Volume XXIV - Annexes 925-958

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
VOLUME XXIV OF THE ANNEXES
TO THE MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 925 Judgment in an administrative offence case, 11 October 2017, Rostov-on-
Don, Case No. 5438/17)
Annex 926 List of Organizations and Individuals on which There is Information that
They are Involved in Extremist Activity or Terrorism, Rosfinmonitoring
[16 May 2018], accessed at http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terroristscatalog-
portal-act.
Annex 927 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, art. 275 (“High Treason”)
Annex 928 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, article 280.1
Annex 929 I n terim measures for Civil Suit No. 2-1688/2014 (prohibiting Crimea
Foundation from exercising ownership of its properties and sequestering
its bank accounts)
Annex 930 Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea
Annex 931 Letter dated 2 February 2014 from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass
Media of the Russian Federation to Meydan
Annex 932 Decree for the Initiation of criminal proceeding and Pre-trial
Investigation (12 May 2016)
Annex 933 Protocol, Interrogation of the Suspect (12 May 2016)
Annex 934 Decision to Prosecute As Defendant Adopted by I.A. Skripka, Senior
Lieutenant of Justice and the Investigator of the Investigation
Department of the Department of Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia
in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevasto
Annex 935 Excerpts of Hearing Transcript of Umerov
Annex 936 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Crimean Tatars Demand
Recognition as Indigenous People (18 September 2013)
Annex 937 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Menacing FSB Interrogations
of Ukrainian Cultual Centre Activists in Russian-Occupied Crimea (23
March2017), accessed at http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936.
Annex 938 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces
(14 March 2014)
Annex 939 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed (18 March
2014)
Annex 940 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One
Tortured (25 March 2014)
Annex 941 Amnesty International Public Statement, Harassment and Violence
Against Crimean Tatars by State and Non-State Actors (23 May 2014)
Annex 942 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Enforced Disappearances (7 October
2014)
Annex 943 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea (November
2014)
Annex 944 Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, “Annexed”
Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea, Monitoring Report (2015)
Annex 945 Crimea Human Rights Field Mission - Brief Review of the Situation in
Crimea (April 2015)
Annex 946 Kharkiv Human Rights Group, Sentsov-Kolchenko Trial, Crimea and
What Russia Has to Hide (10 July 2015)
Annex 947 Ridvan Bari Urcosta, New Eastern Europe, Crimean Tatar World
Congress: Fear and Expectations (4 August 2015), accessed at
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1680-crimean-tatarworld-
congress-fears-and-expectations.
Annex 948 Andrii Klymenko, Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea,
Atlantic Council (5 August 2015)
Annex 949 Human Rights Group Report (October 2015)
Annex 950 Crimean Human Rights Situation Review, May 2016
Annex 951 Amnesty International, URGENT ACTION: Crimean Tatar Activist
Forcibly Disappeared (26 May 2016).
Annex 952 Crimean Human Rights Group, The Victims of Enforced Disappearance
in Crimea as a Result of the Illegal Establishment of the Russian
Federation Control (2014-2016) (June 2016)
Annex 953 Human Rights Watch, Crimean Tatar Activist Confined in Psychiatric
Hospital (26 August 2016)
Annex 954 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information
Centre (HRIC), Regional Centre for Human Rights (RCHR), and
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint Submission to
the UN Universal Periodic Review: Russian Federation (2017)
Annex 955 Regional Centre for Human Rights, et al., Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic
Review of the Human Rights Situation under Occupation, Vol. 3, Right to
Nationality (citizenship) (2017)
Annex 956 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights
Union, and CHROT, Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic Review of the
Human Rights Situation under Occupation (2017)
Annex 957 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Crimea Beyond Rules: Right to
Nationality (Citizenship) (2017)
Annex 958 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Report of the International
Expert Group: 26 February Criminal Case (2017)

Annex 925
Judgment in an administrative offence case, 11 October 2017, Rostov-on-Don, Case No. 5-
438/17
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

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Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don (Rostov Oblast)
Larisa Valeryevna Zakharenko
Page 1 of 6
Case No. 5-438/17
JUDGMENT
in an administrative offence case
October 11, 2017 Rostov-on-Don
Having considered at the Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don the case of an
administrative offence specified in art. 7.13, part 1 of the Code of the Russian Federation on
Administrative Offences received from the Ministry of Culture of Rostov-on-Don against an official,
the Chair of the State Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation <redacted>, Sergei Alekseevich
Efimov, DD.MM.YYY of birth, a native of <redacted>, registered at <address>, residing at
<address> L.V. ZAKHARENKO, judge of the Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don
FOUND:
The Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don received from the Ministry of Culture of Rostov
Oblast a case of an administrative offence specified in art. 7.13, part 1 of the Code of the Russian
Federation on Administrative Offences against an official, the Chair of the State Committee for
Cultural Heritage Preservation <redacted>, in the person of the Chair of the State Committee for
Cultural Heritage Preservation <redacted>, Sergei Alekseevich Efimov.
Present at the court session were A.A. Vitvitsky, the representative of the Office of the RF
Ministry of Culture for the Southern and Northern Caucasus federal districts, acting on the basis of a
power of attorney dated DD.MM.YYYY, and I.P. Gurzhieva, acting on the basis of a power of
attorney dated DD.MM.YYYY; they asked that the official be held administratively liable for the
offence.
S.A. Efimov, Chair of the State Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation <redacted>,
did not appear at the court session; he was duly notified of the time and place of the court session.
Having read the case file and heard the representatives of the Office of the RF Ministry of
Culture for the Southern and Northern Caucasus federal circuits, the court concluded as follows.
Pursuant to art. 26.1 of the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offences, the
circumstances subject to clarification in an administrative offence case are: the presence of an
administrative offence event; the person who committed the unlawful action; the culpability of the
person in the commission of the administrative offence; circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the
administrative offence, as well as other circumstances relevant to a correct resolution of the case.
According to art. 7.13, part 1 of the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative
Offences (KoAP RF), violation of the law on the preservation of cultural heritage sites (historical and
cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation, violation of the land use regime within
the borders of the territories of cultural heritage sites, or failure to comply with the restrictions
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Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don (Rostov Oblast)
Larisa Valeryevna Zakharenko
Page 2 of 6
established within the borders of the protection zones of cultural heritage sites, except as otherwise
stipulated by parts 2 and 3 hereof, shall be punishable by an administrative fine on citizens in the
amount of fifteen thousand to two hundred thousand rubles; on officials – twenty thousand to four
hundred thousand rubles; and on legal entities – two hundred thousand to five million rubles.
The relationships that arise in the preservation, use and promotion of cultural heritage sites
(historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation are regulated by Federal
Law No. 73-FZ of June 25, 2002 “On the cultural heritage sites (historical and cultural monuments)
of the peoples of the Russian Federation.”
In accordance with articles 33, 47.2, 47.3, and 48 of RF Federal Law No. 73-FZ of
06.25.2002 “On the cultural heritage sites (historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the
Russian Federation,” the owner (user) shall be responsible for the proper maintenance and
preservation of a cultural heritage site.
Based on art. 33, cl. 1 of Federal Law No. 73-FZ, cultural heritage sites shall be subject to
state protection to prevent their damage, destruction, or demolition, change of appearance or interior,
infraction of their prescribed use, or relocation, and to prevent other actions that could damage the
cultural heritage sites, as well as to protect them from adverse environmental impact and other
detrimental effects.
According to art. 45, cl. 1 of Law No. 73-FZ, the works to preserve a cultural heritage site
shall be performed on the basis of an assignment to perform said works, permits to perform said
works issued by the cultural heritage site protection authority, project documentation to perform the
works to preserve the cultural heritage site approved by the appropriate cultural heritage site
protection authority, as well as on condition that there is technical and design supervision and state
cultural heritage site protection supervision over the performance of the works.
Pursuant to art. 47.2, cl. 3, subclause 3 of Federal Law No. 73-FZ, the owners (users) of a
cultural heritage site must organize the performance of works to preserve the cultural heritage site as
stipulated in art. 45 of Federal Law No. 73-FZ.
Administrative offence protocol No. of DD.MM.YYYY, prepared by A.A. Vitvitsky, chief
state inspector of the department for state monitoring and supervision of the preservation, use,
promotion and state protection of cultural heritage objects of the Office of the Ministry of Culture of
the Russian Federation for the Southern and Northern Caucasus federal districts, established the
following circumstances.
On DD.MM.YYYY, the Office of Capital Construction of the Administration of Feodosia of
the Republic of Crimea, a municipal public institution, and Corporation ATTA Group Limited
Liability Company concluded a municipal contract for 32,637,000 (thirty-two million six hundred
and thirty-seven thousand rubles) to perform research, damage prevention, and repair and restoration
work at the cultural heritage site that was part of the Socio-Economic Development <redacted>
federal special-purpose program at the I.K. Aivazovsky House cultural heritage site (OKN).
On DD.MM.YYYY, A.P. Belyantsev, First Deputy Chair of the State Committee for Cultural
Heritage Preservation of the Republic of Crimea, issued to the I.K. Aivazovsky Feodosia Art Gallery
of the Municipality of the Feodosia District of the Republic of Crimea, a municipally-funded cultural
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Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don (Rostov Oblast)
Larisa Valeryevna Zakharenko
Page 3 of 6
institution, an assignment to perform works to preserve the OKN municipally-funded cultural
institution (MBUK) of the Republic of Crimea (RK) I.K. Aivazovsky Gallery, cl. 17 of which states
that one copy of the project documentation shall be submitted for approval to the Committee along
with a state historical-cultural expert report on the research and project documentation for
preservation of the OKN. These documents were never submitted to the Committee by Corporation
ATTA Group Limited Liability Company.
Instead, on DD.MM.YYYY, Committee Chair S.A. Efimov issued an approval to conduct the
works to preserve the cultural heritage site, which is included in the unified state registry of cultural
heritage sites (historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation (type of
works – “damage prevention works”) on the basis of an extract from a meeting of the Scientific
Methodology Council for Cultural Heritage Preservation at the State Committee for Cultural
Heritage Preservation <redacted>, which is at variance with the contract, whose subject is research,
damage prevention, and repair and restoration works, and with the assignment to perform the works
to preserve the cultural heritage site. Such a work approval procedure contravenes the legislation on
preservation of cultural heritage sites and is essentially unlawful.
In addition to federal laws, at the I.K. Aivazovsky House OKN there was a breach of the
requirements as to the composition and contents of the project documentation for the preservation of
cultural heritage sites set in RF National Standard GOST R 55528-2013 – “Composition and contents
of the research and project documentation for the preservation of cultural heritage sites. Historical
and cultural monuments. General requirements” (approved by order No. 593-st of August 28, 2013 of
the Federal Agency of Technical Regulation and Metrology). The repair and restoration work
procedure for cultural heritage sites includes mandatory steps for the issuance of approvals of
assignments and permits immediately preceding OKN preservation works, and includes the
following stages:
- approval by the relevant cultural heritage site preservation authority of the assignment to
perform the works;
- preparation of the research and project documentation and the conduct of a state historical
and cultural review;
- receipt of a permit to perform said works issued by the relevant cultural heritage site
preservation authority;
- monitoring of the performance of the repair and restoration works.
One of the documents needed for approval of the research and project documentation is a
positive state historical-cultural expert report on the research and project documentation and (or) the
project documentation for the preservation of the cultural heritage site. No such review was
conducted.
A historical and cultural review was not conducted, and the head of the Committee regarded
the works listed in the subject of the contract as damage prevention works, although art. 1.1 of the
Contract described them as damage prevention and repair and restoration works. During the works
the subject of the contract was changed and only damage prevention works were left in the contract,
but restoration works were in fact also performed. Equivocation by S.A. Efimov, Chair of the State
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Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don (Rostov Oblast)
Larisa Valeryevna Zakharenko
Page 4 of 6
Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation of the Republic of Crimea, led to damage to the OKN;
as a result, the restoration that was actually performed was documented as damage prevention works.
The performance of damage prevention works requires a Technical Condition Report (a
technical report on the condition of the cultural heritage site) that confirms its unsafe condition.
An inspection of the cultural heritage [sic] on DD.MM.YYYY showed that the performance
of the works to preserve the I.K. Aivazovsky House OKN had changed the original historical
appearance of the building, regarding which an appropriate report was prepared which stated that the
tiled roof batten [sic], the exterior finish, and the color of the main façade of the building had been
replaced; the functional characteristics of the roof joists were changed, the sculptured figures were
repainted (the griffons and the sculptured female figures in niches), the marble Venus and Apollo
sculptures in niches – the originals adorning the main façade – were restored, which is prohibited in
damage prevention works and requires a historical and cultural expert report to confirm the need for
said actions. All these works were listed as damage prevention works in the research and project
document Book 9 – “Priority damage prevention works on the façade of the cultural heritage site
‘House where the artist I.K. Aivazovsky lived <redacted>” at <address> Composition and Scope of
the Works (façade on axes <redacted>).
The works listed in para. 38 of Book 9, namely: cleaning of the surface per the technique,
removal of all old protective layers per the technique, replacement of the loss per the technique,
structural stone reinforcement, injection of cracks with fillers, biocidal treatment of the surface and
application of a protective-decorative coat require a special license from the Ministry of Culture of
the Russian Federation to restore, conserve or recreate sculptures. Such a license was not issued to
either KIRAMET LLC, which prepared the project documentation, or Corporation ATTA Group
LLC. This circumstance is evidence of gross violation of the law on the protection of RF cultural
heritage sites. Yet, having received a notification from KIRAMET LLC, the Committee did not
conduct inspections in accordance with the rules for provision of notification regarding the
performance of the types of activity listed in article 12, part 1 of the Federal Law “On the licensing
of certain types of activity,” whose performance on the territories <redacted> has been allowed since
DD.MM.YYYY without a license (approved by RF Government resolution No. 207 of March 9,
2015), and, accordingly, did not take action to allow KIRAMET LLC to engage in research and
project activity, and did not establish whether the employees of the organization had the requisite
qualification to prepare the research and project documentation.
The decision was therefore taken, without a historical and cultural review, to leave a
historically intact <redacted> section of the wall. The explanations of S.A. Efimov, Chair of the State
Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation <redacted> is refuted by the case evidence. When
questioned as a witness, T.V. Gaiduk, director of MBUK I.K. Aivazovsky Feodosia Art Gallery of
the Feodosia municipality (MO GO) of the RK, explained that she had not given her consent to paint
the sculptures and façade of the OKN. This decision was taken unilaterally by S.A. Efimov, Chair of
the State Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation, and representatives of the enterprise.
By the conclusion of the specialist, who explained that the works performed on the OKN
were not damage prevention but rather restoration [sic]. The OKN has been disfigured, the historical
roof and its construction have been changed, and works have been performed on the site structures
without a state construction review, resulting in an administrative offence under art. 7.13, part 1 of
the KoAP RF.
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Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don (Rostov Oblast)
Larisa Valeryevna Zakharenko
Page 5 of 6
The fact of wrongdoing and culpability of the official in the commission of an administrative
offence is confirmed by all the evidence examined by the court, whose accuracy and admissibility are
incontestable, namely: the administrative offence protocol, the inspection report, photo materials,
order, and other case materials on the administrative offence. By the conclusion of the specialist, who
explained that the works performed on the OKN were not damage prevention but rather restoration
[sic]. The OKN has been disfigured, the historical roof and its construction have been changed, and
works have been performed on the site structures without a state construction review, which qualifies
as a violation of art. 40, cl. 4 of Federal Law (FZ) No. 73-FZ and art. 6, cl. 5.1 and art. 49, cl. 3.4 of
the RF Urban Planning Code; the scope and composition of the research and project documentation
do not meet the requirements of art. 40, cl. 1 of FZ No. 73-FZ.
Having evaluated the evidence thoroughly, fully, objectively, and in its totality, in accordance
with art. 26.11 of the KoAP RF the court concludes that S.V. Efimov, Chair of the State Committee
for Cultural Heritage Preservation <redacted> is guilty of an administrative offence under art. 7.13,
part 1 of the KoAP RF.
In accordance with art. 4.1 of the KoAP RF the administrative punishment shall take into
consideration the nature of the administrative offence, the material and financial position of the
official, and mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Having established and taking into consideration the above circumstances, the court deems it
necessary to impose on the official S.V. Efimov, Chair of the State Committee for Cultural Heritage
Preservation <redacted> in the person of the Chair of the State Committee for Cultural Heritage
Preservation the minimum administrative punishment within the scope of the penal article of the law
in the form of an administrative fine of 20,000 rubles.
Based on the foregoing and governed by articles 29.9 and 29.10 of the KoAP RF, the court
ORDERED:
Find the official S.V. Efimov, Chair of the State Committee for Cultural Heritage
Preservation <redacted>, guilty of an administrative offence under article 7.13, part 1 of the Code of
the Russian Federation on Administrative Offences, and impose on him administrative punishment in
the form of an administrative fine of 20,000 rubles.
Payment details for payment of the fine: settlement account: correspondent account No.:
(none), bank: Rostov-on-Don branch, BIC: No., INN [Taxpayer ID Number] No.:, KPP [Tax
Registration Code] No.:, OKTMO [Russian National Classifier of Municipal Territories] No.:,
recipient – Office of the Federal Treasury for Rostov Oblast (Office of the RF Ministry of Culture for
the Southern and Northern Caucasus and Crimean federal districts (current account No.)), KBK
[Budget Classification Code]: No., purpose of payment: miscellaneous income from monetary
sanctions (fines) and other amounts as recompense for damage paid into the federal budget.
Art. 20.25, part 1 of the RF KoAP are concurrently explained: failure to pay the
administrative fine within 60 days shall incur the imposition of an administrative fine of double the
amount of the unpaid administrative fine or administrative detention for a period of up to 15 days.
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Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don (Rostov Oblast)
Larisa Valeryevna Zakharenko
Page 6 of 6
The order may be appealed or protested to the Rostov Oblast court through the offices of the
Lenin District Court of Rostov-on-Don within 10 days from the date of receipt or delivery of a copy
of the order.
Judge L.V. Zakharenko
Annex 926
List of Organizations and Individuals on which There is Information that They are Involved in
Extremist Activity or Terrorism, Rosfinmonitoring [16 May 2018], accessed at
http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act.
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

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Home (/) / List of organizations and individuals... (/documents/terr-list)
LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ON WHICH THERE IS
INFORMATION THAT THEY ARE INVOLVED IN EXTREMIST ACTIVITY OR
TERRORISM
In accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 6(2) of
Federal Law No. 115-FZ “On Countering the Legalization of Illegal Earnings
(Money Laundering) and the Financing of Terrorism” dated August 7, 2001
(hereinafter Federal Law No. 115-FZ) and the Rules for Determining the List of
Organizations and Individuals on Which There is Information that They Are
Involved in Extremist Activity or Terrorism and making this list available to
organizations engaging in transactions with monetary funds or other assets, and
sole proprietors, approved by Russian Federation Government Resolution No. 804
dated 08/06/2015 (hereinafter the Rules), the Federal Service for Financial
Monitoring shall compile a list of organizations and individuals on which there is
information that they are involved in extremist activity or terrorism (hereinafter
the List).
In accordance with the first and second paragraphs of Clause 21 of the Rules,
Rosfinmonitoring shall make the List available to organizations engaging in
transactions with monetary funds or other assets, sole proprietors who are
subjects of Article 5 of Federal Law No. 115-FZ, and also lawyers, notaries and
persons engaging in business in providing legal or accounting services who are
subjects of Article 7.1 of Federal Law No. 115-FZ by providing access to such
information only through their online accounts
(https://portal.fedsfm.ru/Account/login.aspx) on the official website.
Search the List of Organizations and Individuals on Which There is Information
that They Are Involved in Extremist Activity or Terrorism
827. ANNA DMITRIEVNA ANDRIEVSKAYA, date of birth 10/23/1985, VILLAGE OF
PETROVKA [FIND]
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Name Type Status
827. ANNA DMITRIEVNA ANDRIEVSKAYA,
date of birth 10/23/1985, VILLAGE OF
PETROVKA, KRASNOGVARDEISKIY DISTRICT,
CRIMEA OBLAST, UKRAINE;
Russian individual Active
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© 2001-2018 Federal Service for Financial Monitoring.
Annex 927
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, art. 275 (“High Treason”)

The Criminal Code
Of The Russian Federation
No. 63-Fz Of June 13, 1996
(with Amendments and Additions of May 27, June 25, 1998, February 9, 15, March 18,
July 9, 1999, March 9, 20, June 19, August 7, November 17, December 29, 2001, March 4,
14, May 7, June 25, July 24, 25, October 31, 2002, March 11, April 8, July 4, 7, December 8,
2003, July 21, 26, December 28, 2004, July 21, December 19, 2005, January 5, July 27,
December 4, 30, 2006, April 9, May 10, July 24, November 4, December 1, 6, 2007,
February 14, April 8, May 13, July 22, November 25, December 22, 25, 30, 2008, February
13, April 28, June 3, 29, July 24, 27, 29, October 30, November 3, 9, December 17, 27, 29,
2009, February 21, March 29, April 5, 7, May 6, 19, June 17, July 1, 22, 27, October 4,
November 29, December 9, 23, 28, 29, 2010, March 7, April 6, May 4, July 11, 20, 21,
November 7, 21, December 6, 7, 2011, February 29, March 1, 2012)
Adopted by the State Duma on May 24, 1996
Adopted by the Federation Council on June 5, 1996
See Federal Law No. 64-FZ of June 13, 1996 on the Enforcement of the Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation
General Part
Section I. Criminal Law
Chapter 1. The Tasks and Principles of the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation
Article 1. The Criminal Law of the Russian Federation
1. The criminal law of the Russian Federation consists of the present Code. New laws
providing for criminal liability are subject to inclusion in the present Code.
2. The present Code is based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the
generally recognized principles and norms of international law.
Article 2. The Tasks of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
1. The tasks of the present Code are as follows: the protection of the rights and freedoms
of man and citizen, property, public order and public security, the environment, and the
constitutional system of the Russian Federation against criminal encroachment, the
maintenance of peace and security of mankind, and also the prevention of crimes.
2. To accomplish these tasks, the present Code establishes the basis and principles of
criminal liability, defines which deeds are recognized as offences dangerous to persons, society,
or the State, and establishes the types of punishment and other penal measures for the
commission of offences.
Article 3. The Principle of Legality
1. The criminality of a deed, and also its punishability and other legal consequences shall
Article 274. Violating the Rules for Operation of the Facilities for Computer Information
Storage, Processing and Transmittance and of Information-Telecommunication
Networks
1. Violation of the rules for operation of the facilities for computer information storage,
processing and transmittance or of information-telecommunication systems and of terminal
equipment, as well as of the rules for access to information-telecommunication networks, that
has entailed the destruction, blocking, modification or copying of computer information
accompanied by causing a major damage -
shall be punishable by a fine in the amount of up to 500 thousand roubles or in the
amount of a wage/salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to eighteen
months, or by corrective labour for a term of six months to one year, or by restraint of liberty for
a term of up to two years, or by compulsory labour for a term of up to two years, or by
deprivation of liberty for the same term.
2. The deed provided for by Part One of this article, if it has entailed heavy
consequences or a thereat of their occurrence -
shall be punishable by compulsory labour for a term of up to five years, or by deprivation
of liberty for the same term.
Section X. Crimes Against State Power
Chapter 29. Crimes Against the Fundamentals of the
Constitutional System and State Security
Article 275. High Treason
High treason, that is espionage, disclosure of state secrets, or any other assistance
rendered to a foreign State, a foreign organisation, or their representatives in hostile activities to
the detriment of the external security of the Russian Federation, committed by a citizen of the
Russian Federation,
Shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of 12 to 20 years with or without
a fine in an amount of up to 500 thousand roubles or in the amount of the wage or salary, or
other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years and with restriction of
liberty for a term of up to two years.
Note: A person who has committed crimes stipulated in this Article, or by Articles 276
and 278 of this Code, shall be relieved from criminal liability if he has facilitated the prevention
of further damage to the interests of the Russian Federation by informing the governmental
authorities of his own free will and in due time, or in any other way, if his actions contain no
other corpus delicti.
Article 276. Espionage
Transfer, and also collection, theft, or keeping for the purpose of transfer to a foreign
state, a foreign organisation, or their representatives of information constituting a state secret,
and also transfer or collection of other information under the order of a foreign intelligence
service, to the detriment of the external security of the Russian Federation, if these deeds have
been committed by a foreign national or a stateless person,
Shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of 10 to 20 years.
Article 277. Encroachment on the Life of a Statesman or a Public Figure
Encroachment on the life of a statesman or a public figure, committed for the purpose of
terminating his government or any other political activity, or out of revenge for such activity,
Shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of 12 to 20 years with restriction of
liberty for a term of up to two years, or by imprisonment for life, or by capital punishment.
Article 278. Forcible Seizure of Power or Forcible Retention of Power
Actions aimed at the forcible seizure of power or forcible retention of power in
contravention of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, or aimed at the forcible change of
the constitutional system of the Russian Federation,
Shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of 12 to 20 years with restriction of
liberty for a term of up to two years.
Article 279. Armed Rebellion
Organisation of an armed rebellion or active participation in it for the purpose of
overthrowing or forcibly changing the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, or of
breaching the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,
Shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of 12 to 20 years with restriction
of liberty for a term of up to two years.
Article 280. Public Appeals for the Performance of Extremist Activity
1. Public appeals for the performance of extremist activity -
Shall be punishable with a fine in an amount of up to 300 thousand roubles, or in the
amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period of up to
two years, or by compulsory labour for a term of up to three years, or by arrest for a term of four
to six months, or by deprivation of liberty for a term of up to three years with the deprivation of
the right to occupy certain posts or to engage in a certain activity for the same time term.
2. The same acts, committed with the use of the mass media,
shall be punishable by compulsory labour for a term of up to five years with deprivation of
the right to hold specified offices or to engage in specified activities for a term of up to three
years or without such, or by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to five years with deprivation
of the right to hold specified offices or to engage in specified activities for a term of up to three
years or without such.
Article 281. Sabotage
1. Perpetration of an explosion, arson, or of any other action aimed at the destruction or
damage of enterprises, structures, transport infrastructure facilities and transport vehicles, or
vital supply facilities for the population, with the aim of subverting the economic security or the
defence capacity of the Russian Federation,
Shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of ten to 15 years.
2. The same acts:
a) committed by an organised group;
b) which have entailed the causing of considerable property damage or the ensuing of
other grave consequences -
shall be punishable with deprivation of freedom for a term of twelve to twenty years.
3. Acts stipulated by Parts one or two of this Article if they have entailed intentional
causing of death to a person -
shall be punishable with deprivation of freedom for a term of fifteen to twenty years or
with deprivation of freedom for life.

Annex 928
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, article 280.1
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

RUSSIAN FEDERATION
THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Adopted by the State Duma on 24 May, 1996
Approved by the Council of Federation on 5 June 1996
Article 280-1. Public calls for implementation of actions aimed at violation of
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
1. Public calls for implementation of actions aimed at violation of the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation,-
are punishable by a fine in the amount of one hundred thousand to three hundred
thousand rubles or in the amount of the salary or other income of the convicted person for a
period of one to two years, or by forced labor for a term of up to three years, or by arrest for a
period of four to six months, or by imprisonment for up to four years with deprivation of the
right to hold certain positions or engage in a certain activities for the same period.
2. The same acts committed with the use of mass media information or electronic or
information-telecommunication networks (including the Internet), -
are punishable by compulsory labor for up to four hundred eighty hours with deprivation
of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years, or
deprivation of liberty for a term of up to five years, with deprivation of the right to occupy
certain positions or engage in certain activities in the term up to three years.
(Article 280-1 introduced by the Federal Law No. 433-FZ of December 28, 2013 - Collection of
the Laws of the Russian Federation, 2013, N 52, art. 6998)
Moscow, Kremlin
13 June 1996
No. 63-FZ
Source: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102041891

Annex 929
Interim measures for Civil Suit No. 2-1688/2014 (prohibiting Crimea Foundation from
exercising ownership of its properties and sequestering its bank accounts)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Issue interim measures for civil suit No. 2-1688/2014
1. Prohibit the charitable organization Crimea Foundation (legal address: 40 Zhilkov Street,
Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, actual address: 2 Shmidt Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea,
registered with the executive committee of the Simferopol City Council in the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, certificate No. 206 dated July 23, 2002) from exercising the powers of owner as they pertain to
the use and disposal of property belonging to it (charitable organization Crimea Foundation), including
the lease or sale (alienation) of moveable and real property or the making of any contracts by any means
concerning the property located at:
1) 40 Zhilkov Street/117 Krylov Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea;
2) 34 March 8th Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea;
3) 155 Yaltinskaya Street, Apt. 3, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea;
4) 23 Krymskiye Partizany Street, Apt. 44, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea;
5) 92-a Kievskaya Street, Apt. 34, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea;
6) 37/8 Zhelyabov Street, Apt. 88, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea;
7) 2 Shmidt Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea.
2. Sequester accounts at Vladikombank Commercial Bank CJSC No. 40703810800030100027,
located at: 299040, Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol, 69-a Ostryakov Street, 295017, Republic of Crimea,
Simferopol, 8 Z. Zhiltsova Street.
3. Prohibit the charitable organization Crimea Foundation from opening new accounts at banks in
the Russian Federation.
Entrust the enforcement of this court ruling to the head of the interregional department for
enforcement of special proceedings, Federal Bailiff Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea.
A procedural appeal of this ruling may be filed within fifteen days with the Court of Appeal for the
Republic of Crimea via the Central District Court of Simferopol.
Judge O. N. Andreyeva
JUDGMENT (SENTENCE, RULING,
RESOLUTION) HAS NOT ENTERED [illegible]
Judge [signature]
Secretary [signature]
[round seal:] Central District Court, Simferopol,
Republic of Crimea
TRUE COPY
Judge [signature]
Secretary [signature]
[round seal:] Central District Court, Simferopol,
Republic of Crimea

Annex 930
Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Copy
M-264/18
R U L I N G
On February 21, 2018, having considered the statement of claim of the representative of Elmira
Narimanovna Ablyalimova – Nikolai Nikolaevich Polozov, acting on the basis of a power of
attorney – against Kiramet Limited Liability Company to compel it not to perform actions, M.V.
Kolotsei, judge of the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea,
F O U N D :
N.N. Polozov, acting in the interests of E.N. Ablyalimova on the basis of a power of
attorney, filed a statement of claim against Kiramet Limited Liability Company requesting that
Kiramet LLC be compelled not to perform actions that damage the 16th-19th century Khan Palace
cultural heritage site: 1740-1743 Khan Mosque located at 133 ul. Rechnaya, letter Sh.,
Bakhchisarai, Republic of Crimea.
Having considered this statement of claim, I conclude that it cannot be accepted for
hearing on the following grounds.
As is seen from the contents of the statement of claim, the plaintiff is requesting that the
court compel Kiramet LLC not to perform actions that damage the 16th-19th century Khan Palace
cultural heritage site: 1740-1743 Khan Mosque located at 133 ul. Rechnaya, letter Sh.,
Bakhchisarai, Republic of Crimea since the actions of Kiramet LLC damage a cultural heritage
site that is protected by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law.
In accordance with clause 134, part 1, clause 1 of the RF Code of Civil Procedure (GPK
RF), a judge shall dismiss a statement of claim if the statement is filed to protect the rights,
freedoms or lawful interests of another individual by a public authority, local government
authority, organization or citizen not granted such right by the Code or other federal law.
Article 2 of the GPK RF states that the objective of civil litigation is to protect the
violated or disputed rights, freedoms or lawful interests of citizens and organizations, and the
rights and interests of the Russian Federation, territorial entities of the Russian Federation,
municipalities, and other persons that are subjects of civil, labor or other legal relationships.
Article 46 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation enshrines a guarantee of legal
remedy for the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen.
In furtherance of said provision, article 3, part 1 of the GPK RF states that an interested
person shall have the right, as prescribed by civil litigation law, to petition the court to protect
rights, freedoms or lawful interests that have been infringed.
Legal remedy is therefore guaranteed to any individual only if there are grounds for
assuming that the rights and freedoms whose protection the individual is requesting reside in the
individual, and said rights and freedoms were infringed upon or there is a real threat of their
infringement.
Since it does not appear from the filed statement of claim that the rights, freedoms or
lawful interests of the petitioner, E.N. Ablyalimova, have been infringed, namely: the petitioner
has not specified how its rights have been infringed, there are no grounds for accepting the
statement of claim of the representative of Elmira Narimanovna Ablyalimova – Nikolai
Nikolaevich Polozov, acting on the basis of a power of attorney, against Kiramet Limited
Liability Company to compel it not to perform actions.
On the basis of the foregoing, governed by article 134, part 1, clause 1 of the GPK RF,
R U L E D
dismiss the statement of claim of the representative of Elmira Narimanovna Ablyalimova
– Nikolai Nikolaevich Polozov, acting on the basis of a power of attorney – against Kiramet
Limited Liability Company to compel it not to perform actions.
Explain to the petitioner the provisions of art. 134 of the GPK RF that state that the
dismissal of a statement of claim bars the petitioner from refiling a lawsuit against the same
defendant regarding the same matter and on the same grounds.
A private complaint against the ruling may be submitted to the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Crimea through the offices of Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Simferopol of the
Republic of Crimea within fifteen days from the date of the ruling by the court of first instance.
Judge [signature] M.V. Kolotsei
[handwritten:]
The ruling did not take effect. Original filed in civil case No. 9-72/2018
Judge [signature]
Clerk [signature]
[two round stamps:]
ZHELEZNODOROZHNY DISTRICT COURT OF SIMFEROPOL
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA, Russian Federation
[rectangular stamp:]
THIS IS A TRUE COPY
Judge [signature]
Clerk [signature]
Annex 931
Letter dated 2 February 2014 from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian
Federation to Meydan
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Form of the application for registration of a
mass media outlet (renewal of registration
of a mass media outlet, update of the
certificate of media outlet registration)
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR OVERSIGHT OF TELECOM, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, AND
MASS MEDIA
(in the territory of the Crimean Federal District)
APPLICATION
for registration of a mass media outlet (renewal of registration of a mass media outlet,
update of the certificate of media outlet registration)
Registration No. 1901/91-SMI
December 16, 2014
(to be filled in by the registering authority)
1. Founder (co-founders) of the mass media outlet
In the case of legal entities, specify the legal form of organization, full name, place of business address with the zip code, primary state registration number
(OGRN), taxpayer identification number (INN), phone and fax numbers.
In the case of individuals, specify the first name, patronymic, and last name, passport details, address of residence with the zip code, and phone number.
Limited Liability Company Atlant-SV Television Company; 14, Mamedi Emir-Useina Street, Simferopol,
Republic of Crimea, 295049, Russian Federation; Primary State Registration Number (OGRN):
1149102062317; Taxpayer Identification Number (INN): 9102034975; Phone/fax: (0652) 551301.
2. Name of the mass media outlet: Meydan
3. Form of periodical circulation: radio channel
4. Address and phone number of the editorial office
(Place of business address of the editorial office, including the zip code)
14, Mamedi Emir-Useina Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, 295049, Russian Federation; Phone:
(0652) 551301; Editor-in-Chief: Asan Dzhaferovich Khayretdinov
5. Language(s): Russian, Crimean Tatar, and Ukrainian
6. Indicative programming and/or specialization
Informational, entertainment, musical; advertising in keeping with Russian advertising laws
7. Expected periodicity, maximum volume
The maximum volume of printed periodicals includes: number of pages, format, and press run.
The maximum volume of a TV broadcast, radio broadcast, audio recording broadcast, news footage, video recording broadcast, TV channel or radio channel
must be specified in units of time.
The maximum volume of online publications must be specified using the relevant units of measurement of data (e.g. bytes).
24 hours a day, daily
8. Expected coverage territory: Republic of Crimea
9. Sources of funding: own and borrowed funds
10. Information about other mass media outlets in which the applicant is a founder, owner, editor-in-chief (editorial
office), publisher, or distributor
None
11. For renewal of registration purposes only:
___________________________________________________________________________________________
(Specify which authority registered the mass media outlet, the number and date of issuance of the media outlet registration certificate, and reason for
renewal of registration)
Only for purposes of updating the certificate of media outlet registration:
(Specify which authority registered the mass media outlet, the number and date of issuance of the media outlet registration certificate, and reason for
updates)
Contact details (for purposes of applicant notification once the media outlet registration certificate is ready and for
mailing of the certificate)
Address: 14, M amedi Emir-Useina Street, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, 295049, Russian Federation
Phone: (0652) 551301
I agree to have the media outlet registration certificate mailed to me: ____________________________________
(Signature, name spelled out)
I intend to collect the registration certificate in person: __*________________[Signature]___ E.R. Islyamova_____
(Signature, named spelled out)
*If there is no information to indicate that the applicant intends to collect the certificate of media outlet
registration in person or have it mailed, the certificate of media outlet registration w ill be mailed to the
founder’s address.
The application must be submitted along with documents listed in the Administrative Regulations Governing the Provision
of the Public Service Involving Mass Media Registration by the Federal Service for Oversight of Telecom, Information
Technologies, and Mass Media.
I acknowledge having reviewed the requirements of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on the
M ass M edia.
Media Outlet Founder (Co-founder) Company seal Signature
CEO of Atlant-SV Television Company, LLC [Signature]
Elzara Rustemovna Islyamova
In the case of a legal entity: full name and job title of company’s chief executive
In the case of an individual: full name
Date: October 29, 2014
[Seal] Limited Liability Company Atlant-SV Television Company * Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, Russian Federation *
Primary State Registration Number (OGRN): 1149102062317; Taxpayer Identification Number (INN): 9102034975
FEDERAL SERVICE FOR OVERSIGHT OF TELECOM, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES, AND MASS MEDIA (ROSCOMNADZOR)
HEADQUARTERS OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE FOR OVERSIGHT OF
TELECOM, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, AND MASS MEDIA IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL
NOTIFICATION
about acceptance of an application for media outlet registration (renewal of
registration, update of media outlet registration certificate, issuance of a duplicate
certificate of media outlet registration)
Name of media outlet: Meydan radio channel
Media outlet founder (co-founders): Atlant-SV Television Channel LLC
Officer responsible for acceptance of documents: [Signature] A.N. [illegible]
(Signature) Full name
Headquarters website: http://82rkn.gov.ru//
Number for inquiries about media outlet registration: (+380692) 70-11-92
HEADQUARTERS OF THE FEDERAL
SERVICE FOR OVERSIGHT OF
TELECOM, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES, AND MASS MEDIA IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND
SEVASTOPOL
Incoming correspondence No. 1901/91-
SMI
Date: December 16, 2014
ROSCOMNADZOR
HEADQUARTERS OF THE FEDERAL
SERVICE FOR OVERSIGHT OF
TELECOM, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES, AND MASS MEDIA IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND
SEVASTOPOL
(Roscomnadzor Headquarters in the
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol)
4, Vilar Street, Simferopol, 295000, Republic of Crimea
Email: [email protected]
Attn: Ms. E.R. Islyamova, Chief Executive
Officer, Atlant-SV Television Channel, LLC
14, Mamedi Emir-Useina Street, Simferopol,
Republic of Crimea, 295049, Russian
Federation
No. 149-05/91 of February 2, 2015
Re: (no number) of October 29, 2014
Documents returned without review
Dear Elzara Rustemovna,
Pursuant to Article 13 of the Law of the Russian Federation on the Mass Media of December 27,
1991, No. 2124-1 (hereinafter “the Law”), the Roscomnadzor Headquarters in the Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol hereby returns your submission for registration of the Meydan radio channel without review on
account of the following:
In light of the fact that the name of the mass media outlet can mislead consumers (the audience) as
to the product of the mass media outlet, we suggest that you revise the proposed name of the mass media
outlet proposed for registration, taking into account the information contained in the register of registered
mass media outlets published on the official website of Roscomnadzor on the Internet at www.rkn.gov.ru in
the “Mass Media. Registers” section.
Attachment: 1 copy on 24 pages (incoming correspondence No. 1901/91-SMI of December 16, 2014)
Head S.N. Khudoley
Document is signed with a digital signature in the
electronic document management system of
Roscomnadzor.
DETAILS OF THE DIGITAL SIGNATURE
CERTIFICATE
Issued to: Roscomnadzor Headquarters in the
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol
Serial No. 469452571411028664930275
Issued by: CA RTK
Validity period: April 14, 2014 – April 14, 2015
Annex 932
Decree for the Initiation of criminal proceeding and Pre-trial Investigation (12 May 2016)
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀃
[handwritten:] N 1
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1
DESCRIPTION OF
documents in Volume 1 of criminal case No. 2016427026
Item
No.
Document name Pages
1. 􀀧􀁈􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀊋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀙􀀗􀀕􀀚􀀓􀀕􀀙􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁈-
trial Investigation from 05/12/2016.
1-2
2.
Preliminary investigation Decree for the investigation team from
05/12/2016.
3-4
3. Decree for the acceptance of a Criminal Case for prosecution from
05/12/2016;
5
4. Decision to withdraw the criminal case from the investigator and transfer
it to another investigator from 07/15/2016. 6
5. Decree for the acceptance of a Criminal Case for prosecution dated
07/15/2016.
7
6. Decision to withdraw the criminal case from the investigator and transfer
it to another investigator from 08/02/2016. 8
7. Decree for the acceptance of a Criminal Case for prosecution dated
08/02/2016.
9
8.
Decision to withdraw the criminal case from the investigator and transfer
it to another investigator from 09/09/2016.
10
9.
Decree for the acceptance of a Criminal Case for prosecution from
09/09/2016;
11
10. Decree to withdraw the criminal case from the investigator and transfer it
to another investigator from 09/30/2016.
12
11.
Decree for the acceptance of a Criminal Case for prosecution from
30/09/2016;
13
12. Accompanying letter from the Department of Federal Security Service of
Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the city Sevastopol from /11/2016.
34-15
13. Report about findings of indications that a crime was committed from
11/05/2016.
16
14. Decree on the provision of results of operational-search activity of the
investigation. To the investigator or to the court of 11.05.5.2016.
17-18
15.
Information about operative-search activity (OSA) "Inquiry" from
04/21/2016.
19
16. Information about the OSA "Identification of personality" from
04/21/2016.
20
17. Report of the OSA “Investigation of objects and documents" from
03/21/2016
21-26
18. Accompanying letter to the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical
University from 03/24/2016
27
19. Explanation of rights, duties and responsibilities of an interpreter report
from 03/24/2016.
28
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20. Accompanying letter from the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical
University form 04/21/2016
29
21. Translated video - word for word 30-37
22. Copy of the diploma of the translator Saliadinov K.U. 38-39
23. Document analysis report from 04/21/2016 40-51
24. Document OSA "Study of objects and documents" from 04/28/2016. 52-57
25. Accompanying letter to the Department of Federal Security Service of
Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the city Sevastopol from 04/21/2016.
58
26. Accompanying letter to the Department of Federal Security Service of
Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the city Sevastopol from
04/21/04.2016.
59
27. Conclusion of expert witness No. 77 of 04/21/2016. 60-72
28. Decree on the initiation of an application for the extension of the
preliminary investigation period from 07/05/2016.
73-75
29. Decree on the initiation of an application for the extension of the
preliminary investigation period from 09/07/2016.
76-78
30. Decree on the initiation of an application for the extension of the
preliminary investigation period from 07/11/2016.
79-81
31. Decree on the initiation of an application for the extension of the
preliminary investigation period from 12/07/2016.
82-84
32. Decree on the initiation of an application for the extension of the
preliminary investigation period from 02/07/2017.
85-87
33. A copy of the passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation under the name
of Umerov I. R.
88-90
34. A copy of the passport of a citizen of the Ukraine under the name of Umerov
I. R.
91-96
35. Response to a request from the Military Commissariat of the Republic of
Crimea from 06/22/2016 with an annex
97-102
36. Response to a request from the Bakhchisaray Central Regional Hospital
(psychiatrist and narcologist) from 06/14/2016.
103-104
37. Response to a request from the Department of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Federation for Bakhchisaray district from 06/14/2016.
105-106
38. Request from the Department of Federal Security Service of Russia for the
Republic of Crimea and the city Sevastopol from 05/16/2016.
107
39. Protocol of explanation to the defendant Umerov I. R. of his rights under
Art. 46 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) of the RF from 12/05/2016
108-109
40. Protocol of the explanation to the defendant Umerov I. R. of the right to use
the help of a defendant from 05/12/2016
110
41. Protocol of the explanation to the suspect Umerov I. R. of the rights under
Chapter 40.1 of the CPC of the RF from 05/12/2016
111-115
42. Copy of Kurbedinov, E. M. Attorney certificate. 116
43. Order No. AS-0099 of the attorney Kurbedinov, E. M. from 05/12/2016. 117
44. Copy of Temisheva, D. M. Attorney certificate 118
45. Order No. 27 of attorney Temisheva, D. M. from 05/12/2016. 119
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46. Copy of Semedlyaev, E. S. Attorney certificate. 120
47. 􀀲􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀑􀀃􀈺􀉄-0014 of Attorney Semedlyaev, E. S. from 07/22/2016 121
48. The protocol of interrogation of the defendant Umerov, I. R. from
05/12/2016.
122-125
49 Decision on Selection of Measures of Detention in the form of
Recognizance not to leave and proper conduct of 05/12/2016
126-127
50. Recognizance not to leave and proper conduct of 05/12/2016. 128
51. Decree to prosecute Umerov, I. R. as defendant from 05/19/2016. 129-132
52 Protocol of the interrogation of the defendant Umerov, I. R. from
05/19/2016.
133-135
53 Protocol of the additional interrogation of the defendant Umerov, I.
R. from 10/20/2016.
136-139
54 Decree to prosecute Umerov, I. R. as defendant from 11/02/2016. 140-145
55. Protocol of the additional interrogation of the defendant Umerov, I.
R. from 11/02/2016.
146-149
56. Decree to prosecute Umerov, I. R. as defendant from 01/30/2016. 150-155
57. Protocol of the additional interrogation of the defendant Umerov, I.
R. from 01/30/2016.
156-159
58. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Avamilev, E. R. from
10/14/2016.
160-165
59. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Bayramov, L. U. from
10/05/2016.
166-169
60. Protocol of of the witness interrogation of Bondaruk E.A. from
05/26/2016.
170-173
61. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Budko K. I. from 05/26/2016. 174-177
62. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Dzhelyalova N.E. from
10/13/2016.
178-183
63. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Maushev M. T. from
10/17/2016.
184-189
64. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Memetov Z. I. from
05/27/2016.
190-192
65. Potocol of the witness interrogation of Memetov S. Z. from
05/31/2016.
193-197
66. A copy of the protocol of the witness interrogation of Polozov, N. N.
from 01/25/2017 with attached - an envelope with two optical discs.
198-202
67. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Umerov, M. S. from
05/26/2016.
203-205
4
68.
Protocol of the witness interrogation of Memetov, S. I. from
05/27/2016.
206-208
69. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Cherkashinoi, O. N. from
10/05/2016.
209-213
70. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Shevchenko, V.A. from
11/25/2016
214-220
71. Protocol of the witness interrogation of Yunusova, L. A. from
10/12/2016 221-226
72. Protocol of the expert witness interrogation of Alunin D. A. from
06/06/2016.
227-233
73. Protocol of the expert witness interrogation of Krasnovsky, S. A. from
08/10/2016.
234-238
74 Protocol of the expert witness interrogation of Kushnir G. M. from
08/10/2016.
239-243
74 items on 243 pages
Desdescription prepared by:
Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Department of
Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Rostov
Region, Senior Lieutenant of Justice [signature]
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I. A. Skripka
On March 19, 2016, the citizen of the Russian Federation Umerov, I. R., while being
present on the territory of Ukraine in the city of Kiev, took part in a live broadcast on the Ukrainian
television channel "ATR", where he publicly appealed to an unlimited number of people about the
necessity to violate the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
Furthermore, under circumstances not specified by the investigators, the video materials
of the TV appearance made by Umerov, I. R. were placed and freely accessible on the information
and telecommunication network "Internet" of the resource "YouTube" at web address:
https://www.youtube.com/watch7vCyTuPNPkTUI, with the title "Ilmi Umerov. Live broadcast
from 03/19/2016 ", access to which is granted to unlimited number of persons.
On the basis of the mentioned above, based on the provisions stipulated in art. 140 and
143 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation about the grounds for initiating a
criminal case - a report about the findings of indications that a crime was committed provided for
in Part 2 of Art. 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, received on 05/12/ 2016
from the Department for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against terrorism
and the Department of Federal Security Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and the city
Sevastopol with the attachment - the materials of operational-investigational activity and the
established in part 2 of Art. 140 of the Criminal Procedure Code about the grounds for initiating a
criminal case, and taking into account that there is sufficient data indicating the presence of crime
indications in the actions of Umerov, I. R. as provided in part 2 of Art. 280.1 of the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation, guided by. Art. 140, 145, 146 and part 1 of Art. 156 of the CPC of the
RF,
I DECIDED:
1. To initiate criminal proceedings on the indications of crime as provided for in Part 2 of
Art. 280.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, against a Russian citizen,
Umerov Ilmi Rustemovich, D.O.B. 08/03/1957, who was suspected of committing public appeals
for the carrying out of actions,
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DECREE
for the Initiation of criminal
proceeding and Pre-trial Investigation
City of Simferopol
May 12, 2016
12: 05 PM
The investigator of the Investigation Department of the Department of Federal Security
Service (FSB) of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Senior Lieutenant
of Justice Skripka I. A., having examined the crime report - a report on the indications of evidence
of a crime dated 05/11/2016, received from the Department for Protection of the Constitutional
System and the Fight against terrorism of the Department of FSB of Russia in the Republic of
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol registered in the Registration of crime reports book on May 11,
2016 under No. 181 with attached – operational-investigational materials
DECIDED:
Annex 933
Protocol, Interrogation of the Suspect (12 May 2016)
􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀨􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀔􀀑􀀃

122
does not
PROTOCOL
Interrogation of the suspect
Simferopol
The interrogation started at 6: 20 PM
The interrogation was completed at 6: 38 PM May 12, 2016
Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Federal Security Service of the
Russian Federation for the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Senior
Lieutenant of Justice Skripka, I. A., in room No. 109 of the Investigation Department of
the Department of FSB of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and city of Sevastopol,
located at address 13, Ivana Franko boulevard, Republic of Crimea , in accordance with
part 2, page 46, page 189 and 190 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the RF, I
conducted an interrogation under criminal proceeding No.. 2016427026 of the defendant:
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1. Last Name, First Name, Middle Umerov Ilmi Rustemovich
2. Date of birth 08/03/1957
3.
Place of Birth
village of Akhunbabaeva of the Tashlak
District, Ferghana Region, Uzbek Soviet
Socialist Republic
4.
Place of residence and/or
registration, telephone number
Registered at this address:
17 Pushkin str, Bakhchisaray, Republic of
Crimea and in fact lives at this address: 67
Lazurnaia str, Bakhchisaray, Republic of
Crimea; cellular phone number +7 (978)
701-34-74
5. Citizenship Citizen of the Russian Federation
6.
Education Higher, Andijan Medical Institute of the
Uzbek SSR
7. Marital Status, family composition Married, no underage children
8. Place of work or study, Telephone
Retired
9. Military duty Not liable for military service
10. Criminal record Does not have written record
11. Passport
(another document certifying the
identity of the defendant)
Passport of a Russian citizen series 4514
No. 656825, issued on 04/18/2014 by the
Federal Migration Service (division code
900-002).
12. Other data regarding the
personality of the defendant
MP is not present, are not available,
according to the accounts of expert doctors
in narcology and narcology, not a subject
With the participation of the defender - attorney Tmishev Dzhemilia Musayevich,
presenting certificate No. 1289 of 12/24/2015, order No. 27 of 05/12/2016 with
attorney certificate Kurdedinov Emil Maksudovich, presenting certificate No. 1171
of 11/20/2015, warrant AS-0099 dated 12/05/2016 [signature]
2 123
During the interrogation, an office computer and printer were used
Defendant [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
I have been explained that, in accordance with part four of Art. 46 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (CPC) of the RF, I have the rights:
1. to know what I am suspected on, and to receive a copy of the decision on the criminal
case against me, or a copy of the minutes of the debate, or a copy of the decision to apply to me
the measure of detention;
2. to give explanations and testimony about the suspicions involving me or refuse to give
explanations and testimony. I am warned that with my consent to provide evidence, my
testimony can be used as evidence in the criminal case, including with my subsequent
renunciation from the testimony, except for the case provided for in p. 1, Part Two of Art. 75
of the CPC of the RF;
3. to use the assistance of an attorney from the moment provided for in paragraphs 2 to 3
of Part Three of Article 49 of the CPC of the RF and to meet him/her privately and confidentially
before my first interrogation;
4. to present evidence;
5. to file petitions and objections;
6. to make depositions and explanations in my native language or in a language that I am
proficient in;
7. to use the help of an interpreter free of charge;
8. have access to the records of the investigation conducted with my participation and
submit comments about it
9. to take part, provided that the investigator or detective has given his or her permission,
in the investigative actions carried out at my request, upon request by my defense attorney or
legal representative;
10. file complaints against actions (lack thereof) and court decisions,
11. to rely on other ways and means of defense not prohibited by the CPC of the RF
Furthermore, it has been explained to me that pursuant to Article 51 of the Constitution of
the Russian Federation I may refuse to testify against myself, my spouse and other close
relatives, who are listed in paragraph 4 of Article 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the
Russian Federation.
Defendant [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
According to p. 18 of the CPC of the RF, the suspect was explained the right to make
statements, give explanations and testimony, file petitions, file complaints, get acquainted with
the materials of the criminal case, appear in court using his native language or another language,
which he knows, and use the help of an interpreter, in accordance with the procedure established
by the CPC of the RF.
[signature]
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3 124
On the merits of the suspicions, I can testify that:
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Question: You are suspected of carrying out public appeals to carry out actions aimed at
violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation committed with the use of the information
and telecommunications network "Internet", that is, the offense provided for in Part 2 of Art. 280 1
of the CPC of the RF.
Do you understand the essence of the suspicions that have been brought up against you and do
you consider them justified?
Answer: I was given the opportunity to communicate with my defenders Temishev Jamil
Musayevich, Kurbedinov Emil Mahsudovich alone and confidentially before the start of interrogation
without time limitation.
The essence of the suspicions that are brought up against me is clear to me and completely
understandable.
The suspicions that are brought up against me in the implementation of public appeals for the
implementation of actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,
committed using the information and telecommunications network "Internet", that is, the crime
provided for by Part 2 of Art. 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, I consider
completely unfounded.
During this interrogation, on the basis of Art. 51 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
I refuse to testify.
The suspected Umerov said that he knows Russian written and spoken language well, does
not need the services of an interpreter, he does not suffer from illnesses of hearing and sight and
is not sick
Defendant [signature] Umerov I. R.
name, initials
The defendant Umerov, I. R. was informed that he was suspected of committing a crime under
Part 2 of Art. 280 1 of the CPC of the RF.
Defendant [signature]
Defendant [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
[signature] [signature] [signature]
4 125
Before the beginning, during or after the interrogation of the suspect from the persons involved, the
suspect Umerov, I. R., defenders Temishev, D. M., Kurbedinov, E. M. no statements were received.
Content of statement: none.
Defendant [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
protocol read: on his own
Remarks to the protocol: none
Defendant [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
Defense attorney [signature]
The protocol is drawn up in accordance with Art. 166 of the CPC of the RF
The protocol was prepared by:
Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Federal
Security Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol, Senior Lieutenant of Justice
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[signature] I. A. Skripka
Annex 934
Decision to Prosecute As Defendant Adopted by I.A. Skripka, Senior Lieutenant of Justice and
the Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Department of Federal Security Service
(FSB) of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevasto
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

􀀃
􀀃
DECISION 129
to prosecute as defendant
city of Simferipol May 19, 2016
Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Department of Federal Security Service of Russia
for the Republic of Crimea and the city Sevastopol, senior lieutenant of justice I.A. Skripka, having
examined the materials of the criminal case No. 2016427026,
DECIDED:
Umerov I. R. made public appeals for the implementation of actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, committed using information and
telecommunications networks (including the Internet),
This how, on March 19, 2016, being on the territory of Ukraine in Kiev, acting upon existing
intent to carry out activities aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, in
circumstances not established by the investigation, participating in the live broadcast television show
named after Noman Chelebidzhikhan of the Ukrainian ATR television channel, and, giving an interview
to the presenter of the specified television channel, he deliberately and publicly appealed to an unlimited
number of persons to carry out actions aimed at returning the Republic of Crimea under the jurisdiction
of Ukraine.
Furthermore, under circumstances not specified by the investigators, the video materials of the
TV appearance made by Umerov I. R. were placed on the information and telecommunication network
"Internet" for free access on the video channel "YouTube" at web address:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CyTuPNPkTUI, with the title "Ilmi Umerov. Live broadcast from
03/19/2016 ", access to which is granted to unlimited number of persons. In the abovementioned video,
the following statements of Umerov I. R. are included:
"We must force Russia to withdraw from the Crimea, the Donbass and Lugansk, if they returned
the borders of Ukraine back to their former place" ..., "I repeat, we must force Russia to leave the Crimea
and the Donbass."
"Ukraine should not change its opinion, and in a short time should adopt several laws, on
indigenous peoples, on the status of the Crimean Tatar people, then to make changes in Ukraine's
constitution from territorial autonomies should be translated into national autonomy” ... “It is mandatory,
if Crimean Tatar autonomy will be part of Ukraine “... "To help Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People to
expand and deepen, and strengthen the 3 sanctions, and to force Russia to leave the Crimea ...", "... if
they returned the borders of Ukraine back to their previous location" ... “I repeat, it is necessary to force
Russia to withdraw from the Crimea and Donbas."
Thus, Umerov, I. R, acting deliberately, in violation of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of July 25, 2002,
"On Countering Extremist Activities," publicly appealed for the implementation of actions aimed at
violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, committed with the use of informationcommunication
networks (including the Internet)
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􀀃
􀀃
2 130
In other words, with his actions Umerov I. R. committed a crime under part 2 of Art. 280.1 of
the Criminal Code of the RF
Based on the above and guided by Art. 171,172 CPC of the RF,
I DECIDED:
To indict Umerov Ilmi Rustemovich, D.O. B. 08/03/1957, bon in village if Akhunbabaev of the
Tashlak district of the Ferghana region of the UZ of the USSR, as a defendant in criminal case No.
2016427026, having charged him with committing a crime under part 2 of Article 280 1 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation, about which he will be indicted.
Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia for the Republic
of Crimea and Sevastopol, Senior Lieutenant of Justice
􀀃 [signature]
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I. A. Skripka
􀀃
􀀃
3 131
I was also explained chapter 40.1 of the CPC of the RF, a special procedure for the adoption of a court
decision in the conclusion of a pre-trial cooperation agreement.
Defendant 􀀾􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁀
Defense attorney [signature]
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This decision was announced to me on May 19, 2016 at 10.30 AM, its content was read to me in person
(read in person and aloud by the investigator)
The essence of the indictment is explained. At the same time, I was explained the rights provided for under
Art. 47 of the CPC of the RF:
1. know what I am accused of;
2. to obtain a copy of the indictment decree as a defendant, a copy of the decision on the application
to me of measures, detention, a copy of the indictment decision, the indictment or the indictment order;
3. to object to the charges, to testify on the charges brought against me, or to refuse to give testimony.
If I agree to testify, I am warned that my testimony can be used as evidence in a criminal case, even if I
renounce this testimony later, except as provided by paragraph 1 of the second part of Article 75 of the
CPC of the RF
4. to present evidence;
5. to file petitions and objections;
6. to make depositions and explanations in my native language or in a language that I am proficient
in;
7. to use the help of an interpreter free of charge;
8. To use the help of a lawyer, including free of charge in cases provided for by the CPC of the RF;
9. to have meetings with the defender privately and in confidentially, including before the first
interrogation, without limiting their number and duration;
10. to take part, provided that the investigator or detective has given his or her permission, in the
investigative actions carried out by my request, upon request by my defense attorney or legal
representative;
11. get acquainted with the decision on the appointment of forensic expertise, raise questions to the
expert and get acquainted with the expert's conclusion;
12. after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation phase, to get acquainted with all the
materials of the case and to write down any information from the criminal case without limitations;
13. to make copies of materials of the criminal case at their own expense, including by using
technical means;
14. to bring complaints against actions (inaction) and decisions of the detective, the investigator, the
prosecutor and the court and to participate in their hearing by the court;
15. to object to the termination of the criminal case on the grounds provided for in part 2 of Article
27 of the CPC of the RF
16. Participate in the trial of the criminal case in the courts of the first and second, cassation and
supervisory instances, as well as in the hearing by the court of the issue of election in respect of the
measures of detention and in other instances provided for in clauses 1-3 and 10 of second part of art. 29
of the CPC of the RF
17. To get acquainted with the record of the court session and to submit comments to it
18. To appeal the verdict, the ruling, the court decision and receive copies of the decisions, subject
to appeal;
19. To receive copies of the complaints and submissions brought in the criminal case and file an
objection for these complaints and submissions
20. To participate in the consideration of issues related to the execution of the sentence;
21. To rely on other ways and means of defense not prohibited by the CPC of the RF
􀀃
􀀃
4 132
The decision was announced, the rights were explained, a copy of this decision l was presented to the
defendant and his counsel on May 19, 2016
Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia for the Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol, Senior Lieutenant of Justice
A copy of this decision was sent to the public prosecutor on May 19, 2016.
Investigator of the Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia for the Republic of
Crimea and Sevastopol, Senior Lieutenant of Justice
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[signature] I. A. Skripka
[signature] I. A. Skripka
Annex 935
Excerpts of Hearing Transcript of Umerov
This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language
of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.
Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the
original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has
provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[Page 1]
[…]
To summarize the foregoing, the board of linguistic specialists of
the Guild of Linguistic Experts on Documentation and Information
Disputes (GLEDIS) has reached the following key conclusions.
Opinion No. 110 of August 22, 2016 prepared by expert O.N.
Ivanova does not reflect some of the input data at the disposal of the
expert at the time of expert examination, which calls into question the
objectivity of the document presented as an opinion reflecting the
findings of a forensic expert examination.
In conducting the expert examination whose findings are reflected
in said opinion, expert O.N. Ivanova grossly violated the principle of
completeness of an expert examination prescribed by Article 8 of the Law
On State Forensic Expert Examinations in the Russian Federation, which
obligates the expert to carry out a complete examination of all the
available criminal case files.
As a result of this violation of the principle of completeness and the
resultant substitution of notions committed by the expert in the wake of
investigator I.A. Skripka, the expert answered questions of the
investigator posed in respect of the item called “transcript of the video
recording titled ‘Ilmi Umerov. Live Broadcast. March 19, 2016’,” which in
reality does not apply to any transcript of any video recording
whatsoever, but merely to a translation from the Crimean Tatar language
performed by K.U. Salyadinov.
The criminal case files presented for expert examination do not
include any information to indicate that the text of the translation
performed by K.U. Salyadinov and examined by the expert was in any
way disseminated by I.R. Umerov, reproduced by him and/or stored by
him for purposes of dissemination. The case files contain only information
to the effect that I.R. Umerov disseminated the original text in the
Crimean Tatar language, of which he stands accused. Meanwhile, the
investigator did not pose questions to expert O.N. Ivanova about this
original text; it was not examined by the expert, and the expert did not
even find it appropriate to review it despite the fact that it was made
available to her.
The significance of this conclusion is extremely high. According to
I.R. Umerov’s defense attorney, lawyer M.Z. Feygin, the translation
performed by K.U. Salyadinov is not semantically equivalent to the
original text in the Crimean Tatar language.
The conclusion drawn by expert O.N. Ivanova in response to
Question 1 is not justified.
The conclusion drawn by expert O.N. Ivanova in response to
Question 4 to the effect that the translation examined by her contains
calls to undermine the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
pertains to two statements, the first one of which is not present in the
text examined by the expert, and the second one of which has been
taken out of context with a considerable distortion of meaning.
Therefore, the conclusion drawn by expert O.N. Ivanova in
response to Question 4 is altogether unrelated to the text examined by
her and, consequently, cannot be found to be justified.
I request that the original text of the review dated April 6, 2017
and documents proving the experts’ qualifications be appended to the
case file.
[...]
[Page 3]
[...]
S.A. Kishveyev was asked to enter the courtroom.
The court verified the identity of S.A. Kishveyev. He was born on
January 1, 1965 at DVZ No. 1 of Begovatsk District, Tashkent Oblast of
the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and graduated from Tashkent
People’s Friendship Order State Pedagogic University majoring in “Tatar
language and literature and Russian language and literature”.
[...]
After deliberation in the courtroom, the court decided:
- To allow S.A. Kishveyev to participate in the proceedings in the
capacity of an expert and question him pursuant to Part 4 of Article 271
of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.
[...]
Expert S.A. Kishveyev: I acknowledge my understanding of my
rights and obligations.
Questions posed by defense attorney E.M. Kurbedinov to
expert S.A. Kishveyev:
- What explanation can you offer as an expert regarding the
recording of Ilmi Umerov’s speech?
Expert: I completely reviewed the translation, translated his
speech, and then compared my translation with that of Kurbedinov and
performed a comparative analysis. I have listed the translation
inaccuracies in the table here. Kurbedinov translated the most important
fragment thusly: “In order to help the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People,
[they] would all together broaden and deepen, toughen those sanctions
and force Russia to leave Crimea, Donbas, and Luhansk, would bring
back the borders of Ukraine to where they used to be, after which the
actions of those international organizations would have an even greater
effect. Perhaps now it would be enough to influence those Mejlis
members who remain in Crimean territory, and I think the fact is that
this influence will not happen. But we need to influence them. I repeat:
we have to force Russia to leave Crimea and Donbas”. This translation is
inaccurate. The actual translation reads thusly: “In order to help the
National Mejlis of Crimean Tatars, if everybody broadened and deepened,
toughened those sanctions and forced Russia to give up Crimea and
leave Donetsk and Luhansk, and the borders of Ukraine returned to the
way they had been before, the influence of international organizations
would be stronger after this. Presently we may be able to influence those
Mejlis members who are in Ukraine and the existing situation. However, I
believe they will not be able to influence the situation and events
occurring inside Crimea. I repeat: their influence should be so as to force
Russia to leave Crimea and Donbas”. The words “have to” have not been
used here.
- Does the translation contain any mistakes?
Expert: Very many. They are listed here. The translator used the
following translation: “after they captured Crimea”, while he should have
used the translation “on the part of the occupation authorities”. He also
translated “the case of May 3, 2015 ended”, while he should have used
the translation: “the case of May 3 ended”. Then: “8-10 of our guys are
lying in prisons in connection with the Khizb-ut Takhrir case”, while he
should have used the translation “8-10 of our compatriots are lying
(sitting) in prisons in connection with the Khizb-ut Takhrir case”.
He used the translation: “One could say they frightened them, one
could say they cooled them down”, while he should have used the
translation: “One could say they intimidated them, one could say they
discouraged them”. These words are synonyms.
He used the translation: “Freethinking in Russia is prohibited”, while
he should have used the translation: “It is prohibited to have your own
opinion in Russia”.
There is a lot of unqualified translation.
- How many mistakes are there in all?
Expert: 17 mistakes. Statements were translated incorrectly.
[...]
[Page 5]
[...]
Questions posed by defense attorney A.P. Podrabinek to
expert S.A. Kishveyev:
- Do the translation mistakes made by Kurbedinov change the
meaning of what Umerov said?
Expert: Of course. One word can change an entire sentence.
- To what extent do the mistakes he made change the meaning?
Expert: Even this sentence: “We have to force Russia to leave
Crimea and Donbas”. He did not say those words. He said that influence
on the part of international organizations should force Russia to leave
Crimea and Donbas. The words “have to” are not here. The words “have
to” play the key role here and change the entire meaning of the
sentence.
- Am I right in understanding that different conclusions can be
drawn from the translation by Salyadinov and your translation?
Expert: Yes, of course.
Questions posed by defense attorney E.S. Semedlyaev to
expert S.A. Kishveyev:
- Can a translation fully convey the meaning of what has been said
in another language?
Expert: I can do so closely.
- Do you believe it would be more appropriate to perform an expert
examination of the Crimean Tatar version or the translation?
Expert: The Crimean Tatar version, naturally.
[...]
[Page 7]
[...]
I can even say that I am grateful to some extent to the judge and
even the prosecutor that they insisted on examining the disk in the
courtroom. This examination revealed many inaccuracies in the
translation by translator K. Salyadinov.
Over the course of the translation, I and my defense attorneys
repeatedly corrected him. Meanwhile, the most important part of the
translation in the criminal case files states: “we have to force Russia to
leave Crimea and Donbas”. I spoke out loud, asking the translator how
the words “have to” sound in Crimean Tatar. He answered “kerek”. After
listening to this part of my interview for several times, the court verified
that the word “kerek” is not there. Translator Salyadinov also said: “The
word ‘kerek’ is not there.”
In reality, in this part of my interview I discussed the assistance of
international organizations for the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people,
which does not extend to Crimean territory. I also discussed sanctions
imposed by international organizations (UN, EU) on the Russian
Federation.
Let me quote the translation by Prof. Kerimov that was appended to
the case file: “In order to help the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People – if
everybody jointly toughened, broadened and deepened the sanctions and
forced Russia to give up Crimea and leave Donetsk and Luhansk, and the
borders of Ukraine returned to the way they had been before, the
influence of the international organizations would be stronger after this.
Presently they may able to influence Ukraine and those Mejlis members
who are in Ukraine. However, I believe they will not be able to influence
the existing situation and events occurring inside Crimea. I repeat: their
influence should be so as to force Russia to leave Crimea and Donbas.”
In other words, Russia will give up Crimea on its own under the
influence of sanctions. I did not use the expression “have to force”, and
this fact has been proven here in the courtroom while we examined the
recording and performed the translation.
Previously, while discussing in more detail the inaccuracies and
substitutions of notions in the work of the translator and the expert, I
emphasized the fact that the words “have to” have been added to the
two expressions on which the indictment against me is based (the first
one during the expert examination and the other one in the translation).
The so-called expert examination was based on this incorrect
translation with the addition of the “right” words. It should be recalled
again that this “translation” was called a “transcript” in which the
“orthography and spelling of the source have been preserved”. This
doctored text underwent an expert examination. According to the
findings of the examination, the “examined text of the transcript of the
video recording titled ‘Ilmi Umerov. Live Broadcast. March 19, 2016’
contains calls to undermine the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation”.
As a result, neither the investigator nor the prosecutor bothered to
question the opinion of the so-called “expert”. After all, experts are
always right, aren’t they?
The case files also contain the literal translation of a part of my
interview (minutes 20 to 23) performed by Prof. I. Kerimov. It does not
contain the words “have to” in the two places based on which the socalled
“expert” reached her conclusions.
The case files also contain a review of the opinion of expert O.
Ivanova, which was prepared in Moscow. The review was prepared by the
Guild of Linguistic Experts on Documentation and Information Disputes
(GLEDIS). According to Part 2 of the final conclusions drawn in this
review, the expert committed a substitution of notions in the wake of the
investigator. In reality, the questions of the investigator apply not apply
to any transcript of any video recording whatsoever, but merely to a
translation from the Crimean Tatar language performed by the translator.
The criminal case files presented for expert examination do not include
any information to indicate that the text of the translation performed by
K. Salyadinov and examined by the expert was in any way disseminated
by Umerov, reproduced by him and/or stored by him for purposes of
dissemination. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by expert Ivanova in
response to Question 4 is unrelated to the text examined by her and,
consequently, cannot be found to be justified.
My attorneys contacted the Ukrainian Bureau of Linguistic Expert
Examinations of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which
prepared an expert examination opinion. Presented for examination was
an optical disk with a recording of my interview and the text of the
translation performed by translator Salyadinov for the Federal Security
Service. Experts were asked several questions including this question:
“Did the speech by I. Umerov contain calls to carry out acts of terrorism
and undermine the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation?”
The Ukrainian experts pointed out the inaccuracies in the
translation and conducted an expert examination of my speech in the
Crimean Tatar language (Page 19). The final part of this expert
examination contains two statements with the calls worded as follows:
“Without succumbing to fear, openly express one’s own opinion” and
“Without succumbing to fear, come to court hearings of cases involving
the Crimean Tatars”. Meanwhile, my speech does not contain calls to
engage in extremist activity or calls to undermine the territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation. Unlike so-called “expert” O.N. Ivanova, the
Kyiv-based expert, Prof. Bohdan Mykolayovych Anzhniuk, Ph.D. in
philology, director of the Ukrainian Bureau of Linguistic Expert
Examinations of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, performed
the job entrusted to him in an honest manner and up to a high quality
standard.
Unfortunately, the court refused to add this alternative expert
examination to the case file.
[...]
[Page 9]
[...]
Accordingly, the investigation went down another erroneous path
by ordering an expert examination of the Russian-language version the
way it is normally done in other cases where the problem of bilingualism
does not exist. Meanwhile, the Crimean Tatar language is also an official
language, so the Crimean Tatar version could have also been examined
and the findings of the examination translated into Russian. However,
they took a different path, the way they usually do. The investigator is
not a professional and relies on a translator. Perhaps the investigator had
no way of knowing whether or not this translator was professional
enough. However, in this case Salyadinov (the translator) discussed not
just the different meanings of the translation implied by the Crimean
Tatar language, but also mentioned the fact that the investigator
imposed on him the specific wording of the translation. We heard him
speak about this on 3 or 5 occasions. What he said was inconsistent, but
still he said it. He said how he had to go to the investigator himself in the
absence of attesting witnesses or other people, and edit this endless
translation. We have documented the fact that specific words present in
the translation were originally absent in Umerov’s speech. We have
repeatedly mentioned the words “have to”, or “kerek” in the Crimean
Tatar language. So the investigator recruited this translator, who wrote
down the Russian translation going by his ear straight from the
recording, without first deciphering the video recording and writing down
the literal transcript in the Crimean Tatar language using the Crimean
Tatar alphabet (he used the Cyrillic alphabet instead). This text was then
presented for expert examination. Is this acceptable? In our opinion, in
the opinion of the defense attorneys, and from the perspective of the law
– it’s not. Because it would have been more appropriate to conduct the
expert examination in the Crimean Tatar language to ensure a greater
accuracy of the expert examination. He could have taken the Crimean
Tatar text and perform the expert examination on it and only then
translate the findings of the expert examination into Russian. This would
not have made much of a difference because the expert findings are not
a creative text. They are written in a fairly understandable and dry
language of the expert examination in accordance with the Law On the
State Expert Examination Practice. This did not happen. A Russianlanguage
text was presented and for some reason called a transcript.
The review of the Guild that I have presented discusses this in a fair
amount of detail. My hope is that when you write the reasoning part of
the verdict you will make sure to use the conclusions drawn not by us,
the defense team, but by professionals and not the so-called “expert”
Ivanova; by people who perform this work at a very high professional
level in Moscow; scholars with degrees, titles, and so forth. The GLEDIS
Guild. What conclusions have they drawn? The most important conclusion
is that translator Salyadinov submitted for expert examination a creative
text, his own rendition. It is completely unrelated, no matter in what
details and to what degree is can be correlated with Umerov’s speech. He
submitted for expert examination his own creative text that, I repeat,
has nothing in common with Ilmi Umerov’s speech. This expert
examination was performed by Ivanova. For this specific reason nobody
can say for certain which specific phrases Umerov used that would give
one reason to conclude that they contained deliberate calls (and you
understand that this is a deliberate act from the subjective perspective)
to acts aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation. For this exact reason, all the remaining conclusions (1
through 4) are essentially meaningless. This is because the expert
examination was performed on a text that was not suitable for this kind
of examination. Umerov did not say the things pointed out by expert
Ivanova. He did not say them at all. It will be recalled that even expert
Ivanov, whom you summoned here, when asked “Would the meaning
and the wording of the answer to Question 4 asked by the investigator
change if the words present in the translation were absent?”, replied that
this would require conducting a new expert examination. This question
could not be answered just like that after being summoned to update or
supplement the findings of an expert examination. This calls for a
separate expert examination. And this is not just because of several
“have to” words and so forth. This means that a new expert examination
is necessary.
Your honor, how are you going to write the verdict if you essentially
have exhaustive... because in this case linguist Ivanova serves as
comprehensive evidence in the case, whose findings you will use to
interpret the severity of the offense? Even she said that a new expert
examination is necessary in order to draw a more accurate and definitive
conclusion considering the absence of the words in question. You don’t
have this new expert examination on hand, your honor. In other words,
you would engage in guesswork. While you are not a professional
linguist, you can only offer a professional legal evaluation. However, you
cannot perform a professional evaluation as a philologist, linguist, and
expert in this particular field. This brings us to a dead end. Any verdict
you reach other than acquittal would not be objective and would not be
consistent with the law and be justified, since in this case any doubts of
this kind must be interpreted in favor of the defendant.
[...]

Annex 936
Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Crimean Tatars Demand Recognition as Indigenous
People (18 September 2013)

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Annex 937
Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Menacing FSB Interrogations of Ukrainian Cultual
Centre Activists in Russian-Occupied Crimea (23 March2017), accessed at
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936.

6/6/2018 Menacing FSB interrogations of Ukrainian Cultural Centre activists in Russian-occupied Crimea - Human Rights in Ukraine
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936 1/7
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
23.03.2017 | Halya Coynash
Menacing FSB interrogations of Ukrainian
Cultural Centre activists in Russian-occupied
Crimea
on top
F
6/6/2018 Menacing FSB interrogations of Ukrainian Cultural Centre activists in Russian-occupied Crimea - Human Rights in Ukraine
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936 2/7
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Four members of the Ukrainian Cultural Centre have been subjected to FSB
interrogation in a move that seems clearly aimed at intimidation and at labelling
any pro-Ukrainian activities, however unpolitical, as ‘extremist’. One of the
original founders of the Centre has been driven out of Crimea and is now facing
charges effectively for opposing annexation, while another activist is threatened
with possible criminal charges for a photo on her social network page with a
Ukrainian flag.
Alyona Popova was questioned on March 21, while UCC founder Leonid Kuzmin,
Mykhailo Batrak and Halyna Balaban were summoned earlier. The Crimean Human
Rights Group reports that the four were told by FSB investigator Chumakov that
they were being questioned as ‘witnesses’ in a criminal prosecution launched
against another founder of UCC, Veldar Shukurdzhiyev for supposed ‘extremism’.
The FSB also asked questions about Ukrainian activist Andriy Shchekun who was
forced to leave Crimea after being abducted and tortured by armed paramilitaries
soon after Russia invaded Crimea, and Crimean journalist Ludmila Shchekun.
All of such questioning was manifestly aimed at putting pressure on the UCC
activists, as are the charges against Shukurdzhiyev - seemingly of "public calls to
action aimed at violating Russia's territorial integrity". He was basically forced to
leave Crimea for mainland Ukraine in February 2016, after receiving constant
summonses to the so-called Centre for Countering Extremism and the FSB, and
informal warnings of what to expect if he remained.
Two UCC activists – Andriy Vinohradov and Natalya Kharchenko - were briefly
detained on Jan 12, after the FSB turned up at their home, carrying out a search
and terrifying their two small daughters. The FSB appears to be preparing
‘extremism’ charges against Kharchenko, with the pretext this time being a post
on the social network VKontakte. The couple’s lawyer Edem Semedlyaev was
prevented from being present during the 4-hour interrogation or when they forced
Kharchenko to sign an undertaking not to divulge any information. It is likely that
the uncertainty they have left her in is deliberate. She has still not been charged,
though the investigation appears to be under Article 280 § 2 of Russia’s criminal
code (‘public calls to carry out extremist activities carried out with the use of the
media or Internet’). This is what the FSB call a photo of Kharchenko in camouflage
gear with a Ukrainian flag, against Crimean landscapes. Vinohradov has since on top
6/6/2018 Menacing FSB interrogations of Ukrainian Cultural Centre activists in Russian-occupied Crimea - Human Rights in Ukraine
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936 4/7
reported that both he and his mother-in-law lost their jobs after the detention,
and that he received an open hint that it would be better for them to leave
Crimea. He says they will probably be forced to do so.
If Kharchenko remains and the criminal charges are laid they will mark a sharp
escalation in repression against UCC members, however harassment and court
proceedings are not new. Kuzmin, Shukurdzhiyev and Oleksandr Kravchenko
were first convicted of administrative ‘offences’ in March 2015 after being
detained at a totally peaceful gathering to mark the 201st anniversary of the birth
of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko. All three were sentenced to 40 hours of
compulsory labour, effectively for Ukrainian flags, which one police officer in court
suggested was a ‘prohibited symbol’. Kuzmin also lost his job as a history teacher
as a result.
‘Applications’ to hold the traditional gatherings remembering Shevchenko since
then have been rejected. All Ukrainian activists are likely to be summoned and
issued with ‘warnings about the inadmissibility of extremism’ before any Ukrainian
anniversaries.
Leonid Kuzmin, together with Shukurdzhiyev and others, created the Ukrainian
Cultural Centre in Simferopol on May 7, 2015. It was stressed from the outset
that this was a totally apolitical centre, focusing on Ukrainian culture, history and
language. Initially, members gathered in people’s homes, however in 2016 they
opened a very modest office in Simferopol. The survival of this is constantly in
question, with a month’s rent (around 200 USD) coming to more than individual
members earn.
In January 2017, the Centre addressed an open appeal to MPs from Ukraine’s
Verkhovna Rada, asking for help in paying for this office. They explained that UCC
provides an open space for exchanging information and communicating with each
other, Ukrainian language lessons as well as a language club, a Ukrainian cinema
club and a place to hold lectures on Ukrainian history, literature and culture. It
also contains a library of Ukrainian literature. They also asked for individual
contributions.
Yuliy Mamchur, the former army colonel best-known for his enormous courage in
standing up to the Russian soldiers who had seized his military unit in Crimea in
March 2014, was the only MP who responded.
Kuzmin and other UCC activists feel understandably bitter that Kyiv is indifferent
to their plight. The situation is not, however, entirely straightforward. Krym.realii
spoke with Mamchur and other MPs who said that they would certainly support
any way of helping the Centre to survive. Olha Skrypnyk, from the Crimea Human
Rights Group, warns that care must be taken since any kind of so-called ‘foreign
aid’ could be deemed to violate Russian legislation which is – illegally – applied in
occupied Crimea.
In a recent interview to Novaya Gazeta, Kuzmin explained that there had
previously been far more people active in the Ukrainian Cultural Centre with
Ukrainians coming to Simferopol from Sevastopol and Yalta. Many had stoppedon top
6/6/2018 Menacing FSB interrogations of Ukrainian Cultural Centre activists in Russian-occupied Crimea - Human Rights in Ukraine
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936 5/7
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coming, he explained, since they understood that even for attending lectures on
Ukrainian themes and film showings, a person will at very least attract the
attention of the FSB.
The recent harassment and threats of prosecution from the FSB demonstrate that
the fears are not unfounded. They also give the lie to Russia’s claim at the
International Court in the Hague that ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars are
not facing discrimination under Russian occupation.
on top
6/6/2018 Menacing FSB interrogations of Ukrainian Cultural Centre activists in Russian-occupied Crimea - Human Rights in Ukraine
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936 6/7
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HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE
Website of the Kharkiv Human
Rights Protection Group,
©2018 khpg.org
The constitution and human rights
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Annex 938
Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces (14 March 2014)

􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀑􀀃
􀂋􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
􀀰􀀤􀀵􀀦􀀫􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀃􀀘􀀝􀀕􀀕􀀳􀀰􀀃􀀨􀀧􀀷􀀃
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀵􀁈􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀲􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁚
􀀋􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀌􀀃􀂱􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁅􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃
􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁐􀀏􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀑
􀂳􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁒􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁓􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁆􀁘􀁘􀁐􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁑􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀑􀀃􀂳􀀩􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀂴
􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁛􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁋􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁈􀁙􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀀳􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁎􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀼􀁄􀁑􀁘􀁎􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁋􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀯􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁇􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀑
􀀶􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀂳􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏􀂴􀀃􀀳􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁏􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁊􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃
􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁋􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁌􀀃􀀤􀁎􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀗􀀏􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀤􀁎􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀙􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀑􀂴􀀃􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑􀂴
􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀂱􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀂱􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
􀀰􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁐􀁅􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁕􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁆􀁎􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁆􀀃
􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀤􀀮􀀐􀀗􀀚􀁖􀀑
􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁉􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀑
􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀏􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀥􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁒􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀼􀁒􀁘􀀷􀁘􀁅􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐
􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀤􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁜􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀬􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁑􀂶􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁖􀀞􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀄􀂴
􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁐􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀂴􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑
􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁓􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁖􀁄􀁉􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁍􀁘􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀳􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃
􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀂳􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀐􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀐􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁙􀁒􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀂴􀀃
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀧􀁈􀁑􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀑􀀃􀂳􀀤􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀂵􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀂶􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀑􀂴
􀂳􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖
Andriy Schekun and Anatoly Kovalsky
􀀤􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀜􀀝􀀖􀀓􀀃􀁄􀀑􀁐􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀜􀀏􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁌􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁈􀁙􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁐􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀀐􀁚􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀑
􀀺􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁜􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁌􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃
􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁒􀁗􀀑
􀀲􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁜􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁆􀁎􀀃
􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀂶􀀃
􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁜􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀝
􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀜􀀏􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀂴􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁜􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀁜􀁈􀁕􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀑
􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀯􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀐􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀂳􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀷􀀹􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀀷􀀵􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀀃􀀷􀀹􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀐􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁜􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀑
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁌􀀃􀀤􀁎􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁙􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀶􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁎􀁘􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁎􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁒􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀂳􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀂶􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀑
Myhailo Vdovchenko
􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀰􀁜􀁋􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃􀀹􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀐􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀀩􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁅􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀀐􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀑
􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀀹􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀂳􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁒􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃
􀀹􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀖􀀝􀀖􀀓􀀃􀁓􀀑􀁐􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀀃
􀀹􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀹􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁑􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀹􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁎􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀝
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁉􀁌􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀹􀁇􀁒􀁙􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁖􀀑
Alexei Grytsenko, Natalia Lukianchenko, and Serhiy Suprun
􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁜􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁘􀁎􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁒􀀰􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀃
􀁕􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁒􀁊􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁚􀀃􀀪􀁕􀁜􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀏􀀃􀀯􀁘􀁎􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁑􀁎􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁕􀁘􀁑􀀃􀂱􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁎􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁉􀀃􀂱􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀝􀀖􀀓􀀃􀁓􀁐􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃
􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀑
􀀷􀁒􀁇􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀾􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀗􀁀􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀀰􀁜􀁋􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑
􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁘􀁐􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀰􀁜􀁋􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁒􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀑
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀤􀀃􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁆􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁒􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁘􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀑
􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖
Jacomo Liverani􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁎􀁋􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁌􀀏􀀃􀀖􀀘􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁚􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀘􀀃􀁓􀀑􀁐􀀑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀝
􀀯􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁌􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁓􀁗􀁒􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀑
Anton Goloborod’ko􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃Gazeta po Ukrainski,􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀃􀁄􀀑􀁐􀀑􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁘􀁗􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀀮􀀐
􀀗􀀚􀁖􀀝
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃
􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀀬􀀧􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃
􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁓􀁗􀁒􀁓􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁜􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁈􀁙􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁜􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁖􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀂳􀀬􀁗􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀑􀂴
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁓􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁈􀀃
􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁇􀁑􀂶􀁗􀀃􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀂳􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀑􀂴
􀀺􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀘􀀓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀚􀀓􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀏􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁉􀁌􀁏􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀑
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀙􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁇􀂶􀁎􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀂳􀁗􀁒􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁉􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀂴
A female foreign journalist􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁆􀁎􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀑􀀃
􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁆􀁎􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁒􀁐􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃
􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀤􀀮􀀐􀀗􀀚􀁖􀀏􀀃
􀁎􀁑􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃
􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀝
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁆􀁎􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁖􀀃
􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁊􀁒􀀑
Jan Husar􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁈􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀶􀁏􀁒􀁙􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀺􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁓􀀑􀁐􀀑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃
􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃
􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁓􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀝
􀀩􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁛􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁉􀁏􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀺􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁎􀁌􀁆􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃
􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀀬􀀧􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀬􀀧􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁚􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁉􀁗􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀀑􀀃
􀀲􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁇􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀂳􀁜􀁈􀁖􀀏􀂴􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁘􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁏􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀀫􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁇􀁑􀂶􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁆􀁈􀁈􀁇􀀑
􀀺􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁏􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁖􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁆􀁎􀁓􀁒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀁄􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁎􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀝􀀃
􀀵􀀳􀀪􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁑􀁌􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁉􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁏􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁜􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐
􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀑
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀼􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁛􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁌􀁉􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁓􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁖􀀃
􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀑
􀀇􀀘􀀓
􀀇􀀔􀀓􀀓
􀀇􀀕􀀘􀀓
􀀇􀀘􀀓􀀓
􀀇􀀔􀀏􀀓􀀓􀀓
􀀲􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕
􀀧􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁚
􀀵􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀒􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁜
􀂇 􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀒􀀦􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁌􀁄
􀂇 􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀰􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊
􀂇
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀀬􀀧􀁖􀀃􀂱􀀃􀀬􀀃
􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀏􀀃􀀬􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
􀁇􀁌􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁘􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
􀁆􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁅􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁜􀀃
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀑
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁊􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁇􀁒􀁚􀁑􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁌􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁒􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁐􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁕􀁄􀀑
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀖􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁖
􀀪􀁈􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁋􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁆􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁖􀀃􀀶􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁆􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀫􀁘􀁑􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁜
􀂇
􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈
􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁘􀁓􀀃􀀱􀁒􀀃􀀷􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀲􀁅􀁖􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁜􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁑􀁖
􀀶􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀸􀀵􀀯􀀝􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀀯􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁖
􀀾􀀔􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁅􀁌􀁒􀁖􀀒􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁈􀁏􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁅􀁈􀁕
􀀾􀀕􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀔􀀒􀀖􀀓􀀒􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀐􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀐􀁇􀁒􀁝􀁈􀁑􀁖􀀐􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀐􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁆􀁖
􀀾􀀖􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁎􀁋􀁓􀁊􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁈􀁑􀀒􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁛􀀑􀁓􀁋􀁓􀀢􀁌􀁇􀀠􀀔􀀖􀀜􀀗􀀘􀀚􀀗􀀜􀀘􀀖
􀀾􀀗􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁆􀁓􀁍􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀐􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀐􀁒􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀐􀁒􀁑􀀐􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀐􀁍􀁒􀁅􀀐􀁌􀁑􀀐􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀑􀁓􀁋􀁓
􀀾􀀘􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁈􀁑􀀑􀁕􀁖􀁉􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀐􀁗􀁚􀁒􀀐􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀐􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀐􀀔􀀓􀀐􀀓􀀖􀀐􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀗􀀘􀀜􀀚􀀚􀀑􀁋􀁗􀁐􀁏
􀀾􀀙􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁈􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀐􀁄􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀒􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈
􀀾􀀚􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁗􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀒􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀢􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀠􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀦􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀛􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀜􀀈
􀀕􀀓􀁅􀁜􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀈􀀕􀀓􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀾􀀛􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁈􀁅􀁒􀁒􀁎􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁕􀀑􀁓􀁋􀁓􀀢􀁘􀀠􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐
􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀾􀀜􀁀􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁄􀁗􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀢􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀠􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀦􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀛􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀓􀁅􀁜􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀈
􀀕􀀓􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀓􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀾􀀔􀀓􀁀􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁗􀁒􀀝􀀢􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁍􀁈􀁆􀁗􀀠􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀦􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀛􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀜􀀈􀀕􀀓􀁅􀁜􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀈
􀀕􀀓􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀉􀁄􀁐􀁓􀀞􀁅􀁒􀁇􀁜􀀠􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀾􀀔􀀔􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁎􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁑􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀤􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀀢􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀀠􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁈􀀉􀁄􀁐􀁓􀀞􀁘􀁕􀁏􀀠􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐
􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀉􀁄􀁐􀁓􀀞􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀀠􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀦􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀛􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀨􀀕􀀈􀀛􀀓􀀈􀀜􀀜􀀈
􀀕􀀓􀁅􀁜􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀈􀀕􀀓􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀈􀀕􀀓
􀀾􀀔􀀕􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁓􀁏􀁘􀁖􀀑􀁊􀁒􀁒􀁊􀁏􀁈􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀢􀁘􀁕􀁏􀀠􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀈􀀖􀀤􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖
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􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀉􀁄􀁐􀁓􀀞􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁏􀁈􀀠􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀾􀀔􀀗􀁀􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁐􀀑􀁐􀁈􀀒􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀒􀁘􀁕􀁏􀀢􀁘􀁕􀁏􀀠􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀀓􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀐􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀐􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀐
􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀉􀁄􀁐􀁓􀀞􀁗􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀠􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀝􀀃􀀤􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀏􀀃􀂵􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀬􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖 􀀳􀁄􀁊􀁈􀀃􀀔􀀓􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀔􀀓
􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀁖􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁋􀁕􀁚􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀒􀀕􀀘􀀖􀀓􀀓􀀛 􀀘􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀛
Annex 939
Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed (18 March 2014)

Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed[5/3/2018 8:59:10 PM]
Crimea: Disappeared Man Found
Killed
Urgent Investigation Needed
March 18, 2014 4:19AM EDT
Available In 简体中文English Français 日本語Русский Українська
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Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed[5/3/2018 8:59:10 PM]
(Simferopol) – Crimean authorities should urgently conduct a thorough investigation into the
enforced disappearance and subsequent killing of Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar from the
Simferopol region, and bring the perpetrators to justice.
Ametov’s relatives told Human Rights Watch that he was last seen during a protest on March 3,
2014, on Lenin Square in Simferopol, Ukraine, where three unidentified men in military-style jackets
had led him away. Relatives’ efforts to locate him, including through a complaint to the police, were
unsuccessful. On March 16, local police informed them that a body bearing marks of violent death
had been found outside the town of Belogorsk. On March 17, the family identified the body as
Ametov’s.
“The disappearance and murder of Reshat Ametov illustrates the climate of lawlessness that has
been pervasive in Crimea over the last week,” said Rachel Denber, deputy Europe and Central Asia
director at Human Rights Watch. “Crimean authorities have a duty to thoroughly investigate this
case and punish those responsible, whoever they are.”
Ametov, a 39-year-old seasonal construction worker and the father of three young children, was
well known in the Crimean Tatar community. Ametov had regularly petitioned local authorities
regarding problems in his neighborhood and discussed on his Facebook page issues related to the
situation of Crimean Tatars and the future of Crimea, a relative told Human Rights Watch.
On the morning of March 3, Ametov went to Lenin Square, where a small peaceful protest was
taking place in front of the Crimean Council of Ministers building. He did not return home that
night, and his wife contacted other relatives the following morning. They filed a police report and
started making inquiries among people who had been at the protest.
Ametov’s relative told Human Rights Watch that witnesses who had been at the square said that at
around 10 a.m. Ametov had passed through the line of men from self-defense units and approached
a group of armed men in green uniforms. Footage from ATR (Crimean television channel) shows
two men in green uniforms and one in a black uniform, all without insignias, leading Ametov away
from the square.
Ametov’s relative submitted a missing person report to the local police, who opened an
investigation. But in the two weeks following his enforced disappearance, the family did not receive
Armed self-defence forces in Ukraine. © 2014 Reuters
Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed[5/3/2018 8:59:10 PM]
any information about Ametov’s whereabouts or fate.
On March 16, local police in the town of Belogorsk, 45 kilometers east of Simferopol, informed
Teifuk Gafarov, a lawyer with the Mejlis, the Crimean Tatar representative body, that local villagers
had found a man’s body in a nearby forest. The next day, Ametov’s wife identified the body as her
husband’s.
Local media reports suggested that the body bore marks of torture and that there was transparent
tape wrapped around Ametov’s head and hands. Human Rights Watch was not able to verify these
reports, but Ametov’s relative said the local police told him that the death was registered as
“violent.” Ametov’s relatives have not yet been able to retrieve either his body or the death
certificate from the mortuary.
Human Rights Watch previously documented abuses committed by Crimean self-defense forces and
unidentified military forces across Crimea, and called on the Crimean authorities to disarm and
disband these units and prosecute those responsible for abuses.
“For weeks, armed masked men who refuse to identify themselves have harassed and intimidated
people,” Denber said. “Failure to call a halt to this mistreatment and investigate would only
embolden the people responsible for the abuse.”
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Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed[5/3/2018 8:59:10 PM]
March 18, 2014 | News Release
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March 28, 2018
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March 18, 2014 | News Release
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Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed | Human Rights Watch
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Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed | Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed[5/3/2018 8:59:10 PM]
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Annex 940
Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One Tortured (25 March 2014)

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Annex 941
Amnesty International Public Statement, Harassment and Violence Against Crimean Tatars by
State and Non-State Actors (23 May 2014)

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC STATEMENT
Date 23 May 2014
Index EUR 50/023/2014
HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST CRIMEAN
TATARS BY STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS
At the time of Russia’s military intervention in Crimea, the majority of the Crimean Tatar
community expressed its concern and its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Most Crimean Tatars, who comprise 12% of the peninsula’s population, boycotted the
‘referendum on the status of Crimea’ which took place on 16 March 2014. It resulted in
the annexation of the peninsula by Russia, a move which was supported by the region’s
ethnic Russian majority. Consequently, Crimean Tatars are in the awkward position of
having opposed those under whose jurisdiction they now find themselves and they are
fearful of reprisals.
Since the start of the Russian occupation of Crimea, the de facto Crimean authorities and
the Russian authorities have engaged in a campaign aimed at co-opting the local Tatars,
by means of both persuasion and repression. While publicly declaring full support for the
Crimean Tatars and their rights, the authorities are simultaneously targeting their
community through arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, assembly
and potentially association. For example, on the same day that Vladimir Putin announced
to a meeting of Crimean Tatar representatives in Moscow that Russia will do all it can to
ensure that Crimean Tatars feel like “fully-fledged masters in their own land,” a ban was
imposed on all mass meetings in Crimea until 6 June, which directly affected events
planned by the community during those days (see below).
There have also been increasing reports of violence and reprisals against Crimean Tatar
individuals targeted by both the authorities and self-styled, unofficial “self-defence”
groups. Such informal armed groups have emerged across Ukraine on all sides of the
political divide during the current crisis. Typically, they are armed, dressed in military
outfits with no identifying insignia and have no clear command structure. Many such
groups currently patrol areas of Ukraine and are increasingly being accused of carrying out
human rights abuses with impunity and, furthermore, with the acquiescence of the local
authorities. In Crimea, they are reported to have been behind a number of abductions,
beatings and other human rights abuses, including in relation to Crimean Tatars.
Legacy of the deportation
In 1944, the entire Crimean Tatar population was deported from Crimea by the Soviet
authorities under Joseph Stalin, predominantly to Central Asia. Crimean Tatars were
prohibited from returning to their homeland until the late 1980s, and it was only in the
1990s that significant numbers of ethnic Crimean Tatar families were finally able to come
back and settle in Crimea. By then, the peninsula was part of an independent Ukraine.
Crimean Tatars have enjoyed a limited degree of protection and recognition from the
Ukrainian authorities as a distinct group but they were not able to claim back their homes
and other property lost in 1944 and have remained a marginalised group.1
With the occupation of Crimea by Russia, many Crimean Tatars have feared that they will
lose this, albeit limited, degree of recognition and protection against harassment and
discrimination. Spokespersons for the community have stated that the current targeting of
the Crimean Tatar community is causing many to fear a repetition of the trauma of mass
deportation and dispossession. The apparent and anticipated targeting of their community
has caused thousands of Crimean Tatars to leave Crimea to go to mainland Ukraine. A
speaker for the Crimean Tatar Mejlis (the informal body which is generally recognized as
the highest representative body of the Crimean Tatars) referred to estimates that
approximately 5,000 have moved out of Crimea. Other reported estimates suggest that in
the brief period since occupation, around 7,000 Tatars have left.2
Arbitrary restrictions and harassment of Crimean Tatars
In the two months following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, a whole series of incidents of
harassment and arbitrary restrictions on the rights of members of the Crimean Tatar
community have been reported.
On 22 April, a long-standing informal leader of the Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian MP and
Soviet dissident, Mustafa Jemiliev, was reportedly informed by the Russian Federal
Migration Service that he was a “persona non grata” and banned from entering Crimea,
which is his homeland, for five years. The Russian authorities denied the reports, but on 2
May Mustafa Jemiliev was refused entry to Moscow, from where he hoped to fly to
Simferopol in Crimea (there are currently no flights to Crimea from mainland Ukraine). He
was sent back to Kyiv.
On 3 May, Mustafa Jemiliev made another attempt to gain entry to Crimea, this time by
land, through the checkpoint at Armyansk located on the stretch of land between Crimea
and mainland Ukraine. At least 3,000 Crimean Tatars in over 800 cars arrived at
Armyansk to meet him. They created a human corridor welcoming Mustafa Jemiliev into
Crimea, and he was able to walk past the checkpoint, but he was stopped again by law
enforcement officers and Crimean “self-defence” members on the Crimean side and
refused entry once more. He remains outside of Crimea. A number of shorter, spontaneous
protests broke out in other towns the same day against the refusal by the authorities to
grant Mustafa Jemiliev entry.
The Russian authorities have failed to give any official explanations to Mustafa Jemiliev
concerning the ban. He has also been the focus of a smear campaign. The head of the de
1 Briefing Note UNPO: Recent Developments in Crimea and the Crimean Tatars May 2014
2 http://www.ua-ru.info/news/15549-posle-anneksii-kryma-bolee-semi-tysyach-tatar-pokinuli-poluostrov-postpredukrainy-
v-oon.html
facto Crimean administration Sergei Aksionov described Mustafa Jemiliev as an “instigator
and provocateur” in an interview on 18 May, and accused him of violating Russian law,
inciting ethnic violence and cynicism.3 Mustafa Jemiliev has not been informed of any
criminal or other proceedings brought against him that would explain the ban or such
accusations.
On 14 May 2014, Mustafa Jemiliev’s house in Crimea was searched by law enforcement
officials; due to the ban against him, he was not there. A group of riot police officers
arrived in several buses and surrounded the house and forced entry, claiming to be looking
for evidence in a case related to his son.
In recent days, there have been a number of other searches of houses belonging to
Crimean Tatars by the authorities, reportedly by officers of the Russian Federal Security
Services (FSB), including house searches of other members of the Mejlis. Also on 14 May,
the authorities searched the home of Mejlis member Edem Mustafaev claiming they were
looking for weapons and explosives; none was found. On 15 May, the home of the Head of
the Department for External Relations of the Mejlis, Ali Khamzin, was also searched for
about two hours. Ali Khamzin later told reporters he believed the searches were linked to
the activities of the Mejlis and intended to put pressure on its members.
On 4 May 2014, the Prosecutor of Crimea issued a formal warning to another Crimean
Tatar leader, Refat Chubarov, according to which he may face criminal prosecution under
Russia’s anti-extremism legislation. Refat Chubarov succeeded Mustafa Jemiliev as the
leader of the Mejlis in late 2013. The Prosecutor of Crimea accused him of organizing
“unlawful public protest actions” in Armyansk and other places in Crimea.
According to information provided to Amnesty International by a representative of the
Crimean Tatar Mejlis, at least three of its members have since been summoned for
questioning by the investigation authorities, including Nariman Jelal. It is unclear what
the content of the questioning was. Nariman Jelal who was summoned on 12 May,
followed his lawyer’s advice and refused to answer the investigator’s questions in
accordance with Article 51 of the Russian Constitution which guarantees the right to
remain silent. In response, the investigator reportedly claimed that the lawyer had no right
to advise his client because he is not licensed to do so under Russian regulations.
The authorities have initiated administrative proceedings against dozens of Crimean Tatars
across the peninsula in connection with the events on 3 May in Armyansk and other
towns. They have been charged with “public disorder” and “unlawfully crossing the
Russian border”. So far, according to information provided to Amnesty International by the
Mejlis, there have been at least 55 court hearings on individual cases, which resulted in
hefty fines of between RUB 10,000 and RUB 15,000 (UDS 290-430) in relation to at
least 49 individuals, and RUB 40,000 (USD 1,150) in relation to six individuals. For
many who have been prosecuted, such a fine is far beyond anything they can afford to
pay.
3 In interview with Krym-Inform, 18 May 2014, available at http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/5713.
Reportedly, all the Tatar cars that had arrived at Armyansk to greet Mustafa Jemiliev were
filmed by the authorities which facilitated the identification of their owners and others
involved.
Other restrictions on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
The prosecution of those who peacefully tried to welcome Mustafa Jemiliev at Armyansk,
or protest against his ban, was the first reported indication of the authorities’ intention to
restrict the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in Crimea. Such restrictions were
unreported prior to the recent occupation of the peninsula by Russia.
On 18 May, which this year marked the seventieth anniversary of the deportation of
Crimean Tatars in 1944, the community planned to hold commemorative events across
Crimea, as is customary every year. However, on 16 May, Sergei Aksionov, announced that
all mass meetings in Crimea were banned until 6 June, in order to “eliminate possible
provocations by extremists, who had managed to penetrate the territory of the Republic of
Crimea” and to prevent “disruption of the summer holiday season”. The ban has been
widely interpreted as a blatant obstruction of the Crimean Tatars’ plans to commemorate
the deportation.
In the event, the Tatars were allowed to hold a common prayer followed by a
commemorative rally on 18 May, but only on the outskirts of the Crimean capital,
Simferopol, and nowhere else in Crimea.
Threats to freedom of association
The Crimean Tatar Mejlis has long been recognized as an organization which, along with
the Kurultai (general assembly which elects members of the Mejlis) de facto represents
the Crimean Tatar community, including in its dealings with the governing authorities. It is
an association which was founded in 1991, and performs an important representative
function, enjoying a degree of recognition with the Ukrainian authorities.
Less than two months after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the Mejlis’ existence was
put into question. The formal warning issued by the Prosecutor of Crimea to the head of
the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, on 4 May following the peaceful protest events in Armyansk
and across Crimea, also included a threat to dissolve and prohibit the functioning of the
Mejlis “on the territory of the Russian Federation” if it proceeds to engage in “extremist
activities.”
The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association has
noted that “the suspension and the involuntarily dissolution of an association are the
severest types of restrictions on freedom of association. As a result, it should only be
possible when there is a clear and imminent danger resulting in a flagrant violation of
On 17 May, on the eve of the rally, the authorities organized “crowd control” training of
Russian-uniformed riot police in Simferopol’s central square. In a clear show of force, the
training included hundreds of heavily equipped police officers. On the day of the rally, the
riot police maintained a heavy presence in Simferopol, police helicopters were flying above
the peaceful gathering, and armoured military vehicles were reportedly parked in the
vicinity alongside vehicles intended for transportation of detainees.
national law, in compliance with international human rights law. It should be strictly
proportional to the legitimate aim pursued and used only when softer measures would be
insufficient.”4 This threat to dissolve the Crimean Tatar Mejlis constitutes an arbitrary
interference in the right to freedom of association.
The Mejlis evolved as a form of association, representative of the Crimean Tatar
community, and has been performing this function for years, without having any formal
legal status under Ukrainian law. In an interview on 18 May 2014, the head of the de
facto Crimean administration, Sergei Aksionov, stated that it will have to register under
Russian legislation or it will not enjoy any recognition by the authorities.
However, whether it is registered or not, the prosecutor’s threat to ban it under Russian
anti-extremism legislation is much more serious, as this will make membership of the
Mejlis a criminal offense punishable by up to four years in prison (Article 282.2 of the
Russian Criminal Code). The Russian authorities have used anti-extremism legislation to
harass and obstruct the normal operation of non-mainstream religious groups and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in Russia,5 and criminally prosecute civil society
activists by applying its provisions arbitrarily.
Harassment of media and journalists
There are reports that the local Crimean Tatar TV channel, ATR, received informal
instructions from the authorities not to broadcast reports which included members of the
Mejlis or leaders of the Crimean Tatar community, unless they were loyal to the de facto
authorities and Russia. Although the instructions were reportedly issued informally and
cannot be verified, the content of the channel’s subsequent broadcasts is consistent with
this report.
In the meantime, independent journalists continue to be subjected to intimidation and
harassment, particularly by the members of the so-called Crimean “self-defence” forces.
Their members are believed to have been behind the disappearances of journalists and
activists during the weeks preceding the “referendum”.6
During the meeting on 18 May 2014, members of the “self-defence” forces reportedly
detained Crimean Tatar journalist Osman Pashayev, his cameraman Cengiz Kizgin (Turkish
national), and seven other persons (reportedly, all or most of them media professionals).
They have all since been released. In his interviews, Osman Pashayev spoke about his
4 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai,
Human Rights Council, Twentieth session, Agenda item 3, 21 May 2012, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-27_en.pdf
5 The Prosecutor’s Office in Russia undertook a series of unannounced “inspections” of independent Russian
NGOs in spring 2013, which it explained – at least in some cases – by the need to enforce anti-extremism
legislation. See Amnesty International, Freedom under threat: The clampdown against freedoms of expression,
assembly and association in Russia, report, 24 April 2013 (AI Index: EUR 46/011/2013), page 32, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR46/011/2013/en.
6 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/ukraine-clashes-and-abductions-ahead-disputed-crimea-vote-2014-03-14
unlawful detention and ill-treatment by the “self-defence” forces, who held him for about
four hours, most of the time standing with his face to the wall while he was interrogated
and beaten on his legs. His equipment was taken away and not returned. According to
Osman Pashayev, other persons held captive were ill-treated too. Before his release,
Osman Pashayev was handed over by his captors to police and members of the
Investigative Committee (a stand-alone official agency in Russia responsible for
investigating serious crime), where he was held for a further few hours – some ten hours of
captivity in total. The Investigative Committee officials questioned and released him, but
they claimed that they could not establish who had originally held him or, implausibly,
who had delivered him to them.
The journalist intends to submit official complaints, but holds little hope that those who
initially detained him will be effectively investigated. He has left Crimea for fear of further
reprisals.
Other incidents of violence and ill-treatment targeting Crimean Tatars
There are increasing concerns that the authorities are failing in their duty to protect the
Crimean Tatar community from a reported rise in incidents of harassment and violent
attacks by Crimea’s “self-defence” forces.
On 3 March, 39-year old Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar, held a one-man protest in front
of the Crimean Council of Ministers building in the region’s capital, Simferopol, which was
being guarded by ‘self-defence’ forces. Video footage shows him being led away by three
men from the ‘self-defence’ forces. His family claim that when they reported him as
missing, there was no subsequent contact from the authorities. His body was found almost
two weeks later, showing signs of torture. A criminal case has been opened, but no
progress in the investigation has been reported.
Amnesty International has spoken with a member of the Crimean Mejlis who was also
beaten by ‘self-defence’ forces in central Simferopol on 6 May. Abduraman Egiz was
approached by three or four men and asked to show them his identity documents and the
content of his car. When he refused, the men called for reinforcement. Some 15 or 20
other ‘self-defence’ men arrived within minutes. They asked Abduraman Egiz again to
show his documents. When he refused again, stating that he would only deal with the
police, they handcuffed him and started to beat him. To stop the violence, Abduraman
Egiz showed them his passport. At this point they let him go with no apology or
explanation. He told Amnesty International, “I understood then that there is no rule of law.
These men were drunk, they had guns and they can do anything they want.” He was
subsequently diagnosed with concussion. Abduraman Egiz informed the police about the
incident, which was filmed by a nearby security camera, and an investigation has been
opened. Police came to the site of the incident and took photos, but made no effort to
locate and question any members of the ‘self-defence’ forces.
Pressure to give up citizenship
The Russian authorities have given Crimean residents the unenviable choice of having to
give up their Ukrainian citizenship for a Russian one or become foreigners in their own
land and acquire a “residence permit”. Failure to do either will amount to a violation of
Russian immigration regulations and result in severe penalties, including the loss of the
right to continue to reside in Crimea. Crimeans were given a very short period of only one
month to make the decision and, should they wish to do so, declare to the authorities their
decision to keep their Ukrainian citizenship and receive a residence permit. There were
only four centres in the whole of Crimea where this could be done, and although the
deadline has been extended, the need to do so promptly or face legal and other
consequences remains.
The full implications of rejecting Russian citizenship are as yet unknown, but it is clear
that there will be substantial consequences. For example, a “foreign citizen” in Crimea
will not be able to vote, hold an official position, such as that of a member of the police
force, or own agricultural land – the source of livelihood for many local Tatars. There are
also concerns that access to education, employment and healthcare will be hindered.
Recommendations
To the de facto Crimean and Russian authorities:
􀁸 Ensure that all those living in Crimea are able to exercise and enjoy their human
rights, without discrimination;
􀁸 Respect and protect the rights of minorities, including Crimean Tatars in
particular;
􀁸 Respect freedom of movement and freedom to choose one’s place of residence, in
accordance with Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, with regards to all residents of Crimea, and in particular:
o Lift the entry ban on Mustafa Jemiliev, giving him immediate and
unimpeded access to Crimea, in order that he may exercise his right to
enter his own country;
􀁸 Ensure that any changes to the institutional and legal framework in Crimea,
including those regarding citizenship, do not adversely impact on the enjoyment
of the full range of human rights by all persons in Crimea. In particular, fully
protect all the rights of those in Crimea who choose to remain citizens of Ukraine,
including as regards the rights to residence, work, property, education and health;
􀁸 Respect and protect the rights to freedom of assembly, expression and
association, and in particular:
o drop the charges against all those who took part in the peaceful
assemblies in Armyansk and in other locations in Crimea on 3 May 2014,
and immediately revoke all penalties imposed on peaceful protesters;
o lift the ban “on mass meetings” announced on 16 May by head of the de
facto Crimean administration, Sergei Aksionov;
o immediately end the harassment of members of the Mejlis, and recall the
warning in connection with “extremist activities” issued against it by the
Prosecutor of Crimea;
o end the harassment of the media, individual journalists and human rights
defenders and investigate effectively and impartially all reported incidents
of violence and harassment of journalists in Crimea, including the cases
of abduction and unlawful deprivation of freedom of journalists earlier this
year;
􀁸 Publicly condemn human rights abuses, harassment, torture and other illtreatment
or the arbitrary use of force and unlawful deprivation of freedom, by law
enforcement officers or by members of the so-called “self-defence” forces; and
ensure that all such cases are promptly, effectively and independently
investigated, and that those reasonably suspected of such crimes are prosecuted
in proceedings which fully comply with international standards for fair trial;
􀁸 Ensure that any arrest or detention of persons in Crimea is carried out strictly in
accordance with law, by competent officials or persons authorized to exercise
those powers, acting in accordance with their human rights obligations and
adhering to international law and standards on the use of force and firearms;
􀁸 Grant immediate, full and unimpeded access, and provide all necessary
assistance to international monitoring missions.
To the international community:
􀁸 Monitor the human rights situation and report human rights violations in Crimea,
and raise these at every available opportunity with the Ukrainian and Russian
authorities, in the appropriate bilateral and multilateral fora;
􀁸 Ensure effective coordination and cooperation between international monitoring
mechanisms operating in Ukraine;
􀁸 Demand that the de facto Crimean and Russian authorities grant full and
unimpeded access to international monitors, including the OSCE Special
Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission.
To the OSCE:
Ensure that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine:
􀁸 Strengthens its human rights component;
􀁸 Cooperates closely with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights;
and
􀁸 Continues to request access to Crimea and report on the situation there.
To the High Commissioner on National Minorities:
Continue to engage with the de facto authorities in the Crimea and the Russian
authorities, including through visits to the region, and urge them to ensure the respect for
the rights of Crimean Tatars and other minorities.
End/
Annex 942
Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Enforced Disappearances (7 October 2014)

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(Berlin) – At least seven people have been forcibly
disappeared or gone missing in Crimea since May 2014,
including two on September 27, Human Rights Watch said
today. Five are Crimean Tatars and two are pro-Ukraine
activists. Crimean Tatars have generally openly opposed
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March. Two other
Crimea: Enforced Disappearances
Crimean Tatars, Other Pro-Ukraine Figures Among the Missing
October 􀆂, 􀅽􀅻􀅼􀅿 􀅿:􀆀􀆄AM EDT Available In English Français Русский Українська
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LAUNCH GALLERY
Parents holding photograph of Seiran Zinedinov, Crimean Tatar activist,
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Crimean Tatars who appeared not to have political ties
have gone missing in recent days. The body of one was
found hanged on October 6. De-facto authorities in
Crimea should promptly and thoroughly investigate these
cases and bring those responsible to account, Human
Rights Watch said.
“The disappearances are contributing to the atmosphere
of fear and hostility in Crimea for anyone who is pro-
Ukraine, including Crimean Tatars,” said Yulia
Gorbunova, Europe and Central Asia researcher at
Human Rights Watch. “The de-facto authorities need to
investigate all potential leads in these disappearances,
including whether paramilitary groups or Russian security
forces were behind them.”
In the past six months the de-facto authorities have
steadily increased pressure on some members of the
Crimean Tatar community. The authorities have issued
several warnings to Mejlis, the body that represents
Crimean Tatars with the authorities and international
community, over what were called “extremist” activities,
including flying a Ukrainian flag at the Mejlis office.
The authorities threatened to dissolve Mejlis and searched
and sealed its office in September. They have banned the
former and the current Mejlis leaders from entering
Crimea for five years, one in April and the other in July. In
August and September, authorities conducted dozens of
intrusive searches in mosques, schools, and private homes
of Crimean Tatars, claiming to be looking for weapons,
drugs, and “prohibited literature.”
On September 27, two young Crimean Tatar cousins
disappeared after being seen bundled into a minivan by
two men in black uniforms. During the last week of May,
three activists with a pro-Ukraine group, one of them a
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Crimean Tatar, disappeared within several days of each
other. The families of two of them said they had hostile
encounters with the “self-defense” units in March.
Human Rights Watch has previously documented other
abuses by Crimean “self-defense” and paramilitary forces
across Crimea, including attacks on and abductions of pro-
Ukrainian activists and said that the Crimean authorities
should disarm and disband these units and prosecute
those responsible for abuses. Human Rights Watch
documented the forced disappearance of seven people in
Crimea in March; six were eventually freed, but the body
of one, a Crimean Tatar from Simferopol region, was
found 13 days after his abduction bearing marks of
violent death.
“The authorities need to find out what happened to these
men,” Gorbunova said. “As one person after another falls
out of sight without any resolution of the cases, it sends
the message to those responsible that they can continue to
act with impunity.”
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Abductions of Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet
Islyamov
On September 27, Islyam Dzhepparov, 18 and his cousin,
Dzhevdet Islyamov, 23, both Crimean Tatars, disappeared
from the village of Saryi-Su, near the town of Belogorsk.
Dzhepparov’s father, Abdureshit, told Human Rights
Watch that the young men were last seen on a road near
Belogorsk being forced into a minivan.
The father said that on the evening of September 27, the
young men went to visit Islyam’s uncle, who lives in the
area. At around 7 p.m., a family friend told the father that
as the friend was driving home on the road outside Saryi-
Su, he saw two men in black uniforms frisk the two young
men, then push them into a blue minivan with tinted
windows and drive off. The witness said that the men had
been “fast and professional.” The father called the police,
who came and questioned him and the witness about the
disappearance.
Abdureshit Dzhepparov is a well-known member of the
Crimean Tatar community, a former delegate to Kurultai,
the elected council of the Crimean Tatar community, and
a former member of Mejlis.
He told Human Rights Watch that in the days following his
son’s disappearance, hundreds of Crimean Tatars from
other regions of Crimea came to his house to show
support. On October 1, Sergey Aksyonov, the de-facto
prime minister of Crimea, visited Saryi-Su and met with
him and several other representatives of Crimean Tatar
community. Aksyonov assured the relatives that the
authorities were doing their best to investigate all the
disappearances and denied any involvement of the socalled
“self-defense units.”
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Abdureshit told Human Rights Watch, however, that in
August and September, the authorities had steadily
intensified pressure on Crimean Tatars in his
neighborhood and conducted invasive searches for
“prohibited literature,” drugs, and weapons in private
homes, mosques, and schools:
Disappearances of Leonid Korzh, Timur Shaimardanov
and Seiran Zinedinov
The Crimean Field Mission, a human rights monitoring
group in Simferopol, reported that on May 22, colleagues
and relatives lost contact with Leonid Korzh, 24, a member
of a pro-Ukraine activist group Ukrainsky Narodny Dom
(Ukrainian People’s Home). On May 25, one of the leaders
of the group, Timur Shaimardanov, spoke about Korzh’s
disappearance at a meeting with a pastor from the
Salvation Army in Simferopol.
The next day, Shaimardanov, a 34 year old entrepreneur,
left his house in the morning to go to work and was not
seen again. Shaimardanov’s wife, Olga Shaimardonova,
told Human Rights Watch that her husband told her he
was going to the bank and would pick up their eight-yearold
son from school at noon. She said that she called her
husband at 11 a.m. but that his phone was switched off. She
was not able to contact him after that. His relatives’
further attempts to locate him, including through a police
investigation, were unsuccessful.
Dozens of people in masks with automatic weapons come at
the break of dawn, sometimes tell the whole family to lie down
facing the floor and turn their houses upside down. It happened
to some of my neighbors. I don’t know what their motives are.
All I know is that today in Crimea it is dangerous to be a
Crimean Tatar.
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Shaimardanov’s family reported his disappearance to the
police on May 27, but the criminal investigation into his
disappearance was initiated only on July 9.
Shaimardanov’s sister told Human Rights Watch that
when she met with one of the investigators in late July, he
asked her questions about Shaimardanov’s religious
beliefs, whether he could read the Quran and knew how to
shoot a gun, and whether she was “familiar with any
extremist organizations.” When Shaimardanov’s sister
asked why this was relevant, the investigator implied that
Shaimardanov could have gone to eastern Ukraine to fight
against insurgents there.
On May 30, another member of the Ukrainian People’s
Home, Seiran Zinedinov, a 33-year-old Crimean Tatar and
father of three, also disappeared. His relatives and other
activists told Human Rights Watch that Zinedinov had
been trying to locate Shaimardanov.
Zinedinov’s mother, Elvira Zinedinova, told Human Rights
Watch that on Zinedinov and his wife were at Zinedinova’s
home in the village of Stroganovka in the Simferopol
region on May 30. At about 7:40 p.m., Seiran said he
needed to step outside to speak with Shaimardanova about
her husband’s disappearance. Zinedinova said her son left
the house in just what he had been wearing and did not
bring his wallet, passport, or driver’s license with him. Half
an hour later, Zinedinov called his wife, told her that he
was walking back to the house and asked her to start
dinner. But he did not return and did not answer his phone
when his wife called him later that evening.
Shaimardanova later told Zinedinov’s relatives that she
and Zinedinov had a brief conversation on the road just
outside the entrance to the village, approximately 300 m
from Zinedinov’s house. She said that Zinedinov told her
he had reasons to believe that Crimean “self-defense”
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units were involved in her husband’s disappearance. The
conversation lasted 20 minutes, after which
Shaimardanova left in her car and Zinedinov headed home
on foot.
Shaimardanov’s family told Human Rights Watch that
both Shaimardanov and Zinedinov had hostile encounters
with the “self-defense” units in March and that
Shaimardanov told his relatives he was being followed
several days before he disappeared.
Zinedinov’s relatives reported his disappearance to the
police on the morning of May 31, but the police started a
criminal investigation only two months later. The relatives
told Human Rights Watch that before the investigation
began, the lead investigator on the case had been replaced
10 times. Zinedinova also said the investigator called
Zinedinov’s family the first week in October to report that
there has been no progress in the investigation:
Edem Asanov and Eskender Apselyamov
Human Rights Watch documented two cases of young
Crimean Tatar men who went missing, although it is not
clear whether their disappearance is in any way related to
paramilitary, “self-defense,” or other groups. Asanov, 25,
went missing on his way to work on September 29.
Asanov’s sister, Feride, said that he was not politically
active although he had occasionally discussed on his social
network Vkontakte page issues related to the situation of
Crimean Tatars. The sister said that Asanov left his home
The investigators asked a lot of questions about my son’s
activism and how he felt about Russia but did not present a
single piece of information about how or why he disappeared.
It’s been four months and I know nothing. His daughter was
born in July and he has never even met her.
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in Saki at 8.30 a.m. to take the bus to Evpatoria, a resort
town approximately 22 km away where he worked as a
lifeguard at a spa.
His relatives said that an acquaintance saw Asanov later
that morning at a bus station in Evpatoria. But his
employer said he never arrived at work, and when
Asanova’s relatives tried calling him during the day, his
phone was switched off. His relatives’ efforts to locate him
were unsuccessful. In the evening of September 29,
Asanov’s family reported him missing to the local police,
who started an investigation.
On October 6, police found Asanov’s body hanged in an
abandoned building in Evpatoria. The circumstances
surrounding his death are unclear.
Eskender Apselyamov, 23, disappeared on October 3.
Relatives told Human Rights Watch that Apselyamov left
his apartment at around 5:30 p.m. to go to work, but never
arrived. He was last seen at around 6 p.m. at a convenience
store approximately 400 meters from his work buying
cigarettes. His relatives’ attempts to locate him were
unsuccessful. The police have started an investigation.
Relatives of both men said that neither they nor the young
men were politically active, and Human Rights Watch has
not found any reason suggesting why they might have been
targeted. But given the disturbing trend of abductions of
and threats to Crimean Tatars over the last few months,
the circumstances under which they went missing should
be thoroughly investigated.
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Annex 943
Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea (November 2014)

RIGHTS IN RETREAT
Abuses in Crimea
H U M A N
R I G H T S
W A T C H
Rights in Retreat
Abuses in Crimea
Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-1-6231-32064
Cover design by Rafael Jimenez
Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate
abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and
secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that
works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of
human rights for all.
Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries,
and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg,
London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo,
Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich.
For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org
NOVEMBER 2014 978-1-6231-32064
Rights in Retreat
Abuses in Crimea
Map of Crimea ................................................................................................................... i
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1
Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 5
To the Authorities Exercising Effective Control on the Crimean Peninsula and to the Russian
Federation ................................................................................................................................ 5
To the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the
Council of Europe and Their Member States ............................................................................. 6
To the Government of Ukraine ................................................................................................... 7
I. Persecution of Crimean Tatars and Pro-Ukrainian Activists ........................................... 8
Background ............................................................................................................................. 8
Enforced Disappearances ........................................................................................................ 8
Harassment of the Crimean Tartar Mejlis and Its Affiliates ........................................................ 9
Prosecutions and Detention of Crimean Activists..................................................................... 12
Searches of the Mejlis and Avdet and Proceedings against the Crimea Foundation .................. 13
Searches of Homes, Mosques, and Islamic Schools ................................................................ 15
Abuses by Self-Defense Units ................................................................................................ 20
II. Harassment of Pro-Ukraine and Crimean Tatar Media Outlets ..................................... 24
Use of Anti-Extremist Legislation to Silence Criticism .............................................................. 25
III. Imposition of Russian Citizenship in Crimea .............................................................. 28
Violations of the Law on Occupation ...................................................................................... 29
Discriminatory Treatment of Ukrainian Citizenship Holders ..................................................... 30
Risk of Expulsion from Crimea ................................................................................................. 32
Travel Between Crimea and Other Parts of Ukraine .................................................................. 34
IV. Applicable Legal Framework ...................................................................................... 35
International Humanitarian Law .............................................................................................. 36
International Human Rights Law ............................................................................................. 36

I HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
Map of Crimea
© 2014 Human Rights Watch

