Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2007/3
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2007
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 7 March 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2007
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 7 mars 2007, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans
la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieigtgins
Vice-Prsi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Judges ad hoc TorresBernárdez
Gaja
Couevrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident
RanMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
BeTroresz.
jugesaja, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the Republic of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassa dor of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Samuel Santos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua,
Mr.Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Member of the International
Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit interna tional, Distinguished Fellow, All Souls College,
Oxford,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Research Associate, Neth erlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht
University,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.Robin Cleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, F. G.S., Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
Mr. Dick Gent, Law of the Sea Consultant, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
as Scientific and Technical Advisers;
MsTania Elena Pacheco Blandino, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsNadine Susani, Doctor of Public Law, Centre de droit international de Nanterre(CEDIN),
University of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Assistant Advisers;
Ms Gina Hodgson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Ana Mogorrón Huerta,
as Assistants.
The Government of the Republic of Honduras is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Max Velásquez Díaz, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the French Republic,
H.E. Mr. Roberto Flores Bermúdez, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the United States
of America,
as Agents; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Arguëllo Gómez, ambassad eur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Samuel Santos, ministre des affaires étrangères de la République du Nicaragua,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la
Commission du droit international, professeur ém érite de droit international public (chaire
Chichele) à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international,Distinguished
fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, research associate à l’Institut néerlandais du droit de la mer de
l’Université d’Utrecht,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris X- Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad autónoma de Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Robin Cleverly, M.A., DPhil, CGeol, F.G.S., consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty
Consultancy Services,
M. Dick Gent, consultant en droit de la mer, Admiralty Consultancy Services,
comme conseillers scientifiques et techniques ;
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, premier secrétaire de l’ambassade de la République du
Nicaragua au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Nadine Susani, docteur en droit public, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Université de Paris X-Nanterre,
comme conseillers adjoints ;
Mme Gina Hodgson, ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Ana Mogorrón Huerta,
commaessistantes .
Le Gouvernement de la République du Honduras est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Max Velásquez Díaz, ambassadeur de la République du Honduras auprès de la
République française,
S. Exc. M. Roberto Flores Bermúdez, ambassad eur de la République du Honduras auprès des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme agents ; - 6 -
H.E. Mr.Julio Rendón Barnica, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
MrP.ierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor of Public International Law, University of Paris
(Panthéon-Assas), and the European University Institute in Florence,
Mr. Luis Ignacio Sánchez Rodríguez, Professor of International Law, Universidad Complutense de
Madrid,
Mr.Christopher Greenwood, C.M.G., Q.C., Profess or of International Law, London School of
Economics and Political Science,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London,
Mr.Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de dr oit international à l’Université de ParisI
Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr. David A. Colson, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green & MacRae, LL.P., Washington, D.C., member of the
California State Bar and District of Columbia Bar,
Mr. Carlos Jiménez Piernas, Professor of International Law, Universidad de Alcalá, Madrid,
Mr. Richard Meese, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Milton Jiménez Puerto, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Honduras,
H.E. Mr.Eduardo Enrique Reina García, Deputy Mini ster for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Honduras,
H.E. Mr. Carlos López Contreras, Ambassador, National Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr.Roberto Arita Quiñónez, Ambassador, Director of the Special Bureau on Sovereignty
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. Mr. José Eduardo Martell Mejía, Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras to the Kingdom of
Spain,
H.E. Mr. Miguel Tosta Appel, Ambassador, Chairm an of the Honduran Demarcation Commission,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
H.E. MsPatricia Licona Cubero, Ambassador, Advi ser for Central American Integration Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Ms Anjolie Singh, Assistant, University College London, member of the Indian Bar,
Ms Adriana Fabra, Associate Professor of International Law, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, - 7 -
S. Exc. M. Julio Rendón Barnica, ambassadeur de la République du Honduras auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur de droit in ternational public à l’Université de Paris
(Panthéon-Assas) et à l’Institut universitaire européen de Florence,
M. Luis Ignacio Sánchez Rodríguez, professeur de droit international à l’Université Complutense
de Madrid,
M. Christopher Greenwood, C.M.G., Q.C., professeur de droit international à la London School of
Economics and Political Sciences,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres,
M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur émérite de droit international à l’Université ParisI
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M. David A. Colson, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., membre du
barreau de l’Etat de Californie et du barreau du district de Columbia,
M. Carlos Jiménez Piernas, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Alcalá (Madrid),
M. Richard Meese, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
S. Exc. M. Milton Jiménez Puerto, ministre des affaires étrangères de la République du Honduras,
S. Exc. M. Eduardo Enrique Reina García, vice-mi nistre des affaires étrangères de la République
du Honduras,
S. Exc. M. Carlos López Contreras, ambassadeu r, conseiller national au ministère des affaires
étrangères,
S. Exc. M. Roberto Arita Quiñónez, ambassadeur, directeur du bureau spécial pour les affaires de
souveraineté du ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. M. José Eduardo Martell Mejía, ambass adeur de la République du Honduras auprès du
Royaume d’Espagne,
S. Exc. M. Miguel Tosta Appel, ambassadeur, président de la commission hondurienne de
démarcation du ministère des affaires étrangères,
S. Exc. Mme Patricia Licona Cubero, ambassad eur, conseiller pour les affaires d’intégration
d’Amérique Centrale du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Anjolie Singh, assistante au University College de Londres, membre du barreau indien,
Mme Adriana Fabra, professeur associé de dro it international à l’Université autonome de
Barcelone, - 8 -
Mr. Javier Quel López, Professor of International Law, Universidad del País Vasco,
Ms Gabriela Membreño, Assistant Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Sergio Acosta, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Honduras in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Assistant Advisers;
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
Mr. Thomas D. Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Advisers. - 9 -
M. Javier Quel López, professeur de droit international à l’Université du Pays basque,
Mme Gabriela Membreño, conseiller adjoint du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Sergio Acosta, ministre conseiller à l’amba ssade de la République du Honduras au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers adjoints ;
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
M. Thomas D. Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseillers techniques. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The session is open. The Court meets again for the
continuation of the case of Nicaragua. You have the floor, Mr. Brownlie.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Madam President. Madam President, Members of the Court,
yesterday I had completed the question of rele vant circumstances and I move on now to the
proposal of a median line by Honduras.
The equidistance line proposed by Honduras in the Rejoinder
190. In the Rejoinder, Honduras proposes an e quidistance line or, what purports to be an
equidistance line. The purpose is stated to be that this line is substantially more to the advantage of
Honduras than the “traditional line” claimed in her Counter-Memorial (RH, para. 8.19).
191. This “equidistance line” is described as follows:
“Plate 48 [which is reproduced here as graphic IB40] shows the Honduran line
together with the equidistance line. Due to the unstable character of the mouth of the
River Coco, the initial segment is a simplif ied equidistance line that runs from the
point established by the 1962 Mixed Commission to the tripoint with Honduras’ Bobel
Cay and Nicaragua’s Edinburgh Cay. Ther eafter the equidistance line is constructed
using standard methods.”
And the Rejoinder continues,
“As can be seen, the equidistance line will leave the mainland and trend in an
east-southeast direction south of 14°59.8'N latitude to a point that is approximately
14.8 nautical miles off the mainland coast. At this point, Nicaragua’s rocks begin to
turn the equidistance line back to the north and east. However, it never goes north of
14° 59.8' N latitude. Further east, the eastward position of Honduras’ South Cay takes
over and pushes the equidistance line further south-eastward. One would expect that
if Honduras were to advance the strict equidistance line as its preferred boundary
method, Nicaragua would object and say that the equidistance line developed from
Honduran islands north of 15° N latitude cuts off the projection of the eastward facing
coastal front of Nicaragua.” (RH, pp. 130-131, paras. 8.17-8.18.)
192. This line is introduced by Honduras as “a provisional equidistance” line (para.8.16).
For Honduras to describe the line as a provisional median line between the States of Nicaragua and
Honduras is totally misleading; the constructi on of the line totally ignores the entire mainland
coasts of both States. The line, so far as it is calculated, is a median line between a subjective
choice of minute cays lying in excess of 25 miles to seaward of the mainland coast. The positions
of these cays are dubious, being almost entirely b ased on nineteenthcentury surveys and, indeed,
the status of these cays as rock or island features is by no means certain. The choice of cays does - 11 -
not appear to include all the available structur es and the base points used are picked on the high
waterline of the cays, not the charted low waterlin e of the surrounding reefs. In all respects, the
Honduran line fails the criteria needed to describe it as a median line.
193. At a rather arbitrary point in this construction between cays of dubious position and
disputed sovereignty, where the entrance to the river Coco is at the same distance as the high-water
line of the nearest cays, the constructed median line has been abandoned and the line is simply
joined to the 1962 Mixed Commission point in the river mouth. Thus the construction is
misleading, based solely on the dubious selecti on of minute cays, ignoring the low waterline and
bearing no relationship at all to the actual coasts of either State.
194. The median line, whether provisional or not, must be a rigorous calculation based on
valid base points from either side, even where the coast is potentially unstable. By any standards,
an examination of the mainland coasts clearly i ndicates that a line equidistant from both baselines
will depart from the mouth of the river in a north-easterly direction and continue in such a direction
if only the mainland base points are considered. It is only under the influence of questionable,
minute cays some 25 to 42 miles off the coast that this north-easterly direction can be deflected to
the east and further out, to the south-east.
195. In conclusion, the line introduced by Honduras does not satisfy the legal and
hydrographic criteria of validity of a line described as an “equidistance line”.
Some incidental questions
196. Before setting out my conclusions, there are some incidental questions to be dealt with.
(a) The median line as a provisional line
197. The first such question concerns the standard methodology adopted by the Court in the
delimitation of a single maritime boundary. The method was described in the Judgment in the
Cameroon v. Nigeria case. In the words of the Court:
“The Court has on various occasions made it clear what the applicable criteria,
principles and rules of delimitation are when a line covering several zones of
coincident jurisdictions is to be determin ed. They are expressed in the so-called
equitable principles/relevant circumstances method. This method, which is very
similar to the equidistance/special circumst ances method applicable in delimitation of
the territorial sea, involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering - 12 -
whether there are factors calling for the adjust ment or shifting of that line in order to
achieve an ‘equitable result’.” (Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 441, para. 288.)
The Court then reviews the relevant passages in the Judgments in the Jan Mayen and
Qatar/Bahrain cases.
“Thus, in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between
Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), the Court, which had been asked to
draw a single maritime boundary, took the vi ew, with regard to delimitation of the
continental shelf, that
‘even if it were appropriate to appl y... customary law concerning the
continental shelf as developed in the decided cases, it is in accord with
precedents to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to
ask whether “special circumstances” require any adjustment or shifting of
that line’ (I.C.J. Reports 1993, Judgment, p. 61, para. 51).
In seeking to ascertain whether there were in that case factors which should
cause it to adjust or shift the median line in order to achieve an “equitable result”, the
Court stated:
‘[i]t is thus apparent that special circumstances are those circumstances
which might modify the result produced by an unqualified application of
the equidistance principle. General international law, as it has developed
through the case-law of the Court and arbitral jurisprudence, and through
the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
has employed the concept of “relevant circumstances”. This concept can
be described as a fact necessary to be taken into account in the
delimitation process.’ (Ibid, p. 62, para. 55.)
In the case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) the Court further stated that:
‘[f]or the delimitation of the maritime zones beyond the 12-mile zone it
[would] first provisionally draw an equidistance line and then consider
whether there [were] circumstances whic h must lead to an adjustment of
that line’ (I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 230).
The Court will apply the same method in the present case.” ( Land and
Maritime Boundary between Ca meroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 441-442, paras. 289-290.)
198. This methodology confirmed in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case is the standard approach
but, in parenthesis, it should be recalled that th e provisional drawing of a median line is not a
necessary or obligatory step in every case (see the Judgment in the case concerning Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), I.C.J. Reports
1993, p. 103, para. 51). - 13 -
199. In any event, there is no obvious reason wh y the standard judicial procedure should not
be applied mutatis mutandis in the present case. After all the bisector of angles is the alter ego of
equidistance, when the physical and political geography dictates a modified approach.
Accordingly, like the provisional equidistance line, the bisector is a provisional alignment which
may require adjustment in the light of the relevant circumstances.
(b) The perpendicular invoked by Honduras
200. There is a second incidental question which is raised by the Honduran thesis that the
parallel of latitude claim can be reproduced as a perpendicular to the general direction of the
coast.
201. In her Rejoinder Honduras plays with the coastal geography in order to reproduce her
claim to a parallel as a perpendicular to the gene ral direction of the eastward facing coast. The
precise argument is as follows:
“Of course, if Nicaragua insists, and wishes to impose the bisector method on
the local change in coastal direction at Cabo Gracias a Dios, using only the Honduran
and Nicaraguan coasts that face the area to be delimited in this case, the result is
instructive. For this purpose Plate42 in Ch apter6 may be recalled. As is clearly
shown by reference to that Figure, the bisector of the angle created by the Honduras’
coastal front from CapeFalso to Cabo Gracias a Dios and Nicaragua’s coastal front
from LagunaWano (de Bismuna) to Cabo GraciasaDios will closely approximate a
parallel of latitude.” (RH, para. 7.15.)
The Rejoinder continues:
“This is not surprising. Since Nicaragua’s LagunaWano (de Bismuna) and
Honduras’ CapeFalso are roughly the same distance from Cabo GraciasaDios, and
since they lie on approximately the same longitude, the exercise set forth in
paragraph7.15 above is the same as est ablishing the line that runs through Cabo
Gracias a Dios that is perpendicular to th e general direction of the coast connecting
CapeFalso with LagunaWano (de Bismuna), or for that matter between CapeFalso
and PuertoCabezas, or even between Cape Falso and Nicaragua’s border with
Costa Rica. Thus, the bisector of the angl e of the Honduran and Nicaraguan coasts in
the vicinity of Cabo Gracias aDios, is basi cally the same as the perpendicular to the
general direction of the eastward facing coast of Central America; in other words a
parallel of latitude extending from Cabo Gracias a Dios.” (RH, p. 123, para. 7.16.)
202. This thesis encounters a multiplicity of difficulties. In the first place, if it is based upon
the conduct of the Parties, why is it at all rele vant to assert that it coincides with the alleged
outcome of a method of delimitation completely unrelated to the conduct of the Parties? Such a
coincidence would be cogent only if the two qua ntities coinciding have a shared rationality. But - 14 -
they do not, and a coincidence in these circumstances cannot provide a confirmation. The
geometrical method does not confirm the conduct of the Parties, and the conduct of the Parties
equally does not confirm the authenticity of the perpendicular.
203. If the perpendicular is examined on its own terms, it can be seen that it falls well
outside the parameters of validity set by the appli cable law. In this context Honduras subjects the
perpendicular to a series of inappropriate conditions.
First: The geography on which the perpendicular is based is confined to a small sector of the
coasts abutting upon the areas in dispute.
Secondly: The geography is based exclusively up on the eastward facing coast of Central
America.
Thirdly: The identification of the sector of the coast alleged to be the evidence of its general
direction lacks credibility.
204. First of all, the segment, being relativel y short, is not representative of the general
direction of the relevant coastlines abutting upon the areas in dispute.
And, furthermore, the coast connectin g CapeFalso and La guna Wano (de Bismuna) within
this sector can be seen to lack a general direction.
And, finally, the fact that CaboFalso and the LagunadeWano (de Bismuna) “lie on
approximately the same longitude” is legally irre levant. In any case the suggested longitude lies
substantially to the east of both Cabo Gracias a Dios and ignores the markedly convex features of
the coast within the sector selected by Honduras.
205. In consequence, the proposed perpendi cular has no foundation either in the actual
coastal configurations or in the applicable law. I shall now move to my conclusions.
Conclusions
206. First, the sources of the principles of maritime delimitation recognize geometrical
methods as applicable in appropriate circumstan ces. The bisector method is well established as a
member of the family of geometrical methods. - 15 -
207. Second, the location and mode of constr uction of the bisector line constitute a careful
reflection of the coastal configurations in the disp uted area. It also reflects the overall relationship
of the coasts of the Parties.
