Corrigé
Corrected
CR2012127
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LAHAYE
YEAR2012
Public sitting
held on Monday 3 December 2012, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the case concerning thMaritime Dispute
(Pern v. Chile)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNÉE2012
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 3 décembre2012, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous laprésidencedeM. Tomka, président,
en l'affaire Différendmaritime
(Pérouc. Chili)
COMPTE RENDU -2-
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepulveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Orrego Vicufia
Registrar Couvreur - 3-
Présents: M. Tomka, président
M. Sepulveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
MmesXue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges
MM. Guillaume
Orrego Vicufia,juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier - 4-
The Government of the Republic of Peru is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Allan Wagner, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, former Minister of
Defence, former Secretary-General of the Andean Community, Ambassador of Peru to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Rafael Roncagliolo, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Special Envoy;
H.E. Mr. José AntonioGarcia Belaunde, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. Jorge Châvez Soto, Ambassador, member of the Peruvian Delegation to the Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar, Eversheds
LLP, Paris,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate member of the Institut de Droit International,
Mr. AlainPellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairmanofthe International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de
Droit International,
Mr. Tullio Treves, Professorat the Facultyw, State University of Milan, former judge of the
International Tribunal for the Lawe Sea,
SirMichael Wood, K.C.M.G., member of the English Bar, Member of the International Law
Commission,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Eduardo Ferrero, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, former Minister for Foreign
~~~::::: .·::A:ff:a:îrs;::In.eml:Jeroftl1e=J?ertivlaï1::oeïegaHü11Tü= t.f.....f..Tr<rtJN'=eonferen<::e=on=i:ï1e:r;a.w::ori:11e::Sea~==·······
Mr. Vicente Ugarte del Pino, former President of the Supreme Court of Justice, former President of
the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, former Dean of the Lima Bar Association,
Mr. Roberto Mac Lean, former judgeof the Supreme Court of Justice, former member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,
H.E. Mr. Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, Ambassador, former Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador ofPeru to Unesco,
as State Advocates; - 5-
Le Gouvernement de la République du Pérouest représentépar:
S. Exc. M. Allan Wagner, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures, ancien ministre
de la défense, ancien secrétaire généralde la Communauté andine, ambassadeur du Pérou
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Rafael Roncagliolo, ministre des relations extérieures,
comme envoyéspécial;
S. Exc. M. JoséAntonio Garcia Belaunde, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
S. Exc. M. Jorge Châvez Soto, ambassadeur, membre de la délégation péruvienne à la
troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieuressur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
comme coagents ;
M. Rodman Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Tullio Treves, professeur à la facultéde droit de l'Université de Milan, ancien juge du Tribunal
international du droit de la mer,
sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G, membre du barreau d'Angleterre, membre de la Commission du droit
international,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Eduardo Ferrero, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, ancien ministre des relations
extérieures, membre de la délégationpéruvienne à la troisième conférence des Natioi1s Unies
sur le droit de la mer,
M. Juan Vicente Ugarte del Pino, ancien président de la Cour suprêmede justice, ancien président
de la Cour de justice de la Communauté andine, ancien bâtonnier, barreau de Lima,
M. Roberto Mac Lean, ancien juge de la Cour suprême de justice, ancien membre de la Cour
permanente d'arbitrage,
S. Exc. M. Manuel Rodriguez Cuadros, ambassadeur, ancien ministre des relations extérieures,
ambassadeur du Pérouauprès de l'Unesco,
comme avocats de l'Etat ; - 6-
Minister-Counsellor Marisol Agüero Colunga, LL.M., former Adviser of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs on Lawof the Sea Matters, Co-ordinator of the Peruvian Delegation,
H.E. Mr. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, Ambassador, Adviser ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
Law of the Sea Matters,
Mr. Juan JoséRuda, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Legal AdviserofMinistry
ofForeign Affairs,
as Counsel;
Mr. Benjamin Samson, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., New York University Schoolf Law,
as Assistant Counsel;
Mr. Carlos Enrique Gamarra, Vice Admirai (retired), Hydrographer, Adviser to the Office for Law
of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Special Adviser;
Mr. Ramon Bahamonde, M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Alejandro DeustUAa,M.A., Advisory Office for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., AdvisoryOffice for the Law of the Sea of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Jaime Valdez, Lieutenant Commander (retired), National Cartographer of the Peruvian
Delegation,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers;
Mr. Paul Duclos, Minister-Counsellor, LL.M., M.A., Advisory Office for the Law ofthe Sea of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ~~-- _·--~----~---~---
Mr. Alfredo Fortes, Counsellor, LL.M., Embassy ofPeru in the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
Mr. JoséAntonio Torrico, Counsellor, M.A., EmbassyfPeru in the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
Mr. CésarTalavera, First Secretary, M.Sc., Embassyeru in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Advisers; - 7-
Mme Marisol Agüero Colunga, LL.M., ministre-conseiller et ancien conseiller du ministre des
relations extérieures sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer, coordonnateur de la
délégationpéruvienne,
S. Exc. M. Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, MIPP, ambassadeur, conseiller du ministère des relations
extérieuressur les questions relatives au droit de la mer,
M. Juan JoséRuda, membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, conseiller juridique du ministère
des relations extérieures,
comme conseils ;
M. Benjamin Samson, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M. Eran Sthoeger, LL.M., facultéde droit de l'Universitéde New York,
comme conseils adjoints ;
Le vice-amiral (en retraite) Carlos Enrique Gamarra, hydrographe, conseiller auprès du bureau du
droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
comme conseiller spécial;
M. Ramon Bahamonde, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Alejandro Deustua, M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministèredes relations extérieures,
M. Pablo Moscoso de la Cuba, LL.M., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des relations
extérieures,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
Le capitaine de corvette (en retraite) Jaime Vaidez, cartographe de la délégationpéruvienne,
Le capitaine de vaisseau (en retraite) Aquiles Carcovich, cartographe,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques ;
M. Paul Duclos, ministre-conseiller, LL.M., M.A., bureau du droit de la mer du ministère des
relations extérieures,
M. Alfredo Fortes, conseiller, LL.M., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. JoséAntonio Torrico, conseiller, M.A., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. CésarTalavera, premier secrétaire,M.Sc., ambassade du Pérouau Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ; - 8-
Ms EvelyCamposSancheEmbassyofPeruin theKingdoof the Netherlands,
Ph.D. candidate, Amsterdam Center for International Law, University
Ms Charis Tan, Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore, member of the New York Bar, Solicitor,
· ··England and Wales, Eversheds LLP,
Mr. Raymundo Tullio Treves, Ph.D. candidate, Max Planck Researchul
Disputes Settlement, Heidelberg,
as Assistants.
The Government ofthe Republic ofCizile is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Albert van Klaverenmbassador, former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ministry Foreign Affairs, Professorat the University ofChile,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Alfredo Moreno Charme, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile,
as National Authority;
H.E. Mr. Juan Martabit Scaff, Ambassador ofChile to the Kingdom ofthe Netherlands,
H.E. Ms Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, National Director ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Professorat the University ofChile, memberdroit international,
as Co-Agents;
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and
Development, Geneva, and at the University of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University
of Cambridge, member ofthe Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers,
Mr. Jan Paulsson, President of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, President of
the Administrative Tribunal ofthe OECD, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
·····-~:]:\.!{r:-::.Pit'. -'io:!:A-\§.r::>.~!i!~Bg!.:!!:og!?!:~C!~..~.:!~'.§
. ··-···--..QfCalifornia and1he D.i§.tri···--·-·- ·-··-·.......... -····-··-··-·-···---·
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor oflnternational Law, University of Florence,
Mr. Georgios Petrochilos, Avocat à la Cour and Advocate of the Greek Supreme Court, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
Mr.Samuel WOrdsworiù5mrf the ·EBarlnember of theBarEssex Court
Chambers,
Mr. Claudio Grossman, Dean,dson Professor of International Law, American University,
Washington Collegew,
as Counsel and Advocates; -9-
Mme Evelyn Campos Sanchez, ambassade du Pérou au Royaume des Pays-Bas, doctorant à
l'Amsterdam Center for International Law, Université d'Amsterdam,
Mme Charis Tan, avocat et solicitor (Singapour), membre du barreau de New York, solicitor
(Angleterre et Pays de Galle), cabinet Eversheds LLP,
M. Raymundo Tullio Treves, doctorant à l'International Max Planck Research School, section
spécialiséedans le règlement des différends internationaux, Heidelberg,
comme assistants.
Le Gouvernement de la République du Chili est représentépar :
S. Exc. M. Albert van Klaveren Stork, ambassadeur, ancien vice-ministre des relations extérieures,
ministère des relations extérieures, professeur à l'Université du Chili,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Alfredo Moreno Charme, ministre des relations extérieures du Chili,
comme membre du Gouvernement ;
S. Exc. M. Juan Martabit Scaff, ambassadeur du Chili auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. Mme Maria Teresa Infante Caffi, directeur national, frontières et limites, ministère des
relations extérieures, professeur à l'Université du Chili, membre de l'Institut de droit
international,
comme coagents ;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du
développement de Genève et à l'Université Paris II (Panthéon-Assas), membre de l'Institut de
droit international,
M. James R. Crawford, S.C., LL.D., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l'Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers,
M. Jan Paulsson, président du Conseil international pour l'arbitrage commercial, président du
Tribunal administratif de l'OCDE, cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. David A. Colson, avocat, cabinet Patton Boggs LLP, Washington D.C., membre des barreaux
de l'Etat de Californie et du district de Columbia,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l'Université de Florence,
M. Georgios Petrochilos, avocat à la Cour et à la Cour suprême grecque, cabinet Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, membre des barreaux d'Angleterre et de Paris, Essex Court Chambers,
M. Claudio Grossman, doyen, professeur titulaire de la Chaire R. Geraldson, American University,
facultéde droit de Washington,
comme conseils et avocats ; - 10-
H.E. Mr. Hernan Salinas, Ambassador, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Professor,
Catholic University ofChile,
H.E. Mr. Luis Winter, Ambassador, Ministry ofForeign Affairs,
Mr. Enrique Barros Bourie, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Julio Fa(mdez, Professor, University of Warwick,
Ms Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, Professor, University ofChile,
Mr. Andres Jana, Professor, University ofChile,
Ms Mariana Durney, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. John Ranson, Legal Officer, Professor oflnternational Law, Chilean Navy,
Mr. Ben Juratowitch, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Motohiro Maeda, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
LLP,
Mr. Coalter G. Lathrop, Special Adviser, Sovereign Geographie, member of the North Carolina
Bar,
H.E. Mr. Luis Goycoolea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Antonio Correa Olbrich, Counsellor, Embassy ofChile in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, Second Secretary, Embassy of Chile in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Kate Parlett, Solicitor admitted in England and Wales and in Queensland, Australia,
Ms Nienke Grossman, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore, Maryland, member of the Bars
ofVirginia and the Districtof Columbia,
======:============-===:= ----~--~----------------------~----~----~------------·------------------------
-------- ----Ms-Alexandravan-der-Meulen,-Avocat-à-la-Gour-and-member-oHhe-Bar-
ofthe-StateofNew.:York-,--------
Mr. Francisco Abriani, member ofthe Buenos Aires Bar,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor oflnternational Law, University ofMacerata,
as Advisers,:__.
Mr. Julio Poblete, National Division ofFrontiers and Limits, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Fiona Bloor, United Kingdom Hydrographie Office,
Mr. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd.,
as Technical Advisers. - 11-
S. Exc. M. Hernan Salinas, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique au ministère des relations extérieures,
professeur à l'Universitécatholique du Chili,
S. Exc. M. Luis Winter, ambassadeur, ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Enrique Barros Bourie, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Julio Faùndez, professeur à l'Universitéde Warwick,
Mme Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, professeur à l'Université du Chili,
M. Claudio Troncoso Repetto, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
M. Andres Jana, professeur à l'Universitédu Chili,
Mme Mariana Durney, conseiller juridique au ministère des relations extérieures,
M. John Ranson, conseiller juridique, professeur de droit international, marine chilienne,
M. Ben Juratowitch, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Motohiro Maeda, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles), cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP,
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, conseiller spécial, Sovereign Geographie, membre du barreau de Caroline
du Nord,
S. Exc. M. Luis Goycoolea, ministère des relations extérieures,
M. Antonio Correa Olbrich, conseiller à l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Javier Gorostegui Obanoz, deuxième secrétaire de l'ambassade du Chili au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
Mme Kate Parlett, solicitor (Angleterre et pays de Galles, et Queensland (Australie)),
Mme Nienke Grossman, professeur adjoint à l'Université de Baltimore, Maryland, membre des
barreaux de l'Etat de Virginie et du district de Columbia,
Mme Alexandra van der Meulen, avocat à la Cour et membre du barreau de l'Etat de New York,
M. Francisco Abriani, membre du barreau de Buenos Aires,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associéde droit international à l'Universitéde Macerata,
comme conseillers ;
M. Julio Poblete, division nationale des frontières et des limites, ministère des relations extérieures,
Mme Fiona Bloor, services hydrographiques du Royaume-Uni,
M. Dick Gent, Marine Delimitation Ltd,
comme conseillers techniques. - 12-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. The Court meets today to hear the
oral argumentsof the Parties in the case concerning the Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile).
Judge Greenwood has recused himselffrom the case in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of
the Statute ofthe Court.
I note initially that Judge for reasons made known tome, is unable to take his seat on
the Bench today.
I further note that, since the Court does not include upon the Benche nationality
of either of the Parties, both Parties have availed themselves of the right, under Article 31,
paragraph 2,f the Statute, to choose ajudge ad hoc. Peru chose Mr. Gilbert Guillaume and Chile
Mr. Francisco Orrego Vicufia.
Article0 of the Statute provides that "[e]very Member of the Court shall, before taking up
his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and
conscientiously".ursuant to Article 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute, that same provision applies to
judgesad hoc.
In accordance with custom, I shall first say a few words about the career and qualifications
of each judge ad hoc before inviting them to make his solemn declaration.
M. Gilbert Guillaume, de nationalité française, est licencié en droit et diplômé d'études
supérieuresd'économiepolitique et de science économiquede l'Universitédes; il est aussi
diplômé de l'Institut d'études politiques dearis et ancien élève de l'Ecole nationale
d'administration.. Guillaume est bien connu de la Cour, puisqu'il en a étémembre de 1987
.··---~- 2-0~0e~p,ésidentdu6 février2000 au5 février2003. ··----·-··-··-·····_
Avant de devenir membre de la Cour, M. Guillaume avait déjà à son actif une longue et
brillante carrière, tant de magistrat que de haut responsable national et international. Il a ainsi été
conseiller d'Etat et est maintenant membre honoraire de cette prestigieuse institution. Conseiller
juridique de l'Organisation du Traitéde l'Atlantique Nord de 1967, il a aussi exercé les
fonctions de représentantde la France au comitéjuridique de l'Organisation de l'aviation civile
internationale et assuréla présidencede ce comitéde 1975. M. Guillaume a par ailleurs été
directeur des affaires juridiqude l'Organisation de coopération et de développement
économiques, ainsi que directeur des affaires juridiques au ministère français des affaires - 13 -
étrangères. Il a en outre étéagent de la France devant la Cour de justice des communautés
européenneset la Cour européennedes droits de l'homme.