1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
Summary
Human rights protections in Crimea have been severely curtailed since Russia began its
occupation of the peninsula in February 2014. In the past eight months, the de facto
authorities in Crimea have limited free expression, restricted peaceful assembly, and
intimidated and harassed those who have opposed Russia’s actions in Crimea. In
particular the authorities have targeted the Crimean Tatar community, a Muslim ethnic
minority that is native to the Crimean peninsula and that has openly opposed Russia’s
occupation. At the same time the authorities have failed to rein in or effectively investigate
abuses by paramilitary groups implicated in enforced disappearances and unlawful
detention and ill-treatment of Crimean Tatars, activists, journalists, and other individuals
who are or perceived to be pro-Ukrainian. By bestowing Russian citizenship on Crimea
residents through a coercive process, the authorities have also engaged in discrimination
against Ukrainian citizens in Crimea, laid the groundwork for the potential expulsion of
some Ukrainian citizens, and violated their obligations as an occupying power under
international humanitarian law in relation to protecting civilians’ rights.
Following the signing of the Treaty on the Adoption of the Republic of Crimea into Russia
between local Crimea authorities and Russia and the Russian Duma passing the law On the
Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation of New
Federal Subjects on March 20, 2014, Russian and Crimea’s authorities started the process
of extending Russian legislation and policy to Crimea. This includes Russian laws relating
to citizenship, media registration, and laws on “extremism,” including prohibited literature.
In particular, authorities in Crimea have used Russia’s vaguely worded and overly broad
anti-extremism legislation to issue several “anti-extremist warnings” to the Mejlis, the
Crimean Tatar representative body, and have banned mass public gatherings by the
Crimean Tatar community. Between August and October, authorities conducted invasive
and in some cases unwarranted searches at mosques and Islamic schools and searched
dozens of private homes of Crimean Tatars, including members of the Mejlis. The searches,
which the authorities say were conducted to look for “drugs, weapons, and prohibited
literature,” were carried out by both local police and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB)
but also involved dozens of unidentified armed, masked men.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 2
The authorities have harassed pro-Ukraine and Crimean Tatar media outlets, searched
their offices, shut down some, and threatened others with closure. The FSB and Crimea
prosecutor’s office issued formal and informal warnings to leading Crimean Tatar media
outlets against publishing “extremist materials” and invited editors to their offices for
meetings during which they threatened that the outlets would not be allowed to reregister
under Russian legislation unless they changed what they called their anti-
Russian editorial policies.
The authorities continue to support so-called self-defense units, armed paramilitary
groups which formed in Crimea toward the end of February and were implicated in
enforced disappearances, beatings, and in at least one case, the torture of pro-Ukraine
activists in March.1 These units continue to unlawfully detain and beat pro-Ukraine
activists in Crimea. The authorities have neither restrained the units from committing
abuses nor investigated the abuses themselves. Rather, in June they took steps to
regularize the units under the law and give them wider powers. Additionally, in July the de
facto prime minister of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, introduced a draft law to the parliament
of Crimea proposing to grant amnesty to all members of the self-defense units in Crimea
for the period between February and April 2014.2 At this writing, a similar law is pending in
Russia’s State Duma, which proposes amnesty for members of the self-defense units for
the period between February 2014 and January 2015 with the exception of those
“motivated by personal gain.”3
1 See Human Rights Watch news releases, “Crimea: Enforced Disappearances,” October 7, 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/07/crimea-enforced-disappearances; “Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal
Forces,” March 14, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/crimea-attacks-disappearances-illegal-forces; “Crimea:
Disappeared Man Found Killed,” March 18, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-foundkilled;
“Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One Tortured,” March 25, 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/25/ukraine-activists-detained-and-beaten-one-tortured.
2 Draft law of the Republic of Crimea, “On Preventing Persecution of Persons for Actions Directed at Upholding Public Order
and Protecting Interests of the Republic of Crimea [О недопущении преследования лиц за действия, совершенные в целях
охраны общественного порядка и защиты интересов Республики Крым],”
http://www.rada.crimea.ua/textdoc/ru/6/project/1664.pdf (accessed November 3, 2014).
3 Draft of Federal Law “On Introducing Changes to the Federal Constitutional Law of March 21, 2014 No. 6-FKZ ‘On the
Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation of New Federal Subjects – the Republic of
Crimea and the City of Sevastopol,’ [О внесении изменений в Федеральный конституционный закон от 21 марта 2014 года
№ 6-ФКЗ ‘О принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым и образовании в составе Российской Федерации
новых субъектов – Республики Крым и города федерального значения Севастополя’],”
http://asozd2c.duma.gov.ru/addwork/scans.nsf/ID/16740DBDDF67CCDF43257D650048D45D/$FILE/613379-
6.PDF?OpenElement (accessed November 2, 2014).
3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
This report documents the abuses outlined above. It is based on on-site research in Crimea
in October 2014, during which a Human Rights Watch researcher met and spoke with
journalists, activists, lawyers, civil society representatives, and members of the Crimean
Tatar community, including the leadership of the Mejlis and the Spiritual Directorate of the
Muslims of Crimea. Human Rights Watch researchers also conducted telephone interviews
with people who have left Crimea for mainland Ukraine. The report also includes previously
published material gathered during a research trip to Crimea in March 2014.
On November 6, Human Rights Watch sent a letter summarizing our research findings to
the Crimean authorities. We have not yet received a response.
Human Rights Watch considers that as a matter of international law Russia has been an
occupying power in Crimea since at least late February 2014 and assesses its actions with
respect to the law on occupation under international humanitarian law. Russia is an
occupying power as it exercises effective control in Crimea without the consent of the
government of Ukraine, and there has been no legally recognized transfer of sovereignty to
Russia. The referendum held by the local authorities, without the authorization of the
Ukrainian government or any broad-based endorsement by the international community,
and Russia’s unilateral actions following the referendum cannot be considered to meet the
criteria under international law for a transfer of sovereignty that would end the state of
belligerent occupation.4
International human rights law also remains applicable to Crimea, including all treaties
ratified by Russia, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Under the law of occupation, Russia
has an obligation to restore and ensure public order and safety as far as possible while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented from doing so, Crimea’s and Ukraine’s laws in
force prior to March 2014.5 Russia is also responsible for violations of international
4 Human Rights Watch Q&A, “Questions and Answers: Russia, Ukraine and International Humanitarian and Human Rights
Law, March 22, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/21/questions-and-answers-russia-ukraine-and-internationalhumanitarian-
and-human-righ-0.See also UN General Assembly, A/RES/68/262, on the “Territorial integrity of Ukraine,” in
which it underscored “that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16
March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
or of the city of Sevastopol.”
5 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899 and Hague
Convention (IV) of 1907, arts. 43 and 64. See also Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 108.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 4
humanitarian and human rights law committed by local authorities or proxy forces and has
a duty to prevent and prosecute such violations.6
Russia cites the local Crimean authorities’ request to be part of Russia, later approved by
the Russian parliament, to maintain that it is not an occupying power, even though the
local authorities had no authority to make that request, that Crimea requested to be part of
Russia, and that this request was approved by the Russian parliament. It therefore acts as
though Crimea were a part of Russia and extends Russian federal laws to Crimea
notwithstanding the presumption imposed on occupying powers that they will respect,
unless absolutely prevented from doing so, the occupied country’s laws in force.
In this report Human Rights Watch uses the term “authorities” to refer to those in Crimea
who de facto exercise effective control on the peninsula and are de facto responsible for
the governance and administration of Crimea, irrespective of the legal status of those
agents under Ukrainian or Russian law.
Human Rights Watch, in accordance with its longstanding policy on laws of armed conflict,
remains neutral on the decisions of parties to a conflict to use military force or to militarily
occupy of another country or region. However, we seek to ensure that international law
governing the conduct of war and occupation are respected.
6 Ibid.
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
Recommendations
To the Authorities Exercising Effective Control on the Crimean Peninsula and
to the Russian Federation
• Ensure prompt, effective and impartial investigations into all allegations of human
rights abuses by the police and other auxiliary forces that have been operating in
the region since February 2014.
• Disband all self-defense units; the regular police force should not incorporate into
its ranks members of self-defense units who have been implicated in human rights
abuses.
• Ensure that any amnesty adopted to benefit members of self-defense units does
not cover serious human rights violations such as the ones documented in this
report;
• Cease all actions that target members of the Crimean Tatar community under the
pretext of combating extremism.
• Cease all unjustified interference with media freedoms and ensure that media can
convey a plurality of views, even if they do not support Russia’s actions in Crimea;
immediately cease and condemn all physical attacks and intimidation against
journalists.
• Ensure access to Crimea for human rights monitoring by independent groups and
humanitarian and intergovernmental organizations without imposing undue
restrictions based on point of entry.
• Reverse the process whereby Ukrainian citizens were required to choose between
Russian and Ukrainian citizenship; ensure that no Ukrainian citizen is pressured,
directly or indirectly, into accepting Russian citizenship and that there are no
adverse, including discriminatory, consequences for those who retain Ukrainian
citizenship.
• Ensure that all people can make fully informed choices about citizenship by
ensuring availability of clear and accurate information regarding the requirements
of Russian citizenship and regarding the consequences of choice of citizenship.
• Take no action that would deprive Crimea residents who retain Ukrainian
citizenship of rights they enjoyed prior to March 2014.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 6
To the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, and the Council of Europe and Their Member States
• Press members of the UN Security Council to adopt a Chapter VI resolution urging
for the full implementation of the recommendations regarding the situation in
Crimea contained in the reports on Ukraine by the UN Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine.
• Press for immediate and unfettered access to Crimea for dedicated UN
mechanisms, in particular those relevant to enforced disappearances, such as the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on
torture, and also and the Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders
• The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission, whose mandate covers all of Ukraine,
should, without further delay, be granted access to establish a permanent
presence in Crimea to operate and report freely.
• Urge the Swiss OSCE chairman-in-office to organize a public discussion on
Crimea during the December 4-5, 2014 OSCE Ministerial Council.
• OSCE participating states should urgently consider organizing informal and open
Permanent Council briefings on Crimea, inviting representatives from civil society
and other international organizations to report on developments and discuss
international responses.
• Press for immediate and unfettered access to Crimea for other relevant human
rights mechanisms of the OSCE, the UN, and the Council of Europe.
• Raise concerns about the human rights violations documented in this report, as
well as in regular reports by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in
Ukraine and the October 2014 report by the Council of Europe commissioner for
human rights, and urge the de facto authorities of Crimea and the Russian
Federation to promptly implement the recommendations addressed to them.
• Urge Ukraine to reconfirm its declaration under article 12(3) of the Rome Statue
made on April 17, 2014 accepting jurisdiction for the International Criminal Court
(ICC) over the territory of Ukraine but removing time constraints on the court’s
jurisdiction, and move swiftly to ratify the Rome Statue including addressing any
obstacles to such ratification.
7 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
To the Government of Ukraine
• Reconfirm the declaration made under article 12(3) of the Rome Statue of the ICC
on April 17, 2014 accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to alleged crimes
committed on Ukrainian territory but removing the time constraints (for the period
November 21, 2013 to February 22, 2014) on the court’s jurisdiction. Move swiftly to
ratify the Rome Statue, including addressing any obstacles to such ratification.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 8
I. Persecution of Crimean Tatars and
Pro-Ukrainian Activists
Background
In 1944, Soviet authorities accused the entire Crimean Tatar population of Crimea of
collaborating with the Nazis and, as collective punishment, deported all Crimean Tatars,
then estimated to be about 240,000 people, to distant regions of the Soviet Union. More
than half reportedly died in the months following deportation from starvation and disease.
Although Crimean Tatars were allowed to return to Crimea in the mid-1980s, the authorities
did not take meaningful steps to facilitate their return or compensate them for lost
property. In April 2014, the Ukrainian parliament recognized Crimean Tatars as an official
ethnic group of Ukraine. Also in April, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on
political, cultural, and economic rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars.7
According to the last Ukrainian population census data, in 2001 Crimean Tatars comprised
about 12 percent of the population of Crimea. 8
Enforced Disappearances
Human Rights Watch previously documented at least 15 cases in which Crimean Tatars or pro-
Ukraine activists were forcibly disappeared, abducted, or went missing in Crimea since March
2014. Six were subsequently released. Two of those who were forcibly disappeared were
subsequently found dead. The true number of forced disappearances is likely to be higher.9
For example, Human Rights Watch reported on the case of two Crimean Tatar cousins,
Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet Islyamov, who disappeared on September 27 after being
7 “Putin: decree on rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars is a basis for moving forward [Путин: указ о реабилитации крымских
татар - основа для развития],” Ria Novosti, May 16, 2014, http://ria.ru/politics/20140516/1008042615.html (accessed
October 28, 2014). On June 4, 2014, the parliament of Crimea adopted a decree providing for social guarantees to Crimean
Tatars and other ethnic groups who were had been deported.
8 Official census of the population by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine,
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/general/nationality/crimea/ (accessed November 4, 2014).
9 See Human Rights Watch news releases, “Crimea: Enforced Disappearances,” October 7, 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/07/crimea-enforced-disappearances; “Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces,”
March 14, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/crimea-attacks-disappearances-illegal-forces; “Crimea: Disappeared
Man Found Killed,” March 18, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed.
9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
seen bundled into a minivan by two men in black uniforms. At time of writing, the criminal
investigation into their disappearances has not led to results.
During the last week of May, Leonid Korzh, Timur Shaimardanov, and Seiran Zinedinov,
activists with a pro-Ukraine group, disappeared within several days of each other. Two of
them, according to their families, had hostile encounters with the “self-defense” units in
March. Their relatives and lawyers said their whereabouts remain unknown, and there has
been no progress in investigations into the circumstances of their disappearances.
Edem Asanov, a Crimean Tatar who was not politically active but had occasionally discussed
on his social network VKontakte page issues related to the situation of Crimean Tatars,
disappeared on September 29 in Evpatoria, a resort town approximately 60 km from
Simferopol, on his way to work. Six days later, police found Asanov’s body hanged in an
abandoned building in Evpatoria. The circumstances surrounding his death remain unclear.
Eskender Apselyamov, 23, disappeared on October 3. Relatives told Human Rights Watch
that Apselyamov left his apartment to go to work but never arrived. His relatives’ attempts to
locate him were unsuccessful. The police have started an investigation.
In March Human Rights Watch documented a case of a disappearance and subsequent
killing of a Crimean Tatar activist, Reshat Ametov. Ametov’s case is described in more
detail below.
Harassment of the Crimean Tartar Mejlis and Its Affiliates
The Mejlis, a self-governing body comprised of 33 members, is the highest executive body
of the Crimean Tatar people and represents them in their dealings with the authorities and
international bodies.
The Mejlis has openly criticized Russia’s occupation of Crimea, called on Crimean Tatars
to boycott the March referendum on Crimea’s status and the September local elections,
and also called on the authorities to disarm and disband the self-defense units in Crimea.
On April 22, 2014, the authorities banned Mustafa Dzhemilev, the informal leader of the
Crimean Tatars and a previous chair of the Mejlis, from entering Crimea for five years
after Russia’s Federal Migration Service (FMS) declared him a persona non grata in
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 10
Russia.10 On May 3, when Dzhemilev, a Ukrainian citizen, attempted to enter Crimea from
mainland Ukraine through the Armyansk checkpoint in northern Crimea, law enforcement
and members of self-defense units refused to allow him to enter. On May 14, the
authorities searched Dzhemilev’s house in his absence. Dzhemilev has not been charged
with any offense.
On May 3, 2014, about 2,000 Crimean Tatars came to greet Dzhemilev at the border.
According to media reports, some of those gathered at the Armyansk checkpoint broke
through a police cordon while attempting to create a corridor through which Dzhemilev
could cross through the checkpoint buffered from law enforcement and border officials.11
Law enforcement stopped the crowd, which at times, according to one eyewitness, became
agitated but according to other witnesses, stood down upon Dzhemilev’s request. On the
same day, groups of Crimean Tatars protested Dzhemilev’s ban in several cities in Crimea.
While the protests were largely peaceful, in some cases they blocked roads, disrupting
traffic. Local authorities initiated administrative proceedings against dozens of Crimean
Tatars in connection with the events of May 3, fining at least 140 of them for “public
disorders” and “unlawful border crossing” for amounts ranging from 10,000 to 40, 000
rubles (approximately US$290 to $1,500).
Human Rights Watch was not in a position to independently research the May 3 events and
assess whether the administrative charges and fines were proportionate responses to the
specific incidents. However, the authorities have subsequently referenced these events to
justify extensive searches, warnings, and other measures against Crimean Tatar groups
and individuals. The authorities have not produced new, specific evidence to justify such
measures. Rather, the measures appear from their scope and frequency and from the
vague accusations levelled at those targeted designed to intimidate members of the
Crimean Tatar community who are perceived as opponents of Russia’s takeover of Crimea,
and therefore opponents of Russia.
10 Dzhemilev learned of the designation when he was crossing the administrative border between Crimea and mainland
Ukraine, and local authorities handed him a document stating he was banned from returning to Crimea.
11 “Prosecutor of Crimea saw ‘mass riots’ during the gathering of Crimean Tatars to meet Dzhemilev at the border [Прокурор
Крыма разглядела ‘массовые беспорядки’ во встрече татар и Джемилева на границе],” Rosbalt, May 4, 2014,
http://www.rosbalt.ru/federal/2014/05/04/1264281.html (accessed October 7, 2014).
11 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
On May 5, the prosecutor of Crimea issued a warning to Refat Chubarov, the chair of the
Mejlis, that the group was at risk of being accused of “extremist actions” for the May 3
events. Chubarov told Human Rights Watch that the prosecutor read the warning out to
him and threatened to dissolve the Mejlis and ban its work should it engage again in such
“extremist” activities as the May 3 actions but did not provide him with a copy of the
warning.12 On July 5, authorities banned Chubarov, who at that time was away from Crimea,
from entering the peninsula for five years.
Also in May, two days before the 70th anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars (on
May 18, 1944), which the Mejlis for years had commemorated by organizing large peaceful
gatherings, local authorities banned all mass events on the territory of Crimea through
June 6, referring to possible “provocations” and disruption of the summer holiday season.
Local authorities eventually allowed a small-scale commemoration event to take place on
May 17, although not in the center of Simferopol.
The prosecutor issued several statements warning the Mejlis against “extremist” activities,
including after it called for a boycott of the September 14 local elections.13 In September,
the de facto prime minister of Crimea stated publicly that the Mejlis was not a “legal
organization” and that it had “very little authority” among the Crimean Tatar population.14
Russian authorities have repeatedly stopped and questioned Mejlis members and other
Crimean Tartars when they traveled across the border to mainland Ukraine. For instance,
between July and September they stopped Eskender Bariev, a Mejlis member, at least
seven times. Since March, when Russia introduced a policy whereby all residents of
Crimea had to choose between retaining their existing Ukrainian citizenship or accepting
Russian citizenship, Bariev had organized several seminars for Crimean Tatars to explain
what was at stake in one’s choice of citizenship and taking a Russian passport.
On July 23, eight Russian border guards armed with automatic weapons surrounded
Bariev’s car at the Armyansk checkpoint when he and a colleague were returning to Crimea.
12 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Refat Chubarov, May 21, 2014.
13 “Crimea: Mejlis activities considered extremist [Крым: деятельность меджлиса сочли экстремизмом],” SOVA Center,
http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2014/07/d29884/ (accessed November 2, 2014).
14 “Akseyonov announced that the Mejlis doesn’t exist [Аксенов заявил, что меджлиса не существует],” ATN,
http://atn.ua/politika/aksenov-zayavil-chto-medzhlisa-ne-sushchestvuet (accessed October 14, 2014).
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 12
Bariev told Human Rights Watch that after searching his car and looking through his
possessions, the border guards took away his passport, camera, and audio recorder and
questioned him about his religious beliefs and his Mejlis activities. Three hours later, they
returned Bariev’s passport and equipment and let him through. Two weeks later, border
guards again stopped Bariev as he was leaving Crimea with his family, questioned him,
and held him for three hours. Three days later, as Bariev was returning to Crimea, the same
border guards again detained him and took his passport. They brought him to their office
for a meeting, during which they asked him whether he knew Mustafa Dzhemilev and why
Crimean Tatars were distrustful of Russia. Bariev told Human Rights Watch that he has
been stopped, searched, and questioned four more times in a similar manner since then.15
Bariev also said that Russian security services in Crimea invited him several other times for
informal conversations. During one such conversation in May, a Federal Security Service
(FSB) agent asked Bariev why he had not yet applied for a Russian passport. He also
warned Bariev against what the agent called “extremist acts” during a planned public
gathering commemorating the 70th anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars.16
Prosecutions and Detention of Crimean Activists
In October, authorities arrested and charged three Crimean men whom they accuse of
carrying out various criminal acts during the protests on May 3. On October 22, police
arrested Crimean Tatar activist Tair Smerdlyaev, a member of the Mejlis. Smerdlyaev’s
brother, Zair, told Human Rights Watch that the law enforcement agents who arrested his
brother told him that he was suspected of using violence against a police officer during the
mass gathering on May 3.17 Smerdlyaev was placed in a temporary detention cell and on
October 24 a court in Simferopol remanded him to pretrial detention pending a court
hearing on the criminal charges against him scheduled for December 22. Smerdlyaev’s
lawyer, Emil Kurbedinov, told Human Rights Watch that the October 24 court hearing was
closed for relatives and the media and that during the hearing the judge rejected all of the
defense’s motions and ruled to keep Smerdlyaev in custody despite insufficient evidence
that would justify lengthy pretrial detention. Kurbedinov said that the judge based his
decision to keep Smerdlyaev in custody on “oral accounts of 60 people, mostly
15 Human Rights Watch interview with Eskender Bariev, October 6, 2014.
16 Ibid.
17 Human Rights Watch interview with Zair Smerdlyaev, October 24, 2014.
13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
Smerdlyaev’s neighbors,” who allegedly told police that Smerdlyaev had “extremist and
anti-Russian views.” Despite Kurberdinov’s request, none of the witnesses for the defense
were brought to court for the hearing. The judge also referenced information by the Interior
Ministry’s Center for Combating Extremism alleging that Smerdlyaev “had extremist
connections” and was a member of the Right Sector, an ultra-nationalist Ukrainian group.18
Zair Smerdlyaev told Human Rights Watch that authorities had arrested two other Crimean
Tatar men, Musa Apkerimov and Rustam Abdurakhmanov, on October 16 and 17,
respectively, on similar charges. A Simferopol court remanded both to pretrial custody
pending investigations into criminal charges against them.19
Human Rights Watch is not aware of evidence—other than the alleged denunciations by
neighbors and the allegations by the anti-extremism department—the authorities possess
that they have used to justify keeping Smerdlyaev in custody prior to the trial.
Searches of the Mejlis and Avdet and Proceedings against the Crimea
Foundation
On September 15, police in Simferopol conducted a 17-hour search of the offices of the
Mejlis, the Crimea Foundation, the charitable organization that administers the Mejlis, and
the Mejlis newspaper Avdet.
Riza Shevkiev, the general director of the Crimea Foundation and a Mejlis member, told
Human Rights Watch that at 9 a.m. on September 15 the police and unidentified armed,
masked men surrounded the building that houses all three offices, blocking the front
door.20 The armed men warned journalists to stay away and threatened them when they
tried to film, one of the journalists who was at the scene told Human Rights Watch.21 When
Shevkiev arrived at the office shortly afterwards, law enforcement agents provided him
with a copy of a court order requesting that a search be conducted at the Mejlis office
“with the purpose of finding weapons, firearms and publications inciting racial, gender or
religious discord.” According to Shevkiev, after searching the Mejlis offices and library, law
18 Human Rights Watch interview with Emil Kurbedinov, October 24, 2014.
19 Human Rights Watch interview with Zair Smerdlyaev, October 24, 2014.
20 Human Rights Watch interview with Riza Shevkiev, October 13, 2014.
21 Human Rights Watch interview with Radio Free Europe journalist N., October 1, 2014.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 14
enforcement agents searched the separate offices of the Crimea Foundation and Avdet.
When Shevkiev requested a search warrant for those premises, law enforcement agents
failed to provide one.
The authorities confiscated all of the Mejlis’s equipment, including six computers, two
hard drives, several flash drives, and documents, including notes from Mejlis meetings in
recent months and several religious brochures. The police also broke into the safe in
Mustafa Dzhemilev’s office and confiscated the money in it (approximately €3,670,
US$200). The money was reportedly later returned to Dzhemilev’s wife at her request.
The next morning, on September 16, several court bailiffs accompanied by a group of
approximately 10 unidentified armed, masked men arrived at the Mejlis office and
presented Shevkiev with a September decision by Simferopol’s Leninsky District Court
stating that at the request of the Crimea prosecutor’s office the court had initiated
administrative proceedings against the Mejlis’s charitable entity, the Crimea Foundation.
The notification said that the prosecutor’s office alleged that Mustafa Dzhemilev was one
of the group’s founders and that this violated Russian law regulating noncommercial
organizations because he had been banned from Russia. The bailiffs also presented
Shevkiev with a court order to freeze all of the Crimea Foundation’s assets, including seven
properties and all bank accounts, pending a court hearing on excluding Dzhemilev from
the foundation’s list of founders.
The bailiffs told Shevkiev that he had 24 hours to vacate all premises owned or
administered by the Crimea Foundation, which include the building that houses the
foundation, the Mejlis, and Avdet. On September 17, the authorities sealed the Mejlis
office and other property of the Foundation and froze all its bank accounts, effectively
paralyzing the activities of the Mejlis and Avdet.
Shevkiev told Human Rights Watch that the Crimea Foundation’s founding documents did
not list Dzhemilev as a founder. However, when Shevkiev presented the founding
documents at a September 29 court hearing, the judge did not examine them and ordered
the foundation to exclude Dzhemilev from the group’s list of founders notwithstanding the
fact that he was not included. Shevkiev said,
15 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
Mustafa [Dzhemilev] was never among the list the founders of the Crimea
Foundation. He is the president of the foundation, which is more of a
ceremonial position. We have three founders, including me, and
Dzhemilev’s name is not among us. But considering the absurdity of the
situation, I assembled a conference of the board of the foundation and we
agreed to “remove” Dzhemilev from the position that he never occupied in
the first place.22
Shevkiev is currently appealing the court’s decision to seize the property of the Crimea
Foundation. At time of writing, the offices of the Mejlis and Avdet remain sealed, and their
bank accounts remain frozen.
Searches of Homes, Mosques, and Islamic Schools
Since May, authorities have conducted a number of searches in the homes of Mejlis
members and other Crimean Tatars. The searches intensified before significant public
events. For example, on the night of May 14, a day before planned public gatherings to
commemorate the 70th anniversary of the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars, the
authorities searched dozens of homes, including the home of Mustafa Dzhemilev and the
Mejlis’s press-secretary, Ali Khamzin. Khamzin said in a media interview that he was not at
home during the search but that the authorities were reportedly looking for possible links
to terrorism.23 Khamsin also said that several days earlier authorities summoned dozens of
Muslims in Crimea to police stations where they took their fingerprints and asked
questions about their religious beliefs.24
Searches became more frequent and intrusive in the lead-up to the September 14 local
elections. According to the Crimean Field Mission, a rights-monitoring nongovernmental
group on the ground in Crimea, in September alone authorities searched at least 15 homes
of Crimean Tatars in Simferopol and surrounding areas, mostly homes of Mejlis members,
22 Human Rights Watch interview with Riza Shevkiev, October 13, 2014.
23 “Mass searches in the homes of Crimean Tatars last night – Mejlis [Сегодня ночью состоялись массовые обыски в домах
крымских татар, – Меджлис],” Censor.net, May 15, 2014,
http://censor.net.ua/news/285457/segodnya_nochyu_sostoyalis_massovye_obyski_v_domah_krymskih_tatar_medjlis
(accessed October 15, 2014).
24 Ibid.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 16
as well as the home of a pro-Ukraine activist, and several mosques and Islamic schools.25
The searches were conducted by local police and Russian FSB personnel in the presence of
dozens of masked, unidentified men armed with automatic weapons. In some cases, law
enforcement agents who claimed to be looking for prohibited literature, weapons, and
drugs refused to identify themselves, present documents authorizing the search, or allow
independent witnesses to observe the search, as required by Russian law. In several cases
documented by Human Rights Watch, law enforcement and security personnel detained
the inhabitants for several hours, questioned them about their religious beliefs, or berated
them for not obtaining Russian passports.
Mejlis member Eskender Bariev told Human Rights Watch that on September 16 at about
6.30 a.m., a group of approximately 15 men— some 10 in camouflage uniforms and masks
and the others in civilian clothing—came to his flat. One of the men introduced himself as
a Crimea FSB lieutenant but refused to show identification. He showed Bariev a search
warrant and said that they needed to search his apartment for weapons, drugs, and
prohibited literature. Bariev requested that two outside witnesses be brought in to observe
the search, as required by law, but the men told him that they brought their own witnesses.
After searching his flat for two hours, the men left, taking Bariev’s laptop and a computer
hard drive to conduct what they called “technical expert analysis.” At time of writing,
Bariev twice inquired about his seized property but received no answer as to when it might
be returned to him. The authorities have neither charged Bariev with any offence nor
informed him if he is considered a suspect in an ongoing investigation.26
Also on September 16, authorities searched the home of Mustafa Asaba, chair of the
regional Mejlis for the city of Belogorsk. Asaba, 59, told Human Rights Watch that at
approximately 6 a.m. a group of 12 men in civilian clothing, presumably FSB agents,
accompanied by 20 masked people armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, came to his
home looking for “drugs, weapons and prohibited literature.” One of the men, who
introduced himself as an FSB agent, took Asaba’s phone and, after presenting him with a
search warrant, asked Asaba for identification. After Asaba showed his Ukrainian passport,
25 “Brief overview of the human rights situation in Crimea [Краткий обзор ситуации с правами человека в Крыму],” Crimea
Field Mission, September 2014, http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/obzor_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_sentyabr_2014.pdf
(accessed October 21, 2014).
26 Human Rights Watch interview with Eskender Bariev, October 6, 2014.
17 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
the FSB agent asked him why he did not have a Russian passport. Asaba told Human
Rights Watch,
I didn’t have Russian passport, only a Ukrainian [passport] and told him
that. He responded, “Do you have something against Russia?” He asked me
several strange questions, like, “Why do you support Dzhemilev? Did you
know that Dzhemilev is an American agent and gets money from the
Americans?” and “Why are you watching [pro-Ukraine] Channel 5?”27
The search continued for over three hours. In the end, the security personnel confiscated
five brochures, one of them of a religious nature, and left. About 20 minutes after the
search ended, police took Asaba to the station, where they held him briefly for questioning
before releasing him.
Authorities also conducted intrusive searches in mosques and Islamic schools. In an
interview with Human Rights Watch, Asadullah Bairov, the deputy mufti of the Spiritual
Directorate of the Muslims of Crimea (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musulman Kryma, or DUMK)
said that between June and September law enforcement agents conducted searches for
prohibited literature in 8 out 10 religious schools in Crimea operating under the auspices
of the DUMK. Bairov described a particularly intrusive search at a religious school in the
village of Kolchugino in the Simferopol region, details of which he later learned from the
director of the school. On June 24, 30 armed men, including police and FSB agents, forcibly
entered the school and conducted an extensive search examining, among other things, the
school’s library and students’ personal possessions. According to a DUMK press service
statement, law enforcement broke the front door and several windows in the school.28
Bairov said that thirteen children and two teachers were on the school premises at the
time. At the end of the search, which lasted about five hours, law enforcement officers
confiscated several school computers and memory sticks. On the same day, authorities
also searched the home of the school’s deputy director, held him at the police station for
several hours for questioning, and released him.29
27 Human Rights Watch interview with Mustafa Asaba, October 2, 2014.
28 Human Rights Watch interview with Asadullah Bairov, October 27, 2014.
29 Ibid.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 18
Bairov told Human Rights Watch that in September, authorities conducted more searches
in several mosques and Islamic schools, looking for “extremist literature.” On September
17, authorities searched a mosque in Simferopol and on September 2, a mosque in Yalta.
The deputy head of the DUMK told the media that the search in Yalta involved police, the
FSB, and approximately 30 armed men. The search lasted seven hours and resulted in the
authorities confiscating several religious books.30
According to the data gathered by the Crimean Field Mission, on September 9, police and
the FSB searched a boarding school in the Bakhchisarai area, confiscating three religious
books from the school library. Children were on the school premises at the time of the
search. As reported by the Crimean Field Mission, some of the students’ parents said that
police asked the children to remove all items with Crimean Tatar symbols on it.31
Asadullah Bairov told Human Rights Watch that between June and October, he and other
DUMK members had several meetings with the de facto prime minister of Crimea, Sergei
Aksyonov, during which they voiced concern about the searches, noting that religious
schools, mosques, and the Muslim population in general were not given enough time to
dispose of literature prohibited by Russian law.32
The Federal List of Extremist Materials was introduced by Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On
Combating Extremist Activities” in July 2002. The list, which was first published in 2007
and has been updated regularly, currently includes about 2,500 publications, audio and
video materials, and images. Alexander Verkhovsky, the director of the SOVA Center, a
Russian nongovernmental organization (NGO) which conducts research on nationalism
and racism and provides analysis on the government misuse of counter-extremism
measures, told Human Rights Watch that approximately 1/3 of the banned items on the list
are Islamic literature and that around 25 per cent of those items are widely used by the
Islamic community, include no extremist content, and were banned inappropriately.
Additionally, Verkhovsky noted that as published, the list is confusing, at times
30 “In the occupied Yalta, armed people conducted a seven-hour search in a mosque [В оккупированной Ялте вооруженные
люди семь часов проводили обыск в мечети],” Black Sea News, September 24, 2014,
http://www.blackseanews.net/read/87800, (accessed October 15, 2014).
31 “Brief overview of the human rights situation in Crimea [Краткий обзор ситуации с правами человека в Крыму],” Crimea
Field Mission, September 2014, http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/obzor_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_sentyabr_2014.pdf
(accessed October 21, 2014).
32 Ibid.
19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
contradictory, and very difficult to comprehend, especially for a layperson.33 In Crimea the
enforcement of this law has had a discriminatory impact on Crimea Tatars who are Muslims.
In a meeting with the grand mufti of Crimea in September, which Asadullah Bairov also
attended, Aksyonov acknowledged that law enforcement sometimes “went overboard” in
conducting searches and promised to take steps to address the issues raised by the
Spiritual Directorate, Bairov told Human Rights Watch.34 In a media statement in October,
Aksyonov announced that Crimea residents will be given three additional months to
dispose of all literature prohibited by Russian law.35 This does not address the underlying
issue that the scope of Russian law and its enforcement in Crimea violates international
law on the protection of freedom of expression, as well as the obligations of Russia as an
occupying power.
Also in September, the authorities searched the home of Elizaveta Bohutska, who is not a
Crimean Tatar but is a well-known pro-Ukraine activist who is openly critical of Russia’s
occupation of Crimea and the leader of a movement called Mothers of the World Against
the War. In a telephone interview, Bohutska told Human Rights Watch that at around 5:30
a.m. on September 8, a group of men in civilian clothing, some of them armed and masked,
came to her backyard in Simferopol and demanded that she come outside. One of the men
fired five shots, one of them injuring Bohutska’s dog. One of them told Bohutska that he
was from the Center for Combating Extremism and presented a warrant to search
Bohutska’s home for weapons, ammunition, drugs, and prohibited literature.36
After the search, which lasted about three hours, the authorities seized three of
Bohutska’s computers, including one belonging to her son, a camera, two flash drives, and
some personal notes. They took Bohutska to the Center for Combatting Extremism in
Simferopol and questioned her for seven hours without her lawyer present. The four
officials who questioned Bohutska told her that the search was prompted by “complaints
from her neighbors that she was inciting separatism by renouncing the ‘return of Crimea to
Russia.’” According to Bohutska, the investigators mostly asked her about what they
33 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alexander Verkhovsky, November 7, 2014.
34 Human Rights Watch interview with Asadullah Bairov, October 27, 2014.
35 “Aksyonov gave Crimean residents three months to give up prohibited literature [Аксенов дал жителям Крыма три месяца
на сдачу запрещенной литературы],” Openrussia.org, http://openrussia.org/post/view/427/ (accessed November 3, 2014).
36 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Elizaveta Bohutska, October 3, 2014.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 20
called her “anti-Russian” position and her Facebook posts in which she criticized Russia’s
actions in Crimea. The same day, the authorities also searched another of Bohutska’s
homes, which she rents out, and attempted to search her art gallery.
After about seven hours of questioning, an investigator told Bohutska that she was a
witness in a case connected with the May 3 events. Bohutska’s lawyer arrived at around 4
p.m. and said that Bohutska should stop answering questions in case they alleged she
was incriminating herself. The interrogation ended, and Bohutska was allowed to leave at
around 7 p.m. She left Crimea the same night and at time of writing has not returned.37
Abuses by Self-Defense Units
Crimea’s so-called self-defense units are armed paramilitary groups that emerged in late
February to prevent any opposition to the March referendum on Crimea’s status. They have
been involved in unlawful detention, abduction, ill-treatment including torture, and
harassment of pro-Ukraine activists and other residents with complete impunity.38
Ukrainian human rights groups have reported that the units have also been involved in
unlawful searches of persons and vehicles, violent dispersals of public gatherings, and
attacks on journalists.
Human Rights Watch has repeatedly called on the authorities to immediately disarm and
disband those units operating outside any legal framework.39
In June, the parliament of Crimea attempted to bring the self-defense units under a legal
framework by passing the law “On People’s Uprising,” which authorized self-defense units
to, among other things, check identity documents and if necessary, assist police in
temporarily detaining people.40 While the law clearly states that the self-defense units
37 Ibid.
38 See Human Rights Watch news releases, “Crimea: Enforced Disappearances,” October 7, 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/07/crimea-enforced-disappearances; “Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal
Forces,” March 14, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/crimea-attacks-disappearances-illegal-forces; “Crimea:
Disappeared Man Found Killed,” March 18, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-foundkilled;
“Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One Tortured,” March 25, 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/25/ukraine-activists-detained-and-beaten-one-tortured.
39 Ibid.
40 “Parliament of Crimea passed on the second reading the law ‘On the national militia – the people’s druzhina’ and a
number of other laws in the first reading [Парламент Крыма принял во втором чтении закон ‘О Народном ополчении –
народной дружине’ и ряд законов в первом чтении],” Parliament of Crimea press service, June 11, 2014,
21 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
may act only in conjunction with police, as described below, they appear to be operating
autonomously and regularly harass, question, and sometimes beat people without the
presence of police.
In one case Human Rights Watch documented in March, self-defense units appeared to be
involved in the enforced disappearance and death of Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar man
who disappeared and was subsequently found dead in the Simferopol region in March.41
Ametov was last seen during a protest in the center of Simferopol on March 3, where three
unidentified men in military-style clothing led him away. In October, Ametov’s family and
his lawyer told Human Rights Watch that the investigation into the enforced disappearance
and killing of Ametov has not provided any results.
Human Rights Watch previously reported on several cases of abductions of pro-Ukraine
activists by self-defense units, most of whom have been released. In some cases, the
police were involved but appeared to have no coordination or control over these units.
For example, in March armed groups abducted two well-known pro-Ukraine political
activists, Andriy Shekun and Anatoly Kovalksy, held them for 11 days in secret detention
with several other detainees, ill-treated them both, and badly tortured Shekun.42 After
detaining the activists at a train station in Simferopol, members of a self-defense unit first
took both activists to a police station where they were registered in police books. After that,
armed men from a self-defense unit again took both activists to an unknown location
where they remained for 11 days and were repeatedly questioned, beaten, and shot at with
low velocity handguns commonly called traumatic weapons in the former Soviet region.
Shekun was subjected to electric shock on two occasions. When Human Rights Watch
spoke to Shekun in October, he said that he filed a complaint with the police in March but
had not heard anything about the progress of the investigation since June.43
http://www.rada.crimea.ua/news/11_06_2014_1 (accessed October 4, 2014).
41 Human Rights Watch news release, “Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed,” March 18, 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-man-found-killed.
42 Human Rights Watch news release, “Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One Tortured,” March 25, 2014,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/25/ukraine-activists-detained-and-beaten-one-tortured.
43 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with Andriy Shekun, October 16, 2014.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 22
On June 2, members of a self-defense unit stopped a journalist, Sergey Mokrushin, and his
colleague, Vladlen Melnikov, for publicly singing a song featuring profane lyrics about
Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mokrushin told Human Rights Watch that at around 8
p.m., as he and Melnikov were returning from a party singing loudly, 10 armed men
surrounded them on the street in the center of Simferopol. The men introduced themselves
as members of Crimea’s self-defense units and said the two were being detained. Despite
the journalists’ repeated requests to call the police, the men searched Mokrushin and
Melnikov and then forced them to come to the self-defense headquarters nearby, where
they handcuffed them, searched them once more, and questioned and beat them.44
Mokrushin told Human Rights Watch that after handcuffing both him and Melnikov, the
armed men made them stand facing the wall, beat Mokrushin with batons on his ribcage
and legs, and hit Melnikov’s head several times against the plexiglass wall. About an hour
later, Melnikov managed to send a text message to his colleagues, who immediately
started calling the authorities demanding that the men be released. The police arrived
shortly after, questioned Melnikov and Mokrushin in the presence of the armed men who
had assaulted them, and later released both without charge. Mokrushin had a bruised
ribcage and several hematomas on his body. He reported the assault to the police the next
day, and a week later, when he inquired about the progress of his case, police said they
would contact him with any updates. At time of writing, four-and-a-half months later,
Mokrushin has received no information on whether the police initiated a criminal
investigation into the assault.45
Human Rights Watch is aware of several other cases in which police dismissed complains
about abuses by self-defense units. For example, on the afternoon of May 6, self-defense
units in the center of Simferopol attacked Adburaman Egiz, a 30-year-old Mejlis member.
Egiz told Human Rights Watch that seven armed men wearing camouflage approached him
as he was getting out of a car and demanded that he show his documents. Egiz refused,
explaining that he did not know who the men were and asked that they call the police. The
men said they would call the police but instead called in 20 more men in military-style
clothing. They surrounded Egiz, handcuffed him, and started beating and kicking him. Egiz
repeated loudly several times that he was prepared to show his passport, but they
44 Human Rights Watch interview with Sergey Mokrushin, October 4, 2014
45 Ibid.
23 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
continued to hit him. After approximately three minutes, they stopped hitting him, checked
his passport, and let him go.46
Egiz told Human Rights Watch that he reported the assault to the local police station the next
day. The police officer on duty asked him, “Why didn’t you call the police?” On May 8, the
police said that they would not be initiating a criminal investigation into Egiz’s complaint
and provided him with a statement, which Egiz showed Human Rights Watch, that confirmed
the police refused to initiate a criminal case due to a “lack of criminal actions.”47
Self-defense units have also detained and in some cases beaten journalists and media
workers as they were carrying out their work. For example, on May 18, self-defense units
detained Crimean Tatar journalist Osman Pashayev, his cameraman, and seven other
people, most of them media workers, while they were filming a mass gathering in
Simferopol. Pashayev told the media that self-defense units forced him and his colleagues
to stand facing a wall for several hours and interrogated and beat them before releasing
them. The self-defense units also took away the journalists’ equipment, including three
iPads, two iPhones, a laptop, and money amounting to 500 Ukrainian hryvnia
(approximately US$100). The equipment and money were never returned to them. After his
release, Pashayev left Crimea.48
The self-defense units publicly referred to ATR, the main Crimean Tatar channel, as “the
enemy channel” and since March attacked and beat several ATR journalists who were
filming public events and took away their equipment, the deputy director of the ATR
channel told Human Rights Watch.49
In researching this report Human Rights Watch did not learn of any cases in which local
authorities have effectively investigated unlawful actions by self-defense units. A draft law
proposed by the de facto prime minister would grant amnesty to all members of selfdefense
units in Crimea for the period between February and April 2014, effectively ending
any prospect for accountability for abuses during that period.
46 Human Rights Watch interview with Adburaman Egiz, October 2, 2014.
47 Ibid.
48 Osman Pashaev’s video interview, Crimea Open Channel, May 18, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89oE8UTAX2o
(accessed November 2, 2014).
49 Human Rights Watch interview with Lilya Budzhurova, October 3, 2014.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 24
II. Harassment of Pro-Ukraine and Crimean Tatar
Media Outlets
In accordance with Russia’s position of applying its federal laws in Crimea, Russia has set
a January 2015 deadline by which media outlets in Crimea must re-register under Russian
law. A Human Rights Watch researcher met with several Crimean journalists and editors
who spoke of pressure and censorship of media outlets and journalists critical of the
authorities and of the impending deadline. This pressure appears to be part of the
authorities’ efforts to stifle all pro-Ukraine media in Crimea. Many pro-Ukraine journalists
have left Crimea for mainland Ukraine, and those journalists and media outlets who
remain have found themselves unable to function freely.
Since March, the authorities have been gradually pushing Ukrainian media from Crimea’s
airwaves. Broadcasts from the six main Ukrainian television channels in Crimea have been
blocked and replaced with broadcasts from Russian channels. Since the end of June, cable
television providers also stopped airing most leading Ukrainian-language channels in
Crimea, including Inter, Channel 5, 1+1, and several others, significantly reducing the
amount of televised Ukrainian-language content.50
In August, authorities effectively shut down Chernomorska (Black Sea) Television Company,
a private independent company, after police seized the station’s broadcast equipment and
computers and sealed the building. The raid followed a lawsuit filed by the Crimea Radio
and Television Transmitting Center, the official body that administers broadcasts in Crimea,
alleging that the station owed the center money in fees. During the raid the police also
seized without explanation equipment belonging to the Center for Journalistic
Investigation, a nonprofit group specializing in investigative journalism that had an office
in the same building, a journalist from the Center told Human Rights Watch.51
In August, a court in Crimea ruled in favor of Chernomorska and requested that the
authorities unfreeze its assets, but at time of writing, the station’s equipment has not been
50 “Media freedom under siege in Crimea, Ukraine, says OSCE representative,” OSCE news release, March 8, 2014,
http://www.osce.org/fom/116240 (accessed November 2, 2014).
51 Human Rights Watch interview with Sergey M., October 4, 2014.
25 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
returned, and it has not resumed broadcasting in Crimea. The Center for Investigative
Journalism has relocated to Kiev. It has made several inquiries with police about its
equipment, but police have not returned the group’s equipment, a journalist from the
Center told Human Rights Watch.52
Use of Anti-Extremist Legislation to Silence Criticism
The authorities in Crimea have used Russia’s vaguely worded and overly broad antiextremism
legislation to pressure Crimean Tatar media outlets into ceasing criticism of
Russia’s occupation of Crimea.
For instance, the authorities issued official and informal warnings to Shevket Kaibullaev,
the editor-in-chief of the Mejlis newspaper, Avdet, which was established in 1990 and
publishes in Crimean Tatar and Russian. Kaibullaev told Human Rights Watch that in early
June the Simferopol prosecutor’s office issued him an official warning that some of the
newspaper’s materials allegedly contained extremist content, for example the call to
boycott the September elections in Crimea and use of the terms “annexation,”
“occupation,” and “temporary occupation” of Crimea. The authorities also called
Kaibullaev for two informal conversations, he said, during which FSB agents and officials
from the prosecutor’s office warned him that Avdet will not be allowed to re-register under
Russian law if it continued to publish such controversial content.53
As noted above, on September 16, law enforcement agents searched the office of Avdet,
located in the same building as Mejlis’s office in Simferopol. Kaibullaev told Human Rights
Watch that the authorities did not show a warrant for the search of the newspaper’s office and
did not let him inside until after the search ended. The authorities seized the newspaper’s
stationary computer, a hard drive, and several flash drives. Kaibullaev said that because the
authorities did not give him relevant procedural documents after they completed the search,
he was not able to trace which of the law enforcement agencies conducted the search and
seized the equipment. Avdet’s office has since remained sealed and its bank accounts frozen.
Kaibullaev told Human Rights Watch that the day after the search, on September 17, the
Crimean FSB office handed him an official warning that referenced Kaibullaev’s “personal
52 Ibid.
53 Human Rights Watch interview with Shevket Kaibullaev, October 1, 2014.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 26
responsibility” for publishing materials calling for the September election boycott with
“intent to disrupt” the work of state bodies. The document explicitly warned Kaibullaev
that such actions qualified as public calls for extremist activities, a crime punishable by up
to five years in jail.54
In an official response to a September 19 statement by the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) expressing concern about the fate of Avdet, Russia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the search was connected with alleged extremist
activities of the newspaper, which “refuses to work within the boundaries of the law.”55
The authorities also harassed ATR, the only Crimean Tatar television station, which was
founded in 2005 and broadcasts in three languages: Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, and
Russian. On May 16, the Crimea prosecutor’s office issued an official warning to ATR’s
leadership about its coverage of the mass gathering on May 3, stating that the channel had
reported on the gathering’s participants making calls “of an extremist nature.”
ATR’s deputy director, Lilya Budzhurova, told Human Rights Watch that the pressure on
independent media in Crimea in general and ATR in particular has been unprecedented in
the past six months. She said that ATR had to develop self-censorship in order to survive:
All media outlets in Crimea have until January [the end of the transition
period] to re-register under Russian law. After that, Roskomnadzor [the
Russian state media oversight body] will have complete freedom to do what
they like with “provocateurs” like us. We want to continue working so we
started self-censoring where we can: for example, we avoid using certain
words and phrases, such as “annexation” or “occupation’ of Crimea.” 56
Budzhurova told Human Rights Watch that since May the FSB and the prosecutor’s office in
Crimea visited ATR’s office several times and had conversations with Budzhurova and her
54 Ibid.
55 “Commentary of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in in response to the
statement by the OSCE expressing concern about the fate of Avdet [Комментарий Департамента информации и печати
МИД России в связи с заявлением Представителя ОБСЕ по вопросам свободы СМИ Д.Миятович о ситуации вокруг газеты
‘Авдет’],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, September 22, 2014,
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/2521FB260EFAFE9744257D5B0051A5D2 (accessed November 5, 2014).
56 Human Rights Watch interview with Lilya Budzhurova, October 3, 2014.
27 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
colleagues about the channel’s editorial policies, which the officials said they found to be
“aggressive and provocative.”57
Budzhurova also said that when ATR was reporting on the wave of searches of Crimean Tatars’
homes, schools, and mosques in September, FSB agents would call ATR requesting that it
refrain from airing the materials. “Almost every morning would start with a call from the
authorities, from the FSB,” Budzhurova said. “They say something like: we saw there was an
ATR crew at the search in a mosque yesterday. There is no need for you to broadcast that story.
Or sometimes they would ask us to replace the word ‘search’ with the word ‘inspection.’”
Budzhurova said that after she responded that ATR was not inventing the coverage but
showing news that really happened, the FSB agents threatened the television station with
imminent closure and repeated that threat several times over the next few days. “They try
to force us to not report on controversial subjects by threatening to shut us down,”
Budzhurova told Human Rights Watch.
Budzhorova also said that since March the authorities have on many occasions and mostly
without explanation prevented ATR journalists from reporting on official events, such as
local parliamentary sessions. In August, the authorities cancelled ATR journalist Shevket
Namatullaev’s accreditation to cover local parliament sessions because he did not stand
up during the Russian anthem, she said.58
A September 24 letter from the Interior Ministry’s Center for Combating Extremism to ATR’s
director, which Human Rights Watch reviewed, stated that the center received information that
ATR’s editorial policies were directed at creating “anti-Russian” public opinion and inciting
“distrust towards authorities among the Crimean Tatar population.” The letter further requested
that ATR provide the center with copies of its registration documents, documents authorizing
ATR’s work, and all administrative documents, including the office rental agreement.
“The atmosphere towards media in Crimea is so hostile that it made it practically
impossible for us to continue working,” Budzjurova told Human Rights Watch.59
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 28
III. Imposition of Russian Citizenship in Crimea
Following the March occupation, the Russian government expressed its intent to move
swiftly to bestow Russian citizenship and passports on residents of Crimea. In line with its
March 2014 law “On the Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation
and the Creation of New Federal Subjects – the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal
Significance Sevastopol,” Russia required any permanent resident of Crimea who held
Ukrainian citizenship to undergo a process of declaring intent to maintain Ukrainian
citizenship. The deadline to complete that process was April 18, after which all Ukrainian
passport holders who resided in Crimea were deemed Russian citizens.60
After April 18, Russian legislation regulating the rights and entitlements that extend to
Russian citizens but not non-Russians went into effect in Crimea. The effect of this law was
to discriminate against those residents who chose not to renounce their Ukrainian
citizenship, who are now considered by Russia to be foreign migrants with no guaranteed
right to remain in Crimea. Ukrainian citizens are not guaranteed the same rights as Russian
citizens. For example, only Russian passport holders are allowed to occupy government
and municipal jobs.61
All those who obtained Russian citizenship are also subject to Russia’s military service
requirements. Article 3 of the March 23 Russian law on the acceptance of Crimea into
Russia states that residents of Crimea conscripted into the Russian armed forces will serve
on the territory of Crimea until the end of 2016.
Russia has not simply offered Russian citizenship to residents of Crimea, but rather Russia
has compelled residents to choose between Ukrainian and Russian citizenship while
imposing adverse consequences, directly and indirectly, on those who chose to retain
Ukrainian citizenship. In addition, as documented below, there were serious flaws in the
process for Ukrainian citizens who sought to retain Ukrainian citizenship: some Ukrainian
60 Federal law no. 6- FKZ from March 21, 2014, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, http://www.rg.ru/2014/03/22/krym-dok.html (accessed
November 6, 2014). See also, “Information for foreign citizens and stateless persons residing on the territory of the Crimean
peninsula and the city of Sevastopol [Информация для иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства, проживающих
(пребывающих) на территории Республики Крым и г. Севастополя],” Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation,
http://www.fms.gov.ru/treatment/voprosy/info_dlya_instrn_grzhdn_v_krymu/ (accessed November 1, 2014).
61 Ibid.
29 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
citizens were unable to exercise their choice to retain citizenship and had Russian
citizenship imposed on them. Others were subject to harassment and intimidation for not
obtaining Russian citizenship. In such circumstances, the imposition of Russian
citizenship in Crimea was coercive.
Another impact of the change of citizenship is that men of conscription age who acquired
Russian citizenship, whether through choice or default, will be subject to Russian
mandatory military service requirements. Article 3 of the March 23 Russian law on the
acceptance of Crimea into Russia states that residents of Crimea conscripted into the
Russian armed forces will serve on the territory of Crimea until the end of 2016. This raises
serious issues under international law discussed below.
Violations of the Law on Occupation
It is a longstanding rule of international law that an occupying power is forbidden from
compelling the inhabitants of an occupied territory to swear allegiance to the occupying power,
and allegiance to the displaced sovereign, in this case Ukraine, cannot be altered by duress.62
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, civilians and other protected persons “may in no
circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
Convention …”63 and in particular an occupying power may not compel residents of the
occupied territory to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. The Fourth Geneva Convention
explicitly prohibits any “pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary
enlistment,” and violation of the prohibition is a grave breach.64
It is further prohibited for an occupying power to seek to make a permanent change to the
demographics of the occupied territory, for example for an occupying power to deport or
forcibly transfer the civilian population of an occupied territory, in whole or in part, unless
the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons demand it.65 Nor can
62 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Hague Convention (II) of 1899 and Hague
Convention (IV) of 1907, article 45. See also Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), para. 124.
63 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, art. 8.
64 Geneva Convention (IV), arts. 51 and 147.
65 Geneva Convention (IV), art. 49.
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 30
the occupying power deport or transfer parts of their own civilian population into a territory
they occupy.66
While Russia is entitled to offer citizenship to whoever qualifies under its national laws,
irrespective of where they reside, a policy that seeks to coerce, directly or indirectly, a
population in occupied territory to assume Russian citizenship is not permitted under
international law.
In addition to introducing policies that would discriminate against citizens of the occupied
territory, in this case Ukrainians, Russian migration laws and policies may also lead to a
situation where Ukrainian citizens in Crimea are forced out of Crimea. Any deportation or
forced expulsions by Russia of Ukrainian citizens, individually or collectively, from Crimea
would constitute a war crime.
Discriminatory Treatment of Ukrainian Citizenship Holders
The process of bestowing Russian citizenship on Ukrainians in Crimea was not simply a
matter of allowing those who wished to apply for Russian citizenship. The process required
all residents of Crimea who were citizens of Ukraine prior to the occupation of Crimea to
take proactive steps to confirm their Ukrainian citizenship within a one-month period, or
become Russian citizens by default.67
While there are no official statistics available at time of writing on the number of people
who were able to confirm their Ukrainian citizenship or those who obtained Russian
citizenship, in a media interview in September a senior official of the Federal Migration
Service (FMS) stated that by September, 98 percent of Crimean residents obtained Russian
passports.68 There is no way to verify this data, but rights groups and numerous media
reports suggest that a significant number of people who wished to retain their Ukrainian
citizenship faced difficulties that prevented them from doing so within the one-month
66 Ibid.
67 For excellent summaries regarding citizenship in Crimea, see reports by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in
Ukraine; see especially the report of May 15, 2014:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15May2014.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014) and of June
15, 2014: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/HRMMUReport15June2014.pdf (accessed November 14, 2014).
68 “FMS: 98% of Crimean residents obtained Russian passports [98% жителей Крыма получили российские паспорта],”
BBC Russian Service, September 11, 2014,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/rolling_news/2014/09/140911_rn_crimea_russian_passports (accessed November 10, 2014).
31 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
deadline. 69 Such difficulties included the extraordinary short grace period compounded by
lack of publicly available information on the procedure and other obstacles outlined below.
According to local residents and rights monitoring groups on the ground in Crimea, Russia’s
FMS operated only four offices in Crimea where Crimean residents could confirm Ukrainian
citizenship. These offices were not easily accessible to Crimean residents living in the
countryside: three were in or around the regional capital of Simferopol and one was in
Sevastopol. 70 Local media reported on long lines exceeding daily capacity of each of four
offices, which resulted in some people not being able to get to the top of the queue before
the deadline expired.71 Several more offices were open in Crimea in April, but the timeframe
for retaining Ukrainian citizenship, which expired on April 18, was not extended.72
Crimean residents who wanted to receive Russian passports could do so by mail, apply at 160
designated offices around Crimea, or apply at any Russian consulate or embassy in the world.
Crimean residents who were Ukrainian citizens but were outside Crimea during that onemonth
period had no clear recourse for declaring Ukrainian citizenship within the deadline
due to conflicting information provided by the authorities on whether Russian embassies and
consulates around the world accepted such applications.73 Rights groups, journalists, and
bloggers reported cases where people were unable to apply to retain their Ukrainian
citizenship abroad because Russian consulates refused to accept such applications citing
lack of clear instructions and absence of forms to process such requests.74
69 “Russian or Else: On How Russia is foisting its citizenship in Crimea,” Kharkiv Human Rights Group, September 22, 2014,
http://khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id=1411211863 (accessed November 5, 2014).
70 Brief overview of the human rights situation in Crimea [Краткий обзор ситуации с правами человека в Крыму],” Crimea
Field Mission, July-August 2014, http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_iyulavgust_
2014.pdf (accessed November 1, 2014).
71 “Crimeans refuse Russian citizenship [Крымчане отказываются от российского гражданства],” Krym Realii, April 4, 2014,
http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/25321899.html (accessed November 11, 2014).
72 Brief overview of the human rights situation in Crimea [Краткий обзор ситуации с правами человека в Крыму],” Crimea
Field Mission, July-August 2014, http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_iyulavgust_
2014.pdf (accessed November 1, 2014).
73 On April 11, Russia’s Federal Migration Service in Crimea officially confirmed on its Facebook page that Crimea residents
with Ukrainian citizenship could declare their wish to retain Ukrainian citizenship at Russia’s consulates and embassies
worldwide. However, the same statement also acknowledged problems with applications possibly not arriving to the FMS
due to postal services’ glitches and encouraged people to apply in person in Crimea.
74 “Crimean citizen had to return from Germany to retain Ukrainian citizenship [Крымчанка намеренно вернулась из
Германии чтобы сохранить украинское гражданство],” Fakti, April 8, 2014, http://fakty.ictv.ua/ru/index/readnews/
id/1511057 (accessed October 15, 2014). See also, “Entry – one ruble, exit – two. To retain Ukrainian citizenship in
Crimea is much more difficult than to obtain Russian [Вход – один рубль, выход – два. Сохранить украинское гражданство
в Крыму намного сложнее, чем получить российское], ”Radio Liberty, October 10, 2014,
http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/25319928.html (accessed November 6, 2014).
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 32
According to Russia’s FMS, Crimea residents who wished to retain their Ukrainian
citizenship did not automatically obtain Russian permanent residence status. They had to
present Russian migration authorities with numerous documents, including proof of the
fact that they permanently resided in Crimea as of March 2014.75
The FMS considers a residence registration as the main proof of one's place of residence.
Indeed, this residence stamp in one’s passport is required of all permanent or temporary
residents of Russia by law. In Ukraine, however, getting a residence stamp is mostly
voluntary.76 As a result, many people, while in practice residing in Crimea, either did not
have the registration stamp in their passport at all or were formally registered in mainland
Ukraine. To get a Russian permanent residence permit, they had to demonstrate they were
residing in Crimea permanently in March.
Certain categories of residents of Crimea were left with no option but to accept Russian
citizenship. This was particularly the case for prisoners, people with disabilities, or others
who could not meet the in-person requirements to declare their Ukrainian citizenship by
the April 2014 deadline.77
The Crimean Field Mission, a monitoring group based in Crimea, reported that some
Crimean residents were threatened with dismissal at their workplace if they did not
become Russian nationals.78
Risk of Expulsion from Crimea
As noted above, under the March 2014 law Crimea residents who did not want Russian
citizenship and declared their Ukrainian citizenship ahead of the April 2014 deadline have
the right to receive a permanent residence permit to stay in Crimea. Foreigners and
75 “Information for foreign citizens and stateless persons residing on the territory of the Crimean peninsula and the city of
Sevastopol [Информация для иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства, проживающих (пребывающих) на
территории Республики Крым и г. Севастополя],” Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation,
http://www.fms.gov.ru/treatment/voprosy/info_dlya_instrn_grzhdn_v_krymu/ (accessed November 1, 2014).
76 Svetlana Gannushkina, “Заметки о Крыме [Notes on Crimea],” Novaya Gazeta, April 24. 2014,
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/comments/63343.html (accessed November 12, 2014).
77 “Russian or Else: On How Russia is foisting its citizenship in Crimea,” Kharkiv Human Rights Group, September 22, 2014,
http://khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id=1411211863 (accessed November 5, 2014).
78 Brief overview of the human rights situation in Crimea [Краткий обзор ситуации с правами человека в Крыму],” Crimea
Field Mission, July-August 2014, http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_iyulavgust_
2014.pdf (accessed November 1, 2014).
33 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
stateless persons who were temporary residents in Crimea as of March 18 have until
January 1 to apply to Russian migration services to obtain a new, Russian temporary
residence permits for Crimea.79
In July, the Russian government introduced a quota system for temporary residence
permits for non-Russian citizens in Crimea.80 The quota system provides only 5,000
temporary residence permits for non-Russians in Crimea and 400 for Sevastopol.
The quota system raised very serious concerns among Russian and Ukrainian migration
experts that the quota was set far too low to reasonably accommodate all foreigners who
were already in Crimea on residence permits, in addition to Ukrainian citizens who wanted
to retain their citizenship but were not able to successfully apply for permanent residency
for the reasons stated above.
While there are no official guidelines clarifying the quota, in a late September media
interview, an FMS official in Crimea stated it applied only to foreign citizens who were
temporarily residing in Crimea and not to Ukrainian citizens who were permanently living
there as of March 2014 and chose to keep their Ukrainian citizenship. Those who were
living in Crimea permanently, he said, could apply directly for permanent residency and
would not be subjected to the quota. The quota, he said, did apply to foreigners with
non-Ukrainian passports who were living in Crimea before March and held Ukrainian
residence permits.81
Human Rights Watch came across several reports, which it was not in the position to
independently verify, of individuals who had declared their Ukrainian citizenship and
applied for permanent residence permits being required to present proof of stable income,
including written confirmation from their employer when applying. This implies that
79 “Information for foreign citizens and stateless persons residing on the territory of the Crimean peninsula and the city of
Sevastopol [Информация для иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства, проживающих (пребывающих) на
территории Республики Крым и г. Севастополя],” Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation,
http://www.fms.gov.ru/treatment/voprosy/info_dlya_instrn_grzhdn_v_krymu/ (accessed November 1, 2014).
80 “On the establishment of quotas for issuing temporary residence permits to foreign citizens and stateless persons in the
Russian Federation (as amended July 19, 2014) [Об установлении квоты на выдачу иностранным гражданам и лицам без
гражданства разрешений на временное проживание в Российской Федерации (с изменениями на 19 июля 2014 года)],”
http://docs.cntd.ru/document/499062521 (accessed November 12, 2014).
81 “Crimean FMS department explained that more than 5000 foreign citizens can reside in Crimea [В крымском управлении
ФМС разъяснили, что на полуострове могут длительно проживать гораздо больше 5 тыс иностранных граждан],” Krym
Inform, September 23, 2014 (accessed November 2, 2014).
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 34
residency will not be automatically granted and that there is a possibility that Ukrainian
citizens could be refused residency permits and ultimately deported or expelled.
Travel Between Crimea and Other Parts of Ukraine
Human Rights Watch came across several reports of Crimean residents facing difficulties
while traveling to other parts of Ukraine. While Ukraine does not allow dual citizenship,
Ukrainian authorities made public pledges not to penalize Ukrainian citizens forced to
obtain Russian citizenship in Crimea—as indeed they should, since they should be
recognized as continuing their Ukrainian citizenship. Despite that, in the last six months
there have been reports of Ukrainian border guards deliberately searching people for
Russian passports and refusing permission to Ukrainian citizens who have received
Russian passports to enter mainland Ukraine from Crimea. Human Rights Watch has been
able to document three such cases.
In one incident on June 4, Ukrainian border guards stopped and searched Risa Veli,
technical director of the ATR television channel, and his colleague, both of whom were
traveling on a train from Crimea to Kiev on a work assignment, in the town of Melitopol
on the administrative border between Crimea and mainland Ukraine. Both Veli and his
colleague presented their Ukrainian passports to the border guards, but the border
guards insisted on searching their bags where they discovered Russian passports. After
that, the border guards refused Veli and his colleague entry into Ukraine and ordered
them to leave the train and return to Crimea. Human Rights Watch has been unable to
determine whether this and the two other incidents we documented are isolated cases or
part of a broader problem.82
82 Human Rights Watch interview with Nadjie F., October 1, 2014.
35 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
IV. Applicable Legal Framework
As noted above, Human Rights Watch applies the international law of occupation to
Russian forces in Crimea. Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, territory is considered
“occupied” when it comes under the control or authority of foreign armed forces, whether
partially or entirely, without the consent of the domestic government. This is a factual
determination, and the reasons or motives that lead to the occupation or are the basis for
continued occupation are irrelevant.
Following the February 2014 ouster of Ukraine’s former president, Viktor Yanukovich,
Russian armed personnel and pro-Russian militias in Crimea prevented Ukrainian armed
forces from leaving their bases, took control over strategic facilities, and took over
Crimea’s administrative borders with the rest of Ukraine.
On March 16, Crimea’s local authorities held a referendum on whether Crimea should
secede from Ukraine to join the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian government did not
recognize and declared the referendum illegal. After local authorities announced on March
17 that 97 percent of the population had voted to join Russia, President Vladimir Putin of
Russia signed a decree recognizing Crimea as an independent state. On March 18, Putin
and Crimea’s leadership signed agreements making Crimea and the city of Sevastopol part
of the Russian Federation. Russia’s parliament subsequently adopted a law accepting the
new regions as parts of the Russian Federation.
As a matter of international law Crimea is considered to be a part of Ukraine. The
referendum vote and decisions on sovereignty by local authorities in Crimea took place
during military occupation of Crimea by Russia and in face of objection by Ukraine and
without any broad-based support of the international community. On April 1, the UN
General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/262 on the “Territorial integrity of Ukraine,”83 in
which it underscored “that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any
83 UN General Assembly Resolution, “Territorial integrity of Ukraine,” A/RES/68/262, para. 5. Also, para. 6 “Calls upon all
States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action
or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.”
RIGHTS IN RETREAT 36
alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol.”
Consequently, under international law neither the referendum nor its endorsement by
Russia can be considered to effect a transfer of sovereignty that would end the state of
belligerent occupation and do not impact the applicability of the law of occupation to the
Crimea situation.
International Humanitarian Law
Russia and Ukraine are both parties to the Hague Regulations of 1907 (Hague), the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva IV), and certain provisions of the 1977 Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I), which provide the primary treaty
sources for the modern law of occupation. Much of this law is also a matter of customary
international law.84 For the purposes of the developments documented in this report,
Human Rights Watch draws particular attention to the responsibility of the occupying
power to ensure that everyone is treated humanely and without discrimination based on
ethnicity, religion, or any other basis.85 This includes respecting family honor and rights,
people’s lives, and private property, as well as religious and customary convictions and
practice and adhering to the prohibitions on acts such as arbitrary detention, enforced
disappearances, and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and torture. Under
the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupying power has the obligation to “facilitate the
proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.”
International Human Rights Law
Both Ukraine and Russia are parties to several international human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European
Convention on Human Rights, which continue to be applicable during the occupation.
While in a time of war restrictions on and derogations from many of these rights are
permitted (e.g. restrictions on freedom of assembly and right to privacy), such restrictions
are limited to those that are strictly required by the necessity of the situation and that are
compatible with obligations under international humanitarian law. Several rights such as
the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and the obligation of
84 Human Rights Watch Q&A, “Questions and Answers: Russia, Ukraine and International Humanitarian and Human Rights
Law, March 22, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/21/questions-and-answers-russia-ukraine-and-internationalhumanitarian-
and-human-righ-0.
85 See Geneva Conventions, common art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 13; Additional Protocol I, art. 75(1).
37 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2014
nondiscrimination cannot be subject to restrictions. The UN Human Rights Committee and
the European Court of Human Rights also retain jurisdiction over Crimea.
Ukraine has already filed three cases against Russia for actions in Crimea with the
European Court of Human Rights.
The first application, Ukraine v. Russia I (no. 20958/14), lodged in March 2014, alleged
that the civilian population on the territory of Ukraine was at risk of measures by Russia
that might threaten their life and health. The second application, Ukraine v. Russia II (no.
43800/14), lodged in June, concerns the alleged transfer of 16 children and 2 teachers
from Ukraine to Russia who have since been returned to Ukraine. And in the third
application, Ukraine v. Russia III (no. 49537/14), lodged in July, a complaint was made on
behalf of Hayser Dzhemilov regarding his detention in Simferopol. In all cases the court
invoked rule 39 of the Rules of Court and indicated to the governments of Russia and
Ukraine that they should ensure respect for convention rights of the civilian population
and the particular persons involved.
According to the European Court, by August 12, 2014, 55 individual applications were also
lodged with the court against either or both Ukraine and Russia relating to events in
Crimea or southeastern regions of Ukraine.
hrw.org
(above) The parents of Seiran Zinedinov, a Crimean
Tatar activist who disappeared on May 30, 2014,
holding his photograph.
© 2014 Lucy Ash/BBC
(front cover) Army and police officers block the road
ahead of a protest by Crimean Tatars (visible in the
background) at a Russia-Ukraine border checkpoint
outside the town of Armyansk, Crimea on May 3, 2014.
© 2014 Associated Press
RIGHTS IN RETREAT
Abuses in Crimea

Annex 944
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, “Annexed” Education in Temporarily
Occupied Crimea, Monitoring Report (2015)

Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research
Integration and Development Center
for Information and Research
Edited by Yulia Tyshchenko, Oleg Smirnov
Kyiv - 2015
«Annexed» Education
in Temporarily
Occupied Crimea
Monitoring Report
УДК 37.018(477.75)»2014»=161.2=111
ББК 74.200.6(4Укр-4Крм)
А66
The monitoring report is prepared within the framework of
«Democratization, Human Rights and Civil Society Development
in Ukraine» programme, implemented by the United Nations Development
Programme with financial support from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Denmark during 2013-2016.
The opinions, attitudes, and assessments contained in the
report do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Development
Programme, other UN Agencies or the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Denmark.
The report is issued in the Ukrainian and English languages
in printed and electronic versions. The electronic version of the edition
can be found on the UCIPR’s site at: http://www.ucipr.org.ua.
The printed version of the book is distributed free of charge. The
UCIPR allows the texts to be circulated with reference to the
source.
«Annexed» Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea / Ukrainian Center for Independent
Political Research. : Edited by Yulia Tyshchenko, Oleg Smirnov. – K. :
2015. – 40 p. – Paperback.
ISBN 978-966-137-034-9
The Monitoring Report presents a brief description of the situation in Crimea after annexation
in the area of education in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar, the content of humanitarian
subjects and opportunities of Crimean school graduates for entering Ukrainian HEIs. The
Report is based on statistical and actual data, documentary materials on transformations in
the system of Crimean education as well as the educational rights of Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars.
The Report will be useful for officials, public activists and a broad circle of people interested
in education issues.
Copy editor Olena Reshetova
Translated into English by Svitlana Dorofeeva
Cover design and publication layout by Andriy Dorydor
The dummy-layout was made on the equipment of the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political
Research (UCIPR, www.ucipr.org.ua)
Ukraine, 01001, Kyiv, of. 2, 18, Sofiivska St.
Tel.: (+38-044) 599-4251, 592-9823
Approved for printing 03.03.2015. Format 70х100/16. Offset paper. Offset printing. Garniture
Newton. Pressrun 200 copies. Printed at the printing house of LLC «Agency «Ukraine».
Order № 5/3.
Ukraine, 01054, Kyiv, 55, Honchara St.
(Registration Certificate series DK № 265 from 30.11.2000)
УДК 37.018(477.75)»2014»=161.2=111
ББК 74.200.6(4Укр-4Крм)
ISBN 978-966-137-034-9
А66
© UCIPR, 2015
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Problems of education in the Ukrainian language in Crimea: the beginning of the new 2014/2015
academic year ...................................................................................................................................... 10
2. Changes in the teaching of history in Crimean schools after the annexation (2014/2015) .................... 12
3. Entry to Higher Education Institutions for Crimean School Leavers ...................................................... 15
4. The State of Education in Crimean Tatar in Crimea in the 2014/2015 Academic Year ............................ 18
5. The Situation in Education in Respect of the Right to Teaching in or of the Native (Non-Ukrainian)
Language ............................................................................................................................................. 22
6. Specific Features of Educational Work in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea ..................................... 26
7. The transition from the twelve- to five-point grading scale in Crimea .................................................. 30
8. The situation in the area of education regarding instruction in Ukrainian and some aspects of
educational work in Crimea .................................................................................................................. 32
Annexes ........................................................................................................................................................ 34
3
Contents
Introduction
The system of secondary education in Russia-annexed and occupied
Crimea has experienced radical transformations over the past 9 months of 2014
and 2015. Specifically, this concerns the organization of education in Ukrainian,
changes in curriculums and grading system. The monitoring of the situation in
the area of Crimea’s education provides a detailed analysis of the above changes.
The relevant materials are collected and presented under the Project on «Educational
Rights Enjoyment by Minorities in Crimea».
Within 6 months of the Project, the situation in the area of education in
Crimea has been monitored based on public sources and information provided by
monitors. In particular, this concerns the following:
■ Changes in education in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
■ Drastic changes in the content of humanitarian subjects
■ Challenges of entering Ukrainian higher education institutions for
Crimean school graduates
■ Changes in the grading system (the transition to the five-point grading
system)
■ Specificities of out-of-school education (in terms of combating extremism
and terrorism).
The monitoring presents statistical and actual data, documentary materials
on transformations in the system of education after Crimea’s annexation as well
as the rights of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.
The initial information has been used for 8 monitoring reports providing
general description of the situation in different educational areas. In general,
transformations in the Crimean education system decreased opportunities for instruction
in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar and resulted in the closure of schools
with tuition in Ukrainian, changes in the teaching of humanitarian subjects and
substitution of textbooks.
It is possible to make the following conclusions on the basis of monitoring
data.
I. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION:
1. The Crimean education system was to transfer to Russian standards within
a couple of months, from March to August 2014. Since 1 September,
2014,Crimean schools have shifted to Russian standards in accordance
with the federal law No. 84-ФЗ «On Specific Features of Legal Regulation
of Relations in the Area of Education in Connection with the Accession
of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia and on the Formation of
4
New Constituent Territories in the Russian Federation – the Republic of
Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol» dated 5 May, 2014 and amendments
to the Federal Law «On Education in the Russian Federation».
This is not officially treated as the problem because of the importance to
demonstrate the easiness, logic and naturalness of «Crimea’s return» at all
levels of government activity. Also, it is possible to state the full confiscation
of textbooks and teaching aids published by Ukrainian standards and
used in the educational process till recently. They are brought to warehouses
or school basements. Some schoolbooks are taken to educational
institutions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
2. On 30 December, 2014, the Crimean Council of Ministers has issued the
resolution No. 651 «On the Approval of the State Program for the Development
of Education and Science in the Republic of Crimea for 2015-
2017». Meanwhile, no Program Section is dedicated to the access to education
in native (minority) languages or, at least, the exercise of the right
to learn them. There are no statistical data on the language of instruction
or other characteristics of the existing educational institutions of Crimea.
3. Curriculums and the structure of humanitarian subjects have been radically
changed. History of Ukraine and Ukrainian Literature disappeared
from the list of humanitarian disciplines in educational establishments.
In the context of teaching of humanitarian subjects, of special interest is
history as the main form of communicating ideology to new generations.
There is a great difference in the teaching of humanitarian disciplines, in
particular history and social studies, between Ukraine and Russia by curricular
and ideological criteria. Although this subject is studied from the
5th class in both countries, the forms of teaching are totally different. The
difference between Russian and Ukrainian curriculums is actually one
year, which has caused a lot of problems for teachers and school students.
4. Of special note is the enhancement of the ideological element of historical
teaching, which completely destroys ideology of children who studied
under the Ukrainian system of education. History is becoming an efficient
mechanism for narrowing ideology of schoolchildren, disregard for critical
thinking in their work with historical materials, forcible indoctrination
on history of native land and Crimea. The study of Ukrainian history is
not provided for in the history curriculum.
5. The return to the five-point grading system is one of the important indicators
of different approaches that impacts the exercise of the right to
effective and competitive education. It means a step back in the process
of historical development of the education system. It restricts not only
flexibility of the grading system, thus creating additional difficulties for
teachers and students, but also opportunities of Crimean school graduates
for choosing HEIs for further education.
5
6. The entry to Russian and Ukrainian higher education institutions for
Crimean school graduates poses a serious problem that limits their right
to education. On the one hand, authorities believed that one year of study
under Russian educational programs will help Crimean school graduates
get prepared for the Unified State Exam (USE). However, the difference
between Russian and Ukrainian curriculums is so great that it is impossible
to overcome it within one year. Therefore, it was decided to admit
Crimean senior schoolchildren to higher education institutions of Crimea
and other regions by the simplified procedure, i.e. without the mandatory
USE. However, applicants to Crimean HEIs may face the problem of
recognition of diplomas of newly established or reformed Crimean HEIs
in the world. The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine takes certain
measures aimed to ensure access to the External Independent Testing
and entry of Crimean school leavers to Ukrainian HEIs.
7. Teachers also emphasize severe bureaucratic procedures of attestation of
academic staff that impacts their salary rate. They have to collect their own
«portfolio» consisting of numerous documents confirming involvement
in different activities. They have to take part in webinars, create personal
websites, teach online lessons and carry out extra-curricular activities. All
these are regulated by relevant regulations establishing grades for each
type of activity. Hence, teachers’ sentiments are changing depending on
their load and the level of bureaucratization of the attestation procedure.
II. IN THE AREA OF ENSURING THE RIGHT TO TEACHING
IN OR OF THE NATIVE (UKRAINIAN) LANGUAGE:
During the summer vacations of 2014, the structure of educational institutions
was completely changed; the number of schools and classes offering tuition
in the native language was drastically reduced. The Taurida National V. I. Vernadsky
University has closed down the Ukrainian Philology Faculty; most teachers
have been fired. The number of hours for the study of Ukrainian has become half
as much as that for the study of Russian. 15 hours were given for the Ukrainian
Language and Ukrainian Literature in total and 28 hours – for the Russian Language
and Russian Literature. It is indicative that 15 hours a week were allocated
for the study of foreign language. Such approach actually equalized the mother
tongue and a foreign language (by this criterion).
Violations of the language and education rights of the Ukrainian minority
in Crimea are characterized by the situation in the area of education in the
2014/2015 academic year. In particular, 177,984 students of 576 Crimean schools
study in Russian. Only one school in Yalta remained out of 7 schools with instruction
in Ukrainian. The number of students who study in Ukrainian is 1,990 or
1.2% of the total number of schoolchildren (or 184,869, of whom 4,895 students
study in Crimean Tatar and 1,990 students are instructed in Ukrainian). Before
the annexation, at least 8.2% of Crimean children were taught in Ukrainian.
6
The closure of he Ukrainian Philology Faculty of the Taurida National V. I.
Vernadsky University has resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of teachers
of Ukrainian language and literature and their retraining in teachers of Russian
language and literature. Under the order the Ministry of Education of the Republic
of Crimea No. 132 as of 29 August, 2014, 276 teachers of Ukrainian language
and literature have been sent for retraining in «Philology, Russian Language and
Literature» for 10 months (the instruction of the Republican Institute for Postgraduate
Pedagogical Education (CRIPPE) No.8 «On Enrollment» dated 1 September,
2014).
Since February 2014, Crimean authorities have created the atmosphere of
Ukrainophobia and intolerance to Ukrainian identity, which has influenced the
choice of the language of instruction. According to parents, most of them felt
uncomfortable and failed to file applications for the language of tuition. Some
parents reported special community meetings held by school masters to dissuade
them from writing applications and saying that «the study of Ukrainian is a waste
of time for your children. The knowledge of Ukrainian will not increase but reduce
their opportunities to enter HEIs.
» The problem of opposition between
parents and school teachers was solved only by means of administrative pressure
on teachers and teaching staffs and intimidation of parents through parent committees
or individual conversations often attended with threats of violence and
physical attack. Parents were pressed to decrease the number of applications for
the teaching in the native language.
There are numerous examples of repressions and defamation against school
teachers of Ukrainian language and literature, which eventually made them quit
and leave Crimea or search for another job. Pressure was also put on children
taught in Ukrainian. Almost 80% of them were forced to leave Crimea and enter
educational institutions in other Ukrainian regions.
All this happened contrary to principles of the so-called Crimean Constitution
governing, «Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tatar shall be the national
languages of the Republic of Crimea», «the Republic of Crimea shall recognize
the principle of diversity of cultures, ensure their equal development and mutual
enrichment» (Paragraph 3, Article 1) and «everyone shall have the right to use his/
her native language and to freely choose the language of communication, teaching,
education and creation» (Paragraph 2, Article 19).
III. IN THE AREA OF ENSURING THE RIGHT TO TEACHING
IN OR OF THE NATIVE (CRIMEAN TATAR) LANGUAGE
The development of a system of education in the Crimean Tatar language
has always been serious challenges for Crimean Tatars. The above problems retained
after the annexation and some of them even deteriorated, e.g. a reduction
in the number of hours for study of Crimean Tatar language and literature. Headmasters
have chosen curriculums without hours for study of native language and
forced many parents not to file relevant applications.
7
Yet, the power has adjusted the policy for teaching and learning of Crimean
Tatar language and literature and submitted for public discussion the State Program
on «Preservation, Learning and Development of Languages of Armenian,
Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German Peoples for 2015-2020». Among
other things, the Program «shall provide a legislative and organizational framework
for education in minority languages on a non-discriminatory basis; and expand
opportunities to meet the needs of every human being for the study of native
language.» Another positive aspect is the task «to exercise the constitutional
right to affordable and free pre-school, elementary and secondary education in
Crimean Tatar».
Meanwhile, the number of schools with the Crimean Tatar language of
teaching as well as that of schoolchildren who learn or are taught in the native
(Crimean Tatar) language has not practically changed compared with the previous
year. Yet, the number of hours has decreased. According to the «Curriculum
Sample for Educational Institutions of the Republic of Crimea with Instruction
in the Native (non-Russian) Language (Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar)», the
number of hours spent for the native language and Russian was the same in the 4th
class, whereas in the 5th class, the difference in the number of hours for the Russian
and non-Russian language and literature doubled. In upper school classes,
subjects are not taught in the native language. The difference in the education
systems also indicates possible deterioration of problems linked to education in
Crimean Tatar.
It has also to be stated that the number of classes and schoolchildren has
considerably decreased. In the 2014/2015 academic year, the number of schoolchildren
taught in Crimean Tatar (from the 1st to the 9th classes) totals 4,975
(331 classes). In the 2013/2014 academic year, this indicator amounted to 5,551
schoolchildren (576 up from the previous year).
Also, the share of Crimean Tatar children who have access to teaching
in or of the native language in the total number of children of the school age
remains very low (15-20% at different levels) and is not in line with the real
needs.
IV. IN THE AREA OF EDUCATIONAL WORK:
It is possible to state that a dominant concept of educational work is the
one gradually promoted within the first months of the 2014/2015 academic
year based on the need to shape a «defense ideology» by increasing the number
of educational actions for combating extremism and terrorism. The Concept
of Patriotic, Spiritual and Moral Education of the Population of the Republic of
Crimea of 18 December, 2014 is the fateful document promoting the development
of Crimea’s education area and focused, among other things, on «military
and patriotic upbringing of school students». Many actions and events
recommended to be conducted at educational institutions are dedicated to
historical «substantiation of Crimea’s annexation», which clearly indicates
the formation of further directions of patriotic education. The legal rules have
toughened. Teachers report a trend towards Ukrainophobia and celebration of
new holidays.
In the opinion of class masters, the number of actions has increased by many
times. It all comes to «runaround replies». The real education is absent. It has become
impossible to work on a specific problem at schools. The conduct of educational
actions is ordered by authorities.
Yulia Tyshchenko, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research
Oleg Smirnov, Integration and Development Center for Information and
Research
9
1. Problems of education
in the Ukrainian language in Crimea:
the beginning of the new
2014/2015 academic year
Changes in the area of education and violations of the rights of Ukrainians
to education in their mother tongue are particularly evident and gross.
instruction in Ukrainian. There were 165 schools offering tuition in Ukrainian and
in Russian, 1 school with Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages of instruction
and 333 schools that provided education only in Russian. Anyway, at least 8.2% of
Crimean children were taught in Ukrainian.
The situation has dramatically changed since the occupation. Only one
group of classes was left for teaching in Ukrainian in the only Ukrainian
school-gymnasium in Simferopol (just 9 Ukrainian-language classes compared
to 33 Russian-language classes started their academic year on 1
September, 2014.) Other Ukrainian schools in Shchelkino and Kerch were
closed. Hence, just 4 schools with tuition in Ukrainian are left in Crimea,
however, their destiny is still uncertain. The number of classes with instruction
in Ukrainian is being drastically reduced. Unfortunately, no official
statistical data are available so far.
The Taurida National V. I. Vernadsky University has closed down the Ukrainian
Philology Faculty.
In the opinion of respondents, a silent system of administrative pressure on
parents and teachers so as to shrink the Ukrainian-language education space has
been built up,
«The Ministry of Education makes pressure on school heads to exclude
the Ukrainian language from the system of education as «unnecessary».
In turn, teachers press on parents threatening with problems of admission
to higher education institutions. As it is difficult to prove anything in this
situation, parents usually agree with what they have been proposed.» –
Interview materials
Moreover, pollsters have pointed out that repressions against the Ukrainian
language in the system of education also limit opportunities for the development
of education in the Crimean Tatar language.
10
Specifically, before the annexation, Crimea used to have 7 schools providing
«The opposition on the part of republican and local officials is very strong:
they are very negative about the Ukrainian language in Crimea. The opening
of schools or classes with instruction in Crimean Tatar implies the
opening of schools or classes with instruction in Ukrainian. The negative
attitude of officials and school administrations to this language makes it
impossible to legitimate the Ukrainian and, consequently, Crimean Tatar
languages.» – Interview materials
Notwithstanding the declarative articles of Crimean Constitution on state
languages, Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tatar (Article 10), all documents in
Crimea are produced in Russian. It is impossible to receive administrative services
in Ukrainian. According to the Explanations No. 01-14/382 of the Ministry of Education
of Crimea dated 25 June 2014, «The teaching and learning of state languages
in the Republic of Crimea (Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar) shall not be provided to
the detriment of the state language of the Russian Federation», i.e. Russian.
As the criteria of the «detriment» have not been set, authorities and local
self-government bodies have direct influence on the use of languages in the system
of education and are actually forbidding the instruction in Ukrainian.
In compliance with the recommendations of the Crimean Republican Institute
of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education (CRIPPE) on the educational process
at schools with «the native (non-Russian) language of teaching», the number
of hours for the study of Ukrainian is half as much as that for the study of Russian.
15 hours are given for the Ukrainian Language and Ukrainian Literature in total
and 28 hours – for the Russian Language and Russian Literature. It is indicative
that 15 hours a week are allocated for the study of foreign language. Such approach
actually equalizes the mother tongue and a foreign language.
History of Ukraine and Ukrainian Literature disappeared from the list of
humanitarian disciplines in educational establishments. Analysis of the content
of Russian textbooks for Crimea is a topic for another discussion but it has to be
mentioned that they contain controversial aspects concerning the rights of Ukrainians
and Crimean Tatars.
«Many teachers have lost jobs just because they taught Ukrainian. Many of
them have been forced to retrain but could not fulfill themselves. Say, they are told to
retrain as teachers of physics and if they fail, they will be fired.»
What is interesting is that due to the lack of schoolbooks on humanitarian
subjects, especially history, teachers were unofficially allowed to use Ukrainian
textbooks and teaching plans. However, if an inspection finds out that teachers
use Ukrainian textbooks, they will by subject to administrative pressure as the
whole situation is considered as the demonstration of disloyalty. Many teachers of
the Ukrainian language and literature have lost jobs.
11
2. Changes in the teaching of history in
Crimean schools after the annexation
(2014/2015)
Drastic changes in the system of education have occurred after Crimea’s
annexation by Russia. In the context of teaching of humanitarian subjects, of
special interest is history as the main form of communicating ideology to new
generations.
From the 2014/2015 academic year, socio-humanitarian disciplines in
the Republic of Crimea will be taught under curriculums of the Russian
Federation… On 16 March, 2014, the national referendum has
been held in Crimea. Over 96% of Crimeans have voted for the annexation.
President of the RF Vladimir Putin commented on this event as
saying, «To understand this choice, it is enough to know Crimea’s history
and to realize what Russia meant and means for Crimea and what
Crimea means for Russia.» Teachers of history are recommended to
conduct lessons and educational actions under the motto «We Are Together
» dedicated to Crimean history based on the following materials:
• Address of President of the RF Vladimir Putin to the Federation
Council of 18 March, 2014,
• Federal constitutional law of 21 March, 2014 «On the Acceptance
of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation
of New Federal Subjects – the Republic of Crimea and the
Federal City of Sevastopol»,
• K. A. Kochegarov, Crimea in the Russian History. Teaching aid, M.,
«Russian Word», 2014.
Under the decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin No. 375 of 22
April, 2013 and for the purpose of drawing public attention to the issue
of cultural development, preservation of cultural and historical heritage
and the role of Russian culture in the world, 2014 is declared the
Year of Culture. (Teaching aids on history and social studies in general
education institutions of the Republic of Crimea in the 2014/2015
academic year)
In the Ukrainian and Russian system of education, history is taught from
the 5th class but forms of teaching are completely different. The unusual system of
the study of history (as it happened in Crimea) is rather problematic for teachers
and schoolchildren.
12
The content of school subjects
The first problem is that Ukraine applies the linear model of education,
whereas Russia uses the concentric one. Consequently, the change in the system of
education gives a one academic year difference between curriculums. This problem
is not officially emphasized since the demonstration of easiness, consistency and
naturalness of «Crimea’s return» is extremely important at all levels of state activity.
Meanwhile, teachers have been unofficially suggested to «repeat» (or, in other
words, to learn) material for the missing academic year by Ukrainian textbooks.
THE DIFFERENCE IN THE HISTORY CURRICULUMS
IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE
Class 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Ukraine Introduction
History
of
Ancient
World
Medieval history 16-18
centuries
1789-
1914
1914-
1939
1939-
2014
Russian
Federation
History
of
Ancient
World
Medieval
history
Medieval history +
Modern history the
late 15th – the late
18th centuries. The
history of ancient
Russia until the late
16th century +the
history of Russia in
17th - 18th centuries
19
century
The
early
20th –
the early
21st
centuries
Ancient
history
–
until
the late
19th
century
20th
-21st
centuries
The methodological problem
The second problem is that the history of Russia is not a separate subject but
a part of the World History Course studied from the 6th class, whereas the history of
Ukraine is a separate subject studied in the context of the world history.
Besides, of special note is the fact that the study of Ukrainian history is not
provided for in the history curriculum. Crimean history is not mentioned in Russian
textbooks (apart from the events of March 2014). Hence, Crimean teachers could
include Crimean history into a small curricular course, «the Local History», which,
of course, is not enough.
13
The form and context of the coverage of the March events are extremely
interesting. The Russian Ministry of Education and Science has developed
recommendations for the conduct of thematic lessons in secondary and vocational
institutions on the topic «Crimea and Sevastopol: Their Historical
Meaning for Russia» (see details on the website of the Ministry of Education
and Science of the Russian Federation dated 18 April, 2014). On 6
May, the Ministry of Education and Science of the RF has posted recommendations
and methodical materials on this topic.
The brief history of Crimea described in the teaching aid ends with the recent
events and presents political observations aimed to «explain» schoolchildren
the position of Russian authorities. In particular, the teaching aid reads, «The
forcible Ukrainization of Crimea, which encroached on the rights of the Russian
majority and other peoples, developed at a quickened pace <...> The power
was seized by far-right and Russophobic elements supported by NATO.» Crimean
teachers are recommended «to emphasize the feasibility of Crimea’s annexation
from the viewpoint of international law, moral and ethical norms».
The above excerpt illustrates the ideological and utilitarian function of history
in the system of education of Russia. As a result, the history of Crimea’s annexation
is represented in a predictable manner in the government discourse of
glorifying the presidential policy.
The course of social studies is another aspect important for describing the
problems of teaching of humanitarian subjects in Crimea. Social studies is the
general course taught in Russian schools and referring to the study of various
social aspects. (Actually, it is mostly based on the Marxist-Leninist philosophy
and the ideological-patriotic upbringing and substitutes the social science course
taught under the USSR). The course studies the foundations of social sciences,
such as philosophy, sociology and political science. Besides, it focuses on the law,
economics, history, culturology and social psychology.
It has to be mentioned that there is no such subject as social studies in the
system of Ukrainian education. Consequently, its introduction will pose a problem.
This year, it is taught for Crimean schoolchildren of the 6th-11th classes (schoolchildren
of the 6th-9th classes – 1 hour a week and schoolchildren of the 10th-11th classes
– 2 hours a week). Hence, it is possible to conclude that the majority of schoolchildren
will learn the subject from the middle of the course without introduction.
And the last thing that has to be mentioned is a radical difference in
the teaching of humanitarian disciplines, in particular history and social studies,
between Ukraine and Russia by curricular and ideological criteria. So,
a change in the system of education on the territory of annexed Crimea is a
rather complicated and «painful» process for teachers and schoolchildren as
demonstrated by this Monitoring Report. The media prefer to suppress problems
and difficulties faced by Crimean secondary education institutions as a
result of the annexation.
14
3. Entry to Higher Education Institutions
for Crimean School Leavers
Entry to Russian HEIs
The Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation has
drafted amendments to the federal law No. 84-ФЗ dated 5 May, 2014 «On Specific
Features of Legal Regulation of Relations in the Area of Education in Connection
with the Accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia and on the Formation
of New Constituent Territories in the Russian Federation – the Republic of
Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol»1. The new document is designed «to
eliminate obstacles to the normal work of education institutions of the Crimean
Federal District under Russian educational programs and standards»2 (Moscow,
17 October, 2014; RIA News Agency). The law sets norms «aimed to ensure the
integration of the education systems of Crimea and Sevastopol into the education
space of the Russian Federation». The matter concerns the recognition of education
and qualification levels, academic degrees and titles awarded in Ukraine as
well as positions of pedagogy and research personnel in state higher education
institutions (HEIs) and student rights to be adequate to education and qualification
levels, academic degrees and titles awarded in Russia. Besides, the document
provides for special procedures for the final assessment of school graduates and
their entrance to HEIs. Activities of education organizations in Crimea and Sevastopol
will be brought in line with the law of the Russian Federation. In general,
this integration had to be carried out within the transition period until 1 September,
2014. Although Russian authorities say that «the number of unsettled issues is
getting fewer and fewer» and that teachers have been retrained and provided with
tutorials, comprehensive problems of the difference in curriculums still remain.
These include final exams, general certificates of secondary education and admission
to HEIs, including Ukrainian ones.
1 The federal law of the Russia Federation No. 84-ФЗ dated 5 May, 2014 «On Specific Features of
Legal Regulation of Relations in the Area of Education in Connection with the Accession of Crimea
and Sevastopol to Russia and on the Formation of New Constituent Territories in the Russian
Federation – the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol» and amendments to the
Federal Law «On Education in the Russian Federation» http://www.rg.ru/2014/05/07/regulirovaniedok.
html
2 The Future Law to Impede the Development of Education in Crimea, 17 October, 2014 | RIA
News Agency http://law.edu.ru/news/news.asp?newsID=16414
15
The amendments mostly concern the following:
1) A change in admission quotas for state-subsidized education in HEIs
The federal law No. 84-ФЗ provided for additional admission quotas for
Crimean HEIs but at the same time, there is an order on the establishment of two
federal HEIs in Crimea and Sevastopol, the Crimean Federal University3 and the
Sevastopol State University.
«Earlier on, Crimean and Sevastopol authorities have established admission
quotas for all higher education institutions. Yet, as the rules of the game are
different at the federal level and the entry deadline expired, special admission
quotas were set for the next academic year. This means that the next year, the Russian
Ministry of Education and Science will set admission quotas without entry
competition,» explained Maksim Zhivaev, Director of the Department of Law of
the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation4.
2) The procedure for the final assessment of Crimean school graduates
The procedure for the final assessment of Crimean secondary school graduates
in 2015 will be the same as in 2014, i.e. they will take either the final examinations
or the Unified State Exam (USE). The procedure for admission to HEIs
for them will be prolonged for one year as well.
The authors of the basic law No. 84-ФЗ believed that the year of study
under Russian educational programs will help Crimean school graduates get prepared
for the USE. However, the gap between Russian and Ukrainian curriculums
is so great that it is impossible to overcome it within one year. Therefore, it was decided
to admit Crimean senior schoolchildren to higher education institutions of
Crimea and other regions by the simplified procedure, i.e. without the mandatory
USE. Several USE centers will be set up in Crimea — in Simferopol, Sevastopol,
Kerch and Feodosia.
Entry to Ukrainian HEIs
The recent letter of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine
No. 1/9-535 of 14 October, 2014 «On the Organization of Education in General
Education Institutions for Persons Living on the Temporarily Occupied Territory
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol and in Anti-Terrorist
Operation Areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk Regions»5 explains aspects of
3 The Crimean Federal University named after Vladimir Vernadsky is a Russian federal university
in Simferopol set up in 2014 on the basis of 7 HEIs and 7 research centers of Crimea. The Federal
University is established under the program of Crimea’s integration into the public, economic and
legal framework of the Russian Federation.
4 http://www.informio.ru/news/id7805/Budushii-zakon-ustranit-prepjatstvija-dlja-razvitijaobrazovanija-
v-Krymu
5 http://www.mon.gov.ua/ua/about-ministry/normative/2957-
16
further education and procedures for getting general education certificates issued
in the government-approved format.
The letter clearly states, «Education certificates issued by occupation organs
of the Russian Federation and self-proclaimed Crimean authorities are and will not
be recognized legal, nostrified or exchanged by the Ministry of Education and Science
of Ukraine, other Ukrainian authorities and foreign countries.
»
Hence, «Parents of students, first of all those in the final year of secondary
school who live on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and in the city of Sevastopol (…) are recommended to take measures enabling
their children to pass the External Independent Testing in spring 2015, receive
general education certificates issued in the government-approved format and enter
vocational schools and higher education institutions of Ukraine.
»
Under the Ukrainian legislation in force, «Senior schoolchildren, who live in
the above areas and are willing to receive general education certificates issued in the
government-approved format, have the right to continue education in Ukraine in all
forms (full-time, evening, online, education without attending classes, individual and
group education.»
The Ministry does not actually offer additional assistance to Ukrainian citizens
in Crimea and proposes them to become refugees in mainland Ukraine in
order to continue education.
On October 20, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine has
posted conditions for entrance to HEIs in 2015. It has to be mentioned that the
document does not provide privileges or, at least, recommendations for Crimean
school leavers. Besides, a Crimean Center is absent on the list of regional branches
of the Ukrainian Center for Educational Quality Assessment (CEQA) available
on its website (http://testportal.gov.ua). All other regions are included, even the
Donetsk and Luhansk ones. Specifically, according to the Ukrainian CEQA, the
Kherson CEQA is in the process of establishment (in connection with the liquidation
of the Simferopol CEQA). Only after that, its service areas will be redistributed.
Hence, for the time being, the informational and institutional capacities
are weak to ensure the exercise of the right to education of Ukrainians in Crimea.
17
§3 Entry to Higher Education Institutions for Crimean School Leavers
4. The State of Education
in Crimean Tatar in Crimea
in the 2014/2015 Academic Year
The development of the system of education in the Crimean Tatar language
has always been a serious challenge for Crimean Tatars. The education system of
Crimea has not properly secured the constitutional right to education in Crimean
Tatar. Factors adversely affecting the development of education in the Crimean
Tatar language incorporated:
■ Lack of pre-school institutions
■ Absence of modern and efficient facilities and equipment at schools
with instruction in Crimean Tatar
■ Underdeveloped Crimean Tatar terminology in various subjects (mathematics,
physics, biology and others), which complicated the development
of Crimean Tatar-language textbooks on technical and natural
sciences
■ Lack of technical school teachers teaching in Crimean Tatar
■ Lack of methodical materials and teaching aids in Crimean Tatar.
The above problems retained after the annexation and some of them even
deteriorated, e.g. the number of hours spent for the Crimean Tatar language and
literature. Specifically, before the beginning of the 2014/2015 academic year in
Crimea, the Maarifchi Association of Crimean Tatar Educators has pointed out
problems in the area of education in the Crimean Tatar language,6 «According to
regional data, the number of hours for the Crimean Tatar language and literature
at school with instruction in Russian is put in question because of problems with
the load of teachers and desires of parents.» This indicates that school heads have
chosen curriculums exclusive of hours to be spent for the learning of the native
language.
Teachers have stated, «At schools offering tuition in Russian, hours for the
Crimean Tatar language have to be allocated based on the regional and school
components, not less than 3 hours a week. The neglect of this rule will result in
conflicts between teachers of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages, parents
and school administration. At schools providing education in the Crimean
Tatar language and in classes with instruction in Crimean Tatar on the basis of
Russian-language schools, the problem with the load of teachers is not that acute.
However, to retain and increase the number of hours spent for the native language
6 http://qha.com.ua/v-shkolah-krima-sokraschayut-chasi-na-izuchenie-krimskotatarskogoyazika-
139442.html
18
in 5th-9th classes, schools with instruction in Crimean Tatar have to switch to a
six-day school week.»7
The new realities of educational institutions offering instruction in the
Crimean Tatar language are as follows:
In the 2014/2015 academic year, there are 31 groups (836 children) with the
Crimean Tatar language of upbringing and instruction in Crimea.
The largest number of such groups is reported in Simferopol (6 groups, 240
children), the Bakhchisarai (5 groups, 144 children), the Belgorod (5 groups, 113
children) and the Dzhankoi districts (5 groups, 105 children).
Groups with the Crimean Tatar language of instruction are absent in the
following cities: Alushta, Armyansk, Dzhankoi, Yevpatoriya, Kerch, Krasnoperekopsk,
Sudak, Feodosia and Yalta and districts: the Kirov, Krasnoperekopsk,
Razdolne, Saky and Chernomorsk.
For comparison, in the 2013/2014 academic year, there were 33 pre-school
groups for 820 children in Crimea. (This year, the number of groups has decreased
by 2, whereas that of children has increased by 16).
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN FIRST CLASSES
OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS BY DISTRICTS:
The largest number of first classes with instruction in Crimean Tatar is at
the secondary school No. 42 of Simferopol (5 classes, 110 schoolchildren); at
secondary schools of the cities of Bakhchisarai and Yevpatoriya, the Kirov and
Sovetske districts – by 2-3 classes (65-36 schoolchildren). The smallest number
of classes and schoolchildren is at the Sarybash secondary school of the first–
third level of the Pervomaisk district and the Annovsk secondary school of the
first level of the Belgorod district – by 1 class and 5 schoolchildren. In total, there
are 27 first classes for 534 schoolchildren that provide education in the Crimean
Tatar language.
In the 2014/2015 academic year, the number of first classes with instruction
in Crimean Tatar at Russian-language, bilingual and trilingual schools fluctuates
from 0 to 11 and averages 44 classes for 604 schoolchildren. The largest number
of first classes (11 classes, 129 schoolchildren) is recorded in the Kirov district,
the city of Simferopol (5 classes, 94 schoolchildren) and the Belgorod district (5
classes, 73 schoolchildren). Classes of this type are absent in the following cities:
Armyansk, Yevpatoriya, Kerch, Krasnoperekopsk, Saky, Yalta and districts: the
Bakhchisarai, Lenin and Nizhnegorsk.
7 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=690515057703430&id=100002348260
445&fref=nf
19
IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
In the 2014/2015 academic year, there are 15 schools (161 classes, 2,793
schoolchildren) with the Crimean Tatar language of teaching in Crimea. The
number of schools has not changed compared with the previous year, whereas that
of classes and schoolchildren has grown by 21 and 299 respectively (182 classes,
3,092 schoolchildren).
Besides, 170 classes for 2,182 schoolchildren offering tuition in Crimean
Tatar have opened on the basis of 47 Russian-language schools.
For comparison, in the 2013/2014 academic year, there were 20 bilingual
schools (Crimean Tatar and Russian, 68 classes, 679 schoolchildren), 27 trilingual
schools (Crimean Tatar, Russian and Ukrainian, 109 classes, 1281 schoolchildren)
and 1 Crimean Tatar-language school with Ukrainian-language classes
(40 classes, 809 schoolchildren). The number of Crimean Tatar-language
classes in 48 schools with instruction in different languages totaled 304 (2,769
schoolchildren).
It has to be mentioned that the number of classes and schoolchildren has
considerably decreased (down from the previous year by 134 classes and 587
schoolchildren).
In the 2014/2015 academic year, the number of schoolchildren taught
in Crimean Tatar (from the 1st to the 9th classes) totals 4,975 (331 classes).
In the 2013/2014 academic year, this indicator was higher by 576
and amounted to 5,551 schoolchildren.
In the 2013/2014 academic year, only 12,707 schoolchildren studied
the Crimean Tatar language (including 5,773 schoolchildren
studied it as a subject, 28 schoolchildren – advanced study and
6,906 schoolchildren – optional study). In the 2014/2015 academic
year, the number of schoolchildren has grown to 20,941
(including 12,461 schoolchildren who studied it as a subject, 241
schoolchildren – advanced study and 8,139 schoolchildren – optional
study).
According to the «Curriculum Sample for Educational Institutions of the
Republic of Crimea with Instruction in the Native (non-Russian) Language
(Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar)», the number of hours spent for the native language
and Russian is the same in the 4th class, whereas in the 5th class, the difference
in the number of hours for the Russian and non-Russian language and
literature doubles8.
8 Methodical recommendations for the teaching the Crimean Tatar language and literature
in general secondary institutions of the Republic of Crimea for the 2014/2015 academic year
(Annex 3)
20
CURRICULUM SAMPLE
FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
WITH INSTRUCTION IN THE NATIVE (NON-RUSSIAN) LANGUAGE
BASIC GENERAL EDUCATION
School subjects
Number of hours per week
Total
V VI VII VIII IX
Russian language 5 5 3 2 2 17
Literature 2 2 2 2 3 11
Native (non-
Russian) language and
literature
3 3 3 3 3 15
There are problems with the learning of the native language in upper school
classes.
The difference in the education systems also indicates a possible deterioration
of problems of education in the Crimean Tatar language.
21
§4 The State of Education in Crimean Tatar in Crimea in the 2014/2015 Academic Year
5. The Situation in Education
in Respect of the Right to Teaching
in or of the Native
(Non-Ukrainian) Language
Paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 11
April, 2014 reads, «Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar shall be the national
languages in the Republic of Crimea» (although the text of the Constitution of the republic
of Crimea in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar is not available on official Crimean
websites). «The Republic of Crimea shall recognize the principle of diversity of
cultures, ensure their equal development and mutual enrichment» (Paragraph 3,
Article 10) and «The Republic of Crimea shall create and provide equal conditions
for the preservation and development of all ethnic cultures» (Paragraph 4,
Article 37). Paragraph 2, Article 19 of the Constitution governs, «Everyone shall
have the right to use his/her native language and to freely choose the language of
communication, teaching, education and creation.»
Yet, since the very beginning of annexation, central and local Crimean authorities
have created conditions incompatible with the declared principles.
The problem of choosing
the language of instruction
Despite the fact that the ethnic composition of Crimea’s population remained
the same, the transition to the Russian system of education has entailed
changes in curriculums and the number of hours for the learning of the native
language (it has to be reminded that under the 2001 Census, 24.3% of Crimeans
identified themselves as Ukrainians, while 10.1% recognized Ukrainian as their
mother tongue). Hence, the need for teaching in and of the native language is still
acute.
Education has become one of the main areas of total ousting of Ukrainian
from the use. There are numerous examples of repressions and defamation
against school teachers of Ukrainian language and literature,
which eventually made them quit and leave Crimea or seek another job.
Pressure was also put on children taught in Ukrainian. Almost 80% of
them were forced to leave Crimea and enter educational institutions in
other Ukrainian regions.
22
A number of legal documents have been adopted to ensure the observance
of constitutional principles. Specifically, the Letter of the Ministry of Education,
Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea No. 01-14/382 «On the Choice of the
Language of Instruction» dated 25 June, 2014 aims to ensure the right to education
in the native language and explains the mechanism of formation of classes with
the national (Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian) and native languages of tuition based
on the 25 October, 1991 Federal Law No. 1807-1 «On Languages of Peoples of the
Russian Federation» (amended) and Article 11 of the 29 December, 2012 Federal
Law No. 273-ФЗ «On Education in the Russian Federation».
The Letter emphasizes, «Of special note is the task to ensure the free, voluntary
and conscious choice of a language of teaching and learning by parents…
The choice shall be confirmed by parents’ written applications. Officials and employees
of educational authorities and institutions shall impact the choice of the
language of education on no pretext (convenience for a school/class; absence of
opportunities to ensure this choice; absence of experienced teachers, etc.).
However in practice, Crimean authorities created the atmosphere of
Ukrainophobia and intolerance to Ukrainian identity over the past months (since
February 2014), which, in turn, has influenced the choice of the language of
instruction.
According to parents, most of them felt uncomfortable and failed to
file the said applications. Some parents have reported special community
meetings held by school masters to dissuade them from writing applications
and saying, «The study of Ukrainian is a waste of time for
your children. The knowledge of Ukrainian will not increase but reduce
their opportunities to enter HEIs and is therefore absolutely useless for
employment.»
The problem of teachers of Ukrainian
language and literature
Taking into account a sharp decrease in the number of hours to learn the
Ukrainian language and literature and a decrease in the number of teachers, the
Crimean education system has faced the problem of retraining of many of them.
They were proposed:
■ Take short-term retraining courses for teaching the Russian language
and literature and further on-site and off-site training on the basis of the
Crimean Republican Institute of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education
(CRIPPE) for 10 months
23
■ Under the 29 August, 2014 order the Ministry of Education of the Republic
of Crimea No. 132, 276 teachers of Ukrainian language and literature
have been sent for retraining in «Philology, Russian Language
and Literature» for 10 months (the CRIPPE instruction No.8 of 1 September,
2014 «On Enrollment»).
The problem of curriculums,
textbooks and teaching aids
The attitude to Ukrainian textbooks on Ukrainian language and literature
and other subjects has become indicative in the context of perception of the
Ukrainian culture, language and literature.
As reported by school teachers, despite the oral permission to use
Ukrainian textbooks in case of a shortage of Russian ones, in early September,
representatives of the Ministry of Education and regional education
authorities have raided Crimean schools to confiscate Ukrainian
textbooks and punish teachers for their use. All Ukrainian textbooks
were confiscated and brought to basements. Only on 10 November, the
Ministry of Education of Crimea has passed the resolution No. 265 on the
transfer of Ukrainian textbooks to educational institutions of the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.
The teachers have also reported the closure of some educational programs,
e.g. the Ukraine’s Intellect for the elementary school developed by Kharkiv experts.
Conversely, the Recommendations for the Development of the Ukrainian
Language and Ukrainian Literature Curriculums and the «Curriculum Sample
for Educational Institutions of the Republic of Crimea for the Ukrainian Language
in the 5th-9th Classes at Russian-Language Schools» are designed to ensure
Ukrainian symbols are actually prohibited in educational establishments.
Such massive Ukrainophobia and information propaganda have resulted in intolerance
of children to Ukrainian symbols (at a children drawing contest, there
have been examples when children refused to draw the Ukrainian national flag
«because there is no such country as Ukraine»).
As of now, there are no complete statistical data on the number of classes
and children who study in Ukrainian or learn the Ukrainian language and literature.
The teachers say that at many schools, only one hour per week is allocated
for the study of Ukrainian language and literature (optional study, by 5-6 schoolchildren);
and only in Ukrainian-languages classes, 3 hours are allocated for this
purpose. A group of teachers has been formed to develop adaptive textbooks.
24
the study of Ukrainian. On their basis, every teacher has to develop an individual
program for every class.
The absence of protection of the right
to education in Ukrainian in educational
decisions and documents
The recent decisions of Crimean authorities are indicative in respect of the
Ukrainian culture, language and literature. Specifically, on 23 October, 2014, the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea has passed the resolution No. 235 on
measures to restore historical justice and ensure the political, social and spiritual revival
of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples disadvantaged
by illegal deportation and political repressions on ethnic and other grounds.
The State Program on «Preservation, Learning and Development of Languages of
Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German Peoples for 2015-2020»
has been submitted for discussion. Among other things, the Program «shall provide
legislative and organizational conditions for education in minority languages on a
non-discriminatory basis; and expand opportunities to meet the needs of every human
being for the study of the native language.» Another positive aspect is the task
«to exercise the constitutional right to afordable and free pre-school, elementary
and secondary education in Crimean Tatar».
Yet, no document ensuring the right to education in Ukrainian has been
developed and adopted. Perhaps it is because the Program’s expected results
are as follows, «the share of citizens in the population of the Russian Federation
residing in Crimea who positively assess the state of inter-ethnic relation
is 85%, while the level of tolerant attitude to citizens who speak their mother
tongue is 95%.»
25
§5 The Situation in Education in Respect of the Right to Teaching in or of the Native (Non-Ukrainian) Language
6. Specific Features
of Educational Work in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea
In December 2014, two new documents have been issued to promote the
development of education and training in Crimea, the decree of the Head of the
Republic No. 522-У «On the Approval of the Concept of Patriotic, Spiritual and
Moral Education of the Population of the Republic of Crimea» of 18 December and
the resolution of the Crimean Council of Ministers No. 651 «On the Approval of
the State Program for the Development of Education and Science in the Republic of
Crimea for 2015-2017»9 of 30 December prioritizing, among other things, «military
and patriotic upbringing of the students».
Meanwhile, no Program Section is dedicated to the access to education
in minority languages or, at least, the exercise of the right to learn them. There
are no statistical data on the language of instruction or other characteristics of
the existing educational institutions of Crimea. Only the beginning of Section 1
reads, «The state provides constitutional guarantees and rights to education in the
Russian language, implements comprehensive measures for the retention and development
of a network of classes and schools offering tuition in the native (Ukrainian
and Crimean Tatar) languages, including maintenance of their facilities and
equipment.»
The authors of the Concept stress, «The Concept is based on the all-Russian
principles of and methodological approaches to the patriotic upbringing and
education.» «It has to ensure the implementation of the state patriotic education
policy in the Republic of Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation by means
of accelerated bridging of a historical gap between the Russian and local education
system regarding ideology and methodology.
»
Section 2 is dedicated to the historical substantiation of Crimea’s annexation
that shapes the directions of patriotic education, the main one of which is
«to improve military and patriotic upbringing and enhance the motivation for
military service, provide citizens of the Republic of Crimea with knowledge of its
fundamentals; form the understanding of citizens’ place and role in their service
to Motherland, high personal responsibility for the fulfillment of military service
requirements, the need to acquire skills and abilities needed to serve in the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation, other military formations (perhaps, this implies
Crimean Self-Defense units?) and bodies on the territory of the Republic of
Crimea.»
9 http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_238010.pdf
26
The Concept also declares the need «to shape racial, ethnic and religious
tolerance and to preserve ethnic identity, tolerant attitude to the language of communication,
nationality and religion as well as tolerant attitude to languages, cultures
and traditions of Russian peoples» but that is all.
It is possible to state that the Concept has actually prioritized the education
directions gradually promoted within the first months of the 2014/2015 academic
year based on the need to shape a «defense ideology» by increasing the number
of educational actions for combating extremism and terrorism. Terrorism is seen
everywhere but there are contractions described in relevant paragraphs of schoolbooks
(!!) (e. g., L. Bogoliubov and others, Social Science, textbook for the 10th
class, Basic Level, M., 2014. P. 351; Paragraph 9 is fully dedicated to the global
threat of international terrorism; history textbooks for 9 and 11 classes also depict
terrorism and the search of enemies).
The (legal) rules have toughened. Teachers report a trend towards «ousting
» the Ukrainian language and culture, celebrating new holidays and adopting
formalities. According to a class master, «Other people’s work style and holidays are
being forcibly imposed.» Specifically, the following holidays have to be celebrated
together with children: the Russian Constitution Day, the Unknown Soldier Remembrance
Day, the Day against Terrorism and Drugs, the Day of the Heroes
of the Fatherland and the Day of Russian Elections (each holiday is established
by a separate decree). Names of some clubs and optional courses draw attention
as well, «I Am a Russian Citizen» or «Russian Action-Oriented Games».10 (Examples
In the opinion of class masters, «The number of actions has increased by
many times. It all comes to «runaround replies». The real education is absent.»
In particular, in November 2014, a Simferopol school held elections of a school
president. Children told teachers that a candidacy of an «elected» boy had been
approved long before and that elections were just a formality. «Elections were held
just to confirm that all formalities were observed.» This is how the respect for
democratic control procedures is instilled in Crimean children.
According to teachers, most educational activities are handed down. It has
become impossible to work on a specific problem at schools. The conduct of educational
actions is ordered by authorities.
Schoolchildren cite other examples of enhanced military and patriotic education
through actions against terrorism and extremism. They say that it is partly
good and partly bad.
As reported by teachers, some students (about 30%) are fond of Russian
history and take an interest in it. Other 10% are interested in nothing, whereas the
10 http://chauka.krimedu.com/ru/site/extra-curricular -activities.html
27
.10 of some contests are given in below.)
rest 60% learn what they are taught. Data of the 15 November municipal (district)
Academic Competition in history demonstrate that there were no prize winners
among students of 10th-11th classes of the Simferopol district. In other words, no
one got even 50% of grades because it is difficult for schoolchildren to learn Russian
history. The Social Science course (taught from the 6 class) is perceived better
than history because it raises socially important issues, which are interesting
for children.
Teachers also emphasize severe bureaucratic procedures of attestation of
academic staff. They have to collect their own «portfolio». If a teacher fails to be
attested, he/she is placed at the lowest level, not a level down. So, teachers refuse
to attest for the first category. They have to take part in webinars, create personal
websites, teach online lessons, carry out extra-curricular activities etc. All these
are regulated by relevant decrees and legal documents establishing grades for each
type of activity.
New contests are announced actually each day: on the law, on the war, on
history and others. Some of them are free, whereas others are for money. Students
unwillingly participate even in free ones. Teachers have to force them as their bonuses
depend on these contests.
Hence, teachers’ sentiments are changing. Many of them start understanding
this «throwback» of education. One pro-Russian deputy head teacher said
that the Ukrainian education system was freer. Yet, this changes little.
Examples of some contests
1.
The Education Department of the Simferopol District State Administration
02 December, 2014, Simferopol
No. 2945
To the attention of the leadership of comprehensive educational institutions
The Education Department of the Simferopol District State Administration
informs the following: According to the letter of the Crimean Prosecutor
General’s Office No. І-21-4778-14/11538 dated 17 November, 2014 and with
the purpose of propagating and promoting healthy living among the students,
we recommend organizing and holding the children drawing contests on «Control
of Drugs and Alcohol» and «Combating Extremism and Terrorism in educational
institutions.
Until 15 December, 2014, a registrar of the Education Department shall
be presented electronically with information on relevant actions (materials and
drawings’ photos).
28
in the Republic of Crimea
2.
The contest aims to shape patriotic views, ideals and respect for Crimea’s
historical and cultural past and present. The contest shall: help the students show
their worth in literature, expand creative potential, social activity and civic responsibility
by means of creative writing.
Organizers: the Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature,
the Crimean Republican Institute of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education
29
§6 Specific Features of Educational Work in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
The announcement of the «Crimean Spring» Patriotic Poetry Republican
Contest
Deadline: 1 March, 2015.
under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic
if Crimea.
Timeframe: 15 December, 2014 – 1 March, 2015.
Creative educators, educational workers, teachers, methodologists, teachers
of Russian language and literature are invited to take part in the contest.
Participants in the contest are offered the opportunity to assay their abilities in
writing essays on Motherland, Crimea’s return to Russia and the most sacred human
values – homeland and patriotism.
Participants are asked to send their applications and works on data storage
devices (CD or DVD) at the following address: the Crimean Republican Institute
of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education, 15 Lenin Street, Simferopol, 95001 or
email them at: [email protected].
7. The transition from the twelve- to fivepoint
grading scale in Crimea
After the illegal annexation of Crimea, numerous efforts have been made
to transform the Ukrainian system of education in accordance with the Russian
rules. Specifically, Crimean schools have actually shifted to the Russian educational
standards from 1 September, 2014 in compliance with the federal laws No.
84-ФЗ «On Specific Features of Legal Regulation of Relations in the Area of
Education in Connection with the Accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia
and on the Formation of New Constituent Territories in the Russian Federation
– the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol» and amendments
to the Federal Law «On Education in the Russian Federation» dated 5
May, 2014.11
«Starting from the new academic year, Crimea will definitely adopt the
Russian standards, including the five-point grading scale,»12 said Natalia Goncharova,
Minister of Education in the self-proclaimed Crimea government.
On his visit to the Simferopol Special Secondary Boarding School No. 2
on 1 September, Head of the Republic Sergey Aksenov stated that the five-point
grading scale «will help more efficiently evaluate academic progress of school
students»13 compared with the previous 12-point system. «In our case, the Soviet
five-point system seems to be more efficient,» he added.
In the Russian Federation, the five-point grading system has not changed
since the USSR. In the Soviet Union, this system was introduced by the Ministry
of Education in 1937. Annexed Crimea has transited to the five-point grading
scale at schools on an instantaneous basis14:
Ukraine Russia
«10», «11», «12» «5»
«9», «8», «7» «4»
«6», «5», «4» «3»
«3», «2», «1» «unsatisfactory»
11 The Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol: Integration of the System of Education and
Science: http://минобрнауки.рф/новости/4092
12 Crimean School Students to Return to the Five-Point Grading Scale: http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/
news/116511/
13 Aksenov Welcomes the Five-Point Grading System in Crimea, News of Crimea, Crimean News
Agency, 1 August, 2014: http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/9/1/aksenov-rad-chto-v-krymubudet-
pyatibalnoe-otsenivanie-znanii-20514/
14 Based on the letter of the International Department of the Ministry of Education and Science
of the Russian Federation No. 16-11204 dated 4 September, 2013
30
After a few months experience of transiting from the 12- to 5-point grading
system, it is possible to state that the attitude to it is ambiguous. By the way,
the 100-point grading scale applied at the EIT is discordant to the five-point
system.
According to an interview with Crimean teachers, it is possible to conclude
that the shift to the Soviet grading system has adversely affected the educational
process. It is because, say, Russian «3» («satisfactory») actually equates those who
were below their schoolfellows in class and mediocre students. By the way, educators
of Russia, where the academic grading at schools has not been reformed since
the USSR, put forward similar arguments.
Many head teachers attempt to press students for «2» («unsatisfactory») as
academic term grades because under the Russian law, «2» for a subject means the
retaking of an exam in fall (several «2s» mean that a student will be held back).
Under the 12-point grading system, all the grades were recognized and no students
were held back. Teachers say that they are «closed» within the three grades,
«3», «4» and «5».
Although children easily accommodate to changes, they are ambiguous
about the above process. Most respondents say that the transition was difficult
because of a misunderstanding and strangeness of the «limited» grading system.
Yet, some pollsters emphasized the insignificance of this change.
The major disadvantage of the new system is its «lesser flexibility». In other
words, the transition to the five-point system turned «7», «8» and «9» into «4»
(«good» grade). Schoolchildren take this ill because no difference is made between
those «good» and «middling» students. However, all who got «7» are turning
into mediocre students.
In general, the return to the five-point grading scale is a step back in the
process of historical development the educational system. The so-called Soviet
system is not in line with the Bologna process, which aims to develop a European
higher education area by making academic qualifications and quality assurance
standards more comparable and compatible. Hence, the return to the five-point
grading scale complicates the integration of Crimean students into a European
higher education area.
It has to be stated that this seemingly insignificant step, the change of
the grading system, actually poses a lot of problems. The shift from the 12- to
5-point grading scale is negative because it restricts not only flexibility of the
grading system, thus creating additional difficulties for teachers and students but
also opportunities of Crimean school graduates for choosing HEIs for further
education.
31
8. The situation in the area of education
regarding instruction in Ukrainian and some
aspects of educational work in Crimea
At the beginning of the 2014/2015 academic year, there were 4 out of 7
schools with instruction in Ukrainian, whereas in January 2015, only one school
remained (in Yalta). The number of students who study in Ukrainian is 1,990 persons
or 1.2% of the total number of schoolchildren (184,869, of whom 4,895 students
study in Crimean Tatar, 1,990 students are instructed in Ukrainian, whereas
the rest of 177,984 students of 576 Crimean schools study in Russian).
Data on the number of classes are concealed. In October, Natalia Goncharova,
Minister of Education in the self-proclaimed Crimea government, stated,
«There are classes with tuition in Ukrainian in 20 Crimean schools.» Yet, these
speculations contradict the reality. The «Ukrainian language» subject is studied
only as an optional course. It means that after lessons, students take a 45-minute
rest break and then take additional (optional) course, if their parent filed relevant
applications. At the majority of Crimean schools, only 2 hours are allocated for
the study of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar instead 3 hours guaranteed by the law
(Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, Article 14 (Language of
Education and Learning) of the Russian Federal Law No. 273 «On Education» of
29 December, 2012). Needless to say, such organization of the study of languages
can hardly be called effective and adequate to language needs.
Only 33 students from different classes and schools took part in the Ukrainian
language and literature Academic Competition in January 2015, which indicates
a sharp reduction in the number of schoolchildren who lean Ukrainian
(data are given for the Simferopol district – see Annex 1).
It will be possible to get some statistical data on the number of students
learning Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar after processing information on the number
of applicants for State Final Certification in the Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar
language. Relevant data are to be collected in accordance with the letter by the
Ministry of Education and Science of Crimea No. 01-43-01/03 dated 14 January,
2015 (see Annexes 2, 3, 4).
It has to be noted that the CRIPPE website asks the question «Do
you believe the study of Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar to be mandatory for
Crimean students regardless of their desire?» to be answered «Yes» or «No»
(http://www.krippo.ru/component/acepolls/poll/2-2015-02-02-12-44-57). As
of 8 February, 2015, 1,467 users answered «yes» and 473 users answered «no» out
of 1,940 visitors. The above question demonstrates that authorities are studying
32
I
the attitude to trilingualism stated in the Crimean Constitution. Yet in practice,
everything is different.
The animosity towards Ukrainian language and culture, xenophobia and
intolerance towards Ukraine and Ukrainians is currently growing, ranging from
the open position of CRIPPE educators «No hours should be given to teachers of
Ukrainian language or social science. They are our ideological enemies!» to their
strong anti-Ukrainian propaganda in educational institutions.
In this respect, of special note is the letter No. 868/01-04 of 13 November,
2014 of the CRIPPE Rector recommending the leadership of educational authorities
to include into the school curriculum a xenophobic piece of poetry of
doubtful artistic value (see Annex 5).
Such mass propaganda has already given results. At the January 15 Academic
Competitions, there were many essays on history of students of the 10th-
11th classes with phrases like «we have always been insulted but we will retaliate»,
«the West is our enemy», «our great Motherland, our people» and «Russians,
Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews suffered in the Great Patriotic War but Slavs
suffered most».
The same mass propaganda of xenophobia and intolerance is conducted
among teachers. In particular, on 3 February, 2015, the CRIPPE has held a meeting
with Maksim Grigoriev, Doctor of Political Science, member of the Civic
Chamber Council from the Novgorod region, Director of the Non-Commercial
Foundation for Democracy Studies, who made a video presentation of the book
«Military Crimes of Ukrainian Militants: Tortures and Inhuman Treatment of
Donbas Residents».
All of this adversely impacted inter-ethnic relations on the peninsula and
created foundations for conflicts and intolerance towards different ethnic and
language groups.
33
The results of the Ukrainian language and literature Academic
Competition in the 2014/2015 academic year
No. School 7 class 8 class 9 class 10 class 11 class Points,
Points Place Points Place Points Place Points Place Points Place total Place
1. Vinnitskaya 0 35
2. State school No. 1 27,5 3 16,5 23 6
3. Gvardeisk Educational
College
- -
4. Gvardeisk Educational
College No. 3
13 14 13,5 13
5. Dobrovske
Educational College
8,5 12 21 54 1 27 3
6. Donsk 30 2 21 13 23 6
7. Denisovka 0 35
8. Zhuravlevka 0 35
9. Kolchugino No. 1 22 22 7
10. Kolchugino No. 2 11,5 11,5 15
11. Konstantinovka 0 35
12. Kubanka 24 3 25 5
13. Mazanka 10 12,5 9 17 13 12,3 14
14. Malenka 0 35
15. Mirnovo No. 1 - -
16. Mirnovo No. 2 0 35
17. Molodezhnensk No. 1 30 2 32 1
18. Molodezhnensk No. 2 25 3 26 4
Annex 1
Annexes
34
19. Nikolaevka 18,5 18,5 10
20. Novoandreevka - -
21. Novoselovo 25 3 20 23,5 6
22. Partizanka 0 35
23. Perovsk Educational
College
0 35
24. Pervomaisk 16 16 11
25. Pozharsk 0 35
26. Perevalnoe 20 20 9
27. Rodnikovsk
Educational College
9,5 14 3 16 4 9,3 16
28. Skvortsovo 13 12 24,5 3 7,5 15 12
29. Teplovsk 0 35
30. Trudovsk 25 3 26 4
31. Ukromnovo - -
32. Urozhainoe 16 13 19 16 11
33. Chaikinsk 24 3 24 3 9 21 8
34. Chistensk Educational
College 36/202 22 3 29 2
35. Shirokovsk - -
36. Ukrainsk 12 2 7 17
37. Zalessk 0 35
38. Krasnoselsk 0 35
39. Klenovsk 20 20 9
Methodologist of the Children’s and Youth Activity Center A. N. Kostikova
Award panel: G. I. Sakharchuk, N. N. Saltykova, T. T. Slonimska, S. Y. Varfolomyeyeva,
M. S. Lysenko, E. V. Ustinova
35
Annex 2.
Letter by the Ministry of Education and Science of Crimea
No. 01-43-01/03 dated 14 January, 2015
The letter of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of
Crimea No. 01-43-01/03 «On Clarification of Some Aspects of Registration for
the State Final Certification» dated 14 January, 2015 is forwarded to Directors of
municipal budgetary general education institution for reading and submission of
information to the Children’s and Youth Activity Center, Room 5.
A form of application for the state final certification (Annex 1) and information
on the number of 2014/2015 school graduates (Annex 2) shall be submitted
until 30 January, 2015.
Information on each individual subject shall be confirmed on paper and
emailed to:
• Crimean Tatar language and literature – A. I. Rustemova
([email protected]);
• Ukrainian language and literature – A. N. Kostikova
([email protected])
36
Annex 3.
A form of application for the state final certification
in the native language and literature
Chairman State Examination
Commission of the Republic of Crimea
N. G. Goncharova
Application
I,
(Surname)
(Name)
(Patronymic)
Contact number:
Date of birth: . .
Day/month/year
Identification document ______________________________________________
(Document name)
Series: Number:
Gender: Male Female
Ask to register me for the State Final Certification in the native language from among
languages of peoples of the Russian Federation and literature of peoples of the Russian
Federation in the native language from among languages of peoples of the Russian
Federation
Native language (_____________________________________)
Indicate the subject name
Native literature (_____________________________________)
Indicate the subject name
Consent to personal data processing is enclosed.
Applicant’s signature ______________/__________________________________
(Full name))
«____»___________ 2015
Application accepted by: _____________ / _______________________________
(Signature) (Full name)
Date «____»___________2015 г.
Registration Number _________________________
37
Annex 4.
Information on the number of 2014/2015 school graduates
who applied for the State Final Certifi cation in the native
language and literature
City/district __________________________________________________
Subject name _________________________________________________
№ Name of educatioal institution Graduate’s full name
38
Annex 5. Letter No. 868/01-04 of 13 November, 2014 by the CRIPPE
Rector recommending the leadership of educational authorities to include into the
school curriculum a xenophobic piece of poetry of doubtful artistic value
39
40
Annex 945
Crimea Human Rights Field Mission - Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (April 2015)

