ÿ on- Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected iranslat ion
CR 96/11 (traduction)'
CR 96/11 (translation)
Vendredi 3 mai 1996 (15 heures)
Friday 3 May 1996 (3 p.Ir..)
'Afin d'accélérer la distri~ution a- la --aL-.zicc aes compte rendus, une
partie des citations d'ouvrages oc clart:rles ae àoctrine est reproduite
àans la langue originale ez sera trâûü:re .~ltPrleurement. -2-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Thehearing is resumed in the
case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention,continuing
this afternoon withthe second round of oralarguments. It is now the
turn of the representativesof Bosnia-Herzegovina tospeak and 1 cal1
upon His ExcellencyMr. Muhamed Sacirbey.
M. SACIRBEY : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président. Lesmembres
de notre équipeet moi-même avons noté que vous avez dit hier que
M. Schwebel était souffrant et nous lui souhaitons tous un prompt
rétablissement. Nous savons qu'il n'a pas été en mesure d'être présent à
l'audience.
Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour, je répondrai brièvement
à certaines des déclarations faites hier.
Je le fais quelque peu à contrecŒur. Ni les conseils ni mci-même
avons l'intentionde répondre du tac au tac aux déclarations dénuées de
tout fondement et provocatrices faites au nom de llEtat défendeur ou de
les réfuter point parpoint.
Il est dans une certaine mesure regrettable que M. PeraziC ait
cherché dans sa déclaration à réitérer des motifs sur lesquels le
défendeur a insisté violemment et furieusement,dans le contexte de cette
affaire, et même ailleurs.
Nous ne chercherocspas à vous imposerun rappel de faits qui
parlent clairement d'eux-mêmes.
D'une manière générale, je suis très inquieten ce qui concerne la
présente affaireet vivement préoccupé au sujet de la sincérité de
l'engagementde llEtat défendeur à l'égard des accords de Dayton/Paris,
si je m'en tiens à l'exposé révélateur de M. PeraziC. Pourquoi llEtat
défendeur continue-t-ilde considérerque la Bosnie-Herzégovinedoit être -3-
dénommée, selon ses propres termes, la aprétendueBosnie-Herzégovine, ?
Pourquoi le défendeurmet-il en question le statutde la Bosnie en tant
9
qulEtat ?
Alors que lereste de la communauté internationale, y compris
l'organisation des NationsUnies, reconnaît la validité et la légitimité
de l'indépendanceet de La qualité dlEtat de la Bosnie-Herzégovine,les
autorités de Belgrade, au nom desquelles s'est exprimé hier M. PeraziC,
ne le font évidemmentpas.
Alors que le restede la communauté internationalereconnaît que la
République socialiste fédérativede Yougoslavie a <cessé d'exister, et
que toutes les anciennes républiques, y compris la Bosnie-Herzégovine,et
la République fédérativede Yougoslavie, sont des successeurs dansdes
conditions d'égalité, Belgrade qualifie avecassurance toutes les autres
républiques dlEtats sécessionnistesou «rebelles»illégaux et prétend
assumer seule leur continuité.
Permettez-moide revenir sur le terme «rebelle». M. PeraziC admet
sans vergogne que la JNA avait livré unebataille contre ceux qu'il avait
qualifiés de <<forcesrebelles», à savoir les dirigeants, reconnus sur le
plan internzcional,de la Bosnie, et partant, son peuple. Il est
intéressantde noter qu'il n'a jamais jugé bon de nous dire quand son
gouvernement a considéré que la Bosnie-Herzégovinene méritait plus
d'être qualifiée dlEtat rebelle.
Bien entendu, cela pourrait êtreassez difficile pourla République
fédérative de Yougoslavie,püisque même après qu'elle eut annoncé son
retrait officiel de Bosnie-Herzégovine,essentiellement les mêmes
soldats, les mêmes officiers, portant lesmêmes uniformes, dotés des
mêmes armes, de la même logistique,de la même structure de commandement
stratégique,du même soutien et défense aériens provenant duterritoire -4-
de la Serbie et Monténégro, recrutés et rémunérés par la République
fédérative de Yougoslavie, ont continué de mener une guerre sans relâche
et sans merci contre cetEtat cebelle» et son peuple.
De fait, compte tenu des éléments de preuve accablants qui existent,
1 0 dont certains d'entre eux ont déjà été évoquésdevant vous, je trouve que
les observations de M. PeraziE constituent un aveuétonnant, provoqué par
l'attitude arrogante dont il a fait preuve.
Permettez-moiaussi d'examiner très brièvement un autre argument
avancé par M. Brownlie, à savoir que les événements en osn nie-Herzégovine
constituaientune guerre civile.
Il est révélateur de noter que ni M. Brownlie, ni un membre
quelconque de l'équipe du défendeur, n'a jugé utile de contester en
aucune façon que les acteshorribles constituantun génocide, et qu'en
fait un génocide, ont effectivement été commisen Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Ils semblent au contraire aussi soutenirque les Musulmansde
Bosnie-Herzégovineavaient provoqué le génocide, qu'ils l'avaientmême
recherché, que la Bosnie est un Etat rebelle et que ce qui s'était passé
en Bosnie était une suerre civile. Outre leur incohérenceévidente et
leur inexactitudeoutrageante, ces déclarationsn'ont aucun rapport avec
la question de la compétence.
Comme on pouvait leprévoir, M. Brownlie a cherché en recourant à
des procédés rhétoriques à nous reprocherde ne pas avoir réfuté ses
sources qui, selon ce qu'il voulait nous faire croire, prouveraient d'une
. manière indiscutable lebien-fondé de son affirmation selonlaquelle le
conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovineétait une guerre civile.
Même si la questionde savoir si le confliten Bosnie-Herzégovine
était une guerre civile doit être tranchée, elle ne peut l'être
normalement qu'à la phase du fond. La Partie adverse pense-t-elle réellement que nous allonsmordre à l'hameçon et nous prêter à sa
stratégie de diversionen considérântcomme sérieux et définitif leur
recueil de déclarationset d'opinions en leur faveur qu'ils ont citées ?
Néanmoins, je suis convaincuque la Cour me pardonnera d'abuser de
son temps en citant les déclarations faites devant le Conseid le sécurité
concernant $a nature et la responsabilitéde la guerre, qui répondent de
manière plus éloquenteaux déclarationsde MM. Brownlie, PeraziE et
Etinski que je ne pourrais le faire dans mon propre exposé.
J'appelle l'attentionde la Cour sur une déclarationdes plus
,'1 claires concernantla participationde la République fédérativede
! I
Yougoslavie auconflit dans mon pays, faite devant leConseil de sécurité
au cours du débat tenu enmai 1992 lorsque des sanctionsont été imposées
pour la première fois 3 l'encontrede le République fédérativede
Yougoslavie,après, soit dit en passant, qu'elle eut déclaré qu'elle ne
aisposait pas de troupes enBosnie-Herzégovine. Selon le procès-verbal,
ce débat a eu lieu le 30 mai 1992. Sir David Hannay, le représentant
permanent du Royaume-Uniet mon anciec ccllègue, a indiqué, comme cela
resscrt clairement de la page 42 de ce procès-ver~al,ce qai suit :
«Cela dit, nul doute n'est possible quant à la question de
savoir qui porte principale men^ la responsabilitédans cette
affaire. Ce scnt les autorités civileset militaires de
Belgrade. C'est une réalité qu'on ne peut esquiver: Il est
inutile de prétendrequ'elles n'ont rien à voir dans les
événements en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Les lanceurs de roquettes
multiples neviennent pas desgranges des paysans serbes. Ils
viennent de l'armée nationale yougoslave. 11s sant armés de
munitions qui proviennentdes stocks de munitions de l'armde.
Ils sont alimentéset payés par cette armée. C'est ae là
qu'ils viennent. ... les autorités deBelgrade ... nous
prennent vraiment pourdes imbéciles.»
Au cours du même débat, M. Budai (Hongrie),a déclaré comme il est
indiqué aux pages 14, 15 et 16 du procès-verbalde cette séance :
«Les-éléments de l'armée nationale yougoslave (JNA) laissés
sur place ne sont pas sous l'autoritédu Gouvernement de Bosnie-Herzégovine;leurs armes n'ont pas été placées sous
surveillanceou contrôle internationaux réels. Les expulsions
forcées de personnes se poursuivent, et les tentatives de
modification de la composition ethnique de la population a'ont
pas été abandonnées.
Nous savons tous très bien qui portel'écrasante
responsabilitéde cette évolution de la crise en
Bosnie-Herzégovine. En dépit des effortsdiplomatiqueset des
initiatives entreprisespar les organisations régionales
européennes et autres, les dirigeantsde Belgrade n'ont pas
modifié leur attitude.»
A la page 31 du même procès-verbal,le représentant de la Belgique,
l'ambassadeurNoterdaeme, s'exprimantégalement au nom de l'Union
européenne, a déclaré :
«Pour la Belgique, la responsabilité de Belgrade dansla
crise bosniaque est en effet écrasante. Cette responsabilité
nous a été suffisamment corroboréepar différentes sources,
notamment par le Secrétariat de notre organisation, pourqu'il
ne soit plus nécessaired'y revenir.»
A la page 27 du même procès-verbal,l'ambassadeurArria (Venezuela)
1 .-
a rappelé que la Bosnie avaitété admise en fait au sein de
l'Organisationdes Nations Unies plusieurs semainesauparavant, et avait
été reconnue en tant qulEtat indépendant,et il a fait la déclaration
suivante :
«La responsabilitédes sanctions qui entreront en vigueur
leur incombeentièrement,étant donné qu'ils n'ont pas répondu
à l'appel du Conseil de sécurité exprimédans la résolution 751
(1992) ni aux appels de la Communauté européenne. Au mépris
total de l'opinion publique internationale,ils ont
considérablementétendu la zone de leurs attaques contrela
Bosnie-Herzégovine à Dubrovnik et à d'autres parties de la
Croatie.
Ce projet de résolution sanctionneet condamne de façon
définitive le comportementd'un Etat qui, en abusant de sa
puissance militaire, foule aux pieds, écrase et viole la
souveraineté d'un Etat Membre de notre organisation,la
Bosnie-Herzégovine. Il ne s'agit pas d'un problème internede
1 'ex-Yougoslavie. » Aux pages 32 et suivantesde ce même procès-verbal,il est indiqué
que l'ambassadeurPerkins des Etats-Unis a déclaré :
«Les Etats-Unis, la Communauté européenne, la Conférence
sur la sécurité et la coopérationen Europe et le Conseil de
sécurité - par les mesures qu'il prend aujourd'hui - envoient
un message clairau régime serbe et aux forces qu'il soutient
en Bosnie-Herzégovineet en Croatie.»
«Par son agression contre la Bosnie-Herzégovineet la
Croatie et par la répression qu'il exerce en Serbie, le régime
serbe ne peut que se condamner lui-même à un traitement de plus
en plus sévère de la part d'un mcnde uni dans son opposition à
1 'agression serbe. »
«Il doit cesser la campagne de terreur qu'il mène contre
les populations civiles de Bosnie-Herzégovineet de Croatie.»
Ces sanctions,comme je l'ai déjà dit, ont été imposées le
30 mai 1992 et levées que trois ans plus tard.
Au cours du même débat, M. Vorontsov, le représentant dela
Fédération àe Russie, a déclaré, comme il est indiqué aux pages 36 et 37
de ce même procès-verbal :
«la Russie fait tout ce qu'elle peQt pour renforcer les liens
traditionnelsd'amitié et de coopératicnavec les peuples
yougoslaves,rétablir 13 paix sur leur terrltoireet garantir
leur liberté et leur indépendance. C'est l'objectifvisé par
les mesures sans prgcédent que nous avons prisesrécemmo ,nt en
ce qui concerne la Serbie, la Croatie et cous les Etats
souvèralnsqui se sont formés sur leterrltoire de l'ancienne
Yougoslavie. »
«Jusqulàpréserit,Belgrade n'a tcutefoispas tenu compte
.i3
des conseilset des mises en garde plus qu'il n'a satisfait aux
exigences de la communauté internationale.D'où les sanctions
qu'elle s'est vu imposer par les NationsUnles. En votant en
faveur de ces sanctions,la Russle s'acquittede ses
obligationsen tant que membr? permanent du Conseil desécurité
au regard du maintien dela paix et de la sécurité
internationales. »
Comme le sait bien la Cour, le Conseil de sécurité a confirmé à
plusieurs reprises les sanctionsimposées contrela République fédérative
de Yougoslavie. Dans scindébat du 17 avril 1993, au cours duquel le
Conseil a renforcé les sanctions antérieures,mon ancien collègue, l'ambassadeur Mérimée, représentant de la France, a déclaré, comme il est
indiqué aux pages 7 et 8 du procès-verbalde la séance tenue à cette
date, ce qui suit :
«Je me félicite donc que notre Conseil réuni ce soir
s'apprête à prendre une décisionsur le projet mis au point par
ma délégation et plusieurs de ses partenaires au Conseil,
projet visant à renforcer les sanctionscontre la République
fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbieet Monténégro) ... Cela
constitue en effet pour la communauté internationalela bonne
réponse ... pour faire face au défi des autorités de Belgrade
et des éléments serbesqu'elles soutiennenten Bosnie d'une
manière manifeste.
Après des mois et des mois de refus par les Serbes de
coopérer avec la communauté internationale,d'atermoiements,de
prises de gages sur le terrain, elle marque, en renforçant les
dispositions de la résolution 757 (1992),llétablissementd'un
isolement économiqueet financier total de la Serbie.
Les autorités de Belgrade doivent être conscientes quela
communauté internationalene faiblirapas.»
Je m'abstiendrai d'abuser encore plus du temps précieuxde la Cour
pour répondre aux autres déclarationsenflammées et dénuées de tout
fondement faites par le représentantde la République fédérative de
Yougoslavie hier et jlespère que vous voudrez bienm'excuser d'avoir
consacré tant de temps à ces citations
Je me àois de faire une dernière observation. L'agent du défendeur
affirme que le document présentéde manière erronée devantla Cour comme
étant un rapport de la commission d'experts des Nations Unies était le
produit d'un «malentexdu»entre son auteur qui refuse d'en porter la
; 4
responsabilitéet M. Sherif Bassiouni. M. Bassiouni a manifestementvu
la situation de manière différente, et dans sa lettre datée du
29 avril 1996, il n'a laissé aucun doutelorsqu'il a affirmé que «le
document avait été distribué d'une manière frauduleuse»;la réponse du -9-
défendeur fait clairementressortir la méthode singulièrequ'il a adoptée
dans cette affaire, ainsi que son attitude au sujet de la responsabilité
du conflit dont il est à l'origine, à savoir, faire retcmber le blâme sur
d'autres et diluer les responsabilités.
De la même manière,M. Etinski a rendu encore plus difficilela
position manifestement insoutenable dd uéfendeur en assimilant un
malentendu à une fraude, et la claire responsabilité des auteurs
concernés à une erreur mutuelle entre l'auteur lui-même et M. Bassiouni.
Dans les mêmes conditions, il a assimilé le génocide à quelques
morts inexpliquées,et la culpabilitéunilatérale à une responsabilité
égale.
Monsieur le Président,en conclusion jlaimeraissaisir cette
occasion pour faire savoir à le Cour qu'hier,conformément à leur
engagement derespecter 1'Etat de droit et leurs obligations
internationales, lesautorités de mon pays ont arrêté deux Musulmans
bosniaques contre lesquels le Tribunal pénal international avait délivré
des actes de mise en accusation il y a environ un mois.
