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CK 93/32 (Traduction)
CR 93/32 (Translation)

Le mercredi 14 juillet 1993
Wesdiiesday14 July 1993 Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vousasseoir. Je donne laparole à
. O10

M. Pellet.

Mr. PELLET:

1. My brief oral pleading this mornini gntroduces thefourthand

last part of Chad'soral rejoinder.

This part will deal with the Franco-LibyanTreaty of 10 August 1955

which appears tous to be capableof providingsufficient,simple,and 1

was almost going to say "obvious"bases for thesolutionof the dispute

on which you are requestedto pronounceby the FrameworkAgreement

concludedat Algierson 31 August 1989.

One of the paradoxesof the case before you is, however,that after

2,344 pages of writtenpleadings - we have counted them, Mr. President!-

not including,of course,the 21 volumesof annexes,and after a month of

oral pleadings,the Partiescontinueto be opposedto one anotheras to

the realnature and actual scopeof theirdispute.

There is no doubt: the Partiesdisagree. But abouwhat?

2. As my colleaguesand friends ProfessorF sranck and Sorel showed

yesterday, Chad'sattitudeduring the 20 years that the disputehas

lastedhas been clear,consistentand firm. Poor and disadvantagedas it
w

is, and weakenedby civilwar and toomany fratricidal struggles,Chad

has never wavered in its legal,and 1 would goso far as to say

"patriotic",convictions. In al1 the Governmentsthat have succeededone

anotherat N'Djamenasince 1971, the year of the first threats to the

integrityof the nationalterritory, the Aozos utrip dispute- for it is
1)
this thathas been the point atissueal1 along - has alwaysproduced the

same reactions: thisregionof 114,000square kilometres formsan

integralpart of the Republicof Chad, and thatfor reasons which havenot changed: the Treaty concludeo dn 10 August 1955 between independent

Libya and France,to which Chad has succeeded, establishen de varietur

the boundary between the two countries; that of 7 January 1935, the

Laval-Mussolini Treaty, never entered intoforceand groducedno legal

effect whatever.

3. It is more difficultto make sense of the successive positions

adoptedby Libya,althoughduringthe first20 years whichfollowed its

accessionto independenceit manifested,by its consistent attitudet ,he

convictionthat the lineof its southern boundarw yas indeed the line

which Chad is defendingtoday andwhich the 1955 Treaty had defined.

This was reflectedin a peaceful CO-existence, firs with France and

laterwith independentChad,until the end of the 1960s. And the fact is

not without legal significance.

Matters became less clear thereafter:Libya made,or had

circulated, some doubtfu maps; but it disclaimed responsibilitf yor

them; it seized the Aozou strip but, for a while, affirmedthat it was

present there only fop rurelyhumanitarian reasons befor eoing on to

deny the existence of a disputeand then to justify itself grudginglyby

arguments which always directl or indirectly - 1 am thinkingof the

invocation ofthe "phantommap" aboutwhich Professor Franch kas spoken

at some length - harkedback to the Laval-Mussolini Treaty o1 f935.

Yet Libyahas brought adifferent dispute befort ehe Court,a

dispute defined by it alone as concerning halfof Chad's territory. 1

may Say that we believewe coulddetect,especially atthe end of the

Libyan pleadings, something lia ketendencyto fa11 back on the

1935 line. Moreover, everyone could readin the magazine Jeune Afrique

of 8 July of this year an interview withthe LibyanMinister for ForeignAffairs,Mr. Al-Mountasser,in whichhe stated: "Asfor the dispute

concerning the Aozou strip, we await the verdictof the Courtat The

Hague."

That statement addsto our perplexity, Mr. President; foron the

very day when the headof Libya's diplomacy was making it Libya's Agent

was reaffirming the Jamahiriya'ssubmissionshere (cf. CR 93/29,

pp. 71-72). The legal problemsto which Professor Higgins drew the

Court'sattentionat the beginningof our pleadings(cf. CR 93/21,

pp. 44 ff.) are therefore far from being resolved; wetare convinced

that your Judgmentwill take care of that.
I
4. The contrastbetweenwhat 1 might cal1 the "amplitude" of Libya's

claims - but that isan understatement - and its litigation strategi ys

very striking.

The Libyan Partyhas never, in point of fact, tried to establish

positivelythe soundnessof its claims, which are as unexpecta ed they

are enormous. Rather,it has spent its timecriticizingthe legal

arguments advanced by Chad. But pilingup argumentsthat are exclusively

negativedoes not seem to us to be of great helpto the Court in settling

the dispute. "Lessplus less"has never addedup to a positive

solution; the negative strategy adoptedby Libya may perhaps have raised w

a doubt concerning this or that elementof our thesis,but it does not

seem to us to be capableof establishing the soundnessof the Libyan

party's submissions, any more,come to that, than of calling into

question Chad's case as a whole. .

Such "harassrnenttactics" have anothecronsequence: theybligeOur

adversariesto concentrateon points ofdetail. But, as ProfessorCrawford

(CR 93/29,p. 32) pointedout to Mr. Sohier (CR 93/27,p. 66), it is not

the good Lord butthe devil that resides inthe details. 5. We on this side of the barbelievethat the purposeof judicial

debate is to enableeach party to justifyits conclusionsby legal

argumentswhich ought to show an overallconsistency.

That is why, in this last round of oral pleadinwe have

endeavouredto demonstrate thatour wholethesisultimatelyconverged

upon the Treaty of 10 August 1955. Thatoes not-meanthat the same

resultcannotbe reachedby other linesof argument; and we maintain,in

particular, thatit ispossibleto reasonon groundsof territorialtitle

rather than of the boundaryline itself,and that the colonial

effectivitésfollowedby independentChad'speaceful exercise of its

territorialsovereigntyjustifythe submissionsChad has put beforeyou.

We are likewiseconvincedthat the agreements concludebetweenthe

colonialpowers at the very end of the 19th centuryand atthe beginning

of the presentone in themselvesestablishedthe boundarywhose course
the Republicof Chad has defined. Likewiseagain,we think that this

boundaryis bindingupon Libya by reasonof its acquiescence thereto.

Each of these lines of argumenthas its meritsand couldbe

sufficientin itself. Buthe characteristiocf the 1955 Franco-Libyan

Treaty is that it is, as it were, the pointof convergence1would

almost Say that it "transcends"them all:

- it establishes beyond any doubttat the two Partieshave a territorial

title on eitherside of the frontierit determines. In this

connection,1 shouldlike to open a brief parenthesis: on 6 July one

of the eminent counsel foLibya mentioned three timesthe

extraordinary outburst("CR 93/27,pp. 56-57)of a no less eminent

(21 4 counselfor Chad,who had askedhow the Libyan Partyreconciledits
- -
theory accordingto which Francehad never acquired territorial title

with its recognitioof the validityof the 1955 Treaty(CR 93/24,

p. 42); asking this questionvas certainlynot an "extraordinary
5 1 5 outburst",and 1 simplynote in passing thatthe very existence ofthe

Treaty showsthat the twoparties mutually recognized each other's

territorial title whicLhibya todaydenies- retroactively - to

France; the Treaty reaffirms thtewo States' territorial title;

- likewise,by defining the earlier delimitation agreemenats being in

forcebetweenthe parties, the 1955 Treaty removedany doubt there

might have beenas to the opposabilityof those instrumentsto Italy

and later to Libya;

- likewiseagain,by expressly recognizing in the Treaty that the

frontiers betweenthem resultedfrom those agreements, thetwo parties
*
made superfluous any discussion concerning r thelityand scope of

previous acquiescences.

Of course thisdoes not mean, 1 repeat,that the rights ofthe

Republicof Chad do not alsoresult from the territorial titleto which

it succeeded from Franceand also fromthe Agreements of1899, 1902 and

1919 or from the previous acquiescencbes Italy or Libya. It merely

means that, since Libya and Franceagreed in 1955upon the course ofa

boundary, thereis no point in lookingany further.

6. It is therefore particularly importanat, this ultimate stage of
w
the oral pleadings,to sum upwhat we have to Say about the Treatyof

10 August 1955in the lightof the arguments developedby counselfor

Libya during the oralpleadings.

First,Professor Jean-PierrCeot will establish thatthe Treaty

meets the basic objective of stabilitthat any frontier settlementust

meet, and thatit must be interpretedin the light of that principle.

C? O Professor Higgins willthen endeavourto show that thediscussionon

the constitutive or declaratory charactofrthe Treaty, to whichOur

adversarieshave devotedso much time, is a dead-end. Lastly,with yourpermission,Mr. President,Mr. Jean-PierreCot

will returnto the bar to address himself more specificallyto the

conceptof international instrument sn force before goingon to the

questionof good faith.

Mr. President, Members of the Court,you have shown a great deal of

patienceand kindnessby consentingto hear me .onseveraloccasions. For

this 1 thankyou most warmlyand 1ask you, Mr. President,to cal1 upon

ProfessorCot .

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Pellet. MonsieCot.

Mr. COT: As Professor Pellet has just toldyou, we are revertingto

the interpretation of the Treaty of10 August 1955. That is what we

started with in the first round. With that, logicallyw ,e end the

second roundbecausewe believethat to apply theTreaty of

10 August 1955sufficesto resolvethe dispute brought before you: to

apply the Treaty of 10August 1955and, inparticular, Article 3 of the

Treaty and its Annex1, which we have taken the liberty of redistributing

to you for today's hearing folder.

1 note that theLibyanParty actually projectedfor you and

distributedto you severalpreliminarydraftsand alternative texts

envisaged atone point or anotherin the negotiations(cf.Judges'

foldersNos. 12, 13, 187 and 96). And this as late as on the last day of

Libya'soral pleadings by ProfessorBowett . But 1 also note that it

forgotto distributeto you the decisive text,that is to say Annex 1 of

the Treaty! It did, of course, include the Annex in its written

pleadings,but you will findno traceof it in the Green Book.
. .
"?7 Allow me to recallthat underArticle9 of the Treaty of
i;;
10 August 1955"the Conventionsand Annexes appended to the present

Treaty ... form an integralpart of it". 1 add that Annex 1, inconsigningto the same instrument Article 3 whose termsit reiteratesand

the lists of reference treaties, affirmsby so doing the unityof the

instrumentum, which isan additional indicatioo nf the Parties' willto

envisage this set of norms asan indissociable whole.

For the purposeof interpretingthe Treaty - as 1 recalledduring

the first round - we have at our disposa1a "discourseon method": the

Vienna Convention,which codifies your case-law. 1 invited

Sir Ian Sinclair,who is well acquainted with thoseprovisions,and for

good reason,to apply them to the interpretation of the text we are

concerned with. Buhe chosenot to do so, seeking,on the contrary,
1
with talentand skill,to mix up different methods of interpretation, to

omit essential instrument and to recompose inhis somewhat baroque

fashiona treatycobbled together ouo tf odds and ends.

There is inthis approach undoubtedly somethio ngAnglo-saxon

pragmatism,which 1 salute- a defiancein the face ofan excessively

square Cartesianism. There iin it above al1 what one mightcal1 a wish

to "fudgethe issue"so as to avoid theconclusionsto which the

interpretation of the Treaty of10 August 1955 accordingto the banal

rules of the art inevitably leads. 1 am thereforefacedwith the

difficult choice betweee nither repeatingmyself or following SirIan in V

his excursionsand peregrinations at the risk of losingsight of the

essentialpoint. Fortunately,Mr. Maghur suggests a sensible solution

that can get us out of the difficulty:

"In counsel's presentation, Libya will indicate t fhor
Court the principal matters of substance in this cn ase
adequately addressed in Chad'swritten pleadings, or in these
oral proceedings,
for the issuesconcernedto have been truly
joined ... the failureto address pointsof evidenceand
argumentsof an adversary may well resultin a tribunal's
construing such failure astantamountto an admission."
(CR 93/27,p. 17.) 1 will, accordingly,availmyself of the freedomwhich Libya's Agent

proposesto us, without, 1 hasten to reassureyou, abusingit!

