Traduction

1 Non-Corrigé 1 TraductIOn
Translation

CR93/28 (traduction)
CR 93/28 (translation)

Mercred7 juillet 1993
Wednesday7 July 1993 Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. Je donne la parole à

M. Sohier.

M. SOHIER : Monsieur le Président, Messieu desla Cour, à la fin de

l'audience d'hier,j'avaisterminéune analyse assez détaill dées

accordsde 1900-1902. J'avais essayd ée démontrer que la seule

ces accords, l'Italie
conclusion que l'onpouvait tirer était qd uens

n'a reconnu aucune frontièd re la Tripolitainen,i aucune sphère

d'influence françaisejusqu'àune telle frontière.

La déclaration Prinetti(1901)

M. Pelleta tentéde ranimer lathéoriedu Tchad relative aux

accordsde 1900-1902en se référant à un discoursdu ministre français

des affairesétrangères, Delcassé,prononcédevant le Parlemenf trançais

en janvier 1902, quelques semaines ap lrèsnterventiofnaitepar

M. Prinetti, ministre italien des affai éterangèresdevant leParlement

italien, en décembr 1e901. Il a laisséentendreque la Libyese gardait

de mentionner le discour de Delcassé,en mettant plutôt l'acces ntr un

mot précisqui figurait dans celuiPrinetti, un mot quine figurait pas

dans l'accordde 1900(CR 93/23,p. 23-24).

Dansma première interventioj n,me suis efforcé d'expliquer

soigneusement à la Cour(CR 93/16,p. 50-51et p. 54-56)pourquoile

discoursde Prinettirevêtaitune signification juridique direp coter

interpréter l'accordde 1900selon les normes codifié pesr la convention

de Viennede 1969. En effet,la partiedu discours de Prinett qui se

rapportait à l'accordde 1900avait été concertée mot pom uort entreles
1
Gouvernements italie et français.Elle constituait donc,pour citer

l'article31, paragraphe 3, de la conventionu,n "accordultérieur

intervenu entre les parties au su deel'interprétatiod nu traitéou de

l'applicationde ses dispositions".Ce n'étaitpas l'affaired'un seul petitmot, comme l'a ditM. Pellet : toutela déclarationde M. Prinetti

montrait clairement qu l'accordde 1900concernait la partie occidentale

G",1 de la frontièrede la Tripolitainel,e secteurconfinantà la partie

orientale des possessions africai dela France.

Cettethèse a été illustréesur une carte que vous revoyez

maintenantsur l'écran. Prinetti--,aidentifié-"sphèred',influence

française"mentionnée dans llaettrede 1900commeétantles possessions

africainesde la France,à l'estdesquelles se trouvaitle vilayetde

Tripoli. La déclarationde Prinetti,établied'un commun accord,

montrait bien que la sphèf reançaise évoquéeans la déclaration

unilatéralede Barrèreen 1900étaitseulement la partiecolorée en bleu

sur la carte.

Pourtant,M. Pelleta essayéplutôtde donner del'importance au

discoursde Delcassé,prononcépeu après. Il a affirmé que lestextes

des deux allocutionsavaient étésoigneusementcoordonnés.Cette

affirmation n'estétayéepar aucunélémentde preuve. Le discours de

Prinetti avaitfait l'objetd'un accord mot poumrot. Mais celuide

Delcassén'a pas du toutété concerté avecl'Italie. C'étaitun discours

politique, servanstes propres intérêtsvisant à répondreaux.critiques

adressées auGouvernementfrançais pour avoi négligé les intérêts dla

France dans la déclarati den1899et, entoutétatde cause,c'estune

descriptioninexacteet exagéréedes effetsde la déclaration.L'onne

peut accorderà ce genrede discoursaucune signification juridiq pour

interpréter soit la déclaratd ion1899,soit l'accordde 1900,

conformémentaux règlesénoncéesdans la conventionde Vienne.

M. Cassesea faitune dernièretentative pourranimer les accords de

1900-1902dans son analysede l'accordTittoni-Poincardée 1912. Il a

commencédu mauvais pied, ednisantque l'objetessentiel de l'accord

de 1912étaitde confirmer l'accor de 1902, en se fondantpour celasur la mentionde cet accordqui figure dansle préambulede l'accord

de 1912. Il a considérablemen aggravéson cas en affirmanàt tortque

l'accordde 1912 avaitété signé avantque la souverainet italienne

sur la Tripolitaine aitété reconnue,et que le ministre des affaires

étrangères, Poincaré, avait, avantd'accordercette reconnaissance,

insistépour que la questionde la souveraineté-territoriafe.soi-t.tirée

au clair.

Sauf son respect,M. Cassesese trompesur lesfaitset les

conclusions.La Franceavait inconditionnelleme reconnu la

souveraineté italienn sur laTripolitaine à la suitedu traitéd90uchy, 1

quelques jours avantl'accordde 1912. Cet accord étaliat

contrepartie de la Francepour cettereconnaissancee ,t il consistaien

une clause réciproqud ee la nation la plusavorisée,énoncée au deuxième

paragraphe de cet accord. Le projetd'accordélaboré par la Francene

comportait aucune mentid on l'accordde 1902 - celle-cia été ajoutée

par l'Italie,commel'a observéM. Cassese à Justetitre,et cene

pouvaitdonc guèreêtrele principal objed te l'accordde 1912,qui était

dû à une initiativdee la France.

Il est vrai que Poincaréavait initialemen songéà saisir cette

occasionpour éclaircil ra questionde la frontièrede la Tripolitaine

avec l'Italie -contre lesconseilsde Barrère -mais les élémentd se

preuve produits dans l présente affaire établisse qu'ilrenonça

ensuite à cetteidée. La questionfut laisséepourune négociation

séparée avec l'Italie qui devait commenceern 1914, maisqui n'eut

jamais lieu àcausedu déclenchement de la première guerrmeondiale.

M. Cassesea oubliéde mentionner les travaux préparatoires cités

dans la répliqudee la Libye(par.6.99et suiv.),qui démontrent que

~oincaréa reconnuqu'au-delà de Ghadamès, iln'existait pas de frontière

de la Tripolitaine. Cet élément estune preuvede plusde ce que l'affirmationdu Tchad - que la lignesinueuseen pointillé figuran sur

la cartedu Livre jaune encerclantla Tripolitaine étaitune

frontière- est dénuéede fondement.C'estune preuvede plus quecette

thèse est dépourvu ee fondement.

La conclusion à laquelle a aboutli'exposéde M. Casseseétaitque

par la référence- on.pourraitdire le--renvo i-àl'accord-de1902qui

figuraitdans l'accordde 1912, l'Italieet la Franceétaient convenues

de reconnaître comme frontière méridiod nalea Libyela lignefigurant

sur lacartedu Livre jauneque, selonlui,l'Italieavaitreconnue

en 1902.
. -
C'estune sorte detriple renvoi : de 1912à 1902 à 1900. L'erreur,
O13
- - c'estque l'accordde 1900-1902 ne reconnaissaiptas de frontière de la

Tripolitaine.Et dans ces accords,l'Italiene reconnaissait pas non

plusde sphèred'influence française, saup four le Maroc.

Monsieurle Président, Messieursde la Cour, deux cartes françaises

officielles ont été publiées en1912,et ellessont toutesdeuxproduites

dans la documentatior de la présente affaire.

Voici à l'écranla cartede 1912qui figuredans l'atlas

cartographiqudeu Tchad. J'appellel'attention de la Coursur lehaut de

cette carte, donvtoicimaintenant l'agrandissemens tur l'écran,qui

montreles régions de Ghat et de Toummo. Vousy voyez uneligne jaune en

pointillé - interrompueau sud surune partieimportante de cette

courbe - qui paraîtressembler à une partiede la ligne sinueuse en

pointillé de la cartedu Livre jaune. Commele montrela légende, elle

n'estpas représentée comme un frontière.Cette carte français établit

que la France ne considérait palsa ligne sinueuseen pointillé comme une

frontière à cetteépoque. La déclarationfranco-britanniqude 1899

J'en viens maintenant la déclaratiodne 1899, mais seulemepour

réfuterl'argumentatiodne M. Pellet,carnous avons consacrbéeaucoup

d'attentionà la déclaration lordsu premiertour. Je m'attacherai

deux questions: premièrement, dans la déclaration, une sphère

d'influencefrançaiseétait-elle reconnueaurrurddu 15e-parallèle?

~euxièmement,quelleétait l'orientation ql ueon entendaitdonneà la

ligne décriteà l'article3 de la déclaratio?

0 1 4 Une limiteà une zone francaise

Le Tchad affirmqu'à l'article3 de la déclaratiode 1899, la

Grande-Bretagne raeconnu une sphère d'influence françajusqu'àla

ligneest-sud-est décriteà l'article3. Au lieude répondreaux

argumentsde la Libyemontrant quecettethèseest fausse, M. Pellet

s'estattaché à parlerde prétendus changemendtsavisde la Libye surce

pointainsiqu'à des contradictionssupposéesentreles déclarations

faitespar les conseilsde la Libye devanla Cour. Je tiens à assurerà

la Cour que la Libyn'a cessé d'affirmer qul'article3 de la

déclarationde 1899n'a pas délimitéde frontièreni délimité oreconnu

de zoned'influence.Quantà l'exposéde M. Cahier,qu'évoquait

M. Pelleten formulantses accusations,il traitaitdes échanges entre

l'Italie,la Grande-Bretagneet la France dans les anné1920 et 1930,

où, en effet,les termesutilisésétaient parfoiisnexacts dans le

contexted'uneprotestation contr la conventionde 1919. Ce àquoi l'on

s'intéressait,à cette époquec'étaitau changementd'orientationde la

lignesud-est et aux allégationsnexactesde la France selon lesquelles

la lignede l'article3 avait été transformée pmaagie enfrontière,
et

non à la reconnaissance supposéer l'Italied'unesphèred'influence

française. A proposdu textede l'article3 de la déclaration de 1899,

M.Pelleta laisséentendreque la Libye se fondaitsur cequ'ila appelé

une "distinctiosnubtile" entrlee mot "zone", qui escteluiqui figure

dans l'article,et l'expressio"nsphèred'influence".Eh bien,j'ai fait

l'effortd'expliquer:pourquoia,u cours des dernierjsours dela

négociation,l'expression"zonefrançaise"a été-retenue,-et-- Usphère

d'influence française" La distinction n'est pa ssubtile"du tout :

bien au contrairele terme"zone",commeJe l'ai expliquéen détail,a

6th soigneusementchoisiafind'éviter toutereconnaissancd e'une

sphèred'influence française.
. .
Cl5 Il est inutilede répéter cette explication, q leeTchadpréfère
- -
toutsimplement ignorer. Il est évidentque le choixde l'expression

"zonefrançaise"n'étaitpas fortuit. Dans d'autrescontextes, les

expressions"zone" et"sphèred'influence" sont souvent

interchangeables.Mais pas ici. Les travaux préparatoire confirment

que le choixdu mot "zone"était délibérée,t que ce mot n'étaitpas

censé signifielr'équivalentde "sphèred'influencefrançaise".Tout

celaa été soigneusement exposépar la Libye lorsdu premiertour.

Des citations des travau préparatoirespertinentsse trouventdans

la transcriptiod ne ma dernièreintervention(CR 93/16,p. 36-38). Il

est clairet incontestable qu ees Français voulaienéviterde

reconnaître la moindre sphè d'influencebritannique,et que les

Britanniques ne voula.ientas accepterde textequi indiquât la moindre

reconnaissance ou définiti d'unesphèred'influence française.

Le textede l'article 3 prévoyaitque la lignesud-estqu'il

décrivaitétait la de la zonefrançaise".Pas "zone

d'influence1' pas "sphèred'influence": la "zonefffrançaise.Et

l'article 3 ne comportait aucunexpression de reconnaissancdee la

moindre zone ou sphère. Le contextede l'article 3établitque lechoix du mot "zone"visaitexpressément à distinguerla limited'unezone

française établipear la lignesud-estd'unelimiteou frontière d'une

sphèred'influence française.

Je voudrais faire ici une autreobservationsur le contextede cet

article3 et l'indicationclaireque l'emploidu mot "zone"n'étaitpas

simplementune négligencede rédaction-ouun choix.demutspeu réfléchi.

Il ressortdes travaux préparatoire que ceuxqui étaient chargé de la

rédactionproprementdite étaient,du côtébritannique, lord Salisbu ety

lord Sandersone,t, ducôté français, Cambo et Delcassé. Ils étaient

assistésde lord Everettdu War Office,à Londres,et de Lecomte, à
. . w
Paris. Everettet Lecomteétaientdes hommesd'expérience.Ils avaient
016
- - tous deuxfait partiede lacommission qui avaitdélimitéla zone

d'influencede 1890pour en faireune frontièreentreles territoires

britanniqueset françaisdans laconvention de 1898. Ils avaient donc

directement participà l'élaboration età la rédactionde la convention

de 1898commede la déclaration de 1899. On ne peutpas raisonnablement

croireque lechangement de terminologi au,profitde l'expression "zone

française",n'a pas étédélibéré dansla version finaldee l'article 3;

et les raisonsde ce choixont été énoncées dansmon intervention

précédente.

La directionde la lignede l'article 3

Je vaismaintenant reprendr une foisde plus la question de la

direction de la ligne définieà l'article3 de la déclaration d1e899.

Dans mapremière plaidoirie la Cours'ensouviendra, j'ai expliqué

pourquoil'orientation de la ligne présentuene telle importancpeour le ,

Tchad. Si, et tel est assurément le cas selon la Libyel'orientation de

la lignede l'article3 étaitle sud-est,ce qui ressort du textede

l'article - et le sud-est estune direction cartographique préc -ise alors,au lieu que les "actesinternationauxé "numérésà l'annexe1 du

traitéde 1955 indiquent touu sne seuleligne,comme l'affirme le Tchad,

ils indiquent deux lignet s,èsdifférentes, commeon le voit sur l'écran.

La lignede l'article 3 de 1899étaitdéfinie comme une ligne

sud-est. Ce qu'ilest convenud'appelerl'"interprétation de cette

ligne donnée danlsa conventionde 1919 'a-udifi--entermes.~xprès sa

direction pour en faire une lie gnte-sud-est.La cartedu Livre jaune

représentait encoreune troisièmeligne. Aucunede ces lignesn'était

une lignefrontière.

Commentpeut-onsoutenir que le" sactes internationaux" énuméréà

l'annexe1 n'aientproduitqu'une seule lign ?e Si, comme le Tchadl'a

soutenu danssonmémoire, la lignede 1919 doit avoir la priorité en cas

de conflitentre les deux lignes v enrtudu principe lex posterior

priori derogat(voircontre-mémoird ee la Libye,par. 3.125-3.126

Cl7 et 4.197),alorspourquoidiablel'article 3 et l'annexe1 ne l'ont-ils

pas dit toutsimplement en stipulant queles partiesacceptaient la ligne

de 1919 comme frontièm reridionalede la Libye? Bien entendu,cela

n'auraittoujours laissé aucu fondement pourle "segment ouestd"e la

frontière revendiquée pl ar Tchad,qui s'étenddu tropique duCancer

dans la directiodne Toummo.

