Traduction
Translation
CR 2015/21
Vendredi 8 mai 2015 à 15 heures
Friday 8 May 2015 at 3 p.m. - 2 -
10 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets today to hear the
second round of Bolivia’s arguments. I now give the floor to Professor Chemillier-Gendreau.
Ms CHEMILLIER-GENDREAU:
T HERE IS NO BAR TO THE COURT ’S JURISDICTION IN THE
LEGAL AVENUES TAKEN BY BOLIVIA
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the present proceedings will end in a short while
and you will each have to decide on the matter that has been put to you, that of jurisdiction in this
case. Bolivia considers that it has a duty to make some general clarifications. Bolivia is calling for
Chile to respect its obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia in good faith.
Chile shifts the focus of the dispute and repeats ad nauseam that Bolivia is seeking revision of the
1904 Treaty.
2. To untangle this knotty issue, it is necessary to understand the historical roots of this
dispute. The situation arising from the military conquest of Bolivian coastal territories by Chile
was confirmed in the 1904 Treaty. There is an injustice in this situation which has been recognized
very widely and continuously, and not only by Bolivia. Faced with this injustice, Bolivia has
turned to the law, and it is on this basis that it appears before you. Chile is caught off balance,
since it must leave its comfort zone of always promising and never giving.
3. While it is quite natural for Bolivia to have tried to put right an injustice it has suffered, it
is still more significant to note that the very perpetrators of this injustice have always accepted it
was necessary to find the means to put an end to it. From the early days of the War of the Pacific,
thus for more than a century, Chile has repeatedly expressed its willingness to meet Bolivia’s
persistent requests, without ever actually following up on them however. In 1919 Bello Codesido
nonetheless spoke of a legitimate claim. And the Chilean President Gabriel González Videla
referred to the need for “an historical reparation”.
4. And today Chile would like to make Bolivia feel guilty for trying to escape that injustice.
The Government of Bolivia and its people seek a remedy to the injustice they have suffered, that is
true. - 3 -
11 5. However, as the Court has understood from our earlier arguments, Bolivia intends to use
the legal avenues open to it and nothing more. It does not put itself in the position of Antigone
who appealed to natural law over positive law. No, we know that positive international law,
notwithstanding the progress it has made, cannot always achieve the objective set by Vattel. In
1758, the latter wrote in his work Droit des gens:
“Justice is the basis of all society . . . It is still more necessary between nations,
than between individuals; because injustice produces more dreadful consequences in
the quarrels of these powerful bodies politic, and it is more difficult to obtain
redress . . .”
6. Nonetheless, while justice is the horizon of international law, the law is always a balance
between an order that must be safeguarded and societal shifts that must be followed. Hence the
importance of progress in codifying international law and the possibility of having recourse to a
judge. Speaking on this subject, Rosalyn Higgins, former President of the Court, summed up the
terms of the debate: “In my own view, law is really to be seen not as rules but as opposing norms
which must be chosen between (no use of force/self-defence). And that can only be done by
2
articulating the values which can be promoted by one choice over the other.”
7. Thus, in the case that has been submitted to you, the jurist is faced with a choice of
values. On the one hand there is an evolution of modern international law, in the phase ushered in
by the Charter of the United Nations, which is upending that law’s traditional landscape. With the
emergence of the norm prohibiting the use of force, the validity of treaties no longer depends solely
on agreement between the signatory States. It is determined by respect for certain values which
serve to align law and justice as far as possible.
8. However, we are dealing here with a particular value which determines global equilibrium
and which is expressed in the principle of stability of boundaries. That stability is so important that
each time the Court has the opportunity to do so, it endorses the principle of uti possidetis juris
12 founded on respect for colonial boundaries. Furthermore, this is in keeping with the provisions of
Article 70 of the Vienna Convention . 3
1
Vattel, Droit des gens, Book II, Chap. V, p. 306, paras. 63-64 (from the translation by J. Chitty (ed.),
Philadelphia, 1883).
2Dame Rosalyn Higgins, DBE, Q.C., Ethics and International Law, in Liber Amicorum in honour of
Raymond Ranjeva, A. Pedone (ed.), Paris, 2013, p. 509.
3Article 70 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 29 May 1969. - 4 -
9. And in order to choose between those values, we have the doctrine of intertemporal law.
Defined in Max Huber’s celebrated Award of 1928 in the Island of Palmas case, this doctrine holds
that a situation involving international relations should be judged by the law in force at the time the
events took place. The War of the Pacific and the Treaty which ended it should thus be considered
in legal terms by the norms of the time. The use of force was then an attribute of sovereignty and
the peace treaties were not invalid. On most continents, the map dividing up land between States
was established on those bases. And that is what General König expressed in 1900 with the utmost
cynicism.
10. Bolivia therefore knows full well that it is impossible for it to challenge the 1904 Treaty,
unless it were to be renegotiated with the voluntary and sovereign agreement of both States, a
possibility that Chile has so far ruled out. It is because Bolivia is aware of the limitations thus
imposed on it by positive law that there is no trace in Bolivia’s pleadings of a request to cancel or
revise the 1904 Treaty, the legal act that consolidated the established injustice. It knows that such a
step would run counter to the contemporary legal situation. And that is precisely why Article VI of
the Pact of Bogotá is inapplicable in this case and why the Court has full jurisdiction.
11. As for the attempt by my distinguished colleague, who concluded Chile’s arguments
yesterday, to widen the issue, it is not pertinent. Why cite treaties that have nothing to do with this
case? Bolivia respects the treaties and the boundaries they define. If there is a dispute today
between Chile and Bolivia, it is very specific because, in this particular case, Chile recognized as
soon as the Treaty was concluded that it left a matter unresolved, and said that it was prepared to
resolve it.
12. If Chile itself had not opened another way to remedy the injustice enshrined in that
Treaty, Bolivia would have been obliged to take no further action. But Chile cannot rewrite its
13 history. It made promise after promise and committed itself in bilateral agreements, and raised
what is referred to in law as legitimate expectations. Our opponents wondered with feigned
innocence as to the whereabouts of the source of law relied upon by Bolivia. But the source of that
law is in Chile’s own conduct. And what you are now being asked, Mr. President, Members of the
Court, is to guide the two States concerned on a legal path that Chile took the responsibility of - 5 -
opening, a path that can provide a concrete solution to the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked
situation.
13. To uphold its claim, therefore, Bolivia first relies on respect for the given word. Not at
the time of the 1904 Treaty, which nothing undermines. But in respect of the numerous
commitments made by Chile to give Bolivia a sovereign maritime outlet, independently of that
Treaty. Chile cannot maintain the contradiction which consists in having repeated on so many
occasions that it would negotiate sovereign access to the sea with Bolivia independently of the
1904 Treaty, and in now saying, in the hope of raising an obstacle to the Court’s jurisdiction, that it
is the 1904 Treaty which, by its very content, prevents Chile from giving Bolivia a coast. Its good
faith is at stake.
14. To assert its jurisdiction the Court will have to note that the matter submitted to it is
independent of the 1904 Treaty and take into consideration the pactum de contrahendo to which
Chile subscribed. Because this pactum does exist, contrary to what Mr. Wordsworth said yesterday
at the podium.
15. Our opponent has made a highly selective choice of documents. It has truncated those
documents to give Chile’s position a guise of consistency, in which it is severely lacking. Let us
take some examples and for a moment return to those words, giving them the meaning the law
confers on them. Paragraph IV of the Chilean memorandum of 9 September 1919 clearly expresses
Chile’s willingness to make all the necessary efforts for Bolivia to acquire access to the sea, but
again in paragraph V, Chile states that it “accepts to engage into new negotiations to fulfil the
longing” of Bolivia . Chile accepts. And to accept is to conclude.
16. Should the letter from the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs of 6 February 1923 be
14
5
considered insignificant as our colleague suggests ? It nonetheless states that “the Government of
Chile will make the greatest effort to arrange” with Bolivia “the grounds for a direct negotiation
that lead to the realization” of Bolivia’s maritime aspiration. The Court will make no mistake of
Chile’s intentions. To say that one will make the greatest effort is to make a commitment and a
strong one at that.
4
MB, Ann. 19; CR 2015/20, p. 22, para. 19 (Wordsworth).