1 shall refer first to the cardinal principlo ef the stabilityand

finalityof the border dispute settlement. In connectionwith this

principle, 1 had quoted - almost pour mémoire, 1 shouldsay - the

Advisory Opinion of the PermanentCourt of International Justicein the

Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne case andthe Judgmentof the

International Court of Justicein the Temple of Preah Vihearcase.

Sir Ian Sinclairsurprisedme by his insistenceon minimizingthe scope

of the dicta 1 had cited,as thoughthey concerned only specialcases

or were obiter dicta without any consequenc eCR 93/27,pp. 29-30).

1 must say that 1:completely disagrew eith Sir Ian. It was not the

local circumstancesthat in both these cases led the Courtto recognize

the stabilityand finalityof the boundarysettlement,but on the

contrary,it was the searchfor the stability and finalityof the

boundary settlement that ledthe PermanentCourt tostipulatea complete

boundary line in the Treaty of Lausanne case and the International

Court to recognizethe existenceof an estoppel and todismissthe

argumentof error in the Temple of Preah Vihearcase.

It is indeed thecardinal principle of stabilityof frontiersthat

governedthe settlementof the cases at issue,and not the otherway

round. Moreover,we are not dealingwith a few isolatedcases.

1 shallnot bore the Court byrecapitulating al1 the many cases

relatingto this principle. The Permanent Court recalled tht ate

boundarymust be delimited completel and uninterruptedly in the
C, 3
Jaworzina case (P.C.I.J.,Series 8, No. 8, p. 32). International

tribunals emphasized t:hestability requiremeni tn theGrisbadarna case

(RSA, Vol. XI, p. 161), theFrontier Land case(I.C.J. Reports 1959,pp. 221-222),the Beagle Channel case (in which

the Tribunalreferred explicitlt yo the Court's dictum in the Temple

of Preah Vihear case: 52 ILR, p. 131) and the Aegean Sea case, in

which your Court statedin connectionwith delimitationthat:

"Whetherit is a land frontier or a boundaryline in the
continentalshelf that is in question,the processis
essentiallythe same, and inevitablyinvolvesthe same element
of stabilityand permanenceand is subjectto the rule
excluding boundary agreements from fundamec nhangeof
circumstances." (I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 36.)

The doctrineis just as voluminous,and 1 shall confinemyself to

agreeingwith the authorsof the 9th editionof Oppenheim that a tribunal

dealingwith a boundary dispute - as we are now - "willhave it in mind

that 'oneof the primaryobjects'of boundarysettlement'is toachieve

stablityand finality' ..." (pp. 667-668).

1 shallnot returnto the demonstration conducty edsterday bymy

colleague Professor Francc koncerning the stabilit oyf African frontiers

and the application of the uti possidetis principlewithin the

Organizationof AfricanUnity. The principleof the stabilityand

finalityof frontiersis a cardinal principlw ehich is very widely

applicable.

We are not assertingthat this principle is absolutely applicable,

for theParties can set it aside or can agree to carry outonly apartial

delimitationof the boundary. Butwhat we maintainis that if this

principlehas any meaning,if it is not justan empty formula,a

rhetorical phrase, it shouldserve asa presumption and should clarify

the interpretation of the provisions of a treatyor of an articleof a

treaty concerning an internationalfrontier. As the PermanentCourt

stated in the Treaty of Lausanne case, and 1 beg your pardon for

repeating this quotationin one pleading after another: "It is ... natural that any article designedto fix a
frontier should, if possible, b seo interpretedthat the result
of the application of its provisionsin their entirety should
be the establishment of a precise, completeand definitive
frontier." (P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 12,p. 20.)

1 can understand Sir Ian's embarrassmea ntd his unwillingnessto

accept this principla end the legal presumptiownhich followsfrom it,

sincehe has no possibilityof proving the contrary intention t ofe

parties. We demonstratedthis duringthe firstround and 1 shall return

to the pointin a moment. Neither the text, the contex nor the

subsequent practice establishes anysuch contrary intention, any more

than do the travaux préparatoires.

To set this presumption asidewould be detrimentalto thestability

of boundary settlementa snd take us beyond thescope of the present

case. 1 have no desire to bestridethe horses of the apocalypse of which

we have spokenso much, but ifyou followthe reasoning ofOur opponents,

you will be invitinga general,criticalreview ofthe territorial

clausesof al1 treaties. 1am therefore sure that you will maintainthis

presumptionof the stabilityand finality ofthe boundary settlement.

Let us now see whetherthe Libyan Partyhas succeededin refutingthis

presumptionby means of new and decisiveevidence.

First of all,let us take the objectand purposeof the Treaty. My

opponent spokeironicallyabout myanalysis ofthe preamble ofthe

Treaty: what1 stressedwas that the Treaty intendedto facilitatethe

settlementof al1 the questionsthat arose for thetwo countriesfrom

their geographic situation. As know, a preambleis only a partof a

whole, and it is rathermore than a "nicety",since it declaresthe will

of the partiesto contributeto the settlement ofal1 these problems.

This will is also manifestedby Article 3 of the Treatyand Annex 1

thereto, whichdefine the boundaries between the twoHigh Contracting

Partiesand providefor a demarcation procedurea , delimitationof the whole of the frontier betweenthe two partiesor, more precisely- and

Sir Ian is right on that point- of al1 the frontiersbetweenthe two

parties.

Why this plural? 1 would be inclinedto say that it is becausein .

good French one speaksof "les frontièresde la France" or "les

frontièresde I1Ecosse",but it is also becausethe legal statusof the

French possessionsin Africa varied greatlayt the time - protectorates,

departments, overseatserritories. But in any case, this grammatical

point, this plural,in no way affects the requiremenotf the stability

and finalityof the boundary settlement between the contract pangties.
I
With regardto thehypothesisof two segmentsof the frontier, one

delimited and the other"to be delimited",and thecorrelative hypothesis

of an implicit mandatefor negotiationon the segmentsof the frontier

which arenot delimited, 1 still do not seeany shadowof proof in its

favour, eitherin the text, in the contextor in the travaux

préparatoires. SiIan Sinclairhas certainlyrefined his hypothesisby

distinguishing between fou insteadof two segments pertainingto

different conventional instruments But he is batteringat an opendoor,

if 1 may Say so, sincehe has in no way established thewill of the

partiesto deal specificallyor differently with any segment of the

frontier accordingto the instrumentof referencein question. 1 can

thus refer theCourt to my pleadingon this subjectduring the first

round (CR 93/22,pp. 11-14). 1 have nothingto addto this.

The parties notonly agreedto delimit al1 their frontiers,but they

providedfor a demarcation procedur to eliminateal1 difficultieson the

ground. The Frenchand Libyan diplomats were well awao re the

distinction between delimitatia ond demarcation,and we have constantly

02 3 been remindedthat it was the representativeosf Francewho introducedthat distinctionduringdebatesin the United Nations (CR 93/27,p. 35).

And in this connection, Sir Ian Sinclair evenpaid a tributeto the

Frenchdiplomaticservice!

He has never contestedthat demarcation presupposes delimitation, a

frontierwhich has already been delimiteda ,nd this has confrontedhim

with a difficulty, that of explainit nge establishmentof a procedure of

demarcation,and not a procedure of delimitation, of the frontiers

between the two parties. Our opponenttried to evade this difficultb yy

interpreting the paragraphs relatit ngthe demarcation procedure, those

of Annex1, as applying onlyto the segment between Ghâa tnd Tournmand

by pointing outthat theseparagraphs concerning demarcation foll thwe

paragraphin which the two parties establish the three points serv asng

a basis for the delimitation o the frontierin that segment.

(CR 93/27,pp. 47-48). He is thus tryingto break upthe effectof

Annex 1 and toconfinethe demarcation procedurt eo one specificsegment.

This interpretation in no way resultsfrom the text of Annex1,

which refersto "demarcatingthe boundary, wherever that work hasnot

yet been done and where eitherGovernmentmay considerit tobe

necessary".

1 would add that the interpretation in question, designedto break

up the effectof Annex 1, is furtherrefuted by the subsequentconductof

the parties,as may be seen from the Inoharten incident (MC,Anns. 276

and 278). Inohartenis north of Ghât, inthe Edjelé region. Following a

frontier incident, Prime Minister Ben Halim reques inedarch 1956that

the demarcation procedurp erovidedfor in Annex 1 to the 1955 Treatybe

applied. The French Government consented, pointing o that the Treaty

of 1955 hadnot yet enteredinto forceand that there couldbe no forma1

application ofthe procedureprovidedfor init, but neitherthe FrenchGovernmentnor the LibyanGovernment sought to limit the

demarcation procedureto the segment between Ghâatnd Toummo, whichdid

not comprise the Inohartenregion.

And then,we are asked, whydid the French Governmenn tot cal1 for .

demarcation along the whole lengo th thefrontier,and particularlythe

frontier betweenToummo and Sudan, if it believed that this frontiehad

alreadybeen delimitedby the 1955 Treaty? Why, becausetherewas no

need to delimit thisfrontier! Demarcation is a difficultand expensive

operation, especiallyunder the conditionsof the time,in 1955,when the

equipmentwe have now was not available,and especiallyin such an

inhospitabledesert regionas the Tibestican be. In this sector,and

through the applicatioonf the instrumentsof reference, delimitationcan

be precisely establishebdy referringto specificastronomie

CO-ordinates; in 1955 the boundaryline did not pass throughany

populated centres, cultivate land or militaryinstallations.The

caravansof necessitytravelled from onw eateringplace to another,every

one ofthese points being situateodn one or the otherside of the

frontier,and this sufficed for anycontrols. At that time, fortunately,

no one had the preposteroui sdea of settingup a frontier barrier with a

customs officerin a peakedhat inthe middle of thedesert. Demarcation V

had no meaning in this sector.

1 thereforenote that on this point the LibyanParty has adducedno

proof that in 1955 the partiesintendedto accorddifferenttreatmentto

any particular segmenotf the frontier. The text of Article3 does not

u - 5 distinguishbetween the frontiers concerneda ,nd the textof Annex 1

lists al1 the applicable conventions withoumaking any distinction

betweenthem. The demarcation procedure is applicabla e,necessaryand

at the requestof one or the other Party, to any segment whatsoeveorf

the frontier or frontiers. Mr. President,1 now come to thecontext.

Our opponents have notsaid much about the context,and 1 shall

therefore take the libertyof referringto the "Maghurdoctrine".

Articles 4 and 5 refer back toArticle3 for the definitionof the

frontier,and thereby imply its existence. The same appliesto the

Conventionof Good Neighbourlinesa snd also to the specialconvention

which, as we know, explicitlysituatesthe Muri Idie regionin Chadian

territory and thus confirms the appurtenanc of the Aozou stripto Chad.

Finally, the hypothesio sf an imaginarydefencezone has not been

resuscitatedin Our opponents' reply(cf. CR 93/22,pp. 14-17).

Sir Ian Sinclairreproachesme for being reticent about the

subsequentpracticeof the parties(CR 93/17,pp. 48-49). What 1 have in

mind is thesubsequent practica es it is definedin Article 31 of the

Vienna Convention,that is to Say, the practice "which establisht ese

agreementof the parties regardin[ gthe]interpretation [ot fhe

treaty]". 1 have singled outtwo texts in this connection. Contraryo

what Sir Ian says, the Agreementof 26 December1956 does not completely

refuteOur assertionthat theTreaty of 10 August 1955was intendedto

define the boundary line throughout ie tstirelength. And 1 ask you,

why was the 1956 Agreement concluded? Was it becausetherewas no

delimited frontier between Ghadam and Ghât, the sector in question?