208. Third, the bisector method produces results which involve the fulfilment of the
equitable principle of equal division.
209. And lastly, in any event, in the absence of a stable terminus of the land boundary and in
face of the lack of appropriate base points, th e bisector method constitutes a necessary vehicle of
delimitation.
210. The bisector method can be used without difficulty to deal with cases of long distance
delimitation, that is to say, situations which have the following characteristics.
First: The areas to be delimited lie off, rather than between, the coasts of the Parties.
Second: The coastlines have the relation of being lateral rather than opposite.
Third: The bisector method, like equidistance, is also a function of the geography of the
coastline and the area to be divided consists of th e areas which either lie off the coast of Honduras
or the coast of Nicaragua.
211. In contrast to the line produced by the bisector method, the Honduran “traditional line”
has no relation to the legal parameters of maritime delimitation.
In coming to the end of my presentation, I want to acknowledge the assistance of colleagues
in the Nicaraguan delegation and particularly the assistance of Dick Gent and Robin Cleverly. And
finally I would like to thank the Court for its consideration and close attention. Madam President, I
would ask you to give the podium to my colleague Professor Remiro. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, MrB . rownlie. We do now call
Professor Remiro Brotóns to address the Court. - 16 -
M. BROTÓNS :
L’«uti possidetis iuris»
A. Présentation
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les jug es, je suis très honoré de me présenter ici à
nouveau pour m’adresser à vous, mais vous auriez sans doute pu éviter l’ennuyeuse tâche d’écouter
cette intervention sans l’invocation répétée du principe de l’uti possidetis iuris par la République du
Honduras, qui prétend en faire application à la délimitation des espaces maritimes entre elle et le
Nicaragua. De cette application elle déduit le titre du Honduras à une ligne de partage suivant le
prolongement du parallèle sur lequel est situé le point d’aboutissement de la frontière terrestre,
c’est-à-dire le parallèle 14 59,8' N .
2. C’est donc le Honduras qui a soulevé le débat sur l’ uti possidetis iuris, non le Nicaragua.
Et il l’a fait dans le dessein que la Cour ne fasse pas droit à la demande que le Nicaragua lui a
adressée dans sa requête du 9décembre1999, à sa voir, «de déterminer le tracé d’une frontière
maritime unique» entre les espaces maritimes relevant respectivement du Nicaragua et du
Honduras, «conformément aux principes équitables et aux circonstances pertinentes que le droit
international général reconnaît comme s’appliquant à une délimitation de cet ordre».
3. Comme vous le savez le principe de l’ uti possidetis iuris vise, avant tout, à assurer le
respect des limites territoriales au moment de l’accession à l’indépendance; du même coup, il
transforme des limites administratives en frontières internationales ( Différend frontalier (Burkina
Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 566, par. 23). Dans le cas des républiques
de l’Amérique centrale, l’indépendance eut lieu en 1821. A cette date fut figée, comme en un
instantané, la situation qui a entraîné la transf ormation des limites administratives des entités
territoriales qui faisaient partie de la Couronne espagnole en frontières internationales.
4. Cette simple constatation devrait suffir e pour constater qu’il est impossible d’appliquer
l’uti possidetis à la délimitation d’espaces maritimes, comme le plateau continental et la zone
économique exclusive qui prirent naissance à une date très, très postérieure à celle de
1
CMH, chap. 5 ; DH, chap. 3. - 17 -
l’émancipation des provinces américaines de la Couronne d’Espagne. Même avec beaucoup
d’imagination, on ne peut commettre un tel anachronisme. L’invocation de l’uti possidetis ne serait
conceptuellement admissible qu’en ce qui conc erne les espaces maritimes relevant de la
souveraineté du riverain en 1821, à savoir, une ét roite bande d’eaux maritimes adjacentes à la côte
que nous appelons aujourd’hui mer territoriale. Mais naturellement, l’application de l’uti possidetis
dans un cas concret part de la prémisse que le souverain a projeté sur la mer les limites
administratives de ses différentes divisions territoriales. De cette prémisse on ne peut tirer aucune
conclusion, comme nous le verrons, pour l’Amérique hispanique.
5. Le Honduras est parfaitement conscient que ses ambitions démesurées sur la mer, le sol et
le sous-sol des Caraïbes ne pourront être satisfaites par une Cour appelée à tracer une ligne qui soit
équitable, celle qu’il propose ne l’étant pas. Dans cette logique, le Honduras prétend préjuger
l’objet de la demande en déplaçant le différend à une question préliminaire, que le Nicaragua
considère forcée et artificielle, et dont le Honduras espère tirer parti en élevant au maximum le
niveau de confusion. S’il y avait déjà une ligne imposée par l’histoire, ou consentie tout au long de
l’histoire, la seule tâche de la Cour serait de confirmer cette ligne. C’est ce que propose le
Honduras. L’invocation de l’uti possidetis iuris est le premier pas dans cette volonté d’introduire le
trouble.
6. Le Nicaragua réaffirme l’argumentation et les conclusions qu’il a présentées sur ce point
2
mises par écrit dans sa réplique au contre-mémoire du Honduras da ns lequel l’invocation de l’ uti
possidetis iuris est apparue pour la première fois. Face aux raisonnements du Nicaragua, le
Honduras a répondu dans sa duplique avec une certa ine grandiloquence et des tentatives de
disqualification de l’adversaire qui n’apportent rien au débat juridique.
7. En outre, dans sa duplique, le Honduras a prétendu fonder son argumentation sur des
rapports d’experts qu’il suit substantiellement et qu’il incorpore par la suite dans des annexes 3.
8. Néanmoins, ce n’est pas le curriculum de l’auteur mais l’argumentation précise et
rigoureuse qui rend un rapport solide. Du coup, l’on ne peut attendre grand-chose des rapports des
2
RN, chap. IV.
3DH, vol. II, annexes 266 et 267. - 18 -
experts du Honduras, dont les sources d’information sont incomplètes et inappropriées, ce qui les
conduit à un raisonnement défectueux et, fatalement, à des conclusions erronées.
9. Le Honduras et ses experts simplifient, ju squ’à la caricature, l’ordre juridique et
e
institutionnel complexe des territoires américains de la monarchie espagnole durant le XVIII siècle
et le début du XIX e siècle afin de maintenir des positions dénuées de tout fondement. C’est ce que,
comptant sur la bienveillante patience de la Cour, je me propose de démontrer.
10. Face aux conclusions du Honduras nous pouvons affirmer que, en 1821, date de
l’indépendance de l’Amérique centrale, et donc date critique pour apprécier l’uti possidetis iuris (et
même bien avant d’ailleurs) :
1) les espaces maritimes de la monarchie espagnol e ou, si l’on veut, les mers adjacentes aux côtes
de la monarchie espagnole en Amérique, n’étaient pas attribuées aux différentes entités
territoriales de la Couronne, ni même délimitées entre elles ;
2) les autorités de ces entités territoriales étaien t dépourvues de compétences sur la mer et sur les
gens de mer ; et que
3) les compétences sur les côtes ⎯ et non sur les eaux ⎯ de l’Amérique centrale dans la mer des
Caraïbes revenaient de droit et étaient exercées directement par le capitaine général du
Guatemala, dont la capitainerie, à cette époque, englobait, entre autres, les intendances ou
provinces de Comayagua (Honduras) et du Nicaragua.
B. La mer, un espace unitaire sous juridiction unique dans la monarchie espagnole
11. Assurément, le titulaire de la souveraineté sur la mer adjacente à la côte peut répartir
l’exercice de la juridiction entre les autorit és des différentes entités territoriales qui composent
l’Etat souverain. Mais ce n’éta it pas le cas de la monarchie espa gnole, pour laquelle la mer était
une compétence régalienne, un droit inhérent du roi, qui y exerçait une juridiction exclusive.
12. Dans la monarchie espagnole toute la mer constitue un espace unitaire sur lequel, surtout
à partir des réformes de CharlesIII et CharlesIV dans la seconde moitié du XVIII esiècle et le
e
début du XIX siècle, une juridiction spéciale et centrali sée, celle de la marine, s’applique à titre
exclusif. En aucun cas celle-ci n’est attribuée aux autorités des différentes entités territoriales
terrestres représentant la monarchie espagnole dans le Nouveau Monde. - 19 -
The PRESIDENT: Professor Remiro, could I ask you to speak a little more slowly so that
the interpreters can keep pace. Thank you.
M. BROTÓNS: Thank you.
13. La création en 1714 d’un ministère de la marine et des Indes fut suivie d’une série de
réformes capitales qui conduisirent à l’unification de l’Armada et au renforcement progressif de la
juridiction de la marine, à travers ses propres ordonnances.
4
14. Aux termes du fameux décret royal du 8 juillet 1787 , il devait y avoir une marine royale
dirigée d’une seule main dans tous les territoir es de la Couronne: la main du secrétaire (le
ministre) de la marine.
15. C’est à lui qu’incombait la responsabilité des établissements maritimes et des vaisseaux
de l’Armada (la marine royale), des garde-côtes et des corsaires, où que ce soit dans les Indes. La
marine commerciale recevait aussi ses lettres patentes et licences de ce ministère et elle était
soumise aux ordonnances de la marine. Les immatriculations des marins, les chantiers navals et les
travaux des ports, ainsi que les dépêches de t outes les consultations du Conseil des Indes sur les
questions maritimes, étaient aussi de sa compétence.
16. Un ordre royal du 22 mai 1802 décida que tous les garde-côtes des domaines de
Sa Majesté seraient affectés à l’Armada, à la marine royale ; un an plus tard, une Instruction pour la
gouverne des garde-côtes aux Indes fut publiée, fort éclairante sur la situation juridique de la mer et
des côtes américaines 5. Cette Instruction a été récemment rééditée en 1982.
17. L’articlepremier de cette Instruction précise: «La marine royale sera chargée de la
défense de toutes les côtes des domaines de Sa Majesté aux Indes.» A ce propos, elle devait établir
les croisières permises par le nombre des vaisseaux disponibles dans les points les plus exposés aux
fraudes.
18. Le Trésor royal, dont les intendants étaien t responsables dans leurs districts, était obligé
en vertu de l’article3 de l’Instruction de reme ttre à la marine royale tous les vaisseaux dont il
4 Decretos del Rey creando dos Secretarías de Estado y del Despacho de Indias, una de Gracia y Justicia y
materias eclesiásticas, y otra de Guerra , Hacienda, Comercio y navegación, en lugar de la única que ha habido hasta
ahora para todos estos negocios, Imprenta de Lorenzo de San Martín, 1787.
5 Instrucción para gobierno de los baxeles de S.M. Guardac ostas de Indias, publicada en 1º de octubre de 1803,
Madrid en la Imprenta Real, 1803. (Voir dossier des juges, document n - 20 -
disposait pour combattre la contrebande et il en allait de même des vaisseaux dépendant d’autres
autorités et de toutes les infrastructures et moye ns nécessaires à leur entretien, «à l’exception
seulement des felouques ou des petites embarcations destinées à des guets et des reconnaissances à
l’intérieur des ports».
19. Dans les Indes, donc, tous les bateaux, excepté les m odestes felouques et les petites
embarcations destinées aux rondes dans les strictes limites des ports, demeurèrent sous le
commandement et le gouvernement supérieur des commandants de la marine des apostaderos (nom
des départements maritimes et des ports militaires en Amérique) 6. Ceux-ci (les commandants de la
marine) décidaient par eux-mêmes «et sans que l’ ordre des vice-rois soit nécessaire» de la sortie
des vaisseaux, «que ce soit lorsqu’on les destine à des croisières ou bien lorsqu’on les emploie dans
une commission déterminée», ce qui pouvait arrive r lorsque les commandants de marine ou les
chefs de la défense terrestre étaient informés de quelque fraude que l’on tentait de commettre 7.
20. A partir de 1767, La Havane fut l’apostadero principal des vaisseaux de la marine royale
qui contrôlaient les eaux des Caraïbes et prot égeaient les côtes de la vice-royauté de la
NouvelleEspagne (Mexique actue l) et de la capitainerie gé nérale du Guatemala (Amérique
centrale). En cas de nécessité, ils étaient assistés par les vaisseaux de l ’apostadero de Carthagène
des Indes. En aucun cas les autorités terrestres ne pouvaient prétendre exercer leur juridiction sur
ceux-ci quel que soit le lieu où ils se trouvaient ou quelle que soit la mission de protection qui leur
avait été confiée. Leurs prises devaient être conduites au port de l’ apostadero à moins que «les
8
circonstances du temps ne les obligent» à se diriger vers le port le plus proche» . Toutes leurs
activités «dans les mers, destinations ou circons tances quelles qu’elles fussent» devaient être
9
gouvernées conformément aux ordonnances de la marine royale .
21. Ce qui a été dit au sujet des garde- côtes est valable aussi pour les corsaires,
indispensables dans les Caraïbes étant donné le ma nque de vaisseaux de l’Armada de la marine
6 Instruction, art. 4.
7
Instruction, art. 5.
8
Instruction, art. 19.
9 Instruction, art. 49. - 21 -
10
royale. La dernière ordonnan ce pertinente est celle de1796 , revisée par celle du 20juin1801.
Les vaisseaux armés en course furent assimilés à la marine royale et, en tant que tels, étaient sujets
à ses ordonnances et à sa juridiction, de même que les prises qui seraient réalisées.
22 . Par ailleurs, toutes les activités maritimes imaginables et les métiers ayant un rapport
avec la mer requéraient une in scription, une immatriculation (matrícula de mar) et seuls les
commandants de la marine étaient compétents pour y procéder. Leur dernière réglementation fut le
11
fait d’une ordonnance de1802 recueillie dans la la Novísima recopilación (Recueil de lois
de 1805) maintes fois rééditée, la dernière en 1992.
23. Selon l’article 3 du titre VI de l’ordonnance, toutes les activités suivantes relevaient de la
juridiction militaire de la marine :
«pêche, navigation, prises, arrivages et naufrages; soin, développement et
conservation des bois de marine…, tout ce qui a trait à la sécurité et au nettoiement
des ports, balises et lanternes et à la construction de quais, ainsi qu’à la fabrication
d’armes, de cordages, de toiles, de bitumes ou d’autres effets pour le service de la
12
marine…» .
24. Ainsi, non seulement la défense militaire dans la mer océane et dans la mer adjacente aux
côtes relevait de la juridiction unique de la marine , mais il en allait de même de la lutte contre la
piraterie et la contrebande, de l’adjudication de prises, et de tout autre type de navigation et
d’activités en mer. Même les activités à terre, lorsqu’elles avaient un rapport avec les activités
marines, tombaient sous sa juridiction.
25. En conséquence, il n’y a pas d’espace mariti me déterminé par la projection de lignes
imaginaires qui prolongeraient dans la mer les ci rconscriptions terrestres, mais une mer de la
monarchie qui est protégée et peut être explo itée par des bateaux et des hommes d’une condition
déterminée sous une juridiction spéciale, centra lisée, unique, privative, exclusive: celle de la
marine.
26. Le Honduras passe sous silence toutes le s ordonnances, ordres et instructions que nous
avons mentionnés, lesquels sont pourtant tout à fa it pertinents dans le cas qui nous occupe. Et si
10
Ordenanza de S.M. que prescribe las reglas con que se ha de hacer el Corso de particulares contra los
enemigos de la Corona, Madrid en la Imprenta Real, 1796.
11Ordenanza de S.M. para el régimen y gobie rno militar de las Matrículas de Mar, Madrid en la Imprenta Real,
1802.
12Novísima Recopilación de 1805, livre VI, titre VII, loi IX. (Voir dossier des juges, document n 2.) - 22 -
nous examinons le rapport de M.Pérez-Prendes, la masse législative (legislative mass) qu’il
considère pertinente ne témoigne ni d’une rech erche sérieuse de documents pertinents ni d’une
réflexion approfondie sur leur portée.
27. Le Honduras et ses experts non seulement limitent leur recherche à la législation générale
de la monarchie mais, de surcroît, ils s’arrêtent en 1793, soit trenteans avant l’indépendance.