M. Guillaume a maintes fois exercéles fonctions de juge ad hoc à la Cour internationale de
Justice. Il siège actuellement à ce titre dans l'affaire de la Demande en interprétation de l'arrêt
du 15juin 1962 en l'affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge
c. Thaïlande), dans celle relative à Certaines activités menéespar le Nicaragua dans la région
frontalière (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) et dans celle relative à la Construction d'une route au
Costa Rica le long du fleuve San Juan (Nicaragua c. Costa Rica). Membre de la Cour permanente
d'arbitrage depuis 1980, M. Guillaume a siégéen tant qu'arbitre dans plusieurs affaires. Il est aussi
arbitre au Centre international pour le règlement des différends relatifs aux investissements
(CIRDI), et a assuré à nombreuses reprises le rôle du président de tribunaux arbitraux. Il est
membre de l'Institut de droit international, dont il a étévice-président, et l'auteur de nombreux
ouvrages consacrés à un large éventaild'aspects du droit international. Il a par ailleurs enseignéà
l'Académie de droit international de La Haye. En mars 2007, M. Guillaume s'est vu conférer
l'insigne honneur d'êtreélu membre de l'Institut de France (classe des sciences morales et
politiques).
Mr. Francisco Orrego Vicufia, of Chilean nationality, holds degrees from the University of
Chile and the University of London. He has enjoyed a long and wide-ranging career in
international law, in particular in dispute settlement mechanisms. Mr. Orrego Vicufia is presently a
judge at the Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund and a former judge at the
Administrative Tribunal of the World Bank, where he served for 17 years and was President
from 2001 to 2004. Since 1995, he has been a Member of the Panels of Conciliators and
Arbitrators of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); in that
connection, Mr. Orrego Vicufia has also acted as President of the Arbitral Tribunal of ICSID in a
significant number of cases. In addition, he is a member of various other Arbitral institutions. He
has also used his dispute settlement skills in the service of his country in bilateral negotiations and
mediations and in the service of the Organization of American States.
In tandem with his activities in the field of dispute settlement, Mr. Orrego Vicufia has
enjoyed an illustrions academie career. He is Professor of International Law at the Heidelberg - 14-
University Centre for Latin America, Professor (and former Director) of the Institute of
International Studies of the University of Chile, and has taught law at numerous academie
institutions around the world. He has also lectured at the Hague Academy oflnternational Law.
Mr. Orrego Vicufia has represented his Government on a number of occasions including as
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Chilean Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea. He is a Member and former President of the Institut de droit international.
He is the author of many publications in the field of public international law.
In accordance with the order of precedenee fixed by Article 7, paragraph 3, of the Rules of
Court, I shall first invite Mr. Gilbert Guillaume to make the solemn declaration prescribed by the
Statute, and 1would request ali those present to rise.
M. GUILLAUME :
«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement,en pleine et parfaite impartialitéet
en toute conscience.»
The PRESIDENT: Merci. I shall now invite Mr. Orrego Vicufia to make the solemn
declaration prescribed by the Statute.
Mr. ORREGO VICUNA:
<de déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement,en pleine et parfaite impartialitéet
en toute conscience.»
-~~----------The-PRESLDEN'I':--'I'hanLyou.-Please-be-seated.-1-take-note-oLthe-solemn-declarations---~
made by Mr. Guillaume and Mr. Orrego Vicufia and declare them duly installed as judges ad hoc in
the case concerning the Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile).
*
1shaHnow recall the principal steps of the procedure so far followed in this case. - 15 -
On 16 January 2008, Peru filed in the Registry of the Comi an Application instituting
proceedings against Chile in respect of a dispute concerning the maritime boundary between the
two States in the Pacifie Ocean.
In its Application, Peru founded the jurisdiction of the Court on the provisions of
Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacifie Settlement signed on 30 April1948, known
according to Article LX thereof as the "Pact ofBogota".
In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, the Registrar
immediately communicated the Application to the Government of Chile; and, pursuant to
paragraph 3 of that Article, ali other States entitled to appear before the Comi were notified of the
Application.
Pursuant to the instructions ofthe Court under Article 43, paragraph 1, ofthe Rules of Court,
the Registrar addressed to States parties to the Pact of Bogota the notifications provided for in
Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. In accordance with the provisions of
Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar moreover addressed to the
Organization of American States the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the
Statute of the Court. The Registrar subsequently transmitted to this organization copies of the
pleadings filed in the case and asked its Secretary-General to inform him whether or not the
Organization intended to present observations in writing within the meaning of Article 69,
paragraph 3, ofthe Rules of Court. The Organization indicated that it did not intend to submit any
such observations.
On the instructions of the Court under Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the
Registrar addressed to Ecuador, as a State party to the 1952 Santiago Declaration and to the
1954 Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone, the notification provided for in
Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. In accordance with the provisions of
Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar also addressed to the Permanent
Commission for the South Pacifie the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the
Statute of the Court with regard to the 1952 Declaration on the Maritime Zone and to the
1954 Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone and asked that organization whether
or not it intended to furnish observations in writing within the meaning of Article 69, paragraph 3, - 16-
of the Rules of CoThe Permanent Commission indicated that, as provided for in the
Commission's statutes, its Secretariat was not empowered to furnish constructions
instruments.
By an Order dated 31 March 2008, the Court fixed 20 Marcl12009 and 9 March 2010,
respectively, as the time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of Peru and the Counter-Memorial of
Chile; those pleadings were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.
By an Order of 27 April 2010, the Court authorized the submission of a Reply by Peru and a
Rejoinder by Chile, and fixed 9 November 2010 and 11 July 2011 as the respective time-limits for
the filing ofthose pleadings. The Reply and the Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits so
prescribed.
Referring to Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the Governments of Colombia,
Ecuador and Bolivia, respectively, asked to be furnished with copies of the pleadings and
documents annexed in the case. Having ascertained the views of the Parties pursuant to that article,
the Court decided to grant each ofthese requests.
*
Having ascertained the views of the Parties, the Court decided, pursuant to Article 53,
paragraph 2, of its Rules, that copies of the pleadings and the documents annexed would be made
accessible to the public on the openingroceFurther, in accordance with the
... :~~:~~:~:~:():_l::!_:Jt~.~:djr!lg!1)c.~L~:i~!h.<:>!l!:::fu~ti":Iin ~l··~~t:l~."\-\'illJ?~P_I:Ito~i!Jh~Ç(;)t!!:t':~"\-\'~lJ~i!~J!2rrl:J()<!I:lY~~:~:::::~::::::
*
1note the presence at the hearing of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru (the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Chile will attend the hearing on Thursday), Agents, counsel and advocates of
both Parties. In accordance with the arrangements for the organization of the proceedings which
have been decided by the Court, the hearings will comprise a first and a second round of oral
argument. - 17-
The first round of oral argument will begin today and will ctose on Friday 7 December 2012.
The second round of oral argument will begin on Tuesday 11December 2012 and come to a close
on Friday 14 December 2012.
In this frrst sitting, Peru may, if required, avail itself of a short extension beyond 6 p.m., in
view of the time taken up by the opening part ofthese oral proceedings.
I now give the floor to H.E. Ambassador Allan Wagner, Agent ofPeru. You have the floor,
Sir.
Mr. WAGNER:
INTRODUCTION
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour to appear before the
International Court of Justice as Agent of the Republic of Peru in the case of the Maritime Dispute
between Peru and Chile.
2. This case is ofthe utmost importance to the Government and people ofPeru. At stake are
the fundamental legal entitlements that international law accords to a coastal State such as Peru to
the maritime areas lying off its coasts, and the delimitation of its maritime boundary with Chile in a
manner that produces an equitable solution.
3. 1should like at the outset to record Peru's admiration for the contribution that this Court
has made, and continues to make, to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to the achievement of
the objectives set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. Peru's confidence in the Court is
demonstrated by its 2003 Declaration accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. As you,
Mr. President, said when you addressed the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law, "bringing a
dispute before the Cami usually contributes to defusing tensions between States, in particular in
situations of competing claims to sovereignty or maritime zones" 1• That perfectly describes Peru's
abject in bringing this case before the Court.
4. In this regard, I would also like to pay tribute to Judge JoséLuis Bustamante y Rivera, an
illustrions President of my country and one of the most prominent figures of Peruvian democracy.
Statement by H.E. Judge Peter Tomka, President of the International Court of Justice, at the High-Level Meeting
on the Ruleof Law, New York, 24 Sep. 2012. Available at: <http://www.unrol.org/files/22006 Statement ICJ.pdt>
accessed30 Nov. 2012. - 18-
Bustamante y Rivero was judge and became President of this Court, where he played an important
role in contributing to the attainment of the aims and goals of the Court. He was also one of the
founding fathers of the 200-nautical-mile thesis, an important step in the evolution of the modern
law of the sea.
Why Pero bas brought this case
(i)The absence of a maritime boundary
5. Mr. President, the case of Peru before this Court is that the maritime boundary between
Peru and Chile has never been delimited and that, in the absence of such delimitation, that
boundary remains to be determined by your Court. Contrary to the arguments advanced by Chile,
the re is no treaty, and no other agreement, that establishes a maritime boundary between Peru and
Chile. In fact, what is striking about the arguments of our opponents is that Chile has failed to
demonstrate where and when the maritime limit that it asserts was established.
6. Chile affirms in its Rejoinder that "[t]he Parties disagree about the legal foundation and
characterof a boundary Iine which has been in place for many decades and observed in the Parties'
bilateral practice without incidents or reservation position ... " (RC, para. 1.2). This is not true.
There is no pre-existing maritime boundary between the Parties, either conventionally or resulting
from a defacto line, which ever established such a boundary.
7. In order to appreciate why Peru instituted these proceedings, it is necessary to understand
the historical context which gave rise to the present dispute.
_·_·_________:__:_::_:::_::_~==~::!J:l=!~~1Z!~~}!~::_~Sl.l~~::_EI::_d~~~-~EJ:t!QI!:EI:l!~~~~rl.l~_a:_~_I:IIJ_t:_e_f!l~!>-~-~~~~=-~~~~-~t:!!if!g_=!~~~~!e_t~~-~~1:~==-
of their jurisdiction to a distance of 200 miles from the coast. These instruments were in line with
the Truman Proclamations two years earlier, and reflected a common aim to protect each State's
maritime entitlements in the face of increased foreign whaling and fishing offtheir coasts. Neither
instrument was concerned with lateral boundaries with neighbouring States. Indeed, not a word
was said in Peru's 1947 Supreme Decree about a laterallimit following a parallel of latitude or any
other line.
9. In 1952, Peru, together with Chile and Ecuador, signed the Declaration of Santiago. This
Declaration expressed a common policy of Peru, Chile and Ecuador towards the international - 19-
community in order to defend and protect their marine living resources that were being exploited
by large foreign whaling and fishing fleets. These three States therefore proclaimed their
jurisdiction up to a minimum distance of200 nautical miles from their coasts.
10. As Peru's counsel will explain, the Santiago Declaration has nothing to do with lateral
boundaries. It was concerned with the 200-mile extension of the three States' maritime zones in
the face of predatory whaling and fishing by foreign fleets.
11. Notwithstanding this, Chile asserts that, by point IV of the Santiago Declaration, the
Parties delimited their maritime boundary. However, point IV only concerns the maritime
entitlements of islands. Point IV did not delimit the maritime boundaries between Peru and Chile
or between Peru and Ecuador; it simply stated that where islands were situated within 200 nautical
miles of the general maritime zone of another of the signatory States, the maritime zone of such
islands would be limited by the parallel of latitude corresponding to the final point of the land
boundary of the two States. This situation exists only in the vicinity ofPeru and Ecuador due to the
existence of islands near their coasts. And even with respect to the situation between Peru and
Ecuador, their maritime boundary was not delimited by the Santiago Declaration, which only
established a general principle to be applied eventually in the case of islands; it was delimited
pursuant to a specifie agreement concluded by an Exchange ofNotes in May 2011.
12. Chile is fully aware that the plain language and ordinary meaning of the Santiago
Declaration does not support its claim that the Parties agreed at that time on an all-purpose
maritime boundary stretching out to 200 miles. It has therefore tried to reinforce its argument for
the existence of a boundary delimited by the Santiago Declaration by having recourse to the
subsequent conduct of the Parties, including the 1954 Agreement Relating to a Special Maritime
Frontier Zone for policing of fishing in order to avoid friction between their respective fishing
communities and the establishment of coastal lights in 1968-1969 for purposes of providing
orientation to inshore artisanal fishermen. But that tinef argument faits to reflect the actual facts.
In such cases, the Parties adopted practical arrangements of a provisional nature for specifie
purposes in the sea areas lying close to their coasts.
13. Later, during the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Peru played an active rote,
particularlyin Negotiating Group No. 7 which was tasked with elaborating rules of maritime -20-
delimitation. Peru's position then, as it remains today, was that the basic goal of delimitation is the
achievement of an equitable solution, and that equidistance constitutes the general rule for maritime
delimitation unless there are special circumstances whichjustizy a different boundary.
14. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea recognized that the maritime entitlements of
coastal States extend to a distance of 200 nautical miles from baselines, and thus vindicated Peru's
and Chile's earlier claims to jurisdiction out to these limits. It also reinforced the principle that the
overriding aim of maritime delimitation is to achieve an equitable solution.
(ii)Failure to negotiate a boundary
15. It was in the light of this situation that, saon after the adoption of the Convention, Peru
requested Chile to start negotiations in arder to establish by agreement the maritime boundary
between them. The distinguished Peruvian Ambassador Juan Miguel Bakula, acting as special
envoy, made an official presentation on this matter in 1986 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Chile, as stated in the Memorandum prepared by him at the request of the Chilean Minister.
Chile's reaction was that it would study the matter and revert in due course.
16. Regrettably, Chile subsequently gave no indication that it was studying the matter or
ready to discuss it with Peru. Instead, starting in the 1990s, Chile began to undertake a number of
unilateral steps in arder to create the impression that a maritime boundary already existed with Peru
despite the complete absence of any agreement to that effect.
17. For example, Chile began for the very first time to issue maps purporting to show a
.... ....·~·· ·.~ aritime. boundacywith.Peru, notwithstandingthefact thaLChile.had.issued.no. such.maps during.................
the United Nations which purported to depict a boundary running along the 18°21'8 parallel of
latitude. Peru was constrained to protest these activities and to emphasize that it had never signed
any maritime delimitation agreement with Chile.
18. In 2004, Peru again formally proposed the initiation of bilateral negotiations to determine
H (:l the maritime boundary. However, Chile rejected this initiative, arguthat~mariti bmundary
had already been established. In view of the impasse that emerged, the Foreign Ministers of bath
countries signed a Joint Communiqué on 4 November 2004 which recorded the fact that the two - 21 -
States held different positions over the legal question of maritime delimitation between them.
Further diplomatie exchanges between the Parties in 2005 made it clear that Chile had no interest in
negotiating the delimitation of an all-purpose maritime boundary with Peru.
19. It was these circumstances which led Peru to commence these proceedings before the
Court. Peru is a finn believer in the principle set out in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter
that disputes should be settled by peaceful means, including judicial settlement when negotiations
fail to achieve a solution. Peru therefore brought the present case under Article XXXI of the Pact
ofBogota, to which Peru and Chile are parties, in order to establish an equitable maritime boundary
between them.
Peru's claims
20. In this case, Mr. President, Peru is requesting the Court to do two things: first, to delimit
the respective maritime zones between the Parties on the basis of the principles and rules of
international law articulated by this Court, starting from a point known as "Point Concordia" where
the land boundary reaches the sea; second, to declare Peru's entitlement to exercise exclusive
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an area situated within 200 nautical miles of its baselines, but
more than 200 miles from Chile's baselines. This is what is referred to as the "outer triangle" in
Peru's pleadings.
(i) The maritime boundary and its starting-point
21. With respect to the delimitation of the maritime boundary, it is self-evident that that
boundary must begin at the terminus of the Parties' land boundary where it meets the sea- a
boundary that the Parties agree was fhlly delimited pursuant to the 1929 Treaty of Lima. This is
Point Concordia, to which I have referred.
22. Peru was alarmed to see that Chile's Counter-Memorial took the position that the land
boundary terminus is not located on the seashore at Point Concordia, but inland at the first
boundary marker that was established pursuant to the demarcation of the land boundary in 1930.
