Traduction

GC

CR 2006/51 (translation)

CR 2006/51 (traduction)

Tuesday 28 November 2006 at 10 a.m.

Mardi 28 novembre 2006 à 10 heures - 2 -

8 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour est réunie

aujourd’hui pour entendre la République de Guinée en son premier tour de plaidoiries. Je donne

maintenant la parole à l’agent de la Guinée. M. Camara, vous avez la parole.

Mr. CAMARA: Thank you, Madam President.

I. NTRODUCTION

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, it is a very great honour for me to appear before

you as Agent of my country, the Republic of Guinea, which for the first time is party to a case

brought before your distinguished Court.

2. Madam President, although Guinea has submitted to the Court a dispute between it and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, relations betwee n the two States before you today have always

been marked by deep respect a nd mutual esteem. They will not be affected by this case.

Moreover, our Congolese brothers, whose eminent re presentatives in this Great Hall of Justice I

salute, have already placed their disputes in your hands in recent years, thereby demonstrating their

trust in your justice. It is the same trust thahas prompted the Republic of Guinea to submit this

dispute to you.

3. We are conscious of the long years of suffering experienced by our Congolese brothers,

having ourselves all too often witnessed at our gates the civil wars wreaking havoc on

neighbouring peoples. And we warmly congratul ate the Congo on the considerable efforts it has

made in recent years to rebuild a pacified civil and political society. Moreover, the presidential

elections, whose second round has just ended, mark the dawn of a new era for the Congo, which

the Republic of Guinea warmly welcomes.

4. The facts which lie at the heart of the present dispute relate, as we know, to another era,

during which the Democratic Republic of the Congo was still called Zaire. Yet neither the political

changes since then, nor time, and still less the many difficulties faced by the Congo have erased or

excused the harm done by Zaire to a Guinean national. The Congo would gain credit by

acknowledging the errors of the past and making good their prejudicial consequences or placing

that matter in the hands of the Court. - 3 -

9 5. Alas, such is not the case, since the De mocratic Republic of the Congo seeks to prevent

you from exercising your jurisdiction in the present cas e. It has raised arguments which, in its

view, would justify the Court in ruling that the cl aims made by my country are inadmissible. I

shall leave it to the eminent counsel who will address the Court after me to show that, both in fact

and in law, these arguments are misguided. I sh all confine myself to a few introductory remarks

but which we believe are important for an understanding of the ins and outs of this case.

6. Madam President, the dispute before the C ourt concerns the treatment meted out by the

Zairean authorities, between 1985 and1996, to a Guinean national, Mr.AhmadouSadioDiallo,

and to the fruit of his labours, which is to say hi s investments on Zairean territory. This arbitrary

and discriminatory treatment has caused him serious damage, for which he has not obtained justice

in Zaire. In accordance with international law, the Republic of Guinea has therefore decided to

adopt his cause, by exercising its right to exerci se diplomatic protection with respect to its

nationals.

7. Madam President, it is exceptional and pr obably unique for a country such as Guinea to

move an international court in or der to defend the rights of one of its nationals. Indeed, the case

submitted to you by this African country, poor, beset by a whole host of problems, and “peripheral”

vis-à-vis the globalized capitalism which today characterizes the international economy, is

exceptional and in many ways exemplary.

8. If it has decided to protect the interests ofMr. Diallo and his companies, this is because,

although Guinea falls into the category of the least developed countries, it is convinced that it has

one rich asset: its ninemillion people, who see th eir reflection in the national slogan: “labour,

justice, solidarity”. To them, the Republic of Gu inea has a duty of solidarity and justice, whether

they are within its territory or abroad. This is the spirit of Guinea’s action here.

9. In its statement yesterday morning, Mr. Kalala though he was being ironic in claiming that

we would invite the Court “to settle some quarrels over money, ar guments about billing,

1
10 differences over interest rates between Congolese registered businesses” . That accusation

self-evidently has no basis and calls for two remarks:

1
CR 2006/50, p. 42, para. 97. - 4 -

⎯ first, in settling this dispute, Members of the Court, you will recall that international law

protects the investments of Africans in African countries, just as it protects others; the

protection of rights, be they financial or commercial, of a Guinean national is no less worthy of

interest than those of a Canadian or American company; and

⎯ second, the DRC forgets that, in any event, Gu inea’s application is not solely aimed at

protecting Mr. Diallo’s commercial rights and, by substitution, those of his companies, but also

and first and foremost at obtaining compensati on for the harm done to him through his unjust

imprisonment (twice) then his unlawful expulsion (described as “refoulement” (forced return)

by the then Zairean authorities). The fina ncial damage on which Congo has exclusively

focussed is but the consequence of these acts wholly at variance with international law.

10. Madam President, the Congo has dwelt on the amount of the prejudice indicated in the

Application of 28July1998 with a view to disputing its credibility. But the discussion on the

“quantum” of the compensation claimed by Guinea is not the purpose of the proceedings at this

stage, as it is a purely substantive question. Furthermore, the Republic of Guinea has already

stated, and I wish to expressly confirm this, that in any event it does no t intend to restate the

assessments presented in the Annex to its Application as they stand. And on this point we would

ask the Court and the opposing Party to excuse those initial estimates, whose approximation and

manifest exaggeration ⎯ which we readily acknowledge, as, moreover, we indicated in our

2
Observations ⎯ stemmed from our inexperience of this type of case.

11. On the other hand, Guinea firmly maintain s that grave internationally unlawful acts can

be attributed to the Respondent, and that they caused prejudice, which will need to be assessed at

the stage of the merits.

11 12. Before concluding these preliminary remarks, Madam President, let me point out that in

yesterday’s oral arguments, the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo limited

themselves to reading out extracts from the Prelim inary Objections of 1October2002, without

replying to Guinea’s Observations and without even referring to them. We, however, in

2
Observations of the Republic of Guinea on the Preliminary Objections of the DRC (OG), pp. 2-3, para. 0.09. - 5 -

accordance with the requirements of Article60 of the Rules of Court, will refrain from repeating

what is in those Observations; we will develop and amplify them.

13. In order to set out our legal arguments in that spirit, my country has the benefit of the

expertise and aid of eminent jurists, who have ge nerously agreed to assist it and whose particular

tasks here will be as follows:

(1) Mr.MathiasForteau, Professor at the Univers ity of Lille, will present the pertinent facts in

these proceedings;

(2) Mr.SamuelWordsworth, Member of the English Bar and Avocat at the Paris Bar, will show

that Guinea is entitled to exercise its diplomatic protection in favour of its national owing to the

violations of his shareholder’s rights;

(3)Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member and Former

Chairman of the International Law Commissi on of the United Nations, Deputy Agent of the

Republic of Guinea, will show that Guinea may also exercise its protection in favour of

Mr. Diallo owing to the prejudice suffered by the companies of which he was sole gérant and

associé; lastly,

(4) Mr.JeanMarcThouvenin, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre and Avocat at the

Paris Bar, will show that the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies could not be applied in

this case.

14. Before concluding my statement, I wish to thank the Registry of the Court, and

particularly its Registrar, Mr.Couvreur, for all his understanding and assistance throughout the

written proceedings.

15. Madam President, Members of the Court, thank you for your attention. May I ask you,

Madam President, to give the floor to Professor Mathias Forteau. Thank you.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup. J’appelle à présent le professeur Forteau à la barre. - 6 -

12 Mr. FORTEAU: Thank you, Madam President.

II. THE FACTS

Madam President, Members of the Court, I would like to begin by telling you how honoured

I am as I take the floor for the first time before the full Court, having already had the privilege of

doing so before one of your Chambers.

1. Madam President, as the Agent of Guinea has ju st said, it is my task to set out the facts

which will enable you to come to an informed d ecision on the preliminary objections raised by the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. I shall do so keeping in mind at all times the specific

constraints in these incidental proceedings: at this stage in the case, it is not yet time to debate all

points of fact or to consider the merit or possible justification for the acts of which the Respondent

has been accused; it is solely a matter of setting out the factual elements relating to the objections

made to the admissibility of Guinea’s claim.

3
2. As Mr.Kalala recalled yesterday , Mr.Diallo, a Guinean national, settled in Zaire in

1964. For the purpose of engaging in business ac tivities there, he played a role in founding

twoprivate limited liability companies, Africo m and Africontainers, and he was their sole

managing director (gérant) and shareholder (associé) throughout the entire period of interest to us 4.

3. In the 1980s, these two co mpanies established a number of contractual relationships, both

direct and indirect, with the Zairean State 5. Mr.Diallo’s companies entered into several

commercial contracts with the Zairean State itsel f, with two public undertakings (Gécamines and

Onatra), and with three oil companies in wh ich the Zairean State held a controlling stake ⎯ I am

6
referring to Zaire Mobil Oil, Zaire Shell and Zaire Fina .

13 4. As a result of the breach of their contr actual obligations by the trading partners of

Mr.Diallo’s companies, disputes arose in the 1980s and 1990s, some of which were to yield

favourable trial-court decisions for Mr. Diallo’s companies.

3CR 2006/50, pp. 16-17, para. 4.
4
Memorial of Guinea (MG), pp.10-11, paras.2.3-2.5, and Ann.3, Extraordinary General Meeting of
Africontainers, 18 April 1980.
5
See MG, pp. 12-14, paras. 2.7-2.13; Preliminary Objections (POC), p. 12, para. 1.07.
6See OG, pp. 14-15, paras. 1.29-1.32. - 7 -

5. The various disputes should normally have been resolved once a nd for all within the

Zairean legal order, and Guinea does not deny this. But, and this is the nub of the case, rather than

letting internal proceedings take their course, Zairean authorities in the executive branch intervened

to block them, first by stopping the proceedings to enforce the decisions handed down in favour of

Mr.Diallo’s companies and then by arresting, imprisoning and finally expelling their sole

managing director and shareholder.

6. Most curiously, the Congo kept very quiet yesterday on the subject of these measures,

which nevertheless lie at the heart of the dispute before you. Contrary to what counsel for the

Respondent gave us to understand 7, Guinea has not referred domestic contract disputes to the

Court; it has brought proceedings before the Court, in the framework of the law of State

responsibility, concerning measures taken by a State to the detriment of private parties.

Accordingly, to identify the relevant facts, we should review the chronology and nature of the

complained-of measures taken by the Congolese State.

7. As for any justification of the Respondent ’s conduct, on which Mr. Kalala spoke at great

length yesterday, levelling serious accusations against Mr.Diallo and his companies, such

justification is in the nature of a defence on the merits and therefore does not belong in the debate

at this stage in the proceedings. I will nevertheless say a few words about them, preliminarily, in

order to dispel the unwarranted opprobrium sought to be heaped on Mr. Diallo through them.

I. The unjustified accusations against Mr. Diallo

8. In its written pleadings and its oral statements yesterday, the Congo has based the

measures taken against Mr.Diallo on two sets of accusations, without, by the way, making very

clear whether those accusations are cumulative or in the alternative. First, the Congo alleges that

Mr. Diallo “had been involved in currency traffi cking and . . . was moreover guilty of a number of

14 attempts at bribery... of Zairean judicial and political officials” 8. Second, Mr.Diallo is said to

9
have “made claims”, deemed “arbitrary and unjustified” by the Congo . Both of these accusations

are unfounded.

7CR 2006/50, p. 17, para. 5; p. 42, para. 97 (Kalala).
8
POC, p. 39, para. 1.53; p. 42, para. 1.57; CR 2006/50, p. 39, para. 87 (Kalala).
9POC, pp. 98-99, para. 2.98; CR 2006/50, p. 39, para. 86 (Kalala). - 8 -

9. In respect of the first, there is a rather striking contrast between, on the one hand, the

seriousness of the accusation and, on the other, the lack of any shred of proof whatever. Indeed,

the Congolese side has offered absolutely nothing to support the accusation that Mr.Diallo was a

financial criminal or briber. Aside from the fact that making unsubstantiated accusations is morally

reprehensible, it runs counter to the most widely accepted general principles of proof under

international law. As the Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission recently noted, the gravity of an

accusation requires that it be proved by “clear and convincing evidence” 10, which is not at all the

case here.

10. That said, this evidentiary shortcoming on the part of the Congo is hardly surprising:

⎯ since the reason now advanced by the Res pondent to justify Mr.Diallo’s removal

(refoulement) from the country appears nowhere in the expulsion decree of 31October 1995,

which fails to state any reasons, the Congo now finds itself unable to rely on its own records to

11
prove its groundless accusations ;

⎯ and it is that much more difficult for it to do so in that at no time before or since his expulsion

has Mr. Diallo ever been accused of anything of the sort;

⎯ it is moreover particularly worthy of note on this point ⎯ because this stands in complete

contradiction to what the Congo asserts 12 ⎯ that when Mr.Diallo won in the Zairean trial

courts, the losing parties never appealed to ha ve those judgments set aside on the ground that

15 the lower court judges had been bribed by Mr.Diallo 13. This argument was never raised, or

even alluded to, in the various proceedings brou ght by the very parties who would have been

the only ones with an interest in raising the issue.

10
Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim 17, 1 July 2003, para. 46
(www.pca-cpa.org).
11
POC, Ann. 75, Decree No. 0043 dated 31 October 1995 ex pelling Mr. Diallo from the territory of the Republic
of Zaire.
1POC, p. 39, para. 1.53; CR 2006/50, p. 39, para. 87 (Kalala).

1See POC, Ann.54, Judgment of the Court of A ppeal of Kinshasa-Gombe dated 24February1994
(Africontainers/Zaire Fina litig ation); MG, Ann.146, submissi ons by the public prosecutor [ministère public] in the
appeal to the Court of Cassation against JudgmentRCA 17244, 11January1995 (which reviews the grounds and

reasoning in the judgment by the Court of Appeal dated 9March 1994) (Africom/PLZ litig ation); POC, Ann.63,
document from Shell appealing against the trial c ourt judgment handed down on 3July1995 by the tribunal de grande
instance of Kinshasa-Gombe; POC, Ann. 64, judgment of the Court of Appeal of Kinshasa-Gombe dated 20 June 2002;
POC, Ann.66, writ of summons for a stay of execution submitted by Zaire Shell on 29August1995; POC, Ann.67,
application lodging an appeal to the Court of Ca ssation, 18 September 1995, submitted by Zaire Shell
(Aftricontainers/Shell litigation). - 9 -

11. In respect of the other ground now invoked by the Congo to justify the refoulement or

expulsion ⎯ Mr.Diallo’s alleged assertion of “arbitrary and unjustified claims” 14 against his

companies’ contracting partners, I shall first note that, by raising this argument, the Congo

15
necessarily admits, and moreover admits this expressly in its preliminary objections , that there

was no other motive for the forced removal from Zair ean territory than to strike at Mr.Diallo’s

companies through their sole managing director and shareholder, with a view to putting their

claims to rest.

12. However that may be, the Congo’s argument is inconsistent with evidence in the record.

The truth proves much more complex than was described by Mr. Kalala yesterday:

(1)Some of the claims asserted by Mr.Diallo on behalf of his companies were subject to

evaluation by parties independent of the litigants; those appraisals confirmed the validity of the

claims. This was the case in the dispute between Africontainers and Zaire Fina; an evaluation

was made by the Association nationale des entrepreneurs zaïrois [National Association of

Zairean Businesses], which recognized the legitimacy of Mr. Diallo’s claim, as reported in the

12 August 1993 judgment of the tribunal de grande instance of Kinshasa, which itself upheld

16
this claim, by the way .

(2) The Respondent often abbreviates the facts for its own benefit. I shall cite two examples:

17 18
16 (i) First example: in its Preliminary Objections and its oral statements yesterday , the

Congo accused Mr. Diallo of, between 1992 and 19 96, having inflated the estimated loss

caused to Africontainers by Gécamines’ actions. But the Congo forgot to state the reasons

for this increase in the loss: by 1996 the dispute between the two companies was no

longer limited to the initial disagreement (concerning the lay-up of 32containers at

19
Gécamines’ facilities ); the initial dispute had grown to encompass further contract

1POC, pp. 98-99, para. 2.98.