D’après M. Perez-Prendes, la «pièce centrale» de cette «masse législative» serait constituée par les
ordonnances de Sa Majesté de 1768 po ur le régime, la discipline, la subordination et le service de
ses armées, partiellement complétées par les ordonna nces des ingénieurs, promulguées en 1718, et
par les ordonnances générales de la marine de 1748 et1751, revisées en1793, dit-il, pour leur
13
harmonisation avec celles de l’armée et des ingénieurs .
28. De fait, la seule ordonnance générale postérieure que le Honduras et son expert
14
mentionnent est l’ordonnance gé nérale des intendants de 1803 . Mais, comme tout
l’historiographe juridique sur les Indes devrait le savoir, cette ordonnance fut retirée par un ordre
royal du 11 janvier 1804.
29. Si nous nous penchons sur la masse législative sélectionnée par le Honduras, on
s’aperçoit que M. Perez-Prendes ignore les ordonnan ces des ingénieurs de 1803. En conséquence,
15
il ignore aussi le règlement additionnel de 1805 pour le service des ingénieurs aux Indes . A vrai
dire, les ordonnances des ingénieurs n’apportent au cune lumière particulière sur la question qui
nous occupe ; mais, puisque l’expert du Honduras les mentionne, on peut au moins lui demander de
connaître les textes en vigueur à la date de l’indépendance.
30. Les lacunes de l’information sur laquelle se fonde le Honduras concernant l’organisation,
l’activité et la juridiction de la marine royale sont plus frappantes et plus graves. Il ne faut pas être
grand clerc pour supposer que, si l’on parle de la mer et des espaces maritimes, la marine avait
quelque chose à voir avec ceux-ci, surtout si nous essayons de traduire juridiction par souveraineté
pour déterminer la projection de l’uti possidetis iuris.
13
DH, vol. II, annexe 266, p. 98-99.
14
Ibid., p. 99.
15Reglamento adicional a la Ordenanza de l real Cuerpo de Ingenieros que S. M. ha resuelto se observe para el
servicio de este cuerpo en Indias, Madrid en la Imprenta Real, 1805. - 23 -
31. Il semblerait que l’expert commis par le Honduras considère qu’un renvoi générique aux
ordonnances de 1748 et 1793 est suffisant, comme si ces dernières n’avaient pas subi d’importantes
modifications et additions dans les années postéri eures, obligeant ainsi à une mise à jour continue
qui se matérialisa dans des collections successives des textes pertinents 16. L’expert hondurien
oublie ainsi la réforme bien connue des or donnances de la marine royale précisément ⎯ réforme
qui date de 1802 1.
32. Qui plus est, l’expert renvoie à peine aux ordonnances de la marine, les remplaçant, dans
son discours, par celles de l’armée, qui constituen t pratiquement l’unique matériel normatif qu’il
utilise. Il tente de se justifier en présentant les ordonnances de la marine comme un ensemble
législatif subordonné qui n’apporte rien. Cette présentation n’est pas correcte. Dans l’ancien
régime, il n’y avait pas de hiérarchie normative. Les ordonnances de la marine étaient pour la
marine ce que les ordonnances de l’armée étaient pour l’armée. Il pouvait y avoir des conflits de
juridiction, mais pas de subordination législative.
33. Pour corroborer un tel raisonnement, il suff it de rappeler l’ordre royal du 14 février 1769
et la circulaire du Conseil d’Etat du 8août 1800 (facilement accessibles sur le web), tous deux
démonstratifs du renforcement progressif de la juridiction de la marine sur les espaces, non
seulement maritimes mais aussi côtiers 18.
34. La circulaire du Conseil d’Etat fait a llusion au grand nombre de recours générés par
l’application erronée de l’ordre royal de1769, le quel avait été interprété dans le sens qu’il aurait
uniformisé la marine avec l’armée selon l’ordonnance applicable, à cette dernière.
«Le roi ayant été informé de tout ceci ⎯ dit le Conseil d’Etat ⎯ a déterminé de
faire circuler un ordre royal dans tous les corps, tribunaux et justices à l’intérieur et
hors du Royaume, afin que soient observées inviolablement et sans interprétation
aucune les ordonnances générales de la marine aussi bien pour le gouvernement
intérieur de ce corps que pour sa correspondance avec les autres juridictions…»
35. Il y a lieu de s’interroger sur la raison pour laquelle l’expert du Honduras considère que
les ordonnances de l’armée peuvent s’appliquer au cas qui nous occupe, confondant au surplus les
16
Voir par exemple J. J. Matraya y Ricci, Catálogo cronológico de las pragmáticas, cédulas, decretos, órdenes y
resoluciones reales generales emanados después de la Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, Instituto de Investigaciones
Históricas, Buenos Aires, 1978.
17Real Ordenanza Naval para el servicio de los baxeles de S.M., Madrid en la Imprenta Real, 1802.
18Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 4988 (92) et 5112 (36). Accessible sur www.cultura.mecd.es/archivos/
lhe/index.html (Voir dossier des juges, document n 3.) - 24 -
rôles des vice-rois et de capitaines généraux, de ceux-ci avec le capitaine général de la marine ou
les capitaines généraux du département mar itime, des gouverneurs provinciaux avec les
gouverneurs militaires, sans citer le texte sur leque l il se base pour réaliser cette curieuse série
d’«assimilations» effectuées dans son rapport.
36. Par ailleurs, l’expert du Honduras force la lecture des articles mêmes des ordonnances de
l’armée identifiant, sans justification aucune, les compétences que l’on concède aux capitaines
généraux avec celles qui sont réglementées par les ordonnances de la marine, comme si les
forteresses étaient la même chose que les arsenaux, l’infanterie que l’équipage de la marine, les
chevaux que les bateaux, etc. Il n’y a pas lieu de présupposer. Il faudrait démontrer que les
ordonnances de l’armée sont la source fondament ale qui doit être utilisée dans le cas qui nous
occupe. Le Honduras ne le fait pas. C’est d’ailleurs une mission impossible.
37. Si les références législatives générales dont il prétend tirer ses conclusions présentent ces
graves lacunes, il en va à fortiori de même de l’ignorance dans laquelle le Honduras et ses experts
tiennent les lois particulières applicables. Et en effet, ceux-ci passent totalement sous silence aussi
bien l’ordre royal sur les garde-côtes du 22 mai1802, que l’Instruction pour la gouverne des
garde-côtes aux Indes, de 1803, l’ordonnance sur l es navires corsaires de 1796, revisée en 1801, et
l’ordonnance relative au régime et au gouvernem ent militaire des immatriculations des marins
(matrícula de mar) de 1802, qui sont tous des instruments normatifs pertinents en l’espèce.
38. Il s’agit de textes, comme je l’ai déjà dit, facilement accessibles. Les ordonnances sur la
course maritime et sur l’immatriculation des marins ont été recueillies dans la Novísima
19
Recopilación (le Recueil de lois ) de1805 promulgué par CharlesIV (livre 6, titres7 et8) . Ce
recueil a été maintes fois réédité. Il l’a été en 1975 et, à nouveau, en 1992 par le Boletín Oficial del
Estado (la maison éditrice du Journal officiel de l’Etat). L’Instruction pour la gouverne des
garde-côtes aux Indes de1803 est apparue, par exemple, dans les Annales de l’Université de
20
Murcie .
19
Novísima Recopilación…de 1805, libro VI, tit. VII («Del servicio de la Marina, fuero y privilegios de sus
matriculados») ; t. VIII («Del corso contra enemigos de la Corona»).
20Vol. XXXIX, n 2-4, faculté de lettres, cours 1980-1981, éd. 1982, 303 et suiv. - 25 -
39. L’utilisation des instruments (working means) proposés par les experts du Honduras pour
compléter l’étude des instruments normatifs ne conduit pas à une meilleure appréciation de leur
travail. Pour commencer, le Cedulario Indico de Ayala (dont, par la suite dans le rapport, il n’y a
pas une seule citation) n’est pas comme on affi rme, un ouvrage «comprenant vingt-six volumes
dont il existe une autre copie connue comme Miscelánea» , mais une série de quarante-deux
volumes qui fait partie d’une série plus vaste, la Miscelánea de Ayala, cette dernière comprenant
22
quatre-vingt-quatre volumes . L’ouvrage qui comporte vingt-six volumes c’est le Dictionnaire du
gouvernement et de législation des Indes élaboré par Ayala lui-même pour faciliter l’utilisation du
23
Cedulario . C’est cet instrument dont se sert, en réalité, M. Pérez-Prendes.
40. Quant à l’autre ouvrage proposé, Les tribunaux militaires d’Espagne et ses Indes , de
Félix Colón de Larriátegui, il est très révélateur des sources limitées auxquelles l’expert a recours.
Il utilise la seconde édition, de 1797, et non la troi sième «corrigée et augmentée», qui inclut toutes
les résolutions royales jusqu’en1817 24. On peut retrouver facilement celle-ci dans un CD-ROM
25
édité en 1999 par la Fondation Historique Tavera .
41. La fiabilité des conclusions d’une étude historique dépend essentiellement de la sélection
correcte et de la vérification des sources documenta ires sur lesquelles elles se fondent, ainsi que de
l’analyse qui en est faite dans leur contexte. Cette considération est fatale pour le Honduras et ses
experts. La masse législative critique dont ils se servent est très déficiente, fruit d’un traitement
capricieux des sources et, par conséquent, elle mène à des conclusions infondées.
C. Le régime de la mer adjacente aux côtes de la capitainerie générale du Guatemala
42. Il ne fait aucun doute que le régime juridique de la mer qui baigne les côtes des territoires
sous la juridiction de la capita inerie générale du Guatemala, c’est-à-dire la mer du nord bordant la
21DH, vol. II, annexe 266, p. 99.
22M.Gómez Gómez, Actores del Documento. Oficiale s, archiveros y escr ibientes de la Secretaría de Estado y
del Despacho Universal de Indias durante el siglo XVIII, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2003,
p. 330-336.
23Diccionario de Gobierno y Legislación de Indias, Edición y estudios: Marta Milagros de Vas Mingo, Ediciones
de Cultura Hispánica, Madrid, 1988-1996.
24F. Colón de Larriátegui, Juzgados militares de España y sus Indias , 4 vol. Madrid, 1817.
25
Fundación Histórica Tavera, Textos Clásicos de Literatura Jurídica Indiana (I) , I. Sánchez Bella (comp.),
serie II, vol. 15, Temáticas para la historia de Iberoamérica, Madrid, 1999. - 26 -
côte de Mosquitos, se basait en1821, non pas sur la masse législative présentée par le Honduras,
mais fondamentalement sur les sources auxquelles j’ai déjà fa it allusion dans mon intervention, à
savoir, les ordonnances de la marine de 1802, l’ordre royal sur les garde-côtes de la même année et
l’Instruction pour leur gouverne aux Indes de 1803, l’ordonnance sur les vaisseaux corsaires
de1796, revisée en 1801, et l’ordonnan ce sur l’immatriculation des marins (la matricula de mar)
de 1802.
43. S’approchant de la zone en litige, le Honduras et ses experts invoquent les ordres royaux
26
du 23 août 1745 et du 20 novembre 1803 . Le premier ordre, motivé exclusivement par le désir de
contrôler dans la guerre avec les Anglais des terres non encore explorées et non dominées par la
Couronne, se servit du cap Gracias a Dios pour divise r le territoire depuis la péninsule du Yucatán
jusqu’au fleuve Chagres, établissant ainsi une juridiction militaire privative dont il recommanda
l’exercice aux gouverneurs du Honduras et du Nicar agua. Il n’est pas nécessaire de se prononcer
pour l’instant sur la question de savoir si cet or dre altéra ou non le statut territorial des deux
provinces. Ce qui est clair c’est que l’on ne déclara nulle part que ce cap déterminerait la
27
juridiction de l’un ou de l’autre gouverneur sur la mer .
44. En ce qui concerne l’ordre royal du 20 no vembre 1803, que le Honduras interprète en se
prenant pour la Colombie, mieux vaut se reporter à ce que le Nicaragua a dit à ce sujet, là où il
devait le faire, à savoir, dans le mémoir e présenté le 28avril2003 dans l’affaire du Différend
28
territorial et maritime avec la Colombie, actuellement soumise à la Cour .
45. Partant des sources utilisées, on ne voit pas comment la Partie adverse peut arriver à la
conclusion que l’extension à la mer adjacente de la juridiction des provinces qui composaient la
capitainerie générale du Guatemala serait une conséquence «logique». Et l’on ne sait pas à quoi se
réfère l’expert du Honduras lo rsqu’il mentionne les «pratiques gouvernementales coutumières des
autorités espagnoles» pour affirmer que celles-ci ont entraîné «une division des compétences dans
la zone maritime avoisinante» 29.
26CMH, vol. I, par. 5.14 et suiv ; DH, vol. I, par. 3.18 et suiv ; vol. II, annexe 266, p. 101.
27 o
RN, p. 66, n 169.
28MN, 1.45 et suiv
29DH, vol. II, annexe 266, p. 101. - 27 -
46 . Il est scientifiquement et juridiquement inadmissible d’affirmer dans un rapport présenté
à la Cour, sans apport de preuves quelles qu’elles so ient, qu’«une pratique constante étendait à la
30
mer les compétences des autorités terrestres avoisinantes» .
47. L’expert du Honduras soutient que la navi gation militaire autour du cap Gracias a Dios
était dirigée par ou sous le contrôle des autorit és du Honduras. Il affirme que les exemples sont
très abondants 31, mais, malgré cette prétendue abondance, le seul exemple qu’il offre de cette
e
navigation remonte au dernier tiers du XVII siècle, plus précisément à1672, sous le règne du
dernier roi de la Maison d’Autriche, CharlesII. En outre, il n’y a rien dans cet épisode qui
témoigne du contrôle des autorités provinciales du Honduras sur cette navigation 32. En fait, ce dont
il s’agit c’est que, à cette époque-là, le capitain e général du Guatemala exerçait quelques-unes de
ses compétences depuis des ports situés dans ce qui est aujourd’hui le Honduras. Comment
peut-on alors affirmer que ce document illustre «l ’efficacité historique des compétences dans le
domaine étudié» et, surtout, que ces compétences relevaient de la province du Honduras 33?
48 . Cette manière de procéder est, pour le moins, cavalière. Mais c’est bien plus que cela, si
l’on tient compte du fait que l’histoire de la côte de Mosquitos, à partir de 1783, est bien connue à
travers des sources documentaires directes, facileme nt accessibles aujourd’hui. En effet, le fonds
documentaire essentiel concernant l’histoire de la côte de Mosquitos provenant du secrétariat de la
guerre et déposé dans les archives générales de Si mancas, a été numérisé et peut être consulté à
l’adresse électronique des archives espagnoles, mini stère de la culture (que vous pouvez lire sur
l’écran diaporama ARB1) : http ://aer.mcu.es/sgae/index_aer.jsp.
49. Il est surprenant que les experts du Honduras ne l’aient pas fait, parce que n’importe qui,
où qu’il se trouve, peut obtenir de façon im médiate et gratuite le mot de passe (password) qui en
permet l’accès (diaporamaARB2). Concrètement le code de référence est ES47161.AGS/19.7;
sous le titre Guatemala, il se compose de dix-neuf dossiers qui embrassent la période allant
de1783 à1802. Une recherche plus générale à la même adresse électronique révélerait
30Ibid. p. 100.
31
Ibid., p. 107.
32Ibid., p. 108, 112-114.
33Ibid., p. 107. - 28 -
six mille quatre cent quatre-vingt neuf entrées qui répondent à l’appellation géographique Costa de
Mosquitos, réparties dans différentes archives espagnoles.
50. Les conclusions qui peuvent s’obtenir à partir des documents qui composent ce fonds
démolissent les prétentions du Honduras et discréditen t définitivement le travail de ses experts.
Les sources historiques auxquelles se réfère M.Pérez-Prendes ne sont pas pertinentes ici, du fait
qu’elles ne mentionnent rien sur le point ⎯ essentiel ⎯ de savoir qui avait juridiction sur la mer
adjacente aux côtes de la capitainerie généra le du Guatemala et comment s’exerçait cette
juridiction. Ces sources sont loin de confirme r ses dires selon lesquels il a préparé son opinion
avec «des sources scientifiques les plus fiables» et que «seules des sources de première main ont
34
été utilisées» .
