CR 2006/26
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Friday 24 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 24 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieigtgins
Vice-Prsi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Judges ad hoc Mahiou
Kre ća
Couevrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-K.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bjnnosuna,
MaMhou.,
Kre ća, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
coagment;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la fact de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Master in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
cocomnseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
coagment;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djeri ć, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. PhD. (Cambridge), Walther-Schücking Institute, University of Kiel,
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdji ć, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebi ć, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Institut Walther-Schücking, Université de Kiel,
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open.
Today, the Court will hear the evidence of the next witness called by Serbia and
Montenegro, General Sir Michael Rose, who will testify in English. The witness may now be
brought into court.
[Witness enters and takes his place at the rostrum]
I call upon General Rose to make the solemn declaration for witnesses as set down in
Article 64 (a) of the Rules of Court.
General ROSE: I solemnly declare upon my whole honour and conscience that I will speak
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. I now give the floor to Mr.Brownlie to begin his
examination of the witness.
Mr. BROWNLIE: General Rose, as we open the examination-in-chief, would you please
make your opening statement to the Court?
General ROSE: I am a retired soldier, form erly of the British army, and my interest in
appearing before this Court is to serve the inter ests of justice and of peace. I do not regard myself
as other than a witness of the Court. I am not siding with one party to the dispute or another. I was
appointed Commander of the United Nations Pr otection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina on
5January1994, and I remained in that post un til 23 January 1995. I of course was not solely
responsible for the policies and the actions of the United Nations during that time in Bosnia. I was
part of a team, which consisted of the civil a dviser, under whom I was serving, because of course
the military are always in support of the ci vil authority. At the start, there was
Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, sadly blown up and killed in a bomb in Iraq, and latterly
Mr.ViktorAndreev. My superior headquarter s was located in Zagreb , where I was under the
military direction of General, first of all, Kot a nd then subsequently, deLaprel. And throughout,
the senior civil/military representative of the United Nations was Mr. Yasushi Akashi, from Japan.
Behind him, of course, was Mr.KofiAnnan who at that time was the Special Representative for
Peacekeeping Operations in the United Nations. - 11 -
The mission of the United Nations Protection Fo rce in Bosnia was to facilitate the delivery
of humanitarian aid and to attempt to bring about a peaceful reconciliation of what at times was a
three-sided civil war. It was never to enforce a ju st solution; it was never to protect or defend.
Because of course those are war-fighting actions, which a peacekeeping force is neither mandated
nor trained, nor equipped, nor deployed so to do. Its responsibilities, therefore, were limited to
facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid and the normal process of a peacekeeping force,
which is to try and bring about the conditions which could be a peaceful resolution to the problem.
The three parties to that conflict were at ti mes not helpful to the process of peace. Indeed,
they interrupted the passage of convoys, often to the detriment of their own people, they shot at and
abused the peacekeeping force, and they attempted often to infringe the demilitarized zones which
existed, or to use the so-called “safe areas” for their own military advantages. They were
recalcitrant parties to the peace pro cess, to say the least. And all three parties were guilty of war
crimes to one degree or another. Of course, the military forces under the command of
General Mladić were by far and away the greatest perpetrators of war crimes and atrocities during
that civil war, but one judges criminality by the quality of the act, not by the quantity of the act, and
all three sides were undoubtedly guilty of war crimes.
The responsibility for those war crimes does not lie solely with the military because of
course on all three sides the military were again in support of the civil power. And so the burden of
responsibility for those war crimes undoubtedly goes th rough the civil authority, and notably to the
top, in the case of Mr. Tudjman; in the case of Republika Srpska, Mr. Karadži ć; and in the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr.Izetbegovi ć. All three share responsibility for the war crimes and
atrocities.
