relevant circumstances because they did not reveal that
the result would be
"radically inequitahle, that is to say, as likely to entai1 catastrophic reper-
cussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of
the countries concerned" (ibid., p. 342, para. 237; emphasis added).
Malta ventures to make three ottservations regarding the approach adopted
by the Chamber.
The first is that the Chamber iiccepted the basic relevance of econornic
considerations as material to the assessment of the equitableness of a line
constructed by reference to physical and political geography. This is in accord
with the position previously adopted by the Court.
The second is that the Chamber set very high the level at which econornic
considerations might be regarded as affecting the equitable validity ofa line
established by reference to geographic criteria. It appears to be not enough that
the impact of the economic considerations should show the otherwise deter-
mined line to be merely "inequitable". The considerations must show that it was
"radically inequitable".Again. it appears to be not enough that there should be
merely "repercussions" from the proposed line upon the livelihood and econo-
mic well-being of the population of the countries concerned. It is necessary
that those repercussions should he "catastrophic". Mr. President. Malta ven-
tures to observe that these two qualifications of "radically" inequitable and of
"catastrophic" repercussions do not appear to be ones which have previously
figured in the Court's consideration of an equitable solution. The Court has not
previously contrasted an "equitable solution" with a "radically" inequitable
one. There is, therefore, room for consideration of the question whether there
rests upon a party seeking to show that a solution is inequitable the seemingly
heavier burden of establishing thaiitis radically inequilable.
A comparable comment may be made regarding the use of the word "catas-
trophic" as qualifying "repercussions". One may compare this word with the
language used in paragraph 107 of the TunisialLibya Judgment, which dealt
with the question of "economic considerations" and IOwhich 1 have already
~eferred. Howeve~, that paragraph does no1 seem to support the requirement
that the economic considerations should spell catastrophe before they can have
any impact upon the equitableness of the solution. Of course, both Maltü and
Libya will survive regardless of the indications which the Court gives in its328 CONTINENTAL SHELF
judgmeni. Neither will be afflicted by catastrophe. If Malta's claims are reco-
gnized, the economic impact on Libya will be marginal. But if Libya's clairns
are recognized, the effect on Matta will be very serious indeed, in the sense
that it will not be able to better its economic position by access to the natural
resources which are believed to lieto the south-east.
Again, some clarification would be helpful as to whether it is necessary, in
order to demonstrate the inequitableness of a particular line. that a party must
demonstrate that ihe repercussions upon its livelihood and well-being will be
"catastrophic".
And the third observation, Mr. President, that one may make upon the
Judgment of the Chamber, is that itdid in fact examine certain economic ele-
ments in the case - as is evident from paragraphs 238-241 of the Judgment.
Thus the Chamber rtbserved (para. 238) that :
"nothing iess than a decision which would have assigned the whole of the
Georges Bank to one of the Parties might possibly have entailed serious
economic repercussions for the other".
Again, in the next paragraph, the Chamber pointed out:
"that the deliniitation line drawn by the Chamber so divides the main
areas in which the subsoil is king explored for ils mineral resources as to
leave on either side broad expanses in which prospecting has been under-
taken in the past and may be resumed to the extent desired by the Parties"
(para. 239).
So much then for the helpful Judgment of the Chamber in the GuIfof Maine
case.
And 1 pause, next to submit, that there is useful guidance also to be obtained
from the Report of the Conciliation Commission in the case of the Continental
Sheif Areo hetnteen lceland und Jan Mayen (International Law Reports,
Vol. 62, p. 108). The Conciliation Commission was of distinguished composi-
tion. The Conciliator appointed by lceland was Mr. Andersen who had been
the leader of Iceland's delegation to the United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference; the Conciiialor appointed by Nonvay was Mr. - now Judge-elect
- Evensen. The Chairman was the eminent American lawyer and diplomat,
Mr. Elliot Richardson.
The mandate for the Commission was:
"the submission of recommendations with regard to the dividing line for
the shelf area between lceland and Jan Mayen. In preparing such recom-
mendations the Commission shall take into account Iceland's strong eco-
nomic interests in these sea areas, the existing geographical and geological
factors and oiher special circumstances." (P. 1 Il.)
ln carrying ou! ~hismandate the Commission said :
"Although not a court of law, the Commission has thoroughly examined
State practice and court decisions in order to ascenain uossible euidelines
for thé practicable and equitable solution of the qu&tions ctncerned."
(P. 125.)
The Commission expressly stated that amongst the factors to which it had
given special consideration were the following :
"(a)lceland is totally dependerit on imports of hydrocarbon products. ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 329
(h) The shelf surrounding Iceland is considered by scientistio have very
low hydrocarbon potential." (P. 126.)
It is thus plain that both lceland and Norway in drawing up the Agreement and
the Commission in canying it out had in mind that economic considerations
had a direct and essential bearing upon the question. Nor was this regarded by
the Commission as a consequence simply of its function as an organ of con-
ciliation; the paragraph from which 1 have just extracted the mention of eco-
nomic factors was itself introduced by the quotation of the paragraph from the
decision of this Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases where the
Court says that:
"there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take
account of for thepurpose of making sure that they apply equitable proce-
dures" (I.CJ. Reports 1969. p. 50, quoted at62 ILR, p. 126).
In this respect, therefore, the Commission appears to have seen itself as
applying the same legal standard as the Court would have. The Agreement of
22 October 1981, to which Libya has referred in its plelidings. states in its
preamble that the Parties have found it possible to proceed on the basis of the
Commission's recommendations, that is, the Agreement by which the two
States, Norway and Iceland, agreed to implement the recommendations of the
Commission.
A point has now been reached at which it may be appropriate for me to
recall the direction in which my argument is developing. 1 have been exam-
ining the manner in which this Court. in the North Seo Crwzrinerriol helf and
TunisialLibyn cases, the Chamber of this Court in the Gulf of Maine case and
the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French case have developed the concept
of what 1am calfing "equitable pririciples/equitable result". The reason why 1
embarked upon this survey was to siipport two submissions.
The first, was to the effect that the circurnstances or considerations material
to the identification of an equitable solution were not limitedIO physical cir-
cumstances, but could and should embrace non-physical considerations in the
shape of relative economic circumstanceç. On ihis first submission 1 believe
that 1have said enough - except ~ierhapsto add this: that the economic cir-
cumstances which are referred to rnay be on a rnacro-economic scale, rather
than on a micro-economic one. In responding to Maltais statement of the eco-
nomic situation, Libya sought to make itself out as a country with an oil-
dependent and therefore unbalanced economy - from this it would appear, in
Libya's unstated submission, to follow that Libya requires more oil to maintain
that condition fora longer period before it needs to readjust its economy to its
changing resource circumstances, some time well in the twenty-first century.
Malta does not believe that it is appropriate to enter into a discussion in this
case of Libya's handling of its economy, whether in the future or in the pres-
ent in relation to the future. For such a discussion, would. for purposes of
contrast with the point 1 am making now, be in the field of micro-economics
- the day-to-day details of how much money Libya makes and how much it
spends and in what way.
Malta submits that it is sufficient now to refer to economics on a macro-eco-
nomic scale, which is particularly possible in a case where there is so evident a
disparity between the economic positions of the Parties,Itmay be recalled that
in each of the cases in which equitable principles have previously been applied
there was a much more even balance between the economics of the respective
Parties.330 CONTINENTAL SHELF
Perhaps 1 may be permitted quickly to pass them in review. In the North Sea
Coniinental Shelf cases, although the Federal Republic of Germany was evi-
dently a more substantial economic unit than Denmark or the Netherlands, the
imbalance was not on the scale that it is in the present case. In any event, the
Court will remember that there was no argument between the Parties regarding
the whole concept of equitable principleslequitable result and of the relevance
thereto of economic factors.
In the Anglo-French case, the size of each of the contending Parties would
have made a reference to economic balance absurd. In the TunisialLibya case,
even though Libya may have been better off than Tunisia in oil tems and
larger in terrns oares,the discrepancy in their positions was perhapsnot so large
as to enable the Court confidently to embark upon a cornparison of their res-
pective economic strengths. And in the Guy of Maine case, despite the fact
that the United States is a more powerful economic unit than is Canada, each
Party was of such a size that the outcome of the case could only have rela-
tively little impact on the overall economics of the two States.
To say that that is not so in relation to Malta as one of the Parties to the
present case is too obvious to require further rehearsal of the facts.
Nonetheless, it is important that the Court should not permit the very obvious-
ness and simplicity of this point to be obscured by a flood of more complex
and controversial considerations.
Enough then, Mr. President, about the economic aspects of the concept of
equitable principleslequitable results. With your permission, 1 should like to
turn to the second aspect of the concept, which it falls to me to argue, namely,
the relationship between equity and the idea of equidistance. This is, of course,
a very important aspect of the case which will be dealt with primarily by my
colleague, Professor Weil. However, it has been thought that it rnay be helpful
to Professor Weil in keeping his argument within manageabie dimensions if 1
address the Court on the question of State practice showing the use of equidis-
tance.
Now it is not my purpose in referring to the exteni and nature of Staie prac-
tice regarding the use of equidistance to repeat what Malta has already said on
this subject in its three written pleadings. And what has also been expounded
by the learned Agent for Malta. 1 shall seek to do only two things, and each of
them, briefly :
The first is to recall the purpose for which Malta refers to State practice
involving the use of equistance.
The second is to reply to some of the arguments raised by Libya in its Reply
with a view to showing the unreliability of the Libyan presentation of material
and hence the inadequacy of its response to Maltais assertion.
First, Mr. President,a few words about the framework or perspective within
which Malta presents its evidence on State practice. Libya seems determined to
read Malta's materials on State practice as being deployed exclusively to show
that there is arule of law requiring that the equidistance line be applied wholly
and exclusively in situations such as the present. For this purpose Libya intro-
duces the materials on State practice in its Reply (supro) (al para. 4.06) wih a
quotation from a passage in Malta's Mernorial which appears not in the section
on State practice in Malta's Memorial, but in a chapter entitled "Malta's
Entitlemenr as an Island State" (beginning at p. 43 of Malta's Mernorial, 1). Ir
would have been inuch more to the point - and, of course, a good deal less
creative of confusion - if Libya had identified Malta's ground for reference to
State practice in the chapter where such grounds rnight reasonably have been ARGUMENT OF UR. LAUTERPACHT 331
expected to be found, namely Chüpter VI1 on "The Principles and Rules of
International Law applicable in the Context of the Present Delimiration" (this
began at p. 59). Within [hot chapter lhere isa section entitled "3. Staie
Practice" and within that section a subsection entitled "The relevance of State
practice" (see p. 61). Within that subsection, following a quotation from the
separate opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo in the Norrh Seu Cnnrinental Shelf
cases, there is a sentence which briefly and clearly identifies the role of
reference to State practice. It says:
"There is an evident value in recourse to the practice of States irilike
and comparable situations as an objective reflection of the application of
equitable principlesleading to an equitable resu1t.l(1.MM, para. 184.)
The poini is made agajn in Malia's Counter-Memorial (II): "They [the deli-
mitation agreements cited by Malta] provide compelling evidence of the stan-
dard of equity in customary law ..."
And, of course, to refer to "customary law" in this situation is perfectly pro-
per because the starting point of the whole consideration is that we are talking
about equity within the law. Itcannot for a moment be forgotten that the sole
justification for recourse to equitable principles has been,since the first enun-
ciation of the doctrine in the Nurrh Sea Coritinental Sheif cases, that law
requires recourse to equity and that equity is applied at the dictate, and within
the framework, of law. And Malta cites a body of practice which, though
Libya may pick at it, has a relevancy, consistency and impact which defy
contradiction. Finally, the point is repeated in paragraph 270 of Maltais Reply
(supra ):
"Siate practice likewise provides clear indications that in comparable
geographical situations the equidistance method was considered by the
panies as producing an equitable result."
In short, Malta does not contend that ihere is an absolute requirement in the
shape of a specific rule of law IO the effect that the system of equidistance
mus1 be applied. regardless of the circiimstances. It is Malta's contention that
in the circurnsiances of this case. the equitable solution involves the applica-
tion of the system of equidistance.
So 1may now, Mr. President, tum to my second group of comments on the
use of equidistance. In them 1 shall identify the unreliability in a number of
material respects of Libya's presentation of matenal on this point - so many,
indeed - that 1am bound to invite the Court to reach the conclusion that
Libya has entirely failed in its atteinpt to show that the use of equidistance has
no1 been regarded by the Parties concerned as the equitable solution in those
settlements in which it was used. It is, 1 venture to submit, important that the
Court should not allow itself to be led by Libya's latest assertions to feel that
there may be any such doubt about the material deployed by Malta as to war-
rant hesitation in accepting it as evidence of what States have regarded as
being equitable in comparable situations. 1 would, in passing, respectfully
recall to the Court's notice, thExpert Opinion on Smte Praciice by Dr. J. R. V.
Prescott, which is annexed to Malta's Reply. There in short compass, Dr.
Prescott, an established authoriiy on boundary delimitation, analyses the
situation. Dr. Prescott has dealt with boundary delimitation, including maritime
boundaries, in a number of works and for a period of years. He has produced
books under such titles as Boitndaries and Frontiers (1978), The Political
Geography of the Oceuns (1975). and the Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty
(1975). He is a Reader in Geography in the University of Melbourne and a332 CONTINENTAL SHELF
man who has specialized in this area more so than any other authority whom 1
can identify. His analysis does not need to be repeated here but is clear and
speaks for itself.
To give substance to my invitation to the Court to reject Libya's attempt to
rebut the relevance and content of the practice cited by Malta, perhaps 1may
be perrnitted to look more closely at the paragraphs on the subject which
appear at pages 34 to 40 of the Libyan Reply (supra).
In paragraph 4.06, after misstating the basis on which Malta refe~s to the
examples of State practice - a matter to which 1 have already referred -
Libya asserts that there are three principal defects in Malta's argument. 1 res-
pectfully invite the Court to joinme in a close scrutiny of some of the allega-
tions of "defect", if for no better reason than to get some taste of the limita-
tions of Libya's arguments on points of detail.
As part of the first alleged defect Libya declares:
"It is clear that there is a large number of delimitation agreements
where island States and island dependencies have not been accorded a
median line in the delimitation of their continental shelves." (supra, LR,
para. 4.07.)
When one looks at each of the Libyan examples, one finds that they never
seem to tell the whole story. Either a part is omitted which isa part which
supports equidistance, or the circumstances are identifiably different from
those of Malta and 1-ibyain the present case.
First, Libya produced three examples "found in the Maltese pleadings"
(supra, LR, para. 4.08). The first example: the delimitation between Australia
and lndonesia in which, so Llbya States, Timor "received significantly less than
equidistance treatment". That is true - biit the situation was a special one.
The line was dictated by the existence of the Timor Trough - a feature which
creates a discontinuity between the Australian and Indonesian continental
shelves of an entirely different and greater order of magnitude than any of the
troughs which Libya invokes as relevant in the Pelagian Block. The deepest of
the Pelagian troughs is the Malta Trough, said by Libya to have a maximum
depth of 1,714 metres, a width of 11 miles and a length of between 87 and
108 miles (1, LM, para. 3.14). The same source indicates that the Timor
Trough is more than 550 nautical miles long as opposed to 87 or 108 of the
Malta Trough, and an average of 40 miles wide, as compared with 11 mites for
theMalta Trough. and the sea-bed slopes down on opposite sides to a depth of
over 10,000 feet, that is 3,000 metres or nearly twice the depth of the Malta
Trough. Moreover, the Timor Trough marks the edge of a plate and is an area
of subduction - thilsamounting to a fundamental discontinuity in the stricrest
sense of the term.
The second and third examples given by Libya are of the treatment of the
ltalian islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa, Linosa and Lampione and of the
British Channel Islands. It is true that none of these islands was accorded an
equidistance boundary - but the fact is that al1 the islands in question were
dependent islands and thus not in a position comparable to Malta or to
Bahrain, Indonesia, Japan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Haiti and Papua New Guinea - to mention but some of the island
States inrelation to which equidistance has been applied.
The Libyan Reply then cites in tabular form II examples "where islands
were not accorded strict equidistance in continental shelfdelimitations" (supra,
LR, para. 4.09). Mr. President, 1 began to prepare a comment on each of
these situations and then, by the time 1 had reached the sixth illustration, ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 333
realized that 1 was simply tilting at windmills. Libya is not using these
examples to contradict the relevance of equidistance, but only to support the
proposition that there are cases in State practice where strict (and 1emphasize
Libya's own limitation of its argument by the use of the word strict - that is
their word) equidistance has not been followed in continental shelf delimitations
involving islands. Of course, there are such cases. Malta does not Sayotherwise
and does not need to say otherwise.
There are cases where small islands - and even not so small ones - were
not given full weight in a delimitation. They are always dependent islands.
None of them are independent Staies. None of them is comparable to Malta in
size or location. So some deviation from the nom is not surprising. What mat-
ters for present purposes, however. is that in each case it is obvious that equi-
distance was the starting point and that equidistance was regarded as reflecting
the equities of the situation.
1 turn next to a second major defect which Libya claims to find in Malta's
use of State practice, namely, the assumption (as Libya puts it) that a method
of delimitation, because it has been used in particular delimitation situations
between other States, must of necessity be employed as between Libya and
Malta at least as an a prioro ir "pnmary" delimitation (supra, LR, para. 4.10).
It is important that Mafta should make its position clear on this matter.
Malta is nor suggesting any auiomatic application of equidistance to the pres-
ent case simply because it has been used by other States. Malta's proposition
may be put in the form of a question: why is it that equidistance plays so large
a part in the delimitation of continental shelves of island States unless there is
some community sense that equidistance is equitable in such circumstances?
The Libyan Reply asks, "How does Malta know?" what are the factors
which determine a State's choice of a particular line (see supra, LR, para. 4.11).
The answer lies, in large part, in the language which States use, coupled with
the line which they actually draw. Thus, if States describe their agreement as
equitable, or use some formula which has the same effect, and then use equi-
distance as the basic method of construction, can there be any better evidence
that they thought that equity called for the application of equidistance?
One rnay look, for example. at the agreement between the German
Democratic Republic and Poland concluded on 28 November 1975 (Limifs in
the Seas, No. 65). This is interestlng for several reasons. First, the preamble
states that the parties are "prompted by the desire toact in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention on the Continental Shelf', and that of course was
the Continental Shelf Conventian of 1958. My understanding is thatthose pro-
visions, Article 6, are seen, despite their wordingas being in effect, the equiva-
lent of the equitable principles/equitable result concept. Second, the parties
adopted the rnedian line as the controlling principle. Now of course that was a
delimitation between adjacent States but then comes the interesting part, the
third observation. They expressly acknowledged that the line which they drew
between them, the median line, should extend no further than a point equidis-
tant between the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Danish island of
Bornholm. Fourth, it is clear that the relevant coasts of the German Democratic
Republic and Poland are markedly larger than those of Bornholm. But, in so
far as proportionality may depend upon the comparative length of coastlines,
it is interesting that nothing is said about proportionality in this agreement
between Germany and Poland and itdoes not appear that the concept was seen
as having any role to play in the situation.
So, to sum up that item, Mr. President, what we have is a bilateral delimita-
tion agreement. The goveming principle is expressed in terms of reference to334 CONTINENTALSHELF
the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 which for present purposes may be
taken as an indication of the equitable solution approach. The other important
element in it is thatthese two adjacent States, confronted by an island beiong-
ing to a third State, out at sea, took the view that their bilateral delimitation
should stop at the equidistance point between those two States and the third
State's island, which is an acknowiedgment in effect that in terms of equity
they saw equidistance as the proper rule to apply to the delimitation with
Denmark.
Now, to take another example, almost at random, one may look at the decla-
ration of Uruguay and Brazil of 10 May 1969 (which appears as an Annex in
the United States series Limits in the Seas, No. 73). There we find an un-
usually explicit ackriowledgment of the relevance and role of State practice. The
substance of the declaration is that the two Governments recognize the median
line as the lateral limit of their respective maritime jurisdictions. But the sub-
stance is preceded by a series of preambular paragraphs of which the last pro-
vides a highly pertinent indication of the factors which motivated the two
countries to reach an agreement which each would evidently have been more
than surprised to hear characterized as other than equitable. This is what the
lastpreambularparagraph said of this declaration by Brazil and Uruguay :
"Considering the precedents established by international doctrines and
practices, multilateral conventions, and particularly Article 12 of the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone for the
purpose of determining the lateral border between maritime jurisdictions
of neighbouring countries."
That is interesting. Here are two countries which reach an agreement. They do
not expressly say that they are reaching that agreement on the basis of equi-
table principles leading to an equitable result. But as 1 have suggested, it is
inconceivable that either State would have thought that the conclusion thus
reached by agreement was inequitable. And for the purpose of rearhing ihat
conclusion, what do they Say? They Say: we have looked at "the precedents
established by international doctrines and practices", multilateral conventions
and particularly the 1958 Convention for the purpose of determining the lateral
border. That seems to me to be an inescapable indication of the concem those
two States had to reflect in their own practice the conduct of other States as
being something which established equitable standards.
Mr. President, 1 shall not pursue further the disagreement between the
Parties as to the extent and significance of State practice which applies the
equidistance concept. It must, of course, be recognized that when the Libyan
Reply was prepared, Dr. Prescott's expert opinion was not then available. This
opinion makes it clear that equidistance is a concept which has dominated
State practice in boundary delimitation. It is no use Libya saying that in a
number of cases equidistance was applied in an imperfect or qualified manner.
The fact is that equidistance was the basic concept, from which the process of
delimitation must have started and as a result of which the line adopied was
clearly recognizable as a modified equidistance line. Nor is anything gained by
Libya if it questions the motivation underlying the use of equidistance. The
point which is alniost too obvious to require statement is that: Dr. Prescott
States in paragraph 52 of his opinion the following :
"Before 1970 the proportion of boundaries which relied on equidistance
was 76 per cent, In the period since 1969, 83 per cent of boundaries de-
fined by the agreement have relied an equidistance." (supra, MR, p. 168.) ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 335
The dates of 1969 and 1970 are obviously selected by reference to the date of
the Court's Judgment in the North Sea Continental Sheif cases. Cün itfor a
moment be seriously maintained that States in concfuding these agreements
thought that the results which they were achieving were anything other than
equitable ?
1 turn at this point from the question of the application of equitable prin-
ciples. in the form of the concept of equidistance. But in doing so, I am
anxious to avoid leaving the Court with any impression that equitable corisid-
erations which 1 have not mentioned, but which have previously been developed
in Malta's written pleadings. are being abandoned. That is not the case at all.
But 1 am mindful of the Court's rule relating to the appropriate content of
observations in the course of the oral hearing. My task in relation to equitable
principles and the associated identilication of relevant circumstances has been
a limited one - limited to some elaboration of the nature of Stare practice and
a recolleclion of the relevance and rote of economic factors. But as the oral
arguments for Malta proceed. it will become evident that such additional consi-
derations a% Matta's concem for her own security are still a very important
part of Malta's case.
1hope rhat it will not be seen asunduly repetitive if 1emphasize the impli-
cations of Libya's claim that the boundary should be drawn within and dong
the line of the Rift Zone. The Libyan claim, if accepted, opens up the possibi-
lity that a continental shelf boundary line might be established within 25 nauti-
cal miles of Malta's shores. Libya would have sovereign rights to operate in
this area with a view to exploring for and exploiting the natural resources of
the sea-bed and subsoil. Malta would be confronted by the prospect of constant
ship and aircraft movements close to its shores but not subjecIO its regulation,
supervision or control. This movement would extend in time beyond the period
of exploration to that of the construction and use of oil drilling and production
rigs, standing on the sea bottom, with a wide range of associated submürine
devices emplaced on the sea floor. It would be natural for anyone to feel
apprehensive about al1 this activity and the presence and even possible misuse
of so much technologically advanced and sophisticated equipment.
I hardly need to iell this Couri of matters ofwhich ii can so readily iake
judicial notice. For we are no longer talking about development in the sea by
reference to small rigs: we are talking about developments in the sea which
involve the use of massive towers that stand several hundred feet high and pro-
vide accommodation for a hundred or more men. that include helicopter land-
ing pads, and are in effect vinually artificial islands.
If the Libyan contention were accepted, and let us say the 1973 proportion-
ality line were adopted. the effect would be that within perhaps 25 miles of
Malta's Coast,within ten minutes' flying time for a helicopier, you would have
these structures. There would be the risk of pollution in the event of blowouts
or other accidents, and yet none of the activities on board these artificial
islands would be under Malta's jurisdiction.
Such a situation would be unacceptable anywhere else, except in areas so
geographically constricted that geography created homogeneity and led to co-
operation between neighbouring States. But there is no such geographical
constriciion here. In terms of simple national security. the prorimity of so
much foreign nhysical presence within, as 1 suggested, so short a flighl of
Malta, not more perhaps than 15 niinutes' flight from its principal centres of
population süch as Valletta, is bound to be creative of genuine unease in
Malta.The exposure to such threats and apprehensions is something which is a
matter of good sense and fairness, as well as of sovereign equality, and should336 CONTINENTALSHELF
be shared by the Rirties equally; and the achievement of such equality is itself
an equitable consideration favouring the use of the equidistance method.
Mr. President, 1 now tum to the third main section of my submissions. This
relates to the "technical" part of the case - the geology and geomorphology
of the area between Libya and Malta; and I recognize that 20 minutes before
lunchtirne is hardly the best moment in the day at which to turn to a subject
which so manifestly provokes so little reaction amongst al1of us.
But, the crux of this case for Libya is its assertion that there is in the so-
called Rift Zone "a fundamental discontinuity in the sea-bed and subsoil sep-
arating the shelf area between the Parties". If Libya is wrong in this assertion,
that is effectively the end of Libya's positive case. 1t may be left with the pos-
sibility of criiicizing the development by Malta of its case. But unless Libya
can satisfy the Court, in a clear and convincing manner, of its contention that
the Rift Zone separates the shelf areas of the Parties, it does not even have the
starting-point to support the most important of the subrnissions with which it
concludes its Reply. This is Subrnission No. 9:
"The principles and rules of international law can in practice be applied
by the Parties so as to achieve an equitable result, taking account of the
physical factors and al1 the other relevant circumstances of this case, by
agreement on a delimitation within, and following the general direction of,
the Rift Zone as defined in the Libyan Mernorial."
If one knocks out the validity of that reference to a line "within, and fol-
lowing the general direction of, the Rift Zone", there is nothing left by way
of positive assertion in the Libyan case; and that is why one has to look at the
technical matters.
1can sincerely assure the Court that the last thing that 1ever wanted was to
get involved in a discussion of the geology and the geomorphology of the
Mediterranean sea-bed. 1 should much prefer to argue solid points of law.
Indeed, as the Court will have observed from the evolution of Malta's plead-
ings in this case, it is only reluctantly and subsidiarily that Malta has been pre-
pared to follow Libya into any discussion of the sea-bed characteristics of the
area. As the Court will appreciate, Malta's principal position in relation to the
Libyan Rift Zone assertion is that as a matter of iaw itis irrelevant having
regard to the substitution of distance for natural prolongation in its physical
sense as the basis for claims to the continental shelf. Thus, even if Libya's
presentation of its geological case were well founded in fact, it could not in law
have any impact upon the present case. And this point will be duly developed
by rny learned frieiid, Professor Weil.
Nonetheless, since Libya has accorded such prominence to its geological
case, the Court rnay feel that if Malta declines to react to it, that could reflect
either some inability on Malta's part to do so, or some belief on the part of
Malta that Libya's geological case is relevant and unanswerable. Nothing could
be further from the truth; and so it falls to me to develop Malta's submission
that Libya's case on the character and effect of the Rift Zone is, quite simply,
wrong. And after that 1 shall need to refer to the Libyan argument regarding
the so-called "Escarpments-Fault Zone".
1begin with the Rift Zone, and, Mr. President, if you will permit me, just so
that we can al1be clear as to the area about which 1 am speaking may 1be per-
mitted just to indicate it on the map. I am going to dra~ a line in the area in
which i understand, in the Libyan arguments, is covered by the Rift Zone; and
it is something that goes like this.
It lies to the West,the south-west, the south, and even so it is claimed,to the ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 337
south-east of Malta; and it lies, as the Coun can see, very close to Malta - as
1said a moment ago, the northem parts of the so-called Rift Zone can be as
close as 25 nautical miles to the coast of Malta. And it is, as the Court will
equally observe, a considerable distance away from the coast of Libya.
There are three respects in which the picture of geology and geomorphology
presented by Libya cannot be accepted.
First,it is incomplete. It fails to analyse specifically and precisely the
concept of a fundamental discontinuity separating the shelf areas between the
Parties.
Second, the presentation of some important facts, and of the cansequences
sought to be drawn from others. are open to sufficient adverse comment to
deprive them of persuasive value.
Third, the Libyan technical argument is incomplete because it faifs to give
due weight to other features of the sea-bed in the area between Malta and
Libya which, if geological and geomorphological considerations are pertinent,
have as much bearing on the question of delimitation as have the features
constituting the so-caHed Rift Zone.
1 shall begin with the fundamental defect of the Libyan case on the Rift
Zone. Now this is not so frighteningly technical as one might apprehend. This
defect is Libya's failure to establish the existence of the claimed fundamental
discontinuity which, so Libya asserts, places Malta and Libya on two separate
natural prolongations and hence on two distinct continental shelves.
It is a striking feature of al1 three stages of Libya's written pleadings that
they contain no attempt whatsoever to identify the meaning of the expression
"fundamental discontinuity" on which the whole of their case hangs, no
attempt whatsoever to identify the meaning of that expression or the establish-
ment and elaboration of it in factual ternis. The point is simple, they do not, at
any point in their pleadings, really grapple with the problem of the meaning of
fundamental discontinuity. 1will explain that now.
For example, the first place in the pleading at which a reference is made to
"continuity" - namely, at the beginning of the section on "The General
Setting" in Chapter 3 under the title "The Geornorphological and Geological
Setting" (1, LM, para. 3.06) - the words "the continuity of this area of shelf'
are used as if they had a single, clear, inescapabte rneaning. Apparently, it was
not thought necessary to suggesi that there was any room for a distinction to
be drawn between the sea-bed and itssubsoil or within the subsoil between the
upper and the lower crust, which lie above the earth'ç mantle.
Indeed, the Libyan Memorial goes on with a ~ersistence which excludes
accident, actually [Oconfuse the gëmorphological and the geological aspects of
the matter. Thus, it states a clear distinction between the Pelagian Block and
the African Plate. "These are", Libya says, "quite different kinds of physical
entities and are not CO-extensive"(1, LM. para. 3.11). "The first". Libya states,
"is geomorphological; the second is geological and involves consideration of
the entire lithosphere of the earth" (ibid.)At this point, therefore, the empha-
sis in the Libyan Memorial is on a geomorphological separation between Libya
and Malta. In the nexr paragraph (para. 3.12) the Memorial glides into a dif-
ferent proposition without acknowledging the change of direction. In entering
into a description of the northern boundary of the Pelagian Block (which. as
recently as the previous paragraph, was seen as a geomorphological or. in
effect, a surface feature), the Libyan Memorial claims that the features of this
boundary "separate in the physical sense the natural prolongation of the Libyan
landmass northward from the natural prolongation of Malta southward". Now,
to most readers, Mr. President. this would appear to be a reference to geologi-338 CONTINENTALSHELF
cal considerations since such words as "naturai prolongation" and "landmass':
refer to inherent content and structure rather than to surface shape. And fair
enough, the Libynn Memorial within a few lines slips in a reference to the
need for a discussion of geology. And so it continues : in one paragraph there is
a reference to geomorphology (e.g., para. 3.15); in the next a reference to geo-
logy (para. 3.16); in the one following (para. 3.17) a reference again to geo-
rnorphology and in the one following a reference to them both in the phrase
"the Rift Zone is a geological feature whose significance is reflected geornor-
phologicaily and whose effects are defoming the sea-bed and subsoil" (para.
3.18).
But that is a statment which begs the material questions. For the questions
are: how much sub-soil? To what depth? And, most important, with what
effect relevant to the task of the Court - a task of determining the limits of
the entitlement of the Parties to the legal concept of the continental shelf?
As 1 have stated, the Libyan Memorial never grapples directly and openly
with these questions. The nearest that it cornes to them is the staternent made
almost glancingly that "Geologically, these Troughs are deeply-seated grabens
which extend into the base of the earth's crust" (1, LM, para. 8.03). But in
contrast with many less material assertions in the Libyan Memorial, this vitally
important one is not accompanied by any evidential demonstration.
This failure to define the relationship between the claimed discontinuity be-
tween the natural prolongations of Malta and Libya and the subject-rnatter of
the case is maintained in the Libyan Counter-Memorial. Malta is charged with
conducting a "sketchy" discussion (II, LCM, para. 2.55) and with being
"casual" in its treatment of sea-bed features (II, LCM, para. 2.64). But Libya's
argument, for al1the dimension of its technical display. still limits its mention
of the essential detail to the statement (para. 2.59) that the depth of rifting in
the area of the Medina Channel, which is only one of the rifts upon which it
comes to rely :
"slices through the Tertiary, Cretaceous, Jurassic, Tnassic and Permian
layers of the subsoil (strata as old as 250 million years) down to a depth
of more than 5 kilometres. Seismic reflection profiles confirm this fact."
However, it is nowhere demonstrated that this faulting, whatever its degree and
depth, establishes a "fundamental discontinuity" in relation to the very conti-
nentalsheif in the delimitation of which the Court must aid.
That is not to Say that the Libyan Counter-Memorial entirely ignores the
relation between sea-bed and continental shelf. At one point, after making the
important declaration that Libya does not question that "this whole area is part
of the same African plate which is generally acknowledged to include the
southern part of Sicily", the Libyan Counter-Memorial continued thus:
"But the African Plate is not synonyrnous with the continental shelf. In
fact, there are several distinct continental shelves to be found on the
African Plate." (II, LCM, para. 2.60.)
Yet this assertion, of critical importance to Libya's case, is supported by a
reference to authority which, when scrutinized, tums out to invalve a number
of manipulative steps which rernove the conclusions a long way from the origi-
nal data.
When one turns to the Libyan Reply, the situation is not much different.
Again, the text speaks of the Rift Zone consituting "a fundamental disconti-
nuity in the area of continental shelf lying between Libya and Malta . . ."
(supra. LR, para. 5.21). But beyond developing certain technical arguments ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 339
already canvassed in the pleadings and to which 1 shall presently return, the
concept of discontinuity in the continental shelf as such is not funher devel-
oped.
And so, Mr. President. after what may seem a long introduction, 1 state
expressly the point which during ihese past few minutes 1have been making
by implication. The Court is concerned with the delimitation of the continental
shelf. Though the continental shelf is an expression which is geological in its
origin, itis for the purpose of this case something which is legal in ifs present
content. To speak, us do the Libyan pleadings, of a "fundamental disconti-
nuity" in the sea-bed and the subsoil or in the continental shelf is absolutely
not to the point unless that discoritinuity is related to a currently acceptable
working concept of the continentai sheff. Not only does Libya not attempt to
establish that relationship; it appears tbe entirely unconcerned wiih the need
for it. Thai is the first defect in the Libyan argument.
Now. it is reasonable to ask oneself, why should Libya have failed to
grapple with this point? It could certainly not be because it failed10 perceive
its pertinence. It is rather, 1 would submit, because once the relevance of the
point is identified, it is in the present case quite impossible to establish an
appropriate discontinuity in the relevant continental shelf.
TheCourt rose at I p.m. ELEVENTH PUBLIC SITTING (28 XI 84, 10a.m.)
Present: [See sitting of 26 XI 84, Judge Lachs absent.]
The PRESIDENT : Further to rny announcement yesterday, Judge Lachs is
unabte to be with us this moming.
ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT(cont.)
C'OUNSELFOR THE GOVERNMENTOF MALTA
Mr. LAUTERPACHT: Perhaps the Members of the Court wiil permit me to
remind thern of the point that 1 had reached in my argument yesterday, by
approaching it from a slightly different angle. It occurs to me that 1 could
converiiently begin this moming by indicating to the Court the limited and
unintimidating range of the physical features which figure in the controversy in
this case.
For this purpose may 1 ask the Court to use, as the basis of this survey,
@ Figure 3 in the looseleaf binder provided by Malta. This is the one which is
entitled "Faults and Rifting in the Pelagiann".
This Figure corresponds to Figure 19, which appears in the Annexes to the
MakteseCounter-Mernorial (II), Volume II, at page 50. 1oshould be grateful
if the Court wouldow allow me to take it through the following steps. I may
@ say that I have adopted this Figure 3 as the basis for presenting the situation to
the Court,because the iines on it, which represent the pattern of troughs and
rifting in the Pelagianasin will assisthe Court in finding the various fea-
@ tures which1 shall indicate in a moment on the map. The Court will also find
it helpful, perhaps not now but in due course, to look at the bathyrnetric chart
of the Pelagian Sea. which appears in Malta's Counter-Mernorial (II), Volume
II, at page 16; it is helpful and easy to follow.
1turn to the map behind me in order to go through the various features of
thearea.
Here is the Pelagian Sea; the whole of this area here, stretching up into its
eastem limit, which corresponds iname with the edge of the escarpment. At
that point the Sea changes its name and becomes the Ionian Sea; and the Court
is primarily concemed with this section of the Pelagian Sea and part of the
Ionian Sea.
The water depths in the lonian Sea are evidently much greater than they are
in the Pelagian Sea. This is a bathymetric map, and so of course the colours
reflect the water depths.
The point should however be made that notwithstanding the considerable
depths of water in the lonian Sea, that whole area falls within the definition of
the continental shelf which appears in t1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
the words of which 1shalt refer to in a minute. And the reason why, notwith-
standing the depths, this is continental shelf area is because the sea-bed is
overlain by a depth of six to seven kilornetres of sedirnents. This area is also
al1continental shelf as is evident from the depths concemed. ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 341
Here is Malta and the associated island of Gozo. May 1 invite the Mernbers
of the Court to do as1 do now. which is to connect the north-west extremity of
the island of Gozo with the sea terminus of theland boundary between Tunisia
and Libya by a straight line - rather like this1 am sorry that 1 am not very
good at drawing straight lines, but thai is intended to be a straight line connect-
ing the two points. 1 shall cal1 this line "the Straight Line" for ease and
convenience. 1 apologize to my colteagues for venturing to use the definite
article and capital letters to describe a feature even more cornmon than the Rift
Zone.
The area to the north-west of this line obviously does not lie in any way
between Libya and Malta - the area to the north-wesof that line.
In order to give the Court a full description of the area, so that it is as fair
as much to my colleagues as it is to us, 1 have to go to the north-west of the
line to identify the island of Pantelleria.
Stretching south-east from Pantelleria, between the IWO lines which üppear
@ on Figure 3 just to the south-east of Pantelleria, is the Pantelleria Trough. That
is in approximately that area, there- the two lines are the ones which have
teeth, facing inwards and are running south-eastwards from Pantelleria.
Then at the south-east end of the upper line running from Pantelleria, with
its teeth facing to the south-west, at the south-east end of that upper line one
runs into the Malta Trough, which is approximately that area - there - and
lies also between two lines with their teeth facing inwards.
The deep pan of the Malta Trough lies principally to the north-west of the
Straight Line. Only a small section of deep water lies to the south-east of the
Straight Line, just south of Malta. Then the Malta Trough becomes markedly
shallower, as the waters become shallower, and it runs into the Matta Channel,
which is the extension to the east.
Now we have to go back to the south-east end of the Pantelleria Channel
once more. We have looked at the extension of the northern part, now we must
look at the extension of the southern part and when 1use the word "extension"
1 am not accepting that that is a description of what actually happens in geolo-
gical terrns but it is convenient to use that word to describe the area to you. It
is clear that at the south-east end of the Pantelleria Trough we run into the
Linosa Trough, which stretches for a short way - 1have made a slight mis-
take because the Linosa Trough does not extend beyond the Straight Line. The
Linosa Trough is to the north-west of the Straight Line. So. to recapitulate, the
Pantelleria Trough and the Linosa Trough lie entirely to the north-west of the
Straight Line. Only the Malta Trough stretches çlightly to the south-east of the
Straight Line.
1go tothe next feature. We have here a large innorninate area- it does not
have a name - which is ar the end of the Linosa Trough, south of Malta
where the waters are shallower. These waters then run towards the Medina
Channel here and this Medina Channel descends into the Heron Valley, which
is there. So we have the Malta Channel to the north. the Medina Channel to
the south and the Heron Valley lying at that point.
South of the Medina Channel is the Medina Bank. This is a much shallower
area and itis important in this case because it is the area in which we are al1
interested because in this whole region in dispute this is the area believebeto
one where oil is most likely to befound. It lies well to the north of the equi-
distance line. It is the area in which Malta granted concessions in the period
1973- 1974.So, this is the Medina Rank.
Just to the south-west of the Medina Bank lies the Melita Bank and to the
south-west of the Melita Bank lies the Jarrafa Trough, which corresponds with 342 CONTINENTAL SHELF
@ the row of parallel lines in Figure 3, which is the second one frorn the bottom.
Perhaps it will be helpful if 1 indicated first the Tripolitanian Furrow. The
Tripolitanian Furrow lies here, in this area, and is the bottom set of parallel
@ lines with the teeth facing inwards in Figure 3. Slightly above that and slightly
to the north-west of that isheJarrafa Trough - the set of parallel lines above
the Tripolitanian Furrow. The Jarrafa Trough gets deeper as it runs in the south-
easterly direction. Likewise the Tripolitanian Furrow gets deeper as it runs in
thesouth-eastern direction. The Tripolitanian Furrow is, of course, the Trough
on which the Court has something to say in the TunisialLibya case. The Court
in that case rejected the Tripolitanian Furrow as a relevant feature because the
Court considered that its significant depths lay too far to the east to affect the
delimitation between Libya and Tunisia. But those features of the Tripolitanian
Furrow - its depths -, which were not relevant in the TunisialLibya case are
relevant in this case that is to say if any such features are relevant at -l1
because in this case the deeper waters of the Tripolitanian Furrow in this area
lie, of course, between Libya and Malta.
Mr. President, 1have ventured to take the Court through this accumulation
of features, not because Malta attaches importance to them, but because Libya
does so, or at any rate, attaches importance to al1of them except those that do
not suit it, namely. the Jarrafa Trough and the Tripolitanian Furrow.
So, at this point, we can come back almost to the point that we had reached
yesterday and identify the crux of Libya's case. Starting from the Pantelleria,
Malta and Linosa 'ïroughs - which al1 lie to the north-west of the Straight
Line and with the exception of that small projection of the Maita Trough
slightly to the south-east of that line, Libya constructs out of those Troughs
and of their much milder sea-bed expressions to the south-east, namely, the
Malta and the Medina Channels, this conception of the Rift Zone, but really it
rests simply on those three Troughs which stretch so far, and in one case only
a little further, and then the relatively shallow expressions of the faulting to the
south-east ofMalta.
This area is not dascribed by Libya as a rift zone but as "the Rift Zone", as
if it were something very special and controlling. At the same time, while
asserting the relevance of these features to the north, Libya insists on the ir-
relevance of the comparable features of the Jarrafa Trough and the Tripolitanian
Trough to the south. This is a major discrepancy in Libya's approach to the
geology and geomorphology of the area and 1 shall have more to Say a bit
later. For the moment. 1limit myself to the situation in the north.
Here Libya says that there is a "fundamental discontinuity". such as by itself
to warrant the area to the north of the so-called fundamental discontinuity
king regarded as one continental shelf and the area to the south of it as
another; Malta's to the north; Libya's to the south.
And that is how 1 come to the point at which I closed yesterday. Although
Libya talks about a "fundamental discontinuity", it nevcr identifies in legal
terms the structure in which that continuity is said to lie and to operate. Nor
does it ever Say what is meant to a geologist or geomorphologist by the
concept of a fundamental discontinuity. Malta's position on the point is as fol-
lows: the only structure in which a discontinuity, if one exists, can operate in
legal terms, is the legal structure of the continental shelf and the discontinuity
must be of a kind which is recognized in law.
1 can now pick up at the point where 1 stopped yesterday. This is an appro-
pnate place at which to refer to the definition of the continental shelf which
appears in Article 76 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and 1apologize
for reading parts of it because 1am sure it is so famili!Oyou : ARGUMENT OP MR. LAUTERPACHT 343
"1. The continental shelf of ricoastal State comprises the sea-bed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge
of the continental margin. or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadih of the territorial sea is measured where
the outer edge of the continental margindoes not extend up to that distance.
[That is the basic concept.]
2. The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the
limits providefd or in paragraphs4 to6."
Paragraph 3 is important :
"3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of
the landmass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil
of the shelf, the slope and the rise. Ii.does not include the deep ocean
floor with its oceünic ridges or the subsoil thereof."
And then there is iri paragraph 4 a definitio:
"4. (O) For the purposes of this Convention. the coastal State shüll estab-
lish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured,by either:
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the
outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary
rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to
the foot of the continental slope".
Mr. President, 1 do not really need to read anything more except the state-
ment :
"(h) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the conti-
nental slope shall be detennined as the point of maximum change in the
gradient atits base .. ."
My leamed friend Professor Weil will deal with the legal implications of that
definition in due course.
It is evident from this definition that the existence of a geological fauli sys-
tem or of the geomorphological refleciion thereof in a continental shelf will
not affect the existence in law of the coniinental shelf. The natural prolonga-
tion of the land territory of a State isdeemed to extend to the point at which
the slope and the rise descend to the deep ocean floor. But that deep ocean
floor is not reached by the troughs and grabens of which Libya speaks in the
Rift Zone. Even in the area of the lonian Sea and the abyssal plain to the east
of the Sicily-Malta iind Medina Escarpments the thick sedirnentary cover
which overlies the deep abyssal plairi brings it fully within the definition of the
continental shelf. Italy and Greece have shown by the southern projection of
their agreed continent:il shelf delimitation that they regard their common conti-
nental shelf as extending into depths frirgreater than those of the troughs men-
tioned by Libya. The Court will remember that the Italian-Greek line is
coming down into this area and ends somewhere in that zone. But as the Court
can see the line cornes into ihis area of very deep water and the sea-bed on
either side of the line lying beneath that deep water is deemed by both Italy
and Greecz to fonn part of their respective continental shelf areas. And even
Libya itself clairns an entitlementIO coniinental shelf rights in this same area
east of the escarpments. The whole of this area stretching from here right over344 CONTINENTAL SHELF
to here falls within the range of Libya's continental shelf clairns. There is this
massive area to the east of Ras Zarruq and stretching as far as the Egyptian
border. This is al1this same deep water which overlies a depth of six to seven
kilometres of sedimentary deposits and thus constitutes the area of continental
shelf within the definition of the Law of the Sea Convention. So mere faljing
away of the sea-bed, even to great depths, does not terminate the continental
shelf. That is the important point that 1seek to make.
This should not be regarded as surprising. It is entirely in accord with the
development of modern dnlling technology which isnow capable of drilling
commercial wells to depths of seven and eight kilometres and of doing so in
depths of water even as great as two kilometres. (See Michaei E. Jones,
Deepwater Oil Production and Manned Underwater Sirucfures (1981), pp. 9-
10). In other words, there is no technical reason why the economic activity
principülly associated with the continental shelf should not be carried on in
great depths of water and in great depths of underlying sedimentary deposit.
The fact that there may be faulting in the subsoil through which the drill
passes in no way deprives the area in which the drilling occurs of its conti-
nuity ss continental shelf or indeed even of its geological continuity. Of thi1
shall have more to say presently.
But then. the question may understandably be posed: if, as 1 submit, the
presence of even a deep fault does not amount to a fundamental discontinuity
in the continental shelf, what does?
There are two elements in the answer.
The first is that the concept of "fundamental discontinuity" is in fact one
with which geologists as such are not familiar. In their art thdo not have to
talk about "fundamental discontinuity". Of course, they rnay use the word
"discontinuity" alone. because that is a purely descriptive word. But scientists
need much more than the adjective "fundamental" to identify in satisfactory
scientific terms the size or character of a discontinuity. Essentially. the phrase
"fundamental discontinuity" is a layman's term. It has no technical geological
meaning or relevance.
That being so, we corne to the next element in the answer to this question of
what could a "fundamental discontinuity" mean. If one is to speak of any dis-
continuity in a sense which can be recognized by geologists, then the only real
discontinuity in the earth's lithosphere- that is to Say. the whole of the area
between, so to speak, the bottom of the sea and the top of the highly molten
area beneath the eürth's crust- is where continental crust meets oceanic cmst
and this happens, for example, at the foot of the continental slope between the
Ionian abyssal plain and the African continental shelf. Other discontinuitiesf
comparable magnitude may be found in what are called mid-ocean spreading
centres - in the deep ocean - where plates are diverging. Or yet again. one
finds such discontinuities in highly active continental margins where plates are
converging and creating areas of subduction, as in the Timor Trough. But the
so-called "Rift Zone" does not fall into any of these categories. In other words,
to have a discontinuity of a kind that is significant you have to have this line
between oceanic cmst and continental cmst.
Mr. President, 1now tum ro the second main heading of my consideration of
the geomorphological and geological technicalities of the Libyan case in rela-
tion to the Rift Zone. This is that Libya's interpretation of the basic data is so
open to question that theCour thould not accept it.
1 shall submit thar the Libyan suggestion that there is a fundamental discon-
tinuity in the area of the so-called Rift Zone is not established in any sense
material to this case. This is in part because the rifting, such as it is, is in the346 CONTINENTAL SHELF
1 shall have more to Say about them later. In the meantime, 1 am anxious !O
suggest - with the greatest of respect - that considerable caution must be
exercised when reading the descriptive language used by Libya or its experts
in order to avoid being swept away by what 1may cal1the "enthusiasm" of the
words used.
In the remarks that follow, 1 shall concentrate on statements made in the
Libyan Reply, and will take a number of them in turn, in the order in which
they are made.
1. At paragraph 5.19 the Reply (supra) States that "the principal point about
the Rift Zone that has emerged from the pIeadings of the Parties to date is that
itsphysical existence is acknowledged by both Parties". That isnot a correct
statement. As the Libyan Reply itself acknowledges, Malta does not concede
that there is an area called "the Rift Zone". Libya has adopted this name for
the area which specially interests it. Just as I have adopted the name "the
Straight Line" for the line that interests me. But the name "Rift Zone" is not a
name which geologists or geomorphologists have attached to this area to dis-
tinguish it from other areas. The expression does not have the same connota-
tion as, forexample, the words "the Gulf', narnely, the area of sea which lies
between, principally, Iran and Saudi Arabia. When one speaks of "the Gulf*'
the words would nciwadays be taken as referring only to that area and to no
other. But if, in the course of a discussion among geologists, one were to refer
to "the Rift Zone", without more, the participants would al1look uncertain and
would ask: "which Rift Zone? There are so many."
The nomenclature "the Rift Zone" is thus a confection manufactured by
Libya for iis own piirposes in fhis case.
What Malta acknowledges is that there is an area of rifting between Malta
and Libya. but it is not so special as to warrant the attribution to it of an aura
of uniqueness by according to it the use of the definite article and the use of
the capital letters; nor is it so special or so specific as to warrant identifying it
as a relevant discontinuity in the continental margin which falls to be delimited
between the two countries; nor is it limited to those features which Libya
invokes as "constituting a fundamental discontinuity".
2. In paragraph 5.21 of the Reply (supra), Libya once again refers to seis-
mic profiles in an attempt to support its assertion of the existence of a funda-
mental discontinuity "between Libya and Malta". This attracts two cornrnents:
(1) First, there is no basis for assuming that because a fault appears on a
seismic profile, it necessarily reflects a relevant "fundamental discontinuity".
For example, what the profile along line MS 19, as it is called, shows is, of
course, that there is faulting in the technical geologicalsense, that is to Say,in the
sense that the layers of subsoil have, so to speak, slipped one against another.
But the basic continuity of the sea-bed as a physical feature is unaltered.
The same geological layers appear in the same vertical sequence; they appear
in approximately the same thickness; and they appear with the same sedimen-
tary and fossiliferous content al1the way from Libya to Malta.
For al1 scientific authorities who have worked in this region are agreed that
the entire crust beneath the Pelagian Sea and the sediment layers deposited
upon it form a geological unity, a definite geoIogica1unity. The ages and types
of rocks found in Malta and the distinctive fossils contained in them are the
same as those which are found in eastem Tunisia and northern Libya. In geolo-
gical terms the entire crust beneath the Pelagian Sea has formed a platform
with essentiaily the same sediments deposited across its entire area at any
given geological time. For exampie, Dr. Finetti, an expert for Libya, has writ- ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTBRPACHT 347
ten in an earlier article than the one which 1 have already cited, namely, his
article with Professor Morelli in1973 (Finetti and Morelli, 1973, Bollerino di
Geofisica, Vol. 15), that "in the Strait of Sicily there is absolute continuity of
the continental African plate from Tunisianibya up to the Ragusan massif
[thatis, the rocks of south-eastern Sicily]" (p. 261). He also said :hat
"there exists an absolute continuity of sediments from southern Sicily to
the northern African coasts, and al1 the sequences involve variable, but
always consistent thicknesses of pre-pliocenic Tertiary and Mesozoic [i.e.,
sedirnents deposited more than5 million years agol" (p. 299).
It is true that, although the entire Pelagian Block forms a geological unity, it
has through itshistory been frequently stretched and faulted. When continental
crust is stretched,it breaks along faults because it is brittle. Most areas of
continental crust inthe world, and particularly those lying near the edges of
large plates like the African Plate have numerous faults in them and the
Pelagian Block is no exception. When continental crust is stretched it often
accommodates the stretching by faulting along two inward-dipping faults, with
the crustal block in the middle dropping down to form a valley or graben.
If the stretching motion ceases,a valley will be left.Ifit is beneath the sea
this valley will gradually be filled with sediment deposited in the sea until
eventually the sediment completely fills the valley leaving a flat overlying sea-
floor. Then one can only determine how much stretching has occurred by map-
ping the down-faulted layers of rock using seismic reflection profiles (which
give a cross-section along the profile).
Libya has drawn attention to a number of disconnected grabens south and
south-west of Malta which they refer to as the "Rift Zone". These are relatively
young in geologjcal terms, having been formed only over the past 10 to
15 million years. Although accordirig to Dr. Finetti's 1984 paper, the motion
has decreased in recent times, the area appearsstill to remain active and there
has not been lime for the graben troughs or valleys to be filled with sediments.
Therefore rhey appear as valleys or troughs in the sea-bed. However, the
average rate of subsidence, even in these troughs, is less than one miilimetre
per yeür.
Now, 1 must ask to be forgiven if the point which 1 am about to make is
seen as being very eiementary - but it is a point which must be borne in
mind when there is talk of rifting imd faulting. The activity of striking, slip-
ping, stretching, wrenching and rotating is reflected in actual openings and
gaps only in the surface of the sea-bed when, in the rnannerI have already
described, a rift, trough or channel may open up and then in due course be
coated or filled with sediments. But, Mr. President, it is important to appre-
ciate that undemeath the sea-bed, in the subsoil, there are no gaps. Even when
there is a fault, the two surfaces or planes on either side of the fault are
in constant contact with each other under the pressure of the superjacent
water and of the sea-bed itself. So, from the layman's point of view. there is
no subsoil physical discontinuity. Yuu could not squeeze a razor blade into the
crack.
While 1 realize thai any analogy is bound tobe faulty in some respect, per-
haps one rnight liken the sea-bed area between Libya and Malta to a wedge-
shaped slice of layer cake with its apex or point lying to the west-north-west of
Malta and the rest of it spreading, almost Iike a fan, towards the eaçt, with one
side running past Malta and the other down towards Libya. In a way not dis-
@ similar to the layout of the troughs which appear on Figure 3. 1 have in mind ARGUMENT OF MU. LAUTERPACHT 349
the Malta, Pantelleria and Linosa Troughs. Libya invokes the technical paper
of Malta's expert, Professor Vanney, in claiming support of the contention that
the Malta Trough lies between Malta and Libya.
Two things must be observed. The first is that Libya, having begun by assert-
ing the significance of al1three troughs, ends by relying upon one trough only,
the Malta Trough, which stretches just to the south of Malta. The second is
that the south-eastwards extension uf the Malta Trough is only slight in rela-
tion to the area of dispute between the two Parties and therefore can hardly
serve as an essential factor in establishing the existence of any relevantda-
mental discontinuity.
When Libya attempts, in paragraph 5.26 of the Reply (supra) to overcome
the relative slightness of the intrusion of the Malta Trough into the area lying
between the two Parties, it does so by citing a paper written by experts who
have assisted the Libyan team (see supra, LR, p. 65). Even these experts start
from the premise that the area in question forms part of the African margin
stretching northwards; and the language used to describe the relevant geologi-
cal events is hardly that of "fundamental discontinuity", but merely that des-
criptive of three stylof faulting.
So that, Mr. President, conctudes my second comment on the seismic
faulting.
3. 1 should refer next to a further argument which Libya develops in para-
graph 5.27 of the Reply (supra) as hearing out its contention regarding the dis-
continuity between Libya and Maltti, and as they allege "the continuity of the
Rift Zone". In other words, while there is discontinuity here, the allegation is
that there is continuity there. The argument which they use in paragraph 5.27
is a quite striking illustration of the type of argument which Libya has been
forced to develop.
The argument consists of reliance upon gravity anomaly data along the Rift
Zone. Now, what is meant by "gravity anomaly data"? These wards refer ta
the measurement of the force of gravity to determine the thickness and charac-
ter of the crusts in any particular area. The thinner the crust, the greater the
measurement of gravity. Because in a thinner area the measurement is greater
than one would expect in anormal or unfaulted area, one speaks of a "gravity
anomaly" and hence of "gravity anornaly data". From a study of these gravity
anomaly data, Libya seeks to identifya line which it calls an axial ridge of the
@ Rift Zone. This is illustrated on Map 10 (opposite supra LR,p. 66).1 am very
sorry, we have not put that into the Maltese dossier and it is being prepared so
that you may see it, andit will be hiinded in in due course.
This map, which appears at the moment in the Libyan Reply, is an appa-
rently clear and simple red line which is said to represent "the axial ridof
the Rift Zone where the crust has been stretched to its thinnest poin1hope 1
will not be accused of deliberately distorting the line 1am going to attempt
to draw it into this mapso that the Court may see for what Libya is contend-
ing. Effectively, Libya is suggesting that there should be a line that goes
something like that - it rnay not be entirely accurate- but something like
that.
Mr. President, 1 am sorry 1 missed something and rny learned Agent has
very helpfully recalled thisto my natice. May I invite the Court to turn to
@ Figure 13 in Malta's loose-leaf book and there you will see the axial ridge
line. It is a red line drawn in, starting just to the north-west of Pantelleria and
apparently passing through Pantelleria, through the Pantelleria Trough then
down towards Linosa and then moving through the south-east, and 1see happily 350 CONTINENTAL SHELF
coinciding on this rnap with quite considerable parts of Libya's 1973 propor-
tionality line, and then moving up to the north-east. through the Malta Channel
until it reaches the escarpment. 1am sorry, it ia very small line to be seen on
this map.
Paragraph 5.27 of the Libyan Reply (supra) refers to Annex 7 as containing
the technical foundation for this line. The first limitation on this approach
which has to be appreciaied - but is clearly not brought out in the Libyan
pleading - is that the residual graviiy map, from which that red line is de-
rived, is not a direct or immediate reflection of objectively verifiable elements.
Measurements take place, but after the stage of measiiremenl theresulting data
have, as 1understand if.gone through two stages of modification, each involv-
ing the exercise of the author's discretion. Now, what are these two discretio-
nary stages? The first was IO use a mathematical procedure to correct the
effect which the body of water lying above the sea-bed has upon the measure-
ments of the gravity field. In other words, to get some uniform approach to the
measurements, a guess has to be made of the density of the rock below the
water, and this has tobe followed by a calculütion of the quantity of rock of
that density which would fiIl the relevant water column. In that way, one can
"even out" al1the underlying materiai, but that al1involves a guess. That guess
may be an informed guess but the elements in it are no; identified, indeed the
fact that guess has been made has not been mentioned.
Then there cornes the second discretionary stage. The information, after this
first guess has been put into operation, is then "filtered.In Annex 7 of the
Libyan Reply, there appears what is called the residual gravity map. Ihave a
copy of this hereand it is of that thatcopy will be presented by Malta in due
course. At the bottom left-hand corner of the residual gravity rnap there is a
reference to "filter length" which appears to be the square root of 10s= 31.6
kilometres, and no explanation was provided, either in Dr. Finetti's article or
in the Libyan Reply, of why that length was chosen; and there is no obvious
reason for it. What is meant by this concept of a "filter" is that certain points
are left out in order to obtain a certain evenness of line. That filter is ex-
pressed in terms of distance, 31.6 kilometres, but why this was chosen is not
stated. It thus leads one to think that perhaps that is the length which best suifs
the theory which the production of the rnap is intended to support. The Court
will appreciate what the theory is. That if you can identify this axial ridge line
it reflects some kind of break in the crust. so that there is a fundamental dis-
continuity evidenced by the gravity anomaty.
Apart from the uncenainty relating to that evidence, there is the fact that
when one looks at that residual gravity rnap and at the axial ridge line drawn
on the basis of it, one can observe the arbitrary manner and preconceived
@ character of the line which appears so smoothly drawn in Figure 13 of Malta's
loose-leaf book. On the rnap on page 18 of Annex 7 of the Libyan Reply one
can see the so-called axial ridge line, drawn as a pair of black parallel tram-
lines. What is this line? It is. in faci. nothing more than a line which has been
drawn to connect certain highs on the map. The rnap is expressed as an ordi-
nq contour map, but it is no&a rnap of the contours of the sea-bed, it is a
map of gravity anomalies. And so there are certain highs where there is more
gravity and therefore. presumably. thinner crust. So, what the axial ndge line
is doing is connecting the highs and the line which Libya has drawn is mani-
fest from the map. But one has to look more closely at the rnap, and when one
does this it is evident that there are many highs besicles those which Libya has
used as the points which are connected by its axial ridge line. These other
highs, or plussigiis, are marked by two characteristics: ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 351
(1) They are no less numerous than those through which the Libyan axial
ridge line was drawn.