We have shown in our Reply that Chile's argument is untenable; it is in blatant contradiction with
what the Parties agreed in the 1929 Treaty. -22-
23. In its Rejoinder, Chile was therefore forced to resile from this position. However, it still
asserts that a maritime boundary exists along the parallel of latitude passing through the first
boundary marker and that the distance between this marker and Point Concordia is negligible. This
argument is outrageons and contrary to the 1929 Treaty of Lima.
24. Peru has never agreed its maritime boundary with Chile, whether in the 1952 Santiago
Declaration or otherwise. And Peru has certainly never agreed to a maritime boundary following a
parallelof latitude or one that would start from the coast north of the actualland boundary terminus
at Point Concordia in territory that is weil inside Peru's exclusive sovereignty. Yet that is the
upshot ofChile's position.
(ii) Peru's rights over the "outer triangle"
25. As for the "outer triangle", the plain fact is that this is a maritime area that falls within
200 nautical miles of Peru's coast but beyond 200 nautical miles from Chile's coast. How Chile
can challenge Peru's sovereign rights in this area is impossible to understand. The modern law of
the sea recognizes to every coastal State the right to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the
maritime areas lying off its coasts up to a distance of 200 nautical miles. Nothing that Chile asserts
to the contrary can negate these rights that vest inPeru.
Peru's respect for international law
26. Mr. President, on behalf of the Government of Peru, I wish formally to place on record
Peru's commitment to the modern law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 United Nations
practice are in full conformity with the contemporary law of the sea. The term "maritime domain"
used in our Constitution is applied in a manner consistent with the maritime zones set out in the
1982 Convention; the Constitution refers expressly to freedom of international communication.
27. In short,Peru accepts and applies the rules of the customary international law ofthe sea
as reflected in the Convention.
28. The plain fact is that Peru is asking for nothing more than that to which every coastal
State is entitled under international law. Although Peru is not yet a party to the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, both its Constitution and its domestic law and practice are consistent with -23-
the principles and rules set out in the Convention, including the overall ann of maritime
delimitation, which is to achieve an equitable solution.
29. Contrary to Chile's contentions,Peru is not violating the principle ofpacta sunt servanda
or the stability of boundaries. Peru strongly rejects this imputation made by Chile. No maritime
boundary agreement has been concluded between the Parties. Throughout its history, Peru bas
always been committed to peace and the observance of international law.
30. The promotion of regional integration bas consistently been among the main goals of
Peru's foreign policy in arder to contribute to the well-being, unity and co-operation among the
American Republics.
31. I would also Iike to note that bilateral relations betweeneru and Chile are good. There
is an increasing flow oftrade and investments between our two countries. Thousands ofPeruvians
have settled in Chile and thousands of Chileans cross the border every day to obtain goods and
services from Peru. Bath countries participate actively together in ali the processes of regional
integration and co-operation in Latin America.
32. Peru is confident that the decision rendered by this distinguished Court will resolve the
last boundary issue between Peru and Chile, enabling our two countries to enjoy a common future
of peace and well-being for our peoples.
The structure ofPeru's oral pleadings
33. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Peru's oral pleadings in this first round are
organized in the following way. This afternoon,
Professor Alain Pellet will start by presenting an overview of Peru's case.
He will be followed by Mr. Rodman Bundy, who will explain Peru's position on the course of
the maritime boundary that achieves an equitable solution in this case. This is the tine which
we ask the Court to determine.
Counsel will then explain why Chile's assertion that there is already a maritime boundary
between the Parties has no basis in fact or law, and the wholly inequitable nature of the line they
assert. -24-
Professor Tullio Treves will begin by placing the 1947 Chilean and Peruvian instruments, and
the 1952 Santiago Declaration, in perspective by considering these instruments in the light of
the law of the sea as it stood at the time.
Sir Michael Wood will then deal with Chile's reliance on instruments and events prior to the
Santiago Declaration.
These pleadings will be continued tomorrow. And finally we shall deal with two distinct but
important issues raised in Chile's written pleadings: the starting-point of the maritime boundary;
and the "outer triangle".
34. Mr. President, Members of the Court, with this I end my presentation, and 1 would
respectfully request, Mr. President, that Professor Alain Pellet be called to the podium. Thank you
for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador. J'invite maintenant le professeur Pellet à faire
la présentationgénéralede l'affaire au nom de la délégationdu Pérou.
M. PELLET:
PRÉSENTATION GÉNÉRALE DE L'AFFAIRE
1. Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, rarement, un différendsoumis
à votre haute juridiction aura étémarqué par une «opposition» aussi tranchée «de thèses.
2
juridiques» • Sans caricaturer on peut dire que :
··---------·····--···--~---·-----···---;;:---
le Chili tente de transformer en un litige assez insaisissable et fort complexe portant
essentiellement sur le droit des traités.
2 Cf. C.P.J.l., Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt1l 2, 1924, p. 11; voir aussi: Questions
d'interprétationet d'applicatione la convention de Montréalde 1971 résultantde l'incident aériende Lockerbie
(Jamahiriya arabe libyennec. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),exceptionspréliminaires,arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil1998, p. 122-123,
par. 21, Certains biens (Liechtenstein c.Allemagne), exceptionspréliminaires,arrêt,C.IJ. Recueil2005, p. 18, par. 24,
Activitésarméessur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requête: 2002) (Républiquedémocratiquedu Congo c. Rwanda),
compétence et recevabilité, arrêt,C.J.J.Recueil 2006, p. 40, par. 90, Demande en inte1prétationde 1'arrêtdu
31 mars 2004 en l'affaire Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique)(Mexique
c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16juillet 2008, C.J.J.Recueil2008, p. 325-326,
par. 53-57 et Questions concernant 1'obligation de poursuivre ou d'extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal),arrêt du
20juillet 2012, par. 46. -25-
1. Une affaire simple de délimitationmaritime
2. Au paragraphe 13 de sa requête,le Péroudemande à la Cour
«to determine the course of the boundary between the maritime zones of the two
States in accordance with international law ... and to adjudge and declare that Peru
possesses exclusive sovereign rights in the maritime area situated within the limit of
200 nautical miles from its coast but outside Chile's exclusive economie zone or
3
continental shelf» •
Et les conclusions du mémoire et de la réplique du Pérou précisent ces demandes sans les
modifier 4•
3. Qu'il s'agisse du «triangle extérieur» visépar sa seconde conclusion ou, d'une manière
générale,de la ligne de délimitationentre les espaces maritimes relevant respectivement des deux
Parties, le Pérouvous prie, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, de trancher le différendqu'il vous a
soumis en appliquant les principes du droit de la mer, tels que la convention de 1982 les reflète et
que lajurisprudence de la Cour et d'autres tribunaux internationaux les consacre.
4. Les articles 74 et 83 de la convention se bornent, chacun le sait, à indiquer que «[l]a
délimitation du plateau continental [et de la zone économiqueexclusive] entre Etats dont les côtes
sont adjacentes ou se font face est effectuée par voie d'accord ..., afin d'aboutir à une solution
équitable». Faute d'accord, les Parties doivent recourir à un mode de règlement pacifique, ceci
5
toujours afin de parvenir à une telle solution ; parallèlement, elles sont incitéesà faire «tout leur
possible pour conclure des arrangements provisoires de caractère pratique» 6•
5. Faute d'accord de délimitation -ce que la déclaration de Santiago de 1952 n'est
certainement pas, les deux Etats ont certes conclu des arrangements provisoires de ce genre mais, à
7
la suite du refus chilien de négocier-malgré de premières velléitésen ce sens , le Péroua saisi la
Cour de céans. C'est donc à elle de déterminerla solution équitablequi s'impose en appliquant la
«méthode de référence» maintena,t solidement fixée et énoncéede façon limpide dans les
3
Différendmaritime (Pérouc. Chili), 2008, par. 13.
4Voir. MP, p. 275, ou RP, p. 331.
5Cf. les articles 74, par. 2, et 83, par. 2, de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer.
6Cf. les articles 74, par. 3, et 83, par. 3, ibid.
7RP, p. 206-208, par. 4.47-4.52.
8
Différendterritorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012, par. 199. -26-
9
derniers arrêtsde la Cour- notamment dans votre décisionde 2009 dans Roumanie c. Ukraine et
dans celle du mois dernier dans Nicaragua c. Colombie 10;méthodeque le Tribunal international
du droit de la mer a également mise en ànïvre àvëc fermetédans son àrrêtdu 14 mars 2012 dans
.. ................. ,,.
l'affaire Bangladesh/Myanmar .
6. Je ne m'y attarde pas -et nous aurons bien sür l'occasion d'y revenir. Il suffit de
rappeler brièvement pour l'instant que :
«La Cour a dit clairement et à plusieurs reprises que, en cas de chevauchement de droits
à un plateau continental et à une zone économiqueexclusive, la méthodede délimitation
qu'elle entendait employer normalement comportait trois étapes( )»1•
«Ces différentes étapes, présentéesdans leurs grandes lignes dans l'affaire du Plateau
continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte14),ont étépréciséesau cours des dernières
15
décennies» ;
«Dans un premier temps, il s'agit pour la Cour d'établir une ligne de délimitation
provisoire entre les territoires respectifs des Parties (y compris leurs territoires
insulaires). Elle a recours pour ce faire à des méthodesà la fois objectives sur le plan
16
géométriqueet adaptéesà la géographiede la zone» •
«Cette tâche consiste à construire une ligne d'équidistance, lorsque les côtes pertinentes
sont adjacentes, ou une ligne médianeentre les deux côtes, lorsque celles-ci se font face,
9
·=~=~~ - - -.·.i.mitatio;z~r entmirNeofl~aR;z Ula,a;e,a~r~tC..-.ceuei/2009,IJ.61. -------- -------
1Différendterritorial et maritime (Nicaragua c.arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012.
1TIDM, Différendrelatif à la délimitationde laji·ontièremaritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le
golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar)tu 14 mars 2012.
12
(Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt, C.l.J Recup. 46, par. 60;
Délimitationmaritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,C.lJp. lOI, par. 115-116).
13
Differend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c.arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012, par. 190. Voir aussi
Délimitationmaritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,C.lJp. lOI, par. 115.
14
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte) (arrêt,C.lJ Recp. 46, par. 60).
15Délimitationmaritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,C.lJ Rp. 101, par. 116. Voir
aussi TIDM,ifférendrelatif à la délimitationde lafrontière maritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe
du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmarrêtdu 14 mars 2012, par. 233.
16Différendterritorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012, par. 191. Voir aussi
Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,C.lJ Recup. 101, par. 116 et TIDM,
Différendrelatif à la délimitationde lafrontière maritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du Bengale
(Bangladesh!Myanmm"arrêtdu 14 mars 2012, par. 233. - 27-
à moins que, dans un cas comme dans l'autre, des raisons impérieusesne le permettent
«A la deuxième étape,il s'agit pour la Cour de déterminers'il existe des circonstances
pertinentes qui pourraient appeler un ajustement ou un déplacement de la ligne
19
d'équidistance(ou médiane)provisoire afin d'aboutir à un résultatéquitable» •
«La troisième et dernière étape consiste pour la Cour à vérifier si la ligne, telle
qu'ajustéeou déplacée,a pour effet de créerune disproportion marquéeentre les espaces
maritimes attribués à chacune des Parties dans la zone pertinente, par rapport à la
longueur de leurs côtes pertinentes respectives» 20•
[Projection no 1 : Une délimitationéquitable.]
7. Ce petit «collage» de citations extraites principalement de Nicaragua c. Colombie (dont
on trouve l'équivalentdans Roumanie c. Ukraine et dans nombre d'autres affaires), ce copier-coller
que je viens de faire décrit,je crois, de manière succincte mais suffisante, la méthodede référence
couramment dénommée«méthode de l'équidistance-circonstànces pertinentes». Juridiquement
contraignante pour les Parties comme pour la Cour, elle permet de déterminer la ligne de
délimitationmaritime correspondant à la solution équitableexigéetant par les articles 74 et 83 de la
convention de Montego Bay que par le droit coutumier. En l'espèce:
aucune <<raisonimpérieuse»ne s'oppose à recourir à une ligne d'équidistance(elle correspond
d'ailleurs presque exactement à une bissectrice qui serait tracéedans l'angle que forme la côte
adjacente aux deux Etats là où se termine leur frontièreterrestre) ;
17
(Voir Différendterritorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua
c. Honduras), arrêt,C.l.J. Recuei/2007 (li), p. 745, par. 281).
18
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012, par. 191. Voir aussi
Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,C.lJ. Recuei/2009, p. 101, par. 116, Différend
territorial et maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt,
C.J.J. Recueil 2007 (li), p. 745, par. 281 et TIDM, Différend relatif à la délimitation de la fi·ontière maritime entre le
Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh!Myanmar), arrêtdu 14 mars 2012, par. 233.
19
Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012, par. 192. Voir aussi
Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ula·aine), arrêt,C.J.J. Recuei/2009, p. 112, par. 155 et TIDM,
Différendrelatif à la délimitation de la fi·ontière maritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du Bengale
(Bangladesh!Myanmar), arrêtdu 14 mars 2012, par. 233 et 275.
20 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012, par. 193. Voir aussi
Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie c. Ukraine), arrêt,C.l.J. Recuei/2009, p. 129, par. 210 et TIDM,
Différendrelatifà la délimitation de la fi·ontière maritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe du Bengale
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), arrêtdu 14 mars 2012, par. 233 et 497. -28-
aucune circonstance spéciale ou pertinente n'impose un ajustement de la ligne d'équidistance
lors de la deuxième étape; et
cette ligne non seulement n'entraîne pas de disproportion marquée entre les longueurs
respectives des côtes pertinentes et les espaces ainsi répartis, mais elle réalise un partage
pratiquement égal des espaces de chevauchement entre les deux Etats, dont les côtes
pertinentes sont presque égales.
[Fin de la projection n° 1.]
II. Une affaire indûment compliquéepar le Chili
8. Une affaire simple donc, Monsieur le président. Mais une affaire que le Chili, servi par le
talent et l'imagination de ses avocats, s'emploie à compliquer très indfnnent. Au lieu de reconnaître
l'évidence d'une absence de délimitation maritime entre les Parties, l'Etat défendeur s'efforce en
effet de prouver, au prix de contorsions imposéesau droit des traitéset aux faits de la cause, qu'une
ligne frontière a étéadoptée conventionnellement en 1952 -par la déclaration de Santiago- et
constamment mise en Œuvre par la suite.
[Projection no 2 :Point Concordia.]
9. Le traitement singulier que le Chili fait subir au droit conventionnel se manifeste d'emblée
par la manière insolite dont il prétendappliquer- ou faire interpréter par la Cour le traité de
Lima de 1929 et le rapport final de la commission de démarcation du 21 juillet 1930. Aux termes
de ce dernier: «La ligne frontière abornée part de l'océanPacifique, à un point du littoral situéà
Ceci est d'ailleurs la simple mise en Œuvre de ce que prévoyait le traité lui-même: «la
frontière entre les territoires du Chili et du Pérou, partira d'un point de la côte qui sera appelé
-«Concordia», à une-distance de dix kilomètres au nord du pont de la Lluta»n;_ - --- - ------ -
1O. MeBundy reviendra plus longuement sur ce point -qui est 1'une de ses marottes-,
mais il me semble qu'un croquis peut suffire à montrer que le point d'aboutissement de la frontière
21MP, annexe 54.
22
MP, annexe 45, art. 2. -29-
terrestre-et donc le point de départde la délimitationmaritine peut pas êtresituélà où le
Chili prétendqu'il estc'est-à-dire au parallèle 18° 21'00" sud. Ce parallèle est la latitude de la
Vi dernièreborne frontière, le hitomesur, lés~stme gé odn siquede référenceWGS84»2,
mais l'emplacement de cette borne ne correspond pas au point Concordia que décriventles textes
conventionnels applicables et qui se trouve à l'intersection de la frontièreterrestre avec la côte.
