Traduction

Non-Corrigé Traduction

Uncorrected Translation

AU

CR 2009/19 (traduction)

CR 2009/19 (translation)

Jeudi 24 septembre 2009 à 10 heures

Thursday 24 September 2009 at 10 a.m. - 2 -

12 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The hearing is open, and we

shall hear further presentations in the first round of pleadings of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay.

I give the floor to Professor Luigi Condorelli. You have the floor, Sir.

CMOr. DORELLI:

A RTICLE 12 OF THE 1975 S TATUTE ,AND URUGUAY ’S RESPECT
FOR ITS PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS

I. NTRODUCTION

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I am very honoured to take the floor once again

before the Court, and I am grateful to the Eastern Republic of Uruguay which has charged me with

presenting its point of view to the Court regardi ng the alleged breaches of procedural obligations

under the Statute of the River Uruguay which the Argentine Republic claims the Respondent to

have committed. My presentation follows on from that of Mr.Martin, who has shown why

Uruguay cannot be accused of any breach of Article 7 of the Statute. For my part, I shall show in

particular that the Respondent’s conduct in th is case has complied with the other procedural

provisions contained in Chapter II of the 1975 Statute.

2. For the purposes of my presentation, I shal refrain from reciting yet again the various

provisions contained in Chapter II of the Statute that follow Article 7: this Court has already heard

a great deal about them, and I certainly do not wish to bore you further by putting Articles 8 to 11

of the Statute up on the screen yet again. Rather, my intention is to draw the Court’s attention to

the final stages of the procedure governed by Ch apterII, and specifically the provisions of

Article12 of the Statute. Curiously, our opponent s have largely neglected this poor Article12,

which however is of crucial importance in this case. They have all avoided mentioning it with one

exception: ProfessorPellet, who valiantly put the view that, yes, Article12 is certainly very

1
important in principle, but not in the present cas e. Here, he contends, it has no role to play

is far from being Uruguay’s point of view, as I shal l endeavour to show; for, on the contrary, all

13 the contentious points relating to Uruguay’s alleged breach of its procedural obligations in this case

1
CR 2009/13, p. 34, para. 20 (Pellet). - 3 -

have to do with the interpretation of this Article. [Slide1 on.] I shall quote this Article in full:

“Should the Parties fail to reach agreement within 180 days following the notification referred to in

article11, the procedure indicated in chapterXV shall be followed.” It is worth noting that

Article 12 does not merely refer to disputes being submitted to this Court as the final stage in the

procedure, as our opponents seem to believe; it also refers to a final negotiating period at the end

of which, if the Parties fail to reach agreement, disputes may be submitted to the Court. [Slide1

off.]

II. FOUR POINTS OF CONTENTION IN REGARD
TO THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

3. Allow me, Mr.President, to try to be of service to the Court in reaching its decision by

identifying as clearly and precisely as possible the issues disputed by the Parties regarding the

procedural aspects that I have just cited. Dis tilled from the thousands of pages of pleadings that

have been submitted to you and the rivers of words that have been spoken in this Great Hall, there

are in fact four key questions.

4. Question1: At a summit meeting held on 5May2005, the countries’ Heads of State ⎯

Tabaré Vásquez and Néstor Kirchner ⎯ in the face of rising tensions between their countries over

the pulp mills on the Uruguayan side of the river and the impasse in CARU’s work, decided to set

up the GTAN (High-Level Technical Group), which subsequently held 12meetings over a period

of six months, from August2005 to January2006, without an agreement being reached. The

question is this: does this exercise qualify as carrying on the direct negotiations between the

Parties referred to in Article 12?

5. Question2: Did the GTAN effectively function as a forum for consultation and

negotiation between the Parties carried on in accordance with the applicable principles of

international law?

6. Question3: Since it is the two States that agreed to use the GTAN as an appropriate

forum for direct negotiation to try to settle their opposing points of view regarding the danger

14 posed by the pulp mills, is it admissible, once tho se direct negotiations failed, to reopen the matter

of the obligations which the States ought to have fulfilled vis-à-vis CARU? - 4 -

7. And finally, Question 4: If the negotiations via the GTAN were indeed those required by

Article12, it goes without saying ⎯ given that those negotiations did not result in an agreement

between the Parties within 180 days following their commencement ⎯ that the path was open from

that point onwards for the matter to be submitted to the Court pursuant to Article 60 of the Statute.

But in the interim until such time as the Court issed its decision, could the project be built and

commissioned, bearing in mind that the Court of course had full jurisdiction subsequently to order

that the project be halted, modified, or even dism antled if by some impossible eventuality it should

attribute to Uruguay wrongful acts so serious as to justify radical measures of this kind? In other

words, how should the 1975 Statute’s silence on this question be interpreted?

III.Q UESTION 1: D ID THE CONSULTATIONS CONDUCTED THROUGH THE GTAN

CONSTITUTE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS PURSUANT TO A RTICLE 12?

8. Let us begin with the first question, which is the simplest: did the consultations conducted

through the GTAN constitute direct negotiations pursuant to Article 12 of the Statute?

Mr. President, I fully believe that the only possible answer is yes. There are many reasons why the

answer can only be yes, but it will be sufficient here to cite just one, which is absolutely decisive:

it is Argentina that itself answered this question in the affirmative in a very official way, basing its

submission of this case to the Court on it. It is therefore inadmissible that Argentina should now

take a contrary position, as it tries to do in certa in passages in its most recent submissions, which

moreover are rather confused, as well as in its pleadi ngs last week. Indeed, in its Application of

4May2006, the Applicant cited as grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction the fact that negotiations

2
through the GTAN had failed and documented this point in a footnote referring to a diplomatic

Note from the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador of Uruguay in Argentina,

which it appended to the Application as AnnexII. [Slide2 on.] In that diplomatic Note, as you

15 can see, the Argentine Government defines the GTAN as “the negotiating body established

between both Parties upon the Parties having failed to reach agreement within CARU” and then

goes on to say “the Government of the Argentine Republic concludes that, upon the Parties having

failed to reach agreement, as specified by Article 12 of the River Uruguay’s Statute, this paves the

2
Application instituting proceedings, 4 May 2006, p. 4, para. 4. - 5 -

3
way for the procedure provided for in ChapterXV of the... Statute” . It is remarkable that the

content of that diplomatic Note is referred to without hesitation in the Memorial of Argentina 4. But

that is not the only Argentine document admitting that negotiations through the GTAN were carried

on pursuant to Article12 of the Statute, as Prof essorPellet maintained rather hastily last week 5.

[Slide2 off. Slide3 on.] Indeed, the Memorial of Argentina also includes another important

document (although failing to highlight the passage that is by far the most significant, or to

translate it into French) which had also been annexed to the Application as AnnexIII: this is the

statement by the Argentine Minister for Foreign A ffairs to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies on

14 February 2006, in which the Minister explains the position that his country had communicated

to Uruguay in its recent diplomatic correspondence in the following terms:

“(a) that the GTAN was the instance of dir ect negotiation between both countries in
relation with the dispute over the construction project for the two industrial
cellulose production plants; and

(b) that, should both countries fail to reach an agreement by 30January2006, the
180-day period provided for in the Statute fo r authorising either of the Parties to
6
resort to the ICJ will have expired.”

9. It is worth recalling in this context that during the oral phase concerned with the request

for the indication of provisional measures submitte d by the Argentine Republic, this Court heard

one of Argentina’s counsel, Professor Pellet, admit several times, without reservation, with respect

to this case that “the Court’s intervention forms an integral part of the procedure laid down in

16 ChapterII of the 1975Statute, Article12 of which entrusts the task of making a final decision to

the Court if the Parties have not been able to reach agreement on a construction planned . . . by one

3Note149/2005 from the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador of Uruguay in Argentina,

14Dec.2005, Application of Argentina instituting proceedings, 4 May2006, Ann.II. The French translation provided
by Argentina in that Annex is slightly different from the Fr ench translation which appears in the Memorial of Argentina
(MA, Anns., Vol.II, Ann.27.). The la tter translation is preferable, as it matches the original Spanish text of
Note 149/2005 more closely.
4
MA, p. 56, para. 2.72 (see preceding footnote).
5CR 2009/13, p. 35, para. 21 (Pellet).

6Address by Mr.JorgeTaiana, Minist er for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, on 12February2006, before the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, Application instituting proceedings, 4 May 2006, Ann. III. - 6 -

7
of them” . [Slide 3 off.] I have taken the liberty, Mr. President, of indicating other passages from

our opponents’ pleadings on this point.

10. Mr.President, I am not going to make my presentation on this question even longer by

adding further citations. The two documents to wh ich I have drawn the Court’s attention are fully

sufficient in themselves. After having officially notified Uruguay by means of a diplomatic Note

that the matter could be submitted to the Court because the negotiations pursuant to Article12 of

the Statute had taken place and had not brought forth an agreement, after having repeated the same

view publicly through its highest officials and after having reiterated that position before this Court

in its Application and the annexes thereto, as well as through the words spoken by its counsel in

their pleadings during the oral phase concerned with the request for the indication of provisional

measures, Argentina cannot now withdraw that position at the last minute and completely

contradict itself. This is why what it has tried to do in its Reply and in its pleadings of last week,

contending that in the end it was not “on the basis of Article 12” that the matter was submitted to

8
the Court, since in fact ⎯ as it had just discovered ⎯ “the remedy under Article 12 was closed” .

The Court will remark the Applicant’s ham-handed attempt to suggest casually that its Application

9
instituting proceedings was based on the same point of view , whereas the documentation I have

just cited makes it plain that it was not. But no, Mr. President, the remedy under Article 12 was not

closed at all, since the direct negotiations provide d under that Article indeed took place and it was

following the failure of those negotiations that Argentine submitted the matter to the Court!

17 IV. Q UESTION 2: D ID THE GTAN EFFECTIVELY FUNCTION AS A FORUM FOR CONSULTATION

AND DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE P ARTIES CARRIED ON IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ?

11. I come now to Question2, whether or not the GTAN effectively functioned as a forum

for consultation and direct nego tiation between the Parties in accordance with the applicable

principles of international law. Here, one must look closely at why and for what purpose the two

7CR 2006/46, p. 63, para.18 (Pellet). See also CR2006/46, p.57, para.6 (Pellet) (“There can be no doubt that

that is the case: the dispute concerns ‘the interpretation and the application’ of the Treaty concerned and of the rules of
international law to which it refers, and it does indithin the provisions’ of the Tr eaty and, in particular, of
Article12 thereof which provides...”) and CR 2006/48, p.41 (P ellet) (“in the exercise of the functions conferred on it
by Article 12 of the 1975 Statute, the Court will reject the Application . . . ”).
8
RA, p. 141, para. 1.173.
9Ibid., p. 18, para. 0.18. - 7 -

countries’ Heads of State set up the GTAN. We have already alluded to a piece of evidence which

is particularly significant, inasmuch as it concerns one of the most important diplomatic Notes in

this case, which was first communicated to Uruguay, as indeed it should be, and then to the Court

as one of the main annexes to the Application 10. As the Court has already heard, this Note of

14 December 2005 describes the GTAN as “the ne gotiating body established between both Parties

upon the Parties having failed to reach agreement within CARU”. Mr.President, as Argentina

openly admits, the GTAN was charged with the t ask of doing what it was impossible for CARU to

do, as the two delegations within CARU stood at an impasse.

12. To be sure, however, the essential documen t on this point is the one containing the

agreement between the two States, concluded by the two Presidents, setting up the GTAN. That

document is the joint press release of 31May2005 1, which was drafted through intensive

negotiation between the two countries as pointed out in the June 2005 report by Argentina’s Chief

of the Cabinet Office to the Argentine Senate 12: its words were therefore weighed, discussed and

agreed by the two Parties with the greatest care and merit special attention. I am sure the Applicant

would not contest its binding legal va lue, for I hold its eminent jurists in too high a regard for that.

And at least for now, I shall not cite this Court’s wealth of jurisprudence concerning the contractual

nature of documents of this sort. At this point , I shall limit myself to drawing the Court’s attention

to the total irrelevance of Professor Kohen’s remarks on this subject, pointing out that mere parallel

negotiations carried on with a view to settling a dispute between States but failing to reach an

agreement cannot result “in the rejection or setting aside of the procedure laid down by the treaty at
18
13
issue in the dispute” . Well, my friend, of course! But here, this is not a case of an aborted

negotiation but a negotiation that was well a nd truly launched on the basis of a genuine

international agreement duly concluded by the two countries’ Heads of State. Mr.President, the

existence of this contractual instrument is a fact, an undeniable fact, and not simply hair-splitting

10
Note149/2005 from the Argentine Minister for ForeignAffairs to the Ambassador of Uruguay in Argentina,
14 Dec. 2005, Application instituting proceedings, 4 May 2006, Ann. II (see footnote 3 above).
11
MA, Vol. IV, Ann. 3; CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 126.
12RU, Vol. II, Ann. R14, p. 620.

13CR 2009/14, p. 14, para. 9 (Kohen). - 8 -

for the purposes of argument: it is an intern ational agreement to which the principle of pacta sunt

servanda fully applies!