Not at all! It was becausethe frontier as delimitedby theAgreementof

12 September 1919and referredto in the 1955 Treatydid not suit France,

. L:I.6 which wished, byan authentic interpretation to roundoff its territory

in the sector in such a way asto comprise thewhole of the oil deposit

recently discovereadt Edjelé.

In this connection, our opponenn tst unreasonablyraise the

questionof France's blackmailto the ratificationof the Treatyof

10 August 1955 (CR 93/15,p. 61). By acceptingthe Isorniamendmentin the FrenchNational Assembly - and 1 would remindyou that Maître Isorni

was to be one of the champions oFfrenchAlgeria - the French Government

in fact made the fate of the Treatyof 10 August 1955 dependenotn the

prior adoption ofthe authentic interpretatio of the boundary line in .

the Edjelé sector. We have givenan accountof al1 this in our Mernorial

and we have annexedto it the relevant parliamentar -anddiplomatic

documentation.

There is thus no possible wayin which the 1956 Agreementcan be

regardedas an interpretation of the Treatywithin the meaningallegedby

our opponents,that is to say, a recognitionof the absence of
delimitation: we know that this is a questionof authentic

interpretation,or rectification.

May 1 be permittedto make a slight digressioant this point.

Sir Ian cited andcommentedon two lettersof 1960, one fromthe Minister

for Foreign Affairs,Mr. Maurice Couvede Murville,and the otherfrom

the FrenchAmbassador in TripoliM ,r. PierreSébilleau(CR 93/27,

pp. 32-33).

These letters, written fivyeears after the 1955 Treaty,do not

constitutean agreementbetween the partieson the interpretation of the

treaty. Moreover,they donot say whatSir Ian would like them to Say.

The lettersrefermainly to the Ghât-Tournmsoector,that is to say,

the sectorwhich wasthe subjectof a specific delimitatio bny reference

to three geographic points i nhe Treaty of1955. They do not Say at any

point that the delimitationis non-existent,but theysay that the

. 2 ? 7 delimitationis unsatisfactoryand should be completed - the Ambassador
V -
refersto a general demarcatio-n so that there isno questionof a

delimitationde novo. In my opinion,al1 this does not deserveso much

of Sir Ian's attention. 1 shouldnow like to draw attentionto some negligenceon the part

of our opponents. Sir Ian cited theletter from AmbassadorSébilleau,

but theLibyan Reply reproduces only partof this letter,up to page 8

(letterof 13 June 1960, RL,Exhibit6-10, pp. 1-8; cf., also, the

English translation of this Exhibit,which indicates that the document

transmittedto the Registry is incomplete). The rest is missing,but not

for everyone, since Sir Ian was able to complete the sentence beguonn

that page. This minor slip, which1 in no way ascribeto our friend

Sir Ian Sinclair,knowinghis scrupulousprobity, wouldnot be worthy of

Our attention if there han dot been somerepetition.

This is the fourthtime that theLibyanParty is submitting an

interesting document, bup troviding theRegistrywith an incomplete

version,in violation of Article 50 of your Rules.

The first time was in connection withExhibit73 of the

LibyanMemorial,the Libyan minutes of the final negotiations.

The second time, it was in connection witEhxhibit 74 of the

LibyanMemorial, the Report of Colonel Latyoush's mission of

4 August 1955. 1 shall returnto this in the second partof my pleading,

and we have distributed the document in today's folders to facilitate

its consultation.

The third time, it was in connection withthat curious document

(RL,Exhibit 6-4) whose origin 1 had questioned. Mr. Maghur reassuredus

completelyon the respectable source of this document(CR 93/27,p. 15),

but added that:

"what these transcripts broughtout, among other things,is
that Libya did not wishor intendto deal with the delimitation
of Libya'sboundariesin the 1955 Treaty".

1 tried to check in the Exhibitannexedto the Libyan Reply the

accuracyof this assertion, which did not correspondto what 1

remembered, butfoundnothing ofthe kind. 1 then realizedthat once again the LibyanParty had only provided

extracts from this curious documen and had not submitted the whole

text to the Registry.

Mr. President, four successive violatioo nsArticle 50 of the Rules i

of Court is quite a lot! We are not tryingto createa procedural

incident, butyou will agree that al1 this createssome disorder.

After the1956 Agreement, the second text which we think involves

the subsequent practico ef the parties is the Conventioo nf

Good Neighbourliness of 2 March 1966. Last Thursday, Professor Cahier

analysed this Convention (CR 93/28,pp. 59-61),which reproduces the

essential provisions of the Good Neighbourliness Conventio on 1955.

That is why we thoughtit unnecessary in our first statemet nt repeat in

connectionwith the 1966 Convention the remarkswe had made concerning

the Convention annexet do the Treaty of 10August 1955. 1 would point

out, to completethe picture,that Articles1, 2, 6 and 8 of the

1966 Convention refer explicitl to the frontier between the two

countries, orto separateborderlands,one Chadianand the other Libyan,

on either side of the frontier, something that hardly corresponds to

Professor Cahier's analysi of one vast borderland which he showedus on

the big screen the other day. 1 shouldlike to add two remarks inthis V

connection.

1. Two good-neighbourliness conventions, oo ne 1955 and the other

of 1966, clearly establish a boundary-zone governedby commonrules on

either side of a frontierdefinedby Article 3 of the Treaty and Annex 1

thereto. But the establishment os fuch a borderlanddoes not

automatically abolish the linearfrontier. 1 would remindthe Court of

the award handed down by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Lac Lanoux case:

the Spanish Governmenp tostulatedthe existence of "a zone organizedin accordancewith a special customarylaw incorporatedin internationallaw

by the delimitation treatiesunder which ithas been recognized"

(XIIUNRIAA,p. 307) [translation by the Registry].

In this case, the Tribunas lummedup as follows:

"It is impossibleto extendthe régimeof compascuités
beyond the limits assigne to them bytreaties, orto derive
from thema generalizedconceptof 'community' which would have
any legalcontent whatsoever.With regardto recourseto the
conceptof 'borderlands', it cannot through theuse of
doctrinal terminologa ydd any obligationto those imposed by

positive law." LTranslation by the Registry.]

And Mr. Cahierwho is an eminentrepresentative of the orthodox

view, as he remindedus the otherday, is here advancinga concept,that

of frontierzone,which has no more legal substance today than in 1957.

2. My second remark relatetso theway in whichProfessor Cahier has

described the frontier zon establishedby Article2 of the Treaty of

Good Neighbourliness of 1966. He pointedout, you will perhaps remember,

that therewere 750 kilometres between Faya i nhe south and thenorthern

point of the zonethat was defined,or, as he said,more than the

distance between Nice and Paris! 1 comparethis remarkwith the repeated

assertionsof Professor Bowett about the impossibility fora contingent

of a few hundredmen to ensurethe effectivepresence ofa State insuch

a vast space. If 1have understood them well, my colleagues have nothad

our opportunity of visitingthe superb regionsof whichwe are speaking.

They would have flown for hoursat low altitude over the plateaux without

seeinga livingsoul,perhapsa shepherdand a few scrawnybeasts hereor

there. They would have seen in thefew palmgroves, a population massbut

of smallnumbers, forthe resourcesderivedfrom stock-breeding do not

allow large numbersof people to live there.

The population density itnhe B.E.T. is 0.2 inhabitantsper square

kilometre. In the Aozou strip,what can the populationbe estimatedat?

Some 5,000 inhabitants fo1r20,000square kilometres, one inhabitap ntr 20squarekilometres. If 1 remembermy geography,in a country likethe

one wherewe are today, the proportioi ns rather different: well over

200 inhabitantsper squarekilometre. 1 stress this point,

Mr. President,because the exerciseof acts of sovereignty there is

necessarily different, sporadicO .rder is maintained thereby patrolsof

what usedto be called méharis; the public serviceswork on an

ad hoc basis ratherthan by presencein a fixed post. The very concept

of frontierzone isquite different from what we know in Europe. The

journey from Gatroumto Faya is nothing like the journey from Paris to

Nice, and the frontier zone referre do in the Treatiesof Good 1

Neighbourliness of 1955 and 1966 has littleto do with the free zones of

Upper Savoy and the districtof Gex: Neverthelessit is a frontier zone

straddlinga frontier line defineb dy the relevanttreaties.

Mr. President, Members of the Court,the application ofthe

principal methods of interpretation therefora emply confirms,in our

view, the presumption raisedby the principle of stabilita ynd finality

of frontierlines. Keepingto the text,placed in its context,

illuminatedby the objectand purposeof the Treaty,and regard beinghad

to the subsequent practice ot fhe parties, Article3 and Annex 1 of the

Treaty of 10 August 1955 do have the objectand effectof determiningthe W

whole lengthof the frontiers betweenthe twoParties,notably from

Toummo to the Sudanesefrontier.

But here SirIan Sinclair bringsout his secret weapon. Al1 this

does not work, he says, sinceArticle 3 is declaratoryand not

constitutive.

In the firstround of the pleadings 1 had the opportunityto explain

why we considerthis thesisill-founded, why we think the problem isa

false problem inventeb dyOur opponentsto get out of a difficult situation. 1 may add thatif we were to follow our honourableopponents

on this groundwe shouldthen be in completeoppositionto al1 the

provisionsconceming the frontiers and the frontier régime contained in

the Treatiesof 1955 and 1966 which 1 have just discussed. But as the

Libyan thesisattacks the heart of the Treatyand the solutionit adopts

in frontiermatters,we shallnow subject-itto re-examination, a

re-examination which Professor Higgins will present.

Monsieurle Président, comme nous nousarrêteronsun peu tôt ce

matin, vousjugerezpeut-êtrecommoded'interrompreles plaidoiries à ce

moment-là,même si c'estun peu tôt, et de faireune pause avant

d'appelerMme Higgins.

. .
A Le PRESIDENT : Oui, sicela entre dans le programmegénéral,
r '7j
- -3
Monsieur Cot,merci beaucoup,et nous allons maintenant suspendre

l'audience.

The Court adjourned from 10.50 to 11.15 a.m.

Le PRESIDENT :Je donne la parole à Mme Higgins.

Mme HIGGINS :Monsieurle Président, Messieurd se la Cour, la Libye

est confrontée à un traité qu'elle a signé et ratifiéet qui règlela

questionlitigieuse,qui estde savoiroù est la frontière. Afin

d'éludercette réalité déplaisante,la Libye se lance dansles promesses

les plus hardies enfait de science-fiction, à la grandejoi-e du

spectateur. Ces tentativd esexploits descience-fiction revêten la

formed'une véritable série de propositionsjuridiquesqui sont tout à

fait de l'ordrede l'imaginaire :l'avisrelatifau Sahara occidental a

décidéque la Francen'auraitjamaispu avoirde titre;il faut choisir

entre la res nullius et la conquête;le Pacte de la Sociétédes Nationsinterdisaitdéjà de fonder un titre colonial sur l'occupationmilitaire;

une doctrinede la non-succession à l'acquiescement permet d'écartl er

notion juridiqued'opposabilité.On peut encore citer l'introducti des

théories déclaratoire et constitutivede la reconnaissance dans les

traités relatifs aux frontières.

2. La Libye nous engage à dévalerà sa suite toutes ces voies

d'évasionet à l'aiderà se déroberau bras de la loi en répondant à

toutesles questionsqu'elle a choisies. Dans l'ensemble,ces questions

nous paraissentdépourvuesde pertinencepar rapportau point litigieux

en cause et nous ne sommes pasenclins à aider la Libye quand elle tente
Ir
d'échapperau traitéde 1955. Pourtant,plaideren justice,c'est

plaideren justiceet nousnous sommesefforcésde faire connaîtrenotre

point de vue à la ~ibye et à la Cour.