1
CrimeanHumanRightsFieldMission
Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea
(April 2015)
Analytical review
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of contents ..................................................................................................................................... 1
і. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 3
іi. Problems of the residents of Crimea ...................................................................................................... 5
2.1. Civil and political rights ...................................................................................................................... 5
Right to life ......................................................................................................................................... 5
The Karachevsky case ...................................................................................................................... 5
Prohibition of torture............................................................................................................................ 7
The Kostenko case ........................................................................................................................... 7
Right to liberty and security of person ................................................................................................... 9
Disappearances ................................................................................................................................ 9
Detentions, arrests, searches ........................................................................................................... 10
Searches in the Kostenko case ...................................................................................................... 11
Detentions in the 26 February case ................................................................................................ 12
Searches and detentions in the Hizb ut-Tahrir case ......................................................................... 13
Other detentions and assaults ....................................................................................................... 13
Freedom of speech and expression ...................................................................................................... 13
‘Struggle with extremism’ and restrictions of freedom of expression and freedom of speech ................ 16
Freedom of peaceful assembly ............................................................................................................ 17
Episode with students filming a clip in support of ATR ....................................................................... 17
Action by “Protect Sevastopol” movement......................................................................................... 18
Action in Alushta ............................................................................................................................. 18
Freedom of association ....................................................................................................................... 18
Freedom of conscience and religion ..................................................................................................... 19
2
Freedom of movement ........................................................................................................................ 20
Right to a fair trial and an effective remedy .......................................................................................... 21
The Sentsov case ............................................................................................................................ 21
The Kolchenko case ......................................................................................................................... 22
The Chirnii case .............................................................................................................................. 22
The 'Crimean self-defence' .................................................................................................................. 23
Citizenship-related issues .................................................................................................................... 24
2.2. Social and economic rights ............................................................................................................... 25
Property rights ................................................................................................................................... 25
Involvement of the ‘Crimean self-defence’ in violations of property rights ........................................... 25
iii. Problems of the Crimean residents who were forced to leave the peninsula and move to mainland Ukraine
(internally displaced persons) .................................................................................................................. 27
General situation ................................................................................................................................ 27
Additional materials ................................................................................................................................ 27
Monitoring of Crimea entry/exit points ................................................................................................. 27
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................ 32
3
І. INTRODUCTION
This monitoring review has been prepared by the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission based on
the materials collected by the Mission in April 2015 during its work in Crimea, as well as in Russia
and Ukraine.
The Crimean Field Mission (“the CFM”) commenced its work on 5 March 2014.
The goals of the Mission are as follows:
􀁸 providing information about the developments in Crimea;
􀁸 reducing the level of threat to all parties to the conflict;
􀁸 maintaining a proper legal environment in the region, strengthening and promoting human
rights standards and efficient protection mechanisms through the situation monitoring and
verification of incoming messages about human rights violations;
􀁸 providing comprehensive assistance to the initiatives related to human rights protection
towards all participants of the conflict.
Emphasizing that human rights are a direct and legitimate concern of the international civil society
and implementing the above-mentioned goals, the Mission:
􀁸 performs monitoring of the general situation concerning observance of international
humanitarian law and fundamental human rights in the territory of Crimea, as well as
of the issues related to protecting human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, and public
figures and ensuring their professional activities;
􀁸 pays special attention to the monitoring of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations;
􀁸 observes the activities of law enforcement bodies and public authorities;
􀁸 urges all the parties involved in the stand-offto abide by the rules of international
humanitarian law and the human rights commitments, and calls on international
intergovernmental organizations and their members and participants to supervise the
compliance with the commitments.
In its activities, the Mission is guided by the principles of absolute forbearance of violenсe and
discriminatory practices and is committed to political neutrality and adherence to law.
The conclusions in this paper are based on results of the first-hand information collection
(observation of the situation and developments in Crimea, interviews with members of key target
groups), mass media monitoring, analysis of developments and legal framework, and official
statistics.
The review is prepared on a monthly basis and includes sections dealing with the situation with
civil, political and socio-economic rights in Crimea and also covers the status of vulnerable groups
and xenophobic manifestations in the peninsula.
Besides, the review features the problems faced by the Crimean residents who had to leave the
peninsula and move to Ukraine’s mainland (involuntarily relocating persons).
4
The CFM extends its gratitude to everyone who assisted with the preparation of the present
review.
The monitoring review was prepared with support from the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
of Switzerland and the Democratization and Human Rights in UkraineProject implemented by the
United Nations Development Programme in Ukraine and financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Denmark.
The opinions, stands and assessments contained in this report do not necessarily represent the
stand of the United Nations Development Programme, other UN agencies, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Denmark, or the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland.
5
ІI. PROBLEMS OF THE RESIDENTS OF CRIMEA
2.1. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
RIGHT TO LIFE
THE KARACHEVSKY CASE
In the context of the right to life, questions arise to the investigation of the murder of Ukrainian
Navy Major Stanislav Karachevsky.
He was murdered on 6 April 2014 by a RF military serviceman. The murder occurred in Crimea, in
Novofedorovka urban-type settlement, in the dormitory where Ukrainian military personnel was
quartered before departure for mainland Ukraine.
The murder charge was served to Yevgenii Zaitsev, Junior Sergeant of the Russian Armed Forces,
and on 13 March 2015, the Crimean garrison military court, chaired by R.A. Zubairov, convicted
Yevgenii Zaitsev fora murder committed in excess of the measures needed for the detention of a
person having committed a crime, i.e. for a crime envisaged by part 2 of Art. 108 RF Criminal
Code, and awarded him a punishment in the form of imprisonment for 2 (two) yearsto be served in
a penal settlement.
A civil suit filed by complainant Olha Karachevska, murdered major’s wife, formoral damage
compensation in the amount of 50,000,000 (fifty million) roubles was compiled with in part. The
court ruled to collect 500,000 (fifty thousand) roubles from military unit No. 45764 in Olha
Karachevska’s favour but to deny payment of the rest, i.e. 49,500,000 (forty-nine million five
hundred thousand) roubles. The obligation to pay the awarded sum is assigned to the Financial
Provision Department of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence in Krasnodar Krai (Appendix
1).
On 23 March 2015, Olha Karachevska lodged an appeal to the judicial division for criminal cases of
North Caucasus district military court, indicating that the court’s findings as presented in the verdict
did not correspond to factual circumstances of the case established by the first-instance court.
Besides, the appeal mentioned a violation of the legislation on criminal procedure, namely the court
groundlessly rejected some items of evidence while taking other ones, and wrongly applied a
criminal law by mistakenly qualifying Ye. Zaitsev’s actions under part 2 of Art. 108 RF CC, which
resulted in a groundless and unfair verdict imposing thereon a punishment that does not
correspond to the gravity of the offence he had committed.
Based on the above, injured Olha Karachevska asks to “quash the verdict delivered by the Crimean
garrison military court on 13 March 2015 concerning Ye. Zaitsev, deliver a verdict of guilty,
qualifying his actions under part 1 of Art. 105 RF CC, change the amount of compensation for
moral damage towards substantial increase” (Appendix 2 ).
The defence team has questions as to selectivity of testimonial evidence recorded in the protocol
and stating that Maj. Karachevsky is a criminal who attacked the RF Armed Forces checkpoint while
Ye. Zaitsev’s actions aimed to detain him. Meanwhile, in the defence’s opinion, the question about
the involvement and role in the incident of Ye. Zaitsev’s fellow servicemen, viewed as witnesses, is
6
not considered. In the defence’s opinion, no proper attention was paid to the versions assuming
that the clash had occurred in the context of the conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian
military servicemen while the incident itself can be regarded as the Russian servicemen’s armed
assault on the Ukrainian ones that the latter tried to avoid by hiding in their house.
The court admits that S. Karachevsky had no weapons, that “he was pursued by several persons,
with a duty unit military serviceman running inclose proximity to him”, that “it was possible to
detain Karachevsky in some other way, without causing him severe bodily injuries that resulted in
death”, that “the accused’s having caused death to Karachevsky is manifestly not proportionate to
the character and degree of the public danger of the action believed by the accused to have been
committed by the detainee and to circumstances of detention, and that a manifestly excessive
harm, not justified by the situation, was caused to the injured without any need”.
At the same time, some materials in the case reproduced in the verdict, according to the defence,
indicate that the pursuers aimed not simply to detain the “disturbers” but, instead, to cause as
much physical harm as possible to the unarmed Ukrainian military servicemen. For example, it can
be concluded from the testimony by witness Khanmirzaev and the expert opinion dated 19 May
2014 that Stanislav Karachevsky was dying for several minutes, “a short period of time, amounting
to minutes, passed until the moment of death”, and “anemia of brain and internals” was “a direct
cause of death”. Meanwhile, none of the pursuers tried to render medical aid. Ramazanov ordered
Khanmirzaev to guard Karachevsky and proceeded to chase another pursued Ukrainian military
serviceman. What happened to the pursued one was also not mentioned in the verdict but he is a
direct participant of the events, a witness and, perhaps, an injured, and circumstances of the
incident remain incomplete for the court without his testimony. Media wrote that he was an officer
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Capt. Artem Yermolaenko, and he was “brutally beaten and
arrested by the RF soldiers”1.
The verdict does not mention what official relations are between the suspect and the witnesses and
how it affected the course of events – in particular, on what grounds witness Ramazanov gave
orders to others, including the order to guard dying Karachevsky. It has not been established
whether he was superior in rank or position, whether Ye. Zaitsev followed him and executed his
commands or acting on his own initiative.
For example, according to testimonial evidence, there was no command to pursue and detain S.
Karachevsky and two other persons mentioned in thetestimony who were running away. Moreover,
the testimony states that first shots occurred at the checkpoint and were fired by on-duty Karniak
and Semionov while Ramazanov testifies that once Kuteinikov, responsible for security of the
military unit facilities, came out to the attackers, “the disturbers started running away to their
dormitory”. Thus, it remains unclear what was the reason for the actually entire unit on duty,
having no command or order, to rush to pursue the disturbers. All the military servicemen
unanimously state that they “followed their fellow servicemen, believing that they did not hear the
unit commander’s order about the detention”.
1http://news.berdyansk.net/news/15595-pogib-mayor-stanislav-karachevskiy.html
7
The verdict does not mention establishment of the circumstances of the sixth shot fired in the
dormitory building. It is seen from the testimonial evidence that Titov fired two shots while Zaitsev
fired three. According to witnesses, Titov shot one time in a window to frighten the attackers off
Zaitsev, then Zaitsev and himself fired one shot each at Karachevsky on a staircase, and then
Zaitsev killed Karachevsky with two shots. However, material evidence to be destroyed according
to the verdict, include 6 (six) metalcartridge cases, which matches the number of cartridges in
eight submachine-gun magazines to be transferred to military unit No. 45765.
Thus, the version of an attack at the checkpoint is takenas a primary lead while Zaitsev was a
member of the unit on duty that was performing actions “to guard and defend the military station
based on a relevant order and because of having information about an attack at the checkpoint”.
The court considered all these data to be sufficient to qualify the incident under part 2 of Art. 108
RF CC as “a murder committed in excess of the measures needed for the detention of a person
having committed a crime” and insufficient to qualify it under more severe articles envisaging
liability for a murder committed by a group of persons or for hatred orenmity. In the defence’s
opinion, such qualification allows Ye. Zaitsev to be inflicted a minimum penalty and other Russian
military servicemen involved to avoid any liability; the killed person is presented as a public order
disturber whereas the injured party’s interests in appropriate investigation and fair compensation
for the infringed right to life are not secured to the proper extent. The defence believes that the
court did not sufficiently examined the extent of involvement of the persons acting as witnesses in
the casein the crime committed. In this regard, the defence will appeal against the verdict and
raises the question about securing the above-mentioned interests.
PROHIBITION OF TORTURE
THE KOSTENKO CASE
In the context of the right to freedom from torture, attention is drawn to the statements of defence
of Oleksandr Kostenko who is in detention in the Simferopol pre-trial detention facility, on a
charge of his involvement in the February 2014 Kyiv Maidan events during which he allegedly
caused minor bodily injuries to an officer of the Crimean detachment of Ukrainian MIA’s Berkut
police, as well as on a charge of illegal possession of weapons which he claims were planted on
him (see previous CFM reviews for details of the Kostenko case).
As far back as 12 February, Oleksandr Kostenko’s father Fedir claimed in his complaint to Crimea
Public Prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya that “facts of Oleksandr’s critical physical condition have
emerged: his left hand is broken, his right hand is dislocated, abdominal cavity damaged, heavy
signs of beating on his face and head, pain in the liver and kidneys, foot damaged”. Besides, the
complaint describes the 5 February events: “At about 17.00, near our house entrance, with a large
number of people present, several persons in civilian clothes attacked my son, Oleksandr
Fedorovych Kostenko. Those unknown persons used brutal physical force, and, without any
charges, dragged him into a van and took him to an undisclosed location. They replied with
rudeness to neighbours’ remarks. On the same day, I wrote an application to Simferopol city
Kievsky district department of internal affairs concerning the fact of kidnapping of my son. Later, I
applied to police, FSB and other institutions, but no-one ever gave me any answer anywhere. Our
8
neighbours remembered the colour and number of the vehicle in which Oleksandr was taken away
(АК 3274 СН) ” (Appendix 3 ).
The circumstances described by O. Kostenko’s father are in conflict with the investigators’ version
according to which on February 6 Oleksandr came, allegedly of his own free will, to the FSB
Department in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city and declared himself to be “a person
involved in the Maidan events and having caused minor damage to V.V. Poliyenko’s health”. It
should be pointed out that O. Kostenko’s father, Fedir, disappeared on 3 March en route from Kyiv
to Crimea.
On 3 April, a Simferopol court, chaired by V.A. Mozheliansky, granted a motion of state prosecutor
at law – Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea N.V. Poklonskaya, and extended the measure of
restraint in the form of detention, previously assigned to O.F. Kostenko, for two months, i.e.
through 3 June 2015, and simultaneously decided to schedule an open court hearing for 20 April
2015(Appendix 4 ).
On 11 April, Kostenko’s apartment was searched. According to the protocol, the search was
conducted by FSB operative agent Artur Shambazov and managed by FSB officer Tishenin.
According to Kostenko, the latter person was among those who tortured him after his detention on
5 February (formally he was detained only on 6 February): “During the period from 5.02.2015 and
6.02.2015, FSB officers Andrei Tishenin, Artur Shambazov and others illegally deprived me of
liberty by putting into a basement of an unknown building where they were causing me bodily
injuries by beating and torturing me all the time. As a result, I have multiple bodily injuries anda
displaced fracture of the left elbow joint”.
During a court hearing on the case on 20 April, lawyer Dmitrii Sotnikovmade a motion to terminate
the criminal proceedings as regards charging O.F. Kostenkoof having committed the crime
envisaged by Art. 115(2)(б) RF CC, because of no event of the above-mentioned crime in O.F.
Kostenko’s actions since both the accused and injured persons had been Ukrainian nationals as of
the incident while the place of incident had been outside both Russia and Crimea.
UkrainedidnotchargeRussia with conducting criminal prosecution of O. Kostenko.
The lawyer also requested elimination from the criminal case file of any evidence obtained with the
use of illegal physical impact (torture) upon O. Kostenko by law enforcement officers. These
arguments, as well as the fact that Kostenko had a broken hand and needed medical aid, not
provided to him in the pre-trial detention facility (Appendices 5-6), were also presented by the
lawyer in his appeal to the Supreme Court of Crimeaagainst this ruling issued by judge V.A.
Mozheliansky. The complaint also specified that detention was used by investigation bodies and the
first-instance courtfor the purpose of applying torture to O.F. Kostenko to force him refuse from
the arranged lawyer’s services and admit his guilt (Appendix 7 ).
The Supreme Court of Crimea held as follows on 15 April: “The ruling of Kievsky district court, city
of Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, dated 3 April 2015 that extended the detention period for
Aleksandr Fedorovich Kostenko for two months, i.e. until 3 June 2015, shall be left unchanged, and
lawyer Dmitrii Sotnikov’s appeal shall be dismissed” (Appendix 8 ).
9
Along with searches in Kostenko’s apartment, his relatives’ apartments were also searched. On 9
April, in Uiutnoye village, Saki district, a search was conducted in the apartment of Olha Ukolova,
the detainee’s civil-law wife. On 10 April, in Zaozernoye village (Yevpatoria), a search was
conducted in the apartment of Oleksandr Kostenko’s civil-law wife’s brother. The search was
formally grounded on an application about a mobile phone theft (these searches are described in
detail in the section on the Right to Liberty and Security of Person).
Kostenko’s lawyer Dmitrii Sotnikov repeatedly approached various instances stating that tortures
were applied to his client. The lawyer demanded stopping tortures, securing his client against
communication with his torturers, and holding them liable (Appendix 9 ). However, on 18 April
2015, Senior Lieutenant of Justice D.S. Kukasov, senior criminal investigator, military investigation
division 534, Military Investigation Department of the RF Investigation Committee for the Black Sea
Fleet, denied institution of criminal proceedings against Andrei Tishenin and Artur Shambazov for
exceeding official powers with the use or threat of use of violence (Appendix 10).
In response to Fedir Kostenko’s applications, a reply came as far back as 10 March, signed by S.A.
Bogoslavskaya, Deputy Head of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Crimea, indicating
that as a result of the check conducted by the Ombudsman pursuant to the application, “the facts
of your son A.F. Kostenko’s having bodily injuries became confirmed. In this regard, the need arose
to organize measures for an additional examination of circumstances of causing the injuries”
(Appendix 11 ).
The next letter from the Ombudsman’s office informed Kostenko’s father that the Ombudsman had
sent letters on the need for additional examination of the circumstances in which bodily injuries
had been caused to O. Kostenko to various Russian bodies governing Crimea. The document also
made known that Oleksandr Kostenko had had a meeting on 31 March witha representative of the
Office of the RF Human Rights Ombudsman. The following was communicated on results of the
meeting: “According to your son’s information, in Simferopol PTDF-1, possible medical aid
envisaged by detention conditions is rendered to him. He has not written any complaint on
anyone’s actions. He refused to indicate a reason of having sustained a bodily injury. In view of the
stated above, the Ombudsman currently has no ground to keep conducting the inspection”
(Appendix12).
There is information that, before the meeting with the representative of the Office of the RF
Human Rights Ombudsman, PTDF-1 I.L. Levenets threatened Kostenko with reprisal if he would
say anything at the meeting. Levenets personally accompanied Kostenko to the meeting and was
present thereat. No lawyer was allowed to attend. At the meeting, they demanded that Kostenko
must waive the right to counsel, tried to convince Kostenko that the lawyer had been allegedly
detained at an airport with drugs, and demandedto accept a special procedure and admit his guilt.
RIGHTTOLIBERTYAND SECURITY OF PERSON
DISAPPEARANCES
There is no new information available concerning the disappearance cases ofIvan Bondarets,
Valerii Vashchuk, Vasyl Chernysh, Timur Shaimardanov, Seyran Zinedinov, Isliam
Dzhepparov, Dzhevdet Isliamov, Eskender Apseliamov, andO.M. Potapov.
10
Fedir Kostenko, father of Euromaidan activist Oleksandr Kostenko detained on 5 February in
Simferopol, disappeared under unestablished circumstances in March. His son Oleksandr Kostenko
is under arrest, accused of having caused minor bodily injuries to an officer of Crimean Berkut unit
in February 2014 in Kyiv.
Fedir Stepanovych Kostenko’s wife filed an application about his being missing. She points out in
her application that Fedir disappeared on 3 March. Besides, she writes that on 2 and 3 March
“some suspicious persons were near our apartment, apparently watching the entrance and the
apartment near the door and from a car”. According to the application, presence of such
“observers” can be confirmed also by neighbours (Appendix 13 ). At present, no data concerning
Fedir Kostenko’s whereaboutsis available.
DETENTIONS, ARRESTS, SEARCHES
Between 2 and 10 April, some measures were going on in Crimea, which, according to the RF MIA
internal troops, were part ofthe Cordon 2015 operational and strategic exercise aimed to practice
“instructions as regards strengthening border protection and conducting antiterrorist activities”.
According to the materials collected by the Contact Group on Human Rights in Crimea2, the
population was not notified on the scheduled exercise and learned that the activities conducted
were an exercise only from press reports.
Batalyonnoye, Semisotka, Voikovo, Bagerovo, Yarkoye Pole village, Shchelkino, Yalta and Saki
towns, and Simferopol Fontany micro-district.
Except for Yarkoye Pole and Zhuravky, all the ‘exercises’ were conducted according to the same
scenario: about 100-150 MIA employees came to a settlement – enlisted ones, district police
officers, special police squad, road police – all armed. On all the roads leading to and from the
settlement, sandbags were placed and, in some cases (at least in two settlements), machine-guns
and car traps were installed. All the passing cars had to produce documents and undergo
inspection, in some cases total, in some – spot checks.
In the streets of some communities, persons with submachine-guns and dogs were checking
documents.
In Zhuravky settlement, where about 500 Crimean Tatars live, the exercise was observed to occur
as follows. Roadblocks were set on all the three roads leading to the settlement (from
Pervomayskoe, Kirovskoye and Privetnoye). Road police and special police squad officers stopped
all the passing cars at the roadblocks to examine documents.
Accordingtosomewitnesses, the
checks were random and discriminatory: Slavic-looking people only had to produce their
documents whereas Crimean Tatars were sometimes accompanied to their homes to carry out an
‘inspection’ of their housing.
Some houses were simply entered with no attesting witness or search.
A full-scale search was conducted in 10 houses.
2The group was established in autumn 2014 to search for missing Crimean Tatars. It includes relatives of some
disappeared persons, lawyers, and members of the Crimean Tatar public.
The Contact Group recorded that the exercise was going on in settlements of Lenino, Kirovskoye,
11
A similar procedure was followed for the exercise in Yarkoye Pole on 3 April. Itbeganat 9.00
andlasteduntil 13.30. About 10 housesweresearched.
Such kind of ‘exercise’, when the civilian population is their object, is an unacceptable practice that
was never used in Crimea before. It not only restricts fundamental rights (right to liberty of
movement, respect for home, right to liberty and security of person, and groundlessly jeopardizes
the right to life) but also violates the presumption of innocence principle, thereby resulting in
discrimination expressed as searches in people’s houses only based on ethnicity and religious
affiliation. Settlements and people residing there must not be an object of army and police
exercises that lead to unfounded restriction of their rights.
Searches in the Kostenko case
On 9 April, Russian police officers searched the apartment of Olha Ukolova, Oleksandr Kostenko’s
civil-law wife, in Uyutnoye village, Saki district. To conduct the search, they had to break a steel
apartment door. The search record indicated that “the apartment entrance had a metal door with a
mortice lock. Because of the refusal to open, the lock was deformed in view of the need to open
the door” (Appendix 14). According to O. Kostenko’s brother, Yevhen: “Unknown men came to
the apartment in Uyutnoye village, Saki district, where the woman is living, knocked at the door
and stated they were going to conduct a search. They claimed to be police officers but the woman
asserts that she heard an adolescent’s laughter behind the door as well. She was in the apartment
with her child and mother. They did not know what to do – let the people in or not”.
According to the record, began at 21.15 and ended at 23.55. A few phones, a SIM card, and
flashcards were withdrawn during the search. Apart from Olha Ukolova, her 7-month-old baby and
her mother were in the premises she is living in. A uniformed man who entered the apartment
introduced himself as a district police officer Chalabayev. Besides, according to eyewitnesses, the
people who entered the house included police officers whose presence is not indicated in the
search record: district police officers Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Terekhov and Telman Seydosi Ogly.
The total number of people who entered the apartment where Olha Ukolova with her 7-month-old
baby and her mother is living, was about 12. The search lasted for more than two hours and ended
at 23.55.
On 10 April, police officers conducted a search in the apartment of Oleksandr Kostenko’s civil-law
wife’s brother in Zaozernoye village (Yevpatoria). The formal ground for the search consisted of an
application about mobile phone theft. According to Yuliia Taktasheva, Olha Ukolova’s brother’s
wife, she was approached at about 12.00 in the street by some persons in uniforms but having no
police badges, one of them introduced himself as a police station chief. They started interrogating
her asking who she was, what she was engaged in, where she lived, and if she was Oleksandr
Taktashev’s wife. She tried to find out what was the ground for her being interrogated and being
demanded to show her documents. In response, the officers started threatening her and saying
they would take her and her child to the police station. She was afraid and showed her documents.
Late that evening, a search was conducted in her house.
The search was commenced at 21.00 and ended at 22.20. According to Kostenko’s relatives, the
premises where the family is living, has only 18 sq. m in area. There were 10 people inside, and 10
more were in the street; a search warrant was not given for familiarization. The warrant was
12
shown to Taktashev’s mother (he himself was not at home), but they did not let her read it to the
end. The persons conducting the search called it an ‘emergency search’. Asked to allow making a
photocopy of the record, they refused. It is known that the search was conducted by investigators
Denis Viktorovich Monastyrsky and Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Drochevsky. According to the police
officers, a phone theft was a formal ground for the search. They also tried to seize a computer
processor unit. During the search, the police officers prohibited making any phone calls.
Both searches took place late in the evening. AccordingtoArt. 164 RF Code of Criminal Procedure,
no investigative actions can be performed at night except for pressing cases. In both situations
above, a great number of police officers were present, violations of many procedural norms
occurred, and Kostenko’s defence lawyer and family regard these episodes as elements of
psychological pressure.
Detentions in the 26 February case
On 14 April, another search was conducted in the house of Mustafa Asaba, chairman of
Belogorsk regional Mejlis. 13 cartridges wrapped in paperwere found during the search. On the
same day, Mustafa Asaba was taken to the investigation committee for an interrogation, after
which he was allowed to go home. The search was conducted as part of investigation of the 26
February case (see CFM monitoring reviews for March and February 2015 for details of the case).
It should be reminded that Mustafa Asaba’s house was already searched in September last year.
That search was conducted in connection with the 3 May events when Crimean Tatars had been
meeting Mejlis ex-head Mustafa Dzhemilev at an administrative border in Armiansk.
On 14 April, Russian law-enforcement officials conducted searches in the houses of Belogorsk
businessmen and patrons, brothers Resul and Remzi Veliliayev. The searches took place as part
of investigation of the criminal case concerning the 26 February 2014 events. After the search,
Remzi Veliliayev was taken to the Investigation Committee for an interrogation. Sometimelater, he
was released, the same as Mustafa Asaba. Resul Veliliayev is a member of Belogorsk district
council, former member of the Supreme Council of Crimea, Honoured Worker of Services of Crimea
and Ukraine.
In the evening of 15 April, Russian law-enforcement officials detained Crimean Tatar Ali Asanov,
resident of Urozhaynoye village, Sovetsky district. He was delivered to the Simferopol investigation
committee on 16 April for an interrogation, and detained there until a trial that was held on the
next day. According to his relatives, the detention took place as part of the 26 February criminal
case.
On 17 April, Kievsky district court of Simferopol held a session in the case of Ali Asanov, detained in
the framework of the 26 February case. The court imposed on him a restraint in the form of twomonth
detention until the completion of the investigation, namely until 15 June 2015.
Thecourt decision mentions having caused deathby recklessness to I.A. Postny and V.D. Korneva.
The court ruled to indictAli Asanov as the defendant for having committed a crime envisaged by
part 2 of Art. 212 RF CC (involvement in mass riot, punishable by imprisonment for three to eight
years).
13
In the evening of 20 April, Eskender Nebiev, an ATR TV channel cameraman, was detained in
Simferopol. According to law-enforcement bodies, the criminal case includes evidence of his having
taken part in a mass action as one of the activists, not as a journalist. On 22 April, Kievsky district
court of Simferopol imposed on him a restraint in the form of two-month custody.
Eskender Kantemirov, arrested in this case on 8 February, was admitted to bail earlier, on 9
April, and Eskender Emirvaliev, arrested on 18 February, was admitted to bail on 17 April.
Abdurahman Egiz and Diliaver Akiev, members of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, were
interrogated as part of this criminal caseon 27 April; Zair Smedliayev, chairman of the Central
Election Commission of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, was re-interrogated on 28 April;
Nariman Dzhelial, Mejlis 1st Deputy Chairman, and Diliaver Akiev, Mejlis Secretariat head, were
re-interrogated on 30 April. Also on 30 April,Mejlis members Ali Hamzin and Enver Kurtiev, and
Zair Smedliayev and Qurultay Audit Commission chairman Ali Ozenbash were interrogated.
Searches and detentions in the Hizb ut-Tahrir case
About 6 a.m. 2 April, FBS officers conducted a search in Ferat Sayfullaev’s house in Orlinoye
village, Balaklava distrist. Taking part in the search were 6 persons, three of them in masks, an
investigator, and two attesting witnesses. They did not allow Sayfullaev to make a phone call and
invite a lawyer. Onthesameday, FeratSayfullaevwasdetainedon suspicion of connection with Hizb
ut-Tahrir terrorist organization. A computer and 3 Islamic books were seized during the search.
On 3 April, a restraint in the form of two-month custody was imposed on Sayfullaev.
To remind, Sevastopol city court extended the arrest of three Muslims detained in January – Nuri
Primov, Ruslan Zeytullaev and Rustem Vaitov – for another two months. Involvement in the
activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir organization, officially banned in the territory of Russia, is incriminated
to all of them. All they are officially suspected of violation of Art. 205.5 RF CC (Organization of, and
participation in, activities of a terrorist organization).
Otherdetentionsandassaults
On 20 April, Emir-Usein Kuku, representative of the Contact Group under the Crimean
Government Chairman (which was established by parents of kidnapped young persons and lawyers
to supervise the progress of kidnapping investigation) in Yalta region, employee of Yalta district
administration, was detained in Yalta. Witnesses claim that unknown persons in camouflage
uniforms took part in the detention.
On 17 April in Simferopol, pro-Ukrainian activist Leonid Kuzmin, organizer of the action on
Ukrainian writer Taras Shevchenko’s birthday, was assaulted. According to him, his former pupil
stopped him in the evening 17 April. Theyoungman’sfriend, standingbeside, recognized the activist
and started offending him on the ethnical ground. As Kuzmin said, he tried to avoid a conflict,
turned his back on them and was going to go away but washit on his head with a bottle. Then, the
assailants hit him for several times and ran away. At a traumatology centre, Kuzmin was diagnosed
with brain concussion. Leonid wrote apolice statement.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
14
In April, there was a series of searches, interrogations and detentions of journalists and media
workers. Importantly, all these cases were connected exactly with professional activities of
journalists or media workers as well as with the freedom of expression in web resources.
On 8 April in Simferopol, FSВ officials called in for interrogation Anna Shaidurova, reporter of
theCentre for Investigative Journalism. No summons was served on her when calling in for the
interrogation, which is a violation of criminal procedure standards. The interrogation was
conducted as part of the criminal proceedings concerning calls to violation of territorial integrity
(Art. 280.1 RF CC) initiated against journalist Anna Andrievska because of publication of his
article about the Krym battalion in the antiterrorist operation area. Anna Shaidurova could not
report details of her interrogation because the journalist and her lawyer signed a pledge of nondisclosure.
On 9 April in Yalta, FSB officials conducted a search in the house of Tetiana Huchakova, former
deputy editor-in-chief of BlackSeaNews media outlet. Huchakova has not been working in the
outlet for more than a year because its editorial office moved to Kyiv. According to the outlet
workers, the search lasted for about 10 hours and resulted in seizure of all computer equipment.
After the search, Tetiana Huchakova was interrogated and late at night released. Grounds for the
search and interrogation are being ascertained.
On 11 April in Simferopol, officials of the Counter-Extremism Centre conducted a search in the
house of videotape operatorAmet Umerov. After the search, Umerov was called to the Centre for
a conversation. According to him, a ground of the search consisted of his friendship in a social
network with a person who committed suicide. However, Umerov himself does not remember that
man while his relatives associate the law-enforcement officers’ actions with Umerov’s critical
statements in social media about representatives of the authorities.
On 21 April in Simferopol, officials of the Investigation Committee conducted a search in the house
of Eskeneder Nebiev, cameraman at Crimean Tatar ATR TV channel. Nebiev was detained and
on 22 April arrested on suspicion of involvement in mass riot within the framework of the so-called
‘26 February case’. Eskeneder Nebiev claims having been there as a cameraman and performing
his professional duties to cover the events. However, the investigators state that Nebiev was one of
the organizers of the event and was not performinghis professional duties on that day. At present,
Nebiev is in Simferopol pre-trial detention facility.
On 21 April, blogger and activist Marlen Muzhdabaev informed via Facebook that police had
come to his parents’ house in Simferopol (Muzhdabaev himself is not living in Crimea). Muzhdabaev
believes that the police search for him and points out that it was already fourth visit of lawenforcement
officers to his relatives’ house during the last three months.According to him,
testimony was taken from his relatives who were at home.
On 22 April, Gayana Yuksel, director of QHA Crimean Tatar news agency, was called to the
Counter-Extremism Centre. The ground for the call consisted of the publication at the agency’s
website of information about the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army (UPA), which had been active during the World War II in the west of Ukraine.
15
On 17 November 2014, the RF Supreme Court included UPA on the list of non-commercial
organizations concerning which a court passed a decision on liquidation or prohibition on the
grounds3 envisaged by the Federal Law on Counteraction to Extremist Activities, the decision
having taken legal effect.Besides UPA, the list also includes other Ukrainian organizations: Pravy
Sektor, Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence, Stepan Bandera Tryzub,
Bratstvo. OUNisnotonthatlist.
As Gayana Yuksel explained at the interrogation, the article about UPA had been published before
the RF Supreme Court recognized that organization as extremist. However, law-enforcement
officials ignored that fact. ConcerningGayanaYuksel,
areportwasdrawnupontheadministrativeoffenceenvisagedbyArt. 13.15(2) RFAdministrative Offence
Code(AOC) “Abuseofthefreedomofmedia” (Appendix 15), namely “dissemination of information
about a public association or other organization, included in the published list of public and
religious associations and other organizations concerning which a court passed a decision on
liquidation or prohibition, which has taken legal effect, on the grounds envisaged by the Federal
Law on Counteraction to Extremist Activities (No. 114-ФЗ dated 25 July 2002), without a note that
the respective association or organization has been liquidated or their activity has been prohibited”.
GayanaYukselherself did not agree with the content of the report drawn up and refused to sign it.
A serious danger for journalists’ work is posed by the assault on Iryna Ostashchenko, production
editor of Informer web media outlet. She was assaulted at about 11 a.m. on 9 April in Sevastopol,
in the entrance hall of house the journalist is living in. An unidentified person hit her on the head
with an unknown item, due to which the victim lost consciousness while the assailant disappeared.
Later on, Ostashchenko was delivered to a neurosurgical department where she was diagnosed
with a chopped, avulsed and scalping-type wound of the head front and parietal part.
Of special danger is absence of any efficient investigation of the assault. According to witnesses,
emergency care and neurosurgical department staff failed to report to the police about a specific
character of the wounds that testifies an assault. Subsequently, the investigation accepted as a
primary lead the assumption that Ostashchenko had fallen down the stairs. Importantly, the
journalist’s area of professional interests covered investigation of corruption in the field of
immovable property and land relations.
Apart from the cases described above, problems remain concerning formal restrictions on mass
media work according to provisions of the Russian legislation. First of all, it is the need for
registration with the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Communications, Information
Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). According to Roskomnadzor, after the completion of
a ‘transient period’ for mass media registration, 232 Crimean mass media are registered with
Roskomnadzor as of 2 April: 8 online media, 19 TV channels, 42 radio channels, 163 print media
and news agencies4.
However, many media have not still managed to re-register themselves and keep working. They
include the only Crimean Tatar TV channel, ATR, which has been continuing its efforts to achieve
3 http://minjust.ru/ru/nko/perechen_zapret
4 http://minfo.rk.gov.ru/rus/index.htm/news/299158.htm
16
registration. Special anxiety among Crimean Tatar journalists and ATR TV channel staff was caused
by S. Aksionov’s decree “On the Public Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Company” dated 22 April
20155. The decree assumes the establishment of the Public Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Company
and the formation of the Council for that company. Therewith, the Council’s membership shall be
approved personally by Crimea head Sergey Aksionov from among the candidates nominated by
the State Committee for Interethnic Relations and Deported Citizens. Establishment of a Crimean
Tatar television, controlled by the local authorities, will result in restrictions on the creation and
activity of other Crimean Tatar media.
Accreditation restraints are another problem for journalists’ work. For example, the RF Government
Head Dmitriy Medvedev paid an official visit to Simferopol on 27 April. An accreditation application
for coverage of the event had to be filed a week prior thereto. It can be concluded that some
Crimean journalists failed to get accredited because of their ‘disloyalty’. In particular, one of the
female journalists was found to post on her social network page some photos of the Maidan events
taken in the course of her professional activity. It became a ground for denial of accreditation for
her. The journalist refused to appeal against the denial.
In addition, local journalists report that the Russia Today international news agency opened its
press centre in Simferopol, and its administration claims to reserve the right to deny accreditation
without giving reasons. The Independent Media Workers Trade Union believes that such press
centres are used to provide a possibility of media ‘filtering’ and create additional instruments for
restriction of the freedom of speech.
‘STRUGGLEWITHEXTREMISM’ ANDRESTRICTIONSOFFREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
A special threat to the freedom of speech and expression is posed by so-called ‘struggle with
extremism and terrorism’. Main work ‘to counter extremism and terrorism’ is carried out by the
Crimean prosecution office. An interagency working group to combat manifestations of extremism,
headed by Crimea Public Prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya, has been established in Crimea6. One of
the key areas of such work consists of continuous supervision of internet resources and social
networks. Intensification of such activities is also connected with implementation of S. Aksionov’s
decree “On approval of the Comprehensive Plan for counteraction to the ideology of terrorism in
the Republic of Crimea for 2015-2018”7.
The above-mentioned plan assumes counteraction not to concrete actions but to “ideas, concepts,
beliefs, dogmas, goals, slogans substantiating the need for terrorist activityas well as other
destructive ideas having led or able to lead to such ideology”. However, no clear criteria against
which an idea or slogan can be identified as terrorist or destructive is set. The plan fixes a number
of measures in relation of not only mass media but also ordinary users of internet resources, for
example: monitoring or terrorist and anti-Russian activity on the internet; working to detect and
block websites containing terrorist and extremist materials; development of guidelines on the
5 http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_243657.pdf
6 http://rkproc.ru/news/v-prokurature-respubliki-krym-proshlo-zasedanie-mezhvedomstvennoy-rabochey-gruppy
7 http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_238807.pdf
17
operating procedure of the Republic of Crimea public authorities, natural and legal persons for
documentation of the facts of dissemination of destructive ideas and terrorism ideology on the
internet and for submission of such facts to law-enforcement bodies.
As part of ‘counteraction to the terrorism ideology’, the Crimean prosecutor’s office started urging
local residents to apply to the prosecution bodies when they find any internet resources containing
materials with extremist content8. The official website of the Crimean prosecutor’s office now has a
special option of the ‘Notification of extremism”9 that allows any user to report, at his/her
discretion, about manifestations of extremism.
According to the notification form, key information sources that can contain extremist materials
include websites, photo and video repositories, emails, clubs, groups, communities, chats, forums,
guest books, newsgroups, bulletin boards, and knowledge banks. The applicant should find in the
information source any signs of calls to mass riots, extremist activity or participation in mass
(public) events held in violation of the established procedure (Appendix 16). Such notifications
provide grounds for checking the information source by prosecutor’s office officials, for summoning
the information authors to prosecution bodies, or for blocking the websites.
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
EPISODE WITH STUDENTS FILMING A CLIP IN SUPPORT OF ATR
On 1 April, Simferopol Kievsky district court had a session concerning the students who had been
going to film a video clip in support of the Crimean Tatar ATR TV channel that had had to stop
its broadcasting in Crimea. The court issued a ruling concerning one of the students, Aleksei
Yefremov, according to which he was found guilty of violating the established procedure of
organizing or holding an assembly, meeting, demonstration, procession or picketing. The court
awarded him a penalty in the form of an administrative fine amounting to 20,000 roubles. Besides,
the court found Yefremov guilty of resistance to arrest (defiance of a police official’s legitimate
order), and awarded a penalty in the form of an administrative fine amounting to 500 roubles.
Yefremov himself denies his guilty completely, insisting that he did not resist detention.
On 15 April, the Commission for the Affairs of Minors and Protection of Their Rights, Simferopol
city, issued a resolution concerning two minor female students, who were also detained for an
attempt of filming a video clip, on imposing an administrative penalty(Appendix 17). The
Commission found them guilty of violating the established procedure of organizing or holding an
assembly, meeting, demonstration, procession or picketing (part 5 of Art. 20.2 RF AOC) and
awarded an administrative fine amounting to 10,000 roubles.
The court and the Commission members found the students guilty of violating the established
procedure of organizing or holding an assembly, meeting, demonstration, procession or picketing.
However, the students’ actions (an attempt of filming a video clip in support of the Crimean Tatar
ART TV channel) don’t come within the definitions of the assembly, meeting, demonstration,
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kivcFRQp7RM
9 http://rkproc.ru/node/84
18
processing or picketing enshrined in Article 2 RF FL on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations,
Processions and Picketing. Hence, it is likely a situation when the judge and the Commission
members arbitrarily interpret provisions of the RF legislation by holding persons administratively
liable.
Regardless of whether the students’ actions come within the rather vague notion of a ‘public event’
in the Russian legislation, they as such did not threaten public order and carried no damage to
public interests or other people’s rights.Therefore, rather big fines on doubtful grounds constitute a
disproportionate interference with freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, cause an
additional deterring effect, and thereby violate these rights.
ACTIONBY“PROTECT SEVASTOPOL” MOVEMENT
On 15 April, activists of the “Protect Sevastopol” public movement gather on Nakhimov
Square in Sevastopol to hold an action “Ask Putin a question” aimed at criticizing the local
authorities. Before the start of the public event, a man, who introduced himself as Vladimir
Kolesnikov, official of the Government’s Domestic Policy Department, demanded to stop the action.
He explained his demand by the fact that the meeting was not authorized. The movement’s leader
Vasily Fedorin said that the notice of the meeting had been submitted within a prescribed
deadline, on 5 April. There had been no reply concerning endorsement of the meeting by
Sevastopol city administration. The meeting participants refused to comply with the demand and
continued the action. Then, police officers detained three organizers of the action to draw up
administrative reports. After that, they were released. Earlier, on 5 April, a similar action was held
in another part of the city, and police officers were demanding to stop it.
ACTION IN ALUSHTA
On 24 April, Alushta city administration refused to satisfy the organizers’ application for
endorsement and holding of the public event “Protect our native city – preserve squares and parks”
that had been scheduled for 10 a.m. on 26 April in front of the city administration building.
Moreover, a few hours before the above-mentioned time, a considerable quantity of police and a
special police squad as well as two special vehicles (prison trucks) appeared on the square in front
of the administration. The organizers and participants of the scheduled event came to the square
but, due to presence of police, urged everybody to go away. After that, according to eyewitnesses,
some people, including activists with leaflets dedicated to the Victory Day, were detained by the
police.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
On 23 April, the Crimean Court of Appeal had its preliminary hearing of the case concerning the
withdrawal, as a ‘cultural heritage object’, of a building owned by the Crimea Foundation
charitable organization. Along the Crimea Foundation, the building also hosted the Mejlis of
the Crimean Tatar People and the editorial office of Avdet, Crimean Tatar newspaper.
As a ground for withdrawal, the State Committee regards the Foundation’s failure to meet his
obligations on maintenance of a cultural heritage object. According to the Committee, re19
equipment of the building in 2003 and 2010 was the main violation. Representatives of the Crimea
Foundation repeatedly stated that the alterations had been done long before establishment of the
RF jurisdiction in Crimea and had completely met the Ukrainian laws. However, the court ignores
these arguments. As a result, the court decided to satisfy the State Committee’s demands, namely
withdraw the above-mentioned building from the Crimea Foundation ownership to arrange its
redemption or sale by public tender, and to charge the Foundation with court costs in the federal
budget’s favour, amounting to 6000 roubles (Appendix 18 ).
By depriving the Crimea Foundation of its possessions, the court interfered with its right to
property in the meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Art. 1 of the
Protocol No. 1 to ECHR). Such interference was grounded by the RF legislation instead of the
Ukrainian legislation that should have been applied to the legal relationships considered by the
court.
When withdrawing the Foundation’s possessions, the court did not award any compensation for the
withdrawn property and did not specify what exactly circumstances exempt the state from its duty
of paying the compensation to the owner.Besides, the court decision contains no explanation about
how exactly the repair done causes harm to the building (cultural heritage object) and why the
owner cannot itself eliminate the repair consequences instead of suffering a disproportionately
stringent measure, namely deprivation of his right of ownership to the building.
A special problem for many associations still consists of difficulties in obtaining the legal entity
status according to the RF legislative provisions. The organizations encounter formal prevention of
registration, delayed replies from registering bodies, need for multiple payment ofa state duty for
registration, lack of necessary knowledge among the staff of registration bodies, etc.
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION
Application of the Russian counter-extremism legislation in Crimea has resulted in criminal
prosecution of participants (or possible participants) of Hizb ut-Tahrir international political
organization. For example, on 23 January, the court imposed on detainedNuri Primov, Ruslan
Zeytullaevand Rustem Vaitov a restraint in the form of two-month custody, and in March it
extended their arrest for another two months. The three detainees are suspected of violation of
Art. 205.5 RF CC (Organization of, and participation in, activities of a terrorist organization)
because, in the investigators’ opinion, they are involved in Hizb ut-Tahrir.
Later on, searches in Muslim homes were conducted on suspicion of involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir
activities in Crimea. For example, on 2 April, FSB officials conducted a search in the house of Ferat
Sayfullaev in Orlinoye village, Balaklava distrist (near Sevastopol). His lawyer Emil Kurbedinov
said that Sayfullaev had been summoned to an interrogation after the search. A ground for the
search and interrogation consisted of his being suspected of connections with Hizb ut-Tahrir that,
according to the RF legislation, isfound to be a terrorist organization.
Manifestations of intolerance towards the Muslim umma are observed from time to time. For
example, about 4 a.m. on 26 April, unknown persons threw a few bottles with Molotov cocktail into
a mosque building. These actions the building façade was partially damaged. On this fact, criminal
proceedings were instituted, and investigation is going on.
20
On 15 April, Bishop Anatoly Kaliuzhny, pastor of the New Life protestant church, reported
having grounds to believethat purposeful ousting of Protestantism was occurring in Crimea10.
According to him, representatives of the local authorities exert pressure on protestant communities
and priests. Formal hindrances for re-registration of protestant communities are one of the forms
of the pressure. According to the pastor, none of the protestant communities managed to get reregistered
so far. This fact restricts their activities substantially, often deprives them of any
possibility of renting necessary premises, etc. AsBishopAnatolyKaliuzhnysaid, it became known from
the reports of protestants living in Crimea that church leaders are subject to ‘individual processing’
by the Russian secret services. A special database of church leaders has been created, and their
contacts with believers living in mainland Ukraine are being traced.
Kliment, Archbishop of Simferopol and Crimea (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv
Patriarchy), also stated for many times before about FSB staff interferences in the affairs of his
church and about ‘preventive conversations’ of FSB officers with priests and parishioners.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Between2 and 10 April, antiterroristexerciseswereheldinsomecommunities,
mainlyvillagesandsettlements, duringwhichturnpikeequippedroadblockswereinstalledatcommunityentrances.
Motor vehicles entering and leaving the
communities were subject to random inspection. The exercises resulted in substantial limitation of
movement, especially of the persons moving in cars. Besides, local residents noticed emergence of
new roadblocks, non-existent before, on motor roads. For example, one of such roadblocks was
installed in Gaspra settlement (Appendix 19).
Earlier, on 10 August 2014, the RF FSB banned Ismet Yuksel entry into the RF territory for 5
years, until 30 June 2019. Ismet Yuksel is an advisor to the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar People, a public figure, a Turkish national; before that, he had lawfully resided in Crimea for
20 years (based on a Ukrainian residence permit). He filed a lawsuit to the court challenging the
FSB’s on the ban of entry into the territory of the Russian Federation. Complaints on the entry ban
decision were lodged in Simferopol and Moscow. Simferopol Kievsky district court refused to
consider the complaint, referring to the ‘jurisdiction principle’. Moscow Meshchansky court held an
initial hearing on 22 January to consider Yuksel’s lawsuit but the FSB representatives failed to
appear.
The next session to consider Ismet Yuksel’s lawsuit against the FSB’s entry ban decision was held
in Moscow city court on 7 April. That time, a FSB representative attended the hearing. The court
session was postponed in order to notify Ismet Yuksel on holding the session and obtain his
consent or refusal to considering the case inhis absence because he cannot be present in the court
for being banned to enter the RF.
Yuksel’s lawyer, Illarion Vasiliev, supported by the Strategic Litigations Fund of the Ukrainian
Helsinki Human Rights Union, applied to the European Court of Human Rights concerning the RF’s
violation of some articles of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, namely: interference with the applicant’s private life, restriction on his freedom of
10 http://risu.org.ua/ru/index/all_news/state/church_state_relations/59732/
21
movement, unlawful deportation, discrimination, unfair trial, lack of effective remedies, and
infringement on property rights. The European Court of Human Rights accepted the appeal and
assigned it case number 9117/15 (Yuksel v. Russia ).
In April, a joint monitoring group of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, Lawtrend Legal
Transformation Centre, and "Right to Protection" All-Ukrainian Charitable Foundation in
partnership with HIAS,supported by the international coalition “Initiative Group for Human
Rights in Crimea”, conducted monitoring of Crimea entry/exit points11. Preliminary results of the
monitoring are presented in the section “Monitoring of Crimea Entry/Exit Points”.
RIGHTTOAFAIRTRIALANDANEFFECTIVEREMEDY
THE SENTSOV CASE
On 8 April, Yelena Kaneva, judge of Moscow Lefortovsky district court, extended Oleh Sentsov’s
detention period in Lefortovo PTDF to 11 May. Extension of the custody period was requested by
Artem Burdin, Major of Justice, senior investigator for major cases of the FSB investigation
department.
Lawyer Vadim Samokhin, objecting the arrest extension, drew attention to gross factual
contradictions in the case. In particular, according to him, two organizations were found injured in
the case but damage suffered by them from the accused persons’ actions was not indicated.
On 16 April, the investigation party served a final wording of the charge on Oleh Sentsov. He is
accused under part 1 of Art. 205.4 (organization of a terrorist community), in two episodes under
part 2(a) of Art. 205 (terrorist attack committed by an organized group), in one episode under part
1 of Art. 30 – part 2(a) of Art. 205 (preparation for a terrorist attack), and part 3 of Art. 30 – part 3
of Art. 222 RF CC (attempted illegal trafficking of weapons and explosives by an organized group).
The final charge includes one more episode under part 3 of Art. 222 RF CC (illegal possession of
weapons). Sentsov is also accused of managing a sabotage and terrorist group of the Pravy Sektor
that, according to the FSB’s assertions, was preparing terrorist attacks in Simferopol, Yalta and
Sevastopol and, later on, “extermination of a number of vital facilities, railroad bridges, and
power transmission lines”. According to the article about terrorist attacks, Sentsovis threatened
with up to 20 years in prison. Film director Oleh Sentsov admits no guilt on any of the imputed
accusations.
Sentsov himself stated in the court: “The federal service of lawlessness in your country is very well
able to build big frame-ups”. He has no doubt that he will be sentenced to a 20 years in prison.
“They told me about such sentence already on the first day, before my official detention”, he
explained. “They hint me that I will have a very hard and ‘interesting’ life in the prison camp if I
reach it at all”.
11TheInitiativeGroupforHumanRightsinCrimeaisafreecoalitionoforganizationsofUkraine,
Russiaandothercountriesaswellasindividualexperts, willingtoacttogethertodefendhumanrightsintheCrimeanpeninsula.
22
THE KOLCHENKO CASE
On 9 April, Yelena Kaneva, judge of Moscow Lefortovsky district court, extended the detention
period in Lefortovo PTDF of Crimean activist Oleksandr Kolchenko to 16 May. Extension of the
custody period was requested by Artem Burdin, Major of Justice, senior investigator for major
cases of the FSB investigation department.
As one of the arguments in favour of Kolchenko’s further custody in the PTDF, Burdin mentioned
the fact of the activist’s visit to Kyiv Euromaidan. Kolchenko’s lawyer Svetlana Sydorkina gave
positive characteristics of her client as counterarguments and referred to the fact that the
investigation in the case was already completed. However, thejudgesidedwiththeinvestigators.
Oleksandr Kolchenko applied to the ECtHR with an appeal against forced establishment of the
Russian citizenship. The activist claims that Russia violated Article 8 of the ECHR (right to respect
for private and family life) in relation to him. As mentioned in the appeal, the ECtHR has earlier
pointed out for many times that the right to acquire or maintain a certain citizenship is one of the
rights guaranteed by the ECHR.
THE CHIRNII CASE
On 15 April, the North Caucasus district military court in Rostov-on-Don scheduled a hearing in the
case of Oleksii Chirnii, one of the persons involved in the Sentsov case, for 21 April. Since the
defendant agreed to a plea deal, his case will be considered according to a special procedure –
without interrogations of witnesses and analysis of evidence.
As proposed by Ukraine’s Consul-General in Moscow Hennadii Breskalenko, since the work ofthe
appointed lawyer, Tamaz Nodia,does not suit Chirnii, lawyer Ilya Novikov, defending also Nadiia
Savchenko, joined the defence.
On 21 April, proceedings began inthe North Caucasus district military court in Rostov-on-Don. The
prosecutor requested imprisonment of Oleksii Chirnii for 12 years in high-security conditions. This
was reported by Chirnii’s lawyer Ilya Novikov, suspended from the trial. The case is considered
according to a special procedure, that is without interrogations of witnesses and analysis of
evidence. As Novikov also mentioned, he asked his client to terminate the plea deal but the client
refused, expecting to get a relatively short term – between 7 and 10 years in prison.
As a result, Novikov, referring to an official letter from Ukraine’s Consul-General in Moscow
Hennadii Breskalenko, claimed that Chirnii had been tortured so he had had to slander himself and
other persons. On that ground, the lawyer presented a motion forreturning the case to the
prosecutor’s office. The defendant himself, however, did not support the motion.
Noting the opinionconflict between Chirnii and his lawyer, the court withdrew Novikov from the
process. According to him, the law on the legal profession allows a lawyer to take part in the
process even if his stand differs from the client’s, but the prosecutor insisted on withdrawing
Novikov, claiming that Chirnii’s right to defence was allegedly violated.
On the same day, the North Caucasus district military court in Rostov-on-Donsentenced Crimean
resident Oleksii Chirnii to seven years of imprisonment in high security conditions. The defendant
was found guilty under part 2(a) of Art. 205 (terrorist attack committed by an organized group;
23
two episodes), part 1 of Art. 30 – part 2(a) of Art. 205 (preparation for a terrorist attack to be
committed by an organized group; two episodes), and part 3 of Art. 30 – part 3 of Art. 222 RF CC
(attempted procurement of explosives by an organized group; one episode). Part 2 of Art. 205
envisages between 10 and 20 years of imprisonment in a penal colony.
The court considered Oleksii Chirnii to be a member of the Pravy Sektor’s sabotage and terrorist
group, in which film director Oleh Sentsov, according to investigators, was the leader, and left-wing
activist Oleksandr Kolchenko was one of the fighters. The court found proven that the convicthad
been involved in all the four actionsimputed to that non-existent group. They meant arsons of the
headquarters of the Russian Community of Crimea and the United Russia in Simferopol, committed
on 14 and 18 April 2014, respectively, as well as explosions near the Lenin monument and the
Eternal Flameallegedly prepared in the Crimean capital.
Note that another Crimean resident, Hennadii Afanasiev, who agreed to a plea deal as well, was
also sentenced to seven years of high-security imprisonment in December 2014.
THE ‘CRIMEAN SELF-DEFENCE’
The problem of impunity in the activity of the ‘people’s militia – voluntary police’ of Crimea, better
known as the ‘Crimean self-defence’ is one of the permanent topics in monitoring of human rights
in Crimea (see previous reviews of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission as well as the
analytical paper “On the influence of paramilitary formations upon the human rights situation in
Crimea”12).
From this point of view, attention is drawn to a recent verdict by Sevastopol Gagarinsky district
court. The court found a Sevastopol resident guilty of illegal possession, transportation and
bearing of firearms and ammunition as well as of an attempted murder of a member of the
‘Crimean self-defence’. According to the investigators, in February 20134, the accused person,
being in Kyiv, found a Makarov gun lying on the ground and misappropriated it. Later, on 9 March
2014 in Sevastopol, ‘pursuing the goal of conducting provocative activities’, he fired from that
gunat a ‘Crimean self-defence’ member but missed.The court awarded him a punishment in the
form of 10 years of imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony.
Facts of possession and bearing of firearms by the ‘Crimean self-defence’ members as well as
involvement of the ‘Crimean self-defence’ in abductions, assaults on people, causing bodily injuries,
and seizure of properties have been repeatedly recorded. However, there is no data in the
information space about investigation of such cases, any criminal proceedings instituted, or guilty
verdicts delivered against members of the ‘Crimean self-defence’.
Meanwhile, the ‘Crimean self-defence’ members, in the status of the ‘people’s militia of the
Republic of Crimea’ fighters, keep regularly receiving commendations ‘for courage and patriotism,
active participation in the maintenance of public order, and ensuring public security’ from Crimea
head S. Aksionov13.
12 http://crimeahr.org/analiticheskaya-zapiska-3-kryimskoy-pol/
13 http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_242969.pdf
24
CITIZENSHIP-RELATEDISSUES
Key problems in the field of citizenship still include obtaining a temporary permission to stay, a
residence permit, or the RF citizenship to keep residing permanently in Crimea.
In the cases on establishment of the fact of long-term residence in Crimea as a ground for
acquiring the RF citizenship, courts rather often hold their sessions with no prior notice of the
hearing date and time, or in absence of the applicant, fail to take account of the evidence
presented, or call them in question groundlessly. Such a feature in consideration of civil-law cases
has been recently observed in Saki and Simferopol.
The situation of the persons living without registration is difficult. Even if their citizenship is
confirmed by a court, relevant bodies deny such persons a stamp on residence registration in their
passports. For example, a mother of two children found herself under the threat of eviction from a
residential accommodation in the temporary public housing because of having no registration.
Closely connected with citizenship are problems of job placement of the persons who filed an
application of citizenship maintenance but who filed no such application but refuse to obtain a RF
citizen’s passport. Such individuals are substantially restricted in job placement because employers
prefer hiring persons having RF citizenship. This can be seen from many job ads in local
newspapers. For example, Yalta Kulturnaya I Kommercheskaya newspaper, Issue No. 13 (1096), 3
April 2015, contains job ads with a widespread condition – the RF citizenship. Besides, the issue
contains job ads for a cook, cashier, barmen, and cleaner solely subject to having the RF
citizenship: “RF citizens only” (Appendix 20 ).
25
2.2. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Thelocalauthoritieskeeppursuingapolicyofso-called ‘nationalization’ ofpropertyitems. For example,
the State Council of Crimea transferredsome non-residential premises at Managarova Str. in Yalta
to municipal ownership14. Besides, the building of the boarding house “A.P. Chekhov Creative
House of Writers” was transferred to Yalta city’s municipal ownership.
Crimea head Sergey Aksionov came out with a legislative initiative for submitting to the RF Federal
Assembly State Duma a draft Federal Constitutional Law assuming a simplified procedure for
demolition of illegal structures. Thedraftentitles local governments to demolish illegal buildings
without court orders. It carries substantial risks, first of all, to Crimean Tatars who, in a certain
period, had to build so-called ‘take-overs’ because the issues of property for those returning from
the deportation places were not regulated in Ukraine.
Dismantling of buildings at so-called ‘protest clearings’ is going on in Crimea. Sergey Aksionov
stated on 14 April that more than 200 illegal structures at squatted land plots had been dismantled
in Simferopol and Simferopol district. Besides, buildings on 7 areas in Sudak were demolished
voluntarily by the squatters themselves. The authorities emphasize that all the demolitions are
going on voluntarily but some participants of the ‘protest clearings’ report being exerted pressure
on.
The investigation division for major cases of the Chief Investigation Department for Crimea under
the RF Investigation Committee instituted two more criminal proceedings for the components of
crime envisaged by part 1 of Art. 201 RF CC (abuse of power) based on the fact of abuse of power
by the management of Massandra National Production and Agricultural Association15. However,
Massandra NPAA representatives believe that it is a way of exerting pressure on them for
transferring ownership of Massandra NPAA to some other person.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE ‘CRIMEAN SELF-DEFENCE’ IN VIOLATIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
On 1 April in Yalta, representatives of the ‘Crimean self-defence’ produced a decision on
nationalization of Krym hotel to the hotel managers and started making an inventory of its
property. The nationalization decision itself was adopted as far back as 24 September 2014 by a
session of the State Council members.
On 10 April, unknown persons in camouflage uniforms seized a parking area in front of Skazka zoo
and began measurements for subsequent installation of trade kiosks. They refused to show any
documents, and the vehicle they arrived in had a ‘militia’ plate. A few hours later, they went away
toan undisclosed location. Meanwhile, representatives of the ‘Crimean self-defence’ paramilitary
formation claimed they were not involved in the offence against other people’s property.
In the middle of April, about ten armed men in camouflage and masks broke into the Massandra
boarding house and took over control of its territory. After that, they began to take inventory of
14 http://www.crimea.gov.ru/act/13482
15 http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/item/909472/
26
property without any authorization. According to the boarding house staff, the facility was some
time ago included in the list of property owned by Ukrainian businessman Ihor Kolomoysky and
subject to privatization, but then its owners proved their right to this property in courts for three
times.
27
III.
PROBLEMSOFTHECRIMEANRESIDENTSWHOWEREFORCEDTOLEAVETHEPENINSULAANDMOVE
TOMAINLANDUKRAINE (INTERNALLYDISPLACEDPERSONS)
GENERAL SITUATION
A review of the general situation of the Crimean residents who had to leave the peninsula and
move to mainland Ukraine will be published on a quarterly basis.
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS
MONITORINGOFCRIMEAENTRY/EXITPOINTS
The study was conducted by a joint monitoring group of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission,
Lawtrend Legal Transformation Centre, and "Right to Protection" All-Ukrainian Charitable
Foundation in partnership with HIAS, supported by the international coalition “Initiative Group
for Human Rights in Crimea”, conducted monitoring of Crimea entry/exit points.
Results of the monitoring will be presented as a separate report. Provided below are collected data
relating to three Crimea entry/exit points.
According to the Ukrainian legislation, foreigners and Ukrainian citizens can enter the territory of
Crimea only from the Ukrainian territory via 3 border crossing points:
1) Chaplynkacontrolpoint (CP) – Perekop two-way automobile border-crossing point (TABCP or
BCP) (only for citizens of Ukraine and the Russian Federation);
2) Kalanchakcontrolpoint – Armiansk international automobile border-crossing point (IABCP or
BCP);
3) Chongar (Salkovo) controlpoint – Chongar international automobile border-crossing point.
There are two routes from the RF side: via Kerch ferry line and by Russian flights to Simferopol.
According to Ukrainian laws, both options are a violation of the procedure of crossing of the
Ukrainian state border and entail administrative liability (Art. 204-1, 204-2 of the Code of Ukraine
on Administrative Offences) or criminal liability (Art. 332, 332-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).
Representationofinformationabout the rules and regime of administrative border
crossing on the websites of public authorities
The website of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine16has a specialized section “Passing of
persons through the administrative border with the ARC”17 that presents information about the
documents, which Ukrainian citizens, foreigners and children below 14 years of age need to have
to cross the administrative border. Besides, it contains information saying that persons can only
pass via control points at the administrative border of the AR of Crimea situated on the territory
controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, and that the documents issued by the Russian state
authorities in Crimea are not recognized by the border guard service. It means that entry into
16 http://dpsu.gov.ua/
17 http://dpsu.gov.ua/ru/activities/skipping/skipping_31.htm
28
Crimea via Ukrainian control point is impossible with the RF passports issued by migration bodies in
Crimea. Thewebsitehasnoinformation or references to information from Ukrainian public authorities
about possible ways of addressing the issue of execution of travel documents if such documents
are absent (expired, lost). Such information is briefly presented at the website of the State
Migration Service of Ukraine18.
The website of the RF FSB border guard service19 contains no information concerning a special
procedure for crossing of the border with Ukraine in Crimea. Such information is absent at the
Crimean government’s website as well20. This is explained by the fact that the Russian state
authorities regard the administrative border of the AR of Crimea in the territory controlled by the
Ukrainian authorities as the RF state border.
Transport communication
Regular bus and railway communication with Crimea has been cancelled since 26-27 December
2014, but bus communication, not in full extent, was resumed sometime later. At present, there
are some irregular bus runs between the peninsula and mainland Ukraine, for example between
Simferopol-Novoalekseevka, Kherson-Alushta, etc. The first option of bus passenger transportation
is one bus crossing the border. In this case, passengers have to go out of the bus before an
Ukrainian border-crossing point and cross the border as pedestrians. Meanwhile, the driver with the
bus empty is passing control on general terms, and then takes the passengers and goes to the
Russian border-crossing point. The second option assumes that the passengers ride with a
transfer: one bus goes up to the border and puts the people off before the crossing point, and the
second one takes the passengers after border crossing. Besides, the border can be crossed in
private cars or by feet.
Monitoring of Chaplynka CP – Perekop TABCP
The Ukrainian CP is a set of temporary structures: concrete slabs for restriction of transport traffic
and several container units for the work of the staff of border guard and customs services. During
execution of documents, the persons crossing the CP are outdoors, there are no shelters protecting
against rain and snow.
Pedestrians are let in the CP area in groups of 5; prior to that, the people are also outdoors. In the
direction towards Crimea, the CP has no information about the rules of administrative border
crossing or excerpts from the Ukrainian migration legislation.On the route towards mainland
Ukraine, such information is partly presented on an information stand but it contains
misrepresenting data. For example, it has a citation from Art. 10 ofthe Law of Ukraine on the Legal
Regime of Ensuring Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms in the Occupied Territories of Ukraine, according
to which foreigners must have a special permit to enter Crimea. There is no reservation that such a
permit is currently not required because the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has still not adopted a
relevant provision.
18 http://dmsu.gov.ua/informatsiya-dlya-krimchan
19 http://ps.fsb.ru/
20 http://rk.gov.ru/
29
Beside the crossing point, there are military units with automatic and large-calibre weapons. Not
far from the CP, along the road leading to the Russian crossing point, there are small mine-warning
signs. Road guarding from that zone is fragmented and can allow people to get in the danger zone.
During the crossing of the Ukrainian side, an officer of the Ukrainian border guard service, when
checking the Ukrainian documents, asks about the goal of the visit, and enters passport data into
an electronic database. No other documents were required to cross the administrative border, and
no records were made in the passport. The border guard service officer also warned that
Belarussian citizens may be prevented from crossing the border because the Russian crossing point
is two-way and designed only for citizens of Ukraine and Russia. The point ensures passing of
pedestrians and all modes of transport. All the procedures took about 15 minutes to complete.
The buffer zone distance between CP and TABCP is about 2 km. Pedestrian traffic is not regulated,
people walk on the roadway becausethe wayside is not equipped and is used for vehicle parking. A
trailer café is situated in the buffer zone near the wayside, selling water and snacks. A great lot of
garbage can be seen on both sides of the road.
Perekop TABCP is an area fenced bymetal mesh, where container units are situated. In front of the
crossing point, there is a stand with information about the procedure of crossing of the RF state
border. Pedestrians are let in the area in groups of 10. Noseating places or shelters against rain
and snow are provided before the entrance. While waiting, people fill out migration cards. Outside
the fencing perimeter, some people in camouflage clothes withoutdistinctive marks with automatic
weapons were seen. Waiting before the crossing point took about 1 hour. When a sufficient
number of pedestrians gathered at the entrance, a border guard service officer took the group for
passport control. A female Ukrainian citizen from the group passed all the procedures within about
30 minutes. Since the TABCP is two-way, i.e. designed for Russian and Ukrainian citizens only, two
observers being Belarusian citizens were not allowed and went back. At the Ukrainian CP, the
observers’ passports were checked (without making any records), necessary entries in the
electronic database were made, and then the observers were let out without obstacles.
Kalanchak CP – Armiansk IABCP
The Ukrainian CP is a set of temporary structures: concrete slabs for restriction of transport traffic
and several container units for the border guard and customs services. During execution of
documents, the persons crossing the CP are outdoors, there are no shelters protecting against rain
and snow. Crossing the administrative border via this CP is possible by car or by feet. Passengers
of regular cars get off at the CP entrance and undergo control as pedestrians.
Observers took about 30 minutes to cross the Ukrainian CP. Pedestrians are let in the CP area in
groups of 5. One of them is given a log sheet that should be submitted when a group is leaving the
CP area. The group is met by a border guard service officer and taken to passport control. The
information stands present, for example, excerpts from Art. 10 of the Law of Ukraine on the Legal
Regime of Ensuring Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms in the Occupied Territories of Ukraine
concerning the procedure of crossing the administrative border. At the passport control, Belarusian
citizens were asked about the goal of the visit. No record was made in their passports. Persons
passing passport control together with the observers produced their Ukrainian passports; no
Russian passports were seen.
30
A 1-km-long buffer zone is not equipped for pedestrian traffic, and the wayside is occupied
bymotor cars and trucks. People walk on the road in close vicinity of the vehicles running by. A
great lot of garbage was seen along the road.
Armiansk IABCP is an area fenced bymetal mesh, where container units for border guard, customs,
sanitary and epidemiological and other services are situated. The point is equipped with a mobile
scanning unit for trucks. There is a stand with information about the procedure of crossing the RF
state border in front of the point. Pedestrians are let in the area in groups of 10. Nobenches or
shelters against rain and snow are provided before the entrance. At a 20 m distance from the
entrance, there was an armed man standing in a camouflage uniform without anyinsignia.
Crossing the Russian CP as pedestrians took about 2 hours. Pedestrian groups were let in the area
at about 30 minutes intervals. Standing in the queue was unsafe because of the closeness (less
than 0.5 m) of trucks entering the CP. People in the queue repeatedly expressed indignation at the
slow work of border guards, regarding it as humiliation.
The car queue for the crossing was no less than 300 m long. The observers recorded the following
situation. A motor car approached the CP entrance but a border guard did not let it jump the
queue. After that, the car blocked traffic of other vehicles in front of the CP to both sides. Border
guard service officers were trying to settle the conflict for about 20 minutes. Then, two persons
having stripes of the ‘Crimean militia’, 6 masked men with rubber truncheons, and two border
guard service officers came out to the car from the CP area. They surrounded the car and had talks
with driver. Sometime later, the car turned back and went towards the Ukrainian crossing point.
Passport control at the CP was also implemented via a container unit window. Foreigners were
asked about the purpose of their visits. Passport control took about 15 minutes, after which a
border guard accompanied the group to the CP exit. None of 10 pedestrians in the group produced
a Ukrainian passport. Interviews with some Crimean residents indicate a widespread practice:
when a person has 2 passports – Ukrainian and Russian issued in Crimea – the person produces
the Ukrainian passport at the Ukrainian crossing point and the Russian one at the Russian crossing
point.
Chongar IABCP – Chongar (Salkovo) CP
In terms of infrastructure, Chongar IABCP corresponds to other CPs, but from the Crimean side
there is no stand with information about crossing the RF state border. Pedestrians are let in the
area in groups of 10. Nobenches or shelters against rain and snow are provided before the
entrance.
Distance between the Russian and Ukrainian border-crossing points is about 5 km. A shuttle bus
operates in the buffer zone, transporting people from the Russian CP to the bridge where a Russian
military roadblock is installed. Behind the bridge, a similar Ukrainian roadblock is situated.
Theobserversrecordednochecksattheseroadblocks. Waysides are not equipped for pedestrian traffic,
and people walk on the roadway.
An officer of the Ukrainian border guard service regulates entry in the CP. There are stands in front
of the entrance with information about the rules of administrative border crossing. One poster was
prepared by the Ukrainian border guard service, and the second one was made by non31
governmental organizations. These two stands have differences that can be misrepresenting. For
example, the border guard service’s stand doesn’t mention a special permit among necessary
documents for foreigners. The poster prepared by non-governmental organizations, agreed upon
with the Ukrainian border service, on the other hand, lists the special permit about the required
documents.
Crossing the Ukrainian CP also took about 30 minutes.
Kerch – Caucasus ferry line
Kerch ferry line is a sea route connecting Crimea with RF Krasnodar Krai. The ferry line provides
transportation of passengers and vehicles across the Kerch Strait. The ferries run between Krym
port (Kerch) and Kavkaz port (Krasnodar Krai). The line is situated in the strait’s narrowest place
(distance between the ports is about 5 km), near the northeastern outskirts of Kerch city, and is
operated on the round-the-clock basis throughout the year.
According to the website of Kerch ferry line, Morskaya Direktsiya LLC21, there are 12 runs a day at
a 45 minutes interval. However, this information did not correspond to the reality as of the moment
of observation, 25 April 2015. The ferry line workers reported that a ferry is dispatched as it is filled
with vehicles: for example, people going back to Crimea waited for departure of the ferry for about
1.5 hours.
To enter the station, a person must under personal examination via a metal detector. Sanitary and
customs control is envisaged for road transport. The cost of a one-way ticket was 162 roubles as of
25 April 2015. To buy a ticket, a person needs to provide an identity document according to the
general rules valid in the RF. No passport control is conducted upon arrival to the mainland.
The review was prepared by:
Olha Skrypnyk, Deputy Head of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission;
Vissarion Aseev, analyst of the Almenda Centre of Civic Education;
HalynaBocheva, Right to Protection AUCF in partnership with HIAS;
Oleksandra Krylenkova, field coordinator of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission;
Andrii Krysko, Simferopol office coordinator of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission;
Dmytro Makarov, Deputy Head of the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission;
Tetyana Pechonchyk, Chairman of the Board of the Human Rights Information Centre;
DaryaSvyrydova, lawyer, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union;
Experts of the Lawtrend Legal Transformation Centre.
21 http://www.gosparom.ru/
32
APPENDICES
Appendix 1
VerdicttoYe. ZaitsevinthecaseonthemurderofUkraineNavyMajorS. Karachevsky
Full text of the verdict is available at:
http://crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/prigovor-zaytsev.pdf
33
Appendix 2
Appealin the criminal case concerning Sgt. Ye. Zaitsev
34
Appendix 3
FedirKostenko’scomplainttoCrimeaprosecutorN.V. Poklonskaya
35
Appendix 4
The resolution on extending the measure of restraint in the form of detention, previously assigned
to O.F. Kostenko, for two months, i.e. through 3 June 2015, and the decision on scheduling an
open court hearing for 20 April 2015
36
Appendix 5
ExpertopiniononO. Kostenko’sstateofhealthdated 9 February
37
Appendix 6
Certificatefromthepre-trialdetentionfacilityconcerningO. Kostenko’s state of health
38
Appendix 7
Appealagainst thecourtrulingonextensionofthemeasureofrestraintforO. Kostenko
39
Appendix 8
Appellateresolutionconcerning the lawyer’s appeal against the court ruling
onextensionofthemeasureofrestraintforO. Kostenko
40
Appendix 9
Thelawyer’smessageonacrimecommittedagainstO. Kostenko
41
Appendix 10
Order to deny initiation of criminal proceedings on the lawyer’s statement on a crime committed
against O. Kostenko
42
Appendix 11
Reply by S.A. Bogoslavskaya, Deputy Head of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in
Crimea, as regards O. Kostenko’s health check results
43
Appendix 12
ReplybyS.A. Bogoslavskaya, DeputyHeadoftheOfficeoftheHumanRightsOmbudsmaninCrimea, to the
effect that there is no ground to continueO. Kostenko’shealthcheck
44
Appendix 13
Application on the loss of Fedir Kostenko
45
Appendix 14
RecordofsearchintheapartmentofO. Kostenko’s common-law wife
46
Appendix 15
Report on the administrative offence envisaged by Art. 13.15(2) RF AOС“Abuse of the freedom of
media” concerning G. Yuksel
47
Appendix 16
Theformof “Notificationof extremism” on the web-site of the Crimean prosecutor’s office
48
Appendix 17
Resolution of the Commission for the Affairs of Minors and Protection of Their Rights, Simferopol
city, on imposing an administrative penalty upon a participant of filming of a video clip in support
of the ATR TV channel
49
Appendix 18
Court decision on withdrawing the building (where the Majlis was situated) from the Crimea
Foundation ownership to arrange its redemption or sale by public tender
50
Appendix 19
Roadblock in Gaspra settlement (8 April 2015)
51
Appendix 20
Yalta Kulturnaya I Kommercheskaya newspaper, Issue No. 13 (1096), 3 April 2015

Annex 946
Kharkiv Human Rights Group, Sentsov-Kolchenko Trial, Crimea and What Russia Has to Hide
(10 July 2015)

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Annex 947
Ridvan Bari Urcosta, New Eastern Europe, Crimean Tatar World Congress: Fear and
Expectations (4 August 2015), accessed at http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1680-
crimean-tatar-world-congress-fears-and-expectations.

􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀑􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀁􀀂􀀈􀀇􀀉􀀊􀀂􀀋􀀂􀀈􀀖􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀗􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀍􀀅􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀘􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀖􀀚􀀛􀀜􀀝􀀘􀀕􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀘􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀘􀀞􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀘􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀘􀀟􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀘􀀅􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐
􀀠􀀡􀀢􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀅􀀐􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀤􀀈􀀝􀀥􀀈􀀦􀀡􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀨􀀈􀀚􀀚􀀑􀀨􀀝
􀀁􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀂􀀙􀀑􀀈􀀦􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀍􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀙
􀀋􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀩􀀃􀀎􀀪􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀫􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀈􀀬􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀆
􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐
􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀭􀀆􀀙􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀝􀀮􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀯􀀃􀀄􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀤
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀤􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀔􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟
􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀐􀀣􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀟􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀒􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀐􀀣􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀎
􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀟􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀐􀀣􀀈􀀭􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀯􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀡􀀰􀀈􀀲􀀅􀀍􀀃􀀰􀀆􀀇􀀎
􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀪􀀃􀀕􀀅􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀰􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀃􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀤
􀀭􀀅􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀦􀀰􀀳􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀂􀀱􀀈􀀴􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀤􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀙
􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀜􀀝􀀝􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀚􀀧􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐
􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀚􀀛􀀝􀀈􀀵􀀶􀀴􀀐􀀱
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀃􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀉􀀄􀀄􀀊􀀋􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀍􀀎
􀀒􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀍􀀆􀀙􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀕􀀂􀀡􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀂􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀌􀀞􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇
􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀌􀀡􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀌􀀢􀀍􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎
􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀔􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀟􀀡􀀊􀀡􀀂􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀩􀀅􀀟􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀢􀀆􀀂􀀌􀀪􀀤􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀔􀀡􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀆􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀸􀀕􀀌􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀃􀀍􀀹􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀆􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀱
􀀦􀀈􀀰􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀌􀀍􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀊􀀆􀀇􀀊
􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀕􀀍􀀡􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀎􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀍􀀍􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀑
􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀙􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀇􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅
􀀅􀀊􀀣􀀇􀀃􀀕􀀈􀀏􀀂􀀌􀀡􀀔􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀔􀀱􀀈􀀺􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀔􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀔􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀇
􀀡􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀅􀀟􀀟􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀐􀀡􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀼􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀤􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀕􀀤􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀃􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀡􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀕􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀡􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀐
􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀇􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀡􀀍􀀆􀀱
􀀯􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀰􀀇􀀌􀀞􀀍􀀅􀀎􀀏􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀕􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀌􀀂􀀙􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀞􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀐
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀞􀀆􀀂􀀎􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀃􀀏􀀇􀀌􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀏􀀙􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟
􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀤􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀃􀀕􀀣􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀂􀀌􀀎􀀡􀀕􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀅􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀚􀀖􀀥
􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀌􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀃􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀭􀀆􀀙􀀈􀀚􀀜􀀊􀀣
􀀚􀀮􀀥􀀥􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀯􀀌􀀪􀀃􀀅􀀊􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀱
􀀉􀀣􀀃􀀂􀀎􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀍􀀃􀀄􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀌􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀢􀀅
􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀟􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀡􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀌􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟
􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀌􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀢􀀷􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎
􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀵􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀃􀀍􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀽􀀡􀀂􀀌􀀔􀀅􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀽􀀬􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍
􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀱
􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀕􀀡􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀤􀀈􀀣􀀌􀀞􀀅􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀤􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀔􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀕􀀍􀀡􀀐􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇
􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀌􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀟􀀟􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀍􀀃􀀪􀀅
􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀂􀀈􀀣􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀡􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀤􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀞􀀆􀀂􀀅􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀡􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀇
􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀢􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀃􀀔􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀱
􀀦􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀌􀀕􀀡􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀞􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀙􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀟􀀊􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀍􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀂􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀤􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀃􀀕􀀣􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀃􀀄􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀡􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀡􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀇􀀪􀀃􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌
􀀆􀀕􀀣􀀃􀀅􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀊􀀌􀀇􀀌􀀄􀀙􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀱
􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀣􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀢􀀂􀀡􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀨􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀟
􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀊􀀞􀀅􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀥􀀾􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀪􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀊􀀞􀀅􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀡􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀊
􀀚􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀧􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀨􀀱
􀀺􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀢􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀆
􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀞􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀟􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀍􀀍􀀆􀀔􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀯􀀌􀀪􀀃􀀅􀀊􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀄􀀡􀀕􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀢􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀐􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀒􀀆􀀂􀀘􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀕􀀣􀀃􀀇􀀏
􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀞􀀈􀀏􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀕􀀃􀀂􀀕􀀡􀀄􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀄􀀱􀀈􀀯􀀃􀀇􀀕􀀅
􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀌􀀰􀀈􀀔􀀍􀀆􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀭􀀆􀀂􀀕􀀣􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀔􀀡􀀂􀀐􀀡􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀆
􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀱􀀈􀀯􀀃􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀓􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀤
􀀭􀀌􀀐􀀕􀀌􀀞􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀏􀀌􀀊􀀃􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀊
􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀿􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀇􀀼􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀦􀀟􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀔􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀆􀀃􀀍􀀅􀀎􀀤􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀂􀀌􀀎􀀡􀀕􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀕􀀙􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎
􀀌􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀱
􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀢􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀷􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀏􀀅􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀔
􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀡􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀍􀀃􀀇􀀰􀀐􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀊􀀞􀀅􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂
􀀭􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀟􀀆􀀈􀁀􀁁􀀣􀀅􀀄􀀃􀀍􀀅􀀪􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀩􀀅􀀟􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀁􀀣􀀡􀀢􀀆􀀂􀀌􀀪􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀢􀀃􀀎􀀎􀀅􀀇􀀱􀀈􀀺􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀟􀀃􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇
􀀯􀀃􀀄􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀍􀀌􀀐􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀍􀀌􀀕􀀰􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀯􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀒􀀌􀀂􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀒􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀙􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀿􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀍􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀣􀀅􀀎
􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀕􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀌􀀈􀀌􀀔􀀅􀀇􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀏􀀇􀀊􀀙
􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀟􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀱
􀀴􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀟􀀟􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀣􀀌􀀎􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀯􀀫􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀡􀀐􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀟􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌
􀀊􀀣􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀌􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀙􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌
􀀂􀀅􀀊􀀡􀀂􀀇􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀡􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀂􀀪􀀃􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀡􀀂􀀐􀀡􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀈􀀟􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀄􀀌􀀌􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀣􀀌􀀎􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟
􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀣􀀃􀀷􀀆􀀕􀀰􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀊􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀇􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀡􀀍􀀆􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀌􀀂
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀤􀀈􀀃􀀟􀀈􀁂􀀇􀀅􀀅􀀎􀀅􀀎􀁃􀀤􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀌􀀞􀀈􀀡􀀔􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀎􀀎􀀅􀀇􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀁂􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀂􀀌􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀊􀁃􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀂
􀀐􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀕􀀣􀀅􀀐􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀣􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀍􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀕􀀣􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀄􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀆
􀀧􀀖􀀥
􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀍􀀟􀀤􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀡􀀔􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀅
􀀻􀀡􀀃􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀎􀀃􀀕􀀊􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀦􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀌􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀰􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀄􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊
􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀢􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀙􀀈􀀙􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀱
􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀙􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀿􀀡􀀂􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀘􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀟􀀘􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀟􀀘􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀘􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀊􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇
􀀞􀀣􀀃􀀕􀀣􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀕􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀍􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀚􀀮􀀜􀀝􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀡􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀆􀀇
􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀎􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀃􀁁􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀁄􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀟􀀘􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀥
􀀞􀀣􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀁄􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀕􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀰􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀔􀀍􀀆􀀕􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀺􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀤􀀈􀀿􀀙􀀃􀀪􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀕􀀅􀀔􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆
􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀴􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀤􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀤􀀈􀀆􀀟􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀏􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀡􀀔􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀇􀀘􀀞􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀔􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀍􀀰􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀔􀀡􀀊􀀊􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀡􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀟􀀡􀀐􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀱
􀀺􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀕􀀌􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀃􀀇􀀰􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀌􀀍􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀪􀀅􀀍􀀌􀀔􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀏􀀙
􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀡􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀿􀀡􀀂􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀞􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀟
􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀍􀀃􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀱􀀈􀀵􀀅􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀌􀀕􀀕􀀡􀀔􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀤􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀄􀀔􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀃􀀄􀀔􀀌􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀢􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌
􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀿􀀡􀀂􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀕􀀆􀀡􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀪􀀆􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀿􀀡􀀂􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀢􀀆􀀐􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀅
􀀐􀀅􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀡􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀍􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀿􀀙􀀃􀀪􀀱􀀈􀀦􀀐􀀈􀀭􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀟􀀆􀀈􀁀􀁁􀀣􀀅􀀄􀀃􀀍􀀅􀀪􀀈􀀟􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀤
􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀙􀀈􀀟􀀆􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀌􀀢􀀍􀀅􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀟􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀢􀀆􀀕􀀰􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀱􀀈􀀺􀀊􀀈􀀣􀀆􀀐
􀀇􀀌􀀞􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀏􀀆􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀂􀀅
􀀡􀀇􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀊􀀡􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀎􀀃􀀕􀀊􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀅􀀱
􀀦􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀤􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀔􀀂􀀌􀀘
􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀘􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀘􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀌􀀍􀀌􀀏􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀂􀀰􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀌􀀇􀀏
􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀔􀀡􀀍􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀞􀀆􀀂􀀇􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀌􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀌􀀈􀀞􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇
􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀈􀁅􀀎􀀆􀀇􀀏􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀡􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀊􀀙􀁅􀀱
􀀴􀀇􀀈􀁆􀀡􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀧􀀜􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀨􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀺􀀇􀀪􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀃􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀢􀀆􀀇􀀇􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀂􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂
􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀋􀀌􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀿􀀡􀀂􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀈􀀽􀀍􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇
􀀁􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀃􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀅􀀤􀀈􀁇􀀆􀀃􀀂􀀈􀀯􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀍􀀙􀀆􀀅􀀪􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀊􀀈􀁀􀀅􀀔􀀡􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀁􀀣􀀆􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀆􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀵􀀆􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀁆􀀅􀀍􀀆􀀍􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀙
􀀞􀀃􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀡􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀚􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀒􀀯􀀫􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀇􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀁅􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀒􀀅􀀢􀀂􀀡􀀆􀀂􀀙􀀈􀀧􀀛􀁅􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀱
􀀺􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀂􀀌􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀡􀀏􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀚􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀆􀀰􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀺􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀌
􀀟􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀁆􀀡􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀧􀀜 􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀯􀀃􀀄􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀔􀀌􀀍
􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀂􀀃􀀕􀀊􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀡􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀄􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀕􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀌􀀎􀀙􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀊􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀦􀀣􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀁􀀣􀀙􀀏􀀌􀁁􀀈􀀸􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀔􀀡􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀆􀀎
􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀹􀀱
􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀶􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀕􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀆􀀈􀁁􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀟􀀃􀀕􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇
􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀱􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀕􀀣􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀿􀀡􀀂􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀃
􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀙􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀰􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀪􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀏􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀙
􀀞􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀔􀀍􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀟􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀞􀀇􀀈􀀟􀀆􀀄􀀃􀀍􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎
􀀎􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀱􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀍􀀙􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀁆􀀡􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀧􀀮􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀊􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀬􀀯
􀀦􀀄􀀢􀀆􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀶􀀅􀀌􀀟􀀟􀀂􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀠􀀙􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀱􀀈􀀠􀀙􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀈􀁂􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀟􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀣􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀞􀀆􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀐􀀡􀀔􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀊􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀂
􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀡􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀙􀁃􀀱􀀈􀀦􀀎􀀎􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀐􀀣􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀌􀀞􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀡􀀕􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐
􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀤􀀈􀀢􀀡􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀣􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀈􀀍􀀅􀀪􀀅􀀍􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀟􀀃􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀐􀀣􀀈􀀶􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀆􀀊􀀊􀀅􀀇􀀎􀀱
􀀊􀀣
􀀾􀀖􀀥
􀁈􀀆􀀪􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀄􀀃􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀡􀀂􀀂􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀡􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀡􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀤􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐
􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀓􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀢􀀂􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀟􀀌􀀍􀀍􀀌􀀞􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀑
􀀘􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀔􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀔􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀽􀀡􀀂􀀌􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀤􀀈􀀬􀀵􀀤􀀈􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀽􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅
􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀺􀀇􀀎􀀃􀀏􀀅􀀇􀀌􀀡􀀐􀀈􀀠􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀤
􀀘􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀞􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀞􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀅􀀍􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀙
􀀕􀀆􀀂􀀅􀀟􀀡􀀍􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀢􀀙􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀱􀀈􀀺􀀊􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀎􀀅􀀐􀀃􀀂􀀆􀀢􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀃􀀐
􀀊􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀄􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅
􀀕􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀯􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀐􀀤
􀀘􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀌􀀔􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀔􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀽􀀡􀀂􀀌􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀤􀀈􀀬􀀵􀀤􀀈􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀽􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀅􀀷􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀘􀀿􀀡􀀂􀀡􀀍􀀊􀀆􀀃
􀀐􀀙􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀈􀀆􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀍􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀡􀀊􀀣􀀌􀀂􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀔􀀅􀀌􀀔􀀍􀀅􀀤
􀀘􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀡􀀔􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀄􀀡􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀇􀀡􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀇􀀌􀀊􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀏􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀈􀀩􀀡􀀐􀀐􀀃􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀐􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀃􀀏􀀇􀀊􀀙
􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀇􀀡􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀌􀀄􀀃􀀕􀀈􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀏􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀤
􀀘􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀡􀀔􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀃􀀐􀀣􀀈􀀏􀀌􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀄􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀢􀀌􀀎􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀆􀀊􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀇
􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀡􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀌􀀂􀀎􀀃􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀅􀀙􀀱
􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀕􀀃􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀢􀀌􀀎􀀙􀀈􀀐􀀣􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀃􀀎􀀅􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀪􀀃􀀐􀀌􀀂􀀙􀀈􀀡􀀇􀀃􀀊􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀠􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀈􀀭􀀃􀀇􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀉􀀡􀀂􀀰􀀅􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀅
􀀡􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀣􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀂􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀊􀀂􀀌􀀍􀀤
􀀘􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀽􀀬􀀤􀀈􀀴􀀯􀀁􀀽􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀬􀀵􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀅􀀄􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀢􀀡􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀤
􀀘􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀄􀀢􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀟􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀈􀀂􀀅􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀢􀀙􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀃􀀂
􀀃􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀡􀀇􀀊􀀂􀀃􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀅􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀍􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀐􀀱
􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀦􀀇􀀰􀀆􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀐􀀊􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀐􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀟􀀌􀀂􀀅􀀈􀀊􀀞􀀌􀀈􀀄􀀆􀀷􀀌􀀂􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀐􀀡􀀅􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀃􀀂􀀐􀀊􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀌􀀃􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀇􀀅􀀞
􀀣􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀌􀀇􀀏􀀂􀀅􀀐􀀐􀀈􀀞􀀣􀀌􀀈􀀞􀀌􀀡􀀍􀀎􀀈􀀢􀀅􀀈􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀂􀀡􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀎􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀔􀀍􀀌􀀄􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀍􀀌􀀢􀀢􀀙􀀃􀀇􀀏􀀈􀀟􀀡􀀇􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀐􀀱􀀈􀀉􀀣􀀅
􀀐􀀅􀀕􀀌􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀌􀀇􀀅􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀄􀀌􀀢􀀃􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀎􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀔􀀌􀀂􀀆􀀈􀀞􀀃􀀊􀀣􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀃􀀄􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀃􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀅􀀟􀀟􀀅􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀐􀀙􀀐􀀊􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀕
􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀌􀀂􀀎􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀌􀀈􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀻􀀡􀀆􀀊􀀅􀀍􀀙􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀐􀀞􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀌􀀂􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀕􀀣􀀆􀀍􀀍􀀅􀀇􀀏􀀅􀀐􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀧􀀝􀀚􀀥􀀱
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀄􀀁􀀐􀀑􀀄􀀇􀀍􀀐􀀒􀀇􀀓􀀉􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀈􀀃􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀈􀀣􀀡􀀄􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀂􀀃􀀏􀀣􀀊􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀕􀀊􀀃􀀪􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀈􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀐􀀕􀀃􀀅􀀇􀀊􀀃􀀐􀀊􀀤􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀎􀀈􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀢􀀅􀀂􀀈􀀌􀀟􀀈􀀊􀀣􀀅􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀇
􀀉􀀆􀀊􀀆􀀂􀀐􀀈􀀺􀀇􀀊􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀵􀀶􀀴􀀈􀁂􀀫􀀃􀁁􀀃􀀄􀀈􀁉􀀃􀀂􀀃􀀄􀁃􀀈􀀃􀀇􀀈􀀯􀀃􀀄􀀟􀀅􀀂􀀌􀀔􀀌􀀍􀀤􀀈􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀤􀀈􀀬􀀰􀀂􀀆􀀃􀀇􀀅􀀱􀀈􀁈􀀅􀀈􀀣􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀐􀀈􀀆􀀇􀀈􀀭􀀦􀀈􀀃􀀇
􀀠􀀌􀀍􀀃􀀊􀀃􀀕􀀆􀀍􀀈􀀯􀀕􀀃􀀅􀀇􀀕􀀅􀀈􀀟􀀂􀀌􀀄􀀈􀀉􀀆􀀡􀀂􀀃􀀎􀀆􀀈􀀵􀀆􀀊􀀃􀀌􀀇􀀆􀀍􀀈􀁊􀀱􀀺􀀱􀀈􀁊􀀅􀀂􀀇􀀆􀀎􀀐􀀰􀀙􀀈􀀬􀀇􀀃􀀪􀀅􀀂􀀐􀀃􀀊􀀙􀀱
􀀠􀀆􀀂􀀊􀀇􀀅􀀂􀀐
􀀥􀀖􀀥
Annex 948
Andrii Klymenko, Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea, Atlantic Council (5
August 2015)

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
IN RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED CRIMEA
by Andrii Klymenko
© 2015 The Atlantic Council of the United States and Freedom House. All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic
Council or Freedom House, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews.
Please direct inquiries to:
Atlantic Council
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Washington, DC 20036
ISBN: 978-1-61977-980-8
Publication design: April Brady. Cover is a treatment of a photo of pro-Russia forces in Perevalne, Crimea.
Photo credit: Anton Holoborodko
This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence.
The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council, Freedom House, and
their funders do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.
March 2015
OR
Foreword .......................................................................................................................................................... 1
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 3
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea ............................................................................... 4
Changing the Guard, Replacing the Population ........................................................................................ 6
Restricting Communication and Media: An “Information Ghetto” .....................................................8
Targeting Annexation Critics and “Disloyal” Groups ............................................................................10
Property Rights ..............................................................................................................................................17
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................18
Appendix: Timeline of the Annexation .....................................................................................................19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
1
The “green men” who fanned out across Crimea in early
2014, establishing control over key infrastructure and clearing
the way for once-marginal political actors to seize the
reins of power, were the vanguard of a forced political
change that has led to grave human rights abuses across the
Crimean peninsula.
Firmly in control of the executive and law enforcement bodies,
the so-called Crimean authorities ostensibly implemented the
law of the Russian Federation but in reality created a hybrid
system where Russian law is subsidiary to the whims of “selfdefense
forces” and “republican authorities.” Those forces
derive their power from their weapons rather than from the
support of the local population.
In an environment where brute force rules the day,
the international community has lost access to basic
information about political, economic, and social developments
on the Crimean peninsula. As a result, human rights abuses,
now a regular part of life in Crimea, are left unreported or
poorly understood.
Freedom House and the Atlantic Council’s Dinu Patriciu
Eurasia Center are proud to present Andrii Klymenko’s
report, Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea. His
work makes an important contribution to our understanding
of what has happened in Crimea since the Kremlin forcibly
seized the peninsula in February 2014, setting off a crisis that
is transforming security calculations in Europe and Eurasia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to justify the
intervention in Crimea by claiming that ethnic Russians and
Russian speakers were under threat by Ukrainian authorities
and nationalists. What Klymenko’s research makes clear, in
a dispassionate parade of facts, is that the Russian invasion
introduced extensive repression on the peninsula. Under the
laws and policies instituted by the Kremlin, any resident of
Crimea who refuses to take Russian citizenship and a Russian
passport, or who tries to retain Ukrainian citizenship, forfeits
his/her right to live, to work in, or even to visit the peninsula.
These actions violate fundamental international human
rights, including basic civil, political, and social rights. If for
no other reason than this, events in Crimea deserve greater
attention, and authorities there should be held accountable
for compromising fundamental freedoms.
This report is part of the Atlantic Council’s Ukraine in Europe
Initiative. This initiative was designed in early 2014 to help
the Ukrainian people choose their own future in the face
of increasingly autocratic leadership at home (under then-
President Viktor Yanukovych) and aggression from Russia.
As Ukraine elected a reform-minded president in May 2014,
Petro Poroshenko, and a new parliament in October of that
year, the Ukraine in Europe Initiative has focused on helping
Ukraine implement democratic and market reforms at home
and to withstand and deter further Russian aggression.
The Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center would like to thank the
generous supporters of our initiative. They include the
Ukrainian World Congress, the Smith Richardson Foundation,
the George Chopivsky Foundation, Chevron USA, US State
Department, and the Espirito Santo Financial Group.
The Eurasia Center also wishes to pay respect to the
memory of Dinu Patriciu, its visionary founding sponsor,
whose untimely passing in August 2014 saddened all at the
Atlantic Council. Freedom House wishes to acknowledge
the dedication of David Kramer to the issues confronting
Ukraine and its neighbors.
FOREWORD
Frederick Kempe, President and CEO, Atlantic Council
Mark P. Lagon, President, Freedom House
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
3 Atlantic Council | 3
In March 2014, Russia forcefully and illegally annexed
the Crimean peninsula from the territory of Ukraine.
􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀃀􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁅􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀺􀁒􀁕􀁏􀁇􀀃
War II exposed the Kremlin’s imperialist ambitions
and posed a serious threat to the post-Cold War
international order.
Since the onset of Russian occupation, Crimea’s
residents have faced increasingly grave civic,
political, and human rights violations. These include
discriminatory policies against Crimea’s ethnic
Tatar minority, infringement of property rights, and
intimidation of independent voices through selective
use of the law and physical force. The Kremlin has
sought to suppress reporting of many such abuses
by creating a so-called “information ghetto” on the
peninsula through a crackdown on local and foreign
media. As Western media shifted its attention to
the war in Ukraine’s east, the human rights abuses in
Crimea have gone underreported.
This report documents the alarming deterioration of
human rights in Crimea under Russian occupation.
Through a careful chronicling of evidence, Andrii
Klymenko, Chief Editor of Black Sea News and
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Maidan of
Foreign Affairs, exposes the Kremlin’s repressive
and discriminatory policies against three groups:
ethnic, religious, or national groups that opposed the
annexation, especially members of the indigenous
Crimean Tatar community, independent voices seeking
to report on the situation in Crimea (journalists, civil
society activists, and members of nongovernmental
organizations), and holders of Ukrainian passports.
The Crimean Tatars, estimated at three hundred
thousand, have endured especially harsh treatment
since the annexation. For their refusal to recognize
the authority of the de facto government, Tatar leaders
have been exiled or banned from public life, their public
commemorations prohibited, and their media muzzled.
Activists and journalists who simply speak up for
human rights have been subjected to torture,
intimidated into emigration, and have had their
􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃
with authorities offering little to no evidence that they
are investigating the disappearances.
Today, holding a Ukrainian passport as a Crimean
resident is tantamount to treason. Crimean
residents who hold Ukrainian passports are de facto
disenfranchised from exercising their political and civic
rights. They are blocked from accessing social services,
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀃀􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
legal employment.
The report is not a complete account of the many
human rights violations in Crimea, but it makes clear
that physical harassment, criminal prosecution, and
forced emigration of potentially “disloyal” groups
is part and parcel of Russia’s control strategy for
the peninsula. By documenting a small portion of
such abuses, Klymenko provides a window into
the “information ghetto” of the peninsula and the
everyday lives of its residents in the year since
Russian occupation.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
4
This report seeks to chronicle the deteriorating
human rights situation in Crimea since the occupation
and annexation of the previously autonomous
Ukrainian region by the Russian Federation. The
crisis, which began in February 2014, continues to
intensify due to Russian legislation and a series of
oppressive measures carried out by the region’s de
facto authorities.
These actions, which are not widely reported
abroad, include the imposition of Russian citizenship,
restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly,
takeover of private and Ukrainian state property,
clampdowns on independent media outlets,
persecution of annexation critics and proponents
of Ukrainian unity, and harassment of ethnic and
religious groups perceived as disloyal to the new
order. They represent violations of basic human rights
and, in some cases, contravene international law.
The report is based on the information available
from Ukrainian and international media outlets,
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
journalists working undercover in Crimea, human
rights groups, and the author’s own interviews with
Crimean residents.1
Before Crimea’s annexation by the Russian Federation
in March 2014, the human rights situation in Crimea
differed little from that in the rest of Ukraine. For
the most part, residents of the peninsula enjoyed
freedom of speech and assembly and had an active
civil society. Numerous independent print, broadcast,
and online media outlets operated. Nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and grassroots groups regularly
1 Interviews with residents of Crimea took place during the author’s
visits to mainland Ukraine.
organized assemblies, rallies, and pickets on political,
social, and environmental issues. Protests against
corruption or illegal construction were commonplace,
and Crimean Tatar organizations were particularly
active.
Throughout the EuroMaidan period of mass protests
from November 2013 to February 2014, this situation
did not materially change.2 However, the occupation
and annexation of Crimea in early 2014 initiated a
string of serious and ongoing human rights violations.
This put the peninsula and its residents in an entirely
new position—one predicated by Russia’s need to
quash unsanctioned political activity and pro-Ukrainian
sentiment while presenting a picture of its actions as
legal and locally supported.
To understand this crackdown it is important to
recognize that, contrary to the Russian narrative, the
annexation of the region was not the result of natural
sociopolitical processes, nor did it grow from the
aspirations of the Crimean population. In fact, residents
of Crimea have actually grown more “Ukrainian” in
their outlook in recent years. According to a 2011
survey by the Razumkov Center, an independent policy
institute in Kyiv, 71.3 percent of respondents said they
considered Ukraine their homeland—up from 39.3
percent in a 2008 poll.3 Among ethnic Russian residents,
66.8 percent viewed Ukraine as their homeland;
among ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, that
2 The day President Viktor Yanukovych rejected the Association Agreement
with the EU, tens of thousands of protesters appeared on the
Maidan, Kyiv’s main square. When the authorities tried to disband the
protesters by force, the demonstrations became much larger protests
against Yanukovych’s authoritarian policies.
􀀖􀀃 􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁕􀁄􀁝􀁘􀁐􀁎􀁒􀁙􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀑􀁘􀁄􀀒􀁘􀁎􀁕􀀒􀃀􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀒􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁒􀁕􀁜􀁂􀁍􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀒􀀱􀀶􀀧􀀔􀀕􀀕􀁂􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁂􀀖􀀑
pdf (in Ukrainian).
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED CRIMEA
BY ANDRII KLYMENKO
Andrii Klymenko is Chief Editor of Black Sea News and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Maidan of Foreign Affairs.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
5 Atlantic Council | 5
􀃀􀁊􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀛􀀓􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃􀀲􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀙􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
respondents said they did not think of Ukraine as their
homeland, while 10 percent said they could not answer
the question.
In preparing to annex the peninsula, Russian state
media launched a campaign to counter Ukrainian
􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀃁􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
by “Ukrainian fascists” among Crimea’s ethnic Russian
population. This echoed similar rhetoric used by former
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of
Regions toward the EuroMaidan movement.
Misinformation was followed in short order by
􀁌􀁑􀃀􀁏􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀋􀁖􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁛􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
of the occupation). The days immediately surrounding
the start of the Russian occupation of Crimea on
February 26 ushered in a series of escalating
􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀝􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁅􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀃀􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃
Russia’s Krasnodar region, the covert deployment of
Russian troops with military equipment and specialpurpose
airborne units, the seizure of Crimean
􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
military blockade of Ukrainian army and navy bases and
law-enforcement facilities.4
􀀗􀀃 􀀦􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁎􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
Federation. They are divided into regional territorial armies and Military
Cossack Societies; the smallest of these is known as a “hundred” and
derives from the World War I Cossack cavalry squadrons consisting of
one hundred soldiers.
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁅􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁜􀀃􀀋􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀂷􀁖􀀃􀀮􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁑􀁒􀁇􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀌􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃
announced its support for the Russian population of Crimea on February
28. See Simon Shuster, “Armed Cossacks Flock to Crimea to Help
These blockades involved armed Crimean “selfdefense”
units, formed from the ranks of the Cossacks
􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀃀􀁏􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁛􀀐􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
of the Berkut (the special Ukrainian police force
that disbanded over the shooting of EuroMaidan
protesters).5 The executive branches of the Crimean
regional and Sevastopol municipal governments
were replaced, paving the way for the supposed
legitimization of the occupation via a March 16
referendum, the legality and results of which
Russian Annexation Bid,” Time, March 12, 2014, http://time.com/22125/
ukraine-crimea-cossacks-russia/; Roland Oliphant, “Ukraine Crisis:
On the New Crimea Border the Russian Army Waits,” Telegraph,
March 3, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
ukraine/10674305/Ukraine-crisis-On-Crimeas-new-border-the-Rus-
􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀐􀀤􀁕􀁐􀁜􀀐􀁚􀁄􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀑􀁋􀁗􀁐􀁏􀀌􀀑􀀃􀀫􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀃀􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀃀􀁉􀁗􀁜􀀐􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀮􀁘􀁅􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃
Army group arrived in Crimea at the invitation of the Crimean Cossack
Union on February 26, the day before the occupation began. Cossacks
were urgently summoned in just two hours. Ukrainian border
guards tried to prevent the passage of the delegation to the territory
of Crimea. Russian media reported one thousand Kuban Cossacks
􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁆􀁆􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕-
􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁛􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
the Cossack army reported that each Cossack was paid one thousand
rubles per day for being in Crimea.
The Cossack grouping was dispersed throughout the peninsula.
Together with alleged Berkut soldiers, the Cossacks took control of
the checkpoints on all transportation routes and points of entry into
􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀀋􀀦􀁋􀁒􀁑􀁋􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁖􀁎􀁌􀁜􀀃􀀹􀁄􀁏􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃
buildings. The Cossacks set up camps, blocked entrances, and dug
trenches and bunkers.
5 On January 24, 2014, a congress of the Taurus “hundred” of the
Tersk Military Cossack Society (from the Stavropol region of Russia)
took place in Sevastopol. The congress demanded that the city administration
created “people’s units” for protecting order in Sevastopol.
Pro-Russia forces patrol Simferopol International Airport on February 28, 2014. Source: Elizabeth Arrott/VOA.
6
were overwhelmingly rejected by the international
community.
This referendum was held under occupation
conditions marked by the presence of Russian military
troops, including Cossacks, and “self-defense” units
􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁕􀃀􀁈􀁏􀁇􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
bases, and guarding polling stations and election
􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁌􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃
with quasi-military, bureaucratic, and ostensibly legal
mechanisms used to maintain an environment of
misinformation and intimidation toward those who
would question the legitimacy of Russia’s takeover.
CHANGING THE GUARD,
REPLACING THE POPULATION
Maintaining this semblance of legitimacy requires
establishing a new bureaucracy in Crimea and
cultivating a “loyal” population incapable of organized
protest or any other unsanctioned political activity.
This is being accomplished in part by coercing
Crimeans into obtaining Russian citizenship and
􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁜􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
replacements.
In the year since the occupation began, Russia has
removed Crimean professionals from strategically
important posts throughout the peninsula. Major law
􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃
investigators, police, and members of the security
services, were steadily being replaced by personnel
imported from different regions of Russia.
A partial sample shows the systematic nature of
these replacements:
• March 25: After signing the treaty annexing Crimea,
Russian President Vladimir Putin appoints Russian
􀁑􀁄􀁙􀁜􀀃􀀹􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀲􀁏􀁈􀁊􀀃􀀥􀁈􀁏􀁄􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀁈􀁙􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
representative to the new Crimean Federal District.
• April 16: The port city of Feodosiia is assigned
a new prosecutor from the Krasnoyarsk region of
Russia.
• 􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀕􀀕􀀝􀀃􀀲􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀃀􀁉􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀁈􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
Russian regions are detailed to the new investigative
􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃
• April 25: A prosecutor from Orsk in the Orenburg
region of Russia is appointed to a similar post in the
Crimean city of Alushta.
• May 16: A new head of the Crimean gas-producing
company Chernomorneftegaz, a subsidiary of Ukrainian
state energy company Naftogaz, is appointed from the
Krasnodar region.
• May 18: Yevpatoriia in western Crimea gets a
prosecutor from Russia’s Sverdlovsk.
• 􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀖􀀔􀀝􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁉􀃀􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
forces receive new management from the Russian
Federation.
• July 28: Three regions of Crimea are assigned new
prosecutors from the Russian Federation.
• August 25: Seventy-three staff members of thirteen
territorial bodies of the Russian Federal Penitentiary
Service arrive in Crimea for placements.
Among the general population of Crimea, the Kremlin
is seeking to ensure loyalty—or force emigration—by
insisting that all residents take Russian citizenship.
Those who refuse are subject to losing their jobs,
property, and the right to reside in Crimea.
On March 18, all citizens of Ukraine legally residing on
the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and Sevastopol were automatically declared citizens
of Russia. Those who wished to keep their Ukrainian
citizenship had one month to inform the Russian
occupation authorities.
ON MARCH 18, ALL CITIZENS
OF UKRAINE LEGALLY RESIDING
ON THE TERRITORY OF
THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC
OF CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL
WERE AUTOMATICALLY DECLARED
CITIZENS OF RUSSIA.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
7 Atlantic Council | 7
This procedure violated all norms of international
law related to citizenship. Moreover, it was purposely
complicated. In all of Crimea, an area of 10,000 square
􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁑􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁘􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁖􀂳􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀏􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁎􀁋􀁆􀁋􀁜􀁖􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁌􀀏􀀃
Simferopol, and Bilohirsk—were designated to receive
the paperwork for those wishing to retain Ukrainian
citizenship. Applications by mail or proxy were not
accepted. Some people had to travel as far as 150
􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀋􀀧􀁘􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁘􀁖􀁋􀁗􀁄􀀏􀀃􀀼􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀀮􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀀔􀀕􀀏􀀃􀃀􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
deadline.) Those who rejected Russian citizenship,
or have not yet received their Russian passports, are
required to obtain a residence permit. In a territory
with a population of 2.4 million, the issuance of
residence permits is limited to 5,000 per year.6
People not granted residence permits are considered
foreign nationals with no right to be on the “territory
of the Russian Federation” for more than 180 days per
year. Natives of Crimea with family, jobs, and property
in the region will have to regularly travel outside the
peninsula for long periods of time, without guarantees
that they will be allowed back in. They will not be able
to work without a residence permit and will be subject
to employment quotas for foreigners.7
In response, Ukraine’s parliament passed a law on April
15 suspending the country’s dual citizenship prohibition
for Crimeans who had Russian citizenship forced upon
them.8 In a tit-for-tat measure, Russia’s Duma then
passed legislation on May 28 setting criminal penalties
for Russian citizens who hold dual nationality but
have not disclosed that fact to the Russian authorities.
􀀳􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁈􀀃􀃀􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀏􀀓􀀓􀀓􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀀋􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃
$5,200) and up to 400 hours of community service. The
law comes into force on January 2016.9
Public servants in Crimea, such as judges, police
􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃
the Russian Federation to turn in their Ukrainian
passports.10 According to numerous personal accounts
from Crimean residents, all employees of state
6 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/85896 (in Russian); http://www.
blackseanews.net/read/87562 (in Russian); http://www.c-inform.info/
news/id/10994 (in Russian).
7 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/85239 (in Russian); http://www.
blackseanews.net/read/81225 (in Russian).
8 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18 (in Ukrainian).
9 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/80869 (in Russian); http://www.
blackseanews.net/read/80309 (in Russian).
10 http://investigator.org.ua/news/124274/ (in Russian).
institutions, including hospitals and schools, are
􀁘􀁑􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁐􀁈􀀑􀀃
The authorities of occupied Crimea declared that
Ukrainian passports would only be permitted until
January 1, 2015, after which citizens with Ukrainian
passports residing in Crimea would be considered
aliens. As such, they would not able to obtain free
treatment at state health-care facilities, purchase
mobile phone starter kits, register property, pay
utilities, or be admitted to a university or work. Since
the law came into effect, Ukrainian passports are de
facto useless for everyday life.
By effectively coercing Crimeans into getting Russian
citizenship, the Kremlin indirectly restricts Crimeans’
freedom of movement to the territory of the
Russian Federation. Ukrainian law does not recognize
documents issued by the occupation authorities;
therefore, holders of Russian passports issued in
Crimea will not be able to use them to enter other
􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀃀􀁈􀁇􀀃
other states that it considers such passports illegal,
Crimeans will likely encounter problems when
traveling abroad, especially in countries that require
visas. This will also affect those who were under
eighteen years of age on March 18, 2014, and had
not yet been required to obtain a passport for
foreign travel.11
11 At the age of sixteen, every Ukrainian citizen must obtain a do-
In April 2014, Sergei Aksyonov was appointed acting
“Governor of Crimea” by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Source: www.kremlin.ru.
8
RESTRICTING COMMUNICATION
AND MEDIA: AN “INFORMATION
GHETTO”
Russia is working to turn the Crimean peninsula into
an information ghetto, where citizens are denied the
opportunity to receive news and communication from
the rest of Ukraine. On the heels of the annexation
treaty, Russia took steps to replace Ukrainian
Internet service providers on the peninsula. Access
to Ukrainian television has been virtually eliminated,
and major Ukrainian mobile phone services have been
disconnected, with occupation authorities openly
touting a new Russian provider.
An amendment to Russia’s criminal code was passed
in the Russian Federation on December 25, 2013,
before the Crimean annexation. The law took effect
in the territory of the Russian Federation on
􀁐􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁋􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀃀􀁆􀁄-
tion document. However, to travel internationally, adults must obtain a
foreign travel passport. Those under eighteen can travel internationally
by having their name included in their parents’ foreign travel passport
or by obtaining a child travel passport.
May 9, 2014, which at that point included the Crimean
peninsula, and made it illegal to publicly call for “actions
aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation.”12􀀃􀀳􀁘􀁅􀁏􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁈􀃀􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
or written suggestions or requests to act addressed to
a particular person or persons, or to the general public.
Neither the context in which those calls are made nor
whether they generate actual action matters from the
perspective of the law.
Crimean media outlets were forced to re-register
in accordance with Russian law, and, as a result,
independent media essentially ceased to exist on
the peninsula. Online publications were particularly
affected; under Ukrainian law they were not required
to register with state authorities, but under Russian law
both online and print outlets must do so.
Today, challenging Crimea’s status as part of Russia or
supporting its return to Ukraine—in the media, on
social networks, or in a public place—is a prosecutable
offense. The law also carries a potential three-year
􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀃀􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
rubles or two years of the convicted person’s wages.
􀀫􀁄􀁕􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀃀􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁜􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃
12 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/80195 (in Russian);
http://www.blackseanews.net/read/80100 (in Russian).
Council of Ministers of Crimea “Chairman” Sergei Aksyonov, State Council of the Republic of Crimea “President” Vladimir Konstantinov, Russian
President Vladimir Putin, and “Mayor” of Sevastopol Alexey Chaly sign a treaty making Crimea part of the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014.
Source: www.kremlin.ru.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
9 Atlantic Council | 9
are reserved for making such calls “with the use of
media, including information and telecommunications
networks, including Internet.”13
As with Russian laws on “instigating extremism,”
determining what constitutes such a call and the intent
of the speaker or writer is up to law-enforcement
bodies. Lawyers, therefore, recommend that Crimeans
choose words carefully and even watch their intonation
when addressing topics related to Crimea, Ukraine, and
Russia in public—be it online, in a store, or on public
transport— to avoid their comments being interpreted
as a “call” or “appeal.”
In such an environment, numerous independent
media outlets and NGOs that do not agree with
the annexation of Crimea have left the peninsula for
mainland Ukraine, including the Center for Investigative
Journalism, Black Sea News, Crimean Events, the
Black Sea TV and Radio Company, the Information
Press Center, and the Taurus Institute of Regional
Development. The result is that Crimea now has only
pro-Russian media.
Since the occupation began, all broadcasts of Ukrainian
TV networks have been shut down. On cable systems,
the situation ranges from the complete elimination of
Ukrainian outlets in some places to the airing of a few,
mostly entertainment channels in others.
􀀬􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁉􀃀􀁆􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁈􀁏􀁖􀁈􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃
swiftly cut. Within days of the annexation, Russian
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev ordered state-owned
communications company Rostelecom to provide
Internet service to Crimea as soon as possible. Over
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁈􀁛􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀃀􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃
the Kerch Strait from Russia. In May, Rostelecom
􀁄􀁆􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀃀􀁅􀁈􀁕􀀐􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁆􀀐􀁆􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁚􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑14 It
began providing service to Crimea in late July.15 Private
Internet service providers are now required to operate
in accordance with Russian law, under which they must
store information on users for six months and disable
access to any site if so ordered by Russia’s Federal
Security Service (FSB).
13 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/80195 (in Russian).
14 Ilya Kharennikov, “Rostelecom Wins $4.7 Billion Internet Job, Buys
Crimea Operators,” Bloomberg, May 13, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2014-05-13/rostelecom-wins-4-7-billion-internet-job-buyscrimea-
operators.html.
15 Doug Madory, “No Turning Back: Russia Activates Crimean Cable,”
Dyn Research, July 31, 2014, http://www.renesys.com/2014/07/no-turning-
back-russia-crimea/.
De facto authorities in the Crimea and Sevastopol
administrations declared that they could disconnect
mobile phone users in the region from the Ukrainian
providers that held most of the market before the
occupation.16 Before annexation, mobile users in
Crimea were mainly served by the three largest
Ukrainian operators: MTS Ukraine (57 percent),
Kyivstar (21 percent), and Astelit (16 percent).17
In early August, connection in Crimea to both MTS
Ukraine and Kyivstar was stopped. Both companies
said they were not responsible for the disruption
of service.
On August 4, Russian operator K-Telekom announced
the launch of service on the peninsula to replace MTS
Ukraine.18 The following day, MTS Ukraine said it was
unable to control an important node responsible for
communications in Crimea. Then, on August 8, the
􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀃀􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁒􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃
K-Telecom’s network, making it much more expensive
to use MTS Ukraine in the region. Dmitry Polonsky,
Crimea’s “Deputy Prime Minister,” said the move
indicated that MTS Ukraine now recognized it was
operating in a foreign country.19
􀀮􀁜􀁌􀁙􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁕􀂷􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃
􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀃀􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁜􀂷􀁖􀀃
16 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/87640 (in Russian); http://
www.blackseanews.net/read/87181 (in Russian); http://www.blackseanews.
net/read/84999 (in Russian); http://www.blackseanews.net/
read/84927 (in Russian); http://www.blackseanews.net/read/84876 (in
Russian); http://www.blackseanews.net/read/84724 (in Russian).
17 http://ria.ru/economy/20140401/1002141618.html (in Russian).
18 James Barton, “MTS Ends Ukraine Services as Russia Reviews
Crimea Telecom Options,” Developing Telecoms, August 6, 2014, http://
www.developingtelecoms.com/business/deals/121-operators/5392-
mts-ends-ukraine-services-as-russia-reviews-crimea-telecom-options.
html.
19 Ibid.
SINCE THE OCCUPATION
BEGAN, ALL BROADCASTS OF
UKRAINIAN TV NETWORKS
HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN.
10
􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
equipment. Its service remains disabled in Crimea.
The de facto authorities say these mobile operators
have been kicked out because Ukrainian legislation
supposedly prohibits them from paying for property
leases, electricity, and equipment maintenance in
Russian rubles. As of the time of this writing, there are
no longer any Ukrainian mobile operators in Crimea.
􀀤􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁘􀁊􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀃀􀁛􀁈􀁇􀀐􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀃
had also been shut down in Sevastopol and their
customers switched to Rostelecom. According to
Black Sea News and the Maidan of Foreign Affairs
􀁗􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁎􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁎􀀏􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀃀􀁛􀁈􀁇􀀐􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃
Crimea, will likely have to either register its business
in Crimea in accordance with Russian legislation or
sell its assets to Russian operators.20
TARGETING ANNEXATION
CRITICS AND “DISLOYAL”
GROUPS
􀀩􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀃀􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁜􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁘􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
Federation organized a large-scale campaign of
physical harassment and criminal prosecution of
potentially disloyal groups and anyone who opposed
the annexation of Crimea. On the pretext of ensuring
security, the peninsula’s de facto authorities have
limited the locations where mass gatherings can be
held. They have also changed the school curriculum,
harried certain religious groups, and persecuted
individuals through detentions, property seizures, and
police raids.
􀀤􀁗􀀃􀃀􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
so-called “self-defense” forces, but they have since
evolved into a systematic campaign conducted in
concert with police and the FSB. The chief targets can
be divided roughly into three groups (with
some overlap):
• ethnic Ukrainians and other ethnic, religious, or
national groups viewed as favoring Ukraine’s position
􀀕􀀓􀀃 􀀰􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁉􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀮􀁜􀁌􀁙􀀐􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁑􀁓􀁕􀁒􀃀􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
that aims to formulate an independent vision of Ukrainian foreign
􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁄􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁚􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁒􀁘􀁗􀁏􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀀃
the peninsula in March 2014 and is now based in Kyiv.
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃁􀁌􀁆􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate; Catholics;
Jews; and immigrants from Poland, Belarus, and the
Baltic states
• 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
of its self-governing body, the Mejlis, and other Muslim
organizations, including the Spiritual Administration of
Crimea Muslims and groups designated as extremist by
Russia but not by Ukraine
• journalists, civil society activists, and members of
NGOs existing prior to the occupation
Ukrainians
The communal targeting of ethnic Ukrainians has often
involved religious institutions and schools, where the
Ukrainian curriculum is being curtailed through both
􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀏􀀃
Crimean departments of education announced that
Ukrainian language and literature would be studied
only as an elective.21 At the same time, the number
of Russian language and literature lessons doubled;
Russian history and geography lessons also increased.
This, and the general anti-Ukrainian political climate,
dissuaded most parents and students from electing
to take Ukrainian classes. On October 9, the de
facto Crimean Minister of Education, Science, and
Youth, Nataliya Goncharova, said that the demand
21 http://crimea.vgorode.ua/news/sobytyia/224277-ukraynskyi-yazykv-
krymskykh-shkolakh-budut-yzuchat-po-zhelanyui (in Russian).
FROM THE FIRST DAYS OF THE
OCCUPATION, THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION ORGANIZED A
LARGE-SCALE CAMPAIGN OF
PHYSICAL HARASSMENT AND
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
ANYONE WHO OPPOSED THE
ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
11 Atlantic Council | 11
for Ukrainian instruction in Crimea was rapidly
declining.22 Consequently, there is no longer a single
one of the six hundred schools in Crimea offering
instruction fully in Ukrainian, and only twenty have
separate Ukrainian classes. This has led to massive job
losses among teachers of Ukrainian, who now have
to choose another source of income or retrain at
their own expense.23 In addition, high school students
planning to take the External Independent Evaluation
(the Ukrainian equivalent to the United States’
Scholastic Aptitude Test) in order to enter universities
in Ukraine are thus deprived of an opportunity to
study in accordance with the Ukrainian curriculum.
Many children in Crimea now face additional obstacles
outside of the classroom. As of January 1, 2014, the
Child Services Registry of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea included 4,323 orphans and children
deprived of parental care;24 some were living in
special boarding schools on the peninsula. After the
annexation, they were automatically recognized as
Russian citizens and thus deprived of the option to
choose their citizenship and place of residence.25
The recognition of these children as citizens of the
􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀃀􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
procedure of adoption or guardianship by citizens
of Ukraine or elsewhere, given Russia’s increasing
restrictions on foreign adoptions. Full information
on how the rights and interests of these children
are being protected is not available. This situation
potentially violates the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child by interfering with the exercise
of a child’s right to preserve his or her identity,
including citizenship, name, and family relations.
Religious Groups
Members and leaders of Ukraine’s indigenous religious
groups, who stood with EuroMaidan protesters
against Yanukovych’s presidency and have spoken
out against Russia’s annexation of Crimea, have
been intimidated and harassed by the authorities or
unknown attackers.26 Shortly after expressing support
22 http://ria.ru/education/20141009/1027621414.html (in Russian).
􀀕􀀖􀀃 􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁌􀁓􀁆􀀐􀁅􀁌􀁊􀁜􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁄􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁂􀁅􀁌􀁊􀁂􀁜􀁄􀁏􀁗􀁄􀀒􀀔􀀗􀀗􀀙􀀖􀀑􀁋􀁗􀁐􀁏􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀌􀀑
24 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation
in Crimea􀀃􀀋􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀌􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁋􀁕􀀑􀁒􀁕􀁊􀀒􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀒􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁄􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀒􀃀􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀒
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁂􀃀􀁈􀁏􀁇􀁂􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁂􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁂􀁍􀁘􀁑􀁈􀁂􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀁂􀁈􀁑􀁊􀀑􀁓􀁇􀁉􀀏􀀃􀁓􀀑􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀑
25 Ibid., p. 18.
26 “Battle of Orthodox Christian Patriarchs as Ukraine’s Filaret
for besieged Ukrainian military units in February
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀏􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀂷􀁖􀀃􀃀􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁋􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC) began
receiving threats that they would be prosecuted and
their parishes eliminated.
In March, three of its priests—from Sevastopol, Yalta,
and Yevpatoriia—were kidnapped and later released.
One of them, Mykolai Kwich, said he was questioned
by members of the Crimean “self-defense” force
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
extremism.27 The priests refused to talk about any
further details of their detention or release. Later
in the spring, the three priests left Crimea, but
they returned to their parishes in late August. On
September 2, the priest from Yevpatoriia, Bohdan
Kostetsky, and twelve parishioners were detained on
the way to Yalta, placed in a basement, interrogated,
and released the following day without charge. These
actions were likely acts of intimidation related to the
pro-Ukrainian and pro-Maidan position of the Greek
Catholic Church in Ukraine.28 The Greek Catholic
􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁏􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁚􀁄􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁌􀃀􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃
the church’s legal status.
Parishioners and the priest of St. Clement of Rome,
a Ukrainian Orthodox church in Sevastopol that sits
Denounces Russia’s Kirill,” Kyiv Post, January 8, 2014, http://www.
kyivpost.com/content/politics/battle-of-orthodox-christian-patriarchs-
􀁄􀁖􀀐􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀐􀃀􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁗􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀐􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁖􀀐􀁎􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀐􀀖􀀖􀀗􀀚􀀙􀀖􀀑􀁋􀁗􀁐􀁏􀀑
􀀕􀀚􀀃 􀀶􀁒􀁑􀁜􀁄􀀃􀀥􀁌􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁎􀁒􀁚􀁜􀁆􀁝􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁒􀃀􀁄􀀃􀀮􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁐􀁄􀁕􀀏􀀃􀂴􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃
Experiencing ‘Total Persecution’ in Crimea,” Catholic News Agency,
March 18, 2014, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/ukrainiancatholics-
experiencing-total-persecution-in-crimea/; http://investigator.
org.ua/news/122162/ (in Russian); http://investigator.org.ua/
news/122277/ (in Russian).
28 http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/26565233.html (in Russian);
http://www.unian.net/society/958567-v-kryimu-zaderjali-svyaschennika-
ugkts-i-gruppu-prihojan-iz-evpatorii.html (in Russian).
THERE IS NO LONGER A
SINGLE ONE OF THE SIX
HUNDRED SCHOOLS IN
CRIMEA OFFERING INSTRUCTION
FULLY IN UKRAINIAN.
12
on the grounds of a Ukrainian Naval Academy facility,
have been barred from using the building.29 On July 1,
a group of armed men in Russian Cossack dress broke
into a Ukrainian Orthodox church in Perevalnoye
village, in the Simferopol district, and destroyed
religious relics. During the attack, a pregnant
parishioner and a priest’s daughter who suffers from
cerebral palsy were hurt, and the priest’s car was
broken into. Archbishop Klyment of Simferopol and
Crimea reported that the police took the invaders’
side and refused to register a complaint.30
The pastor of the Salvation Army’s Crimean branch,
Ruslan Zuyev, who had reported on the pressure
applied to representatives of Protestant religious
groups in Crimea, was forced to leave Crimea with his
family in June. He had been repeatedly summoned by
the FSB for airing “pro-Ukrainian” views.31
In early March, Rabbi Mikhail Kapustin of the
Communities of Reform Judaism of Simferopol and
􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁓􀁘􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃
denounced Russian aggression in Crimea. In late
February, someone painted a swastika and anti-Semitic
􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁉􀃀􀁗􀁌􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀀱􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁑􀁄􀁊􀁒􀁊􀁘􀁈􀀑32 In April, vandals
29 http://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/v-krymu-otbirayut-hramykievskogo-
patriarhata-516020.html (in Russian).
30 http://ru.krymr.com/archive/news-ru/20140701/16898/16898.
html?id=25408930 (in Russian).
31 “Crimea: Enforced Departure of Turkish Imams; FSB Surveillance,”
Forum 18 News Service, September 3, 2014, http://www.forum18.org/
􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀑􀁓􀁋􀁓􀀢􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁂􀁌􀁇􀀠􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀕􀀑
32 http://rus.newsru.ua/ukraine/21mar2014/kapustin.html (in Rusdefaced
Sevastopol’s monument to the 4,200 Jews,
including Crymchaks (a small and separate indigenous
group of Tatar-speaking Crimean Jews), who were
murdered by the Nazi occupiers on July 12, 1942.33
On June 13, the façade of the Chukurcha Jami mosque
in Simferopol was damaged when someone threw a
Molotov cocktail at it. A surveillance camera recorded
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀁗􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁓􀁈􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁜􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀃀􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃
arrested. In addition, the fence next to the mosque was
painted with a black swastika and the arson date.34
Crimean Tatars
The Tatars of Crimea have endured especially harsh
treatment since the annexation. Although there are
􀁑􀁒􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃
number at approximately three hundred thousand.35
For their refusal to recognize the authority of the de
facto government, Tatar leaders have been exiled or
banned from public life, their public commemorations
prohibited, and their media muzzled.
One of the earliest signs that Tatars would receive
brutal treatment came on March 15, when the
body of Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar activist,
was found roughly two weeks after he attended a
peaceful protest in front of the occupied Crimean
parliament.36 Witnesses reported seeing men in military
uniforms leading Ametov away from the protest. His
relatives later told Human Rights Watch that police
􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁏􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀃀􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑37 Prosecutors
have released no information on the progress of the
investigation into his death.
About three weeks later, on April 8, a monument
to the renowned twentieth-century Crimean Tatar
choreographer Akim Dzhemilev was demolished in
the village of Malorechenske. In the same village, a red
sian).
33 http://www.newsru.com/russia/22apr2014/ussr.html (in Russian).
34 http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mechet-v-simferopole-zabrosali-kokteyly-
􀁄􀁐􀁌􀀐􀁐􀁒􀁏􀁒􀁗􀁒􀁙􀁄􀀐􀀔􀀗􀀙􀀜􀀛􀀜􀁂􀀑􀁋􀁗􀁐􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀌􀀑
35 “Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Upends Lives of Tatar Minority,”
Associated Press, December 10, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.
com/news/article/russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-upends-lives-of-tatarminority/
513093.html.
36 http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/04/8/7021747/(in Russian).
37 Human Rights Watch, “Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed,”
March 18, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/18/crimea-disappeared-
man-found-killed.
FOR THEIR REFUSAL TO
RECOGNIZE THE AUTHORITY
OF THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT,
TATAR LEADERS HAVE
BEEN EXILED OR BANNED
FROM PUBLIC LIFE, THEIR
PUBLIC COMMEMORATIONS
PROHIBITED, AND THEIR
MEDIA MUZZLED.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
13 Atlantic Council | 13
swastika was painted on the windows of a school
whose headmaster is a Crimean Tatar.38
On April 21, members of “self-defense” units arrived
􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁕􀀃􀀰􀁈􀁍􀁏􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀃁􀁄􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃
the building two days earlier. A similar event played
out in mid-September, followed by a Russian security
service search of a Mejlis member’s home and a raid
on the Mejlis and a Tatar newspaper.39 In the following
days, the Tatars were evicted outright from the
Mejlis building.40
In late April, the press secretary to Mustafa Dzhemilev,
a Crimean Tatar and Soviet-era dissident who formerly
led the Mejlis, said he and another Tatar leader had
been banned from broadcasts of the Crimea State
TV and Radio network.41 Two weeks later, Dzhemilev
was barred from the territory of Russia and Crimea,
although Russian authorities denied it at the time.
38 http://investigator.org.ua/news/124075/ (in Russian).
39 “Crimean Tatar Mejlis Raided, Searched by Police,” Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, September 16, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/
crimean-tatar-mejlis-raid-police-search-avdet-simferopol/26587038.
html.
􀀗􀀓􀀃 􀂴􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀲􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁖􀂷􀀃􀀤􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁐􀁅􀁏􀁜􀀏􀂵􀀃􀀵􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁒􀀃􀀩􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃
Europe/Radio Liberty, September 18, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/
crimean-tatar-mejlis-russia-impounded/26592606.html.
41 “Crimean Tatar Leaders Banned on Crimean State TV,” Crimean
News Agency, April 22, 2014, http://qha.com.ua/crimean-tatar-leadersbanned-
on-crimean-state-tv-131226en.html.
He was returning to Crimea through the Turetskiy
Val checkpoint in Armiansk, northern Crimea, and
was blocked by Russian special forces and Crimean
“self-defense” forces. In response, Tatars broke
through the security line at the checkpoint to meet
Dzhemilev. For that, the prosecutor of Crimea,
Natalya Poklonskaya, ordered the Russian Investigative
Committee and the FSB to investigate the protesters
􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁋􀁄􀁕􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀏􀀃􀁘􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁊􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀏􀀃
and illegally crossing the state border.42 Poklonskaya
also threatened to dissolve the Mejlis because of
“extremist” actions by Tatars.43 The prosecutor’s
􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁓􀁜􀀃
of the warning, which would have allowed them to
appeal it.
In June, Dzhemilev’s son, Khaiser, was taken into
custody and charged with murder in connection
with the May 2013 shooting of a security guard who
worked for his family. Khaiser Dzhemilev’s case was
being reviewed for a possible downgrade from murder
to manslaughter when Crimea was annexed. The de
facto authorities now say he is subject to Russian
justice. At a July 16 press conference, Dzhemilev
and his lawyer said that the European Court of
42 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/79292 (in Russian);
http://www.blackseanews.net/read/79825 (in Russian).
43 “Protestors Warn Crimean Tatars Over ‘Extremism’ Amid Protests,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 4, 2014, http://www.rferl.
org/content/ukraine-crimea-tatars-warned-extremism/25372706.html.
Russian servicemen attempt to block the way for Crimean Tatars crossing a checkpoint connecting Crimea and the Kherson region in May 2014.
Source: Reuters.
14
Human Rights had ordered his son’s release, but in
late September he reported that his son had been
transferred to a prison in Russia’s Krasnodar region.44
􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀩􀀶􀀥􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁌􀀃
Khamzin, head of the Mejlis’ Foreign Relations
Department, on allegations that they had found
Khamzin’s business card in the possession of members
of Pravyi Sektor, a Ukrainian political group demonized
by the Russian authorities. As Khamzin was in Kyiv
at the time, his son, who also lived in the house, was
summoned by the FSB the following day.45
In the days leading up to May 18, the annual day of
remembrance for Tatars who were expelled from
Crimea in 1944, the de facto authorities sought to
preempt opportunities for public gatherings. On May
16, Sergey Aksyonov, Crimea’s de facto Prime Minister,
issued a decree prohibiting mass events until June 6.
In mid-June, the Simferopol City Council denied a
􀁕􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀷􀁄􀁗􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁘􀁄􀁏􀀃􀀩􀁏􀁄􀁊􀀃
Day celebrations on June 26 in a city center park that
had hosted the event in previous years. The council
refused, saying that a “mass gathering in an area not
intended to accommodate the expected number
of the event participants can create conditions for
44 http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/videogallery/
gallery?galleryId=247461056& (in Russian); “Dzhemilev’s Son Transferred
in Custody from Crimea to Krasnodar,” Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, September 29, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/
khaiser-dzhemilev-son-custody-crimea-arrest-transfer-krasnodartatar/
26611103.html.
45 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/80412 (in Russian).
violating the public order and the rights and lawful
interests of other citizens.”46
On June 24, masked men unlawfully entered the house
of Eider Osmanov, the Deputy Director of a madrassa
in the Simferopol village of Kolchugino, while he was
at home with his wife and two young children.47 Later
that day, a group of masked men invaded the school
itself when students were present, according to Eider
Adzhimambetov, Press Secretary of the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Deputy
Chairman of the Mejlis. The invaders searched the
school and took the Deputy Director with them. He
was released several hours later without any charges.
On July 5, Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov was banned
􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀃀􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁜􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁖􀀃
that he and the Mejlis had engaged in extremist activity.
Chubarov had been traveling back to Crimea from a
neighboring part of Ukraine when he was stopped at a
checkpoint and barred from entering the peninsula.48
Journalists and Political Activists
The list of abuses against journalists and activists since
the Russian takeover of Crimea could comprise an
entire report in itself. However, this abridged version
highlights the severity of the current situation. The tone
was set in early March, when armed men cut Ukrainian
radio and television signals and Russian hannels took
over the airwaves.49 Since then, journalists have been
subject to an ongoing campaign of harassment, violence,
and threats.
On March 1, several members of the Crimean “self-
􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀂵􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
Center for Investigative Journalism in Simferopol.50
According to center director Valentina Samar, the
46 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/82155 (in Russian).
47 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/82533 (in Russian); http://www.
blackseanews.net/read/82539 (in Russian); http://www.blackseanews.
net/read/82564 (in Russian).
48 Amnesty International, “Document–Ukraine: Crimean Tatar Leader
Banned from Homeland,” July 9, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/EUR50/035/2014/en/82d8d901-6885-4bd3-81a0-e9752dbcff03/
eur500352014en.html.
49 Reporters Without Borders, “Freedom of Information in Dire
Straits in Crimea,” March 7, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/ukraine-freedom-ofinformation-
in-dire-07-03-2014,45960.html.
50 David E. Caplan, “Masked Gunmen Seize Crimean Investigative
Journalism Center,” Global Investigative Journalism Network, March 2,
2014, http://gijn.org/2014/03/02/masked-gunmen-seize-crimean-investigative-
journalism-center/.
IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO
MAY 18, THE ANNUAL DAY OF
REMEMBRANCE FOR TATARS
WHO WERE EXPELLED FROM
CRIMEA IN 1944, THE DE FACTO
AUTHORITIES SOUGHT TO
PREEMPT OPPORTUNITIES FOR
PUBLIC GATHERINGS.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
15 Atlantic Council | 15
paramilitaries demanded to see the organization’s
􀁐􀁈􀁇􀁌􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁇􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀀃
agreement. Samar said that shortly afterward the
Federation of Crimean Trade Unions, which owns the
building, asked the center to vacate the premises by the
end of the month.51􀀃􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀚􀀏􀀃􀀩􀀶􀀥􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃
and interrogated Waclav Radziwinowicz, a Moscowbased
reporter for the Polish newspaper Gazeta
Wyborcza, for several hours. Various reports say he
was accused of misrepresenting his identity or crossing
the border illegally.52 Nikolai Semena, a Crimea-based
reporter for the Ukrainian newspaper Dien and
photographer Lenyara Abibulayeva were also detained.
Those attempting to cover the cancellation of the
commemoration of the Tatar deportation, and
reporters in the Tatar community itself, have been
especially visible targets. On the eve of the Tatar
deportation anniversary, a photographer from the
Crimean Telegraph newspaper was detained by “selfdefense”
forces while recording a story about the
maneuvers of police special units.53 On May 18, the
deportation anniversary, “self-defense” forces detained
Crimean Tatar journalist Osman Pashayev and Turkish
cameraman Cengiz Kizgin for several hours at the
paramilitary group’s headquarters in Simferopol.
Pashayev stated on his Facebook page after their
release that the two journalists were threatened
with physical violence and subjected to psychological
abuse.54 They were also robbed of equipment and
personal belongings valued at seventy thousand hryvnya
(approximately six thousand dollars at the time).
Afterward, they were transferred to police custody and
interrogated with no attorney present.
On the same day, a journalist for Russia’s Dozhd
TV was shooting a video in the central square of
Simferopol when “self-defense” forces told him to
delete the footage. He complied but still was brought
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀂴􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀂵􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
was damaged.55
51 http://investigator.org.ua/news/120460/ (in Russian).
􀀘􀀕􀀃 􀀲􀁕􀁊􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁝􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀨􀁘􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀀏􀀃􀂴􀀦􀁒􀁑􀃁􀁌􀁆􀁗-
ing Sides Should Stop Targeting Media Professionals Covering Ukraine
Crisis, Says OSCE Representative,” May 19, 2014, http://www.osce.org/
fom/118686; Reporters Without Borders, “Ukrainian and Russian Authorities
Step Up Arrests of Journalists,” May 21, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/
ukraine-ukrainian-and-russian-authorities-21-05-2014,46320.html.
53 http://investigator.org.ua/news/127662/ (in Russian).
54 http://investigator.org.ua/news/127425/ (in Russian).
55 Reporters Without Borders, “Ukrainian and Russian Authorities
Step Up Arrests of Journalists,” May 21, 2014.
On June 2, “self-defense” forces detained journalist
Sergei Mokrushin and producer Vladlen Melnikov of
the Center for Investigative Journalism for making
􀂴􀁌􀁑􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁎􀁖􀂵􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁓􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀑56
They were handcuffed and taken to the headquarters
of the “self-defense” forces, where their telephones
and social media accounts were inspected. Both men
say they were beaten and Mokrushin appeared to have
bruising around the ribcage and possibly broken ribs.57
On June 3, the Editor-in-Chief of the Crimean Tatar
newspaper Avdet, Shevket Kaybullaev, was summoned
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀂷􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃
he received notice that the newspaper was being
investigated for extremist activity because it referred
to “Russia’s annexation of Crimea” and to Crimea as
an “occupied territory.”58 Two days later, a founder of
the Events of Crimea website, Ruslan Yugosh, reported
on attempts by Crimean police to put pressure
on him by interrogating his seventy-three-year-old
mother. According to Yugosh, representatives of the
police came to his house and summoned his mother
to testify in the district police station; no summons
papers were served.59
On June 22, Sevastopol occupation police detained
reporter Tatiana Kozyreva and cameraman Karen
Arzumanyan of independent Ukrainian channel
Hromadske TV, who were broadcasting from a rally
at a city square.60 The journalists said they were
interrogated by staff members of the Leninsky district
56 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation
in Crimea, p. 5.
57 Reporters Without Borders, “More Journalists Abducted in Eastern
Ukraine and Crimea,” June 4, 2014, http://en.rsf.org/ukraine-morejournalists-
abducted-in-04-06-2014,46399.html.
58 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation
in Crimea, p. 6.
59 Ibid., p. 6.
60 Ibid., p. 6.
JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN
SUBJECT TO AN ONGOING
CAMPAIGN OF HARASSMENT,
VIOLENCE, AND THREATS.
16
police department and the Department for
Combating Extremism.
Similarly, activists who oppose Russia’s annexation of
Crimea or simply speak up for human rights have been
subjected to torture or hounded out of the peninsula,
losing their property in the process. Some have gone
missing, with authorities offering little to no evidence
they are investigating the disappearances.
Andrey Schekun, a EuroMaidan activist and
representative of the education and culture center
Ukrainian House,61􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀮􀁜􀁌􀁙􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃
being abducted by “self-defense” forces on March 9,
tortured, and eventually released on March 20. His
apartment in Bakhchysarai, Crimea, was sealed by
􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀃀􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀀭􀁘􀁑􀁈􀀃􀀚􀀑62
On May 10 (by some accounts, May 11) Crimea-born
􀃀􀁏􀁐􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀲􀁏􀁈􀁊􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀁒􀁙􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀀶􀀥􀀑􀀃
Sentsov had participated in the AutoMaidan protests
and helped bring food and supplies to Ukrainian
soldiers trapped in Crimean bases during the early days
of Russia’s occupation. He was charged with plotting
to destroy key infrastructure in Simferopol, Yalta, and
61 The Ukrainian House Crimean Center for Business and Cultural
Cooperation is an NGO engaged in educational and cultural activity. It
supported the EuroMaidan, and during the 2013-2014 “Revolution of
Dignity” organized pro-EuroMaidan meetings in Crimea.
62 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation
in Crimea, p. 17.
Sevastopol.63 Along with Sentsov, activists Gennady
Afanasiev, Alexei Chirnii, and Alexander Kolchenko
were also detained. The FSB claims they belong to
Pravyi Sektor, but that organization and the detainees
both denied their membership. On June 4, Sentsov’s
lawyer, Dmitry Dinse, said his client had been tortured
in an attempt to coerce him into confessing. Dinse
􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀃀􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀂷􀁖􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃
Committee. Sentsov and Kolchenko’s requests to
see the Ukrainian Consul were denied.64 A court has
ordered Sentsov and his co-defendants to be held in
pretrial detention until mid-January.65
The fate of Vasyl Chernysh, a resident of Sevastopol
and an AutoMaidan activist who was reported
missing on March 15, the eve of the Crimean
referendum, remains unknown. His family fears he
is no longer alive.66
63 Ibid., p. 17.
64 Amnesty International, “Ukrainian Detainee Threatened with
Rape,” June 24, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/
EUR50/027/2014/fr/740a7dff-12c4-4685-8e57-159c923fa4ac/eur-
500272014en.html.
65 “Moscow Court Prolongs Detention for Ukrainian Director,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 29, 2014, http://www.rferl.
org/content/sentsov-crimea-terror-pretrial-detention-prolongationlefortovo/
26611965.html.
66 Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation
in Crimea, p. 4.
Protesters in Moscow carry a banner reading “Occupation of Crimea Is the Shame of Russia” during a peace march in March 2014.
Source: Bogomolov.PL.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
17 Atlantic Council | 17
􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁒􀁕􀂷􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃
agencies of Crimea have not provided information
on the progress of investigations into the late-May
disappearances of three other activists: Leonid Korzh,
a member of Ukrainian House, reported missing on
May 22; Timur Shaimardanov, reported missing on
May 26; and Seiran Zinedinov, kidnapped on May
30. All were active in the movement for Ukraine’s
territorial integrity and provided aid to Ukrainian
military units trapped by the initial Russian takeover
in February and March. Their relatives and friends
believe their disappearances were connected and
politically motivated.67
On June 29, houses in Simferopol were pasted with
􀁏􀁈􀁄􀃁􀁈􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀁑􀀃
Department of the FSB—anonymously, if necessary—
of people who were “against the return of Crimea
to the Russian Federation or participated in the
regional Maidan.”68
Not all victims of violence or abuse since the
annexation belong to the above groups. Still unsolved,
for instance, are the April 6 murders of Ukrainian
Navy Major Stanislav Karachevskyi and sixteen-yearold
Mark Ivaniuk, who witnesses said was beaten by
􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁄􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀑􀀃
The boy later died of his injuries.69
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Since the annexation, property rights in Crimea have
been violated on a massive scale. All Ukrainian state
property on the peninsula is now being expropriated
under the rubric of “nationalization” by the Republic
of Crimea. Private companies have also been
􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀃀􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁄􀁎􀁈􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
forced management changes carried out by “selfdefense”
forces. Crimean authorities decreed on July
30 that all lease contracts on property dated before
the annexation could be terminated prematurely and
67 Ibid., p. 4.
68 Ibid., p. 6.
􀀙􀀜􀀃 􀂴􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃􀀮􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀲􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀂵􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕-
mation Agency, April 7, 2014, http://www.unian.info/politics/904792-
􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀐􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀐􀁎􀁌􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀐􀁘􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀐􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀐􀁌􀁑􀀐􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀑􀁋􀁗􀁐􀁏􀀞􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀀩􀁌􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃
Mission on Human Rights, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea, April
2014, http://helsinki.org.ua/index.php?id=1400849870.
unilaterally. So far, four hundred public companies have
been “nationalized” and the list is constantly growing.
It includes all seaports, airports, railroads, wineries,
grain elevators, agricultural enterprises, water and
energy supply infrastructures, and some two hundred
health resorts. The famous Nikitskyi Botanical
Gardens, the Artek Children’s Center, the oil and gas
company Chernomorneftegaz, and the More shipyard
have also been seized.70
The expropriation is not limited to Ukrainian state
property. Many “nationalized” entities also include
trade unions, higher education institutions, the
Academy of Sciences, and civic organizations.
􀀳􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃
are instead subject to hostile takeovers and smear
campaigns from the region’s de facto authorities.
􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃
that a private enterprise is bankrupt or faulty before
seizing it.71 This has been especially true of property
belonging to Ukrainian businessmen who oppose the
Russian takeover. In one August 24 incident, “selfdefense”
henchmen blocked managers of the large
Zaliv shipyard in Kerch from entering—supposedly
at the request of the workers. The plant belongs to
Ukrainian billionaire Konstiantyn Zhevago, a member
of parliament who supports the democratic changes
in the country.72
Russian authorities avoid taking part in these
“nationalizations” directly, instead deeming property
taken from the Ukrainian government to have been
70 Monitored by the Black Sea News and Maidan of Foreign Affairs.
71 http://www.sobytiya.info/public/14/44006 (in Russian).
72 “Zaliv Goes to Court,” Tradewinds News, September 18, 2014,
http://www.tradewindsnews.com/shipsales/344853/Zaliv-goes-to-court.
ALL UKRAINIAN STATE
PROPERTY ON THE PENINSULA
IS NOW BEING EXPROPRIATED
UNDER THE RUBRIC
OF “NATIONALIZATION” BY
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA.
18
transferred to the Republic of Crimea. Similarly,
Russia’s largest state-owned monopolies have not
taken direct control of the expropriated enterprises
in Crimea, fearing international sanctions. Instead, the
occupation authorities created de facto government
enterprises to assume control.
The concentration of a vast number of enterprises in
the hands of the “Crimean authorities” has worrying
economic implications. The authorities of autonomous
Crimea have never run so many state businesses at
once and have no pool of top state managers to draw
from, because Russian personnel has been limited
largely to military, law enforcement, and security
agencies. This creates a serious management problem
that will likely lead to a severe economic crisis in
Crimea. The danger is compounded by the inability to
attract private foreign investment to occupied Crimea.
The expropriated businesses in Crimea have lost
old markets and contracts and are in the process of
􀁖􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁎􀁈􀁓􀁗􀀃􀁄􀃁􀁒􀁄􀁗􀀃
only by Russian bank loans that are allocated mostly
for salaries.
Russia’s approach to economic development in
the occupied territory has been opportunistic and
chaotic. Plans for the funding and construction of a
bridge over the Kerch Strait change every few weeks.
There is also a kaleidoscope of ideas on how to
supply the peninsula with water, ranging from building
desalinization plants to bringing it by tankers, to laying
an underwater pipe network across the strait.
Russia will likely have to continue heavily subsidizing
Crimea just to keep pensions and public employees’
salaries at levels promised before the referendum.
To do so, Moscow is already using national retirement
savings funds, as well as the budget reserves of
some regions of Russia, which increasingly fuels
local irritation.73
􀀚􀀖􀀃 􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁑􀁊􀀑􀁕􀁘􀀒􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀒􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀐􀀓􀀙􀀐􀀕􀀙􀀒􀀔􀁂􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁌􀀑􀁋􀁗􀁐􀁏􀀃􀀋􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖-
􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀌􀀞􀀃􀁋􀁗􀁗􀁓􀀝􀀒􀀒􀁚􀁚􀁚􀀑􀁑􀁈􀁚􀁖􀁕􀁘􀀑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀀒􀃀􀁑􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀒􀀕􀀘􀁍􀁘􀁑􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀗􀀒􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁘􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁙􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁗􀀑
html (in Russian); http://inosmi.info/cctv-moskva-vkladyvaet-v-krymmilliardy-
no-ne-vidit-blagodarnosti.html. (in Russian).
CONCLUSION
The Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea has
unleashed an ongoing chain of human rights violations
across the peninsula. The de facto government and socalled
“self-defense” units have incapacitated Crimea’s
military and effectively cut off its citizens from the
outside world. This approach has led to the detention
and disappearance of dissenters, the persecution
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁗􀁋􀁑􀁌􀁆􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁌􀃁􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
media, and the forced nationalization of Ukrainian state
property. Many of these abuses are not widely known
due to the effectiveness of the occupying forces’ media
crackdown and a Russian political narrative that masks
the stark reality faced by the Crimean people.
Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea
19 Atlantic Council | 19
APPENDIX:
TIMELINE OF THE ANNEXATION
On February 20, as Vladislav Surkov, an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, visited Crimea, social networks
􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁏􀁘􀁐􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀃀􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁋􀁌􀁆􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁝􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁜􀁄􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀃
􀀥􀁕􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀂷􀁖􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁄􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀁚􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁇􀁄􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁌􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁋􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃
􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀑􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁓􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁓􀀃􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁄􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃
in other parts of Crimea.
On February 23, the rally in Sevastopol illegally “elected” a so-called “People’s Mayor” and on February 24,
Russian armored vehicles blocked all entrances to Sevastopol.
􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁅􀁕􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀕􀀘􀀏􀀃􀁄􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁄􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁇􀁕􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁘􀁕􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁒􀁆􀁋􀁌􀀃􀀲􀁏􀁜􀁐􀁓􀁌􀁆􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃
􀁈􀁏􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁄􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁜􀁖􀁎􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁄􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃
servicemen submitted lists of their family members in the event of evacuation. The Marine Brigade was put on
high alert. Two military vehicles with Russian license plates and carrying special forces entered Yalta and settled in
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁄􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀂷􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁏􀀑
On the night of February 26, a reconnaissance and sabotage group of Russia’s airborne special forces arrived
from Sevastopol in uniforms without insignia and seized the buildings of the Supreme Council and the Council of
􀀰􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀃁􀁄􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁄􀁕􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁌􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀀃
On the morning of February 27, the Russian military set up checkpoints on the Isthmus of Perekop and the
Chonhar peninsula, which connect Crimea and mainland Ukraine. The Cossacks, who had arrived in advance,
guarded them together with the Russian military.
On February 28, at an emergency session of the occupied Crimean parliament, “Chairman” Vladimir Konstantinov
instructed the Council of Ministers to ensure the rights and freedoms of Crimeans, and promote law
enforcement and public safety by establishing bodies made up partly of former members of the Berkut special
police units. These units had been disbanded in Kyiv during the Maidan protests in the winter of 2013/2014 for
participating in shooting peaceful Maidan protesters. A vigorous campaign of organizing self-defense groups from
ex-Berkut members, the military, veterans’ organizations, Cossack organizations, criminal elements, and other
Crimean residents, as well as volunteer Russian citizens, ensued.
On February 28, special military forces of the Russian Federation without insignia captured the Simferopol and
Belbek (Sevastopol) airports. Eleven Russian MI-24 combat helicopters entered Crimean air space from Russia,
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀬􀀯􀀐􀀚􀀙􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀐􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁕􀁆􀁕􀁄􀁉􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀪􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁜􀁖􀁎􀁒􀁜􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁌􀁕􀃀􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀬􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃
􀁄􀁑􀁑􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀃀􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁗􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀶􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀀥􀁒􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃
February–March 2014
20
Service of Ukraine. Several dozen Russian-made armored vehicles, among which observers noticed Tigers (Tigr),
􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁓􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁈􀁔􀁘􀁌􀁓􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁈􀁄􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃
􀁋􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁙􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀪􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁜􀁖􀁎􀁒􀁜􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀑􀀃􀀸􀁑􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀃀􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁐􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁇􀀃
the State Border Service of Ukraine’s Balaklava unit.
On March 1, two large landing ships of the Baltic Fleet, Kaliningrad and Minsk, arrived in Sevastopol harbor from
Novorossiysk (Russia) with paratroopers and equipment on board.
On March 2, two large landing ships, Russian Northern Fleet’s Olenegorsky Gornyak and Russian Baltic Fleet’s
Georgiy Pobedonosets, arrived in Sevastopol harbor from Novorossiysk with more paratroopers and equipment.
On March 3, the Russian military began a blockade of all Ukrainian military units and bases in Crimea that
continued through March 25.
The commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Alexander Vitko, ordered the Ukrainian military to
surrender by 5 a.m. on March 26 or face attacks on all units and bases in Crimea. This ultimatum was delivered
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀀸􀁎􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁏􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁒􀁏􀁇􀁌􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀀥􀁏􀁄􀁆􀁎􀀃􀀶􀁈􀁄􀀃􀃁􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁅􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃
exits from Sevastopol bays into the open sea for Ukrainian Boarder Service vessels, including the Balaklava Bay
exit. The Moskva missile cruiser, missile boat Squall, and two other Russian missile boats blocked the Donuzlav
Ukrainian naval base north of Yevpatoriia.
On March 4, at a press conference, Putin claimed local self-defense forces and not Russian troops were
blockading Ukrainian army facilities.
􀀲􀁑􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃􀀘􀀏􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁘􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁘􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀦􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁄􀀏􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁏􀁘􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀀧􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃
Minister Sergei Shoigu.
On March 7, before the Russian military in Sevastopol began its assault on the Ukrainian Air Force’s Crimea
task group command, Cossacks rammed the gates of the base with heavy trucks. And on March 8, one hundred
so-called “self-defense” troops equipped with automatic weapons, bulletproof vests, and portable radios arrived
􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁕􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁘􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁏􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀃀􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁒􀁏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁈􀀐􀁊􀁘􀁑􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀃁􀁒􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀂴􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀐􀁇􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀂵􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁗􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀃀􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁐􀁖􀁈􀁏􀁉􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
Crimean government.

