Traduction

CO

CR 2005/15 (traduction)

CR 2005/15 (translation)

Mercredi 27 avril 2005 à 15 heures

Wednesday 27 April 2005 at 3 p.m. - 2 -

8 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. L’a udience est ouverte. Je donne la parole à

M. Brownlie.

La question des droits de l’homme

M. BROWNLIE : Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges.

1. Je me propose, dans mon exposé, de ré pondre au conseil du Congo sur la question des

violations des droits de l’homme.

Les arguments d’ordre procédural

2. M.Kalala a été surpris par les arguments de l’Ouganda, qui étaient à ses yeux d’ordre

purement procédural. Or, Monsieur le préside nt, ces arguments d’ordre purement procédural

concernent l’utilité des plaidoiries, le principe du contradictoire et la question de savoir quelle est la

thèse à laquelle l’Etat défendeur doit répondre. Les solutions de continuité, l’amnésie et l’approche

sporadique du sujet traité causent en effet de très graves difficultés à l’Etat défendeur.

3. Il n’est pas surprenant de constater que l’article49 du Règlement de la Cour présuppose

clairement la continuité. Car, après tout, cet article prescrit à quelle fin et dans quel ordre les

pièces de procédure écrite sont déposées. M.Ka lala qualifie les critiques formulées au nom de

l’Ouganda d’«objections préliminaires». Bien sûr, il ne s’agit pas, formellement parlant,

d’exceptions préliminaires. Mais le parallèle est intéressant car, dans certains systèmes de droit, il

existerait une procédure permettant d’écarter d’emblée les demandes manifestement non fondées

en droit.

4. Le conseil du Congo se demande quelles c onséquences juridiques découlent de l’analyse

faite par l’Ouganda de la mé thode d’argumentation défaillante adoptée par le Congo (CR 2005/12,

p.55). M.Kalala semble croire qu’il ne peut y avoir de conséquences, mais il est évident que la

manière de plaider, les carences en matière de preuves et l’absence de continuité auront forcément

une incidence sur le jugement que portera la Cour au sujet de la thèse congolaise. Et cela devrait

d’autant plus être le cas que la charge de la preuve incombe au Congo.

5. Avant de passer au stade suivant de m on exposé, il me faut demander, au nom de

l’Ouganda, si le conseil du Congo a contribué à faire avancer le débat. Malheureusement, la - 3 -

9 réponse est «non». En fait, la confusion semble s’être accrue. Ainsi, vers le début de son exposé,

M. Kalala explique que les écritures congolaises (MRDC, par. 5; RRDC, par. 2.05) indiquent quels

éléments sont devenus sans objet, ce qui est d’aille urs vrai. Mais c’est reconnaître en même temps

l’existence du problème. Le passage visé de la réplique précise que celle-ci est désormais

«l’instrument de référence» par rapport à la requête et au mémoire.

6. Quoi qu’il en soit, ce système de renouvellement cyclique est lui-même quelque peu

obscur et, un peu plus loin dans la même interv ention, le conseil du Congo affirme à la Cour que

les éléments de preuve à présenter s’inscrivent toujours pleinement dans le cadre de la requête

initiale (CR 2005/12, p. 54, par. 6).

7. Le conseil du Congo s’est plaint que les critiques de l’Ouganda n’ont pas contribué au

débat judiciaire. Mais, Monsieur le président , dans une telle confusion et après de tels

changements de tactique, il est difficile d’avoir un débat.

La valeur probante du rapport de la MONUC

8. Le Congo, dans ses écritures, fait gra nd cas du rapport de la MONUC du 16 juillet 2004,

notamment M.Kalala au second tour des plaidoiries (CR2005/13, par.17-24). Pour répondre à

cela, l’Ouganda estime nécessaire de montrer à quel point le rapport de la MONUC n’est pas l’outil

adéquat pour mener une analyse avec la rigueur qui sied au cadre judiciaire.

9. En particulier, les éléments suivants doivent être relevés :

Premièrement, la mission de la MONUC n’était p as équipée pour faire des enquêtes de

nature spécifiquement juridique. On ignore si des juristes ont participé à ces enquêtes.

Deuxièmement, de graves problèmes d’accès existaient en Ituri aussi bien avant qu’après le

déploiement des forces multinationales en juin 2003.

Troisièmement, le rapport émet des hypothèses quant aux causes du conflit entre les Hema et

les Lendu ⎯ hypothèses dépourvues de fondement historique.

Quatrièmement, le rapport fait état de violations graves d’une ampleur similaire à celles

commises au Rwanda; dans ce cas, pourquoi la co mmunauté internationale n’y a-t-elle pas prêté

attention ? - 4 -

Cinquièmement, d’après les conclusions et recommandations (annexeI), l’Ouganda aurait

formé plusieurs groupes composés d’habitants de la région et les forces ougandaises auraient

10 ensuite combattu chacun de ces mêmes groupes peu de temps après. L’Ouganda nie avoir formé

ces groupes et trouve étonnant d’être mis en cause pour une suite d’événements aussi étrange.

Sixièmement, l’Ouganda estime singulier et hautement contestable de supposer que ses

forces aient été associées à des exactions systémati ques en Ituri, alors que rien de tel ne s’est

produit dans d’autres régions.

L’occupation prétendue du Congo par l’Ouganda

10. Au second tour de plaidoiries, M. Corten a rappelé la position congolaise selon laquelle

l’Ouganda avait le statut de «puissance occupant e» à l’égard du Congo (CR2005/12, p.42-52).

L’Ouganda a déjà réfuté cette thèse à plusieurs re prises, tant du point de vue du droit qu’en ce qui

concerne l’étendue du territoire congolais en cause.

11. L’emploi du terme «occupation» par le Congo, à la fois dans les écritures et les

plaidoiries, est depuis le début équivoque. Le terme est-il synonyme du régime juridique

particulier connu sous le nom d’o ccupation de guerre, tel qu’il est d écrit dans les manuels de droit

militaire et les ouvrages de droit international ? L’exposé de M.Corten (CR2005/12, p.49,

par.16) ne fait qu’ajouter au doute. Au paragraphe en question, M.Corten cite pêle-mêle des

exemples d’occupation militaire. Les cas cités sont juridiquement très hétéroclites, et le fait de les

avoir rapprochés dans une même liste dénote une maîtrise insuffisante du sujet. Ainsi, l’occupation

par l’Allemagne de plusieurs pa ys d’Europe durant la seconde guerre mondiale est placée sur le

même plan que des cas qualitativement différents.

12. L’incapacité des représentants du Congo à reconnaître les cas véritables d’occupation de

guerre ressort dans une large mesure des faits suivants.

Premièrement : Il y a occupation de guerre si l’état de guerre est déclaré ou reconnu comme

tel par les belligérants ou les Etats neutres.

Or, ni l’une, ni l’autre des Parties n’a reconnu l’état de guerre. Aucun Etat tiers, aucun Etat

de la région, n’a déclaré sa neutralité. - 5 -

Deuxièmement : Un conflit peut être à l’origine d’un état de guerre si les parties

reconnaissent ultérieurement l’existence de l’état de guerre. Or, les Parties à la présente instance

ne parlent jamais d’un état de guerre entre elles, mais parfois d’une guerre civile au Congo.

11 Troisièmement : Le Gouvernement ougandais a, par son comportement, démontré qu’il ne

revendiquait pas le pouvoir d’administrer les zones concernées. Or, s’il y avait eu occupation de

guerre, l’Ouganda aurait eu le pouvoir d’administration reconnu par le droit des conflits armés.

Quatrièmement : Contrairement à ce qu’affirme le C ongo, l’applicabilité des conventions

relatives aux droits de l’homme ne permet pas de conclure à l’existence ou à l’inexistence d’une

occupation de guerre.

Cinquièmement : Comme mon collègue M.Reichler l’a souligné ce matin, l’accord de

Lusaka et les accords conclus ultérieurement n’ont absolument rien à voir avec la notion juridique

d’occupation de guerre.

Le rôle de l’Ouganda dans le processus de pacification de l’Ituri

13. Dans son intervention de lundi, dans la quelle il répondait à l’exposé que j’ai présenté au

nom de l’Ouganda dans le pr emier tour de plaidoiries (CR2005/10, p.18-20, par.51-58),

M.Kalala a minimisé le rôle joué par l’Ouganda dans le processus de pacification de l’Ituri. De

l’avis de l’Ouganda, les Parties s’opposent sur cette question. Il r este difficile de concilier le rôle

joué par l’Ouganda, dont les détails ne sont pas contestés, avec le cynisme dont nos contradicteurs

nous accusent.

Les événements de Kisangani

14. Dans son dernier exposé de lundi, M. Kala la est revenu sur la question de la recevabilité

de la demande relative aux événements de Kisangani: je vous renvoie à cet égard aux

paragraphes13 à 16 de sa plaidoirie (CR2005/12, p. 57-58). En particulier, il a invoqué la

décision rendue en l’affaire Nauru. Les Parties se sont déjà opposées sur cette question. Le Congo

a invoqué l’affaire Nauru dans la réplique (par. 1.23-1.31). L’Ouganda maintient la position qu’il

avait adoptée à partir d’une analyse détaillée de la jurisprudence, que l’on trouvera aux

paragraphes272 à 278 du contre-mém oire; je vous renvoie aussi a ux paragraphes33 à38 de la - 6 -

duplique. Le Congo n’a pas reconnu que, en l’affaire Nauru, la question n’avait en fait pas été

tranchée.