Il est important denoter que M. Cassese, Président du Tribunal
pénal international, a adressé il y a quelques jours seulementau Conseil
de sécurité une demande concernant les mesures à prendre pour répondre à
l'inexécutionpar la République fédérative deYougoslavie de son
obligation d'arrêter et d'extrader les personnes mises enaccusation il y
a presqu'un an. Dans sa lettre au Président du Conseil desécurité
. datée du 24 avril 1996, M. Cassese a cité la transcriptiond'une audience
tenue le 28 mars 1996, dans une affaireconcernant trois Serbes,au cours
de laquelle le procureura déclaré que la République fédérativede
Yougoslavie avait «encouragé,soutenu et continué à rémunérer un criminel de
guerre mis en accusation [Sljivancanin]et de le maintenir dans
1 L; ses fonctionsd'officier supérieur dans 1'armée,et si .. .les
informations sont exactes, il est même aujourd'hui chargé de
former des élèves officiers. Y a-t-il une manière plus
flagrante de montrer leur méconnaissanceet même leur mépris à
l'égard de leurs obligations en tant qu'Etat Membre de
l'organisation des Nations Unies, obligations que laRépublique
fédérative de Yougoslavie a récemment réaffirmées en concluant
les accords de Dayton.»
Ces mots ont été prononcés par le procureur, M. Goldstone. Nous avons et
continueronsd'avoir foi dans la justice et dans l'état de droit. Nous
continuons d'Œuvrer en faveur de la réconciliationet de la paix. Nos
citoyens pensent que notre confianceest solidement établie.
. Enfin, j'aimerais conclure mon exposé en exprimant mes remerciements
à la Cour et à son personnel pour leconcours et l'assistancequ'ils nous
ont accordés au cours de la présentationde notre requête et tout au long
de cette semaine.
J'aimerais maintenant demander à la Cour de bien vouloir appeler à
la barre M. Thomas Franck. Jevous remercie beaucoup
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup de votre exposé et je donne
maintenant la parole à M. Franck
M. FRANCK :Merci Monsieur le Président,Messieurs de la Cour.
1. Je me propose de répondre très brièvementaux arguments de la
Partie adverse au nom de la Bosnie-Herzégovineen traitant des deux
points suivants.
2. Premierement, l'article IX de la convention sur le génocide
confère-t-il à la Cour compéteiice pour connaître desdifférends entre les
Etats parties à la convention ? Lorsqu'un différend a trait à des
prétendues violationsde la convention et à la responsabilitédes Etats à
raison de telles violations, la Cour peut-elle connaître d'un tel - 11 -
différend ? En résumé, il s'agit de la question de la responsabilité des
Etats et de la responsabilité civile.
3. Deuxièmement, la requête de laBosnie-Herzégovineindique-t-elle
objectivementles motifs sur lesquels se fonde la défense, comme le
prescrit l'article IX ? C'est-à-direexiste-t-ildes adifférendsentre
les parties contractantesrelatifs à l'interprétation,l'applicationou
l'exécutionde la présente convention,y compris ceux relatifs à la
responsabilitéd'un Etat en matière de génocide ou de l'un quelconque des
autres actes énumérés à ].'article III» ? Il s'agit de la question de
savoir s il existe un différend juridiquement fondé.
4. Je vais donc traiter tourd'abord de la questionde la
responsabilitédes Etats au regard de la convention. Examinons une fois
de plus si la convention autorisela Cour à dire, sur la base d'éléments
de preuve, qu'il existe une responsabilité des Etats à raison d'une
violation d'obligationsjuridiques. Delon M. Brownlie, la Cour doit
donner une interprétationétroite des cemes essentiels de l'article IX :
ltexpression«responsabilitéd'un Etat ec matière de génocide ou de l'un
quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l'article III» - c'est-à-dire
l'entente, l'incitation directe,la tentative et la complicité. Cette
phrase doit être,de l'avis de la Yougoslavie, interprétée étroitement
par la Cour, car les Etats ne sont responsables, selonM. Brownlie, que
de leur obligationde faire appel à leur droit interne pour «préveniret
punir^l,es actes de génocide, commis par des personnes sur lesquellesils
exercent leurcontrôle» !CR 96/7, p. ..) . En d'autres tel-mes,selon
cette interprétation, l'articleIX ne confère à la Cour qu'une compétence
pour se prononcer sur les différends découlant de l'article 1 do la
convention. Bien entendu, la Bosnie a, à propos de l'article 1, un
différend avec la République fédérative reposant expressément su le fait - 12 -
qu'elle n'a pas prévenu le génocideet n'a pas puni les actes individuels
qu'elle s'est abstenue d'empêcher. J'espère que l'agent adjoint et
moi-même avons déjà établi prima facie le bien-fondé de notre
argumentation à ce sujet à la fois en fait et en droit. Nous avons
demandé instamment à la Cour de tenir compte, à cet égard, des solides
conclusions Ge différentes chambres du Tribunalpénal international pour
l'ex-Yougoslavie. Nous avons aussi prié la Courde tenir compte dufait
4 r-.
! ! que le défendeur ne s est manifestementpas acquitté des obligationsque
lui impose l'article VI et le chapitre VI1 de la Charte des Nations Unies
de remettre pour qu'elles puissent être jugées les personnes dûment mises
en accusation par le Tribunal pénal international. Néanmoins,la Bosnie
n'admet nullement la proposition selonlaquelle la compétence de la Cour
en vertu de l'article IX est limitée aux griefs dirigés contrela
Yougoslavie parce qu'elle s'est abstenue de «prévenir et punir» les
crimes prévus par l'article 1. Cela ne semble pasressortir de toute
interprétation possiblede l'article IX, ni des travaux. Il s'agit d'une
sorte de pavillon de complaisance,fabriqué de toutes pièces parceux qui
l'arborent.
5. Au contraire, l'article IX confère sans ambiguïté à la Cour
compétencepour se prononcer surla responsabilité d'un Etat en matière
de génocide, 1'ententeen vue de commettre legénocide, l'incitation,la
coinplicité,etc. De fait, le défendeur cherche aussi à passer sous
silence l'zrticle III que l'article IX rend expressément applicable au
comportementdes Etats, ainsi que des particuliers. Rien dansle libellé
de l'article IX ni dans les travauxne permet d'écarter une telle
compétence. Au contraire, l'article IX fait que l'article III est
expressément applicable parla Cour pour déterminer la responsabilité
d'un Etat partie. - 13 -
6. L'interprétationdu défendeur tend à remplacer cette suppression
radicale d'une partie de la conventionpar l'adjonction de deux phrases
entièrementnouvelles. Je viens de citer l'une d'entre elles : le fait
de ne pas prévenir legériocide«commis par des personnes sur lesquelles
ils exercent leurcontrôle». Cette limitationde responsabilité
n'apparaît nulle part dans le texte de la convention. En introduisant
une telle limitation, leconseil cherche à faire en sorte que la Cour
réduise laportée de l'obligationimposée par la convention auxEtats de
prévenir et de punir de tels actes en limitant cette obligation aux
«personnes sur lesquelles ilsexercent leur contrôle% (CR 96/7, p. ..).
Le défendeur cherche ainsi à éluder la responsabilité,ou à instituer une
respocsabiiitédu fait d'autrui, à l'égard des personnes qui ont incité,
aidé, et dirigé sans nécessairemectcontrôler de tels actes, bien que
leur comportement illicite aurait pu être empêché parles autoritésde
'1i, Belgrade. A la phase du fond, nous démontrerons quele Gouvernement
yougoslave était coupable à chacun de ces titres et que la responsabilité
de 1'Etat slattachzitun tel comportement.
7. Pour paraphraserce qu'avalt dit un juge à la Cour suprême des
Etats-Unis,une personne qui met lefeu à un théâtre bondé est
responsabledes dommages occasionnés parla panique qui en a résulté,
qu'il ait ou non «exercé un contrôle» sur les personnes qui s'enfuyaient.
Le conseil a ajouté une autre mlse en garde à l'article 1 :la seule
obligation de 1'Etat au regard de la convention est de prévenir et de
punir les individus auteursdes actes incriminés «se trouvant sur le
territoire de llEtat>> (ibid.). Cette invention s'expliquepar la
déclaration dénuée de tout fondement selon laquelle les «principesde la
responsabilité des Etatsexigent une capacitéd'exercer un contrôle dans
la région concernée». 11 n'existe pas le moindre élément, si l'on s'en - 14 -
tient au texte et non aux travaux,permettant d'étayer l'introduction
d'une telle limitation de territorialité à l'égard de l'obligationde
prévenir le génocideou d'en punir les auteurs. La pratique constante
des tribunaux, depuis l'affaire de la Fonderie de Trail jusqu'à celle du
Nicaragua, a été de reconnaître la responsabilité des Etats à raison des
actes illicitescommis, ou dont les principaux effetss'étendent,en
dehors des régionssur lesquelles ils exercent un contrôle légal ou même
matériel. Toutefois, M. Brownlie aurait voulu nous faire croireque «la
convention sur le génocide ne peut s'appliquerque lorsque llEtat
concerné exerce une compétence territoriale dansles régions où les
violations de la convention se seraient produites, (plaidoirie du 2 mai,
p. 10, version préliminaire). En tout état de cause. les forces de la
Yougoslavie exerçaientleur contrôle sur de vastes régions do la Bosnie
où se sont produits les actes de génocide. Et nous démontreronscela à
la phase du fond.
8. Les efforts de la République fédérativede Yougoslavie de réduirt
la responsabilité desEtats à une version amputée-de l'article 1, en
supprimant discrètementles articles II, 111 et IV, ne peuvent être
serieux, étant donné le pouvoir spécifique conféré à la Cour par
l'article IX d'exercer une compétence beaucoup plus étendue à l'égard des
1;1:
violations de la responsabilitédes Etats. On nous a reproché de nous en
tenir uniquement aux termes strictsde la convention,et aux travaux
clairs consacrés à l'article IX, et on nous a dit de passer plus de temps
à la bibliothèque. M. Brownlie critique enparticulier la Bosniecar
nous n'avons pas commenté toutes les sources qu'il a citées pour étayer
ses améliorations remarquables dutexte de la convention. Une plus
grande diligence, déclare-t-il,nous aurait conduits à nous rendre compte
que la responsabilité desEtats au regardde l'article IX est limitée à une petite catégorie d'actes illicites : lorsqu'un Etat s'est abstenu
d'exercer sa juridictionpénale interne pour mettrefin aux infractions
commises sur son propre territoire parses propres nationaux. Ces
interprétationsdémontrent, insiste-t-il,que les dispositions de la
convention «n'engagentpas à la responsabilitéd'une partie contractante
en tant que telle à raison d'actes de génocide, mais .saresponsabilité
pour ne pas avoirprévenu ou puni les actes de génocide commis pardes
particuliers sur son territoire oupar des particuliers relevant d'elle à
tout autre titre» (CR 96/7, p. ..). 11 nous accuse de ne pas avoir
montré beaucoupd'ardeur dans nos recherches doctrinales, alors que nous
pensons être seulement coupablesd'un excès de charité.
9. Il nous reprochede ne pas avoir lu l'ouvrage de l'éminent auteur
~ehemia Robinson. Nous avons bien lu M. Robinson. Voici cequ'il disait
dans son étude de 1960 :
«L'obligationdes parties de soumettre des différends à la
Cour internationalede Justice a une portée assez large : elle
comprend non seulement l'interprétationdes dispositionsde la
convention,mais égalementson application (notamment dans des
affaires où sa non-applicationest invoquée) et
llaccomplissementdes obligations imposées par la convention.
Ces dernières comprendraientl'obligationde prendre les
mesures législatives nécessaires (article V) , d'extrader les
coupables (article\'II),et de poursuivre lesauteurs d'actes
punissables en vertu de la convention (articleVI). En outre,
de tels différends peuvent porter sur la responsabilité d'un
Etat à raison d'actes de génoclde ou de tour autre acte
punissable ... Comme cela a été dit à maintes reprises, le
génocide ne pourrait que très rarement êtrecommis si 1'Etat
n'y participait pas ou ne le toléraitpas; si la convention ne
devait pas prévoir de mesures contrede tels actes, elle ne
pourrait accomplir sonbut. r (N. Robinson, The Genocide
2 8 Convention, p. 101 (1960) ; les italiques sontde nous.)
Dans son ouvrage, M. Robinson relatece que la Bosnieelle-même a dit en
détail dans son mémoire du 15 avril 1995, en faisant observer que
certains Etats étaientopposés à la reconnaissancede la responsabilité
civile des Etats dans les violations de la convention, mais indique que - 16 -
les partisans de ce nouveaumotif d'action ont insisté et l'ont
finalement emporté. Leur insistance a été motivée par les raisons qui
ont été si clairement énoncéespar sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. Je ne citerai
que la dernière phrase deson brillant raisonnement que j'ai exposé en
entier dans ma première plaidoirie :
«la disposition tendant à soumettre les actes de génocide à la
Cour in'ternationald ee Justice, et ... l'inclusionde l'idée de
la responsabilité internationale desEtats et des
gouvernements,était nécessaire pour établirune convention
efficace sur le génocide».
10. Cette idée avaitdes adversaires,mais ceux-ci ne l'ont pas
emporté.
En outre, l'oppositionvenait en grande partie des Etatsqui
voulaient créer immédiatement un tribunal pénal, doté d'une compétence
sur les régimes qui avaient commisde tels crimes. La France était au
début l'un des Etats qui y étaient le plusfavorable. Commevous le
savez, le compromis consistait à créer à la fois une obligation juridique
de la part des Etats d'engager des poursuites pénales contre des
particuliers devantleurs tribunaux internes(convention,art. IV), et
également d'établir une responsabilitécivile invocable par desEtats
contre d'autres Etats devant la Cour internationalede Justice (documents
officiels de 1'Assembléegénérale, Sixième Commission, comptesrendus
analytiques, 21 septembre - 10 décembre 1918; ibid.,p. 339).
11. Compte tenu de la clarté manifestedu texte et de l'intention
évidente manifestéeexprimée par les parties au cours destravaux, est-il
vraiment utile d'abuser encore du temps de la Cour en continuant à
. analyser ces documents ? Permettez-moide dire à la Cour qu'aucune des
sources citées, quelque soit leur importance,ne confirme en rien la
proposition selon laquellel'article IX ne confère aucune compétence à la
Cour sauf dans le cas où un Etat s'abstient de prévenir de tels crimes ou
r\1
L 1
de poursuivre ses propres nationauxqui en sont responsables. Et cela - 17 -
constitue, et uniquement cela, la proposition pour laquelle ilsont cité
ces documents.
12. M. Maniay Hudson, pour citer un autre exemple d'un auteur
faisant autorité apprécié par laCour, dans son analyse annuelledes
travaux de la Cour internationale deJustice, reconnaît simplementcomme
nous tous qqe l'article LX prévoit unevoie d'actionpénale contre les
Etats. Toutefois, il n'exclut pas expressémentqu'un différend
concernant la responsabi:lité des Etats peut êtreun différend quant à
l'applicationde la convention». 11 a estimé qu'un tel différend serait
plus susceptible d'être régi «par le droit internationalgénéraln
(M. Hudson, «The Twenty-NinthYear of the World Courts, 45 Am. J. Int. L.
33-34 (1951)). Un tel droit internationalgénéral comprendrait
aujourd'huicertainement toutesles obiigationsspécifiques des Etats
énoncées aux articles 1 à VI1 de la convention sur legénocide.
