CR 2006/38
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 2 May 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 2 mai 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieigtgins
Vice-Prsi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Mahiou
Kre ća
Couevrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-K.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
MaMhou.,
Kre ća, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
coagment;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la fact de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M., - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Master in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
cocomnseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
coagment;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djeri ć, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. PhD. (Cambridge), Walther-Schücking Institute, University of Kiel,
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdji ć, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebi ć, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Institut Walther-Schücking, Université de Kiel,
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.
The Court meets today to begin the second round of oral argument of Serbia and
Montenegro. In the same way as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro will dispose, for
this purpose, of eight sessions. I now give th e floor to the Agent of Serbia and Montenegro,
Professor Stojanović.
STMO.JANOVI Ć : Thank you, Madame le président.
INTRODUCTION :THÈSES FONDAMENTALES AVANCÉES DANS NOTRE PLAIDOIRIE CONTRE
LA REQUÊTE DÉPOSÉE PAR LA BOSNIE -H ERZÉGOVINE
1. La naissance de la Yougoslavie fut le cour onnement de soixante-dix ans d’aspirations
communes des Slaves du Sud envers la création d’un Etat commun. L’unification des Serbes, des
er
Croates et des Slovènes a été proclamée le 1décembre 1918, et la conférence de paix à Versailles
a vérifié cet acte en reconnaissant le Royaume des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes.
2. Ce royaume qui, à partir de 1929 s’appela it «le Royaume de Yougoslavie», était un Etat
multiethnique mais il n’est jamais devenu une véritable communauté politique et sociale de
«citoyens yougoslaves». Cet Etat continuait à exister comme un regroupement de communautés
ethno-nationales et les valeurs sociales ont c ontinué à se développer à l’intérieur de ces
communautés. Il est effectivement regrettable que ce processus ne fût pas accompagné de la
promotion de valeurs communes à tous les citoyens de l’Etat yougoslave.
3. Ainsi, dès le début de la création de l’Etat yougoslave, les valeurs des différentes
communautés ethno-nationales se sont développées indépendamment les unes des autres et au
détriment de valeurs communes, lesquelles auraient pourtant été indispensables au maintien d’une
Yougoslavie multiethnique en tant qu’Etat re présentant l’ensemble de ses citoyens.
Périodiquement, certaines communautés ethno-nationa les s’alliaient contre d’autres communautés,
ce qui provoquait des tensions internes et des conflits politiques de lutte de pouvoir tout au long de
la période menant à la seconde guerre mondiale. Sur le plan constitutionnel, l’élite politique
serbe ⎯avec le soutien de certaines communautés ethno-nationales (notamment des Musulmans
bosniaques et des Slovènes) ⎯ a su imposer sa volonté: au lieu d’être constituée comme un Etat
fédéral, la Yougoslavie multiethnique a été cons tituée comme un Etat unitaire. Pourtant, le - 11 -
système fédéral aurait probablement pu contribuer au développement graduel d’une «identité
nationale yougoslave» ressentie par tous les citoyens de cet Etat. L’Etat unitaire ne fut pas accepté,
notamment par les Croates, et les relations entre les deux plus grandes nations au sein du Royaume
yougoslave, à savoir les Serbes et les Croates, furent tendues dès le début de la création de cet Etat.
Ces tensions provoquaient des conflits politiques, alternés par de courtes périodes de coopération.
4. Comme indiqué ci-dessus, soixante-dix ans d’efforts communs ont précédé la naissance de
la Yougoslavie. Environ autant d’années furent nécessaires pour Œuvrer à sa mort.
5. Les causes de la désintégration de la Yougos lavie ont été les suivantes : au moment de la
crise économique et politique des années quatre-vingt, les valeurs spécifiques des différentes
communautés ethno-nationales, qui constituaient le fondement de leurs identités, sont devenues
prépondérantes. Ces valeurs furent le produit d’un processus de développement historique et
culturel. Elles furent aussi marquées par l’ appartenance religieuse, laquelle a joué un rôle
considérable dans la formation des iden tités respectives des différentes communautés
ethno-nationales. Bien que les différences religieuses n’exerçassent normalement pas une
influence décisive sur les rapports politiques, dans un climat de tension permanent, ces différences
ont été utilisées comme justification supplémentaire pour la séparation des groupements sociaux
déjà confrontés sur le plan politique. Il faut t outefois rappeler qu’en dehors des tensions et des
conflits politiques, les différents groupements sociaux connaissaient aussi des périodes de
coopération. Par conséquent, les conflits armés n’ont éclaté qu’au commen cement de la seconde
guerre mondiale. Nous avons analysé ce processus d’une manière détaillée lors de notre premier
tour de plaidoiries.
6. Dans les années quatre-vingt, lorsque la cr ise économique s’instaure, les différences dans
le niveau de développement économique entr e les différentes communautés ethno-nationales
renforcent leurs divergences politiques concernant les moyens de sortir de cette crise.
7. La Slovénie et la Croatie, qui étaient les entités fédérales les plus développées, ont opté
pour la sécession de la Yougoslavie, considérant, entre autres, que cette séparation les aiderait à
sortir plus rapidement de la crise. Ceci a engendré une tendance générale vers la création
d’«Etats-nations», puisque toutes les entités fédé rales, sauf la Bosnie-Herzégovine, avaient été
constituées et s’étaient développées sur une base ethno-nationale. L’essence même du - 12 -
nationalisme en tant qu’idéologi e, pris sous son aspect positif, est de vouloir regrouper tous ceux
qui ont le sentiment d’une appartenance commune da ns le but de la création d’un Etat-nation.
Toutefois, le nationalisme constitue aussi un grand danger, car il entr aîne l’exclusion de tous ceux
qui ont une identité différente, et crée ainsi la b ase pour la discrimination et l’intolérance sociale,
voire pour les conflits ouverts entre les différentes communautés établies sur le territoire où on veut
constituer un Etat-nation. Ces tensions se reflèten t tant sur le plan interhumain et sur le plan
familial, que sur le plan professionnel. La méfi ance et la peur s’instauraient et provoquaient
l’hostilité entre les membres des différentes communautés. On finit par pratiquer la politique de
l’exclusion «des autres» communautés de la «nôtre », laquelle doit devenir le fondement du futur
Etat indépendant. «Its (nationalism) key characteristic is its definition of a political community, its
principles of membership, its cultural and territo rial boundaries and also, therefore its enemies.»
(S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1995, p. 223.)
8. Par sa composition multiethnique, la Bosn ie-Herzégovine pouvait être considérée comme
une véritable «petite Yougoslavie». Mais à la différence de la Slové nie, de la Croatie et de la
Macédoine, une délimitation territoriale de la Bo snie-Herzégovine n’était pas possible, car les
communautés ethno-nationales y étaient complètement mélangées, surtout dans les villes. Suite à
un processus d’urbanisation accru dans la période entre 1945 et 1991, aucune ville (sauf quelques
rares exceptions, comme la ville de Drvar pa r exemple) n’était dominée par une communauté
ethno-nationale. Dans les villages, la situation fut différente: les petites exploitations agricoles
tendaient à la séparation des maisons, des familles et des individus selon le critère ethno-national.
L’appartenance religieuse fut aussi un critère de séparation. C’est ainsi que l’idéologie
nationaliste, qui s’est substituée à l’idéologie communiste, a réussi à séparer les voisins d’autrefois.
Les premiers conflits armés ont effectivement éclaté entre les villages et dans les villages. Ces
conflits initiaux et sporadiques ont engendré la formation d’unités militaires sur une base
ethno-nationale, et se sont graduellement tr ansformés en un conflit armé généralisé
(S. L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 237). - 13 -
Les questions de compétence
9. Lors de notre premier tour de plaidoiries, le professeur Tibor Varady a démontré que
er
jusqu’au 1 novembre 2000 la République fédérale de Yougoslavie (RFY) (aujourd’hui
Serbie-et-Monténégro) ne pouvait pas avoir accès à la Cour, car elle n’était pas membre de
l’Organisation des NationsUnies (ONU). Par c onséquent, elle ne pouvait pas être un Etat
défendeur en vertu de la conve ntion pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(dénommée ci-après «la convention sur le génocide»). Dans son arrêt, la Cour s’est basée sur le
er
fait que la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’était pas membre de l’ONU avant le 1 novembre 2000. Avant
cette date la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a, en effe t, pas pu être membre de l’ONU puisqu’elle ne
possédait pas de continuité avec l’ex-Yougoslavie. Comme vous le savez, tous les nouveaux Etats
créés après la désintégration de l’ex-Yougoslavi e ont été admis à l’ONU en tant que nouveaux
Membres de cette organisation.
10. Dans notre second tour de plaidoiries nous nous emploierons à prouver encore une fois
que l’Etat de Serbie-et-Monténégro n’était pas lié et n’est pas lié par l’article IX de la convention
sur le génocide. En1996, lorsque la Cour a re ndu son arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires, la
Cour s’est basée sur la présomption que la Serbie-e t-Monténégro était liée à la convention en vertu
de la continuité étatique qu’elle pouvait avoir maintenu par rapport à l’ex-Yougoslavie. Lorsqu’il a
été décidé que la Serbie-et-Monténégro ne posséd ait ni de continuité su bjective ni de statut
contractuel de l’ex-Yougoslavie, cette présomption a perdu son fondement.
11. Nous allons aussi démontrer que la Serbie -et-Monténégro n’est pas liée par l’article IX,
car elle n’a jamais déposé de notification indi quant son intention d’être le successeur de
l’ex-Yougoslavie en ce qui concerne la convention su r le génocide. La proclamation de la création
de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie qui a eu lieu le 27avril1992, ne pouvait pas être
interprétée comme étant l’acte de succession des traités. Comm e vous le savez, une succession
entre Etats n’est jamais automatique. Et même si l’automatisme existait, il ne pourrait pas
s’appliquer à l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide vu le fait que cet article constitue la base
pour la juridiction de la Cour pour les différends entre les parties contractantes à la convention sur
le génocide. - 14 -
12. Nous allons également démontrer que la Serbie-et-Monténégro ne pouvait pas avoir
qualité pour être partie contractan te à la convention sur le génocid e avant de devenir Etat Membre
de l’ONU. En tant qu’Etat non membre de l’ONU, la Serbie-et-Monténég ro n’a pu adhérer à la
convention sur le génocide qu’après y avoir été spécia lement invitée en application de l’article XI,
c’est-à-dire par le biais d’une invitation formelle de la part de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU.
Comme vous le savez, la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a jamais reçu une telle invitation. Ce n’est
qu’après être devenu Etat Membre de l’ONU que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a accédé à la convention
sur le génocide tout en formulant une réserve relati ve à l’articleIX. Le statut contractuel de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro est confirmé dans le rapport du Secrétaire général de l’ONU, en sa qualité de
dépositaire de la convention sur le génocide. Sur la base de ce rapport, il ne peut y avoir de doute
sur le fait que la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a adhéré à la convention sur le génocide qu’en 2001, tout
en formulant une réserve relative à l’article IX.
13. Puisque la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas eu accès à la Cour dans la période visée par la
présente requête et puisque la Serbie-et-Montén égro n’était pas liée par l’articleIX de la
convention, nous prions cette honor able Cour de réexaminer les questions de sa compétence et de
se déclarer non compétente pour statuer sur la présente affaire.
14. Lors de notre second tour de plaidoiries, la Serbie-et-Monténégro continuera à plaider,
aussi sur la base d’autres arguments, en faveur de la non-compétence de la Cour dans la présente
affaire.
Je veux souligner encore une fois, au début du deuxième tour de nos plaidoiries, que cette
haute Cour n’a pas de compétence pour connaître de la présente affaire et que la
Serbie-et-Monténégro n’avait pas accès à la Cour au moment pertinent. Nous avons démontré cette
assertion et nos arguments n’ont pas été réfutés d’une manière convaincante par le demandeur.
