Traduction

DJF

CR 2008/1 (translation)

CR 2008/1 (traduction)

Monday 21 January 2008 at 3 p.m.

Lundi 21 janvier 2008 à 15 heures - 2 -

8 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court meets today, pursuant to Article 43 and the

following Articles of its Statute, to hear the oralarguments of the Parties in the case concerning

Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France).

Before recalling the principal phases of the present proceedings, I would like to indicate

initially that JudgeAbraham deemed that he shoul d not take part in the decision of the case, in

accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Statut e of the Court. Pursuant to Article 31 of the

Statute and Article 37, paragraph 1, of the Rul es of Court, France appointed Mr. Gilbert Guillaume

as judge ad hoc for the case.

Since the Court does not include upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of the Republic of

Djibouti, that Party has availed itself of its righunder Article31, paragraph2, of the Statute, to

choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: it chose Mr. Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf.

Article 20 of the Statute provides that “[e]very Member of the Court shall, before taking up

his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and

conscientiously”. Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute, that same provision applies to

judges ad hoc.

In accordance with custom, I shall first say a few words about the career and qualifications

of each judge ad hoc before inviting them to make their solemn declarations.

Mr. Gilbert Guillaume, of French nationality, has a degree in law and a postgraduate diploma

in political economy and economic science from the Un iversity of Paris; he also holds a diploma

from the Paris Institut d’études politiques and is an alumnus of the Ecole nationale

d’administration. An eminent jurist, he has comb ined the careers of judge and senior official at

national and international level. Mr.Guillaume is an honorary member of the French Council of

State, after having served as a Councillor of State. He was France’s representative on the Legal

Committee of the International Civil Aviation Orga nization (ICAO) and, as such, Chairman of the

Committee from 1971 to 1975. He was Chairman of the Conciliation Commission of the

Organisation for Economic Co-ope ration and Development (OECD) and subsequently became the

9 Director of Legal Affairs of that organization. Mr.Guillaume has been the Director of Legal

Affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, as such, acted inter alia as the Agent of - 3 -

France before the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of Human

Rights. He was a Member of the International Court of Justice from 1987 to 2005 and President of

the Court from 6February2000 to 5February2003. Mr.Guillaume has been chosen as judge

ad hoc in the cases concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v.

France) and the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua). A

member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration since 1980, Mr. Guillaume has sat as Arbitrator in a

large number of disputes.

Mr.AbdulqawiAhmedYusuf, of Somali nationality, holds a doctorate in political science

(international law) from the Graduate Institute of International Studies of the University of Geneva,

and has a doctorate in law from the Somalia National University. He has held numerous teaching

posts around the world, in particular at the Faculty of Law of the University of Geneva; he has also

taught at the European University Institute in Forence. Mr. Yusuf is the Legal Adviser to the

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco), and the Director of the

Office of International Standards and Legal Affairs of that orga nization. Previously, he had

worked as Assistant Director-Gen eral at the United Nations Indus trial Development Organization

(UNIDO) and held various positions at the Unite d Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD). He has represented Somalia on several occasions before the Organisation of African

Unity and the Arab League.

In accordance with the order of precedence fixed by Article7, paragraph3, of the Rules of

Court, I shall first invite Mr. Guillaume to make the solemn declaration prescribed by the Statute,

and I would request all those present to rise.

Mr. GUILLAUME:

“I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as

judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously.”

10 The PRESIDENT: Thank you. I shall now invite Mr. Yusuf to make the solemn declaration

prescribed by the Statute.

YMUr.UF: - 4 -

“I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as
judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously.”

The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Please be seated. I take note of the solemn declarations

made by Mr. Guillaume and Mr. Yusuf and declare them duly installed as judges ad hoc in the case

concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France).

*

I shall now recall the principal steps of the procedure so far followed in this case.

On 9 January 2006, the Republic of Djibouti filed in the Registry of the Court an Application

instituting proceedings against the French Republic in respect of a dispute concerning

“the refusal by the French governmental and judicial authorities to execute an
international letter rogatory regarding the transmission to the judicial authorities in

Djibouti of the record relating to the i nvestigation in the ‘Case againstX for the
murder of BernardBorrel’, in violation of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters between the [Djiboutian] Government and the [French] Government,
of 27September1986, and in breach of othe r international obligations borne by the

French Republic to the Republic of Djibouti”.

In respect of the refusal to execute an international letter rogatory, the Application also

alleged the violation of the Treaty of Friendshi p and Co-operation concl uded between France and

Djibouti on 27June1977. The Application further referred to the issuing, by the French judicial

authorities, of witness summonses to the Djiboutia n Head of State and senior Djiboutian officials,

allegedly in breach of the provisions of the said Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, as well as

of the principles and rules governing the diplomatic privileges and immunities laid down by the

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 and the principles established under

customary international law relati ng to international immunities, as reflected in particular by the

11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,

including Diplomatic Agents, of 14 December 1973.

In its Application, Djibouti indicated that it sought to found the Court’s jurisdiction on

Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court and was “confident that the French Republic w[ould]

agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court to settle the present dispute”.

Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court provides that: - 5 -

“When the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a
consent thereto yet to be given or mani fested by the State against which such
application is made, the application shall be transmitted to that State. It shall not

however be entered in the General List, nor any action be taken in the proceedings,
unless and until the State against which such application is made consents to the
Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.”

The Registrar, in accordance with this provi sion, immediately transmitted a copy of the

Application to the French Government and inform ed both States that, pursuant to that provision of

the Rules, the case would not be entered in the Ge neral List, nor would any action be taken in the

proceedings, unless and until the State against whic h the Application was made consented to the

Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.

By a letter dated 25July2006 and received in the Registry on 9August2006, the French

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Court that “the French Repub lic consent[ed] to the

Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Applicati on pursuant to, and solely on the basis of...

Article 38, paragraph 5”, of the Rules of Court, thereby making it possible to enter the proceedings

in the General List of the Court.

By an Order dated 15November2006, the Court fixed 15March2007 and 13July2007,

respectively, as the time-limits for the filing ofthe Memorial of the Republic of Djibouti and the

Counter-Memorial of the French Republic. Those pleadings were duly filed within the time-limits

so prescribed.

The Parties not having deemed it necessary to file a Reply and a Rejoinder, and the Court

likewise having seen no need for these, the case was therefore ready for hearing.

On 22 November 2007, the Republic of Djibouti filed additional documents which it wished

to produce in the case. By a letter dated 4D ecember2007, the Agent of the French Republic

informed the Court that her Government had no objection to the production of these documents,

12 while observing firstly that this lack of objecti on could not “be interpreted as consent to an

extension of the jurisdiction of the Court as accepted by France in the letter dated 25July2006”

and, secondly, that “some of the documents produc ed constitute[d] publications which are readily

available, within the meaning of Article56 [, para graph4,] of the Rules of Court”. By letters of

7December2007, the Registrar notified the Parti es that the Court had decided to authorize the

production of the documents concerned and had dul y taken note of the observations made by the - 6 -

Agent of France regarding the interpretation to be given to her lack of objection to the production

of the said documents.

After ascertaining the views of the Parties, the Court, pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of

the Rules of Court, decided that copies of thpleadings and documents annexed would be made

accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings.

*

I note the presence at the hearing of the Agents , counsel and advocates of both Parties. In

accordance with the arrangements for the organizati on of the oral proceedings which have been

decided by the Court, the hearings will comprise a first and a second round of oral argument. The

first round of oral argument will begin today and will close on Friday 25January2008. The

second round of oral argument will begin on Mond ay 28 January 2008 and will close on Tuesday

29 January 2008.

I now give the floor to H.E. Mr. Siad Mohamed Doualeh, Agent of the Republic of Djibouti.

DMOr. ALEH:

INTRODUCTION

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to stand here before

you as Agent of the Republic of Djibouti to introduce the first round of oral pleadings of the

Republic of Djibouti in this case between it and the French Republic. The presence of the Republic

13 of Djibouti before this Court as Applicant evinces its deep attachment to the principle of the

peaceful settlement of disputes. Since its accession to independence in 1977, the Republic of

Djibouti has chosen to participate in international life as a State which respects international law.

This is the philosophy which prompted my coun try to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of your

Court for all legal disputes between it and any other State accepting the same obligation. The

submission of this dispute to your Court marks a major step in the history of the small State of

Djibouti, which gained independence only 30 years ago. - 7 -

2. However, allow me, Madam President, to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s. Although

the case was filed in the Court by way of an application by the Republic of Djibouti under

Article40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the C ourt and Article38, paragraph5, of the Rules of

Court and not by way of a special agreement, the idea of submitting this dispute to this, the most

illustrious of international cour ts, emerged during a meeting betw een the then President of the

French Republic and the President of the Republic of Djibouti. On that basis, it seemed useful and

necessary for Djibouti to have recourse to the In ternational Court of Justice in order to find a

definitive solution to the legal dispute as well as th e diplomatic tensions to which the procedure of

mutual assistance between the Republic of Djibouti and the French Republic has given rise in the

context of the famous Borrel case.

3. Of course, we are not meeting today for the Court to rule upon the Borrel case, to which I

shall revert in a few moments. Only, every effect having its cause, it is important to stress at the

outset that the traditionally most amicable relati ons between the French Republic and the Republic

of Djibouti gradually became tarnished and deteriorated as a result of t
he Borrel case. Had it not

been for that case, the ins and outs of which still remain confused and cont radictory, there would

have been no real obstacle to co-operation betw een France and Djibouti in the area of mutual

assistance. Similarly, without this case, the Djiboutian authorities would never have been faced

with the defamation and injuries which they have suffered for years, in disregard of their status and

the guarantees conferred on them by international law in the exercise of their duties.

14 4. Notwithstanding the deplorable upsets there have been from time to time in relations

between France and Djibouti in the wake of the Borrel case, the Republic of Djibouti wishes to

solemnly reiterate its faith in the ideals of international justice and the close ties characterizing

relations between the Djiboutian and French peopl es. Djibouti remains convinced that both the

spirit and the letter of international law will on ce again triumph within the walls of the Peace

Palace. Owing to its unique status as “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”, we are

wholly confident that your Court will give full lega l effect to the principles of equality, friendship

and good-faith co-operation among nations.

5. Contrary to the Respondent which, much to the surprise of the Republic of Djibouti, has

expressed reservations as to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione temporis in the - 8 -

present dispute, the Republic of Djibouti is convinced that an adequate and definitive settlement of

this dispute in its entirety is what is needed to brighten th e now very stormy skies of relations

between the French Republic and the Republic of Djibouti. Only a ruling with the authority to put

an end to all the internationally wrongful acts by the French authorities could re-establish the status

quo ante in Franco-Djiboutian relations and fully restore Djibouti’s sovereign rights. The Republic

of Djibouti expects neither more nor less of your Court and hopes that the French Republic,

notwithstanding its conduct in manifest breach of international law, will this week embrace the

same constructive mindset.

6. Madam President, Members of the Court, let me recall here that the contemporary

international legal order revolves around and is based upon a sacrosanct principle: that of equality

between States. This principle is the guarantor of stability in international relations. It is also

fundamental to preventing and avoiding the development in international society of a state of

nature in which the strong dominates the weak. If anything is certain, it is the fact that in the

essential domain of mutual assistance relating to the Borrel case, the French Republic’s action has

been at the opposite extreme to the principle of equality between States. Admittedly, the Republic

of Djibouti is only a small State consisting of 700,000 inhabitants, pitted against a State with a

population of over 60 million inhabitants. True, the Republic of Djibouti is among the poorest and

least advanced countries in the world, a situati on which cannot possibly be compared with one of

the richest and most powerful in the world. Yet these characteristics do not de jure preclude the
15

obligation to respect the principle of equality betw een States and one of its corollaries, reciprocity

in international relations.

7. The actions of the French Republic in mani fest breach of its international obligations in

the domain of mutual assistance are all, mutatis mutandis, violations of the principle of equality

between States and call into question those principles ⎯ such essential ones ⎯ of the international

order of reciprocity, friendship and co-operation between States. Every State, regardless of its size

and degree of development, has the right to en joy respect, friendship and co-operation in full

measure. At the same time, every State ⎯ even a rich and powerful one ⎯ has a duty to ensure

with all due diligence that its executive, legisla tive and judicial organs respect those founding - 9 -

principles of the civilized world, equality, co-operation and friendship. This is why your Court is

more than ever before called upon today to give primacy and force to the rule of international law.

8. Apart from the litigious side of every dispute in general, it must be borne in mind that the

presence of Djibouti and France before your esteemed Court is motivated by a strong desire to

reinforce the links of co-operation and friendship. This is fully in keeping with the Treaty of

Friendship and Co-operation between the French Re public and the Republic of Djibouti, signed in

Djibouti in 1977, which, in its preamble, procla ims the desire of the two States “to fulfil the

purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations for the promotion of international

co-operation and friendly relations among nations”. As the Republic of Djibouti will not tire of

repeating in its oral pleadings, it wishes the Cour t to reach a positive settlement of the dispute in

order to unblock a situation which has persiste d for too long and has a pernicious effect on

international co-operation between France and Djibou ti. At stake are the essential interests of the

Republic of Djibouti as a sovereign State. The conduct attributable to the French authorities

prejudices the normal functioning of the Djiboutian State through the discredit cast upon its highest

authorities, including the President of the Republic, and prevents some of its senior officials from

fully performing their duties.