Conclusion

15. En guise de conclusion à cette brève intervention, je suis obligé de contredire la thèse de

M. Kalala qui affirme, contrairement aux faits, que l’Ouganda aurait reconnu sa responsabilité dans

les différentes violations des droits de l’homme dont il est accusé: je parle des paragraphes18

12 et 19 de son exposé de lundi après-midi (CR 2005/13) ⎯ affirmation d’autant plus surprenante que

l’Ouganda a réservé sa position au premier tour de plaidoiries (CR 2005/10, p. 23).

J’en ai terminé avec mon exposé. Je tiens à remercier la Cour de la courtoisie et de la

considération dont elle a fait preuve durant ces deux longs tours de plaidoiries et je tiens aussi à

remercier les fonctionnaires du Greffe et tous ceux qui contribuent de manière générale au bon

déroulement des audiences. Monsieur le président, je vous demanderais de bien vouloir appeler à

la barre mon ami et collègue, M. Suy.

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, Monsieur Brownlie. Je donne à présent la parole à

M. Suy.

SMUr.:

T HE QUESTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

1. Mr.President, distinguished Members of the Court, in his presentation yesterday,

ProfessorSands, on behalf of the Democratic Re public of the Congo, answered some of the

arguments developed by Uganda last week, but a voided answering others. I should like now to

comment briefly on those remarks of the DRC. I shall first address Mr.Sands’s observations

concerning the establishment of the facts(I), before turning to his remarks on the legal

characterization of the facts (II).

I. Replies to the DRC’s comments on the establishment of the facts

2. Two clarificatory responses by Uganda are called for in regard to this problem. The first

relates to the continuing differences between the Parties regarding the need for the DRC to - 7 -

establish the facts and injury (A); the second concerns the failure of the DRC’s attempt to deny the

existence of major discrepancies between the findings of the Porter Commission’s Report and those

of the United Nations Panels (B). I promise to be brief on each of these two points.

A. The persistent differences between the two Parties regarding the establishment of the
facts and of injury

3. I shall first deal with the problem of the establishment of the facts (a) before going on to

the question of proof of injury (b) by the DRC.

13
(a) The DRC has refused to specify precisely the facts for which it seek s to hold Uganda
responsible

4. Despite our appeals, the DRC has refused precisely to specify the wrongful acts for which

it requests your Court to hold Uganda internationally responsible. It continues to take refuge

behind a judgment which it seeks to characterize as “declaratory”, erroneously interpreting the

Court’s position in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against

Nicaragua. Uganda has already expressed its astonishment at this approach. Even if it were

accepted that the DRC could, at a later stage, sp ecify “the precise amount” and “the precise form”

1
of reparation , this could only, by definition, relate ex clusively to the facts established during the

current phase of the proceedings, which would thus be covered by res judicata. However, the DRC

requests the Court to declare now, in abstracto, that Uganda committed internationally wrongful

acts, and then subsequently to reopen the entire case at a later stage, in order to define, in concreto,

what those internationally wrongful acts are . Uganda categorically opposes this approach and it

will fall to the Court to settle this dispute. We hope, however, that the DRC will not thus transform

this case into a modern-day stone of Sisyphus to be carried for evermore by your Court and the

defenders of Uganda.

5. I shall now turn to the second problem concerning the proof of injury.

(b) The DRC has failed to demonstrate that it suffered any direct injury

6. Despite the urgent demands of Uganda, the DRC has completely failed in its duty to

demonstrate that it suffered direct injury as a result of acts which it seeks to impute to Uganda.

1
Cf. CR 2005/3, p. 20, para. 8 (Mr. Sands), and CR 2005/5, p. 56, para. 20 (Mr. Salmon). - 8 -

Instead, ProfessorSands denied that injury constitutes a condition for engaging the international

responsibility of States and he referred in this connection to the approach adopted by the ILC in its

draft Articles 1 and 2 on State Responsibility 2. In reply, allow me to refer to what was written on

this subject by one of the authors I cited last week–– whose eminence ProfessorSands himself

acknowledged. In the general course on internatio nal law which he gave some years ago at the

14 Hague Academy of International Law, Professor Prosper Weil made the following point: “One of

the most revolutionary aspects of the work of the International Law Commission consisted in

3
defining international responsibility without including injury as a condition therefor.”

7. This makes clear the way in which the ILC’s approach is characterized in this field: it is

“revolutionary”, which means that the possibl e elimination (and I deliberately use the word

“possible” since the actual circumstances are always much more complicated ) of injury as one of

the conditions for the ILC’s engagement of Stat e responsibility can only be defined as a normative

proposition de lege ferenda for the progressive development of international law, and not as a

codification of existing international law in this field, which always, as I showed last week, upholds

the principle: “no injury, no international responsibility”.

8. Respect for this principle is all the more necessary in this area since the DRC has utterly

failed to specify whether the alleged acts caused inju ry to the State itself, or rather to private,

natural or legal persons. For example, if a particular company –– such as “La Société Victoria” so

frequently cited by ProfessorSands–– sought to “purchase” diamonds in the DRC while paying

the necessary taxes to the local Congolese admini stration –– again citing the documents submitted

by ProfessorSands–– who would have been injure d by this act, even assuming that it could be

characterized as “internationally wrongful”? The Stat e itself? An individual? Another company?

Uganda has placed great emphasis on the fact th at the DRC was under an obligation to establish

that it sustained direct injury and that any injury suffered by private individuals could be taken into

account by this Court only after the exhaustion of local remedies, in accordance with the

2
CR 2005/13, p. 34, para. 36.
3P. Weil, Le droit international en quête de son identité , RCADI, 1992/VI, Vol.237, 1996, p.340: emphasis
added. - 9 -

procedures for diplomatic protection. In this connection, the DRC has given no response other than

that injury is not a condition for establishing the responsibility of a State.

9. I now turn to a second set of responses concerning the DRC’s attitude to the establishment

of the facts and injury and the content of the Porter Report.

15 B. The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s failure to explain away significant differences

between the findings of the Porter Commission and those of the United Nations Panels

10. Last week, I explained these differences to the Court at length, and I shall not go over

them again. In all honesty, I stated at the outset that it was not “my intention to deny the existence

of certain points of agreement between the in vestigations in question as far as the individual

conduct of certain soldiers and officers is concerne d”. I nevertheless pointed out that my objective

was to bring to the Court’s attention the fact that the findings of the Porter Commission Report and

those of the United Nations Panels (especially the firstreport, cited at length in the annexes and

written pleadings of the DRC) exhibit significant quantitative and qualitative differences. I also

explained that these differences were of decisi ve importance for the subsequent stage of legal

characterization of the facts, particularly inasmuc h as the findings of the Porter Commission, on

which the DRC now relies exclusively, in no sense permit Uganda’s international responsibility to

be engaged for “violation of the principle of the permanent sovereignty of the Congolese people

over its natural resources”, or again, to cite the submissions made the day before yesterday by the

4
Agent of the DRC, for violation of the “rights of peoples to self-determination” .

11. What did Professor Sands have to say in res ponse to all this? Well, next to nothing! He

seems to have accepted these differences.

12. It is true that he suggested that my presentation was “selective”. However,

notwithstanding the fact that he made little effort to clarify that remark, I should like to reply that

the selective approach was his rather than mine, that is, the presentation of only his side of the coin,

without having the courage to accept openly that the findings of the Porter Commission report

render totally groundless many of the serious al legations made against Uganda in the DRC’s

written pleadings.

4
CR 2005/13, p. 37, par. 1 - 10 -

13. Mr.Sands also claimed that I “carefully avoided” referring to page196 of the report 5

which contains a passage that states: “in general this Commission and the reconstituted Panel are

16 not so far apart” 6. Here again, however, Mr. Sands does me an injustice. In actual fact, not only

did I not fail to cite that page, but on the contrary I supplemented the highly selective citation of the

section mentioned by Mr.Sands by pointing out that, while the Porter Commission expressed

agreement with the reconstituted Panel on the fact that certain individuals, soldiers or officers

conducted themselves in the DRC “in a manner unb ecoming”, it particularly emphasized that:

“There is agreement that the original Panel’s allegations against Uganda as a State, and against

President Museveni were wrong .” 7 I similarly took great care to explain that, more generally

speaking, the reports issued by the reconstitu ted Panel abandoned or revised most of the

accusations made by the original Panel, and that the Porter Commission, in agreement with the

reconstituted Panel, also rebutted them.