3. Quelle est la thèsede la-Libyeconcernantl'article 3 et les

théories - constitutiveet déclaratoire- de la reconnaissance ? Je vais

essayer,sans artifice, de répéter commentnous comprenonsce que ditla

Libye. Je rappellerai,une fois de plus, les termes de l'article3 du

traitéde 1955 :

"Les deux Hautes Partiescontractances reconnaissent que
les frontières séparanl tes territoiresde la Tunisie,de
l'Algérie,de l'Afriqueéquatoriale françaisd e'une part, du
territoirede la Libye d'autre part, sont cellesqui résultent
des actesinternationaux en vigueurà la date de la
constitutiondu RoyaumeUni de Libyetels qu'ilssont définis
dans l'échangede lettresci-jointes."

Vient ensuitela mentionde l'annexe1.

4. Les Partiesont adoptédes pointsde vue différentsau sujet de

la signification des diver slémentsde l'article3, y comprisles

expressions "celles qu iésultent", "actei snternationauxen vigueur",et

"sontdéfinis". La Libye considère que notre interprétation du mot

"reconnaissent' présentede l'importance par elle-même et parce qu'elle

éclairenotre interprétation de ces autrestermes. Selon la Libye, comme ellel'indiqueclairementau paragraphe5.38

de sa réplique :

"L'emploidu mot 'reconnaissentm 'ontre que cette

dispositiondevait être déclaratoire de frontières existantes
et non constitutivede frontièreslà où il n'en avaitpas
existéprécédemment."

6. Qu'est-ce-quela Libye tire de cet argument ? Eh bien, la Libye

dit que"reconnaître" une frontière indique le choixd'une conception

déclaratoire(tandisque, probablement,"accepter"indiqueraitle choix

d'une conceptionconstitutive).Autrementdit le traitéde 1955 n'a

effectuéaucunedélimitationde frontières,mais simplementreconnudes

frontières qui existaientdéjà et étaientopposables à la Libye, en

vertu d'instruments internationaux q s'appliquaienten 1951.

7. On est frappépar l'ampleur que la Libye donne à son rejetdu

traitéde 1955 comme règlement frontalier. La Libye dit dans son

contre-mémoire, au paragraphe3.04 :

"Commeson libelléle dit clairement, l'article 3

stipulaitque la Libye et la France reconnaissaien tuelques
aspects de certaines frontières... l'article3 ne fixait pas
de frontières,mais il reconnaissait les frontières qui
avaientdéjà été fixéesen vertu d'accords internationaux en
vigueuren 1951." (Les italiques sont de nous.)

Certaines frontières, déclal re Libye, avaientpeut-êtrebien été déjà

fixées avant1951 et la Libyeindique lesquelled sans sa réplique

(par.5.22). Mais ces frontièresn'englobaientpas la frontière à l'est

de Toummo,et celle-cine pouvait pas davantage être considérée comme

opposableà la Libye,car en 1951l'accordde 1902 n'était pas"en

vigueur". La Libye présente cela d'unemanièreun peu curieuseet

soutientque "ni1'acc:ord franco-italien de 1900,ni celui de 1902

n'établissent de frontière"(contre-mémoire de la Libye, par. 3.11;les
-.-
italiquessont de nous). Le Tchadne demandepas à l'accordde 1902
: 0 5 5 "d'établirune frontière" : cela a été accomplipar les conventions

de 1899 et 1919. Cet accord faittoutefois partie de l'histoirede

l'opposabilitéd'une frontière existante à l'Italie, puis à la Libye.

8. Bref, l'emploidu mot "reconnaissent" perme d'invoquerla

doctrinede l'effetdéclaratoire dela reconnaissance et de limiterle

renvoiaux seules frontières qui existaient déja en 1951.

9. Monsieurle Président, Messieurs de la Cour le Tchad a indiqué

clairementdans son contre-mémoire(par.11.28)qu'il envisage cesdeux

conceptions possibled se la reconnaissance - déclaratoirepar opposition

à constitutive - avec indifférence. Mêms ei nous devionsnous engager

sur le terrain dela Libyeet admettre qu'ilfaut faireun choix entre la

théorie déclaratoire et la théorie constitutive, cela, seln onus, ne

change rien à l'affaire. Si le mot "reconnaissent" produiu tn effet

déclaratoire, alors la ligne frontière que demande la Libe yxeistaitbien

déjà en 1951 par référence à ces instruments de base. Même si onadopte

le point de vue déclaratoire, le fait que l'accord de1902 n'étaitpas

"en vigueur"en 1951 ne fournit aucuneéchappatoire.

10. L'inclusionde la formule "en vigueura "vait pourbut

d'exclure le traité de1935. Non seulementce traiténe devaitpas

figurer à l'annexe, mais les terme dont ils'agit devaient souligner

qu'il étaitmis findésormais à l'appelconstant à un instrument dépourvu

de portée juridique.Quant au fait quel'accord de 1902 figurs eur la

liste alors qu'il n'étaip tas, objectivement,"en vigueur"en 1951,les

partiesen 1955 ont simplement décidé de considérer leda itcord comme

relevant de la catégorie des instrumen "en vigueur" à cette date. La

mentiondu traité de 1902 sur la liste étaitun acte de volontéclair et

délibérédes parties. 11. Les partiesne cherchaient pas à s'engagerdans leurpropre

analyse juridique.L'expression"en vigueur" a été employéeà des fins

descriptiveset non à titre de condition préalable d l'effetdonné aux

autres clauses du traité. Cette formule n'était certe pas, comme l'a
336
soutenula Libye, une"condition inéluctabled "e l'effet donnéà

l'article 3 (contre-mémoire de la Libye,par. 4.04). Même si le fait

d'être "en vigueur" en 1902constituaitune erreur (à la différence de

l'inscriptionsur la liste par lesparties), où cela nous mène t-il ?

Dans l'affairedu Temple de Préah Vihéar, dansle fameux passageoù la

Cour affirmele principe dela stabilitédes frontièreset des solutions

définitives, elle déclare :

"Cela estimpossiblesi le tracé ainsi établi peuê ttre
remis en question à tout moment,sur la based'une procédure
constamment ouverte, et si la rectification peue tn être
demandée chaque fois que l'on découvre une inexactip turde
rapport à une disposition du traité debase. Pareille
procédure pourrait se poursuivr indéfinimentet l'on
n'atteindrait jamais une solution définitive aussi longtemps

qu'il resterait possible de découvr dirs erreurs."
(C.I.J.Recueil 1962, p. 34.)

12. Nous pouvonspenser que, si les partiesse résolventclairement

à délimiterune frontière, comme c'était le cas en 1955, l'err devrait

pour autant jouerun rôle limitéquand il s'agit de remettre en question

cette intention. De plus, l'emploi du terme "reconnaissent" souligne

cette considération et sert aussi degarantie contre le recour au moyen

tiré de l'erreur. De l'avisdu Tchad, il doit y avoir là un principe

d'interprétation des traités frontalie qusi entrenten vigueur,aussi

bien quedes traités frontaliers depuis longtemé psablis.

13. D'ailleurs, si le traité de 1955 doê itre considéré comme

"constitutif", cela aussi convientau Tchad. Si le traitéde 1955 crée

des obligations de novo et établitdes frontières là où il n'y en avait pas auparavant,et même si notrefrontièren'existaitpas déjà (elle

existait),cela aussi donne une frontière,fût-ellede novo, et la

Libye y a consenti.

14. Dans une affaireoù l'on entenddonnerun effet constitutifà

cette reconnaissanced,it la Libye, mieuxvaut consacrerà cela quelques
-
observations. C'estce qu'a fait sir IanSinclair. Pour l'essentiel,on

traitede l'éventualitéconstitutive, que la Libye présente comme une

solution impensable,en criantau mauvaiscoup. Sans demander à la Cour

d'écarterle traitéde 1955, la Libye la presse plutôtde ne pas
l'interprétercomme ayantun "effet constitutif"c,ar celane tiendrait
'0 3 7 \I
-.- pas comptede la situationdésavantagéeet de l'ignorance danslesquelles

la Libyese trouvaitquand elle l'a conclu. L'argumentde la "pauvre

Libye"n'a pas pour butde priver le traitéde validité, mais de

l'interpréterafin qu'il dise cequ'ilne dit pas. Sur le fondde cette

demande, M. Cot vous en dira davantage.

15. Ainsi leTchad n'a-t-ilperçu aucunenécessité spéciale

d'effectuerles choixque la Libyeveut quenous fassions.
16. Toutefois, detoutemanière,Monsieurle Président,Messieursde

la Cour,le Tchad a une autre raison dene pas s'intéresser fairede

tels choix pour laLibye. Lavoici. Nous croyonsque, non seulementdu -

point de vue des conséquences, maien droit, il n'y a tout

simplementpas lieu de choisirentre la théoriedéclaratoireet la

théorie constitutive.

17. La reconnaissance des effetsdivers en droitinternational,et

elle peut elle-même varier beaucoupelon sa natureet porter sur des

objetsdifférents. L'élémencommun,c'est que lareconnaissancesuppose
qu'un Etatconstate oudéclarepubliquement qu'il accepteun fait ou une

situation, quelsqu'ils soient,survenantdans ses relationsavec un

autre Etat. Eric Suyen a donné la définition suivant: "La reconnaissanceest une manifestation de volonté
unilatérale par laquell uen sujet de droit constatuene
situation donnée et exprimela volonté de la considérer comme
étant conformeau droit." (Les actes juridiques unilatérauxen
droit international public, 196p 7, 190.)

Il y a des possibilitéssans fin de faits susceptibles de donner lieu à

une reconnaissance.Les situations sont un peu plus faciles à grouper :

de nouveauxEtats naissent. Des gouvernements changent d'une manière

violenteou inconstitutionnelle. Des hostilités éclate entredes

nations. Des guerres civiles font rage à l'intérieurd'Etats. La

souveraineté territoriale doi être attribuée.Et des frontièresfont

l'objetd'un règlementdéfinitif.

18. La plupart de ces catégorie de reconnaissance se présentent

commedes actes unilatéraux.Un Etat décidetout simplement s'il entend

reconnaîtreun autre Etat,ou un gouvernement, ou une situation de
-

belligérance. Quand la non-reconnaissance est utilisée à des fins

politiques,la décisionpeut êtremultilatérale,et être adoptée dans le

cadre del'ONU ou d'autres groupementn son régionaux. Parfois,le

procédé approprié pour exprimer une reconnaissanc est un traité. Les

déterminations de frontières sot ntès souvent effectuées par traitéet

la reconnaissance de la frontièd rent il s'agit constitueun élément de

ce traité ou decet acte international. L'instrumen peut être

multilatéral(commel'acte finald'Helsinki)ou bilatéral(commedans le

traitéde 1955 entre la France et la Libye).

19. Demandersi une obligation contenue dan un traitéest

constitutiveou déclaratoire, c'est poser une non-question. Voilà

pourquoi, malgré les protestations deLl ibye, le Tchada refusé de

répondre à la questionpour le traité de1955. La reconnaissance de

faits et situations autres que la naissance de nouveaux Et n'test ni

déclaratoire, ni constitutive. Les clauses d'un traité signifient simplementce qu'ellesdisent,ni plus ni moins, et obligentcomme

telles. Quand un traitésert d'instrument pour exprimer ql u'eon est

disposé à reconnaîtreun fait ou une situation, lesens et laportéedes

termesqu'il contient doivent êtrdeéterminéspar référenceau principe

de l'interprétationdes traitéset non à ceux de la reconnaissancedes

Etats.