[Fin de la projection 2.]
11. La conception insolite que se font nos contradicteurs des engagements conventionnels se
retrouve dans leur présentationde ce qui constitue le cŒurdu différendsoumis à la Cour. Mais là,
il ne s'agit pas de revenir sur un engagement conventionnel, comme l'est celui fixant le point
d'aboutissement de la frontière terrestre, mais d'en inventer un, qui n'a jamais étéconclu entre les
Parties et selon lequel elles se seraient entendues sur une délimitationmaritime dont le résultatle
plus clair serait de priver le Péroude prèsde 67 000 kilomètres carrésd'espaces marins (autant que
la superficie du Sri Lanka ou de la Géorgie), espaces marins sur lesquels le droit de la mer
reconnaît au Pérouun titre exclusif à des droits souverains.
12. Ce résultat improbable serait la conséquence de la délimitation qu'aurait réaliséela
déclarationsur la zone maritime signéeà Santiago le 18 août 1952 -1'on appelle pour faire
court «déclarationde Santiago». Je laisse à mes éminentset savants collègues le soin de discuter la
nature juridique incertaine de cet instrument. Qu'il me suffise à ce stade encore préliminairede
t-l nos plaidoiries orales de vous rappeler le texte de sa disposition centrapoint I(~
déclarationest reproduite dans son intégralitéà la fois en espagnol et dans ses traductions française
t--'et anglaise sous l'onglet n°3 du dossier des;JG€lèlisposition se Ht1ainsi:
«En conséquence, les Gouvernements du Chili, de l'Equateur et du Pérou
fondent leur politique internationale maritime sur la souveraineté et la juridiction
exclusivesqu'a chacun d'eux sur la mer qui baigne les côtes de son pays jusqu'à
200 milles marins au moins à partir desdites côtes.»
13. Je sais bien, Monsieur le président,que cette déclaratiol'objet était,selon son
préambule,de pennettre aux gouvernements des trois Etats de formuler des principes de nature à
«conserver et assurer à leurs peuples respectifs les ressources naturelles des zones maritimes qui
23CMC,p.305.
24MP,annex47. - 30-
baignent leurs côtes», comporte également un point IV, dont le Chili fait grand cas. Je le lis en
entier, Monsieur le président, pour prendre date- car le Chili n'affectionne cette disposition que
tronquée 25:
«S'agissant d'un territoire insulaire, la zone de 200 milles marins s'étendra
autour de l'île ou du groupe d'îles. Si une île ou un groupe d'îles appartenant à l'un
des pays signataires de la présente [d]éclaration se trouve à moins de
200 milles marins de la zone maritime généralequi se trouve sous la juridiction d'un
autre d'entre eux, la zone maritime de l'île ou du groupe d'îles en question sera
limitéepar le parallèle passant par le point où aboutit en mer la frontière terrestre des
Etats en cause.» 26
14. Cela se passe de commentaire, Monsieur le président : le point IV de la déclaration se
borne expressément et strictement à établir l'extension maximale des espaces maritimes potentiels
des territoires insulaires. En outre,il est plus que douteux qu'il se suffise à lui-mêmeet puisse être
mis en Œuvre en l'absence d'accords ultérieursen précisant la portée(et, de toute manière, il n'y a
point d'îles devant êtreprises en considération dans la zone litigieuse). Quant au point Il, que j'ai
lu tout à l'heure, il ne concerne ni de près ni de loin la délimitation latérale de la zone ainsi
revendiquée- inédite à l'époque- dont il proclame l'existence. C'est pourtant sur cette base
fragilissime que le Chili se fonde pour tenter de vous convaincre, Mesdames et Messieurs de la
Cour, de l'existence d'un accord de délimitation maritime entre les deux pays. Un tel accord
n'existe pas.
15. Fort de ce postulat (peut-être devrais-je dire «faible de ce postulat» ?... ), le Chili
s'évertue ensuite à «démontrer» que la pratique ultérieuredes Parties (et des tiers pour faire bonne
......:::::.:::~~:~::=:::~::me·sure}::a::~<e<mfirmé»::ou:<<mis:en::œuvre»::::l'intronva:ble:::délimita:tion::c<mventionn·etle::de:1952~2:~:
Mais on ne peut confirmer ou appliquer qu'une délimitation qui a étéeffectivement adoptée- pas
de délimitation en 1952, pas de confirmation ultérieure bien sür. Et s'il peut êtretenu compte de la
pratique ultérieurement suivie pour interpréter un traité, la pratique ne peut pallier l'inexistence de
tout traité ni, s'il en existe, se substituer à lui pour lui faire dire des choses qu'il ne dit
nullement- ici, pour transformer un texte proclamant l'existence d'une zone de souveraineté et
25 Voir RP, p. 121, par. 3.62, p. 122-125, par. 3.63, p. 126, par. 3.68 et p. 127, pVoir aussi MP,
annexe 47.
26Les italiquessont de moi.
27
Voir parmi beaucoup d'autres exemples, CMC, p. 2, par. 1.4; OC, p. 212, par. 5.1; OC, p. 242, par. 6.9; ou
OC, p. 283-284, par. 8.13. - 31 -
juridiction maritime en un accord de délimitation de cette zone. La thèse du Chili, adroitement
forgée 28 peu après que le Pérou eut suggéré,en 1986, l'ouverture de négociations entre les
29
deux pays ,est demeuréeà quelques nuances près,celle qu'il défendaujourd'hui.
16. Bien entendu, Monsieur le président,nous n'esquiverons pas la discussion- mais je le
dis d'emblée,c'est un faux débat: la déclarationde 1952 n'est pas un accord de délimitation; et la
pratique ultérieureinvoquéepar le Chili ne peut, par je ne sais quelle alchimie mystérieuse,l'avoir
transforméeen ce qu'elle n'est pas. Certes, il est exact qu'après 1952, les deux pays ont conclu des
arrangements de caractère pratique pour réglementer provisoirement certaines activités dans la
zone litigieuse- ou plutôt d'ailleurs, en général,dans certaines parties de la zone litigieuse; mais
ces arrangements étaientla plupart du temps limitésau secteur le plus proche des côtes et à la seule
colonne d'eau surjacente, à l'exclusion du fond de la mer et de son sous-sol; ces arrangements,
sectoriels et provisoires, n'avaient pas vocation à fixer une frontière maritime, ni polyvalente ni
permanente, contrairement à ce que prétendle Chili.
[Projection n°3 : Iniquitéde la ligne chilienne.]
17. Et quelle frontière, Monsieur le président!
une frontière qui, je l'ai dit, réduitla zone maritime sur laquelle le Pérouest en droit d'exercer
des droits souverains de quelque 67 000 kilomètrescarrés;
- une frontière qui ampute radicalement l'accèsdu Pérouà la mer libre;
une frontière qui empêchecelui-ci de projeter ses droits souverains et sa juridiction aussi loin
vers le large que le lui permet le droit internationa1 30 ;
et au nom de laquelle le Chili entend au surplus priver le Péroude ses droits exclusifs dans une
zone dans laquelle il n'en peut, lui Chili, revendiquer aucun.
28
Voir notamment F. Orrego Vicufia, The Exclusive Economie Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under
International Law, Cambridge UP, 1989, p. 206-207 (CMC, annexe 301); ouF. Orrego Vicufia, «International Ocean
Developments in the Southeast Pacifie: The Case of Chile», in J. P. Craven, J. Schneider et C. Stimson (eds.), The
International Implications of Extended Maritime Jurisdiction in the Pacifie, 1989, p. 221 (CMC, annexe 302).
29
Voir le mémorandum diplomatique annexé à la note n° 5-4-M/147 du 23 mai 1986 adressée au ministère
chilien des affaires étrangèrespar l'ambassade Pérou(MP, annexe 76).
30
Voir Délimitationde la fi"ontièremaritime entre la Guinéeet la Guinée-Bissau,sentence du 14 février1985,
Nations Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitrales (RSA), vol. XIX,187, par. 104 ou par. 115. -32-
18. Et tout ceci, Monsieur le président, sur la base d'une sorte de faisceau d'indices,
adroitement agencés par les conseils du Chili, mais qui ni isolément ni ensemble ne peuvent
constituer la preuve convaincante de l'accord de délimitation dont se prévaut l'Etat défendeur.
Vous l'avez dit de manière nette et persuaMesdames et Messieursde la Cour:
«L'établissement d'une frontière maritime permanente est une question de grande importance, et
un accord ne doit pas être présuméfacilement.» (Différend territorial et maritime entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt,
C.LJ. Recueil 2007 (Il), p. 735, par. 253.)
19. L'embrouillamini d'arguties juridiques soulevées par le Chili se prolonge au-delà de la
zone maritime qu'il veut s'approprier aux dépensdes droits péruviens,avec sa prétentionde nier au
Péroula juridiction et les droits souverains qui lui appartiennent dans ce que nous avons appelé le
«triangle extérieur». Ici encore, le Chili complique très indûment des données juridiques fort
simples : les droits qu'il conteste au Pérousontmoins en ce qui concerne le plateau
32
continentalet s'agissant des eaux surjacentes, le titre, l'entitlement, de l'Etat riverain est
exclusif; de toute manière, en l'espèce, le Pérou a proclamé «sa souveraineté et juridiction» sur
l'ensemble de cette zone et de ses.ressources
20. Il ne s'agit au demeurant que de tirer la conséquence logique de la conclusion principale
du Pérou qui porte sur le tracé de la frontière maritime entre les deux pays suivant la ligne
d'équidistance : puisqu'il s'agit de deux Etats dont les côtes sont adjacentes, sans vis-à-vis, cette
ligne se poursuit jusqu'à une distance de 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles
~~- -~~~- -- ~~- ~-~-- ~~~~----~34--~-~~-~~-~-~---~-------~~---------~------
e~!___f ~'!a!e_!_9l-_teJ!__~:rt:-~i'dSeu_~§tiatas_p~~oYcJ!mstroit~_l:!~~ains_
que le droit international reconnaît sur ces espaces.
21. Il est vrai que, sans soulever formellement d'exception d'irrecevabilité, le Chili a, dans
son contre-mémoire, accuséle Péroude demander à la Cour d'étendreson domaine maritime -to
31
.Voir aussi Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), C.l.J., arrêtdu 19 novembre 2012,
par. 219 ; ou Différendrelatif à la délimitationde laji·ontière maritime entre le Bangladesh et le Myanmar dans le golfe
du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar),êtdu 14 mars 2012, par. 95.
32Voir l'article 77 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer.
33Voir Constitution politique du Péroudu 12 juillet 1979 (MP, annexe 17), Constitution politique du Péroudu
29 décembre1993 (MP, annexela loi n° 28621 du 3 novembre 2005 (MP, annexe 23) et le décret
suprême047-2007-RE du 11 août 2007 (MP, annexe 24).
34
Articles 57 et 76, paragraphe 1, de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. -33-
enlarge its maritime dominion 35 -, ce qui serait contraire à ce qu'autorisent les articles 74 et 83 de
6 37
la convention de Montego Bai • Comme nous l'avons fait remarquer dans la réplique , pour
formuler cet argument, le Chili doit déformerla conclusion du Pérou,qui ne demande pas à la Cour
de consacrer la notion de dominion maritime- une expression que l'on ne trouve nulle part dans
les écritures péruviennes-, mais de reconnaître formellement ses droits souverains et sa
juridiction dans la zone de 200 milles conformémentaux règles contemporaines du droit de la mer.
22. Pour faire droit à la prétentionchilienne, la Cour devrait:
1) décider que l'un des Etats signataires pourrait renoncer par un traité particulier à une zone
maritime sur laquelle il bénéficie,en vertu du droit contemporain de la mer, d'un titre exclusif à
des droits souverains, et que cette renonciation produirait ses effets vis-à-vis tant de la
communauté internationale des Etats dans son ensemble que de l'autre ou des autres Etats
contractants- qui n'y ont pourtant aucun droit particulier; et
2) il vous faudrait aussi accepter que la déclarationde Santiago peut tenir en échecles dispositions
des articles 74 et 83 de la convention de 1982 dont les deux Parties s'accordent à reconnaître
qu'ils reflètent le droit coutumier- et que cette déclaration a privé le Pérou des droits
inhérentsqu'il tient du droit contemporain de la mer; une telle position jetterait plus que des
doutes sur la validitéde cet instrument -la déclarationde Santiago-, sur lequel le défendeur
place pourtant tous ses espoirs dans la présenteaffaire.
23. S'apercevant sans doute qu'en invoquant l'irrecevabilité de la sec~md cenclusion du
Péroule Chili risquait fort de devenir l'arroseur arrosé,il a renoncéà y revenir dans sa duplique.
Sage précaution,dont on peut déduirequ'il admet dorénavantque le Pérouest recevable à conclure
à la reconnaissance de ses droits souverains dans la zone de 200 milles dans son ensemble -des
droits que le droit international contemporain de la mer reconnaît, ni plus ni moins, ainsi que
l'ambassadeur Wagner l'a réitéré trèsformellement il y a quelques instants. Tout comme le Chili,
le Pérou a souhaité promouvoir, à la fin des années1940 et au début des années1950, une
conception trèsextensive de ses droits maritimes; tout comme le Chili, il accepte que le droit de la
35
Voir CMC, p. 22, par. 1.74.
36Ibid.
37Voir RP, p. 32-36, par. 1.34-1.40. - 34-
mer, tel qu'il a évolué(évolution dans laquelle les deux Etats ont joué un rôle majeur), limite
ces droits à la fois géographiquement et substantiellement; et le Pérou ne revendique
certainement pas aujourd'hui une pleine souveraineté sur cette zone de 200 milles. Je le redis,
Monsieur le président, le Pérouaccepte le droit de la mer tel qu'il est et, comme l'a dit son agent, il
ne demande rien de plus (mais rien de moins) que la reconnaissance des droits que celui-ci
reconnaît à tous les Etats côtiers.
[Fin de la projectionn°3.]
24. Je vous remercie de votre attention, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges. Et je vous prie,
Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler à cette barre MeRodman Bundy qui décrira, de
manière moins sommaire que je viens de le faire pour les besoins de cette présentation très
générale,la méthode à suivre en vue de fixer la frontière maritime unique entre les deux pays.
The PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. And the Court is ready to listen to the
pleading ofMr. Bundy. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr.BUNDY:
THE DRAWING OF PERU'S DELIMITATION LINE SO ASTO ACHIEVE
AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
Introduction
1. Thank you very much, Mr. President, Members of the Court. It is, as always, a great
honour to appear before this Court; and it is also a privilege for me to represent the Governmentof
2. ln considering the law of maritime delimitation over the years, two principles stand out as
having always played a dominant role. The first is that delimitation is to be effected by agreement
on the basis of international law. The second is that the overarching aim of maritime delimitation
is to achieve an equitable solution. These two principles lie at the heart of the present case.
3. As Professor Pellet pointed out, despite Chile's arguments to the contrary, Peru and Chile
have never agreed the delimitation of their maritime boundary. This is a matter we shall return to
later in our presentation. But its precisely because of the absence of an agreed maritime boundary - 35-
that Peru instituted these proceedings in which it is requesting your Court to determine the course
ofthat boundary on the basis of customary international law.
4. This is where the second principle I alluded to cornes into play -the principle that the
essential goal of maritime delimitation is to achieve an equitable solution. Because this principle is
so central to an appreciation of the main issues that have been raised in the case, we believe that it
will assist the Court if Peru sets out its position on the delimitation question early in its first round
presentation.
5. And so my task this afternoon, Mr. President, Members of the Court, therefore, is to
explain how the principles and rules of international law apply to the geographie circumstances
characterizing the case in arder to achieve a genuinely equitable solution. As I hope to
demonstrate, this case presents a textbook example of a situation where a boundary delimited on
the basis of equidistance produces such a result.