Or, qu'a trouvéà direM. Pelletau sujetde l'orientation de la

ligne (CR 93/23,p. 37-45) ? D'abord, iln'a fait querépéterun

argumentdu Tchad déjàréfuté par lL aibye (CR 93/16,p. 26),à savoir

qu'ilrésulterait de l'inclusiondes mots"en principe"dans l'article 3

que la définitionde la ligne"dansla direction du sud-est"(to the

south-east)n'étaitpas censée faire d'elleune "ligne sud-est

mathématique". Mais il résultdeu contextede l'article 3 que les mots

"en principe"n'ont pas étéutilisés à l'article 3pourmodifier la définitionde l'orientationde la ligne,à la différencede l'article 2

de la déclaration,où ces mots ont bien modiflié définitionde la

frontièrede l'article2.

M. Pelleta ensuite tenté d'étayercet argumenten se fondantsur
4
les mots qui définissenl'orientatiodne la ligneà l'article3 : "dans

la directiondu sud-est". Cette questiond'interprétation textuelle a

été examinéeen détail lorsdu premiertour. Je ne mentionneraiici que

quelques considératiopnsrtinentes.

premièrement, il n'y a riend'imprécisdans la formule"dansla

directiondu sud-est'e't il ressortdu contextede l'article3 que l'on
1
entendaitemployer ainsiun termeprécis. Des termessemblables

d'orientation géographiqueapparaissent tou tu longde la convention

de 1898et l'onpeut en trouver aussidans ladéclaration.Je ne

répéterai pasmon analysedétailléede ce point(CR 93/16, p. 31-32),

saufpour mentionneurn exemple. A l'article 1de la conventiodne 1898,

lesmots mêmesdont il s'agit - en l'occurrence"dansla direction de

l'est"- furent employépsourdéfinir une ligne qu l'on entendait

nécessairement tracer droità l'est,car ellesuivaitun parallèle.

~euxièmement,dans lanote verbale italienn du 27 mars 1924

adresséepar l'ambassadeur d'Itale ie Franceau ministrefrançaisdes

affairesétrangères (mémoiredu Tchad,annexe104)pour protesteu rne

foisencorecontre la conventio de 1919,l'ambassadeurd'Italiea

formuléune observation qui avait directement trait l'orientatiodne la

ligne définie à l'article3 de la déclaratiodne 1899 :il a fait

observer que le textede l'article3, du pointde vue de l'Italie,

, 1 9 définissait une ligneprécise. Celle-cidevait,a-t-ildit, suivre "non

pas ... une directionquelconque sud-est mais bienla directiondu

sud-est", Troisièmement, les travaux préparatoc irnesirmentque lesmots

"dansla direction du sud-est"étaientcensés signifiep rrécisément

cela :une lignetracée rigoureusemev ntrs le sud-est. C'estce

qu'illustrela propositionprésentée par lor Salisburyle 19 mars,qui

aurait"poussé", selonle termede Cambon,la frontière de l'article2

jusqu'au18~ parallèle. On voit.surl'écranla ra-rte.utifisé leorsdu

Si la frontière de l'article2
premier tour pou récrirecet incident.
e
est repoussée vers le nordusqu'au18 parallèle, l'orientati denla

ligne allantde là àson pointd'aboutissemens tur le tropiqudeu Cancer

n'était plus nord-ouest(à ce stade,évidemment, ils parlaientdans le

sens du sud au nord et non du nord ausud),ellen'étaitplus nord-ouest,

mais ouest-nord-ouest. Dans les négociations je l'aidit, on

envisageaità ce momentla lignecomme tracée du sud au nord.

Dans le projetde lordSalisbury, la ligne proposéeétaitdécrite

commeétant tracée "dansla direction du nord-ouest".Lord Salisbury

-et Cambon - et ceuxqui les conseillaienàt Londreset à Paris - ne

pouvaientguèreêtreaussi naïfsen matièrede directions géographiques

queM. Pelletl'a donné à entendre.

La preuveinattaquable du faitque les négociateurs britanniques

connaissaientla différence entrlee sud-estet l'est-sud-est,c'estla

note delordSandersonà lordSalisbury, qui figureune foisde plus à

l'écran. M. Pelletn'a donnélecture àla Courque d'une seulp ehrasede

cettenote : "Jene pensepas que cela ait beaucoupd'importance.'L 'a

réelle significatiodne cettenotene résidait pas dans cettephrasemais

dans la direction quel'on entendait donnerà la ligne. Lord Sanderson a

faitobserver à lordSalisbury que la lignefigurantsur la cartedu

Livre jaune, dont il venaitde recevoirun exemplaire, étaie trronée.

Je pourrais ajouter Ici que lordSandersonn'étaitpas alors

Tnr l'ambassadeub rritanniqueà Paris. Il ne futjamais l'ambassadeur
LLJbritannique à Paris. 11 fut le bras droitde lordSalisburypendantles

négociations pour élaborer l projets. Il se trouvaità Parisquand il

envoya cette note parcequ'ilétaitvenu parapherle traité. Eh bien,

dans sa note à lordSalisbury, lordSanderson déclara qu la ligneétait
1
orientéevers l'est-sud-est c'est-à-dire ESE etnon SE, versle sud-est.

Il a ajouté,à proposde la carte,"par ailleurs" - autrement dit, sauf

pour cette erreur - elle sembleéquitable. Cela revient à dire :"ils

ont commis une erreurdans la directiod ne la ligne".

Par la suite,le War Office britannique publ des cartes

officielles qui représentaienlta lignede l'article3 commeune ligne

sud-estrigoureuse ou vraie. Aucune protestation française'a été

consignée.

Toutefois, le Tchada introduit dans sa répliqueune note de1923

d'un certain MacMichaed lu service britanniqudu Soudanqui semble

contester cette conclusi( onépliquedu Tchad,vol. 2, annexe43); cette

note affirmait que les premièrescartesdu War Office publiées

jusqu'en1914avaientreprésenté une ligneplutôtest-sud-est que

sud-est. Alors, soutenait MacMichael, le War Offe iceprocédantà une

revisiongénérale des cartes interprétal'article3 de la déclaration

de 1899 d'une façon littéral erronée,et modifia la lignp eortéesur

les cartes officielles britanniq puesr en faire une orientée

rigoureusement verl se sud-est. Le Tchadn'a pas commentécet élémentde

preuve dans sa réplique,ni pendantle premier tour de plaidoiries, bien

que la Libye l'aitexpressément invitéà le faireavantde commenter

elle-mêmela note deMacMichael. Il incombedonc maintenant à la Libye

d'en dire quelquechose.

Il est clair que MacMichael, en poste au si dugeervicedu Soudan

à Khartoum,n'avaitqu'uneconnaissance incomplèd tes cartes

britanniquespubliées.
Lors du premiertour, la Libyea projetésur l'écranla cartede la Royal Geographical Societde 1899, publiéepeu

après la signatur ee la déclaratione 1899. Elle représentaitla ligne

de l'article3 comme suivantrigoureusemenutne directionsud-est. La

Libyea aussitrouvé,dans un ouvrage publiéu,ne reproduction d'une

cartedu War Officede 1906 (voirla Map of Africa by Treatyde
021
e Hertslet, imprimé earHis MajestyVsStationery-Office.;-voiranssi

e
Robinson et GallagherAfrica and the Victorians, 2éd., 1981,avec

les cartesà la fin). Sur cettecartede 1906, maintenant projetéesur

l'écran,la lignede l'article 3 est figuréecomme orientéestrictement

vers le sud-est.

Je voudraisprésenterquelques autres observations au su deecette

carte. Commela Courpeut le voir, la ligne sinueue sepointilléy

figure, mais ilest clairqu'à l'ouestdu pointde départde la lignede

l'article3 du tropiquedu Cancer,cette lignen'estpas présentée comme

une quelconque frontièr(cettepartie juste là). Toutefois,à l'estet

au norddu tropique,1.alignesinueuse en pointilléest marquéepar le

même symbole que les.ignesdes articles2 et 3de la déclaration

de 1899,un symboledéfinidans la légende commu ene frontièrdont le

relevérestait à faire. Pourrions-nous avoide nouveau lacarte entière

afinde montrer la légende? La légendeest justelà; la lignequi suit

le tracéet va toutdu long jusqu'àla Méditerranéecorrespondà cette

lignesur la légende;cette ligneest définiecommeune frontière dont le

relevé resteà faire.

Cela,semble-t-il, n'a aucun sens;ni la Franceni la

Grande-Bretagnnee considéraient laignesud-estde l'article 3 comme

une frontière en 190et le Tchadne lui attribue pas davantaugne tel

caractère.Fait remarquable, cettefrontière dontle relevérestaità

faireest représentéecommebritannique toud tu longjusqu'àla

Méditerranée, de sortequ'ellene saurait guère justifie l'argument selonlequel, dans les accord ds 1900-1902,une sphèred'influence

françaisea été reconnuejusqu'àcetteligne. La carte,et ce faitreste

inexpliqué,sembleindiquerqu'ily avait une sphèrd e'influence

britannique jusqu'àcette ligne, c'est-à-direexactementce qu'en1899

les Français voulaienéviterde reconnaître.Toutefois, cettc earte

de 1906 reflète le pointde vue-officiel-britannique-s lardirectionde

la ligne définieàl'article3 de la déclarationde 1899 et confirmele

même pointde vue figurésur lacartede 1899de la Royal Geographical

Society.

. . Les élémentsde preuve versés aux débae ts l'espècene contiennent
wq
022 aucune cartedu War Officed'avant1919où figureautre chose qu'une
- -

ligne rigoureusement orientée vleersud-est etla Libyen'a vuaucune

cartede ce genre. Certes, après 1919, la ligne représes ntéeles

cartes britanniqueasété réorientéevers l'est-sud-estconformémentà la

convention franco-britanniqu de 1919.

Je voudrais achevemra discussion de la directidon la lignede

l'article 3 en mentionnant une foiencore l'incident qu s'estproduit

le 19mars 1899, quand lord Salisbury a préseu ntnouveauprojet.

C'étaitjustedeuxjoursavantla signature.

M. Pelleta donné à entendre quec'estla Libyequi a tentéde

transformer cet épisodeen un événement importantCR 93/23,p. 40) : il

oublie quec'estdans le contre-mémoird eu Tchad (par.8.99)qu'il aété

présenté commeun "épisodecrucial". Une foisde plus, le Tchad semble

donc se dérober devantdes élémentsde preuve auxquels,à un moment,il

avait attribuéune importance particulière.

L'analysedonnéepar la Libye, dans ses écritures,de ce qui s'est

passéle 19mars, tellequ'ellea étérésuméependantle premier tour, a

été qualifiée"d'absolumentextraordinaire" pa M. Pellet. Or, Monsieur

le président, cette analyn seétaitriende plus qu'uneanalysedes faits. Commeon s'en souvient, le 19 mars,lordSalisburya présenté une

proposition,formuléedansun nouveauprojet, tendanà t pousserla

frontièrede lSarticl, evers lenord jusqu'au lae parallèleet, à

partirde là, de tracerla lignede l'article 3vers l'ouest-nord-ouest

jusqu'autropiquedu Cancer(autrement dit, selonles termes dont il

s'est servi dansson projet-dans-la"directio du-nwrd-mest") . Sa

propositionet ce qui s'estpasséensuitevont maintenant êtr illustrés

sur l'écran.

A l'époque,la frontière envisagé dans lesprojetséchangés - la

frontièrede l'article2 de la déclaration de 1899- finissait au

15~parallèle, mais fl restaitencore à déterminer en queploint exact

vu que la frontièrdee l'article2, entreles lleet parallèles,

n'avait pas encore été délimitéeavecprécision.
. .
Ce que proposa lordSalisbury, ce fut d'étendrela frontière de
O23
- l'article2 (ou de la "pousser"selonl'expression de Cambon) jusqu'au

lae parallèle et,à partirde là, de tracerune ligne dans la direction

du nord-ouestjusqu'au poindt'intersectiod nu 16 méridienet du

tropiquedu Cancer. La proposition avait don pour objetd'étendrevers

le nord la frontière dle'article2. Il ne s'agissait pas de la ligne

tracéeentrece pointet le tropique du Cancer, comme l'indique c lempte

rendude Cambon, selon lequelce dernierrejeta laproposition de

lordSalisbury car i.1était"impossible de pousser ladélimitation

jusqu'aulae parallèle".

Le pointsur lequeldiffèrentles interprétationd sonnéesde cette

proposition par la Libyeet par le Tchad,c'estque le Tchad suppose à

tortque ce que voulaitdire Cambon, c'étaitque lordSalisburyproposait

de faire descendre la lignesud-est de l'article 3- vers le sud-

tandisque lordSalisbury, commo en le voitsur l'écran,proposaitde

remonterlbligne frontière de l'article2 - vers le nord - jusqu'au 18~parallèle. Commel'a dit Cambon, lorSdalisburyproposait de

e
pousser versle haut ladélimitation,jusqu'au18 parallèle. La

seuledélimitation en cause concernailta frontièrede l'article2.

Le récit queje viensde fairede ce qui s'estpassélors decet

épisode crucial,pour reprendre les termedu Tchad,se dégageclairement

de l'examen du projetmême de lord Salisbury. Sa-.propositiocomportait

une revisionde l'article 2 du projet,qui concernait la délimitatid on

la frontièredu sud au nord. Ce qu'ilproposaitn'étaitpas de marquer

la fin de cette frontière alSe parallèle, comme l'avaiefntitles

projets antérieurs, mai de la prolongervers lenord jusqu'au

18~parallèle. Telleétaitsa proposition.

Bien sûr, la directionde la lignede l'article3 dépendaitde la

questionde savoir jusqu'oùle segmentde l'article2 s'étendait vers le

nord. S'il s'arrêtaitau lSe parallèle, lalignede l'article 3 était

une lignesud-est rigoureuse. Si on le "poussaitvers lenord jusqu'au

18~parallèle,elledevenait une ligne est-sud-est.

Ce que soutientM. Pellet,c'est que lord Salisbue ryCambon, le

19 mars,ont pris commepoint dedépartun segmentde la frontière de

l'article2 qui s'étendaiv ters le nordjusqu'aulge parallèleet qui

correspond doncà la ligne représentée sur l cartedu Livre jaune. Il W

soutient que Cambo anrefuséde "pousser"le pointd'aboutissemend te la

lignesud-est vers le sud jusqu'au18 parallèle.