1Ibid.
16
POC, Ann.53, judgment of the tribunal de grande instance of Kinshasa-Gombe, 12August 1993, RC61538,
penultimate page of the judgment, point IV.
17
POC, pp. 19-20, para. 1.18.

1CR 2006/50, pp. 25-26, para. 44 (Kalala).

1MG, Ann.151, minutes of the meeting on 1June1995 be tween Gécamines and Africontainers concerning the
use by Gécamines of Africontainers’ containers under the tripartite contract. - 10 -

breaches (unfair competition by Gécamines and improper, non-contractual use by

Gécamines of nearly 500 containers on the Kinshasa-Matadi route 20).

(ii)Second example: yesterday Mr.Kalala accused Mr.Diallo of having engaged in

“scandalous conduct” in 1990 on the ground that, having agreed to settle with Onatra, he

allegedly then called into question th e settlement terms by claiming further

21
compensation . But, here again, Mr. Kalala forgets that Mr. Diallo had in the meantime

realized that other contract breaches had been committed, namely Onatra’s fraudulent use

over three years of no fewer than 211 containers 22.

(3) Far from rejecting out of hand Mr.Diallo’s claims on the ground that they were excessive

beyond reason, the partners of Mr. Diallo’s compan ies on the contrary felt the need to develop,

as Mr. Kalala noted yesterday, “sophisticated legal arguments” in their own defence 23, and they

even admitted that some of the damage indisputably warranted reparation (as Mr. Kalala again

said yesterday morning 24).

(4) The fact is, and I shall show this in a moment, that just before Mr. Diallo was imprisoned and

expelled, the Zairean domestic courts had at th e trial-court level recognized the merit of the

17 claims referred to them and had thus upheld them. Moreover, submissions to the Court of

Cassation had been made in favour of Mr.Diallo ’s companies. Thus, as the Zairean judicial

authorities said themselves, the companies’ claims were not completely unfounded.

(5)Mr.Kalala took umbrage yesterday, on sever al occasions, at the interest rates charged by

25
Mr. Diallo, which he deemed “exorbitant” . But here too, Mr. Diallo’s claims must be placed

in the economic context of Zaire then: as yo u will observe from the public documents placed

in the judges’ folder at tabs 1 and 2, bank inte rest rates in Zaire at the end of the 1980s and the

26
first half of the 1990s were 55 per cent, and even 95 per cent, per annum ; more importantly,

2POC, Ann.6, note of 16September 1997 on the timetable of work of the Containers Disputes Commission
(Gécamines), p. 2, point 1.2.1.

2CR 2006/50, pp. 29-30, para. 54.
22
MG, Anns. 72 and 91.
23
CR 2006/50, p. 26, para. 45.
2CR 2006/50, p. 26, para. 46.

2CR 2006/50, p. 33, para. 68; p. 36, para. 75.

2See judges’ folder, No. 1. - 11 -

Zaire was then experiencing runaway inflation: at rates of from 80 to 104percent between

1987 and 1990; more than 2,000percent in 1991, and between 3,500 and 23,000percent in

1992 27. Under the circumstances, the charging of very high interest rates was inevitable.

These fluctuations obviously made it very difficu lt to produce a financial evaluation of the

losses and explain certain errors made by Mr. Diallo, who ended up overestimating some of the

debts owed to his companies.

(6) The Congo is clearly aware of the limitations of its accusation, because it finds it necessary to

base it on an additional element: the fact that Mr . Diallo contacted foreign officials by means

of a letter dated 30November 1995 allegedly damaged the Congo’s “credibility and image”

and “that was the backdrop”, according to Mr .Kalala, to issuing the expulsion decree 28. Not

only am I sceptical as to whether a letter could by itself create the slightest disturbance to

public order, but also Mr. Kalala’s grasp of the chronology is rather curious: the 30 November

letter came after the expulsion decree, whic h had been adopted onemonth earlier, on

31 October 1995. Thus, I do not see how that le tter could have justified the expulsion decree,

as Mr. Kalala claims.

18 (7) And finally the very background to the adoption of the complained-of measures taken by the

Congolese State shows that at that time the Congo did not consider the claims by Mr. Diallo’s

companies to be unfounded, since, if the Zairean authorities had then truly deemed Mr. Diallo’s

claims to be unfounded, as the Congo asserts toda y, they would have had nothing to fear from

action by internal courts, which would certainly have rejected them. Normal proceedings

therefore simply needed to be allowed to take their course. Yet that is precisely what the

Zairean authorities did not do; they intervened to stop the judicial actions in progress. There is

only one ⎯ not just plausible, but possible ⎯ explanation for this behaviour: the Congolese

executive authorities feared that the domestic courts would uphold the claims by Mr.Diallo’s

companies, and, if such a fear existed, it is indeed because those claims were not wholly devoid

of merit. This last comment leads me straight to my second point, in which I shall recall:

27
See judges’ folder, No. 2.
28
CR 2006/50, pp. 38-39, paras. 84-87. - 12 -

II. The measures taken by the Congolese State against Mr. Diallo and his companies

13. What does the evidence in the record show in this respect, evidence which, let me say,

comes from the very Zairean authorities whose cond uct is challenged and, pursuant to your settled

case law, that gives this evidence particular probative weight 29? The evidence shows that in 1988,

as in 1995-1996, the Zairean executive authorities did not hesitate arbitrarily to stay the internal

proceedings for the enforcement of decisions ha nded down in favour of Mr.Diallo’s companies,

before arresting and then imprisoning him a nd finally expelling him in 1995-1996. With your

permission, Madam President, I shall review these two periods in detail in turn, beginning with . . .

Le PRESIDENT: Oui, certainement, mais pourriez-vous le faire en allant un peu plus

lentement ?

M. FORTEAU : Oui.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie.

19
Interference in proceedings in progress, arrest and detention in 1988
30
14. As Mr.Kalala noted yesterday , in June1986 Africom and the Zairean State entered

into a contract, as they had done in 1983, a cont ract under which Mr. Diallo’s company agreed to

fill an order by the State for listing paper 31. Africom was chosen thanks to its reliability, according

32
to the Congo itself, in performing the 1983 contract (incidentally, in 1986 the State had still not

performed under that contract, when the invoice had still not been paid).

15. Ultimately on 13 November 1987, five bills of exchange were issued for the payment to

Africom of all invoices for the orders filled pursuant to the contracts entered into with the Zairean

29
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment
of 19 December 2005, para. 61, citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguv.
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, para. 64.
30
CR 2006/50, p. 18, para. 11.
31
MG, Ann.26, letter dated 20June1985 from the Depa rtment of Finance, Budge t and Investment to the
Commissioner for Finance and Budget in Kinshasa-Gombe.
32Ibid. - 13 -

State since 1983 33 and, on 22December of that year, the Commissioner for Finance asked the

34
Governor of the Bank of Zaire to pay those bills by debiting the account of the Treasury .

16. But, even though the fact of the debt was not and never has been disputed by the Congo

and although it only involved an “insignificant amount” 35in the words of the Congo itself, the

Zairean authorities first abruptly decided to halt pa yment of the sums owed just before it was to be

made, and then took arbitrary measures to arrest and imprison, solely on the ground that Mr. Diallo

had dared to claim payment of debts, debts which the State itself had recognized as due and

payable.

17. On 14January 1988 the First Commissioner of Zaire asked the Commissioner for

Finance to cease payment of the invoices 36. This was followed by a media campaign launched by

the executive authorities against Mr.Diallo, accusing him of cheating the State, when all he had

20 done was demand payment of a debt which had been fully acknowledged. He was then arrested

and imprisoned without further ado, on the orders of the same First Commissioner of Zaire, at the

37
end of January 1988 .

18. Six months later, Mr.Diallo was still being held, as shown by a letter from the First

Commissioner dated 4July 1988 38, and he was to wait until 28Ja nuary1989, one year after the

events, before the procureur général finally recognized, coldly and without offering any apology,

that the case opened against the managing director of Africom had to be closed for inexpediency of

prosecution 39. As Mr.Kalala had absolutely nothing to say yesterday about these coercive

40 41
measures , which are nevertheless described in Guinea’s Observations , I conclude that the

Respondent admits this to be true.

33
See OG, p. 16, para. 1.38 and MG, Anns. 46-50 (bills of exchange of 13 November 1987).
34
MG, Ann.51, letter dated 22December 1987 from the Department of Finance to the Governor of the Bank of
Zaire.
35
POC, pp. 14-15, para. 1.10; CR 2006/50, p. 19, paras. 15-16 (Kalala).
36MG, Ann. 51, cited above.

37See OG, pp. 17-18, paras. 1.40-1.42.

38See OG, Ann.15, letter No.0639 dated 4July1988 from Mr.SambwaPi daNbagui, First Zairean State
Commissioner to the President of the Judicial Council.

39OG, Ann.16, letter No.431 dated 28January1989 from the procureur général at the Court of Appeal of
Kinshasa to Mr. Diallo.

40CR 2006/50, pp. 18-19, paras. 11-16,
41
OG, pp. 17-18, paras. 1.40-1.43. - 14 -

19. After his release, Mr.Diallo, exhibiting a deference and prudence easily understood

given the measures which had just been taken agai nst him, did indeed ask the competent Zairean

authorities to pay the amounts due of their own accord 42. But the State’s only response was to

43
incorporate the debt into the Congo’s national public debt and to refer the matter to the Office de

44
la gestion de la dette publique , where “all matters concerning the public debt [had been]

centralized” 45; the Office never took any action on Africom’s claim.

Interference in proceedings in progress, a rrest, detention, expulsion and removal in
1995-1996

20. In retrospect, it is apparent that the measures taken against Mr.Diallo in 1988 were

merely a foretaste of those, even more tragic in their consequences, he was to suffer seven years

21 later at the hands of the same Zairean executive po wer. It was not a good idea to take on the

Congolese State in 1988 and it was no better seven years later to demand debt payment from

undertakings in which the State had obvious equity stakes. On 31 October 1995, a decree expelling

46 47
Mr.Diallo was adopted , and he was arrested and impris oned on 5November of that year ,

released on 10 January 1996 48, only to be arrested again and finally removed (refoulé) from

49
Zairean territory on 31 January permanently, with no possibility of return .

21. What prompted these measures? The ch ronology shows the an swer very clearly:

Mr. Diallo’s companies had won, or were about to win, before the various Zairean courts in which

they had brought suit, and the executive power in Za ire, whose financial interests were at stake,

would not accept this.

22. The year 1995 looked promising from the judicial standpoint for Mr. Diallo’s companies:

42
See MG, Ann.57, letter of 27July 1989 from the Director of the Bureau of the President of Zaire to the First
Commissioner; OG, Ann. 18, letter of 30 November 1989 from Mr. Diallo to the Governor of the Bank of Zaire.
43
POC, p. 15, para. 1.10.
4MG, Ann.71, letter of 3August1990 from the Ministry of Finance to the président délégué général of the

OGEDEP; POC, p. 15, para. 1.10.
4POC, Ann. 57, letter from the Minister of Finance of Zaire (undated).

4POC, Ann.75, Decree No.0043 of 31October1995 expelling Mr.Diallo from the territory of the Republic of
Zaire.

4OG, Ann. 27, notice of imprisonment dated 5 November 1995.

4MG, Ann. 194, order releasing Mr. Diallo, 10 January 1996.
49
MG, Ann.197, “refusal-of-entry notice” (procès-verbal de refoulement) of Mr.Diallo, 31January1996. See
MG, pp. 29-33, paras. 2.63-2.74. - 15 -

⎯ on 11January, and then on 20April, the ministère public (Public Prosecutor) made

submissions to the Supreme Court of Justice which were in favour of Africom in the case

between it and PLZ and of Africontainers in its case against Zaire-Fina, recommending the

quashing in each case of the appellate judgments which had vacated the trial court judgments

rendered on every occasion in favour of Mr. Diallo’s companies 50;

⎯ further, on 3July 1995 the tribunal de grande instance of Kinshasa upheld Africontainers’

claims in its dispute with Zaire-Shell, ordering the latter to pay US$13million 51. This

22 judgment indirectly concerned the other two oil companies, Mobil Oil and Fina, because

Africontainers accused them of the same contract breaches as those committed by Zaire-Shell.

23. Zaire-Shell attempted to obtain a stay of execution of the tribunal’s judgment through

ordinary judicial channels but failed. Its appli cation for a stay was rejected on 24August by the

Court of Appeal 52, which on 13 September reaffirmed, in response to a further application by Shell,

53
that the judgment handed down by the tribunal de grande instance was fully enforceable .

24. To get round the impossibility of escaping enforcement of the judgment rendered against

it by judicial means, Shell then turned to the executiv e, asking it to interfere in the judicial

proceedings in progress. That was in effect the purpose of the letter it sent on 29August to the

Minister of Justice 54; that letter was to be echoed by anot her, similar, letter sent to the Prime

55
Minister on 15 November by Mobil Oil and Fina .

25. It is perhaps worth pointing out here ⎯ because this clearly shows that full-scale

interference in proceedings in progress was being sought ⎯ that the request for a “stay of

5MG, Ann.146, Submissions by the ministère public (Public Prosecutor) in the appeal on points of law against
appeal court judgment RCA 17244 (the trial court judgment appears in Ann. 130 of Guinea’s Memorial); MG, Ann. 149,
Submissions of the ministère public (Public Prosecutor) in the appeal on points of law against appeal court

judgmentRCA17229 of 24February1994 (the trial court judgme nt appears in Ann.53 of the preliminary objections,
and the appellate court judgment in Ann. 54 of the preliminary objections).
5MG, Ann. 153, judgment of the tribunal de grande instance of Kinshasa, RCA 63824 RH 26767 of 3 July 1995.

5POC, Ann.65, service on Zaire-Shell of the judgment of 24August1995 rendered by the Court of Appeal of
Kinshasa-Gombe.

5MG, Ann.170, letter dated 13Sept ember1995 from the First President of the Court of Appeal of
Kinshasa-Gombe to the enforcement division of the tribunal de grande instance of Kinshasa-Gombe. See also MG,
Ann.169, report dated 5September1995 with a view to obtaining approval for execution of judgment RC63824 in the
Africontainers v. Zaire-Shell case.

5MG, Ann.166, letter of 29August1995 from Zaire-Shell to the Zairean Minister of Justice regarding the
request for a stay of execution of appellate and trial court judgments.

5POC, Ann. 74, joint letter from Mobil and Fina to the Zairean authorities dated 15 November 1995. - 16 -

execution of judgments” made by Shell did not con cern only Mr. Diallo’s companies. Shell found

itself ⎯ these are not made up but are its own words ⎯ in the “particularly worrying and recurring

situation” of having been on the losing side rep eatedly (no less than 13times) in disputes with a

number of its contracting partners. According to Shell, the stay which it was seeking of these

13 proceedings for the execution of judicial decisi ons was necessary to “safeguard [its] property”,

property in respect of which the Zairean State was not indifferent, as it held an ownership interest

in it.

26. The executive power responded quickly to this request. Enforcement of the judgment in

the Africontainers v. Zaire-Shell case was stayed, on 13September, by order of the Minister of

23 Justice, without any legal basis 56. On 28September, the Minister of Justice finally admitted in a

letter to the First President of the Court of App eal that there had been “no manifest error of

judgment”. He accordingly asked that execution of the judgment resume 57; this made it possible

58
to effect an attachment of goods on 6October . But, in another about-face, of which the

Respondent is unaware 59, the attachments were once again revoked on 13October, this time

permanently, on “oral instructions” from the Minister of Justice and outside the law 60.