Annex 949
Human Rights Group Report (October 2015)

1
Monitoring review of the human
rights situation in Crimea
October 2015
Crimean Human Rights Group
in collaboration with
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of contents .......................................................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3
2. Civil and political rights ........................................................................................................ 4
Right to life ..................................................................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Torture and inhuman treatment .............................................................................................. 4
Investigation of high-profile murder cases ................................................................................ 4
Forced disappearances ........................................................................................................... 5
Right to freedom and personal immunity ........................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Detention .............................................................................................................................. 6
Arrests ......................................................................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Searches ...................................................................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Porgress of the high - profile criminal cases .................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Freedom of speeh and expression .............................................................................................. 9
Freedom of association ............................................................................................................ 11
Freedom of peaceful assembly .......................................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Freedom of conscience and religion ................................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Case of Sentsov, Kolchenko, Afanasyev, Chirniy ......................................................................... 13
Freedom of movement and movement through the check points ............... Ошибка! Закладка не
определена.
Monitoring of human rights during the "Civil Blockade of Crimea" ................................................ 13
Issues related to citizenship .............................................. Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
Annexes ....................................................................... Ошибка! Закладка не определена.
3
1. INTRODUCTION
The monitoring review was prepared by the Crimean Human Rights Group and is based on the
materials collected in October 2015.
The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) is an initiative of representatives of human rights
organizations, which aims to promote the observance and protection of human rights in Crimea
through attracting wide attention to issues related to human rights and international humanitarian law
in the territory of the Crimean peninsula.
The Crimean Human Rights Group commenced its work in August 2015.
In its activity the CHRG is guided, first of all, by the provisions of fundamental documents on human
rights, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights etc.
The aims of the CHRG are as follows:
1) collection and analysis of information on the human rights situation in Crimea;
2) wide provision of information to authorities, international organizations, intergovernmental bodies,
non-governmental organizations, the media and other target groups by publishing and disseminating
the analytical and informational materials on the human rights situation in Crimea;
3) promotion of the protection of human rights and respect for international law in Crimea;
4) development of recommendations for the authorities and international organizations in the field of
human rights;
5) ensuring the presence of the topic “human rights in Crimea” in the information space.
In preparation and dissemination of information the CHRG is guided by the principles of objectivity,
reliability and timeliness.
4
2. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
RIGHT TO LIFE
TORTURE AND INHUMAN TREATMENT
In November 2014, in the Simferopol detention center an inmate died.
On October 6th, 2015, the investigation department of the Zheleznodorozhny district of Simferopol of
the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in Crimea
reported that it charged the officer of the Department of the Federal Service for the Execution of
Sentences over the commission of an offense under Part 1 of Art. 286 of the Criminal Code of the RF
(abuse of power)1. The investigation believes that the accused officer knew that the person in the cell
of the Detention Center-1 (Simferopol) had suffered injuries, which resulted in his death, but concealed
the circumstances of these injuries. The officer shall be held in pretrial detention.
“According to investigators, in November 2014, the accused, knowing that the person in the cell of the
detention center had suffered injuries, which resulted in his death, concealed the circumstances of
these injuries” — the Investigation Department reported to the ‘Crimean truth’2.
Earlier, the Crimean Field Mission on Human Rights has repeatedly reported3 that in the detention
center in Simferopol the detainees suffer from tortures and bodily blows. Thus, a convicted Maidan
activist Alexander Kostenko was systematically tortured at the detention center in Simferopol.
On October 23, a 43 year-old resident of Simferopol jumped from the fifth floor window of the
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Simferopol district. The man died at the scene.
The police explained the situation as follows. On October 22, the police dispatch center received a
report about the theft of the car VAZ-2101. The police officers suspected the man, but did not name
the grounds for suspicion. According to the police, they asked the man to come to the police station to
give explanations on the fact of a theft. They reported that “the man was in the fifth floor hallway of
the building of DMIA and waited until he was asked to come in by the security officer, who at the time
was in his office. The police officer did not observe the actions of the man. At the time, while the man
was alone in the hallway, for unknown reasons, he jumped out of the window, which is not equipped
with bars ”4.
The reasons which prompted the man to jump out of the window remain unclear. Of particular interest
is the fact that the incident happened at 04:30 am, which is not the reception hour. The citizens are
asked to come for questioning or provision of explanations during the working hours. This incident is
under an internal check.
INVESTIGATION OF HIGH-PROFILE MURDER CASES
On October 10, the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee in Crimea reported
that in the forest belt of Simferopol district the body of Bekir Nebiev was found. He was suspected of
1 http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/item/974642/
2 http://c-pravda.ru/news/2015/10/07/v-simferopole-rabotnik-sizo--skryl-ubijjstvo-odnogo-iz-zaklyuchjonnykh
3 http://investigator.org.ua/news/150270/
4 https://82.mvd.ru/news/item/6659206/
5
killing a nursing assistant and a paramedic at the ambulance station in Simferopol5. He was charged
with an offense under subsection “a” of Part 2 of Art. 105 of the Criminal Code of the RF (murder of
two or more persons).
The IC of the RF reported that the body was found by the children6, and a representative of the MIA of
the RF Elena Alekseeva said that the body was found by the “road policeman”7. It should be noted that
earlier in the area the search measures were taken in relation to the investigation of the attack on the
ambulance station, but neither the suspect nor the instrument of crime was found.
Bekir Nebiev’s body was identified by relatives. Later on October 26, the Senior Assistant to the Head
of the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in
Crimea Evgenya Belikova said that a forensic examination of the Bekir Nebiev’s body will continue at
least until mid-November8. She said that based on the results of the examination the final identification
of the body will be carried out, and the time and cause of death will be determined.
However, despite the lack of results of the forensic medical examination, the IC of the RF in Crimea
announced that one of the basic versions of the investigation is that it was suicide9. The relatives of
Bekir Nebiev believe that the investigation will be biased and inefficient. This is also evidenced by the
fact that in respect of Bekir Nebiev many media use the phrase “Simferopol shooter”10, despite the fact
that his guilt at this point had not been proved and can only be determined by the court.
FORCED DISAPPEARANCES
A criminal case was opened on the disappearance of Mukhtar Arislanov for an offence under Part 1
of Art. 105 of the Criminal Code of the RF (murder)11. Mukhtar Arislanov disappeared on August 27,
2015. The witnesses and relatives reported12 that the disappearance is related to the acts of violence
against him committed by persons in uniform, which resembled the law enforcement officers.
The CHRG found out that in the Kherson region a pre-trial investigation into the murder of Reshat
Ametov, born in 1975 is carried out for a criminal offense under Part 1 of Art. 115 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine (murder). Reshat Ametov was abducted on March 3, 2014 in Simferopol, and on
March 15, his body was found with the signs of torture.
Also, in the Kherson region, a pre-trial investigation into the disappearance of Eskender Apselyamov
is carried out for a criminal offense under Part 1 of Art. 115 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (murder).
Eskender Apselyamov went missing in Simferopol on October 3, 2014, and to date there is no
information about his whereabouts.
5 http://15minut.org/article/posle-strelby-na-stantsii-skoroj-v-simferopole-vozbudili-ugolovnoe-delo-2015-09-26-22-06-31
6 http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/item/975938/
7 http://tass.ru/proisshestviya/2335683
8 http://crimea.ria.ru/society/20151026/1101329136.html
9 http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/item/975938/
10 http://www.currenttime.tv/content/article/27299139.html ; http://ren.tv/novosti/2015-09-28/rasstrelyannyysimferopolskim-
strelkom-feldsher-vyshel-iz-komy ; http://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/78316
11 http://crim.sledcom.ru/attention/missing_persons/item/963643/
12 http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/09/1/7079809/
6
RIGHT TO FREEDOM AND PERSONAL IMMUNITY
DETENTION
On the night of September 4 – 5, at the border with Crimea the Ukrainian military were detained:
troopers of the 79th airmobile brigade the 25-year-old Alexander Yurov, 20-year-old Alexander
Orlenko and the 39-year-old Konstantin Mekshun. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine confirmed the disappearance of the military. The Speaker of the Presidential Administration of
Ukraine for the military operation Andrey Lysenko said that the primary lead with regard to the
disappearance of the Ukrainian soldiers is related to their unlawful detention and transportation to the
territory of Crimea by the Russian military13. Later, the FSS of the RF reported that the Ukrainian
military were detained on suspicion of illegal crossing of the border with the Russian Federation14. The
Ukrainian military are in the Crimean city Armyansk.
On October 9, according to CHRG’s information, during the searches in the Plotinnoye village of
Bakhchisarai district nine people, all of which are the Crimean Tatars, were arrested. The police
reported that among the detainees there are the ex-convicts. They were taken to the IC of the RF in
Crimea for additional check-up as part of the investigative activities related to the attack on the
ambulance station on September 26.
On October 14, the police officers detained15 three activists of the Ukrainian cultural center
during the laying of flowers in front of the monument to Bogdan Khmelnitsky in Simferopol. The
detained were taken to the Centre for Combating Extremism. One of the detainees, Leonid Kuzmin,
said that they provided explanations, and officers of the Center demanded the data from their mobile
phones. The activists were released two hours later; the protocol was not drawn up.
ARRESTS
On October 6, the Kiev District Court of Simferopol (judge Kuznetsova O.P.) decided on the detention
for up to two months of the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, people’s deputy of
Ukraine Refat Chubarov. The calculation of the period is determined by the court as of his extradition
to the Russian Federation or the actual detention in Russia. The basis for such a decision was an
appeal to the court of the Investigation Division of the Department of the Federal Security Service for
Crimea and Sevastopol (Annex 1 ).
Earlier, Refat Chubarov was accused of committing a crime under Part 2 of Art. 280.1 of the Criminal
Code of the RF, namely, public calls for action aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation committed with the use of mass media or electronic and information-telecommunication
networks (including the Internet).
The court substantiated a decision on the detention as follows: the crime of which Refat Chubarov is
accused is punishable with imprisonment for up to five years; the court finds that Refat Chubarov could
13 http://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/ap-ozvuchil-glavnuyu-versiyu-ukrainskih-desantnikov-na-granice-s-krymom-pohitilirossiyskie-
voennye-647410.html
14 http://tass.ru/proisshestviya/2242919
15 http://blacksea.tv/news/nezakonnie-cveti-v-krimy-zaderali-aktivistov
7
hide from the investigating authorities, threaten the witnesses, destroy the evidence; Refat Chubarov,
in the court’s opinion, is included in the federal and international wanted list.
However, the Chairman of the Mejlis is not included in the international wanted list, which is also
declared by the lawyer appointed for the case. In the appeal, the lawyer stated that the reference to
the fact that Refat Chubarov is in the wanted list is “tentative” (Annex 2 ). Moreover, earlier, on July 5,
2014, Refat Chubarov was denied the entry to the territory of the Russian Federation for 5 years,
based on which the Russian authorities do not allow him to enter the territory of Crimea. Refat
Chubarov is outside of Crimea and considers such actions a deliberate political persecution.
On July 2, a 36-year-old resident of Sevastopol Yuri Ilchenko, who, according to media reports, is
accused of calling for the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, was detained16.
Currently, he is in the detention center in Simferopol. On September 23, the Simferopol court extended
his detention for two months. Yuri’s father, Gennady Ilchenko reported that the FSS investigator during
the questioning showed him the records in which his son urged the Ukrainian authorities to expand the
military might. These and other statements of Yuri Ilchenko are considered by the investigation as calls
for the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. The father Gennady Ilchenko also
reported the procedural violations by the investigating authorities. The lawyer of Yuri Ilchenko, Yuri
Berdnikov provided no comments on the case.
SEARCHES
In early October, in the Ak-Mechet and Fountains districts of Simferopol, the searches continued within
the investigation into the attack on the ambulance station on September 26. The searches were
conducted, according to witnesses, in some apartments and houses without the appropriate procedural
documents.
On October 9, the OMON Special Forces performed the same actions in the Plotinnoye village of
Bakhchisarai district. According to a witness Dilyaver Abduramanov, the search activities and searches
were carried out since the early morning. During the searches, there were no witnesses and relevant
court orders. The local residents reported that some Crimean Tatars were forcibly taken to
fingerprinting.
Previously, in early April, in some Crimean villages and towns there have been massive searches and
inspections, as reported in the survey of the Crimean Field Mission for April 201517. In connection with
these events, a complaint was submitted to the Presidential Council for Civil Society Institutions and
Human Rights on the mass searches in Crimea during April 2 - 10 in the framework of strategic
exercises “Barrier-2015” of the troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Relations. The complaint
indicated on the searches and inspections in the Zhuravki village of Kirov district, Yarkoe Shchelkovo,
Lenino, Battalion, Semisotka, Vojkovo, Bagerovo villages, near Simferopol Fountains and in Saki.
The “strategic exercises” were carried out based on the same scenario: about 100-150 armed MIA
officers: interior troops, district police, OMON, traffic police arrived to the village. On all the roads
leading to or from the village, they mounted sandbags, and in some cases (in at least two villages) –
machine guns, road blocks. The passing cars were asked to show the documents and inspected. In
16 http://ru.krymr.com/content/article/27118233.html
17 http://crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Crimea_Field_Mission_Review_April_2015_RU.pdf
8
some cases there was total inspection, in some - random. In case of random inspections the law
enforcement officers’ attention was drawn to the Crimean Tatars (Annex 3).
In October, the Crimean Human Rights Group received a response of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s
Office of the RF to its appeal (Annex 4 ). The Prosecutor’s Office confirmed that the exercises were
held, but the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation did not take part in the
establishment of checkpoints, documents checking, search of premises and inspection of vehicles.
The Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office believes that the information about the violations by officers of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation during the exercises was not confirmed.
This appeal was also responded by the Prosecutor of Crimea Natalia Poklonskaya. She said that the
exercises “Barrier-2015” were carried out according to the order of the MIA of the RF of February 27,
2015 #1/96c On the preparation and carrying out of the strategic exercises of the troops of the MIA of
the RF “Barrier-2015”. The Prosecutor, unlike the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office did not deny the
participation of the MIA of the RF units in the activities related to the establishment of checkpoints,
checking of documents, search of premises and inspection of vehicles. The Prosecutor said that the
exercises were carried out with respect for human rights, and there is no reason for the Prosecutor’s
intervention (Annex 5).
However, according to the witnesses and Crimean Field Mission18 monitors, the exercises were carried
out with numerous violations of the right to personal immunity and inviolability of the home, the local
residents have been intimidated and because of that did not complain to the MIA and the Prosecutor’s
Office.
PROGRESS OF THE HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
Alexander Kostenko’s case
In October, Alexander Kostenko was taken from the territory of Crimea and transferred to one of
the prisons of the Russian Federation to serve his sentence. The mother and brother of Alexander
Kostenko were not allowed to visit him before his transfer. The relatives were not informed in which
prison Alexander was transferred. The officers of the Department of the Federal Service for the
Execution of Sentences responded to mother’s request that the relatives will be notified about the
whereabouts of Alexander only after Alexander arrives in prison.
Earlier, on September 23, the lawyer Dmitry Sotnikov submitted to the Supreme Court of Crimea an
appeal with regard to Alexander Kostenko’s case on the abolition of prosecutorial decisions and the
termination of criminal prosecution. On October 7, the criminal case was delivered to the Supreme
Court of Crimea from the Kiev District Court in Simferopol. The lawyer noted that the question related
to the receipt of the appeal shall be considered until November 23.
‘May 3rd case’
On October 14, it became known that the Armyansk Court of Crimea postponed the hearing of Tahir
Smedlyaev and Eden Osmanov cases, who were accused of the use of force against the law
18 http://apostrophe.com.ua/news/society/2015-04-06/pravozaschitniki-zayavlyayut-o-massovyih-obyiskah-v-kryimu/20713
9
enforcement officers during a meeting of the leader of the Crimean Tatars Mustafa Dzhemilev on May
3, 201419. The court session was postponed because of the absence of one of the witnesses20.
‘February 26th case’
On October 10, one of the defendants in the ‘February 26th case’, the cameraman of the TV channel
ATR Eskender Nebiev was placed into detention until the hearing. The reasons for the sudden
decision on the detention were not explained.
The previous day, the body of his father Bekir Nebiyev suspected of committing the attack on the
ambulance station and killing two people was found (for details see section the Right to Life).
Prior to that Eskender Nebiev was arrested on April 20, 2015 based on charges of involvement in the
mass riot, which took place on February 26, 2014 at the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea, and on April 22, the Kiev district court of Simferopol adopted a decision on the detention for
two months. On June 18, Eskender Nebiev was released under surety of the Mufti of Muslims of
Crimea Emirali Ablaev. On October 12, the Central District Court of Simferopol found Eskender Nebiev
guilty of an offense under Part 2 of Art. 212 of the Criminal Code of the RF and sentenced him to 2
years and 6 months of imprisonment with the probation for 2 years. Nebiev agreed with the
accusation, and after the announcement of the verdict, he was released in the courtroom21.
On October 14, with regard to the other defendant in the ‘February 26th case’ Ali Asanov, the court
extended the detention until November 19. Ali Asanov was arrested on April 16, 2015. The defense
filed an appeal against this decision and requested to replace the detention with a more lenient
measure - house arrest or the recognizance not to leave. On October 26, the court of Simferopol
rejected the appeal. The head of the Central Election Commission of Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar
people Zair Smedlyaev said that the court did not consider the defense’s argument that the decision of
the Kiev District Court was made in violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RF, and that Ali
Asanov, having four young children, will not hide from investigation or the court22. The decision on the
extension of the term of detention remains in force.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
In October, the Prosecutor General’s Office limited the access to the websites of a number of news
agencies, citing the fact that the information they publish contains the calls for extremist or other
prohibited activity.
As of October 2, it became known that the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications,
Information Technology Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor) restricted the access to the website of
the NA ‘Center for Investigative Reporting’ at the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office of
the RF of September 30, 2015. The notification on the limitation of access to the information resource
(Annex 6 ) states that the information “on the information resource http://investigator.org.ua contains
calls for riots, extremist activities or participation in mass (public) events held in violation of the
established order”.23
19 http://obozrevatel.com/politics/38407-delo-3-maya-kak-indikator-polozheniya-kryimskih-tatar.htm
20 http://www.sobytiya.info/news/15/56537
21 http://investigator.org.ua/news/165606/
22 http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27327472.html
23 http://investigator.org.ua/news/165046/
10
Based on the decision of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the RF, the access to the information
resource http://investigator.org.ua is granted only to the communications service providers in the
territory of the Russian Federation, which in turn are required, within one day as of the date of receipt
of the notification to inform the http://investigator.org.ua of the requirement of the Prosecutor
General’s Office of the RF to without delay remove the information with the relevant calls.
As indicated in the notification, the resumption of access to the information resource shall be possible
in the event of removal of such information and reinspection by the Federal Service for Supervision of
Communications, Information Technology Mass Communications.
Also, on October 2, it was reported on the restriction of access to the website of the IA Events of
Crimea at the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the RF of September 30, 2015. The
notification sent to the editorial board of the Events of Crimea stated that the information “placed on
the information resource contains calls for riots, extremist activities or participation in mass (public)
events held in violation of the established order “.24
On October 5, it was reported that Roskomnadzor blocked the access to the website of
BlackSeaNews in Russia and Crimea at the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the RF. The
notification stated that the resource contained “calls for riots, extremist activities or participation in
mass (public) events held in violation of the established order”.25
On October 2, in Armyansk, the journalist of the information channel Armyansk.info while performing
professional activity was attacked26 by the road workers, who used force and took away his camera.
After an appeal to the police the camera was returned, but police officials did not arrest the attackers.
The victim refused to appeal against the actions of the law enforcement agency.
In the City Court of Kerch, on October 19, the media representatives could not get to the session on
the criminal case against the former mayor of Kerch Oleg Osadchy, who is accused of abuse of office
(Part 2 of Art. 286 of the Criminal Code of the RF). The session was to take place openly, the judge
Elena Kuzmina did not decide on a closed session. However, the representative of the Prosecutor’s
Office told the journalists that the session will be closed27.
According to the CHRG sources in Crimea, the session was held in the office of a judge, which cannot
contain more than 10 people. The journalists and the public were not allowed to attend the session
due to the fact that there is not enough space in the office, and the seats are occupied by the
Prosecutor’s Office and the FSS officers. However, the journalists reported that at the time, the court
room was free and there was no objective necessity to transfer the session to the judge’s office. The
journalists believe that in this way the court and the Prosecutor’s Office ensured the closed trial and
hindered the performance of journalistic activities.
The next day, on October 20, the chairman of the court session verbally announced the verdict for
Oleg Osadchy as a fine of 200 thousand rubles. The accused was found guilty of committing a crime
under Part 2 of Art. 286 of the Criminal Code of the RF (abuse of power committed by a person holding
a public position or a public position of the subject of the Russian Federation, as well as the head of
the local authority)28. It should be noted that according to local journalists, with whom the CHRG
monitors were able to communicate, the use of the judge’s office instead of the courtroom to establish
a closed process is not the first case.
24 http://www.sobytiya.info/news/15/56178
25 http://investigator.org.ua/news/165234/
26 http://armyansk.info/news/news-archive/121-2015/5159-zhurnalistov-dushat-za-reportazhi-o-blagoustrojstve-armyanska
27 http://kerch.fm/2015/10/19/v-kerchi-proshel-sud-po-ugolovnomu-delu-osadchego.html
28 http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/item/979280/
11
On October 21, the trade union of the news agency Voice of Crimea established in Kiev a branch
of the Committee of the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine. According to the Committee, the
statutory meeting of the Crimean branch was held on October 16th29. The organization includes 5
journalists from the Voice of Crimea agency. The main purpose of the branch is to ensure the
journalists’ access to professional legal protection if required.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
On September 16, the State Council of Crimea adopted a Law On the organization and implementation
of public control in the territory of the Republic of Crimea30. Article 4 of this Law refers to the subjects
of public control in Crimea the Public Chamber of Crimea, the community councils of municipalities,
community councils at the government authorities of Crimea. According to the practical application,
only the public associations registered as legal entities according to the provisions of the Russian
legislation can become members of such subjects.
Thus, the associations without legal registration (including those acting in the territory of Crimea until
March 2014, which did not undergo the re-registration) are deprived of the opportunity to be the
subjects of public control. However, according to the legislation of the Russian Federation, the public
associations have the right to carry out their activities without legal registration.
In addition, Article 4 of the Law states that in order to implement the public control in cases and under
the procedure established by the legislation of the Russian Federation the 1) public monitoring
commissions; 2) public inspections; 3) public control groups; 4) other organizational structures of
public control may be established.
Thus, the Law envisages the establishment of the public monitoring commissions in Crimea. However,
Part 2 of Article 10 of the Federal Law of the RF On public control over ensuring human rights in places
of forced detention and provision of assistance to persons in places of detention31 states that the right
to nominate the candidates for the Public Monitoring Commission belongs to a nationwide, interregional
or regional public association with the state registration, which carries out its activity for at
least five years as of the date of its establishment , and the statutory purpose or the activity of
which is the protection or promotion of human and civil rights and freedoms.
Thus, the public associations of Crimea cannot establish public monitoring commissions, because the
maximum duration of their activities as of the date of registration under the legislation of the Russian
Federation is two years. This, in turn, denies the opportunity for the associations to exercise public
control over the activity of penitentiary authorities and monitor the situation of persons in detention in
Crimea.
It should be recalled that until March 2014, in Crimea the Law On the Commissioner for Human Rights
of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which ensured the work for the National Preventive Mechanism32
(NPM) on the model of ‘Ombudsman +’ (representatives of NGOs and civil society monitors) as the
round-the-clock and unimpeded access to all the detention centers in the territory of Crimea. The NPM
29 http://nmpu.org.ua/2015/10/zhurnalisty-z-krymu-stvoryly-u-kyjevi-profspilkovyj-oseredok-nmpu/
30 http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/145z.pdf
31 http://ombudsman74.ru/xcat/499
32 http://npm.org.ua/
12
operates in Ukraine since 2012 under the Optional Protocol33 to the UN Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which was ratified by Ukraine in 2006.
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
On October 14, the police officers in Simferopol detained three activists of the Ukrainian cultural
center, including Leonid Kuzmin, who were laying flowers in front of the monument to Bogdan
Khmelnitsky in Simferopol34. The three detainees were brought to the local Centre for Combating
Extremism for questioning without drawing up a protocol. It is important to note that this is not the
first case of detention35 of the Ukrainian activists during the laying of flowers in front of the
monuments to the public and government figures of Ukraine in Crimea.
It should be noted that on September 16, the Article 2 of the Law On ensuring the conditions for the
exercise by the citizens of the Russian Federation of the right to hold meetings, rallies, demonstrations
and pickets in the Republic of Crimea was amended36. The amendments specify that in case if the
deadline for submission of notification of holding the public event fully coincides with non-working days
(holidays), the notification may be submitted on the last business day preceding the non-working days
(holidays). In practice, this provision leads to a reduction of the time limit envisaged for submission of
notifications on holding a peaceful assembly. Moreover, the availability of the notification and
authorization procedure is a significant restriction on the freedom of assembly.
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION
The Head of the Committee of the State Council of Crimea on Culture and Cultural Heritage Svetlana
Savchenko announced that by the end of the year a draft law On the freedom of conscience and
religion will be introduced. The draft law is aimed at regulating the religious worship and the
establishment of certain limits for rites and ceremonies, as well as the regulation of the activities of
religious associations on the territory of Crimea. She also stressed that the draft law would “terminate
the activities of the banned extremist organizations in the Crimean peninsula”37.
The draft law imposes a risk of restricting the freedom of conscience and religion by fixing a number of
formal requirements for religious groups. One of the requirements refers to the registration of the
religious community and the undergoing of the applicable “extremist” expertise. Many representatives
of the religious communities are concerned that the draft law is aimed at strengthening the local
authorities’ control in the sphere of religion and conscience.
The strengthening of local authorities’ control in the sphere of freedom of conscience and religion is
demonstrated by the establishment of the Interagency Commission on Combating Extremism in
Crimea. The Commission was established on October 7 by the Order of Sergei Aksenov38. The
Commission consists mainly of representatives of the law enforcement agencies. One of the directions
33 http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/torture_prot.shtml
34 http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27307324.html
35 http://investigator.org.ua/news/166922/
36 http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/148z.pdf
37 http://crimea.gov.ru/news/29_09_15
38 http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_262176.pdf
13
of its work is to monitor the activities of religious communities from the point of view of “combating
extremism”.
CASE OF SENTSOV, KOLCHENKO, AFANASYEV, CHIRNIY
Gennady Afanasyev, one of the defendants in the Sentsov-Kolchenko case, who was sentenced to
seven years in prison, was transferred to a penal colony #25 of the Republic of Komi, Syktyvkar. In
court, during the trial on Oleg Sentsov and Alexander Kolchenko’s case he withdrew his testimony,
explaining that it was given under torture. The lawyer Alexander Popkov said that in Syktyvkar
Gennady Afanasiev was placed in a punishment cell, he, as his lawyer, was not notified of the transfer
of Gennady Afanasyev.
On October 16, the representatives of the Public Oversight Commission (POC) visited Gennady
Afanasyev in prison and reported that he was placed in a punishment cell, according to the prison’s
staff, because he carried the blades. Gennady Afanasyev and his lawyer insist that the blades were
planted with the aim to put him in more stringent conditions of imprisonment. A POC member Igor
Sazhin visited the prisoner and said that Gennady Afanasyev was brought in Syktyvkar on October 8
and at first he was put in Detention Center-239. Gennady's mother Olga Afanasyeva said40 that the
prison administration intends to keep Gennady in stringent conditions of imprisonment, which assume
the maximum restrictions in the penal colony.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND MOVEMENT THROUGH THE CHECK POINTS
In the previous monitoring reviews of the Crimean Field Mission41 the cases of arbitrary detention and
search of personal belongings by the border guards of the Russian Federation have been widely
reported. In most cases, these actions were carried out against the activists permanently residing in
Crimea, but often traveling outside of Crimea. The activists were arrested for several hours without
explanation, were interviewed, and in some cases were required to show the data of the mobile phone
(SMS messages, phone book of contacts). During the search of personal belongings there were no
witnesses, the rights were not explained, it was prohibited to use a mobile phone, the protocols of
arrest or inspection were not drawn up.
On October 31, the activist Leonid Kuzmin reported42 that he was arrested at the Ukrainian
checkpoint by the officers of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine at the entrance to Crimea. After he
was released, the protocol, according to Leonid Kuzmin, was not drawn up.
MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS DURING THE “CIVIL BLOCKADE OF CRIMEA”
As of September 20, there is a “Civil Blockade of Crimea” organized by the people’s deputy of Ukraine,
leader of the Crimean Tatar people Mustafa Dzhemilev, people’s deputy, Chairman of the Majlis of the
Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov and Lenur Islyamov, the Vice President of the World Congress of
Crimean Tatars, the owner of the TV channel ATR43. The blockade takes place at the three points of
39 http://zona.media/news/lezviya-shizo/
40 http://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-community/1911875-politzaklyuchennogo-afanaseva-perevodyat-v-polnuyu-izolyatsiyumat.
html
41 http://crimeahr.org/category/monitoring/
42 http://www.sobytiya.info/news/15/57069
43 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBS9FgXCBtg
14
entry and exit to Crimea: Chongar, Kalanchak and Chaplynka. The blockade involves the military unit
Pravy Sector and other.
Given the fact that after the start of the blockade the CHRG regularly receives complaints about the
unlawful actions of the protesters, the CHRG continuously monitors the observance of human rights
during the blockade. The monitoring also includes the travels by the CHRG, in particular, on October 6,
Olga Skrypnyk and Vissarion Aseev visited Chongar with the aim to perform monitoring. Currently, the
following issues and violations were identified.
1. Establishment of unlawful checkpoints. At all three points on the highways the protesters
installed the improvised roadblocks (Annex 7 ). The checkpoints are placed in public areas and impede
the movement of not only trucks, but of all vehicles without exception, and are used to stop the
vehicles. According to the provisions of the Ukrainian legislation, the protesters have no authority and
permits for the installation of such roadblocks. It is also contrary to the format of the blockade
announced by the organizers when it was reported that “the movement of people and cars will be
unobstructed”44.
2. Unlawful checks of identity documents and inspection of vehicles. A persistent problem is
the unlawful checking of identity documents and inspection of vehicles. This is constantly reported by
the drivers of motor vehicles, and it was also confirmed by the representatives of the CHRG, who spent
40 minutes in Chongar and during that time about 20 cars were stopped by members of the Pravy
Sector, Azov and other military units (Annex 8 ) acting with the consent of organizers of the blockade.
Both the cars on their way to and from Crimea were stopped. When the car was stopped, the
representatives of the military units inspected it, mainly the car trunk. In some cases, they asked the
passengers to show the identity documents. Passport documents were also required from the
representatives of the CHRG.
The human rights activists refused to show their documents, arguing that such a requirement by the
participants of the blockade is unlawful. After such refusal the human rights activists were taken to the
leaders of the military groups in order to “determine their identity”.
In addition, the representatives of the military units began to use the so-called “separatists list ” - a
list of the personal data of a number of persons who, according to the military units are “separatists or
their accomplices”. These lists are printed on the A4-size sheets using a printer, with a volume of about
10 sheets. The representatives of the military units are asking the men going to or from Crimea to tell
their names and surnames, and then verify them according to the lists.
These actions of the military units constitute an interference with the right to liberty and personal
immunity and violate the legislation of Ukraine, as the documents checkup and the inspections of
private vehicles can be carried out only by representatives of the relevant government authorities,
presenting a legitimate reason for this. There are cases where such actions take place in the presence
of the police officers. In some cases, if the driver refused to show the documents to unidentified
persons, the protesters involved the police.
3. Risks to the safety of passengers and pedestrians. Some representatives of the military units
carry firearms or side arms45 (Annex 9). It is not possible to determine whether these people have a
permit to carry a weapon. The behavior of many representatives of the military units, both according to
passengers, drivers and the CHRG is often aggressive. In the course of communication with the CHRG
human rights activists many protesters mentioned the previous combat experience gained in the ATO
44 http://gordonua.com/news/crimea/CHubarov-Blokada-Kryma-nachnetsya-v-1200-20-sentyabrya-98084.html
45 http://ru.krymr.mobi/a/27332084.html
15
area. This situation creates the risks of the use of violence by such groups in the event of a conflict
with the driver or a pedestrian.
According to the response of the Investigation Department of the National Police in the Kherson
region, three cases of unlawful handling of arms were entered in the Unified register of pre-trial
investigations (Art. 263 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) (Annex 11).
Also, the CHRG representatives noted that during their stay at Chongar (in the evening after 18.00) at
the checkpoint and the headquarters of the blockade there were the representatives of the military
units as well as Lenur Islyamov, one of the organizers of the blockade. The law enforcement officers in
charge of maintaining the public order and authorized to prevent possible violence were not present at
Chongar at the time.
A special danger to passengers, drivers and participants of the blockade is related to the blow-up of
the power supply utilities in the areas of the blockade. Thus, on October 6, the deputy chief of the
Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Kherson region Ilya Kiva reported that at night, the
unidentified persons blew up the high voltage transmission tower supplying the electricity to Crimea.
The investigative group, the representatives of the Department of the Ministry of Emergency
Situations, the MIA battalion Kherson arrived at the scene46. On October 20, at night, near Chongar,
the unidentified persons blew up two transmission towers, which also supplied electricity to Crimea.
According to MIA, the explosions were carried out through the use of mines, two of which
malfunctioned and were subsequently deactivated by pyrotechnic experts47.
4. Cases of unlawful deprivation of liberty. On October 6, the CHRG human rights activists found
out that according to one of the organizers of the blockade Lenur Islyamov, at night on October 5, the
protesters detained two men who, according to them, carried drugs and explosives. The Pravy Sector
in social networks confirmed that they arrested two men, namely Kozoriz Nikolay Ivanovich and
Karfut Sergei Lyubomirovich48 (Annex 10).
The human rights activists reported that the protesters should have transferred the detainees to the
law enforcement authorities, but this was not done. In this regard, the representatives of the CHRG
submitted an application to the police requiring to deal with the situation and in the case of unlawful
detention of people - to take appropriate legal action (the application was received by Lieutenant
Romanchuk D.S.). After that, the police arrived at Chongar and took away the detainees.
Later it became known that with regard to this fact the criminal proceedings were initiated. The
Investigation Department of the National Police in the Kherson region reported the following.
On October 5, around 17:00 at the 108 km of the Kherson-Armyansk road, the unidentified persons
unlawfully stopped the car Gazel and openly took possession of the silver chain and amulet of Kozoriz
N.I. On October 8, the Investigation Department of the Kalanchak RD of the Department of MIA
registered the criminal proceedings on the grounds of a criminal offense under Part 2 of Article 186 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine (robbery). The pre-trial investigation is ongoing (Annex 11).
Another case is related to the detention at Kalanchak of the Crimean resident Rostislav Stetsenko.
He was detained by the representatives of the civil unit Azov due to the fact that he had a Russian
passport issued in Crimea. The relevant video was posted by the representatives of Azov49. The video
46 http://www.unian.net/society/1143912-neizvestnyie-povredili-vyisokovoltnuyu-oporu-dlya-podachi-elektroenergii-v-kryimfoto.
html
47 http://www.unian.net/society/1157295-vozle-chongara-neizvestnyie-vzorvali-dve-elektrooporyi-podayuschie-elektrichestvov-
kryim.html
48 https://www.facebook.com/ostap.bender.35574/posts/1657122794564063
49 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QsuSjffK8e0
16
depicts the face of the detainee with the signs of beatings and blood. He was not transferred to the
law enforcement agency. Rostislav, after his release, said that he experienced great difficulty in
returning home to Kerch, and that the representatives of the military unit used violence against him,
caused bodily harm and threatened with sexual violence. There is no information on the investigation
of the fact of unlawful actions of the protesters.
The Ukrainian legislation requires that in the case of detention of a person by civilians such person
should be immediately delivered to an authorized officer or the authorized officer should be
immediately informed of the detention and whereabouts of the person. The grounds for such detention
may only be a reasonable suspicion of commission of a criminal offense. Thus, the actions of the
military units may have the signs of a criminal offense - unlawful detention.
5. Breakage and seizure of property. The car drivers complained about the damage caused to their
cars by the protesters. Thus, Andrey Krutsenko reported50 that the representatives of the military
units smashed the windows of his car because he refused to unload the vegetables he bought (Annex
12). He submitted an application to the police. Andrey Krutsenko also reported that he had met with
the representatives of the headquarters of the blockade who promised to compensate the losses
incurred.
In addition, the drivers reported that the representatives of the military units demanded to throw away
the purchased food products (fruits and vegetables), if the car was on its way to Crimea. In some
cases, the drivers, in order to avoid the conflict with the military units, were forced to get rid of food
products at the checkpoints of the blockade.
There were cases when the protesters forced the drivers or the passengers to dispose of the
purchased goods. Thus, on October 11, at the checkpoint in Kalanchak, the protesters stopped the car
with a man and woman who were going back to Crimea from a music festival in Europe. The protesters
found alcoholic beverages in the car, which were purchased in Europe. The representatives of the
military unit seized alcoholic beverages and destroyed them51 (Annex 13).
On October 18, according to the CHRG information, the Crimean Archbishop Clement said that at the
point of exit from Crimea he was stopped at the two checkpoints of the blockade. During the inspection
the goods, which he carried with him as a gift were seized.
Currently, the CHRG is informed of the pre-trial investigation conducted with regard to three cases of
property damage (Article 194 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) (Annex 11).
6. Interference with the activity of the human rights activists. The representatives of the
Crimean Human Rights Group performed the recording of the unlawful actions of the blockade
participants (inspections of the private vehicles). However, the representatives of the Pravy Sector
rudely forbade the members of the CHRG to do so and to be present at the checkpoint (despite the
fact that it is a public place), threatened and behaved aggressively.
The Investigation Department of the National Police in the Kherson region reported that during the
“blockade” of Crimea the regional police registered 186 incidents, of which 38 were entered into the
Unified register of pre-trial investigations.
These incidents include elements of the following criminal offenses: 1 - under Part 2 of Article 186 of
the Criminal Code of Ukraine (robbery), 2 - under Article 279 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (the
blocking of transport communications), 3 - under Article 263 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (unlawful
handling of weapons), 10 - under Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (forgery of documents,
stamps, seals), 1 - Article 125 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (minor injuries), 3 - under Article 194 of
50 http://hromadskeradio.org/2015/10/07/na-blokpostu-produktovoyi-blokady-v-moyiy-mashyni-pobyly-vikna-vodiy
51 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=532392276916814&id=527496024073106&__mref=message_bubble
17
the Criminal Code of Ukraine (destruction of property), 2 - under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine (fictitious business). The Kherson police did not inform on the number of persons prosecuted
(Annex 11).
It should also be noted that the Assistant to the Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Oleh Slobodian reported that the passenger and traffic flow at the points of entry and exit to Crimea
decreased twice during the “blockade of Crimea”. This refers not only to trucks carrying commercial
goods, but also to other passenger flows52.
ISSUES RELATED TO CITIZENSHIP
Currently, for the residents of Crimea it still remains unclear whether they should, as of January 1,
2016, within 60 days notify the Federal Migration Service (FMS) on their other citizenship. This applies
to the vast majority of the residents of Crimea, as they have Ukrainian citizenship.
According to Part 5 of Article 6 of the Federal Law of June 4, 2014 #142-FZ On the introduction of
amendments to Articles 6 and 30 of the Federal Law On citizenship of the Russian Federation, the
residents of Crimea according to the Federal Law of May 31, 2002 #62-FZ On citizenship of the
Russian Federation, as of January 1, 2016 should submit a notification in case they have another
citizenship in the case its acquiring. However, according to other legal regulations of the Russian
Federation the residents of Crimea did not acquire the citizenship of Ukraine, they automatically
became the citizens of Ukraine.
Because of this contradiction, it remains unclear whether the residents of Crimea are required to notify
of their Ukrainian citizenship. The Department of FMS of Crimea placed a clarification on this issue on
the website of the FMS of Crimea. It states “as of January 1, 2016, the residents of Crimea should
submit a notification of other citizenship if they have or re-acquire the citizenship of a foreign state, for
example, of Armenia, the USA, Germany and other. If the resident of Crimea acquired the citizenship
of the Russian Federation in accordance with the Federal Constitutional Law 6 being a stateless person,
and subsequently acquired the citizenship of Ukraine, it is also necessary, within 60 days, to notify the
Federal Migration Service of Russia ”53. It should be noted that on the website of the FMS of Sevastopol
the similar requirement is lacking and there is a direct indication of the need to notify of a second
citizenship by the residents of Sevastopol. Thus, there is still no clear position on the matter.
On October 13, the Department of FMS of Crimea reported that foreign citizens that received in 2014 a
residence permit in Crimea valid until the end of 2015 according to the Federal Law of 25.07.2002
#115-FZ On the legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation should submit to the FMS of
Russia the notification of confirmation of their residence in the Russian Federation54. This provision
primarily concerns the citizens of Ukraine, permanently residing in Crimea who renounced the Russian
citizenship. In case of violation of this obligation by the foreign citizen, he will be brought to
administrative responsibility.
In addition to the notification, the “temporarily residing foreign citizens” should also submit an income
statement, a copy of a tax declaration or other document confirming the amount and source of income
of a foreign citizen. This requirement for many residents of Crimea, who did not acquire the Russian
citizenship, is quite difficult to fulfill as without the Russian passport in Crimea it is extremely difficult to
find a job.
Furthermore, in accordance with Article 11 of the Federal Law of 25.07.2002 #115-FZ On the legal
status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation, the temporarily residing in the Russian Federation
52 http://www.depo.ua/rus/life/cherez-blokadu-pasazhirskiy-potik-v-krim-zmenshivsya-vdvichi-08102015154000
53 http://www.92fmsgov.ru/?page_id=10212
54 http://www.92fmsgov.ru/?page_id=10080
18
foreign citizen is not entitled to voluntarily change the place of residence within the subject of the
Russian Federation on the territory of which he is allowed to temporary reside, or to choose the place
of residence outside the specified subject of the Russian Federation. Such a provision significantly
restricts the right to choose the place of residence.
On October 29, the so-called grace period of stay of the foreign citizens in Crimea, first of all of the
citizens of Ukraine who renounced the Russian citizenship expired. Under the Russian legislation, such
persons are obliged to leave Crimea for at least 180 days.
It is extremely difficult to obtain a temporary residence permit or a work patent in Crimea. The
issuance of the work patent or employment, given the availability of a work patent, is complicated by
the fact that the citizens of Ukraine, which have the work patent, are denied employment as the tax
and other statements in case of employment of such a person are much more difficult than of a person
with a Russian passport.
As a result such provision leads to the fact that persons who permanently resided in Crimea, but
refused to obtain the Russian citizenship and have not been able to obtain a temporary residence
permit are threatened with deportation from the territory of Crimea, or are forced to leave Crimea for
180 days, leaving their families and property.
For example, in one of the families in Kerch the woman was able to obtain a temporary residence
permit, and her husband was not. The man was informed that in that case he was obliged to leave
Crimea for 180 days. Subsequently, the man applied to the Chief of the Federal Migration Service and
obtained a permit for temporary residence.
A separate provision is envisaged for Ukrainian citizens who moved to Crimea from Ukraine, where
currently there is a military conflict. For these individuals the extension of stay is provided. However,
there is no clear definition of specific areas of Ukraine, from which a person was displaced, so this
provision is difficult to apply in practice.
For example, a citizen of Ukraine has registered residence in the Maryinka village of Donetsk region.
According to the maps of the area of the military conflict, this village is on the frontline. However, the
FMS replied that this settlement is not included in the FMS list of settlements of Donbas. Thus, the man
will have to leave Crimea for 180 days, but ha cannot return to the previous place of residence, since
there are continuing hostilities.
The review was prepared by:
Olga Skrypnik, coordinator of the analytical activity of the Crimean Human Rights Group;
Vissarion Aseev, coordinator of the monitoring activity of the Crimean Human Rights Group;
Dariia Sviridova lawyer, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union;
Tetiana Pechonchyk, coordinator of the advocacy activity of the Crimean Human Rights Group,
Human Rights Information Centre.
19
ANNEXES
Annex 1
Notification of the decision on the detention of the Chairman of the Majlis, people’s deputy of Ukraine
Refat Chubarov
20
Annex 2
Appeal against the decision with respect to Refat Chubarov
21
Annex 3
Председателю Совета при Президенте Российской Федерации по развитию
гражданского общества и правам человека
Федотову М.А.
Уважаемый Михаил Александрович!
В рабочую группу по правам человека в Крыму Совета при Президенте Российской Федерации по развитию
гражданского общества и правам человека поступило и рассмотрено обращение о массовых обысках в отдельных
населенных пунктах Крыма в первой половине апреля сего года и нарушениях прав человека, сопровождавших эти
события.
Речь идет о мероприятиях, которые прошли на территории Крыма со 2 по 10 апреля в рамках оперативно-
стратегических учений "Заслон-2015" внутренних войск МВД РФ.
Определенное беспокойство вызывает то обстоятельство, что учения затронули населенные пункты с
преимущественно крымскотатарским населением.
Так в поселке Журавки, Кировского района, в котором проживает около 500 крымских татар 2 апреля в 9:00
были выставлены блок-посты на всех трех дорогах, ведущих в село (со стороны Первомайского, Кировского и
Приветного). Сотрудники ГАИ и ОМОНа на блокпостах останавливали все проезжающие машины, у пассажиров
проверяли документы. Имеются свидетельства "дифференцированного подхода": у людей славянской внешности
только проверяли документы, а крымских татар сопровождали до дома и проводили там так называемые "осмотры"
(по сути, обыски в жилище). В общей сложности, в поселке находилось 5 автобусов, 10 легковых полицейских машин
и 5 УАЗов. Все они были наполнены с людьми с автоматами, собаками и ОМОНом. Над поселком летали вертолеты.
Полноценные обыски прошли как минимум в 10 домах. По крайней мере, в двух из них изъяли системные блоки
компьютеров. Помимо частных домов были обысканы какое-то количество публичных мест — например, спортивный
зал, магазины. Все эти действия продолжались примерно до 14:00. При этом никаких объяснений цели и оснований
происходящего жителям не давалось.
Подобные действия, включая обыски примерно в 10 домах, прошли также 3 апреля в поселке Яркое поле
примерно с 9:00 до 13:30.
Сообщения об аналогичных мероприятиях поступили также из поселков Щелково, Ленино, Батальонное,
Семисотка, Войково, Багерово, в районе Симферополя Фонтаны и в Саках. В этих населенных пунктах «учения»
проходили по одному и тому же сценарию. В поселок приезжали около 100-150 сотрудников МВД: военнослужащие
внутренних войск, участковые, сотрудники ОМОН, ГИБДД, все они были вооружены. На всех дорогах, ведущих в
поселок или из поселка, устанавливались мешки с песком, в некоторых случаях (как минимум, в двух поселках) –
пулеметы, автозаградители. У проезжающих машин проверялись документы, проводился досмотр. В некоторых
случаях – сплошная проверка, в некоторых – выборочная. В случае выборочной проверки особое внимание
правоохранителей привлекали крымские татары.
Жители населенных пунктов Крыма отмечают, что они не были оповещены об «учениях», и узнали о том, что
проводимые мероприятия являются учениями лишь из сообщений прессы после начала «учений».
Представляется, что «учения», проводимые подобным образом, не создают у граждан ощущения
безопасности, а напротив, способствуют нагнетанию напряженности, страха и чувства незащищенности, что в итоге
может привести к обострению межнациональных отношений и роста недоверия граждан к властям Российской
Федерации.
Прошу Вас направить обращение в профильные органы государственной власти Российской Федерации с
целью прояснить правовой статус данных учений и провести проверку правомерности и обоснованности действий
сотрудников органов внутренних дел и военнослужащих внутренних войск при проведении данных учений на
территории Крыма.
С уважением,
член Совета при Президенте России по развитию гражданского общества и правам человека
Кривенко С.В.
An appeal to the Presidential Council for Civil Society Institutions Development and Human Rights on
the massive searches in Crimea on April 2 – 10, in the framework of strategic exercises “Barrier-2015”
of the Russian MIA troops
22
Annex 4
The answer of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation to the appeal to the
Presidential Council for Civil Society Institutions Development and Human Rights on the massive
23
searches in Crimea on April 2 – 10, in the framework of strategic exercises “Barrier-2015” of the
Russian MIA troops
24
Annex 5
The answer of the Prosecutor of Crimea N. Poklonskaya the appeal to the Presidential Council for Civil
Society Institutions Development and Human Rights on the massive searches in Crimea on April 2 – 10,
in the framework of strategic exercises “Barrier-2015” of the Russian MIA troops
25
Annex 6
Notification of restriction of access to the information resource IA Center for Investigative Journalism
26
Annex 7
Checkpoint of the participants of the “Civil Blockade of Crimea”
27
Annex 8
Stopping of cars by the participants of the “Civil Blockade of Crimea”
28
Annex 9
The presence of weapons at the “Civil Blockade of Crimea”
29
Annex 10
Detained participants of the “Civil Blockade of Crimea” Nikolay Kozoriz and Sergei Karfut
30
Annex 11
ГОЛОВНЕ УПРАВЛІННЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ
ПОЛІЦІЇ
В ХЕРСОНСЬКІЙ ОБЛАСТІ
СЛІДЧЕ УПРАВЛІННЯ
вул. Кірова, 4, м. Херсон, 73014
Голові Центру громадянської
просвіти «Альменда»
Скрипник О.С.
Київ-1, а/с В-55, 01001
09.11.2015 № 8/С-24зі
На виконання запиту про отримання публічної інформації повідомляємо, що з початку громадської
акції з блокування АР Крим, у період часу з 20.09 по 05.11.2015 органами поліції області зареєстровано 186
подій, з яких:
- за 38 повідомленнями інформацію внесено до Єдиного реєстру досудових розслідувань (10 – за
ст.258 КК України – підроблення документів, печаток, штампів та бланків, їх збут, використанні підроблених
документів; 1 - за ст. 125 КК України - легкі тілесні ушкодження; 3 - за ст. 194 КК України - пошкодження
майна; 1 - за ч.2 ст. 186 КК України – пограбування; 2 - за ст. 205 КК України - фіктивне підприємництво;
2 - за ст. 279 КК України - блокування транспортних комунікацій; 3 - за ст. 263 КК України - незаконне
поводження зі зброєю);
- матеріали за 24 повідомленнями передано за належністю;
- 121 повідомлення розглянуто в порядку Закону України «Про звернення громадян» та матеріали
списано висновками у справи;
- за 3 повідомленнями рішення не прийняті.
Також повідомляємо, що 05.10.2015 близько 17.00 год. на 108 км. автодороги Херсон-Армянськ,
невстановлені особи не законно зупинили автомобіль марки "Газель" та відкрито заволоділи срібним
ланцюжком та ладонкой Козоріза М.І.
08.10.2015 СВ Каланчацького РВ УМВС зареєстроване кримінальне провадження за ознаками
складу кримінального правопорушення, передбаченого ч.2 ст.186 КК України (Грабіж). Процесуальне
рішення у кримінальному провадженні не прийнято, досудове розслідування триває.
Слідчі слідчих підрозділів Головного управління Національної поліції в Херсонській області за період
громадської акції з блокування АР Крим осіб за підозрою у вчиненні кримінальних правопорушень,
пов’язаних з блокуванням в’їзних шляхів в АР Крим, в порядку ст.208 КПК України не затримували.
Відповідно до запитуваної інформації роз’яснюємо, що згідно ст.4 Конституції України в Україні існує
єдине громадянство. Підстави набуття і припинення громадянства України визначаються Законом.
Заступник начальника Н.Р. Іванюк
Response of the Investigation Department of the National Police of the Kherson region to the inquiry
31
Annex 12
Car of Andrey Krutsenko damaged by the participants of the “Civil blockade of Crimea”
32
Annex 13
Seizure of alcoholic beverages by the participants of the “Civil blockade of Crimea” from the citizens
entering Crimea
Annex 950
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review, May 2016

CRIMEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION REVIEW
e-mail: [email protected] website: crimeahrg.org
May 2016
This monitoring review was prepared
by the Crimean Human Rights Group
on the basis of materials collected
in May 2016
Monitoring review of the human rights situation in Crimea
Go to link, to see
monthly monitoring reviews of the
Crimean Human Rights Group
Go to link, to see
thematic reviews and articles
of the Crimean Human Rights Group
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
1
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................2
2. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS .....................................................................................................3
The right to life, enforced disappearances ......................................................................................3
Right to liberty and security of the person ......................................................................................3
Detentions ..........................................................................................................................................3
Arrests .................................................................................................................................................4
Searches .............................................................................................................................................4
Progress of the high-profile criminal cases................................................................................5
Freedom of speech and expression ..................................................................................................9
Obstruction of journalists’ work ..................................................................................................11
Freedom of association .....................................................................................................................12
Freedom of peaceful assembly ........................................................................................................14
Freedom of assembly violations in connection with Remembrance day of the victims
of Crimean tatars deportation ......................................................................................................15
Other cases of violations of freedom of assembly .................................................................16
Freedom of movement and issues related to checkpoints passing ........................................16
3. ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................................18
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) is an organization of the Crimean human
rights defenders and journalists, the purpose of which is to promote the observance and protection
of human rights in Crimea by attracting widespread attention to the problems of human rights
and international humanitarian law in the territory of the Crimean peninsula, as well as the search
and development of mechanisms to protect the human rights in Crimea.
The CHRG first of all obey the rules of basic documents in the field of human rights, such as:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International Covenant on economic, social and cultural Rights and others.
The main objectives of the CHRG:
1) Collection and analysis of the information regarding the human rights situation in the
Crimea;
2) Broad awareness among governments, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations,
non-governmental organizations, the media and other target groups through
the publication and spreading of analytical and information materials on the human rights
situation in Crimea;
3) Promote the protection of human rights and respect for international law in Crimea;
4) Preparation of recommendations for government authorities and international organizations
in the sphere of human rights;
5) Providing the presence of «human rights in the Crimea topics» in the information space.
The CHRG’s team consists of experts, human rights activists and journalists from different
countries who are involved in monitoring and documenting human rights violations in Crimea,
since February, 2014.
During preparation and spreading of the information the CHRG is guided by principles of objectivity,
reliability and timeliness.
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
3
2. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
THE RIGHT TO LIFE, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES
On 24 May, Erwin Ibragimov born in 1985 was kidnapped in Bakhchisaray. Previously, in
2011 he was a chief specialist of international relations of Bakhchisaray district administration in
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. He was also the deputy of the 6th convocation of the City
Council of Bakhchisaray and a member of the World Congress of the Crimean Tatars.
In the evening on 24 May, unidentified persons in the uniform of the road patrol service of Russia
stopped the car of Erwin Ibragimov in Bakhchisarai near the house on 9 Mira Street. After that
he was forcibly putted in the car and taken away in an unknown direction. Before he was forced
into a car by unknown persons, he called his relatives and asked regarding the documents on his
car. It also confirms that he was stopped by security forces. After the kidnapping of Ibragimov his
car was left on the road with the doors open and the key in the ignition with no signs of robbery.
On the video of the alleged kidnapping of Ibragimov 1 it can be seen as he goes to the car of traffic
police. However, after he saw that there are other persons in the car, he is trying to run away
from the car. However, he was caught up and placed in the car with the use of force. After that,
there was no information about his whereabouts or the people who participated in the kidnapping.
On 1 June passport and work record of the kidnapped Ibragimov were found near the bar
«Arpat» in Bakhchisarai.
Active political activity of Ibragimov and involvement in the kidnapping of power structures
characterize this case as an enforced disappearance.
The criminal case under paragraph «A, B» Part 2, Article 126 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation — «Abduction» was opened by the main Investigation Department of the Investigative
Committee of Russia in Crimea 2.
Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea (Kiev) has opened criminal proceedings on
the fact of kidnapping of Ibragimov Part 1 Article 115 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine —
«deliberate murder» 3.
RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON
DETENTIONS
On 6 May, near the mosque at Molodezhnoe village Simferopol district security forces,
including riot police, conducted a so-called spot-check to verify the documents of the
mosque congregation. Police officers demanded identity documents from the local Muslims
that were coming out of the mosque. Those Muslims who did not have documents with them
were ordered to sit in the police bus and go to the district department of police in Simferopol.
People were outraged by such actions and demanded to clarify the reasons for these
inspections and detentions 4. According to Emil Kurbedinov, several dozen Muslims were taken
1 Video from the place of abduction of Erwin Ibragimov: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FW8bqgsBFaQ
2 Information about Erwin Ibragimov on the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation website in the «Missing»
section: http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/item/1045425/
3 Notice regarding the beginning of the criminal procedure by the prosecutor’s office of Crimea (Kiev): http://ark.gp.gov.ua/
ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=184163
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9MH3T97sTQ
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
4
to the police station 5; others were obliged to come to the department on their own 6. After the
identification they were released.
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol appealed to law enforcement agencies
for an explanation of the grounds of the actions that took place in Molodezhnoe village. Crimea
muftiat was given an answer that «the planned raid is carried out by the Federal Migration Service
under the verification of compliance with the migration legislation of the Russian Federation» 7.
On 7 May, during the afternoon time about two dozen people of «nonslavik» appearance were
arrested in the central market in Yevpatoriya. They were taken to the police station for fingerprinting.
Such actions violate the right to liberty and security. Illegally detained people are not subject
to mandatory state fingerprint registration in accordance with the Federal Law of 25.07.1998 N
128-FL (ed. from 07.05.2013) «On State Fingerprinting in the Russian Federation».
Crimean prosecutor called such actions as «enhanced measures to ensure public safety in
the cities of Crimea before the celebration of the Victory Day on 9 May». She also said that such
raids will take place in other cities, «the migration legislation will be checked everywhere, security
measures will be held in places of mass gathering of citizens». She said that eight citizens of Uzbekistan
have been identified at the market in Yevpatoriya that were violating migration laws 8.
On 18 May, the participants of the motor rally dedicated to the Day of memory of victims of
deportation of the Crimean Tatars were detained. Kurukch S., R. Yapalahov, U. Fakhriev and E.
Berberov were detained in the Lgovskoe village of Kirov district, and Ablyakim Ablyakimov, Seytmamut
Seytumerov, Enver Chavushev and Alim Muslyadinov were detained in Sudak (Read more
in «Freedom of Peaceful Assembly» section).
ARRESTS
On 4 May, Zair Smedlyaev reported that the court extended the detention of two suspects
(Muedin Alvapov, who was arrested on 23 January, 2016, and Kudryashov) until 23 July regarding
the case of «arson of cars» in Yalta 9.
On 13 May, Kiev District Court of Simferopol ordered the arrest for a period of two months until
11 July for four Muslims that were arrested on 12 May in Bakhchisarai on the «Case of the Hizb
ut-Tahrir» — Enver Mamutov, Remzi Memetov, Zevri Abseitov and Rustem Abiltarov (Read
more in «Resonant cases progress» section).
SEARCHES
On 12 May, searches took place in Bahchisarai, during which four Muslims were arrested.
Two buses with armed officers of security agencies arrived in Bakhchisarai. The searches took
place in four private households of Mamutov Enver, Abeltarov Rustem, Abseitov Zevri and
Remzi Memetov. The search was also conducted in «Salachyk» cafe. Locals were reordering
the events on video cameras, some of the videos show by the presence and people in masks
and camouflage uniforms without relying marks. CHRG has published a selection of videos
5 https://www.facebook.com/emil.kurbedinov/posts/1106311846100078?pnref=story
6 https://www.facebook.com/emil.kurbedinov/posts/1106321809432415
7 http://qmdi.org/index.php/ru/glavnye-novosti/2563-zayavlenie-dukhovnogo-upravleniya-musulman-kryma-i-g-sevastopol-v-svyazi-ssobytiyami-
proizoshedshimi-v-mecheti-sela-molodezhnoe-simferopolskogo-rajona
8 http://tass.ru/obschestvo/3266024
9 http://ru.krymr.com/archive/news-ru/20160504/16898/16898.html?id=27715991
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
5
on 12 May 10. After the search, the four Muslims were detained and taken for questioning, after
which they were taken into custody (Read more in «Resonant cases progress» section).
Regarding the facts of searches and arrests that took place on 12 May in Crimea, Ukrainian
Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea (Kiev) opened several criminal proceedings on the grounds of criminal
offenses under Part 2 Article 146 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (illegal deprivation of liberty)
and Part 2 Article 162 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (violation of the inviolability of the home) 11.
On 13 May, Zair Smedlyaev reported that according to the chairman of Karasuvbazarsk (Belogorsk)
regional mejlis Asab Mustafa, the search is conducted in the mosque in Mushash (Vishnevoe)
village 12.
On 14 May, Zair Smedlyaev reported that the search took place in the house of Abdul Yudashev
in Pionerskoe village of Simferopol area, after which he was taken to the Central administration
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to Zair Smedlyaev, Yudashev was released two
hours later without charges and he was informed that an error occurred during the investigation 13.
On 26 May, the search took place in the houses of Timur Osmanov, Khalilov Hayser and Arthur
Haltaev in Simferopol, during which, according to witnesses, the property was damaged. After
the search, all three of them were taken to the Extremism Combating Centre, where they stayed,
according to relatives, from 7 a.m. until 2 a.m. In addition, the relatives reported that the lawyer was
not allowed for detainees. As the reason for the search and detention representatives of law enforcement
agencies called a violation of the migration legislation of the Russian Federation — the
employment of foreigners and stateless persons in violation of laws of the Russian Federation 14.
On 30 May, late at night armed security forces stormed into the «Butterfly» nightclub in Sevastopol
made few shots at the ceiling with automatic weapons and demanded the visitors to lie face
down on the floor. The owner of the club Samsonova reported that as the reason for such actions
and the search was called the assumption that there may be narcotic and psychotropic substances
in the club. Samsonova said that shortly before the club was tested by the Federal Service for Drug
Control, and did not reveal anything. According to her words, force was used to visitors by law enforcement
officers, kicked several times, and approximately 5 people were detained for unknown
reasons. The law enforcement officers seized alcoholic drinks, worth more than a million rubles, and
the server with the electronic media, which kept recording with video surveillance cameras, without
creating a copy, which violates Russian law. The club was refused when they asked to provide a
copy in accordance with Article 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation 15.
PROGRESS OF THE HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
PERSECUTION OF THE KIEV MAIDAN MEMBERS:
THE ANDREY KOLOMIETS’S CASE
On 16 May another meeting on the case of the Ukrainian citizen Andrey Kolomiets, a resident
of the Kiev region, who is accused of attempted murder of two former employees of «Berkut» unit
10 https://www.facebook.com/crimeahrg/photos/a.1677121552573479.1073741828.1676669515952016/1722731228012511/?type=3&theater
11 http://ark.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=183560
12 https://www.facebook.com/zair.smedlya/posts/1028579167177251
13 https://www.facebook.com/zair.smedlya/posts/1028947390473762
14 https://www.facebook.com/namatullaev/posts/1061349137278848
15 https://www.facebook.com/crimeahrg/posts/1729907037294930
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
6
during the events on the Maidan in Kiev (Article 30, Article 105 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation «murder of two or more persons (unfinished)» and possession of drugs (Article
228 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) was held in Simferopol. He was detained in
Kabardino-Balkar republic of the Russian Federation, and then transported to Crimea.
In court, a lawyer attached to the materials of the criminal case the lawyer’s question of witness
of detention of Andrei Kolomiets 16. The evidence of the witness refutes the version of the investigation,
which is set out in the indictment that Kolomiets allegedly volunteered to come to the
police office together with the staff of the Extremism combat centre.
The evidence indicates that the search in the house of the civil wife of Kolomiyts was conducted
superficially and mainly served as a reason for detaining of Kolomiets, and initially he was treated
as a criminal, which violates the presumption of innocence. The search was conducted with procedural
irregularities, including the fact that marijuana was found during the search was not included
in the protocol. The drug was in a closed vault, and Kolomiets didn’t have access to it.
Later, after two days after the search in the house of his civil wife, according to investigators,
marijuana was found in the Kolomiyts white car, using which he allegedly was returning home after
the conversation with the extremism combat centre officers. The court had to question the witnesses
and the driver Alim Borchaev, who was in the car, where allegedly drugs were found and
Kolomiets was arrested. However, the questioning did not take place, because Nalchik bailiffs did
not provided the witnesses presence at the video conference, referring to the fact that «their location
was not set».
The court also failed to question Andrei Kolomiets, because he found it difficult to testify because
of the illness. Following the defence’s request an ambulance was called for Kolomiets because
he complained feeling not well and a high temperature. Ambulance employees confirmed
that he has a cold. After providing medical care to Kolomiets the judge continued the meeting.
The meeting ended around 17.30 and the next meeting is scheduled for 1 June, where the sentence
may be proclaimed. The lawyer Mikhail Kushpel believes, taking into account that almost
all applications were rejected, including the recognition of the validity of documents of the criminal
case, judgement of conviction is assumed.
On 27 May, lawyer Mikhail Kushpel reported at a press conference in Kiev 17 that the case of
his client is fabricated: «He was arrested for drug possession, but during the hearing the witness
of detention gave the information that refutes this fact. There is no evidence regarding the
charges in the attack at the time of the events on the Maidan Kiev on «Berkut» employees. These
victims say that they did not receive any physical injuries and they were not hospitalized. They
cannot show the clothing that was on them on that day and that they allegedly burned it».
The lawyer also confirmed that after the arrest his client was tortured: «Kolomiets reported
that the security forces putted a package on his head, attached wires to the fingers using large
staples, putted a damp cloth under and passed an electric current. Andrei Kolomiets remember
and can identify the employees who participated in the torture. He was forced to confess to the
attempted murder of employees of «Berkut» with these tortures.
The right for protection has been also violated with regard to Kolomiets. During the preliminary
investigation of the criminal case and first hearings by previous lawyers of Kolomiets, who were
there to represent him regarding the appointment of the preliminary investigation no applications
16 Law question of Davydova, the witness of detention of Andrei Kolomiets, the document: http://crimeahrg.org/v-dele-ukraintsaandreya-
kolomiytsa-poyavilis-novyie-svidetelstva-falsifikatsii-dokazatelstv-kpg/
17 The video of the press conference of Mikhail Kushpel in Kiev: https://www.facebook.com/crimeahrg/videos/1728690090749958/
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
7
were filed. None of the previous lawyers raised the question regarding that Kolomiets has the right
to receive information in a language he understands, he was not provided with an interpreter, and it
could also lead to the fact that Kolomiets was signing investigative materials, poorly understanding
effects of recognition and what was written in them. Appointed lawyer swayed Kolomiyts for the
confession, never visited him in prison, did not seek to find and interview witnesses in his favour.
There is a document in the materials of the criminal case that Kolomiets expressed in writing a
desire to testify in Russian. However, Kolomiets was born and raised in the Kiev region; the education
was delivered in Ukrainian language and he didn’t study Russian. Relevant document from
the school was added to the case file during the trial (Annex 1). Despite of this fact, the court still
refers to the written statement of Kolomiets and believes that he knows the Russian language.
However, in a fragment of the protocol submitted by the lawyer, it is clear that the top line with
the Ukrainian letter «i» and mistakes Kolomiets wrote himself. However, further in the protocol
the agreement to testify in Russian has been written by another person. According to Michael
Kushpel, it was written by the lawyer, who was provided for Kolomiitsev in Nalchik. Thus, different
handwriting in the questioning protocol of Kolomiyts indicates to the fact of fundamental procedural
violations and intent to falsify the case materials (Annex 2).
The lawyer believes that the preliminary investigation, including the investigation of the district
court, is held with serious violations of substantive and procedural law. He also insists that the
Russian judicial system has no relation to the consideration of the circumstances of the crime,
which is accused to Andrey Kolomiets. Imputed to the Kolomiets events took place on the territory
of Ukraine, victims and other participants of the event are the citizens of Ukraine and Ukrainian
law enforcement authorities have the appropriate investigations regarding these events, which is
confirmed by the answer of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine (Annex 3).
«CASE OF FEBRUARY 26»
On 13 May, First Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars Nariman Dzhelyal
reported that the judge of the Supreme Court of Crimea Pribilova rejected the appeal of the lawyer
Ahtem Chiygoz and Ali Asanov regarding the previous decision to extend their detention.
Consideration of the appeal of Mustafa Degermendzhi was postponed to 16 May because of the
absence of the lawyer 18.
On 17 May, the judge of the Supreme Court of Crimea Plastinina O.V. made a decision to appoint
the meeting regarding the extension of the period of detention in relation to Ahtem Chiygoz
for 19 May (Annex 4).
According to the decree, Ahtem Chiygoz should take part in the hearing via videoconference from
the predetention centre 1 in Simferopol, where he is being kept. Lawyer Nikolai Polozov claims that
this violates the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, as the consideration of the extension
of such measure of restraint should be made with the personal participation of the accused.
On 19 May, the hearing regarding the extension of detention of Ahtem Chiygoz was held. After
the start of the court session Ahtem Chiygoz stated that he requires personal presence in
the courtroom. The lawyer claimed the protest against the absence of the accused in the courtroom.
Ahtem Chiygoz asked for time to consult with lawyers and the judge Plastinina announced
a break. After the break, the judge decided to postpone the hearing for 20 May with delivering of
Ahtem Chiygoz to the court 19.
18 http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27732335.html
19 https://www.facebook.com/nikolay.polozov/posts/1046498698748859
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On 20 May, the detention period for Ahtem Chiygoz was extended till 22 July 2016 20. The
court explained its decision by the fact that Ahtem Chiygoz supposedly can escape and put pressure
on witnesses 21.
Currently, Ahtem Chiygoz, Ali Asanov and Mustafa Degermendzhi are in custody in Crimea on
the «26 February case».
On 17 May, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Kiev) reported
that regarding the events of 26 February, 2014 (event, for participation in which the Russian prosecutor’s
office in Crimea accuses Ahtem Chiygoz and others) initiated a criminal case under Article
340 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine — illegal obstruction of organization or holding of meetings,
rallies, marches and demonstrations.
It was revealed by the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea that on 26 February, 2014 in
Simferopol representatives of the pro-Russian organizations with the aim of illegal preventing to
conduct the meetings, including the meeting with the participation of the Crimean Tatar activists
in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, committed actions with the use of physical violence
aimed to stop these rallies.
As a result of such actions people who were expressing their patriotic position, have got injuries
with varying degrees of severity, and two members of the event died in hospital because of
injuries. Materials regarding the case were sent to the General Prosecutor Office of Ukraine to
determine jurisdiction 22.
«CASE OF HIZB UT-TAHRIR»
On 6 May, the Crimean Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the arrest of Arsen
Dzhepparov and Refat Alimov 23. On 19 April, Refat Alimov and Arsen Dzhepparov a preventive
measure in the form of detention until 18 June was chosen. They are charged under Part
2 Article 205.5 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (participation in the activities
of a terrorist organization), namely — participation in the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir.
On 12 May, four Crimean Muslims were arrested in Bahchisaray in connection with «Hizb
ut-Tahrir case» — Enver Mamutov, Remzi Memetov, Zevri Abseitov and Rustem Abiltarov. On 13
May, Kiev District Court of Simferopol granted the request of the inspector and ordered their
arrest for a period of two months until 11 July. Crimean prosecutor’s office supported the petition
of the investigator regarding the election of a preventive measure in the form of detention.
Enver Mamutov is charged with committing an offense under Part 1, Article 205.5 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (organization of activities of a terrorist organization)
and Remzi Memetov, Zevri Abseitov and Rustem Abiltarov — Part 2 of Article 205.5 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (participation in a terrorist organization). According
to investigators, Enver Mamutov organized «local cell of Hizb ut-Tahrir, carried a hidden anti-
Russian, anti-constitutional activities, recruited local people to the ranks of the terrorist organizations
» in Bakhchisarai. The investigators believe that Memetov, Abseitov and Abiltarov also
participated in these activities 24. However, no evidence was provided by the investigation.
20 https://www.facebook.com/zair.smedlya/posts/1032101063491728
21 https://www.facebook.com/zair.smedlya/posts/1032083703493464
22 http://ark.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=183804
23 http://investigator.org.ua/news/179224/
24 http://rkproc.ru/ru/news/prokuratura-respubliki-podderzhala-v-sude-hodataystvo-ob-areste-chlenov-bahchisarayskoy
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On 24 May, Crimean Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the arrest of Enver Mamutov,
Remzi Memetov and Zevri Abseitov. Lawyer Emil Kurbedinov reported that the investigation
did not provide justification regarding the arrest, that being under house arrest the accused
may abscond or exert pressure on witnesses. The court did not take into account the positive personal
characteristics and the presence of minor children 25. The court also dismissed the appeal
on the arrest of Rustem Abiltarov.
On 18 May, the hearing on the «case of Hizb ut-Tahrir» was held in Rostov-on-Don, during
which the period of detention was extended until October for Ruslan Zeytullaev, Rustem Vaitov,
Nuri Primov and Ferat Sayfullaev. They were arrested on 23 January and 2 April, 2015 (Ferat Sayfullaev).
The next hearing was scheduled for 1 June at the North Caucasus District Military Court
in Rostov-on-Don (Russia) 26. Lawyer Emil Kurbedinov reported that the defence petition regarding
the exclusion of the evidence that was obtained with a significant violation of the law, have
been rejected. The requests regarding the court hearing in Crimea were also rejected 27.
On 27 May Ruslan Zeytullaev, Rustem Vaitov, Nuri Primov and Ferat Sayfullaev were taken to
attend the hearing out of Crimea to Russia, in Rostov-on-Don. Defence insisted that the North
Caucasus District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don should hold a meeting on the case in Crimea.
As of May, 14 people being contained under detention in Crimea regarding the case of «Hizbut-
Tahrir» — Ruslan Zeytulaev, Rustem Vaitov, Nuri Primov, Ferat Sayfulaev, Enver Bekirov, Vadim
Siruk, Muslim Aliev, Emir-Usein Kuku, Refat Alimov, Arsen Dzhepparov, Enver Mamutov, Remzi
Memetov, Zevri Abseitov and Rustem Abiltarov (Annex 5).
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
On 7 May, Crimean News Agency «Kryminform» reported that the Office of the Investigative
Committee of Russia in Sevastopol opened a criminal case regarding the events that took place
on 8 April 28. On 8 April during the opening meeting of the Public Expert Council, were the Governor
of Sevastopol was presented, distorted version of the anthem of Russia 29 was played. Harsh
and critical remarks about Russia and distorted music were used in the anthem. After the incident,
the Federal Security Service of Russia reported that they will conduct a check on this fact 30.
Kryminform refers to a source in law enforcement bodies of Sevastopol that reported that the
case was opened under Part 1 Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation —
«inciting of hatred or hostility, and humiliation of human dignity». Maximum punishment for that is
imprisonment for a term that does not exceed four years. At the moment there is no information
regarding the persons who may be held accountable for this fact.
On 11 May, the prosecutor’s office of Feodosia city reported that the city prosecutor opened
a case against a local resident of an administrative offense under Part 1, Article 20.3 of the Administrative
Code of the Russian Federation (public display of Nazi symbols and symbols similar
to the Nazi to the point of confusion) 31. The reason for this was that the user of social networks
25 https://www.facebook.com/emil.kurbedinov/posts/1117815334949729
26 https://www.facebook.com/zair.smedlya/posts/1031299360238565
27 http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27744396.html
28 http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/38411
29 The distorted version of the anthem of Russia: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y19nzlmcQCE
30 https://lenta.ru/news/2016/04/09/gimn/
31 http://rkproc.ru/ru/news/po-postanovleniyu-prokurora-feodosiec-privlechen-k-otvetstvennosti-za-ekstremistskiy-post-v
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posted a picture of the German military plane with drawing on Nazi symbols in the comments to
the news article on a news site. The prosecutor’s office regarded that fact as propaganda of Nazi
paraphernalia or symbols, as well as the extremist activities. Having reviewed the submitted materials
the prosecutor’s office of Feodosia City Court sentenced the guilty to a fine of one thousand
rubles. However, the context in which the image was used, says that the author indented to use
it to illustrate his views, rather than to propagandize Nazi or extremist activities. Such images can
be used in historical, semiotic, and other discussions without the purpose of propaganda of Nazi
symbols. However, the court and the prosecutor did not seek to find the purpose and motive of
the use of the image, which could eliminate the fact of the offense.
On 12 May, Crimean prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya informed the Russian news agency
TASS that «according to data compiled by the Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea, Federal Supervision
Agency for Information Technologies and Communications conducts procedures for blocking
access to the site of the project «Crimea.Realities» («Radio Liberty» project) 32. In April Crimean
prosecutor N. Poklonskaya stated that the publication of the project «contains a justification for
acts of sabotage, extremism and discredit the authorities in Crimea, inciting of ethnic hatred» and
transferred materials to the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.
After this statement, monitors of the Crimean human rights group documented the restriction
of access to the site «Crimea.Realities» from the computers in Crimea.
On 13 May, press-secretary of the Federal Supervision Agency for Information Technologies
and Communications Vadim Ampelonsky announced that the Federal Supervision Agency for Information
Technologies and Communications unblocked site «Crimea.Realities». According to his
words, the restrictions were removed due to the fact that the site met the requirements and removed
material that was regarded as illegal by the Federal Supervision Agency for Information
Technologies and Communications. However, Natalia Poklonskaya stated that she will insist on
the complete blocking of access to the site 33. Crimean residents do have the access to the site
«Crimea.Realities» at this time.
Crimean prosecutor’s office continues to use the rules of anti-extremist and anti-terrorist legislation
of the Russian Federation to limit access to information. Thus, on 17 May Natalia Poklonskaya
stated that «with the purpose to stop the spreading of the information of radical ideologies
the access was limited to more than 80 resources on the Internet» 34.
On 12 May, Crimean prosecutor’s office announced that it recognized the initiation of criminal
proceedings against the deputy chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Ilmi Umerov
on the fact of committing acts of an extremist activity as legitimate and justified. Crimean prosecutor
N. Poklonskaya took personal control of the investigation of this case 35.
On 12 May, two officers of the Federal Security Service of Russia accompanied by riot policemen
came to the house of Ilmi Umerov and summoned him for questioning. He agreed to go with
them in Simferopol office of the Federal Security Service of Russia for questioning. During the
questioning, Ilmi Umerov refused to answer most of the questions of investigators. His lawyers
were present during the questioning 36. After the questioning, the investigator of the Federal Security
Service of Russia gave Ilmi Umerov the notice regarding the recognisance not to leave and
32 http://tass.ru/politika/3274509
33 http://ria.ru/society/20160513/1432463496.html
34 http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/38773
35 http://rkproc.ru/ru/news/prokuror-respubliki-vzyala-na-lichnyy-kontrol-ugolovnoe-delo-o-publichnyh-prizyvah-k
36 http://15minut.org/news/159629-umerov-o-svoem-areste-video
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appropriate behaviour 37 (according to Article 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian
Federation). The recognisance not to leave obliges Umerov not to leave Crimea without the
permission of the investigator or the court, and also obliges him to be present at the appointed
time when he is summoned by the investigator or the court and not to interfere with the criminal
proceedings.
After the questioning, the officers of police and the Federal Security Service of Russia raided
the house of Ilmi Umerov. According to his words, nothing was found during the search.
On 19 May, Skripka I.A. the investigator of the investigation department of the Federal Security
Service of Russia in Crimea and Sevastopol ordered the indictment to Ilmi Umerov according to
the criminal case № 2016427026. Ilmi Umerov was charged with an offense under Part 2 Article
280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation «Public calls for the implementation of actions
aimed for violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, committed by using
information and telecommunications networks (including the Internet)» (Annex 6).
The Federal Security Service of Russia imputes guilt on Ilmi Umerov for his participation in live
show on ATR TV channel. The investigator considers that Umerov was saying phrases such as «it
is necessary to force Russia to leave Crimea, Donbass and Lugansk», «if the borders of Ukraine
were returned back in its place» and others during the broadcast. These phrases are classified as
a criminal offense under Part 2 Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
On 26 May, the first Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars Nariman Dgelialov
reported that Ilmi Umerov has signed a personal recognizance regarding nondisclosure of the
case file. Close relatives of Umerov who refused to give evidence were invited for the questioning
by the Federal Security Service of Russia.
On 27 May, parents of children that study in school № 15 in Blizhnee village (Feodosia)
reported that Federal Security Service of Russia officers conduct interviews with the pupils
of 9th class. These interviews were held in the office of the school principal, in the presence
of parents and school psychologist. Federal Security Service of Russia officers questioned
the children about whether they have met with such definitions as «annexation», «occupation»,
«vatnik» (stands for insulting name of the person with pro-Russian views), as well as regarding
wearing of St. George’s ribbons during the events dedicated to the victory day on 9 May.
Elmira Gazieva, the mother of one of the pupils, reported that Crimean Tatars boys were summoned
for the conversation. Suleiman Kadyrov, the member of Feodosia regional Mejlis reported
that, according to the Federal Security Service of Russia, such conversations will be
continued with other children 38.
OBSTRUCTION OF JOURNALISTS’ WORK
On 11 May, Ukrainian journalist Igor Burdyga entered Crimea to prepare the material for the RBCUkraine
about the holding of the anniversary of deportation of the Crimean Tatars. He attended one
of the meetings in the «supreme» court of Crimea. During the break in the meeting, the journalist went
out, where he was approached by two men in civilian clothes, and presented documents of police officers.
They asked the journalist to follow them to the Zheleznodorozhnyi district police department for
identification in connection with allegedly recent robbery of the store because the offender looks like a
journalist. Igor Burdyga agreed to follow them.
37 https://www.facebook.com/nariman.dzhelalov/posts/1103585353038657?pnref=story&__mref=message_bubble
38 http://hromadskeradio.org/2016/05/27/fsbshnyky-provely-v-krymu-besedy-so-shkolnykamy-yz-za-georgyevskyh-lent
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However, officer of The Federal Security Service of Russia was waiting for him in the police department
who, according to the journalist, knew that Burdyga is a Ukrainian journalist, and began to
threaten him with the criminal case due to the lack of accreditation.
The Federal Security Service of Russia officer stated that he has reasons to detain the journalist
on suspicion of membership in the «Right sector» organization that is banned in Russia on the basis
of his report regarding the activities of the «Right Sector» on the Maidan in Kiev in February 2014,
which was published in «Vesti.Reporter» magazine. Also the Federal Security Service of Russia officer
promised journalist to reject such accusations, if he would agree to «voluntary interview». Journalist
was scared of prosecution and agreed to such a conversation. He was questioned about his travels
to other countries, whether he is familiar with Oleg Sentsov and Alexander Kol’chenko, as well as with
other Crimean journalists and activists.
Under the threat of criminal proceedings Igor Burdyga was forced to testify in a criminal case that
was opened in Crimea on the fact of explosions of pylons in the Kherson region during the «blockade
of Crimea». Testimony was taken by the senior investigator of the Federal Security Service of Russia
Mikhail Golyshev, who previously, according to the journalist, served in the Security Service of Ukraine.
The journalist also reported that the police conducted a fingerprint registration, took his fingerprints,
the prints of his shoes and saliva sample for the DNA analysis.
The journalist was released around 8 pm, after 7 hours of questioning by different investigators. He
immediately left Crimea after that. A more detailed report regarding the interrogation of the journalist
was published in the article on RBC-Ukraine site «About me being a spy: RBC-Ukraine reporter spent
a day at the Federal Security Service of Russia office in Crimea» 39.
On 27 May, a warning about «inadmissibility of violation of countering extremist activities and media
legislation» was issued to Crimean Tatar journalist Lilia Bujurova (former Deputy General Director of TV
channel ATR). The warning was issued by the deputy prosecutor of the city of Simferopol Shkitovoy A.F.
The document indicates that the prosecutor’s office employers monitor the information in social
networks on personal accounts. In its warning prosecutor’s office refers to the information published
by Lilia Bujurova on «Facebook» social network and on the Centre for Investigative Reporting site.
According to the prosecutor’s office, the information of Lilia Bujurova may contain «signs of extremist
statements», also the prosecutor’s office considers that the journalist calls on people to protests.
Also in this warning deputy prosecutor of Simferopol recalled that earlier, in 2014, Bujurova was
given a similar warning. She was warned about the possible subsequent prosecution (Annex 7).
By using such warnings and other norms of the Russian legislation, the de facto authorities are
preventing the journalistic activity (such warning is a threat of possible prosecution for journalistic
activities) and seek to limit the freedom of expression not only in the media but also in the personal
accounts at social networks.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
On 4 May, the representative of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Nariman Djelyalov received
a decision of the Supreme Court of Crimea from 26 April for the review regarding the ban
the activities of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people on the territory of the Russian Federation.
The decision was rendered by a court composed of following judges: Terentyeva N.A., Yusupova
L. A. and Pawlowskiy E.G.
39 https://www.rbc.ua/rus/opinion/poldnya-fsb-eshche-odna-istoriya-akkreditatsiyu-1463131347.html
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The prosecutor of Crimea N. Poklonskaya justifies her demand about the ban of the Mejlis by
the fact that the Mejlis doesn’t have the state registration in accordance with the Russian legislation,
was the organizer, from her point of view, of a few unauthorized and extremist acts, members
of the Mejlis were issued 17 warnings regarding the inadmissibility of extremist activity and
Refat Chubarov, Chairman of the Mejlis, according to the prosecutor, has repeatedly expressed
extremist slogans that Crimea is part of Ukraine. The prosecutor was blaming the Mejlis regarding
the events in 2004 and 2008, which occurred prior to the establishment of Russian control in
Crimea, the «Crimea blockade» and explosions of transmission towers in the territory of Ukraine in
Kherson region.
In response to the arguments of the Mejlis representative that the Mejlis is not a public organization,
but is a representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, the court responded that, according
to the norms of the Russian legislation, the court considers the Mejlis as public organization
that doesn’t have the legal identity and does not consider it as a representative body because
the Mejlis doesn’t refer to the local authorities in accordance with Russian law.
The representative of the Committee for international relations and deported citizens of Crimea
believes that there are enough other non-governmental organizations in Crimea that work with issues
of Crimean Tatars, and who work in collaboration with government agencies but the Mejlis is
not cooperating with the authorities. The official stated that, in his opinion, Mejlis does not provide
protection of the Crimean Tatars. However, the presence of other Tatar organizations in Crimea in
no way is connected with the prosecution of the Mejlis on extremist activity.
The court decided that the prosecution arguments regarding the extremist nature of the activity
of the Mejlis are sufficient. As a fact of the Extremist Activity the court took the event on 3
May, 2014 near Armyansk, when Crimean Tatars come out against a ban on the entry to Crimea
for Mustafa Dzhemilev. As the main evidence of extremist activity of the Majlis court considered
«Crimea blockade» action that was organized with the participation of Refat Chubarov, Mustafa
Dzhemilev and Lenur Islyamov due to which the supply of electric power in Crimea from the mainland
Ukraine was interrupted. The court also pointed out a number of public appearances of Refat
Chubarov in the Ukrainian media about the illegal actions of Russia in Crimea and the need for
the return of the Crimea to Ukraine. Most of the evidences taken by the court are the links to various
resources on the Internet and judgemental view about the work of the Mejlis.
Despite the fact that the Majlis is the only representative and executive body of the Crimean
Tatar people, the court decided that the Majlis ban will not entail violations of the rights of the
Crimean Tatar people for development and self-determination.
A member of the Majlis Lemmar Yunusov and the lawyer Dzhemil Temishev brought the appeal
before the Supreme Court against the court’s decision to ban the activities of the Mejlis 40.
Ruslan Balbec, the Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Council of Ministers, despite the fact that
the court’s decision to ban the activities of the Mejlis has not entered into force, sent the letter to
the heads of administrations of cities and villages, in which he not only calls the Mejlis an extremist
organization, but also accused the Mejlis members in participation in «international terrorist
groups». Moreover, Balbec stated that the Mejlis «does not have any connection to the Crimea
and Crimean Tatars anymore». He also lists a number of restrictions for members of the Mejlis and
obliges officials to report to the Crimean prosecutor’s office regarding the violations of these prohibitions
by the Mejlis members (Annex 8).
40 https://vs--krm.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=127462053&result=1&delo_id=1540005&new=
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Thus, using the administrative resource, the Crimean Council of Ministers is trying to create
extremely negative attitude to the Mejlis in the society and is stigmatizing the Mejlis members on
the basis of their belonging to this association.
On 18 May, Kerch city administration held a seminar regarding countering extremist activity
complicity with the representatives of the prosecutor’s office and the police. Participants reported
about the responsibility of citizens for aiding organizations that are engaged in extremist activities.
Deputy of the head of the city administration Dilyaver Melgaziev, despite the fact that the
judgment has not entered into force, reported that the activities of the Mejlis is prohibited on the
territory of the Russian Federation. The employee of the Centre for counteraction to extremism in
Crimea Anatoly Shuklin urged everyone to inform the law enforcement agencies regarding persons
«whose activities have signs of extremism» 41.
FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
In majority of previously reported cases of unjustified restrictions on freedom of assembly —
prohibition of peaceful assembly, dispersals of peaceful assembly, administrative penalties against
the organizers and participants of the meetings — were applied to the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
activists. However, recently there is an increase in meetings restrictions in respect of the supporters
of the Russian leadership, which actively supported the actions of Russia in Crimea in 2014.
On 6 May, representatives of Crimean Cossacks came out to protest against the closure of
the Crimean Cossack Cadet Corpus in Simferopol. Organizers of the event gave a notice regarding
the action, but they were denied in holding of the public event due to the fact that at the same
time and in the same place there will be another event. However, there were no other events carried
out. In connection with this fact the protesters have decided to hold the planned event. The
police officer demanded the event to be stopped because it wasn’t agreed with the city administration.
The organizer was warned that the report on administrative offense will be drawn up.
Protesters refused to stop the action, motivating its refusal by the fact that they do not violate
public order, do not interfere with the movement of pedestrians and there are no other events in
this place. However, the police officers, using force, began to disperse the protesters. It is reordered
on the video 42 that at least two protesters were detained and placed in the paddy wagon.
The force and non-lethal weapons were used to one of them.
Local entrepreneurs protest arose spontaneously inn Sevastopol on Istoricheskiy Boulevard.
The protest was a reaction of small trade stands owners on an attempt to evacuate one of the
pavilions by local authorities. State unitary enterprise’s «Sevavtodor» loading car loaded one of
the kiosks, but entrepreneurs — owners of the stalls blocked the movement of the car, requiring a
court decision to demolish the stall 43.
This situation lasted until the evening. Later in the evening the attempt of violent disperses of
entrepreneurs and unblocking of the car with the stall took place. According to entrepreneurs and
witnesses, police, local authorities and local self-defence took part in the attempt to disperse the
protest. Finally it was decided to remove the stall from the truck and put it in its previous place.
After that entrepreneurs have unblocked the truck and it left Istoricheskiy Boulevard 44.
41 http://gorsovetkerch.ru/news/18-05-2016/sostoyalsya-seminar-o-merah-po-protivodejstviyu-posobnichestvu-ekstremistskoj-deyatelnosti.html
42 The video of the Crimean Cossacks’s protest against the closure of the Crimean Cossack Cadet Corpus, May 6, 2016,
Simferopol: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdMIeM5EeFU
43 http://sevastopol.su/news.php?id=87075
44 http://sevastopol.su/news.php?id=87104
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An attempt of local authorities to attract self-defence (paramilitary forces) for disperse of local
entrepreneurs is a threat of the use of unjustified violence, which can result in injuries or property
damages. It also indicates the intentions of the local authorities to use illegal methods to resolve
the conflict.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY VIOLATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH REMEMBRANCE
DAY OF THE VICTIMS OF CRIMEAN TATARS DEPORTATION
On 13 May, administration of Voinka village Krasnoperekopsky area represented by the chairman
of the village council and the head of the village administration Maximov E.V. refused the regional
representative of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Saniye Ametova to hold a rally on
18 May in connection with the Remembrance Day of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars. The
reason for rejection: the local authorities are carrying out landscaping works in the park, where
it was planned to hold the event. In this regard, the administration banned the conduction of any
events on 18 May except of the laying of flowers at the memorial sign to those killed during the
deportation, which was organized by the local authorities (Annex 9).
On 17 May, three police officers of Bakhchisarai intended to give a warning about the inadmissibility
of violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation on the Day of Remembrance of
the deportation of the Crimean Tatars to the deputy chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
people Ilmi Umerov. Ilmi Umerov refused to sign the warning, because he is not an organizer of
any public events on 18 May. He reported that on 18 May he plans to take part in laying flowers
at the memorial plaque and during the prayer service at the midday prayer in memory of the
victims of the deportation. These activities are not subject to the norms of the Russian legislation
on public events 45.
Days before 18 May, the message regarding the ban on missing of the classes by students
or teachers on May 18 was spread in number of educational institutions of Crimea as well as the
requirement to inform the school management about the number and reasons of absence on 18
May «separately for Crimean Tatar children» (Annex 10).
On 18 May, motor rallies dedicated to the Day of memory of victims of deportation took place
in several cities in Crimea. Motor rallies did not create any accidents on the roads, did not interfere
with traffic. However, several members of motor rallies were detained.
17-year-old Eskender Ganiev was detained on the way to Bakhchisarai. The protocol was
drawn on him about administrative offense and administrative fine in the amount of 4,000 rubles.
He was released afterwards 46.
Four participants of the motor rally were detained in Lgovskoe village Kirovskiy district: Kurukch
S., Yapalahov R., Fakhriev U. and Berberov E. The protocols were drawn up for committing
an administrative offense under Part 2, Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code of the Russian
Federation «Violation of the order of organizing or holding of meetings, rallies, demonstrations,
marches and pickets». On 19 May the judge of the Kirov district court Mikhailov Roman adjudged
the four participants of the rally guilty of committing an administrative offense under Part 6.1
Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation — participation in unsanctioned
rallies, meetings, demonstrations, processions and picketing, which caused interference with the
functioning of critical infrastructure, transport and social infrastructure, communication, movement
45 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1768632480048284&id=100007046477228
46 http://avdet.org/node/19198
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
16
of pedestrians and (or) the vehicles or citizens access to premises or facilities of transport or
social infrastructure 47. In respect of each of them the judge ruled on administrative punishment in
the form of 20 hours of compulsory work 48. The decree came into force on 31 May.
Four Crimean Tatars Ablyakim Ablyakimov, Seytmamut Seytumerov, Enver Chavushev and
Alim Muslyadinov were arrested in Sudak. On 18 May, they drove through Sudak on cars with
Crimean Tatar symbols. They stopped near the monument to the victims of deportation to take
part in the «Light a Candle» event. They were detained by police near the monument, and
taken to the city police station, where they were drawn up protocols for committing an administrative
offense under Part 2 Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation
«Violation of the order of organizing or holding of the meetings, rallies, demonstrations,
marches and pickets».
Administrative proceedings in respect of all four members were appointed to run at Sudak City
Court on 25, 30 and 31 May. Each time the meeting was postponed by the judge Haraman Helena
Petrovna. The next meeting is scheduled for 7 June 49.
OTHER CASES OF VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
Yalta city administration refused to local residents in organising of the event on the occasion
of the Crimean Tatar celebration Hydyrlez on 3 May in the Koreiz village. The reason for the
refusal was «lack of security measures». The inability to ensure the safety was explained by the
local authorities that their powers will be used to ensure safety at the event at «Scheherazade»
cultural and entertainment centre. This event was organized by the local authorities and in their
refusal Yalta authorities offer local residents of Koreiz to visit exactly this event, rather than to
organise their own (Annex 11). Local residents consider the refusal in holding of the local holidays
of Hydyrlez as a way to increase the number of people at the event that is organized by the
Crimean authorities.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ISSUES RELATED TO
CHECKPOINTS PASSING
On 25 May, Ilham Shakirov, a resident of Yalta, Ukrainian citizen was denied in entry to Crimea
by Russian border guards. Earlier, about six months ago, officer of the Interior Ministry of the Russian
Federation found out during the checking of his documents that he was checked on entry to
Turkey, but there is no mark regarding his return. The court found Ilham Shakirov guilty of violating
the immigration laws of the Russian Federation, namely, in his words, in fact of providing of
void migration card with missed period of validity, as well as the availability of dual citizenship in
Ukraine and Turkey. The court appointed Shakirov a penalty of a fine of 2,000 rubles and ordered
to leave Russia within 10 days. Shakirov left Crimea, hoping to extend the migration card, but the
Russian border guards informed him about the ban of the entrance to Crimea and the Russian
Federation for 5 years. His wife and minor children are in Yalta. He doesn’t have an opportunity to
see them as well as he has no means of living outside of Crimea 50.
47 https://kirovskiy--krm.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&H_date=19.05.2016
48 https://www.facebook.com/nariman.dzhelalov/posts/1107699962627196
49 https://sudak--krm.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&H_date=31.05.2016
50 http://15minut.org/news/160126-grazhdanina-ukrainy-ne-puskayut-v-krym-k-zhene-i-dochke
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
17
On 30 May, the officer of border department of the Federal Security Service of Russia in
Crimea Shalukin A.V. conducted the searches and questioning of Ali Ozenbash who is the head
of the Audit Commission of the Kurultai, the executive board member of the World Congress of
Crimean Tatars at the Russian checkpoint with Crimea Dzhankoy (Annex 12). Ali Ozenbash reported
that the officer of the Federal Security Service of Russia refused to present himself during
the interrogation and did not give reasons for a personal inspection 51.
It is important to note that using the language of hatred and administrative resources, local authorities
are trying to restrict the movement of Crimea citizens to the Ukrainian mainland. Thus on
31 May the head of the city administration of Sudak Serov V.N. sent the letter to all heads of state
and municipal enterprises. The letter states that «the sphere of influence of the Crimean Tatar extremists
in the Ukrainian checkpoints expanded» so the city administration recommends residents
«not to travel to Ukraine through the Crimean land border» (Annex 13).
THE REVIEW WAS PREPARED BY:
Olga Skrypnyk, coordinator of the Crimean Human Rights Group;
Vissarion Aseev, coordinator of the monitoring direction of the Crimean Human Rights Group;
Alexander Sedov, analyst of the Crimean Human Rights Group.
51 http://ru.krymr.com/content/news/27769368.html
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
18
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1
The certificate from the school in Viktorivka village
in which Andrew Kolomiets studied in Ukrainian
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
19
ANNEX 2
The fragment of the protocol of interrogation of Andrei Kolomiets, in which falsification
signs appear. The protocol filled by different people on behalf of the interviewee
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
20
ANNEX 3
The answer of the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine regarding
the request of Michael Kushpel, lawyer of Andrei Kolomiets
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
21
ANNEX 4
The decree of the judge of the Supreme Court of Crimea Plastinina O.V. regarding the
appointment of the meeting for 19 May about the extending of the period of detention
of Ahtem Chiygoz, 17 May, 2016
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
22
ANNEX 5
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
23
ANNEX 6
Resolution of the investigator of the investigation department of Federal Security
Service in Crimea and Sevastopol Skrypka I.A. to prosecute an accused Ilmi Umerov
in a criminal case under Part 2 Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
federation, 19 May 2016
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
24
ANNEX 7
The fragment of the warning to Lilia Bujurova regarding the «inadmissibility of violating
the law on combating extremist activities and media legislation» May 27, 2016
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
25
ANNEX 8
The letter of Ruslan Balbek, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea
addressed to the heads of administrations of cities and villages of Crimea regarding
the prosecution of the Mejlis because of involvement in «international terrorist groups»
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
26
ANNEX 9
The refusal of the Voinka village administration of Krasnoperekopsky district
to hold a rally on 18 May dedicated to the Day of memory of victims
of deportation of the Crimean Tatars, 13 May, 2016
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
27
ANNEX 10
The notice about mandatory reporting about the number and reasons
of the absence on 18 May, including «children of Crimean Tatars in particular»
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
28
ANNEX 11
The refusal of Yalta city administration to hold the event on the occasion of the
Hydyrlez celebration of the Crimean Tatars on 3 May in Koreiz village
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
29
ANNEX 12
The act about the conduction of a personal search of Ali Ozenbash,
Dzhankoi, 30 May, 2016
Crimean Human Rights Situation Review
May 2016
30
ANNEX 13
The letter of the Head of the city administration of Sudak Serov V.N.
to the heads of state and municipal companies with a warning
«not to travel to Ukraine through the Crimean land border», 31 May, 2016

Annex 951
Amnesty International, URGENT ACTION: Crimean Tatar Activist Forcibly Disappeared (26
May 2016).