(2) Those other highs or plusses reflect gravity anomalies of comparable
magnitude to those through which the Libyan line is drawn. That is to say.
they are marked by contour lines carrying the number 5 and 10. It is both pos-
sible and perrnissible, and indeed, in this case, necessary to connect these other
highs by lines in the same way as Libya has connected the highs which it has
chosen to underlie its own axial ridge line. But if these other highs are corn-
parably connected, one gets a very different picture. I apologize for the lack of
a figure in Our dossier, but we shall have one prepared and circulated as
Figure 40.
For example. in the western sector of the rnap, a line could have been drawn
running in a generally north-souih direciion through an eastwards-bending
curve. In the southem central part of the map an almost north-south line could
have been drawn. 1,üstly. and perhaps most compellingly of all, in the south-
east corner, only a littlemore thari 100 kilometres north of the coast between
Tripoli and Misurata, a line could have been drawn roughly parallel to the
axial ridge line selected by Libya, but at least 200 kilometres nearer to the
Libyan coast. This would have reflected the existence on a comparable scale of
gravity anomalies in the Tripolitanian Trough - a subject to which 1 shall
retum later.
Now if that is the kind of evidence that is introduced to buttress the Libyan
case, 1suggest that the validity of that case is, Io say the least, seriously corn-
promised. Libya niay contend in ils reply that the residual gravity map is only
a subsidiary argument. That would not meet Malta's criticism. In the firsr
place, Dr. Fineiti in his 1984 article (p. 7) expressly claims that the residual
gravity anomalies additionally "provide a very important contribution to the
understanding of the deep effect of the observed fragmentation". Secondly.
even if the gravity anomaly data constituted a subsidiary argument, one could
quite properly pose the following dilemma: either the main argument is suffi-
ciently strong to support Libya's case. in which event there is no need to bol-
ster it,or it is not sufficiently strong - and so Libya. apparently, thinks:
othenvise it would not have brought in the residual gravity rnap. And if the
main argument is not strong, a persuasive argument cannot be made out of an
accumulation of individually weak arguments.
The Court crdjourned from II.15 0.m. to 11.30a.m.
Having thus identified the weakness of the use of the gravity anomaly data.
I should return for a moment to the character of the rifting upon which Libya
relies. In paragraph 5.25 of the Reply (supra), in an attempt to meet Malta's
observation that the so-called Rift Zone, if it ia discontinuity at ali, does not
extend to the south and south-east of Malta in any significant way, Libya States
"a feature of this sire involving pull-apart and shearing motions, is necessarily
diffuse". Now, in this manner, Libya effectively concedes Malta's point.
Whatever may be the magnitude and nature of the rifting to the Westand north-
Westof Malta, the rifting to the south and south-east of the so-called Rift Zone
of Malta is much less intense because of the fan-like character of the feature.
The nature of this development is shown in Part II of Annex 2 of Maltais
Counter-Memorial (II). the part prepared by Professor Mascle. There he 352 CONTINENTAL SHELF
shows, at pages47 to 51, the configuration of a zone rifting by an anticlock-
@ wise rotation of its northern part and Figures 18-2 and 19 demonstrate pre-
cisely what is going on in the relevant area; and Figure 19 is the one which
@ is reproduced in M;ilta7s loose-leaf book as Figure 3. As is particularly clear
from this Figure, once one moves south-eastwards from the zone of deeper
rifting Westof Malta, which does not lie between Malta and Libya, there is no
particular reason why one should adopt as the south-west extension of that
riftingnly the Malia and Medina Channels. The fan-like spread of rifting also
stretches downto include the Jarrafa Trough and, to the south and south-west
of that, to include even the Tripolitanian Valley. Frofessor Mascle concludes
with these words:
"the Pelagian Sea is the seat of extensional faulting whichs relatively
concentrated in the westernregion and is on the contrary diffused in the
east. In the latter case, locating a structuralt becomes problernatic."
(II, MCM, Vol. II,p. 56.)
Mr. President, i1 may just go back to my fan for a moment, the fan illus-
trates very clearly what Professor Mascle is saying, that the Pelagian Sea is the
seat of extensional faulting which is relatively concentrated in the western
region- in other words, the faulting is deeper and more concentrated at the
handle end of the fan: and is, on the contrary, diffused in the east. So there
you are, at the east. and it is spread out and diffused. Now. it does not stop
there, but it extends there to include the Jarrafa and the Tripolitanian Furrows.
The Libyan Reply does not contradict this conclusion but pretends rather
thatif is irrelevant, may be seen from paragraph 5.28 of the Libyan Reply
(supra). Now it is diffrcult to see what is relevant about an explanation of the
structure of the relevant area of sea-bed andsubsoil which contradicts the
Libyan contention that thealta and Medina Channels are the exclusive conti-
nuation of the so-called fundamental discontinuities,they are the continua-
tion of it at alf.
One of the difficulties that Libya has in discussing its so-called Rift Zone is
that this zoneis in fact a composite feature of many separate troughs. Its
greatest expression, the Pantelleria Trough, is far to the north-west of Malta,
well outside tharea of delimitation at present under discussion. The Pantelleria
Trough in the West is replaced in the east bythe two troughs with greatly
reduced sea-bed expression, the Malta and Linosa Troughs. Even further east-
wards, immediately south of Malta, the troughs are represented by the Malta
and the Medina Channels, which exhibit even less sea-bed expression.
The generation of the fault grabens. or troughs, as a result of the large-scale
rotation, which has been discussed by Malta, not only satisfies al1the scientific
data but alsoexplains why there are more troughs in the east of the Pelagian
Block than in the west: the reason is that the extension that results from the
rotation is greater in the east than in the west, and so it causes more of these
grabens, or troughs, to be generated in the east. Furthemore, the Jarrafa and
Tripolitanian Troughsin the south of the area are seen to be the result of the
same rotational extension as has caused the opening of the so-called Rift Zone
in the north.
Measurements have been made of the extension recorded by the grabens
@ along a profile running northwards frorn Tripoli in Libya to Ispica (Fi4).
The extension has been calculated since the end of the Mesozoic period. that is
to say during the last 65 million years, because the rock layer deposited at the
@ end of the Mesozoic is easily identified on seismic profiles (shoneFig. 4).
Having measured theangle at which the faults dip downwards from the many ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 353
seismic profiles, and the amount by which the rocks are displaced by the
faults, it is possible to determine what amount of extension has occumd. The
results show that the extension of the northem troughs - those of Malta and
Linosa - is the same as the extension of the southem iroughs - that is to
Say, Jarrafa and Tripolitania - along lhat line (Tripoli-Ispica). Thus, the
Libyan Rift Zone is not unique. The amount of extension in the southern half,
nearest to Libya, is the same as the amount of extension over the last 65 mil-
lion years in the northern part of the Pelagian Block. the half nearest to Malta.
Again, the shallow water area of the Lampedusa Plateau and the Melita and
Medina Banks appears as an axis of symmetry dividing equally the extension
to the north and the south. In other words, here is the Lampedusa Bank, here
are the Malta and Medina Banks, so in a sense youhave this raw of Banks
lying between the faults to the north and the faults to the south, the so-called
axis of symmetry.
Libya asçerts the belief "confirmed by scieniific papers and even by Malta's
own experts, that the essential elernents of fact which establish the Rift Zone
are clear and uncontroversial" (supra, LR. para. 5.28). Malta does not share
this belief. nor is it confirmed by Malta's own experts. There may be a fair
measure of agreement about the elernents of the situation, but the interpreta-
tions and conclusions of the experts differ considerably.
It is not correct to say, as the Libyan Reply(supra) claims in the next para-
graph (para. 5.29). that the evidence put forward by the pleadings of both
Parties establishes the existence and importance of the Rift Zone. Nor is it tnie
that "this evidence shows that it cannot be regarded as other than a fundamen-
ta1 discontinuity in the sea-bed and subsoil in areas of shelf Iying between
Libya and Malta". The evidence cenainly does not show that the Rift Zone is a
"fundamental discontinuity", either as a matter of geological and geomorpholo-
gical fact or in any IegalIy relevant sense.
Mr. President, I turn now to the third main criticisrn of Libya's case on the
so-called "Rift Zone" - namely its failure to give due weight to other features
of the sea-bed in the area between Malta and Libye. 1 have already hinted at
this several times. The point is not always easy to disentangle from the res-
ponse which Malta has had to make to other Libyan arguments regarding the
existence of the Rift Zone in the north. But as the Court will have appreciated,
Malta's main contention regarding the southem aspect is that the Libyan argu-
ments have failed to take account of geological and geomorphological features
which lie furtherto the south between Libya and Malta. If anygeological or
geomorphological features have any bearing on the present case, these southem
features certainly have as much relevance as the northem features which
consiitute. in Libya's contention, the so-called Rift Zone.
Libya has virtually ignored the extensive faulting that is found throughout
the entire Pelagian Block south of the so-called "Rift Zone". The continentai
crust between Libya and Malta is cut by numerous other faults, particularly so
south of the 35th parallel. Many of these faults have a similar west-northwest-
east-southeast trend to the faults of the "Rift Zone". This faulting has been
reviewed by Dr. Mascle in the Technical Annex of Malta's Counter-Memorial.
Nonethetess, it is worth emphasizing the complete agreement of al1authorities,
even Libya" own scientific advisers, on the presence of extensive faulting in
the southern Pelagian Sea. Good maps of the faulting in the southern Pelagian
Block appear in Figures 15 and 16 in the paper by Professors Jongsma, van
Hinte and Woodside, of which a copy was furnished by Libya to the Registry
and the figures are included as Figures 38 and 39 in Malta's dossier. Some of
the faulting in thesouth and particularly that near the Libyan Coast, has ken354 CONTINENTAL SWELF
present for very long periods, up to 200 million years, in contrast to the more
recent faulting in the north of the Pelagian Block and some of these faults in
the south have formed grabens or troughs, namely the Jarrafa Trough and the
Tripolitania Valley.
1 ought perhaps at this point just to observe that the fact that the faulting in
the south is older than the faulting in the north does not diminish the validity
of the final concept. Things do not al1 take place at the same time in geologi-
cal terms. So this happened first - down at the bottorn - and as a result of it
happening first, as 1 will expiain again in a moment, and by virtue of it being
closer to the Libyan shore than is the faulting to the north, the sediments from
the continent had been washed down into the sea and therefore there has been
more sediment and more time for these troughs in the south to be filled out
and thus for the sea-bed to become more level.
Several cross-sections from Libya to Sicily, again exhibiting considerable
deeply penetrating faulting, appear as Figure 7 in the paper by Professor
Jongsma and his colleagues. The extensive faulting throughout the Pelagian
Block has been discussed by Dr. Finetti in his 1982 paper. He writes that :
"During the last main extensional phase of the Miocene-Quaternary [i.e., in
the last25 million years] a remarkable stretching and faulting activity affected
the whole Pelagian Sea ..." (p. 255); and that:
"The Sirte Rise [in the south Pelagian Sea], as well as other geological
provinces of the studied area [which was the Pelagian and Ionian Seas]
was greatly stretched during the third extensional phase of the Middle
Upper Cretaceous." (P. 247.)
Dr. Finetti recogriizes several extensional phases which have affected the
southern Pelagian Sea. In the Gabes-Tripoli-Misurata Basin, for example, he
writes that the basin is the result of the "extensional geodynamic movernents
which occurred in the Triassic [Le., about 200-250 million years ago] and
before in Palaeozoic [i.e., older than 250 million years]" (p. 253). Following
this episode of stretching, several further similar extensional phases occurred,
as he describes at page 254:
"After the Paleozoic-Tnassic stretching movements other important exten-
sional geodynamic phases occurred in the Middle Jurassic [c. 180 million
yearsl and especially in the Middle-Upper Cretaceous [c. 65-100 million
years]. With this last one are associated remarkable igneous effusions of a
basaltic type. Basaltic layers in the Middle-Upper Cretaceous have been
found in several points by drilling exploration. These movements were
accompanied by a consistent subsidence of the basin. Extensional and sub-
sidence activities occurred also successively. In the Middle-Upper
Miocene to Quaternary [Le., the last 15 million years], one of the main
extensional phases which affected not only and not particularly this area
took place."
The Libyan Reply, mindful of the implications of this extensive faulting in
the southern Pelagian Sea, did not seek to refute its presence; instead Libya
suggested that it should be ignored and attention focused solely on the faulting
in the "Rift Zone" for the purposes of delimitation. The main Libyan argu-
ments for this stance are that the faulting in the south Pelagian Sea is outside
the area of dispute, and that it is "ancient" with little sea-bed expression, and
both these parties can easily be refuted as1will now atternpt to do.
First, Libya suggests that the faulting of the southern Pelagian Sea is outside
the area of dispute in which they seek a dividing line and so should be ignored ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 355
(supra, LR. para. 5.33). It is no exaggeration to describe as extraordinary the
argument that the faulting of the "Rift Zone" to the south of Malta is a proper
topic of discussion just because Libya claims the sen-bed so far north as that,
but the faulting in the southern Pelagian Sea, a similar distance from the
Libyan coast, should be ignored simply because Malta does not push its claim
an equivalent distance southwards. Why does Libya talk at al1 about the
northern faults? They constitute, says Libya, a fundamental discontinuity, but in
or of what are they a discontinuity, one must ask? The ünswer is, presumably.
in a claimed natural prolongation of Libya. Well, one is bound to reply, if the
natural prolongation of Libya is relevant, is ilnot equally relevant that there
lies between Libya and the claimed area of natural prolongation a feature of a
magnitude comparable to the one which is said to terminate the natural prolon-
gation?
The Court may find it helpful at this point to be referred to the passages in
its Judgment in the Tuni.~ialLibyacase where it dealt with the Tripolitanian
Furrow, In paragraph 66 of that Judgrnent the Court said
"The only feaiure of any substantial relevance is the Tripolitanian
Furrow; but that submarine valley does not display any really marked
relief until it has run considerably further to the east than the area relevant
to the delimitation."
NOWo , f course, the area relevant to the delimitation in thTuizisialLibya case
was this area here - and so it is quite understandable that the Court saw no
relevance in the structure of the Tripolitanian Furrow which lies here. But even
ço, the Court then did observe the depths of the Tripolitanian Furrow and use
the expression that itdid not show any really marked relief until it had run
into this eastern and now relevant section.
ln that paragraph, therefore, the Court made iiclear that the most eastem
relevant point on the Libyan coast for the purpose of the Libyan case was Ras
Tajoura and said that it could not rakeinto consideration such parts of the sea-
bed of the Pelagian Block as lie beyond those limits.
Now, the part of the Tripolitaniari Furrow which is relevant to the present
case is precisely thût part which lies east of Ras Tüjouraand which displays
this "really marked relief' of which the Court spoke in paragraph 66 of the
1982 Judgment. This can be seen very clearly frorn the bathyrnetric chart
which 1have already rnentioned. (LR,Fig. 1, opposite p. 65.)
Mr. President, in fact the most stable, least füulted region of the Pelagian
Block is the crust of the Melita-Medina platform which has remained relatively
shallow and stable for hundreds of millions of years. The Melita-Medina plat-
form lies midway between Malta and Libya and separates the region of faulting
in the "Rift Zone" to the tlorth from the extensive region of faulting of the
Gabes-Tripolitania-Misurata Basin to the south. The delimitarion line identified
by Malta as equitable in fact lies over this stable crustal block.
I turn to the second main Libyan argument for discounting the importance of
the faulting in the southern Pelagian Sea. This is the suggestion that it is
"ancient" and that the sediments which have been deposited in the region
cause the faulting to exhibit reduced sea-floor expression. It is true that much
of the extensive faulting in the southern Pelagian Sea was active before the
present "Rift Zone" was fornied, as 1 explained a moment aga. As we have
already noted, the extensional phases thüt have affected the whole Pelagian Sea
have occurred in episodes.
But that does natmean that because the southern fiiulting is "old", the north-
ern faulting is "new" and, therefore, in some way better or more relevant.356 CONT~NENTAL SHELF
The extensional phases in the Pelagian Sea have, as elsewhere, taken place in
episodes which occur simultaneously in different locations and to different
degrees. The fact that there may be active faulting in the north does not
exclude the possibility that there may be less active faulting going on in the
south ;and vice versa. The important point is that if one adds up the faulting in
the southern part of the Pelagian Sea, it is as great as the faulting in the north-
ern part, but simply spread over more faults. In other words, you may have a
fault which is deep like this - one fault - but elsewhere you may have two
faults which are approximateiy half the size of the first fault, but those two
faults half the size of the first add up to thesame kind of situation as consti-
tuted by the first. Moreover, it is to be noted that the fauiting in the "Rift
Zone" which started 10 to 1.5million years ago has already passed its zenith.
In other words, we do not have an area which is going on being active. It does
not show acceleration or positive movement to go on, it is something which
apparently is already declining. Dr. Finetti notes in his 1984 paper which is
reproduced in part in Annex 7 of the Libyan Reply (supra):
"The first rift movements commenced in the Early Pliocene [5 my ago]
(or Late Miocene) 110 my ago] and continued . . .until the Late Qua-
ternary:then they decreased but remain stili active at the present time."
So we are on a downward trend. Over the same period, there is certainly fault-
ing in the southern Pelagian Sea, as reported by Blanpied and Bellaiche in the
article which has been incorporated as Document A at the back of the Maltese
loose-leaf folder (inMarine Geolngy, 1983, Vol. 52, pp. 1ff.). The faulting in
the southern Pelagian Sea may not be so intense as that in the nonh, but it is
there, in the Jarrafa Trough which exhibited "a perenniat and active tectonism
throughout post Miocene times [Le. the last 5 my]". The published profiles
across the Jarrafa Trough show that the faults there are still actively moving.
The same is to be observed on the western part of the Tripolitanian Furrow.
The fact that faults in the earth are still active in the Tripolitanian Trough near
the Libyan Coast is also dernonstrated by the fact that an earthquake (of a
magnitude of 4.5) has been recorded there. The present-day topographic
expression of the troughs in the southem Pelagian Block (Tripolitania and
Jarrafa) is not so great as that of the troughs in the so-called "Rift Zone", but
this is only because, as 1said earlier, these troughs are nearer the mainland,
and so closer to the supply of sediment which has filled them in. The sediment
has partially filled the valleys, reducing their sea-floor expression. When the
original shape of the valley floor, which shows how much faulting has oc-
curred,is examined by seismic profiles it is found that the size of the Tripoli-
tania and Jarrafa Troughs is similar to that of, for example, the Linosa and
Malta Troughs, as shown by Figure 7 in the paper by Professor Jongsma and
his colleagues.
So far Malta has shown that the faulting of the so-called "Rift Zone" is cer-
tainly not unique in the Pelagian Sea, but that there is equally deep-seated
faulting across the entire region of continental crust between Sicily and Libya.
lt is possible to go even further than this. As was shown in the Malteçe
Memorial, a11the troughs in the Pelagian Sea, including those in the south,
are the geometric result of the process of extension that has applied to the
entire region (including the Tunisian Sahel, the Pelagian Sea, western Libya
and south-eastem Sicily). This process of extension has occurred intermittently
throughout the last 180 million years, and often the same troughs have been
repetitively opened (Finetti, 1982). It can be described by a simple counter-
clockwise rotation of 10 to 15 degrees during the last 10 million years of the ARGUMENT OF MR. LAUTERPACHT 357
lblean Plateau (i.e., the area south-east of Sicily) with respect to the African
landmass (south of the Tripolitanian Valley). This rotation is disparaged by
Libya as a "rather imaginative discussion" and as a "mere theory", but it is
based not just on the pattern of faulting but also on palaeomagnetic rneasure-
ments published in high-level scientific joumals (e.g.. Besse et al.. 1983,
1984). Libya has ignored these palaeomagnetic data, with which their model
does not fit. Since the palaeomagnetic data are relevant and well-established
scientific facts the Libyan model of the "Rift Zone" which ignores them must
be called into question.
Finally, Mr. President,it is perhaps necessary to refer to the Libyan sugges-
tion that "a 'microplate' may be in formation along the Rift Zone". It should
be observed that the authorities cited in support of this suggestion are articles
published in the year 1984 by experts who have themselves been directly asso-
ciated with the Libyan case.
It should be emphasized that even these experts only Say that a microplate
rnay be in formation. They do not assert it positively. It is strange that no hint
of such a suggestion affects the scientific rnaterial presented by Libya in
connection with the TunisialLibya case. Indeed in that case, Libya demon-
strated that the Pelagian Block was a unitextending nonh of Malta. This appears
clearly from two figures which the Court rnay like to examine in the Libyan
Counter-Mernonal in the TunisiulLih~vc uase. The first is Figure1 in the Libyan
Counter-Mernorial, 198 1. This shows the Pelagian basin extending north of
Malta, in a manner ncrtconsistent with the newly deployed Libyan arguments.
The second is Figure 6 in the sarne Counter-Memorial of 1981 which shows
the whole of the Pelagian Sea as an aseismic. that is to say, an inactive block,
with no hint of the microplate that Libya now contends rnay beseen in it.
The text of the Libyan Counter-Mernorial in the present case also has some
bearing on the subject. Having stated that the Rift Zone "cleady ranks anlong
the major and relatively rare rift zones of the world", a footnote to page 52 of
the Counter-Mernorial (II) states:
"In somewhat mare technical terms,the Rift Zone is an incipientboun-
dary where continental crust has thinned owing to the pull-apart effect of
the deep-seated ~rdhens noted above. However, the extension of the
earth's crust has not evolved tci the point at which ocean crust has been
created . . ."
The Court will recall my earlier distinction between continental and ocean
cmst as being the only kind of discontinuiry thai would really have any
meaning. Here they Say:
"However, the extension of the earth's crust has not evolved tu the
point at which ocean crust has been created. It rnay be described as the
beginning of a continentat breakup. At the stage at which the Rift Zone
now is. it is characterized by diffuse features."
This is evidently not language descriptive of a microplate. The incipient
boundary is rnany millions of years away and cannot possibly have any rele-
vance to the present case as evidencing the existence now of a fundamental
discontinuity. Indeed. it rnay never corne into existence at al1 since, as 1 have
suggested. there is evidence that the faulting is now decreasing.
So much then for the geology and geornorphology of the sea-bed under the
Pelagian Sea. With your leave, Mr. President, 1should like to pass on to make
a few remarks about the area to the east of the Pelagian Block, the area which
Libya has called "the Escarpments-Fault Zone" - this is the escarpment-fault358 CONTINENTAL SHELF
zone and this of course is the Ionian Sea which lies kyond it. 1should correct
one remark that 1made earlier in the rnoming. You will recall that 1 drew the
line of the Itaiian/Greek continental shelf boundary and 1terminated it there. 1
made a mistake, 1should have terminated it a good deal further to the south -
at this point here - which is the southem point of the deepest part of the
Ionian Sea.
The Libyan Reply calls for a few comments. First. in paragraph 5.40 of the
Reply (supra). Libya seeks to press the degree of agreement between the
experts on the twcisides too far by stating that :
"the Parties are in agreement over the fact that the Escarpments-Fault
Zone forming the eastern boundary of the Pelagian Block constitutes a
fundamental break in the morphology of the sea-bed and subsoil".
Once again, the problem may appear to be semantic, but its resolution in the
bland manner which Libya assens may create an impression which Malla
would not entirely share. The question is. what does Libya intend to convey by
the phrase "a fundamental break inthe morphology of the sea-bed and subsoil"?
In footnote 3 to page 72 of the Libyan Reply (supro), Libya declares that it
"has never conceded that Malta's continental shelf rights extend this far to the
east". That means as far to the east as here. It has never conceded that. At the
same time, Libya, in the same footnote, acknowledges that it is not its position
that the continental margin as defined iiArticle 76 (3) of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention ends at the Escarpments-Fault Zone. So what is it that it has
been saying? That it does not concede that Malta's shelf can extend beyond
the line of the escarpments. On the other hand says Libya. it does claim that
this area iscontinental shelf within the meaning of the 1982 definition. 1s then
the allegaiion that the Parties are in agreement that the Escarpments-Fault
Zone constitutes a fundamental break in the morphology of the sea-bed and
subsoil an attempt to imply that in some way Malta agrees that the eastem
limit of its continental shelf must besought ai the edge of this zone? If it is,
Malta must emphatically repudiate it.
Next, in the same paragraph (5.40) Libya goes on to make the same point in
somewhat different language :
"The point is simply that the Escarpments-Fault Zone represents a fun-
damental change in the morphology of the sea-bed and subsoil, forming the
edge of the continental shelf underlying the Pelagian Sea, often referred to
as the 'Pelagian Block'."
Malta does not accept that the change in morphology "forrns the edge of the
continental shelf underlying the Pelagian Sea". Why? Because the implication
of the language used by Libya is that in some way the continental shelf.
whether of Malta or of Libya, under the Pelagian Sea is bounded by the limits
of the Pelagian Block. 1 must emphasize that there really is a danger of getting
caught up in words here because the concepis are very simple. This area is
called, for convenience, the Pelagian Sea, and this area for convenience is called
the Ionian Sea. but although the morphology is different, although the shape of
the sea-bed is different between this area and this area, the law is that the
whole of this area is one continental shelf in the eyes of the law and so rhis
repreçentation, that in some way the escarpment here affects the continental
shelf continuity,is wrong. This escarprnent or fault where the sea-bed falls
down into the depths no more denies Libya the opportunity of coming across
up the escarpment in this southem area here, than it denies Malta the right to
extend its continental shelf area over the edge of the escarpment. For the pur- ARGUMENT OF hlR. LAUTERPACHT 359
poses of continental shelf delimitation, this is a single area and this feature.
although it is prominent, rnakes no clifference.
We have here a situation in which despite the dropping away of the sea-bed
to the east of the escarpment, the sediments foming the sea-bed are of such a
thickness that they fully satisfy the requirements of the definition of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
The emphasis in the Libyan Reply on the absence of discontinuity between
Libya and the lonian sea-bed to the north of Libya is accompanied by the
assertion that the escarpment "cuts ilcross and disrupts . . . the Maltese prolon-
gation to the east" (sirpra, LR, para. 5.40). This may be so in geomorphologi-
cal terms; it is not so in legally relevant continental shelf terms. Once the
essential continental shelf continuity and unity of the whole area is recognized.
then there is no reason for according Libya a special advantage simply because
there is no drop between one level and another of its continental shelf in this
eastern sector.
As is properly pointed out, 1 mis-expressed myself - there is in truth a
drop. The fact is thar just as there isa drop from this lighter blue into this dar-
ker blue, so here there is a drop froin the lighter blue into the darker blue. It is
only close in to shore that Libya has the kind of continuity with its continental
shelf that it isnsisting that Malta must have with Mülta's continental shelf.
Mr. President, that brings me to the end of the main points of rny argument.
No peroration is required. But a summary of rny main conclusions may be of
some help in drawing together what 1have said, and that summary consists of
ten points:
1. The task of the Court under the Special Agreement isto identify the rele-
vant principles and rules of international law with the same degree of particu-
larity as these principles were identified in the TurrisiolLihyuJudgment. This
rneans in effect that the Court should indicate the boundary which in its view
would result from the application of the method which it chooses. The Court
should not reach ü conclusion in tenns so general as those proposed by Libya.
2. The Court is not entitled under the Special Agreement from which it
derives its jurisdictiori in this case to take into consideration the claim identi-
fied by Italy except by the terms of what 1may cal1the "without prejudice" state-
ment foreseen by the Court at pages 26 to 27 of its Judgment of 21 March 1984.
3. The task of the Court in terms of the application of law is to apply
equitable principles in order to achieve an equitable result.
4. The ci~cumstancesrelevant IOthe identification of ihe equitable result are
not limired to ones of a geographical nature. The Court is entitled to weigh al1
circumstances including, especially, ones of a macro-economjc character. The
established possession, or lack, of resources by the Parties. relative to each
other, is certainly a relevant circumstance.
5. The application of equitable principles in the present case leads to the use
of the concept of equidistance. In identifying these equitable principles it is
proper and necessary to pay regard to Slate practice in the conclusion of deti-
mitation agreements as a reflection of what States consider equitable.
6. ln the practice of States, equidistance plays a predominant role. Before
1969, 76 per cent and after 1970, 83 per cent of al1continental shelf delimita-
tions involved the application of eqiiidistance, even if in some cases this appli-
cation was to some extent modified or simplified. Even if it cannot be said that
this practice reflects a custom accepted as law. it is inconceivable that what
has occurred should be regarded by the States concerned as anything other
than equitable.360 CONTINENTALSHELF
7. Libya's positive case rests upon the assertion of the existence of a funda-
mental discontinuity in geomorphological and geological terms in the area of
the so-called Rift Zone. That is the positive basis on which Libya contends
that the bundary should bedrawn within and following the general direction
of this Rift Zone. This contention is in law quite misplaced. The physical
characteristics of the sea-bed and subsoil have no bearing on the situation Save
in terms of satisfying either the definition of the continental shelf or the defini-
tion of the exclusive economic zone as laid down in the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention. There is no doubt that the physical facts render the whole relevant
area continental shelf and economic zone in the legal sense.
8. In any event, Libya has not established the existence of any fundamental
geomorphological or geological discontinuity in the Rift Zone. In particular,
one of ifs most important pieces of evidence - the gravity anomaly map - is
open to severe criticism and cm also be used to show another line of equal
force in the area of the Tripolitanian Furrow which is much more favourable to
Malta and much less favourable to Libya.
9. Generally, in concentrating its arguments in the Rift Zone Libya has
failed IO give due weight to the Jarrafa Trough and the Tripolitanian Furrow.
These - in tems of Libya's own argument - are geomorphological and geo-
logical feaiures of a significance comparable to those relied upon by Libya
more to the north.
10. The whole of the sea-kd north of the eastern part of Libya and east of
the Escarpment is covered by sediments 6 to 7 kilornetres thick and is conti-
nental shelf, in the legal sense of that term, continuous with that of Malta to
the Westand Libya to the south. It has so been recognized by ltaly and Greece.
Mr. President, that concludes my summary. 1 repeat my apologies for having
had to re-convey to the Court much information it must have ülready possessed
on technical matters and 1hope that I have said enough to enabte the Court to
feel that it may safely set Libya's technical case aside. It remains for me,
Mr. President, only to ask you to be so kind as to cal1 upon my learned friend,
Professor WeiI. PLAIDOIRIEDE M. WEIL
CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENTDE MALTE
M. WEIL: Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, il n'est pas d'usage,
lorsqu'un gouvernement vous fait le grand honneur de vous confier la défense
de ses intérêtsnationaux devant Ia Cour internationale de Justice, de commen-
cer son intervention par une note personnelle.
La Cour ainsi que l'agent de Malte me pardonneront si je prends cette liberté
pour évoquer la mémoiredu grand juriste et du grand ami disparu prématuré-
ment il y a quelques mois. 11y a peu de temps encore le professeur Antonio
Malintoppi etait A cette même place, gravement malade déjà,mais tenant, au
prix d'un effort surhumain, B assumer ses responsabilités jusqu'à l'extrême
limite de ses forces. Que la Cour, qui a souvent eu l'occasion d'apprécier sa
science et son talent, me permette de rendre hommage à ce brillant reprksentant
de la grande ecole italienne de droit international, dont les qualités intellec-
tuelles n'avaient d16gales que les qualités de cŒur, et auquel m'attachaient
depuis de longues années tant de liens,
Monsieur le Résident, dans les affaires de délimitation maritime portées
jusqu'ici devant la juridiction internationale, c'était l'application du droit aux
faits plutôt que l'énoncé dudroit qui était controversée. L'affaire actuellement
devant la Cour se caractérise au contraire par l'existence de divergences fonda-
mentales sur le droit lui-même. Ces différences vontbien au-delà de la question
de savoir si la délimitation doit se faire dans notre affaire selon la méthodede
l'équidistance ou selonquelque autre méthode ou combinaison de méthodes.
C'est la quasi-totalitédes klémeritsconceptuels mis en place par le droit inter-
national en vue de la construction d'un droit de la délimitationdu plateau conti-
nental qui se trouve mise en discussion dans laprksente affaire.
Les Parties sont d'accord - comment pourraient-elles ne pas l'être? - pour
estimer que la délimitation de leur plateau continental doit êtreeffectuée de
manière 3 aboutir Bun résultatequitable compte tenu de toutes les circonstances
pertinentes. Mais cette convergence sur la finalité B poursuivre ne s'étend pas
au cheminement permettant d'atteindre l'objectif recherché.Quel processus juri-
dique de droit international envisage-t-il pour aboutir 3 une solution équitable
compte tenu de toutes les circonstances pertinentes? Telle est en définitive la
question; et sur cette question Malte et la Libye professent des vues diamétrale-
ment opposees.
L'abîme qui sépare les Parties surce problème est d'autant plus profond que
la Partie libyenne, au lieu d'exposer une position cohérente, a choisi d'adopter
la tactique des thèses multiples; tant et si bien que ce n'est pas à une thèse
libyenne que nous sommes confrontés mais à un foisonnement de thèses qui
prennent parfois le contrepied les unes des autres. Cette tactique n'est pas de
nature h clarifier le débat.
Monsieur le Président, l'identificiitiondes composantes de la controverse juri-
dique est difficile parce que ces composantes se croisent et s'entrecroisent en un
écheveau malaise à démêler. Aucundes éléments conceptuels qui composent le
droit de la délimitation du plateau continental ne peut s'envisager en faisant
abstraction des autres,?Il'état pur, sij'ose dire; chacun d'eux ne se rencontre
que dans un alliage avec un ou plusieurs autres. II faut pourtant, pour les362 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
besoins de l'exposé, distinguer quelques themes majeurs autour desquels il .soit
possible d'ordonner les divergences juridiques fondamentales qui s'affrontent
devant ta Cour.
Après avoir évoqué,dans un premier chapitre, la question des sources du
droit applicable. je consacrerai les chapitres suivants aux thèmes majeurs qui
constituent, me semble-t-il, le pivot de la controverse.
Le chapitre II portera sur l'opérationde délimitation.
Les chapitres Il1 eIV se concentreront sur les deux concepts clés du plateau
continental que sont le prolongement naturel et le principe de distance.
Dans le chapitre V, enfin, je m'attacherai à la question de l'équidistance et,
plus particulièrement,?Icelle de la ligne médiane propre à notre affaire.
Quant au problème de la proportionnalité, c'est mon ami le professeur lan
Brownlie qu'il reviendra de l'examiner.
Je crois devoir préciser, Monsieur le Président, qu'en vue d'alléger mon
exposéje ne donnerai aucune référence juriprudentielle ou doctrinale. La Cour
et la Partie adverse les trouveront dans le compte tendu, dans lequel figureront
également les références aux passages pertinentsdes mémoires écrits libyenset
maltais.
1.LES SOURCESDU DROIT APPLICABLE
Quelles sont, dans notre affaire, les sources du droit applicable?
Nous sommes d'accord des deux côtés de la barre pour considérer que la
convention de 1958 sur le plateau continental n'est pas applicable, que t'article 6
de cette convention est étranger au débat, et que ce sont en conséquence les
principes et règles du droit coutumier qui régissentla présente délimitation.
Au-delà de ce point évident, je crains qu'il ne faille se défendre d'un opti-
misme exagéré. Même si la Partie adverse a étéplutôt discréte surce problème
du droit applicable, et mêmesi elle n'a pas contesté les positions que nous
avons prises à ce sujet (II, CMM, p. 45-48, par. 76-82), les divergences demeu-
rent considérablessur un point essentiel.
De l'avis de Malte, les règles de droit coutumier applicables comprennent
certaines règlesqui ont trouvé expressiondans la récente convention sur le droit
de la mer de 1982; ce n'est pas, bien sûr, en tant que règles conventionnelles
que les dispositions en cause s'appliquent en ce cas, mais parce que ces disposi-
tions peuvent être regardéescomme consacrant ou cristallisant des règles de
droit coutumier préexistantes ou en voie de formation. De maniére plus large,
comme l'a fait observer un membre de la Cour dans l'affaire du Plateau confi-
nental (TunisieiJumahiriya umbe libyenne), c'est 1 l'ensemble des travaux de la
troisième conférencequ'il convient de se référer lorsque l'on cherche à définir
l'état du droit coutumier en ces matiéres (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, opinion dissi-
dente de M. Oda, p. 172, par. 26).
En 1974, dans l'affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries,la Cour
avait, il est vrai,arquéune certaine reticence fi tenir compte de ces travaux et
des textes qui en sont issus(C.1J. Recueil 1974, p. 23-24, par. 53), et cette réti-
cence avait étépartagéepar le tribunal arbitral franco-britannique en 1977 (sen-
tence arbitrale, par.7 et 96). Mais on n'était encoreen présence, 3 ce moment-
là, selon les termes mêmes de la Cour, que de «propositions et documents
préparatoires ..manifestant les théseset les opinions d'Etats à titre individue...
et traduisant leurs aspiratio», et non pas de ((principes du droit exista»t(C.I.J.
Recueil 1974, /oc. rit.).
En 1982, au contraire, dans l'affaire TurrisieiLibye, la Cour a estimé que, PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 363
puisque «le processus de formation du droit est aujourd'hui beaucoup plus
avancé>>i,l lui appartientà présen1de «tenir compte d'office des travaux de la
conférence», et qu'elle ne saurait en conskquence
«négliger une disposition du projet de convention si elle venait àconclure
que sa substance lie tous les rnembres de la communautéinternationale du
fait qu'elleconsacre ou cristallise une règlede droit coutumier préexistante
ou en voie de formation» (C.I.J.Recueil 1982, p.37 et 38, par. 23 et 24).
Maintenant que le projet de convention est devenu une convention signée,et
même ratifiee, par de nombreux Etats, l'analyse de la Cour s'impose avec plus
de force encore. II ya quelques semaines à peine, dans l'affaire de la Délimita-
tionde lafrontière maritime dans la ré~ion du golfe dtl Maine, la Chambre de
la Cour, tout en rappelant que la convention de 1982 n'est pasencore entrée en
vigueur, a relevéque certaines de ses dispositions ont fait l'objet d'un consen-
sus et «peuvent être considéréecsomme conformes actuellement au droit inter-
national généralen la matière» (C.l.1Recueil 1984, p. 294, par. 94).
C'est dans cette perspective que Malte estime qu'il faut tenir compte, dans la
présente délimitation,des règles de droit coutumier qui ont trouvé expression
dans l'article 76 de la convention et dans les dispositions de la convention rela-
tive 3 la zone Cconomiqueexclusive (CMM, p. 47-48, par. 80-82). En raison de
l'importance que le paragraphe 1 de l'article 76 présentedans le débat, nous
nous permettrons d'en reproduire le texte dans lecompte rendu:
«Le plateau continental d'lin Etat cotier comprend les fonds marins et
leur sous-sol au-delà de sa mer territoriale, sur toute l'étenduedu prolonge-
ment naturel du territoire terrestre de cet Etatsqu'au rebord externe de la
marge continentale, ou jusqu'à 200 milles marins des lignes de base à par-
tir desquelles est mesuréela 1;irgeude la mer territoriale, lorsque le rebord
externe de la marge continentale se trouveà une distance inférieure»
L'opinion de Malre à ce sujet s'autorise de la position prisàcet egard par la
Cour elle-mêmedans son arrêtde 1982. Dans cette décisionla Cour a déclaré
clairement que «la définitiondu paragraphe 1 de l'article 76 ne doit pas être
perdue de vue» (ca~inot be ignoreil)(C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 48, par47). et que
la zone économique exclusive peut être considérde *comme faisant partie du
droit internationalniodeme* (ihid p.,74, par. 100). Le «principe de distance»
- c'est leterme employépar laCour (ibid.p. 49, par. 48)- figure en consé-
quence parmi les principes et règles du droit international coutumier dont il
convient de tenir compte.
Voilà pour la positionde Malte: elle est, on le constate, claire et simple.
La position de la Libye sur les règles issuesde la troisième conférenceest,
quant à elle, beaucoup plus difficilà décrire.
Dans son premier écrit,la Libye cherchait à se mettre à l'abri de ces regles,
et plus particulièrement du principe de distance, en soutenant que la convention
de 1982 n'est pas en vigueur et ne fait pas droit entre les Parties (1,ML, p. 84,
par. 6.10,et p. 89-90, par. 6.22). Sauf erreur de ma part, cet argument n'a plus
refait surface dans les écrits ultérieurs.et c'est sur un autre terrain que la Libye
a porté sa tentativede tenir le principe de distancà l'écartde notre affaire. La
Libye cherche à présent à établir que le concept de distance intervient seule-
ment sur le plan du titre juridique et des limites extérieures,par oppositioiila
délimitation; que mêmesur le plan du titre juridique et des limites exterieures,
ilne joue qu'un rôle subsidiaire; et que la zone économique exclusive, qui est
son domaine d'élection,est étrangere à la présente affaire, puisque celle-ci ne364 PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
met en cause que la délimitation du plateau continental et ne préjuge pas la
délimitationd'une éventuelle zoneéconomiqueexclusive entre les deux pays.
Faut-il en conclure que désormaisla Partie adverse reconnaît le caracthe de
droit coutumier des &@esincorporéesdans les dispositions pertinentesde la con-
vention? Peut-êtrenoiis kclairera-t-elle Ih-dessusau cours de la procédureorale.
Ce qu'il me faut et] tout cas constater, c'est que la Libye passe complttement
sous silence dans ses écrits la profonde évolution subie par les règles coutu-
mières relatives au plateau continental et A sa délimitation. Elleoublie que le
droit coutumier n'est pasimmuable, et que c'est & la tumièredu droit coutumier
tel qu'il existeà un moment donnéque les concepts relatifs au plateau conti-
nental età la délimitation doivent êtrcompris et appliqués.
Monsieur le Président,la Cour a déclaré:«La notion de prolongement naturel
est et demeure ..une notion àexaminer dans le contexte du droit coutumier et
de la pratique des Etats» (C.I.J.Recueil 1982,p. 46, par. 43).
Prenant le contrepied de l'approche dynamique ainsi adoptéepar la Cour, la
Libye paraît tenir pour nulle et non avenue l'évolution du conceptde plateau
continental sur lequel la Cour a si fortement mis l'accent; elle ignore le déta-
chement progressif de ce concept des donnéesphysiques de la géologieet de la
géomorphologie, ainsi que son évolution vers une conception juridique fondée
sur une relation spatiale entre les espaces sous-marins et les-côtes. En présen-
tant à la Cour une revendication construite sur les caractéristiquesdu sol et du
sous-sol de la mer, la Libye plaide comme on aurait pu le faire il y a quinze
ans. Si elle semble admettre le caractérecoutumier des règles pertinentes de la
convention de 1982, elle ne le fait que du bout des levres et sans en tirer de
conséquences. La these libyenne ne serait pas diffkrente si ces règles n'étaient
pas applicables.
Dans la même perspective,la Partie adverse nie en bloc toute pertinence du
concept de zone économiqueexclusive à propos de la délimitation du plateau
continental dans la présenteaffaire. Dans son contre-mémoire, la Libye insiste
sur le fait que seule est demandéela délimitationdes fonds marins et du sous-
sol, à I'excIusion de toute délimitation de la colonne d'eau surjacente et, plus
particulièrement, des zones de pêche(II, CML, p.62, par. 3.14 et note 1; p. 71,
par. 3.39). La réplique libyenne adopte une position plus radicale encore: elle
passe totalement sous silence le problème: de la zone économique exclusive il
n'est tout simplement plus question.
11est évident, Monsieurle Rksident, que la Cour n'est saisiedans la présente
affaire que de la délimitationdu plateau continental; le compromis ne laisse pas
de doute sur ce point et nous en sommes d'accord. Ni Malte ni la Libye n'ont
d'ailleurs proclaméjusqu'ici une zone économique exclusive, et Malte a pro-
claméune zone de pkhe de 25 milles. On ne saurait toutefois ignorer que l'une
ou l'autre Partie.u les deux, peuvent à tout moment procéder à une telle procla-
mation. II ne faut pas oublier que le tribunal arbitral franco-britannique a estimé
devoir tenir compte, pour la délimitationdu plateau continental des îles Anglo-
Normandes, de la possibilitéreconnue par le droit international au Royaume-Uni
de porter sa mer territoriale, qui étaitalors de 3 millàsla largeur de 12 milles
autorisée parle droit international (sentence arbitrale, par. 187).
Mais !àn'est pas la seule raison interdisant d'évacuerles regles coutumi&res
sur la zone économiqueexclusive du présentdkbat, même si celui-cine porte
directement que sur la délimitationdu plateau continental. On ne peut faire abs-
traction de ce que la zone Pconomique exclusive confère à 1'Etatcôtier, jusqu'8
une distance de 200 milles marins, aux termes de l'article 56 de la convention
de 1982, des droits souverains sur les ressources naturelles, non seulement des
eaux surjacentes, mais également eten mêmetemps des fonds marins et de leur PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 365
sous-sol. On ne peut pas faire abstraction non plus de ce que les droits de pla-
teau continental s'étendent aujour(iihui, comme l'knonce l'article 76, à tout le
moins jusqu'à la limite extérieure de la zone kconomique exclusive. 11existe
ainsi une corrélation certaine- je ne dis pas: une coïncidence ou une identité
totales - entre les concepts de plateau continental et de zone économique
exclusive, et il paraît impossible, aujourd'hui, sous peine de perdre de vue
l'évolutiondu droit coutumier de la mer, d'aborder une délimitation du plateau
continental en faisant purement et simplement le silence sur le concept de zone
économique exclusive. C'est poumant là l'attitude que la Partie adverse paraît
avoir adoptée.
Il reste, Monsieur le Président, pour compléter ce rapide inventaire des
sources du droit applicable, àévoquer l'article 83 de la convention de 1982 sur
le droit de la mer intitulé: Delimitation du plateau continental entre Etats dont
les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face*:
«La délimitation du plateau continental entre Etats dont les côtes sont
adjacentes ou se font face est effectuée par voie d'accordconformkment au
droit international tel qu'il est vàsl'article 38 du Statut de la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice, afin'aboutir à un résultat équitable.»
II n'est pas inutile de rappeler que cette disposition a étéintroduite dans le
projet de convention le dernier jour de la conférence, le 28 août 1981, sauf
erreur de ma part, à la suite de contacts pris entre des délégationsrepdsentant
respectivement le président de la conférence et les deux groupes d'Etats qui
s'étaientopposés jusque-là au sein du groupe de négociation 7. Son introduction
dans le projet de convention suscita des réserves de la part d'une douzaine
d'Etats, qui estimaient n'avoir pas eu le temps d'étudier le texte. D'autres délé-
gations, semble-t-il, exprimerent leurs reticences en privé. Je puise ces indica-
tions dans une opinion qui accompagne l'arrêt de 1982 (C.I.J.Recueil 1982,
opinion dissidente de M. Oda, p. 245, par. 142) dans une étude du professeur
Oxman, vice-président de la délégation américaine (ArnericanJournal of lnter-
national Law, vol. 76, 1982, p.14).
Il faut toutefois noter que la conférence n'est parvenue à mettre fin ainsi,in
exrremis, iiune controverse qui l'avait divisée pendant des années qu'au prix
d'une véritablestkrilisation de la substance même du texte.
D'abord parce que la disposition adoptée se borne, selon l'expression du pro-
fesseur Caflisch, à une «exhortation adressée aux négociateurs* («Les zones
maritimes sous juridiction nationale»,dans Le nouveau droit international de la
mer, Paris, Pedone, 1983, p. 102); elle n'énonce aucuneregle qui s'adresserait,
en l'absence d'accord, au juge ou à l'arbitre international, C'esce que souligne
égalementle professeur Oxman (loi:. cit.).
D'autre part, même en tant que directive destinée3 inspirer les gouveme-
ments dans leurs négociations. letexte se révelecomme dépourvude toute subs-
tance réelle. Pour obtenir un semblant de consensus, les rédacteursdu texte ont
en effet supprimé toute mention de l'un comme de l'autre des deux concepts
qui s'étaient affrontés pendantdes années: plus d'*équidistance», plus de
*principes kquitablesa. «Dans le nouveau texte, a constatéIa Cour, toute indi-
cation d'un crit&respécifiquepouvant aider les Etats interessfisà parvenir à une
solution kquitable a disparu» (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 49, par. 50). Comme le
souligne l'opinion que j'ai déjà citée, l'articlene répondpas à la question de
savoir en quoi consiste [la] solution équitable, ni quelle est la méthodeh appli-
quer pour y aboutir*; il énonce, dit la même opinion,«une règle fourre-tout,
capable de satisfaire les uns et les autres*, et il est difficile d'enxtraire ...
un sens positif* (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 246 et 247, par. 143 et 144). Les au-366 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
teurs ne s'y sont pas trompés: «a text that says nothing of significance-,
estime le professeur Oxman (op. cit.,p. 15); «illustration saisissante» d'une
«ambiguïté délibérée*, déclardee son côtéle professeur Quéneudec(rapport au
colloque de Rouen de la Sociétéfrançaise pour le droit international, Perspec-
tivesdu droit de la mer à l'issue de la troisièmeconférencedes Nations Unies,
Paris, Pedone, 1984, p. 149).
Tant par les conditions de son adoption que par son contenu, l'article 83 de la
convention sur le droit de la mer ne saurait donc êtreregardé comme consti-
tuant à lui seul le corpusjuris du droit applicable par la Cour en l'absence d'un
accord entre les Etats intéressés.S'il indique l'objectif à atteindre, indication
précieuse bien entendu, il est muet sur la voie à suivre pour y parvenir.
L'article83 se borne àénoncerun standard et, comme dans tous !es ordres juri-
diques, c'est au juge qu'il appartient de doter ce standard d'un contenu effectif:
«texte succinct», observe l'arrêtdu Goife du Maine, qui «ouvre la porte 2 la
poursuite du développement résultant de la jurisprudence internationale en la
matiére » (par. 95).
Par leur compromis, les Parties ont demandé à la Cour de leur indiquer
«quels sont les principes et régiesde droit international qui sont applicables» h
la délimitation de leur plateau continental. Dès lors que les Parties sont
d'accord sur la nécessité juridiqued'un résultatéquitable et que leur différend
porte uniquement sur les moyens pour y parvenir conformément au droit inter-
national, il appartient la Cour, de l'avis de Malte, de définir quels sont, selon
le droit international, les principes et règles régissantl'opération mêmede déli-
mitation et non plus seulement le resultat. Et, pour cela, l'article 83, quelque
précieux qu'il soit en ce qui concerne la finalité1 poursuivre, n'est malheureu-
sement d'aucun sectiurs.
l'en arrive ainsi, Monsieur le Président, au second foyer de divergence, à
savoir le cheminement juridique conduisant à une délimitation conforme au
droit international. C'est ce cheminement que la Cour a désignéen 1969, puis
nouveau en 1982, du nom de «process of delimitation» (C.I.J. Recueil 1969,
p. 22, par. 18 et 20; C.I.J.Recueil 1982, p. 47, par. 44, et p.77, par. 106). En
1969 le terme était traduit en français par la Cour par ((opérationde délimita-
tion»; en 1982 il l'a étépar «processus de délimitation», mais i'idée est la
même dans les deux cas. La Chambre de la Cour a repris le vocable d'«opéra-
tion de délimitarion» dans son arrêtde 1984 dans l'affaire du Goife du Maine
(C.I.J.Recueil 1984, p. 300, par.115, et passim). C'est sur lastructure de cette
opérationque portent certaines des divergences les plus profondes entre les Par-
ties.
II me paraît nécessaire d'identifier les positions des Parties sur cette question
capitale, avant d'exposer les vues de Malte sur l'opératione délimitationet sur
les relations entree titre juridique et la délimitation.
A ces trois aspects- les positions des Parties, le contenu de l'opération de
délimitation, les relations entre titre et délimitation seront consacrées les
trois sectionse ce chapitre.
L'audience est levée à 12h 52 DOUZIEME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (29 XI 84. 10 h)
Pré.wnrs: IVoir audience du 26 XI 84.)
M. WEIL :Monsieur le Président.Messieurs les juges. comme je l'ai indiqué
hier, mon expose sera articulé autourde quatre des cinq thémesqui forment. me
semble-t-il, les composantes de la controverse juridique, le cinquièm- la pro-
portionnalité- devant êtretriiitépar mon ami lan Brownlie.
J'ai examinébriévementla question du droit applicable par les Parties et j'ai
abordé cellede l'opérationde délimitation,en précisantqueje m'attacherai suc-
cessivement auxpositions des Parties, au contenu de I'operation de délimitation
et aux relationsentre titre et délimitation.
Comment. par quelle voie, parvenir h cette solution équitable qui constituela
finalité indiçcutéede l'exercice de délimitation'?Sur cette question fondamen-
tale, quelles sont les positions des Parties?
La position de Malte. énoncéeavec clartédans nos écritures(II, CMM, p. 58-
61, par. 108-1 17: p. 74-83. par. 152-176).se résumeen quelques mots. L'opé-
ration de délimitation doit s'enraciner dans le fondement juridique du titre de
I'Etat côtier h des droits de plateau continental, et son point de départdoit, en
conséquence, êtreen rapport avec ce fondement juridique. Ce premier pas
n'épuise cependantpas la question, car. pour êtreconforme au droit internatio-
nal. ilne suffit pas que la delimitation soit ancrée dans le droit. elle doit égale-
ment aboutir h une solution équitable. C'est pourquoi ce premier pas se pro-
longe nécessairement par la vérificiitionde l'équitédu résultai, vérificationqui
s'opèrepar Laconfrontation du rksultaaux circonstances pertinentede l'affaire,
et, s'il y a lieu, par sa soumission au test de proponionnalité. Contrairement
21celle de Malte, la thésede la Libye ne se prêtepas à un bref résumé.Nous
aurions aime pouvoir défendrela ptiilosophie maltaise. si j'ose dire, de I'opéra-
tion de délimitation faceh une approche libyenne bien définie.Une controverse
2 visage découvert est toujours préférable à un combat dans l'ombre. 11nous
faut cependant constater, 3 noire grand regret. que la Partie adverse a choisi la
stratkgie du brouillard, nous rendant ainsi la tâche particuliérementdifficile.
Deux courants contradictoires traversent en effet les écritures libyennes. Dans
le mémoire libyen, la dtlimitation proposee est dominée par le concept qui
constitue, selon la Libye, le fondement juridique du titre de'Etatcôtier au pla-
teau continental, c'est-à-dire le prolongement naturel. Dans la réplique libyenne,
au contraire, la délimitationdemandéeest présentéecomme dictée par les cir-
constances de fait. en dehors de toute prise en considtration du titre juridique
au plateau cottineninl. A partir de là, les conceptions libyennes se ramifienta
l'extrême, etce n'est pas sans quelque scrupule que j'invite la Couà me suivre
dans le labyrinthe- dépourvu hélas!de fild'Ariane - des thèsesadverses.
Avant d'engager la Cour dans les flottements et contradictions des théses
libyennes, je voudrais cependant apporter une précisiond'ordre terminologique.
Je vais être amené, comme mescollègues, à utiliser le terme dRqi Zone. et
je tiensB répéterce qui a déj8 eté dit par eux. Mêmeutiliséavec un R et un Z
majuscules, cette expression ne correspond 2Iaucune désignationroponymique368 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
connue ou reconnue. Qu'il y ait eu dans cette régiondes phénoménesde rijing
n'autorise pas 3 désigner cette régionpar ce vocable à l'apparence scientifique
qui peut donner l'impression que l'on serait en présencede lu zone de rifring
par excellence. Les mêmesphénomenesde rifrin se sont produits ailleurs entre
Malte et la Libye. et bien entendu ailleurs dans le monde. Je n'emploierai donc,
comme mes collègues, le terme de RifrZrjnr que pour apporter la contradiction
à la Libye.
C'est pour cette raison que je m'en tiendrai 3 l'appellation anglaise utilisée
par la Panie adverse, sans essayer de la traduire en français.
Une seconde raison milite dans le même sens. J'auraispu recourir à l'expres-
sion «zone d'effondrement », choisie par les traducteurs et par les interprètesde
la Cour. Si je ne l'ni pas fait, c'est parce que ce terme évoquepour le profane
que je suis un ~collapse~ d'une certaine envergure. un effondrement, et crée
l'image d'une vaste zone dans laquelle le fond marin se serait effondré,laissant
la place à un vaste trou. Or, d'après les informations que j'ai recueillies. car je
ne suis pas homme de science, L'expression«zone d'effondrement>>ne com-
porte scientifiquement aucune connotation dimensionnelle. Comme le mémoire
libyen le précise àjuste titre:
<<Therems rift,rif/ing. rif, i~~lkyand r1j7zone niay be understood
through the definition of rift: a geomorphological term describing a narrow
cleft. fissure or other opening in rock. made by cracking or sp1itting.w (1,
ML, p. 29, note 3.)
Ce serait une erreur de s'imaginer cette soi-disant R$ Zone comme une
espèce de gigantesque fosse dans laquelle le lit de la mer se serait effondré.
D'abord parcequ'on n'est pas en présenced'une zone homogène, mais d'un as-
semblage d'accidents naturels divers, Le mémoire libyenn'en fait pasmystére:
«The vnrious features that will be discussed here combine to make up a
riftzone (hereinafter referred to as the "Rift Zone') - a feaiure of major
importance to this case .. .» (lhid., par. 3.12.) (Les italiques sont de moi.)
Le glissement sémantiquene saurait êtreplus clair. Ensuite parce que cette soi-
disant zone est constituéed'une succession de hauts et de bas, de creux et de
crêtes. Lescreux les plus profonds - qui ne dépassentpas 1715 mètres - sont
ceux des fosses de Pantelleria, Malte et Linosa: ils se trouvent tous. comme mon
ami Elihu Lauterpacht l'a montré hier, à l'ouest et au sud-ouest de Malte et,
sauf pour l'extrémitéde la fosse de Malte, sont étrangers à la délimitationentre
Malte et la Libye. Quant aux chenaux de Malte et de Medina. qui. eux, intéres-
sent pleinement notre délimitation, leurprofondeur nedépasse guère 500mètres :
on comprend que leur présencegênevisiblement la partie adverse.
Voilà la seconde raison pour laquelle je n'ai pas cru devoir utiliser la traduc-
tion française de «zone d'effondrement P.
Troisieme raison enfin, qui explique que je conserverai l'appellation libyenne
en anglais de RifrZone: le mot anglais riftest, paraît-il, utilisé couramment par
les scientifiques de langue française, et les traducteurs de la Cour eux-mêmes
ont rendu rifi par rifidans la version ' francaise du mémoire libyenqu'ils ont
prkparée à l'intention des membres de la Cour.
Je referme cette parenthèse terminologique. et je prie maintenant respectueu-
sement la Cour de bien vouloir m'accompagner pendant quelques minutes dans
le dedale des positions libyennes.
Non reproduite./Note du Greffe.] PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 369
Voyons d'abord la premiere approche de nos adversaires. qui se dédouble
elle-même endeux hypothéses.
Dans cette premiere approche, qui est celle du mtmoire, la Libye aboutit à
une revendication axée sur la soi-disant Rifr Zone à partir d'un processus de
délimitation exprimant ce que la Libye appelle la relation conceptuelle entre
prolongement naturel et délimitation (the conceptual relationship berneen naru-
ru1prolongation and delimitarion) (1, ML. p. 83. par. 6.09). Selon la Libye,
deux situations doivent être distinguées.
Première situation. Lorsqu'on est en présence, comme le mémoire libyen sou-
tient que c'est le cas dans notre affaire, de deux prolongements naturels physi-
quement distincts, l'opération de détimitation, explique le memoire libyen, part
du titre juridique des parties à un plateau continental, c'est-&-dire, selon la
Libye, du concept de prolongement naturel. En I'espece c'est donc, explique
toujours le mémoire libyen, avec l'identification de la sdparation natureIle «in-
diquée* par la soi-disant RifrZone et par la zone des escarpements que le pro-
cessus commence. Après quoi. nous dit le mémoire libyen. iI faut vérifier si
cette délimitation conduit à un résultat équitable à ta lumiéredes circonstances
pertinentes de l'affaire, et c'est seulementaux termes de cette vérificationque la
délimitation indiquéepar le titre juridique peut devenir la délimitationdéfinitive
(ibid., p. 91, par. 6.25; p. 113, par. 6.86; p. 133, par. 8.18; p. 153,par. 9.64;
p. 154, par. 10.01).
Dans cette premiére hypothèse, prétendument réalisée dans notre affaire,
d'une séparation entre deux plateaux continentaux physiquement distincts, le
processus de délimitation. tel que le décrit le mémoire libyen, présente,on le
constate, trois caractéristiques majeures. D'abord, l'op4ration de delimitation
repose sur I'idee que titre juridique et délimitation marchent la main dans ta
main (go hand in hand) (1,ML. p. 83, par. 6.09; cf. II. CML, p. 56, par. 2.84).
En second lieu, le processus de delimitation part, à titre de premier pas, de la
prise en considération du titre juridique au plateau continental (le prolongement
naturel, selon la Libye) et se poursuit avec la vtrification de l'équitédu résultat
grâce à la confrontation'avec les circonstances pertinentes. Enfin, troisième
t~ait: c'est la nature qui précise elle-même@oints up; 1,ML. p. 132. par. 8.13)
la delimitation retenir: selon la Libye, une zone frontiére divisant les prolon-
gements naturels des parties peut être dans notre cas physiquement identifiée
(ibid..p. 134, par. 9.02).
Voilà pour la premièrehypothèse exposéedans le mémoire.
Seconde situation. La seconde situation envisagée par le mtmoire libyen -
toujours dans le cadre de l'approche du mémoire - concerne les cas dans les-
quels il n'existe qu'un seulplateau continu, qui constitue le prolongement natu-
rel aussi bien de l'un que de l'autre des deux Etats. En ce cas, nous dit-on, les
caractéristiques géologiques et géomorphologiquesdes fonds marins et de leur
sous-sol ne revêtentplus le caractère de discontinuité fondamentale indicative
par elle-même d'une frontikre maritime; elles cessent d'être déterminantes
(determinative, conclrrsive) pour la délimitation et sont simplementà prendre en
considération comme des circonstances pertinentes parmi d'autres (ibid., p. 83,
par. 6.09; p. 91et 92, par. 6.26 à6.28; p. 102.par. 6.55).
Dans cette seconde situation le tableau n'est plus le même. D'abord, nousdit-
on, titre juridique et délimitation (qui toutà l'heure allaient ahand in handn)
n'ont maintenant plus de corrélation nécessaire (1, ML, p. 83, par. 6.09).