14. Finally, Professor Sands stated that an analysis of the non-exhaustive list of

15“differences” that I had presented was “instructive”. This time we are in full agreement. The

Porter Commission, on whose findings the DRC now relies exclusively , concluded that the

overwhelming majority, if not all, of the alle gations concerning the exploitation of the DRC’s

forest and agricultural resources by Uganda or by Ugandan soldiers, allegations previously

reproduced at length in the written pleadings of the DRC, before being played down the day before

yesterday by Professor Sands ⎯ were not proven. The Porter Commission found that several

allegations of looting were also unfounded. It found that Uganda had at no time intended to exploit

the natural resources of the DRC or to use those resources to “finance the war” and that it did not

do so. On the contrary, it found that the Ugandan authorities had repeatedly issued clear orders and

had acted resolutely to prevent any excesses by certain soldiers ⎯ but this, too, is no longer at all

denied by the DRC, which even projected on the screen behind me several documents

5
Page 198 according to Mr. Sand’s numbering, which is not id entical to that of the offi cial Court document. See
Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into allegations of illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms
of wealth in the DRC, in ICJ, Submission by the Republic of Uganda of new documents in accordance with Article 43 of
the Statute and Article 56 of the Rules of Court, 20 October 2003.
6
Emphasis added.
7Ibid., p. 196, para. 40.8: emphasis added. Cf. CR 2005/5, p. 33, para. 12 (Mr. Sands). - 11 -

demonstrating the unceasing efforts of the Ugandan authorities to bring recalcitrant soldiers to

order and put an immediate end to any questionable conduct.

17 15. What remains, therefore, of the massive case initially presented by the DRC in its Reply?

The DRC now relies exclusively, I repeat, on the findings of the Porter Commission Report. All

that remains today, therefore, is the various findings of that Commission concerning the individual

and private conduct of certain soldiers and officers who, in clear violation of orders given by the

highest State authorities, “have conducted themselv es in the Democratic Republic of Congo in a

manner unbecoming”, before doing everything possible (“a conspiracy of silence” ⎯ according to

the Porter Commission) to conceal their activities from those same authorities. These are the facts

to which you must give a legal characteriza tion, Members of the Court, and my modest

contribution to this effort at legal characterization can only take the form, at this stage, of a quick

review of the replies which Uganda wishes to furnish to Mr. Sand’s comments on this point.

II. Replies to the DRC’s comments on the legal characterization of the facts

16. Four of the points that Professor Sands addressed (or evaded) on behalf of the Congo call

for a response. The first concerns the lack of a Congolese response concerning the confusion

deliberately maintained by the Congo between an “illegal” and an “internationally wrongful”

act(A). The second concerns Mr.Philippe Sands’s criticisms on the subject of international

humanitarian law(B). The third concerns the separate question of the alleged violation of the

“principle of the permanent sovereignty of the Congolese people over its natural resources”(C).

And the fourth and final point concerns the duty of diligence (D).

A. The lack of a response concerning the deliberate failure to distinguish between “illegal”

acts and “internationally wrongful” acts

17. My lengthy exposition on this point last week elicited only a terse response from

Mr. Sands. He found them, he said, “interesting, but . . . totally irrelevant”8. However, the interest

aroused in Professor Sands by that exposition should have prompted him to look into this important

question a little more carefully in order to grasp its total relevance.

8
CR 2005/13, para. 34. - 12 -

18 18. As I explained last week, the DRC deliber ately maintained, and even cultivated, in its

written pleadings, the confusion generated by the United Nations Panel reports, which had attached

the label “illegal” to acts which could never be characterized by an international tribunal as

“internationally wrongful acts” . I even provided several examples in support of my assertions,

such as “respect for the DRC’s regulatory frame work”, “discrepancy between widely accepted

practices in trade and business and the way business is conducted in the Democratic Republic of

the Congo”, or even violation of “soft law” and of the OECD’s soft law guidelines.

9
ProfessorSands now attempts to correct his aim by recognizing that the DRC can only accuse

Uganda of violating “its obligati ons under international law”. In the process, he also seems to

10
accept implicitly that the routine trading activities conducted between Uganda and the territories

controlled by the rebels did not in principle constitu te “illegal exploitation”, even if the regulations

of the central Government in Kinshasa could not be respected and even if taxes were paid to the

local Congolese authorities rather than to the central Government.

19. The question that this Court thus faces is whether all the acts noted by the Porter

Commission and relied upon by the DRC necessarily constitute “internationally wrongful acts” .

Uganda does not believe that they do. If such a characterization could perhaps be applied to certain

acts of looting committed, according to the Porter Commission, by a limited number of soldiers and

officers, it is certainly not applicable to the ove rwhelming majority of the acts described in that

report.

20. This is a crucial issue since, before any act by an individual can be attributed to a State in

order to engage the latter’s inte rnational responsibility, the “internationally wrongful” character of

that act must first be established. This is underscored, for example, by the commentary on

Article 7 of the International Law Commission’s draft articles, which makes it clear that the Article

in question “is not concerned with the question whether the [unauthorized] conduct [of an agent of

11
19 a State] amounted to a breach of an international obligation” . However, although the Porter

Commission referred to several cases of violations of the internal law of Uganda by certain

9Ibid.
10
Cf. ibid., para. 30.
1Commentary on Article7, in Report of the Internaional Law Commission to the United Nations General
Assembly, A/56/10, 2001, p. 103. - 13 -

individuals, or even certain cases of non-observan ce by those individuals of certain rules and

practices of the Kinshasa central Government in the territories where only rebels exercised de facto

administrative authority, this does not necessarily constitute an “internationally wrongful act” .

Even the document projected on the screen two days ago in which the leader of a major rebel group

“granted permission to” La Société Victoria “to do business in coffee, diamonds, gold” in certain

towns while paying “all local taxes” for that pur pose, does not automatically, in the absence of

other evidence, constitute an “internationally wrongful act” ⎯ although it certainly constitutes

totally unbecoming conduct, contrary to orders, by Brigadier Kazini, against whom proceedings

were instituted.

21. At the end of my presentation, I shall return to this important issue. For the moment,

Uganda respectfully requests the Court to study the Porter Report and to focus exclusively on those

acts which could be considered to constitute a “violation of an international obligation”.

22. I now turn to the question of humanitarian law.

B. The question of humanitarian law

23. Professor Sands voiced certain criticizms in this respect and reproached me for not

having said “a single word” about the rules of humanitarian law.

24. I would like to begin my response with an observation. The Application of the DRC

invokes no rules of humanitarian law with respect to the question of natural resources. This was

the very reason why Mr.Sands requested permissi on from this Court to amend the claims of the

DRC in order to “make clear that in respect of natural resources the finding should encompass also

12
violations of international humanitarian law” . Neither does the Memorial of the DRC invoke any

rule of humanitarian law in connection with the issue of natural resources. As for the Reply of the

DRC, it devotes 50 closely argued pages to the question of natural resources, including ten on

20 Uganda’s alleged breach “of the sovereignty of the DRC over its natural resources” and the alleged

breach of “the obligation of vigilance”. But within that abundant discourse, how much space is

devoted in this respect to humanitarian law? Six lines, Mr. President, just six lines, which appear at

the very end of those 50closely argued pages and where only Article33 of the Fourth Geneva

12
CR 2005/13, para. 39. - 14 -

Convention of 12 August 1949, on the prohibition of pillage, is expressly invoked. To be sure, the

DRC has now understandably realized, in the light of the Porter Commission’s conclusions, that it

is impossible to obtain a finding against Uganda in respect of the two charges initially relied on,

and it is obviously for this reason that the DRC h as amended the legal basis of its claim and its

requests to the Court. The case presented by the DRC in this respect, as in other respects, certainly

resembles the myth of Proteus: when you finall y think you have grasped it, it has already changed

shape . . . But to accuse Uganda of not respondi ng to certain legal arguments on natural resources

never raised by the DRC in the written proceedings before the Court is really going a step too far.

25. That accusation appears particularly unfo unded as far as I am concerned, since I was

careful, in my statement last Wednesday, to address the arguments based on humanitarian law

raised by Mr. Sands during his first statement.

26. Turning, first, to the arguments concerning “authority over the occupied territories” ⎯ to

cite PhilippeSands ⎯ I have repeatedly explained that Uganda did not exercise any acts of

authority over those territories, that it did not control the Congolese rebel groups exercising such

authority and that it had no power over the acts of authority performed by those de facto

authorities. In this respect, I particularly focused on the findings of the Porter Commission, which

emphasized that the original Panel’s allegati ons that the Ugandan authorities “directly and

indirectly appointed regional governors or lo cal authorities” were unfounded, and which also

pointed out several times that Uganda had no jurisdiction over the Congolese nationals and rebel

groups.

27. Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, it should be mentioned here that if

Uganda had intended, as the Congo claims, to “exploit” the natural resources of the Congo, it

21 would have been in its best interest to exercise such acts of administration and to invoke the right

of occupation and the corresponding privileges conferred by law upon the occupant.

28. Need it be recalled that Article48 of the Fourth Hague Convention confers on the

occupant the right to collect taxes, dues and tolls? Need it be recalled that Article 49 authorizes the

occupant to levy other money contributions in the o ccupied territory “for the needs of the army or

of the administration of the territory in question” ? Need it be recalled that Article32 authorizes

“requisitions in kind” of private property “for the needs of the army of occupation”? Need it be - 15 -

recalled that Article53 authorizes the occupant to take possession of “all movable property

belonging to the State which may be used for mi litary operations”? Need it be recalled that

Article 55 authorizes the occupant to administer pub lic buildings or forests and agricultural estates

belonging to the hostile State in accordance with th e rules of usufruit? And so the list goes on,

Mr. President. In this connection it is revealing th at one of the most important articles written on

the subject, that of ProfessorAntonioCassese 1, mentioned my Mr.Sands, represents a perfect

illustration of the fact that the real principle in this area is not that the right of occupation prohibits

any exploitation of the resources of the occupied State by the occupant , but rather the contrary, that

is to say that this right seems to have conferred upon the occupant broad ⎯ perhaps too broad ⎯

powers that, in one way or another, must be restri cted. Uganda has never invoked such powers. It

has never exercised acts of authority and has not sought to interfere in any way in the authority

exercised by the Congolese people itself over the territories of eastern Congo.