13. M. Marcel Sibert:,dans son étuae de 1951, regrette que la
convention sur le génocide n'institue pas uridroit d'intenter une action
civile, mais reste silencieusesur cette question. Il constate que cela
va à l'encontrede
«toute la jurisprudencedes ~ribunaux internationauxqui,
depuis d6jà longtemps,consacrent la responsabilitéde la
collectivït~étatique pour des actes de ses gouvernants oude
ses agents quand ils méconnaissentle droit des gens ...>>
(M. Sibert, Le Droir de palx, 446, 1351).
Que pouvons-nousdire de celasinon que M. Sibert était enavance sur son
temps, trop ambitieux en matière de droits de l'homme, ou peut-être trop
pessiniste au sujet de la manière dontla convention seraitappliquée
dans la pratique. Il ressort clairement deson texte que s'il était
membre de la Cour, il serait certainement favorable à une reconnaissance
de sa compétencedans cette affaire, compte tenu de ce qu'il considère comme la pratique constante des tribunaux internationau x l'égard de la
responsabilité desEtats à raison des violations des droits de l'homme.
14. M. Malcolm Shaw, dont le défendeur a si chaleureusementfait
2 2 1 éloge, n1adopte absolument aucune position contraire à 1'interprétation
de la Bosnie-Herzégovineen matière de responsabilitédes Etats en vertu
de l'article IX. Il fait remarquerdans son analyse de l'historiquede
1'articleIX que
«la disposition concernant la question de la compétenc àe
l'égard de la responsabilité desEtats en matière de génocide
présente un intérêt particulier. Elle slinscrivaitdans le
cadre d'une tentative pour donnerplus d'efficacité à la
convention.» (M. Shaw, «Genocide in InternationalLaww, in
International Law at a Time of Perplexity, Y. Dinstein, ed.,
p. 818.)
15. Je persiste à penser que bien que leurcitation constitue un
exercice d'un grand intérêtsur le plan scolastique,ces sources ne
présentent pratiquement aucune utilitépour la Cour. Certainesd'entre
elles sont ambiguës. D'autres ont été citées de manière erronée. Mais
aucune ne contredit le sens clair de l'article IX. Il est certain
qu'aucune de ces sources ne modifient le texte ou les travaux de
l'article IX. Au sujet de cette disposition,le représentantdes
Etats-Unis à la Sixième Commissiona déclaré en 1948 ce qui suit :
«la responsabilitéd'un Etat est utilisée dans lesens
traditionnel de la responsabilitéenvers un autre Etat pour des
dommages subispar des ressortissantsde 1'Etat auteur de la
plainte en violation des principesde droit international»
«l'exécutionse rapporte aux différends dans lesquels les
intérêts des nationaux de 1'Etat auteur de la plainte sont en
jeu» (11 Whiteman, Digest of International Law (US), p. 856).
Cette interprétation officielled'une partie qui a joué un rôle important
dans la rédaction de la convention, sera, je l'espère, considérée comme
utile et intéressantepour faciliter son interprétation. 16. On peut également citer l'avis exprimé par M. Pescatore,
représentant le Luxembourg à la Sixième Commissionde l'Assemblée
générale au cours des débats consacrésen 1948 à l'article IX. 11 a
également présenté la propositionde manière correcte. Il a dit ceci :
«certains représentantsont déclaré que la notion de
responsabilité ... etait encore impréciseet qu'on ignorait qui
pourrait faire valoir des droits à réparation à la süite
d'un ... génocide ... Cette responsabilitéexistera chaque
fois que le génocide aura été commis par un Etat sur le
territoire d'un autre Etat. Dans ce cas, llEtat qui aura subi
des dommages aura uri droit à réparation. L'amendement commun
de la Belgique et du Royaume-Uni (qui est devenu l'article IX)
-;5 [a-t-ildbclaré] dcnne la possibilité à la Cour internationale
de Justice de décider s'il y a lieu ou non d'accorder des
dommages-intérêtset ce sera au demandeur de prouver le dommage
scbi .»
C'est cette opinion qui a motivé les auteurs de l'article IX et qui l'a
emporté 2 la Sixigme Commission (A/C 6/SR103, p. 14-15).
18. Monsieur le Président, je viens de vous citer des
interprétations convaincantesdes auteurs, les Etats qui ont façonné cet
ensemble remarquable de dispositions juridiques. Dans la plupart des
cas, les auteurs cités par mon éminent collèguene traitent simplement
pas de ia question sounise à la Cour. Cette question estde savoir si la
Bosnie peut intenterune action civile cnntre la République fédérative de
Yougoslavie envertu de l'article IX à raison des violations décrites
dans notre mémoire et dans nos plaldolrles. Dans d'autres cas, les
auteurs cités sont particulièrement mal interprétés. M. Kunz, qui est
cité si lar~ement par M. Brownlie (CR 96/7, p. ..) dit une chose
pertinente, qui, toutefois, n'a pas été mentionnée dans les parties
citées. Il déclare :
«L'article IX vise expressément lesdifférends concernant
la responsabilité d'un Etat en matière de génocide ... seuls
les Etats sont, selon les conditions générales de la
responsabilité des Etats, responsables sur le plan
international.. .» (J. Kunz, «Editorial»,43 Am. J. Intl. L.
746. ) - 20 -
Même l'étudiant anonyme de Yale fait sj.mplement observer que les
juridictions internesde chaque Etat sont limitées par leur compétence
territoriale dansl'applicationdes voies d'action pénales prévuespar la
convention,mais ne dit absolument rienau sujet de la limite
territoriale de la responsabilité desEtats dans les actions civilesau
titre de l'article IX.
18. Toutes les sources en conviennent : le texte de l'article IX,
les travaux, y compris ceux citéspar le défendeur, et singulièrementla
plupart des éminents jurisconsultesmentionnés devant nous par le
défendeur. Elles reconnaissentque l'article IX constitue une innovation
remarquable et importante,conférant à la Cour une compétence illimitée à
2 4 l'égard de tout différend découlantde toute disposition de la convention
et, en particulier, en ce qui concerne la responsabilitédes Etats en
matière de génocide, pour tous lesactes qui s'y rapportent mentionnés à
l'article III. Il n'y a tout simplement aucunmalentendu possible.
19. Le second point que je vais maintenant aborderest la question
soulevée par M. Brownlie de savoir si le demandeir a fait état d'un
«différend»au sens de l'article IX. Dans sa seconde plaidoirie, il fait
valoir que le demandeur
«se réfère à de prétendus types de responsabilitéqui ne
relèvent pas des dispositionsde la convention et qui ne
peuvent donc mettreen cause des différends entrant dans le
cadre des dispositionsde l'article IX» (Brownlie, 2'tour de
plaidoiries, 2 mai, p. ...; transcription non officielle) .
20. Malheureusement,la République fédérativede Yougoslavie ne nous
a pas donné la moindre indication sur le critère que devraia tppliquer,
selon elle, la Cour, pour déterminer si un «différend»existe. Elle n'a
fait simplement que répétermaintes et maintes fois, que la Yougoslavie
n'ayant pas violé un droit quelconque protégé par laconvention,on peut
dire qu'il n'existe aucun différend. La République fédérative de - 21 -
Yougoslavie demande à la Cour d'admettre sa thèse consistant à dire que
ses actes concernant laBosnie ne violent pas la convention. Il s'ensuit
qu'il ne peut y avoir de différend. Et comme il n'y a pas de différend,
la Cour ne peut examiner à la phase du fond si les actes du défendeur
violent la convention.
21. Or, Monsieur le Président, je ne suis pas un-cartésien de
formation,mais je peux me rendre comptequ'il y a quelque chose d'erroné
dans cet argument. En effet, il existe bien un critère juridiquepour
déterminer l'existenced'un différend,mais comme le défendeurne l'a pas
indiqué lui-même,nous al.lonsnous-mêmes le faire. Il existe un critère
raisonnable élaboré par l,aCour elle-même. Dans l'affairede
1' Interprétation des trai. tés de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie
et la Roumanie, première phase, la Cour a déclaré qu'«il s'est donc
produit une situation dans laquelleles points de vue des deux parties,
quant à l'exécutionou à la non-exécutionde certaines obligations
découlant des traités, sont nettemen: opposés» et donc que «des
différends internationauxse sont produits» (C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 74)
'\-
./2 Cette opinion était réaffirméepar la Cour en 1988 dans son avis
consultatif concernant1' Ap-~licabit li de 1 'obligation d'arbitrage en
vertu de la section 21 de l'accord dc 26 juin 1947 relatif au siège de
l'organisation des Nations Unies. Dans cette affaire, la Cour a fait
observer que c'est l'affirmationen droit d'une revendication qui fait
qu'un différend existe mais non la preuve du bien-fondé des assertions de
. l'une ou l'autre partie concernant cetterevendication
(C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 19-22). Comme la Cour l'a déclaré dans les
affaires du Sud-Ouest africain en 1962, pour démontrer l'existenced'un
différend, il suffit de prouver «que la réclamation de l'une des parties
se heurte à l'oppositionmanifeste de l'autre» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, - 22 -
p. 328). Un différend existe lorsqu'uneallégation concernant une
peut étayer d'une manière
violation, si elle est prouvée en fait,
plausible cette allégation en droit, et si les parties sont manifestement
opposées au sujet de la question en cause.
22. C'est l'élément de contradictionmutuelle entre les parties, non
le bien-fondé ou non des assertions, qui constitue uridifférend. En
1995, dans l'affaire du Timor orientai, l'Australie,tout comme la
Yougoslavie en l'espèce, a dans une de ses exceptionsdit qu'il n'existe
pas véritablement de différend entreelle-même et le Portugal» (Timor
oriental, C.1.J. Recueil 1995, p. 99). La Cour a rejeté cet argument en
considérantqu'«à tort ou à raison, le Portugal a formulé des griefs en
fait et en droit à l'encontrede l'Australieet celle-ci les a rejetés.
Du fait de ce rejet, il existe un différend d'ordre juridique.» (Ibid.,
p. 100; les italiques sontde nous.)
23. Bien entendu, la convention sur le génocide donne une idée
claire des questions au sujet desquelles les Parties ont des positions
contradictoiresau regard de l'article IX. Elles doivent porter surla
question de savoirsi la République fédérative de Yougoslavie a commis un
génocide, si les Bosniapes ont été victimes de ce génocide, si la
République fédérativeet les élémentsserbes de Bosnie s'étaient entendus
pour commettre le génocide, si les autoritésde Belgrade et d'autres
Serbes avaienc incité directementet publiquement à commettre le
L16 génocide, et s il existait une complicité dans le génocide commis en
Bosnie. Les Partiessont absolumenten désaccord sur tous ces points.
Et elles ont des positions contradictoires au sujet de la question de
savoir si la République fédérativede Yougoslavie s'est acquittée de son
obligation de préveniret de punir les actesde génocide. Quels que
soient les éléments que les plaidoiriesde cette semaine ont permisde - 23 -
démontrer, elles ont certainement permisd'établir que les Parties
étaient absolument en désaccord sur tout. Les questions qui les opposent
totalement portent précisémentsur des points de droit et de fait sur
lesquels la Cour est compétente en vertu de l'article IX. Ergo, il
existe donc un différend au sensde cette disposition.
24. La Bosnie sou~ient donc, en droit, qu'il existe un différend
entre les Parties, que le différend concerne cettepartie du droit en
matière de responsabilitédes Etats qui est développée aux articles 1,
II, III et IV de la convention sur le génocide, et que l'article IX
confère à la Cour une compétence absolueet indiscutablepour connaître
du différend ainsi que de le régler comme il convient. Bien entendu,
cette décision doit être adoptée à la phase du fond et non, comme le
voudrai: le défendeur, à cette phase préliminaire.
25. Monsieur le Président, avant de vous prier de bien vouloir
donner la parole à mon collègue Alain Pellet, puis-je me permettre de
faire quelqiiesobservaticsns personnelles. K. Srownlie, dans sa seconde
plaidoirie, hier, a deciaré «ec outre, M. Franck a conclu en disant :
«bien entendu, il existait une perre clvile en Bosnie-Herzégovine»
(p. .. de la plaidoirie, 2 mai 1996; trânscriptlonnon officielle). Si
nous examinons la page .. du compte renàu non corrigé du le' mai 1996
(CR/96/9),vous constaterezqu'Sn fait j'avais dit que «Bien entendu, il
existait une guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine.» Nous travailions tous dans
des conditions difficiles,certes, et je sais que M. Brownlie ne voudrait
pas que le compte rendu induise en erreur ceux qui auraientpeut-être
l'occasion de lire les mots sans doute trop faibles mais fermement
:.,r
/ ressentis que nous avonsprononcés ici
26. Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, je vous remercie de
votre aimable courtoisieet de toute l'attention que vous m'avez - 24 -
accordée. Je sais que nousvous avons placés dans une situation presque
insoutenable en présentant nos différentes demandeset je vous suis
profondément reconnaissant debien vouloir prendre en comptel'extrême
urgence que nous attachons à cette affaire.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup, Monsieur Franck, de votre
1
exposé. J'appelle maintenant à la barre M. Alain Pellet.
Professor PELLET: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Mr. President, Members of the Court,
1. It falls to me to reply to a number of points raised yesterdayby
Yugoslavia, mainly in the statements of Professor Brownlie and
Mr. Etinski.
1 shall deal with the following six questions in turn:
(1) what is the nature of the conflict which has ravaged
Bosnia-Herzegovina; above al1 how relevant is this question, to which Our
adversaries attach so much importance in these proceedings?
(2) what impact does the erga omnes and peremptory characterof the
norms contained in the 1948 Convention have on the dispute between the
Parties?
(3) does Bosnia-Herzegovinahave the right to invoke bases for the
jurisdiction of the Court other than Article IX of the 1948 Convention,
and if so, what effect could this haveon the consideration of the
Bosnian claims with regard to:
(4) the letter £rom Presidents Milosevie and Bulatovié dated
(5)Article 11 of the 1919 saint-~ermainTreaty; and - 25 -
(6) forum prorogatum (althoughlet it be said here and now that in
its arguments yesterday afternoonYugoslavia presentedthe theses of
Bosnia-Herzegovina in an unduly selective light)?
Mr. President, this will take me beyond a reasonable coffee-break,
so please do not hesitate to interruptme after any one of these points.
The first polnt is the nature of the conflict.
1. The nature of the conflict
2. Mr. President, iritheir oral arguments,our adversaries made much
of one issue which, 1 must Say, from this side of the bar appears to
present no legal interest in relation to this case, and certainly
presents not the slightest interest with regard to questions of
jurisdiction and admissibility. The point is whether the conflict which
has ravaged Sosnia-Herzegcvinawas an interna1 or an international war.
Mr. Mitii:touched or1this issiieon Monday morning (cf. CR 96/5,
pp. 35-36) ; Professor Brownlie del7otedhis entire statement on Monday to
it (CR 96/6, pp. 33-51), and returned to it at length yesterday afternoon
(CR 96/10, pp. ..... ), denouncing the "inarticulate"and "very eccentric"
nature of the replies made by Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mr. President, 1 am
sorry to disappointmy eminent adversar).once again and to be, in his
eyes, quitc as uinarticuLate"and "eccentric" as my colleague and friend
. .