Ensuite. nous dit-on, il n'y a plus cette fois-ci ni premier pas axé surle titre
juridique ni v6rification par la mise en balance des circonstances pertinentes: le
processus se réduit la seule prise en considérationdes circonstances pi-
nentes, au sein desquelles les catactéristiques physiques du sol et du sous-sol370 PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
trouvent leur place parmi d'autres (1, ML, p. 92, par. 6.28). Enfin, et par voie
de conséquence, ce n'est plus, cette fois-ci, la nature, mais la mise en balance
des circonstances pertinentes, qui indique la frontière (1, ML, p. 91 et 92,
par. 6.26 à6.29; p. 102, par. 6.55).
Selon le mémoire libyen,je le rappelle, ce n'est pas cette seconde hypothése
qui se trouve réaliséedans notre affaire, mais la première, celle de l'existence
de deux prolongements naturels physiquement distincts (ibid., p. 102, par. 6.54;
p. 127, par. 8.01; p.132, par.8.13; p. 133, par. 8.17).
Voilà, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, la premiere des deux lignes
de penséeexposéespar la Libye, celle qu'elle a exposke au stade du mémoire.
Dans la réplique libyenne apparaît une seconde approche, trèsdifférente.
Dans cette deuxiéme approche la distinction, présentéepar le mémoire comme
majeure, entre les situations& plateaux physiquement séparéset les situations 5
plateau continu est passéesous silence, oubliée, effacée.ans notre cas, nous dit-
on à présent, comme dans tous les autres, titre juridique et délimitations
sont toujours fondamentalement separés. Dans notre cas, nous dit-on, comme
dans tous les autres, l'opération de délimitation, loin de comporter un point de
départ ancrédans le titre juridique, commence directement par la prise en consi-
deration et la mise en balance des faits. Le résultat. c'est-à-dire la delimita-
tion, nous dit-on, est le produit de cette mise en balance (ci-dessus, RL, p. 90,
par. 7.15). .
En d'autres termes, les caractéristiques physiques des fonds marins, quelle
que soit la situation, ne conduisent plus jamais à elles seules à mettre en évi-
dence la délimitation; elles ne sont jamais que des circonstances pertinentes
parmi d'autres, et c'est la mise en balance de l'ensemble de ces circonstances
qui conduit à (poitrts ro, points towards) la solution équitable. Voila ce que l'on
nous explique abondamment dans la réplique (parexemple: ci-dessus, RL, p. 7,
par. 1.04; p. 81, par. 6.17; p. 84, par. 6.23; p. 98-99, par. 8.15). Dans cette
nouvelle optique, on le constate, les circonstances de fait ne remplissent plus
jamais la fonction d'une vérification du résultat indiquépar le titre juridique.
c'est-&-dire parle prolongement naturel; elles conduisent toujours directement &
la solution. C'est toujours par la prise en considkration des faits, nous dit-on en
toutes lettres, que«l'exercice de délimitationcommence* (ci-dessus, RL, p. 88,
par. 7.09); ce sont toujours les faits de l'espèce qui constituent «le point de
départ» de la délimitation (ibid., p. 98, par. 8.14). Mais écoutons la réplique
adverse nous décrireelle-même cette nouvelleapproche:
« Libya examines the facts, opening up the map, observing the coasts of the
Parties . . and al1the geographical, geomorphological and geological fea-
tures. Other factors such as the presence of third States and the conduct of
the Parties areexamined.~ (ibid p.,96, par. 8.09.)
Aprés quoi il convient, toujours selon la description adverse, de déterminer,
parmi les faits ainsi relevés,
<<whichones are relevant and how much weight should be accorded those
that are relevant in order to reach an equitable result. . . . What then
remains is for the result that emerges from the facts to be tested by means
of the element of proportionality.» (Ibid.,lac.cir.et p. 99, par. 8.15.)
La RifrZone, la RifrZone, la Rif Ztone: voilà en quoi se concentre en défini-
tive, par-del5 des distinctions et sous-distinctions, la revendication libyenne.
Mais, Monsieur le Président, c'est une revendication, ce n'est pas une thése.
Car, pour peu que l'on pose la question: pourquoi - j'entends: pourquoi en PLAlDOIKlE DE M. WEIL 371
droit - la Rifr Zone? la consultation des écritures libyennes, je crois l'avoir
montré, produitdes reponses Bpeu près aussiclaires et cohérentesque celles de
fa pythie de Delphes.
De contradiction en nuance, de nuance en contradiction, l'analyse concep-
tuelle - c'est le mot employépar nos adversaires - qui prétend sous-tendre la
revendication de la Rift Zone finit par échapper à l'entendement.
Pourquoi, Monsieur le Président, pourquoi titre et délimitation marchent-ils
«la main dans la main» dans certains cas et évoluent-ils sur des planètes diffë-
rentes dans d'autres'?
Comment comprendre que l'on nous décrive longuementun processus compor-
tant un «premier pas>>suivi d'une vkrification par les circonstances pertinentes
(1, ML, p. 113, par. 6.86) et qu'en mEme temps on proclame avec indignation
que «tout le concept d'une «délimitation primaire» est étranger à la penséede
la Libye» (ci-dessus, RL, p. 94, par. X.03)?
Comment accepter que Malte soit accusée-et sur quel ton! - une fois, dix
fois, vingt fois de négliger les faits, de ieap;frog, de «jouer à saute-moutons»
avec eux, de préconiser à la place un schémapurement abstrait dans lequel les
faits seraient réduits au rôle subalterne de «facteurs subsidiaires» (ci-dessus,
RL, p. 25, par. 3.17)? Mais la Partie adverse aurait-elle oubliéque c'est elle -
et non pas Malte - qui a exposé clans cette affaire une série de distinctions
d'une complexité qui défie le bon sens; que c'est elle - et non pas Malte -
qui a la première parléde <<premierpas» et qui a la première introduit dans le
debat l'idéed'une délimitation primaire et d'une espèce de présomption; que
c'est elle- et non pas Malte - qui a la première proposé à la Cour une déli-
mitation fondée surla prise en consiclCrationdu titre juridique et sur la vérifica-
tion ultérieure de I'éqiiitedu résultatpar les circonstances pertinentes et le test
de proportionnalité (voir 1, ML, p. 91, par. 6.25 ; p. 133, par. S.18 ; p. 101,
par. 6.51; p. 153, par. 9.64)? Avant de nous accabler de ses sarcasmes et de
tourner en dérision notre prétendue *abstraction», la Partie adverse aurait dû
prendre la précaution de relire ses propres écrits.
Et comment, Monsieur le Président, comment se laisser convaincre par les
vertueuses protestations du genre: «La Libye n'a jamais avancé la proposition
que la Rifi Zone constitue pcr se une frontière maritime naturelle entre les
Etatsm (ci-dessus, RL, p. 82, par. 6.19; cf. p. 7, par. 1.04)? Aurions-nous rêvé
lorsque nous avons lu des dizaines de fois, à travers le mémoire, le contre-
mémoireet la réplique libyennes que la Rifr Zone constitue une nfundamentrzl»,
une (.major discontinuity N qui ~arresrs ,)le prolongement naturel des deux pays
et qui constitue la limite à la fois de leurs titres et de leurs zones respectives,
qui arompt la continuité du plateau.* et qui met en évidence de ce fait <<une
frontière suivant cette division* (1,ML, p. 89, par. 6.21; p. 102, par. 6.54;
p. 154, par. 10.01; p. 134, par. 9.02; 11,CML, p. 23, par. 2.05; p. 86. par.4.22;
p. 166, par. 8.04; p. 167, par. 8.10; ci-dessus, RL, p. 28, par. 3.27; p. 44,
par. 4.32)? Aurions-nous étévictimes d'un phantasme lorsque nous avons cru
voir évoquer une comparaison avec le Rhin et le Mississipi «qui [est-il écrit
dans le contre-rndmoire libyen] forment des frontières entre des entités poli-
tiques* (II, CML, p. 53, note l)? Et avons-nous eu des visions lorsque nous
croyons lire, dans les conclusions finiiles des trois écrits libyens,que
«there exists a fundamental discontinuity in the sea-bed and subsoil which
divides the areas of continental shelf into two distinct natural prolongations
extending from the land territories of the respective Parties» (Conclusion
no 4)?
Lorsque la nature indique une séparationet que cette séparation devient par là-372 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
mêmeune frontière, est-ce autre chose, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les
juges, que ce que l'on appelait autrefois une frontiere naturelle?
Comment, enfin, appréhender une thésequi, d'un côté. est bâtie sur I'exis-
tence de deux plateaux continentaux séparés physiquementpar une adisconti-
nuitéfondamentalen et sur la négationradicale de tout «continuum» géologique
et géomorphologique, et qui, d'un autre côté, constate - en toutes lettres-
que l'ensemble du litde la mer Pélagienneet de la mer Ionienne relève de la
définition que l'article 76 donne de la <<margecontinentale» (ci-dessus, RL,
p. 21, note 2)?
Monsieur le Président,il ne nous appartient pas de diagnostiquer les raisons
de cet éclatement de la thése libyenne. Peut-être dirais-je simplementque la
peur du concept de distance ne nous paraît pas ktrangére à cette accumulation
de contradictions. Pour tenter d'échapper auprincipe de distance, la Libye a
cherché d'abord ;i le reléguerdans le domaine du titre juridique et des limites
extérieureset à érigerun écran coupe-feuentre le monde du titre et celui de la
délimitation. C'est seulementdans l'hypothèse où elle aurait pu faire accepter
comme titre le prolongement naturel au sens physique du terme qu'elle aurait
admis - et avec enthousiasme alors - la corrélation entre titreet délimitation.
Mais sans doute était-ceencore trop dangereux à ses yeux. .Aussi la Libye sug-
gère-t-elle d'aller plus loin. Elle veutà présentqu'en toute hypothese titre et
délimitation soient séparése.t c'est dans ce but, me semble-t-il, qu'elle réduith
présent l'opération de dtlimiiation 3 la simple mise en balance des faits sans
aucune prise en considération du titre juridique. De cette manière exit le titre,
e.riila distance. c'sir la zone économique exclusive: nous sommes dans le
monde clos des faits et des circonstances pertinentes, et dans ce monde restreint,
espère la Libye. point de place pour les considérations de distance venues du
monde lointain du titre juridique.
Peut-être aussi13 Libye a-t-elle cherchétout simplement àjouer sur plusieurs
tableaux à )a fois. espérant ainsi mettredavantage de chances de son côté. A la
manihre de la chauve-souris de la fable de La Fontaine, elle a peut-être choisi
de présenter à la Cour un double visage juridique, l'un qui exprime le titre jun-
dique, l'autre qui ne reflete que les faits:
«Je suis oiseau; voyez mes ailes...
Je suis souris; vivent les rat»!
Quoi qu'il en soit. rien ne saurait mieux mettre en lumiérela difficulte que
nous éprouvons A nous battre contre des theses qui s'évanouissent aussitôtque
nous tentons de les appréhender.
II existe, écrit la Libye. entre les Panies des «différences fondamentales
quanr au cadre juridique dans lequel la délimitation doit êtreeffectuée>)(ci-
dessus, RL, p. 5. par. t2), et la Libye a raison. Mais ce qu'elle oublie de dire.
c'est qu'il existe aussi,à presque tous les niveaux. des «différencesfondarnen-
tales» entre les diverses conceptions juridiques énoncées simultanémenptar elle-
meme.
Nul doute. Monsieur le Président. qu'il soit indispensablede mettre un peu
d'ordre dans ce debat que les écritsadverses ont à ce point obscurci. Au risque
de nous faire accuser h nouveau d'abstraction, je voudrais soumettre à ce sujet
quelques observations sur les aspects les plus controversés de la discussion.
L'impressionnisme juridique peut servir de taciique ou de rideau de fumée. II
ne suffit pas?faire du bon droit.
C'est dans cette perspective que je me tourne maintenant avec votre permis-
sion. Monsieur le Président. vers la structure et le contenu de l'opération de
délimitation. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 373
2. Stricctureet contenu de I'opéintionde délimitation
II est certain, Monsieur le Président,que la délimitation du plateau continen-
tal doit s'effectuer conformément Ades principes équitables en vue d'aboutir à
une solution équitable. La Partie adverse croit nécessaire de nous rappeler ce
principe 21tout moment, comme si nous avions jamais soutenu le contraire.
Qu'elle se rassure: nous sommes parfaitement d'accord avec elle sur ce point.
De même sommes-nous d'accorddes deux côtésde la barre pour estimer que
les principes équitables comportent essentiellement l'obligation de prendre en
considération et de mettre en balance tes circonstances pertinentes propres à
notre affaire. Dans sa plaidoirie dans l'affaire des Pêcheries, Maurice Bourquin
faisait observer que:
*Prétendre soumettre toutes les situations à des règles préciseset rigou-
reuses, qui s'appliqueraientuniformkment sans tenir compte des réalité.s..,
c'est aller au-devant d'un échec ...parce que c'est poursuivre une idée
fausse.» (C.I.JMémoires, vol. V, p. 11.)
Et un peu plus tard Charles De Vissçher évoquait dans fe même esprit les«élé-
ments individualisateurs constitutifs de l'équité*(De l'équité dansle règlement
arbiiral ou judiciaire des litiges de droit international public, Paris, Pedone,
1972, p. 13). C'est cette même idéeque la Cour a récemment exprimée dans
une formule frappante:
<<Cequi est raisonnable et équitable dans un cas donné dépend forcé-
ment des circonstances, et à coup sûr il est virtuellement impossible, dans
une délimitation, d'aboutir à une solution équitable en méconnaissant les
circonstances propres à la région.» (C.1.J.Recueil 1982, p. 60, par. 72.)
11y a quelques semaines l'arrêt duGoIfe du Maine confirmait cette approche
à de nambreuses reprises: .chaque cas concret est finalement diffkrent des
autres», énonce-t-il,«il est un unicurnw(par. 81; cf. par. 163, 219, etc.).
Bref, l'équité, c'est avanttout la prise en considération de la spécificitéde
chaque cas; ce n'est jamais, comme je me suis déjà permis de le dire ici, la
mêmeeau qui coule sous le mêmepont.
Il est certain, dès lors, comme nous l'avons écrit,que (<lescirconstances per-
tinentes sont toujours présentes dans le processus de délimitation» (II, CMM,
p. 60, par. 114). Jusqu'ici je ne pense pas que la Partie adverse se séparera de
nous.
Est-ce à dire pour autant que l'op&-ationde délimitationdoive se limiter a la
prise en considération des circonstances pertinentes, et que cette dernière l'oc-
cupe en quelque sorte tout entière?
C'est ce que soutient la Libye dans la seconde des approches qu'elle a adop-
tées dans ses kcritures, celle exposée dans sa réplique, celle selon laquelle
l'exercice de délimitation commencerait immédiatementet directement par la
prise en considération des faits de l'espèce, le resultat équitable etant censé
émergerdirectement de ces faits.
Monsieur le Président, Maltene souscrit pasB une telle approche. Pour Malte
les circonstances pertinentes doivent être«prises en considération» par le juge,
mais elles ne sauraient êtretenues pour un facteur primaire. direct et exclusif de
la dklimitation.
La mission du juge ou de l'arbitre, telle que Malte la conçoit, ne peut se
ramener à celle d'un ordinateur qui tirerait automatiquement des faits de
l'espèce unesolution prédéterminée. IIn'y a pas, avons-nous &rit, de dikrordes
circonstances pertinentes (II, CMM, p. 59, par. 109, et p. 60, par. 113). Pas374 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
davantage ne saurait-il être question de concevoir l'opération de délimitation
sous la forme d'une décision purement discrétionnaireque le juge tirerait de
l'examen des circonstances de fait. La Cour a fait clairement savoir, en 1969
d'abord, puis en 1982, qu'en préconisant la prise en considération des circons-
tances particulières de chaque espèce concrete, elle n'envisage ni une décision
ex aequo et hotzo, ni l'«exercice d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire ou de concilia-
tion», ni le« recoursà la justice distributi»e(C.I.J. Recueil 1969,p. 48, par. 88;
C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 60, par. 71). La Chambre a noté de son côté, dans
l'affaire duGolfe tiu Maine, qu'elle étaittenue «non pas de déciderex aequo er
hono, mais d'asseoir le résultatàatteindre sur une base de droit» (par. 59). C'est
ce que la Libye paraît avoir oublié. Partirdes faits, comme elle prétend lefaire,
se tenir aux faits sans les quitter jamais, cela s'appelle statueraequo et bono.
Des faits ne peut émerger le droit que si l'on applique à ces faits une norme
juridique; les faits sont impuissants par eux-mêmes à créer du droit. Même
des agissements purement matérielsne sont susceptibles d'entraîner une responsa-
bilité sur la base du droit qu'en application d'une règle juridique préexistante
prévoyant les conditions de mise en jeu et les effets de la responsabilité; sinon,
c'est d'une décisionen pure équitéqu'il s'agit, et de rien d'autre.
Certes il importe, la Cour l'a indiqué à deux reprises, que la règle générale
soit «adaptée à la diversitédes circonstances de fait» (Pêcheries,C.I.J. Recueil
1951, p. 133; Plaieali conrinenrul de la mer du Nord, C.I.J. Recueil 1969,
p. 51, par. 94); et pour cela il faut, nous en sommes d'accord avec la Libye,
examiner les faits, ouvrir la carte, observer les côtes et toutes les donnéesgéo-
graphiques et autres, prendre en compte la conduite des Parties. Mais cela ne
veut pas dire que de ces faits bruts puisse jaillir, par un coup de baguette
magique, une solution juridique, à la manière d'une Vénus sortant tout année
des flots.
Le droit de la délimitation du plateau continental ne saurait, selon nous, s'ac-
commoder de la philosophie négatrice de tout principe expriméepar Talleyrand
dans une formule célèbre : *IIn'y a pas de principes, il n'y a que des événements;
il n'ya pas de lois, il n'y a quedes circonstances» Dans cette matiérecomme en
toute autre, on est en présence, comme l'a observé un membre de la Cour en
1982, d'un
«dilemme ...qui tientà la nécessitéde respecter l'uniformité des principes
et règles de droit dans une sériede situations que caractérise leur extrême
diversité» (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, opinion individuelle de M. Jiménezde Aré-
chaga, p. 106, par. 26).
Le droit de la délimitation du plateau continental exige certes que soit pris en
considération I'(~unicum»irréductible de chaque situation. Cela ne signifie pas
pour autant que l'on puisse le concevoir comme formé d'une succession de
solutions d'espèce,décideesau coup par coup et sans aucun fil directeur.
Les circonstances pertinentes ne sauraient donc, selon nous, suffireà détermi-
ner la délimitation. Leur fonction ne peut êtreque de servir de réactif permet-
tant de vérifier le caractère équitable (c'est-&-dire adapté auxdonnées particu-
lières du cas) d'une ligne reposant sur un élément objectifet général - pour
tout dire:sur le droit;faute de quoi, la dklimitation dériverait inéluctablement
vers le subjectif et. du mêmecoup, vers l'imprévisible.
Monsieur le Président,la démarche suggérée par la Libye dans sa réplique est
de celles que peuvent suivre des gouvernements désireux de procéder A une
délimitation conforme à des règles de droit, c'est-à-dire tenter d'aboutirà une
solution identique à celle qui aurait pu être décidée par un juge ou un arbitre
international, C'est ainsi que certains accords récentsconclus par la France (la PLAIDOIRIEDE M. WEIL 375
Cour en trouvera des illustrations dans le compte rendu) font expressément réfé-
rence au droit international (accords Francenonga, II, CML, ~Annex of Deli-
mitation Agreements», accord no 63; France/Maurice, ibid., accord no 65;
FranceNenezuela, ihid., accord no67; France/Sainte-Lucie, ibid., accord no69;
France/Australie, ihid.,accord no 71). Mais, s'ils le veulent, les gouvernements
peuvent s'évader des considérations juridiqueset retenir tout tracéleur parais-
sant équitable sur la base des seules circonstances de fait. L'équitése conçoit
dans un tel cadre sous la forme la plus large. Elle peut reposer sur les considé-
rations les plus diverses: economiqiies, militaires, que sais-je encore? Un gou-
vernement peut accepter une délimitation défavorablesur l'une de ses côtes en
contrepartie d'une délimitation plus favorable sur une autre côte ou en contre-
partie d'avantages économiquesou politiques d'ordre différent. Aucune règlede
jus cogens ne vient restreindre leur liberté contractuelle à cet égard. Les faits
peuvent constituer le point de départde l'exercice de délimitationdans une déli-
mitation conventionnelle.
Dans le cas d'une délimitation par voie judiciaire ou arbitrale la situation
n'est plus la même,me semble-t-il. L'équité se conçoit alorsd'une manière plus
stricte que dans le cas d'une délimitation conventionnelle, car il s'agit d'une
équité « within the rulen, d'une «notion juridique de l'équitéP. comme l'a dit la
Cour (C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p.48, par. 88, et C.I.JRecueil 1982, p. 60, par. 71).
Contrairement à des gouvernements qui procèdent à une délimitation par voie
d'accord, le juge ou l'arbitre ne peuvent pas adopter n'importe quelle délimi-
tation qui leur paraîtrait équitable partir du moment où ils ont ouvert la carte
et examiné les faits. Ils ne peuvent pas se placer en marge du droit. Ils sont
tenus, pour reprendre l'expression de la Chambre, <<d'asseoirle résultat à
atteindre sur une base de droit» (par. 59). On peut transposer ici ce que la Cour
a déclaré dansun autre contexte:
«II ne s'agit pas seulement d'arriver a une solution équitable mais d'arri-
ver à une solution équitable qui repose sur le droit applicable.» (Co~npé-
rence en matière de pêcheries,C.1.J.Recueil 1974, p. 33, par. 78.)
C'est dire que la délimitation ne saurait flotter dans le vide. L'opération de
délimitation ne peut pas se borner h extraire directement des faits une solution
qui semblerait équitable. Elle doitnbcessairement avoir un point d'ancrage dans
le droit.
C'est dire aussi que la méthode de délimitation ne doit pas seulement être
justifiéee.rpost par le caractère equitable du résultat, mais également ex ante
par des considérations juridiques de caractere objectif. La séquence normale
mène à la ligne de délimitation en partant du droit et de la géographie, et en
passant par la méthodequi jette un pont entre eux. Commencer par tracer une
ligne regardee comme kquitable sur la base des seuls faits, c'est inverser l'ordre
normal de I'op6ration de délimitatiori.
En refusant avec fermeté de concevoir sa mission comme l'<<exerciced'un
pouvoir discrétionnaire ou de la coriciliation~, la Cour a écartétoute approche
de la délimitation du plateau continental qui, orientée exclusivement vers le
rksultat à atteindre, rie justifierait ce résultat que par rapport aux faits indivi-
duels et changeants de chaque espSce, sans l'ancrage sécurisantet stable du
droit. Le droit ne saurait, selon la Cour, être cantonné dans le résultat à
atteindre; ildoit êtrepresent kgalement dans le processus qui l'y conduit. Limi-
ter le droità l'équitédu rksultat appréciésur la base directe et exclusive des
faits, etkvacuer le droit des méthodes a appliquer, priverait la délimitation des
espaces maritimes de toute sécurite, de toute prkvisibilité. Si deux gouveme-
rnents décidentde s'en remettre à la Cour internationale de Justice ou à I'arbi-376 PI-ATEAU CONTINENTAL
trüge, ce n'est pas pour obtenir une espèce de conciliation obligatoire, mais
pour être jugés1 l'aune du droit. Toute confusion des genres risquerait de pous-
ser les gouvernements à maximiser leurs revendications ou, plus grave encore,
de les dissuader de recourir à la justice internationale. A un moment où il reste
des centaines de délimitations maritimes?Ieffectuer, un tel risque ne saurait être
pris h la légère.
Monsieur le Président,le déroulement du processus de délimitations'impose
des lors clairement de lui-même:une ligne de depart reposant sur une méthode
enracinee dans le droit; puis une vérificationdu caractère équitabledu résultat,
avec les ajustemenis ou corrections nécessaires pour tenir compte des circons-
tances particuli2res l I'espéce.La ligne de dklimitation d'arrivée ne coïncidera
donc pas forcément avecla ligne provisoire de départ. Ainsi se trouvent respec-
tés les deux pôles de toute délimitation selon le droit international. Car, me
semble-t-il. pour êtreconforme au droit international, une délimitalion doit
satisfaireà deux conditions. l'une et I'autre nécessaires, sans qu'aucuned'elles
ne soit suffisante: elle doit être ancréedans le droit; elle doit êtreéquitable
compte tenu des circonstances particulières propres à I'espce.
Ainsi que vient de le déclarerla Chambre dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine:
(<ilconvient d'arrêterd'abord son choix sur une méthode pratique appro-
priée,?Iutiliser pour etablir provisoirement une délimitation de base, puis
de prendre en considération les correctifs que les circonstances spéciales de
l'espèce pourront rendre indispensable de lui apporter. Il s'agira donc
d'une opérationen deux étapes.» (C.I.J.Rccueil 1984, p. 333, par. 215.)
A une délimitation provisoirement &ablie» (par. 185). déclare la Chambre,
fait suite une délimitation établie& titre définitif* (par. 216).
Notre conception de l'opération de délimitation, qui paraît ainsi être égale-
ment celle de la Chambre. nous a valu des critiques cinglantes de la part de la
Libye. qui nous accuse de minimiser le rôle des circonstances pertinentes et de
chercher ?Inous évader des faits pour nous rkfugier dans l'abstraction (ci-des-
sus,Rt.p.24,par.3.14;p.25.par. 3.17;p.31,par.3.34).
La Partie adverse, jele crains, a dû nous lire un peu rapidement. Ce que nous
avons écrit,et que nousrépétons.c'es1que les circonstances pertinentes ne suf-
fisent pas ?Ielles seules 5 établir une ligne de délimitation (II, CMM, p. 60,
par. 113); mais, loin de leur accorder un rôle subordonné, subsidiaire, nous
avons tout su contraire souligné que leur prise en considération occupe une
place capitale dans l'opération de délimitation (ibid.,p. 58, par. 108; p. 60,
par. 112 et 114).
II est h peine besoin d'ajouter qu'il n'y a pas de hiérarchiede primaire et de
secondaire entre les deux aspects de la délimitation, et quel'un n'a pas prCérni-
nence sur l'autre. Ces deux aspects ne sont dissociables que pour les besoins de
l'analyse et de l'exposé.Dans la rkalitk ils se confondent en une opérationglo-
bale et synthétique dont l'objet estde prendre en considération à la fois et en
mêmetemps le fondement du titre - élément juridique commun à toutes les
délimitations du plateau continental - et les circonstances pertinentes de
l'espèce- élément particulierà chaque cas.
Le titre juridique au plateau continental, sans les faits concrets de l'espèce,
serait un squelette sans chair; les faits de l'espèce, sans le titre juridique au pla-
teau continental, seraient une chairsans ossature. La conception libyenne privi-
16gie les faitsà 1'6tatnu et néglige le droit. La conception de Malte accorde
leur juste place et au droit et aux faits.
Monsieur le Président, si les vues des Parties sur l'operation de délimitation
divergent aussi profondément que je viens de l'exposer, c'est parce qu'elles se PLAlDOlRlE DE M. WEIL 377
séparentsur un point précis: pour nous, le fondement juridique du titre de I'Etat
cBtier au plateau continental a nécessairement une incidence sur l'opérationde
délimitation; pour la Libye, au contraire, du moins dans la derniere version de
ses écritures, titre juridique et délimitation évoluent surdes orbitesdifferentes,
et leurs routes ne se croisentpas.
C'est à ce problème précis des rapports entre le titre juridique au plateau
continental et la délimitation. problèmequi domine, à mon sens, l'ensemble de
la controverse et qui en fournit la clé, que je voudrais m'arrêteriiprésent
quelques instants.
3. Tiwejuridique et dPlirnitation
Si Malte acceptait de situer lef~ndernentjuridique du titre au plateau conti-
nental dans le prolongement naturel au sens géologiqueet géomorphologiquedu
terme, la Libye, nous l'avons vu, serait toute disposée à admettre que le tirre
juridique intervient dans l'opérationde délimitation (1,ML, p. 83. par. 6.09: cf.
II. CML, p. 56, par. 2.84). Le problème, pour elle, serait réglé h son avantage,
pense-t-elfe. Mais Malte estime que c'est te principe de distance qui constitue le
fondement juridique du titre de 1'Etat côtier au plateau continental. Comme
c'est ce principe que la Libye craint par-dessus tout, elle tente la fois de jeter
le doute sur le principe de distance en tant que base juridique du titre - c'est
un aspect de la these libyenne que j'exarninerai plus tard - et elle tente aussi
d'ériger une barrière infranchissatile entre titre juridique et délimitation. La
Libye espere ainsi. au cas oh elle rie pourrait empêcherla Cour de voir dans le
principe de distance le fondement juridique du titre de I'Etat côtier au plateau
continental, parvenir 1 tout le moins ilpréserver la délimitation de ce principe
tant redouté.
11n'est pas excessif de dire que la negation de toute corrélation entre titre et
délimitation se situe au cŒur du cas libyen. Aussi comprend-on l'insistance
quasi obsédante avec laquelle ces theses se trouvent répétéeds'un bout àl'autre
des trois ecrits libyens (1.ML. p. 82, par. 6.04 et 6.06; p. 89-90, par. 6.22;
II, CML, p. 80, par. 4.10; p. 81, par. 4.12; p. 101. par. 4.52; ci-dessus, RL,
p. 3-4, par. 9; p. 18, par. 3.03; p. 19, par. 3.05; p. 21, par. 3.08: p. 22,
par. 3.10; p. 23. par. 3.13; p. 31, par. 3.33; p. 33. par. 4.02; p. 72, par. 5.40).
Nous avons dénoncéles vices de ces thèses dans nos écritures (II, CMM,
p. 54-56, par. 96-101; ci-dessus, RM, p. 29-32, par. 48-57). L'importance déci-
sive du problhme me conduit néannioins 3 en reprendre ici quelques aspects.
Monsieur le Résident. il est évident, et nous en sommes parfaitement
d'accord, que tes concepts de titre juridique- entirlement - et de délimitation
ne sont pas synonymes et ne se recouvrent pas. La Libye nous fait un procés
entièrement imaginaire en nous faisant continuellement grief de les confondre.
Nous savons que le titre juridique intéresse ladetermination des concepts sur la
base desquels un Etat est juridiquement habilité à exercer une certaine juridic-
tion sur les espaces maritimes au large de ses côtes; il se rapporte essentielle-
ment h la fixation des limites extérieures, vers le large. Nous savons aussi que
la délimitation, quant à elle, consiste h tracer une frontière entre des Etats voi-
sins lorsque la situation géographique ne permet pas à chacun des Etats intéres-
ses de jouir de son titre jusqu'li son extrême limite. Noussavons enfin que la
Cour a fait clairement état de cette distinction entre titre et délimitation. tant
dans son arrêtde 1969 (C.I.J.Recucil 1969, p.22, par. 18et 20; p. 32, par. 86),
que dans son arrêtde 1982 (C.I.J.Recueil 1982, p. 47, par. 44; p. 61, par. 73).
Tout cela, nous le savons, de tout cela nous sommes d'accord. Le fait que les
deux concepts soient distincts, et ils le sont. n'implique cependant pas qu'il ne378 PLATEAU CONT~NENTAL
puisse pas y avoir de comklation entre eux. En concluant de la non-synonymie à
la non-corrélation,le Libye se livreà un non sequitur.
II nous paraît évident qu'une délimitationde plateau continental ne peut pas
s'effectuer de la même manière selon que le titre juridique sur le plateau
repose, mettons, sur l'occupation effective ou sur le prolongement naturel au
sens physique du terme, ou sur une distance donnée des côtes ou sur quelque
autre concept juridique. Une délimitation complètement détachéede la nature
juridique du titre, et qui serait laEme quel que soit le concept juridique du
titre, serait étrangèretout principe de droit; elle consisterait en une répartition
du plateau reposant uniquement sur des considérations d'opportunité. C'est
exactement à quoi conduit la these libyenne d'une délimitation axéeseulement
sur les faits,à l'exclusion de toute prise en considération du titre juridique: la
délimitation qui «émerge» des faits, pour reprendre le mot de la Libye, serait
exactement la mêmequel que soit le fondement des droits de 1'Etat côtier au
plateau continental, et quelle que soit l'évolution du droit coutumier en ce
domaine. La théselibyenne conduit en quelque sorte à isoler le droit de la déli-
mitation du plateau continental et de son environnement juridique. Elle implique
une sorte d'immobilisme juridique qui contraste avec l'évolution rapideet pro-
fonde du droit de la mer.
La position de la jurisprudence sur ce problème capital ne laisse pourtant
place aucune ambiguïté.
Si la Cour a fait, dans son arrêtde 1969, la place que l'on sait au prolonge-
ment naturel, c'est parce qu'elle avait auparavant situé la base juridique des
droits de 1'Etatcôtier sur le plateau continental dans le prolongement naturel de
son temtoire sous la mer (C.I.J.Recuei! 1969, p. 22, par. 19; p. 31,par. 43). Si
le prolongement naturel n'avait pas étéau cŒur de I'entitlemeni dans l'arrêtde
1969, il n'aurait pasrouvCsa place au cŒur de la delimitation.
Dans l'affaire franco-britannique, le tribunal arbitral a rejeté uneméthodede
délimitation de la région atlantique préconiséepar la France, au motif que:
acette méthodene semble pas au tribunal être compatible avec le régimejuri-
dique applicable au plateau continental...)) (par.6).
Mais c'est, bien entendu, dans I'artêtTunisielLibye que le lien entre le titre et
la délimitationa étémis en lumièrede la manière la plus remarquable.
Je me permettrai de rappeler que, dans un dictum de principe, la Cour a
d'abord déclaréque:
«les «principes et règles du droit international qui peuvent êtreappliqds»
pour la délitnitciliondes zones du plateau continental découlent nécessaire-
ment de la notion mêmede plateau continental, telle qu'elle est comprise
en droit international» (C.I.J.Recueil 1982, p. 43, par. 36). (Les italiques
sont de moi.)
Après cela comment affirmer, comme le fait la Partie adverse, que titre et
délimitation évolueiit dans des mondes differents? Mais ce n'est pas tout. Un
peu plus loin dans le mêmearrêt,la Cour aborde la question du paragraphe 1
de l'article 76 de cc qui n'étaitalors encore que le projet de convention sur le
droit de la mer. Au paragraphe 48 de son arrêt,aprks avoir rappel6 que désor-
mais, «dans certaines circonstances, la distance à partir de la ligne de base,
mesutee à la surface de la mer, fonde le titre de I'Etat côtier*, elle indique que
dans ce cas «seule la base juridique des droits.sur le plateau continental- la
simple distance de la côte - peut être priseen considération comme pouvant
influer sur les prétentions des Parties*, c'est-à-dire sur les prétentions dans le
litige soumisà la Cour, autrement dit en matière de délimitation.
L'incidence du titre sur la dhlimitation apparaît dans une lumière tout aussi PLAIDOIRIEDE M. WEIL 379
vive dans un troisiéinepassage de l'arrêtde 1982 dont la Cour me permettra de
donner lecture de nouveau:
«C'est ...en partant de la côte des Parties qu'il faut rechercher jusqu'où
les espaces sous-marins relevant de chacune d'elles s'étendent versle
large, ainsi que par rapport aux Etats qui leur sont limitrophes ou leur font
face.» (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 61, par74.)
La prise en considérationdes côtes - qui est une composante du concept de
distance, mais qui est entiérement étrangère à celui de prolongement naturel
physique - intervient donc, c'esi clair.à la fois pour la fixation des limites
extérieureset pour la délimitation.
Les prononcésde 1982 sont tellement dévastateurs pourle postulat libyen de
l'incommunicabilitéentre titre et délimitationque la Libye a tente dans sa ré-
plique une opération de dernière chance pour essayer d'en sauver quelque
chose. Que nous dit la Libye?
D'abord, allègue-r-elle (ci-dessus, RL, p. 19, par. 3.05; cf. p. 22, par.3.10),
le paragraphe 1 de I'article 76 se réfPreaux limites extérieures, et il ne peut
avoir aucune incidence sur la dklimitation pour une raison très simple. C'est
que le même article comprend un paragraphe 10 qui dit:
«Le présent article ne préjugepas de la question de la délimitationdu
plateau continental entre des IStatsdont les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font
face.»
Puisque l'article 10 précise que rien dans le présent article ne préjuge de la
question de la délimitation, cela signifie, explique la Libye, que le paragrüphe 1
de l'article 76 ne peut pas Etre invoqué comme ayant un rapport quelconque
avec la délimitation.
L'objection libyenne me paraît sans portée. Si la Cour a jugé utile d'évoquer
I'articte 76, paragraphe 1, dans l'affaire TunisieiLibye, c'est précisémentparce
qu'elle estimait qu'il s'agissait 18d'une disposition susceptible de ~erefiéteres
nouvelles tendances acceptées à prendre en considération en I'espkce~ (C.I.J.
Recueil 1982, p. 48, par. 47): «en l'espèce*, c'est-à-diredans la délimitation
du plateau continental entre la Tunisie et la Libye. Pourquoi donc la Cour
aurait-elle songé à évoquer ces dispositions si elle avait consider6 qu'elles
étaient depourvues de toute pertinence pour l'affaire de délimitationdont elle
étaitsaisie? Que l'article 76, paragraphe 1, ait pour objet de définirles limites
extérieuresdu plateau continental vers le large, cela est évident, certain,et nul
ne le contestera. Mais la Cour n'a pas penséqu'il y avait un obstacle à ce que
cette disposition relative au titreait une influence sur la délimitation. Elle a
mêmepensé exactementle contraire. Elle a dit expressémentque «cette défini-
tion ne doit pas étre perdue de vue» (cannol he ignoi-ed): «perdue de vue »,
pour quelle fin, si ce n'est celle de la délimitation du plateau continental en
cause devant elle? Mieux encore, la Cour a déclarkqu'il ne fallait pas <.perdre
de vue » cette disposition aux fins de la délimitation,«bien que le paragraphe 10
spécifieque les dispositions de I'article ne préjugent pas de la question de la
délimitation» (p. 48, par. 47). Aux yeux de la Cour, le paragraphe 10 de
l'article 76 n'a donc pas fait obstacle à la pertinence du paragraphe 1 pour la
déiimitation. Je ne dis pas comme regissant la délimitation - car il régit la
limite extérieure- mais comme pertinent pour l'opérationde délimitation.Le
premier argument libyen a donc déjàétérejetépar la Cour.
Second argument libyen: la Libye conteste qu'au paragraphe 48 de l'arrêtde
1982,que j'ai analyséil y a quelques instants, la Cour ait véritablementévoqué
la délimitation; la Libye n'hésitelias à nous accuser d'avoir fait de ce passage380 PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
une citation hors contexte et d'en avoir ainsi dénaturé le sens. C'est une accusa-
tion grave (ci-dessus, RL, p. 20, par. 3.06).
Monsieur le Président, le paragraphe 48 est connu de la Cour. Il parle pour
lui-même.La Cour n'a-t-elle vraiment pas parle de délimitation dans le para-
graphe 48? La Cour parle dans ce passage de la distance en tant que fondement
du titre de I'Etat côtier, et immédiatement après elle se demande comment cette
nouvelle base juridique des droits sur le plateau continental qu'est la simple dis-
tance des côtes peut influer sur les prétentions des Parties (c'est-&-dire,je le
répète,au sujet de la délimitation du plateau continental et non pas sur leur titre
juridique ou les limites extérieures du plateau, qui étaient hors de cause dans
l'affaire). La position de la Cour est simple: elle déclare qu'en l'affaire dont
elle était saisie le principe de distance ne fournit aucun critsre de delimitation,
puisque les Parties ne s'étaient pas placées sur ce terrain. D'où, a contrario,
que si les Parties s'étaient placées surce terrain, la nouvelle «base juridique des
droits sur le plateau continental)),Asavoir «la simple distance des côtes», aurait
pu «influer» - le mot influerest de la Cour - sur leurs prétentions.
Prétendre que le paragraphe 48 ne s'intéresse pas à la délimitation ne me
paraît dèslors pas conforme au texte clair de'ce passage de la Cour.
La Libye avance un troisième pion encore, aussi fragile que les prkcédents.
Elle soutient, et elle a raison, que c'est l'article 83 de la convention qui régit la
délimitationdu plateau continental, et non pas I'article 76, paragraphe 1 (ci-des-
sus, RL, p. 22, par. 3.10). Mais, comme je l'ai dit tout A l'heure, le fait que l'ar-
ticle76 ne régisse pas la délimitation ne signifie pas qu'il n'ait pas d'influence
sur elle.
Pour faire justice de cet argument, il suffit d'observer que la Cour a évoqué
elle-même I'article 83 immédiatement apres avoir fait étatde I'article 76 - les
deux sont cités par la Cour au paragraphe 47 et au paragraphe 49 (C.1.J.Rerlleil
1982, p. 48, par. 47, et p. 49, par. 49-50). L'existence de l'article 83 n'a donc
manifestement pas fait obstacle àce que la Cour envisage de prendre également
en considération, pour la délimitation, l'article76. La pauvreté - voulue - de
la rPg1eénoncée à l'article 83 est telle, j'espère l'avoir montré, que cette dispo-
sition ne saurait constituerà elle seule le corpus juris des principes et regles du
droit international régissant la délimitation du plateau continental. Le recours à
l'article 76 pour compléter cette matikre a dû paraître d'autant plus normal à la
Cour que, pour elle, le titre juridique au plateau continental, objet propre de
I'article76, est pertinent par nature pour la delimitation.
Monsieur le Président, au terme de ces observations, l'existence d'une corrk-
lation inhérente et nécessaireentre le titre juridique au plateau continental et la
délimitation me parait établie au-delàde tout doute. Ce qui signifie que, dans la
mesure oh le droit international coutumier place aujourd'hui, pour reprendre le
langage de la Cour, le atitre de I'Etarcôtier», c'est-à-dire la «base juridique
des droits sur le plateau continental,, dans «la simple distance de la côte» -
toutes ces expressions sont de la Cour -, l'opérationde délimitation du plateau
continental entre Malte et la Libye ne peut pas être, menée à bien en se basant
uniquement sur les faits et sans que le «principe de distance)} soit «pris en
considération comme pouvant influer sur les prétentions des Parties». En un
mot, le principe de distance estpertinent pour la delimitation.
De Ih une double conséquence.
- Négativement, la délimitationne peut pas prendre pour point de départle
prolongement naturel au sens physique du terme. Mêmes'il était établi - et
mon ami Elihu Lauterpacht a montré qu'il n'est pas établi - que scientifique-
ment la Rifr Zone et la zone des escarpements marquent sur le plan physique la
fin du prolongement naturel de Malte respectivement vers le sud et vers l'est, PLAIDOIRID EE M. WEIL 381
mêmealors l'opération de délimitation ne pourrait pas se limiter B s'appuyer
serviIement sur ces «faits physiques-, étrangersau fondement juridique du titre
de Malte et de la Libye au plateau continental.
- Positivement, la delimitation doit obligatoirement prendre comme point de
départ une méthode en rapport avec le «titre de I'Etat côtier», c'est-A-direavec
le «principe de distance P.
A la lumière de ces observations, ilest possible àprésent, Monsieurle Prési-
dent, Messieurs les juges, de porter mon attention sur les deux concepts clésde
la théorie juridique du plateau continental: le prolongement naturel et le prin-
cipe de distance.
Tel sera l'objet des deux chapitres qui vont suivre.
111.LE PROLONGEMENTNATUREL
J'aborde donc le concept de prolongement naturel, qui constitue l'alpha et
l'omégade la théselibyenne.
Une remarque terminologique pour commencer.
Comme Ia Libye, nous prendrons le terme de prolongement naturel «dans son
sens traditionnel de concept physique. (1, ML, p. 92, par. 6.28) - c'est ainsi
qu'elle le définit-, c'est-à-dire dans la signification d'une caractéristiquephy-
sique susceptible d'une identification scientifique.
Cela dit, le concept de prolongement naturel peut revCtir, mêmeen s'en
tenant à ses aspects physiques,des significations tres diffkrentes.
Dans l'affaire qui l'opposaità la Tunisie - la Cour s'en souviendra -, la
Libye se fondait essentiellement sur la géologie historique des profondeurs et
regardait la topographie sous-marine comme secondaire (voir les réfkrences
dans II.CMM, p. 16. note 4); la Tunisie, au contraire, s'attachait essentielle-
ment aux données géomorphologiques et bathymétriques.
Dans notre affaire, au contraire, tenant sans doute compte des indications de
l'arrêd te 1982, la Libye a rectifieson tir et. mêmesi les vieux démonsde la
géologie historique et de la tectonique des plaques refont surface de temps h
autre, ce sont cette fois-ci essentiellement les données géomorphologiques etles
données géologiquesaffectant la surface du lit de la mer qui. selon elle, caracté-
risent le prolongement naturel (voir les références dansII, CMM, p. 17, par. 33;
odde, ci-dessus. RL, p. 59-75, par. 5.15-5.43; p.76, par. 6.02).
Depuis son contre-mémoire, la Libye a cependant apporté une légèrein-
flexion à cette manikre de concevoir le prolongement naturel. La Libye re-
groupe à présent sous l'expression génériquede «facteurs physiques» ou de
«faits physiques* (physicol facrs, physical factorsu )ne triade qu'elle définit
comme comprenant non seulement la gkomorphoIogie et la géologie, mais aussi
la géographie(II. CML, p. 23, note 2; ci-dessus, RL, p.54, note 1). Elle espere
ainsi entraîner les facteurs non déterminants de la géomorphologie etla géolo-
gie derrière la locomotive des facteurs géographiques. seuls déterminants -
j'aurai l'occasion d'y revenir.
11est clair cependant - je dois le noter tout de suite- que cette nouvelle
conception du prolongement naturel. constituée par le triple élementde la géo-
graphie, de la gkologie et la géomorphologie, est cotalement hétérogène.Les
indications fournies par les caract6ristiques geologiques et géomorphologiques
des fonds marins ne vont pas forcement dans le même sens que ceuxde la géo-
graphie côtière. II n'y a aucune raison Apriori pour que la prise en considéra-
tion d'une séparation géologiqueou géomorphologique du type de la soi-disant
RifrZone ou du type de la zone des escarpements reflète la configuration de la382 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
géographie côtièredes deux pays. Les deux donnéesse situent sur des plans tel-
lement differents que la coïncidence releverait du miracle - ou de l'argument
d'avocat! C'est de manière tout à fait artificielle, cela saute aux yeux, que la
Partie adverse tente ce regroupement contre nature sous le vocable global de
«facteurs physiques >..
Etant donné que la thèse libyenne de la Rifr Zone et de la zone des escarpe-
ments ne s'appuie en aucune façon sur la géographie côtière - avec laquelle
elle n'a rigoureusement aucun rapport -, mais uniquement sur les caractéris-
tiques géologiqueset géomorphologiques des fonds marins, c'est au prolonge-
ment naturel défini parces dernières cüractéristiquesgéologiqueset géomorpho-
logiques que je m'attacherai ici. Quant à la géographie côtière,qui est partie
intégrantedu principe de distance et de la méthodede l'équidistance,je me pro-
pose de l'évoquerdans les chapitres ultérieurs.
Monsieur le Président, monami Eli Lauterpacht a établique la these libyenne
est scientifiquement inexacte. On pourrait dire du plateau continental qui
s'étendentre Malte et la Libye et des accidents de la soi-disant zone exactement
ce que la chambre vient de dire du golfe du Maine et du chenal nord-est:
«Bien sûr il est possible de discerner sur ce fond unique et uniforme ce
qu'on appelle des plateaux, des bancs, des bassins, des chenaux ..Il s'agit...
d'un ensemble finalement assez peu significatif d'inégalitésde relief...
Mêmele plus accentuéde ces accidents ... ne possède pas les caractéris-
tiques d'une véritable fossequi marquerait la skparation entre deux unités
géomorphologiques distinctes.Il y a là tout simplement un trait naturel de
la région.» (C.I.J.Recueil 1984, p. 274, par. 45-46.)
Ce que je voudrais à présent démontrer, c'est qu'en tout éta dte cause - c'est-
B-dire mêmesi les descriptions factuelles de la Libye étaient scientifiquement
exactes, ce qu'elles ne sont pas - les caractéristiques géologiqueset géomor-
phologiques des fonds marins dont la Libye fait étatne seraient pas de nature 31
*indiquer», à «désigner» juridiquement une delimitation qui les transposerait
du plan de la nature sur celui du droit.
L'audience. suspendue à Il h 20, est repriseà 1I h 30
Monsieur le President, l'impuissance des caractéristiques géologiques, géo-
morphologiques du lit de la mer et de son sous-sol à mettre en évidence une
frontikre de plateau continental résultede la conjonction de deux considérations
en interaction étroite,à savoir:
Premièrement, l'existence prétenduede deux plateaux continentaux physique-
ment séparéspar une caractéristique naturelledu type de la soi-disant Rifr Zone
est incom~atibie avec le conceut mêmede délimitation.
~elixithernent, Iiprise en 'considérationdes caractéristiques géologiqueset
e~omomhoIoaisues des fonds marins comme élémentdkterminant dans la déli-
Litatioi du plieau continental est condamnée par le principe de l'égalitédes
Etats.
Tels sont les deux.aspects auxquels je voudrais m'attacher tour h tour.
1. L'existence prétendue de deux plateaux continentau physiquemeni séparés
par un accident natirrel du type de Ia soi-disant Rift Zone est incompatible avec
le concept même de délimitationdu plaieau continental
Et d'abord l'incompatibilitéde la these de la Rift Zone avec le concept même
de delimitation du plateau continental. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 383
Nous avons déjà fait remarquer que le concept libyen d'une délimitation aà
l'intérieurde la RifrZrmc et en suivant sa direction générale. est d'une impré-
cision telle que, si la Coursuivair les conclusions de la Libye. des dizaines de
lignes frontières seraient possibles. Outre que. comme nous l'avons montre dans
nos écritures (II,CMM, p. 23, par. 47), les limites orieniale et occidentale de
cette soi-disant zone sont mal défiriies,il ne faut pas oublier ce fait très simple
que la RifrZone telle que nous la dessinent les cartes libyennes (par exemple la
@ carte 17 du mémoire libyen,p. 160)couvre une étenduelarge dc parfois plus de
100 kilomètres.
Mais là n'est pas le plus important, la Cour le constatera en se reportanà la
@ figure 13 de notre dossiert. et je voudrais la prier respectueusement de bien
vouloir se tourner un moment vers elle.
Dans la conception libyenne, c'est la soi-disant RifrZona dans son ensemble,
dans toute sa largeur et dans toute son ampleur, qui sépare le prolongement
naturel de Malte. au nord, de celui de la Libye, au sud. Le prolongement naturel
de Malte s'arrête à la lisière septentrionale et de la Rifi Zone; le prolongement
naturel de la Libye s'arrêteItla lisitre méridionalede la R$tZone. Voila ce que
nous dit la Libye.
Si cette description était exacte, Monsieur le Président,eh bien. il n'y aurait
tout simplement aucune possibilitéde définirquelque ligne frontitre que ce soit,
et l'on devrait se contenter de prendre acte de la limite extérieure du plateau
maltais et de la limite extérieure du plateau libyen! II n'y aurait tout simple-
ment plus lieu & délimitation puisque, par définition même, la délimitation
implique la fixation d'une ligne dparant deux plateaux qui se touchent ou se
chevauchent et que, dans l'une des conceptions libyennes au moins, les deux
plateaux seraient séparéspar un hiatus.
Dans son excellent ouvrage sur The Legal Régime of tsla~iiisin Inr~rnorionul
Law, mon ami et collègue M. Bowett a fait justement observer qu'il ne peut se
poser un problème de délirnirationqu'entre des Etats qui bordent un mêmepla-
teau continental. Si le plateau de chacun des Etats est détachéde celui de
l'autre par une séparation physique, la seule chose qu'il y ait lieu de faire c'est
de constater jusqu'où s'étendle prolongement naturel de chacun. Et comme ily
a une séparation physique entre les deux, iln'y a plus de frontiere commune
entre lesdeux Etais:
«Boundaries between shelves belonging to neighbouring States, be they
opposite or adjacent, presuppcise that the States share a common shelf, a
shelf area likely to be of essential, physical continuity.(Op. cir., p. 221;
cf.p. 144-145.)
Cette observation nous paraît parfaitement exacte.
La Libye ne se lasse pas de rép&terque le plateau continental entre Malte et
la Libye ne saurait être considérécomme un continuum (par exemple, II, CML,
p. 44-45, par. 2.57; p. 45, par. 2.58; p. 47, par. 2.63; p. 49, par. 2.69; ci-des-
sus, RL, p. 28,note 4; p. 59. par. 5.15; p. 67, par.5.29; p. 79.par. 5.38; p. 72,
par. 5.40, etc.), piiisqu'il es1interrompu, selon elle, pafundumetifal dist:onti-
nuity que constitue la Rift Zone. Mêmedans ses conclusions finales. nous
l'avons vu, la Libye confirme cette position. Cette conclusion est radicalement
' Lesdossiersspécialemenp tréparé sl'intentiode laCour par les Partiespour illus-
trer leurs plaidoiriesne spas reproduits. une carte ouillustration contendans un
dossier est reprise dansle volumedes canes de la présente édit(V),elle est dûment
signaléeen marge du texte[Note du GrefSe.1 384 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
incompatible avec le concept de délimitation.qui fait l'objet du compromis par
lequel l'affaire a été portée devanlta Cour.
La Libye a-t-elle pris conscience du caractère autodestructeur de la these
qui est la sienne d'une zone séparant lesdeux plateaux continentaux de Malte
et de la Libye aux lieu et place d'une ligne les mettant en contact? Je ne sais.
Toujours est-il que, sans modifier sa conclusion finale en faveur d'une fron-
tière swithin, and following the general direction of, the Rift Zone», elle a
entrepris dans sa rkplique d'esquisser un embryon de ligne, une espèce de
((inchoate line», sous la forme de la soi-disant <Axial Ridge Line» (ci-dessus,
@@ RL, cartes 10et 13)dont a parléhier mon ami Elihu Lauterpacht.
@ ,La Cour trouvera cette ligne reproduite sur la figure 13 de notre dossier. Il
s agirait, la Cour s'en souvient, d'une ligne le long de laquelle la croûte ter-
restre auraittéamincie au maximum du fait des déchirementssurvenus en pro-
fondeur (ci-dessusRL p. 65-66, par. 5.27; p. 83, par.6.20; 84, par. 6.22). Le
long de cette ligne, nous explique-t-on même,pourrait se produire un jour une
séparationdes plaques, créant ainsiun nouvel océan. Mais, ajoute prudemment
la réplique, cette évolutionn'est que «spéculative» (ihid..83, note 2). Nous
voici en tout cas rassurés!
Monsieur le Président, même en faisant abstraction du caractère scientifique-
ment discutable - le mot est faible- de cette invention de demigre minute,
dont le moins que l'on puisse dire est qu'on peut la soupFonner d'êtrequelque
peu pro domo sua, comment ne pas constater une fois de plus la contradiction
interne des theses libyennes? Si la Axial Ridge Line existait, il n'y aurait plus
de séparation des prolongements naturelsle long des bords nord et sud de la
Rifr Zone. On ne saurait concevoir l'existence simultanéede deux sortes de
limites des prolongements naturels entre Malte et la Libye: I'une qui serait for-
méede deux limites, qui suivraient respectivement,à une grande distance l'une
de l'autre- des dizaines de kilornetre- les lisiéresnord et sud d'une zone
dotéed'une certaine épaisseur; l'autre, de caractère linéaire,le long de pré-
tendue AxialRidge Line. Dans le premier cas les prolongements naturels de
Malte et de la Libye ne se toucheraient pas; dans le second ils se toucheraient
le long d'une ligne. La thPse de la Rifi Zone et celle de la Axial RidgeLine
s'excluent mutuellement. Voilà la vkrité,Monsieur le Président.
L'hétérogénéité s'aggraevnecore lorsqu'on nousexplique que - ô! miracle!
- la ligne de plus grand amincissement courtà peu prèsentre Ies deux séries
de fosses et chenaux dont la Libye vient également de dbcouvrir l'existence
dans sa répliquede juillet dernier, l'une qui suivrait l'itinérairede la fosse et du
chenal de Malte au nord, l'autre qui suivrait l'itinérairede la fosse de Linosa et
du chenal de Medina au sud (ci-dessus,RL, p. 83,par. 6.21, et p84,par. 6.22).
Ainsi donc ce n'est plus seulement la ligne du plus grand amincissement qui est
mise en avant, mais une espèce de ligne mbdiane entre deux sériesde profon-
deurs - c'est-&-dire une ligne de crêtes.Ce qui est d'ailleurs tout à fait
@ inexact: si la Cour veut bien jeter un coup d'ail sur la figu13de notre dos-
30 srer, qui reproduit la carte 13 de la réplique libyenne,elle constatera immediate-
O ment que la soi-disant Axial Ridge Line ne passe pas du toutrnm deux seriss
de fosses situées I'uneau nord l'autre au sud, mais en plein milieu dans les
fosses de Pantelleria et deinosa.
La Libye nous parle d'une troisikme ligne encore, celle qui unit les points ter-
minaux sud des délimitations conventionnellesItalienunisie et ItalieJGrèce:une
telle ligne, nous dit la Libye, ne s'écarteraitpas substantiellement d'une ligne
courantà travers lRif Zone (ci-dessus, RL, p. 77, par. 6.05, et p. 84, par. 6.22).
Cela fait beaucoude lignes. La Libye n'a toutefois pas poussécette idéejusqu'à
l'illustrer en compagnie des deux autres: les deux autres figurent sur ces cartes, PLAIDOIRIEDE M. WEIL 385
pas celle-là. On comprend pourquoi. Si la Cour veut bien se reporter nos
@@ figures 13 et 4 où les lignes de délimitation italo-tunisiennes et italo-grecques
sont plus clairement reproduites, elle constatera que la ligne unissant les points
terminaux sud de la délimitarion conventionnellealielïunisie et de la délimita-
tion conventionnelle Italie/Grèce n'a pas le moindre rapport avec la Axial Ridge
Lineou avec la ligne qui courB mi-chemin entre les deux prétendues séries de
fosses et de chenaux.
Les coincidences miraculeuses m s'arrêtentd'ailleurs pas 18: la proposition
libyenne de 1973, exclusivement fondée, cela atédit par la Libye. sur la pro-
portionnalit6 des longueurs côtières, cette proposition libyenne de 1973 est h
son tour présentée comme prochede la ligne de plus grande minceur de la
croûte terrestre et de la ligne de crête qui sépareles sériesde plus grandes pro-
@ fondeurs (ci-dessus, RL, p. 84, par. 6.22, et carte 13). Que de coïncidences!
On se défend mal de l'impression que. sensible peut-êtreaux critiques mal-
taises. la Partie adverse a tenté l'impossible, mais vraiment l'impossible, pour
évoquer une ligne, à la place d'une zone séparative de plusieurs dizaines de
kilomètres d'épaisseur. Mais,ayant fait cela, ta Libye n'a pas eu le courage,
comme diraient les psychanalistes, de passeA l'acte. La ligne de délimitation
en est demeurée ill'état de velléité. puisque les conclusions finales restent
fidéles,je l'ai indique toul'heure.àla zone frontier- «a boundary within,
and following the general direction of, the Riftne» - autrement dit 3.la
non-frontière.
2. La prise en considération de caractéristiques géologiques er gPnmorpho-
logiques des fonds marins comme élémentdéterminant dans la délimitation du
plateau continenfaesrcondamnéepar le principe de l'égalitédesEtats
J'en viensà present, Monsieur le Présidentà la seconde raison qui s'oppose
à la prise en considération des données géologiqueset géomorphologiques des
fonds marins comme élémentdéterniinantdans la délimitation du plateau conti-
nental: le droit international a écaréette prise en considération parce qu'eile
s'est avérée incompatible avec le principe del'kgalitédes Etats.
L'égalitédes Etats intervient en effet un double niveau pour écarter une
délimitation fondéesur les caractéristiques physiques des fonds marins et de
leur sous-sol.
C'est l'égalitédes Etats, d'abord, qui a constitué l'élémentmoteur de I'effa-
cement du prolongement naturel et de l'émergence du principede distance dans
le droit du plateau continental. C'est l'égalitédes Etats ensuite, quiàesla
racine des principes de non-empiétement ete non-amputation dans la délimita-
tion du plateau continental.
Je me propose d'examiner ces deux aspects l'un aprh l'autre.
L'évolution du droit international du prolongement natuvel ifersle principe de
disrance
L'évolutiondu droit du plateaucontinental a kt4 dominée par lapréoccupa-
tion de réduire les inégalitbsentre Etats côtiers selon que la nature les a dotés
d'un plateau continental plus ou moins large répondantu crithe physique de
prolongement naturel. Telle est la première constatation que l'on peutiicete
égard.
Cette évolution, quia commencé«très tôt», pour reprendre l'expression de la
Cour - c'est-à-dire dèsla convention de 1958 et ses travaux préparatoiàela386 PLATEAU CONT~NENTAL
Commission du droit international - a étérelatéepar la Cour dans son arrêide
1982 (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 45-49, par. 41-50), ainsi que dans plusieurs opi-
nions jointes à cet arrét. Nous l'avons nous-mêmes retracéd eans nos écritures
(II, CMM, p. 63-74. par. 122-151 ; ci-dessus, RM, p. 36-41, par. 65-71). Le
silence complet ohsemé à ce sujet par la Libye dans sa réplique m'oblige à
revenir ici sur certains aspects de cette évolution d'une importance capitale, au
risque de rappeler des données connues de tous.
En 1953 déjà, l'attention de la Commission du droit international avait été
attiréepar certains de ses membres sur le cas des Etats qui, n'ayant pasde pla-
teau continental au sens physique du terme, pouvaient être défavorisép sar une
conception exclusivement physique du plateau; et la suggestion avait étéémise
désce moment-là - il y a trente ans déjà!- de définir le plateau continental
par une certaine distance de la côte, quelle que soit la profondeur(Annuaire de
la Commission du droit inrernationnl. 1953, vol. II, p. 9). Le concept de dis-
tance, la Cour voudra bien nous l'accorder, n'est ni une découverte récenteni le
fruit de l'imagination de Malte!
C'est dès ce moment-là également que l'attention de la Commission avait été
attiréesur le casde fosses situées àproximitéde la côte de certains Etats et qui
risquaient de priver ces Etats de leurs droits sur des fonds marins peu profonds
situésau-delà de ces fosses. La Commission avait estimé quede tels fonds, bien
que séparésde la côte par une fosse, devaient faire partie du plateau continental
de 1'Etatriverain (ibid., p. 214, par. 66).