Mais nous ne voulons laisser sans réponse aucun grief et, par conséquent, nous allons écarter
tous les arguments du demandeur. Nous allons dém ontrer encore une fois que le défendeur n’avait
pas accès à la Cour au moment pertinent et que cet te Cour n’est pas compétente dans l’affaire en
présence. Nous allons présenter nos arguments dans la même succession que celle employée par le
demandeur et donc nous traiterons de la question de l’accès et de la compétence lors des audiences
des 8 et 9 mai. - 15 -
A NALYSE DE LA BASE FACTUELLE ET APPLICATION DE LA NOTION
DU GÉNOCIDE SUR LES FAITS
15. Le 20 mars 1993, la Bosnie-Herzégovine a déposé devant cette honorable Cour une
requête introductive d’instance contre la Répub lique fédérale de Yougos lavie (RFY) invoquant
comme base de compétence de la Cour l’article IX de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide (ci-après dénommé e «la convention sur le génocide»). Cette
requête, qui se réfère à la guerre menée en Bosn ie-Herzégovine entre 1992 et 1995 (Application de
la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, requête), prétend que la
Serbie-et-Monténégro est responsable d’ avoir commis le génocide prétendu en
Bosnie-Herzégovine pendant la guerre mentionnée ci-dessus.
16. Le nombre des victimes des crimes (actus reus) que le requérant a décrit dans ses
arguments écrits ainsi que lors de son premier tour de plaidoiries de vant cette honorable Cour dans
la période du 27 février au 7 mars de cette année est considérable ment exagéré, ce que nous avons
cherché à prouver dans notre premier tour de plaidoiries, notamment lors de l’exposé fait par
M.SasaObradovic, coagent de la délégation de Serbie-et-Monténégro, et dans l’exposé du
témoin-expert, M. Jean-Paul Sardon, qui a présenté devant cette honorable Cour son analyse des
faits concernant le nombre des victimes de la guerre qui a eu lieu en Bosnie-Herzégovine
entre1992 et 1995. Nous avons aussi présenté les informations fournies par le Centre de
documentation basé à Sarajevo et dirigé par M.Mirsad Tokaca. Sur un plan théorique, on peut
défendre la thèse que le nombre des victimes n’a pas d’importance pour établir l’existence du crime
de génocide. En pratique, la jurisprudence du Tr ibunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie
(TPIY) introduit aussi le «critère quantitatif»: lenombre des victimes a ainsi été jugé important
pour déterminer l’ actus reus dans les affaires Sikirica (no IT-95-10-T) et Jelisic (n IT-95-10-T).
On doit toutefois admettre que le crime de génocide diffère des autres crimes contre l’humanité par
son élément subjectif et son intension dolosive (mens rea) car ce crime exige un «dol spécial»
(dolus specialis) de commettre le génocide. (Voir WilliamsSchabas, Genocide in International
Law. The Crime of Crimes , Cambridge University Press 2000, p. 213-228.) La convention sur le
génocide contient la définition de l’intention d’ exterminer en totalité ou partiellement un groupe - 16 -
ethnique, national, racial ou religieux. Cette inten tion doit revêtir la forme d’une intention directe
(dolus specialis).
17. Nous estimons que pendant les premier et second tours de plaidoiries le requérant n’a
jamais réussi à prouver l’existence du dolus specialis. Au lieu d’apporter les preuves directes du
dolus specialis, le requérant a essayé d’apporter les preuves indirectes qui concernent l’ actus reus
et cela sur la base de faits inex acts, comme il a été mentionné ci-dessus. Ceci a été clairement
e
démontré par M Xavier de Roux.
18. Au second tour de plaidoiries qui s’est tenu du 18 au 24 avril, le requérant s’est de
nouveau employé à prouver l’existence de l’intention (mens rea) par le biais des preuves qui
concernent l’actus reus. La Partie de la Bosnie-Herzégovine a ainsi exposé des faits concernant les
crimes commis (meurtres, déportations, viols et l’ existence de «camps de concentration»). Nous
sommes d’avis que ces crimes ne peuvent pas être qualifiés de crimes de génocide dès lors que le
dolus specialis, à savoir l’intention d’exterminer un groupe en totalité ou partiellement, telle que
définie par la convention sur le génocide, n’est pas prouvé.
19. Tous les représentants de la Partie de la Bosnie-Herzégovine se sont employés à prouver
l’intention de commettre le génocide en évoquant le dessein politique de la «création de la
Grande Serbie», à savoir l’objectif politique de créer un Etat commun pour tous les Serbes. Or, il
est important de rappeler que cet objectif politique fut déj à réalisé lors de la constitution de la
Yougoslavie, ce qui a permis tant au peuple serbe qu’aux autres peuples de regrouper la plupart de
leurs ressortissants au sein d’un même Etat. En évoquant le dessein politique de la «création de la
Grande Serbie» et la poursuite de l’objectif politi que «tous les Serbes dans un Etat», le requérant a
voulu inciter cette honorable Cour à admettre l’exis tence de l’intention d’exterminer tout groupe
qui s’opposerait à la réalisation de ces objectifs politiques. Notre Partie s’est dès lors employée à
démontrer que le dessein politique visant la créati on de la «Grande Serbie» ne comprenait point
d’intention de détruire d’autres peuples vivant su r le territoire visé par ce dessein politique. La
Partie de la Bosnie-Herzégovine s’est employée, ta nt dans ses arguments écrits que lors de ses
plaidoiries, d’apporter des preuves historiques sur l’existence du dessein politique de la création de
e
la «Grande Serbie» en remontant à la première moitié du XIX siècle. Nous pensons avoir réussi à
rejeter cette thèse lors de notre premier tour de plaidoiries devant cette honorable Cour. - 17 -
20. Parmi les preuves que nous avons a pportées pour dénoncer l’existence du dessein
politique de la création de la «Grande Serbie» ⎯ aussi bien dans le passé que pendant la période en
question (entre 1992 et 1995) ⎯, nous avons mis en exergue plus ieurs propositions élaborées par
les Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine visant une so lution pacifique du conflit: ces propositions
tendaient à la constitution de la Bosnie-Herzégovine comme une fédération ou une confédération
(voir par. 116 de notre premier tour de plaidoiri es), tandis que la Partie de la Bosnie-Herzégovine
insistait sur le système constitutionnel unitaire du futur Etat souverain et indépendant de
Bosnie-Herzégovine. Il faut en outre rappeler que les Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine avaient
accepté le «plan de José Cutiliero» datant du 18 mars 1992 qui préconisait la mise en place d’un
système cantonal en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Comme vous le savez, ce «plan» avait été d’abord
accepté par les Musulmans bosniaques après les né gociations diplomatiqu es qui ont eu lieu à
Lisbonne le 18mars 1992. Quelques jours plus ta rd, au moment même de la signature de cet
accord à Sarajevo, les Musulmans bosniaques ont changé leur position et ont rejeté le «plan
Cutiliero».
L A GUERRE EN B OSNIE -HERZÉGOVINE (1992-1995)
21. Il est utile d’évoquer brièvement le contex te de guerre, les causes et les conséquences du
conflit armé y compris les causes et conséquences des conflits passés, et notamment de la seconde
guerre mondiale. Dans ce contexte, il est important de garder à l’esprit que tout état de guerre est
un état criminogène. Toutefois, les actes criminels commis au cours d’un état de guerre ne peuvent
pas être considérés comme actes génocidaires s’ils ne comportent pas des éléments du crime de
génocide.
22. La Bosnie-Herzégovine a été reconnue par l’Union européenne le 6avril1992, comme
un Etat indépendant avec un système constitutionnel unitaire, à la suite du référendum par lequel
les Musulmans et les Croates de Bosnie-Herzégovine ont ensemble assuré la majorité nécessaire
pour assurer la validité de ce référendum.
23. Pourtant, une large majorité des Serb es de Bosnie-Herzégovine qui ont été qualifiés
d’une minorité nationale par la décision de la commission Badinter de1992 ont boycotté le
référendum et ceci était aussi contraire à la Constitution en vigueur de Bosnie-Herzégovine qui - 18 -
exigeait que la majorité de chacun des «trois pe uples constitutifs» s’exprime en faveur du résultat
d’un référendum. Les Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovi ne ont donc refusé d’accepter les résultats du
référendum et sont entrés en conflit armé vu le fait que toutes les trois parties en présence en
Bosnie-Herzégovine avaient déjà formé leurs unit és militaires. Les Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine
souhaitaient acquérir un territoire où les Serbes ne seraient pas considérés comme une minorité
nationale. Il existait plusieurs solutions possibles concernant le statut d’un territoire serbe, comme
nous l’avons démontré au premier tour de ma plaidoirie.
24. Nous pensons que la reconnaissance inte rnationale de la Bosnie-Herzégovine a été
prématurée car ses peuples constitutifs étaient visiblement divisés et le Gouvernement de
Bosnie-Herzégovine n’exerçait pas de contrôle eff ectif sur l’ensemble du territoire de l’Etat qui a
été reconnu par la communauté internationale. V ous avez ce témoignage de M.Micunovic, j’ai
donné au dossier de la Cour son interview donnée au Baltimore Times aux Etats-Unis en ce
temps-là.
25. Une autre preuve du caractère prématuré de la reconnaissance in ternationale de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine était le fait de l’existe nce d’une armée qui comptait environ cent dix
millehommes et qui relevait toujours du comma ndement direct de son état-major, lequel se
trouvait dans une autre unité fédérale, à Belgrade. Comme il fut expliqué lors de notre premier tour
de plaidoiries, outre l’armée nationale yougoslave (la JNA) en Bosnie-Herzégovine opéraient à
cette époque deux autres formations militaires: «la ligue patriotique» en tant que formation
militaire des Musulmans bosniaques, ainsi que la formation militaire croate y compris l’armée
régulière de Croatie (HV). Face à l’existence de ces formations militaires dans un climat de
profond conflit politique tout observateur pouvait déduire que le conflit armé était devenu possible,
voire inévitable, surtout parce que les dirigean ts de ces formations n’étaient pas disposés à
rechercher un compromis.
26. Il est utile de rappeler que la reconnaissance internationale de la Slovénie et de la Croatie
n’a eu lieu qu’après le retrait de la JNA de ces unit és fédérales (le retrait par exemple de la JNA de
la Croatie eu lieu 29 novembre 1991). Cependant, la reconnaissa nce de la Bosnie-Herzégovine a
eu lieu le 6avril1992 et le 7 avril 1992 resp ectivement par l’Union européenne et par les
Etats-Unis. Seulement cinqjours après la reconnaissance de la Bosnie-Herzégovine (le - 19 -
11avril1992), l’Union européenne a demandé à la République fédéra le de Yougoslavie de
procéder au retrait de la JNA de la Bosnie-H erzégovine. Le 15 mai 1992, presque dix jours après
la reconnaissance, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU a adopté sa résolution 752 stipulant que «JNA
or Croatian army units in Bosnia and Herzegovina be withdrawn or subject to Bosnia-Herzegovina
government authority or disarmed and disbanded with weapons under intern ational supervisions»
(S. L. Woodward, op. cit., p.258). En raison de l’inexécution de cette résolution, le Conseil de
sécurité a adopté une nouvelle résolution757 qui a imposé une longue série de sanctions contre
l’Etat nouvellement créé ⎯c’est-à-dire la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. Il est important
d’attirer l’attention de cette honor able Cour que sur un nombre total de cent quarante mille soldats
de la JNA, quatre-vingt-dixmille soldats ( 68%) ont été stationnés en Bosnie-Herzégovine
(S. L. Woodward, op. cit., p. 259). Si on tient compte du fait qu’à cette époque l’industrie militaire
comptait pour 50% de l’ensemble de l’activité in dustrielle en Bosnie-Herzégovine, et que cette
industrie employait quarante mille personnes, en réalité la JNA luttait en Bosnie-Herzégovine pour
sa propre survie. Ceci semblait être possible seulement si elle avait pu compter sur «son propre
Etat», c’est une situation politique déjà reconnue. Dans notre premier tour de plaidoiries, nous
avons expliqué les problèmes que le retrait de la JNA aurait entraînés pour la JNA en raison du fait
que les officiers et les soldats des unités de la JNA stationnées en Bosnie-Herzégovine étaient
originaires, de par leur naissance, de la Bosn ie-Herzégovine. Il est nécessaire de rappeler que
chaque citoyen de l’ex-Yougoslavie avait la «double nationalité» : la nationalité de l’unité fédérale
de sa naissance et celle de la Yougoslavie.