-'y Professor Thomas Franck, to whom 1 believe those remarks were directed
3. Once again, if we did not follow Mr. Brownlie on the path he so
incautiously followed, i.tis because this path does not lead to the
discovery of a new world, as Thomas Franck wittily phrased it, but
unfortunately and more mundanely to an impasse! Baldly put, in the view
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the question has no legal importance. 1 even have some scruples, 1 must admit, in going back over this
point, so obvious does it appear to us. It arises firstlyand primarily
from the clear, unambiguous termsof Article 1 of the 1948 Convention
itself:
"The Contracting Parties confirm thatgenocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
internationallaw which they undertake to prevent and to
punish. "
A fortiori, it is quite clear that this applies whether genocideis
committed in the context of or in connectionwith an armed interna1 or
international conflict. This was also clearly stated by the Appeals
Chamber of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
in its decision of 2 October 1995, a decision which ProfessorBrownlie
makes much of, 1 would add. Referring to "conventionsconcerning
genocide and apartheid", the Appeals Chambzr stated:
"both . . . prohibit particular types of crimes against
humanity regardlessof any connectionto armed conflict" (case
no. IT-94-1-AR72,para. 140, p. 73; see also para. 45 of the
Secretary-GenerallsReport drawn up in pursuance of parayraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1493)presenting the draft
Statute of the ICTY, document S/25704).
4. Lt is true that, in its intervention yesterdayafternoon, Our
adversary appearsto have realizedthat the ship he thought he had
boarded had run aground beforeit had so much as left port. So, up with
a fresh sail: Ilthemain point is not whether ornot there was a civil war
as such, but that the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia was nota party to
the armed conflict" (CR 96/10, p...). 1 fear that thiswill not be
enough to get his ship under way.
Mr. President, 1 have three comments on this point, if 1 may.
5. Firstly, this in no way, but in no way, corresponds to the
presentation made by the Respondentlssame counsel last Monday
(CR 96/6, pp. 33-34 and 38-42), nor does it correspond to what ~ugoslavia - 27 -
claimed in its first preliminaryobjection - presented in its written
pleadings of June 1995 in the followingterms: "The existence of a civil
war at the material time renders the Applicationinadmissible.''
(Preliminary Objections,p. 91; see also p. 141.)
6. Secondly, my colleague'sassertions are belied by even the most
superficial observation c,fthe facts and by even the most cursory reading
of the available documentation. In particular, theyare belied by the
many, specific, consistent facts, as illustrated bythe eloquent
quotation made by counsel for Bosnia at these hearings, and particularly
by my colleaguesand friends, Phon van den Biesen and ThomasFranck, in
their statementson Wednesday. 1 am surprised that Professor Brownlie
did not hear them. In any event, so that my adversary need not "depart
on new journeysof discovery without having heard the responseI1 regarding
the evidence (CR 96/10, p...), may 1 point out that he will find any
number of useful referencesand quotationsin the verbatim records for
Wednesday, CR 96/8, pp. 42-48, and CR 96/9, pp. 58-60. There are a host
of others. To Save time, 1 shall give referencesto only a few examples,
, /.
which the membersof the Court mal7peruse at leisure:
- for examplr, the position taker,by Mr. Mazouiecki, in his sixth
periodic report (E/CN.4/1994/110,21 February 1994,para. 154, p. 26);
- the position of the Commissionon Human Rights, which has frequently
condemned the repeated interventiono sf the Serbo-Montenegrin
authorities and their support forthe atrocities committed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina(see footnote to resolutions 1993/7 of
23 February 1993 and 1994/75 of 9 March 1994);
- the position of Human Rights Committee which, acting on the basis of
specific, consistent information,has strongly condemned the
Government ofthe Federal Republic ofYugoslavia for the same actions - 28 -
perpetrated both in osn nia-~er ane~inoCroanaia, and which has
deplored the refusa1 of this country to accept responsibility for
these acts (28 December 1992, CCPR/C/79/~dd.l6,para. 7, p. 3; see
also footnote, 20 Ncvember 1992, A/C.3/47/CRP.l,para. 24) ;
- 1 was also thinking of similar vigorous condemnationsof Yugoslavia
(Serbiaand Montenegro) by the Security Council and the General
Assembiy (CR 96/8, pp. 42-48 and CR 96/9, pp. 58-60);
- or, of course, there come to mind several decisions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia which has
highlighted - not only in the TadiC case, but also in the NikoliC and
"SrebrenicaNcases - the genocidal acts of the JNA on the territory of
Bosriia-Herzegovina (for example, decision of Trial Chamber 1 of
20 October 1995 in theNikoliC case, IT-9462-R61,para. 30, p. 19; see
also para. 28, p. 16 and Judge Riad's review of the indictment in the
"Srebrenica",KaradZiS and MladiS case, dated 16 November 1995,
IT-95-18-1, Po. 4-5).
Mr. President, 1 do not think it necessary +O carry on any further.
Professor Brownlie ought, 1 believe, to be satisfied. Al1 this - and the
list could be considerably longer - richly establishesthe involvementof
the authorities of the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia,not only in the
armed conflict taking place on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina,but
also - and this is particularly relevant in this case - in the acts of
genocide comïnittedon the same territory.
7. Mr. Preoident, this being so, 1 come to my third comment, which
will be very brief. Paradoxically,despite what our adversaries Say -
paradoxically,as 1 truly believe that theythemselves cannot make it add
up - al1 this has no real relevance at this stage of the proceedings.
Yugoslavia claims, wrongly, not to be involved in the atrocities - 29 -
committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovins aays otherwise,
rightly 1 believe. As Thomas Franck said a short time ago, this is what
constitutes the dispute. It will be for the Court todecide when it
hears the caseon the merits.
, II. The erga omnes character of the provisions
of the 1948 Convention
8. Mr. President, in his statementyesterday, Professor Brownlie
also spoke briefly about the erg2 ames character of the breach of
internationallaw constitutedby the crinieof genocide ("Genocideas an
Offence Erga Omnes") (CR 96/10, pp. 12-13). Even though here again, for
reasons to which 1 shall refer very briefly, the point is somewhat
marginal in relation to the issues at stake in these proceedings, i.e.,
..- the jurisdictionof the Court ana the admissibilityof the Application,
-i
r!~5 it seernsuseful CO revert to them brieiiy.
If Our adversary is to be ~elieved.Bosnia-Herzegovina'sposition
that the prohibition of genocide 1s a peremptory norm of general
international law, and consequentlythaz an' State party Lo the Genocide
Conve~tionis entitled to refer to the Coiirtvi~lations of the Convention
by any other party, wherever cornnitteci= ,ornesup against two substantial
obstacles:
"In the firstplace, it confuses the issueof locus standi
with the differentquestion of the territorialapplication of
the Convention and of its appllcabllityin general.
Seco~diy, the invocationof peremptory norms does not
absolve the Court, which is a court of law, from a normal
determination of its competence and of the justiciabilityof
the issuespresented in the Application." (CR 96/10, p. 12.)
9. Mr. President, 1 would like to take the second pointfirst, if 1
rnay. - 30 -
To prove his point, eminent counsel for Yugoslavia relieson the
Court's Judgrnentof 30 June 1995 in the East Timor case, in which you
considered that"the erga omnes characterof a nom and the rule of
consent to jurisdictionare two differentthings" (I.C.J. Reports 1995,
p. 102). Members of the Court, it would il1 become me to question this
decision; moreover thisis not the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina,which
has never claimed that the Court hasjurisdictionbecause the prohibition
of genocide, like the principle of the right of peoples to
self-determination,constitutes "one of the essentialprinciples of
contemporary internationallaw" (ibid.). It is moreover for this reason
that 1 said in beginning my review of this question that it was somewhat
marginal in relation to the subject-matterof this phase of the
-î4
proceedings.
10. However, even if the peremptory and erga omnes characterof the
principle -a aharacter which Yugoslaviadoes not dare to deny - does not
confer jurisdictionon the Court in this case, it is nonetheless
important to our evaluation of the extent and scope of the Court's
jurisdiction. This leads me to the first of the "substantialobstaclesu
mentioned by Professor Brownlie yesterday afternoon.
No, Mr. President, Bosnia-Herzegovina does not confuse the issueof
locus standi with the different questionof the applicabilityof the
Convention, particularlyits territorial application! We merely contend
that, since the two States are bound by the Convention - and my
distinguished cclleague ProfessorBrigitte Sternwill shortly show, as my
other distinguished colleague Professor Thomas Franck has just shown,
that the two Parties were indeed boundby the Convention - if therefore
two States are bound by the Convention, and one Stateaccuses the other
of having committed acts of genocide, that State may refer the matter to - 31 -
the Court onthe basis of Article IX, without having to showthat it has
sustained a direct, persona1 injury arising from such acts of genocide.
As the Court very c1earl.ystated in theBarcelona Traction case, with
express referencemoreover to the outlawingof genocide, "in view of the
importanceof rights involved,al1 States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection" (Judgmentof 5 February 197C,
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32). In other words, France might have seised
the Court, Chad might have done so, Portugal might have done so as well,
al1 of them without having toconcern themselves with showing that their
nationals or their territorywere affected, on the sole ground that
Article IX creates a jurisdictional link between Yugoslavia and each one
i,L of them (see for exampie, Joe Verhoeven, "Le crime de génocide,
-rV
originalitéet ambiguitél1[The Crime of Genocide: Criginality and
Ambiguity], RBDI 1991, p. 14)
Of course, in the specific case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,the issue
does not arise. Bosnia-Herzegoïina was martyrized verydirectly in the
persons of thousands,hundreds of thousands of its nationals, who were
the victirnson its territor17 of genociae commicted by an6 abetted'by
Yugoslavia.
Nonetheless the erga omnes character of the obligationsunder the
Convention of the States which are partles to the Conventionand Parties
to the present dispute, is of real Importance. The consequencesare
inter aiia:
(1) that the Applicant State may search out the Respondent's
responsibilityfor acts of genocide it has committed both inthe
territory of third States - I am thlnking of course of Croatia - and
in Yugoslavia itself; (2) that, in the same way, the Applicant State has locus standi, both on
behalf of its own nationals who are victims of acts of genocide
attributable to the Respondent, and to promote the protection of any
other people who may be victims of the same acts, be they Yugoslavs
or nationals of any third State; and
(3) that, as Brigitte Stern will shortly show, Bosnia-Herzegovinama):
claim compensation for al1 acts of genocide committedby the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, irrespectiveof the date on which such acts
were conmitted.
III. The various bases of the jurisdiction
of the Court
11. Mr. President, this brings me to my third point: the various
bases of the jurisdiction of the Court. Mr. President, in his statement
yesterday afternoon, the Agent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
attempted to "neutralize"the bases of jurisdiction invokedby
Bosnia-Herzegovina other than Article IX of the 1948 Convention.
Mr. Etinski justified his Governmentlsposition in the following words:
''TheApplicant failedto present and document at the
appropriate stage of the proceedings, i.e., at the time of the
submission of the Memorial, the alleged additional basesof the
jurisdiction of the Court, as well as the possible requests to
be based on them, and we consider that it cannot do it now in
this se9arate procedure related to the Preliminary Objections."
(CR 96/10, p. 38, Mr. Etinski.)
The Respondent State is here asserting two very differentthings:
- on the one hand, that since the date on which the Memorial was
filed, Bosnia-Herzegovinawas debarred from invokingany basis of the
Court's jurisdiction other than Article IX of the Genocide Convention;
- On the other, that it no longer has the right to amend its
conclusions (1 believe this is what Mr. Etinski is talking about whenhe refers to "possible requests to be based on [the additional bases of the
jurisdiction of the Court] ").
Bosnia-Herzegovinacannot agree with either of these two points.
12. It is scarcely necessary to spend much time on the first point.
At the Sitting of last Wednesday 1 read out the relevant passage in the
Judoment of the Court of 26 November 1984, which was reproduced in the
Order of 13 September 1993. Mr. Etinski found it necessary to read it
out again. 1 shall re-read one small part and 1 believe that this will
dispose of the matter
"as the Court has recognized, 'An additional ground of jurisdiction
may . . . be brought to theCourt's attention' after the filingof
'ir. . the Application,
--./
'and the Court may take it into account provided theApplicant makes
it clear that it intends to proceed upon that basis . . . and
provided also that the result is not to transform thedispute
brought before the Court by the application inta onother dispute
which is different in character . . . (Militaryand Paramilitary
Activities in and againsr Nicaragua IiJicaragua v. United States of
America) , Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1984, p. 427, para. 80)'." (Orderof 13 September 1993, I.C.J.
Reports 1993, p. 339.)
The Agent of Yugoslavia did not recall thisfact, but the Court in
its Order of 8 April 1993 already found that the fact that the letter
sent by the Montenegrin and Serb Presidents on 8 June 1992
"was not invoked in the Application as abasis of jurisdiction does
not in its itself constitute a bar to reliance being placed upon it
in the further courseof the proceedings (cf.Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav.
United States of America), 1.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 426-
427, para. 80) ".
The Court may therefore entertain the Application on the basis of
any title of jurisdiction which was valid at the time when it was
formulated - as is the case in respect of Article IX of the Saint-Germain
Treaty, or the letter of the two Presidentsdated 8 June 1992 - or on the
basis of any other title of jurisdiction which might becomevalid at a - 34 -
later time. This is the very foundation of the principle of forum
prorogatum, as the Court recalled in theCorfu Channel case (I.C.J.
Reports 1947-1948, Judgement of 25 March 1948, pp. 27-28].
Such a solution would appear to be necessary for at leastthree
reasons:
(1) it would be absurd to oblige a State which hasfsled an application
invoking a particular basis of jurisdictionto formulatean
identical application on different grounds, on the pretext that
these grounds were not initially invoked;
(2) any other interpretationwould exclude even the possibility of forum
--
- b prorogatum; the Respondent itselfdoes not challenge this
possibility, and one of the reasons why Article 38 of the Rules of
Court invites the âpplicant to specify "as far as possibleu the
legal groünds on which the jurisdictionof the Court is said to be
based is precisely in order to preserve the possibility of forum
prorogatum (cf. Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the
International Court,Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 351, or
Geneviève Guyomar, Commentaire dc Règlemect de la Cour
internationale deJustice, [Annotateatext of the Rules of Court of
the InternationalCourt of Justice], Pédone, Paris, 1983, pp. 237-
238) ;
(3) the second reasonbehind this form of words was the concern notto
impose on States obligations which are not laid down in the Statute;
however, Article 40 (1) of the Statute of the Court does not require
the grounds of jurisdiction to be mentioned in theApplication (cf.
G. Guyomar, ibid., pp. 235-236) .
13. On the other hand, the Applicant is not entitled to use any
further bases of jurisdictionthat it invokes as a pretext for - 35 -
transforming the dispute "into another dispute which is different in
character" (cf. Société commerciale de Belgique, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 8, p. 173; and Nicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1984, Judgement of
26 November 1984, previously cited, p. 427; or Order of
13 September 1993, previ.ouslycited, p. 339). There is no conflict
between the Parties as t.othe principle on this point. 1 repeat that
Bosnia-Herzegovina has no intention of transforming the dispute in this
way.
In its Memorial, Bosnia-Herzegovina stated very clearly that, whilst
it reserved the possibility of invoking al1 relevant titles of
jurisdiction, whatever t.hebases of the Court's jurisdiction, it intended
in any event to focus ez:clusivelyon the claims made in its Application,
relating to the application of the Genocide Convention and to acts of
-
5 5 genocide (cf. Memorial, Chapter 1.2, "Sharpening the Focus", pp. 4 -5 and
-
Section 4.2.4, p. 176 et:seq) ; speakiilgon behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
1 reiterated this very czlearlyon Wednesday (cf. CR 96/8, p. 3).
14. This nieans,very clearly, noc oniy that there no question of
going beyond the claims containearn the Application, but also that
Bosnia-Herzegovina renounces al1 claims which are not directly linked to
the genocide committed or abetced by Yugoslavia.