13. [Slide 4 on.] Allow me to put up on the screen once again, as Mr. Martin did yesterday,

the central passage in the press release of 31 May 2 005, this time in the French translation supplied

by Argentina:

“Suivant ce qui a été accordé par MM. les présidents de la République argentine
et de la République orientale de l’Urugua y, les ministères des affaires étrangères des
deux pays constituent, sous leur superv ision, un groupe de techniciens, pour
complément d’études et d’analyses, d’éch anges d’information et de suivi des

conséquences que sur l’écosystème du fl euve Uruguay qu’ils partagent aura le
fonctionnement des usines de pâte à papier que l’on construit dans la République
orientale de l’Uruguay.” 14

14. If I may, given that this is an agreement for which the authentic language is Spanish, I

should like to make one tiny clarification. The original Spanish phrase “las plantas de celulosa que

se están construyendo ...” has been rendered in French as “usines de pâte à papier que l’on

construit...”. Here, the English translation prov ided by Uruguay reflects the original Spanish

more faithfully: “the cellulose plants, that are being constructed . . .”. The sense of this agreement

is clear: the two Parties are recognizing as an accepted fact at that point that pulp mills are being

built in Uruguay and are deciding, because of th e impasse in CARU, that it is through the GTAN

that additional studies and analyses are to be ca rried out, and that information and follow-up

(seguimiento) on the effects (consecuencias) which the mills’ operation will have on the ecosystem

of the river will take place.

15. Why was such a decision made? The reasons for the decision are well known to you:

yesterday Mr.Martin recalled the growing probl ems the Argentine Government was facing in

public opinion, which was being mobilized more and more strongly against the pulp mill project,
19

together with the reasons that led the Uruguayan G overnment, in spite of its firm conviction that it

had already exchanged all the information necessar y, to agree to proceed with new in-depth

consultations. Those consultations, as stated in the text of the agreement itself, were to consist of

complementary studies and analyses and subsequent exchanges of information and data on “the

1MA, Vol.IV, Ann.3. [Note by the Registry: English translation by Uruguay: “In conformity with what was
agreed to by the Presidents of Argentina and Uruguay, the Foreign Ministries of both our countries constitute, under their

supervision, a Group of Technical Experts for complemenary studies and analyses, exchange of information and
followup on the effects that the operation of the cellulose plan ts, that are being constructed in the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay will have on the ecosystem of the shared Uruguay River.”] - 9 -

effects that the operation of the cellulose plants ... will have on the ecosystem of the shared

Uruguay River”. The consultations were to proceed through the GTAN, that is, in the framework

of direct negotiations under Article12 of the Statute. One will also note in this context the

make-up of the GTAN, consisting not only of senior political officials but also of technical experts

(inasmuch as each Party effectively appointed to the GTAN both senior diplomats and renowned

experts, including delegates to CARU) 15, which attests to the eminent role ascribed to it.

16. Mr.President, the May2005 agreement between the two Heads of State followed on

perfectly from the March2004 arrangements of wh ich Mr.Martin spoke yesterday, and is the

clearest possible evidence of the friendly understanding that had developed between the two Parties

that the dispute between them over the installation of the pulp mills was “closed”, and that it was

taken as an accepted fact that the mills were under construction when the GTAN was set up. By

common consent, from that point forward the crux of the dispute was limited to the environmental

risks which might result from their “operation” (a s the two Heads of State said explicitly): the

negotiation provided for under Article 12 of the Statute, to be conducted through the GTAN, was

therefore to be concerned with the precise identification of the risks in question following a full

exchange of information, and on steps to be taken to offset such risks if need be. [Slide 4 off.]

17. During the 180-day period established for the negotiations under Article12 of the

1975 Statute, Uruguay, like Argentina, was unquestionably bound to act in good faith in the sense

that it could not present the other Party with faits accomplis while ⎯ within the process of building

the mills ⎯ implementing unilateral decisions on ma tters which were the subject of the

20
negotiations: indeed, such behaviour would ha ve rendered the negotiations pointless. Uruguay

fully respected that obligation. To be sure, an entire series of preparatory activities for the

construction of the project had been carried out, but none of the steps taken by Uruguay before the

expiry of the time period provided for in Article 12 resulted in a fait accompli which was capable

per se of preventing the negotiations from reaching a conclusion. Indeed, each and every one of

the preparatory activities approved by Uruguay and ca rried out before that date left entirely open

the possibility of choosing one technical solution or another in order, in the best way possible, to

15
CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 127. - 10 -

prevent environmental risks that might result from the operation of the mill, for example in regard

to the bleaching technology to be used, wastewat er treatment facilities and methods, the type and

location of discharge points in the river and so forth. The direct negotiations carried on through the

GTAN were to deal with all of these questions, on all of these issues. And indeed, within the

framework of the GTAN, Uruguay shared with Argentina all the information and all the analyses

relating to these questions, including production processes and technologies relating to them 16, the

environmental impact of waterborne discharges in view of the hydrodynamics of the river, and

17 18
particularly in view of the phenomena of reverse flow , the impact of air emissions and

monitoring programmes 19, not to mention the issue of the im pact on communities on both sides of

the river 20and so forth .21

The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: ProfessorCondorelli, I can see that you are

21 passionate in presenting the case but, if I may, I would ask you to speak a little more slowly to

facilitate the work of the interpreters. You do ha ve sufficient time to present your arguments.

Thank you.

Mr. CONDORELLI: Please accept my apologies, Mr. President. I shall slow down.

18. The extensive nature of the consultati ons carried on through the GTAN, based on an

impressive array of documentation, does not merit the strange silence reserved for it by

Professor Sands who stated that in his view “the c onsultations required by Articles 9 to 11 did not

22
take place” , but did not say a single word about the consultations under Article 12.

16
CMU, para. 3.100; GTAN/DU/6/19-08- 05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 154, A nn. B; GTAN/DU/9/14-09-05, CMU,
Vol. V, Ann. 129; GTAN/DU/10/14-09-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 131; GTAN/DU/11/14-09-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 132;
GTAN/DU/17/30-09-05, CMU, VoV l., Ann1.36; GTAN/DU/18/30-09-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 137;
GTAN/DU/30/09-12-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 148.
17
CMU, para. 3.100; GTAN/DU/12/14-09-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 154, Ann. B; GTAN/DU/24/07-11-05, CMU,
Vol. V, Ann. 143; GTAN/DU/25/21-11-05, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 144; GTAN/DU/33/21-12-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 151.
18
CMU, para. 3.100; GTAN/DU/22/07-11-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 141; GTAN/DU/32/16-12-05, CMU, Vol. V,
Ann. 150; GTAN/DU/35/18-01-06, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 152.
19
CMU, para.3.100; CMU, Vol.II, Ann.20; CMU, Vol.II, Ann.21; GTAN/DU/15/14-09-05, CMU, Vol.V,
Ann. 135; GTAN/DU/27/25-11-05, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 146.
20
CMU, para.3.100; CMU, Vol.II , Ann.20; GTAN/DU/6/19-08-05, CMU, Vol.V, Ann.154, Ann.B;
GTAN/DU/24/07-11-05, CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 143; GTAN/DU/31/16-12-05, CMU, Vol. V, Ann. 149.
21
For the list of documents communicated to Argentina within the framework of the GTAN, see CMU,
pp. 211 et seq,. para. 3.100.
22
CR 2009/13, p. 69, para. 18 (Sands). - 11 -

19. Moreover, Uruguay’s pleadings have shown that, in fact, whilst the authorization to build

the plant was certainly preceded by authorizationrelating to a variety of preparatory works, the

authorization to build was itself only issued after the acknowledged failure of the negotiations

carried on through the GTAN, that is, on 18 January 2006. In these circumstances, the accusations

against Uruguay as to alleged violations of the lett er and spirit of Article 12 of the 1975 Statute are

clearly lacking any basis from that perspective as well.

V. QUESTION 3: FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH
THE GTAN, SHOULD THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH CARU
PURSUANT TO A RTICLE 7 HAVE BEEN REOPENED ?

20. Mr.President, Members of the Court, as I have just shown, there is no question that

direct negotiations pursuant to Article 12 of the St atute did indeed take place. You might well ask,

then, why Argentina suddenly decided, very late in the process, to deny th e evidence by executing

a perilous sort of double somersault. This may app ear incomprehensible at first, but in the end it

can be understood very well. It is because, ater reading the Counter-Memorial of Uruguay, the

Applicant no doubt recognized a series of implications, which were very negative for its case,

which inevitably ensued from admitting that befo re the matter was submitted to the Court, the

dispute between the two States over the pulp mills had reached the stage of direct negotiations

pursuant to Article 12. What I am doing is coming to the third of the four central questions, and I

present it in the light of the answers to Questionsand 2. It is an established fact that the two

States agreed to use and effectively did use the GTAN as a forum for direct negotiation under

22 Article 12 of the Statute, in an effort to settle th eir opposing views in regard to the danger posed by

the pulp mills. Is it then admissible, once those negotiations failed, to reopen the matter of the

obligations that the States should have discharged vi s-à-vis CARU, and particularly on the basis of

Article 7?

21. I am inclined to let Argentina’s own words answer that question. As I have just pointed

out, the Applicant refuses in its Reply to reognize what seemed self-evident up to that point,

namely that the matter had been placed before th e Court “on the basis of Article 12”. That is not

so, Argentina maintains! And why not? I quote, “For it to have done so, the procedure under

Articles7 to11 would have had to be duly followed and completed, i.e., the conclusion reached - 12 -

that an agreement was impossible.” 23 Inasmuch as the matter was placed before the Court, as

Argentina now argues, not “under Article12” but on the basis of Article60 of the Statute, it

follows that “the role which the Court is required to play in this case is not to provide the final

24
assessment under Article12 of the Statute...” . Last week, counsel for our opponents

relentlessly repeated this notion 25. But Mr.President, the most elementary logic turns this

argument on its ear: as we have seen, there can be no question that the matter was submitted to this

Court by Argentina “under Article12”, that is, following the failure of the direct negotiations

provided for pursuant to that article. Consequently, that means that the role of the Court in this

case has to be recognized as being precisely that of “providing the final assessment under

Article 12 of the Statute . . .”, that is, deciding whether or not the works under discussion risk doing

significant damage to the quality of the waters of the River Uruguay. It also follows that, following

the failure of the direct negotiations undertaken pur suant to Article 12, the next step could only be

as indicated in that article, namely submitting the matter to the Court, not going back to CARU.

22. But it is not only logic that leads straight to this conclusion. The entire history of this

23 dispute, as retraced by ProfessorMcCaffrey, Mr.Ma rtin and me, confirms its validity. It shows

clearly that no return to CARU with a view to a hypothetical bela ted application of Article7 was

envisaged. Of course not! What possible sense c ould it have made, at this advanced stage, for

CARU to do a preliminary assessment of the project in accord ance with Article7, whereas what

was called for at this point was a comprehensive in-depth political and technical evaluation that

explored all possible aspects and examined every la st detail of the issue? Mr. President, the thesis

advanced by the Applicant whereby the press rele ase of 31May2005 implied, even anticipated,

returning to CARU and Article7 truly does not st and up. Moreover, that thesis is in flagrant

contradiction with what that accord spells out: that all the additional information necessary in

order for the Parties to assess the environmental compatibility of the mills’ operation, that all

exchanges in that regard should be done hencefor th in the framework of direct negotiations under

Article 12 of the Statute, that is, through the GT AN and not through CARU. In short, the stage of

23RA, p. 141, para. 1.173.
24
Ibid., p. 142, para. 1.174.
25See, for example, CR 2009/13, p. 33, paras. 17 et seq. (Pellet). - 13 -

preliminary examination referred to in Article7of the Statute was entirely left behind once the

process had moved on and a mechanism able to satisfy environmental risk analysis requirements in

much more complete fashion was set up.

23. Nevertheless, I have one final observation to make, still in regard to this third question.

Even without taking into account the bilateral accord of March2004 of which Mr.Martin spoke

yesterday, one cannot seriously suggest that the absence of an evaluation by CARU under Article 7

implies a breach of the 1975Statute. Indeed, th e accord of 31May 2005 setting up the GTAN is

sufficient to refute such an allegation. It has to be borne in mind that by that accord the two Parties

organized how to go about a complete examination of the matter through direct negotiations

between them, thereby rendering superfluous a hypothe tical return to the stage of a preliminary

examination within CARU, which is a forum for t echnical negotiations. The fact that the direct

negotiations did not in the end reach an agreem ent does not change that: the failure of the

negotiations in fact opened the way for the next stage provided for in Article12, that is, the

possibility for the matter to be submitted to this Court ⎯ of which Argentina availed itself — and

could not justify going back to CARU.

24 VI.Q UESTION 4: IN THE EVENT OF THE MATTER BEING SUBMITTED TO THE COURT
FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ,IS IT PERMITTED OR

PROHIBITED FOR THE PROJECT TO BE BUILT AND COMMISSIONED
BEFORE THE C OURT ISSUES ITS FINAL DECISION ?

24. And now, Mr. President, it is time to look at the fourth and final question: Following the

failure of the direct negotiations, does theatute permit Uruguay to build and commission the

project after the matter had been submitted to the Court, or should Uruguay have waited until the

Court issued its final decision permitting the project to proceed?

25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the first comment I would make on this subject is

that the text of the 1975 Statute is silent on this point. Nowhere do its provisions explicitly say one

way or the other. Article12 does provide that if the period established for direct negotiations

elapses without an agreement being reached, the ma tter may be submitted to the Court; but it does

not say whether in the meantime the project is permitted to go ahead. One must therefore turn to an

interpretation going beyond the letter of the Treaty, using all appropriate methods suggested by the

relevant principles enshrined in Articles31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of - 14 -

Treaties. There is an agreement in principle betw een the Parties that that is the approach which

should be taken, although they disagree profoundly as to the conclusions reached by that means.

26. A great many pages have been written on this subject in the Parties’ pleadings, of which

the Court has taken note. At this point, in the oral phase of proceedings, it would not be

appropriate to review in detail all the arguments th at have been extensively laid forth in writing:

that would be pointless, and contrary to the Court’s instructions. I shall therefore try to identify the

core of the dispute between the two Parties and th e key points of their divergent positions, in the

hope of helping the Court discharge its high task.