27. Suite à la création de l’armée yougoslave (VJ) le 8 mai 1992, le ministère de la défense
de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie a décidé de retirer t ous les soldats de la JNA stationnés
en Bosnie-Herzégovine qui étaient originaires de la Serbie ou du Monténégro. Le retrait de ces
troupes fut entamé le 19 mai 1992. Environ quatre -vingtmille ou quatre-vingt-dix mille soldats
d’origine et de nationalité bosniaques sont restés en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Lors de notre premier
tour de plaidoiries, nous avons expliqué pourquoi le retrait de ces troupes-ci de la JNA dans la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie n’était pas possible.
28. Madame le président et Messieurs les juges, lors de notre second tour de plaidoiries nous
nous emploierons à prouver que les cr imes énoncés par le requérant ta nt dans ses arguments écrits - 20 -
que dans son premier tour de plaidoiries ne pe uvent être juridiquement qualifiés que comme des
crimes de guerre ou des crimes contre l’humanité.
29. Le statut de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) fait une claire distinction entre trois types
de crimes: le crime de génocid e, défini de la même manière comme dans la convention sur le
génocide (statut de la CPI, art. 6), le crime contre l’ humanité (statut de la CPI, art. 7) et le crime de
guerre (statut de la CPI, art. 8).
30. Lors de notre second tour de plaidoiri es, nous nous emploierons à démontrer que le
requérant n’a pas prouvé l’existence de l’intentio n de détruire un groupe entier. Les trois peuples
constitutifs, à savoir les trois différentes comm unautés ethniques, nationales et religieuses
cohabitent toujours sur le territoire de la Bosnie-H erzégovine et aucune d’elles n’est en danger et
n’a jamais été en danger d’extermination.
31. Aux termes de la convention sur le génoc ide, la destruction d’une partie d’un groupe
suffit pour constituer le crime de génocide seulement si tous les autres éléments constitutifs de ce
crime sont réunis. Il est largement admis que «l’intention de détruire» doit viser au moins une
partie substantielle d’un groupe. Le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) semble
aller plus loin encore, en exigeant que les accu sés aient eu l’intention de détruire un nombre
«considérable» des individus qui sont membres d’un groupe.
32. Dans sa plaidoirie du 18 avril 20 06 ouvrant le deuxième tour d’audiences,
M. Sakib Softić, l’agent du demandeur, a affirmé: «J udgment for génocide would accelerate
democratisation of the society and help abandon the ideology of conflicting with neighbours…»
33. Madame le président, permettez-moi de dire qu’une conclusion sur la responsabilité d’un
Etat pour génocide ne peut et ne doit pas être tir ée des spéculations rela tives au fait qu’une telle
conclusion contribue ou pas au processus de démo cratisation. Et je pense que mes collègues
représentants de l’Etat demandeur en sont d’accord. Toutefois, une telle affirmation a été faite et,
par conséquent, je vais en traite r brièvement, car elle démontre une perception totalement erronée
des réalités sociales ⎯ et de la conscience sociale, en tant que partie de ces réalités.
34. Madame le président, Messieurs les jug es, une partie de notre réalité et conscience
sociale est représentée par les souvenirs de la décennie dernière, entachée par tant de tragédies et de
souffrances. Je peux accepter le fait que, pendant ce tte dernière décennie, les grandes souffrances - 21 -
du peuple bosniaque aient été les plus graves. Une autre partie de notre conscience sociale est
représentée également par les conflits du siècle passé, où le peuple serbe a été, à plusieurs reprises,
celui à subir les tragédies les plus graves et les pertes les plus importantes.
35. Des gestes visant à la réconciliation ont été faits et nous sommes prêts à continuer de les
faire. Mais il est vrai aussi que l’extrémisme national est encore présent en Serbie, comme ailleurs.
Ce sont des faits qui doivent également être pris en considération. Un jugement sur le génocide
aura, sans doute, un impact sur notre structure sociale et politique.
36. Mais je ne vois pas comment on peut considérer qu’un jugement condamnant la
Serbie-et-Monténégro pour génocide ⎯un jugement rendant la Serbie le seul Etat responsable
e
pour génocide pendant le XX siècle ⎯ pourrait «accélérer la démocratisation de la société».
Est-ce qu’on peut réellement croire qu’un tel jugement ait comme effet l’allègement des sentiments
nationalistes et des rivalités nationales, et non pas, par contre, que leur exacerbation ?
37. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi d’ajouter aussi qu’un tel
jugement que le demandeur pense pouvoir accélérer la démocratisation et aider à surmonter les
conflits aurait en réalité pour effet de placer la Repub lika Srpska du côté de la prétendue victime et
le Kosovo du côté du prétendu auteur.
38. Madame le président, je réitère ma convi ction que les spéculations relatives à l’impact
d’un jugement sur le génocide vis-à-vis du processu s de démocratisation ne doivent et ne peuvent
avoir aucune pertinence. Elles ne peuvent pas justifier une décision en faveur du demandeur et
⎯il faut le dire ⎯ en faveur du défendeur non plus. Ta nt les questions procédurales que les
questions matérielles faisant l’obje t de cette affaire relèvent du dro it et des faits et non pas de la
politique.
39. La Partie de la Serbie-et-Monténégro prouvera au second tour de plaidoiries que les
preuves du requérant mentionnées dans ses arguments écrits et dans ses plaidoiries ne sont pas
valables. Ceci, Madame le président et Messieurs les juges de la Cour, sera développé par notre
e
avocat, M Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć. Je dois informer la Cour que notre maître,
M. Xavier de Roux, a subi une opération sérieuse à Paris, il y a trois semaines, sur son cŒur et c’est
pour ça que Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović va présenter son discours devant la Cour. Merci. - 22 -
ELÉMENTS DE PREUVE CONFIRMANT LA NON IMPLICATION DU
GOUVERNEMENT DE BELGRADE
40. Le nombre total (environ 200 000) de sold ats de l’armée de la Republika Srpska (VRS)
et de la police et des unités de défense territriale de la Republika Srpska. Un petit nombre de
volontaires de Serbie-et-Monténégro n’était pas s ous le contrôle de Se rbie-et-Monténégro, ne
pouvait donc pas constituer un élémen t important dans la conduite d es opérations militaires. Il ne
pouvait en outre exercer un contrôle effectif ni de la force armée de la Republika Srpska, ni de son
commandement suprême présidé par M.Radovan Karadzic, ni de son état-major dont le
commandant était le général Ratko Mladic. Cette conclusion découle de la logique des rapports de
pouvoir et de lutte de pouvoir selon laquelle celui qui possède une plus grande force détient aussi le
pouvoir dans le processus de la prise de décisions au sein des organes politiques et militaires.
41. L’examen de la question du critère de la preuve nous amène naturellement à nos
conclusions sur la question du contrôle. Compte tenu de tous les éléments de preuve disponibles, il
apparaît qu’il n’existe aucune pr euve claire et convaincante du contrôle exercé sur la Republika
Srpska par le gouvernement de Belgrade.
42. Par contre, il existe des éléments de preuve abondants qui confirment que le
gouvernement de Belgrade n’a pas participé aux act es de la Republika Srpska. Nous vous avons
présenté ces éléments lors de notre premier tour de plaidoiries.
43. Comme déjà cité lors de notre premier tour de plaidoiries devant cette honorable Cour,
avant le 6 avril 1992, la JNA était une force armé e légitime en Bosnie-Herzégovine et en tant que
telle ⎯«from January through April 1992, JNA in Bosn ia had two priorities. The first was to
work with and support a peaceful settlement of the political differences among three ethnic groups.
The second, and more important, was to see that the Bosnian Serbs and their position in the
republic was secure.» (CIA, op. cit., VI, p. 128.)
44. A cette époque-là, les forces de la JNA pouvaient donc être déployées, en toute légalité,
en Bosnie-Herzégovine afin de protéger les communautés serbes qui étaient établies de longue date
sur son territoire. Finalement, le fait que le gouvernement de Belgrade ait fourni une assistance aux
Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine ne permet pas pour au tant d’établir l’existence d’un contrôle exercé
par ce gouvernement. - 23 -
45. Le climat dans lequel vivaient les Serbes en Bosnie-Herzégovine et en Croatie
provoquait chez eux la peur de la répétition possible des crimes que les Oustachis avaient commis
lors de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Nous a vons évoqué ceci lors de notre premier tour de
plaidoiries sans pour autant avoir l’intention d’ exposer l’ensemble des crimes commispar les
Oustachis contre les Juifs, les Serbes et les Tz iganes. Le souvenir de ces crimes est resté gravé
dans la mémoire des Serbes qui se sont enfuis ou ont été expulsés en dehors de la Croatie ou de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine. Madame le président et M essieurs les juges de la Cour, nous n’avons pas
l’intention de nous étendre plus longuement su r ce sujet mais nous tenons toutefois à attirer
l’attention de cette honorable Cour sur l’existence réelle de cette peur chez les Serbes et de son
amplification permanente en raison de l’accroiss ement de la propagande nationaliste-oustachie
dans les médias, surtout en Croatie, dans la pé riode précédant la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Beaucoup de livres ont traité de ce sujet. (Nous n’avons toutefois pas l’intention d’accuser devant
cette honorable Cour. Bien au contraire, nous souhaitons démontrer notre volonté d’entamer le
processus indispensable de la réconciliation nationale.)
46. Les circonstances exposées ci-dessus, Mada me le président, peuvent expliquer pourquoi
le gouvernement de Belgrade n’était pas en position d’exercer son contrôle sur la Republika Srpska
car ces circonstances n’existaient pas en Serbie. Nous pouvons prouver ce tte affirmation par le
soutien que le gouvernement de Be lgrade a apporté au «plan Vance-Owen» et au «plan du groupe
de contact» ainsi que par d’autres tentatives du go uvernement de Belgrade allant dans le sens
d’éviter le commencement de la guerre ou d’arrêter son déroulement.
47. Personne ne conteste le fait que la Serbie -et-Monténégro apportait à la Republika Srpska
une aide en armes, nourriture et autres matériels sa ns lesquels la survie de la Republika Srpska et
de son armée n’était pas possible. Cependant , de nombreuses preuves démontrent que les
Musulmans bosniaques étaient aussi aidés en armes et en matériels par d’autres pays.
48. La situation militaire et politique qui régnait dans la région sous contrôle des Musulmans
bosniaques était complexe, en grande partie due à l’assistance que le Gouvernement de la Croatie
apportait aux Musulmans bosniaques dirigés par M. Alija Izetbegovic. Cette assistance passait
notamment par l’utilisation de l’aér oport de Zagreb pour le trans port de matériel militaire en
provenance d’Etats tiers amis et destiné aux forces armées des Musulmans bosniaques. - 24 -
1
49. Le rapport élaboré par l’Institut néerla ndais pour la documentation de guerre (NIOD)
évoque aussi un accord conclu directement pa r M. Alija Izetbegovic avec le gouvernement de
Téhéran en octobre 1992. En effet, au début de l’ année 1993, l’Iran et la Turquie livraient l’un et
l’autre des armes à la Bosnie via la Croatie.
50. Aux yeux des autorités de Belgrade, il ét ait clair que les importantes livraisons d’armes
dont bénéficiaient les Musulmans bosniaques au début du processus de la dissolution de la
Yougoslavie risquaient de modifier sérieusement le rapport de forces militaires. Une assistance
aux Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine dès lors s’imposait. Dans son livre Stratégie astucieuse 2,
l’auteur Sefer Halilovic (un des commandants de l’armée musulmane) affirme que «l’armée de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine a atteint, déjà en janvier 1993, le chiffre de deux cent soixante et un mille cinq
cents soldats». D’après la mê me source, l’armée de Bosnie-H erzégovine, dès février1992, avait
cent vingt mille soldats 3. Ceci se trouve aussi dans le dossier de la Cour. La copie du livre traduit
le titre seulement et le passage que j’ai cité ici. Je vous remercie, Madame le président. Je termine
l’élément de ma plaidoirie avec une petite conclusion.
51. Rappelons enfin que le gouvernement de Belgrade a introduit l’embargo pour les
exportations d’armes à la Republika Srpska apr ès que celle-ci a refusé d’accepter deux plans de
paix, à savoir le «plan Vance-Owen» en 1993 et le «plan du groupe de contact» en 1994.
L’embargo a été supervisé par les observateurs dési gnés par les organisations internationales. Le
gouvernement de Belgrade a continué d’envoyer l’aide humanitaire à la Republika Srpska.