On the other hand, the Respondent State is not entitled to reproach
Bosnia-Herzegovinawith having reliea on al1 valid titles which might
establish the jurisdictionof the Court for this purpose. The main title
of jurisdiction is of course ArrricleIX of the 1948 Convention, but other
titles include recognitionof the jurisdiction of the Court in other
instruments or 'by "acts conclusively establishing [consentl~on the part
of the Respondent State. As 1 said the day before yesterday, this might
present a degree of interest, enabling the Court tomaKe findings on some of the ways andmeans used by Yugoslavia to perpetrate the genocide of
which it stands accused, and particularly its recourse to a war of
aggression during which it seriously violated the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Protocols 1 and II.
In the opinion of the Bosnian Government, the Court might proceed in
this way on Vhe basis of Article IX alone. Nevertheless,as Judge
Lauterpacht stated in his separate opinion appended to the
Order of 13 September 1995,
"it must be borne in mind that conduct which may prima facieappear
not to fa11 within those categories iof acts enumerated in
Article III of the 1948 Convention] mayin truth do so if such
conduct can in fact be shown to cause, or contribute to, with
sufficient directness, genocideor genocidal activity"
(1.C.J. Reports 1393, p. 413) .
The possibilityof relying on bases of jurisdiction otherthan
4 k' Article IX of the Convention would at least simplify matters in this
respect and would avoid futile arguments between the Parties as to
whether such conduct is or is not linked "with sufficient directness" to
the Convention. It must be understood, 1 repeat, that Bosnia-Eerzegovina
has no intention of protracting its submissionsunduly.
Mr. President, 1 can rarry on or take a break here, as you wish.
The PRESIDENT: Please continue.
Mr. PELLET: 1 come now to my fourth point, i.e., the letter of
8 June 1992.
IV. The letter of 8 June 1992
15. Mr. President,yesterday afternoonthe Agent of Yugoslavia
devoted part o.f his statement to the letter sent on 8 June 1992 by the
Presidents of Montenegro and Serbia, on behalf of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, to the President of the Arbitration Commissionof the InternationalConference for Peace in Yugoslavia. After quoting
in extenso the relevantpassages of the Orders of the Court of 8 April
and 13 September 1993, Mr. Etinski concluded:
"The letter of 8 June 1992 was addressedto the President
of the Arbitration Commission andit referred to the concrete
situation. This declarationwas not drawn up in abstracto,
erga omnes and without specifictiming. It was the expression
of the political opinions of the two Presidents that al1
disputes, concerning the matters raisedby the letter of
3 June 1992, should be resolved ina peaceful manner and, if
agreement is not possible, by judicial settlement. In
addition, according to the general rules of internationallaw,
this letter cannot be seen as a treaty offer or a unilateral
aeclaration of the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia." (CR 96/10,
P - .)
16. In its Order of 8April 1993, the Court raisedseveral
4 1 questions. Did the letter:
- constitute an "immediatecommitmentN,binding on Yugoslavia, to accept
unconditionallythe unilateral submission to the Court of a wide range
of legal disputes;
- or was it intended "as a commitment solely to submission to the Court
of the three questionsraised by the Chairman of the Committee [i.e.,
the President of the krbitration Commissionll'(by the by, these
questions were raisedby the Chairman of the Conference,
Lord Carrington, and the President of the Arbitration Commission,
Mr. Badinter, did no more than transmit it);
- lastly, the Court raised the question as to whether it was no more
than "the enunciation of a general policyof favouring judicial
settlement,which did not embody an offer or commitment"
(1.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 18) .
Naturaily, Yugoslavia opts for the thirdpossibility.
Mr. President, it is wrong to do so 17. In order to avoid any ambikity, the simplest thing is to use
the text of the letter itself. It is written in Serbo-Croat,a language
1 do not know. 1 shall therefore notventure to read the original text,
and shall merely recall the crucialpassages of the letter in the English
translation done by Professor Anne Henderson of the William and Mary
College of Williamsburg. These passages read as follows:
"The Federal Republicof Yugoslavia takes the position that
those legal disputes which cannot be resolved through agreement
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav
Republics must be submitced to the jurisdictionof the
InternationalCourt of Justice as the principal Court
organization of the UN.
Therefore, keeping in micd the fact that the questionsyour
letter raised were of a legal nature, the Federal Republicof
A:L Yugoslavia proposes thatif agreement on these questions cannot
be reached amocg the participantsof the conference, they be
resolved before the InternationalCourt of Justice in
accordance with the Statute of that Court." (CR 33/33, p. 32.;
18. A reading cf these passages seemsto me to suffice to êliminate
the uncertaintiesmentioned in tne Order of 8April 1993. Each of the
two paragraphs 1 have just read fully carries out one of the first two
functions envisageaby the Court:
- the second paragraph constitutesa speclfic suggestion for submittins
the three questions raised by Lord Carrington to the Court. It is of
no direct concern to us here; it is merely an illustrationof the
first of these paragraphs;
- the first paragraph constitutesa firm commitmentto accept that
disputes between Yugoslaviaand the former YugoslavRepublics "must be
submittedu to the Internati~r~al Court of Justice - however thiscan
only be a proposa1 since effective submission necessarilydepends on
the acceptance of those other States. - 39 -
In its Written Observations of 24 August 1993, to which Mr. Etinski
referred in his statementyesterday, Yugoslavia stressedthat "Al1
delegations optea forthe Badinter Commission" (para. 34, p. 21); ic was
referring to the other four Statesformed £rom the breakup of the former
Yugoslavia. The Respondent is partly right, but it confuses matters
somewhat and draws the wrong conclusions from itsfindings:
Firstly, "opting" for the BadinterCommission concerned onlyissues
in respect of the succession of States; however, the Yugoslav offer was
much more general, the second paragraphwhich 1 have quoted being, 1
repeat, merely an illustrationof the first.
Secondly, it is clear moreoverthat Bosnia-Herzegovina forits part
- 5 oloptedfor the Court" on the central issueof genocide;
Thirdly, in addition, Yugoslavia's own reasoning confirms that the
letter of 8 June 1992 must be interpreted asa firm offer to submit to
the jurisdictionof the Court.
19. Contrary to the position adoptedby Yugoslavia in its oral
arguments of April 1993 (cf. CR 93/13, p. 29), it is not a matter of
whether theparties reached an agreement to submit the dispute to the
Court, as tiieydid in the case concerning the Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (Judgment of 8 December 1978, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 44) or the
case concerning Maritime Delimi tation and Territorial Questions between
Qatar and Bahrain (Judgment of 15 February 1995, 1.C. J.Reports
1995, p. 23). It is rather a matter of whether theunilateral
declarationby Yugosiavia committed that State at international level.
If this question is answered in the affirmative, there is no doubt that
Bosnia-Herzegovina coula submit the dispute to the Court unilaterally
since, in line with the Court's well-known dictum in the Nuclear Tests
case, "It is well recognized that declarationsmade by way of
unilateral acts, concerning legal orfactual situations,may have
the effect of creating legal obligations . . . When it is the
intention of the State making the declaration that it should become
bound according to itsterms, that intention confers on the
declaration the characterof a legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth legally required to followa course of conduct
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if
given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made
within the context of internationalnegotiations,is binding."
(Judgmentof 20 December 1974, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 267 and 472.)
20. These conditions have been met in this case:
- Yugoslavia has clearly statedthat the disputes between itself and
other States formed from thebreak-up of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia shouldbe submitted to the Court, if no
agreement is possible;
- this intention was expressed publicly andmust be analyzed as an offer
made to thefour other States concerned,and Yugoslavia cannot
withdraw this offer if one of these States accepts it, as in this
case. Once again, we are not talking hereof an agreement,but of a
unilateral act on the part of Yugoslavia;
- thirdly: this legal comrnitmentis al1 the more firm in that it was
made in the course of proceedings whichwere not judicial but were at
least quasi-arbitral. Such a declaration is obviously binding on the
State in whose name it is made (cf.Arbitral Award of 17 July 1986 in
the case concerningFilleting in the Saint-LawrenceGulf, RGDIP
- lastly, it would not be acceptable fora State to object to the
jurisdiction of an organ of dispute settlement, in offering to settle
disputes before the World Court, only to reject the Court's
jurisdiction subsequentlywhen it is "taken at its word". Such an
attitude obviously runscounter to the principle of good faith which
ought to govern relations between sovereignStates, and runs counter - 41 -
to the dignity of the Court and that of the other organs of dispute
settlement to which the Court was preferred.
21. Several factors bear witness to the desire on the part of the
Federal Republicof Yugoslavia to commit itself:
- firstly, the double signature of the Presidents of the Presidenciesof
the two pFrts of this State;
- then the solemn tone of the introductory phrase: "The Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia takesthe position that . . .I,
- or the word "declaration",which was thrice used by the Yugoslav Agent
-- +, in his submissions of 26 August 1993 to describe the letter of
. V
8 June 1992 (CR 93/35, p. 34) ;
- or the fact that in thesame circumstancesand again yesterday the
agent of Yugoslavia challengedthe applicabilityof this text, on the
dual pretext that it was not "in force on 31 March 1993" (without
however explaining why. - and this means in any event thatit was "in
forcev before or after . . .), and that "the condition contained in
the declaration is not fulfilledu (ibid.) : a contrario this means
that if this condition ismet, Yugoslavia accepcs that the Court has
jurisdictionon that kasis.
22. What condition are we talking about? We are saying that the
Parties find it impossible to reach agreementconcerning a dispute (the
letter refers to "disputeswhich cannotbe resolved through agreement").
It is clear that the condition is met in this case. The obligation to
negotiate to which Yugoslaviasubordinatesits offer ta appear before the
Court, like any obligationof this type, cannot be absolute. As the
Court recalled inthe case concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf,
"[the parties] are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the
negotiations are meaningful" (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47); this cannot - 42 -
be so when, as in this case, one of the Parties, in the words of the 1969
Judgment, not only "insistsupon its own position withoutcontemplating
any modification of it" (ibid.),but even refuses to admit that a problem
exists. This applies to Yugoslaviawhich, as the Agent of
Bosnia-Herzegovinarecalled a short time ago, denies any involvementin
the genocide perpetrated againstnon-Serb populations in the former
Yugoslavia.
There can therefore be no doubt that negotiationswould be totally
futile and that the sole condition to whichYugoslavia, on its own
admission, subordinated its "declaration"of 8June 1992must be
considered to have been met. This unilateral commitment therefore also
4 -
founds the jurisdictionof the Court to entertain theApplication by
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Shall 1 go on?
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor. You will have quite enough
time; 1 will give you the time you require to expound your last point
after the break which the Court willnow take. The hearing is suspended.
The Court adjournedfrom 4.35 to 4.45 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Pellet, you have the
floor again to finish your statemeilt.
Mr. PELLET: 1 am coming to the end, 1 promise. Thank you,
Mr. President.
Mr. President, you said that 1 had one point left, but in fact 1 have
two, one concerning Article 11 of the Saint-GermainTreaty of
10 September 1919, and the second concerning forum prorogatum. However,
since 1 believe that the Bosnian team is running a little bit late, 1 do - 43 -
not think that 1 will go into Article 11 of the Saint-GermainTreaty of
10 September 1919 in detail, and will merely seekto summarize it very
briefly. Firstly, let me Say that Bosnia-Herzegovinamaintains that
basis of jurisdiction,and that that basisof jurisdictiondoes not have
the effect of transforming the dispute into another type of dispute,
since the most elementaryminority right protectedunder the
saint-GermainTreaty is that of not being a victim of genocide.
Subsequently 1 shall remind the Court that thevalidity of this Treaty
has been affirmed by the United Nations organs, as was stated by
Bosnia-Herzegovinain the memorandumof 6 August 1993 in which it first
referred to this Treaty. Lastly, I shall recall that the machinery
guaranteeing the rights of minorities under Article 11 of the
Saint-GermainTreaty invoived the interventionof the Council of the
League of Nations and its members. As the Court accepted with regard to
the monitoring of the obligations of the mandatory Powers in the
South-WestAfrica cases, this type of monitoring machinerywas bequeathed
by the Council of the League of Nations to the General Assembly. It
therefore appearslegiti,mate to consider that the privileges, to term
t.hemthus, accorded to members of the Council of the League of Nations
have been bequeathedto the General Assembly of the United Nations, of
which Bosnia-Herzegovina is a membor.
Mr. President, after this brief summary 1 come to my last point.
V. Forum prorogatum and the acquiescence of Yugoslavia
22. Mr. President,Mr. Etinski devoted almosthalf his statement
yesterday afternoon tothe question of forum prorogatum (CR 96/10,
p. ...). The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovinaholds him to be mistaken
in law and in fact. - 44 -
23. Firstly, in fa&.
The Agent of Yugoslavia accusesme of having quoted "the statement of
Shabtai Rosenneu "on several occasions~ (CR 96/10, p. ...) .
Mr. President, this is totally incorrect. In speakingof forum
prorogatum 1 neither quoted nor even mentionedat any time the statements
of Ambassador Rosenne (cf. CR 96/8, p. 78-79); 1 referred to them only
in relation to acquiescence in the jurisdictionof the Court on the basis
4 s of Article IX of the 1948 Convention (cf. ibid., p. 80-81). This is
quite a different matter and 1 shall touch on it again when 1 finish.
At this point we are dealing with forum prorogatum strictosensu,
i.e., the principle that the jurisdictionof the Court may resultfrom
any "act conclusivelyestablishing [consent]"by the Respondent State and
particularly its conduct after the Application is filed if such conduct
involves "an element of consent regardingthe jurisdictionof the Court"
(Anglo-IranianOil Co., Preliminary Objection, Judgmentof 22 July 1952,
I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 114). In this respect, the "act conclusively
establishing [consent]"which foundsthe jurisdictionof the Court is
constituted notby any declarationsthat were madeor that might have
been made by Nr. Rosenn- in the oral arguments presented in April 1993,
but by the simple fact that Yugoslavia submitted a request for the
indication of provisional measures on 1 April 1993.
24. With your permission Mr. President, it may perhaps be not
unhelpful tc re-read a few extracts £rom this request:
"The Yugoslav Government welcomes thereadiness of the
InternationalCourt of Justice to discuss theneed of ordering
provisional measuresto bring to an end inter-ethnicand
inter-religiousarmed conflictswithin the territory of the
'Republicof Bosnia and Herzegovina' and in this context,
recommends that the Court, pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute
and Article 33 of its Rules of Procedure, orders the application
of provisional measures,in particular: ... I,. - 45 -
there followça long list of ineasuresincluding: compliance with the
cease-fire of 28 March 1993 - which is ofno interest today; several
measures linkedto the alleged "ethnic cleansing" of Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina - which cornesunder the Genocide Convention; and, to
quote the terms of the Yugoslav requestonce again:
" - to direct the authoritiesunder the control of Izetbegovic [sicl
to respect the Geneva Conventions for theProtection of Victims of
War of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols thereof ..."
45
For those purposes, Yugoslavia thereforeclearly and distinctly
accepted the jurisdictionof the Court.
25. Yugoslavia defends itself in two ways.
Firstly by stating: "it is quite clear ... that Mr. Rosenne has
reserved al1 our rights [this is the Agent of Yugoslavia speaking]
concerning the jurisdictionof the Court" (CR 96/10, p. ...).
Mr. President, as we have seen, this is not accurate. Yugoslavials
request for the indication of provisional measuresof 1 April 1993 was
not qualified by any reservationsand the Judgment of the Court of
22 July 1952 in the case concerningthe Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. is of no
nelp to Yugoslavia. The measures of defence invokedby Iran and on which
the United Kingdom relied in order to affirm the existence of forum
prorogatum were clearly designatedby the Respondent as I1[measures of
defence] which it would be necessary to examine only if Iran's Objection
to the jurisdictionwere rejectedn as the Court expresslynoted (I.C.J.