20. M. Cot a déjà parléà la Cour des principesde l'interprétation

des traités quisont pertinentsdu point de vue de l'article 3 et de

l'annexe 1 du traitéde 1955. Cette question estdéveloppéeplus en

détail dansnos piècesde procédureécrite.

21. L'étudede la doctrineconfirme cette analyse. Le point de

départ classiquede toutediscussionsur la reconnaissance et surtoutsur

le débat relatif àla nature constitutiveou déclaratoirede celle-ci
-.
. 0 3 9 doit être l'ouvrage familie de sir HerschLauterpachtsur la
- ..
reconnaissance et le droit internationa l~ecognition and International

~aw). Je pense que même des juristes dteradition romaniste

l'admettront ! Nous pouvonsnous remémorer les termes précis doi nt

s'est servi :

"Reconnaîtreune communauté politique comme Ets atgnifie
déclarer qu'elleremplit les conditions que doit réunir1'Etat
au regarddu droit international...Bien qu'ainsila
reconnaissance soit déclaratoi reun fait existant,une telle
déclaration,faitepour exécuterde façon impartialeune
obligation juridiquee,st constitutive,dans lesrapportsentre
1'Etatqui reconnaîtet la communauté ainsi reconnue, des
droits et devoirsinternationaux liésà la pleine qualité
d'Etat."(P. 6.)

22.Le débat entre la théorie déclaratoireet la théorie

constitutive n'est pertineq nte pourla reconnaissance des Etats. Le

"fait"reconnu - la naissanced'un nouvel agent internationa-l constitue

la dernièrequestion liminaire à laquelle ilfaut répondrepour pouvoir

qualifierune entité dqEtatsouverain.
C'est l'existencemême d'un sujet du droit international qui est en cause. Dans une telle perspective, on

comprend parfaitement la pertinend ce cette question : la reconnaissance

par d'autresdu caractère d'Etatde celuiqui s'en prévautest-elle

elle-mêmeune condition préalable pour qu'il ait ce caractère ?

Dans d'autresdomaines, l'oppositioe nntre la conception déclaratoire t

la théorie constitutivn ee sert aucunefin fonctionnelle. 11 n'est pas

d'autrescirconstances posant le problèmede la reconnaissance où

apparaisseune question liminaire de ce genre. Ainsi, la reconnaissance

d'un gouvernement produit certains effes tsr lesrelations entre les

, 40 deux Etats, maiselle ne détermine passi le gouvernementexiste. La
LI

reconnaissance comme belligérae ntt pertinentedu point de vuedes

droits qui seront accordés à la partie reconnue dans certaines catégories

de situation defait. Selon l'expression de Lauterpacht, elle déclenche

"une obligation imposép ear les faits en l'occurrence" (Recognition in

InternationalLaw, p. 175). Toutefois, la reconnaissanc ne détermine

pas ici l'existencedes hostilités. Il n'y a pas lieu de poser la

question("ma reconnaissance fait-elleexistercette entité ?") que

tentent d'examiner ceuq xui débattentde la théoriedéclaratoireet de la

théorieconstitutive. Demander"si la reconnaissance d'une situation

d'hostilités dans le pays X est constitutive ou déclaratoire" n'a pd as

sens. Ce n'estpas par coïncidenceque cettethéoriea tantretenu

l'attention dans la perspective l de reconnaissance dela qualité

d'Etat. Elle n'a aucune place dans les autres formedse reconnaissance.

23. Même dansle contextede la qualitéd'Etat,cettenotion a

suscité plusd'intérêtchez les auteurs que dans la pratique étatique.

Les Etats reconnaissent d'autres Etats sa sesdemander sice qu'ils font

produitun effet constitutif dela naissancedu nouvel Etat ou

déclaratoirede son existence. Le fait que ceuxqui reconnaissent unnouvel Etat sont peu nombreux - soit que la communauté internationa ait

appelé à la non-reconnaissance (commedans le cas des Bantoustans, ou de

1'Etat fédératif turc deChypre),soit peut-être pour d'autres raisons

(commedans le cas du Biafra)- produirades conséquencesindiscutables.

Pourtant, peu d'Etatsestimentaujourd'huiqu'il soitutile d'exprimer

ces conséquencesen termesd'une conception constitutive ou déclaratoire

de la reconnaissance. Du reste, ce sujet retiend te moins en moins

l'attentionmême parmiles auteurs :dans laplupartdes ouvragesde

base, il faitl'objetd'une brève mention à titrede question d'intérêt

historique. Il est frappantde constater que seule une brève mentionlui w

est consacrée dansla neuvième édition d'oppenheim,dont la huitième

avait été dirigée, évidemment par sir Hersch Lauterpacht.

24. Quelle place l'opposition entre la théorie constitue tivlea

théorie déclaratoirepourrait-elledonc occuper dans la reconnaissance de

revendications d'un autre Etat d ouune ligne frontière ? La réponseest

qu'iln'y a pas placepour elle. Ici, la reconnaissance ne sert pas à

entamerun tel débat théorique plutôt stérile, mais à des finstout à

fait différentes.Reconnaître officiellemen un fait ou une situation

juridique, c'est se voir interdire par l'estoppelde nier ce faitou

cette situation.Un auteur de common law, J.F. Williams,a déclaré

dans son cours sur la reconnaissance à l'Académiede La Haye en1933 (un

cours donné,semble-t-il,en français) :

"On donneà la reconnaissance une fonctio qui ressemble à
celle de 'l'estoppel'(empêchement) en droit anglais : quandun
Etat a reconnu une prétentioni ,l estempêché(estopped)de
la contester." (RCADI (1933-II),vol. 44, p. 210.)

Le même point de vue a été adoptépar Anzilotti,qui a déclaré :

"la reconnaissance peut produire en droit internationu al
effet semblable à celuide la prescription en droi trivé".
(J.F. Williams,p. 210, citantAnzilotti,Cours de droit
international, Recueil Sirey Paris, 1929.) 25. Monsieurle Président, Messieurs de la Coun r,us l'avonsdit :

il ne s'agit pas d'une théorie déclaratoi oueconstitutive de la

reconnaissance, mais d'interpréter l'article3 et l'annexe 1 conformément

à leur sens manifeste, dans leur context et d'une manièrequi ne soit

pas absurdeni ne les videde tout contenu. Or, quand on agit ainsi,

l'emploidu mot "reconnaissent" garde del'importance, mais non celle

qu'espéraitla Libye.

26. La jurisprudencede la Cour et les principaux auteurs attestent

amplement que la reconnaissance d'une situation entraîne certaines

conséquences importantee sn droit. L'emploide ce terme signifie un

désir commun de certitude une intentiondes parties de reléguer les

différends dansle passé, une ferme volonté de préservl earstabilité des

frontièreset la forcl.usiopnour ce qui est de toute revendication

contraire à ce qui a été reconnu.
. -
27. Dans les questions territoriale et frontalières,le terme
442
"reconnaissent" n'est employ que quandil existeune certitudesur le

fait ou la situation en l'occurrence. Ce'est pas là une expression à

laquelleon a recoursquand il y a une hésitation quelconque au sujet du

régime juridique d'un territoire ou l dedélimitation d'une frontière,

selon le cas. Ainsi la Cour permanentea-t-elledéclaré dansson avis

consultatifen l'affairede Jaworzina (C.P.J.I. série B no 8, p. 32) :

"Les clausesconcernantla reconnaissance immédiate de la
souveraineté des Etats intéressés sur les territoires ...
supposent l'existencd e'un territoireentièrementcirconscrit
et délimité, notamment vis-à-visde l'autreEtat."

28. On voit aussi souvent employer le terme "reconnaître" quand les

parties ont conclu des accords frontaliers alorq su'il y aeu toute une

histoire de difficultée st de conflits,ou d'arrangements conclus à grand

peine. L'une des parties propose une contrepartu ie,quid pro quo, et Le
il est demandé à l'autre partie de reconnaîtr la ligne frontière.

terme employé exprime "un march conclu". On comprend ceque cela veut

dire dans l'accord conclu entre la France et la Turquiele 23 juin 1939

au sujet du règlementde problèmes territoriaue xntre la Turquieet la

Syrie. La France cédait à la Turquie leSandjakd'Alexandrette.

Corrélativement, l'article7 stipulait : "la Turquie reconnaît comme

constituantla limite définitive de son territoire laligne"décrite dans

ce passage.

29. En 1955, la Libye a obtenuce qu'elle voulait : le retrait de la

France du Fezzan. La Libye nous dit que telétait en réalité le seul

objet du traitéde 1955, que toute délimitation était réserv pour

l'avenir,à d'éventuelsarrangementsqui seraient conclus tout à fait en

dehors du cadre du traitéde 1955. Mais la réaliteést que l'article 3

était la contrepartie, à savoir la reconnaissance de la ligne frontière

de 1899. Dans ce traité, à la différencede l'accordfranco-turc

de 1939, cette disposition est rédigée sous forme d'une obligatiorqiui

échoitaux deuxparties : cela est certain. Toutefois,elle supposait

pour la Libyeseulement la renonciation à sa ligne préférée, la ligne

de 1935.

*
30. Quiconque reconnaît quelque chose s'enga àgee pas faire valoir
-
de revendication en senscontraire, alors qu'autrement il estprobable

que de telles revendicationa suraient été poursuivies. Dans l'affairedu

Droit de passage (C.X.J.Recueil 1960, p. 39), la Coura décrit

comment :

"Les Britanniques s'abstinrent de prétend rux-mêmes à la
souverainetéen qualitéde successeurs des Mahrattes, mais ils
ne reconnurent pas non plus expressémentla souverainetédu
Portugal... Ainsi la souverainetd éu Portugal sur les villages
fut-ellereconnuepar les Britanniques en fait et par
implication; elle le fut ensuite tacitement par l'Inde. En
conséquence,les villages viséspar la concession mahratte
acquirent le caractère d'enclaves portugaie sesterritoire
indien." 31. Dans cette affaire,la reconnaissance a eu cette conséquence

parce que des revendications qui auraient puêtre formuléesne l'ontpas

été. Lorsquela reconnaissance d'une situatio est une obligation

conventionnelle expressément assumée, comme dansle traité de1955,

c'est avec beaucoup plus de force encoreque ce principe supposu ene

obligationde ne pas invoquerdes revendications contraires.

32. Cette situation a été exprimée clairement dans l'affairedu

Statut juridique du Groenland oriental où, se référantà certains

accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux, la Cour permanente a déclaréce qui

suit :

"En acceptant comme obligatoires poe urle ces traités

bilatérauxou plurilatéraux, la Norvègea réaffirmé lefait que
tout le Groënlandest reconnupar elle commedanois,
réaffirmationqui exclutune contestation de la souveraineté
danoisesur l'ensembledu Groënland." (C.P.J.I. série A/B
no 53, p. 68-69.)

33. Hans Blix a établiune distinction entre la reconnaissance de

sujetsdu droit internationae lt les autres formes de reconnaissance. A

propos de ces dernièresp ,ar exemple,parlantde la "reconnaissance d'une

frontière", ildit que

"en pareil cas, la reconnaissance suppo une acceptation de la
juridiction revendiquée et signifie queson auteurest disposé
à la respecter dans la pratique" (RCADI (1870-II),vol. 130,
p. 599).

34. Georg Schwarzenbergea r souligné en ces termeq sue, lorsqu'il

est employé dansun traitéde frontières, le mot "reconnu"a pour but de

préserver la stabilité :

"Quelleque puisseêtre la faiblessed'un titre,et sans
égard à tout autre critère, la reconnaissanceinterdit à 1'Etat
qui a reconnu le titre de contester un jour sa validité."
(AJIL,1957,p. 316.)