5MB, Ann. 48; CR 2015/20, p. 23, para. 22 (Wordsworth). - 6 -
6
17. Let us return again for a moment to the exchange of Notes of 1950 . In an attempt to
play down the significance of this exchange, which nonetheless has contractual value, our friends
on the other side of the Bar feign ignorance of the fact that in that Note Chile refers to various
quotations contained in Bolivia’s Note of 1 June 1950; the latter Note included an introductory
paragraph noting that Chile had, on a number of occasions, from 1895 to 1949, agreed to discuss
the means for Bolivia to acquire sovereign access to the sea. And it is on the basis of these
acknowledged references that Chile declared in its Note of 1950 that its “Government [would] act
consistently with this position”, a position it had taken for a number of years, namely to formally
enter into negotiations with Bolivia in order to find a formula that would make it possible to give
Bolivia sovereign access to the sea.
7
18. Our opponents pay scant attention to the 1961 Trucco Memorandum . No doubt because
it recalls that in 1950 Chile consented to holding negotiations, as soon as possible, aimed at
8
satisfying Bolivia’s fundamental national need for sovereign access of its own to the sea . The
commitment to negotiate is fully confirmed.
19. I could cite many other documents. Without encroaching on the merits of this case and
for the sole purpose of demonstrating that the Court has jurisdiction on the basis of commitments
made independently of the 1904 Treaty, we could refer to the President of Chile’s Note of
30 September 1975. In it he mentions the “repeated declarations” he made concerning the sincere
and unchanging purpose of his Government to examine with Bolivia a lasting solution to Bolivia’s
9
landlocked condition . In a further Note of 8 February 1977, the President of Chile recalled that his
15 Government had entered into negotiations with Bolivia to satisfy the latter’s aspiration to have
sovereign access to the sea, and stated that his Government would maintain its “decision” to reach
a satisfactory solution . He was to confirm this on 23 November 1977 . 11
6
MB, Ann. 109 A and Annex 109 B.
CR 2015/20, p. 28, para. 38 (Wordsworth).
MB, Ann. 24.
9
Ibid., Ann. 70.
10
Ibid., Ann. 74.
1Ibid., Ann. 76. - 7 -
20. And this pactum de contrahendo found another more recent expression on 17 June 2008.
On that day, the Vice-Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two countries agreed to continue
discussions on the maritime issue, point 6 on the Agenda of 13 Points adopted in 2006 . The same
word “agreed”, with all its legal significance, is to be found in the minutes of the 2010 negotiations,
regarding the continuation of discussions on the maritime issue .3
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, these are only examples, as the place for a
complete analysis is during the debate on the merits and not here. However, they serve to show
that Bolivia relies on international law and on the obligation to negotiate as it results therefrom
when a State Chile has committed itself to doing so. Which is what it did in respect of
Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea.
22. Bolivia therefore asks the Court to force Chile to respect the obligation it is under and
thus to resume negotiations, but with the obligation to achieve an outcome based on the
commitments previously made by that country. This request is independent of any attempt to
return to the provisions of the 1904 Treaty. By no means does it pave the way for the application
of Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá, which would impede the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction. It
falls within the scope of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá and no objection can block it. Upon
rigorous consideration, the Court will reject Chile’s preliminary objection and declare that it has
jurisdiction to judge this case.
Mr. President, I thank the Court for its attention and ask you to call Professor Forteau.
16 The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to Professor Forteau.
Mr. FORTEAU:
T HE SUBJECT -MATTER OF THE DISPUTE AND THE QUESTION OF
THE SO -CALLED CRITICAL DATE
1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will not try to conceal
our surprise at Chile’s oral arguments yesterday. It was our understanding that Chile had raised a
preliminary objection on 15 July 2014, as a result of which, by an Order of the Court made on the
1MB, Ann. 120.
1Ibid., Ann. 124. - 8 -
same day, the proceedings on the merits had been suspended. And yet, despite requesting that
suspension , Chile devoted the majority of its oral argument yesterday to pleading the merits of the
case. Mr. President, let us be clear, our opponent cannot, especially in such an expeditious and
piecemeal manner, during a second round of oral argument on jurisdiction, and having itself
requested the suspension of the proceedings on the merits, ask the Court to rule on the merits of the
case, as it did yesterday in the guise of pleading on jurisdiction.
2. If it were able to do so, Chile would undoubtedly claim in its defence that it had to
examine the merits, because, in order to establish the Court’s jurisdiction, it is necessary to sort the
pre-1948 sources of the obligation to negotiate from the post-1948 sources — that was the whole
point of the presentations made by Mr. Wordsworth and Professor Dupuy, who hid behind the idea
that 1948 is the critical date for the purposes of ascertaining the Court’s jurisdiction. Mr. President,
this issue of the critical date is actually a false problem, and I will return to it in a moment.
I. Bolivia’s claim
3. Before that, allow me first to say a few words on the subject-matter of the dispute.
Mr. Wordsworth asked the Court to requalify this dispute in order, he said, to give it its correct
characterization .5
17 4. He began by indicating that the Applicant was not the master of the meaning of its claim,
suggesting that the Court’s task in this case was not only to interpret but also to reformulate
Bolivia’s claim . 16 According to Mr. Wordsworth, the jurisprudence in this respect is well
established — but he remained very elusive on this point. I will simply say in response to him that,
in a recent Judgment rendered in 2012, the Court noted that:
“[t]he present case was brought before the Court by the Application of Nicaragua, not
by special agreement between the Parties, and there has been no counter-claim by
Colombia. It is, therefore, to the Nicaraguan Application and Nicaragua’s
submissions that it is necessary to turn in order to determine what the Court is called
upon to decide.” 17
14
POCh, pp. 3-4, para. 1.7.
1CR 2015/20, p. 18, Part II (Wordsworth).
1Ibid., pp. 21-22, paras. 11-13 (Wordsworth).
17
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 670,
para. 133. - 9 -
5. Mr. Wordsworth then endeavoured to show that Bolivia’s claim is equivalent to a request
for the revision of the 1904 Treaty, concentrating his efforts on the third part of Bolivia’s claim
calling for the implementation of the obligation to negotiate. However, in order to arrive at that
conclusion, Chile is forced to reformulate Bolivia’s request — reformulate it, and not simply
interpret it, which only the Court has the authority to do. Let us hear what Mr. Wordsworth had to
say: “if the words referring to the alleged obligation to negotiate were removed from Bolivia’s
prayer for relief, the Court would lack jurisdiction by virtue of Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá” . 18
6. Two points, Mr. President: the first is to point out that, if the claim does concern the
obligation to negotiate (and it does), there is no issue of jurisdiction; the second, why on earth and
on what basis would it be necessary to remove the words “obligation to negotiate” from Bolivia’s
claim? Those words form the very essence of its claim. According to Bolivia, an obligation to
negotiate has arisen alongside the 1904 Treaty. Members of the Court, we could debate the
existence of this obligation and its exact content. But this is the very question on the merits that
has been submitted to the Court, and it cannot be decided at the jurisdiction stage. And so we keep
coming back to the same point: Chile’s preliminary objection postulates that there is no obligation
to negotiate; Chile is confusing jurisdiction and merits.
18 7. Moreover, Chile asserted again yesterday that Bolivia’s claim is the product of
“repackaging” carried out “suddenly” by Bolivia in 2013 . However, I recalled on Wednesday —
referring to the relevant supporting documents — that in 1979, that is to say over 30 years ago,
Bolivia officially reminded Chile that it was under an obligation to negotiate sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean ; 20 furthermore, at that time, Chile did not refute having made such a
commitment (which, by the way, can be regarded as a form of acquiescence, which constitutes a
valid source of obligations under international law). Bolivia did not seise the Court until 30 years
later — and it did so in 2011 for a specific reason: it was then that Chile began to renege on the
commitment it had made to negotiate.
18
CR 2015/20, p. 18, para. 5 (Wordsworth).
1Ibid., pp. 20-21, para. 12 (Wordsworth).
20
CR 2015/19, pp. 22-23, para. 28 (Forteau); MB, Ann. 203. - 10 -
8. It is interesting also to note that both Sir Daniel and Mr. Wordsworth seemed to suggest
yesterday that Chile had no particular problem in terms of jurisdiction with the first or second parts
of Bolivia’s claim; it is only the third part of the claim which, they argue, raises the issue of
jurisdiction, since requesting the implementation of the obligation to negotiate would, in their eyes,
21
be a clear infringement of the 1904 Treaty . I have two comments to make in that connection.