The applicable principles and rnles
6. Let me start with the applicable legal principles. Since Peru is not a party to the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, the maritime boundary between the Parties
falls to be determined in accordance with customary internationallaw 38•
7. I can reassure the Court that it is not my intention to rehearse the law of maritime
delimitation at any length. I say this for three reasons. First, Peru described the relevant principles
39
and rules in its written pleadings and there is no need for me to repeat that exposition. Second,
Chile has not taken issue with any of these principles in its written pleadings. We will see what
they have to say before your Court later this week. Third, it has obviously been this Court that has
contributed mainly to what is now a well-established body of law relating to maritime delimitation,
including in the Judgment it handed dawn two weeks aga in the Nicaragua-Colombia case, and
thus it is scarcely necessary for me to review the Court's jurisprudence in any detail and in any
event my colleague, Professor Pellet has already highlighted the main points.
38
MP, para. 3.4; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012,
para. 137.
39See, MP, paras. 6.3-6.18. - 36-
8. Let me simply recall, as the Court stated recently in Nicaragua-Colombia as weil as in the
Black Sea cases, that when it is called upon to delimit the continental shelf and the exclusive
economie zone, the Court proceeds in three well-defined stages: first, the establishment of the
provisional equidistance line between the territories of the Parties; second, consideration of
whether there are any relevant circumstances that cali for an adjustment to be made to the
equidistance line so asto achieve an equitable result; and third, an assessment ofthe line resulting
0
from the first two steps to verify that it does not produce a disproportionate resulé • The same
approach was obviously adopted by the International Tribünal for the Law of the Sea in the
Bangladesh/Myanmar case 4, decided earlier this year. And it is the approach that is perfectly
suited- ideally suited -to achieving an equitable solution in the present case.
9. Now as Professor Treves will explain tomorrow, throughout the United Nations
Conference on the Law ofthe Sea, Peru adopted the same basic position. Peru's position then, as it
remains today, was that the object of maritime delimitation is to reach an equitable solution, and
that in the absence of any special circumstances, the maritime zones between adjacent States
should be delimited by means of an equidistance line 42• That was, in effect, no more than an
articulation of the "equidistance/relevant circumstances" rule that has since come to play such a
central role in the law of maritime delimitation.
The relevant coasts of the Parties and the relevant area
1O.Having outlined very briefly the legal process which governs delimitation, let me now
---------~-------=:----:--;:::;-::;;---:
in the Romania/Ukraine case: "The title of a State to the continental shelf and to the exclusive
economie zone is based on the principle that the land dominates the sea through the projection of
the coasts or the coastal fronts." 43 And it is therefore necessary to identify the relevant coasts of the
40
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012, paras. 190-193;
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 101, paras. 115-116;
pp.101-103, paras. 120-122; and p. 129, para. 211.
41
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal, Judgment of 14 March 2012, p. 76, para. 240.
42
See Reply of Peru (RP), Introduction, para. 19 and footnote 19, and para. 5.2.
43
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 89, para. 77,
citingNorth Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, l.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 51, para. 96 and Continental Shelf(Tunisia/Libyan
ArabJamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 73. - 37-
Parties which generate overlapping maritime entitlements, and the corresponding relevant area that
falls to be delimited in this case.
(i) The relevant coasts
'\'""""-\[Fig. 6.2 from Pery'g Memorial OR screen, but withont the green and red highlighting of each
t----1 Party's coast and withou-1t:he 131ackcoastal front tines]
\----i 11. The map that is now going to be projected on the screen (tab 5 in the folders) shows the
general geographie setting, the map which may be projected on the screen.
The PRESIDENT: Perhaps you can tell us whether the map is in the judges' folder?
Mr. BUNDY: The map is in the judges' folder. Could 1 suggest that the judges turn to
tab 5? And we have now got it on the screen, I apologize for the delay. The map shows the
general geographie setting and as Peru explained in its written pleadings- and this is an important
point that I will come back to tomorrow- the land boundary between Peru and Chile starts
where that land boundary reaches the sea is at a point known as Point Concordia- which is being
highlighted on the map and in your folders. And that is the point from which the maritime
1---fdelimitation must begin [arro'Npainting to Point Concordia].
12. Now what immediately stands out from this map is that Point Concordia lies almost
exactly where the western coast of South America changes direction. You can see from the map
thatjust to the south of the terminus of the land boundary at Point Concordia, Chile's coast can be
seen to run in an almost due north-south direction. There are some minor undulations along that
coast, but no major promontories or inlets, and no offshore islands. In contrast, north of Point
Concordia, Peru's coast runs in a very different direction, adopting a south-east to north-west
orientation. But, once again, there are no prominent coastal features that interrupt the general
direction of Peru's coast, or islands that could arguably distort the course of an equidistance line.
13. Both Parties claim 200-nautical-mile entitlements extending from their respective
baselines. Chile claims a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile continental shelf and exclusive
economie zone. Peru claims a 200-nautical-mile maritime domain comprising the sea, sea-bed and -38-
44
subsoil pursuant to its 1979 and 1993 Consti,uwhich, as the distinguished Agent recalled
earlier this afternoon, Peru implements in accordance with the legal status of these areas as they are
now enshrined in contemporary international law: and the limits ofthe Parties' collective 200-mile
entitlements that are generated by their coasts can be seen on thewhiteseading and
the light blue interface.
14. For purposes determining the relevant coasts of the Parties and the relevant area, it is
worth recalling the Court's statement Romania-Ukraine case, which was also cited with
approval in the recNicaragua-Colombiacase: "the coast, in order to be considered as relevant
for the purpose of the delimitation, must generate projections which overlap with projections from
the coast of the other Par(Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romav.Ukraine),
Judgment, IC.J Reports 2009, p. 97, para. 99; see alTerritorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaraguav.Colombia),Judgment of 19 November 2012, para. 150).
15. Given that both Peru and Chile claim maritime entitlements based on the 200-nautical
mile distance criterion, Peru has identified the relevant coasts of the Parties as those coasts lying
within 200 miles of the terminal point at Point Concordia, because it is those coasts which generate
the 200-mile entitlements which overlap with each other, thus calling for delimitation.
\--f [Add ths rsd, grssn and blinefrom Fig 6 2 ofPem's Memorial to the map],
16. You will be able to see on your map in the folder (tab 5), if the system is not working,
but in principle 1 wanted to project the map on the screen now which shows the relevant coasts.
The relevant coast of Chile stretches 200 miles south of Point Concordia, as you can see on the
-~-====~---------f ma~p-fiiisl:;fieDa_ed!Ju'>laac-eArenas~ i-s_}iïlc=-t:lie--yfcii1i~= _-_~~=~~Tocation-calleâ
Antofagasta- that is on the Chilean side, stretching 200 miles down its coast. Peru's relevant
coast extends 200 miles north-west of Point Concordia up to the vicinity of Punta Pescadores.
(ii) The relevant-area ·
17. It is on the basis of identizying these relevant coasts that project into the area to be
delimited that I can turn to the relevant area: and the relevant area, as the Court described it in
Nicaragua-Colombia: "comprises that part of the maritime space in which the potential
44MP, Ann. 17 and Ann. 19. -39-
entitlements of the parties overlap" (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment of 19 November 2012, para. 159; emphasis added). That part of the maritime space
...-, where the potential entitlements of the Parties overla~ Now this area of potentially
overlapping entitlements is circumscribed by 200-nautical-mile arcs drawn from the nearest points
1--f on each Party's coast. [Display Fig. 6 3 from Peru'fO Uen:wrilillgn fOcreen]A " s you can see from the
map that is displayed on the screen (tab 6 in the folders), Chile can have no maritime entitlements
beyond the northern 200-mile arc labelled in green on the map- beyond that green tine is further
than 200 nautical miles from the closest Chilean coast; and Peru can have no entitlements beyond
the- or to the south of the- southern arc labelled in red. The area defined by these tines
therefore constitutes the area of overlapping maritime entitlements and, consequent!y, the relevant
area within which the delimitation falls to be carried out. In that blue shaded area every point in
that area is within 200 miles ofboth Parties' coasts- overlapping entitlements, the relevant area.
Plotting the equidistance Iine
18. Having identified the relevant coasts of the Parties and the relevant area, the next step is
the plotting of the provisional equidistance line: and obviously, the identification of the course of
the equidistance line depends on the base points that are used on each State's coast for plotting that
line. In sorne cases, that issue can be controversial, particularly where you have a system of
H.11-t-\ straight baselines :wl+i.clth.as been promulgated, or where there are small islands or low-tide
elevations, or where those kind of features are involved, the process can be more complex. In the
present case, however, there are no such complications. Both Parties' coasts on either side of the
point where their land boundary meets the sea are relatively smooth; neither Party has adopted a
system of straight baselines in the relevant area; and there are no islands that might arguably
distort the course of an equidistance line if they were to be ,usedas base points.
' '
H [Fig.é.é from Peru's Memorial on screen]
19. The next map appearing on the screen shows the course of the provisional equidistance
tine as weil as the base points on the Parties' coasts that have been used for plotting that tine, and it
is under tab 7 of your the folders. The line starts from Point Concordia where the land boundary
meets the sea, and extends generally in a west-south-westerly direction out to the 200-nautical-mile -40-
limit of each Party's entitlements. The co-ordinates of the various turning points on the
equidistance Iine have been provided by Peru on the figure, and they can also be found on the map
that was included at page 224 of Peru's Memorial. And the fact that the equidistance line has no .
sharp turning points- it follows the same general direction throughout its course- is precisely
due to the smooth nature of each Party's coast bordering the relevant area.
The absence of any relevant circumstances justifying a shifting
of the equidistance line
20. Now the second step of the delimitation process involves assessing whether there are any
relevant circumstances that justify shifting the equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable
result. And, in this respect, the jurisprudence makes it clear that the Court's focus is on whether
there are any geographie factors that constitute potential relevant circumstances, particularly in
cases that involve the delimitation ofboth the continental shelf and the exclusive economie zone.
21. In the Gulf of Maine case, for example, the Chamber of the Court pointed to the fact that,
with the graduai adoption by a majority of maritime States of an exclusive economie zone and,
consequently, an increasingly general demand for the adoption of a single maritime boundary,
preference should be given to criteria that are neutra! in character 45• And, as the Chamber
observed:
"it is, accordingly, towards an application to the present case of criteria more
especially derived from geography that it feels bound to turn. What is here understood
by geography is of course mainly the geography of coasts, which has primarily a
physical aspect, to which may be added, in the second place, a political aspect."
(Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United
----------·::=~~======-states·OfAmeriëCi)~~7tidgmënfi-7X;:~:J.~~Report~T984~p.'327~-para.-T95;r~:=-------------·-··--·-----·----·
-----~-----------------~~-
22. In the present case, there are no circumstances, such as a marked disparity in the lengths
of the relevant coasts of the Parties or the presence of islands that warrant an adjustment being
1 .- made to the equidistance line. •And, fi anything, the coastal geography between Peru and Chile in
this case bordering the relevant area is eveJl.niore straigl1tforward-t11àn-itwas as 5etween Camèroon·
and Nigeria, or between Romania and Ukraine, where the Court did not find that there were any
45Delimitation of the Maritime Boundmy in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America),
Judgment, l.C.J Reports 1984p. 327, para. 195. - 41 -
factors calling for a modification of the equidistance line 46• And, again, ·and in short, the
geographie characteristics of the present case present a classic example of a situation where
equidistance in itself produces a manifest!y equitable result.
23. The one geographie factor that does stand out in this case is the change in direction of the
coast that occurs in the vicinity of Point Concordia. Peru's coast trends in a south-east to
north-west direction; Chile's coast runs almost due north-south. But the equidistance tine takes
this factor into account. Every delimitation involving neighbouring States involves sorne degree of
eut-off or encroachment in the sense that neither party can enjoy unimpeded entitlements out to a
distance of 200 miles from its coast that it would otherwise possess if it had no neighbour. In this
t--1 case, application of the equidistance method deals with that eut-off effect in an equitable maRR@f
and balanced manner.
t-t [Fig. 9.2 (rig!:tthaRd figttre GRly)frgm Pem's Memgrial QI=screeR]
24. If the Court looks at the map presently on the screen, which is tab 8 in your folders, it can
be seen that, taking the projections from each Party's coastal front, the equidistance tine results in a
balanced eut-off effect for both Parties. For example, the distance between the town Vila Vila
along Peru's coast and the equidistance tine, measured perpendicular to the general direction of the
coast, is sorne 51 nautical miles. The distance between a corresponding point along Chile's coast,
to the south of the land boundary terminus and the same point on the equidistance Iine is
50.6 nautical miles. And, similarly, the distance between the town ofllo along Peru's coast and the
equidistance tine is 168.7 nautical miles, while the distance between a corresponding point along
Chile's coast and, again, the same point on the equidistance tine, is 170.8 nautical miles. And it
goes on, as the map displays.
25. As Professor Prosper Weil put it in his book Rejlections on maritime delimitation, except
in those special situations which require corrections: "equidistance allows the boundary to be fixed
at the maximum distance from both States and so avoids any excessive amputation of their
maritime projections" 47•
4Land and Maritime Bound between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea
intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 200pp. 445-446, para. 297; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v.Ukraine),Judgment, I.C.J. Reports200pp. 117-118, para. 168.
4Prosper Weil,The Law of Maritime Delimitation- ReflectiCambridge, Grotius, 1989, p. 60. -42-
26.1A-R4,-1haits precisely what equidistance does here- that is the situation we have here.
Equidistance produces an equitable result in and of itself without the need for any adjustment.
And, there are no other relevant factors that would justizy shifting the provisional equidistance line,
such as have been considered, and for the most part rejected, in other cases.
{Fig. é.7from Psnt's MeRJorial on screetJ.f
27. I would suggest that the equitable nature of the equidistance line is further confirmed if it
is compared with the result that would be produced by application of the coastal bisector method
based on the general direction of the two Parties' coasts. As the map that is now on the screen
illustrates, the bisector linein fact tracks very closely the .course of the equidistance Iine- it is not
surprising, given the relatively smooth nature of the coast, and the bisector thus confirms the
equitableness of an equidistance-based boundary.
Applying the disproportionality test
28. That, Mr. President, brings me to the last six or seven minutes of my pleading where 1
would Iike to address the third step- disproportionality- 1am in your bands.
The PRESIDENT: Please proceed and complete your presentation.
Mr. BUNDY: Thank you very much. As 1 said, 1 now come to the third step in the
delimitation exercise- the application of the disproportionality test. And, on this point, the Court
has consistently held that proportionality, in tenns of a direct division of the area in dispute
Rather, the role of proportionality- or
disproportionality- is an ex post facto test- in other words, a means to verizy the equitableness
of a result arrived at by other means 49• As your Court noted in its Judgment in the Black Sea case,
it turns to the"disproportionality" test to check:
"that the result thus far arrived at, so far as the envisaged delimitation line is
concerned, does not lead to any significant disproportionality by reference to the
48
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundmy in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 198p. 323, para. 185.
49
Case concerning theContinental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, J.C.J.Reports 1p. 49,
para. 66. -43-
respective coastal lengths and the apportionment of areas that ensue". (Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, IC.J. Reports 2009,
p. 129, para. 210; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment of 19November 2012, para. 240.)
29. Now, this test has been systematically applied in situations where the delimitation is
between States with adjacent coasts, and where the relevant area can be identified with reasonable
accuracy without trespassing on areas claimed by third States. That was the situation in
Tunisia/Libya, it was the situation in the Black Sea case, where the test was again applied, as weil
as in theBangladesh/Myanmar case decided by ITLOS earlier this year and, of course, in the recent
Nicaragua-Colomhia case. In each of these cases, the disproportionality test was applied to verifY
whether the boundary line that was arrived at using other means produced an equitable, or not
"disproportionate", result.
