Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR200215 (traduction)
CR200215 (translation)
Vendredi22 févrie2002à 10heures
Friday22February2002 at10 a.m. Le PRESIDENT :Veuillezvous asseoir. La séanceest ouverteetje donne la parolepour la
RépubliqueduCamerounauprofesseurMauriceMendelson.
M. MENDELSON :Merci, Monsieurleprésident.
1. LA FRONTIÈRE TERRESTRE
7. Bakassi
f) La reconnaissanceet l'acceptation par le Nigériade la souveraineté camerounaise sur la
péninsuledeBakassi
1.Introduction
1.Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour,vous avez déjàpu entendreun
certainnombre d'interventionsau cours desquellesvousa étéexposéela façondont la communauté
internationalea, par l'entremise de ses organisations,reconnu l'appartenancede la presqu'île de
Bakassi au Cameroun méridional puis àla Républiquedu Cameroun;elle l'a fait par la mise en
place des régimesdes mandats et de la tutelle sur le Cameroun méridional,ainsi que par leur
supervision,par l'organisationd'un plébisciteet, enfin,par la confirmation desrésultatsdecelui-ci.
Au cours de ma plaidoirie de ce matin, je traiterai un thème quelque peu différent :je me
concentreraiplusparticulièrementsurlareconnaissanceet l'acceptationpar leNigérialui-même de
la souveraineté camerounaisesur la presqu'île de Bakassi. Je n'aborderai ni les matériaux
cartographiques,sur lesquels s'est expriméhier mon ami le professeur Cot, ni la question des
traités de délimitation maritimeconclus entre le Nigéria et le Cameroun, qui présupposaient
l'existence d'unefrontièrepassant à l'ouest de la presqu'île. Cette question fera l'objet d'une
plaidoirie distincte présentéepar mon ami et confrère, M.Thouvenin, que vous entendrez
immédiatementaprès la mienne. Les interventions de M. Cot et de M. Thouvenin confirment
néanmoins,sije puis m'exprimerainsi,lathèsequeje me propose de voussoumettre.
2. Je ne m'attarderaipas sur la distinction entre reconnaissanceet acquiescement,dans la
mesure où ladifférenceentreces deux termesest sans incidencesur la questionqui nousintéresse
ici. De la mêmefaçon, l'acceptationet la confirmation par des instances et des fonctionnaires
nigérians attestentde ce qu'était lepoint de vue du Nigériaà l'époque,qu'elles aient ou non
constituéune reconnaissanceexpresse- ce qui a parfois étéle cas. Il existe d'ailleurs, comme nous le verrons, une certaine manière de chevauchemententre ces notions et l'un des thèmesqui
ont fait l'objetde maplaidoirie d'hier,leseffectivitésduCameroun.
3. Monsieur le président,la reconnaissance par le Nigéria dutitre du Cameroun et son
acquiescement à celui-ci ne sont naturellement pas une condition nécessairepour que vous
1 9
tranchiez en faveur d'une souveraineté camerounaisesur la presqu'île de Balcassi. En effet, si,
comme il le revendique, le Cameroun détient untitre conventionnel valable, il s'agit là d'un
élément suffisane tn soi. Du reste, l'exerciceeffectif d'une souveraineté surla presqu'île par les
prédécesseure sn titre du Camerounet par leCameroun lui-mêmei,ncontestépendantdes dizaines
d'années, jusqu'à ceque le Nigéria s'engagedans une politique d'expansion et d'agression,
constituerait un autre élément susceptiblede fonder votre décision. Mais même si la
reconnaissance ne constitue pas une condition nécessaire,elle n'en demeure pas moins une
condition suffisante. Cette proposition s'appuie surun précédentc ,onstituépar l'arrêtrendu en
l'affairedu Templede Préah Yihéar,danslequel la Coura fondésadécisionrelative à la «frontière
de la carte))sur lefait que «[l]esdeux partiesont par leurconduitereconnu la ligneet,par làmême,
...sont effectivement convenues dela considérercommeétantla frontière))'. Ce prononcé aété
invoquédans l'affaire, plus récente, duDzférendterritorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/~cha~2.
Nul ne sembleen effet contesterque,si leNigéria reconnaissaitlasouverainetécamerounaisesur la
presqu'île, la questiondont nousdébattonsn'auraitplus lieud'être, puisqu'untellereconnaissance
est naturellementopposable à 1'Etatqui en est l'auteur:je me réfèreplus particulièrementaux
paragraphes 10.187 à 10.190du contre-mémoiredu ~i~éria~.Cela étant dit,jeporterai maintenant
mon attention sur le comportement affichédu côté nigérian, lequec lonstitue à nos yeux une
acceptation,expresseou tacite,de la souveraineté camerounaisesur lapresqu'île.
2. La reconnaissance par le Nigériaavant le plébisciteorganiséau Cameroun méridionalet
immédiatementaprès
4. Je commencerai par examiner la reconnaissance nigérianeau cours des périodesayant
précédé le plébiscite organiséau Cameroun méridionalet immédiatementsuivi celui-ci. Je
'C.I.J.Recue1962p. 33.
C.I.J.Recue1994p. 23, par.45.
CMN,vol. 1p.280-282. n'abuserai pas de lapatience de la Cour en répétate qui figuredéjadansles piècesécrites,ni ce
que mon ami, M. Shaw, a exposédans sa plaidoirie. Si vous me le permettez, je mettrai
simplement en lumièretrois points.
5. Tout d'abord, le Nigéria,qui figurait incontestablementparmilesparties intéressées, était
à ce titre parfaitementinforméde la situationet,vous vous en doutez, fut consultépar les autorités
britanniques et mêmepar les NationsUnies dès le milieu des années cinquante, et plus
particulièrementàpartir de 1958. Les informationsqui lui étaient communiquéecsoncernaientles
frontièresduCamerounméridionaletle découpageen districtsdeplébiscite,parmi lesquelsfigurait
la presqu'îlede Bakass- autant d'élémentqsuele Nigérianepouvait doncmanquer d'ignorer. A
2 O
cela s'ajouteque les frontièresavaientdéjàétpréciséesdans les Ordersin Councilbritanniques
qui avaientdéfini leslimitesdu Nigéria lui-même.
6. En deuxième lieu, même s'ie lst vrai que, pendant une partie de la périodequi nous
occupe, leNigéria setrouvait encoresous administrationbritannique,il s'agissaitdéjàd'un Etaten
formation- un Etat in statu nascendi. Le Nigériaavait été prépar él'indépendance,dans la
mesure où il avait bénéficiée ,ntre autres choses, d'un certaindegréd'autonomie au moment
opportun. Il semble raisonnable de supposer que cet Etat en devenir qui était,nous l'avons vu,
pleinement associé au processus d'accession à l'indépendance, jouissaitau moins d'une
personnalitéet d'une capacitjuridiques suffisantes pour pouvoir particiàela défmitionde ses
propres frontières et,enconséquence, reconnaîtcelles desesvoisins. A ce propos, ilest peut-être
importantde soulignerque le Nigériane fut soumisàaucunecontrainte.
7. J'insisterai en troisièmelieu sur le fait que quatremois et demi aprèsson accessiàn
l'indépendance,le le'octobre 1960, et aprèsle plébiscite organiséau Cameroun méridional,le
Nigéria,commele montrent les piècesdu cameroun4,continuait à êtreinformé des événemenetn s
cours alorsqu'il étaitdéjaindépendant,et qu'ilne formulaaucune objectionla frontièreproposée
I
avec le Cameroun,y compris pour la partie incluant la presqu'îlede Bakassi. Nous avons déjàvu
que le Nigériaindépendant avait voté en faveud re la résolution 1608 (XV) de l'Assemblée
généraleq,ui mettait fin au régime dela tutelle britanniquLà encore, la frontière faisaitpartie
MC, vol1,p.249-258,par.3.254-3.276;vol.p. 89-91,par.2.140-2.144.intégrante decette décision. En soutenant dans sa duplique5que ces démarchesont entraîné«des
modificationsde statut et enclenchéun processusde successiondYEtats»et «ne portent pas sur des
questionslocales)),leNigériase montrenon seulementvaguemaispeu convaincant desurcroît.
8. Tous ces éléments constituentune reconnaissance et un acquiescement les plus
incontestablesqui soient et mêmes'il s'agissaitdu seul exemple ence sens, le Cameroun estime
qu'il suffiraitempêcherle Nigéria de contestercette frontière. Mais il y en a d'autres-car
j'aborderai maintenantlaquestion desvisites effectuéespar lesconsulsetambassadeurs.
b) Visitesdeconsulsetd'ambassadeurs
9. L'un des premiers exemples enest celle effectuéeen février1969dans la presqu'île de
Bakassipar le consul nigériaà Buéa(dans la province du Sud-Ouest du Cameroun). Un rapport
du Distri cflcer de l'arrondissementde Bamoussodatédu 20 mars 1969~relate la coopération
duconsul avec les forcesde police camerounaises,qui enquêtaient alsur l'implication alléguée
de soldats nigériansdans un incendie crimineà Ine-Odiong, dans la presqu'île de Bakassi. Le
consul entra tout d'abord en rapport avec les autoritéslocales Bamousso, au Cameroun, et
procéda à sa mission accompagnéde fonctionnaires camerounaislocaux. Lorsque le bateau du
groupe arrivaà destination, il dut rebrousser cheàicause d'obstacles naturels. L'enquêtefut
totalement confiéeàl'unité mobiledela police camerounaisequi était statione Atabong, surla
presqu'île. Cet incidenttémoigneàla fois de lareconnaissance,par leNigéria, de lapresqu'îlede
Bakassien tant que territoire camerounais,et de l'exercice,par le Cameroun,de pouvoirs depolice
danscette région,et ceà une époqueoù, commenous l'avonsvu hier, nos adversaires prétendent
quele Cameroun acquiesçait àl'exercice,par leNigéria, de sa souveraisur lapresqu'île !
10. L'annexe 38 à la réplique7contient des informations sur une autre visite, qui date du
mois de novembre 1974. Le consul généralnigérian à Buéa -M. John Onochie à
l'époque - écrivitau gouverneur de la province du Sud-Ouest en l'informant deson intention
d'effectuer une «tournée des passeports)) dans les provinces Sud-Ouest et Nord-Ouest du
Cameroun et en lui communiquant son itinéraire, lequel comprenaitles localités d71dabato
-
Vol. 1,p. 181-182,par.3.316.
RC,annexe18,p.281
'Vol. IV,p. 461. (Atabong)et de Jabane (Abana),toutes deux situées, comme nousle savons, sur la presqu'île de
Bakassi. Il poursuivait sa lettreen priant le gouverneurde faire en sorte que son ((administration
[lui]prêtesonassistance,commec'est l'usage, aux fins du bon déroulement decette visite)). Cette
demandeprouveen soi, trèsclairement, quele Nigériareconnaissait la souverainetédu Cameroun
sur lapresqu'île. Mais elleconstitue également une preuve implicite, danlsa mesure où il n'existe
aucuneraison qu'un agent consulairduNigériaeffectueune tournéeen territoirenigérian.
11.Le Nigéria nepeutpas davantageprétendreque l'un de ses fonctionnairesait commis, à
cette occasion,une erreur isolée.La preuve en est qu'à l'annexe49 de la répliquedu cameroun8,
nous avons une notification émanantd'un autre consul généralM , . E. U.Akang, qui, en 1980,
informe le gouverneur de la province du Sud-Ouest de son intention de se rendre dans les
arrondissementsd7IdabatoetdeBamousso, y comprisdansla localitéd7Idabatoelle-même,dansle
départementduNdian, qui setrouve au Cameroun. Ce qu'il est égalementintéressantd'observer
dans cette correspondance,c'est qu'ily est expressément déclaréue le but de cette visite est de
(([délivredes passeports auxNigérians résidantdans la région,ou [de renouveler] ceuxqui ont
expiré)).Monsieurle président,ce fait est doublement important. Tout d'abord,si lespêcheursde
Bakassi avaient étéen territoirenigérian, ilsn'auraient paseu besoin de passeports à moins,
2 2 bien sûr, qu'ils n'aient eu l'intention de voyager, ce dont nousn'avons aucunepreuve. Si les
Nigériansde Bakassi avaient besoin de passeports, c'est en fait parce qu'ils étaientdéjà à
l'étranger,au Cameroun. En second lieu, s'il estnormal qu'un consuldélivreou renouvelle à
l'étranger depasseportsà sescompatriotes,il n'estpasnormal qu'il le fassedans sonproprepays,
duquelle Nigériaa, par la suite,prétenduque Bakassifaisait partie. Desfonctions identiques ont
égalementétéremplies, durant ces tournées, dansd'autres endroits que le Nigéria atoujours
reconnuscommeappartenantau Cameroun,ce qui renforcemonargument.
12. En 1983, un autreconsul général, M. E. A. Otuokon, se rend dans ces villages-les
b
détailsdecettetournéefigurentaux annexes78 et 80 de la répliqueg.Et salettredu 16février1983
contient la phrase suivante((Etantdonnéque la tournée inclutles temtoires parsemésde cours
d'eaudu départementdu Ndian,je saurais gré àSonExcellenced'avoir l'amabilité de faire en sorte
*Vol.IV,p.547.
Vol.V,p.705et715.que la marinemette àla disposition demoi-même ed te mon entourageun bateau pour ce voyage
envisagé.))Onne faitpasune telledemande à ungouvernementétrangerlorsquel'onsetrouvesur
sonpropreterritoire. Lesproposqu'iltient en arrivantà cesvillagessontencoreplusintéressants,
commeon peut le constateren lisantle rapport adressé au préfetdu Ndianpar le chef de district
d71dabatoq, uifigureà l'annexe82". A Idabato,enréponse à un discoursde bienvenue,le consul
générad luNigériadit à ses compatriotesque ((vivantsur le solcamerounais,ils [doivent]s'entenir
strictement aux frontières établiespar les maîtres coloniaux. En leur qualité d'étrangers))
poursuivit-il,ils doivent«seconformeraux loisduCamerounetobéirauxautoritésconstituées))I .l
y déclare égalemenq t ue l'une de ses missions est de fournir à la population nigérianeles
documents«qui leur permettrontde mener leurs activitéséconomiques[la pêche]et de voyager
partoutsansencombre)). Il prononcedes déclarationssimilairesKomboAbedimoetJabane,oùil
aurait expressément diqtue((Jabanese [trouve]surle sol camerounais)), algré lemécontentement
suscitéparsesproposparmilapopulationdeJabane,essentiellement nigériane.
13. Desévénements semblable esurent lieà l'occasiond'unevisite effectuée parun autre
consul, l'annéeprécédentee ,n 1982". Il ressort clairement d'une lettre de remerciement très
chaleureuse adresséepar celui-ci au gouverneur de la province du Sud-Ouest (reproduite à
l'annexe265dumémoire)1q 2u'ilétaitsatisfaitdelatournée.