9. Madam President, Members of the Court, fe w States would have agreed to submit, with

the patience and tolerance displayed by Djibouti for years, to the prejudice suffered by some of its

highest officials. In the face of the lack of goo d-faith co-operation, but above all the breaches of
16

the elementary principles of international court esy and customary law relating to immunity, the

Republic of Djibouti has unfailingly responded with a constant desire, in good faith, to preserve the

historical relations of friendship and co-operation between the two peoples. Djibouti has preferred

to respect its international commitments by giving France access to all the necessary and

appropriate channels for the realization of mutual assistance. The Djiboutian authorities have thus

singled themselves out by their dynamism and determination to afford France “the widest measure”

of mutual assistance, going so far as to place Djibouti’s human and financial resources at its

disposal and, on two occasions, opening the gates of the presidential palace to French investigators,

judges, journalists and civil parties ⎯ something inconceivable in France! - 10 -

10. The Court is certainly aware of the sustained media attention which has accompanied and

surrounded the Borrel case. By no means is it the intention of the Republic of Djibouti to give the

Court its opinion on the lingering e ffects and consequences of this media campaign. However, it

wishes to draw the attention of the Court to th e “Findings of Mrs.Marie-Paule Moracchini”, a

French judge who investigated the Borrel case for a number of years. This report, which is

included in the case documents before you, provide s an objective view of the ins and outs of the

case, including its treatment by the civil parties and the media. It is easy to see, moreover, that the

latter’s actions did not really lead to the adoption of a clear position by the French authorities

aimed at guaranteeing respect for international law within the limits of their jurisdiction.

11. In this connection it should be underlined , Madam President, that the French Republic’s

respect for the law and the commitments undertaken by it has often been lacking in this case. The

clearest example relates to the undertaking first gi ven to execute the international letter rogatory

requested by the Republic of Djibouti, an undertaking later reiterated, then reneged upon, following

France’s unexpected about-face, which consisted in replying to the Djiboutian request with a

definitive “no”. This breach of the undertakings and assurances given dashed Djibouti’s legitimate

expectations based on the rules and principles set out in the Convention on Mutual Assistance in

17 Criminal Matters of 1986. And yet, Madam Presi dent, Members of the Court, you will agree with

me that no State is entitled to breach its interna tional obligations as it chooses, contrary to the

essential principle pacta sunt servanda and, moreover, to prejudice the immunities of another State,

however small, poor or weak.

Th2e. Borrel case, which served as a receptacle for violations of international law by

France, cannot eclipse or empty of legal effect the principles and rules of international law

applicable in the case and on which Djibouti intends to base its oral arguments. As I emphasized at

the beginning of this statement, various intern ationally wrongful acts imputable to the French

Republic are bound up with the Borrel case. That case originated in the proceedings opened by the

French judicial authorities following the death, in October 1995, of JudgeBernard Borrel on the

territory of the Republic of Djibouti. The death of Judge Borrel gave rise to various theories as to

the cause of death, so much so that it would be more appropriate to speak of the Borrel “cases”

than of a Borrel case in the singular. While at first the suicide theory was favoured, particularly by - 11 -

the French authorities, a private forensic examination subsequently cast doubt upon it. The murder

theory then emerged, a murder which, according to some asser tions, was the result of a plot

cobbled together by those in political power in Djibouti at the time, in complicity with certain

French authorities. A third theory also emerge d, linking the death of JudgeBorrel to paedophile

networks in Djibouti. In other words, total uncertainty surrounds the cause of death of

JudgeBorrel. That uncertainty means that uppermost in our minds must be the presumption of

innocence, a fundamental principle recognized by vi rtually all modern legal systems and enshrined

in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This uncertainty also implies that the possibility of

the Borrel case in any way influencing the proceedings on the merits before the Court should be

avoided.

The PRESIDENT: Could I interrupt to ask if you might speak a little more slowly.

M. DOUALEH: All right. I shall do so.

The PRESIDENT: Oui. It is easier for those who are following in English. Thank you.

18 M. DOUALEH: Very well.

13. Apart from the uncertainty referred to, it is, on the other hand, total clarity and

transparency which have characterized the a ttitude of the Republic of Djibouti following the

opening in France of an investigation “against X fo r the murder of Bernard Borrel”. The opening

of this investigation marks the continuation of exemplary good-faith co-operation by the Djiboutian

authorities in the Borrel case. Djibouti spared no effort to guarantee close and complete

co-operation in “the widest measure” of execution of the international letters rogatory presented by

the French Republic in connection with the Borrel case, instancing the lex scripta of the Treaty of

Friendship and Co-operation and of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. In

exchange, when Djibouti called upon France to reci procate in the execution of an international

letter rogatory intended to make it possible once and for all to reveal all the circumstances of the

death of JudgeBorrel, it ultimately found itself facing a simple refusal, one, moreover, for which

no reasons were given. - 12 -

14. Madam President, Members of the Court, the refusal by the French Republic in fact

conceals a conflict between the French executive a nd judiciary regarding the appropriate treatment

to be given to the international letter rogatory presented by the Republic of Djibouti. This is a

contextual element which cannot be ignored. Just as it is undeniable that the internal rivalries in

Djiboutian politics also played a role in the context of the Borrel case. The only testimony

implicating the Djiboutian authorities in the death of Judge Borrel came from a founder member of

the so-called “government in exile” of Djibouti 1, Mr. Alhoumekani, the content of whose

testimony has been seriously questioned not only by Judge Moracchini in her “Findings”, to which

I shall refer later, but also by an order delivered by another investigating judge at the Paris Tribunal

2
de grande instance . In passing it should be said that another person whose testimony

19 subsequently supported that of Mr. Alhoumekani, na mely Mr. Iftin, is also a member of the same

alleged “government in exile”.

15. Notwithstanding these contextual elements, the Republic of Djibouti is of the view that a

settlement of this dispute must not be conditioned by the internal legal and political tensions in

France and Djibouti. The Republic of Djibouti wishes the Court to reach a judgment which would

preserve the integrity of the treaty context governing mutual assistance between France and

Djibouti. Let there be no mistake: we are con cerned here with questions of international law.

Nothing more, but nothing less! I take the liberty of emphasizing this because the Respondent

might be tempted to overlook this point.

16. As Applicant, the Republic of Djibou ti is seeking to obtain a judgment by the

International Court of Justice on matters falling w ithin the scope of the Treaty of Friendship and

Co-operation, the 1986 Convention and the appli cable rules and customary and conventional

principles in the sphere of immunities. The Republic of Djibouti is not asking the Court to concern

itself with the Borrel case as such, but with the conduct attri butable to the French authorities in the

application of the various international rules governing, on the one hand, co-operation between the

two States regarding mutual assistance in criminal matters and, on the other hand, the prevention of

1
See “Extract from the website of the Government in exile of Djibouti, ‘Composition of the Government in Exile
of Djibouti’, 12 July 2006”, documents submitted to the Court on 21 Nov. 2007, Ann. 8, pp. 47-50.
2“Decision not to proceed, Paris Tribunal de grande instance, 7 Feb. 2002”, documents submitted to the Court on
21 Nov. 2007, Ann. 8, pp. 51-53. - 13 -

attacks on the person, freedom or dignity of natio nals enjoying international protection. The

Republic of Djibouti ventures to hope that the Fr ench Republic will confine itself to these aspects

of international law.

17. As indicated in the Application and Memori al of the Republic of Djibouti, the subject of

the dispute is based on three types of breaches attributable to the French authorities. First, there are

breaches in the application of the Treaty of Fr iendship and Co-operation between the French

Republic and the Republic of Djibouti of 27 June 1977. Second, there are breaches in the

application of the Convention on Mutual Assistan ce in Criminal Matters between the Government

of the Republic of Djibouti and the Government of the French Republic of 27September 1986.

Third, there are breaches regarding the rules rela ting to international pr otection enjoyed by the

supreme authorities of the State as well as by other senior bodies.

20 18. Madam President, Members of the Court, the timetable of the oral arguments of the

Republic of Djibouti will be as follows. This af ternoon the questions of the jurisdiction of the

Court, the immunity of the President of the Republic and the violation of the Treaty of Friendship

and Co-operation will be presented in turn. Tomorrow, Tuesday morning, the Republic of Djibouti

will present its views on the question of the violation of the 1986 Convention, as well as on the

issue of the immunity of certain senior Djiboutian officials. Lastly, the Republic of Djibouti will

devote Tuesday afternoon to the legal consequences of the internationally wrongful acts imputable

to the French Republic and to the conclusions and submissions of Djibouti in this case.

19. Thank you, Madam President, for your kind a ttention. May I ask you to give the floor to

Professor Luigi Condorelli.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Agent of the Republic of Djibouti and give the floor to

Professor Condorelli.

Mr. CONDORELLI: - 14 -

JURISDICTION OF THE C OURT

1. Introduction

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear once again

before the Court and I wish to express my sinceres t gratitude to the Republic of Djibouti for giving

me this opportunity.

2. Madam President, when on 9August2006 the Application instituting proceedings

submitted on 4January2006 by the Republic of Dji bouti (and filed in the Registry on 9January)

was able to be entered in the Court’s General List, following the declaration dated 25 July 2006 by

the French Republic formally expressing France’s c onsent to the Court’s jurisdiction in the present

case, Djibouti believed for a moment that we would be able ⎯ in the ensuing written and oral

exchanges before the Court ⎯ to dispense with all argument on the issue of your jurisdiction,

which appeared clear beyond all doubt, France having indeed expressed its consent on 25 July 2006

21 allowing the Court “to entertain the Application” by Djibouti: granted, nothing more than what is

in the Application, but nothing less. Now, in its Memorial of 15March 2007, the Applicant

scrupulously confined itself to that: it discussed th e ins and outs of its Application and requested

the Court to adjudge and declare that the claims set out in the Application, and those claims alone,

were justified in law. In short, nothing less than was in the Application, but most certainly nothing

more. Accordingly, Djibouti was convinced that the oral argument could focus entirely on the

merits of the case before you.

3. The Applicant was thus astonished at th e content of the French Counter-Memorial,

Chapter 2 of which sets out various objections rela ting to matters involving the Court’s jurisdiction

in the present case. The language appearing in the very recent letter from the Agent of France to

the Registrar (namely, the letter of 4December 2007 on the subject of the additional documents

submitted by the Applicant on 21 November 2007) summarizes these objections most clearly: first,

according to the Respondent, certain claims asserted by the Republic of Djibouti in its Memorial

exceed the bounds of the dispute which France consen ted to have submitted to the Court; and,

second, they are inadmissible. Faced with these unexpected challenges, the Applicant is

constrained to describe to the Court the reasons militating in favour of rejecting the assertions by

France which I in turn have just summarized. - 15 -

4. A preliminary clarification is however called for, so that the subject-matter of the

following remarks will be sharply defined. It is true that the Republic of Djibouti in its Application

stated that it reserved the right, if need be, to in voke international instruments capable of founding

the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, above and beyond the “sole basis” recognized by

France in its declaration of 25 July 2006 (that is, Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court). In

its Counter-Memorial, the Respondent vociferously takes issue with this position and argues, first,

that there are no such instruments and, second, that it is too late to invoke them at this stage in the

proceedings. Madam President, please allow me to make clear that the Applicant firmly maintains

its position in respect of its rights in this regard, buprefers not to dwell on this point at present.

For two reasons: the first is that, after analysing the terms of France’s written pleadings, the

22 Applicant sees that reliance on other bases for the Court’s jurisdiction appears unnecessary in the

present case to enable the Court to adjudicate all th e claims in Djibouti’s Application; the second

reason is that the Applicant prefers to avoid putting France in an awkward position, given the

Respondent’s apparent desire to limit as much as possible the scope of its willingness to submit the

lawfulness of its actions to review by the Court.

2. Consent by States as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction

5. Madam President, the Court has reaffirmed countless times, and has been unshakeable in

its rigour and consistency in doing so, that “the Court has jurisdiction in respect of States only to

the extent that they have consented thereto” ( Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New

Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006,

p. 32, para. 65). In the extensive collection of expressions used by the Court to voice this principle,

the phrasing is sometimes more spun out and diffuse, but the concept is unchanging: thus, for

example, the Court has expressed itself in these very didactic terms:

“the Court, under its Statute, does not au tomatically have jurisdiction over legal
disputes between States parties to that Statute or between other States
entitled to
appear before the Court;... the Court has repeatedly stated that one of the

fundamental principles of its Statute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States
without the consent of those States to its jurisdiction; and . . . the Court therefore has
jurisdiction only between States parties to a dispute who not only have access to the
Court but also have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, either in general form or for

the individual dispute concerned” ( Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Provisional - 16 -

Measures, Order of 10July2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002 , p.241, para.57; see also
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of
2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 132, para. 20).

6. As we all know, Djibouti is the only Part y present in this courtroom to figure among the

States having “in general form” recognized your ju risdiction, which it did by its declaration of

18July2005, pursuant to Article36, paragraph2, of the Statute. In the absence of an analogous

general declaration in force on the French side, and in the absence of a special agreement, predating

the reference to the Court, the Republic of Djibouti wished to see the consent given ad hoc which

would be necessary to found the Court’s jurisdiction in this specific case and, with this goal in

mind, took the path recommended by Article38, para graph5, of the Rules of Court. As we all

know, this provision opens the way for a unilatera l referral to the Court, which can however

23 produce the desired effect only if the State against which the applicati on is lodged consents to your

jurisdiction.

7. In its Memorial, Djibouti explicitly mani fested its keen appreciation to the French

Government for having consented, on 25July2006, to the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain

Djibouti’s Application, and wishes now to reiterate this expression of gratitude. It is indeed an

excellent thing that your Court can contribute, in fulfilling its eminent mission, to restoring the

friendly relations between the two countries which ha ve been, and still are, so deeply upset, as a

result of factors centring on the matter commonly known as the Borrel case, and of related

insinuations and practices affecting the honour and dignity of senior officials of Djibouti.

3. The case of State consent resulting from separate and successive acts

8. Madam President, even before Article38, paragraph5, of the Rules of Court was laid

down, it was recognized ⎯ thanks to an already long-standing pronouncement by the Court ⎯ that

“there is nothing to prevent the acceptance of jurisdiction, as in the present case, from being

effected by two separate and successive acts, in stead of jointly and beforehand by a special

agreement” (Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, 1948,

I.C.J. Reports 1947-1948 , p.28). It is self-evident that precisely in the case of “separate and

successive” acts, the task for the Court is to understand to what extent these distinct acts,

employing different words, give rise to a real consent, an in idem placitum consensus (to use the

Romans’ expression), that is to say an agreemen t on a single, specific subject precisely delineating - 17 -

the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court is, in short, here being asked, as is always the case

with issues of this type, to exercise its “compétence de la compétence” . One might say in your

own words:

“It is for the Court itself, while giving particular attention to the formulation of
the dispute chosen by the Applicant, to determine on an objective basis the dispute
dividing the parties, by examining the position of both parties: ‘[I]t is the Court’s duty
to isolate the real issue in the case and to id entify the object of the claim. It has never

been contested that the Court is entitled to interpret the submissions of the parties, and
in fact is bound to do so; this is one of the attributes of its judicial functions.’”
24 (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1998 , p.448, para.30. See also Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p.466, para.30; Request for an Examination of the
Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of
20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case (New

Zealand v. France), Order of 22September1995, I.C.J. Reports 1995 , p.304,
para. 55.)