9. Firstly, the implementation of the obligation to negotiate, which is the subject-matter of
the third part of Bolivia’s claim, will not have a direct effect on the 1904 Treaty: it is not a
self-enforcing obligation which would in itself bring about sovereign access to the sea. As is very
clearly explained in Bolivia’s Memorial, it is an obligation to enter into negotiations and to
maintain a certain level of conduct during those negotiations, with the aim of reaching an
agreement on sovereign access to the sea — in that regard I refer the Court most respectfully to
paragraphs 238 to 290 of Bolivia’s Memorial, which very clearly set out what Bolivia means by the
obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the sea.
10. Bolivia also fails to see why the request for implementation of the obligation to negotiate
would pose a particular problem in terms of jurisdiction under Article VI of the Pact. If the Court
19 finds that an obligation to negotiate exists (the object of the first part of the claim), then Chile has
an obligation under international law. In that event, it will thus simply be a matter of giving effect
to an obligation assumed by Chile — it being understood, as I have just said, that the obligation in
question is an obligation to negotiate. Whatever constraints that obligation places upon Chile, it is
a principle upheld by this Court that the fact that a right or an obligation “may give rise to delicate
questions of application . . . is not, in the view of the Court, sufficient ground for holding that the
right is not susceptible of judicial determination with reference to . . . the Statute” .
11. Thus, we keep coming back to the same point: does an obligation exist in this case? It is
strictly a question on the merits. If that obligation does not exist, Chile will not be required to do
anything; if that obligation does exist, Chile is, quite simply, bound by international law, of which
this Court is an instrument.
2CR 2015/20, p. 10, para. 1 (Bethlehem); p. 17, para. 2 (Wordsworth).
2Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 37. - 11 -
II. The so-called critical date of 1948
12. Mr. President, I now come to the point I raised earlier: the critical date for the purposes
of the application of Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá.
13. Professor Dupuy spoke yesterday about a question that was “critical in terms of verifying
whether or not the Court has jurisdiction in this case” . This critical question was as follows:
“The simple question before the Court at this preliminary stage is whether the
matter referred to it by Bolivia’s Application was or was not already settled by the
24
1904 Peace Treaty, in force when the Pact of Bogotá was signed in 1948.”
14. Almost all of Chile’s counsel echoed this idea that, in order for Article VI of the Pact to
apply, not one but two temporal conditions must be met: the matter in question must be one which
was governed in 1948 by a treaty in force in 1948. Thus, Mr. Wordsworth used the expression “as
25
of 1948” six times in his presentation yesterday . And as far as Chile is concerned, this double
temporal condition is vital, because it has very definite consequences.
20 15. Both Ms Pinto and Mr. Wordsworth told the Court on Monday that if a matter is
governed or settled by a treaty within the meaning of Article VI, then “that matter is outside the
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under the Pact even if the arrangement or treaty concerning the
matter was altered after 1948” . Professor Dupuy also claimed that the obligation to negotiate
27
needed to have arisen before 1948 in order to block the application of Article VI of the Pact . That
is why, according to Professor Dupuy, it is essential for Bolivia to state “the point at which” the
28
obligation to negotiate arose: “Before or after 1948” ?
16. With all due respect to my esteemed opponents, Mr. President, their interpretation of
Article VI is not correct: this critical date is a condition that has been cobbled together by Chile in
order to sidestep the agreements concluded by Chile after 1948, starting with the 1950 exchange of
notes. It is clear that our opponents are not at ease with the post-1948 period, and that they would
rather it simply disappeared from the landscape.
23
CR 2015/20, p. 37, para. 23 (Dupuy).
24
Ibid., p. 33, para. 6 (Dupuy).
2See also CR 2015/18, p. 58, para. 49 (Wordsworth).
2CR 2015/18, p. 26, para. 16 (Pinto); pp. 57-58, para. 46 (Wordsworth).
27
CR 2015/20, p. 35, para. 14 (Dupuy).
2Ibid., p. 32, para. 4 (Dupuy). - 12 -
17. The first thing to say is that Chile’s critical date is impossible to apply on a practical
level. Take the following example, which is essentially fictitious: in 1928, a treaty concluded
between Nicaragua and Colombia awards three islands to Colombia. A new treaty is concluded in
1950, which transfers sovereignty over those islands to Nicaragua. A dispute then arises between
the two countries concerning both sovereignty over the islands and maritime delimitation, and that
dispute is brought before the Court on the basis of the Pact of Bogotá. This is what Chile is
arguing:
the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the question of sovereignty over the islands
because, in 1948, it was settled by a treaty — the 1928 Treaty;
of course, sovereignty changed hands in 1950, but, according to Chile, what counts is that in
1948 the matter was settled by a treaty in force on that date — the 1928 Treaty;
this means that, for the purposes of maritime delimitation, the Court should take account of
how sovereignty over the islands was dealt with in the 1928 Treaty, since that is the agreement
reputed to have settled or governed the matter by virtue of the Pact of Bogotá;
21 but how, then, is the Court going to carry out the maritime delimitation, which depends on who
has sovereignty over the islands? If it takes account of the 1928 Treaty, it is not respecting the
new treaty of 1950. And if it takes account of the 1950 Treaty, it is not respecting Chile’s
interpretation of Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá. This is the sort of impasse to which Chile’s
reasoning leads.
18. It is true that Ms Pinto referred on Monday to the authority of the Court’s jurisprudence.
You will find at tab 2.1 in the judges’ folder the document which was shown to that end during her
presentation. And that document was subsequently relied upon by all of Chile’s counsel. It
reproduces paragraph 82 of the Court’s 2007 Judgment in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case, in
which the Court states:
“the question whether the Treaty was terminated in 1969 is not relevant to the question
of its jurisdiction since what is determinative, under Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá,
is whether the 1928 Treaty was in force on the date of the conclusion of the Pact, i.e.
in 1948, and not in 1969”. - 13 -
19. Chile deduces from the foregoing that any commitment to negotiate made post 1948 is
without effect on the Court’s jurisdiction, irrespective of whether it would modify the 1904 Treaty
in one sense or another, because the critical date is the situation as it existed in 1948.
20. This does not seem to me to be the reasoning followed by the Court. First, it will not
have escaped you that, at the end of paragraph 82 of the 2007 Judgment, “see paragraph 89 below”
appears in brackets. This would seem to suggest that what the Court says in paragraph 82 is not
sufficient in itself. In fact, paragraph 82 falls within section 4.4.3 of the Judgment, which focuses
solely on the question of whether the 1928 Treaty invoked in this case was in force in 1948. It is
clear that, in order to answer this question (whether the 1928 Treaty was in force in 1948), one
must look at the situation in 1948.
21. Now let’s turn the pages of the Report to paragraph 83 of the Judgment, and the start of a
new section in which the Court examines the preliminary objection in relation to different elements
of the dispute, that is to say that it considers whether each of those elements is settled by the treaty
in force in 1948. Here, the Court does not state that it will verify whether each of the elements of
the dispute were governed in 1948 by the 1928 Treaty. It says in paragraph 85: “[t]he Court finds
it appropriate to examine in turn whether each matter listed above has been settled by the
22
1928 Treaty” — “whether each matter . . . has been settled” and not “whether each matter had
been” settled in 1948 by the 1928 Treaty.
22. This explains why, later on in its Judgment, the Court takes account of the possibility that
29
the law might have evolved after 1948 , and shows that the Court must ensure that the treaty still
governs, at the time of its ruling, the question submitted to it. At the time of its ruling, and not in
1948.
23. There is absolutely nothing unusual about this, for three reasons:
(1) it is a general principle upheld by the Court that the critical date for the purposes of
ascertaining jurisdiction is the date of the filing of the application;
2Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 861, para. 89, and p. 869, para. 120. - 14 -
(2) as Sir Daniel rightly stated, this Court is an instrument “of judicial settlement” ; its role is to
settle disputes in the present and, in order to do this, it must apply the law in force at the time of
its settlement;
(3) Article XXXIV of the Pact provides that, if the Court declares itself to be without jurisdiction
to hear the dispute submitted to it on the basis of Article VI, that dispute “shall be declared
ended”. Contrary to Sir Daniel’s arguments, Article XXXIV is not simply a jurisdictional
31
provision ; Article VI has the effect of putting an end to the dispute and of putting an end to it
not in 1948 but now. Article VI actually precludes the applicant from turning to another means
of dispute settlement because, by virtue of Article VI, there is no longer a dispute.