27. In essence, Argentina’s position is based on what is traditionall
y known as argumentum

a contrario. Put as simply as possible, its reasoni ng runs as follows. As we know, when a

disagreement arises between the Parties as to the environmental compatibility of a project under

Article 7, the Party wishing to carry out the proj ect must notify the other Party and, in accordance

with Article8, must wait 180days for a determination by the latter. If finally the Party notified

raises no objections or does not respond, Article 9 provides that the Party wishing to carry out the

project may go ahead with it. However, should there be an objection, the Party wishing to carry

25 out the project is notified of the same (Article11) , and a new period of 180days then begins for

negotiations to take place. At the end of that second 180-day period, in accordance with Article 12,

either the Parties reach an agreement or the proc edure for the dispute to be settled by judicial

means becomes applicable. For Argentina, inasmuch as Article9 expressly provides that the

project may be executed if there is an agreemen t (or in the absence of a disagreement) following

26
the first 180days, this would include a contrario , “implicitly but inevitably” , that if there is a

disagreement, and if that disagreement continues after the second period of 180days has elapsed,

the project may not be carried out until the C ourt has made a favourable decision following the

judicial procedure governed by Article 60. In short, in the Applicant’s view, a project covered by

Article7 can only be carried out either on the basi s of prior agreement between the Parties to the

dispute or on the basis of a favourable judgment on the merits from the International Court of

Justice.

26
RA, p. 120, para. 1.138. - 15 -

28. As the Court knows, this view is vigor ously criticized by Uruguay. Certainly, the

Respondent agrees that the Statute establishes a procedure consisting of various stages aimed at

enabling a prior agreement to be reached, and even encouraging that result in so far as possible.

But the Statute does not stop there: it also sets out how to overcome any impasse should it be

found, once all the stages of the procedure of dir ect negotiation have been exhausted, that it is

impossible to reach an agreement. However, the Statute does not state in this case that the position

of the Party opposing the agreement should be given precedence over the position of the other

Party: indeed, why should the Party wishing to carry out a project be forbidden from running the

risk of an unfavourable outcome resulting from the judicial dispute-settlement procedure if it is

convinced in good faith that carrying out the project is perfectly in accordance with the Statute and

that its opponent’s case cannot be justified? Argentina’s thesis seems unacceptable to Uruguay in

that it implies that the Statute would recognize for each of the High Contracting
Parties a veritable

right of veto over any project that the other Party might wish to undertake under Article 7 et seq.,

and that such a situation would prevail until the Court had taken all the time necessary (several

years, as we are in a position to know well!) to make its decision on the basis of Article60

concerning the judicial settlement of disputes. Such a right of veto would continue ⎯ and I must

26 stress this point ⎯ even if the Party on whose territory the pr oject is to be carried out is convinced

that it has in good faith discharged all its substantive and procedural obligations under the Statute

as regards prevention, information and negotiation (which is effectively the case here, as Uruguay’s

counsel have just demonstrated), and even if it is convinced that the other Party’s opposition is

based in substance on prejudices or insufficient or questionable motives and is in fact explained by

pressure of public opinion that is poorly informed and hostile in principle.

29. It is true, Mr.President, that Argentina ch allenges this terminology. No right of veto

exists, it exclaims, since the Court is empowered to make the final decision, which may be

unfavourable to the State opposing a project. However, regardless of whether the term “right of

veto” is used (if the expression “no construction rule”, so dear to ProfessorSands, is used

instead27), Argentina’s thesis would have extremely onerous consequences. In effect, this thesis

27
CR 2009/13, p. 70, para. 19 (Sands). - 16 -

would give each Party a sort of highly discretiona ry power which could be used without a valid

reason and, since it would not be rooted in the marketplace, at no cost— the power to block a

project that is environmentally impeccable and v ital to the other Party’s sustainable development

for years on end, doing the other Party unfair, grave and perhaps irreparable harm, which no one

would be required to undo subsequently, even if upon the conclusion of the judicial proceeding it

should be found that the veto (my apologies, the “blocking”) was unjustified.

30. To be sure, as the classic jibe would suggest, “adducere inconvenientes non est solvere

argumentum”: that is, the difficulties which are of grave concern deriving from Argentina’s thesis

would not be sufficient in themselves to refute its validity in law if such a thesis were clearly set

forth in the provisions of the 1975 Statute. But that is not the case here: the Statute is silent on the

subject. It must be said in passing that this is not a factor in Argentina’s favour, as Argentina is

insisting on the idea that the St atute would spell out detailed, precise obligations, whereas by all

evidence that is not the case here. As for argumentum a contrario, it would appear if not simplistic

27 then at the very least unpersuasive if it is not validated within the framework of a satisfying and

complete interpretation of the relevant provisi ons, achieved on the basis of all applicable

interpretive principles. The thesis that Uruguay puts before the Court is based on the objective

interpretation of the Statute in the light of its objective and purpose, and takes into account all the

pertinent considerations deriving from Article 31, paragraph 3, of the 1969 Vienna Convention:

“(a) any subsequent agreement between the pa rties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;

(b)any subsequent practice in the appli cation of the treaty which establishes the

agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.”

31. So far as subsequent agreement and subse quent practice are concerned, it can readily be

seen that through 2004 and 2005 the Parties did agree on one aspect ⎯ a limited aspect, to be sure,

but a precise one ⎯ of the application of Articles7 et seq. of the Statute in this case. After the

arguments presented to the Court by Mr. Martin yest erday and by me today, I do not have to say a

great deal to show this. It is sufficient to r ecall, on the one hand, the agreement between the two - 17 -

countries’ Foreign Ministers of 2 March 2004 28. And, on the other hand, the agreements between

29
the two Presidents recorded in the press release of 31 May 2005 . These two agreements indicate

clearly and in a perfectly consistent way that the Parties to the 1975 Statute were agreed in regard

to the application of Article7 et seq. in the sense of considering closed the dispute between them

regarding the “establishment” of the mills: within this frame of reference, in particular, the two

Heads of State affirmed that the pulp mills were “being constructed” at the moment the GTAN was

set up, and agreed on the need to monitor th eir “operation” by exchanging all appropriate

30
information to evaluate the “effects” of such operation . To be sure, there were still divergences

over whether or not the information already exchanged was complete and how additional

information should be provided, as well as over the precise evaluation of the environmental risks

that could be brought about as a result of the mills’ activities and how to offset those risks,

28 divergences that the consultations carried on thr ough the GTAN were unable to reconcile. From

the Respondent’s standpoint, that is the dispute on which the Court should focus and which it is

called upon to resolve.

32. The elements of subsequent practice followed in the application of the Statute, which I

have just cited, play an important role in Ur uguay’s opinion for settling the dispute now before the

Court because they show that the Parties were in agreement as to how the procedural provisions of

the Statute were to be applied. That practice, however, says nothing decisive regarding the overall

interpretation that should be given to the relevant pr ovisions of the Statute, particularly Article 12.

What remains to be sorted out, in effect, is the question of whether ⎯ once the period allowed for

reaching an agreement through direct negotiation had elapsed ⎯ the Party wishing to carry out the

project was authorized to proceed without having to wait for the decision of the Court. What

interpretation should be given to Ar ticle12 in light of the rules of international law applicable to

relations between the Parties, as discussed in Article31, paragraph3, subparagraph (a), of the

Vienna Convention?

2CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 99.
29
RU, Vol. II, Ann. R14.
3Ibid. - 18 -

33. That is the point of contention which has perhaps been the point most extensively

debated by the two sides, as the Court can attest from the written pleadings and oral arguments.

Here, even more than elsewhere, it is appropriate that I limit myself to highlighting the key point in

dispute. For Uruguay, two sub-questions must be asked in order to reveal the appropriate response.

The first may be put this way: since the 1975 Statute, like any international treaty, creates a

jus speciale linking the Parties, which is in principle (subject to the norms of jus cogens)

appropriate for departing from the jus generale represented by the principles of general

international law, to what degree and under what c onditions is it justified to resort to general

international law to fill in lacunae in the treat y? The second sub-question is this: does general

international law contain a principle in regard to international watercourses which offers elements

that can be used to answer the question?

34. The first sub-question highlights an issue of methodology on which the jurisprudence of

the Court offers a wealth of information. Partic ularly apt to my mind is the 1989 Judgment by the

Chamber of the Court in the case of Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v.

29 Italy). The part that interests us is the passag e in which the Chamber addresses the question of

whether the rule of general international law re garding the exhaustion of local remedies could

apply to a case brought under a bilateral treaty giving the Court jurisdiction for the settlement of

disputes relating to the treatment given by one party to citizens of the other party, under a

dispute-resolution clause “categorical in its terms” and not making access to the Court subject to

any sort of condition. The Chamber’s finding is worth citing:

“The Chamber has no doubt that the parties to the treaty can therein either agree

that the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged breaches of that
treaty; or confirm that it shall apply. Yet the Chamber finds itself unable to accept
that an important principle of customary international law should be held to have been
tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do

so.” (Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 42, para. 50.)”

35. The principle highlighted by the Court seems very relevant to this case. Indeed, it is

clear that the Parties which negotiated the 1975St atute could freely have agreed that “important”

principles of general international law governing this question would not apply to cases covered by

the Statute. But ⎯ to borrow the words of the Chamber ⎯ it could not be accepted that these - 19 -

principles should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with by the Statute without such an

intention having explicitly been stated. In the Statute, no such intention that they be dispensed with

is stated in “any words” or by any other means. It follows, then, that it is perfectly legitimate to

resort to general international law to interpret the Statute in order to resolve the question of

whether, when the matter is submitted to the C ourt on the basis of Article 12 following the failure

of direct negotiations, the Party concerned may immediately build and commission the planned

project, or must wait for the favourable decision of the Court before doing so.

36. What of the principles of international law? Do they offer useful considerations for

answering this question? This is the second of th e two sub-questions I mentioned. The answer is

not difficult to determine, for the very simple re ason that there is actually no real disagreement

between the Parties on this subject. From their pleadings and oral arguments it is clear that

ultimately both Parties see the gr eat principles set forth in the 1997 Convention on the Law of the

Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses as faithfully codifying the principles of

30 international general law in this area. It is rema rkable that this substantial agreement between the

two sides is not rejected by Argentina, even on pr inciple, by reason of Article 17, paragraph3, or

Article 19 of the 1997 Convention, which provide that once the reasonable period of time allowed

for consultations and negotiations between the Parties regarding the project’s environmental

compatibility has elapsed, the interested party may proceed to implement its project even if no

agreement has been reached (provided that certa in time-frames and conditions are complied with),

and without its decision being subject to the comp letion of dispute-settlement procedures. To be

sure, Argentina is careful not to proclaim that loudly. Nevertheless, however much one reads and

rereads its pleadings and listens to its coun sel, nowhere do we find Argentina challenging the

notion that this principle enshrined in the Convention (and confirmed in the 2001 draft principles of

the International Law Commission on the allocatio n of loss in the case of transboundary harm

arising out of hazardous activities) is also a principle of general international law. The only thing

that Argentina contests, and relentlessly so, is the use of this principle in interpreting the

1975 Statute; that is all.

37. Why should such an unquestionably important principle of general international law not

be applicable for appropriately interpreting a provi sion of the Statute in which there is a lacuna, - 20 -

such as Article12, despite the fact that the principle in question is not dispensed with in “any

words” in the Statute? For Argentina, the reason is that it would be fundamentally incompatible

with the agreed régime established by the Stat ute. But why would it be incompatible? If one

examines in depth the reasoning put forward by the Applicant to demonstrate this alleged

incompatibility, one finds that in the end ev erything comes down to a single argument which

Argentina propounds by underscoring the “major di fference” between Article 12 of the Statute and

the principles set forth in the 1997Convention (whi ch, as we have seen, reflect those of general

international law). This “major difference” is th at the Statute “establishes compulsory machinery

which guarantees that the situation will be resolv ed”, whereas the 1997 Convention (following the

example of general international law, I might add) leaves

“the possibility of an impasse entirely open, the result of which would be that the
Party wishing to carry out an operation wh ich, objectively, caused no significant
damage to the other State, would not be able to do so because, in those systems, there
31 is nothing to guarantee that the stalemate could be overcome” . 31

(I would mention in passing that I have corrected a few minor typographical errors in the original

passage quoted from the Applicant’s Reply.)

38. Members of the Court, the “major di fference” between the 1975Statute and general

international law for our purposes is unquestionable: only the Statute, and not general international

law, establishes an obligatory judicial dispute- settlement mechanism which can be initiated by

either Party and which leads to a binding decision on whether or not the project is in accordance

with the applicable rules. But what Argentin a does not explain is why the presence of such a

mechanism in the Statute should favour the position of the Party opposed to a project rather than

the position of the Party wishing to carry it out in a situation such as this where the project is vital

for the country’s sustainable development and the Party wishing to carry it out is convinced that

objectively the project will do no significant harm to the first Party, to borrow the vocabulary used

by our opponents. On the contrary, one can very well see the presence of the obligatory

dispute-resolution mechanism in the Statute as a c onsistent complement to a system which permits

the Party concerned to carry out the project if the period reserved for consultations and negotiations

ends without an agreement being reached, whilst ne vertheless refusing that Party the advantage of

31
RA, p. 128, para. 1.151, and CR 2009/13, p. 70, para. 19 (Sands). - 21 -

being the sole judge as to whether it is within its rights. In effect, the Party opposing the project,

while not being able to prevent its going ahead fo llowing the failure of direct negotiations, enjoys

under the Statute a very important guarantee for its interests, which the principles of general

international law do not grant it: the Statute gives the Party opposing the project the right to obtain

a judgment from this Court which is binding and determines whether the Party carrying out the

project has acted legally or not, and decides what consequences ther e ought to be, if applicable, in

terms of reparation, restitutio in integrum and so forth. Moreover, the Party opposing the project

also has the possibility of asking the Cour t to indicate urgent provisional measures ⎯ which are

also obligatory ⎯ stopping the construction and commissioning of the disputed project if that Party

can demonstrate that the project in question risks doing irreparable harm such that it is inadvisable

to wait for the final decision of the Court. It is thus a solution that fits perfectly with the major

32 principles of international environmental law, a solu tion which, in particular, is in accordance with

the fundamental principles of the permanent sove reignty of States in regard to their natural

resources and sustainable development, but nevertheless a solution which finds an equitable middle

ground amongst the interests at stake whilst safeguarding all such interests adequately but not

sacrificing any.