9. The basic principle is simple. When pro ceedings are initiated before the Court by way of

unilateral application, in accordance with Article 40 of the Statute, it is the application which

delimits ratione materiae the subject of the dispute and the claim(s) presented to the Court.

France’s Counter-Memorial comprehensively review s the relevant international jurisprudence on

3
this subject, rightly describing it as “long-standing and established” and beginning with the

precursor, which is a genuine locus classicus, one might say, of international law: “under

Article 40 of the Statute, it is the Application which sets out the subject of the dispute, and the Case

[Memorial], though it may elucidate the terms of th e Application, must not go beyond the limits of

the claim as set out therein” ( Prince von Pless Administration, Order of 4 February 1933, P.C.I.J.,

Series A/B, No. 52, p. 14).

10. It goes without saying that, if a respondent’s consent has not been given ante hoc, but

comes post hoc, in keeping with the scenario outlined in Article38, paragraph5, of the Rules of

Court (which is operative in our case), the extent of the Court’s jurisdiction will then inescapably

depend on the scope and terms of the post hoc consent. Of course, the State against which the

application is submitted cannot broaden (or indeed transform) the dispute as compared with the

scope of the application. But that State can, by its declaration, very well give only partial consent,

and by so doing narrow the jurisdiction of the Cour t by comparison with that contemplated in the

3
CMF, p. 10, para. 2.8. - 18 -

application, just as it can, moreover, consent to nothing at all and in this case prevent the Court

from settling even the slightest part of the disput e, unless of course other bases for jurisdiction are

present.

11. In brief, to determine the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction in the present dispute, you will

first have to analyse and interpret the Application to ascertain exactly what claims the Republic of

Djibouti wished to submit to you for judgment; an d you will then have to interpret the French

25 declaration of 25 July 2006 to ascertain whether or not France has consented to the Court’s exercise

of its jurisdiction over all these claims, or possibly only some of them. Obviously, if the French

side has given only partial consent, those claims by Djibouti not covered by France’s declaration of

consent will escape your jurisdiction.

4. The principles governing the interpretation of unilateral declarations concerning the
jurisdiction of the Court

12. Madam President, Members of the Court, you are confronted here with two unilateral

declarations concerning the jurisdiction of the Cour t which intersect and combine with each other.

Your jurisprudence is rich in guidance on the subj ect of interpreting unilatera l declarations of this

type. Thus, the Court has said a number of times th at such a declaration “must be interpreted as it

stands, having regard to the words actually used” (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran),

Preliminary Objection, Judgment , I.C.J. Reports 1952 , p.105; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v.

Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , p.454, para.47), and must be

applied “as it stands” ( Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1957, p. 27); you have also made clear that the Court “cannot base itself on a purely grammatical

interpretation of the text” ( Anglo-Iranian, op. cit., p. 104; Fisheries Jurisdiction, op cit.), given

that what must be sought is “the interpretation which is in harmony with a natural and reasonable

way of reading the text” (ibid.); you have laid emphasis on the notion that such declarations “are to

be read as a whole” (ibid.). But, most important of all, your Court has underlined the objective

sought in determining the meaning of what you have defined to be “a unilaterally drafted

instrument” (ibid., para. 48): to identify the true intention of the drafter of the instrument.

13. Granted, the jurisprudence which I am citing usually involved declarations under

Article36, paragraph2, of the Statute. But that in no way detracts from the relevance of your - 19 -

teachings in the present case, as it still involves the interpretation of unilaterally drafted

instruments. With your leave, I shall cite a few passages which are particularly eloquent on this

subject: “since a declaration under Article36, para graph2, of the Statute is a unilaterally drafted

instrument, the Court has not hesitated to pl ace a certain emphasis on the intention of the

26 depositing State” (ibid.). And: “The Court will thus interpret the relevant words of the

declaration... in a natural and reasonable way, having due regard to the intention of the State

concerned . . .” (ibid., para. 49). Your Court elsewhere observed, in regard to the historical reasons

underlying the origin of a particular unilateral decl aration: “such considerations cannot . . . prevail

over the intention of a declarant State, as expr essed in the actual text of its declaration” ( Aerial

Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000 , p. 31,

para. 44).

14. Is the “intention of the declarant State” not identifiable in perfectly clear terms if each of

the two declarations is analysed “as a whole”, th e words actually used being interpreted “in a

natural and reasonable way” and without “basing oneself on a purely grammatical interpretation of

the text”? Let us see point by point, beginning with the Application of the Republic of Djibouti.

5. The interpretation of Djibouti’s Application in terms of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione
materiae

15. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is probably possible to criticize Djibouti’s

Application ⎯ and indeed France does so ⎯ for the less than perfect wording of the text that

appears under the heading “Subject of the dispute”, on the ground that the text merely refers to the

“refusal by the French governmental and judici al authorities to execute an international letter

rogatory . . .” etc. It is indeed true that there is no reference to attacks on the immunities, privileges

and prerogatives of Djibouti’s Head of State and other high-ranking figures in Djibouti. However,

that kind of imperfection, as indeed certain minor errors of substance, which France criticizes in

both the Application and the Memorial, cannot prevent the Court from perceiving clearly the

intention of the declarant State, Djibouti, as that intention emerges with absolute clarity from the

declaration as a whole, if that declaration is c onstrued by according the words used their “natural

and reasonable” meaning. Nor should we forget the very familiar doctrine of the Permanent

International Court of Justice to the effect that: “The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is - 20 -

not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in

municipal law.” ( Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgmen t No.2, 1924, P.C.I.J., SeriesA,

No. 2, p.34; see also Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary

27 Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p.28.) In the final analysis, the Respondent cannot

claim that it is necessary to single out certain linesin the Application (namely those that appear

under the heading “Subject of the dispute”), c ontrasting them with the remainder of the

Application, when that Application forms a “whol e”, and the heading “Nature of the claim” an

integral part of that whole, setting out in detail the various claims on which the Applicant is asking

the Court to give judgment. Those claims rela te explicitly and specifically, on the one hand, to

France’s breaching of its obligations in relation to mutual assistance and, on the other, to the

violation of the principles of international law whereby attacks on the person, freedom and dignity

of the Head of State and high-ranking figures in the Republic of Djibouti are prohibited. That was

and remains the explicit intention of the Applicant, set out in words whose “natural and reasonable”

meaning is perfectly plain to anyone seeking to analyse them in good faith.

16. Madam President, permit me to emphasize this point: Djibouti’s Application requests

the Court to adjudge and declare that these various claims are well founded in law and ⎯ contrary

to what is claimed in th e Counter-Memorial of France ⎯ that Application is careful to avoid

confusing the claims made with the legal grounds relied upon. That is perfectly apparent if we look

at the heading of the Application entitled “Stateme nt of the grounds on which the claim is based”

(paras. 14-17). As the Court may easily ascertain, for each of the claims ⎯ including paragraph 16

on “attacks on the person, freedom or dignity of an internationally protected person” ⎯ a summary

account of “the grounds on which the claim is based” is provided. In short, the intention set out in

the Application is, unquestionably, to seise the C ourt of a dispute which consists of a number of

claims and, therefore, extends beyond the mere ma tter of France’s violation of its obligations in

respect of mutual assistance.

6. The scope of France’s consent to the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae

17. Let me turn now to closer consideration of the unilateral declaration by France, in the

form of the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic of 25July2006, by - 21 -

28 which France “consents to the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Application” of Djibouti (for

your convenience, you will find that letter in the file that we have given to you). As I mentioned

earlier, France could very well ha ve consented only partially to th e Court’s jurisdiction in relation

to the Application: it could, for example, have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction solely in relation

to the issue of mutual assistance in the strict sense, and withheld its consent from the other claims

made in the Application. But did it do so?

18. Madam President, Members of the Court, the answer to that question must be “no”. If

the text of the letter is read in a “natural and reasonable way” ⎯ to use the Court’s own words ⎯

we have inevitably to conclude that France has called into question neither the subject of the

dispute nor the nature of the claims, as set out in Djibouti’s Application. France has, indeed,

consented to the Court ruling on all of the clai ms which Djibouti has made and, of course, on

nothing more. What else could be meant by the st atement that the consent of France is valid “in

respect of the dispute forming the subject of the Application and strictly within the limits of the

claims formulated...” in Djibouti’s Application? France has, therefore, agreed that all of the

claims set out in the Application fall with in the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae

and may, consequently, be decided by the Court.

19. Furthermore, Madam President, it should be pointed out that the French

Counter-Memorial finally acknowledges ⎯ albeit rather casually, using a form of words that the

Applicant has no hesitation in taking as its ow n and which is worth quoting verbatim here ⎯ that

“it is not the French Republic’s intention to assert any ground for the Court’s lack of jurisdiction, as

4
long as Djibouti’s claims remain strictly lim ited to those set out in the Application” . That,

Madam President, Members of the Court, is pr ecisely the case: nothing which Djibouti submitted

to the Court in its Memorial goes even slightly beyond the claims made in the Application, which

France has consented to have adjudged by the Cour t. The French Republic cannot now retract the

consent which it clearly expressed on that matte r and must accept the consequences of that

consent ⎯ as the Court itself so elegantly defined them in 1985: “The Court must not exceed the

jurisdiction conferred on it by the Parties, but it must also exercise that jurisdiction to its full
29

4
CMF, p. 8, para. 2.2. - 22 -

extent.” (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 23,

para. 19.)

20. It should, moreover, be pointed out that there is one area in regard to which, in the

2006document, France expressed the desire to rest rict the scope of its consent to the Court’s

jurisdiction: this, however, relates not to the material scope of that jurisdiction, but to its basis. As

far as France is concerned, the Court can base its jurisdiction in this case on Article38,

paragraph5, of the Rules of the Court only. Th at early indication of the refusal (subsequently

elaborated on in the Counter-Memorial) to accept Djibouti’s argument that bases for jurisdiction

other than Article 38, paragraph 5, could be relevant in this case further demonstrates that France,

on the other hand, had no inten tion of limiting its consent ratione materiae to the Court’s

jurisdiction to settle the claims set out in the Republic of Djibouti’s Application. Clearly, therefore,

France accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in relatio n to the whole of the dispute, as identified and

defined by the Application as a whole, and the Court cannot permit France to change tack at this

juncture and seek to curtail the subject of the dispute and reduce the nature and scope of the claims

set out by Djibouti in its Application, by partiall y retracting, in its Counter-Memorial, the consent

which it gave in its declaration of 25July2006. I should draw attention here to an extremely

pertinent dictum of the Court, according to which: “It is a rule of law generally accepted, as well

as one acted upon in the past by the Court, that, once the Court has been validly seised of a dispute,

unilateral action by the respondent State in termin ating its declaration in whole or part, cannot

divest the Court of jurisdiction.” ( Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India),

Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 142.)

7. The link between the claims set out in Djibouti’s Application

21. Since, by its declaration, France agreed th at the Court should rule on all of the claims set

out in Djibouti’s Application, there is little point in dwelling ⎯ as the Counter-Memorial does ⎯

on the fact that the link between the claims is, allegedly, inadequate: in point of fact, France

alleges that Djibouti’s claims concerning th e immunities, privileges and prerogatives of

high-ranking figures in Djibouti bear no direct rela tion to the question of the French authorities’ - 23 -

30 refusal to execute the international letter rogatory pertaining to the Borrel case . As I demonstrated

to the Court just a moment ago, an allegation of that nature, even if true, would be without

relevance, since France has recognized the jurisdictio n of the Court to decide whether or not all of

the claims set out in Djibouti’s Application are well founded, however close the link between them

may or may not be. But it should be pointed out even now that the French allegation is, moreover,

quite simply wrong.

22. It is in fact quite apparent from France’s Counter-Memorial itself and the annexes thereto

that the opening of proceedings for subornation of perjury against high-ranking figures in Djibouti

at the Versailles court (which itself constitutes ⎯ as I shall later demonstrate ⎯ a violation of the

principles of international law pertaining to imm unities) directly and decisively influenced the

decision to refuse to execute the letter rogatory. The Respondent claims that the decision to refuse

execution was taken not by the executive auth orities of the French Republic but by the

investigating judge at the Paris Tribunal de grande instance responsible for the Borrel case, in her

6
Order of 8February2005 . That order actually cites, as the first reason justifying refusal, the

inclusion in the case file of documents concerning the investigation opened at the Versailles court

7
for subornation of perjury against Djibouti’s St ate Prosecutor and Head of National Security . In

those circumstances, it is hard to see how the Re spondent can argue that there is no “relation”

between the claim concerning the failure by France to execute the letter rogatory which the

Applicant presented and the claim relating to Fran ce’s breaching of its obligations regarding the

immunities to be accorded to high-ranking figures in Djibouti.

8. TheCourt’sjurisdiction ratione temporis

23. Consideration of the Respondent’s objections analysed so far therefore allows us to

conclude that there can be no shadow of a doubt that the Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae in

relation to all of the claims set out in Djibouti’s Application. However, it remains for me to discuss

31 a final objection concerning the limits to the Court’s jurisdiction: this time, limits not ratione

materiae but ratione temporis. France in fact alleges that

5CMF, p. 14, para. 2.22.
6
CMF, p. 36, paras. 3.66 et seq.
7CMF, Ann. 21. - 24 -

“in the unlikely event that the Court were to find jurisdiction in principle to decide the

lawfulness of these judicial processes, even though they bear absolutely no relation to
Djibouti’s international letter rogatory of 2004, it is obvious that the Court could not
exercise its jurisdiction in respect of facts arising subsequent to the Application” . 8

In other words, Djibouti’s claims concerning th e violations which occurred after 9January2006,

the date on which the Applicant referred the matter to the Court, are alleged to be inadmissible.