24. In its 2007 Judgment, the Court thus noted that it “could not have concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction over that matter under the Pact of Bogotá had there still been an extant dispute
with regard thereto”, and found that it lacked jurisdiction on the basis of Article 36 of its Statute
because, in its own words, the application of Article VI necessarily leads to the conclusion that
32
“there is no extant legal dispute between the Parties” . This confirms, on the one hand, that
Article VI must be exercised with caution, given its effects, and, on the other, that the application
23 of Article VI of the Pact means determining whether, on the date on which the Court was seised,
the date on which it settles the dispute, that dispute is governed or ruled by the treaty invoked.
25. Under these conditions, there is no need to discriminate, as Chile does, between the pre-
and post-1948 agreements. If, for example, as Bolivia claims, the 1950 exchange of letters is
indeed an agreement whereby Chile undertook to negotiate sovereign access to the sea, it cannot be
opposed by Article VI of the Pact on the ground that it would be necessary to consider the situation
in 1948 in order to determine whether the question was settled on that date. It is necessary to look
at the situation on the date on which the Court was seised of the dispute it is being asked to
resolve — in this instance, 2013. Therefore, in order to found the obligation to negotiate, it is only
necessary to find that that obligation existed at the time of the seisin of the Court and at the
30CR 2015/20, pp. 13-14, para. 15 (Bethlehem).
31Ibid., p. 16, para. 25 (Bethlehem).
32
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 874, para. 138. - 15 -
moment at which Bolivia claims Chile stopped respecting it; there is no need to ascertain whether
the obligation existed before or after 1948.
26. I come now to my conclusion, Mr. President. Bolivia believes that, in this case, neither
the dispute relating to the existence of the obligation to negotiate, nor the dispute relating to the
violation of that obligation, was settled or governed by the 1904 Treaty when Chile renounced its
obligation to negotiate, and it does so for a very simple reason: the obligation to negotiate does not
derive from the 1904 Treaty, but from sources of law separate from that Treaty.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes my presentation. Thank you very much
for listening. I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you would give the floor to my esteemed
colleague Antonio Remiro Brotóns.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor. I now give the floor to Professor Remiro Brotóns.
Mr. REMIRO BROTONS:
O N THE 1904T REATY , FORMALISM IN THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS AND SCARE TACTICS
1. Mr. President, Members of the Courttoday I propose to address certain aspects of the
second round of Chile’s arguments, which seem to me particularly revealing: firstly, the
24 absolute consecration of the 1904 Treaty as the beginning and end of all things; secondly,
scepticism as to the formation of international obligations outside of treaties, understood as
solemn and formal written agreements; and thirdly, scare tactics.
I. On the 1904 Treaty
2. First, I shall address the 1904 Treaty. Listening to Chile’s counsel yesterday, I wondered
if perhaps Moses had come down from Mount Sinai with the tablets of the ten commandments in
one hand and a copy of the 1904 Treaty certified by God in the other. The 1904 Treaty has
permanent value, of course, it merits sanctity, but it is not eternal. No doubt this assertion, which is
based on the logic of history, puts me on the list of suspects of those bent on its revision. The mere
mention of the fact that the 1904 Treaty might be renegotiated, amended or complemented - 16 -
immediately triggered the accusation of revisionism . Our opponent has accused us time and
again of not paying heed to the 1904 Treaty in our pleadings, but as soon as we do, we are
immediately accused of wanting to revise it.
3. Revising treaties no doubt has a bad reputation in the civilized world, since those who
seek to do so are stereotyped as destabilizing agents of the established order by those who,
beforehand, succeeded in destabilizing the pre-established order. But, truth be told, there is no
normative principle prohibiting the renegotiation of treaties by peaceful means and on the basis of
consent. The texts of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties provide since it could not
34 35
have been otherwise for the amendment and succession of treaties as available options.
4. Bolivia seems doomed to a sorry fate. If it refers to the 1904 Treaty, in any way
whatsoever, it is revisionist. According to Chile’s diagnosis, it is a form of genetic determinism
25 that must lead to the sudden death of any initiative to regain sovereign access to the sea within the
framework of compliance with the said Treaty.
5. It is true that Bolivia went before the League of Nations in 1920 to request the revision of
the 1904 Treaty which it considered unjust , inspired by the hopes raised by Article 20 of the
“Covenant” and by a misinterpretation of the powers of the Council and the latter’s desire to
implement them. To the same end, in 1948, Bolivia supported proposals which were eventually
discarded to widen the scope of the settlement procedures in the Pact, and then, when the Pact
was signed and ratified, it made a declaration in the same spirit . However, this account leads us
to a completely different issue, which, contrary to what Chile claims in its attempt to sow
confusion, has nothing to do with the matter we are actually dealing with here.
6. Now, in the second round of argument, Chile has returned to what it believes is evidence
of the scheme to cover up (or camouflage) revision of the 1904 Treaty initiated by the subtle forces
of Bolivia in order to dupe the Court. I already addressed the withdrawal of Bolivia’s reservation
33CR 2015/20, p. 13 (Bethlehem).
34Arts. 39 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS),
Vol. 1155, p. 331).
35
Arts. 30.3 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, (UNTS), Vol. 1155, p. 331.
36“[T]he Delegation of Bolivia makes a reservation with regard to Article VI, inasmuch as it considers that pacific
procedures may also be applied to controversies arising from matters settled by arrangement between the Parties, when
the said arrangement affects the vital interests of a State.” - 17 -
37
to Article VI of the Pact in my first speech, and I am obliged to return to it again . In fact,
Bolivia’s reservation was not a genuine one according to the definition of Article 2 (d) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, due to the fact that its purpose was not to exclude or
modify the legal effects of the Pact’s provisions, but to widen them. Bolivia withdrew its
reservation, as it had every right to, but it does not see any problem in stating that it did so in order
that Chile should not continue to use it to oppose the Pact’s entry into force in their mutual
relations. To attempt to infer that the purpose of Bolivia’s claim, two weeks later, was to revise the
1904 Treaty, smacks of childishness considering the petitum of Bolivia’s claim. If Chile wished to
escape the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a matter such as the one submitted by Bolivia, it
should have denounced the Pact and then let a year pass for the denunciation to become effective,
pursuant to its Article LVI. However, our opponent did not choose this approach. It decided to
26 shelter behind Article VI and distort the subject-matter of Bolivia’s Application.
7. And, quite naturally, we spoke again of the Bolivian Constitution of 2009, a Constitution
which is in fact a progressive model of respect for international human rights law and treaty law.
Chile maintains that the purpose of Bolivia’s claim before the Court is to revise the 1904 Treaty,
because it is assumed that that Treaty is incompatible with the Constitution and the interpretation of
the ninth transitional provision which provides for the submission of claims to international
tribunals as an alternative to denunciation. However, as already noted in the first round, the 1904
Treaty was never included in the list drawn up by Bolivia’s Foreign Minister of treaties contrary to
the Constitution which were then denounced or renegotiated. Chile’s counsel questioned the
existence of proof in this connection . The proof exists. I don’t know whether it is in the judges’
folder after all, since I understand there were some regulatory problems given that there was a copy
in Spanish, but, materially, the proof exists: if the Chilean delegation would like to have a copy, I
will have it sent to them straight away.
8. Moreover, Article 267 of the Constitution formulates a legitimate objective that is entirely
compatible with respect for the 1904 Treaty, taking account in particular of the fact that the
obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean is considered outside the Treaty
37
CR 2015/20, p. 35 (Dupuy).
3Ibid., p. 21 (Wordsworth). - 18 -
though in full observance thereof. Given Chile’s refusal to comply with that obligation, it is
reasonable to argue that, in order to achieve this constitutional objective, Bolivia seised the Court
by invoking Article XXXI of the Pact, and that the source of legitimacy for the appointment of
Bolivia’s Agent lies in Article 267 of the Basic Law.