35. La jurisprudencede la Cour permanente ainsi que dl ea Cour

internationale de Just.ice,de même que l'opinion unanime des jurist qeui

font autorité, sontdonc autantd'éléments qui montrent quela reconnaissance d'une frontière suppose l'engagemen de mettre finà tout

différendet d'accepterla stabilitédes frontières. La reconnaissance

reflète également un désir de certitudeet a pour conséquence, par voie

d'estoppel, d'interdire à la partie quien est l'auteurde défendre des

revendicationsen sens contraire. Et il en est ainsi sans égard à la

questionde savoirsi la reconnaissance est unilatéraleou si elleest

expriméedans un traité.

36. Si, comme dansla présente affaire, cette reconnaissan est

exprimée dansun traité, ces conséquences juridiques sont consacrées dans

un instrument qui, en soi est sans que la "reconnaissance" doive même

être expressément mentionnée a,pour objetun échange d'obligations

contraignantes : pacta sunt servanda. L'on pourrait direqu'il s'agit

là d'une disposition assez proche d'uc neausede stabilisation,

laquelle, dansun traité liant déjà les parties,a pour effet demettre

en relief l'importance que revêtep ntur ces dernières certaines

dispositions;et c'est égalementle cas de l'introductiod nu concept de

reconnaissance dansun traitéqui, du fait de sa nature juridique, oblige

déjà les parties à accepter les obligations qu'il énonce.

37. Que direpar conséquent de notre traité du traité de 1955et en

w
particulier deson article 3 et de son annexe 1 ? Que savons-nous de

l'introduction de ce mot "reconnaissent"? Son but est-ild'introduire

des notionsd'effet déclaratoirec ,omme l'a suggérésir IanSinclair, ou

est-ilplutôt d'établirexactementce que ce termea généralementpour
04 5
but d'établir dansdes traités frontaliersc ,'est-à-direla finalitéet

les autres conséquences dont j'p airlé ? Dans ses écritures,il y a

lieu de le rappelerà la Cour une fois de plus, l Libye soutient que

l'introductiondu mot "reconnaissent" "devaitêtre" déclaratoire de

frontières existantes(répliquede laLibye,par. 5.38). 38. Monsieurle Président, Messieurs de la Cour, leséléments de

preuve sont passablement clais rsr ce point. Commençons par les

documentsde négociation des parties. L'on sait qu'à lafin de 1954

déjà, la rumeurétait que la Libyeavait l'intentiond'occuperAouzou.

Cela ressort clairemend tes élémentsde preuve produits aussi biep nar la

Libye que par le Tchad lorsde la procédure écrite (voirmémoire de la

Libye, Annexe : archives françaisesp ,. 166 et mémoiredu Tchad,

annexe262). Le projetde procès-verbaldu 30 mars 1955établipar les

services administratifs français montre qs ue,certaines questions à

l'examenfaisaient encore l'objed te formules différentes échangée entre

la Franceet la Libye, il avait ététrouvé au paragraphe IV une formule

commune concernant les frontièresqui se lisait comme suit :

"Les deux gouvernementsconviennentde s'en tenir,en ce
qui concerne les tracés des frontières séparantles territoires
françaiset libyen, aux stipulations générald ess textes
internationaux en vigueur à la date dela créationde 1'Etat
libyen."

Les partiesétaientdonc déjà disposéesp ,our ce qui était de la ligne

frontière,à convenir de s'en tenir aux stipulations généralesdes

instruments internationau en vigueurà la datede l'indépendance de la

Libye.

39. Au printemps 1955, la Libye manifestaitun intérêtvisiblepour

le traitéLaval-Mussolini et rassemblaitauprèsde différentes sources

toutes les informationp sossibles quantaux possibilités qu'il offrait

(mémoiredu Tchad, annexe258). C'est là une question dont M. Cot vous

, 0 45 parleraplus longuement. En février1955 s'est produit le fameux

- - "incidentd'Aouzou"(mémoirede la Libye, Annexe : archives françaises,

p. 167; mémoiredu Tchad,annexe272; réplique duTchad, annexe 92bis).

Les preuves documentairefsont ressortir clairement les préoccupatio dnes la France et sa volontéde voir réglésune fois pour toutes les questions

de frontièreet les problèmes résultand te l'accordLaval-Mussolini non

ratifié.

40. Et les documents suivants, ce sont les projetsque l'ambassadeur

Dejean a amenés aveclui à Tripolicommebase de travailpour les

négociationsde juillet. L'article 3 du premierde ces projets

spécifiait queles deuxparties : "reconnaissentque les frontières

sont celles quirésultentdes actes internationaue xn vigueur"(réplique

de la Libye, pièce 6.6, p. 3). Quant au deuxième projet,il disait que

"La délimitationdes frontièresfranco-libyennes est fixée par les

documents figurant en annexes à la présentelettre." (Ibid.,p. 7.)

41. Commenous levoyons, il y a eudes changements importants et

en particulierl'introduction du mot "reconnaissent" pour remplac ler

membre de phrase "conviennentde s'en tenir"et le remplacementdu renvoi

aux stipulationsgénéralesdes instrumentsde référence pardes

"frontières",qui sont "cellesqui résultent"des instruments énumérés

dans une annexe. L'intentionétait, d'une part, de renforcerles

obligationset les conséquencesjuridiques,et, de l'autre,de préciser

davantage lasituation.

42. Cette précision a effectivementété obtenuedans la version

finalelorsque lesinstrumentsen questionont étéspécifiés dans une

seule annexe distinctel ,'annexe1. Et, comme la Cour le sait fortbien,

le mot "reconnaissent" a été introduit égalemendtans l'échangede

lettresfigurant à l'annexe 1.

43. Cette évolution délibéré vers une plus grandeprécision,d'une

part, et vers l'énoncé d'engagementj suridiquesaussi fermesque possible

en ce qui concernela frontière,de l'autre,est confirmée par des

documentsfrançaisqui ne font pas partiedes documentsde négociation. La note d'information venue dPearis en1955 (mémoiredu Tchad,
0-7
. annexe145) nous dit en effet qu'à ce stade, il étaitjugé préférablede

ne présenter quedes propositions rédigées en termes extrêmement généraux.

44. Et il y a eu, en mai, une réunion d'experts français afin de

préparerles négociationsde juillet. Aucun problème n'a été soulevé

quant à notre tronçonde frontière(répliquede laLibye, pièce 6.6). Ce

qu'il fallait, c'était obteniq ru'ellesoit fermement reconnue,et

l'importancede ce pointest soulignée dansune lettredu 14 mai

contenant les instruction du ministredes affaires étrangères.La

délimitation satisfaisante des frontièr était l'une des "conditions

minima" à un accord concernant l'évacuatiodnes troupes françaisesdu

Fezzan. Selon cesinstructions, la délégation françai "see manquera pas

de demander ... en particulier,la reconnaissance par la Libye de

l'appartenance de certains points aux territoi resnçais". Cette

formule devaitse retrouver dans l'annexe à proposde la référenceaux

trois points, dans laquell nous trouvons les mots : "il a été

reconnu..." Voilà, selonla Libye, le seul engagementcontraignant en

vertu du traité de 1955. Comme M. Cot l'a fait observer dans ses

plaidoiries,il estbien étrange queles mots "il a été reconnu" soient

traitésd'une façon aussidifférente des mots "ils reconnaissent";cela

illustre bien le caractère artifici deltoute cette argumentation.

45. Le traité proposéqui devait êtreconclusous peu est expliqué

dans unenote du 25 juilletétablie à l'intentionde la présidencepar le

ministredes affaires étrangères.Le résumé qui y est fait des

dispositions relatives aux frontières correspond exactemenà la formule

issuedes propositions de l'ambassadeur Dejeandont je viens deparler.

Enfin,un document français passe en revue les progrès accompli entre les négociationsde janvier 1955et de juillet-août 1955.Ce document

relèveà la fois la précision apportée au text et le fait que celui-ci

excluaitle traitéde 1935 :

"a) Enumérationlimitativedes actes internationaux
définissantles frontières,excluantles accords
Laval-Mussolini de 193( 5par conséquent renonciatiod ne la
Libye à toute prétention sur leTibesti)."

47. Reconnaissanceet précision allaient de pair. Loin d'ouvrir la

porte, parl'introduction de concepts académiques liés àune théorie

constitutiveou déclaratoire, à la possibilité quele traitése trouve

vidé de toute signification, ces termes reflètent l'engagement

irrévocabledes parties,sur le plan politique comme en droit,de

respecter les frontièrec sonvenues.

Je remercie très sincèremenl ta Cour de satrès aimable attention,

et je vous sauraisgré, Monsieur le Présidentd ,e bien vouloir donnerla

parole à M. Cot.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup, Madame Higgins Je donne

la parole à M. Cot.

Mr. COT: Mr. President, Members of theCourt, Professor Higgins has

just taken apart the logicaltrap in which Libyawas tryingto catch the
w
Court by callingupon it to reply to the "declaratoryor constitutive"

option,and thus rendering sterile the provisionsof Article 3 of the

Treaty and of its Annex 1. By establishingthat the sovereignwill of

the contracting parties wai sndeedto rendereffective the provisions in

question,Mrs. Higginshas restoredmeaning to a treatywhich without

this would reallyhave been nonsense on this point. We are awareof the

penchantof our honourable opponents fo this particularform of British

humour,but 1 doubt that Messrs.Dejeanand Ben Halimwere jokingwhen

they negotiatedthe Treaty of 10August 1955. Mr. President, itnow remains forus to draw the logical conclusions

L, r,
- - from Our analysisas to the conceptof treatyin forcewithin the meaning

of Article 3 and to respondto Sir Ian Sinclair's final criticism

concerningthe implementation of the principleof good faith.

First of all, as far as thetexts in force are concernedthe High

ContractingParties wentstraightto the point. In Article 3 they

specified that the international instrume intforce fromwhich the

frontier resulted were referredto in Annex 1. In sovereignfashionthey

thereforeconsidered these instrumentsas being in force. Our opponents

have constructed their declaratot ryeory tomake this observation

sterile and deprivethe clearwordingof Article3 of al1 meaning,thus

transformingan observation: "the followinginternational instruments

are in force" intoa condition: "the followinginternationalinstruments

are applicableif they are in force".

This reasoning, the signal weakneo ss whichhas just been

demonstratedby Mrs. Higgins,led Our opponentsto demonstratethat the

instrumentsof referencewere not in forceat the criticaldate,whatever

the sovereignparties might have thought.

At first,as you will recall,Our opponentsclaimed that the

treatiesconcludedwith Italy wereno longerin force as they had not

been notifiedin accordancewith Article 44 of the Peace Treatyof 1947.

These instruments should therefore irrevocably b consideredabrogated

and this would allow the fate of the Franco-ItaliaA nccordsof 1902 and

1919 to be settled.

1 believe1 refutedthis argumenton 28 June. It is contraryto the

text of the Treaty of Peace sinceby Article23 Italy renouncedal1 right

and title to its former colonies and could thereforenot be concerned by

the fate of the treatiesrelating tothem. But the Libyan argument,1 recalled,vas still contraryto the unanimouspracticeof the States
. O 5 0
- - concemed sinceno treatyof this type was notified,and lastlywe noted

that the United Nations itselfonsideredthese instrumentsas being in

force in 1950. ApparentlyOur opponents accepteour argumentson this

point. ProfessorCondorelli adrnittedand 1 quote,that

"the bilateral delimitationreaties relatinto the former
Italiancolonies,including the Franco-Italian Accoofd
12 September 1919...were maintainedin force" (CR93/28,
p. 51).