27. Thus the enforcement procedure was abruptly and arbitrarily terminated, even though it

had been approved by the domestic courts and th e same Minister had just a few days earlier

acknowledged that it should be carried out. This was the background to the adoption, on

31 October, of the decree expelling Mr. Diallo 61, the sole motive for which was clearly not only to

deter him, but more generally, in keeping with the measures already taken, to prevent him from

pursuing the various proceedings underway on behalf of his companies. In imprisoning and then

expelling the sole gérant and associé of the private limited liability companies Africom and

56
MG, Ann.171, report in execution RH26853, Africontainers v. Zaire-Shell , 13September1995; POC,
Ann. 70, letter of 13 September 1995 from Vi ce-Minister Maître Kikadi Gapongolo to the First President of the Court of
Appeal of Kinshasa-Gombe.
57
MG, Ann.177, letter of 28September 1995 from the Minister of Justice to the First President of the Court of
Appeal of Kinshasa-Gombe.
58
MG, Ann. 179, attachment of goods RH 26853 on Zaire-Shell premises, 6 October 1995.
5POC, pp. 124-126, paras. 3.47-3.50; CR 2006/50, p. 35, para. 73 (Kalala).

6OG, Ann. 26, notice of 13 October 1995 revoking the seizure of property belonging to Shell.

6POC, Ann.75, Decree No.0043 of 31October1995 expelling Mr.Diallo from the territory of the Republic of
Zaire. - 17 -

Africontainers, the Congo knew full well that it would hinder the business activity of the two

companies and would prevent any recovery of debts owed to them ⎯ which is in fact what

62
occurred .

28. The circumstances under which the expul sion process was carried out by the Zairean

executive authorities confirms moreover that their ac tion was in no way dictated by public interest

but that their real intention was to ensure that Mr. Diallo would be unable to pursue, on behalf of

his companies, the lawsuits that had been brought . It is enough to set the applicable legislative

provisions and the measures actually taken almost literally side by side to show the patent

24 arbitrariness, within the meaning ascribed to that term by your case law, and the arbitral

jurisprudence 63, of the process by which the expulsion was carried out:

⎯ first, the requirements as to reasons to be gi ven, procedure and prior consultation laid down by

Articles15 and 16 of the Order of 12Sept ember 1983 concerning immigration control 64 ⎯

which you will find in the judges’ folder as document No.3 ⎯ were not respected by those

who drew up the expulsion decree;

⎯ secondly, if Mr. Diallo had attempted to evade expulsion, Article 15 of that Order would have

given the Zairean authorities no right to detain him beyond eight days, the absolute maximum,

a period far exceeded in the present case, contra ry to Mr.Kalala’s unsupported assertion here

yesterday: Mr.Diallo was indeed imprisoned on 5November1995, as proved not only by a

letter from Avocats sans frontières dated 13December1995 but also by a notice of

65
imprisonment (billet d’écrou) dated 5 November 1995 ; the Congo recognizes moreover that

66
Mr.Diallo was still in detention the following month, December1995 ; finally, Guinea

produced in its Memorial a notice of release not dated until 10 January 1996 67. The period of

62
OG, pp. 26-27, paras. 1.66-1.168.
63See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p.76,

para. 128; ICSID, Azurix Corp. and the Argentine Republic , ARB/01/12, award of 14 July 2006, para. 393 (available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/); LG&E Energy Corp. and the Argentine Republic , ARB/02/1, decision of 3October2006,
para. 157 (available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
64
POC, Ann.73, Legislative Order No.83-033 of 12 September1983 concerning i mmigration control, and
judges’ folder (tab 3).
65MG, Ann.190, letter of 13December1995 from Avocats sans frontières to the Prime Minister of Zaire; OG,

Ann. 27, notice of imprisonment dated 5 November 1995.
66POC, p. 41, para. 1.56.

67MG, Ann. 194, notice of release of Mr. Diallo, 10 January 1996. - 18 -

detention therefore clearly exceeded, by far, the strict maximum of eight days. Moreover,

Mr.Diallo suffered further coercive measures before his permanent removal (refoulement) on

31 January. What is more, he was not given th e opportunity to communicate with his consular

authorities during his detention;

⎯ last comment, this is a notice of refusal of entry (refoulement) which made Mr.Diallo’s

68
permanent removal from the Respondent’s territory a reality , even though under Zairean law

25 Mr.Diallo could not legally be “refused entry” (refoulé) because he was in the Congo when

69
this measure was carried out .

29. These various elements show the obvious haste with which the Zairean authorities acted,

without troubling to respect the applicable proce dural and formal requirements. Mr. Diallo was a

nuisance, he had to be got rid of, regardless of th e means used, because it wa s an urgent necessity

to thwart his companies’ claims, of which the domestic courts in Zaire were beginning to recognize

the merit. That was the objective, and that has been the effect, of the measures taken by the

Congolese State, which in so doing infringed the righ ts of Mr.Diallo and his companies. Those,

Madam President, are the relevant facts which I ha ve found it necessary to indicate at this stage in

the proceedings.

Thank you, Madam President, Members of the Court, for your kind attention. May I ask you

to call Mr. Wordsworth.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, M. Forteau. J’appelle à présent M. Wordsworth à la barre.

M. WORDSWORTH :

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Forteau. J’appelle M. Wordsworth à la barre.

M. WORDSWORTH :

68
MG, Ann. 197, refusal-of-entry notice (process-verbal de refoulement) concerning Mr. Diallo, 31 January 1996.
69See Arts. 13 and 15 of the above-cited Order of 12 September 1983. - 19 -

III. Le droit de la Guinée d’exercer sa protection diplomatique au sujet de la détention et
de l’expulsion arbitraires de M. Diallo, ainsi que de ses droits en tant qu’actionnaire

1. Madame le président, Messieurs de la C our, c’est un honneur que de comparaître devant

vous dans le cadre d’une affaire qui met en lumi ère deux questions très importantes concernant la

portée des droits relatifs à la protection diploma tique. Il s’agit là de deux questions qui, d’une

certaine manière, attendaient d’être examinées plus avant par la Cour, après que celle-ci les a tout

juste abordées en l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction ( Barcelona Traction, Light and Power

Company, Limited (Belgique c. Espagne), de uxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970 , p. 3.), et qui

ont été passées sous silence ous sous un quasi-sile nce dans la décision de la Chambre en l’affaire

de l’Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c. Italie),

arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p. 15).

a) La première de ces questions concerne la portée des droits des actionnaires. En l’affaire de la

Barcelona Traction, la Cour a, bien entendu, reconnu que l’Etat des actionnaires avait le droit

d’exercer une protection diploma tique lorsque «les actes incriminés [étaient] dirigés contre les

70
26 droits propres des actionnaires en tant que tels» (par. 47) . Les Parties conviennent qu’il existe

un droit d’exercice de la protection diplomatique dans de telles circons tances. Dès lors, le

différend porte sur la question de savoir si M. Di allo dispose en l’espèce de droits d’actionnaire

propres pertinents, et telle est la question sur laquelle je vais m’appesantir.

b) La seconde question concerne la «thèse» évoquée par la Cour en l’affaire de la

Barcelona Traction selon laquelle, dans l’hypothèse où le préjudice concerné a été causé à la

société, «l’Etat des actionnaires aurait le droit d’exercer sa protection diplomatique lorsque

l’Etat dont la responsabilité est en cause est l’Et at national de la société» (par.92). Tel est

précisément le cas en l’espèce: la responsabilité de la RDC est en cause, et la RDC est l’Etat

national des deux sociétés de M. Diallo. M. Pelle t examinera la question de savoir si la Guinée

a, par conséquent, un droit de protection dipl omatique au sujet du préjudice causé aux deux

sociétés.

2. Pour ce qui concerne les droits des actionnaires, la thèse présentée hier par M. Mazyambo

était assez simple. En substance, il a dit que la Guinée se contentait de répéter les arguments des

70
Voir également l’affaire Agrotexim et autres c. Grèce (1996) 21, Cour européenne des droits de l’homme,
p. 282, par. 62. - 20 -

actionnaires belges qui avaient été jugés irrecevables en l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction, que la

décision rendue en ladite affaire réglait par conséquent les questions posées en l’espèce 71, que la

72
Guinée confondait les droits de la société avec ceux des actionnaires , et que, bien qu’une

demande relative aux droits des actionnaires puisse en théorie être formulée, ces droits étaient très

73
limités et n’étaient pas en cause en l’espèce .

3. La réponse de la Guinée est la suivante :

4. Premièrement, elle s’étonne d’un silence: deux aspects de sa demande n’ont pas du tout

été abordés hier. La Guinée invoque un droit d’exer cice de la protection diplomatique au sujet de

la détention illicite et de l’expul sion arbitraire dont aurait été victime son ressortissant, M. Diallo.

La Guinée invoque également des droits au sujet de l’absence de notification à M.Diallo de son

droit à communiquer avec ses autorités consulaires. Ces questions sont examinées de manière

détaillée dans le mémoire de la Guinée 74. Pourtant, la RDC a tout simplement passé sous silence

ces aspects de la demande de la Guinée, tant dans ses écritures qu’hier à l’audience.

27 5. Deuxièmement, si l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction constitue un point de départ utile

pour l’examen de la Cour en l’espèce, elle n’en constitue néanmoins en aucune manière le point

final. Il ne s’agit pas d’une Barcelona Traction numéro II, ni d’une ELSI numéro II, et ce bien que

cette dernière affaire puisse en réalité se révéler le précédent le plus utile pour la Cour.

6. Troisièmement, la RDC a choisi de ne pas répondre à l’argument de la Guinée concernant

les droits des actionnaires. Cet argument ne re pose pas sur une confusion entre les droits de

l’actionnaire et les droits patrimoniaux ou autres de la société, et s’en tient bien à la violation des

droits dont jouit l’actionnaire vis-à-vis la société.

7. Permettez-moi de développer ces points, en m’intéressant tout d’abord aux différences

entre la présente affaire et celle de la Barcelona Traction. Il y a cinq grandes différences :

8. Premièrement, l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction ⎯tout comme, d’ailleurs, ELSI ⎯

portait sur un préjudice causé d’abord et avant tout à une société: la faillite de la société, dans

71CR 2006/50, 27 novembre 2006, p. 47-48, par. 13, et 16-18.
72
CR 2006/50, 27 novembre 2006, p. 46, par. 9.
73
CR 2006/50, 27 novembre 2006, p. 45, par. 8 ; p. 49, par. 21.
74Mémoire de la Guinée, par. 3.2-3.12. - 21 -

Barcelona Traction, et, dans ELSI, la confiscation des avoirs de la société et la faillite qui s’en est

suivie. En l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction, la question était, selon la formulation employée par

la Cour, de savoir si l’on pouvait di re qu’un droit, en l’occurrence celui de la Belgique, avait été

violé dès lors que «les mesures incriminées [avaient] été prises à l’égard non pas de ressortissants

belges mais de la société elle-même», laquelle n’était pas une société belge (par.32; voir

également par. 33-35). En l’espèce, en revanche, l’allégation principale ⎯ ou du moins l’une des

principales ⎯ porte sur des mesures prises à l’encontre du ressortissant guinéen, M. Diallo.

a) C’est M.Diallo qui a été détenu illégalement et expulsé arbitrairement, et non ses sociétés.

C’est M. Diallo qui n’a pas été informé de ses droits à communiquer avec ses autorités

consulaires. Il n’était question d’aucune mesure de ce type dans l’affaire de la

Barcelona Traction, ni d’ailleurs dans ELSI, et l’issue de la première aurait certainement été

différente si tel avait été le cas. Si la question est bien, suivant la formulation de la Cour en

l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction, celle de savoir si un droit de la Guinée a été violé du fait de

la détention arbitraire et de l’expulsion de M.Diallo, alors la réponse doit être «oui» (voir

l’affaire de la BarcelonaTraction, Light and Power Com pany, Limited (Belgique c.Espagne),

arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p.33, par.35). Un droit de la Guinée a également été violé du fait

que M. Diallo n’a pas été informé de son droit à communiquer avec ses autorités consulaires, et

ce en violation de la convention de Vienne sur l es relations consulaires. Il se peut néanmoins

que, s’agissant de la protection diplomatique, la question soit plutôt de savoir quelle personne

ou entité dispose du motif pertinent d’action en justice. Telle fut l’approche suggérée par

sirGeraldFitzmaurice dans son opinion individuelle en l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction,

28
opinion à laquelle avaient souscrit à l’époque d’éminents auteurs (voir C.I.J. Recueil 1970,

opinion individuelle de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 66. Voir également Higgins, «Aspects of the

Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited» , Virginia

Journal of International Law , 11, 327, 330). Il va de soi que c’est M.Diallo qui dispose du

motif pertinent d’action en justice pour ce qui concerne la détention et l’expulsion arbitraires

dont il aurait été victime, et que la Guinée peut sans nul doute faire sienne cette cause.

b) Il s’agit également là d’une courte réponse aux ex ceptions préliminaires. Des questions de fait

doivent sans nul doute être tranchées, tout comme celles relatives aux pertes qui résultent de la - 22 -

violation des droits de M.Diallo, y compris ce lle de savoir si celui-ci peut obtenir réparation

des pertes engendrées par l’incapacité de ses sociét és à recouvrer leurs créances, incapacité qui

a découlé de sa détention et de son expulsion. Mais ce sont là des questions qui relèvent du

fond. Le droit d’exercer la protection diplomatique et les autres droits existent bel et bien ; ils

ne sont pas contestés, et cela signifie que les exceptions préliminaires doivent être rejetées, à

tout le moins en partie.

9. J’en viens maintenant à la deuxième différence: ce sont, de la même manière, les droits

propres de M. Diallo actionnaire qui ont été violés, y compris ⎯ comme je vais le démontrer ⎯ ses

droits, en tant qu’actionnaire, de supervision, de contrôle et de gestion de ses sociétés. Dans

l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction, en revanche, la Belgique n’avait pas expressément fondé sa

demande sur une atteinte aux droits propres des actionnaires (voir par. 49).

10. Troisième différence : dans l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction, la Cour avait à déterminer

l’étendue des droits de protection diplomati que dans une hypothèse où troisEtats étaient

susceptibles d’être impliqués dans une «relation tr iangulaire» : les actionnaires belges, une société

canadienne et les actes illicites allégués de l’Espagne. En la présente affaire, bien entendu, seuls

deux Etats sont impliqués : la Guinée, Etat de nationalité de M. Diallo, et la RDC, Etat où ont été

constituées les sociétés de M. Diallo, et aussi Etat qui aurait commis les actes illicites. Dès lors, la

conclusion principale de l’affaire Barcelona Traction ⎯à savoir que la Belgique ne pouvait pas

faire sienne une demande concernant le préjudi ce causé aux intérêts d’actionnaires belges par suite

d’actes dirigés contre une société canadienne⎯ n’est pas applicable en l’espèce.

11. Quatrième différence : il ne s’agit pas ici d’un actionnariat complexe et multinational ni

de concurrence entre différents Etats de nationalité des actionnaires. En effet, il n’y a qu’un seul

actionnaire et, il va de soi, il n’y a qu’un seul Etat de nationalité. Le fait que M.Diallo était

l’actionnaire unique revêt une importance particulière dans la mesure où il ressort des faits allégués

et, de fait, de la thèse de la RDC, telle qu ’exposée hier, que le défendeur confond actionnaire et

29 société. La RDC a perpétré des actes contre M.Diallo ⎯notamment en le détenant et en

l’expulsant⎯ dans le but précis ⎯ but effectivement atteint d’ailleurs ⎯ de l’empêcher d’exercer

ses droits de supervision, de cont rôle et de gestion des sociétés ; le défendeur a de ce fait empêché

les deux sociétés de fonctionner et rendu impossible le recouvrement de leurs créances. Ainsi, bien - 23 -

que l’argumentation de la Guinée soit centré sur les dr oits de M.Diallo en tant qu’actionnaire, la

question du préjudice causé aux sociétés en deme ure une dimension importante, notamment pour

ce qui concerne l’évaluation des pertes ayant résulté de la violation desdits droits.