9. Furthermore, it seems that Chile has found in an offering of bonds definitive proof that
Bolivia seeks revision of the 1904 Treaty before this Court. However, if we examine the paragraph
that Chile highlighted in the offering memorandum, there is nothing to support this claim. The first
sentence merely notes the substance of Article 267 of the Constitution. The second sentence
establishes the undeniable fact that, since the 1904 Treaty, Bolivia has not had sovereign access to
27 the Pacific Ocean. The third sentence recalls Bolivia’s persistent claim to regain access to that
Ocean, not to be confused with the territories ceded by the 1904 Treaty. Finally, it is mentioned
that in order to find a peaceful solution to the maritime dispute a dispute whose object is not the
revision of the 1904 Treaty Bolivia seised the International Court of Justice. In the end, the
most interesting aspect of this ten-year US$500 million bond offering is its interest rate
5.95 per cent.
10. The facts, when all is said and done, give the lie to the judgments of intention cast by
Chile. The 1904 Treaty has never been considered as being contrary to the Constitution, nor has
the Executive Branch ever denounced it or challenged it before an international tribunal. On the
contrary, the 1904 Treaty is still in force and is protected by constitutional provisions which
guarantee that, in domestic law, it ranks above other legislation, pursuant to Article 410,
39
paragraph 2, of the Bolivian Constitution .
11. Treaties that are respected are not always loved. Chile’s attachment to the 1904 Treaty is
understandable, in the same way that Bolivia’s profound disappointment is understandable. At the
end of the day, the former gained a 120,000 sq km of the coastal Department of Litoral that
belonged to the latter; as the ever-present Minister Plenipotentiary Abraham König once said “our
3Text in Spanish:
“La aplicación de las normas jurídicas se regirá por la siguiente jerarquía, de acuerdo a las
competencias de las entidades territoriale1. Constitución Política del Estado2. Los tratados
internacionales. 3. Las leyes nacionales, los estatutos autonómicos, las cartas orgánicas y el resto de
legislación departamental, municipal e indígena 4. Los decretos, reglamentos y demás resoluciones
emanadas de los órganos ejecutivos correspondientes.” - 19 -
rights are rooted in victory, the supreme law of Nations” . In these circumstances, it is hard to
understand how the victor that succeeded in translating its conquest into a legal title of ownership
can hold itself up as an example of magnanimity towards the one that had the “good fortune” to be
beaten by it. Since Chile has used this platform to display, once again, its virtue towards Bolivia , 41
which enjoys so say the most ample freedom of transit in the world, note should be taken,
just for the record, of the many restrictions to the right of free transit from which Bolivia in fact
suffers on Chilean territory; it is the source of recurrent disputes that have to be resolved in
28 different fora, such as the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) . The last of Chile’s
counsel to arrive in The Hague asserted that Bolivia is asking the Court to order Chile to
renegotiate to change Bolivia’s non-sovereign access through Chilean territory into sovereign
access . This assertion is wrong. Bolivia has no intention of waiving the right of free transit
afforded to it in the 1904 Treaty, nor is it demanding its revision or seeking to change Chilean ports
into Bolivian ones.
II. A formalist approach to the formation
of international obligations
12. I noted that the second feature of Chile’s second round of oral argument was a complete,
though entirely recent, scepticism towards the formation of obligations outside of treaties
understood as formal written agreements. I get the impression that Chile began to lose faith in its
belief that international obligations can arise out of declarations and unilateral acts of acquiescence
the day it realized that its conduct could result in obligations not only for its neighbours but also for
itself. Since Chile’s conversion to strict formalism, its lawyers have rejected the legal value of the
exchanges of notes, joint declarations and unilateral acts submitted to the Court by Bolivia in its
Memorial of 17 April 2014. But it has taken its iconoclastic fury too far. Pursuant to Article 79,
paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court, the pleadings must be confined to those matters that are relevant
to the objection.
40
See MB, Vol. II, Part I, Ann. 39.
41CR 2015/20, p. 16 (Bethlehem).
42Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, “Limitaciones al derecho de libre tránsito de Bolivia por territorio chileno”,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diremar, 2015.
43
CR 2015/20, p. 39 (Koh). - 20 -
13. Establishing whether the obligation to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for
Bolivia can be inferred from those documents is a question which goes to the merits. It is
something that we might have been discussing here today had Chile filed its Counter-Memorial in
accordance with the terms of the Court’s Order of 18 June 2013, instead of raising a preliminary
objection to the Court’s jurisdiction. However, Chile chose to contest the Court’s jurisdiction
under Article 79, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, and, as a result, the proceedings on the merits
have been suspended. Our opponent cannot now use the one-and-a-half hours in the second
29 round — as it did — to dispose of the merits in a decision on the Court’s jurisdiction. Chile
invoked Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá and that is the provision we have debated. Bolivia has
highlighted the illogicality of Chile’s objection to the Court’s jurisdiction. If the Court confirms
that it has jurisdiction, as Bolivia expects it to do, Chile will have several months in which to
develop first its written and then its oral arguments on the nature and content of the obligation to
negotiate which Bolivia infers from the agreements and unilateral acts submitted to the Court.
Attempting to do so at this stage of the proceedings is, procedurally speaking, both improper and
inappropriate, and the Court must not tolerate such conduct.
III. The scare tactics
14. The third and final feature of Chile’s second round was its scare tactics . 44 It is
fascinating that Mr. Koh came all the way to The Hague to spend Chile’s final ten minutes
preaching a terrible message of the territorial instability awaiting Latin America were the Members
of this Court to find that they have jurisdiction to entertain Bolivia’s modest, reasoned and civilized
Application. Every single treaty of limits would be in danger; the Pact of Bogotá would collapse;
Bolivia would end up asking the Court to review its borders with all its neighbours; others would
follow its bad example; good neighbourliness and regional co-operation would be at risk; the
Court would find itself caught up in sensitive diplomatic affairs. Members of the Court, if you
must be subjected to scare tactics, I truly believe you deserve something more sophisticated than
the speech made by our opponent. Mr. Koh casually asserts that a legal declaration confirming the
existence of the obligation to negotiate would result in States refusing to contemplate negotiations
44CR 2015/20, p. 38 (Koh). - 21 -
for fear of the consequences. And yet, Bolivia has seised the Court precisely because of that: a
refusal to negotiate.
15. Allow me to finish with a parable — the story of the Sephardic Jews, expelled from
Castille in 1492, who abandoned their homes but took the keys with them in the hope that they
would one day return. This symbolic return took place more than 500 years later with the legal
recognition that they had an automatic right to Spanish nationality. It is not surprising that, in
circumstances as complicated as those surrounding Bolivia’s traumatic expulsion from the sea, the
30 latter tried to keep hold of its sovereign right to the ocean, in the same way that the Sephardic Jews
held onto the keys to their homes, in the hope of one day returning. It did so with the longing of a
Sephardic Jew. And, like the former, without seeking anything more than that which once
belonged to it.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for listening. Mr. President, I would be
grateful if you would give the floor to my colleague Professor Payam Akhavan.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor. I now give the floor to Professor Akhavan.
M. AKHAVAN :
L’EXCEPTION SOULEVÉE PAR LE CHILI AU REGARD DU PARAGRAPHE 9
DE L ARTICLE 79 DU R ÈGLEMENT DE LA COUR
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, hier, le Chili n’a laissé aucune
place au doute quant à son souhait d’obtenir une décision au fond. M. Dupuy l’a dit aussi
clairement que succinctement :
«The only test to verify the jurisdiction of the Court is whether the [1904]
[T]reaty . . . was in force or not in 1948. And Bolivia itself acknowledges that such
was indeed the case, while at the same time trying to have that real treaty prevailed
over by an improbable pactum.»45
Voilà qui est formulé on ne peut plus clairement. Le Chili demande donc à la Cour de dire qu’il
46
existe un «traité réel» et un «pactum improbable» , qu’il n’a pas l’obligation de négocier un accès
souverain à la mer, et qu’il n’existe aucun pactum de contrahendo mais uniquement
4CR 2015/20, p. 37, par. 22.
4Ibid. - 22 -
l’incontournable traité de 1904. Il s’agit là purement et simplement d’une réfutation catégorique de
la demande de la Bolivie au fond.