As a result of the work undertaken by the Un ited Nations, I was often required to travel to
Pale, where Republika Srpska had its military and political headquarters, and I was able to gain
some impression as to how closely the political and military operations of Republika Srpska were
being either directly controlled or influenced by Belgrade. And my impression was that it was not,
on the military side, a formal military command arra ngement. They were not, in technical terms,
under command, but a great deal of influence was bro ught to bear and a great deal of consultation,
material support was provided a nd on one or two notable occasi ons, actual military support was - 12 -
deployed in support of Republika Srpska from the fo rmer Republic of Yugoslavia. So there was a
link, but it was not formal. And of course on the political side, again there were many occasions
where one was able to achieve changes in the political position of Mr.Karadži ć by bringing
pressure to bear through the United Nations or , indeed, sometimes through Russia, on Miloševi ć’s
administration and government, and that would then be translated, but never clearly done; it was
always a long process and often did not produce r esults. So, again, one’s impression was that it
was not a formal arrangement.
Finally, I would like to state that I think this Application by the Government of
Bosnia-Herzegovina is not in the interests of peace. I believe that to punish successive generations
of young Serbs who are trying to put the past behi nd them for crimes, however atrocious, that were
committed by a government, which many of whose leaders are either dead or here in The Hague, is
not conducive to peace, particularly when the Stat e of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, at the time, was
party and complicit to war crimes. A far better a nd more constructive approach would be that of
truth and reconciliation. We would not want to se e, clearly, a situation arising in the Balkans,
certainly in Serbia and Montenegro, where the pe ople felt so aggrieved that they took the same
responses as the Germans did in 1930, when heav y reparations were brought to bear on the people
of Germany. That was a mistake which it did not repeat in 1945. Madam President, thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Michael. I now ask . . .
Ms KORNER: I am so sorry Madam to interrupt and it is not the General’s fault but he read
this at some speed and obviously what he had to sa y was important. I wonder if there is a copy of
this available for . . .
General ROSE: I was not reading what I said.
Ms KORNER: I see; you didn’t have a written statement.
General ROSE: I have a written statement but I didn’t follow it very closely. But I could
provide you with my statement if you wish, as I intended to make it. The substantive points are
certainly contained within it.
Ms KORNER: Thank you very much. If the other side has no objection? - 13 -
The PRESIDENT: I think, Ms Korner, you have heard what the General had to say. It was
not immensely detailed and specific ⎯ they were very important points ⎯ but I do believe his
main points you have surely been able to absorb. So I am going to ask you now if you would like
to commence your cross-examination. I beg your pardon, I am going to ask Mr.Brownlie if he
would like to commence his examination.
Mr. BROWNLIE: On behalf of Serbia and Montenegro, in my own personal opinion I think
we have been very patient in face of a number of attempts at procedural innovation and as I
understand it the evidence is the oral testimony given under oath and . . .
The PRESIDENT: I have ruled on this point. Thank you.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Would you please confirm that your period in Serbia as Commander of
UNPROFOR was January 1994 to January 1995.
General ROSE: That is correct.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Could you please confirm that the statement you made and your answers
to questions is or will be your own evidence.
General ROSE: It will.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you. Have you at any time made arrangements with the Office of
the Prosecutor of ICTY for the carrying out of investigations on behalf of the Prosecutor?
General ROSE: I have not.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you. Now if I can pr oceed with some more precise questions.
What is your opinion on the relation between the army of Republika Srpska and the Yugoslav army
in general? And, by the way, please give your evidence to the Court.
General ROSE: As I said in my opening remarks, there was clear evidence of liaison and, on
two notable occasions, direct military support provided, but otherwise my impression was that
materiel support was being given in terms of fuel , ammunition, reinforcements of soldiers being
recruited “voluntarily” to fight for the army of Republika Srpska in Serbia, but there was no formal
military command arrangement: they were not under tactical command, they were not under full
command, in a way that one would get in a coalition of forces. - 14 -
Mr. BROWNLIE: Could you give me your opinion about the relation between Mladi ć and
Radovan Karadžić and also the relation of both of them with Miloševi ć and other politicians from
Serbia and Yugoslavia.