Je vous prie, Madame le président, de donner la parole à M. Brownlie, Q.C. Merci.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Stojanović. I now give the floor to Mr. Brownlie.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Madam President.
1
www.srebrenica.nl/en/a_index.htm.
2
Ed. Matica, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 152.
3Ibid., p. 222. - 25 -
T HE EVIDENCE OF THE ATTRIBUTION ALLEGED IS
INSUBSTANTIAL AND UNRELIABLE
1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, the purpose of this presentation is
to analyse the evidence of attribution offered by th e applicant State. The general approach of our
opponents will be examined and then the main body of the speech will be devoted to a systematic
examination of the evidence advanced by the App licant which purports to establish the attribution
of acts, which if committed by a State would constitute genocide, to the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and its successors.
T HE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE APPLICANT STATE TO EVIDENCE
2. As I move into my subject, it is useful to dispose of some preliminary matters. In his first
speech in these proceedings Professo r Franck complained of the ab sence of full access to relevant
documents concerning the alleged attribution of act s in Bosnia to the authorities in Belgrade:
references will appear in the transcript to the vari ous speeches I cite (CR2006/3, p.25, para.16).
The logic of this complaint is not easy to see. The applicant State has deployed enormous numbers
of documents in these proceedings and has had access to the archives of the ICTY. Captured
documents have been produced and resort has been had to numerous intercepts of telephone calls
of political leaders. It is a matter of public know ledge that the prosecution office and the apparatus
of the ICTY as a whole are well founded.
3. In any event, in the light of all the evidence available, and especially the numerous
intercepts of telephone conversations, an importa nt logical inference would be the absence, the
absence, of evidence of attribution. Moreover, intercepts of telephone conversations in fact
constitute a form of reliable evidence, at least when they are presented in their actual context.
4. One further preliminary point. Earlier in these proceedings, Mr.vandenBiesen stated
that the Respondent “has not been forthcoming with any defence” and that “saving any defence for
the second round of these oral hearings would almost certainly lead to a violation of the principle
of fair trial” (see CR 2006/2, p. 21, paras. 12-14But Mr. van den Biesen offers no proof that the
provisions of the Rules of Court have been contra vened. The Rules do not include provisions for
the filing of a defence as such. In any event, as Professor Pellet has pointed out, there is no defence - 26 -
to the commission of genocide. But of course this assumes that the commission of genocide has
been proved.
5. In the result, it is not easy to follow Mr.vandenBiesen’s legal logic. This is not a
criminal trial, in part because this Court does not exercise a criminal jurisdiction. The position of
the respondent State is straightforward. If the Cour t decides that it has jurisdiction, there is on the
facts no breach of the Genocide Convention which is attributable to the Respondent.
6. These are all preliminary issues. I now co me to the central problem in these proceedings,
which is the eccentric and unhelpful approach to evidence adopted by the applicant State.
7. This approach has several strands but th e main elements are the assumption that actual
proof is not necessary, together with a genera l tendency to avoid presenting evidence, especially
documentary evidence, in a mode which is in accordance with acceptable standards.
8. The principal contention of the applicant State is that the facts are more or less undeniable.
This is the policy declared in the first round speech of Professor Franck, when he said:
“14. In the present case we will mostly present direct evidence, whenever it is
available. Nevertheless, for reasons of economy, we will ask the Court to consider
some facts as ‘notorious’ because of the frequency and regularity with which they
have entered the public domain: mostly through reports of reliable observers.
15. But we will also ask the Cour t to draw inferences from patterns ⎯ patterns
of facts to conclusions that are logically or experientially inescapable, even if they
cannot be proven with direct evidence. For example, where an intent must be
demonstrated, we ask the Court to consider direct evidence of what was said and done,
with what frequency and to whom, and how, as indirect evidence of the perpetrators’
intent.” (CR 2006/3, pp. 23-25.)
9. These paragraphs summarize the simplistic appr oach of the applicant State. Everything is
supposedly clear and notorious. Direct evidence is to be supplanted by inferences from activities
and events on the ground. In the next passag e of his speech ProfessorFranck sets forth the
evidential modalities as seen by his delegation in respect of attribution. This, it is asserted, can also
be dealt with on the basis of inference “from activities and events on the ground in Bosnia and
Herzegovina” (ibid., p. 25, para. 16).
10. Madam President, this approach to eviden ce cannot be applied appropriately to the issue
of attribution. Counsel for Bosnia invokes Srebrenica as an example of activities and events on the
ground. In my first presentation in these hear ings I discussed the historical background of the - 27 -
killings in Srebrenica. The purpose was to show the elements of causation involved and to indicate
to the Court the historical circumstances which had characterized the conflict in and around the
enclave.
11. In any case, when counsel for Bosnia re fer to the activities and events on the ground as
providing the basis for inference, what does this mean? In the ab sence of evidence of the context
the facts cannot be notorious. They have to be understood.
12. This is especially true of the issue of attribution. The facts on the ground beg the
important question. Moreover, the first question is, in any event: what were the facts on the
ground. To take the case of Srebrenica: the sequence of events began in December 1992. There
are some significant sources available and yet the version of the facts offered to the Court on behalf
of Bosnia was grossly inadequate.
13. The local origins of the feud and the background of armed conflict constitute major
elements in the picture. Such a context unde rmines the credibility of assertions of external
involvement and the existence of a long-standing plan to commit genocide.
14. The inability to refer to the easily availa ble sources relating to Srebrenica is very odd.
The counsel for Bosnia complain of deprivation of sources of material and yet prior to the second
round have shown no interest in the substan tial CIA study published in 2002, or the Dutch
Government Report, which is massive, or the re levant passage of the judgments of the Trial
Chamber in the Krstic case. The concepts of notoriety of fact s, of inference, of a pattern of events
relied upon by the applicant State, have no legal weight in the absence of substantial evidence
including evidence of context and elements of causation.
15. The evidential assumptions of the Bosnian delegation involve a number of
contradictions. At certain stages of the pleadings , counsel for Bosnia come close to saying that
there is no need for proof by means of direct evidence (CR2006/2, pp.20-21, para.12
(van den Biesen)).
16. At other junctures counsel for Bosnia app ear to recognize that their stock of evidence is
limited and unreliable. In the first round Prof essorFranck accepts in terms that Bosnia does not
possess first-hand documentary evidence to establish the link of State responsibility between events
in Bosnia and the government in Belgrade (CR 20 06/3, p.26, para.19). Now, of course, this - 28 -
complaint is exaggerated. Both in the Reply, and since the close of the written pleadings, the
applicant State has deployed a large number of doc uments. But the nub of the matter is the fact
that the numerous documents available fail to establish attribution.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE APPLICANT S TATE
17. I now propose to analyse one by one the specific forms of evidence relied upon by the
applicant State in relation to proving attributionThe categories employed are intended to reflect
the presentation adopted by the other Party.
18. The principal categories to be discussed are as follows:
A. First, alleged modes of preparation for genocide, such as the distribution of arms or the creation
of parallel institutions.
B. Second, resort to inherently flawed types of evidence, including the product of plea bargains
and the use of seriously curtailed quotations.
C. And lastly, other individual items of evidence given prominence by the applicant State.
19. When this agenda of material is review ed it will be seen to provide no substantial or
reliable support to the submissions of Bosnia on the issue of attribution.
A. Alleged modes of preparation for genocide
Reorganization of the federal army of Yugoslavia
20. And so, the first of the alleged modes of preparation for genocide is reorganization of the
federal army of Yugoslavia. When the disint egration of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia was taking place, the different communities reacted in essentially similar ways. The
Croats, the Bosnian Muslims, and the different Serbian communities made dispositions which
appeared necessary to preserve their security and interests.
21. The position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in these proceedings has been to allege that any
such protective measures constituted a prepara tion for genocide. Counsel for Bosnia have
supported this extravagant thesis (CR2006/2, pp.32-34 (van den Biesen); CR2006/4, pp.10-21
(Karagiannakis); CR 2006/8, pp. 40-50 (van den Biesen).
22. On 3 March Mr.van den Biesen addressed the Court on a variety of topics assembled
under the rubric “The Respondent’s continued pr esence”. This presentati on was introduced as a - 29 -
“general overview of the facts which will be relevant for the actual establishment of State
responsibility” (CR 2006/8, pp. 39-61).
23. As I pointed out in the first round, the arming and redeployment of Serbian forces after
the political and military disintegration of the fe deral State, is regarded as unacceptable and
sinister. The judicial finding relied upon by Mr.van den Biesen, in the Brdjanin case, reads, in
part, as follows:
“As President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Miloševi ć made
arrangements to ensure that Bosnian Serb forces could retain personnel and arms by
ordering, on 5 December 1991, that sold iers who were native of Bosnia and
Herzegovina be transferred to Bosnia and that those in Bosnia who were native of
other republics be moved out. On 25 D ecember 1991, a JNA commander reported to
Milošević that these transfers were 90 per cent complete. According to the diary notes
of Borislav Jovi ć (President of the SFRY Presidency), Miloševi ć anticipated that
several Yugoslav republics would soon be recognized as independent States, and the
Serbian President wanted to be sure that the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina could
qualify as an indigenous Bosnian fighting force. Throughout 1991 and 1992, the
Bosnian Serb leadership communicated with the SFRY leadership on strategic policy
in the event that Bosnia and Herzegovina would become independent.” (CR 2006/8,
p. 41, para. 11.)
24. As I submitted in the first round, these reactions of the Serbs are entirely to be expected
in the prevailing circumstances.
25. And it must be noted that there is no evidence available to link these measures of
redeployment with any plan to commit genocide or to establish any motive to commit genocide.
The distribution of arms
26. And then the second of the alleged modes of preparation for genocide is the distribution
of arms. Counsel for Bosnia give prominence to the distribution of weapons by the Yugoslav
authorities in the period of disintegration and transition. This is the account given by
Ms Karagiannakis on 28 February:
“10. The JNA and the Serbian Ministry of the Interior and the SFRY Ministry
of the Interior armed the Bosnian Se rbs of the Serbian Democratic Party ⎯ the
SDS ⎯, Serbian paramilitaries and Bosnian Serb territorial defence units, otherwise
referred to as the TO. This point has been demonstrated in our Reply and the
materials that have come to light subsequently have only served to reinforce this.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12. The Trial Chamber (that is in the Brdjanin case) found that, in September
1990, the JNA had ordered that weapons be removed from the depots under the - 30 -
control of the territorial defence units and moved to its own armouries, thereby
concentrating arms with the JNA in Bosnia . The Serbian Democratic Party received
substantial support from the JNA. It sy stematically supplied light arms to SDS
committees in Bosnian Serb claimed areas, as well as to Serbian paramilitary groups.
Serbian paramilitary groups in this c ontext means local Serb paramilitaries and
paramilitary groups coming from outside of Bosnia. Distribution to Bosnian Serb
civilians was carried out by the local comm unes and was supervised by the SDS, with
the support of the JNA and the local police. The arming of the Bosnian Serb villagers
was well organized and involved the use of trucks and occasionally even helicopters.
The JNA also engaged in redistributing weapons to the Serbian TO units in
predominantly Bosnian Serb populated areas.
13. Obviously, this arming did not go unnoticed. Muslims and Croats in
Bosnian Krajina also sought to obtain ar ms. However, the non-Serb efforts were
nowhere near as successful as those of the Bosnian Serbs, both in terms of numbers
and quality. This was because they mainly procured their weapons on an individual
basis. These individual efforts fell far short of the efficient, well-organized and
large-scale arming efforts of the Serbs.” (CR 2006/4, pp. 12-13.)
27. Madam President, this account of the fact s can be accepted for the sake of argument.
Counsel does not seek to link these facts with a plan to commit genocide on the part of the Serbian
authorities. There is no suggestion that in the circumstances the distribution of arms was illegal
and it was pursued also by other groups. Moreover, with a touch of realism, counsel for Bosnia
and Herzegovina recognizes that the Muslims and Croats “also sought to obtain arms”.
Madam President, if you wish, that would be a good place to break.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Brownlie. The Court will now rise for fifteen minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.35 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Mr. Brownlie, you have the floor.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Madam President.