Reports 1952, p. 114). There is nothing of the sort in this case. As
for Mr. Rosenne, he made no reservationsat al1 on this point (cf. CR
93/13, passim) .
As for the contention reiterated yesterday by the Agent of
Yugoslavia, namelythat I1[i]nparagraph 3 of its Request for the indicationof
provisional measures of 9 August 1993., the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia reserved al1 the rights of objection to the
jurisdictionof the Court and theadmissibilityof the
Application" (CR 96/10, p . . .),
it has no significance. As 1 believe 1 showed in my statement on
Wednesday (cf. CR 96/8, p. 76-77), it concerns a different phaseof the
case and, even if such a "reservation"were to have any legal effect,
which is more than doubtful, it would only have such an effect with
regard to the requests put forward in the memorandumof August 1993 and
1'p,
3 ?J in no way with regard to those made on 1 April 1993, requests which
clearly show that Yugoslavia considered that the Courthad jurisdiction
to rule on the claims formulated in the requests.
26. Mr. President, coming now to the errors of law made by
Mr Etinski, it is difficult to see how a State can both request the
indication of provisional measuresand question the jurisdictionof the
Court to deal with its request.
As 1 showed on Wednesday (CR 96/8, pp. 77-75), without the Agent of
Yugoslavia deemingit helpful or possibleto challenge my assertions,the
jurisdictionof the Court to rule on a request for the indication of
provisional measures isan incidental jurisdiction. It presupposes that
the Court has jurisdiction in the main issue (cf. Shigeru Oda,
"ProvisionalMeasures; the Practice of the International Courtof
Justicev, in V. Lowe and M. Fitzmauriceeds., Fifty Years of the
InternationalCourt of Justice - Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings,
Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996, p. 554). No doubt it is true that, at
the stage of indicating provisional measures, the Court merely has to
find that it has prima facie jurisdictionand it is also true that, after
more extensive consideration,it may happen that the Court finds thatit
lacks jurisdictionto entertain the Application. - 47 -
This is what happened in the case concerning the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. as my adversary correctly noted yesterday (CR 96/10, p . . .).
However, this has no relevance to the point at issue. What is this
point? It is not a matter of whether the Courtrules, eventually, that
it has jurisdictionor has no jurisdiction,it is a matter of
establishing whether the Respondent accepts that it has.
In submitting its request of 1 April 1993, Yugoslavia showedthat it
accepted this - at least in relation to the questions forming the
subject-matterof the claims in its memorandum. It cannot today retract
its expression of this acceptance,which bore witness to its consent to
the jurisdictionof the Court, whatever thereasons: a feeling that it
was moreover bound for reasons of pure expediency. To paraphrase
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his separate opinion appended tothe Judgment
of 1962 in the case concerningthe Temple of Preah Vihear, "having
accepted a certain obligation,or having becomebound by a certain
instrument [it] cannot now be heard to deny the fact, to blow hot and
cold" (I.C.U. Reports 1962, p. 63).
27. It is true that Mr. Etinski advanced oneargument, a single one,
which went against thisreasoning:he stated that it would run counter to
the principle of equality of the Parties (CR 96/10, p . . .).
Mr. President,this too is incorrect, for it is like saying that a party
which accepts the jurisdictionof the Court anda State which refusesto
accept it are not "equal" before the Court! They are equal, of course,
but they are equal with a different status: applicant for the first;
respondent for the second. There is nothing to prevent the respondent
from accepting the jurisdictionof the Court and from becoming in turn an
applicant, for example, by formulatingcounter-claims or requests for the
indication of provisional measures. However, the second party cannot - 48 -
have its cake and eat it, it cannot refuse the jurisdictionof the Court
on matters which disturb it and accept its jurisdictionon matters which
suit it.
28. Under these conditions, it is obvious that Bosnia-Herzegovinacan
do no more than contend that you, the Mernbersof the Court, have
jurisdictioq to make findings to the full extent implied by the Yugoslav
requests of 1 April 1993, which cover both the breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventionsand the 1977 Protocols and the breaches of the 1948
r Convention. However, Mr. President, there is more to be said with regard
5 i
u to the latter Convention. 1 explained this point at some length last
Wednesday (CR 96/8, pp. 79-83) but the other Party has apparentlynot
found it necessary to come back to this point again.
Only apparently, however,and this is why 1have to Say a few words
to round off the çubject.
Still with reference to Mr. Etinski, in his oral arguments yesterday
afternoon, Mr. Etinski confused what 1 said about forum prorogatum on the
one hand (CR 96/8, pp. 75-79) and about acquiescence inthe jurisdiction
of the Court on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention on the
other (ibid. pp. 75-83). 1 do not know whether the Agent of Yugoslavia
did so in good faith or deliberately,but ln either case, it seems useful
to clarify mat.ters.
These are two points which are clearly not completelyunrelated but
which nevertheless are quite distinct. In the first case, that of forum
prorogatum, the jurisdictionof the Court is based on the "act
conclusively establishing [consent]" constitutedby Yugoslavia's request
for the indication of provisional measures of 1 April 1993. 1 have just
spoken at some lengthon this subject. The second point, acquiescence,
concerns the declarationsmade on behalf of Yugoslavia during the proceedings, declarationsby which Yugoslavia expressly recognized the
jurisdictionof the Court on the basis of Article IX of the 1948
Convention.
It is concerning thissecond aspect of the matter that Mr. Etinski's
comment, which 1 have just noted, worries me. In his statement on
2 April 1993, Mr. Rosenne effectively addeda caveat to the acceptance by
Yugoslavia of the jurisdictionof the Court (reiteratedon at least three
5 3
occasions -cf. CR 93/13, pp. 16, 34 and 54), a caveat which the Agent of
Yugoslavia read out at the hearing yesterday afternoon. 1 will remind
you of the text (Mr.Etinski having carefully 'forgotten"the beginning):
"The problem starts with the followingwords of Article IX. 1
would not at this stage dispute thatal1 the words ofArticle IX from
'fulfilmentof the present Convention1to 'acts enumerated in
Article [III]'relate to the merits of the case, and we are not
concerned with that now, beyond reservingal1 our rights as to how we
shall deal with the jurisdictionof the Court and themerits when the
times cornes." (Ibid., p. 18.)
1 would remindyou that this wasMr. Rosenne speaking.
This somewhatobscure passage invites threecomments:
- firstly, contrary to what the Agentof Yugoslavia peremptorily
stated yesterday, it is not too clear "that Mr. Rosenne has reserved al1
[Yugoslavia'slrights concerningthe jurisdictionof the Court"
(CR 96/10, p. 40); it is the reverse of his statementwhich is "quite
clear" (ibid.) In his statementAmbassador Rosenne, speaking on behalf
of Yugoslavia, frequently recognizedthe jurisdictionof the Court on the
basis of Article IX. On.the other hand, he expressed doubtsas to the
exact scope of this provision -and this is precisely whathe does in the
passage 1 have just quot.ed. In other words, Yugoslavia acceptsthe
jurisdictionof the Court but is at odds with Bosnia-Herzegovina as to
the exact scope of Article IX. This is confirmed by another passage in - 50 -
the same speech, which 1 also quoted on Wednesday (CR 96/8, p. 81). In
this passage, the Respondent'sAgent scated:
"we do think that thejurisdictionof the Court is limited, but we
are prepared to continue to litigate the case within the limits of
the jurisdictionas we understanciit" (CR 93/13, p. 54).
4
- Secondly, even if the passage taken from Mr. Rosennets speech which
1 quoted earlier mightbe interpretedas meaning in these precise
1
circumstancesthat Yugoslavia had intended "to reserve the right" to
question its acceptance of the jurisdictionof the Court on the basis of
Article IX of the Convention, nothingcould be inferred £rom this in
legal terms. As 1 said yesterday, this is a "cock and bu11 story" and
"giving and withholding is worthlessu icf. CR 96/8, p. 9-80).
- Thirdly and las~ly, on Wednesday 1 also referred to many other
instances of acquiescenceby Yugoslavia inthe juris2ictionof the Court
on the basis of Article IX, instances of acquiescence whichwere not
qualified by any caveat or reservation (cf.CR 96/8, p. 80-81).
Members of the Court, this brings us back to the same conclusion,
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia clearly, formally and frequently
acquiesced in the jurisdictionof the Court on the basis of Articl'eIX.
It no longer has the right to rescind thisacquiescence. This disposes
of al1 the petty, specious argumentsthat it has developed inthe course
of the hearings since the beginning of the week, in a bid to escape from
the judgment of the Court.
29. Mr. President, it cannot escapeyour judgment -and this is
fortunate; it is fortunate for Bosnia-Herzegovina; lt is fortunate for
the hundreds of thousands of victims of the genocide it committed and in
which it abetted and who cry out for justice; it is fortunate too for
the re-establishmentof peace in thiswar-torn part of Europe. - 51 -
As Professor Antonio Cassese, President of the InternationalCrimical
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia wrotein his first report to the
Security Council, quoting Hegel, "fiat justitia ne pereat mundus (let
justice be done or the world will perish)" (ICTY, Yearbook 1994,
,35
para. 18, p. 91).
Mr. President,Members of the Court, thank you very much indeed for
your patience. Mr. President,may 1 request you to give the floor to
Professor Brigitte Stern.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor, foryour statement. 1 now cal1
upon Professor Brigitte Stern
Professor STERN: Mr:.President,Members of the Court, 1 come before
yoiionce again, in order to take a fresh look at the problems of
succession of States in relation to the position of Bosnia within the
framework of the Genocide Convention. 1 shall in fact be speaking quite
briefly, as it seemed to me that Professor Eric Suy, counsel for the
Government of Yugoslavia, acquiesced yesterday not only in the structure
of the arguments that 1 had presented on behalf of the Government of
Bosnia, but also to a vory large extent in their substance.
1 accordinglypropose, in my flrst section, tc attempt to draw up an
inventory of che problems of succession of States, for which 1 shall
begin by recording the points of agreement, before 1-everting, at slightly
greater length, to the outstandingpoints of disagreement.
However, in a second phase, 1 should like to make some comments upon
the strange image of the Genocide Convention that hasgradually taken
shape in the courseof t.heoral presentationsby our adversaries. This
second point actually seems to me to be a great deal more important, as
it touches on the very concept formedby the Federal Republic of - 52 -
Yugoslavia of the structure of the internationalcommunity, of which your
Court is the highest judicial body.
1. THE INVENTORY
A. The Points of Agreement
These are relatively numerousand 1 will show, in the first place,
that some of them result implicitly £rom the absence of any reply by
Yugoslavia to certain statements forcefullyexpressed by
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1. The Appreheneiveness of Yugoslavia at the Prospect of a Judgment
of the Court
The first point of agreement seems to have come about with regard to
the apprehensivenessof the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia at the
prospect of a judgment of the Court.
Accordingly,Mr. President, it is as well to begin by drawing the
Court's attention to the fact that the Respondent has not attempted to
deny that its whole strategycan be explained by its apprehensivenessat
the prospect of a judgment.
One the counsel for the Government of Yugoslavia went so far as to
Say very clearly that what Yugoslavia was aiming at, was not a dilatory
strategy merely delayingthe delivery of the judgment,but that it rather
wanted to stop the case. It did not Say to win the case, but to stop the
case. It doubtless knows only too well what it risks by agreeing to
submit to your judgment. Instead of confronting theGenocide Convention
with its head held high, the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia prefers to
avoid a confrontationof those actions with the fundamental norms laid
down by that Genocide Convention. 2. The Imposeibility of a State's Preventing another State from
Succeeding to the Genocide Convention
In the secondplace, both Parties are in agreement as to the
impossibilityof a Statels preventing another State from succeedingto
the Genocide Convention.
1 shall read out again what Professor Suy had to Say on that subject:
"Yugoslavia sharesthe view that no State may prevent a
successor State, should the latter so desire, from becoming
party to a multilateral convention, such as the Genocide
Convention, to which the predecessor Statewas party." (CR 96/6,
p. 6.)
Bosnia takesnote of that acknowledgmentwhich, in itself, suffices
to confer jurisdictionupon the Court.
Of course, the Respondent subsequentlyattempts to moderate its
statement,but is quite unable to do so.
Other points of agreement result £rom the explicit acknowledgment -
this time by Yugoslavia - of certai~ positions previously taken by the
Government of Bosnia
3. The Explanation of the Unique Character of Yugoslavia's Objectiori
to Bosniats Notification of Succession to the Genocide Convention
This applies to the explanationof what 1 emphasized at some length
as being the unique characterof Yugoslavia'sobjection to the
notification of Bosnia's succession to the Genocide Convention.
1 pointed out that, in my view, the only reason for that objection
derived £rom the existen.ce of Article IX. Not only did the Respondent
fail to refute that analysis: it expressly confirmedit. 1 shall once
again read out thatcompletely unambiguous admissionby Professor Suy.
This is what he has to Say:
"The reason for the lack of any objection to the other
declarations of succession is, in fact, that Bosnia-Herzegovina had filed an Application with thisCourt on the basis of
Article IX of the Convention." (CR 96/10, p. . . .; emphasis
added .)
5 b
1s there any more cynical way of acknowledgingthat that objection
but to an opportunist
was not a response to a long-term legal policy,
policy of a short-termnature?
Certain points of agreement are, after all, concealed behind apparent
disagreemsnts,whose sole aim is to throw the Court into confusion
1 shall, for example, stress a number of points upon which, in the
absence of objections or where objectionsare extremely superficial,it
seems to me that the Respondent fully agrees with the positions that we
have put forwara.
S. The Analysis of the Opinio Juris of the Chairpersons of Bodies
for the Protection of Human Rights
In the first place, we shall see thatthe Respondent agrees with the
analysis presentedby the Government of Bosnia with respectto the
opinio juris of the chairpersonsof bodies for the protection of human
rights .
1 shall not dwell upon this point, as no element worthyof refutation
has been submitted,no element which could serve to weaken the impact of
that evident opinio juris in favour of automatic continuity.
Neither is it worth my while to refute the affirmation according to
which this was a persona1 opinion, as the experts of the Committees were
no more than representativesof Governments. Theydid however express
their agreement in their capacityof cogs in the machinery forthe
protection of human rights - in the same way as you, as Judges of the
Court, express your separate or dissentingopinions
Neither is it worth refuting the implicationof the
-!1.
Secretary-General'sappeal for a confirmationof a succession, in an - 55 -
attempt to Say that, since a confirmationwas called for -well, that
means there had been no succession. Everybodyknows that a confirmation
is always useful, as it serves to promote the securityof international
relations and their transparency.
5. The Analysis of the Practice of the Commission on Human Rights
The Governmentof the Republic of Yugoslavia likewise agrees, as 1
see it, with the analysis of the practice of the Commission of Human
Rights as presentedby Bosnia.
Once again, Mr. President, 1 can only Say what 1 think, namely, that
the opposing Party is glossing over the fact that it cannot possibly
disagree with the Government of Bosniâ-Herzegovina,by taking refuge
behind elaborations which seem to me to go much too far at times.
For instance, it is initially declared - in an attempt to refute th2
position of the Commission onHuman Rights which says that there is
automatic succession - it is declared to this Courtthat the form of
words employed, according to which "Statesare automaticallybound by
obligationsunder international . . .instrüments" (CR 96/10, p. ..) does
not signify that they are parties to those instruments.
What does being a party to a treaty mean, other than that one is
bound by obligations under that treaty?
It does not seernto me, Mr. President, thct there is much point in
pursuing these Mside-tracks"at any length.