30. In the present case, the coastal geography of the Parties is such that the disproportionality
test not only can be readily applied; it should be applied to verifYthe equitableness of each Party's
claim Iine. The delimitation is between States with adjacent coasts; it is confined to a well-defined
area of the western littoral of South America where the relevant area can be identified with a high
degree of precision; there are no third States bordering the area whose interests could be affected
by the decision of the Court. The proportionality or disproportionality test fits perfectly in such
situations.
t-l [Fig1:1r6e.9 from Pom's Memorial OR seteent
31. The figure on the screen, which is in tab 10 of the folders, illustrates the position
produced by a boundary tine calculated on the basis of equidistance. The relevant area is shaded in
the light purple. As I explained, that is the area within which the Parties have overlapping
200-nautical-mile entitlements. The relevant coasts are the coasts as I described them a few
01'\t-t minutes ago. Now measured in a straight line as a coastal front, each Party's relevant coast-ep
either side of Point Concordia is 200 miles long: a one-to-one ratio. If, on the other hand, one
measures the coasts of the Parties according to ali of their sinuosities, the figures are slightly
different. Peru's relevant coast is 475 km long; Chile's is 446 km. This produces a coastal ratio of
1.06:1, very slightly in favour of Peru.
32. As you can see from the map on the screen, the equidistance line divides the relevant
up '"" area into two parts, the areas of which also have a ratio of 1.06:1. We did not make this~ This -44-
is what the geography produces in this situation because of the uncomplicated nature of the Parties'
coasts. And that 1.06:1 difference is insignificant. And I would suggest that what is evident is that
an equidistance line unquestionably satisfies the disproportionality test and produces an equitable
result.
Conclusions
33. Mr. President, distinguisheone of the striking aspects of Chile's written
pleadingss that Chile does not challenge what I have said. Chile has not taken issue with Peru's
discussion ofthe relevant principles and rules of maritime delimitation that apply under customary
international law. It has not disagreed with Peru's description of the relevant coasts of the Parties
for delimitation purposes or the relevant area. It has not said a ward about the manner in which
Peru has calculated the equidistance Iine; nor has Chile contradicted Peru's demonstration that
there are no relevant circumstances that justifY an adjustment being made to that line. And Chile
has made no attempt to argue that equidistance somehow fails to satisfYthe disproportionality test
or that it does not produce an equitable solution.
34. Chile's whole case rests on the proposition that the Parties have already delimited their
maritime boundary along a parallel of latitude by means of the 1952 Santiago Declaration. And my
colleagues will show that that is simply not the case.
35. But what I would add is that, if Chile's theory of a pre-existing boundary between the
Parties delimiting bath the sea-bed and subsoil and the column of water is wrong, as is the case,
~~: :::_::::::::::::: ::-l::at':s1,tohlttii~ultt.t~~-----·~-~~~-t~;s:LOffered~
--~--~·-
36. There can be little doubt that this reflects a deliberate litigation strategy on the part of our
colleagues on the other side. Chile does not want to join issue with Peru on the matters I have
discussed because it does not want to take the risk of refocusing attention to the real issues in this
case out of fear that it would deflect attentionand erroneously conceived-
argument that a boundary already exists. Now that is its choice. But at the same time, Chile is
fully aware of the fact that an equidistance line obviously produces an equitable result between the
relevant coastshe Parties, while its parallel of latitude claim most assuredly does not. That is a
matter Professor Pellet will come back to tomorrow. -45-
37. Mr. President, Members of the Court, having laid out the justification for Peru's
delimitation line, I would like to thank the Court for its attention and patience and perhaps after the
customary break, ask that the floor be given to Professor Treves. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. The hearing is suspended for 20 minutes. We
will resume at 5 o'clock sharp.
The Court adjournedfrom 4.40 to 5.05 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and I invite
Professor Tullio Treves to address the Court. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. TREVES:
HISTORIC BACKGROUND
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear
before this illustrious Court after about 20 years. I am profoundly grateful to the Government of
Peru for giving me this opportunity.
2. Sorne of the key legal documents Chile alleges are relevant for the present case are
60 years old, like the Santiago Declaration, or even older, like the 1947 Peruvian and Chilean
proclamations of200 nautical miles maritime zones. As my colleagues will explain in some detail,
none of those instruments, nor the combination of them, amount to international agreements on
maritime boundaries.
3. The international law of the sea at the time these documents were adopted was very
different from the law of the sea of today. Three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the
Sea, judgments of the International Court of Justice and of arbitral tribunals, as weil as intensive
State practice and scholarly writings which have flourished during the last 60 years were yet to
come. - 46-
4. In order to understand these documents it is necessary to move back the clock and look at
them in the framework of the law of the sea and policies of the sea as they existed in the first
decade after the Second World War.
5. To do so is consistent with the doctrine of the intertemporal law, often stated in the
practice of the Cfor instance in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Judgment of
50
19 December -9and of arbitral tribunats since the well-known dictum of Max Huber in the
Island ofPalmas•case
6. The purpose of the present pleading is not, of course, to lecture the Court on matters of
merely historie interest. However, given that Chile tries to read documents from the middle of the
last century through the eyes of contemporary international law of the sea, it seems necessary to
engage in this look backwards and present to the Court the international law of the sea as it was in
the middle of the twentieth century. Within this framework it will become easier to understand the
position of the South American States facing the Pacifie leading up to the Santiago Declaration of
1952, and to the meaning that can be attributed to the documents they subscribed to.
7. This will make evident to the Court that it would have been extraordinary if, as Chile
claims, in the circumstances of 1952, Peru and Chile would have agreed on a legally-binding
all-purpose international maritime boundary along a parallel of latitude that produced such
inequitable results for one side,t. morrow by ProfeteHl:en·o·w.
International law of the sea in 1947-1952
··- ..·..·..·....l·1!·~rl1~t~()_l1.~U~"\-~ \'1::~~!:!:ftJ~.fs~'~lli_.s:1i!~
adopted their 200-nautical-mile claims and when, together with Ecuador, they signed, in 1952, the .
Santiago Declaration, may be called the "traditional" of~ osaite sea. It was the law
emerged in the inconclusive codification efforts conducted under the aegis of the League of
Nations and in the elabor~baeoon such efforts, in particular the monumental and
influential treatise by Gilbert Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer (1932-34). Signs of
50
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf(Greece v. Tw·key), I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 32, para. 75.
5United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (R!AA), Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United
States) 4 April 1928, Vol. 2, p. 845. See also: UNRIAA, case conceming the Delimitation of maritime boundmy Guinea
Bissau and Senegal, Vol. 20, p. 151, para. 85. -47-
change were, however, emerging. They consisted in the two Proclamations issued on
28 September 1945 by the United States President Truman.
The traditionallaw of the sea
9. Leaving aside internai waters, the "traditional" law of the sea was based on the recognition
of two distinct maritime zones: the territorial sea, a narrow band of sea adjacent to the coast on
whose width there was no general agreement, and the high seas. Subject to certain specified
restrictions, States had sovereignty over the territorial sea, as already stated in 1928 by the Institut
de droit international in Article 1 of its Stockholm resolution on the territorial sea.
1O.On the high seas, the principle was that of freedom for ail States.
11. Certain functional rights beyond the limits of the territorial sea were nonetheless
recognized to coastal States. These were the right of hot pursuit and the right of enforcement
concerning especially customs matters in a narrow zone contiguous to the territorial sea later to be
codified in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958.
12. There was no doubt, however, that the areas over which such functional rights could be
exercised remained part of the high seas. And it was equally clear that contiguous zone rights
52
could not apply to fisheries, as clearly stated by Gidel and later, in light of the developments up to
53
the 1958 Geneva Conference, by the Cuban jurist and diplomat Garcia Amador •
13. Already in the 1930s, some States recognized that sovereignty over the territorial sea was
not sufficient to ensure the proper conservation of fisheries in the areas adjacent to it. There was
nonetheless widespread reluctance to entrust the subject to the unilateral decisions of the coastal
54
State. In Gidel's view, "extremist" and "arbitrary" measures would result •
The Truman Proclamations
55
14. The Truman Proclamations of 1945 mark a turning point.
5Gidel Gilbert, Le droit international public de la mer, Vol. III, "La mer territorial et la zone contiguë", Paris,
Recueil Sirey, 1934, p. 473.
5Garcia Amador, The Exploitation and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea,1959, p. 65.
5Gidel Gilbert, Le droit international public de la mer, Vol. III, p. 468.
55
MP, Ann. 88. -48-
15. The Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf, which you will find at tab 11 ofyour
folders, is a claim that the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States "appertain" to the United
States, subject to itsjurisdiction~md control.. It was aclàlm for exclusivity going beyond what bad
hitherto been accepted in international law.
16. The Truman Proclamation on coastal fisheries, to the contrary, although it sought to meet
the "pressing need" for conservation of fisheries resources in high seas waters contiguous to the
coasts of the United States, remained much closer to traditional international law. The claim to
exclusivity was limited to regulation and control. It did not apply to the resources as such.
17. Bath Proclamations underlined the "character as high seas" of, respectively, the waters
above the continental shelf and the areas in which conservation zones are established and stated
that "the right to their free and unimpeded navigation" was "in no way ... affected".
The Latin-American daims
18. Seen from Latin America, the two proclamations were welcome as an opening to the
extension of the coastal State's control aver and protection of resources in the adjacent sea. It saon
appeared, however, that the different régimesset out for essentially the mineral resources of the
shelf and for the living resources of the waters adjacent to the coasts was lopsided and tailored to
the needs of the United States, a country with a sizable continental shelf and important fishing
activities along the coastsof other- especially Latin American- States.
were quick to follow the United States in proclaiming sovereign rights in respect of their shelves.
They also proclaimed similar rights on the waters above the continental shelf. This was the notion
ofthe "epicontinental sea".
20. South American States with coasts on the Pacifie had no extended "physical" continental
shelves as the sea-bed adjacent to their coasts descended abruptly to the abyssal plains. When
claims concerning the continental shelf and its resources became widespread, those States felt the
5Decree No.l4, 708 concerning national sovereignty over epicontinental sea and the Argentine continental shelf,
of Il October 1946, MP, Ann. 90.
57
Presidential Declaration with respect to the Continental Shelf, 29 October 1945, MP, Ann. 89 . -49-
injustice of the Jack of opportunity to exploit mineral resources that their situation entailed. They
considered that they needed to be compensated and that it was urgent to preserve the biological
richness of the sea adjacent to their coasts from predatory whale hunting and fishing by vessels that
had moved south as a consequence of the Truman Proclamation on coastal fisheries. As explained
by the well-known Peruvian Jurist Alberto Ulloa, the Head of Peru's delegation to the 1952
Santiago Conference and later to become the leader of the Peruvian delegation at the 1958 Geneva
Conference, the 200-mile claims of Peru, Chile and Ecuador created a norm that was "just because
it represent[ed] the compensation for the countries that do not have a continental shelf for what
58
States that have such shelfreceive and exploit" •
The 1952 Santiago Declaration
21. The mam factors that triggered the 1947 proclamations of Chile and Peru, and the
Santiago Declaration of 1952, were the need to react to the intensive foreign whaling and
increasing foreign fishing in the waters adjacent to their coasts, as weil as dissatisfaction with the
1946 International Whaling Convention which they signed but decided not to ratify once they
found it favoured the larger whaling powers to the detriment oftheir own whaling industries 59• As
Ulloa stated in the general debate of the First Committee of the Geneva Conference, the Santiago
Declaration "was of a defensive character and its sole object was the conservation of the living
resources of the sea ... " 6•
Unstabilized terminology and concepts
22. The terminology and the very concepts utilized in describing the 200-mile claims were
tentative and variable. They cannot be read with the precise meaning that, after two major
codification exercises, the international law ofthe sea now gives them.
23. The tenn "sovereignty" in the proclamations and in the Santiago Declaration was read by
Chilean and Peruvian representatives at the Geneva Conference as meaning nothing more than
58
Alberto Ulloa, Derecho internacional pûb/ico, Vol. 1, 4th edition, 1957, p. 565.In the Spanish original:
"Norma justa porque representa la compensacion para los paises que no tienen Plataforma de Jo que reciben y usan los
paises que tienenPlataforma."
5MP, para. 4.43.
60
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. III, First Committee, p. 7; MP,
Ann. 100. -50-
rights to resources. Referring to this term, the Chilean representative Gutierrez Olivos noted that
61
"the terminology used in international law was not uniform" • Such lack of uniformity is
confirmed in his own speeches. In the speech just quoted he refers not only to "sovereign rights for
certain specified purposes" but also to "limited sovereignty over a 200-mile zone", while in another
speech he refers to "sovereign rights to effect the protection of the living resources of the south
Pacific"62• The Peruvian Representative and former Foreign Minister, Garcia Sayan, at the Geneva
Conference of 1958, explained that: "the concept of sovereignty referred to in the proclamations of
Peru and other States, ... had no absolute meaning and was in fact identified with the notions of
jurisdiction and control mentioned in President Truman's Proclamation of 1945" 63•
24. The instructions given by the Peruvian Foreign Minister for the signing of the Santiago
Declaration are particularly relevant. The Minister clearly spelled out that the measures based on
the Declaration would be taken "without implying full exercise ofsovereignty" 64•
25. Similarly, the terminology used to preserve navigational rights in the 200-mile zone is
not the same in the 1947 Proclamations and in the Santiago Declaration. While the former refer to
"rights of free navigation on the high seas"- Chile- and to "free navigation ofships of ali
nations"- Peru the Santiago Declaration refers to "innocent and inoffensive passage in the
area indicated for ships of ali nations".
26. In light of the not yet stabilized terminology of the time, it would not be correct to
interpret the Santiago Declaration on the basis of the concepts of the international law of the sea as
they are now understood. It would be incorrect and anachronistic to consider that, because they
--==-=--=-===ill_~!!!~ne-d···inno-cei1Ipassage;!'_i_~~sig~~~or --r~_s~~nvisag~~~tl1~:zoo~~il~~.matitiine-zo~~-~~~-~~·~~tofiai~=:==-~==·-···
sea. Indeed, the Declaration was not so interpreted by its authors. This emerges from the agreed
responses given in 1955 to the objections raised as regards the Santiago Declaration by the United
States and the United Kingdom. Ecuador, Chile and Peru stated that with the Declaration they
were "inspired in a defined and precise way by the conservation and prudent use of natural
61
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. III, First Cp.33.tee,
6/bid., p152.
6MP, Ann. 101.
6MP, Ann. 91. -51 -
resources", white safeguarding "the legitimate interest that other States could have for navigation
and trade" 6•
27. In a declaration made in 1960 atthe end ofthe Second United Nations Conference on the
Law ofthe Sea, and commenting on its failure, the Chairman of the Peruvian Delegation confirmed
that the rules adopted by his country in the exercise of its maritime jurisdiction continued in force
"with the important provision that these rules do not hamper sea and air navigation for legitimate
purposes and do not discriminate as between foreign fishermen who submit to our measures of
66
regulation and contro1" •
The 200-mile claims and international law of the time
28. When adopting their proclamations and the Santiago Declaration, Chile, Peru and
Ecuador were fully aware that their claims did not correspond to the established international law
of their time. Their purpose was to open new ground, to start a process that, according to the
wishes of the three States, would eventually lead to the general recognition of the novel rights that
they claimed. The strong protests of 1948 by the United Kingdom and the United States 67 indicated
that these States considered the claims of 1947 to go beyond what was permitted by international
law. The International Court of Justice recently confirmed this assessment of the situation stating,
in the Romania v. Ukraine Judgment, that in 1949 "[t]he concept of an exclusive economie zone in
international law was still some long years away" (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine), IC.J Reports 2009, p. 87, para 70).
29. Still at the time of the 1958 Geneva Conference, South American States with coasts on
the Pacifie were aware that the claims they had put forward did not correspond to international law.
Speaking at the Geneva Conference, Ulloa recognized that the International Law Commission had
not accepted the "new formulas" proposed by the South American countries. He acknowledged
that: "It would be a long time before the slow process of the progressive development of
68
international law absorbed such new principles."