14. Notreréplique contientdes documentsattestant d'autrestournées. Au risque de vous
ennuyer,je doissignaler encoreune visite- nonpas,cettefois,celle d'unconsulgénéralnigérian,
mais celle de l'ambassadeurdu Nigéna auprès du Cameroun, S. Exc. M.A. Yusufari. Dans une
lettre du 26novembre1986:,un fonctionnaire consulaire nigérian informe leCameroun de
l'intention de l'ambassadeur d'effectuer sa premièretournéedans le départementdu di an'^.
L'itinérairejointà ce courrier passe par Idabato,ainsi que par d'autres villesdont le Nigéria
reconnaît,même aujourd'hui,qu'ellesfont effectivementpartiedu Cameroun. La lettrese termine
ainsi: «Il serait souhaitable que, comme à l'accoutumée,vous apportiez votre aide et votre
'OVol.V, p. 725.
" RC,vol.V, annexe70,p. 661.
l2Vol.VI,p. 2195.
" RC,vol.VI, annexe149,p. 149.coopérationafinque la tournée envisagés eoit un succès.» LeNigériaaffirme maintenantque rien
neprouve quelavisite à Idabatoait effectivementeu lieu14.Naturellement,laquestion n'estpas là.
Cequ'il faut retenirde cettelettre, c'estqu'un ambassadeur serenden visiteofficiellà l'étranger,
et non pas dans son pays. Encore moins demande-il la «coopération»d'un Etat étrangep rour se
rendre dans telle ou telle régionde son propre pays. Que la visiteait éeffectuéeou non - et il
estvrai que vousne disposezd'aucunepreuve à cet égard- est toutàfaithorssujet.
15.Toutesles visites et demandesde visite dontil est faitétat danslespiècesdu Cameroun
constituentselonnous une preuve trèssolide de son titre. Commentle Nigériarépond-il à cela?
Premièrement, ilnous dit que : «Tout bien considérél,es hypothèsesacceptées parles consuls
reposaient sur une erreur fondamentale...)) Tout comme,sans aucun doute,cela avait déjà été le
cas pour les nombreuses autoritésbritanniques à l'époquedu mandat et du régime detutelle,
autoritésque leNigériaaccuse,en désespoirde cause, dese tromperaussi, commenous l'avons vu
hier. Si erreur il y avait, il s'agissait certainement, pour reprendreles termes du Nigéria, d'une
erreur «fondamentale», et mêmeénorme - d'une erreur, quiplus est, commise nonpas par un,
mais par au moins quatre consuls, auxquels s'ajoutent, semble-t-il,un ambassadeur et ses
subordonnés. 11ne s'agissait pourtant pas là d'une erreur, bien évidemment: cela confirme
simplementune véritéque le Nigériaa fini par trouver gênante. Deuxièmement -cela semble
êtreson argumentprincipal -, le Nigériacite abondamment desextraits de doctrinepour montrer
que les consuls n'exercent que des fonctions purement administratives, qu'ils «n'ontpas pour
mandat de s'occuper de questions de titres territoriaux)),et qu'«en l'espèce,les fonctionnaires
consulaires n'étaient nullement habilités, qce soit de manièreexpresse outacite, àse prononcer
surdes questionsde sou~eraineté»'~.
16. Monsieur le président,le Nigériane semble pas avoir examinéavec suffisamment
d'attention la façon dont le Cameroun aplaidé sathèse. Le Cameroun n'a pas soutenu que les
consuls avaientle pouvoir de reconnaîtreau Cameroun un titreterritorial - ce n'est évidemment
pas le cas. (Bien que, incidemment,nous ne dirions pas forcément lamêmechose au sujet des
ambassadeurs.) En réalitéc ,e que le Cameroun soutient au paragraphe 5.266de sa réplique, c'est
l4DN, par.3.322.
"DN, vol.1,p. 182-184,par.3.317-3.321que : «JusquYaumilieu des années 1980, les autorités diplomatiqueset consulaires ont donc
confirmé,par unepratique administrative régulièrel,'accord des deux Etats sur l'appartenance de
lapéninsulede Bakassi àla Républiquedu ~ameroun.))'~Il ne s'agit pasici de reconnaissance de
la part de qui que ce soit. Ce qu'affirme le Cameroun, c'est quela conduite de ces autorités
confirmece que noustenons d'autres preuvessoumises àla Cour,parmi lesquelles cellesrelatives
auprocessus quidevaitaboutir à l'unification du Camerounméridionalet du Cameroun. Monsieur
le président,il n'est tout simplement pas crédiblede prétendreque tous ces fonctionnaires,pris
d'une fantaisie personnelle, se seraient totalement écartésde leur mission sans en informer leur
gouvernement. Par exemple, lorsqu'ils s'acquittaientde leurs fonctions consulaires normales, en
délivrantou en renouvelantdes passeports nigériansà leurs concitoyens dela presqu'île, ils neles
imprimaient pas, à priori,à leur domicilesur la presse de leurs enfants, mais les obtenaient du
ministère nigérian compétentP .lus généralemento ,n ne peut tout simplementpas imaginerqu'ils
aient pu organiser ces visites, demander l'aide de fonctionnaires locaux camerounais, lesen
remercier, et même confirmer à titre officiel, en s'adressant à leur propre population,
l'appartenancedeBakassi au Cameroun, toutcela sansobtenir l'autorisationde leurs supérieursau
Nigéria,ni mêmesans les eniinformer. Leur conduiteest parfaitement conforme à la thèse du
Cameroun concernantla souverainetésur la presqu'île,mais est absolument contraire àl'analyse
juridique et factuellede la question parleNigéria.
c) Laleîîre de M. Elias
17. J'en viens enfin a une lettre adresséeen 1972 au ministère nigériandes affaires
extérieurespar le procureur généralde la fédération du Nigéria, M.Taslim Olawale Elias. Un
extraitde cette lettre extrêmement importante a éptubliédans le quotidien nigérianTheNews;il
estreproduit à l'annexe350 du mémoire17 et figureégalementdansvos dossiers sous le no72/7j,
accompagné d'une traductionen françaiseffectuéepar le Greffe.
18. Les membres decette Cour serappelleront,mieux quequiconque,que M. Elias fut l'un
des plus éminentsspécialistes dudroit internationalque 17Afiiqueait jamais produit. Il occupa
l6Vol.1,p.319[enfrançaisdansle texte].
" Vol. VII,2851.plusieurs fonctions importantesau service de son pays, notammentcelle de présidentde la Cour
suprême. Il reçut de multiples distinctions universitaireset écrivit un grandnombre d'ouvrages
importants. Enfin, et surtout,il siégeade 1976à 1991au sein de cette Cour, dont ilfit leprésident
de 1982 à 1985. C'est pourquoi la conclusion que M. Elias exposedans sa lettre méritele plus
grand respect. Elle est d'autantplus dignede foi que les témoignages de cegenre, ((contrairesaux
propres intérêtdse leurauteun) (comme on les qualifie souvent), sont considérés comme figurant
au rangdespreuves lesplus convaincantes.
19.Si vous lepermettez,j'aimerais vouslire quelquescourtsextraits decettelettre. M. Elias
commenceainsi :
«Le Nigéria ale devoir d'honorercertainstraitésantérieursà l'indépendanceet
autres conventions internationales héritées de la Grande-Bretagne ev nertu de
l'échangede notes du 1" octobre 1960entre [leNigéria]et leRoyaume-Unirelatif aux
obligations conventionnelles. Les conventions pertinenteà la présentequestion, qui
sont obligatoires pour le Nigériaet qui doivent êtrelues en bloc, indiquent que la
presqu'île appartientau Cameroun, car la frontièreinternationale tracéele long du
thalweg de la rivièreAkpayaféplace lapresqu'îlede Bakassi du côtécamerounaisde
lafrontière)).
M. Elias cite ensuite un certainnombre de traités, ainsique l'ordonnancerendue en conseil. Il
soulignel'absence de la presqu'île surles cartes administrativesduNigéria,et signale qu'une note
diplomatique adressée en1962 àl'ambassadedu Camerounpar le ministèrenigériandes affaires
extérieures,à laquelle étaitjointe une carte dressée parle service cartographique nigérian,
reconnaissaitla presqu'îlede Bakassicommefaisant partiedu Cameroun. Mon ami M. Thouvenin
reviendratout à l'heure surcettenote diplomatique(qui figureàl'annexeMC 229, vol. 5,p. 1881).
Aprèsavoirpasséen revue ces différentsélémentsM , . Elias déclareque«le principe de bonne foi
dans lesrelations internationalesexige queleNigéria nerenie pas sa parole d'honneur, attestéepar
la note de1962.))
20.Monsieur leprésident,MadameetMessieurslesMembres de la Cour,tel est exactement
le sentimentdu Cameroun.
21. Je vous remercie de votre attention. Monsieurle président,je vous prie de bienvouloir
donnermaintenantlaparole a M.Jean-Marc Thouvenin. Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie,Monsieur Mendelson. Etje donne maintenantla parole
à M. Jean-MarcThouvenin.
Mr.THOUVENIN: Thankyou,Mr. President.
1.THE LAND BOUNDARY
7. Bakassi
(g) Recognition of the validity of the 1913 Treaty and of the appurtenance of the Bakassi
Peninsulato Cameroon: maritimeaspects
1.Mr. President,Mernbersof theCourt, it is a very greathonour forme to appearbefore the
Court forthe first time,in orderto presentcertainofthe argumentsof theRepublicofCameroon.
2. It will be my task to demonstrate that, throughoutthe maritime negotiations between
Nigeria and Carneroon since independence, and through the resulting agreements, Nigeria has
recognized the validity of the 1913 Treaty, the boundary derivingfrom it, and Cameroon's
sovereigntyover the BakassiPeninsula.
3. Mr. President, "One cannot begin to delimit maritime zones until the basepoint fiom
which theyare to be drawnhas beendetermined." That is what ProfessorCrawfordtold the Court
on 3 March 1998, in the preliminary objections phase (CR 9812, p. 46).Quite. And indeed,
Nigeria and Cameroonentered into themost meticulousnegotiations regardingthe delimitationof
their maritime boundary. They even adopted agreements,which demonstrates that both States
considered, at least for a while, that the southern boundary between them had been fully
established. Moreover,aswe shall see,they were equallyconvincedthatthat boundaryran Westof
Bakassi.
4. This is what is apparentin particular fiom four relevant instruments, which1shall review
in turn: the Nigerian Note of 1962, whichhasjust been mentioned, followedby the agreementsof
4 April 1971,the Kano Agreementandthe MarouaAgreement.
7 1. The Nigerian NoteNo. 570 of 27 March 1962 acknowledgedthst the BakassiPeninsula
belongedto Cameroon
5.1 shallbegin withthe Note VerbaleNo. 570of 27 March 1962,complementedby a mer
Note of the same year (Memorialof Cameroon,Ann.229). A copy of that Note is reproduced in
thejudges' folders as documentNo.73; the qualityis mediocre. A translationby theRegistry has also been provided. Cameroonhas naturally referredto it in its written pleadings (Memorial of
Cameroon,p. 161,para. 3.46, p.127,para.2.214, p. 503, para. 5.17; Reply of Cameroon,p. 304,
para.5.206,p. 305,para. 5.209). For itspart,Nigeria devoted a fewlines to theNote, withouttmly
discussing its significance (Rejoinder of Nigeria, pp. 436-437, paras. 10.16-10.17). Yet it
undoubtedlyhas avalid placeinthe debate.
6. Mr. President, the Note was addressed by Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
Embassyof Cameroonin Lagos. Its purposewas to draw certainconclusionsfiom the attachment
of the Southern Cameroonsto the Republic of Cameroon, averyrecent event atthe time,since the
referendum of 11February 1961had just been held. The new question whichNigeria then faced
was to determine the course of the maritimeboundary between itself and Cameroon. From that
standpoint, the 1962 Note Verbale officially expressed Nigeria's position,on the one hand by
describingthe then situation inobjectivetermsand onthe otherby submittingcertain claimswhich
Nigeria consideredthat it wasentitledto make.
7. As for the situation, the Note first drew Cameroon's attention to three oil prospection
blocks established in 1959, called"L", "M and "N. AS you can see from the sketch-map
appendedto theNote Verbale, whichyou seebehindme andwhichhas alsobeenreproducedin the
judges' folders as document No. 73, block "N", the most easterlyone, constituted themaritime
projection ofthe Bakassi Peninsula directly southwards.TheNote stated thatblock "N isnow off
shore the Cameroon Republic", and that consequently it had "reverted" to Cameroon. The
conclusion is obvious: in the view of theNigerian Ministry, there was no doubt, in 1962,that
Bakassiwas now in Camerooniantemtory.
8. The import of this is far from being trivial, for the Court has already recognizedthe
evidential value of similar correspondence,in particular in 1953 in the Minquiers and Ecrehos
case. To quotetherelevant extractsfiom the Judgrnentof the Court:
2 8 "By his Note of June 12th, 1820, to the Foreign Office.. . the French
Ambassador in London transmitted a lette... in which the Minquierswere statedto
be 'possedéspar 1'Angleterre',and in one of the charts enclosedthe Minquiersgroup
was indicated as being Britis... it was not a proposa1 ora concessionmade during
negotiations,but a statement of facts transmittedto the Foreign Officeby the French
Ambassador,who did not express anyreservation in respect thereof. This statement
must therefore be considered as evidence of the French officia1view at the time." (Minquiers and Ecrehos case, Judgment of 17 November 1953, I.C.J. Reports 1953,
p. 71).
9. Mr. President, the Note Verbale of 1962 similarly reflected Nigeria's officia1view, the
viewit then held,that Bakassi hadbeenunderCameroonian sovereigntysincethe referendum.
10.The Notealso statedthat, in Nigeria's viewa ,t least atthe time, the land boundary indeed
ran west of Bakassi. The Nigerian Ministryof ForeignAffairs wrote: "theboundary follows the
lower course of the Akwayafe River, wherethere appears to be no uncertainty, and then out into
the CrossRiver estuary".
11. Thesewords quite clearly confirmthe validityof the 1913Treaty,which establishedthat
the boundary followedthe courseof the Akwayafe. Furthermore,the languageis not dissimilarto
that of MinisterIhlen, to which the Permanent Court gave decisive weight in the Eastern
Greenland case (Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 5 April 1933, P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B, No. 53,
p. 22). In the courseof a conversationwhichbecame famous,theNorwegian Minister forForeign
Affairs, Mr. Ihlen, told his Danish counterpart that his country would make "no difficulties"
respecting the settlement of the issue of sovereignty over Eastern Greenland (ibid., p. 36). The
Courtfound that this declarationwas binding onNorway (ibid.,p. 73). Mr. President, even more
evidently here, the Note Verbale of 1962,being not a conversationbut a written instrument,an
officia1 diplornatic instrument affirmingthe absence of doubtregarding the course of the
boundary - "no uncertainty" - is opposable to Nigeria, andprecludes Nigeria fiom challenging
it.