General ROSE: Well, the relationship between Mladi ć and Karadži ć was as one would
expect in a confused and brutal situation, of varying intensity. At times Mladi ć would appear to
dominate the discussions and determine the course of events; on other occasions Karadži ć would
be able to hold his political position and Mladi ć would then conform to that, depending very much
on how pressed they felt, either politically or m ilitarily on the ground. But generally speaking, I
think my opening remark is true, that the military were generally in support of the civil power.
They did not replace it. And of course, it wasn’t just Mr.Karadži ć, there was also Mr.Kodovi ć
and Mr.Krajisnik as well. And they formed a triumvirate, however they were very powerful
politically and to whom Mr. Mladić at least on the surface responded. In terms of their relationship
with Belgrade, it was very difficult to determine ot her than by inference, because, of course, we
were not party to the conversations or . . .
The PRESIDENT: Can you speak slightly more slowly, Sir Michael, so that the interpreters
can keep up with you.
General ROSE: The relationship between Pale and Belgrade was more difficult to ascertain
because of course we were not party to the liaisons or conferences that took place. In my memory I
do not think that Mladi ć or Karadži ć were present, certainly, on the occasion that I went to
Belgrade; they were not present at the meeting between the United Nations and the Government of
the former Republic of Yugoslavia. But of course, there was, as I say, by inference, a great liaison
and consultation. It was possible from time to time to bring about changes in the course of action
on the ground or policies of Pale by bringing pressure to bear on the Belgrade Government.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Could I ask a question in clarification. Could anyone, including Karadžić
and Milošević have given an order to General Mladić.
General ROSE: Well, they certainly could have given an order, but I very much doubt if it
would have been obeyed in that direct way. - 15 -
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you. Who was the Supreme Commander of the Army of the
Republika Srpska?
General ROSE: That was General Mladić.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Now, if I can move on thr ough some other subjects. Do you have any
information about the direct involvement of Y ugoslav army units or police of the Republic of
Serbia or special police of Republic of Serbia units in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
General ROSE: On one occasion, after there had been an agreed ceasefire in Sarajevo,
which took place in February 1994, which halted the bombardment in Sarajevo and, indeed, the
siege in Sarajevo was partially lifted for many months. One small dissident group that was fighting
for the forces of Republika Srpska who, it appear s were volunteers that had come from outside the
Balkans mainly and were located in the Jewish cemetery in Sarajevo, refused to accept the
ceasefire, even though they had been ordered to do so by the Republika Srpska military command.
After some difficulty ⎯ I think a week of difficulty ⎯ when they themselves were shot at by the
so-called heroes who lived up in the Jewish cemet ery, a unit of the regular Yugoslav army did
appear and eliminated them. That was the only time I saw evidence of those forces coming on the
ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There was another occasion shortly afterwards, when four bombers bombed a town called
Bugojno on the western side of Bosnia and Herze govina, west of Sarajevo, and they were all four
shot down by NATO and they were, because of course, there was a no-fly zone over Bosnia and the
pilots undoubtedly came from the Yugoslav air force.
They were the only two occasions where there was direct evidence.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you. You were, by virtue of your office as Commander of
UNPROFOR directly involved in the arrangement and maintenance of ceasefire agreements. Is
that the case?
General ROSE: I was.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you. Could you tell us what was the general approach of the
Bosnian Government in relation to peace plans a nd ceasefire agreements in the period in which
your office was maintained? - 16 -
General ROSE: They were recalcitrant and unhelpful to the cause of establishing long-term
peace in Bosnia. The reason was quite simple. Or iginally they had welcomed the United Nations
peacekeeping forces because their people were needing their support and indeed the presence of the
United Nations peacekeeping forces prevented, in some cases, the physical presence on the ground.