6. Analy~tisof the Practice of the Hunan Rights Committee
6 0 My last point is that the opposing Government is likewise in
agreement with the analysis of the practice of the Human Rights Comrnittee
that is being presentedby the Government of Bosnia - 56 -
In the first place, Professor ~uy attempted to deny the impact of the
practice of the Human Rights Committee, by saying that the Committee had
asked Bosnia to confirm the continuity of the Covenant - but it is well
known that a request for confirmationdoes not imply that there isno
such continuity. The very term wconfirmation"indicates on the contrary
that such a continuity already exists. Professor Suy goes on to Say - as
if that confirmed Yugoslavia's argument whereas, as you will see, that
quotation rathertends to invalidate it - Professor Suy goes on to make
the following comments which 1 shall read out:
"not until 1 Septernber 1993 - in other words ten months after
this recommendationby the Human Rights Committee - did the
Secretary-General receivethe Instrument ofSuccession of
. . . Bosnia-Herzegovina"(CR 96/6, p. 10).
So we anticipate Eome major revelation; the confirmationcomes
six months after the event, does this mean that some time will elapse
before Bosniabecomes bound? Not at all, as the Secretary-Generaldid
not declare that Bosnia was not bound until three months after the filing
or give any other informationof that kind, which would haveshow that
there was no continuity.
Professor Suy, what is more - and 1 would stress this - brings this
argument to a close by adding that that confirmation took I1effect from
6 May 1992 (the date of its proclamation of independence).".
We likewise note this statement onthe record.
Lastly, it is with respectto the analysisof the practice of this
5 1 Human Rights Committeethat the Yugoslav Government engaged ina quite
remarkable stylisticexercise, in which it accused theGovernment of
Bosnia of having "engaged in a breathtaking distortion of the facts"
(CR 96/10, p. . . .).
What crime has been committedby the Government of Bosnia? - 57 -
In the first place, it committed the error of indicatingthat, at the
time at which the Report of Bosnia was submitted to the Human Rights
Committee Dy virtue of Article 40 - as 1 reminded you - that Committoe
was chaired by Mr. Faust0 Pocar and not byMrs. Rosalyn Higgins. with
al1 due respect 1 must say that 1 do not see how that error, while
obviously regrettable - Mrs. Rosalyn Higginswas a member of the
Committee at that time, and personally welcomed thedelegation of Bosnia,
but was not chairman at that stage - it is however difficult tosee how
that error can occasion the collapse of the theoretical reasoning
presented: the fact that the declarationsrelating to the continuity of
Bosnia-Herzegovinalsobligations were made by a man is not necessarily
any less significant than if those same declarationshad been made by a
woman !
What is more, Rosalyn Higgins succeeded Mr. Pocar and the policyof
the Human Rights Committee remainedthe same. One may for example,
Mr. President, read in the last Report of the Commission onHuman Rights
to the Secretary-General,that
"at its fifty-fifthsession [i.e.,very recently]
(October-November 1995), the Human Rights Committee . . . took
the -ricdthat human rights treaties aevolved with territory, and
that States continue to be bound by the obligations under the
Covenant entered into by the predecessor State" (E/CN.4/1996/76,
4 January 1996, p. 2).
We are still looking for the "breathtaking distortionof the facts".
It is not enough to state, as did Professor Suy, that IIIconsider it
regrettable thatBosnia-Herzegovinashould have had to resort to such
distortions to give support to its arguments", for those distortions
L fi
J L suddenly to exist !
Subsequently,the Government of Bosnia continued to try to
dest~bilizethe - extremely clear - practice of that Committee by - 58 -
accusing the Bosnian Governmentof having put statements in the mouths of
Committee members, that they did not make. It is extremely easy to reply
to such assertions. In the first place, no exact quotationof the
statements was made and it seems to me that when one quotes things one
should put them in inverted commas - at least this is what 1 always tell
my students and 1 try to keep to it myself. What is more the summary of
the Committee'sposition as presented by Bosnia merely followed -and
this only had to be checked - the summary given in the Report addressed
to the Secretary-Generalby the Commission on Human Rights
(~/CN/4/1995/80, 28 November 1994). 1 do not see how such a Report can
fail to lay itself open to criticism.
We accordingly consider that the opposingParty subscribes to our
akalysis of the practice of the bodies concernedwith matters of human
rights.
Let us now move on to the points of disagreement.
B. The Points of Disagreement
1. The Date of Entry into Force of the Genocide Convention
These points seems to be less numerous but they are, as you will see,
quite important al1 the same £rom a qualitative standpoint.
The first pointof disagreement is the date of the entry into force
of the Genocide Convention.
Bosnia-Herzegovinareasserts here before you, very clearly, what it
has said already on a nurnberof occasions, i.e., that the date of entry
into force of the Genocide Conventionwas 6 March 1992.
Yugoslavia, for its part, has put forward a whole range of dates in a
L.3 bid to extend the period of inapplicabilityof the Convention as far as
possible. - 59 -
1 should like to deal with this range of dates one at a time and
quickly remind the Court of what1 have already said, and which has not
been refuted.
- In the first place, it is clear that the date of entry into force
of the Genocide Convention is not 14 December 1995, the date of the
Dayton Agreements.
The bringing intoforce cannot have waiteduntil the Dayton
Agreements and mutual recognition to take its effect.
It will be recalled that thepractice abundantly confirms the rule
according to which two States which do not recognize each other may
nonetheless be parties to multilateral treaties.
1 shall content myself with calling to mind some examples with which
you are al1 familiar. Israel and Syria, for example, are both parties to
the Genocide Convention (ratification by Israel on 9 March 1950, and by
Syria on 25 June 1955, multilateral treaties deposited with the
Secretary-General(Statute)on 31 December 1994, ST/LEG/SER.E/13.,
pp. 83-84); and the same holds good for Greece and the former Yugoslav
Republic ofMacedonia, which are likewise both parties to the Genocide
Convention (ratificationby Greece on 8 December 1954 and by the former
Yugoslav Republicof Macedonia on 18 January 1994, idem., p. 84). It is
moreover difficultto see why, in Yugoslavia'slogic, if the Dayton
Agreements are so important forthe entry into forceof the notification
of succession,why the date is not 14 March 1996 - in other words, by
virtue of the Convention, three months after the time at which the
notification of accession became an operative legal instrument. This
, .4 would be more logicalwithin the framework of the presentation of
94
Yugoslavia~sargument. Perhapsif there had been a third rowd of oral
arguments, the date would have been shifted even further? - 60 -
Let us continue tonarrow the range of possibilities.
- The date of entry into force of the Genocide Convention is not
29 March 1993, ei ther.
That date, as you will doubtless remember, resulted from the analysis
of the notification of succession as an accession. NeitherBosnia nor
the Secretary-Generalconsider that the act of successionmay signify or
have to be an act of accession. 1 shall accordingly not revertto this
point.
- The date of entry into force of the Genocide Convention is not the
date of the transmittal of the notification of succession, on
18 March 1992.
Here one may proceedby analogy to applythe Court's decision in a
case concerningthe Right of Passage over Indian Territory, in which it
was indicated that the differentoptional declarationsof acceptance of
the compulsory jurisdictionof the Court did not create bilateral
relations between the States.
- Lastly, neither is the date of entry into force of the Genocide
Convention the date of notification of succession, 29 December 1993.
We alrcady indicatedduring the first roundof oral arguments that
the internatiocalrule provides that the new State is not bound on the
date on which it sends a notification of succession,but is bound as from
the date of its independence.
If one accepts that the principle of automatic succession applies, it
is of course only logical that there shouldbe no gap and that the date
of independencemust be taken to apply. - 61 -
However, even in cases in wnich the clean slate rule applies, i.e.,
5 5 essentially withinthe framework of decolonization,it has always been
considered thata notification of succession took effect on the date of
independence.
Legal theory has it that when a new State makes a notification of
succession, it 1s bound as from the date of its independence. In
particular, this is the position maintained by Professor IanBrownlie, in
a quotation to which ProfessorSuy most opportunely referred. Looking at
the precedents relating to notifications of succession to multilateral
treaties of a universal character, he declaredthat "the actual
practice . . .indicates that the successor has an option [and the word
option is stressed in the textby Professor Brownlie himselfl to
participate in such treaties in its own right irrespectiveof the
provisions in final clausesof the treaty on conditions of participationu
(Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990,
4th ed., p. 670) .
The practice likewiseconfirms that rule accerding to which
succession takes effecton the date of ~ndependence.
This could be seen at the tirneof the various independences. 1 will
only cal1 to mind, at this point, the case of Algeria which, while it
acceded to a large number of multilateral treaties,made a point of
succeeding to France in respectof the multilateral Conventions on the
protection of human rights and the humanitarian Conventions.
This has likewise been confirrnedduring the recent wave of
successions of States. Al1 the successor States, when making
notificationsof succession, indicated thatthose notifications took
effect on the date of their independence. Thiswas the case of the Czech
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Croatia,Slovakia, the former Republic of - 62 -
Macedonia and, of course, it is the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is
more, no state even dreamed of raising the slightest objection - other
66
than the one with which we are now concerned,of course.
With respect to the recent practice to which reference has just been
made, 1 would like to indicatebriefly that Mr.Etinski attempted to show
that the use of a notification of successionwas reserved to those States
that came into being in the course of the decolonization process. To
prove this pointhe said that this had not been done in recent years and
hiç reason was that none of the States of the former Soviet Unionhad
made use of a notification of succession.
He told the Court thatonly the States of the former Czechoslovakia
and the former Yugcslaviâ had made use of the notification of succession.
By comparing the number of States of the former SovietUnion - there
are twelve of them - to the others - and there are six of thern - he gets
the impression that notification of succession is not the general
practice.
1 propose another reading - which seems to me more rational - and
which as you will see, Mr. President, radically inverts the proportions
of practice. That other reading is that there are novathree procedures
of succession in use and that, out of those three procedures of
succession,twc in any event haveabsolutely involved thenotification of
succession. The case of the former Soviet Unioncan be explained by the
agreement among the States for one of them to assure continuity.
In any case, one cannot draw any conclusion from the recent practice
that serves to invalidate - as Mr. Etinski attempted to do - the rule
according to which notificationtakes effect as£rom the date on whicha
new State ccmes intobeing. 2. The content of the rule governing the succession of States in
respect of multilateral treatiee
This is another respect - and 1 told you there were two - in which
disagreementpersists with regard to the content of the rule governing
the succession of States in respect of multilateral treaties.
It is no longer the right time - and it is not necessary as 1 have
already stressed - for us to settle this question.
However, 1 should li.keto Say once again, Mr. President, that the
strategy of the Respondent's legal advisers has been to cause you to get
lost, either voluntarily or because they were themselves lost inthe
labyrinth of problems posed by the succession of States. They have
wandered off in al1 directions, they have gone along a number of paths,
but al1 have led to a dead end, because they did not haveAriacineos
thread. To jet through the maze, one actually only needs one such
thread - either the guiding thread of automatic continuity or the thread
of the clean slate rule. However, if one jumps £rom one to the other,
the skein becornestangled and the realpestions get lost along the way.
If cne looks at the matter from the standpoint of aiit.omatic
continuity,the applicabilityof the Genocide Convention is in no doubt.
The real question then arises - if one adopts the standpoint of the
Respondent - the real question that 1 raise is by what legal reasoning
one can set aside the continuity intendedby a State exercisingits
sovereignty withinthe framework of the clean slate rule. The Respondent
is incapable of finding such a line of argument - and for a good reason -
and has no recourse other than to create a permanent confusion, as 1 have
just pointed out, between automatic continuity - within the framework of
the theory of continuity - and deliberate continuity,within the
framework of the clean slate rule. It seems to me that the Respondent - 64 -
has still not given the Court any answer to the following question, which
is decisive for your case:
On what basis, within the framework of the clean slate rule, can
Yugoslavia refuse to allow any kindof effectivenessto Yugoslavia's
declaration of continuity?
We still do not know why the Applicant cannotsucceed within the
framework of the clean slate rule, if it so desires.
It is, then, unusual for the real questions - in particular the
question that 1 asked just now - to be raised.
II. THE CALLING INTO QWSTION OF THE NATURE OF THE CONVENTION
1 should now like to deal, in a second point, with what 1 have called
- for want of a better title - the calling into question of the nature of
the Genocide Convention.
The points that 1 will be dealing with in thissection are relatively
new because this calling into question has seemed to me to become
increasinglyapparent in the courseof the oral proceedings.
During my first interventionbefore you, 1 indicated that Yugoslavia
was trying to disqualify the Genocide Conventionby preventing it £rom
being consideredapplicable, or by delaying its effects.
These two types of strategy - preventing the Convention £rom being
applicable and delaying its effects - are strategies that 1 would
describe as procedural attacks ... but they allow the integrity of the
Convention to subsist.
To Say that the Genocide Convention does not apply ratione personae,
as they have done because Bosnia is seen as not being a party to it, has
no directly adverseeffect upon the Convention. - 65 -
In the same way, to Say that the Genocide Conventiondoes not apply
5 9 ratione temporis,because Bosnia is not yet a party to it, has no
directly adverseeffect upon the Convention.
In other words, these initial analyses - which emerged above al1 £rom
the written pleadings - have no adverse effect upon what 1 shall cal1 the
essence of t,heConvention; they only have an adverse effect uponits
existence with regardto Bosnia.
Matters have developed very differentlw yith respect to the
conjugated assaults whose force hassteadily increased in the course of
the oral proceedings, and which do undermine thevery nature of the
Genocide Convention. We have witnessed nothingless than an attempt to
distort the Convention,an attempted distortion which is presented in the
form of three proposals,which the Government of Bosnia feels obliged to
refute in the most categoricalmarner.
First proposal: the Genocide Convention is not a convention on human
rights (so that there is no automatic continuity).
Second proposal: the clause of Article IX of the Genocide Convention
is of a purely contractual character(so there is no automatic
continuity) .
Third proposal: the non-retroactivityof the notification of
successionmust be applied to the Genocide Convention(so thtre is no
autûmatic contiauity) .
As 1 have very firrnlystated, 1 shall refute these three proposals
and 1 shall begin with the first, according to which the Genocide
Convention is not, in Yugoslavia'sview, a convention on human rights. - The Genocide Convention is said not to be a convention on human
ri-.
/il rights
The aim of such a statement - which seems tome to have been made for
the first time in the oral proceedingsand that Professor Suy persists in
not considering to be at al1 shocking (CR 96/10, p. ...) is the
following: doubtless becoming awareof the irrefutabilityof Bosnia's
position according to which there is an automatic continuity for
conventions on human rights, Yugoslavia has been unable to find more than
one way of attempting to escape, in spite of everything, £rom the
ascendency of the Genocide Convention,and that is by asserting that the
Genocide Convention does not fa11 within the category of human rights
conventions to which the rule of automatic continuity applies.
However, it can not that easily avoid being monitored by thiC sourt
under Article IX, merely by performing semantic pirouettes.
1 am somewhat confusedby being obligedto undertake a serious
refutation of those verbal constructions. 1 shall Say quite simply that:
(1) in the first. place, Bosnia assertsthat automatic continuity in fact
applies to al1 the universal treatiesthat lay down general rules.
This is stated in various passages of both the written and oral
pleadings. Of course, the conventions protectinghuman rights are a
perfect illustrationof this type of universal treatiesthat lay down
general rules. Moreover, if continuity does in fact apply to al1 the
universal treaties laying down generalrules, it does not suffice to
give the Genocide Conventionthe status of a convention of
internationalcriminal law to set aside the rule of automatic
succession'merelyby waving this magic wand;
(2) the same comment applies to a variation of the same idea which was
put forward by the Respondent. Still basing its assertion - or so it - 67 -
seems to me - upon the same premonition that it will be unable to
convince the Court that automaticsuccession does not apply to
7 1
conventions on human rights, Yugoslavia coldlydeclares that the
Genocide Conventiondoes not create any rights for individuals - and
1 quote Professor Suy who stated: "Mr. President, the Genocide
Convention contains no clause conferringsubjective rights upon
individuals." (CR 96/10, p. ...)