51. La pratique démontre justement le cont raire de ce que cet expert a soutenu. Les
exemples sont, en effet, «très abondants» mais pour le démentir.
52. Pensons, par exemple, au mémoire sur l’ «envoi de vaisseaux à la côte de Mosquitos
depuis LaHavane» de1788 35, au mémoire sur le «refus du co mmandant général de LaHavane
d’envoyer à la côte de Mosquitos la corvette San Pío» de 1789 3, au rapport sur les «navires pour la
37
défense de la côte de Mosquitos» de1790, au rapport sur «la reconnaissance géométrique et
politique de la côte de Mosquitos» de Porta et Costas, daté de1791 38, ou à la «dissertation du
voyage fait par ordre du roi par le lieutenant de na vire … Don José del Río aux îles de San Andrés,
39
Providencia et Mangles et à la côte de Mosquitos», datée à La Havane en 1793 , etc. Si nous nous
laissions emporter par la simplification de l’expert du Hond uras, il pourrait très bien en résulter
que, conformément à l’uti possidetis iuris, la côte de Mosquitos appartiendrait à Cuba.
53. L’absence de tout effort de recherche documentaire s’étend à l’autre expert du Honduras,
l’historien M.MarianoCuesta, lequel s’est conten té d’inclure, dans l’«annexe documentaire» de
34 o
Ibid., p. 97, n 3.
35
AGS, Guerra, 6947, exp. 10.
36
AGS, Guerra, 6948, exp.1.
37AGS, Guerra, 6949, exp. 2.
38AGS, Guerra, 6949, exp.14
39
MN (Différend territorial et maritime, (Nicaragua c. Colombie)), vol. II, annexe 3. - 29 -
son mini-rapport spéculatif, une série de diagrammes qui ne concernent pas spécifiquement la zone
40
pertinente ni les problèmes dont il était censé s’occuper .
54. S’il avait pris en considération ces ouvr ages, il aurait pris connaissance de données
intéressantes comme par exemple la question de savoir qui décidait de l’envoi d’une expédition
pour le levé cartographique, à quelle flotte appartenait le bateau qui le réalisait, devant qui en
répondaient les commandants du navire, etc. Mais l’historien Cuesta préfère tirer des conclusions
même «juridiques» à partir d’une série d’inférences qui n’ont rien à voir avec le cas.
D.Les établissements de la côte de Mosquito s ne furent jamais sous la juridiction de
l’intendance de Comayagua (Honduras)
55. L’oubli remarquable par le Honduras et ses experts de la législation portant sur la mer,
l’oubli des armadas successives et des flottes, l’oubli des apostaderos, l’oubli des garde-côtes,
l’oubli de l’identité des corsaires de la zone, l’ oubli de l’immatriculati on des marins, l’oubli de
l’histoire réelle de la mer des Caraïbes, etc., t ous ces oublis ont pour coro llaire une très regrettable
confusion sur la fondation et la gestion des établis sements de la côte de Mosquitos menées à bien
directement par le capitaine général du Guatemal a et non par les gouverneurs ou intendants de ses
provinces.
56. Une fois de plus, pourquoi les experts du Honduras n’ont-ils pas eu recours aux
instruments de travail que l’Etat espagnol metta it à leur disposition pour le maniement de la masse
législative pertinente, à savoir, les registres cen traux des dispositions maintenus par les organes
expéditeurs (le Conseil des Indes, les secrétariats d’Etat, de la guerre, de la marine), officiels et
exhaustifs, conservés aujourd’hui dans les di fférentes archives espagnoles, notamment dans les
archives générales des Indes et de Simancas qui sont aisément accessibles? Pourquoi ne pas
recourir à l’adresse électronique (diaporamaARB1 ) déjà mentionnée qui leur aurait permis, sans
les forcer à se déplacer, un accès direct (diaporama ARB2) aux fonds qui documentent l’histoire de
la côte de Mosquitos ?
57. La date, 1783, à laquelle commence le dossier de la côte de Mosquitos n’est pas fortuite.
Elle correspond à l’année où, en vertu de l’article 6 du traité de paix entre les Couronnes d’Espagne
40
DH, vol. II, annexe 267, p. 141-164. - 30 -
et d’Angleterre, signé à Versailles le 3 septembre, les Anglais acceptèrent de se retirer du dénommé
continent espagnol et des îles dépendant de celui-ci, exception faite du territoire du Belize dans
lequel il leur fut permis de s’établir pour l’e xploitation du bois, concrètement, pour la coupe du
bois de teinture dit campêche, toujours dans le cadre de la s ouveraineté de Sa Majesté catholique
(S. M. C.) .1
58. Une convention pour expliquer, amplifier et exécuter l’article 6 en question fut signée à
Londres le 14juillet1786. En ce qui nous concer ne, son article premier confirme expressément
l’évacuation des «pays de Mosquitos, de même que du continent en général et des îles adjacentes
sans exception», des sujets de Sa Majesté britannique (S.M.B.) et autres colons qui jusqu’alors
42
avaient joui de la protection de l’Angleterre .
59. L’opération d’évacuation des colons angl ais et assimilés fut compliquée et de multiples
autorités, responsables conjointement de la défense des intérêts de la monarchie, y participèrent.
Pour ce qui nous intéresse ici, il faut souligner que ce fut seulement lorsque l’Espagne essaya de
coloniser la Mosquitia, c’est-à-dire la façade atlantique d es actuels Honduras et Nicaragua. Cette
colonisation se solda par un échec car, à l’excepti on de l’établissement de Trujillo, l’une des bases
les plus importantes de contrebande dans toute l’ Amérique centrale, tous les autres établissements
durent être abandonnés. Ainsi, en 1794, un ordre royal ordonna au capitaine général du Guatemala
l’évacuation de l’établissement de Gracias a Dios, considéré indéfendable 43.
60. Ces établissements, dont la composante militaire était très importante, furent directement,
dès le début et jusqu’à la date de l’indépendance, soumis à l’ autorité du capitaine général du
Guatemala, tandis que leur défense maritime fut confiée à l’ apostadero de La Havane et, dans une
moindre mesure, à celui de Carthagène des Indes.
61. C’est le monarque, à travers son secrétaire (son ministre) de la marine, qui émettait les
ordres qu’il considérait convenables pour la surveilla nce de la côte de Mosquitos depuis la mer,
ordres qui étaient directement transmis aux commandants des apostaderos, sans l’intermédiaire du
capitaine général du Guatemala. Ainsi, ce fut le monarque qui demanda au commandant général de
41C. Parry, The Consolidated Treaty Series, vol. 48, 481-486.
42
Ibid., vol. 50, 47-51.
43ES.47161.AGS/19.7//SGU,6951,1. - 31 -
La Havane, Pedro Obregón, un rapport, daté du 2 février 1790, sur les vaisseaux nécessaires pour la
défense et la sécurité de la côte de Mosquitos et des stations, îles et hauts-fonds qui entourent ce
44
continent .
62. Le capitaine général du Guatemala n’a pu jamais disposer directement de ces effectifs
navals. Il dépendit toujours des ordres royaux ordo nnant les autorités de la marine de lui prêter
l’aide par lui sollicitée.
63. Ce n’est que sur la base de ces ordres que le capitaine général du Guatemala pouvait
réclamer les embarcations qui relevaient toujours de l’autorité de la marine. Cette dernière, le cas
échéant, pouvait opposer des bonnes raisons au monarque pour s’exonérer de la prestation de l’aide
sollicitée, en invoquant une meilleure organisation de la défense générale de la zone.
64. En tout cas, tous les établissements de la côte de Mosquitos étant, en date de 1821, sous
la dépendance directe du capitaine général du Gu atemala, toute prétention de projection de
juridiction sur la mer adjacente sur la base de l’ uti possidetis iuris serait liée à la capitainerie
générale du Guatemala en tant que telle et non à l’une ou l’autre de ses provinces.
65. Les établissements de la côte de Mosqu itos n’ont jamais été sous la juridiction des
gouverneurs ou intendants et ils n’ont pas non plus fait partie des provinces ou intendances où ils
étaient géographiquement situés. Ce fait a été reconnu par le gouverneur de Comayagua
(Honduras) lorsque, faisant allusion dans un rapport daté du 20oct obre1791 à la situation de ces
établissements, il déclara être «sans moyens, dépendant en tout de la capitainerie du Guatemala» 45.
66. Lorsque quelques années plus tard le gouve rneur de Comayagua, invoquant l’application
de l’Instruction relative aux intendants de 1786, voulut contester au capitaine général du Guatemala
ses compétences, le roi décida par ordre royal du 13novembre1806 que c’était au capitaine
général de s’occuper seul et à titre exclusif de t outes les affaires qui pouvaient survenir dans la
colonie de Trujillo et dans les autres ports militair es de la côte de Mosquitos, conformément aux
ordres royaux qui, depuis l’année1782, l’autorisai ent à occuper, défendre et peupler cette côte
46
jusqu’à ce que Sa Majesté convienne de modifier le système existant .
44
ES.47161.AGS/19.7//SGU,6951, 2 et 3.
45ES47161.AGS/19.7//SGU, 6950, 9.
46M. Peralta, Costa Rica y Costa de Mosquitos. Documentos par a la Historia de la jurisdicción territorial de
Costa Rica y Colombia, Paris, 1898, p. 496-498. (Voir dossier des juges, document n) - 32 -
67. Les pétitions de la province de Comayagua à l’Assemblée constituante (Cortes) réunie en
Espagne en 1812, puis en 1820, dema ndant que les ports de Trujillo et Omoa soient affectés à une
province du Honduras, séparée de celle du Guatemal a, démontrent que le système n’avait subi
aucun changement à ces dates . En résumé, il ne fait aucun doute que les établissements de la côte
ne firent jamais partie de Comayagua, leur garde et surveillance étant sous la responsabilité directe
du capitaine général du Guatemala jusqu’à la date de l’indépendance.
68. Dès lors, comment l’intendant de Coma yagua pouvait-il avoir juridiction sur la mer
adjacente à des établissements terrestres, les seuls sur la côte, sur lesquels il ne pouvait revendiquer
aucune sorte de compétence? Comment soutenir que l’intendant de Comayagua, sans juridiction
sur la côte et sans bateaux, pouvait exercer une compétence quelconque dans les espaces maritimes
au-delà du cap Gracias a Dios ? Comment, de surcroît, prétendre qu’il existait une ligne de partage
précise qui n’apparaît nulle part dans l’abondante législation émanant de la Couronne tout au long
des siècles ?
69. Le Honduras procède à une identification tr ompeuse entre le cap Gracias a Dios et le
15 eparallèle. Si la délimitation des espaces maritimes entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras prend bien
pour point de départ le cap, à l’embouchure du fleuve Coco, où se trouvent les fondements
juridiques de sa prolongation tout au long du para llèle 14º59.8'N? Selon un témoignage de
e 48
pêcheur apporté par le Honduras, le 15 parallèle fut «le legs de Christophe Colomb» , mais nous
sommes en droit de supposer ici encore qu’il s’ag it, comme ailleurs dans d’autres témoignages,
d’une licence littéraire.
70. Soyons sérieux. L’invocation de l’ uti possidetis iuris dans les réclamations territoriales
oblige à traduire en termes actuels des situations juridiques historiques; mais le sérieux et la
rigueur dont on doit faire preuve dans la lecture de textes historiques ne s’accommode pas de
l’esprit d’invention dont fait preuve le Honduras. Il ne faut pas prétendre trouver dans le passé des
réponses à des questions qui, si elles furent formulées, elles le furent en des termes complètement
différents de ceux d’aujourd’hui.
47M. Lorente Sariñena, « El fracaso de la Intendencia en Hondur as: La Alcaldía Mayor de Tegucigalpa
(1799-1819)», Pacis Artes, Obra Homenaje al Prof. Julio D. González Campos, Madrid, 2005, t.II, 2017-2044
o
(en 2018-2019). (Voir dossier des juges, document n 5).
48CMH, vol. II, annexe 68. - 33 -
71. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, accepter le fait que l’intendant de Comayagua,
bien qu’il n’ait pas eu de juridiction sur les ét ablissements de la côte de Mosquitos, ni même
d’effectifs maritimes à sa disposition, exerçait en1821, et auparavant, juridiction sur la mer
adjacente au nord du 15 parallèle est, pour le dire brièvement, une pure invention.
E. L’uti possidetis iuris des espaces maritimes
72. Depuis quand parle-t-on d’un uti possidetis iuris des espaces maritimes? Pendant plus
de cent ans on a beaucoup écrit sur l’ uti possidetis par rapport aux espaces terrestres et rien par
rapport à la mer car, tout simplement, il n’y avait pas de base pour cela.
73. Sous une dénomination ou une autre il y a eu une mer territoriale depuis des siècles,
mais le plateau continental et la zone économique exclusive sont des institutions récentes en tant
que concepts juridiques attributifs de droits souve rains aux Etats riverains ; elles remontent à peine
à quelques décennies.
74. Il faut mentionner à cet égard la conscience que la monarchie espagnole avait de la haute
mer, malgré ses efforts persévérants pour mainte nir le monopole commercial entre l’Europe et ses
possessions américaines. «L’immunité des côtes de la Couronne» disait le roi dans la cédule royale
du 14juin1797 sur les règles à suivre dans les j ugements de prises, «ne doit pas être déterminée
comme jusqu’à présent par la portée douteuse et incertaine du canon, mais par la distance de
2950toises chacune… Les prises qui seront faites hors de la distance en question devront être
considérées comme étant faites en haute mer…» 49 (Une toise est égale à un 1,946 mètre.)
75. Les trois auteurs que le Honduras cite da ns une note en pied de page pour avaliser
l’affirmation que tous ceux qui ont étudié la question dans l’aire américaine soutiennent
50 51
l’application maritime de l’uti possidetis iuris , ont tous écrit après 1989 . L’un d’entre eux, pour
sûr, ne put pas le faire dans les pages 590 et suivantes de sa monographie de 579pages. Ce
dernier, qui traite la question dans les pages 461 à464 de son ouvrage affirme qu’«en Amérique
49 o
Novísima Recopilación de 1805, 6.8.5. (Voir dossier des juges, document n 5.)
50DH, par. 3.17
51Ibid.,p. 34, par. l9. - 34 -
latine la situation ne s’est guère présentée et ce pour des raisons évidentes. Au XIX esiècle des
52
notions telles que le plateau continental et la zone économique exclusive étaient inconnues.»
76. Cette affirmation avait déjà été faite par le Tribunal arbitral qui décida la ligne de partage
des espaces maritimes entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal en1989. Considérant l’évolution
récente du droit de la mer, le Tribunal déclare : «on ne peut prétendre trouver des précédents [de
l’application de l’ uti possidetis ] au siècle dernier, époque où les Etats de l’Amérique latine
accédèrent à l’indépendance» 53.
77. Dans un empire comme l’Empire espagnol , dieu nourricier de l’application de l’ uti
possidetis iuris , le territoire était seulement l’un des él éments pertinents de l’attribution aux
institutions de l’exercice d’une juridiction dont le roi restait le titulaire, et le territoire l’était, en
outre, sous différentes configurati ons de géométrie variable. Sur la mer, ainsi que nous l’avons
e
déjà observé, le territoire était un, surtout à partir du XVIII siècle, et une était la juridiction,
centralisée, privative, exclusive, celle de la marine.
78. Le Honduras invoque l’arrêt de cette C our du 11septembre1992 dans l’affaire du
Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime entre les Républiques d’El Salvador et du
Honduras comme preuve d’un uti possidetis iuris maritime, dans le golfe de Fonseca 54. Mais le
Honduras a tronqué sans vergogne la motivation de la Cour et fait dire aux juges bien davantage
que ce qui se déduit de la lecture intégrale de leur raisonnement.