The forces of Republika Srpska were overrunning, for example, Sarajevo which they could have
done at one point. There were various agreements brokered; for example, they withdrew from the
top of Mt. Igman and that was subject to gua rantees by NATO that they should so remain ⎯ both
parties ⎯ outside the Mt.Igman region. The reason being that the Serbs were on it and were
therefore about to close a complete encirclement of Sarajevo but finally withdrew under agreement
brokered before my time by the United Nations and NATO. But the guarantees were by NATO
that no one would go back into that zone. On ot her occasions the ceasefire I referred to: again the
Bosnian Government were very reluctant to agr ee that ceasefire because th ey felt that if they
agreed a ceasefire too early, this could turn in to a cessation of hostilities, a freezing of the battle
lines and then they would have been unjustly legi slated against by the in ternational community.
They would have lost large parts of their territory.
So, at the start they needed peacekeeping forces, but as time progressively moved, on during
my time, they were very reluctant to accept ceasefires because they felt ⎯ as I say ⎯ that they
would really be frozen ultimately long term on th e battle lines as they existed. And therefore they
were the main cause, throughout 1994, of Un ited Nations brokered ceasefires being broken and a
return to war; each time it was the Bosnian Serb s that broke the ceasefire and not either the Croats
or the Serbs.
Mr.BROWNLIE: General Rose, is it true that in 1994 the Bosnian army extended its
military operations?
General ROSE: Please can you repeat that question?
Mr.BROWNLIE: Can you tell me to what extent in 1994 the Bosnian Government
extended the military operations?
General ROSE: The Bosnian Government ⎯ army ⎯ was developing and being built
throughout 1994. Indeed from the time that it creat ed the State of Bosnia, it did not have an army;
it took the rump elements of the former Yugoslav army and started to build its own forces. And - 17 -
throughout 1994 that process continued eith er through the illicit supply of weapons and
ammunition and training that was coming in from outside, subsequent to the formation of the
federation between Croatia and Bosnia. That cha nged the military balance and they were able to
get a lot of support, obviously from the Croatian side , in terms of their own military capability. So
they were not only politically opposed to the peace process by then, but they were also emboldened
and encouraged by the enlargement of their own military capability, the extent of their military
capability, and would often ⎯ as I say ⎯ launch attacks when actually they should not have done,
in sensible military terms.
Mr.BROWNLIE: Thank you. Could you please explain to the Court the creation by the
Security Council of the institution of safe havens. And in connection with that, the extent to which
the safe havens were effectively demilitarized?
General ROSE: The arrangement for the safe areas, as they were called, came about as a
result of an attack that had been launched by forces of Republika Srpska into the area of Srebrenica
in 1993. This followed some major ethnic cleansing of the Serb villages in the area by the Muslim
forces that were located in Srebrenica, under the military commander called Nasir Orić, who is now
indicted for war crimes. In response of these a ttacks against the Serb villages, a major onslaught
was launched into Srebrenica. General Morillon, my predecessor, halted those attacks, physically
standing on the road in front of the Serb for ces, and then engaged in a conversation with
General Mladić, in which General Mladić agreed not to press his attack and overrun the enclave of
Srebrenica from where his own side were being att acked. But in return he expected the Muslim
forces under Naser Ori ć to hand in their weapons and dem ilitarize the zone. The idea of a safe
area, or sanctuary, is an old concept in war where both side parties to a conflict agree they will not
fight in an area in order to preserve the civilian pop ulation in that area and that would therefore be
a safe area. The United Nations sanctioned this arrangement that was made on the ground by
passing two main Security Council resolutions. One was United Nations Security Council
resolution 824, the other was 836, and these resolu tions extended the concept of having a safe area
to the other five: Goražde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Biha ć ⎯ Maglaj, I think, was the other one, or Zepa.