12. Cinquième différence: les deuxsociétés de M.Diallo n’étaient pas des «sociétés

anonymes» ⎯ alors que la société Barcelona Traction Company , elle, l’était ⎯ mais revêtaient la

forme très particulière de «sociétés privées à responsabilité limitée» («SPRL»), définies comme

une forme hybride de société, comparable à certains égards à un simple partenariat ou à une

«société de personnes» 75, avec des droits et des mesures de protection spécifiques pour les

actionnaires, tant s’agissant de la cession des parts que ⎯ce qui est important en l’espèce ⎯ des

droits de contrôle.

13. Cela m’amène donc à l’argument de la Guinée sur la nature et l’étendue des droits de

M.Diallo en tant qu’actionnaire, dont l’analy se doit commencer par la question préliminaire de

l’identification de la source juridique de ces droits.

La source des droits de M. Diallo en tant qu’actionnaire

14. Evidemment, le droit d’exercer une protec tion diplomatique au sujet des droits propres

d’un actionnaire existe en droit international. En la matière, le droit international renvoie toutefois

au droit interne, lequel définit le contenu des droits propres pertinents.

15. Ainsi, dans l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction , la Cour a établi une distinction entre les

actes affectant directement la société et ceux affectant directement l’actionnaire en indiquant ce qui

suit :

«La situation est différente si les actes incriminés sont dirigés contre les droits
propres des actionnaires en tant que tels. Il est bien connu que le droit interne leur
confère des droits distincts de ceux de la société, parmi lesquels le droit aux

dividendes déclarés, le droit de prendre part aux assemblées générales et d’y voter, le
droit à une partie du reliquat d’actif de la société lors de la liquidation. S’il est porté
atteinte à l’un de leurs droits propres, les actionnaires ont un droit de recours

indépendant.» (Par. 47.)

75Louis Frédéric, Traité de droit commercial belge , t.V, Fecheyr (dir. de publ.), Gand, 1950, p.877; voir
également, s’agissant de l’équivalent français pour SPRL, la «société à responsabilité limit ée» (SARL), PaulLeCornu,
Droit des sociétés , Montchrestien, Paris, 200p.733 et Philippe Merle,Droit commercial. Sociétés commerciales ,

Dalloz, Paris, 2000, p. 189. - 24 -

30 16. Deux remarques s’imposent : premièrement, la Cour ne cherche aucunement à établir une

liste exhaustive de droits propres — elle cite quelques exemples fort connus, mais ce ne sont que

des exemples, et j’ai cru comprendre que MM . azyambo en convenait (CR 2006/50,

27 novembre 2006, p. 49, par. 23) ; deuxièmement, il aurait été difficile pour la Cour de faire plus

que donner des exemples dans la mesure où elle semble considérer que ces droits pertinents

découlent d’un droit interne qui n’est pas précisé.

17. Cette position a été à présent reprise à l’article12 des projets d’articles de 2006 de la

CDI sur la protection diplomatique, adoptés le 8 a oût 2006, article que j’ai reproduit au point 4 du

plan de mon exposé figurant dans le dossier des juges. Cet article dispose :

«Dans la mesure où un fait interna tionalement illicite d’un Etat porte

directement atteinte aux droits des actionna ires en tant que tels, droits qui sont
distincts de ceux de la société, l’Etat de nationalité desdits actionnaires est en droit
d’exercer sa protection diplomatique à leur profit.»

Le commentaire de l’article 12 précise (au par. 4)) :

«Le projet d’article12 ne précise pas quel est le système juridique applicable

pour déterminer quels sont les droits propres des actionnaires par opposition à ceux de
la société. Dans la plupart des cas, cette question doit être tranchée par le droit interne
de l’Etat où celle-ci a été constituée.» 76

18. Il n’y a là rien de surprenant. Le droit de l’Etat où la société a été constituée est le droit

qui fonde la relation juridique entre la société et l’actionnaire, et c’est aussi le droit en vertu duquel

77
la personnalité de la société est reconnue internationalement . Corrélativement, ce droit doit aussi

être celui en vertu duquel les droits des actionnaires vis-à-vis de la société sont reconnus sur le plan

international.

Le droit applicable de la RDC : le décret de 1887

19. Les droits propres de M. Diallo en tant qu ’actionnaire peuvent dès lors, en l’espèce, être

considérés comme établis en droit de la RDC, notamment par le décret de1887 sur les sociétés

78
commerciales, tel que modifié .

76
Voir également le quatrième rapport du rapporteur spécial, M. Dugard, par. 92.
77
Bakalian v. Ottoman Bank (1965) ILR, 216, 228. Voir également le chapitre rédigé par Lowe, «Injuries to
Corporations» ; dans «La responsabilité internationale», Crawford et consorts (dir. de publ.).
78OG, annexe 35. - 25 -

31 20. J’ai rappelé les articles pertinents au poi nt 5 de mon plan; ils figurent également sous

l’onglet 4 du dossier des juges. Il ressort de ces articles ⎯ sur lesquels je reviendrai plus en détail

dans un instant ⎯ que les droits dont jouissait M.Diallo en tant qu’actionnaire se répartissaient

entre ce qu’on pourrait considérer plus ou moins comme des droits patrimoniaux, tels que les droits

aux bénéfices et aux produits de la liquidation et, ce qui est bien plus important en la présente

affaire, des droits de contrôle. Par «droits de contrôle» j’entends non pas le pouvoir de direction

des sociétés au quotidien ⎯ pouvoir dont M. Diallo jouissait assurément en sa qualité de «gérant»

et du fait de son droit de vote en tant qu’actionnaire unique 79⎯, mais les droits concrets de

participation au contrôle des deux SPRL, l’une des formes de sociétés prévues par le droit des

sociétés de la RDC.

21. Pour en venir aux dispositions prises individuellement ⎯en haut de la page3 de mon

plan ⎯, j’ai relevé :

a) L’article 51, qui confère à chaque actionnaire «an equal entitlement in the exercise of members’

prerogatives».

b) L’article65: «managers shall be appointed either in the instrument of incorporation or by the

general meeting, for a period which may be fixed or indeterminate» : il s’agit du droit qu’ont les

actionnaires de nommer le «gérant», un droit importa nt, là encore, de participation au contrôle

de la société. M.Diallo, en tant qu’actionna ire unique, avait le droit de se nommer lui-même

gérant. Et, selon une pratique tout à fait courante dans les SPRL, c’est bel et bien ce qu’il a fait,

80
et ce ⎯ le point mérite d’être souligné ⎯, pour une durée non déterminée .

c) Parce que cela nous conduit alors à l’article 67: «unless the statutes provide otherwise,

member-managers» ⎯ et c’est ce qu’est M.Diallo, en l’espèce, «un gérant associé»

⎯«appointed for the life of the company» ⎯ comme l’était M.Diallo ⎯ «can be removed

only for good cause, by a general meeting de liberating under the conditions required for

amendments to the statutes. Other managers can be removed at any time.» Il existe une nette

différence entre «gérant associé» nommé pour la durée de la société et les autres «gérants», qui

sont simplement «révocables en tout temps». Le «gérant associé» d’une SPRL jouit donc d’un

79
Voir BT, par. xx
80
MG, annexe 3. - 26 -

statut et de protections particuliers : dès lors qu’il a été nommé pour la durée de la société, il ne

peut être révoqué ⎯ si ce n’est à l’issue d’un vote spécial de l’assemblée générale de la société.

32 Ce cas est donc très différent de celui de la «société anonyme». Pour citer un commentateur :

«It is in the provisions concerning executive management ( gérance) that the
difference between an SPRL and an SA appears most clearly. No matter how great
the authority granted in some SAs to the managing director (administrateur délégué) .

. . , ‘full control’ ( «la maîtrise de l’affaire») can never be granted to him or her as in
an SPRL.» 81

d) Toutefois, à la suite de sa détention et de s on expulsion, M.Diallo n’a, de fait, plus été en

mesure de jouir de ces droits importants. En contradiction avec les dispos itions de l’article 65,

il a été privé du droit de nommer le «gérant» de son choix, en l’occurrence lui-même ⎯ il ne lui

était en effet plus possible, sur un plan pratique , de remplir les fonctions de «gérant» depuis la

Guinée. Les protections prévues à l’article 67, de même, ne lui étaient d’aucune utilité.

e) J’en viens maintenant à l’article68 ⎯reproduit en bas de la page 3 de mon plan. Cet article

porte sur les pouvoirs du gérant. «Each manager shall have all the powers to act on behalf of

the company in all circumstances and to perform the administrative acts and take the measures

that the purpose of the company implies.» Tels sont les pouvoirs dont jouit le gérant. Or, en

tant qu’actionnaire unique des deux SPRL, M. Di allo avait le droit de se nommer lui-même

gérant, et, partant, de se conférer le droit d’exercer ces pouvoirs. Ainsi, les articles65 et67

créent certains droits pour l’«associé» ou pour le «gérant associé», alors que l’article68 peut

être considéré comme donnant un contenu à ces droits.

f) J’en viens à l’article 71 ⎯un article qui revêt une importance particulière en l’espèce:

«oversight of the management shall be entruste d to one or more administrators, who need not

be members, called “auditors” if the number of members does not exceed five» ⎯et tel était

bien sûr le cas des sociétés de M. Diallo ; il en était le seul actionnaire ; il n’y avait qu’un seul

«associé» ⎯ «the appointment of auditors is not compulsory, and each member shall have the

powers of an auditor». M.Diallo étant l’unique actionnaire de ses deux sociétés; il jouissait,

aux termes de l’article 71, de tous les droits et pouvoirs reconnus aux «commissaires». Ce droit

81M.Coipel, Les sociétés privéesà responsabilité limitée , Larcier, Bruxelles, 1p.82. Voir aussi

J. Van Houtte, Traité des sociétés de personnes à responsabilité limitée, t. I, Larcier, Bruxelles, 1962, p. 81. - 27 -

est également énoncé à l’article19 des statuts d’Africontainers: «Each of the members shall

82
exercise supervision over the company.»

g) Le contenu du droit énoncé à l’article 71 est ensuite précisé à l’article 75 : «The auditors’ job is

to oversee and check, without such powers being subject to any limitation, all actions taken by

management, all corporate operations and the register of members.»

33 i) Manifestement, il s’agit là de droits extr êmement importants et d’une très grande portée.

Pour citer M.MakelaMassamba, de l’Université de Kinshasa: «The auditors play a

crucial role in companies. They ensure th at corporate affairs run smoothly and that the

provisions of the law and of the company’s articles concerning the company’s accounts are

83
complied with.»

ii) Par ailleurs, il découle des articles 71 et 75 qu e M. Diallo avait le droit de surveiller et de

contrôler, sans restriction aucune, la gestion et les activités de ses deux sociétés. Là

encore, du fait de sa détention et de son expul sion, M.Diallo a été mis dans l’incapacité

d’exercer ces droits importants.

h) Les articles78 et79, qui figurent à la page5 de mon plan, énoncent ensuite certains droits

relatifs aux assemblées générales, qui sont eux aussi des droits concrets de participation au

contrôle de la société reconnus aux actionnaires.

i) L’article78 dispose: «The ge neral meeting of members shall have the widest powers to

perform or ratify acts concerning the company . . .». L’assemblée générale ⎯ en l’espèce, elle

se résume bien sûr, de fait, à la personne de M.Diallo ⎯ a donc «the widest powers to

perform . . . acts concerning the company». Il s’agit là d’un droit d’acti onnaire des plus larges

possibles.

j) L’article 79 traite ensuite du droit de prendre part aux assemblées générales et de voter, un droit

qui est bien entendu l’un des droits mentionnés dans le passage de l’arrêt rendu en l’affaire

Barcelona Traction que je vous ai déjà cité (par. 47).

82
MG, annexe 1.
83Roger Makela Massamba, Droit des affaires ⎯ Cadre juridique de la vie des affaires au Zaïre ,
Cadicec/De Boecke Université, 1996, p. 313. - 28 -

i)Les droits énoncés aux articles78 et79 do ivent être lus à la lumière des obligations

o 84
découlant de l’article premier de l’ordonnance-loi n 66-341 , également reproduit à la

page5 du plan. Cet article fait obligation à M. Diallo d’établir le siège de ses sociétés

en RDC, ainsi que de tenir des assemblées générales en RDC.

ii) En procédant à son arrestation puis à son expulsion, la RDC a, dans les faits, mis M. Diallo

dans l’incapacité de jouir de ce droit. L’assemblée générale devait se réunir enRDC;

M.Diallo avait été expulsé du pays; sur un plan pratique, il lui devenait impossible de

prendre réellement part et de voter aux assemblées générales de ses sociétés. Nous ne

disons certes pas que M.Diallo était dans l’impossibilité de voter par procuration ou par
34

correspondance, mais dans la mesure où il s’agit ici de sociétés détenues par un actionnaire

unique, lequel actionnaire et gérant unique avait été frappé d’une mesure d’expulsion,

l’impossibilité qu’il y avait de tenir l’assemblée générale est tout à fait évidente.

22. Or ces différents droits de contrôle, de surveillance et de gestion sont à l’évidence des

droits propres de l’actionnaire, exactement comme le droit de «constituer, contrôler et gérer»

énoncé au paragraphe2 de l’articleIII du traité d’amitié examiné dans l’affaire ELSI. Le

paragraphe2 de l’articleIII dudit traité d’am itié dispose dans le passage qui nous intéresse ⎯

lequel figure en haut de la page 6 de mon plan :

«Les ressortissants, sociétés et associations de chacune des Hautes Parties
contractantes seront autorisés, en conformité des lois et règlements applicables à
l’intérieur des territoires de l’autre Haute Pa rtie contractante, à constituer, contrôler et
gérer des sociétés et associations de cette autre Haute Partie contractante en vue de

poursuivre des activités touchant la fabrication ou la transformation industrielles…»

ou d’autres activités.

23. La Cour se rappellera que, dans l’affaire ELSI, l’Italie protesta contre le fait que les droits

à la protection et la sécurité constantes ainsi que la clause de la nation la plus favorisée figurant aux

paragraphes 1 et 3 de l’article V du traité d’am itié ont été accordés uniquement au sujet des biens

appartenant à la société sans créer de droit pour les actionnaires, mais aucune protestation de cette

sorte n’a été soulevée relativement au paragraphe2 de l’articleIII. Pour reprendre les termes de

M.Lowe, ce paragraphe2 de l’articleIII est «cla irement un droit des actionnaires. On ne saurait

84
OG, annexe 35. - 29 -

soutenir qu’il s’agit là d’un droit conféré à la so ciété ; et il est difficile de souscrire logiquement à

l’idée que ce droit pourrait être conféré à une soci été que des actionnaires constituent, contrôlent et

gèrent.» 85 [Traduction du Greffe.]

24. M. F.A. Mann a fait la même remarque : «Même le plus fervent partisan de l’expression

verbeuse doit admettre que le droit «de contrôle r et gérer» ne peut être garanti que pour

l’actionnaire», à savoir pour l’actionnaire uni que en l’espèce, «plutôt que pour la société

elle-même.» 86 [Traduction du Greffe.]

25. On peut dire précisément la même chose ici en ce qui concerne les droits de surveillance

et de contrôle énoncés aux articles 71 et 75 du décr et de 1887, ainsi que dans les autres articles sur

lesquels j’ai déjà appelé l’atten tion de la Cour. Le fait que ces dr oits découlent du droit interne et

non d’un traité ne peut nullement modifier leur nature et les transformer en droits de la société et

non de l’actionnaire.

35 26. Par ailleurs, l’affaire ELSI établit qu’un acte visant une société est susceptible de violer le

droit de contrôle et de gestion d’un actionnaire. Ainsi, soulignant les répercussions de la

réquisition, la Cour conclut (par.70): «Il est i ndéniable que la réquisiti on de «l’usine et des

équipements connexes» d’une entreprise doit normale ment équivaloir à une privation, du moins

pour une part importante, du droit de contrôler et de gérer.»