79. Cette invocation de l’arrêt de 1992 par le Honduras a, en outre, des effets
contre-productifs pour sa propre thèse. Le Nicara gua ne discute pas la possibilité théorique d’un
uti possidetis iuris maritime et son application lorsque les conditions requises sont remplies, mais il
conteste sa pertinence dans notre cas. Dans l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et
maritime entre les Républiques d’El Salvador et du H onduras, la Chambre explique qu’elle «a été
très frappée par la différence fondamentale qui existe [à l’égard de l’ uti possidetis iuris] entre les
zones terrestres qu’elle a eu à examiner et cette zone maritime» ( Différend frontalier terrestre,
insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras ; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992,
52
M. Kohen, Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale, Genève, 1997, p. 461.
53
Sentence arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989, par. 63 et 64, RSA, vol. XX, p. 119 et suiv.
54DH, par. 3.52 et suiv. - 35 -
p. 601, par. 405). Et la Chambre nous dit encore : «Aucun des éléments présentés à la Chambre ne
suggère qu’il ait existé pour ces eaux, avant182 1 ou en1821, quoi que ce soit d’analogue aux
limites dont … il a été si abondamment question ici au sujet des terres.» (Ibid., p. 601, par. 386.)
80. Les juges peuvent parler et, d’ailleurs, parlent d ’eaux historiques, de baie historique,
mais ils ne peuvent appliquer l’ uti possidetis iuris parce que le souverain, le roi d’Espagne, ne
précisa jamais les compétences sur le golfe de Fonseca, de provinces, intendances, mairies ou
quelques autres entités territoriales.
81. Dans sa longue et bien documentée opinion individuelle accompagnant cet arrêt le juge
Torres Bernárdez constate que,
«au moment où la succession a eu lieu, l’Etat prédécesseur n’avait pas
⎯ administrativement parlant ⎯ divisé les eaux de la baie historique de Fonseca entre
les juridictions territoriales des provinces coloniales, ou de leurs subdivisions, qui
constituaient en1821 le territoire de l’un ou l’autre des trois Etats du golfe. Il
s’ensuit que les eaux historiques qui n’ont pas été divisées par le Honduras,
ElSalvador et le Nicaragua après1821 con tinuent de relever de la souveraineté des
trois Républiques conjointement, tant qu’elles ne font pas l’objet d’une délimitation.»
(Ibid., p. 712, par. 178.)
82. Si, comme c’est notre cas, l’on examine à fond l’argument, la seule chose que l’on puisse
dire est que, à la date de l’indépendance, une souveraineté conjointe des républiques riveraines se
produisit sur les eaux de la Couronne d’Espagne en mer du nord, mer des Caraïbes, et perdure tant
que l’on ne procédera pas à une délimitation des espaces correspondant à chacune d’elles. C’est
justement ce que le Nicaragua sollicite de la Cour conformément aux règles de la convention des
NationsUnies sur le droit de la mer, auxquelles sont parties aussi bien le Nicaragua que le
Honduras.
83. Rien de plus naturel. Le fait que l’immense majorité des républiques latino-américaines
aient mené une politique de délimitation conven tionnelle de leurs espaces maritimes ne pourrait
s’expliquer si elles avaient l’uti possidetis iuris à portée de la main.
F. Le uti possidetis iuris et les îles
84. Le Honduras mélange, à notre avis intentionnellement, l’ uti possidetis iuris sur les îles
avec l’uti possidetis iuris sur les espaces maritimes. Ils doivent être distingués. S’agissant d’îles, - 36 -
le Nicaragua soutient non seuleme nt la possibilité théorique de l’ uti possidetis mais aussi son
application pratique en Amérique latine.
85. Il n’y a aucun doute que le roi d’Espa gne, comme l’indique une disposition qui remonte
à 1519 et qui est incluse dans le Recueil de lois des Indes de 1680, se considérait lui-même «maître
55
des Indes occidentales, îles, terre ferme de la mer océane, découvertes et à découvrir» .
86. Etant donné qu’il n’y avait pas de terrae insulares nullius, si le monarque ne réalisa pas
l’assignation d’une île ou d’un archipel à une entité territoriale déterminée, dans notre cas une
province, et si les recherches ultérieures des par ties n’ont pas permis d’éclaircir rétrospectivement
l’uti possidetis iuris, il faudra alors avoir recours à d’autres titres ou appliquer le principe de la
proximité, ainsi que le fit la Cour au sujet de Meanguera et Meanguerita ( Différend frontalier
terrestre, insulaire et maritime (ES lal vador/Honduras; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt ,
C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 570-579, par. 356-368), dans l’arrêt qui a donné tant de satisfaction au
Honduras.
87. Il convient de rappeler que la Chambr e considéra que Meanguerita, exiguë et non
habitée, était par sa proximité de Meanguera une «dépendance» de celle-ci (ibid., p. 570, par. 356 ;
p.579, par.368), mais que l’adjudication de Meanguera se basa sur une longue série d’actes de
souveraineté du Salvador, sans jamais se heurter à aucune objection de la part du Honduras, étant
donné «l’impossibilité d’établir de faç on satisfaisante la situation de l ’uti possidetis juris en1821
sur la base des titres coloniaux et des effectivités» (ibid., p. 579, par. 367).
88. Si telle fut la situation de Meanguera, une petite île habit ée, et de Meanguerita, il faut
écarter la possibilité que l’on puisse établir un uti possidetis iuris des récifs et îlots situés dans la
zone en litige qui serait favorable à l’une ou l’au tre des provinces qui formaient la capitainerie
générale du Guatemala. Les 26hectares de l’exiguë et inhabitée Meanguerita sont l’Australie en
comparaison avec les récifs et îlots infinitésimaux des Caraïbes dont nous parlons.
89. Le Nicaragua a offert dans sa réplique des données suffisantes pour affirmer sa plus
grande présence et activité dans la zone où se tr ouvent les récifs et les îlots tout au long
55
Liv. III, Tit. I, loi 1 de la Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, mandadas a imprimir y publicar
por la Majestad Católica del Rey Don Carlos II, Nuestro Señor (éd. facs, 3 vols, Madrid, 1998). - 37 -
e 56
du XIX siècle . En tout cas, le principe de proximité opérerait à la date de l’indépendance, 1821,
au bénéfice de la capitainerie générale du Guatem ala, qui exerçait directement juridiction, comme
nous l’avons vu, sur les établissements de la côte de Mosquitos, et non au bénéfice du Honduras ou
du Nicaragua. C’est pourquoi, selon l’avis de cette dernière république, le titre de l’une ou l’autre
partie sur les récifs ou îlots dans la zone disputée ne peut remonter à l’ uti possidetis iuris de 1821 ;
il devra, s’il existe, avoir une autre base.
90. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je n’abuserai pas plus de votre temps, en
démentant ou nuançant les considérations de la duplique du Honduras sur des questions comme les
relations entre le constitutionna lisme historique des Parties et l’ uti possidetis iuris , ou la
reconsidération de la jurisprudence qui avale l’application de ce principe, ou les contradictions dans
lesquelles, selon le Honduras, le Nicaragua tomber ait en contestant face à lui ce qu’il soutient face
57
à la Colombie . Il suffit de se reporter aux développemen ts sur ces différents points de la réplique
du Nicaragua 58pour se rendre compte de leur insignifiance, de leur inconsistance et de leur absence
de pertinence.
91. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre courtoise attention
et, ayant achevé mon exposé, Madame le préside nt, peut-être avez-vous considéré l’opportunité
d’une pause avant de bien vouloir appeler à cette barre M. Oude Elferink.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Brotóns. There will now be a short
break and the Court will then resume.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.40 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Dr. Oude Elferink, you have the floor.
56
RN, par. 6.93 et 4.46 et suiv.
57DH, par. 3.33 et suiv.
58RN, par. 4.7 et suiv. - 38 -
EMLr.ERINK:
T HE CAYS IN THE AREA OF OVERLAPPING CLAIMS
Introduction
1. Thank you Madam President. Madam Presid ent, Members of the Court, today I will be
addressing certain questions concerning the sove reignty of the cays contained between the
maritime boundary lines claimed by the Parties to the present proceedings. This concerns the cays
located just to the south of the Main Cape Channe l. Figure 1, that is now on the screen, shows the
maritime boundaries claimed by respectively Nicara gua and Honduras and the reef areas in which
the cays are located. On this scale the cays themselves are not visible.
2. My presentation today is structured as follows. First, I will say something about the
critical date of the dispute between the Partiesand its relevance for the questions concerning the
cays. Next, I will address the arguments that ha ve been made by Nicaragua and Honduras to
support their respective positions. The focus of that analysis will be on the Rejoinder of Honduras,
which is the last written pleading in these proceedi ngs. Following that analysis, I will deal with
Honduras’s allegation that Nicaragua has sought to widen the subject of the dispute before the
Court.
The critical date for the proceedings
3. As the Reply indicated, in the present case the critical date can be established as 1977, that
is, the year in which Nicaragua proposed Honduras to open negotiations in order to delimit their
maritime areas in the Caribbean Sea. That argument can be found in paragraph5.4(iv) of the
Reply. In that same paragraph, it was observed that “Honduras’s supposed effectivités in the area
in dispute are dated after 1980, that is, beginning with the civil conflict in Nicaragua supported and
financed by the United States in cooperation with Nicaragua’s neighbours, particularly Honduras”.
4. In the Rejoinder, Honduras tries to rehab ilitate its reliance on prac tice subsequent to the
critical date. First of all, it is suggested that caragua’s claim is of recent origin (RH, p.18,
para. 2.20). As will become apparent from my pres entation, that epithet does not do justice to the
origin of the Nicaraguan claim, to say the least. Let me give one example already ⎯ Nicaragua has
regulated a turtle fishery of the Cayman Island fishermen along Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast. That - 39 -
fishery started in the nineteenth century and came to an end in 1960, when the Treaty granting the
Cayman islanders access to the fishery was not renewed by Nicaragua (RN, Addendum).
5. Honduras also seeks to rehabilitate its re liance upon practice that has taken place after the
critical date by arguing that it has maintained a consistent position throughout (RH, p.20,
para. 2.26). That is demonstrably not the case. All of Honduras’s evidence points to the fact that
Honduras started to take an interest in the cays after Nicaragua proposed to start talks on the
delimitation of a maritime boundary in the Caribbean Sea in 1977. Honduras has tried to create the
impression of a consistent practice before and after the critical date. In my presentation I will refer
to several instances of attempts of Honduras to su ggest a consistent practice before and after the
critical date. They show that to create the impression of a consistent position throughout Honduras
as far as the period before the critical date is con cerned draws on acts which do not pertain to the
cays in dispute or which do not involve Honduras.
6. To support its argument concerning the relevance of acts having taken place after the
critical date, Honduras cites from paragraph 135 of the Judgment on the merits in the case
concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia). The Court in
that case observed that “it cannot take into cons ideration acts having taken place after the date on
which the dispute between the Parties crystallized unless such acts are a normal continuation of
prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose of improving the legal position of the Party which
relies on them” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 682, para. 135). The Court then concluded that
“[t]he Court will, therefore, primarily, analyse the effectivités which date from the period before
1969, the year in which the Parties asserted conflicting claims to Ligitan and Sipadan” (ibid.).
7. In the present case, this statement imp lies that the analysis should primarily concern
effectivités from the period before 1977. Acts havi ng taken place after 1977 are only relevant if
they are a normal continuation of acts prior to 1977. There are no such acts of Honduras. Let me
now turn to a review of the acts of both Parties before and after 1977. - 40 -
The arguments of the Parties in relation to the Cays
(a) Introduction
8. Honduras, in Chapter 6 of the Counter-Memorial, discussed what it termed the indicia that
supported a Honduran title to the cays in dispute in the present proceedings. Nicaragua discussed
these acts and activities in paragraphs 6.30 to 6.87 of the Reply. The conclusion of that discussion
can be found at paragraphs 6.86 and 6.87 of the Reply. Next, the Reply discusses the bases of the
Nicaraguan claim at paragraphs 6.88 to 6.117 with conclusions cont ained in paragraph 6.118. The
evidence presented in Chapter 6 of the Reply led to the conclusion that the title to the cays in
dispute rests with Nicaragua. I will not repeat th e analysis contained in the Reply. Instead, as I
said before, I will focus on the further argument that Honduras has presented in the Rejoinder.
(b) Fisheries
9. Honduras submits that its regulation of fishing activities is one of the elements
establishing its title to the cays in dispute. The Counter-Memorial devoted 16 pages to that matter
(CMH, pp.102-117). Nicaragua refuted the re levance of the Honduran argument in the Reply
(RN, pp. 81-84, paras. 5.28-5.39; pp. 109-116, paras. 6.42-6.61).
10. The Rejoinder dismisses Nicaragua’s argum ents rather cursorily. According to the
Rejoinder a great number of Nicaragua’s arguments raise “smokescreens” and it is indicated that
the Rejoinder will not respond to Nicaragua’s claim (RH, p.86, para.5.18). Luckily, Honduras
does provide an example of one of the allege d smokescreens that according to Honduras are
intended to cloud substantive arguments. Acco rding to Honduras the comments of Nicaragua on
two bitácoras introduced by Honduras were not substantive in character (RH, p.86, para.5.17).
The bitácora is a document issued by Honduras on which fishermen are to indicate their catches.
11. What did Nicaragua have to say about those documents? In the Rejoinder Honduras
argued that its regulation of fishing activities is relevant to the title of the cays in dispute. For
instance, reference can be made to paragraph 5.20 of the Rejoinder. In the light of that position,
Nicaragua in the Reply made a number of points in respect of the two bitácoras that Honduras
produced as plate31 to the Counter-Memorial (RN, p.84, para.5.39; pp.112-113, para.6.50).
Plate 31 is included in figure 2 on the screen. One of the bitácoras extends to the east and north of
the point with the geographical co-ordinates 18° N 80° W ⎯ including an area beyond 200 nautical - 41 -
miles of Honduras. Thus, the bitácora does not indicate the extent of the 200 nautical mile zone of
Honduras or its maritime boundaries with neighbouring States. The other bitácora includes an area
to the south of parallel of 15°N, indicating the mainland coast of Nicaragua ⎯ the curved line
south of Cape Gracias a Dios. There is no indication of a boundary between Nicaragua and
Honduras. Moreover, neither bitácora indicates any of the cays in dispute, even though they show
other islands and submarine banks. These arguments from the Reply are not smokescreens ⎯ as
Honduras is suggesting ⎯ they directly address the fact that the evidence related to fisheries that
Honduras has produced does not prove the existence of a maritime boundary along the parallel of
14° 59' 48" N or a Honduran title to the cays to the south of the Main Cape Channel.
12. In the Rejoinder, Honduras also presents some additional argument on fisheries activities
(RH, pp. 86-94, paras. 5.20-5.37). Three additional fisheries concessions are presented. These are
depicted at plates38 to 40 in the Rejoinder, which have been included in figure3. These
concessions date from 9June1975, July1976 an d January1977. Honduras argues that “these
concessions encompass Bobel Cay, South Cay, Po rt Royal Cay and Savannah Cay” (RH, p.88,
para.5.23). Actually, only one of the concessions ⎯ a provisional permit from 1977: as will be
recalled 1977 is the critical date ⎯ is applicable to the maritime area in which those cays are
located; but the provisional permit does not refer to the cays themselves. The earlier concessions
are well to the east of the cays in dispute. Agai n, this is an example of Honduras’s reliance on
administrative acts to support its claim to the cays although they are not relevant. None of the
concessions pertains to the cays in dispute.