39. In short, it is clear that contemporary general international law contains a principle,

which is codified both by the 1997 United Nations Convention and by the ILC’s 2001 draft articles,

according to which, once the period reserved for consultations and negotiations between the Parties

regarding the environmental compatibility of the project has elapsed, the Party wishing to carry out

the project may decide to go ahead with it even if no agreement has been reached, without its

decision having to wait until dispute-settlement pr ocedures have reached their conclusion. Not

only has this principle not been dispensed with by the Statute of the River Uruguay either in “any

words” or by any other means, but moreover it is not in any way contrary to the provisions of the

Statute and is in fact fully consistent with the Statute’s objects and aims. It follows that Article 12

of the Statute must be interpreted, and its lacunae resolved, in accordance with this principle and in

light of it. - 22 -

VII. C ONCLUSION

40. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my pleading ends here, and I hope I have helped

convince you that Uruguay did not breach its procedural obligations under Articles7 to 12 of the

Statute. I shall now leave Mr.Reichler to presen t the Respondent’s conclusions in regard to the

role of this Court in settling this dispute, and I would ask you, Mr. President, to give him the floor.

The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, ProfessorCondorelli. And I shall

give the floor to Mr. Reichler.

33 M. REICHLER :

LA MANIERE DONT IL CONVIENT DE TRAITER LES ELEMENTS
DE PREUVE PRODUITS PAR DES EXPERTS

1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, c’est un honneur que de me présenter de

nouveau devant vous. J’aborderai aujourd’hui un sujet qui semble revêtir une pertinence

particulière aux fins de la présente instance,à savoir la manière dont il convient de traiter les

éléments de preuve invoqués par les Parties qui ont été produits par des experts.

2. De très nombreux documents de ce type ont été présentés à la Cour, extrêmement

techniques pour la plupart. Comme il fallait s’y a ttendre, ils se contredisent en tous points, ou

presque. Les rapports d’experts présentés par l’Uru guay concluent que l’usine Botnia respecte les

normes internationales les plus strictes et ne cau se aucun dommage au fleuve Uruguay, à la qualité

de ses eaux, à ses organismes aquatiques ou à son écosystème dans son ensemble. Les rapports

d’experts présentés par l’Argentine, quant à eux, affirment le contraire. Dès lors, comment la Cour

peut-elle décider lesquels de ces éléments sont les plus crédibles et quel poids il convient de leur

accorder ?

3. Permettez-moi de suggérer respectueusement qu’il serait bon de commencer par distinguer

les uns des autres les différents experts dont les rapports, déclarations et exposés devant la Cour

figurent au dossier de l’affaire. La première distinction qu’il convient d’établir — et la plus

importante — consiste peut-être à faire la différe nce entre les experts indépendants et ceux qui ne

le sont pas. Toutes choses égales par ailleurs, les premiers devraient normalement se voir accorder

un crédit supérieur, et leurs rapports, davantagede poids. Voilà qui m’amène directement aux - 23 -

32
questions qui ont été posées mardi aux Parties par M.le juge Bennouna . Celui-ci a posé deux

questions. Si la Cour le permet, je commencerai par donner la réponse de l’Uruguay à la seconde.

4. Le juge Bennouna a demandé : «dans le contexte de l’affaire dont la Cour est saisie, est-ce

qu’un expert mandaté par l’une ou l’autre des Parties peut être qualifié d’expert indépendant ?» La

réponse de l’Uruguay est «non». Catégoriquement non. Selon l’Uruguay, un expert mandaté ou

engagé par l’une des Parties n’est pas, par défi nition, indépendant. Pa r conséquent, un rapport

établi par un expert engagé aux fins de la présente instance, et qui a été versé au dossier, n’est pas

un rapport indépendant. Les déclarations des e xperts engagés par une Partie pour exercer les

fonctions de conseil ou d’avocat ne peuve nt pas non plus être considérées comme étant

indépendantes. Telle est la position de l’Uruguay depuis le début de la présente instance.

34 L’Uruguay a toujours veillé à ne pas qualifier d’«indépendants» les rapports, déclarations ou

exposés des experts engagés par lui. Ils ne le s ont pas. L’Argentine a, en revanche, toujours

qualifié d’«indépendants» les rappor ts présentés par les experts qu’ elle a engagés. Selon

l’Uruguay, c’est un non-sens. Un expert engagé par une partie ne peut être indépendant.

5. L’autre question posée par M.le jugeBe nnouna était la suivante: «[q]u’est-ce que les

Parties entendent par un «expert indépendant» auque l elles ont pu avoir recours» ? Cette question

appelle une réponse plus longue, sachant que les Par ties divergent sur ce point. Dans ses écritures,

l’Argentine qualifie d’«indépendants» les experts qu’elle a engagés aux fins de la présente instance

et leurs différents rapports. Il s’agit de Latinoconsult 33, de MM.Rabinovich et Tournier 34, de

35 36
MM.Wheater et McIntyre , du «groupe d’étude indépendant argentin sur l’environnement» ,

ainsi que de leurs rapports. Dans son mémoire, l’Argentine a qualifié ces documents de «rapports

32CR 2009/17, p. 59 (Bennouna).

33Latinoconsult S.A., Evaluation de l’impact sur l’environnement fluvial de l’usine de pâte à papier que Botnia
envisage de construire dans la baie de Fray Bentos sur le fleuve Urugua y en Uruguay, 20novembre2006, MA, vol.V,
annexe 3.

34J. Rabinovich et L. Tournier, Rapport scientifique présenté au ministère argentin des affaires étrangères assorti
de réponses au contre-mémoire de l’Uruguay concernant les aspects environnementaux de l’usine de pâte à papier Botnia,
près de Fray Bentos, en Uruguay, rapport non daté, RA, vol. III, annexe 43.

35H. Wheather et N. McIntyre, Examen de l’étude d’impact cumulé finale de la SFI concernant l’usine de pâte à
papier Botnia en Uruguay, 4 décembre 2006, MA, vol. V, annexe 5; H. Wheater et N. McIntyre, Observations techniques
sur le contre-mémoire de l’Uruguay en ce qui concerne les usines de pâte à papi er sur le fleuve Uruguay, rapport non
daté, RA, vol. III, annexe 44.

36MA, par. 7.5. - 24 -

37
indépendants présentés par l’Argentine» . Dans sa réplique, elle a de nouveau qualifié les experts

qu’elle a engagés d’«indépendants» 38. Dans cette pièce, l’Argentine a par ailleurs évoqué le

«réexamen technique» effectué en son nom par «des experts indépendants engagés par

39
l’Argentine» , par des experts indépendants engagés par l’Argentine. Toujours dans la réplique, il

est indiqué que «[l]e second rapport Wheater est un rapport indépendant [en] lequel l’Argentine a

toute confiance», et qu’il a été «établi à la re quête de l’Argentine aux fins d’une évaluation

40
indépendante» , qu’il a été établi à la requête de l’Argentine aux fins d’une évaluation

indépendante.

41 42
35 6. Ainsi que l’Uruguay l’a fait observer dans son contre-mémoire et dans sa duplique ,

aucun de ces experts et aucun de ces rapports ne peut être qualifié d’«indépendant». Le rapport

scientifique et technique établi par M.Colombo et daté du 30juin2009 n’est, lui non plus,

nullement indépendant. Le fait que M.Colombo et son équipe aient été engagés par le ministère

argentin des affaires étrangères à la seule fin de produire des éléments en vue de la présente espèce

n’est pas contesté. De même, les déclarations que M. Colombo a faites devant la Cour la semaine

dernière ne sont pas indépendantes. Tout comme M.Wheater, M. Colombo est ici en tant que

membre de la délégation de l’Argentine. Lorsqu’ils se sont adressés à la Cour, MM. Colombo et

Wheater l’ont fait en tant qu’avocats, et non en tant qu’experts indépendants.

7. Certes, l’Uruguay a, lui aussi, engagé des experts pour établir des rapports techniques aux

seules fins de la présente instance. La différence est qu’il n’a pas cherché à qualifier ces experts —

ni leurs rapports — d’indépendants. Parmi les expe rts et auteurs de rapports d’experts engagés par

37
MA, par. 5.52.
38Voir RA, par. 3.7.

39Ibid..
40
RA, par. 3.12.
41
CMU, par. 5.7 (dans son contre-mémoire, l’Uruguay précise que
«l’Argentine a chargé plusieurs «experts» d’établir des rapports aux seules fins de la présente instance.

Les auteurs de ces rapports ne sont pas indépendants ; ils sont payés pa r l’Argentine et agissent pour son
compte. Or, la jurisprudence de la Cour est claire sur la nécessité d’ accorder moins de poids à de tels
rapports… Le scepticisme de la Cour est particulièrement de mise dans le cas des rapports fournis par
l’Argentine en l’espèce…»).
42
DU, par.6.9 («[L]es auteurs du rapport de l’Argentine ne sont, dans aucun sens du terme, «indépendants».
D’ailleurs, le fait que l’Argentine n’ait curieusement fourni aucun curriculum vitae et aucune information les concernant
s’explique sans doute par le fait que ces «experts» sont en réalité des employés de l’Argentine.»). - 25 -

43 44 45 46
l’Uruguay figurent MM . enzie , MMD . eardorff et Pryke , MS.heate , MB. ooth ,

MM. Swanson et Yassuda 47, ainsi que la société Exponent 48. Quant à M.McCubbin, qui s’est

exprimé mardi en tant qu’avocat et membre de la délégation de l’Uruguay (CR2009/17), il a été

engagé par l’Uruguay en août2009, c’est-à-dire le mois dernier. L’Uruguay ne prétend pas que

l’un quelconque de ces experts soit indépendant.

8. La Cour ne considère pas que les éléments de preuve émanant d’experts engagés par les

parties à une affaire sont irrecevables. Selon leur qualité, ces éléments peuvent en effet l’aider, et

elle peut leur accorder un poids considérable. Lo rsqu’elle les apprécie, elle ne manque cependant

36 pas de garder à l’esprit qu’ils ont été établis a ux fins d’étayer la thèse d’une partie, ce qui impose

de les traiter avec prudence. Ainsi qu’elle l’a précisé dans l’affaire des Activités armées sur le

territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda), et rappelé dans l’affaire du

Génocide, «[l]a Cour traitera avec prudence les éléments de preuve spécialement établis aux fins de

l’affaire» (Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide

(Bosnie-Herzégovine c.Serbie et M onténégro), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2007 , p. 130, par. 213 ;

Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c.Ouganda),

arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2005 , p. 201, par. 61). Selon un éminent auteur, «[ l]es liens qu’un expert

entretient avec une partie peuve nt avoir une incidence sur le poids qu’il convient d’accorder aux

éléments de preuve en question ; ils sont cependant sans incidence sur leur recevabilité» 49

[traduction du Greffe] (les références figureront bien ente ndu dans les notes de bas de page du

43
C.A.Menzie (Exponent, Inc.), Evaluation de l’étude d’ impact cumulé finale concernant l’usine de pâte à
papier Kraft blanchie de Botnia S.A. (FrayBentos, Uruguay) sous l’angle des impacts sur la qualité de l’eau et des
ressources aquatiques et sous l’angle des commentaires et questions formulés par le Gouvernement argentin, juillet 2007,
CMU, vol. X, annexe 213.
44
T. L. Deardorff et D.C. Pryke (Exponent, Inc.), Techniqu es disponibles et meilleures pratiques en matière de
gestion de l’environnement pour l’usine de pâte kraft blanchie de Botnia S. A., Fray Bentos, Uruguay, 8juillet2007,
CMU, vol. X, annexe 215.
45
W.Sheate (Collingwood Environmental Planning), Commentaires sur le pro cessus d’évaluation d’impact sur
l’environnement, juin 2007, CMU, vol. X, annexe 216.
46
P. Booth (Exponent, Inc.), Caractère suffisant des informations de l’évaluation d’impact sur l’environnement et
du GTAN pour la détermination des impacts sur l’environnement ⎯Botnia, S.A., Fray Bentos Uruguay, juin2007,
CMU, vol. X, annexe 217.

47 J. C. Swanson et E. A. Yassuda (Applied Science Associates, Inc.), Analyse hydrologique de l’usine de
cellulose envisagée par Botnia sur le fleuve Uruguay, juin 2007, CMU, vol. X, annexe 214.

48Exponent, Inc., Réponse à la rép lique du Gouvernement argentin ⎯Technologie de conception de
l’installation et aspects environnementaux de l’usine de pâte à papier d’OrionFrayBentos sur le fleuve Uruguay en
Uruguay, juillet 2008, DU, vol. IV, annexe 83.

49A. Zimmermannn et al., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, p. 120. - 26 -

CR). Sir Arthur Watts a formulé une observation inté ressante au sujet d’une situation qui nous est

devenue familière depuis deux semaines en la présente instance. Il s’est intéressé au

«choix qui doit être fait par la partie souha itant recourir à des opinions d’experts.