Toutefois,cette interprétatio fantaisisten'a aucunrapport avec

le textede la proposition de lordSalisbury. Celui-cidécrivaiten

effetla lignede l'article 2. Sa description allai du sud au nord

commedans toutes les négociation passées. 11 proposaitde "pousser"le

point d'aboutissemen de la frontièrede l'article2 vers le nord, du

lse au 18~parallèle. Si M.Pelletavait raison, la proposition

manuscrite maintenant projetée sur l'éf cranitapparaître le chiffre18O rayéd'unecroixet le chiffre 19",et non 15O, inscrit àsa

place. Cette copie de la propositionmanuscrite montreen effet quel

changementlordSalisburya acceptéde voir apporter à sa proposition.

Ila convenude renoncerà l'idéede pousserla frontière de l'article2

vers le nord jusqu'au18~parallèleet il a acceptéle 15e parallèle

commepointd'aboutissement.Les-deux-Parties étaient--c--convenueqsue

la lignede l'article 3 seraitrigoureusemenotrientéenord-ouest/sud-est.

Cambon rejeta cette propositi car il tenaità ne pas exclurede

façon définitivdees futures possessionfrançaises,le cas échéant, les

régions situées justeau nord du Darfour.Lord Salisburya accepté

l'objectionde Cambon, comme lmeontrele textede sa proposition projeté

sur l'écran. Le chiffre 18O a étérayéd'unecroixet le chiffre 15O a

été inséré dansle texte.

L'épisodedu 19 mars est doncun élémentdes travauxpréparatoires

qui confirme l'interprétation donp née la Libye del'article3, à

savoir que la ligne décrié teait censée êtrerientée versle sud-estet

non vers l'est-sud-estcommecelleque représente la cartedu Livre

jaune. 11 démontre que, l1e9 mars, les négociateuront convenu quela

ligne nord-ouest/sud.-e straittracée entrele tropiquedu Canceret le

15~parallèle.La Libyea discuté en détailpendantle premiertour,

4'7 de la difficultéde trouverce pointprécis,ainsique des solutions

habilesqui permirentde faire face à ce problème.

Le Tchada beaucoup insist sur lefaitque la Grande-Bretagn n'a

pas émisde protestation officielle conl trecartedu Livrejaune,sur

laquellela lignede l'article3 était figurée comme une ligne

est-sud-est.Les raisonsde cetteabstention ont étéexposées dans les

écrituresde la Libye(voircontre-mémoird ee la Libye,par. 6.35-6.36). Il s'agittoutefois18 d'un argument vraimenttrivial. L'important

est queles cartes britannique slles-mêmesindiquaientavec clarté

commentla Grande-Bretagne conceva latdirection quel'on entendait

donnerà la ligne définieà l'article3 : droitau sud-est. Il n'y a pas

la moindre indication, dans les éléme detsreuve présentés la Courou

dont la Libyea connaissance, qulea France aitjamais--protestéontre

ces cartes officiellebritanniques.

J'aborderaimaintenant quelques arguments quM. Cot a fait valoir

au sujetde cartes pertinentedsu pointde vue de la direction qul'on

entendaitdonner àla lignede l'article3.

La démonstration cartographiqdeeM. Cot

M. Cot a affirmé quatre fois au moiqns'aucunedes cartespubliées

après 1919n'indiquaitune ligne ditewmathématiqueo"rientée

rigoureusement verlse sud-est pour laignede l'article3 de la

déclarationde 1899 (CR 93/25,p. 32-33,39 et 46). Il n'estpas exact

de dire que la ligne orientréegoureusementers le sud-esta disparu,

commeje vais ledémontrer. L'affirmation incorrd ecte Cot rappelle

une remarquede Mark Twainqui,à la lecture dela nouvellede son propre

décès dans les journauax,dit"Lanouvelle de ma mort est fortement

exagérée." Il en va de même de la lignerientée rigoureusemevntrs le

sud-es.

La Cour se souviendrade la démonstrationes cartes italiennes

donnéepar M. Condorelli,qui arévélé que toutes les cartes italiennes

sur lesquelles apparaît la lidgnel'article3 montraientqu'elle

suivaitune directionrigoureusemenstud-est. Ces cartesn'ontpas pris

02.6 fin en 1919. Le mémoirede la Libyecontient troicsartesitaliennes

publiées en 1926qui indiquentla même ligne(mémoirede la Libye,

cartes70, 71 et 72). Ces cartes sont maintenant projet éursl'écran.

Ellesportentles nos 89, 90 et 91 dans le dossierd'audience. Les cartes italiennes postérieures omettent complèteme liglede

l'article 3 et mettent enlumièrel'absence de frontière méridionale de

la Libye. Mais lorsque cette ligéneait indiquéseur les cartes

italiennes, c'étaittoujoursune ligne orientée rigoureusement vl eers

sud-est.

Il existeégalement une carte très récent-que.frCota.~omplètement

passéesoussilence dans sa présentation. Cette carte apparaît

maintenantsur l'écran. Il s'agitd'unecarte quiétaitjointeaux

rapportsdu sous-comité de l'OUAde 1987et 1988et qui figure dans le

volume 2 de la répliquede la Libye. Elle porte leno 88 dans le dossier

d'audience.L'orientation de la ligne del'article3 de la déclaration

de 1899 indiqués eur cette cartest rigoureusemenstud-est. Il n'y a

aucune indicatio ni mention dans ce cas d'uneobjectionquelconque du

Tchadà cettecarte.

La lignede l'article 3de la déclaratiodne 1899 indiquéesur la

carte comme étantune ligneorientée rigoureusement ve lessud-estn'a

donc pas disparu aprè 1919. Elle se portait encore for bien en 1988.

Résumé : les cartesdes frontières

Je voudraisconcluremes remarques en projetas ntr l'écranla

situation des frontièresà la finde 1912, lorsquefut conclule traité

d'0uchyet que l'Italiehérita des droite st titres ottomans.C'estla

carte que j'avaisdemandée, vous vouesn souviendrez,à la finde ma

dernièreintervention mais quel'éminence grise derrière le ridenaua

pas pumontrer. Nous auronspeut-êtrela même difficulté, ca je ne la

I vois pas encore, mai je croisqu'elleapparaîtra.La voici. On ne voit

02.7 sur cette cartnei la ligne sinueuse epnointillé entouran la Libye, ni

la lignesud-estde ].'articl3 e de la déclaratione 1899,car elles

n'étaient pas defsrontières,et c'est une carte décrivant lefrontièresde 1912. Je dirai, à proposde cette carte, qul ea Libyene prend pas

positionau sujetdes frontières indiquées sur cette caq rute concernent

uniquement d'autresEtats.

La carte projetéesur l'écranindiqueune certaineévolution. Elle

indiqueles frontières de la Libye tellesqu'ellesont évolué

jusqu'en1934du faitdes divers accords .internationauconclus,

c'est-à-dire, pour se référer encore une foiàsl'article3 du traité

de 1955, lesfrontières qui résultentdes "actes internationaum x"is,

dans ce cas particuliers,ans égardà la questionde savoir si ces actes

étaientou non en vigueur à la datecritique.

La première démonstratio est la ligne vertde l'accord

franco-italied ne 1919. Nous voyonsmaintenantla frontière délimité en

vertude l'article2 dans l'accord franco-britanniq due

8 septembre1919. Nous voyons aussi la frontièrdee l'article2

prolongéeen vertudu protocolede 1924, leprotocole

franco-britannique. Puis nousavons la frontièr dee 1925 avec1'Egypte.

Et, enfin, lafrontière de 1934avec leSoudan. Telle était, à la veille

du traitéde 1935, la situation des frontières décr etteeconnueà

l'article3 du traitéde 1955. Cettecarteportele no 63 dans le

dossierd'audience.Je n'indiquerai pal ses changements apportés aux

cartespar le traitéde 1935puisquenous savonsque les instruments de

ratificationde cetraité n'ont jamaisété échangéset que la frontière

n'estjamais devenue unf erontière internationale.

Toutefois,nous avonsde nouveauprojetésur l'écranla carte

italienne de 1941. Celle-ciillustrela même situation qu ea carte

décrivant les frontièrj essqu'en1934. Il n'y a pas de frontièreà

l'estde Toummo. Et cette situationn'a pas changéau cours des

dix annéessuivantes, ce qui nous amèneà 1951,la date critique. La dernière carte projets éer l'écranillustrel'article4 de la

Constitution de la Li'bye.Elle portele no 4 dans le dossierd'audience

et j'invitela Cour à lireavecmoi le textede l'article 4 (no 11 du

dossierd'audience) car ilseraprojetésur l'écran.

Voici commentcommence l'article4. Il stipule que les frontières

du Royaume-Uni de Libye sont: au-nord,l-amier-Miditerra&; à l'est,les

frontières du RoyaumedlEgypteet du Soudananglo-égyptiena ;u sud,

absencede frontières : au sud, le Soudananglo-égyptien, l'Afrique

équatoriale françaisl e,Afriqueoccidentale français et le désert

algérien; à l'ouest,les frontièred se la Tunisieet de l'Algérie.Voilà

ce qui étaitreconnu en vertu del'article 3 de ladéclaration de 1955.

Je vous remercie, Monsieu le Président. Ainsise terminent mes

remarques. Je vous serais obligéde bienvouloir appeleM r. Condorelli.

Le PRESIDENT :Je remerciebeaucoup M. Sohier deson exposé,et je

donnela parole àM. Condorelli.

Mr. CONDORELLI:

1. Introduction

Mr. President, with youprermission1 shallbeginmy presentation

todayby expressing my admiration forthe eminent counseland friends on

the otherside of thebar,who have givenus some brilliant pleadings.

As 1 listenedto them 1 couldnot help thinkingof thewittyrejoinder of

Madamede Maintenon,themistressof Louis XIV,to the impertinent person

who hadaskedher an indiscreet question abot ute King. The greatlady

repliedin the famouswords: "Everything about tg heeat Kingis

great!" Mutatismutandis,1 thinkthatwe can say much the sameabout

Our remarkableopponents: everythinbgoutthem is remarkable,including

their extraordinary capacity for presentin factsandnoms relating

to this disputein sounexpected a light that thee ynd by assumingan aspectvery differentfrom theone hitherto perceive dy such undoubtedly

ingenuousminds as myown.

We were eventreatedto a real coupde théatre,which somewhat

complicatesmy present task,since it involveda considerable changen

the argument advanced by thepposingParty withrespect tothe position

of Italy. Indeed, France hadmaintainedsince-the.beginninogf this

century that through the Franco-Italian Agreeoment900-1902,Italy

recognizedthat France'ssphereof influencenorth of LakeChad extended

up to the line appearingon theivre jaunemap allegedlyannexedto

the Franco-BritisDheclarationof 1899,and thatthis line, as rb,

"interpreted"by the Franco-Britishonventionof 1919,was or had become

a frontier opposablteo Italy,still by virtuof Italianrecognitionin

1902. Chad in turnhad adoptedthis theory foritself. But on

29 June 1993,at the eleventhhour, everything changednder the very

. O 30 eyes of your Court: Chad declared(CR 93/23,pp. 34 et seq.) that

Libyawas quite rightto considersuch an argumentas untenable,and

explainedto us its newly-foundtruth. In actualfact,we are now told,

in 1902Italydid not acceptthe south-east line as thelimitof the

French sphereof influence,but only thewavy line surrounding

Tripolitaniain the Livre jauneap. Accordingto Chad, it would

thereforebe immediatelybeyondthis line that thesphere ofinfluence

reservedfor Francewould begin: in thoseregions,Francecouldhave

done whateverit likedvis-à-visItaly, whichwould consequentlhyave no

legaltitleto protesteither againstthe shiftingof the south-easline

by the Franco-British Agreemeof 1919 or againstthe transformatioof

this line into a realfrontier.

My colleagueMr. Sohierhas alreadypresentedthe Libyanpoint of

view concerningthe Chadianvolte-facewith respectto the Franco-Italian

Agreementof 1900-1902, a volte-facewhich myeminentfriend Professor Pelletno doubt modestlycountsamong the "adjustments"on

pointsof detailto whichhe referredin his latestpleading(CR 93/26,

p. 69). 1 shall thereforenot returnto this topic,sincemy task isto

reply to the arguments concerni theItalianperiod(1912-1947) made

duringthe oral phase bythe ChadianParty. It is obvious, howevert ,hat

tocarryout this task 1 shallhaveto taktaccvunt-of-£fiad' new thesis,

and 1 shalldo my best to overcomethe difficulties causedy this sudden

changein referencepoints.

1 am slightly relievedh,owever,by the feelingthat 1 am not alone

in this confusion, for have observed thatsome of the eminentcounsel

forChadhave also hadsome difficultyin changing their opinion so

031 quickly. Thus, for example,on Friday25 June one of the counselfor

Chad statedthat:

"TheFranco-British Conventionof 1919 confirmedthe
courseof the line,setting forthin writingwhat theyhad
agreedin 1899,and had been acceptedby Italyin 1902 onthe
basisof the map." (CR 93/21,p. 59.)

But no, my dearand eminentfriends,it is not so: the Agent forChad

showedthe following Tuesdaythat thatwas notthe line acceptedby Italy

in1902: That sameTuesday,another counsel for Chadmaintainedin turn

thatduringthe negot.iatioonf the Tittoni-PoincarAgreementof 1912,

the Frenchnegotiators hadnot raised thequestionof the southern

boundaryof Libyafor theobvious reason that it wasnot opento

discussion,since"it had been clearly establishe by the Franco-Italian

Agreementsof 1902" (,CR93/23,p. 51). A little further on in the same

pleadingwe also heard that, becauseof the referenceto the 1902

Agreementsin the Tittoni-PoincarAégreementof 1912, "Italy,henceforth

holdingsovereignrights overLibya,undertookto regardthe 1899map as

determiningthe southernboundaryof Libya"(ibid.,pp. 51 et seq.).

But no, gentlemenon the otherside of the bar: Italy'sundertakingin 1902,according to Chad'slatesttheory,relatednot to the line

which,accordingto Franceat the timeand to Chad today,represented the

southernboundaryof Libya,but to a different line!

In any case, nothinrgeallyseriousor reprehensiblheas been done:

the Chadian Partyis certainlyentitledto changeits argumentsas much

as it likesand will stillhave an opportunitynext-weekto remedyany

aporiasthat alast-minute reversa1couldhave caused. Yet it is

extraordinary tha duringthe sameroundof pleadingsChad tookgreat

pains toshow thatthe Libyan Party had changedits positionover the

yearsand thatit deservedto be penalizedfor thisby your Court!