12. Lastly, the Note, whichis indeedinstructive,providesthe informationthat Nigeria was
perfectly satisfiedwith the then situation. This is what can be deduced fiom its statement of its
claims.
13. On the same sketch-mapas earlier,projectedhere once again, the Court will seethat the
line of equidistancebetween the two countriesnuis to the east of the line separating prospection
blocks "M and "N. What liesbetweenthose two lines - the triangle colouredlight grey on the
sketch-map - might therefore come underNigerianjurisdiction, were the line of equidistance to
be chosen as the maritime boundaxy. This was precisely the position adopted by the Nigerian
Ministry of ForeignAffairs i:n1962. It stated that the line of equidistancewas, in its view, the"correct boundary" and consequentlyclaimedthe portion shaded grey onthe sketch-mapas being
"rightlywithin Nigeria'sjurisdiction".
14. The Court will note that this means, a contrario, that what lies east of the line of
equidistance was not claimed to be "within Nigeria's jurisdiction". Yet what lies to the east is
Bakassi.
II. TheAgreement of4 April1971
15. The first maritime agreement came into being nine years later, on 4 April 1971, in
Yaoundé. It was onthat date that the Headsof State of Nigeria and CameroonoEcially fixedthe
first segment of their maritime boundary. We shall now show another sketch-map showingthe
resultant line, found in the judges' folder as document No. 74. The agreement was concluded
between the Heads of State directly,at a timewhen the work of the experts ofthe Joint Boundary
Commissionset up in 1970wasmakingnoprogress18.
16.However, there can beno doubt asto the existence ofthis agreement. The signaturesof
the Heads of State were apposedat the foot of the frontier linerawn on 4 April 1971on British
Admiralty Chart No. 3433, alreadyprojected yesterdaybymy fiiend Jean-PierreCot. Furthermore,
the YaoundéIIDeclarationreferstothe agreementin paragraph4, sub-paragraph1. To quotefiom
this: "The two Heads of State agree to regard as the boundary the compromise line which they
have plotted by joint agreement on British Admiralty Chart No. 3433". The Agreement was
concluded,it was Mer noted,"in accordancewith the Anglo-GermanTreaty of 1913" (Mernorial
of Cameroon,Ann.242).
17.The Agreementhastwoeffects.
(a) TheAgreementof4April1971 constitutesa recognitionof thevalidityof the 1913 Treaty
18. First, it recognizes the validity of the 1913 Treaty in respect of Bakassi. It is indeed
L
evidentthat, in concluding the Agreement"in accordance withthe Anglo-German Treaty of1913"
(the wording used in the declaration),Cameroonand Nigeria voluntarilyplaced themselvesunder
the authorityof thatTreaty andquite simply appliedthe Treaty.
''o ne work of the Joint Boundary Commission,see case concerningLand and Maritime Boundaryberneen
Cameroonand Nigeria (Cameroonv. Nigeria), PrelirninaryObjections,Judgrnentof 11June 1998,I.C.J. Reports 1998,
pp. 301-302,paras. 52-53; and Memorialof Cameroon,pp. 507-513,paras. 5.18-5.31. 19. This is al1the more indisputable in that the very purpose of the Agreement was to
interpretand to apply in practical terms Article of the 1913Treaty (for the negotiations, see
Memorialof Cameroon,pp. 508-513,paras.5.22-5.3 1).
(b) TheAgreementof 4April1971 alsorepresentsa recognition thatthe line establishedunder
the1913 Treatywastheboundarywith Cameroon
20. Second,and in any event, the Agreement of 4 April 1971also represents a recognition
that the line establishedunder the 1913Treaty was the border with Cameroon. There can be no
doubt- to echothe words of the Courtin the case conceming TerritorialDispute (LibyanArab
Jamahiriya/Chad) - that:
"The fixing of a fiontierepends on the will of the sovereign States directly
concemed. There isnothingto preventthe Partiesfiom decidingby mutualagreement
to consider a certain line as a fiontier, whatever the previous status of that line."
(Judgrnentof 3 February1994,I.C.J R.eports1994,p. 23,para.45.)
(c) TheAgreementof 4April1971 is opposabletoNigeria
21. Nigeria is well aware, particularlyby reasonof this Agreementof 4 April 1971,that its
contentionthatthe 1913Treatyis partiallyinvalid andthat there isno conventional boundaryinthe
Bakassiarea is unsustainable. It is thereforeonly to be expectedthat it disputesthe significanceof
the Agreement(RejoinderofNigeria,p. 84,para. 3.38).
22. Its argumentsin this respect are twofold.irst, the YaoundéII Declaration: "formed
part of an ongoingprogrammeof meetingrelating to the maritime boundary, and(that) the matter
was subject to Mer discussion" (ibid.). Obviously,we do not read the Declaration in the same
way. Paragraph4, sub-paragraph1, which 1 havejust read, recordsthe agreementof the Headsof
State. Sub-paragraph 2 contains an instructionto the experts of the Joint Boundary Commission,
namely "the application of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea for the
demarcationofthe remainderof the maritimeboundary"(emphasis added).
23. It followsfiom this wording that discussionswere to be held only on theemainderof
themaritimeboundary,andcertainlynot on the linealready adopted. There wasno question, ever,
of reopeningthe Agreement betweentheHeads of State. 24. Nigeria's second argument is based on a letter fiom General Gowon written on
23 August 1974(Rejoinder ofNigeria, Ann. 12). The Nigerian Head ofState saidin that letterthat
in 1972he had rejected certainproposals oftheexpertsdating fiom 4 April 1971. It will be noted
that the letterrelates exclusively,accordingto itsown words,to proposals of the experts. Thereis
therefore no point in discussingit, since it is clearthat it does not refer to the Agreement as issue
here.
III.The KanoAgreement
25. Mr.President,before concludingmystatementwiththe Maroua Agreement,we notethat
the Kano Agreement can also be seen as an instrument recognizing that the Bakassi Peninsula
belongsto Cameroon.
26. This Agreement came into being in 1974, at a time when the negotiations on the
maritimeboundaryhadbeen inthedoldrumssince1971. A noteworthyadvancehad been recorded
back in June 1971 with the adoption of an additional segment based on the principle of
equidistance. Whatyou see now is a sketch-mapof this line, which is also found in the judges'
folder as document No. 75. The Lagos Declarationof 21 June 1971took note of this. 1would
merely point out that its text (thetext of the Lagos Declaration) does not distanceitself fiom the
1913Treaty or fiom the Agreement of 4 April1971. It refers to them explicitly (Memorial of
Cameroon, Ann.243).
27. The line was eventually rejected by the Nigerian authorities, on the grounds of
disagreements(Memorialof Carneroon, Ann.243)which, itmust be emphasized,hadnothingto do
with the 1913Treaty or the Agreementof 4 April1971,and even lessto do withthe appurtenance
of the Bakassi Peninsulato Cameroon. Onthosepoints, consensusremained complete.
28. On 1 September 1974therefore,theHeadsof Stateof Cameroon andNigeria adoptedthe
Kano Declaration. That Declaration prohibited any oil prospection activities in a corridor 4km
wide which you can now see in green on the sketch-map, and which is also shown on the
sketch-map found in the judges' folder as document No. 76. We would simply note that,
a contrario, the Declarationrecognizesthe lawfulnessof the oil operations carriedout to the west
of thecorridorby Nigeria and to theeast by Carneroon. 29. Now, to the east lies Bakassi and its surrounding waters.In other words, at that time
Nigeria hadno doubtwhatsoeverthatBakassibelongedto Cameroon.
IV. The MarouaAgreement
30.Nor did Nigeria haveany doubts when the Maroua Agreement was concluded in 1975
(Memorial of Cameroon,Ann.250); the result will now be projected for you behind me, the
sketch-mapbeing found as document No.77. The agreementhas already been discussed in the
written pleadingsand1shall dwellon it onlybriefly, in orderto showthat it constitutesrecognition
of the validityof the Agreementof4 April 1971 and,consequently, ofthe appurtenanceof Bakassi
to Cameroon.
31.The MarouaAgreementrecords the agreement of the two Heads of Stateto prolongthe
maritime boundary beyond a point 12 defined as being "situated at the limit of the maritime
boundaryadoptedbythe two Headsof Stateon 4 April 1971".
32. The wording clearly confirmsthat the compromiseline of 4 April 1971,which, as we
have seen, confirms without the shadow of a doubt that Bakassi is in Cameroon, was indeed
"adopted and that thisposition shouldbe maintained.
V. Conclusion
33.Mr.President,the 1913Treaty has always been valid, al1the clausesof it, and the same
applies to the 1971 and 1975 Agreements. They are the expression, in treaty terms, of the
appurtenanceof theBakassiPeninsulato Cameroon.
34.Nigeria seeksto evadethe legal consequences ofthis. It will be for theCourt to decide
but, in contrast,itwill be recalled that in the case concerningthe Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier Dispute (ElSalvador/Honduras), the evidence against Honduras, with regard to its
boundary with El Salvador, amounted to much less than agreements, being merelythe "basis"
which it had accepted for years regarding the general course of its fi-ontier(Judgment of
11 September1992, I.C.J. Reports1992,p. 405,para. 72; emphasisadded).
35.Mr. President,in this case,there isite clearlya basis which had longbeen acceptedby
each side,and by others,that Bakassibelongsto Cameroon. But there is morethan this: thereare proper agreements, andCameroon simplyrequeststhe Court to confum the consequencesof such
3 3
agreements.
36. Mr.President, Members of the Court, 1 thankyou very much for your attention and
request you togive the floorto ProfessorBipounWoum.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Thouvenin, and 1 now give the floor to
ProfessorBipounWoum.
Mr. BIPOUNWOUM: Thankyou,Mr. President.
I.THE LAND BOUNDARY
7. Bakassi
Summaryof the argumentonBakassiandthe land boundary
Mr. President, Membersof the Court,
1. It is now my task to wind up the argument and to present to you the essence of
Cameroon's position in this case with respect to the land boundary in general, and the Bakassi
Peninsulainparticular.
2.1 findit somewhatdifficult to perform thisexercisebecause, fiankly speaking,at the close
of long and complex pleadings, westill have not understood Nigeria's legal position. Nigeria's
caseseemsto usjust as incomprehensibleasbefore. It slipsbetweenour fingers,likean eel.
3. Nigeria accepts the instruments of delimitation,but, as it were, conditionally. "In
principle", it says. We fear that this principle may mask a desire to evade Nigeria's treaty
obligations,wheneverthesethreaten itsinterestsorinterferewith its plans.
4. Nigeria'sapproachis insidious. It doesnot directlyattackthe delimitation agreements,for
lackof any legal ground fordoing so. It underminesthem fiom within, tries to weakenthem, to
highlighttheir imperfections,torowdoubt ontheir accuracy,their authority,their legal effect. It
3 4 doesthis sothat it can then propose "arnendrnents",which are simply adjustmentsof the boundary
in its favour. In so doing,it is implementing apolicy in regardto the boundary which is literally
revisionist.
5. To this, 1 would add that Nigeria seeks to exclude the application of the relevant
instrumentsat the two ends of the landboundary: in Lake Chad and on the Bakassi Peninsula. Itputs forward fallacious argumentsand concocted findingsto justify the unjustifiable: the useof
forceto expel the Cameroonian authoritiesand annexareas which it covets, setting itself up there
as master.
6. We expectNigeria to provide a clearer explanationof its rights and intentions,sothat the
legal debatecan be honestly conductedbetweenus andso that the Court maypeacefully settlethis
disputeinpossession of al1the facts. Goodfaith is notjust a vagueprecept goveming international
relations"in principle". It is an obligationon everyone,and above al1on the two Parties to this
dispute. It is in this spiritthat Cameroonhasset out itsposition onthe land boundary.
7. At the end of this fmt week, Cameroon's arguments regarding the landboundary seemto
me clear,1would almost Sayobvious. This boundaryhas been determinedby instruments whose
validitybrooks no discussion: the two Partiesrecognizethe relevanceof those instruments,despite
a certain unwarranted reticence (to which 1 shall revert in a moment) on the part of Nigeria
regardingthe Anglo-GermanAgreementof 11March 1913.
8. For each sector ofthe boundary, Cameroonhas clearly indicatedwhich legal instruments
were applicable, whileat thesametime emphasizingthatthe onlyrealproblemsassociatedwiththe
implementation of those relating to the two sectors at the northem and southem ends of the
boundaryare due solely to complications arising out of the occupation of those areas by Nigeria:
LakeChadin the north andBakassiin thesouth.
9. It is apparent, at the close of Cameroon's various arguments concerning the land
boundary,that, in reality, that boundary is perfectly well delimited by thenstrumentsreferredto
above. In the final analysis, whatCameroonis askingofthe Courtisto confirmthat delimitation.
10.1 feel sure,Mr. President,Cameroonis sure,thatthe Courtwill do so and that it will not
(becausethis is not its role) become involvedin rewritingthe relevant conventional instrumentsas
Nigeriais asking it to do, withthe sole aim of securingamendmentof the texts in a mannerwhich
suitsit.
11. It is for this reason that, in its argument, Cameroon has refiained fiom replying to
Nigeria'ssuggestionsfor a modificationofthe valid instruments delimiting theboundary.
12.On the other hand, Cameroonmustvoice its concem here at Nigeria's statedapproachto
the important question of demarcation,which may ariseonce the Court has delivered itsjudgmentinthis case. On this point, allowme,if you will,Mr. President,Membersof the Court, to referyou
to the introductory remarksby theAgent of Cameroon.
13. In recapitulating sector by sector and relying on the recognized instruments,
Mr.President, Members of the Court, Cameroon reiterates, at the close of this round of oral
argumentonthe landboundary, itsrequest fora confirmationof that boundaryas follows:
(1) From Lake Chad to the "very prominent peak" described in paragraph 60 of the
Thomson-Marchand Declaration, and better known under the usual name of
"MountKombon": the boundary was defined by the Milner-Simon Declaration of
10July 1919,as clarifiedby the Thomson-MarchandDeclarationof 31January 1930annexed
to the exchangeofnotesbetween Hendersonand DeFleuriauof 9 January 1931 ;
(2) From Mount Kombon to pillar 64: this part of the boundary was defined by the Nigeria
(Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946, more precisely in
Section61,of that Order. It was later confirmedby theNorthem Region,WesternRegionand
EasternRegion(Definitionof Boundaries)Proclamation1954;
(3) From pillar 64 to the mouth of the Akwayafe: thispart of the boundary was precisely
determinedon the groundbythe Joint DemarcationCommissionsetup afierthe signingofthe
Agreement of 11March 1913; this Commissioncanied out to the letter the tasks assignedto
it, which concluded in thesigning of the Obokum Agreement of 12Apnl 1913: it thus
complementsthe Agreementof 11 Marchand, together with that Agreement, constitutesthe
relevant instrumentfor the delimitationofthe boundaryin this sector.