Doit-elle appeler ces experts à la barre en tant que témoins, les soumettant ainsi à un
contre-interrogatoire mené par l’autre partie, ou doit-elle les inclure dans son équipe
juridique, en tant qu’avocats ou conseils, auquel cas ils ne sont pas soumis à un
contre-interrogatoire mais sont naturellem ent, quel que soit leur renom, considérés

comme étant clairement partisans. [Et la citation se poursuit] Du point de vue de la 50
tactique de plaidoirie, il s’agit là pour les Etats d’un équilibre difficile à trouver.»
[Traduction du Greffe.]

9. «Du point de vue de la tactique de plai doirie.» Monsieur le président, sirArthur ne

pouvait pas mieux résumer la question. La tactique de l’Argentine est claire. Elle a choisi de ne

pas exposer MM.Colombo et Weather —car, ne nous y trompons pas, ce sont bel et bien des

dépositions qu’ils ont faites —à un contre-inte rrogatoire des conseils de l’Uruguay et aux

questions de la Cour et ce, en habillant les inté ressés d’une robe d’avo cat. Ce nonobstant, alors

même qu’il est privé de la faculté de mener un contre-interrogatoire, l’Uruguay a le sentiment

d’avoir démontré qu’il n’était pas opportun que la Cour se fonde sur un quelconque élément

produit par MM. Colombo ou Weather.

10. Fort heureusement, la Cour a d’autres solutions que de s’appuyer sur les rapports,

déclarations, dépositions et exposés présentés par les experts mandatés par les Parties. Elle peut en

37
effet choisir de se fonder sur les déclarations et opinions d’experts publiées par une organisation

internationale compétente, ainsi que sur les rapports d’experts établis par les consultants

indépendants engagés par cette or ganisation aux fins d’apprécier et d’évaluer la performance

environnementale de l’usine Botnia. L’organisatio n internationale en question n’est autre que la

Société financière internationale, ou SFI, l’une des institutions du groupe de la Banque mondiale.

Il s’agit de la principale institution multilatérale qui finance des projets du secteur privé dans les

pays en développement. Son indépendance par rapport aux Parties est incontestable. Son expertise

en matière d’évaluation du risque environnemental et de surveillance de la performance

environnementale ne peut pas non plus être mise en doute. De surcroît, personne ne saurait

50
Sir Arthur Watts, Burden of Proof, and Evidence before the ICF , in Friedl Weiss, Improving WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals, p. 299. - 27 -

aujourd’hui, en ce début du XXI esiècle, contester sérieusement son engagement en faveur de la

51
«durabilité sociale et environnementale» , pour reprendre ses propres termes.

11. La Cour connaît bien désormais les conc lusions solidement documentées que la SFI a

formulées au sujet de l’usine Botnia. Mes collègues, MM.Boyle et McCaffrey, les ont rappelées

devant vous. Selon l’Uruguay, troi s raisons devraient conduire la C our à accorder une très grande

importance aux conclusions de la SFI et de ses experts consultants.

Monsieur le président, je sais que l’heur e habituelle de la pause approche; me

permettez-vous tout de même de poursuivre encore quelques minutes ?

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de préside nt : Oui, je pense qu’il est préférable que

vous poursuiviez et terminiez votre exposé.

M. REICHLER : Je vous remercie.

12. Comme je l’ai dit, il y a trois raisons po ur lesquelles la Cour devrait accorder le plus

grand crédit aux conclusions de la SFI et de ses co nsultants experts. Premièrement, elle a accordé

un traitement similaire aux éléments de preuve, en particulier ceux d’ordre technique, recueillis par

des enquêteurs indépendants et désintéressés ou par des organisations internationales, telles que la

SFI. Ensuite, la SFI a apprécié les faits à l’aune de ses propres normes environnementales, qui sont

très rigoureuses et directement liées à la question ce ntrale en l’espèce, à savoir: l’usine Botnia

causera-t-elle un préjudice sensible au fleuve Urugua y et à son milieu aquatique ? Troisièmement,

la SFI a mené un examen particulièrement approfondi en effectuant des évaluations à de multiples

38 niveaux et en consultant des experts triés sur le volet et particulièrement pointus sur les questions à

l’examen. Je vais analyser successivement chacune de ces trois raisons.

13. Prenons la première raison d’accorder un poi ds spécial aux conclusions de la SFI. Dans

l’affaire République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda, la Cour a fait observer que les «éléments

de preuve obtenus» par des personnes indépendantes «rompu[e]s à l’examen et à l’appréciation de

grandes quantités d’informations factuelles, parfois de nature technique» méri taient «une attention

51
Voir CMU, par. 5.8-5.9. - 28 -

52
particulière [je dis bien, une attention particulière]» ( op. cit., p.201, par.61) . Dans l’affaire du

Génocide, la Cour a conclu que le rapport du Secrét aire général de l’Organisation des Nations

Unies intitulé «La chute de Srebrenica» devait se voir conférer «une autorité considérable» en

raison du «soin avec lequel [il] a[vait] été établi, [de] la diversité de ses sources et [de]

l’indépendance des personnes chargées de son élaboration» (op. cit., p. 135-137, par. 228-230). Et

la Cour d’indiquer, dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre

celui-ci, que les «dépositions…de témoins désintéressés ⎯qui ne sont pas parties au litige et

n’ont rien à y gagner ni à y perdre» sont «considérées comme ayant a priori une valeur probatoire

élevée», par rapport à celles qui sont préparées pour le compte d’une partie ( Activités militaires et

paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-c i (Nicaragua c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique) , fond, arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 43, par. 69). L’Uruguay considère que l’aval donné par la SFI au projet de

Botnia et la performance environnementale de l’ usine constituent précisément le type d’élément de

preuve auquel une importance considérable doit être accordée.

14. Venons-en à la deuxième raison d’accorder du poids aux rapports de la SFI et de ses

experts: si ses conclusions sont spécialement per tinentes à l’égard des questions de fond dont la

Cour est saisie, c’est parce que la SFI a constaté que l’usine respectait ses normes, qui sont très

strictes en matière d’environnement. La SFI a pour politique de traiter les craintes pour

l’environnement avec le plus grand sérieux 53. Ses activités de financement doivent être menées

52 Le rapport concerné dans cette affaire-là était cui de la commission Porter, qui a entendu des personnes
impliquées dans les actes opposant les parties.

53 Les instituts financiers multilatéraux tels que la SFI et l’Agence multilatérale de garantie des investissements
(AMGI) sont tenus, en droit inte rnational général, de faire en sorte que urs activités protègent l’environnement de
manière adéquate. Pour reprendre les termes d’un comme ntateur, les «banques de développement multilatérales»

jouissent «d’une personnalité internati onale suffisante pour être subordonnées àcertains devoirs dictés par le droit
international, y compris des devoirs nés par l’effet des règles générales et partieulièresdroit international relatif à
l’environnement», Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2 éd., Cambridge University Press,
2003, p. 1024-1025 [traduction du Greffe]. Par suite, «[l]es banques de développement multilatérales ont l’obligation de
se conformer aux principes généraux du dro it international qui se rapportent à la protection de l’environnement, et tout
manquement en la matière est susceptible d’engager leur responsabilité internationale, ainsi que leur responsabilité pour
les dommages pouvant être causés», ibid., [traduction du Greffe]. - 29 -

54
39 «de manière «non préjudiciable» aux populations ou à l’environnement» . Ainsi, la SFI a pour

principe de refuser de financer de «nouvelles activités commerciales non susceptibles de respecter»

l’ensemble de ses normes en matière de performance environnementale 55, et quiconque lui soumet

un projet doit produire une «évaluation» rigoureu se des «risques et impacts … environnementaux»

et mettre en Œuvre des «mesures pour satisfair e aux exigences» de ses normes de résultats 56. La

SFI examine ensuite l’évaluation de l’emprunteur, l’aide à élaborer des «mesures destinées à éviter,

réduire, atténuer ou indemniser les impact s…environnementaux», et surveille sa

«performance…environnementale…pendant toute la durée de l’investissement» 57. Les normes

de résultats que je viens d’évoquer visent l’évaluation et la gestion environnementales, la

prévention et la réduction de la pollution, la santé et la sécurité des communautés, la biodiversité et

la gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Les normes de la SFI prévoient également l’examen

des obligations découlant du droit international de l’environnement. En d’autres termes, elles

couvrent des aspects qui occupent une place centrale dans le règlement des questions de fond qui

nous réunissent ici.

15. Passons maintenant à la troisième raison de respecter les conclusions de la SFI: ces

conclusions sont toutes étayées par l’évaluation dé taillée de consultants techniques indépendants.

La Cour a déjà entendu le nom de ces consultants: il s’agit du cab inet Hatfield, de l’AMEC et

d’EcoMetrix, le bureau canadien qui a établi l’étude d’impact cumulé finale, ainsi que des rapports

de suivi rendant compte des résultats concrets de l’usine. L’Argentine a souvent qualifié les

58
experts du cabinet Hatfield d’«indépendants» et, dans son mémoire, elle s’est très souvent

54Société financière internationale (ci-après la «SFI»), Politique en matière de durabilité sociale et

environnementale, par. (3a0il006), dont le texte peut être consulté à l’adresse suivant:e
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_Soc…
lityPolicy_French.pdf (dernière visite le 24septembre2009). La SFI se disti ngue depuis longtemps par l’action qu’elle
mène en faveur du développement durable en ne participant qu’à des projets dans lesquels elle ne décèle aucune atteinte à
l’environnement. Même avant l’adoption de son actuelle Politique en matière de durabilité sociale et environnementale,
les politiques de la SFI en la matière figuraient dans ses Politiques opérationnelles relatives à l’évaluation
environnementale, et notamment dans la politique opérationnell e 4.01, qui codifiait l’évalua tion environnementale, et la
politique opérationnelle 7.50, qui codifiait les projets sur les cours d’eau internationaux. Aujourd’hui remplacées par la

Politique en matière de durabilité sociale et environnementale, ces politiques opérationnelles imposaient des conditions
strictes dans le domaine de l’éval uation des impacts possibles sur l’envi ronnement, y compris ceux de nature
transfrontière.
55
Ibid., par. 17.
56Ibid., par. 10.

57Ibid., par. 11.

58MA, par. 5.58, 7.1. - 30 -

59
réclamée de leurs travaux, pas moins de 13fois . La SFI a présenté l’AMEC comme un

«consultan[t] extern [e] indépendan[t]» 60. Elle a indiqué qu’EcoMetrix avait été choisi parmi

d’autres «bureaux de consultants indépendants qui n’avaient jamais eu auparavant de relations

61
40 avec» Botnia . La SFI a sélectionné EcoMetrix au sein d’un «grand groupe de consultants» en

raison de son «expérience et de ses compétences éprouvées dans l’évaluation de l’impact sur

62
l’environnement des projets de fabr ication de pâte et de papier» . Les travaux accomplis par ces

experts constituent un gage du fait que, pour parvenir à ses constatations et conclusions, la SFI s’est

systématiquement fondée sur un examen technique approfondi et impartial.

16. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, MM.Boyle et McCaffrey vous ont déjà

exposé les conclusions des experts que la SFI a elle-même qualifiés d’«indépendants», mais, si

vous me le permettez, à l’approche de la clôture du premier tour de plaidoiries de l’Uruguay, je

vais les résumer très brièvement. En octobre 2006, une fois l’étude d’impact cumulé achevée par

EcoMetrix et revisée par Hatfield, la SFI a déclaré que le projet de Botnia «sera[it] source

63
d’avantages économiques importants pour l’Uruguay», «sans nuire à l’environnement» .

17. Comme condition au financement, la SFI a exigé de Botnia qu’elle «[engage] des

consultants acceptables par [elle] pour [p]rocéd er à un suivi indépendant de la performance

environnementale et de la sécurité de l’usine ains i que de son impact sanitaire et social sur les

populations» 64. Botnia s’est exécutée et, le 13novembre2007, la SFI a publié deux rapports,

préparés par ses fameux «consultants externes indépendants», qu’elle avait chargés d’examiner les

65
derniers préparatifs réalisés dans l’usine avant sa mise en service . Ces rapports, l’un d’EcoMetrix

et l’autre de l’AMEC, indiquaient que Botnia était en passe de répondre à toutes les attentes. Telle

59
MA, par. 4.78, 5.17, 5.34, 5.39, 5.58, 5.59, 5.71, 7.5, 7.7, 7.42, 7.96, 7.107, 7.108.
60DU, vol. III, annexe R80.

61Site Internet de la SFI, Amérique latine et Caraïbes, «Usine de pâte à papier Orion, en Uruguay», DU, vol. III,
annexe R80.

62Le cabinet EcoMetrix a été choisi pour reviser l’étude d’impact cumulé des usines de pâte à papier en Uruguay,
juillet 2006, disponible à l’adresse http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/lac.nsf/Content/Uruguay_PulpMills_Ecometrix_B…
(dernière visite le 24 septembre 2009).

63Société financière internationale, communiqué de presse intitulé «Les conseils d’administration de la SFI et de
l’AMGI approuvent le projet d’usine de pâte à papier Ori on en Uruguay: 2500 emplois à la clé, aucune nuisance pour
l’environnement», p. 1, 21 novembre 2006, CMU, vol. IX, annexe 206.

64Voir DU, vol. III, annexe R50, p. 10.1-10.16.
65
Site Internet de la SFI, Amérique latine et Caraïbes, «Usine de pâte à papier Orion, en Uruguay», DU, vol. III,
annexe R80. - 31 -

a aussi été la conclusion de la SFI elle-même qui , lors de la publication des rapports, a déclaré y

voir la preuve «qu[e] l’usine de pâte à papier Orion de Botnia, en Uruguay, [était] prête à

fonctionner en conformité avec les exigences environnementales et sociales de la SFI et les

normes…MTD (meilleures technologies dis ponibles) à l’échelle internationale» 66. La SFI a

conclu que ces rapports «confirm[ai]ent que l’us ine Orion produira[it] d’importantes retombées

économiques pour l’Uruguay et ne nuira[it] pas à l’environnement» 6.