The creation of parallel institutions
28. As the process of disintegration of the Yugoslav federation advanced, the Serb leadership
and political organizations in Bosnia began setting up parallel institutions. Ms Karagiannakis gives
the following helpful account:
“26. The Bosnian Serbs set up parallel institutions at their so-called republic
level, at the regional level and, critically, at the municipal level. The steps that were
taken in this regard have been set out most recently in the Brdjanin judgment of the
ICTY. They are also explained in detail in the expert reports and testimony on the - 31 -
Bosnian Serb leadership and the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs, which have been admitted
into evidence in the Krajisnik case.
27. A ground-breaking step in the creation of the Bosnian Serb parallel
structures was the creation of a Serbian A ssembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
inaugural session was held on 24 October 1991 after the SDS delegates walked out of
the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between its
establishment and the founding of the Bosnian Serb Republic on 9 January 1992, the
Assembly legislatively prepared the mean s and conditions for the establishment of
entirely separate structures for the Serbian people of Bosnia. In a speech given in
November 1991, Radovan Karadži ć instructed SDS members to impose complete
authority in their respective municipalities, regions and local communities. On
1December 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to recommend the
establishment of Serbian municipalities, the aim of which was to break up the existing
municipalities where Serbs were not in the majority.” (CR 2006/4, pp. 16-17.)
29. This process of political adjustment took place in other regions affected by the
disintegration of the Federation. However, in relation to the Bosnian Serbs counsel for the
applicant State insists that the creation of new local institutions was solely a means to an end, that
is to say, preparation for ethnic cleansing and for a genocidal conflict (see CR 2006/4, p.10,
para. 3, and p. 12, para. 9). The reality was otherw ise. In the light of the initiatives taken by those
pursuing a secessionist programme, the Bosnian Serbs had little or no choice in facing up to the
crisis.
30. In any event this type of evidence cannot be regarded as logically related to issues of
attribution, because the creation of new local in stitutions was based upon practical needs and was
politically neutral.
Lawful forms of co-operation and mutual assistance alleged to be preparations for genocide
31. The tendency of the applicant State to c onceptualize all forms of reasonable and lawful
activity as preparation for genocide has been extende d to various categories of mutual assistance
and international co-operation, including co-ope ration in the banking sphere. These aspects of the
Bosnian argument will now be examined.
The question of financial relations
32. The question of financial interdepende ncy was the subject of the presentation by
Mr.Torkildsen on 6March (CR 2006/9, pp.22-49). The subject was also touched on by
MsKaragiannakis on 28 February (CR 2006/4, pp.20-21). The purpose of Mr.Torkildsen’s
discourse was to assert: - 32 -
“The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provided the financial resources to the
army of the Republika Srpska and the ar my of the Republika Srpska Krajina both
directly and indirectly: directly, by paying the salaries for the officers in these armies;
indirectly, through the provisions of primary issues from Belgrade to the other two
Serb entities to cover the budget deficits of Republika Srpska and the Republika
Srpska Krajina in 1992 and 1993.
In order to streamline all of this, the economies of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina were organized into a
structure that can best be described as a single economic and monetary entity.
The government institutions of the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia controlled,
implemented and organized this entity.” (CR 2006/9, p. 49.)
33. I would like to present a more objective pi cture of the financial relationship between the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a nd Republika Srpska during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I would also like to emphasize the Applicant’s in correct assertions in relation to the banking
system. It is obvious that the Applicant does no t have sufficient evidence and for that reason,
resort is had to incomplete citations and illogical assumptions.
34. The National Bank of Republika Srpska was founded by its decision No. 02-113 on
12May1992. From that time until the establis hment of the National Bank of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it was an independent central ba nk. Soon after the National Bank of Republika
Srpska was established, the La w of the National Bank was adopt ed and the Governor, and the
members of the Board, were appointed. The documents supporting these facts may be found in the
Annual Report of the National Bank of Republika Srps ka and it appears also in the documents of
the Milosevic case (February 1993 ⎯ ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic , case
No. IT-02-54-T, C4219, p. 1).
35. Co-operation between the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY), the National Bank of
Republika Srpska (NBRS) and the National Bank of the Republika Srpska Krajina (NBRSK) was
based primarily on the intentions of the Nati onal Bank of Yugoslavia to help newly founded
banking institutions to more easily overcome the initial difficulties that usually exist in this process.
By the Law of National Bank of Yugoslavia (25 J une 1993) the NBY controlled solvency and the
legality of operations by commercial banks and ot her financial institutions. The National Bank of
Yugoslavia controlled neither the National Bank of Republika Srpska nor the commercial banks
operating in Republika Srpska. Th at could be seen from the information from the meeting of the
Bank Association of 18 May 1994 (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, case No. IT-02-54-T, - 33 -
C4154). It seems that the “Information from th e meeting of Bank Association concerning the
statements contained in the finding of the Republika Srpska financial police” is the best proof to the
contrary of the claims of the Applicant. As stat ed in the information “the control of the National
Bank and of commercial banks has been carried out by persons who are neither competent nor have
the required skills for controlling the banking system”. Control of the banks and the National Bank
of Republika Srpska may be carried out only by the National Bank of Yugoslavia on the basis of
the “Protocol regulating the single monetary policy for the territories of the FRY, Republika Srpska
and Republika Srpska Krajina”. It is clear that such control never took place. Moreover, as it was
established in the cited information, it was not applied in practice.
36. The NBRS and the NBRSK adopted the legal regulations of the National Bank of
Yugoslavia. The reason for that was their incap acity to implement regulations during the war
period. The Law and Regulations of the Nationa l Bank of Yugoslavia were based on the law of
regulations of the National Bank of the former SFR Y. Similarly, the Central Bank of Croatia and
Slovenia, countries that obviously emerged from the former Yugoslavia, adopted their legal
regulations using the same starting points.
37. The conclusions presented in the “Annual Report of the National Bank of the Republic of
Srpska” indicate that the economic sanctions impos ed by the international community against the
FRY also affected the RS (Republic of Srpska) since all transfers of goods from the RS went
through the FRY. Considering that the RS was e ngaged in war at the time when this report was
drawn up and was not in the position to ensure the tr ansit of goods via territories affected by heavy
fighting, the question was being posed as to whic h other routes could have been used for these
transits. It goes without saying that the sancti ons against the FRY, the sole trading partner and
neighbour of the RS, would have affected the RS itself.
38. Moreover, the sanctions imposed against the FRY caused damage to the other neighbours
of the FRY (Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania). It is logical to conclude that the RS and RSK
were affected by the sanctions imposed against the FRY, which was their principal trading and
business partner. It is a fact that the FRY help ed the Serbian populations in these territories and
there is nothing objectionable in this respect. Even ten years after the Dayton Accords, Serbia is
still the most important trading partner of the Republic of Srpska. - 34 -
39. It is most important to emphasize, in orde r to point out the absence of the “financing” of
the RS and RSK (i.e., their central banks and partic ularly their military structures by the FRY and
FRY’s central banks) is as follows: the NBY printed currency (dinars) on request of the NBRS and
NBRSK. The currency issued by NBY had to be backed by foreign currency and deposited in the
NBY. This information can be found in the “Note on the possibilities of mobilizing foreign
exchange reserves for the purposes of budget deficit financing”, of 3 March 1993 (ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic , case No. IT-02-54-T, C4133, p.1) which says that the
“mentioned Protocol clearly provides that the amount of new dinars printed for the territory of the
RS should be covered by the foreign currency deposited with the NBY”. Thus, it is quite clear that
there was no financing of the RS or the Bosnian Serb army for that matter.
40. Mr.Torkildsen constantly repeated in his presentation that financing of RS from
Belgrade was carried out in secrecy. This asserti on is without any basis. Indeed, Mr.Torkildsen
even cited Slobodan Milosevic who stated that the Republic of Srpska spent substantial amounts of
money on Serbs outside of Serbia. As Mr.Milo sevic declared to the Yugoslav News Agency
Tanjug on 11 May 1993:
“In the past two years, the Republic of Serbia ⎯ by assisting Serbs outside
Serbia ⎯ has forced its economy to make mass ive efforts and its citizens to make
substantial sacrifices. These efforts and these sacrifices are now reaching the limits of
endurance. Most of the assistance was sent to people and fighters in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.”
41. The allocations to the Yugoslav army and army of Bosnian Serbs from their budgets are
also interesting. It should be recalled that the RS was engaged in a war at the time and that the war
was on the border with the FRY. Even in time of peace, the largest share of the national budgets of
all countries involved was dedicated to their respectiv e armies. Naturally, when there is a threat of
war, budget allocations for the military are large. The reason why the National Bank of Yugoslavia
printed money for the JNA and why there were insufficient amounts of money in the budget,
relates partly to the suspension of financing by the former Republics of Slovenia and Croatia.
1. Printing money in the National Bank of Yugoslavia
42. It is to be recalled that on 1 July 1992, the Republic of Srpska introduced new currency
and the SFRY currency (that was legal up to that point) was replaced and withdrawn from - 35 -
circulation ⎯ I refer to the document “An analysis of the combat readiness and activities of Army
of RS in 1992”. As I have already indicated, Re public of Srpska, the RS, and the Republic of
Serbian Krajina in 1992 and 1993 had their ow n separate central banks and printed their own
currency. The currency of the Republic of Srpska was issued by the Central Bank of the Republic
of Srpska and the currency of the Republic of Se rbian Krajina was issued by the Central Bank of
the Republic of Serbian Krajina. These currencies were printed at the Topcider mint in Belgrade,
the printing facility of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.
43. The Respondent has submitted a currency note of Republika Srpska during the period of
1992-1993 into the judges’ folder. As you can cl early see and conclude, Republika Srpska, as well
as the FRY, suffered substantial hyperinflation, which was the consequence of several factors.
44. Currencies of the RS and the RSK, were se t at parity with the Yugoslav dinar, meaning
that one RSK dinar was equal to one FRY dinar and also one RS dinar was equal to one FRY dinar.
The printing location has only a technical significance. The question of the money issuance by
both central banks is more important. Sometimes the currencies, the banknotes of one country will
be printed in another country because it is an issue of a purely commercial value, a commercial
deal, and a service done by another country. Curre ncies were issued by the Central Banks of the
RS and the RSK. They were printed in the FRY because RS and RSK did not have their own
mints.
45. In that period there was a banknote replacement ⎯ old dinars were converted into the
new dinars. The old banknotes were delivered to the treasury of the National Bank of Yugoslavia
in order to be replaced by an appropriate amount of valid banknotes. For example, if someone had
German marks and lived in France, German marks ha d to be replaced by euros. They had to be
exchanged in some bank for euros because German marks were not valid after a certain period of
time. So why is that operation different from the previous one? It was a technical operation and it
was limited to the area of the RSK, the RS, and the FRY.
2. Hyperinflation and monetary integration
46. In the spring of 1992, sanctions were in force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and in May 1993, after the Vance-Owen Plan wa s rejected, the most rigorous sanctions were - 36 -
introduced which closed the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These severe
sanctions completely shut off the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Srpska and the
Republic of Serbian Krajina, from the rest of th e world and caused immense financial damage to
their respective economies. In the second half of 1993, the sanctions caused hyperinflation.
47. It is necessary to outline the realities and effects of the hyperinflation that occurred in
Yugoslavia during 1992 to 1993. Hyperinflation is defined as monthly growth in prices or values
above 50per cent. The hyperinflation in the Re public of Serbia will be easier to comprehend
through a review of the numbers.
48. During January 1994, dail y growth of prices in the FRY exceeded 60percent. To put
this into perspective, prices in the FRY during that 31-day period rose 2 per cent per hour. It was at
this time that the FRY issued the 5,000million dinar note. Indeed, during this period of
hyperinflation new bills were issued every month. This period of hyperinflation lasted 24 months:
and a copy of the 5,000 million dinar bill is in the judges’ folder.
49. The average income of the FRY citizens in December 1993 was 21 Deutschmarks: and it
is still questionable how the citizens survived during that time. For a comparison, I would like to
point out that in October 1993 one kilo of apples cost 3,000 dinars, while in January 1994 the same
kilo was priced at an unbelievable four billion dina rs. I am afraid in my book a billion is a million
million ⎯ there are debates on how this can be properly done. On the basis of this information it is
easy to understand the enormous figures that were mentioned in Mr.Torkildsen’s quotations
regarding budgets and rebalances of the budgets of the FRY and the RS.