65MP, para. 4.108, and Ann. 58, parad).
66MP, Ann. 103.
6MP, Anns. 61 and 62.
68
MP, Ann. 100. -52-
30. Similarly, in the joint Statement they made on 27 April 1958, the last day of the Geneva
Conference, the Chairmen of the delegations of Chile, Ecuador and Peru recognized that the
positions held by their countries did not correspond to what was acceptable to the States convened
at the Conference69•
31. The conclusions we can draw regarding the 200-mile claims of Chile, Ecuador and Peru,
made in a context in which lack of precision in terminology and in concepts and uncertainty about
the future ofthe law prevailed, are:
(a) That the three States claimed new rights to living resources on the high seas adjacent to their
coasts;
(b) That such rights would not be such asto establish a 200-mile territorial sea;
(c) That the claims would not prejudice the freedom of navigation;
(d) That the rights were claimed in full recognition that they did not correspond to customary law
as it existed at that time.
Maritime delimitation
32. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in this light, we have to look at the question of
delimitation.
33. In the 1930s, States did not consider delimitation as particularly important
notwithstanding the precedent of the Grisbadarna arbitration 70• In the discussions leading to the
1930 Codification Conference there was some consideration of lateral delimitation of the territorial
·····-·---.sea,.butthe.matter..was.not.includedin.the..'.'.BasesofDiscussion'.'..forthe-HagueConferenc
e.
-,---------------~-~------------T-I1es-ëfVaiTOliStllB.I-fOTIO-W~Will-ShOWW hatWIaS COOcerr_ ilgllffirtat10ntlw--~--- ---
time the Declaration of Santiago was signed. The conclusions reached on this point will make it
clear that the Declaration can hardly be read as meaning that the signatories had, by implication,
agreed on the tine ofthe parallel,-as argued by Chile;- ···
35. ln 1952, the practice ofclaiming extensive maritime zones going beyond the limits ofthe
territorial sea was just beginning. As remarked by the International Court of Justice in the North
69MP, Ann. 102.
70United Nations, RIAA (Norway/Sweden), 23 October 1909, Vp.212ff., p155. -53-
Sea Continental ShelfJudgment, at that time, "[a]s regards boundaries, the main issue was not that
of boundaries between States but of the seaward limit of the area in respect of which the coastal
State could claim exclusive rights of exploitation" (North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, IC.J.
Reports 1969, p. 33, para. 48).
36. At the time of the Santiago Declaration, there were no real precedents concerning the
delimitation of maritime areas extending further seaward than the territorial sea. Two documents
may nonetheless be recalled, one to be found in a bilateral agreement and the other in a unilateral
proclamation. It must be stressed that neither document refers to a 200-mile zone.
37. The first of these documents is the Treaty of 1942 between the United Kingdom and
Venezuela "to make provision for and to define as between themselves their respective interests in
71
the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria" laying between Trinidad and Venezuela • (You may find
it at tab12ofyour folders.)
38. The Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty was the first treaty concerning the sea-bed and subsoil
beyond the territorial sea (which was at that time for both parties of 3 miles). It purports to define
the respective interests of the contracting parties in the oil-rich Gulf of Paria. The two States
assume the obligation not to "assert any claim to sovereignty or control" over sea-bed areas beyond
a certain line, and to recognize the other's sovereign rights already acquired or to be lawfully
acquired on these areas. The line drawn bas effects corresponding to those of a delimitation one. It
is, however, limited to the sea-bed, and certainly is not an all-purpose line, as the notion of an
all-purpose delimitation emerged only after the exclusive economie zone had become generally
accepted.
39. The method adopted to draw the line is not spelled out. However, 1 kindly invite the
Court to look at the map on the screen and at tab 13 of the folders, showing the agreed Iine in the
Gulf of Paria proper (segments A to B) and the hypothetical equidistance line. It appears from it
that the straight A to B line agreed leaves to Trinidad to the east a sizable area that would have
belonged to Venezuela on the basis of equidistance, and to Venezuela a roughly equivalent area to
the west which, following equidistance, would have belonged to Trinidad. While the parties
71
Treaty between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Venezuela relating to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf
of Paria, Caracas, Venezuela, 26 February 1942, League of Nations, Treaty Series (LNTS), Vol. 205, p. 122. -54-
considered it expedient to draw a straight separating line, they took care to draw it in such a way
that the area each would obtain would not be very different in size from that they would have
obtained applying equidistance. An equal, and, even more so, equitable sharing of resources was
what they strived for.
40. The second document is the Truman Continental Shelf Proclamation of 1945 (which you
72
may find in your folders, at tab 11) • It envisages the question of delimitation, albeit only as
regards the continental shelf. It states: "in cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores
of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the
United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles".
41. It can hardly be concluded from these two documents that in 1952 there existed an
international law rule concerning delimitation of the continental shelf or of maritime areas
extending beyond the limits of the territorial sea. Two quite different and isolated precedents are
obviously insufficient to build a customary rule, especially with respect to new maritime zones
whose compatibility with general international law was, as already noted, not yet widely accepted
by States generally.
42. The documents I have discussed are not, however, without significance. They show that
equity was seen as playing an important role. Equitable principles were referred to in the Truman
Proclamation, and the way the line was drawn in the Gulf of Paria Agreement indicates that an
equitable sharing of resources was intended.
43. At the time of the Santiago Declaration, and even later, States did not consider it
States and Mexico, two neighbouring States that proclaimed maritime zones beyond the territorial
sea even before the Santiago Declaration, started to conclude delimitation agreements between
73
them only in the 1970s, and continued the process until the year 2000 • Similarly, the attitude of
72MP, Ann. 88.
73
Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the
International Boundary,3 November 1970, entry into force 18 April 1972; Maritime Boundary Agreement Effected by
Exchange of Notes on 24 November 1976; Treaty on Maritime Borders (Caribbean Sea and Pacifie Ocean) 4 May 1978,
entry into force3November 1997; Treaty on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelfin the Western Gulf of Mexico
beyond 200 miles, 9 June 2000, entry into force 17 January 2001. -55-
Chile and Peru, at the time of the Santiago Declaration, was characterized by the Jack of urgeney,
not to sayof any feeling of necessity, to deal with lateral maritime boundaries.
44. In the absence of a specifie general international law rule concerning delimitation,
general principles of international law could play a role.
45. At the time of the Santiago Declaration, the applicable principles were that of State
sovereignty and the consequential one of avoiding interference with the neighbouring State's
sovereignty. In the notion of sovereignty were included the rights on maritime areas a State has, or
may claim, on the basis of the exercise of its power on the territory. In light of these principles, in
1952 the question of delimitation between overlapping maritime claims was to be resolved
applying the concept of the maximum extension of one State's sovereignty compatible with the
maximum extension ofthe sovereignty ofthe neighbouring State.
46. In proclaiming together in the Santiago Declaration as a "norm" oftheir maritime policy
that they each possess "sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction up to a minimum distance of
200 miles from their coasts", each of the signatory States did not mean anything different than that
its sovereignty andjurisdiction would reach the maximum extent possible.
47. Equidistance broadly corresponds to the application of these principles. Equitable
considerations also had an important role to play, as indicated by the two precedents to which I
have referred.
Conclusion
48. The criterion of maximum extension with minimum overlap cannot be claimed to be
established as a technical rule on delimitation of maritime areas at a time in which there were no
such rules. But it existed as a legal principle, as the result of the combination of State sovereignty
and of good neighbourliness. The last aspect seems particularly relevant as between the three
States concerned, as they were engaged together in formulating, and defending, before a sceptical
and suspicious world, a totally new maritime policy.
49. That in formulating such policy one of the parties would accept or, worse, could be
deemed to have accepted- a delimitation so clearly unfavourable to its interests as that of the
parallel cannot be assumed. This applies in general terms and also in the specifie context of the -56-
Santiago Conference, a conference to which- as will be shawn by Professor Lowe- Peru was
invited in arder to deal with whale protection in presence of abusive foreign hunting. How can
Peru in this context, be presumed to have accepted, without specifie discussion, without particular
formalities, lateral limits that fell short of the requirement of the maximum extension of its
sovereign rights and jurisdiction compatible with that of its neighbours?
Thank you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen of the Court, for your patience. May I
kindly request you to give the floor toSir Michael Wood, the next speaker for Peru.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Treves, for your pleading and I give the floor to
Sir Michael Wood. You have the tloor, Sir.
SirMichael WOOD:
CHILE'S RELIANCE UPON EVENTS PRIOR TO THE 1952 SANTIAGO DECLARATION
1.Introduction
1. Thank you very much, Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear
before you on behalf ofPeru.
2. As Mr. Bundy has explained, the maritime boundary between Peru and Chile runs along
the equidistance line, beginning at the terminus of the land boundary, and continuing for 200 miles
in a west/south-westerly direction. That line is identified by applying the three-stage methodology
4
described most recently in your Nicaragua v. Colombia Judgmene •
.,l '"' constitute8t an international maritime boundary agreement, which fixed a permanent all-purpose
maritime boundary between the two States. They seek to bolster this claim by reference to diverse
elements ofwhat they term "practice". As we shall show, Chile's case is simply not credible.
4. Let me briefly recall the requirements of international law for the establishment of a
maritime boundary. The burden of proving the existence of a maritime boundary agreement lies on
74
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012, paras. 190-193. -57-
5
Chile. And it is a heavy burden, as this Court, and- earlier this year- the Hamburg Tribunaf ,
have made clear. As you said in Nicaragua v. Honduras, "[t]he establishment of a pennanent
maritime boundary is a matter of grave importance and agreement is not easily to be presumed"
(Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2007, p. 735, para. 253; see also Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2009, p. 86,
para. 68; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of
19November 2012, para. 219). As Mr. Lowe will explain later, to establish a maritime boundary
one cannat simply take individual instances of the exercise of authority by a Govemment and say
that each must count to determine which of two States has the better claim. That is the approach
Chile would have you adopt. It is fundamentally misconceived. Nothing in Chile's extensive
written pleadings gets anywhere near to establishing the existence of a maritime delimitation
agreement binding on the two Parties. Chile has failed to discharge the burden upon it.
5. Mr. President, Chile's case, as we understand it from the written p1eadings, stands or falls.
on whether an international maritime boundary agreement between Peru and Chile is to be found at
point IV ofthe ·1952Santiago Declaration 7• Mr. Lowe will address that matter tomorrow morning.
My task is to caver in the next few minutes the events prior to the 1952 Declaration that are relied
upon by Chile. 1 shall deal in particular with the two 1947 instruments: Chile's declaration of
H 23 June, and the Peruvian Supreme Decree of 1 August ~- As 1 shall explain, these two
instruments do not have the significance that Chile seeks to place on them.
II. Two general points
6. I begin with two general points. First, as Professor Treves has just explained, in arder
properly to understand the significance of the various instruments and events relied upon by Chile,
itis necessary to step back intime and consider them in the light of the circumstances prevailing in
the 1940s and early 1950s. As he has shawn, the law of the sea looked very different then. There
was virtually no practice of maritime boundary delimitation. The continental shelf doctrine was not
75
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundmy in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh!Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports
2012(to be published), 14 March 2012, para. 95.
76
RC, paras. 1.6 and 2.1. -58-
established law. The idea of200-mile zones, which was beginning to appear in the Americas, was
revolutionary. It would not be consolidated in treaty for another quarter century. The claims made
by Chile and Peru in 1947 were far ahead of their time. As such, they were necessarily tentative.
They had followed claims by the United States -- the Truman Proclamations, Mexico, also in
77
1945, and Argentina in 1946 . The 1947 claims were a response to the impact of increased
activities of foreign vessels on fishing and particularly whaling resources in the south-east
78
Pacific • And as Professor Treves has just recalled, the two 1947 instruments provoked strong
reactions on the part of certain States.
7. The second general point is this. The burden upon Chile, as it scratches around to show
the existence of an agreement, is particularly heavy, given the obvious and dramatic inequity of the
line of the parallel that it claims. [Sketch on screen showing the parallel and equidistance !ines]
As Professor Pellet will explain, by no stretch of the imagination does a parallel produce an
"equitable solution" between Peru and Chile. The inequity is obvious just from looking at the
.T H general direction of the coasts,....theseform a clear angle near the endpoint of the land boundary:
south-east/north-west in the case of Peru's coast; north-south in the case of Chile. As can be seen
wc..::.l-- 'on the screen, a parallel would have a dramatic eut-off effect on Peru's south~ facing coast
[Slide 4, with proportionality figures] It would lead to a division of the relevant area in a
proportion of0.39:1 in favour ofChile, while the relevant coasts of the Parties are virtually equal in
length. [Siide 5, with area figures] To compound matters, Chile also argues that Peru has forfeited
a further area of over 28,000 sq km south of the parallel and outside any potential claim by Chile.
would have surrendered large parts ofthat claim. [Sketch off]
III.Chile's arguments concerning the 1947 instruments
8. Mr. President,- l now ~tur tn Chile's declaration of 23 June-1947 and the Peruvian
Supreme Decree that was issued on 1 August. The essential point to note is that, in each case, the
purpose was to assert control, vis-à-vis the world at large, over an area of sea out to 200 nautical
77
MP, paras.4.11-4.44.
7CMC, paras.2.22-2.26. -59-
miles or more. Neither the declaration nor the Supreme Decree was concerned with setting lateral
boundaries between neighbouring States.
9. Mr. President, it is not easy to discern the precise role that the 1947 instruments play in
Chile's legal argument. Chile's arguments are vague and shifting. At one point, Chile asserts that
"[t]he primary significance of the 1947 proclamations to this case is as antecedents to the Parties'
maritime boundary agreement" 79• Elsewhere, and equally vaguely, it refers to them as "the
80
predicate for the Santiago Declaration" • Chile has even suggested that, since- as it asserts-
lateral boundaries were unilaterally proclaimed in 1947, "[t]he question of lateral boundaries could
81
be, and was in fact, dealt with in summary terms in the Santiago Declaration" •
10. In our Reply, we sought to tease out and understand Chile's legal arguments concerning
the relevance ofthe 1947 instruments, by quoting Chile's own words from the Counter-Memorial 82.
Regrettably, Chile made no effort in the Rejoinder to clarizy its position 83, though it did at least
acknowledge that the 1947 instruments did not amount to an international maritime boundary
84
agreement between Peru and Chile • That much now seems to be common ground.
11. But, elsewhere in the Rejoinder, Chile added further twists to its argument based on the
1947 documents. It claims, for example, that they are "relevant to this case insofar as they
constituted unilateral declarations by Chile and Peru to each other, and by each of them to the
international community, oftheir claims to 200M maritime zones" 85• Again, the exact meaning is
unclear. Is Chile claiming that they were unilateral declarations capable of creating legal
86
obligations? Perhaps so, since they go on to refer at some length to the Nuclear Tests case • But if
so, what legal obligations, in Chile's eyes, did the instruments create? As the Court stated in
Nuclear Tests, "when it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become
~ bound according to its terms"":that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legat
79
RC, para. 2.4.
80
RC, para. 2.5.
81
CMC, para. 4.57.
82
CMC, para. 1.3, cited in RP, para. 3; CMC, para. 4.1, cited in RP, para. 6.
83
RC, paras. 2.3-2.1 1.
84
RC, para. 2.3.
85RC, para. 2.5.
86RC, para. 2.5. - 60-
H
undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required tol-"+follow a course of conduct consistent
with the declaration" (Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), I.C.J Reports 1974, p. 267, para. 43;
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), I.C.J Reports 1974, p. 472, para. 46). The Court
pt) reaffrrmed this in Burkina Faso/Mali...(FrontierDispute, Judgmenlj. I.C.J Reports 1986, at p. 573,
para. 39), where it noted that the circumstances were radically different from those in Nuclear
Tests. In Burkina Faso/Mali "there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention
to accept [certain conclusions] by the normal method: a formai agreement on the basis of
reciprocity" (ibid., para. 40). ln the case of the 1947 Peruvian Decree, there was clearly no
intention to become bound vis-à-vis any other State. Equally, there was nothing to hinder the
conclusion of an agreement had the parties so wished. This is also concordant with Chile's own
position, which does not seem to claim that the 1947 instruments established obligations as regards
7
a lateralboundarl • But then why did they cite Nuclear Tests?