C'est dès ce moment-là encore que le critère de profondeur a étécomplété
par celui de I'exploitabilité, ce qui conférait au concept de plateau continental
une potentialité d'extension à une distance de plus en plus grande vers le large
au fur et à mesure des progrès de la technique. Par laétaitamorcé, comme la
Cour le notera en 1982, acet élargissement du concept [de plateau continental]
à des fins juridiques* (C.I.J.Recueil 1982, p. 45, par. 41) qui n'a cessédepuis
lors de caractériser l'évolutiondu droit du plateau continental.
On comprend des lors que la Cour ait noté dès cette époque reculée une
«absence d'identite entre la notion juridique de plateau continental ei. le phéno-
mène physique que les géographes désignentpar la mêmeexpression» (C.I.J.
Recueil 1982, p. 46, par. 42; cf. opinion individuelle de M. Jiménez de Aré-
chaga, p. 112, par. 44), et que, tirant les conséquences de cette conception jun-
dique sur le plan de la délimitation, elle n'ait pas <<considéré comme syno-
nymes une délimitation équitableet la fixation des limites des prolongements
naturels» (ibid p.,46, par. 44).
Il ressort par ailleurs de l'arrêtde 1969 que la Cour n'a pas entendu remettre
en cause les droits reconnus à la Norvège par les accords de délimitationqu'elle
avait conclus avec d'autres Etats riverains de la mer du Nord et qui ne tenaient
pas compte de l'existence de la fosse norvégienne (C.I.J. Recueil 1969. p. 32,
par. 45).
Dès 1969, on le constate, le lien entre la délimitation et les faits physiques
des fonds marins a commencé à se distendre.
La sentence arbitrale de 1977 marque une nouvelle étape dans cette évolu-
tion. Elle note que:
«Le fait mêmequ'en droit international le plateau continental est un
concept juridique signifie que son étendue et ses modalités d'application ne
sont pas déterminées exclusivementpar les facteurs physiques de la géo-
graphie mais aussi par les règles juridiques. (Par. 191.)
De cette constatation sur le plan du enritlement le tribunal tire immédiatement la
conséquence sur le plan de la délimitation: «on ne règle pas» toujours, dit le PLAIWIRIE DE M. WELL 387
tribunal, la question de l'attribution d'une partie du plateau à l'un ou il l'autre
des Etats intkressés .<en se référantsimplement au principe du prolongement
naturel du territoires (par. 192). et ilfaut faire appel aux «règles de droit qui
forment le concept juridique de plateau continental » (par. 194).
Il n'est pas surprenant, dans ces conditions. que le tribunal arbitral ait écarté
l'idée, que lui avait soumise le Royaume-Uni, de faire coïncider la ligne de
delimitation avec la fosse centrale et la zone de failles de la fosse centrale. Les
passages clésméritentd'êtrerelus une foie sncore:
«Le Tribunal ne considère pas que la fosse centrale et la zone de friilles
de la fosse centrale soient des caractéristiques géographiquesqui puissent
avoir une influence réellesur la déterminationde la limite ...
... il ne semble y avoir aucun motif juridique d'&carter la méthode de
\'&quidistanceou toute autre méthodede délimitation pourlui préférersim-
plement un accident tel que la fosse centrale ou la zone de failles de la
fosse centrale...
...L'axe de la fosse centrale et de la zone de failles de Iü fosse centrale se
trouve là où il est par un simple accident de la nature, et iln'y a en soi
aucun motif pour que cet axe constitue la limite ..» (Par. 107 et 108.)
Monsieur le Président, ne pourrait-on substituer les mots «Rift Zone» et
~Escarpments-Fault Zone» B ceux de «fosse centrale et de zone de failles de la
fosse centrale »?
C'est 5juste titre, oti le constate, que le professeur Bowett a relevéque le rri-
bunal franco-britannique ü rrouvC le concept de prolongement naturel <<depeu
d'assistance* (of lirtlussi,stunce) (op.cir.,p. 168). Le profeseur Bowett voit Id
un «développement salutaire )(a sulutury dei.~lopmenf):
<<Oneof the more welcome features of the Court of Arbitration Award is
that ii has decreased, or corrected. the excessive emphasis of geological
factors and emphasized rüther niore the geographical factors. in particular
the coastal configuration of the Parties.» (Op. cir.. p. 321.)
Et le professeur Bowett préciseque l'on peut considérercomme probable que
dans l'avenir le «prolongement naturel se référeradavantage aux configurations
géographiques qu'aux facteursgéologiques». Le mêmepoint de vue se trouve
exprimé dans l'articlebien connu que le professeur Bowett a donnéau Briiisli
Year Book of InleintitionalLant (1978, p. 16).
L'évolution ainsidéjà largement iimorcée allaitêtre accéléreeconsidérable-
ment par les travaux de la troisième conférencesur le droit de la mer. Pour cor-
riger l'inégalitédont pâtissaient, sous l'empire de la conception antérieure, les
Etats dotéspar la nature d'un plateau étroit,on en vint i~accorder à tout Etat
côtier des droits de plateau continental sur le sol et le sous-sol des espaces
maritimes adjacents à ses côtes jusqu'à une distance de 200 milles marins au
moins de ces derniéres, quelie que soit par ailleurs la configuration physique de
ces fonds marins. La fixation d'une largeur uniforme de 200 milles pour tous
les Etats côtiers aurait toutefois désavantagéles quelques Etats dont le pla-
teau continental, au sens physique du terme, s'étendvers le large plus loin que
200 milles marins de leurs côtes. Pour éviter de faire perdre à ces quelques
Etats l'avantage que leur assurait l'ancien critkre des 200 métresde profondeur,
il fut décidé deleur conserver le bénéficedu critère du prolongement naturel
jusqu'au rebord externe de la marge continentale. Celte extension n'étaittoute-
fois pas indéfinie: elle s'arrêterait,fut-il décidé, sot une distance de 350 milles
marins des lignes de base. soit 21une distance de 100 milles marins de I'iso-
bathe de 2500 mètres.388 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
Monsieur le Prksident, l'égalité quia été poursuivie- et obtenue grâce ce
compromis de la troisième conférence - n'implique kvidemment pas que tous
les Etats aient désormais un pIateau continental: c'est une égalité quia étééta-
blie entre les seuls Etats côtiers. Et encore ne s'agit-il pas d'accorderous les
Etats côtiers des superficies égales de plateau continental; les zones de plateau
continental relevant de chaque Etat côtier seront fonction de la configuration de
ses côtes -chaque Etat côtier ayant une configuration différente aura donc une
superficie différente de plateau continental. L'égalité quia été recherchée à la
troisième confkrence a pour seul objet d'écarter les facteurs d'inégalité qui peu-
vent être provoquespar les caractéristiquesdes fonds marins telles que profon-
deurs plus ou moins grandes atteintes A des distances plus ou moins grandes de
la côte, ou présence de fosses qui séparent la côte de zones peu profondes
situkes plus au large, C'est cette inégalité-là. et nulle autre, quel'on a écartée.
et cela grâce h un critère spatial, qui opere indépendammentde toute caractéris-
tique physique ou naturelle. C'est seulement au-del&de 200 milles marins que
le prolongement naturel reprend une connotation physique; mais mêmelà ce
sont des critères d'ordre spatialqui fixent la limite extérieure des droits élargis
de plateau continental.
La Libye reproche étrangement au critère de distance de conduire à ce qu'elle
appelle une ittheory of leap-frogging features of the sea-bedr (ci-dessus, RL,
p. 97, par. 8.11). Mais oui, Monsieur le Président. c'est là trés exactement la
raison d'êtredu changement apportépar la troisieme conférence à la conception
du plateau continental et du recours à la distance pour définirles droits du pla-
teau continental: le but recherché était effectivement de sauter par-dessus les
inégalités provoquées par les caractéristiques des fonds marins!
C'est cette évolution-là qui a trouvé son expression dans l'article 76 de la
convention sur le droit de la mer, auquel, comme je l'ai indiqué, s'attache
aujourd'hui une valeur de droit coutumier.
La Cour a pris acte de ces données nouvellesdu droit international dans son
arrêt de1982. Elle constate le divorce entre le concept de prolongement naturel
physique et celui de plateau continental: «Le concept juridique, déclare la Cour,
bien que fondé sur le phénomène physique,a évoluf h part* (C.I.J. Recueil
1982, p. 46. par. 42). Avec l'article 76. observe la Cour. «la notion juridique du
plateau continental reposant sur une «es@ce de soclev est ...modifiée ou au
moins complétée»par le critère de la distance de 200 milles, puisque ce critère
«s'écarte du principe suivant lequel ce serait le prolongement naturel qui en
constituerait la seule base» (ihid., p. 48, par. 47-48). Ainsi, précisela Cour. se
trouve menée son terme l'évolution qui a conduit à inclure dans le plateau
continental
«toute étendue du fond des mers se trouvant dans un rapport particulier
avec la côte d'un Etat voisin, qu'elle présenienu non les curaciéristiques
exactes qu'un géographe attribuerait à un nplateau coniinenial~ (ibid.,
p.45. par. 41).(Les italiques sont de moi.)
De cette évolution sur le plan du titre juridique la Cour tire une fois encore
les conséquences sur le plan de la délimitation. La position prise par la Cour
retient d'autant plus l'attention que, dans cette affaire TunisielLibye, les deux
Parties s'étaient appuyées, l'uneet l'autre, sur le prolongement naturel au sens
physique du terme. La Cour déclare que. mêmesi l'identification de la limite
des prolongements naturels des deux Etats était scientifiquement possible (ce
qui n'était pas lecas dans cette affaire), ceite identification ne serait pascé-
ment
«suffisante ni même appropriéeen elle-même pour préciser l'étendue PLAIDOIRID EE M. WEIL 389
exacte des droits d'un Etat par rapport 2iceux d'un Etat voisin)) (C.I.J.
Recueil 1982. p. 46, par. 43).
c'est-&-direpour la délimitation,et elle déclaréqu'elle
«ne peut ... faire sienne la thtse libyenne suivant laquelle, *(une fois que
l'on a déterminéle prolongement naturel d'un Etat, la délimitation ne
consiste plus qu'à se conformer aux exigences de la nature,, (ihid., p. 47.
par. 44).
Deux opinions jointes à l'arrêt jettentune vive lumière sur ce décrochage,par
rapport au prolongement naturel physique, tant du concept juridique de plateau
continental que du droit de ta délimitation du plateau continental (ihid., opinion
individuelle de M. Jiménez de Aréchaga, p. 110, par. 39; p. 114, par. 51;
p. 117. par. 59 et 61; p. 121, par. 73; opinion dissidente de M. Oda, p. 222,
par.107, et p.257, par.160).
Dans le droit filde cette jurisprudence. l'arrêtde la Chambre dans l'affaire
du Golfe du Maine observe ce qui suit:
a le «titre juridiquw sur certaines étendues maritimes ou sous-marines est
toujours et uniquement l'effet d'une opérationjuridique. 11en va de même
pour la limitejusqu'h laquelle ce titre s'&end. C'est d'une réglede droit que
cette limite découle, et non d'une quelconque vertu intrinséque que pos-
séderait le fait purement physique.)) (C.I.J.Recueil 1984, p. 296. par.103.)
Ayant ainsi refuséde fonder te titre juridique de I'Etat côtier sur les faits phy-
siques, la Chambre ne pouvait que refuser de considérer ces mêmes faitsphy-
siques comme un élément décisif pourla délimitation. C'est ce qu'elle a fait.
Les Etats-Unis s'étaient appuyésmassivement sur ce qu'ils appelaient la nailrra1
houndary, la «fronti&re naturelle* du chenal Nord-Est pour demander h la
Chambre de tracer la frontitre maritime unique le long de cet accident physique
dans lequel ils voyaient la seule ruptiire significative (the only signnifihrcaki
dans le plateau continental de la région (C.I.J. Mémoires. Délimiiation de la
frontidre mariiime dans la région ih golfe drr Moine, vol. II, mémoire des
Etats-Unis, par. 13, 296; ibid., vol. V, réplique des Etats-Unis. par. 213). La
Chambre a écarté cettethèse avec une fermetétoute particulière. Elle arefusé
de voir dans le chenal, comme je l'ai déjh indiqué, autre chose qu'un «trait
naturel de la région»et a considéréce trait naturel * comme dépourvude toute
pertinence pour la délimitation. Elleirappeléque
«la présence d'accidents beaucoupplus accentués,tels que la fosse centrale
et la zone de failles géologiques présentesdans le plateau qui faisait l'objet
de l'arbitrage franco-britannique, n'a pas empêchéle tribunal arbitral de
conclure que les failles en question n'interrompaient pas la continuité gé@
logique dudit plateau et ne constituaient pas üe me permets d'insister sur
ce passage] des facteurs utiles pour arrêterla méthode de délimitation»
(C.I.J.Recueil 1984, p. 274, par.46).
Rarement, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs lesjuges. a-t-on étéen prksence
d'une jurispmdence aussi concordante etaussi nettement affirmee.
Quant àla doctrine, elle a, de son côté,pris acte de cet effritement du critere
du prolongement naturel, fondé sur les caractéristiques physiques des fonds
marins, au profit du concept kgalitaire et uniformisant de la distance mesurée à
la surface de la mer.
La Partie adverse a fait étatdans ses écritures(II, CML. p. 107, note 4) des
travaux du colloque de la Sociétéfrançaise pour le droit international, tenu390 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
Rouen, en 1983. sur le sujet suivant: «Perspectives du droit de la mer2l'issue
de la troisiémeconférence des Nations Unies», et elle a reproduit deux pages
extraites de la communication faite à ce colloque par M. Guillaume. directeur
des affaires juridiques au ministère des relations extérieures français. Cette
communicütion a été publiée in e.rtenso il y a quelques mois dans le volume
imprimé qui reproduit les rapports et discussions du colloque. Selon
M. Guillaume, il n'existe que deux rnt5thodesde délimitation acceptables, parce
qu'elles respectent la naturà,savoir:
a- soit prendre en compte les profondeurs, les structures géologiques,
bathymétriques ou géomorphologiques duplateau continental, mais [c'est
M. Guillaume qui parle] cette méhode ne vaut pas pour la zone écono-
mique et elle pose même problèmeau regard de la nouvelle définitiondu
plateau contiiiental donnée par l'article 76 de la convention des Nations
Unies sur le droit de la mer. du moins jusqu'à une distance de 200 milles.
Aussi le déclindu critère géologique,déjà amorcé dans lasentence arbi-
trale franco-britannique, est-il tr&sperceptiblela lecture de l'arrêtde la
Cour internationale de Justice de 1982;
- soit [c'est toujours M. Guillaume qui parle], seconde solution,
prendre en compte la surface,ilpartirde la géographie,donc de la configu-
ration généraledes côtes» (Paris, Pedone, 1984, p. 281).
Déclindu critère de la profondeur, fondésur la géologieet la géomorpholo-
gie, au profit du critère de la surface, qui part de la géographie, doncde la
configuration côtiere: voilà résuméeen quelques mots, de manière particulière-
ment frappante, l'évolutionque j'ai retracée trop longuement.
En prksentant, aujourd'hui,à la Cour une revendication centrée tout entière
sur les donnéesphysiques des fonds marins, la Libye invite la Cour h un retour.
non seulement au passé, mais A la prkhistoire du plateau continental. Ce n'est
plus seulement de l'immobilisme juridique; c'est du véritable passéisme.
La Libye étaitplus àjour, si j'ose dire, de I'évolutiondu droit international il
y a quelques années, puisque dans l'affaire qui l'opposait 2i la Tunisie elle
exposait que «le critère de profondeur ou bathymétriea cesséd'avoir toute per-
tinence pour la d6finition du plateau en deçà de 200 milles de la ligne de base*
(C.I.J. Mémoires, Pluteou coniinental (TunisielJamohiriya arabe libyenne),
vol. II, contre-mémoire libyen,par. 317). Or ici nous sommes, aussi bien pour
la Rifi Zone que pour la zone des escarpements, en deçà de 200 milles de la
ligne de base.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs lesjuges. l'enseignement àtirer de cet effa-
cement du prolongement naturel physique dans le droit du plateau continental
est clair: le droit international interdit de ramener la délimitation du plateau
continental l'identification d'une frontiére naturelle sous-marine.
Si Malte étaitsituéeen plein milieu de l'océan, loinde tout autre pays, ses
droits de plateau continental ne seraient pas arr&téspar une configuration natu-
relle du type de la Rifr Zone situke à une quinzaine de milles marins de ses
côtes; ils sauteraient. si j'ose dire, par-dessus elle et s'étendraient au moins
jusqu'2i 200 milles vers le large. Ce n'est pas parce que Malte est situCe à
proche distance de la Libye que ses droits de plateau continental devraient sou-
dainement êtrearrêtés par une telle configurationsous le prétexte que celle-ci
constituerait uneiontiérenaturelle entre les fonds marins des deux pays.
Mon ami Elihu Lauterpacht a rappeléque les accidents de la soi-disant Rifi
Zone, comme ceux de la zone des escarpements, ne marquent pas le rebord
externe de la marge continentale de Malte et n'arrêtentdonc pas ses droits de
plateau continental. En serait-il même autrement, à supposer mêmeque la PLAIDOIRIEDE M. WEIL 391
marge continentale de Malte s'arrêie à la Rifz Zone et i la zone des escarpe-
ments les droits de plateau continental de Malte ne seraient quand mêmepas blo-
quéspar ces accidents, puisqu'ils s'étendraient,en vertu de la règle de droit cou-
tumier dont j'ai retracé l'évolutionet qui est expriméeaujourd'huà l'article 76,
jusqu'à 200 milles de ses lignes de base.
Je voudrais exprimer cette constatation élémentairesous une autre forme. De
deux choses, l'une: ou bien les accidents physiques de la soi-disant RifrZone et
de la zone des escarpements ne marquent pas physiquement le rebord externe
de la marge continentale de Malte -- ce qui est le cas -, ou bien ils le mar-
quent. Dans le premier cas, les droits de plateau continental de Malte s'étendent
au-delà, jusqu'au rebord externe de la marge continentale. Dans le second cas,
ces accidents étant situésB moins de 200 milles marins des lignes de base de
Malte, les droits du plateau continental de Malte s'&tendent ici encore au-delà
de ces accidents, jusqu'à200 milles marins des lignes de base.
En un mot, comme en cent, le concept de frontière naturelle n'a aucune place
dans le débatcompte tenu de l'évolutiondu droit international en cette matière.
La Partie adverse se défend,il est vrai, dans sa réplique,d'avoir jamais sou-
tenu que la Rifr Zone constitue per se une frontière maritime naturelle (ci-des-
sus, RL, p.7, par. 1.04; p. 82, par. 6.19; p. 94, par. 8.03). Elle n'emploie pas le
mot, c'est exact,mais c'est pourtant bien de cela qu'il s'agit, puisque la Cour
est invitéeà placer la dklimitation exactement la ou la nature a,à en croire la
Libye, situéla séparation physique entre les prolongements physiques respectifs
des deux pays. Lorsque la nature dksigne le cours d'une frontière, lorsqu'on
évoqueune frontiére<<physiquementidentifiéex (1, ML, p. 234, par. 9.02), cela,
je le répète,porte unnom: cela s'appelle une frontière naturelle.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, le concept mêmed'une frontière
que le droit emprunterait à la nature est étranger au droit international de la
mer. II serait inconcevable que les frontières de plateau continental séparant des
Etats dont les côtes se font face ou sont adjacentes se situent obligatoirement
où les hasards de la nature ont placé des accidents topographiques ou géolo-
giques sous-marins. L'égalité desEtats, car c'est d'elle qu'il s'agit, serait grave-
ment compromise si la nature pouvait imposer aux gouvernements et aux tribu-
naux internationaux des frontièresgknératricesd'empiétements. A quoi s'ajoute
que, en admettant mêmeque les *exigences de la nature» (the dicrate of
nature), gour reprendre l'expression que la Libye avait utilisée dans son litige
avec la Tunisie (C.I.J. Mémoires.Pl~iteaucontinental (TunisielJurnahiriyaarabe
libyenne), vol.1. p. 487, par. 89), puissent dicter le droit, l'identification du
«traitnaturel* à ériger en frontière n'irait pas toujours de soi. La nature ne
parle pas toujours d'une voix parfaitement claire. Dans le cas présent. par
exemple, pourquoi les accidents de la prétendue Rij? Zone s'imposeraient-ils
avec plus de force contraignante A la Cour que les accidents similaires situés
plus au sud, tels que la fosse de Jarrafa ou la vallée(ou sillon) tripolitain dont a
parlé hier mon ami Elihu Lauterpacht? Ces accidents, il n'est pas sans intérêt
de le noter- la fosse de Jarrafa et le sillon tripoli-ainsont mentionnés en
@ toutes lettres sur la carte bathymétrique internationale de la Méditerranée sur
laquelle la Partie adversedeclare s'appuyer dès le début de son mémoire (1,
ML, p. 26, par. 3.03), qu'elle a analysée dans l'annexe technique de son
mémoire et dont elle a placéune copie réduite dans la pochette du volume III
de son mémoire.Le nom de ces deux accidents a toutefois disparu sur toutes les
cartesdes écritslibyens destinéesà représenter le «General Morphological Set-
ting),, tandis que lesnoms des fosses et chenaux de la soi-disantRift Zone y
sont soigneusement reproduits. La Cour pourra s'en convaincre si elle veut bien
@ se reporter h la carte 6 du mémoire libyen, h la carte 4 du contre-mémoire392 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
libyen, aux cartes 1, 11, 12 et 13 de la réplique libyenne. Dans la mdme pers-
pective, pourquoi les accidents en creux de la prétendue Rift Zone s'impose-
raient-ils avec plus de force contraignanteà la Cour que la ligne de crêtes for-
méepar les bancs de Medina et de Melita qui se rapprochent du niveau de la
mer, à 146 et 86 mktres de profondeur à peine?
La Libye fait valoir, je ne l'ignore pas, que l'«élémentde hasard» que nous
avons avancé à propos des accidents géologiques et géomorphologiques affecte
l'ensemble des facteurs géographiques de chaque situation concrète, et pas seu-
lement les accidents sous-marins (ci-dessus, RL, p. 29, par. 3.29). Pourquoi,
semble dire la Libye, la délimitation devrait-elle s'incliner devant la nature
comme nous le prétendons du côté maltais - lorsqu'il s'agit de la géographie,
mais ne devrait-elle pas s'incliner devant la nature lorsqu'il s'agit de la géolo-
gie ou de la géomorphologie sous-marines?
La question est intéressante; la réponseme semble-t-il est claire.
II aurait certes été possible de concevoir les droits maritimes des Etats du
monde comme domines par le principe d'une répartition totalement et stricte-
ment égalitaires: les Etats sans littoral auraient joui de droits identiqueseux
des Etats côtiers, et les Etats côtiers auraient eu tous les mêmes superficies
maritimes indépendamment de la configuration de leurs côtes. Cela aurait été
concevable, mais ce n'est pas cette conception que le droit international a
consacrée. La pfiili~sophie du droit international a été différente. Les droits
maritimes sont réservésaux Etats côtiers à peu d'exceptions prts - M. Qué-
neudec a trèsjustenient mis l'accent sur ce qu'il appelle l'«aspect militan..de
la doctrine du «côtiérismc» (op. cit.p. 132) - et les droits de chaque Etat
côtier sont fonction de sa géographie côtière.
911est ...nécessaire de regarder de près la configuration géographique des
côtes des pays dont on doit délimiter le plateau continental*, dkclare la Cour
dans l'affairedu Plateau continental de lo mer du Nord (C.1.X Recueil 1969,
p. 51, par. 96). «La méthodede délimitation B adopter doit êtreen rapport avec
les côtes des Parties qui bordent effectivement le plateau continental»,épktela
sentence franco-britannique (par. 240). «C'est ...en partant de la côte des Par-
ties qu'il faut rechercher jusqu'où les espaces sous-marins relevant de chacune
d'elfes s'étendent... par rapport aux Etats qui leur sont limitrophes ou leur font
face*, confirme la Cour en 1982 (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 61, par. 74). «Une
ligne de délimitation àtracer dans une aire déterminée est fonction de la confi-
guration des côtes),, proclame la Chambre dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine
(par. 205).
En un mot comme en cent, la «nature* qu'il faut respecter. la nature qu'il ne
faut pas c<refashion», c'est la géographiecôti2re. Ce n'est pas la structure géo-
logique ou la topographie des fonds marins et de leur sous-sol. La frontiere
qu'indique la géographie de surface, celle des côtes, oui. La frontière que dési-
gnent la géologieet la géomorphologie des profondeurs, celle des fonds marins,
non.
La pratique des Etats a-t-elle montr6 plus d'enthousiasme que la jurispm-
dence pour les frontières naturelles sous-marines? Certainement pas. L'observa-
tion en a été faitepar le tribunal franco-britannique dès 1977 (sentence arbi-
trale, par.107), et elle demeure valable aujourd'hui. Nous avons examiné la
totalité des accords de délimitation qui figurent dans l'annexe produite par la
Libye, et nous avons constaté que des fosses et dépressions parfois tr&simpor-
tantes ont étéignorées complètement par les gouvernements intéressés. Des
exemples ont été cités par mon ami M. Mizzi, parmi lesquels une place particu-
li2redoit être faiteà deux accords int6ressant des zones proches de la nbtre, à
savoir les accords de délimitation entre l'Italie et la Tunisie et entre l'Italie et la PLAIWlRlE DE M. WEIL 393
Grhce (cf. 11, CMM, p. 70-74. par. 144-151 ; ci-dessus, RM, p. 39-41, par. 70-
71).
A cette pratique massivement contraire à la frontière naturelle sous-marine, et
dans les détailsde laquelle je crois toutà fait inutiIe d'entrer ici, une exception,
probablement la seule: la fameuse fosse de Timor. L'agent de Malte a fourni à
ce sujet des explications détaillées+Et nous en avons également parlédans nos
écritures. Nous avons cru pouvoir écrire ?î ce sujet que le fait que deux Etats
peuvent délimiter leur plateau continental selon un accident de la nature du type
de la fosse de Timor - ils le peuvent certainement - ne signifie pas qu'une
juridiction internationale soitobligke en droit d'adopter une delimitation fondée
sur un tel critère (II, CMM, p. 68, par. 137, et p. 71, par. 145). Cette observa-
tion nous paraissait exprimer une vérité évidente. Ellea pourtant suscité l'ironie
cinglante de la Partie adverse qui n'hésite pas à nous accuser de -casuistique»
(ci-dessus,RL, p. 29, par. 3.28). Pour justifier notre point de vue, je me permet-
trai de rappeler que, selon un membre de la Cour, les facteurs physiques et gko-
logiques ne figurent pas
«parmi les regles juridiques qui régissent ou déterminent la délimitation ...
mais parmi les facteurs que les Parties [peuvent] prendre en considération
en négociantla délimitation qui les intéresse» (C.I.J.Recireil1982, opinion
individuelle de M. Jiménezde Aréchaga,p. 117, par. 60).
Et l'auteurde cette opinion d'ajouter que, entre la délimitation conveniionnelle
et la délimitation judiciaire ou arbitrale. üla différence est énorme» (ihere isa
ujorldof dtrerence). En droit, c'est-&-direpour le juge ou l'arbitre, écrit-il:
«Les caractéristiques physiques - dkpressions, chenaux, contours du
fond des mers, structures géologiques, etc. - ne sauraient suffire 3.déter-
miner les limites du plateau continental.» (Ibid., par. 61.)
En un mot: que deux Etats négocient la délimitation de leur plateau continental
en tenant compte d'une fosse, dkprrssion, chenal ou canyon, est une chose - et
encore ne le font-ils quasiment jamais. Que le juge ou l'arbitre leur imposent
une telle délimitation au nom du droit en est une autre. Voilà, Monsieur le Pré-
sident, pour la «casuistique>,.
Dans son plus récentécrii, la Partie adverse semble avoir changé son fusil
d'kpaule en ce qui concerne les enseignements à tirer de la pratique des Etats
en rnaiiére de configurations sous-marines. Au lieu de soutenir, comme elle
l'avait fait dans son mémoire et dans les commentaires de son annexe sur les
accords de delimitation, que les données physiques du sol et du sous-sol ont
joué un rôle important dans les dtlimitations conventionnelles - car c'est cela
qu'elle soutenait iice stade-là - elle reconnaît à présent que tel n'est pas le
cas ; mais elle ajoute immédiatemc:ntque les accords n'expriment pas toujours
clairement les raisons de la délimitation retenue et que l'on ne saurait donc en
tirer des conclusions précises (ci-dessus, RL, p. 30, par. 3.30). Nous en sommes
d'accord. mais alors pourquoi - je me permets de poser la question - pour-
quoi la Libye a-t-elle jugé bon d'assortir certains des commentaires de son
annexe sur les accords de délimitation de la mention que la frontiére adoptée
suit tel ou tel accident sous-marin? Commentaires aventureux de son propre
aveu. d'autant plus aventureux d'ailleurs que dans un des cas au moins cette inter-
prétationest formellement contredite par le texte même de l'accord qui déclare
la délimitation fondéesur l'équidistance (accord Cuba/Mexique, annexe 47; cf.
ci-dessus. RM. p. 41, par. 71).
Mais il y a mieux encore. Cherchant 3. faire contre mauvaise fortune bon
cŒur, la Libye explique ?Iprésentque l'absence de prkcédentsdans la pratique394 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
conventionnelle elle-mêmene fait que mettre en relief le caractére hautement
spécial etexceptionnel de notre affaire et l'originalité particulièrement marquée
de la Rifi Zone (II, RL, p. 30, par. 3.30-3.31). Si j'ai bien compris cet argu-
ment, la Rifi Zone constituerait l'accident sous-marin le plus significatif du
monde. Des autres fosses ou dépressionsqui existent sur le globe, les Etats ont
légitimementpu faire abstraction, tellement elles sont insignifiantes; de la soi-
disant RijtZone - celle qui mérite les majuscules - la Cour ne saurait faire
abstraction, tant elle est remarquable.La Cour appréciera la valeur de I'argu-
ment...
Monsieur le Président,de mêmeque la dangereuse doctrine des «fronti&res
naturellesn, que Rousseau a condamnéeen faisant observer «qu'elles aboutis-
saient A faire de l'ordre politique i'ouvrage de la nature», a été écartépear le
droir international en matière de frontières terrestres, ainsi que l'a noté un
membre de la Cour en 1982 (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, opinion individuelle de
M. Jiménezde Aréchaga. p. f17, par. 61),de m&mele droit international de la
mer n'accepte pas que les frontières de plateau continental soient .l'ouvrage de
la nature». Comme vient de le déclarerla Chambre:
((une délimitation,qu'elle soit maritime ou terrestre, est une opérationjuri-
dico-politique et ...rien ne dit que. là mêmeoù une frontiére naturelle
apparaît, la délimitation doive nécessairement en suivre le tracé.* (C.I.J.
Recueil 1984. p. 277, par. 56.)
Comme les frontiéres terrestres, les frontiéres maritimes sont le fruit de la
volonté politiquedes Etats ou de la décision juridique du juge international; et
ni les gouvernements ni le juge international ne bornent l'exercice de leur pou-
voir iiun constat scientifique.Rcs judicara pro verirare habetur, dit-on depuis
des sikcles. C'est?ila veritas juridique que ce vieil adage se réfère,et non paà
la veriras scientifique. La mission de la Cour est celle d'un organe judiciaire
chargéde dire le droit: elle n'est pas. contrairement au rôle que voudrait lui
faire jouer la Partie adverse, celle d'un collège scientifique qui viendraitZila
manière d'un expert ou d'un superexpert, conférerune force de véritélégale à
un prononcéde caractére scientifique.
Une derniéreobservation encore si vous me le permettez au sujet des fron-
tièresnaturelles sous-marines.
Si l'on avait puA la rigueur accepter de tenir compte des accidents physiques
sous-marins A une époqueoù le plateau continental n'intéressait que I'explorü-
tion et l'exploitation des richesses des fonds marins, il en va différemment
aujourd'hui. A présentles limites extérieureset les frontières du plateau conti-
nental coïncideront dans bien des cas avec celles de la zone économiqueexclu-
sive. Comment imaginer que des limites exterieures et des frontièresentre Etats
voisins intéressantla colonne d'eau puissent être dictées aux gouvernemente st
à fortiori au juge international par les caractéristiques physiquesdlitde la mer
et du sous-sol telles qu'une fosse ou une dépression?
Inconcevable en elle-même,une solution de ce genre ne ferait qu'étendre aux
eaux surjacentes l'impact des hasards naturels auxquels on a précisément cher-
che 3 porter remède à la troisiéme confkrence sur le plateau continental, en
aggravant leur effet inégalitaire par l'adjonctiond'un coefficient multiplicateur.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, <<leplateau continental est une
institution du droit international qui, bien que restantlike un fiaitnaturel. ne
s'identifie pas au phénomènedésignépar la même expressiondans d'autres dis-
ciplines*; il n'y a pas «identité entre la notion juridique de plateau continental
et le phénomtne physique que les géographes dtsignent par la mêmeex-
pression »; «le concept juridique, bien que fondé surle phénomène physique,a PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 395
évolué à parts; <<lanotion de prolongement naturel est et demeure une notion
A examiner dans le contexte du droit coutumier et de la pratique des Etats»
(C.1.J Recuei/ 1982, p. 45-46, par. 42-43): par ces prononcés clairs et décisifs
la Cour a pris position, me semble-t-il, sur plusieurs des points qui se trouvent
aujourd'hui en discussion devant elle. La tentative de la Partie adverse de les
remettre en question dans notre affaire est ma seule excuse - et je prie la Cour
de bien vouloir l'accepter - pour avoir si longuement repris le thgrne,2 vrai
dire tout à fait banal, de l'érosion des critères physiques au profit de critéres
juridiques dans le droit de la déliniitationdu plateau continental.
L'égalitédes Etats n'a pas seulement constitué le moteur de l'effacement du
prolongement naturel physique au profit du principe de distance. Elle se traduit
égalementsous la forme d'un principe capital en matièrede délimitationdu pla-
teau continental: celui de non-empiktement.
C'est à ce second aspect du rôle du principe d'égalitédes Etats en cette
matièreque je voudrais m'attacher à présent.
Egaliré des Etats etprincipe de non-empiétement
Par définition, un problème de tlélimitationsurgit seulement lorsqu'il n'existe
pas d'espaces maritimes suffisants pour que chacun des Etats puisse se projeter
jusqu'h l'extrême limitede ses droits et que chacun des deux Erats doit donc
accepter un sacrifice. L'amputation est inhérente au concept de délimitation.
Mais encore faut-il que cette ampiltation soit équilibréeet raisonnable et qu'elle
ne privilégie pasde maniere inéquitable I'unedes côtes au détrimentde l'autre,
en accordant, par exemple, un effet déraisonnableà une configuration mineure
de I'une des côtes au détrimentde l'autre. C'est cela, me semble-t-il, quesigni-
tie tres exactement le principe de non-amputation ou de non-ernpibtement.
Cefte exigence fondamentale de l'équité,une délimitation qui reposerait sur
les facteurs physiqiies de la géologie ou de la géomorphologie n'a aucunerai-
son logique d'y satisfaire autrement que par l'effet de hasard heureux ou d'une
coïncidence due à la chance. Une caractéristique sous-marine, fût-elle même
d'une grande ampleur, est située là où elle est par un «accident de la nature»
(a fuct of narure), selon l'expression du tribunal franco-britannique; elle consti-
tue un «trait naturel de la r6gioii», selon l'expression de la Chambre. Mais,
Monsieur le Président, la nature peut mal faire les choses. Si l'«accident de la
nature» se situe très près des côtes de I'un des Etats, et très loin des côtese
l'autre, cette caractEristique physique ne pourrait être retenue comme indicative
d'une frontière de plateau continental qu'au prix d'une amputation déséquili-
brée, donc inéquitable, des droits de l'un des Etats. Il suffit, par exemple,
d'évoquer la fosse du cap Breton près de la côte espagnole, ou la fosse norvé-
gienne pres de la côte norvégienne, ou le sillon tripolitain pres de la côte
libyenne. Chaque fois que la prise en considération d'une caractéristique des
profondeurs conduirait à placer la frontière du plateau continental à une trop
grande proximité de la côte de I'une des parties, amputant ainsi la projection
maritime de cette dernière de manière déséquilibréeu ,ne atteinte grave serait
portée à I'un des éléments constitutifsde la conception mêmedu plateau conti-
nental, àsavoir le droit inhérent,ipso factoet ah inirio, de chaque Etat côtier a
l'extension maritime engendréepar ses côtes.
La Libye n'ignore rien de ces opérations. Le fait de ne pas avoir tenu compte
de la fosse norvégienne dans la délimitation entre le Royaume-Uni et la Nor-
vege lui paraît touà faitjustifié:
eotherwise [écrit-elle, si on en avait tenu compte], the United Kingdom396 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
would have acquired a grossly disproportionate share of the continental
shelf of the North Sea between the two States if the boundary line had fol-
lowed the Norwegian Trough which runs close to the Norwegian Coast.»
(1, ML, p. 101, par. 6.51.)
Pourquoi ce qui est valable pour la fosse norvégienne entre la Norvège et le
Royaume-Uni cesserait-il de l'être pour la soi-disantRifrZone entre Malte et la
Libye? Y aurait-il donc deux vérités?
Et si la natureavait eu l'idée deplacer la Rift Zone, ou mêmeune dépression
beaucoup plus marquée - quelque sillon tripolitain multiplié par dix, par
exemple - h quelques milles matins seulement de la côte libyenne, la Libye
accepterait-elle que ses droits de plateau continental s'arrêteàcette dépression
et que de l'autre côtéde cette fosse, vers le nord, le plateau continental tout
entier appartienne à Malte, ou à d'autres Etats? Encore une fois, y aurait-il
donc deux vérités?
Dans l'affaire TunisieiLihye, la Libye s'était montréetrks attentive à ce pro-
bleme. Elle avait fait valoir que le principe du non-empiétement trouve sa rai-
son d'être dansle souci de chaque Etat côtier de ne pas voir une puissance
étrangère exercerdes droits d'exploration et d'exploitation des fonds marins
directement devant ses côtes, et elle évoquait cet égarddes ((considérations de
sécurité etde praticabilitén (consid~rarionsof security and practicahilify(C.I.J.
Mémoires, Plaieau continental (TunisielJarnahiriyaarabe libyenne), vol. IV,
réplique libyenne,p. 59, par. 130, cite dans II, CMM, p. 12, par. 21).
La Libye aurait-elle oublié ce qu'elle exposait avec tant de force - et tant
d'exactitude - hier?
Si la limite extérieure du plateau continental a été repoussée versle large
jusqu'à une distance d'au moins 200 milles marins, c'est essentiellement,
comme je l'ai rappelé, afinde ne pas établitune inégalité entre les Etats côtiers
selon le caprice des configurations naturelles; niais c'est aussi pour une autre
raison, c'est pour mettre chaque Etat à l'abri de I'exploration et de I'exploita-
tion des ressources de ses fonds marins à une trop grande proximité de ses
côtes (cf.C.I.J.Recueil 1982, opinion individuelle de M. Jiménezde Aréchaga,
p. 119-120,par. 70). C'est pour cette raison également que le droit international
ne tient compte aujourd'hui, pour fixer les limites extérieures du plateau conti-
nental vers le large, ni d'une chute du fond marin vers les profondeurs en deçà
d'une distance de 200 milles marins, c'est-à-direà une breve distance des côtes,
ni de la présence d'une fosse ou dépression en deçà de cette même distance.
Des tors que les droits de plateau continental de 1'Etat côtier s'étendront au
moins jusqu'à une distance de 200 milles marins, 1'Etat côtier sera assure
qu'aucun Etat tiers ne pourra venir explorer ou exploiter les ressources du sot et
de son sous-sol à une si brève distance de ses côtes.
Le principe du non-empiétement ne fait que transposer et exprimer cette
préoccupation majeure sur le plan de la délimitation entre Etats voisins. Il
s'agit. bien sûr, d'assureàchacun des Etats un espace suffisamment large pour
lui permettre l'exploration et l'exploitation des ressources naturelles des fonds
marins, mais il s'agit aussi de veilleB ce que l'un des deux Etats ne puisse pas
procéder à l'exploration ou à l'exploitation des ressources des fonds marins à
une distance trop rapprochée des côtes de I'autre Etat.
Préoccupation économique au premier chef, sansnul doute. Mais comment
nier que des considérations politiques au sens large du terme, des préoccupa-
tions de souverainet6 en quelque sorte, se profilent en filigrane derriére les
prkoccupations purement économiques? La Libye s'insurge lorsque Malte fait
etat de telles considérations. Je me permettrai de rappeler ce que disait ici B PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 397
cette même place,il y a quelques mois à peine, l'agent des Etats-Unis dans sa
déclaration finaledans l'affaire duGolfe du Maine:
«[The] issue of cut-off . .. raises the most fundamental questions of
sovereignty. The question of cut-off posed in this case, not only in aeo-
graphic sense, but in a political sense as well. affects the interests of al1
States, For al1Ourhopes that the customary law of coastal-State rights will
now stabilize, no State knows with any certainty what the future of the
economic zone régimewill ho1d.n (C.I.J.Mémoires,vol. VII, p. 266.)
Le souci de garder l'autre Etat suffisamment éloignéde sa propre côte se
situe ainsi au cŒur mème du principe du non-empiétement.Le lien est éclatant
entre ce principe et le concept de distance.
Il n'est pas douteux, nul ne le contestera. que la violation du principe de non-
empiétement. expressionparriculiere du principe générÿlde l'égalitédes Etats,
conduit à écarter danscertains cas la mgthode de l'équidistance.Cela est acquis.
Et pourquoi alors la violation du principe de non-empiétement ne condamnerait-
elle aas éealement, pour les mêines raisons,une délimitation fondéesur les
donnéesggologiques-et géomorphologiquesdes fonds marins? Le déséquilibre
dans les amputations infligées aux proiections respectives des deux Parties ne
saurait êtreFritiquable dais le cas où -il serait imputablà l'application de la
mtthode de I'équidisiance,et devenir acceptable dans le cas où il serait dûà la
prise en considération des caractéristiques physiques des profondeurs sous-
marines.
Par sa nature même,je le répète,le principe du non-empiétementa un carac-
téreessentiellement spatial. II conipléteet corrobore le déclindu prolongement
naturel, ainsi que l'émergence parallèle du conceptde distance, en vue d'assurer
le respect de l'égalitédes Etats dans le droit de la délimitationdu plateau conti-
nental.
Pleinement consciente, je l'ai noté,de cet aspect du problème lorsqu'il s'agit
de la fosse norvégienneou de ses propres droits de plateau continental, la Libye
y devient insensible lorsqu'il s'agit des droitsde Malte.'Qu'une délimitation
fondéesur les prétendus faits physiquesde la Rifr Zoneet de la zone des escar-
pements conduise à empiétermassivement sur la projection maritime de Malte
et à amputer massivement cette projection ne semble pas gênerla Libye. Com-
ment ne pas êtrefrappépourtant par l'effet d'enclave rapprochéeque provoque-
rait une frontière de plateau continental conforme aux vŒux de la Libye, c'est-
à-dire une frontikre qui passerait à quelque 15 milles marins seulement des
côtes maltaises vers le sud et qui bloquerait la projection maritime de Malte à
quelque 60 milles marins des côtes maltaises vers l'est? Une frontiere de ce
genre passerait juste sous les fenêtresde Malte. si j'ose dire. lui faisant perdre
le contraLe d'espaces sous-marins directement adjacents à ses côtes, alorsque
l'extension maritime de la Libye s'épanouirait largement. Rarementun Etai
aura-t-il formulé une revendication aussi déraisonnable et inéquitable, et ce
n'est pas parce qu'elle se fonderait sur les facteurs physiques de la géologieet
de la géomorphologie sous-marines qu'elle deviendraitplus acceptable. Un
coup d'Œil sur l'une quelconque des cartes libyennes ou sur la figure 13 de
notre dossier en dit plus long là-dessus que toutes mes explications.
J'ai prononcé le mot d'enclave. Au débutde la procédure,le Libye hésitait
quelque peu, semble-t-il,?iparler d'enclave. même si l'idé en étaitincontesta-
blement présente. ainsi que nous l'avons immédiatement relevédans notre
contre-mémoire(II, CMM, p. 13, par. 23). Les deux derniers écritlibyens font
preuve de moins de réserve àce sujet.
Le contre-mémoire libyen évoque discrétement l'enclavement de deux îles398 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
yougoslaves dans l'accord i~alo-yougoslave, l'enclavement partiel des îles ita-
liennes dans l'accord italo-tunisien, et l'enclavement partiel de certaines îles
dans les accords relatifs au Golfe (11,ML, p. 129,par. 5.77; p. 130,par. 5.79;
p. 133, par. 5.91)- comme si l'on pouvait assimiler le cas de Malte, Etat sou-
verain.& celui d'Îles appartenantà l'un des deux Etats continentaux voisins!
Dans sa répliquela Libye revient à l'idée d'enclavementen évoquant à deux
reprises l'enckavement des îles Anglo-Normandes par la sentence arbitrale
franco-britannique de 1977 (ci-dessus, RL, p. 47. par.4.42. et p. 80, note 1). La
Libye aurait-elle oublié que l'un des motifs invoquésen faveur de cette solution
par le tribunal arbitral a précisémentété queces iles doivent êtreconsidérees
«comme des îles du Royaume-Uni. et non pas comme des Etats semi-indépen-
dants jouissant d'un titre particulierà leur plateau continental vis-A-vis de la
République françaiser (sentence arbitrale, par. 186)? Contrairement aux îles
Anglo-Normandes, Malte est un Etat indépendantqui jouit à coup sûr d'un titre
particulierà son plateau continental vis-à-vis de la Libye. En outre, comme le
releve également le tribunal arbitral franco-britannique, les îles Anglo-Nor-
mandes ont cette particularité d'ètre situées «du côté français de la ligne
médianetracéeentre les territoires terrestres des deux Etatsm. c'est-&-dirertdu
mauvais côtéde la ligne médiane» (ihid., par. 183 et 199): ce trait, mis en
avant ?Ijuste titre par le professeur Bowett dans l'ouvrage que j'ai cit(p. 203),
ne s'applique sûrement pas à Malte.
Mais c'est dans un autre passage de la répliqueque la Libye Iéve compléte-
ment le masque au sujet de ses intentions d'enclavement de Malte:
«The fact that Malta is a group of small islands necessarily leads to ano-
ther result that seems to have eluded Malta - itis bound ultimately to be
enclaved, whatever means of delimitation are agreed between Malta and its
neighbours. » (Ci-dessus, RL, p. 57,par. 5.10.)
Si la Libye veut dire par I$ que le plateau continental de Malte connaîtra fatale-
ment, faute d'espace suffisant en Méditerranée, certaines limitesdans toutes les
directions, elle ne fait qu'énoncer sous une forme éléganteune véritéd'évi-
dence. Cette vérités'applique à vrai dire tout autantà la Libye, car, bien que
n'étantpas une île et bien que n'étantpas petite, la Libye doit elle aussi accep-
ter une réduction de ses projections maritimes vis-à-vis de Malte. Mais si la
Libye laisse entendre par là que les droits de Malte doivent ètre réduitsen rai-
son de sa double nature d'Etat insulaire et d'Etat de faible superficie, et non pas
en raison du manque d'espace en Méditerrante, elle formule une proposition
juridiquement inacceptable. La Libye ne proclamerait alors, en substance, rien
de moins que le principe de la soustraction des petits Etats et des Etats insu-
laires- età plus forte raison des Etats qui ont le malheur d'êtreà la fois petits
et insulaires - à la garantie que leur apporte le principe du non-empiétement,
expression du principe fondamental de I'egalitédes Etats.
Exagération.caricature, nous objectera la Panie adverse. Certes, mais si peu!
Combien de fois ne nous a-t-on pas expliqué que dans cette Méditerranéesi
étroite,si serrée,si confinée,le Lilliput maltais doit modérerses appétits face à
ceux du Gulliver libyen et se contenter de la portion congrue tandis que la part
du lion reviendrait à la Libye (par exemple. 1, ML. p. 136. par. 9.07; p. 155,
par. 10.05)! La réplique libyenne s'indigneet s'énervede ce que nous ayons
présentéla thèse iibyenne sous la forme raccourcie de Malla disregarded; et
elle ajoute que la Libye comparaît devant la Cour «sur un pied d'égalitkavec
Malte» el qu'«il n'y a aucun problémequant l'existence de Malte ri(there is
no issua es to the e.ristence of Malta) (ci-dessus, RL. p. 1-2. pa3). C'est vrai.
la thèselibyenne du prolongement naturel, ne prive pas Malte de tout droit un PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 399
plateau continental. Mais comment ne pas voir que ces thésesn'accordent pas à
Malte, mais alors pas du tout, le traitement équitableque réclamele principe de
non-amputation? Peut-on considérer comme raisonnable une frontiere de pla-
teau continental qui passerait, je le répète.certains endroitsà une quinzaine de
milles marins de Malte - c'est-&-direà 3 milles marins seulement de la limite
extérieure de sa mer territoriale - alors qu'elle passeraità plus de 150 milles
marins de la Libye? La réponse est claire.
Le caractère excessif,d6raisonnable. inéquitablede la revendication libyenne
apparaît dans une lumiére particuli2rernent vive lorsque l'on prend conscience
de ce que la Libye réclame, vis-A-vis de Malte, une frontiére de plateau conti-
nental se situant plus au nord - ei donc plus favorable à \a Libye - que la
ligne médiane tracéeentre la Libye et I'ltalie en faisant abstraction de I'exis-
tence de Malte. Mêmeavec Mulru disregarded la Libye ne pourrait espérer
pousser aussi loin vers le nord ses droits de plateau continental! J'ai tracé
approximativement sur Iü carte derrière moi les contours de la Rift Zona. donc
du claim libyen, la ligne mediane entre I'ltalie et la Libye ne donnant pas
d'effet à Malte, et la ligne médiane entre Malte et la Libye revendiquée par
Malte. Pour la commoditéde la Cour et de la Partie adverse, nous nous propo-
sons de reproduire ces indications sur notre carte de base et de I'4outer à notre
dossier dès que possible. Ces canes montrent, en tout cas, je le rappelle, que la
Libye revendique, vis-à-vis de Malte. une ligne qui est située plus au nord que
la ligne médiane entre I'ltalie etla Libye, faisant abstraction de l'existence de
Malte. Nous sommes donc mêmeau-delà de Malta disregurded.
Monsieur le Président, Messieur:; les juges, le moment est venu de conclure
ces développements sur le prolongement naturel.
Si vous le permetlez, je le ferai en ramenant à quelques phrases les conclu-
sions qui me semblent s'imposer:
1) Les droits de I'Etat côtier sur les fonds marins et leur sous-sol ne sont
plus lies aujourd'hui aux caractéristiques géologiques et géomorphologiques
(sauf le cas de marges continentales se prolongeant au-delà de 200 milles des
lignes de base). Ces droits s'étendentà une distance de 200 milles des lignes de
base quelles que soient la structure geologique, la configuration ou la topogra-
phie des fonds marins: une chute rapide vers les profondeurs ne les arrêtepas;
une fosse ou une dépression, quelle que soit son importance, ne les interrompt
pas.
2) Cette régledu droit international coutumier, qui a trouvé expression dans
l'article76, paragraphe 1, de la ciinvention sur le droit de la mer de 1982, a
pour objet essentiel d'assurer l'égalité entreles Etats côtiers indépendamment
des caractéristiques géologiqueset géornorphologiques des fonds marins et de
leur sous-sol adjacents à leurs côtes. Positivement, cette regle assureà tous les
Etats côtiers le droit d'explorationetd'exploitation des fonds marins et de leur
sous-sol jusqu'à une distance minimale de 200 milles de leurs lignes de base.
Négativement,elle interdit aux Etars tiers d'exercer de tels droitsb une distance
inferieureà 200 milles des lignes de base d'un Etat côtier quelconque.
3) L'étenduedes droits de plateau continental de chaque Etat côtier dépend
essentiellement de la configuration de ses côtes, c'est-à-dire de facteurs géogra-
phiques. Le principe demeure que la terre domine la mer et que le plateau
continental constitue l'extension de la souverainetéterritoriale sous la mer.
4) La nature du titre juridiqile de 1'Etatcôtier sur le plateau continental a des
incidences directes sur la délimitation du plateau continental entre Etats voisins
dont les côtes sont adjacentes ou se font face.
5) Pas plus que la fixation des limites extérieures, la délimitation du plateau400 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
continental ne peut dépendre des hasards des caractéristiques géologiqueset
géomorphologiquesdes fonds marins et de leur sous-sol. Comme la fixation des
limites extérieures,la délimitation du plateau continentaldkpend essentiellement
de la géographiecôtière et repose sur la prise en considération d'une certaine
distance par rapport aux côtes.
6) Faire ddpendre la délimitation du plateau continentaldes hasards de carac-
téristiques géologiqueset géomorphologiquesdes fonds marins et de leur sous-
sol conduirait hdes empiétementset des amputations générateursd'inéquité.Le
principe du non-empiétement est de nature essentiellement spatiale: il tend à
assurer a chacun des deux Etats voisins un espace raisonnable - en termes de
distance des côtes - sur lequel il puisse exercer ses droits souverains et dont il
puisse écarter l'autre Etat. Seule la prise en considération de la géographie
côtière et du facteur de distance par rapport aux côtes permet de satisfaire à
cette exigence.
7) La délimitationdu plateau continental ne peut donc pas prendre pour point
de départ,en tani.que titre juridique du plateau continental, les donnéesgéolo-
giques et géomorphologiques du sol et du sous-sol, ni accorder d'une autre
manière à ces donnéesun rôle prééminentdans la délimitation.
8) En conséquence, la thése libyenne construite tout entière, comme elle
l'est, sur les caractéristiques géologiqueset géomorphologiques des fonds
marins, se révèle - indépendamment mêmd ees inexactitudes factuelles sur ies-
quelles elle s'appuie - comme contraire au droit international. La soi-disant
Rift Zone et la zone des escarpements sont denuées de tout caractere détermi-
nant dans la délimitation du plateau continental entre Malte et la Libye. Ces
configurations des profondeurs sous-marines ne reflètent en aucune manière la
configuration de la géographie côtièredes deux pays, et leur prise en considéra-
tion aux fins de la fixation de la frontiere de plateau continental entre Malte et
la Libye conduirait, en raison de leur situation, à une violation grossière du
principe de non-empiétement et, par là même,B une violation du principe de
l'égalitédes Etats.
Monsieur le Président, si la revendication libyenne se trouve condamnée
parce qu'elle est fondéesur une conception erronéedu prolongement naturel et
sur une méconnaissance du principe de distance, la revendication maltaise est,
quant à elle, conforme au droit international puisque, sans faire réference aux
structuresgéologiqiies et géomorphologiques sous-marines, elle repose sur le
principe de distance.
C'est donc vers ce principe que je me propose, avec votre autorisation, de me
tourner demain matin.
L'audience est levée à 13 heures TREIZI~MEAUDlENCE PUBLIQUE (30 XI 84, 10 h)
Présents:[Voir audience du 26 XI 84.1
M. WEIL: Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, après avoir examiné
dans mes précedentsdéveloppements les sources du droit applicable. l'opération
de délimitation et le prolongement naturel, je me tourne 3 présentvers le prin-
cipe de distance.
IV. LE PRINCIPEDE DISTANCE
L'expression «principe de distance », que j'empmnte 3la Cour (CI.J.Recueil
1982. p. 49, par. 48) se réfèreesseritiellernenii un élément spatial,iisavoir une
certaine distance exprimée numériquement.
C'est cette distance qui permet de déterminer jusqu'où s'ktendent, aussi bien
vers le large que par rapport aux Etats voisins. les droits et juridictions mari-
times de I'Etat côtier, et en particulier ses droits de plateau continental.
Le principe selon lequel la terre domine la mer, et selon lequel les droits et
juridictions de 1'Etatcôtier sur les espaces maritimes adjacents à ses côtes sont
l'extension et l'accessoire de la souverainete territoriale, trouvait naguère son
expression. en ce qui concerne le plateau continental, dans le concept de prolon-
gement naturel. 11la trouve aujourd'hui dans le principe de distance qui lui
conféreun contenu concret et aisémentdéterminable.
Le principe de distance constitue déslors la traduction moderne de I'idee fon-
damentale d'adjacence sur laquelle l'arrêtde fa Chambre dans l'affaire du Golfe
du Maine vient d'attirer l'attention (C.I.J.Recueil 1984, p. 296, par.103).
Mais une distance ne se définitpas dans l'absolu, elle se mesure par rappon à
quelque chose, en l'espèce par rappon aux côtes. Le principe de distance com-
porte donc. outre l'élément spatial.une seconde composante: la notion de côtes.
C'est la liaison entre ces deux paramstres: côtes et distance. qui forme le prin-
cipe de distance.
Le rapport entre la géographie côtiére et l'élément spatiala étémis en
lumiéredans l'arrêtde 1982. 11faut relire une fois de plus les formules de la
Cour, tant elles sont riches de substance:
ab lien géographiqueentre la côte et les zones immergées qui se trou-
vent devant elle est le fondement du titre juridique de cet Etat..» (Plnteau
conrinenial (TunisielJomahiriyaarabe libyenne). arrêt, CI.J. Recueil 1982.
p. 61. par. 73.)
a Dans la mesure ...où ...dans certaines circonstances la distanceilpartir
de la ligne de base, mesurCe A la surface de la mer, fonde le titre de I'Etat
côtier...seule la base juridique des droits sur le plateau continental - la
simple distance de la côte - peut être prise en considération commepou-
vant influer sur les pretentions des Parties., (Ibid., p. 48, par. 48.)
De l'avis de Malte, c'est dans le principe de distance, conçu comme un rap-
port entre les côtes et la distance, que résidele titre juridique qui doit nécessai-
rement &trepris en considé~ationcomme point de départ du processus de déli-
mitation.402 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
Aussi voudrais-je me pencher tour h tour sur chacune de ces deux compo-
santes.
Et d'abord, les «côtes B.
1. Les rccotes»
II serait tout h fait inutile de revenir sur l'importance primordiale du concept
de côtes, proclaméepar une jurisprudence unanime et reconnue par la Libye, si
la Partie adverse ne s'étaitlivréeBune succession de glissements injustifiables
et d'assimilations arbitraires qui la conduise. tout en proclamant son attache-
ment à la primautéde la géographiecôtiere, à en dénaturerle sens.
J'ai déjh eu l'occasion de dénoncer la tentative adverse de mettre sur le
meme plan. sous le couvert du vocable génériquede <<facteursphysiques». la
géographie côtière,d'une part, la géologieet la géomorphologie.d'autre part.
Sans doute la Lihye espère-t-elle, gri2ceh cet amalgame de concepts hétéro-
gènes, faire bénéficier les faits non pertinentsde la géologie et de la géomor-
phologie sous-marines du pavillon juridique flatteur de la géographie côtière. Il
faut le répéterune fois encore, une frontière dictée par les accidents sous-
marins de la soi-disant Rifr Zone et de la zone des escarpements ne serait en
aucune maniPre le fruit ou mêmele reflet de la géographie des côtes de Malte
et de la Libye.
Ainsi apparaît un premier aspect d'une tentative de vaste envergure tendant à
ne proclamer l'importance des côtes que pour exorciser ce problème et mieux
s'en débarrasser.
Un second aspect de cette tactique consiste à glisser subrepticement du
concept de «côtes» celui de .masse territoriale derriére les côtes»(lundmass
behind the coasis). Nous avions déjh relevé ce glissement dans les deux pre-
miers mémoires libyens (voir ci-dessus, RM, p. 42, par. 76). 11s'est confirmé
avec éclatdans la réplique libyenne, où l'on peut lire,entre autres, ceci:
« What determines the appropriate method of delimitation is the relationship
of the two landinasses and the two coasts ... the shelf area is "generated" by
the respectivelandmasses and coasts ... N (Ci-dessus, RL. p. 45, par. 4.36.)
Ou encore ceci:
((good sense would require that an equitable delimitation should reflect the
landmass behind the coast in terms of the "weight" of its natural prolonga-
tion» (ibid., p88, par. 7.10).
On retrouve ainsi le thème qu'un Etat de dimensions considérables comme la
Libye jouit d'un prolongement naturel plus «intense » et plus «naturel » - ce
sont les mots employés par les écritures libyennes - qu'un petit Etat comme
Malte (II. CML, p. 41, par. 2.48).
Nous avons dénoncédans nos écritures cette tentative inadmissible de se ser-
vir de la primautédes côtes pour faire venir sur le devant de la scèneles super-
ficies respectives des territoires des deux Etats (ci-dessus, RM. p. 43-46,
par. 77-82) qui sont derrière les côtes. M. Mizzi a dkjh évoquécette question et
M. Brownlie y reviendra plus en détail.
Je me bornerai pour ma part une seule observation: la thése libyenne porte
une fois de plus atteinte à l'égalité desEtats. L'idee, cent fois exprimée tout au
long des écritslibyens, que. dans le processus de délimitation. l'énorme land-
mass* libyenne doit peser plus lourd que la .~small sizew de Malte (par
exemple. ci-dessus, RL, p. 91, par. 7.16) fait intervenir un facteur de discrimi-
nation qui est aux antipodes du droit international. PLAIDûIRIE DE M. WEIL 403
Aucun accord de délimitation conclu ce jour ne vient confirmer la these
selon laquelle un Etat côtier bénéficeraitd'un surplus de «poids» du fait de
l'étenduede son hinrerland terrestre, pas plus qu'elle ne confirme cette autre
thtse qu'un Etat côtier devrait accepter une capitis deminuiio du fait que son
hinterland terrestre est un peu profond. Les côtes, certainement oui; l'étendue
des terres qui se trouvent derrière lescôtes, certainement non.
L'idke que la masse terrestre se projetterait en mer en sautant en quelque
sorte par-dessus les côtes est juridiquement inacceptable. Elle l'est aussi politi-
quement, car elle tend 3 remettre en cause et à ébranlerles fondements mêmes
du droit de la mer.