29. Let us move away now from the “rules of occupation” and turn towards the other rules of

humanitarian law . I must confess that I have some difficulty in comprehending why

Professor Sands devoted so much energy (with refe rence, for example, to the Lusaka Agreement),

to showing that they were applicable in the present case. Uganda has never in fact argued the

contrary. This is particularly true for the prohibition against looting in time of armed conflict.

Uganda has never denied that principle and h as not sought to hide behind Article7 of the

International Law Commission’s draft articles, as Mr . Sands claimed. Quite the contrary, Uganda

22 has acknowledged the findings of the Porter Commi ssion in this sphere concerning certain acts of

looting by some soldiers acting in a purely priv ate capacity for their personal enrichment, and has

undertaken to prosecute those soldiers. But an act of looting is an act of looting. It cannot by

magic be transformed into a “violation of the principle of permanent sovereignty of peoples over

their natural resources” or into a “violation of th e right of peoples to self-determination”. It is

towards that most significant question that I would now like to turn.

13
Cassesse, A., “Powers and Duties of an Occupant in Rela tion to Land and Natural Res ources”, in Playfair, E.,
(ed.). International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 419-442. - 16 -

C. The principle of the permanent sovereignty of the Congolese people
over its natural resources

30. In the light of my comments and clarifications last week, I had hoped that the DRC

would withdraw this outrageous accusation which, as I have explained, resurrects the spectre of

colonialism in Africa. Since the DRC is unwilling to do so, I feel justified in making the following

observations.

31. First, I trust there is agreement among a ll the jurists present in this room that the

principle in question is not a principle of humanitarian law. ProfessorSands could not ⎯ and

indeed did not ⎯ say anything to the contrary. He simply sought to show that this principle, which

was shaped in a totally different context, that of decolonialization, may also be applicable in time

of war. In this respect, he invoked ⎯ and reiterated the day before yesterday ⎯ certain General

Assembly resolutions concerning a particular well known conflict. Regardless of the pertinence of

those resolutions for the conflict in question, I s hould like to point out, Members of the Court, that

the case before you today has nothing to do with the conflict mentioned in the General Assembly

resolutions, which concern certain deliberate and intentional policies adopted by a particular State

over the past few decades. Now, and this is why earlier on I placed emphasis on the establishment

of the facts, in the case before you it is established beyond any reasonable doubt that not only did

Uganda never once intend to exploit in any wa y the natural resources of the DRC but, on the

contrary, the Ugandan authorities, on several occasions, issued clear orders and acted in a

determined manner to avoid any excesses on the pa rt of certain soldiers acting in a personal

capacity.

23 32. Last week, I pointed out that the mechanis m of attributability in international law is not

some magic wand that can be used to alter the characterization of an international offence,

miraculously transforming an act of looting, comm itted by an individual in violation of orders and

instructions, into a heinous crime of the State on account of the “violation of the principle of the

permanent sovereignty of the Congolese people over its natural resources”. I even raised the

rhetorical question whether an act of looting co mmitted by a United Nations peacekeeper could be

legally classified as a violation by the United Nations of the “principle of the permanent - 17 -

sovereignty of the people of that country over its natural resources” or as a “violation of the right of

14
peoples to self-determination”. Most surprisingly, Mr. Sands replied in the affirmative .

33. Nevertheless, Mr. President, as we say in French: “Let’s call a cat a cat.” A cat is not an

elephant and still less a dinosaur. An act of looting remains an act of looting. It cannot be

transformed, on the basis of the clear elements be fore your Court, either into a violation of the

“principle of the permanent sovereignty of the Congolese people over its natural resources” or into

a violation of “the right of peoples to self-determination”.

34. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in this beautiful city where your Court has its seat,

an outstanding museum has recently been opened to exhibit the work of the Dutch artist

Maurits Escher, the wizard of metamorphosis. Among his works, one can admire a woodcut called

“MetamorphosisI”, where a tiny individual is mi raculously transformed before our very eyes ⎯

15
into a city in southern Italy . But here, Members of the Court, we are not in the Palace of the

Lange Voorhout but in the Peace Palace; Mr.Sands , despite his talent, is no MauritsEscher and

cannot transform a pumpkin into a coach; and the mechanism of attributability is not an optical

illusion. For this reason, Uganda reiterates before this Court that it respectfully requests you to

dismiss all of the outrageous accusations concer ning “foreign subjugation and exploitation”, the

violation of the “principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources” and the violation of the

“right of peoples to self-determination”.

24 35. I will now move on to the last part of my analysis regarding the obligation of vigilance.

D. The obligation of vigilance

36. In its first round of oral argument, the DRC accused Uganda of having sought to mislead

the Court by “hiding” from it the Porter Commi ssion Report. Uganda had hoped that, after my

intervention to put the record straight last We dnesday, the DRC might have presented its apologies

or at least have graciously acknowledged the reality.

37. Instead of that, in its second round of oral argument, the DRC fell still further into error

in its assessment of Uganda’s attitude towards the Porter Commission Report.

14
CR 2005/13, para. 33.
1See The (E.), The Magic of M.C. Esher, Joost Elffers Books, Harry Abrams Publ., New York, pp. 50-51. - 18 -

38. This time the DRC has come up with a wi re from a Ugandan newspaper report retrieved

from the Internet. A certain Edison Mbiringi, pr esented in that report as “The Deputy Inspector

General of Police”, is reported as having stated to the paper “[w]e have closed all the files relating

to UPDF operations in Congo...” ⎯ a sentence read and emphasized several times by

Philippe Sands last Monday, with obvious implications for Uganda.

39. In reality, Mr.President, Members of the Court, no “crime” has been committed and if

that event proves anything at all, it will only be the merits of the wisdom and prudence with which

this Court always deals with material from the pr ess. I would like to examine that document more

closely.

40. We can pass over the fact, first of all, that the individual in question,

Mr. Edison Mbiringi is not, as the journalist clai ms, “The Deputy Inspector General of Police”, but

a minor official of the Ugandan police force. We can also pass over the fact that his statements

were completely distorted by the journalist, in her quest for a “scoop”. Let us look rather at certain

objective elements, the precise content of that offi cial’s statement, as reported in the article in

question and as censored in the selective presentation by PhilippeSands. Here is the entire

25 “statement”, of which Professor Sands only read the first part: “We have closed all files relating to

the UPDF operations in Congo and that marks the end of everything as regards the two files that

were for investigations.” 16

41. Furthermore, the rest of the report, referring to “two files” and “the fate of the files”,

makes it clear that this only concerns two particular files and certainly not the whole series of

investigations undertaken in response to the findings of the Porter Commission which, for their

part, are continuing and which remain entirely open in Uganda.

42. So what are those two files that have been closed? The answer is most revealing, and

Uganda is entitled to respond to the DRC’s accusations and to provide the Court with the whole

picture.

43. Mr.President, those twofiles are dated 9February2005. The first file concerns the

Porter Commission’s findings with respect to the airline “Take Air Ltd” ⎯ findings which take up

16
Document cited by Philippe Sands in CR 2005/13, para. 20 (tab 44 in the judges’ folder submitted by the DRC);
emphasis added. - 19 -

just nine lines out of the whole 250 pages in the Porter Commission Report 17. What is this about?

According to the Porter Commission, it is about a book-keeping problem involving an airline

company which, in 1998, received from the UP DF 111million shillings (some US$65,000) to

convey material and personnel in the DRC but which subsequently failed to produce the necessary

supporting documents to prove that the paid servi ces had been rendered. The police investigated

the existence of an “offence of causing financial loss to government” and concluded that the

elements in the case file did not justify the prosecution of the airline’s managing director.

44. The second file which has been shelved concerns an investigation into a possible

violation of Section 396 of the Ugandan Companie s Act, because a minor was allegedly appointed

18
as a director of a Ugandan company, contrary to the provisions of the said Act .

45. Thus these are the only two files concerning the Porter Report that have been closed.

The question now is the following: are those files really of interest to this Court? Are those

26 precise investigations into particular cases of breaches of Ugandan domestic legislation by certain

individuals really of any relevance whatsoever to the case before you? I am sure you will

understand, Mr.President, Members of the Court, why I have emphasized so much in both my

statements the necessary distinction between the va rious “illegal” acts (from the point of view of

domestic law) observed by the Porter Commission a nd the United Nations Panels and the possible

“internationally wrongful acts” which alone fall within the purview of this Court. Mr. President, I

have now come to the end of my statement on this part, on the question of natural resources, and I

would kindly request a break before I begin my statement on the counter-claims. Thank you,

Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Suy. Indeed this is the proper place for you to

stop. The Court will have a ten-minute break, after which you will continue.

The Court adjourned from 4 to 4.10 p.m.