UA: 130/16 Index: EUR 50/4121/2016 Ukraine Date: 26 May 2016
URGENT ACTION
CRIMEAN TATAR ACTIVIST FORCIBLY DISAPPEARED
Crimean Tatar activist Ervin Ibragimov went missing on 24 May near his house in
Bakhchysarai, a town in central Crimea. Footage from a CCTV camera shows a group of
men forcing him into a van and driving away. Ervin Ibragimov has not been heard from
since and there are serious concerns for his safety.
Activist Ervin Ibragimov (30-years-old) is an ethnic Crimean Tatar from the town of Bakhchysarai, in central
Crimea. He is a former member of the local Bakhchysarai Town Council and a member of the World Congress of
Crimean Tatars, an international organisation aimed at promoting the rights of Crimean Tatars and their cultural
heritage which was set up after the peninsula’s annexation by Russia in 2014.
Ervin Ibragimov told his friends that on 17 May he noticed a car waiting outside his house, which later followed him
during the day. He did not report further incidents. On 25 May, he was due to travel to the town of Sudak to attend
a court hearing on the case of a group of Crimean Tatars arrested by the de facto Crimean authorities for holding
an “unauthorized” gathering on 18 May to mark the Crimean Tatar Deportation Remembrance Day.
Ervin Ibragimov last spoke to his father on the phone at around 11 pm on 24 May. His father later found his car
abandoned outside their home, with the doors open and the key left in the ignition. CCTV footage from a camera at
a nearby shop shows a group of men stopping Ervin Ibragimov’s car. He is seen briefly speaking to the men before
trying to escape. The men are seen apprehending and forcing him into their van and immediately driving away.
On 25 May, Ervin Ibragimov’s father went to the offices of the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB) in the
Crimean city of Simferopol to file a complaint and provide the CCTV footage. FSB officers refused to file the
complaint and told him to send it by post. Police in Bakhchysarai opened an investigation into the incident and
inspected the car.
There have been several enforced disappearances of ethnic Crimean Tatars since the peninsula’s occupation and
annexation by Russia in 2014, none of which has been effectively investigated.
Please write immediately in Ukrainian, Russian or your own language:
􀂄 Urging the de facto authorities to immediately establish and reveal Ervin Ibragimov's whereabouts and inform
his family accordingly;
􀂄 Call for his immediate release, unless he is charged with a recognisable offence, in which case he should have
an immediate access to a lawyer.
PLEASE SEND APPEALS BEFORE 7 JULY 2016 TO:
Prosecutor of Crimea
Nataliya Poklonskaya
Simferopol
Crimea
Fax: +7 3652 550 310
Salutation: Dear Prosecutor
And copies to:
Head of Crimea
Sergey Aksyonov
Simferopol
Crimea
Email: [email protected]
Fax: + 7 3652 248 020
And copies to:
Human Rights Commissioner in Crimea
Lyudmila Lyubina
Simferopol
Crimea
Email: [email protected]
Also send copies to diplomatic representatives accredited to your country. Please insert local diplomatic addresses below:
Name Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Fax Fax number Email Email address Salutation Salutation
Please check with your section office if sending appeals after the above date.
URGENT ACTION
CRIMEAN TATAR ACTIVIST FORCIBLY DISAPPEARED
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
There have been at least six confirmed and suspected enforced disappearances of ethnic Crimean Tatars in Crimea since its
occupation and annexation by Russia in 2014, none of which has been effectively investigated.
While families of the missing have received assurances from the de facto authorities that the disappearances would be
effectively investigated, there have been no signs of any genuine inquiries. This was despite a plethora of evidence, including
video footage, strongly suggesting that pro-Russian paramilitaries from the so-called Crimean self-defense force had been
behind at least some of these cases.
Name: Ervin Ibragimov
Gender m/f: m
UA: 130/16 Index: EUR 50/4121/2016 Issue Date: 26 May 2016
Annex 952
Crimean Human Rights Group, The Victims of Enforced Disappearance in Crimea as a Result of
the Illegal Establishment of the Russian Federation Control (2014-2016) (June 2016)

e-mail: [email protected] website: crimeahrg.org
The report prepared by
the Crimean Human Rights Group
as of June 2016
THE VICTIMS OF ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCE IN CRIMEA
AS A RESULT OF THE ILLEGAL
ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CONTROL
(2014 – 2016)
Follow the http://crimeahrg.org/category/monitor,
to read monthly monitoring reviews of the
Crimean Human Rights Group
Follow the http://crimeahrg.org/category/analytic,
to read thematic reviews and articles of the
Crimean Human Rights Group
The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) is the NGO of the Crimean human rights defenders and journalists, aimed
at promoting the observance and protection of human rights in Crimea by attracting wide attention to problems of human
rights and international humanitarian law in the territory of the Crimean peninsula, and the search for and development of
mechanisms for the protection of human rights in Crimea.
The CHRG is guided by principles of objectivity, reliability and timeliness while preparing and spreading information.
The CHRG’s team consists of experts, human rights activists and journalists from different countries who are involved in
monitoring and documenting human rights violations in Crimea, since February, 2014. CHRG focuses on human rights
violations in connection with the illegal actions of the Russian Federation in Crimea.
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
1
During the preparation of the review CHRG follows the next definition that is regulated by the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance:
«enforced disappearance» is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons
or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.
According to the Crimean Human Rights Group 9 people became victims of enforced disappearances
among civilians as a result of the illegal establishment of the Russian Federation control in
Crimea. CHRG considers victims of disappearances, which have next elements:
􀀒 Politically motivated abductions in connection with the social activities or an
ethnic / religious affiliation of the vanished person;
􀀒 The involvement of representatives of the de facto authorities or members
of paramilitary groups, controlled by the de facto authority, in the enforced
disappearance;
􀀒 The lack of effective investigation by the de facto authorities of Crimea.
In addition, the CHRG tracks information about other cases of disappearance, which may have signs
of enforced disappearance, but there are no sufficient reason to consider them as such at the moment.
It is important to note that members of paramilitary formations, in the first place, the so-called
«Crimean self-defence» were involved in the majority of enforced disappearances in 2014. «Crimean
self-defense» is one of the main systemic violations of human rights in Crimea. «Crimean self-defense»
has emerged as an illegal armed group on February 20, 2014 and has been extensively involved in the
storming of the Ukrainian military units, the squad of assemblies in support of the «Maidan» and territorial
integrity of Ukraine, the capture of administrative buildings.
The «self-defense» included former personnel of the special force «Bercut» of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine, the representatives of sports clubs and associations, as well as criminal organizations,
including Russian citizens and local residents. In March there were numerous contacts of the
«Crimean self-defense» with the Russian servicemen in joint actions. There is evidence of the involvement
of representatives of the «Crimean self-defense» in the most serious violations of human rights,
namely, the abduction and murder of Reshat Ametov (the body was found on March 15); the abduction
and torture of more than 20 Ukrainian activists (among them Andrey Schekun, Anatoliy Kovalskiy
and others).
After March 18, the «Crimean self-defense» was not disbanded, vice versa — the process of its
establishment as a force structure to support the Crimean government (especially of S.Aksenov) and
suppress any attempts to oppose the new government commenced. On June 11, the Crimean defacto
authorities adopted a Law On the People’s Militia — the people’s guard of the Republic of
Crimea. This Law has put the «Crimean self-defense» under the control of the Head of Crimea S. Aksenov
and of the Council of Ministers of Crimea, and assigned to the paramilitary formation the status
of people’s guards. 1
Also there is a particularity of law enforcement officials, that have been created by the de facto
authorities in Crimea after the Crimean occupation, that the employees are those individuals who have
1 Legalization of «CRIMEAN SELF-DEFENSE», web-site of the Crimean Human Rights Group: http://crimeahrg.org/en/
legalization-of-crimean-self-defense/
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
2
supported the illegal actions of Russia in Crimea, and many of them contributed to the occupation of
Ukrainian military units and office buildings by the Russian military or paramilitary units during February
and March, 2014.
In addition, many senior positions in the Crimean force authorities since 2014 are taken by officials,
who are citizens of Russia and who were transferred to Crimea. For example, Victor Palagin is
the head of the Federal Security Service of Russia in Crimea and Sevastopol. Previously, from 2008
to 2013 he was a head of the Federal Security Service of Russia in the Republic of Bashkortostan. In
Bashkiria Victor Palagin was known for having initiated a series of criminal cases regarding extremist
crimes, defendants in which were participants of religious and national non-governmental organizations.
Palagin reported that other Federal Security Service of Russia colleagues were transferred with
him in Crimea.
Thus, this situation creates a risk of biased investigation or sabotaging of the investigations regarding
the disappearances, the victims of which are individuals who belong to groups that are opposed
to the annexation of Crimea (Ukrainian and Crimean Tatars, the protesters on Independence Square in
Kiev).
It is necessary to note that Ukrainian legislation accredits authorizes of the Prosecutor’s Office
and the police authorities of Ukraine to make the appropriate legal proceedings on the fact of abduction
or disappearances of citizens of Ukraine in Crimea. Furthermore, for the purpose of recording the
violations of human rights in Crimea and investigation of crimes that were committed by the de facto
authorities in Crimea, the individual law enforcement agencies were created (restored) in Ukraine: The
Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Kiev), the main national police headquarters
in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (Odessa), the Office of the security Service
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol (Kherson). In this regard, the CHRG also
monitors the activities of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies in matters of recording and investigation
of human rights violations in Crimea.
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
3
Reshat Ametov
Date of Birth: 01/24/1975
Occupation: activist
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Crimean Tatar
Disappearance date: March 03, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Simferopol
Circumstances of the disappearance:
He was abducted by men in camouflage uniforms in the centre of Simferopol on 3 March, 2014
during a single picket against the occupation of Crimea by Russia on Lenin Square next to the Crimean
Council of Ministers building. His body with signs of torture was found in the Zemlyanichnoe village
of Belogorsk district. Handcuffs were found next to the body and the head of the killed was bound up
with tape. The cause of death — a penetrating stab wound to the eye with a sharp object.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
The Investigative Committee of the Investigation
Department of Russia in Crimea has opened a
criminal case under part 1 of article 105 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation —
«Murder».
On 4 November, 2014 a criminal investigation regarding
the murder of Reshat Ametov been suspended,
the official reason: «The person liable to
be charged, is not determined». Members of the
«Crimean self-defence», which are involved in the
abduction of Ametov are determined, but are considered
as witnesses in the case.
In the Kherson region of Ukraine (the region that
borders on Crimea) pre-trial investigation regarding
the killing of Reshat Ametov is taking place on
the grounds of a criminal offense under the Part 1
of Article 115 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine —
«premeditated murder».
Links to additional materials:
1. The Brief Reviews of Crimean Field Mission in April, May, June 2014: http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/en/category/
monitoring-en/
2. The Crimean Human Rights Group, the Review of the Situation with Human Rights in Crimea in October 2015:
http://crimeahrg.org/en/review-of-the-situation-with-human-rights-in-crimea-in-october-2015/
3. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.1. The
First Victims of the Occupation: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
4. The Video recording of Reshat Ametov’s abduction on March 3, 2014, in the central square of Simferopol:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2gwhzl7dbj0
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
4
Timur Shaimardanov
Date of Birth: 09/13/1980
Occupation: activist of the public initiative «Ukrainian People’s
House», participated in humanitarian assistance to Ukrainian military
in Crimea in March 2014
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Kazan Tatar
Disappearance date: May 26, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Simferopol
Circumstances of the disappearance:
On 25 May, 2014 the activist reported to his colleagues in the social activities regarding the disappearance
of Leonid Korzh (who later returned home). On 26 May, 2014 Shaimardanov left the house
and never returned home. The connection with him was lost on the same day. Witnesses and relatives
informed about the involvement of members of the «Crimean self-defence» in the abduction of activist.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
Russia’s Investigative Committee opened a criminal
case under the Article 105 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation — «Murder». In
November 2015 the lawyer reported that the case
is suspended in Crimea.
The investigator in the case denied the access to
the case file for the lawyer. The lawyer appealed
against this refusal of the investigator and did not
receive a response to his application for a long time.
Witnesses reported that the investigation in the
case of the abduction of Timur Shaimardanov is
considering versions of extinction due to commercial
activity or hiss voluntary departure from Crimea,
but does not consider the version of the abduction
because of his social activities and involvement of
the persons from the «Crimean self-defence».
In connection with the abduction of Timur Shaimardanov
a criminal case under the Article 146 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine — «Illegal imprisonment
or kidnapping», which is being investigated by the
Main Department of the Interior Ministry of Ukraine
in the Kherson region was opened. Later, the case
was transferred to the General Office of the National
Police in the Kherson region.
Representatives of the relatives of Timur Shaimardanov
filed a complaint to the ECHR against Russia
and Ukraine due to the inaction of law enforcement
agencies in the investigation of this fact.
Links to additional materials:
1. The Brief Reviews of Crimean Field Mission in May 2014: http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/
otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_may_2014.pdf
2. Information about Timur Shaimardanov on the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation website in the
«Missing» section: http://crim.sledcom.ru/attention/missing_persons/item/873128/
3. Information about Timur Shaimardanov on the Interior Ministry of Ukraine website in the «Disappeared Citizens»
section: http://wanted.mvs.gov.ua/searchbezvesti/
4. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.2.
Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
5
Seyran Zinedinov
Date of Birth: 07/04/1981
Occupation: Activist of «Ukrainian People’s House» public initiative,
the participant of actions against Russia’s actions in Crimea
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Crimean Tatar
Disappearance date: May 30, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Simferopol
Circumstances of the disappearance:
Seyran Zinedinov was engaged in the search for the missing colleague in social activities Timur
Shaimardanov on 26 May. In the evening on 30 May, 2014 Seyran Zinedinov met with the wife of
Shaimardanov, but after the meeting did not return home. After the disappearance the signal of his
mobile phone was detected next to the «Dolphin» pensionate near the town of Yevpatoria. In addition,
relatives of Seyran Zinetdinov reported about the existence of a video from the surveillance camera,
which is detected as the activist was putted in the car against his will. Witnesses also reported about
the involvement of members of the «Crimean self-defence» in the abduction.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
Russia’s Investigative Committee opened a criminal
case under the Article 105 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Fedreation — «Murder». In
November 2015 the lawyer reported that the case
is suspended in Crimea.
In the case of the abduction of Seyran Zinedinov
the investigation considering versions of disappearance
due to commercial activity or voluntary
departure from the Crimea, but does not consider
the version of the abduction because of social
activities and involvement of persons from the
«Crimean self-defence», as reported by witnesses.
In connection with the abduction Seyran Zinedinov
a criminal case under the Article 146 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine — «Illegal imprisonment or kidnapping
», which is being investigated by the Main
Department of the Interior Ministry of Ukraine in the
Kherson region was opened. Later, the case was
transferred to the General Office of the National
Police in the Kherson region.
However, on the site of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Ukraine Zinedinov listed as missing not in
Crimea, but in the territory of the antiterrorist operation
(Luhansk and Donetsk region of Ukraine)
Representatives of Zinedinov relatives filed a complaint
to the ECHR against Russia and Ukraine
due to the inaction of law enforcement agencies in
the investigation of this fact.
Links to additional materials:
1. The Brief Reviews of Crimean Field Mission in May 2014: http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/
otchet_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_-_may_2014.pdf
2. Information about Seyran Zinedinov on the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation website in the
«Missing» section: http://crim.sledcom.ru/attention/missing_persons/item/873129/
3. Information about Seyran Zinedinov on the Interior Ministry of Ukraine website in the «Disappeared Citizens»
section: http://wanted.mvs.gov.ua/searchbezvesti/
4. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.2.
Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
6
Vasiliy Chernysh
Date of Birth: 02/01/1978
Occupation: Activist of «automaidan». Participated in the search of abducted
activists in Crimea and was an employee of Security Service
of Ukraine in Sevastopol earlier.
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Ukrainian
Disappearance date: March 15, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Sevastopol
Circumstances of the disappearance:
The last time Vasiliy Chernysh got in touch with the relatives was on 15 March, 2014. Ever since
then his location is not known. The activist of «automaidan» Alexey Gritsenko reported that they were
able to find out that Chernysh was taken from his apartment and taken away in an unknown direction
by police officers.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
De facto authorities in Crimea are not conducting
an investigation regarding the disappearance of
Vasiliy Chernysh.
He is not listed on the website of the Investigative
Committee of Russia in Crimea in the «Missing»
section.
Upon the disappearance of Vasiliy Chernysh
information was included in the National
Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under
№121014100010004863 by the Main Department
of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Kiev on 18
June, 2014.
However, on the site of MIA of Ukraine in the «Missing
Citizens» section it is stated that Chernysh disappeared
not in Crimea but in Donetsk, Donetsk
region of Ukraine.
Links to additional materials:
1. The Crimean Human Rights Group, the Review of the Situation with Human Rights in Crimea in July-August
2015: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Crimean_Human_Rights_Group_July_August_2015_ENG.pdf
2. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.2.
Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
3. Crimea: Ukrainian identity banned. Analytical report on politically motivated persecution and discrimination on the
ground of pro-Ukrainian opinion. Editor: Olga Skrypnyk — Kyiv, 2016. http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
Crimea-Ukrainian-identity-banned_EN_CHRG.pdf
4. Information about Vasiliy Chernysh on the Interior Ministry of Ukraine website in the «Disappeared Citizens»
section: http://wanted.mvs.gov.ua/searchbezvesti/
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
7
Ivan Bondarec
Date of Birth: 07/31/1990
Occupation: the participant of the 40th sotnia of Maidan-selfdefence.
Protester on Independence Square in Kiev.
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Ukrainian
Disappearance date: March 07, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Simferopol
Circumstances of the disappearance:
Upon arrival in Simferopol Ivan Bondarec and his public colleague Valeriy Vashchuk called their relatives
and said that they were detained by the police in Simferopol. After that, they reported that they
were released, and they are going to the meeting of the Ukrainian movement with colleagues. Since
then communication with them was lost, and so far nothing is known about their location.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
De facto authorities in Crimea are not conducting
an investigation regarding the disappearance of
Ivan Bondarec.
He is not listed on the website of the Investigative
Committee of Russia in Crimea in the «Missing»
section.
Upon the disappearance of Ivan Bondarec Prosecutor’s
Office of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (Kiev) opened criminal proceedings under
the Part 1 of Article 115 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine — «deliberate murder».
Also regarding the disappearance of I. Bondarec
Rovno Regional Office of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs in Rovno region filled in the information
in National Register of Pre-Trial Investigations
№120141800010001927 on 9 April, 2014.
However, at present the information about the disappearance
of Bondarec is missing on the website
of MIA of Ukraine in the «Disappeared Citizens»
section.
Links to additional materials:
1. The Crimean Human Rights Group, the Review of the Situation with Human Rights in Crimea in July-August
2015: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Crimean_Human_Rights_Group_July_August_2015_ENG.pdf
2. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.2.
Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
3. Crimea: Ukrainian identity banned. Analytical report on politically motivated persecution and discrimination on the
ground of pro-Ukrainian opinion. Editor: Olga Skrypnyk — Kyiv, 2016. http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
Crimea-Ukrainian-identity-banned_EN_CHRG.pdf
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
8
Valery Vashchuk
Date of Birth: 12/29/1985
Occupation: the participant of the 40th sotnia of Maidan-selfdefence.
Protester on Independence Square in Kiev.
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Ukrainian
Disappearance date: March 07, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Simferopol
Circumstances of the disappearance:
On arrival at the Simferopol Valery Vashchuk and his public colleague Ivan Bondarec called their
relatives and said that they were detained by the police in Simferopol. After that, they reported that
they were released, and they are going to the meeting with their colleagues to the Ukrainian movement.
Since then communication with them was lost, and so far nothing is known about their location.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
De facto authorities in Crimea are not conducting
an investigation regarding the disappearance of
Ivan Bondarec.
He is not listed on the website of the Investigative
Committee of Russia in Crimea in the «Missing»
section.
On 2 April, 2014 Ostroh Regional Office of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Rovno
region initiated a pre-trial investigation regarding
the disappearance of Valeriy Vashchuk
№12014180170000136 in criminal proceedings
on the grounds of the Part 1 of Article 115 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine — «deliberate murder».
However, the case files were sent to the Simferopol
State Interior Ministry of Ukraine in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea in Simferopol on 11
April, 2014. During this period the Ukrainian authorities
have not acted on the territory of Crimea.
Valeriy Vashchuk is listed on the website of MIA of
Ukraine in the «Disappeared Citizens» section as
missing on the territory of Crimea.
Links to additional materials:
1. The Crimean Human Rights Group, the Review of the Situation with Human Rights in Crimea in July-August
2015: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Crimean_Human_Rights_Group_July_August_2015_ENG.pdf
2. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.2.
Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
3. Crimea: Ukrainian identity banned. Analytical report on politically motivated persecution and discrimination on the
ground of pro-Ukrainian opinion. Editor: Olga Skrypnyk — Kyiv, 2016. http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/
Crimea-Ukrainian-identity-banned_EN_CHRG.pdf
4. Information about Valeriy Vashchuk on the Interior Ministry of Ukraine website in the «Disappeared Citizens»
section: http://wanted.mvs.gov.ua/searchbezvesti/
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
9
Islyam Dzhepparov
Date of Birth: 11/13/1995
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Crimean Tatar
Disappearance date: September 27, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Belogorsk
The circumstances of the disappearance:
According to witnesses, two masked men dressed in black uniforms, allegedly members of the
«Crimean self-defence» searched Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhavdet Islyamov and then forcibly put
them in the blue Volkswagen Transporter minivan with tinted windows (registered sign 755, region
82) and taken in the direction of Feodosia. Islyam Dzhepparov is the son of the Crimean Tatar activist
Abdureshit Dzhepparov.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
Russian Investigative Committee opened a
criminal case on the grounds of an offense under
subsection «A, G» part 2 article 126 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation — «abduction
of a person by a group of persons with prior agreement
in respect of two or more persons».
Results of the investigation are unknown.
Despite signs of an enforced disappearance,
the investigation considers the version of the
voluntary departure from Crimea or departure to
Syria, ostensibly to participate in armed hostilities.
Prosecutor General of Ukraine opened criminal
proceedings in connection with the abduction
of Islyam Dzhepparov on the grounds of a criminal
offense under the Part 2 of Article 146 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine — «unlawful deprivation
of liberty, or kidnapping, committed against two or
more persons with prior agreement by a group of
persons».
However, there is no information about the
disappearance on the site of Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine.
Links to additional materials:
1. The Brief Reviews of Crimean Field Mission in September 2014: http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/01/crimea_field_mission_septmber_2014_report_eng.pdf
2. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.2.
Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
3. Information about Islyam Dzhepparov on the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation website in the
«Missing» section: http://crim.sledcom.ru/attention/missing_persons/item/873126/
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
10
Islyamov Dzhavdet Serverovich
Date of Birth: 04/30/1991
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Crimean Tatar
Disappearance date: September 27, 2014
Settlement in which he was seen before disappearing: Belogorsk
The circumstances of the disappearance:
According to witnesses, two masked men dressed in black uniforms, allegedly members of the
«Crimean self-defence» searched Dzhavdet Islyamov and Islyam Dzhepparov and then forcibly put
them in a blue Volkswagen Transporter minivan with tinted windows (registered sign 755, region 82)
and taken them in the direction of Feodosia.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
Russian Investigative Committee opened a criminal
case on the grounds of an offense under subsection
«A, G» part 2 article 126 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation — «abduction of
a person, a group of persons with prior agreement
in respect of two or more persons».
Results of the investigation are unknown.
Despite signs of an enforced disappearance, the
investigation considers the version of the voluntary
departure from Crimea or departure to Syria,
ostensibly to participate in armed hostilities.
Prosecutor General of Ukraine opened criminal
proceedings in connection with the abduction
of Dzhavdet Islyamov on the grounds of a criminal
offense under the Part 2 of Article 146 of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine — «unlawful deprivation
of liberty, or kidnapping, committed against two or
more persons with prior agreement by a group of
persons».
However, there is no information about the disappearance
on the site of Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Ukraine.
Links to additional materials:
1. The Brief Reviews of Crimean Field Mission in September 2014: http://cfmission.crimeahr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/01/crimea_field_mission_septmber_2014_report_eng.pdf
2. The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea / Under the general
editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition, revised and corrected, Kyiv, 2016 / Point 4.2.
Abductions and Tortures of Activists During the Occupation of Crimea: http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG_v04.indd_.pdf
3. Information about Dzhavdet Islyamov on the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation website in the
«Missing» section: http://crim.sledcom.ru/attention/missing_persons/item/873126/
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
11
Erwin Ibragimov
Date of Birth: 07/17/1985
Occupation: from 10.01.2011 was a chief specialist of international
relations of Bakhchisaray district administration in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, Bakhchisaray. He was the deputy of the 6th convocation
of the City Council.
Ethnic / religious affiliation: Crimean Tatar
Disappearance date: May 24, 2016
Settlement in which he was seen: Bakhchisaray
Circumstances of the disappearance:
Unidentified persons in the Russia traffic police uniform stopped a passing by car of Ibragimov in
Bakhchisarai near the house on the 9 Mira street. After that he was forcibly putted in the car and drove
away in an unknown direction. On 1 June near the «Arpat» bar in Bakhchisarai, passport and work record
book of the kidnapped Ibragimov were found.
Investigation:
De facto authorities in Crimea Law enforcement bodies of Ukraine
Main Investigation Department of the Investigative
Committee of Russia in Crimea opened a criminal
case under subsection «A, B» part 2, Article 126
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation —
«Abduction».
Local community representatives have repeatedly
carried out actions with the requirement to provide
information about the investigation and the involvement
of police officers in the abduction. However,
there is no new information on the case.
Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea (Kiev) has opened
criminal proceedings on the fact of kidnapping of
Ibragimov under part 1 article 115 of the Criminal
Code of Ukraine — «deliberate murder».
Links to additional materials:
1. Video from the place of abduction of Erwin Ibragimov: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FW8bqgsBFaQ
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZZh4zFaWKY
3. Information about Erwin Ibragimov on the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation website in the
«Missing» section: http://crim.sledcom.ru/news/item/1045425/
4. Notice regarding the beginning of the criminal procedure by the prosecutor’s office of Crimea (Kiev): http://ark.
gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=184163
5. The Crimean Human Rights Group, the Review of the Situation with Human Rights in Crimea in May 2016:
http://crimeahrg.org/en/category/monitor-2/
June 2016
The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea
OTHER CASES OF DISAPPEARANCES WITH POSSIBLE SIGNS
OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES:
Edem Asanov, born in 1989, disappeared on his way to work on 29 September, 2014 in the
town of Saki. According to his sister Asanova Feride, he left his house in Saki at 8:30 a.m. to take
a bus to Yalta, where he worked as a lifeguard at the sanatorium. On 6 October Asanov was found
hanged in a abundant building in Yevpatoria. Suicide note was found with him. Relatives insist that the
death of Eden Asanov is not connected with the political processes that are taking place in Crimea.
At the same time, the information was spread that the namesake of E. Asanov has been specified
in the request of 22 September regarding the extending the arrest for Ukrainian film director Oleg
Sentsov regarding the so-called «case of the Crimean terrorists». The document, signed by the senior
investigator for particularly important cases of the Investigative Department of the FSB of the Russian
Federation, states that Major of Justice Artem Burdin, said: «The specified terrorist community at various
times included Asanov E.N., Afanasiev G.S., ..., ..., Kol’chenko A.A., ... .., Chirniy A.V. and other unidentified
persons». This information appeared about a week before the disappearance of E. Asanov.
Some experts expressed the view that these circumstances make it impossible to say with certainty
about the non-violent nature of E. Asanov death.
Mukhtar Arislanov, born in 1970, is a Crimean Tatar who worked as a physical education teacher
at the school in Simferopol district. On 27 August, 2015 went out of the house to buy some products
at the «Zaleski» market in Simferopol, and so far has not returned. According to Arislanov sister,
a witness saw two men in police uniform that were guiding Arislanov. The silver minivan came down
from the side of storey buildings. Arislanov was putted in the bus and drove off in the direction of the
city. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a criminal case on the grounds
of an offense under the Part 1, Article 105 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (murder).
There is no information about the disappearance on the site of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
Separately, it must be said about the fact of the disappearance of Fedor Kostenko.
On 3 March, 2015 it became known about the disappearance of Fedor Kostenko who is the father
of Ukrainian political prisoner Alexander Kostenko (who is located in prison camp in Kirovo-Chipetsk
in Russian). Before his disappearance, Fedor Kostenko came from Crimea to Kiev to communicate
with the media on the case of his son. However, he found out about the new search of his apartment in
Simferopol and decided to return to Crimea. The last time he got in touch via mobile phone from Kiev,
and then there was no connection with him. According to the State Border Service of Ukraine, Fedor
Kostenko left the territory of Crimea on 1 March 2015.There is no information about the fact of his
return to Crimea after that. Thus, this information suggests that Fedor Kostenko disappeared on the
mainland of Ukraine. Ukrainian law enforcement authorities opened a criminal case under Part 1, Article
115 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine «intended murder». Fedor Kostenko is listed on the website of
MIA of Ukraine in the «Disappeared Citizens» section.
Other cases of disappearances have been fixed in Crimea (Eskender Apselyamov, Bilyal Bilyalov,
Arlen Terekhov, Ruslan Ganiev, Arsen Aliev, Abdurahmon Ayubov and other), but at this moment
there are not clearly identified signs of enforced disappearances in these cases.
12
ABOUT US
The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG) is an organization of the Crimean human rights
defenders and journalists, the purpose of which is to promote the observance and protection of
human rights in Crimea by attracting widespread attention to the problems of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the territory of the Crimean peninsula, as well as the search and
development of mechanisms to protect the human rights in Crimea.
The CHRG first of all obey the rules of basic documents in the field of human rights, such as:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, the Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International Covenant on economic, social and cultural Rights and others.
The main objectives of the CHRG:
1) Collection and analysis of the information regarding the human rights situation in the Crimea;
2) Broad awareness among governments, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations,
non-governmental organizations, the media and other target groups through
the publication and spreading of analytical and information materials on the human rights
situation in Crimea;
3) Promote the protection of human rights and respect for international law in Crimea;
4) Preparation of recommendations for government authorities and international organizations in
the sphere of human rights;
5) Providing the presence of «human rights in the Crimea topics» in the information space.
The CHRG’s team consists of experts, human rights activists and journalists from different
countries who are involved in monitoring and documenting human rights violations in Crimea,
since February, 2014.
During preparation and spreading of the information the CHRG is guided by principles of
objectivity, reliability and timeliness.
Monthly monitoring reviews of the Crimean Human Rights Group
http://crimeahrg.org/category/monitor
Thematic reviews and articles of the Crimean Human Rights Group
http://crimeahrg.org/category/analytic
Annex 953
Human Rights Watch, Crimean Tatar Activist Confined in Psychiatric Hospital (26 August 2016)

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􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀑􀀅􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀔􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀘􀀎􀀔􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀔􀀑􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀳􀀂􀀎􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀰
􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀉􀀆􀀴􀀵􀀉􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀪􀀑􀀶􀀛􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀑􀀚􀀆􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀅􀀆􀀑􀀘􀀏􀀎􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀑
􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀘􀀐􀀝􀀂􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀎􀀍􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀤􀀐􀀷􀀞􀀎􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀄􀀸􀀆􀀐􀀞􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀝􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀭􀀖􀀘􀀚􀀰􀀆􀀧􀀎􀀒􀀔􀀐
􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀔􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀎􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀹􀀐􀀭􀀍􀀂􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀺􀀉􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀂􀀅􀀄􀀝􀀖􀀶􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀖􀀗
􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀘􀀏􀀎􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀅􀀛􀀒􀀎􀀔
􀀏􀀎􀀒􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀠􀀛􀀖􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀐􀀒􀀞􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀝􀀝􀀖􀀄􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀝􀀑􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀲􀀶􀀍􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀰􀀆􀀓􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀂􀀝􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀐
􀀌􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀍􀀎􀀞􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀞􀀑􀀍􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀤􀀐􀀷􀀞􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀻􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀍􀀃􀀑􀀒􀀎􀀼􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍
􀀑􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀝􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀞􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀎􀀄􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀰
􀀽􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀔􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀝􀀄􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀗􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀐􀀃􀀍􀀐􀀃􀀎􀀖􀀂􀀄􀀆􀀕􀀎􀀖􀀞􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀄􀀉􀀾􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀒􀀚􀀑
􀀌􀀖􀀖􀀝􀀐􀀍􀀉􀀆􀀲􀀶􀀍􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀔􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀑􀀅􀀆􀀜􀀂􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀯􀀑􀀅􀀔􀀛􀀰􀀆􀀽􀀱􀀅􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀗􀀂􀀞􀀆􀀑􀀅􀀅􀀐􀀏􀀝􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀂􀀄􀀐
􀀝􀀄􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀎􀀞􀀐􀀒􀀔􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀛􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀝􀀂􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀝􀀖􀀝􀀂􀀞􀀑􀀍􀀆􀀝􀀍􀀑􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀔􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀃􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀘􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐
􀀧􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀅􀀆􀀲􀀒􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀰􀀾
􀀥􀀻􀀝􀀑􀀒􀀘
􀀱􀀞􀀏􀀎􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀉􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀆􀀑􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀉􀀆􀀿􀀂􀀞􀀚􀀆􀀈􀀉
􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀴􀀰
􀁀􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀶􀀍􀀚􀀏􀀍􀀰􀀖􀀍􀀃􀀆􀀩􀀮􀀹􀀥􀀟􀀮􀁁􀀫
􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀹􀀐􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀧􀀐􀀔􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀧􀀐􀀍􀀕􀀎􀀔􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀩􀀹􀀧􀀪􀀫􀀆􀀘􀀐􀀅􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀤􀀑􀀚􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀪􀀑􀀶􀀛􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀑􀀚􀀉􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀘
􀀛􀀎􀀏􀀆􀀠􀀎􀀅􀀛􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀝􀀑􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀂􀀒􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀝􀀑􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀇􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀁􀀍􀀅􀀎􀀔􀀞􀀐􀀆􀀇􀀡􀀊􀀰􀀋􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀎􀀒􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀘􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀭􀀑􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀏
􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀞􀀐􀀑􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀃􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀰􀀆􀀤􀀑􀀍􀀶􀀆􀀹􀀐􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀚􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀞􀀘
􀀜􀀂􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀯􀀑􀀅􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀑􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀋􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀹􀀧􀀪􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀗􀀎􀀔􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀔􀀎􀀭􀀞􀀚􀀆􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀑
􀀧􀀎􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀝􀀖􀀞􀀆􀀛􀀖􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀅􀀑􀀞􀀉􀀆􀀠􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀔􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀆􀀭􀀞􀀖􀀖􀀘􀀆􀀝􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀝􀀄􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀔
􀀗􀀑􀀔􀀎􀀞􀀎􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀎􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀕􀀖􀀞􀀂􀀒􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀝􀀄􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀞􀀂􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀉􀀆􀀠􀀛􀀎􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀔􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀂􀀝􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀇􀀡􀀆􀀘􀀑􀀚􀀄
􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀞􀀖􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀰
􀀋􀀟􀁂
􀀹􀀐􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀏􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀤􀀑􀀍􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀈􀀆􀀞􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀠􀀆􀀠􀀎􀀅􀀛􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀆􀀓􀁃
􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀞􀀆􀀁􀀓􀀮􀀉􀀆􀀠􀀛􀀎􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀝􀀖􀀄􀀅􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀒􀀆􀁄􀀖􀀂􀀓􀀂􀀭􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀐􀀻􀀅􀀆􀀘􀀑􀀚􀀰􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀘􀀖􀀠􀀒􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐
􀀄􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀝􀀍􀀎􀀞􀀆􀀇􀀊􀀋􀀴􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀞􀀖􀀔􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀁅􀀎􀀐􀀕􀀰
􀀹􀀐􀀚􀀃􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀑􀀅􀀆􀀭􀀑􀀄􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀢􀀔􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀐􀀻􀀝􀀐􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀞􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀑􀀞􀀚􀀄􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀞􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗
􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀒􀀃􀀂􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀠􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀹􀀧􀀪􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀞􀀂􀀘􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀑􀀅􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀒􀀐􀀘
􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀃􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀭􀀚􀀆􀀏􀀑􀀶􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀔􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀄􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀭􀀑􀀔􀀶􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀰􀀆􀀽􀀱􀀅􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀝􀀖􀀍􀀅􀀑􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀖
􀀏􀀑􀀶􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀞􀀐􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀉􀀆􀀦􀀖􀀒􀀭􀀑􀀄􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀁁􀀂􀀛􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀶􀀉􀀆􀀎􀀗􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀒􀀞􀀚􀀆􀀝􀀖􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀭􀀞􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀲􀀶􀀍􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀸􀀄
􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀭􀀖􀀍􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀄􀁆􀀾􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀔􀀍􀀎􀀝􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀚􀀄􀀰􀀆􀀱􀀒􀀆􀀿􀀂􀀞􀀚􀀉􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀠􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀞􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀎􀀒􀀑􀀞
􀀎􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀃􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀉􀀆􀀭􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀂􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀅􀀎􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀰
􀁇􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀋􀀋􀀉􀀆􀀠􀀛􀀎􀀞􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀎􀀏􀀗􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀝􀀖􀀞􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀄􀀎􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀅􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀹􀀧􀀪􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀃􀀑􀀅􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀖
􀀖􀀍􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀝􀀄􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀞􀀂􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀉􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀔􀀑􀀏􀀐􀀆􀀂􀀒􀀠􀀐􀀞􀀞􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀝􀀍􀀐􀀢􀀐􀀻􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀆􀀭􀀞􀀖􀀖􀀘
􀀝􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀘􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀛􀀖􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀅􀀑􀀞􀀎􀀼􀀐􀀘􀀰􀀆􀀓􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀑􀀝􀀝􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀝􀀄􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀑􀀞􀀂􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘
􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀚􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀏􀀏􀀐􀀘􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀞􀀚􀀆􀀑􀀝􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀞􀀐􀀘􀀰􀀆􀀪􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀁􀀂􀀃􀀂􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀋􀀡􀀉􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀗􀀐􀀍􀀍􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐
􀀝􀀄􀀚􀀔􀀛􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀗􀀑􀀔􀀎􀀞􀀎􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀝􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀂􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀝􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀞􀀉􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀭􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀝􀀍􀀖􀀔􀀐􀀘􀀂􀀍􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀰
􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀘􀀑􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀉􀀆􀀁􀀚􀀄􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀑􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀗􀀑􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀑􀀚􀀆􀀛􀀐
􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀘􀀰􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀚􀀆􀀭􀀑􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀚􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀔􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀝􀀑􀀔􀀶􀀑􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀍
􀀂􀀄􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀅􀀐􀀞􀀐􀀝􀀛􀀖􀀒􀀐􀀰􀀆􀁁􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀉􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀚􀀐􀀍􀀉􀀆􀀨􀀎􀀶􀀖􀀞􀀑􀀎􀀆􀀙􀀖􀀞􀀖􀀼􀀖􀀕􀀉􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀏􀀰􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀸􀀄
􀀘􀀑􀀂􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀚􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀚􀀆􀀠􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀕􀀐􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀔􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀑􀀭􀀖􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀞􀀅􀀛􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀔􀀑􀀂􀀄􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀐
􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀔􀀐􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀘􀀎􀀔􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀔􀀑􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀐􀀐􀀘􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀘􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀰􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀄
􀀘􀀎􀀑􀀭􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀙􀀑􀀍􀀶􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀄􀀐􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀅􀀆􀀘􀀎􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀄􀀐􀀰
􀀽􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀂􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀅􀀎􀀒􀀂􀀐􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀘􀀎􀀔􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀛􀀖􀀄􀀝􀀎􀀅􀀑􀀞􀀉􀀆􀀠􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀐􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐
􀀔􀀑􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀳􀀂􀀎􀀍􀀐􀀄􀀉􀀾􀀆􀀌􀀖􀀖􀀝􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀰􀀆􀀽􀀓􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀂􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀖􀀝􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀎􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀂􀀏􀀝􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀂􀀝􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗
􀀄􀀐􀀝􀀑􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀑􀀃􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀗􀀂􀀞􀀆􀀐􀀻􀀐􀀍􀀔􀀎􀀄􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀐􀀐􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀐􀀐􀀔􀀛􀀰􀀾
􀀲􀀒􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀐􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀐􀀐􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀘􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀐􀀐􀀘􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀗
􀀑􀀄􀀄􀀖􀀔􀀎􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀍􀀂􀀒􀀶􀀆􀀘􀀍􀀑􀀏􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀔􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀚􀀰􀀆􀀓􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀗􀀑􀀎􀀞􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀘􀀂􀀔􀀅
􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀗􀀂􀀞􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀕􀀐􀀄􀀅􀀎􀀃􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀑􀀅􀀅􀀑􀀔􀀶􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀝􀀍􀀖􀀢􀀲􀀶􀀍􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀕􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀄
􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀷􀀖􀀂􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀞􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀄􀀰􀀆􀀲􀀒􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀝􀀍􀀐􀀅􀀐􀀻􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀭􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀐􀀻􀀅􀀍􀀐􀀏􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀆􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀍􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀄􀀏􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀕􀀐
􀀛􀀑􀀍􀀑􀀄􀀄􀀐􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀎􀀏􀀎􀀘􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀑􀀶􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀍􀀭􀀎􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀞􀀐􀀃􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀑􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀃􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀄􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀄􀀰
􀁁􀀖􀀔􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀘􀀐􀀔􀀞􀀑􀀍􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀠􀀖􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀆􀀞􀀐􀀑􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀖􀀒􀀑􀀐􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀐􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀝􀀍􀀖􀀛􀀎􀀭􀀎􀀅􀀐􀀘
􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀏􀀆􀀗􀀍􀀖􀀏􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀰􀀆􀀓􀀛􀀐􀀚􀀆􀀑􀀞􀀄􀀖􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀔􀀛􀀐􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀍􀀐􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀒􀀐􀀘􀀉􀀆􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀘􀀖􀀠􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍
􀀏􀀐􀀘􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀖􀀂􀀅􀀞􀀐􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀭􀀑􀀒􀀒􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀔􀀐􀀗􀀂􀀞􀀆􀀃􀀑􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀄􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀏􀀏􀀐􀀏􀀖􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀔􀀆􀀐􀀕􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀄􀀉􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐
􀀑􀀒􀀒􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀑􀀍􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀘􀀐􀀝􀀖􀀍􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀓􀀑􀀅􀀑􀀍􀀄􀀆􀀘􀀂􀀍􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀧􀀖􀀕􀀎􀀐􀀅􀀆􀀚􀀐􀀑􀀍􀀄􀀰
􀀲􀀒􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀉􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀹􀀐􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀚􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀝􀀖􀀠􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀅
􀀐􀀻􀀐􀀍􀀔􀀎􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀐􀀗􀀗􀀐􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀕􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀅􀀍􀀖􀀞􀀆􀀠􀀎􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀄􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀲􀀶􀀍􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀐􀀉􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀆􀀛􀀑􀀄
􀀭􀀐􀀐􀀒􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀆􀀞􀀐􀀃􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀚􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀔􀀖􀀃􀀒􀀎􀀼􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀗􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀎􀀃􀀒􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀰􀀆􀀁􀀆􀀍􀀐􀀗􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀒􀀘􀀂􀀏􀀉􀀆􀀛􀀐􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀠􀀎􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐
􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀼􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀲􀀶􀀍􀀑􀀎􀀒􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀃􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀑􀀒􀀚􀀆􀀭􀀍􀀖􀀑􀀘􀀢􀀭􀀑􀀄􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀘􀀖􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀆􀀭􀀚􀀆􀀖􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀄􀀉
􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀂􀀒􀀎􀀞􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀑􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀗􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀠􀀑􀀍􀀘􀀆􀀔􀀑􀀒􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀖􀀒􀀄􀀎􀀘􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀖􀀆􀀏􀀐􀀐􀀅􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀔􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀎􀀑􀀆􀀂􀀒􀀘􀀐􀀍
􀀎􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀍􀀒􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀑􀀞􀀆􀀞􀀑􀀠􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀅􀀍􀀑􀀒􀀄􀀗􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀄􀀖􀀕􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀎􀀃􀀒􀀅􀀚􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀑􀀅􀀆􀀠􀀖􀀂􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀐􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀅􀀛􀀐􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀑􀀅􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀞􀀞􀀎􀀃􀀐􀀍􀀐􀀒􀀅
􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀑􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀰􀀆􀀜􀀂􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀮􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀯􀀑􀀅􀀔􀀛􀀆􀀘􀀖􀀔􀀂􀀏􀀐􀀒􀀅􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀑􀀆􀀄􀀂􀀍􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀖􀀗􀀆􀀛􀀂􀀏􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀍􀀎􀀃􀀛􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀭􀀂􀀄􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀒􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀆􀀑􀀗􀀅􀀐􀀍
􀀇􀀟􀁂
􀀎􀀅􀀆􀀠􀀑􀀄􀀆􀀖􀀔􀀔􀀂􀀝􀀎􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀭􀀚􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀰
􀀽􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀒􀀆􀀑􀀂􀀅􀀛􀀖􀀍􀀎􀀅􀀎􀀐􀀄􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀂􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀄􀀅􀀖􀀝􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀍􀀄􀀐􀀔􀀂􀀅􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀝􀀐􀀖􀀝􀀞􀀐􀀆􀀠􀀛􀀖􀀆􀀔􀀛􀀑􀀞􀀞􀀐􀀒􀀃􀀐􀀆􀀮􀀂􀀄􀀄􀀎􀀑􀀸􀀄􀀆􀀑􀀔􀀅􀀎􀀖􀀒􀀄􀀆􀀎􀀒
􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑􀀉􀀾􀀆􀀌􀀖􀀖􀀝􀀐􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀑􀀎􀀘􀀰􀀆􀀽􀀲􀀏􀀐􀀍􀀖􀀕􀀆􀀄􀀛􀀖􀀂􀀞􀀘􀀆􀀒􀀖􀀅􀀆􀀭􀀐􀀆􀀝􀀂􀀒􀀎􀀄􀀛􀀐􀀘􀀆􀀗􀀖􀀍􀀆􀀄􀀝􀀐􀀑􀀶􀀎􀀒􀀃􀀆􀀛􀀎􀀄􀀆􀀏􀀎􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀑􀀭􀀖􀀂􀀅􀀆􀀌􀀍􀀎􀀏􀀐􀀑
􀀑􀀒􀀘􀀆􀀎􀀅􀀄􀀆􀀗􀀂􀀅􀀂􀀍􀀐􀀰􀀾
􀁂􀀟􀁂

Annex 954
Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional
Centre for Human Rights (RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU),
Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Russian Federation (2017)

1
Universal Periodic Review of Russia
30th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review
Submitting NGOs
􀁸 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG)
􀁸 Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC)
􀁸 Regional Centre for Human Rights (RCHR)
􀁸 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU)
About the coalition of NGOs
The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG)1, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
(UHHRU)2, the Regional Centre for Human Rights (RCHR)3, and the Human Rights
Information Centre (HRIC)4 have been monitoring the human rights situation in Crimea since
the beginning of the Russian occupation. These organisations have provided first hand and
reliable information on the worsening human rights situation in Crimea in the last three years
while also addressing shortcomings in Ukraine’s policy towards its occupied territories. The
information submitted in this report is mainly based on the observations and calls made by these
organisations.
Contact person on behalf of the NGOs:
Matthew Jones, International Advocacy Officer
Human Rights House Foundation
[email protected]
+41 797417321
Introduction
1. This report is a joint contribution to the 30th session of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
for Russia. It was prepared by a coalition of Ukrainian NGOs with the support of the
Human Rights House Foundation (HRHF) and People in Need (PiN).
2. The present report focuses on human rights violations linked to the illegal annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Federation. The authors of this report wish to stress that the
1 Crimean Human Rights Group website: http://crimeahrg.org/
2 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union website: http://helsinki.org.ua
3 Regional Centre for Human Rights websites: http://rchr.org.ua and additional resource found here:
http://precedent.crimea.ua/
4 Human Rights Information Centre website: http://humanrights.org.ua/
2
underlying responsibility for the current dire human rights situation in Crimea lies with the
local de facto authorities and with the authorities of the Russian Federation that is to be held
accountable as occupying power.
General recommendations
3. That Russia upholds all obligations under applicable international law as an
occupying power;
4. That Crimea be made accessible for international organisations, including, but not
limited to the United Nations, OSCE, European Union, Council of Europe
structures and independent representatives, representatives of international human
rights organisations and human rights organisations of Ukraine, and ombudsmen of
the Parliament of Ukraine to monitor the observance of human rights.
Political prisoners
5. More than 60 people have been prosecuted in politically motivated cases in Crimea since the
occupation of the peninsula. 40 of those are currently serving sentences in places of
detention, 10 people are under investigation, 10 people were convicted in criminal cases, the
judgments for which were conditional or in the form of a fine. The number of political
prisoners continues to grow. These cases are characterized by gross falsifications, illegal
methods of investigation, torture and psychological pressure.
Recommendation
6. Release prisoners who were arrested in Crimea for political activities, including
those peacefully protesting against the occupation.
Torture
7. Politically motivated cases against Ukrainian citizens are closely linked to the use of torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the Russian authorities
in Crimea. It is reliably known that torture was used against Alexander Kostenko, Andrei
Kolomiets, and the figurants of the case of "Ukrainian saboteurs" Yevgeny Panov, Andrei
Zakhtei and Vladimir Prisich. Volodymyr Balukh was subjected to constant pressure in a
pre-trial detention center. At the same time, all attempts made by lawyers to initiate an
investigation regarding the use of torture were completely ignored by the Russian
authorities.
8. Torture and cruel treatment are used routinely by the police and the Russian Federation’s
Federal Security Service (FSB). These methods are used for forced confessions, inducing
detainees to conclude a deal with the investigation, and forcing them to refuse the services
of lawyers under the agreement in favour of court-appointed lawyers that work together
with the FSB. To achieve these goals, victims are often beaten, tortured, throttled,
threatened with sexual violence, and blackmailed by the fate of their loved ones.
3
9. For example, nine citizens of Ukraine were detained in Crimea in 2017. The FSB calls them
‘members of the terror sabotage group of Defense of Ukraine’ though without presenting
any evidence. There is good evidence they were subject to torture, resulting in forced
admission of guilt. Three of them have subsequently, so far, received prison sentences.
10. In another example, during Volodymyr Balukh’s trial, his defence presented evidence of the
activist’s innocence, including evidence tampering, serious violations committed during
police searches, and other investigative actions. However, the judge did not accept the
arguments, called them ‘vicious’ and handed him a three year, seven month sentence and
fine of RUR 10,000 on 4 August 2017.
11. In an even more recent example, on 13 September 2017, Renat Paralamov was abducted by
FSB officers from his house and taken to an unknown destination. However, after
Paralamov signed a testimony against himself and other people being subjected to torture,
he was thrown out at a bus station in Simferopol, severely injured.
12. The victims of torture are deprived of standard international mechanisms for protection
against torture. In particular, representatives of neither the UN Committee against Torture
nor the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment can visit Crimea. The UN monitoring mission in Ukraine also
cannot effectively conduct its work without having the opportunity to visit Crimea.
13. Moreover the treatment and conditions of detention of persons in police custody and
penitentiary establishments in Crimea are cruel, inhuman and degrading. There is also
evidence of convicts who were tortured for refusing Russian citizenship; they were sent to a
punishment cell or are put under pressure through other prisoners. Ill treatment is also used
during the transportation of people from pre-detention centres to the court hearings.
Prisoners continue to be transferred to Russia, where there are already documented cases of
denial of medical assistance and death of convicted citizens of Ukraine.
Recommendations
14. Bring an end to all discriminatory measures and practices, arbitrary detention,
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and revoke all
discriminatory legislation;
15. Investigate and prosecute all cases of torture in Crimea.
Enforced disappearance
16. Occupation of Crimea was accompanied by a number of enforced disappearances including
the arrests, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
Russian Federation or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of them. A sharp increase in cases occurred in March-May 2014
during the active phase of occupation when occupational authorities were trying to suppress
4
the resistance from the local population5. Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists, journalists,
documentary filmmakers among others, have been particularly targeted.
17. The first victim of enforced disappearances, Crimean Tatar Reshat activist Ametov, was
abducted by men in camouflage uniforms in the centre of Simferopol on 3 March 2014
during a single picket against the occupation of Crimea by Russia. His body was later
discovered in the village of Zemlyanichnoe. Handcuffs were found next to the body and his
head was bound up with tape. He died from the penetrating stab wound to the eye.
18. At least 10 people who became victims of enforced disappearances among civilians as a
result of the occupation are still missing, including an activist of Automaidan, Vasyl
Chernysh, participants of Euromaidan Ivan Bondarets and Valeriy Vashchuk (missing since
March 2014), activists of Ukrainian People’s House, Tymur Shaimardanov and Seyran
Zinedinov (missing since May 2014), Crimean Tatars Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhavdet
Islyamov (missing since September 2014), Mukhtar Arislanov (missing since August 2015)
and a member of the executive board of the World Congress of Crimean Tatars, the former
member of Bakhchisaray district council and a member of the regional Mejlis Ervin
Ibragimov (missing since May 2016). None of these cases have been effectively investigated
and no perpetrators have been brought to justice.
19. The members of the local paramilitary group, the so-called “Crimean self-defense”, was
involved in the majority of enforced disappearances in 20146, having emerged as an illegal
armed group on 20 February 2014.
Recommendations
20. Effectively and impartially investigate all alleged and suspected cases of enforced
disappearance in Crimea, and immediately disclose the fate and whereabouts of all
those arbitrarily deprived of liberty and inform their families accordingly;
21. Investigate and prosecute all cases of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, unlawful killing
or enforced disappearance.
Freedom of movement
22. The occupation of Crimea has resulted in serious and unjustified breaches of free
movement. This has included the denial of access to the territory of Crimea and denial of
permission to leave the territory of Crimea, which is permission based, as well as the seizure
of documents needed to enter or leave Crimea.
5 See also: The Peninsula of Fear : Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in
Crimea / Under the general editorship of O. Skrypnyk and T. Pechonchyk. Second edition,
revised and corrected. – Kyiv: KBC, 2016. – P.58. - https://helsinki.org.ua/wpcontent/
uploads/2016/05/PeninsulaFear_Book_ENG.pdf
6 See also: The victims of enforced disappearance in Crimea as a result of the illegal
establishment of the Russian Federation control (2014-2016), June 2016. -
http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CHRG_The-victims-of-enforceddisappearance_
Crimea.pdf
5
23. No provision has been made to leave Crimea in case a passport or any other identity
document is lost, including for example, in cases when a citizen of Ukraine or a foreigner
temporarily arrives in Crimea and loses their passport.
24. There was considerable unilateral change in residency conditions for citizens of Ukraine,
foreigners and stateless persons who were in Crimea at the time of occupation. This
included, for example, in relation to Ukrainian citizens who resided in Crimea, but had their
place of stay registered in other parts of Ukraine, or foreigners and stateless persons who
had a permanent residence permit in Crimea, that was issued by the immigration authorities
of Ukraine.
25. Children aged 14 to 16 years cannot leave Crimea without a Russian passport, greatly
affecting the rights of those who do not have one.
26. An unlawful transfer of part of the civilian population (deportation) from Crimea has
occurred in relation to persons kept in custodial settings. More than 4,700 civilian prisoners,
Ukrainian citizens kept in places of detention, were transferred by the Russian authorities
from Crimea, and now they are in at least 49 penal colonies located in 23 regions of the
Russian Federation.
27. Additionally, the internal displacement of much of the population of Crimea (IDPs) to
mainland Ukraine has furthered the atmosphere of fear. The official number of Crimean
IDPs in mainland Ukraine, as registered with Ukrainian authorities, is approximately 20,000.
However, Ukrainian NGOs working closely with IDPs at the Administrative Boundary Line
and throughout Ukraine estimate the real figure to be closer to 40,000 or 50,000.
Recommendations
28. Reverse changes to the conditions of residency of citizens of Ukraine, foreigners and
stateless persons who were in Crimea at the beginning of occupation, including
Russian Federation migration legislation which incorporates denial of access to
Crimea and denial of permission to leave Crimea;
29. Transfer to Ukraine all convicted Ukrainian citizens who express such a wish, so
that they may serve the remainder of their sentences in territories controlled by the
Ukrainian authorities;
30. Bring an end to the displacement from Crimea to the Russian Federation of people
that do not have Russian citizenship – including those sentenced to imprisonment –
who have, whatever the circumstances, found themselves under the control of the
Russian Federation in Crimea.
Right to nationality
31. According to Article 4 of Russian Federation Constitutional Law 6-FKZ “from the date of
the admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the
Russian Federation the new constituent entities Ukrainian nationals and stateless persons
who had been permanently residing in the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal
Importance Sevastopol were recognized as nationals of the Russian Federation, except for
6
persons who within one month thereafter declared their willingness to retain their and (or)
their minor children’s other nationality or remain stateless.”
32. Due to a number of objective reasons, (reducing the period for the submission of the
application to 18 days; small number of operating offices of the Federal Migrating Service,
which received applications); and an unwillingness of the population to live as foreigners
within the relevant restrictions (related to employment, the right to social benefits, migration
control, prohibition of participation in political activities and to be engaged in public life,
etc.), roughly 3,500 persons filed applications “declaring their will to keep their and (or) their
minor children’s other nationality or remain stateless.”
33. Children in social care have been the most vulnerable to this imposition of citizenship.
According to the Office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, as
of 1 August 2014 there were 4,228 such children in Crimea. Since the beginning of the
occupation, the Russian Federation took control over the administration of the institutions
that provided care for such children. On the grounds of “respecting the best interests of the
child” no applications were filed “declaring willingness to keep their existing... other
nationality.”
34. Additionally, children born in Crimea since the beginning of the occupation are
automatically recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation by the occupying authorities.
Thus, in accordance with article 12 of the Federal Law "On the citizenship of the Russian
Federation", a child acquires citizenship of the Russian Federation by birth, if at the date of
the birth of the child both or the only parent have citizenship of the Russian Federation,
(irrespective of the birthplace).
35. Consequently, children of those, who did not apply for retention of Ukrainian citizenship,
born after the beginning of the occupation, are recognized as citizens of the Russian
Federation. For example, in 2016 alone, 22,944 children were born in Crimea (not including
the city of Sevastopol). Thus, the vast majority of them have been made citizens of the
Russian Federation.
Recommendations
36. End the imposition of citizenship of the Russian Federation on the population of
Crimea;
37. End the discrimination of the population of Crimea on the basis of citizenship of
Ukraine, and end the repressive actions by the Russian Federation against people
loyal to the Ukrainian authorities in occupied Crimea.
Right to property
38. The Russian Federation has started a wide-scale nationalisation of private as well as state
property located in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.
39. Subject to data based on official sources and decisions of the occupation power, more than
330 enterprises, institutions and organizations belonging to the state of Ukraine and and
labor unions, and 280 enterprises in private property have been nationalized. Mass
7
nationalization happened in Crimea in 2014 and continued in 2015. According to another
report, the number of nationalized businesses is as high as 4,000.
40. The wide-spread nature of nationalization of private property as well as instances of
unlawful seizure of property are also confirmed in a number of reports by international
governmental organization, including the OHCHR, Council of Europe and OSCE.
41. Since the second half of 2016 there has been a steady trend to increase the number of
lawsuits for seizure of land and demolition of residential and non-residential buildings in the
occupied peninsula. In the overwhelming majority of cases courts deliver decisions in favour
of the occupation authorities and the prosecutor's office.
Recommendations
42. End an extensive appropriation of state and private property in Crimea on the basis
of regulations and orders of occupying authorities;
43. Provide financial compensation for property rights violations;
44. Ensure fairness and objectivity in lawsuits relating to seizure of land plots and
demolition of residential and non-residential buildings within the courts.
Thought, conscience and religion
45. Fines for participation in unsanctioned rallies have been levied on participants of religious
events. In 2016, a court in Yalta fined a Krishnaite, because he walked along the Yalta
embankment shouting "Hari Krishna". The judge regarded this as an unauthorized
procession. In 2015 in the village of Maryanovka, nine members of the "Evangelical
Christian Baptists" organization offered Easter-related greetings to people. The court fined
each person between ten and twenty thousand rubles.
46. On 6 July 2016, two Federal laws and certain Russian Federation legislative instruments
were introduced as additional actions to fight terrorism and ensure the public security.
Article 8 of Law No 374-FZ has introduced the concept of ‘missionary activity’ with
provisions on its restriction. The list of persons that may act as missionaries and the list of
places where they may act as missionaries were limited.
47. The liability for violation of laws on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and faith
based organizations (Article 5.26 of Russian Federation CAO) has been stiffened. Article
5.26 of RF CAO now includes Part 3, liability of religious institution for activities without
indicating its full name, Part 4, liability for missionary activity with violations of legal
provisions on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and faith-based organizations.
48. Among the six officially documented cases published online in the first nine months of
2017, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses organization was fined by a “justice of the
peace” in Yalta for worshiping, reading the Bible, singing songs and praying, in June 2017.
In May 2017, the "Justice of the Peace of Bakhchisarai" fined a pastor of the local religious
organization "Christian Faith Evangelical Church of Revival" for 30,000 rubles for the lack
of a sign on the premises where sermons are held. On 27 June 2017 Mr Tulparov, ‘justice of
8
the peace’ in Dzhankoy, chaired the court proceedings on the case of Mr Vitaliy Arseniuk
accused of the illegal missionary activity. Mr Arseniuk had been a head of the local
Jehovah’s Witnesses Committee before the ban on this organization in the Russian
Federation. The same night, after the ‘court’ session, Mr Arseniuk passed away due to
extensive infarction.7
49. On 20 April 2017, the Russian Federation Supreme Court declared the activity of Jehovah’s
Witnesses organization as extremist and banned it. The ban was extended to the occupied
Crimea where 22 organization branches were included.
50. "Anti-terrorist" Russian legislation is used as a tool to oppress Muslims in Crimea. Criminal
prosecution is based on the Court decision defining Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist
organization and banning its activities in the Russian Federation. This judgment provides
justification for massive searches, and regular interrogations and arrests are conducted in the
homes of Muslims.
Recommendations
51. Stop unjustified criminal prosecution of Muslims on religious grounds;
52. End the unjustifiable restrictions placed on religious associations, including laws
that severely restrict freedom of religion or belief such as Law No 374-FZ and Law
No 375-FZ.
Conscientious objection – and rights relating to the military
53. In violation of the Geneva Convention, ‘Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ and
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Russian Federation drafts citizens of
Ukraine in Crimea into its army. It should be noted that a number of the Ukrainian citizens
drafted into the Russian Federation Armed Forces are forcibly moved from the territory of
Crimea to the territory of Russian Federation.
54. On 1 April 2017, the spring campaign on the call of the residents of Crimea to the armed
forces of the Russian Federation started. The Russian government plans to draft 2,400
Crimeans aged 18 to 27 years in the spring of 2017 into the Russian Armed Forces. This
year the Crimeans will be distributed not only in the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation in Crimea, but also will be moved to the territory of the Russian Federation,
which violates Article 49 and Article 51 of the Geneva Convention IV.
55. On 10 April 2017, the "military commissioner" of Crimea, Anatoly Maloletko reported that
a criminal case was started against one citizen of Ukraine living in Crimea for evading
military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and about 200 citizens are
listed as having "not received" the draft notice. He also reported that about 20 people will
serve outside Crimea - on the territory of the Russian Federation. "The head of the
department of preparation and drafting of citizens for military service of the military
7 See also: People in Crimea are being persecuted by court for their religious beliefs. - Crimean
Human Rights Group, 05 July, 2017. - http://crimeahrg.org/en/people-in-crimea-are-beingpersecuted-
by-court-for-their-religious-beliefs/
9
commissariat of Crimea" Vadim Meshalkin and Anatoly Maloletko confirmed that the
Crimean citizens that were called for the military service have Ukrainian citizenship.
56. On 18 July, the website of the TV and Radio Company of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation Zvezda reported that within the framework of the 2017 spring draft campaign,
approximately 400 residents of Sevastopol are called to the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation, 10 of them are sent to serve in the territory of the Russian Federation to join the
Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation.
57. A significant component of Russia’s information and communication includes persistent
offers for Crimean residents to be contracted into the Russian Federation Armed Forces to
continue the military service. Criminal and administrative laws, as well as information and
economic resources, are used by the Russian Federation to force Crimean residents to serve
in the Russian Forces armed and auxiliary forces. Article 51 of the Geneva Convention,
‘Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’, states that the Occupying Power may not
compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or
propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted. But Russia conducts
mass propaganda not only among the adult population, but also among children.8
58. For example, the representatives of military commissariats deliver dedicated classes for
children aimed at preparing for military service. For instance, on 15 February 2016, the Yalta
Town Military Commissariat participated in the military patriotic classes in the Livadia
educational orphanage as reported on the Crimean ‘Government’ website. The service in the
Russian Federation army was promoted on such lessons.
59. Russian Federation military personnel participate in various children’s events promoting
service in the Russian army. For instance, a festival dedicated to the Day of Fatherland’s
Defender was held in Orlionok Nursery School No 28 on 23 February 2017. Soldiers of
Military Unit No 98546 of Russian Federation Armed Forces were invited to the
celebrations at the nursery school.
Recommendations
60. Stop the illegal call for Ukrainian citizens to enter the Russian army;
61. End the use of military propaganda among underage Crimean residents.
Opinion and expression
62. Establishment of the Russian Federation's control over the Crimean territory was
accompanied by a process of curtailment of freedom of speech and expression of opinions,
in part, through the implementation of the law on countering extremist activity, criminal
8 See also: Human rights in Crimea militarization context: Situation with Human Rights in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol City. Adverse Impact of Russian Militarization.
Information and Analytical Report (April 2014 – May 2017) / under the general editorship of
O.Skrypnyk and I.Sedova – Kyiv, 2017. - Crimean Human Rights Group, July, 2017. - -
http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/HUMAN-RIGHTS-IN-CRIMEAMILITARIZATION-
CONTEXT_EN-2017.pdf
10
liability for "incitement to separatism", reduction of a number of alternative sources of
information, harassment of journalists by law enforcement agencies and the "Crimean Self-
Defense" and blocking media outlets online. Independent outlets were forcibly shut down,
transmissions of Ukrainian stations were replaced with broadcasts from Russia, access to a
number of local and Ukrainian media outlets via the internet was blocked for users in
Crimea, and many journalists fled Crimea to escape harassment, violence, and arrests.
63. Journalists and media workers in Crimea are subject to obstruction, arbitrary detention,
interrogation, and seizure or damage of equipment. In January 2015, before Crimean Tatar
TV Channel ATR ceased broadcasting from Crimea, the authorities raided its headquarters
and confiscated equipment while ostensibly searching for footage of a 2014 protest.
64. Hundreds of media outlets were unable to obtain registration with Russian authorities by an
April 2015 deadline, reducing the number allowed to operate in Crimea from more than
3,000 to just 232. Those barred from re-registering included several outlets—television,
radio, print, and online—that served the Crimean Tatar minority9. More than 20 online
media outlets were also blocked by Roskomnadzor, prosecutor`s office and internet
providers on the territory of Crimean peninsula in 2015 and 2016.
65. Journalists in Crimea are subject to trumped-up criminal charges for defamation,
“extremism,” incitement to separatism, and other offenses. A 2014 Russian law against
inciting separatism—Article 280.1 of the penal code—was used to persecute Crimean
journalists. Criminal cases have been opened against the editor of the BlackSeaNews Andriy
Klymenko, journalists with the Center for Investigative Reporting Anna Andriyevska and
author of the Radio Liberty Mykola Semena which carry up to five years in prison. While
Klymenko and Andriyevska left Crimean peninsula, Semena is under the travel ban. On 22
September 2017 a local court found Mykola Semena guilty on a charge of ‘separatism’ and
handed him a two-and-a-half-year suspended sentence. He was also barred from "public
activities" - apparently including journalism - for three years.
66. In general, during 2014-2016 the Human Rights Information Center has documented over
500 single violations of freedom of speech and expression. Independent journalists that
expressed dissent with occupational authorities were forced either to leave Crimea or to
leave their profession. As a result of intimidation and restrictions, 10 Crimean media outlets
moved to the mainland Ukraine (QHA, Radio Meidan, Crimean Tatar TV Channels ART
and Children’s Television Lale, BlackSeaNews, Radio Leader, 15 minutes, Center for
Investigative Journalism, Chornomorska TV and Sobytiya.Info) where they continue to
operate and cover Crimean issues from a distance while the majority of them are being
blocked online in Crimea.
Recommendations
67. Allow and facilitate media outlets that have been unlawfully closed, or forced to
close, under the requirement to re-register under the Russian law, to reopen;
9 See also: Crimean Tatar Media in Crimea: situation in 2014 – 2016. – Human Rights
Information Center, 10 April 2017. -
https://humanrights.org.ua/en/material/tri_goda_nesvobody_polozhenije_krymskotatarskih_m
edia_v_krymu
11
68. Ensure that journalists have unrestricted access to, and the freedom to conduct their
professional activities in, Crimea, including those from mainland Ukraine;
69. Investigate all reported instances of unlawful detention, intimidation and
harassment of journalists in Crimea, and bring those suspected of criminal
responsibility to justice in fair trials;
70. End the practice of blocking access to online resources on arbitrary grounds and
without judicial authorisation;
71. Stop using ‘anti-extremists’ and ‘anti-separatist’ legislation to attack journalists and
bloggers.
Peaceful assembly and association
72. The Russian authorities used brutal tactics against participants of peaceful assemblies in the
first year of the occupation: attacks of so called ‘Crimean self-defense’ and other ‘nonidentified
persons’ on the events supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, abductions
and murders of their participants in spring 2014, mass detentions, arrests of single activists,
and the violent dispersal of protests. The occupation authorities represented by the police,
the prosecutor’s office, and the courts use administrative and criminal prosecution against
participants of peaceful assemblies.
73. On 16 May 2014, ‘Prime Minister’ of Crimea Sergey Aksionov issued Edict No 29 that
prohibited peaceful assemblies on the territory of Crimea till 6 June that year. The ban on
peaceful assemblies was applied to the mourning events of 18 May 2014 dedicated to the
70th anniversary of the Crimean Tatar deportation. On 22 November 2015, a new
moratorium on holding public events was introduced on the territory of Simferopol. Mr G.
Bakharev, head of Simferopol Administration, decided ‘to suspend temporarily actions on
holding mass, public, cultural and entertainment and other events’ on the territory of
Simferopol starting from 22 November 2015 until further notice.
74. On 12 November 2014, the ‘Council of Ministers of Crimea’ issued resolution No 452 ‘On
approving the list of places for holding public events on the territory of the Republic of
Crimea’, that indicates the places for holding peaceful assemblies. For instance, in
Simferopol (a city with 400,000 residents) the peaceful assemblies may only be held in four
places. On 4 July 2016, the ‘Council of Ministers of Crimea’ – by resolution no 315 -
significantly reduced a list of places allowed for holding peaceful assemblies. For the whole
of Crimea the total number of places for holding peaceful assemblies decreased from 717 to
360. The document restricts considerably the possibilities for the Crimean residents to hold
a peaceful assembly within the ‘sight and sound’ of the audience they want to address.
75. Crimean human rights group conducted an analysis of judicial decisions that were made in
Crimea since the beginning of the occupation. The analysis of the court decisions revealed
256 judgments that included punishment applied to participants for participating in peaceful
assemblies. The fines collectively totalled more than RUR 2,700,000. The amount of some
individual fines reached RUR 150,000. It should be noted that the average pension in
Crimea is less than RUR 9,000.
12
76. In addition to the penalties, 14 decisions were passed, according to which participants in
peaceful assemblies were sentenced to compulsory public works, from twenty to forty
hours, and 22 people were arrested for a period from two to fifteen days. The prosecutions
are related to the participants in peaceful assemblies, which were held on grounds of
national identity, discontent with the actions of local authorities, or in support of Crimean
residents who are deprived of their liberty by the Russian authorities.
77. On 18 May 2017 in Bakhchisarai a group of Crimean Tatars including Mr Abdurefieyv, Mr
Umerov, Mr Mamutov, Mr Mamutov and Mr Yusupov, were detained after driving cars
with Crimean Tatar flags. They were accused of violating Article 20.2-5 of RF CAO
(Violation of the peaceful assembly holding procedure). The local court imposed a RUR
10,000 fine on each of them.
78. The 76-year-old Crimean Tatar, Server Karametov, was fined RUR 10,000 fine for holding a
single picket in support of political prisoner Akhtem Chyigoz, and was detained for ten days
for “nonobservance” of the orders of police officers who detained him.
79. In addition to the administrative persecution, 40 people are currently deprived of their
liberty and 9 are under criminal investigation for manifesting their political, national or
religious position. Akhtem Chiygoz was sentenced to eight years in prison for organizing a
peaceful rally on 26 February 2014, that is, at a time when even the Russian Federation
considered Crimea as a part of Ukraine10.
80. In April 2016 the Crimean Tatars' Mejlis, an assembly representing the ethnic group's
interests, was banned by the Russian Federation as an "extremist" organisation. This had
followed the de facto Prosecutor of Crimea asking the Supreme Court of Crimea to suspend
the Mejlis as an extremist organization. The assembly had been seen as a key body for the
enjoyment of freedom of assembly, association and expression by the Crimean Tatar People
and the move to ban it was roundly criticized by a number of international organisations,
including the European Parliament11 and the International Court of Justice12.
Recommendations
81. Stop unjustified administrative and criminal persecutions of organisers and
participants of peaceful assemblies;
82. Immediately release persons deprived of liberty due to exercising their right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association and reimburse them the damage
caused by the unlawful imprisonment, torture or other inhuman and degraded
treatment;
10 See also: Unsanctioned Freedom: Analytical review on violation of right to peaceful assembly
in Crimea (March 2014 – March 2017) / produced by A.Sedov, under the general editorship of
O.Skrypnyk and literary editorship of M.Budzar. – Kyiv, 2017. – 43 p. - Crimean Human Rights
Group, May, 2017. - http://crimeahrg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/book-EN.pdf
11 “EU Parliament adopts resolution on Crimean Tatars”,
humanrightshouse.org/Articles/21611.html
12 ICJ Press Release, 19 April 2017, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/166/19412.pdf
13
83. Refrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean
Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions, including the Mejlis,
and to protect against any attacks upon its members.
Discrimination in education
84. The number of pupils studying in Ukrainian has reduced 36 times during the three years of
occupation. Correspondingly, the number of Ukrainian medium classes reduced 31 times
for the same period. In the 2013/2014 academic year 13,589 people in the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea were educated in Ukrainian in 875 classes. According to the ‘Ministry of
Education’ of Crimea only 28 classes are reported to be left in Crimea in the academic year
2016/2017, where only 371 children of 188,517 pupils of Crimea (excluding Sevastopol)
were educated in the Ukrainian medium, or 0.2 percent of the total number of pupils in
Crimea in 201613.
85. The census carried out by the Russian Federation in 2014 states that there were 18,706
children of Ukrainian nationality and 29,140 children of Crimean Tatar nationality in
Crimea. So only 3.2 percent of Ukrainian children and 25.2 percent of Crimean Tatar
children are educated in the native language. Other children of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
nationalities are educated in Russian.
86. On 4 May 2017, representatives of the Sevastopol Ukrainian National Cultural Society
requested Mr Rodikov, a director of Sevastopol education department, to return to
Ukrainian medium education in Sevastopol schools. Mr Rodikov answered that the
Ukrainian language was not a state language in Sevastopol, and there were no Russian
educational programs in Ukrainian, so there were no legal grounds for teaching in Ukrainian
medium in the city secondary schools.
Recommendation:
87. Ensure full and unimpeded access to education in the native languages in Crimea,
including Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, and halt all discrimination
against schools teaching in those mediums.
13 See also: Situation with access to the education in the native language in Crimea. - Crimean
Human Rights Group, 21 April, 2017. - http://crimeahrg.org/en/situation-with-access-to-theeducation-
in-the-native-language-in-crimea/

Annex 955
Regional Centre for Human Rights, et al., Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic Review of the Human
Rights Situation under Occupation, Vol. 3, Right to Nationality (citizenship) (2017)

Crimea
beyond
rules
Thematic review of the human
rights situation under
occupation
Issue № 3
Right to nationality
(citizenship)
UHHRU RCHR CHROT

РЕГІОНАЛЬНИЙ ЦЕНТР ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ
REGIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Regional Centre for Human Rights - NGO, the
nucleus of which consists of professional lawyers
from Crimea and Sevastopol, specializing in the field
of international human rights law.
rchr.org.ua
CHROT - expert-analytical group, whose members
wish to remain anonymous.
Some results of work of this group
are presented at the link below :
precedent.crimea.ua
Ukrainian Helsinki Human
Rights Union
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union - non-profit
and non-political organization. The largest association of
human rights organizations in Ukraine, which unites 29
NGOs, the purpose of which is to protect human rights.
helsinki.org.ua