14.The sector ofthe boundary extending fiom the Cross River to the sea is that bordering
the Bakassi Peninsula,which 1am now goingto discuss in particular, as part of this surnmaryof
Cameroon's positions regardingthe land boundary.
15.Specificallywith respectto Bakassi,1hardly needto remindyou that it was the invasion
of this Carneroonianpeninsulaby Nigerian armedforces at the end of December 1993 whichwas
the immediate reason why Cameroon brought the matter before the Courton 29March 1994; that
invasionthusmade manifestNigeria's policyofoccupyingCamerooniantemtory by force.
16. Mr. President, during their oral argument, a nurnber of Cameroon's counselhave
highlightedthe factthat,unlikemany other regionsin Afiica,the boundarybetween CameroonandNigeria istoday delimitedby the clearestandmost preciseof instruments. But it maybe saidthat
the sector ofthe boundary borderingthe BakassiPeninsulaand, morespecifically,the legal status
of that Peninsulaitself,are, beyondany doubt,the points whichhave been the subjectof the most
readily comprehensibleand stabilizing provisions capable of being incorporated in a boundary
treaty.
17.Thus, underthe Agreementof 11March 1913,the signatones clearly located Bakassion
the Cameroonian side; subsequently, they took good care to guarantee the conventional
permanenceof that location by safeguarding itagainst anyproblem of future interpretationwhich
might aise from any subsequent (natural or artificial) reorientation of the lower course of the
Akwayafe; lastly,they took into account the socialproblemof the transbordermobilityof riparian
populations, a far-seeing precaution,bearing in mind how much the absence of similar provisions
in other treaties of the same kind has been a source of boundary instability based on ethnic
irredentismin variousregions ofAfrica.
18. In the course of oral argument, Cameroonhas already emphasized the desire of the
parties to the Agreement to protect that stability of its provisions, by allowing for the possible
effects of any unforeseeable subsequentchange innatural factors such as the hydrographyof the
area.
19.But the sameconcem is also apparentin the manner,wholly admirable forthe period,in
which the immediatesocial implicationsof the Agreement whichhadjust been signedwere dealt
with, implicationsto which the provisions of Articles XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII and XXIX of the
Agreementare entirelydevoted.
20.Amongotherthings, thoseprovisionsregulated:
- the fateof the fishingrights ofthe indigenous populationof the Bakassi Peninsulain the Cross
Riverestuary;
- the question of the economic integrity of the villages situatedalong the boundary: under the
Agreement, farmswere not to be separated from the villages of which they formed part, the
two Govermnents having been authorized, if need be, to deviate very slightly from the
boundaryforthis purpose;
- equalityof navigationand fishingrights forthe benefitofthe population onbothbanks. 21. Tocrown whatmight wellbe called,Mr.President,the socialpolicy of the signatoriesof
the Agreement of 11March 1913, ArticleXXVIIprovided that, in the six months following the
date of the demarcationof the boundary,the indigenouspeoples living close to the boundary line
could, if theywished, crossit inorderto settle on the otherside, also being given the fieedom to
take with themtheir movableproperty and crops.
22. Rather than contriving to exclude Bakassi fiom the benefit of the provisions of the
Agreement of 11March 1913, Nigeria ought instead to try to seek inspiration fiom it in order to
perpetuate,togetherwithCameroon, the happyandpeaceful cohabitationofthe communitiesin the
peninsula,assowisely andpresciently envisagedby the authorsof the Agreement.
23. Fromthepointofview of Cameroon, Mr. President,such an enterprisecertainlymerits a
greatdeal of considerationand even admiration. And Nigeria's feats of imaginationin inventing
al1sorts of artifices for the purpose of circumventingthe law and facts relating to Bakassi have
patently failed.
24.Anexample ofthis is the mirageof a sovereign"OldCalabar" with its kings opportunely
enhanced in stature, yet hitherto curiously invisibleon the internationalstage, and asopointed
out here lastWednesdayby my colleagueBrunoSimma,never manifestedthemselves at the time
when the issuesrelating toBakassi werebeing discussed(includingthe titleof sovereignty over the
peninsula) or in the negotiations leadingto the Moor-Puttkammer Agreement of 1901,or indeed
later.
3 8 25. Ultimately, al1these facts merely serve to confirm Cameroon's position regarding the
sector oftheboundaryborderingonBakassi:
- fiom pillar 114 on the Cross Riverto the intersectionof the straight linejoining Bakassi Point
to King Point and the centre of the navigable Channelof the Akwayafe, the boundary is
determinedby paragraphsXVItoXXIof theAnglo-GermanAgreementof 11March 1913;
- consequently,Mr. President,Membersof the Court, sovereigntyoverthe Bakassi Peninsulais
indisputably Cameroonian.
Cameroonwill now embark upon its oral argumentrelating to the maritime boundary and,
forthispurpose,1wouldaskyou, Mr.President, togive the floorto ProfessorAlain Pellet.
Thankyou for yourattention. ThePRESIDENT: Thank you,Professor. 1will nowgive the floorto ProfessorAlain Pellet.
Mr.PELLET: Mr. President, Membersofthe Court,
II.THE MARITIME BOUNDARY
8. Thelawapplicableandthe taskof the Court
1. The Cameroontearn will now addressthe other aspect of the boundary dispute that has
been submittedto you,that relatingto themaritimeboundary.
2. And, since we are specifically addressing thistopic for the first time during this oral
phase, 1wish to begin by mentioning the narnes of two of the members of our team who had
worked more particularlyon thisaspect ofthe case and who are no longer with us: Jean Gateaud,
who died in 1999, and Keith Highet,who passed awaythe followingyear. 1pay tribute to their
memory as a fiend. More recently, another ofour cartographers,Mr. Rozo, becameseriously ill;
he alsois inur thoughts.
3. Mr. President, in this openingspee1will offer some general considerationsregarding
the way inwhichNigeriadeals withthese issuesof maritime delimitation; an1will endeavourto
summarizesome generalaspectsof the law applicableandto explainwhat in our viewthe Court's
task is inthis regard.
1. Thetwoboundarysectors
4. As 1 argued before you last Monday, this task differs greatly depending on the sector
concerned. One, which runs fiom the mouth of the Akwayafe to pointG fixed by the Maroua
Declaration of 1June 1975, has alreadybeen delimitedby agreementbetween the Parties.As in
the case of the land boundary, therefore, it is for the Court merely to confirm that delimitation,
which Nigeriais seekingto reopen. Beyondpoint G,by contrast,Nigeria has deliberately shirked
the obligation incumbent on it to negotiate with a view to amving at equitable delimitation.
Furthermore,by its attitude both duringthe negotiationson the maritime delimitation andoutside
them- and 1am thinking particularly of the invasion of the Bakassi PeninsulNigeria has
made any negotiation impossible.Thus, absent agreement, Membersof the Court, it is for your
distinguished Court tofix the limits of the Parties' respectiveareas, so as to put a completeand
final end to the dispute between them. Here, more than ever, judicial settlement"is simply analternative to a direct and fiiendly settleme...between the parties7'(case of the Free Zones,
Order of 19 August 1929,P.C.I.J.SeriesANo.22,p. 13).
5. In spite of protests by Cameroon (see, inter alia, Reply of Cameroon, p. 343,
paras.7.01-7.04; p. 387,para. 9.01; and p. 395,para. 9.26),Nigeria persists in devotinga single
section of its Rejoinder to "the maritime boundary" (see Rejoinder of Nigeria, Vol. II,art IV,
pp.415-527), without drawing any distinction,obvious though it is, between the two sectors to
which 1havejust refened. It requires no great genius to understandwhy: to admit that the first
sectorof the maritime boundary hasbeen delimited - if onlyto disputethe line- wouldamount
to acknowledgingCameroon'stitle to Bakassi,asJean-Marc Thouvenindemonsbated so welljust
now.
6. In deciding to place the land boundary(and hence the starting point of the maritime
boundary)in the Rio delRey, the FederalRepublicof Nigeriashows a bafflingloss ofmemory: it
deliberately forgets ArticleXVIII of the London Treaty of 11March 1913, which places the
starting point of the maritime boundarybetween Cameroon and Nigeriaat the intersection of a
straightlinejoining Bakassiand King Pointsto the thalweg ofthe Akwayafe [start of projectionof
map78-maritime delimitationasfaras pointG]. It forgetsthelengthynegotiationswhich made
it possible, from the end of the 1960sto 1975,to delimit this maritime boundary, first as far as
point 12by Yaoundé Agreement II of 4 April 1971, as clarifiedby the Ngoh-Coker Declarationof
21 June 1971, then as far as point G, by the Maroua Agreement of 1975. The result of these
negotiationscan be seenon the map projected behindme andwhich appearsin thejudges' folder
underreferenceNo. 78.
7. It is not for me to describein detailthe circumstancesin which these various agreements
were concluded, still less todescribe their conten- Cameroon has done so very fully in its
written pleadings (see, inter alia, Memorial of Cameroon, pp. 500-529, paras. 5.06-5.5.62, and
Reply of Cameroon, pp. 359-384, paras.8.01-8.87) and my colleagues Maurice Kamto,
ChristianTomuschat and MauriceMendelsonwill return to them later to the extent necessary to
replyto the Rejoinder.
8. Let meconfinemyself to adding that Nigeria also forgetsthat thevarious maritimezones
between Stateswhose coastsare oppositeor adjacentto eachotherare in anycase not subjectto the applicationof the same legal rules, as the Courthas recently forceîully recalled (see Judgmentof
16March 2001, case concerning Maritime Delimitationand Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain, para. 174).Therules laid down forStates,whetherin Article 12of the 1958Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea or Article 15 of the Montego Bay Convention, which are
moreover drafied in almost identical terms and are "to be regarded as having a customary
character" (ibid., para. 176), are not the same as those applicable to the delimitation of their
exclusive economiczones and continental shelves under Articles74 and 83 of the 1982 United
Nations Convention, to which Cameroon and Nigeria became parties in 1985 and 1986
respectively.
9. 1would add here that Nigeria persists in raising a major issue with Cameroon over the
point by againretming in its Rejoinderto the matterof the breadth of the Cameroonianterritorial
sea (Rejoinderof Nigeria,pp. 432-433,paras. 10.5and 10.6).
10. It is perfectly true that the Law of 5 December 1974- the Cameroonian Law of
4 1
5 December1974 - fixesthat breadthat 50 nauticalmiles. That Law had been enactedbeforethe
signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, at a time when the
negotiationsfor the Conventionhad only just begun,and the positions and pmctice of Stateswere
particularly anarchic. Since then the 12-milerule prescribed by Article 3 of the Conventionhas
quickly acquired customary validityand is obligatoryfor al1States- a fortiori for Cameroon,
which, as 1have said, has ratifiedthe Conventionand whose monist-inspiredConstitution confers
upon "duly ratified or approved treatiesor agreements..an authority superior to that of Statute
law, contingent in the case of each treaty or agreement on its application by the other party"
(Art.45). And the United Nations has made no mistake on this point: contrary to what Nigeria
contends in its Rejoinder (p. 432, para. 10.5),the Law of the Sea Division indeed lists Cameroon
among the States with a territorial seabreadth of 12nauticalmiles; pursuant to (and consequent
upon) the ConstitutionalLaw of 1996so amendingthe 1972Constitution - as can be seen fiom
document No. 79 in the judges' folder (www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND
TREATIES/status.htm).
11. As for the condition of reciprocity, it is met in this case because Nigeria (a "dualist"
country,if1amnot mistaken)setthe breadth of itsown territorialsea at 12nautical miles in 1998. 1note incidentallythat it was only then that Nigeria brought its law into linewith the Law of the
Sea Convention (which it had ratified in 1986); previously,the breadth ofts own territorial sea
hadbeen 30 miles(see Section2 of the Decreeof 1January 1998,amendingthe TerritorialWaters
Act of 8 April 1967- Counter-Memorialof Nigeria, Ann.336). Thus it il1behoves Nigeria to
criticize Cameroon, aState claiming"constitutionalmonism"(andis thus immediatelyboundin its
domesticlaw by a duly ratified and published treaty) forits similar action,when Carneroon itself
had been bound since ratification under its domestic law. SinceNigeria refersto the case law of
the French Conseilconstitutionnel- for which, of course,1can hardly blame it!- 1venture to
remind it that the Conseil constitutionnel has asomewhat strict idea of reciprocity andes the
view that this condition of reciprociw is met as soon as the other States parties have actually
ratified the treaty in question (see decision No. 92-308 of 9 April 1992, Traité sur l'Union
européenne,C.C. Reports, 1992, p. 59, para. 16). And do 1 need to recall the words of the
4 2
PermanentCourt: "From thestandpointof InternationalLaw andof the Courtwhich is its organ,
municipal lawsare merely facts ..."(Certain GermanInterests in Polish UpperSilesia, Judgment
of 25May 1926, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No. 7,p. 19)?- which in any event couldnot prevail before
you overthe clearwording ofa conventionalprovisionin force.
12. Moreover, and to give thisparticularlyartificialpoint its quietus, on 17April 2000 the
National Assemblyof Cameroon passed a Law,No. 200012,relating to its maritime areas which
repeals the Law of 1974 and by its Article4 sets the breadth of Cameroon'stemtorial sea at
12nautical miles(see Written Observations of the Republic of Cameroonon the intervention by
EquatorialGuinea, Ann. ODGE 2). Membersof the Court, thetext of this Law, published in the
Oficial Journal of the Republicof Cameroon,can be found in your folderunderreferenceNo. 80.
1 observein passing that the Law moreoverin fact deliberatelyrefrains fiomtaking a position on
issuesrelating to the disputebefore us. Unlike Nigeria, Cameroonis not seekingto confiont your
distinguished Courtwith afait accompli.