17
“Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into alle gations of illegal exploitation of natural resources and
other forms of wealth in the DRC”, in ICJ, Submission by the Republic of Uganda of new documents in accordance with
Article 43 of the Statute and Article 56 of the Rules of Court, 20 October 2003, p. 81, para. 18.4.
1See ibid., pp. 80 and 153. - 20 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Suy, please continue.

SUYr.:

T HE U GANDAN COUNTER -CLAIMS

1. Mr. President, honourable Members of th e Court, Uganda’s reply to the arguments

presented last Friday by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Ugandan counter-claims will

be set out as follows: first, I should briefly like to rehearse the reasons why Uganda considers that,

contrary to what was said last Friday, the prelim inary objections as to ad missibility raised by the

DRC are themselves inadmissible at this stage in the proceedings (I). Secondly, I shall respond to

the DRC’s treatment of the first counter-claim, covering both the alleged “renunciation” by Uganda

and the merits of the case. I shall thus show that, by allowing various rebel bands to use its

territory to prepare and launch terrorist attaand acts of subversion against Uganda, or even

27 supporting and aiding these rebels, the DRC breached a number of international obligations⎯

contrary to what was claimed last Friday by our honourable opponents (II). Third and last, I shall

address the question of the second counter-claim in order to reply both to the objections to

admissibility raised by the other Party and to the denials of the facts, which are however clearly

established, and represent the very cornerstone of this claim (III).

I. The DRC cannot legitimately raise preliminary objections at

this stage in the proceedings

2. I should thus like to reply first to the arguments put forward last Friday by

Professor P. Klein concerning the admissibility, at this stage in the proceedings, of the objections of

inadmissibility raised by the DRC against Uganda’s counter-claims.

3. In this connection, ProfessorKlein referred to your Court’s recent decision in the

Oil Platforms case. It is indeed well known that, its Judgment of 6November 2003, the Court

agreed to consider the objections of inadmissibility made by Iran, notwithstanding the United

States argument that the Court had finally settle d the matter in its Order of 10 March 1998 relating

specifically to the American counter-claims. What my distinguished colleague nevertheless

omitted to mention is that this decision of the Court was dictated by the very particular - 21 -

circumstances of the case, which justify the view that the Court’s solution on 6November 2003

does not constitute the principle, but rather the exception to the rule.

4. More precisely, a careful examination of the Oil Platforms case shows that the Iranian

preliminary objections were indeed raised be fore the Order of 10March 1998; moreover, Iran

wished the Court to consider them in those initial proceedings. However, it was the United States

itself, the counter-claimant, which, in March 1998, had continually requested the Court to limit its

consideration to matters relating to the connec tion between the counter-claims and the principal

claim, and to reserve its reply on the preliminary objections for a later stage in the proceedings ⎯ a

request the Court ultimately acceded to.

28 5. The oral arguments of counsel for Iran at the hearings in February-March 2003 dwell on

this fact at length. For example, counsel for Iran stated that, in his “very humble opinion, the Court

could already have” settled the preliminary objections issue in the Order of 10 March 1998, but “in

its wisdom, it decided otherwise” 19. However, he stressed that, in view of this situation, in view of

the fact that, in 1998, “the United States had urged the Court to confine itself solely to the issues of

admissibility regarding the connection of the coun ter-claim with the subject-matter of the main

20
claim” , Iran was entitled to ask the Court, in 2003, to “rule on the points ⎯ and there are a

number of them ⎯ on which [the Court] did not decide, in accordance with the clear position

(then) taken by the United States, which cannot, as it is now doing, blow cold after previously

21
blowing hot and urging you to take the position which you took” .

6. Your Court, moreover, itself emphasized this important point in its Judgment of

6November 2003. Thus, just before the passage from that Judgment quoted last week by

Professor Klein, there is another in which the Court explains its position. Let me remind you of it:

“The United States contends that the Order of 10March 1998 settled
definitively in its favour all such issues of jurisdiction and admissibility as might arise.

The Court notes however that the United States is adopting an attitude different
from its position in 1998 . At that time, while Iran was asking the Court to rule

generally on its jurisdiction and on the ad missibility of the counter-claim, the United
States was basing itself solely on Article 80. It argued in particular that

1CR 2003/14 of 28 February 2003, para. 3 (Pellet).
20
CR 2003/19 of 7 March 2003, para. 2 (Pellet); emphasis added.
2CR 2003/14 of 28 February 2003, para. 4 (Pellet). - 22 -

‘[m]any of Iran’s objections to jurisdiction and admissibility involve

contested matters, which the Court cannot effectively address at this
stage, particularly not in the cont ext of the abbreviated procedures of
Article 80, paragraph 3’ (cited in I.C.J. Reports 1998 , p. 200, para .
22).” 22

29 7. Thus it is logical to take the view that your Court’s position in the Oil Platforms case was

exclusively dictated by the very particular circ umstances of the case I have just set out to you ⎯ a

fact which the Court itself emphasized.

8. However, the present case has no similarity with the situation just described, and

Uganda’s attitude can in no way be equated with that of the United States in the Oil Platforms case.

It is clear to the Government of Uganda th at the imperatives of legal security and the sound

administration of justice, as well as a reasonable in terpretation of the Rules of Court, require the

DRC to present all of its preliminary objections at once. To allow the DRC to present its

objections in “instalments” could only be prejudici al to the counter-claimant State, obliging it,

contrary to what is laid down by Article79 for th e applicant State, to continue to reply to the

various exclusively preliminary objections until the final stage of the proceedings. Such an

interpretation of the Rules would thus create inequality between the parties, which would certainly

be contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Stat ute and Rules of Court. As Judge Rosalyn Higgins

so neatly summed it up, recalling the principle of eq uality of treatment between the parties, in her

separate opinion appended to the Order of 10 March 1998 relating to Oil Platforms, “matters going

to jurisdiction should, wherever possible, be disposed of before proceeding to the merits” 23.

9. For all these reasons, Uganda requests the C ourt to adjudge and declare that the Order of

29November 2001 definitively settled all issues of admissibility and that it had the effect of

estopping the DRC from filing further preliminary objections.

10. Mr. President, it is thus only in the altern ative that Uganda will reply to those objections

in the context of its discussion of the first and second counter-claim, to which I should now like to

turn.

22
Judgment, pp. 209-210, para. 104; emphasis added.
23 Oil Platforms, Counter-Claim, Order, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , separate opinion of Judge Higgins; emphasis

added. - 23 -

II. The first counter-claim

11. Allow me first of all to address the matter of the alleged “renunciation” by Uganda (A),

before briefly reverting to the merits of this first counter-claim (B).

30 A. The alleged “renunciation”

12. While the “slicing” technique is skilfully employed by the DRC in order to induce your

Court to adopt a fragmented approach to its prelim inary objections, this technique is raised to a

veritable art form where the treatment by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the first

Ugandan counter-claim is concerned. Just like Zeno, who in one of his famous paradoxes divided a

race into a sequence of separate parts in order to prove that Achilles would never beat the tortoise,

the DRC also takes a continuing wrongful act and chops it into slices, in order to contend before

your Court that you should not concern yourself with certain of them. The art thus lies in creating

the illusion of a clear contrast between “the period before the accession to power of President

Laurent Kabila” and “the period after the accession to power of President LaurentKabila”,

between “Zaire” on the one hand and the “DRC” on the other ⎯ which are supposedly not the

same.

13. By removing the period before May1997 from consideration by your Court, the DRC

thus seeks to limit Uganda’s counter-claim to a brief period of 15months, for which Uganda is

required to furnish overwhelming evidence of the DRC’s ambiguous conduct. The Court will thus

no longer have before it the complete picture, wh ich could but be highly advantageous to a State

that for over seven years either tolerated or sponsored and supported ar med bands, which were

using its territory tranquilly to train and prepar e and –– just as tranquilly –– launch attacks against

Uganda, before once again finding a safe refuge on Congolese soil.

14. The problem raised by this approach is that Zaire and the DRC are not distinct entities.

By virtue of the State continuity principle, it is precisely the same legal person responsible for the

explosive situation which has prevailed in east ern Congo all these years–– a situation caused by

the shelter given to anti-Ugandan rebels in that region. There is therefore no reason to make any

distinction between Doctor Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and thus to “slice” the Ugandan claim in this way.

15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, th e argument that Uganda allegedly “renounced”

part of its first counter-claim is thus completely w ithout foundation. In reality, this is a mere ploy - 24 -

dreamed up by the DRC as a response to the rejection by the Court, in its Order of

31 29November2001, of the Congolese argument that there is no connection between the principal

claim and this alleged “slice” of the first Ug andan counter-claim, fo r which the Court has

nevertheless clearly indicated that it was part of “facts of the same nature” , i.e. of a “conflict in

existence between the two neighbouring States, in various forms and of variable intensity since

1994” 24.

16. Members of the Court, last week I made a lengthy analysis of international jurisprudence

on the subject of waiver, which would seem to have gone unchallenged by the other Party. Yet the

DRC has not been able to adduce even a single sh red of evidence of any waiver whatever, whether

express or implicit, which, according to the clear position of the International Law Commission,

25
must in any event be “unequivocal” . In reality, Uganda’s conduct throughout the period

concerned shows only one thing: Uganda’s c ontinuous, varied and multifaceted reaction to a

serious situation caused by the actions and omissi ons of Zaire/DRC in the east of that country,

accompanied by an equally conti nuous and uninterrupted plea by Uganda to Zaire/DRC for it to

take all necessary steps to put an end to the situation.