But the wording in the Security Council resolution was very specific; indeed, GeneralMambia
went over to advise on what the limitations of a peacekeeping force were. They could protect, they - 18 -
could not defend, the best they could do was to de ter attacks against by their presence which is not
a war-fighting mission; it is a peacekeeping mi ssion and therefore the United Nations Security
Council resolution was very clear in its wording. The wording was: “to use all means possible to
deter attacks against”. That depended on the co- operation of both parties to the conflict not to
either attack out or to attack in because the United Nations forces themselves were not in a military
position to defend or protect. Unfortunately, the Bo snian forces failed to disarm in Srebrenica and
indeed in a number of the other safe areas and therefore there was continual cross-exchanges of fire
going on throughout my time in command. And, of course we know all about the horrors that
subsequently happened in Srebrenica.
Mr. BROWNLIE: General Rose, can you confirm that there were similar situations in 1994
in Goražde and in Bihać?
General ROSE: Yes, that is so.
Mr.BROWNLIE: Could you describe what the reaction was of the Serbian forces in
Goražde and Bihać?
General ROSE: Well, in Goražde, where they decided to launch an a ttack to prevent these
sullies against themselves, and ind eed also to recover some of the villages from which they had
been driven out during the fighting the previous year, they launched another attack, I think in
March 1994, against Goražde and the United Nations we re obliged to use air strikes to prevent the
overrunning of Goražde, which they duly did. The Serbs pulled out their forces on the line more or
less where their own villages had been, and neve r actually entered the main Muslim side of
Goražde, which was on the other side of the river.
And so that was the first occasion in which NATO was used in live combat in its history; of
course, it has been used many times since; but the first occasion was the stopping of the
overrunning of Goražde. The United Nations we re accused often of using pinpricks, not
destroying, using that as an excuse to take on the entire army of Republika Srpska or indeed that
for the JNA in Belgrade because the plans fo r follow-up action of NATO was to bomb supply
depots and command and communication centres throughout that part of the Balkans, not limiting
itself to Bosnia. So, the United Nations would not accept this and this caused a great deal of
friction at the time and a lot of negative propaga nda against the United Nations subsequently for - 19 -
not extending the air strikes in their campaign. But of course the United Nations were limited not
only by its mandate from the United Nations but al so another constituency which rarely gets a
mention and that is the constituency of the troop-co ntributing nations, all of whom have had to get
parliamentary authority within their countries to deploy forces as peacekeepers; they had no
authority from their own parliaments to deploy them as war-fighting forces or to get them engaged
in war. They had all seen what had happened the year before in Somalia when peacekeeping forces
attempted to attain war-fighting goals in Mogadish u. And the result had been the collapse of the
peacekeeping mission and the prolonged suffering of the people of Somalia; and they were not
prepared for that to happen again.
Mr. BROWNLIE: If we could move on to a different subject: could you describe the kind
of conflict which took place between Fikret Abdi ć, the Muslim ruler of the Autonomous Province
of Western Bosnia, on the one hand, and the Bosnian Government, on the other?
General ROSE: This was a strange anomaly of which, of course, there were many in such a
confused, three-sided civil war in the Balkans. Mr.Abdi ć had run for presidential election at the
start and had lost to Mr. Izetbegović, who claimed that he had been cheated of his electoral victory,
so he formed a breakaway State in his own comm unity, raised an army and found himself clearly
under attack from the Bosnian forces and then formed an unholy alliance with the army of
Republika Srpska, so you had the anomalous pos ition where there were Serbs and Muslims in
coalition fighting the main forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the end he, of course, was
overwhelmed and defeated and I have no idea wh at happened to him subsequently. But this
breakaway State did not last for long.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Could you now describe the relation between FikretAbdi ć and the
Republic of Srpska?
General ROSE: I never saw th em together, but they were in a military alliance, a loose
military alliance.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Could you tell us whether Re publika Srpska or Republika Srpska Krajina
gave support and help to Fikret Abdić?
General ROSE: They undoubtedly did. - 20 -
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you. And, lastly, c ould you provide some information about the
conflict which took place between Croats and Muslims?