41 18. La SFI a chargé les mêmes experts indépendants de continuer à assurer un suivi

permanent de la performance de l’usine. Le 10 juillet 2008, la SFI — je dis bien, la SFI — a publié

un rapport d’EcoMetrix évaluant la performance environnementale de l’usine Botnia durant son

68
premier semestre d’exploitation . Voici ce qu’EcoMetrix concluait dans ce rapport :

«tout indique qu[e]…l’activité de l’usin e satisfait aux normes environnementales
strictes prévues dans l’évaluation d’impact sur l’environnement et l’étude d’impact
cumulé, ainsi qu’aux normes de l’Uruguay et de la SFI. Ces résultats correspondent
69
par ailleurs aux mesures effectuées pour d’autres usines modernes» .

19. Vous le savez, EcoMetrix a établi un au tre rapport, qui couvre toute l’année 2008. Ce

rapport contient des conclusions tout aussi tranchées. Ainsi qu’indiqué publiquement par la SFI en

mars 2009, à propos du bilan de l’usine pour toute l’année 2008 :

«la performance de l’usine est conforme a ux normes de qualité de l’air et de l’eau
figurant dans l’étude d’impact cumulé et dans l’évaluation d’impact sur

l’environnement, comme l’exigeait la SFI, et respecte amplement les limites prescrites
par les permis environnementaux déliv rés par l’instance de réglementation
uruguayenne, la DINAMA» . 70

20. Bien entendu, c’est à la Cour qu’il appartient de déterminer lesquels des éléments soumis

par les Parties «revêtent une valeur probante à l’ égard des faits allégués», et c’est à elle de «se

prononce[r]…sur le poids, la fi abilité et la valeur qu’elle juge devoir leur être reconnus» (pour

citer l’arrêt en l’affaire République démocratique du Congo c.Ouganda , op. cit., p.200,

66Ibid.
67
Ibid. (les italiques sont de nous).
68
DU, vol. IV, annexe R98, p. ES.i.
69Ibid., p. ES.ii.

70Société financière internationale, «Usine de pâte à papier Orion, en Uruguay», disponible à l’adresse
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/lac.nsf/Content/Uruguay_Pulp_Mills (dernière visite le 24 septembre 2009). - 32 -

par. 58-59) . Dans la présente affaire, la Cour ne dispose pas uniquement de l’appréciation des

faits livrée par les Parties elles-mêmes. Elle bénéficie également d’évaluations techniques très

poussées émanant de la SFI et de ses consultants—considérés par celle-ci comme des experts

véritablement indépendants et impa rtiaux — qui ont conclu sans réserve que l’usine satisfaisait en

tous points aux normes internationales les plus strictes et qu’elle n’avait aucune incidence sur

l’environnement: aucune incidence sur le fle uve Uruguay ni sur la qualité de ses eaux, aucune

incidence sur la santé des organismes aquati ques et des poissons, et aucune incidence sur

l’écosystème.

21. Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de revenir à présent sur la question du

jugeBennouna pour boucler la boucle. L’Uru guay considère que, parmi les nombreux rapports

d’experts dont dispose la Cour, seule une catégorie de rapports méritent, en fait, le qualificatif

42 d’indépendants. Il s’agit des rapports établis pa r la SFI et sous sa direction. Partant, et

conformément à sa jurisprudence, c’est aux rapports de ces experts-là que la Cour devra attacher la

plus grande valeur lorsqu’elle examinera les aspects factuels des questions environnementales

relevant du fond de la présente affaire.

22. Monsieur le président, le prochain orateur de l’Uruguay, et le dernier à intervenir lors de

ce tour, sera mon collègue M. Condorelli, qui tra itera ce qui constitue pour l’Uruguay une question

purement théorique, à savoir celle de la réparation demandée par l’Argentine. Avec tout le respect

dû à l’Argentine, l’Uruguay soutient qu’elle n’a apporté aucune preuve—ni même le

commencement d’une preuve — à l’appui de son prétendu droit à réparation, puisqu’elle n’est pas

parvenue à établir que l’Uruguay avait violé l’ une quelconque des obligations lui incombant en

vertu du statut de 1975. M.Condorelli répondra néanmoins à la présentation que notre ami

commun M. Pellet a faite sur cette question.

23. Monsieur le président, un seul remède s’impose dans les circonstances de la présente

affaire. C’est celui que l’Uruguay a demandé dans les conclusions de sa duplique, en priant la

Cour de lui reconnaître le «droit de continuer à exploiter l’usine Botnia conformément aux

71
Voir également l’arrêt rendu en l’affaire du Génocide, op.cit., par.212 («La Cour doit déterminer elle-même
les faits qui sont pertinents au regard des règles de droit que, selon le demandeur, le défendeur aurait transgressées»). - 33 -

72
dispositions du statut de 1975» . L’Uruguay a exposé les fondements de sa demande dans la

duplique 73, de sorte que je n’ai pas à les répéter tous ici. Je me bornerai à appeler

respectueusement l’attention de la Cour sur un point essentiel, à savoir qu’une occasion unique

s’offre à elle d’apporter une contribution très précieuse au règlement pacifique des différends,

d’aider à clore toute cette affaire inutile et fâcheu se, et de favoriser un ret our rapide aux rapports

fraternels et harmonieux qu’ont toujours connus ces deux pays frères d’Amérique du Sud, en

publiant une déclaration qui énoncerait de la manière la plus claire possible les droits et obligations

respectifs des Parties.

24. La Cour n’est assurément pas sans savoir que, depuis plus de trois ans, des manifestants

argentins barrent quasiment sans arrêt la prin cipale voie de circulation entre l’Uruguay et

l’Argentine, sur le pont du General San Martín. Ces barrages ont infligé à l’Uruguay des pertes

économiques qui se chiffrent en centaines de millions de dollars. La sema ine dernière, M. Kohen

s’est inquiété à plusieurs reprises du taux de chômage à Fray Bentos 74. S’il en cherche la cause, je

lui conseille de se tourner vers les barrages. Les manifestants ont menacé de maintenir ces

43 barrages à l’avenir, au moins aussi longtemps que durera la présente affaire. Quant à savoir s’ils se

poursuivront par la suite, ou si on les laissera se poursuivre, cela dépendra peut-être de ce que la

Cour décidera et de ce qu’elle dira.

25. Ainsi que M. l’ambassadeur Gianelli l’a relevé dans son discours d’ouverture, l’absence

de mesures prises par l’Argentine pour rouvrir le pont à la circulation a déjà été déclarée contraire

au droit international par un tribunal arbitral du Mercosur 75. Cette inaction est d’autant plus

remarquable que, dans sa décision, le tribunal avait expressément mis en demeure l’Argentine

d’aligner son comportement sur le droit. Ainsi avait-il indiqué à l’unanimité :

«Fixer des règles non ambiguës que devront respecter les pays après qu’il aura

été statué dans cette procédure, règles qui ont fait défaut jusqu’ici parce que ces types
de circonstances ne sont pas régies au Mercosur, tracera clairement la frontière entre
ce qui est permis et ce qui ne l’est pas, de sorte que l’on puisse compter que ces types
76
de conflits ne se reproduiront plus.»

72 DU, conclusions.

73 DU, par. 7.30-7.40.
74
Voir, par exemple, le CR 2009/15, p. 63-64, par. 23-29 (Kohen).
75 CR 2009/16, p. 16, par. 29 (Gianelli).

76 CR 2009/16, note 1, sentence, par. 192. - 34 -

Les conflits se sont reproduits, et ils perdurent.

26. Compte tenu des faits pour le moins ex traordinaires dont nous débattons ici, qui

distinguent radicalement la présente affaire de celles dans lesquelles la Cour a pu envisager une

telle forme de réparation, l’Argentine n’ayant d’ailleurs jamais cherché à nier ces faits

extraordinaires, le risque de voir persister le conflit—sans parler d’une situation d’illicéité

manifeste —, même après la décision de la Cour sur le fond, est bien réel. Face à cette situation

sans précédent, l’Uruguay estime que la Cour ferait grandement avan cer la cause que nous

défendons tous dans ce prétoire, à savoir de mettre une fois pour toutes un point final au présent

différend, qui n’a que trop duré, et de faciliter le rétablissement des relations particulièrement

amicales entre l’Argentine et l’Uruguay—en affirmant expressément le droit invoqué par

l’Uruguay en l’espèce, à savoir celui d’exploiter l’usine Botnia conformément au statut de 1975 77.

Laisser subsister la moindre ambigüité sur cette question serait tout simplement par trop risqué.

27. Monsieur le président, ainsi s’achève mon exposé de la matinée. Je vous remercie

encore infiniment de la courtoisie et de la pa tience avec laquelle vous m’avez écouté. Je vous prie

de rappeler M. Condorelli à la barre, peut-être après la pause.

44 Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de prési dent : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Reichler.

Effectivement, après avoir plaidé pendant soix ante-sept minutes ce matin, M.Condorelli mérite

une pause et un café, de même que les membres de la Cour. L’audience est suspendue pendant

quinze minutes.

L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 40 à 11 h 55.

The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and

you again have the floor, Professor Condorelli.

COrN. DORELLI:

77
Ordonnance rendue le 23 janvier 2007 dans la présente affaire, par. 29. - 35 -

THE REMEDIES REQUESTED BY A RGENTINA :
WHY THE C OURT SHOULD REJECT THEM

I. NTRODUCTION

1. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr . President, Members of the Court, the purpose

of this oral argument is to examine what the consequences should be of the internationally

wrongful acts which Uruguay allegedly committed in breach of the obligations laid down by the

1975Statute, thereby incurring its international r esponsibility with respect to Argentina. It goes

without saying that, as Uruguay has already several times demonstrated to you, it has not breached

any of its obligations, my comments to you now are purely subsidiary ⎯ or academic as we have

been told ⎯ it is fine for a professor to make academ ic comments: in other words, the Court

should take them into account only in the unlikely event that it should become convinced that

Uruguay has acted in a way which does not comply with the Statute.

2. Argentina is asking the Court to recognize that it is supposedly entitled to four types of

remedy 78. Firstly, cessation of the continued breaches attributable to Uruguay and the resumption

of the performance of the obligations breached. Secondly, reparation in the form of restitutio in

integrum. Thirdly, reparation in the form of compensation. Fourthly, guarantees and assurances of

non-repetition.

45 3. I would emphasize at the outset that my following remarks will focus exclusively on

Argentina’s second, third and fourth requests, a nd for obvious reasons: for Uruguay does not have

the slightest difficulty in accepting that, were the Court hypothetically ever to recognize its

international responsibility for conduct constituting continued breaches of obligations laid down by

the Statute, it would then undeniably have to cease that conduct and return to compliance with the

rules breached, and without any need for the opera tive paragraph in the judgment to state this

explicitly. As your Court has pointed out just recently,

“[i]t is not necessary, and it serves no useful purpose as a general rule, for the Court to

recall the existence of this obligation in the operative paragraphs of the judgments it
renders: the obligation incumbent on the State concerned to cease such conduct
derives by operation of law from the very fact that the Court establishes the existence
of a violation of a continuing character” ( Dispute regarding Navigational and Related

Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009, para. 148).

78
CR 2009/15, p. 45, para. 3 (Pellet). - 36 -

In this context, Uruguay notes the fact that Argentina states in its Me morial: the (alleged)

procedural breaches relating to Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute ought supposedly to be characterized

as of an immediate nature 79. The obligation of cessation would thus allegedly not be appropriate to

these, whereas it might perhaps be relevant in the event of conduct considered to be contrary to

substantive obligations and continuing in time.

4. Moreover, it is understood that where the obligation of cessation might be relevant ⎯

namely, should the Court decide that Uruguay has rendered itself responsible for breaches of

substantive requirements in the Statute continuously ⎯ such an obligation of cessation might very

well mean that Uruguay must adopt new measures with a view, for example, to better prevention of

pollution. Uruguay in no way disputes the power of your Court, if need be, to order the

implementation of measures of that kind as an elem ent of the cessation, in the unlikely event that it

were to find that the Respondent’s conduct has not complied with the Statute.

II. SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

5. Three preliminary remarks are needed before I come to the heart of the matter.

46 6. The first concerns the identification of th e international principles which must be called

upon for determining the legal consequences of the wrongful acts consisting of breaches of the

provisions of the Statute. Of course, Uruguay agrees with Argentina on the need to apply the

“secondary” rules of general international law on the responsibility of States, which are transcribed

80
in the text of the associated Articles, elaborat ed in 2001 by the International Law Commission .

However, the concept which the International Law Commission stressed in Article55 of its 2001

text, relating to “Lex specialis”, in which it is stated that “these articles do not apply where and to

the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationall y wrongful act or the content or

implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of

international law” 81 must not be forgotten here. Yet Argen tina appears to simply forget that the

Statute contains any number of specific rules relating to the consequences of wrongful acts.

79
MA, para. 8.12 et seq.
80
RA, p. 17, para. 0.16.
8Art.55 of the ILC Arts. on the responsibility of es (General Assembly resolution56/83, 12Dec.200l,
Ann.). - 37 -

Articles42 and43 explicitly contemplate compensation as an appropriate remedy in the event of

harm caused by the pollution of the river in brea ch of the Statute. The importance of these

provisions cannot be underestimated: they clearly indicate that, if harm is caused by polluting the

river, according to the Statute, compensation must be envisaged in principle as a perfectly adequate

form of reparation. This is an important aspect to which we must return later.