17. The fact, as this Court pointed out, that this dispute between these two neighbouring

States took “various forms” or was of “variable intensity” from one period to another, does not

warrant the inference of any “renunciation” by Uganda . The fact that at one time or another some

statement or timid action by PresidentMobutu or President LaurentKabila could have nourished

the hope that Zaire/DRC was perhaps goi ng to decide to change its attitude ⎯ a hope soon dashed

moreover by the actions and highly ambiguous conduct of that State ⎯ in no way warrants the

conclusion that there was any “renunciation” what ever. And what was required of Zaire/DRC by

the “international stability” referred to by my di stinguished colleague PierreKlein last week was

certainly not that it should infer from Kampala’s attitude some form of “renunciation”, but rather

that it should make a serious response to the latte r’s continuous claims by putting an end to the

situation created in eastern Congo.

24
Order of 29 November 2001, para. 38; emphasis added.
25
ILC Report, doc. A/56/10, 2001, p. 331; emphasis added. - 25 -

B. The facts and the law

32 18. I should now like to respond briefly to what the DRC maintained last week regarding the

“merits” of this first counter-claim.

In my presentation last week I cited a number of legal principles applicable to the present

case, principles which have not been denied in an y way by our opponents, so I will not need to

return to them now.

19. Neither has there been any rebuttal of th e lengthy listing by my colleagues and myself of

the actions of the rebel groups using Congolese soil as a refuge in order to carry out murderous

attacks on Uganda, and above all on the Ugandan civilian population, nor of the long list of these

attacks presented before the Court. Quite to the contrary, these facts have clearly been accepted by

the other Party, as witness, for example, the pr ecise words used by ProfessorCorten, pleading on

behalf of the DRC:

“A few days ago, counsel for Uganda r eeled off a list of the26arious Ugandan
rebel groups that had been operating from Congolese territory . They also dwelt on
various actions by those groups, providing details of some of their military activities . 27

The DRC has never denied t28se facts , and it is therefore surprised at their being
repeated so insistently.”

20. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let us turn our attention briefly to this point. The

Congo acknowledges that many rebel groups have u sed its territory for years to train for and

prepare attacks on its neighbour. The Congo acknowl edges the existence and accuracy of the list

of bloodthirsty armed attacks that my colleagu es have put before you, and also acknowledges that

these appalling attacks occurred over a period of several years. The Congo does not deny for a

moment that it was from its own territory that the rebels launched their attacks undisturbed for

years and went off to massacre Ugandan civilians or to burn a hundred or so innocent children alive

at Kichwamba College ⎯ before returning to fi nd refuge on Congolese soil. The only thing that

the Congo refuses to accept is that these facts can be regarded in any way whatever as a violation

of international law imputable to the State which ha rboured rebels and terrorists for so many years.

Thus the unfortunate neighbour of that State should have passively accepted these attacks without

2CR 2005/7, pp. 9-11, paras. 3 and 4 (Mr. Brownlie).
27
Ibid., p. 11, para. 8 (Mr. Brownlie).
2CR 2005/11, para. 4; emphasis added. - 26 -

33 the right to invoke self-defence, or to i nvoke necessity, or even the right to invoke a violation of

international law by the State which offered rebels and terrorists a safe haven for so many years.

21. The reason for so extraordinary a conclu sion was given last week by ProfessorCorten:

the Congo has not violated international law, either by act or by omission 29.

22. Let us start first of all with the sensitive issue of “omission” . The Congo accepts that a

duty of vigilance exists in international law in this area. This duty requires a State to take drastic

measures to prevent any group from being able to use its territory in order to organize and conduct

subversive or terrorist activities against another St ate. However, the C ongo claims that such

measures were adopted with effect from May 1997.

23. I would point out that, even without its having to rule on this argument, these assertions

by the Congo allow the Court, with no need for other evidence, to recognize the international

responsibility of that State, at least for the period prior to May 1997.
If the Congo accepts that for

all those years before May1997 rebels were usi ng its territory to launch numerous attacks on

Uganda, and if the Congo acknowledges that until May 1997 it took no measures to comply with its

duty of vigilance (and, I repeat, no measures have been mentioned by ProfessorKlein or

ProfessorCorten), the DRC automatically incurs responsibility. Mr.Hyde can no longer hide

behind Doctor Jekyll. Thus one readily understands our opponents’ desperate efforts to enable the

Congo to escape its responsibility through recourse to “slicing” techniques and to the ingenious

device of an alleged “renunciation”.

24. But even during the period between May1997 and August1998 the argument that the

Congo had at last fulfilled its duty of vigilance is unconvincing. Thus it should be stressed that it is

not enough for a State to declare that it is co-operating or to pretend to co-operate in order to

comply with its duty of vigilance. Neither did signing an agreement such as the April1998

Protocol mean that it could claim indulgence for past and future acts. This morning my

distinguished colleague and frie nd, Paul Reichler, recalled all the ambiguities in Congolese policy

34 during that period and showed that “co-operation” was merely the visible tip of an iceberg of

continuing tolerance of and support for anti-Ugandan rebels.

29
Idem., paras. 2 et seq. - 27 -

25. This indeed leads us to wonder whether Congo has not only violated international law by

omission, by failing in its duty of vigilance, but also by its acts. ProfessorKlein and

ProfessorCorten have denied in toto that there were any such acts on the part of the Congo.

Nevertheless the facts before the Court leave little room for doubt in this respect. Of course, when

a State is supporting rebels or terrorists it does not often organize press conferences in this

connection and rarely makes a tele vised statement about it. From this point of view, Uganda

unfortunately cannot produce to the Court so lemn declarations by PresidentMobutu or

President Laurent Kabila claiming ultimate responsibility for the acts of rebels.

26. However, the evidence produced by Uganda in the annexes to its written pleadings is

sufficient to establish the truth of the facts. In his presentation this morning, my colleague

PaulReichler dwelt at length on this point regarding the period under Mr.LaurentKabila’s

presidency, so I am not going to return to it. As to the period under Mr. Mobutu’s presidency, aid

by the Congo to anti-Ugandan rebels is establis hed beyond all reasonable doubt by a whole series

of different documents, including several statem ents by a large number of anti-Ugandan rebels

themselves who explain, for example, how “ADF requested for bases in the Congo (DRC) to

establish camps which was granted” 30 by Mr.Mobutu’s Government, how the activities of

31
anti-Ugandan rebels proceeded “under the direct authority of President Mobutu” or how “ADF

received several weapons from th e Sudan Government with help of the Government of Zaire” 32.

Uganda is not going to revisit a ll of these documents here in or der to present each one of them

individually. Uganda simply respectfully requ ests the Court to examine the following Annexes

with care:

35 ⎯ in the Ugandan Counter-Memorial: Annex 3 (pp. 1-2), Annex 4, Annex 5 (p.2), Annex7

(pp. 3-5), Annex 10 (p. 1), Annex 18 (pp. 2-3), Annex60 (p.6), Annex62 (p.1), Annex63

(p. 1), Annex 64 (p. 1), Annex 71 (p. 1), Annex 90 (pp. 3-7);

⎯ in the Ugandan Rejoinder: Annex19 (p.2), Annex 20 (p. 2), Annex 21, Annex 22 (p. 3),

Annex 25 (pp. 1-3), Annex 85, Annex 108 (pp. 4-10).

3CMU, Ann. 64, p. 1; emphasis added.
31
Idem., Ann. 71, p. 1; emphasis added.
3CMU, Ann. 60, p. 6 or again Ann. 62, p. 1; emphasis added. - 28 -

27. In the light of all of these documents and all of this evid ence, Uganda is asking the Court

to adjudge and declare that actions in support of the rebels on the part of the Congolese authorities

all constitute violations of the legal principles that I analysed last week.

28. With your permission, Mr. President, I should now like to move on to the second part of

my presentation, which concerns the second counter-claim.

III. The second counter-claim

29. In this last section I would like to comment very briefly on the preliminary objections

raised by the DRC (A) before turning, also briefly, to the merits (B).

A. The preliminary objections to the second counter-claim

30. My distinguished colleague Jean Salmon reiterated here before you the preliminary

objections belatedly raised by the DRC. My responses follow.

(a) The objection relating to the alleged modification of Uganda’s second claim resulting from
the alleged belated addition of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Law to the list of rules
violated by the DRC

31. Without repeating here what I said last week, Uganda will make the following fou
r

points in response.