27. En l’espèce, la Cour examine de manière pr agmatique ce que constituent le contrôle et la

gestion afin de se prononcer sur le point de savoir si , dans le cas où l’objet sur lequel ils portent est

supprimé dans les faits, il s’ensuit qu’il y a atteinte au droit de contrôle et de gestion.

28. Eh bien, la situation, en l’espèce, concer nant les faits allégués par la Guinée est encore

bien plus évidente : c’est l’actionnaire qui est habilité par le droit applicable
à surveiller, contrôler

et gérer ce qui a été, en réalité, écarté de la scène.

a) En détenant, puis en expulsant M. Diallo, la RDC a cherché à l’empêcher, et l’a effectivement

empêché, d’exercer ses droits de contrôle, de surveillance et de gestion. Il ne pouvait pas

85Lowe, «Shareholders’ Rights to Control and Manage: from Barcelona Traction to ELSI», dans Liber
Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda, N. Ando et al. (dir. de publ.), 2002, p. 269.

86F.A. Mann, «Foreign Investment in the International Court of Justice : The ELSI Case», AJIL vol. 86, p. 97-98.
Voir également sir ArthurWatts, «Nationality of Claims: So me Relevant Concepts», dans V.Lowe et M.Fitzmaurice,
Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, Grotius, Cambridge, 1996, p. 435. - 30 -

contrôler, surveiller ou gérer ses sociétés, de mani ère réellement sérieuse, depuis la Guinée. Et

même s’il avait été en mesure de nommer un nouveau «gérant» et un «commissaire» ⎯ or, il ne

l’était pas, du fait qu’il manqua it de moyens financiers ⎯, il était toutefois privé du droit de

nommer celui de son choix, en violation des articles65 et67 du décret de1887, et on ne

pouvait attendre de lui qu’il remette ou abandonne la gestion de ses sociétés à quelque tierce

partie.

b) Si j’ai bien saisi les arguments développés hier par M.Mazyambo, la RDC considère qu’une

expulsion ne constitue pas une ingérence dans l es droits des actionnaires. Cette thèse est par

principe douteuse, mais cela importe peu en l’espèce, l’intention précise à l’origine de la

détention et de l’expulsion de M. Diallo étant de l’empêcher d’exercer ses droits de contrôle, de

surveillance et de gestion, parmi lesquels bien évidemment le droit de contrôler le déroulement

des diverses procédures locales. La détention et l’expulsion de M. Diallo sont directement dues

à la lettre adressée au ministre de la justice le 29 août 1995 par Shell Za ïre, dans laquelle celle-

ci demandait que des mesures soient prises au sujet de l’arrêt Africontainers, arrêt qui

concernait l’une des sociétés de M.Diallo; M.Forteau vous a déjà parlé de cette lettre 87.

M.Diallo a été expulsé précisément parce qu’il avait, et exerçait, les droits de contrôler, de
36

surveiller et de gérer ses deux sociétés.

c) Cette expulsion a eu ⎯encore une fois, telle semble avoir été l’intention ⎯ des effets

dramatiques sur les deux sociétés, lesquelles fu rent définitivement empêchées de poursuivre

leurs activités, y compris le recouvrement des créances de la société.

d) Et là, de nouveau, l’affaire ELSI constitue un précédent utile, car l’une des précisions apportées

dans la décision est l’accent mis par la Chambre sur l’intention qui était à l’origine de l’acte

illicite allégué (par. 70). Mettant l’accent sur l’in tention à l’origine de la réquisition de l’usine

d’ELSI, la Chambre conclut :

«Comme la réquisition avait donc pour dessein d’empêcher Raytheon d’exercer,
pendant sixmois décisifs, ce qui constitu ait à l’époque l’un des aspects les plus
importants de son droit de contrôler et de gérer l’ELSI, la question se pose de savoir si
la réquisition était conforme aux exigences du paragraphe2 de l’articleIII du traité

de 1948.»

87
MG, annexe 166. - 31 -

L’affaire n’ayant ensuite pas abouti au regard des faits, il n’y eut, en l’occurrence, aucune

conclusion à la violation du paragraphe 2 de l’article III.

29. Mais nous n’en sommes pas à ce stade en l’espèce et l’important pour le moment, c’est

de ne pas nous égarer dans des questions de f ond, dont celle de l’étendue du préjudice que la

violation de son droit à ne pas être détenu et expulsé arbitrairement et celle de ses droits de

contrôle, de surveillance et de gestion de ses de ux sociétés ont causé à M. Diallo. Pour les besoins

actuels, tout ce qu’il faut démontrer, c’est ceci :

a) Il faut, en premier lieu, établir l’existen ce d’un droit à ne pas être détenu et expulsé

arbitrairement et que ce droit n’a pas été respecté. En vérité, il n’y a pas de débat en tant que

tel, il n’y a pas de débat du tout, quant à l’exis tence de ce droit et la RDC n’a pas contesté le

droit de la Guinée à exercer sa protection diplomatique à ce sujet.

b) En second lieu, il faut démontrer l’existence des droits des actionnaires et que ces droits n’ont

pas été respectés. Là encore, les Parties s’accordent à reconnaître à tout le moins que la Guinée

peut, au moins en théorie, exercer un droit à la protection diplomatique en ce qui concerne les

droits des actionnaires. Et nous estimons que la RDC n’a tout simplement pas répondu aux

arguments de la Guinée concernant la nature et l’étendue de ces droits en l’espèce.

30. Bien entendu, les questions de fait objet d’un débat acharné entre les Parties ne manquent

pas en l’espèce, mais ces questions ne sont pas à trancher pour le moment.

Madame le président, ceci met un terme à mon exposé sur ce point et je vous saurais gré de
37

bien vouloir appeler à la barre M. Pellet, afin qu’il puisse au moins commencer sa plaidoirie avant

la pause de ce matin. Je vous remercie de votre attention.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci Monsieur Wordsworth. Je donne la parole à M. Pellet.

M. PELLET : Je vous remercie, Madame le président.

IV. Protection of Mr. Diallo by Guinea in his capacity as a shareholder in Congolese
companies for damage suffered by those companies

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, as Mr.Wordsworth has just stated, the case

before us today gives the Court an opportunity to clarify issues of fundamental importance

regarding the diplomatic protection of companies in contemporary international law, issues that - 32 -

were touched upon but not finally resolved in Barcelona Traction, still the flagship case in this

area.

2. In its 1970 Judgment the Court asked itself wh ether, “for reasons of equity, a State should

be able, in certain cases, to take up the protection of its nationals, shareholders in a company which

has been the victim of a violation of interna tional law”, in particular “when the State whose

responsibility is invoked is the national State of the company” ( Barcelona Traction, Light and

Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, I.C.J. Reports 1970, Judgment , p.48, para.92) . This

eminent Court did not answer the question directly ⎯ it did not arise in that case. However, it does

arise today and it seems to me almost beyond disput e that, in the special circumstances of our case

at all events, the answer must be in the affirmative.

3. Indeed, we are precisely in the situation that the Court had expressly ruled out in 1970.

Moreover BT ⎯ the familiar name given by international lawyers to Barcelona Traction ⎯ was a

limited company, a very special category of legal entity characterised inter alia by a complex and

fluctuating body of shareholders, whereas Mr.Diallo’s companies are private limited liability

companies (SPRL), in which intuitu personae has a fundamental role.

38 I. Guinea can extend its diplomatic protection to the shareholder of a c
ompany
having the nationality of the respondent State

A. The exception to the rule of the non-protection of shareholders in the 1970 Judgment of
the Court

4. Madam President, if the DRC is to be believed, the facts of the Barcelona Traction case

are disconcerting in their simplicity: “In that case, the Applicant, Belgium, claimed to be
88
protecting the Belgian shareholders of a co mpany which did not have that nationality.” One

point, that is all ⎯ and that is a great deal too brief, if only because our opponents gloss over an

essential fact, which no one disputed ( Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,

Second Phase, I.C.J. Reports 1970, Judgment, pp. 42-44, paras. 71-76): BT had the nationality of a

third State (it was Canadian), whereas Mr.Diallo’s two companies, Africom-Zaire and

88
POG, p. 47, para. 2.03: see also, for example, p. 97, para. 2.95. - 33 -

Africontainers-Zaire, have the nationality of the Respondent itself (they are Congolese ⎯ at the

89
time they were Zairean) ⎯ which no one disputes either .

5. Without doubt, therefore, we are in the exception hypothesis ⎯ what is commonly called

the “substitution” hypothesis ⎯ envisaged by the Court in its 1970 Judgment:

⎯ it starts by restating the theory that in such circumstances “a State should be able, in certain

cases, to take up the protection of its nationals, shareholders in a company which has been the

victim of a violation of international law” (I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 48, para. 92);

⎯ without making a clear decision on its sanctioni ng by positive law, the Court notes that

“[w]hatever the validity of this theory may be, it is certainly not applicable to the present case,

since Spain is not the national State of Barcelona Traction” (ibid.);

⎯ the Court explains nonetheless that “[in] view , however, of the discretionary nature of

diplomatic protection, considerations of equity”, which would justify the exception. “cannot

require more than the possibility for a protector State to interven e, whether it be the national

State of the company, by virtue of the general rule . . ., or, in a secondary capacity, the national

State of the shareholders who claim protection” (ibid., p. 48, para. 94: emphasis added).

39 In other words, one of the factors explaining the rejection of protection for the Belgian

shareholders of BT is the fact that in that case Canada could exercise its protection (though in ways

other than legal action). This is out of the questi on in the case before us: it is quite simply absurd

to think that the DRC might extend its diplomatic protection in favour of Africom and

Africontainers against . . . the DRC.

6. Let me say in passing that this is exactly what we wrote in the passage cited yesterday by

Professor Mazyambo 90from the textbook of which I am one of the co-authors: there we state that

the national State of a company cannot act by way of diplomatic protection when at the same time

it is the perpetrator of the internationally wrongful act 91. On the other hand we give the question

whether the State of which the majority sharehol ders of a company are nationals can extend its

89
See MG, p. 79, para. 4.12, p. 96, para. 4.59; POG, p. 13, para. 1.08, or p. 47, para. 2.01; OG, p. 30, para. 2.05,
p. 33, para. 2.13.
90
CR 2006/50, p. 49, para. 20. See also POG, p. 59, para. 2.23.
91Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, Droit international public (Nguyen Quoc Dinh ), 6thed., Paris, LGDJ, 1999,
p. 774; see also 7th ed., 2002, p. 811. - 34 -

protection to them and against the national State of the company precisely the same affirmative

answer 92 as Guinea has in the present case (and as the C ourt gave in the 1970 Judgment). As

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice wrote in the separate opinion that he appended to the Judgment, in a case of

this kind “the normal rule of intervention onl y on behalf of the company by the company’s

93
government becomes not so much inapplicable as irrelevant or meaningless in the context” .

These are considerations, of common sense as much as of “equity”, that provide the explanation for

the exception to the “normal rule”, an exception which your distinguished Court rightly refrained

from applying in the Barcelona Traction case.

B. The customary nature of diplomatic protection for shareholders of a company with the

nationality of the internationally responsible State

7. Madam President, in its Memorial Guinea has referred to a large number of arbitral

awards spread over a considerable period, which establish that the shareholders of a company can

enjoy the diplomatic protection of their own national State as regards the national State of the

94
company when that State is responsible for an internationally wrongful act against them . The

40 Congo does not deny this, but asserts that “these old arbitrations... are based on specific

conventional procedures which ca nnot be transposed into the ordinary law of diplomatic

protection” 95. Two comments on this “defence”, Madam President, in telegraphic style because we

certainly have very little time (I note in this connection in passing that, in BT, the Court heard

pleadings by our illustrious predecessors at forty-three sittings in the first phase and at sixty-four in

the second (I.C.J. Reports 1964, pp.9-10 and I.C.J. Reports 1970, p.7, para.7. I.C.J. Pleadings,

Barcelona Traction, Vol. II-III and VIII-X). We are far short of that):

(1) some of these arbitrations do refer to the prin ciples of justice, but this was common currency at

the time and there is no doubt that the tribunals intended to apply, and did apply, the law in

force as they saw it; and

92
Ibid., p. 774 (1999) or pp. 811-812 (2002).
93Ibid., p. 72, para. 14.

94See MG, pp.84-90, paras.4.30-4.44; s ee also OG, pp.50-51, para.2.53. See inter alia United States-Peru
Mixed Commission, S.A., 26 February 1870, Ruden, in J.B. Moore, International Arbitrations, II, p. 1653; arbitration by
MacMahon, 24July1875, Delagoa Railway, RIAA, Vol. III, p.637; arbitration by H.St rong, M.Dickinson, D.Castro
(then J. Rosa Pacas), El Triunfo (case concerning the Salvador Commercial Company ), 8May 1902, RIAA, Vol.XV,

p. 467 or arbitration by Sir Herbert Sisnett, Shufeldt, 24 July 1930, RIAA, Vol. II, p. 1098.
95POG, p. 69, para. 2.46. - 35 -

(2) it is obvious that, in order to assess their competence, the tribunals in these cases took the

agreement submitting the dispute to them as the basis ⎯ but none of these agreements

mentioned how the problem that concerns us should be solved. Thus, for example, the

agreement in the Shufeldt case confined itself, apart from the rules of procedure, to stating the

questions put to the tribunal, in particular wh ether “P.S. Shufeldt [has] the right to claim

96
pecuniary indemnification” . Such a question in no way prejudices the tribunal’s answer; this

was doubtless in favour of protection “by substitution”.

Th8e. Baasch and Römer 97 and Jacob Henriquez 98 cases, both decided by the Mixed

Dutch-Venezuelan Commission, on which the C ongo laid great stress in its preliminary

objections 99 and to which ProfessorMazyambo referred yesterday morning 100, cannot refute the

41 “trend”, which is very firm and in any event fa vourable to the exception, to say the least. These

two decisions are clearly at odds with the solutions adopted by the other Venezuelan Commissions,

which for the most part favoured the jus standi of shareholders or partners in local companies ⎯

101
i.e., Venezuelan law .

9. As early as 1934, following an in-depth anal ysis of the jurisprudence, Charles de Visscher

wrote:

“In vain would the defendant State object that the company had its nationality.

It will be replied that this nationality is separate from that of the shareholders solely
for the purpose of legal protection that the local law has proved powerless to
guarantee. Only then can international action open the way to compensation demanded

for foreign interests. To reason otherwise is to give legal personality effects that
compromise the very purpose for which it was constituted; it is to exploit an abstract
idea at the expense of the only realities that justify its use.” 102 [Translation by the

Registry]

9See agreement dated 2 November 1929, RIAA, Vol. II, p. 1081.

9Dutch-Venezuelan Commission, 1903 award, Baasch and Römer, RIAA, Vol. X, p. 723.

9Dutch-Venezuelan Commission, 1903 award, Jacob M. Henriquez, RIAA, Vol. X, p. 727.
99
POG, pp. 94-95, para. 2.90.
100
CR 2006/50, p. 55, para. 48.
10See Mixed United States-Ven ezuelan Commission, 1903 award, Kunhardt, RIAA , Vol.IX, p.171 or Mixed
Italian-Venezuelan Commission, 1903 award, Massardo, Carbone & Co., RIAA , Vol. , . 38; see also

Lucius C. Caflisch, La protection des sociétés commerciales et des intérêts indirects en droit international publ,c
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1969, pp. 182-183.
10“De la protection diplomatique des ac tionnaires d’une société contre l’Etat sous la législation duquel cette

société s’est constituée”, RDILC, Vol.15, 1934, pp.641-642. On the same li nes see also, for example: J.M.Jones,
“Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who are Shareholders in Foreign Companies”, BYBIL, Vol.26, 1949, p.255;
Lucius C. Caflisch, La protection des sociétés commerciales et des intérêts indirects en droit international publ,c
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1969, p. 192. - 36 -

10. This was the situation when the Court adopted its judgment in 1970. Subsequent

practice, conventional or jurisprudential, about which our opponents are careful to say nothing, has

dispelled any uncertainty, if uncertainty there were, on the positive nature of the “exception”.