1 am happyat thisbeginningof a pointof convergence, but1 would
ask Our opponentsto make yet another litteffort. Libya grants the

Accord of 12 September1919,but on the otherhandit claims thatthe

exchangeof lettersof 1 November1902 lapsed, independentlyf the

operationof Article44 of the Treaty of Peace. The groundsfor this

invalidityare sketchedin ratherthan developedby Libya. Accordinto

ProfessorCondorelli,the Accord of 1902 was extinguishedbecauseit was

not revivedby resolution 289(IV) of the UnitedNations

General Assembly,since it was not an agreement delimitg boundary,

(CR 93/28,p. 51). For ProfessorBowett,the Accord disappearedas early
as 1947with Italy'srenunciationof al1 its rightsand titlesto Libya.

Mr. President,Membersof the Court,1 confessthat 1 am perplexed.
*
The United NationsGeneral Assembly certainly didt mean to decideon

whetheror not treaties concludedith Italy and concerning its former

coloniesshould bemaintainedin force or not. Professor Franckhas

shownyou that thesole concernof the General Assemblyn this pointwas

to promotea stableand definitivesolutionof the frontier problems,

leaving thepartiesconcernedto settle the procedure. True,
resolution 289(IV)impliesthat frontiershad beensettledby

internationaltreaties,but itdoes not list them andis carefulnot to

come to any conclusionon their status. * C51 As to Italy'srenunciationof its rights overLibya, this had the
- -
effectof triggeringthe State succession,but it did not make the

treatiesfrom which Libya's frontiersresultedlose their

"raisond'être" - to use the expressionemployedby our opponents.

1 shallnot come back to the Accordsof 1902,the legalnature of

which has beenanalysedby ProfessorPellet. Our opponents arguethat

theseAccordsno longerhave any "raisond'être"- this is the expression

used - becausethey have no relationto the establishmentof a frontier

and becausethey are exclusivelybound to the legal personality of

Italy. And, Mr. President,the aim of theseAccords of 1902 wasto

recognizea sphereof influencein the frontiersof Tripolitaniaas they

figuredon the map of 1899 - and 1 shall not returnto Alain Pellet's

demonstrationhere. Although someof theirprovisionshave incontestably

become invalid,their territorial objective stile lxists infull; they

do stillhave that "raison d'être".This theoretical controversy is

interestingbut - may 1 respectfully sugges-t it is a controversythat

has indeedlost any "raison d'être", since France and Libya settledthe

questionon 10 August 1955. The two contractingparties notedin

sovereignfashionthat the frontiersseparatingtheir respective

territoriesresulted inter alia from the Accords of1902.

In brief, bothhere and elsewhere,it is the criterionof the

sovereign willof the parties that settlesthe problemof the succession

of States to bilateraltreaties. And this will is clearly expressed -

made explicit - as far as the Accordsof 1902 are concerned.

The reason is even clearer, obviously,for the Franco-British

Accordsof 1899 and 1919. Ouropponentsdo not rely on their

352 invalidity. There is no successionof Stateshere. Atthe most Libya has outlined - the linehere is veryblurred - the argumentof
opposability. These Accords arenot applicableto Libya becausethey are

not opposableto it.

This is a curiousargument,which asProfessor Higgins recalled,

acknowledgesas the principal reason for international recognit then

renderingof a legalinstrumentor a situation opposablt eo the

recognizing State.And, whatever the nature of Article3 and Annex 1 of

the Treaty of 1955, let us agree thatt proceedsto a recognition of the

treaties defined in Annex1, for otherwisetheseprovisions would not

even have the valueof the shopping listto which Our opponentsclaim to #

reduce it:

Mr. President, Membersof the Court, letus stop producing arguments

and quibblesto defeat the wish of the parties. In 1955 Franceand Libya
wished to identify their frontierby referringto the Franco-British

Accords of 1899 and 1919, and to the Franco-Italian Accords of 19and

1919. The pointwas to render effective this clearlyexpresseddesire.

The point was to apply the Treaty.

Mr. President, Membersof the Court,to concludethis pleading1

come to the questionof good faith. You will rernembethat Libya called

into questionthe goodfaith ofthe French negotiators in the first round -

of pleadings,thus seekingto create a climate of suspicio in order to

derive a marginal advantage as regardthe interpretation ofthe Treaty

of 1955.
.
L..4 Our opponents doubtlestsook ourobjectionsinto account; they did

not again impute ulterior motiveso us in their reply. Noted.
But, al1 the same, Sir Ian Sinclairhas not abandonedthe theme of

good faith. He has turnedthe argumentround and tellsus today that

Libya's good faithmust be protected. 1 quotehim. Referringto our

contentions SirIan States: "1 must say that,if an argument alongthese lineswere to
appeal to the Court, it would raise some very seriousquestions
indeed about the good faith natureof the 1955 negotiations.
Libya would,on that analysis,have beeninducedto agree to a
boundaryby inadvertence.Libya is therefore confidentthat
the Court would not entertaina result of this nature."
(CR 93/27,p. 41.)

And in his robustway Professor Bowett hammerei dn the nail on

8 July: "nonegotiations,no texts,no maps" (CR 93/29, p. 67).

Mr. President, this is not correct, therewere negotiations, there

were texts, there were mapsand 1 now have to show you proof of this.

1 shalluse simultaneously the three sourca esailable: the French

diplomatic dispatchesw ,hich are confirmed bythe diplomatic documents of

the ForeignOffice,and by theLibyan minutesof the negotiation. These

combined sources helpus to followthe threadof the negotiationand to

set asidewithout any possible doubt the thesisthat the Libyans were

inducedby inadvertenceto agree to the Tibesti boundaryin the final

negotiation.

The boundary question,as we know,was brought up from the outsetof

the negotiationsin the month of January between Premier Mendès-France

and Prime Minister BenHalim. The French sumrnarrecord, more

specifically the French not on the January conversations, tells u that

PremierMendès-France stateo dn 4 Januarythat:

"the aspects of particulairmportanceto us were ... to delimit
a frontiersuch as would be acceptedby both parties, with the
joint organization ofa frontier police force" (MC Vol. IV,
p. 32, Ann. 239).

And in reply to Prime Minister BenHalim, the French Premier"noted

Libya'sdesire for a clarification of the statusof the frontiers"

(ibid., p. 33).

Mr. Ben Halim'sobjectionat that point did not relateto the

delimitationof the frontierbut to its concomitancewith the evacuation

of the French troops fromthe Fezzan. Al1 this is very general,you will tellme. No, for the immediate

problem facing theLibyandelegation isthat of the delimitationof our

boundary, the boundaroyf Tibesti. It wasMr. Wilford, ofthe British

Embassy in Paris, whoreceived the informatioonn 5 January 1955from

Mr. Jerbi, a Libyan diplomatand formerUnder-Secretary of State for

ForeignAffairs, specifying

"thathe would be returning [Jerbi, ofcourse]to Tripolivia
Rome in order that he could tryto get from the Italian
Government the archives dealiw ngth the Laval-Mussolini
Agreementof 1935, to which theywere entitled and without
which his Governmentcouldnot decidewhat positionto take
up." (RC,Am. 79, matchedby MC, Ann. 245, p. 3.)

The Libyan Governmentasked in January,as early as5 January,to be J

providedwith the archives of the 1935 negotiatio n,ich so far aswe

are concerned,that is, as regardsthe Libyanboundaries, related only to

the Tibestiboundary.

Mr. Aneizi, a member ofthe Libyan delegation and Minister of

Finance, headedthe mission to Rome to obtainthat documentation (MC,

Am. 258). He no doubt met there with Italian diplomats. They were

perfectly familiarwith the case, and hence witha number of maps, as

Professor Condorellh ias shown us withhis customarytalent. Mr.Jerbi

!A3 reportedon it toMr. Ravensdale, ofthe British Embassy in Tripol( iRC, *

Ann. 84), as early as 15 January. Heknew, then, that theexchangeof

ratificationsof the Treaty of Rome had not takenplace and he was still

unclear asto the instruments applicableb ,ut haddiscussedthe matter in

Rome with his Italianinterlocutors.

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequen providedthe

LibyanMinistry of Foreign Affairs wit the textof the Treaty of Rome,

togetherwith the necessary explanations (MC Ann. 258). It is a pity

that we do not haveal1 that materialthatmust be in Tripoli. In any

case, documents there are: Then came the Aozou or Moya incideno t, 28 February1955. 1 shall

not go back overthe incident itself sinceMr. Cassesehas analysedit.

What interestsme is the reaction ofthe Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Halim.

Aozou, as weknow, is the main palmgrove, themain settlementin the

strip that bears itsname, as Professor Sorel remindeu ds yesterday. Now

the incident took place morethan a month after the returnof the mission

specially sentto Rome to clarifythe matter. The French protestcame at

about the timewhen the Italians supplied the documentarymaterial

requestedin Rome by Mr. Aneizi and Mr. Jerbi.

PrimeMinisterBen Halim is unlikelyto have beencompletely unaware

of the boundary situatiownhen acknowledgingthat the village of Aozou

lay in French territory. The Aneizi mission musthave reportedto him.

He knew that Aozou was northof the line ofthe Treaty of Rome.

Ignoranceof that was stillmore improbable in June 1955 when the British

Ambassadorto Tripoli,Mr. Graham,calledthe Prime Minister's attention

to the seriousconsequences of repeating theprevious February's escapade
ij5 6
. .
(MC,Ann. 264).

Mr. Ben Halim had ample time to inform himselfand prepare forthe

the forthcoming negotiations wit the Frenchand, for his part,

Mr. Graham certainlydid not stepin withouta "biscuit",given the

special relations betweenthose two alliedStatesthat Great Britainand

Libya were.

1 come now to the maps. Our opponentscontend,once more - 1

respectfully tellthem - againstal1 probability,that the Libyan

negotiators had no maps. Itis very likely,as we have seen, that the

Italian diplomats showetdhem some whenthey went to Rome. You do not

discussthe course ofa boundary line in the abstractand withoutmaps. Professor Condorelli showe us a number of maps. But above all, maps

were, aswe know, producedand discussedduringthe negotiationof

July 1955.

It is certainly the case thati ,n the final negotiation, the Tibesti

was discussedon the basis of a map, a map producedby the Libyan

delegationand no doubt featuring the boundaryof the Treatyof Rome.

The Ambassador,Mr. Dejean,who led the French delegation, cablet dhe

informationto his ministryon 28July. Mr. Dejeanhad thisto say:

"Even though certaiL nibyanofficersproduced,during
yesterday'smeeting,a map whichincludedin Libya [word
omittedand hence not includedin the transmission] of the
Tibesti,Mr. Ben Halim recognized thismorning,in the meeting,
that the Agreements should be applit edthose areas. This
means that there is no longerany major difficulty.We still
have to reach agreement on a delimitationof the frontier
between Ghâtand Toummo, for which the texts are rather
difficultto interpret. Officersbrought overspeciallyfrom
Paris are workingon the problemwith Libyan officers, ina
sub-cornmittetehat was set up this morning."(MC,Ann. 268.)

The cable is dated 28 July, and the map of the Tibestiwas produced

by the Libyan officerson 27 July.

The Dejean cable is confirrnedy thereportof ColonelEl Senoussi

Latyoush dated4 August 1955, following the missionof the sub-cornmittee

mentionedby Dejean. This is the report that you will find in your

folder,Exhibit 74 of the LibyanMernorial.Annexed to the report,as

indicatedby ColonelLatyoush,are maps unfortunateln yot in our

possession.

The joint Franco-Libyan mission of1 and 2 August 1955 flew overthe

boundary between Ghât and Toummo and consultedwith Touareg

representatives at Ghât. What wasthe purposeof that mission? To

compare the boundary lines on two maps: a map A of Frenchorigin,and a

map B of Italianorigin. Colonel Latyoush was perfectly capableofreading the maps and he devotedhis reportto a detailed comparisoo nf

the two lines. And in conclusion, he recommended adoptioonf the

boundary line shownon map B.