32. First, this objection is patently inadmissible since the issue of the admissibility of this

claim has already been settled, as I have said, by the Order rendered by the Court on

29 November 2001.

33. Secondly, there is nothing new in the formulation of Uganda’s second claim. Contrary to

the DRC’s contention, the 1961Vienna Conventio n was invoked in Uganda’s Counter-Memorial,

36 and no fewer than three times in paragraph 402 of the Counter-Memorial. It is impossible to see in

this respect why paragraph402, despite its clar ity, would be ineffective for this second claim and

that only paragraphs 405 and 408 would be relevant ⎯ to again cite the argument advanced by my

33
friend JeanSalmon . Further, we should recall what the Court said in its Order of

29 November 2001:

33
CR 2005/11, p. 42, para. 1. - 29 -

“in respect of Uganda’s second counter-claim . . ., it is evident from the case file that

the facts relied on by Uganda occurred in August 1998, immediately after its alleged
invasion of Congolese territory; whereas each Party holds the other responsible for
various acts of oppression allegedly accompan ying an illegal use of force; whereas
these are facts of the same nature, and whereas the Parties’ claims form part of the

same factual complex . . .; and whereas each Party seeks to establish the responsibility
of the other by invoking, in connection with the alleged illegal use of force, certain
rules of conventional or customary international law relating to the protection of
34
persons and property; whereas the Parties are thus pursuing the same legal aims” .

It is thus clear that the “conventional... law” to which the Court referred is none other than the

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the only conventional instrument expressly named in

that part of the Counter-Memorial devoted to the second claim.

34. Thirdly, and in the alternative, even assuming that the Court concludes, in spite of

everything, that the Vienna Convention was not i nvoked in the Counter-Memorial, it is difficult to

see why the Court should take the view that the reference to the Convention changes the

subject-matter of the claim, making it into a “new claim”.

35. I shall recall in this connection that the Court, in its Judgment of 6 November 2003 in the

Oil Platforms case, rejected a similar argument made by Iran, even though the particulars and

incidents added by the United States after having formulated the counter-claim were far more

important than Uganda’s alleged addition, minimal as it is, of a reference to the Vienna Convention

in this case. Yet, in its 6November2003 Judgment in the Oil Platforms case, the Court rejected

Iran’s argument, finding that the United States had not “by doing so, transformed the subject of the

dispute originally submitted to the Court, nor has it modified the substance of its counter-claim,

37 which remains the same . . .” 35. We believe that the same conclusion should, a fortiori, be adopted

here.

36. Finally, and again in the alternative, even assumi ng that the Court decides, in spite of

everything, that the claim is a “new” one, we would have difficulty understanding why it should be

dismissed on the basis of Article80, paragraph1, of the Rules of Court. This claim’s historical

connection is perfectly clear: it relates to exac tly those facts in respect of which the Court

recognized such a connection in its Order of 29 November2001. The legal connection is just as

clear, the Court having pointed out that such a connection is established by the fact that the two

34
Op. cit., I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 679, para. 40; emphasis added.
35
Op. cit., para. 118. - 30 -

States invoke the same rules relating to “the prot ection of persons and prope rty”. Let us observe

finally that a decision to the effect that Uganda should file a new, separate application concerning

the Vienna Convention’s applicability to the facts already submitted to the Court for consideration

would be contrary to the principles of procedural economy and, beyond that, the principle of sound

administration of justice.

(b) The other objections

37. Last Friday, my friend Jean Salmon said practically nothing about the objection relating

to the exercise of diplomatic protection. I explained at length in my statement last Wednesday

(CR2005/10) why recourse to diplomatic protecti on was inapplicable in the present case. I

therefore stand by those arguments.

38. On the other hand, Jean Salmon tried to sow confusion in respect of that part of the

second claim concerning attacks on “Ugandan nationa ls”. Uganda has however always made a

very clear distinction between, on the one hand, me mbers of the diplomatic staff of the Mission,

including all persons covered by the provisions of the Vienna C onvention, and, on the other hand,

other Ugandan nationals who are not diplomats and who, Uganda believes, are entitled to the

protection extended by general principles of inte rnational law concerning treatment of foreign

nationals. Therefore, while the rather histrioni c performance by my friend Jean Salmon, brilliantly

38 bringing to life a fable by La Fontaine, was no doubt amusing and very nice after two exhausting

weeks of proceedings, it was nevertheless legally irrelevant.

B. Examination of the second claim on the merits

39. Maître Tshibangu Kalala then endeavoured to show that Uganda’s second counter-claim

should be rejected because unfounded both in law and in fact. His conclusions are as simple as

they are categorical: “none of these accusations made against (the DRC) by the Respondent has

any serious and credible factual basis” (CR 2005/11, p. 51, para. 3). And he concludes from this:

the Ugandan diplomatic mission was never attacked: Ugandan nationals were not mistreated,

either at the embassy or at Ndjili International Ai rport; public immovable property of Uganda was

never ransacked but rather voluntarily abandoned by Ugandan diplomats and, notwithstanding its

“dilapidation”, remains at the disposal of Uganda. According to the DRC, Uganda is unable to - 31 -

prove that four vehicles remaining in Kinshasa were stolen by Congolese soldiers. Certain archives

and official documents belonging to Uganda’s mission in Kinshasa were not stolen by the DRC

either and the DRC did not seize certain [moveable] property of the Ugandan mission. The few

documents produced by Uganda in support of its claims are said to be without probative force:

they are alleged to have been “concocted” (paras. 24 and 28) by Uganda with a view to engaging

the responsibility of the DRC! Words cannot express Uganda’s indignation at such charges!

40. The Luanda Treaty of 6September2002 provided for an inspection of Uganda’s

chancery and official residen ce in Kinshasa by a joint dele gation of Ugandan and Congolese

officials. A report dated 28September concerning the condition of those buildings was thus

prepared and signed by the two States’ officials. This report is found in Annex88 of Uganda’s

Rejoinder. MaîtreTshibanguKalala is aware of bot h the existence and content of this report, but

he feels that this inventory

“can only constitute evidence if compared with a separate inventory, prepared in
tempore non suspecto at the time when the Ugandan diplomats were evacuated from
Kinshasa. However, no such inventor y was ever made, probably because the
members of Uganda’s diplomatic mission to ok with them all property and archives of

any value . . .” (CR 2005/11, p. 57, para. 20.)

39 However, this joint report notes: (1) that the two buildings were occupied ⎯ and certainly not by

Ugandan officials; (2)that they were in a state of total ruin; and (3)that the delegation did not

find any moveable property belonging to the Ugandan Embassy or its former officials. But the

DRC no doubt considers this document, like all the others moreover, to be worthless, even though

it is bilateral in nature and, in this case, was not unilaterally “concocted” by Uganda.

That, Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court, brings to a conclusion my statement

on Uganda’s counter-claims in the second round of oral argument. Thanking you, Mr.President,

and Members of the Court, for your kind attention, I would now like to ask you to give the floor to

the Honourable Khiddu Makibuya, Attorney Genera l of the Republic of Uganda, who will make a

brief statement and present Uganda’s final submissions. Thank you.

Le PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie, Monsieur Suy. Je donne à présent la parole à

S. Exc. M. Khiddu Makubuya, agent de l’Ouganda. - 32 -

M. KHIDDU MAKUBUYA :

1. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, c’est avec un grand plaisir que je

prends de nouveau la parole devant vous, cette fois pour clore la plaidoirie de l’Ouganda. Avant

d’en venir aux conclusions formelles de l’Ougand a, j’espère que vous me permettrez de formuler

quelques dernières observations au nom de mon gouvernement.

2. Au cours des deux semaines et demie qui viennent de s’écouler, chacune des Parties a

défendu ses thèses avec véhémence, et je dirais mê me avec éclat. Si les plaidoiries de la RDC

furent parfois pénibles à entendre, je n’en ai pas moins été impressionné par l’opiniâtreté avec

laquelle ses conseils ont ⎯ infatigablement ⎯ défendu leur cause contre l’Ouganda. Ce qui rendit

l’écoute pénible, ce ne furent pas seulement les terribles accusations formulées à l’encontre de

l’Ouganda. C’est aussi que cela nous a tous contraints à revenir sur une période qui fut

traumatisante pour la RDC, pour l’Ouganda et d’ ailleurs pour l’Afrique tout entière, période que

l’Ouganda croyait révolue depuis fort longtemps.

3. Comme je l’ai dit lorsque j’ai eu l’honneur de me présenter une première fois devant la

Cour le vendredi 15 avril dernier, les relations bilatérales entre l’Ouganda et la RDC sont nettement

40 meilleures depuis les dernières années, tout particulièrement depuis la signature de l’accord de paix

de Luanda en septembre 2002. J’ai été heur eux d’entendre M. l’ambassadeur Masangu-a-Mwanza

e
et M Kalala en apporter l’un et l’autre confirmation au nom du Congo. Pour insister sur ce fait, je

vous dirai que, la semaine dernière, alors même que se déroulaient nos audiences, des représentants

de l’Ouganda, de la RDC et du Rwanda ont tenu à Lubumbashi, au Congo, la deuxième réunion de

la commission tripartite mise en plac e par l’accord tripartite d’octobre2004 ⎯dont une copie

figure au dossier des juges, à l’onglet10. Avec l’aide et la médiation de l’Organisation des

NationsUnies, de l’Union européenne, de l’Un ion africaine, de la Belgique, des Etats-Unis

d’Amérique et du Royaume-Uni, les Parties ont convenu de créer une «cellule conjointe de

collecte, d’exploitation et d’analyse du renseignement» ⎯ une initiative qui s’inscrit dans le cadre

de l’action que nous menons sans relâche pour aider à mettre vraiment un point final au conflit qui

ensanglante la région des Grands Lacs depuis 1994, et en particulier pour en finir avec la présence

de bandes armées qui subsistent dans certaines parties du Congo. - 33 -

4. Lundi, j’ai entendu M Kalala reprocher à l’Ouganda et à ses conseils d’invoquer

inutilement l’histoire et la politique régionale da ns le cadre de leur défense. L’Ouganda estime

qu’on ne peut pas comprendre les événements en cause devant la Cour sans avoir une connaissance

approfondie du contexte régional et historique dans lesquels ils s’inscrivent. D’où la nécessité de

suivre la voie qu’ont été contraints d’emprunter tous les pays d’Afrique centrale depuis le génocide

barbare commis au Rwanda en 1994. D’où, aussi, la nécessité de revenir plus particulièrement sur

le rôle indéniable joué et par le Rwanda et par le Soudan dans ces événements. Il ne m’agrée pas

e
plus qu’à M Kalala d’entendre le nom du «Soudan» répé té 250fois, mais les faits sont ce qu’ils

sont et non ce que nous voudrions qu’ils soient.