A few lines previously, he had used a more specific vocabulary, when
he said that the Genocide Conventiondoes not create 'lsubjective rights -
acquired rights - in favour of individuals" (CR 96/10, p. ...).
1 am well aware, Mr. President,Members of the Court, that as the
poet so aptly expressed it, 'lnothing is ever acquired by man, neither his
strength,nor his weakcess, nor his life ...". However can one, without
even raisinga eyebrow, maintain at the end of the twentieth century,
which is so concerned withthe protection of human rights, that the
people livingon this earth have no acquired right notto be the victims
of a genocide? The mere formulationof such a question maKes one
shudder !
In order to reinforizethat somewhat original argument - not to
qualify it in moral terms - Professor Eric Suy most inaptly quotes from
the writings of Professor Rein Mülierson. Quite simply, he stops the
quotation from oneof his articles too soon and 1 must - so that
Professor Mü1.lerson may not be considered as an accomplice ir,such a
negative constructionof human rights - give a fairly extensivequotation
from what he said. This is his statement, seven lines after the
quotation given by Eric Suy:
"The population of most States enjoy these rights and
though in manyStates which are partiesto such treaties human
rights are violated, participationin the treaties and the use of their respective monitoring mechanisms help both to remedy
situations where rightshave been violated andto prevent new
rir. and grave violations." ("TheContinuity andSuccession of States
!i
by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslaviav, ICLQ, 1993, p.
491.)
The matter is, then, clear: the human rights conventions described
in such terms provide for rights for individuals andfor machinery tobe
implemented,tomonitor the observance of those rights. Rights and the
monitoring of those rights. The aim of that monitoringis to make sure
that reparation is available to those who have been victims of a
violation of their rights and to prevent any future violations.
This gives a framew~rk for an analysis into which the Genocide
Convention fits perfectly: it provides that individualsare entitled not
to be murdered, are entitled not to have to undergo any assault upon
their physical or mental integrity,are entitled not to be subjected to
living conditions such as to lead to the destruction of the group to
which they belong ... and 1 maintain that this right isa subjective
rignt of individuals. What is more, the Genocide Conventionprovides for
a whole series of monitoring mechanisms: monitor'ing by national courts,
monitoring by the International Courtof Justice, monitoring by an
internationalcriminal court - once such a court has been brought into
being. Moreover, the finality of that monitoring is also the twofold
objective indicated by Rein Müllerson; to provide a remedy for
violations and to prevent futureviolations.
This means that there is not the slightest reasonable basis upon
which one can assert that the Convention on Human Rights is not a
convention for the protection of human rights, that the Genocide
Convention is not a convention for the protection of human rights and,
for that reason, is to be exempted £rom the rule of automatic succession. - Monitoring under Article IX of the Genocide Convention is said
to be of a purely contractual character
73
The second statement that1 should like forcefully to refuteis that
monitoring under Article IX of the Genocide Conventionis of a purely
contractualcharacter.
The second statementwhich, once again, seems to me to have been
presented for the first time during the oral proceedings, has exactly the
same impact as the analysis that we have just made, i.e., the point of
analyzing Article IX in a contractualmanner, is to contend that
automatic successionwould apply to the provisions layingdom general
rules but would not apply to the clausesrelating to dispute settlement.
By attempting to bilateralize the clause of Article IX, Professor Suy
is doubtless attemptingto minimizing the impact of the - fundamental -
judicial monitoring included in that Article. Does he not go so far as
to qualify the Genocide Convention asa "Conventionwhich is allegedly of
universai applicationv? (CR 96/6; Eng. Trans. p. 14).
1 shall replyby referring to your Court, on the one hand to the 1951
Advisory Opiniorion the Genocide Convention and on the other to the
Judgment to the case concerning the Right of Passage over Indian
Terri tory.
In the 1951 Advisory Opinion - to which lengthyreferences have been
made and to which 1 shall not revert - it is very frequently stated that
it relates to a universal convention,and the Court has never given the
. slightest indication of any need to distinguish between legislativeand
contractual clauses.
The Judgment on the preliminary objections raised in the Right of
Passage case likewise seems to me to be most significant. It may be recalled that the Government of Portugal filedoptional
74 declarations of acceptance of the compulsoryjurisdictionof the Court on
19 December 1955, and that it filed an application against India by
virtue of that declaration three days later, on 22 December.
As India did not receive the notification until somewhat later - 1
shall not go into the dates inorder to avoid wasting.time - but after
the seisin of the Court, attempted to exploit thatsituation in order to
have the application of Portugal declaredinadmissible. The idea
underlying its reasoning was the following: as the Government of India
had been unable to file an application against Portugal Oefore having
ascertained that Portugalhad filed a declaration of acceptance, that
meant that, in that case, India could oniy institute proceedingsbefore
the Court on 9 January 1956 or, at the earliest, on 30 December 1955,
when it had been informed ofthat declaration of acceptance. Inversely,
India could have filedthe application once its own declaration had been
deposited. Portugal accordingly contended that therehad been an
infringementof the exchange of intentions to carry out the contract, and
that this meant that India's declaration could not take effect as from
the date of that deposition, and that it would only have Seen operational
if the intentions of the two States had coincided.
The Court very firmly rejected that analysis. It indicated that the
network of declarations of acceptance of the jurisdictionof the Court
could not be analyzed as a network of bilateral relations,but on the
contrary constitutedan integrated network, a system aimed at an
objective of general interest.
Although it is somewhat long, 1 should like to read out a relevant
passage from the Judgrnentin the case concerningthe Right of Passage,
Prel iminary Objections: "The Court considers that, by the deposit of its
Declaration of Acceptance with theSecretary-General,the
accepting State becomesa Party to the system of the Optional
Clause in relation to the other declarant States, with al1 the
rights and obligations deriding fromArticle 36. The
contractual relation between the Parties and the compulsory
jurisdictionof the Court resulting therefromare established,
'ipso facto and without special agreement8,by the fact of the
making of the Declaration. Accordingly,every State which makes
a Declaration of Acceptance must be deemed to take into account
the possibility that, under the Statute, it may at any time find
itself subjected to the obligationsof the Optional Clause in
relation to a new Si.gnature as the result of thedeposit by that
Signatory of a Declaration of Acceptance." (I.C.J. Reports
1957, p. 146.)
It seems to me that the system of Article IX can be analyzed in
exactly the same way. The Federal Republic does not have to have
received notification of the successionof Bosnia, for the compromissory
clause of Article IX to be operative inrelation to Yugoslavia. And
there is, 1 believe, no possible basis for contracturalizingArticle IX
in order to exempt it from automatic continuity.
- The non-retroactivity of the notification of succession should
be applied to the Genocide Convention
One last point upon which 1 would like tostate my firm oppositionto
the claims of the opposing Party is the statement according to which the
non-retroactivityof the notification of succession shouldbe applied to
the Genocide Convention.
With that proposal, we are perhaps moving ont0 the most strange, the
most disturbing or ouradversary's submissions.
1 would like, therefore, to give the reasons which lead me to Say
that that statement on the non-retroactivityof the notification of
successionwas made for reasons that seemto me to be hard to
acknowledge.
Professor Suy actuaïly says that the notification of succession
cannot be retroactive,cannot take effectat the time of independence.Why? Ah well, he says, because the States partiesto a convention,who
do not really know whether a new State is bound before it effects its
notification,may find themselvesbound withouttheir knowledge. 1 will
quote from what Professor Suy actually said, namely:
"Accordingto Bosnia-Herzegovinathesis, al1 States parties
of the 1948 Convention, including Yugoslavia,would have been
bound by treaty to Bosnia-Herzegovinawithout their knowledge."
(CR9616; Eng. Trans., p. 22.)
Does this suggest that what Yugoslaviais complaining about, is that
it did not know that it could not commit crimesof genocide in Bosnia
with impunity?
This interpretationseems, moreover, to be borne out by subsequent
excerpts from a commectary of the InternationalLaw Commission,which is
so characteristicthat 1 should like to read it out, even if it is not
given in full. It says that:
"the intended recipient, still unaware of a notification or
communication,might in al1 innocsnce commitan act which
infringed the legal rights of the State making it".
It is clear that the International Law Commission could onlb ye
referring to economic rights, and that it 1s impossible to transfer that
reasoning to obligations erga omnes.
If we were actually to transpose that reasoning, that would imply
that non-retroactivityhas to be imposed in this case, as if this were
not the case Yugoslavia, before havingknowledge of the notification of
Bosnia, could well violate the Genocide Convention inal1 innocence.
However, Mr. President,Members of the Court, 1 have not finished
with retroactivity.
1 should like to make a few concludingcomments on that subject.
These tend to show that al1 the efforts of Yugoslavia to delay entry into
force of the Yenocide Convention with regard to Bosnia are bound to fail. - 73 -
More particularly, the idea accordingto which one cannot acceptthe
retroactivityof the notification of succession is completely useless.
What in fact is Yugoslavia telling us, now that it thinks that it has
managed to remove £rom the jurisdictionof the Court al1 the massacres
that took place in Bosnia, including Srebrenica?
It tells us that, thanks to Dayton, the Genocide Conventionis
currently in force, i.e., as from 14 December 1995. That means, and any
lawyer will agree, that the compromissoryclause of Article IX is
currently inforce.
Let us look for a minute at that compromissory clause.
We know that a compromis always, by definition,provides for the
exercise of jurisdictionby arbitrators,with respectof facts that
occurred before thecompromis came into being.
We also know that unless there is an express specificationto the
contrary, optional declarations of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
cover those facts that occured before they were deposited.
It is not clear why the compromissoryclause.;if one accepts - and
Yugoslavia does accept - that it is currently inforce, could not enable
your Court to supervise compliance with the rules of the
Genocide Convention,which nobody denies to have been applicable since it
first came intobeing.
Lastly, and in order to remove any doubts asto your jurisdiction, 1
must add that the existence today, when the caseis before this Court, of
a valid basis of jurisdictionrecognized explicitlyby the two Parties,
obliterates what Yugoslavia has incessantlydenounced as being the
Court's lack of jurisdiction to deal with this Application.
Mr. President,Members of the Court, this brings me to the end of my
arguments on the succession of States, but 1 should like to add that - 74 -
Bosnia-Herzegovina,drawing an inférence £rom what 1 have jus+ said,
anticipates that you will ültimately inform it that you are ready to hear
its case.
It is vital that Bosnia be able to present its complaints to this
Court.
And sin,ce,during these oral arguments, there have been discussions
on contributions to the iegal theory, not of an unknown warrier but by an
unknown student, 1 should like to borrow the conclusion to my statement
from one of my students, Ian Jurovitz, who is currently writing a thesis
under my supervision on the concept of a crime against humanity.
Reflecting on the immense challenge posed by the need to reconcile
differect peoples after an ordeal like the one undergone by Bosnia, he
wrote that "Peace can be niadeamong Nations, but there can be no peace
between crimes and humanity."
1 thank you, Mr. President, and would askyou to call upon the
co-Agent,Mr. Phon van den Biesen, who will present the submissions of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Tne PRESIDEhi: 1 thank you, Professor Brigitt? Stern, for your
statement and call upon Mr. Phon van der Biesen. to present the
submissions.
M. van den BIESEN: Monsieur le Président, Messiesrs les Membresde
la Cour,
A la fin de cette procédure orale, j'ai l'honneur de présenter, en
guise de conclusion, quelques observationsau nom du Gouvernement de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Tout au long de cette semaine, nous avons, longuement, peut-être trop
longuement, démontré à la Cour qu'il n'existe aucun fondement, tant en - 75 -
fait qu'en droit, pour que celle-ci fasse droit à l'une ou l'autre des
exceptions soulevéespar 1'Etat défendeur. Parailleurs, 1'Etat
défendeur a apporté la démonstrationqu'il ne prend pas cette affaire au
sérieux, qu'il ne prend pas au sérieux 1'Etat demandeur et, de ce fait,
qu'il ne prend pas non plus au sérieux la Cour elle-même.
Au cours de cette semaine nous avons, de façon concise, peut-être
trop concise, compte tenu de l'énormité des faits, démontré à la Cour que
cette affaire est bien une affaire de génocide. Cependant1'Etat
défendeur n'a pas jugé appropriéde consacrer un seul mot aux faits que
nous avons relatés. De plus, les représentants dela Yougoslavie n'ont
pas montré, de quelque manière que ce soit, la moindre compassionpour
les victimes de l'immense tragédie qu'a connue la Bosnie-Herzégovine.
L'Etat défendeur s'est borné faussement à déclarer : «Nous ne sommes pour
rien dans cette tragédie»,démontrant parlà-même ce qu'est sa position :
«Nous n'avons cure de cette tragédie.»
Nous sommes persuadésque la Cour prendra ses distances aveccette
forme extrême de cynisme, lorsqu'elleexaminera cetteaffaire.
Nous avons parcouru biendu chemin, eK ce au prix de plusieurs
tentatives,pour déterminer le contenu juridiquede ces exceptions
préliminaires. Nous avons tenté de les traiter de la façon que l'on est
en droit d'attendre d'un Etat qui seprésente devantla Cour. Nous ne
doutons pas quece que la Cour fera correspond à ce qui est, depuis le
début, pour le peuplebosniaque, l'essencemême de cette affaire : que
3 u
justice lui soit rendue là 05 trop d'injusticesont été commises.
Conclusions finales
Considérant ce qui a été exposé par la Bosnie-Herzégovinedans toutes
ses conclusionsécrites antérieures et ce qui a été affirmé par les
représentants de cet Etat au cours d~ la procédure orale de cette - 76 -
semaine, le Gouvernementde la Bosnie-Herzégovineprie respectueusement
la Cour
1) de dire et juger que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie a
abusé du droit de soulever des exceptions préliminaires que prévoit le
paragraphe 6 de l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour et l'article 79 de son
Règlement;
2) de rejeter les exceptions préliminaires de la République
fédérative de Yougoslavie;et
3) de dire et juger
i) que la Cour estcompétente sur la base des divers motifs qui ont été
exposés dans nos conclusionsécrites antérieures et qui ont été plus
amplement démontrésau cours de la présente procédure orale au regard
des conclusionsprésentées dansle mémoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine
et
ii) que ces conclusionssont recevables.
Je vous remercie de l'attentionque vous avez bien voulu réserver à
nos plaidoiries.
The PRESIDENT: 1 thank you, Mr. van den Biesen, for your statement
and for the final submissions that you have justpresented on behalfof
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1 should also like to thankal1 the members of the
Bosnian team who have assistedthe Court by shedding lighton the case.
This brings to an end the second roundof oral arguments by
Bosnia-Herzegovina,and at the same time concludes thewhole of these
proceedings that have been under way since Monday, 29 April. 1 thank the
Y 1
agents, counsel and advocates of the two Parties for the assistance that
they have given to the Court and for the spirit of courtesy that they
have manifested throughoutthese hearings. In accordance withthe usualpractice, 1 shall ask the two Agentsto remain at the disposa1 of the
Court for any further informationthe Court may require in order to carry
out its task, and subject to that proviso, 1 declare closed the oral
proceedings in the case concerning thA epplication of the Genocide
convention. The Court wi.11now withdraw to deliberate on the case and
the agents yill in due course be notified of the date when theJudgment
will be delivered. The Court havingno other business on its agenda, the
sitting isnow closed.
The Court rose at 6.05 p .m.
Traduction