50. The isolated environments and the living conditions created serious difficulties, not only
for the people within Serbia proper, but also fo r the people living in the RS and the RSK. The
international sanctions were imposed exclusively against the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and not against the RS and the RSK. However, since the RS and the RSK were isolated, the only
country that they could financially co-operate with was Serbia and that was the reason for the
monetary integration. One should keep in mi nd that the economic environment was so narrowed
down that some 12million people were struggling fo r their survival. Trad e had been restricted
under the sanctions to the extent that eventually barely any trade actually existed. Co-operation
was necessary to help the struggling people under quite impossible conditions. - 37 -
51. In former Yugoslavia there was a fe deration based upon the development of the
underdeveloped regions and the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina was considered to be an
insufficiently developed region of the SFRY, along w ith some other regions. As a result it was the
recipient of aid and assistance, and additional assi stance for its development. The fund of the
federation for support to the insufficiently deve loped regions of the SFRY was first set up by
Serbia and it was financed to the extent of 50 per cent by the resources and income of Serbia.
3. Credits and “budget financing” of the RS
52. Mr.Torkildsen constantly repeated in his speech that Serbia and Montenegro gave
credits to rebalance the budget of the RS. The i ssue of “budget financing” in Republika Srpska by
the FRY is elaborated in Mr.Torkildsen’s re port in a very interesting way. During the
cross-examination of Mr.Vladimir Lukic, MsKo rner, following the example of Mr.Torkildsen,
attempted to impress upon the Court that the FRY financed both the budget and the budget deficits
associated with Republika Srpska. There is simply no credible evidence to support this claim.
53. First of all, there is an allegation re garding the budget of the RS that this budget
consisted of no other income than the inco me received from the credits. From the Official Gazette
of Republika Srpska dated 25 Augus t 1993, it could be seen that the income was coming from the
profits of the companies, trade taxes, property taxes, tariffs, fees, and so forth.
54. Another unfounded claim of Mr.Torkildsen re lated to an almost complete financing of
the rebalance of the budget of the RS from the loans received from the FRY. In the Official
Gazette of Republika Srpska, dated 30March 1994, it w as stated that the origin of income for
rebalancing the budget of the RS came from cred it funds. However, the document does not
mention that the FRY provided those loans. Thus , the construction of Mr. Torkildsen is not based
on the documentary evidence.
55. I would like to emphasize, once more, the importance of the document entitled “Note on
the possibilities of mobilising foreign excha nge reserves for the purposes of budget deficit
financing” adopted by the National Bank of Re publika Srpska. This document proves that no
financing from the FRY could have existed. The Note was adopted in Banja Luka on
3March1993 and discusses the problem of financ ing the budget deficits. The problem was - 38 -
ultimately resolved in the following way ⎯ for each amount of new dinars, issued for the territory
of Republika Srpska, there was to be an equiva lent amount of foreign currency deposited in the
National Bank of Yugoslavia. This document also discusses how this process was applied in
practice and explains that the Government of the RS, for the purpose of providing 15 million new
dinars, used a portion of its available foreign exchange to cover the issuance of new dinars.
56. Furthermore, from the same documen t it can be observed that the “decision on
mobilising foreign currency reserves” has been submitted to the National Bank for their realization.
57. The only possible conclusion is that all th e indications of Mr. Torkildsen are completely
untrue and that there was no financing of the budget deficit in Republika Srpska by the FRY.
58. However, even if the FRY did give credits to the RS, what was wrong with that? Credits
should be repaid. It is common logic that the gran ting of credits cannot be the same as financing.
Since Yugoslavia was isolated, some kind of co- operation and assistance had to be established.
How is that different from the situation when the International Monetary Fund, for example,
decides to grant a credit under favourable condition s to maintain the recipient country’s economic
stability?
59. And then there is the question of who c ontrolled these funds? If the credit was given to
the Republic of Srpska Krajina or to Republika Sr pska to cover the deficit in their respective
budgets, surely the recipient of the loan ⎯ or whoever made budget decisions ⎯ controlled those
funds. The motive of the FRY was to help the people who lived there.
4. Report of Mr. Milivoje Miletic
60. One of the documents that the Applicant relies upon to prove its point is the report made
by the representative of the NBY, Mr.Milivoje Mile tic. Mr.Miletic paid an official visit to the
NBRS in the period 4 to 8 April 1994. The Applican t alleges that Mr. Miletic visited the NBRS in
order to observe how it was operating. I emphasize this because the Applicant referred to this visit
as “the control carried out by the NBY in rela tion to the NBRS”. Mr.Torkildsen constantly
repeated that Mr.MilivojeMiletic was acting as the Director of the NBY. Now, it is true that
Mr.Miletic had a title of a director, but I think it would be useful to explain his precise position.
According to the Law on the NBY of 1993, the NBY had the Council ⎯ which had seven - 39 -
members ⎯, the Governor of the National Bank, th e Deputy Governor, the Vice-Governors and
directors. There were five different departments. When Mr.Torkildsen said “the Director of the
National Bank”, one might think that this was someone who manages the National Bank.
Mr. Miletic was not the Governor or the Deputy G overnor or the Vice-Governor. He was not even
the director of a department. He was merely a dir ector of one of the units within one of the five
departments. The co-operation and assistance that existed was on a professional expert level. Such
co-operation among national banks is completely normal and the visit of Mr.Miletic to the
National Bank of the Republic of Srpska was or ganized in that manner and primarily focused on
that goal.
61. The activities of the NBRS are clearly defined in the report as activities of the Central
Bank. Mr. Torkildsen stated in his speech:
“A detailed explanation of the rela tionship between the National Bank of
Republika Srpska and the National Bank of Yugoslavia is found in the Annual Report
of the National Bank of Republika Srpska for 1992. Here we read: ‘In the beginning
the National Bank of Republika Srpska w as given special support by the National
Bank of Yugoslavia.’”
Mr.Torkildsen added that “special support” took the form of “work methodology, printing of
money” (CR 2006/9, para. 45).
62. It is clear that the relationship betw een national banks was based on co-operation,
support and assistance to the National Bank of the RS from the National Bank of the FRY.
63. It is even mentioned by the Applican t that “during this phase there was a close
co-operation between national banks”. It is logical to ask, how is it possible to talk about the
creation of the national banks’ systems on the basis of co-operation and expert assistance when
that is normal in the relationship between central banks . The report also states that the
co-operation between the banks included the assistance that the NBY rendered to the NBRS, at that
time in the process of creation. The NBRS Annual Report of May 1993 stated that the NBRS
received special support from the NBY in the initia l phase of its work and that “despite different
monetary area” the NBY provided expert assistance , assistance in the methodology of functioning
and banknote printing. Th is information obviously reinforces th e claims that there was a working
relationship between these two central banks and that the NBY provided expertise and assistance to
the newly created NBRS, and did so legally. - 40 -
64. Mr. Torkildsen stated at the end of his presentation on the 6 March 2006 that:
“If all of the issues and documents discussed before would leave any doubt
about the true nature of the financial struct ure of these three entities, the Official Note
‘from the meeting of the governors of the three national banks’, which took place on
12 May 1994, cannot fail to leave the Court in any doubt whatsoever.”
He says:
“This note clearly confirms the subordinated role of the National Bank of
Republika Srpska and the National Bank of Republika Srpska Krajina in their
relationship to the National Bank of Yugoslavia.” (CR 2006/9, para. 59.)
65. The only problem for Mr. Torkildsen and the Applicant concerning this Official Note is
that this “document” was never signed and offici ally recognized. Under the Law of the National
Bank of Yugoslavia of 25 June 1993, the Gover nor must adopt general and special decisions.
General decisions adopted by the Governor during that period were required to be published in the
Official Gazette of the FRY. The so-called Official Note that Mr. Torkildsen referred to was never
published. Consequently, this document has never been adopted.
66. The same law specified that the National Bank of Yugoslavia had the main republic
branches in Belgrade and Podgorica and branches in Novi Sad and Pristina. It follows that there
are no main branches in the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Srpska Krajina, contrary to the
assertions of Mr. Torkildsen.
5. Assistance to the army of Republika Srpska
67. A part of Mr. Torkildsen’s speech was devoted to the issue of the assistance to the army
of the RS. In the document “Analysis of the co mbat readiness and activities of the army of RS in
1992” ⎯dated 1993, issued by the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska ⎯, the chapter
entitled “Planning of the developm ent and financing of the VRS army” enables us to see the three
stages of VRS army financing. Mr. Torkildsen menti oned this Analysis in part 9 of the transcripts
and stated that “in the first stage, lasting from 20 May 1992 until June 1992 finances were provided
mainly from the resources at the disposal of the J NA units”. However, Mr. Torkildsen “forgets” to
continue the reading of the document he quotes, wh ich states: “These resources had remained in
the territory of Republika Srpska”, and “this period is characterized by the virtual disintegration of
the former system of financing, a general shorta ge of financial resources, and personal status - 41 -
issues” (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Miloševi ć, case NoI .T-02-54-T, C4712, p1 . 27).
Mr.Torkildsen continued with this conclusion: “T he fact is that the total financing of the VRS
from Belgrade continued, but this financing was executed in a more discreet manner.” And he
again “forgets” to read the next chapter of the Analysis: “In the second stage, the Ministry of
Defence, that is, the Government of Republika Sr pska, took over the entire financing burden” and
also “[i]t is important to mention that on 1July1992 the currency of Republika Srpska was
introduced, and the SFRY currency was replaced and withdrawn from circulation” (p. 127).
68. Paragraph 31 of the transcripts of Mr.To rkildsen (CR 2006/9) is the best proof of his
inconsistency and that the c onclusions he made are totally unsupported by evidence.
Mr. Torkildsen cited the confidential internal letter of the Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army
dated 11 September 1992: “I am asking you to settle this matter with the GS (General Staff) of the
Army of FRY, who should, and in our opinion has a duty to, help us financially for the purpose of
successful combat actions.” Mr.Torkildsen conc luded: “This shows not only that the Bosnian
Serb Army did have a supply problem, but at the sa me time, apparently, it is considered to be just
normal for the army of the Federal Republic of Y ugoslavia to resolve this problem financially, and
apparently it did.”
69. It is difficult to understand this conclusi on. Where is the evidence that the FRY army
resolved that financial problem? And after the Dayton Accords in 1995, there were absolutely no
conflicts, not even individual incidents anywhe re in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia. Until 2002,
Yugoslavia extended material aid to the officers, that is, the army of Republika Srpska. Is this not
sufficient to justify the conclusion that that aid was not for purposes of war but to support the
maintenance of the army within the scope and conditions of the Dayton Accords? No one was
waging war after the signing of the Dayton Accords and material aid continued for the next seven
years.
70. Madam President, this segment of the Bosnian argument provides yet another example of
the habit of our opponents to construe every norm al action of Serbia and Montenegro as evidence
of culpability. - 42 -
71. At this stage in the argument, some recap itulation is called for. In my review of the
evidence adduced by Bosnia, thr ee types of completely normal actions and policies have been
reviewed:
First: the reorganization of the Federal Army of Yugoslavia when the disintegration of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was taking place.
Second: the distribution of weapons by the Yugoslav authorities in the period of
disintegration and transition.
Third: various categories of mutual assist ance and co-operation, including co-operation in
the banking sphere.
I shall now move on to certain
B. Inherently flawed types of evidence relied upon by the applicant State: and first, the
evidence resulting from plea bargains
72. In the search for eviden ce the applicant State chooses to rely upon types of evidence
which, in our submission, are inherently flawed. The reliance on plea bargains is one such type of
evidence. In this context th e plea agreement of MsPlavši ć is invoked frequently ⎯ I would say
very frequently.
Biljana Plavšić
73. Reference should be made in the first round to the speeches of
(a) Mr. van den Biesen (CR 2006/2, pp. 33 and 48);
(b) Ms Karagiannakis (CR 2006/3, p. 49);
(c) Professor Franck (CR 2006/6, p. 29);
(d) Professor Pellet (CR 2006/10, pp. 55-56).
And then, in the second round:
(e) Professor Franck (CR 2006/32, p. 11);
(f) Professor Franck (CR 2006/33, pp. 41-42).