Crimea
beyond rules
3
issue
Right to nationality
(citizenship) 5
Dear readers,
Crimean events at the beginning of 2014 have challenged the post-war system of
international security. They stirred up the whole range of human emotions - from the loss of
vital references to the euphoria, from joyful hope to fear and frustration. Like 160 years
ago, Crimea attracted the attention of the whole Europe. In this publication we have tried
to turn away from emotions and reconsider the situation rationally through human
values and historical experience . We hope that the publication will be interesting to
all, regardless of their political views and attitudes towards those events.
S. Zayets
R. Martynovskyy
D. Svyrydova
Table of contents
Introduction 6
1. International standards 7
2. Case law of international courts 16
3. Laws and regulations of Ukraine 20
4. Laws and regulations of the Russian
Federation 22
5. Laws of the so-called “Republic of Crimea” 29
6. Historical materials on citizenship 30
7. Crimean cases 34
8. Analytics 36
Crimea
beyond rules
3
issue
Right to nationality
(citizenship) 6
The periodic review ”Crimea beyond rules”, prepared by joint efforts of several organizations and
invited experts, aims to help the international community, human rights organizations, international
and national bodies and structures as well as anyone who wants to better understand the human
rights situation in Crimea.
Each review is themed around a specific topic and includes a number of analytical articles,
references to international regulations, standards and legislation relating to the chosen themes as
well analysis of prospects for potential complaints or those already filed with the international bodies
for the protection of human rights. The series of thematic reviews ”Crimea beyond rules” is devoted
to the study and description of violations of human rights and rules of international humanitarian law
resulting from the continuing aggressive expansion on the side of the Russian Federation in respect
of Crimea as a part of the territory of Ukraine.
During the occupation and subsequent annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the Russian
Federation announced all Ukrainian nationals living in Crimea its subjects. Residents of the occupied
territory faced a difficult choice. On the one hand, by obtaining Russian passports, they formally took
the oath of allegiance to the State which had committed an act of aggression against their sovereigncountry.
On the other hand, during a short period of time (in fact - 18 days) they could try to submit
the “declaration about the willingness to retain the nationality of Ukraine” to one of the four offices
which accepted such declarations in Crimea. In this case, they suddenly became foreigners at home
and were severely limited in their rights.
Using the imperfection of international standards in this ng situations of statelessness and resolving
cases of dual nationality. Arbitrary change and imposition of a nationality became a new challenge to
which the world was not ready. Having imposed its nationality, the Russian Federation «forced into
loyalty» the population of the occupied peninsula under threat of criminal liability (see. Art. 275 of the
Criminal Code «High Treason»).
It is important to understand that the situation in Crimea is fundamentally different from the current
practice of issuing passports of the Russian Federation nationals on the so-called «unrecognized
territories» (Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Thus, residents of the «unrecognized
territories» may obtain Russian nationality only on its own initiative, by addressing the competent
bodies with the appropriate application. In Crimea, the Russian authorities themselves decided the
nationality issue for more than 2.3 million people, declaring them subjects of the Russian Federation.
The situation regarding the nationality which arose from the annexation of Crimea should also
be distinguished from cases of secession of territories and the succession of States. In cases of
secession or succession there takes place an entirely legitimate transfer of the territory under
the control of another State which is in accordance with international law. At the same time, the
occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation were carried out with
gross violation of these norms, of what the international community has been consistently informing
since March 2014 and calling on the authorities of the Russian Federation to return control over
Crimea to Ukraine. Because of this, any attempt to apply to Crimea the relevant rules concerning the
secession or succession of states are inadmissible.
In the post-war world, a person is more and more recognized as a subject of international law. That
is why a change of nationality of Cri-mean residents can and should be considered in the context
of relations of four actors: Ukraine, as the country of existing nationality, Russia, as the country that
imposes its nationality, the actu-al resident of the Crimean peninsula and the third countries.
The existing practice of various international judicial bodies concerns cases of violations related
to the deprivation of nationality or refusal in its granting. So, in cases related to the imposition of
nationality there can be set new precedents. More information about these and other issues can be
found in the current review.
International law assumes that the occupation is a temporary regime. We are also convinced that
the need for such reviews is provisional. Being optimistic, we believe that the main task of these
materials should be apprehension of what had happened and generalization of experience in order
to prevent further human rights violations in Crimea or other regions of the world.
The authors of the review: the team of human rights activists, experts and scholars from Regional
Centre for Human Rights (rchr.org.ua), Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (helsinki.org.ua), as
well as expert and analytical group CHROT.
Introduction
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International standards
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by resolution
217 A (III) of the UN General Assembly on 110 December 1949 and is an act of the so-called
«soft law». However, compliance with the obligations under the Declaration is the subject of
continuous monitoring by the international community, even if its provisions are not reflected
in the texts of other, more binding international instruments.
In particular, along with other documents, the Declaration provisions are the foundation of
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), and its violation can be the reason for individual appeals
to the United Nations Human Rights Council in accordance with the Human Rights Council
Resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007 (former procedure 1503).
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right of every person
to a nationality, and also prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of the nationality or the right to
change it.
The full text of the document can be found following the link1.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The Covenant was adopted by resolution 220 A (ХХI) of the UN General Assembly on
16 December 1966. Ukraine (at that time - the USSR as an independent member of the UN)
signed the Covenant on 20 March 1968 and ratified it on 19 October 1973.
Russia, not being an independent member of the UN, has inherited the obligations under the
Covenant as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union signed the document
on 18 March 1968. Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR ratified it on 18 September
1973.
The document entered into force in Ukraine and the Soviet Union (and respectively in the
Russian Federation) simultaneously, on 23 March 1976.
ARTICLE 24
[…]
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The full text of the document can be found following the link2.
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
The Convention was adopted in New York on 28 September 1954 by the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries convened in accordance with resolution 526 A (XVII) of the Economic and
Social Council on 26 April 1954. It entered into force on 6 June 1960. It was ratified by Ukraine
on 11 January 2013 and entered into force for it on 23 June 2013.
The Russian Federation is not a party to the Convention.
The Convention provides a definition of the concept of a stateless person, declares rights,
obligations of persons who are not citizens of any state, by setting that the treatment of such
persons can not be worse than that of the citizens of the state in which they find themselves
(e.g. in terms of freedom to practice their religion), or to foreign nationals residing in the
territory of such state. It also regulates the issues of movable and immovable property,
copyrights and industrial rights of stateless persons, their associations and the right to appeal
to the courts (Chapter II). In addition, Chapters III and IV regulate the employment and social
security, and Chapter V regulates administrative measures (freedom of movement, identity
1 http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/language.aspx?langid=eng
2 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
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documents, travel documents, taxes, removal of property, deportation, naturalization).
The full text of the document can be found following the link3.
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
The Convention was adopted and signed in New York on 30 August 1961 pursuant to
resolution 896 (IX), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 December
1954. The Convention entered into force on 13 December 1975. It was ratified by Ukraine on
11 January 2013 and entered into force for it on 23 June 2013.
The Russian Federation is not a party to this Convention.
The Convention requires States to grant their nationality to a stateless person and prohibits
to deprive a person of his nationality, if such deprivation would render him stateless. An
exception is made in the context of loyalty relations: the demonstration of disloyalty by
nationals empowers the State to deprive them of nationality regardless of the consequences.
ARTICLE 8
1. A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would
render him stateless.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a person may be deprived of
the nationality of a Contracting State:
(a) In the circumstances in which, under paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 7, it is permissible that
a person should lose his nationality;
(b) Where the nationality has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a Contracting State may
retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of signature, ratification or
accession it specifies its retention of such right on one or more of the following grounds, being
grounds existing in its national law at that time:
(a) That, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person:
(i) Has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued
to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or
(ii) Has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State;
(b) That the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to
another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to
the Contracting State.
The full text of the document can be found following the link4.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
The Convention was adopted by resolution 2106 (XX) of the UN General Assembly on 21
December 1965, signed on 7 March 1966 and entered into force on 4 January 1969. The
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic signed the Convention on 7 March 1966. The Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR ratified it on 21 January 1969, and on 7 April 1969 it
entered into force for Ukraine.
Russian Federation, not being at that time an independent member of the UN, inherited the
obligations of the Convention as the legal successor of the USSR. The Soviet Union signed
the document on 7 March 1966. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified it
on 22 January 1969, and on 4 March 1969 it entered into force.
3 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
4 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Statelessness.aspx
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ARTICLE 1
[…]
2. This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences
made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.
3. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions
of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such
provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
[…]
ARTICLE 5
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention,
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and
to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic
origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:
[…]
(d) Other civil rights, in particular:
[…]
(iii) The right to nationality;
[…]
The full text of the document can be found following the link5.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child
Convention was adopted by resolution 44/25 of the UN General Assembly on 20 November
1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
signed the Convention on 21 February 1990, and ratified the decision of the Verkhovna Rada
of the Ukrainian SSR on 27 February 1991. For Ukraine, the Convention entered into force on
27 September 1991.
The Russian Federation, not being at that time an independent member of the UN, has
inherited the obligations of the Convention as the legal successor of the USSR. The Soviet
Union signed the document on 26 January 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified it
on 13 June 1990 and on 15 September 1990, the Convention entered into force.
The Convention is particularly interesting, because it considers nationality as one of the
elements of identity. It is difficult to assume that upon reaching adulthood, a nationality
becomes irrelevant. This provision can be used as a key to the consideration of certain issues
of nationality in the context of the right to respect for private life.
ARTICLE 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared
for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
ARTICLE 8
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful
interference.
[…]
The full text of the document can be found following the link6.
5 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx
6 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
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The Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
The Convention was signed in the Hague on 12 April 1930. It entered into force on 1 July
1937 from the date of the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession on behalf of
ten members of the League of Nations or non-members of the League of Nations states.
The Soviet Union at the time did not sign and ratify it; respectively, Ukraine and the Russian
Federation are not parties to this international treaty, but its provisions could be used as a
source of customary law.
Chapter I of the Convention establishes the general principles applicable to matters relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws. These include, in particular:
- the right of each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. At the
same time, this law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally
recognized with regard to nationality (Art. 1);
- the right of each State to determine any question as to whether a person possesses the
nationality of a particular State in accordance with the law of that State (Art.2);
- the right of each State to regard as its national a person having two or more nationalities
(Art. 3);
- an inability of the State to afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a
State whose nationality such person also possesses (Art. 4);
- the right of a third State to treat a person having more than one nationality as if he had
only one, the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident,
or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact
most closely connected (Art. 5);
- the right of a person to renounce one of two nationalities if this nationality was acquired
without any voluntary act on his part (Art. 6).
The full text of the document can be found following the link7.
UN General Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 30 January 2001 On nationality of natural
persons in relation to the succession of States
Resolution was adopted on the basis of articles on nationality of natural persons in relation
to the succession of States prepared by the International Law Commission the Article 3 of
that document expressly provides that «the present articles apply only to the effects of a
succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.»
The resolutions of the UN General Assembly following the occupation of Crimea recognized
that the actions of the Russian Federation violated the principles of international law.
Thus, the Russian Federation has no legal grounds for references to articles on nationality of
natural persons in relation to the succession of States in support of their actions in relation to
the imposition of nationality of the Russian Federation to all nationals of Ukraine who resided
and were registered in the territory of the Crimean peninsula at the time of its annexation and
occupation by the Russian Federation.
The full text of the document can be found following the link8.
7 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/InternationalDB/docs/Convention%20on%20certain%20questions%20relaing%20to%20
the%20conflict%20of%20nationality%20laws%20FULL%20TEXT.pdf
8 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/153
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Declaration on the human rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country in
which they live
The Declaration was adopted by resolution 40/144 of the UN General Assembly on 13
December 1985.
The Declaration proclaims the right of aliens to life and security of person, to protection from
interference with privacy and family life, including in respect of home and correspondence;
the right to be equal before the courts; the right to choose a spouse, to marry, to found a
family; the right to freedom of thought, opinion, conscience and religion, as well as other
rights as defined in Part 1 of Article 5 of the Declaration.
Part 2 of the same Article declares the following rights of aliens: the right to leave the
country; the right to freedom of expression; the right of peaceful assembly; the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others, subject to domestic law.
Article 8 defines the rights of aliens lawfully residing in the territory of a State. They, in
particular, have the right to appropriate working conditions, fair wages and equal remuneration
for work, the right to join trade unions, the right to health protection, medical care, social
security, social services, education and recreation.
The full text of the document can be found following the link9.
The European Convention on Nationality
The Convention was signed on 6 November 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 2000.
Ukraine signed the Convention on 1 July 2003, ratified it on 20 September 2006. The
Convention entered into force for Ukraine on 1 April 2007.
The Russian Federation signed this Convention on 6 November 1997, but has not ratified it.
The Convention establishes guarantee of the right to a nationality for each person as well as
a guarantee in order to avoid cases of statelessness, arbitrarily deprivation of nationality, lack
of automatic consequences in relation to a nationality of a spouse, regardless of change in
marital status or change of the nationality by the other spouse (Art. 4). This can be considered
as an element of respect for the will of persons while changing the nationality.
It also sets out the grounds for the acquisition and deprivation of nationality, especially
loss of nationality at the initiative of the individual, a simplified procedure for the recovery of
nationality by former nationals, procedures relating to nationality, cases of multiple nationality,
rights and duties related to multiple nationality.
It should be noted that the ratification of this Convention has been made by Ukraine with
reservations. In particular, in the Law of 20 September 2006 № 163-V «On ratification of the
European Convention on Nationality» Ukraine declared that it excludes Chapter VII from the
scope of the Convention.
The provisions of this chapter provide that persons possessing the nationality of two or
more parties to the Convention shall be required to fulfil their military obligations in relation
to one of those States Parties only.
In practice, this may mean that persons who had to obtain a Russian passport in the
occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol and were called
up for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, after the performance
of such a service can be conscripted for military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
However, this clause does not matter in relation to the Russian Federation, because the
Russian Federation is not a party to that Convention. Attention should also be paid to the
explanatory report at the end of the text of the Convention on the official website of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
9 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/40/144
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The text of the Law on ratification can be found following the link10.
The full text of the Convention in English can be found following the link11.
The full text of the Convention in Ukrainian, with the explanatory report mentioned above
can be found following the link12.
The UN General Assembly Resolution the action of Israel in the Syrian Golan
The UN General Assembly has repeatedly assessed the Israeli practices in the occupied
territories (see, for example, this resolution ). Special attention shall be drawn to the Resolution
A/RES/55/134 of 8 December 2000, which urged to refrain from imposing Israeli citizenship
and Israeli identity cards on the Syrian citizens in the Syrian Golan occupied by Israel .
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights)
The Convention was signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3
September 1953.
Ukraine ratified the Convention on 17 July 1997. The Convention entered into force for
Ukraine on 11 September 1997.
Russia ratified the Convention on 30 March 1998. The Convention entered into force for the
Russian Federation on 1 August 1998.
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed that the Convention does
not protect the right to a nationality. Indeed, the Convention does not contain a provision,
which would fully or partially reproduce the provisions of Art. 15 of the UDHR. However, the
Court has repeatedly considered cases, where it recognized that in some situations, issues
related to the deprivation of nationality may affect matters within the scope of Art. 8 of the
Convention (right to respect for private and family life) and even discrimination (Art. 14 in
conjunction with Art. 8 of the Convention).
In particular, the interest in this aspect is presented in the cases Genovese v. Malta, no.
53124/09, § 30, 11 October 2011 and Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012.
Nevertheless, it appears that the imposition of Russian nationality as a result of the
occupation of Crimea may also raise new issues in the context of Art. 8 of the Convention. In
particular, this may be related to issues of national identity and forced loyalty (see, in particular,
comments on the Convention on the Rights of the Child and on Art. 275 of the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation).
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
A brief summary of the three most typical judgments of the European Court regarding
important human rights issues in the context of citizenship, is given below. The Court itself
notes in these judgments that initially ECtHR denied the admissibility of cases related to
issues of citizenship, given that “the Convention does not guarantee the right to citizenship.”
Nevertheless, the case law has evolved whereby the issues of this category have come in
view of the Court. These cases are characterised by the fact that
the Court does not evaluate national authorities’ actions or decisions on determination of
the applicants’ citizenship as such, but carefully considers consequences of these decisions
and their impact on the lives of the applicants in the context of Article 8 of the Convention.
In particular, the Court found no violation of Art. 8 of the Convention in cases RAMADAN v.
MALTA and GENOVESE v. MALTA, since the decisions of national authorities were rather
formal, and had no real impact on the lives of the applicants. For example, in the case
10 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/40/144
11 http://www.coe.int/ru/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007f2c8
12 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_004/
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RAMADAN v. MALTA the applicant, even though deprived of his Maltese citizenship, was not
expelled from the country, deprived of his job, he had no documents seized and did not suffer
any other serious consequences. Similarly, the case GENOVESE v. MALTA concerned only a
request of the applicant’s mother for her child to be granted Maltese citizenship despite the
fact that they resided in Scotland . In contrast, in the case KURIĆ AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA
the consequences of the authorities’ decisions were enormous for applicants and affected
all their lives.
In the context of the situation of the imposition of Russian citizenship to residents of Crimea
the consequences of such decision can be significant for possible lodging of complaints with
the European Court. Technically, the attribution of Russian citizenship to Crimean residents
looks like granting them additional rights, and not depriving of them. But in fact, these
“additional rights” are a heavy burden for many people. Many people perceive the imposed
identification of Crimean Ukrainians as citizens of the Russian Federation in the context of the
ongoing conflict very painful. But these consequences are not limited to the inner discomfort
only: like any other citizens of the Russian Federation (and citizens only!), they are liable
under Art. 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for treason against the State in
the event of demonstrating loyalty to Ukraine. This means that if they are not required to be
directly loyal to the Russian authorities, still they must refrain from any active manifestation of
disloyalty. However, it should be understood that those of the Crimean people who decided
and managed to declare “the desire to keep the existing citizenship of Ukraine” found
themselves in the position of the applicants in the case KURIĆ AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA.
CASE OF RAMADAN v. MALTA
(21 June 2016, Application no. 76136/12)
The case was examined by the European Court of Human Rights upon the complaint about
the applicant’s deprivation of Maltese citizenship in the context of Art. 8 of the Convention.
The applicant was deprived of his citizenship on the grounds that he had obtained it by fraud.
As a result, he became an apatride (a stateless person).
In this regard, the Court emphasized that an arbitrary denial of a citizenship might in certain
circumstances raise an issue under Art. 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such
denial on the private life of the individual. Although, in this case the Court found no violation
of the Convention, the conclusion that the consequences of changes of nationality ratione
materiae fall within the Art. 8 of the Convention is significant in the context of this review.
The Court also underlines that the private life is a concept that is wide enough to embrace
aspects of a person’s social identity.
In this case, the Court reiterated that the Convention does not guarantee the right to
citizenship. However, in this case likewise in others, the Court draws attention not to the fact
of deprivation of citizenship, but on the related (derived) changes in the applicant’s private life.
The full text of the judgment can be found following the link13.
CASE OF GENOVESE v. MALTA
(11 October 2011, Application no. 53124/09)
The case was examined by the European Court of Human Rights upon the complaint about
the refusal of the Maltese authorities to recognize the applicant’s right to Maltese citizenship.
The applicant was an illegitimate son of a citizen of the United Kingdom and a citizen of Malta.
The father refused to acknowledge the applicant to be his son and his mother had to prove the
paternity in court. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact established in court, that the father of the
child was a citizen of Malta, the Maltese authorities refused to recognize the child as its citizen.
On highlighting that the right to citizenship is not as such a Convention right, the Court also
noted that its denial in the present case was not such as to give rise to a violation of Article
13 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163820
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8 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the impact of citizenship on
social identity was such as to bring it within the general scope and ambit of Article 8 of the
Convention in the aspect of the right to respect for private life.
The full text of the judgment can be found following the link14.
CASE OF KURIĆ AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA
(12 March 2014, Application no. 26828/06)
This case was examined by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
upon the complaint of several former citizens of Yugoslavia against the actions of Slovenia,
as a result of which the applicants lost their status of citizens and the formal right to stay in
this country. Although the individual situation of each applicant differed, they were all united
by the fact that they were living in Slovenia at the time of the proclamation of independence
of the Republic (after the dissolution of Yugoslavia) and did not express their will regarding
its future status (did not acquire citizenship of Slovenia, and did not apply for a permission to
stay). After a while, the Slovenian authorities cleared the records of the applicants as persons
legally residing in the country, whereupon they were deprived of many rights, which they
enjoyed previously and which were granted to the citizens (the right to work, social benefits,
access to health care, the ability to replace lost documents, etc.), and in some cases they even
run a risk of expulsion. Thus, the authorities’ decision on the applicants’ status as citizens or
residents of the country had a profound impact on the whole range of their rights.
The Court concluded that the impact of such decision of the authorities on personal and
family life of the applicants did not comply with the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention.
The full text of the judgment can be found following the link15.
The American Convention on Human Rights
The Convention was adopted at the Inter-American Conference on Human Rights on 22
November 1969 in San Jose. It entered into force on 18 July 1978.
This Convention establishes a regional human rights protection system similar to the
European one. The text of the Convention reflects the specific approach to human rights
typical for the American continent. At the same time, the right to a nationality was included
to the catalog of human rights as a separate item after the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. In this issue American Convention differs from the European Convention on Human
Rights, where the European Court with great difficulty recognizes the right to a nationality as
a circumstance pertaining to personal or family life (see the relevant section in the analytical
materials).
ARTICLE 20. RIGHT TO NATIONALITY
1.Every person has the right to a nationality.
2.Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if
he does not have the right to any other nationality.
3.No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.
The full text of the Convention can be found following the link16.
Convention with respect to the laws and customs of war on land
(The Hague Convention IV)
This Convention is one of the documents adopted at the Peace Conferences in the Hague
in the years 1899 and 1907. The document was adopted on 18 October 1907. For the Russian
14 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106785
15 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111634
16 http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr5.html
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Federation the document came into force on 21 November 1909, for Ukraine – on 29 May
2015. Adoption of the Convention was seen as the embodiment of the rules of customary
international law. Consequently, they are also binding for states that are not formally parties
to the Convention. The rules laid down in the Regulation, have been partially confirmed and
developed in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
ARTICLE 45 OF REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR
ON LAND (THE HAGUE REGULATION).
It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostile Power.
The full text of the Convention can be found following the link17.
The Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
The Fourth Geneva Convention was adopted on 12 August 1949 under the auspices of
the International Committee of the Red Cross. It entered into force on 21 October 1950. The
participants of the Convention (as well as the other three Geneva Conventions, adopted on
the same day in 1949) are all the nations of the world. The Convention contains provisions
on the protection of the civilian population in the context of armed conflict, in particular the
occupation.
Article 67 of the GC IV provides that the occupying military courts shall take into consideration
the fact the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power. It is customary to interpret this
provision in the sense that persons who prior to the occupation had nationality of a State
possessing sovereignty over the relevant territory retain it18.
Forced recruitment of residents of the occupied territory into the armed forces of the
occupying Power is a serious violation of international humanitarian law and a war crime (see.
Wagner precedent19, Berger precedent20, Article 147 of the GC IV, Art. 8 (2) (a) (v ) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court21).
ARTICLE 47
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced,
as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said
territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories
and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the
occupied territory.
ARTICLE 68
[…]
The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person unless the attention
of the court has been particularly called to the fact that since the accused is not a national of
the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance.
[…]
The full text of the Convention can be found following the link22.
17 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195
18 Dinstein Y. The International Law of Belligerent Occupation. — Cambridge, 2009. — P. 53.
19 http://www.worldcourts.com/ildc/eng/decisions/1946.05.03_France_v_Wagner.pdf
20 http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1949.04.13_United_States_v_Weizsaecker.pdf#search=%22weizsaecer%22
21 https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
22 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&
action=openDocument
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Robert Wagner Case
In the summer of 1940, Robert Wagner was appointed by Hitler to be a Gauleiter23 and at the
same time the imperial viceroy in occupied France Alsace for the purpose of germanization
and nazification of the region. Prior to that, Wagner served as Gauleiter and the governor of
Baden. In the early years of the German occupation he made many attempts to encourage
the Alsatians to voluntarily serve in the German army. In general, for the German side the
idea of recruiting volunteers failed (only about 2,300 people, mostly Germans of Alsace
responded to the call). The solution to this problem was the introduction of conscription.
Conscription was introduced in Alsace by the Order of 25 August 1942. In accordance with
section 1 of the Order compulsory military service in the German armed forces for all Alsatians
of German nationality was introduced in Alsace. The Order was made public simultaneously
with the Decree on acquisition of German nationality by all Alsatians. This Decree was
issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Third Reich on 23 August 1942, and also was
applied to the population of Lorraine and Luxembourg. These measures were approved by
the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, in particular, Hitler and Keitel. Consequently, the
spread of German citizenship entailed an obligation for the population of these territories to
serve in the German army.
On 29 July 1945 Wagner was arrested by US occupation forces and handed over to the
French authorities. On 23 April 1946 he was brought before the Permanent Military Tribunal
in Strasbourg. The Tribunal charged Wagner, in particular, with the instigation of the French
to take up arms against France, as well as with organization of recruitment of the French into
the enemy (German) army. As a result, on 3 May 1946 the tribunal sentenced Robert Wagner
to death and confiscation of all property in favor of the people.
Gottlob Berger Case
Gottlob Berger was brought to trial by the American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the
case of «Wilhelmstrasse». On 1 April 1940, Berger was appointed Chief of the SS Main Office,
and in July 1942 became Himmler’s liaison officer for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern
Territories. Also, at various times he served as commander of the reserve forces, the head
of the Service for Prisoners of War in Germany, the chief of staff of the German Volkssturm
(People’s Volunteer Corps) and General of the Waffen-SS.
Regarding Berger through a judicial process in the clearest possible terms, it was noted that,
“the program implemented in Serbia and Croatia was also carried out in Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Russia, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine. Without a doubt, defendant Berger is
guilty of committing crimes against humanity by the fact that he and his departments were
involved in forcing the citizens of these countries to the Germanization or other methods for
the purpose of recruitment into the German armed forces”.
On 11 April 1949 the American Military Tribunal sentenced Gottlob Berger to 25 years in
prison.
These precedents again prove the fact that the right to a nationality and violation of this
right is closely linked to other human rights violations, right up to international crimes, which
is the forced recruitment of inhabitants of the occupied territory into the armed forces of the
occupying Power.
Nottebohm Case24
International Court of Justice in its famous judgment in the Nottebohm case of 6 April 1955,
said that it is the sovereign right of each State to decide who are its nationals, provided
23 Gauleiter was the party leader of a regional branch of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party
24 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf
Case law of international courts
Case law of international courts
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that this process must be properly regulated by international law. International Court of
Justice has upheld the principle of «effective nationality”, that which accorded with the facts
and based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of these States
whose nationality is involved. These factors include the habitual residence of the individual
concerned but also the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life,
attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic25
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its judgment in the case of Yean and Bosico
v. Dominican Republic acknowledged the ethnic discrimination of citizens of the Dominican
Republic of Haitian descent and confirmed, as enshrined in the aforementioned American
Convention on Human Rights, the right of every person to citizenship as a prerequisite for
equal enjoyment of all rights in the society. Inter-American Court in its decision also noted
that the regulation of nationality issues is the responsibility of the state, but international law
imposes certain restrictions on the implementation of such powers. The Court upheld this
argument in another case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru26, but also noted27 that the right to a
nationality is an inalienable right of all people and has an important influence on the legal
existence of a natural person.
Joint statement of the participants of the Conference of European Constitutional
Courts concerning respect for territorial integrity and international law in administering
constitutional justice of 10 September 2015
(Batumi Declaration)
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation played its role in the formal recognition of
the annexation, having considered the so-called “treaty on the accession of Crimea” in terms
of its constitutionality, and spoke in favor of the legality of admitting the so-called “Republic of
Crimea” and the “City of Federal Importance Sevastopol” to the Russian Federation (see the
relevant section in the Russian legislation). At the same time the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation also assessed provisions regarding citizenship of the Crimean residents
(see below the section in the Russian legislation).
The position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation was condemned by some
participants of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, which was held in Batumi in
September 2015. In particular, on 10 September 2015, there was signed the so-called Batumi
Declaration, which noted that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation formally
had a decisive role in the process of annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and without its
judgment the annexation could not be recognized as lawful under national Russian legislation
(the illegality of the annexation in the context of international law is not in question in the text
of the declaration).
The full text of the document can be read below in this review
25 http://www.refworld.org/docid/44e497d94.html
26 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_74_ing.pdf
27 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_04_ing.pdf
JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ADMINISTERING CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
As it is known, on 19 March 2014, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
passed the judgment in the case «On the verification of the constitutionality of the
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international treaty, which has not yet entered into force, between the Russian Federation
and the Republic of Crimea on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian
Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation».
By that unprecedented judgment, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
recognised that the agreement between the Russian Federation and the so-called
«Republic of Crimea», located in the territory of Ukraine, is an international treaty, as well
as that the so-called «Republic of Crimea» has the status of an international legal entity.
It is important to note’ that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
formally has a decisive role in the process of the annexation of foreign territories. Under
Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation
«On the Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New
Subject of the Russian Federation in Its Composition», an international treaty on the
accession of a new entity to the Russian Federation may be ratified only after the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation rules such a treaty to be in compliance
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Thus, under the Russian legislation,
the above-mentioned judgment was necessary in order to formally annex part of the
territory of Ukraine — Crimea and the City of Sevastopol. Without that judgment, the
annexation of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol could not be formally accomplished.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, by adopting its judgment
of 19 March 2014 within one day after the so-called «Treaty» was signed, performed an
instrumental role in accomplishing and justifying the annexation of Crimea.
We recall that, under international law, such annexation of a foreign territory is a
manifestation of aggression and cannot be justified by any consideration.
In this context, it should be noted that not a single European state has recognised
this annexation and that the general international consensus as to the illegality of the
«Crimean referendum» and the annexation of Crimea is, inter alia, expressed in United
Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 68/262 «The territorial integrity of Ukraine»
(2014), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolutions no. 1988 «Recent
developments in Ukraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions» (2014),
no. 1990 «Reconsideration on 2
substantive grounds of the previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation»
(2014) and no. 2034 «Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified
credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation» (2015), European Parliament
Resolution no. 2014/2699(RSP) «On Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries
and in particular destabilisation of eastern Ukraine» and the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly Resolution «The continuation of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of
OSCE commitments and international norms by the Russian Federation» (2015). The
conclusions concerning the illegality of the «Crimean referendum» were also stated in
the Opinion of the European Commission for
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on «Whether the decision taken by
the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organise a
referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the Russian Federation or Restoring
Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is compatible with constitutional principles» (2014).
We consider that the judgment of 19 March 2014 of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation amounts to a grave violation of international law (the universally
recognised norms of international law, including those consolidated in the 1945
Charter of the United Nations, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe). Consequently, it may be concluded that this judgment is not
in accordance with the fundamental principle of the rule of law, which obliges courts to
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comply with the general principles of law, the main principles of international law and
the values of democratic constitutional order,
We reiterate that the Statute of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts
makes the full membership of European Constitutional Courts in this organisation
conditional upon the conduct of judicial activities by its members in accordance with
the principle of judicial independence, the fundamental principles of democracy, the
rule of law and the duty to respect human rights (Paragraph 1 (a) of Article 6),
We, therefore, invite the members of the Conference of European Constitutional
Courts to consider adopting the «Declaration on respect for territorial integrity and
international law in administering constitutional justice», which has been proposed by
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
This Joint Statement is open for signature to the memberS of the Conference of
European Constitutional Courts,
Batumi, 10 September 2015
SIGNED BY:
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Laws and regulations of Ukraine
Constitution of Ukraine
Date of approval and number: 28 June 1996, no. 254k/96-VR
Effective date: 28 June 1996
ARTICLE 4.
There is single citizenship in Ukraine. The grounds for the acquisition and termination of
Ukrainian citizenship are determined by law.
ARTICLE 25.
A citizen of Ukraine shall not be deprived of citizenship and of the right to change citizenship.
A citizen of Ukraine shall not be expelled from Ukraine or surrendered to another state.
Ukraine guarantees care and protection to its citizens who are beyond its borders.
ARTICLE 26.
Foreigners and stateless persons who are in Ukraine on legal grounds enjoy the same
rights and freedoms and also bear the same duties as citizens of Ukraine, with the exceptions
established by the Constitution, laws or international treaties of Ukraine. Foreigners and
stateless persons may be granted asylum by the procedure established by law.
ARTICLE 33.
Everyone who is legally present on the territory of Ukraine is guaranteed freedom of
movement, free choice of place of residence, and the right to freely leave the territory of
Ukraine, with the exception of restrictions established by law.
A citizen of Ukraine may not be deprived of the right to return to Ukraine at any time.
The full text of the Constitution can be found following the link28.
Law of Ukraine “On the Unified state demographic register and the documents
confirming citizenship of Ukraine, certifying the identity or its special status”
ARTICLE 13.
Titles and types of documents issued with the application of the Unified state demographic
register.
1. Documents, execution of which is provided by this Law with the application of the Register,
in accordance with their purpose are divided into:
1) documents certifying the identity and confirming citizenship of Ukraine:
a) a Ukrainian passport;
b) a Ukrainian international passport;
c) a diplomatic passport of Ukraine;
d) a service passport of Ukraine;
e) a seafarers’ identity document;
f) a crew member certificate;
g) an ID card to return to Ukraine;
h) a Ukrainian temporary certificate.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link29.
Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine”
Date of approval and number: 18 January 2001, no. 2235-III
28 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/profiles/ukraineConstitution_en.asp
29 http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1601-18
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Effective date: 1 March 2001
Contents: the Law regulates the procedure for acquisition of citizenship, defining the
grounds for such an acquisition (Art. 6), as well as the procedure for termination of citizenship
(Art. 17 voluntary termination of citizenship of Ukraine).
The citizenship of Ukraine is based, in particular, on the principles of a single citizenship,
prevention of statelessness, impossibility of deprivation of citizenship, retention of citizenship,
regardless of the citizen’s place of residence (Art. 2).
The full text of the Law can be found following the link30.
The Law of Ukraine “On Securing the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal
Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”
Date of approval and number: 15 April 2014, no. 1207-18
Effective date: 27 April 2014
Contents: Part 1 of Art. 6 of the Law secures the rights of citizens residing in the temporarily
occupied territory for issuance of documents certifying Ukrainian citizenship.
Part 4 of Art. 5 determines that compulsory automatic enrollment of Ukrainian citizens, who
reside in the temporarily occupied territory, to the citizenship of the Russian Federation is not
recognized by Ukraine and is not ground for deprivation of Ukraine’s citizenship.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link31.
The Law of Ukraine «On Creation of the Free Economic Zone «Crimea» and on
Peculiarities of Exercising Economic Activity in the Temporarily Occupied Territories
of Ukraine»
Date of approval and number: 12 August 2014. no. 1636-VII
Effective date: 27 September 2014
Contents: Art. 8.3. of the Law stipulates that state guarantees concerning benefits and social
assistance do not apply to citizens who live in the territory of the FEZ Crimea and are either
stateless or have citizenship of a foreign state, as well as to the citizens of Ukraine who also
have the citizenship of the occupying state. Transitional provisions of the Law established
that foreigners and stateless persons, citizens of Ukraine who live in the temporarily occupied
territory of Ukraine or temporarily staying in the other territory of Ukraine are recognized nonresidents
for the purpose of customs formalities.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link32.
Law of Ukraine “On ensuring the rights and freedoms of internally displaced persons”
Date of approval and number: 20 October 2014, no. 1706-VII
Effective date: 22 November 2014
Contents: IDPs can receive documents certifying their identity, special status and citizenship
if they appeal to the central executive body at the place of their factual residence (Art. 6).
The full text of the Law can be found following the link33.
30 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/nationality/National%20legislation/Ukraine%20LawCitizenship%20
consol%20June05_ENG.pdf
31 http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/23095-law-of-ukraine-no-1207-vii-of-15-april-2014-on-securingthe-
rights-and-freedoms-of-citizens-and-the-legal-regimeon-the-temporarily-occupied-territory-of-ukraine-withchanges-
set-forth-by-the-law-no-1237-vii-of-6-may-2014
32 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1636-18
33 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ukraine-IDP-Law-November-2014.pdf
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Federation
Constitution of the Russian Federation
Date of approval: 12 December 1993
Effective date: 01 October 1993
Contents: Art. 6 stioulates that the citizenship of the Russian Federation shall be acquired
and terminated according to federal law; it shall be one and equal, irrespective of the grounds
of acquisition. Every citizen of the Russian Federation shall enjoy in its territory all the rights and
freedoms and bear equal duties provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. A
citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deprived of his or her citizenship or of the right
to change it.
Art. 62 of the Constitution allows dual citizenship for Russian citizens.
The full text of the Constitution can be found following the link34.
Law of the Russian Federation of 28 November 1991 no. 1948-I “On Citizenship of the
Russian Federation”
The Law on Citizenship was adopted in connection with the proclamation of independence
by the Russian Federation in 1991. In 2002, the text of the Law was redrafted (see below).
Of a particular interest are the provisions on granting Russian citizenship to former USSR
citizens residing in the territory of the Russian Federation on the date of entry into force of this
Law. Persons of this category had the right to declare their unwillingness to have citizenship
of the Russian Federation during a year after the Law came into force. In comparison, the
residents of Crimea were given less than a month to think about this decision, and the period,
during which the opportunity to “express the desire to keep the citizenship of Ukraine” existed
de facto, was less than 18 days.
ARTICLE 13. RECOGNITION OF CITIZENSHIP OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
1. All former Soviet citizens permanently residing in the territory of the Russian Federation
on the date of entry into force of this Law shall be recognized as citizens of the Russian
Federation, unless they declared their unwillingness to have Russian citizenship within one
year after that day.
The full text of the document can be found following the link35.
Federal Constitutional Law “On Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of
Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the New Constituent Entities
of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol”
Date of approval and number: 20 March 2014, no. 6-FKZ
Effective date: 21 March 2014
Contents: Art. 4 of the FCL regulates the recognition of citizenship of the Russian Federation
for the citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons who permanently reside in the territory of
the Republic of Crimea or Sevastopol. Thus, all Ukrainian citizens and stateless persons who
reside in the territory of the Republic of Crimea or Sevastopol shall be recognized as citizens
of the Russian Federation. Persons willing to retain their nationality or remain stateless must
declare this within 1 month after admitting the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation.
Otherwise, citizens shall be recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation without any
second citizenship. In addition, the Law imposes restrictions for holding positions in state
34 http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm
35 http://www.democracy.ru/library/laws/federal/1948-I_fz/
Laws and regulations of the Russian Federation
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Federation
and municipal bodies by the Russian citizens who have a second citizenship or the right of
permanent residence in a foreign country. Art. 11 of the Law also guarantees the citizens of
Ukraine and stateless persons residing in the territory of the Republic of Crimea at the time of
admitting the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation the right to social assistance only
in case they acquire Russian citizenship.
Typical form of declaration that was strictly recommended to fulfill by those Crimeans who
wanted to avoid Russian citizenship:
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Federal Law “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation”
Date of approval, number: April 19, 2002, no. 62-FZ
Effective date: 1 July, 2002
Contents: Art. 4 of the Law contains the principles concerning the citizenship of the Russian
Federation and the rules that regulate relations in the field of the Russian citizenship. In addition,
it defines grounds, conditions and procedure for acquisition and termination of citizenship of
the Russian Federation. Art. 6 of the FL allows dual citizenship for Russian citizens. The list
of grounds for acquisition of citizenship of the Russian Federation is not exhaustive (Art. 11: at
birth, on reinstatement in the citizenship, on admission to the citizenship, etc.).
Arts. 18 and 19 of the Law contain grounds and regulate the manner of renunciation of
citizenship of the Russian Federation on the basis of free will of a person. Art. 20 provides that
renunciation of citizenship shall not be permitted if a person: a) owes an incomplete obligation
towards the Russian Federation, established by the federal laws; b) is under indictment in a
criminal case in the Russian Federation or under a sentence of conviction which has taken
effect and is pending execution; c) possesses no other citizenship and guarantee for the
acquisition thereof.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link36.
36 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_36927/
FMS of Russia
From a citizen________________
___________________________
Date of birth_________________
___________________________
Place of birth_________________
___________________________
Residing in__________________
___________________________
Passport details_______________
Declaration
I____________________________________________________________________
declare the willingness to retain my citizenship of Ukraine (status of a stateless person) for
myself and my minor children __________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________
In light of this, I refuse to be recognized (to recognize my minor children) as a citizen of
the Russian Federation according to the Article 5 of the Agreement between the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Crimea on admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of
Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities (Moscow,
March 18, 2014).
I am aware of a legal status of a foreigner, a stateless person and necessity to make relevant
documents, as well as legal consequences of my decision.
______________________ ______________________
(date) (signature)
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Federation
Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation “On approval of the Regulations on the
order of consideration of issues of citizenship of the Russian Federation”
Date of adoption and number: 14 November, 2002, no. 1325 (revised on 4 August, 2016).
Contents: It regulates the procedure for submission and review of documents for
renunciation of citizenship of the Russian Federation.
The following data must be provided among other things in an application for renunciation
of citizenship: series, number, date of issue of a Russian passport and the authority which has
issued this document. A copy of passport must be enclosed to this application.
Thus, the exercise of the right to renounce Russian citizenship is impossible for persons who
have refused to obtain Russian passports and whom the Russian Federation, nevertheless,
considers its citizens.
The full text of the Decree can be found following the link37.
The Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the
Admitting of the Republic of Crimea in the Russian Federation and on Establishing
New Constituent Entities within the Russian Federation
Date of signature: 18 March 2014
Date of ratification: 21 March 2014
Effective date: 1 April 2014
Contents: the Agreement specifies that the citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons
permanently residing on the day the Republic of Crimea was admitted to the Russian
Federation are recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation. An exception are persons
who, within one month from the date of acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the
Russian Federation declare their desire to maintain their existing citizenship or otherwise
remain stateless. Changes regarding the period of notice have been made to the Federal
Law «On Amendments to Art. Art. 6 and 30 of the Federal Law «On Citizenship of the Russian
Federation” and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation». The term has been
extended to January 1, 2016.
The full text of the Agreement can be found following the link38.
Decision of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court on 19 March 2014 no. 6-II
“On the constitutionality of the International Agreement, not yet in force, between
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the
new constituent entities”
Date of approval: 19 March 2014
Contents: The Court considered the request of the President of the RF on the constitutionality
of the International Agreement concluded between the RF and Crimea. The Court found that
the Agreement corresponds to the Constitution of the RF. It was found that the provision on
granting citizenship of the RF and the obligation to notify dual citizenship or statelessness
is not inconsistent with the Constitution, because it does not compel to renounce another
citizenship or remain stateless while ensuring, if desired, the right to acquire Russian
citizenship without taking any actions for this purpose.
The full text of the decision can be found following the link39.
37 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_39607/0b46424cde96ea7d9427d2c3d28d0bac40dd8cb4/
38 http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102171897&rdk=&backlink=1
39 https://goo.gl/dtHuRw
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Federal Law of the RF “On amendments to Art. 6 and 30 of the Federal Law “On
citizenship of the Russian Federation” and certain legislative acts of the Russian
Federation”
Date of approval and number: 23 May 2014, no. 142-FZ
Effective date: 4 August 2014
Contents: The Federal Law introduces amendments to some legislative instruments
regarding Russian citizens who reside within the boundaries of the Russian Federation and
who have another citizenship or the right of permanent residence in another country. These
citizens shall be obliged to notify in writing of any other citizenship or the right of permanent
residence within 60 days from the date of acquisition of a second citizenship or the right of
permanent residence. The procedure for notification of such citizenship is also regulated.
Violation of the established procedure for notification shall entail the imposition of an
administrative fine (Art.19.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences). The Criminal Code was
amended imposing liability in the form of a fine, forced labor for failure to fulfill a notification
obligation (Art. 330.2 of the Russian Criminal Code). Citizens who acquire Russian citizenship
in accordance with the Agreement on admitting to the RF the Republic of Crimea no. 6-FKZ
shall be deemed to have the Russian citizenship only, in case of filing an application for
their reluctance to be citizens of a foreign state. The deadline for notification of a second
citizenship and punishment for violation of the established procedure for notification, as well
as punishment for failure to notify and concealing dual citizenship is effective from 1 January
2016 (Art. 6 of the Federal Law of the RF “On citizenship”).
The full text of the document can be found following the link40.
Federal Law “On amendments to Art. 6 of the Federal Law “On citizenship”
Date of approval and number: 19 December 2014, no. 507-FZ
Effective date: 31 December 2014
Contents: Art. 6 of the Federal Law “On citizenship” is supplemented with part 3, which
states that citizens who have multiple citizenship and file no notice within 60 days of their
foreign citizenship or the right of residence in a foreign state shall be obliged to submit such
notification not later than 30 days from the date of entry into the territory of the RF. Citizens
who arrive in the Russian Federation in a manner not requiring a visa and on the date of
entry into force of this Law are citizens of that foreign state only shall submit a notification of
another citizenship or the right of permanent residence in other country prior to January 1,
2016.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link41.
Federal Law “On amendments to the Federal Law “On the legal status of foreign citizens
in the Russian Federation” and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”
Date of approval and number: 14 November 2014, no. 357-FZ
Effective date: 24 November 2014
In accordance with this Law, foreign citizens staying lawfully in the territory of the Russian
Federation, arriving in the Russian Federation in a manner not requiring a visa and reaching
the age of 18 shall be entitled from January 1, 2015 to be employed on the basis of a work
permit both by individuals and legal entities. Thus, the Crimean people who are not citizens of
the Russian Federation in accordance with the Russian laws shall be obliged to obtain a work
40 https://rg.ru/2014/06/06/grajdanstvo-dok.html
41 https://rg.ru/2015/01/12/grazhdanstvo-dok.html
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Federation
permit. Clarifications on the employment can be found following the link42.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link43.
Decree of the Russian Government dd. October 29, 2015 no. 2197-r on the establishment
of quotas for issuing permits for temporary residence in the Russian Federation to
foreign citizens and stateless persons
In accordance with this Decree, in 2016, the Crimean Federal District (including the “Republic
of Crimea” and Sevastopol) was provided with 1900 temporary residence permits for foreign
citizens and stateless persons (1500 for Crimea and 400 for Sevastopol).
The full text of the document can be found following the link44.
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation contains two articles that are of direct
relevance to citizenship.
First of all, it is Art. 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which provides for
liability for high treason. The subject of the offense under this Article is a citizen of Russia. This
provision, in addition to direct collection of information constituting a state secret, provides for
liability for rendering any assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization,
or their representatives in activities against the security of the Russian Federation. Obviously,
in the context of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine the imposition
of Russian citizenship predetermines the prosecution of Crimean people for any active
demonstration of loyalty to Ukraine. Given that the classification of the activities to such that
are directed against the security of the Russian Federation is carried out in a quite subjective
way, this provision predetermines repressions against the Crimean people.
Moreover, the provisions of Art. 330.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
provide for liability for failure to notify the Russian authorities of the citizenship (nationality)
of another state. In fact, it is a means of control over possible loyalty of citizens to other
countries.
ARTICLE 275. HIGH TREASON
High treason, that is act of espionage committed by a citizen of the Russian Federation,
disclosure to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives
of information constituting a state secret that has been entrusted or has become known to
that person through service, work, study or in other cases determined by the legislation of the
Russian Federation, or any financial, material and technical, consultative or other assistance
to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives in activities
against the security of the Russian Federation -
shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for a term of twelve to twenty years with or
without a fine in an amount of up to five hundred thousand rubles or in the amount of the wage
or salary, or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years and with
restriction of liberty for a term of up to two years.
Note. A person who has committed crimes stipulated in this Article, or Articles 276 and
278 of this Code, shall be relieved from criminal liability if he has facilitated the prevention
of further damage to the interests of the Russian Federation by informing the governmental
authorities of his own free will and in due time, or in any other way, if his actions contain no
other corpus delicti.
42 http://mtrud.rk.gov.ru/rus/info.php?id=622731
43 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_171225/
44 http://government.ru/media/files/WSuem3sXQhKEsRQlJ4CNsW2M1J94eeup.pdf
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ARTICLE 330.2. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY OF THE
CITIZENSHIP (NATIONALITY) OF A FOREIGN STATE OR A RESIDENCE PERMIT
OR ANY OTHER VALID DOCUMENT CONFIRMING THE RIGHT TO PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY (PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL LAW OF
04.06.2014 NO. 142-FZ)
Failure to comply with the obligation determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation
to notify the relevant territorial body within the federal executive body authorized to exercise
the functions of control and supervision in the field of migration about the citizenship (nationality)
of a foreign state or a residence permit or any other valid document confirming the right to
permanent residence in a foreign country - shall be punished by a fine in an amount of up to
two hundred thousand rubles or in the amount of the wage or salary, or other income of the
convicted person for a period of up to one year or by compulsory labor for a term of up to four
hundred hours.
The full text of the document can be found following the link45.
Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 4 October 2016 no.
18-P in the case regarding the verification of constitutionality of Part 1, Article 4 of the
Federal Constitutional Law “On admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of
Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities
of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol” upon A.G.
Olenev’s complaint
The reason for this decision was the problem that had arisen with respect to getting a
Russian passport by persons who actually lived in Crimea, but were not registered there.
When considering this case, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation referred
to the principle of respect for the will of certain persons. According to the authors of this
review, this position does not fit well with the other part of this decision: the Constitutional
Court substantiates its findings with the Russia’s succession to the Crimean Peninsula and
considers the connection of “new citizens” with the annexed territory as a ground for granting
citizenship (this idea is borrowed from the UN General Assembly Resolution on Nationality
of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States). The contradiction in the position
of the Constitutional Court is that if the same principles apply to persons who were officially
registered in Crimea, then their will to be recognized as Russian citizens was rudely ignored,
as they were subjected to mass collective naturalization as something that comes together
with the annexed territory.
The full text of the document can be found following the link46.
45 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/2ca391674eeaa02069722fa3f13cbb41cce0a95d/
46 http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision247212.pdf
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Laws of the so-called “Republic of Crimea” 29
Constitution of the Republic of Crimea
Date of ratification: 11 April 2014
Effective date: 12 April 2014
Contents: Part 3 of Art. 62 of the Constitution defines the head of the Republic of Crimea as
a citizen of the Russian Federation without citizenship of a foreign state or a residence permit
or any other document confirming the right of permanent residence of a Russian citizen in a
foreign country.
The full text of the Constitution of the “RC” can be found following the link47.
47 https://rg.ru/2014/05/06/krim-konstituciya-reg-dok.html
Laws of the so-called “Republic of Crimea”
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German Czechoslovakian treaty relating to citizenship and options of 20 November
193848
This treaty was adopted with the aim to resolve issues of citizenship between Germany
and Czechoslovakia as a result of the occupation of the territory of the latter in October 1938.
Since the end of World War II, due to the insignificance of the Munich agreement on the
division of Czechoslovakia in 1938 all the acts that took the form of an international treaty, in
particular, the said contract would be recognized as invalid.
Despite an early invalidation of the Treaty, there is reason to believe that its adoption
largely affected the «post-war» fate of many Germans living in the occupied territories
of Czechoslovakia. We are talking about the forced eviction of the German minority in
Czechoslovakia who acquired German citizenship before the end of World War II. The eviction
of the civilian population, being illegal from the point of view of modern international law, was
made on the basis of decrees of Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš.
Thus, in accordance with Beneš Decree of 2 August 1945 regarding the change of the
Czechoslovak citizenship for persons of German and Hungarian ethnic origin, citizens of
Czechoslovakia of German or Hungarian national origin who acquired German or Hungarian
citizenship by the order of the occupation authorities, lost the right to citizenship of
Czechoslovakia on the day of acquiring this citizenship.
The text of the treaty of 20 November 1938
The governments of Germany and Czechoslovakia, willing to settle the issues of citizenship
and options arising from the reunification of Sudeten German areas with the German Reich,
authorized:
on behalf of the German Government – Ministerialdirektor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Dr. Friedrich Gauss, and Ministerial Adviser in the Reichsministerium, Mr. Dr. Hans Globke.
On behalf of the Government of Czechoslovakia - Mr. Dr. Antonin Koukal, Ministerial Adviser
of the Ministry of Justice in Prague,
who agreed on the following provisions:
§1.
Those citizens of Czechoslovakia who as of 10 October 1938 were living in one of the
communities reunited with the German Reich, from 10 October 1938 acquire German
citizenship while losing Czechoslovak citizenship, if they
a) were born before 1 January 1910 in the territory, reunited with the German Reich,
or
b) lost their German citizenship on 10 January 1920,
or
c) are the children or grandchildren of a person who is subject to the conditions of a) or b)
or
d) are the wives of persons who are subject to the terms of paragraphs a), b) or c)
Citizens of Czechoslovakia of German national origin, who as of 10 October 1938 resided
outside the territory of the former state Czechoslovakia from 10 October 1938 receive German
citizenship while losing Czechoslovak citizenship, if they as of 10 October 1938 had the right
to citizenship in one of the communities reunited with the German Reich.
A wife does not acquire German citizenship if a husband does not acquire it.
§2.
The German Government is entitled up to 10 July 1939 to require persons of not German
48 The translation is made by the NGO “Regional Centre for Human Rights”
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national origin who, according to the provisions of this Treaty shall remain citizens of
Czechoslovakia and moved to the territory, reunited with the German Reich, since 1 January
1910, as well as their descendants with Czechoslovak citizenship, to leave the German Reich
during the three-month period.
The Government of Czechoslovakia takes these persons in its territory.
The Government of Czechoslovakia is entitled up to 10 July 1939 to require persons of German
national origin, who by the time this Treaty enteres into force are citizens of Czechoslovakia
and moved to the territory of the modern Republic of Czechoslovakia since 1 January 1910
as well as their descendants to leave the territory of the Czechoslovak Republicduring the
three-month period.
At the same time, these persons are deprived of citizenship of Czechoslovakia. The German
government takes them into its territory. This provision shall not apply to persons who have
received Czechoslovak citizenship after 30 January 1933 and until the date indicated had
been citizens of Germany or Austria.
§ 3.
Persons not of German national origin, who under the provisions of § 1 acquire German
citizenship, have until 29 March 1939 the right to opt for Czechoslovak citizenship.
§ 4.
Persons of German national origin, who remain citizens of Czechoslovakia, have until 29
March 1939 the right to opt for German citizenship. This provision shall not apply to persons
who received Czechoslovak citizenship after 30 January 1933 and until the date indicated
had been citizens of Germany or Austria.
§ 5.
One can inform about the willingness to opt:
a) in favor of Czechoslovak citizenship in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republicin the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in Prague,
outside the Czechoslovak Republicin the competent executive authority of Czechoslovakia;
b) in favor of German citizenship in the territory of the German Reich in the lower competent
administrative authority,
outside the German Reich in the authorized German consulate.
§ 6.
The territorial competence of the authorities referred to in § 5 is determined by the place of
residence, and in the absence of residence, place of location of an optant.
If the application of option is submitted to the territorially incompetent authority, other than
specified in § 5, then the latter passes it to the territorially competent authority. The date of
submission of the application shall be the date of its receipt in the first instance.
§ 7.
Application of option is submitted to the authority referred to in § 5 being recorded or in
writing. Signature under the application submitted in writing must be certified by the official
representative of the State whose citizenship is chosen, by the court or the notary.
Application of option may also be submitted by an authorized representative. The
signature under a power of attorney must be certified by any of the instances referred to in
the paragraph 1.
Certification is exempt from fees, taxes, stamp duties and other charges.
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§ 8.
The competent authority of the state whose citizenship is selected, checks the prerequisites
for the option. In the Czechoslovak Republic, this checking is reserved for the Ministry of
Interior in Prague.
If the conditions for the option are met, the authority shall immediately issue a certificate of
option for an optant, and notify the authority designated by the other Government.
In the certificate of option there should be also specified family members subject to the
option.
The option enters into force at the time an application of option is received by the authorities
dealing with the choice of citizenship.
The procedure of option does not provide for any fees, taxes, stamp duties and other
charges.
§ 9.
Any person having reached the age of 18 may submit the application of option.
The wife does not have the right to opt for their own; option by the husband covers a wife.
This rule does not apply if the marriage is dissolved in court.
For persons under 18, for persons over 18 years, for whom there are grounds for depriving
them of their legal capacity, as well as for persons who are deprived of legal capacity or over
whom a temporary custody (guardianship) is established, option could be made by their legal
representatives, even if the latter has no right of option. In order to assess the grounds for the
application of option under this paragraph, the date of submission of the application of option
to the authorities dealing with the choice of citizenship is fundamental.
§ 10.
The option is irreversible.
However, if persons for whom the legal representative has exercised the right of option,
reach the age of 18 years before the expiry of the option period or until the expiration of that
period the basis of their legal representation is no longer valid, they can cancel option within
the time limit. The abolition of the option is covered by the provisions of §§ 5-7, respectively.
§ 11.
According to this Treaty, a place of residence of a person is the place where the person has
settled with the intention of long-term residence.
If a person has more than one place of residence, the place that he indicates as his place
of residence, is fundamental.
§ 12.
Persons who are required to leave the territory of the German Reich or the Czechoslovak
Republic, as prescribed under § 2, as well as optants that until 3 March 1940 move their place
of residence to the State in favor of which they have opted, are permitted to take all movable
property, which they had as of the date of this Treaty, and they are exempt from any duties.
An exception is cash, securities and collections that are of particular historical or cultural
significance to the country of export. Consideration of these issues should be specified by a
special agreement.
§ 13.
To check and resolve all issues that arise in the execution of this Treaty, a Mixed Commission
is created, to which each of two Governments shall send an equal number of representatives.
This Commission is particularly charged with the responsibility of:
1. the development of proposals to facilitate the exchange of populations, as well as
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clarification of fundamental questions that arise in this exchange;
2. the verification of doubt in regard to citizenship.
The Commission may appoint a sub-committees on specific issues if necessary.
§ 14.
This Treaty shall enter into force on 26 November 1938.
Done in duplicate, in the German and Czechoslovak languages.
Berlin, 20 November 1938.
Friedrich Gauss
Antonin Koukal
Hans Globke
[Source: The monthly magazine of Foreign Policy 5 (1938), no. 9, pp 1213-1216].
The Treaty in the original language can be found following the link49.
Resolution of the Crimean Supreme Council on legislative initiative for the right of
citizens of the Republic of Crimea to dual citizenship
18 December 1992, № 223-1
1. In accordance with Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On citizenship of Ukraine” and Article
21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea to consider it necessary to propose to the
Supreme Council of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine to speed up decision-making on
the exercise of the right to dual citizenship by the Crimean citizens.
2. To temporarily suspend in the territory of the Republic of Crimea the execution of
decisions by the law enforcement bodies on citizenship of Ukraine in relation to the Crimean
citizens, who haven’t still decided on their belonging to Ukraine.
3. To instruct the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for legislation,
lawfulness and system of justice to prepare proposals on the practical exercise of the right of
the Crimean citizens to dual citizenship.
The full text of the document can be found following the link50.
49 http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19381120-1.pdf
50 http://precedent.crimea.ua/documents/postanovlenye-verhovnoho-soveta-kryima-o-zakonodatelnoj-ynytsyatyve-povoprosu-
realyzatsyy-prava-hrazhdan-respublyky-kryim-na-dvojnoe-hrazhdanstvo-ystorycheskye-materyalyi/
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The Russian authorities exploit the “automatic obtaining of nationality” for prosecuting
pro-Ukrainian activists. The best-known examples are cases of Oleg Sentsov and Aleksandr
Kolchenko who were arrested and transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation
on suspicion of committing criminal offenses. Both are citizens of Ukraine and during the
occupation lived in Crimea. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights highlighted in its report of July 15, 2014 (para. 188):
“It would appear that since Sentsov did not explicitly renounce Russian citizenship within the
deadline provided under Russian legislation, he is automatically considered to have become
a Russian citizen.”
Particularly, the “Kolchenko’s case” should be mentioned in the context ofnationality, as
it indicates the compulsory nature of the “automatic nationaity” of the Russian Federation,
which does not depend on the will of a person. The court denied the retention of the Ukrainian
citizenship by Kolchenko, despite the fact that Kolchenko while being in custody in Moscow
could not apply for Russian citizenship and obtain a Russian passport. Kolchenko confirms
that he has taken no actions to obtain Russian citizenship. The only document that has been
certifying his identity since the time of his arrest is his Ukrainian passport. Kolchenko considers
himself a citizen of Ukraine, and Ukraine recognizes Kolchenko’s Ukrainian citizenship.
The court decided to deny the retention of the Ukrainian citizenship by Oleksandr
Kolchenko. The court’s decision to deny the retention of the Ukrainian citizenship contradicts
international law, Russian and Ukrainian legislations. Therefore, Kolchenko is deprived of the
right to nationality, despite the fact that no one can be deprived of nationality arbitrarily. In
addition, the judgment violates Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1966, which guarantees that everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere
as a person before the law. Thus, Kolchenko’s legal personality is based on his Ukrainian
nationality, and his legal nexus as a national of Ukraine remains unchanged outside Ukraine.
In this case, the court, deciding in the name of the Russian Federation, unreasonably refuses
to recognize Oleksandr Kolchenko’s legal personality (Report of the Crimean Human Rights
Field Mission for January 2015, p. 16).
Eventually, the North Caucasus District Military Court sentenced Oleg Sentsov and
Oleksandr Kolchenko to 20 and 10 years of imprisonment in a strict regime penal colony,
respectively, as Russian citizens. At the same time, Kolchenko with assistance of his lawyer
Svetlana Sidorkina filed a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights about the
compulsory imposition of the Russian nationality.
This “automatic” acquisition of Russian nationality by nationals of Ukraine in Crimea is illegal,
since the internal procedures of the Russian Federation for its acquisition fail to comply with
the applicable international conventions, customary international law and the principles of the
nationality law (in particular, see The European Convention on Nationality, Nottebohm case).
***
Those Crimeans who for one reason or another have not declared their «desire to preserve
their existing citizenship of Ukraine», but still do not wish to be considered as citizens of the
Russian Federation, faced a “curious” situation. Often in this situation, these people do not
apply for the issuance of Russian passports, while continuing to use the passport of citizen
of Ukraine.
Some of these people have applied for a residence permit as citizens of Ukraine. Mainly,
this situation ends with failure. Denial is usually motivated by the fact that, in accordance with
the law of 6-FKZ applicants are considered as citizens of Russia, and a residence permit may
be granted only to foreign nationals.
Those Crimeans who try to renounce the imposed citizenship of the Russian Federation
also end up in a complicated situation. Russian legislation makes no exception for Crimeans,
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and thus they have to undergo the procedure of renouncing the citizenship in a general way.
This procedure, among other things, requires a RF passport. Thus, here is a vicious circle:
in order to get rid of the imposed citizenship, you must first recognize yourself a citizen of
Russia and formally apply for a passport.
If Crimeans do not have a «document confirming the legality of staying in the territory of
Russia» (Russian passport or residence permit) this leads to restriction or deprivation of many
of their rights. Without Russian passport or a residence permit it is impossible be formal
employment, apply for health services, social benefits and pensions.
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Imposition of citizenship as a new human rights violation and a way of
implementing aggressive expansion by the Russian Federation in the
context of the occupation of Crimea
By Serhiy Zayets
Lawyer and expert of the NGO “Regional Centre for Human Rights”
* This article was first published in Ukrainian and German languages with support of the Institute for European
Policy (Berlin), the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Federal Foreign Office of Germany under
the project “Strengthening of Ukrainian Think Tanks: the Development of Institutional Capacity and Improving
Cooperation with Partners in the European Union”
Introduction
After the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula the Russian Federation collectively
naturalized the population of Crimea. This fact raises a number of questions that have no
ready answers in today’s environment. Firstly, it is a way of seizing the territory together
with the population. Secondly, it is interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs and nationality
relationship that existed between the Crimean residents and the Ukrainian state. Finally,
Russia has violated international human rights standards, interfering in the internal sphere
of an individual. It is this aspect – the violation of human rights by means of imposition of
nationality – that is a focus of this study.
It should be realized that the occupation and actions directed at the appropriation of the
occupied territory is a phenomenon that happened perhaps for the first time in the European
system of human rights protection. The similar situation, which can be compared to Crimea,
is the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus. However, the current level of economic, legal,
information, cultural and other relations rises new issues which did not exist or were not so
high-profile during the invasion of Cyprus. Furthermore, Cyprus still remains the so-called
unrecognized territory that Turkey has never tried to make a part of its own country.
Crimea also differs from other unrecognized territories, including Transnistria, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia51. The Russian Federation has been carrying out the “passportization” of
the population in these territories for quite a long time already. However, the main difference
from the Crimean situation is that the expression of individual’s will is needed in order to
obtain Russian nationality in these territories and there is no temporal limitation. In other
words, those who are unwilling to acquire Russian nationality can avoid it. But in Crimea there
was held quick collective passportization, during which there was no possibility to consciously
respond to the situation.
In the postwar time contemporary international law addressed the issues of eliminating
statelessness52 and resolving cases of dual nationality. However, the issue of protection
against arbitrary imposition of nationality has so far remained unnoticed by the international
community. It is time when these issues must also take their rightful place in international
discussions.
Historical background
In early 2014, Russia committed an act of military aggression against sovereign Ukraine and
tried to annex part of its territory - the Crimean Peninsula. The beginning of the active phase
51 See, for example, Human Rights in the Occupied Territories of Georgia: Information Note Distributed by the Delegation
of Georgia during OSCE Review Conference - Human Dimension Session (Warsaw, 30 September - 8 October 2010). –
Access mode: http://www.osce.org/home/73289?download=true (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
52 See, for example, materials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) about the campaign to stop
statelessness. – Access mode: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/53174c306.html (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
Analytics
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of such actions should be considered the third decade of February53.
The occupation was carried out under the protection the so-called “green men” - armed men
without insignia. Later in the documentary “Crimea: The Way Back Home”, Russian President
Vladimir Putin recognized that those were the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation54.
According to numerous press reports, many of the participants of the occupation were
awarded with a medal “For the return of Crimea”, but the official list of the medaled persons
is not available55.
On 27 February 2014, by a decision of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (ARC), captured and controlled at the time by the armed men, there was scheduled an
all-Crimean referendum56. The initial date of the referendum was set on the day of presidential
elections in Ukraine –25 May 2014. Then the referendum was rescheduled for 30 March and
finally - for 16 March 2014. The latter was the date when the referendum took place57.
Reliable data on the results of voting is not available, and public statements of those involved
in its organization and conduct contain contradictory information58. Despite that fact, on 18
March 2014, (in two days after the referendum) an agreement “on admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new
constituent entities” (hereinafter - “Agreement”) was signed59.
The next day the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation by its decision dd. 19 March
2014 no. 6-P acknowledged this Agreement as such that corresponds to the Constitution of
53 On 23 February 2014, on the Nakhimov Square in the city of Sevastopol there was held a rally, during which a Russian
citizen Oleksiy Chaly was “elected” as the so-called “people’s mayor”. Then the city was surrounded by checkpoints.
Later, on 26 February 2014, in front of the building of Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, that was taken over by people
unknown at that time, there was held a meeting of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian forces (the latter included the Crimean
Tatars). However, the medal “For the return of Crimea”, legalized by the Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian
Federation no. 160 of 21 March 2014 bears the dates 20.02.14 - 18.03.14. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the Law of
15 September 2015 specified the date of the beginning of the occupation: the beginning of the occupation is officially
considered to be 20 February 2014.- Access mode: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-vii.
54 Andriy Kondrashov: Film “Crimea: The Way Back Home” (All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company,
2015).- Access mode: https://russia.tv/brand/show/brand_id/59195/ (date of reference: 01/11/2016). The film has English
subtitles. Regarding the participation of Russian troops, please, watch from 1:05:00.
55 According to the site life.ru: ca. three hundred Russian citizens were awarded with a medal “For the Return of Crimea”.-
Access mode: https://life.ru/t/новости/l5l348 (date of reference: 01/01/2016).
56 Resolution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea “On holding of the all-Crimean referendum”.- Access mode: http://
crimea.gov.ru/act/11689 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
57 During this short period, not only any public debate was not organized, but also Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists
were severely persecuted. See, for example, the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine dd. 15.04.2014, prepared after the visit of Assistant Secretary
General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović to Crimea: “the presence of paramilitary and so called self-defence groups
as well as soldiers in uniform without insignia, widely believed to be from the Russian Federation, was not conducive
to an environment in which voters could freely exercise their right to hold opinions and the right to freedom of
expression. There have also been credible allegations of harassment, arbitrary arrest, and torture targeting activists
and journalists who did not support the referendum. Furthermore, seven persons were reported as missing <...> While
the Tatar community was promised numerous concessions, including Government positions as well as the recognized
status as indigenous peoples, the majority of the members of the community chose to boycott the referendum. OHCHR
was informed by representatives of Crimean Tatars that no more than 1,000, out of a population of 290,000-300,000,
participated in the 16 March referendum” (para. 6) .- Access mode: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/
Ukraine_Report_15April2014.doc (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
58 According to the statement of Mykhaylo Malyshev, the so-called “Head of the Crimean Parliament Commission on
organization and holding of the referendum” 1 million 250 thousand 426 people voted in Crimea. This is without
Sevastopol <.> With Sevastopol the number of people voted made up 1 million 724 thousand 563 people.” (Quoted by
the Newspapers: “Crimea has chosen Russia.” – Access mode: https:// www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/03/15_a_5951217.
shtml (date of reference: 01/11/2016). According to this statement, more than 474 thousand people voted in Sevastopol,
while the total number of population (including children who do not have the right to vote) was a little over 385 thousand
people.
59 On the peninsula, in compliance with Article 133 of the Constitution of Ukraine, there were established two administrative
units equal in status - the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereinafter - ARC) and the city of Sevastopol, which had been
existing in that form since declaration of independence of Ukraine in 1991. The two administrative units had the same
status, and none of them was subordinate to the other. Nevertheless, the referendum was also conducted in the city of
Sevastopol. By tangent rule the terms regarding the city of Sevastopol were included in the “agreement”.- Access mode:
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20605 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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the Russian Federation60.
On 21 March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the law on ratification of the
Agreement and the Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ “On admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new
constituent entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol”
(hereinafter - the Law 6-FKZ)61.
This Law came into force on 1 April 2014. Since that time, its provisions began to be formally
applied by the occupation authorities on the Crimean Peninsula. However, it should be noted
that according to Article 1 of the “Agreement” the so-called Republic of Crimea deemed to
be admitted to the Russian Federation from the date of signing of this Agreement, i.e. from
18 March 2014.
The occupation has been followed by numerous violations of human rights: freedom of
movement, property rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial
and so on. At the same time, some of these violations themselves are also international
crimes: for example, transfer of the Crimean residents from the occupied territory and vice
versa, transfer of the civilian population of the Russian Federation to the occupied territory
significantly changes the population profile of the peninsula. Conscription of residents of the
occupied territory into the Russian Armed Forces is another example of such an offense. A
prerequisite for this and other offenses is arbitrary imposition of Russian nationality, which is
being analyzed below.
International legal qualification of the Russian Federation’s actions in Crimea
The UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974 defines aggression as
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations62.
The Ukraine’s territorial integrity is guaranteed by a package of international legal
agreements from the UN Charter to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
According to the so-called Budapest Memorandum63 signed by the Russian Federation
along with Great Britain and the United States, the signatories made a commitment to respect
the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine and refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine,
ensuring that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense
or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations64.
The UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on Ukraine’s territorial integrity of 27 March
2014 called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to
recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol on the basis of the referendum held on 16 March 2014 and to refrain from any
60 See the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 19 March 2014 no. 6-P.- Access mode: https://
rg.ru/2014/03/19/ks-site-dok.html (date of reference: 01/11/2016). On 10 September 2015, at the Conference of European
Constitutional Courts in Batumi there was signed the so-called Batumi Declaration, which noted the crucial role of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in legalizing the occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.
61 Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ “On admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing
within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal
Importance Sevastopol”. - Access mode: http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=LAW&n=200047
&fld=134&dst=100136,0&rnd=0.46997960940071615#0 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
62 UN General Assembly Resolution no. 3314 of 14 December 1974.- Access mode: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_
conv/conventions/aggression.shtml (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
63 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994.- Access mode: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_158 (date of
reference: 01.11.2016).
64 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.- Access mode: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_158 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status65.
External conditions in which Crimeans had to choose their citizenship
According to Article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ “from the date of the
admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian
Federation the new constituent entities Ukrainian nationals and stateless persons who had
been permanently residing in the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance
Sevastopol were recognized as nationals of the Russian Federation, except for persons
who within one month thereafter declared their willingness to retain their and (or) their minor
children’s other nationality or remain stateless.” 66
As mentioned above, according to the “Agreement” the “Republic of Crimea” is deemed to
be admitted to the Russian Federation from the date of signing of the “Agreement”, i.e. from
18 March 2014. Thus, starting exactly from that date the term envisaged by Art. 4 of the Law
6-FKZ was restricted. That term ended on April 18. But since the legislation of the Russian
Federation started being applied on the peninsula from 1 April 2014, according to the Law no.
6-FKZ, as mentioned earlier, so the general term for the submission of that application de jure
was reduced to 18 days.
As of 4-9 April 2014, in Crimea there were operating only two offices of the Federal Migration
Service (FMS) , which received applications, in Sevastopol and Simferopol. As of 10 April,
9 FMS offices were operating in: Sevastopol, Simferopol, Yalta, Bakhchisaray, Bilogorsk,
Yevpatoriya, Saki, Kerch and Dzhankoy67. It was reported by the Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine (hereinafter – HRMMU) in its periodic report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine of 15 May 201468.
In total, ca. 3500 persons filed applications “declaring their will to keep their and (or) their
minor children’s other nationality or remain stateless.” 69
As indicated in the report of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea
in 2014, “transitional period”, the time allotted for integration of the <...> region from the
established system of law and governance into the system of public institutions of the Russian
Federation <...> is characterized by internal contradictions, inconsistency, interchange of
progressive development phases, often combined with conflicts in the application of laws.
This leads to the fact that an ordinary person is lost in a variety of new rules of life different
from those, which he got accustomed to.” 70
That is not to say that the inhabitants of Crimea were fully deprived of possibility to express
their will to acquire Russian nationality. However, the conditions in which they had to choose
(instantaneous loss of familiar landmarks in everyday life, lack of adequate information about
consequences, extremely short term, infrastructural constraints, etc.) did not enable to make
an informed choice71. Observations show that the majority of Crimeans did not try to make
their choices and acquired the status of Russian nationals “with the tacit consent” after the
65 UN General Assembly Resolution of 27 March 2014 no. 68/262 “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”.- Access mode: http://
www.un.org/ru/documents/ods.asp?m=A/RES/68/262 (date of reference: 01/01/2016).
66 Law no. 6-FKZ, ibid.
67 For comparison: offices of the Federal Migration Service in which one could apply for a Russian passport, have been
established within the network of similar offices of the State Migration Service of Ukraine. These offices were located,
as a rule, within walking distance of the place of residence of citizens in big cities.
68 Para. 27 of the periodic report of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine on the situation of human rights
in Ukraine of May 15, 2014.- Access mode: http://www.un.org.ua/images/stories/Report_15_May_2014ua.pdf (date of
reference: 01/11/2016).
69 See the Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation for 2014, p. 99.- Access mode: http://
ombudsmanrf.org/www/upload/files/docs/appeals/doklad2014.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
70 Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea in 2014, p. 4.- Access mode: http://crimea.
gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf This document is of great evidentiary value, since the credentials of the author L.E.
Lubinaya as the Commissioner for Human Rights are recognized by the Russian Government.
71 The term “informed choice” is used by analogy with the fixed term “informed consent to medical treatment”, which
provides for such consent on the basis of sufficient and timely information about the nature of medical treatment, the
associated risks and possible consequences.
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expiry of the 18-day term72.
In the meantime, any option of choice, which had to be made by the Crimeans, led to a
deterioration in their situation: they had to choose between a significant restriction of rights
(up to a complete loss of legal personality) and the oath of allegiance to the aggressor state.
Consequences of renunciation of Russian nationality
Applying to renounce Russian nationality automatically led to the fact that this person
acquired the status of a foreigner with the relevant restrictions (related to employment, the
right to social benefits, migration control, prohibition of participation in political activities
and to be engaged in public life, etc.). But unlike the common situation when a foreigner
deliberately moves to a foreign country and agrees to relevant limitations, this category
of Crimean residents found themselves to have a status of foreign nationals at home. The
further stay on the peninsula became entirely dependent on the discretion of the occupation
authorities as to permission to stay.
The former nationals of Yugoslavia in Slovenia faced similar problems. The European Court
of Human Rights in the case Kurić and Others v Slovenia73 concluded that such situation
entails a loss of legal personality, and declared it incompatible with Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights <respect for privacy>. In addition, the Court also held that the
applicants had been subjected to discriminatory treatment on the ground of national origin74.
At the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, all nationals had dual nationality - of Yugoslavia
itself (which was used effectively) and one of the republics, it was composed of (before the
disintegration that nationality was purely nominal and did not influence the possibility of living
in another republic and participating in the elections). After the disintegration of Yugoslavia,
the former Yugoslav nationality lost its meaning. Instead Slovenia provided a certain period to
all those willing to get their own nationality or a permission to stay. After the deadline, those
who did not use the right provided were “erased” from the register of residents. Applicants
for various reasons did not use the opportunity to determine their status in the republic and
found themselves in the category of “the erased”. This led to the fact that they were in a
position that the ECtHR defined as the loss of legal personality when they had the severely
limited ability to exercise their rights or even were fully deprived of them.
Consequences of acquiring the status of Russian citizens
It is much harder to understand the situation of the persons who in the period up to 18April
2014 had not submitted the above said application and thus acquired the status of Russian
citizens regardless of subsequent obtaining a passport or avoidance of getting it. “New
citizens” avoided the problems associated with the loss of legal personality. In fact, they have
received a full range of rights enjoyed by Russian nationals by birth in Russia.
In this aspect it looks as if the Russian Federation has done its best and made the Crimean
inhabitants equal to any national of Russia. But in fact this is not true. Since the acquisition of
nationality involves not only getting a set of rights but also certain duties and the possibility of
imposing restrictions by the state. Therefore, the situation that has signs of external equality,
actually has a negative impact on “new nationals” having Ukrainian identity, who are now
obliged, for example, to use arms to defend the Russian Federation, which, in turn, is in
72 According to the observations of the NGO “Regional Center for Human Rights” there are recorded a large number of
people in Crimea and those who left the occupied territory, who did not submit an application regarding unwillingness to
obtain Russian nationality, but also did not apply for obtaining a Russian passport. We should understand that pursuant
to the Russian laws such persons are also considered nationals of the Russian Federation, despite the lack of proper
documents. See further, for example, O. Kolchenko’s example.
73 Case of KURIĆ and others v. SLOVENIA.- Access mode: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111634 (date of reference:
01/11/2016)
74 According to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination the discrimination on the
ground of national origin is a form of racial discrimination.
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conflict with Ukraine.
Nationality also includes the creation of certain loyalty relationship that affects the private
life and may cause a serious internal conflict in a person. Such situation may raise the
question about violation of the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. It is the analysis of compliance of Russia’s actions on imposing
nationality with international standards that we are going to focus on.
We should make a reservation: this relates to nationals of Ukraine who were loyal to their
homeland and lived in Crimea at the time of occupation (regardless of whether they left the
occupied territory thereafter or continue to live there). For those who welcomed the fact of
annexation and the status of Russian nationals, the problem does not exist: they have just
taken the opportunity.75
Arbitrary imposition of nationality as a new challenge
When we talk about imposition of nationality as an entirely new challenge, it should be
emphasized that existing precedents are related only to the history of the World War II.
The Permanent Military Tribunal at Strasbourg and the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
sentenced consequently Robert Wagner (1946)76 and Gottlob Berger (1949)77 for actions
related to Germanization of the population in the occupied territories and its mobilization as
German nationals. However, these cases concerned the imposition of nationality as one of
the objective elements of war crimes or crimes against humanity and related to the violation
of international humanitarian law. According to Art. 45 of the Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) it is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied
territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power78.
Prerequisites for viewing the imposition of nationality in the context of human rights violation
arise with the adoption of core international human rights treaties. Due to the development of
an international catalogue of human rights standards a person was recognized as international
legal personality and ceased to be exclusively a toy in the hands of the sovereign. Hence
there arose a need to take into account person’s will in matters that previously were only
within the scope of interstate politics.
In its Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984 regarding the proposed amendments
to the naturalization provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights noted that, despite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral and
regulation of nationality are matters for each state to decide, contemporary developments
indicate that international law does impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by
the states in that area. And thus the manners in which states regulate nationality matters
n cannot today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; those powers of the state are
also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights. The
classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted by the state to its
subjects, has gradually evolved to the point that nationality is today perceived as involving
the jurisdiction of the state as well as human rights issues (para 32, 33)79.
The classic case on nationality is the so-called case of Nottebohm reviewed by the
International Court of Justice80. In this case the Court drew a conclusion that today has
75 This material is devoted to consideration of issues of nationality in terms of human rights and exactly in this context there
were made reservations. However, the forced extraterritorial collective naturalization of nationals of the other state also
violates international public law in terms of inter-State relations.
76 Access mode: https://www.phdn.org/archives/www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/wagner1.htm (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
77 Access mode: http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1949.04.13_United_States_v_Weizsaecker.
pdf#search=%22gottlob berger% 22 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
78 Access mode: https://www.icrc.org/rus/resources/documents/misc/hague-convention-iv-181007.htm (date of reference:
01/11/2016).
79 Access mode: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_04_ing.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
80 LIECHTENSTEIN v. GUATEMALA, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1955.- Access mode: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/18/2674.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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become classic: “Naturalization is not a matter to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is
not something that happens frequently in the life of a human being. It involves his breaking of a
bond of allegiance and his establishment of a new bond of allegiance. It may have far-reaching
consequences and involve profound changes in the destiny of the individual who obtains it. It
concerns him personally, and to consider it only from the point of view of its repercussions with
regard to his property would be to misunderstand its profound significance. In order to appraise
its international effect, it is impossible to disregard the circumstances in which it was conferred,
the serious character which attaches to it, the real and effective, and not merely the verbal
preference of the individual seeking it for the country which grants it to him.” (p. 24)
Although, in the above case issues of nationality are considered in the context of
international relations, the definition of this phenomenon given by the International Court of
Justice enables to consider it through the system of international human rights standards as
well.
International standards for nationality as the right included in the international
catalogue of human rights
Nationality is viewed as a category contained in the catalogue of human rights in compliance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Under Article 15 of the Declaration everyone
has the right to a nationality and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights somewhat narrows the context and
reads only the child’s right to acquire a nationality (Art. 24).
The right to a nationality is regulated in more details by Article 20 of the American Convention
on Human Rights. Its provisions guarantee every person the right to the nationality of the
state in whose territory he was born, and prohibits arbitrary deprivation of nationality or of the
right to change it.
The European Convention on Human Rights, in contrast to these international instruments,
does not at all contain provisions on nationality. The European Court noted that the right to
a nationality is not as guaranteed by the Convention, although under certain conditions the
issue of violation of Article 8 may arise in the context of nationality.
In particular, in the case Genovese v. Malta (Application no. 53124/09, 11 November 2011,
§ 30) the ECtHR noted: “The Court … reiterates that the concept “private life” is a broad term
not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a
person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity.
<...> The provisions of Article 8 <respect for private life> do not, however, guarantee a right to
acquire a particular nationality or citizenship. Nevertheless, the Court has previously stated
that it cannot be ruled out that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances
raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial
(deprivation) on the private life of the individual.” 81 In this judgment, the Court noted that
Malta had violated Article 14 <prohibition of discrimination> in conjunction with Article 8 of
the Convention <respect for private life>, as its Citizenship Act prevented an illegitimate child
to acquire Maltese citizenship even though his father was Maltese, while children born to a
married couple could inherit citizenship of one of parents.
It should be emphasized that the whole case-law of international judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, where the issue of human rights violations in the aspects related to nationality was
raised, refers first of all to negative actions of states (deprivation of nationality, denial to
81 Access mode: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106785 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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renounce nationality or other similar acts)82. The situation of imposition of nationality, as
happened in Crimea, has not been the subject of legal assessment to be conducted by
international bodies yet83. This new phenomenon has not also been the subject of theoretical
study to be carried out by research workers84.
And though the European Court of Human Rights addresses nationality issues very carefully,
Crimean situation is a favorable opportunity to review the preliminary findings and develop
practices in this regard.
Although, as it has been repeatedly noted, the European Convention contains no
guarantees on the right to nationality, a status of nationals can be considered as aspect of
the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, self-identification
is a manifestation of a private life. According to Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child a nationality is an element of the child’s identity. There is no reason to state,
especially considering the position of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm’s
case regarding the fundamental nature of nationality in the life of each person that nationality
loses such meaning for an adult person.
In other words, the fact that the ECtHR does not contain provisions that guarantee a person
the right to nationality, in no way excludes that the arbitrary imposition of nationality cannot
give rise to circumstances which are incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights <right to respect for private life>.
The arbitrary imposition of nationality on Crimean inhabitants, therefore, on the one hand, is
forcing the legal relationship between the inhabitants of Crimea and the Russian Federation,
on the other hand represents interference of the Russian Federation in the relationship that
emerged earlier and existed between the residents of Crimea and the Ukrainian state. Due
to this, actions of the Russian Federation directed at the imposition of nationality are not
within its sovereign jurisdiction. Rather the opposite: Russia violated its obligations under the
Budapest Memorandum, interfered in the internal affairs of Ukraine and relations between
the Ukrainian state and its nationals.
Before the occupation there were no effective relations between the Crimean residents
and Russia, which could be the ground for the formalization of nationality relations. It is rather
the opposite: the occupation and imposition of nationality became a prerequisite for certain
relationship between the Crimean inhabitants and the Russian state. Such relations are
undesirable for many Crimean people.
The possibility of reviewing this issue in the context of human rights gives each victim of
Russian aggression the opportunity to protect their rights when everybody can directly appeal
to international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (including the ECtHR and the UNCHR). The
use of these mechanisms does not depend on the political will inside the state and allows
everyone to initiate a dialogue not only in the context of international relations but also in
humanitarian dimension.
Situation as viewed by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
By its Judgment no. 18-p of 4 October 2016 the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation tried to analyze the decision of the Russian Government relating nationality taking
82 See, for example, decisions of the ECtHR in the cases Riener v. Bulgaria (no. 46343/99, 23 May 2006), Petropavlovskis
v. Latvia (no. 44230/06, § 83, ECHR 2015), Karassev v. Finland (dec.), no. 31414/96, Slivenko v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no.
48321/99, Savoia and Bounegru v. Italy (dec.), no. 8407/05, 11 July 2006; Dragan and Others v. Germany (dec.), no.
33743/03, 7 October 2004; Mennesson v. France; Fedorova v. Latvia (dec.), no. 69405/01, 9 October 2003; Dadouch v.
Malta; Slepcik v. the Netherlands and the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 30913/96, 2 September 1996, and so on.
83 Now specialists of the NGO “Regional Center for Human Rights” are preparing an appication to the ECtHR and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee regarding discrimination and violation of the right to respect for private life
through the Russia’s imposition of nationality.
84 For more detailed information¬¬ about modern approaches we encourage you to read The Changing Role of Nationality
in International Law (Routledge Research in International Law) .- Access mode: https://www.amazon.com/Changing-
Role-Nationality-International -Law/dp/B00EVWK2G0/ref=sr_1_1_twi_kin_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1466688841&sr=1-
1&keywords=The+changing+role+of+nationality+in+international+law&selectObb = rent. (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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into consideration the norms of international law.
In this case, the subject to the proceedings of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation was the right of Ukrainian nationals and stateless persons who resided in Crimea
without official registration to acquire nationality under the Law no. 6-FKZ.
The Constitutional Court referred to the European Convention on Nationality (Strasbourg,
6 November 1997), the Russia’s succession with respect to Crimea and the UN General
Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 12 December 2000 “Nationality of natural persons in relation
to the succession of States” 85. Let us try to consider, how the supreme body of constitutional
justice of Russia has interpreted them.
First of all, significant is the reference to the European Convention on Nationality, which
though is signed by Russia, is not however ratified yet. Since the Convention is not ratified by
Russia, the reference to its provisions is essential in terms of recognition of its binding nature
at least in the form of customary law. On referring to the Convention, the Constitutional Court
cited its preamble, which states that account should be taken both of the legitimate interests
of States and those of individuals. However, the Court did not go beyond citing, that is why
the issue concerning the way of applying the indicated principle to the Crimean situation
remains open.
Nevertheless, the above analysis of Russia’s actions in Crimea shows the disregard for
the rights and interests of individuals in the occupied territory and the arbitrary imposition of
nationality. Thus, Russia has violated provisions of international law which binding nature for
the Russian Federation is recognized by the Constitutional Court of the state.
Regarding the reference to the Russia’s succession with respect to Crimea, the Constitutional
Court of the RF mentioned the UN General Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 12 December
2000 “Nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States”. Article 3 of
the Declaration provides that its provisions apply only to the effects of a succession of
States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
As it has been already noted, the UN General Assembly Resolution of 27 March 2014 called
upon all States to refrain from actions aimed at the disruption of the territorial integrity of
Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders and not to recognize any alteration
of the status of the Crimean Peninsula. Under such conditions the rules of international law
exclude the possibility of Russia’s succession to Crimea, and therefore the reference to the
UN General Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 12 December 2000 is also irrelevant86.
Finally, the Constitutional Court, referring to the Resolution 55/153, has given considerable
prominence to the person’s connection with a particular territory. However, this approach
reduces the status of people to serfs who are captured together with the land.
At the same time, it is necessary to mention again that in Nottebohm’s classic case the focus
in issues of nationality was put on the effective links of a person not with the territory, but the
state itself. A different approach would mean that people could not reside long outside their
country of nationality, as it would inevitably result in their naturalization: increase in length
of stay in a particular territory would lead to the strengthening of links with this territory and
weakening of links with the territory of origin. Author is unaware of origins of the concept of
nationality based on a connection with the territory, but its flaws have been demonstrated.
However, if we apply the principle of effective connection with the state itself, not the
85 Access mode: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/568/59/PDF/N0056859.pdf?OpenElement.
(date of reference: 01/11/2016).
86 The statement on succession generates many other objections: the capture of Crimea occurred without taking into
account the sovereign will of the Ukrainian state; Ukraine, which owns the peninsula, continues to exist; there is no
“people of Crimea”, who could have the right to self-determination, however, there is a multiethnic population of the
peninsula; the Republic of Crimea and especially the city of Sevastopol have never been subjects of international
law and were not recognized by anyone to be such during a short period in March 2014, and therefore could not
conclude international agreements, etc. This also deprives Russia of the possibility to refer to many other international
agreements and principles of international law as they also cannot be applied because of a violation of fundamental
obligations under the UN Charter.
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territory, it is necessary to stress once again that at the time of the occupation there was no
connection between the population of the peninsula and the Russian Federation, sufficient
for the nationality relations. At the same time, the imposition of nationality inevitably created
such links.
It is worth to mention one more time that the above decision of the Constitutional Court was
made in the context of the right of persons, who do not have a registered place of residence
in Crimea, to a nationality under the Law no. 6-FKZ. And in fact, following the above logic the
Constitutional Court of Russia tried to confirm this right of theirs. However, these principles
themselves cannot be applied to the naturalization of other nationals, and that is why they
themselves enable to conclude that Russia has violated international law.
Thus, the existing attempts to legitimize the presence of the Russian Federation in Crimea
roughly and obviously run against the rules of international law violated during the occupation.
Ukraine’s reaction to Russia’s actions
According to Art. 5 of the Law of Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of
nationals and on the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine” the forced
automatic acquisition of the nationality of the Russian Federation by the Ukrainian nationals
residing in the temporarily occupied territory is not recognized by Ukraine and is not accepted
as a ground for loss of nationality of Ukraine87.
At the same time, Ukraine’s position to some extent is inconsistent. For example, according
to the para. 12.7 Art. 12 of the Law of Ukraine “On creation of the free economic zone “Crimea”
and peculiarities of economic activities in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine” bank
savings guarantees are not applicable to nationals of the Russian Federation. This provision
was practically extended to Crimean residents who have to submit a declaration of having
no nationality of the Occupying Power. There can be also foreseen the issues regarding the
access of the Crimean residents to public service, classified information and others related to
security and the vulnerable situation in which the residents of Crimea found themselves due
to the imposed nationality.
This indicates that Ukraine cannot entirely ignore the actions of the Russian Federation
directed at the collective naturalization of the Crimean population and is compelled to take
into account this fact, even declaring its legal nullity.
Practical consequences of collective naturalization
The most vulnerable group of nationals of Ukraine who have suffered negative consequences
of Russia’s actions are children deprived of parental care. According to the Office of the
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, as of 01.08.2014 there were 4228 of
such children in Crimea. Since the beginning of the occupation the authorities of the Russian
Federation took control over administration of the institutions that provided care for such
children. On the grounds of “respecting the best interests of the child” in favor of these
children there was not filed any application “declaring willingness to keep their existing ...
other nationality.” 88
Persons who at the time of the occupation were held in custody belong to another vulnerable
group. The administration of places of detention did not properly secure their right to refuse
to be recognized Russian citizens as well. Thus they were deprived of consular protection
and the right to be transferred to the Ukrainian authorities for serving their sentences. The
87 Law of Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of nationals and on the legal regime in the temporarily occupied
territory of Ukraine.”- Access mode: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-vii (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
88 See the statement of Head of the Department on Observance of the Rights of the Child, Non-discrimination and Gender
Equality A. Filipyshyna of 05/06/2015 submitted to the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for
Human Rights.- Access mode: http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/all-news/pr/5615-sm-aksana-filipishina-prava-ditini-vkrimu-
pochali-porushuvati-vid-samogo/ ; http://health.unian.net/country/1085947-ukrainskim-detyam-sirotam-v-kryimuprinuditelno-
prisvaivayut-rossiyskoe-grajdanstvo.html (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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most famous manifestation of this problem is a situation in which political prisoners Oleh
Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko found themselves89. Referring to the fact that they have
acquired Russian nationality, Russian authorities refused to transfer them to Ukraine under
the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (1983). Deputy Minister of Justice of
Ukraine S. Petukhov published the information about it on his Facebook page90. However,
this problem actually concerns hundreds of Ukrainian prisoners who as of today are being
transferred from Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation.
The amended Law “On nationality of the Russian Federation” is in force from 04.06.201491.
According to Art. 6 of the Law nationals of the Russian Federation (except for those
permanently residing outside the Russian Federation), who also have another nationality or a
permanent residence permit in a foreign country, must notify in writing a territorial body of the
Federal Migration Service of these circumstances. Russian nationals permanently residing
outside of Russia shall submit such a notification within thirty days after entering the territory
of Russia. Russian passport is a prerequisite for such an application. No exceptions are made
for Crimean residents who at the time of the occupation had Ukrainian nationality, moreover
these provisions became binding upon them from January 1, 201692. Failure to abide by these
regulations results in criminal liability under Art. 330.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation. Violation of notification terms results in administrative liability.
This itself can be viewed as a violation of the right to respect for private life, as these legal
provisions are a requirement to report a loyalty relationship with other state. In the context
of Crimea such interference cannot have a legitimate purpose. In addition, in this way Russia
actually forces the Crimean residents to get passports of the Russian Federation and declare
their loyalty to Ukraine.
A number of other provisions of the legislation and administrative practice also force the
Crimean residents to obtain Russian passports. As stated in the aforementioned report of
the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea, the absence of a Russian
passport “makes it impossible to exercise almost all the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Constitution. In particular, these include inability to work, ineligibility for social security...” The
cases of social benefits termination in Crimea for Ukrainian nationals who have not received
a Russian passport or a residence permit, as well as problems with employment of such
nationals started to be recorded by the Regional Center for Human Rights after the so-called
“transition period” from January 1, 201593.
Conclusions
With the occupation of Crimea there emerged a situation when almost all residents of
the occupied territory were recognized Russian nationals without the effective links with the
country of their “new nationality”. The emergence of such links was not a prerequisite for
granting the status of nationals, but on the contrary, its consequence.
Formally having the possibility to choose a nationality, but not actually being able to
make an informed choice because of lack of time, information, and other circumstances, the
nationals of Ukraine found themselves at a crossroads facing two equally bad options: to lose
89 O. Sentsov and O. Kolchenko were detained in Simferopol in May 2014 on charges of involvement in the terrorist group,
brought to Moscow and later sentenced under Articles 205 and 205.4 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
to 20 and 10 years of imprisonment respectively. They did not submit the application regarding renunciation of Ukrainian
nationality, as well as did not receive Russian passports. They do not recognize themselves as nationals of the Russian
Federation. However, the Russian Government refuses to transfer them to the authorities of Ukraine in order to serve
their sentence, referring to the fact that they have acquired the status of Russian nationals under the Law no. 6-FKZ.
90 Access mode: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1796566357285662&set=a.1434318470177121.1073741828.
100007969451473&type=3&theater (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
91 Access mode: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_36927 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
92 Access mode: https://web.archive.org/web/20160209125758/http://www.82.fms.gov.ru/press/news/item/51894/ (date
of reference: 01/11/2016 ).
93 Access mode: http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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47
legal personality and become foreigners at home or to refuse their own Ukrainian identity
and swear allegiance to the aggressor state. The given circumstances and in particular the
collective nature of naturalization of persons outside the sovereign territory of Russia indicate
that the will of the nationals did not have a significant impact on results. The absence of
a special status for the inhabitants of the occupied territories and making them equal to
ordinary foreigners complicate or make the residence in Crimea impossible for Crimeans
without obtaining a Russian passport.
The collective extraterritorial nationalization undermines the value of nationality institute in
international law, because it allows to degrade the nationals’ legal connection with the state,
depriving them of all the privileges they had due to that connection (for example, the right to
consular protection). These actions enable to bring the population of a certain territory under
control of authorities of the aggressor state, threaten the world order and are a means of
aggressive expansion of the Russian Federation.
In Crimea, there was created a dangerous precedent for which contemporary international
law appeared unprepared. Mainly addressing the issues of eliminating statelessness,
international law has left the issue of arbitrary imposition of nationality almost entirely neglected.
This issue today requires attention from the international community and development of
new additional principles because it has a significant impact both in the context of foreign
policy relations and public international law as well as in the context of human rights.
The possibility of reviewing the situation in the context of international human rights
standards gives each victim affected by Russia’s actions the opportunity to directly appeal
to international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in order to protect his rights and initiate a
dialogue at international level.
Recommendations to the international community:
• With assistance of the institute of special rapporteurs of the international organizations to
provide a detailed examination of the situation regarding the imposition of Russian nationality
on residents of the occupied territory of the Crimean Peninsula.
• To attract international expert institutions to develop recommendations on resolving the
situation resulting from the imposition of Russian nationality on residents of the occupied
territory of the Crimean Peninsula.
• To attract international expert institutions to develop universal standards for ensuring the
rights of persons subjected to naturalization protecting them against the arbitrary actions of
the state, taking into account such nationals’ will and protecting their rights.
• With assistance of consular services to ensure control over the non-recognition of the
status of Russian nationals obtained by nationals of Ukraine who live in the occupied territory
of the Crimean Peninsula (for example, in terms of impermissibility of issuing visas to such
people as Russian nationals through the relevant consular institutions, in terms of prohibition
for consular institutions of the Russian Federation to provide such nationals with consular
assistance, their extradition to the Russian Federation or at the request of Russia, etc.).
Consequences of human rights violations by the Russian Federation
in the occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol (the question of citizenship)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter - the Covenant) provides
an example of the general principle of equality that underlies international human rights law
(IHRL) in its relation to non-citizens, and the limited nature of the exceptions to this principle.
According to part 1 of Article 2 of the Covenant, each State party:
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«undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status”.
Moreover, Article 26 of the Covenant states that:
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status”.
International Court of Justice, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, as well
as states in practice believe that the provisions of the Covenant apply also in the occupied
territories94.
The UN Human Rights Committee explains that:
«The rights enshrined in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and
irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness. Thus, the general rule is that each
one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens.»
The Human Rights Committee also noted that the right of non-citizens can be accompanied
only by such limitations that may be lawfully imposed under the Covenant. More specifically,
the Covenant permits to the States to draw distinctions between citizens and non-citizens
with respect to two categories of rights: political rights explicitly guaranteed to citizens
(participation in public affairs, right to vote and to be elected and to have access to public
service), and freedom of movement95.
Similar to Part 1 of Article 2 of the Covenant, Part 2 of Article 2 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights declares that States parties guarantee the rights
enunciated in that Covenant «without any discrimination as to race, color... national or social
origin ... or other status»96.
In its turn, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its recommendation
XXX on discrimination against non-citizens indicated that97:
«States have an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens
in the enjoyment of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights to the extent
recognized under international law and as set out in particular in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on civil and political Rights».
As a result of violations of international law by the Russian Federation in the context of the
imposition of Russian citizenship to citizens of Ukraine, those who reside in the occupied
territories of Crimea do not enjoy those rights that had to be guaranteed under international
law. Moreover, in the context of the occupation of the AR Crimea and Sevastopol they are
very often at risk of their own safety and well-being (criminal and administrative liability,
discrimination, especially on ethnic grounds, etc.)
1. A passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation is a prerequisite for the realization of
a significant number of rights to residents of Crimea. Namely, it is more complicated for him
to receive all kinds of social benefits, obtain a driver’s license, register a vehicle, be employed
94 Sassoli, “How Does Law Protect In War”, Volume I, Outline of IHL (3rd Edition), p. 357.
95 See General Comment number 15 (1986) of the Human Rights Committee on the position of aliens under the Covenant.;
With regard to freedom of movement, Article 12 (1) provides “the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence” only to persons who are “lawfully within the territory of a State”, i.e., apparently permitting restrictions against
migrants without proper documents.
96 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/noncitizensen_ru.pdf
97 http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139e084.html
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in certain positions (public institutions), obtain of land plots, free medical care, re-registration
of ownership98. This was openly declared by the official representatives of the authorities of
the Russian Federation.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in its report of 15 April
2014 on the human rights situation in Ukraine noted99:
«Measures such as the introduction of Russian citizenship will complicate the lives of those
who want to preserve their Ukrainian citizenship in Crimea and will raise questions about
the legality of residence, the loss of social and economic rights, including the right to work.»
Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea (“Ombudsperson”), in his
report for 2014 confirmed this fact:
«It is not necessary to explain the legal consequences of the absence of the passport
of the State in which as person resides. This makes for a person impossible to implement
almost all the fundamental rights and freedoms (emphasis is the author’s note), set forth
in the Constitution. In particular, it leads to impossibility to be employed, to receive social
security, which could lead to lower standards of living and an increase in the crime rate.
Therefore, I believe that immediate measures should be taken to address the problems of
citizens related to the possibility of obtaining passports”.100
The Ombudsperson in this report also notes that according to information received in the
Office of the Federal Migration Service for the Republic of Crimea for the period from March
2014 there were issued 1,560,162 passports of Russian citizens. Given that the approximate
population of Crimea is about 2.3 million. That is to say that as of the end of 2014 slightly
less than 1 million people are not passportized in Crimea101. Hence, so many people do not
enjoy a significant number of their rights, either being opposed to the imposition of Russian
passports, or due to objective reasons (mentioned in the first section) being unable to obtain
Russian citizenship.
2. Federal Law of the RF no. 142-FZ «On Amendments to Articles 6 and 30 of the Federal
Law» On Citizenship of the Russian Federation” and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation» was adopted on 04.06.2014. This law establishes the possibility of criminal
liability for concealing the existence of a second citizenship (for Crimeans, this norm of law of
the Russian Federation will take effect from 1 January 2016)102. After that date, all the citizens
of Ukraine who are registered and living in Crimea will have to report if they have Ukrainian
citizenship. Whereby concealing of information on citizenship entails serious liability up to
criminal (art. 330-2 of the Criminal Code)103. If the citizens inform about their dual citizenship
after the schedualed date or indicate incomplete or obviously inaccurate data, they will face
administrative responsibility - a fine of 500 to 1000 rubles. All the internally displaced persons
from Crimea can also get under these rules. On 21 September 2015 on the official website of
the Federal Migration Service of Russia there was published a clarification on the notification
about the other citizenship and renouncing the Ukrainian citizenship by Crimeans104.
Taking into account the above mentioned, it can be assumed that if the situation does not
change in Crimea regarding citizenship the residents of Crimea who have preserved Ukrainian
98 A striking example is the situation with the judges in the territories occupied by the Russian Federation. According to
article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation No 6ZH, before the setting up of federal courts in
the territory of Crimea, the justice on behalf of the Russian Federation is dispensed in these areas by the courts which
were operating at the time of the occupation, and the judges of these courts are receiving the status of persons who
replace judges of these courts. The condition for the admission of these persons to justice was obtaining of Russian
citizenship, the transfer of passport of Ukraine to the Russian authorities, as well as the submitting to the Russian
authorities of a declaration about renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship.
99 http://www.un.org.ua/images/stories/Report_15_April_2014_en.pdf
100 http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf .
101 http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf
102 http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/06/grajdanstvo-dok.html
103 http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ukrf/10_45.html
104 http://www.82.fms.gov.ru/press/news/item/51894/. Аrchive: https://web.archive.org/web/20160209125758/http://
www.82.fms.gov.ru/press/news/item/51894/
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passports, may face further problems connected with informing about «dual» citizenship.
3. In accordance with the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation «On
the distribution among the constituent entities of the Russian Federation of quotas for the
issuance of temporary residence permits in the Russian Federation for 2015 for foreign
citizens and stateless persons» no. 2275-r of 14 November 2014, there was established the
quota for residents of Crimea (the citizens of Ukraine and other states) for the issuance of
permits for temporary residence in the Russian Federation for 2015. The quota for Crimea is
1500 permits, of them 400 permits for the city of Sevastopol105 (in 2014 this quota was 5,000
permits for the AR Crimea and 400 for Sevastopol).
Citizens of Ukraine who do not wish to obtain Russian citizenship, but wish to constantly
continue to live in Crimea, are limited in their ability to get a temporary residence permit in
the territory over which the sovereignty of Ukraine is extended. Thus, those persons who
exceed the allocated quota will not be able to get the documents in order to continue to
reside permanently in Crimea.
Restrictions and other quotas regarding where non-citizens may live in the state, particularly
the restrictions and quotas which may be associated with an element of coercion, can violate
their right to freedom of movement106.
4. In a particularly vulnerable position were orphans and children in the care or custody
of state authorities. According to official data as of 08.01.2014, there were 4228 of such
children in Crimea. Administration of all the institutions of Crimea began to collaborate with
the Russian authorities. Children are effectively deprived of the right to choose citizenship
(obtaining of Russian passports is provided upon reaching the age of 14). On 05.06.2015
the Head of the Department for observance of the rights of the child, non-discrimination and
gender equality of the Secretariat of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine Aksana Filipishina informed about this problem during a press conference on
«Violations of children’s rights in the occupied Crimea»107.
105 http://government.ru/media/files/7CP91bGabOg.pdf
106 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Second report on Denmark (CRI (2001) 4, paras. 18–25).
107 http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/all-news/pr/5615-sm-aksana-filipishina-prava-ditini-v-krimu-pochali-porushuvativid-
samogo/; http://health.unian.net/country/1085947-ukrainskim-detyam-sirotam-v-kryimu-prinuditelno-prisvaivayutrossiyskoe-
grajdanstvo.html

CRIMEA BEYOND RULES
Other issues of the series.
By the time this issue is published, the following issues has already came out or
are ready for publication:
Issue 1. The right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence.
Issue 2. Right to property.
Special issue. Transfer by the Russian Federation of parts of its own civilian
population into the occupied territory of Ukraine.
Issue 3. Right to nationality (citizenship).
Issue 4. Freedom of expression (under preparation).
These and other materials devoted to the observance of the international standards
of human rights by the authorities of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation with
reference to the occupation of the Crimean peninsula could be found on eh website
precedent.crimea.ua
Do you need assistance in applying to the European Court of Human Rights? Fill up
a form on goo.gl/forms/KLqi9LsA5Z
Would you like to share your opinion or offer material for publication in following
issues?
Contact [email protected]
© RCHR
© UHHRU
«CRIMEA BEYOND RULES. Thematic review of the human rights situation under
occupation.» - Vol. 3 - Right to nationality (citizenship) / Edited by S. Zayets,
R. Martynovskyy, D. Svyrydova. – Kyiv, 2017. – 52 p.
The publication is aimed at representatives of international organizations,
diplomatic missions, government bodies and professional legal community, who
need information on the practical application of international human rights standards
under occupation of the Crimea.
Thematic review is published in electronic form and is for free distribution. The
materials are available in three languages - Ukrainian, Russian and English. Use of
Content is permitted with the obligatory reference to the source and authorship. If
the author of the material is not explicitly stated, all rights to the material belong
to the expert-analytical group CHROT. The materials included in the publication, as
well as other materials on the topic can be found on the website precedent.crimea.
ua
Annex 956
Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, and CHROT,
Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic Review of the Human Rights Situation under Occupation
(2017)