2. The Treatyof Ouchyof 1912

Followingtheseclarifications , shouldnow like to refer rapidly

to the Treatyof Ouchyof 1912, underwhichthe OttomanEmpireceded

Libyato Italy. 1 shallpoint outfirstof al1 thatthereis no real

disagreementbetweenthe Partiesconcerning the principlenemo dat quod

non habet and its applicatioin thiscase: it is clearthatTurkey

transferred to Ital the entireLibyanterritory as possessedby the

Portein 1912,in accordance with the relevantterritorial titles as

well as the rightto exerciseits sovereignty overal1 theLibyan

populationswhichhad until thenbeen subjectto Ottomanauthority.

Thereis certainly a sharpdifference of opinionbetween Libyaand Chad

concerning the identificationf the "territorialsnapshot"at themoment

of thissuccession, but sinceother membersof the Libyanteam intendto

dealwith thisquestion tomorrow ,shall not need to concernmyselfwith

it now. 1 shouldlike, however,to pointout with somesurprisethat

Chadmakesno mentionwhatsoeverof the argumentsthatLibyathoughtit

coulddraw fromthe interpretatioo nf the provisionof the Treaty of

Ouchy,athough thesearguments are weighty. Moreover,Chadprefersto maintainan embarrassed silenc eonceming the subsequent practice,

althoughthisshows t'hathe Porte withdrewfromthe areawhich is the

subjectof the presentdisputein pursuanceof the Treaty: it therefore
033
- interpreted that instrume astentailingthe cession ofthat areaalso,

and evenreassuredFranceon thatscore.

Mr. President, whereaso one-could-contesChad'srightnat to

reply to the legal argumen put forwardby Libyaduringthe firstround

of pleadings,that rightwouldbe questionable ifChadwere to decideto

reply to thesearguments atthe lastminute,thusevadinga correct

judicialdebate.

3. Recognition by Francof the succession between the Ottoman Empire
and Italy

It is true, howeverthat theChadian argumentdso not relate

essentially tothe relations between Itaalyd theOttomanEmpire arising

fromthe Treaty ofOuchy,but to the Franco-Italian relatiop nsevailing

at the timewhen Italyacquiredsovereignty oveL ribyanterritory.You

haveheard theChadianParty allege thaton thisoccasionItalyrenounced

the Ottomanheritage, whereas Libya maintat inst thiswas notso. At

thisstageof the proceedings, 1 shall refrain frormeturningto this

subject,sinceChadpreferredto reiterateits pleadings withour teplying

to the Libyananalysis.

1 must pointout,however,that thestatements submitte by Chad on

this subjectare markedwith seriousfactual errorsw,hich totally

distortthe accountof the relevantevents. In the first place, our

eminentopponents have forgottenthaton 20 October1912,two days after

the conclusionof the Treatyof Ouchy,Francerecognized Italian

sovereignty oveLribyaunilaterallyand without any reservations, whereas

the bilateralTittoni-Poincaré Agreeme was signedeightdays later,and

is therefore subsequento the saidunilateral recognitioannd is independent of it. 1 must thenconfirm that th Agreementin question

involvedno territorial reservatio on the partof France: by this1
034

mean that it comprisedneitheran explicitFrenchreservation (whichin

any eventwould have been inconceivablein the caseof a bilateral

agreement), or an implicit reservation, aind is quitesurprisingthat

the Chadian Partystubbornly allegetshe contrary tobe the case,in

spiteof the specificproofthatemerges from th eravaux préparatoires.

It is true thatat a certainpointin thenegotiations the French

Président du Conseilwishedto obtainassurances from Ital concerning

the Algero-Tripolitanian bound( arytthe southernboundary),but the

travaux préparatoiresshowbeyondany doubtthathe subsequently

abandonedthis intention underpressure fromthe FrenchArnbassadoirn

Rome,Mr. CamilleBarrère. In any case, thosedebatesrelated only to

Libya'swesternboundary, whereas thew res neverany referenceto the

southernboundariesof Libyanterritory.The ChadianPartyrecognizes

thiswhen it assertsthat thereasonwas that thissouthernboundary"had

been clearly established btyhe Franco-Italian Agreemenots1902"

(CR 93/23,p. 51). Thesestatements are not only erroneous, butthey

have become laughablei,f 1 may Say so, now thatChadhas just informed

us that,as Professor Pelletsaid,"a more attentive study" hc adnvinced

it thatthe Franco-Italianexchangeof lettersof 1902did not really

relate tothe southernboundaryof Libya(exceptfor avery short

stretch),but to anotherline,the so-called"frontier of Tripolitania"

(CR 93/23,p. 34).

1 alsonote thatChadhas notrepliedto the argumentadvancedby

Libyaconcerning the interpretati ofnthe actualtextof the

Tittoni-PoincarTéreaty. Underthis instrumentt ,he Partiesundertake

not to hinderany measuresthatmightbe adoptedin the future by France

in Morocco and by Italiyn Libya,respectively,and to grant each other. 0 35 reciprocal most-favoured-natio treatment; the Treatyclearlyexplains

thattheseundertakings follow from t 1902Agreements.Thosewere the

obligations thatthe two Partiesexplicitly recogniza ed arisingout of

the 1902Agreements: on the otherhand,theydeduced nothing fro them

concerning the Libyanboundaries at the timewhen Italy was becoming

sovereignin Libya,and thatservesas the clearest-possf31 proof that

the 1902Agreements were regardedbothby Franceand by Italy ashaving

no relevance whatsoeve to the questionof frontiers.

4. Chad's "new thesis"is refuted by the conductof Franceand Italy
after 1912

Mr. President,it seemsobviousto me that the Tittoni-Poincaré

Treaty of 1912 lendsno supportto Chad'snew thesisconcerning the

effectof the Franco-Italian Agreemen ofs1900-1902: it is not by

changing horsesin mi.d-streatmhatthe path chosenby the ChadianParty

will be renderedless impracticablet ,hemore sosincethisnew thesisis

even moreradically contradictory thanthe old one with the subsequent

conductof Franceand Italy. You can see this fromthemap whichnow

appearson the screen: it givesa visualpresentation of Chad'snew

thesis,accordingto whichthe Franco-Italian Agreemeno ts 1902and 1912

did not render opposablteo Italythe lineof theAnglo-French

Declaration of 1899In any of its threeversions(theso-called

"mathematicalv "ersion,thatof the Livre jaune and of 1899and thatof

the Franco-British Conventio on 1919,the threelineswhichyou have

seenprojectedone afterthe otheron the screen). Theselines,we are

told today,concernonly therelations betweeF nranceand Great Britain,

and not Italyin its relationswith France. We can thereforeerasethem

and bringon the so-called frontierof Tripolitania, whichChadnow tells

us was acceptedby Italyin 1902and confirmed in 1912. Beyondthis

line, whichaccordingto Chaddelimitedthe Italian sphere, begat nhe spherereservedfor France,whichItaly - we are told-undertook

togetherwith Franceto respect. But didit indeeddo so? And if Italy

did not do so, did Franceprotestagainstsuchviolationsof its rights?

The replyto thesequestionsis unequivocal and emerges asclearlyas can

be from thefile: it is no, both times,no:

Let us first takeItalianpenetrationintosouthernCyrenaica: this

took place very gradualalyd amid thousandsof difficultieand

reversalsbecauseof the fierceresistance of the local tribesmen

organized andled by theSanûssiya, whichfoughttoothand nail for every

metreof Libyanterritory.This led the Italian Government,whichat u

that time reallcyontrolled only thCoast,to treatwith the Sanûssiya

throughoutthe periodup to 1923,in an attempt toestablish a systeomf

shared sovereignt yn the Ottomanmodel. Let us takeas anexamplethe

El Regima Agreemenotf 25 October1920between Italyand the Sanûssiya,

whereby the EmirIdriss(thefuture King Idriss)was vestedby Italy,

inter alia,with the right toadminister independently tsouthern

oases,such as Koufraand Giaraboub, whicyhou will seeare situated

beyond theso-calledfrontierof Tripolitania,and with the right tbe

consulted befortehe enactmentof Italian legislatioconcerningLibya,

in accordancewith the provisionof the Treatyof Ouchy. Andthen,in 1

1923, the denunciation oal1 the treatiewith the Sanûssiyadecided

upon by the fascist governmecntused thoutbreakof anew war,and with
CS7
- it themilitary campaign which ve slowlyled the Italian forcetso

capturethesesouthernoases after terriblebattles: thus,for instance,

after many vicissitudesDjaraboubfellintoItalian hands in 1926,then

it was the turnof Koufrain 1931,and so forth.

It is not a loveof historythathas led me to recapitulatehese

events: my purposeis to showyou that if Chad'svery latestthesiswere

correct,al1 theseactionsby Italywouldhave constituted sm oany violationsof conventional obligatiu ondertakenby itin favourof

Francein 1902and 1912. And yet, asyou know,France notonlynever

dreamtof protesting, buton the contrarycongratulated Ital yn the

militarysuccessesthat it gradually achievedn the region. The Chadian

Party willno doubt tellus thatFrancewas not interested in these

territories,whichit had assignedto the Britishsphere ofinfluence,

but, apart from the fat ctatEnglandhad alsonot protested,is it

believablethatFranceshould welcome publicly what amoun toed

violations by Ital yf rightswhichit held vis-à-visthat same Italy?

Therewere indeedsomeprotestsduringthatperiod, but oddle ynough

(for Chad of course:),they didnot comefromFrance,but al1 from

Italy. Firstof all, Italy protestedagainst theFranco-British

Conventionof 1919and rejectedthe possibility thatthisConvention -

res interalios - mightgive rise to any effectfor it. Secondly,as

from1930, Italy asserted the illegali ofythe conductof the French

authoritieswhen they decidedto establishmilitary postsin the Tibesti

(atBardai, Wourand Sherda)
or at Tekroand at NadiAgdébé(MC,

Anns. 125 and 140 and Exhibi36),well to the southof the so-called

"frontierof Tripolitania":the arrowson the screen will shoywou where

2 38 theseplaces were siruated. It had thereforneever crossed thmind of

the ItalianGovernmentthat it was committedvis-à-visFranceto remain

withinthe linesurrounding Tripolitania.WhereFrance wasconcerned, it

certainlyrejectedthe Italianprotests, but moso tf the timeit did so

in pursuanceof the theorywhichChadhas now abandoned.

In conclusion,thingshave notchangedwith eitherthe new or the

old Chadianthesis: no internationaclonvention befor1e935 everdrewa

frontierin the regionvalidlyand in a manneropposableto Italy; in

particular,no internationalinstrument committeItalyto acceptingor

recognizingany one of thelineson whichthe Chadianclaimis based. The geographic maps froImtaliansourcesthat 1 had the honourto present

to the Courtduringthe first roundof pleadings faithfullr yeflectthe

legal situationthat they describe. 1 thereforedo not needto returnto

thesemaps, particularlysinceno seriouscriticismhas beenlevelled

againstthem from the otherside of the bar.

5.The Italian maps

Nevertheless, certainremarksput forwardby an eminentcounsel for

Chad compelme to make a brief reply. The fact is that Our honourable

opponents,no doubt overwhelmedby the impactof the Italiancartographie

materialfrom officia1sources - and this is understandable- have made w

a rather laughable attempto reduceits credibility.For lack ofother

more cogent arguments,theyhave resortedto an absolutelyfantastic

scenario; they mustbe fond of fantasticnovels, sincewe have already

listened to a grippinand vivid accountof the manner in whichmeetings

039 of the counsel foLibyaunfolded. This time anew chaptercan be added

to the novel,perhapsentitled"Themad cartographers". Indeed,we are

told that theItalianmaps are not to be trusted,since they "hardly

correspondto the positionstakenby the ItalianGovernment",reflecting

the"discordbetweenthe Italianservices" (CR 93/25,p. 31).

You can envisagethe scene: between 1906 and 1941,therewas at the

ItalianMinistryof Foreign Affairs a servic of mentallyderanged

cartographerswho spenttheirtime erasing from geographic mapsthe

frontiersthat theirGovernmenthad accepted! The ChadianPartyno doubt

thinksthat argumentsof thiskind - facileif not folkloric - have some

chance of being convincina g,d indeedit has already largelybased its

pleadingson the administrative disorderwhich allegedlyprevailedin

Italyat the time, or evenon what it callsthe war betweenthe various

ministries,and so on and so forth. Since1 am speakingof maps,1 shalltake this opportunito yf saying

a few wordsabout thecaseof the schoolmap of1930. The only real

criticismlevelledat us by Chad in this connections for havingdrawn

conclusions, and perfectly logi cals,fromtwo facts. The firstis
040
that in responseto a protestby France,the Italianauthoritiesdecided

to adopt thesolutionof leaving-thedisputedarea-fwhich had-previously

appearedon themap as part of Libya)uncoloured, inorderto show that

no delimitationhad beenagreedupon in the area. The second factis

thatwe haveno knowledge of any subsequenptroteston the part of

France, andour conclusionis thatwe are entitledto believethatthe

solutionadoptedby the Italianauthorities did not seemunacceptableto

the Frenchauthorities.

Unless1 am mistaken,our eminentopponentsfind thatthis

conclusion cannobte justifiedunlesswe can prove thatFrancedid not

protestagain. We are infact being asket do supplysome kindof

probatio diabolica! Al1 1 can Say on thissubjectis that thvery

careful researcchonductedby Libyain the Frenchdiplomatic archive has

not led to the discoveryof any laternote ofprotest. We are sure that

Chad for itsparthas conducted equall diligent research ,nd the fact

that it too has founnothing strengthen us inour conclusions. With

regardto the Italiand.ocumentsin the case,theyare so numerousand

concordantthatit is surprisingto see Chad casting doubon what

emerges from theiarnalysis.

6. Confirmationsof the absenceof delimitatiothatmay be deduced from
the Treatyof 1935, the press releasand theExposé desHotifs

The timehas cometo returnonceagainto the Treatyof Rome of 1935

which,in the opinion oftheLibyan Party, in factrepresents nothing

more thana confirmation- and a very convincinone - of everything that

already emerges clearflyoman objective studoyf earlierevents:namely,thatno limitation had everbeforebeen established in the area

in question. The two Parties havedweltat greatlengthon this

question, each developingits arguments: it is for the Courtto decide.

1 shouldlike to pointout,however,that1 have beenunableto find

in the pleadingsof the opposingPartya singleargumentthatLibyahas

not alreadyexaminedin depthand duly refuted, with the possible

exceptionof the one relatint go theword "cession",which is indeedto

be foundin severalFrenchand Italiandocumentsof the period

surrounding the Treatyof 1935. My eminentcolleagueand very dear

friendProfessorCassesehas laidmuch emphasison this important

subject,whichwe should therefore examina e,1 shalldo shortly.