13. In the Counter-Memorial Honduras introduced a large number of witness statements that,
according to Honduras, support its title to the cays in dispute. Nicaragua dealt with those witness
statements in paragraphs6.51 to 6.61 of the Reply. The Reply concluded that the witness
statements are general in nature and do not provi de any evidence about specific events in the cays
in dispute (RN, pp. 114-115, paras. 6.53-6.56). Secondly, the Reply concluded that the statements
and other evidence introduced by Honduras show that Honduras only started to regulate activities
of fishermen staying on the cays some two decade s after the critical date of 1977 (RN, p.116,
para. 6.60). - 42 -
14. In the Reply, Nicaragua introduced a number of witness statements that testified that in
the 1970s only Nicaragua was policing fishing activities in the area around the cays south of the
Main Cape Channel and further to the east a nd north-east (RN, Anns.21-25). The Rejoinder
contests the relevance of two statements ⎯ of Mr. Presida contained in Annex 21 of the Reply and
Mr. Clark McLean in Annex 22 of the Reply ⎯ because the activities they describe are of a private
character. As Honduras points out these fishermen do not refer to the fact that they got licences or
any authorization from Nicaragua (RH, p.68, paras. 4.38 and 4.39). That criticism, however, is
completely off target. Both witnesses indicate th at they fished around the reefs and cays to the
south of the Main Cape Channel and that this ar ea was patrolled by Nicaragua to protect fishery
resources. No better proof of government acts is possible. As Mr.ClarkMcLean indicates, his
statement is concerned with the period from 1975, wh en he started working on a fishing boat. The
only Honduran criticism of Nicaragua ’s other witness statements concerning fisheries is that they
are not corroborated by documentary evidence (RH, p.68, paras.4.40-4.41). This concerns the
statements of Mr.Möhrke Vega, Mr.Morgan Britton and Mr.AguirreSevilla contained in
Annexes 23 to 25 of the Reply. Honduras has nothing to say about the veracity of those other
documents. Those witness statements attest that Nicaragua was present in the area surrounding the
cays in dispute before and after the critical date.
(c) The significance of Honduras’s witness statements
15. Honduras criticizes the Reply’s review of Honduras’s witness statements. The Rejoinder
submits that Nicaragua chooses to ignore that the witness statements that Honduras introduces in
the Counter-Memorial have to be taken together with the other evidence on fishing concessions,
registration of vessels, operation of naval patr ols, and other related activities (RH, p.88,
paras.5.24-5.25). In paragraph 5.25 of the Re joinder Honduras illustrates this point by short
extracts from four of its witness statements. I woul d like to give you the context of those short
extracts.
16. The first example in paragraph5.25 of the Rejoinder concerns a witness statement of
Mr.Maurice Loy Gowe, a Jamaican fisherman, w ho according to his statement has been fishing
around Savanna Cay for more than 30years ⎯ the statement is included as Annex67 to the - 43 -
Counter-Memorial. In his statement Mr.Gowe also testified that he fishes there because he has
been provided with a licence by Honduras. He does not mention when he first obtained a licence
from Honduras and no other evidence to that e ffect has been presented by Honduras. To the
contrary, Mr. Gowe’s statement does provide a specific date concerning one of the other Honduran
acts he mentions. As Mr.Gowe indicates, the municipality of Puerto Lempira enumerated the
houses in Savanna Cay two years prior to MrG. owe’s witness statement, recorded
in September 2001: two years.
17. The second example provided in paragraph 5.25 of the Rejoinder concerns a witness
statement by the migration delegated officer in Puerto Lempira, Honduras, a Mr.Seision ⎯ the
statement is included in Annex 71 of the Counter-M emorial. Mr. Seision talks about the issuance
of work permits to Jamaicans and Nicaraguans wo rking in the cays. Mr.Seision states that he
started to work in Puerto Lempira in 1989 and that his own visits to the islands stem from 1997 to
1999. This reference to 1997 for his first visit to the cays, although he worked in Puerto Lempira
since 1989, is in accord with other evidence of Honduras that it started to build up a presence in the
cays in the latter half of the 1990s. That is also confirmed by the date of the work permits to which
Honduras refers in the Counter-Memorial. Th e permits all are fromJanuary2000 (see CMH,
Ann. 125).
18. Mr. Seision also makes some observations on the period before taking up his position in
Puerto Lempira. These observations are not only concerned with the cays but also refer to
PuertoCastilla and the Bay Islands in the nor th of Honduras, which are a couple of hundred
kilometres distant from the cays. Mr. Seision mentions two specific dates. He mentions that he is
aware that in 1975 Jamaican fishermen were hired by a businessman of Puerto Castilla, in the north
of Honduras. which is distant some hundred ki lometres from the cays. Where those fishermen
were employed is not clear. Mr. Seision further observes that Nicaraguans have been living on the
cays since 1982 ⎯ that is, five years after the critical date. These observations indicate that
Jamaican fishermen only started to come to Hondur as in the second half of the 1970s and that the
arrival of Nicaraguans is linked to the armed conflict in Central America in the 1980s. These
observations do not assist Honduras in establishing its presence on the cays before the critical date. - 44 -
19. The third example contained in paragraph 5.25 of the Rejoinder is the witness statement
of Mr.Flores Ramírez, port supervisor of Puerto Lempira at the time of his deposition. All of
Mr.Flores’s testimony only refers to events of 19 88 or a more recent date. Finally, there is the
statement of Mr.Ricardo Domínguez, a Honduran fisherman ⎯ contained in Annex80 of the
Counter-Memorial. Mr. Domínguez declares that he has been fishing in South Cay for the last nine
years. His statement was recorded in 2001. A ccordingly, Mr.Domínguez started fishing in the
area in 1992, 15 years after the critical date.
20. Madam President, one has to assume that Honduras picked these four examples
carefully, to present the Court with the most c onvincing witness statements it has to offer.
However, the four witness statements do not prov ide anything tangible as far as activities prior to
the critical date are concerned. To the contrary, th ey rather deal with events after the critical date
and they confirm that Honduras only became interested in the cays in the area in dispute after the
critical date ⎯ well after the critical date. Honduras tries to build up that practice although it was
perfectly aware of Nicaragua’s position. Such pr actice cannot contribute to establishing a title to
the cays.
21. Honduras also takes issue with Nicar agua for quoting selectively from the witness
statements in discussing them in the Reply (RH, pp.89-90, para.5.26). This is not the case.
Madam President, I will not repeat the review that was carried out by Nicaragua in the Reply (RN,
pp. 113-116, paras. 6.51-6.61). Nicaragua invites th e Court to carefully read the references of the
Parties to the statements and compare them to th e statements themselves. Let me however make
one point here. This concerns the four witness statements I just discussed. The only reference
Honduras makes to a year or time period in the paragraph of the Rejoinder in which it quotes from
them concerns the fact that one fisherman had been fishing for 30 years in the area around Savanna
Cay. You will not find any reference to any of the other dates I mentioned to you just now in
paragraph5.25 of the Rejoinder. That mak es Honduras’s accusation of selectivity sound rather
hollow.
22. There is one affidavit introduced by H onduras that deserves closer consideration as it
contains specific information on a period well before the critical date in this dispute. This is the
deposition of Mr.Daniel Bordas Nixon, who travelle d with his father to Bobel Cay in the 1920s. - 45 -
That deposition can be found at Annex70 of the Counter-Memorial. In the Reply, Nicaragua
concluded that the deposition rather confirmed th e historical links between Nicaragua and the cays
that are now in dispute (RN, p. 117, para. 6.63). The Rejoinder seeks to re fute this conclusion by
accusing Nicaragua of taking liberties with the evidence. Honduras recognizes that Mr.Bordas
was born on the right bank of the Rio Coco ⎯ that is in Nicaragua ⎯ and that he lived in Cape
Gracias a Dios. However, Honduras points out, Mr .Bordas’s birth was registered in Puerto
Lempira, Honduras, he holds Honduran nationalit y and he moved to H onduras after the Judgment
of the Court of 1960 in the case concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on
23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua) (RH, p. 99, para. 5.53).
23. Mr.Bordas Nixon’s links to Nicaragua are much more substantive than Honduras
suggests. His deposition indicates that he lived fo r 65 years in Cape Gracias a Dios before moving
to Honduras. As Mr.Bordas was probably born somewhere between 1910 and 1920 ⎯ his
deposition does not provide his date of birth, but indicates that Mr. Bordas visited Bobel Cay with
his father in the 1920s at the age of 12 ⎯ he only moved to Honduras between 1970 and 1980, well
after the Judgment of the Court in the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain . Mr. Bordas in
his deposition also indicates that he conducted hi s commercial transactions at Puerto Cabezas,
Nicaragua. In conclusion, it is fully justified to accept Mr. Bord as’s deposition as evidence of the
links between Nicaragua and the cays in dispute.
(d) The views of third parties
24. Honduras has argued that the views of third parties are relevant to establishing the title to
the cays in dispute. In the Counter-Memorial, Honduras referred to the views of third States and
other third parties (CMH, pp.126-129, paras.6.68- 6.75). In the Reply, Nicaragua concluded that
the views of third parties did not contribute to establishing a title of Honduras to the cays in dispute
(RN, pp. 119-123, paras. 6.71-6.82). Honduras revisited this matter in the Rejoinder. This requires
some further comments.
25. The Rejoinder insists on the relevance of various fisheries reports produced by third
parties (RH, pp.91-94, paras.5.31-5.37). First, there is a report of the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service of 1943 (CMH, Ann. 162). The Rejo inder submits that it is readily apparent that - 46 -
this report’s reference to islands and cays includes the cays that are now in dispute (RH, p.92,
para. 5.32). As Nicaragua pointed out in the Repl y the report only makes specific mention of the
Bay Islands and the Caratasca Cays (RN, p. 110, para. 6.45). As can be appreciated from figure 4
all of these islands and cays are well to the west and north of the cays located between the maritime
boundary claims of the Parties. If anything, this report proves that in 1943, Honduras considered
that it had a title to the cays to the north of its mainland coast. The cays in dispute are not to the
north of the Honduran mainland coast and are well to the east of the islands and cays that are
mentioned in the 1943 report.
26. That conclusion concerning the 1943report is confirmed by a notification of a fishing
licence from 1962 that was introduced by Honduras in the Counter-Memorial (CMH, Ann.119).
In the Reply, Nicaragua pointed out that this doc ument refers to an area in a northbound direction
from the mainland coast between the Bay of Puer to Cortes and the Rio Coco (RN, p.112,
para.6.49). That northbound area as shown on figu re5 includes the Caratasca Cays and the Bay
Islands mentioned in the 1943 report. It does not include any of the cays that are located in the area
of overlapping maritime claims.
27. The Rejoinder also discusses a number of reports published by the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) that originated from a project on fisheries off the Central American coasts in
the Caribbean and the Pacific from the end of the 1960s and early 1970s (RH, pp.92-93,
paras.5.33-5.35). The gist of the Rejoinder’s ar gument is that Nicaragua has not addressed the
substance of the FAO reports. Nicaragua did address the substance of the reports. That analysis is
contained in paragraphs 6.46 to 6.48 of the Reply and does not need repeating for the moment. My
colleague Professor Remiro Brotóns will say someth ing more about the FAO project on Thursday.
However, one point is worth mentioning in respect of the Rejoinder’s critique. At paragraph 5.34
of the Rejoinder, Nicaragua is accused of trying to mislead the Court. This concerns the following.
In the Reply, Nicaragua drew attention to the fa ct that off the Gulf of Fonseca one of the FAO
reports indicates a line that would seem to contradict Honduras’s position in respect of its maritime
boundary in that area (RN, p. 111, para. 6.46). The alleged misrepresentation of the Reply consists
of the absence of a reference to the 1992 Judgment of the Court dealing with the régime of the Gulf
of Fonseca. Nicaragua did of course implicitly refer to Honduras’s interpretation of that Judgment. - 47 -
The bottom line of Nicaragua’s argument is that lines included in the FAO reports do not represent
lines dividing territory or maritime zones ⎯ be it in the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean.
Honduras’s claim that the reports prove the exis tence of a traditional boundary line along the
parallel of 14° 59' 48" N is unfounded.
28. Honduras has also argued that its sovereignty over the cays has been recognized by third
States. In this connection, Honduras makes refere nce to Jamaica and the United States. In the
Reply, Nicaragua set out that the arguments of Honduras to prove Jamaican recognition were not
convincing (RN, p.119, paras.6.71-6.72). In a ddition, Nicaragua pointed out that Nicaragua had
held negotiations with Jamaica concerning the delim itation of a bilateral maritime boundary in the
area to the north of the maritime boundary claim of Honduras along the parallel of 14°59'48" N.
Nicaragua submitted that those negotiations proved that Jamaica did not consider that the parallel
claimed by Honduras served to limit the maritime areas or sovereignty over islands of Nicaragua
(RN, p.138, paras.6.116-6.117). A proposal of Jamaica to Nicaragua specifically mentioned
Media Luna, located to the north of the parallel, as a base point (RN, Ann. 33).
29. The Rejoinder submits that the negotia tions between Jamaica and Nicaragua do not
support the proposition put forward by Nicaragua concerning the position of Jamaica (RH,
pp.69-70, paras.4.44-4.45). In this connec tion, Honduras points out that its negotiations with
Jamaica were subsequent to those of Nicaragua and Jamaica. Honduras also quotes a Jamaican
aide-mémoire of 15June2003; unfortunately, a rather selective quotation. The aide-mémoire is
on the screen in figure6. Paragraph2 of the ai de-mémoire is quoted in paragraph4.44 of the
Rejoinder; paragraph3 of th e aide-mémoire is not quoted. Paragraph3 contradicts Honduras’s
claim that Jamaica has expressed support for the position of Honduras. The paragraph reads “[t]he
Government of Jamaica has not in any way expressed support for either party in this dispute”.
30. A comparison of the bilateral negotiations of Jamaica with respectively Nicaragua and
Honduras is revealing. Jamaica submitted a propo sal for a maritime boundary to Nicaragua and to
Honduras (RN, Ann. 331; RH, Ann. 234, p. 15). Those proposals are indicated in figure 7 that is
now on the screen. Honduras suggests that its subse quent negotiations took place in the same area
(RH, p.69, para.4.44). Apparently, Honduras considers that its negotiations with Jamaica
cancelled out the prior negotiations between Jamaic a and Nicaragua. As can be appreciated, no - 48 -
such thing happened. The two proposals of Jamaica did not concern the same area, as the
Rejoinder submits. The delimitation line Jamaica proposed to Honduras starts to the north of the
delimitation line Jamaica proposed to Nicaragua . These two proposals from Jamaica imply that
Jamaica had in mind a putative tripoint somewhere between the proposals. If Jamaica had
supported or believed Honduras’s 15°N claim agai nst Nicaragua, the Jamaican proposals would
have reflected that.
The PRESIDENT: Dr. Oude Elferink, could I ask you to speak a little more slowly, which
will help the interpreters.
Mr. ELFERINK: Yes, of course.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you.
EMLr.ERINK:
31. Honduras has relied on a 1976 arrangement between itself and the United States to argue
that the United States has supported the positi on of Honduras concerning the parallel of
14° 59' 48" N (CMH, Ann. 152). In the Reply, Ni caragua pointed out that the 1976 arrangement is
not relevant to the dispute over the cays (RN, p. 119, para. 6.73). The arrangement does not make
any reference to the parallel of 14° 59'48"N, or the cays in disput e. As was also pointed out in
that paragraph of the Reply only in 1981, at which time Nicaragua was involved in an armed
conflict with inter alia Honduras and the United States, markers were placed on the cays. In the
Rejoinder (para.5.64) Honduras is silent on th is latter point and again only suggests that 1976 ⎯
the date of the bilateral agreement that does not mention the cays at all⎯ is the relevant date for
the placement of the markers and not 1981, when they were actually placed.
32. The Rejoinder also insists on the releva nce of United States Gazetteers, USDefense
Mapping Agency Sailing Directions and Charts pub lished by the British Hydrographer of the navy
to establish title to the cays (RH, pp.104-105, paras.5.67-5.70). The Reply already set out the
irrelevance of those materials at paragraphs6. 77 to 6.79, and I refrain from repeating that
argument. The Rejoinder has certainly not addr essed that argument. On the other hand, the
Rejoinder does seek to distort what was said in th e Reply. According to the Rejoinder, Nicaragua - 49 -
has not raised any material whic h enables it to challenge the fact that the 1993 charts published by
the British Hydrographer treat the islands as being located in Honduras (RH, p.105, para.5.70).