Thus, for example, Article25, paragra ph 2b, of the 1965 Washington Convention ⎯ the ICSID

Convention ⎯ accepts that a local company “ because of foreign control, . . . should be treated as a

national of another Contracting State ” for the purposes of the protection offered by the Convention,

and many bilateral treaties for the enco uragement and protection of investment 103, including those

42 104 105
entered into by the Congo , or even multilateral treaties include similar clauses. In accordance

with these provisions the jurisprudence, starting with the ICSID 106or the Iran-United States Claims

103
See, for example, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the
reciprocal protection and encouragement of investment, 14 Novemb er 1991, Art. VII, para. 8. For an application of this
provision see Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/13), BP America Production Company, Pan American Sur SRL, Pan American Fueguina SRL and Pan
American Continental SRL v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8), Decision on Jurisdiction,
27 July 2006, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/PanAmerican_BP-Argentine-Juri….

104See for example Articles I c) and III 2)of the bilateral treaty on the reciprocal protection and encouragement of
investment with the United States of America datA e1g984t,

http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_demo_rep_congo.pdf; the first Article othe bilateral treaty with
France dated 5 October 1972, http://www.uncta d.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/france_zaire_fr.pdf; the first Article of
the bilateral treaty with Switzerland dated 10 March 1972,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_zaire_fr… or the first Article of the bilateral treaty with
Germany dated 18 March 1969, http:// www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_congo_fr.pdf. See also
Article1, paragraph2, of the treaty with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union da ted 17 February 2005 (not yet
entered into force), reproduced in draft Lawle5578/ 00 approving agreements betw een the Belgium-Luxembourg

Economic Union and certain third countries concerning the reciprocal protection and en couragement of investment,
http://www.chd.lu/servlet/ShowAttachment?mime=application%2fpdf&id=8446….
105
See for example Article 1117 of the NAFTA.
106See inter alia: Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Case

No. ARB/87/3), Award, 27 June 1990, ICSID Rev.— FILJ , Vol.6, 1991, pp.526 et seq.; American Manufacturing &
Trading, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (Case No. ARB/91/1), Award, 21 February 1997, ICSID Reports,
Vol. 5, pp. 14 et seq .; Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi (Case No. ARB/95/3) and Award,
10 February 1999, ICSID Rev.— FILJ , Vol.15, 2000, pp.457 et seq.; Lanco International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic
(Case No.ARB/97/6), preliminary decision on jurisdiction, 8December 1998, ILM, Vol.40, 2001, pp457 et seq .;
Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Case No.ARB/97/7) , preliminary objections, decision, 25January2000,

ICSID Rev. — FILJ, Vol. 16, 2001, pp. 212 et seq.; Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. Republic
of Estonia, Award, 25June2001, http://www.worldbank.org /icsid/cases/genin.pdf, paras.319-329; Compañía de Aguas
del Aconquija S. A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/97/3), Cancellation, Award, 3 July 2002,
ICSID Rev. — FILJ, Vol. 19, 2004, pp. 89 et seq.; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/01/12), decision
on jurisdiction8ecembe2r003, http://www.worldba nk.org/icsid/cases/azurix-decision-en.pdf.; CMS Gas
Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (Case No.ARB/01/8), preliminary objections, decision, 17July2003,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Decision_english.pdf.; LG & E Energy Corp, LG & E Capital Corp. and

LG & E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/02/1), preliminary objections, decision, 30 April 2004,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/lge-decision-en.pdf.; Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria (Case
No.ARB/03/24), decision on jurisdiction, 8February 2005, ICSID Rev.— FILJ , Vol.20, 2005, pp.262 et seq.; Suez,
et al. v. Argentine Republic (Case No. ARB/03/19) , decision on jurisdiction3ugu2st06,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/ARB0319_DecisionJurisdiction03….; Pan American Energy LLC, and
BP Argentina Exploration Company v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13), BP America Production

Company, Pan American Sur SRL, Pan American Fu eguina, SRL and Pan American Continental SRL v. The Argentine
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8), Decision on Jurisdiction,2 J0276,
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/PanAmerican_BP-Argentina-Juri….; in particular para. 218. - 37 -

107
Tribunal Reports , confirms that a shareholder can seise an international tribunal in respect of

damage to a local company 108.

11. I am well aware, Madam President, Members of the Court, that these treaty provisions

and this jurisprudence, which are virtually unanimous, do not constitute the direct application of the

principles and rules governing diplomatic protecti on, and the ICSID tribunals do not fail to recall

109
43 this . It is nonetheless true that the number of these treaties and of these awards is overwhelming

and that all endorse rules and principles concei ved on the same model inspired by the same

concerns, and serve as illustrations of the “objectio n” advocated by the Court 36 years ago. Even

assuming that it did not then reflect positive law, wh ich I believe not to be true, there can be no

doubt, to reiterate what the Court said in 1969, that “it has since acquired a broader basis” (North

Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.41, para.69) which makes it today

opposable to the DRC. As explained by Professo r Dugard, Special ILC Rapporteur on diplomatic

protection “the fact that the cases relied on for this exception are based on special agreements does

not deprive them of value in the law-formation process” and makes it possible to affirm that the

twin requirements for the crystallization of a customary rule, usus and opinion juris, have been

met 110.

12. The possibility of protection “by substitutio n” is therefore no longer in doubt today.

And, in view of the Congolese nationality of the two companies of which Mr.Diallo is sole

107
See ArticleVII, para.2, of the Algiers declaoation of 1981, and in particular: William Bikoff and George
Eisenpresser v. The Islamic Republic of Iran , award n138-82-2, 22 June 1984, Iran-US CTR, Vol.7, pp.4 et seq.;
Blount Brothers Corporation v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. , Award No.215-52-1,
28 February 1986, Iran-US CTR, Vol. 10, pp. 60 et seq.; Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
Partial Award No. 506-308-2, 18 February 1991, Iran-US CTR, Vol. 26, pp. 65 et seq.
108
See also, for example, decision No.4 taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation
Commission, para. (e), http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/decision/dec_04.pdf.
109
See, for example, Azuriz Corp . v. Argentine Republic (case No.ARB/01/12), Decision on Competence,
8 December 2003, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/azurix-decision-en.pdf, para.72; LG & E Energy Corp.,
LG&E Capital Corp and LG & E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic (case No.ARB/02/1), Preliminary
Objections, Decision, April004, ht tp://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/lge-decision-en.pdf, para5.2; and
PanAmerican Energy LLC, and BP Ar gentina Exploration Company v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID case
No. ARB/03/13), BP America Production Company, PanAmerican Sur SRL, PanAmerican Fueguina, SRL and

Pan American Continental SRL v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID case No.ARB/04/8), Decision on Jurisdiction,
27 July 2006, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/PanAmerican_BP-Argentina-Juri…, paras. 216-217.
11Seventh report on diplomatic prot ection, A/CN.4/567, para.64 (a); see also his Fourth report on diplomatic

protection, A/CN.4/530, para.84; see also the separate opinion of JudgeGros in the Barcelona Traction case, I.C.J.
Reports 1970, pp.277-278, or Richard B.Lillich, “The Rigidity of Barcelona”, AJIL, Vol. 65, 1971, pp. 525-532, and
Stephen M. Schwebel, “The Influence of Bilateral Investments Treaties on Customary International Law”, ASIL,
Proceedings, 2004, pp. 27-30. - 38 -

associate and managing director, Guinea indisputably has jus standi enabling it to stand squarely

behind its national in respect of the prejudice suffered by his companies.

Madam President, this is perhaps the moment for a well-deserved break.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Pellet.

La Cour va se retirer et l’audience reprendra plutôt rapidement.

L’audience est suspendue de 11 h 30 à midi

44 Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président: Veuillez vous asseoir. Le président,

le juge Koroma et le juge Buergenthal devant assister à une importante cérémonie ailleurs, ils ne

seront pas en mesure d’être sur le siège pour la seconde partie de la séance d'aujourd’hui. Dans ces

circonstances, le président m’a demandé de présider le reste de l’audience d’aujourd’hui et je vous

demande, M. Pellet, de reprendre votre plaidoirie.

M. PELLET : Je vous remercie infiniment, Monsieur le président.

II. The circumstances of the case reinforce the applicability of

protection “by substitution” in the present case

13. Before the break I observed that the possibility of protection by substitution was no

longer in doubt today even if it might have been in 1970, which I do not believe, and I stated that

Guinea indisputably has the necessary jus standi to enable it to stand squarely behind its national in

respect of the prejudice suffered by his companies. Madam President, whatever our opponents may

say about it, this well-established rule is comple tely in keeping with equity, and the special

characteristics of Mr.Diallo’s companies pres cribe its application in our case even more

pressingly.

A. The role of equity

14. In its Memorial, Guinea noted in passing th at after recalling the “general rule” that only

the national State of the company can exercise its diplomatic protection with regard to a State

responsible for a breach of international law, the Court nevertheless, in its 1970 Judgment,

“expressly reserved the possibility that, for considerations of equity, the State of the

shareholders in the company in question re tains the right in certain circumstances, - 39 -

including in particular in situations co mparable to the present one, to exercise its
diplomatic protection, independently of th e violation of the shareholders’ direct
rights”111.

Seizing upon that sentence, which nevertheless strictly reflects the position of the Court, the DRC

pretends to be indignant at “[t]he argumen t of the Republic of Guinea founded on equity

112
contra legem” .

45 15. In the first place, the Congo’s position simply begs the question: the exception to the

principle of exclusive protection by the State of the nationality of the company is well established

in contemporary international law; it is therefore not a matter of equity contra legem as the Congo

113
would have us believe , but infra legem . This sort of equity which, far from contradicting the

legal rules, underpins and justifies them, has been mentioned by the Court and by its Members,

most of whom endorsed its position ( I.C.J. Reports 1970 , separate opinion of

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, pp. 71-75, paras. 13-20; separate opinion of J udge Jessup, pp. 191-193,

paras.51-52; separate opinion of JudgeTanaka, p.134; see also the separate opinion of

Judge Wellington Koo attached to the Judgment of 24 July 1964, Barcelona Traction (Preliminary

Objections), I.C.J. Reports 1964 , p.58, para.20. See MG, pp.93-96, paras.4.53-4.96, or OG,

p. 47, paras. 2.45-2.46) only as an explanation give n of the exception, its material source in a way.

The point, as the 1970Judgment also makes clear, is to make “a reasonable application” ( I.C.J.

Reports 1970, p. 48, para. 93) of the rules relating to diplomatic protection. The purpose is not to

deprive foreign shareholders in a company who have the nationality of all State responsible for the

internationally wrongful act of all possibility of protection.

16. Secondly, as to the substance, the Congo’s arguments are no sounder. According to it,

“[a]pplication of the solution advocated by the Republic of Guinea would in this case lead to an

inequitable result” 114:

⎯ it would result in a régime of discriminatory protection;

⎯ this “solution” would not take account of the conduct of Mr. Diallo; and

11MG, p. 93, para. 4.52.
112
POC, p. 88, A; see also, in the same terms: CR 2006/50, p. 54, para. 42 (Mazyambo).
113
POC, pp. 88-90, paras. 2.82-2.83.
11POC, p. 95, 2; see also: CR 2006/50, p. 55, para. 44 (Mazyambo). - 40 -

⎯ his “refusal” to exhaust the remedies availabl e in the DRC “would in any event render any

protection by substitution inequitable” 115.

With all the respect I have for our opponents, these objections are groundless and are even

somewhat absurd.

17. In the case of the first argument, that of the alleged incidences of “discrimination”

between shareholders who are protected and those who are not 116, they are inherent in the very

46 institution of diplomatic protection since the State has discretion to exercise or not to exercise its

protection. In any event, the problem does not arise in this case since Mr.Diallo is the only

shareholder of the two companies concerned.

18. The other two arguments, both of which pertain to Mr.Diallo’s conduct, are wholly

inadmissible:

⎯ the first concerns his alleged “dirty hands”: the Congo itself recognizes that clean hands are

not a condition of the admissibility of complaints, which, after some vicissitudes, the

117
International Law Commission was unanimous in firmly recognizing in 2005 ;

⎯ as to the affirmation that Mr. Diallo “refused” to exhaust all the remedies available in the DRC,

not only does it raise questions of fact to which my colleague and friend Jean-Marc Thouvenin

will be coming shortly, but it can have no impact whatsoever on the question of protection by

substitution.

B. The special characteristics of Mr. Diallo’s companies

19. Mr. President, not only is the exercise by Guinea of diplomatic protection in respect of

damage suffered by the companies in question in no way contrary to equity, but also the

admissibility of its action before the Court is pa rticularly compelling on account of the special

characteristics of these companies

⎯ that Mr. Diallo had to set up in Zaire; and

⎯ which are of a marked intuitu personae character.

115
POC, p. 100 (c); see also, in the same terms, CR 2006/50, p. 56, para. 50 (Mazyambo).
116See POC, pp. 97-98, paras. 2.95-2.97.

117J.Dugard, Sixth report on diplom atic protection, A/CN.4/546 and Report of the International Law
Commission, Fifty-seventh Session, 2006, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 10
(A/60/10), p. 110, para. 231. - 41 -

20. The alleged principle that diplomatic prot ection of the shareholders of a company having

the nationality of the responsible State is only possi ble if “incorporation in that State was required

118
by it as a precondition for doing business there” , this alleged principle is hardly substantiated in

positive law. Moreover, in the commentaries on Artic le 11 of its draft, affirming that requirement,

47 the International Law Commission shows its awareness of this. It is careful to state on the one

hand that the way in which the law has evolved in this area would suffice to “sustain a general

119
exception” to the rule of protection by the national State of the company alone , and, on the other,

that “it is not necessary that the law of that State require incorporation. Other forms of compulsion

120
might also result in a corporation being ‘required’ to incorporate in that State” .

21. In any event, in our case, the legal obliga tion well and truly exists. It results from the

121
first subparagraph of Article1 of the 1996 order-law relating to the headquarters of companies

whereby: “companies whose main operational h eadquarters is located in the Congo must have

their administrative headquarters in the Congo” [translation by the Registry] . And Article 2 even

required the transfer to the Congo of companies not fulfilling that condition at the date of entry into

force of the law.

22. There can then be no doubt that the incorporation of the companies in question in Zaire

was a “precondition” set by that country for their being able to “do business there”. To that initial

constraint a second was added which constitutes a ra ther strange feature of Congolese (or Zairean

as it then was) law. For if foreign investors have to incorporate their companies in the form of

companies under local law, such companies are nonetheless subject to a different and

discriminatory régime, and one much less favourable than the other companies under Zairean law.

23. As a specialist has written, “Law No .73-009 of 5January1973 known as the special

commerce law, substantially limits the access of foreigne rs to the commercial profession” and in

principle reserves “the monopoly of the exercise of commerce for Zaireans , more precisely for

‘individuals of Zairean nationality and for companies under Zairean law the capital of which

118Art. 11 of the ILC draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.
119
Ibid., p. 66, para. 12 of the commentary on Art. 11.
120
Ibid., p. 67, para. 12 of the commentary on Art. 11.
121OG, Ann. 35, p. 244. - 42 -

122
belongs entirely to Zaireans’” [translation by the Registry] . Special dispensations may be

granted to foreigners but, according to the same au thor, they come at the cost of “a thousand and

123
one administrative hassles” [translation by the Registry] and in return for the deposit of a

sizeable financial guarantee 124. It does not then appear conceivable that such “foreign national”

48 companies, subject in many respects to the lega l régime applicable to foreigners, under Congolese

law itself, should once more become exclusivel y national companies for the purposes of their

diplomatic protection.