Non, Monsieur le Président, lescôtes libyennes n'ont pas plus d'«intensité»
pour engendrer les droits du plateau continental ni plus de «poids» pour fixer
une délimitation que les côtes maltaises. La dimension de I'Etat, la dimension
terrestre deI'Etat est tout simplement en dehors de la question.
Non contente d'affecter aux côtes des Parties un pouvoir génér.ateurde pla-
teau continental plus ou moins intense en fonction de la dimension du territoire
terrestre qui en constitue le hinterland, la Libye introduit entre les côtes mal-
taises et les côtes libyennes une nouvelle discrimination. en fonction cette fois-
ci du carnctere insulaire ou continental du territoire des deux Etats. Ce qui
signifierait, 3 en croire la Libye, que le pouvoir générateur duplateau continen-
ral des côtes maltaises se trouverait mutilé du fait d'une double infirmité: la
dimension réduitede Malte, d'une put. son caractère insulaire, de l'autre.
La these libyenne d'une gradation dans le pouvoir générateurdes côtes défie
le bon sens. II est évident - j'y reviendrai - qu'un Etat insulaire de petite
taille, s'il est situéau milieu de l'océan,engendre des droits de plateau conti-
nental jusqu'à 200 milles marins au moins de ses côtes: son pouvoir générateur
d'espaces maritimes vers le large n'est donc pas mutilédu fait de son insularité
ou de sa petitesse. Si Malte étaitsitu& Ziplus de 400 milles - ou même exac-
tement à 400 milles marins de la Libye - Malte engendrerait une ceinture de
200 milles marins au moins de plateau continental tout autour de ses côtes, bien
qu'elle soit une île, bien qu'elle soit petite. Et malgrésa dimension considérable
et malgré son caractkre continental la Libye serait exactement dans la même
situation. Bref, Malte et la Libye auraient un pouvoir générateur duplateau
continental égal,et la Libye ne pourrait pas contester i1 Malte le droit d'avoir
les mêmesprojections qu'elle-même.
Pourquoi cette égalitédans l'intensitédu pouvoir générateurde droits de pla-
teau conlinentai disparaîtrait-elle comme par enchantement lorsque, comme
c'est le cas, Malte et la Libye sont trop proches I'une de l'autre pour que leurs
droits puissent s'exercer vers le large dans leur intégralité?Et pourquoi Malte
aurait-elle soudain un pouvoir générateurde plateau continental moins intense
que la Libye? On retrouve ainsi, par une autre voie. les observations que j'ai
faites précédemmentau sujet de la relation entre le principe de non-empiéte-
ment et celui de t'kgalitédes Etats.
Pour tenter de faire admettre une thèse aussi inattendue, la Libye nous
explique que dans la pratique des Eiats et dans la jurisprudence la question des
petites îlesa toujours soulevédes difficultés, qu'elles ont étéignorées,encla-
vkes ou dotées d'un effet réduit (ci-dessus.RL, p. 38, par. 4.12; p. 80, note 1;
p. 88, par. 7.10). En un mot, nous dit-on «the size of the island will virtually
always bea relevant factor in the delimitation* (ihid..p. 88,par. 7.10).
Sans doute la Libye reconnaît-elle - comment pourrait-elle nier une évi-
dence juridique aussi éclatante? - que, conforrn6ment a la règle coutumière
exprimée dans l'article 121 de la convention sur le droit de la mer, les îles doi-
vent êtretraitéescomme tout autre territoire terrestre (1, ML, p. 11 1,par. 6.82;404 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
cf. p. 110, par. 6.7!>).Mais ce qu'elle déduitde là, c'est la proposition surpre-
nante que les îles - ou les Etats insulaires- ne bénéficientpas d'un statut
privilkgiépar rapport aux autres temtoires (1, ML, p. 142, par. 9.22; II, CML,
p. 33, par. 2.31: p. 73. par. 3.36; p. 78, par. 4.01; p. 93-98, par. 4.34-4.45). Car
Malte est accusée,tout au long des kcrits libyens, de soutenir qu'un petit pays
insulaire doit bénéficierde regles juridiques plus favorables qu'un Etat conti-
nental de dimension plus grande. L'accusation est tellement ridicule, la dénatu-
ration de notre position est tellement grossière que ne ne sais quoi rkpondre. Ce
que nous soutenons, c'est que Malte. bien que petite et bien qu'insulaire, jouit
de droits egaux à ceux de tout autre Etat côtier. Malte réclame le droit à l'éga-
lité.La Libye traduit: Malte réclame un privilège.D
Monsieur le Président.l'argumentation libyenne est dominéetout entitre par
une confusion, qui la dévorede l'intérieur, à la manière d'un ver dans un fruit.
Je veux parler, la Cour l'aura deviné,de la confusion systématiquementenirete-
nue entre deux situations essentiellement différentes: celle des îles qui sont rat-
tachées politiquement h un Etat continental. et celle des iles qui forment par
elles-mêmesdes entitésétatiquessouveraines.
Lorsqu'il s'agit d'îles dépendantes,c'est vrai, le droit international leur attri-
bue un effet variable dans la délimitation du plateau continental, et il tient
compte à cet égard. c'est vrai, de leur dimension, ainsi d'ailleurs que de leur
population, de leur économieet de leur situation à proximite ou non de lacôte
de I'un des Etats, du «bon » ou du amauvais» côtéde la ligne mediane.
On fait souvent référence à ce sujet à une intervention du Commander Ken-
nedy, représentant du Royaume-Uni devant la quatrième commission de la
confkrence de Genève, le 9 avril1958. Après avoir indiquéqu'«au nombre des
circonstances spéciales dont il pourrait y avoir lieu de tenir compte on peut
mentionner l'existence d'une île, petite ou grande, dans la zone iirépartir», le
Commander Kennedy suggéraitque «pour tracer une ligne de demarcation, on
tienne compte de l'étenduedes îles » (islands should be treared on their merirs,
selon le texte original). Il a suggéré aussique l'on négligede atrés petites îles»
situées sur le plateau continental continu et en dehors de la mer territoriale
(Premièreconférencedes Nurions Uniessur le droit de la mer. Documents ofi-
ciels, vol. Vi, p. 112; texteanglais. p. 93). Monsieur lePrésident, ils'agissait
manifestement, dans l'esprit de M. Kennedy, de petites îles appartenant à I'un
des Etats et se trouvant dans la zoneà délimiter.
Depuis lors l'idéequ'aux fins de la délimitation du plateau continental il y a
îles et iles - je paraphrase, vous l'aurez remarqué, la célkbre formule de
Gidel: si1 y a detroits et détroit-» cette idéea ét6reprise par une abondante
doctrine et confirmée par la pratique des Etats, mais dans la doctrine comme
dans la pratique des Etats, c'est toujours, comme dans la déclarationdu Com-
mander Kennedy. d'îles dépendantes qu'il s'agit, jamaisd'Etats insulaires.
Je n'infligerai pasà la Cour une revue exhaustive de la doctrine. Je me bor-
nerai noter que, si certaines Ctudes écartent implicitement le cas des Etats
insulaires pour ne viser que celui des îles dépendantes par exemple. celles de
MM. Ely et Goldie (Ely, «Seabed Boundaries between Coastal States: The
EffectTo Be Given Islets as "Special Circumsrances"», ln~ernafionalLawyer.
vol.6, 1982, p. 219 et suiv.. notamment p. 219, 223, 231, 234, 236; Goldie,
«The ICJ's "Natural Prolongation" and the Continental Shelf Problem of
Islands», Netherlonds Yearbook of International Law,vol. IV, 1973. p. 237 et
suiv., notamment p. 247) - d'autres sont au contraire toutà fait explicites. Je
pense, par exemple, à un récent articlede M. Karl («Islands and the Delimita-
tion of the Continental Shelf: A Framework for Analysisn, American Journal
of lnternurional Law, vol. 71, 1977, p. 642 et suiv.), dans lequel l'auteur PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 405
déclare ne se préoccuperque des îles dépendantes et ajoute «it is assumed that
independent insular States should be treated no differently frorn mainland
States» (p. 642, note 3; cf. p. 667, note 99, et p. 668, note 108). Je pense éga-
lement à un article déjà un peu plus ancien de M. Delin («Shall Islands Be
Taken into Account when Drawing the Median Line According to Article 6 of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf? », Nordisk Tidsskrif?for International
Rer, vol. 41, 1971, p. 205 et sutv.). Je citerai aussi dans le même ordre d'idée
une thèse de doctorat française, iniitulée L'emprise maritime de I'Etat clitier,
dans laquelle l'auteur, M. Apollis, souligne l'importance du statut politique de
l'Île et précisece qui suit:
(con sait, que les conditions imposées aux îles pour obtenir une emprise
côtikrenormale ne conment lias tes Etats insulaires et les Etats archipels
et n'affectent que les îles appartenant h un Etat côtier» (Paris, Pedone,
1981, p. 75, note 176).
Mais c'est à une remarque de l'ancien géographe du département d'Etat des
Etats-Unis, M. Hodgson, que je me réfbreraisurtout, en raison de l'expérience
et de l'autorité de ce spécialiste des délimitationsmaritimes: les petits Etats
insulaires, écrit-il, doivent bénéficierdes mêmesattributs qu'un Etat continen-
tal. II poursuit: «Its difficult to conceive of such a small State being deprived
justifiably of shelf . . . merely on the basis of size.» Et il ajoute qu'avec le
mouvement d'accession à l'indépendance des petites îles les questions de déli-
mitation impliquant de petits Etats insulaires vont se multiplier. La Cour trou-
vera un extrait de l'étudede l'éminent géographedans notre mémoire (1, MM,
p. 57, par. 174).
La pratique conventionnelle confirme pleinement les indications de cette litté-
rature. S'il est vrai, et il est vrai, que les accords dedelimitation n'accordent
parfois qu'un effet rbduità certaines îles, compte tenu de leur taille, situation
ou population, cela ne concerne jamais, jamais des îles jouissant du statut éta-
tique, mais toujours des îles dépendiintes.Nous avons citédans nos écrituresde
nombreux accords de délimitation reconnaissant la plénitude de leurs droits de
plateau continental h des Etats insulaires, parfois tout petits (1, MM, p. 61-78,
par. 185-187). Jamais un Etat insulaire, fût-il petit, n'a vu ses droits réduits
parcequ'il aurait eu la malchance d'êtreinsulaire et petit; aucun exemple
contraire n'a pu être fournipar la Partie adverse. Bref, les délimitations conven-
tionnelles - dans lesquelles pourtant les Etats pèsent parfoisd'un poids concret
inégaI - infligent un démentiéclatant à la théorie discriminatoire que la Libye
voudrait érigeren regle juridique.
Lorsque la Libye allègue que le <<poids* à attribuer des petites îles varie
selon leur dimension, leur situationou d'autres facteurs (1,ML, p. 90, par. 4.30),
c'est exact - mais c'est exact seulement dans le cas d'îles d6pendantes. Pour
les îles-Etats, aucune discrimination de ce genre n'est faite ni par la doctrine ni
par la pratique.
Aussi n'est-ce pas sans quelque surprise qu'on lit dans les écrits adversesque
le droit international estindiffërent au statut politique d'une île en matière de
titre juridique ou de délimitationde plateau continental; le statut politique d'une
île, soutient en toutes lettres la Libye, est sans pertinence en cette matière(II,
CML, p. 72, par. 3.42; p. 96, par. 4.42)e, t Malte se voit reprocher d'attacher
une importance injustifiée au fait qu'elle n'est pas seulement une île, mais un
Etat insulaire:noi jnstan island but an island State (II, CML, p. 73, par. 3.45).
Pour avancer une interprétation aussi inattendue du droit international, la
Libye croit pouvoir s'appuyer sur la sentence arbitrale franco-britannique. Dans
cette affaire, soutient-elle, le statut politique des îles Anglo-Normandes n'aoué406 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
aucun rôle significatif, et toute supposition que nous pourrions faire que ces îles
auraient ététraitées diffgremrnent si eIles avaient constitué des Etats indépen-
dants serait pure conjecture (II, CML, p. 92-93, par. 4.35).
Reprenons donc un instant la sentence. Que soutenait le Royaume-Uni? Il
soutenait que les îles Anglo-Normandes «sont en fait des Etats insulaires jouis-
sant, dans une large mesure, d'une indépendancepolitique, législative, adminis-
trative etéconomirluede longue date» (par. 171). Et que soutenait la France?
La France soutenait qu'il s'agit d'îles «qui n'ont pas la responsabilité directe de
leurs relations extérieures,ce qui les distingue des Etats insulaires..» (par. 158).
Bref, la question du statut politique des îles etait clairement posée devant le
tribunal par les parties. Cette question a-t-elle étéindifférenteau tribunal? Cer-
tainement pas, puisque le tribunal, loin de s'en désintéresser,a demandé des
précisions à ce sujet à l'agent du Royaume-Uni (par. 172) et que, sur la base
des renseignements founiis par ce dernier, letribunal a conclu:
«qu'il ne doit considérer lesîles Anglo-Normandes que comme des îles du
Royaume-Uni, et non pas comme des Etats semi-indépendants jouissant
d'un titre particulier à leur plateau continental vis-à-vis de la République
française » (par. 186).
Les îles Anglo-Normandes, a-t-il préciseplus loin, «sont des iles distinctes du
Royaume-Uni, non pas des Etats distincts» (par. 190).
L'interprétation proposéepar la Libye ne résistepas, on le voit, à la lecture
de cette sentence.
La doctrine ne s'est pas trompée surle sens de cette dernière.
Dans son ouvrage The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (La
Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), M. Clive Symmons, commentant les passages
cités, écritce qui suit:
«had the Channel Islands constituted independml Island States, their
effect as continental basepoints would have been different~ (p. 177). (Les
italiques sont de moi.)
De même, M. Derek Bowett, tout en relevant les incertitudes quant aux
conséquences exactes qu'aurait pu avoir l'indépendance des îles Anglo-Nor-
mandes sur la délimitation (op. cit., p. 2231,observe que la discussion détaillée
du statut politique des îles par le tribunal <<clearlysuggests that political status
isa relevant factor» (r,p cit.,p. 224, note 59). Et M. Bowett ajoute que la
maniere dont le tribunal a tranché la question du plateau continental des îles
Anglo-Normandes - c'est-&-dire la solution de l'enclave, pour parler claire-
ment - «can have little value. as a "precedent", for island situations where the
islands are separate Statesrr (op. cit.p. 226).
Monsieur le Président, j'espère ainsi avoir montréque la confusion entretenue
par la Libye entre les îles dépendantes et les îles jouissant de l'indépendance
étatique est contraire à la jurisprudence tout autant qu'à la pratique et aux vues
de la doctrine. Sans doute l'exemple des îles dépendantes n'est-il pas entière-
ment dépourvud'intérêt poun rotre affaire, et c'est pour cette raison que nous y
avons nous-mêmes fait référence: caril est précieuxde noter que mêmedes îles
dépendantes de petite taille ont et6 parfois pleinement prises en compte dans la
délimitation du plateau continental. II n'en demeure pas moins que les deux
situations ne sont pas juridiquement assimilables: les nuances et distinctions qui
s'appliquent aux iles dépendantes, notamment selon leur taille, sont sans perti-
nence aucune l'égarddes Etats insulaires.
Si Malte était terre italienne ou terre grecque, on pourrait se demander quel
effetilconviendrait de lui attribuer, compte tenu de son caractere insulaire et desa petite dimension, dans une délimitation italo-libyenne ou gréco-libyenne.
Mais Malte n'est ni territoire italien ni territoire grec. Malte est territoire mal-
tais. Malte est un Etat.
Si un Etat insulaire est une île, il est aussi, et peut-êtremêmeavant tout, un
Etat. Et à ce titre 1'Etat insulaire jouit, quelle que soit sa taille et malgré son
caractère insulaire, de la plénitudedes droits et attributions de 1'Etat. Une fois
de plus nous croisons sur notre chemin le principe de l'kgalitédes Etats.
Ce principe, que nous rencontrons à tous Ies carrefours, gênela Partie
adverse, on le comprend. Elle ne peut pas en nier l'existence, et elle est
condamnee à admettre que «l'égalitédes Etats est un principe fondamental du
droit international>, (LI, CML, p. 78, par. 4.04). Comment fait-elle alors pour
s'en dkbarrasser? Elle recourt à tin procédéqui la séduit malheureusement
trop souvent: déformernotre thèse afin de mieux pouvoir la tourner en ridicule.
L'égalitédes Etats signifierait, dans la conception de Malte telle qu'interprétée
par la Libye, que, puisque Malte et la Libye sont des Etats égaux,ils devraient
recevoir des superficies identiques de plateau continental. Ce qui signifierait,
toujours selon la position de Malte telle qu'interprétée par la Libye, que toutes
les délimitations doivent être effectuées sur la base de l'équidistance. Cequi
signifierait enfin, pousséiil'extrême,qu'en vertu du principe d'égalitéles Etats
devraient avoir tous des territoirestle mêmedimension, des populations égales,
des niveaux économiquescomparables. Voilà comment, Monsieur le Président,
la Partie adverse croit lire l'égalitédes Etats dans la pensée maltaise(II, CML.
p. 79 et 80, par. 4.06 et 4.07).
Le caractère excessivement caricatural de ces descriptions n'appelle pas de
longues observations. Nous n'avons jamais dit que l'égalitédes Etats exige une
répani~ionégaledu plateau continental entre Malte et la Libye. Nous avons tout
au contraire fait ressortir que la Libye aurait, mêmedans le cas de la ligne
médiane préconisée par Malte. une superficie de plateau continental considéra-
blement plus grande que celle relevant de Malte (1,MM. p. 36, par. 117). Et
M. Mizzi s'est longuementexpliquésur ce point.
La remarque libyenne selon laquelle la sentence arbitrale de 1977 aurait «dis-
poséde la prétention mallaise» de faqon ucrysfal clear. est hors de propos.
Certes, je le sais, la sentence franco-britannique écarte au paragraphe 195
l'argument français fondésur l'égalité des Etats, mais pourquoil'a-t-elle fait?
Parce que cet argument conduisait Al'attribution de paTtségales,de supeficies
égales,ainsi qu'il ressort clairement de l'analyse de la thèsefrançaise qui figure
au paragraphe 165 infine de la sentence elle-même. Maisce n'est pas cela que
Malte demande. Ce que Malte demande, sur le fondement de l'égalitédes Etais,
ce n'est pas du tout, inais pas du totit, un partage égaldes superficies du plateau
continental, mais la consécration d'une position d'égalité dans l'opératiod ne
délimitation duplateau continental - mêmesi l'un des Etats est continental et
de taille importante, et l'autre insulaire et de taille réduite. Faceau droit de la
délimitation maritime,le csmall group of islandsn qu'est Malte vaut autant et
pkse aussi lourd que l'énorme*continental landmassn qu'est la Libye. Voilà la
vérité majeure, contre laquelle la Libye tente en vain de s'insurger.
Monsieur le Président, 1'Etat maltais n'a jamais pretendu un seul instant
bénéficierd'un statut spkcial ou privilégié.
Ce que I'Etat maltais soutient, c'est qu'en tant qu'Etat, en tant que membre ?I
part entièrede l'organisation des Nations Unies et des organisations internatio-
nales - tout le monde connaît le rôle qu'il ajouédans l'élaboration du droitde
la mer - Malte est placCesur un pied d'égalitéavec 1'Etat libyen aux fins de
la présente delimitation.
Affirmer ou impliquer le contraire, comme n'hésitepas à la faire la Libye,408 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
c'est méconnaîtreun principe fondamental du droit et des relations internatio-
nales.
L'inégalité concrètedes Etats sur le plan du développement économiquea
conduit certains à s'élever contre la situation dominante que l'égalitédes Etats
sur le plan juridique peut assurer aux «grands» vis-&-visdes «petits», et l'idée
a été émise - en particulier par mon ami le doyen Colliard - de remédier a
cette domination de fait au moyen de ce qu'il a appeléune inégalité compensa-
trice. La Cour n'acceptera pas, Malte en est persuadée,qu'en matiere de délirni-
tation du plateau continental la protection que le principe de l'egalite souveraine
des Etats assure aux «petits» soit balayée par des privileges juridiques exorbi-
tants accordés aux «grands»; faute de quoi l'inégalité compensatrice ferait
place à une inégalité aggravatrice.
Ainsi s'effondre, Monsieur le Président, Messieursles juges, la tentative de la
Partie adverse de faire dévier le concept de côtes vers un concept différent, qui
n'a rien à voir avec lui. Apparemment la Libye parle «côtes»; en réalitéelle
veut faire passer sous ce pavillon les masses continentales respectives des deux
pays et le contraste entre le caractère insulaire de Malte et le caracttre continen-
tal de la Libye. Pour Malte, au contraire, les côtes sont les côtes, et pas autre
chose; une île-Etat est un Etat comme un autre; et les côtes d'un Etat insulaire
ont le mêmepouvoir générateurde droits et juridictions maritimes et pèsent
aussi lourd dans la délimitation du plateau continental que les côtes de
n'importe quel autre Etat côtier.
La dénaturation dii concept de côtes par la Libye ne s'arrête pourtant paslà.
La Libye lit en effet le vocable de «côtes» comme synonyme pour l'essentiel
de «longueur de cBles». Les côtes de Malte étantmains longues que celles de
la Libye, elles engendrent des droits moins importants de plateau continental.
Voilà ce qu'on peut lire de la premièreà la derniérepage des écrits libyens.
Ce probléme intéresse la question de la proportionnalité des longueurs de
côtes, déjhévoquéepar M. Mizzi et sur laquelle reviendra en détail mon ami
Ian Brownlie. Je me bornerai, pour ma part, à évoquer la longueur des côtes
dans le contexte d'une controverse un peu spéciale suscitée par la Libye àpro-
pos des points de base.
Ainsi que la Cour l'a noté, la Partie adverse nous reproche. à plusieurs
reprises,de substituer «points de basen et lignes de base à «côtes». Apparue
dans le contre-mémoirede la Libye (II, CML, p. 37, par. 2.39; p. 42, par. 2.49.
p. 159, par. 7.23), cette accusation occupe une place importante dans la
réplique. Malteest clouéeau pilori pour avoir confondu points de base et côtes
(ci-dessus,RL, p. 44, par. 4.33) et pour avoir oublié que ce sont les côtes, et
non pas des points de base en tant que tels. qui engendrent des droits maritimes
(ibid.,p. 45. par. 4.36; p. 58, par. 5.13).
Ce qu'il y a derrière cette surprenante accusation, c'est la tentative libyenne
de rkduire la géographie côtièreBune longueur côtière mesurée enkilomktres
ou en milles, grâce en quelque sorte à un instrument d'arpentage que l'on
dérouleraitle long des côtes.
La longueur des côtes constitue sans doute l'un des élémentsde la géographie
côtière,nul n'en disconviendra; elte ne saurait pour autant êtreregardh comme
le facteur décisif, et moins encore comme le facteur exclusif, de la géographie
côlière au regard de la générationdes droits de plateau continental.
La Libye paraît oublier que, selon une regle aujourd'hui bien établie,et dont
portent témoignage les articles 57 et 76 de la convention sur le droit de la mer,
la largeur de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau continental est calcu-
lee par rapport aux «lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesuréela largeur de
la mer territoriale», et que ces lignes de base peuvent être des+lignes de base PLAIDOIRIEDE M. WEIL 409
droites reliant des points appropriés>i,selon les dispositions de l'article 7 de la
même convention.Si c'étaitla longueur effective des côtes, en tant que telles,
qui constituait le facteurgenerateur des droits maritimes, la technique des lignes
de base droites ne serait pas admissible. Au regard du plateau continental et de
la zone économique exclusive, comme au regard de la mer territoriale, les
lignes de base sont regardées par le droit international comme une expression
juridiquement valable des côtes. Ce n'est pas un hasard si l'on parle couram-
ment, par raccourci, de «2ûû milles marins des côtes», au lieu de dire, ce qui
serait plus précis: «200 milles marins des lignes de base A partir desquelles est
mesurée lamer territoriale*. Cet usage de langage assimilant «lignes de base*
et «côtes » est révélateur.
Mais la Libye paraît oublier surtout que, pour la fixation de la limite exté-
rieure de la mer territoriale, le droii international a depuis longtemps abandonne
la méthodedite du trace parallèle, qui consiste 21suivra la côte ou les lignes de
base dans toutes leurs inflexions, au profit de la méthodedite de la courbe tan-
gente, ou des enveloppes des arcs de cercle, qui repose précisément sur la tech-
nique des points de base. Cette méthode consiste, s'il m'est permis de le rappe-
ler, à calculer la largeur de la mer territoriale partir de quelques points de
base seulement et à négliger encons6quence d'autres points de la côte, qui sont
ainsi «perdus» pour cette construction. Nous avons donné des explications
détailléessur cette méthode, aujourd'hui érigée en règld ee droit par l'article4
de la convention de 1982, dans notre réplique écrite iilaquelle je prie respec-
tueusement la Cour de bien vouloir se reporter (ci-dessus, RM, p. 48-50, par. 89-
95). Ce que je retiendrai ici, c'est seulement ceci: le droit international n'a
apparemment vu rien de condamnable dans ce que la Partie adverse appelle la
substitution de points de base aux côtes. Les points de base sont utilisés, exacte-
ment comme le sont les lignes de base, parce qu'ils expriment la configuration
réelle de lacôte, et dans la mesure où ils l'expriment. Puis-je me pennettre de
rappeler qu'en decrivant la méthode de la courbe tangente en 1951, à une
époqueoù cette méthodeétaitdéj8répandueen pratique mais n'&taitpas encore
obligatoire en droit, la Cour a declaréque «son but est d'assurer l'application
du principe que la ceinture des eaux territoriales doit suivre la ligne de la côte»
(affaire des Pêcheries, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 129)? Côtes, Iignes de base et
points de base sont des aspects d'urie seule et même rkalitégéographique.
La leçon qui se d6gage de ces observations est claire: en essayant d'établir
une opposition entre le concept de côtes, d'une part, et la mkthode des points et
lignes de base. d'autre part, la Libye mène un combat d'arrikre-garde: d'ores et
déjàle droit international lui a donn6 ton.
Il est assez piquant, au demeurant, de voir la Libye s'en prendre ainsi à la
ligne de délimitation préconisée parMalte au nom d'une prétenduenon-repré-
sentation des côtes qui serait due,à en croire la Libye, à l'utilisation de la tech-
nique des points de base. En quoi -- on aimerait le savoir - une ligne qui sui-
vrait la direction de la soi-disanl Rifr Zone serait-elle représentative de la
configuration côtiéredes deux pays?
C'est sans doute parce qu'elle est consciente du caractère désespéré de sa ten-
tative que la Partie adverse, dans uri ultime sursaut, se plaint de ne pas vraiment
connaître les points de base sur lesquels Malte s'appuie (1, ML, p. 47, note 5;
II.CML. p. 37, note 2; ci-dessus, RL, p. 58, par. 5.13).
Monsieur le Prksident, dans son premier kcrit déjà,Malte a indiqué que les
lignes de base droites à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeurde sa mer terri-
toriale- et donc calculée sa ligne médiane - joignent vingt-six points et que
ces lignes étaient illustréesur la crute no2 annexee au mkmoire (1,MM, p. 16,
par. 31-32). La Cour trouvera ces mêmeslignes reproduites sur la figure 11 de 410 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
notre dossier. Ces lignes, que la Libye connaissait donc, ont été notifiées à la
Libye en 1972 et ont étéutilisées en 1973 pour l'octroi des licences d'explora-
tion. La Libye a élevé certaines objections contre l'utilisation comme pointde
base du rocher de Filfla, comme l'a rappelémon ami, M. Mizzi (cf. ci-dessus,
RM. p. 10. par. II; RL, p. 35, note 1). L'ignorance dans laquelle la Libye se
plaint d'avoir été maintenueau sujet des lignes de base de Malte est d'autant
plus inattendue que la Libye a fait état de notre carteno2 dans ses propres écri-
@ tures (Il, CML, p. 35, par. 2.35).
Voilà, Monsieur le Prksident. pour le prétendu«mysttre» qui, à en croire la
Partie adverse, affecterait les points et lignes de base de Malte(1, ML, p. 13,
par. 1.11). Dea rnysttrew, iln'y en a certainement pas.
La tentative de ln Partie adverse de faire dériver le concept de geographie
côtière vers celui de longueurs côtitres s'effondre ainsi d'elle-même.La lon-
gueur des côtes est un dément de la configuration côtitre, parmi d'autres; elle
n'exprime pas à elle seule la configuration côtiére. Glisser de la proposition: les
droits de plateau continental sont engendrés par la géographie côtière,et leur
étendue dépendde la géographie côtièredes deux pays concernés. à la proposi-
tion: les droits de plateau continental sont engendrés par les longueurs côtieres,
et leur étendue dépenddes longueurs cbtieres des deux pays concernés, revien-
draità prétendre que. si un kilomètre de côtes de l'un des Etats engendre une
étendue donnéede plateau continental, dix kilomttres de côtes de l'autre Etat
engendrent une ttendue dix fois supérieure de plateau continental. Ce serait
faire des longueurs côtières une source directe du titre au plateau continental,
une source autonome de dtlimitation. ce 1 quoi se refuse la totalitéde la juris-
prudence, jusques et y compris le récent arrêtdu Golfe du Moine (C.I.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 323. par. 185. et p.334-335, par. 218),tout comme s'y refuse
la pratique des Etats.
J'en ai ainsi terminé, Monsieur le Président. Messieursles juges, avec la pre-
miérecomposante du principe de distance, c'est-3-dire le concept de côtes. Les
conclusions auxquelles je pense êtreparvenu sont 6videntes; elles le sont même
tellement que sans les extraordinaires théories libyennes je ne me serais pas cru
autorisé à développer devant la Cour de telles banalités. Le titre juridique au
plateau continental de Malte et de la Libye, appel6 à intervenir dans le proces-
sus de délimitation, ne se trouve ni dans les masses continentales situées der-
rière les côtes des deux pays, ni dans le caractére insulaire ou continental des
deux Etats, ni dans les longueurs de leurs côtes mesurees au cordeau. II se
trouve dans les côtes de Malte et de la Libye telles qu'elles sont exprimées dans
les lignes et points de base établis et retenus enconformit6 avec le droit inter-
national.
2. La adistance *
Monsieur le Président, nous venons de creuser le concept de «côtes», ou du
moins de I'evoquer; il nous reste tenter de mieux appréhender celui de <<dis-
tance par rapport aux côtes».
Ce qui me retiendra d'abord, dans le cadre de ces développements. c'est la
composante spatiale du principe de distance. c'est-à-dire le fait que l'extension
du titre de I'Etat côtier sur le plateau continental et l'étenduede ses droits vis-
à-vis dlEtats voisins se définissent par une certaine distance, mesurée ?ila sur-
face de la mer, par rapport aux lignes ou points de base représentatifsdes côtes.
L'existence et en tout cas la pertinence de ce concept pour notre affaire sont
contestées par la Partie adverse: je m'efforcerai donc d'établiret l'existence et
la pertinence de ce concept pour notre affaire la turniere du droit international PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 411
coutumier tel qu'il a trouvéexpression dans l'article 76 de la convention sur le
droit de la mer.
Après quoi, dans un second temps, je m'attacherai à la manière dont le prin-
cipe de distance, conçu comme un rapport de caractère spatial avec les côtes est
mis en Œuvre concrètement. Ce sera pour moi l'occasion d'évoquerle principe
et la technique de la projection radiale.
Le concept de distance et l'article 76, paragraphe 1, de la convention surle
droitde la mer de 1982
La position de la Libye ?il'égardde la règle expriméedans l'article 76, para-
graphe 1, de la convention sur le droit de la mer est complexe. Si je I'ai bien
comprise,elle peut se résumerdans les propositions suivantes:
Premièrement: la Libye semble admettre, comme je I'ai déjà indiqué,que le
concept de distance joue un rôle important en matière de zone économique
exclusive (II, CML, p. 101, par. 4.52). mais elle considère que la zone écono-
mique exclusive est étrangère à la présente affaire.Je me suis déjà expliqué sur
ce point.
Deuxièmement: en ce qui concerne spécifiquement le plateau continental, la
Libye ne paraît plus, dans le plus récent étatde sa pensée, mettre en doute,
comme elle le faisait dans le mémoire, la valeur coutumière de la regle qui a
trouvé son expression dans l'article 76, paragraphe 1, mais peut-êtred'autres
explications nous seront-elles fournies sur ce point dans quelques jours.
Troisièmement: en vue d'atteindre son objectif primordial, qui est de mettre
la présente délimitation à l'abri du principe de distance dans l'espoir de conser-
ver ses chances au prolongement naturel physique, la Libye érige une double
ligne de défense.
La Libye soutient d'abord que l'article 76, paragraphe 1, régit seulement la
base juridique du titre au plateau continental et la détermination de sa limite
extérieure, et qu'il n'intéresse pas la délimitation du plateau continental entre
Etats voisins. Cette négation de toute corrélation entre titre et délimitation
forme la ligne de défense rapprochée 6rigéepar la Libye dans l'espoir de pr6-
server la délimitation de toute contamination du principe de distance. J'üi kvo-
quéhier cette question des rapports enlre titre juridique et délimitation,etje n'y
reviendrai pas.
Mais, pour renforcer cette tentarivede prophylaxie, la Libye s'en prend, dans
un second volet de son argumentation, au principe de distance sur le plan du
entitlement lui-même.C'est là la ligne de défense éloignéed , ont l'objectif est
de stérilisersur le plan du titre juridique, la racine si j'ose dire, le principe de
distance tant redoute. Cette mise en question du principe de distance sur le plan
du titre juridique prend la forme d'une exégèse complexe et laborieuse du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 76, et c'est sur cet aspect précis de l'argumentation
libyenne que je voudrais m'arrêter ici.
L'article76, paragraphe 1,de la convention sur le droit de la mer de 1982
fait-il, ou ne fait-il pas, de la distance l'élément centraldu titre juridique au pla-
teau continental et le critere determinant de sa limite extérieure? Nous parlons
ici de titre vers le large et non pas de délimitation.
Pour apporter à cette question la réponse négative conforme à ses vues, la
Libye propose de lire cette disposition comme confirmant le principe tradition-
nel du prolongement naturel au sens géologiqueet géomorphologique du terme
en tant que critère «principal» du titre juridique au plateau continental (main.
primary, fundanrenraf.essential) voilà les mots qu'elle emploie - et c'est seu-
lement à ce titre <.subsidiaire» nu «secondaire » (suhsidiary, secondary) que,412 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
selon la Libye, l'article 76 ferait intervenir le critere spatial de la diàtpar-
tir des lignes de base (1, ML, p. 87-89, par. 6.18-6.20; II, CML, p. 98-99,
par. 4.47-4.48; ci-dessus, RL, p. 21, par. 3.07-3.08). Cette argumentation desti-
née, je lerépete, à dt?truireà la racine même. sur lepian éloignédu titre juri-
dique, le principe de distance se trouve exposke dans le mémoire, dans le
contre-mémoire et dans lareplique libyens.
A l'appui de cette interprétation minimisante du principe de distance dans
l'article76, la Libye croit pouvoir invoquer la genèse de cette disposition au
cours des travaux de la troisième conférence.A en croire la Libye, la troisième
conférence aurait cherchépar là iidonner une importance nouvelle et préémi-
nente au prolongement naturel, et c'est seulement à titre exceptionnel et margi-
nal, à contre-coeur eii quelque sorte, qu'elle aurait introduit la distance dans
notre disposition. Loin d'avoir étéaffaibli par l'article 76, le prolongement
naturel physique serait sorti renforcé des travaux de la conférence.Voila ce que
voudrait nous faire croire la Partie adverse1, ML, p. 89, par. 6.20).
Cette lecture de l'article 76 comme ayant insufflé au prolongement naturel
physique une sorte de seconde jeunesse ne manquera pas de surprendre. Les tra-
vaux de la conférence ne montrent-ils pas. tout au contraire, ainsi que je l'ai
rappelé, que la substitution, au critère physique des 200 mètres de profondeur,
d'une distance uniforme, indépendante des hasards des caractéristiques sous-
marines, a étéconçue par la conférence comme un facteur de correction des
inégalités, et que c'est seulementen vue de ne pas lt?ser les quelques Etats
pourvus par la nature d'une marge continentale particulièrement large que la
conférence a conserve - pour eux et eux seuls - le critère du prolongement
naturel? Critère ((fondamental*, «primaire>>,«essentiel», «principal», nous dit
fa Libye à propos du prolongement naturel. Mais comment la suivre si l'on
connaît le deroulement des travaux de la troisieme conférence et comment la
suivre alors que, precisément, la conférence n'a pas permis, même pour les
Etats à marge continentale large, au critère du prolongement naturel physique
de jouer à plein? Car les Etats à large marge continentale eux-mêmesne peu-
vent pas exercer leurs droits de plateau continentaljusqu'h la limite effective de
leur prolongement naturel physique; et chacun sait à quels difficiles dkbats a
donné lieu cette question à la conférence. Pas davantage ne saurait-on oublier
que cette limite assignée à l'épanouissement du prolongement naturel physique
dans toute sa plénitude, même pourles Etats ?imarge continentale large, a
consisté, précisément, à recourir, mêmedans ce cas, au crithrede ladistance -
puisque la suite de ce mêmearticle 76 arrête les droitsde plateau continental en
tout état de cause à350 milles marins des lignes de base ou à 100 milles marins
de l'isobathe des 2500 metres. Monsieur le Président, la \imite des 200 milles
n'a rien, mais vraiment rien de «subsidiaire» ou de «secondaire». Elle corres-
pond d'abord la situation la plus frequente,à la normale en quelque sorte.
Elle constitue ensuite la distance de référence par rapport à laquelle se définis-
sentà la fois l'extension des droits de plateau continental plus loin vers le large
dans certaines situations et la limite maximale de cette extension. La distance
est partout dans cette matière.
L'article76 énonceune règle en deux parties, sans ktablir de hikrarchie entre
une partie qui serait essentielle et une partie qui serait secondaire. Ces deux par-
ties sont de valeur égale et sont placées surle même plan.Jusqu'à 200 milles
des lignes de base, c'est la distance seule qui fonde le titre juridique de'Etat
côtier. Au-del%des 200 milles 1'Etatcôtier n'a de titre juridique sur les fonds
marins que dans la mesure où sa marge continentale au sens physique du terme
s'étendplus loin vers le large, mais mêmedans ce cas ses droits sont enfermés
dans des limites de ciiractérespatial. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 413
Dans le #néirant et riche rapport qu'il a présentéau colloque de Rouen déjB
cité de la Société françaisepour le droit international, mon ami et collègue
M. Quéneudec a évoqué ce qu'il a appel6 «la règle généraledes 200 millesri.
Cette r&gle,dit-il, a ét6établie par l'article 57 de la convention comme «un
maximum pour la zone économique» et par l'article 76 comme -un minimum
pour le plateau contioentalw. D'où il résulte quele plateau continental
.ne se présenteplus seulement comme une notion naturelle englobée dans
le concept géologique de amarge continentale*, il est également conçu par
le texte de la convention comme une notion artifirielle fondée sur itn cri-
tPrede dirtancem (op. cil.. p. 133-134). (Les italiques sont de moi.)
De critère «principal» et de critère «secondaire». M. Quéneudecne fait, hjuste
titre, aucune mention.
Dans l'espoir de prêterun semblant de plausibilité juridique à sa these de la
hiérarchie entre une disposition principale et une disposition subsidiaire (celle
sur la distance6tmt qualifiée de subsidiaire),la Libye appelle1 son aide la Cour
elle-même. A l'en croire, en effet, c'est cette thèse du caractére subsidiaire et
secondaire de la distance qui se trouverait confirmée par le paragraphe 47 de
l'arrêtTunisitlLibye auquel j'ai déjheu plusieurs fois me rdfkrer (II, CML,
p. 99, par. 4.48; ci-dessus, RL, p. 21, par. 3.07).
Que dit donc la Cour dans ce passage?
Elle commence par declarer que la définition du premier paragraphe de
l'article 76 «comprend deux parties, faisant appel à des critires différents..
Après quoi la Cour enonce:
«D'apiPs la première partie du paragraphe 1,c'est le prolongement natu-
rel du territoire terrestre qui est leitere principal. Dans la deuxième par-
tie du paragraphe. c'est la distance de 200 milles qui fonde dans certaines
circonstances le titre de 1'Etatcôtie».(C.IJ. Recltcil 1982, p. 48.)
La Libye souligne dans ses écritsle mot «principal» - #the main crirerion~
- et elle en déduit que. puisque le prolongement naturel est le wcritéreprinci-
palW. ladistance ne peut être que le critére secondaire.
Mais, Monsieur le Président, ce n'est pas du tout cela que la Cour a dit. La
Cour n'a pas déclaré: aD'aprés le premier paragraphe de l'article 76 [le pre-
mier paragraphe tout entier], c'est le prolongement naturel qui est le critére
principal.» La Cour n'a pas dit cela. La Cour a déclaré:«D'aprés la première
partie [c'est-à-dire lapremiére phrase] du paragraphe 1, c'est le prolongement
naturel ..qui est le critéreprincipal», c'est-&-dire lorsque la marge continentale
s'étendau-del&de 200 milles des lignes de base, ce qui est toutà fait différent.
II est évidentque dans le cas des Etats Amarge continentale large c'est le pro-
longement naturel qui constitue le critere principal. Mais de li?iétablirune hié-
rarchie à I'intbrieur du paragraphe 1, comme le fait la Libye, il y a un pas que
rien n'autoriseà franchir. La Cour n'a établiaucune hiérarchiede ce genre; elle
a parléde «deux parties, faisant appel h des critères différents*, sans dire en
aucune maniere que l'une des parties ou l'un des critères serait plus ufonda-
mental >>ou plus «primaire » que l'autre.
Une opinion individuelle dans la mêmeaffaire TunisielLibye fait observer que
%lecritérede distance ...doit êtreconsidéré comme cristallisantd'ores et déjà
une réglede droit international coutumier* (C,I.J.Recueil 1982, opinion indivi-
duelle de M. Jiménezde Aréchaga.p. 114. par. 52). De critére«secondaire» ou
«subsidiairen il n'est, dans cette opinion, pas davantage question.
La Libye ne peut decidernent pas espérer mobiliser la Cour au service de sa414 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
tentative de réduireB un rang mineur. subalterne, le principe de distance dans la
philosophie du plateau continental de l'article76.
Monsieur le Président,au terme de ces observations, le bilan est facileà dres-
ser.
Les efforts tous azimuts déployés par laLibye en vue de minimiser à tout prix
la présencede la distance dans la nouvelle conception - et, par voie de consé-
quence, dans la délimitation - du plateau continental. il ne reste rienLes faits
sont là, et les faits sont têtus.Le titre juridique au plateau continental repose
aujourd'hui essentieflement sur la corrklütion spatialeentre les côteel les fonds
marins adjacents iices côtes situés à une certaine distance de ces dernieres, et
l'étenduedes droits cleplateau continental de I'Etat côtier est dictéepar la conju-
gaison de la géographie côtière et de la distance par rapportàces côtes.
Le rapprocherneni du plateau continental et de la zone économiqueexclusive
revient à l'esprit, puisque la zone économique exclusive englobe les juridictions
et droits souverains de 1'Etatcôtier aussi bien sur les fonds marinset leur sous-
sol que sur la colonne d'eau et que les limites extérieures du plateau continental
et de la zone économique exclusive coïncideront dans la majorité des cas. ou
dans bien des cas en tout cas. On comprend que certains soient allés jusqu'h
évoquer l'absorption partielle (c'est-&-direen deçh de 200 milles marins des
lignes de base) du plateau continental et de la zone économique exclusive. On
lit ainsi dans une opinion jointeà l'arrêtde 1982:
«il est difficile de nier que, tout au moins pour le plateau continental ne
dépassant pas 200 milles, la notion mêmede plateau continental soit en
voie d'êtreassimilée ou intégree ii celle de zone économique exclusive»
(C.I.J. Recueil 1982, opinion individuelle de M. Jiménez de Aréchaga,
p. 115, par. 55; cf. ibid., opinion dissidente de M. Oda, p. 249, par. 146).
Dans le même espril, M. Quéneudec a observé, dans le rapport déji cité au
colloque de Rouen, que par le jeu de l'article 76
<<uncomplémeritest accordé forfaitairement à I'Etai côtier, de manière ii
faire coïncider la limite extérieurede son plateau continental et la limite de
la zone éconoinique exclusive qu'il est en droit d'instituer* (op. rit.,
p. 134).
Ce rapprochement entre la conception du plateau continental et celle de la
zone économique exclusive ne peut pas demeurer sans effet sur le plan de la
delimitation. Comme l'a dit une autre opinion en 1982:
«dans la nouvelle conception du plateau continental comme dans celle de
la zone économiqueexclusive. le critere de distance joue désormaisun rôle
déterminant dans la détermination de l'étenduedes zones respectives ...Le
crit5re de la distance ...est appelé à remplacer le prolongement naturel
comme critérede délimitation du plateau continental>>(C.I.J. Recueil 1982,
opinion dissidente de M. Oda. p. 257, par. 160, et p. 270. par. 182; cf.
p. 249, par. 146).
Ces observations prennent un relief particulier B la lumière d'un passage du
récent arrêdtu Goife du Maine:
«il est ..à prévoir [écritla Chambre] que, avec l'adoption progressive, par
la plupart des Etats maritimes, d'une zone économique exclusive et, par
conséquent. avec la géneralisation de la demande d'une délimitation
unique. ..la préférenceira désormais, inévitablement. àdes critéresse prê-
tant mieux, par leur caractère plus neutre, à une délimitation polyvalenten
(C.I.J. Recueil 1984. p. 327, par. 194). PLAIDOIR~ DEEM. WEIL 415
D'où la Chambre tire la double conséquence que le critère de base de la déli-
mitation doit êtrela géographie des côtes et que les méthodes destinées iile
mettre en application doivent être desméthodes géométriques (ihid., p. 327,
par. 195, et p. 329, par. 199). Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, je
pose la question: quel critére plus neutre, plus géométrique, pour mettreen
Œuvre le concept fondamental d'adjacence, peut-on imaginer que celui de la
distance àpartir des côtes?
II n'y a pas lieu ici d'examiner, et je ne m'aventurerai pas dans ce domaine,
le problème de savoir dans quelle mesure la délimitationdu plateau continental
et la délimitation de la zone économique exclusive doivent ou non coïncider.
C'est un autre problème. II s'agit dans notre affaire, nous sommes d'accord
avec la Partie adverse sur ce point, de la délimitation du plateau continental
entre Malte et la Libye, et de rien d'autre. La question de la zone économique
exclusive doit néanmoins,je l'ai déjà relevé, demeurer présente l'esprit.
Ayant ainsi ktabli le rôle du concept de distanceil me reste il m'interroger
sur sa mise en Œuvre concrète. C'est à cet aspect du problèmeque je souhaite-
rais consacrer la fin de mes développementsrelatifs au principe de distance.
Lo mise en aiivre d~rconceptde disrunce: la projection radiale à partir des
c~rt-s
La Libye reconnaît que la côte constitue (<lepoint de depart ...de l'exercice
de délimitation* (II, CML. p. 157. par.7.18). C'est effectivement, nous l'avons
vu, ce que décide une jurisprudence unanime, depuis l'arrêtsur le Plcireau
conriilenta1de laMer du Nord de 1969 jusqu'h l'arrêtde 1984 sur leGolfe du
Maine. Ce que la Libye omet toutefois de préciser, c'est que le titre de 1'Etat
côtier sur une certaine étenduede fonds marins tant vers le large que vis-à-vis
d'Etats voisins ne se trouve pas dans les côtes prises en elles-mêmes, maisdans
une corrélationentre ces côtes et les espaces mariiimes adjacents situés devant
elles.
Comment, en effet. les droits de 1'Etatcôtier vont-ils ttre déterminés concrè-
tement?
Lorsqu'il s'agit de definir les espaces maritimes dans l'absolu, c'est-&-dire
vers le large et sans avoir à tenir compte de l'existence d'un Etat voisin. le
meilleur moyen consiste àtracer des arcs de cercle de la distance voulue 3 par-
tir de pointde la côte. En ce qui concerne plus précisémentla limite extérieure
du plateau continental, on commencera donc en pratique par tracer des arcs de
cercle d'un rayon de 200 milles, puisque aucun droit de plateau continental
n'est aujourd'hui inférieurà 200 milles. Mais mêmepour les Etats à marge
continentale large. il sera nécessairde commencer par là, puisque l'extension
éventuelle de leur plateau au-delà ne pourra s'établir quepar référenceà cette
limite de 200 milles. De maniéreplus précise,on aura recours à la technique de
l'enveloppe des arcs de cercle, mise au point naguére pourla limite extérieure
de la mer territoriale et3 laquelle je me suis déjà référd(cf. ci-dessus, RM,
p. 47-50, par. 87-95). Cette technique, qui prend appui. je le rappelle, sur cer-
tains points représentatifsdes côtes, les points de base.rmet de concrétiserla
projection de la côte vers la mer adjacente dans toutes les directions; elle per-
met de créer cette «ceinture» dont la Cour a parlé ilpropos de la mer territo-
riale(C.I.J.Recueil 1951, p. 129) et qui se retrouve chaque fois qu'un espace se
définitou se mesure par une certaine distance à partir des côtes. Le mot de
ceceinture)),la Cour n'aura pas manqué de le noter, est particulierement appro-
prie dans le cas d'une île: un Etat insufaire, mêmepetit, situé au milieu de
l'océan,engendre une vaste ceinture de plateau continental grâceà la projection 4 16 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
radiale et multidirectionnellà partir des, points de base représentatifs de ses
côtes. C'est ce qui explique ce phénoménebien connu que des Etats insulaires
de dimension réduite puissent attirer un domaine maritime absolument hors de
proportion avec leur superficie terrestre. Nous avons cité dansnos écritures
l'exemple, que nous avons puisé dans l'ouvrage deM. Lucchini et de M. Voel-
ckel, Les Etars et la mer, de l'île de Nauru dont la superficie terrestre de
21 kilomètres carrés engendre une zonekconomique exclusive près de dix mille
fois plus étendue (ci-dessus,, p. 44, par. 78).
Dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine, M. Jaenicke, conseil du Canada, s'est
exprimé àce sujet dans les termes suivants:
«the coastal Stnte's jurisdiction extends into the sea without any predeter-
mined direction; it extends . . . "radial. . It rnay suffice here to cal1
attention to the situation of an isolated insular Coast in the ocean. Nobody
woutd deny, for example, the Hawaian islands a radial seaward projection
of theiroasts in al1directions.» (C.I.J.Mémoires, vol. VII46.)
Sur ce premier point, je pense, la Partie adverse ne nous apportera aucune
contradiction. Ceqii'elle nous objectera, je le devine, c'est que Malte prkcisk-
ment n'est pas située au milieu d'un vaste océan et qu'il ne s'agit pas dans
notre affaire de limites extérieures mais de délimitation.
Il est vrai que I;i situation respective de Malte et de la Libye ne permet
d'accorder à aucun des deux Etats cette «ceinture» -je reprends lemot de la
Cour - complète de 200 milles marins au moins de plateau continental à
laquelle conduirait l'application de la méthode des arcs de cercle tàpartir
des points de base appropriés de chacun d'eux. L'essence mêmede la délimita-
tion consiste, jel'ai noté, h amputer les droits de chacun des deux Etats de
manière équitable et raisonnable. choix de la méthode de délimitation n'est
en définitive rien d'autre que le choix de la méthode appropriée pour tracerce
que j'appellerai la ligne d'amputation, c'est-à-dire pour fixer la disàala-
quelle chacun des deux Etats devra accepter d'arrêter des projections qui, autre-
ment, auraient pu s'épanouir versle large jusqu'à une distance de milles au
moins.
Pour illustrer ces explications quelque peu abstraites, mais dictées finalement
par le bon sens, nous avons préparéune carte, que la Cour trouvera dans le dos-
@ sier qui lui a étéremis sous le numéro12 et àlaquelle je la prie, très respec-
tueusement, de bien vouloir se reporter quelques instants.
Sur cette carte nous avonstrace,à titre d'échantillonnage, en couleur rouge,
des arcs de cercle de00 milles marins Zipartir de deux points de base pris sur
les lignes de base droites de Malte,savoir les pointcm» et Mn». Si la Cour
@ veut bien se reporteàla figure 11, elle constatera que ce s18tdeux des trois
points de base qui contrôlent la ligne médiane du côté maltais.
Nous avons prockdéde même sur la figure 12, en couleur noire, à partir de
@ cinq points pris sur les côtes de la Libye,savoir les points «a>>,«c>>,eh»,
@ «in, et «j». Ce sont là, comme le montre à nouveau notre figure 11, cinq des
douze points de base qui contrôlent la ligne médiane du côté libyen.l s'agit
donc d'un échantillonnage destine éclairer mon raisonnement.
Si Malte n'avait en face d'elle que la mer, son plateau continental s'étendrait
au moins jusqu'à l'enveloppe de tous les arcs de cercle tracés surmodèle de
ceux qui figurent sur cette carte en rouge. Et si la Libye n'avait en face d'elle
que la mer, son plateau continental s'étendrait également au moins jusqu'à
l'enveloppe de tous les arcs de cercle tracés sur le modèle de ceux qui figurent
sur cette carte en noir.
Mais telle n'est évidemment pas la situation réelle.La situation réelle est que les projections maltaises et les projections libyennes se chevauchentàcertains
endroits et que, de ce chevauchement, naît la dcessite d'une délimitation et,
par conséquent,d'une diminution des droits de chacun. II faudra donc détermi-
ner une méthode permettantde stopper les deux projections avant que chacune
d'elles n'atteigne son plein épanouissementet de rkaliser cette amputation reci-
proque et mutuelle qui est l'essence même de l'exercicede délimitation.
On mesure, dans ces conditions, à quel point la théorie avancéepar la Libye
au sujet des côtes pertinentes dans la présente affaire est erronée.
La Libye soutient que seuls sont pertinents pour notre dklimitation les seg-
ments de la côte maltaise et les segments de la côte libyenne qui se font face
directement et sont rigoureusement parallèles,
En ce qui concerne la Libye - la Cour pourra suivre ce raisonnement sur la
@ figure 11 -, la Partie adverse ne reconnaît en conséquence de pertinence, pour
la délimitation avec Malte,qu'au segment de la côte entre Ras Ajdir et Ras Zar-
rouq. Le reste de la côte libyenne,à l'est de Ras Zarrouq, est prksentécomme
étranger à la délimitation avec Malte, puisque faisant face non pas aux côtes
maltaises, mais aux côtes d'Etats tiers, plus précisémentaux côtes italiennes et
grecques. Les côtes pertinentes libyennes, selon la Libye, s'arrêtent ici.
En ce qui concerne Malte, seuls sont pertinents, d'après la Libye, les seg-
ments de la côte maltaise qui font face directement à la côte libyenne, c'est-
à-dire les segments orientés plein sud. Les autres segments de la côte maltaise,
non orientés pleinsud face 2ila Lihye, sont déclarésétrangers à la délimitation
avec la Libye. Etmt donné le fameux «tild» de Malte, nous affirme-t-on,
«seules de petites longueurs des îles maltaises peuvent être regardées comme
faisant face directementà la Libye* (ci-dessus, RL, p. 78, par. 6.06). 11s'agit,
est-il précisé dans les6critures libyennes, du segment de la côte de I'ile de Malte
@ entre Delimara Point etRas il-Qaws - que la Cour trouvera sur la figure 1-
d'une part, et «peutCtre» (nous dit.-on)du segment de la côte de l'île de Gozo
entre Ras in-Newwiela et Ras il-Wardija, d'autre part. Si l'on se réière,dit la
Libye, aux lignes de base droites de Malte, et non plus aux côtes rkelles, le seg-
ment pertinent se rkduità la ligne joignant Delimara Poinà Fiifla, car de Filfla
à Ras il-Wardija la ligne de base «ne fait facà aucune côte libyenne mais fait
face aux îles italiennes àtla côte de Tunisie>,(11,CML, p. 35, par. 2.35).
Pour justifier cette thèse. la Libyt: s'appuie sur un passage de l'arrêtde 1982
sur lequel je reviendrai'dans un instant.
Telle est la théorie présentée parla Libye (1, ML, p. 156-157, par. 10.08-
10.11; II, p. 34-35, par. 2.33-2.35; p39, par. 2.43-2.44; ci-dessus, RL, p. 78,
par.6.06-6.07).
L'audience, suspendue tiII h 17, est repriseà II h 35
Monsieur le Président,j'ai fait état toàtl'heurede la thèse libyenne relative
aux côtes pertinentes, th& selon laquelle seules sont pertinentes pour notre
délimitation: ducôtb libyen les côtes de Ras Ajdir à Ras Zarrouk, et du côté
maltais les petits segments de côtes qui font face au sud surle de Malte et sur
l'île de Gozo ou, si l'on prend les lignes de base droites, la ligne de Delimara
Point h Filfia.
Cette thkorie, Monsieur le Président, reposesur de graves confusions.
Il est de principe que la dklimitation doit, pour reprendre les termes bien
connus de la sentence arbitrale franco-britannique, être «en rapport avec les
côtes des Parties qui bordent effectivement [acrually abutting on] le plateau
continental* de la région encause (par.24). Le concept de «plateau continental
que bordent effectivement les côtes des Parties* n'a de toute évidence rien à 418 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
voiravec la questionde savoisri sur tel ou tel segment les côtes des Parties se
font face ou non. La notion de côtes se faisant face est en relation avec celle de
c6tes adjacentes, et les deux notions de côtes se faisant face et de côtes adja-
centes ne se situent pas sur le mêmeplan que la notion decôtes qui bordent le
plateau à délimiterNi la Cour dans aucune des affaires dont elle a étésaisie ni
Ie tribunal franco-britannique n'ont jamais découpe les côtes en présence pour
ne retenir comme pertinents que les seuls segments des deux côtes qui se font
directement face. Dans l'affaire du Goif.. du Maine, pour m'en tenir à cet
exemple récent, la Chambre n'a relevt! de «quasi-parallélisme», de «parallé-
lisme presque parfait», entre des segments de la côte des Etats-Unis et des seg-
ments de la côte du Canada, que dans une seule des trois parties composante
qu'elle a appeléI'naire de délimitation», c'est-à-dire, selon sa définition, «la
zone géographique directement concernéepar cette delimitation)) (C.IRecueil
1984, p. 268, par. 28). Il s'agit des segments où les côtes du Massachusetts et
de la Nouvelle-Ecosse se font face et se situent dans un «rapport d'opposition
frontalen (par. 32, 189, 206, 216). Mais la Chambre n'a pas refusé pour autant
de considérer comme «directement concernées par la délimitation» les autres
parties del'«aire de délimitation», celles dans lesquelles les côtes américaines
et canadiennes ne présententplus aucun&lémentde parallélisme.
Le «tilt» des îles maltais-s qui, selon la Libye, empêcheraitla quasi-tota-
lit6 des côtes maltaises de faire face aux côtes libye-nen'a en conséquence
rienà voir avec notre problème. Ce n'est pas parce que le segment de la ligne
de base droite de Malte entre Filfla et Ras il-Wardija est orienté vers le sud-
@ ouest plutôt que vers le sud, comme il apparaîà la figure II de notre dossier,
que ce segment ne pourrait se projeter que dans la seule direction sud-ouest
@ illustrée parles fleches sur la carte 2 du contre-memoire libEtnce n'est pas
non plus parce qu'elle est orientée vers l'est-sud-est plutôt que vers le sud que
la côte maltaise au nord de Delimara Point devrait être récus.our les mêmes
raisons, ce n'est pas parce que la côte libyenne'est de Ras Zarrouk n'est pas
orientée plein nord. face directement Malte, qu'elle ne serait pas pertinente
pour la délimitationentrea Libye et Malte: dans la mesure où les projectioàs
partir de points pris sur cette côte chevauchent des projections maltaises, cette
côte à l'est de Ras Zarrouk est au contraire directement pertinente tout autant
que celle située l'ouest de Ras Zarrouk. Or un coup d'Œil sur la carte figurant
@ sur notre figure 12 permet de constater que des projections issues de certains
points dela côte libyenne Bl'est de Ras Zarrouk chevauchent des projections
effectuées?ipartir de points maltais.
La confusion commise par la Partie adverse a une racine profonde. La Libye
ne conçoit pas les projections maritimes comme s'étendant radialement dans
toutes les directions, mais comme s'effectuant frontalement dans le sens et
uniquement dans le sens - de l'orientation de chaque segment de côte, autre-
ment dit perpendiculairementà la direction généralede chaque segment. Entre
Ras Ajdir et Ras Zarrouk, la côte libyenne se projetterai frontalement vers le
nord, et seulement vers le nord, rencontrant ainsi les projections maltaises
l'ouest du méridiende 16", mais pasà l'est de celui-ci. Au-delà de Ras Zarrouk
la côte libyenne se projetterait également vers le nord, et seulement vers le
nord, ne rencontrant ainsi aucune projection maltaise. Quant aux côtes mal-
taises, elles ne sauraient,n croire la Libye. que se projeter vers le àupar-
tir des rares segments des côtes (ou des lignes de base) de Malte orientks plein
@ sud, et qui apparaissent sur la figu11 de notre dossier, et seules ces projec-
tions-là seraient capables de rencontrer des projections libyennesrovenance
du segment de la côte libyenne compris entre larontikre tunisienne et Ras Zar-
rouk; les autres segments des côtes de Malte se projetteraient dans d'autres PLAIDOIKIE DE M. WEIL 419
directions et ne seraient donc pas pertinents pour la délimitation entre Malte et
la Libye.
En d'autres termes, c'est chaque Soisdans le sens de la perpendiculaire à la
direction généraledu segment de côte considéré,et dans ce sens seulement, que
se réaliseraitla projection dudit segment.
Mais, Monsieur le Président,ce n'est pas ainsi que les choses se présentent.