Otherwise, 1 must admitmy surprise atthe factthatmost of the timethe

opposingPartyrepeats without the slightestadditionargumentsthathave

alreadybeen advanced,omittingto takeaccountof the very

well-documentedrepliesthatLibyahas had occasion to make. This

applies, for example,in connectionwith the term"remainin French

territory" appearingin Article2 of theTreaty,or in connection with

the legal statusand effectsof the press releaseof 1935 inthe lightof

internationalcase-law.

1 alsonote thatOur eminentopponents, aftea rccusingus of

adoptingan approach which theydescribeas "biased",adoptthe same

approach themselves witho autraceof embarrassment.Thus, for example,

in the twopassagesof the ~xposé des Motifsof the FrenchBill

approving Ratificatio of the Treatyof Rome of 1935,on which1

commentedduringthe firstround and whichyou nowsee againon the

screen,counsel for Chad carefullypicked out thpehrase relatintgo what

Italy"had ...refusedto recognize",with a view to allegingthatFrance

had not endorsedthe Italianversion; on the otherhand, the same

Chadiancounselhas madeno mentionof the solemnadmission, which is completely unambiguouand clearly imputabl to the FrenchGovernment,

thatthereis no conventional boundary to t eastof Toummo,as stated

in the first passagea,nd thatthislack ofboundaries, accordingto the

second passageh,ampersthe activitiesof bothcountries.

In passing, 1 confessthat1 entirelyfailto see how Chad can

continueto criticize (CR93/24,p. 71)-the%taI.ian thesi.s-as-summarized

in the first passagoef theExposé des Motifs stillbeforeyou on the

screen: this thesis,Mr. President, is nothingotherthanChad'snew

thesiswhich1 mentionedat the startof today's hearing: France,

perhaps, did not adopt thisthesisat the time, butChadadoptedit no

laterthan lastweek:

7. Confirmations obtained fr British documents

Mr. President,1 greatly appreciate the invitato ioone of Chad's

eminentcounsel,Prof'essoCrassese,who proposes to offerto the Court

the fullestpossible picturo ef elements andfactorsto facilitate a

correct assessmen otf the significancof the 1935 Rome Treaty:the

picture, truth to tel.1is now more thanfull,and the Libyan Party, it

seemsto me, has had no difficultybeingthemain contributor to this.

However, it is possibleto do stillmore,and for that purpose1 should

like to recallhow Great Britain evaluated thesituation asit existedin

the 1930s withregardto the southern limito sf Libyanterritory.

In thisconnection 1 should liketo stressagainthe interest

. - attachingto another press communiqo ué the precedingyear, the

Anglo-Italo-Egyptia communiqué of 21 July 1934wherebythe

threecountriesrecognized that th ferontierbetweenCyrenaicaand the

Frenchpossessions in CentralAfricawas "stillto be fixed" (ML,

Vol. IV, p. 277). If 1 revertto this documentw ,hichyou have already

seensinceit was presentedto you by ProfessorCahier,it is firstto point out thaLibya producedit alreadyin its Memorial,and not

belatedlyas an eminent counseof Chadhas incorrectly claimed

(CR 93/21,p. 61). The second reasonis that this document certainly

cannotbe accusedof using approximate language that confuses demarcation

with delimitation: tollege this,as thesaid counselof the opposing

Partyneverthelessdid, suggestsa complete disregar-dof-thactual

contentsof the Agreementof 20 July 1934delimitingthe frontier between

the Anglo-EgyptiaSudanand Libya, to which this other press communiqué

relates andwhosemeaningit illustrates.The Agreementin question, may

1remindyou, had failedto identify the end-point,towards thesouth,of w

the frontier between thSudanand Libya, precisely for the reason

explainedin the communiqué, namely,hat the frontier between Libaand

the futureChad was "stillto be fixed".

But thatis not all. Inperfectly consistent fashion, GrB eattain

then clearly indicatedhat the1935Mussolini-Laval Treatyhad to be

definedas a treaty establishina gboundaryin the regionfor thefirst

time,since "the frontierin this area had previousnyot been determined

and the territoryin questionwas indispute": theLibyanMemorial

(p. 330) citesariousForeignOffice documents of th year 1935,al1

pointingin the same direction.

The Chad Party will undoubtedlnot fail to make thepoint that

thesedocuments, originatin from a thirdState,couldnot in any way

commitFrance. Formally, Chadwould be rightto maintainthis, butit

would be wrong as to substance:Great Britainknew betterthan anyone

elsewhat it was talking aboutbecause- let us not forgetit - it had

been party to the Agreementof 1900 and 1919,the kingpinsof the French

claimat the timeand of Chad'sclaimtoday. At the least,these
O4 5
positions adoptebdy Great Britainin the 1930sremoveal1 credibility

from whata representativeof the same countrywas to say at the General Assembloyf theUnited Nationson 14 October1949. The eminent

counselof Chadwho, on28 June last, recallew dith emphasisthe opinion

of Mr.McNeilthatLibyahad "well-delimite frontiers"(CR 93/22,p. 57)

forgotto mentionthatthe distinguisheB dritish diplomat clearly h ad

very poorknowledge ofthebrief: in particularhe was unaware ofwhat

the Goverment of HisBritannic-Majestyhad-most officiafy andmost

publicly declared 1yearsearlier. And, as far as 1 know,Our

adversarieshave notclaimedthat thedefinition of the Chad-Libya

frontier occurrebdet.wee1934and 1949.

The only argumentadvancedby Chad in the oralpleadingson the

subjectof the 1935Treaty which deservesan attentive responsies the

argument basedon the use made in severaldocumentsof the 1930sof the

term "cession"in connectionwith theTreaty: if thatas the language

used on bothsides,we are told,the reasonis thatboth Franceand Italy

recognizedthatthe Treatyenvisaged the cession ofa portionof French

territoryto Italy.

In itswrittenpleadings, Libyaalreadyfurnished a very detailed

explanation showinwhy certainItaliandocumentsspeak of"cession":

the reasonis thatthe implementatioonf the RomeTreaty,had it entered

intoforce,wouldhave effectively implie the withdrawalof French

militaryforcesfromthe locationsin the areanorth ofthe 1935 line

wherethey hadrecentlyestablished themselves,and,simultaneouslyt ,he

handing backof thoselocationsto the Italians. It is thereforenot at

al1 surprisingthat theItaliansidespokeof "cession"in orderto

describethe setof concertedoperations that wouldhavehad to take
-1246
placeon the ground; but this in noway signifiesthat a"transfer" of

titleto sovereignty ovetrhe territory concern eas envisaged,since,

on the contra-, for theItalians theterritorywas an Italianone

illegallyinvadedby the French: it mustnot be forgottenthatItalyhad clearly denounced, bmeansof a wholeseriesof very preciseprotest

notes,the illegal presencoef Frenchforcesin the area. It must

thereforebe ruled out that th Italiandocumentsin questioncan be

interpretedas theyare by the opposingParty, whichevaluatesthemin

erroneousfashionbecauseit failsto take thehistorical contex tnto

accoun.

As for the Frenchdocuments,the explanationfor the termsemployed

is still moreobviousand in no way justifiesOur eminentadversaries'

triumphanttone. It sufficesto recallthatevenbeforethe FirstWorld

War the Frenchauthoritieshad developed the negotiating strattegbe
I
usedwith Italyin future: France'sstarting-pointa ,s 1 have recalled,

was the theory accordinto whichthe southernfrontierof Libyahad

alreadybeen delimitedbecauseItalyhad, so to speak,"adheredto" the

Anglo-FrenchDeclarationof 1899 in 1902and had thusaccepted the line

appearingon the map allegedlaynnexedto thesaidDeclaration.

Accordingto thattheory, then,as 1 recalledduringthe firstroundof

pleadings,al1 that remainewdas to demarcatethe frontiersincethe

delimitationhad alreadybeen effected.

Thanksto the opposing Party'sconversionduringthe lastphase of

the present procedure,e findthatChad and Libyanow agreein

consideringthat theFrenchtheorywas ineffectunfounded, sinceit is
047
admittedthatItalydid not acceptthe 1899line. The fact remains that

in the 1930sthis theoryrepresented thofficia1positionof France. It

is therefornot at al1 surprisingthat it shouldhave beendeclaredon

the French sidethat the RomTereatyenvisagedthiscessionof a pieceof

Frenchterritoryto Italy:which explainsthe expressionsthatChad's

counselhave beenpleasedto collect,as iftheirnumbercould, by some

kind of cumulative effectgive force to a thesisclearlycontradictedby

so many concordant elemeno ts record. 1 may add that informedFrenchcircleswere wellawareof where the

truthlay: the Quai d'Orsaynote of1 January 1935,alreadycitedby

Libya in its Memorial(ML, p. 324),is the clearest possibl proofof

this; and the fact,emphasizedforno discernible reasonby the opposing

Party,that the note in questionwas unsigned obviouslryobs it of none

of its significance. Especiallyas the languageempioped'in.thisnote is

very closely akin to thatappearingin the famousExposé des Motifsof

1935of which 1 was just speakingagain. And it should also be pointed

out thatLaval himself, in hia sddressto the Senateon 26 March 1935,

had madeit very clearlyunderstoodthat the Rome Treaty was not reallya

boundaryrectification agreement but rather a delimitation agre (eme,nt

p. 329).

If you agree,Mr. President,this mightbe a suitablemomentfor the

break.

Le PRESIDENT :J'evous remerciebeaucoup. Nous allons maintenant

faireune pause.

The Court adjournedfrom 11.25 to 11.40 a.m.

O48 Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vousasseoir. Je donne la parole à

M. Condorelli.

Mr. CONDORELLI:

9. Subsequentpractice: the Jef-Jefincidentand the Armistice
ConmissionFile

Two episodes subsequentto 1935have broughtdown the Chadian

Party's wrathon my remarks madeon 17 June. Given the minor character

of the incidents1 shallnot revertto them at length, especiall as 1

have heard nothingthatmight invalidate my earlieranalysis. A few quickcommentsare called for,however,so as to correct the inaccuracies

which havecrept intothe analysis made byOur honourableadversaries.

On the subjectof the Jef-Jef episodethe firstpoint1 wish to

make is that careshouldbe takennot to confusethe datesand to mistake

the chronologicalrderof the diplomaticnotesexchanged:

two diplomatic notesin all. The Italian noteis-thefirst,and it

expresses, in very politelanguageit is true,the ItalianGovernmentls

displeasurewith the French who hainterruptedsome civilengineering

operationsconducted by Italyin the zonethat40 yearslaterwas to be

called the "Aozoustrip". The Frenchdiplomaticnote of 20 June 1938is -

therefore the repl yo an Italianprotest,and not viceversa. This item

of informationin itselfalonegivesthe storywe were told an entirely

differentcolouring.

The secondpoint is that theFrenchmilitary interruptethe Italian

workmen'swork only once- once only- therebycausing thereactionby

Italy, whichpromptly announce dhe resumptioof thework, thistime

undermilitaryescort. That resumption, contrar to what the opposing

Partyclaims,was not interruptedby the French: therenchdiplomatic

note testifiesto this in observingthat the incidents closedas the

Italians have lefftorKoufraof their own account,and not becausethey

were removed byforce.

The thirdexplanatorypoint isthat, contraryto what is claimedon

the otherside of the bar, it doesnot in the least emerthatthere was

a third occasion.If the Chadianparty meansto alludeto the account

containedin a Frenchdocument of8 January1939which it has itself

produced(CMC,Vol. IV, p. 545),1 may point out thadturingthe very

courteous meetingin themidstof the desertreferredto in the document,

the Italianofficer communicateto his Frenchoppositenumberthathe

had not received orderto resumethe drillingwork and wouldhave lethim know if he had. :Isthis Italy'srecognition of Frenchsovereignty

over the territoryin question?

My fourthpoint concernsthe sketchof the zone sentby Balbo to the

Italian Ministryof ForeignAffairs,which the Chadian Party has

exhibited(CR 93/24,p. 82), givingit a completely disproportionate

importance. We are to believethat a simp3x-sketch,-designed--exc~usively

to assistin locatingthe site in question, supposedli ympliesItaly's

recognitionof the French thesisjust becausethe line representing that

thesisappearsin the sketch.We are to believe,in short,that a mere

sketchhas the powerto sweeepaway theprobative force of the unbroken

seriesof officia1Italianmaps 1 had the honour to presentto you on

17 June. Butwhy, then,for example,does an officia1map subsequentto

Our sketch(the 1941map whichyou see againon the screen) not carryany

indicationof a boundary?

There is one lastpoint tobe made, inconnectionwith the marks of

sovereigntywhich the Italiansoldiershad left at Jef-Jef. You will

undoubtedly remembetrhe eminentcounselof Chad chortlingas he

describedthe nature of thesemarks on 30 Junelast: some paperwith a

letterheadplacedin some barrels, how footling,we are told! No

cornparisono,f course,with the importanceof the marks of French

sovereignty by whicthheywere replaced: just imagine,some paperwith a

Frenchletterhead placei dn thesarnebarrels(CMC,Vol. IV, p. 540)!

As for thepoint about the 1942Armistice Commission ,ust one

commentis calledfor. 1 fail to see, 1 reallyfail to see how Our

eminentadversariescan persistin maintaining thaI ttaly supposedly

recognizedthe soundnessof the Frenchallegations, when the Italian

authoritiesconfinedthemselvesto shelvingthe questionof the

delimitationof the 'boundarytogetherwith othersto be settled afterthe

end of the war. 10. The questionof the effectsof the Treatyof Peaceon the
Franco-Italian bilateral accords

For purely chronological reasonsshouldnow like to make a few

commentson a subjectrelatingto the interpretatioof the 1947Treaty

of Peace. 1 referto the questioof the abrogationor otherwiseof the

Franco-Italian bilateral treatwhich were notnotified aftethe war

as requiredunderArticle44 of the Treatyof Peace.

You have heard an eminentcounselof Chad protestagainstthe

analysis presented byibya,using a multitudof argumentsto condemnit

as radicallyill-founded(CR 93/21,p. 76 ff.). 1 takenote ofhis

criticisms. 1 must, howeverremark fromthe startthat the opposing

Party'sbrilliant refutations addressednot only to Libya but,ove

all, to Chad itself,which initsMemorial(p. 123)upheld athesisnot

fundamentally differentrom ours.Chadmaintained thaFtrancehad not

notified the Franco-Italian agreements relatinghe formerItalian
colonies preciselyecauseit wishedto be released frothoseagreements

so as to be able to appropriate substantial porofsthe territories
. 0 5 1
concerned. In fact, Francehoped to bring this offby using the

proceduresprovided for thaturposeunder the Treatyof Peace. But its

designcouldnot be accomplishebecausefirstthe otherPowersand then
w
the General Assembldid not allowit: they refuseto proceedto the

redefinitioof the boundariesof the formerItaliancolonieswhich the

Treatyof Peaceauthorizedthem to carryout.