This would apply in particular to the claim concerning “the invitation to testify sent to the President

of the Republic of Djibouti in February 2007” 9and the claim relating to the arrest warrants issued

in October 2006 against two senior Djiboutian offici als, pursuant to the judgment by the Versailles

Court of Appeal of 27 September 2006 10.

24. Madam President, the Court cannot accept such an allegation, which is clearly unfounded

in law. To begin with, it should be borne in mind that, in paragraph26 of its Application, the

Applicant reserved the right to “amend and supplem ent the present Application” in the course of

the proceedings. It is true that, as the Permanen t International Court of Justice held in the case

concerning Société Commerciale de Belgique, and as this Court has on many occasions reaffirmed,

“the liberty accorded to the parties to amend their submissions up to the end of the oral proceedings

must be construed reasonably”, and “the Court cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before

it by application to be transformed by amendmen ts into another dispute which is different in

character” (Société Commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78 , p. 173.

See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States

of America), Jurisdiction and Admissib ility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 427, para. 80;

Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1992, pp. 266-267; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),

32 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003 , pp.213-214.). It is, however, hard to see how it could be argued

that, if the Court agreed to consider the claims which Djibouti set out in its Memorial, including

those relating to events after 9 January 2006, “the subject of the dispute originally submitted to the

Court would be transformed” ( Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), op. cit.,

p. 267, para. 70) and “the Court w ould have to consider a number of questions that appear to it to

8CMF, p. 14, para. 2.23.
9
CMF, p. 15, para. 2.24.
10CMF, p. 15, para. 2.25. - 25 -

be extraneous to the original claim” ( ibid., p.266, para.68). In point of fact, none of the claims

which Djibouti has made are new or extraneous to th e initial claims: they all relate to the claims

set out in the Application and are based on the same legal grounds.

25. It is true that some of the claims have been brought up to date in the light of recent

developments in the dispute between the Parties. But no one could prevent the Parties from doing

this and, consequently, supplementing their claims to take account of events which took place after

the Court was seised of the dispute. The Court h as certainly recognized that possibility. In its

Judgment in the case concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction, for example, the Court had no hesitation in

considering admissible a claim for compensation which the applicant first made in its memorial and

which related to events that postdated the applica tion: in order to establish its jurisdiction in the

case, the Court had only to determine that the ma tter raised by the applicant “is part of the

controversy between the Parties” and that the related claim “is one based on facts subsequent to the

filing of the Application, but arising directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of the

Application” (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 203, para. 72). Madam President, the circumstances are clearly the same in

this case: there can be no doubt that the matters subsequent to Djibouti’s Application that are

raised in its Memorial are (to use the Court’s own words) matters “arising directly out of the

question which is the subject-matter of the Application”. These are, in fact, new violations which

would not have occurred, had France rigorously complied with its international obligations referred

33 to in the Application, which specifically cited th e violation by the Respondent of the principles of

international law concerning the freedom, dignity and immunities of those high-ranking figures in

the Republic of Djibouti.

Conclusion

26. Members of the Court, let me sum up my oral argument thus. The Republic of Djibouti

requests the Court to dismiss all of the objections which France has raised concerning the scope of

the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione temporis. The Applicant therefore requests

the Court to decide that it has jurisdiction to rule on the merits in respect of all of the claims which

the Applicant set out in its Application and elaborated upon in its Memorial. - 26 -

*

* *

27. Madam President, may I thank you and ask you to give the floor now to the Deputy

Agent of the Republic of Djibouti, Mr. Phon van den Biesen.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you Professor Condorelli. We shall now take a brief pause. The

sitting is adjourned for a few minutes.

The Court adjourned from 4.20 p.m. to 4.35 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Maître van den Biesen.

Mr. van den BIESEN:

A TTEINTES À L ’IMMUNITÉ ,À L HONNEUR ET À LA DIGNITÉ

DU PRÉSIDENT DE L ’ETAT DEMANDEUR

Remarques liminaires

1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la C our, c’est pour moi aussi un grand honneur et un

immense plaisir de me présenter devant la Cour une fois de plus. C’est même un honneur et un

plaisir tout particuliers, compte tenu des spécificités qui sont celles de la présente affaire: car le

34 demandeur, en l’espèce, est un Etat minuscule , classé parmi les pays les plus pauvres du

globe ⎯ un Etat minuscule qui sollicite la protection de ses droits dans le cadre d’un différend qui

l’oppose à un pays qui reste l’un des plus importants et des plus influents de la planète. Si bien que

ce qui se jouera ici pendant ces quelques jours, et à quoi nous contribuer ons tous, relève de

l’exercice de l’une des attributions éminemment nobles de la justice : assurer la protection du faible

contre le fort. Or, cette protection devient perceptible dans un cadre où l’une et l’autre des Parties

sont ⎯ en tant que Parties ⎯ placées sur un pied de complète égalité ⎯ égalité dans leur position

devant cette Cour, la Cour internationale de Justice. Cette affaire présente par ailleurs un autre trait

distinctif : le défendeur, en l’espèce, a choisi de c onsentir à la saisine de la Cour pour trancher les

questions en jeu. L’on ne saurait mésestimer l’importance de ce choix: la République française - 27 -

montre ainsi au monde son inclination à privilégier un mode de règlement pacifique et civilisé des

différends internationaux et, ce faisant, met en lumièr e, et renforce, l’autorité dont est investie la

Cour en tant qu’organe judiciaire principal de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.

2. En d’autres termes, aussi fortes que soient les convictions qui les divisent, les deux Parties

en cause s’accordent avant tout à penser que c’est effectivement au Palais de la Paix que, de

préférence, il convient de chercher à régler leurs désaccords.

Introduction

3. Madame le président, ainsi que l’ont rappe lé les précédents orateurs, plusieurs questions

sont en jeu en l’espèce. Des questions qui sont étroitement liées entre elles, et qui se sont traduites

par une série d’actions et d’omissions ⎯ en partie simultanées ⎯ du défendeur qui toutes, de l’avis

du demandeur, sont à l’origine de la violation de plusieurs de ses droits au regard du droit

international. Parmi elles figurent les atteintes à l’immunité, à l’honneur et à la dignité du président

de l’Etat demandeur, d’une part, et les atteint es à la dignité et à l’immunité de deux de ses

représentants, d’autre part. A l’évidence, ainsi que l’a indiqué le demandeur dans son mémoire, ces

atteintes doivent être considérées comme allant à l’ encontre du but et de l’esprit de coopération de

11
bonne foi sous-tendant le tra ité d’amitié et de coopération . Bien que ces violations puissent être

considérées comme de nature assez semblable, elles présentent des différences tant du point de vue

des principes que des faits. Cela nous a conduits à dissocier les violations dont a été victime le

président de celles dont ont été l’objet les deux fonctionnaires.

35 4. Je me consacrerai aujourd’hui à l’appréciati on des faits concernant le président de l’Etat

demandeur, et M.Condorelli examinera, demain, ce ux qui concernent le procureur général et le

chef de la sécurité djiboutiens.

5. Ma plaidoirie d’aujourd’hui s’articule autour de deux incidents, qui, l’un comme l’autre,

étaient destinés à impliquer le président de Dji bouti dans les instructions ouvertes en France au

sujet de l’affaire Borrel :

⎯ la «convocation à témoin» du 17 mai 2005 adressée par le juge chargé de l’instruction sur le

meurtre de M. Borrel, Mme Sophie Clément ;

11
MD, par. 125. - 28 -

⎯ une convocation de même nature, émanant du même juge d’instruction, datée du

14 février 2007.

Avant de nous pencher de plus près sur ce s deux convocations, il c onviendrait de préciser

brièvement quelques points de droit.

Le droit

6. Madame le président, la Cour, dans l’affaire relative au Mandat d’arrêt, a estimé que,

«de même que les agents diplomatiques et consulaires, certaines personnes occupant
un rang élevé dans l’Etat, telles que le chef de l’Etat…, jouissent dans les autres Etats
d’immunités de juridiction, tant civiles que pénales» (Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000

(République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 20-21,
par. 51).

7. Le défendeur semble également s’inspirer de cet arrêt 12. Il a indiqué en outre, dans son

contre-mémoire :

«La République française reconnaît pleinement, et sans restriction, le caractère
absolu de l’immunité de juridiction et, à pl us forte raison, d’exécution, dont disposent
13
les chefs d’Etat étrangers.»

Le défendeur exprime une position analogue dans les divers communiqués de presse qu’il a publiés

en rapport avec les convocations dont il est question en l’espèce 14. Il est donc légitime, Madame le

président, de conclure qu’il n’existe pas de gra nde divergence de vues entre les Parties quant à

l’existence de règles de droit international coutumier protégeant l’immunité, l’honneur et la dignité

d’un chef d’Etat, et à la signification générale de ces règles.

36 8. Les Parties semblent en revanche être en désaccord sur la pertinence, en l’espèce, de la

convention de 1973 sur la protection et la répressi on des infractions contre les personnes jouissant

15
d’une protection internationale, y compris les agents diplomatiques . Comment, toutefois,

pourrait-on nourrir le moindre doute sur la pe rtinence que revêt la disposition énoncée au

paragraphe 3 de l’article 2 de cette convention, qui évoque clairement l’existence incontestée et le

12
CMF, par. 4.9.
13CMF, par. 4.6.

14Communiqué de presse, cabinet du garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice de la République française,
14février2007, annexe3 des documents additionnels soum is à la Cour par la République de Djibouti le
21 novembre 2007, p. 7.

15Convention sur la prévention et la répression des infra ctions contre les personnes jouissant d’une protection
internationale, y compris les agents diplomatiques, du 14 décembre 1973 ⎯ entrée en vigueur le 20 février 1977. - 29 -

caractère contraignant des «obligations qui, en vertu du droit international, incombent aux Etats

parties de prendre toutes mesures appropriées pour prévenir d’autres atteintes à la personne, la

liberté ou la dignité d’une personne jouissant d’une protection internationale» ? Cette disposition

confirme, et confirme d’une manière qui ne laisse aucun doute, que les atteintes à la dignité des

personnes jouissant d’une protection internationale relèvent entièrement de la protection offerte par

les règles de droit international coutumier garantissant l’immunité des chefs d’Etat.

9. Madame le président, l’affaire relative au Mandat d’arrêt présente quelques autres

caractéristiques intéressantes. Dans cette affaire, la Cour n’avait pas été priée de se prononcer

spécifiquement sur le degré d’immunité auquel pouva it prétendre un chef d’Etat. Néanmoins, cinq

juges au moins l’ont fait. Dans leurs opinions individuelles et dissidentes respectives, tous ont, à

leur manière, affirmé qu’effectivement, les chefs d’Etat avaient droit à un autre niveau de

protection, un niveau supérieur, cette prérogative trouvant son origine et sa raison d’être dans le fait

qu’ils personnifient l’Etat ( Mandat d’arrêt du 11avril2000 (République démocratique du Congo

c. Belgique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, opinion individuelle commune de Mme Higgins,

M. Kooijmans et M. Buergenthal, p. 87, par. 80 ; ibid., opinion individuelle de M.Koroma, p.61,

par. 6 ; ibid., opinion dissidente de M. Al-Khasawneh, p. 96, par. 2).

10. Dans l’une de ces opinions, trois juges ⎯ vous, Madame le président, ainsi que MM. les

juges Buergenthal et Kooijmans ⎯ ont fait référence à la résolution adoptée, en 2001, par l’Institut

de droit international à sa session de Vancouver. Cette résolution vient, elle aussi, étayer la thèse

du demandeur en l’espèce. En effet, elle établit une distinction entre immunité en matière pénale,

16
laquelle est affirmée de manière absolue , et immunité en matière civile ou administrative,

laquelle n’est pas reconnue en tant que telle, si ce n’est dans le cas d’actes accomplis par un chef

17
d’Etat dans l’exercice de ses fonctions officielles . Toutefois, en ce qui concerne les cas relevant

37 du domaine civil et administratif, pour lesquels aucune immunité n’est prévue, la résolution dispose

expressément qu’«aucun acte lié à l’exercice de la fonction juridictionnelle ne peut être accompli à

[l’]endroit [du chef d’Etat] lorsqu’il se trouve sur le territoire d[’un] Etat [étranger] dans l’exercice

16
Article 2 de la résolution de l’Institut de droit international relative aux immunités de juridiction et d’exécution
du chef d’Etat et de gouvernement en droit internat ional, adoptée le 26t 001 (rapporteur spécia:l
M. Joe Verhoeven), disponible à l’adresse : http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/2001_van_02_fr.PDF.
17Ibid., art. 3. - 30 -

de ses fonctions officielles» 18. De toute évidence, la garan tie qu’offre cette dérogation à la

non-protection de l’immunité s’explique, une fois de plus, par la position particulière qu’occupe le

chef d’Etat. Le fait que cette même protecti on soit énoncée dans le contexte d’un régime de

protection nettement moins contraignant que celui prévu en matière pénale prouve que les

convocations adressées au chef de l’Etat demandeur alors qu’il se trouvait en visite officielle en

France constituaient clairement une atteinte à son immunité, à son honneur et à sa dignité.

Les deux convocations

11. Compte tenu du très large accord existant entre les Parties sur les règles essentielles du

droit coutumier qui s’appliquent à la fonction présidentielle, j’aborderai maintenant les faits

pertinents relatifs aux deux convocations ainsi que leur interprétation.