13.The purpose of al1this, Mr. President,is to state somethingquite obvi-usbut Nigeria
quiteoften compelsus to pleadthe obvious: at al1events,the maritimeboundarybetweenthe two
Partiesincludestwoquite distinctsectors,not one only,as Nigeriaaffectsto believe. As we see it,
one of these sectors is delimited, the other is not. And if, against al1reason, the delimitation agreementsof 1971and 1975wereto be treatedas mere scraps ofpaper,there wouldstill be two
maritimesectors,subjecttoseparaterulesof thelawof the sea: the territorialsea,upto 12nautical
miles fiom the baselines,the continental shelfand the exclusive economic zone beyond. One
cannottreat them as undifferentiated,as Nigeriapersists in do-ngabsolutelynot! as my fnend
MalcolmShawwouldSay.
14.Onthe otherhand1note, Mr. President,that theParties areinagreementinaskingyouto
rule on a single line of delimitationbetween their respective continental shelvesand exclusive
economic zones (see Memonal of Cameroon, p. 548, para. 5.107; Reply of Cameroon,
pp.389-392, paras.9.08-9.19, andRejoinder of Nigeria, p.433, para. 10.7), as they themselves
have moreover begunto doas faraspoint G.
4 3 2. The roleof equidistance
15. In both cases, whether the territorial sea or the continental shelf (or the exclusive
economic zone)is involved, equidistancehas arolto play. Buta differingrole.
16.1will not spendlong onwhatoughtto be decidedonthe improbableassumptionthatyou
wereto takethe view thatthe agreements concludedbetweenthe Partiesas far as point G should
not be implemented; that seems sounrealistic. Itis enoughto Sayin this connectionthat, as far
back as 1962,Nigeria demonstratedits convictionthat the equidistanceprinciplewas applicable,
without any need to invoke the "special circumstances" referred toin Article 12 of the Geneva
Conventiononthe Territorial Sea,to whichitwasa Party.
17. Doubtless,when he approvedthe 1971 "compromiseline", the CameroonianHead of
State agreedto takeinto considerationtheNigerian claimof"fiee access"to the Crossandalabar
Rivers. It is also thisconcenithatexplainsthe line adoptedatMarouathree yearslater. However,
whenthey proceedbywayof agreement, Statesmay departfiom generalinternationallaw. Thisis
whatthey didon that occasion; butit isverydoubtfulwhetherthereis in this desirefor fiee access
to certain ports a "special circumstance"within the meaning of Article 15 of the current
Conventionon the Law of the Sea, the more so because al1vessels enjoy a right of innocent
passage within the Cameroonian territorial sea (see the case of Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial QuestionsbetweenQatar and Bahrain, Judgmentof 16March 2001,para.223). And even if it were a special circumstance, it wouldbe at least balanced by other "very special
circumstances"resulting fiom the generalconfigurationof the coasts and the particularfeaturesof
the Bight of Biafia region, which are alsorelevantbeyond pointG, and to which DeanKamto will
return. Takinga "swings and roundabouts"approach,this wouldlead at worst for Cameroonto a
return to an equidistanceline,which correspondsmoreoverto Nigeria's stated positionin 1962,as
ProfessorThouvenin has just explained. Furthermore, 1 repeat, this median line which, under
Article 15 of the United Nations Conventionon the Law ofthe Sea, shouldbe departedfiom only
if "it is necessary..."- and 1 stress "necessary"- ''todelimitthe temtorial seas ... in a way
which is at variance therewith",is more favourableto Cameroon than the one resulting fiom the
agreementsin force. But,as we have foundon several occasions, Nigeriais happy to "bat forthe
other team"
18.Theoperationofequidistancebeyond pointG is moreinteresting.
4 4
19. Drafted in thesame terms, Articles74 and 83 of the Montego Bay Convention,which
make no mention of equidistance, embody- following your jurisprudence, moreover - the
cardinal principleof the needto arriveatan"equitablesolution".
20. It certainly does not follow that equidistance has no role to play in delimitation ofthe
exclusiveeconomiczone orof the continentalshelfof Stateswithoppositeor adjacent coasts. And
your Judgment of16March 2001inthe Qatar/Bahraincase opportunelymadethe pointthat
"the equidistance/specialcircumstancesrule, which is applicable in particular to the
delimitation of the territorial sea, andthe equitable principles/relevantcircumstances
rule, as it has been developed since1958in case-law and State practicewith regardto
the delimitation of the continentalshelf and the exclusive economiczone, are closely
interrelated"(para.231).
And you addedthat the proper approachwas thus to "draw anequidistance lineand then consider
whetherthere arecircurnstances whichmustleadto an adjustmentof that line" (para.230).
21. 1do not believethat, in so stating,the Court intendedto cal1into question its previous
jurisprudence, with which these statementsare directly in line,as can be seen fiom its citatio-s
very convincingones, it seemsto me- fiom several of its previous Judgmentsin the paragraphs
preceding thosethat 1havejust quoted; neitherdo 1think- indeed still lessso- that the Court
intendedto go back on the fundamentalprinciplethat the essentialpurpose,the sole purpose,is to
arrive at an equitable solution. Immediatelyafter stating that it might be proper "to begin the process of delimitation by a median line provisionally drawn",as it had said in its Judgment of
14June 1993 in the JanMayen case (I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 62, para.53, also cited in the
Judgmentof 16March 2001,para. 228),the Court
"recalls first that in its Judgmentin the caseconcemingthe ContinentalSheZf(Libyan
ArabJamahiriya/Malta)it [theCourt] declaredas follows:
'theequidistance methodis not the onlymethodapplicableto the present
dispute, and it does not even have the benefit of a presumption in its
favour. Thus, under existing law, it must be demonstrated that the
equidistancemethod leadsto an equitable resultin the case in question.'
(I.C.J.Reports1985,p. 47,para. 63) (para.233.)"
4 5 22. It could equallywe'ilhavereferred to theJudgmentof 1993itself,in which it(the Court)
stated that"[tlhe aim in each and every situation must be to achieve 'an equitable result'
(I.C.JReports1993, p. 62,para. 54), as is establishedby your settled case law (see, inter alia,
Judgmentsof20 February 1969,NorthSea ContinentalShelf;I.C.J. Reports1969, p. 49, para. 90,
or p. 50, para.92; of 24 February 1982, Tunisia/LibyaContinentalShelf;I.C.J. Reports 1982,
p. 59, para. 70 or p. 79, para. 110; of 12October 1984 (Chamber),Delimitationof the Maritime
BoundaryintheGulfof MaineArea,I.C.J.Reports1984,pp.312-313,paras. 157-158,and p. 315,
paras. 162-163; of 3 June 1985, Libya/MaltaContinentalSheEJIl.C.J.Reports 1985, pp. 38-39,
paras.44-45; see also the Arbitral Awards of 14February 1985,case conceming Delimitationof
the MaritimeBoundaiy between Guineaand Guinea-Bissau, RGDIP,1985, p. 521, para. 88, or
p. 525, para. 102[ILM,Vol.25 (1986), pp. 289, 2941; or of 10 June 1992, case concerning the
Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic (St Pierre and
Miquelon), RGDIP,1992,p. 692,para.38) [ILM,vol. 31 (1992),p. 11631,and is nevermerely the
applicationofthe customarymle reflectedby Article74, paragraph 1, andArticle 83,paragraph 1,
ofthe 1982Conventiononthe Lawofthe Sea.
23. Thereis not the slightestdoubt that the law of maritime delimitations remains govemed
bythe search forsuch an equitablesolution. In that context equidistance isa startingpoint, not an
exclusive rule that can be implemented in isolation, withoutregard for the circumstances of the
casein point. In some casesequidistancemay be a sufficient manifestationof equity; in others it
will require adjustment inorder to give full expressionto that equity and to secure an equitable solution. That is theposition inthe presentcase,as Cameroonhas constantlyasserted eversinceits
seisin ofthe Court.
24. Moreover,1note with satisfactionthat Nigeria itself doesnot dispute this. On page490
of itsRejoinderitwrites: "Thusinternationaltribunais- while rejecting a mle of equidistanceas
amatterof generalinternationallaw- generallystartpom a medianor equidistanceline whichis
thenaqusted to takeinto account other relevant circumstances ". Nigeria also notes that: "Itis
truethatthe casefor a medianor equidistanceline asa startingpoint is strongerfor oppositethan
for adjacentcoast..."- it isNigeria whosaysthis @ara.12.23; emphasisadded). We couldnot
put itbetter,Mr. President! Butwhy doesNigeriatakeno accounthere of the correctandjudicious
4 6 principles that it cites and continueto advocate- at least ostensibly,1 will return to thithe
rigid application of equidistance as a principle of delimitation,when it can be no more than a
methodological convenience,andthe relevantcircumstanceshere areclearly againstthe drawing of
amedianline?
25. The equitable line that Cameroon proposes seems to us to meet this requirement.
Dean Kamto will return to thisin more specificterms in a few minutes,or perhapson Monday,and
will show what the relevant circumstancesare which in the present case require adjustrnentto
correctthe inequitableeffectsof equidistancepure andsimple.
Mr. President,1still havea good 15to 20 minutesof argument. 1do not know whetheryou
thinkthis is a suitablepoint fora break.
The PRESIDENT: Professor, the Courtwill adjourn the sitting for about ten minutes.
Thankyou.
TheCourtadjournedffom11.25to 11.45a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. The sitting is resumed, and1 give the floor again to
ProfessorAlain Pellet.
Mr. PELLET: Thankyouvery much,Mr. President. 3. The Parties'submissionsandthe taskof theCourt
26. Beforeending this introductoryspeech presentingCameroon'sposition on the maritime
delimitation, wishto drawthe Court'sattentionto a peculiarityinNigeria's argument: after some
ten years ofwrittenpleadings, Nigeriainsists that it still does not laiow the extent of Cameroon's
claims: "Nigeriastilldoesnotknowwhat isCameroon'smaritimeclaim. " (Rejoinderof Nigeria,
p. 422,para. 9.9.) The sentence is in italics in thetextThis is al1the more paradoxical in that
Nigeria, foritspart, has finally made upits mind to stateits ownclaims,erylate (forthe first time
in itsRejoinder),grudgingly,and in a way that is,to Saythe least,ambiguous.
27. Withyour permission,Mr.President,letusbegin with:
4 7 (a) Thescope ofthe Camerooniansubmissions
28. Theseare set outin paragraph 13.1 (c)oftheReply (pp.591-592).
29. As isshown by map78 in the judges' folder, alreadyprojected a short time ago, these
submissions relateto two sectors [projectmap 78 again]. As far as point G, you are requested to
note that "the "boundary of'the maritime zones appertaining respectively to the Republic of
Cameroonand the FederalRepublicof Nigeria" followsthe course fixed by the agreements (often
called "declarations"- but this does not affect their conventional nature in any way) of
Yaoundé IIof 4 April 1971and Maroua of 1June 1975. These instrumentsprecisely defme the
geographical CO-ordinatesof points 1to 12 and A to G of the maritime boundary between the
Parties, albeit bearing in mind that the Yaoundé II agreement was supplemented by the Joint
Commission's Lagos declaration of 21 June 1971, commonly known as the "Ngoh-Coker
declaration"(Memorial of Cameroon,Book V, Ann.243; the Maroua Declarationisreproducedin
Annex251,BookVI, oftheMemorialof Cameroon).
30. Moreover, it would seem that Nigeria's criticisms are not directed at this part of
Cameroon's submissions,but rather that its unfortunate insistenceon treating the two maritime
delimitationsectors as a single unit prevents it from "particularizing" itsclaim. What Nigeria
complains of relates in reality to the maritime boundary between the Parties beyond point G.
Nigeria criticizesus because the initial map preparedby cartographers in our tearn (Memorial of
Cameroon, p. 556) does not match the CO-ordinatesin the submissions in the Reply which 1
mentioneda momentago andwhich areillustratedbymap R 21 inthe Reply asamended. 31. As the Republic of Cameroon acknowledged in a letter to the Registrar on
22 February 2001, there were unfortunate errors of cartographic transposition, for which we
apologizedto the Court andtoNigeria, who,1might statein passing,has alsomademistakesin its
cartography; it has correctedthem, without Our seeking to take advantage of them (see, for
example, the letter from D.J.Freeman of 28 September 1999 regarding map 79 in the atlas
annexedto the Counter-Memorial; the letterfrom the Agent of Nigeria of 15March 2001relating
to the figures in paragraph 11.16 of the Rejoinder, or the letter fiom D. J. Freeman of
4 8
28 January2002 enclosinga correctedversionof a mapalsoappearingin the Rejoinder).
32.That said, the amended map R21 [project amendedmap R 21 ("Equitable line") -
document No. 81), which is projected behind me and accordingly reproduced as No. 81 in the
judges' folder,transposes,thistime correctly,the geographicalCO-ordinatofthe equitable lineas
these are given in the submissionsin the Reply. This, then, is map R 21, No. 81 in your folder.
Moreover, it is the submissions that define the scope of the dispute (see Judgrnent of
21 March 1984, ContinentalShelf(Libyan ArabJamahiriya/Malta)A , pplicationfor Permissionto
Intervene,I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 19, para.29) and the submissionsin the Reply are as precise as
they can be, and Nigeria could not reasonably have any doubt as to their scope. The maps
accompanying theParties' writtenor oral pleading- possiblyin sometimesexcessivenumbersin
recent years arepurely illustrativein nature: if Nigeria'scounselfind the illustrations submitted
by Cameroonnot to their liking,1invitethemto confine themselvesto the written submissionsin
the Reply; theyalonehave legalforce.
33. But let them at least do so, Mr. President! Cameroon has noted, with some
astonishment- that is an understatemen- that Nigeria, for the requirements of its arguments,
hastakenthe libertypurely andsimplyofinventing certainCameroonian submissions.
34. The most brazen illustration of this strange technique is doubtless supplied by the
placing- byNigeria - ofa point"L", tobe added to pointK onthe equitableline and which,if 1
have not misunderstood,Nigeriahas decidedrepresents the terminal point of Cameroon'sclaims.
My fiiend and colleagueMauriceKamtowill return to this.
35.1 would neverthelesspoint outthatit seemedreasonable to us,Membersof the Court,not
to ask you to fix a terminal point for the maritimeoundary, in particular out of a concem tosafeguardthird-partyrights in their entirety (especiallythe rights of Sao Tome and Principe, which
hasnot intervenedinthe caseandthereforehas not statedits point ofview), evenif thoserights are
notthreatenedbytheequitablelineproposedby Cameroon,as 1willestablishthis comingMonday.
Moreover,it is customaryin maritime delimitationcasesof this typefor the Courtor the arbitration
tribunalto refrain fiom fixingthe exact point where the maritime boundary separatingwo States
ends (see, for exarnple, the Judgment of 24 February 1982, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
JamahiriyaMalta), I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 94, para. 133 C. 3, or the Arbitral Award of
14 February 1985,Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau,
RGDIP, 1985,p. 535,para. 130.3 (c),[ILM,Vol.25 (1980),p. 2521).