Toutes les côtes libyennes, quelle qiie soit leiir orientation, et qu'elles soieàt
l'est ou ?i l'ouest de Ras Zarrouk, se projettent en mer dans toutes les direc-
tions, et pas seulement frontalement ou perpendiculairement; et toutes les côtes
maltaises font de même. Lescôtes iiprendre en considération sont celles dont
les projections se rencontrent et se chevauchent, appelant par là mêmeune déli-
mitation, c'est-à-dire une amputation. une diminution. C'est cela très exacte-
ment que dit le passage de l'arrêtde 1982 invoqué parla Libye. Je me permets
de le relire ici, tant il est important et clair:
«pour délimiter le plateau entre les Parties, il n'y a pas à tenir compte de
la totalitédes côtes de chacune d'elles; tout segment du littoral d'une Par-
tie dont, en raison de sa situation g6ographique, le prolongement ne
pourrait rencontrer celui du litroral de l'autre Partie està écarter... Les
cartes mettent en évidence, sur la côte de chacune des deux Parties, I'exis-
tence d'un point au-delà duquel ladite côte ne peut plus avoir de lien avec
les côtes de l'autre Partie aux finsde la délimitationdes fonds marins. Au-
delà de ce point, les fonds marins au large de la côte ne peuvent donc pas
constituer une zone de chevauchement des extensions du territoire des deux
Parties et,de ce fait, n'ont aucun rôle àjouer dans la dklimitation.)) (C.I.J.
Recueil 1982, p. 61-62, par. 75.)
L'expression «zone de chevauchement» des projections des deux côtes, il
n'est pas sans intérêtde le noter, se trouvait déjà utiliséedans l'arrêtde 1969
(on overlapping ofrhe areas) (C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 52, par. 99), et elle appa-
raîtà de nombreuses reprises dans l'arrêtde la Chambre dans l'affaire du Golfe
du Maine (par exemple, par. 115, 195, 209). Le concept de zone de chevauche-
ment peut ainsi êtreregard6 comme une constante de la jurisprudence. II existe
ainsi, on le constate, un lien étroit entre les concepts de projection radiale, de
côtes pertinentes,de zones de chevauchement et de délimitation.
Dans l'affaire du Cnljë du Maine les Etats-Unis avaient illustré leur concep-
tion de la projection maritime par une carte (mémoire des Etats-Unis, figure 31
- C.I.J.Mémoires, vol. VIII, carte 37). Pour mettre en évidence l'erreur qui
était à la racine de cette conception de la projection frontale, le Canada avait
établiun croquis sur lequel apparaissaient les conséquencesd'une telle approche
dans le cas d'un Etat insulaire, indépendamment de tout problème de délimi-
tation (contre-mémoire du Canada, carte 41A - C.I.J. Mémoires,vol. VIII.
carte 70); la carte américaine et le croquis canadien figurent dans notre dossier
sous les numéros 14 et 15. Au cours de la procédure orale l'un des conseils
du Canada, M. Jaenicke, avait illustré la conception des Etats-Unis à l'aide
d'une carte que nous avons reproduite dans notre dossier sous Je numéro 18;
et il avait opposé à cette carte deux autres ',illustrant la projection radiale; ces
deux cartes, présentées par M. Jaenicke pour illustrer la projection radiale et
combattre la projection frontale ou perpendiculaire, sont reproduites dans
notre dossier sous les numéros 16 el 17. Dans son arrêtla Chambre a prockdé
à la delimitation du secteur intérieurdu golfe du Maine sur la base d'une ~divi-
] Voir C.I.J.MPmoires, DPlimirurion de la frontière maritime dans la régiondu Co&
du Maine, vol.VIII,cartes 240, 241 et 242[Nore du Greffe.] 420 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
sion ..de la zone de chevauchement crééepar la superposition latéraledes pro-
jections maritimes des deux Etatsn (C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 331-332, par. 209).
Elle a ainsi implicitement rejeté la conception de la projection frontale et per-
pendiculaire des &tes américaines du fond du golfe préconisée par les Etats-
Unis, au profit de la conception canadienne de la projection radiale etrnnidi-
rectionnelle.
Si je me suis permis de me référer B ce précédent, c'est parce qu'ilpermet
une comparaison qui ne manque pas d'intérêd tans notre affaire.
La projection de Malte, pas plus que celle des Etats-Unis dans l'affaire précé-
dente, ne s'effectue frontalement du nord au sud, perpendiculairement au seg-
ment de la côte maltaise orientee plein sud et en direction des segments de la
côte libyenne orienttie plein nord. La côte maltaise engendre des extensions
maritimes dans toutes les directions, et un problème de dklimitation surgit
chaque fois que des extensions de Malte rencontrent l'extension de la côte d'un
autre Etat:la libye dans certains cas, la Tunisie ou I'ltalie dans d'autres.
La tentative libyenne de concevoir la présente affairecomme celle d'une déli-
mitation frontale entre les seuls segments de la côte maltaise orientésplein sud
et le seul segment de la côte libyenne orienté plein nord face iiMalte s'ex-
plique, je le suppose du moins, par une préoccupationde caractkre tactique et
de portée lointaine.II s'agit sans doute pour la Libye de confiner ladelimita-
tion entre elle et Malteà la zone situéeà l'ouest du méridiende 16", c'est-
à-dire, approximativement à la hauteur de Ras Zarrouq et de la zone des escar-
pements. Les cartes sur lesquelles la Libye illustre sa revendication sont
@ significariveà cetégard. Je pense par exemple à la carte 17du iiidiiioilz libyen
28 29 30 OU aux cartes 11. 12 et 13 de la répliquelibyenne; cette derniere est reproduite
'O0 sur la carte 13 de notre dossier. La vision que la Libye cherchA accr6diter. la
manière dont elle souhaiterait que la Cour conçoive lerobleme ressortent clai-
rement de ces cartes. Comme la Cour le constatera, ces cartes arrêtentla reven-
dication de la délimitation la hauteur du méridiende 16O.La delimitation pro-
posée par la Libye ne tient pas compte de la côte libyenne à l'est de Ras
Zarrouq, bien que la projection de certains points de cette côte- les points
« iHet «j » - se chevauche avec les projections de la côte maltaise, ainsi qu'il
@ apparaît clairement sur notre figure 12. La délimitation proposée par la Libye
ne tient pas compte non plus du fait - qui saute aux yeux sur cette même
figure 12 - que la projection de tous les points maltais s'effectue bien au-delà
du seizièmedegré delongitude, auquel la Libye prétendla bloquer.
Monsieur le Prksident, Messieurs les juges, Malte ne saurait accepter que le
problème soumis la Cour soit ainsimput6 d'une partie importante de sa subs-
tance. De l'avis de Malte, la mission de la Cour est de répondreaux questions
poséesdans le compromis sur toute l'étenduede la zone de chevauchement des
projections des côtes des deux Parties. Cette zone de chevauchement s'étend
largement à l'est du méridiende 16"de longitude. Malte nesaurait accepter que
sous le couvert d'une définition arbitrairement réduitedes côtes pertinentes et
de l'aire de délimitation,l lui soit infligéune mutilation injustifiéede ses droits
de plateau continental en direction de l'est.
L'objectif libyen apparaît ainsi une fois de plus en pleine lumière: réduirele
plateau continental de Malte$ la quasi-insignifiance.
La Cour apportera à cette prétention, nousen sommes confiants, la rkponse
qu'elle mérite.
Les observations que je viens de présenter conduisentà une autre constatation
encore :la longueur de chacune des côtes mesurée en kilomktres n'a rieniivoir
avec la creation d'une zone de chevauchement et la nécessitkd'une délimita-
tion. C'est la configuration des côtes, dont la longueur ne constitue qu'un16- PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 421
ment parmi d'autres, qui crée les points de base aussi bien sur la longue côte
libyenne que sur la petite côte maltaise, points de base d'où partent les projec-
tions utiles engendrant les zones de chevauchement, et non pas leur longueur en
tant que telle eter se.
J'en ai ainsi terminé, Monsieur le Président, de ces longs développemenrs
relatifs au principe de distance.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les juges, l'analyse des thèmes autour des-
quels se cristallisent les diffkrences majeures séparant les Parties ne saurait être
complète sans que soit abordé ce qui constitue sans nul doute l'une des ques-
tions les plus disputéesdans noire affaire:je veux parler, la Cour l'aura deviné,
de la question de l'équidistance.
Une remarque préliminaire,d'abord.
Dans le chapitre introductif, et puià nouveau dans le dernier paragraphe du
chapitre de conclusion de sa réplique,la Libye écrit que c'est I'«insistance» de
Malte en faveur d'une délimitation fondke sur I'équidistance qui constitue le
principal obstacle à une solution équitable (ci-dessus. RL.p. 3, par. 8. et p. 99,
par. 8.17).
Bien sûr, Monsieur le Président, si Malte ne réclamaitpas une ligne médiane
et s'inclinait devant la revendication libyenne, le différend serait réglé. Com-
ment la Libye réagirait-ellesi nous venions dire a la Cour que c'est l'insistance
mise par la Libye à réclamerune frcintiérele long de la RifrZone qui entretient
le conflit et met obstacle3 une solution équitable?
Si j'ai soulevé cette question. en soi mineure, c'est parce qu'elle illustre le
manque de mesure et de modération qui caractérise la maniéredont la Partie
adverse aborde le problémede I'équidistance.Dès qu'il est question de I'équi-
distance, les écritsadverses quittent le ton de la critique sereine pour se réfugier
dans le proces d'intention.
C'est en effetcontre une thèse maltaise imaginaire - taillke sur mesure pour
faciliter la critiqu- que la Libye ménel'attaque. Nous sommes accusés bien
sûr, d'ériger l'équidistance en «principe absolu» et d'y voir une règle de
acaractere obligatoire*. Mais nous sommes accusés surtout de regarder I'équi-
distance comme «syntinyme de resultat equitable*, ce qui nous permettrait,à en
croire la Libye, de demander à la Cour une délimitation équidistante surla foi
de la seule «vertu abstraite» de cette méthodeet sans nous êtreassurésau préa-
lable de l'équité de cette délimitationau regard des circonstances concrètes de
l'affaire; bref, par notre <iadhésiondogmatique» à I'équidistance nous cherche-
rions à acontourner les faits»,& nous évaderen quelque sorte des donnéess@-
cifiques de la situation (II. CML, p. 102, par. 5.01; p. 103, par. 5.05; p. 104,
par. 5.09; p. 107, pu. 5.18; p. 112, par. 5.33; ci-dessus, RL. p. 25, par. 3.17;
p. 33, par. 4.01; p. 48, par. 4.43; p50. par. 4.50; p. 53, par.4.55-4.56; p. 55.
par. 5.05; p. 95-96. par. 8.07;p.97, par. 8.10-8.12).
Tout ceci, nous l'avons déjàsoulignt5, mais il me faut le répéter, dénature
complètement notre pensée (ci-dessus, RM. p. 53, par. 101). Nous n'ignorons
rien de l'évolutiondu droit internationalà ce sujet. Nous savons que l'évolution
qui a conduit de l'article 6 de la convention de 1958 à l'article 83 de celle de
1982 reflète, comme i'a relevé un membre de la Cour dans l'affaire
TunisielLib unee,certaine tendance à diminuer dans le cadre conventionnel
(tone down) le rôle de I'tquidistancç (C.I.JRecueil 1982, opinion individuelle
de M. Jiménez de Aréchaga. p. 109, par. 35). Nous ne considkrons pas que422 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
I'équidistance constitueen elle-mêmela méthodede délimitation«imposée par
le droit*. et nous ne regiudons pas I'équidistancecomme ((synonyme de résul-
tat équitable». Nous sommes pleinement conscients. faut-il le redire, pour
reprendre les termes de l'arrêtsur leGolfe d~rMaine, que l'équidistance«n'est
pas ... devenue une règle du droit international, une norme découlant logique-
ment d'un principe juridiquement obligatoire du droit international coutumier»
(C.I.J.Recrieil1964, p. 297. par. 107). L'analyse que nous avons proposéedu
processus de délimitation est dépourvue.je l'espère, de toute ambiguïté: c'est
seulement en tant que point de départprovisoire que la prise en considération
de I'équidistance s'imposeen vertu du titre juridique au plateau continental. Il
n'y a pas synonyn~ieentre équidistance et solution équitable,et la délimitation
définitivene sera équidistanteque dans la mesure où I'équidistance apparaîtra,à
la lurnikre des circonstances concrétes de l'affaire. comme conduisant à un
résultat équitableet raisonnable. J'espère que cela mettra fin à ce proces
d'intention.
Je voudrais, avec votre permission, Monsieur le Prksident. m'arrêterquelques
instants sur I'équidistancecomme point de départde l'opérationde délimitation.
Aprésquoi je me propose d'examiner les rapports entre kquidistance et équité
tant sur un plan généralqu'au regard des données spécifiques de la présente
affaire.
L'équidistance commp eointde départde l'opérutionde délimitation
Comme j'espéreêtreparvenu à en faire la démonstration, l'opérationde déli-
mitation ne peut pas se réduire (I la détermination d'une frontière équitable
en partant des seules circonstances de fait de la situation. moins d'envisager
une décision ex aequo et hono. I'équitene peut pas s'apprécier dans le vide;
l'équité doitse verifier par rappon 2 une ligne donnée,fondée surun élément
objectif, en rapport avec le concept juridique de plateau continental. est indis-
pensable, si je puis me permettre cette expression. de commencer par quelque
chose, autrement (lit de disposer d'un point d'amarrage quiempêchel'opération
de délimitationde dériver versle subjectif et l'arbitraire.
C'est cela, et rien d'autre. que nous avons voulu exprimer en parlant de
«point de départ»,de «premier pas» ou de (<délimitationprimaire».
De l'avis de Malte, la méthode appropriée pour servirde méthode de réfé-
rence est celle de I'équidistance.De toutes les méthodes.c'est celle qui permet
le mieux d'intégrerles deux composantes du titre juridique de 1'Etatsur le pla-
teau continental. h savoir tes côtes et la distance. De toutes les méthodesc'est
celle qui répondle mieux aux impkratifs de «neutralité» et de «géométrie>q >ui
- l'arrêtdu Golfe dir Maine vient de le souligner- caractérisentde plus en
plus les d6limitations maritimes dans le droit de la mer contemporain (C.LJ.
Recueil 1984, p. 327. par. 194. et p. 329. par. 199).
«Le choix de Iü méthode à utiliser est essentiellement fonction de la géogra-
phie>>;la méthode a retenir doitse prêterA êtreutiliste «sur la toile de fond de
la géographiem.a déclaréla Chambre dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine, en pré-
cisant que <<pargeographie, il faut entendre...essentiellement la géographiedes
côtes» (ibid.p. 301. par. 119; p. 327, par. 195.et p. 333-334, par.216). Com-
ment douter que la méthodede I'équidistance - qu'elle conduise à une ligne
d'équidistance latérale ou B une ligne médiane entrecôtes se faisant face -
réponde pleinement2icette exigence? La nature mêmede cette méthodela fait
reposer sur la configuration côtihre. II s'agit, comme la Cour l'a indique en
1982 dans les tennes les plus clairs, d'une méthode«où la ligne de délimitation
est directement fonction de points sur les côtes en cause» (C.I.J.Recueil 1982, PLAIDClIRIEDE M. WEIL 423
p. 62, par. 76) et qui, dit toujours la Cour, «a l'avantage - peut-êtreaussi
l'inconvénient- de reproduire presque toutes les irrégularités des côtes prises
comme base » (ihid., p. 88, par. 126).
11est difficile, dans ces conditions, de comprendre l'argument libyen selon
lequel la méthode et I'équidistance ne serait pas susceptible, par sa nature
même derefléter la géographie côtiere (ci-dessus, RL, p. 152, par. 7.04). S'il
est un mérite que tous s'accordent à reconnaître h I'équidistance, c'est bien
celui de refléterles côtes enprbsence.
IJ est exact en revanche que la méthodede I'équidistance ne reflète pas les
circonstances de caractère non géographique, tellesla géologieet la géomorpho-
logie des fonds marins ou la conduite des Parties, et qu'elle ne tient pas compte
de la superficie relative des deux Etrits et de la longueur comparée de leurs
côtes (1, ML, p. 53, par. 4.24; p. 124, par. 7.11: II. CML, p. 23, par. 2.04;
p. 151-152, par. 7.04-7.05).
Mais ce fiait, invoqué par la Libye, ne saurait disqualifier I'équidistance
comme méthode de premier pas, puisqu'elle reflète la configuration des côtes,
et que c'est la configuration des côtes qui, selon la jurisprudence, est le seul
facteur qu'il faille mettre en rapportavec la distance pour établir le titre juri-
dique de I'Etat au plateau continental avant de procéder à la vérification du
résultat. méthode purement cartographique», s'écrie la Libye pour critiquer
I'équidistance. Mais c'est là, très précisément,la raison pour laquelle cette
méthode «géométrique., dont l'utilisation se déroule«sur la toile de fond de la
géographie», exprime le fondement juridique du titre des Etats côtiers au pla-
teau continental. La Libye ne s'est-elle pas rendue compte qu'en proférant ce
qui est à ses yeux une accusation, elle décernait à la méthodede I'équidistance
ses lettres de noblesse?
J'espère ainsi avoir établique la méthodede I'équidistanceintègre la compo-
sante côtière du fondement juridique du titre au plateau continental. Incorpore-
t-elle également la composante spatiale de ce principe? Là encore, la réponse
affirmative me paraît hors de doute.
Par définition même,est-il nécessairede le répéter?la méthodede I'équidis-
tance consiste à tracer une ligne dont chaque point est à égale distance des
points les plus proches sur les lignes de base de la mer territoriale des deux
pays. Lorsque les espaces sous-marins sur lesquels les deux pays ont un titre
juridique se chevauchent, faute de distance suffisante entre les deux côtes, la
méthode de I'équidistanceampute la projection potentielle de chacun des deux
Etats d'une distance identique et permet ainsià chacun des deux Etats d'exercer
ses droits de plateau continental IIune aussi grande distance de sa côte que
I'auiorise le respect des droits d'égale valeurde I'aut~eEtat. Du mêmecoup se
trouvent sauvegardés le principe du non-empiétement et celui de l'égalitédes
Etats.
Tel est, en tout cas, l'avantage que l'on peut attendre de la méthodeprima
facie. Car il est évidemment possible que, dans certains cas particuliers, le
résultat apparaisse inéquitable: une particularité mineure peut, par exemple,
faire dévier la ligne à une trop grande proximité de l'une des côtes; d'autres
facteurs propres L la situation concrète de l'espèce peuvent également conduire
à ne pas considérerle résultatcomine raisonnable. Mais c'est là, précisément,le
rôle assigné A la seconde phase de l'opération, à savoir la vérification de
l'équité di1 résultat, suivie le cas échéantdes corrections nécessaires. Bquidis-
tance n'est pas forcémentsynonyme d'équité; et ce dontil est question, pour le
moment, ce n'est rien de plus que de prendre la ligne d'équidistance en consi-
dération provisoirement, h titre de premier pas, parce qu'elle intègre le double
paramètre de «côtes a et de «distance., et qu'elle reflète le fondement juridique424 PLATEAUCONTINENTAL
du titre au plateau continental. On ne saurait nier, me semble-t-il, que I'appari-
tion du principe de distance comme fondement principal du titre juridique de
1'Etat côtier au plateau continental confere un intérêt nouveaà 13t?quidistance
en tant que méthode de délimitationà envisager comme point de départ.
L'équidistance refl2te ainsi le binôme côtesfdistance: cette raison d'ordre
purement juridique serait peut-être suffisante pour exiger que ce soit la ligne
d'équidistancequi constitue le point deépart du processus de délimitation.
A cette première raison s'en ajoute une autre, qui milite dans le même sens:
l'extrême simplicitéet commoditéde cette méthode, qu'admet d'ailleurs la Par-
tie adverw (LiC ,ML, p. 135, note 1).On peut dire de la méthodede I'dquidis-
tance ce que Boggs disait de celle des enveloppes des arcs de cercle: elle est
d'un maniement aussi facile que celle du papierde tournesol pour determiner si
une solution est acideou alcaline (AJIL, vol. 45,1951, p.248). «Aucune autre
méthode de délimitation, a dédaréla Cour elle-même,ne combine au m&me
degréles avantages de la commodit6 pratique et de la certitude dans l'applica-
tion. ~on «emploi, a-telle ajoute,est indiqué dans un très grand nombre de
cas» (C.I.J.Recueil 1969, p. 23, par. 22-23). Le tribunal franco-britannique a
notéque le bien-fondéde cette observation de la Cour
«est certainement confirmé par la pratique des Etats; celle-ci montre que
jusqu'à ce jour un nombre considkrable de délimitationsde plateaux conti-
nentaux ont .éteffectuéespar l'application soit de la methode de I'équidis-
tance, soit, assez fréquemment, par quelque variante de cette méthode*
(sentence arbitrale, par. 85).
ta Chambre de la Cour vient également de relever la simplicité^ de cette
méthode (C.LJ. Recueil 1984, p. 327, par. 195),qui, a-t-elle précisé,a rendu
ades services indéniables par son application dans bien des situations
concrètes» (p. 297, par. 107). Les explications fournieà la Cour par mon ami
Elihu Lauterpacht corroborent pleinement ces vues. Mais alors. Monsieur le
Président,je me permets de poser une question: si l'emploi de l'équidistance
apparaît si souvent *indiqué» pour le rksultat définitif, ne l'est-il a fortiori
lorsqu'il s'agit seulemende déterminer une ligne de référence appelée à subir
l'épreuvedu contrôle de l'équité?
Ces deux raisonsmajeures de prendre 116quidistancecomme point de ddpart,
àsavoir sa relation avec le binôme côtes/distance et sa simplicité etcommodite
d'emploi, se prolongent par une troisième considération,mise en lumikre par
l'arrêt duGoIfe du Maine. Au sujet de la méthode consistantà diviser par parts
égalesles zones de convergence et de chevauchement des projections maritimes
des deux Etats, l'arrêtsur le Golfe du Maine déclare que son «équitk est de
Longue date considérée commeun caractére rejoignant la simplicité>>(C.I.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 327, par. 195); cette méthode, poursuit l'arrêmet en Œuvre
un %critère dont le caractkre équitable est inhdrent iison simple énoncé*
(p. 328, par. 197) et peut êtretenue pour équitable «de prime abord au moins*
(p. 300, par. 115). c'est-à-diltitre de point de départ.
On comprend, dans ces conditions, que lorsque deux gouvernements cher-
chent à se delimiter par ta voie conventionnelle, ils commencent presque tou-
jours par envisagerune ligne d'équidistance, soit pour la retenir définitivement,
soit pour l'ajuster ou mêmeIvecarterà Ia fin du processus. De cette pratique de
la négociation, les témoignages lesplus autorisésne manquent pas.
En 1958 déjà,au cours de ta Confdrence de Genève, le Commander Kennedy
avait indique que. mêmes'il existe dans une situation donnéedes circonstances
spéciales justifiant une ligne autre que I'kquidistance, la Iignemkdiane «consti-
tuerait, mêmealors, le meilleur point de départ pourdes n6gociations» (would PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 425
still provide the best starring poinr for negotiations) (PremiPre conférence des
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Documents officiels, vol. VI, p. 112: trad.
angl., p. 93).
Plus significative que cette prise de position intervenue dans le contexte juri-
dique de la règle équidistance-circcinstancesspéciales dela convention de 1958
est l'analyse faite récemmentde la pratique française par M. Guillaume: cette
analyse est d'autant plus précieuse que, selon les indications de l'auteur -
orièvre en la rnatiere. s'il en es--, la France cherche à négocier avec ses par-
tenaires, sauf exceptions particulières, des délimitations fondées surle droit, et
non pas seulement sur des raisons d'opportunitt, politiques ou autres. Et que
nous dit M. Guillaume? Je lis:
«La méthode de l'équidistance doit toujours constituer un point de
départ dans la recherche de I'kquité ...Elle constitue un excellent point de
départ permettant de tracer une première délimitation objective grhce à
laquelle les négociations pourront partir d'un élément concret.,)(Op. cit.,
p. 281-282.)
Ce qui n'empêche pas,bien slir,hl. Guillaume de noter que dans certains cas
l'équidistance s'avérera inéquitable eqtu'il conviendra donc de Ia comger ou
de l'&carter.
Ce témoignage du directeur des affaires juridiques du ministère français des
relations extérieures est d'autant plus intéressant,me semble-t-il, que la France
a fait partieà la troisiémeconférencede ce qu'un membre de la Cour a appelé
le «courant de pensée» (school of rhought) des (<principes équitables» par
opposition à celui de l'équidistancr:, etqu'elle a figuréparmi les Etats qui ont
proposéau groupe de travail no7 le texte dit NG 7/10, auquel la Libye se rétère
dans ses écritures (II, CML, p. 111, note 1, et annexe documentaire no 33) (cf.
C.LJ. Recueil 1982. opinion dissidente de M. Oda, p. 223-224).
Ce qui est vrai des délimitations conventionnelles l'est tout autant des délimi-
tations par voie judiciaire ou arbitrale.
Dans l'arrêtde 1969, on litque:
«la Cour doit rechercher comment une délimitationde plateau continental
peut &treassurée lorsque le principe de l'équidistancene donne ...pas une
solution équitable* (C.I.J.Recueil 1969, p. 50, par.92).
Comment savoir que l'équidistance «ne donne pas une solution équitable>)si on
ne commence pas, à tout le moins, par l'essayer? C'est de toute évidence ce
que la Cour a fait dans l'affaire du Plateau conrinental de la mer du Nord, et
c'est seulement parce que le résultatlui est apparu comme inéquitable, compte
tenu de ta configuration particulière des côtes en cause, qu'elle s'est mise à la
recherche d'une autre solution.
La sentence arbitrale de 1977 évoquede son côté
<<laquestion de savoir si certaines caractéristiques géographiques ont pour
obiet de rendre «injustifiée» ciu«inéquitable» une délimitation conforme
a~-~rinci~ede liéqu'idistance..» (par. 240).
Et c'est effectivement à partir de la ligne d'dquidistance et par rapport à cette
ligne qu'ont étéappréciés parle tribunal arbitral les effets disproportionnés de
Ia configuration gkographique particulière des Sorlingues (par. 243).
Sans doute l'arrêtde 1982 paraît-il écarter l'équidistance«as a first step»
(C.I.J.Recueil 1982, p. 79, par. 1IO), mais il ne faut pas oublier que dans cette
affaire les deux Parties s'étaient prononcées,l'une et l'autre, contre l'applica-
tion de cette methode: «la Cour, est-il dit dans l'arrêt, doit tenir comptede426 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
cette ferme position des Parties* (C.I.J. Recueil 1982). La suite de l'arrêt
montre au surplus que, au moins dans le second secteur, la méthodede I'équi-
distance a étéprise en considérationpar la Cour (ibid p. 88, par. 126).
Quant à l'arrêtde la Chambre dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine, il déclare
certes qu'iln'y a pas de méthode«dont on puisse dire absolument qu'elle doit
êtreprise en considération en priorité» (C. I..Recueil 1984, p. 315, par. 163).
Cela ne l'empêche pasde relever que «dans nombre de cas» on a pris «cer-
taines méthodess en considération «en priorité par rapport à d'autres» (ibid.,
par. 162). Cela ne l'empêchesurtout pas, au moment où il s'apprête à proposer
sa solution au litige, de déclarerque
«son choix de base ne peut que se porter sur le critère à propos duquel
l'équité estde longue date considéréecomme un caractère rejoignant la
simplicité:h savoir le critère qui consistà viser en principe- en tenant
compte des circonstances spéciales de l'espèce - à une division par parts
égales des zones de convergence et de chevauchement des projections
marines des côtes des Etats entre lesquels la délimitation est recherchée*
(ibid p. 327, par. 195; dans le même sens, p.328, par. 197).
C'est effectivement en partant de l'équidistance que la Chambre a procédéh la
délimitation dans deux des trois secteurs qu'elle a distinguks dans la région à
délimiter, quitteà y apporter ensuite les corrections qu'elle a jugées équitables
compte tenu des circonstances de l'espèce (ihidp. .331-332, par. 209-210, et
p. 333-337, par. 215-223).
Je voudrais enfin pour terminer faire état du témoignaged'un membre même
de la Cour, selon lequel:
«Il va de soi que, dans toute affaire de délimitation, le juge envisage la
ligne d'équidistance, mêmesi aucune des Parties n'en a demandéle tracé.»
(C.1.J. Recueil 1982, opinion individuelle de M. Jiménez de Aréchaga,
p. 105, par. 18.)
Monsieur le Prksident, la situation, on le constate, est des plus claires.
La solution préconiséepar Malte commence par prendre en considération, à
titre provisoire, la méthode de l'équidistance, qui incorpore les concepts de
côtes et de distance dont la combinaison constitue le fondement du titre juri-
dique de 1'Etatcôtier au plateau continental adjacenàses côtes.
La solution préconisée parla Libye court-circuite, au contraire, ce double
paramétre.
Cela est t?vident pour la composante spatiale, A laquelle la Libye refuse tout
simplement toute pertinence dans la délimjtarion.
Mais c'est vrai également pourla composante cdtikre, à laquelle la Libye fait
certes semblant d'accorder une place de choix, mais qui ne joue aucun rôle
effectif dans la délimitation qu'elleprkconise: avec des côtes maltaises et des
côtes libyennes tout à fait différentes de ce qu'elles sont, la revendication
libyenne d'une délimitation le long de laRift Zone et de la zone des escarpe-
ments ne bougerait pas d'un pouce.
En prenant, comme elle le fait, le contre-pied de l'équidistance en tant que
point de départde l'opérationde dklimitation découlant du principe de distance
dans sa double composante, la Libye ignore en définitive lar&gledes 200 milles,
elle négligela conception du plateau continental telle que l'exprime l'article 76,
elle ne tient aucun compte de l'apparition du concept de la zone économique
exclusive- en un mot elle méconnaît l'environnement juridique du droit de la
mer contemporain. La these libyenne est une survivance du passé.
Après ces observations sur la prise en considération de l'équidistancecommepoint de départde l'opérationde délimitation,je voudrais maintenant me tour-
ner pour finir, avec votre permission, Monsieur le Président, vers l'importante
et délicate question des rapports entre l'équidistance et l'équitédans notre
affaire.
Equidistance ri solurion équitable
Non contente d'imputer à Malte la thèse purement imaginaire selon laquelle
l'équidistance serait toujours équitable, la Partie adverse en vient à laisser
entendre que l'équidistance ne serait jamais équitable. Oh, je sais bien que la
Libye n'a pas dit cela expressis vt.rhiet qu'elle a mêmepris soin de noter dans
ses écritures que dans certaines circonstances I'équidistance peut se révéler
comme une solution équitable! II est clair pourtant que les critiques que la
Libye a faites à I'équidistance ne restent pas sur le terrain des circonstances
concretes de la présente affaire, inais s'adressent in abstracto à cette méthode
en tant que telle - ce qui, je le note en passant, est assez piquant lorsqu'on
songe à l'âpreté avec laquellela Libye nous a reproché notre prétendue *abs-
traclion».
Ce n'est en effet pas seulement le caractère équitable de la ligne médiane
dans le cas concret de norre affaire qui fait l'objet d'une offensivede grande
envergure, mais le caractère équitablede toute ligne d'équidistance, autrement
dit de la méthode de l'équidistance en soi. Sous la plume de nos adversaires,
j'exagère à peine, I'équidistance devient, sij'ose dire, la brebis galeuse du droit
de la délimitationdu plateau continental, dont toute l'évolution du droitinterna-
tional tend à s'écarter («trend away from equidistancem). Pour un peu le
vocable mêmed'équidistance deviendrait un mot honteux, que l'on n'oserait
plus utiliser qu'avec d'infinies précautionsde langage.
Si les critiquesf'ormuléespar la Libye contre la méthode d'équidistanceen
soi étaient justifiées, I'équidistancene devrait pour ainsi dire jamais être retenue
comme base d'une délimitation de plateau continental. Et pourtant, combien de
d6limitations conventionnelles ne reposent-elles pas sur l'équidistance, même
lorsqu'un petit Etat insulaire fait Facà un grand Etat continental? Et comment
oublier que La jurisprudence n'a pas seiilement eu à cŒur de noter je ne sais
combien de fois que l'équidistancepeut constituer une solution équitable (cf. II,
CMM, p. 82, par. 174), mais qu'elle a effectivement eu recours à cette me-
thode, ou à une variante de cette méthode?
Pour comprendre l'attitude de la jurisprudence à l'égard du caractère équi-
table ou non de la méthode de l'équidistance, il ne faut pas perdre de vue la
distinction terminologique et conceptuelle entre les deux variantes de la ligne
d'équidistance sur laquelle l'arrêtdu Golfe du Maine vient d'attirer une fois de
plus l'attention: celle entre une Ligned'équidistance latérale entre deux côtes
limitrophes et une ligne d'équidistance médiane entre deuxcôtes se faisant face
(C.IJ. Recueil 1984, p. 323-324, par. 186-1871. Face Bune jurisprudence una-
nime sur ce point, et confirméepar l'arrêt surle Golfe du Maine, l'affirmation
libyenne d'une «disparition progressive de toute distinction entre Etats <<sefai-
sant face» ou «adjacents. (II, CML, p. 112-117, par. 5.34-5.48) prend figure
de wishful rhinking,ainsi que nous l'avons montré dans notre replique (ci-des-
sus, RM, p. 63-68, par. 120-129, et p. 91-93, par. 182-189).
Cette distinction avait étédéjiiposée par la Cour dans son arrêtde 1969
(C.I.J.Recueil 1969, p. 17, par. 6, et p. 36, par. 57); la Cour avait montré -
j'aià peine besoin de le rappeler - que les difficultés soulevéespar une ligne
latérale entre côtes limitrophes rie se retrouvent pas dans le cas d'une ligne
mediane entre côtes se faisant face. Le texte des paragraphes 6 et 57 de l'arrêt428 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
de 1969 est si connu que je ne mc permettrai pas d'en donner lecture à nouveau
ici.
La sentence arbitrale franco-britannique de 1977 avait également tenu ?souli-
gner la nécessité d'une rigueur terrninologiquesur ce point (par. 96, note l), et
elle avait qualifié dt«essentielte» la distinction posée par la Cour (par. 86).
Selon le tribunal arbitral:
«pour établir si la méthode de l'équidistance permetd'aboutir à une solu-
tion équitable, il faut tenir compte de la différence qui existe entre une
limite ((latérale entre Etats «limitrophes » et une ligne ((médiane* entre
Etats«se faisant face» (par. 97);
rdans le cas d'hats «se faisant face*, une ligne mediane aura pour effet
normal une délimitation qui sera dans l'ensemble équitable»,
ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas pour une ligne d'équidistance latérale (par.95;
dans le mêmesens, par. 235). Comme l'observe M. Bowett, le tribunal arbitral
a recouru d'emblée à la ligne médiane dans les regions non controversées de
l'arbitrage franco-britannique et, dans les deux régions controversées,il a modi-
fiéplutôt que rejeté cette méthode(op. rit.,p.217; BYBIL,loc..ci pf..4).
L'arrêt TunisieiLihye de 1982 avait lui aussi confirmé que dans le cas de
côtes se faisant face «la position d'une ligne d'equidistance pèse plus qu'elle ne
ferait normalement dans l'apprkciation globale des considérations d'équité*
(C.I.J.Recueil 1982, p. 88, par. 126).
C'est à cette distinction solidement étabtie que se réfère avec insistance
I'arret du Golfe du Mlaine. Mêmedans le secteur intérieur du golfe, où la sttua-
tion est pourtant, selon la Chambre, celle d'un rapport d'adjacence latérale
(C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 324-325, par. 188-1891, la Chambre a considéréque
«l'idée de tracer une ligne d'équidistance latérale» était «parfaitement conce-
vable» (par. 188); et si elle a corrigé en fin de compte cette ligne en raison des
circonstances propres àl'espèce, elle l'a fait au profit d'une ligne plus favorable
pour le Canada que la ligne d'équidistance que ce dernier revendiquait. Ayant
ainsi admis qu'une ligne d'équidistance latéraleentre côtes limitrophes à I'inté-
rieur du golfe étaità tout le moins concevable, la Chambre allait tout naturelle-
ment, à plus fane raison, souligner avec plus de force encore le caractère nor-
malement équitable d'une ligne médiane dans le second secteur, celui où se
présentait entre les c6tes des Parties un rapport caractériséd'opposition fron-
tale. Pour l'application du «critère équitable de la division, autant que possible
par parts égales, des zones de chevauchement des projections maritimes des
deux Etats », a déclarkla Chambre, won ne saurait ... imaginer de meilleure occa-
sion... que l'existence de deux côtes opposées pratiquement parallèles, entre les-
quelles il s'agit d'établirà mi-chemin une ligne de délimitation médiane*
(C.LJ. Recueil 1984, p. 334, par. 217). La prise en considération des circons-
tances pertinentes, et notamment de l'existence d'une frontière terrestre dans un
coin particulierdu golfe, conduira la Chambre à corriger fa ligne médiane plutôt
qu'à la rejeter.
On saisit, dans ces conditions, 21quel point est excessive et injustifiée lcn-
tique, faite par la Libye, à la méthode de l'équidistance en gknéral, selon
laquelle cette méthode conduirait à répartirle plateau continental entre les Etats
en cause dans la proportion de 1:l (ci-dessus, RL, p. 80-81. par. 6.14-6.17).
Faut-il rappeler, une fois de plus, que dans notre affaire, avec une ligne
médiane. la Libye aurait une zone de plateau continental beaucoup plus étendue
que Malte (cf. 1, MM, p. 36, par. 117; II, CMM, p. 107, par. 244)? Diviser
également les zones de chevauchement des projections maritimes des deux PLAlDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 4 29
côtes rie signifie pas diviser également le plateau continental entre les deux
pays. Les deux notions sont différentes.
Pas davantage ne saurait-on accorder d'intérêtau témoignage du déclin de
I'équidistanceen généralque la Partie adverse croit trouver dans l'absence de
référence ?iI'équidistancedans le texte définitifde I'article 83 de la convention
sur le droit de la mer (II, CML, p. 112, par. 5.32-5.33). Cette absence ne revêt
nullement la signification de vaste envergure que la Libye voudrait lui attacher.
II ne faut pas oublier que la méthodede I'équidistance estla seule à avoir bé-
néficiéd'une mention expresse dans certains des textes de négociation. Cette
mention a certes disparu de la redaction dkfiniiive de l'article 83, mais pour une
raison tres particulièr: c'est, commeje l'ai rappel6 prkddemment, parce que ce
texte de compromis. rédigéen hâte à la fin de la conférence.a éliminéen même
temps les deux concepts disputés au cours de la longue lutte qui s'étaitdéroulée
au sein de la conférenceet du groupe de travail:les «principes équitables»ont dis-
paru dans la tourmente finale en mêmetemps que l'«équidistance», et seule a
survécula mention neutre et, dans une certaine mesure. inoffensive de la finalité
d'une asolution équitable)).On ne saurait tirer du silence gardépar l'article 83
au sujet de l'équidistance la conclusion dévastatrice pour cette méthode que
la Libye souhaiterait en tirer - pas plus d'ailleurs. je m'empresse de le noter,
que l'on ne serait justifià infkrer du silence de l'article 83 sur les «principes
équitables. pour soutenir que ces derniers ont disparu du droit de la délimita-
tion du plateau continental.
Par I'excts mêmede ses critiques la Libye s'est engagée,je le crains, dans ce
que j'ai cru pouvoir appeler dans l'affaire duGolJiedi( Maine, où l'une des Par-
ties avait recouru à la même tactiquede critique sans mesure de l'équidistance,
une croisade contre I'équidistance, présentéecomme le mal absolu (C.I.J.
Mémoires,vol. VII, p. 32).
Monsieur le Président,faut-il répéterque I'équidistance n'a certainementpas
valeur universelle; elle n'est certainement pas toujours équitable. Mais de cela
on ne saurait déduire que l'kquidistance n'a pratiquement pas de valeur, qu'elle
n'est presque jamais équitable. En dépit des réservesqu'elle a exprimees à son
égard, la Chambre vient de réaffirmer, dans l'affaire du Golfe du Maine, que
I'équidistance constitue «une méthode pratique utilisable aux fins de la délimi-
tation» (C.I.J.Recueil 1984, p. 297, par. 106). Le fait que son emploi ne soit
pas juridiquement obligatoire - et nous en convenons, du côté maltais - ne
signifie pas, a préciséla Chambre, que son emploi soit juridiquement interdit:
«il ne faut pas confondre, déclare la Chambre, l'absence d'une obligation de
faire avec une obligation de ne pas faire» (p.321. par. 180). Ce n'est pas parce
que les partisans des *principes équitables>rse sont affrontés à ceux de \'«equi-
distance » au sein de la troisième conférence que I'équidistance devrait être
conçue comme 1'opposé des«principes équitables », et réciproquement.Equidis-
tance et équiténe sont pasplus antinomiques que synonymes: I'équidistance
peut êtreéquitable, elle peut être inéquitable. Evidencesd'une totale banalité,
penseront sans doute la plupart des membres de la Cour. Certes, et j'aurais
hésité?iles rappeler devant la Cour si toute l'argumentation de la Libye dans
notre affaire ne se déroulait pas sur la toile de fond d'une espèce d'opposition
quasi ontologique à l'équidistance+
Les rapports entre I'équidistanceet l'équité oné t tér6surn6s par la Cour dans
une formule d'une puissante simplicité àlaquelle il faut toujours revenir et dont
je voudrais demander la Cour la permission de donner une fois encore lec-
ture: «l'équidistance est applicable si elle conduit à une solution équitable;
sinon il y a lieu d'avoir recours à d'autres méthodes» (C.I.J. Recueil 1982,
p. 79, par. 109). Dans cette formule se trouve affirmée l'idéeque l'équidistance430 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
constitue la méthodede réfkrencepar rapport à laquelle l'équité est appréciée.
Dans cette formule se trouve également énoncé,avec le sens de l'équilibreet de
la mesure qui fait les grands dicta juridiques, qu'équidistance et équitépeuvent
coïncider sans coïncider nécessairement, peuvent diverger sans diverger néces-
sairement.
Il apparaît ainsi que l'opposition entre équidistanceet équitéest un faux pro-
blkme. Comme l'a dit M. Guillaume, dans la communication déjàmentionnée:
«il n'existe pas, semble-t-il, un dilemme équidistanceléquité,mais un
objectif, la recherche d'une solution équitable, qui doit être atteinten fai-
sant application de la règlejuridique selon laquelle l'équidistance doitêtre
corrigéeen fonction des circonstances spéciales»(op. cir., p. 280). (Les ita-
liques sont de moi.)
Cette prise en considération des circonstances pertinentes destinées à vérifier
I'équitédu résultat pose bien entendu le problème de l'identification des cir-
constances dont il convient de tenir compte, car toutes les circonstances ne sont
pas pertinentes en droit, et c'est le juge ou l'arbitre qui, dans chaque affaire,
détermineracelles des circonstances auxquelles il accordera cette qualité. Après
quoi surgira le problème de la mise en balance des différentes circonstances que
le juge ou l'arbitre aura retenues comme pertinentes. Problème difficile, car rien
n'assure a priori que les circonstances retenues comme pertinentes en droit
militent toutes dans le même sens.Des choix difficiles peuvent s'avérer néces-
saires, et c'estlà que s'exerce ce que la sentence franco-britannique a appeléle
pouvoir d'«appréciation» du juge (par. 70; cf. arrêtdu GoIfe du Maine. C.1.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 312, par. 156, et p. 325, par. 191).
Il n'est pas nécessaireque j'examine ici ce double problème de l'identifica-
tion des circonstances pertinentes et de leur poids respectif. Je noterai seulement
que les circonstances de caractkre géographique - c'est-à-dire celles qui tien-
nent à la configuration des côtes, aux relations entre les côtes en présence,
d'une part, et entre ces côtes et la zone de plateau continental délimiter,
d'autre part - sont h coup sûr pertinentes et qu'elles occupent au sein des
autres circonstances pertinentes une place privifégiée.C'est essentiellement,
bien que non exclusivement, par rapport aux données de la géographie que
I'équité de la ligne d'équidistance prise comme point de départ va devoir
s'apprécier.
Cette primauté accordée aux circonstances pertinentes de caractère géogra-
phique pour tester I'équitédu résultatremonte àfort loin.
IIy a un demi-siècle déjà, Gidel préconisait, pour délimiterla mer territoriale
dans ce qu'il appelait les «détroits peu larges» - nous dirions aujourd'hui:
entre côtes se faisant face-, le recours à la méthodede la ligne médiane,sauf
convention contraire et moins que des aconditions physiques exception-
nelles» ne conduisent à recourir à une autre méthode et à adopter «tel tracé à
déterminer en tenant compte de la nature des lieux » (G. Gidet, Le droit inîer-
national public de Ir1mer, t.III, Paris, 1934, p. 756-757). On reste admiratif
devant l'intuition de Gidel et le modernisme de ses vues.
Plus pres de nous, et à propos cette fois du plateau continental lui-même,la
Commission du droit international élaborait ce qui allait devenir la régle de
l'article6 de la convention de 1958: ligne médiane «à défaut d'accord, et à
moins que des circonstances spéciales ne justifient une autre délimitation »; et
la Commission précisait dans son commentaire que par «circonstances
spéciales» elle entendait <.une configuration exceptionnelle de la côte, ou
encore la prksence d'iles ou de chenaux navigables » (Annuaire de la CDI,
1956, vol. 11,p. 300). PLAiDClIRIE DE M. WEIL 431
Cette primautédes circonstances géographiques, établiepar Gidel et la Com-
mission, ne s'est pas démentiedepuis lors. Le dispositif de l'arrêtde 1969 place
au premier rang des facteurs à prendre en considération «la configuration géné-
rale des côtes des Parties et la présence de toute caractéristique spécialeou
inhabituelle)) (C.I.J.Recueil 1969, p. 54, par. 101 D). La sentence arbitrale de
1977 attire dix fois, vingt fois l'attention sur Les «circonstances géogra-
phiques)), qu'elle cite tantôt seules (par exemple, par. 84-85), tantôt avec
d'autres en évoquant les circonstances pertinentes *géographiques et autres »
(par exemple, par. 69, 93, 194, 232). Dans l'arrêtTunisieiLihye la géographie
côtière a kgalement joué un rôle de premier plan qu'il n'est pas nécessairede
rappeler a la Cour (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 86, par. 122, et p. 88-89, par. 128).
Plus récemmentencore, l'arrêtdu Golfe du Moine énonce que
«le caractère kquitable ou non du résultatde I'operation de délimitation ...
pourrait difficilement être appréciépar rapport à des paramètres autres que
ceux, dominants, fournis par la gkographie physique et politique des lieux»
(C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 340, par. 231).
La géographie côtière, Monsieurle Président,je le note en passant, constitue
ainsi un facteur «dominant». dans les deux phases de l'opération de déli-
mitation: au niveau du point de départ, de la ligne de départ provisoire, c'est
eHe qui suggère I'eniploi de la méthodede I'équidistanceet détermine le tracé
de la ligne d'équidistance de premier pas; au niveau de la délimitation défini-
tive, c'est encore la géographie cijtière qui fournit le paramètre de rkférence
dominant pour l'appréciationdu caractère équitable,ou non, de la ligne.
L'idée quise dégage de I'ensemtile de la jurisprudence est que le juge entend
avant tout vérifier si un accident géographique mineur de l'une des côtes - une
île ou un rocher, un saillant isolécle la côte ou un promontoire exceptionnelle-
ment long, par exemple - n'a pas pour effet de provoquer une déviation
majeure de la ligne d'équidistance, génératriced'une amputation ou d'un
empiétement disproportionnéspar rapport à l'importance de l'accident et, par là
même,inéquitable.
C'est parce que la configuration de? côtes «peut dans certains cas aboutir B
des résultatsde prime abord [on theface of them] extraordinaires, anormaux ou
déraisonnablesri que 1s Cour a considéré,en 1969, qu'il faut parfois écarter
l'équidistance (C.I.J.Recueil 1969, p. 23,par. 24). La Cour parle dans cet arrêt
de la nécessitéd'«éliminer l'effet exagéréde déviation» que peuvent engendrer
des «îlots, des rochers ou des légerssaillants de la côte), (ihid.p. 36, par. 57);
et elle relève qu'il convient de *remédier 3. une particularité non essentielle
d'où pourrait résulter une injustifiable différence de traitement* (ihid., p. 50,
par. 91).
Quelques années plus tard, cette approche est confirmée par la sentence arbi-
trale franco-britannique: *Le rôle de l'équitéest ...de remédierde façon conve-
nable aux effets inéquitables de déviation d'une caractéristique géographique.»
(Par. 251.) Il faut éviter,estime le iribunal arbitral, que des aconfigurations par-
ticulières de la côte», des «caractéristiques particulières», des «particularités
non essentielles» (sentence, par. 100. 101, 251) ne créentune «distorsion dans
le tracéde la limite» (par. 100). Ide tribunal évoque nla question de savoir si
certaines caractéristiques géographiques ont pour effet de rendre «injustifiée»
ou «inéqtiitable» une délimitatiori conforme au principe de l'équidistance»
(par. 240).
Dans l'affaire du Golfe du Mainci la Chambre a souligné, dans le sillage et le
droit fil de la jurisprudence antérieure, qu'«il ne faut pas se laisser trop facile-43 2 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
ment séduire par les apparences de perfection» de la mkthode de I'équidistance
en raison, notamment, des
((inconvénientsque peut engendrer une méthode consistant prkcisément à
retenir comme points de base, pour le tracé d'une ligne recherchant une
division à égalitéd'un certain espace, de toutes petites îles, de rochers
inhabités, des hauts-fonds, situés parfois une distance considérable de la
terreferme» (C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 330-331, par. 201; cf. aussi p. 327-
328, par. 196).
C'est cette considération, entre autres, quia conduit la Chambre à corriger la
ligne d'équidistance de départ dansle secteur intérieurdu golfe: «c'est exacte-
ment [c'est-à-dire 121présence de petites îles, de rochers inhabités, de hauts-
fonds] le type d'accident géographique mineur, dit la Chambre, dont ...il
convient de faire abstraction.» (ibid., p. 332, par. 210).
C'est 1%que réside l'élément essentiel,bien que non exclusif, de la prise en
considérationdes circonstances pertinentes: s'assurer que la méthode d'équidis-
tance retenue comme première approche ne provoque pas, en raison d'une
configuration géographique particulière et exceptionnelle, une déviation disprm
portionnee, une distortion déraisonnable. Ce n'est pas toute déviation, même
minime, qui sera à corriger parce que génératrice d'inéquitém , ais seulement
celle qui conduit une *différence injustifiable de traitement» ou h des résul-
tats «de prime abord extraordinaires, anormaux ou déraisonnables». Des distor-
tions insignifiantes n'appellent aucune correction. Comme j'ai cru pouvoir le
dire dans un autre contexte, de minimis non curat delimitator (C.1J. Mémoires,
Délimitationde lafrontière maritimedans lu régiondu GoIfedu Maine, vol. VIl,
p. 34).
On en vient ainsi A apprécier à sa juste valeur ce qui a constitué, sije puis
dire, la philosophie de la Commission du droit international, il y a près de
trente ans: I'équidistance, mais avec la flexibilité et la souplesse dcessaires
pour permettre une solution équitable compte tenu des circonstances particu-
lières de l'espèce. Sur le plan de l'opportunité technique,et non pas sur le plan
juridique, le Comité d'experts avait suggéréla solution de la ligne médiane ou
de l'équidistance, assortied'une soupape de sûreté (Annuaire de la CDI, 1953,
vol. II, p. 79), et, dans le sillage de cette suggestion, la Commission s'étaitpro-
noncée,sur le plan (lu droit cette fois, en faveur de I'équidistance assortied'une
certaine élasticité
«il doit êtreprévu [a indiqué la Commission dans son rapport de 19561
qu'on peut s'écarter de la règle lorsqu'une configuration exceptionnelle de
la côte ou encore la présence d'îles oude chenaux navigables l'exigent. Ce
cas pourra se présenter assez souvent. La règle adoptée est donc dotée par
là d'une certaine souplesse.* (Annuaire de la CDI, 1956, vol. II,p. 300.)
Trente ans aprés, on ne peut manquer d'être frappé parla perspicacité de la
Commission et par l'actualité de son approche. A cette époque le principe de
distance en était encore à ses tout premiers balbutiements, et c'est surtout la
commodité pratique de I'équidistancequi inspirait la Commission. Cette com-
modité n'a pas disparu, et demeure aussi convaincante aujourd'hui qu'hier.
Mais une raison juridique s'ajoute à présent iice motif pratique de prendre
I'équidistance pourpoint de dtpart: le principe de distance justifie aujourd'hui
juridiquement ce qui n'ktait encoreà cette époque qu'une solution de conve-
nance.
Il est certain. Monsieur le President, comme vient de le rappeler la Chambre
dans l'affaire duGoIfe du Maine, que la rtgle combinée «équidistance-circons- PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 433
tances spéciales», dont s'occupait la Commission, est limitée au droit interna-
tional particulier de la convention de Genève et ne constitue pas une régledu
droit international général et coutumier(par. 122-123). J'en suis parfaitement
conscient. Il n'en demeure pas moins que, dans leur substance, la règle conven-
tionnelle de la convention de Genève combinant «équidistance-circonstances
spéciales» et la regle de droit coutumier dont la Chambre vient de donner une
«reformulation» au paragraphe 112 de son arrêtne sont pas tr&séloignées l'une
de I'autre; I'un des apports jurisprudentiels majeurs de la sentence franco-bri-
tannique a précisémentétéd'unifier. ou de rapprocher du moins, le contenu du
droit conventionnel et du droit coutumier en cette matière, en relevant qu'il n'y
a pas de véritabledifference de forid ou de résultat entre la regle de l'article 6
et la norme généraledu droit coutumier (sentence arbitrale. par. 69-70 et 97). 11
est peut-être significatifà cet kgarti que la Chambre elle-mêmeait eu recours,
pour désigner les données concrètes susceptibles de conduire à une correction
de la méthode d'équidistancede départ dans le cadre du droit coutumier. au
vocable de acirconstances spécialesde l'espèce » emprunt6 iila terminologie de
la Commission du droit international et de la convention de 1958 (par. 195).
Les observations que je viens de faire conduisent à poser Ztprésent la ques-
tion décisivesur laquelle j'échèverai cet exposé: existe-t-il, dansle cas présent,
des circonstances pertinentes qui feraient apparaître le caractére inéquitablede
la ligne d'équidistance de départ et necessiteraient donc sa correction, voire
même son abandon?
La géologie et la géomorphologie sous-marines ne sauraient, nous l'avons
montré, avoirde poids dans notre affaire, pour des raisons tant scientifiques que
juridiques.
D'autres circonstances présentent davantaged'intérêt:la conduite des Parties,
les considet-ationsde sécuritkau sens large, et d'autres encore. Mes collèguesont
eu - et auront - I'occasion de montrer que, loin d'invalider la ligne d'équi-
distance, ces circonstances contribuent au contraire?ien confirmer l'équité.
Je m'en tiendrai. pour ma part, aux circonstances de caractère géographique,
dont le caractsre «dominant» est affirmé, comme nous l'avons vu, par une
jurispmdence unanime.
L'examen de la géographie côtière conduitB une constatation difficilement
contestable: aucune circonstance de caractere géographiquene permet de regar-
der comme inéquitable la ligne médiane entre les côtes qui se font face de
Malte et de la Libye; toutes les circonslances de caractere géographique condui-
sent au contraire à regarder une telle ligne comme conforme à l'exigence fonda-
mentale d'un résultat équitable.
Pour asseoir cette constatation avec plus de certitude, revenons un instant en
arrière, Monsieur le Président. et rernontonsau débutde l'opérationde délimita-
tion.
Les côtes de Malte et de la Libye se font face, mêmesi elles ne sont pas
rigoureusement parallèlesmétrepar mètre.Ces côtes - Ies maltaises aussi bien
que les libyennes - engendrent des projections de plateau continental omnidi-
rectionnelles. Sans le vis-à-vis libyen les projections maltaises s'étendraient
jusqu'à 200 milles marins au moins des lignes de base de Malte. Sans le vis-h-
vis maltais les projections libyennes s'étendraient jusqu'à 200 milles marins au
moins des points de base de la Libye. En dépitde leur différence de taille. en
dépit du caractere insulaire de I'un et continental de l'autre, les deux Etats
seraient alorstraitéssur un pied d'égalitéau regard du droit de la mer et de leur
pouvoir générateurde plateau continental. Mais Malte a un vis-à-vis libyen. et
la Libye a un vis-à-vis maltais, et chacun des deux pays est situé tropprEs de
son vis-à-vis pour qu'il soit possible de luiconserver la plénitudede ses droits434 PLATEAU CONTlNENTAL
potentiels de plateaii continental. Les projections des deux côtes se rencontrent
et se chevauchent, et c'est de l'existence de ce front de chevauchements que
naît le problème de délimitationsoumis à la Cour.
Pour résoudrece problème, l'égalitédes Etats interdit de privilégierla projec-
tion de l'une des Parties au détriment de celle de l'autre. Les deux côtes sont
juridiquement d'égale valeur. La projection maltaise n'a pas plus de poids que
celle de la Libye, mais pas moins non plus; et la mêmechose est vraie de la
projection Libyenne. Chacun des deux Etats a une vocation d'égale valeur au
plateau continental s'etendant jusqu'à une distance de 200 milles marins au
moins de ses côtes. Chacun des deux doit cependant accepter une amputation.
L'équitéexige que cette amputation soit équilibrée et raisonnable. Diminuer
l'amputation de l'un revient à augmenter l'amputation de l'autre. Aussi est-il
nécessaire d'envisager pour commencer une méthode de délimitation qui soit
capable de respecter l'égaldroit de Malte et de la Libye h une zone de plateau
continental s'étendant jusqu'à une même distancede leurs côtes respectives. La
méthode susceptible de satisfaire 2 cette exigence est celle qui arrêtelaprojec-
tion de chacune des Parties à un endroit tel que, si on la laissait se poursuivre
plus loin, laprojection d'egale valeur de l'autre se trouverait compromise. Une
teHe méthode existe: c'est celle de l'équidistance, représentée ici par une ligne
médiane.
Voilà donc ce que Malte propose: commencer par prendre en consideration la
ligne mCdiane, qui reflète la configuration côtisre et respecte les exigences du
principe de distance.
Bien sûr, s'il apparaissait que cette ligne est inéquitable et déraisonnable en
raison de l'effetexagérkde déviation provoqué parune caractéristique géogra-
phique mineure, il serait nécessaire de la corriger ou même, dans des cas
extrêmes,de lui substituer une ligne baséesur une variante de l'équidistanceou
une autre méthode.
Mais tel n'est pas le cas- à moins, bien entendu, et peut-être est-celà tout
le problème de considérer l'existence même de I'Etat maltais comme généra-
trice d'inequité! Voici deux côtes situées incontestablement dans un rapport
d'opposition frontale, dont le caractère de côtes se faisant face n'est pas dou-
teux, et dépourvues de toute trace d'adjacence. Pas de configuration mineure,
sur aucune des deux côtes, qui serait susceptible de faire «dévierlatéralementla
ligne d'équidistance» et d'amputer 1'Etat d'en face «de zones situees juste
devant sa façade maritime*. Pas de saillant, pas de rentrant, pas de convexité,
pas de concavité. Du côte maltais comme du côté libyen, des côtes régulières,
d'une totale banalité, et assurément dkpourvues de toute «caractéristique spé-
ciale ou inhabituelle*.Et ce qui est vrai des côtes l'est tout autant de l'espace
qui les sépare. Danscet espace pas la moindre Île, pas le moindre rocher, pas le
moindre haut-fond, que ce soit devant la côte de Malte ou devant la côte de la
Libye, que ce soit du«bon >>ou du «mauvais » côté dela ligne médiane. La Libye
écritque: «The question of the distorting effect which small islands may have
on an equidistance line has alwaysbeena problem » (ci-dessus, RL, p. 80, not1):
l'observation est exacte, mais entre les côtes des deux Etats, pas le moindre îlot
de nature à faire problémeet à donner quelque piment à une géographie dépour-
vue d'originalité.
Quelle que soit la manière dont on aborde la situation géographique, elle
apparaît banale, dépourvue de toute caractéristique particulière. Aucune dévia-
tion ou distorsion de la ligne d'équidistance assez importante «pour justifier
une ligne de délimitation autreque la lignemédianen. Pas de résultatsqui appa-
raissentccde prime abord extraordinaires, anormaux ou déraisonnables». Nous
sommes presque en présence d'un cas d'école, que l'on aurait simplifié 21 PLAIDOIRIE DE M. WEIL 435
l'extrême pour faciliterla démonstration. La situation géographique de notre
affaire est plus que simple, elle est simpliste. Non, rien, vraiment rien, dans la
géographie côtièrene conduit à jeter le doute sur le caractère raisonnable et
équitable de la ligne médiane envisagée comme point de dkpart et B l'écarter
comme ligne de délimitation définitive.Toute autre solution conduirait à refaire
la nature et la géographie.
Le caractère raisonnable de la ligne médiane revendiquéepar Malte s'éclaire
encore davantage si l'on se rappelle que cette ligne. comme je l'ai indiqué
hier, est situéeà peine plus au sud que ne le serait une ligne médiane que l'on
tracerait entre la Libye et l'Italie en faisant abstraction de Malte. La prise en
considération de Malte ne conduit en définitive pas à une ligne beaucoup plus
défavorable pour la Libye que si Malte n'existait pas. Mais cette modeste
conséquence de l'existence de Malte paraît, semble-t-il, encore excessive à la
Libye ...
Reste la lorigueur des côtes.
Une différence dans la longueur ifes façades côtières produit par elle-même
une délimitation accordant à chaque Etat une superficie différente de plateau
continental, mais il est clair que la longueur comparée des côtes ne saurait être
considkréecomme une circonstance appelant per se un ajustement de la ligne
d'équidistance de départ.Si, au terme de la prise en considérationet de la mise
en balance des circonstances pertinentes, la ligne d'équidistance paraît inéqui-
table,ce sera pour des considérations autres que la différence dans la longueur
des façades côtières: un effet de déviation exagéré dû à un accident géogra-
phique mineur, par exempte, ou un empiétement disproportionné;ce ne sera pas
simplement parce que les côtes en présence n'ontpas la même longueur.