24. While hardly national, having been incorporated in the Congo to meet the requirements

of that country’s law, Africom-Zaire and Africont ainers-Zaire also have the peculiarity of being

“private limited liability companies” (SPRL, sociétés privées à responsabilité limitée ), and not

limited liability companies (sociétés anonymes). Now only the latter (limited liability companies)

were at issue in the Barcelona Traction case ( I.C.J. Reports 1970, p.33, para.37 or p.34,

para.40), in which the Court emphasized in particular that “[t]he legal difference” between the

limited liability company and other sorts of company “is that for the limited liability company it is

the overriding tie of legal personality which is determinant; for the other associations, the

continuing autonomy of their several members” (ibid., p. 34, para. 40).

25. One of these differences is more particularly deserving of attention in the present case:

the shares of a joint-stock company are freely transferable while, as in the case of the associations

of individuals concerned by the 1970 Judgment, the shares of an SPRL “are not freely

transmissible” 125 [translation by the Registry] , as stipulated in Article36 of the Decree of

27 February 1887, amended in 1965 and in force in the Congo. This in one reason why these

SPRLs are regarded as a medium term between ass ociations of individuals and capital companies,

on account of the very marked intuitu personae character pervading their status and the legal

122
Roger Makela Massamba, Droit des affaires ⎯ Cadre juridique de la vie des affaires au Zaïre ,
Cadicec/De Boecke Université, 1996, p. 67; original emphasis.
12Ibid., p. 73.

12See Order-Law No. 66-260 of 24 April 1996 (see judges’ folder) and Art. 3 of the special law on commerce of
5 January 1973, amended on 10 July 1974 (see judges’ folder).

12Art. 36 of the Decree of 27 February 1887 on commercial companies (as amended in 1965); see also Arts. 57
and 58 (see judges’ folder). - 43 -

régime applicable to them (for example, the associates can in some cases be held personally liable

for the debts of the company 126).

26. A second peculiarity of the relations between Mr. Diallo and his companies is that they

were statutorily controlled and managed by one single person. Mr.Diallo was at once sole

managing director of the two companies ⎯ of which he directly or indirectly possessed

100percent of the capital ⎯ and by the same token their only associate. The upshot is a very

close interlinkage of the status of associate and of managing director of the two companies since

49 Mr. Diallo alone was authorized under Congolese law, in his capacities as associate and managing

127
director, to convene, participate in and vote in the general assemblies of the two companies .

This means that in fact and in law it was virtua lly impossible to distinguish Mr.Diallo from his

companies. Their fates were and are linked. A nd we can echo word for word the reasoning of the

Italy/United States Conciliation Commission, which, in the De Leon case, deduced from the fact

that

“Arthur De Leon became the sole owner of all the shares of stock and that his
personal capacity was merged completely with the joint stock corporation’s
property... that it is unavailing to ma ke a separation between the two sets of

property, and that, in the instant case, the claimant should be regarded as entitled to
claim, personally, with respect to the corporate rights accruing to him in their
entirety.”128

Furthermore, the confusion between the interests of Mr.Diallo and of his companies is further

aggravated by the fact that the purpose of the measures taken against him was precisely to deprive

129
those companies of any possibility of future action .

27. As a result, moreover, the Court’s hesitations in the Barcelona Traction case with respect

not to protection by substitution but to the diplomat ic protection of the shareholders of a foreign

company are “neutralized”:

⎯ any investment involves risks ⎯ including the risk that diplomatic protection may not be

exercised (I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 35, para. 43; p. 46, paras. 86 and 87; p. 50, para. 99)? Most

12Ibid., Arts. 103 and 106 (see judges’ folder).
127
Ibid., Arts. 78 to 88 (see judges’ folder).
128
Italo-American Conciliation Commission, 15 May 1962, De Leon, ILR, Vol. 40, p. 143.
12OG, pp. 23-24, paras. 1.56-1.60. - 44 -

certainly; but, here, the diplomatic protection of the company’s (notional) national State is not

uncertain but completely ruled out;

⎯ “the adoption of the theory of diplomatic prot ection of shareholders as such, by opening the

door to competing diplomatic claims, could create an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity

in international economic relations” (ibid., p. 49, para. 96)? Certainly again; but it could not be

so when all the shareholders are of the same nationality or, a fortiori, when, as is the case here,

just one shareholder exists and there are considerable limitations on the transmissibility of the

shares 13;

⎯ for the same reason, there can be no fearing any proliferation of “the claims to which
50

recognition of a general right of protection of foreign shareholders by their various national

States might give rise” (I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 50, para. 98; p. 38, para. 98).

28. Everything thus supports the conclusion, Members of the Court, in the specific case

before you, that it was possible for Guinea to protect Mr.Diallo’s rights ⎯ both as an individual

and as a shareholder whose rights have been violat ed by the internationally wrongful acts of the

Respondent, and, by substitution, in respect of the damage suffered by the companies, formally

Congolese (Zairean at the time), of which Mr. Diallo was the sole associate.

Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention. Mr.President, may I request you to

call Professor Jean-Marc Thouvenin to the Bar?

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de pr ésident: Je vous remercie, Monsieur Pellet,

pour votre exposé et j’invite M. Thouvenin à la barre.

M. THOUVENIN : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président.

V. The exhaustion of local remedies

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a very great honour for me to appear once more

before the Court and to speak as Counsel and Advocate of the Republic of Guinea.

2. It falls to me to discuss the Congo’s second preliminary objection, and I shall focus on the

exhaustion of local remedies, starting with three clarifications.

130
See above, para. 25. - 45 -

131
3. First, it was not “ the choice of the Republic of Guinea to submit a case to the Court” .

Nor does it aim to “use the Court” 132, as Maître Kalala asserted yesterday. It brought the matter to

the Court because it had no alternative. Three internal Guinean ministerial communications, dating

from the period preceding the filing of the Application, make this clear:

(i) As early as April 1996, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guinea took note of the fact

that Mr.Diallo had been expelled at a tim e when the proceedings instituted by his

51 companies were culminating in favourable judgm ents, the Minister deploring the fact that

“instead of seeing these judgments properly enforced, Mr. Diallo Cravate [had been] quite

simply arrested and expelled from Zaire, un ceremoniously and in patent violation of all

procedures in such matters” 133.

(ii) That same year, the Guinean Minister of Justice emphasized that Mr.Diallo “[had been]

concerned about exhausting domestic remedies, both amicable and contentious, before

seeking the diplomatic protection of his own St ate. However, he [had been] prevented

from following through the domestic remedy procedures because of his sudden

expulsion” 134.

(iii) In February 1997, the Minister for Forei gn Affairs observed that Mr. Diallo was unable to

take any useful step since he had been “prohibited from entering Zaire” 13.

4. Guinea does not appear before you out of choice, but because it had a duty to protect its

national, as stated by Guinea’s agent this morning, especially as Zaire deprived Mr.Diallo of the

protection afforded by the1961 Vienna Conventio n on Consular Relations, with the result that

Guinea had no other alternative for exercising its diplomatic protection.

5. I note, secondly, that the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies, recently upheld in your

Judgment of 31March2004 (see Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States),

Judgment of 31 March 2004, para. 40; see also Ambatielos, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953,

p. 10; Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America) Pre liminary Objections, Judgment,

13POC, p. 4, para. 0.07.
132
CR 2006/50, p. 42, para. 96.
133
MG, Ann. 203. See judges’ folder, tab 7.
13MG, Ann. 212. See judges’ folder, tab 8.

13MG, Ann. 216. See judges’ folder, tab 9. - 46 -

I.C.J. Reports1959 , p.27; Elettronica SiculaS.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy),

I.C.J. Reports1989 , p.42) and codified in Article14, of the ILC’s draft Articles on Diplomatic

Protection, is agreed upon by both Parties 136. Nor is it disputed that the rule “ought to be

137
understood in a rational manner” and is subject to numerous ex ceptions, which have moreover

52 138
been codified in Article 15 of the ILC’s draft Articles . The exhaustion of local remedies cannot

be required when there are no local remedies to exhaust 139. To say it in English: “It would be a

mistake to regard the rule as rigidly and inexorably established without possibility of reasonable

140
exceptions being recognized, particularly beyond the existing and accepted limitations.”

6. I believe that the Parties also concur that “The futility of local remedies must be

141
determined at the time at which they are to be used.”

7. And finally, my third point is that it will not have escaped the Court’s attention that three

separate “persons” are under Guinea’s protection in th is case. Its national, Mr. Diallo, but also the

two companies, of which Mr.Diallo was the sole manager and partner, Africom-Zaire and

Africontainers. As the causes of the futility of local remedies were the same for each of these three

persons, my presentation will take the form of th ree points, each of which can be included under

one or another or several of the five exceptions to the rule on exhausting local remedies, as codified

in Article 15, of the ILC’s draft.

8. With the benefit of those explanations, Mr. Vice-President, I will begin by showing that

136
MG, p. 97, para. 4.60; POC, p. 103, para. 3.0; CR 2006/50, p. 58, para. 4 (Kalala).
13Eliza [Montano] case (1863), International Arbitration Digest, Vol. II, p. 1637.

13MG, p. 100, para. 4.68; POC, p. 104, para. 3.03; WObsG, p. 60, para. 2.10; see judges’ folder, tab 10.

13Finnish Ships Arbitration , 9May1934, UNRIAA, Vol.III, p.1543; Panevesys-Saldutiskis Railway, P.C.I.J.
Series A/B No. 76, pp. 4-22; Ambiatielos Arbitral Award of 6 March 1956, UNRIIA, Vol. XII, pp. 91-124; Interhandel,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports1959 , pp.27-29; The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria ,
P.C.I.J. Series A/B No.77 , p.138, dissenting opinion of P.deVisscher; Certain Norwegian Loans , Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1957, p.39, separate opinion of SirHerschLauterpacht. See also the Hague Conference on the Codification of
International Law, 1929-1930, in doc. C.75.M.69.1929, pp.136-139, 171-172, 180, 182, 190, 192-193, 195, 206, 209,
216; in doc. C75(a).M.69(a).1929, p. 23; in doc. C.351(c).M.145(c).1930, p. 203.
140
C.F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law , Cambridge University Press, Second Ed.2003,
p. 203. See CR 2006/50, p. 60, para. 12 (Kalala).
141
C.F. Amerasinghe, The Exhaustion of Procedural Remedies in the Same Court, 1963, 12 ICLQ, pp. 1285-1312;
quoted in the Third Report on Dipl omatic Protection, A/CN.4/523, p. 8, para. 24; see also ECHR, Demirtepe v. France,
21 December 1999, No. 3482/97. See CR 2006/50, p. 60, para. 11 (Kalala). - 47 -

53 I. The DRC cannot object on the ground of non-exhaustion of local remedies in this case 142
because “The injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies”

A. Zaire deported Mr. Diallo to prevent him from using local remedies

9. Mr.Vice-President, as ProfessorMathiasForteau demonstrated earlier, there can be no

doubt on the fact: the Congolese State deliberatel y chose to deny access to its territory to

Mr. Diallo because of the legal proceedings that he had initiated on behalf of his companies.

10. Legal proceedings: that was what was characterized yesterday as “wrongful conduct

143 144
under Congolese law” or threats “to breach . . . public order” .

11. In these circumstances, to accuse Mr. Diallo of not having exhausted the remedies would

145
not only be manifestly “unreasonable” and “unfair” , but also an abuse of the rule regarding the

exhaustion of local remedies.

12. One of the bases of this rule lies in th e notion that a foreign national who freely chooses

to reside in a country must agree to abide by the local legal system. The link between the choice of

the place of residence by the foreign national, whether a natural or legal person, and the

corresponding obligation to accept its consequences is reflected in the commentary on the ILC’s

draft Article 14, which refers to the cases concerning Interhandel (I.C.J. Reports1959, p.27) and

146
Salem cases. In the Salem case, the arbitral tribun al found that: “As a rule, a foreigner must

acknowledge as applicable to himself the kind of ju stice instituted in the country in which he did

choose his residence”.

13. Conversely, however, if a State delibera tely chooses to remove a foreign national from

its territory, that is to say to deny him the right to reside there, because that foreign national is

seeking local redress, that State can no longer reasonably demand that that foreign national seek

redress only through the legal means available in its territory. International law does not impose

obligations which are impossible to meet. Mu ch less does it enable the State making this

obligation impossible to meet to turn the failure to meet it to its own advantage. The Permanent

142Art. 15 (d) of the ILC’s draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. See judges’ folder, tab 10.
143
CR 2006/50, p. 14.
144
CR 2006/50, p. 39, para. 88 (Kalala).
145Report of the International Law Commi ssion, Fifty-Eighth Session,2006, S up.10 (A/61/10), Art.15, p.77,
para. 1.

146UNRIIA, Vol. II, p. 1202. - 48 -

54 Court of International Justice found in1937 in the Factory at Chorzów case that it was a practice

generally accepted in international jurisprudence

“as well as by municipal courts, that one Party cannot avail himself of the fact that the

other has not fulfilled some obligation or has not had recourse to some means of
redress, if the former Party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling
the obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal which would have

been open to him” ( Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No.8, 1927 P.C.I.J
Series A, No. 9, p. 31).

14. Just recently, the ILC codified th is principle. According to paragraph (d), of draft

Article15, no objection can be made on the ground of the rule regarding the exhaustion of local

remedies if “the injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies”. In the

commentary, the commentary on this paragraph, it explains that the exception of manifest

impossibility relates, among other things, to circ umstances in which the respondent State prevents

the injured person from entering its territory 14. In the present case, Mr. Diallo was deprived of his

freedom, and removed from the territory precisely to prevent him from pursuing local remedies,

particularly on behalf of his companies.

B. The circumstances of Mr.Diallo’s deportation precluded him from pursuing Zairean

remedies for himself or for his companies

15. There is no doubt that when Zaire turned on Mr. Diallo, with his arrest in January 1988

and again in November1995, two periods of detention, the first lasting for a year in1988, the

second for over two months in1995, and then fina lly his arbitrary expulsion in January1996, it

was to punish a company manager who had ventur ed, on behalf of his companies, to bring

administrative and legal claims. In1988, whic h was the very time when he was claiming the

payment of money owed by the Zairean State, he was arrested and thrown into prison; in1995,

which was when court rulings had been made in his favour and he was seeking their enforcement

he was, once again, arrested, detained, and, this time, removed from Zairean territory.

16. The Diallo case is clearly one of those examples of “factual denial of access to local

148
remedies” referred to by John Dugard in his Third Report on Diplomatic Protection . In that

report, he notes that: “A State may prevent an injured alien from gaining factual access to its

147
A/CN.4/523.
148
A/CN.4/523. - 49 -

tribunals by, for instance, denying him entry to its territory or exposing him to dangers that make it

55 unsafe for him to seek entry to its territory.” 149 The ILC’s commentary on draft Article15,

paragraph (d), returns to this point: the obligation to exhaust local remedies does not apply when

“the injured person is prevented by the respondent State from entering its territory, either by law or

by threats to his or her personal safety, a nd thereby denying him the opportunity to bring

proceedings in local courts” 150.

17. Denial of entry or threats, says the In ternational Law Commission. Here, the incapacity

to act which is at issue results directly from both the threats weighing on the manager of the

companies and the denial of entry into the territory of which he was the object.

18. The Court will note that, while it is certain that Zaire wanted to prevent Mr. Diallo from

pursuing legal proceedings, it is just as clear that it has succeeded. In this respect, to paraphrase the

151
arbitral tribunal in the Biloune case: “Given the central role of [Mr.Diallo] in [managing the

proceedings of his companies], his expulsion fr om the country effectively prevented [his

companies] from further [exhausting local remedies].”

19. Mr.Vice-President, it should be added that the circumstances of Mr.Diallo’s expulsion

made it materially impossible for him to pursue any remedy whatsoever in Zaire.

20. I would agree with my opponent on one point: Mr.Diallo’s financial situation is, in

itself, without relevance to the rule regarding the exhaustion of local remedies 15. Rich or poor, no

matter: the rule is the same for all. But that is not the issue here. Guinea refers to Mr.Diallo’s

financial situation as a consequence of the acts of Zaire and, in particular, his arbitrary deportation

and denial of entry to the country. In such a case, as emphasized by Amerasinghe, when raising

poverty as an exception, “there may be consid erations of estoppel or waiver that may

operate . . .”153.