Honduras is turning things on their head. Honduras itself has not introduced any material to prove
that British charts treat the cays as being located in Honduras. The charts that are before the Court
disprove Honduras’s assertion. Two charts of th e United Kingdom Hydrographic Office covering
the Atlantic coasts of Nicaragua and Honduras have been used by the Parties in these proceedings.
Chart 1218 “Cuba to Miskito Bank” and the larger scale chart 2425 “River Hueson to False Cape”.
These charts do neither indicate that the cays to th e south of the Main Cape Channel are Honduran
nor that there exists a maritime boundary betw een Nicaragua and Honduras. What Nicaragua
actually did say in the Reply in respect of a Pilot prepared by the UnitedKingdom Hydrographic
Office was that “[i]f it were to be accepted that the geographical descriptions contained in the Pilot
contribute to establishing a title to the disputed cays , they would form part of Nicaragua, as they
are located in the MiskitoBank o ff the east coast of Nicaragua” (RN, p.122, para.6.79). The
Rejoinder is silent on that reference of the Pilo t to cays on the MiskitoBank off the east coast of
Nicaragua.
33. Madam President, let me conclude this re view concerning the views of third States.
What first of all counts to decide this dispute is the practice of the Parties. Honduras apparently
has to rely to such an extent on third parties because it considers th at its own practice falls short of
proving its case. The review of Honduras’s arguments show that the views of third parties do not
support its case. Honduras has placed particular reliance on the views of Jamaica. If Jamaica’s
proposals on maritime delimitation to Nicaragua a nd Honduras were to be given any weight, they
contribute to confirming the position of Nicaragua in respect of the cays in dispute.
(e) The application of civil and criminal law by Honduras
34. In the Reply, Nicaragua had argued that the evidence that Honduras had presented
concerning the application and enforcement of its civil and criminal laws in the Counter-Memorial
concerned cases long after the critical date (RN, p. 105, para. 6.35). The Reply also observed that
all of the cases involving the applications of H onduras’s civil law were in no way related to the
cays in dispute in the present proceedings (RN, p. 105, para. 6.35). The Rejoinder does not contest - 50 -
that these cases concerned events af ter the critical date (RH, p.98, para.5.47). Interestingly, the
Rejoinder tries to suggest that incidents that occurred on fishing banks have some relevance for the
question concerning the cays. The Rejoinder submits that those banks are in close proximity to the
disputed cays (RH, p.98, para.5.48). Appare ntly, Honduras uses the term “proximity” rather
loosely. None of these banks is close to the cays. For example, MiddleBank, one of the banks
concerned, is over 100 nautical miles distant from the disputed cays.
35. In the Counter-Memorial, Honduras argued that it had long regulated the access of
Jamaican fishermen to the cays in dispute. In the Reply Nicaragua pointed out that Honduras only
provides evidence of its regulatory activity in 1999 and beyond (RN, p.116, para. 6.62). The
Reply observes that the Counter-Memorial then refe rs to the presence of persons in the cays for a
much longer period, without submitting any proof th at such presence was regulated by Honduras
before 1999 (RN, pp.116-117, para.6.62). In the Rejoinder Honduras points out that it has
actually regulated immigration, mostly of Ja maicans, since 1997, not 1999 (RH, pp.98-99,
para.5.50). That two-year time difference is not really significant. It is still 20years after the
critical date and further confirms that Honduras onl y tried to create the impression of a presence in
cays in the second half of the1990s.
36. Paragraph 5.50 of the Rejoinder insist s that the nondescript statements Honduras has
provided the Court with are proof of the fact that Honduras regulated immigration before 1997.
The witness statement of the migration delega ted officer in Puerto Lempira, Mr.Seision ⎯ to
which I referred before ⎯ indicates the contrary. This migration officer assumed office in Puerto
Lempira in 1989 but only first visited the cays in 1997.
(f) Naval patrols of Nicaragua and Honduras
37. In the Counter-Memorial, Honduras introdu ced a large number of documents related to
naval patrols to support its claims concerning the cays (CMH, pp.121-124, paras.6.60-6.63).
Nicaragua responded to this by pointing out that those patrols were not of direct relevance to
establish a title to the cays (RN, p.117, para.6.64). In addition, Nicaragua pointed out that
Honduras had not introduced any evidence of such ac tivities in the cays before the critical date of
1977 (RN, p.117, para.6.65). Nicaragua then referred to two of its witness statements ⎯ - 51 -
contained in Annexes 23 and 24 of the Reply ⎯ that confirmed that point (RN, p. 117, para. 6.65).
The two witness statements also indicate that Ni caragua did patrol the area to the north-east of
Cape Gracias a Dios up to the parallel of 17° N. In the Rejoinder, Honduras takes issue with those
witness statements (RH, p. 100, paras. 5.55-5.56). Honduras criticizes Nicaragua for relying on the
witness statement of Mr.Möhrke Vega ⎯ contained in Annex23 of the Reply ⎯ to argue that
Honduras did not patrol the area before the cr itical date of 1977. Honduras argues that
Mr.MöhrkeVega’s statement can only concern the period before 1975, because at that time he
retired from his job as a ship’s captain (RH, p. 100, para. 5.55). That criticism in itself is surprising
as it implies an admission on the part of Honduras that Nicaragua regulated activities in the area
concerned before 1975 and that Honduras up to 197 5 was not present in the same area. Moreover,
the witness statement also indicates that Mr.M öhrke’s next assignment was with the Nicaraguan
navy on the Atlantic coast. From his statement it is clear that he remained involved in the
operations of the navy in the maritime area up to the parallel of 17° N. Honduras’s criticism of the
other witness statement seems to boil down to its use of the term “in recent years” as not being
sufficiently precise (RH, p.100, para.5.56). This is the witness statement of Mr.Morgan Britton
in Annex 24 of the Reply. Mr. Morgan is very sp ecific in noting that as a cap tain up to the end of
1974, he never noted any presence of Honduran au thorities in the area north of the parallel
of 15° N.
38. The Rejoinder does not respond directly to the Reply’s critic ism that no evidence on
Honduran naval patrols before 1977 was offered. The Counter-Memorial contains a large number
of documents on Honduran naval patrols (CMH, Anns. 129-142). The earliest of these documents
is only from 1982. What is particularly in teresting about the first of these documents ⎯ contained
in Annex 129 of the Counter-Memorial ⎯ is that it concerns an incident involving a patrol vessel
of Honduras and a patrol vessel of Nicaragua near Bobel Cay. The first documented presence of a
Honduran naval patrol in the area south of the Ma in Cape Channel led immediately to an incident
with the Nicaraguan navy. That fact is diffi cult to reconcile with Honduras’s assertion that
Nicaragua first made a claim to the cays in th e Memorial in these proceedings (RH, p.3,
para. 1.10). - 52 -
39. The Counter-Memorial also includes one document on Honduran naval activities in
respect of cays from before 1982. That report ⎯ contained in Annex 145 of the
Counter-Memorial ⎯ refers to the placing of beacons and buoys in Vivorillo Cays and Pichon Cay.
However, those cays are to the north of the Main Cape Channel and not in dispute.
40. The Rejoinder seeks to make up for the ab sence of any material from before the critical
date of 1977 in the Counter-Memorial by introducing a witness statement of a retired officer of the
Honduran navy, Mr. Cristobal Cano (RH, p. 100, para . 5.57). Tellingly, no document is offered to
back up any of his statements. As I mentioned before Honduras takes issue with Nicaragua for not
providing any documentary evidence accompanying certain witness statements (RH, p.68,
para. 4.41). It adopts the same approach itself.
(g) The maps introduced by the Parties
41. Madam President, some commentary is also required on the cartographic evidence of the
Parties. In the Counter-Memorial Honduras introduced a number of maps of Honduras. According
to Honduras, these maps confirmed its title to the cays (CMH, p.47, para.3.36; and p.56,
para. 3.58). In the Reply Nicaragua discussed those maps included in the Counter-Memorial. That
analysis led to two conclusions. First, the maps produced by Honduras do not show the cays that
are now in dispute as being part of the territory of Honduras. Second, one of the maps, a general
map of Honduras of 1933 ⎯ that is reproduced as plate23 in the Counter-Memorial ⎯ shows a
“jurisdictional maritime line of Honduras” to the sout h of the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N. Honduras
has not given an explanation of what that line represen ts. However, the inclusion of that line in an
official map of Honduras belies the present position of Honduras that the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N
has been used since the colonial period to a ttribute islands and maritime zones to Honduras and
Nicaragua.
42. A couple of additional remarks are in pl ace in respect of the Rejoinder’s comments on
the Reply’s analysis of the map evidence. The Rejoinder states that Nicaragua is forced to
recognize that an official map of Honduras of 1954 includes Media Luna Cay (RH, p.95,
para. 5.39). That assertion deserves some explanati on. The 1954 map can be found at plate 25 of
the Counter-Memorial. As Nicaragua pointed out at paragraphs 6.24 and 6.25 of the Reply, the - 53 -
main map of the 1954official map does not include any of the cays that are now in dispute. A
continuation of the main map in an inset ⎯ shown on figure8 ⎯ does indicate a number of cays
and banks to the north-east of Cape Gracias a Dios. The inclusion of that inset to show cays that
were located beyond the area covered by the main map indicates that Honduras on its official map
intended to show all of its territory. All of the f eatures included in the inset are to the north of the
Main Cape Channel and are not in dispute between th e Parties. But, what about Media Luna Cay?
On the 1954 official map Cayo Media Luna is incl uded in a small-scale map of Central America at
the right hand bottom of the main map. That small-scale map ⎯ included as figure 9 in the judges’
folder ⎯ not only includes Media Luna Cay, but also includes islands that are hundreds of
kilometres to the south of the parallel of 14°59' 48"N, such as Isla Maiz, Isla Maiz Grande and
Cayo Perlas. The small-scale map does not make any distinction between Media Luna Cay and
those other islands. What does that imply? First, this official map is evidence of the fact that
Honduras in 1954 was aware of the location of Medi a Luna Cay. Second, notwithstanding this
knowledge, the map does not indicate Media Luna Cay as part of the territory of Honduras. To the
contrary, similar cays to the north of the Main Cape Channel are indicated as territory of Honduras
in a continuation of the main map contained in an inset.
43. In the Reply, Nicaragua introduced additional maps of Honduras that did not depict the
cays in dispute (RN, para.6.28). The comment of the Rejoinder on the third of those maps is of
particular interest. Honduras observes that it is a school map that is prepared by a private company
and has no official status (RH, p. 95, para. 5.41). The fact that Honduras rejects the significance of
this map on the basis of its status and refrains from discussing its content warrants having a look at
what it actually shows. The map is annexed to the Reply as map III. A comparison of the map to
the official map of Honduras of 1954, which I just discussed, shows that both maps depict the
territory of Honduras in exactly the same way. None of the cays to the south of the Main Cape
Channel are depicted as part of the territory of Honduras on either the 1954 or 1984 map. The
relevant part of the maps is compared on figure 10 in your folder, and which is now also on the
screen. The 1984 map contains the same inset that continues the main map, which shows the cays
to the north of the Main Cape Channel. A lthough the 1984 map according to Honduras has no
official status, its envisaged use ⎯ as its legend indicates it is a school map showing the physical - 54 -
and political geography of the Republic of Honduras ⎯ suggests that this assertion should not be
accepted out of hand.
44. The Rejoinder suggests that Honduran maps provide more convincing support for the
claim of Honduras to the cays in dispute than the ma ps of Nicaragua for its claim to the cays (RH,
pp. 70-71, paras. 4.46-4.48). That suggestion ignores a number of points. First, as was set out in
the Reply, and was further confirmed just now, the Honduran maps go a long way to proving that
Honduras did not consider that the cays in dispute formed part of its territory. That makes the
Honduran assertion that its map evidence is more c onvincing rather implausible to begin with.
Secondly, the Rejoinder almost completely ignores the argument on Nicaraguan maps set out in the
Reply (paras.6.100-6.104). For instance, no mention is made of the fact that the Reply indicates
that an official map of Nicaragua of 1898 includes cays to the north and the south of the cays that
are now in dispute. Honduras also ignores that official maps of Nicaragua of 1982 and 1993
indicate the reef areas to the north of the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N. Finally, Nicaragua pointed out
that no map of Nicaragua shows a boundary along the parallel of 14° 59'48"N. To the contrary,
the boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras in th e Gulf of Fonseca is indicated. The latter
point indicates that the map-makers were not unf amiliar with the concept of maritime boundaries.
On the screen is figure 11 showing the official map of Nicaragua of 1982 to illustrate these points.
This is a better quality copy of the copy of th e map reproduced as map IV contained in Volume II
of the Reply. The map includes a boundary in the Gu lf of Fonseca. As an enlargement of a part of
the map of the mouth of the Rio Coco shows, no maritime boundary is indicated in the Caribbean
Sea. The official map also contains an inset showing Rosalind Bank and Serranilla Bank. Their
inclusion in the inset provides further evidence that Nicaragua held that its maritime zones
extended to the area of Rosalind Bank, well to the north of the parallel of 15° N.
45. The following conclusions can be drawn from the map evidence presented by the Parties.
Nicaragua is not arguing that official maps of Ni caragua provide conclusive evidence of its title to
the cays to the south of the Main Cape Channel. However, what the maps do show is that
Nicaragua has never recognized the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N as any kind of boundary. No map of
Nicaragua indicates a boundary along that parallel. Some of the Nicaraguan maps include cays,
reef areas or banks to the north of the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N. - 55 -
46. The maps of Honduras that have been introduced also do not show a boundary along the
parallel of 14° 59' 48" N. What is more, one map indicates that this parallel was not considered to
be a boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras. Moreover, maps of Honduras giving a detailed
picture of the Honduran territory do not include the cays that are now claimed by Honduras. This
includes the official map of Honduras from 1954. This map evidence should be taken into account
in evaluating the claim of Honduras that the para llel of 14°59'48"N is a boundary and that
Honduras has a title to the cays to the north of th e parallel. These maps may be viewed as an
admission against interest from official Honduran sources. That conclusion is confirmed by the
Beagle Channel arbitration (para.142 of the Award) and the first phase of the Eritrea/Yemen
arbitration (para. 374 of the Award).
(h) The relevance of national legislation allegedly referring to the cays
47. Another argument of Honduras to support its claim to the cays in dispute is the fact that
the Constitution of Honduras and Honduran legislation refer to some of those cays. This argument
was first made in the Counter-Memorial (CMH , pp.43-45, para.3.29). In the Reply
(paras.6.17-6.19) Nicaragua analysed that argument of Honduras and concluded that only in
1982 ⎯ five years after the dispute over ma ritime delimitation became apparent ⎯ Honduras
included a reference to one cay in the area of overlapping maritime claims in its Constitution ⎯
Media Luna Cay (RN, p.98, para.6.18). Th e 1982 Constitution does not mention the four cays
which Honduras in these proceedings has identified as being important islands.
48. In the Rejoinder, Honduras returns to its argument concerning its Constitution. Three
fold out plates (plates 37 (a)-37 (c)) are used in connection with the elaboration of its point
concerning its Constitution. These plates, especially plate37 (c) depicting the claim under the
Constitution of Honduras of 1982, indeed show an impressive array of cays. However, what is the
relevance of this for the cays in dispute? If one were to draw the maritime boundaries claimed by
the Parties on plates 37 (a) and 37 (b) of the Rejoinder ⎯ the plates that depict the cays mentioned
in the Constitutions of Honduras of 1957 and 1965 ⎯ only one cay is included between those
claim lines ⎯ namely Cayo Palo de Campeche. On the screen is figure12 (a) reproducing
plate 37 (b) of the Rejoinder to illustrate this point.As I just mentioned, Nicaragua in the Reply - 56 -
concluded that the Constitutions of Honduras before 1982 did not refer to any of the cays in the
area of overlapping claims with Nicaragua. Wh at explains the difference between the Reply’s
conclusion and the Rejoinder’s plates 37 (a) and 37 (b)?