36. In any event,there wasnever any question of a point "L" on our side. Reckoningfiom
point"K", it seemsto the Republic of Cameroonthat it would be necessary and suficient for you
to indicatea generaldirection andto rely forthe rest on the rules and principles of the Montego
Bay Convention,which Cameroonand Nigeriahave ratified. To myknowledgethere is no dispute
betweenthem in thisrespect, and it is for each of the Parties to determine the extensionof their
respective maritime jurisdictions in a seaward direction pursuant to Articles 57 and 76 of the
1982UnitedNationsConventionon the Lawof the Sea.
37. Allow me, Mr. President,to point out one last paradox: Nigeria, a1 have said, claims
not to know the extentof Cameroon'smaritimeclaims. At the sametime, however,it presumesto
knowthem better thanwe anddoesnot hesitateto adaptthe Camerooniansubmissionsto suititself
and to change them in what it believes to be its best interests. Once again, the Republic of
Cameroondoes not ask the Courtto fix the outer limit of the Parties' respective maritime zones,
but, reckoning fiompoint "K", to indicate the directionthat the limit of those zones shouldtake.
Neitherdoes it askNigeriato take its placein formulatingits submissions.
(b) TheNigeriansubmissions
38. On the other hand,Mr.President,wewould liketo knowexactlywhatthe submissionsof
theNigerian Part arein thismatter.
39. Nevertheless we can say that the Rejoinder is an advance in this respect relativeto the
Counter-Memorial. Inthe latterNigeria had expressly refused to disclose to the Court the course of the maritime boundarythat it consideredjustified(Counter-Memorialof Nigeria, pp. 603-604,
para. 23.3)- on very weak grounds, as Cameroon had in its Reply (Reply of Cameroon,
5 0 pp. 351-355, paras. 7.27-7.42). Ourobjections seem to have been heard in part, because in its
Rejoinder Nigeria venturesto describe the line that it prefers and asks the Court to adjudge and
declare:
"(e) that the respectiveterritorial watersofthe two States are dividedby a medianline
boundary withinthe Riodel Rey;
(f)that, beyond the Rio del Rey, the respectivemaritime zones of the parties are to
be delimited in accordance withthe principle of equidistanceto the point where
the line so drawn meets the median boundary with Equatorial Guinea at
approximately4" 6' N, 8"30' E" (RejoinderofNigeria, p. 765, para. 4; see also
p. 527, para. 13.44.2).
40. 1referred a short time ago to the view that should be taken of "any equidistance" on
whichNigeriarelies. 1willnot returnto thisnow.
41.Moreover, weshouldnot be surprisedthat Nigeriaaffects to start the maritimeboundary
between the two States at the Rio delRey: the contrary position would have arnountedto an
admission,which Nigeriacould not make, regardingCameroon'stitle tothe BakassiPeninsula. It
is nonethelessrevealing thatthis submissionbyNigeria is,to Saythe least,lackingin assuranceand
obscured rather than substantiatedby the reasoningunderlying it, despitethe extreme cautionby
which it ischaracterized.
42. This caution shows itself first in the disproportionate brevity of the arguments put
forward: four pages (sixparagraphs and a map), whereas Nigeria devotes over 100pages to
rebuttingthe line proposedby Cameroon. Moreover,our opponentsshow clearly that they arenot
deceivedthemselves bythat relocationof the boundary linefi-omthe Akwayafeto the Rio delRey:
to be sure,they submit anillustrativemap, figure13.9,appearing afterpage 524 of the Rejoinder,
which shows a convenient sandbank,which, as we pointed out just now, they claim to have
recently discovered andwhich avoidstoo absurda line; however, Nigeria takes the precautionof
also refemng - in this section devoted to defending theNigerian line- to figure 13.8, which
claims to represent the "oil practice line" (Rejoinder of Nigeria, p.22bis) and which should
doubtlessberegarded asrepresentingthe trueboundarythatNigeria isproposingtoyou. 43. Dean Kamto and Professor Mendelsonwill give details later of the serious criticism to
whichthe Nigerianposition, which is neither well-foundedin law nor in accordancewith the facts
(at the "critical date" in any event), exposesitself in this regard; for the concessionson which
5 Nigeria relies are for the most part recent and overlapthose granted by Cameroon orEquatorial
Guinea beyond pointG. The issue that 1would like to bring out is different: in order to rebut
Cameroon's equitable line, Nigeriadoesnot rely, at leastas its main argument,on the equidistance
principle (exceptin an attemptto persuadeyou to fixa tripoint- but we will have an opportunity
to returnto this); its principal, its soleconcem, Membersof the Court, is to presentyouwith what
it is endeavouringto submitto you as the fait accompliof oil concessions- meaningits own, for
it shows scant concern for those granted by Cameroonor Equatorial Guinea- as is shown, for
example,by the extraordinasr figure 10.5in the Rejoinder(p.446bis), which claims to show the
zone where Nigerian and Equatorial Guinean concessions overlap, but which shows only the
Nigerian concessions,to theex.clusionofthose grantedby the interveningState.
44. Moreover, afier describing its oil operations in the region (of Bakassi, not of Rio del
Rey) (Rejoinder of Nigeria, pp. 434-441, paras. 10-11-10.22) and submitting as an Annex a
"cartographic historyof the concessions" ("LicensingHistory Maps", pp. 457 et seq.), the sources
of whichare moreovernot shown withtherequisiteprecision,Nigeriaseeksto attackCameroonby
claimingthat the latter's proposed equitableline conflictsnot with the line of the oil concessions
between the two countries, but to that of their actual operations (see Rejoinder of Nigeria,
pp. 510-523, paras.13.14-13.37), that is to say wells, boreholes, etc. But these are operations
which Nigeria has contrived to render impossible for Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Then
comesNigeria's real "hidden submission": the line separatingthe two States' maritimezones is
the extreme limit ofits oil operations-it, Nigeria's, operatio-s which, moreover,it succeeded
in imposingon Equatorial Guineabythetreaty of 23September2000; we willhave an opportunity
to comeback to this:
"even on the basis of Cameroon's unjustified claimto the Bakassi Peninsula, the
maximum claim line that Cameroon could advance would involve delimiting the
respectivemaritimezones of the Partiesbeyondthe CrossRiver Estuaryin themarner
shown in Fig. 18.8 [the one 1 just mentioned figuring the 'Oil Practice Line']. The
effect is to maintain,on eachsideof the line sodrawn, al1wells and installations["all
wells and installations, Mr. President, not ail oil licences] which were drilled or constmcted under licenses or permits granted by either party..." (Rejoinder of
Nigeria,p. 527,para. 13.45.)
45. However, itis not forme to discussthe validity ofthis claim; my leamedcolleagueswill
be responsible for that. But we wanted to bring out what seem to us obviously to represent
Nigeria's real submissions: it wishesto retain, in their entirety,"al1wells and installations"that it
has succeededin forcingon theregion, eventotally unlawfully,in defiance ofthemaxiex injuria
jus non oritur. The line that Nigeria would like you to adopt, Members of the Court, is that
resulting fiom its "oil imperialism".This line is marked not on map 13.9 in the Rejoinder
(Rejoinder of Nigeria, p.524bis), but on map 13.8 (p. 522bis), for which maps 13.5 to 13.7
representthe preliminaries,but notthejustification.
DeanMauriceKamto will return to this key point later. Now 1 would be gratefbl,
Mr. President,if you would givehim the floorso that he can showthe Courtwhich instrumentsare
relevant to the delimitation of the first sector of the maritime boundary, fiomthe Akwayafe to
point G.
Thankyou verymuch,Mr.President,Membersofthe Court, foryour attention.
ThePRESIDENT: Thankyou, Professor. 1nowgivethe floorto Dean MauriceKamto.
Mr.KAMTO:
II.THE MARITIME BOUNDARY
9.The first maritimesector (fromthe mouthof theAkwayafetopointG)
1.Mr. President, Membersof the Court, it falls to me to present to the Court thecourse of
the maritime boundary between Cameroonand Nigeria and to statewhy, in the opinion of the
Republicof Cameroon,the equitable line itproposesisthebest possible coursein thehtoftreaty
law and customary law,as wellas the practiceof international courts.
2. As my colleague and fiiend ProfessorPellet hasjust said, the maritime boundary can be
divided intotwosectors: the first hasbeen clearly delimitedby means of international agreements
which arevalid, although disputedby Nigeria; the secondremainsto be delimited. 1wishnow to
speak ofthe first sector.
3. The first sector of the maritimeboundary between Cameroon and Nigeria runs from the
mouth of the Akwayafe to pointG. The course of this first sector is based mainly on three international legal instruments: the Anglo-GermanAgreement of London of 11March 1913,the
Cameroonian-NigerianAgreementof 4 April 1971,comprising theYaoundéIIDeclarationand the
appended Chart3433, and the Cameroonian-Nigerian Agreementof 11June 1975, known as the
MarouaDeclaration. The relevant documentunderpinningthese various agreementsis the British
Admiralty Chari [projectionof map No. 11,found in the judges' folder as document No. 82 and
showingthe estuaryof the Calabarand Akwayaferivers and its southem approacheson a scale of
1:50,000. This was the map, the version published in 1970, used by the negotiators of the
Yaoundé II and Maroua Declarations to draw the lines between points 1 and 12, then between
points A and G, the lines respectively defined under those agreements. The topography ofthe
coastline shown on this chart has changed little since then, and recent surveys, camed out for
navigationalpurposes,have notconcernedthemselveswithit.
4. The Yaoundé II and Maroua Agreements, post-colonial agreements between the
independent Cameroon andNigeria, were the hit of long negotiations, and in its Memorial
Cameroon presented the full history and a detailed analysis of the salient stages of these
negotiations'9and1shall refrainfiom coveringthe groundagain.
5. Allow me, however, at this stage, to highlight one oddity in Nigeria's approach: the
course of the maritime boundary established by the bilateral agreement of 23 September2000
between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea- which agreement, 1 would remind you, is in no way
opposable to Cameroon- starts from a hypothetical point I~'. In its Rejoinder, Nigeria
nonethelessboldlylocates themaritime boundary betweenCameroonand itself in the Rio del Rey
and explains with apparent serenity that the course of this imaginary boundary "follows the
equidistance line south-westwards until it meets the tripoint with Equatorial Guinea, [at
5 4 approximately latitude4'6' N, longitude 8' 30' E]"~'; stating that the result is equitablebecause
"theequity of anoutcomereached""is" "a generalmatterof impression"22.
'9~emorialofCameroon,pp.500-529,paras.5.06-5.62.
20~ejoinderofNigeria,fig. 1.3.
"RejoinderofNigeria, p.52.4,para.13.40.
22~ejoinderofNigeria, p.52:4,para.13.41. 6. This is al1statedon page 524 of Nigeria'sRejoinder. Yet three pages previously, in the
sarne Rejoinder, sketch-map 13.8 [projection No. 21, found in the judges' folder as document
No. 83, shows a red linemarked "Oil Practice Line", startingat an adrnittedlyundefinedpoint,but
this time from the mouth of the Akwayafe and not the Rio del Rey. That line, which Nigeria
devotes eight pages to defendingas the defacto line23abruptlyjumps fiom the Akwayafe- the
sketch-map we have just seen- to the Rio del Rey [projectionNo. 33. This is the new line
proposed by Nigeria; the sketch-map is found in the judges' folder as document No. 84. It is
flagrant,Mr. President, Members of the Court: Nigeria is tom and ensnared in its own
contradictions,and wetoo are baffled. 1can onlySaythat itsposition recallsthat ofBuridan'sass,
which according to fable died of hunger and thirst because it was unable to choose between a
bucket of water and a bundle ofhay. And Cameroonasksthe question: which line does Nigeria
Sayshouldbe considered asthe course of the maritimeboundarybetweenthe two countries? The
"Oil PracticeLine"? Orthe onewhich startsfromthe RiodelRey?
7. Well then, let us talk about the famous line fiom the Rio del Rey, to which Nigeria
devotesatotal of three pages outofthe 528inVolumeII of its Rejoinder. Nigeria explainsthatthe
line, prima facie, follows the equidistance line out in the direction of Bioko, until it meets the
Equatorial Guinea-Bakassi equidistance line; it adds that a relevant factor, "a substantial sand
island, notshown on earlier charts", which can be seen at the mouth of the Rio del Rey within
12miles of the Coast,affects the equidistanceline and prompts it, i.e., Nigeria, to tthat line
south-westwardsZ4.
Whatan admirableconcem for faimess. But it's al1smoke andmirrors! Artfully, Nigeria
conjures up in the Rio del Rey, where it, Nigeria, is not physically present, an island- a
5 5 substaritialsand island- whichwe Cameroonians, whohave a permanent presencein the area,
have never seen and which nobody knows about since it has never been marked on any map; a
substantial island which cannot be seen with the naked eye, but only by means of satellite
photography. This is awesomelyimprobable,to Saythe least. ,
23~ejoindof Nigeria,pp.516-517,paras.13.23-13.25.
24~ejoindof Nigeria,pp. 523-524,para.13.39. 8. Mr. President, the Republic of Cameroon holds steadfastly to its international
undertakings, it respects the comrnitmentsundertaken today and those contained in the colonial
agreements which it inherited; it has always contendedthat the maritime boundarybetween the
Federal Republic of Nigeria and itself starts from theouth of the Akwayafe and it has never
changedits positiononthis subject.
9. This line has a clearly defined starting point, namelythe intersection ofthe straight line
running from Bakassi Pointin CameroontoKing Pointin Nigeria, andthe centre of the navigable
channelof the Akwayafe. Thïspointwas not conjured up from nowhere,Mr. President; nor is it a
creationof Cameroon; it is definedby ArticleXVIIIof the Anglo-Geman Agreement ofLondon
of 11March 1913, which locatesthe landwards startingpoint of the maritime boundary at the
intersectionof the thalwegof thiswatercourse andof a"straight linejoining BakassiPoint to King
Point".
10. Article XXI of the London Agreementprovidesthat, from this point in the "centre" of
the navigable channel, the boundary goes "as far as the 3-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction".
ArticleXXII of the same Agreement provides that the baseline forming the starting point for
calculating the breadth of the territorial sea, fixed at 3 nautical miles, is the line linking the
extremitiesof the Akwayafe estuary,and the Partiesto the 1913 Agreement agreedto defineit as
"a linejoining Sandypoint and Tom ShotPoint". The 1913London Agreement was thus the first
treaty instrument to establish thebases for delimitingthe maritime boundary between Cameroon
andNigeria and to beginthe taskof delimitation.
11.Itwasno easytaskto drawthe linedefinedbythat Agreement, which,under the positive
law of the sea of the time, represented the line separatingthe territorial sea of the territory of
Cameroon fromthatofthe temitoryof Nigeria.