1 add that Colonel Latyous has fully awareof the situation to the

east of Toummo sincehe informed the Touareg representative "about the

discussionsof the frontier between Itaa lyd Francein the year 1935".

And he noted that France hadthen cededterritoryto Italy,but that the

Treatyof Rome had never enteredinto force. If the Latyoush missiono ,f

1 and 2 August1955,did not alludeto the frontierto the eastof Toummo

and did not fly over the Tibesti,it was becausethe matterhad already

been settledon the previous 28 July, aswe have just seen.

But theLibyanParty will have difficult in convincingyou that a

patrioticcolonel wellversedin cartography and wishingto reopenthe

boundary issue - this is another otfheirconclusions - became fascinated

with the maps West of Toummo whilegivingno attentionto thosefor the

area east of Toummo!

Particularlysincewe have herea finalindication 1 find in

Exhibit73, of the Libyan Party, of the LibyanMernorial,thoseLibyan

minutesof the July negotiationthat Our opponents havebelatedly

supplied. Thereinwe meet ColonelLatyoushagain. He attendedthe

negotiation. He was presenton 28 July in the morning,before the

openingof the meeting. To do what? To submithis reporton the

boundariesof the Fezzan. Andit was most probably Colonel Latyoush in

personwho, the day before,presented the map of the Tibestithat

offendedthe Ambassador, Mr. Dejean,sincehe is the officercitedin the

minuteskept by the Libyan Party ot fhe negotiation. Al1 thishangs

together. The French and Libyanmilitary cartographers took par in the

negotiation,in the discussionof the Tibesti boundary on the basis of

maps, and in particular the map supplie by the Libyan officers. Then,

the problem havingbeen settled,they went off together into thf eield to

fly over theToummo-Ghâtsectorand so complete the agreemen bteing

negotiated.

So much for the mapsthen!

The sourcesof the three origins - French, Britishand Libyan - are

in agreement. These same sourcesenableus to reconstitute the final

phase of the negotiation, which is notat al1 that describedby

Sir Ian Sinclairand ProfessorBowett. The French wished,as we have

seen, to securea consecration of the boundaryof the Tibestibased on

the lineof the Anglo-French Agreement of 8 September1919. The Libyans

did not want this. The Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Halim, tried to prevent

the Treatyenvisagedfrom settlingthe issue. He only resigned himself

to that, aswe know, on 28 July, the day after the discussionthat had

taken place about the Tibesti ma producedby the Libyan officers.

This we learn fromthe Libyan minutes, in Exhibit 73. "No boundary,

no treaty," exclaimed Ambassador Dejean,you remember. He thus put the

deal bluntly to the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Halim. The latter

capitulated, acceptet dhe deal, acceptedthe Tibesti boundary,

unwillinglyno doubt but quite advisedly. That precise result was

recordedin the French dispatches and in the British dispatches.On the

French side, 1 have mentionedthe Dejeandispatchof 28 July. It is

confirmedby a dispatch,from the same Ambassador, dated 9 August 1955

(RL, Ann. 6.6). On the Britishside, there is the dispatch from

Mr. Graham, the British Ambassado to Tripoli,to the Foreign Secretary,

Harold MacMillan, of 30 July 1955: "The Libyan representatives, who throughou the
negotiationswere far more conciliatora ynd anxiousto reach an
agreement than the Frenchhad daredto hope, admitted freely
that the frontiers should bb eased on the international
agreementsin forceat the time Libya gained her independence.
They conceded, apparently wit ahwry smile, that the
Laval-Mussolini agreementof 1935was nugatory." (RC,

Ann. 120.)

Mr. Ben Halim did capitulateon the questionof the Tibesti. No

doubtwith a "wry smile", but with full knowledge t ofe facts and in

exchangefor advantages obtained elsewhew rethin the overallagreement.

Prime MinisterBen Halimwas probablycriticizedfor that concession

in his own country. As early as 4August 1955,as we can see,

Colonel Latyoushcalledfor the negotiations to be reopenedon al1 the

boundaries. In 1956, what1 shall cal1 the revisionistParty, that

seekinga review of the agreementr ,eturnedto the attack. And, as we

know, the Libyandelegationasked in November1956 forthe whole matter

fi.7iJ to be reopened. We also know that the French delegation refusedand gave
'LU
as its reasonthe existence of the Treaty of10 August 1955, ashaving

already resolved the issue (CML,para. 3.110). The Libyan delegation

capitulated: pacta sunt servanda.

1 conclude,Mr. President, Members of theCourt.

We cannot Say that therewas no negotiationon the Tibesti boundary

in 1955. The question wasraisedon the very firstday by

PresidentMendès-Franceand the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Halim. The

questionwas the subjectof an explicitsettlement inthe finalphase of

the negotiations,on 28 July 1955. Meanwhile, the LibyanGovernment

sought information on this situationfrom the Italian Government and

probably fromthe BritishGovernment. In any case, as we know, it had

texts, it had mapsand itconcludedquite advisedly. "Negotiations,

texts, maps", it's al1 there, Professor Bowett. The last questionis whether Prime MinisteB ren Halim was at fault

in signing the Treatyof 10 August 1955and then having it ratified?

Some thoughtso, as we have seen, even beforethe signing ofthe treaty.

Others thinkso today,no doubt among ouropponents! But letus leave

that to the historians. It was at the time amatter of political

appreciationand ithas become a historical issue. But the question of

the appreciation made in 1955,by the Libyan PrimeMinisterof his

country's interests in the negotiationhas never at any timebeen a legal

issue. 1 add that that appreciation, whichgoes beyond Our jurisdiction,

could only be made in the light of the overall outcomof a negotiation
w
which, 1 note inpassing,was conductedintelligently and doggedlyby the

Libyannegotiators.

1 think that in this case we haveturned overal1 the Stones in the

courseof the long oral argumentsthat you have been patient enougt ho

hear out. We have examinedal1 aspects ofthe Treaty of10 August 1955

with the aid of our friendsand opponents ofthe Libyan Party. We remain

convinced, for our partt ,hat thekey to this whole matter is to be found

in the simple application of t reaty concludedadvisedly between two

sovereign States, the Treaty of10 August 1955. 1 hope that we have

convincedyou of this.

Mr. President,before requesting you to cal1 upon the Agent ofthe

Republicof Chad,you will allowme to voice the usual expression of

thankssince 1 am the lastcounsel ofOur team to be speaking.

My thanks goto Our colleaguesand opponents,to whom 1 wish to

express our admiratiofnor the talentdisplayedin the defence of a

difficult cause- they are al1 difficult- and our greetingsat the close

of a joust that has in no way impairedour bondsof esteem. Our thanks goto the Registrarof the Court,to al1 the staff, to

the interpreters,and here 1 wish to expressOur gratitude for their

competenceand kindness.

Our thanksgo, if you will permitme, to you Mr. Presidentand to

you, Members of the Court,sinceyou have throughouttheseweeks

maintained this redoubtable, vigilant aw nd,n al1 is said and done,

kindly attention.

Mr. President, 1 requestyou now to cal1 upon the Agentof the

Republicof Chad, Rector Abderahman Dadi.

Le PRESIDENT: Je remerciebeaucoupM. Cot. RectorDadi, you have

the floor.

Mr. DADI: Mr. President, Members of the Court.

These hearings are drawing to their close. Libya has already

presented its submissions. Todait is the turn ofChad, but before

presenting theforma1submissions, 1shouldlike to say a few words

following the second round of Libyan oral arguments.

Libya has persistedin allusionsto "the purely forma1independence"

of Chad.

Allow me, Mr. President, simplyto Say that Chad is a fully-fledged

member of the international community.

And one can never, through allusionor insinuation, diminish its

statusas a sovereign State,particularlysince Chad has been - and

remains - highly vulnerable inthe face of the threats of a powerful

neighbour,which happensto be Libyaitself.

Mr. President,if the Libyanpeople exists,so then does the Chadian

people. The Libyanpeopleand theChadian people are equai ln dignity

and have the same rights. As to the Toubou,an integralpart and active component of the

Chadian people, thewyere no more Senoussi than they are Libyan today.

History establishes this cleara lyd firmly.

1 am a Toubou,but 1 have never felt Libyan,nor have 1 contemplated ,

my futureon the otherside of the boundary.

Mr. President, things ars eimple: Libya and Chad are two

neighbouringStates,both very large and sparsely populated countries,

1,760,000and 1,284,000 square kilometre in area and with four million
, L' LI
and five million inhabitants respectively. Their comrnon boundaryhas

been very clearly delimited.Theie relations mustbe envisagedin the

light of the necessitiesthat any such neighbourly proximity implies.

Chad wishes to live in harmony with its neighbours, bu it intends

to remain itsown master at home. Its interna1 political difficulties?

Itwill be capableof overcorning them by finding the necessaryresources

within itself. What the Chadian people really need pi eace and respect

for their territorial integria tyd not a dismernberinogf theircountry

to fulfil the dreamsof grandeur ofa neighbour.

Here now are the final submissions of Chad:

The Republicof Chad respectfully requestt she InternationalCourt

of Justiceto adjudgeand declarethat its frontierwith the LibyanArab

Jamahiriyais constitutedby the following line:

- from the pointof intersection of the 24" of longitudeeast of

Greenwichwith the parallelof 19" 30' of latitudenorth, the frontier

shall run as far as the point of intersection of the Tropi ocf Cancer

with the 16" of longitudeeast of Greenwich;

- from that latterpoint it shall followa line runningtowardsthe

well of Toummo as faras the 15" eastof Greenwich. Just a few more words,Mr. President, tobring my statement toits

close.

1. 1 shouldlike in turn to greet the Agent and the Membersof the

team of Libya and commendtheir cordiality throughou these long oral

arguments.

2. 1 shouldalso like to thank, publicly once more, the eminent

juristswho have assisted Chad in presentingits positionto your Court,

togetherwith their associates. In this theyhave displayed competence

and dedication,forgoinga substantialpart of the normal fees.

64 This is a practicalgestureof solidarity towarda s poor country
-. ,jL
like Chad,which has also receivedassistance from the special

United Nations TrustFund. For this, 1 wish hereby toexpress the

gratitudeof the Governmentof Chad.

Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1 thankyou for your patient

attentionand wish you a very goodholiday.

Le PRESIDENT :Thank you very much, RectorDadi. Cela nous amène à

la fin de la procédure orale danlsa présente affaire entre laLibye et

le Tchad et au nom de la Cour je voudrais exprimemres remerciementsaux

agents et conseilsdes deuxPartiespour la très grande assistancequ'ils

ont donnée à la Cour par la manière dontils ont conduit cette

procédure. Conformément à la pratiquehabituelleje dois demanderaux

agentsde rester à la dispositionde la Cour pour les renseignements

supplémentairesdont la Cour pourraitavoir besoin.

Demeure laquestion quele jugeGuillaumea posée à la Libye le

3 juillet. Je crois savoirqu'uneréponseécrite a déjà été déposéeau

Greffeau coursde la matinéeet, conformément à l'article72 duRèglement, une copie decetteréponse sera communiquée au Tch adq,ui la

possibilité serd aûment offertdee présenterdes observationsà son sujet

s'il ledésire.

La Courva donc maintenant se retirer pourdélibérer sur cette

affaireet notification sera faite aux agents en temps voulu dla date à

laquelle la décision sep raononcée. Compte tenu des réserves qu e'ai

mentionnées, je déclare doncmaintenantclose la procédure orale dans

cetteaffaire. Je vous remercie beaucoup.

L'audience est levéeà 12 h 35.