2. Comme si la lune était jalouse des étoiles, sir Daniel, incapable de tolérer d’autres accords
au firmament des obligations, a qualifié le traité de 1904 de «toxique» 47 pour la demande
bolivienne. Il a parlé de lever le voile sur celle-ci , et il en aura tout le loisir, Monsieur le
président, mais il lui faudra attendre la nuit de noces, c’est-à-dire le stade de l’examen au fond de la
présente instance.
31 3. M. Wordsworth, quant à lui, a qualifié les négociations portant sur un accès souverain de
déclarations exprimant une «intention ... et non [un] pactum de contrahendo» ; il a évoqué un 49
50 51
pactum «tiré[] par les cheveux» et «imaginaire» , ainsi que des «termes ne pouvant guère créer
52
d’obligation[] juridique[]» , estimant que ces éléments étaient tout sauf un pactum de
contrahendo . Pour faire bonne mesure, il a poliment ajouté que, s’il s’attaquait ainsi frontalement
à la demande de la Bolivie au fond, c’était uniquement dans le cadre de l’«examen de la question
54
de la compétence» .
4. Monsieur le président, avec tout le respect que je porte à la Cour, il serait inconcevable
qu’elle dise que cette exception a un caractère exclusivement préliminaire, au sens du paragraphe 9
de l’article 79 de son Règlement. Certes, il est clair que le fait de «[r]echercher si elle a
55
compétence pourrait amener la Cour à effleurer certains aspects du fond de l’affaire» , mais «une
56
décision sur la compétence ne peut jamais régler directement un point de fond» . Or, la décision
sollicitée par le Chili, selon laquelle il n’existerait pas de pactum de contrahendo, signifie
47
CR 2015/20, p. 13, par. 14.
48Ibid.
49Ibid., p. 22, par. 19.
50Ibid., p. 23, par. 21.
51Ibid., p. 31, par. 51.
52
Ibid., p. 25, par. 27.
53
Ibid., p. 29, par. 45.
54
Ibid., p. 31, par. 51.
55Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise, compétence, arrêt n 6, 1925, C.P.J.I. série A n 6,o
p. 15.
56Appel concernant la compétence du Conseil de l’OACI (Inde c. Pakistan), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 56 ; les
italiques sont de moi. - 23 -
nécessairement que «le fait de répondre à l’exception préliminaire» équivaudrait, pour la Cour, à
57
«trancher le différend ... au fond» . C’est tout à fait évident et élémentaire. La Cour ne saurait
statuer sur cette question au stade préliminaire sans connaître du fond.
5. Monsieur le président, votre prédécesseur, M. le juge Aréchaga, a précisé que, en 1972,
les mots «exclusivement préliminaire» avaient été ajoutés au paragraphe 9 de l’article 79 du
Règlement de la Cour pour «dissuader les parties de soulever certaines questions sous la forme
58
d’exceptions préliminaires» et les «encourager à mettre ces exceptions de côté, en tant que
moyens de défense au fond ne devant être introduits, intacts et préservés, qu’à ce stade». Telle est
exactement la situation en la présente espèce ; nous avons affaire à des exceptions d’incompétence
constituant à l’évidence des moyens de défense au fond qui n’auraient dû être introduits, «intacts et
préservés», qu’au stade de l’examen au fond, et non pas à ce stade préliminaire.
32 6. Il va de soi que la Bolivie a toute confiance en son argumentation au fond. Bien qu’il ait
tourné cette argumentation en ridicule, le Chili n’a en effet expliqué à aucun moment ce qu’était un
pactum de contrahendo. Tout ce qu’il a trouvé à dire, c’est que la présente affaire porterait sur le
59
caractère «sans préjudice» des négociations , et que la reconnaissance de l’existence d’un accord
de négocier aurait, pour reprendre les termes de M. Koh, un «effet pervers» qui «paralyserait» la
diplomatie .60 En revanche, le Chili est resté muet sur les principes bien établis relatifs aux
obligations qui découlent d’accords et d’autres éléments du comportement des Etats, parmi lesquels
le pacta de contrahendo mais aussi le pacta de negocio et l’estoppel, qui constituent autant de
motifs reconnus attestant l’existence d’obligations internationales, ainsi que cela est exposé au
chapitre II, paragraphes 291 à 334, du mémoire. L’un d’entre eux est le principe fondamental selon
lequel les «Etats sont en droit d’attendre et d’exiger que pareils engagements, une fois pris, soient
respectés», principe qui «trouve son expression dans diverses notions juridiques, telles que
l’estoppel, la forclusion et les attentes légitimes» (mémoire, par. 332). La Bolivie connaît fort bien
la différence entre les déclarations politiques et les engagements juridiques, et elle a hâte de
57 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 852, par. 51.
58Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, «The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the International Court of
Justice», American Journal of International Law, vol. 61, p. 16.
59
CR 2015/20, p. 16, par. 27 ; p. 39, par. 3 ; et p. 40, par. 6.
60
Ibid., p. 41, par. 9. - 24 -
pouvoir contester la description erronée que le Chili a faite de sa demande, dépeinte comme étant le
fruit d’une série de négociations qui n’ont pas abouti. Mais il lui faudra patienter jusqu’au stade de
l’examen au fond.
7. En répétant sans cesse que l’accord en vue de négocier se heurterait immanquablement au
traité de 1904, le Chili a fait l’impasse sur le renvoi, au cours du premier tour de plaidoiries de la
Bolivie, à l’affaire Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. Les chauffards qui circulent à Téhéran ou ailleurs
seraient bien avisés de lire attentivement ce qui est dit dans cet arrêt : «Il n’appartient pas à la Cour
de déterminer quel sera le résultat final des négociations à mener par les Parties. Ce sont les Parties
elles-mêmes qui doivent trouver d’un commun accord une solution qui tienne compte des objectifs
[de l’accord].» 61 Les conséquences sont évidentes : les obligations découlant du traité de 1904 et
de l’accord de négocier existent parallèlement ; une solution trouvée d’un commun accord peut
donc avoir ou non une incidence sur le traité. Dans la pratique, pareille solution pourrait tout à fait
ne pas exiger de revision du traité de 1904 mais, même si cela devait se révéler nécessaire,
pourquoi faudrait-il s’en alarmer ? Ce qui importe, c’est qu’il s’agirait d’une solution trouvée d’un
commun accord, et non d’une solution imposée. C’est là toute la futilité de l’argument du Chili
concernant les heurts entre ces deux éléments. Sir Daniel a parlé, non sans dédain, d’«obligations
parallèles», séparées par des «portes coulissantes», qui «coexistent sans jamais se recouper» , et 62
33 M. Koh a poursuivi en mettant la Cour en garde contre le fait de «prescrire judiciairement une
obligation de négocier en vue d’atteindre un résultat précis» 63et les dangers d’une négociation
64
«déséquilibrée» . Mais la véritable question, Monsieur le président, ne consisterait-elle pas
simplement à déterminer précisément ce dont les Parties sont convenues, en examinant l’affaire au
fond ?
8. Le Chili ne ménage pas ses efforts pour faire du traité de 1904 un tabou. Sir Daniel a ainsi
fait grand cas de ma déclaration selon laquelle «[u]n traité [pouvait] être pertinent à l’égard d’un
différend sans pour autant le régler» . En l’occurrence, il semblerait que ce traité soit intouchable,
61
Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p. 7, par. 141.
62
CR 2015/20, p. 10, par. 1.
63 Ibid., p. 40, par. 6.
64
Ibid.
65
CR 2015/19, p. 54, par. 13. - 25 -
que même un accord prévoyant de négocier qui pourrait aboutir à une entente susceptible ne
serait-ce que d’effleurer le traité de 1904 reviendrait automatiquement à répudier cet instrument ; et
que cela justifierait que la Cour se déclare incompétente en application de l’article VI au motif
qu’elle rouvrirait une question déjà réglée, et ce, alors même que l’accord prévoyant de négocier
revient à dire qu’une question demeure en suspens. Monsieur le président, tel ne saurait être le cas.