7. The second remark concerns the distincti on between the procedural and the substantive

obligations. It must be emphasized at the outset that it is certainly not right to deal with the

question of the remedies to be applied as regard s punishing the breach of these two categories of

obligations in the same way. The same remedies cannot be considered appropriate in the two cases

indiscriminately. The content of the primary rule at issue must obviously be taken into account in

order to identify and quantify the most appropriate remedy in the case. As the commentary by the

International Law Commission on the Articles on the responsibility of States pertinently points out,

“the primary obligation breached may also play an important role with respect to the form and

47 extent of reparation” 82. Moreover, these concepts are clearly recognized by your Court. Thus, for

example, in the Judgment of 31March 2004 in the Avena case, after quoting that locus classicus,

the celebrated Chorzów dictum, according to which “it is a principle of international law that the

breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form” (Factory

at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21), your Court stated:

“What constitutes ‘reparation in an adequate form’ clearly varies depending
upon the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise nature and
scope of the injury, since the question has to be examined from the viewpoint of what

is the ‘reparation in an adequate form ’ that corresponds to the injury.” ( Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2004, p. 59, para. 119.)

Likewise in the present case, in order to determine what the adequate form of reparation is

which corresponds to the injury, the various cont ents of the obligations allegedly breached by

8See report of the International Law Commission, Fifth-Third Session, doc. A/56/10, p. 96. See also, along the
same lines, for example, J.Combacau and D.Alland, “‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Rules in the Law of State
Responsibility: Categorizing International Obligations”, 16Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1985), p.108
(“it is above all the consideration of ‘cont ent’ of the primary obligation in its wi dest meaning . .. which explains why a
certain consequence is attached specifically and ab initio to its breach”); I. Brownlie, State Responsibility, Oxford, 1983,
p.234 (“the interaction of subs tantive law and issues of reparation should be stressed”); C.Tomu schat, “International
Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century”, 282I.C.J. Reports 1999, p.273 (“The actual
consequences may not be separated so easily from the substance of the obligation breached”); C.Gray, “The Choice

between Restitution and Compensation”, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999), pp. 413 et seq. - 38 -

Uruguay would necessarily would have to be assessed and a distinction drawn between harm

arising from procedural or from substantive breaches. These two aspects must therefore be dealt

with separately.

8. But I still have one more preliminary remark, the last, to make to the Court. As the Court

has read and heard a number of times, for Argen tina only one solution to the dispute between itself

and Uruguay is acceptable: the one which entails nothing less than the dismantling of Botnia, or at

the most its conversion to other industrial uses, w ithout the least consideration being given to the

colossal damage in economic and social terms wh ich such a measure would cause Uruguay and its

sovereign programmes of sustainable development. Nor would the enormous effort made by

Uruguay for the adoption of all measures, including the most sophisticated and costly ones, to fully

preserve the river environment merit any considera tion: an effort whose remarkable success has

48 been unreservedly welcomed by the competent international organizations and by the pick of

independent experts. But no matter! The Applicant unreservedly proclaims that the dismantling

83
would be justified in any event, even “if the Orion mill does not damage the River Uruguay” ,

even if “in the unlikely event of the Court deciding that the construction and commissioning of the

84
Orion mill are not likely to cause a risk of significant damage” . Uruguay cannot be surprised at

such an attitude, which, on Argentina’s part, rather than a genuine concern for the preservation of

the river, seems to reveal an incomprehensib le animosity towards a brother country, whose

commitment and record in the area of sustaina ble development and environmental protection are

nevertheless indisputably recognized throughout the world. Uruguay fervently hopes that the

Court’s decision will help to place relations be tween the two countries back on the track of

friendship and co-operation.

III.T HE QUESTION OF THE REMEDIES FOR THE SUPPOSED

BREACHES OF THE PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS

9. I now come to the question of the remedi es for the supposed breaches of the procedural

obligations laid down by the Statute which can a llegedly be imputed to Uruguay. In its written

pleadings, Argentina constantly stresses the exis tence of an indissociable link between the

83
RA, p. 45, para. 1.41.
84RA, p. 141, para. 1.172. - 39 -

procedural and the substantive links 85. The purpose ⎯ as we know ⎯ is to try to show that, even

if the Court were to recognize that the construc tion and operation of the Orion mill are unable to

cause risks of significant harm to Argentina, the breach by Uruguay of its procedural commitments

would in any event ⎯ as a remedy ⎯ give rise to the obligation to dismantle the mill. The

Applicant’s strategy is clear: unable to prove that Botnia causes or risks causing significant

environmental harm to the River Uruguay, Argentina pins everything on the alleged breaches of the

procedural obligations, hoping to convince your Cour t that, even if it were to agree with it on this

single point, just one remedy would have to be granted: restitutio in integrum.

49 10. Argentina’s claim clearly lacks any basis. Of course, Uruguay recognizes that the

procedural mechanism laid down by the Statute play s an important role in the system created by

that instrument. It also recognizes that, if ever the Court were to decide that Uruguay has rendered

itself responsible for breaches of the provisions in question, that country should bear the

consequences. Uruguay, on the other hand, for va rious reasons, considers Argentina’s argument

that the dismantling of the plant would be the only appropriate remedy as a response, even for this

order of offence, to be fundamentally unacceptable and baseless.

11. Firstly, Argentina has no ground for invoking Uruguay’s international responsibility for

conduct which, in the abstract, might perhaps be characterized as breaches of the procedural

provisions of the Statute, to the extent that it accepted them, thereby abandoning any demonstration

of their unlawfulness. I am not going to go back again over the 2004 and 2 005 agreements, which

Professor McCaffrey, Mr. Martin and myself have di scussed at length yesterday and today. I will

confine myself to pointing out that these agreements clearly and unequivocally reveal that

Argentina has refrained from invoking any breaches of procedural obligations which Uruguay

might have committed previously. As stated by Ar ticle 45 of the 2001 text of the ILC Articles on

responsibility, “[t]he responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: (a) the injured State has

86
validly waived the claim . . .” .

85
RA, p. 115, para. 1.28, p. 141, para. 1.172 and p. 503, para. 5.40.
86Article45 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States (General Assembly resolution56/83,
12 Dec. 2001, Ann.). - 40 -

12. However, even disregarding what has just been said, the fact nevertheless remains that,

according to the principles of international law, the remedy of restitutio claimed by the Applicant

would not be applicable. It would not be so by virtue of the striking disproportion between the

gravity of the consequences of the unlawful act of which it is accused and those of the remedy

claimed. Thus, restitution would not be based on these “considerations of equity and

87
reasonableness” whose central role in this area is st rongly emphasized by the International Law

Commission.

13. In its commentary on the draft Articles on the Responsibility of States adopted at first

reading, the ILC stressed that: “it would be inaccurate from the theoretical and practical standpoint

50 to define restitution in kind as the form of repara tion unconditionally or invariably ideal or most

appropriate which must be used in all cases and all circumstances” 88.

14. As regards the possibility of applying the remedy of restitution when it is a matter of

breaches of procedural obligations, in 2001 the ILC made the following observations:

“In particular, in cases of restitution not involving the return of persons,
property or territory of the injured State, the notion of reverting to the status quo ante
has to be applied having regard to the resp ective rights and competences of the States

concerned. This may be the case, for example, where what is involved is a procedural
obligation conditioning the exercise of the s ubstantive powers of a State. Restitution
in such cases should not give the injured St ate more than it would have been entitled
89
to if the obligation had been performed.”

15. These remarks are clearly of great relevan ce in our case: they unanimously suggest that,

by calling for the dismantling of the Botnia mill so lely on the basis of the breach of procedural

obligations, the Applicant is seeking to obtain ⎯ I am again quoting the words of the ILC ⎯

“more than it would have been entitled to if th e obligation had been performed”. The wholly

disproportionate nature of the remedy of restitution ⎯ particularly in the form indicated by

Argentina ⎯ is glaringly apparent.

16. This fundamental disproportion is all the more apparent if one takes into account the size

of the economic and social burden which disman tling the Botnia mill would impose on Uruguay.

The elimination of the plant as a remedy for br eaches of procedural obligations would entail an

8See Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, doc. A/56/10, p. 262.
88
See ILC Yearbook, 1993, Vol. II, part 1, p. 65.
8See Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, doc. A.56/10, p. 254. - 41 -

extremely high cost, at the same time providing no be nefit to the river environment. In a word, it

would typically be what Article 35 of the 2001 IL C Articles on the Responsibility of States defines

as “a burden out of all proportion to the be nefit deriving from restitution instead of

compensation” 90. This is precisely one of the two cases in which, according to Article35 just

quoted, restitution must be excluded.

51 17. But there is another element to be consid ered, that of identifying the remedy which your

Court might deem appropriate in the event of the vi olation of procedural obligations laid down by

the Statute. As I had the honour to show you this morning, it is indisputable that your Court was

seised by Argentina “on the basis of Article 12”, following the failure of the direct negotiations laid

down by that provision. The inevitable consequence is therefore that the Court’s role in the present

case must be recognized as, precisely, that of fina l arbiter, a power conferred upon it by Article 12

of the Statute, namely to decide whether the wo rks in question do or do not cause significant harm

to the quality of the waters of the River Uruguay.

18. Mr.President, the implications are clear: if, at the end of these proceedings, the Court

concludes that Uruguay has not rendered itself responsible for breaches of the substantive

provisions of the Statute, it would be left with no basis for considering the remedy of restitution in

the form of the dismantling of the plant as appropriate. Admittedly, the fact that the Court was

seised on the basis of Article12, cannot per se exclude, during the stages preceding the direct

negotiation between the Parties, the fact that breaches of procedural obligations had occurred, and

the Court’s jurisdiction to verify this is beyond dispute. But in no event could these breaches

justify such a radical remedy, which would nullify Uruguay’s sovereign right to exploit its natural

resources in compliance with its international obligations relating to the protection of the

environment of the River Uruguay. The Court’s task is to ensure a fair balance between the rights

and obligations of the Parties, duly taking into account both Argentina’s procedural rights and

Uruguay’s substantive rights. The remedy requested would completely sacrifice Uruguay’s

substantive rights on the altar of comprehensive compliance with Argentina’s procedural rights,

whereas ⎯ once again to echo the words of the ILC ⎯ “[r]estitution in such cases, if it is available

90
Article 35 (b) of the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States (General Assembly resolution56/83,
12 Dec. 2001, Ann.). - 42 -

at all, cannot be allowed to give the injured St ate after the event more than it would have been

entitled to if the obligation had been performed”.

52 IV. THE QUESTION OF THE REMEDIES TO BE APPLIED IN THE EVENT OF THE BREACH BY
U RUGUAY OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS LAID DOWN BY THE 1975 S TATUTE

19. I now come, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to the legal consequences attached to

the alleged breaches by Uruguay of substantive ob ligations laid down by the 1975 Statute.

Argentina’s demand that the pulp mill should be dismantled as a remedy is essentially based on two

arguments, which are attached to the principal object of the Statute: “to prevent damage to the

ecosystem of the river, not just to repair any damage” 91. First, Argentina argues that, as Uruguay

has breached its procedural obligations, it is no longer possible to achieve such a substantive

objective (prevention) other than by returning to the statu quo ante, and to do so, once again, by the

92
dismantling of the plant . Secondly, Argentina excludes the fact that, if harm is done to the

ecosystem of the river, it can be repaired by compensation (coupled with cessation, of course): but

still because of the essential objective of the Statute, which is to prevent and not to repair.

20. As regards the first argument, Argentina ag ain resorts to the trick of mixing procedural

and substantive questions, seeking to have us believe that breaching procedural obligations would

necessarily entail the breach of substantive ones. Ultimately, it is the procedural aspects to which

the Applicant always gives priority, when the fundamental purpose on which the Statute is based is

undoubtedly the ⎯ highly substantive one ⎯ of protecting and preserving the ecosystem of the

river. The Court cannot condone this approach. If actions by one Party breach the Statute by

harming the protected environment, then the ha rm caused must be determined by assessing the

damage (or the risk of damage) suffered by the other Party as a result of those actions. As for the

remedies, they must patently be chosen precisely in relation to the need to repair the harm caused.

Here, the reference to the procedural obligations is quite irrelevant: its sole purpose is to divert the

Court’s attention from the fact that no serious evidence has been provided by Argentina on the

environmental harm which Uruguay has allegedly caused the Applicant.

91
RA, p. 486, para. 5.9. See also, p. 497, para. 5.26 and CR 2009/15, p. 48, para. 8 (Pellet).
92RA, p. 487, para. 5.10. - 43 -

53 21. Argentina’s second argument is that compensation cannot be seen as an appropriate

remedy for the breach of substantive obligations laid down by the Statute because that instrument

has created a régime wholly geared to prevention, rather than to reparation 93. This, Mr. President,

is a false syllogism, based on purely abstract a prioris, but which ignores the positive givens:

Argentina proposes that the Court should do this, glossing over what the Statute explicitly says,

when it states in so many words that the usual re medy, in the event of harm caused by pollution of

the river, is compensation. [Slide1.] In this connection, Articles42 and 43 of the Statute, and

more particularly Article43, need to be looked at again: “The jurisdiction of each Party with

regard to any violation of pollution laws shall be exercised without prejudice to the rights of the

other Party to obtain compensation for the losses it has suffered as a result of such violation.”

Undeniably, this provision is of paramount impor tance when it comes to establishing whether the

appropriate remedy, should the Court decide that Uruguay has breached its substantive obligations,

is restitution or compensation.