12. Les Parties conviennent que deux convocati ons ont bien été adressées au président de

Djibouti : la première, le 17 mai 2005, et la seconde , le 14 février 2007. Le défendeur le confirme

explicitement dans son contre-mémoire : «En l’esp èce, le chef d’Etat djiboutien a été convoqué, à

deux reprises, par un magistrat instructeur français en tant que simple témoin.» 19

13. En outre, compte tenu de l’explication four nie par le défendeur sur les différences entre

un témoin et un témoin assisté, il n’y a aucun d ésaccord entre les Parties sur le sens de ces deux

20
dénominations . Le demandeur considère que le prési dent de Djibouti n’a pas été cité à

comparaître en tant que témoin assisté, mais seulement en tant que témoin, et que cette citation était

exclusivement liée à l’enquête sur l’assassinat de M. Borrel.

14. C’est sur ce point que les divergences semblent commencer à se faire jour, et je vais donc

examiner ces deux convocations plus en détail.

38 17 mai 2005

15. En mai2005, le président de Djibouti a rendu une visite officielle au président de la

République française. Le 17mai2005, le juge d’instruction chargé de l’enquête Borrel,

MmeSophieClément, profitant de sa présence en France, a envoyé une lettre au président de

18Ibid.
19
CMF, par. 4.8; voir également CMF, par. 4.16.
20CMF, par. 4.7. - 31 -

Djibouti en personne, aux bons soins de l’ambassade de Djibouti à Paris. Cette lettre a été envoyée

par simple télécopie 21.

16. La lettre contient un titre en majuscules indiquant: convocation à témoin (soit dit en

passant, Madame le président, le titre ainsi que l’adresse apparaissent bien dans l’original français,

mais pas dans la traduction fournie par le Greffe).

17. Par cette lettre, le président du demandeur était invité à se présenter en personne au

bureau du jugeClément. Selon la lettre, ce tte comparution devait avoir lieu le lendemain,

le18mai2005 au matin, à 9h30. L’objet de la comparution était également précisé: le président

devait être entendu.

18. Il ressort clairement de la forme de la lettre que le tribunal de grande instance utilise un

document type pour ce genre de convocation, documen t dans lequel, semble-t-il, certaines parties

peuvent être supprimées ou ajoutées, en fonction d es spécificités de l’affaire ou des préférences de

l’expéditeur. Le dossier actuel contient troi s convocations de ce genre : la convocation de

22
l’ambassadeur de Djibouti en date du 21décembre2004 , la convocation du président en date

du 17 mai 2005 23 et la convocation de MmeGenevi èveFoix, datée du 15octobre2007 24. Ces

convocations, Madame le président, se trouvent toutes dans le dossier de plaidoirie. Elles sont

toutes rédigées en des termes rigoureusement iden tiques, y compris la phrase introductive, dans

laquelle le verbe principal est «inviter».

19. Il existe une différence frappante entre les convocations adressées à l’ambassadeur et au

président, d’une part, et celle adressée à Mme Foix, d’autre part: cette dernière contient un

avertissement ⎯une mise en garde ⎯ précisant les conséquences juridiques d’un refus de

comparaître devant le juge. Il y est indiqu é que, conformément à l’article109 du code de

39 procédure pénale français, le témoin qui ne co mparaît pas peut y être contraint par la force

21MD, annexe 28.
22
MD, annexe 25.
23
MD, annexe 28.
24Lettre en date du 21 novembre 2007 adressée à la Cour par le demandeur, annexe 7. - 32 -

25
publique . Il y est également indiqué que, confor mément à l’article434-15-1 du code pénal

français, le défaut de comparution est passible d’une amende de 3750euros (ce qui, soit dit en

passant, représente près de deux fois le revenu annuel moyen d’un citoyen de Djibouti).

20. L’on ne peut que deviner, Madame le président, les raisons qui ont conduit les juges

d’instruction respectifs à ne pas faire figurer cet avertissement dans les convocations envoyées à

l’ambassadeur et au président. Toutefois, le fait que cette mise en garde n’ait pas été incluse dans

ces convocations n’a évidemment pas d’effet suspensif sur l’application de l’article 109 du code de

procédure pénale français ni de la disposition susmentionnée du code pénal français.

21. Compte tenu de ces particularités de la convocation du 17 mai 2005 et de ce qui ressort

des termes employés, il ne saurait y avoir de doute qu ’il est clairement demandé au destinataire, le

président de Djibouti, de comparaître en personne afin d’être entendu en tant que témoin, le défaut

de comparution étant punissable en droit français et pouvant conduire à l’usage de la force

publique.

22. Voyons à présent quelle est l’interprétation du défendeur. Ce dernier affirme que la

convocation n’est pas ce que son libellé donne à ente ndre qu’elle est; cherchant, clairement, à la

transformer en autre chose, il avance qu’elle devrait être considérée, non comme une convocation à

26
témoin, mais comme une invitation à déposer . Puis, le défendeur se la nce dans une explication

du véritable sens d’une disposition tout à fait di fférente du code de procédure pénale français ⎯ à

27
savoir l’article 656 ⎯, tout en insistant sur son caractère volontaire .

23. Mais, Madame le président, cet article 656 s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une procédure écrite,

c’est-à-dire d’une procédure qui a pour objet d’ obtenir une déposition écrite de la part du

représentant d’une puissance étrangère. Il s’agit là, Madame le président, d’une question tout à fait

différente. Pour ce type de demande, la procédur e pénale française exige l’entremise du ministère

25Art. 109: “Any person summoned to be heard in the capa city of a witness is obliged to appear, to swear an

oath, and to make a statement, subject to the provisions of Articles226-13 and 226-14 of the Criminal Code... If the
witness does not appear or refuses to app ear, the investigating judge may, on the re quest of the district prosecutor, order
him to be produced by the law-enforcement agencies.”
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleArticleCode;jsessio…

Hh0Dhh5mOwnIiaXiq5DSOCy8F52Z7U9uIx72!1357326563!iwsspad4.legifrance.tours.ort.fr!10038!-1!-
374008625!iwsspad6.legifrance.tours.ort.fr!10038!-1
26CMF, par. 4.8.

27CMF, par. 4.10. - 33 -

des affaires étrangères. Dès lors qu’elle vise à obtenir une déposition écrite, la procédure de

40
l’article656 n’est pas assortie d’une demande de comparaître en personne au bureau du juge

d’instruction à une date et à une heure données; il n’en résulte pas que la personne à qui la

demande est adressée sera interrogée oralement par le juge d’instruction, et elle ne prévoit pas de

sanctions pénales dans l’hypothèse où la déposition ne serait pas présentée.

24. Le défendeur a sans doute raison sur la na ture de la procédure de l’article656, en

particulier lorsqu’il met l’accent sur son caractère volontaire et sur les nombreuses précautions

procédurales dont elle est entourée, y compris tous les égards liés à la fonction de l’intéressé en sa

qualité de représentant d’un Etat souverain 28. Cependant, toutes ces particularités ne se retrouvent

tout simplement pas dans la convocation à témoin envoyée au président du demandeur

le17mai2005, laquelle est clairement une c onvocation fondée sur l’article101 du code de

procédure pénale français. A l’ évidence, le défendeur tente ici de créer un écran de fumée pour

nous empêcher de nous faire une idée claire de la forme, du sens, ainsi que des conséquences de la

convocation à témoin. Les faits dont nous avons connaissance font que cette tentative est tout

simplement vouée à l’échec.

25. Dans l’affaire des Otages de Téhéran , la Cour a estimé qu’une simple tentative «de

contraindre les otages [c’est-à-dire les diplomat es] à témoigner» serait suffisante pour constituer

une violation des dispositions pertinentes de la convention de Vienne de 1961 (affaire relative au

Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Un is à Téhéran (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c.Iran),

arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil1980 , p.37, par.79). Dès lors qu’il est généralement admis que les règles

relatives aux immunités dont jouissent les agents di plomatiques reflètent le droit coutumier, et

qu’elles peuvent par conséquent être appliquées pa r analogie aux chefs d’Etat, il est clair que cette

observation formulée par la Cour s’appliquerait à fortiori à un chef d’Etat.

26. De manière similaire, la Cour a, en l’affaire du Mandat d’arrêt, estimé que la simple

émission d’un mandat d’arrêt qui, aux termes de la législation nationale pertinente, est susceptible

de conduire à l’arrestation de la personne concernée, constituerait comme telle et en elle-même une

violation de l’immunité du ministre de s affaires étrangères (affaire relative au Mandat d’arrêt du

28
CMF, par. 4.11. - 34 -

11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c.Belgique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil2002 ,

par. 70).

27. Compte tenu de ces précédents, la questi on qui reste posée est de savoir dans quelle

mesure la «convocation» de l’article101 est liée à l’article109 du même code français, lequel

prévoit le recours à la force publique. Madame le président, qui, mieux que la Cour de cassation du

41 défendeur, pourrait fournir une interprétation faisant autorité de ces dispositions ? Il a été demandé

à la Cour de cassation d’apprécier la légalité d’une invitation à témoigner, invitation qui avait été

adressée au président Chirac. Eh bien, voici ce que la plus haute juridiction française a indiqué :

“[T]he President of the Republic cannot, during his term of office, be heard as a
legally represented witness, or be placed under judicial examination, summoned to

appear or committed for trial for any offence before any organ of ordinary criminal
jurisdiction; whereas neither can he be obliged to appear as a witness pursuant to
Article101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since, under Article109 of the said

Code, there attaches to that obligation a me asure of publicly enforceable constraint
and it is sanctioned by a criminal penalty.”

Autrement dit, la Cour de cassation a jugé que le lien entre les deux dispositions était tel que

l’article101 s’accompagnait effectivement, par le bi ais de l’article109, du soutien de la force

publique. Et c’est pour cette raison que la plus haute juridiction française a jugé qu’une

convocation adressée au président français aux termes de l’article 101 était illicite.

28. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, il ne saurait y avoir de doute que la convocation à témoin

envoyée par télécopie au président de l’Etat de mandeur le 17mai2005 devrait également être

considérée comme illicite au regard du droit inte rnational. M.MichelCosnard, dans sa

contribution au colloque de la Société française de droit international organisé en 2001, a formulé

29
in abstacto une conclusion similaire .

29. Le défendeur réduit tout cela à une question de forme et dé
clare :

«Il ne fait pas de doute que, sur la forme, cette convocation ne respectait pas les
prescriptions de l’article 656 du code de pro cédure pénale dès lors qu’elle n’avait pas
été transmise au chef de l’Etat djiboutien [soit] par «l’entremise du ministère des
30
affaires étrangères», soit par la voie diplomatique.»

Il ne fait pas de doute que le défendeur a raison sur ce point particulier, sur ce point mineur.

Seulement, ce que nous examinons ici n’est pas une question ayant trait au respect ou au

29
Cosnard, «Les immunités du chef d’Etat», in Actes du colloque de la Société française de droit international
(Clermont-Ferrand 2001), Paris, 2002, p. 255.
30
CMF, par. 4.20. - 35 -

non-respect d’une certaine exigen ce procédurale de l’article656 ⎯tout simplement parce que la

présente convocation à témoin n’est pas une demande régie par cet article ⎯, mais une

convocation d’une nature totalement différente, régie par l’article 101 du code de procédure pénale

42 français. Il convient de relever que cet écran de fumée est en fait la seule ⎯ l’unique ⎯ réponse

que le défendeur a formulée au sujet de la convocation du 17mai2005. Le contre-mémoire ne

contient pas la moindre ébauche d’une thèse selon laquelle le recours à une convocation au titre de

l’article 101 pourrait, d’une quelconque manière, être licite au regard du droit international, lorsque

la personne à laquelle cette convocation est adressé e est un chef d’Etat. Par conséquent, si les

Parties semblent s’accorder sur le droit, le défe ndeur, pour tenter d’étayer sa thèse, présente les

faits d’une manière totalement dépourvue de fondement et complètement invraisemblable.

31
30. Ainsi que nous l’avons rappelé dans le mémoire , dès réception de la convocation

envoyée par télécopie le 17mai2005, l’ambassad eur de Djibouti à Paris adressa immédiatement

32
une lettre de protestation au ministère des affaires étrangères français . A ce stade, l’ambassadeur

était tout à fait au courant des données juridiques et factuelles dont il était question; en effet, il

avait l’expérience de ce genre de convocation, puisque, peu de temps auparavant ⎯à savoir le

33
21 décembre 2004 ⎯, il en avait lui-même reçu une . A l’occasion de cet incident, le chef du

protocole français ne se mêla pas d’opérer une métamorphose, mais se contenta de présenter ses

excuses, excuses qu’il formula dans sa lettre du 14 janvier 2005. Il y indiquait :

“I also confirm that, in accordance with Article 656 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, a written statement from a representative of a foreign power is requested
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As that was not done in the present case ⎯ a

fact which34 deplore ⎯ I ask you to accept my apologies for this breach of diplomatic
custom.”

En outre, le chef du protocole informa l’amba ssadeur que le juge d’instruction qui avait

envoyé cette convocation avait reconnu son erreur et déclaré que ledit document devait être

considéré comme nul et non avenu. A cette occasi on, le défendeur ne tenta donc pas de se cacher

derrière un quelconque rideau de fumée ni de di re au destinataire ce qu’il essaie de nous dire

31MD, par. 75.
32
Note de l’ambassadeur de la République de Djibouti à Paris, 18 mai 2007, MD, annexe 29.
33
MD, annexe 25.
34Ibid., annexe 27. - 36 -

aujourd’hui, à savoir que cette convocation n’est pas ce que son libellé donne à entendre qu’elle est

et qu’il s’agirait de l’invitation prévue à l’article 656.