1.From the mouthofthe Akwayaféto point12
12.Shortly afterthe independenceof bothcountries,Nigeria, throughthe intermediaryof its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, addressedto Cameroonits Note No. 570 of 27 March 1962. In that
5 6 Note, on the subject of which Professor Jean-MarcThouvenin has addressedthe Court, and towhich was appended a ~ketch-ma~~~ w,hich has already beenshown [projectionNo. 41 and which
appears in the judges' folder as document No. 85, in that Note Nigeria unilaterally, without
consultingCameroon, drewa line showing the maritimeboundarybetweenthe two countriesinthe
temtorial seaas far asthe 3-mile limitfixedunderthe 1913Agreement.
13.Members of the Court, there is no needto dwell excessivelyon the decisivecharacterof
this Note as proof of the "Cameroonness" of Bakassi. ProfessorThouvenin covered that
sufficiently afew momentsago, and 1shallnotreopenthe subject.
14.On the other hand, Mr. President,1would emphasizethat this Note showeda line which
quite visibly started fiom the landwardsstartingpoint of the maritime boundary as defined under
the 1913Agreement, i.e., as 1 have just stated, fiom the intersection of the straight line joining
Bakassi Point inCameroon and King Point in Nigeria, and the centre of the navigablechannel of
the Akwayafe. In other words, whateverit claimstoday, Nigeria heldthe 1913 Agreementto be
valid, and considered it to be the first legal instrument initiating the process of delimiting the
maritimeboundary between Cameroonand itself. Let us take a look at the course of line AB, as
shown on the sketch-mapappended to the 1962Note [projectionNo. 51,and found in the judges'
folder as document No. 86. This is actually a transpositionfrom the sketch-mapappended to the
1962 Note, transposed so as not to modi@the coastal fiont; the broken line represents the line
appended to the 1962 Note, which went as far as point 12 approximately. Thismap shows the
course of the Ali3 line running to the Westof the line which was to emerge fiom the work on
YaoundéII and much closer to the line proposed at the time by the experts, but eventually
abandonedby the Heads of State in favourof a compromiselinerunning further east. Adrnittedly,
this is only a sketch-map,which is not to scale, andthere are noCO-ordinatesforthe line drawn on
it. Unquestionably, it is somewhat imprecise, afact of whichNigeria was aware, since Nigeria
itselfreferred to an "arbitrary line" in the letter appended to the Note. However it is plain,
Mr.President,that that line was moreadvantageousto Cameroonthan the line acceptedtoday, and
that Nigeriathen consideredthis AB lineto be"the correctboundary"betweenthe twocountries.
ZS~emoriaol f Cameroon,AM. 229. 15.Whatthen happenedto makeNigeria- Nigeria who drewthis line unilaterally,Nigeria
who complains that Cameroon took no action on its Note relating to the line, Nigeria who
nonetheless applied the course of the line without hearing Cameroon's views or securing its
consent - what made Nigeria, 1 ask,challenge todaythe linenegotiated and fixedby a succession
of agreements which it signed, agreements which are more favourable to Nigeria than the
1962line? There is a mystery herewhich Nigeria will doubtlessendeavourto elucidate,Members
of the Court. 1fear however that Nigeriamay betempted by the absurd, meaningthe temptation
which prompts it to request the Court to disregard the agreements which Nigeria has formally
concluded and which are binding upon it, in order to award it a boundary conjured up from
nowhere, lackingany legalbasis orhistorical reference.
16.After the episodeof the 1962Note(No. 570), it appearednecessary to both countriesto
take a concertedapproachto delimitingtheirmaritimeboundary. In the early 1970s,the authorities
of both countries decided to address the task of delimiting their joint maritime boundary
exhaustivelyand thoroughly. To that end, they set up ajoint commission under the "Yaoundé1"
Declaration of 14August 1970. After severalmeetings of the commission,the outcomeof which
was that experts fiom each country maintained markedly conflictingpositions, the Heads ofState
of Cameroon and Nigeria settled the matter in the Cameroonian capital on 4 April 1971, by
adopting "a compromiseline" whichthey jointly drew on British Admiralty Chart343326,which 1
projected at the beginning of'my statement and which, 1recall, is found in the judges' folder as
document No. 82. This "compromise line" runs fiom point 1, at the mouth of the Akwayafe,to
point 12outat sea, passingthroughthe successiveintermediarypoints fiom 2 to 11. Chart3433,to
which 1 have just referred, :showsvery clearly that point 1, the starting point of the maritime
boundary, was situatedin the centreof the navigablechannelof the Akwayafe, in accordancewith
ArticleXXIof the London Agreementof 1913.
17.This ChartNo. 3433 (foundin thejudges' folderas documentNo. 82) [projectionagain],
the chari on which is drawn the line linking point 12 to point 13,and point 13 to point 20, this
being the continuation ofthe linedrawn up by the experts, clearly shows the consequence of the
26~aoundéIIDeclaratio, emorialfCameroonA, nn.242. concessionmade to Nigeria by Cameroon. The westward shift of the line between point 12 and
point20 is particularly striking. Itakesplain the concession that was made betweenpoint 1 and
point 12 in relation to the equidistance line. Mr. President,there is no other explanationfor the
lateral shifî between point 12 and point 13, and for the course followed upto point 20: it is the
*
result of an application of the principles laid down in the 1958Geneva Convention on the
Temtorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Thisline apportioned, in an equal manner, the maritime
areasof Cameroonand Nigeria beyondthe compromise line. However,the segment fiompoint 12
topoint 20 wasnot validatedby the Headsof State.
18.Membersof the Court, the firstsegmentofthe maritime boundaryfiom the mouthof the
Akwayafe to point 12 was thus fixed on the basis of a compromisewhich was, once again, very
favourable to Nigeriaand which disregardedthe general rules of the law of the sea of that time.
This segment has not beenmodified sincethen, and the CO-ordinatesofthe 12points defining its
course were given in the Lagos Declaration of 21June 1971 adopted at the conclusion of the
meetingof the Joint Commissionchargedwith delimitingthe boundarybetweenthe twocountries.
II.Frompoint12to point G
19.Mr.President,the delimitation ofthe maritimeboundary betweenpoint 12andpoint 20,
as drawnup bythe experts,having beenabandonedbecause it did not suitthe Nigerianpad7, the
prolongation of the maritime boundary fiom point 12 seawards up to "point G, situated
approximately17.7 nauticalmiles fiom thebaselines,proved difficult.
20. Until July 1974, it was not possible to reach any agreement between both Parties
regardingtheprolongationofthe boundarysouthwardsfiom point 12. Nigeriapersisted inrefusing
a line based on equidistance. Once again, it demanded a compromise linewhich wouldbe more
favourablethan a line of strict equidistance. Afier all, having obtainedsuch a compromiseup to
point 12, there was no reason to stop when everything was goingso well. However, Nigeria's
concern to have access to the port of Calabar without passing through Cameroonian temtorial
59 #
waters promptedthe two countries to adopt a provisional solutionwherebytheir respective claims
were fiozen and "a corridor extending for 2 km on either side of the line joining the Fairway
27~emorial Cameroon ,p. 5 16-5 ,ara5.41-5.42. landing buoy to buoys Nos. 1, 2and3 as shown on Chart3433"28was defined in what became
known asthe Kano Declarationof 1September 1974,signedby PresidentAhidjoof Cameroonand
General Gowon of Nigeria. In this no-man's land "al1 prospecting operations for oil" were
"prohibited"29.
21. It is important to note that the buoys referred to were those marking the navigable
channel of theCrossICalabarI3ivers3O.And, taking a close look at the sketch-mapdrawn on the
basis of Chart3433 and the buffer zone thus defined [projectionNo. 61 (document No. 87) it
appears that this too, Mr. President, was favourableto the interests of Nigeria. In effect, it is
essentiallylocated to the east of the line resultinghe line adoptedin application of the 1958
Geneva Conventionby the Joint Commissionin June 1971. However,the Kano arrangement was
not aimed atthe definition of an enduring régime, andwas not directedat the delimitation of the
maritime boundary.
22. The prolongation ofthe maritime boundary southwards fiom point 12was effected less
than one year later, at the conclusion of a summit meeting between Cameroon and Nigeria in
May-June 1975. Itwas during thatmeetingthat PresidentAhidjo andGeneral Gowon"reached&ll
agreementon the exactcourse of the maritime boundary" (emphasis added), as expressed in the
joint communiqué published at theend of the meeting3'. 1 lay emphasis on the words "full
agreement"and "exactcourse'",sincethey dismissany doubts as to the intentionof the Parties and
the nature and purpose of the Maroua Agreement which Nigeria has taken it upon itself to
challenge. Next Monday,ProfessorTomuschat will establishthe legalvalidity of this Agreement,
which was complemented by an exchange of letters, on 12June and 17July 1975~~,in which
PresidentAhidjo and GeneralGowon agreed to correct a trivial factual error conceming the
CO-ordinateosf pointB on the linerunning fiompoint 12topoint G.
6 0
23. As the provisions of the Maroua Agreement make clear, the explicit objective of the
Agreementwas to extend "the delineation of the maritime boundary betweenthe two Countries
28~ernorialof Cameroon,p. 527.
29~anoDeclaration,Memorialof Cameroon, .46.
30~eeChart3433,Memorialof Carnero, nn.242.
3'~ernorialof Cameroon,Arin.250.
32~ernorialof Cameroon,Ann.251. For example,on 27 May 1976,it gave backthe Kita-Marine hydrocarbonwellNo. 1which
had been drilledby Elf Serepcain 1972[projectionNo. 71(doc.No. 89). Itgave backthis oil well,
whichhad revealedthepresenceofoiland gas,ata time whenit had barelydiscoveredits ownfirst
oilfields, whereasNigeria was alreadya major oil exporter. The logical conclusion, Mr. President,
is that Nigeria, which didnot refusethe returnedwell, thus acknowledged,at least implicitly,that
the Maroua line constitutesthe maritimeboundarybetweenthe two countries. For why else would
suchrestitution havetaken place excepton groundsof compliancewith the said boundary?
III.Confirmationofthe conventional delimitation by Statepractice
26. Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is the whole of this maritime bounda~~,
painstakingly delimited by agreement from point 1 to pointG, which Nigeria now seeks to
challengetoday inthe narne of an ill-consideredterritorial claim over the Bakassi Peninsula,and,
as mentioned just now, by seeking to rely on the "fait accompli" of the "oil concessions", in
defianceof its owntreatyundertakings.
27. The Federal Republic of Nigeria claims, both in its ~ounter-~emorial~~and in its
~ejoinder~~,to describe the present situation as regards oil concessions, which it contends
representsthe conductof the Parties. It does soin a partial and insomerespects erroneousmanner,
and its Rejoinder, rather than correcting and clarifiing its Counter-Memorial in this regard,
perpetuatesthe inaccuracy.
28. Inits Reply, Cameroonpointsoutthat,in its ~ounter-~emorial~~ Nigeriapresents a table
of the concessions granted and, in Annex 341 to that Counter-Memorial, States the present
CO-ordinates of some of those concessions,yet without givingthe source of Annex341, whichhas
the air of a tailor-made, composite Nigeria does not provide that informationin its
Rejoindereither. Instead,with respectto sketch-mapsR 24 andR 25 producedby Cameroonin its
Reply and showingboth "thelimitofthe operations"of the Cameroonian petroleumcompaniesand
-
33~ounter-~emorialof Nigeria, Vol.II,paras.20.3-20.17.
34~ejoinderofNigeria, Vol. II,pp.435-441,paras. 10.11-10.22.
35~ara2.0.14.
36~eplyof Carneroon,p. 428, para.9.107.the areas of overlap of the concessions, it states that "there are no Cameroon installationsin the
southernarea of overlappinglicenses, shown in blue onthe mapW3'.
29. Membersof the Court, Nigeriais seekingto concealthetruth on at least threepoints:
30. Tobegin with, after indicatingthat a seriesof offshore blocks,lettered fiom Ato N, was
I
designatedin 1959,it adds: "the most easterly ofthese,BlockN, was nevergranted"38.It does not
Sayby whom this block was not granted,thereby givingthe impressionthat it is a Nigerian block
which it has refiained from granting. Mr. President, Nigeria knows perfectly well that this
BlockN, situatedoff Bakassi,is a Cameroonian block,a fact it actually aclaowledges in its Note
Verbale of 1962,which is referred to severaltimes. Further, it is also aware that this Block was
long since granted by Carneroon,as it corresponds moreor lessto Block 17named Kita Eden on
the sketch-map entitled Figure 10.1 in Nigeria's Rejoinder - where the limit of Cameroon's
operations is indicated by a broken red line - and faces Nigeria's BlockOPL98, whichNigeria
itself says is the former Block M, granted inSeptember 1961. This statement, quietlyslipped by
our opponentsinto their Rejoinder, reflects Nigeria'sdesire to take advantage of that 1962Note,
while at the same time denying it- though without so admitting- because it provides the
strongest possible confirmationthat Nigeriahas always recognizedCarneroon'stitle to Bakassi.
31.Secondly,on the issue of whetherits oilconcessionsinthe delimitedpart ofthe maritime
boundary are of long standing or not, Nigeria persists, at the conclusion of this paragraph of its
Rejoinder, in expressingits perplexity at Cameroon's contentionthat the Nigerian oil concessions
in this area are recent, statingthat, on the contrary,the area in question "has been the subject of
licensing, relinquishment,relicensingetc.over morethan 40 years"39.
32. Yet this same Nigeria reluctantly concedes just before, in paragraph 10.15 of its
Rejoinder: "It is true thatmany concessions currentlyin forcewere grantedin the last 10years, as
shown in the table in Nigeria'sCounter-Memoriai". 1 stress the word "many", as Nigeriagoes on
to Say: "But in most cases ... these werere-issuesor re-grants after long-established licenceareas
i
37~ejoindeof Nigeria,p.435, para.10.110.
3s~ejoinderof Nigerp.436, para.10.16.
39~ejoindeof Nigeria,pp.463-437, para.10.16.had been relinquishedor e~changed'~~.In passing, 1would point out that Nigeria cites only two
examplesto illustratethe word "most", in this case Blocks OPL98 and OPL 230, and, in reality,
Nigeria would be hard put to it to quote any other examples. More seriously, even the two
examples chosendo not illustratewhat Nigeria claims,becausethe two blocks in question do not
confirm Nigeria's assertionon the ground. BlockOPL 230 no longer exists,since it was replaced
in 1999by concessionOML 1.14.According to themaps prepared byPetroconsultants (laterIHS),
which we consulted and which Nigeria itself cites, neither BlockOPL230 in the past nor
concession OLM 114 today encroaches on the 1975Maroualine. Where BlockOPL 98 is
concerned, accordingto the map of the limit of theoil concessions, of which 1havejust giventhe
reference, Nigeria claimsthat it only slightly encroaches upon this 1975line at its south-eastern
end. In reality, if one refersto any mapof the oil concessions of NigeriaSouth East drawnup by
IHS, the former Petroconsultants, reference body for petroleum operations, it is clear that
concessionOPL98 also scrupulouslyrespectstheMaroua line.