5. Tandis qu’il morigénait l’Ouganda parce que ce dernier évoquait des faits relevant de la

politique et de l’histoire régionale, M eKalala s’est employé à souligner que c’est un jugement en

36
droit que la RDC demande à la Cour dans le différend qui l’oppose à l’Ouganda . Mais ici, il me

faut m’arrêter un instant et revenir sur un point que j’ai soulevé dans ma première intervention et

que la RDC s’est abstenue de traiter. Il s’ag it des termes de l’accord de paix de Luanda. A

l’article 4, sous l’intitulé «Des relations judiciaires», l’Ouganda et la RDC ont convenu de «trouver

e
une formule à l’amiable pour résoudre tout litige juridique entre elles». Or donc, si M Kalala est

dans le vrai et qu’il s’agit en effet ici d’un simple différend «en droit», celui-ci est par définition

couvert par l’article4 de l’accord de Luanda. En conséquence, les Parties sont tenues de trouver
41

une «formule à l’amiable» pour le résoudre. Quand la RDC veut de façon absolument unilatérale

inscrire une nouvelle fois cette affa ire au calendrier de la Cour ⎯et, là-dessus, elle fait tout

bonnement litière de l’objec tion expresse de l’Ouganda ⎯ la RDC formule une demande tout

simplement contraire à l’engagement qu’elle a contracté dans l’accord de paix de Luanda.

6. La Cour, point n’est besoin pour moi de le rappeler, est bien plus qu’une simple cour de

justice. C’est un rouage essentiel du système de l’Organisation des NationsUnies visant à

promouvoir et à faciliter le règlement pacifique des différends. Son mandat ne se résume donc pas,

tant s’en faut, à appliquer des principes abst raits de droit international sans se soucier des

conséquences politiques et humaines que sa décision est appelée à avoir sur le terrain.

36CR 2005/12, p. 9, par. 3. - 34 -

7. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je veux être

parfaitement clair. L’Ouganda a le plus grand respect pour la Cour et pour les règles du droit

international. Voilà pourquoi, contrairement à certains des autres protagonistes de la pièce qui s’est

déroulée dans ce prétoire, l’Ouganda a accepté sa ju ridiction obligatoire en1963, peu après avoir

accédé à l’indépendance. Voilà aussi pourquoi l’Ouganda ⎯et c’est, à sa connaissance, le seul

pays de la communauté inte rnationale à l’avoir fait ⎯ a voulu créer une commission judiciaire

indépendante chargée d’enquêter sur les alléga tions de pillage des richesses congolaises.

D’ailleurs, j’ai pu, en ma qualité d’ Attorney General de l’Ouganda, constater avec ironie que c’est

précisément l’attachement de l’Ouganda à la transparence et à la primauté du droit qui a permis aux

conseils de la RDC de vous faire entendre ce qu’ils considèrent à tort comme des arguments

servant leur cause. Le Congo s’est fortement appuyé sur des documents internes du Gouvernement

ougandais et de l’armée ougandaise, produits dans le cadre de la mission de la commission Porter.

Il va sans dire que la même possibilité d’examiner les dossiers internes du Gouvernement congolais

ou de l’armée congolaise n’a pas été donnée à l’Ouganda. Dans sa résolution1457 de 2003, au

paragraphe15, le Conseil de sécu rité avait engagé tous les Etats de la région à créer leur propre

commission d’enquête pour mener une instruction indépendante sur les allégations. La RDC a bien

cité abondamment le rapport de la commission Porter, mais il aurait été plus utile pour la Cour de

l’entendre faire état du rapport de sa propre commission judiciaire d’enquête ⎯ encore aurait-il

fallu que celle-ci existe.

8. Respecter le droit international consiste pour partie à honorer les engagements contractés

par la voie de traités internationaux. Et c’est là ce que nous demandons à la RDC et ce que nous

attendons de sa part. La Cour sait parfaiteme nt qu’en novembre2003, les Parties ont convenu

d’une «formule à l’amiable» afin de résoudre leur différend par la voie de négociations

42 diplomatiques. Ensuite, sans consulter au préalable l’Ouganda, la RDC a unilatéralement exigé que

cette affaire soit de nouveau inscrite au calendrier de la Cour. Comme l’Ouganda l’a dit alors à la

Cour, cette formule unilatérale n’avait rien d’une formule amiable.

9. Force est pour moi de poser à nouveau la question que j’ai soulevée lorsque l’Ouganda a

entamé sa défense le 15avril2005. Qui a réelleme nt intérêt à prolonger cette action en justice?

Nous sommes deux pays en développement appelé s à acquitter des frais exorbitants notamment - 35 -

pour notre représentation en justice alors que cet argent pourrait être consacré à un bien meilleur

usage. N’aurions-nous pas intérêt à trouver une manière plus constructive de régler ce différend ?

10. J’ai entendu M.Kalala réclamer avec ar deur justice et réparation au nom du peuple

congolais. Dois-je en faire autant au nom d es civils ougandais, dont on ignore le nombre, qui

furent tués délibérément par les rebelles armés opérant en toute impunité depuis le territoire

congolais ⎯ souvent avec le soutien du Gouvernement zaïrois ou congolais ?

11. Il faut faire la lumière sur les méfaits allégués, certes. Mais, avec tout le respect qui lui

est dû, je dirai à la Cour qu’elle favoriserait le plus efficacement et le plus durablement le

règlement pacifique de ce différend en incitant l es Parties à honorer l’engagement qu’elles ont pris

de trouver à cet effet une formule à l’amiable.

12. Permettez-moi de vous dire clairement au nom de mon gouvernement que l’Ouganda est

prêt à prendre place à une table avec le Congo, est tout disposé à s’asseoir à cette table pour

qu’entre voisins nous cherchions résoudre toutes les questions qui sont à régler entre nous. En ce

moment de transition en RDC et dans la région des Grands Lacs tout entière, et c’est un moment

périlleux mais aussi un moment historique, l’Ougand a se féliciterait de toute mesure que la Cour

pourrait juger opportun de prendre en vue d’inciter ou d’aider les Parties à trouver une formule à

l’amiable pour résoudre leur diffé rend ainsi qu’elles en sont tenues en tout état de cause par

l’article 4 de l’accord de Luanda.

13. Monsieur le président, Madame et M essieurs de la Cour, ce fut un honneur pour

l’Ouganda et pour moi-même que de comparaître devant vous. Conformément à l’article60 du

Règlement de la Cour, je vous soumets à présent les conclusions formelles de l’Ouganda.

14. La République de l’Ouganda prie la Cour :

43 1) De juger et déclarer conformément au droit international :

A) que les prétentions de la République démocratique du Congo relatives aux activités ou aux

situations impliquant la République du Rw anda ou ses agents sont irrecevables pour les

raisons énoncées au chapitre XV du contre-mémoire et réaffirmées à l’audience;

B) que les prétentions de la République démocratique du Congo tendant à ce que la Cour juge

que la République de l’Ouganda est res ponsable de diverses violations du droit - 36 -

international, suivant les allégations formulées dans le mémoire, dans la réplique et/ou à

l’audience, sont rejetées; et

C)que les demandes reconventionnelles de l’Ouganda formulées au chapitreXVIII du

contre-mémoire et renouvelées au chapitreVI de la duplique ainsi qu’à l’audience sont

confirmées.

2) de réserver à un stade ultérieur de la procé dure la question des réparations en rapport avec les

demandes reconventionnelles de l’Ouganda.

15. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieu rs de la Cour, je vous remercie de votre

bienveillante attention. Comme l’a indiqué M. Reichler ce matin, l’Ouganda répondra par écrit aux

trois questions posées par la Cour à l’issue du premier tour de plaidoiries. Je vous remercie.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Votre Excelle nce. La Cour prend acte des conclusions

finales dont vous avez donné lecture au nom de l’ Ouganda. Voilà qui clôt le second tour de

plaidoiries de l’Ouganda.

Les audiences en l’affaire reprendront le vendredi 29 avril, de 10 heures à 11 h 30 : la Cour

entendra alors la plaidoirie de la Républi que démocratique du Congo sur les demandes

reconventionnelles de l’Ouganda. L’audience est levée.

L’audience est levée à 17 h 30.

___________