9. J’en viens à présent à la question posée à la Bolivie par M. le juge Greenwood, à savoir
«[à] quelle date [celle-ci] considère-t-elle que les Parties ont conclu un accord aux fins de négocier
66
un accès souverain à la mer ?» . La Bolivie se fera un plaisir de répondre à cette question, et
commencera par relever que le Chili s’est en saisi avec enthousiasme lors de son second tour de
plaidoiries. M. Dupuy a ainsi parlé d’un continuum historique aux origines mystérieuses et de la
nécessité que se produisent une «sédimentation» , une «cristallisation» , une «métamorphose» , 69
ou d’autres instants magiques donnant soudainement naissance à des obligations. Il a laissé
entendre que, si un accord particulier n’avait pas été conclu à une date précise, un comportement ou
une pratique constante ne pouvaient générer d’obligation. Or, ce n’est pas là ce que la Cour a dit à
maintes reprises. Pour ne citer qu’un seul exemple récent, dans l’affaire du Différend maritime
(Pérou c. Chili), elle a considéré que l’«accord tacite» intervenu entre les Parties «[laissait]
70
supposer que la manière dont [elles] envisageaient leur frontière maritime avait évolué» . Aucun
principe de droit international n’exige en effet qu’il y ait un unique instant magique où des accords
ou ententes apparaissent comme par enchantement, à l’instar de la création du monde. Cela étant,
la Bolivie n’estime pas moins qu’il existe plusieurs exemples d’accords conclus avec le Chili. Au
34 paragraphe 337 de son mémoire, elle a d’ailleurs clairement indiqué que «[l]es événements
exposés ... satisf[aisaient] [tous] aux critères d’un engagement juridique contraignant. Alors même
qu’un seul engagement aurait suffi à donner naissance à l’obligation invoquée, c’[était] en l’espèce
toute une série d’actes successifs du Chili qui [venait] étayer la thèse de la Bolivie.»
66
CR 2015/19, p. 60.
67 CR 2015/20, p. 32, par. 4 (Dupuy).
68 Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70 Différend maritime (Pérou c. Chili), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2014, p. 38, par. 91. - 26 -
10. Les faits sont tous là. Ils démontrent que, en de nombreuses occasions, le Chili a promis
de négocier un accès souverain à la mer. «Si vous escomptez avoir du succès dans le monde,
promettez tout, ne donnez rien !», a dit un jour Napoléon. En droit, une promesse reste toutefois
une promesse, qu’elle ait été formulée une seule ou plusieurs fois. C’est aussi simple que cela.
11. M. Wordsworth n’a pas ménagé ses efforts pour ne retenir dans ces échanges que ce qui
lui convenait, Mme Chemillier ayant brièvement démontré que les documents en question avaient
ainsi été présentés sous un faux jour. Il n’en demeure pas moins que ces questions portent toutes
sur le fond, et que la Bolivie se fera un plaisir, le moment venu, d’examiner en détail l’ensemble de
ces échanges, à la lumière des principes applicables du droit international. En tout état de cause,
ces questions ne relèvent pas de la procédure sur la compétence. Le comportement constant dont a
fait preuve le Chili a bel et bien donné naissance à des obligations, tant avant qu’après 1948, et ce,
que l’on considère les faits pertinents isolément ou conjointement. Pour en revenir à la question du
juge Greenwood, la Bolivie estime qu’elle ne pourrait se révéler pertinente aux fins de la
compétence que si l’on considérait qu’il existe une différence entre les périodes antérieure et
postérieure à 1948, comme si l’article VI signifiait que les parties contractantes ne pouvaient plus
conclure de nouveaux accords après l’instant magique où avaient sonné les douze coups de minuit,
le 30 avril 1948. Or, les faits énoncés dans le mémoire de la Bolivie couvrent toutes les
éventualités ; ils établissent l’existence d’obligations avant, en, et après 1948, mais il s’agit là,
encore une fois, d’une question de fond.
12. Ce qui est évident, c’est que les auteurs du pacte de Bogotá, «pour satisfaire» à
l’article 27 de la charte de l’OEA, avaient prévu de donner à l’article XXXI la portée la plus large
possible, afin de «régler définitivement» tous les différends dans les Amériques. Sir Daniel a
certes tenté de minimiser l’effet de l’article XXXIV du pacte, qu’il a qualifié de «disposition
concernant [exclusivement] la compétence de la Cour» et signifiant que les «mécanismes de
71
règlement des différends prévus dans cet instrument [étaient] épuisés» . Cependant, ainsi que
M. Forteau l’a précisé tout à l’heure, cette disposition met un terme à un différend si la Cour se
71CR 2015/20, p. 16, par. 25 (Bethlehem). - 27 -
déclare incompétente en application de l’article VI ; elle ne peut donc s’appliquer que s’il ne fait
aucun doute qu’une question a bien été réglée définitivement.
35 13. Monsieur le président, le Chili a fait grand cas de l’article 6 du traité de 1904, qui
72
accorde à la Bolivie un «droit perpétuel et absolu de ... transit» . Nous ne sommes pas tout à fait
sûrs du but qu’il poursuit en invoquant sans cesse ce droit. Cherche-t-il, ce faisant, à insinuer que,
puisqu’elle jouit de ce droit de transit moins important, la Bolivie devrait tout simplement oublier
la promesse qu’il lui a faite de négocier un accès souverain ? Toujours est-il qu’il suffit, là encore,
pour répondre à cette question, de déterminer précisément ce dont les Parties sont convenues
c’est-à-dire la teneur du pactum de contrahendo , point qui relève du fond. Pour éviter que la
Cour ne soit induite en erreur par cette prétendue «liberté de transit», la Bolivie tient toutefois à
préciser qu’elle a récemment saisi l’Association latino-américaine d’intégration (ALADI), basée en
Uruguay, de réclamations contre le Chili portant sur des restrictions que celui-ci a imposées en
matière de transport. Ces restrictions prennent notamment la forme de longue files de camions
auxquels il faut parfois trois jours pour franchir la frontière, ce qui nuit clairement au commerce
extérieur bolivien. En dépit des droits que la Bolivie tient de l’accord en vue de négocier, les coûts
entraînés par le refus de lui assurer un accès souverain à la mer ont eu des conséquences
catastrophiques sur son développement ; en témoigne le fait que tous les pays de l’OEA
reconnaissent que cette question reste en suspens et doit être résolue par voie de négociation entre
les Parties.
14. Le ton que le Chili a adopté dans la présente instance ne saurait passer inaperçu. Tantôt
celui-ci traite avec dédain les préoccupations bien réelles de la Bolivie, en prédisant le pire chaos et
de graves bouleversements si la présente affaire devait être entendue au fond et en assimilant une
procédure judiciaire à une attaque unilatérale, tantôt il déclare, comme dans l’exposé liminaire de
73
son agent, qu’il «ne consent [tout simplement] pas» à reconnaître la compétence de la Cour.
M. Koh a, quant à lui, parlé de «tentatives unilatérales visant à remettre en cause, par voie
72CR 2015/20, p. 43, par. 1 (Bulnes).
73CR 2015/18, p. 19, par. 20 (Bulnes). - 28 -
judiciaire, [les] frontières» du continent, de les «ébranler et [de les] déstabiliser» , un peu comme
si, en affirmant qu’il existe un accord en vue de négocier, la Bolivie avait commis un acte
d’agression à l’encontre de ses voisins. M. Koh a également brandi la menace que la présente
affaire donne à la Bolivie la possibilité de renégocier l’ensemble de ses traités frontaliers, ce qui est
tout simplement faux. La Bolivie se fonde exclusivement sur son accord spécifique avec le Chili
portant sur la négociation d’un accès souverain à l’océan Pacifique. Il s’agit d’une lex specialis,
propre à des circonstances tout à fait particulières, aux relations historiques entre les deux Etats et
aux ententes qu’ils ont conclues.
15. Il est évident que, en avançant de tels arguments politiques, le Chili s’est largement
36
écarté du droit applicable en vertu du pacte de Bogotá. Plutôt que de rester dans ce cadre, il s’est
servi de la présente instance pour présenter la demande de la Bolivie comme un précédent
76
dépourvu de fondement, artificiel, vexatoire, dangereux et «tout à fait inacceptable pour [lui]» ,
afin de susciter la crainte au sein de la Cour et de la dissuader d’examiner l’affaire au fond, en
invoquant des motifs sans rapport aucun avec le droit international. Mais peut-être le recours à
pareils arguments dénote-t-il un manque de confiance en sa propre exception d’incompétence.