Crimea
beyond
rules
Thematic review of the human
rights situation under
occupation
Issue № 4
Information
occupation
UHHRU RCHR CHROT
РЕГІОНАЛЬНИЙ ЦЕНТР ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ
REGIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Regional Centre for Human Rights - NGO, the
nucleus of which consists of professional lawyers
from Crimea and Sevastopol, specializing in the field
of international human rights law.
rchr.org.ua
CHROT - expert-analytical group, whose members
wish to remain anonymous.
Some results of work of this group
are presented at the link below :
precedent.crimea.ua
Ukrainian Helsinki Human
Rights Union
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union - non-profit
and non-political organization. The largest association of
human rights organizations in Ukraine, which unites 29
NGOs, the purpose of which is to protect human rights.
helsinki.org.ua
Crimea
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issue Information occupation 3
Dear readers,
Crimean events at the beginning of 2014 have challenged the post-war system of
international security. They stirred up the whole range of human emotions - from the loss
of directions in life to the euphoria, from joyful hope to fear and frustration. Like 160 years
ago, Crimea attracted the attention of the whole Europe. In this publication we have tried
to turn away from emotions and reconsider the situation rationally through human
values and historical experience. We hope that the publication will be interesting to all,
regardless of their political views and attitudes towards these events.
S. Zayets
R. Martynovskyy
D. Svyrydova
Table of contents
Introduction 4
1. International standards 5
2. International criminal liability for crimes,
related to abuse of freedom of speech
10
3. Review of national legislation and
regulation of occupation regime
Ukraine 13
Russian Federation 17
Crimea 24
4. Crimean cases 26
5. Analytics 41
Crimea
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4 issue Information occupation
Introduction
Occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation has dramatically
changed the «rules of the game» in different areas, particularly in freedom of speech and
of the media. Mass media, that used to work in Crimea, were all of a sudden and without
questions confined within strict limits of Russian legislation, which was furthermore changed
taking into account “acquisition of the territory”. In particular, the requirements for reregistration
of all Crimean mass media, ban on the establishment of mass media by foreign
citizens and many other “innovations” in Russian legislation have driven off a significant
part of those not ready or unwilling to adapt to new conditions or openly disloyal to the
occupation authorities.
The continuous tightening of Russian legislation on counteracting extremism and
separatism, as well as show trials over journalists and activists disagreeing with the
occupation, had a chilling or even “freezing” effect on other individuals, having completed
the process of cleansing the Crimean information landscape.
It is worth mentioning, that according to human rights organizations, the general
situation with freedom of speech in Russia has long ago been unsatisfactory. Yet, the
Crimean Peninsula, declared a part of the Russian territory, was subjected to even more
severe pressure. While in Russia the process of restriction on freedom of speech has been
conducted for years, allowing gradual adapting to the changing situation, in Crimea all
happened abruptly.
Straight after the illegal annexation, the Russian Parliament started to adopt laws and
articles missing in the Criminal Code, basically restraining the possibility of any discussion
on identity of the Crimean Peninsula and legality of its “accession”. The frequency of
amendments to the CC of the RF after 2014 has increased about twice. Many of them has
affected in particular freedom of speech. Since that time, any open support to the position
of the UN and the Council of Europe regarding occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and its
affiliation to Ukraine is severely suppressed through criminal charges.
The issue of the “accession” of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation is of
great political importance. Meanwhile, no one can be restricted in the right to openly
express their views on this issue, including those differing from the «official» position of the
Russian authorities and the occupation authorities of the peninsula. By severe restrictions
of freedom of speech in the Crimean Peninsula and isolation of all dissenters, Russian
authorities are trying to create for the international community an illusion of overall, strong
endorsement and support of its actions by Crimeans. However, if actions of the occupying
country are really supported by the majority of the population of the Crimean Peninsula,
why, then, would it so violently suppress any disagreements with the Russian politics and
any attempts to remind of the Ukrainian status of the peninsula?
At the present stage of social development, the occupation has obtained a new
dimension – informational. The openness of the “ideas market”, which can include both
useful and harmful messages, is at the same time the strength and the weakness of the
democratic organization of society. On the one hand, it develops critical thinking, immunity
and ability to counter different challenges. On the other hand, such openness makes the
society vulnerable for different kinds of manipulations and promotion of “toxic” information.
Lack of ability to discuss different opinions openly and fairly creates an illusion of
power and omnipotence of a totalitarian state. At the same time, the society is unable
to understand the moment, when it appears to be poisoned by the state-sponsored
propaganda. The history knows tragic examples of how painful such poisoning of the
society is, and how difficult the recovery can be. One has only to think about the Nazi
Germany of 1930 - 1940 and Rwanda of 1990.
Today’s Crimea under Russian occupation is likely to have become a new challenge to
the system of international security and a terrific example of gross human rights violations in
modern history.
Introduction
Crimea
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issue Information occupation 5 International standarts
International standards
In addition to universal standards, relating to freedom of expression, some specific
standards are implied in the assessment of the circumstances in the context of occupation.
For example, it relates to struggle against so called “hate speech” (Article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 17 together with Article
10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)1.
The Human Rights Committee emphasized that restrictions of freedom of expression,
admitted in accordance with Article 20 of the Covenant may also be applied in the context
of Article 19, establishing the rules of legitimacy of limitations2. The European Court of
Human Rights has repeatedly emphasized that Article 10 protects not only essence and
contents of information and ideas, but also the means of their transmission. In accordance
with the practice of the Court, the press enjoys the broadest protection which includes also
confidentiality of the journalists’ sources3.
It’s worth remembering the standards of protection of journalists during crisis or conflict.
The practice of the European Court of Human Rights, relating to so-called “chilling effect” is
essential, because the actions of Russian authorities on the occupied territories are largely
aimed at intimidation of dissenters and cultivation of self-censorship4.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 19485
ARTICLE 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights6
ARTICLE 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regard less of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre publique), or of public
health or morals.
ARTICLE 20
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
1 For more details see transcript of the public lecture of A. Yudkivska, Judge at ECtHR.
2 J.R.T. and the W.G. Party v. Canada: https://www.article19.org/pages/en/hate-speech-more.html
3 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Journalistic_sources_ENG.pdf
4 For more details see: Sergiy Zayets “The chilling effect” in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights”,
pp. 71-74 this review.
5 http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/declhr.shtml
6 http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/pactpol.shtml
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6 International standarts
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 19507
ARTICLE 10
Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
1949 (GC IV)8
ARTICLE 70
Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying Power
for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary
interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war. Nationals
of the occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have sought refuge in the
territory of the occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from
the occupied territory, except for offences committed after the outbreak of hostilities, or for
offences under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which, according to
the law of the occupied State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 19779
ARTICLE 79
Measures of protection for journalists
1. Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall
be considered as civilians within the meaning of Article 50, paragraph 1.
2. They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Protocol, provided that
they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians, and without prejudice to the
right of war correspondents accredited to the armed forces to the status provided for in Article
4 A (4) of the Third Convention10.
3. They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex II of this Protocol. This card,
which shall be issued by the government of the State of which the journalist is a national or in
whose territory he resides or in which the news medium employing him is located, shall attest
to his status as a journalist.
7 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_RUS.pdf
8 https://www.icrc.org/rus/resources/documents/misc/geneva-convention-4.htm
9 https://www.icrc.org/rus/assets/files/2013/ap_i_rus.pdf
10 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.
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Declaration11 and Recommendation12 on the protection of journalists in situation of
conflict and tensions of 1996
The Declaration contains the confirmation, that all journalists, working in situation of
conflict and tension, are entitled to overall protection under IHL and International human
rights law. The Declaration condemns the increasing number of murder, disappearances
and other assaults on journalists and considers such actions as attack against freedom of
journalist activity.
In its recommendation the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe offers the
governments of the Member States to follow in their activities and policy the fundamental
principles in the context of protection of journalists in the situation of conflict and tensions.
The named fundamental principles must be applicable to both foreign and local journalists
without any discrimination. The governments are also recommended to distribute the text
of the recommendation, in particular among mass media, journalists, and professional
organizations, state authorities and officials, both military and civilians.
Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe to member states on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of
information13
The recommendation contains the list of principles on the protection of the sources of
information. The principles enshrined in the recommendation should not apply to cases that
comply with the requirements of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on
Human Rights, and if the prevailing public interest requires this, and if the circumstances are
extremely important for society.
Resolution 1438 (2005) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
on the Freedom of the press and the working conditions of journalists in conflict
zones14 and Recommendation 1702 (2005) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe on the Freedom of the press and the working conditions of
journalists in conflict zones Parliamentary Assembly15
These two documents are a timely and necessary response to the current situation,
when on the one hand, journalists frequently face the obstacles and constraints in the
performance of their professional obligations, crucial for exercising the right to information
and, on the other hand, face dangerous conditions which seriously undermine their
personal lives, freedom and security.
Resolution 1738 (2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5613th meeting, on
23 December 200616
The resolution stressed that journalists involved in dangerous missions in armed conflicts
are equated with civilians and should be defended as such. The UN Security Council
stressed that, in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL),
attacks deliberately directed against civilians constitute war crimes, and all parties to the
armed conflict called on the UN Security Council to respect professional independence and
the rights of journalists, media workers (media) and associated personnel as civilians.
11 https://goo.gl/ELG6mQ
12 https://rm.coe.int/16804ff5a1
13 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805e2fd2
14 http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17326&lang=en
15 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805d920c
16 http://www.un.org/ru/sc/documents/resolutions/2006.shtml
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Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on protecting
freedom of expression and information in times of crisis17
This document once again stressed the fact that freedom of expression and freedom
of mass media are crucial for the existence of a democratic society and its further
development. The guidelines enshrined the provisions that should be used by the
member states of the Council of Europe in times of crisis in the context of the protection of
journalists’ rights and freedoms.
These and other documents are available in the Council of Europe18 and OSCE19
collections on the security of journalistic activities and its international legal unification.
***
Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the
Russian Federation20
1. The Committee considered the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation
(CCPR/C/RUS/7) at its 3136th and 3137th meetings (CCPR/C/SR.3136 and 3137), held on
16 and 17 March 2015. At its 3157th meeting (CCPR/C/SR.3157), held on 31 March 2015, it
adopted the following concluding observations.
Freedom of expression
19. The Committee is concerned about a number of developments that separately and
jointly create a substantial chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression of dissenting
political opinions, including:
(a) The re-criminalization of defamation in 2011;
(b) Federal law No. 190-FZ of November 2012 expanding the definition of treason to
include the provision of any financial, material, technical, consultative or other assistance to
a foreign State or an international or foreign organization against State security;
(c) Federal law No. 136-FZ (“blasphemy law”) of June 2013 and the legal proceedings
against members of the Pussy Riot punk band for hooliganism under article 213 of the
Criminal Code;
(d) Federal law No. 398-FZ authorizing prosecutors to issue emergency orders, without
a court decision, to block any website containing, inter alia, calls to participate in “public
events held in violation of the established order” or “extremist” or “terrorist” activities,
and also used in order to block news websites (grani.ru and kasparov.ru) and the blog of
opposition leader Alexei Navalny;
(e) The law criminalizing, inter alia, distortion of the Soviet Union’s role in the Second
World War, signed by the President on 5 May 2014;
(f) The law regulating the activities of blogs, signed by the President on 5 May 2014,
requiring bloggers with more than 3,000 visitors daily to conform to burdensome legal
constraints and responsibilities.
17 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805ae60e
18 https://rm.coe.int/16806b596f
19 https://www.osce.org/fom/85777?download=true
20 Adopted by the Committee at its 113th session (16 March – 2 April 2015); https://goo.gl/Xnb1sG
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The Committee notes that the above laws appear to be incompatible with the Covenant,
as the necessity of the imposed restrictions and the proportionality of the response appear
not to meet the strict requirements of article 19 (3) of the Covenant.
The State party should consider decriminalizing defamation and, in any case, it should
countenance the application of criminal law only in the most serious of cases, bearing in
mind that imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for defamation. It should repeal or
revise the other laws mentioned above with a view to bringing them into conformity with its
obligations under the Covenant, taking into account the Committee’s general comment No.
34 (2011) on freedoms of opinion and expression. In particular, it should clarify the vague,
broad and open-ended definition of key terms in these laws and ensure that they are not
used as tools to curtail freedom of expression beyond the narrow restrictions permitted in
article 19 of the Covenant.
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10 International criminal liability for crimes,
related to abuse of freedom of speech
Nuremberg Tribunal (14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946)
One of the 24 accused at the Nuremberg Tribunal was a German propagandist, a radio
presenter, a high ranking officer of the Joseph Goebbels’ Ministry of Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda of, also a journalist - Hans Fritzsche.
The verdict of the Tribunal reads that “The Nazi government tried to unite people to
get support of its policy through the intensified propaganda. A number of official agencies
were established in Germany, in order to control and influence the press, radio, cinema,
publishing houses, etc., and oversee the entertainment, art and culture. All these official
agencies were subordinated to the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
headed by Goebbels, who, together with the relevant organization of the NSDAP and
the Reich Chamber of Culture, was fully responsible for this
supervision. The defendant Rosenberg played a leading role in
spreading the National Socialist doctrines on behalf of the party,
and the defendant Fritzsche together with Goebbels did the
same on behalf of the state authorities”21.
Notwithstanding the fact, that the Tribunal found Alfred
Rosenberg guilty of all sections of the indictment and sentenced
him to death by hanging, Hans Fritzsche was acquitted. The
judges found him not guilty of the crimes he was charged with
(instigation and inducement to commit war crimes and crimes
against humanity through deliberate falsification of information).
Hans Fritzsche 22
Despite the acquittal at the Nuremberg trial, Fritzsche was soon sentenced to 9 years
in prison by the West German denazification court for inciting anti-Semitism. The judges of
the court noted that throughout his career in the German broadcasting service, Fritzsche’s
speeches corresponded to Nazi ideology. In addition, after 1942, when Fritzsche was in
charge of political leadership of the German broadcasting service and was appointed as
head of the radio department of the Ministry of Propaganda, his influence on the formation
of public opinion increased significantly.
Another journalist who was brought before the Nuremberg
Tribunal was Julius Streicher, former Gauleiter of Franconia
and chief editor of the anti-Semitic and anti-communist
newspaper Der Stürmer. He was convicted of crimes against
humanity, namely, incitement to murder and the destruction
of the Jews. The Tribunal sentenced Streicher to death by
hanging.
Julius Streicher23
21 https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf p. 182 (192)
22 A link to photos: http://www.nndb.com/people/901/000087640/
23 A link to photos: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Julius-Streicher
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In 1949, the U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunal sentenced Otto Dietrich, another Nazi
statesman occupied with propaganda to 7 years in prison in the so-called “Wilhelmstrasse
Case”. The Reich Press Service headed by Dietrich was one of
the Head Departments in the system of the Reich leadership of
the NSDAP, that carried out public relations of the NSDAP and
managed the entire party press, including Nazi non-governmental
organizations.
The Tribunal held Dietrich responsible for committing war
crimes, crimes against humanity, as well as for participating
in the criminal organization, and noted that the purpose of his
propaganda was undoubtedly aimed to set the Germans against
the Jews, justify measures taken against them, and also to subdue
any doubts that could arise regarding the fairness of measures of
racial persecution against the Jews24.
Otto Dietrich25
Rwanda Genocide 1994
The mass media played a crucial role in incitement of the conflict in the 1990s in Rwanda.
The genocide was organized by a small group of individuals who were trying to keep power
over the country in their hands. In addition to the usual system of subordination of the
country’s administration through the army, police, administration and military formations,
they also used radio programs to spread “hate speech”: encouragement for Rwandans
to kill their fellow citizens. “Hate speech” became an integral part of the genocide in
Rwanda26.
“Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television” was a Rwandan radio station that incited
ethnic hatred and genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The staff of this radio station not only
spread the propaganda against the Tutsi (the
second largest group of people in Rwandaauthor’s
note), but also explicitly encouraged
their extermination, up to naming persons to be
murdered withtheir addresses27.
On 3 December 2003, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda passed a
judgment in the well-known “mass media case”.
Two of the three convicts, namely Ferdinand
Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, were
closely associated with “Thousand Hills Free
Ferdinand Nahimana28, co-founder of Radio and Television”.
“Thousand Hills Free Radio and Television”.
According to the Tribunal, despite the fact that the weapons of the accused were not
machetes but words, the defendants were guilty of committing genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity29.
24 ht t p : / / www.worl d c o u r t s .com/imt / e n g /decisi o n s / 1 949.04.1 3_United_St a t e s_v_We i zsaecker.
pdf#search=%22weizsaecker %22
25 A link to photos: http://spartacus-educational.com/Otto_Dietrich.htm
26 https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/13569/19095.pdf
27 http://www.rwandafile.com/rtlm/
28 A link to photos: https://goo.gl/LrWQSb
29 http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-52/trial-judgements/en/031203.pdf
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court30
The ICC is the first permanent international body of criminal justice with the competence
to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
(as of 2017). The Court has jurisdiction over individuals, establishing individual criminal
liability for the above mentioned crimes.
An individual may be charged with a criminal offence even if he is not directly a
perpetrator of the crime. Thus, according to Article 25 (3) of the RS of the ICC, a person
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the
means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such
a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be
intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of
the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by
means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances
independent of the person’s intentions.
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents
the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the
attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal
purpose.
In the case Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana the ICC has already dealt with the
problem of abuse of freedom of speech. Thus, the ICC Prosecutor argued that the accused,
as one of the leaders of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (in the context
of the armed conflict in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo since January
2009), made a significant contribution to the crimes committed by the FDLR. The Office of
the Prosecutor of the ICC charged him with inter alia the development and dissemination of
an international media campaign aimed at concealing the responsibility of FDLR members
for crimes committed by them, as well as blaming other armed groups operating in the
territory of the DRC in the context of armed conflict.
On 16 December 2011, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber noted that the evidence provided by
the Prosecutor’s Office was not sufficient to believe that a suspect could be prosecuted
within the meaning of Article 25 (3) (d) RS of the ICC31.
It is entirely possible, that the facts and analysis of the events related to the occupation
of the Crimean Peninsula, which will be given in this analytical review, may also in the future
become the subject of study by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC.
30 https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
31 https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_22538.PDF
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Since April 2014, in violation of international law, the Russian Federation has extended
its legislation to the territory of occupied Crimea. At first view, it is difficult to grasp the
differences in the regulation of freedom of expression, media activity and the work of
journalists in Ukraine and Russia. In fact, similar declarations in the Constitution, the
Civil Code, similar provisions of relevant laws and other normative acts prescribe equal
conditions for the realization of the right to hold opinions, receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by the State. And only a closer look reveals differences in
the laws of the two states. The impact of these differences is enormous.
Below is an analysis of the provisions of Ukrainian legislation, Russian legislation and
the regulations of the so-called “Republic of Crimea”, which restrict freedom of speech. It is
important to understand that as a result of the occupation, there was a sharp change in the
rules of the game in the field of freedom of speech. Even if the provisions of the legislation
of the Russian Federation themselves do not violate the international standards of freedom
of speech, this change of the rules of the game already constitutes an interference in
this sphere which is difficult to justify. However, in addition, the legislation of the Russian
Federation contains provisions that are incompatible with the standards of freedom of
speech. These factors caused irreparable damage to freedom of speech on the peninsula.
UKRAINE
Constitution of Ukraine
According to Part 3 of Article 15 of the Constitution of Ukraine, censorship is prohibited.
According to Article 34 of the Constitution, everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom
of thought and speech, and to the free expression of views and beliefs. Everyone has the
right to freely collect, store, use and impart information by oral, written, or other means
of his or her choice. The exercise of these rights may be restricted by law in the interests
of national security, territorial integrity or public order, for the purpose of preventing
disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, other persons’ reputation or
rights, preventing the publication of information received confidentially, or maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Civil Code of Ukraine
(1) The Code contains a number of provisions that guarantee everyone respect for his
or her dignity and honour (Article 297), business reputation (Article 299), individuality
(Article 300), and respect for the right to freely collect, store, use and impart information
(Article 302). At the same time, the Civil Code contains provisions that allow the restriction
of these rights. In particular, this is about the right to privacy of correspondence (Article
306), protection of individual’s interests when being photographed, filmed, televised or
videotaped (Article 307), protection of individual’s interests when being portrayed on
photographs and other products of fine art (Article 308).
(2) Article 309 stipulates that censorship and results of creative activities shall be
inadmissible.
Law of Ukraine “On information” No. 2657-XII32
(1) Pursuant to Article 5 of Law No. 2657-XII, everyone has the right to information that
32 http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2657-12
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provides for the possibility to freely obtain, use, impart, store and protect information
necessary to exercise his or her rights, freedoms and legitimate interests. However, the Law
prescribes a list of cases when the right to information may be restricted (Part 2 of Article 6).
(2) The law contains general provisions on the prohibition of censorship and interference
in professional activities of journalists and the media (Article 24), as well as guarantees
for activities of the media and journalists (Article 25), and prescribes the accreditation
procedure for journalists and media employees (Article 26).
(3) It is envisaged that the lack of accreditation can not be considered as a relevant
ground forto non-admission of a journalist, a media employee to public events held by
authorities, agencies or public officers. Authorities, agencies or public officers that accredit
journalists, media professionals are obligated to facilitate their professional activities; notify
them of the venue and time of the sessions, meetings, conferences, briefings and other
public events in advance; provide them with information meant for the media; as well as
facilitate the creation of conditions for recording and transmitting information, conducting
interviews, receiving comments from officials. If an event is held in accordance with
international or other special protocols, special conditions for admission of journalists may
be established.
(4) The law also contains provisions on responsibility for abuse of the right to information
(Article 28). In particular, information shall not be used to incite the overthrow of the
constitutional order, violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine, or propagandise for war,
violence, cruelty, incite racial, ethnic or religious hatred, or encroach on human rights and
freedoms.
The law also prescribes the exemption from responsibility for expressing value
judgments (Article 30).
Law of Ukraine “On television and radio broadcasting”33
The law is aimed at promotion of free speech, the rights of citizens to exhaustive,
reliable and up-to-date information and public and free discussion of social issues. The
State guarantees the right to information, free and public discussion of socially important
problems with the use of television and radio broadcasting (Article 4). Article 5 of the
Law reads that censorship of information activities of broadcasting organizations shall be
prohibited. Article 6 of the Law establishes the general conditions for abuse of freedom of
broadcasting activities.
Law of Ukraine “On print media (press) in Ukraine”34
(1) Article 2 of the Law provides for the right of everyone to freely and independently
search for, receive, record, use and impart any information through the print media.
According to the Law, it is prohibited to establish and finance state bodies, institutions,
organizations or positions to censor mass information.
(2) The right to establish the print media belongs to citizens of Ukraine, citizens of other
states not limited in legal capacity and legal capability by legal entities of Ukraine and other
states, workers’ associations of enterprises, institutions and organizations on the basis
of the relevant decision of the general meeting (conference). A print media outlet can do
publications after its state registration. Articles 11-13 of the Law provide for submission of
state registration applications to the central executive authorities.
33 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3759-12/
34 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2782-12
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State authorities, other state bodies and self-governing authorities can not act as a
founder of print media.
The right to establish television- and radio-broadcasting companies as commercial
entities in Ukraine belongs to legal entities and citizens of Ukraine, not limited in legal
capacity.
(3) In Ukraine it is prohibited to establish and participate in broadcasting organizations
or software service providers on behalf of: public authorities and self-governing authorities,
legal entities that public authorities and self-governing authorities have established at all
levels of the chain of ownership of corporate broadcasting rights, unless the decision to
establish them or their statute authorizes to establish television and radio-broadcasting
companies; legal entities and individuals - entrepreneurs registered in offshore zones,
the list of which is approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, as well as stateless
persons; individuals and legal entities that are residents of a state recognized by the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor or occupying state, as well as legal entities
which participants (shareholders) are legal entities or individuals at all levels of the chain
of ownership of corporate broadcasting rights and the ultimate beneficiaries; political
parties, trade unions, religious organizations and legal entities that they have established
at all levels of the chain of ownership of corporate broadcasting rights or a software service
provider; citizens who, upon the court’s judgment, are serving their sentence in places of
detention or held legally incapable by the court. The participation of foreign individuals and/
or legal entities in the authorized capital of broadcasting organizations is governed by the
Economic Code of Ukraine (Article 12 of the Law).
(4) The right to establish a news agency in Ukraine belongs to citizens and legal entities
of Ukraine. Foreigners and foreign legal entities have the right to co-found news agencies
of Ukraine. All news agencies and representative offices of news agencies, which are
established or operate in Ukraine, are subject to state registration. State registration of
representative offices of foreign news agencies as entities of information activities is carried
out after the accreditation of their correspondents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
State registration of entities of information activities
The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1287 of 17 November
1997 “On the state registration of print media, news agencies and registration
fees”35
According to the Resolution, the state registration of print media as entities of information
activities is carried out by the Ministry of Justice. The Order of the Ministry of Justice of
Ukraine No. 12/5 of 21 February 2006 “On the approval of the Regulation on the state
registration of print media in Ukraine and the Regulation on the state registration of news
agencies as entities of information activities”36 details these organizational issues of
registration.
According to the provisions of Article 38 of the Law of Ukraine “On television and radio
broadcasting”, business entities that obtain a broadcasting license and a software service
provider’s license are subject to state registration as entities of information activities.
Persons who do not have broadcasting licenses can be registered as entities of information
activities of their own free will.
35 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1287-97-%D0%BF
36 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0173-06
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Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine “On print media (press) in Ukraine” provides for the
procedure for ceasing the print editions by decision of a founder (co-founders) or upon a
court decision.
Article 18 of the Law of Ukraine “On news agencies”37 prescribes that activities of news
agencies shall be terminated in the event of their reorganization (merger, consolidation,
split-up, spin-off, reconstruction) or liquidation: on the initiative of a founder (co-founders)
and upon a court decision.
Activities of journalists
Journalist’s status and guarantees of journalistic activities in Ukraine are regulated by a
set of provisions that are prescribed in various laws and regulations.
Law of Ukraine “On state support for the mass media and social protection of
journalists”38
As a component of the legislation of Ukraine on freedom of speech and information
activities, this law strengthens the system of legal regulation in the information sphere. In
accordance with article 4 of the Law, state support for the media is carried out through the
protectionist policy of reducing the consumer value of information products, including tax,
fee, customs, currency and economic regulation, damages, financial assistance. According
to Article 1 of the Law, a journalist is a creative specialist who professionally collects
receives, creates and is engaged in preparation of information for mass media, fulfills
editorial and official service duties in mass media (in-house or out-of-house staff).
Article 25 of the Law of Ukraine “On print media (press) in Ukraine” defines the notion
of a journalist of print media who is a creative professional and is professionally involved
in collecting, receiving, creating and preparing information for print media and acts under
employment or other contractual relationship with its editorial office or is engaged in such
activities under his\her authorization, which shall be confirmed by an editorial identity paper
or other document issued to the journalist by the editorial office of the print media.
Article 25 of the Law of Ukraine “On information” contains a number of guarantees for
activities of the media and journalists. In accordance with para. 7 of the article, the rights
and obligations of a journalist, a media employee, as defined in this Law, apply to foreign
journalists, foreign media employees working in Ukraine.
Some restrictions on freedom of speech regarding the collection and use of information
are prescribed in the Law of Ukraine “On state support for the mass media and social
protection of journalists”. In accordance with Article 15 of the Law, a journalist, working in
places of armed conflicts, terroristic attacks, for liquidation of dangerous criminal groups,
must comply with the requirements for non-disclosure of special forces’ plans ,pre-trial
investigation data, avoiding propaganda of terrorist and other criminal groups’ activities and
statements specially designed for the media, never acting as an arbitrator or intruding into
an incident, never creating artificial psychological tensions in the society.
Article 171 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine prescribes responsibility for deliberate
obstruction of the journalist’s lawful professional activities.
Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine “On state support for mass media and social protection
of journalists” provides for responsibility for infringement on journalist’s life and health,
other actions against him and journalist’s responsibility for moral (non-material) damage
caused to him.
37 http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/74/95-%D0%B2%D1%80
38 http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/540/97-вр
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Constitution of the Russian Federation39
According to Article 29 of the Constitution, everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of
ideas and speech. The propaganda or agitation instigating social, racial, national or religious
hatred and strife shall not be allowed. The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious
or linguistic supremacy shall be banned. No one may be forced to express their views and
convictions or to renounce them. Everyone shall have the right to freely look for, receive,
transmit, produce and distribute information by any legal way. The list of data comprising
state secrets shall be determined by a federal law. The freedom of mass communication
shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be banned.
Civil Code of the Russian Federation40
In accordance with Part 1 of Article 152 of the Code, a citizen shall have the right to claim
before the court to deny the information discrediting his or her honour, dignity or business
reputation, unless the person who has spread such information proves that they are true. If
the information discrediting citizen’s honour, dignity or business reputation is spread by the
mass media, it shall be refuted by the same mass media.
The Federal Law No. 149-FZ of the Russian Federation “On information,
informational technologies and protection of information”41
(1) According to Article 8 of the Federal Law, citizens (individuals) and organizations (legal
entities) shall have the right to search for and receive any information in any form and from
any sources subject to the requirements established by this Federal Law and other federal
laws.
(2) Article 9 of the Federal Law prescribes the restriction of access to information for the
purposes of protecting the basic fundamentals of the constitutional system, morality, health,
rights and legitimate interests of other persons, ensuring the defense and security of the
state.
(3) Article 10.1 of the Federal Law provides for the duties of an organizer of dissemination
of information on the Internet, which is obliged to notify the relevant body of the
commencement of its activities, to store all information about the receipt, transfer, delivery
and (or) processing of voice information, written text, images, sounds or other electronic
messages of users of the Internet and information about these users within six months
from the end of the implementation of such actions, as well as providing this information to
authorized state bodies in cases prescribed by law.
(4) Article 10.2 of the Federal Law enshrines the special status of a blogger, who is the
owner of the site, and (or) pages of the website on the Internet, where public information
is posted, as well as access to which exceeds more than three thousand users within three
days. Such sites or pages of the site are included in the special register. The introduction
of a separate status for bloggers, due to obligations under the legislation of the Russian
Federation on information, is aimed at strengthening censorship on the Internet.
39 http://www.constitution.ru
40 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_5142/
41 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_61798/
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Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1101 of 26 October
201242
The Decree specifies the above-mentioned Federal Law No. 149-FZ, as well as creates
a unified register of domain names, site page indexes and network addresses that allow
identifying sites containing prohibited information. The Federal Service for Supervision in
the Sphere of Communications, Information Technologies and Mass Communications
(hereinafter - Roskomnadzor) is engaged in the creation, formation and maintenance of this
register. The grounds for inclusion in the unified register of domain names and/or indexes
of pages of sites on the Internet, as well as network addresses that allow identifying sites on
the Internet that contain prohibited information, are:
1) decisions of the Federal Drug Control Service, the Federal Service for Supervision of
Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare, the Federal Service for Supervision in
the Sphere of Communications, Roskomnadzor, the Federal Tax Service – concerning the
distribution through the Internet network information within the competence of one of the
specified state bodies of the Russian Federation;
2) effective court decisions on the recognition of information disseminated through the
Internet as prohibited one.
Article 15.3 of the Federal Law No. 149-FZ also prescribes the procedure in accordance
with which the Prosecutor General of the RF or his deputies forward a request to
Roskomnadzor to take measures to restrict access to the information disseminated in
breach of the law.
Law of the Russian Federation “On mass media” No. 2124-143
(1) According to Article 2 of the Law, mass media shall be understood to mean a
periodical printed publication, a radio, television or video program, a newsreel program, and
any other form of periodical dissemination of mass information;
(2) The law established and concretized the fundamentals of freedom of speech in the
territory of the Russian Federation. In accordance with Article 3 of the Law, no provision
shall be made for the censorship of mass information, that is, the request made by the
editor’s office of the mass media to officials, state organs, organizations, institutions or
public associations to agree in advance on messages and materials (except for the cases
when the official is an auditor or interviewee) as well as the ban on dissemination of
messages and materials and parts thereof.
At the same time, Article 4 of the Law contains provisions on the inadmissibility of
abuse of freedom of the media. In particular, the Law prohibits the use of the media for
the purpose of committing criminally indictable deeds, divulging information making up a
state secret or any other law-protective secret, calling for the seizure of power, violently
changing the constitutional system and the state integrity, inciting national, class, social and
religious intolerance or strife, propagating war, and also for the spreading of broadcasts
propagandizing pornography or the cult of violence and cruelty, and materials containing
obscene language.
(3) According to Article 7 of the Law, a founder (co-founder) of the media can be a
citizen, association of citizens, organization, or state body. A founder (co-founder) of the
print media, in accordance with Federal Law No. 131-FZ of 6 October 2003, may be a selfgoverning
authority. The following persons and bodies may not act as founders: a private
42 https://rg.ru/2012/10/29/reestr-dok.html
43 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_1511/
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citizen who has not reached the age of eighteen, or an individual who serves his sentence
in places of detention according to the court’s verdict or an insane person recognized as
legally incapable by a court of law; an association of private citizens, enterprise, institution
and organization which activity is banned by law; a citizen of another State or a stateless
person who is not a permanent resident of the Russian Federation.
Federal Law No. 305-FZ “On amending the law of the Russian Federation “On
mass media”44
(1) On 14 October 2014, the Law of the Russian Federation No. 2124-1 was supplemented
with Article 19.1. “Restrictions related to the establishment of the mass media, the
broadcasting organization (legal entity)”. According to this rule, unless otherwise provided
by an international treaty of the Russian Federation, a foreign state, an international
organization, as well as an organization under their control, a foreign legal entity, a foreign
invested Russian legal entity, a foreign citizen, a stateless person, a Russian citizen holding
foreign citizenship, jointly or individually, are not entitled to act as a founder (participant) of
the mass media, to be an editorial board of media, a broadcasting organization (legal entity).
(2) A prohibition is established for a foreign state, an international organization, as well as
an organization under their control, a foreign legal entity, a Russian legal entity which share
in the authorized capital of the foreign capital is more than 20 percent, a foreign citizen,
a stateless person, a Russian citizen holding foreign citizenship, jointly or individually,
to exercise possession, management or control directly or indirectly (including through
controlled entities or through (shares) in more than 20 percent of the shares of any person)
in respect of more than 20 percent of the shares in the authorized capital of the person
who is a member (shareholder) of the founder of the mass media, the editorial office of the
media, the organization (legal entity).
Thus, the right to be a founder (co-founder) of the mass media in Russia is more limited
than in Ukraine, and therefore citizens of Ukraine can not be founders of mass media on
the territory of the Russian Federation. The application of this rule in the occupied territory
of Crimea has made it impossible for Ukrainian media to function in Crimea or forced their
founders to acquire Russian citizenship.
Article 23 of the RF Law “On mass media” determines the status of the news agency:
the status of the editorial office, publisher, distributor and the legal treatment of mass media
shall also extend to the news agencies in the process of applying the present Law.
Prescribing the status of a news agency, the Media Law does not define this term. The
current federal legislation does not contain an interpretation of the news agency. Until
2005, the definition of this concept could be found in the Federal Law of 1 December
1995 No. 191-FZ “On State Support for Mass Media and Book Publishing of the Russian
Federation”, which implies under the news agency “an organization that collects and
disseminates information”. However, according to Federal Law No. 122-FZ of 22 August
2004, aforementioned regulation was declared invalid from 1 January 2005.
The specific nature of news agencies is that they disseminate information not
periodically, but as information appears. The main consumers of news agencies are the
media. News agencies are established, registered, operated and liquidated according to
the general rules provided for all media.
44 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_169740/3d0cac60971a511280cbba229d9b6329c07731f7/
#dst100017
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State registration of mass media
Law of the Russian Federation “On mass media”
(1) According to Article 8, the media operates after its registration. The website on
the Internet can be registered as a network publication in accordance with the Law. The
website on the Internet, not registered as the media, is not a mass media outlet.
(2) Article 16 of the Law provides for the procedure for termination and suspension of
activities of the media. In addition to general cases, it is envisaged that the mass media
can terminate activities by decision of a court on repeatedly abuse of the freedom of mass
information during the twelve months of violation by the editors of the requirements of
Article 4. The activities of the media can also be suspended in connection with the violation
of the rules established by Article 19.1 “Restrictions related to the establishment of a mass
medium, broadcasting organization (legal entity).
Federal Law “On counteracting extremist activities”45
The activity of the media can be terminated if the mass media carry out extremist
activities resulting in violation of the rights and freedoms of persons or citizens, causing
damage to personality, health of citizens, environment, social order, national security,
property, legal economic interests of physical and (or) legal entities, society and
government, or creating a realistic threat of causing such damage, the activity of the
respective provider of mass information may be discontinued by court ruling on the basis
of the declaration of the authorized government body of executive power in the sphere of
print, television or radio broadcasting and means of mass communication, or the General
Prosecutor of the Russian Federation or a proper subordinate prosecutor (Articles 8, 11).
Federal Law “On the peculiarities of the legal regulation of relations in the field of
the mass media in connection with the admission to the Russian Federation of the
Republic of Crimea and the formation in the Russian Federation of new territorial
entities - the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol”46of
01.12.2014
(1) In accordance with the Law, registration of mass media which products are meant for
distribution in the entities’ territories of the Russian Federation – the Republic of Crimea and
the federal city of Sevastopol, till 1 April 2015 is carried out free of charge.
(2) Distribution of media products, including the implementation of television and radio
broadcasting, in the territories of the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol,
is allowed before 1 April 2015 on the basis of documents issued by state bodies of Ukraine.
Activities of journalists
Law of the Russian Federation “On mass media”
(1) According to Article 2 of the Law, a journalist shall be understood to mean a person
who edits, creates, collects or prepares messages and materials for the editor’s office
of a mass medium and is connected with it with labor and other contractual relations or
engaged in such activity, being authorized by it. The rights and obligations of journalists are
provided in Articles 47, 49 of the aforementioned Law. In general, the status of a journalist
45 https://rg.ru/2002/07/30/extremizm-dok.html
46 https://82.rkn.gov.ru/directions/p15378/reg_smi/
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in Russia can be exercised by a much wider range of people, in comparison with Ukraine.
However, an obligatory condition in this case is the state registration of such media.
(2) Article 51 of this Law provides for the inadmissibility of abusing the rights of
journalists, namely: The journalist’s rights stipulated by this Law shall not be used for the
purpose of the concealment or falsification of publicly important information, the spread
of rumors under the guise of authentic reports, the collection of information in favor of an
outside person or organization, which is not a mass medium.
(3) It shall be forbidden to use the journalist’s right to spread information for the purpose
of discrediting private citizens or particular categories of private citizens exclusively on
account of sex, age, race, nationality, language, religion, profession, place of residences
and work, and also of political convictions.
(4) The status of foreign correspondents in the territory of the Russian Federation is
regulated by the Article 55 of the Law. According to Article 55 of the Law, accreditation
of foreign correspondents in Russia is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation in accordance with Article 48 of the Law. Foreign correspondents, who
are not accredited in the Russian Federation in the established order, enjoy the rights and
bear duties as representatives of a foreign legal entity.
Anti-extremist legislation and media activities
In accordance with Article 13 of the Federal Law of 25 July 2002 No, 114-FZ “On
counteracting extremist activity”47, paragraph 7 of the Regulation on the Ministry of
Justice of the Russian Federation, approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation of 13.10.2004 No. 131348, the Ministry of Justice of Russia is responsible for
maintaining, publishing and placing on the Internet a federal list of extremist materials.
Information materials are recognized the extremist materials by the federal court at
the place where they are found, distributed or regarding the location of organization
that produced such materials, on the basis of the submission of the prosecutor or in the
proceedings in the relevant case of an administrative offense, civil or criminal case.
The federal list of extremist materials is formed on the basis of the copies of decisions
of the courts that have come into legal force on the recognition of information materials as
extremist and have been received by the Ministry of Justice of Russia.
Recognition of organizations as extremist in the Russian Federation is carried out in the
order of adjudication on the basis of a statement by the Prosecutor General of the Russian
Federation or a relevant prosecutor subordinate to him. The mechanism of attracting
individuals and organizations to extremist activities, for today, is one of the most applicable
tools to combat dissent in the territory of the Russian Federation.
In accordance with the current legislation of the Russian Federation, citizens are
responsible for posting extremist content on the Internet. Depending on the circumstances,
those responsible bear administrative or criminal responsibility.
The Code on Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation49 provides for the
responsibility for the production and dissemination of extremist materials (Article 20.29).
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation50 provides for responsibility for public
appeals to carry out terrorist activities or publicly justifying terrorism (Article 205.2), public
calls for the implementation of extremist activities (Article 280), incitement of hatred or
enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity (Article 282).
47 http://base.garant.ru/12127578/
48 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_49892/
49 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_34661/
50 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/
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Criminal responsibility for separatism and rehabilitation of Nazism in the Russian
Federation
Federal Law No. 433-FZ of 28 December 2013 “On amending the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation”, entered into force on 9 May 201451
(1) According to the Law, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was supplemented
with Article 280.1 “Public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation”. According to this provision, criminal responsibility is provided for
public appeals to carry out actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation – aforementioned acts are punished with a fine in the amount of one hundred
thousand to three hundred thousand rubles or in the amount of the wage or other income
of the convicted person for a period of one to two years, or correctional labour for a period
of up to three years, or by arrest for a term of four to six months, or by deprivation of liberty
for a term of up to four years, with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or
occupy certain activities for the same period. Also, responsibility is provided for the same
acts committed with the use of mass media or electronic or information-telecommunication
networks (including the Internet).
(2) It should be noted that this law was adopted following the legislative initiative of
the Head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov in 2013.
According to the explanatory note to the draft law, the rules introduced should have
allowed to prevent possible separatist tendencies and calls for actions to cede parts of
Russia to foreign states, as well as to prevent the dissemination of information justifying
these actions.
Federal Law of 05.05.2014 No. 128-FZ “On amending certain legislative acts of
the Russian Federation” of 5 May 201452
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was supplemented by Article 354.1, which
provides for responsibility for the rehabilitation of Nazism.
According to this provision, the denial of the facts established by the sentence of the
International Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of the main war criminals of
European Axis countries, the approval of the crimes established by this verdict, as well as
the dissemination of knowingly false information about the activities of the USSR during the
Second World War, committed in public- are punished with a fine of up to three hundred
thousand rubles or in the amount of the salary or other income of the convicted person for
a period of up to two years, or by correctional labour for up to three years, or imprisonment
for the same period. It also provides for the responsibility for distributing information about
the days of military glory and the memorable dates of Russia expressing obvious disrespect
to the society related to the defense of the Fatherland, as well as the desecration of the
symbols of Russia’s military glory, committed in public.
Other forms of responsibility and restrictions in the field of media activities
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
(1) Article 128.1. of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for responsibility
for defamation. Previously, this article was decriminalized, but in 2012 the Criminal Code was
51 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_156577/
52 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_162575/
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amended again by the Federal Law of 28.07.2012 No. 141-FZ53. At the same time, defamation
means the dissemination of knowingly false information discrediting the honor and dignity
of another person or undermining his or her reputation. A qualifying characteristic providing
for a more severe punishment is defamation contained in a public statement, a publicly
displayed work or the media. Also, the article was supplemented by a new composition:
defamation that a person suffers from a disease that poses a danger to others, as well as
slander, combined with the accusation of a person committing a crime of a sexual nature.
(2) For the commitment of a criminal offense, stipulated by Article 128.1 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation, provides for a penalty in the form of a fine or correctional
labour. At the same time, the maximum fine is set forth in the amount of 5 million rubles, and
correctional labour can be assigned for a period of up to 480 hours.
(3) In addition, Article 319 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for
responsibility for a public insult to a representative of the government in the performance of
his duties or in connection with their performance.
Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On counteracting terrorism”54 No. 35-FZ
(adopted on 6 March 2006, entered into force on 1 January 2007)
(1) According to the present law, terrorism is the ideology of violence and the practice of
influencing the adoption of a decision by state power bodies, local self-government bodies
or international organizations connected with frightening the population and (or) other
forms of unlawful violent actions. Terrorist activity includes, among other elements, the
popularization of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information urging terrorist
activities, substantiating or justifying the necessity of the exercise of such activity.
(2) In accordance with the Law, the organization is recognized as terrorist and shall be
subject to liquidation (and its activities shall be subject to prohibition) by court decision
on the basis of an application of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation or of
the prosecutor subordinate to him, if on behalf or in the interests of this organization the
crimes provided for by Articles 205-206, 208, 211, 277-280, 282.1, 282.2 and 360 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In the recognition of organizations as terrorist, the
Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation also plays the main role. The court takes an
appropriate decision on the basis of the appeal of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the
Russian Federation.
Federal Law “On non-profit organizations”55 No. 7-FZ
(1) The law specifies the features of the civil-legal status of non-profit organizations. At the
same time, the concept of a “foreign agent” was introduced by the present law.
A non-profit organization exercising the functions of a foreign agent means in this Federal
Law a Russian non-profit organization which receives monetary assets and other property
from foreign states, their state bodies, international and foreign organizations, foreign
persons, stateless persons or from the persons authorized by them and/or from Russian
legal entities receiving monetary assets and other property from the cited sources (except
for public joint-stock companies with the state participation and their branch companies)
(hereinafter referred to as foreign sources) and which participates, in particular in the interests
of foreign sources, in political activities exercised in the territory of the Russian Federation.
(2) In accordance with Part 1 of Article 24 of the Law, the materials issued by a non-profit
organization exercising the functions of a foreign agent and/or distributed by it, in particular
53 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_133284/
54 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_58840/
55 http://base.garant.ru/10105879/
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through mass media and/or with the use of the Internet information-telecommunication
system, must have an indication that these materials are issued and/or distributed by a nonprofit
organization exercising the functions of a foreign agent.
Federal Law “On measures to influence persons involved in violations of
fundamental human rights and freedoms, rights and freedoms of citizens of the
Russian Federation”56 (adopted on 21 December 2012, entered into force on 1
January 2013)
(1) The law regulates the activities of foreign and international non-governmental
organizations. In accordance with the Law, the activities of a foreign or international nongovernmental
organization that threaten the fundamentals of the constitutional system
of the Russian Federation, the country’s defense capability or the state’s security can be
considered undesirable on the territory of the Russian Federation.
(2) Recognition of activities of a foreign or international non-governmental organization
that is undesirable on the territory of the Russian Federation entails a ban on the
establishment (opening), termination of the procedure for the operation of previously
established (open) in the Russian Federation such structural units, as well as the prohibition
on the dissemination of information materials, published and/or disseminated by a
foreign or international non-governmental organization, including through the media and
(or) “Internet”, and the production or storage of such materials in order to spread. It also
prohibits the implementation of programs (projects) in the territory of the Russian Federation
for a foreign or international non-governmental organization which activities are deemed
undesirable on the territory of the Russian Federation.
(3) The decision on recognizing the activities of a foreign or international nongovernmental
organization undesirable on the territory of the Russian Federation is taken
by the RF Prosecutor General or his deputies in agreement with the federal executive
authority that exercises functions to develop and implement state policy and legal
regulation within international relations of the Russian Federation.
(4) In accordance with the Order for the Maintenance of the List of Foreign and
International Non-Governmental Organizations which activities are deemed undesirable
on the territory of the Russian Federation, the inclusion or exclusion of foreign and
international non-governmental organizations from this list57, aforementioned inclusion or
exclusion of organizations is carried out by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation
on the basis of the received information from the General Prosecutor’s Office of the
Russian Federation. Recognition of activities of a foreign or international non-governmental
organization on the territory of the Russian Federation as undesirable can occur only on the
basis of a decision of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation.
CRIMEA
Constitution of the so-called “Republic of Crimea”58
According to the document, everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and
speech. Propaganda or agitation that incites social, racial, national or religious hatred and
enmity is prohibited. Propagation of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic superiority
is prohibited. No one can be forced to express or reject their opinions and beliefs. Everyone
has the right to seek, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information freely in any
56 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_139994/
57 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_185658/
58 https://rg.ru/2014/05/06/krim-konstituciya-reg-dok.html
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lawful way. Freedom of the media is guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited.
Decree of the so-called Head of the Republic of Crimea “On the approval of the
comprehensive plan to counter the ideology of terrorism in the Republic of Crimea
for 2015-2018”59
(1) The comprehensive plan developed measures to prevent the radicalization of various
groups of the population of the Republic of Crimea, especially young people, and prevent
their involvement in extremist and terrorist activities.
(2) According to the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan, the ideology of terrorism
(terrorist ideology) is understood to mean a set of ideas, concepts, beliefs, dogmas, goals,
slogans that justify the need for terrorist activity, as well as other destructive ideas that led
or may lead to such an ideology.
(3) The list of persons, conducting destructive activities, includes “accomplices of
participants in armed conflicts in Syria and Ukraine”; “distributors of terrorist, extremist
ideology and information discrediting the Russian Federation”; “active members and
ideologists of non-traditional religious organizations and sects carrying out their activities in
the Republic of Crimea”.
(4) Among the planned activities, it is proposed to introduce measures to protect the
Internet space of the Republic of Crimea from the penetration of terrorist and extremist
materials, destructive information, instructions for manufacturing explosive devices, calls
for the commission of terrorist acts; work on the identification and blocking of Internet sites
containing terrorist and extremist materials.
Rules for the accreditation of journalists, media employees, news agencies in the
so-called “State Council of the Republic of Crimea”60, approved on 25 November
2014 by the Decree of the so-called “Presidium of the State Council of the
Republic of Crimea” No. 222-1/14
1) The rules have aggravated the procedure for accrediting journalists and have created
a number of restrictions on the coverage of the work of the State Council of Crimea. The
list of documents that must be attached to an application for accreditation is expanded.
The non-compliance of an application for accreditation with the requirements presented
is the basis for refusing accreditation. Accreditation is provided only to media employees
who have state registration, quantitative restrictions on accreditation from the same media
have been introduced. Various forms of accreditation and differences in rights between
journalists of different forms of accreditation have been introduced, as well as the term
accreditation “on accreditation lists” has been introduced. A permissive procedure for
journalists to use audio and video equipment, film and photography is provided. An
application for use of aforementioned equipment must be submitted to the press service
not later than a day before the event.
(2) Sanctions in the form of deprivation for a year of the right to receive annual
accreditation in case of loss, theft, damage, etc. certificates of accreditation have been
introduced. The rules introduced a requirement for journalists to follow the business style of
clothing. Failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules is one of the reasons for the
termination of accreditation.
59 http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_238807.pdf
60 http://www.crimea.gov.ru/app/4201
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With the beginning of occupation of Crimea in February 2014 and before the holding
of the so-called «referendum», many independent journalists of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol were persecuted and forced to leave the peninsula.
According to Tatiana Kurmanova, the editor of the Center for Investigative Journalism
(Crimea), the peak of attacks on journalists in Crimea was in March 2014 (85 cases were
recorded). Since April 2014, access to public information has been limited. And by May
2014, the media unwelcome by new «authorities» had practically ceased their activities on
the peninsula61. A detailed overview of the situation related to harassment of journalists
in Crimea after the beginning of occupation was also conducted by an international nongovernmental
organization “Committee to Protect Journalists”62.
The initial stage of physical ousting of journalists from Crimea was replaced by a period
of systematic intimidation, which concerns also those who found themselves outside the
occupied territory. The searches and prosecutions conducted by the occupation authorities
aimed not only and not so much to punish those who are directly concerned but rather
to force others to be silent. This policy has affected not only professional journalists.
Bloggers, human rights lawyers and activists are also exposed to pressure for expressing
their opinions. Below are some stories that illustrate the situation with the persecution of
journalists and the media on the peninsula.
Ganna ANDRIIEVSKA
Journalist, investigator of the information
agency «Center for Investigative
Journalism» (Crimea)
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
In May 2014, Crimean journalist Ganna Andriievska, fearing
persecution by the occupation authorities, left for Kyiv.
Nevertheless, she continues to cooperate with the Center for
Investigative Journalism.
On 2 February 2015, the investigative department of the
Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in Crimea
launched a criminal proceeding under p. 2 of Article 280.1 of the
Criminal Code. The basis for the institution of this proceeding
was the publication of Ganna Andriievska called “Volunteers
of the battalion “Crimea” on the website of the Center for Investigative Journalism. In this
publication, the occupation authorities saw incitements for actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
The article mainly dealt with volunteers who were helping Crimean people fighting in
the area of the antiterrorist operation and protecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine in
Donbas. The text of the article is available following the link: https://investigator.org.ua/ua/
articles/144257/
On 13 March 2015, officers of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in
Crimea conducted a search in the house of Ganna’s parents in Crimea. During the search a
computer of the journalist’s father was confiscated63.
The FSS of RF ordered employees of the post office to report about any correspondence
addressed to G. Andriievska. The journalist claims that all correspondence sent to her
registration address in Crimea, including the address of her family members, is censored.
According to the data from the website of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring
61 More details in Monitoring Review of the Crimean Field Mission: https://goo.gl/bpTpVh
62 https://cpj.org/ru/2015/07/post-94.php
63 https://lb.ua/news/2015/03/13/298405_fsb_nachala_noviy_vitok_presledovaniya.html
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(Rosfinmonitoring), the journalist is put in the List of Terrorists and Extremists64.
Today Ganna Andriievska continues to work as a journalist in mainland Ukraine.
Zair AKADYROV
Editor-in-chief of the online media
“Arguments of the Week - Crimea”,
freelance journalist since March 2014
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
On 6 March 2014, Crimean journalist Zair Akadyrov
resigned from the post of editor-in-chief of the online
media “Arguments of the Week - Crimea” referring
to the fact that pro-Russian censorship was actually
introduced in the aforementioned online media.
On 18 May 2015, as a freelance journalist he covered the motor rally with Crimean Tatar
flags, publishing materials in his blog.
On 15 January 2016, the journalist was detained by the police in the hall of the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Crimea65. The court held a hearing on a resonant politically
motivated criminal case. Akadyrov was present in a court room as a blogger and freelancer.
The journalist was subjected to physical violence and threats, was taken to the police office,
searched and interrogated, including about his professional activities. The intervention of
the public stopped further plans of the security services. During the interrogation in the
police, the journalist found out that he is on the “FSS lists” as a participant of the “motor
rally” of 18 May 2015 as well as the fact that he was subjected to surveillance.
On 27 January 2016, the journalist was summoned to the Prosecutor’s Office of
Zheleznodorozhny district of Simferopol for a “conversation”.
On 20 April 2016, the house of Zair Akadyrov was searched. After the search, the
journalist was summoned to the FSS of the Russian Federation in Crimea for interrogation.
On 30 May 2016, Russian security services detained Akadyrov during his crossing of the
administrative border between occupied Crimea and mainland Ukraine. The journalist was
released after the “conversation” with the FSS officers.
According to the journalist’s statement, fear and closeness reign in Crimea nowadays.
Many people refuse to meet with journalists from foreign media because they are afraid of
the consequences and pressure from law enforcement bodies66.
Yelizaveta BOGUTSKAYA
Crimean blogger, public activist
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
With the beginning of occupation of Crimea in 2014 she
expressed pro-Ukrainian position on her Facebook page. In
her blogs Yelizaveta repeatedly expressed disagreement with
occupation of Crimea, imposition of citizenship of the Russian
Federation in Crimea, seizure of Ukrainian territories in the
Eastern Ukraine, etc.
On 24 August 2014, she participated in a meeting dedicated to the Independence Day of
Ukraine near the monument to Taras Shevchenko in Simferopol.
64 http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act
65 https://ru.krymr.com/a/news/27489628.html
66 https://ru.krymr.com/a/27528188.html
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On 8 September 2014, the police officers made a search in Bogutskaya’s house. A
computer, a camera, a USB flash drive and other property were seized by the police during
the search. After the search, Bogutskaya was transferred to the Center for Countering
Extremism for interrogation. The interrogation lasted more than 6 hours. The police
explained their actions by the fact that her messages in the social network Facebook incite
interethnic hostility and provoke interethnic conflicts.
Photo source - Facebook https://www.facebook.com/namatullaev/posts/712097372204028
The next day, fearing for her life, Bogutskaya left the territory of the peninsula67.
«I left at night… I decided that writing articles out of prison is better than not writing them
behind the bars» (from interview)68. At the moment, Yelizaveta Bogutskaya lives in mainland
Ukraine.
Lilia BUDZHUROVA
Deputy Director General of the ATR
television channel until March 2015.
Deputy Director General of QaraDeniz
Production
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
In 2014, the occupation authorities announced
a warning to journalist Lilia Budzhurova about the
inadmissibility of carrying out extremist activities.
The reason was the activity of the television
channel ATR, the only Crimean Tatar TV channel on the peninsula, in which the journalist
held the position of deputy director general.
On 2 November 2015, the officers of the Russian FSS carried out a search in the house
of the journalist in Simferopol. Budzhurova was not allowed to have access to a lawyer. All
data storage devices, a laptop, a tablet, mobile phones, USB flash drives, CDs, old video
cassettes, personal archive of the journalist were confiscated69. The actions of the FSS
during the search were appealed by the legal representatives of the journalist.
On 18 November 2015, Kyiv District Court of the city of Simferopol, which is currently
under the control of the Russian authorities, dismissed a complaint of Lilia Budzhurova on
the actions of FSS officers during the search.
On 30 May 2016, the Russian occupation authorities one more time announced a
warning to Lilia Budzhurova about the inadmissibility of violating legislation on countering
extremist activities. This time, the reason was the publication on the page in the social
network Facebook, where the journalist encouraged to help the children of Crimean Tatars
67 http://investigator.org.ua/news/136402/
68 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCtPTR7Dsmw&list=UU2oGvjIJwxn1KeZR3JtE-uQ
69 https://ru.krymr.com/a/27342918.html
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who had been arrested by the occupation authorities.
After the closure of the ATR channel in Crimea in March 2015, the journalist actually lost
the opportunity to engage in professional activities. Today Budzhurova continues to live on
the territory of the occupied peninsula.
Igor BURDYGA
Journalist at hromadske.ua, freelance
journalist at Deutsche Welle (DW). In the
past, a reporter at RBC-Ukraine
Kyiv
On 11 May 2016, Igor Burdyga arrived in occupied Crimea
to attend as a listener a court hearing on the criminal case in
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, as well as to
give coverage to the preparations for the anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars
and more frequent arrests and detentions on the peninsula.
According to him, during the break in the court hearing, Burdyga was detained by two
plain-clothes men. Then Burdyga was taken to the building of the Zheleznodorozhny
district Police Department of the city of Simferopol, where he was interrogated by the
FSS officers. The interrogation concerned his journalistic activities. In particular, the
questions concerned his reporting on the activities of the Right Sector organization in
Kyiv’s EuroMaidan in February 2014. In addition, he was interrogated about the case of
energy towers destruction in November 201570. Moreover, the officers of the FSS illegally
took his fingerprints, saliva samples and foot prints of shoes. The interrogation also
concerned all recent trips and reports by Igor, his acquaintances with Crimean activists,
journalist colleagues who left Crimea after the beginning of occupation. About 8 p.m. on
the same day the journalist was released, after which he was forced to leave the peninsula
hastily. The journalist wrote about the illegal detention and pressure from the occupation
authorities in one of his materials71.
Tatyana GUCHAKOVA
Journalist, former Deputy Editor-in-chief
of the website BlackSeaNews.net
Yalta, AR of Crimea
On 9 April 2015, the officers of the FSS in Crimea conducted
a search in the house of Guchakova. The search lasted 10 hours
and was conducted in connection with the institution of a criminal
proceeding against another journalist of the BlackSeaNews website
- Andrey Klimenko. Computer equipment, a telephone, a fax machine,
documents, business cards were confiscated during the search. After the search, the FSS
officers took the journalist to the interrogation72.
The summons to interrogations were repeated after a while. During the interrogations,
Guchakova was able to listen to the records of the personal telephone conversations that
70 As a result of energy towers destruction in the Kherson region on the night of 20 November 2015, two of the four
backbone transmission lines were disrupted. Aforementioned backbone transmission lines supplied the power to the
territory of Crimea.
71 https://daily.rbc.ua/rus/show/poldnya-fsb-eshche-odna-istoriya-akkreditatsiyu-1463131347.html
72 https://ru.krymr.com/a/26947411.html, https://ru.krymr.com/a/news/26948258.html
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were recorded by the Russian security services. Consequently, they asked questions about
the content of the conversations73.
After the third interrogation in the so-called FSS of Crimea Tatyana Guchakova decided
to leave the occupied peninsula.
Andrey KLIMENKO
Editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Big
Yalta News”, co-founder and editor-inchief
of the website BlackSeaNews.net,
Head of the Supervisory Board of the
“Maidan of Foreign Affairs” Foundation
Yalta, AR of Crimea
Right after the beginning of occupation, the journalist
and editor-in-chief of the website “Blackseanews.net” left
the territory of Crimea and continues to report about events
in Crimea.
On 10 March 2015, the FSS in Crimea launched the
criminal proceeding against Klimenko under Article 2801 of the Criminal Code. According
to the data from the website of Rosfinmonitoring, the journalist is included in the list
of terrorists and extremists under number 3414. Klimenko associates initiation of the
aforementioned criminal prosecution with his professional activities.
According to the journalist, at least 20 journalists were interrogated in connection with
this criminal proceeding, searches were carried out, property was confiscated (for example,
see the case of a journalist Tatyana Guchakova above).
Andrey Klimenko and all the journalists of the website “Blackseanews.net” left Crimea
and continue to work in mainland Ukraine74.
Natalia KOKORINA
Editor of the Information Agency “Center
for Investigative Journalism” (Crimea)
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
On 13 August 2015, the house of Natalia’s parents was
searched by the Russian FSS officers. A lawyer was not
allowed to enter the house during the search. Documents,
three laptops, including laptops of the journalist’s parents,
were confiscated75.
After the search Natalia was taken to the interrogation
to the FSS of the Russian Federation in Crimea. The
interrogation lasted six hours.
The search and interrogation of Kokorina was carried out in connection with the criminal
proceeding launched on the fact of publication “Volunteers of the battalion “Crimea” on the
resource of the Center for Investigative Journalism. Later, criminal charges in connection
with the preparation of this material were filed against a journalist Ganna Andriievska.
Fearing further persecution, Natalia Kokorina left the occupied territory and moved to
73 http://qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/est-li-svoboda-slova-v-krimu/152932/
74 http://glavred.info/politika/andrey-klimenko-krym-obhoditsya-rossiyskoy-ekonomiki-tak-zhe-dorogo-kak-chechnya-iingushetiya-
433407.html
75 https://www.svoboda.org/a/26900078.html
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mainland Ukraine.
Emil KURBEDINOV
Lawyer and human rights activist,
provides legal assistance within many
politically motivated cases in Crimea
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
Emil Kurbedinov provides professional legal
assistance in many criminal cases that are being
conducted by the Russian authorities against
Crimeans. Often it concerns cases that have
features of political persecution. In particular,
he defends a journalist Mykola Semena (see the
case of M. Semena), members of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Ilmi Umerov and
Akhtem Chiygoz, Muslims on charges of involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir and many others
Crimeans. The facts of pressure on him on behalf of the de-facto authorities were fixed, in
particular, by the international human rights organization Amnesty International76.
On 26 January 2017, Kurbedinov was detained by the officers of the Center for
Countering Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the
Republic of Crimea near the house of the Crimean Tatar Seyran Saliev, where he was
heading to participate in the search. Following that, Kurbedinov was taken to Simferopol for
interrogation. Meanwhile, his house was also searched.
In respect of the lawyer a protocol was drawn up on an administrative offense under
Article 20.3 of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation. According to the
protocol, the violation consisted of a public video demonstration, which contained the
symbols of the Muslim organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. This organization is recognized as
extremist in the territory of the Russian Federation.
On the same day, by order of the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Simferopol, which is
currently under the control of the Russian authorities, Kurbedinov was sentenced to 10 days
of administrative arrest.
It is noteworthy that the video, whose public demonstration was regarded by the
occupation authorities as a violation of Russian law, was published by him in one of the
social networks on 5 June 2013, long before the beginning of occupation of Crimea.
Subsequently, in May 2017, the lawyer got an award of an international organization
Front Line Defenders for human rights defenders at risk, due to the pressure exerted on
him by the Russian authorities77.
Base on that, an application was submitted to the European Court of Human Rights in
relation to the violation by the Russian authorities of the right to disseminate information
without interference of the public authorities (Article 10 of the ECHR).
76 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=eur50%2f5595%2f2017&language=en
77 https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/2017-front-line-defenders-award-human-rights-defenders-risk
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Sergey MOKRUSHIN
Correspondent of the Information Agency
“Center for Investigative Journalism”
(Crimea), journalist at “Gromadske.Krym”,
TV host of the project Radio Svoboda
“Krym. Realii”
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
Being a correspondent of the Information Agency “Center
for Investigative Journalism” Sergey Mokrushin was engaged
in investigative journalism, including illegal actions of
representatives of the authorities of Crimea.
On 2 June 2014, Mokrushin, along with the film director
Vladlen Melnikov, were illegally detained and severely beaten by representatives of the
so-called “Crimean self-defense” in Simferopol. According to “self-defenders”, journalists
allegedly insulted the honor and dignity of the highest officials of the Russian Federation78.
On 13 August 2015, Sergey Mokrushin, along with his colleagues, came to the FSS office
in Crimea to support journalist Natalia Kokorina (see N. Kokorina’s case above). During
this action, the police copied the passport data from all its participants. The police officers
justified aforementioned actions by the order of their supervisors.
Also, the journalist conducted his own investigation on the circumstances related to the
institution of the criminal proceeding against Maidan activist Alexander Kostenko by the
authorities of Crimea. Kostenko was accused of inflicting bodily harm to a staff member of
the Berkut on Maidan in Kyiv. Alexander Kostenko was subsequently illegally sentenced
by the occupation authorities, and Ukrainian human rights organizations recognize him
as a political prisoner. According to Sergey Mokrushin, by his investigation he interfered
with the plans of the officers of the FSS of the Crimea to falsify the case against activist A.
Kostenko79.
According to the journalist, immediately after the annexation of Crimea, journalists
having the pro-Ukrainian position worked almost like guerrillas (they did not discuss
important matters over the phone, did not act under their own names), it practically became
impossible to work. Fearing persecution, the journalist decided to leave Crimea, and now
continues his professional activities in mainland Ukraine.
Valentyna SAMAR and the NGO “Information Press Center”
Editor-in-chief of the Information Agency
“Center for Investigative Journalism”
(Crimea)
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
Valentyna Samar is a Crimean journalist, editor-in-chief
of the Center for Investigative Journalism, the author of
many journalistic investigations, including illegal actions of
the Crimean authorities.
At the beginning of March 2014, 20 people in
camouflage uniforms without identification signs seized the House of the Federation of
78 https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news/128751/
79 http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2015/03/27/7062767/view_print/
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Independent Trade Unions of Crimea,
where the Public organization “Information
Press Center” leased premises for the
media center, editorial office and studio
for the production of TV programs by the
Center for Investigative Journalism. Video
which captures the seizure of the building
was posted on the YouTube channel80.
Journalists of the Center for Investigative
Journalism, who were preparing to go live
on the Chernomorskaya TV and Radio
Company, were blocked for three hours in
the premises of the editorial office and the television studio. The cameraman of the ATR
television channel M. Murtazaev, who was streaming the seizure of the House of Trade
Unions, was beaten by unknown persons. Later, in the seized media center, activists of
the Eurasian Youth Union (was banned by a court decision at the time of the occupation of
Crimea) held their press conference.
After these events, the editorial staff of the Center was forced to look for a new premises
and temporarily settled in the building of the Chernomorskaya TV and Radio Company.
In June 2014, the film director Vladlen Melnikov and the journalist of the Center Sergey
Mokrushin were illegally detained by representatives of the so-called “Crimean selfdefense”
(see the case of S. Mokrushin above).
On 1 August 2014, bailiffs of the Russian Federation and representatives of the Federal
Security Service of Crimea, using force, broke into premises of the Chernomorskaya TV
and Radio Company, where the editorial office of the Center had to move. Representatives
of the occupation authorities confiscated and arrested all television and office property
not only of the Chernomorskaya TRC, but also of the Information Press Center, although
the court decision was only extended to the property of the Chernomorskaya TRC. The
representatives of the occupation authorities asked journalists and employees of the
company to leave the building. The information press center lost equipment and premises,
a significant amount of information was destroyed (photos and video materials), in fact, the
work and broadcasting of TV programs were stopped. It made impossible for journalists to
continue their professional activities. Despite the fact that in December 2014 the property
was returned, most of the equipment was not subject to recovery and repair.
In September 2014, the editorial mail of the “Center for Investigative Journalism” was
hacked, the web-site of the editorial office was subjected to powerful DDos attacks, the
website’s functioning was temporarily stopped.
Valentyna Samar and other employees of the Center were summoned for “preventive
talks” to the prosecutor’s office of Crimea and the FSS in Simferopol, which is currently
under the control of the Russian authorities. In connection with the real threat of further
persecution by the occupation authorities and the inability to work in Crimea, a decision
was made to evacuate the agency. Valentyna Samar and other employees of the Center
were forced to leave the peninsula. In October 2015, Roskomnadzor of the Russian
Federation blocked access to the “Center for Investigative Journalism”81.
At the moment, Samar and other journalists of the NGO “Information Press Center”
continue to work with the Crimean topic in mainland Ukraine.
80 www.youtube.com/watch?v=zG2b5fd6AWU
81 https://ru.krymr.com/a/27288620.html
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Irina SEDOVA
Editor of “Breeze” TRC in Kerch, one of
the creators of the website kerch.fm,
journalist at “Gromadske radio”, at the
moment she is a journalist of the Crimean
human rights group
Kerch, AR of Crimea
At the time when occupation of Crimea began, Irina
Sedova worked as the editor of the “Breeze” TRC in Kerch,
was one of the creators of the website kerch.fm. The edition
covered acute social and political issues, and journalists were
conducting investigations, including against the authorities
of the city. During the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014
the journalist published materials about the events in Kyiv,
prepared articles in which she discredited the pro-Russian
propaganda about the events on Maidan.
On 22 February 2014, during a meeting in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine in
Kerch, pro-Russian activists attacked the journalist82. A week later, at a similar meeting, she
was attacked again.
After the beginning of the occupation of Crimea, the journalist and her family began
to receive threats. Representatives of the so-called “Crimean self-defense” physically
interfered in the implementation of journalistic activities (they did not allow to take
pictures, footages). Law enforcement bodies of Crimea did not react to these incidents of
harassment and did not conduct effective investigations of attacks on the journalist and her
colleagues.
In summer 2015, the journalists of the project “Krym. Realii” had at their disposal
documents with information on at least 50 individuals, being prosecuted by the Crimean
prosecutor’s office controlled by the Russian Federation in connection with the organization
and participation in the EuroMaidan on the peninsula83. The name of the journalist Irina
Sedova also appeared on the above lists. Occupation authorities didn’t give either official
refutation or confirmation of published documents.
Fearing for her life, Irina Sedova and her family left the occupied Crimea in March 2014.
At the moment she continues to be engaged in journalistic activities in mainland Ukraine.
Mykola SEMENA
Journalist of the Radio Svoboda “Krym.
Realii” project
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
Crimean journalist Mykola Semena started his
cooperation with Radio Svoboda in 2014. After
a while, the journalist began to notice signs of
surveillance, and later a spy program was detected
on his computer.
On 19 April 2016, FSS officers searched the
journalist’s house, and after several hours of
82 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_h_bRyNxYCM
83 https://ru.krymr.com/a/27052049.html
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interrogation at the FSS office in the Republic of Crimea the journalist was released on a
written undertaking not to leave a place of residence84. During the search, computer
equipment, data storage media, as well as other documents were confiscated in the
journalist’s house. On the same day, several Crimean journalists were questioned and
searched in Simferopol, Sevastopol and Yalta, suspected of collaborating with Radio
Svoboda. Later, the prosecutor’s office of Crimea, which is currently under the control of the
Russian authorities, reported that the searches were conducted within the investigation of
the case of separatism, in which the journalist Mykola Semena was accused.
In December 2016, the final charge under part 2 of Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code for
calls for violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation using the Internet was
brought against the journalist85. The maximum term of punishment provided by this article
is 5 years of imprisonment. Accusations against the journalist were brought in connection
with the preparation of the publication “The blockade is the first necessary step towards the
liberation of Crimea”86.
Being under a written undertaking not to leave a place of residence, Semena can
not leave the territory of the peninsula for a long time and can not actually be engaged
in professional activities. According to the website of the Federal Service for Financial
Monitoring of the Russian Federation, the journalist is included in the List of Terrorists and
Extremists. Based on this, the Central Bank of Russia blocked his bank accounts87.
Several dozens of human rights organizations spoke in defense of the journalist. The
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic, called for the removal of
all charges against him. At the Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership in Brussels,
Semena was awarded the Paul Sheremet Prize (the journalist was not allowed to go to
Brussels to receive the prize).
On 22 September 2017, the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of the city of Simferopol,
which is currently under the control of the Russian authorities, found Semena guilty of
separatism, i.e. calls for violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
The court sentenced him to 2 years and 6 months’ of suspended imprisonment and also
prohibited him from engaging in any public activity for a period of 3 years. Violation of
this prohibition threatens the journalist by sending him to custodial settings for a period
determined by the court.
Anastasia RINGIS
Journalist of the online media «Ukrayinska
Pravda»
Kyiv
Anastasia Ringis is a Ukrainian journalist. She has been
working at the online media “Ukrayinska Pravda” since 2014.
She grew up in the town Gurzuf in Crimea where her parents
live.
On 25 February 2016, while she was entering occupied
territory of Crimea through the “Chongar” check point, the FSS officers in Crimea handed
over to the journalist a notice banning her entry to Crimea for four years, namely, until 1
September 2020.
The notice states that the entry into the territory of the Russian Federation is prohibited
for Ringis on the basis of subpar. 1 part 1 Article 27 of the Federal Law of 15 August 1996
84 https://ru.krymr.com/a/28368407.html
85 https://memohrc.org/special-projects/semena-nikolay-mihaylovich
86 https://ru.krymr.com/a/27240750.html
87 https://investigator.org.ua/rss_yandex/183216/
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No. 114-FZ “On the procedure for leaving the Russian Federation and entry into the Russian
Federation”88. According to the document, the prohibition of entry is necessary in order to
ensure the defense capability or security of the state, or public order, or protection of public
health.
According to the journalist, this ban is related to her professional activities. “It could
happen because I’m a Ukrainian journalist. Just in order to stop talking in the Ukrainian
press about the situation in Crimea. I have a feeling that they just “close” Crimea. The
people of Crimea are now like on a submarine, they have access only to Russian media,”
the journalist told to one of the media89.
Tatyana RIKHTUN
The Media Center “IPC Sevastopol”, the
website of investigative journalism “Civil
Defense” (911sevastopol.org)
The city of Sevastopol
On 3 March 2014, Rikhtun was attacked by
unknown persons during the filming of the siege of the
headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol.
On 9 March 2014, she was present as a journalist
at a meeting at the monument to Taras Shevchenko
in Sevastopol. This meeting was stopped because of
clashes between its participants and pro-Russian activists. Later on that day, unknown
people were watching her near her own house and showered her with eggs.
On 13 March 2014, the representatives of the so-called “Crimean self-defense” in
camouflage burst to the room that was rented by the media center “IPC Sevastopol”.
Together with the Sevastopol police they blocked journalists in a small room, held them
there for several hours, during which they conducted an illegal examination of personal
belongings and copying of documents. The video of this incident is available on YouTube
channel90.
Fearing for her life and health, Tatyana Rikhtun was forced to leave the occupied territory
of Crimea and at the moment she continues to work in mainland Ukraine. Law enforcement
bodies have not carried out an effective investigation of the facts of repeated attacks on
Rikhtun and interference in her journalistic activities.
Gayana and Ismet YÜKSEL
Director of the Information
Agency, member of the
Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar people
Coordinator of the
Information Agency,
advisor to the head of
the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar people
88 http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/02/25/7100290/
89 https://ru.krymr.com/a/27583611.html
90 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ts_kgt-PeKw
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Since the beginning of the Russian occupation of the peninsula in February 2014,
almost all employees of the Information Agency “QHA Crimean News Agency” have been
subjected to persecution and pressure for their pro-Ukrainian position by the special
services of the Russian Federation.
On 9 August 2014, representatives of the occupation authorities banned Ismet Yuksel
from entering Crimea for 5 years with reference to Part 1 of Article 27 of the Federal Law FZ-
114. Yet, Ismet Yuksel has never received the text of the decision itself, which could justify
the entry ban.
On 21 April 2015, the head of the QHA Information Agency, Gayane Yüksel, was
summoned to the Center for Countering Extremism, created in Crimea after the occupation.
The reason for the summoning was the publication of information on the agency’s website
about the organization, which in November 2014 was recognized extremist in the territory
of the Russian Federation. As a result, Gayana Yuksel was brought to administrative
responsibility for the publication of 2006-2009.
As a result of systematic persecution, the agency could not continue to work as a
mass media in the territory of Crimea and was forced to leave the peninsula. Currently, it
continues its activities in Kyiv.
Information Agency “QHA Crimean News Agency” was established in Crimea and
registered in accordance with Ukrainian legislation in 2005. The agency aims to provide
objective and complete information about Crimea and Crimean Tatars. QHA materials are
provided in Russian, Ukrainian, English and Turkish. The agency’s information activities
promoted Crimea as a peculiar region of Ukraine, which had its political, economic and
ethnic specifics.
Alexander YANKOVSKY
Journalist, TV host and producer of
Chernomorskaya TRC, the head of the
Radio Svoboda “Krym. Realii” television
project
Simferopol, AR of Crimea
Alexander Yankovsky, a journalist and a TV host of
the largest television and radio company of Crimea,
Chernomorskaya TRC, in early March 2014 joined the
national media campaign “Edyna kraina. Edinaya strana”.
The purpose of the campaign was to demonstrate the unity of Ukraine and prevent the
destabilization of the situation in the country. Yankovsky became the author and host of
the eponymous telethon, held at the Chernomorskaya TRC jointly with the “Center for
Investigative Journalism” (Crimea).
After the telethon was released in early March 2014, the “Center for Investigative
Journalism” in Simferopol was attacked. A few days later, Alexander Yankovsky received
calls from unknown persons who threatened him with reprisal.
Fearing for his life and health, Alexander decided to move with his family to Kyiv, where
he continues journalistic activities and works with the Crimean topic.
“I understand clearly one thing. Now it is impossible to work in Crimea as a journalist.
Large Ukrainian international TV channels are simply turning off their correspondent posts.
It’s scary to stay in Crimea for people of our profession ...”, the journalist told to one of the
Ukrainian media after he left the peninsula in March 201491.
91 httpfakty.ua/179097-aleksandr-yankovskij-posle-togo-kak-proizoshlo-napadenie-na-centr-zhurnalistskih-rassledovanijv-
simferopole-neizvestnyj-pozvonil-mne-i-skazal-gotovsya-ty-budesh-sleduyucshim
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Chernomorskaya TV and Radio Company
Founded in 1993, “Chernomorskaya”
TRC was one of the largest television
companies of the Crimean Peninsula.
The television company created over 140
television projects and TV cycles.
Chernomorskaya TRC broadcasts via satellite and
cable networks in other regions of Ukraine since 2011. The
broadcaster actively covered the events on Maidan from
positions that differed from the coverage of the Ukrainian
Revolution of Dignity in the Russian media. From the
very beginning of the occupation, the TV company was
persecuted by the occupation authorities.
For instance, on 11 April 2014, during the attack on the
staff of the television channel, a flash card with video
material was destroyed by representatives of the “Crimean self-defense”. On 29 June 2014,
Chernomorskaya TRC was disconnected from broadcasting in cable networks92.
On 1 August 2014, all property of the Chernomorskaya TRC, located in its building in
Simferopol, was arrested and confiscated by the occupation authorities of Crimea. For some
time on the territory of the company there were located the representatives of the “Crimean
self-defense”, who did not let journalists of the agency “Center for Investigative Journalism”
to enter the premises (See the case of V. Samar). Subsequently, the broadcasting of the TV
channel was suspended. With the help of 14 transmitters belonging to the Chernomorskaya
TRC, the occupation authorities started to illegally provide broadcasting of the Rossiya-24
television channel93.
Chernomorskaya TRC was forced to move to Kyiv. One of the company’s tasks today is
to inform citizens of Ukraine about the events in occupied Crimea.
ATR TV Channel
ATR channel was founded in 2005. It
was the first Crimean Tatar TV channel
to broadcast in Crimea, Turkey and
European countries.
ATR is one of the largest television channels in Crimea.
Starting from the beginning of the occupation the channel
was persecuted by the occupation authorities.
On 11 August 2014, the ATR journalist Sh. Nemattulaev
has lost his accreditation in the so-called Crimean State
Council. On 24 September, the general director of the
ATR channel E. Islyamova received a letter from the
Center for Combating Extremism with a request to provide
certain documents. The aforementioned document contained a reference to a letter of the
Roskomnadzor Office, established on the territory of Crimea, where it was stated that the
ATR channel had changed the direction of information content and “stubbornly lays down
the idea of possible repressions on the national and religious grounds, contributes to the
formation of anti-Russian opinion, deliberately foments Crimean Tatars distrust of power
92 https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PeninsulaFear_Book.pdf
93 http://blacksea.tv/we/
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and its actions, which indirectly carries the threat of extremist activity”94.
On 26 January 2015, representatives of the Investigative Committee of the Russian
Federation and the Center for Countering Extremism, accompanied by OMON officers
armed with automatic weapons, searched the editorial office of the ATR channel and
confiscated the server, as a result of which the broadcasting process was disrupted.
In February 2015, Roskomnadzor provided broadcast frequencies, used by the ATR
channel, to another TV and radio company. The executives of ATR repeatedly appealed
to the occupation authorities to preserve the right to broadcast, but has not received
permission to continue broadcasting in Crimea95.
On the night of 1 April 2015, the ATR channel stopped its broadcasting. In May 2015, the
television channel tried to resume work on the Internet, but journalists were prevented from
working, systematically denied admission to events, interviews, and filming. In November
2015, searches were conducted in the homes of ex-general director of the ATR E. Islyamova
and ex-deputy director L. Budzhurova. In December 2015, a search was conducted in the
house of R. Spiridonov, the ex-editor of the news agency “15 Minutes”, which was part of
the ATR holding.
In June 2015, due to systematic persecution the TV channel moved to mainland
Ukraine where it continues to work, including constantly covering events in Crimea and for
Crimeans via satellite television.
In 2015, a copy of the order signed by the director of the health department of
Sevastopol leaked to the Internet, by which the territory of medical institutions was in fact
closed for the media.
94 https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PeninsulaFear_Book.pdf
95 http://news.allcrimea.net/allspets/atr/
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According to the ruling of the Kiev district court of the city of Simferopol, which is
currently under the control of the Russian authorities, of 27 February 2015, Ganna
Andriievska might have been involved in the dissemination of the article «Volunteers of
the battalion «Crimea». In the opinion of the investigative body supported by the court,
the content of this article incites for the implementation of actions aimed at violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
The court allowed a search in the premises where the journalist was registered with the
purpose of finding objects and documents relevant to the criminal case.
At the time this ruling was adopted, Ganna Andriievska had already lived in Kyiv for
about a year. Her parents continued to reside at the address indicated.
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issue Information occupation 41 INFORMATION OCCUPATION – A NEW CONCEPT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Professor Katrin Nyman Metcalf96
Introduction
This article discusses the concept “information occupation”, assumed to mean actions
to limit or distort media and access to information, undertaken by a hostile power that
exercises de facto or de jure occupation over the information sphere of another state. The
discussion is linked to the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation as well as the
situation in Eastern Ukraine although the article treats the topic in a general manner. The
term “information occupation” does not have a recognised meaning in legal instruments or
among legal authors, but has been used, e.g. in Ukraine in discussions around the draft
Information Security Concept first presented in 2015 and finally approved in February 201797
(although not in the concept itself).
The article discusses what the notion “information occupation” could contain, if
interpreting it in light of rules on occupation in international law together with provisions on
freedom of information. The aim of the analysis is to determine whether the concept would
be useful. Would the term help to identify aggressive action in order to better counter it or
would it in any other manner add clarity to the new way in which conflicts can be carried
out, given the importance of the information space for modern society?
To clarify whether such a notion can add anything to the debate about media in crisis,
in a situation like the one in Crimea, the article examines what occupation means in
international law and whether rules and cases on this could be used also for the information
sphere. As occupation is a violation of sovereignty, we look at the concept “information
sovereignty” and what that can mean. Propaganda is a means to interfere in other
countries. A short section highlights the situation in Ukraine. Finally, the author makes some
concluding remarks which are her personal reflections, based on work with freedom of
expression in complicated situations over many years in a multitude of countries.
Occupation under International Law
The term “occupation” has a legally defined meaning in international law since more
than 100 years98, but nevertheless it is often utilised differently than in accordance with the
defined meaning. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations says “Territory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation
extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be
exercised”. The common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies to any
territory occupied during international hostilities, also in situations where there was no
armed resistance99. It is relevant to recall that humanitarian law – the law of war, jus in
bello – does not deal with the legality of a state taking territory from another but with what
applies when a situation of occupation has arisen. Legality of taking territory is regulated
96 Katrin Nyman Metcalf ([email protected]), Professor of Law in the School of Business and Governance, Tallinn
University of Technology and active as an international consultant primarily on communications law. She has written on
related topics in The Uppsala Yearbook of Eurasian Studies (2017) and in The Situation in Ukraine since 2014: jus ad
bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum (Asser, 2017), both forthcoming.
97 http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-zatverdiv-doktrinu-informacijnoyi-bezpeki-ukr-40190
98 The 1907 Hague Regulations (arts 42-56), the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV, art. 27-34 and 47-78) and provisions
of Additional Protocol I and customary international humanitarian law include duties of occupying powers. Hague
Regulations: https://treatydatabase.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/003319. Geneva Conventions: https://www.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp. Occupation was the legal term for getting sovereignty over territory that did not
belong to any state, terra (or res) nullius. Such areas do not exist anymore so this is of historical interest. Rebecca M. M.
Wallace (1986) International Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1986), pp. 81-85.
99 For an overview of humanitarian law provisions on occupation: The International Committee of the Red Cross; https://
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm
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by the UN Charter and customary law, and in this context is sometimes referred to as jus
ad bellum, the law about the right to use force (conduct war). Normally, taking territory of
another state is illegal, unless it is based on an agreement between states. Use of force is
illegal under international law apart from very special circumstances (mainly self-defence)
but this issue will not be discussed in this article as it is a very large topic in itself.
If we stick to the question of occupation and what this term means, to see if we can use
it also for information space, the fist remark is that it is difficult to determine exactly when
occupation has arisen – when has control been established? In common speech, people
tend to talk about occupation for any situation of foreign-imposed control regardless of how
this came about and regardless of whether it is a temporary or a long-term situation. Often
the same action is called different things by different people: just like one man´s terrorist is
another man´s freedom fighter, one person´s invasion is someone else´s liberation. From the
legal viewpoint, the level of approval of the occupation does not matter for the application
of humanitarian law. If territory comes under the effective control of hostile foreign armed
forces, even if there was no armed resistance, an occupation has come into being and
relevant humanitarian law provisions apply. The most complex question in this context
is often what amounts to “control”, for example while an invasion is ongoing. The ICRC’s
1958 Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV)100 suggests that humanitarian
law should apply while other commentators believe that it is only meaningful to talk about
occupation when the relevant party can actually exercise sufficient authority over enemy
territory to carry out the duties imposed on an occupier by humanitarian law101.
It is almost a norm in practice that occupying states refer to the support of the local
population – they come to “liberate” them. Ukraine shows examples of this. From a legal
viewpoint, regarding the existing rules on occupation, it is worth to recall that agreements
between the occupying power and the local authorities cannot deprive the population of
occupied territory of the protection of international humanitarian law (GC IV, Article 47)
and protected persons themselves can in no circumstances renounce their rights (GC IV,
Article 8). The occupying power is under the obligation to respect the laws in force in the
occupied territory with some exceptions (if laws constitute a threat to its security or an
obstacle to the application of the international law of occupation). It is the responsibility
of the occupying power to ensure public order and safety as well as the well-being of the
population in the occupied territory. There are several provisions restricting the occupying
power from exercising violence, reprisals or other negative acts.
For the legal conditions of occupation one ingredient is that the occupant does not
acquire sovereignty over the territory but occupation is a temporary situation102. Territorial
changes at the end of a war have to be done through some form of agreement or process,
to gain legal status. Permanent taking of territory is also called annexation. Such territorial
changes are almost always extremely controversial and often masked as popular initiatives,
righting of historical wrongs and so on (which sometimes they may be). International law
does not easily recognise changes of territory. The so-called annexation of Crimea in 2014
demonstrates how the power annexing a country finds any excuses that suits it to justify the
action, rather than explain it in legal terms.
If we consider occupation of the information and communication space, we should think
about what such an action could look like in this different context. Media and information
are not explicitly mentioned in the list of duties and obligations of occupying powers and
has no special protection like cultural property. Some other humanitarian law provisions
may affect media matters, like the requirement to protect prisoners of war against insults
100 Oscar Uhler & Henri Coursier (1958) Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Volume IV; https://
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0206.htm
101 https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm
102 Which has not prevented a number of drawn-out occupations, the Israeli occupation of Palestine is the longest but there
is also Namibia, East Timor and several others.
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and public curiosity (Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, repeated in GC
IV Article 27 for the protection of civilians, particularly those who are in the hands of the
opposing side or of an occupying power). Thus, a requirement of respect can be deduced
- the obligation not to abuse the possibilities that control gives.
Russian actions in Ukraine show how states do not act in accordance with norms of
international law or explain their behaviour in these terms. Russian actions have been
condemned by the European Union (EU) and many countries. The clearest example was
the annexation of Crimea that led to international sanctions. As for the situation in Eastern
Ukraine, Russia has had somewhat more success in claiming that it is not involved or at
least that there is no evidence that it is (officially) involved. Most independent observers
would claim that there is plenty of evidence of Russian involvement, but in international
politics states sometimes seize upon any ambiguities that will allow them to avoid having
to take a clear stance. This would fit with the EU policy toward Russia, which has moved
away from the value-driven one to a policy dictated by realism, as Jonsson wrote already in
2011103. Russia has for some time gone toward being quite explicit about how it regards any
actions in the former Soviet area that it objects to and perceives as norm-setting, which it
has not been consulted on, as hostile acts against Russia104.
Information Occupation and Information Sovereignty
As opposed to the well-known - but in practice complex - notion of occupation, the term
“information occupation” does not have an accepted meaning. If searching on this term,
one tends to fall upon messages about professions dealing with information. This author
was faced with the notion in discussions about the draft Information Security Concept
of Ukraine in the second half of 2015, which she was asked to analyse by the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media105. The stated aim of the Concept was to create
preconditions for developing Ukraine’s information potential to ensure growth and avoid
negative external influences. It appeared unsurprisingly that the main reason for drafting
the concept was the war and the external aggression Ukraine was facing. A main aim was
to prevent propaganda targeted at the country from abroad, in practice from Russia. Even
if this was an understandable and legitimate aim, the report was nevertheless critical of the
draft Concept. What was brought up was the difficulty in defining propaganda and the risk
with setting out limitations on media content in law or regulation, rather than assessing it
ad hoc based on general rules (like prohibition of incitement to hatred and violance). New
rules could lead to undue limitations on freedom of expression, especially as the legal
nature of the draft Concept was unclear106. When the Concept in its amended form was
finally adopted as an Information Security Doctrine in February 2017 the statement on the
website of the President of Ukraine mentions that the necessity of adoption of the Doctrine
was caused by the emergence of topical threats to national security in the information
sphere, as well as by the need to determine innovative approaches to formation of the
protection system and development of the information space in conditions of globalisation
and free flow of information. The destructive information impact of Russia in conditions of
the hybrid war unleashed by it are explicitly mentioned. The defence related aspects of the
Doctrine are shown by the National Security and Defence Council holding a key role for
implementing the Doctrine107.
Doubtless the information space is becoming all the more important in any warfare just
as for any other purpose. However, modern information and communication technologies
103 Anna Jonsson (2011) “Russia and Europe”, pp. 444-453 in G. Gill & J. Young (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Russian
Politics and Society (Routledge, London), p. 444.
104 Ibid., p. 448.
105 Katrin Nyman Metcalf (2015) Legal Analysis of the draft Information Security Concept of Ukraine. OSCE Representative
on Freedom of the Media, 21 July 2015; http://www.osce.org/fom/173776
106 Ibid.
107 http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-zatverdiv-doktrinu-informacijnoyi-bezpeki-ukr-40190
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(ICT) means that it is difficult to keep apart what is an “information” action and what is
something else, using the same technologies. Cyber warfare is indeed a combination of all
sorts of acts that only have in common that they use the cyberspace – internet – in some
way108. As words are so important for lawyers, before a new term is taken into use, we need
to see what if anything this term adds and if we can define it in an acceptable manner. To
see if a notion such as information occupation can add anything to the international legal
debate, we have to see if the known aspects of occupation under international law can fit
in information space or if there are other, new ways to determine what such occupation
could look like. The term is closely linked to the notion of “information sovereignty” that is
also a new (or newly revived)109 and not widely accepted term. This term can be defined as
the supreme authority (for a state) to make decisions about and to maintain order in relation
to information communication within the state and to have equal and independent right to
produce, transmit and use information free from any external interference or control also
externally110.
Russia and China have been promoting an understanding of protection of the information
space, including internet, that focuses on content. They have stressed concepts such as
information security111 and information sovereignty, while countries, most notably European
and other Western countries, with strong protection of freedom of expression do not
use such terms in relation to content of media. It is hard to imagine any real meaning of
sovereignty in information in today´s interconnected world, other than an excuse to restrict
free movement of information. The extent of sovereignty in any form in the modern,
interconnected world is a matter of discussion among academics as well as practitioners.
Sovereignty retains an important role in international law as it is the foundation on which
ideas such as a ban on interference in the internal affairs of other states rests, but what it
means in practice is more challenging as no country can act independently of others in the
modern global society. To try to link such a concept to the very interconnected information
space is even more complex. Without denying that every country has the right to define its
own policies, including on media, in societies with freedom of expression this should not
mean limiting possibilities for people to access content from other countries (or distribute it
to other countries)112.
Russia has stressed sovereignty in different ways, for example by making it a goal
of its foreign policy to be a “sovereign democracy”113. The stress in that term should
definitely be on “sovereign” rather than on “democracy”, as what it appears to mean is
that Russia refuses to abide even by commitments it has accepted by joining international
organisations and treaties. It shows the ambivalence of reforms in Ukraine that there are
proposals in Ukraine to use the information sovereignty concept, even if this is promoted
mainly by Russia and rejected by European states and others who favour freedom of
expression. International organisations have advised Ukraine against using this concept as
it is hard to define what it means and it is likely to be abused to control internet and other
modern media content.
The actual Russian attitude to freedom of expression is best shown by its actions, for
108 On cyberattacks against Ukrainian media and electricity systems, allegedly with the same malware. http://securityaffairs.
co/wordpress/43321/hacking/ukraine-attack-caused- power-outage.html
109 The term has been used for decades but with the spread of electronic information, countries like China have started
using it more, applying it to information technologies. Wenxiang Gong (2005) “Information Sovereignty Reviewed” in
Intercultural Communication Studies, Volume XIV:1; 2005, pp. 119-135 especially, p. 119 and p. 121.
110 Ibid., p. 129.
111 Henry Rõigas (2015) “The Ukraine Crisis as a Test for Proposed Cyber Norms”, pp. 135-144 in Kenneth Geers (ed.)
Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,
Tallinn), p. 36.
112 Katrin Nyman Metcalf (2015), Legal Analysis of the draft Information Security Concept of Ukraine. OSCE Representative
on Freedom of the Media, 21 July 2015; http://www.osce.org/fom/173776
113 Anna Jonsson (2011), “Russia and Europe” pp. 444-453 in G. Gill & J. Young (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Russian
Politics and Society (Routledge, London) p. 450.
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example in Crimea. Immediately after the annexation, media freedom was severely curtailed
either through direct measures such as banning certain media outlets or by other actions
like imposing various requirements and limitations, that in practice had the same effect –
depriving media outlets of any possibility to operate properly. The situation in Eastern
Ukraine is a bit different as the territory, formally, is not under control of Russian authorities,
but the intention of Russia and its supporting elements to limit freedom of the media is the
same.
International Case Law on Information under Occupation
When looking for ways to interpret what information occupation might look like in the
legal sense, the tools to use are analysis of case law on information under occupation as
well as looking for situations in the world where such information occupation is practiced.
In assessing case law, the first issue one is faced with is the problem of what is occupation.
It is rare that there is agreement that a certain situation amounts to occupation – at least
beyond a limited time during or just after hostilities. If the situation of control by a hostile
power remains, this power will most likely seek to justify the situation through different
means, like a “voluntary” adherence to the occupying state, maybe after a referendum.
This means that in order to find interesting cases one needs to assume that some
situations amount to or resemble occupation at least to the extent relevant for our study
– time limited control by a hostile power over territory of another state. In the European
Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) there are a few cases on the obligations to protect freedom
of expression in all contexts, including disputed territories like Northern Cyprus and
Transnistria. The Crimean media and information situation has not yet been examined by
the ECtHR in any final ruling.
For situations of occupation, a first question is whether a state that has had its territory
occupied by someone else can be responsible for upholding rights if it has no control
or at least not full control over the territory. ECtHR has stressed that even in exceptional
circumstances, when a State is prevented from exercising authority over part of its territory
due to military occupation by the armed forces of another State, acts of war or rebellion
or the installation of a separatist regime within its territory, it does not cease to have
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). However, the responsibility is limited to discharging positive obligations, related to
measures needed to re-establish control over the territory in question, as an expression of
its jurisdiction, and to measures to ensure respect for the applicant’s individual rights114. The
occupying power will also have obligations and who can actually be in charge of what is an
important question. The situation in Ukraine was examined in the case Khlebik v. Ukraine115
about a complaint by a man convicted in 2013 of several offences by a court in the Luhansk
Region that the domestic courts were unable to examine his appeal, because his case
file was blocked in an area that was no longer under the Ukrainian Government’s control.
ECtHR did not find that the complainant had suffered negative consequences like extended
detention. The Court found that the Ukrainian authorities had done all in their power, under
the circumstances of the hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, to address the situation. We can thus
see a responsibility for all sides to uphold rights to the extent it is possible for them, or at
least do what they may have in their power.
Cases from occupation situations tend to be about property or procedural issues. In
the Case of Cyprus v. Turkey116 legality of restrictions on media in a disputed territory were
discussed. The alleged restrictions were not fully proven, so the pronouncements of the
court were limited. Some concrete restrictions on specific information sources (specifically
school books) were identified and these were condemned. The occupying power should
114 Chiragov and others v. Armenia, Application 13216/05, Judgement on 16 June 2105; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, Application
40167/06, Judgement on 16 June 2015.
115 Application 2945/16, Judgement 25 July 2017.
116 Application no. 25781/94, Judgment on 10 May 2001, especially paragraphs 248 onwards.
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not use its control to undertake such restrictions. As for rules posing restrictions on
newspapers, other books or electronic media, there was not enough evidence about what
the actual limitations were. In the part that was regarded as proven, on the school books, it
can be seen that the court does not allow the authorities in control of a disputed territory to
limit freedom of expression because content may be against the views of this power.
In the Case (Grand Chamber) Catan and others v. Moldovia and Russia117 the occupation
of Transnistria was at issue including from a perspective of culture, primarily education. The
verdict is interesting in its statement of why Russia denies jurisdiction118. The responsibility
for allowing media to operate freely in occupied territories, including minority media, can
be deduced from the case even if it is not expressly stated. Another Transnistria case, Case
of Ilascu and others v. Moldova and Russia119, discusses jurisdiction and responsibility of
states for violations of the ECHR in situations of occupation120. The need for functioning
of media is mentioned121. The dissenting opinions are also interesting on the treatment of
what occupation is and what the responsibility in such cases is. In situations like the ones
mentioned, a problem for case law is that de facto occupying powers will often deny that
they have such role and thus also deny any responsibility to apply laws and protect rights.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not dealt with the question of information
under occupation. There are many cases on right to territory and few cases on what
can be done in certain disputed territories but nothing that is close to the issue at hand
or that could easily fit if we “move” the occupation to cyberspace. In the case Certain
Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)122 there
is a discussion on what actions may be taken in disputed territories. However, it is not
easy to make an analogy to the effect on media or other communications from this case as
the actions are very practical (dredging, digging etc.) and the main question is about their
lasting impact on nature. The findings rely a lot on whether any effects are irreparable or
not. The distinctions between movable and immovable property and lasting or repairable
effects cannot easily be transferred to the ICT sphere123.
Propaganda
One main issue related to occupation of the information space is the prevalence of
propaganda. Propaganda is not only used in occupation (or annexation) situations, but such
situations give the occupying hostile power, a possibility to exercise propaganda without
there being many effective tools against it. It occupies the media scene with its message.
This is seen in Crimea. At the time of the Russian annexation, restrictions on media or
other information channels are among the reasons why the so-called referendum did not
meet international standards on a democratic process, even should it otherwise have been
legitimate (which it was not). Here we can say that Russia knew it had to occupy information
space as an early step in the occupation and annexation of the territory. The modern
communications landscape is diverse with a multitude of media sources, social media,
access to global media and so on, but official media – primarily broadcasting - still remains
important as a source of news in many countries. If there is a sufficiently hostile climate
in general in the county, self-censorship and fear will limit the impact of alternative voices
even it is technically complex to do so.
Propaganda is nothing new – it has existed for centuries. Richter mentions the important
role that the desire to stop nationalistic propaganda had in the ultimatum to Serbia, which
117 Applications nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, Judgement of 19 October 2012.
118 Ibid., paragraph 96.
119 Application no. 48787/99, Judgement 8 July 2004.
120 Ibid., especially paragraphs 312 and 333.
121 Ibid., paragraph 234.
122 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 8 March 2011, ICJ.
123 On this distinction, Jamal L. El-Hindi (1989-90) “The West Bank Aquifer and Conventions regarding Law on Belligerent
Occupation”, pp. 405-428 in Victor Kattan (ed.), (2008). The Palestinian Question in International Law (British Institute of
International and Comparative Law; reprinted from 11 Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 1400-1423) pp. 416-417.
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to a large extent was behind the start of the hostilities that led to the First World War124. It
was only during this war and in an ad hoc manner that politicians became aware of how
important it is to deal with issues of information and public opinion125.
Propaganda is a value-laden term that we are all guilty of using much more readily about
messages we disagree with than about political speech that we agree with. The term is
notoriously hard to define. From definitions suggested by authors, we can use the one by
Lasswell, who defines propaganda as the technique of influencing human action by the
manipulation of representations, in the form of spoken or written words, pictures, films or
any other form126. In international instruments, the rules on propaganda are specific for
certain situations and types of messages. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits war propaganda and incitement to hatred. The issue
is not easy to deal with legally, as there is rarely consensus on the fact that propaganda is
being used. Such difficulty in defining propaganda and the risk with setting out limitations
on content in law or regulation are the explanation why this author does not recommend
making specific bans on propaganda but rather to assess it ad hoc based on general rules
(like prohibition of incitement to hatred and violence)127.
To meet propaganda with propaganda is rarely a good idea. It leads to an escalation,
where both sides have to provide more and more propaganda and people in any case
end up believing only what comes from “their” side. In addition to it being difficult to
maintain a neutral stance and avid falling into the trap of making own propaganda, such
battles nowadays risk being ineffective. As mentioned, there are so many possible sources
of information that the people who look out for facts and different opinions can find this,
while certain population groups tend to believe certain media. With battles of propaganda
versus propaganda, everyone just sticks to their preferred source in any case and only truth
and a balanced debate suffers. The fact that people often chose to use only certain media
and believe the message they like128 should not deflect from the importance of plurality as
this at least provides the possibility to check things and makes it that much more difficult
for authorities to provide only one truth. Before engaging in propaganda, those behind it
should also consider that educated and active people with an interest in a matter will seek
alternative information and if they see media outlets engaged in propaganda they will just
not believe these outlets any more.
In a situation of occupation, it is in the interest of the occupying power to limit access
to alternative sources of information in order to exacerbate the effect of its propaganda.
Modern media means that such limitations are more complex than in the pre-internet world,
when jamming of broadcasts and restriction on sales of newspapers could be employed. It
is more effective to be vigilant against any attempts to limit availability and access to media
than to counter propaganda with more propaganda
Censorship is a form of negative propaganda129. People do not get access to information
so a false impression of reality is built up. Traditionally this has been glorifying war,
exaggerating victories and hiding defeat as well as vilifying the enemy, so as not to lose
public support. Modern social media with so many people being able to send eyewitness
reports, film and pictures has changed this reality where the state can control the image,
but states have not yet fully embraced this change. Official media still promotes its sole
124 Andrei Richter (2015) “The Relationship between Freedom of Expression and the Ban on Propaganda for War” in
Wolfgang Benedek, Florence Benoît-Rohmer, Matthias C. Kettemann, Benjamin Kneihs & Manfred Nowak (eds.)
European Yearbook on Human Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp), pp. 489-505 at p. 489.
125 Cate Haste (1977) “The Machinery of Propaganda”, pp. 105-136 in Robert Jackall (ed.), (1995), Propaganda (New York
University Press; reprinted from Cate Haste Keep the Home Fires Burning, Allen Lane 1977), p. 105.
126 Harold D. Laswell (1934) “Propaganda”, pp. 13-25 in Robert Jackall (ed.), (1995); reprinted from Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed.,
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan 1934), p. 13.
127 Also in the context of the proposed Ukrainian Information Security Concept. Nyman Metcalf (2015) op. cit.
128 Discussed already by C. Wright Mills (1956) “The Mass Society”, pp. 74-101 in Robert Jackall (ed.), (1995), p. 89.
129 Haste (1977), p. 114. She mentions how even weather reports were banned as they could be useful for the enemy and
chess problems (unless sent by perfectly reliable British nationals) as they could be hidden code, ibid., p. 116.
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truth in many countries. Russian media has been strongly advocating the official narrative
on heroic warfare as well as Russian victimhood in relation to the war in Ukraine130. Activities
to shape the message in social media started before conflicts on the ground, with creation
of extensive trolling networks131 and other significant on-line presence, to make sure the
Russian version of the story would be the dominant one132. Preparations to use the term
Novorossiya were made before the term was started to be used more widely133.
The more complex and untransparent a war or crisis is, the easier it is to exploit it for
propaganda. Observers do not have access to any facts that can refute propagandistic
statements. There is a need to fabricate a discourse, to create the criteria by which success
is measured134. When the popular opinion is ambiguous, as is often especially the case
when a conflict has aspects of civil war, it becomes extra important to manipulate the
civilian response to war to ensure that there is support for all the different costs of war. The
propaganda battle is not just against an external enemy but also against “the enemy in our
midst” as Haste explains from the First World War and the hatred against pacifists or other
opponents of the official message135.
Information Occupation in Ukraine
The impression of the communications landscape in Ukraine is somewhat complex
and even contradictory, with moves towards proper respect for freedom of expression
and information but occasional backward steps as well. The situation is not as in Russia,
where free media is very restricted, but at the same time there are restrictions on freedom
of expression also in Ukraine. To some extent this is due to the country going through a
period of reform while at the same time dealing with an armed conflict. However, some of
the restrictions are due to Ukraine coming from a system without strong guarantees for a
free media. In a 2015 survey of Eastern Partnership countries, Ukraine was in the middle
of the list, after Georgia and Moldova but ahead of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus,
which is not bad for a country at war. The situation in Crimea but also Eastern Ukraine is
considerably worse than in the rest of the country, as these areas are outside of the control
of Ukrainian authorities.
Many international organisations have stressed the difficult situation for media in Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine. There are manipulations as well as direct threats to journalists,
closure of media outlets, obstacles to investigative journalism, lack of proper investigation
of attacks on media and so on136. Ukrainian authorities have tried to take measures
to ensure the availability of Ukrainian media in the conflict areas but there have been
numerous actions to prevent this over the course of the conflict137. From 2014 onwards,
Ukrainian channels have been taken off air and made unavailable in cable packages, but
also Crimean channels have been denied frequencies or otherwise hindered in their work.
130 Keir Giles (2015) “Russia and its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities”, pp. 19-28 in Kenneth Geers (ed.), p. 21.
131 On “Troll farming” see Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili & Sanda Svetoka (2015) “Strategic Communications and Social Media
in the Russia Ukraine Conflict”, pp. 103-111 in Kenneth Geers (ed.), p. 110.
132 James J. Wirtz (2015) “Cyber War and Strategic Culture: the Russian Integration of Cyber Power into Grand Strategy”, pp.
29-37 in Kenneth Geers (ed.), p. 36. Also Lange-Ionatamishvili & Svetoka (2015), p. 106.
133 Margarita Levin Jaitner (2015) “Russian Information Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine”, pp. 87-94 in Kenneth Geers (ed.),
p. 92.
134 In literature, the Vietnam war is often mentioned as the first war when it was necessary to pay attention to creating the
narrative of success. See David L. Altheide & John M. Johnson (1980) “Bureaucratic Propaganda: The Case of Battle
Efficiency Reports”, pp. 299-328 in Robert Jackall (ed.), (1995), p. 300.
135 Haste (1977). She quotes returning British First World War soldiers as shocked at the attitudes in the country, saying that
humanity existed more in the trenches than among civilians.
136 For example, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in many statements and interviews (http://www.osce.
org/fom/297526; http://www.osce.org/fom/295336, http://www.osce.org/fom/234691).
137 For example: 5 January 2016 Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine - MIP: broadcasting of the First channel of
Ukrainian radio in Donetsk and Luhansk regions was renewed (http://mip.gov.ua/en/news/874.html); 29 December 2015
- MIP: In Starobilsk Luhansk region broadcasting of one more Ukrainian TV channel was renewed (http://mip.gov.ua/en/
news/872.html); 1 December 2015 - MIP: Latvia will provide three powerful transmitters to restore broadcasting in the
east of Ukraine (http://mip.gov.ua/en/news/821.html).
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Crimean Tartar media is among the media that is being severely restricted138. Thus, it has
become near enough impossible to provide not just Ukrainian media but any free and
pluralistic media in the Crimea. Ukrainian authorities do not exercise control in the conflict
area of Eastern Ukraine, while Russia does not admit to being an occupying power and
denies any responsibility and the separatists lack legitimacy as well as actual control so in
practice there is no rule of law for media139.
In the communications landscape there are some anomalies, like dependence on Russia.
Giles points out than as far as cyberwar against Ukraine is concerned, Russia is helped as
it already controls important assets like telecommunications companies and infrastructure.
Until recently even many Ukrainian government officials used Russian e-mail services140.
For Russia, information has been seen as an important element of power also before
the current information dependent era. Instead of seeing cyber security and information
security as separate things, as is done by NATO and generally in the West, with one being
the technical and the other the content related aspect, Russian discourse sees them as
different aspects of the same thing. There is still a great fear of content (just as for the
Soviet Union, witnessed e.g. in discussions around direct broadcasting satellites in the
1970s and 1980s) and thus defending information space becomes a major issue141 – and as
a corollary also attacking information space. The situation for Russian media was restricted
already before the war in Ukraine but state control of media content has increased lately.
One aspect of this is to ensure that at least the vast majority of Russian people do not get
anything but the official Kremlin version of the Ukraine crisis. The Russian media in Eastern
Ukraine uses a method of incitement that has been called accusation in a mirror – meaning
that media warns of attacks and asks the audience to prepare themselves for probable
imminent attacks, thus permitting them to be ready to commit violent acts as they feel this
is justified as self-defence. This was seen in the Tadic case by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)142.
The impression of the media situation in Crimea is such that it can easily be said that
it has been occupied by a hostile power. Communications networks are also controlled
and limited by this power. The actions Ukrainian authorities can take are likely to remain
ineffective143. However, even if we can see something that it may be attractive in the political
discourse to call “information occupation”, in order to underline the importance of the
restrictions imposed, as a legal term this remains complex and it is questionable if it adds
anything to the debate.
Concluding remarks
There is no question that with the importance of information in the modern society,
occupation of the information space may be as important or even more important than
physical occupation of territory. The term “information occupation” appears attractive to
draw attention to this. Nevertheless, it is not a good idea to launch this term into the legal
debate. Occupation has a determined legal meaning and even if it is often difficult due to
the politically charged atmosphere in the individual case to determine if there is occupation
138 http://www.osce.org/odihr/272816
139 Putin during his annual press conference at the end of 2015 admitted for the first time that there are Russian advisors
in Eastern Ukraine, although still denying official military presence. Unsurprisingly, official Russian media claims that
Western journalists who are ignorant about Ukraine twisted his words https://www.rt.com/op-edge/326334-putin-mediatroops-
ukraine/ This story is a good example of the Russia propaganda narrative about the issue, filled with images of
“trustworthy” Western journalists for example.
140 Keir Giles (2015), “Russia and its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities”, pp. 19-28 in Kenneth Geers (ed.), p. 24.
141 Margarita Levin Jaitner (2015) “Russian Information Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine” p. 88.
142 Prosecutor v Tadic, ICTY 7 May 1997.
143 Even if it is possible to identify individuals who are behind curbing freedom of expression in the Crimea and an Adviser to
the Minister of Information Policy, Yuliya Kazdobina, states that the Ministry in partnership with representatives of rightsdefence
organisations plan to launch criminal proceedings in mainland Ukraine, and work for personalised sanctions
like travel bans, freezing of assets, and so on, the impact of such measures may not be great, given the powerful regime
that supports such individuals; http://www.civicsolidarity.org/article/1440/list-people-curbing-freedom-speech-crimea
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in the legal sense, annexation or something else, there are still set criteria. These criteria
do not easily transfer to the information space. Instead, introducing a novel concept that is
vague from its initiation could entail the risk that it is interpreted as allowing limitations to
freedom of information.
There has been an interest in influencing and controlling people´s minds and thoughts,
ever since humans started interacting. Especially in times of war, hostilities and other
crises, the possibility of impacting information flows becomes a priority. What is new in
our modern information society is how important ICT is for society – we do so much more
through ICT than just exchange messages. Consequently, control over information space in
a time of war becomes extremely important. At the same time, modern information systems
make such control more difficult. There are so many different ways to communicate, the
information market can be global and it is to a large extent privately handled.
Let us not forget the importance of freedom of expression – pushed by international
organisations and accepted by more and more states especially since the Second World
War. This freedom includes the right to communicate as well as access information. It is
not an absolute freedom and it is sadly still violated rather frequently, but for a democratic
society to retain credibility as a democracy with respect for human rights, even in times
of crisis, any restrictions of freedom of information need to be limited, proportional and
carefully considered. It is difficult to convince states to abode by this, especially if one side
of a conflict is a state that does not respect such rules (as is the case in the Ukrainian war,
as Russia has severely limited freedom of expression). In such a case, the battle of the
information space will be fought without equality of arms. However, the option of sacrificing
freedom of expression in what should be a fight for freedom and democracy would be a
Pyrrhic victory indeed. The only way to maintain real freedom of expression is to stay on the
moral high-ground of not doing the same as those one wants to oppose.
Thus, even if “information occupation” does go on and even if the term may be useful to
illustrate this, it should not be used as a (quasi) legal term. It is likely to add confusion rather
than clarity and give a tool that can be abused – an excuse for restricting free information
flows. Ukraine is faced with an enemy that makes information warfare a central part of its
activities, underlining concepts like information sovereignty. Ukraine should not fall into
the trap of fighting with these same weapons but instead continue its ongoing work to
do whatever is possible to ensure plurality of media, prevent forced shut-down of media
outlets or domination of cyber space and social media by pro-Kremlin trolls.
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THE HATE SPEECH144
Ganna Yudkivska
Judge of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of Ukraine
The topic of hate speech is extremely relevant for Ukraine — there is so much tense in
society today that any careless word can lead to an explosion. My lecture will highlight the
opinion of the European Court of Human Rights on this issue.
Let us start with Article 10 of the Convention, which is well known by all practicing
lawyers and advocates, working in the field of human rights protection. This article is the
only provision of the Convention which envisages that a person has certain duties and
responsibilities while exercising his or her guaranteed right.
Unlike this article, for example, the first amendment to the United States Constitution
says quite harshly: “Congress shall make no law, abridging the freedom of speech”. Thus,
we have to deal with various approaches to the issue of freedom of speech applied in
Europe and in the USA.
Despite the fact that in this chapter the main focus will basically lie on the practice of the
European Court on this issue, I will also pay attention to the American approach, which still,
to some extent, had some influence on European practice, regardless of its differences.
When and how can one restrict the freedom of speech?
The findings of the European Court on this issue were initially expressed in one of its first
cases Handyside v. The United Kingdom. In this case, the Court determined that “freedom
of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for
the development of every man”. In the other case, Lingens v. Austria, the Court stated that
“freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment”.
Subject to paragraph 2 (Article 10-2), it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that
are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.
At the same time, in the conclusions of the Supreme Court of the USA in the case of
Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union it was determined that “The First Amendment
presupposes that the freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty
- and thus a good unto itself - but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the
vitality of society as a whole”.
Thus, it is possible to trace, besides the distinctions, the existence of certain common
features in these approaches.
Let’s turn to the American approach. According to Ronald Dworkin, people should be
treated by society as conscious individuals, morally capable of assessing the situation,
except for those who are incompetent. Mr. Dworkin notes that “(...) neither any official
nor majority has the right to conceal from us the opinion on the grounds that we are not
able to hear and think about it”. He believes that the Government insult their citizens by
deciding that they cannot be trusted to hear certain thoughts, deemed by the Government
144 The text of the public lecture, which was held on 14 July 2015 at the Academy of Advocacy of Ukraine (Kyiv) supported
by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union.
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as harmful. The concept of moral responsibility of every person who hears an unfavorable
opinion is constantly highlighted in the dissenting opinions of various members of the
Supreme Court of the United States. For example, Justice William Orville Douglas, in his
dissenting opinion on the case of Dennis v. United States, expressed the conviction that
“the American people can be trusted to hear dangerous Communist propaganda. Our faith
should be that our people will never give support to these advocates of revolution, so long
as we remain loyal to the purposes for which our Nation was founded”.
A similar approach is proposed by some judges of the European Court, including former
ones. Thus, it is worth noting the quotation from the dissenting opinion of the Judge Torkel
Opsahl in the Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom case: “The goal of influencing others who
are themselves responsible for their actions is the key and legitimate aspect of freedom
of speech in political and other matters”. In another dissenting opinion on this case, other
judge pointed out that “persons who are persuaded to take an expressed opinion should
bear their own personal burden of responsibility. In addition, suppression of freedom of
speech is ultimately considered more dangerous for national security than tolerance for it,
because suppression of unwanted thoughts does not exclude them, it simply drives them
underground.»
Returning to the development of the American approach to freedom of speech, it should
be mentioned that the first case which inspired this development was Schenck v. United
States case145. The applicant, Charles Schenk, a member of the Socialist Party, was arrested
for organizing protests against conscription during the World War I. After spreading about
20,000 pamphlets, in which he compared mobilization to slavery, he called on US citizens
to protest against mobilization, since, as he claimed, this was their moral duty. As a result
of such actions he was detained. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the
applicant did actually have the freedom of speech, but under conditions of war this freedom
could be limited.
Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes in this
decision noted: “The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. When a
nation is at war, many things that might be
said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight, and that
no Court could regard them as protected
by any constitutional right. It seems to be
admitted that, if an actual obstruction of
the recruiting service were proved, liability
for words that produced that effect might
be enforced”. He also used his famous
metaphor: “The most stringent protection
of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic”.
145 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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In this way, the Supreme Court distinguished dangerous statements from dangerous
acts by declaring the statements, contained in Shenk’s leaflets, as those that could be
considered an immediate threat to the security of the country and the welfare of its people.
Later, the Supreme Court passed similar sentences against persons who resorted to their
freedom of speech during the war.
Subsequently, the approach of the Court has changed in certain way, namely, in the
case of Abrams v. United States146. In the above mentioned case, the defendants - Russian
immigrants - protested against attempts of the US government to thwart the revolution in
Russia by spreading leaflets from a multistoried building in which one of the activists lived.
In that regard, there is a caricature in which the judge tells the defendant: “The First
Amendment doesn’t protect your pro-communist, anti-US leafleting during war”. The
defendant, in his turn, replies: “This proves how oppressive the US is. The USSR would
never restrict speech”.
Judge John Hessin Clarke developed the majority opinion, according to which the case
materials contained convincing evidence that the accused were setting up a provocation
against the government and an attempt to reduce military-material production. The court
used the so-called “bad tendency” test and indicated that if the speech has even the intent
of causing a particular harm, it is enough to limit its independence, regardless of how
theoretically possible this harm can be. It was contended: “while the immediate occasion
for this particular outbreak of lawlessness on the part of the defendant alien anarchists
may have been resentment caused by our Government’s sending troops into Russia...
yet the plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war,
disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of
embarrassing, and, if possible, defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe”.
The language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke and to encourage
resistance to the United States in the war.
Judge Holmes, the author of the “clear and present danger” doctrine, dissented from the
majority opinion in this case and noted that the “clear and present danger” test should be
applied very limitedly: “I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the
law that an immediate check is required to save the country”. In his opinion, the production
of some sort of leaflets by absolutely random people and their distribution in a certain area
of New York did not create this clear and present danger, which justified restrictions on
freedom of speech.
146 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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This was the approach of the Americans regarding the events during the World War I
and the revolution in Russia. Further the era of the Red Terror began in the United States.
In the decision on the case Whitney v. California147 the US Supreme Court confirmed the
conviction of the applicant for financing the Communist Party, which supposedly had
an intention to forcibly overthrow the government. The applicant, in her turn, argued that
neither she nor her Party had such intentions. This case is interesting for the dissenting
opinion of Luis Dembitz Brandeis, one of the most remarkable former judges of the US
Supreme Court. This opinion is considered to be the most powerful speech focused on
protecting freedom of speech. He clarified the test of “clear and present” danger. “Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared
witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground
to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced (...). But even advocacy of
violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech
where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and
incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must
be borne in mind (…)”. Further, the judge stated that “those who won our independence
by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt
order at the cost of liberty…” According to Brandeis, the test for justifying the suppression
of freedom of speech is quite tough. There must be quite reasonable grounds for the
impendence of the danger as well as grounds to believe that the evil is of a serious extent.
With this in mind, he replaced the words the “present danger”, used by Judge Holmes, to
the words “imminent danger”, as the intention to impose harder conditions regarding both
the possibility of harm and its immediacy in time. The last and very important step in the
history of the “clear and imminent danger” test is the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio148. The
Court overturned the conviction of the leader of the Ku Klux Klan organization for the praise
of the crime and sabotage. The evidence, which was used by the courts, was a record of
the meeting of the Ku Klux Klan, in one of the episodes of which the applicant told: “We
are the Klan, we’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there
might have to be some revengeance taken”. This speech was a clear direct threat. Only
the participants and journalists attended the meeting. Without any obvious reference to
the “clear and imminent danger” test, the Supreme Court applied the following standard:
“Constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action”. That is, the test, which was brought by this case into the future jurisprudence
of the United States, established the following distinct criteria: first, the speaker should have
a subjective intention to incite, and secondly, the words used in the context are likely to
lead to immediate illegal actions. Also in this regard, it is worth recalling the recent case
Snyder v. Phelps149, which concerned the burial of an American soldier who died in Iraq. In
the cemetery during the burial ceremony, where the family of the deceased was gathered,
certain persons appeared, holding posters “Thank God for dead soldiers! Sin and shame,
not pride, and you are going to hell!” These posters meant that the death of soldiers in
Iraq is a punishment for tolerance of the USA to homosexual relations. The delicacy of the
situation was caused by the fact that the father of this deceased soldier was a person of
unconventional sexual orientation. The lawsuit was filed against those activists with posters.
However, it was not upheld by the US Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice expressed his
147 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
148 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
149 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F. 3d 206 (2011).
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vision of freedom of speech as following: “Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action,
move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here— inflict great pain. On the
facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have
chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that
we do not stifle public debate”.
This is the general US approach to this issue. However, as I have written in one of my
special opinions, “looking at numerous known historical and political causes, Europe
today cannot afford the luxury of such a vision of the paramount importance of freedom of
speech”.
Before turning back to the European Court’s practice on the question of hate speech, we
should dwell on two issues: the Nuremberg Trials and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
It is known, that the main verdict of the Nuremberg Trials, where all the commanders
of the Nazi army were condemned, was delivered on September 30 - October 1, 1946
(overall, 12 trials were conducted). There were two people among the convicts, who did
not directly give orders to shoot, and who did not conduct military operations. The first
of them was Julius Streicher, the well-known editor-in-chief of the German anti-Semitic
newspaper “Der Sturmer” (The Stormtrooper). According to the findings of the Nuremberg
Trials, «for his twenty-five years of speaking, writing, and preaching hatred of the Jews,
Streicher was widely known as “Jew-Baiter Number One”. In his speeches and articles,
week after week, month after month, he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-
Semitism and incited the German people to active persecution. Each issue of Der Stürmer,
which reached a circulation of 600,000 in 1935, was filled with such articles, often lewd
and disgusting... Such was the poison Streicher injected into the minds of thousands of
Germans which caused them to follow the National Socialist policy of Jewish persecution
and extermination”.
The judgement of the Tribunal stated that the responsibility of Julius Streicher was
based, at least in part, on the hate speech, which infused a negative staining to the attitude
of the German people towards the Jews, and urged them not only to physical annihilation,
but also to the Jew-baiting. That means, the hate speech, which prompts not only to
destruction, but also to prosecution, should be punished in a similar way.
Another person, convicted by the abovementioned judgement, is Hans Fritzsche, who
was the head of the broadcasting department of the Ministry of Public Enlightment and
Propaganda. Radio, as you know, was the main media in Nazi Germany. Subsequently,
he was promoted to the post of the head of newsroom in the relevant ministry. In the
Nuremberg Trial judgement, he was charged with conspiracy to commit crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It was noted in the verdict that “the
accusation is based on deliberate falsification of news which was aimed at inciting the
German people to acts of violence”. Despite the acquittal at the Nuremberg trials due to
the lack of proof, Fritzsche was soon sentenced to 9 years in prison by the West German
denazification court for inciting anti-Semitism.
Similarly, one can recall the well-known cases of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, which stated that the reports in the magazine and the related broadcasts of
the television channel created a climate of harm and caused the persecution of the Tutsi
people. Consequently, it turns out that not only direct appeals to violence are harmful, but
also the speeches, generating fear, hatred and, finally, creating conditions for genocide.
As for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it should be noted that, according
to the researchers, the most fierce argument during the discussion of its text were
concentrated around Article 19 and freedom of speech. The question arose: how tolerant
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should society be for freedom of speech? In the light of the recent history of fascist
propaganda that led to World War II, and while Western states standed for absolute
freedom of speech, the states of the communist bloc insisted on limiting particularly
the hate speech. In this regard, it is expedient to quote the Soviet diplomat Alexander
Bogomolov: «...It cannot be said, that the prohibition of propaganda of racial, national or
religious hatred is a violation of the right to freedom of the press or freedom of speech.
There is a thin line between Hitler’s racial propaganda or any other kind of advocacy that
incites racial, national or religious hatred and the one, inciting war. Freedom of the press
and freedom of speech cannot serve as an excuse for spreading views that poison public
opinion. Propaganda in favor of racial or national exclusiveness or superiority serves only as
an ideological mask for imperialistic aggression”.
While the Soviet Union and other socialist states did not succeed during discussion of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they won in the discussion of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The minutes of the meetings show that once again
the enormous debate took place between the representatives of Western democracy and
representatives of the Communist bloc. However, this time the victory was on the side of
the Communist bloc. Thus, Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant stipulates that “any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”.
It is interesting to mention that the United States ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights with a reservation to Article 20 (2) as contradicting the First
Amendment to the US Constitution.
Finally, we are moving on to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The European Court, in order to provide an assessment of the issue of hate speech,
unfavorable speech or speech, constituting any conflict with the right, guaranteed by the
Convention, use the following two approaches. Firstly, the Court may entirely exclude the
consideration of such a speech from the scope of protection of Article 10 of the Convention,
applying Article 17 of the Convention. Besides that, the Court may consider the case under
Article 10 (2) of the Convention, establishing whether the restriction of freedom of speech
was necessary in a democratic society, or whether it was committed in accordance with the
law and whether it pursued a legitimate aim.
Exceptions under Article 17 of the Convention
First of all, we will examine the application of Article 17 of the Convention, which is
often called the “guillotine position”. According to it, “nothing in this Convention may be
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity
or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention”. The
purpose of Article 17 is not to restrict the rights under the Convention, but rather to ensure
the system of democratic values laid down in the Convention.
As one of the leaders of the French Revolution, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, said: “There
is no freedom for the enemies of freedom”. Just as the author of “Theory of Justice” John
Rawls noted: “Justice does not require that men must stand idly by while others destroy the
basis of their existence”.
In this way, Article 17 of the Convention expresses the idea of a militant democracy, i.e. a
democracy that is capable of defending itself. The Convention, born from the dark pages of
the history of mankind, cannot logically provide opportunities and means for returning back
to the past.
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On this occasion, there is a brilliant quotation of Nazi ideologist Joseph Goebbels: “one
of the most ridiculous aspects of democracy has always been that it supplies its deadly
enemies with weapons, through which it can be destroyed».
The European Court of Human Rights in its judgement on Lawless v. Ireland case noted
that «the purpose of Article 17, insofar as it refers to groups or to individuals, is to make
it impossible for them to derive from the Convention a right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Convention; whereas, therefore, no person may be able to take advantage of the provisions
of the Convention to perform acts aimed at destroying the aforesaid rights and freedoms”.
The fight against racism, anti-Semitism, hatred, or the struggle for freedom of speech
– each of those is a struggle for a higher level of the culture of society. No one defends
the restrictions on expression of views or opinions that should take place in a pluralistic,
democratic society. However, democracy should also have the right to protect itself, before
it’s too late. Here it is expedient to quote the philosopher Karl Popper: “We should therefore
claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant”.
In the practice of the European Court, Article 17 of the Convention is applied extremely
rare. Realizing that this article itself can be the context of numerous abuses, the Court is
very cautious with it. For the first time the Court applied it in the context of the Cold War
in the case of the Communist Party (KPD) v. the Federal Republic of Germany, noting that
the establishment of “the communist social order through the proletarian revolution and the
dictatorship of the proletariat” is contrary to the Convention.
Although the political activities of this party were not declared unconstitutional at the
time, the Commission concluded that it had not renounced its revolutionary goals (Decision
of 20 July 1957, Yearbook 1, p. 222).
In addition, considering the scope of Article 17 of the Convention, we are talking about
nihilism (denial). It is clear that the denial of the Holocaust calls for the application of Article
17 of the Convention.
For the first time, such conclusions were contained in the case Lehideux and Isorni v.
France. It concerned a brochure, released in one of the daily French publications, which
goal was to rehabilitate the image of Marshal Petain, the head of the Nazi-controlled
Vichy regime. The authors of this brochure noted that Petain was playing a double game,
pretending to collaborate with the Nazi but, in fact, he acted in favor of France. The French
government, in turn, argued that the sanctions against the publication were justified, since
the story of Marshal Petain’s double game was refuted by historians and the publication
was intended solely to “whitewash” his image. In these circumstances, the Government
insisted on the application of Article 17 of the Convention. The European Court noted that its
competence does not include the settlement of issues, that are part of the ongoing debate
among historians about these events and their interpretation. This issue does not fall into
the category of well-established historical facts, such as the Holocaust, so its denial or
revision is deprived of the protection of Article 10 by virtue of Article 17 of the Convention.
Consequently, the extension of Article 17 to the denial of the Holocaust was indicated in this
case obiter dictum.
The next case of the European Court on this matter is Garaudy v. France case, related to
the condemnation of pseudo-historian Roger Garaudy for a series of excerpts in the book
that were interpreted by the French courts as a denial of the Holocaust, racial slander and
incitement to racial hatred. In this case, the European Court gave further consideration
to the issue covered in the previous case and noted that denying the reality of wellestablished
historical facts such as the Holocaust undermines the values on which the fight
against racism and anti-Semitism is based and poses a serious threat to public order. Such
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acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights, since they violate the rights of
others, respectively, they can be seen as an attempt to renew the Nazi regime. This case
demonstrates that in order to apply article 17 of the Convention, in addition to the usual
denial of facts, in particular, the denial of the Holocaust as such, it is necessary that the
supporters of that denial have intentions for the resumption of Nazism or incitement to
racial hatred.
This approach has been changed by the Court in the case of Witzsch v. Germany in
2005. It was about a letter containing statements that impugned the responsibility of
Hitler and his party for the extermination of Jews. It means that it was not a classic case
of a denial of the Holocaust, because the author doubted neither the Holocaust nor the
existence of gas chambers. This was the main distinction between this case and the abovementioned
case of Garaudy v. France. During the hearing, in order to dismiss the complaint
on the basis of Article 17 of the Convention, the Court had to expand the previously
established principle, considering that not only the denial of the Holocaust itself, but also
a denial of another equally significant and established circumstances connected with it, fall
within the scope of Article 17 of the Convention.
Denial of the Holocaust, tolerant attitude towards it, and denial of another historical facts
connected with it shouldn’t be permitted in a democratic society. I would point out that a
base for the Holocaust denial was developed by the Nazis before the fall of the Reich and
the destruction of the concentration camps.
The historians point to the stories of the victims-prisoners of concentration camps,
according to which German torturers made fun saying the following: “Even if some of you
stay alive, and also in the presence of certain evidence, everything you say will be so
horrible that nobody will believe you, instead, they will believe us, because we will deny
everything”. The fascists believed that even at worst, in case of their loss, everything they
had done would not be confirmed and would be forgotten.
I want to share a story with you, which I have heard from Cherif Bassiouni, the father of
the international criminal law, who had been investigating the acts of genocide in Bosnia
for a long period of time, was one of the initiators of the International Criminal Court, the
author of the Roman statute, and the leading expert of the United Nations. The international
criminal law, as you know, was born at the end of the First World War, when humanity was
shocked by meaningless human losses, when it sought to establish the justice and, among
other things, punish the perpetrators. As it is known, the First World War ended with the
conclusion of a number of peace agreement, which, among other things, concerned the
prosecution of those responsible of numerous human losses. From the beginning, the list
of guilty persons contained 22 thousands of names. However, afterwards, considering
unreality of this number, the list was shortened to a couple of thousands, and later, to
several hundreds. As a result, only 22 persons were charged and only 19 of them were
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 3 years maximum. In the first lists of the accused
persons there were the key Ottoman empire officials - for the Armenian Genocide in 1915.
But it is about 1919, when Turkey occupied an extremely important geopolitical position
controlling the Bosporus, on the other side of which Communist Russia was growing. Thus,
nobody wanted to annoy the Turks. The justice was replaced by the considerations of “real
politics”. The secret protocol, according to which all Turkish generals were amnestied, was
concluded in Lausanne in 1923. Bassiouni narrates that in 1939, right before the invasion of
Czechoslovakia and Poland, the key Wehrmacht officials were not thrilled with such an idea,
because they perfectly remembered all the attempts of prosecution after the First World
War. The night before the invasion, Hitler had a conversation with Commander-in-Chief of
the Wehrmacht, who explained his considerations in this regard. Hitler’s answer was simple:
“Listen, who remembers about Armenians now?” Thus, only 20 years passed, and the world
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had already forgotten about the tragedy that took lives of 1 million people. The next day, the
invasion of German troops happened.
People say that history does not know subjunctive mood. However, there is every reason
to believe that if at that moment the Armenian Genocide had been admitted and all those
involved had been punished, probably there would be no Holocaust. It is assumed that in
case of the absence of recognition of such facts, the presence of doubts on this matter, and
the absence of justice, such actions can be repeated again.
That is exactly why such a strict demand to instantly react to the denial of the Holocaust
has been worked out. But what about another crimes against humanity, besides the
Holocaust?
It is known that there are huge debates about the Armenian Genocide, in which there is
more politics than history or law. For example, on the eve of the elections in France, Nicolas
Sarkozy forced his political party to vote for the law on criminalization of the denial of the
Armenian Genocide. However, this law did not enter into force since the Constitutional
Council declared it unconstitutional.
In Ukraine, we also have debates concerning the Holodomor 1932-1933. In 2006, the
Law “On the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-1933” was passed. The Supreme Council of
Ukraine admitted it as the act of genocide and established the punishment for the public
denial of it. But this Law has not been applied. As an example, we can remember the
claim against Victor Yanukovich, who in April 2010 made a statement that the admitting
the Holodomor as the act of Genocide is not right and unfair, because it was the result of
the Soviet policy and it was not supposed to destroy the Ukrainians solely. This claim was
dismissed by the national courts.
The European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
avoid any recognition of the Holodomor as genocide. However, they declared it the
crime against humanity in their Resolutions. Regarding the Armenian Genocide, it is worth
remembering one of the most sensational cases examined by the Court on this matter -
Perinçek v. Switzerland. Criminal Code of Switzerland punishes the justification and the
denial of the acts of genocide or any other crime against humanity. Swiss court was the
first in history that found a person guilty of denial of the Armenian Genocide. The accused,
Mister Perinçek, did not deny the existence of massacres, deportation, and atrocity, but he
reckoned that this atrocity was reciprocal, so he came to conclusion that recognizing these
actions as genocide is “international lie”.
During the consideration of this case by the Court, the Government of Switzerland
insisted on applying of the Article of 17 of the Convention, which the European Court
refused to do. It accepted that some remarks made by the applicant were provocative.
Speaking of these events, the applicant referred to the definition of “international lie”.
Nevertheless, ideas that offend, shock, or excite are also protected by Article 10 of the
Convention. The applicant by no means questioned the existence of the massacres and
deportation, he only denied the legal characteristic of these events as the “genocide”.
The Court considers that the denial of the legal qualification of the events that took place
in 1915 as the genocide does not, as such, incite hatred towards the Armenian people.
The applicant has never been accused or convicted of the justification of the genocide
or incitement to hatred. He also did not express negative attitude towards the victims of
those events. That is why the Court ruled that there are no reason to apply Article 17 of the
Convention.
In the Chamber’s judgment, the Court recognized that Switzerland violated Article 10 of
the Convention, since the applicant expressed his views on the issue of relations between
Turkey and Armenia as a politician. He expressed his vision of the legal qualification of the
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events as genocide, that is, his speech had historical, legal, and political character.
In addition, the Court emphasized the lack of the European consensus on this issue.
Thus, among the hundred and ninety countries of the world, only twenty officially
recognized the Armenian events as genocide. The final judgment in this case was taken
after its reconsideration by the Grand Chamber on 15 October 2015.
Nevertheless, this judgment does not mean that the denial of the crimes against
humanity cannot trigger the application of Article 17 of the Convention. Although the Court
has never applied this Article to this category of cases, the possibility of its application
was indicated obiter dictum. For example, the case of Orban and Others v. France
dealt with a book titled “Special Services of Algeria”, published by the applicants, which
concerned massacres and tortures committed by the French during the war in Algeria. The
applicants were accused of public defence of war crimes. The Court noted that statements
unequivocally seeking to justify war crimes, such as torture or mass executions, are an
attempt to divert Article 10 of the Convention from its direct purpose. However, in this case
the Court did not consider that the book pursued such a goal. This was rather a historical
discussion, and that is why the Court refused to apply Article 17 of the Convention, noting
however that theoretically it is possible.
Similar conclusions of the Court were stated in the case of Janowiec and Others v.
Russia, which concerned the execution in Katyn. The Court confirmed its permanent
position that denying crimes against humanity such as the Holocaust contradicts the
fundamental values of the Convention and democracy, namely, justice and peace. The
Chamber of the Court noted that the position of the Russian authorities, which denied the
real executions that took place in the Katyn forest, is contrary to the fundamental values of
the Convention.
The language of racial and ethnic hatred does not enjoy the protection of the Convention
under Article 17. In the case of Grimmerveveen and Hagenbeek v. The Netherlands, which
was examined by the European Commission back in 1979, the applicants were convicted of
distributing leaflets to “white” Dutchmen demanding to remove all “non-white” persons from
the territory of the Netherlands. In the inadmissibility decision, the European Commission
decided that the applicants’ position clearly contained elements of racial discrimination
prohibited by the Convention and other international instruments, respectively, they could
not enjoy the protection of the Convention.
Similarly, in the case of Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, which was declared inadmissible by the
Court, the applicant, the owner of the newspaper, was found guilty of inciting ethnic hatred
through the media. The Court noted that the applicant accused the entire ethnic group
of plotting a conspiracy against the Russian people and ascribed Fascist ideology to the
Jewish leadership. “He consistently denied the Jews the right to national dignity, claiming
that they did not form a nation. The Court … has no doubt as to the markedly anti-Semitic
tenor of the applicant’s views and it agrees with the assessment made by the domestic
courts that he sought through his publications to incite hatred towards the Jewish people.
Such a general and vehement attack on one ethnic group is in contradiction with the
Convention’s underlying values, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.
Consequently, the Court finds that, by reason of Article 17 of the Convention, the applicant
may not benefit from the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention”.
In comparison, it is worth remembering the case of a refugee from Rwanda named
Leon Mugesera, which was examined by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2005. The
Court had to decide whether the prosecution for the crime of hate speech was severe
enough to preclude the possibility of granting asylum under Canadian law. Mr. Mugesera,
an extremist politician, made a disgraceful speech at a political meeting in 1992, in which
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he made an attempt to blacken the Tutsi people, calling them “cockroaches”. His speech
was so powerful that it have risen the fierce hatred towards the Tutsi, which later led to
the Rwandan tragedy. Indeed, he found an exact symbol, because in fact nobody likes
cockroaches. Therefore, it happened that people who had been neighbors for all their lives
instantly imagined that Tutsi are cockroaches that must be destroyed.
My colleague, the Judge of the European Court of Human Rights from Norway, Erik
Møse, who once served as the chairman of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, told many
horrifying stories in this regard. For example, during the interrogation of a Hutu woman
of a very old age, who could not even kill a fly in her lifetime, or cut plants without regret
(they also felt pain!), she explained that she killed Tutsi absolutely easy and without any
doubts. She said: “Well, yes, of course, but they’re cockroaches”. The image of cockroaches
invented by Mugesera was really powerful. In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada
noted that “the harm in hate speech lies not only in the injury to the self-dignity of target
group members but also in the credence that may be given to the speech, which may
promote discrimination and even violence”, which actually happened.
On the question of religious hate speech, it is worth recalling the European Court’s
decision on inadmissibility of the application in the case of Norwood v. The United Kingdom.
The applicant, who was the regional organizer of the British National Party, hung a poster
in the window of his apartment with the words: “Islam out of Britain – Protect the British
People!” He was accused of displaying, with hostility towards a racial or religious group, any
writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting. The
Court notes and agrees with the assessment made by the domestic courts, namely that “the
words and images on the poster amounted to a public expression of attack on all Muslims in
the United Kingdom. Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the
group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values proclaimed
and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.
The applicant’s display of the poster in his window constituted an act within the meaning of
Article 17, which did not, therefore, enjoy the protection of Articles 10 or 14”.
Article 10 § 2 of the Convention
Having examined the position of the European Court on application of Article 17 of
the Convention with regard to the topic of hate speech, we turn to situations where it is
inapplicable. Therefore, the Court considers the necessity for interference with freedom
of speech under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. How then is it possible to determine
the boundaries of freedom of speech, given that freedom of expression, as is known, is
applicable not only to the “information” or “ideas” that are favorably received, but also to
those which offend, shock, or disturb the state or any part of the population, considering
that these are the requirements of pluralism, tolerance, and breadth of views?
Let us try to delineate the boundaries of hate speech. In this regard, the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted recommendations which note that “the
term ‘incitement to hatred’ is interpreted as a concept covering all forms of expression
that include the dissemination, provocation, promotion or justification of racial hatred,
xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including
intolerance in the form of aggressive nationalism or ethnocentrism, discrimination and
hostility towards minorities, migrants and persons with emigrant roots”.
In the Court’s practice, there is no clear definition of hate speech, but there are certain
parameters by which the Court evaluates such speech. Context and intent are two basic
elements that are pragmatically evaluated in terms of their ability to convince, direct an
audience, and incite it to the implementation or non-implementation of a particular deed.
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The speaker’s status, form, and influence of speech are additional elements that should
also be kept in mind.
Glorification of violence
In accordance with the Court’s practice, glorification of violence includes incitement to
violence and hostility, taking into account the intention of the speaker. The test, which is
used in such cases, is very similar to the American clear and present danger test. In the
case of Arrowsmith v. The United Kingdom, the applicant was convicted of distributing
leaflets in a military camp aimed at keeping the British military from performing their duties
in Northern Ireland. Seeing the extreme complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland at
that time, the significant number of victims as a result of constant clashes with terrorists, the
European Commission first decided to examine the contents of these leaflets. It was found
out that they have not just expressed political thought, but they could be interpreted as
encouraging soldiers to desertion. Since the desertion of soldiers poses a threat to national
security even in times of peace, the Commission concluded that the applicant’s conviction
by the national courts was in accordance with the legitimate aim. It remained to find out
whether it was necessary in a democratic society. In this regard, the applicant insisted
that the European Commission applied the above-mentioned clear and present danger
US Supreme Court doctrine. The Commission, in turn, did not reject it, but on the contrary
acknowledged that the notion “necessary in a democratic society”, from the point of view of
Article 10 of the Convention, implies a “pressing social need”, which may include a present
and imminent danger test, and should be evaluated in the light of the circumstances of a
particular case. In this regard, it is worth recalling the aforementioned case of Schenck v.
United States, which is very similar. The Commission recognized the criminal prosecution
a pressing social need. “Given the special characteristics of life in the army, the restrictions
on the freedom of expression of the applicant were within the discretion left to the British
authorities to determine such restrictions necessary to prevent indiscipline, as well as for
the reasons indicated above, and are contained in Article 10”.
Two dissentin opinions were added to this case, in particular, Judge Torkel Opsahl
believed that “applicant’s action remotely threatened public policy, this is not in my opinion
a sufficient justification for interference under the system of the European Convention
whose claim to credibility it is very important to preserve in the world-wide debate on
human rights”. That is, he used the element of the test of urgency, and believing that
there was no immediate threat, immediate harmful influence from her leaflets, he voted for
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Another judge, Nik Klecker, noted, “at a time in
our history, when so many are prepared to either advocate the use of violence to achieve
political ends or adopt violent means themselves, a large measure of protection should
be afforded to who seek to express their voice of disapproval in moderate non-violent
terms. It must be clear that there are alternatives to violence in a society that claims to be
democratic”.
Subsequently, the Court developed its approach to the issue of glorifying violence in a
number of cases against Turkey concerning the situation with Kurdistan.
It is interesting to note that if you replace the words “the Turkish army” with “the
Ukrainian army” and “Kurdistan” with “DPR, LPR” in the texts that the European Court
assessed at that time, then looking through some of today’s news in the media and
social networks it can be seen that some sayings and speeches are absolutely identical.
Everything, unfortunately, can repeat itself.
The crucial decision in which the Court established the necessary principles was the
judgment in the case of Zana v. Turkey. The applicant was the former mayor of the Turkish
city, and during his stay in prison he gave an interview, noting that he “supports the PKK
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(the Kurdistan Worker’s Party) national liberation movement; on the other hand, he was not
in favour of massacres. Anyone can make mistakes, and the PKK kill women and children by
mistake …” He was convicted for glorification or defence of a serious crime. The Court did
not find a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the applicant’s conviction.
Interference with Mr. Zana’s freedom of speech had a legitimate aim, namely, protection
of national security and public order. The Court took into account the sensitivity of the
security situation in South-Eastern Turkey, where there were constant clashes between the
PKK forces and the Turkish army, which led to the death of civilians.
Applying the criteria developed in its own case-practice, the Court concluded that the
applicant’s allegations were contradictory and ambiguous, as he supported the PKK,
which is a terrorist organization and resorts to violence to achieve its goals. At the same
time, he declared himself an opponent of violence, and the death of women and children
he described as “mistakes”. However, these allegations cannot be assessed outside the
context, and the Court attached special importance to the general Turkish context in which
these statements were made. Besides, this interview coincided with the PKK’s deadly
attacks on civilians in the southeast of Turkey, where there was extreme tension at that
time. The Court noted that in this context the words are likely to exacerbate an already
explosive situation in the region: “In those circumstances the support given to the PKK –
described as a “national liberation movement” – by the former mayor of Diyarbakır, the
most important city in south-east Turkey, in an interview published in a major national daily
newspaper, had to be regarded as likely to exacerbate an already explosive situation in that
region”. This judgment was passed by a small majority - 12 votes in favour, 8 - against.
Some judges disagreed with the majority’s decision, noting that the former mayor was in
prison during the interview. Accordingly, the influence of his words was not so significant.
Other judges believed that the fact that this interview was printed in Istanbul - far from
the site of events - also reduced the impact of this interview on society. In this case, we
can see how the Court defined the aforementioned limits of hate speech, in particular, the
circumstances of the speech - the security situation in southeast Turkey, the authority of the
speaker, and the place of distribution of this text. While examining these aspects, the Court
tried to assess the likelihood of damage from Mr. Zana’s statements, and this position –
“act and effect” - quite clearly resembles the American clear and present danger doctrine,
without additional requirements for urgency, which were later introduced into the American
jurisprudence.
In another case, Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), the applicant was convicted of disseminating
propaganda against the territorial integrity of the state after the publication of the letters
of two readers in the newspaper he owned. The letters contained excerpts with the words:
“Prior to the intensification of the national liberation war in Kurdistan, the fascist Turkish
army continues to carry out bombings”. The Court in this case noted that there was
a clear intention to stigmatise the other side to the conflict by the use of labels such as
“the fascist Turkish army”, “the Turkish murder gang” and “the hired killers of imperialism”
alongside references to “massacres”, “brutalities” and “slaughter”. In the view of the Court
the impugned letters amount to an appeal to bloody revenge by stirring up base emotions
and hardening already embedded prejudices which have manifested themselves in deadly
violence: “Furthermore, it is to be noted that the letters were published in the context of the
security situation in south-east Turkey… In such a context the content of the letters must be
seen as capable of inciting to further violence…”
“...The Court reiterates that the mere fact that “information” or “ideas” offend, shock
or disturb does not suffice to justify that interference. What is in issue in the instant case,
however, is hate speech and the glorification of violence”.
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By eleven votes to six, the Court found no violation in this case. Judges who disagreed
with the majority opinion believed that the applicant’s statements were abstract, remote in
time and space from the actual place or prepared violence, and in this situation freedom
of speech must prevail. Other judges believed that freedom of expression protected by
the Convention could only be limited when there was direct incitement to commit serious
crimes. Thus, Judge Giovanni Bonello noted: “I believe that punishment by the national
authorities of those encouraging violence would be justifiable in a democratic society only if
the incitement were such as to create a clear and present danger. When the invitation to the
use of force is intellectualised, abstract, and removed in time and space from the foci of
actual or impending violence, then the fundamental right to freedom of expression should
generally prevail”.
In another case, Şener v. Turkey, the applicant was convicted of publishing an article
containing, in the Government’s opinion, separatist propaganda. The article was about
the situation of the Kurdish people in the southern part of Turkey, and it began with the
words: “We are watching the wholesale extermination of a nation. We are watching
a genocide on such a scale that it is not a mistake to call it unprecedented”. The article
contained sharp criticism of the policy of the Turkish government and the armed security
forces against the people of Kurdish origin. The author criticized the general approach of
experts to the Kurdish problem, noting that Kurdish reality should be recognized, and urged
“to hear the Kurds instead of resorting to military action”. He expressed regret that blood
was pouring between the brotherly nations and his discontent with all kinds of chauvinism.
The Government, in turn, insisted that the applicant’s statements that “we forget the
axiom that the only way to oppose a war is to wage a just war” was a clear incitement and
encouragement to violence. The Government also argued that, in the context of the fierce
campaign of terrorism, the applicant had to be punished. The European Court disagreed
with it, although it stressed that “duties and responsibilities” which accompany the exercise
of the right to freedom of expression by media professionals assume special significance in
situations of conflict and tension. Particular caution is called for when consideration is being
given to the publication of views which contain incitement to violence against the State,
lest the media become a vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and the promotion of
violence.
At the same time, where such views cannot be so categorised, Contracting States
“cannot, with reference to the protection of territorial integrity or national security or the
prevention of crime or disorder, restrict the right of the public to be informed of them by
bringing the weight of the criminal law to bear on the media”.
The Court noted that although some of the phrases among the applicant’s statements
had an aggressive purpose, they did not glorify the violence. The Court, by six votes to one,
found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The only judge who disagreed with the
majority and considered that there was no violation was the national judge. He noted that
support of the creation of an independent Kurdish state in that special situation was a frank
support of terrorists that may be equated with a call for violent actions.
The last case worth mentioning in this context is the case of Düzgören v. Turkey, in which
the applicant, a journalist, distributed a leaflet about the person who refused to serve in
the army on the basis of his religious belief. As a result of this, the applicant was convicted.
The leaflet contained the following phrases: “The army, unable to deal with us through
judicial methods, think that they can draw the opponents of war away from the public view...
I am not a soldier and I never will be. Of course, I am aware that I will be summoned for
military service, but until I am summoned, whenever that may be there will be no changes
to my lifestyle. They can find me here and take me by force. But I will resist to the end in
the barracks, and I am underlining that I will refuse to do military service in any shape or
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fashion”. The respondent Government stated that compulsory military service in Turkey was
necessary in order to protect national and public security. They argued that the applicant
committed an offense of incitement to deviation from military service.
The Court distinguished this case from the case of Arrowsmith v. The United Kingdom,
mentioned above, by pointing out that although the words used in the article endue a
negative connotation to military service, they do not promote violence, armed resistance,
or insurrection, and cannot be called a hate speech. In addition, while in the case of
Arrowsmith the applicant handed out leaflets directly to the soldiers who were already
supposed to go to war in Northern Ireland, in this case the leaflets were distributed not in
the place of congestion of the soldiers who were supposed to go to the south of Turkey
for military operations, but in the centre of the state. In the opinion of the European Court,
unfavourable leaflets, both in their form and in content, were not intended to cause
immediate desertion from the army. That is why in the present case the Court found a
violation of the Convention.
It can be seen from the above analysis that when applying Article 10 of the Convention,
the Court never uses the test of “clear and present danger”, as in American judicial practice.
However, the Court uses certain elements of this test. In comparison with American
jurisprudence, the European Court does not provide sufficiently clear instructions to the
states regarding how they should act. The Court uses a fairly broad standard – “incitement
to violence” - in a meaning which ultimately always depends on the discretion of the judges,
the nature of the words, and the context in which they were pronounced. That is why the
opinions of the judges, as we see, differ significantly in these cases, and it is rather difficult
to predict whether any particular statement would be qualified by the Court as incitement to
violence. Article 10 of the Convention is the absolute sphere of subjective opinions, where
personal views of each individual judge matter significantly.
Glorification of terrorism
As an example of the glorification of terrorism, I can recall the case of Leroy v. France,
which concerned the cartoons drawn by the applicant and published in a local newspaper.
One of the caricatures depicted planes that hit the American twin towers and contained the
inscription “we all dreamed of it, and Hamas did it”.
The Court acknowledged that by publishing such a drawing, the applicant expressed
moral support and solidarity with the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in America,
demonstrating the approval of violence and humiliating the dignity of the victims. In this
case the Court took into account the harmful influence of such an image, and noted that «in
order to constitute an offense, provocation does not necessarily have to trigger a reaction.
Although in the applicant’s case it took the form of satire, ... a person enjoying the freedom
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of expression must assume certain duties and responsibilities”. Thus, the Court found no
violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
Glorification of totalitarianism
As of today, the question of the glorification of totalitarianism is on the front burner. In
this regard, it is worth recalling the case of Vajnai v. Hungary, the so-called “red star case”.
The Hungarian Criminal Code penalizes the distribution, public use, and display of symbols
of a totalitarian regime, including the red star. It is interesting that the constitutionality of
this provision of the Criminal Code was confirmed by the decision of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court, which stated that “... allowing an unrestricted, open, and public use
of the symbols concerned would, in the present historical situation, seriously offend all
persons committed to democracy who respect the human dignity of persons and thus
condemn the ideologies of hatred and aggression, and would offend in particular those
who were persecuted by Nazism and communism. Accordingly, the historical experience
of Hungary and the danger to the constitutional values threatening Hungarian society
reflected in the potential publicly to demonstrate activities based on the ideologies of
former regimes, convincingly, objectively and reasonably justify the prohibition of such
activities and the use of the criminal law to combat them ...”
In this case, the applicant, who was the vice-president of the left-wing workers’ party,
was convicted of appearing with a red star on his jacket at a public demonstration in
which he took part as a speaker. The Court pointed out that it is mindful of the fact that
the well-known mass violations of human rights committed under communism discredited
the symbolic value of the red star. However, in the Court’s view, this symbol cannot be
understood as representing exclusively communist totalitarian rule. The Court therefore
considers that the ban in question is too broad in the light of the multiple meanings of the
red star.
The Court referred to the fact that the red star is also used by various labor movements
and certain legitimate parties in European countries. As regards the goal of preventing
offenses, the Court noted that the Government have not referred to any instance where
an actual or even remote danger of disorder triggered by the public display of the red star
had arisen in Hungary. The containment of a mere speculative danger, as a preventive
measure for the protection of democracy, cannot be seen as a “pressing social need”. The
court also stressed that “... the potential propagation of that ideology, obnoxious as it may
be, cannot be the sole reason to limit [the red star usage] by way of a criminal sanction. A
symbol which may have several meanings in the context of the present case, where it was
displayed by a leader of a registered political party with no known totalitarian ambitions,
cannot be equated with dangerous propaganda...
The Court is of course aware that the systematic terror applied to consolidate communist
rule in several countries, including Hungary, remains a serious scar in the mind and heart
of Europe. It accepts that the display of a symbol which was ubiquitous during the reign
of those regimes may create uneasiness among past victims and their relatives, who may
rightly find such displays disrespectful. It nevertheless considers that such sentiments,
however understandable, cannot alone set the limits of freedom of expression”.
Given this, the Court used the altogether untypical phrase: “In the Court’s view, a legal
system which applies restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public
feeling – real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs
recognised in a democratic society, since that society must remain reasonable in its
judgement”.
As a result, the European Court found a violation of Article 10 in this case.
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Language of racial hatred
The European Court has repeatedly considered the issue of racial hatred, in particular,
anti-migration and anti-Islamic discourse in the media. In the case of Féret v. Belgium,
the applicant, a member of Parliament, a member of the ultra-right party, was convicted
of public incitement to racial discrimination and hatred. A leaflet was distributed with the
slogan of his political party - the hand holding the tricolor - with the words: «Let’s protect
our colors.» On the basis of such slogan, «our colors» could have been be understood as,
for example, the colors of the flags of Belgium or France. However, in fact, it was about
the colors of skin. That is, in reality there was a dirty wordplay. Moreover, in this leaflet,
the applicant described non-European, emigrant communities as having a purely criminal
mentality and wishing to use social benefits for their own purposes by living in Belgium.
That is, he sought to ridicule them and cause a certain negative attitude towards them.
The Belgian courts demonstrated a certain sense of humor too: at the national level, the
applicant was sentenced to 250 hours of work with migrants. He was also forbidden to be
elected to the representative authorities for ten years.
The European Court in this case concluded that there was no violation of Article 10 of
the Convention. It is interesting that the Court noted that the influence of such racist and
xenophobic statements during the election campaign is stronger than at any other time. The
Court recognized the existence of a pressing public need to prevent disorders and protect
the rights of others.
The Court emphasized that «incitement to hatred is not limited to calling for specific acts
of violence or other crimes. Insults, ridicule, or defamation directed against specific groups
of population, or incitement to discrimination, as in this case, are sufficient enough to
prioritize combatting hate propaganda, when authorities face irresponsible use of freedom
of expression that degrades human dignity and undermines security. Political speech that
raises hatred based on religious, ethnic, or cultural prejudices constitutes a threat to social
peace and political stability in democratic states ...”
The judgment in this case, which was obvious at first glance, was taken by four votes
to three. In his dissenting opinion, Judge András Sajó noted that “content regulation and
restriction imposed on speech depending on its content are based on the assumption that
some statements are contrary to the “spirit” of the Convention. However, the term “spirit”
does not provide clear standards and is open to abuse. People, including judges, are
inclined to label statements they disagree with as frankly unacceptable and consequently
exclude them from the ambit of protected freedom of speech. However, it is precisely when
we are confronted with ideas that provoke our hatred or disgust, that we must be the most
cautious in our judgments, insofar as our personal beliefs risk influencing our conclusions
about what is truly dangerous”.
Religious Hatred
The matter of religious hatred is the most difficult subject. The Court’s judgment in the
case of the Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria may be used as an example. The applicant
was a private association that complained about the confiscation of a film called Council
in Heaven, which they planned to release for public display. The film was based on the
play written back in the late 19th century during the spread of the first wave of syphilis. This
play was quite satirical, as its author believed that such a disease as syphilis is, to a certain
extent, a revenge for blindly following dogmas, while the real meaning of faith remains
unapprehended. These statements of the author were condemned even back then, at
the end of the XIX century. The mentioned film combines the episodes from this play and
from the trial of its author. In the film, the Virgin Mary and Jesus Christ are depicted in an
absolutely unattractive manner. The film was confiscated for contempt of religious precepts.
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The applicant company, accordingly, complained to the Court of violation of Article 10 of
the Convention.
It is worth mentioning that the recent scandal in Russia on the matter of production of
the opera Tannhauser by Richard Wagner concerned the same issue. The prosecutor’s
office stated that the author has publicly desecrated the object of religious worship of the
Christian faith.
In the above mentioned case against Austria, the Court found no violation of the
Convention by pointing out that «whoever exercises the rights and freedoms enshrined
in the first paragraph of that Article (Article 10-1) undertakes “duties and responsibilities”.
Amongst them - in the context of religious opinions and beliefs - may legitimately be
included an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously
offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights... In seizing the film, the Austrian
authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some
people should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and
offensive manner». In other words, the Court concluded that when the matter of protection
of religious beliefs is at stake, considerations of public order may also be relevant, which
include prevention of an open conflict between different religious groups. The minority of
judges disagreed, believing that in this case, the film did not imply offending the feelings of
others, since the annotation to the film clearly described its plot. In fact, it did so sufficiently
clearly to enable the religiously sensitive public to make an informed decision to stay away.
A number of judges also noted that “the Convention does not, in terms, guarantee a right
to protection of religious feelings. More particularly, such a right cannot be derived from the
right to freedom of religion, which in effect includes a right to express views critical of the
religious opinions of others».
Subsequently, the Court, in its judgment in the case of I.A. v. Turkey assessed not only
insulting or shocking comments or “provocative” thoughts, but also “an insulting attack on
the Prophet of Islam”: “Notwithstanding the fact that there is a certain tolerance of criticism
of religious doctrine within Turkish society, which is deeply attached to the principle of
secularity, believers may legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted
and offensive attacks… The Court therefore considers that the measure taken in respect
of the statements in issue was intended to provide protection against offensive attacks
on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims”. The judgment in this case was taken by four
votes to three. The minority of judges indicated that “the time has perhaps come to “revisit”
this case-law, which in our view seems to place too much emphasis on conformism or
uniformity of thought and to reflect an overcautious and timid conception of freedom of the
press”.
Actually, in my opinion, the problem is not that conformism receives too much attention;
the problem is much more significant. It is that the Court equates blasphemy, that is,
assaults on God, to assaults on believers. It is a rather dangerous trend. I wonder what
decision the Court would have taken on this matter today, after the attack on Charlie
Hebdo150. After all, it is one thing when the personal dignity of a person or a religious or
ethnical group is offended, and quite another thing is when it comes to, as in the above
case, “an insulting attack on the Prophet of Islam”.
On this occasion, I would like to quote a remarkable Russian poet Andrei Orlov (Orlusha),
who wrote a poem the next day after the attack on the editorial board of Charlie Hebdo
was committed (in the original language):
150 French satirical weekly.
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Клоуны в лужах крови уснули,
Дойдя последней линии до.
Хулили Бога, а Богу – хули?
Бог не читает «Шарли Эбдо».
В мозги, как в масло, входили пули
Текло что-то липкое цвета бордо.
Во имя Бога? А Богу – хули?
Бог не читает «Шарли Эбдо».
Смерть для Бога – дело житейское.
- Журнал бы смешнее делать могли, -
Ворчал Создатель, по Елисейским
Шагая с плакатом Je Suis Charlie.
Его в толпе узнавали люди –
В ночнушке, с нимбом и бородой,
А он гордился, что завтра будет
На новой обложке «Шарли Эбдо»151.
Criminalization of “insulting of religious feelings” is an extremely dangerous approach. It
is not about insulting a particular group, a person, or personal dignity, but an image of what
a person considers sacred for him/herself.
In this regard, it is worth to mention the Russian feminist punk rock band Pussy Riot and
their unauthorized performance in the Russian temple, for which the participants of the
band were accused of hooliganism based on religious hatred. Now this case is pending
before the Court.
The French law of 1881, which is still in force as of today, clearly demarcates blasphemy
that does not constitute a criminal offence from attacking personal dignity of believers. It is
possible to imagine how many lawsuits were filed against Charlie Hebdo during the decade
of their existence. However, despite of the strictness of the French laws on the protection
of the rights of believers, 80% of lawsuits were decided by French courts in favor of the
editorial board. According to the conclusion of the national courts, the caricature of the
prophet is not a caricature of the believers.
And the last case to be recalled on the issue of religious hatred is the case of Gündüz
v. Turkey, which deals with the relationship between democracy and sharia. The Court
reiterated that “it was difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights
while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia. It considered that sharia,
which faithfully reflected the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, was stable and
invariable and clearly diverged from Convention values...[T]here is no doubt that, like any
other remark directed against the Convention’s underlying values, expressions that seek to
spread, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance, including religious intolerance, do not
enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention. However, the Court considers
that the mere fact of defending sharia, without calling for violence to establish it, cannot be
regarded as “hate speech”.
Homophobic language
For the first time, the Court was faced with questions of homophobic speech in the
case of Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden. In this case, four children were convicted of
distributing leaflets at school with the following text: «In the course of a few decades society
151 The “clowns” commit murders in the name of God, who actually does not take into account what the media write about
him – “The God does not read ‘Charlie Hebdo’”. Instead, the God laughs at the media satire on him and mourns the
victims of the terror attacks.
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has swung from rejection of homosexuality and other sexual deviances to embracing this
deviant sexual proclivity. Your anti-Swedish teachers know very well that homosexuality
has a morally destructive effect on the substance of society and will willingly try to put it
forward as something normal and good. Tell them that HIV and AIDS appeared early with
the homosexuals and that their promiscuous lifestyle was one of the main reasons for this
modern-day plague gaining a foothold. Tell them that homosexual lobby organisations are
also trying to play down paedophilia, and ask if this sexual deviation should be legalised».
The Court unanimously found no violation of the provisions of the Convention in this
case, but noted that “attacks on persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule or
slandering specific groups of the population can be sufficient for the authorities to favour
combating racist speech in the face of freedom of expression exercised in an irresponsible
manner”. The Court also took into consideration that the leaflets were left in the lockers
of young people who were at an impressionable and sensitive age and who had no
possibility to decline to accept them; and the Court agreed that the statements contained
in the leaflets were offensive. This case is unique in that although the decision was taken
unanimously, 5 out of 7 judges expressed dissenting opinions.
As noted by Judges Dean Spielmann and Angelika Nußberger in their dissenting
opinion, “a real problem of homophobic and transphobic bullying and discrimination in
educational settings may justify a restriction of freedom of expression […]. Indeed, according
to studies carried out across member States and supported by some government research,
LGBT students suffer from bullying from both peers and teachers”.
Judge Boštjan M. Zupančič compared this case to the above-mentioned case of the US
Supreme Court Snyder v. Phelps152, which concerned the burial of a soldier killed in Iraq.
He believed that in this case also it might have been possible to establish a violation of
the provisions of the Convention: «American Supreme Court takes a very liberal position
concerning the contents of the controversial messages. That the statement is arguably of
inappropriate or controversial character “... is irrelevant to the question of whether it deals
with a matter of public concern”153. In other words, freedom of speech in Snyder […] was not
to be impeded by considerations of proportionality as long as the statement in question
could be “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community”. “Speech on public issues occupies the highest rank of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection”154.
My dissenting opinion, joined by Judge Mark Villiger, was somewhat different. In the
dissenting opinion, the need for legislation on hate speech and the possible application
of Article 17 of the Convention on the existence of a fine line between verbal harassment
and incitement to violence was pointed out, since accusing LGBT people of spreading
HIV and AIDS may provoke aggression against them. “Statistics on hate crimes show
that hate propaganda always inflicts harm, be it immediate or potential…” In the words of
the prominent US constitutionalist Alexander Bickel: “... This sort of speech … may create
a climate, an environment in which conduct and actions that were not possible before
become possible ... Where nothing is unspeakable, nothing is undoable”.
Another case concerning homophobic speech that should be recalled is the case of
Identoba and Others v. Georgia, the applicants in which were the victims of a clash that
took place during the gay parade in Georgia between the parade participants and the
representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church. The latter “brought down” all the power
of “Christian forgiveness, love, and understanding” to this march. There was both physical
violence and language of hatred aimed at the parade participants. “That violence”, the
152 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F. 3d 206 (2011)
153 Citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387, pp. 5-7.
154 Citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 and 146.
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Court pointed out, “which consisted mostly of hate speech and serious threats […] rendered
the fear, anxiety and insecurity […] severe enough to reach the relevant threshold under
Article 3 read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention”. That is, hate speech may in
certain cases reach the threshold under Article 3.
In a rather similar fashion the Court has examined the issues of hate speech aimed
against persons with disabilities (physically handicapped persons) in the case of Đorđević
v. Croatia. The applicant - teenager with physical and mental disabilities – constantly
experienced mockery from other children and adolescents. The Court pointed out that this
case concerns State’s positive obligations outside the sphere of the criminal law: where
the competent State authorities were aware of a situation of serious harassment and
even violence directed against a person with physical and mental disabilities but failed to
respond adequately to such a situation in order to properly address acts of violence and
harassment that had already occurred and to prevent any such further acts, the Court found
a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
Persecution of a person on the basis of his/her mental and physical disabilities cannot
go unpunished. It is worth remembering that the Holocaust arose from that. By the way,
the idea of using gas chambers belongs to the Irish writer, Nobel laureate Bernard Shaw.
He once expressed an opinion about reasonability of finding a gas with which it would
be possible to “humanly” kill persons “unwanted” for the society (people with disabilities,
elderly people who are of no use). Adolf Hitler’s team gladly seized on this idea, and the
black spot forever fell on the reputation of the writer who tried to “clear himself” stating that
he in no way meant any total destruction of certain groups.
Words are weapon. As Lev Tolstoy said, “one can unite people by a word, one can
disconnect them by a word, a word can serve love, a word you can serve the enmity and
hate”. Hate speech is a delayed-action explosive, but in conditions of extreme public
tension it can become a weapon of mass destruction.
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“THE CHILLING EFFECT” IN THE PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Sergiy Zayets
Lawyer, expert of the Regional Centre for Human Rights
One of the admissibility criteria of the European Court of Human Rights is violation
of individual interests of an applicant (Article 34 of the European Convention on Human
Rights). The application “for the protection of personal interests” (actio popularis), raising
the issue of abstract incompatibility of the legal order of the state with the standards of the
Convention is held inadmissible by the Court.
While filing an application, related to violation of freedom of expression, an applicant
must meet the required conditions. Nevertheless in the course of the proceeding the
general context may be more significant for the Court, than individual circumstances of the
applicant.
The specific role of the mass media in the democratic society is that they constitute
the arena for discussion of significant issues. Mass media collect information not for
conservation in archives or libraries, but for its immediate retransmission. Due to such
functions of the mass media, in the cases before the ECtHR on interference in the activity of
the mass media regarding the collection and dissemination of information, the consumers
of this information are invisible applicants together with journalists and editors. The same as
in human body: while the blood circulation between the heart and the lungs and its oxygen
enrichment is a significant part of work of the cardiovascular system, no less important is
oxygen delivery to the peripheral parts. Failure in any part of the cycle has a bad effect on
the entire body, therefore, when treating the heart a doctor should always remember about
other organs that depend on blood supply.
In some cases before the ECtHR, such a systematic approach comes into sharp
focus. In particular, this relates to cases in which the Court refers to the concept of the socalled
“chilling effect”. By “chilling effect” the ECtHR means the negative consequences
of state actions that go beyond the scope of the individual case and can influence the
freedom of speech in the country as a whole.
Below we will discuss the above mentioned through examples of several decisions
of the ECtHR. In these cases, the classical three-step test is the basis for assessing the
legitimacy of interference with freedom of expression. This review does not purport to
fully cover the topic and is intended to demonstrate some examples of interference with
freedom of expression that may be relevant in the context of the topic of this issue.
The first two cases, which we will discuss, relate to protection of journalistic sources.
In the case Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (Application No. 17488/90; Judgment
of 27 March 1996)155 the ECtHR Grand Chamber found the violation of the Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights by 11 votes against 8 in the situation when the
British courts imposed a large penalty on the journalist for his denial to disclose the sources
of leak of confidential information on the financial status of the company Tetra Ltd.
Specific nature of this case is that the company was able to prevent the
dissemination of information by obtaining an injunction to publish it. This ban made it
impossible to disseminate information through the majority of the media. Nevertheless,
during the proceeding, the national court ordered the applicant to disclose the identity of
the person who provided the leak.
The ECtHR noted that the dissemination of information had already been prevented
by the order of the national court, so the requirement to disclose the source added nothing
to the protection of the interests of the company in this sense. However, the need for
155 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57974
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measures taken at the national level was also justified by the fact that Tetra Ltd continued to
be under constant threat of disclosure of the commercial information directly to consumers
or competitors of the company by the same person, bypassing media. The ECtHR noted
that in this case there was an obvious conflict between the company’s interest and public
concern in the existence of a free press.
The Court stressed that the protection of journalistic sources is one of the main
conditions for freedom of the press. The lack of such protection can keep individuals who
own information important for society from interacting with the press. Thus, the key role
of the press as a “watchdog of democracy” and its ability to provide accurate and reliable
information can be undermined. The potential chilling effect of the requirement to disclose
the source of information makes such a requirement incompatible with the provisions of
Article 10 of the Convention.
In other words, the threat that this or that “source”, fearing for one’s safety, may be
afraid to cooperate with the press makes such interference unacceptable. The existence
of a channel through which the civil society can receive information is more important than
protecting a company from the potential threat of this channel to its economic security.
The next case Financial Times Ltd and others v. the United Kingdom (Application
No. 821/03; Judgment of 15 December 2009)156 generally repeats the conclusions on the
case Goodwin. The difference between this case and the previous one is that though the
information was published, its accuracy and reliability were questioned.
The editorial offices of several media (Financial Times, The Guardian, The Times,
Reuters, etc.) received by mail copies of confidential documents relating to the upcoming
purchase by the corporation Interbrew of shares of its competitor - South African Breweries
plc.). The identity of the person who sent those copies was unknown even to journalists.
The material was published by a number of outlets. Presumably, the documents contained
some distort information. All this led to a significant change in the stock prices of these
companies and caused significant economic damage.
Interbrew filed a lawsuit against several of these media outlets, in which, referring to
the interests of investigating into the leakage of information, required a copy of the report
and the envelopes in which it was sent to the editorial offices. The national courts satisfied
this requirement.
The European Court highlighted that, even though this case is not about the
disclosure of the identity of the person who provided confidential information to the media,
but only relates to documents that could help establish his/her identity, the coercion of
journalists to cooperate in the matter of revealing the source by itself can negatively
affect the ability of the media to fulfill its function in society. Notwithstanding that in case
of unauthorized information leakage there is a risk of recurrence of such a situation in
the future, the interest in suppressing this channel does not exceed the public interest in
protecting journalistic sources. Thus, the possible disclosure of the source in this case could
also have a chilling effect.
The next case where the Court outlined the possibility of “chilling effect” is Mosley v.
the United Kingdom (Application No. 48009/08; Judgment of 10 May 2011)157.
In this case, the applicant raised the issue of a violation by the state of its positive
obligations under Article 8 of the Convention in connection with the fact that the “News of
the World” published information about his personal life. Moreover, a video of the applicant
participating in scenes of sexual nature was posted on the web-site of the same newspaper.
The court stated that the video was of much greater interest, and had much more influence
than the text of the publication itself.
The applicant received compensation at the national level, but argued that such
compensation did not fully restore his rights. He insisted on the positive obligations
156 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96157
157 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104712
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of the state to protect personal lives of its citizens. In his opinion, the state should have
established the obligation for journalists to inform the person in advance before publishing
information relating to their private life.
In spite of the fact that the ECtHR criticized the newspaper’s actions, it noted that a
possible requirement for prior notification of a person about a planned publication should
be considered in the broader context of the role of the press in discussions relating to the
general public interest. In this case the ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention, since the requirement of prior notification could have a chilling effect.
The ECtHR noted, that even though the applicant’s arguments in the particular
circumstances of a case may be meritorious, the Court must bear in mind the general nature
of the pre-notification requirement. In particular, the Court pointed out that its implications
for freedom of expression are not limited to the sensationalist reporting at issue in this case
but extend to political reporting and serious investigative journalism.
In the case Altug Taner Akcam v Turkey (Application No. 27520/07; Judgment of
25 October 2011)158 the applicant was a professor who lived in Ankara. He was engaged
in historical studies of the events of 1915, relating to the policy of the Ottoman Empire
concerning the Armenian population and had a large number of publications on this topic.
In 2006, he published a research paper in which he expressed support to colleagues
being prosecuted for defamation of the Turkish people. Their fault was to publicly accuse
the Turkish people of the Armenian Genocide.
In connection with this publication, the applicant was summoned to the prosecutor’s
office for interrogation on charges of provoking a crime and inciting ethnic hatred.
Subsequently, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were repeatedly stopped and
resumed again. In the end, it was terminated due to the expiry of the statute of limitations.
In this case, the Court examined whether there had been interference in the rights
guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention and whether the interference had been
prescribed by law.
As for the first paragraph, the Government claimed that the applicant in the case had
lost the status of the victim, as the criminal proceedings against him had been terminated.
The court did not agree with the Government, as the applicant provided convincing
evidence that his scientific work was devoted to the study of Armenian Genocide in the
Ottoman Empire, and thus demonstrated that he was directly affected by the threat of
criminal liability for such activities.
The Court noted that the provisions of Turkish law had a chilling effect in the aspect
of freedom of expression, since they generated the applicant’s fear of being punished. Even
in the event of the actual termination of the criminal prosecution in connection with specific
circumstances, the applicant had reasons to refrain from such statements in the future.
Thus, the threat of criminal liability had a chilling effect and was a form of interference with
the applicant’s freedom of expression.
However, the Court also noted the vagueness of the provisions of the Criminal Code
and on that basis found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention by Turkey.
In the case Kaperzyński v. Poland (Application No. 43206/07; Judgment of 3 April
2012)159 the applicant was an editor in a small local newspaper in Poland. He published
an article, relating to the situation concerning the sewage system in the municipality and
containing the criticism against the authorities. He received an ironic response from the
mayor of the municipality, accusing applicant of acting in personal interests when publishing
the material. The applicant ignored this letter and as a result was prosecuted for refusing
to publish a refutation or reply. He was sentenced to four months of restriction of freedom,
public works and deprivation of the right to be engaged in journalistic activities. The
execution of the sentence was delayed for two years.
158 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-107206
159 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110171
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With reference to the previous case law, the ECtHR once again stressed that the
threat of criminal liability has an unconditional chilling effect on the freedom of journalistic
activity. Taking into account a severe nature of the punishment, the ECtHR found that the
interference in the activities of the journalist in this case had not been “necessary in a
democratic society”.
It should be noted, that the chilling effect can take place not only in the situation
with the journalists. In the case Elçi and Others v. Turkey (Application No(s). 23145/93 and
25091/94; Judgment of 13 November 2003)160 the applicants were lawyers, who carried out
legal protection at the national level and handled cases before the ECtHR. In connection
with their professional activities, the lawyers were detained by the police, interrogated and
subjected to inhuman treatment. The Court agreed that such treatment caused damage to
their professional activities, even temporary one. However, in the more general context, the
Court expressed concern that this also had a chilling effect on all individuals involved in
criminal defense or protection of human rights in Turkey.
The application of these principles to the assessment of the situation in Crimea gives
one more argument to applicants when they apply to the European Court. The searches
at journalists’ places and the seizure of their property pose a threat to the disclosure of
the circle of communication and sources of information. This on its own can keep people
from frank conversations with media representatives, even in the case of a promise of
confidentiality. Obviously, in such conditions, the fulfillment of such a promise does not
always depend on the will of a journalist. In addition, the provisions of the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation also deter journalists from discussing thorny issues related to the
occupation of the peninsula. The real nature of the threat of being accused of extremism, of
inciting ethnic hatred or appeals to violate the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
leads to the freezing of hot topics and turns Crimea into an information hole.
160 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61442
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SPECIAL ASPECTS OF THE WORK OF MEDIA IN OCCUPIED CRIMEA
Elena Sokolan
Freedom of forced speech…
Three years of the Russian occupation has fundamentally changed the information
environment of Crimea. The journalists had either to adapt to new realities, which are
significantly different from Ukrainian ones, or to leave the peninsula. As a last resort, they
could abandon their names and observance of many standards in favor of anonymity for
their own safety. Both work approaches and methods of collecting information as well as
the legal field as a whole have undergone substantial changes. Russian media legislation
and law enforcement practices are tougher than Ukrainian ones and to some extent are
aimed at restricting the freedom of speech and the rights of journalists. According to
human rights defenders, public officials and security agencies of the occupied Crimean
Peninsula are disloyal to the members of the press and do not show interest in conducting
investigations of the crimes committed against them.
The Crimean Peninsula is essentially in information isolation. Russian and local media
demonstrating loyalty to the authorities do not fully reflect the specificities of the life in
this gray area. Violations of the rights of media workers are often ignored and sometimes
are openly manipulated in order to please officials and security services. Ukrainian
and international human rights defenders and journalists have quite limited access to
information in Crimea. Thus, the purpose of this article is to reveal the practical difference
between the application of Ukrainian and Russian media legislation and to collect as many
unique testimonies of Crimean journalists about their work in the occupation as possible.
The article uses interviews, including anonymous of the Crimean media representatives,
analyzes the results of human rights monitoring carried out by human rights organizations
and compares the application of Russian and Ukrainian legislation with regard to journalists
and the mass media.
In February 2014, Vladimir Putin signed the Law on amendments to the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation (hereinafter the CC of RF). From then onwards, for public calls
for extremist activities (Article 282.1 of the CC) Russians will face at least 100 000-300 000
RUB penalty (about 1,5 - 4,4 thousand EUR) or as maximum – deprivation of liberty for up to
5 years. The mentioned amendments has also increased responsibility for “incitement to
hatred or enmity” (Article 282 of the CC of RF) with penalty raging upwards from 300 000
RUB (about 4,4 thousand EUR) and deprivation of liberty being maximum six years.
The organization of extremist group (Article 282.1 of the CC of RF) provides for the
minimal penalty of 400 000 RUB (about 5,8 thousand EUR), the maximum punishment
being 10 years of imprisonment.
It is noteworthy that Russian so-called “anti-extremist legislation” is so vague that
any organization or group of people openly criticizing the actions of the officials can be
optionally brought under the definition of such a community. Moreover, an on-line media
that disseminates materials, forbidden in the opinion of law enforcement and judicial
authorities, can be considered an extremist community. Currently, in occupied Crimea the
following persons have been found guilty for “extremist articles”: Ilmi Umerov, the deputy
chairman of the Mejilis of the Crimean Tatar People, who was sentenced to two years in
settlement colony by Simferopol Regional Court, and Mykola Semena, a journalist of Radio
Svoboda, who was sentences by Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Simferopol to 2 years
and 6 months of suspended sentence, with a 3 year probation and the ban to conduct any
public activity throughout the probation period. These proceedings, unlike the all-Russian
practice, are directly related to the peculiarities of the Crimean situation in the media
sphere. Both defendants were prosecuted for denying in the media the fact that Crimea
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inhere to the Russian Federation, which indeed is a reproduction of the official position of
the institutions of the Council of Europe and the United Nations, consistently recognizing
the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as the territory of Ukraine. Moreover, Ilmi
Umerov was even forcibly sent to a psychiatric examination in the Simferopol psychiatric
hospital. Mr. Umerov himself, his family and lawyers regarded this as a way of psychological
pressure on him. Thanks to a wide public resonance all over the world, Mr. Umerov was
successfully released from the hospital.
Russian legislation provides for a special punishment for the media, considered by
the court as distributors of extremist materials. Thus, Article 11 of the Federal Law “On
Counteracting Extremist Activities” permits the seizure of materials, or of the whole
circulation, audio and video recordings of programs, and even the termination of the
activities of the mass media on the basis of a court decision. Article 11 of the Federal Law
“On Counteracting Extremist Activities” allows seizing materials or the whole circulation,
audio and video of programs and even terminating the work of the media pursuant to the
decision of the court.
The human rights defender of the Crimean Field Mission, Dmitry Makarov, explains that
particularly the vagueness of the “anti-extremist” amendments make it possible to pressure
any media and journalists, since any criticism of the authorities can be tied to this concept
(CFM is the joint initiative of Ukrainian and Russian human rights organizations launched on
5 March 2014).
Article 1 of the Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activities” gives the following
definition of extremist activities:
• forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of the
integrity of the Russian Federation;
• public justification of terrorism and other terrorist activities;
• stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord;
• propaganda of the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the
basis of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
• violation of rights and freedoms and lawful interests in connection with a person’s
social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
• obstruction of the exercise by citizens of their electoral rights and rights to
participate in a referendum or violation of voting secrecy, combined with violence or threat
of the use thereof;
• obstruction of the lawful activities of state authorities, local authorities, electoral
commissions, public and religious associations or other organizations, combined with
violence or threat of the use thereof;
• committing of crimes with the motives set out in indent “e” of paragraph 1 of article
63 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
• propaganda and public show of nazi emblems or symbols or of emblems or symbols
similar to nazi emblems or symbols to the point of confusion between the two;
• public calls inciting the carrying out of the aforementioned actions or mass
dissemination of knowingly extremist material, and likewise the production or storage
thereof with the aim of mass dissemination;
• public, knowingly false accusation of an individual holding state office of the Russian
Federation or state office of a Russian Federation constituent entity of having committed
actions mentioned in the present Article and that constitute offences while discharging
their official duties; organization and preparation of the aforementioned actions and also
incitement of others to commit them;
• funding of the aforementioned actions or any assistance for their organization,
preparation and carrying out, including by providing training, printing and material/technical
support, telephony or other types of communications links or information services.
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Part 2 of Article 280 of the CC of RF is a special norm, establishing responsibility for
public appeals for the performance of extremist activity “with the use of the mass media”.
It provides for more severe punishment specifically for mass media and informationalcommunicational
(including Internet) workers. “In fact, for any statement that Crimea is
a part of Ukrainian territory, one is at risk of being imprisoned for up to 4 years; for the
same with the use of mass media – for up to 5 years. And we know, that there are already
criminal proceedings under these articles against journalists in Crimea,” explains Dmitriy
Makarov. He also shows headline figures: as of July 2015, the advocates recorded 25 facts
of pressure on journalists by the security officers; 13 times the “unwanted” representatives
of the media were forbidden to visit and report on official events. Four documents abridging
freedom of speech were adopted on the federal and local levels including the mentioned
amendments to the CC. Moreover, in May 2014, criminal responsibility for “public calls
for actions, directed on the violation of territorial integrity of the Russian Federation”
(separatism), and in July 2014 criminal responsibility for separatism was increased.
Less than in a year – between September 2016 and July 2017 - the Russian register of
banned materials was expanded with more than 1500 positions. Currently, the “black list”
includes more than 4000 articles, social media posts and entire communities (http://minjust.
ru/ru/extremist-materials?field_extremist_content_value=&page=20).
About 60 entities are recognized as extremist organization in the Russian Federation,
including those, not banned in Ukraine: Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Hizb ut-Tahrir,
Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses and its 35 regional divisions (http://minjust.ru/
nko/perechen_zapret).
Certain individuals, most actively speaking on Crimea-related topics in mass media, are
even included in the list of terrorists and extremists (http://fedsfm.ru/documents/terroristscatalog-
portal-act). Among them are: deputy chairman of the Mejilis Ilmi Umerov and
Ukrainian journalists, Crimeans, Ganna Andriievska, Andriy Klimenko and Oleh Sentsov. As
a whole, as for July 2017 this list included more than 75000 individuals.
Ukrainian legislation does not provide for specific liability for mass media and for
consequences like closure, liquidation or suspension of a license. The same is for slander,
printing or demonstration of prohibited symbols. Only National Council on Television and
Radio Broadcasting is authorized to impose sanctions and exclude from the register of
permitted foreign mass media. For instance, in 2017, TV channel “Dozhd” was excluded
from the list of channels permitted for broadcasting in cable networks. The main reason was
demonstration of the Russian map that included Crimea. It was considered by the National
Council as a gross violation of Ukrainian legislation. The National Council banned some
more channels, including “Nostalgiya”, stylized with Soviet symbols, and children’s channel
“Karusel” also broadcasting programs, where Crimea was called the Russian territory.
In May 2017, subject to the Order of the National Security and Defense Council of
Ukraine, Russian social networks “Vkontakte” and “Odnoklassniki” were banned for
reasons of informational security and counteracting extremism.
At the same time, no proceedings against journalists and mass media were opened by
Ukrainian law enforcement authorities under articles 109 and 110 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine “Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or takeover
of government” and “Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine”.
In Crimea, social networks are sources of active search for extremists. Thus, the Crimea
Field Mission in its September 2015 report informers about several violations of the rights
of media workers in Crimea. In particular, on 7 September, the head of the apparatus of the
Crimean Antiterrorist Commission, Alexander Bulychev, informed that since the beginning
of the year seven bloggers, who were allegedly maintaining two extremist communities in
the social network Vkontakte, promoting radical Islam and the ideas of fascism, had been
detained on suspicion of extremism. However, human rights lawyers and activists noted that
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the official did not cite any particular example of the prohibited statement.
In addition, on 22 September 2015, several leading Crimean mass media received letters
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cimea, strongly recommending not to
use the word “Mejilis” for the reason that according to the Prosecutor’s Office of Crimea,
controlled by the RF, such organization is not registered neither in Crimea, nor in the city
of Sevastopol. Later these attempts to silence Crimean Tatars led to the complete ban of
Mejilis in 2016. According to Kirill Koroteyev, the legal director of the Human Rights Center
“Memorial”, that decision has put hundreds, if not thousands of Crimeans, in danger. “As
the party that lodged an appeal, we were the first (in the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation), to prove that Mejilis is not a public organization but a body of democratic
representation, that an action for recognition as extremist authority cannot be brought
against it, and that its activity cannot be considered extremist, etc. However, the decision
remained in force. As for the consequences: membership in extremist organization is a
crime under Russian law. 33 Mejilis members are in danger and the prosecution may be
expanded on the members of regional Mejilis organizations and concern hundreds of
people”.
In addition, local occupation authorities are trying to ban media from presenting objective
information on the military operations of the RF. According to the CFM, on 29 September
2015, the representatives of Roskomnadzor phoned to the editors of several information
editions and forbade to disseminate any information on the presence of Russian troops in
Syria.
You can find out more monitoring data on the human rights and freedom of speech in
Crimea on the official website of the CFM (http://crimeahr.org/).
The editorial office of the Sevastopol edition “Informer” notified the author of this article
that they suspected their editor Irina Ostaschenko had been poisoned for her political
publications. Five month before her death the woman was assaulted near her flat. The
journalist and her colleagues associated the incident with the publication of the article
“Does Sevastopol Che Guevara fly forever?”. The article criticized businessman Aleksey
Chaly, the so called “peoples mayor’’ of Sevastopol and owner of the enterprise “Tavrida
Electric”.
The personnel of “Informer” on condition of anonymity confessed that after suspicious
death of Irina Ostaschenko, the editorial office started to apply self-censorship. Human
rights defenders note that such a method, as a rule, becomes the norm in conditions of
pressure on freedom of speech, taking into account the lack of activity of the authorities in
the investigation of crimes against journalists.
Gradual curtailment of the rights and freedoms of the media professionals affected both
the topics and methods of work, chosen by journalists. Sevastopol freelance journalist
Vladimir said that such kind of activity as journalist investigation had almost disappeared
from Crimean media. The reason is that this type of activity requires constant, including
“acute”, contacts not only with public or security officials but also with the representatives of
business and criminal structures. Under circumstances, when the journalists feel themselves
not merely unprotected but rather vulnerable, such contacts should be avoided.
Special correspondent of Ukrainian TV channel “Inter” Yulia Kryuchkova notes that now
it is almost impossible to produce topical TV spots, find characters, receive official and
statistic data. Since officials almost do not communicate with Ukrainian journalists, often
exclude them from mailings about planned events, and, in general, scarcely invite to or
inform about press-conferences and events with the participation of officials. Moreover,
Yulia’s film crew has already been detained by law enforcement officers several times
despite the fact that “Inter” is the only Ukrainian TV channel permitted in Crimea by the
Russian MFA. Yulia Kryuchkova shared the details: “First time the motive was quite
strange. The law enforcement officials have allegedly received anonymous message, that
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we may possess forbidden items. We were detained and brought to the police office for
verification of our identities, where we spent about 5 hours and our car was searched. And
this happened despite the fact that we had all documents, including editorial ID cards and
permission of the MFA”.
One of the Crimean journalists, the editor of the internet news portal, said in a personal
conversation that she was afraid for her life and freedom living in such an environment.
Therefore, she flatly refused to publish her name and explained her decision in the
following words: “None of the prisoners of the concentration camp will ever tell the truth
about their life, they either lie or do not say anything”.
In the spring of 2015, Crimea witnessed a wave of searches and voluntarily-compulsory
“conversations” with the most active pro-Ukrainian journalists. Some people were
blacklisted by the Federal Security Service as witness and others as participants in the
criminal proceeding. According to Human Rights Information Center, by September 2016,
5 criminal proceedings had been instituted against Crimean journalists on extremism
in social networks under articles, providing criminal liability for “calls for separatism”
(https://humanrights.org.ua/ru/material/aktualna_infografika_pro_stan_svobodi_slova_v_
okupovanomu_krimu). These events practically forced the majority of Ukrainian media
specialists from the Crimean market. As for April 2016, the experts of the CFM documented
decrease of 88% in the number of mass-media in Crimea. Human rights activists associate
this inter alia with the fear of press workers to be arrested for political reasons, and with the
pressure of government structures on the media, up to and including forceful suspension of
a broadcast license for certain opposition mass media.
Thus, since 1 April 2015 the only Crimean Tatar TV channel “ATR” ceased to broadcast.
The local web-site Kerch FM cited the Director General of the company Elsar Ilyasov: “The
company has submitted documents for reregistration to Roscomnadzor, however, each time
they got a refusal”. As a result, ATR together with the whole editorial office had to move to
the mainland Ukraine and to continue broadcasting from Kyiv. Only a Facebook community
“Crimean reporter”, still preparing videos from the peninsula used by the disgraced TV
channel, remained in Crimea.
In November 2015, the Crimean prosecutor’s office controlled by the Russian authorities
instituted a criminal proceeding against the owner of the ATR TV channel Lenur Islyamov.
The businessman has become one of the initiators of the “trade blockade”, and later of
the “energy blockade” of the peninsula. While investigating this case, the security officials
visited Lilia Budzhurova, the editor of the Crimean branch of the TV channel, to search her
place.
Earlier, the editorial office and some of the equipment of the Ukrainian-language
television and radio company of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine “Breeze” had to
be evacuated. As the chief editor of the channel “Breeze” captain Ivan Chmil reported,
both military and civil journalists were repeatedly threatened with reprisals and criminal
proceedings. The Russian military seized a part of the editorial property and a valuable
video archive. Unique shots, made in spring 2014 during the seizure of Crimea by the
Russian military officers, were seized and partially destroyed. According to the testimony of
the journalists, a part of editorial materials were found on the shelves of the Russian special
services, some information was illegally sold to foreign TV channels.
Currently the access of Ukrainian and foreign media to Crimea is drastically restricted. In
order to work officially in the occupied peninsula, journalists have to operate on the fringes
of Ukrainian law. The position of the official Kyiv is that journalists have no right to request
Russia the permission for work in Crimea, because it can be interpreted as an indirect
recognition of the Russian authority in the peninsula. Thus, in 2017, the network of Ukrainian
media professionals is mainly represented by freelancers working anonymously, having
very limited access to information. They do not have any opportunity to attend official
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events and make information requests openly.
However, accreditation also does not solve all problems. In February 2017 in Simferopol,
there was detained the STB film crew, which, as an experiment, received permission from
the Russian MFA to work in Ukrainian Crimea (https://www.facebook.com/lunkovaalyona/
posts/10207079799107821). Journalists Alyona Lunkova and Irina Romaliyskaya spent
several hours being verified by the police, with their documents being confiscated. They
believe that the wide publicity of the incident in social networks and in the media prevented
the situation from becoming more serious. Journalists were released, but during the visit
they felt the special attention of the law enforcement officers.
However, a large number of local Crimean media staff is not worried by such facts of
suppression of freedom of speech. My interlocutors from pro-Russian and pro-governmental
on-line media in Sevastopol are openly proud of their materials despite the fact that often
emotionality prevails over common sense, and the presentation of facts and assessment
verge upon poorly concealed manipulation. They explain it by saying they are doing
something useful for Russia, i.e. they do not inform but correct public opinion for the needs
of the state. Here are just a few examples of the headlines of the Crimean media: “Barack
Obama’s plan to establish control over the government of Sevastopol failed miserably!”,
“The United States demand that Ukraine hands reins over to gays”, “ISIS militants shave
their beards and flee Syria under the guise of women”.
Russian journalists, who had filled vacancies following the outflow of Ukrainian staff,
added more ideological “gravy” to local media. So far media researchers have not given
exact figures, because the methodology of such calculation is difficult to develop. Since
88% of media were closed and people are still quitting from the functioning TV channels,
on-line media and newspapers, both new generation of Crimean journalists and “guests”
from the territory of Russia replace them. As my interviewees journalists assume, the media
staff was renewed for 50-90% and about a half of them are video operators and editors
from Russian regions.
In general, the opposition journalists and entire media organizations in Crimea are under
constant pressure from the power structures and the Federal Security Service. According
to lawyers, the reason is Russian legislation which allows to interprete of critical statements
and disagreement with the position of the Crimean and Russian authorities as extremism
and separatism. In addition, the whole situation is exacerbated by the reluctance of
officials and investigators to investigate objectively the facts of pressure on the press in
Crimea. Such cases are either not investigated at all, or are slowly investigated. Therefore,
according to human rights lawyers and activists, media staff feels unprotected on the
peninsula and is forced to hide its position under pseudonyms or exercise self-censorship.
This idea is proved also by the testimony of my interviewees who continue working in the
media under occupation. Moreover, “Inter” channel is the only Ukrainian TV channel that
has received the official permission of the MFA of the RF to work in Crimea. The rest of
Ukrainian and foreign media on the peninsula are outside the law from the Russian view
point. Major informational channels like Reuters, BBC, Radio Svoboda receive information
either from their Russian bureaus or from local freelancers. Sometimes Ukrainian and
foreign journalists go to Crimea with small cameras or even mobile phones unofficially,
under the guise of tourists or guests. They are hiding from security agencies and gather
exclusive materials about the life of the peninsula. However, they are not then protected by
information legislation and can even be equated with foreign spies.
Basically, access to the media space of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol is limited
due to undefined status of this territory. According to the position of Ukraine and the most
countries of the world, the Crimean Peninsula is a temporarily occupied part of the territory
of Ukraine. According to the position of Russia, the Crimean Peninsula is a part of the
Federation, governed by rules and laws of the Russian Federation.
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Establishment of independent international monitoring mission, acting under generally
recognized standards of journalism and human rights, would improve the situation with
freedom of speech in Crimea. Such a mission could work under the patronage of the
prominent European or American organizations (such as Reporters without Borders),
and could obtain permission from both Ukraine and Russia to work and publish research
materials abroad. That would at least partially allow to raise the media sphere of Crimea out
of the complete isolation. However, even for such a mission it would be difficult to work in
conditions when journalists, bloggers and public figures do not trust the official structures
and are afraid for their lives and freedom.
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NOTES
CRIMEA BEYOND RULES
Other issues of the series.
By the time this issue is published, the following issues has already came out or
are ready for publication:
Issue 1. The right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence.
Issue 2. Right to property.
Special issue. Transfer by the Russian Federation of parts of its own civilian
population into the occupied territory of Ukraine.
Issue 3. Right to nationality (citizenship).
Issue 4. Information occupation.
© RCHR
© UHHRU
«CRIMEA BEYOND RULES. Thematic review of the human rights situation under
occupation.» - Vol. 4 - Information occupation. / Edited by
S. Zayets, R. Martynovskyy, D. Svyrydova. – Kyiv, 2017. – 84 p.
The publication is aimed at representatives of international organizations,
diplomatic missions, government bodies and professional legal community, who
need information on the practical application of international human rights
standards under occupation of the Crimea.
Thematic review is published in electronic form and is for free distribution. The
materials are available in three languages - Ukrainian, Russian and English. Use of
Content is permitted with the obligatory reference to the source and authorship. If
the author of the material is not explicitly stated, all rights to the material belong
to the expert-analytical group CHROT. The materials included in the publication,
as well as other materials on the topic can be found on the website precedent.
crimea.ua
Translation from Russian and Ukrainian into English: Olga Androsova, Vitaliy
Nabukhotny, Nadiia Franko, Zinaida Kosenko.
These and other materials devoted to the observance of the international
standards of human rights by the authorities of both Ukraine and the Russian
Federation with reference to the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula could be
found on eh website precedent.crimea.ua
Do you need assistance in applying to the European Court of Human Rights? Fill
up a form on goo.gl/forms/KLqi9LsA5Z
Would you like to share your opinion or offer material for publication in following
issues? Contact [email protected]
Annex 957
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Crimea Beyond Rules: Right to Nationality
(Citizenship) (2017)

Crimea
beyond
rules
Thematic review of the human
rights situation under
occupation
Issue № 3
Right to nationality
(citizenship)
UHHRU RCHR CHROT

РЕГІОНАЛЬНИЙ ЦЕНТР ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ
REGIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Regional Centre for Human Rights - NGO, the
nucleus of which consists of professional lawyers
from Crimea and Sevastopol, specializing in the field
of international human rights law.
rchr.org.ua
CHROT - expert-analytical group, whose members
wish to remain anonymous.
Some results of work of this group
are presented at the link below :
precedent.crimea.ua
Ukrainian Helsinki Human
Rights Union
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union - non-profit
and non-political organization. The largest association of
human rights organizations in Ukraine, which unites 29
NGOs, the purpose of which is to protect human rights.
helsinki.org.ua

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Dear readers,
Crimean events at the beginning of 2014 have challenged the post-war system of
international security. They stirred up the whole range of human emotions - from the loss of
vital references to the euphoria, from joyful hope to fear and frustration. Like 160 years
ago, Crimea attracted the attention of the whole Europe. In this publication we have tried
to turn away from emotions and reconsider the situation rationally through human
values and historical experience . We hope that the publication will be interesting to
all, regardless of their political views and attitudes towards those events.
S. Zayets
R. Martynovskyy
D. Svyrydova
Table of contents
Introduction 6
1. International standards 7
2. Case law of international courts 16
3. Laws and regulations of Ukraine 20
4. Laws and regulations of the Russian
Federation 22
5. Laws of the so-called “Republic of Crimea” 29
6. Historical materials on citizenship 30
7. Crimean cases 34
8. Analytics 36
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The periodic review ”Crimea beyond rules”, prepared by joint efforts of several organizations and
invited experts, aims to help the international community, human rights organizations, international
and national bodies and structures as well as anyone who wants to better understand the human
rights situation in Crimea.
Each review is themed around a specific topic and includes a number of analytical articles,
references to international regulations, standards and legislation relating to the chosen themes as
well analysis of prospects for potential complaints or those already filed with the international bodies
for the protection of human rights. The series of thematic reviews ”Crimea beyond rules” is devoted
to the study and description of violations of human rights and rules of international humanitarian law
resulting from the continuing aggressive expansion on the side of the Russian Federation in respect
of Crimea as a part of the territory of Ukraine.
During the occupation and subsequent annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the Russian
Federation announced all Ukrainian nationals living in Crimea its subjects. Residents of the occupied
territory faced a difficult choice. On the one hand, by obtaining Russian passports, they formally took
the oath of allegiance to the State which had committed an act of aggression against their sovereigncountry.
On the other hand, during a short period of time (in fact - 18 days) they could try to submit
the “declaration about the willingness to retain the nationality of Ukraine” to one of the four offices
which accepted such declarations in Crimea. In this case, they suddenly became foreigners at home
and were severely limited in their rights.
Using the imperfection of international standards in this ng situations of statelessness and resolving
cases of dual nationality. Arbitrary change and imposition of a nationality became a new challenge to
which the world was not ready. Having imposed its nationality, the Russian Federation «forced into
loyalty» the population of the occupied peninsula under threat of criminal liability (see. Art. 275 of the
Criminal Code «High Treason»).
It is important to understand that the situation in Crimea is fundamentally different from the current
practice of issuing passports of the Russian Federation nationals on the so-called «unrecognized
territories» (Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Thus, residents of the «unrecognized
territories» may obtain Russian nationality only on its own initiative, by addressing the competent
bodies with the appropriate application. In Crimea, the Russian authorities themselves decided the
nationality issue for more than 2.3 million people, declaring them subjects of the Russian Federation.
The situation regarding the nationality which arose from the annexation of Crimea should also
be distinguished from cases of secession of territories and the succession of States. In cases of
secession or succession there takes place an entirely legitimate transfer of the territory under
the control of another State which is in accordance with international law. At the same time, the
occupation and subsequent annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation were carried out with
gross violation of these norms, of what the international community has been consistently informing
since March 2014 and calling on the authorities of the Russian Federation to return control over
Crimea to Ukraine. Because of this, any attempt to apply to Crimea the relevant rules concerning the
secession or succession of states are inadmissible.
In the post-war world, a person is more and more recognized as a subject of international law. That
is why a change of nationality of Cri-mean residents can and should be considered in the context
of relations of four actors: Ukraine, as the country of existing nationality, Russia, as the country that
imposes its nationality, the actu-al resident of the Crimean peninsula and the third countries.
The existing practice of various international judicial bodies concerns cases of violations related
to the deprivation of nationality or refusal in its granting. So, in cases related to the imposition of
nationality there can be set new precedents. More information about these and other issues can be
found in the current review.
International law assumes that the occupation is a temporary regime. We are also convinced that
the need for such reviews is provisional. Being optimistic, we believe that the main task of these
materials should be apprehension of what had happened and generalization of experience in order
to prevent further human rights violations in Crimea or other regions of the world.
The authors of the review: the team of human rights activists, experts and scholars from Regional
Centre for Human Rights (rchr.org.ua), Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (helsinki.org.ua), as
well as expert and analytical group CHROT.
Introduction
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International standards
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by resolution
217 A (III) of the UN General Assembly on 110 December 1949 and is an act of the so-called
«soft law». However, compliance with the obligations under the Declaration is the subject of
continuous monitoring by the international community, even if its provisions are not reflected
in the texts of other, more binding international instruments.
In particular, along with other documents, the Declaration provisions are the foundation of
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), and its violation can be the reason for individual appeals
to the United Nations Human Rights Council in accordance with the Human Rights Council
Resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007 (former procedure 1503).
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right of every person
to a nationality, and also prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of the nationality or the right to
change it.
The full text of the document can be found following the link1.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The Covenant was adopted by resolution 220 A (ХХI) of the UN General Assembly on
16 December 1966. Ukraine (at that time - the USSR as an independent member of the UN)
signed the Covenant on 20 March 1968 and ratified it on 19 October 1973.
Russia, not being an independent member of the UN, has inherited the obligations under the
Covenant as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union signed the document
on 18 March 1968. Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR ratified it on 18 September
1973.
The document entered into force in Ukraine and the Soviet Union (and respectively in the
Russian Federation) simultaneously, on 23 March 1976.
ARTICLE 24
[…]
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The full text of the document can be found following the link2.
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
The Convention was adopted in New York on 28 September 1954 by the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries convened in accordance with resolution 526 A (XVII) of the Economic and
Social Council on 26 April 1954. It entered into force on 6 June 1960. It was ratified by Ukraine
on 11 January 2013 and entered into force for it on 23 June 2013.
The Russian Federation is not a party to the Convention.
The Convention provides a definition of the concept of a stateless person, declares rights,
obligations of persons who are not citizens of any state, by setting that the treatment of such
persons can not be worse than that of the citizens of the state in which they find themselves
(e.g. in terms of freedom to practice their religion), or to foreign nationals residing in the
territory of such state. It also regulates the issues of movable and immovable property,
copyrights and industrial rights of stateless persons, their associations and the right to appeal
to the courts (Chapter II). In addition, Chapters III and IV regulate the employment and social
security, and Chapter V regulates administrative measures (freedom of movement, identity
1 http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/language.aspx?langid=eng
2 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
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documents, travel documents, taxes, removal of property, deportation, naturalization).
The full text of the document can be found following the link3.
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
The Convention was adopted and signed in New York on 30 August 1961 pursuant to
resolution 896 (IX), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 December
1954. The Convention entered into force on 13 December 1975. It was ratified by Ukraine on
11 January 2013 and entered into force for it on 23 June 2013.
The Russian Federation is not a party to this Convention.
The Convention requires States to grant their nationality to a stateless person and prohibits
to deprive a person of his nationality, if such deprivation would render him stateless. An
exception is made in the context of loyalty relations: the demonstration of disloyalty by
nationals empowers the State to deprive them of nationality regardless of the consequences.
ARTICLE 8
1. A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would
render him stateless.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a person may be deprived of
the nationality of a Contracting State:
(a) In the circumstances in which, under paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 7, it is permissible that
a person should lose his nationality;
(b) Where the nationality has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a Contracting State may
retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of signature, ratification or
accession it specifies its retention of such right on one or more of the following grounds, being
grounds existing in its national law at that time:
(a) That, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person:
(i) Has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued
to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or
(ii) Has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State;
(b) That the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to
another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to
the Contracting State.
The full text of the document can be found following the link4.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
The Convention was adopted by resolution 2106 (XX) of the UN General Assembly on 21
December 1965, signed on 7 March 1966 and entered into force on 4 January 1969. The
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic signed the Convention on 7 March 1966. The Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR ratified it on 21 January 1969, and on 7 April 1969 it
entered into force for Ukraine.
Russian Federation, not being at that time an independent member of the UN, inherited the
obligations of the Convention as the legal successor of the USSR. The Soviet Union signed
the document on 7 March 1966. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified it
on 22 January 1969, and on 4 March 1969 it entered into force.
3 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
4 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Statelessness.aspx
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ARTICLE 1
[…]
2. This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences
made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.
3. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions
of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such
provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
[…]
ARTICLE 5
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention,
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and
to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic
origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:
[…]
(d) Other civil rights, in particular:
[…]
(iii) The right to nationality;
[…]
The full text of the document can be found following the link5.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child
Convention was adopted by resolution 44/25 of the UN General Assembly on 20 November
1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
signed the Convention on 21 February 1990, and ratified the decision of the Verkhovna Rada
of the Ukrainian SSR on 27 February 1991. For Ukraine, the Convention entered into force on
27 September 1991.
The Russian Federation, not being at that time an independent member of the UN, has
inherited the obligations of the Convention as the legal successor of the USSR. The Soviet
Union signed the document on 26 January 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified it
on 13 June 1990 and on 15 September 1990, the Convention entered into force.
The Convention is particularly interesting, because it considers nationality as one of the
elements of identity. It is difficult to assume that upon reaching adulthood, a nationality
becomes irrelevant. This provision can be used as a key to the consideration of certain issues
of nationality in the context of the right to respect for private life.
ARTICLE 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared
for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
ARTICLE 8
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful
interference.
[…]
The full text of the document can be found following the link6.
5 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx
6 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
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The Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
The Convention was signed in the Hague on 12 April 1930. It entered into force on 1 July
1937 from the date of the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession on behalf of
ten members of the League of Nations or non-members of the League of Nations states.
The Soviet Union at the time did not sign and ratify it; respectively, Ukraine and the Russian
Federation are not parties to this international treaty, but its provisions could be used as a
source of customary law.
Chapter I of the Convention establishes the general principles applicable to matters relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws. These include, in particular:
- the right of each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. At the
same time, this law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally
recognized with regard to nationality (Art. 1);
- the right of each State to determine any question as to whether a person possesses the
nationality of a particular State in accordance with the law of that State (Art.2);
- the right of each State to regard as its national a person having two or more nationalities
(Art. 3);
- an inability of the State to afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a
State whose nationality such person also possesses (Art. 4);
- the right of a third State to treat a person having more than one nationality as if he had
only one, the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident,
or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact
most closely connected (Art. 5);
- the right of a person to renounce one of two nationalities if this nationality was acquired
without any voluntary act on his part (Art. 6).
The full text of the document can be found following the link7.
UN General Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 30 January 2001 On nationality of natural
persons in relation to the succession of States
Resolution was adopted on the basis of articles on nationality of natural persons in relation
to the succession of States prepared by the International Law Commission the Article 3 of
that document expressly provides that «the present articles apply only to the effects of a
succession of States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.»
The resolutions of the UN General Assembly following the occupation of Crimea recognized
that the actions of the Russian Federation violated the principles of international law.
Thus, the Russian Federation has no legal grounds for references to articles on nationality of
natural persons in relation to the succession of States in support of their actions in relation to
the imposition of nationality of the Russian Federation to all nationals of Ukraine who resided
and were registered in the territory of the Crimean peninsula at the time of its annexation and
occupation by the Russian Federation.
The full text of the document can be found following the link8.
7 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/InternationalDB/docs/Convention%20on%20certain%20questions%20relaing%20to%20
the%20conflict%20of%20nationality%20laws%20FULL%20TEXT.pdf
8 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/153
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Declaration on the human rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country in
which they live
The Declaration was adopted by resolution 40/144 of the UN General Assembly on 13
December 1985.
The Declaration proclaims the right of aliens to life and security of person, to protection from
interference with privacy and family life, including in respect of home and correspondence;
the right to be equal before the courts; the right to choose a spouse, to marry, to found a
family; the right to freedom of thought, opinion, conscience and religion, as well as other
rights as defined in Part 1 of Article 5 of the Declaration.
Part 2 of the same Article declares the following rights of aliens: the right to leave the
country; the right to freedom of expression; the right of peaceful assembly; the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others, subject to domestic law.
Article 8 defines the rights of aliens lawfully residing in the territory of a State. They, in
particular, have the right to appropriate working conditions, fair wages and equal remuneration
for work, the right to join trade unions, the right to health protection, medical care, social
security, social services, education and recreation.
The full text of the document can be found following the link9.
The European Convention on Nationality
The Convention was signed on 6 November 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 2000.
Ukraine signed the Convention on 1 July 2003, ratified it on 20 September 2006. The
Convention entered into force for Ukraine on 1 April 2007.
The Russian Federation signed this Convention on 6 November 1997, but has not ratified it.
The Convention establishes guarantee of the right to a nationality for each person as well as
a guarantee in order to avoid cases of statelessness, arbitrarily deprivation of nationality, lack
of automatic consequences in relation to a nationality of a spouse, regardless of change in
marital status or change of the nationality by the other spouse (Art. 4). This can be considered
as an element of respect for the will of persons while changing the nationality.
It also sets out the grounds for the acquisition and deprivation of nationality, especially
loss of nationality at the initiative of the individual, a simplified procedure for the recovery of
nationality by former nationals, procedures relating to nationality, cases of multiple nationality,
rights and duties related to multiple nationality.
It should be noted that the ratification of this Convention has been made by Ukraine with
reservations. In particular, in the Law of 20 September 2006 № 163-V «On ratification of the
European Convention on Nationality» Ukraine declared that it excludes Chapter VII from the
scope of the Convention.
The provisions of this chapter provide that persons possessing the nationality of two or
more parties to the Convention shall be required to fulfil their military obligations in relation
to one of those States Parties only.
In practice, this may mean that persons who had to obtain a Russian passport in the
occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol and were called
up for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, after the performance
of such a service can be conscripted for military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
However, this clause does not matter in relation to the Russian Federation, because the
Russian Federation is not a party to that Convention. Attention should also be paid to the
explanatory report at the end of the text of the Convention on the official website of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
9 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/40/144
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The text of the Law on ratification can be found following the link10.
The full text of the Convention in English can be found following the link11.
The full text of the Convention in Ukrainian, with the explanatory report mentioned above
can be found following the link12.
The UN General Assembly Resolution the action of Israel in the Syrian Golan
The UN General Assembly has repeatedly assessed the Israeli practices in the occupied
territories (see, for example, this resolution ). Special attention shall be drawn to the Resolution
A/RES/55/134 of 8 December 2000, which urged to refrain from imposing Israeli citizenship
and Israeli identity cards on the Syrian citizens in the Syrian Golan occupied by Israel .
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights)
The Convention was signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3
September 1953.
Ukraine ratified the Convention on 17 July 1997. The Convention entered into force for
Ukraine on 11 September 1997.
Russia ratified the Convention on 30 March 1998. The Convention entered into force for the
Russian Federation on 1 August 1998.
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed that the Convention does
not protect the right to a nationality. Indeed, the Convention does not contain a provision,
which would fully or partially reproduce the provisions of Art. 15 of the UDHR. However, the
Court has repeatedly considered cases, where it recognized that in some situations, issues
related to the deprivation of nationality may affect matters within the scope of Art. 8 of the
Convention (right to respect for private and family life) and even discrimination (Art. 14 in
conjunction with Art. 8 of the Convention).
In particular, the interest in this aspect is presented in the cases Genovese v. Malta, no.
53124/09, § 30, 11 October 2011 and Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012.
Nevertheless, it appears that the imposition of Russian nationality as a result of the
occupation of Crimea may also raise new issues in the context of Art. 8 of the Convention. In
particular, this may be related to issues of national identity and forced loyalty (see, in particular,
comments on the Convention on the Rights of the Child and on Art. 275 of the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation).
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
A brief summary of the three most typical judgments of the European Court regarding
important human rights issues in the context of citizenship, is given below. The Court itself
notes in these judgments that initially ECtHR denied the admissibility of cases related to
issues of citizenship, given that “the Convention does not guarantee the right to citizenship.”
Nevertheless, the case law has evolved whereby the issues of this category have come in
view of the Court. These cases are characterised by the fact that
the Court does not evaluate national authorities’ actions or decisions on determination of
the applicants’ citizenship as such, but carefully considers consequences of these decisions
and their impact on the lives of the applicants in the context of Article 8 of the Convention.
In particular, the Court found no violation of Art. 8 of the Convention in cases RAMADAN v.
MALTA and GENOVESE v. MALTA, since the decisions of national authorities were rather
formal, and had no real impact on the lives of the applicants. For example, in the case
10 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/40/144
11 http://www.coe.int/ru/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007f2c8
12 http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_004/
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RAMADAN v. MALTA the applicant, even though deprived of his Maltese citizenship, was not
expelled from the country, deprived of his job, he had no documents seized and did not suffer
any other serious consequences. Similarly, the case GENOVESE v. MALTA concerned only a
request of the applicant’s mother for her child to be granted Maltese citizenship despite the
fact that they resided in Scotland . In contrast, in the case KURIĆ AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA
the consequences of the authorities’ decisions were enormous for applicants and affected
all their lives.
In the context of the situation of the imposition of Russian citizenship to residents of Crimea
the consequences of such decision can be significant for possible lodging of complaints with
the European Court. Technically, the attribution of Russian citizenship to Crimean residents
looks like granting them additional rights, and not depriving of them. But in fact, these
“additional rights” are a heavy burden for many people. Many people perceive the imposed
identification of Crimean Ukrainians as citizens of the Russian Federation in the context of the
ongoing conflict very painful. But these consequences are not limited to the inner discomfort
only: like any other citizens of the Russian Federation (and citizens only!), they are liable
under Art. 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for treason against the State in
the event of demonstrating loyalty to Ukraine. This means that if they are not required to be
directly loyal to the Russian authorities, still they must refrain from any active manifestation of
disloyalty. However, it should be understood that those of the Crimean people who decided
and managed to declare “the desire to keep the existing citizenship of Ukraine” found
themselves in the position of the applicants in the case KURIĆ AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA.
CASE OF RAMADAN v. MALTA
(21 June 2016, Application no. 76136/12)
The case was examined by the European Court of Human Rights upon the complaint about
the applicant’s deprivation of Maltese citizenship in the context of Art. 8 of the Convention.
The applicant was deprived of his citizenship on the grounds that he had obtained it by fraud.
As a result, he became an apatride (a stateless person).
In this regard, the Court emphasized that an arbitrary denial of a citizenship might in certain
circumstances raise an issue under Art. 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such
denial on the private life of the individual. Although, in this case the Court found no violation
of the Convention, the conclusion that the consequences of changes of nationality ratione
materiae fall within the Art. 8 of the Convention is significant in the context of this review.
The Court also underlines that the private life is a concept that is wide enough to embrace
aspects of a person’s social identity.
In this case, the Court reiterated that the Convention does not guarantee the right to
citizenship. However, in this case likewise in others, the Court draws attention not to the fact
of deprivation of citizenship, but on the related (derived) changes in the applicant’s private life.
The full text of the judgment can be found following the link13.
CASE OF GENOVESE v. MALTA
(11 October 2011, Application no. 53124/09)
The case was examined by the European Court of Human Rights upon the complaint about
the refusal of the Maltese authorities to recognize the applicant’s right to Maltese citizenship.
The applicant was an illegitimate son of a citizen of the United Kingdom and a citizen of Malta.
The father refused to acknowledge the applicant to be his son and his mother had to prove the
paternity in court. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact established in court, that the father of the
child was a citizen of Malta, the Maltese authorities refused to recognize the child as its citizen.
On highlighting that the right to citizenship is not as such a Convention right, the Court also
noted that its denial in the present case was not such as to give rise to a violation of Article
13 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163820
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8 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the impact of citizenship on
social identity was such as to bring it within the general scope and ambit of Article 8 of the
Convention in the aspect of the right to respect for private life.
The full text of the judgment can be found following the link14.
CASE OF KURIĆ AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA
(12 March 2014, Application no. 26828/06)
This case was examined by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
upon the complaint of several former citizens of Yugoslavia against the actions of Slovenia,
as a result of which the applicants lost their status of citizens and the formal right to stay in
this country. Although the individual situation of each applicant differed, they were all united
by the fact that they were living in Slovenia at the time of the proclamation of independence
of the Republic (after the dissolution of Yugoslavia) and did not express their will regarding
its future status (did not acquire citizenship of Slovenia, and did not apply for a permission to
stay). After a while, the Slovenian authorities cleared the records of the applicants as persons
legally residing in the country, whereupon they were deprived of many rights, which they
enjoyed previously and which were granted to the citizens (the right to work, social benefits,
access to health care, the ability to replace lost documents, etc.), and in some cases they even
run a risk of expulsion. Thus, the authorities’ decision on the applicants’ status as citizens or
residents of the country had a profound impact on the whole range of their rights.
The Court concluded that the impact of such decision of the authorities on personal and
family life of the applicants did not comply with the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention.
The full text of the judgment can be found following the link15.
The American Convention on Human Rights
The Convention was adopted at the Inter-American Conference on Human Rights on 22
November 1969 in San Jose. It entered into force on 18 July 1978.
This Convention establishes a regional human rights protection system similar to the
European one. The text of the Convention reflects the specific approach to human rights
typical for the American continent. At the same time, the right to a nationality was included
to the catalog of human rights as a separate item after the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. In this issue American Convention differs from the European Convention on Human
Rights, where the European Court with great difficulty recognizes the right to a nationality as
a circumstance pertaining to personal or family life (see the relevant section in the analytical
materials).
ARTICLE 20. RIGHT TO NATIONALITY
1.Every person has the right to a nationality.
2.Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if
he does not have the right to any other nationality.
3.No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.
The full text of the Convention can be found following the link16.
Convention with respect to the laws and customs of war on land
(The Hague Convention IV)
This Convention is one of the documents adopted at the Peace Conferences in the Hague
in the years 1899 and 1907. The document was adopted on 18 October 1907. For the Russian
14 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106785
15 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111634
16 http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr5.html
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Federation the document came into force on 21 November 1909, for Ukraine – on 29 May
2015. Adoption of the Convention was seen as the embodiment of the rules of customary
international law. Consequently, they are also binding for states that are not formally parties
to the Convention. The rules laid down in the Regulation, have been partially confirmed and
developed in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
ARTICLE 45 OF REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR
ON LAND (THE HAGUE REGULATION).
It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the
hostile Power.
The full text of the Convention can be found following the link17.
The Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
The Fourth Geneva Convention was adopted on 12 August 1949 under the auspices of
the International Committee of the Red Cross. It entered into force on 21 October 1950. The
participants of the Convention (as well as the other three Geneva Conventions, adopted on
the same day in 1949) are all the nations of the world. The Convention contains provisions
on the protection of the civilian population in the context of armed conflict, in particular the
occupation.
Article 67 of the GC IV provides that the occupying military courts shall take into consideration
the fact the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power. It is customary to interpret this
provision in the sense that persons who prior to the occupation had nationality of a State
possessing sovereignty over the relevant territory retain it18.
Forced recruitment of residents of the occupied territory into the armed forces of the
occupying Power is a serious violation of international humanitarian law and a war crime (see.
Wagner precedent19, Berger precedent20, Article 147 of the GC IV, Art. 8 (2) (a) (v ) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court21).
ARTICLE 47
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced,
as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said
territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories
and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the
occupied territory.
ARTICLE 68
[…]
The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person unless the attention
of the court has been particularly called to the fact that since the accused is not a national of
the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance.
[…]
The full text of the Convention can be found following the link22.
17 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195
18 Dinstein Y. The International Law of Belligerent Occupation. — Cambridge, 2009. — P. 53.
19 http://www.worldcourts.com/ildc/eng/decisions/1946.05.03_France_v_Wagner.pdf
20 http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1949.04.13_United_States_v_Weizsaecker.pdf#search=%22weizsaecer%22
21 https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
22 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&
action=openDocument
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Robert Wagner Case
In the summer of 1940, Robert Wagner was appointed by Hitler to be a Gauleiter23 and at the
same time the imperial viceroy in occupied France Alsace for the purpose of germanization
and nazification of the region. Prior to that, Wagner served as Gauleiter and the governor of
Baden. In the early years of the German occupation he made many attempts to encourage
the Alsatians to voluntarily serve in the German army. In general, for the German side the
idea of recruiting volunteers failed (only about 2,300 people, mostly Germans of Alsace
responded to the call). The solution to this problem was the introduction of conscription.
Conscription was introduced in Alsace by the Order of 25 August 1942. In accordance with
section 1 of the Order compulsory military service in the German armed forces for all Alsatians
of German nationality was introduced in Alsace. The Order was made public simultaneously
with the Decree on acquisition of German nationality by all Alsatians. This Decree was
issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Third Reich on 23 August 1942, and also was
applied to the population of Lorraine and Luxembourg. These measures were approved by
the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, in particular, Hitler and Keitel. Consequently, the
spread of German citizenship entailed an obligation for the population of these territories to
serve in the German army.
On 29 July 1945 Wagner was arrested by US occupation forces and handed over to the
French authorities. On 23 April 1946 he was brought before the Permanent Military Tribunal
in Strasbourg. The Tribunal charged Wagner, in particular, with the instigation of the French
to take up arms against France, as well as with organization of recruitment of the French into
the enemy (German) army. As a result, on 3 May 1946 the tribunal sentenced Robert Wagner
to death and confiscation of all property in favor of the people.
Gottlob Berger Case
Gottlob Berger was brought to trial by the American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the
case of «Wilhelmstrasse». On 1 April 1940, Berger was appointed Chief of the SS Main Office,
and in July 1942 became Himmler’s liaison officer for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern
Territories. Also, at various times he served as commander of the reserve forces, the head
of the Service for Prisoners of War in Germany, the chief of staff of the German Volkssturm
(People’s Volunteer Corps) and General of the Waffen-SS.
Regarding Berger through a judicial process in the clearest possible terms, it was noted that,
“the program implemented in Serbia and Croatia was also carried out in Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Russia, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine. Without a doubt, defendant Berger is
guilty of committing crimes against humanity by the fact that he and his departments were
involved in forcing the citizens of these countries to the Germanization or other methods for
the purpose of recruitment into the German armed forces”.
On 11 April 1949 the American Military Tribunal sentenced Gottlob Berger to 25 years in
prison.
These precedents again prove the fact that the right to a nationality and violation of this
right is closely linked to other human rights violations, right up to international crimes, which
is the forced recruitment of inhabitants of the occupied territory into the armed forces of the
occupying Power.
Nottebohm Case24
International Court of Justice in its famous judgment in the Nottebohm case of 6 April 1955,
said that it is the sovereign right of each State to decide who are its nationals, provided
23 Gauleiter was the party leader of a regional branch of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party
24 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/18/2674.pdf
Case law of international courts
Case law of international courts
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that this process must be properly regulated by international law. International Court of
Justice has upheld the principle of «effective nationality”, that which accorded with the facts
and based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of these States
whose nationality is involved. These factors include the habitual residence of the individual
concerned but also the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life,
attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
Case of Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic25
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its judgment in the case of Yean and Bosico
v. Dominican Republic acknowledged the ethnic discrimination of citizens of the Dominican
Republic of Haitian descent and confirmed, as enshrined in the aforementioned American
Convention on Human Rights, the right of every person to citizenship as a prerequisite for
equal enjoyment of all rights in the society. Inter-American Court in its decision also noted
that the regulation of nationality issues is the responsibility of the state, but international law
imposes certain restrictions on the implementation of such powers. The Court upheld this
argument in another case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru26, but also noted27 that the right to a
nationality is an inalienable right of all people and has an important influence on the legal
existence of a natural person.
Joint statement of the participants of the Conference of European Constitutional
Courts concerning respect for territorial integrity and international law in administering
constitutional justice of 10 September 2015
(Batumi Declaration)
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation played its role in the formal recognition of
the annexation, having considered the so-called “treaty on the accession of Crimea” in terms
of its constitutionality, and spoke in favor of the legality of admitting the so-called “Republic of
Crimea” and the “City of Federal Importance Sevastopol” to the Russian Federation (see the
relevant section in the Russian legislation). At the same time the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation also assessed provisions regarding citizenship of the Crimean residents
(see below the section in the Russian legislation).
The position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation was condemned by some
participants of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, which was held in Batumi in
September 2015. In particular, on 10 September 2015, there was signed the so-called Batumi
Declaration, which noted that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation formally
had a decisive role in the process of annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and without its
judgment the annexation could not be recognized as lawful under national Russian legislation
(the illegality of the annexation in the context of international law is not in question in the text
of the declaration).
The full text of the document can be read below in this review
25 http://www.refworld.org/docid/44e497d94.html
26 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_74_ing.pdf
27 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_04_ing.pdf
JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ADMINISTERING CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
As it is known, on 19 March 2014, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
passed the judgment in the case «On the verification of the constitutionality of the
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international treaty, which has not yet entered into force, between the Russian Federation
and the Republic of Crimea on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian
Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation».
By that unprecedented judgment, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
recognised that the agreement between the Russian Federation and the so-called
«Republic of Crimea», located in the territory of Ukraine, is an international treaty, as well
as that the so-called «Republic of Crimea» has the status of an international legal entity.
It is important to note’ that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
formally has a decisive role in the process of the annexation of foreign territories. Under
Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation
«On the Procedure of Admission to the Russian Federation and Creation of a New
Subject of the Russian Federation in Its Composition», an international treaty on the
accession of a new entity to the Russian Federation may be ratified only after the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation rules such a treaty to be in compliance
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Thus, under the Russian legislation,
the above-mentioned judgment was necessary in order to formally annex part of the
territory of Ukraine — Crimea and the City of Sevastopol. Without that judgment, the
annexation of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol could not be formally accomplished.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, by adopting its judgment
of 19 March 2014 within one day after the so-called «Treaty» was signed, performed an
instrumental role in accomplishing and justifying the annexation of Crimea.
We recall that, under international law, such annexation of a foreign territory is a
manifestation of aggression and cannot be justified by any consideration.
In this context, it should be noted that not a single European state has recognised
this annexation and that the general international consensus as to the illegality of the
«Crimean referendum» and the annexation of Crimea is, inter alia, expressed in United
Nations General Assembly Resolution no. 68/262 «The territorial integrity of Ukraine»
(2014), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolutions no. 1988 «Recent
developments in Ukraine: threats to the functioning of democratic institutions» (2014),
no. 1990 «Reconsideration on 2
substantive grounds of the previously ratified credentials of the Russian delegation»
(2014) and no. 2034 «Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified
credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation» (2015), European Parliament
Resolution no. 2014/2699(RSP) «On Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries
and in particular destabilisation of eastern Ukraine» and the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly Resolution «The continuation of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of
OSCE commitments and international norms by the Russian Federation» (2015). The
conclusions concerning the illegality of the «Crimean referendum» were also stated in
the Opinion of the European Commission for
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on «Whether the decision taken by
the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organise a
referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the Russian Federation or Restoring
Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is compatible with constitutional principles» (2014).
We consider that the judgment of 19 March 2014 of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation amounts to a grave violation of international law (the universally
recognised norms of international law, including those consolidated in the 1945
Charter of the United Nations, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe). Consequently, it may be concluded that this judgment is not
in accordance with the fundamental principle of the rule of law, which obliges courts to
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comply with the general principles of law, the main principles of international law and
the values of democratic constitutional order,
We reiterate that the Statute of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts
makes the full membership of European Constitutional Courts in this organisation
conditional upon the conduct of judicial activities by its members in accordance with
the principle of judicial independence, the fundamental principles of democracy, the
rule of law and the duty to respect human rights (Paragraph 1 (a) of Article 6),
We, therefore, invite the members of the Conference of European Constitutional
Courts to consider adopting the «Declaration on respect for territorial integrity and
international law in administering constitutional justice», which has been proposed by
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
This Joint Statement is open for signature to the memberS of the Conference of
European Constitutional Courts,
Batumi, 10 September 2015
SIGNED BY:
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Laws and regulations of Ukraine
Constitution of Ukraine
Date of approval and number: 28 June 1996, no. 254k/96-VR
Effective date: 28 June 1996
ARTICLE 4.
There is single citizenship in Ukraine. The grounds for the acquisition and termination of
Ukrainian citizenship are determined by law.
ARTICLE 25.
A citizen of Ukraine shall not be deprived of citizenship and of the right to change citizenship.
A citizen of Ukraine shall not be expelled from Ukraine or surrendered to another state.
Ukraine guarantees care and protection to its citizens who are beyond its borders.
ARTICLE 26.
Foreigners and stateless persons who are in Ukraine on legal grounds enjoy the same
rights and freedoms and also bear the same duties as citizens of Ukraine, with the exceptions
established by the Constitution, laws or international treaties of Ukraine. Foreigners and
stateless persons may be granted asylum by the procedure established by law.
ARTICLE 33.
Everyone who is legally present on the territory of Ukraine is guaranteed freedom of
movement, free choice of place of residence, and the right to freely leave the territory of
Ukraine, with the exception of restrictions established by law.
A citizen of Ukraine may not be deprived of the right to return to Ukraine at any time.
The full text of the Constitution can be found following the link28.
Law of Ukraine “On the Unified state demographic register and the documents
confirming citizenship of Ukraine, certifying the identity or its special status”
ARTICLE 13.
Titles and types of documents issued with the application of the Unified state demographic
register.
1. Documents, execution of which is provided by this Law with the application of the Register,
in accordance with their purpose are divided into:
1) documents certifying the identity and confirming citizenship of Ukraine:
a) a Ukrainian passport;
b) a Ukrainian international passport;
c) a diplomatic passport of Ukraine;
d) a service passport of Ukraine;
e) a seafarers’ identity document;
f) a crew member certificate;
g) an ID card to return to Ukraine;
h) a Ukrainian temporary certificate.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link29.
Law of Ukraine “On Citizenship of Ukraine”
Date of approval and number: 18 January 2001, no. 2235-III
28 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ccpe/profiles/ukraineConstitution_en.asp
29 http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1601-18
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Effective date: 1 March 2001
Contents: the Law regulates the procedure for acquisition of citizenship, defining the
grounds for such an acquisition (Art. 6), as well as the procedure for termination of citizenship
(Art. 17 voluntary termination of citizenship of Ukraine).
The citizenship of Ukraine is based, in particular, on the principles of a single citizenship,
prevention of statelessness, impossibility of deprivation of citizenship, retention of citizenship,
regardless of the citizen’s place of residence (Art. 2).
The full text of the Law can be found following the link30.
The Law of Ukraine “On Securing the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal
Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”
Date of approval and number: 15 April 2014, no. 1207-18
Effective date: 27 April 2014
Contents: Part 1 of Art. 6 of the Law secures the rights of citizens residing in the temporarily
occupied territory for issuance of documents certifying Ukrainian citizenship.
Part 4 of Art. 5 determines that compulsory automatic enrollment of Ukrainian citizens, who
reside in the temporarily occupied territory, to the citizenship of the Russian Federation is not
recognized by Ukraine and is not ground for deprivation of Ukraine’s citizenship.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link31.
The Law of Ukraine «On Creation of the Free Economic Zone «Crimea» and on
Peculiarities of Exercising Economic Activity in the Temporarily Occupied Territories
of Ukraine»
Date of approval and number: 12 August 2014. no. 1636-VII
Effective date: 27 September 2014
Contents: Art. 8.3. of the Law stipulates that state guarantees concerning benefits and social
assistance do not apply to citizens who live in the territory of the FEZ Crimea and are either
stateless or have citizenship of a foreign state, as well as to the citizens of Ukraine who also
have the citizenship of the occupying state. Transitional provisions of the Law established
that foreigners and stateless persons, citizens of Ukraine who live in the temporarily occupied
territory of Ukraine or temporarily staying in the other territory of Ukraine are recognized nonresidents
for the purpose of customs formalities.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link32.
Law of Ukraine “On ensuring the rights and freedoms of internally displaced persons”
Date of approval and number: 20 October 2014, no. 1706-VII
Effective date: 22 November 2014
Contents: IDPs can receive documents certifying their identity, special status and citizenship
if they appeal to the central executive body at the place of their factual residence (Art. 6).
The full text of the Law can be found following the link33.
30 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/nationality/National%20legislation/Ukraine%20LawCitizenship%20
consol%20June05_ENG.pdf
31 http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-news/23095-law-of-ukraine-no-1207-vii-of-15-april-2014-on-securingthe-
rights-and-freedoms-of-citizens-and-the-legal-regimeon-the-temporarily-occupied-territory-of-ukraine-withchanges-
set-forth-by-the-law-no-1237-vii-of-6-may-2014
32 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1636-18
33 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ukraine-IDP-Law-November-2014.pdf
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Federation
Constitution of the Russian Federation
Date of approval: 12 December 1993
Effective date: 01 October 1993
Contents: Art. 6 stioulates that the citizenship of the Russian Federation shall be acquired
and terminated according to federal law; it shall be one and equal, irrespective of the grounds
of acquisition. Every citizen of the Russian Federation shall enjoy in its territory all the rights and
freedoms and bear equal duties provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. A
citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deprived of his or her citizenship or of the right
to change it.
Art. 62 of the Constitution allows dual citizenship for Russian citizens.
The full text of the Constitution can be found following the link34.
Law of the Russian Federation of 28 November 1991 no. 1948-I “On Citizenship of the
Russian Federation”
The Law on Citizenship was adopted in connection with the proclamation of independence
by the Russian Federation in 1991. In 2002, the text of the Law was redrafted (see below).
Of a particular interest are the provisions on granting Russian citizenship to former USSR
citizens residing in the territory of the Russian Federation on the date of entry into force of this
Law. Persons of this category had the right to declare their unwillingness to have citizenship
of the Russian Federation during a year after the Law came into force. In comparison, the
residents of Crimea were given less than a month to think about this decision, and the period,
during which the opportunity to “express the desire to keep the citizenship of Ukraine” existed
de facto, was less than 18 days.
ARTICLE 13. RECOGNITION OF CITIZENSHIP OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
1. All former Soviet citizens permanently residing in the territory of the Russian Federation
on the date of entry into force of this Law shall be recognized as citizens of the Russian
Federation, unless they declared their unwillingness to have Russian citizenship within one
year after that day.
The full text of the document can be found following the link35.
Federal Constitutional Law “On Admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of
Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the New Constituent Entities
of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol”
Date of approval and number: 20 March 2014, no. 6-FKZ
Effective date: 21 March 2014
Contents: Art. 4 of the FCL regulates the recognition of citizenship of the Russian Federation
for the citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons who permanently reside in the territory of
the Republic of Crimea or Sevastopol. Thus, all Ukrainian citizens and stateless persons who
reside in the territory of the Republic of Crimea or Sevastopol shall be recognized as citizens
of the Russian Federation. Persons willing to retain their nationality or remain stateless must
declare this within 1 month after admitting the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation.
Otherwise, citizens shall be recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation without any
second citizenship. In addition, the Law imposes restrictions for holding positions in state
34 http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm
35 http://www.democracy.ru/library/laws/federal/1948-I_fz/
Laws and regulations of the Russian Federation
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Federation
and municipal bodies by the Russian citizens who have a second citizenship or the right of
permanent residence in a foreign country. Art. 11 of the Law also guarantees the citizens of
Ukraine and stateless persons residing in the territory of the Republic of Crimea at the time of
admitting the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation the right to social assistance only
in case they acquire Russian citizenship.
Typical form of declaration that was strictly recommended to fulfill by those Crimeans who
wanted to avoid Russian citizenship:
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Federal Law “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation”
Date of approval, number: April 19, 2002, no. 62-FZ
Effective date: 1 July, 2002
Contents: Art. 4 of the Law contains the principles concerning the citizenship of the Russian
Federation and the rules that regulate relations in the field of the Russian citizenship. In addition,
it defines grounds, conditions and procedure for acquisition and termination of citizenship of
the Russian Federation. Art. 6 of the FL allows dual citizenship for Russian citizens. The list
of grounds for acquisition of citizenship of the Russian Federation is not exhaustive (Art. 11: at
birth, on reinstatement in the citizenship, on admission to the citizenship, etc.).
Arts. 18 and 19 of the Law contain grounds and regulate the manner of renunciation of
citizenship of the Russian Federation on the basis of free will of a person. Art. 20 provides that
renunciation of citizenship shall not be permitted if a person: a) owes an incomplete obligation
towards the Russian Federation, established by the federal laws; b) is under indictment in a
criminal case in the Russian Federation or under a sentence of conviction which has taken
effect and is pending execution; c) possesses no other citizenship and guarantee for the
acquisition thereof.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link36.
36 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_36927/
FMS of Russia
From a citizen________________
___________________________
Date of birth_________________
___________________________
Place of birth_________________
___________________________
Residing in__________________
___________________________
Passport details_______________
Declaration
I____________________________________________________________________
declare the willingness to retain my citizenship of Ukraine (status of a stateless person) for
myself and my minor children __________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________
In light of this, I refuse to be recognized (to recognize my minor children) as a citizen of
the Russian Federation according to the Article 5 of the Agreement between the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Crimea on admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of
Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities (Moscow,
March 18, 2014).
I am aware of a legal status of a foreigner, a stateless person and necessity to make relevant
documents, as well as legal consequences of my decision.
______________________ ______________________
(date) (signature)
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Federation
Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation “On approval of the Regulations on the
order of consideration of issues of citizenship of the Russian Federation”
Date of adoption and number: 14 November, 2002, no. 1325 (revised on 4 August, 2016).
Contents: It regulates the procedure for submission and review of documents for
renunciation of citizenship of the Russian Federation.
The following data must be provided among other things in an application for renunciation
of citizenship: series, number, date of issue of a Russian passport and the authority which has
issued this document. A copy of passport must be enclosed to this application.
Thus, the exercise of the right to renounce Russian citizenship is impossible for persons who
have refused to obtain Russian passports and whom the Russian Federation, nevertheless,
considers its citizens.
The full text of the Decree can be found following the link37.
The Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the
Admitting of the Republic of Crimea in the Russian Federation and on Establishing
New Constituent Entities within the Russian Federation
Date of signature: 18 March 2014
Date of ratification: 21 March 2014
Effective date: 1 April 2014
Contents: the Agreement specifies that the citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons
permanently residing on the day the Republic of Crimea was admitted to the Russian
Federation are recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation. An exception are persons
who, within one month from the date of acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the
Russian Federation declare their desire to maintain their existing citizenship or otherwise
remain stateless. Changes regarding the period of notice have been made to the Federal
Law «On Amendments to Art. Art. 6 and 30 of the Federal Law «On Citizenship of the Russian
Federation” and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation». The term has been
extended to January 1, 2016.
The full text of the Agreement can be found following the link38.
Decision of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court on 19 March 2014 no. 6-II
“On the constitutionality of the International Agreement, not yet in force, between
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the
new constituent entities”
Date of approval: 19 March 2014
Contents: The Court considered the request of the President of the RF on the constitutionality
of the International Agreement concluded between the RF and Crimea. The Court found that
the Agreement corresponds to the Constitution of the RF. It was found that the provision on
granting citizenship of the RF and the obligation to notify dual citizenship or statelessness
is not inconsistent with the Constitution, because it does not compel to renounce another
citizenship or remain stateless while ensuring, if desired, the right to acquire Russian
citizenship without taking any actions for this purpose.
The full text of the decision can be found following the link39.
37 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_39607/0b46424cde96ea7d9427d2c3d28d0bac40dd8cb4/
38 http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102171897&rdk=&backlink=1
39 https://goo.gl/dtHuRw
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Federation
Federal Law of the RF “On amendments to Art. 6 and 30 of the Federal Law “On
citizenship of the Russian Federation” and certain legislative acts of the Russian
Federation”
Date of approval and number: 23 May 2014, no. 142-FZ
Effective date: 4 August 2014
Contents: The Federal Law introduces amendments to some legislative instruments
regarding Russian citizens who reside within the boundaries of the Russian Federation and
who have another citizenship or the right of permanent residence in another country. These
citizens shall be obliged to notify in writing of any other citizenship or the right of permanent
residence within 60 days from the date of acquisition of a second citizenship or the right of
permanent residence. The procedure for notification of such citizenship is also regulated.
Violation of the established procedure for notification shall entail the imposition of an
administrative fine (Art.19.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences). The Criminal Code was
amended imposing liability in the form of a fine, forced labor for failure to fulfill a notification
obligation (Art. 330.2 of the Russian Criminal Code). Citizens who acquire Russian citizenship
in accordance with the Agreement on admitting to the RF the Republic of Crimea no. 6-FKZ
shall be deemed to have the Russian citizenship only, in case of filing an application for
their reluctance to be citizens of a foreign state. The deadline for notification of a second
citizenship and punishment for violation of the established procedure for notification, as well
as punishment for failure to notify and concealing dual citizenship is effective from 1 January
2016 (Art. 6 of the Federal Law of the RF “On citizenship”).
The full text of the document can be found following the link40.
Federal Law “On amendments to Art. 6 of the Federal Law “On citizenship”
Date of approval and number: 19 December 2014, no. 507-FZ
Effective date: 31 December 2014
Contents: Art. 6 of the Federal Law “On citizenship” is supplemented with part 3, which
states that citizens who have multiple citizenship and file no notice within 60 days of their
foreign citizenship or the right of residence in a foreign state shall be obliged to submit such
notification not later than 30 days from the date of entry into the territory of the RF. Citizens
who arrive in the Russian Federation in a manner not requiring a visa and on the date of
entry into force of this Law are citizens of that foreign state only shall submit a notification of
another citizenship or the right of permanent residence in other country prior to January 1,
2016.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link41.
Federal Law “On amendments to the Federal Law “On the legal status of foreign citizens
in the Russian Federation” and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”
Date of approval and number: 14 November 2014, no. 357-FZ
Effective date: 24 November 2014
In accordance with this Law, foreign citizens staying lawfully in the territory of the Russian
Federation, arriving in the Russian Federation in a manner not requiring a visa and reaching
the age of 18 shall be entitled from January 1, 2015 to be employed on the basis of a work
permit both by individuals and legal entities. Thus, the Crimean people who are not citizens of
the Russian Federation in accordance with the Russian laws shall be obliged to obtain a work
40 https://rg.ru/2014/06/06/grajdanstvo-dok.html
41 https://rg.ru/2015/01/12/grazhdanstvo-dok.html
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Federation
permit. Clarifications on the employment can be found following the link42.
The full text of the Law can be found following the link43.
Decree of the Russian Government dd. October 29, 2015 no. 2197-r on the establishment
of quotas for issuing permits for temporary residence in the Russian Federation to
foreign citizens and stateless persons
In accordance with this Decree, in 2016, the Crimean Federal District (including the “Republic
of Crimea” and Sevastopol) was provided with 1900 temporary residence permits for foreign
citizens and stateless persons (1500 for Crimea and 400 for Sevastopol).
The full text of the document can be found following the link44.
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation contains two articles that are of direct
relevance to citizenship.
First of all, it is Art. 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which provides for
liability for high treason. The subject of the offense under this Article is a citizen of Russia. This
provision, in addition to direct collection of information constituting a state secret, provides for
liability for rendering any assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization,
or their representatives in activities against the security of the Russian Federation. Obviously,
in the context of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine the imposition
of Russian citizenship predetermines the prosecution of Crimean people for any active
demonstration of loyalty to Ukraine. Given that the classification of the activities to such that
are directed against the security of the Russian Federation is carried out in a quite subjective
way, this provision predetermines repressions against the Crimean people.
Moreover, the provisions of Art. 330.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
provide for liability for failure to notify the Russian authorities of the citizenship (nationality)
of another state. In fact, it is a means of control over possible loyalty of citizens to other
countries.
ARTICLE 275. HIGH TREASON
High treason, that is act of espionage committed by a citizen of the Russian Federation,
disclosure to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives
of information constituting a state secret that has been entrusted or has become known to
that person through service, work, study or in other cases determined by the legislation of the
Russian Federation, or any financial, material and technical, consultative or other assistance
to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives in activities
against the security of the Russian Federation -
shall be punished by deprivation of liberty for a term of twelve to twenty years with or
without a fine in an amount of up to five hundred thousand rubles or in the amount of the wage
or salary, or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years and with
restriction of liberty for a term of up to two years.
Note. A person who has committed crimes stipulated in this Article, or Articles 276 and
278 of this Code, shall be relieved from criminal liability if he has facilitated the prevention
of further damage to the interests of the Russian Federation by informing the governmental
authorities of his own free will and in due time, or in any other way, if his actions contain no
other corpus delicti.
42 http://mtrud.rk.gov.ru/rus/info.php?id=622731
43 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_171225/
44 http://government.ru/media/files/WSuem3sXQhKEsRQlJ4CNsW2M1J94eeup.pdf
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ARTICLE 330.2. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY OF THE
CITIZENSHIP (NATIONALITY) OF A FOREIGN STATE OR A RESIDENCE PERMIT
OR ANY OTHER VALID DOCUMENT CONFIRMING THE RIGHT TO PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY (PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL LAW OF
04.06.2014 NO. 142-FZ)
Failure to comply with the obligation determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation
to notify the relevant territorial body within the federal executive body authorized to exercise
the functions of control and supervision in the field of migration about the citizenship (nationality)
of a foreign state or a residence permit or any other valid document confirming the right to
permanent residence in a foreign country - shall be punished by a fine in an amount of up to
two hundred thousand rubles or in the amount of the wage or salary, or other income of the
convicted person for a period of up to one year or by compulsory labor for a term of up to four
hundred hours.
The full text of the document can be found following the link45.
Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 4 October 2016 no.
18-P in the case regarding the verification of constitutionality of Part 1, Article 4 of the
Federal Constitutional Law “On admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of
Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities
of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol” upon A.G.
Olenev’s complaint
The reason for this decision was the problem that had arisen with respect to getting a
Russian passport by persons who actually lived in Crimea, but were not registered there.
When considering this case, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation referred
to the principle of respect for the will of certain persons. According to the authors of this
review, this position does not fit well with the other part of this decision: the Constitutional
Court substantiates its findings with the Russia’s succession to the Crimean Peninsula and
considers the connection of “new citizens” with the annexed territory as a ground for granting
citizenship (this idea is borrowed from the UN General Assembly Resolution on Nationality
of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States). The contradiction in the position
of the Constitutional Court is that if the same principles apply to persons who were officially
registered in Crimea, then their will to be recognized as Russian citizens was rudely ignored,
as they were subjected to mass collective naturalization as something that comes together
with the annexed territory.
The full text of the document can be found following the link46.
45 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/2ca391674eeaa02069722fa3f13cbb41cce0a95d/
46 http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision247212.pdf
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Constitution of the Republic of Crimea
Date of ratification: 11 April 2014
Effective date: 12 April 2014
Contents: Part 3 of Art. 62 of the Constitution defines the head of the Republic of Crimea as
a citizen of the Russian Federation without citizenship of a foreign state or a residence permit
or any other document confirming the right of permanent residence of a Russian citizen in a
foreign country.
The full text of the Constitution of the “RC” can be found following the link47.
47 https://rg.ru/2014/05/06/krim-konstituciya-reg-dok.html
Laws of the so-called “Republic of Crimea”
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German Czechoslovakian treaty relating to citizenship and options of 20 November
193848
This treaty was adopted with the aim to resolve issues of citizenship between Germany
and Czechoslovakia as a result of the occupation of the territory of the latter in October 1938.
Since the end of World War II, due to the insignificance of the Munich agreement on the
division of Czechoslovakia in 1938 all the acts that took the form of an international treaty, in
particular, the said contract would be recognized as invalid.
Despite an early invalidation of the Treaty, there is reason to believe that its adoption
largely affected the «post-war» fate of many Germans living in the occupied territories
of Czechoslovakia. We are talking about the forced eviction of the German minority in
Czechoslovakia who acquired German citizenship before the end of World War II. The eviction
of the civilian population, being illegal from the point of view of modern international law, was
made on the basis of decrees of Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš.
Thus, in accordance with Beneš Decree of 2 August 1945 regarding the change of the
Czechoslovak citizenship for persons of German and Hungarian ethnic origin, citizens of
Czechoslovakia of German or Hungarian national origin who acquired German or Hungarian
citizenship by the order of the occupation authorities, lost the right to citizenship of
Czechoslovakia on the day of acquiring this citizenship.
The text of the treaty of 20 November 1938
The governments of Germany and Czechoslovakia, willing to settle the issues of citizenship
and options arising from the reunification of Sudeten German areas with the German Reich,
authorized:
on behalf of the German Government – Ministerialdirektor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Dr. Friedrich Gauss, and Ministerial Adviser in the Reichsministerium, Mr. Dr. Hans Globke.
On behalf of the Government of Czechoslovakia - Mr. Dr. Antonin Koukal, Ministerial Adviser
of the Ministry of Justice in Prague,
who agreed on the following provisions:
§1.
Those citizens of Czechoslovakia who as of 10 October 1938 were living in one of the
communities reunited with the German Reich, from 10 October 1938 acquire German
citizenship while losing Czechoslovak citizenship, if they
a) were born before 1 January 1910 in the territory, reunited with the German Reich,
or
b) lost their German citizenship on 10 January 1920,
or
c) are the children or grandchildren of a person who is subject to the conditions of a) or b)
or
d) are the wives of persons who are subject to the terms of paragraphs a), b) or c)
Citizens of Czechoslovakia of German national origin, who as of 10 October 1938 resided
outside the territory of the former state Czechoslovakia from 10 October 1938 receive German
citizenship while losing Czechoslovak citizenship, if they as of 10 October 1938 had the right
to citizenship in one of the communities reunited with the German Reich.
A wife does not acquire German citizenship if a husband does not acquire it.
§2.
The German Government is entitled up to 10 July 1939 to require persons of not German
48 The translation is made by the NGO “Regional Centre for Human Rights”
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national origin who, according to the provisions of this Treaty shall remain citizens of
Czechoslovakia and moved to the territory, reunited with the German Reich, since 1 January
1910, as well as their descendants with Czechoslovak citizenship, to leave the German Reich
during the three-month period.
The Government of Czechoslovakia takes these persons in its territory.
The Government of Czechoslovakia is entitled up to 10 July 1939 to require persons of German
national origin, who by the time this Treaty enteres into force are citizens of Czechoslovakia
and moved to the territory of the modern Republic of Czechoslovakia since 1 January 1910
as well as their descendants to leave the territory of the Czechoslovak Republicduring the
three-month period.
At the same time, these persons are deprived of citizenship of Czechoslovakia. The German
government takes them into its territory. This provision shall not apply to persons who have
received Czechoslovak citizenship after 30 January 1933 and until the date indicated had
been citizens of Germany or Austria.
§ 3.
Persons not of German national origin, who under the provisions of § 1 acquire German
citizenship, have until 29 March 1939 the right to opt for Czechoslovak citizenship.
§ 4.
Persons of German national origin, who remain citizens of Czechoslovakia, have until 29
March 1939 the right to opt for German citizenship. This provision shall not apply to persons
who received Czechoslovak citizenship after 30 January 1933 and until the date indicated
had been citizens of Germany or Austria.
§ 5.
One can inform about the willingness to opt:
a) in favor of Czechoslovak citizenship in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republicin the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in Prague,
outside the Czechoslovak Republicin the competent executive authority of Czechoslovakia;
b) in favor of German citizenship in the territory of the German Reich in the lower competent
administrative authority,
outside the German Reich in the authorized German consulate.
§ 6.
The territorial competence of the authorities referred to in § 5 is determined by the place of
residence, and in the absence of residence, place of location of an optant.
If the application of option is submitted to the territorially incompetent authority, other than
specified in § 5, then the latter passes it to the territorially competent authority. The date of
submission of the application shall be the date of its receipt in the first instance.
§ 7.
Application of option is submitted to the authority referred to in § 5 being recorded or in
writing. Signature under the application submitted in writing must be certified by the official
representative of the State whose citizenship is chosen, by the court or the notary.
Application of option may also be submitted by an authorized representative. The
signature under a power of attorney must be certified by any of the instances referred to in
the paragraph 1.
Certification is exempt from fees, taxes, stamp duties and other charges.
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§ 8.
The competent authority of the state whose citizenship is selected, checks the prerequisites
for the option. In the Czechoslovak Republic, this checking is reserved for the Ministry of
Interior in Prague.
If the conditions for the option are met, the authority shall immediately issue a certificate of
option for an optant, and notify the authority designated by the other Government.
In the certificate of option there should be also specified family members subject to the
option.
The option enters into force at the time an application of option is received by the authorities
dealing with the choice of citizenship.
The procedure of option does not provide for any fees, taxes, stamp duties and other
charges.
§ 9.
Any person having reached the age of 18 may submit the application of option.
The wife does not have the right to opt for their own; option by the husband covers a wife.
This rule does not apply if the marriage is dissolved in court.
For persons under 18, for persons over 18 years, for whom there are grounds for depriving
them of their legal capacity, as well as for persons who are deprived of legal capacity or over
whom a temporary custody (guardianship) is established, option could be made by their legal
representatives, even if the latter has no right of option. In order to assess the grounds for the
application of option under this paragraph, the date of submission of the application of option
to the authorities dealing with the choice of citizenship is fundamental.
§ 10.
The option is irreversible.
However, if persons for whom the legal representative has exercised the right of option,
reach the age of 18 years before the expiry of the option period or until the expiration of that
period the basis of their legal representation is no longer valid, they can cancel option within
the time limit. The abolition of the option is covered by the provisions of §§ 5-7, respectively.
§ 11.
According to this Treaty, a place of residence of a person is the place where the person has
settled with the intention of long-term residence.
If a person has more than one place of residence, the place that he indicates as his place
of residence, is fundamental.
§ 12.
Persons who are required to leave the territory of the German Reich or the Czechoslovak
Republic, as prescribed under § 2, as well as optants that until 3 March 1940 move their place
of residence to the State in favor of which they have opted, are permitted to take all movable
property, which they had as of the date of this Treaty, and they are exempt from any duties.
An exception is cash, securities and collections that are of particular historical or cultural
significance to the country of export. Consideration of these issues should be specified by a
special agreement.
§ 13.
To check and resolve all issues that arise in the execution of this Treaty, a Mixed Commission
is created, to which each of two Governments shall send an equal number of representatives.
This Commission is particularly charged with the responsibility of:
1. the development of proposals to facilitate the exchange of populations, as well as
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clarification of fundamental questions that arise in this exchange;
2. the verification of doubt in regard to citizenship.
The Commission may appoint a sub-committees on specific issues if necessary.
§ 14.
This Treaty shall enter into force on 26 November 1938.
Done in duplicate, in the German and Czechoslovak languages.
Berlin, 20 November 1938.
Friedrich Gauss
Antonin Koukal
Hans Globke
[Source: The monthly magazine of Foreign Policy 5 (1938), no. 9, pp 1213-1216].
The Treaty in the original language can be found following the link49.
Resolution of the Crimean Supreme Council on legislative initiative for the right of
citizens of the Republic of Crimea to dual citizenship
18 December 1992, № 223-1
1. In accordance with Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “On citizenship of Ukraine” and Article
21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea to consider it necessary to propose to the
Supreme Council of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine to speed up decision-making on
the exercise of the right to dual citizenship by the Crimean citizens.
2. To temporarily suspend in the territory of the Republic of Crimea the execution of
decisions by the law enforcement bodies on citizenship of Ukraine in relation to the Crimean
citizens, who haven’t still decided on their belonging to Ukraine.
3. To instruct the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for legislation,
lawfulness and system of justice to prepare proposals on the practical exercise of the right of
the Crimean citizens to dual citizenship.
The full text of the document can be found following the link50.
49 http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19381120-1.pdf
50 http://precedent.crimea.ua/documents/postanovlenye-verhovnoho-soveta-kryima-o-zakonodatelnoj-ynytsyatyve-povoprosu-
realyzatsyy-prava-hrazhdan-respublyky-kryim-na-dvojnoe-hrazhdanstvo-ystorycheskye-materyalyi/
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The Russian authorities exploit the “automatic obtaining of nationality” for prosecuting
pro-Ukrainian activists. The best-known examples are cases of Oleg Sentsov and Aleksandr
Kolchenko who were arrested and transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation
on suspicion of committing criminal offenses. Both are citizens of Ukraine and during the
occupation lived in Crimea. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights highlighted in its report of July 15, 2014 (para. 188):
“It would appear that since Sentsov did not explicitly renounce Russian citizenship within the
deadline provided under Russian legislation, he is automatically considered to have become
a Russian citizen.”
Particularly, the “Kolchenko’s case” should be mentioned in the context ofnationality, as
it indicates the compulsory nature of the “automatic nationaity” of the Russian Federation,
which does not depend on the will of a person. The court denied the retention of the Ukrainian
citizenship by Kolchenko, despite the fact that Kolchenko while being in custody in Moscow
could not apply for Russian citizenship and obtain a Russian passport. Kolchenko confirms
that he has taken no actions to obtain Russian citizenship. The only document that has been
certifying his identity since the time of his arrest is his Ukrainian passport. Kolchenko considers
himself a citizen of Ukraine, and Ukraine recognizes Kolchenko’s Ukrainian citizenship.
The court decided to deny the retention of the Ukrainian citizenship by Oleksandr
Kolchenko. The court’s decision to deny the retention of the Ukrainian citizenship contradicts
international law, Russian and Ukrainian legislations. Therefore, Kolchenko is deprived of the
right to nationality, despite the fact that no one can be deprived of nationality arbitrarily. In
addition, the judgment violates Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1966, which guarantees that everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere
as a person before the law. Thus, Kolchenko’s legal personality is based on his Ukrainian
nationality, and his legal nexus as a national of Ukraine remains unchanged outside Ukraine.
In this case, the court, deciding in the name of the Russian Federation, unreasonably refuses
to recognize Oleksandr Kolchenko’s legal personality (Report of the Crimean Human Rights
Field Mission for January 2015, p. 16).
Eventually, the North Caucasus District Military Court sentenced Oleg Sentsov and
Oleksandr Kolchenko to 20 and 10 years of imprisonment in a strict regime penal colony,
respectively, as Russian citizens. At the same time, Kolchenko with assistance of his lawyer
Svetlana Sidorkina filed a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights about the
compulsory imposition of the Russian nationality.
This “automatic” acquisition of Russian nationality by nationals of Ukraine in Crimea is illegal,
since the internal procedures of the Russian Federation for its acquisition fail to comply with
the applicable international conventions, customary international law and the principles of the
nationality law (in particular, see The European Convention on Nationality, Nottebohm case).
***
Those Crimeans who for one reason or another have not declared their «desire to preserve
their existing citizenship of Ukraine», but still do not wish to be considered as citizens of the
Russian Federation, faced a “curious” situation. Often in this situation, these people do not
apply for the issuance of Russian passports, while continuing to use the passport of citizen
of Ukraine.
Some of these people have applied for a residence permit as citizens of Ukraine. Mainly,
this situation ends with failure. Denial is usually motivated by the fact that, in accordance with
the law of 6-FKZ applicants are considered as citizens of Russia, and a residence permit may
be granted only to foreign nationals.
Those Crimeans who try to renounce the imposed citizenship of the Russian Federation
also end up in a complicated situation. Russian legislation makes no exception for Crimeans,
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and thus they have to undergo the procedure of renouncing the citizenship in a general way.
This procedure, among other things, requires a RF passport. Thus, here is a vicious circle:
in order to get rid of the imposed citizenship, you must first recognize yourself a citizen of
Russia and formally apply for a passport.
If Crimeans do not have a «document confirming the legality of staying in the territory of
Russia» (Russian passport or residence permit) this leads to restriction or deprivation of many
of their rights. Without Russian passport or a residence permit it is impossible be formal
employment, apply for health services, social benefits and pensions.
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Imposition of citizenship as a new human rights violation and a way of
implementing aggressive expansion by the Russian Federation in the
context of the occupation of Crimea
By Serhiy Zayets
Lawyer and expert of the NGO “Regional Centre for Human Rights”
* This article was first published in Ukrainian and German languages with support of the Institute for European
Policy (Berlin), the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the Federal Foreign Office of Germany under
the project “Strengthening of Ukrainian Think Tanks: the Development of Institutional Capacity and Improving
Cooperation with Partners in the European Union”
Introduction
After the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula the Russian Federation collectively
naturalized the population of Crimea. This fact raises a number of questions that have no
ready answers in today’s environment. Firstly, it is a way of seizing the territory together
with the population. Secondly, it is interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs and nationality
relationship that existed between the Crimean residents and the Ukrainian state. Finally,
Russia has violated international human rights standards, interfering in the internal sphere
of an individual. It is this aspect – the violation of human rights by means of imposition of
nationality – that is a focus of this study.
It should be realized that the occupation and actions directed at the appropriation of the
occupied territory is a phenomenon that happened perhaps for the first time in the European
system of human rights protection. The similar situation, which can be compared to Crimea,
is the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus. However, the current level of economic, legal,
information, cultural and other relations rises new issues which did not exist or were not so
high-profile during the invasion of Cyprus. Furthermore, Cyprus still remains the so-called
unrecognized territory that Turkey has never tried to make a part of its own country.
Crimea also differs from other unrecognized territories, including Transnistria, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia51. The Russian Federation has been carrying out the “passportization” of
the population in these territories for quite a long time already. However, the main difference
from the Crimean situation is that the expression of individual’s will is needed in order to
obtain Russian nationality in these territories and there is no temporal limitation. In other
words, those who are unwilling to acquire Russian nationality can avoid it. But in Crimea there
was held quick collective passportization, during which there was no possibility to consciously
respond to the situation.
In the postwar time contemporary international law addressed the issues of eliminating
statelessness52 and resolving cases of dual nationality. However, the issue of protection
against arbitrary imposition of nationality has so far remained unnoticed by the international
community. It is time when these issues must also take their rightful place in international
discussions.
Historical background
In early 2014, Russia committed an act of military aggression against sovereign Ukraine and
tried to annex part of its territory - the Crimean Peninsula. The beginning of the active phase
51 See, for example, Human Rights in the Occupied Territories of Georgia: Information Note Distributed by the Delegation
of Georgia during OSCE Review Conference - Human Dimension Session (Warsaw, 30 September - 8 October 2010). –
Access mode: http://www.osce.org/home/73289?download=true (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
52 See, for example, materials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) about the campaign to stop
statelessness. – Access mode: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/53174c306.html (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
Analytics
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of such actions should be considered the third decade of February53.
The occupation was carried out under the protection the so-called “green men” - armed men
without insignia. Later in the documentary “Crimea: The Way Back Home”, Russian President
Vladimir Putin recognized that those were the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation54.
According to numerous press reports, many of the participants of the occupation were
awarded with a medal “For the return of Crimea”, but the official list of the medaled persons
is not available55.
On 27 February 2014, by a decision of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (ARC), captured and controlled at the time by the armed men, there was scheduled an
all-Crimean referendum56. The initial date of the referendum was set on the day of presidential
elections in Ukraine –25 May 2014. Then the referendum was rescheduled for 30 March and
finally - for 16 March 2014. The latter was the date when the referendum took place57.
Reliable data on the results of voting is not available, and public statements of those involved
in its organization and conduct contain contradictory information58. Despite that fact, on 18
March 2014, (in two days after the referendum) an agreement “on admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new
constituent entities” (hereinafter - “Agreement”) was signed59.
The next day the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation by its decision dd. 19 March
2014 no. 6-P acknowledged this Agreement as such that corresponds to the Constitution of
53 On 23 February 2014, on the Nakhimov Square in the city of Sevastopol there was held a rally, during which a Russian
citizen Oleksiy Chaly was “elected” as the so-called “people’s mayor”. Then the city was surrounded by checkpoints.
Later, on 26 February 2014, in front of the building of Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, that was taken over by people
unknown at that time, there was held a meeting of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian forces (the latter included the Crimean
Tatars). However, the medal “For the return of Crimea”, legalized by the Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian
Federation no. 160 of 21 March 2014 bears the dates 20.02.14 - 18.03.14. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the Law of
15 September 2015 specified the date of the beginning of the occupation: the beginning of the occupation is officially
considered to be 20 February 2014.- Access mode: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-vii.
54 Andriy Kondrashov: Film “Crimea: The Way Back Home” (All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company,
2015).- Access mode: https://russia.tv/brand/show/brand_id/59195/ (date of reference: 01/11/2016). The film has English
subtitles. Regarding the participation of Russian troops, please, watch from 1:05:00.
55 According to the site life.ru: ca. three hundred Russian citizens were awarded with a medal “For the Return of Crimea”.-
Access mode: https://life.ru/t/новости/l5l348 (date of reference: 01/01/2016).
56 Resolution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea “On holding of the all-Crimean referendum”.- Access mode: http://
crimea.gov.ru/act/11689 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
57 During this short period, not only any public debate was not organized, but also Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists
were severely persecuted. See, for example, the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine dd. 15.04.2014, prepared after the visit of Assistant Secretary
General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović to Crimea: “the presence of paramilitary and so called self-defence groups
as well as soldiers in uniform without insignia, widely believed to be from the Russian Federation, was not conducive
to an environment in which voters could freely exercise their right to hold opinions and the right to freedom of
expression. There have also been credible allegations of harassment, arbitrary arrest, and torture targeting activists
and journalists who did not support the referendum. Furthermore, seven persons were reported as missing <...> While
the Tatar community was promised numerous concessions, including Government positions as well as the recognized
status as indigenous peoples, the majority of the members of the community chose to boycott the referendum. OHCHR
was informed by representatives of Crimean Tatars that no more than 1,000, out of a population of 290,000-300,000,
participated in the 16 March referendum” (para. 6) .- Access mode: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/
Ukraine_Report_15April2014.doc (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
58 According to the statement of Mykhaylo Malyshev, the so-called “Head of the Crimean Parliament Commission on
organization and holding of the referendum” 1 million 250 thousand 426 people voted in Crimea. This is without
Sevastopol <.> With Sevastopol the number of people voted made up 1 million 724 thousand 563 people.” (Quoted by
the Newspapers: “Crimea has chosen Russia.” – Access mode: https:// www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/03/15_a_5951217.
shtml (date of reference: 01/11/2016). According to this statement, more than 474 thousand people voted in Sevastopol,
while the total number of population (including children who do not have the right to vote) was a little over 385 thousand
people.
59 On the peninsula, in compliance with Article 133 of the Constitution of Ukraine, there were established two administrative
units equal in status - the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereinafter - ARC) and the city of Sevastopol, which had been
existing in that form since declaration of independence of Ukraine in 1991. The two administrative units had the same
status, and none of them was subordinate to the other. Nevertheless, the referendum was also conducted in the city of
Sevastopol. By tangent rule the terms regarding the city of Sevastopol were included in the “agreement”.- Access mode:
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20605 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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the Russian Federation60.
On 21 March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the law on ratification of the
Agreement and the Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ “On admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation the new
constituent entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol”
(hereinafter - the Law 6-FKZ)61.
This Law came into force on 1 April 2014. Since that time, its provisions began to be formally
applied by the occupation authorities on the Crimean Peninsula. However, it should be noted
that according to Article 1 of the “Agreement” the so-called Republic of Crimea deemed to
be admitted to the Russian Federation from the date of signing of this Agreement, i.e. from
18 March 2014.
The occupation has been followed by numerous violations of human rights: freedom of
movement, property rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial
and so on. At the same time, some of these violations themselves are also international
crimes: for example, transfer of the Crimean residents from the occupied territory and vice
versa, transfer of the civilian population of the Russian Federation to the occupied territory
significantly changes the population profile of the peninsula. Conscription of residents of the
occupied territory into the Russian Armed Forces is another example of such an offense. A
prerequisite for this and other offenses is arbitrary imposition of Russian nationality, which is
being analyzed below.
International legal qualification of the Russian Federation’s actions in Crimea
The UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974 defines aggression as
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations62.
The Ukraine’s territorial integrity is guaranteed by a package of international legal
agreements from the UN Charter to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
According to the so-called Budapest Memorandum63 signed by the Russian Federation
along with Great Britain and the United States, the signatories made a commitment to respect
the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine and refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine,
ensuring that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense
or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations64.
The UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on Ukraine’s territorial integrity of 27 March
2014 called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to
recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol on the basis of the referendum held on 16 March 2014 and to refrain from any
60 See the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 19 March 2014 no. 6-P.- Access mode: https://
rg.ru/2014/03/19/ks-site-dok.html (date of reference: 01/11/2016). On 10 September 2015, at the Conference of European
Constitutional Courts in Batumi there was signed the so-called Batumi Declaration, which noted the crucial role of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in legalizing the occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.
61 Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ “On admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing
within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal
Importance Sevastopol”. - Access mode: http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=LAW&n=200047
&fld=134&dst=100136,0&rnd=0.46997960940071615#0 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
62 UN General Assembly Resolution no. 3314 of 14 December 1974.- Access mode: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_
conv/conventions/aggression.shtml (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
63 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994.- Access mode: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_158 (date of
reference: 01.11.2016).
64 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.- Access mode: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_158 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status65.
External conditions in which Crimeans had to choose their citizenship
According to Article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ “from the date of the
admitting to the Russian Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian
Federation the new constituent entities Ukrainian nationals and stateless persons who had
been permanently residing in the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance
Sevastopol were recognized as nationals of the Russian Federation, except for persons
who within one month thereafter declared their willingness to retain their and (or) their minor
children’s other nationality or remain stateless.” 66
As mentioned above, according to the “Agreement” the “Republic of Crimea” is deemed to
be admitted to the Russian Federation from the date of signing of the “Agreement”, i.e. from
18 March 2014. Thus, starting exactly from that date the term envisaged by Art. 4 of the Law
6-FKZ was restricted. That term ended on April 18. But since the legislation of the Russian
Federation started being applied on the peninsula from 1 April 2014, according to the Law no.
6-FKZ, as mentioned earlier, so the general term for the submission of that application de jure
was reduced to 18 days.
As of 4-9 April 2014, in Crimea there were operating only two offices of the Federal Migration
Service (FMS) , which received applications, in Sevastopol and Simferopol. As of 10 April,
9 FMS offices were operating in: Sevastopol, Simferopol, Yalta, Bakhchisaray, Bilogorsk,
Yevpatoriya, Saki, Kerch and Dzhankoy67. It was reported by the Human Rights Monitoring
Mission in Ukraine (hereinafter – HRMMU) in its periodic report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine of 15 May 201468.
In total, ca. 3500 persons filed applications “declaring their will to keep their and (or) their
minor children’s other nationality or remain stateless.” 69
As indicated in the report of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea
in 2014, “transitional period”, the time allotted for integration of the <...> region from the
established system of law and governance into the system of public institutions of the Russian
Federation <...> is characterized by internal contradictions, inconsistency, interchange of
progressive development phases, often combined with conflicts in the application of laws.
This leads to the fact that an ordinary person is lost in a variety of new rules of life different
from those, which he got accustomed to.” 70
That is not to say that the inhabitants of Crimea were fully deprived of possibility to express
their will to acquire Russian nationality. However, the conditions in which they had to choose
(instantaneous loss of familiar landmarks in everyday life, lack of adequate information about
consequences, extremely short term, infrastructural constraints, etc.) did not enable to make
an informed choice71. Observations show that the majority of Crimeans did not try to make
their choices and acquired the status of Russian nationals “with the tacit consent” after the
65 UN General Assembly Resolution of 27 March 2014 no. 68/262 “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”.- Access mode: http://
www.un.org/ru/documents/ods.asp?m=A/RES/68/262 (date of reference: 01/01/2016).
66 Law no. 6-FKZ, ibid.
67 For comparison: offices of the Federal Migration Service in which one could apply for a Russian passport, have been
established within the network of similar offices of the State Migration Service of Ukraine. These offices were located,
as a rule, within walking distance of the place of residence of citizens in big cities.
68 Para. 27 of the periodic report of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine on the situation of human rights
in Ukraine of May 15, 2014.- Access mode: http://www.un.org.ua/images/stories/Report_15_May_2014ua.pdf (date of
reference: 01/11/2016).
69 See the Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation for 2014, p. 99.- Access mode: http://
ombudsmanrf.org/www/upload/files/docs/appeals/doklad2014.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
70 Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea in 2014, p. 4.- Access mode: http://crimea.
gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf This document is of great evidentiary value, since the credentials of the author L.E.
Lubinaya as the Commissioner for Human Rights are recognized by the Russian Government.
71 The term “informed choice” is used by analogy with the fixed term “informed consent to medical treatment”, which
provides for such consent on the basis of sufficient and timely information about the nature of medical treatment, the
associated risks and possible consequences.
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expiry of the 18-day term72.
In the meantime, any option of choice, which had to be made by the Crimeans, led to a
deterioration in their situation: they had to choose between a significant restriction of rights
(up to a complete loss of legal personality) and the oath of allegiance to the aggressor state.
Consequences of renunciation of Russian nationality
Applying to renounce Russian nationality automatically led to the fact that this person
acquired the status of a foreigner with the relevant restrictions (related to employment, the
right to social benefits, migration control, prohibition of participation in political activities
and to be engaged in public life, etc.). But unlike the common situation when a foreigner
deliberately moves to a foreign country and agrees to relevant limitations, this category
of Crimean residents found themselves to have a status of foreign nationals at home. The
further stay on the peninsula became entirely dependent on the discretion of the occupation
authorities as to permission to stay.
The former nationals of Yugoslavia in Slovenia faced similar problems. The European Court
of Human Rights in the case Kurić and Others v Slovenia73 concluded that such situation
entails a loss of legal personality, and declared it incompatible with Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights <respect for privacy>. In addition, the Court also held that the
applicants had been subjected to discriminatory treatment on the ground of national origin74.
At the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, all nationals had dual nationality - of Yugoslavia
itself (which was used effectively) and one of the republics, it was composed of (before the
disintegration that nationality was purely nominal and did not influence the possibility of living
in another republic and participating in the elections). After the disintegration of Yugoslavia,
the former Yugoslav nationality lost its meaning. Instead Slovenia provided a certain period to
all those willing to get their own nationality or a permission to stay. After the deadline, those
who did not use the right provided were “erased” from the register of residents. Applicants
for various reasons did not use the opportunity to determine their status in the republic and
found themselves in the category of “the erased”. This led to the fact that they were in a
position that the ECtHR defined as the loss of legal personality when they had the severely
limited ability to exercise their rights or even were fully deprived of them.
Consequences of acquiring the status of Russian citizens
It is much harder to understand the situation of the persons who in the period up to 18April
2014 had not submitted the above said application and thus acquired the status of Russian
citizens regardless of subsequent obtaining a passport or avoidance of getting it. “New
citizens” avoided the problems associated with the loss of legal personality. In fact, they have
received a full range of rights enjoyed by Russian nationals by birth in Russia.
In this aspect it looks as if the Russian Federation has done its best and made the Crimean
inhabitants equal to any national of Russia. But in fact this is not true. Since the acquisition of
nationality involves not only getting a set of rights but also certain duties and the possibility of
imposing restrictions by the state. Therefore, the situation that has signs of external equality,
actually has a negative impact on “new nationals” having Ukrainian identity, who are now
obliged, for example, to use arms to defend the Russian Federation, which, in turn, is in
72 According to the observations of the NGO “Regional Center for Human Rights” there are recorded a large number of
people in Crimea and those who left the occupied territory, who did not submit an application regarding unwillingness to
obtain Russian nationality, but also did not apply for obtaining a Russian passport. We should understand that pursuant
to the Russian laws such persons are also considered nationals of the Russian Federation, despite the lack of proper
documents. See further, for example, O. Kolchenko’s example.
73 Case of KURIĆ and others v. SLOVENIA.- Access mode: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111634 (date of reference:
01/11/2016)
74 According to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination the discrimination on the
ground of national origin is a form of racial discrimination.
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conflict with Ukraine.
Nationality also includes the creation of certain loyalty relationship that affects the private
life and may cause a serious internal conflict in a person. Such situation may raise the
question about violation of the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. It is the analysis of compliance of Russia’s actions on imposing
nationality with international standards that we are going to focus on.
We should make a reservation: this relates to nationals of Ukraine who were loyal to their
homeland and lived in Crimea at the time of occupation (regardless of whether they left the
occupied territory thereafter or continue to live there). For those who welcomed the fact of
annexation and the status of Russian nationals, the problem does not exist: they have just
taken the opportunity.75
Arbitrary imposition of nationality as a new challenge
When we talk about imposition of nationality as an entirely new challenge, it should be
emphasized that existing precedents are related only to the history of the World War II.
The Permanent Military Tribunal at Strasbourg and the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
sentenced consequently Robert Wagner (1946)76 and Gottlob Berger (1949)77 for actions
related to Germanization of the population in the occupied territories and its mobilization as
German nationals. However, these cases concerned the imposition of nationality as one of
the objective elements of war crimes or crimes against humanity and related to the violation
of international humanitarian law. According to Art. 45 of the Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) it is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied
territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power78.
Prerequisites for viewing the imposition of nationality in the context of human rights violation
arise with the adoption of core international human rights treaties. Due to the development of
an international catalogue of human rights standards a person was recognized as international
legal personality and ceased to be exclusively a toy in the hands of the sovereign. Hence
there arose a need to take into account person’s will in matters that previously were only
within the scope of interstate politics.
In its Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984 regarding the proposed amendments
to the naturalization provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights noted that, despite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral and
regulation of nationality are matters for each state to decide, contemporary developments
indicate that international law does impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by
the states in that area. And thus the manners in which states regulate nationality matters
n cannot today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; those powers of the state are
also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights. The
classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted by the state to its
subjects, has gradually evolved to the point that nationality is today perceived as involving
the jurisdiction of the state as well as human rights issues (para 32, 33)79.
The classic case on nationality is the so-called case of Nottebohm reviewed by the
International Court of Justice80. In this case the Court drew a conclusion that today has
75 This material is devoted to consideration of issues of nationality in terms of human rights and exactly in this context there
were made reservations. However, the forced extraterritorial collective naturalization of nationals of the other state also
violates international public law in terms of inter-State relations.
76 Access mode: https://www.phdn.org/archives/www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/wagner1.htm (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
77 Access mode: http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1949.04.13_United_States_v_Weizsaecker.
pdf#search=%22gottlob berger% 22 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
78 Access mode: https://www.icrc.org/rus/resources/documents/misc/hague-convention-iv-181007.htm (date of reference:
01/11/2016).
79 Access mode: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_04_ing.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
80 LIECHTENSTEIN v. GUATEMALA, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1955.- Access mode: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/18/2674.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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become classic: “Naturalization is not a matter to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is
not something that happens frequently in the life of a human being. It involves his breaking of a
bond of allegiance and his establishment of a new bond of allegiance. It may have far-reaching
consequences and involve profound changes in the destiny of the individual who obtains it. It
concerns him personally, and to consider it only from the point of view of its repercussions with
regard to his property would be to misunderstand its profound significance. In order to appraise
its international effect, it is impossible to disregard the circumstances in which it was conferred,
the serious character which attaches to it, the real and effective, and not merely the verbal
preference of the individual seeking it for the country which grants it to him.” (p. 24)
Although, in the above case issues of nationality are considered in the context of
international relations, the definition of this phenomenon given by the International Court of
Justice enables to consider it through the system of international human rights standards as
well.
International standards for nationality as the right included in the international
catalogue of human rights
Nationality is viewed as a category contained in the catalogue of human rights in compliance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Under Article 15 of the Declaration everyone
has the right to a nationality and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights somewhat narrows the context and
reads only the child’s right to acquire a nationality (Art. 24).
The right to a nationality is regulated in more details by Article 20 of the American Convention
on Human Rights. Its provisions guarantee every person the right to the nationality of the
state in whose territory he was born, and prohibits arbitrary deprivation of nationality or of the
right to change it.
The European Convention on Human Rights, in contrast to these international instruments,
does not at all contain provisions on nationality. The European Court noted that the right to
a nationality is not as guaranteed by the Convention, although under certain conditions the
issue of violation of Article 8 may arise in the context of nationality.
In particular, in the case Genovese v. Malta (Application no. 53124/09, 11 November 2011,
§ 30) the ECtHR noted: “The Court … reiterates that the concept “private life” is a broad term
not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity of a
person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity.
<...> The provisions of Article 8 <respect for private life> do not, however, guarantee a right to
acquire a particular nationality or citizenship. Nevertheless, the Court has previously stated
that it cannot be ruled out that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances
raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial
(deprivation) on the private life of the individual.” 81 In this judgment, the Court noted that
Malta had violated Article 14 <prohibition of discrimination> in conjunction with Article 8 of
the Convention <respect for private life>, as its Citizenship Act prevented an illegitimate child
to acquire Maltese citizenship even though his father was Maltese, while children born to a
married couple could inherit citizenship of one of parents.
It should be emphasized that the whole case-law of international judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, where the issue of human rights violations in the aspects related to nationality was
raised, refers first of all to negative actions of states (deprivation of nationality, denial to
81 Access mode: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106785 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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renounce nationality or other similar acts)82. The situation of imposition of nationality, as
happened in Crimea, has not been the subject of legal assessment to be conducted by
international bodies yet83. This new phenomenon has not also been the subject of theoretical
study to be carried out by research workers84.
And though the European Court of Human Rights addresses nationality issues very carefully,
Crimean situation is a favorable opportunity to review the preliminary findings and develop
practices in this regard.
Although, as it has been repeatedly noted, the European Convention contains no
guarantees on the right to nationality, a status of nationals can be considered as aspect of
the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, self-identification
is a manifestation of a private life. According to Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child a nationality is an element of the child’s identity. There is no reason to state,
especially considering the position of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm’s
case regarding the fundamental nature of nationality in the life of each person that nationality
loses such meaning for an adult person.
In other words, the fact that the ECtHR does not contain provisions that guarantee a person
the right to nationality, in no way excludes that the arbitrary imposition of nationality cannot
give rise to circumstances which are incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights <right to respect for private life>.
The arbitrary imposition of nationality on Crimean inhabitants, therefore, on the one hand, is
forcing the legal relationship between the inhabitants of Crimea and the Russian Federation,
on the other hand represents interference of the Russian Federation in the relationship that
emerged earlier and existed between the residents of Crimea and the Ukrainian state. Due
to this, actions of the Russian Federation directed at the imposition of nationality are not
within its sovereign jurisdiction. Rather the opposite: Russia violated its obligations under the
Budapest Memorandum, interfered in the internal affairs of Ukraine and relations between
the Ukrainian state and its nationals.
Before the occupation there were no effective relations between the Crimean residents
and Russia, which could be the ground for the formalization of nationality relations. It is rather
the opposite: the occupation and imposition of nationality became a prerequisite for certain
relationship between the Crimean inhabitants and the Russian state. Such relations are
undesirable for many Crimean people.
The possibility of reviewing this issue in the context of human rights gives each victim of
Russian aggression the opportunity to protect their rights when everybody can directly appeal
to international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (including the ECtHR and the UNCHR). The
use of these mechanisms does not depend on the political will inside the state and allows
everyone to initiate a dialogue not only in the context of international relations but also in
humanitarian dimension.
Situation as viewed by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation
By its Judgment no. 18-p of 4 October 2016 the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation tried to analyze the decision of the Russian Government relating nationality taking
82 See, for example, decisions of the ECtHR in the cases Riener v. Bulgaria (no. 46343/99, 23 May 2006), Petropavlovskis
v. Latvia (no. 44230/06, § 83, ECHR 2015), Karassev v. Finland (dec.), no. 31414/96, Slivenko v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no.
48321/99, Savoia and Bounegru v. Italy (dec.), no. 8407/05, 11 July 2006; Dragan and Others v. Germany (dec.), no.
33743/03, 7 October 2004; Mennesson v. France; Fedorova v. Latvia (dec.), no. 69405/01, 9 October 2003; Dadouch v.
Malta; Slepcik v. the Netherlands and the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 30913/96, 2 September 1996, and so on.
83 Now specialists of the NGO “Regional Center for Human Rights” are preparing an appication to the ECtHR and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee regarding discrimination and violation of the right to respect for private life
through the Russia’s imposition of nationality.
84 For more detailed information¬¬ about modern approaches we encourage you to read The Changing Role of Nationality
in International Law (Routledge Research in International Law) .- Access mode: https://www.amazon.com/Changing-
Role-Nationality-International -Law/dp/B00EVWK2G0/ref=sr_1_1_twi_kin_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1466688841&sr=1-
1&keywords=The+changing+role+of+nationality+in+international+law&selectObb = rent. (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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into consideration the norms of international law.
In this case, the subject to the proceedings of the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation was the right of Ukrainian nationals and stateless persons who resided in Crimea
without official registration to acquire nationality under the Law no. 6-FKZ.
The Constitutional Court referred to the European Convention on Nationality (Strasbourg,
6 November 1997), the Russia’s succession with respect to Crimea and the UN General
Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 12 December 2000 “Nationality of natural persons in relation
to the succession of States” 85. Let us try to consider, how the supreme body of constitutional
justice of Russia has interpreted them.
First of all, significant is the reference to the European Convention on Nationality, which
though is signed by Russia, is not however ratified yet. Since the Convention is not ratified by
Russia, the reference to its provisions is essential in terms of recognition of its binding nature
at least in the form of customary law. On referring to the Convention, the Constitutional Court
cited its preamble, which states that account should be taken both of the legitimate interests
of States and those of individuals. However, the Court did not go beyond citing, that is why
the issue concerning the way of applying the indicated principle to the Crimean situation
remains open.
Nevertheless, the above analysis of Russia’s actions in Crimea shows the disregard for
the rights and interests of individuals in the occupied territory and the arbitrary imposition of
nationality. Thus, Russia has violated provisions of international law which binding nature for
the Russian Federation is recognized by the Constitutional Court of the state.
Regarding the reference to the Russia’s succession with respect to Crimea, the Constitutional
Court of the RF mentioned the UN General Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 12 December
2000 “Nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States”. Article 3 of
the Declaration provides that its provisions apply only to the effects of a succession of
States occurring in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
As it has been already noted, the UN General Assembly Resolution of 27 March 2014 called
upon all States to refrain from actions aimed at the disruption of the territorial integrity of
Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders and not to recognize any alteration
of the status of the Crimean Peninsula. Under such conditions the rules of international law
exclude the possibility of Russia’s succession to Crimea, and therefore the reference to the
UN General Assembly Resolution 55/153 of 12 December 2000 is also irrelevant86.
Finally, the Constitutional Court, referring to the Resolution 55/153, has given considerable
prominence to the person’s connection with a particular territory. However, this approach
reduces the status of people to serfs who are captured together with the land.
At the same time, it is necessary to mention again that in Nottebohm’s classic case the focus
in issues of nationality was put on the effective links of a person not with the territory, but the
state itself. A different approach would mean that people could not reside long outside their
country of nationality, as it would inevitably result in their naturalization: increase in length
of stay in a particular territory would lead to the strengthening of links with this territory and
weakening of links with the territory of origin. Author is unaware of origins of the concept of
nationality based on a connection with the territory, but its flaws have been demonstrated.
However, if we apply the principle of effective connection with the state itself, not the
85 Access mode: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/568/59/PDF/N0056859.pdf?OpenElement.
(date of reference: 01/11/2016).
86 The statement on succession generates many other objections: the capture of Crimea occurred without taking into
account the sovereign will of the Ukrainian state; Ukraine, which owns the peninsula, continues to exist; there is no
“people of Crimea”, who could have the right to self-determination, however, there is a multiethnic population of the
peninsula; the Republic of Crimea and especially the city of Sevastopol have never been subjects of international
law and were not recognized by anyone to be such during a short period in March 2014, and therefore could not
conclude international agreements, etc. This also deprives Russia of the possibility to refer to many other international
agreements and principles of international law as they also cannot be applied because of a violation of fundamental
obligations under the UN Charter.
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territory, it is necessary to stress once again that at the time of the occupation there was no
connection between the population of the peninsula and the Russian Federation, sufficient
for the nationality relations. At the same time, the imposition of nationality inevitably created
such links.
It is worth to mention one more time that the above decision of the Constitutional Court was
made in the context of the right of persons, who do not have a registered place of residence
in Crimea, to a nationality under the Law no. 6-FKZ. And in fact, following the above logic the
Constitutional Court of Russia tried to confirm this right of theirs. However, these principles
themselves cannot be applied to the naturalization of other nationals, and that is why they
themselves enable to conclude that Russia has violated international law.
Thus, the existing attempts to legitimize the presence of the Russian Federation in Crimea
roughly and obviously run against the rules of international law violated during the occupation.
Ukraine’s reaction to Russia’s actions
According to Art. 5 of the Law of Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of
nationals and on the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine” the forced
automatic acquisition of the nationality of the Russian Federation by the Ukrainian nationals
residing in the temporarily occupied territory is not recognized by Ukraine and is not accepted
as a ground for loss of nationality of Ukraine87.
At the same time, Ukraine’s position to some extent is inconsistent. For example, according
to the para. 12.7 Art. 12 of the Law of Ukraine “On creation of the free economic zone “Crimea”
and peculiarities of economic activities in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine” bank
savings guarantees are not applicable to nationals of the Russian Federation. This provision
was practically extended to Crimean residents who have to submit a declaration of having
no nationality of the Occupying Power. There can be also foreseen the issues regarding the
access of the Crimean residents to public service, classified information and others related to
security and the vulnerable situation in which the residents of Crimea found themselves due
to the imposed nationality.
This indicates that Ukraine cannot entirely ignore the actions of the Russian Federation
directed at the collective naturalization of the Crimean population and is compelled to take
into account this fact, even declaring its legal nullity.
Practical consequences of collective naturalization
The most vulnerable group of nationals of Ukraine who have suffered negative consequences
of Russia’s actions are children deprived of parental care. According to the Office of the
Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, as of 01.08.2014 there were 4228 of
such children in Crimea. Since the beginning of the occupation the authorities of the Russian
Federation took control over administration of the institutions that provided care for such
children. On the grounds of “respecting the best interests of the child” in favor of these
children there was not filed any application “declaring willingness to keep their existing ...
other nationality.” 88
Persons who at the time of the occupation were held in custody belong to another vulnerable
group. The administration of places of detention did not properly secure their right to refuse
to be recognized Russian citizens as well. Thus they were deprived of consular protection
and the right to be transferred to the Ukrainian authorities for serving their sentences. The
87 Law of Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of nationals and on the legal regime in the temporarily occupied
territory of Ukraine.”- Access mode: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-vii (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
88 See the statement of Head of the Department on Observance of the Rights of the Child, Non-discrimination and Gender
Equality A. Filipyshyna of 05/06/2015 submitted to the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for
Human Rights.- Access mode: http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/all-news/pr/5615-sm-aksana-filipishina-prava-ditini-vkrimu-
pochali-porushuvati-vid-samogo/ ; http://health.unian.net/country/1085947-ukrainskim-detyam-sirotam-v-kryimuprinuditelno-
prisvaivayut-rossiyskoe-grajdanstvo.html (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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most famous manifestation of this problem is a situation in which political prisoners Oleh
Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko found themselves89. Referring to the fact that they have
acquired Russian nationality, Russian authorities refused to transfer them to Ukraine under
the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (1983). Deputy Minister of Justice of
Ukraine S. Petukhov published the information about it on his Facebook page90. However,
this problem actually concerns hundreds of Ukrainian prisoners who as of today are being
transferred from Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation.
The amended Law “On nationality of the Russian Federation” is in force from 04.06.201491.
According to Art. 6 of the Law nationals of the Russian Federation (except for those
permanently residing outside the Russian Federation), who also have another nationality or a
permanent residence permit in a foreign country, must notify in writing a territorial body of the
Federal Migration Service of these circumstances. Russian nationals permanently residing
outside of Russia shall submit such a notification within thirty days after entering the territory
of Russia. Russian passport is a prerequisite for such an application. No exceptions are made
for Crimean residents who at the time of the occupation had Ukrainian nationality, moreover
these provisions became binding upon them from January 1, 201692. Failure to abide by these
regulations results in criminal liability under Art. 330.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation. Violation of notification terms results in administrative liability.
This itself can be viewed as a violation of the right to respect for private life, as these legal
provisions are a requirement to report a loyalty relationship with other state. In the context
of Crimea such interference cannot have a legitimate purpose. In addition, in this way Russia
actually forces the Crimean residents to get passports of the Russian Federation and declare
their loyalty to Ukraine.
A number of other provisions of the legislation and administrative practice also force the
Crimean residents to obtain Russian passports. As stated in the aforementioned report of
the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea, the absence of a Russian
passport “makes it impossible to exercise almost all the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Constitution. In particular, these include inability to work, ineligibility for social security...” The
cases of social benefits termination in Crimea for Ukrainian nationals who have not received
a Russian passport or a residence permit, as well as problems with employment of such
nationals started to be recorded by the Regional Center for Human Rights after the so-called
“transition period” from January 1, 201593.
Conclusions
With the occupation of Crimea there emerged a situation when almost all residents of
the occupied territory were recognized Russian nationals without the effective links with the
country of their “new nationality”. The emergence of such links was not a prerequisite for
granting the status of nationals, but on the contrary, its consequence.
Formally having the possibility to choose a nationality, but not actually being able to
make an informed choice because of lack of time, information, and other circumstances, the
nationals of Ukraine found themselves at a crossroads facing two equally bad options: to lose
89 O. Sentsov and O. Kolchenko were detained in Simferopol in May 2014 on charges of involvement in the terrorist group,
brought to Moscow and later sentenced under Articles 205 and 205.4 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
to 20 and 10 years of imprisonment respectively. They did not submit the application regarding renunciation of Ukrainian
nationality, as well as did not receive Russian passports. They do not recognize themselves as nationals of the Russian
Federation. However, the Russian Government refuses to transfer them to the authorities of Ukraine in order to serve
their sentence, referring to the fact that they have acquired the status of Russian nationals under the Law no. 6-FKZ.
90 Access mode: https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1796566357285662&set=a.1434318470177121.1073741828.
100007969451473&type=3&theater (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
91 Access mode: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_36927 (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
92 Access mode: https://web.archive.org/web/20160209125758/http://www.82.fms.gov.ru/press/news/item/51894/ (date
of reference: 01/11/2016 ).
93 Access mode: http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf (date of reference: 01/11/2016).
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legal personality and become foreigners at home or to refuse their own Ukrainian identity
and swear allegiance to the aggressor state. The given circumstances and in particular the
collective nature of naturalization of persons outside the sovereign territory of Russia indicate
that the will of the nationals did not have a significant impact on results. The absence of
a special status for the inhabitants of the occupied territories and making them equal to
ordinary foreigners complicate or make the residence in Crimea impossible for Crimeans
without obtaining a Russian passport.
The collective extraterritorial nationalization undermines the value of nationality institute in
international law, because it allows to degrade the nationals’ legal connection with the state,
depriving them of all the privileges they had due to that connection (for example, the right to
consular protection). These actions enable to bring the population of a certain territory under
control of authorities of the aggressor state, threaten the world order and are a means of
aggressive expansion of the Russian Federation.
In Crimea, there was created a dangerous precedent for which contemporary international
law appeared unprepared. Mainly addressing the issues of eliminating statelessness,
international law has left the issue of arbitrary imposition of nationality almost entirely neglected.
This issue today requires attention from the international community and development of
new additional principles because it has a significant impact both in the context of foreign
policy relations and public international law as well as in the context of human rights.
The possibility of reviewing the situation in the context of international human rights
standards gives each victim affected by Russia’s actions the opportunity to directly appeal
to international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in order to protect his rights and initiate a
dialogue at international level.
Recommendations to the international community:
• With assistance of the institute of special rapporteurs of the international organizations to
provide a detailed examination of the situation regarding the imposition of Russian nationality
on residents of the occupied territory of the Crimean Peninsula.
• To attract international expert institutions to develop recommendations on resolving the
situation resulting from the imposition of Russian nationality on residents of the occupied
territory of the Crimean Peninsula.
• To attract international expert institutions to develop universal standards for ensuring the
rights of persons subjected to naturalization protecting them against the arbitrary actions of
the state, taking into account such nationals’ will and protecting their rights.
• With assistance of consular services to ensure control over the non-recognition of the
status of Russian nationals obtained by nationals of Ukraine who live in the occupied territory
of the Crimean Peninsula (for example, in terms of impermissibility of issuing visas to such
people as Russian nationals through the relevant consular institutions, in terms of prohibition
for consular institutions of the Russian Federation to provide such nationals with consular
assistance, their extradition to the Russian Federation or at the request of Russia, etc.).
Consequences of human rights violations by the Russian Federation
in the occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol (the question of citizenship)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter - the Covenant) provides
an example of the general principle of equality that underlies international human rights law
(IHRL) in its relation to non-citizens, and the limited nature of the exceptions to this principle.
According to part 1 of Article 2 of the Covenant, each State party:
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«undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status”.
Moreover, Article 26 of the Covenant states that:
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status”.
International Court of Justice, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, as well
as states in practice believe that the provisions of the Covenant apply also in the occupied
territories94.
The UN Human Rights Committee explains that:
«The rights enshrined in the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and
irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness. Thus, the general rule is that each
one of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens.»
The Human Rights Committee also noted that the right of non-citizens can be accompanied
only by such limitations that may be lawfully imposed under the Covenant. More specifically,
the Covenant permits to the States to draw distinctions between citizens and non-citizens
with respect to two categories of rights: political rights explicitly guaranteed to citizens
(participation in public affairs, right to vote and to be elected and to have access to public
service), and freedom of movement95.
Similar to Part 1 of Article 2 of the Covenant, Part 2 of Article 2 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights declares that States parties guarantee the rights
enunciated in that Covenant «without any discrimination as to race, color... national or social
origin ... or other status»96.
In its turn, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its recommendation
XXX on discrimination against non-citizens indicated that97:
«States have an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens
in the enjoyment of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights to the extent
recognized under international law and as set out in particular in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on civil and political Rights».
As a result of violations of international law by the Russian Federation in the context of the
imposition of Russian citizenship to citizens of Ukraine, those who reside in the occupied
territories of Crimea do not enjoy those rights that had to be guaranteed under international
law. Moreover, in the context of the occupation of the AR Crimea and Sevastopol they are
very often at risk of their own safety and well-being (criminal and administrative liability,
discrimination, especially on ethnic grounds, etc.)
1. A passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation is a prerequisite for the realization of
a significant number of rights to residents of Crimea. Namely, it is more complicated for him
to receive all kinds of social benefits, obtain a driver’s license, register a vehicle, be employed
94 Sassoli, “How Does Law Protect In War”, Volume I, Outline of IHL (3rd Edition), p. 357.
95 See General Comment number 15 (1986) of the Human Rights Committee on the position of aliens under the Covenant.;
With regard to freedom of movement, Article 12 (1) provides “the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence” only to persons who are “lawfully within the territory of a State”, i.e., apparently permitting restrictions against
migrants without proper documents.
96 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/noncitizensen_ru.pdf
97 http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139e084.html
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in certain positions (public institutions), obtain of land plots, free medical care, re-registration
of ownership98. This was openly declared by the official representatives of the authorities of
the Russian Federation.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in its report of 15 April
2014 on the human rights situation in Ukraine noted99:
«Measures such as the introduction of Russian citizenship will complicate the lives of those
who want to preserve their Ukrainian citizenship in Crimea and will raise questions about
the legality of residence, the loss of social and economic rights, including the right to work.»
Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Crimea (“Ombudsperson”), in his
report for 2014 confirmed this fact:
«It is not necessary to explain the legal consequences of the absence of the passport
of the State in which as person resides. This makes for a person impossible to implement
almost all the fundamental rights and freedoms (emphasis is the author’s note), set forth
in the Constitution. In particular, it leads to impossibility to be employed, to receive social
security, which could lead to lower standards of living and an increase in the crime rate.
Therefore, I believe that immediate measures should be taken to address the problems of
citizens related to the possibility of obtaining passports”.100
The Ombudsperson in this report also notes that according to information received in the
Office of the Federal Migration Service for the Republic of Crimea for the period from March
2014 there were issued 1,560,162 passports of Russian citizens. Given that the approximate
population of Crimea is about 2.3 million. That is to say that as of the end of 2014 slightly
less than 1 million people are not passportized in Crimea101. Hence, so many people do not
enjoy a significant number of their rights, either being opposed to the imposition of Russian
passports, or due to objective reasons (mentioned in the first section) being unable to obtain
Russian citizenship.
2. Federal Law of the RF no. 142-FZ «On Amendments to Articles 6 and 30 of the Federal
Law» On Citizenship of the Russian Federation” and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian
Federation» was adopted on 04.06.2014. This law establishes the possibility of criminal
liability for concealing the existence of a second citizenship (for Crimeans, this norm of law of
the Russian Federation will take effect from 1 January 2016)102. After that date, all the citizens
of Ukraine who are registered and living in Crimea will have to report if they have Ukrainian
citizenship. Whereby concealing of information on citizenship entails serious liability up to
criminal (art. 330-2 of the Criminal Code)103. If the citizens inform about their dual citizenship
after the schedualed date or indicate incomplete or obviously inaccurate data, they will face
administrative responsibility - a fine of 500 to 1000 rubles. All the internally displaced persons
from Crimea can also get under these rules. On 21 September 2015 on the official website of
the Federal Migration Service of Russia there was published a clarification on the notification
about the other citizenship and renouncing the Ukrainian citizenship by Crimeans104.
Taking into account the above mentioned, it can be assumed that if the situation does not
change in Crimea regarding citizenship the residents of Crimea who have preserved Ukrainian
98 A striking example is the situation with the judges in the territories occupied by the Russian Federation. According to
article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation No 6ZH, before the setting up of federal courts in
the territory of Crimea, the justice on behalf of the Russian Federation is dispensed in these areas by the courts which
were operating at the time of the occupation, and the judges of these courts are receiving the status of persons who
replace judges of these courts. The condition for the admission of these persons to justice was obtaining of Russian
citizenship, the transfer of passport of Ukraine to the Russian authorities, as well as the submitting to the Russian
authorities of a declaration about renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship.
99 http://www.un.org.ua/images/stories/Report_15_April_2014_en.pdf
100 http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf .
101 http://crimea.gov.ru/textdoc/ru/7/act/393pr.pdf
102 http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/06/grajdanstvo-dok.html
103 http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ukrf/10_45.html
104 http://www.82.fms.gov.ru/press/news/item/51894/. Аrchive: https://web.archive.org/web/20160209125758/http://
www.82.fms.gov.ru/press/news/item/51894/
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passports, may face further problems connected with informing about «dual» citizenship.
3. In accordance with the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation «On
the distribution among the constituent entities of the Russian Federation of quotas for the
issuance of temporary residence permits in the Russian Federation for 2015 for foreign
citizens and stateless persons» no. 2275-r of 14 November 2014, there was established the
quota for residents of Crimea (the citizens of Ukraine and other states) for the issuance of
permits for temporary residence in the Russian Federation for 2015. The quota for Crimea is
1500 permits, of them 400 permits for the city of Sevastopol105 (in 2014 this quota was 5,000
permits for the AR Crimea and 400 for Sevastopol).
Citizens of Ukraine who do not wish to obtain Russian citizenship, but wish to constantly
continue to live in Crimea, are limited in their ability to get a temporary residence permit in
the territory over which the sovereignty of Ukraine is extended. Thus, those persons who
exceed the allocated quota will not be able to get the documents in order to continue to
reside permanently in Crimea.
Restrictions and other quotas regarding where non-citizens may live in the state, particularly
the restrictions and quotas which may be associated with an element of coercion, can violate
their right to freedom of movement106.
4. In a particularly vulnerable position were orphans and children in the care or custody
of state authorities. According to official data as of 08.01.2014, there were 4228 of such
children in Crimea. Administration of all the institutions of Crimea began to collaborate with
the Russian authorities. Children are effectively deprived of the right to choose citizenship
(obtaining of Russian passports is provided upon reaching the age of 14). On 05.06.2015
the Head of the Department for observance of the rights of the child, non-discrimination and
gender equality of the Secretariat of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine Aksana Filipishina informed about this problem during a press conference on
«Violations of children’s rights in the occupied Crimea»107.
105 http://government.ru/media/files/7CP91bGabOg.pdf
106 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Second report on Denmark (CRI (2001) 4, paras. 18–25).
107 http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/ua/all-news/pr/5615-sm-aksana-filipishina-prava-ditini-v-krimu-pochali-porushuvativid-
samogo/; http://health.unian.net/country/1085947-ukrainskim-detyam-sirotam-v-kryimu-prinuditelno-prisvaivayutrossiyskoe-
grajdanstvo.html

CRIMEA BEYOND RULES
Other issues of the series.
By the time this issue is published, the following issues has already came out or
are ready for publication:
Issue 1. The right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence.
Issue 2. Right to property.
Special issue. Transfer by the Russian Federation of parts of its own civilian
population into the occupied territory of Ukraine.
Issue 3. Right to nationality (citizenship).
Issue 4. Freedom of expression (under preparation).
These and other materials devoted to the observance of the international standards
of human rights by the authorities of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation with
reference to the occupation of the Crimean peninsula could be found on eh website
precedent.crimea.ua
Do you need assistance in applying to the European Court of Human Rights? Fill up
a form on goo.gl/forms/KLqi9LsA5Z
Would you like to share your opinion or offer material for publication in following
issues?
Contact [email protected]
© RCHR
© UHHRU
«CRIMEA BEYOND RULES. Thematic review of the human rights situation under
occupation.» - Vol. 3 - Right to nationality (citizenship) / Edited by S. Zayets,
R. Martynovskyy, D. Svyrydova. – Kyiv, 2017. – 52 p.
The publication is aimed at representatives of international organizations,
diplomatic missions, government bodies and professional legal community, who
need information on the practical application of international human rights standards
under occupation of the Crimea.
Thematic review is published in electronic form and is for free distribution. The
materials are available in three languages - Ukrainian, Russian and English. Use of
Content is permitted with the obligatory reference to the source and authorship. If
the author of the material is not explicitly stated, all rights to the material belong
to the expert-analytical group CHROT. The materials included in the publication, as
well as other materials on the topic can be found on the website precedent.crimea.
ua
Annex 958
Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Report of the International Expert Group: 26
February Criminal Case (2017)

26
February
CRIMINAL
CASE
Book Analit_Zvit1.indb 1 27.10.17 17:47
“Report of the International Expert Group. “26 February criminal case”. Part 1. Reconstruction
and legal analysis of the events of 26 February 2014 outside the building of the Supreme Council
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Simferopol”/ Edited by: R. Martynovskyy, D. Svyrydova. -
Kiev, 2017. – 100 p.
This Report presents the results of work of the International Expert Group on the so-called “26
February criminal case”, namely: reconstruction and legal analysis of the events that took place on 26
February 2014 outside the building of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in
Simferopol, and their consequences. On that day, two people perished and several other protesters were
injured during two rallies organized by the party “Russian Unity” and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
People. The report also contains conclusions and recommendations of the expert group addressed to the
authorities of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, non-governmental and international organizations.
The report will be useful to all those who are interested in issues related to observance of international
human rights standards.
Representatives of 6 organizations from 4 countries worked together on drafting Part 1 of the Report “Reconstruction
and legal analysis of the events of 26 February 2014 outside the building of the Supreme Council of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Simferopol”, namely:
© Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 2017
Kirill Koroteev –The Human Rights Center “Memorial”, Russia
Roman Martynovskyy –Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukraine
Sergey Ostaf –Resource Center for Human Rights (CReDO), Moldova
Vadim Pivovarov –Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors on Law Enforcement, Ukraine
Olga Salomatova –Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Poland
Daria Svyrydova –Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Ukraine
Aleksandr Sedov –Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Ukraine
Sergey Shvets –Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors on Law Enforcement, Ukraine
Vladimir Yavorskiy –independent expert in the field of freedom of peaceful assembly, Ukraine-Belarus
Book Analit_Zvit1.indb 2 27.10.17 17:47
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07
Methodology of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Section 1. Reconstruction and legal analysis of the events of 26 February 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1. General description and background of the events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2. Key individuals and groups that participated in the events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3. Reconstruction of the events of 26 February 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Episode 1. Gathering of rallyers, designation of positions (8:00-11:10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Episode 2. First clashes (11:10-13:00) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Episode 3. Escalation of confrontation in the inner yard in front
of the Supreme Council of the ARC (13:00-15:00) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Episode 4. Culmination: the beginning of extraordinary session of the SC ARC,
peak tension of the situation in the inner yard. Aggravation of the conflict,
occupation of the inner yard by the “pro-Ukrainian” rallyers, breaking
into the SC ARC building (15:10-15:50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Episode 5. Partial withdrawal of the rallyers from the inner yard in front of the SC ARC,
occupation of positions in the inner yard by the pro-Russian activists (15:50-17:00) . . . . 59
Section 2. Investigation of the events of 26 February 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.1. Investigation of the events by law enforcement agencies of Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2. Criminal prosecution of some participants of the events pursuant
to the legislation of the Russian Federation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3. Procedures for qualification and protection of the rights of A. Chiygoz
in connection with criminal prosecution following the events of 26 February . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Section 3. Legal analysis of the events of 26 February 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1. Jurisdiction, compliance with the principle of “no punishment without law” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2. Legal Regulation of the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.1. Organization of peaceful assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.2. The «peacefulness» of the assembly and the comply with the «requirements
of public order» .............................................................................................................................................................81
3.2.3. State’s positive obligations, legal regulation of police actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.4. Qualification of events, liability of the organizers and rallyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
General conclusions and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
CONTENTS
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General conclusions and recommendations
Main conclusions
With regard to reconstruction and analysis of the events of 26 February 2014
(1) Till 15:00 on 26 February 2014, the overall atmosphere of the rallies was peaceful. There were
a few isolated cases of skirmishes and conflicts between the participants, changes of locations of
participants of the two rallies. The slogans “Crimea is Russia”, Russian flags and the flag of the “Right
Sector” appeared among the rallyers, which brought to the short-term aggravation of the situation
and isolated conflicts.
Police officers held negotiations with the organizers of the rallies on maintenance of public order.
Representatives of law enforcement agencies formed a “cordon” for a short period of time separating
rallyers in the inner yard in front of the building. Later, the police left the yard and moved to the main
entrance of the SC ARC building. Participants and organizers of the rally, using audio equipment,
called on the people in the square to stay calm, arrange corridors to remove people, called on police
to help with policing.
(2) From 15:00 to 16:00 there was conflict escalation and stampede among the participants
of the rallies, isolated skirmishes and fights among rallyers, including the use of different objects
(a flagpole, a bottle, etc.). Presumably, it was this hour, when most of the victims in the case were
injured and two people perished during the stampede. During this period there were observed no
aggravation of the situation in the square in front of the SC ARC, no calls to rallyers for aggressive
conduct and disorder. There were also no calls to the rallyers to maintain public order on the part of
law enforcement agencies, which in this period of time were mainly passive.
(3) Around 16:00, after the rallyers were informed that the extraordinary session of the SC ARC
would not be held, the participants of the “pro-Ukrainian” rally started to leave the square. The pro-
Russian rallyers remained outside of the square, but did not demonstrate overt aggression. The
overall atmosphere at the SC ARC building after 16:00 was peaceful.
(4) The analysis of the events shows that the major clashes between participants of the assemblies
took place when police lifted a cordon separating the rallyers, consisting of police officers. It seems
to be impossible to find a true reason for such decisions, however, the responsibility for such actions,
definitely, rests with the law enforcement agencies.
(5) On the basis on information sources studied, it can be concluded that in fact the role of
organizers and leaders of the rallies was performed by Sergey Aksyonov (on the part of the “pro-
Russian” rally), Refat Chubarov and Enver Arpatly (on the part of the “pro-Ukrainian” rally).
(6) Throughout the rally, Ahtem Chiygoz did not manifest himself as a leader or organizer of
the rally. His name did not appear in the application for holding the rally, he did not take floor
with calls on the participants of the rallies. According to the video available to the group, in one of
the episodes A. Chiygoz was standing with other representatives of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar
People in a “live cordon” separating the pro-Ukrainian activists and the police officers. During the
speeches of organizers of the rallies he remained behind them and tried with his gestures to call on
the rallyers to keep quiet. These circumstances can not provide a basis for the conclusion about the
existence of a causal link between A. Chiygoz’s conduct and deaths during the rallies.
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With regard to jurisdiction, as well as compliance with the principle of “no punishment
without law”
(1) On the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Russian Federation has no right to
carry out any proceedings in relation to the events of 26 February 2014 at the SC ARC building, without
the consent of the authorized agencies of Ukraine, and otherwise than in the manner prescribed by
the international treaty, the parties to which the Russian Federation and Ukraine are.
(2) The extension of Russian criminal law to wrongful acts that were committed prior to the
annexation of the Crimean peninsula implies the retroactive effect (ex post facto), which is contrary
to one of the fundamental principles of criminal procedure recognized in international law – “no
punishment without law”.
(3) Application by the Russian Federation of the principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the ”26
February criminal case“ is impossible due to the fact that the crimes, which the citizens of Ukraine
(Ahtem Chiygoz and others) are charged with, do not relate either to war crimes or crimes against
humanity, and do not fall under any of the Conventions on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime.
(4) The defendants in the ”26 February criminal case“ are being prosecuted for crimes, the
object of which was interests of Ukraine (organization of and participation in mass riots refers to the
offences against public order). In fact, the wrongful act, which the citizens of Ukraine are charged with,
lacks elements of corpus delicti, which constitutes a violation of the provisions of Russian laws and
regulations.
(5) The existing legal problems, together with the unmotivated selective approach of the de facto
authorities of Crimea to the prosecution of the organizers and participants of the two rallies (among
the defendants are only “pro-Ukrainian” rallyers) demonstrate the politically motivated nature of the
criminal prosecution of A. Chiygoz and other persons by the Russian Federation.
With regard to legal regulation of freedom of peaceful assembly
(1) The analysis of the Ukrainian legislation combined with the ECtHR case law in relation to
Ukraine proves the lack of predictable and clear legislation that complies with international human
rights standards and governs the freedom of peaceful assembly. However, administrative and judicial
practices available in Ukraine at the time of the events required from the organizers of the rally only to
notify in advance of its purpose, time and venue, as well as the expected number of participants.
(2) The authorities were informed in advance of the planned rallies and had sufficient time for
preparation to policing the rallies. The authorities had no formal objections to holding of the peaceful
assemblies. The above-said gives reason to assert that the preliminary organization of the assemblies
took place in accordance with international law and the laws of Ukraine.
(3) Assessing the events of 26 February 2014, one can state that, in general, the assemblies were
peaceful. There is no evidence of violent actions planned by the organizers during their preparation
for the rallies. Public statements of the assembly organizers and leaders did not contain incitement to
violence or hostility. Participants of the rallies did not use weapons within the meaning of the law of
Ukraine. The fact that there were some acts of violence during the rallies cannot itself be sufficient to
conclude that their organizers had violent intentions. There is no compelling evidence for accusing the
rallyers of organizing mass riot and the existence of violent goals on their part.
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With regard to actions and responsibility of the police and other authorities
(1) The authorities, being timely informed about two planned rallies, were supposed to ensure the
safety of participants in the framework of the State’s positive obligations.
(2) Policing errors at the time of preparation for the peaceful assemblies and further inaction
during their holding, especially at the time of clashes, when no measures were taken and no available
means to save the life and health of citizens were used, lead to the conclusion about inadequate police
conduct. In general, the police tactics was quite passive and mostly confined to monitoring of the
developments. These errors and inaction resulted in tragic consequences.
(3) The unpreparedness of the militia to a conflict assembly is striking. It was clear that there
could be confrontations among the participants of assemblies due to the heated political situation.
Throughout the assembly, the police did not take any adequate response measures on a step-by-step
basis. Police officers at the rally had no means of protection; at the same time, fully equipped officers
were in the SC ARC building.
(4) The positive obligations of the authorities do not cease with the end of the assemblies, and
bind the State to conduct an effective investigation into offences. During the rally two people were
killed, and several other participants were injured. Law enforcement agencies of Ukraine were obliged
to investigate into all such cases, assess conduct/inaction of law enforcement officers in charge of
safety, and do everything possible to bring the perpetrators to justice.
With regard to responsibility of the organizers and participants of the assemblies, qualification of
the events of 26 February 2014
(1) The rallies declared by the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and the “Russian Unity” party on
26 February 2014 were, by their nature, two assemblies with opposing objectives and requirements,
which partially overlapped in time and place. Reconstruction of the events and detailed legal analysis
make it possible to assert that these rallies held in the square in front of the SC ARC did not contain
signs of mass riot.
(2) Reconstruction of the events and evaluation of the materials of case No. 2015417109 prove a
lack of data about the existence in Ahtem Chiygoz’s conduct of elements of corpus delicti of the “mass
riot” offence (art. 294 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine or art. 212 of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation), as well as elements of any other punishable acts.
With regard to politically motivated prosecution of A. Chiygoz and other defendants in criminal
case No. 2015417109
The selective nature of justice and politically motivated prosecution of A. Chiygoz and other defendants
is proved by the following facts:
(1) only participants of the “pro-Ukrainian” rally, representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, are
prosecuted in the criminal case No. 2015417109;
(2) Russian Federation is lacking jurisdiction and legal grounds to investigate into the events of 26
February 2014 both pursuant to international law and national legislation.
In addition, the most victims in the criminal case No. 2015417109 belong to the participants of the
“pro-Russian” rally, representatives of the SDPU and law enforcement officers. No participant of the
“pro-Ukrainian rally” has been identified as a victim.
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Recommendations
To the authorities of Ukraine:
(1) To conduct an effective investigation into:
а) the facts of death and bodily harm during the events of 26 February 2014 outside the building
of the SC ARC in Simferopol;
b) unlawful actions/inaction of the Ukrainian police officers with regard to positive obligations and
safeguards during the rallies on 26 February 2014, to bring those responsible to justice.
(2) To bring national legislation regulating freedom of peaceful assembly in line with international
human rights standards, including the issues of the procedure for its holding, policing and adequate
reactions in situations requiring special response measures from law enforcement agencies, relying on
the best practice summarized in the OSCE/ODIHR Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies.
(3) To take all necessary steps under international law and national legislation for the protection
and restoration of the rights of persons violated as a result of their unmotivated prosecution for their
participation in peaceful assemblies on 26 February 2014.
To the authorities of the Russian Federation:
(1) To cease the politically motivated prosecution of the participants of the events of 26 February
2014, including Ahtem Chiygoz, Mustafa Degermendzhi, Ali Asanov, Arsen Yunusov, Eskender
Kantemirov, Eskender Emirvaliyev.
(2) With regard to the protection of rights of Ahtem Chiygoz, Mustafa Degermendzhi, Ali Asanov
and others, prosecuted in the case No. 2015417109:
• to free from detention Ahtem Chiygoz, Mustafa Degermendzhi, Ali Asanov, who are detained in
this criminal case;
• to restore the rights and provide adequate compensation for unlawful detention to all the
accused in the case No. 2015417109, who had a preventive measure in the form of arrest imposed on
them for different periods of time;
• to conduct an effective and public investigation into the facts of unlawful detention and
prosecution of persons in this case by the law enforcement agencies of Crimea, established after the
annexation of the peninsula.
(3) To cancel the regulations of the Russian legislation, which allow retrospective application
of criminal legislation of the Russian Federation on the territory of Crimea, as inconsistent with the
principles and standards of national and international law.
To the international organizations and institutions (UN, Council of Europe, European Union, others):
(1) To draft and adopt a resolution on the protection of human rights and the restoration of the
rights of persons who have suffered politically motivated criminal prosecution in connection with the
events of 26 February 2014 in Simferopol.
(2) To carry out system control and monitoring over the human rights situation, the effective
investigation into the events of 26 February 2014 and the prevention of the practice of politically
motivated prosecution of participants of these events.
To mass media:
To thoroughly and objectively cover the consequences of the events of 26 February 2014 in Simferopol
for the purpose of public control over the course of the investigation on the ”26 February criminal case“.
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