31. Dans la lettre de protestation contre la convocation qu’il adressa au président,

l’ambassadeur invita le ministre, dans des te rmes dénués d’ambiguïté, à confirmer que cette

43 convocation devait être considérée comme nulle et n on avenue et qu’il prendrait toutes les mesures

nécessaires à l’égard du juge d’instruction 35. Le ton de cette lettre visait clairement à manifester le

désarroi du demandeur ; ce désarroi était d’autant plus grand que, comme l’ambassadeur l’indiqua

aussi au ministre, vingt et une minutes après que le juge d’instruction eut effectivement transmis la

télécopie contenant la convocation ⎯le bordereau indique qu’il était 15h51 ⎯, l’agence

France-Presse ⎯ à 16 h 12 ⎯ relayait l’existence de ce document. D’un point de vue médiatique,

il s’agissait là d’une véritable prouesse de la part de l’agence France-Presse. Toutefois, la

publication de cette information soulève toutes sortes de questions quant au fonctionnement de la

justice française. Certes, cela n’est naturellement pas, en soi, l’affaire de Djibouti, mais ce

comportement en particulier porte atteinte à sa relation avec la République française et est

également susceptible d’engager la responsabilité in ternationale du défendeur. En tout état de

cause, il aurait été permis d’attendre du ministre français des affaires étrangères une réponse

immédiate contenant à tout le moins ⎯ je dis bien, à tout le moins ⎯ le même type d’excuses que

celles qui furent présentées lors de la convocation illicite de l’ambassadeur, une réponse offrant une

explication et indiquant ce que l’exécutif français pouvait ⎯et donc allait ⎯ faire pour éviter

qu’elle ne se reproduise.

32. Aucune réponse de la sorte ne fut adressée au demandeur. Cela dit, le ministère répondit

effectivement à l’ambassadeur : il lui envoya la transcription d’un en tretien donné en direct par le

porte-parole du ministère à une station de radio française. Aucune lettre de couverture n’était

jointe à cette transcription, en dehors d’un bordereau de télécopie portant la mention «pour votre

information» 36. Dans le cadre de l’entretien en question, l’intéressé explique en termes généraux

que tous les chefs d’Etat en exercice bénéficien t d’une immunité et que la France entend faire

35
Voir plus haut, note 24.
36
CMF, annexe XXIX. - 37 -

respecter ce principe. Il poursuit en expliquant que le code de procédure pé nale contient certaines

dispositions au sujet des dépositions écrites demandées au représentant d’une puissance étrangère.

33. Il ne s’agit pas là d’une manière partic ulièrement élégante de répondre à une lettre de

protestation émanant du représentant d’un Etat avec lequel la République française a convenu

d’entretenir des relations amicales dans le cadre d’un traité d’amitié. En outre, cette réponse ne

peut, ni en substance ni du point de vue de la forme ⎯ et encore moins en termes de bonne foi et

de coopération constructive ⎯, être considérée comme une réaction satisfaisante à la lettre de

l’ambassadeur. Ne peut pas l’être davantage ⎯ tant s’en faut ⎯ le fait de soumettre deux ans plus

44 tard, cette fois-ci à la Cour, un autre communiqué de presse du 18 mai 2005, ce que le défendeur a

37
fait dans son contre-mémoire . Ce communiqué avait un contenu similaire à la transcription que

le défendeur avait adressée à l’ambassadeur de l’Etat demandeur le 19 mai 2005.

34. Madame le président, il est bien beau d’écl airer la presse sur la teneur de l’article656,

ainsi que le défendeur l’a fait dans le communiqué, mais cela ne règle pas le problème, à savoir que

cette convocation à témoin est celle qui est visée par l’article 101. De plus, le fait d’indiquer dans

ce communiqué de presse que la République françai se «entend faire respecter» le principe de

l’immunité ne peut pas non plus être considéré comme une réponse appropriée à la substance de la

lettre de l’ambassadeur. Dans ces communiqués de presse, il est clairement omis d’évoquer

l’erreur faite par le juge d’instruction.

35. En fait, ce type de réponse ou, plutôt , de non-réponse à la lettre du demandeur ajoute

encore au caractère frappant et à la gravité des atteintes portées à l’immunité, à l’honneur et à la

dignité du chef de l’Etat djiboutien. Jusqu’à ce jour, ni le demandeur ni son président n’ont reçu la

moindre notification, sous quelque forme que ce soit, indiquant que la convocation du 17 mai 2005

doit être tenue pour nulle et non avenue. Le chef de l’Etat djiboutien refusant naturellement de se

rendre à la convocation, il demeure actuellement pass ible de sanctions au regard du droit français,

et la force publique peut être utilisée à son encontre pour le contraindre à comparaître devant le

juge d’instruction concerné.

37
CMF, annexe XXX. - 38 -

36. Le défendeur n’a pas saisi l’occasion que lui offrait la procédure qui nous réunit ici pour

formuler des excuses, donner des garanties et assurances de non-répétition, ou faire l’un et l’autre.

37. Madame le président, les faits relatifs à la convocation du 17mai2005 ne peuvent être

contestés d’un point de vue raisonnable. Partant, il ne peut pas non pl us être raisonnablement

contesté que, en lui adressant cette convocation, la République française a bel et bien porté atteinte

à l’immunité ainsi qu’à l’honneur et à la dignité du président de l’Etat demandeur.

38. La réponse ou, plutôt, la non-réponse de la République française à la lettre de

protestation de l’ambassadeur de Djibouti devrait, en elle-même, être considérée comme une autre

atteinte à l’immunité, à l’honneur et à la dignité du président djiboutien ⎯ une atteinte dont force

est de conclure qu’elle se poursuit encore à l’heure actuelle, le défendeur ayant refusé de déclarer la

convocation du 17 mai 2005 nulle et non avenue.

45 Le 14 février 2007

39. Ainsi que je l’ai rappelé plus tôt, dans son contre-mémoire, le défendeur a déclaré : «En

l’espèce, le chef d’Etat djiboutien a été convoqué , à deux reprises, par un magistrat instructeur

38
français en tant que simple témoin.» Nous venons d’examiner la première convocation. J’en

viens maintenant à la seconde, qui fut émise le 14février2007 lors du séjour du président

djiboutien en France à l’occasion de la vingt-quatrième conférence des chefs d’Etat d’Afrique et de

France, qui devait se tenir à Cannes les 15 et 16février2007. Cette conférence réunissait non

seulement quarante-neuf délégations d’Afrique, ma is aussi des représentants de l’Organisation des

Nations Unies et de l’Union africaine, Mme Angela Merkel représentant l’Union européenne, en sa

39
qualité de présidente en exercice .

40. M. Condorelli s’est arrêté sur les questions de compétence soulevées par le défendeur à

40
l’égard de la demande du 14 février 2007 . Je m’attacherai à examiner la nature de cette seconde

tentative visant à faire déposer le président en qualité de
témoin.

41. Tout d’abord, il est difficile de saisir comment les organes judiciaires et exécutifs du

défendeur ont pu tenter une nouvelle fois de mêler le président à l’instruction de l’affaire Borrel en

38CMF, par. 4.8 ; voir aussi par. 4.16.
39
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Africa-France-summit-Final.html
40CR 2008/1, par. 23-25 (Condorelli). - 39 -

tant que témoin, sans faire la moindre menti on des événements de mai2005 concernant la

convocation à témoin.

42. Ensuite, le moment choisi pour cette nouvelle tentative et la manière dont celle-ci a été

mise en Œuvre sont encore plus frappants. Dans le contre-mémoire, le défendeur plaide que, cette

fois-là, seule la procédure écrite visée à l’article 656 du code de procédure pénale français était en

jeu. Pourquoi fallait-il alors porter cette demande à l’attention du président au beau milieu d’une

conférence des chefs d’Etat d’Afrique et de France ? Puisque la forme écrite était de rigueur ici, la

demande formulée au titre de l’artic le 656 aurait dû être transmise au président par l’entremise de

l’ambassadeur de la République française à Djibouti, où que le président se trouvât alors.

46 43. Apparemment, le juge d’instruction préféra choisir l’événement très médiatisé qu’était la

réunion des chefs d’Etat africains en France pour invi ter derechef le président de l’Etat demandeur

à jouer un rôle dans le cadre de l’instruction sur l’assassinat du jugeBorrel. Apparemment, le

ministre français des affaires étrangères n’a vu aucu ne raison de faire savoir au juge Clément qu’il

transmettrait la demande au président par l’entrem ise de l’ambassadeur français à Djibouti, afin de

lui permettre de la traiter à son retour à Djibouti, au lendemain de la clôture de la conférence.

Après tout, la procédure prévue à l’article656 n’oblige pas le ministre des affaires étrangères à

suivre les suggestions du juge au sujet du mome nt de la transmission de l’invitation et de ses

modalités pratiques.

44. Là encore, les raisons pour lesquelles le juge et le ministre ont l’un et l’autre choisi de

procéder ainsi peuvent seulement être supposées. En revanche, au-delà des suppositions, il est

certain que la justice française a ici aussi informé la presse très tôt, cette fois avant même de

transmettre l’information aux représentants de Djibouti.

45. Le 12novembre2007, nous avons transmis à la Cour trois coupures de presse. La

première démontre que L’Express a été en mesure de publier la nouvelle dès 13h41. L’article

indique que le juge Clément a demandé à entendre le témoin le vendredi, à Paris. La deuxième

coupure de presse montre que Le Monde publiait une information similaire à 14h2. Cet article

utilise les mêmes termes que L’Express. Il indique que le juge Clément veut entendre le président

le vendredi, à Paris. La troisi ème coupure de presse, publiée par l’ Associated Press à 14 h 50,

contient un article mis à jour précisant que le juge Clément «a convoqué comme témoin» le - 40 -

président de l’Etat demandeur. L’article annonce en outre que le président est convoqué pour le

vendredi. L’origine de cette information est men tionnée à deux reprises dans l’article : ce sont des

«sources judiciaires». Ces trois organes de presse sont des médias respectés qui n’ont pas la

réputation de publier une nouvelle sans avoir procéd é à une double vérification ni de citer une

source particulière si, en fait, cette source n’est pas la bonne.

46. Sitôt parues ces informations, l’ambassadeur djiboutien publia un communiqué, dans

41
lequel il élevait une protestation et évoquait l’incident, de même nature, survenu en mai 2005 .

47. En réponse à cette protestation, les autorités françaises n’écrivirent pas directement à

l’ambassadeur de Djibouti pour lui présenter des excu ses ou, à tout le moins, des explications. Le

47 ministère de la justice publia toutefois au cours de l’après-midi un communiqué de presse, dans

lequel il mentionnait la «convocation adressée ce jour au président de la République de Djibouti à

titre de témoin» 42. Le ministère y rappelait aussi que les ch efs d’Etat ne pouvaient être contraints

de témoigner. Comme le faisaient les coupures de presse, le ministre de la justice, cette fois,

mentionnait expressément une «convocation …à titre de témoin», et indiquait aussi que cette

convocation était adressée au président. Les termes dans ce communiqué sont plus ou moins les

mêmes que ceux utilisés dans le communiqué publié par le ministère des affaires étrangères le

19 mai 2005, à l’occasion de la première convocation à témoin 43.

48. Ces divers documents du 14février2007 montrent qu’il s’agit ici d’une répétition à

l’identique de l’épisode du 17mai2005. Appa remment, le juge d’instruction a, de nouveau,

cherché à obtenir une déposition du président de l’ Etat demandeur, que celui-ci aurait dû faire, en

personne, à Paris, deux jours après l’envoi de la convocation.

49. Ainsi que je l’ai déjà indiqué, le défe ndeur reconnaît que le président a été convoqué à

deux reprises. Le demandeur n’ayant pas soumis la deuxième convocation ⎯ pour la simple raison

qu’il ne l’a jamais reçue ⎯, le défendeur a affirmé, dans son contre-mémoire, qu’il le ferait à notre

41 Communiqué de l’ambassade de la République de D jibouti à Paris afférent à la demande d’audition de

S. E. M. Ismail Omoar Guelleh, 14 février 2007, annexe 1 des documents additionnels soumis à la Cour par la
République de Djibouti le 21 novembre 2007, p. 1.
42 Communiqué de presse, cabinet du garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice de la République française,
14février2007, annexe 3 des documents additionnels s oumis à la Cour par la République de Djibouti le

21 novembre 2007, p. 7.
43 CMF, annexe XXX. - 41 -

place ⎯ il la soumettrait, pour la commodité de la Cour, en tant qu’annexe IV 44. Dans la liste des

annexes, le titre de cette annexe IV est exactement le même que celui de l’annexe III ; seule la date

est différente. Ainsi, l’annexeIII éta it censée reproduire la convocation du 17mai2005,

l’annexe IV celle du 14 février 2007. Or, le document classé sous l’annexe IV s’est révélé être non

pas l’«invitation à déposer comme témoin» annoncée da ns le contre-mémoire, mais une «lettre en

date du 14février2007 adressée par le ministre des affaires étrangères au ministre de la justice»

⎯ce qui vise, à l’évidence, tout autre chose qu’une convocation ⎯ et, par ailleurs, la lettre en

question figurait, précisément sous ce titre, à l’annexe XXXIV. Le demandeur a donc prié la Cour,

le 3janvier2008, d’inviter le défendeur à rectifier ce qui était apparemment une erreur et à

soumettre le document auquel corr espondait le titre de l’annexeIV. Il a fait de même en ce qui

48 concerne l’annexe III. Le défe ndeur a, le 7 janvier 2008, inform é la Cour qu’il n’était fait qu’une

seule référence à l’annexeIV dans le corp s de son contre-mémoire , au paragraphe1.6 ⎯ ce qui

n’est pas entièrement vrai, puisqu’elle est ég alement mentionnée au paragraphe4.24, lequel

indique que la convocation, «pour la commodité des juges de la Cour, figure en annexeIV du

présent contre-mémoire» 45. Le défendeur affirmait aussi que ne figurait pas, à l’annexe IV,

d’invitation à déposer comme témoin distincte, mais seulement la lettre également soumise en tant

qu’annexe XXXIV.

50. La confusion qui apparaît dans la liste et l’intitulé de ces annexes au contre-mémoire

pourrait très bien être le reflet de la tension perceptible entre le pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir

judicaire français, qui semble se manifester dans les divers incidents examinés en l’espèce. En tout

état de cause, il ressort clairement des coupures de presse évoquées plus haut et du communiqué de

presse émis par le ministère de la justice pe u après que la nouvelle de la convocation eut été

publiée, qu’au début de l’après-midi, une convocation à témoin a en effet dû exister. Il découle

clairement du communiqué que le ministère a trouvé plusieurs lacunes dans la convocation initiale.