49. In paragraph5.42 of the Rejoinder, Honduras observes “Palo de Campeche, now
submerged, is now known as Logwood Cay”. In a f ootnote to this quotation, footnote86, it is
observed that “palo de campeche” or “logwood” are common names of a tree called Haemotoxylon
campechianum. This latter correspondence of terms is not denied by Nicaragua. However,
Nicaragua rejects the conclusion Honduras seems to draw from this correspondence of terms.
There is no recent change in terminology as Hond uras suggests. Logwood Cay has always been
known as Logwood Cay. For instance, the Counter-M emorial makes reference to a British naval
journal of 1841 that mentions Logwood Cay (CMH, p. 18, para. 2.10). The Counter-Memorial also
contradicts the Rejoinder’s identification of Cayo Palo de Campeche as Logwood Cay. The text of
the Counter-Memorial refers 15 times to Logwood Cay. In none of these instances is it indicated
that Logwood Cay is also known as Cayo Palo de Campeche. The Counter-Memorial does suggest
that Logwood Cay is also known as Savanna Cay or Media Luna Cay (CMH, p. 14, para. 2.3): two
other names, but not Cayo Palo de Campeche. The only reference to Cayo Palo de Campeche in
the Counter-Memorial is contained in a reference to the provisions of the Constitution of Honduras
(Chap.3, footnote46). That reference does not make any mention of Logwood Cay. The
Rejoinder’s belated identification of Cayo Palo de Campeche with Logwood Cay is contradicted by
Honduras’s own pleading. Nicaragua stands firm by its conclusion that only in 1982 ⎯ five years
after the dispute over maritime delimitation became apparent ⎯ Honduras included a reference to
one cay in the area of overlapping maritime clai ms in its Constitution. The Constitutions of 1957
and 1965, which include a reference to many features outside the area of overlapping maritime
claims, do not refer to any cay included in the disputed area.
50. The treatment of the cays to the north and the south of the Main Cape Channel in the
Constitutions of Honduras is revealing. All three C onstitutions refer to all the cays immediately to
the north of the Main Cape Channel by name . That can be appreciated from figure 12 (b) for the
1982Constitution. The 1982Constitution also refe rs to False Cape Banks and the Coral Banks
located in that same area. To the contrary, only the 1982 Constitution makes reference to one cay - 57 -
south of the Main Cape Channel, Cayo Media Luna. None of the other cays or reefs in this area,
which include Bobel Cay, South Cay, Savanna Ca y, Burn Cay and Savanna Reef and Alargardo
Reef, are mentioned in the Constitu tions of Honduras. If Honduras is taken at its word as regards
the importance of its Constitutions, the difference in treatment of the cays to the north and the south
of the Main Cape Channel should be taken as one of the indicia confirming Honduras’s sovereignty
over the former and Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the latter.
51. There is one further point in relation to the 1982 Constitution of Honduras that needs to
be noted. The Constitutions of 1957, 1965 and 19 82 refer to Cayos Los Bajos. The
1982 Constitution also included a reference to Ba nco Serranilla, on which Serranilla Cay is located
(figure 12 (b)). Only four years later, in 1986 , Honduras concluded a maritime delimitation
agreement with Colombia that recognized the s overeignty of Colombia over Cayos Los Bajos and
Banco Serranilla and Serranilla Cay. That sequence of events makes one wonder if the inclusion of
a reference to Media Luna Cay in the 1982C onstitution was intended as an opening gambit for
maritime delimitation talks with Nicaragua.
52. The Rejoinder also introduces further legislation that supposedly proves Honduras’s
claim to the cays in dispute (RH, p. 80, para. 5.03). However, that legislation ⎯ like the 1957 and
1965 Constitutions of Honduras ⎯ refers to Cayo Palo de Campeche and not to any of the cays in
the area of overlapping maritime claims (RH, Anns. 242 and 243).
53. In view of Honduras’s insistence on the rele vance of the definition of its territory in its
national legislation to establish a title to the cay s south of the Main Cape Channel it is worth
recalling that Honduras in the Counter-Memoria l introduced two decrees, from 1868 and 1957.
The 1868 Decree defines the extent of the Department of Mosquitia and the 1957 Decree the extent
of the Department of Gracias a Dios (CMH, Anns . 62 and 63). As Nicaragua already pointed out
in the Reply both these decrees refer to Cape Gracia s a Dios as the eastern limit of the Department
(RN, p. 61, para. 4.44; and p. 98, para. 6.17). No reference to the cays to the east of Cape Gracias
a Dios is included. The 1868 Decree does refer to the islands to the north of the Atlantic coast.
This once more confirms that Honduras traditiona lly was looking north, not east, in defining the
extent of its territory. - 58 -
(i) Oil and gas licensing
54. Honduras has paid considerable attention to oil exploration licensing of Nicaragua and
Honduras in their maritime areas off the Caribbean co ast. This practice has to be considered both
in connection with the maritime delimitation and th e sovereignty over the cays to the north of the
parallel of 14°59'48"N. I will focus on the significance of the concession practice for the cays.
On Thursday, Professor Remiro Brotóns will deal with the maritime dimension of that practice.
55. As far as the cays are concerned, a si gnificant shift in the Honduran position can be
discerned between the Counter-Memorial and the Rejoinder. The Counter-Memorial that discusses
oil and gas licensing practice in paragraphs 6.24 to 6.28 did not explicitly explain the significance
of that practice for the question of sovereignty over the cays. Instead, the Counter-Memorial only
submitted that the oil and gas practice supposed ly showed that Honduras and Nicaragua have
treated the parallel of 14°59'48"N as respectiv ely the southern and northern boundaries of their
national territory ⎯ that submission can be found at paragraph 6.24 of the Counter-Memorial.
56. The Reply discussed the Honduran argum ents concerning licensing practice in
Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5, Section D.1, ob served that the Counter-Memorial overlooked the fact
that Nicaraguan concessions indicate that the maritime boundary with Honduras remained to be
established.
57. Chapter 6 of the Reply considered the implications of the licensing practice of Nicaragua
and Honduras for the cays located between thei r maritime boundary claims (RN, pp.105-109,
paras.6.36-6.41). It was pointed out that certain Nicaraguan concessions had an open-ended
northern limit in view of the absence of a mar itime boundary with Honduras. The existence of a
Honduran title to the cays just north of the para llel of 14°59'48"N would have prevented the
approach Nicaragua took in its concession practi ce. Even a minimal extension of one of the
Nicaraguan concession areas to the north of the pa rallel places the cays inside the concession area
concerned (RN, p. 106, paras. 6.37-6.38).
58. Chapter 6 of the Reply quoted extensively from the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration in support
of Nicaragua’s conclusions concerning the licen sing practice of Nicaragua and Honduras. I will
refrain from reading out the relevant paragraphs but respectfully refer the Court to paragraphs 6.39 - 59 -
and 6.41 of the Reply. Some words, however, are necessary on the Rejoinder’s reaction to that part
of the Reply.
59. The Rejoinder suggests that in Eritrea/Yemen there were circumstances that explained
why Ethiopia did not issue licences beyond a certain line and that similar conditions were not
present in the area seaward of the Rio Coco (RH, p.83, para.5.11). However, the open-ended
character of the northern limit of many of the Nicaraguan concessions makes the comparison with
the Ethiopian concessions in Eritrea/Yemen ⎯ that did not have that same open-ended character ⎯
unwarranted.
60. The Rejoinder also criticizes Nicara gua for omitting the conc luding sentence of
paragraph 423 of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award from the quotation in paragraph 6.39 of the Reply
(RH, p. 83, para. 5.12). That concluding sentence refers to a contract of Ethiopia with International
Petroleum/Amoco. That contract is then furthe r discussed in paragraphs 424 to 434 of the Award.
The Rejoinder quotes with approval from paragraphs433 and 434 of the Award, including the
conclusion of the Tribunal that Ethiopia di d grant a concession, including much of the
HanishIslands, and that Yemen did not protest that concession (RH, pp.83-84, para.5.12).
Honduras submits that, like Yemen, Nicaragua has never protested any of the activities of
Honduras (RH, p. 84, para. 5.12). That absence of protest is beside the point. Nicaragua in its own
licences provided for an open-ended northern lim it because the maritime boundary with Honduras
remained to be settled. Honduras submits that Ni caragua had been well aware of the Honduran oil
and gas practice. As was already pointed out by the Agent of Nicaragua, Ambassador Argüello, on
Monday, there is no evidence of any official communication between Nicaragua and Honduras
concerning the Honduran practice. However, if it were to be accepted that Nicaragua should have
been aware of this practice, by the same token, Honduras should have been aware of the
Nicaraguan practice that made it clear that Nicar agua considered that the maritime boundary with
Honduras had not been established and was to the north of the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N.
61. The Rejoinder also fails to mention how the Tribunal in Eritrea/Yemen dealt with the
concession practice of the parties. The Ethiopian licence that was not protested by Yemen was not
conclusive as to the sovereignty over the Hanish Islands. Those islands were awarded to Yemen
not Eritrea. Indeed, the Tribunal’s conclusion in respect of the offshore petroleum contracts - 60 -
entered into by Yemen, and by Ethiopia and Eritrea, was that they failed to establish or
significantly strengthen the claims of either party to sovereignty over the disputed islands (Award,
para. 437).
62. In the Rejoinder, Honduras makes a number of observations to suggest that its oil and
gas practice pertains to the cays in dispute, making up for its silence in the Counter-Memorial. The
Rejoinder notes that “[t]he conn ection between the oil concessions and activities on the islands is
demonstrated by the work carried out by an oil company (pursuant to Honduran Government
approval) on Bobel Cay in the 1960s and 1970s” (R H, p.81, para.5.04). This is a revealing
admission on the part of Honduras. Only on one cay in the area of overlapping maritime claims
there arguably took place activities related to oil and gas concessions. However, that is not all.
Contrary to what Honduras suggests, in paragra ph5.04 of the Rejoinder, this did not concern
activities that spanned two decades. The Rejoinder, in making that assertion, refers to a report
contained in Annex 264 of the Rejoinder. This is a report prepared by Geophysical Service Inc. of
a survey carried out for the Union Oil Company. That report, in the abstract contained on its
page 1, points out that a base station for positioning the ship M/V Midnight Worker was placed on
Bobel Cay in the spring of 1975. Honduran ac tivities allegedly spanning two decades actually
concern one single event carried out by a private company ⎯ not Honduras ⎯ that most likely
took place in a time span of no more than a couple of days or weeks.
63. The Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration had to consider a similar activity. At
paragraph 506 of the Award, in the first stage of the proceedings, it is noted:
“There was some emphasis by Eritrea on a scheme to put beacons on Hanish to
assist Amoco’s seismic testing; there is no clear evidence that they were actually
installed. Any such installation of b eacons covered several locations, of which
Greater Hanish Island was only one, and woul d have been short-lived: the evidence
provided by Eritrea mentions two weeks, a nd provides for removal of the beacons on
completion of the seismic work. Moreover, the beacons were placed by the oil
company, Amoco, with only a limited role for the Ethiopian Government in protecting
the oil company personnel and the temporary beacons from the attentions of ‘random
individuals’.”
64. A comparison of the two cases points out that Honduras has not provided any evidence
of its involvement in respect of the placing of the base station at Bobel Cay similar to that of
Ethiopia. That placement of a beacon on Bobel Cay by a private company is the only activity - 61 -
relating to oil and gas exploration on one of the cays that is now in dispute for which Honduras has
placed evidence before the Court.
65. The Rejoinder also submits that th e joint operation of the Coco Marina well ⎯ an
exploratory well that was drilled in 1969 ⎯ is conclusive evidence con cerning the sovereignty of
Honduras over the cays to the north of the parallel of 14°59'48"N (RH, p.84, para.5.13). As
Honduras points out, the Coco Marina well was drilled within 6 nautical miles from Bobel Cay and
was thus located in the territorial waters of Bobel Cay (RH, plates35 and 36). Honduras also
points out that the Coco Marina well was locat ed inside a concession area licensed by Honduras
(RH, p.84, para.5.13). The fact that the drilli ng of this well concerned a joint operation of the
concession holder of Honduras, Union Oil, and the concession holder of Nicaragua, also Union Oil,
operating in the adjacent concession areas, indicates that Honduras is wrong in concluding that this
operation confirms its sovereignt y over the cays. If the well had been drilled in the undisputed
territorial waters of an island that was the undisp uted territory of Honduras, there would not have
been any need to drill the well under a joint opera tion of the concession holders of Nicaragua and
Honduras. The fact that this was a joint operation proves that there was no agreement on the
parallel of 14° 59' 48" N as a line allocating either territory or maritime areas.
66. As I mentioned earlier, the Reply indicated that the licensing practice of Nicaragua
envisaged that certain Nicaraguan concessions pr ovided for an open-ended definition of their
northern limit in view of the absence of a ma ritime boundary with Honduras. As the Reply
indicated that fact is particularly relevant to the cays in dispute (RN, p. 106, para. 6.38).
67. The only response to the Reply seems to be contained in paragraph 4.20 of the Rejoinder
where it is argued that there is no concession of Nicaragua “in any area which is remotely
proximate to the islands”. It is not clear how H onduras is able to reach this conclusion. Honduras
depicts the concession areas of Nicaragua as ending at the parallel of 15°N, ignoring the
open-ended character of the concessions (CMH, plate 13). All of the reefs and cays to the south of
the Main Cape Channel are in the immediate vicinity of the Nicaraguan concession areas as
depicted by Honduras. By way of example, on the screen on figure 13 you can see the concessions
UnionII, UnionIII and UnionIV. These concession s were originally acquired by the Pure Oil
Company in 1962, but were later acquired by Unio n Oil. Given that the concession of these areas - 62 -
would expire on 3March1972, Union Oil rene wed its requests for the concessions on
25 February 1972, under the same terms but now with the names Union II, Union III and Union IV.
It was indicated that the boundary with Hondur as had not been established (RN, pp.77-78,
paras. 5.18-5.21). Even a minimal extension of these concession areas beyond the parallel of 15° N
includes the reefs and cays inside these concession areas.
68. The Rejoinder accuses Nicaragua of silence on evidence introduced in the
Counter-Memorial that allegedly demonstrates Nicaragua’s respect for the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N
as a maritime boundary. Reference is made to a series of diagrams published in international oil
journals (RH, p.63, para.4.29, Sect. (c)). Nicaragua considers that these diagrams did not
constitute evidence as regards the positions of th e Parties on their maritime boundary. However,
the Rejoinder’s insistence warrants having a closer look at what these diagrams actually show. One
of the diagrams reproduced by Honduras in the Counter-Memorial (CMH, Ann. 118, p. 364) shows
Nicaraguan concessions in December1971. As the copy of the figure included in the
Counter-Memorial is a bit blurred, another copy of the original figure was made. That copy is on
the screen. Madam President, I would like to draw your attention to the land boundaries of
Nicaragua indicated in the figure. As can be seen both the land boundary with Costa Rica and that
with Honduras extends seaward for some distance. One of them concerns the boundary with
Honduras in the Gulf of Fonseca, which is now enlarg ed on the screen. This is figure14. In the
case of the Rio Coco, the boundary extends seawards to the north of the parallel that according to
Honduras allegedly serves as a line to allocate territory and maritime areas (figure14 (a)). If the
Court considers that the diagrams published in intern ational oil journals that have been introduced
by Honduras have any evidentiary value, Nicaragua urges the Court to consider the implications of
the inclusion of a boundary in the sea to the north of the parallel of 14° 59' 48" N.
Madam President, I note that it is past one o’cloc k. Would you like me to continue? I still
have some . . .
The PRESIDENT: I would like you to continue, please.
Mr. ELFERINK: It’s about 20 minutes. Is that agreeable to you? That may be a bit long? - 63 -
The PRESIDENT: Do you really feel that six more pages is going to take 20 minutes?
Perhaps using graphics it will do. Is that your estimate?
Mr. ELFERINK: That was my estimate, yes.
The PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better hear you first thing in the morning.
Mr. ELFERINK: OK. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: The Court will now rise and meet again at 10 in the morning to continue
with Nicaragua’s presentation of its pleadings.
The Court rose at 1.05 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 7 mars 2007, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président, en l'affaire de la Délimitation maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras)