Corrigé
Corrected
CR2013/12
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
LAHAYE THE HAGUE
YEAR2013
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 2 July 2013, at 3p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Tomka presiding,
in the case conceming Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan:
New Zealand intervening)
VERBATIM RECORD
ANNÉE2013
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 2illet 201à,15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous laprésidencede M. Tomka, président,
en l'affaire relative Chasse à la baleine dans l'Antarctique
(Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Zélande(intervenant))
COMPTE RENDU -2-
Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepulveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judge ad hoc Charlesworth
Registrar Couvreur -3-
Présents: M. Tomka, président
M. Sepulveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges
Mme Charlesworth, juged hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier -4-
TlleGovemme111 of Austra/ia is represe11tehy:
The Honourable Mark Dreyfus Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General of Australia,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Bill Campbell, Q.C., General Counsel (International Law), Attorney-General's Department,
as Agent, Counse/ and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Neil Mules, A.O., Ambassador of Australia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,
Mr. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
Mr. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Australian Govemment Solicitor,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Kate Cook, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
Dr. Makane Mbengue, Associate Professor, University of Geneva,
as Counsel;
Ms Anne Sheehan, Acting Assistant-Secretary, Attorney-General's Department,
Mr. Michael Johnson, Principal Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,
Ms Danielle Forrester, Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Ms Stephanie Ierino, Acting Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
Ms Clare Gregory, Senior Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,
Ms Nicole Lyas, Acting Senior Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,
Ms Erin Maher, Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,
Mr. Richard Rowe, Senior Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Dr. Greg French, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, - 5-
Le Gouvememe11tdel'Australieestreprése11p tar:
L'honorable Mark Dreyfus, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General d'Australie,
comme conseil et avocat ;
M. Bill Campbell Q.C., General Counsel (droit international), services de l'Attorney-General
d'Australie,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Neil Mules, A.O., ambassadeur d'Australie auprèsdu Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General d'Australie,
M. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l'Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),
M. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Solicitor du Gouvernement australien,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéde Genève,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Mme Kate Cook, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),
M. Makane Mbengue, professeur associéà l'Universitéde Genève,
comme conseils ;
Mme Anne Sheehan, secrétaireadjoint par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,
M. Michael Johnson, juriste principal, services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Danielle Forrester,juriste principal, services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Stephanie Ierino,juriste principal par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Clare Gregory, juriste hors classe, services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Nicole Lyas, juriste hors classe par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Erin Maher, juriste, services de 1'Attorney-General,
M. Richard Rowe, juriste hors classe, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce,
M. Greg French, secrétaireadjoint, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce, -6-
Mr. Jamie Cooper, Legal Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Ms Donna Petrachenko, First Assistant Secretary, Department of Sustainability, Environment,
Water, Population and Communities,
Mr. Peter Komidar, Director, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and
Communities,
Dr. Bill de la Mare, Scientist, Australian Antarctic Division, Department of Sustainability,
Environment, Water, Population and Communities,
Dr. David Blumenthal, Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,
Ms. Giulia Baggio, First Secretary,Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,
Mr. Todd Quinn, First Secretary, Embassy of Australia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Advisers;
Ms Mandy Williams, Administration Officer, Attorney-General's Department,
as Assistant.
Tlle Governmelltof Japa11 is represe11tedby:
Mr. Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Yasumasa Nagamine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,President of the
Sociétéfrançaise pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the
English Bar,
Mr. Yuji Iwasawa, Professor oflnternational Law at the University of Tokyo, member and former
Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee,
Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University,
member of the Bar of New York and the Law Society of Upper Canada,
Mr. Shotaro Hamamoto, Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,
Ms Yukiko Takashiba, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel and Advocates; - 7-
M. Jamie Cooper, juriste, ministère des affaires étrangèreset du commerce,
Mme Donna Petrachenko, premier secrétaire adjoint, ministère du développement durable,
de l'environnement, de l'eau, des populations et des communautés,
M. Peter Komidar, directeur, ministère du développement durable, de l'environnement, de l'eau,
des populations et des communautés,
M. Bill de la Mare, scientifique, division de l'Antarctique australien, ministère du développement
durable, de l'environnement, de l'eau, des populations et des communautés,
M. David Blumenthal, conseiller principal, services de l'Attorney-General,
Mme Giulia Baggio, conseiller principal, services de l'Attorney-General,
M. Todd Quinn, premier secrétaire,ambassade d'Australie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Mandy Williams, administrateur, services de l'Attorney-General,
comme assistant.
Le Gouvernement du Japon est représentépar:
M. Koji Tsuruoka, ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Yasumasa Nagamine, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Japon auprèsdu
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeurà l'UniversitéParis Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,présidentde la Société
française pour le droit international, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
internationalà l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,
M. Alan Boyle, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéd'Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d'Angleterre,
M. Yuji Iwasawa, professeur de droit international à l'Université de Tokyo, membre et ancien
président duComitédes droits de l'homme,
M. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D (Harvard), professeur de droit international à l'Université
McGill, membre du barreau de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
M. Shotaro Hamamoto, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéde Kyoto,
Mme Yukiko Takashiba, directeur adjoint à la division chargéede l'affaire de la chassà la baleine
devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils et avocats ; - 8 -
Mr. Takane Sugihara, Emeritus Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,
Ms Atsuko Kanehara, Professor of International Law, Sophia University (Tokyo),
Mr. Masafumi lshii, Director-General, International Legal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel;
Mr. Kenji Kagawa, Director-General, Resources Enhancement Promotion Department, Fisheries
Agency,
Mr. Noriyuki Shikata, Minister, Embassy of Japan in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland,
Mr. Kenichi Kobayashi, Director, International Legal Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Joji Morishita, Director-General, National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries,
Mr. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., Director, Fishery Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Yoko Yanagisawa, Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Naohisa Shibuya, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Ken Sakaguchi, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Akiko Muramoto, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Masahiro Kato, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Takaaki Sakamoto, Assistant Director, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Shigeki Takaya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Improvement Division, Fisheries
Agency,
Mr. Toshinori Uoya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Shinji Hiruma, Assistant Director, International Management Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Sadaharu Kodama, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, -9-
M. Takane Sugihara, professeur éméritede droit international de l'Universitéde Kyoto,
Mme Atsuko Kanehara, professeur de droit international à l'UniversitéSophia (Tokyo),
M. Masafumi Ishii, directeur généraldu bureau des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université Paris
Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
commeconseils;
M. Kenji Kagawa, directeur généraldu département de la promotion de la valorisation des
ressources, agence des pêcheries,
M. Noriyuki Shikata, ministre à l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d'Irlande du Nord,
M. Kenichi Kobayashi, directeur à la division des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
M. Joji Morishita, directeur généralde l'Institut national de recherche sur les pêcheriesen eaux
lointaines,
M. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., directeur à la division des pêcheries,ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Yoko Yanagisawa, directeur à la division chargéede l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant
la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Naohisa Shibuya, directeur adjoint à la division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine
devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Ken Sakaguchi, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
Mme Akiko Muramoto, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ,
ministèredes affaires étrangères,
M. Masahiro Kato, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
M. Takaaki Sakamoto, sous-directeur à la division des affaires internationales, agence des
pêcheries,
M. Shigeki Takaya, sous-directeur à la division de l'amélioration de la gestion des pêcheries,
agence des pêcheries,
M. Toshinori Uoya, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion des pêcheries,agence des pêcheries,
M. Shinji Hiruma, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion internationale, agence des pêcheries,
M. Sadaharu Kodama, conseiller juridique àl'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., premier secrétaire de l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des
Pays-Bas, - 10-
Ms Risa Saijo, LL.M., Researcher, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms HéloïseBajer-Pellet, member of the Paris Bar,
as Advisers;
Mr. Douglas Butterworth, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town,
Ms Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., Researcher Professor Emeritus, University of Washington,
Mr. Dan Goodman, National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries,
Mr. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., Director, Survey and Research Division, Institute of
Cetacean Research,
as Scientific Advisers and Experts;
Mr. Martin Pratt, Professor, Department ofGeography, Durham University,
as Expert Adviser;
Mr. James Harrison, Ph.D., Lecturer in International Law, University ofEdinburgh,
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
Mr. Jay Butler, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School,
member of the New York Bar,
as Legal Advisers.
Tlle Govemment of New Zealand is represented by:
The Honourable Christopher Finlayson Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General of New Zealand,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Dr. Penelope Ridings, International Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. George Troup, Ambassador ofNew Zealand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Cheryl Gwyn, Deputy Solicitor-General, Crown Law Office,
Ms Elana Geddis, Barrister, Harbour Chambers, Wellington,
as Counsel;
Mr. Andrew Williams, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, - Il -
Mme Risa Saijo, LL.M., chercheur à l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme HéloïseBajer-Pellet, membre du barreau de Paris,
commeconseillers;
M. Douglas Butterworth, professeur éméritede l'Universitéde Cape Town,
Mme Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., chercheur, professeur éméritede l'Universitéde Washington,
M. Dan Goodman, Institut national de recherche sur les pêcheriesen eaux lointaines,
M. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., directeur à la division des enquêtes et de la recherche,
Institut de recherche sur les cétacés,
commeconseillerset expertsscientifiques;
M. Martin Pratt, professeur au départementde géographiede l'Universitéde Durham,
commeconseillerexpert;
M. James Harrison, Ph.D., chargéde cours en droit international à l'Université d'Edimbourg,
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d'Angleterre,
M. Jay Butler, professeur associé invité de droit à la faculté de droit de l'Université George
Washington, membre du barreau de New York,
co1mneconseil/ersjuridiques.
Le Gouvernement de laNouvelle-Zélandeestreprésenté par :
L'honorable Christopher Finlayson, Q.C., M.P.,Attorney-General de Nouvelle-Zélande,
commeconseilet avocat;
Mme Penelope Ridings, conseiller juridique pour le droit international, ministère des affaires
étrangèreset du commerce,
commeagent,conseilet avocat;
S. Exc. M. George Troup, ambassadeur de Nouvelle-Zélande auprèsdu Royaume des Pays-Bas,
commecoagent;
Mme Cheryl Gwyn, Solicitor-Generaladjoint, Crown Law Office,
Mme Elana Geddis, avocat, Harbour Chambers (Wellington),
commeconseils;
M. Andrew Williams, conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires étrangèreset du commerce, - 12-
Mr. James Christmas, Private Secretary, Attomey-General's Office,
Mr. James Walker, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Paul Vinkenvleugel , Policy Adviser, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Advisers. - 13-
M. James Christmas, chef de cabinet, services de l'Attorney-Genera/,
M. James Walker, chef de mission adjoint, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Paul Vinkenvleugel, conseiller politique, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers. - 14-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good afternoon. The sitting is now open. This
afternoon the Court will hear Japan begin its first round of oral argument.
1 give the tloor to Mr. Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Agent of
Japan. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. TSURUOKA: Thank you, Mr. President.
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is the first time that Japan appears before the
Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 1 am honoured to be the first ever
Agent representing my Government before this august body. Please allow me to be a bit personal
before proceeding. My tate father, Senjin Tsuruoka, devoted much of his life to international law,
serving as a Member of the International Law Commission for 20 years. He would have been
terrified to see me standing in front of the Court. 1must humbly admit that 1 may not satisfy ali
the requirements of an Agent, but 1am determined to do my best.
2. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, 1cannat but be struck by an irony ofhistory. lt was
this very subject, whaling, that forced Japan to open itselfto the world after 300 years of isolation.
Major maritime powers engaged in a massive scale whaling in the nineteenth century demanded
that Japan open up its ports to supply their whalers. And now whaling is testing whether we are
indeed a good global citizen, complying with international law, or whether we have manipulated
the law to circumvent our international obligations.
3. Although we strongly question the jurisdictional basis for Australia's claim, if the Court
is to rule on the merits of the case, we wish to emphasize that the case concerns the legality of
Japan's activities under international law and not ethical values or the evaluation of good or
bad science. The question put to the Court is the interpretation of Article VIII of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) regarding special permit whaling.
4. Japan is fully committed to upholding international law and we take Australia's
allegations very seriously. When a sovereign State is accused of breaching international law,the
accusation must be supported with convincing legal evidence. Australia failed to prove such an
allegation last week. We intend to present our case clearly so that there will be no room to
doubt our faithful observation of our international obligations. - 15-
5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Japan has lived in harmony with nature throughout
her long history. Surrounded by sea, Japan would be the last to misuse whales as resources because
we know we benefit from the fruits of the sea. Sustainable use of living resources is indeed at the
very heart of the Japanese ethos precisely because Japan has scarce resources and has always
relied for her survival on what nature can provide. Japan is deeply aware of the duty to pass on
to future generations a clean environment and rich biological diversity. Japan regards the
environment as one of the important global issues that requires the whole international
community to work co-operatively and inclusively. Japan has a long history of participation in
wildlife conservation treaties.
6. lt was in this spirit that Japan joined the ICRW in 1951. As stated in its preamble, the
ICRW is a régime that provides "for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make
possible the orderly development of the whaling industry'', which is fully consistent with the
Japanese understanding of natural resource utilization.
7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we have witnessed substantial development of
international environmental law on the management of living resources arising out of serious
reflection on the effect of human activities on the unmanaged fishing and hunting on the species.
Japan has embraced such development including the conservation and management of ali living
species. And it welcomes the tangible progress of implementation of such multilateral management
mechanisms.
8. We agree that animal protection, including the prohibition of unnecessary killing and the
preservation of biodiversity, is an essentially good cause. The ICRW was established to remedy
the whaling practice prevalent before 1946 with a view to ensuring conservation and management
based on science.
9. We are conducting the scientific research in a manner such that no harm to stocks
will occur in full application of the precautionary approach. Australia's own expert confirmed last
week that the catch of 850 minke whales a year does not endanger this population. Little is
known of the ecosystem in the Antarctic Ocean. lt is required by the ICRW that management of
whales as marine living resources be conducted based on the best scientific advice. lt is
precisely to supply the Scientific Committee with necessary scientific data that Japan is - 16-
pursuing research whaling and, combined with other nations' contribution, conservation and
management based on science under the IWC has been making progress.
1O. Australia was engaged in commercial whaling until 1979 and used the ICRW to
conduct sustainable whaling • In 1979, however, it drastically changed its position, when Prime
Minister Malcom Fraser announced a total ban on Australia's whaling and vowed to work for the
prohibition of whaling by other countries, saying,
"The Govemment upholds . . . that Australia should pursue a policy of
opposition to whaling and that this policy should be pursued both domestically and
intemationally through the International Whaling Commission and other
organizations."2
Australia has the sovereign right to decide its position. But Australia cannot impose its will on
other nations nor change the IWC into an organization opposed to whaling. Since 1979, Australia
persistently continued its efforts to transform the ICRW and the IWC to a régime of total ban
on whaling. As transformation requires entirely rewriting the ICRW, Australia to this day remains
unsuccessful.
11. Why does Australia take such a position? Are ali cetaceans sacred and endangered? 1
can understand the emotional background to this position, but fail to understand how it can be
translated to a legal or scientific position. The basic objective of a multilateral convention is to
bring States of widely differing social, economie and political systems with diverse interests to
co-operate for agreed global interests under an agreed framework. Inclusiveness in any
multilateral régime can only be ensured through encouraging harmony amongst States by
concentrating upon agreed, basic principles and objectives. A unilateral attempt at changing the
agreed rule seriously disrupts the effective operationof a multilateral convention.
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, throughout the IWC process devoted to agreeing
on methods of better management, Australia opposed any whaling and blocked consensus. When
anti-whaling member States constituted three quarters of the IWC membership, the moratorium on
commercial whaling, as embodied in the Schedule paragraph 10 (e), was adopted. When that
The IWC Summary Catch Database, Version 5.3.
2
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debate, House, 4 April1979, pp. 1481-1482, CMJ Ann. 163. - 17 -
three-fourths majority cou1d not be maintained, Australia pushed for resolutions reflecting its own
policy which required a simple majority for adoption. These resolutions are not binding.
13. Failing to surmount the necessary threshold required to amend the Convention in the
direction Australia wished to see, it came to the Court. After many years of hard negotiation, the
IWC was at last at the culminating point of the "Future of the IWC" process; that is to say,
normalization process undertaken with a view to saving the IWC from complete derailment. Since
the increase in the membership in the 1980s of anti-whaling nations, the IWC suffered from
polarization that stood in the way of constructive discussions. The situation could only be putto
an end when a compromise was reached. Australia's intransigence aborted an agreement that
was about to be reached. Australia took the lead in opposing the consensus that would have
produced the rules acceptable to ali member States of the IWC on the management of cetacean
resources. Japan finds it disturbing that a State, while refusing to make sincere efforts and engage
in co-operation in the most prominent multilateral framework in this field, brings disagreements to
the Court.
14. Another aspect of the case pertains to confining the geographie coverage of Japan's
special permit whaling in the area of Australia's self-proclaimed Exclusive Economie Zone (EEZ)
in the Antarctic Ocean. As amply demonstrated by numerous actions, Australia attempts to
exercise its jurisdictionn this area. Japan does not recognize the Australian position on the EEZ in
relation to the Antarctic. By limiting the geographie coverage of the case toits claimed area in the
Antarctic Ocean and adjacent areas, is Australia attempting to give legitimacy to its self-proclaimed
position on the EEZ? Oris Australia trying to avoid putting its Antarctic claim to the test, as it
would if it imposed a ban on whaling within its claimed Antarctic EEZ, which it has not done.
We have serious doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court in light of Australia's reservation
attached toits acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court.
15. Japan, for its part, has acted in good faith and has achieved tangible scientific results
by presenting its findings to the Scientific Committee. Japan has continued to contribute to the
development of new management methods and painstakingly co-operated with a view to ensuring
conservation and management ofwhales. Even when, as a sovereign country, Japan could have left - 18-
the ICRW and the IWC to resume commercial whaling outside this régime,Japan chose to work
with other members within the given framework.
16. Although the moratorium on commercial whaling was adopted originally on a temporary
basis up to 1990, we are faithfully implementing the moratorium despite its practically indefinite
extension. Since Australia cannat argue scientific whaling is illegal, it claims Japanese special
permit whaling is commercial. The drastic change of the whaling conducted by Japan after its
acceptance of the moratorium on commercial whaling will be presented in detail by counsel and
will amply demonstrate that such whaling is not commercial, but scientific.
17. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me now address the fundamental question
presented to the Court. The difference between Japan and Australia is whether sustainable use of
marine resources may be permitted both in light of law and science.
18. Why is Japan engaged in research whaling? Is it because there is a moratorium on
commercial whaling and Japan needs to continue commercial whaling in disguise as Australia
alleges? Not at ali. Japan is conducting a comprehensive scientific research program because
Japan wishes to resume commercial whaling based on science in a sustainable manner.
19. The IWC needs scientific advice because Article V requires that regulations "shall be
based on scientific findings" and because the language of the moratorium says that "this provision
will be kept under review based upon the best scientific advice". This means that the lifting of
the moratorium requires that convincing scientific data be presented to the Scientific Committee
of the IWC to demonstrate that safe catch limits can be recommended for the resumption of
sustainable commercial whaling. This position is not unique. For example, Norway stated
recent!y, "[c]ontinued gathering of scientific data may also prove to be relevant in the context of
the moratorium on commercial whaling ... due to such moratorium essentially being a temporary
suspension pending further decisions as to future management" 3•
20. Why was JARPA started when Japan accepted the moratorium? Because the justification
for the moratorium was that data on whale stocks was inadequate to manage commercial whaling
properly. In these circumstances it was best to start the research program as saon as possible.
3
Written question from Terje Aasland (A) to the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Answered:
20 June 2013 by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Lisbeth Berg-Hansen;
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/tkd/Whats-new/News/20 13/scientific-research-on-whales.html?id =731449. - 19-
21. Why is JARPA Il conducted around the same waters as commercial whaling had been
conducted? This is because we know from past experience and current scientific data on whale
abundance that this is where whaling could be conducted in a commercially viable way, and
unless it is established that whaling is sustainable in those waters, Japan cannat resume commercial
whaling in those waters.
22. Should Japan be ashamed of trying to resume commercial whaling? As long as
commercial whaling is conducted in a sustainable manner and in accordance with agreements about
humane killing, it is legitimate use of marine living resources and this is precisely what the ICRW
is about.
23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we know only too weil that there are countries
that are opposed to whaling as a matter of principle. This makes it even more important that we
present to the Scientific Committee evidence that resuming commercial whaling is possible so that
the Commission's decisions can be based on science as required by the Convention. If Japan's
scientific research whaling is terminated, there will be no data for the Scientific Committee that
will demonstrate that the resumption of commercial whaling on a sustainable basis is possible, and
a Jackof data will extend the moratorium for commercial whaling indefinitely. That is why we
scrupulously abide by the rules of ICRW. Had there been doubt concerning our observance of
the ICRW,we would havejeopardized our most important goal of resuming sustainable commercial
whaling.
24. Australia, however, bases its arguments on its policy of absolutely no killing of whales.
This is demonstrated by the statement of the Australian Commissioner, stating that "Australia's
view is that we are opposed to any research that involves the killing of whales... ,.4 emphasis
added). By contrast, Japan is committed to science. We rest our case not on an opinion of one
scientist but on requirements of the ICRW and Annex P, which was agreed by the Scientific
Committee of the IWC. The scientific achievements of our special permit whaling are
recognized, appreciated and used by the Scientific Committee of the IWC, composed of over
150 experts in whale studies.
4
VerbatimRecordsof the IWC,1998,p. 131. -20-
25. In spite of the literai interpretation of Article VIII of the Convention
"[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Convention ... ", we are not advocating an "absolute
discretion". Our position is clearly based on efforts to respect the highest precautionary approach.
5
We have fully complied with the procedural requirements • It is scientifically demonstrated that
there is no harm to stock of the targeted species under JARPNJARPA Il. Japan has always
been present in the negotiations through the IWC, has accepted what was agreed and faithfully
complied with it. lt is solely on these solid bases that Japan wishes to resume sustainable
whaling based on the best scientific advice as clearly stipulated in the ICRW.
26. In our pleadings to follow my speech, we will deal with both the jurisdictional question
as weil as the merits. Our counsel will explain that our special permit whaling for purposes of
scientific research is founded in law and based on science, as recognized by the Scientific
Committee of the IWC. In doing so, we will explain why Australia's arguments of last week are
without merit and cannat substantiate such a serious allegation as a breach of the international
convention.
27. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, le droit évolue. Mais
seulement par voie d'accord entre les Etats. On ne peut juger de la portéede ce qui a fait l'objet
d'un accord -ou non -qu'en recourant aux règlesbien établiesde l'interprétationdes traités. Le
Japon a respectéle principe fondamental pacta sunt servanda, en respectant en toute bonne foi ce
qui étaitconvenu et nous nous présentonsaujourd'hui devant vous dans l'espoir que votre arrêt
contribuera au renforcement de la stabilitédes relations internationales. Il va de soi que si la Cour
devait introduire une révolutiondans le droit des traités,cela serait lourd de conséquencesà long
terme pour le droit international. Mais nous sommes convaincus que la Cour, principal organe
judiciaire des Nations Unies, fera respecter le principe fondamental du respect de la parole donnée
dans les termes où elle l'a été.
28. Il appartient à la Cour de se prononcer sur la licéitédes actes des Etats ; pas sur
leur moralité ou leur valeur éthique. Pour certains, les baleines sont des animaux sacrés,
comme les vaches le sont pour les Hindous. Les religions et les cultures perçoivent les animaux
5ArticleVIII, Schedule,para. 30,Ann.P. -21 -
de manière différente. Nous vivons dans un monde où vivent plus de sept milliards d'êtres
humains répartis entre les cinq continents ; et la seule manière de leur permettre de coexister
pacifiquement est de respecter leurs différences, et de ne pas imposer les vues de certains aux
autres.
29. Après avoir lu et écoutéavec attention les arguments de l'Australie, je suis convaincu
qu'il s'agit d'une tentative unilatérale de ce pays pour imposer l'interdiction de toute chasse
baleinière en se fondant sur ses propres valeurs plutôt que sur une argumentation juridique relative
à la chasse scientifique autorisée par le Japon. Certes, dans ce cadre, le Japon capture et tue des
baleines. Devons-nous en êtrehonteux? Mêmesi cela peut êtrel'avis de certains, cela ne veut
pas dire que nous violons le droit international. Si l'on parle en termes de culture, le Japon est
fier de son histoire, qui remonte très loin dans le temps, et de sa tradition de proximité avec la
nature et de préservation de l'environnement pour les générationsà venir. Nous ne critiquons pas
les autres cultures. Monsieur le président,je le dis clairement: s'il fallait établir la supérioritéde
telle culture sur telle autre, le monde ne pourrait pas êtreen paix.
30. Pacta sunt servanda, j'y reviens... Tel est le fondement du droit qui a permis la
coexistence entre les nations durant des siècles etil serait fort regrettable d'écarter ce principe de
sagesse pour la mauvaise raison que les actes de certains Etats semblent moralement répréhensibles
àd'autres.
31. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre
attention et je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler à cette barre
M. le professeur Pellet. Merci beaucoup.
Le PRESIDENT: Merci beaucoup, Monsieur l'agent, et je donne la parole au
professeur Pellet. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur. -22-
M. PELLET:
L'incompétencede la Cour
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l'agent de l'Australie l'a dit
sans fard : l'affaire que ce pays vous a soumise fait partie de sa campagne en faveur de
l'interdiction généraleet définitive de toute chasse commerciale à la baleine 6• Faisant mine
7 8
d'emprunter à la Nouvelle-Zélande le concept de «réglementation collective» , l'Australie lui
substitue sa vision unilatéraleet relaie le slogan de ses activistes en se faisant la championne
de la «tolérance-zéro» à l'égard de toute recherche baleinière utilisant des méthodes létales.
Pour cela,
1) elle modifie l'objet et le but de la convention de 1946 «sur la réglementation» -pas
l'interdiction, Monsieur le président, la réglementation- «de la chasse à la baleine» que
l'Australie transforme en un instrument de pures «conservation et reconstitution» -c'est 9 sa
nouvelle formulation, alors que l'objectif de cet instrument, clairement défini dans le
préambule, est la sauvegarde de la ressource naturelle que constituent les baleines en vue
de «donner à l'industrie baleinière la possibilité de se développer d'une manière
méthodique»;
2) L'Australie interprète l'article VIII de cette convention d'une façon incompatible avec son
texte, son contexte, ses travaux préparatoireset la pratique dont cette disposition a fait l'objet;
en particulier, elle entend soumettre le recours à certaines méthodes de recherche à des
conditions telles qu'elles deviennent complétement inutilisables -alors mêmequ'elles sont
expressémentprévuespar cette disposition clef. Ce faisant, l'Australie entend réduireà néantla
portée de cet article VIII qui laisse expressément une très large marge d'appréciation aux
gouvernements contractants, et ceci alors qu'aucun texte juridiquement contraignant, limitant
6
CR 201317, p. 19, par. 4 (Campbell).
7
Voir OEN, par. 6, 7, 14-32.
8
CR 201317,p. 20, par. 7, p. 22, par. 12 (Campbell).
9CR 2013/7, p. 29, par. 20 (Gleeson); p. 40, par. 1-2, p. 41, par. 6-7, p. 43, par. 13, p. 45, par. 20, p. 46, par. 22,
p. 49, par. 33-34,51, par. 35 (Boisson de Chazoumes). -23-
ou, a fortiori, excluant le recours à de telles méthodes, n'a jamais étéadopté au sein de la
commission baleinière internationale (la «CBI»).
3) Tout ceci au nom de «La Science», présentéecomme une religion révéléeq ,ui correspondrait à
une véritéindiscutable et dont l'Australie se fait le zélateur; le propre de toute attitude
scientifique me paraît pourtant êtrela conscience de la relativitédes approches, la modestie, la
confrontation des points de vue ; on est loin du compte, Monsieur le président: «Moi,
Australie» ou «Moi, professeur Mangel, je sais: il n'est qu'une science etj'en détiensseul(e) la
vérité.«La vraie science», disait Montaigne, «est une ignorance qui se sait» 10;on ne peut pas
dire que l'Australie et ses experts aient la science modeste.
4) Et pourtant, Monsieur le président,les réactionsde la communautéscientifique- y compris au
sein du comitéscientifique de la CBI- sont loin de conforter le méprisdans lequel l'Australie
semble tenir le programme JARPA II :certes, il a fait 1'objet de critiques -parfois vives-
dans certains cercles liésaux Etats hostiles par principe à la chasse baleinière; mais, si l'on
veut bien ne pas s'en tenir à quelques citations sorties de leur contexte et émanant de ces
milieux, le tableau est nettement moins sombre que nos amis australiens veulent le dépeindre;
il existe une grande diversité de points de vue à cet égard, et cette diversité témoigne de
l'absence de toute certitude en ce domaine; il paraît difficile, pour dire le moins, qu'une
juridiction internationale, pour éminentequ'elle soit, puisse trancher entre ces vues divergentes
e .asse preva mr . "~"' "' vente sctentt tque controversee sur une autre.
5) Enfin, il est certainement vrai que les Etats doivent agir de bonne foi et ne pas abuser des droits
que leur reconnaît le droit international ; mais, outre que «la mauvaise foi ne se présumepas» 11,
où est l'abus?
- dans le fait que le Japon, après avoir acceptéle moratoire, ait, dans l'esprit de l'article VIII,
paragraphe 4, de la convention, pris des mesures pour compenser (en partie) la perte des
donnéesscientifiques que fournissaient traditionnellement la chasse commerciale? Ou qu'en
10Michel de Montaigne, Pensées, 1580.
11 Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne, France), sentence arbitrale du 16novembre 1957, Recueil des sentences
arbitrales,vol. XII, p. 305. Voir également l'affaire Tacna Arica (Chili/Pérou),sentence arbitrale du 4 mars 1925,
Recueil des sentences arbitralevol. Il, p. 929-930Concessions Mavrommatis à Jérusalem,arrêtn° 5, 1925, C.P.JI.
sérieA n° 5,p. 43 Certains intérêtasllemands en Haute-Silésiepolonaise, fond, arrêt7, 1926, C.P.JJ. sérieA n°7,
p.30. -24-
vertu du moratoire lui-même, le Japon ait cherché à obtenir l'information scientifique qui
donne à la CBII'assurance qu'elle peut, sans risque, reviser le moratoire? Assurémentpas:
12
JARPA et JARPA Il ne sont pas des moyens de contourner le moratoire ; la montée en
puissance des méthodes de recherche létales est la conséquence du moratoire et de
l'assèchement des donnéesen résultant;
- l'abus serait-il alors dans le simple fait de recourir à ces méthodes? Mais, je l'ai dit, elles sont
expressément envisagées par l'article VIII, et mêmeles experts de l'Australie ont dû concéder
qu'il n'existait pas de méthodes alternatives raisonnablement utilisables et susceptibles de
13
fournir des informations équivalentes ;comme l'a également reconnu M. Gales en réponseà
une question de Mme la juge Donoghue, la connaissance de l'âge des baleines, qui, on peut le
regretter, ne peut êtreobtenue que par ce moyen, est indispensable pour évaluerleur mortalité
14 15
et établirun modèle de distribution des âges -ce qui est l'un des buts de JARPA 11 ; cela
explique aussi le nombre relativement élevéde petits rorquals capturés à cette fin, car
l'établissement de ce modèle suppose des statistiques portant sur un assez grand nombre
d'animaux; qu'il y ait, entre les experts, des divergences d'appréciation sur des problèmes de
ce genre, c'est certain (et naturel) -mais que la Cour puisse trancher ces querelles de
spécialistes,voilà qui est beaucoup moins évident;
l'abus serait-il dans le fait que les produits obtenus à partir des baleines capturées sont,
conformément aux directives du Gouvernement japonais, dans la mesure du possible, mis en
vente sur le marché afin de couvrir les frais entraînés par la recherche ? Mais ceci est
conforme aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'article VIII et aux bonnes pratiques actuelles
communément suivies en matière de financement de la recherche ;
ou y aurait-il abus parce que le Japon ne respecterait pas certaines résolutions adoptéespar la
CBI- souvent à d'étroitesmajorités? Mais ces textes ne sont pas juridiquement obligatoires
et, en revanche, le Japon s'est toujours scrupuleusement conformé à toutes les obligations
12
CR 201317, p. 25, par. 4, p. 27, par. Il, p. 30, par. 25 ; CR 2013/11, p. 30-31, par. 21 (Gieeson).
13Voir CR 2013/9, p.65 (Mange!).
14CR 2013/10, p. 31 (Gales).
15Voir Govemment of Japan, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II)- Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale Resources», SC/57/01(2005), p. 2, 6-7 [CMJ, annexe 150]. -25-
procéduraleslui incombant en vertu de la convention ou du paragraphe 30 du règlementqui lui
est annexé; et il est mêmeallétrès au-delà en coopérantde bonne foi avec les organes de la
convention dont il a toujours considéréles points de vue avec attention- il n'est pas sûr que
l'on puisse en dire autant de l'Australie qui s'est, pour sa part, servie de ces organes pour tenter
d'obtenir une interprétationde la convention de 1946 contraire à sa lettre et à son esprit.
2. Mes collègues et moi-mêmedévelopperont ces points -et d'autres- plus tard cette
après-midi et dans les deux jours qui viennent. Mais nous ne le feront que par précautionou,
comme l'on dit, pour surplus de droit, car nous avons la ferme conviction que la Cour n'est pas
compétentepour se prononcer sur la requêtedont l'Australie a cru pouvoir vous saisir.
3. En effet, bien que le Japon n'ait pas exercé son droit de soulever des exceptions
préliminaires, il n'en objecte pas moins à la compétence de la Cour. C'est cette exception
d'incompétence -dont l'Australie ne conteste pas la recevabilitéet qu'elle a dit prendre très au
sérieux -qu'il m'appartient de vous présenteraujourd'hui.
4. Toutefois, Monsieur le président,le Japon se trouve dans une position assez particulière
et, à vrai dire, fort inconfortable. L'Australie n'a pas cru devoir demander un second tour de
plaidoiries écrites etla Cour ne l'a pas ordonné. Du coup,jusqu'à vendredi dernier-l'Australie a
pris soin d'attendre la toute dernière minute pour plaider ce point liminaire... -nous étionsdans
l'ignorance complètede la position du demandeur sur cet aspect, à nos yeux essentiel, de l'affaire.
5. Tout ce que nous savions concernait un point annexe relatif à la portéede sa requête
-qui a son importance, il est vrai. En effet, durant les réunionsde procéduremenéesavec le
présidentde la Cour, l'agent du demandeur a pris l'engagement formel de ne pas étendrela portée
de ses réclamations, ni ratione materiae (à d'autres conventions), ni ratione loci (au Pacifique Nord
en particulier). Dans sa lettre au greffier dela Cour en date du 22 mai 2012, M. William Campbell,
agent de l'Australie, écrivaiten effet:
«l confirm, as I did at the meeting of the President of the Court with the Agents
of the Parties on 23 April 2012, that Australia's claim in these proceedings concerns
Japan's JARPA II programme in the Southern Ocean (see Australia's Application
Instituting Proceedings, paragraph 2)».
16
CR 201317,p.38,par.60 (Gleeson) et CR 2013/1p.41,par.2 (Bunnester). -26-
Ce dernier détailest significatif, dans la mesure où il établitque l'Australie ne saisit pas la Cour
d'un programme similaire à JARPA 11 17,mais qui se déploiedans une zone maritime sur laquelle
1'Australie n'a pas de prétentions.
6. La Cour est donc saisie de la compatibilité avec la convention de 1946 du programme
JARPA Il, qui se déroule dans l'océan Austral, à l'exclusion de toute autre question. Et, je le
rappelle, c'est la requête,telle qu'interprétéepar les Parties qui fixe et limite la compétence de la
Cour 18• Or il se trouve, Monsieur le président, que la requêteainsi définie n'entre pas dans sa
juridiction telle que l'établissent les déclarations facultatives d'acceptation de la juridiction
obligatoire de la CIJ en vertu de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut, faites respectivement par
l'Australie et le Japon. Ces déclarationsfigurent sous l'onglet n° 16 du dossier des juges. L'une et
1'autre comportent un certain nombre de réserves.
7. La prétendue coïncidence de ces déclarations constitue en l'espèce la seule base sur
laquelle l'Australie entend fonder la compétence de la Cour 19• Aucune autre n'est invoquée. Je
note en particulier que la convention de 1946 dont l'Australie invoque la violation -à l'exclusion
de tout autre traité- ne contient pas de clause de règlementdes différends.
8. Conformément à l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut, la déclaration du Japon précise
qu'elle est faite «à l'égardde tout autre Etat acceptant la mêmeobligation». Au nom du principe
de réciprocité,que vous avez rappelé, par exemple, dans votre arrêtdu 11juin 1998 relatif aux
exceptions préliminaires dans l'affaire Cameroun c. Nigérict 0 et que la Cour a mis en Œuvre à
17CR 2013/8, p. 57, par. 7 (Sands).
18Voir l'article 40, paragraphe 1 du Statut et l'article 38, paragraphe 2, du Règlement; voAdministration
du prince von Pless, ordonnance du 4février1933, C.P.Jl. sérieAIB n°52, p. 14; Certaines terres à phosphates à
Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions préliminaires,arrêt,C.lJ Recuei/1992,p. 267, par. 69;Différend territorialet
maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrê,t
C.I.J Recueil2007 (Il), p. 695, par. 108 ;Certaines questions concernant l'entraide judiciaire en matière pénale
(Djiboutic. France), arrêt,C.I.J Recueil2008,p. 205-206, par. 66-70 Immunitésjuridictionnelles de l'Etat (Allemagne
c. Italie; Grèce(intervenant)arrêtdu 3 février2012, C.I.J., par. 37-39.
19Requête,par. 4; MA, par. 1.10; CR 2013/11, p. 41, par. 5 (Burmester).
2
° Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), exceptions
préliminaires,arrêt,C.lJ Recueil/998, p. 298-299, par. 43. Voir aussi la jurisprudence citéPhosphatesdu Maroc,
arrêt, 1938, C.P.Jl sérieAIB n° 74, p. 22; Licéitéde l'emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Espagne), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance du 2juin 1999, C.lJ Recuei/1999 (Il), p. 23, par. 25 etLicéitéde l'emploi de la force
(Yougoslaviec. Belgique), mesuresconservatoires,ordonnance du 2juin 1999,C.I.J Recueil 1999(1),p. 135, par. 30. -27-
plusieurs reprises, le Japon peut invoquer les réservesde l'Australie- en tout cas l'une d'elles-
21
pour s'opposer à ce que la Cour exerce sa juridiction. L'Etat requérant ne le conteste pa•
[Projection n°1:La deuxième réserveaustralienne.]
9.Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de lire cette réserve, incluse dans la déclaration
australienne du 22 mars 2002, et qui exclut la compétence de la Cour en la présente espèce ; je le
ferai dans le texte original anglais car la traductifrança eitét~range à certains points de vue.
~
~qu'on la trouve dans leRecueildes Traités,lltife.(ïN;;.asiH-!;H;i§ai:M
«This declaration does not apply to :
(b) any dispute conceming or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including
the territorial sea, the exclusive economie zone and the continental shelf, or arising
out of, conceming, or relating to the exploitation of any disputed area of or
adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation;
............................................................... ))
1O.Interprétéeconformément aux intentions de l'Australie, cette réservecouvre l'objet de la
requêteet prive la Cour de compétence pour se prononcer.
1.La portéede la réserveb) de l'Australie
11.Lorsqu'elle doit interpréter une déclaration facultative de juridiction obligatoire, la Cour
met l'accent sur la volonté de l'Etat déclarant, telle qu'elle ressort des termes de la déclaration.
Ainsi, dans l'affaire de laompétenceen matièredepêcheries(Espagnec. Canada), elle a estimé
qu'
«étantdonné qu'une déclaration en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut est
un acte rédigé unilatéralement, la Cour n'a pas manqué de mettre l'accent sur
l'intention de 1'Etat qui dépose une telle déclaration. Aussi bien, dans l'affaire de
I'Anglo-IranianOil Co., la Cour a-t-elle jugé que les termes restrictifs choisis dans la
déclaration de l'Iran étaient «une confirmation décisive de l'intention du
Gouvernement de l'Iran, lorsqu'il a accepté la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour»
(ibid.,p. 107).
49. La Cour interprète donc les termespertinents d'une déclaration, y compris
les réserves qui y figurent, d'une manière naturelle et raisonnableen tenant dûment
21
Voir CR 2013/11, p. 41, par. 6 (Burmester). -28-
compte de l'intention de 1'Etat concernéà l'époque où ce dernier a accepté la
22
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour» •
Mon vieil ami Henry Burmester, que je suis heureux de retrouver ici, mêmesi nous ne sommes pas
cette fois du mêmecôtéde la barre, admet que ces principes sont ceux qu'il convient d'appliquer
23
dans notre espèce •
12. Pour répondre à la question de savoir si le présent différend relève ou non de la
compétence de la Cour, il convient donc de se placer du point de vue de l'Australie et de se
demander si celle-ci pourrait s'opposer avec succès au règlement du différend par la Cour dans
l'hypothèse où elle serait défenderesse dans une affaire du mêmetype que celle qu'elle vous a
soumise.
13. Les termes de la seconde réserveaustralienne sont très larges et, visiblement, ils ont été
rédigésdélibérémend te façon à couvrir tout différendliéaux zones maritimes qu'elle vise. Malgré
les dénégationsde nos amis australiens 24, la réserveb) de l'Australie ne se limite pas à exclure les
différends relatifs à la seule délimitation d'un territoire maritime. Elle y ajoute ceux qui sont «en
rapport» avec une telle délimitation et, surtout pour ce qui nous concerne, ceux «découlant de
l'exploitation de toute zone faisant l'objet d'un différend adjacente à une telle zone maritime en
attente de délimitation ou en faisant partie» ou encore, «concernant une telle exploitation ou en
rapport avec celle-ci». Je note au passage que, dans son arrêtdu 28 mai dernier dans l'affaire du
Louisa invoqué par M. Burmes 5,le Tr~ibunal international du droit de la mer s'est fondé sur
«l'emploi du terme «relatifs» dans la déclaration» de Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines en vertu de
l'article 287 de la convention de Montego Bay pour conclure que «l'interprétation étroitede [cette]
dec arat10n ... ne peut etre re enue» .6
14. La formule adoptéepar l'Australie dans la réserve b) n'est pas sans rappeler celle dont le
Canada avait assorti son acceptation de la compétence obligatoire de la Cour, qui a fait l'objet
22Compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.I.J. Recuei/1998, p. 454, par. 48-49; les italiques sont de nous; voir aussi
Plateau continental de la mer Egée(Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt,C.l.J. Recuei/1978, p.77., par.
23CR 2013/11, p. 43, par. 12 (Bunnester).
24CR 201317,p. 38-39, par. 62 (Gieeson) et CR 2013/11, p. 42, par. 10, p. 44, par. 18, 21 (Bunnester).
25CR 2013/11, p. 49-50, par. 38.
26T.J.D.M., arrêtdu 28 mai 2013, Affaire du navire «LouisaJJ(Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines c. Royaume
d'Espagne),par. 83. -29-
d'une interprétationpar la CIJ dans l'affaire de la Compétenceen matièrede pêcheries. Dans son
arrêt du 4 décembre1998, la Haute Juridiction a commencé:
«par relever qu'en excluant de sa juridiction les «différends auxquels pourraient
donner lieu» les mesures de gestion et de conservation qu'elle mentionne et leur
exécution, la réserve ne réduit pas le critère d'exclusion au seul «objet» du
différend» 2•
Il en va de mêmedans la présenteespèce: du fait de la formulation de la réserveaustralienne, la
Cour ne doit pas avoir égardseulement à l'objet du différendstrictement entendu. La formule
large de la réservel'autorise et lui impose mêmed'aller au-delà. Comme la Cour le remarque dans
ce mêmearrêtde 1998 :
«La version anglaise «disputes arzsmg out of or concerning» laisse plus
clairement apparaître le caractère large et englobant de la formule. Aux termes de la
réservesont exclus non seulement les différendsqui auraient directement pour «objet»
les mesures envisagées et leur exécution, mais aussi ceux qui y auraient «trait»
(«concerning») et, plus généralement,tous ceux qui y trouveraient leur «origine»
(«arising out of»), c'est-à-dire les différendsqui, en l'absence de telles mesures, ne
28
seraient pas nés.»
15. Or, si 1'on compare les deux déclarations-celle de 1'Australie, d'une part, et celle du
Canada qui étaitapplicable dans l'affaire de 1998, d'autre part, on constate que la première- celle
de 1'Australie - est plus large encore, puisqu'aux expressions «différend ... découlant de
l'exploitation>> (dispute ... arising out of the exploitation) de l'une des zones concernées ou
«concernant une telle exploitation» (concerning [such] exploitation), l'Australie a ajouté les
différends «en rapport avec celle-ci» (relating to [such] exploitation). «[L]e caractère large et
englobant de la formule» est encore plus frappant donc: aux termes de la réserveb) sont exclus
non seulement les différends qui auraient directement pour «objet» l'exploitation d'une zone
contestée,mais aussi, pour paraphraser votre arrêtde 1998, non seulement ceux qui auraient «trait
à» (concerning) une telle exploitation ; non seulement, plus généralement, tous ceux qui
trouveraient leur «origine dans» (arising out of) une telle exploitation ; mais aussi tous ceux qui,
d'une manière ou d'une autre, seraient «en rapport avec» (would relate to) une telle exploitation.
27Compétenceen matière de pêcheries(Espagne c. Canada), compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.lJ. Recueil1998,
p. 458, par.62.
28
Compétenceen matièrede pêcheries(Espagne c. Canada), compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.lJ. Recuei/1998,
p.458, par.62. Voir aussi Plateau continental de la mer Egée(Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt,C./.J. Recuei/1978, p. 36,
par.86 Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne), exceptionspréliminaires,arrêt,C.lJ. Recu25,2par46.. -30-
Sur ce point, nous sommes tout à fait d'accord avec M. Burmester mêmesi, curieusement, il nous
29
fait dire le contraire •
16. La présencecumulative d'expressions comme «ayant leur origine dans» (arising out of)
ou «ayant trait à» (concerning) fait d'ailleurs observer à la Cour, dans l'affaire des Pêcheries,que :
«[L]a portéede la réservecanadienne semble mêmeplus large que celle de la
réservedont la Grèce avait assorti son adhésionà l'Acte générald'arbitrage de 1928
(«différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce») et que la Cour avait été
amenéeà interpréterdans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Egéel3°1» 31•
Dans cette dernière affaire d'ailleurs, mer Egée, l'expression «relates to» est systématiquement
traduite en français par «a trait à»3•
17. Au surplus -et là, par contre, je ne suis plus d'accord avec mon contradicteur,
l'utilisation répétitivede la conjonction «OU»(employée pas moins de quatre fois dans la seule
réserveb)) établitl'intention australienne d'exclure largement la compétencede la Cour: les cinq
h ypotheses visees ne sont pas cumu atives, mais . b'Ien a ternatJves; ou, ou, ou, ou.""" '' En aucune
manière, la réservene porte exclusivement sur les différendsrelatifs à la délimitationde l'une des
zones qui y sont mentionnées et qui serait «en rapport» avec celle-ci, pas davantage qu'elle ne
porte exclusivement sur un différend«découlant»de son exploitation et la concernant, et en rapport
avec celle-ci (ce qui serait d'ailleurs assez absurde): il n'y a que des «ou» (or); il suffit donc que
l'on se trouve dans l'un de ces cas de figure pour que la Cour doive déclinersa compétence. Et
33
comme M. Burmester s'en ::r aperçu in extremis durant sa plaidoirie, le «OU»primordial est le
deuxième, celui qui séparela séquence«délimitation»de la séquence «exploitation». Il ne ferait
d'ailleurs aucun sens de répéterdeux fois dans le texte original anglais: «concerning or relating
to» la délimitation d'une part et l'exploitation d'autre part, si l'on devait lire les deux «blocs»
d'exclusion de la compétencede la Cour comme identiques et ne concernant que la délimitation.
29
CR 2013/11, p. 47-48, par. 32 (Burmester).
Jo«(C.l.J Recueil 1978, p. 34, par. 81 et p. 36, par. 86)».
JICompétenceen matière de pêcheries(Espagne c. Canada), compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.I.J Recueil 1998,
p. 458, par. 62.
2
J Voir Plateau continental de la mer Egée(Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt,C.l.J Recueil 1978, p. 34, par. 81 et p. 36,
par. 86 in fine et p. 37, par. 90. Voir aussi l'article 102, paragraphe 2 du Règlement de la Cour; Juridiction territoriale
de la Commission internationale de l'Oder, arrêtn° 16, 1929, C.P.Jl. sérieA n° 23, p. 16.
JJCR 2013/11, p. 46, par. 28 (Burmester). - 31 -
18. J'admets volontiers qu'il ne s'agit pas de délim•taMais rien dans le texte de la
reserveb) n'implique qu'elle vise exclusivement un différend de délimitation maritiAu.
contraire et plusieurs observations peuvent êtrefaitesrd:
1) Il n'est pas inintéressantde noter que la déclarationaustralienne de 1954 contenait une réserve
35
concernant les droits sur les eaux et les zones marines revendiquées par l'Aus;ralie
réserveétait nettementmoins large que celle figurant danslarationactuelle ; elle avait, au
36
surplus, étéabandonnéeen 1975 • C'est donc tout à fait délibérémtue le Gouvernement
australien a modifiénouveau sa déclarationen 2002 en l'assortissant d'une réservelargissime
en ce qui concerne les différendsen rapport avec une délimitationmaout(et j'insiste sur
le «om>,Monsieur le président!)- ou avec l'exploitation d'une zone maritime faisant l'objet
d'un différendou d'une zone adjacente une telle zone dans l'attente de la délimitation. Je
note au passage que l'Australie conteste pas en l'espècel'applicabilitératione loci de cette
large réserve-dont acte.
2) La séquencedes «OU»dont je viens de parler est parfaitement claire : elle exclut la compétence
de la Cour, d'une part en matièredélimitationdes espaces maritimes contestés,de l'autre au
sujet leur exploitation; et l'expression «en attente de délimitation» (pending delimitation) ne
change rienà l'affaire : elle décritun moment, un étatde fait, mais pas, ici, l'objet du différend
exclu; la Cour ne peut se prononcersur la délimitationni, tant que la délimitationn'a pas eu
lieu, sur l'exploitation des zones contestéesou des zones adjacentes.une pause pour les
interprètes.'ai dû rajouter in extremis un petit passage puisque nous n'avons reçu que ce
matin un document fort intéressant etimportan!J Du reste, telle est très exactement la
présentation qu'a donnée l'Attorney-General de l'Australie, dans un document officiel,
analysant au moment de son adoptionla nouvelle déclarationaustralienne, que M. Burmester
avait mentionnéau paragraphe 32 de sa plaidoirie,H jeel'i Eit\eusavons feçfte
le texte à Il heures ce matin. Je cite ce texte:
34
Sur la distinction, voir, par Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,
C.I.Recueil 19p. 41, par. 50.
35
Nations UniRecueil des tr6 février1954, 1-2484, vol. 186, p. 82-83.
36Nations UniRecueil des tr17 mars 1975,1-13809, vol. 961, p. 183.
37
Voir CR 2013/11, p. passi(Burmester). -32-
«The new declaration limits Australia's acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J.. This means that an action cannot be commenced against
Australia in the following circumstances:
[and you have iton your screens]
(b) where disputes involve maritime boundary delimitation, or disputes
concerning the exploitation of an area in dispute, or adjacent to an area in
dispute.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)
C'est limpide.
3) L'interprétation contraire avancée par l'Australie conduit à un résultat parfaitement absurde et
prive de signification toute la seconde partie de la réserve: elle signifierait que la Cour ne peut
trancher un différend relatif à la délimitation mais qu'une fois celui-ci résolu,elle pourrait se
prononcer sur l'exploitation...Si telle étaitla signification de la seconde partie de la phrase, elle
la rend totalement superflue et l'Australie aurait dû se contenter d'exclure la compétencede la
Cour en matière de délimitation -«point-barre»! Pour que la référenceà l'exploitation ait un
sens utile, il faut admettre que, dans l'attente de la délimitation (pending limitation), la Cour ne
peut se prononcer ni sur la délimitationdes zones visées,ni sur leur exploitation.
4) Les discussions au sein du Parlement australien (qui sont relatéesdans un document produit par
le Japon- ils'agit de l'annexe 167 à notre contre-mémoire) et dont M. Burmester s'est efforcé
de tirer le moins mauvais parti possible, confirment cette interprétation et montrent que la
réserve b) concerne non seulement la délimitationdes frontières maritimes, mais plus largement
38
les différends ayant «une connotation maritime» • L'expression a été employée par
M. Campbell durant ces débats, à propos de l'affaire des Essais nucléaires,dont je suis prêtà
admettre qu'elle peut êtreprésentéecomme étant«partiellement maritime» (a «semi-maritime
matter», he said) mais dont l'aspect «délimitation» ne m'avait, je dois dire, jamais frappé. Un
autre exemple d'affaires ayant un aspect maritime donné par M. Campbell lors de cette
discussion avec les parlementaires est celle du Timor Oriental, à propos de laquelle
M. Burmester a très justement fait remarquer qu'elle ne concernait pas une délimitation
maritime mais qu'elle «put at risk existing resource exploitation by Australia», because
38Voir Parliamentary Dehales, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 12 July 2002 (William Campbell), TR 49,
CMJ. [annexe 167], p. 217. -33-
«American oil companies, with interest in exploiting areas off Timor-Leste, were telling anyone
who would listen that they had legal advice that Timor-Leste could properly claim not just a
share of the resources within the former joint zone but also in areas which lay outside its
39
boundaries, including areas already being exploited by Australia» • C'est bien ce que nous
disons, Monsieur le président: en rédigeantsa déclaration, l'Australie a voulu échapperà la
compétencede la Cour en matière d'exploitation des ressources naturelles de zones maritimes
contestéesou adjacentes àcelles sur lesquelles elle a des revendications. Pourquoi pourrait-elle
se prévaloir de cette exclusion lorsque le pétrole qu'elle convoite est en cause et en
refuserait-elle le bénéficeau Japon à propos de l'exploitation d'une autre ressource naturelle?
5) Et pour en finir avec la fable de la réserveexclusivement relative à la délimitationmaritime, un
mot sur l'analogie esquissée par M. Burmester avec la déclaration,faite au mêmemoment par
1'Australie en vertu de 1'article 298, paragraphe 1, de la convention des Nations Unies sur Je
droit de la mer. Mon contradicteur laisse entendre que cette «réserve» Ge lui laisse la
responsabilitédu mot...) aurait la mêmeportéeque celle figurant dans la déclarationfacultative
40
australienne • Il est intéressant de lire cette déclaration et de la confronter au texte de la
réserveb). Vous avez la réserveb) sur l'écran,je lis en anglais la déclarationaustralienne en
vertu de l'article 298 :
«The Government of Australia further declares, under paragraph 1(a) of
article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (... ), that it does
not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the
procedures referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating
- relating, c'est çà qui nous intéresse- to sea boundary delimitations as weil as
those involving historie hays or titles.»1
Si réserve il y a, Monsieur Je président,elle porte, en effet dans cette déclaration,exclusivement,
sur la délimitation (de la mer territoriale, de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau
continental) mais il n'y est pas question d'exploitation des ressources naturelles de ces zones;
moins encore de l'exploitation des ressources naturelles de zones adjacentes dans l'attente de la
39CR 2013/11, p. 45, par. 23-24 (Bunnester).
40Ibid., p. 43-44, par. 17.
41 Declarations of States Parties Relating to Settlement on Disputes in Accordance with Article 298 (Optional
Exceptions to the Applicability of Part XV, Section 2, of the Convention), disponible en ligne:
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic _texts/298_declarations_June_20Il_ english.pdf. -34-
délimitation. Et pour une raison bien simple: cela eût étécontraire à l'article 309 de la convention,
qui prohibe toute réserveet exception non prévuesexpressément -en matière de règlementdes
différends: celles qui ne sont pas autorisées par 1'article 287, paragraphe 1, disposition qui ne
concerne que le règlementdes différendsrelatifs à la délimitationdes zones maritimes. Dans cette
déclaration-là, 1'Australie ne pouvait pas ajouter à 1'exclusion de la délimitation celle de
l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. En revanche, elle le pouvait dans sa déclarationfacultative
de l'article 36-et elle l'a fait: cette exclusion est expriméepar la réserve b).
19. Exploitation -le mot est sans grand mystère. Il inclut 1'ensemble des utilisations des
ressources de la mer et, du reste, le mot «exploitation», qui figure dans le texte anglais de
l'article65 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer consacréaux mammifères
marins, est traduit en français par «utilisation optimale». Et l'article 120, qui renvoie à l'article65,
montre qu'il faut intégrer dans cette notion «la conservation et ... la gestion des mammifères
marins».
20. Comme on l'a écrit,le mot «exploitation»- «exploitation»:
«is a broad term which covers the utilization of animais for reasons such as pure
commercial gain, subsistence or in the interests of conservation or control. The means
by which it is carried out can be consumptive, either permanently removing animais
from the population by hunting or live-trapping or harvesting products from wild
42
individuals under management regimes.»
21. Clairement, Monsieur le président, les activitésque l'Australie reproche au Japon de
mener concernent l'exploitation des ressources d'une zone maritime. Ratione materiae, elles
relèventde la réserve b) de la déclarationaustralienne de 2002 ; elles sont au centre du différend;
elles en constituent l'objet même.
22. Voici, Monsieur le président,pour l'interprétationde la deuxième réserveaustralienne;
la Cour ne peut se reconnaître compétente si la requêteporte sur un différend découlant de
l'exploitation d'une zone maritime en attente de délimitationou d'une zone adjacente à une telle
zone - arising out of, concerning, or relating to the exploitation, of any disputed area or adjacent
42VictoriaJ.Taylor and Nigel Dunstone, «The exploitation, sustainable use and welfare of wild mammals», in
V. J.Taylor and N. Dunstone (eds.), The Exploitation of Mammal Populations, Chap&anHall, Bury St Edmunds,
Suffolk, 1996,. 3-4-les italiques sont de nous. -35-
to any such maritime zone pending ils delimitation. Il en va sans aucun doute ainsi en la présente
espèce.
[Fin de la projection no 1.]
II. La réserve b) s'applique en l'espèce
23. Il me semble que, d'une certaine manière, on peut dire, Monsieur le président, que le
différend qui nous occupe «découle de l'exploitation» (arises out of the exploitation) puisqu'il
porte sur les activitésmenéespar le Japon en vue d'assurer l'exploitation durable d'une ressource
naturelle d'une zone maritime. En tout cas, il n'y a aucun doute qu'il la «concerne» et est «en
rapport avec elle».
24. Comme l'a indiqué l'Australie dans sa requête 43, comme elle l'a répétédans son
4
mémoire \ comme son agent l'a redit durant la réunionde concertation du 23 avril2012 avec le
45
présidentde la Cour et confirmédans sa lettre du 22 mai suivant que j'ai citéetout à l'heure ,et
comme le conseil de l'Australie l'a dit à nouveau la semaine dernière 46, «Australia's claim in these
proceedings concems Japan's JARPA II programme in the Southern Ocean» -«la demande
47
australienne dans la procédureen cours concerne le programme JARPA II dans l'océanAustral» •
Le programme JARPA II dans l'océanAustral, pas donc, le programme, pourtant jumeau, JARPN,
mais qui, lui, se déroule dans le Pacifique Nord, dans lequel l'Australie n'a pas d'intérêts
48
particuliers à préserver • Voici qui confirme, Monsieur le président, que, tout en donnant des
gages à son opinion publique, 1'Australie n'agit pas en défenseur altruiste de la légalité
internationale mais bien plutôt pour préserverses revendications maritimes.
25. Quelle que soit la perspective que l'on adopte -que l'on interprète à la lettre la
définitionque le Japon lui-mêmeen donne ou que l'on se réfèreaux allégations de l'Australie,
JARPA II, qui constitue de l'aveu insistant du demandeur l'unique objet du différend, est,
43
Requêtep ,ar. 40-41.
44MA,par. 1.3-1.7.
45Voirsupra, par. 5.
46CR2013/7,p. 22, par. 13(Campbell).
47Voirsupra, par.5.
48
Voiribid. -36-
indiscutablement, un programme concernant l'exploitation d'une ressource marine et en rapport
avec elle.
26. Le Japon a toujours fait savoir que JARPA étaitdestiné à collecter de l'information qui
permette la reprise de la chasse commerciale àcertaines espèces de baleines. Le but du programme
est d'établirsi cette chasse est durable -sustainab/e. Il s'agit de recherche scientifique appliquée,
liéeà l'exploitation des ressources naturelles de la mer.
27. Ainsi, la mise en place du programme JARPA 1 partait de la volonté du Japon de
participer à «l'examen régulier» de la limite de chasse zéro prévue par le paragraphe 10 e) du
règlement annexéà la convention, examen fondésur «les meilleurs avis scientifiques», qui devait
permettre à la CBI de procéder, au plus tard en 1990, à une «évaluation exhaustive des effets» du
49
moratoire • Les objectifs de ce premier programme étaient ainsi tournés vers une meilleure
gestion des stocks baleiniers dans l'océanAustral 50afin d'établirla possibilitéde leur exploitation.
L'objectif numéro1 visait une «estimation of the biological parameters required for stock
51
management of the Southern Hemisphere minke whale» • Pour sa part l'objectif 4 portait sur «the
elucidation of the stock structure of Southern Hemisphere minke whales to improve stock
1
management» 5• JARPA II, initié en2005, s'inscrit dans la lignéede''JARPA 1 S~es objectifs sont
étroitement associés à la «procédure de gestion revisée»(«RMP» selon le sigle anglais), méthode
53
que la CBI a définie en vue de calculer le niveau raisonnable des prises , et que le
professeur Hamamoto présentera de manière plus précisedemain matin. L'ambition de JARPA II
4
est de <mltimately lead to the improvement of the whale stock management procedures» 5 •
«Looking to the future, the IWC will need to consider a multi-species management approach in the
49Voir CMJ, par. 4.1-4.2, 4.40.
50Voir CMJ, par. 4.18, 4.25-4.37.
51Gouvernement du Japon, «The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere Minke Whale and for
Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic», SC/39/04 (1987) p. 3-4 [CMJ, annexe 135].
5Gouvernement du Japon, «The 1996/97 Research Plan for the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic», SC/48/SH3 (1996), p. 2 [CMJ, annexe 146].
53CMJ, p. 50, par. 5.20.
54
Gouvernement du Japon, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA Il)Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale ResourceS)),SC/57/01 (2005), p. 12 [CMJ, annexe 150]. -37-
Antarctic Ocean, which has the world's largest whale resources, for the conservation and
sustainable use of these resources» 55•
28. Certes, le programme JARPA II est un programme scientifique, il n'en fait pas moins
partie d'un processus dont la finalitéest l'exploitation durable de certains stocks de baleines dans
l'océanAustral. Ayant comme objectif ultime d'établir si et dans quelle mesure les conditions
d'une reprise de la chasse à la baleine sont réunieset quelles précautionsdoivent êtreprises pour
que cette activité soit durable grâce à une gestion raisonnable des stocks, JARPA II est, à
l'évidence,«en rapport» avec l'exploitation des ressources marines. Il la concerne mêmetrès
directement.
29. Pour le montrer, je me suis fondé,Monsieur le président,sur ce que j'appelleraitt «la
véritésur JARPA Il». Mais, pour les besoins de la discussion, je peux aussi bien me référeraux
allégations -erronées- de la Partie australienne, qui veut voir dans le programme japonais des
actes de chasse commerciale à la baleine. Elle prétendque : «the whales are killed for commercial
56
exploitation of the whale meat and to sustain the Japanese whaling industry» , ou encore que : «the
Convention contemplates three types of whaling. The only one that fits JARPA II is commercial
57
whaling that is exploitatiom> • Je relève d'ailleurs qu'en soutenant que «la conservation des
baleines même à des fins économiquesrequiert un système collectif, prévisibleet contraignant de
supervision» 5 ,l'Australie caractérise les activités de chasse à la baleine sous le régime de la
convention comme relevant de l'exploitation (ou parfois de la surexploitation) du stock 59•
30. Monsieur le président, je ne concède en aucune manière que JARPA II serait un
60
programme déguiséde chasse commerciale à la baleine • Ce que je dis simplement est que, s'il
l'était comme le prétendl'Australie, ils'agirait à l'évidencede l'exploitation des ressources des
55 Gouvernment du Japon, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA 11)-Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale Resources»,SC/57/01 (2005), p. 6 [CMJ, annexe 150].
56CR 201317,p. 26, par. 6 (Gleeson).
57CR 2013/11, p. 15, par. 45 (Crawford).
58CR 201317,p. 43, par. Il (Boisson de Chazournes); voir aussi, par exemple, ibid., p. 26, par. 6 (Gieeson).
59
Voir aussi MA, chap. 2, sect. IV, passim. Voir aussi MA, par. 1.2 ou par. 2.125 et Expert Opinion, p. 294,
par. 2.15, ou p. 318, par. 6.12Parmi les auteurs qui font la mêmeassimilation, voir Elle Hey, The Regime for the
Exploitation ofTransboundary Marine Fisheries Resources, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 237-244.
60Voir CR 2013111,p. 48, par. 33 (Burmester). -38-
zones maritimes dans lesquelles ilse déroule. En d'autres termes, que l'on retienne la description
-exacte- qu'en donne le Japon ou celle -erronée- qu'avance l'Australie, le résultatest le
même: JARPA Il, qui est l'objet mêmedu différend que celle-ci a soumis à la Cour, est «en
rapport» étroitavec l'exploitation de la zone maritime dans laquelle il se déroule et «concerne»
cette exploitation trèsdirectement.
31. De toute manière, l'Australie ne peut avoir raison à la fois sur la compétenceet sur le
fond. En effet, de deux choses l'une: soit elle a raison sur le fond -JARPA II est de la chasse
commerciale- mais alors le différend est évidemment exclu de votre compétence car ils'agit
do..\~c.nV"
•é·f'iEienmae dn'txploitation; soit la raison sur la compétence -l'affaire ne concernerait pas
.l'exploitation stricto sensu des baleines- mais alors elle a nécessairementtort sur le fond.
32. Dès lors, il importe peu que le Japon n'ait pas de différend de délimitation avec
l'Australie61,au sens étroitdéfinivendredi par le conseil de l'Etat requérantcomme portant sur des
62
«prétentions maritimes concurrentes» • Les deux pays ont un différend relatif à l'exploitation
d'une zone maritime que l'Australie considère comme relevant de sa zone économiqueexclusive,
ce que le Japon conteste, et de la zone adjacente àcette zone en litige.
33. En résumé,Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, le différendque
l'Australie a cru pouvoir vous soumettre est couvert par la réserveb) de sa propre déclaration
facultative -dont le Japon peut se prévaloir au titre du principe de réciprocité. La réserve
australienne couvre les différends
découlantde l'exploitation de toute zone (maritime) objet d'un différend,qui est en attente de
délimitation,ou d'une zone qui lui est adjacente;
concernant une telle exploitation ; ou
en rapport avec elle.
Le différend soumis à la Cour, à propos du programme JARPA Il, qui vise à permettre
l'exploitation durable des baleines dans l'océan Austral, peut rentrer dans chacune de ces
catégories. A tous ces points de vue, vous ne pouvez, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, que
déclinerl'exercice de votre compétenceet il serait fort injuste que l'Australie puisse se prévaloirde
61CR 2013/11, p.48,par.34 (Burmester).
62
Ibidp. 47,par.30 (Burmester). -39-
sa déclarationfacultative après avoir fait en sorte de se mettre à l'abri de requêtescomparables à
celle qu'elle a elle-mêmeforméepour complaire à son opinion publique.
34. Un dernier mot relatif à l'intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande: si, comme nous Je
croyons, vous vous déclarez incompétents pour connaître de l'affaire que l'Australie vous a
soumise, il va de soi que la demande en intervention de ce pays sera sans objet. En effet, nous nous
trouverons dans une situation comparable àcelle crééepar la demande d'intervention d'El Salvador
dans l'affaire des Activitésmilitaires entre le Nicaragua et les Etats-Unis à la suite de laquelle la
Cour a relevé:
«que la déclaration d'intervention de la République d'El Salvador ... porte en fait
aussi sur des questions, y compris l'interprétationde conventions, qui présupposent
que la Cour a compétencepour connaître du différend entre Je Nicaragua et les
Etats-Unis d'Amérique et que la requête du Nicaragua c63tre les Etats-Unis
d'Amériqueconcernant ce différendest recevable» •
De même,dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires, la Cour a considéré,suite à l'adoption de ses
arrêtsconstatant que les demandes de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélandeétaient «désormaissans
objet», «qu'en conséquence il n'exist[ait] désormaisplus d'instance sur laquelle la requêteà fin
d'intervention [de Fidji] puisse se greffer». Et la Cour a conclu: «que la requêtepar laquelle le
Gouvernement fidjien demande à intervenir dans l'instance introduite par l'Australie [ou la
64
Nouvelle-Zélande]contre la France tombe et que la Cour n'a plus aucune suite à lui donner» • Il
doit en aller de mêmede la demande en intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélandedans l'affaire qui nous
occupe.
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre écoute. Mon successeur à cette
barre sera le professeur Payam Akhavan -si, bien sûr, vous voulez bien lui donner la parole,
Monsieur le président- mais peut-êtreconsidérerez-vous que c'est Je moment approprié pour
notre sacro-sainte (et toujours bienvenue !) pause-cafésurtout aprèsune plaidoirie fort technique?
63
Activitésmilitaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
déclarationd'intervention, ordonnance 4 octobre 1984, C.1.J.Recueil 1984, p.216, par. 2 (les italiques sont de nous).
Voir aussi: Essais nucléaires(Nouvelle-ZélandeFrance), requêteàfin d'intervention, ordonnance du 12juillet 1973,
C.1.J.Recueil 1973, p. 325, par. 1-3 ; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélandec. France), requêteà fin d'intervention,
ordonnance du 20 décembre1974, C.J.J.Recueil 1974, p. 535-536.
64
Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), requêteà fin d'intervention, ordonnance du 20décembre 1974,
C.1.J.Recueil 1974, p. 530-531 ; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), requête à fin d'intervention,
ordonnance du 20 décembre1974, C.J.J. Recueil 1974, p. 535-536. -40-
Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Professeur Pellet, je crains qu'il n'y ait plus rien de sacra-saint
dans ce monde d'aujourd'hui mais il faut respecter quand mêmeles traditions et, avant de déclarer
la pause, quand même,j'ai une petite demande à la délégationjaponaise. Vous avez citéun
document que vous avez reçu, comme vous l'avez déclaré,ce matin à 11 heures. Ce document
-si je me souviens bien- s'appelle National Interest Analyses. Ce document ne fait pas partie
du dossier de l'affaire ni du dossier des juges de ce matin, est-ce que vous pourrez transmettre au
Greffe le texte avec l'indication des sources. Merci beaucoup.
M. PELLET : Je le fais immédiatement.
Le PRESIDENT : Et maintenant, je déclareune pause de 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned.from 4.30 p.m. to 4.55 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and 1 give the floor to
Professor Payam Akhavan. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr.AKHAVAN:
SCIENCE VERSUS POLITICS AT THE IWC
1.Introduction
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour to appear before
you today on behalf of Japan.
2. 1will be addressing the factual background of this dispute. In particular, 1will focus on
the characteristicsf Australia's anti-whaling policy, how it has shaped the relationship between
science and politics at the IWC, and what this context says about the meritsthis case.
3. Australia's allegations are serious and far-reaching. Japan stands accusedf 30 years of
deception and defiance against the IWC. lts programme of scientific research is disparaged as
"commercial whaling" in disguise, in violation of Article VIII of the Convention. But prior to this
case, Australia expressly admitted before the IWC that despite its opposition,apan's programme -41 -
is strict!y legal under Article VIII of the Convention" 6'. So, what is this case really about? Why
has Australia now come before this Court?
4. The question is best answered by considering what Australia insists the case is not about.
The Agent's opening speech emphasized that while "Australia is totally opposed to any form of
66
commercial whaling" this "is not relevant to the resolution of the case before the Court" • This is
a rather curious remark given the subject of this dispute. Why would Australia say that its
opposition to commercial whaling is irrelevant? Mr. Campbell insisted that this case is only about
Japan's "unlawful misuse of the scientific exception under Article VIII". But what if that
exception is used to gather scientific data for the resumption of sustainable commercial whaling?
That, after ali, is exactly the programme of scientific research contemplated by the 1982
moratorium. If Australia is "totally opposed" to lifting the moratorium, then is it not also totally
opposed to the scientific purpose of JARPA II?
5. But what the Agent's speech left unsaid goes much further. Moments after the conclusion
ofhis opening speech, Mr. Campbell toldjournalists, outside this very courtroom, that: "You don't
7
even need to kill one whale to conduct scientific research.'.G The following day, Australia's own
expert witness, Professor Mangel, admitted that "lethal take" may indeed be "appropriate" for
scientific research 68• So what is the Australian position on whether lethal sampling may ever be
justified? The answer may be gleaned from the statement of another Mr. Campbell, the former
Environment Minister of Australia, who stated categorically that Australia opposes- "ali
forms"- "ali forms of scientific and commercial whaling" 69• Minister Campbell clarified that, for
70
Australia, Article VIII is merely a "loophole" that must be closed •
65
Counter-Memorial [CMJ], para. 7, referring to Chairman's Report of the Forty-Ninth Annual MeetiRep. /nt.
Whal.Commn 48, 1998, p. 39, CMJ, Ann. 57; emphasis added.
66CR 2013/7, p. 24, para. 18 (Campbell); emphasis added.
67
Associated Press, "Australia to World Court: Ban Japanese Whaling", 26 June 2013, available at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/australia-world-court-ban-japanese-whali… (last checked on 1July
68
CR 2013/9, p. 61.
69
Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia taking strong action to protee! whales," Press Release, 16 Feb. 2006,
available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2006/australia-taking-strong-ac…
o-protect-wha(last
checked on 1July 2013).
70
Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia Appeals to Japan to Reconsider its 'Scientific' Whale Slaughter,"
Press Release, 8 Nov. 2005, available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media!news/2005/australia-appeals-to-japan…
reconsider-its-scientific-whale-slaughter (Iast checkeduly 2013). -42-
6. As 1 will show, for Australia, the scientific purpose of lethal sampling is largely irrelevant.
It is a mere afterthought to what the Agent called a "strongly-held" anti-whaling policy. This
policy is based on the fundamental belief in Australian public opinion that, unlike other inferior
members of the animal kingdom, whales are unique, sacred, charismatic mammals that should
never be killed. Since 1979, Australia has pursued an express policy of using the IWC, against its
stated purpose, to ban ali whaling. lt has politicized science in order to impose Australian values
on Japan, in disregard of international law. Having failed to achieve its objective, it now cornes
before this Court and makes arguments that manifestly contradict its earlier positions on the
legality of JARPA. To borrow a phrase from the Agent's speech, Australia seeks to cloak its
political and cultural preferences "in the !ab-coat of science" 71• Having put an end to commercial
whaling for the past 30 years through the moratorium, it now also seeks to end scientific whaling.
lt seeks to apply the Whaling Convention as if it were the anti-Whaling Convention.
7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my presentation will be divided into five parts.
First, 1 will briefly situate Japan's scientific research in the global context of contemporary
whaling. Second, 1 will examine the origins and assumptions of Australia's anti-whaling policy.
Third, 1will show how this "no compromise", "zero tolerance" policy has politicized science at the
IWC and brought the organization to the brink of collapse. Fourth, 1 will discuss the evidentiary
significance for this case of the Scientific Committee's findings on JARPA. 1will then conclude
with sorne observations about the circumstances surrounding Australia's decision to initiate this
proceeding, circumstances that shed light on what this case is really about.
ll. The IWC and Global Whaling in Context
8. Turning first to the global context ofwhaling, the IWC was established in 1946 because of
over-exploitation of whale species, main!y for oil rather than food. The International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling was adopted- to quote its preamble- in order "to establish a
system of international regulation for the whale fisheries" 72• lts fundamental object and purpose
was and remains sustainable whaling.
7CR 2013/7, p. 24, para. 18(Campbell).
72
CMJ, Ann. 6, Preamble, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (entered into force
10 Nov. 1948) 161 UNTS72, amended by Protocol of 19 Nov. 1956, 338 UNTS336 (Whaling Convention). -43-
9. By the 1970s, the combination ofiWC regulation and the collapse of the whale-oil market
had significantly reduced commercial whaling. According to the IWC Secretariat, because of "the
improved management of whaling that began in the mid-1970s" many species "are now in the
process ofrecovering". There are now at least three "highly precautionary scientific 'management
procedure' approaches developed by the IWC's Scientific Committee for commercial and
73
aboriginal subsistence whaling in order to ensure that past mistakes will not be repeated" •
1O. Today, most whale species are no longer endangered. For example, the IWC notes that
"humpback whales have shown evidence of strong recovery ... with annual increase rates of about
74
10 per cent" • The graph at tab 19-1 of your folders demonstrates the dramatic drop in global
whaling beginning in the early 1970s, at least a decade prior to the 1982 moratorium. Fortunately,
the days of over-exploitation and unsustainable whaling are long over.
11. The Antarctic minke whale is the smallest and most abundant ofthe "great whales". The
IWC's most recent "best estimate" ofthis population in the Southem Ocean is 515,000 75• The next
76
largest abundance in the Antarctic is the humpback whale estimated by the IWC at 42,000 • Thus,
the Antarctic minke whale exceeds the next largest population by a magnitude of 12.
12. As indicated in tab 19-2, the IWC observes that: "there are several hundred thousand
Antarctic minke whales and thus they are c/early not endangered" 77• "C1early not endangered".
This stands in stark contrast to the alarmist assertions of impending catastrophe in Austra1ia's
p1eadings.
13. To further put matters in perspective, the sample size of Antarctic minke whales under
JARPA II is 1essthan 0.3 per cent- or three tenths of 1 per cent- of the relevant population.
Even Australia's own expert witness, Professor Mangel, readily admitted that what he called a
"very small take ofwhales" will not "in any way endanger this stock" 78•
73
International Whaling Commission, "A Brief Overview of the 'Status' of Whale Populations," available at:
http://iwc.int/status#overview (last checked on 1 July 2013).
74
Internationa1 Whaling Commission, "The Status of Whales",
http://archive.iwcoffice.org/conservation/status.htm (last checked on 1July 2013).
75
International Whaling Commission, "Whale Population Estimates," available at: http://iwc.int/estimate (last
checked on 1Ju1y2013).
76
/bid.
77
Ibid., emphasis added.
78
CR 2013/9, p.63 (Mange!). -44-
14. Japanese scientific research may further be situated in the broader context of global
whaling. The IWC recognizes three categories of whaling: commercial, aboriginal subsistence,
and special permit whaling. The illustrative map in tab 19-3 demonstrates in dark blue Norway and
lceland, both of which engage in commercial whaling in the North Atlantic.
15. The IWC Contracting States engaging in aboriginal subsistence whaling are indicated in
purple. These are Denmark in Greenland, the Russian Federation, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
and the United States of America.
16. The map also indicates in red whaling nations that are not members of the IWC. This
includes Canada, which withdrew from the IWC in the 1980s when the moratorium was adopted,
as weil as Indonesia. Such whaling activity is outside the scope of the Convention.
17. Finally, the map indicates in green, Japan, as the only country committing resources to
special permit whaling. Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium on commercial whaling in
1986.
18. Japan has complied with the moratorium despite a 2,000 year tradition of subsistence
whaling. lt has done so although the IWC anti-whaling block has opposed even small-type
community-based whaling in Japan's own waters. These coastal communities have been anguished
because they can no longer practise their ancestral traditions. The Australian Environment Minister
once remarked in this regard that "many cultures and traditions ... don't belong in a modern
79
world" • IWC resolutions, and even United Nations human rights declarations however, recognize
an inextricable link between sustainable "customary resource use" and cultural survival 80• For the
anti-whaling moral crusaders, saving whales that are clearly not endangered outweighs saving
foreign cultures and communities.
m. Australia's anti-whaling policy and the 1982 moratorium
19. 1will now turn to the origins and characteristics of Australia's anti-whaling policy and
the adoption of the 1982 moratorium. At its inception in 1946, the IWC consisted of a cartel of
15 whaling nations. Japan joined in 1951, at a time when, amidst the devastation of the war, whale
79
ECO, St. Kitts Vol. LVIII, No. 1 (16 June 2006), p. 4, availab1e at:
htto://www.earthisland.org/jmmp/EC02006/2006EcoNol.pdf(1astchecked on 1July 2013).
80
IWC Resolution 2000-1. -45-
meat helped prevent starvation. Despite the Convention's purpose, and despite improved
management procedures in the 1970s, from the 1980s onwards, anti-whaling nations would take
over the IWC, intent on banning ali whaling, irrespective of science-based sustainability.
20. Article V (2) of the Convention specifically provides that Schedule catch quotas "sha/1
be based on scientific findings " 81• The right of Contracting Govemments under Article VIII (1) to
issue special whaling permits clearly contemplated the necessity of such "scientific findings" for
82
sustainable commercial whaling •
21. In this regard, the Scientific Committee plays a pivotai role. It was established to
provide independent scientific advice to the Commission. State representatives may participate in
the Committee's deliberations. But unlike the Commission, the Committee is not a political organ.
It is composed of sorne 150 of the world's leading scientists in the fields of ecology, marine
biology, population dynamics, statistics, genetics, modelling, and other relevant disciplines. It is an
independent expert body.
22. Given the politicization of science in the Commission, it should come as no surprise that
the Commission and the Scientific Committee may express different views on scientific matters. A
useful illustration, which may be found at tab 19-4 in your folders, is Professor Sands's
considerable emphasis on IWC resolution 2003-2 calling for scientific research to be limited to
83
"non-lethal methods only" • The contrary view of the Scientific Committee is that despite the
availability of non-lethal methods, "logistics and abundance of minke populations ... precluded
their successful application" 84• The contrast between these two views is the contrast between
science and politics.
23. Japan has been a leader in cetacean research since the establishment in 1941 of the
85
Nakabe Foundation for Whale Science • It has played a crucial role in the International Decade of
Cetacean Research (IDCR) and the Southem Ocean Whale and Ecosystem Research (SOWER),
81Article V (2), The International Convention for the Regulation ofWhaling.
82Article VIII (1), The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.
83CR 2013/9, p. 29, para. 50 (Sands).
84
SC/49/Rep. 1, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998, p. 386.
85
The Institute of Cetacean Research, "Overview and Purpose", available at:
http://www.icrwhale.org/abouticr.html (last checked on l July3). -46-
86
recognized as the largest whale research program in the Southern Ocean • Survey cruises were
conducted under IWC auspices for more than 30 years, covering 216,000 miles and
43,000 sightings. The Scientific Committee noted in 2009 that "[w]ithout the generous provision
of vessels by the Government of Japan ... the success of this programme would never have been
87
possible" •
24. Australia's politicization of science at the IWC can best be understood through
examining the origins of its anti-whaling policy. In the 1970s, the protest group Project Jonah led a
highly publicized anti-whaling campaign against Australia's last whaling company, Cheynes
Beach. In the 1977 federal elections, whaling became an important political issue, and in 1978,the
Australian Government appointed Sir Sydney Frost to conduct an inquiry into whales and whaling.
The resulting report was submitted to Parliament in February 1979 and Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser endorsed its recommendations on 4 April 1979. This report would have a fundamental and
lasting impact on Australia's policy towards the IWC.
25. The Frost Report's findings were based on Australian "community attitudes to
whaling" 8• This inc1udednumerous petitions and opinion poils, demonstrating that "the killing of
whales is wrong in the eyes of the Australian community" and that its continuation "would outrage
89
a significant proportion of the population" •
26. One "ethical" argument was avoidance of "pain and suffering ... irrespective of whether
90
the being is a human or nonhuman anima1" • But Australia was the world's largest exporter of
beef, much of it to Japan. A more appealing argument was that whales were unique. The Frost
Report thus emphasized that whales are unlike other animais "such as cattle, sheep and pigs that are
traditionally bred for slaughter" in abattoirs or "kangaroo species" and wild carnets that are killed
91
in the millions because they are "a nuisance to farmers" •
86Elwen S. H., et al 20Il. "Cetacean research in the southem African subregion: a review of previous studies and
current knowledge", African Journal of Marine Science 2011, 33(3): pp. 469-493.
87http://iwc.int/sower (last checked on 1July 2013).
88Whales and Whaling, Vol. 1: Report of the Independent Inquiry conducted by The Hon. Sir Sydney Frost,
(Australian Govemment Publishing Service, Canberra 1978) [Frost Report], p. 183.
89/d.,p.193.
90/d.
91Id.p. 186. -47-
27. In brief, the Frost Report was based on the premise that whaling was of no economie or
cultural significance for Australians. In contrast to other animais sacrificed to Australia's giant
meat industry, Australians had a special, emotional attachment to whales. As the Report explained,
"reasonable Australian citizens would conclude that ... it is wrong to kill an animal of such special
significance as the whale" 9• The Report even referred to whales as "sacred animals" 93•
28. It should thus come as no surprise that Australia is categorically opposed to lethal
sampling. The Frost Report explicitly recognized that a whaling ban would result in the Joss of
scientific data. It concluded however that, "the Jossof data for research ... is not a consideration
which can outweigh the matters of principle upon which the Inquiry's views are based" 94•
Opposition to lethal sampling was based on belief in the uniqueness of the whale. It had nothing to
do with scientific merit.
29. In this light, the Frost Report recommended that "Australia should remain a member of
the [IWC] which is the forum where its anti-whaling policy can best be pursued" 95• In other words,
Australia would remain in the IWC for the purpose of defeating its purpose.
30. The Frost Report's conclusions and recommendations were adopted unconditionally and
became Government policy. On 4 April 1979, in his statement to the Australian House of
Representatives, Prime Minister Fraser referred to whales as a "special and intelligent" species and
indicated that: "The Government is to prohibit ali whaling within the impending 200 mile
96
Australian Fishing Zone, including. . . the Australian Antarctic Territory." He further
emphasized that "Australia should pursue a policy of opposition to whaling ... both domestically
and internationally through the International Whaling Convention'.97.
31. In July 1979, the Australian IWC Commissioner announced a policy shift from "the
conservative utilisation ofwhale stocks to ... banning [ali] whaling". Pointing to the Frost Report,
92/d.,p.204.
93/d.,p.189.
94/d.,p.205.
95/d.
96"Ministerial Statementon Whalesand Whaling,Australia,Houseof Representatives,4 Aprill979, available at:
http://www.unimelb.edu.aulmalcolmfraser/speeches/parliamentary/whaling…
m (llast checked on l Jul2013).
91/d. -48-
he explained that this new policy was based on the belief that "whales have the potential of high
intelligence" 98•
32. lt was obvious that Australia could not force whaling nations to adopt a new
Anti-Whaling Convention. Thus, the most expedient strategy was to ban whaling by hijacking the
IWC. This could be achieved by imposing a permanent ban disguised as a temporary moratorium.
The Scientific Committee was of the view that sorne stocks could be sustainably harvested based
on improved management procedures. But the anti-whaling nations pushed for a blanket
moratorium. The Schedule amendment procedure could be used to achieve this because it was
legally binding. But this required a three-quarters majority ofthose Contracting States voting.
33. Having failed to get sufficient votes between 1972 and 1974, sorne of the anti-whaling
nations and non-govemmental organizations initiated a takeover of the IWC through a sudden
expansion of its membership. Greenpeace explains that from 1979 "more and more countries
joined the IWC which had never been involved in whaling" and that "[t]his influx of membership
99
allowed the IWC to adopt a series of conservation measures" • One scholar observes that
Greenpeace "added at !east six new anti-whaling members from 1978 to 1982 through the paying
of annual dues ... [and] naming of commissioners to represent these countries, at an annual cost of
100
more than $150,000" •
34. The illustration at tab 19-5 shows the progression of this takeover by anti-whaling
nations. The first pie-chart shows IWC membership in 1970. It may be recalled that the 1970s
coincided with both a significant decrease in commercial whaling and increased IWC regulation.
Nations in favour of sustainable whaling are indicated in green and anti-whaling nations of course
in red, together with numbers and percentages of each relative to the total membership. The second
pie-chart shows the membership in 1979, when anti-whaling nations had a slight majority but not
the three-quarters required for Schedule amendments. And finally, the third pie-chart shows the
90pening statement by the Australian Commissioner, 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC, London, July 1979;
CMJ, Ann. 164.
9Greenpeace, "The International Whaling Commission considers reopening commercial whaling", available at:
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/oceans/whale-defenders/iwc/ (last checked on 1July 2013)
10Eiizabeth de Sombre, "Distorting Global Governance: Membership, Voting, and the IWC", in
Robert L. Friedheim (ed.), Toward a sustainable whaling regime (2001), p. 187. -49-
membership in 1982, when anti-whaling nations had more than doubled, giving them the
three-quarters majority required for imposing the moratorium.
35. In 1980, in view of this impending take-over, Canada protested that "a moratorium on ali
commercial whaling, not based on scientific grounds, is inconsistent with the express purposes and
101
with Article V of the Convention" • Canada withdrew its membership the following year, citing
102
"the changing composition and operations of the IWC" •
36. In 1982, the commercial whaling moratorium was adopted by just one vote over the
required majority as an amendment contained in paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule. lt provided that
"catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from ali stocks for the 1986 coastal
and the 1985/86 pelagie seasons and thereafter shall be zero" 103• It expressly stated however, that
"[t]his provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at
the latest the Commission will ... consider modification of this provision and the establishment of
other catch limits" (emphasis added). Sorne anti-whaling nations emphasized that this was not "a
104
total ban" but just "a temporary interruption of the activity" • But Australia had a different
agenda.
37. Japan, Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union, exercised their right to abject against the
moratorium under Article V (3) (a) of the Convention. Japan however, removed this objection,
believing in good faith that the moratorium was a temporary measure that would be reviewed by
1990 "based upon the best scientific advice". Japan focused instead on contributing to scientific
research, consistent with paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule and the Scientific Committee's work. lt
resolved to collect scientific data for estimating biological parameters required for stock
management of the Antarctic minke whale. Thus, scientific whaling in the context of the Schedule
was for the specifie purpose of resuming commercial whaling on a sustainable basis.
38. This however, would not come to pass for the 30 years that followed. Science-based
sustainable whaling, the very purpose of the Convention, became increasingly politicized. For
101
Verbatim Record of the 32nd !WC Annual Meeting, pp. 59-61.
102
Department of External Affairs Communique, "Canada withdraws from the International Whaling Convention
and Commission" 26 June 1981.
103
Schedule, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, para. 10 (e)
10Verbatim Record, 34th !WC Annual Meeting, p. 82. -50-
Australia, there was no room for compromise. The moratorium had to become a permanent ban.
By extension, lethal sampling in support of sustainable whaling also had to stop. Bath the purpose
and the means of scientific whaling had to be defeated.
39. The former United States IWC Commissioner, Professor William Aron noted that the
moratorium "marked a significant change: instead of trying to force the IWC to comply with the
convention and support only sustainable whaling, the anti-whaling majority was trying to force the
commission to tlout it" 105•
IV. Australia's policy of defeating science-based sustainable
whaling at the IWC
40. 1 will now turn to Australia's policy, post-moratorium, of defeating the resumption of
science-based sustainable whaling. As 1will explain, this policy of "no compromise" has brought
the IWC to the brink of collapse.