14Ibid, p. 38, para. 100.
150
Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Eighth Session, 2006, Sup. 10 (A/61/10), Art. 15, p. 83.
151
UNCITRAL, Biloune case, 27October1989 and 30June1990, YCA, Vol.XIX, 1994, p.14 and p.71,
para. 28.
15CR 2006/50, p. 62, para. 21 (Kalala).

15Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, op. cit., p. 215. - 50 -

21. I would note in this respect that the two Parties to this case have both ratified the African

Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. In the Rhaddo v. Zambia case 154, for example, whereas
56

the Zambian Government invoked the rule on the ex haustion of local remedies against the persons

it had deported, the Commission countered that the fact that the victims has been held in detention

before their sudden deportation “gave the complain ants no opportunity to establish the illegality of

these actions in the courts. Thus, the recourse referred to by the government under the Immigration

and Deportation Act was as a practical matter not available to the complainants.”

22. I know full well, Members of the Court, that the Congo likes to cast doubts on

155
Mr.Diallo’s poverty following his deportation. But speculate as our opponents may , the fact

remains.

23. Following his deportation, Mr. Diallo was able to follow certain proceedings in Zaire for

a while from a distance, assisted by unpaid volunteer lawyers. Such things happen. Nevertheless,

he soon found it impossible to keep track of a cour t case in the Congo. That is the conclusion of a

letter of April 1996 from the Guinean Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General of the

country’s Presidency, “Mr. Diallo is currently living in Conakry without any income and can only

count on the State of Guinea to see his rights upheld” 15.

157
24. This of course perturbs our opponents , who made much yesterday of the negotiations

held in 1997. But the 1997 nego tiations, in which representatives of Mr. Diallo’s companies took

part, certainly do not prove that the man had any financial wherewithal. Those representatives

were acting on the recommendation of the Guinean Embassy in Zaire and Mr. Diallo had no part in

it. This is apparent from a letter of 1July 1997 signed by Guinea’s Ambassador in Kinshasa no

158
less . Moreover, when those representatives deci ded to write a summary of their discussions,

159
they sent it to the Ambassador and not to Mr.Diallo . You .will find these documents in the

judge’s folder, tabs11 and 12. As to the statem ent that Mr.Diallo ordered them to break off

154African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, communication No. 71/92 (1996).
155
POC, p. 80, paras. 3.33-3.34 and 3.36.
156
MG, Ann. 203.
157POC, p. 79, para. 3.29; CR 2006/50, p. 62, para. 20 (Kalala).

158MG, Ann. 223.

159MG, Ann. 213. - 51 -

160
57 negotiations , it is both absurd and inadmissible. Absurd in that Mr.Diallo had everything to

gain by seeing these talks through to the end. Inadmissible because there is not a shred of evidence

to support it.

25. Guinea did not have to finance domestic legal proceedings. There is no rule in

international law which obliged it to do so. As Mr. Diallo had no money, things remained as they

were.

26. Members of the Court, no matter which way we look at it, the Diallo case shows that his

attempts to seek redress were thwarted w ithin the meaning of Article15, paragraph (d), of the

International Law Commission’s draft Articles. Th is, Mr. Vice-President, brings me to my second

point, which shows that:

II. There were no “reasonably available local remedies” to
challenge Mr. Diallo’s removal from the country 161

27. In its written pleadings, if not yesterday, although nothing precise was said about it

then 162, the Congo affirmed that Mr.Diallo coul d have challenged the deportation order by

applying further up the administrative hierarchy, “w ith a prospect of success within the framework

of Zaire’s domestic legal order” 163. In support, cases of persons gr anted the right to return to

Congolese territory after having been deported were cited.

28. This argument is shaky. The Court will note that while the DRC included in the judges’

folder the deportation notice for Mr.Yaghi 16, the one for Mr.Diallo cannot be found. And with

165
good reason: Mr.Diallo was in fact forcibly repatriated for “illegal residence” in the country.

Why was his deportation dealt with as a “repatriation” when, legally, he could not be “repatriated”?

In any case, what should be noted is that, according to Article13 of the Legislative Order

16CR 2006/50, p. 26, para. 45 (Kalala).
161
Art. 15, para. (a) of the ILC’s draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.
162
CR 2006/50, p. 41, para. 94 (Kalala).
16POC, p. 91, para. 368.

16Judges’ folder Congo, tab 2.

16MG, Ann. 197. - 52 -

58 concerning Immigration Control of 12September 1983, such a measure “ shall not be subject to

166
appeal” .

29. The DRC invokes “a general principle of administrative law”, while acknowledging that

that is, at best, “an informal possibility” 167. Article14, paragraph2, of the ILC’s draft Articles

provides that “‘Local remedies’ means legal remedies which are open to the injured person”. That

is not so of an “informal possibility”.

30. The Court might note that the Congo’s distinguished Minister of Justice indicated

168
yesterday that, with respect to deportation, his country “has always pardoned” . Possibly, but that

just goes to show that there is no mechanism for redress; merely pardons.

31. Scholarly opinion, however, has always been hostile to including extra-legal remedies,

169
whose purpose is “to obtain a favour and not to vindicate a right” . Local remedies “comprise all

forms of recourse as of right, including administrative remedies of a legal nature ‘but not

extra-legal remedies or remedies as of grace’” 170. Administrative remedies which are neither legal

nor quasi-legal and of a discretionary nature are not therefore taken into account by the rule

171
regarding the exhaustion of local remedies . And the International Law Commission indicated

that:

“The injured alien . . . is not required to approach the executive for relief in the

exercise of its discretionary powers. Local remedies do not include remedies whose
‘purpose is to obtain a favour and not to vindicate a right’ nor do they include
remedies of grace unless they constitute an essential prerequisite for the admissibility
172
of subsequent contentious proceedings.”

166POC, Ann. 73; our emphasis. See judges’ folder, tab 3.

167POC, p. 91, para. 3.68.

168CR 2006/50, p. 14.
169
De Becker v. Belgium, Application No.214/56 (1958-1959), 2, Yearbook of the European Convention on
Human Rights, p. 238; E. Jiménez de Aréchaga, “Cours general de droit international public”, Collected Courses of The
Hague Academy of International Law, 1978-I, p. 293.
170
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law , 6th ed. (2003), p.475, J.L.Brierly, The Law of Nations ,
6th ed. (Ed: H. Waldock), p. 281; F.C. Amerasinghe “The Local Remedies Rule in Appropriate Perspective” (1976), 36,
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentiches Recht und Völkerrecht , 747; A.M.Aronovitz, “Notes on the Current Status of
the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the European Convention of Human Rights” (1995), 25, Israel Yearbook on

Human Rights, p.89; Greece v. United Kingdom, Application No.299/57 (1958-1959), 2, Yearbook of the European
Convention on Human Rights, p. 192; Finnish Vessels Arbitration (1934), 3, UNRIAA, 1479.
171
Cançado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law (1983),
p.62; F.C.Amerasinghe, “Local Remedies”, op. cit., p.161; J.E.S. Fawcett, The Application of the European
Convention on Human Rights (1965), p. 295.
172
Report of the International Law Commi ssion, Fifty-Eighth Session,2006, S up.10 (A/61/10), Art.14, p.72,
para. 5. - 53 -

173
59 32. The practice referred to by the Congo confirms the lack of real remedies . Although

the expulsion order on Mr. Yaghi, who has attained celebrity through his presence before the Court

in the written pleadings of the Parties was cancelled by the National Immigration Board 174, no

reasons were given for that decision. Purely an act of grace, in its application, but not in law and

one, moreover, which was made outside any legal framework. The Legislative Order on

Immigration of 12 September 1983 establishes and defines the Board’s powers, but does not confer

175
any decision-making powers on it . Its authority, incidentally, seems to have been somewhat

relative. It was not even consulted before Mr. Diallo’s deportation, alt hough this formality is

176
mandatory in principle under the terms of the law which I have just cited .

33. Mr.Vice-President, having established the ab sence of all remedies, I come to my third

point, which is that, even if there had been remedies,

III. At the time the Zairean judicial system provided “no reasonable possibility” 177
178
of protection, owing to the “undue delay” in proceedings

A. The Government had the discretionary power to overrule judicial decisions

34. At this point, the question that arises is: would Mr. Diallo’s companies have been able, if

they had had the possibility ⎯ quod non ⎯ to appeal against interference by the Zairean

Government, in the legal proceedings concerni ng them, with any reasonable hope of success?

Similarly, could Mr.Diallo have hoped, if he ha d been able to bring the matter before a court ⎯

quod non ⎯ for a judicial review of his situation?

35. Probably not, on the Congo’s own admission, for at the time of the events, the

enforcement of legal decisions depended solely on the government’s goodwill. In the Congolese

written pleadings it is stated that , whatever remedy might have been sought, the final decision lay

173
POC, p. 91, para. 3.69.
174
POC, Ann. 69; judges’ folder Congo, tab 2.
17POC, Ann. 73.

17POC, Ann.75, Decree No.0043 dated 31October 1995 expelling Mr.Diallo from the Territory of the
Republic of Zaire; POC, Ann. 73, Legislative Order No. 80-033 of 12 September 1983 Concerning Immigration Control,
Art. 16.

17Art. 15 (a) of the ILC’s draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.

17Ibid., Art. 15 (b). - 54 -

60 with the government, which had total discretionary power which, moreover was not granted by any

text.

36. Indeed, according to our opponents, in their written pleadings:

“when the enforcement of a judicial decision is liable to provoke social unrest or to

lead to serious public disorder, the Minister of Justice can suspend its enforcement and
request the Inspectorate-General of Courts to review it. After hearing all the Parties
and the judge or judges who gave the decision in question, the Inspectorate sends a

report to the Minister of Justice. In light of this report, the Ministe
r of Justice may
either withdraw the suspension and permit en forcement of the decision to continue or
maintain the suspension in force . . .” 179

37. These are the elements of a denial of justice which Amerasinghe defines as “an act of the

executive interfering with the judicial process” 180. Yet in practice the Minister did as he pleased as

ProfessorForteau showed a few moments ago when discussing interference and explaining the

interference by the Zairean Government in th e legal proceedings brought by Mr.Diallo’s

companies. The upshot of this is that any legal action that Mr. Diallo or his companies might have

brought against the government could only result in a decision by that government based on

political considerations.

38. Members of the Court, the remedies were therefore not “reasonably available”, within

the meaning of the ILC’s Draft Article 15, the commentary on which refers, as an exception to the

rule of exhaustion, to the case in which “the res pondent State does not have an adequate system of

judicial protection” 181. This was manifestly the case in Zaire at the time, particularly as, and in any

event, the wholly unreasonable length of the proceedings rendered them futile.

B.Assuming that recourse to the remedies was feasible, the excessive delays in the
proceedings in which the companies had already been engaged demonstrated their futility

39. I hope I am not going to exceed the length in my own case, but the excessive length of

the domestic proceedings is a ground for the inapp licability of the rule of exhaustion. Moreover,

the Respondent admitted this in its written pleadings 18, by stating ⎯ this was in 2002 ⎯ that in

the case concerned a time-frame of ten years, which is excessive on the face of it, had not yet been

17POC, p. 86, para. 3.50.
180
Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, op. cit., p. 98.
181
Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session, 2006, A/61/10, p. 99.
18POC, p. 128, para. 3.54. - 55 -

61 achieved 183. We have now far exceeded ten years. Moreover, on this gr ound, our opponents are

very uneasy.

40. Mr.Kalala referred yesterday to the Africom-Zaire v. PLZ case 184. According to the

incomplete chronology of this which he retraced, it started in 1992 185 an appeal has been pending

186 187
since 1994 . Mr. Kalala asserts that he knows nothing of the outcome of the proceedings . The

same applies to the Africontainers v. ZaireFina case 188. The legal action began in 1993 189. The

appeal dates from 23 February 1995. The case was still in deliberations in 2002 190. But the Congo

191
yesterday claimed to know nothing of the outcome of these proceedings .

41. Mr.President, the Respondent cannot seri ously assert that it has no knowledge of the

outcome of these cases. It is quite inconceivabl e that, when preparing these oral pleadings, the

Congolese authorities should have failed to enquire about the state of the proceedings. They could

have done so without any difficulty. Moreover, I note that Mr.Kalala was able to obtain such

information in 2002, in a mere two days, via a simp le counsel’s letter addressed to the Registry of

the Supreme Court of Justice (these documents will be found under tab No.13 in the judges’

192
folder) . The Court will note, in passing, that, on that occasion, the Registra
r of the Supreme

Court of Justice acknowledged that a period of sev en years corresponded to the “normal course” of

proceedings, which shows that the excessive lengths were general and probably not exceptional.

42. In any event, I would suggest that the C ourt should not draw any conclusions whatever

from our opponents’ show of ignorance: even if the Congo fights shy of admitting it, the two cases

concerned are still pending, after 14years of pro ceedings in the first case and 13years in the

second.

18Ibid., para. 3.55.

18CR 2006/50, pp. 19-21, paras. 18-24; see also POC, pp. 36-38, paras. 1.48-1.52.

18CR 2006/50, p. 20, para. 20 (Kalala).
186
Ibid., para. 23.
187
Ibid., para. 24.
188
CR 2006/50, pp. 32-34, paras. 61-69.
18Ibid., para. 64.

19POC, Ann. 47.

19Ibid., para. 65.
192
POC, Ann. 47. - 56 -

62 43. This provides a perfect demonstration of the futility of the remedies which Mr. Diallo’s

companies, or indeed he himself, might have done their utmost to seek. Well over ten years later,

the appeal court decisions awaited by Africontainers and Africom-Zaire have still not been

delivered, whereas the best that they could do woul d be to reopen the discussions on the merits.

The legal avenues in Zaire were thus manifestly futile, which irrefutably confirms that Guinea

cannot be accused of having prematurely exercised its diplomatic protection in this case.

44. Mr.Vice-President, I am delighted to say that these remarks bring to a close my oral

argument of this morning, and also the first round of the Republic of Guinea’s oral pleadings. My

sincere thanks for your attention.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président: Je voudrais vous remercier,

Monsieur Thouvenin, pour votre exposé. Un juge, le juge Bennouna, m’a fait savoir qu’il avait une

question qu’il souhaiterait poser aux deux Parties, et je lui donne la parole.

Mr. BENNOUNA: Thank you, Mr.Vice-President. I wish to request a clarification of the

two Parties on whether the legislation of th e Democratic Republic of the Congo or the

jurisprudence of the courts of that country authorize the creation of a private limited company with

a single shareholder and by one person. That is th e clarification I should like from the two Parties.

Thank you, Mr. Vice-President.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je remercie le juge Bennouna. Je vois

que les réponses à la question que vient de poser le juge Bennouna peuvent être données lors du

second tour de plaidoiries, ou par écrit, dans le quel cas la réponse doit parvenir au Greffe le

6 décembre 2006 au plus tard.

Ceci met fin au premier tour de plaidoiries. Je voudrais remercier chacune des Parties pour

les exposés présentés au cours de ce premier tour de plaidoiries.

Les audiences reprendront demain à 15 heures pour entendre la République démocratique du

Congo en son second tour de plaidoiries sur ses excep tions préliminaires. La RDC présentera ses

conclusions finales sur lesdites exceptions à l’issue de l’audience. Je rappelle que la République de - 57 -

er
63 Guinée prendra la parole pour ce qui la concerne le vendredi 1 décembre à 10 heures, pour son

second tour de plaidoiries et présentera ses conclusions finales à l'issue de l'audience

Je tiens à rappeler que le second tour de plaidoiries ne doit pas constituer une répétition de ce

qui a été dit auparavant et que les Parties ne sont pas obligées d’utiliser la totalité du temps qui leur

est attribué.

Je vous remercie infiniment. La Cour va à présent lever la séance.

L’audience est levée à 13 heures.

___________