The General Assemblcouldhave remodelled thterritoryof Libya,

as of the otherItaliancolonies,by virtueof the normativepower

conferredupon it by AnneXI of the Treatyof Peace. Fortunatelyit did

not do so. It took quiteanother decisionalso a bindingone,whichwe

know well:the decisionto preservethe Libyanboundarieswhichhad been

delimitedin the colonialperiod andto delegateto Franceand Libya, after the independeno ce the latter, the tasokf delimiting the

boundariesthathad not beendefinedpreviously.In otherwords,it was

thanksto the decisionof the General Assembl tyhat thebilateral

delimitation treatiesrelatingto the former Italian coloniesi,ncluding

the Franco-Italiaanccordof 12 September 1919 relatit ng the

Algero-Libyanboundary,weremaintained-in-fom. ûn-the-other hand,the

Franco-Italian accord of 1900-1902,justbecausetheywere indisputably

not boundary delimitation agreemen tsrenot maintainedin forceby the

GeneralAssembly: neither werethey, thereforei ,n forceon the date of

the independenco ef Libya.

GeneralAssemblyresolution 289 (IV)remains one of the most

decisiveproofsof the factthat thesouthernboundaryof Libyahad not

been delimitedbefore1950. The importance of thisproofis tremendously

heightened by the fac that theGeneral Assembldyid not considerit

necessaryto adoptthe samedecisionin respectof the eastern boundaries
052
of Libyabecausethey, for theip rart, hadal1 been clearlydelimitedby

treaties beforeLibya'sindependencew ,hich implies,a contrario,clear

recognition bythe General Assembltyhatundelimited boundaries between

Libyaand the Frenchterritories did exist.

11. Positiveindications to be fomd in the colonial legacy

Al1 the comments1 have justmade contribute remarkablwell,1

hope,towardsupholdingthe first essentiac lonclusionwhich Libya has

submitted: in the zone inquestion, no boundary delimitatiohas ever

been establishedto thisday. Allow menow to supposethat the Court

will decidethatthis conclusioi ns well foundedin law. In thatevent
,-- 7
' Ij55 the Court itselwfill thenhave to determinethe delimitation, weighing

up the legal titleson eithersideand identifying their territorial

scope. It was with this hypothesiisn mind that,in the firstroundof oral pleadings,1 respectfully submittedwhole seriesof legal

argumentswhich in Libya'sview, wouldhave to beakeninto
consideration forthatpurposeand which are connectedwith the colonial

period. 1 shouldlikenow to revert rapidlyto that subjectso as to

answerthe objections raised orallby the opposingParty.

The first factto be observeds-thatonr hononrableadversaries

have madeno criticismas to the relevance and applicabilofythe

provisions appearinignAnnexXI of the Treatyof Peaceof 1947, which

imposedfirston the Four Powersand then on the GeneralAssembly,and

now imposeson this Court,the task of delimitingthe frontiersof Libya -

not defined befor1951 "in the lightof the wishesand welfareof the

inhabitants andthe interestsof peace andsecurity". Libyas pleased

to takenote of this absencof disagreement.

Mattersstandquitedifferently, on the otherhand, withthe
relevanceof other factors capablef playinga role in this context.

The firstof thesefactorsis that of the "coloniallegacy". In

this connectionit is necessaryto reject immediateynd once againthe

opposingParty'stotally unfoundeadccusationthatLibya is allegedly

reopening discussionn the frontiersinheritedfrom colonialism.Libya
w
is accusedof wantingto reopenthe colonial dispute bclaiming- this

is plain lunacy-that Chad today must pay theerritorial debts France

had in the past failetomeet vis-à-visItaly. That is an unacceptable

distortionof the Libyansubmissions.Why put such insane and heretical

words in Libya'southwhen that countryhas made it clear fromits first

)- 5 4 writtenpleading onwardhow greatlyit desiresthis Court to determine,
aboveal1 else,whether a delimitatioof the boundarywith Chadwas or

was notcarried outin the colonialperiod? When it hasaid and

repeatedthat,were the Courtto answer thatquestionin the affirmative,

the dispute woulbe settledand Libyawould comply faithfullyith the

decision? But shouldyour answerbe negative, gentlemeonf the Court,the

Court wouldthenhave to selectand weighal1 data relevantto the

settlementof the present dispute, includii ng,Libya'sview, those

pertainingto Article13 of theTreatyof Londonof 1915. Allow meto

specifyin the most objective possibleannerthe conditions in which,as

Libyasees it, thatprovisioncoul-p dlay a role-inthç-presentcase. The

firstcondition is thatArticle13 shouldbe capableof being interpreted

as applicablefor the purposesof determininga frontierfor the first

time,and not only inrespectof cessionsof territory. The second is

that it shouldbe capableof beinginterpreted as referring tothe

questionwhich formsthe subjectof the presentdispute. The thirdis

that it shouldbe possibleto deducefromit indications sufficiently

preciseto be of help indelimiting the boundary.The fourthand lastis

thatthe rights and obligatiop nsovidedshould relate to a "boundary

régime"in accordancewith the principle setforthin Article11 of the

ViennaConvention on Successionof Statesin respectof Treaties, that is

to say, that theyshouldhave a territorial charactr ertherthana

purely personao1ne. On each of thosequestions, as you have heard,the

Partiesdisagreeand seek yourdecision.

Iwouldonlyadd thatArticle23 of the Treaty of Peace, that is,

the fact thatin 1947 Italyrenouncedal1 its colonial rightasnd titles,

has -unlikethe otherfactors1 havementioned - no relevancehere

whatever. Italy'srenunciation couldnot entai1the leastconsequence

forLibya, whosesuccessor rights originai tethe relevantrulesof
c55
general international law governing succes inionspectof treatiesand
-
not in thewill ofthe predecessor State.

12. Indicationsto be derived fromthe 1935 delimitation

Far more importantin Libya'sview is the question whether the 1936

delimitationwhichneverentered into forcecan offerthe Courtany indicationsthatwould be usefulfor the purposeof settling this dispute

in the absenceof a uti possidetis jurisline.

We on this side of the barhave explainedat lengthwhy, in Libya's

view, the characteristics of the Rome Treaty,the circumstancesin which

it was concluded andthe reasons forwhich it failedto enter intoforce,

help significantly in identifying-the--territori scopeof the relevant

legaltitles. The Chadian Party, on the otherhand, hasrefusedto enter

into a dialogueon the subjectand has preferrednot to explainits point

of view to the Court. Thus, it has not said why, in its opinion, Italy

decidednot to proceedto an exchangeof ratifications when the Treaty

was - accordingto Chad -very advantageout so it since it provided,

stillaccordingto Chad, for an importantcessionof territory by France

to Italy. Neither,of course,have Our adversariesgiven their version

of the reasonsthat induced Franceto woo Italyto no good purposefor

somethinglike fouryears, tryingby every means to convinceit to accept

what Chad sayswas a pretty gift of some 114,000 square kilometres of

Frenchterritory. If the greedy businessmai nn theparablerecountedto

us by an eminentcounselof Chad - if thatbusinessman, who in the

parablerepresentsItaly,decidednot to concludethe deal, the reasonis

perhapsthat the allegeb dargainwas not a bargainat all! W

The circurnstanceisn whichan unratified delimitation trea tys

concluded and thr eeasonswhich preventedits entry intoforcehave been

consideredin your case-lawas factorsto be takencarefullyinto

consideration for thepurposeof settling a territoria dispute: Libya

has emphasizedthis in both its writtenand its oral pleadings. Chad,

while apparentlynot wishingto rejectthe lessonsof your case-law,

disputesthat this is possiblein the case in pointbecause,in its view,

equitable factorssuch as this could playonly a verysmall role in

respectof very small portiono sf a boundary. 1 humbly confess, formy part,that1 do not understand why, inthe eventof absence of the

uti possidetis jurisline,equity infra legemshouldcome intoplay

for the purposeof drawing shorl tinesbut not longones: the ratio of

sucha distinction completely escapesme. But 1 wish to stressthatto

allege thatLibya isaskingfor a delimitation based entirelo yn equity

is to distortLibya'sargumentin a caricatural fashion.

No, Mr. Presiden.tLibyahas neverproposedthatyou should have

recourse to equitypraeter legem (or contra legem). What Libyais

askingis only thatthe 1935 delimitation whic never entered into force

be equitably takeninto account in order to determine theterritorial

scope of the legalti,tlespresent on either side. And 1 also emphasize

thatwhenLibya refers to the 1935 delimitatioi ntdoesnot at al1 mean

to invoke exclusivel the 1935 2ine but thewholeset of factors,

interests and reasons whichinduced thepartiesto selectthatline

rather thananother, as well at she full setof factors, interest snd

reasons which laterinducedFranceand Italy notto exchange

. . ratifications.

* O57 A last consideration.Listeningto the statements of the opposing

Partyon thissubject, 1 have the feeling(1 say this withal1 respect)

that its conceptof the roleof equityin territorial delimitationsand,

more generallyt,he role of equityin the reasoning of the international

,-+- judgeis a rathernarrowone. Goingthrough theimportant separate
, JJ Lt)
opinions of Judges Shahabudda eenWeeramantry appende to your Judgment

of 14 June 1993in the caseconcening Maritime Delimitation in the Area

between Greenland andJan Mayen (Denmarkv. Wonuay), in whichthese

issuesare studied in depth, 1 have noted,for example,the observations

made on thesubjectof the role ofequityin the difficult process of

weighingand balancing the argumentsand submissions of the partiesto a

judicial settlemen procedure, in particularin respectof delimitations. May 1 be allowed to cite, way ofconclusion on thispoint and

refraining fromal1 comment, ashortpassageof the separateopinionof

Judge Shahabuddee(np. 58): "difficultiesf thiskind experiencedin

dischargingthe taskof the Courtare not enoughto take theCourt beyond

the provinceof the judicialmission".

Thankyou. Mr. President, may1 askyou to cal1on Mr. Cahier.

Le PRESIDENT: Je remercie beaucop. Condorellide son exposé,et
je donne laparoleà M. Cahier.

Mr. CAHIER: Mr. President, Membersf the Court,the aim of my oral
v
pleading todayis to see whether aftthe Treatyof 1955 the situation

was changedin one wayor another,but1 shallnot examinethe Treaty of

1956 whichdoesnot concern ourdispute.

If therewere any changeit couldonlyhave takenplacein two

ways: (1) either bythe conclusionof new treaties; or(2)by the

conductof the States.

1. Let us firstlook at thetreaties thawere concluded subsequently
. 0 5 9
They wereconcluded betweenLibyaand Chad.

The firstdatesfrom1966,and our eminentopponentsattached

importanceto it,but without analysingt in depth, orrather leus say 'II

that theyhave triedto findin it whatsuitedthem. Accordingto them

this Agreement proves

(a) thatLibyaacknowledgedthat thefrontier betweetnhe countriewas

delimitedon the basisof thatof 1955;

(b) that if thathad not beenthe case Libya woudot haveconcluded

an agreementof this type(MC,p. 33).

It is evident thaif the firstproposition turns outo be wrongthe

otheris wrongas well. Libyahas shown initswrittenpleadings that the Treaty of1966did

not delimit any frontier that therehad beenno negotiation on this

matterbetweenthe parties,and that,unlikethe Treatyof Good

Neighbourliness betwee Franceand Libya of 1955, the Treatyof 1966made

no referenceto Article 3 of theTreatyof 1955.

The Treaty of 1966had one aim and that a specifione: -Its

intentionwas (1) to ensureCO-operationin security matters betwee the

two States; and (2) to allowfree movementto the localpopulations.

In a certainsense,the Treatyof 1966 is comparable to the Treaty

of GoodNeighbourlineso sf 1955. So why concludea new treaty? The

reason is simple,Membersof the Court,and we shall return to it in

greater detail. AlthoughChadbecame independen tn 1960,the Frenchdid

not leaveit and were stillpresentin the regionand as Professor Sorel

has said "therewas a continuity of individuals"(CR 93/25,p. 71).

It was thereforeunderstandablethatwhen the French troops left in

1965, Chad shouldhavewishedto concludea treaty ofgood

neighbourlinesw sithLibya for itsown account.

But letus looka littlecloserat thisTreatyof 1966. According

to Article 2:

"TheGovernment of Libyaand theGovernment of Chad
undertaketo a1l.o~free movementto the populationslivingon
either side of the frontier, withinhe geographicalareas
delimitedby the pointslistedbelow:

With respectto the UnitedKingdomof Libya: Koufra,
Gatroum,Mourzouk,Oubari,Ghat.

With respectto the Republic ofChad: Zouar,Largeau,
Fada."

The magicword frontier havinbgeenuttered,Our honourable

opponents believteheyhave triumphedt ,heycry: "Yousee that there is a

frontier betweetnhe two countries,otherwisethisarticlewouldhave no

meaning!" They seem to forget that thereatyalsomentionsgeographical

areas,and, in Article4, frontierareas. So what areasare involved?

As we have seen,it is an area delimited by number ofpoints: in

Libya: Koufra,Gatroum, Mourzouk,Oubari,Ghat; in Chad: Zouar,

Largeau,Fada.

A map is shownon the screenso thatthe geographical positim ony

be betterunderstood.You seethere a grey area with,in thenorth,the

points indicateads beingin Libyaand thosein the southas beingin

Chad.

Membersof the Court, betweenthe pointof Fayain the southand the v

northernlimitof this area,thereare some750 kilometres.This is more

thanthe distance between Nicaend Paris. And we aremeant to believe

thata frontierexistedbetweenthesetwo countries.Gentlemen, when two

Statesestablish a transfrontier régime t hardly extendsfurtherthan

10 to 20 kilometres, sa- even30. Herewe have 750 kilometres. Here

the regionis so vast thaas you can see on themap, the strict
. 6 1
. - south-eastline resulting from th 1899Treaty,the 1919lineand the

line deriving frothe Treatyof 1935 areeasilyaccornmodated. In actual

fact a cat wouldot findher kittensthere.

If one wishesto avoiddistortingthe facts,the objectiveof the

Treatyof 1966 is perfectlyclear. In the absenceof a delimited

frontierline, Libyaand Chadwishedto attendto the most urgent

matter: to ensurefreedomof movementof thenomadpopulations in a vast

geographicalregion.

But it is the seconChadian statementthat 1wish to send backto

our opponents: if Chadwas convincedof the existenceof a frontier

established by th ereatyof 1955,how could it have signedthe Treaty

of 1966 whichprovesexactly the opposite? If, asChadsays today,the

frontier is representeby the lineresultingfromthe Treaty of 1919,the Treatyof 1966shouldhavementionedAozouas beingin Chadian

territory.But thisis not the case,Aozou is the grey area of themap

whichyou have beforeyou. This is indeed the proofthat in thisvast

regiontherewas no specificfrontier. It stillhad to be delimited.