41. Allow me first to address the claim in Australia's Memorial that: "[i]t was no
coïncidence that Japan only started to issue special permits ... immediately after the moratorium
106
on whaling for commercial purposes came into effect ... in May 1987" • Japan agrees with
Australia that it was no coïncidence. JARPA was necessary exact!y because scientific data could
no longer be acquired incidental to commercial whaling. The Scientific Committee had opposed a
blanket moratorium in the 1970s because it would "bring about a reduction in the amount of
research whereas there was a prime need for a substantial increase in research activity" 107• It had
called instead for "a decade of intensified research on cetaceans" in support of sustainable whaling.
Even the Frost Report had noted that a ban on commercial whaling would result in "the loss of data
for research" 108•
42. The Court may recall that on two occasions, Australia used this graph, at tab 19-6, in
support ofits case. But it only tells halfthe story. Ifit is contrasted with this graph, at tab 19-7, of
10WilliamAron, WilliamBurke,and MiltonFreeman,"Fiouting the Convention",TheAtlantic(May 1999).
106
MA,para. 1.4.
107
Chairman'sReportof the 24th IWCAnnualMeetingin 1972,pp. 5-6.
10Frost Report,Vol. 1,p. 205. -51 -
the pre-moratorium catch, it starkly demonstrates the sequence and difference in scale, between
commercial and scientific whaling. Australia's conspiracy theory is wholly without merit.
43. But what is a truly remarkable distortion of the facts is Australia's statement in these
hearings that "Japan does not like the RMP" whereas Australia endorses it as "a robust and widely
109
supported management procedure" • Australia completely ignores its long-standing and explicit
policy of blocking the RMP's adoption. lts implementation is tantamount to lifting the
moratorium, which Australia totally opposes. Assuming it is not merely a litigation tactic, Japan
welcomes Australia's new policy.
44. The RMP was developed over a decade from 1982 to its unanimous adoption by the
Scientific Committee in 1992. The Chair of the Commission later described it as: "the most
advanced method for the conservation and management of a natural resource", concluding that it
110
would allow "catches ofsome stocks ofminke whales" • However, when it came before the IWC
in 1992 and 1993, it was squarely rejected by the IWC anti-whaling majority, including Australia.
45. The whaling nations that had complied in good faith with the moratorium felt betrayed.
In 1992, Iceland withdrew from the IWC. Its Fisheries Minister explained that white "the IWC was
set up both to conserve and exploit whales ... in recent years it has switched solely to conserving
them. This change gives Iceland the right to leave" 111• Iceland would re-join the IWC ten years
later. But it would do so with a reservation to the moratorium on commercial whaling.
Furthermore, having realized in 1992 that the anti-whaling majority would not allow the IWC to
manage sustainable whaling, lceland joined Norway, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, to establish
a parallel regional organization: the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, or NAMMCO.
46. The fallout escalated further. A year after Iceland's withdrawal, in 1993, the Chair ofthe
Scientific Committee, Professor Philip Hammond of the United Kingdom, resigned in protest. He
bluntly asked: "what is the point of having a Scientific Committee if its unanimous
10CR 2013/9, p. 22, para. 30 (Sands).
11Extract from the Chair's Proposais for a way forward on the RMS- Preface to Chair's Proposais: Why an
RMS is needed. http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/tihtvmg9n6880gco0okssgsk/56-26%20Preface…
df Clast checked on
1July 2013).
11"Ice1and goes it alone on whaling", New Scienlist (15 Feb. 1992):
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg13318081.300-iceland-goes-it-a1on…(last checked on
1July 2013). -52-
112
recommendations on a matter of primary importance are treated with such contempt?" His
resignation symbolized the open confrontation between science and politics at the IWC.
47. In 1994, the anti-whaling nations finally relented and allowed the Commission to accept
the RMP but with qualifications that made the seeming compromise an illusion. In 1992, Australia
had co-sponsored a resolution calling for "additional steps" before the RMP's implementation 113•
114
This so-called Revised Management Scheme or RMS imposed onerous requirements • The
resolution demanded that until there is agreement on ali its aspects, "the Catch Limit Algorithm
should not be implemented". In 1997, Australia suddenly reversed course, stating that "its position
is one of seeking an end to whaling, and [that] it will not support the RMS or engage in the
debate" 115• Between the adoption ofthe RMP in 1994 and 2006, theRMS was discussed at no less
than 52 meetings. Although Australia was absent from most of this scientific work, it was active in
deprecating it before the Commission.
48. Of course, Australia's withdrawal from the RMS deliberations in 1997 was not a
coincidence. lt was in May of that year that a National Task Force on Whaling established by the
Govemment had issued its much publicized Report entitled: "A Universal Metaphor: Australia's
Opposition to Commercial Whaling" 116• Building on the Frost Report, its premise was that "there
is no need for whales to be killed to provide food" based on the belief that "whaling is inherent!y
117
cruel and inhumane" •
49. The Task Force had recommended that: "Australia should oppose and vote against any
proposai to adopt the Revised Management Scheme (RMS) by resolution or to incorporate the
RMS or Revised Management Procedure (RMP) into the Schedule." 118 lt also called on Australia
to seek a prohibition against "special permit (scientific) whaling" 11• Like the 1979 Frost Report,
12
CMJ, para. 3.82.
13
IWC Resolution 1996-6.
114
IWC Resolution 1992-3.
JJSCMJ,Ann. 57; Chairman's Report of the 49th Annual Meeting, p. 36.
116
A Universal Metaphor: Australia's Opposition to Commercial Whaling: Report of the National Task Force on
Whaling, (Canberra: Environment Australia, 1997) http:/1155.187.3.82/coasts/publications/whaling/index.html (last
checked on 1July 2013).
117
Id., p. vii.
uaIbid.,p.xi.
9
llIbid.,p. x. -53-
the 1997Task Force Report was adopted as policy by the Government. lt was thus no surprise that
Australia would undermine both the RMP and the RMS. Perhaps this brief history explains why
Japan was astonished at Australia's sudden endorsement of the RMP at this hearing. If this reflects
a genuine change in policy, it is certainly welcomed by Japan.
50. By 2004, ten years after the adoption of the RMP, and more than 20 years after the
adoption of the moratorium, the IWC Chair, Henrik Fischer of Denmark, finally presented an RMS
"package" to the Commission. He explained that its adoption "is essential for the credibility of the
IWC" 12• His plea for compromise feil on deaf ears. Having ignored theRMS deliberations since
1997, Australia suddenly reappeared in 2004, only to state categorically that it "will not endorse a
121
Revised Management Scheme should one be agreed" • Australian Environment Minister,
Senator lan Campbell, made it clear that even defeating the RMS was not enough. In 2005, just
before the Jaunching of JARPA Il, he stated that Australia wanted to close the "loophole in the
122
[Convention] which allows whales to be killed for 'science"' • Thus, while admitting that Japan
was allowed to pursue scientific whaling, Minister Campbell made clear Australia's strong
123
objection to "ali forms", "ali forms of scientific and commercial whaling" •
51. Amidst this assault on Japan's scientific research, the Scientific Committee's exasperated
Chair, Professor Judy Zeh of the United States, openly complained that "she was disturbed by the
124
way the Scientific Committee's deliberations were misrepresented" by sorne IWC delegations •
Australian intransigence and IWC's possible collapse
52. Australia's intransigence and politicization of science has brought the IWC to the brink
of collapse. Australia has made much of the IWC resolutions adopted by the anti-whaling
12Extract from the Chair's Proposais for a way forward on the RMS- Preface to Chair's Proposais: Why an
RMS is needed http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/tihtvmg9n6880gco0okssgsk/56-26%20Preface.
pdf, last checked on
1July 2013.
12"Responses to the questionnaire related to the 'cali for comments/positions on key issues in relation to the
Chair's proposais for a way forward on theRMS"', IWC/N04/RSWG4, p. 6.
12Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia Appeals to Japan to Reconsider its 'Scientific' Whale Slaughter,"
Press Release, 8 Nov. 2005, available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/medialnews/2005/australia-appeals-to-japan-
to
reconsider-its-scientific-whale-slaughter, last checked on 1July 2013; emphasis added.
12Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia taking strong action to protect whales", available at:
http://www.antarctica.gov.au/medialnews/2006/australia-taking-strong-act
ion-to-protect-whlast, checked on
1July 2013.
12CMJ, Ann. 60, Chairman's Report of the 52nd Annual Meeting, p. 44. -54-
majority. But it omits to mention those adopted when the anti-whaling block was a minority
125
amidst the shifting sands of IWC politics. For instance, the 2006 St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration
stated rather bluntly that "the IWC can be saved from collapse" only by adopting the RMP. It
called for "normalising the functions of the IWC", "respect for cultural diversity and traditions of
coastal peoples", and "the need for science-based policy and rulemaking".
53. In 2007, it was agreed to discuss "The Future of the IWC" with a view to achieving a
consensus solution. In 2009, a Support Group was established as part of a confidence-building
process aimed at adopting a consensus solution. Its distinguished Chair was Sir Geoffrey Palmer,
IWC Commissioner and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, and its members included
Australia, Japan, Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Cameroon, Germany, Iceland, Mexico, St. Kitts and
Nevis, Sweden and the United States.
54. On 20 February 2010, just as a consensus proposai was within reach, Australian
Prime Minister Rudd warned visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Okada that if special permit
whaling continued, Australia would take Japan to the Court. Given the timing, it was difficult not
to conclude that this threat was intended to kilt any hope of an IWC consensus.
55. Australia filed its Application on 31 May 2010, 20 days before the IWC's 2010 Annual
Meeting in Agadir, Morocco. Sorne days earlier, on Il May 2010, the IWC Chair,
Cristian Maquieira of Chile and the Vice-Chair, Anthony Liverpool of Antigua and Barbuda, had
presented a "Proposed Consensus Decision to lmprove the Conservation of Whales" 126• They had
127
also issued a Press Release with the rather explicit title of: "If you really care about whale
conservation- give our proposai a fair reading". In a desperate plea, they warned of "the possible
collapse of the IWC" and emphasized that the confrontational "status quo is not an option for an
effective multilateral organisation".
56. The consensus proposai however, was dead on arrivai. Almost immediately after it was
circulated by the IWC Chair, the new Australian Environment Minister Peter Garrett said that "it
12SCMJ,Ann. 60, "St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration", Resolution 2006-1, Ann. C, Chair's Report of the
58th Annual Meeting,Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 20p. 68.
126
"Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales", available at:
http://iwc.int/index.php?ciD=752&cType=document, last checked on 1July 2013.
127
Revised Press Release: IWC Chair and Vice-Chair; "If you really care about whale conservatgive our
proposai a fairading", http://iwc.int/index.php?ciD=50&cType=document&download=l, last checked on 1July 2013. -55-
was now time to close the door on the Proposed Consensus Decision" 12• He rejected the
compromise because it failed to close what he described as the Article VIII "loophole" and
demanded that Japan "immediate[ly] hait" scientific whaling 12• Amidst the ruins of his hard work,
the Chair of the Support Group, Sir Geoffrey Palmer of New Zealand, "paid tribute" to the United
States "for its . .. leadership" and 1 quote, "to Japan for their huge commitment and their
willingness for compromise" 13• lt was against this backdrop that Australia came before the Court
in 2010, accusing Japan of bad faith.
57. lt is opportune to say a word here about "collective regulation", which is a theme in both
Australia and New Zealand's pleadings. Japan accepts, of course, the obligations that flow from
membership in a treaty-based multilateral organization. The important question is what those
obligations are. The IWC is empowered to decide on certain issues, just as Contracting States are
permitted, by Article V (3), to opt out of the binding effect of such decisions. Yes, Contracting
States collectively consider what steps are appropriate for the proper conservation and the orderly
development of the whaling industry. But this is not a system in which the majority is empowered
to impose its will upon the minority, not !east if the majority is intent on defeating the fundamental
object and purpose of the treaty. lt would be as if an anti-navigation majority took over the
International Maritime Organization and banned ali navigation on the seas.
58. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the main victim of Australia's "no compromise"
"zero tolerance" policy has been the IWC. The attempt to impose what the Agent described as
Australia's "total" opposition to science-based sustainable commercial whaling has alienated
whaling nations and undermined future regulation. A notable example was the anti-whaling
block's rejection in 2012 of Denmark's request to slightly adjust Greenland's aboriginal
131
subsistence catch • In response, the exasperated Inuit people of Greenland decided to set their
128
Peter Garrett, "Whales worth more alive than dead", available at:
http://www.theage.eom.au/opinion/politics/whales-worth--more-alive-than… 100428-trc llast checked on
1July 2013.
129/bid.
130
IWC Chair's Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, p. 8.
13Chair's Report of the 64th Annual meeting 2-6 July 2012, p. 30. -56-
own quota in defiance of the IWC 13• They did so with the support of Denmark. They took their
business elsewhere, to a sustainable whaling organization that functions, to the North Atlantic
Marine Mammal Commission, NAMMCO, that, as 1 explained earlier, was established in 1992
when anti-whaling nations sabotaged the RMP and Iceland withdrew from the IWC. The report of
a 2006 workshop in Denmark explains why these whaling communities are creating an alternative
organization. In the words of the participants:
"NAMMCO is a totally different organisation with a very different attitude and
debate than what we have experienced in the International Whaling Commission
(IWC). The tendency in IWC has been that the hunter in sorne quarters is looked upon
as the 'enemy', whereas in NAMMCO the hunter has always been an important
133
co-player."
59. It may be asked whether Australia is "Saving the Whales" by bringing the IWC to the
brink of collapse? Even the former United States IWC Commissioner spoke of the "intransigence
of anti-whaling nations" that has degenerated the IWC into what he called "a science-free forum
for eco-posturing". He warned that in a world with far more serious challenges, "the example of an
international environmental agency politicizing itself into irrelevance is alarming" 13•
60. Surely, other nations may look at Australia's IWC campaign against Japan and wonder if
the treaty that they sign in good faith today will come back to haunt them tomorrow. Surely, even
more whaling nations will consider withdrawing from an increasingly dysfunctional organization.
Australia can best save the whales by saving the IWC. The choice is not between sustainable
whaling and no whaling at ali. The choice is between sustainable whaling and no regulation at ali.
V. The Scientific Committee's view on the scientific
merit of JARP A
61. I now turn to the fundamental question before the Court; namely, whether Japan is
acting in bad faith when it asserts that JARPA has a scientific purpose. In this regard, we agree
with Professor Sands that in tine with itsjurisprudence, the Court should draw on "findings of fact
13Government of Greenland, "Greenland Quotas for Big Whales", available at:
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Press-Statements/2013/0l/Wh
ales, last checked 2013.
13Report of the NAMMCO Workshop to Address the Problems of "Struck and Lost" in Seal, Walrus
and Whale Hunting, North Atlantic House, Copenhagen, Denmark, 14-16 Nov. 2006, p. 12:
http://www.nammco.no/webcronize/images/Nammco/818.pdf, last checked on 1July 2013.
13William Aron, William Burke, and Milton Freeman, "Flouting the Convention", The Atlantic, May 1999. -57-
135
made by third bodies, independent third bodies, third parties with no direct interest in the case" •
We agree further with him that the Scientific Committee is exactly such an "independent third
body". lt is after ali established for the specifie purpose of providing independent scientific advice
to the IWC. Where we disagree is his assertion that the Scientific Committee, and 1 quote, "has
never- never- offered any positive assessment of either program's contribution to the
·conservation and management ofwhales" 13•
62. Mr. President, Members of the Court, English is not my mother tangue, but it would
seem that "never" is a rather categorical ward. "Never say never" Charles Dickens wrote,
especially if an assertion is patently false. Professor Hamamoto will address the Scientific
Committee's findings at greater length. For present purposes, 1will provide just a few illustrative
examples ofwhat are clearly positive assessments of JARPA's scientific merit, shawn at tab 19-8.