General ROSE: The conflict that took place between the Croats and the Muslims ceased
with the Washington Accord, which I think was signed in early March 1994. Up until then the civil
war had been three-sided, with each side fighting to establish ⎯ well, first of all, protect its own
communities; secondly, to establish its own terr itorial integrities and as a result of discussions
which took place, I think in Washington initially, because the agreement was finally called the
Washington Accords, the United Nations were able to broker a ceasefire on the ground which then
turned outwardly into this newly formed federation. But the fighting up to then had been just as
vicious as between any of the other two communities.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you. That concludes the examination-in-chief, Madam President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Brownlie. I now give the floor to MsKorner for her
cross-examination.
Ms KORNER: Thank you, Madam President. Si r Michael, just before I pick up on some of
the things that you told the Court, can I ask you about your preparation for your testimony here?
Obviously, I imagine you went through your book again?
General ROSE: I did not.
Ms KORNER: You did not?
General ROSE: No.
Ms KORNER: All right.
General ROSE: My children call it “fighting for breath”, and I did not want to go through
that experience again!
Ms KORNER: I am sorry, I really have to say the same thing to you as Mr. Brownlie, could
you ⎯ I know I am asking you questions, I know it is difficult . . .
General ROSE: No, I did not reread the book.
Ms KORNER: Were you given an opportunity to go through your testimony in the Galić
case by the side that is calling you? - 21 -
General ROSE: No, I kept a record because I wa s sent a copy of that record, and I certainly
read the preamble to it, which was the basis of my introduction here today.
Ms KORNER: So you have not had ⎯- did you remind yourself of your testimony before
you came here today? Did you remind yourself of your testimony in Galić by reading through it?
General ROSE: No, I did not read through the testimony to Galić, I read through the
preamble to make sure the dates of my appointment were correct. That is as far as my reading
went.
Ms KORNER: Have you been shown by the side that is calling you ⎯ and I appreciate that
you say that you are just here to assist the Court ⎯ any of the documents that have been entered
into this case as part of this . . .?
General ROSE: No, I have not.
Ms KORNER: So you have not had an opportuni ty of looking, for example, at the Supreme
Defence Council minutes?
General ROSE: I have not.
Ms KORNER: Or, indeed, any of the othe r documents that relate to the command and
control issues in this case?
General ROSE: No.
Ms KORNER: So you are basing what you say to the Court on your experience in Sarajevo
during, effectively, the year 1994?
General ROSE: That is correct: and not just Sarajevo because of course we had meetings all
over, Pale, Banja Luka, on the odd occasion in Goražde . . .
The PRESIDENT: Sir Michael, can I remind you again to speak slowly and it will help with
us hearing you, if you can.
General ROSE: The meetings, of course, were not just limited to Sarajevo, they took place
in Pale, Banja Luka, and elsewhere ⎯ on one occasion, Belgrade.
Ms KORNER: So, for example, when you gave your opinion of the relationship between the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, both of the politicians and the military side,
you are basing that opinion on what you observed rather than any documents you have read? - 22 -
General ROSE: That is correct. I saw no documents relating to their relationship.
Ms KORNER: Thank you. Can I just deal with two or three matters that you raised. First
of all, one you raised quite recently and that is the Fikret Abdić saga ⎯ and you have spoken about
joint operations. Were you aware that in 1994 in the Biha ć area the Bosnian government forces
were facing a coalition of opposing forces which included the VRS, the Republika Srpska army,
the forces of the Serb Republic of Krajina and the MUP and Fikret Abdić?
General ROSE: I think I pr obably was, because I had discussions on one or two occasions
with General Dudaković, who was the Bosnian military commander there at the time, and I am sure
he would have explained who his enemy were.
Ms KORNER: Thank you. But when I say the MUP, actually it is the police, the armed
police, which came from Belgrade. Were you aware of that?