74. This evidence is reported on the basis that MsPlavši ć had made a statement . Thus
Mr. van den Biesen used the locution: “She declared . . .” In fact the so-called statement of facts
was part of the plea bargain and it is well known that it was prepared in the Office of the Prosecutor - 43 -
of the ICTY. The style and content of the drafting reflects the provenance of the statement. If I
can quote paragraph 14 as an example:
“14. Certain members of the Bosnian Se rb leadership collaborated closely with
Slobodan Milosevic in the conception and execution of the objective of ethnic
separation by force. The two princi pal leaders of the Bosnian Serbs,
RadovanKaradzic and Momcilo Krajisnik frequently came to Belgrade to consult
with, take guidance from or arrange for suppor t from Milosevic in achieving this end.
The army of Republika Srpska (VRS) was fina nced and logistically supported by the
political and military leadership in Belgrade, with whom it collaborated and
cooperated in order to execute the objective of ethnic separation by force.”
This particular paragraph was referred to by Professor Pellet (see CR 2006/10, pp. 55-56).
75. This is an example of the content of the factual basis for a plea of guilty, as agreed by the
defence counsel. The plea agreement includes the following paragraphs:
“Penalty
6. Biljana Plavši ć understands that the maximum sentence that could be
imposed by the Trial Chamber for a guilty plea to Count 3 of the Indictment is a term
of imprisonment for a term up to and including the remainder of the convicted
person’s life as described in Rule 101 (A). In determining the sentence, the Trial
Chamber shall, pursuant to Article 24(2) of the Statute, take into consideration such
factors as the gravity of the offence and th e individual circumstances of the convicted
person as well as those factors described in Rule 101 (B).
7. In respect of the length of sentenc e to be imposed, the Prosecutor has made
no promises to Biljana Plavši ć in order to induce her to change her plea to Count 3
from not guilty to guilty.
Factual Basis
8. A written factual basis establishing the crime described in Count 3 of the
Indictment and Biljana Plavši ć’s participation in it has been prepared and filed with
the Trial Chamber. Biljana Plavši ć has reviewed with her attorneys the factual basis
and agrees with the assertions set forth therein.
Consideration by the Prosecutor
9. In exchange for Biljana Plavši ć’s plea of guilty to Count 3 of the Indictment,
the Prosecutor agrees to the following:
(a) Following Biljana Plavšić’s plea of guilty to Count 3 of Indictment, and at the time
of sentencing, the Prosecutor will move to dismiss with prejudice the remaining
counts of the Indictment.
(b) Following Biljana Plavši ć’s plea of guilty, a public sentencing hearing will occur
at which hearing the Prosecutor and the Defence may submit any relevant
evidence that may assist the Trial Cham ber in determining an appropriate
sentence. - 44 -
(c) No other promises or representations ⎯ [no other promises or representations] ⎯
have been made by the Prosecutor to induce Biljana Plavši ć to enter this
Agreement.”
76. Madam President, from these provisions it is clear that the acceptance of the factual
statement by MsPlavši ć was an essential element of the ag reement so far as the Prosecution was
concerned. Given the possible sentence of lif e imprisonment, the acceptance of the statement
drafted by the Office of the Prosecutor was obviously made by the accused under constraint.
77. Madam President, on 12 March 2005 Ms Plavsi c gave an interview to a Banja Luka TV
station, in which she offered some explanation c oncerning her plea agreement. The interview was
reported by a Belgrade daily Glas Javnosti and a news agency known as B92. The copies of both
articles are in the judges’ folder. From one of those articles we can read:
“The former President of the Republika Srpska, who serves 11 years of
imprisonment for war crimes in the Hinsberg Prison in Sweden, does not contest that
the Serbian side committed crimes duri ng the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Nevertheless, she claims that she was in no way involved in war issues, but that, as a
member of the Presidency of the Republik a Srpska, she was engaged in solving the
humanitarian situation.
Biljana Plavsic says that she decided to plead guilty in order to stop the agony
in which she found herself since, as she claims, she could not bring witnesses to
document in The Hague that she had not been involved in crimes. ‘And then, when I
understood how things are being done in The Hague Tribunal, then I said I should at
least do something for myself. At least I didn’t have to sit there and listen to false
witnesses.’” (Article available in Serbian on www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy
=2005&mm=03&dd=12&nav_id=164146&version=print.)
78. Going back to paragraph 14 of the stat ement of facts in her case, which I have just
quoted, it is worth recalling that MsPlavsic refused to testify in the Milosevic case. On this she
gave the following explanation (I am still quoting from the interview):
“Plavsic said that it was true that the Prosecution had invited her to testify
against Slobodan Milosevic and that she had refused that. ‘I told them I didn’t want to
testify, because I had never seen that man during the war. I told them that I would say
that in the courtroom and asked if that is what they wanted to happen’, she said.”
(Article available in Serbian on h ttp://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/
2005/03/13/srpski/P05031203.shtml.)
79. Madam President, in my submission, the pr esentation of such material before this Court
is an indication of the poverty of the evidence wh ich is being deployed on behalf of the applicant
State. Moreover, as Mr.Obradovic pointed out in the first round, the Plavši ć document has not
been used as evidence in any trial before the ICTY (CR 2006/12, pp. 42-43, para. 82).
My second example is the plea agreement of Miroslav Deronjic. - 45 -
80. In this case reference should be made to the speeches of:
(1) Ms Karagiannakis (CR 2006/3, p. 49);
(2) Ms Karagiannakis (CR 2006/4, p. 5, para. 24, ibid., p. 17, para. 30);
(3) Ms Dauban (CR 2006/5, pp. 16, 21-22);
(4) Professor Pellet (CR 2006/10, p. 45);
(5) Mr. van den Biesen (CR 2006/30, p. 50);
(6) Professor Stern (CR 2006/32, p. 42);
(7) Ms Dauban (CR 2006/34, p. 49);
(8) Ms Dauban (CR 2006/35, pp. 23, 25-27, 32).
81. Mr.Deronjic, like MsPlavši ć, had entered into a plea-bargain. The plea agreement
included the following provisions:
“ Penalty and Sentencing
6. Miroslav Deronjic understands th at the maximum sente nce that can be
imposed by the Trial Chamber for a guilty plea to the charge of Persecutions contained
in the Second Amended Indictment is a te rm of imprisonment for a term up to and
including the remainder of the convicted person’s life as described in Rule 101 (A).
7. Miroslav Deronjic understands that the Trial Chamber shall not be bound by
any agreement specified in Rule 62 ter (A) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
8. In determining the sentence, the Trial Chamber shall, pursuant to
Article 24 (2) of the Statute, take into cons ideration such factors as the gravity of the
offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person as well as those
factors described in Rule 101 (B): any aggravating circumstances; any mitigating
circumstances including the substantial co- operation with the Prosecution before or
after conviction; and the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of
the former Yugoslavia.
9. Based on all of the factors and considerations mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the Defence will recommend to th e Trial Chamber that it impose a term of
imprisonment of no more than six years.”
82. The factual statement which formed a part of the plea agreement indicates the strategy of
the Prosecutor’s Office, as in paragraphs 10 and 11:
“10. At a meeting convened in Sarajevo on or about the 19th of December 1991,
presided over by Radovan Karadzic and a ttended by, among others, deputies of the
Bosnian Serb Assembly and by presidents of the municipal boards, including
Miroslav Deronjic, ‘strictly confidential’ written instructions were disseminated by the
attendees relating to the establishment of Bosnian Serb municipal government bodies
in divers municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The instructions, entitled - 46 -
‘Instructions for the organisation and activities of the organs of the Serb people in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in a state of em ergency’ and dated 19 December 1991, were
directed to municipalities where Bosnian Se rbs comprised either a majority of the
population (Variant A) or a minority of the population (Variant B). The contents of
these instructions were explained to the participants of the meeting by
RadovanKaradzic. The instructions identif ied precise steps to be taken within the
respective municipalities in order to establish Bosnian Serb control. The instructions
described two distinct phases of action.
11. Bratunac Municipality was a Variant B municipality. The steps described in
the instructions for Variant B municipalities included the formation of Crisis Staffs
and the formation of Serb Assemblies. Upon receiving these confidential written
instructions, Miroslav Deronjic returned to the Bratunac Municipality where, under his
leadership and direction, the Municipal Board immediately adopted and implemented
the instructions. An SDS Crisis Staff w as formed and Miroslav Deronjic was elected
president. A Serb Assembly was established and Ljubisav Simic was elected
president of that organ.”
83. The accused was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment, sentencing judgment on
30March 2004, and this was affirmed in the sen tencing appeal on 20 July 2005. It is worth
recalling that the first ground of appeal on sentenc ing involved questions relating to the status of
the factual basis in the context of the plea agreement package. The text of the sentencing judgment
makes clear that it may be necessary for a trial chamber to look beyond the plea agreement package
to other evidence as “independent indicia” in order to satisfy itself that “there was a sufficient legal
basis for the guilty plea” (Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, para. 16). These considerations must
serve to emphasize the problematical nature of th e material offered to the Court which emanates
from such plea agreement packages. In any event, the validity of evidence of Mr. Deronjic will be
further discussed by my colleagues, who will dem onstrate that Mr.Deronjic cannot be taken as a
reliable witness.
Inherently flawed types of evidence relied upon by the applicant State: the problematic and
ambiguous segments of conversations and speeches
84. Madam President, I can now move on to examine the problematic and ambiguous
segments of conversations and speeches. These materials will be dealt with in chronological order.
(a) The conversation involving Babic, Milosevic and Karadzic in July 1991
85. In July 1991 Babic, Karadzic and Milosevic had a conversation which has been accorded
considerable significance by the Bosnian delegation in the context of attribution. In the first place
Professor Franck, in his first-round speech, introduced the subject as follows: - 47 -
“In July 1991 Babić, a leader of the Serb-breakaway Republika Srpska Krajina,
had a conversation with Milosevi ć and Karadzi ć in which the Bosnian Serb leader
develops his plans to bring about their gr and design of Greater Serbia, and Milosevi ć
warns Babic not to get in Karadzi ć’s way. He meant: let Karadzi ć do his dirty work
without hindrance. By his own words you will appreciate the total involvement of
Milosević and his cohorts in Belgrade’s ma ssacre of non-Serbs in Bosnia.”
(CR 2006/3, p. 36.)
86. Subsequently, MsKaragiannakis offered a similar interpretation of the conversation as
follows:
“5. The meeting in question took place in July 1991, in Mi losevic’s office in
Belgrade. Karadzi ć and Babi ć attended. At that meeting, Karadzi ć explained what
was in store for the Bosnian Muslims. Karadzi ć said that the Muslims would be
expelled or crammed into river valleys and th at he would link up all Serb territories in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevi ć responded to this explanation by warning
Mr. Babić not to ‘stand in Radovan’s way’.
6. So what Milosević did was to tell Babić not to obstruct Karadzić in what was
the implementation of the Greater Serbian plan in Bosnia through ethnic cleansing. At
the conclusion of the meeting, President Milosevi ć asked both Babi ć and Karadzi ć
where they wanted the army ⎯ meaning the JNA ⎯ to be deployed. Both responded
with their requests about where Milosevi ć was to deploy the JNA. Karadzi ć
responded, ‘on the borders with Croatia’. Milosevi ć said, ‘fine’.” (CR 2006/4, p. 11,
paras. 5-6.)
87. In addition Professor Pellet makes a brief reference to the meeting (CR 2006/10, p.56,
para. 46).
88. None of these speakers report the words actually forming part of the conversation beyond
the fact that Milosevi ć told Babić not to “stand in Radovan’s way” . The assertion in each case is
that the participants were planning the creation of a Greater Serbia.
89. This interpretation of the words apparently used by Mr.Milosevi ć is extravagant. The
assertion is based, in terms of citation, upon a highly compressed quotation from the Milosević
Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, 16 June 2004, paragraph253. This reads as
follows:
“In July 1991, Mr.Babi ć, Radovan Karadzi ć, and the Accused had a
conversation during which Radovan Karadzić stated that he would chase the Muslims
into the river valleys in order to link up all Serb territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Accused warned Mr. Babić not to ‘stand in Radovan’s way’.”