Si l'arrêtduGolfe du Maine a corrigéla ligne médianeentre les côtes se fai-
sant face du Massachusetts et de la Nouvefle-Ecosse, dans le second secteur, en
fonction de la longueur comparée des façades côtières des deux pays dans le
premier secteur (c'est-il-dire l'intérieurdu golfe), c'est en raison d'une consi-
dération spécifique à cette affaire, h savoir que le point terminal de la frontière
internationale entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis est situédans le coin nord-est du
golfe et non pas au milieu de ce dernier. C'est cette considération particulière,
relevant de ce que la Chambre a appelé la <<géographiepolitique* (C.I.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 273, par. 42, et p. 328, par. 196; cf. p. 327, par. 195,et 340,
par. 231), qui a conduit la Chambre à faire intervenir inriirectemcntla longueur
comparée des côtes dans l'appréciation du caractère équitable de ta ligne
médiane(p. 334-335, par. 217-218). La Chambre a préciséque c'est seulement
«dans ces conditions» qu'elle a filit jouer la longueur comparée des côtes
comme élément de la vérification de l'équitéde la ligne médiane provisoire
(p. 334, par. 218; cf. p. 312-313, par. 157)A aucun moment la Chambre n'a, il
convient de le noter, compare la ratio des longueurs côtières totales des deux
pays dans l'aire de delimitation avec la superficie totale d'espaces maritimes
attribuésà chacun d'eux. Aucun élémentde ce genre n'a étépris en considéra-
tion dans l'arrêt.
II ne saurait êtrequestion, on le voit, de condamner ipso facto et automati-
quement comme inéquitable toute ligne médianedès lors que les longueurs des
deux côtes ne sont pas dans un rapport de 1:l. Si on procédait ainsi, cela signi-
fierait que la longueur comparée des côtes deviendrait une circonstance perti-
nente - la seule circoristance pertinente, sans doute- susceptible d'exercer
une sorte de droit de veto, puisque, mêmedans le cas où toutes les autres cir-
constances pertinentes établiraient learactéreéquitablede la délimitation équi-
distante de départ,une diffkrence darisLeslongueurs des côtes suffirait h neutra-
liser ce résultatetà condamner la ligne d'équidistanceou ta ligne médiane.La436 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL
proportionnalité des longueurs de côtes deviendrait alors la circonstance perti-
nente la plusdeterminante, celle en tout caà prendre en considérationen tout
premier lieu, puisque c'est d'elle que dépendrait te caractére équitable de la
ligne; et l'on ne serait pas loin, une fois de plus, de la proportionnalité 6rigée
en source du titre ou en méthode autonome et directe de delimitation. En un
mot, Monsieur le Prhident, l'égalitédes longueurs côtières n'est pas une condi-
tion juridiquement nécessaire durecourà la ligne médiane.
C'est à mon ami Ian Brownlie que revient la tâche d'examiner les questions
de la proportionnalité, de la longueurs cbtes et de la magnitude territoriale,
que je n'ai faitqu'évoqueren passant.
Pour ma part, Monsieur le Président,je demande respectueusement à la Cour
son indulgence pour un exposéque l'importance de la matière et l'enchevêtre-
ment des thèses de nos adversaires a condamné & une longueur que je sais
excessive.
L'audience est levéà 13 h 5 FOURTEENTH PUBLIC SITïING (3 XII 84, 10 a.m.1
Present [See sitting of 26 XI 84.1
ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE
COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF MALTA
Professor BROWNLIE: Mr. President, Members of the Court. May it please
the Court.
It ismy task to examine the legal significance of coasts with particular refer-
ence to the points at issue in this case. In the course of this examinati1nshall
address the question of proportionality and the Libyan argument that the extent
of the land territory behind the Coastis relevant to delimitütion.
As the Court might reasonably expect, the particular focus of my argument
will bethe family of Libyan contentions concerning the length of coastlines set
forth in the course of the submissions appended to the Libyan Reply.
The relevant submissions are as follows :
"5. Equitable principles do not require that a State possessing a restric-
ted coastline betreated as if it possessed anextensive coastline.
6. In the particular geographical situation of this case, the application of
equitable principles requires that the delimitation should take account of
the significant difference in fengths of the respective coastlines which face
the area in which the delimitation is to be effected.
7. The delimitation in this case should reflect the element of a reason-
able degree of proportionality which a delimitation carried out in accor-
dance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of
the continental shelf areas appertaining to the respective States and the
lengths of the relevant parts of their coasts, account being taken of any
other delimitations between States in the same region." (P. 103supra.)
The last of these submissions cleaily reflects the dispositifof the Judgment of
this Court in theorth Sen ContinenrnlSheif cases and thus the focus appears to
be the farniliar subject of proportionality. However, it must be emphasized that
the apparently orthodox reliance upon the concept of proportionality in the
Libyan argument is but the superstructure of a forensic vehicle based upon a
variety of eIements. Proportionality represents but the surface and is not the inner
structure of the argument which is heterodox and radical to a considerable
degree. This state of affairss revealed by the content and order of the submis-
sions at the end of the Libyan Reply. Three of these, which 1 have already
recited, relate to the length of coastlines, and of these three, it is the third
alone which is concerned with the issue of proportionality.
The general structure of the Libyan argument, as revealed at length in the
course of the written pleadings,is substantially incompatible with a legally justi-438 CONTINENTALSHELP
fiable reliance upon the concept of proportionality and this incompatibility takes
the following forms.
First, the concept of proportionality is relied upon as a primary basis of deli-
mitation, thai is to Say, asan independent source of rights over shelf areas, and
such reliance is contrary to legal principle.
Secondly, the form in which the test of proportionality is offered by Libya -
which involves the reference to the relevance of length of coasts - is inapposite
in the geographical circumstances of the present case.
Thirdly, the Libyan argument relies upon the length of coasts as an indepen-
dent principle, not necessarily connected with proportionality, and this is evident
from the submissions.
Fourthly, the Liliyan pleadings relate the concept of coasts to the argument that
the size of the landmass behind the coasts provides "a legal justification for a
State's entitlement to continental shelf rights over maritime areas before its
coast" (II. LCM. para. 2.48; para. 4.19).
Thus it follows, Mr. President, that the matters raised by the Libyan pleadings
cal1 for a canvass of issues which extend well beyond the question of propor-
tionality as it is nomally identified. Indeed, significance of coasts, including
the lengih of coasts, is woi-thyof consideration as a matter of pnnciple and this
irrespective of the particular form of the Libyan argument.
In consequence, in the first part of my presentation 1shall address a series of
issues which are raised directly by the Libyan thesis that "the application of equi-
table prînciples requires that the delimitation should take account of the signifi-
cant difference in the lengths of the coastlines which face the area in which the
delimiiation is to be effected" - 1refer to the words of the sixth Libyan submis-
sion. Those issues are as follows :
First, the general significance of coasts in maritime delimitation treated as a
question of principle.
Second, the significance ofcoastal configurations in relation to continental shelf
delimitation.
Third, the identification of the area relevant to the decision of the dispute.
Fourth, the cdncept of equality and the geographical features which establish the
legal framework of the process of delimitation.
The examination of these questions will have two objectives. The first is the
refutation of the simplistic Libyan ihesis based upon the lengths of coastlines.
and the second is to lay the foundations for an enquiry into the function of the
concept of proportionality in the present case.
The first issue 1shall address within the scheme 1have outlined is the signifi-
cance of coasts in maritime delimitation seen as a question of general principle.
The Libyan argument requires that delimiiation should depend on differences
in the length of coasts and, in this way, it approaches the concept of coast in a
highly abstract form. Length is presented as important as such, and becomes a
quantity divorced from the pertinent geographical relationships overall. More-
over, the significance of the greater length of Libyan coasts is presented in
conjunction with the assertion that the extent of the land territory behind the
coast of Libya is also relevant.
This thesis of the maritime reflection of territorial magnitude is sometimes
presented in ternis of proportionality (see 1, LM, paras. 6.90-6.93; II, LCM, ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOU BROWNLIE 439
paras. 6.25-6.3;and supra, LR,paras. 7.01-7.22), sometimes in ternisatheory
based on theconcept of natural prolongation (see LCM, paras. 2.48, 4.19-4.24;
supro, LR, para. 5.12) and at yet other times in terms of a general description of
the circumstances relevant to the delimitation processa, LR, paras3.01-3.23,
6.22, 8.03, 8.15-8.16).
Within the economy of the Libyan case the argument based upon length of
coasts and upon the magnitude of Libyan territory behind the coasts remains
always the same argument. Removed from the various categories in which it is
presented, the argument comes to this. According to Libya, the application of
equitable principles requires that the territorial magnitude of a State beed
in the delimitation of continental shelf areas within therelevant area, and this ter-
ritorial magnitude is represented either by the greaterth of the Libyan coast
compared with that of Malta, or by the greater size of the Libyan landmasby or
these two factors in combination.
This formulationof the basis of the Libyün claim does not appear as siich in
the Libyan pleadings, but it is a fair staternent of the essence of the positive
aspect of the Libyan case. The use of the concepts of proportionality and natural
prolongation in the Libyan written pleadingsinvolves no more than elements
which are intended to supplement and consolidate the principal thesis.
The outcome, Mr. President, isa double paradox. In these proceedings Libya
asks for a delimitation whichollows the general direction of the so-called Rift
@ Zone, as defined in the Libyan Mernorial, and illustrated by Map 17 of that
Memorial.
@ Reference may also be made to the axial ridge line illustrated on10aof the
Libyan Reply and which may also be seen on Figure 13 of Malta's dossier. One
@ may also refer to the Libyan proposal of 1973 indicated on Ma9of the Libyan
@ Memorial and to be found again iriFigure I of Malta's dossier. In other words,
Libya is claiming the lion's share, a virtual monopoly of the continental shelf
areas within the relevant area. If Libya were to have its way, Malta beuleft
with avery small fraction of the shelf areas lying between the two countries.
Yet, and hereis the first paradox. this claim is based upon the application of
equitable principles. Moreover, there is a second paradox. The Libyan position is
not based upon actual coasts, on geography and coastal relationsaspsuch, but
upon camparisons of magnitudes of Landterritory and lengths of coasts.
The goods in which the Libyan argument trades are geopolitical and, correctly
understood, the argument involves a claim to distributive justice and to appor-
tionment of the shelf in accordance with criteria of comparative territorial magni-
tude. In the words of the Libyan Counter-Memoria:
"Malta's claim that a small island- as Malta is - or even a single
basepoint on its coast would, as of right, generate a continental shelf of the
same reach and extent as a continental coast of considerable length is
neither in harmony with conl.inenta1shelf doctrine nor supported by the
jurisprudence of the Court .he continental shelf concept, thouga legal
concept and subject to legal interpretation according to its object and pur-
pose, cannot be divorced froni its factual basis. It is the landmass behind
the coastline which- by its continuation into and under the se- pro-
vides the factual basis and legal justification for a state's entitlement to
continental shelf rights over maritime areas before its coüs- and not
mere distance or proximity from certain basepoints on the coast." (11.
LCM, para. 4.19.)
The legal framework of the Libyan views as to the significance of coasts will
be explored in due course. My present purpose itoapproach the Libyan thesis,440 CONTINENTAL SHELF
that delimitation should reflect territorial magnitude. on its own terms and thus to
examine the broad politics and rational basis of maritime delimitation.
Mr. President, the Libyan thesis flies in the face of a long-established tradition
in matters of maritime delimitation and jurisdicfion. This tradition has always
been that the seaward reach of the territorial sea, contiguous zones and fishery
conservation zones should always be equal for al1 coastal States and, in that
conception, would not reflect the varying territorial magnitudes of the coastal
States. This picture is complicated a little by the fact that at certain periods in
history there were regional patterns and so for example at one time it looked as
though Mediterranean States generally would adopt a six-mile breadth as the
regional rule for the territorial sea. Moreover, the rules governing outer limits
tended to allow coastaf States io choose varying limits within a certain maxi-
mum.
However, the major premise of equality of seaward reach remained untouched
by such factors. No Siate and no publicist ever expressed the notion - until
these proceedings - that territorial magnitude should play a role either in attri-
bution or in delimitation of territorial sea and zones of jurisdiction forarticular
purposes.
The well-known works of Jessup. published in 1927 (The Law of Territorial
Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction) and Gide], published in 1934 (Vol. 3 of Le
droit international pidhlicde la mer), make no reference to criteria of temtorial
magnitude, nor do they suggest that island States should be in any respect dis-
advantaged.
The tradition of equality of seaward reach of jurisdictionis reflected in Article
12, paragraph 1. of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone adopted in 1958. In respect of the delimitation of the territorial sea
as between two States whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other, this
provision prescribed a median line. However, the provision did not apply "where
it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances" to deli-
mit the territorial seas of the two States in some other way. An almost identical
provision appeats in the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (Art. 15.
para. 1).
It is ironical to note. more or less in passing, that. when theegime of delimi-
tation of the territorial sea was liberalized in favour of the coastal State by this
Court in the Anglo-Nonvegian Fisheries case. that liberalization involved no
reference to territorial magnitude. Indeed, the part of the Norwegian littoral
concerned in the proceedings was very narrow and deeply indented and cut into
by fjords. In its consideration of the "geographical realities" of that case the
Court did not refer to the modest extent of Norwegian land territory (I.C.J.
Reports 1951. p. 116at pp. 127-128), but itis clear at least that Norway was not
disadvantaged as a consequence of her cramped geographical position.
It is true. Mr. President, that the tradition of equality of seaward reach was
developed in connection with the temtorial sea and zones of jurisdiction for
special purposes, the so-called contiguous zones. It is equally true that, when it
first appeared. the continental shelf developed as an autonomous legal concept.
However, there is ncireason to believe that the shelf concept involved a radical
break with tradition in matters of maritime delimitation.
The tenns of the Truman Proclamation, which is generally acknowledged as
the precursor of the development of the shelf as a concept of customary interna-
tional law,indicate the inherent unlikelihood of the development of criteria of the
kind now urged upon this Court by my distinguished opponents. With your per-
mission. Mr. Presideni. 1shall read the salient parts of the Proclamation issued
on 28 September 1945. ARGUMENT OF PROFESSORBROWNLIE 441
First of al1the consideranda :
"Whereas the Govemment of the United States of America, aware of the
long range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other min-
erais, holds the view that efforts to discover and make availabfe new
supplies of these resources should be encouraged; and
Whereas its competent experts are of the opinion that such resources
underlie rnany parts of the continental shelf off the coasts of the United
States of America, and that with modem technological progress their utili-
zation is already practicable or wilhome so at an earlydate; and
Whereas recognized jurisdiction over these resources is required in the
interest of their conservation and prudent utilization when and as develop
ment is undertaken; and
Whereas it is the view of the Govemment of the United States that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea
bed of the continental shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just,
since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these resources
would be contingent upon co-operation and protection from the shore, since
the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of
the coa5tal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it, since these resources
frequently form a seaward extension of a pool or deposit lying within the
territory, and since self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close
watch over activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary for
utilizationof these resources."
Then the Proclamation itself provides as follows :
"Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing
its naturalresources,the Gavernmentof the United States regards the natu-
ral resources of'the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining
to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction andntrol.
In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another
State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall bedetermined
by the United States and the State concemed in accordance with equitable
principles. The character as high seas of the waters above the continental
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way
thus affected."
It is immediately apparent that the criteria of attribution are highly practical in
character. The emphasis is upon contiguity and the need for CO-operationand
protection from the shore in respect of the utilization and conservation of the
resources of the sea-bed. No one reading the Proclamation could envisage the
geopoliticalcriteria now offered in the Libyan pleadings. The references to canti-
guity and the element of security or self-protection are reminiscent of the think-
ing behind the concepts of the territorial sea and contiguous zone. Moreover, the
position of the coastal Statewas sfrengthened when the State practice relating ro
shelf claims developed on the basis of the inherent rights of the coastal State,
which were not dependent upon express claims or effective occupation.
The jurisprudence on the delimitation of shelf areas lying off opposite or adja-
cent States does not representa challenge to the general equality of coastal States
in respect of maritime jurisdiction. On the contrary, the decisions involve the
working out of the concept of equality in relatively complex geographical cir-
cumstances. As 1shall demonstrate later on in this presentation, the key decisions442 CONTINENTAL SHELF
on shelf delimitation provide no support whatsoever to the Libyan position on the
significance of coasts and lengths of coasts.
Mr. President, any attribution of maritime jurisdiction and any consequent
issues of delimitation lead to a consideration of the political implications of
coastal geography. In as much as the canduct of the parties and elements of
acquiescence are relevant in the particular case, maritime delimitation bears cer-
tain similarities to the delimitation of land boundaries. And, of course. in both
cases the alignment rnay be the subject of political agreement. In other respects
the delimitation of sea-bed boundaries as between opposite or adjacent States
is very closely and in most cases exclusively a question of the political (and there-
fore legal) implications of coastal geography, and this was recognized by the
Judgment of the Chamber in the Culfof Maine case (I.C.J.Reports 1984, p. 327,
para. 195).
The political implications of coastal geography were perceived very clearly by
rhe CourijntheAngln-Nomegian Fisheries case. In the well-known passage in
which the Court referred to "the close dependence of the territorial sea upon ihe
land domain", the Court carefully indicated the two different but related conse-
quences of being a coastal State. On the ane hand, the coast generates title: and
thus the Court observed that "it is the land which confers upon the coastal State
a right to the waters off its coasts" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 133). On the other
hand, "the drawing of straight baselines must notdepart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast" (ihid.). Thus the land is both a generator
of rights and a source of limitation and control over the ambit of those rights:the
coast prefigures the delimitation of the rights the existence of which are contin-
gent upon it.
The link between continental shelf and pre-existing concepts of maritime law
was clearly recognized by the Court in its Judgment in the Norih Sea Continental
Sheifcases. The relevant passage reads as follows:
"The doctrine of the continental shelf is a recent instance of encroach-
ment on maritime expanses which. during the greater part of history, apper-
tained to no-one. The contiguous zone and the continental shelf are in this
respect concepts of the same kind. In both instances the principle is applied
ihat the land dominates the sea: it is consequently necessary to examine
closely the geographical configuration of the coastlines of the countries
whose continental shelves are to be delimited. This is one of the reasons
why the Court does not consider that markedly pronounced configurations
can beignored: for. since the land is the legal source of the power which a
State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward, it must first be
clearly established what features do in fact constitute such extensions.
Above ail is this the case when whai is involved is no Ionger areas of sea,
such as the contiguous zone, but streiches of submerged land; for the legal
rkgime of the continental shelf is that of a soi1 and a subsoil, two words
evocative of the land and not of the sea." (1.CJ. Reports 1969. p. 51, para.
96.)
Itmay be remarked that this passage is redolent of continuity of doctrine and a
iraditional approach to the concept of the continental shelf.
The following passage from the decision of the Anglo-French Court of Arbi-
tration is of interest in the same connection:
"In international law . . . the concept of the continental shelf is a juridi-
cal concept which connotes the natural prolongation under the sea not of a
continent or geographical landmass but of the land territory of each State."
(Decision of 30 June 1977. para. 191.) ARGUMENT' OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 443
1 would like to complete this survey of the relevant judicial pronouncements
by a quotation from the Judgment of the Court in the TunisialLibya case:
"lt should first be recalled that exclusive rights over submarine areas
belong to the coastal State. The geographic correlation between coast and
submerged areas off the coast is the basis of the coastal State's legal title.
As the Court explained in the North Sea Conlinenfa1 Shelf cases the conti-
nental shelf is a legal concept in which 'the principle is applied that the
land dominates the sea' (I.CJ. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96). In the
Aegeon Seo Continenta l heifcase the Court emphasized that
'it is solely by virtue of the coastal State's sovereignty over the land
that nghts of exploration and exploitation in the continentat shelf can
attach to it,ipsojure, under international law. In short, continental shelf
rights are Legallyboth an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of
the territorial sovereigntj' of the coastal State.' (I.C.J. Reports 1978,
p. 36, para. 86.)
As has been explained in connection with the concept of natural prolonga-
tion, the coast of the territory of the State is a decisive factor for title to
submarine areas adjacent ro it. Adjacency of the sea-bed to the territory of
the coastal State has been the paramount criterion for determining the legal
status of the submerged areas, as distinct from their delimitation, without
regard to the various elenients which have become significant for the
extension of these areas in the process of the legal evolution of the rules of
international law." (1.CJ. Rtlports 1982, p. 61, para. 73.)
Mr. President, there is no hint in these expressions of judicial opinion that the
magnitude of the territory lying behind the coasts has any relevance either to
entitlement or to delimitation. It is the sovereignty of the coastal State over its
land territory which creates entitlement to rights over shelf areas. As in the case
of the territorial sea, the sovereignty of the coastal State is the necessary condi-
tion for the existence of maritime jurisdiction. And naturally in this connection
the sovereignty of a srnallcoastal State counts in e~actly thesame way as thai of
a large coastal State.
The political thinking, or assumption, behind continental shelf claims has
always regarded the coast, and not the landmass behind, as the relevant land ter-
ritory.To think in terms of the size of landmass would involve transmuting mari-
time claims into synthetic territorial claims. The criteria of territorial magnitude
and coastal length advanced by Libya in this case are criteria of distribution
entirely divorced from the actual relation of submerged areas to the land
territory. Such criteria have no relation to the practical criteria of attribution and
appurtenance Io be found in thc text of the Truman Proclamation and in the
jurisprudence of the Court. These criteria of attribution are as follow:
(a) the general concept of contiguity and appurtenance;
(h) the principle.of security or self-protection;
(c) the principle of non-encroachment; and
(d) the conservation and reservation of the natural resources of the sea-bed in
favour of the coastal State:and thus the continental shelf doctrine authorized
the coastal State to object to the exploitation of the sea-bed in front of its
coasts king undertaken by other States.
Such criteria relate to entitlement rather than to delimitation as such, but they
provide the rationale for shelf claims and constitute the logical framework for the
process of delimitation. It is immediately apparent that they are criteria con-444 CONTINENTALSHELF
noting equality and rio1distribution according to territorial magnitude. Security,
access to and reservation of resources, and non-encroachment are quantities
which cannot be said to benefit some coastal States more than others. Whatever
the problems of delimitation which cal1for solution, these can only affect margi-
nal areas and the solution must be one within a broad framework of equality.
Apportionment in accordance with extemal values, such as temtonal magnitude,
is fundamentally opposed to the traditional assumptions behind maritime delimi-
tation.
These propositions can be tested by a consideration of the maritime frontiers of
closed or semi-encloseii seas such as the Black Sea, the Baltic Seaand the North
Sea. The situation of those seas is shown in Malta's dossier on Figures 19,20 and
24 respectively. In al1ihese cases the process of maritime delimitation is either
virtually complete or well advanced. The pattern includes the establishment of
territorial seaimits and rhedelimitation of areas of conririenial sfielf. There is no
sign in the practice of the States concerned that territorial magnitude is con-
sidered relevant to the process of maritime delimitation. Equality is the order of
the day, both in respect of territorial sea, and continental shelf areas. After all,
the automatic and generally equal effect on entitlement, which al1coasts have,
has resulted in the prominence of the subject of basepoints and baselines.
Mr. President, 1 can now present my conclusions as to.the significance of
coasts in maritime deliinitation seen as a matter of general principle. In summary
form, those conclusions are as follows:
First. the long-established tradition in matters of maritime jurisdiction and
delimitation has been that the seaward reach of the territorial sea, contiguous
zones and fishery conservation zones should always be presumed to be generally
equal for al1 coastal Staies. It follows that the seaward extent of jurisdiction
should not reflect the varying territorial magnitudes of the coastal States.
Second, continental shelf rights are legally both an emanation from and an
automatic adjunct of the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State; and the judi-
cial sources of this doctrine of coastal State entitlement indicate that in this
context the sovereignty of a small coastal State counts in exactly the same way
as that of a larger coastal State.
Third, the criteria of attribution recognized in the Truman Proclamation and in
thejurisprudence of the Court -and especially the principles of security or self-
protection and of non-encroachment - are essentially different from the criteria
of distribution relied upon by Libya which are divorced from the actual relation
of submerged areas to the land territory.
1have concluded my examination of the Libyan case in relation to the general
significance of coasts in the context of maritime jurisdiction. ln the courseof this
1have made reference at appropriate points to the Libyan argument based upon
territorial magnitude since that is closely associated with the Libyan position on
the significance of coasts.
However. the Libyan argument presents the factor of relative landmass as an
independent element, which in effect concerns both entitlement and delimitation,
and which has no necessary connection with the issue of proportionality, and
thus it is appropriate to examine this element separately and on its own terms.
The terms in which the Libyan argument is expressed do not lack either colour
or emphasis. The Counter-Memorial expresses the matter in two distinct pas-
sages. In thefirst passage Libya States that:
"the extent of the land territory behind the Coastmust beregarded as linked
to the factor of the natural prolongation of the land temitory of a State from ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 445
its coast seaward by way of its continental shelf. The land territory behind
Libya's extensive coast is immense, whereas both the coast and land terri-
tory of Malta are very small. Surely, the intensity of the natural prolonga-
tion must be greater - the prolongation, more natural - from the Libyan
coast in arriving at a line of delimitation?" (II, LCM, para. 2.48.)
And elsewhere in the same pleading it is said:
"The continental shelf concept, though a legül concept and subject to
legal interpretation according to its object and purpose. cannot be divorced
from its factual basis. lt is the landmass behind the coast which - by its
continuation into and under the sea - provides the factual basis and legal
justification for a State's entitlement ro continental shelf rights over man-
time areas before its coast - and not mere distance or proximity from cer-
tain basepoints on the coast." (Ihid., para. 4.19.)
These passages - and others which could be cited - indicate that it is the size
of Libyan territory and not rnerely the length of its coastline which is the nub of
the argument.
Thus the Libyan Reply contains the assertion:
"If geography is not to be refashioned .. . the size of Malta and the size
of Libya are undeniabfe facts relevant to the question of delimitation."
(Supra, LR, para. 5.12.)
Mr. President, there are many reasons for rejecting the landmass factor as
irrelevant to continental shelf delimitation.
In the firsi place, i! involves a misunderstanding of the legal character of the
concept of natural prolongation as it has evolved since the Judgment in the North
Seo Continental Slteycases. Indeed, as Judge Jimbnez de Aréchaganoted in his
separate opinion in the TunisialLibyo case, the Judgment in the North Sea Conli-
nental Shelfcases made ilclear that
"'natural prolongation' is a concept divorced from any geomorphological
or geological requirement and that it merely expresses the continuation or
extension seawards of each State's coastal front" (I.C.J. Reports 1982,
p. 116, para. 58).
The second reason for rejecting the landmass argument is that the factor of ter-
ritorial magnitude has no necessary relation to the incidence or lengths of coast-
lines; and differences between spatial magnitudes could not be used except as an
index for a process of spatial distribution of sea-bed areas.
Thirdly, the factor of territorial magnitude is completely alien to the concept of
a boundary whether it içmaritime or in land territory. In the course of disputes
concerning territory and the location of land boundariesmany arguments. some
legai, some factual and political, rnay be advanced. As the Court will readily
appreciate the relative magnitude of the Parties is a complete novelty in this res-
pect. Itis apparent that the factor of territorial magnitude is inirnical to the idea
of equity and this is no doubt why in historical terms it has not been invoked in
relation to territorial disputes. The factor of territorial magnitude is equally
unsuited to the resoluiion of continental shelf disputes and, as the Court recog-
nized in the Aegean Sea Continen~a lheîf case (I.C.J.Reports 1978, pp. 36-37,
paras. 86-90), shelf disputes have an essentially territorial character.
The fourth reason for rejection is that there is no judicial authority in support
of the factor of relative magnitude. Indeed, the argument is so novel that tribu-
nal~have lacked the opportunity to reject it. However, it may be recalled that the
United States employed an argument based upon the concept of "dominant inter-446 CONTINENTAL SHELF
est" in the GulfofMuine case, which has a very slight affinity with the Libyan
thesis under examination. And it is to benoted thai the Chamber gave no en-
couragement io the use of such a concept (I.C.J.Reporrs1984,p. 246, pp. 340-
342, paras. 223-237).
Certainly, there is no evidenceof reference to territorial magnitude in the State
practice concerning shelf delimitation. There is noevidence that States with large
hinterlands, such as tlie USSR, Colombia, Venezuela, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or
India, have had the benefit of any concept of territorial magnitude in effecting
delimitations withsmaller neighbours.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, if territorial magnitude were to be a
relevant factor, the crinsequences of State succession would be radical. The
appearance or absorption of small coasta1 States would result in a need to re-
order maritime delimitations carried out on the basis of the previous relative
magnitudes.
Thus, a series of important considerations of principle and good policy
strongly militate against any legitimation of the argument based upon territo-
rial magnitude and 1have perhaps given it more attention than it really deserves.
1shall now return to the major elements in my presentation, rnoving from the
general significance of coasts inaritime delimitation to a consideration of the
precise significance of coasial configurations for theurposes of continental
sheif delimitation.
III.THE LEGALSIGNIFICANC OFECOASTAL CONFIGURATIONS
IN RELATIO TNOCONTINENTA SLELFDELIMITATION
In the Tunisiu/LibyaJudgment the Court underlined the significance of coasts
in relation to continental shelf entitlement. In the view of the Court the shelf
included any sea-bed iirea possessing a relationship of adjacency to the coast of
the territory of the coastal State. and it was stated that "the geographic cor-
relation between coast and subrnerged areasoff the coast is the basi sf the
coastal State's legal title" (I.C.J.Reports 1982, p. 61, para. The.Judgment
asa whole places considerableemphasis upon actual coasts both in Lhecontext of
entitlement and of delimitation (see, in particular, ihid.. pp. 88-89, p127-.
129). Moreover, in the dispositif the relevant circumstances tbe taken into
account included "the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, and in
particular the marked change in direction of the Tunisian coastline between Ras
Ajdir and Ras Kabudia" (ihid.p. 93, para. 133, B(2)).This focus upon coasts
and coasial relationships had, after all, been characteristic of the earlier
decisions on shelf delimitation,and the Judgment of the Chamber in the Gulf
of Maine case again emphasizes the close connection between the geography of
coasts and the choice of equitable criteria (I.C.J. Reports 1984. p. 327,
para. 195).
And yet the Libyan argument presents coasts either as an abstraction based
upon length or asa novel concept related to the landmass of the temtory lying
behind the coast. In contrast, Malta uses the term coasts within the framework
of legal principle.
In the view of Malta. based upon the jurisprudence of the Court, the signifi-
came of coasts issimplyan aspect of the political and therefore the legal signi-
ficance of geographical relationships. In this conception it is location and rela-
tionship which are the determining factors, and not length as an abstract
quantity.
In principle. the fact that a coast is "long" or "shon", or that it is the coast of
an island or peninsula. or that it is part afconcave or convex coastline, is ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 447
much less significant than the location of the particular coasts in relation to
other coasls. In the final analysis it is location which determines rhe decisive
relationships, not length and not insularity. Indeed. the relarive significance of
lengrh is recognized even in the formula relating to proportionality in tdispo-
sitif of the Judgment in the North Seo Continental Shelf cases. The element of
proportionaliry is there defined by reference to the length of ihe coasi "meas-
ured in the general direction of the coastline" (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 54,
para. 101. D (3)), and a similar formulation appears in the disposif$ of the
Judgment in the finisial Liby case (I.C.J.Reports 1982, p. 93, para. 133, B (5)).
Some examples may be taken from the cases. In the North Seo Conriirenral
Sheycases the relevant geographical circumstances were the existence of three
coastal States with adjacent continental shelves, of which themiddle State, the
German Federnl Republic, had a inarkedly concave and recessing coast. As the
Court made clear in the Judgment, the fact that the coastlineswere comparable
in length was only significant given the configuration of the relevant coastlines
and their relation to each other (I.C.J. Reports 1969. p. 49. para.91). As the
Court pointed out, the facts presented a situation of "equality within thesame
order" (ihid.).
Further examples are furnished by the Decision of the Anglo-French Court of
Arbitration in 1977. In particular, the role of the Channel Islands was derer-
mined by their distance from the English mainland, and by their location close
to the French coast and practically within them5 of a gulf on the French coast
(Decision, paras. 181-190). Again the role of Cornwall and the Scilly Islands,
and of Finistère and Ushant, in respect of the Atlanticregion in thesamç case,
was determined by the location and alignment of ihese features in relation to
each other and in relation io the continental shelf which extended a great dis-
tance into the Atlantic Ocean (Decision, paras. 233,240-248). Some representa-
tion of the lines drawn on that basis maybe seen in the Malta dossier (Fig. 25).
Thus, in judicial practice features are not classified as "islands" or "long coasts"
or "peninsulas" for purposes of delimitation. The focus is broadly upon the
overall geographical circumstances ofthe particular case (Decision of ihe Anglo-
French Court of Arbitration, paras. 94, 239-240). In al1 these examples the
length of particular coasts maybe relevant as a part oü pattern of geographical
circumstances, but it is the location and relationshipf features to one anottier
which are the key elements in the analysis. The length of this or that coastline
taken in isolation cannot playa role either in ünalysis wiahview to selccting a
method af delimitation or in the process of delimitation as such.
IV. THE ~DENTIFICATIOOFFITHE AREA"RELEVANT
TO THE DEL:ISI OONTHE DISPUTE"
The conclusion that it is the overall geographical context which is significant,
and not coastsor lengths of coasts as such, leads to a further consideration. In the
TunisialLibya case the Court indicated that the practical aspect of assessing the
relationship of the coasts of the Parties involved the identificationf the area
"relevant to the decision of the dispute". In the words of the Co:rt
"As has been explained in connection with the concept of naiural prolon-
gation. the coast of theen-itory of the State is the decisive facior for title
tosubinarine areas adjacent to it. Adjacency of the sea-bed to the territory
of the coastal State has been the paramount criterion for determining the
legal status of the submerged areas, as distinct frorn their delimitation,
without regard to the vanous elements which have become significant for448 CONTINENTAL SHELF
the extension of these areas in. the process of the legal evolution of the
rules of international law."
And the Court continiies :
"74. The coasr of each of the Parties, therefore, constitutes the starting
line from which one has to set out in order to ascertain how far the sub-
marine areas appertaining to each of them extend in a seaward direction,
as well as in relation to neighbouring States situated either in an adjacent
or opposite position."
The Court continues :
"The only areas which can be relevant for the determination of the
claims of Libya and Tunisia to the continental shelf in front of their respec-
tive coasts are those which can be considered as lying either off the Tuni-
sian or off the Libyan coast. These areas form together the area which is
relevant to the decision of the dispute. The area in dispute, where one
claim encroaches on the other, is that part of this whole area which can be
considered as lying both off the Libyan coast and off the Tunisian coast."
(I.C.JReporrs 1982, p. 61, paras. 73-74.)
Mr. President, itis the overall geographical circumstances which must estab-
lish the general dimerisions of the area relevant for the purposes of delimitation.
The ciriire coasts of Malta and Libya fucing one unother must be taken into
account in determining the relevant area. In the result the relevant area is boun-
ded by lines joining the terminus of the land frontier with Tunisia and the rele-
vant point on the eastern aspect of Cyrenaica to the respective western and east-
ern aspects of the island of Malta. The result. embellished by 8median line, is the
simple trapezium figure employed by Malta in the written proceedings. That tra-
pezium has been indicated on the basemap in front of the Court and may also be
seen on Figures 7 and 26 in the Malta dossier.
There is in my submission no case for taking a sector of Libyan coast having
an eastern terminus at Ras Zarruq as the basis for the relevant area. The Libyan
pleadings have failed to justify this arbitrary compression of the relevant area (1,
LM. para. 10.09 ; II,LCM, para. 2.44 ;supra. LR. para. 5.14 ; and para. 6.07).
It is quite simply indefensible to accept the relevance of the Libyan coastline
as far West as Ras Ajdir and at the same time to stop eastward at Ras Zanuq,
which is much less tangentially opposite Malta than Ras Ajdir. The asimuth from
Ras Ajdir to Malta is very much at an angle. The straight line from Ras Zarruq to
Malta is much less at an angle. The reasons for which in the Libyan view the area
east of the Medina Escarprnent should be excluded have no relevance to the
coastal relaiionships at present under examination and they lack relevance in
any case.
In this same connection, if the actual coastal relationships are considered as
such. it would be odd indeed if the embayment of the Gulf of Sirte, which com-
mences more or less at Ras Zamq, should have the dramatic consequence that
sea-bed areas which would aiherwise clearly satisfy the test of relevance should
cease to be relevant, at least for Malta's part in the delimitation process. In prin-
ciple, it should be attitude of coasts to each other and not the distance between
them which detemines what is relevant. that is to Say,fit tbe divided between
the Parties in dispute.
The Libyan approach to the relevant area in its eastern aspect is quite simply
free from any tincture of rationality. In the first place, Libya makes a claim
which encroachesextensively upon the sea-bed adjacent to Maltais coasts, and at
the same time takes a spatially restricted view of relevance in the areas to the east ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 449
of Ras Zarruq.Of course, the fact that the Gulf of Sirte is an embayrnent should
not give Libya an advantage in the definition of the relevant area for
delirnitation vis-&-visMalta.
In the second place, the logic of the Libyan argument involves treating the dis-
tance between the facing coasts as a factor which isntal to Malta in the
general context of identifying relevant areas, and yet is not detrimental to Libya
in the context of claiming areas very close to the coasts of Malta.
1 would respectfully ask the Court to refer to the available pictonal indications
of the Libyan clairn. Therst of these is the Libyan proposa1 of 1973,which
@ appears in Malta's Illustrations in Figure 1 and which appears originally as
Map 9 in the Libyan Mernorial.
The line indicated in red very close to Malta on that map conspicuously
assumes that there are relevant areas to the east of the hypothetical azimuth
drawn between Ras Zamq and the eastem aspect oflta's Coastfacing Libya.
You have the red line of 1973 going round indan angular way and then we
have the azimuth, a straight line on the map frorn Malta to Ras Zamq. The dis-
position of the73 line quite clearly assumes there is territory, so to speak, to
be divided to the east of a line between Malta and Ras Zarruq.
The other pictonal indications of the Libyan claim involve the so-called Rift
@ Zone as defined in the Libyan Mernorial and illustrbyeMap 17 of that
@ Mernorial. The Rift Zone appears again on Map 12 of the Libyan Reply and
again on Map 13 of the Libyan Reply, in this case with the addition of the so-
@ called "axial ridge line". The Rift Zone and the axial ridge line are depicted on
@ Figure 13 of Malta's dossier. A study of these rnaps shows that without any
doubta line which would follow the general direction of the Rift Zone. as reques-
ted in the subrnissions, necessarily involves the dofishelf areas lying
far to the east of the Malta to Ras Zamq hypothetical azirnuth.
The Libyan positionf the exteiit of the relevant area in this case lacks foun-
dation and is incompatible with the views Libya has held at various times on
theextent of its claim as against Malta and. in particular, the east-west ambit of
the different versions of theii claim.
The view which Malta holds onthe questionof the relevant area is based upon
the essentially simple coastal relationships between the two Parties. The areas
included within the trapezium satisfy the test propounded by the Court in the
TunisialLi cayea(I.C.Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 74) and consequently can be
considered as lying both off the coasts of Libya and off the coasts of Malta.
The embayment to the east of Ras Zarruq cannot be said to affect the essence
of the coastal relationship. It is true that largelf are included, but that
fact is in no waynirnical to the view taken by Malta. It is the attitude of the
coasts the one to the other which is paramount.
V. THE CONCEPT OF EQUALIT AND THEGEOGRAPHIC FEATURES
WHICH ESTABLIS HHELEGAL FRAMEWORK
The identification of the area relevant to the decision of trtfacetute is
of the more general process which involves an analysis of the overall geagraphi-
cal circumstances with a view to establishing a geographical and legal frarne-
work for the delimitation. The geography of coasts produces the setting in which
the criteria of equity must be applied and a prirnary criterion is that of equality.
Thus in the GulfoMaine case the Judgmenr sta:ed
"that the Chamber's basic choice should favour a criterion lonbeheld to
as equitable as it is simple, namely that in principie, while having regard to
the special circumstances of the case, one should aim at an equal division450 CONTINENTAL SHELF
of areas where the maritime projections of the coasts of the States between
which delimitation is to be effected converge and overlap" (I.C.J.Reports
1984, p. 327, para. 195).
The Chamber gave great ernphasis to this principle of equa) division, and
remarked that it was "a criterion which need only be stated to be seen as intrin-
sically equitable" (ihid.. para. 197).
The problem no doubt is to apply the concept of equality to the geography of
the particular case,andthe coastal geography of the Gulfof Maine casecannot be
said to be comparable to that of the present case. Of the preceding jurisprudence,
the Decision of 1977 in the Anglo-French arbitration may be singled out as
containing elements, both geographical and legal, which may be of some rele-
vance in approaching the problern of delimitation in the present case.
The Decision in the Anglo-French case formulated and applied two concepts,
which formed the foundation of the reasoning of the Court of Arbitration, and
which are in rnany ways instructive and suggestive.
The first of these concepts is that of a relationship of approximate equality
within the geographical and legal framework preseoted by the facts (see the
Decision, para. 181).
The second of these concepts is chat of "the balance of geographical circum-
stances" between the parties in the particular region. In the Anglo-French Con-
tinental Shelf arbitration this concept was employed prorninently as a tool of
analysis and as an important part of the process of delimitation.
In the case of the region of the English Channel the balance of geographi-
cal circumstances resulted from the relationship of opposite coasts (Decision,
paras. 181-182), the unity and continuity of the region (ihid., para. 181), and the
broad equality of the coastlines in relation to the continental shelf (ihid.,
paras. 182-183, 196, 199, 201).
In the case of the Atlantic region the Court sought the geographical features
which would establish the legal framework for its decision (ihid., paras. 232
et seq.). The conclusion reached was that in the Atlantic region "the situation
geographically is one of two laterally related coasts, abutting on the same conti-
nental shelf which extends from them a great distance seawards into the Atlantic
Ocean" (ihid., para. 241;and see also para. 242).
There can be no doubt that the determination of the key geographical features,
on the basis of the "acrual geographical conditions of the particular area of conti-
nental shelf to be delirnited" (ihid., para. 240), is in practice a more significant
analytical tool for theCourt than generalizations about lengths of coasts, or about
islands, or about the distinction between "opposite" or "adjacent" States.
The concept of a "balance of geographical circumstances" is at the same time
both simple and complex. The concept is not based on the idea of symmetry, nor
on the equality of the actual mass of geographical features, and still less on the
idea that coastal frontages should be of equal length.
Thus in the Anglii-French case there is no indication that the Court of Arbi-
tration regarded the equality of lengths of coastlines as a necessary condition in
al1cases for the determination of a balance of geographical circumstances. The
position and attitude of geographical features are regarded as more significant
than length of coasts a'ssuch. Thus in the Anglo-French case the legal frarnework
for delimitation in the Atlantic region consisted of relatively short segments of
Coast abutting on the shelf areas to be delimited (ibid., paras. 233-235; Malta
Illustrations, Fig. 25). Both maritime frontiers were based upon attentuated
features, and so much so that the French Republic had contended that the United
Kingdorn had no maritime frontage facing the region. ARGUMENT OF PROFESSORBROWNLIE 45 1
In the Anglo-French case a particularly striking feature is the readiness of the
Court not only to attach the same significance to the Comish peninsula as it did
to the coast of Finistère but also to regard the Scilly Isles lying some 21 miles
beyond the Cornish peninsula as a part of the coastline of the United Kingdom
(Decision, paras. 235, 248-249). It is true that the further projection westward of
the Scilly lsles was regarded as a cause of distortion justifying a modification of
the equidistance method which was otherwise applicable in the circumstances of
the Atlantic region. But the important point is the significance for delimitation of
every very attenuated feature provided they bear the necessary relation to the
shelf areas to be delimited.
In certain geographical circumstances short sectors of abutting coast will play
a major role in delimitation providing their location is criticai. In the case of the
region of the English Channel the two long opposite coasts having a broad equa-
lity in relation to the continental shelf provided the balance of geographical cir-
cumstances and therefore the legal framework. In the case of the Atlantic region
the key features were constituted by two peninsulas and both Ushant and the
Scilly Isles were treated as mainland for certain purposes. Indeed Ushant was
given full effect in respect of adelimitarion affecting shelf areas reaching Farout
to the 1.000-metre isobath. Point M of the line established by the Court of Arbi-
tration involves giving full effect ioUshantanri this point plays a major role in
the determinaiion of the final sector of the delimitation from Point M to Point N,
a line approximately 170 nautical miles in length (Decision, para. 254; Malra
Illustrations, Fig. 25).
In the present case,itis fair to say, the geographical framework is a hybrid of
the two situations presented in the Anglo-French case. The small island grtiup of
Malta and its dependencies face the long Libyan coast. Thus the relationship
of the principalcoasts is partly that of the Atlantic region, where short sectorof
abutting coast were piven significünt role in the delimitation, and partly that of
the long opposite coasts of the English Channel. The coasts of Malta and Libya
are not laterally related, like those of the Atlantic region, and of course there is
no equality of length of coast.
In the geographical circumstances of the present case what is the balance of
geographical circumstances? In one sense there isno balance, since the two prin-
cipal features, the island State of Malia and the long coasr of Libya. do not share
a common identity. There are no parallel circumstances of the kind which per-
mitted the Court in the North Seo Continental Sheif cases to regard the three
States concemed as being in "a geographical situation of quasi-equality" (I.C.J.
Reports 1969. pp. 49-50, para. 91). There is thus no possibility of equality being
"reckoned within the same plane" in the words of the Judgment in the North Sea
Continental Shelfcases {ihid.).
How then is a balance of geographical circumstances, an approximate equality,
to be found as between Malta and Libya? Mr. President, the beginning of the
answer is to be found in the Judgment in the North Seo ContinentalShevcases,
where the Court outlined the modus opci.undiof delimitation in the following
way :
"Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never be any
question of completely refashioning nature, and equity does not require that
a State without access IO the sea should be allotted an area of continental
shelf, any more than there could be a question of rendering the situation of
a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a State with a restric-
ted coastline. Equality is to be reckoned within the same plane, and it is
not such natural inequalities as ihese that equity could remedy. But in the452 CONTINENTAL SHELF
present case there are three States whose North Sea coastlines are in fact
comparable in length and which, therefore. have been given broadly equal
treatment by nature except that the configuration of one of the coastlines
would, if the equidistance method is used, deny to one of these States treat-
ment equal or comparable to that given the other two. Here indeed is a
case where, in a theoretical situation of equality within the same order,an
inequity is created. What is unacceptable in this instance is that a State
should enjoy continental shelf rights considerably different from those of
its neighbours merely because in the one case the coastline is roughly
convex in form and in the other it is markedly concave, although those
coastlines are comparable in iength. It is therefore not a question of totally
refashioning geography whatever the facts of the situation but. given a geo-
graphical situation of quasi-equality as between a number of States. of
abating the effects of an incidental special feature from which an unjusti-
fiable differenceof treatment could result." (I.C.J.Reports 1969, pp. 49-50,
para. 91.)
The task as always is to make legal sense of the actual geography and to avoid
imposing a solution which involves, so to speak, going behind the real geogra-
phical and political circumstances. In the present case. the fact that there is no
natural quasi-equality as between the Parties has the simple Consequence thatthe
island Srareof Malta and the long-ctiast State of Libya constitute, so ro speak,
neutral quantities in their relationship.e groupof islands forming the Republic
of Malta cannot be treated as an incidental special feature falling within a geo-
graphical and legal framework established by other primary elements in the
situation. The factsof this case are entirely unlike those concerning the Channel
Islands region in the Anglo-French case. There the key elements were the fact
that the Channel Islands region formed part of the English Channel, the Parties
facing each other as opposiie States having almost equal coastlines, and were
"wholly detached geographically from the United Kingdom" (Decision of
30 June 1977, para. 199).
In the present case the Maltese group is a primary element in the geographical
and legal frarnework, and thus plays a major role in that framework.
Th,:Court adjournedfrom 11.20 to 11.35 o.m.
Mr. President, before the break 1was considering. and I was near the end of
my consideration. the concept of equality and the geographical features which
establish the legal framework of any delimitation of continental shelf areas. and
1had completed that part of rny exposition by saying that in the present case the
Maltese group is a primary element in the geographical and legal framework and
plays a major role irthat framework.
The geographical difference between Malta and Libya can have no automatic
effect either of a beneficial or detrimental nature so far as Malta is concerned.
Geography cannot be refashioned and there is no basis for the modification of
the normal delimitation to avoid the distortion caused by any incidental special
features.
In the present case there are no special features. Only the relationship of
Maltese and Libyan coasts. The situation is neither legally nor geographically
eccentric.
In the absence of a situation of geographical quasi-equality of the type visible
in the North Seo ConrinenialSheifcases. the correct approach must surely be to ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 453
ascribe equal legal significance to the coasts of the Parties for purposes of shelf
delimitation. To do so is not to impose an equality which is not there originally.
Indeed, equality is only in issuin the sense that it is necessary to avoid inequa-
Iity of attribution. The law requires that the major geographical elements be
given full faith and credit in the process of delimitation and this means giving
equal significance to the coasts of the two Statesdivided by theame continental
shelf.
In legal terms Malta is a major element in the geographical and legal frame-
work and the Maltese group produces the same seaward reach of sovereign rights
over adjacent shelf areas as other coastal States. The island of Malta is a main-
land and its coasts actually abut upon the shelf areas dividing the Parties. The
southerly aspects of the coasts ofMalta have an equality of seaward reach with
the coasts of Libya.
The shape and location of the Malta group. and not the relative length of coast-
lines, are the determinants of the appropriate solution. and this can onlbe the
application of the equidistance method.
The soundness of this approach isconfirmed by the fact rhat even if Malta had
a longer coast, this would have little or no effect on the generation of shelf rights
@ vis-A-vis Libya. 1respectfully draw the attention of the Court to Diagram A of
the Libyan Counter-Mernorial, which is reproduced in the Malta dossier at
@ Figure 27. This diagram shows how the geography should work unless it is to be
in legal terms "refashioned".
As Malta has pointed out in the Reply. practical experience of boundary-
making in the Persian or Arabian Gulf, for example. supports the view that the
normal legal reflection of real coasts takes the form of the equality of seaward
extension of jurisdiction. The delimitations involving the island State of Bahrain
are of particular interest and in the delimitations of Bahrain with both lran and
SaudiArabia there is an equality of seaward reach; 1refer the Court to the Malta
dossier, Figure22.
In the geogrrtphiciilircumstances of the present case only a delimiiation based
upon equidistance is appropriate. Such a solution involves no more than a recog-
nition of the geographical and therefore the political realities. There are no inci-
dental special features which cal1for modification of equidistance.
In the seaward relationship of Malta and Libya the equidistance method would
reflect and not ignore the geographical circumstances and woutd not be inequi-
table in result. The use of equidistiince in present circumstances simply cannot
involve the sources of inequity detected by the Court in the very different cir-
cumstances prevailing in the North Seo Conlinenta1 Shelf cases (I.C.J.Reports
1969, p. 49, para. 89).
By way of concluding this section of my argument, Mr. President, 1cm sum-
marize the position by saying that in the circumstances of this case, the only
appropriate balance of geographical circumstances involves the preservation of
the status quo. The principle of equality of seaward extension achieves this aim
whilst the Libyan claim does not.
It is not merely the fact that Libya is contending for a virtual monopoly of the
continental shelf dividing the Parties. The most stnking feature of the Libyan
argument is that it calls for an apportionment de novo of the sea-bed areas on the
basis of an abstract formula based upon the discrepancy in the lengths of the
coasts of the Parties. Such an approach essentially destroys the role of real coasts
and actual geographical relationships. The introduction of the thesis that territo-
rial magnitude is also relevant to delimitation gives further emphasis to the inten-
tion to divorce the processf delimitation from the realities of coastal geography
and coastal relationships. In the result Libya does not so much seek to refashion454 CONTINENTAL SHELF
geography but rathei to set it aside altogether in favour of a scheme of distribu-
tive justice based upon an index of territorial magnitude.
1. Introduction
The object of my argument until now has been the significance of lengths of
coasts aside from questions classified as issues of proportionality. This treatrnent
has been justified in part by the character of the Libyan arguments and by the
order of Libya's submissions, and in part by the need to examine certain funda-
mental questions which lie behind the legal principles conceming delimitation of
the shelf and maritime jurisdiction in general.
1 must now address the group of related issues commonly categorized as the
"question of proportionality", which is variously described as a "critenon", a
"factor", a "principle", an "element" and a "test".
1 would preface my remarks on this protean topic by emphasizing what may
seem rather obvious after a perusal of the pleadings in this case ; namely, that the
terrn proportionality may stand for a variety of concepts and it may be used as a
familiar and apparently orthodox label to give legitimacy to arguments which are
entirely incompatible with legal principle and sound policy in matters of delimi-
tation.
2. TheLibyan View of Proportionality
The Libyan view of proportionality in this case is really nothing more than a
self-serving version of distributive justice which in essence involves apportion-
ment de novo and not delimitation in accordance with legal principle. However,
the essence of the Libyan position is to sorne extent obscured by the appearance,
in the Libyan Mernorial especially, of acknowledgments of matters of principle
which are entirely orthodox. Thus the Libyan Memorial (1, LM, para. 6.90)
quotes from the Decision in the Anglo-French arbitration to the effect that :
"Proportionality . . . is to be used as a criterion or factor relevant in
evaluating the equities of certain geographical situations, not as a general
principle providing an independent source of rights to areas of continental
shelf." (Decisinn, para. 101 .)
Moreover, the precise version of the test which Libya relies upon is that of
"proportionality in the light of the ratios between the lengths of the coasts of the
Parties" (1,LM, para. 10.18) and this reflects passages of the Judgment and dis-
positif in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (I.C.J. Reporls 1969, p. 52,
para. 98 ;p. 54, para. 101, D (3)).
These elements of apparent orthodoxy are in fact merely the trappings of
respectability, and are the mere appearance of legal principle. The essence of
the Libyan argument is very different.
Mr. President, the substance of the Libyan argument in this case may be sum-
marized as follows :
First, there is an attack on the equidistance method of delimitation both in
general and in the context of this case.
Second, there is considerable reliance upon the concept of natural prolongation
both in relation to the basis of title and in relation to delimitation.
Third, it is asserted- without reference to proportionality - that delimitation
should take account of the difference in the lengths of the coasts of the Parties. ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 455
Fourth, the test of proportionality is invoked in the form based upon the ratio
of the lengths of the coasts of the Parties.
Fifth, the "proportionality" argument is said to produce a result which CO-
incides with and thus confirms the result based upon the concept of natural pro-
longation.
As 1 hope to demonstrate, the actual role of the Libyan proportionality argu-
ment and its relation to the other elements in the Libyan case is such that the
argument is not in fact based upon proportionality in the legal sense at all. The
use of the ratio of the lengths ofcriastscan only eount as a proportionality argu-
ment if that test is justifiable on the basis of the geographical circumstances
which constitute the legal framework of the particular case. In the absence of
such justification, the Libyan reference to the lengths of coasts, like the reference
to territorial magnitude in general, represents nothing more than a concept of dis-
tributive justice and the apportionment de novo of as yet unattributed areas of
sea-bed.
3. Malta's View of Proporfionaliry in Outline
In contrast to the extravagant use to which Libya seeks to put the concept of
proportionality, Malta has sought toplace proportionality effectively within the
broad context of the law concerning continental shelf delimitation. In accordance
with this modus operandi Maltais position concerning proportionality can be
stated in thefollowing propositions :
First, the role of proportionality must depend upon the general legal frame-
work.
Second, proportionality is a criterion for evaluating the equities of the given
geographical situation but is not in itself an independent determinant of what is
equitable within that geographical framework.
Third, the particular version of the criterion used by Libya - the reference to
the ratio of the lengths of the respective coasts - is not of general application
and cannot apply in the geographic:alcircumstances of the present case.
Fourth, the role of proportionality as it is evidenced by the relevant jurispru-
dence is to maintain the equality of the seaward reach of mainland coasts.
Fifth and last. in the geographical circumstances of the present case it is the
equidistance method which satisfies the criteria of equitable delimitation and
which therefore ipso factosatisfies the criterion of proportionality as it should
apply as between the opposite coasts of Malta and Libya.
4. TheImportance to the Delimitution Process of
the Genet-alLe'qalFrameu~ork
Having summarized Maltais position with respect to proportionality, it is now
necessary to probe niore deeply into the variety of issues which shelter under that
apparently simple category.
The adjective "proportionate" is sornewhat question-begging. A dictionary
definition of the ad.jective tends to be circular and thus the term is defined as
meaning "that is in proportion, or in due proportion". Proportionality, the noun,
is defined simply as"the quality, character, or fact, of being proportionate".
In the face of these unhelpful definitions it must follow that the standard of
proportioriality can only be given substance within a general framework such as
that of the delimitation process. The element of proportionality is a part of the
team of equitable principles; it is necessarily a congener of equitable principles456 CONTINENTAL SHELF
and cannot be seen in the role of an intruder employing values which are at
variance with the main body of equitable concepts and techniques.
The general legal frarnework is set by the actual geographical circurnstances of
the particular case regarded as a whole and in their main elements.
In the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case the Court pointed out that the
concept of proportionality was "clearly inherent in the notion of a delimiiation in
accordance wiih equitable principles" (Decision, para. 98). and thus the role of
proportionality rnay be relatively broad, and "not linked to any specific geogra-
phical feature" (ihid.. para. 99). And the same Coun of Arbitration emphasized
that "proportionality is not in itself a source of title to the continental shelf, but
is rather a criterion for evaluating the equities of certain geographical situations"
(ibid.. para.246).
In this conception, proportionality is regarded simply as a part of the rnatrix of
equitable principles and factors, which in turn are employed to determine the
balance of geographical circumstances as the basis for the task of delimitation. In
this mode, if the difference in the length of the respective coasts is irrelevant to
the balance of geographical circumstances, that issue cannot be reintroduced in
the form of an abstract proportionality test based on the ratio of the lengths of the
coasts, which formula is supposed to be predominant in the matter of seeking an
equitable solution, almost as if it were a species ofjus cogerrs. However, rhere is
a different and rnuch narrower conception of proportionality to be seen in the
jurisprudence. Proportionality rnay be employed as the justification for rnodifica-
tions in the prirnary delimitation which in general represents "the balance of geo-
graphical circumstances" and an "approximate equality" between the Parties. In
this context the purpose is to abate disproportionate effects resulting from "the
presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections" (North Sea Conrinental
Shelfcases. I.C.J. Reporls 1969, p. 36, para. 57), or from "individual geographical
features" (Anglo-French case, Decision, para. 100), or from the presence of
islands "wholly detached" from the mainland and thus anomalous in relation to
the "primary" equitable boundary (Anglo-French case, Decision. paras. 199. 201.
202).
In the circumstances of the present case. Mr. President, the delimitation can
only reflect the configurations of the coasts of the Parties and only the equidis-
tance method of deliniitation can provide the necessary equitable reflection of the
actual geography. No individual geographical features present causes of distor-
tion, and there is no justification for modification of the primary delimitation
based upon equidistance.
In the méfierof thinking about proportionality the particular version based
upon the ratio of coastal lengths represents a relativety exceptional mode, the
application of which will not fail to produce markedly inequitable results if the
legaland geographic;il context be inappropriate.
5. The Ratio of Coastal Lengths Produces a Crude Apportionment in Thi~Case
And in the present case the context is wholly unsuited to the application of the
test based upon the ratio of the respective lengths of coasts. Thisormula. applied
in a geographical situation where there is no equality within the same plane. but
simply the geographical data represented by the coasts of the Parties, would not
maintain approximate equality between the Parties. The actual geography repre-
sents neither an inequality nor an equality, but sirnply the reafgeography of the
Central Mediterranean. The legal value of equality is represented by the equal
seaward reach of equally significant oppositecoasts of the States concemed. The ARGUMENTOF PROFESSORBROWNLIE 457
ratio of lengths of coasts is a formula which is an abstraction and would in the
circumstancesof this case introduce a legal inequality of major proportions.
To give more or less exclusive weight to this criterion of coastal length would
involve a process not of delimitation but of simple apportionment. Such an
apportionment of the area in issue would be in conflict with the basic notion that
continental shelf rights appertain to the coastal State ipsofacto and ob initio. As
this Court said in the North Sea Continental Sheifcases :
"More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and equitable
share appears to be wholly at variance with what the Court entertains no
doubt is the most fundamental of al! the mles of law relating to the conti-
nental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, though
quite independent of it, - iiamely that the rights of the coastal State in
respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolonga-
tion of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab
initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it
in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the sea-bed
and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent
right." (I.C.J.Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 19.)
The risk of misapptying the criterion of proportionality was spelled out by the
Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French case in the following passage :
"In short, it is disproportion rather than any general principle of propor-
tionality which is the relevant criterion or factor. The equitable delimitation
of the continental shelf is not, as this Court has already emphasized in
paragraph 78, a question of apportioning - sharing out - the continental
shelf arnongst the States abutting upon it. Nor is it a question of simply
assigning to them areas of the shelf in proportion to the length of their
coastlines; for to do this would be to substitute for the delimitation of
boundanes a distributive apportionment of shares. Furthermore, the funda-
mental principle that the continental shelf appertains to a coastal State as
being the natural prolongation of its territory places definite limits on
recourse to the factor of proportionality. As was emphasized in the North
Sea Continental Sheifcases (I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 9 1), there can never
be a question of compfetely refashioning nature, such as by rendering the
situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a State
with a restricted coastline;it is rathera question of remedying the dispro-
portionality and inequitable effects produced by particular geographical
configurations or features in situations where otherwise the appurtenance of
roughly comparable attributions of continental shelf to each State would be
indicated by the geographical facts. Proportionality, therefore, is to beused
as a criterion or factor relevant in evaluating the equities of certain geo-
graphical situations, not as a general principle providing an independent
source of rights to areas of ccintinental shelf." (Decision, para. 101.)
Mr. President, it may be helpful to the Court if 1 offer some elucidation of the
intellectual probleni which lies ai the hem of the issue of proportionality and
which is a potential cause of confusion.
On theone hand in the jurisprudence -the NorthSea Continental Shelfcases,
the Anglo-French case (Decision, para. IOI), and the TunisialLibyo case (I.C.J.
Reports 1982. D. 60. Dara.7 1)- it is emohasized that there can be no refashion-
ing of geogra@hyandno consesuent disthutive apportionment of shares. On the
other hand, the primary equitable delimitation mav be subiect to abatement or
modification in order <O aioid "distortion" or "disproportignate effects" caused
by "individual geographical features". There is thus a certain contradiction, since458 CONTINENTAL SHELF
the process of modification involves a certain refashioning of geography, albeit
on a modest scale.