33. It is obvious,Mr. President,that, for Cameroonas for Nigeria, the present configuration
of oilfield grants is the result of a succession of grants, reissues and partial or total-gants.
However,we cannotagreewith Nigeriawhen it claimsthat Cameroon'spractice hasbeento create
defacto overlaps with the Nigerian oilfield. In fact, above point G- the first sector of the
maritime boundary, that which this presentation addresses- ail of the maps produced by the
international bodies regarded as authoritative in the petroleum world (1 quoted
Petroconsultants/IHSa moment ago) contradictthisclaim.
34. Thirdly,in footnote23 onpage 437 ofitsRejoinder, Nigeria discreetlyStates:
"It is mie that a small wedge-shapedarea of former BlockN remained mostly
unlicensed until 1970. This was the area referred to in Nigeria's note verbale of
27 March 1962(Ann.MC 229): there is no record of Cameroonreplying to that note.
The small area in question was licensedby Nigeria in 1970,as can be seen from the
1970mapin the Appendixtothis Chapter."
35. 1would recall, Mr. President, that Cameroon has already observed that Nigeria makes
much of Cameroon'ssilence in regard to Nigerian petroleum initiatives in the maritime area in
question,but neither hasNigeria itself ever objectedto Cameroon'sactivitiesin the area, including
40~ejoindeof Nigeria,p.436, p10.15. in whatit claimsto be the areasof overlappingconcessions. But, above all,Cameroonwoulddraw
the Court's attentionto an implicitadmission byNigeria in that footnote23. At the time when, in
1970,thetwo countrieswere innegotiation with aview to fixingthe startingpoint of themaritime
boundq as determinedby the 1913LondonAgreementand decidingthe course of that boundary
b
up to the limit of 3 nautical miles determined by the Agreement, Nigeria was simultaneously
issuinglicencesfor areaswhichwerethesubjectof thosenegotiations.
36. Yet 1would remind you that, during the negotiationsin question,Nigeria categorically
opposedthe application of the equidistanceline - a line close to the "arbitrary" one of 196-
which Cameroon claimedunder the positive law of the time, but had to abandon in favourof the
famous"compromise line" of 1971. It would behove Nigeria particularlyil1today, Mr.President,
to accuse Cameroon ofnot having reacted to this famous Note of 1962,proposed in haste by
Nigeria, in reality because it had already, in 1959-1960, granted explorationand exploitation
licencesin thearea.
37. That said, what is the precise situation in regard to oil concessionsin this first sector,
wherethemaritimeboundarybetweenthetwo countriesis clearly delimited,and by treatyatthat?
38.Mr. President,in electingnottoreply to Cameroon's argumentspresented on thebasis of
a distinction betweenthe maritimeboundaryup to point G,then beyond point G, Nigeria adopts a
confused approach, failingto distinguishasbetweenthe practiceof the twoStates in the firstsector
and inthe second.
39. In its ~ e ~ lCa~meroon has shown that, in the sector running from the mouth of the
6 5 Akwayafeto point G, the practice of the two Parties as regards oil concessionsup to 1990 - in
other words after what may be regarded as the critical date in this maritime dispute which first
aroseatthe end ofthe 1960s - respectedthe boundarylineupto point G.
40.Invokingthe farnousNote ofMarch 1962in support ofits argumenton the long-standing
nature of its oil concessions, Nigeria writes: "In the light of this document and of the maps
annexedto it, itis bafflinghow Carnerooncan describethis areaas the subjectof 'recent'Nigerian >>
concessions." Andrepeating an assertion already madein the previous paragraph of its Rejoinder,
4'~eplyof Cameroon,p428-438,para9.108-110. it adds: "Rather ithas been the subject of a processof licensing,relinquishment; relicensing etc.
overmore than40 years."42
41. On the basis of the maps producedby the "scoutingservices" of the specializedbodies,
in other words the services which collect and sel1petroleum information, Cameroon maintains,
Mr.President, that,notwithstandingthat the present configurationof the limitsof the licences and
concessionsmay be the resultof a succession of grants andre-gants of the blocks or licences,the
overlaps allegedby Nigeria -- if such there are- are veryrecent. Moreover,it was not possible
for Nigeria to grant licences with very precise eastem limit CO-ordinates,contrary to what is
intimated by its written pleadings. Further,a more reflective attitude would naturally have led
Nigeria only to grant blocks in this area whose eastem limits were situated on or within the
boundary betweenthe two countries,as Cameroon has done on its side, pendingthe judgrnent of
your Court. Nigeria's practicein this respect,andthe overlappingto which it has led,can only be
seen as a manifest desire to dispute a boundary delimitedby treaty. And naturally Cameroon
cannotacceptthis.
42. In this connection,the major oil operators seemmuch more cautiousand perhaps also
more concemed to respect the law in this regard than our opponents. So it is not surprising,
Mr.President, to note that the present dispute between the two countries has led the major oil
companies operatingin thearea, such as Shell, Elf,Mobil, toabandon the Nigerianoilfield situated
6 6 in this border area. Today, the only companies present there are small ones, unknown in the
internationalpetroleumworld, newanivals on the scene andforthe most partNigerian in origin-
and with good reason - the sole exception being Addax, which succeeded Ashland and which
maintainssmall-scaleproductionthere.
43. At al1events, Cameroon,for its part, hasrespectedthe Maroua line,the one fixedby the
1975Agreement. In fact, the same could be said of Nigeria until recently. To avoid any
ambiguity, Carneroonwouldliketo statethat the oil"fait accompli"cannotinany way prevailover
a conventionaldelimitationof'maritime boundaries - as is clearly establishedby the positive law
of the sea. What the Chamberof the Court said of the "efectivitié ns"e case conceming the
42~ejoinderfNigeria,pp.436-437,para.10.16. FrontierDispute (BurkinaFaso/Republicof ~ali)~~on the subject ofthe delimitation ofthe land
boundary, and which was amply cited by my colleagues ProfessorsShaw and Mendelson
yesterday,may be transposedto the maritimeboundary: in relationto that boundary,the Montego ï
Bay Convention,inits Articles 74and 83,provides in this connectionthat "delimitation [ ...] shall
1
be effectedby agreement on the basis of internationallaw [ .. .] in order to achieve an equitable
solution". While these provisions in no way preclude delimitation by a competentbody in the
event ofthe failureofthe negotiations,theyneverthelessgivepriorityto delimitationby agreement.
And this is the case of the maritimeboundarydelimited by an agreementbetweenCameroonand
Nigeria upto "point G. The resultsof sucha delimitation cannotbe eroded or called into question
by the practice of oneof the Parties - a practice al1the more questionablein light of its divisive
nature.
44. In effect,Mr. President, Nigeriainvokes a "long-standingactivity and acquiescenceby
both parties'M and takes it upon itself to defend both its own interests and those of the oil
companies,which arealso a matterof concernto Carneroon. In this connection,itwrites:
"As tothe maritimeareas, however,the Parties(and licenseesclaimingthrough
them) have engaged in a long and uninterrupted course of practice over nearly
40years, involving the drilling in the disputed area of over 400 wells each
61 representingatotal of severalbilliondollars of drillingand otherforms of exploitation
anduse of thespaces concemed"(ibid.,p. 424, para.9.14).
45. 1do not know whether, in speaking on behalf of private parties - namely, "licensees
claimingrights through(the Parties)"-Nigeria is seekingto substituteitself forthem by meansof
diplomatic action, which can in any event have no place in these proceedings. At al1events,
Nigeria is here seeking to set opinions and erroneous facts against the rules of conventionaland
customary law. Any purported oil exploration and exploitation licences, wrongfully issued by
Nigeria in the area concemed, cannot conferupon that State any legaltitle in the area, notably on
Cameroon's continental shelf.And your Court cannot allowfacts to override conventionallaw, in
this casethe YaoundéII and MarouaAgreementsof 1975.
43~.~.Reports1986,pp.586-587,para.68.
"~ejoinderofNigeria,p. 425,para.9.15. 46. But Nigeria has flungin everypossible argument imaginable. Doubtless aware of the
weakness of the argument of overlapping oil concessions, it also invokes the lateness of
Cameroon'sclaims. In paragraph 10.17of its Rejoinderit writes:
"If, infact, Cameroonhad entertainedclaims to the extended areas coveredby
Nigeria's deepwater licenses,thetimeto Sayso was inthe 1960sand 1970s,whenthe
groundworkfor so much subsequent developmentwas beinglaid down- and noten
revanche, on 16March 1995,the date ofCameroon'sMemorial. .. It should alsobe
noted that Nigeria was unintermptedly a party to the Optional Clause from
3 September1965, without any relevant reservation." (Rejoinder of Nigeria, p. 437,
para. 10.17.)
47. Mr. President,that is a temporal argument,conveyingthe notion of a time-baron claims.
Cameroon does not consider it necessasr to express a position onthis point, notwithstanding its
doubts as to the existence of' a time-barof this kind with respect to maritime delimitation. In
reality,Nigeria is doing whateverit canto concealthe truth. Butit is betrayedby its owndates: it
was quite simplynot possible,either forthe oil companiesor forthe two StatesPartiestothis case,
to foresee in the 1960sand 1970sthe future boom in the development of deep-seaoil operations.
The state of oiltechnology,which meansthat deep-seaoil explorationcan currentlybe conducted
6 8
offshore,did notpermit this then. It is thus quitewrong to Saythat the groundworkfor subsequent
developmentwas already being laid downat that time. It is the extraordinarypotential ofcurrent
offshore explorationtechniquesthat has attractedthe interest of al1the coastal Statesand led to an
ever-increasingnurnberof disputes; and no one can reproach Cameroonfor defendingits interest
inthe light of thenew perspectivesthusopenedup.
48. Finally,to substantiate the notion that th- ultimatelyquite recent- overlaps of the
Nigerian licences and concessions with Cameroon's oilfieldwere acquiesced in by Cameroon,
Nigeria Statesthat Cameroon's activity remained confined within the "limit of operations'**. It
then produces a series of 41 diagrams on eight sheets inserted betweenpages 460 and 461 of its
Rejoinder.
49. Mr. President, Nigeriais patently confusingthe "limit of operations" with the maritime
boundary. But this confusionis actuallyof littlesignificancebecauseNigeria itself acknowledges
that there is consistent practice in the concessionswhich respects the line. Thus, in this case,
4S~ejoindofNigeria,para.10.17. Nigeria's"oil practice line" and Cameroon's "limit ofoil operations" bothfollowthe courseof the
maritime boundary up to point G and virtuallycoincide with that boundary, as is clear fiom the
.
sketch-map being shown now (slide No. 8) (reference No. 88). The three lines, Nigeria's "oil
practice line", Cameroon's "oil operations" line and, in the middle, the maritime boundary as
4
establishedby the Maroua Agreementof 1975,followthe samecourseand, inreality, coincide.
50.As for the series of diagramsproduced byour opponents, Nigeriaconfirmsthat they are
the productof a compilationassembled froma number of sources. The use of such a method casts
doubt onthe reliability, and hencethe relevance,ofthosediagrams. They have the lookof what a
very revealing English expression terms "self-servingevidence"; al1the more so becauseNigeria
itselfStates that the diagrams generally correspond to the maps published by the Nigerian
authoritiesand because we don't know howthe alleged compilationwas done, while the sources
6 9 cited often vary and do not al1have the same credibility. The detailed maps produced by IHS
Petroconsultants, which is an authority in this field, are nevertheless clear enough in the
presentation of the respective oilfields of Nigeria, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea,the State
intervening in this case. One has only to consider, in particular, the maps of May 1996 and
June-July2001 to appreciatetheunreliabilityof the illustrations producedby Nigeria.Thosemaps
have been annexed andNigeriahas producedthem.
51. Mr. President, the overlap of the line produced by the delimitation agreementswith
concession OPL 230 granted by Nigeria results fiom a later redefinition of the limits of that
concession - as 1have alreadysaid - and as Nigeria itself acknowledges. Itwrites: "It is true
that many concessions currently in force were granted in the last 10 years", evenif, in the
followingpart of the sentence,it seeks to mitigatethe effect of this statementby adding "in most
cases (includingOPL 98 and the westem part of OPL 230) these were re-issues or re-grantsafter
long-established licenseareas had been relinquished or e~changed""~. Moreover, in refemng to
"the westem part of OPL230",Nigeria recognizes a contrario that the "eastem part", which is m
1
claimed to overlap the maritime boundaq with Cameroon, wasonly establishedquite recently. It
followsthat this redefinition,forwhich Nigeriaat no time cites any date or pertinent legaltexts in
46~ejoindeofNigena, p.36,par10.15. its Rejoinder, is of no relevance and can in no way cal1 into question a line established by
agreement. Moreover,the eastemlimit of concessionOPL98 (NNPCIAddax),establishedin 1973
and redefinedin 1998, confirmsthis boundary, sinceit follows the maritime boundarydetermined
by the MarouaAgreement frompoint D to pointG - yet furtherevidenceofNigeria's belief as to
the binding nature ofthat line.
52.In conclusion,Mr. President, MembersoftheCourt, Cameroonwouldrecall:
- thatthe maritime boundaryis determinedin the firstsectorby the London Agreement of1913,
the Yaoundé Agreementof 4 April 1971andthe MarouaAgreementof 1June 1975;
- thatthe "fait accompli" ofthe oil concessionshasno effectonthis conventional delimitation;
7 0 - thatthe oilpracticeof CameroonandNigeriain thearea confirmsthat delimitation.
53. The Republic of Cameroon could, were it opportunistically inclined, havefollowed
Nigeria in challenging the Maroua Agreement, which was concluded at the highest level by the
Heads of State. But Cameroonis a countrywhich remainsfaithfulto its internationalobligations,
even when they are not necessarily favourable to it, al1the more so as it remains convinced,
Mr. President, ofthe legal validityof thatAgreement.
54.This is why 1would askyou, Mr. President, togive the floor, on Mondaynow probably,
to Professor Christian Tomuschat,so that he can demonstratethis to you. Thankyou for your kind
attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thankyou, ProfessorKamto. It is not my intentionto give the floor to
any fürtherspeakersthis moming,and we willresumeoursittingonMondayat 10a.m. The sitting
is thereforenow closed.
TheCourtroseut 1.10 p.m.
Traduction