46
51. Quelques heures plus tard, toujours le 14 février 2007, à 18 h 59 , le juge d’instruction

SophieClément envoya un message par télécopie au ministre français de la justice pour lui

44Ibid., par. 4.24.
45
Ibid.
46Voir les informations sur l’envoi de la télécopie, qui apparaissent en tête de la lettre concernée. - 42 -

demander de prier le ministre français des affaires étrangères d’inviter le président de l’Etat

demandeur à témoigner dans le ca dre de l’enquête sur l’assassinat du juge Borrel. Il ne fait aucun

doute que cette lettre n’est pas la convocation à la quelle renvoyaient les informations parues dans

la presse et qui était mentionnée dans le communiqué de presse.

52. La suite donnée aux faits survenus le 14 fé vrier 2007 semble avoir pris la tournure d’une

démarche se rapprochant de la procédure définie à l’ article 656 dont j’ai parlé plus tôt. L’épisode

s’est achevé par le refus du président de témoi gner, refus qui a été communiqué aux autorités

françaises le 16 février 2007 47.

53. La lettre du 14 février 2007 n’indique pas que le juge souhaite obtenir une déposition

écrite du président. Il y est annoncé que celui-ci séjournera dans un hôtel de Cannes pendant

plusieurs jours. Force est de conclure qu’une analyse conjointe de tous les faits montre que le juge

49 d’instruction a clairement réessayé d’obtenir que le président soit entendu en personne en qualité de

témoin dans l’enquête sur l’assassinat de M.Borrel. Ainsi, cette tentative visait, du moins

initialement, à suivre la procédure prévue à l’article101 du code de procédure pénale français.

Comme nous l’avons vu, selon cette procédure, le refus de comparaître peut être puni en droit
48
français et conduire au recours à la force publique .

54. Comme nous l’avons également vu, dans l’affaire du Personnel diplomatique et

consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c. Iran) , la Cour avait déclaré qu’une

simple tentative visant à citer les otages à témo igner équivaudrait à une violation des règles

relatives à l’immunité des diplomates, règles qui s ont le reflet du droit coutumier et peuvent, par

analogie, s’appliquer aux chefs d’Etat.

55. Que par la suite la procédure semble s’ être transformée en une procédure régie par

l’article 656 ne change rien aux fa its qui montrent qu’une tentative a bel et bien existé et a même

été communiquée à la presse avant d’être menée à terme. Cette manière de faire a de toute

évidence placé dans une situation embarrassante le président de l’Etat demandeur qui était alors

arrivé en France pour assister à une conférence à laquelle il était expressément invité par son

homologue français ⎯d’autant plus embarrassante que le défendeur n’a pas jugé bon à l’époque

47
CMF, annexe XXXIII.
48
Code de procédure pénale, art. 109 ; voir, ci-dessus, par. 18. - 43 -

de présenter des excuses, d’apporter des précisons ou d’entrer d’une manière ou d’une autre en

communication directe avec les représentants de l’ Etat demandeur, démarche qui pourtant aurait

été perçue comme une tentative de remédier aux a tteintes à l’immunité, à l’honneur et à la dignité

du président djiboutien.

56. Le fait que l’épisode du 14 février 2007 était en réalité une répétition de celui du

17mai2005 renforce la gravité de ces atteintes. Ce fait démontre également que le demandeur a

toutes les raisons de craindre que le défendeur pers iste dans cette conduite à moins que la Cour ne

l’invite à y mettre un terme.

Obligation de prévenir

57. Madame le président, il est, en droit international, généralement reconnu que les Etats

sont tenus de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires à la protection de la personne, de la liberté et

de la dignité de personnes jouissant d’une protection internationale, dont les chefs d’Etat.

L’article29 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques, à laquelle la France et

Djibouti sont parties, dispose que «[l]a personne de l’agent diplomatique est inviolable. Il ne peut

être soumis à aucune forme d’arrestation ou de détention. L’Etat accréditaire le traite avec le

respect qui lui est dû, et prend toutes mesures appropriées pour empêcher toute atteinte à sa

50 personne, sa liberté et sa dignité.» De même, aux termes de l’article29 de la convention sur les

missions spéciales,

«[l]a personne des représentants de l’Etat d’envoi dans la mission spéciale ainsi que
celle des membres du personnel diplomatique de celle-ci est inviolable. Ils ne peuvent
être soumis à aucune forme d’arrestation ou de détention. L’Etat de réception les

traite avec le respect qui leur est dû et prend toutes mesures appropriées pour
empêcher toute atteinte à leur personne, leur liberté et leur dignité.»

Dans ce contexte, il importe de signaler de nouveau que le paragr aphe3 de l’article 2 de la

convention de 1973 sur la prévention et la répr ession des infractions contre les personnes jouissant

d’une protection internationale, y compris les agen ts diplomatiques, utilise un langage similaire et

renvoie à l’existence de telles règles en droit international coutumier en disposant ce qui suit :

«Les paragraphes 1 et 2 du présent article ne portent en rien atteinte aux
obligations qui, en vertu du droit international, incombent aux Etats parties de prendre
toutes mesures appropriées pour prévenir d’autres atteintes à la personne, la liberté ou

la dignité d’une personne jouissant d’une protection internationale.» - 44 -

58. Le défendeur semblait être conscient de cette obligation internationale qui lui incombe

quand il a déclaré le 18 mai 2005 par l’intermédiair e du porte-parole de son ministère des affaires

étrangères que «tout chef d’Etat en exercice bé néficie de l’immunité de juridiction dans ses

déplacements à l’étranger. Il s’agit là d’un princi pe constant du droit inte rnational que la France

49
entend faire respecter.» Par cette déclaration, la France manifestait sa volonté de prendre toutes

les mesures requises pour préserver l’immunité et la dignité d’un chef d’Etat en exercice qui était

en visite officielle sur son territoire, ainsi qu’ une reconnaissance générale du statut juridique de

cette règle. En tout état de cause, le contre-mém oire ne contient pas d’objections à cette obligation

de prévenir, qui constitue un aspect important de l’obligation générale de respect due aux chefs

d’Etat étrangers.

Conclusions

59. Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour , les faits présentés sont clairs et ne peuvent

être interprétés que d’une seule façon. La première convocation, celle du 17 mai 2005, ne peut être

perçue autrement que comme une convocation fondée sur l’article 101 du code de procédure pénale

français qui trouve son pendant exécutif dans l’article 109 du même texte tandis que, aux termes de

l’article434-15-1 dudit code, le défaut de comparution est punissable. La délivrance de cette

convocation constitue une claire violation de l’i mmunité dont bénéficie, comme tout autre chef

51
d’Etat, le président de l’Etat demandeur. Le deuxième épisode ⎯ largement médiatisé ⎯ devrait

tout au moins être interprété comme une autre tent ative de citer le président en vue d’obtenir sa

déposition orale. Nous avons montré qu’il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que le seul fait

d’essayer de citer un chef d’Etat à témoigner dans le cadre d’un système qui prévoit le recours

éventuel à la force publique constitue aussi une violation manifeste de l’immunité qui est due au

président de l’Etat demandeur comme à tout autre chef d’Etat. Que cette tentative n’ait pas abouti

ne change rien à cette violation, cette démarc he ayant été largement relayée à l’initiative du

demandeur et son existence ayant été confirmée par le ministre de la justice dans son communiqué

de presse.

49
CMF, annexe XXX. - 45 -

60. Les violations en cause se sont aggravées et multipliées en raison de la manière dont

l’exécutif français a choisi de réagir aux protestations fermes ⎯et tout à fait justifiées ⎯ que

l’ambassadeur djiboutien avait immédiatement adressées dans les deux cas aux autorités françaises.

En ces deuxoccasions, les réponses des autorités françaises pourraient en elles-mêmes être

qualifiées d’atteintes graves à l’honneur et à la dignité du président djiboutien. En même temps,

cette attitude est loin d’être conforme aux dis positions du traité d’amitié et de coopération du

27 juin 1977, sur lequel M. Condorelli va revenir dans un instant.

61. Les faits invoqués dans cette partie de notre plaidoirie montrent également que le

défendeur a plusieurs fois manqué à son devoir de pr évenir toutes atteintes de sa part à l’immunité,

la dignité et l’honneur du président djiboutie n et que ce manquement est devenu plus manifeste

encore lorsqu’il a de nouveau essayé d’obtenir la déposition orale du président djiboutien.

62. Madame le président, me voici arrivé à la fin de mon exposé. Je vous prie de bien

vouloir rappeler M. Condorelli à la barre.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Maître van den Bi esen. Je donne maintenant la parole à

M. Condorelli.

52 CMOr. DORELLI:

The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the French Republic
and the Republic of Djibouti of 27 June 1977

Premise

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, in the present case the Republic of Djibouti, as

it indicated in its Application instituting proceedin gs and argued in greater detail in its Memorial,

relies on two bilateral agreements tying it to the French Republic and requests the Court to adjudge

and declare that France is responsible for violating them: these are the Treaty of Friendship and

Co-operation of 27June1977 and the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of

27September1986. Let me indicate the order in which we propose to put to the Court the

Djiboutian viewpoint on these two agreements. - 46 -

2. In the first part of this presentation, I will focus my remarks on the 1977 Treaty and show

the Court the role it has to play, in the Applicant’s view, for the purposes of settling the dispute that

has been brought before it. Then, tomorrow morning, in the second part of this same presentation,

I will have the honour to discuss the relevant pr ovisions of the 1986 Convention with a view to

clarifying the legal framework applicable to mutual assistance with regard to letters rogatory.

Subsequently, Mr. van den Biesen will analyse the facts of the case and demonstrate that France’s

refusal to execute the letter rogatory presented by Djibouti, as well as being a violation of the

principles of friendship and co-operation between th e two countries, is an internationally wrongful

act under the 1986 Convention, engaging the international responsibility of the Respondent.

1. The legally binding nature of the 1977 Treaty

3. Madam President, before turning in detail to the breaches of the 1977 Treaty for which the

Republic of Djibouti holds France responsible, a gene ral remark needs to be made. This important

remark is prompted by the fact that the Respondent does not merely contend that it has not violated

any of the obligations deriving from the 1977 Treaty: France’s Counter-Memorial goes much

further than such a claim, si nce it suggests to the Court an interpretation of the 1977 Treaty

which— we cannot pretend otherwise— is a ve ry unpleasant surprise for the Applicant and has

53 given rise to serious concern as to how the bonds of friendship and co-operation between the two

countries, so solemnly and plainly proclaimed in the Treaty, are viewed on the French side. It is an

interpretation which, to be honest, can only creat e doubts as to the future of their relations, the

framework for which in international law — as far as Djibouti has always understood it — has now

been left open to debate.

4. As I emphasized at the outset, France contends that no obligation capable of effect in

terms of mutual judicial assistance derives from the 1977 Treaty: that is a question of

interpretation which has been placed before the Cour t and to which I will return shortly. And it is

true that the Respondent seems to admit in other respects that “[l]egal obligations appear in the

Treaty... in certain areas of co-operation ha ving nothing to do with judicial co-operation in

criminal matters . . .”50; looking ahead, I would say that this lack of connection with mutual

50
CMF, p. 19, para. 3.7. - 47 -

assistance is highly debatable, as we shall see very shortly. But the issue that Djibouti wishes to

raise now is another one. It is that subseque ntly in the Counter-Memorial, when discussing the

object and purpose of the Treaty, the Respondent expresses itself in a completely different vein, no

doubt contradicting itself; ultimately, it implies that beyond the multiple declarations of a purely

political nature, no real legal obligation is imposed on the parties.

5. Here I must quote a significant passage from the Counter-Memorial: “It should... be

recalled that the Treaty’s object and its purpose ar e friendship and co-operation, that is to say

concepts so broad that it is impossible to infer from them anything other than a general intention

51
needing to be given concrete form through specific obligations.” And the Respondent adds—

taking a stance which I emphasize has disturbing implications: “If the object and the purpose of

the Treaty are set against its provisions, it becomes clear that the States parties wished above all

formally to lay down the guiding principles and objectives for their co-operation in the future.” 52

Those words, Madam President, cannot, to my mind, have two different meanings: there is but one

meaning! The argument put forward is that the 1977 Treaty limits itself in substance to sketching

54
out the guidelines for future co-operation; in shor t, it is a draft programme for the years ahead, a

mere project giving rise as such to no real obligations for the time being.

6. Members of the Court, that is not how the Republic of Djibouti has understood the 1977

Treaty until now: it has always viewed it and contin ues to view it as an instrument whose legally

binding scope for the parties to it is in no way di minished by its undeniably political nature: in

other words, an instrument laying down a genera l obligation, as well as more specific obligations,

to co-operate in all the areas covered both directly and indirectly by its provisions.

7. A first general comment must be made in this respect: in 1977 the two States could easily

have limited themselves to proclaiming, by a so lemn political declaration, their common intention

to maintain friendly relations in the future, involving close co-operation in all areas. But that is not

what they decided to do: they negotiated and th en signed a treaty in due form, which they then

ratified in accordance with their relevant nationa l constitutional procedures. For the record, the

French ratification instrument contains the standard phrase: “We declare that it [the Treaty] is

51
CMF, p. 20, para. 3.9; emphasis added.
52
Ibid; emphasis added. - 48 -

accepted, ratified and confirmed and promi se that it will be faithfully carried out.” 53 In short, in

view of the instrument chosen, it clearly appears that the aim pursued by the Contracting Parties

was and continues to be that of binding themselves by means of a genuine legal commitment giving

rise to all the effects of an authentic international agreement.

8. But there is a great deal more than just that general comment. In Djibouti’s opinion, it is

enough to analyse the text with a minimum of atte ntion in order to be convinced of the legally

binding nature of the Treaty. Indeed, can one really talk of a vague “general intention” in relation

to “future [i.e., potential] co-operation”, when the majority of the Treaty’s provisions are clearly

expressed as obligations? Article 1, for example, s tipulates that the parties “decide” to found their

relations on equality, mutual respect and p eace: it does not say that they “propose” or

“contemplate” doing so! In Article 2, the parties do not express a mere wish, they “proclaim their

55 firm desire to preserve and strengthen” their ties of co-operation and friendship. Again, in Article 3

and Article 4, the notion of undertaking occurs four times (the parties, first, “undertake” to consult

each other on the stability of the currency; sec ond, they “undertake” to consult each other on

problems of mutual interest; third, they “decid e” to extend to each other all possible assistance in

achieving the objectives they have set; fourth , they “undertake” to develop and reinforce

co-operation between their two countries in the areas of culture, science, technology and

education): these are not therefore mere progra mmes to be defined in the future, but real

obligations undertaken in the present. Moreover, the lists of areas in which the parties undertake to

co-operate are clearly indicative, and not exhaustive.

9. Further, Djibouti is very surprised to see France pass over in complete silence the first part

of Article 5 of the 1977 Treaty, which is, however, as we shall see in a moment, of great relevance

to the current dispute: it states that the par ties “shall foster” co-operation between the various

public and private national organizations, not that they are contemplating fostering co-operation.

Indeed, everyone knows that the use of the future tense in a treaty provision implies in principle

that an obligation is involved: in other words, “shall foster” means “undertake to foster”, and not

“should foster” or “will try to foster as far as possible”. I might note in passing that the Registry of

53
In the document published by the Court containing tApplication of Djibouti ( 2006, GeneralList No. 136),
see p. 22. - 49 -

the Court made no mistake on this point: in the — admittedly not official — English translation of

the 1977Treaty included in the document published by the Court containing Djibouti’s

Application 54, the expression “favoriseront la coopération” has been correctly translated as “shall

55
foster co-operation” . “Shall”, and not “should”.

10. In short, while it is true that any treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance

with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context (as provided for by

Article31, paragraph1, of the Vienna Conventio n on the Law of Treaties), we cannot see how it

can be claimed that the 1977 Treaty should be classified— as France essentially appears to

wish — as a legally non-binding instrument.

11. MadamPresident, the Republic of Djibouti will listen very carefully to the viewpoint

56 which France will wish to express as clearly as possible, no doubt later in the week, on the question

of whether it really considers that the 1977 Treat y in fact gives rise to no more than a kind of

“general intention” with regard to co-operation between the parties, without establishing any real

legal obligations. Above all, however, the Appli cant attaches considerable importance to how the

Court deals with this issue: your decision will play a major role in future relations between the two

countries, irrespective, I repeat, of the interpreta tion that the Court decides to adopt on the specific

question of whether or not the sub judice conduct of France, including its refusal, without giving

reasons, to execute the letter rogatory concerning the Borrel case, constitutes a violation of the

1977 Treaty.

12. I have already argued that the actual terms of the provisions of the 1977Treaty,

understood in accordance with their ordinary meani ng, clearly show that that Treaty does indeed

impose on the parties real legal obligations, adm ittedly of a general natu re, but no less binding

because of that. What now needs to be clarified, firstly, is the areas covered by the obligations in

question; secondly, we shall identify the principles relating to the methods of co-operation; and

thirdly, we will look at the circumstances in whic h it is legitimate to assert that one of those

obligations has been violated.

54
2006, General List No. 136.
55
Page 21 of the document referred to. - 50 -

3. Theextent ratione materiae of the obligation of co-operation under the 1977 Treaty

13. The first problem is really not a problem at all: in fact what is at issue in the 1977 Treaty

is co-operation in all areas, because the parties “ undertake to consult each other” on all “problems

of mutual interest” and “decide to extend to each other all possible assistance” in these matters, to

cite again the wording of Article3, paragraph2. Moreover, it has already been stressed that

co-operation between the various public and private national organizations is also the subject of a

specific obligation, laid down in Article 5: the duty to “foster” such co-opera tion. It follows that a

party which seriously and unjustifiably impedes such co-operation on a problem of mutual interest,

instead of facilitating it, thereby fails to comply with the requirements of the 1977 Treaty. And it

goes without saying that co-operation between the legal systems of the two countries in terms of

57 mutual assistance in criminal matters is fully included in this context, with regard to the

commitments already referred to arising from Articles 3 and 5.

14. Article6 of the 1977 Treaty is also releva nt in this connection. It refers to a

France-Djibouti Co-operation Commission, which is to “oversee the implementation of the

principles and the pursuit of the objectives defi ned in the present Treaty”. This Commission’s

terms of reference also include monitoring “the application of the various agreements entered into

between the two States” (Art.6, para.2), which quite obviously involves checking that the

application of these other instruments (including without the slightest doubt the 1986 Convention)

is in accordance with the 1977 Treaty. In fact, the 1977 Treaty “oversees”, so to speak, all the

other successive bilateral agreements, including the 1986 Convention, and must be observed in all

areas with which they are concerned. In other words, all agreements subsequent to 1977 must be

interpreted and applied in the light of the object and purpose of the 1977 Treaty and the

undertakings regarding co-operation that derive from it.

15. Madam President, it is true that the France-Djibouti Co-operation Commission, having

been formally established at the outset, has not been used since. However, this in no way

prejudices the role and relevance of the Treaty pr inciples in resolving any problem regarding the

application of other co-operation agreemen ts between the two countries, including the

1986Convention: so in applying the latter, th ere must be scrupulous observance not only of its

own provisions, but also of the principles of the Treaty! Since there is no recourse in bilateral - 51 -

practice to the work of the Commi ssion to check that this is the case, it is the direct responsibility

of each State to see that the Treaty is complied with in all the areas that it covers. And now, within

the limits of the present dispute, that task falls to the Court, because the two States have agreed to

recognize your jurisdiction on this subject.

16. Having shown in this way that the argument advanced by France that no obligation

capable of effect in terms of mutual judicial a ssistance derives from the 1977 Treaty, I still have to

consider the scope of the obligations of co-ope ration that the Treaty imposes upon the parties. The

norms of the Treaty do not come into play solely in the areas referred to by the subsequent bilateral

58 agreements mentioned in Article6: the obliga tions of conduct laid down are applicable to all

“problems of mutual interest”, whether or not these are also covered by specific treaties. In other

words, the Republic of Djibouti is convinced that any unjustified refusal to consult each other, to

give mutual assistance and to co-operate if important interests are at stake might well amount to an

unfriendly act contrary to the principles embodied in the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and

Co-operation, and therefore constitute an internationally wrongful act under the Treaty.

17. It should be stressed that Djibouti is very careful not to claim ⎯ as France would have

you believe ⎯ that it is possible to infer obligations from the object and purpose of the Treaty

which bear no direct relation to the specific fields dealt with by the Treaty, which, as we know very

well, your Court has ruled inadmissible 56. To identify the obligations which it accuses the

Respondent of violating, the Applicant does not refer solely to the preamble of the Treaty, or to a

vague principle in its wording concerning peaceful and friendly relations between the parties.

Djibouti refers to various provisi ons of the Treaty and to the undertakings that these impose as

regards co-operation; of course, interpretation of these must take account of the object and purpose

of the Treaty, as well as its preamble and Article 1. Therefore, France is wrong to rely in its

Counter-Memorial on your Court’s famous obiter dictum in the 1986 Nicaragua Judgment

(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of

America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 137, para. 273); the truth of that statement is

unquestionable, but it is irrelevant in the present case.

56
CMF, p. 20, para. 3.11. - 52 -

4. The principles laid down by the 1977 Treaty relating to the methods of co-operation

18. I now come to the second point requiring cl arification, still relating to the binding effects

of the Treaty. The latter does not confine itself to stating in which areas the parties are under a

general obligation to co-operate, co mbined with more specific duties. It also lays down how this

obligation should be discharged, i.e. what pr inciples and methods are to be applied when

co-operating. Co-operation must be based on “mutual respect for national sovereignty,

non-interference in the internal affairs of each Stat e and protection of their reciprocal interests” (as

59 stated in the preamble) and on “equality, mutual respect and peace”, as stated by Article 1 as a

binding requirement.

19. Madam President, regarding the central impor tance of Article 1 of the 1977 Treaty, the

Republic of Djibouti is pleased to rely on the entirely relevant and in terminis conclusion of the

Court on the analogous Article I of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights

between Iran and the United States of America of 15 August 1955. Quite obviously I am referring

to the Oil Platforms case. First of all in that case, th e Court decided in its 1996 Judgment on the

preliminary objections that “Article I must be rega rded as fixing an objective, in the light of which

the other Treaty provisions are to be interpreted and applied” (Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of

Iran v. United States of America) , Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 , p.814,

para. 28). Subsequently, in its Judgment of 2003 on the merits, your distinguished Court used the

provision in question in a most remarkable way, seeing it as highly relevant to the choice of

interpretation for other clauses in the same Treaty ( Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v.

United States of America) , Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003 , p.182, para.41). Djibouti expects the

Court to adopt the same approach mutatis mutandis in the present case.

4. Internationally wrongful acts under the 1977 Treaty

20. Having made clear which areas are covere d by the obligations of co-operation arising

from the 1977 Treaty and the principles to be adhered to regarding the methods used in

co-operation, we must now turn our attention to the circumstances in which it is legitimate to assert

that there has been a breach of one of these obligations. The French Counter-Memorial claims that

Djibouti’s interpretation of the Treaty would result, without any point or logic, in “systematically

redoubling” the binding obligations on the Parties in terms of co-opera tion: any violation of one of - 53 -

the conventions entered into after 1977 (s uch as the 1986 Convention) “would lead ipso facto to a

57
violation of the 1977 Treaty” . But this is not the argument that Djibouti maintains and submits to

the Court.

60 21. Firstly, as I have already stated, it might we ll be that the obligations of co-operation laid

down by the 1977 Treaty could be breached by unfriendly conduct that would seriously and

unjustifiably impede co-operation between the public organizations of the two parties and run

counter to the principle of proper mutual respect between them, even if outside the areas covered

by other bilateral agreements, such as the 1986 Convention.

22. Secondly, Djibouti certainly does not claim that any violation, even a random violation

of little importance, of one of the specific co-operation agreements between the two countries, such

as the 1986 Convention, would automatically and si multaneously give rise to violation of the

1977 Treaty. On the other hand, the position is quite different if what occurs should be defined as a

serious violation of the 1986 Convention capable of producing tensions between the two countries

and seriously affecting their relations, and if in addition such a violation is committed without a

minimum of satisfactory explanation or even w ith no explanation whatever. Madam President,

Members of the Court, this is exactly what has happened in the case brought before you, as a result

of France’s unjustified refusal to execute Djibouti’s letter rogatory regarding the Borrel case, as the

further pleadings will make clear.

23. Moreover, this kind of action by France stands out clearly as an unacceptable rejection of

the obligations of friendship and co-operation prescribed by the 1977 Treaty, if put into its global

context: a context characterized by other profoundly unfriendly acts, involving repeated violation

by France of international principles protecti ng the honour, immunities and privileges of the

highest authority in the Republic of Djibouti; char acterized also by criminal proceedings (still in

connection with the Borrel case) instituted with disregard fo r international law against senior

Djiboutian officials; and, lastly, by hate campaigns in the press sustained by private groups and

also by official circles (such as the Syndicat de la Magistrature ), without the French Government

feeling the need to dissociate itself clearly from these by taking a firm stand. The abandonment by

57
CMF, p. 21, para. 3.12. - 54 -

France of the “mutual respect” referred to in Artic le1 of the 1977 Treaty is unacceptable, a clear

violation of the conventional principles in force governing relations between the two countries.

61 24. The Court should not underestimate the scope of the reference to the “equality” and due

“mutual respect” between the parties during co-operation in all the areas covered by the

1977Treaty, as expressly required by Article1 thereof. This implies in particular that each party

performing its obligations of co- operation in good faith is entitled to expect reciprocal treatment

from the other, which France does not dispute in principle, moreover. Nor does France dispute that

Djibouti has “fully executed” 58all the letters rogatory issued by France concerning the Borrel case.

However, the Respondent argues that, in its opin ion, no relationship of reciprocity can be

established between Djibouti’s entirely co-operativ e attitude and the refusal by France to execute

the letter rogatory issued by Djibouti, also concerning the Borrel case. We are told from the other

side of the Bar that this is because, under the 1986 Convention, each request for assistance must be

59
considered “individually” . In other words, the success of one party in several requests for

assistance is no bar to that party’s right to refu se, where appropriate, another request for mutual

assistance, even if it is linked to the same case.

25. Madam President, in abstracto, this viewpoint can certainly be defended. Moreover, we

shall be showing the Court soon (or tomorrow) that France’s refusal to comply with Djibouti’s

letter rogatory without giving reasons, which is at the heart of the present dispute, must be defined

in itself, taken individually, as an unacceptable violation of the 1986 Convention. But if that is the

case, i.e., if the Court decides to accept Djibou ti’s view and defines France’s conduct as a serious

violation of the 1986 Convention, the Applicant then asks it to consider a subsequent issue: to

judge whether such a violation, because of its intr insic seriousness and the context already outlined

in which it is situated, represented by other associated internationally wrongful acts which clearly

infringe the immunities and dignity of the Head of State and senior officials of the Republic of

Djibouti, should not be regarded as a major violation of the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and

Co-operation.

58
CMF, p. 23, para. 3.20.
59
CMF, p. 23, para. 3.21. - 55 -

62 5. Conclusion

26. To end, Madam President, let me draw the following conclusion: the Applicant begs the

Court to take full account of the 1977 Treaty for the purposes of settling the present dispute. The

Applicant asks your Court to afford this Treaty th e central role due to it in the interpretation of

subsequent bilateral instruments such as the 1986 Convention: in other words, all those

instruments must be understood and applied in the light of the commitments to co-operation which

flow from the Treaty. The Applicant asks you in addition to adjudge and declare that, over and

above the violations of the 1986 Convention and of the principles governing diplomatic

immunities, privileges and prerogatives, the conduct sub judice attributable to France is to be

regarded as an obvious breach of the obligations of friendship and co-operation laid down by the

bilateral Treaty of 27 June 1977.

Thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Condorelli. The hearing is adjourned until

tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.

The Court rose at 6 p.m.

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