Wowcan this apparent contradiction be resoived? The answer lies within the
formula used by the Court of Arbibration in the Anglo-French case: the task of
the Court is to seek an "approximate equality" as between the Parties. This
"approximate equality" is based upon, and is not at odds with, the major geogra-
phical features abutting upon the shelf areas to be divided. It is a legal conception
of equality. The process of modification of the primary delimitation which itself
represents the principle of equality involves a further refinement of the principle
of equality within the overall geographical framework. The concept of equal
division of the area of convergence played anessentially similar role in the Judg-
ment of the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case, and was similarly subject to a
certain degree of refiriement (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 334, paras. 217, 218).
In short, the process of modification - if it is justified at -l1is part of the
overall judicial task of making legal sense of the geography. The judicial task is
to impose a legai order within the geographical framework and not to provide a
legal substitute for the principal geographical data in the particular case.
In the case of opposite States in the situation of Malta and Libya, where there
are no displaced islands or other geographical complications, there is quite sim-
ply no room for modification of the primary delimitation which respects the
equality of significance, in terms of seaward reach of jurisdiction, of the coasts
of the two Parties. In this context a median line involves an ex hypothesi compa-
tibility with the test of proportionality, since there are no sources of distortion
and both coasts are given equal value. The fact that in the case of the opposite
coasts geography prescribes a median line was recognized in the Judgment of the
Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 331, para. 206;
pp. 333-334, paras. 216-218).
Another way of expressing the matter would be to Saythat the version of pro-
portionality based upon the ratio of the difference of coastal lengths has no appli-
cation in the case ofopposite States. This point has been iriade before, and it is a
pleasure to be able to quote from my learned friend, Professor Bowett. In his
work on The Legal Régimeof Islands in International Law (Dobbs Ferry, New
York, 1979, p. 164), in the context of a discussion of the Judgment in the North
Seu Continental Shelf'cases, he makes the following observations :
"The relevance of the proportionality factor is more difficult to assess.
Clearly, it is entirely subservient to the primary criterion of 'natural pro-
longation', so there can be no justification for ignoring the geological evi-
dence and simply dividing the shelf according to coastal ratios. Nor, indeed,
are such ratios to be calculated on actual coastal length, for the Court en-
visaged a 'coastal front', aline of general direction to the Coastrather than a
line following its sinuosities (so that islands may count for this purpose, as
part of such a 'front').Indeed, it would seem that the proportionality factor
might oniy be applied, or be meaningful, in the case of adjacent States (not
'opposite') where the existenceof a markedly concave or convex coastline
wiHproduce a cut-off effect if the equidistance principle is applied: that is
to say, will allocate to one State shelf areas which in fact lie in front of,
and are a prolongation of, the land territory of another."
6. The Special Funcrionof the Test Based upon the Ratio of Coastal Lengfhs
The Libyan pleadings have in effect equated the criterion of proportionality
with the test based upon the ratio of the lengths of the coastlines or, at least, of ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLlE 459
the relevant part of the coastlines as this is understood by Libya. The section
in the Memorial of Libya (1) which deals with "the role of proportionality"
(paras. 6.90-6.93) states the test in lems of the ratio of coastal lengths and relies
upon the Judgment in the North Sea Conlinentai Shelfcases (para. 6.90, citing
I.C.J. Reports 1969. p. 52, para. 98). The treatment in the Libyan Reply, supra
(Chap. 7) is more nuanced but nevertheless relies exclusively upon the ratio
of lengths (paras. 7.12, 7.20) apart, that is, from the size of the land territory
(paras. 7.10, 7.16). Moreover, the Submissions appended to the Libyan Reply
explicity refer to:
"the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation
carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about
between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the respec-
tive States and the lengths of the relevant parts of their coasts, account
being taken of any other delimitations between States in the same region"
(supra, LR, p. 102, para. 7).
This is proportionality as invoked in the Libyan pleadings. Aside from various
other objections of principle to the form in which the proportionality argument is
invoked, it is invoked in an exceptional form - the ratio of coastal lengths-
which is only appropriate if certain conditions are fulfilled.
The role of proportionality is deterrnined by the overali legal and geographical
framework, and therefore the first condition must be that the reference to the
lengths of the respective coasts is justifiable intems of that framework. As the
Court of Arbitration expressed the point in the Anglo-French case :
"particular configurations ot'the coast or individuai geographical features
may, under certain conditions, distort the course of the boundary, and thus
affect the attribution of continental shelf to each State, which would other-
wise be indicated by the gerieral configuration of their coasts. The concept
of 'proportionality' merely expresses the criterion or factor by which it
may be determined whether such a distortion results in an inequitable deli-
mitation of the continental shelf as between the coastal States concerned.
The factor of proportionality may appear in the form of the ratio between
the areas of continental shelf to the lengths of the respective coastlines, as
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. But it may also appear, and more
usually does, as a factor for deteminina the reasonable or unreasonable -
the equitable or inequitable -- effects 2 particular geographical features or
configurations upon the course of anequidisrance-line boundary." (Deci-
sion,para. 100.) -
The second condition of application, closely related to the first, is that equity
must be reckoned within the same plane, and the requirement of equity is that
one should compare like with like (North Sea Conrinenial Shelf cases, I.C.J.
Reports 1969, pp. 49-50, para. 91; Anglo-French case, Decision, para. 101;
TunisialLibya case, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 76, paras. 104, 130).
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the Judgment of the Court (pp. 49-
50, para. 91) stresses the existence of an equality within the same plane as
between the three coastlines there in question. If I rnay quote that Judgment
once again :
"In the present case there are three States whose North Sea coastlines are
in fact comparable in length and which, therefore. have been given broadly
equal treatment by nature except that the configuration of one of the coast-460 CONTINENTAL ÇHELF
lines would, if the equidistance method is used, deny to one of these States
treatment equal or comparable to that given the other two." (I.C.J. Reports
1969, pp. 49-50, para. 91 .)
It is to be noted that it is the comparability in length of the coastlines and the
"broadly equal treatrnent by nature" which impressed the Court. It was a rnatter
of abaternent within "a geographical situation of quasi-equality" (ibid.). The case
was thus completely different frorn the present.
The more or less exceptional character of the ratio of coastal lengths as a pro-
portionality test was given recognition by the Court in the Anglo-French case. In
the words of the Court :
"In particular, this Court does not consider that the adoption in the North
Sea Continental SheF cases of the criterion of a reasonable degree of pro-
portionality between the areas of continental shelf and the lengths of the
coastlines means that this criterion is one for application in al1 cases. On
the contrary, it was the particular geographical situation of three adjoining
States situated on a concave Coastwhich gave relevance to that criterion in
those cases. In the present case, the role of proportionality in the delirnita-
tion of the continental shelf is, in the view of this Court, a broader one, not
linked to any specific geographical feature. It is rather a factor to be taken
into account in appreciating the effects of geographicat features on the
equitable or inequitable character of a delimitation, and in particular of a
delimitation by application of the equidistance method." (Decision,
para. 99.)
The view of the Court in the Anglo-French case was well applied in practice.
The French Government had invoked the argument based upon the ratio of
coastal lengths both with reference to the Channel Islands region and in respect
of the Atlantic region. In both respects the Court of Arbitration specifically
rejected this form of the French argument. (Decision, paras. 98-101, 166, 195
er seq., 246.)
The decision of this Court in the TunisialLibyacase falls within the pattern set
by the previous decisii~ns.The Judgment applied the test of proportionality by
reference to the lengths of the coastlines within the relevant area and this appli-
cation was on the basis that the two coasts, and also the pertinent coastal fronts,
were in fact cornparahle (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 91, paras. 130-131). As the
Court made clear in its Judgment, "the only absolute requirement of equity is that
one should compare like with like" (ibid., p. 76, para. 104) and again"the essen-
tial aspect of the criterion of proportionality is sirnply that one must compare like
with Iike" (jbid p. 91, para. 130).
What is lacking in the present case is precisely a comparability of the relevant
coasts in legal terms. The principal geographical features,the coasts of Malta and
the coasts of Libya, constitute the essential elements of the legal framework,
standing opposite each other and abutting upon the areas of continental shelf
dividing them.
7. TheScale of Equitable Adjustment
The general intellectual framework of the Libyan pleadings involves a drama-
tic choice between two contrasting methodologies. The choice appears to be be-
tween a solution based upon the method of equidistance and a solution deriving
from criteria of distributive justice based upon coastal extent and the size of State
territory. In the Libyan conception, small States Iitigate a great risk, since the ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 461
stakes are high and delimitation is related to novel principles of legal radicalism.
Mr. President, it is difficult to believe that the law of continental shelf delimita-
tion is as radical, as revisionist, and as unstable as one is led to believe by the
Libyan argument.
Even the departures from equidistance sanctioned by the Court in the Norrh
Sen Conrinenral Shelf cases and the othe~decisions were designed precisely to
maintain a policy of approximate equality in giving legal credit to the actual geo-
graphy of the Parties. The policy of the law is conservative and it is based on
recognition of the security and politicai interest of coastal States in respect of
their adjacent submarine areas.
It must follow that the scale of equitable adjustment must be limited, since the
presumption must be the equality of the relationship of coastal States. In legal
rems the political and security aspects of coasts and the appurtenant submarine
areas are not of variable significance and are no more susceptible to apportion-
ment than shelf areas as such, with the natural resources they contain.
It is clear that the approach to delimitation revealed in the judgments of inter-
national tribunals is based upon the assumption that delimitation is a relatively
marginal opetation affecting a siatus quo based upon the inherent rights of the
coastal State.
Thus in its Judgment in the North Sea Coniinenfal Shelf cases the Court
explained the principle thus :
"The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be
claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These
prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by
means of a median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and
minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which
can be eliminated by other means, such a line must effect an equal division
of the particular area involved."(1.C.J.Reports 1969, p. 36, para. 57.)
The legal philosophy of the continental shelf, as expounded judicially, con-
tains strong indications that delimitation is always a limited and conservative
procedure rather than an extensive and radical procedure.
In the North Seo Continental Shelfcases the Court explained that :
"the nghts of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf
that constitutesa natural prolongation of its land tenitory into and under
the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the
land, and as anextension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring the sea-bed and exploiting its natural resources"
(ibid., p. 22, para. 19).
The Court used that statement as the premise for an important conclusion and
1 quote again from the North Sea Continental SheIfcases :
"It follows that even in such a situation as that of the North Sea, the
notion of apportioning an as yet undelimited area, considered as a whole
(which underlies the doctrine of the just and equitable share), is quite
foreign to, and inconsistent with, the basic concept of continental shelf
entitlement, according to which the process of delimitation is essentially
one of drawing a boundary line between areas which already appertain to
one or other of the States affected. The delimitation itself must indeed be
equilably effected, but it cannot have as its object the awarding of an equi-
table share, or indeed of a share, as such, at all, - for the fundamental
concept involved does not admit of there being anything undivided to share462 CONTINENTAL SHELF
out. Evidently any dispute about boundaries must involve that there is a
disputed marginal or fringe area, to which both parties are laying claim, so
that any delimitation of it which does not leave itwholly to one of the par-
tieswill in practice divide it between them in certain shares, or operate as
if such a division had been made. But this does not mean that there has
been an apportionment of something that previously consisted of an inte-
gral, still less an undivided whole." (Z.C.J.Reports 1969, pp. 22-23,
para. 20.)
This view was endorsed by the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French case
(Decision, paras. 78 and 245).
Mr. President, the idea that the process of delimitation involves an operation
which is limited in scale is reinforced by the principle of non-encroachment,
which is really an outwork of the concept of a Iegal or eFfectiveequality which
reflects the geographical facts. No delimitation can be equitable if iresults in a
cut-off effect. It follows that the criterion of proportionality, like the method
of equidistance, is coiitrolled by the concept of effective equality and this was
pointed out by the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French case (Decision,
para. 101).
The presumption that the process of delimitation is limited in scope is also
strengthened by the fact that "the geographic correlation between coast and sub-
merged areas off the coast is the basis of the coastal State's legal title"as this
Court stated in its Judgment in the TunisialLibya case. The Court there con-
tinued :
"As the Court explained in the North Sea Continental Sheif cases the
continental shelf is a legal concept in which 'the principle is applied that
the land dominates the sea' (I.C.J.Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96)". (LC.J.
Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 73.)
It follows from these premises that the boundary which accords with equitable
principles and legal policy always aims, however approximately, at an equal
attribution of shelf areas to coastal States. None of the key statements of prin-
ciple are qualified by reference to territorial magnitude or the length of coasts.
The procedure of delimitation is conditioned by the basicaily equal relationship
of al1 coastal States. The scale of modification of the primary delimitation, as
determined by the major geographical features when such modification is neces-
sary, is always within a limited compass.
In the present case the Libyan claim involves a massive encroachment upon
shelf areas legally appurtenant to the coasts of Malta. The Libyan claim, as for-
mulated in the submissions appended to the Libyan Reply, involves a radical
inequality as between the Parties and calls for a delimitation procedure substan-
tially outside the controlling conditions set by the legal principles goveming the
attribution and delimitation of areas of continental shelf.
8. Proportionalifv Is Not a General Principle Providing an
Independent Source of Rights
In the Anglo-French case the Court of Arbitration emphasized that proportio-
nality was not to beused "as a general principle providing an independent source
of rights to areas of continental shelf" (Decision, para. 101, and see also
para.246). The reason for this was given by the Court:
"there can never be a question of completely refashioning nature, such as by
rending the situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of ARGUMENT OF PROFESSORBROWNLIE 463
a State with a restricted coastline; it is raahquestion of remedying the
diçproportionality and inequitable effects produced by particular geographi-
cal configurations or features in situations where otherwise the appurtenance
of roughly coniparable attributions of continental shelf to each State would
be indicated by the geographical facts" (Decision, para. 101).
The Libyan clairrito üvery high proportion of the Pelügian Block, to a virtual
monopoly of'the submarine areas dividing the Parties, must involve reliance
upon proportionality as an indeperident sourceof rights.
The claim is formulated alongside, but also independently of, the argument
based upon natural prolongation. The proportionafity argument is autonomous
and forms an important aspect of the Libyan submissions.
The fact that the argument is used in isolation from the actual geography must
make it suspect a\the ouiset. The formulabased on lengihs of coasts completely
ignores the geographical framework and the requirernent of comparability. The
entire purpose of the Libyan argument istogive Libyan coasts more legal signi-
ficance in terms of attribution than those of Malta.
If the graphic representations of'the Libyan claim are examined (LM, Maps 9
300 and 17 :LR. Maps 10, 11. IZand 13)and Irefer the Court respectfully once more
3@@ to Malta's Illustrations: Figure1.which shows the 1973 Libyan proposal and
O0 44 tified by Libyah-shif one looks at those gnphic representations of the Libyanen-
clairn,it is immediately apparent that proportionaliiy is being used aa major
source of attribution, since the scale of the move away from the normal equality
of seaward reach of jurisdiction is redolent of a major principle of attribution
rather than an ancillary principle of equitable adjustment which is not an inde-
pendent source of rights. The fact is that Libya seeks to use proportionality not
as an instrument of equity and approximate equality but as a primary source of
claim.
The Libyan claim not only fails to observe the principle that adjustrnent can
only take place within a framework of geographical comparability - that one
should compare like with like - but it would succeed in rendering the unlike
even more so, since the consequences of the difference in size between the Par-
ties would be greatly exaggerated, and this without any justification.
The practical and political consequences of the Libyan arguments in this case,
were ihey to succeed. would be very unfortunate. lt goes without saying that
disputes conceming maritime delimitation are nomally settled by negotiations.
Article83 of the Law of the Sea Convention expressly provides (in its first para-
graph) that
"the delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts shalbe effecred by agreement on the basis of international
law ... in order to achieve an equitable solution".
If the principle of territorial magnitude and ratio of coastal lengths as a major
source of rights wereIObe given currency. the settlement of disputes by negotia-
tion would become much more difficult. The Libyan approach would substitute a
geopolitical system of attribution forthe existing procedure based upon the equa-
lity of the significance of coastal States in matters of attribution and delimitation.
9. The Inappropriutenessofthe Libyan Versionof Proportionalily as
on Instrumentof Equity: theJurisprudence
Mr. President, there is another perspective in which the Libyan version of pro-
portionality may be examined. The general tendency of the Libyan case is to dis-464 CONTINENTAL SHELF
credit the method of equidistance tout cour[. The impression which is received
from the Libyan pleadings is that not only equidistance, but also the very concept
of approxirnate equality in matters of delimitation musbe discarded. In place of
approximate equality, and the principle of not refashioning geography, the
Libyan side would put the concept of natural prolongation (in its own interpreta-
lion) and the concept of territorial magnitude and the ratio of lengths of coasts.
The Libyan argument thus constitutes a frontal assault not only on the method
of equidistance but also on the idea of approximate equality based upon the
actual geographical circurnstances of the particular case. I have sought io show
the various ways in which the Libyan thesis based upon the ratio of the lengths
of coasts runs counter to legal principle and sound policy.
The eccentricity of this thesis may now be seen by reference to the leading
cases on continental shelf delimitation, which confirm the general equality of the
seaward extension of the sovereign rightsof coastal States in respect of both sub-
marine areas appertaining to adjacent coasts and submarine areas off opposite
coasts.
The cases involve important examples of adjacent or partly adjacent coasts and
it is a striking fact that, even in situations of adjacency. the test of proportionality
is not applicable in the mode on which the Libyan argument relies. The fact is
that the cases are not inimical to the concept of equality of coasts and the reser-
vations which thejurisprudence contains concerningthe equidistance method are
precisely motivated by the need tomaintain an approximate equality in the pro-
cess of delimiting shelf areas.
1tum first to the North Sen Continental Shelfcases (I.C.J.Reports 1969. p. 3).
The facts of this case, the Court wilbe aware, involved three adjacent States in
a situation in which, but for the concavity of the German Coast.the three States
had been given more or less equal treatment by nature. As the Court expressed
the matter:
"What is unacceptable in this instance is that a State should enjoy con-
tinental shelf rights considerably different from those of its neighbours
merely because in the one case the coastline is roughly convex in form and
in the other itis markedly concave, although those coastlines are compa-
rable in length."(Ibid., p. 50, para. 91.)
The entire object of the Court asexplained very clearly in the Judgment was to
maintain equality when there was in geographical terms a "situation of equality
within the sarne order" (ibid. T)he Court set aside the equidistance method
precisely because in the circumstances the result would deny to one of the
three States concerned "treatment equal or comparable to that given the other
two" (ibid.).
The North Seo Continental Shelf cases are of particular relevance. of course,
since the Court therç invoked proportionality in a form similar to the version
invoked by Libya in the present case. And yet, Mr. President, the reasons which
moved the Court to criticize the equidistance method in the NorthSea Continen-
tal Shelfcases are fuiidamentally opposed both to the substance and to the philo-
sophy of the arguments advanced by Libya in the present case.
In the North Sea Conrinenial Shelfcases the Couri was using the medium of
natural prolongation, and the principle that the land dominates the sea andgen-
erates entitlement to shelf nghts ipsofacto and ah inifio. to express a practical
view on delimitation which took the fom of the principle of non-encroachment.
The principle of non-encroachment involved recognition of the equality of the
seaward reach of coastal States and was based upon the legal concept of natural
prolongation as the basis of title to adjacent shelf areas. It may benoted that in ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 465
the dispositif in the NorthSea Continenral Shelfcases proportionality had a low
normative status as a "factor to be taken into account". whereas the principle of
non-encroachment features as the first in the recital of "principles and mles
applicable to the delimitation".
The Judgrnent in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases was much concemed
with the problem of cut-off - that is, of encroachment IateralIy on the coastal
front of another State- which in certain situations is exacerbated by the rnethod
of equidistance (1C.J, Reports 1969. p. 31, paras. 43-44: pp. 34-37. paras. 51 -
59; pp. 46-47, para. 85; p. 49, para. 89). It was this problem which caused the
Court to formulate the principle of non-encroachment (ibid.pp.46-47, para. 85),
and to criticizethe role of equidistance in certain situations.
However, the Court expressly acknowledged that in the case of oppositeStates
the problem of encroachment does not anse from the use of the rnethod of equi-
distance, and in that case delimitation can only be by means of a median line
which "must effect an equal division of the particular area involved" (ibid..
p. 36, para. 57; and see also para. 58). The Libyan argument in the present case,
and the type of alignment it involves. is completely incompatible with the
reasoning of the Court in the NorthSea Continental Shelfcases. Libya is seeking
to tegitimate encroachment on a very substantial scale and the Court can venfy
@ that asseriion by looking at Figure 1 and the 1973 proposal. The claim reaching
to within 15 miles of Malta involves cut-off of a high order, even afthough the
relationship is one of opposite rather than adjacent coasts.
So much for the North Sea Conrinenfal Shelfcases, and 1can now rnove on to
the Decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French case.Once again,
the reasoning contradicts the argument which Libya offers. The approach of the
Court of Arbitration, with particular reference to the Atlantic region, wüs based
on aconcept of proportionality - and its close relative "distortion"- and the
objective was to maintain an equality of seaward reach of the mainlands of the
two States as they abutted upon the subrnarine areas of the region.
It is of interest to recall that the Court regarded the coastal relationshithef
United Kingdom and France as "one analogousto that of adjacent Stales" beyond
the point where the coasts were geographically opposite one another (Decision,
para. 242; and see also paras. 233, 241).
The Court applied the equidistance method on the basis that it produced a solu-
tion appropriate to the balance of geographical circumstances of the Atlantic
region. The issue of the effect to be given to Ushant and the Scilly lsles was seen
exclusively in terms of the modification, not the abolition, of the equidistance
method. 'ïhe Court expressly stated that but for the distorting effect of the Scilly
Isles, "the Iine equidistant from the coasts of the two States would otherwise
constitute the appropriate boundary" (Decision. paras. 248, 249). To the Court
the equidistant line between the mainlands of the United Kingdom and France
represented equity, subject to the technique - on a modest scale - of abating
inequities caused by particular geographical features (Decision, paras. 249-251).
The issue of proportionality was seen by the Court of Arbitration exclusively
in terms of the small-scale modification of the equidistance line in order to abate
the inequitable effects of "the distorting geographical feature", that is to say, the
Scilly IsIes. The purpose of the exercise was to maintaina legal equality betweeri
the mainlands of the United Kingdom and France. No reference was made to the
lengths of coasts except by way of a rejection of a French argument based upon
the lengths of coasts within the Channel (Decision, para. 246).
Next 1shall turn to the decision of the Court in the TunisialLibya case. Here
again no support can be found for the type of proportionality argument deployed
by Libya in the present proceedings. The prirnary objectives of the Court in the466 CONTINENTAL SHELF
TunisiolLibyacase were 10 avoid any undue encroachmenr upon the shelf areas
adjacent to the Libyan coast as a result of changes in the configuration in the
Tunisian coast (1.CJ. Reports 1982, pp. 86-89, paras. 122-129), and. in addition.
to give appropriate weight to the conduct of the Parties and to the defacto mari-
time limit. The Court did not use the equidistance rnethod and of course neither
Party had pleaded equidistance. However, the procedure of delimitation had the
clear purpose of maintaining equality as between the Parties in somewhat com-
plicated geographical circumstances.
The Coun applied "the test of proportionality as an aspect of equity" (ihid.,
p. 91, paras. 130-131) in relation to a delimitation which the Court had already
established on the basis of the various other relevant circumstances. There is no
evidence in the Judgrnent that proportionality played adominant role in the deli-
mitation process. Whilst it is true that the elernent of proportionality appears in
the disposifif as a "relevant circurnstance" (ihid.. p. 93). it is fifth and last in the
order of the relevant circumstances listed, and apart from a brief reference in the
discussion of Tunisian baselines (ibid., p. 76, para. 104)the subject of proportio-
nality is only taken up at the very end of the Judgment (ihid., p. 91, paras. 130-
131). The Court there refers to proportionality explicitly as a test and "as an
aspect of equity", that is to say, as a means of evaluating the attribution of shelf
areas "following the method indicated by the Court" (ihid., para. 131).Moreover,
the test of proportionalitywas applied, it is to be presumed, on the basis thal the
two coasts in the second sector of the delimitation were in principle comparable.
As in the case of the Atlantic region in the context of the Anglo-French case, the
procedure was lhen to find ways of abating the eccentricities of coastal configu-
ration. This was in effect the procedure adopted, muiaiis mutandis, in the Judg-
ment of the Courtin the Tuni.ïi~/Libyacase (I.CJ. Reports 1982, pp. 82, 85-89,
paras. 114-115, 121 -129 ; dispositif, pp. 93-94, para. 133,C (3)). Moreover, in
respect of the second sector the Court stated that :
"The major change in direction undergone by the coast of Tunisia seems
to the Court to go some way. though not thewhole way. towards transforrn-
ing the relationship of Libya and Tunisia from that of adjacent States to
that of opposite States, and thus to produce a situation in which the posi-
tion of an equidistance line becomes a factor to be given more weight in
the balancing of equitable considerations than would otherwise be the
case." (Ihid., p. 88, para. 126.)
And finelly, 1 conie to the decision of a Chamber of this Court in the Guifof
Maine case. In that case the first segment of the delimitation involves a coastal
relationship of lateral adjacency. However, away from the international boundary
terminus and approaching the outer opening of the Gulf, the geographical rela-
tionship becomes one of frontal opposition with a marked quasi-parallelism
(I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 325, paras. 188-189). In respect of the secondsegmentof
the delimitation, theChamber stated that geography prescribed "that the delimi-
tation line should rather be a median line (whether strict or corrected remains to
be determined) for delimitation as between opposite coasts . . ."(ihid., p. 331,
para. 206).
The reasoning of the Chamber is insistent that in the case of opposite coasts a
median line reflects the geographical facts and also gives effect to "the equitable
criterion, so abundaritly endorsed by the Chamber, of the equal division - so far
as feasible- of areas where the maritime projections of the coasts of the two
Statesoverlap"(ihid., p. 334, paras. 216-21 7).
However, the Chamber found it necessary to apply to the median line as ini-
tially drawn what it called a correction which "though limited" would take ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 467
account of the fact that "the back of the Gulf is entirely occupied by the con-
tinuous Coast of Maine, i.e., a component state of the United States" (I.C.J.
Reporls 1984, p. 334, para. 218). The difference in length between the respective
coastlines of the two Parties in the delimitation area was regarded by the Cham-
ber "a special circumstance of some weight" (ibid., p. 322, para. 184) and the
ratio between the coastal fronts was applied as an ad hoc method of effecting
the appropriate correction to the median line (ihid., p. 336, para222).
The Chamber was careful lo explain its modus operandi and it is ribundantly
clear that it has little in common with the modusopcrandi contended for by
Libya in the present case. The reference to the difference in coastal lengths did
not constitute a basis for the settling of a delimitation but wasiiground for the
correction of a delimitation established initially on the basis of other criteria
(ibid., p. 323, para. 185).
The Chamber emphüsized in two separate passages - paragraphs 185and 218
-of the Judgment that the extent of the respective coasts of the Parties did not
constitute a cnterion or method of delimitation. Moreover. in the same IWO pas-
sages the Chamber stated that it had no intention of making "an autonomous
criteriori or method of delimitalion out of proportionality" - 1refer to para-
graph 218 and this refers beck to piiragraph 185of the Judgment of the Chamber.
The thinking of the Chamber isexpressed with particular clürity in the fol-
low ing passage :
"The Chamber's views on ihis subject may be summed up by observing
that a maritime delimitation can certainly not be established by a direct
division of the area in dispute proportional tothe respective lengths of the
coasts belonging to the parties in the relevant area, butit is equally certain
that a subsiantial disproportion to the lengths of those coasts that resulted
from a delimitation effected on a different basis would constitute acircurn-
stance calling for an appropriate correction."(lbid.p. 323, para. 185.)
Whar took place was thus an adjustment of a median Iine which was itself the
result of the equitable criterion selected by the Chamber, that is to say, the prin-
ciple of equal division of the area of overlapping of the maritime projections of
the coasts of the two States. As a rnatter of a formulation of principle, the
approach of the Chamber is entirely unlike the dogmatic reliance upon the ratio
of coastal lengths tobe found in the Libyan arguments in the present case.
And yet apart fram the question of themodus operandi and the criteria appli-
cable, it may be noted that the occasion for the correction of the median line in
the main segment of the delimitation was an unusual conjunction of politics and
geography, involving a rectangular stretch of water with a land boundary termi-
nus at the corner of this rectangle.
The Chamber was seeking to apply the concept of equality muturismutandis to
the particular geographical and political circurnstances. and in the result al1the
geographical features were in principle given full effect,ncludirig even the Cape
Cod peninsula. Even Seal Island, a very minor feature,was given half effect. The
median line was adopted, as the basis of the delimitation between opposite
coasts, subject only to an element of correction.
The decision in the Gulfof Maine case thus stands in the line of jurisprudence
which has worked out the concept of approximate equality in relation to dif-
ferent conjunctions of geography and politics. The centre of the reasoning of the
Chamber is occupied by ihe concept of equality, and thus the philosophy of
the decision, like its predecessors. is inimical to the approach of Libya in this
case.
Mr. President, the four decisions 1 have reviewed provide a modus operandi468 CONTINENTAL SHELF
for the consiruction in varied circumstancesof a r6gime of legal equality between
coastal States abutting upon the same continental shelf. The equitable principles
and factors presented by the jurisprudence constitute a code for the maintenance
of an approximate equality of coastal States. The modusoperandi offered by the
Libyan side in this case finds no place in that code.
Having surveyed the jurisprudence, 1shall now tum to an examination of the
pertinent State practice.
!O. The ConceptofProporrionali~ : the Evidence ofSrarePracrice
By way of preface, it may be observed that the Libyan view of proportionality
in this case is strongly contradicted by the general practice of States in continen-
tal shelf delimitation andit is not at al1surprising that the Libyan pleadings exhi-
bit a fear of State practice. Indeed. the Libyan pleadings contain what are vir-
tually blanket denials of the relevance of Statc practice, as, for example. in the
Counter-Mernorial (II, LCM, para. 5.96), where it is stated that "if State practice
demonstrates anythirig therefore, it is that each case has its own unique setting
and its own peculiar facts".
In the TunisialLibyacase the Court remarked that : "the concept of natural pro-
longation . ..was and remains a concept to be examined within the context of
customary law and State practice" (I.CJ. Reports 1982, p. 46, para. 43), and in
the same connection the Court referred 10"the actual practice of States which is
expressive, or creative,of custornary rules". It isobvious that any concept of the
law of the sea may be examined "within the context of customary law". Nol sur-
prisingly Governrnents and their legal advisers take great trouble to rnonitor State
practice on maritime delimitation and it is unusual for pleadings to ignore such
material. The course of lectures given at the Hague Academy in 1981 by Dr.
Jagota. the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs of india, on the sub-
ject of maritime boundaries, makes very substantial use of State practice
(Recueil descours, Vol. 171(1981-II), p. 83), and this is surely tobe expected.
But, of course,whilst the general relevance of State practice may be undoubted,
the individual items of State practice must be carefully evaluated. Itis not normal
for agreements relaiing to continental shelf delimitation to make express ref-
erence to the precise legal and political elements which lie behind the alignment
established, but it is not uncornmon for the preamble of such agreements to refer
io the fact that the delimitation has ken estabIished "in accordance with interna-
tional law". Not atypical in this respect are the agreements creating continental
shelf boundaries between Iran. a long-coast State with an extensive land territory,
and shori-coasi States opposiie lran (Malta Illuslrations. Fig. 22).
The relevant agreements in chronological order were as follows :
Firsf,between lran and Saudi Arabia, signed in 1968 (ratified on 29 January
1969; II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 17).
Second: between Iran and Qatar, signed in 1969 (ratified on 10 May 1970;
MCM. Annexes, II. p. 416; II. LCM. Annex of Delimitation Agreements,
No. 21).
Third: between Irün and Bahrain. signed in 1971 (ratified on 14 May 1972 ; 1,
MM, Annexes. p. 66; II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 25).
Fo~rrrh:berween lran and Oman, signed in 1974 (ratified on 28 May 1975;
MCM. Annexes, II, p. 416; II, LCM. Annex of Delimitation Agreements,
No. 40).
Fifrh: beiween Iran and the United Arab Emirates signed in 1974 (no\ yet rati-
fied; II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 42). ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 469
Each of these agreements is furnished with a preamble, containing a recital
which makes explicit reference to the application of international law.
The agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia contains the following recitals:
"Desirous further of determining in a just and accurate manner the boun-
dary line separating the respective submarine areas over which each party
is entitled by international law toexercise sovereign rights,
Now therefore and with due respect to the principles of law and particu-
lar circumstances, . . ."
The other four agreements include preambles with an identical considerandum
as follows :
"Desirous of establishing in a just, equitable and precise rnanner the
boundary line between the respective areas of the continental shelf over
which the Parties have sovereign rights in accordance with international
law."
Even in cases in which no express reference is made to international law there
is a presumption that such delimitation agreements are based upon legal prin-
ciples.
It goes without saying that the various agreements make no particular refer-
ence to the factor of proportionality, and it is obvious that the precise course of
the alignment in each case will be affected by the geographical circumstances of
that case and certain elements of political compromise.
None the less the general pattern of agreements relating to comparable geogra-
phical circumstanceç surely constitutes reliable evidence of the practice of States
in the actual application of the matrix of equitable principles, relevant circum-
stances and factors, in the process of delimitation.
The practice need not be seen as evidence of a parricular rule of customary
law, but it must provide significant and reliable evidence of normal standards of
equity. The practice constitutes an international and objective standard of equity
and of what is generaIly accepted as "approximate equality" in matters of shelf
delimitation. Such a standard is also ex hypothesi relevant to the concept of pro-
portionality.
TheCourt rose at 12.55 p.m. FIWE13NTH PUBLIC SITTING (3 XII 84, 3 p.rn.)
Presenr :[See sitting of 26 XI 84.1
Professor BROWNLIE: Mr. President, before the recess for lunch t had
moved on to the relevance of State practice as providing evidence of the intema-
tional objective standard of equity in matters of shelf delimitation, and in that
way being also a standard as to what is accepted by States generally as an
approximate equality in matters of shelf delimitation.
Malta has set out the relevant State practice in her written pleadings (1, MM,
paras. 184- 195; 11, MCM, paras. 252-256), and it is of course not necessary to
rehearse the material in fullWe have also analysed the Libyan treatment of State
practice in OurReply (supra, MR, paras. 234-270; and Annex 4).
However, with your permission, 1would like to point up certain aspects of the
State practice. By way of preface 1would respectfully remind the Court of the
point of reference. The point of reference would seem to be a situation in which
a long-coast State claims a high proportion of the submarine areas dividing it
from an opposite short-coast State, whether that short-coast State is an island or
not. ln the Libyan Mernorial it is stated "that a boundary within the Rift Zone
would leave to each of the Parties areas of shelf within the relevant area that bear
a ratio to each other of between 1:8 and about 1: 12"(1, LM, para. 10.18).
No support can possibly be found in the practice of States for such a dramati-
cally unequal partition of shelf areas, either of shelf areas dividing opposite
States or shelfareas dividing States with other types of coastal relationship.
Four types of evidence rnay be pointed out. In the first place, the existing pat-
terns of delimitation in semi-enclosed seas provide substantial contradiction of
the Libyan view of proportionality in the present case.1 would respectfully refer
the Court to certain figures in Maltais dossier: Figures 19; 21,22 and 24. Figure
19 illustrates the existing shelf delimitations in the Baltic Sea; Figure 21 the
existing delirnitatioris in the Mediterranean; Figure 22 the delimitations of
shelf areas in the Gulf; and Figure 24 the existing continental shelf delimitation
between the Soviet Union and Turkey in the Black Sea.
Secondly, there is the practice involving long-coast States and island States in
an opposite relationship, and such practice is clearly based upon a principle of
equality and the method of equidistance.
The relevant deliniitations of this classnclude the following :
Bahrain and Iran (1, MM, Annexes. p. 66; II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation
Agreements, No. 25')(Malta Illustrations, Fig. 22);
Cuba and Mexico - Mexico is the long-coast State (1, MM, Annexes, p. 68;
II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 47) (Malta Illustrations,
Fig.23);
lndia and the Maldives (1,MM, Annexes, p. 70; 11,LCM, Annex of Delirnita-
tion Agreements, No. 49) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 28) ;
Cuba and the United States (as the long-coast State) (1, MM, Annexes, p. 72;
II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 53) (Malta Illustrations,
Fig.23);
Colornbia. the long-coast State, and the Dominican Republic (1, MM.,
Annexes, p. 74; Il, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 54) (Malta
Illustrations, Fig. 23); ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 47 1
Colombia, the long-coast State, and Haiti (1, MM,Annexes, p. 77; 11,LCM,
Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 55) (Malta Illustrations, Fig.23);
Again Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (1. MM, Annexes, p. 85; II, LCM, Annex of
Delimitation Agreements, No. 5) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 22).
Then 1come to the third class of practice, that is agreements effecting delimi-
tations between long-coast States and short-coast peninsular States opposite the
long-coast States. Such delirnitüticinsare on the basis of the method of equidis-
tance and the relevant delimitarions are as follows :
The delimitation between Denniark and Norway, Denmark as the peninsular
State opposite Norway (MCM, Annexes, II, p. 416; II, LCM, Annex of Deli-
mitation Agreements, No. 12)(Malta Illustrations, Fig. 20);
Iran, the long-coast State, and Qatar as the short-coast peninsular opposite
(MCM. Annexes, II, p. 416; II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements,
No. 21) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 22);
And then again lran and Oman as the peninsular State opposite lran (MCM.
Annexes, II, p. 416; II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 40)
(Malta Illustratioris, Fig. 22;
Australia (in respect of the Yorke Peninsula and so in that respect Australia is
the peninsular short-coast State) opposite Papua New Guinea (which in that
situation is the long-coast State) (hlCM, Annexes, II, p. 416; 11,LCM, Annex of
Delimitation Agreements, No. 60) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 1).
Fourthly, there are those delirnitations between groups of islands, which
groups are in some cases more or less autonomous. and the mainlands of
opposite-related long-coast States. The relevant cases, 1 submit, have a strong
similarity of geographical circumstance to the relation of Malta and Libya, and
the delimitations al1reflect the coricept of equality.
The delimitations concerned are those between :
Denmark (in respect of the Faroes group) and Norway as the long-coast State
(1, MM, Annexes, p. 51 ; 11,LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 62)
(Malta Illustrations, Fig. 29).
Finland (in respect of the Aland Islands which belong to Finland) and Sweden
as the long-coast State (Limits in the Seas, US Dept. of State, No. 71 ;11,LCM,
Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 31) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 32);
France (in respect of New Caledonia) and Australia as the long-coast State
opposite (1,MM, Annexes, p. 203; II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements,
No. 71) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 33);
Norway as the long-coast State and the United Kingdom (in respect of the
Shetland Idands) (1, MM, Annexes, p. 195; Il, LCM, Annex of Delimitation
Agreements, No. 8) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 34);
Then two delimitations involving India:
India (in respect of the Nicobar Islands) and Indonesia (Agreements of 1974
and 1977) (II, LCM, Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 41) (Malta Illus-
trations,Fig. 35) ;
lndia (again also in respect of the Nicobar Islands) and Thailand as the long-
Coast State (1, MM, Annexes, p. 101 ; II, LCM. Annex of Delimitation Agree-
ments, No. 59) (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 36).
In this particular connection,of island groups opposite long coasts, it is useful
to recall that the United Kingdom and France have agreed that, in principle, the
maritime boundary between the Channel Islands and the neighbouring coasts of472 CONTINENTAL SHELF
the French mainland should be the median line (see the Anglo-French Arbi-
tration, Decision of 30 June 1977, para. 22).
Mt. President, 1submit that the only possible conclusion isthat the State prac-
tice effectively demonstrates that a delimitation in accordance with the Libyan
thesis on proportionality would be wholly incompatible with the international
standard as to what is equitable and what accords with the legal concept of
approximate equality.
The Libyan pleadings do not seek to rnakeout apositive argument based upon
State practice to support the Libyan view on proportionality. The tactics of our
distinguished opponents are founded upon two simple and essentially negative
elements :first, the gerieraldenial of the relevance of State practi;and, second,
an assault on the State practice invoked by Malta in the written pleadings.
Of course. given the dogmatic Libyan view that State practice is irrelevant four
court, such an assenion should preclude resort to State practice by the other side.
And in general the Lihyan pleadings have eschewed practice. Thus, for exarnple,
the section of the Libyan Reply entitled "Proportionality in Practice" (supra,LR,
pp. 90-93) is not concerned with State practice at al\.
However, with a cenain inconsistency, the Libyan Counter-Mernorial (II,
LCM. para. 6.15) makes a passing reference to the Franco-Spanish Agreement of
1974 (II, LCM. Annex of Delimitation Agreements, No. 34), one of the few
pieces of State practice to fall under the notice of that written pleading. The
Libyan pleading there states that :
"Even with sn equitable or 'adjusted' equidistance line, between adjacent
States, the differtmces in coastal length may cause a diversion in the line
(as with the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1974)."
Moreover, in the Annex of Delimitation Agreements forming part of the
Libyan Counter-Memorial, the commentary upon the Franco-Spanish Agreement
relies upon the analysis of the Geographer of the Department of State (Lirnitsin
the SFUSN , O.83, p. 13).The analysis states that:
"the second segment of the Franco-Spanish continental shelf boitndag was
negotiated according to equitable principleç relating to the ratio of the arti-
ficial coastlines of the two States".
This statement is not given a source in the text ofthe Litnits in the Seas item.
However, the source would appear to be an article by Professor José Luis de
Azchrraga (Revistu espuBolade derecho internacional,Vol. 28, pp. 131-138),
which is reproduced and translated in the United States Counter-Mernorial in the
GuIfof Maine case (Vol. IV, Ann. 10, App. Al). This article is a personal assess-
ment of the negotiations of the continental shelf agreement relating to the Bay of
Biscay and itrnakes clear that a number of factors other than the lengths of coasts
influenced the delimitation. In particular. the article poin[O the special circum-
stances arising from the topography of the sea-bed and the fact that France's
more extensive continental shelf "dominated the negotiations" (Revisra esparîola
de derecho in~ernocional p..133 ; translationl).
In any case the coastal relationships in the Bay of Biscay are unlike those of
Malta and Libya and seaward beyond the Point R of the Franco-Spanish delimi-
tation the shelf is divided into two distinct areas. As Professor José Luis de
' Not reproduced.For reference see I.CJ. Pleadings. Delimirarion ofthe Maritime
Boundoiyin theGuifof Maine Areo. Vol. IV, p. 458. [Note by rhRegisiry.] ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE 473
Azcarraga expresses the matter: "the linejoining Points R an... is virtually
the median line equidistant between the isobath curves at equal depths" (Revisfa
espafiolu de derecho iniernacional, p. 132; United States Counter-Mernorial,
Vol. IV, Ann. 10,App. A). In the segmentlandward of Point R, that is to Say,the
sector reaching from the territorial sea to the foot of the continental slope, the
Parties adopted the equidistance method in its normal form.
In the result the delimitation in the Franco-Spanish Agreement has little or no
relevance for present purposes and the Libyan pleadings have signally failed to
produce any State practice which provides support for the application of the test
of proportionality, in the form of the ratio of coastal lengths, to geographical cir-
cumstances comparable with those of the present case.
11. Coastal Relationships in Semi-EnclosedSeas
The evidence of State practice leads naturally to a consideration of the general
significance of the Libyanesis in the context of semi-enclosed seas.
The existing practice itheBaltic and the Gulf provides no support whatso-
ever to the Libyan position in the present case. The patterns of delimitation in
both theBaltic and the Gulf flatly contradict the thesis that the length of coasts
or overall territorial magnitude penerate special advantages when it cornes to
delimitation of the continental shelf.
Moreover, the system implied in the Libyan argument is contradicted by logic
and ordinary political sense.
@ If the simple mode1 presented in Figure A (Malta Illustrations, Fig. 27A) is
examined, the strange consequences of the Libyan thesis immediately appear.
According to the Libyan argument the advantages of length of coast and territo-
rial magnitude arebsolute and are not relative to the actual nuriopposite
coastal States. Moreover, general reference to the rights of third States does not
@ resolve the difficulty which is revealed by Figure A, since the question remains,
always, what are the rights of the States on the opposite coast?
The Libyan contention is tha:Ilarge landmass behind the coasts produces a
natural prolongation ofgreater intensity. As expressed in the Libyan Counter-
Memarial (II, LCM, para. 2.48): "The land territory behind Libya's extensive
coast is immense, whereas both the coast and land territory ofta are very
small." And the concluçion then follows: "Surely, the intensity of the natural
prolongation must be greater- the prolongation, more natura- from the
Libyan coast in arriving at a ofndelimitation?" (Ihid.)
The logic of the Libyan argument is such that it applies to al1the short-coast
States jointly as much as it applies to a single short-coast State opposite to the
@ long-,cpastState inFigureA. The Libyan argument for special advantage is not
conditioned by the existenceof a single short-coast State opposite and the Libyan
position thus stands quite simply for the dominance of the shelf areas of a
semi-enclosed sea or gulby a long-coast State. This result which is visible on
@ FigureA provides further evidençe of the divorce between equitable principles
and the doctrine now proposed by Libya as a version of proportionality.
Mr. President, the logic of the L.ibyanreasoning based upon the ratio of length
of coasts and territorial magnitude mustapplicable equally to the case of one
short-coasi State and to caseof several short-coast Statinan opposite rela-
tionship to Stateun that figure. When there is only one short-coast State oppo-
site, naturally the cansequences will Varybut the nature of the variation does not
@ fundamentally affect the issue as presented graphically on FA.ure CONTINENTAL SHELF
12. TheCoincidentResults of Proportionaliiy and the Principle of
Natom1Prolongation in the LibyanArgument
1corne now to the last of the bountiful crop of logical difficulties presented by
the Libyan argument hased upon proportionality.
Both in the submissions and generally in the written pleadings (1, LM,
@ para. 6.90; Map 17 (f6llowing p. 160); supra, LR, paras. 7.15-7.17), the Libyan
argument involves an assertion that the principle of natural prolongation and
the concept of proportionality produce a coincident result, namely a line some-
where within the so-called Rift Zone.
Even if, which Malta would deny, natural prolongation in the Libyan version
were relevant to the delimitation inhe present case, the coincidence can have no
legal significance.There can be no logical connection between the ratio of the
lengths of coastlines and the incidence of geological and geomorphological fea-
tures in and under the sea-bed. This is not to Saythat such coincidence automati-
cally disqualifies the two factors which produce the coincident resul:but unless
there is some legally significant connection between the two factors the coinci-
dence as such cannot increase the independent legal weight, whatever that might
be, of the two factors taken singly.
The situation involves the use by Libya of a particular version of proportiona-
lity which makes reference to the lengths of the respective coasts or at least of
selectedcoasts. This criterion of proportionality operateson its own plane and
clearly has no logical and therefore no legal or equitable,relation to the geology
of the sea-bed areas dividing the Parties or to the legal question of natural pro-
longation. Still less does it have any connection with the extent of the Libyan
landmass, which is also related to the principle of natural prolongation in the
Libyan pleadings (II, LCM, para. 2.48).
It must follow that the coincidence of result between the proportionality cri-
terion as proposed by Libya and the principle of natural prolongation is entirely
artificial and cannot involve any mutual confirmation. The matter can be ex-
pressed even more simply :the physiography of the sea-bed has no logical connec-
tion either with the lengths of the coasts of the two Parties or with the ratio of the
difference of those lengths. For that matter, the physiography of the sea-bed in
the Rift Zone has no connection with any Iinear value such as the latitudinal
reach of Libya or the length of theoastfrom the Tunisian frontier to Ras Zarruq.
13. Conclusionon Propnrrinnali~
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1can now present asummary of conclu-
sions on the issues relating to proportionality.
1.The first conclusion is the most important. The equitable solution must be
found within the actu;il geographical framework and within this framework is to
be found the "balance of geographical circumstances". This balance is not related
to proportionality as an independent factor but reflects the geographical circum-
stances overall and is translated in legal terms as a concept of approximate or
legal equality.
2. The purpose of the law conceming shelf delimitation is to maintain an
equality of seaward reach of jurisdiction and to avoid a delimitation which causes
encroachment upon the continental shelf areas adjacent to the coastal front of
another State.
3. It follows that proportionality cannot be invoked in order to justify a deli-
mitation or a method of delimitation which involves a monopoly or prepon-
derance of jurisdictional reach to the advantage of one State as against another
State abutting upon the same areas of shelf. ARGUMENTOF PROFESSORBROWNLIE 475
4.The test of proportionality cannot have any radical effects upon the delimi-
tation since the judicially evolved approach to delimitation rests upon the as-
sumption that delimitation is an operation of limited scale. In other words, it is a
relatively limited or marginal operation affecting a status quo based upon the
inherent rights of the coastal State as generated by its sovereignty over land ter-
ritory.
5. The ratio of coastal lengths as a test of proportionality is inappropriate to
the geographical framework of the present case and appears consequently as an
argument to support a manifestly inequitable solution, since there is no equality
within the same plane.
6. The length of coasts and the ratio of the different lengths represent an ab-
straction which is not based upon the actual geography and coastal relationships
of the Parties: such criteria cannot reflect the geographical framework and would
necessarilyinvolve a radical apportionment of the submarine areas dividing the
Parties. The result of resort to the Libyan criteria would be to paosubstitute
for the geographical data in this case.
7. The State practice relating to comparable situations clearly demonstrates
the international standard in the practice of continental shelf delimitation, that is
to Say,the objective standard of what is equitable and the State practice is clearly
incompatible with the view of proportionality advanced by Libya in these pro-
reedings.
8, The Libyan position, based as it is upon the criteria of coastal length and
territorial magnitude,roduces a result which would be wholly inequitable, not
only in the present case but generally in the situation of long-coast States co-
existing with short-coast States inmi-enclosed seas. The Libyan argument for
special advantageis afteral1not conditioned to apply only in the case of a single
short-coast State opposite and the factorf territorial magnitude is, in Libya's
thinking,equally signifrcant for each kilometre of Libya's Coast,irrespective of
the nurnber of short-coast States affected.
9. The coincidence of result between the proportionality criterion, as applied
by Libya, and the principle of natural prolongation, is wholly artificial and would
be so even if the so-called Rift Zone had the significance contended for by Libya
in the context of its argument based upon natural prolongation.
The final conclusion may now be formulated. The premise to that conclusion
must be the geographical framework and the relevant area. The trapezium figure,
@@ which appears on Figures 7 and 26 in the Malta dossier illustrat1ssubrnit, the
@ coyct position and does so in the simplest possible terms. ln Figure 7. the tra-
pezium shows the relevant area in relation to the position as between the actual
@ geography of Malta and Libya; in Figure 26 the trapezium is presented simply as
@ an analytical concept. The relevant area, as shown on Figure 7, consists of the
submarine areas lying between Ihe coasts of the Parties. The attribution of an
equal seawardextension ofjurisdiction from the relevant coasts is represented by
a median line.
The trapezium figure is based on the actual geographical relationships. It
shows that the median line between Malta and Libya leaves Libya withapropor-
tion in the ratio of five to one of the submarine areas dividing the P-rtthat
is Matta's proportion, that is what remains to Libya. And this proportion is, in
fact, admitted inhe Libyan pleadings. It is a proportion based on two factors,the
first is the equality of seaward rf:-chand this gives equal Iegal weight to the
coasts of both Parties, in so far as they are opposite each other.
The second factor consists of the longitudinal reach of the coasts of Libya.
That is inevitably and directly reflected in the extent of the southern segment of
the trapezium. 476 CONT~NENTALSHELF
In this way the median line reflects the coastal configurations. The north-
south. or facing, or opposite relation is treated on an equal basis. since to do
otherwise is to create an inequity.The longitudinal aspect of the attribution is
also detemined neutrally, and therefore on abasis of equality, since it is the atti-
tude of the coasts of the Parties and their relation to each other which produce the
lateral limits of the areas delimited by the median line. By the attitude, we mean
the areas which are facing either the coasts of Malta or the coasts of Libya and
the concept of facing and the concept of attitude is reflected in the sides of the
trapezium; and then weihave the coasts of Malta and the coasts of Libya, oppo-
site each other. Thus are the legally equal entitlements based upon geographical
data which are different from each other, but are to be treated equally within the
legal order.A long-coast State thus generates a larger area of shelf than a short-
Coast State without this involving any inequality in the opposite or seaward
extensions of jurisdiction.
Mr. President, the 1973 proposal of Libya, which was based exclusively upon
@ the proportionality argument, and appears on Figure 1 of the dossier, would pro-
duce a situation in which Malta would be virtually deprived of a11adjacent sub-
marine areas outside her territorial sea. This outcome can be cornpared with the
@@ result a~hievedin the trapezium figure (Figs. 7 and 26), which shows a delimita-
tion which produces no encroachment on shelf areas which are more adjacent to
Libya than to Malta. Indeed, the counterpart to the Libyan claim would be a line
along perhaps the Tripolitanian Furrow, and it wasjust such a line which was ruled
out by the Court in the TunisialLibya case (I.C.J.Reports 1982, p. 64, para. 80).
The exis~ingexperience of delimitation in semi-enclosed seas and gulfs - and
itis substantial- provides no support for the Libyan view on these matters.
Neither in principle nor in practice is there any justification for a weighting in
favour of long-coast States which would destroy the legal equality of coastal
States. Such a weighting would be ex hypothesi disproportionate, unreasonable
and inequitable. Malta is relying upon the concept of legat equality in the matter
of shelf delimitation and this involves the reflection in equitable terms of the
relevant geography and geographical relationships. The median iine represents
the equitable result in tliis case, precisely because that line gives legal expression
to the equality of seaward reach of the coasts abutting upon the relevant area.
Malta's position does not involve a claim to a spatial half-share of the relevant
area. As the Agent for Malta has already indicated in his exposéof the issues, the
calculations of the Libyan Counter-Mernorial - at 11,page 43, footnote No. 4-
produce a resutt according to which, within the area covered by the trapezium,
Libya would receive approximately five times as much as the area in issue as
Malta. Malta's stance is based firmly upon a concept of equality within the per-
tinent legalorder; and the trapezium illustrates that conception. Malta's concep-
tion of proportionality as a test of the equity of the result is compatible with the
geographical and legal framework of the case. In contrast, the Libyan reference
to the ratio of coastal lengths, like the reference to an index of territorial rnagni-
tude, is inappropriate both in terms of general legal principle and in terms of the
geographical circumstances. Any doctrine which is allowed to subvert the funda-
mental legal equality of coastal States would produce radical and dismptive
effects in the prmess of delimitation, whether this itotake the form of negotia-
tion or the activity of international tribunals.
Mr. President, I have concluded my presentation, 1 would like to thank the
Court for its customary courteousattention,and 1ask you if you would recognize
the Agent of Malta. STATEMENT BY MR. MIZZI
AGENT OF THE COVERNMENT OF MALTA
Mr. MIZZI: Mr. Piesident, Members of the Court. It had been our intention
that my leamed friend Mr. Lauterpacht would sum up the case for Malta and that
1 should conclude this round of the oral proceedings with a few words.
However. the statements by counsel have run a little longer than expected and,
in order not to abuse the couriesy of the Court, we have agreed that I should
instead conclude Malta's submissions at this stage of the oral proceedings by
recalling, very concisely, the hard core of the arguments developed by my
leamed friends and colleagues during the previous sessions.
We believe that Libya's case rests fundarnentally on two main propositions.
The first is that Malta's natural prolongation terminates at the so-called Rift
Zone on the south, and at the Escarpments-Fault Zone on the east. Consequently,
the delimitation of the shelf areas of Malta and Libya ought to be effected by
means of a line which follows the general direction of the said Rift Zone and
which is contained within it.
The second proposition is that such a tine is also the line which is indicated by
the requirements of equity which, in Libya's view, is synonymous with a division
of shelfareas in direct proportion to the lengths of the respective coastlines and
bearing also some relation to the difference in the size of the respective land-
masses.
In answer to these arguments, counsel for Malta have shown, and 1believe
conclusively, that the Rift Zone does not produce a fundamental discontinuity in
the natural prolongation of the Parties' territories. much less doesiiterminate
Maltais continental shelf. Moreover. whatever its tme physical nature may be,
the Rift Zone is legally irrelevant since the continental shelf of Malta would
extend, in law, up to the very shores of Libya were it no1for the legal enlitlement
of Libya to the same shelf. There is. therefore, no valid reason why the delirnita-
tion should be effected by a line within the Rift Zone. The sarne applies, with
perhaps greater force, to the Escarpments-Fault Zone.
As to the second Libyan proposition. counsel for Malta have shown that pro-
ponionality in the form of a ratio between the size of landmasses is not even
recognized in international law, whether by the jurisprudence, State practice or
doctrine.They have further shown that in cases of delimitation, proponionality is
merely a criterion for assessing the equitable or inequitable effects, of a particu-
largeographical feature or configuration upon a delimitation which would other-
wise be indicated by the general configuration of the coastlines of the Parties. It
is not an independent source of rights and only infrequently does it appear in the
form of the ratio between areas of shelf and lengths of coastlines.
Froportionality therefore has no role to play where the geographical circum-
stances are normal and the delimitation indicated by those circumstances is
consequenlly also equitable. Such are the circumstances of IWO opposite States.
at some distance one from the oiher, without any feature or other circumstances
which could disturb the regularity of the geographical setting. and these are pre-
cisely the circumstances of the present case.
Thus, in Malta's submission. both arguments which are fundamental to
Libya's case have been shown to beunable to withstand a close scrutiny of their
validity. Indeed. the rnanner in which Libya invokes natural prolongation and478 CONTINENTAL SHELF
proportionality as a justification for constructing the boundary so close ta Malta
and so distant from its own shores not only lacks legal validity but is also an invi-
tation to disproportionality.
On the other hand. Malta's case rests, it is firmly believed, on very solid fac-
tual and legal grounds.
Itrests on equity as reflected in the uncontested principle goveming al1State
relations in the contemporary international law; namely, the equality of States.
That principle applies to both entitlement and delimitation. It entitles al1States,
large or small, continental or insular, to an equal standing both with respect to
entitlement of contineiital shelf rights and to their delimitation when the rights of
one State and those of a neighbouring State meet and overlap. Less effect has at
times been given to island dependencies. But island States are States with equal
rights to those of continental States and have invariably been treated as such.
In al1such cases the equality of States demands that delimitation, which is the
consequent and inevitable constraint on a State's rights. should be effected on an
equal basis. Any discrimination on the grounds of size or insularity, or similar
grounds, would violate the principle of equality as well as the principle of
equity. In fact, neither ofthose principles could justify a rule which would give
to a large State more than is justified by its coastal geography by taking away
from a smaller State what properly belongs to itby reason of the seaward reach
of its coasts.
In the case of opposite States. and Malta and Libya stand in that position. the
shelf rights generated by their respective coastlines extend seawards one towards
the other until those rights meet and overlap. That overlap has to be divided and
the division can only be effecied on the basis of equality and equitably by means
of a line which leaves to both of them a relatively equal share of the areas of
overlap. This result is obtained only by an equidistant or median line. This
conclusion has been recognized by the jurisprudence and finds ample confirrna-
tion in State practice.
In special circumstances where such a line proves to be inequitable - such as
where an otherwise etluitable line is unduly distorted by some geographical fea-
ture - that line would have to be adjusted or modified and, in exireme cases. it
may even have ro give way to some other method or combination of methods.
And even in such cases. the modification or adjustment is a modest one. But
where this is not the case the equidistance line is the equitable and consequently
the definitive line.
It is Malta's submission that ihis is precisely the situation in the present case.
In the geographical setting of the case before the Court only a median line could
allow Malta and Libya to retain an appropriate extent of the areas of shelf gen-
erated by the seaward reach of their respective coasts, and which ensures to both
the least possible amputation of their respective entitlements. This does not mean
that such a delimitation would result in an equal division of shelf areas in spatial
terms. Those areas will be unequal in size, indeed, as has been shown, substan-
tially unequal. But that is the naturat and legally acceptable result of the different
configuration of the coastlines of the two States including the difference in the
length of those coastlines.
These differences, Malta respectfully submits, are adequately reflected in the
result obtained from an equidistant or median line and such a line must therefore
be also equitable. This is therefore the result -the equitable solution - which
is the purpose and object of the whole case before the Court.
Mr. President, 1 have concluded. It remains only for me to explain that since
there will be a second round of oral arguments which is due to start, as the Court
has indicated to the Parties. towards the end of January or the beginning of STATEMENT BY MR. MlZZl 479
February, 1 shall not formulate the final submissions of Malta requiredby para-
graph 2 of Article 60 of the Rulesof Court at this stage. 1shall do this at the
conclusion of the last statement made by Malta during a further stage of the oral
proceedings.
Mr. President, Members of the Court. with your permission 1again thank the
Court as well as our friendly and learned opponents for theourtesy and patience
shown to us,and 1extend to you, Mr. President, to the Members of the Court, to
the Agent of Libya and to a11counsel and other advisors on both sides, my
Government's and my own good wishes for the coming festivities and the New
Year to which we look forwürd with keen interest and anticipation.
TheCourt rose ut3.55 p.m. The publicationsof the INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE may be ordered from
any bookseller.For informationregardingthe sale of the Court's publicationspfeasewrite
to theDistributionand Sales Sectio, ffice of the UnitedNations, 1211GenevuIO
(Switzerlund,r thSalesSection,UnitedNations,New York,NY IGû17(USA).
The publications of the PERMANENTCOURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
(1920-1946)re obtainablefromKrausReprintCompany,KrausOrganizationLimited.Route
100,Millwood.NY 10546(USA),towhichal1requestsshouldbe addressed.
On peut acquérhs publicationsde la COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICEauprès
des librairies spécidusmondeentier.Pour tous renseigneme, rièrede s'adresserhla
Sectionde ludistributionetdesventes,OfficedesNationsUniGenève10(Suisseouàla
Sectiondes ventes,NotionsUnies,New York,NY 1001(Eluts-Und'Amérique).
On peut acquérirles publicationsde la COUR PERMANENTEDE JUSTICE INTER-
NATIONALE(192û-1945)auprèsde Kraus ReprintCompany,KrausOrganization Limited,
Route 100,MillwoodNY 10546(Etats-Unisd'Amérique.our tousrenseignements,pritre de
s'adresslicettesociktk.
PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
ISSN 0074-4433
ISBN 92-1-070676-5
Plaidoiries - Procès-verbaux des audiences publique tenues au Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, du 26 novembre au 3 décembre 1984, sous la présidence de M. Elias, président