Gentlemen, iftherewas no frontierin 1966,therewas certainly

none in the succeedinpgeriod. The fourtreati-es-thatsnr--0pponen tsem

to dislike so much addnothingto thematter. The Treatyof 1972

concerned friendshi betweenthe two countries.The Treatyof 1974

mentions theterm frontiersin orderto contestthe very concept.

Professor Soreltellsus on thissubject: "it therefore appears

difficult, to satyhe least,to affirm thatthis [challenge]is the

expression of an absenceof a boundary"(CR 93/25,p. 83). Note,1 never

said that,gentlemen; frotmhe pointof view ofthe determination,or

non-determinatioonf the frontier,theTreaty of1974addsnothing. 1

mentionedit onlyas evidence of the acquiescenceof Chad. The Treatyof

1980 is the famousTreaty ofFriendshipand Alliance.Accordingto what

ProfessorSorel says, the Treatywas notconcluded by a genuine Chadian

Government(CR 93/25,p. 83). We shallreturnto this,but if that were

the casewhy not haveraised its invalidityat the time? Lastly,the

Treatyof 1981 "opened frontiers"betweenthe twocountriesbut the other

side of thebar has discreditedit so much thatone wondershow Chad can

referto it. In any case,the other Party has not maintainedthat in

1981therewas a negotiation for the purposeof delimiting thefrontier.

Mr. President, Memberosf the Court,1 think1 can concludethis

pointby indicating thatbetween 1955 and 1981nothing changedt,herewas

no frontier delimitatio in 1955,therewas none in 1981,the date of the

last treatybetween Libyaand Chad.

In factthe onl:yagreementthat couldhave any interestwhatsoever

for Our disputewas thatof 1966. It brilliantly confirt mse Libyan

contention. My analysishas thereforeshownthatno treatyhad changedthe

situationexistingin 1955,and it now remains fme to examinethe

conductof the parties.

2. Mr. PresidentMembersof the Court,1 now cometo the second

aspectof my oralpleading,namelythe conduct of the StatesQuite

frankly,1 had thoughtthatmy oralpleadingon Friday18 Junewas

perfectlysimple even inaturallyit mightbe contested. But, listening
06 3
to the representativesf the Governmenof Chad lastFriday1 was

surprisedat how non-legaltheir argumentsere. We wereal1 treatedto

a regular fireworkisplaywhich hadnothingto do withthe territorial w

dispute broughto the Courtand on the othersideof the bar they

preferred thide behindthe smoke caused by this fithan to tacklethe
realproblem. Professor Sorel started sbyating,for the first time and

againstal1 credibilitythat theTreatyof 15 June 1981 was"signedon

the Chadiansideby a memberof one of the rival faction,nd thathe

had noofficia1functionin the Government(CR 93/25,p. 83).

In examiningthe oralpleadingof ProfessorHiggins,1have to note

that agood deal of it had nothigo do with our dispute.What can be

the Court'sinterestin the ruptureof diplomatic relations betwChad

and Germany,the takingof severalpeopleas hostagesthe struggle -

betweenthe variousChadian factorsontesting forower,the references

to the Falklands-Malvinas Kuwait? As to ProfessorFranck,he gaveus

an excellentniversitylectureon the valueof theuti possidetis

principle anthatof respect forthe territorial integriof States,
principlesthatLibyahas nevercontested. Al1 thatwas accompanieby

an apocalyptic description the situation inhadwheregovernments

constantly changesubjectas theyare to military interventifrom

Libya,the wicked neighbouto the north. Mr. President,far be it fromme to be ironical aboutthe

misfortunesof Chad,which have beenvery real andwhichwe al1 deplore.

But thesemisfortunesdo not allowit torefrainfrom taking

responsibility foirts actionsas wellas for its omissionso,r to

retreat behinda false descriptionf the situationon the ground,

particularlybehindan obviouschronological-.confusion.

Mr. President,Members of the Court, le us returnto purely legal
064
ground,let us returnto earth,or ratherto sand,and look in more

concrete fashion at thproblem opposinugs to Our colleagueson the

otherside of the bar.

1 shall first examine the questi ofnthe conductof the States

duringthe period from1956 to 1970. This was a periodof calm. France,

whichwas presentup till 1960,disappeared, formally but ni ot

substance,until 1965.

1 shallthen look at theconductof Libyaand Chad from 1971 to

1983; and lastlytheirpositions within the UniteNationsand the OAU.

The otherside of the bar reproachesLibya withits inactionduring

the period1955 to 1970. This is only partiallycorrect. It willbe

rememberedthat at thetime of the negotiation ofthe Treaty of 1956the

expertassistingLibyahad proposed that th frontieras a whole should

be delimited. "To facilitateeverybody's taswke should makea general

reviewof the frontieras a whole,followedby a discussionof the

Ghat-Ghadames issueafterwards." (CM., Ann. 9.)

This proposa1was rejectedby the French.

So whatshould 1,ibyahave done then? It was awareof a French

presencein the region,but in the absenceof a frontier delimitatio it

had no groundsfor protest. Moreoverthe periodwas not conduciveto

protest(it was the periodof the Algerianwar) and Francehad hardly

show.itselfto be accomrnodatin with Libya,as evidencedby its reluctance to evacuat ehe Fezzandespitethe Treatyof 1955. Better

days hadthereforeto be awaited.

Didthesebetterdays dawn after the independence of Chad? This is

doubtful. In Chad'sown admission:

"Followingthe proclamation of independenceon
11 August 1960,the B.E.T. ...was administered,up to 1965,by
Frenchofficers. This situation wasin accordance with
agreementson defenceand technicalas wellas military
assistance, signed bCyhad and Francein August 1960." (MC,

p. 303.)

065 It is true,says Chad,that as far as theiradministrative functions
- -
were concerned,the Frenchtroopsactedon behalfof Chad. We do not
ri
doubt this,but neverthelessto the Libyanadministration, which wasnot

in much of a positionto appreciatethe legalniceties,the situation had

apparentlynot changed. What it saw, asProfessorSorel has said,was

the "continuityof individuals"(CR 93/25, p. 71). It is not by chance

thatmost of the actionsthathe indicatesas being Chadian

effectivitésare priorto 1986.

In short,it was afterthe departureof the Frenchthat a dialogue

began to be established betweenibya and Chad. Doubtlessthe two States

couldhave startedto negotiatethe delimitation of theirfrontier,but

probablyChad did not know the legal dossier any bettethanLibya.

This Treaty of1966 in any caseshows, aswe have seen,that Chad

did not claim theline derivingfrom the Treatyof 1919,for otherwise

the contentof this Treatyis inexplicable.

Thus, gentlemen, whilethe French werethere,Libyawas silent. It

had given Francea broadhint for a negotiationa,nd when thiswas

refusedit embarkedon a dialoguewith Chad by concluding a CO-operation

agreementin a vast area pendinga precisedelimitation.

Mr. President,Membersof the Court, although our opponentshave

tried to make much of Libya'sattitude atChad'saccessionto independence and at the timeto he declarationof the Headsof Statein

Cairoin 1964, drowningit al1 in a saucebaptized "thneew rulesof

decolonizationb"y Professor Franck1,will be brief,for theLibyan

attitudeis quitesimple, and contradictnso ruleof international law.
-.6
- Accordingto Chad,when Chadwas admittedto the United Nations, Libya

shouldhave enteredreservationsw ;hereasi-ts.-wa-approvalshowedthat

it had no frontierproblem.

Stillaccordingto Chad, Libyaindeedoughtto have been aware of

the "new"rulesof uti possidetisand respect for the territorial

integrityof States. As we know,theserulesarenot new, but in any

case, theyhave absolutelynothingto do with Our problem,thatof

Libya'sallegedinactionin the face of this situation.

ProfessorCrawfordwill return to theseprinciples.As to Libya's

attitude,the other Party, whilqeuotingcases inwhichStateshave

indicatedtheirterritorial claimsat the timeof theindependence of

other States(CR 93/25,pp. 65-66),was incapableof provingto us that

sucha practice had become th customaryrule. As we said in our

pleadings(MC,p. 384),the silenceof Burkina Faso and the Republic of

Mali on their independence dnidt prevent themfrombringing their

territorialdisputeto the Courtin 1986.

Thesame is true as faras the declaratioof the African Heads of

State in1964 is concerned. Byhisdeclaration,the conference:

"Solemnlydeclaresthatal1Member States pledgethemselves to respect

the frontiersexistingon their achievemen tf nationalindependence."

Thiswas an affirmation ofa general principle ofonsiderable

importance foArfrica. For what reason,then,should Libya havveoted

againstit? Byinvoking the lacokf a frontierwith Chad? But the reply

wouldhave been that thedeclarationreferredto "frontiers existin on
* -67
their achievemenotf nationalindependence" annot to phantom frontiers.Moreover,other African States withfrontier problemhsad

voted in favourof this declarationa,nd 1 shallmentionBurkina Faso and

the Republicof Mali again.

Mr. President,Membersof the Court, this parenthesis closl ed,us

returnto Libyan-Chadrelations after th Treatyof 1966. As we know,in

March 1968,the Chadian Govenunentwas led to-evacuateMe Aozou strip

definitively following a revb oltitsnomadguards. The other Party,

and this is worthstressing sincesubsequently, accordit ng thatParty,

al1 Chadianmisfortunes camf eromLibya,the otherPartydoesnot

attributewhathappenedin 1968to Libya. w

1 do notthinkit necessaryto comeback to what happenedin 1971,

this roadmap publishedand distributed in Italydoesnot seemvery

important, Imaintain, withouctomingback to it, what1 said in my

secondoralpleading(CR 93/18,pp. 33-34).

1 wouldhave preferrednot to comeback to the Tombalbayeletter,

whichdid not deservethewholeoralpleadingdevotedto it bythe

talentedMr. Pellet. Libya hasattached very relative importanc to this

letter. In my second pleadin g triedto demonstrate that theexistence

of the letterwas likelybecauseit fittedin perfectlywith the sequence

of events. We did not base our argumenon acquiescenceon this letter, W

gentlemen. That said,sincea reply must be made,1 wish to say first of

al1 that it was Chadand not Libyathat first indicated t existenceof

this letterbeforethe Court.

Then,long-standing rumourshave certainlyshownthat theTombalbaye

letterwas reportedto have existed(BernardLanne,Tchad Libye,

La querelledes frontières, 1982p,p. 228-231 andJeuneAfriqueof

11 September1989).

Al1 this is uncertainwe agree, buton the otherhand 1 greatly

regretthat 1 cannotfollow Professor Pellw eten he says thateven if he concedes,for demonstrativepurposesonly,that the letterdid exist,it

wouldhave no value as evidence(CR 93/26,p. 35).

. . Why? Becauseit was notpublic. ProfessorPelletquotesin support
O69
- - the Frenchdeclarationin the contextof the NuclearTests case before

your Court.

The situation is absolutelynot comparable.The CoTIrtanaiysing

this declaration, showe that

"An undertakingof thiskind, if given publicly,and with
an intentto be bound,even thoughnot made withinthe context
of international negotiations is binding."
(I.C.J.Reports 1974,p. 267, para.42.)

And the Courtadds lateron that theunilateralstatementsof the French

authoritieswere made ergaomnes (ibid.,p. 269, para. 50).

In otherwords, the French declarationi,norderto secureits

effects,can only be addressedto the international communit as a

whole. The Tombalbaye letterdoesnot pursuethat aim and the

international community asks nothi ofgit.

As to the Ihlendeclaration, it wasno doubtmade public

subsequentlybut the Courtdid not make its validity conditionu alon

such publicity. That declarationis moreover reminiscenotf the

Tombalbayeletter. In both casesthereis no cessionof territorybut

rather a renunciatio nf any rights thatthosegovernmentsbelievedthey

might possess,one over Greenland andthe other overthe Aozou strip.

If a foreign ministercan commithis State ina case falling within

his competence,then such a cornmitmentan, a fortiori,be assumedby a

head of State.

As 1 have said,the existenceof the letteris plausible,for it

providesa better understandin of subsequentevents. What is more, the

purposeof the lettergoeswell beyond theissueof concernto us since

it announcedto Colonel Qaddafithat Chadhad broken offits diplomatic

relationswith Israel,and thatis a fact. 070 It was thus from 1971 onwardsthatLibyabegan to manifesta certain

presencein the Aozoustrip. 1 entirelyagreewith the assertion ofour

opponentsthat in December 1972no mentionwas made of the Aozou strip.

Thus, on the occasionof the meeting between thewo delegations, the

Chad PressAgencystated:

" [he working meetingproveduseful-i-that-it-enabled
each of the two delegationsto state franklyand clearly its
views and... the meeting took placinan excellentatmosphere
whichmade it possibleto arrive at satisfactoryesults."(RC,
Ann. 157,Vol. III, p. 184)

We know that the meetinwas to give rise to the conclusion ofa

treatyof friendshipand CO-operatioinn 1972. But is that agreement

plausible if meanwhiltehe Libyans arein Aozou unlawfully?

No doubt embarrasseby Chad'sattitudeto Libya in the subsequent

years, the counsel ofthe Chadianovernmentargue todaythat Chadwas

the victimof aggression,thatLibya seizedthe Aozou stripby force.

Accordingto Professor Sorel,that "armedinvasion"took place in 1973

(CR 93/25,p. 76).

The accusationis aseriousone sinceaggressionhas long been

regardedas a breachof an internationalnorm ofthe utmostimportance.

Now there isno instancein international practicof a victimof

aggressionnot protesting,not complainingto the SecurityCouncil. That w

is an instinctive reactionrookingno delay.

Chad did nothing ofthe sort; it kept silent. As a matterof

"prudence",we are told on the otheride of the bar. There is no

prudenceof any worthwhen one is a victimof aggression. The truths

that therewas no aggression,that it exists onlyin the imaginatiof

0 7 1 our opponents. And if theraes no aggression, it wbecausethe Aozou

stripwas regardedby Chad as Libyan.

But that absence of reactidoes not suffice.As 1 have already

said, the Chadian-Libyan communiqué7 March 1974,on the occasion of

ColonelQaddafi'svist to Fort Lamy,states: "PresidentN'GortaTombalbayethankedhis Libyancolleague
and the peopleof Libyafor the effective assistancthey had
givenfor the developmentof Chad."

In truth,pub1ic:lyhankingthe Statethathas subjectedyou to

aggressionis carrying prudence littlefar.

Relations between thtewo States wereso good that,tillin 1974,

they signedseveralprotocolsof agreement forthepurposeof-settingup

jointcompaniesin agriculture, fishery, and livestock infrastructure,

productionandmarketing(RC, Ann. 162). Then, it will beremembered,

12 August1974saw the signingof the treaty highlightinthe historical

ties uniting the two brothcountries.