63. These are sorne conclusions from the 1997 Mid-Term Review:
"JARPA ... has provided substantial improvement in the understanding of stock structure." 137
"JARPA data ... would allow estimation ofthe biological parameters with reasonable levels of
138
precision."
"There was general agreement that the data presented on stock structure, particularly the new
genetic data, were important contributions to the objectives of JARPA and stock
management." 139
64. These are sorne conclusions from the 2006 Review:
140
"[T]he JARPA dataset provides a valuable resource."
"The results of analyses of JARPA data could be used ... to increase the allowed catch of
141
minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere, without increasing depletion risk."
135
eR 2013/8, p. 62, para. 16(Sands).
136
eR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19(Sands).
13eMJ, para 4.159; "Report of the Scientific eommittee", Rep.int.Whai.Commn48, 1998, p. 103.
138/bid.
13eMJ, para. 4.34; Se/49/Rep1, 3.5.
14eMJ, para. 4.132; "Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit
Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic", Se/59/01, J. eetacean Res. Manage. pp 411-445, 5.5.
14eMJ, para. 4.161; ibid., 8.1. -58-
"considerable progress has been made in addressing the issue of stock structure" 142•
"[T]he JARPA dataset provides a valuable resource to allow investigation of sorne aspects of
143
the role ofwhales within the marine ecosystem."
65. There is yet more:
"[JARPA] has also resulted in a number of publications in the IWC Journals and in other
international peer-reviewed journals."
"[T]here have been 22 articles in Rep. !nt. Whal Commn and J. Cetacean Res Manage., and
58 articles in English languagejournals."
"[A] total of 182 scientific documents based on JARPA data have been presented to the IWC
Scientific Committee meetings." 144
66. And if this is not enough, at tab 19-9, here is a statement of the Scientific Committee
Chair from 2008:
"The Japanese input into cetacean research in the Antarctic is significant, and 1 would say
145
crucial for the Scientific Committee."
67. Against this record, it is difficult to understand how Professor Sands could stand before
this Court and assert that there has "never- never been any positive assessment" of JARPA by an
independent body. Indeed, the Scientific Committee reports are fatal to Australia's contention that
JARPA has had "no or negligible scientific results" 146•
68. lt should be noted further that JARPA II will be reviewed by the Scientific Committee
next year, in 2014, under its enhanced Annex P procedure, unanimously endorsed by the IWC.
Perhaps Australia's haste in coming before the Court is to try and pre-empt yet another positive
revtew.
69. It is telling that even staunchly anti-whaling IWC members recognize the scientific merit
of JARPA. A notable example is United States Ambassador David Balton, who testified before a
14CMJ, para. 4.53; ibid.8.1.1.
143
CMJ, para. 4.132; ibid.5.5.
144/bid.
14Arne Bjorge, President of the Scientific Committee at the time of this statement, 2008, quoted in CMJ,
para. 4.166.
14MA, para. 5.132. -59-
Congressional committee on 6 May 2010 that, and 1quote: "Japan does perfonn scientific research
on the whales they take, and probably have the best whale science as a result." 147
70. Instead of reliance on these unambiguous scientific reviews, Australia's oral pleadings
resembled an introductory seminar on scientific methodology. There were musings on hypotheses
about hypotheses, a quaint book on scientific masonry from 1905, an NGO-sponsored open letter in
the New York Times signed by environmental activists, and two expert witnesses whose authority
must be weighed against that of sorne 150 independent experts comprising the Scientific
Committee.
71. Mr. President, Members of the Court. We are not here to detennine if JARPA should
win the Nobel Prize for science. We are here only to detennine if it falls within the Article VIII
exception. We submit that no third party independent body is better situated than the Scientific
Committee to assess JARPA's scientific merit. We therefore invite the Court, consistent with the
line of cases referred to by Professor Sands -Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Pulp
Mills, and the Genocide Convention case- to rely substantially on the factual findings of the
Scientific Committee, as retlected in its official records. Those findings, we submit, leave no
doubt, no doubt whatsoever, asto the scientific merit of Japan's research program.
VI. Australia's case is about neither science nor
the Whaling Convention
72. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, Australia's case can best be described as "science
fiction". lt is perplexing to understand why it would bring such a manifestly untenable case against
Japan, a case that can easily be refuted by the Scientific Committee's official record.
73. It cannot go unnoticed in this regard that Professor Crawford went to great lengths to
distance Australia from Sea Shepherd's violent actions. He explained that "it is of no relevance to
the present case" and that "[t]he real reason for the Japanese Govemment's decision to reduce
148
target catches is ... the sharp decrease in domestic demand for whale meat in Japan" • Of course,
14U.S. Leadership in the International Whaling Commission and H.R. 2455, the International Whale
Conservation and Protection Act of2009: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Asia, theifie and the Global Environment of the Committee Foreign
Affairs, Housef Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, May 6, 2010, Seriai No. 111-95, p.f
29.
148
CR 2013/11, p. 20, para. 68 (Crawford). -60-
once again, the Scientific Committee would disagree. Its 2013 Report recognized that "research
activities were interrupted severa! times by the Sea Shepherd, which directed violent sabotage
149
activities against Japanese research vessels" • The so-called "business mode!" argument is also
easily refuted as Professor Iwasawa will explain in his presentation. The Japanese chef in the
Tokyo restaurant would tell Professor Crawford that under Article VIII (2) of the Convention,
Japan is obligated to sell the meat rather than dumping it into the sea. The Australian tourist seated
in the next table would add that his Government uses the same self-financing mode! for its fisheries
scientific research. Leaving these issues aside, the insistence that Sea Shepherd is irrelevant to this
case is rather intriguing.
74. Sea Shepherd's violent actions have been repeatedly condemned by the IWC and the
International Maritime Organization. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has
labelled it as "eco-terrorism" 150• On 25 February 2013, the United States Court of Appeal for the
Ninth Circuit held that the Sea Shepherd attacks against Japanese research vessels are, and I quote,
151
"the very embodiment of piracy" under international law • There is currently an Interpol Red
Notice against its notorious founder, Paul Watson, for multiple criminal charges in different
75. A quick glanee at the Sea Shepherd website demonstrates what is a private army used to
wage war against Japanese research vessels on the high seas, using Australia as a base. The image
before you, and at tab 19-10, is entitled "Operation Zero Tolerance" and refers to a fleet of "four
ships", "drones", "helicopters", and "new tactics". A little below you will see that this year's
"Operation Zero Tolerance" was launched from the Australian port of Williamstown, using ships
registered in Australia and the Netherlands. This sampie photo, at tab 19-11, demonstrates one
such ship, named after the Hollywood celebrity Bob Barker, attacking Japanese research vessels in
February of this year in Antarctic waters.
149 tana·
sc, 2013,~7.2 JA.RPA;Il, p. 79.
15
°Federal Bureau of Investigations, "The Threat of Eco-Tourism", available at:
http://www.tbi.gov/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism, last checked on 1July 2013.
151
/nstitute ofCetacean Research et al v Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Opinion, US Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Feb. 2013, p. 6, available at: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2013/02/25/1235266.pdf,
last checked on 1July013.
15"1NTERPOL Red Notice issued for Paul Watson at Japan's request", available at:
http://www.internol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2012/N2012091
4, last checkedJuly 2013. -62-
tactics ... "15• He had also "urged thousands of Australians to vote for [Prime Minister] Rudd" in
157
the August 2010 federal elections because he "promised to take Japan to court" • Indeed, on
29 April2010, just a month before the Application was filed, an opinion poli had asked whether
"the Rudd government has done enough to stop commercial whaling?" Eighty-seven per cent
responded "no" and agreed that "it's time for the government to finally take international legal
action" 158•
80. Now Australia's motives for bringing this case may or may not be legally relevant. But
it cannot go unnoticed that prior to this case, senior Australian officiais openly admitted that
Japan's scientific whaling was within its rights under Article VIII. When asked about potential
litigation in 2006, the Environment Minister of the previous Government, Senator lan Campbell,
endorsed the view of New Zealand's IWC Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, as follows- and I
quote here from the Australian Antarctic Division website, which is at tab 19-14:
"We have been looking at the legal theories that are available against the
Japanese for sorne months ... and there is no legal theory that is available that can
159
prevent, in our view, the Japanese from doing what they are doing."
81. Minister Campbell and Sir Geoffrey were by no means alone in this assessment. The
following year, in August 2007, the Australian Minister of Defence, Dr. Brendan Nelson, stated in
the House of Representatives that: "although we find it objectionable, scientific whaling is
160
permissible under the Whaling Convention" • Perhaps it was put best by Australia's former IWC
Commissioner, Peter Bridgewater, who wrote in a 2012 Opinion Editorial that: "[i]t may not feel
161
good but the Japanese are largely right" •
156
"Sea Shepherd Urges Australia to Take Legal Action against Japanese Whalers", available at:
http://www.seashepherd.it/news-and-media/news-090120-3.html (last checked on 1 July 2013).
157
Paul Watson, "The Sea Shepherd Dilemma Down Under", available at: http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and
media/2009/I0/06/the-sea-shepherd-dilemma-down-under-293 (last checked on 1 July 2013).
158
Peter Garrett, "Whales worth more alive than dead", available at:
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/whales-worth-imore-alive-than… 100428-trc l.html (last checked on
1 July 2013).
15http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2006/australia-tak ing-strong-action-to-protect-whale(last checked
on 1July 2013).
16House of Representatives, Question No. 5013, 7 August 2007, p. 167.
16Peter Bridgewater, "Australia's anti-whaling lobby is missing the point", 2 March 2012, available at:
http://www.smh.eom.au/opinion/austral ias-antiwhaling-lobby-is-missing-the-point012030 1-1u5nr.html?skin=text-only
(last checked on 1 July 2013). - 61 -
76. Now 1 would imagine that Sea Shepherd would be very disappointed at
Professor Crawford's suggestion that they are of no relevance to Japan's reduced catch this year.
As shown at tab 19-12, their website triumphantly states: "[t]his was Japan's most disastrous
whaling season ever. Congratulations to Sea Shepherd Australia for leading such a successful
153
Antarctic whaling campaign." Just below you will see a red tab inviting supporters to "Donate
Now". Minimizing Sea Shepherd's relevance as Professor Crawford has done is clearly unhelpful
for their fund-raising campaign.
77. lt would seem that Sea Shepherd's influence in Australia is considerable. In a
22 May 2012 statement, former Environment Minister, lan Campbell, hailed the fugitive
Mr. Watson, as "one of the world's greatest environmental activists". Remarkably, as indicated at
tab 19-13, he admitted on the Sea Shepherd website that: "1was proud to support Captain Watson
154
when 1was a Cabinet Minister in the national govemment of Australia" • Senator Campbell is
currently on the Advisory Board of Sea Shepherd, together with other influential Australian
political figures. It would seem that Australia has outsourced Antarctic maritime enforcement to
Sea Shepherd.
78. This brings me to Sea Shepherd's broader relevance to this case. On the first day of this
hearing, a Sea Shepherd representative spoke to joumalists outside this courtroom. He proudly
claimed that the opening of this case "was a vindication of the group's controversial tactics" in
attacking Japanese shipsJSS.
79. In 2009, Mr. Watson had made what he called "an offer" to the Australian Govemment
"to take legal action against the Japanese whalers". He had stated publicly that "[i]f Australia or
New Zealand ... can agree to take legal action, Sea Shepherd will agree to back off our aggressive
153
"Sea Shepherd Commentary on the Cruise Report of the Japanese Whale Research Program Under Special
Permit in the Antarctic- Second Phase (JARPA Il) in 2012/2013", available at:
http://www.seashepherd.org.au/commentary-and-editorials/2013/06/13/sea-s
hepherd-views-on-the-cruise-report-of-the
japanese-whale-research-program-613 (last checked1July 2013).
15"Letter From the Former Minister of the Environment of Australia Senator lan Campbell to the President and
Environment Ministerof Costa Rica", available at: http://www.seashepherd.orglnews-and-media/2012/05/22/letter-from
the-former-minister-of-the-environment-of-australia-senator-ian-campbell
-1383 (last checked on).
15Mike Corder, "Japanese Whaling Ban Urged By Australia in Highest U.N. Court", available at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 13/06/26/japanese-whaling-ban n 3502842.html?utm hp ref=green (Jast checked on
1July 2013). -63-
82. So, it may be asked, what new theory emerged from one Government to the next to
justify a case against Japan? As 1have explained, this case is plainly not about the scientific merit
of JARPA. lt is about an emotional anti-whaling moral crusade that in the name of "zero
tolerance", tolerates Sea Shepherd's violent extremism, the politicization of science, the collapse of
the IWC, and now before this Court, baseless accusations of bad faith against Japan.
83. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Australia's position on lethal sampling is
absolutely clear. lts IWC Commissioner has stated in categorical terms that Australia is "opposed
162
to any research that involves the killing of whales" • Its Agent in this proceeding has said, just
beyond the confines of this hall, that: "You don't even need to kill one whale to conduct scientific
research." 163This position cannat possibly be reconciled with the plain terms of Article VIII of the
Convention.
84. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the days of civilizing missions and moral crusades
are over. In a world with diverse civilizations and traditions, international law cannat become an
instrument for imposing the cultural preference of sorne at the expense of others. Whether
JARPA II offends Australian public opinion or not, it is clearly within Japan's rights under
Article VIII of the Convention.
85. That concludes my presentation and Japan's pleadings for today. 1thank the Court for its
patience and indulgence.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Akhavan. However, today's sitting does not
conclude with your presentation. Two Members of the Court have questions to put to Australia or
Japan. To that end, 1 shall now give the floor to Judge Greenwood. Judge Greenwood, if you
please.
Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, my question is
for Australia but also for New Zealand.
162
Verbatim Records ofthe JWC, 1989, p. 131.
163
Associated Press, "Australiato World Court: Ban Japanese Whaling", 26 June 2013, availabie at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/australia-world-court-ban-japanese-whali… (last checked on 1 July -64-
"What is the precise legal basis on which it is said that Japan has a legal
obligation arising from the recommendations contained in resolutions of the IWC, and
what is the precise content of that obligation?"
Mr. President, obviously 1 do not expect an answer from Australia until its second round
presentation, but 1ask the question now so that New Zealand has a chance to give its observations
and also, of course, 1look forward to any comment Japan wishes to make in their second round.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Greenwood. 1 shall now give the floor to
Judge Donoghue. Judge Donoghue, you have the floor.
Judge DONOGHUE: Thank you, Mr. President. 1have two related questions and they are
bath addressed to Japan. My first question is:
"What analysis of the feasibility of non-lethal methods did Japan conduct prior
to the settingof sample sizes for each year of JARPA Il?"
And my second question is:
"How did any such analysis bear on those sample sizes?"
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Japan is invited to reply orally to the question if possible
during the first round of oral argument, and Australia will be free during its second round of oral
argument to comment on the reply of Japan. Should Japan require more time to prepare the answer
to the question, and answers the question during the second round of oral argument, then the Court
will determine the procedure for Australia having the opportunity to comment.
As there is no more business for today, this meeting is closed and the Court will meet again
tomorrow on Wednesday 3 July at 10.00 a.m. to hear the continuation of Japan's first round of oral
argument. The sitting is closed.
TheCourtroseat 6p.m.
Audience publique tenue le mardi 2 juillet 2013, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire relative à la Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique (Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Zélande (intervenant))