90. As I pointed out in the first round, there is no justification in the transcript for the
language reported by Professor Franck or for the infe rences he draws. The transcript is in fact
helpful in providing an account of the actual sequence of the conversation. - 48 -
91. During the exch anges between Milosevi ć and Babi ć in the ICTY, Milosevi ć described
Babić as an extremist. Milosevi ć and Karadzi ć were strongly opposed to the plan sponsored by
Babić which involved the uniting of SAO Krajina ⎯ that is the Serbian Autonomous Region of
Krajina ⎯ and another Autonomous Region of the same Krajina (Bosnian Krajina). The relevant
exchanges appear in the transcript at pages 13808-13813. The key passages are as follows:
“Mr. Milosević: [Interpretation]
(question addressed to Mr. Babic)
Q. Do you remember, since you’re saying that the decision was not
implemented, that I opposed it because it was crazy, that Radovan Karadzi ć was
against it because he also thought it was crazy ⎯ do you remember
Page 13811
that in my presence, Radovan Karadzi ć told you that the Serbs and Muslims have
excellent relationships, that your advent ure was undermining the trust between the
Serbs and Muslims and that it was inflicti ng enormous damage to harmony achieved
in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Because after the multiparty elections they had very good
co-operation. When I say “they” I’m referring to both Croats, Muslims, and Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember at wh at length he spoke about the disastrous
effect of this initiative of yours on the mutu al trust between Serbs and Muslims which
he wanted to preserve?
A. You called me to come to Belgrade for him to tell me that there was a
different plan for Bosnia and that now was not the time for the unification of the two
Krajinas, but that we should wait for Alija Izetbegovic to make a wrong political
move, and then he would settle accounts with him in the way he said. He said that he
had Alija Izetbegovic in his little pocket and th at he could deal with him whenever he
wanted but that now was not the time. It was better to wait for him to make a wrong
political move, and then he would settle accounts by chasing the Muslims into the
river valleys and uniting all Serb territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina and annexing SAO
Krajina to that territory. That was the plan . That’s what he presented to me in your
presence. And then you said, ‘Don’t be stubborn’, addressed to me, and, ‘Don’t stand
in Radovan’s way.’ So you called me for him to announce this plan to me, which I
assume you had designed together. [That is Babić’s answer.]
Then there is a question from Mr. Milosević.
Q. So that was going to be my next question. I was going to ask you: Was this
in my presence? Did he say this in my presence? That’s not true.
Babić then answers:
A. But that is why you called me, for him to say that in your presence.
MM i.sevi ć:
Q. Both he and I, Mr. Milan Babi ć, were endeavouring to persuade you to give
up that idiotic plan which was upsetting the whole of Yugoslavia, because questions - 49 -
had to be resolved by political means and not in such an arbitrary and unilateral
manner. And never did he say in my pr esence that he had Izetbegovic in his little
pocket and that he would force them into river valleys, and other such nonsense.
These are all things that you added later on and made up. It appears you have an
extraordinary ability to use half-truths. Half-truths . . .
Judge May [intervening]: I’m stopping this. I’m stopping this speech. Now,
what’s said is that you’ve made this up. Can you deal very briefly with it, please,
witness Milan Babić.
[Babi ć is being asked by the judge to say whether Milosevi ć is correct in
alleging that Babić had made this conversation up.]
Babr. ć:
A. It is not true that I’ve made it up. What is true is that Slobodan Milosevi ć
invited me to Belgrade for Radovan Karadzi ć to tell me, in his presence, about a plan
that he agreed with, and that plan was that what we were doing in Bosnia and Grahovo
could not be implemented just then and that there was another plan for
Bosnia-Herzegovina, what I’ve already said that Radovan said. And Milosevi ć, after
Radovan Karadzić told me this, told me not to be stubborn, not to continue insisting
on my plan on the unification of the two Krajinas and not to stand in Karadzi ć’s way.
And after that he asked me to settle that with the leadership of SDS in Bosnian
Krajina. Radoslav Brdjanin organised the meeting in Celinac with people from
Bosnian Krajina
Page 13813
for Radovan to tell them this in my presence.”
And that is the end of Babić’s answer and that is the end of the sequence of question and answer.
92. In the second round Mr. van den Biesen was cr itical of my reference to the transcript in
the Milosevic case (CR 2006/30, pp. 42-43). My purpose was to find out what the context was, that
is, the context in which Milosevic asked Babic not to stand in the way of Karadzic. The transcript
shows that Milosevic disputed the Babic version of the conversation. The true context was the
opposition of Milosevic to the project of Babic for the unification of the two Krajinas. Why is
counsel for Bosnia so annoyed by the introduction of the transcript and my reference to the full
context?
93. Madam President, Ms Karagiannakis said th at Mr. Babic was “to the nationalist Serbs in
Croatian Krajina what Karadzic was to the nationa list Serbs in Bosnia. Their political leader.”
(CR2006/4, p.11, para.4.) We do not have an y reason to dispute this characterization of
Mr. Babic.
94. However, the witness, Milan Babic, who was obviously a person whom one would
expect to be a part of the purported overall plan to create a “Greater Serbia”, testified for 11 full - 50 -
days in the Milosevic trial and the only sentence from his 11-day-long testimony that the Applicant
referred to is this one sentence, which is strongly disputed by Milosevic.
95. The validity of Mr.Babic’s testimony is further exposed if we take a look at
conversations between other Se rb politicians, conversations which were not conducted in
Mr.Babic’s presence and for that reason would be expected to be more revealing. One such
conversation took place between Milosevic and Karadzic on 9 January 1992 (ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Milosevic, Exhibit P613.158a):
“SloboMdilnoševi ć: It’s an act of courage to bring blue helmet there and
secure a peace in a way, now that’s... now it’s not an act of bravery to push the
people into misery by shouting war cries.
Rado vaaadži ć: That was all said this way, but there is no need to support
you because you are not . . . attacked.
SloboMdaloševi ć: I wasn’t . . . no, I didn’t mean . . . I didn’t mean . . .
protection or anything like that. But simply to make it clear that this is your opinion
too.
Rado vaarnadži ć: Well, one can tell from the text, from what... you /just/
read, not to mention . . .
SloboMdioševi ć: Well, Radovan, one can tell, one can tell that we have no
clue what we’re doing and that we should be united, and these are commonplaces . . .
I’m very sorry about this, I have to tell you. For I expected you would say one
sentence at least, I mean . . . you didn’t have to give me support, you could have said:
‘I think Babi ć should accept this peace plan... Vance, because this peace plan is
good, it secures, you put it in a couple of stat ements which are general in nature. You
didn’t even have to mention me in it.’
Rado vaaadži ć: Yes. Well, we have to see . . . I’m sure other papers will
have more/on it/, because I said exactly that,that I understand the fears, by that the
UN is the guarantee and that it has never fa iled anyone so far, and that those fears
shouldn’t . . . (?) impact.
SloboMdioševi ć: Yes, yes, I understand that, but as I said, I’ve read that, so
I don’t . . . I don’t need support for me, but for the resolution of this problem there, to
solve it in a humane way, in a good way.
Rado vaaadži ć: OK, but one should calm this conflict, now what he... if
he replied in an ugly way, that would contribute to the divisions. He can reply in an
ugly way and then he would be going towards the opposition and this whole thing
would get kind of personal, a kind of persona l disagreement, /and/ that is not good.
That is not good.
SloboMdioševi ć: Radovan, I think that everyone who cares about the Serb
people in Krajina should support the arri val of the UN peace-keeping forces and
thing... [doesn’t make sense] you too said you thought the plan was good and that - 51 -
you don’t understand why he keeps on rejecting, um . . . not mentioning me, my letter,
or anything else, it would be very useful.”
96. The conversation, Madam President, w as about the Vance Peace Plan, as proposed for
the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The transcript reveals the following:
(a) First, despite Milosevic’s effort to influece him, Milan Babic refused to accept the Plan.
Milosevic is complaining becau se he expected more support from Karadzic. Now, more
support in what? This is in his dealings with Izetbegovic.
(b) Secondly, Milosevic and Babic were not on good terms and it was Milosevic who was pushing
for the peaceful solution, while Babic opposed it.
(c) Lastly, Milosevic was clearly not able to control either Babic or Karadzic.
(b) Conversation between Karadzić and Dogo on 12 October 1991
97. I will now return to the evidence presented by the Applicant. In his speech in the first
round Professor Franck quotes from a conversation between Karadzi ć and Dogo on
12 October 1991. Dogo was a political friend of Karadzić. In Professor Franck’s words:
“In an intercepted telephone conversati on of 12 October 1991, speaking of the
Muslim population, Karadzi ć said, ‘they will disappear, that people will disappear
from the face of the earth . . . They do not understand that there would be bloodshed
and that the Muslim people would be exterminated.’” (CR 2006/3, p. 35, para. 39.)
98. The quotation, as is common in these procee dings, lacks any useful context. Moreover,
in the transcript of the intercep t, the first sentence appears on the second page, while the second
sentence is to be found only on the eighth page. The relevant sector of the transcript reads as
follows:
“Rado Kvaadži ć: Here I returned. I was at the negotiations and now I have
returned to have a little rest.
Gojko Dogo: What negotiations, now? I hear you were brilliant last night, if I
may say. Was it last night?
Rado Kvaadži ć: Yes.
Gojko Dogo: They say, well done! Later, they.../three words illegible/, but
they say that you . . . was it at the Assembly, or what?
Rado Kvaadži ć: At the Assembly, at the Assembly. Alija Izetbegović spoke
two or three times and I had to reply to him, you know.
Gojko Dogo: Brilliant! They say that you told them: Gentlemen, we do not,
and now you can do whatever you want. - 52 -
RadoKvaradži ć: We let them, however, they are preparing for a war. They
will try to wage a war here.
Gojko Dogo: They?
RadoKvaadži ć: Probably next week, already.
Gojko Dogo: Come on . . . them to wage war?
RadoKvaadži ć: Well, he’s mad. They are completely mad, you know.
Gojko Dogo: Where does he... where does he mean to start a war, [he of
course is Izetbegović] in Sarajevo? Is he a madman?
RadoKvarnadži ć: He is. I think that they should be beaten if they start the
war. They will . . . they will . . . well, they will disappear, that is . . .
Gojko Dogo: There will be a lot of blood, but . . .
RadoKvanadži ć: They will disappear, that people will disappear from the
face of the Earth if they, if they insist no w. Their only chance was to accept what we
have offered them. It was too much, we did offer them too much. But this . . .
Gojko Dogo: You offered them what I would never offer.
RadoKvaradži ć: Well. It was offered more than the Serbs should have ever
offered. However, they did not want even that, and the only thing that we have now,
we may say ⎯ those who want to leave Yugoslavia, let them utter their wish.”
Later on in this conversation (page 12 of the intercept transcript), we can find the following:
“RadoKvaradži ć: Yes, yes. Here, here we have Muslims in the Army, and
even the reservists and those who really fight well . . .
Gojko Dogo: Aha.
RadoKvaaadži ć: And this is important, that . . . they will manage to save this
Muslim majority, who are the losers in all this, from the position of the ill fated.
Gojko Dogo: Yes.
RadoKvaradži ć: They are... because you still can’t know, you can’t, you
can’t say that there isn’t . . . there really are common people and all that is, and I think
they have to be offered both hands. Howeve r, as far as the leadership is concerned,
there should be no hesitation. They must know that if they want to secede, they will
have to start a war against us, and to hit, to beat us and then they will have the
response, and that is clear.”
99. Madam President, the transcript reveals the following sequence:
(a)First, Karadzic was reporting on what had happened in the Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. - 53 -
(b)Second, Karadzic, on the basis of hearing the interventions of Izetbegovic, states that the
Bosnian Muslims are preparing for a war.
(c) Third, Dogo asks where Izetbegovic means to start a war, in Sarajevo? Is he a madman?
(d) Fourth, Karadzic answers: “I th ink that they will be beaten if they start the war. They will . . .
they, will . . . well, they will disappear, that is . . .”
Dogo says: “There will be a lot of blood, but . . .”
(e) Next, Karadzic says: “They will disappear, that people will disappear from the face of the
Earth if they, if they insist now. Their onl y chance was to accept what we have offered
them . . .”
(f) And last, later on, Karadzic says that common Muslim people have to be offered both hands,
but if the leadership wants to secede they will ha ve to start a war and then they will have the
response.
100. In the result, the context reveals that Karadzic is not announcing a programme of
extermination but is forecasting the consequences if a war is started by Mr. Izetbegovic.
Madam President, it would be quite helpful if I could stop there. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Brownlie. If you are confident that you can get through all that
has to be done this afternoon, we will rise now.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you very much.
The Court rose at 1 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mardi 2 mai 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président