22. It is clear that the very presence in the Statute of Articles 42 and 43 deals a strong blow

to the credibility of Argentina’s argument that the only possible remedy is restitution. Whence the

desperate effort by the opposing Party, which l ast week sought to convince the Court that these

provisions would have to be , so to speak, “forgotten” 94. The argument, a very bold one, is that

those provisions did not concern the wrongful act s stemming from breaches of the substantive

obligations relating to pollution of the river at all, only cases of “liability”, in other words of

“objective” responsibility for harm. Mr. Müller, counsel of Argentina, perhaps allowed himself to

be carried away by a word, a single word, in the u nofficial English translation of the Statute text,

where the term “liable” may be foun d in Article 42: “Each Party shall be liable to the other . . .”.

Unfortunately for him, the authentic French text of Article42 refers to the “responsibility” of the

Parties: “Chaque partie est responsable envers l’ autre des dommages . . .”. And the fact that such

responsibility covers the harm caused to one Party by the wrongful acts of the other is, moreover,

54 clearly shown in Article 43, in which the reference to the harm caused by “any violation” is found.

93
MA, pp.361 et seq., paras.8.28 et seq.
94
CR 2009/15, p. 41, para. 15 (Müller). - 44 -

Any violation, then, and all types of responsibility, including the international responsibility of one

State to another for a wrongful act. [End of slide 1.]

23. The fact that the Statute in so many wo rds assigns the role of ordinary remedy to

compensation in the event of pollution of the river patently has major implications.

24. The first of these is obvious: Article 43 indisputably highlights the fact that Argentina is

wrong when claiming that compensation should be regarded as a form of reparation which is

inadequate per se, according to the logic of the Statute, as a response to any breaches of substantive

obligations which are laid down by it, since, on the contrary, as we have just seen, the Statute

assigns to compensation the role of ordinary re medy to be used in response to breaches of the

obligations relating to pollution of the river.

25. The second implication is that the very presence in the Statute of a provision explicitly

assigning to compensation the role of ordinary means of reparation suggests that, in general,

compensation should be considered as having priority over restitution. Following the logic of the

Statute, restitution can only be prescribed when compensation would prove to be manifestly

incapable of restoring compliance with the treaty obligations and wiping out the effects of the

breaches of them.

26. These considerations further highlight how excessive the claim for restitution submitted

by Argentina is. The dismantling of the pulp mill might be seen as an appropriate remedy for

repairing the breaches of substantive obligations a llegedly applicable to Uruguay in only one case:

if, in the unlikely event that the Court were to find that no other form of reparation would be

capable of eliminating the harm caused or likely to be caused to the ecosystem of the river, and also

able to prevent such harm from continuing to o ccur in the future. Yet Argentina has not shown

(how could it have done so?) that the ha rm or risk of harm imputable to Uruguay ⎯ to the extent

that they persist ⎯ are of such gravity that the only conceivable solution to remedy it would be the

elimination of the Botnia plant. The Applicant is convinced that such an exorbitant claim cannot

possibly be taken seriously by the Court.

55 27. Having no doubt realized the irremediably disproportionate nature of its claim seeking

the dismantling of the plant, Argentina entrusted ProfessorPellet with the task of constructing a

completely new argument, which he presented most eloquently in the oral pleadings last week. - 45 -

The idea which he put forward is that whether restitution is proportionate or not should be

measured not in relation to the situation today, but to the one prevailing when the Application was

filed, when the plant had not yet been built; however, ProfessorPellet also considers the

alternative possibility of identifying, as the “critical da te”, that of your Order of 13July2006, by

which your Court stated that Uruguay “necessarily bears all risks relating to any finding on the

merits that the Court might later make...” 95. In short, everything would be “frozen” on one of

these dates or the other, whereas what subsequently occurred, namely the completion of the work,

its commissioning, etc., would not be taken into consideration at all.

28. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this new argument cannot possibly convince the

Court. First, it should be noted that Uruguay decided to authorize the construction of the plant and

its commissioning not in order to confront Ar gentina and the Court with a fait accompli, but

because it was and remains convinced that, once the period set aside for consultations under

Article 12 of the Statute had expired without result, it was entitled to do so by that instrument. Of

course, under the provisional measures requested by Argentina, the Court could have called a halt

to the construction of the plant three years ago; however, the Court did not do so, considering that

there was no continued risk of irreparable harm to Argentina and the RiverUruguay. The entire

matter was thus postponed until the final decision on the merits.

29. It is therefore at the time when the final decision is made that the question of comparing

the severity of the burden which would result from restitution as against compensation would arise,

in the unlikely event that the Court were ever to decide that Uruguay had rendered itself

responsible for grave breaches of its obligations. Yet this cannot be weighed up by going back in

time. In point of fact, one must definitely turn to the past, as Article35 of the Articles on the

responsibility of States indicates, but that is solely to determine the situation which existed before

56 the wrongful act was committed, which would have to be restored by means of restitution.

However, the cost of such restoration, in order to verify whether it is or not out of proportion to the

benefit which would deri ve from compensation, can only be calculated in the present, in other

95
CR 2009/15, p. 49, para. 12 (Pellet). - 46 -

words, at the moment when your Court would have to choose which of the two remedies is the

most appropriate in relation to the case concerned.

V. THE QUESTION OF “ANCILLIARY ” COMPENSATION

30. I now come to Argentina’s third claim. In its Memorial, the Applicant argues that it has

the right to obtain from the Court the application fo r its benefit of an additional reparatory remedy,

which I would like to term as ancillary to restition. Indeed, according to the Applicant, your

Court should require Uruguay to compensate the harm caused to Argentina to the extent that the

dismantling of the plant is not sufficient to erase all the consequences of the wrongful acts

allegedly perpetrated by the Respondent96. Argentina has even drawn up a list of damage for

which compensation is due: this list includes th e financial losses suffered by tourism, the damages

resulting from the decline in property values, losses and additional expenditure in the agriculture,

97
apiculture and fisheries sectors, etc.

31. It is obvious that these remarks have no solid legal basis. Indeed, Argentina knows full

well that it can only lay claim to such compensati on inasmuch as it can prove the existence of a

sufficiently direct causal link between the wrongful acts imputable to Uruguay and the harm it

refers to. Indeed, the burden of proof undeniably lies with Argentina as regards the fact that, on the

one hand, tourism, property valu es, farming and fisheries have actually suffered losses since the

pulp mill was built and commissioned and, on the other hand, that those losses were directly caused

by breaches by Uruguay of its treaty obligations not to cause significant harm to the quality of the

waters of the RiverUruguay. Yet Argentina has offered not one scintilla of proof of the facts it

57 alleges and the existence of an adequate link of cau sality. This being so, it is hard to see how its

claim for compensation could be considered by the Court.

VI. THE GUARANTEES AND A SSURANCES OF NON -REPETITION
CALLED FOR BY ARGENTINA

32. In both its Memorial and its Reply, Argentina called upon the Court to state that Uruguay

must provide it with “adequate guarantees that it will refrain in future from preventing the Statute

96
MA, pp. 361-362, paras. 8.28-8.31. See also CR 2009/15, p. 53, para. 21 (Pellet).
9MA, pp. 361-362, paras. 8.28-8.31. - 47 -

of the River Uruguay of 1975 from being applied, in particular the consultation procedure

established by Chapter II of that Treaty” 98. In the Memorial, it is specified that the guarantees and

assurances requested must include, firstly, a formal declaration made by a competent authority of

Uruguay and giving an undertaking to comply in future with the provisions of Articles 7 et seq. of

the Statute, and of which the Court would take fo rmal note in the operative part of its judgment;

secondly, Uruguay would undertake to establish, in consultation with Argentina, a fund to support

the preservation and improvement of the environm ent of the river, which would be jointly

managed 99.

33. Mr. President, Uruguay acknowledges that , in certain cases, assurances of non-repetition

may help to restore confidence in relations between two States, upset by a dispute between them.

However, as noted by the International Law Commission,

“assurances and guarantees of non-repetition will not always be appropriate, even if
demanded. Much will depend on the circum stances of the case, including the nature
of the obligation and of the breach. The ra ther exceptional character of the measures

is indicated by the words ‘if circumstances so require’ at the end of
subparagraph (b).” 100

By these words, the Commission is referring to Article 30 (b) of the Articles on the Responsibility

of States, which lays down that “The State respons ible for the internationally wrongful act is under

an obligation: (b)to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if

101
58 circumstances so require.” As regards this Court here, your recent case-law has made some

further interesting remarks on this topic. Hence, your most recent judgment contains the comment

that:

“while the Court may order, as it has done in the past, a State responsible for
internationally wrongful conduct to provide the injured State with assurances and

guarantees of non-repetition, it will only do so if the circumstances so warrant, which
it is for the Court to assess”.

To which your Court immediately added: “[a]s a general rule, there is no reason to suppose that a

State whose act or conduct has been declared wrongf ul by the Court will repeat that act or conduct

98MA, p. 361, para. 9.1; RA, p. 509, para. 6.2. See also CR 2009/15, p. 54, para. 24 (Pellet).
99
MA, p. 365, para. 8.39.
100See report of the International Law Commission, fifty-third session, doc. A/56/10, p. 239-240.

101Article 30 (b) of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility ofStates (General Assembly resolution56/83,
12 Dec. 2001, Ann.). - 48 -

in the future, since its good faith must be presumed” ( Dispute regarding Navigational and Related

Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009, para. 150).

34. In the present case, precisely, even in the unlikely event that the Court were to conclude

that Uruguay had committed wrongful acts in breach of the Statute, it is clear to the Respondent

that the assurances demanded cannot be regarded as either relevant or useful.

35. With respect in particular to the formal declaration requested by Argentina, it must be

emphasized that Uruguay has over and over again dem onstrated its firm intention to continue to

comply with its procedural and substantive oblig ations under the Statute, and has given assurances

that it will scrupulously comply with the Judgmen t of the Court. Moreover, Uruguay would have

greatly preferred to hear the Agent of Argentina express the same firm intention at the beginning of

the oral pleadings, but has no doubt that this will be the case at their closure. Of course, there is

currently an ongoing dispute relating, in particular, to the interpretation to be given to the various

provisions of the Statute. The Court will soon make its decision: the Parties will then have before

them a final judgment establishing with binding force what the right interpretation is to be given to

the provisions which they have hitherto understood differently. Such a judgment will remove any

doubt about the respective rights and obligations of the Parties: both Uruguay and ⎯ it goes

without saying ⎯ Argentina will then know exactly what they are dealing with. Even in the

unlikely event that the Court were to reach a decision unfavourable to Uruguay, it would fully

comply with it, as it is under an obligation to do and, moreover, of which it has repeatedly given its

solemn assurance, for example by official statements by its Agent in this Court. There is nothing to

59
justify the ill-natured doubts expressed by Argentina as to the “seriousness of the commitment thus
102
expressed” .

36. Uruguay is convinced that the Court will reject Argentina’s request for assurances,

characterizing it as totally unfounded, apart from pointless, inopportune and unjust (to say the

least); and this not only because (to echo your recent dictum, which I was quoting a few moments

ago), Uruguay’s good faith “must be presumed”, like that of any sovereign State moreover; but

above all because, throughout these proceedings, th e Court has received incontrovertible evidence

102
MA, p. 365. para. 8.38. - 49 -

of this good faith, as well as of the universally acknowledged seriousness of Uruguay’s

commitment to protection of the environment. This good faith is demonstrated beyond any doubt

by the fact ⎯ which is common knowledge ⎯ that Uruguay has carried out frequent and

scrupulous checks on the quality of the water of the river and continues to do so, thereby assuring

full compliance both with its own internal law in th is field and with all the CARU requirements.

Let me reiterate, these checks are currently carri ed out without the co-operation of CARU, which

Argentina persists in preventing from acting. In sum, your Court would certainly attach great

importance to the undeniable commitment professed by Uruguay ⎯ in words and actions ⎯ as

regards the prevention of any harm to the river eco system and would regard such commitment as a

more than adequate guarantee. It is obvious that, this being so, the forms of assurances demanded

by Argentina clearly seem inappropriate and superfluous.

37. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I have reached the end of my oral argument. An

oral argument which as you will have understood, is purely theoretical ⎯ academic ⎯ , Uruguay

being convinced that it has provided all the necessary proof to enable you to establish that it has not

breached its substantive or its procedural obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute, and that, on the

contrary, it has acted and continues to act in ex emplary compliance with both the Statute and with

all the relevant principles of international law. Thank you for your patience and your attention.

May I ask you, Mr.President, to regard the first round of oral argument in the present case as

closed.

60 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Professor Condorelli.

This brings today’s hearing to a close. I would like to thank each of the Parties for the

statements during the first round of oral argument. The Court will meet again on Monday

28 September, from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. and on Tuesday 29 September, from 10 a. m. to 1 p.m., to hear

the Argentine Republic in the second round or oral argument. At the end of Tuesday’s hearing,

Argentina will present its final submissions.

The Eastern Republic of Uruguay, meanwhile, will present its oral reply on

Thursday 1 October, from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. and on Friday 2 October, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. At the

end of Friday’s hearing, Uruguay will present its own final submissions. - 50 -

Each of the Parties will therefore have two fu ll three-hour hearings in which to set out its

whole oral reply. However, I would stress that, in accordance with Article60(l) of the Rules of

Court, oral statements must be as succinct as possi ble. I would add that the purpose of the second

round of oral argument is to enable each of the Par ties to reply to the arguments put forward orally

by the opposing Party, and also to any questions which have not been answered The second round

must therefore not be a repetition of the arguments already put forward, and I would be grateful for

your co-operation to ensure this. It therefore go es without saying that the Parties are not bound to

use all the speaking time allocated to them. Th ank you. I look forward to seeing you again this

evening in a less formal context on the other side of the Peace Palace.

The hearing is closed.

The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.

___________