12. Again in the Rejoinder, Chile claims that in 1947, the maritime zones of Peru and Chile
"abutted, but did not overlap" and that the "[d]elimitation of the maritime zones generated by
continental coastlines was therefore a straightforward and uncontroversial exercise when it was
done in 1952". Chile goes on to assert that the "delimitation consisted of confirming the dividing
line of their non-overlapping unilateral claims" 88• In other words, Chile seems to be suggesting
that, in 1952, the Parties, by sorne sort of implicit agreement- there was certainly nothing
explicit- adopted as their common maritime boundary a line that each had unilaterally declared in
1947. That argument involves two propositions, neither ofwhich is correct. The first, that in 1947,
zones. That isjust not so and I shall show that. And second, that in the Santiago Declaration, Peru
c:H and Chile agreed on an international maritime boundary along fl:l:t..e unilaterally determined
boundary. Mr. Lowe will show that that also is wrong.
13. In yet another twist in its argument, Chile claims that the 1947 instruments, in sorne
unexplained way, "constitute circumstances ofthe conclusion ofthe Santiago Declaration" and of
87
RC,paras.2.5-2.9.
88RC,para.2.4. - 61 -
the 1954 Agreement, which- and 1quote from Chile's pleadings- are "particularly apposite to
their interpretation, in accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention" 8•
14. [VCLT Art. 32 on screen] Article 32 is now on the screen. It is at tab 15 and we ali
know it by heart. In the Counter-Memorial, Chile only referred to that part of Article 32 which
speaks of confirming a meaning that results from the application of the general rule of
90
interpretation in Article 31 • [Text "Meaning ambiguous or obscure" highlighted on screen
(sketch 8)] It did not invoke Article 32 on the basis that the interpretation of the 1952 Declaration,
according to the general rule in Article 31, left the meaning ambiguous or obscure. That is entirely
understandable. Chile can hardly admit that the meaning of the Santiago Declaration is ambiguous
or obscure, and at the same time claim that it constitutes an international maritime boundary
agreement. [Text "Manifestly absurd or unreasonable" highlighted on screen (sketch 9)]
Similarly, Chile cannot be seen to take the position that the interpretation of the Declaration
according to the general rule leads to "a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable". [Text
"Circumstances of the conclusion" is highlighted (sketch 10)] So they are left with seeking to use
the 1947 instruments merely as "circumstances of the conclusion" of the Declaration to "confirm"
what they say is its meaning. [VCLT off screen] It is far from obvious how instruments from 1947
could count as circumstances ofthe conclusion of an instrument adopted five years later. The 1947
instruments are not mentioned in the Declaration. Moreover, Chile does not explain how the
two 1947 instruments could be relied upon to interpret what was, after ali, a Declaration with three
signatories. Ecuador had not issued any equivalent instrument to those of 1947.
15. Mr. President, Chile also seeks to pray in aid what it tenus prior instances of the use of
91
parallels of latitude in the practice of American States • It refers to two !ines of parallel from the
Canada-United States land boundary on the Atlantic and the Pacifie that were used for the
construction of the 1939 Neutrality Zone established by the Declaration of Panama, and to an
Ecuadorean line for the same purpose. [Sketch on screen] The Neutrality Zone is now on the
screen. It is perfectly obvious that these !ines have no connection whatsoever with maritime
89
RC, para2.12.
9
°CMC,para.4.54.
91CMC, para.2.44-2.49. - 62-
claims. They concern emergency defence arrangements. [Image on screen shows Gulf Maine tine
as H (slide 16)] They have nrelevanc pr~cedents for delimitation of areas of sovereign rights and
jurisdiction between States. The one maritime boundary actually in place between Canada and the
United States, one determined by a Chamber of this C,does not, of course, follow a parallel.
[Sketch off]
A. Chile's Declaration of23 June 1947
16. Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 would now like to take you to the texts of the
two 1947 instruments. First, to Chile's declaration of23 June, which is at tab 17 in the folders. As
we explained in sorne detail in our Reply, this wasquite deliberately notan instrument
with legal force• lt was an expression of political wiItwas published in a newspaper,
El Mercurio,not in Chile'Official Gazettewhich is a requirement for instruments with legal
force. It was inconsistentwith existing Chilean legislation.
17. [Sketch on screen] Chile's declaration says nothing about lateral boundaries with
adjacent States- and let us not forget that there are two coastal States adjacent to Chile
Argentina as weil as Peru-and, as you can see on the screen, it is far from clear how Chile's
interpretation of the document to establish a boundary along a parallel of latitude could apply in the
different, and more complex, geographical configuration between Chile and Argentina.
[Sketch off]
18. As you will see, in parag(1)of the declaration, the President of Chile recorded that
. the G~overnmenL proclaimed itssovereignty~ 'oLthr.~contines nhtalL~·djacenLto~~ ~-th~e~-~--~
··--··-··-~-- and itlnd cnass of its.national territory": Paragraph (2) proclainis sovereignty over
"the seas adjacent to its coasts ..., within those limits necessary in order to reserve ... the natural
resources ... found on, within and below the sea". Neither paragraph set forth any limit, even an
externat one, to the open sea. Paragraph (3) then looked forward to what would be in effect a
provisional demarcationf the protection zones for whaling and deep-sea fishing to be made at
sorne point in the future, "at any moment which the Government may consider convenient, such
92
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundmy in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, !.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246.
9RP, paras. 3.18-3.27. - 63-
demarcation to be ratified, amplified, or modified in any way to conform with the knowledge,
discoveries, studies and interests of Chile as required in the future". Hardly a description of a
permanent fixed boundary. Paragraph (3) goes on to proclaim protection and control "over ali the
seas contained within the perimeter formed by the coast and the mathematical parallel projected
into the sea at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coasts of Chilean territory". Like Peru's
Decree, the Declaration also makes provision for the maritime zones of islands- measuring
200 nautical miles from their coasts. I note that Chile's declaration did not foreshadow point IV of
the Santiago Declaration, which itself, of course, only set forth a principle regarding the maritime
zones of certain islands.
19. Paragraph (4) says that the "declaration of sovereignty" "does not disregard the similar
legitimate rights of other States on a basis of reciprocity"- no hint here that Chile intended to lay
down a border with adjacent States. The language throughout the Chilean declaration is,
unsurpris ingly, tentative and general.
20. Chile has highlighted the reference in paragraph (3) of the Declaration to a "perimeter".
This, while obscure, is in fact quite interesting, since it contrasts with Peru's Supreme Decree and
the Santiago Declaration itself, neither of which contain any reference to the notion of a
"perimeter".
21. Chile's declaration also refers to a "mathematical parallel". This is equally, if not more,
obscure. Unlike a parallel of latitude, it has neither legal nor technical meaning.
22. To sum up on Chile's declaration, Mr. President, it did not establish a lateral boundary
with adjacent States- that is, with Peru and Argentina. Nor did it, as a matter of internai law,
have legal effect.
B. Peru's Supreme Decree No. 781
23. I now turn, very briefly, to Peru's Supreme Decree of 1 August 1947 94(tab 19 invJudges'
folders). Unlike the Chilean declaration, the Peruvian Supreme Decree had internai legal effect,
being a fonn of instrument provided for in the Constitution which has a Ievel below that of a law.
It was published in Peru's Official Journal, El Peruano.
94
MP, Vol. Il, Ann. 6. - 64-
24. It is clear from paragraphs 1 and 2 that the Supreme Decree did not have as its purpose to
fix lateral limits. It was an assertion, in general terms, of the extension seaward of jurisdictional
competences, and- as in the Chilean declaration- even the outer limits were expressed to be
subject to modification "in accordance with supervening circumstances which may originate as a
result of further discoveries, studies or national interests which may become apparent in the
future". The Supreme Decree said nothing about lateral boundaries with neighbouring States.
25. You will find the language relied upon by Chile in the middle ofparagraph 3. The first
part of paragraph 3 makes it clear that Peru reserved the right to establish, in the future, the limits
of the newly proclaimed zones of control and protection, and to modi:f:Y them as necessary in the
light of new circumstances. To that extent, what followed was essentially provisional. In the
second part of the paragraph, Peru declared that, at the same time, it would exercise such control
and protection "on the seas adjacent to the Peruvian coast over the area covered between the coast
and an imaginary parallel line to it at a distance of two hundred (200) nautical miles measured
following the line of the geographical parallels".
26. In its Rejoinder, Chile picks up these concluding words, and asserts:
"This conception of seaward projection meant that the southern limit of the
Peruvian maritime zone was the parallel of latitude passing through the point where
95
Peru's land boundary with Chile reached the sea."
96
27. Here, as in the Counter-Memorial , Chile distorts and misquotes Peru's Supreme
Decree. According to paragraph 3 it is the "imaginary parallel line" to the coast- the tracé
parallèle;the outer limit -- that is "measured following the line of the geographical parallels". The
sense meant that the parallels were themselves intended to become international boundaries. The
parallels were no more than geometrie construction lines. This part of paragraph 3 of the Supreme
Decree is concerned exclusively with drawing, by the tracéparallèle method, an outer limit of
200 miles. As we said in the Memorial, it points to the manner in which the seaward limit of the
9RC, para. 2.4.
96
CMC, para. 4.56. - 65-
initial zone would be constructed cartographically 97• Even that limit was a provisional one given
the possibility, foreshadowed earlier in the paragraph, ofmodifying it at any time.
28. In summary, as regards the Peruvian Decree:
First, there was no intention, in 1947, to delimit the newly proclaimed zone vis-à-vis adjacent
States. The intention was to proclaim an outer limit of200 nautical miles towards the open sea.
Second, this intention was entirely consistent with the actual language of the Supreme Decree.
The geographical parallel was used as a means of drawing the tracéparallèle, and for no.other
purpose.
98
Third, Chile appears to claim, in its Rejoinder , that the Supreme Decree was a unilateral
declaration binding the State internationally such as that at issue in Nuclear Tests. Yet the
Supreme Decree was an instrument of internai law. There was no intention to make a
unilateral declaration binding on the State, as regards lateral delimitation with neighbouring
States.
Fourth, the tracéparallèle itself was not seen as a definitive solution. As I shall explain in a
moment ifl may, it was quickly superseded by the "arcs-of-circles" method.
29. Mr. President, I have about another five or ten minutes.
The PRESIDENT: Please proceed.
IV. Peru's petroleum law of March 1952
99
P t-tLw 30. Mr. President, in March 1952, the Peruvian Congress enacted the.petroleum4aw ,which
100
was published in the Official Gazette • You will find an extract at tab 20 in your folders. This
law, which, as a law, has a higher legal status than the Supreme Decree of 1947, is important
because, in its definition of the 200-mile outer limit of Peru's continental shelf, it used the
arcs-of-circles method, not the tracéparallèle. For the purposes of the law, its Article 14 divided
9MP, para. 4.58.
9RC, paras. 2.5-2.9.
9MP, paras. 4.60-4.61 and Ann. 8; PR, para. 3.60.
100
El Peruano, 14 March 1952. - 66-
Peru into four "zones", the fourth of which was the "Continental Shelf Zone". And this was
defined as:
"the zone lying between the wImit of the Coastal Zone [on the coast] and an
imaginary line drawn seaat a constant distance of 200 miles from the low-water
fine along the continental.
31. Thus, the Petroleum Law abandoned the outmoded and imprtracé parallèle
method, and used in its place the "arcs-of-circles" method. The difference is considerable, as can
~ H beBl'lüWfrom the sketch now appearing on the screen. [Show on screen Fig. 4.1 from MP.] As
you will see, the outer limit drawn according to the "arcs-of-circles" method, which is marked in
red, is much smoother, and further from the coast throughout its lengthttracéhat drawn by the
parallèleThe "arcs-of-circles" method also negates any possible claim that parallels of latitude
are being employed, even for determining the outer limit.
32. The Petroleum Law was adopted just five months before the Santiago Conference.
drew no protest from Chile. So, by the time of the Confbut not Chilehad drawn
the outer limit of its 200-mile zone using the arcs-of-circles method. Chile, on the other hand had
only proclaimed an intention to have a 200-mile zone, and referred in this connection to
establishing it using "mathematical parallels".
101
33. In Appendix A of its Rejoi,dChile presents you with a learned, but somewhat
partial, description of what it terms "historical developments of techniques to measure the outer
limit of maritime zonItdoes so in an effort to persuade you that, as they put it, in August
1952, when the Santiago Declaration was adopted, "the arcs-of-circles method (promoted by
_ ~~=~==~~-geogi :~a:l 1··r11·yct r-_-~raiJ1 1eri~1=less:=wen=--lZnow~-- fn~a=n-=:II1e-7raCè~f_qrazZè1~~me~'i~d
102
(promoted by lawyers and diplomats) and that "[t]here can be no doubt that in 1952 the
outer limit of a distance-based zone of jurisdiction follow[ing] the sintracéies of the coast
103
parallèle-remained in the mainstream of legal thinWhether or not this was so, the
Santiago Declaration adopted the arcs-of-circles method, already used in Peru's Petroleum Law.
10RC, Vol. 1,pp. 286-304.
10Ibipara. A.3.
10lid., para. A.47. - 67-
This Court itselfhad only the year before noted the important differences between the two methods
in its Judgment in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case 104•
34. The method for determining the outer limit was not considered in detail prior to the
1930 Hague Codification Conference. General references such as "following the sinuosities of the
105
coast" do not point to a particular method. As Boggs- with whom Gidel essentially
106
agreed - put it in his influential article of 1930, it was "not clear how the sinuosities of the coast
are to be followed" 10. The true position was described by Boggs in the following tenus: "The first
method [that is, the tracéparallèle] . .. is occasionally suggested in the literature. It is utterly
108
impracticable, however, and was not proposed at the Hague Conference." Nor, contrary to
109
Chile's assertion ,was the tracéparallèle method necessarily "implied" by the text drawn up by
the Sub-Committee II of the Second Committee of the 1930 Conference. What was proposed at the
Hague Conference by the United States Government was the "arcs-of-circles" method, the method
that was favoured by the Committee of Experts that met in 1953, by the International Law
Commission, and eventually by the Law of the Sea Conference in 1958.
V. Conclusion
35. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in summary, Chile's assertions regarding the
1947 instruments are far-fetched. It seems now to be common ground between the Parties that
neither of the 1947 unilateral instruments was intended to, or did, establish an international
boundary between the extended maritime zones then tentatively claimed by Peru and Chile. Both
were essentially and only- provisional instruments, aimed at establishing extended maritime
zones out to 200 nautical miles.
36. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my statement, and 1thank you for
your attention and patience.
104
Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1951, pp. 128-129.
105
RC, Vol. I, paras. A.6-A.21.
106
0. Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer, Vol. III, pp. 153-192, cited in RC, Vol. I, paras. A.32-A.33.
10S. Whittemore Boggs, "Delimitation of the Territorial Sea: The Method of Delimitation Proposed by the
Delegation of the United States at the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law", 24 AJ1L 541 (1930),
reproduced in RC, Ann. 188, at p. 543.
108
/bid., at p. 543.
109
RC, Vol. 1,para. A.26. - 68-
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir Michael. Your statement brings to an end
today's sitting. Oral argument in the case will resume tomorrow, 4 December, at 10 a.m., in order
for Peru to continue its first round of oral argument.
Thank you, the sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 6.05 p.m.
.,·/
r (
\
Audience publique tenue le lundi 3 décembre 2012, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire du Différend maritime (Pérou c. Chili)