M. Koh a, pour sa part, exhorté la Cour à ne pas se mêler de «questions diplomatiques
77
épineuses» , comme si son rôle consistait à se tenir à l’écart de tout différend problématique.
L’organe judiciaire principal de l’Organisation des Nations Unies n’aurait-il donc été créé que pour
connaître de différends dont les enjeux sont minimes et ne portent guère à conséquence ? La
réponse à cette question est claire : c’est un «non» retentissant ! Bien au contraire, c’est
précisément dans le cadre de différends délicats comme celui qui oppose les deux Parties, lorsque
tous les autres moyens de règlement ont été épuisés, que la Cour doit se montrer à la hauteur de la
situation et proposer une solution permettant de sortir de l’impasse. La tentative du Chili de la
dissuader d’exercer sa compétence en introduisant des considérations politiques étrangères à
74
CR 2015/20, p. 41, par. 10 (Koh).
75Ibid., p. 42, par. 14 (Koh).
76CR 2015/18, p. 17, par. 13 (Bulnes).
77
CR 2015/20, p. 42, par. 15 (Koh). - 29 -
l’affaire n’est pas de mise, mais le peuple bolivien est convaincu que la Cour fera la sourde oreille
à pareils arguments, qui n’ont rien à voir avec le droit.
16. En résumé, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, l’exception
d’incompétence soulevée par le Chili consiste à dire qu’il n’existe aucune obligation de négocier un
accès souverain de la Bolivie à la mer. Elle porte donc sur le cœur même de la demande de la
Bolivie, ce qu’atteste le paragraphe 500 du mémoire que celle-ci a présenté. Le Chili vous
demande tout simplement de statuer sur le fond, ce qui montre que son exception n’a
manifestement pas le caractère exclusivement préliminaire requis par le paragraphe 9 de l’article 79
du Règlement de la Cour.
17. Ainsi s’achève ma plaidoirie. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et
Messieurs de la Cour, de votre aimable attention tout au long des présentes audiences et vous prie
de bien vouloir appeler à la barre M. l’ambassadeur Rodríguez Veltzé, agent de la Bolivie, qui
présentera nos conclusions finales.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor. I now give the floor to H.E. Mr. Eduardo
Rodríguez Veltzé, Agent of Bolivia.
37 M. RODRÍGUEZ VELTZÉ :
CONCLUSIONS FINALES DE L ’AGENT DE L ’E TAT
PLURINATIONAL DE B OLIVIE
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, c’est un honneur pour moi que
de m’adresser de nouveau à vous pour présenter, en son nom, les conclusions finales de l’Etat
plurinational de Bolivie.
2. Ainsi que je l’ai indiqué mercredi dernier dans ma déclaration liminaire, la Bolivie a saisi
la Cour parce qu’elle est attachée au droit international et croit au règlement pacifique des
différends. Comme l’ont exposé nos éminents conseils, la Bolivie demande uniquement que le
Chili respecte son obligation de négocier un accès souverain à l’océan Pacifique. Cette obligation
est tout à fait distincte du traité de 1904 et résulte d’une série d’engagements, de déclarations et
d’échanges intervenus au fil des années. Ce comportement prolongé n’est pas anodin ; il se voit au - 30 -
contraire conférer, par le droit international, valeur d’obligation devant être respectée,
conformément aux principes bien établis par la jurisprudence de la Cour.
3. L’existence de cette obligation est la question soumise à la Cour ; il s’agit d’une question
de fond, qui ne peut être traitée à ce stade préliminaire sans la présentation, en bonne et due forme,
d’exposés écrits et oraux. Le Chili a bloqué l’accès souverain de la Bolivie à l’océan Pacifique, il a
bloqué la poursuite des négociations et il tente à présent, par son exception, de bloquer l’accès de la
Bolivie à la Cour. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, il serait injuste de
priver la Bolivie de la possibilité de présenter son argumentation au fond.
4. En dépit des efforts déployés par le Chili pour faire échec à la compétence de la Cour en la
présente espèce, le différend ne va pas disparaître pour autant ; il doit être réglé. Et le peuple
bolivien appelle de ses vœux ce règlement. Le Chili ne devrait pas considérer cette affaire comme
une menace mais comme une opportunité, une occasion s’offrant à lui et à la région tout entière de
régler ce différend conformément au droit international et de renforcer encore les relations amicales
entre les Etats.
5. De fait, le pacte de Bogotá visait précisément à régler pareils différends, de sorte qu’aucun
différend sur le continent américain ne reste sans règlement définitif, ainsi que cela est exposé à
l’article 27 de la charte de l’OEA.
6. La présente affaire revêt une importance capitale pour le peuple bolivien, qui compte sur
votre institution pour régler définitivement la question. En 2013, le bâtiment même dans lequel
nous nous trouvons, le «Palais de la Paix», a célébré son centenaire, et il avait été rappelé à cette
occasion la contribution considérable qu’il avait apportée à la paix et à la justice. Il est devenu le
«Palais de tous les Peuples», lesquels aspirent à ce que justice soit rendue dans un monde en
38 constante évolution. Les décisions prises dans ce palais prouvent que le droit prévaut et que les
différends ne sauraient se prolonger indéfiniment.
7. Avant de donner lecture des conclusions finales, je tiens à exprimer, au nom de la
délégation de l’Etat plurinational de Bolivie, notre sincère gratitude à la Cour pour l’attention et la
patience dont elle a fait preuve tout au long des présentes audiences.
8. Je voudrais également remercier le greffier, M. Philippe Couvreur, et l’ensemble de son
personnel, y compris les interprètes, pour leur courtoisie et leur efficacité. - 31 -
9. Je saisis également cette occasion pour remercier tous les membres de la délégation
bolivienne, qui n’ont pas ménagé leur peine pour élaborer et présenter l’argumentation de la
Bolivie. Enfin, je tiens à remercier nos amis et collègues de la délégation chilienne pour leur
courtoisie et l’esprit de respect mutuel qui a prévalu au cours des présentes audiences.
Conclusions finales de la Bolivie
10. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, je vais à présent donner
lecture des conclusions finales de la Bolivie.
11. La Bolivie prie respectueusement la Cour de :
a) rejeter l’exception d’incompétence soulevée par le Chili ;
b) dire et juger que la demande présentée par la Bolivie relève de sa compétence.
12. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie de votre
attention. Ainsi s’achèvent les conclusions de la Bolivie en la présente audience.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Excellency. A Member of the Court wishes to put a question
to the Parties, and I shall now give him the floor. Judge Owada, please.
Juge OWADA : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président. Je souhaiterais poser une question
simple au demandeur et au défendeur afin d’éclaircir un point. La voici :
Au cours des présentes audiences, comme dans leurs écritures, les deux Parties ont employé
l’expression «accès souverain à la mer». Bien qu’elles l’aient fait l’une et l’autre aux fins
d’exposer leur propre position ou de décrire celle de la Partie adverse, il ne s’agit pas d’une
formule consacrée en droit international général. Je saurais donc gré aux deux Parties de bien
39 vouloir indiquer quel est, selon elles, le sens de cette expression, et préciser quels sont les différents
éléments que celle-ci recouvre lorsqu’elles l’emploient pour définir leur position concernant la
compétence de la Cour.
Merci, Monsieur le président.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. The text of the question will be sent to the Parties in writing
as soon as possible. The Parties are invited to provide their written replies to this question no later
than 1 p.m. on 13 May. Any comments a Party may wish to make, in accordance with Article 72 of - 32 -
the Rules of Court, on the reply by the other Party must be submitted no later than 1 p.m. on
15 May.
The Court takes note of the final submissions which the Agent of Bolivia has just read out on
behalf of Bolivia, as it took note yesterday of the final submissions of Chile.
That brings us to the end of the hearings on the preliminary objection raised by Chile in this
case. I should like to thank the Agents, counsel and advocates of the two Parties for their
presentations. In accordance with the usual practice, I shall ask the Agents to remain at the Court’s
disposal to provide any additional information the Court may require.
With that proviso, I declare closed the oral proceedings in the case concerning Obligation to
Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile). The Court will now retire for
deliberation. The Agents of the Parties will be advised in due course as to the date on which the
Court will deliver its Judgment. As the Court has no other business before it today, the sitting is
now closed.
The Court rose at 4.30 p.m.
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Traduction