We have beentoldthatthe treaties musb te construedin the

historicalcontext,and 1 haveno objectionon thatpoint. As may be

noted,thehistoricalcontextof the relations betweetnhe two States

occasionallyshowsthat theirrelationsare on thewhole friendly.

In any caseour opponents, who constantilysiston the importance

of the text,willnot.deny that the textf a treaty mushave precedence

over the historical contextand the textspeaksof two brotherpeoples.

It was thereforeround about mid-1977 aindearly1978that Chad,

as we know,tookthematterto the OAU and theUnitedNations. It took

Chad fouryears to realizethatit had sufferedan act of aggressiand

thatLibyawas inAozouunlawfully! 1 shall examinethosecomplaints

@ [)7 2 later; let us simplynote herethatthis is a parenthesis.The Security

Councilwas to hold only onmeeting. The two Statesrestoredtheir

diplornaticelationsand everythingesumedas before.

1 comethen to thatfamousTreaty of 1980 whicha,s you will recall,

prohibited the establishment fofeignmilitarybasesin Chad. 1had

deducedtherefrorn,ogically1 think,thatsucha provision showet dhat,

for theChadians, Aozodid not formpart of Chad. Otherwise the

provisionwas incomprehensibleinceLibya wasin that zone. The opposingPartydoesnot replyon this point; it prefersto explainthe
073
Treatyby meansof two trulyextraordinary assertioq nsiteat oddswith

reality. Accordingto Professor Sorel,1 said,"theTreatywas signedon

the Chadiansideby a memberof one of the rival factions antdhathe

exercised no governmentfunction"(CR 93/25,p. 83). If thatassertion

were correct,Chadwould long sincehave raisedthe issue .anciaughtits

invalidation.Yet this is the firsttimethat theargumentis advanced,

and theTreatywas registered in theUnited Nations Secretari iat

October1980.

For herpart,Professor Higginstellsus on the subjectof the same
v
Treaty: "Chadwas undermilitary occupatio when thatAgreementwas

signed. And thesamewas trueof theTreatyof 1981."(CR 93/26,p. 23.)

1 am unclearabout thelegal consequenctehatOur opponentsare

seekingto derivefromthat assertion.In any event,it is completely

mistaken.

As regardsthe 1980 Treaty,it is dated 15June. Now the French

troops completetdheirevacuation of Chadian territoroyn 16May 1980(1

do notthinkProfessor Higginw sas referringto them),and it was only in

October thatLibyantroopsintervened.In facttherefore, the 1980

Treaty wasconcludedin one of the rare periodsin whichthere wereno

foreign troopsin Chad.

What is more,one seemsto be forgetting,and this concernthe

Treatyof 1981,thatthe Libyantroops werein Chad at the requestof its

authorities.If thatconstitutes military occupatiw on,t is thento be

saidof the Frenchmilitary interventiot nsat tookplacein similar

circumstances?We can forthwith dismissthe fineChadianeffectivités,

fromthe period 1960 to 1965,and which weredescribedto us in great

detailby Professor Sorel. The aim pursuedby Our two opponentsin their assertions escape me,

for therecan be no doubt thatin 1980 and 1981 theGUmT constituted the

legitimate govenunentof Chad. That governmentwas representedin the

UnitedNations, and theOAU did not questionits legitimacy. It

suffices, in regardto the latterbody, to referto its Nairobi

resolutionof 27 June 1987 (AEG/Res.XVIIfiRev.1).

F'urthermore,rofessor Cot, who was the FrenchMinister for

Co-operation at the time,wrote: "We believethatPresidentGoukouni,

fat from being aPuppetof Tripoli,embodies acertain Chadian national

will." (J.P.Cot, A l'épreuve du pouvoir,Paris,p. 46.)

1 wanted to formulatethat assertionto avoidany ambiguity.

It will not haveescapedyou that the oral arguments of the other

side on this point of relations betweenibya and Chad,by accumulating

inaccuracies, digression and effectsof atmosphere, pursuethe sole aim

of not respondingto the argument develope in my second statement,

namelythat in the periodfrom 1971 to 1983 (andapart from the 1977-1978

interruption) Chad,by its silenceand byits active conductr ,enounced

the veryuncertainrightsit mighthave thought it possessedin the

region. The entirehistoryof the relationship betweenthe twocountries

showsthis to be so.

By way ofa reply,and in view of thescant timeat Our disposal, 1

think thereis no point in revertingto the close examination madoef

international jurisprudenr cegardingacquiescence, particularlysince

the opposing Partyhas not criticizedit. I therefore fully maintain

what I said on this subject in my statement of Friday 18 June.

It is true, ashas been observed,that a military occupatio does

not give the occupyingPowerany territorial right, but1 think1 have

demonstrated thata,s it so happens,therewas neitheraggressionnor

militaryoccupation. 1 shalladd thatwithoutany delimitation of theboundarybetween Libya and Chad,the latter was underan obligation to

reactagainst the Libyan preseni cetheAozoustrip.

1 now come,very briefly, to the attitude of the Parties tothe

United Nations and theOAU. Here too,the opposing Party seemsto argue

thatChad soughta great many remedies an that it laid its legal

position exhaustivel and rigorouslybefore-thuse-organizations.

Accordingto ProfessorFranck:

"TheLibyan invasioo nf theB.E.T. in 1973was protested
very vigorously byChad; afterbilateral negotiations with,
and appealsto Tripoliprovedof no avail, Chad thentook its

case to the United Nations Security Councilta hedGeneral
Assembly,as well as to the Organization of Africannity."
(CR 93/26,p. 40.)

The realityof thematteris very different.The bilateral

negotiations, as we have seen,were moreconcernedwith friendly

CO-operation betweenthe two States. As to the vigorousprotest,it took

placein 1977 or four yearsafter the allegei dnvasion ofthe region

concerned.

In 1977, beforethe General AssemblyC,haddenounced the military

occupation of the Aozou stripand made mention, withouany evidence or

itemizing, of many negotiations betwetene two Parties.Furthermore, it

developedno legalargumentin support of its denunciation.As to the

Libyan delegate,rejectingthe allegations of interferencein the

intemal affairs ofChad,he referredto theUnited Nations mao pf 1952

annexedto the Peltreport.

In its complaintto theSecurity Council, in February 1978,Chadwas

to lay emphasison the allegedLibyan support for the Chadian rebels,

also stressingthatLibyahad lodged no case to back its claimsto )i

Aozou. Beforethe Security Council,the representativoef Chadno doubt

began tojustifythe claims ofthatStatein the region,referringin

particularto the Treatyof 1955 (UnitedNations, Officia1 Recordsof

the Security Council,2060th meeting,17 February 1978,p. 2). The delegateof Libya,forhis part,was to reaffirmthe Libyan

characterof theAozoustrip: "Therepresentativo ef Chad accusedus of

havingoccupied Aozou in 1973,but that is not true. We did not occupy

anything." (Ibid.,p. 9.)

Clearly,you do not occupy a territory thabtelongsto you. But, as

we have notdenied, it is certainthatLibya,'whife-speckfgit ngat it is

withinits rights, doesnot restits contentioo nn legalreasoning. That

being said,thiswholeaffaircannothave beenvery serioussinceChad

withdrewits complain,t to the Security Councilust a few daysafter

lodgingit.

The matterwas not heardof againuntilfiveyears later,in 1983.

If, as our opponents makoeut, Chadwas subjectedto permanentaggression

fromLibya,thatwas quitesomelengthof time. Chadwas so little

subjectedto thataggression that itsrepresentativw eas to statein the

United Nations General Assemb iny1981that:

"Certainfriendlycountries did not wait for theappeals
of the United Nationasnd the OAU tocometo our aid. We refer
particularlyto the SocialistPeople'sLibyanArab
Jamahiriya ... We wish to expressour profoundgratitudeto
thosebrothercountries."(UnitedNations,Officia1Records
of the Generalhsembly, Thirty-sixth Session,Plenary
Meeting,7 October1981,p. 620.)

1 have alreadypointedout, in mysecondstatement, that

Mr. Goukouni Oueddehïad in any case,in 1980,expressed thag tratitude

on the occasion ofa visitto Tripoli.

It was in factin March 1983thatChad,once more referrin ghe

matterto the Security Council, submitted a memora( ndum/15 649 of

22 March 1983)specifying its legal claims antdhereinare to be found

many,but certainly not all, ofthe arguments develope by Chad in your

Court.

It is true,andwe do not deny this,thatLibyawas notto go to

such lengths. It nevertheless refers, wrong lyis true,to the

Franco-ItaliaTnreatyof 1935.. .
As we have pointed out, firstlyin 1955 Libyawas il1 equippedto
078
- - appreciate the subtletiesof the case before the Coutrtday; and,

secondly,the case is, as you know, one ofextremecomplexity.Indeed,a

ForeignOfficenote of 21 July 1955, at the time th Treatywas being

negotiated, read:

"We are lookingintothe-exactstatus ofprevious
international agreemena ts a matterof urgency. It is an
extremely complicate question."(ML, British Archives Annex,
p. 335.)

Libyamoreoverhas someexcusefor referringto the 1935Treaty.

Professor Cothas shownus thatsomegeographical maps still showedthe
'ri'
line deriving frot mhat Treaty.The FrenchMinisterof Defence, Charles

Hernu,was to substantiate the Libyancontention bysaying,in 1985:

"TheAozou stripis outsideChad. This is a matterdating backto 1934."

(A. BenmessaoudTredano, Intangibilitédes frontières colonialeset

espace étatique en Afrique,aris, 1989, p. 176.)

In short,it was no mere hazardthat Chadput a relatively

consistent case to theUnited Nationsin 1983. For on 31 March 1983the

Frenchrepresentative said in the SecurityCouncil:

"1 should liketo add a final pointwhichis thatal1 the
documentsthatmy Government possesses regardi the courseof
this boundaryhave beencommunicatedboth to the Governmentof
Chad and to the LibyanGovernmentwhichare therefore fully
conversantwith them."

It is no doubtfittingto hail the objectivityof the French

representativoen thatpoint. It is nevertheless trutehata cursory

examinationof the casemighthave inclinedone towards the positio on

Chad,whichwas to bringthisup forthwith, whilethe filecouldfor

Libyabe but the starting-point a foronganalysiswhich onlyreally

cameto fruitionfouryearslaterbeforethe OAU.

The United Nationsdebatesthatfollowtheyear 1983 do not addmuch

to the legal dimension oOfur case. We constantly revertto the alleged instances of Libyaninterferencein Chad'sinternalaffairs,and Libya

was to claimon severaloccasionsthat theAozou strip lies within Libyan

territory.

But 1 shouldal1 the sameliketo emphasizethat,as Mr. Maghurhas

alreadyobserved, the SecuriC tyuncilhas nevercondemned Libyafor

aggression; insteadit referredthe Parties,-in-parti-rra tomthe OAU

for a peaceful settlement of tdhesputes.

1 do not have much to add to what 1 said in my firststatemeon,

Friday18 June,on the attitudeof the two Parties befortheOAU,

particularlysincemy colleague Professor Bowetits to takethismatter

up again. That organization was seisein July 1977 byChad,which

denounced theoccupat.ioby Libya oftheAozoustrip. Chadbasedits

legal reasoninogn the 1955Treaty.

We know that followinghatcomplaint the Conference of Heads of

Statewas to establish anad hoc committeewhichin turndecided,still

in 1977, to appointa sub-committee.The OAU was in fact preoccupiedn

the ensuingyears by, first,Chad'sinternalsituation and, second the

difficult relations between Lib anaChad. Finally,it was only in 1987

that theSub-Cornmittewas to turn seriouslyto the boundarydispute. We

know thatit submittedtwo reports,one in 1987and theother in 1988,

the differencebetween thembeing thatthe lattergives amore thorough

accountof the Libyancontention.Examination of the reportsshowsthat

the Sub-Comrnittemade a detailedstudyof the boundary dispute between

the two States. Contraryto what the opposinParty advances,it did not

by any means confineitselfto the questionof the Aozou strip, whicit

wouldnot forthat matterhave been ableto do sinceLibyaand Chadhad

O C/ put forwardvery cornprehensivlegalarguments.The reportslikewise

indicatethatLibyain no way confinedits claims to the Aozo strip.

Furthermore,contraryto what Professor Franck wouhldve us believewith the statementthat "theOAU wouldnot have beensympatheticto the legal

claimsLibyanow advances"(CR 93/26,p. 56), the Sub-Cornmittdid not

in factcome outin favourof the positionof eitherParty and, as we

know,the OAU was to recommendto the twoStatesthat,failinga

politicalsettlement,they takethe issueto yourCourt.

1 now come to the conclusiof my oralargment. It will beno

surpriseto you that it differs little fromhatof my statementof

18 June.

1. First,an examinationof thevarioustreatiesconcluded between

Libyaand Chadshowsthattherehas beenno delimitation of the boundary
'ii
betweenthe two countries.This is clear,in particular, frotmhe 1966

Treaty. Had a boundary existed, thtwo Partieswouldnot haveprovided

for transboundarCyO-operationin a regionof 750 kilometres.

2. Second, the Libyanresencein theAozou strip did not result

from theuse of forceand Chad,in the period fro1m971 to 1983,only

protested againstthat presencefromJune 1977to February1978. Not

onlywas theresilenceon its part,but its conductwas in complete

contradictiownith whatit contendstoday. NStatesignsfourtreaties

of friendshipwith a State supposedo be occupyingpart of its

territory,not to mention expressionof thanksto Libyaby Chadian

politicians.The legalforceof Chad'sconductas justdescribedto you

must be appreciatein the lightof the recognition by botParties ofa

cut-offdate in 1951. As a result,the conductof the Partiesafterthat

. QI? datemay either confirmor, on the contrary, invalidathe existencoef

a legaltitle. 1 considerthat theLibyanpresencein the Aozou strip,

uncontested byChad,servesto confirm oreven reaffirmLibya'slegal

titlein the region.

3. In conclusion,Libya hasarguedbeforethe OAU and beforethe

UnitedNationsthat theAozou stripformspart of itsterritory. It istrue thatinitially the legal justificatio relieduponwas succinctand

evenmistakenbut, as we have seen,the issuewas complexand,besides,

only in 1983did Chad itselfreallybeginto developits reasoning.

Later,beforethe OAU,Libya wasto develop its position mof rellyfrom

the standpoint boto hf legal argumentasnd of itsclaims,whichtie in

very substantiallwyith thosetoday advanceb deforepou.

1 am most gratefulforyourpatientattention and 1 should

appreciate it,Mr. President, if you wouldkindlygive the floor tomorrow

morningto Mr. Crawford. Thankyou.

Le PRESIDENT :Je remercie beaucoupM. Cahier. Nous reprendrons

demainmatin à 10 heures.

TheCourt rose at 12.50 p.m.