General ROSE: I was certainly not aware of any ⎯ and I would have remembered had
Dudaković mentioned there were regular Serb police in that part of Bosnia: and I am sure he never
told us that.
Ms KORNER: You mentioned, to your knowledge, that there were two instances of armed
involvement by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in operations. Can I take it from that that again
that is from your experience and you cannot say whether there were others, but you were told . . .?
General ROSE: That is inevitably so, and even the two incidents that we did observe ⎯
again, one had no direct proof but there was a strong inference that these different weapons,
different looking people, different uniforms, diffe rent plan and commander c ontrol and, of course,
the bombers were never claimed by Belgrade I do not think, although the pilots were buried ⎯ and
had air force funerals, from what I gather ⎯ back in Yugoslavia, so it was more by inference, but it
was pretty strong evidence, I would say.
Ms KORNER: In Sarajevo, when you were there, was the tunnel in operation?
General ROSE: Of course the tunnel was in operation.
Ms KORNER: And that was throughout the whole period of time you were there?
General ROSE: That is true.
Ms KORNER: And that was because ⎯ and I know in your book, there was some problem
about this, but Sarajevo at that stage was a besieged town. - 23 -
General ROSE: It was certainly a besieged to wn but it was not in a state of medieval siege
that one had read about in the sort of Middle Ages. They were able, through the tunnel or through
deals, to get stuff in and out of Sarajevo and, of course, for most of the middle period of my time
there ⎯ because of the ceasefire the United Nations had brokered: initially it was observed by all
three sides ⎯ convoys were coming from Hamburg, as it were, metaphorically, straight into
Sarajevo and life started to take on a semblance of normality. And their electricity started to go
back on again, water systems were repaired, the tram s started to run again, but, alas, this did not
last more than, I think, September of that year. It was therefore not in a complete stage of siege
and there were certainly deals going on between the two sides. At whatever level, I do not know
where, stuff was moving across the battle lines in the middle of the night, if only because we saw
evidence of it when snow had fallen from satellite photography.
Ms KORNER: Now, I want to ask you also : you referred to and obviously you are very
familiar with the United Nations Security Council resolution, the one 836?
General ROSE: Yes.
Ms KORNER: Do you recall the terms of that now? You obviously remember some parts?
General ROSE: I remember some parts.
Ms KORNER: Do you remember the fifth para graph of the resolution, which said that the
mandate of UNPROFOR, in order to enable it in the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 was to
deter attacks against the safe areas?
General ROSE: That is correct. Deter attacks against, using all means possible . . .
Ms KORNER: I’ll read the rest of it, “to monitor the ceasefire, to promote the withdrawal of
military or paramilitary units, other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and to occupy some key points on the ground”.
General ROSE: That is correct.
Ms KORNER: And it also authorized you, didn’t it, in carrying out this mandate ⎯ and I
think that this is what you are referring to ⎯ acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures,
including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties, to
armed incursion into them, or in the event of an y deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to
the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of the protected humanitarian convoys. - 24 -
General ROSE: That is so.
Ms KORNER: The Muslim forces, as they are sometimes described, were more correctly
described as the Bosnian Government forces, as you have been describing, that’s right isn’t it?
General ROSE: That is so. Because they were more than just Muslims in that organization,
there was the odd Serb, there was the Croat, after the federation. So it was more correct to call
them the Bosnian Government forces.
Ms KORNER: Right. I’m going to ask you a few things about your book. I don’t know
whether you brought a copy with you.
General ROSE: Do you want me to refer to particular pages?
Ms KORNER: I think it might help if you have it with you.
General ROSE: I think you will have to do it, because mine is . . .
Ms KORNER: I think mine is the paperback.
General ROSE: So that’s alright, it’s not the hardback.
Ms KORNER: Though I’m afraid the page numbers are different. I tell you what, if we give
you the hardback . . . Do take that.
General ROSE: I have got the paperback.
Ms KORNER: Unfortunately our markings are all . . . I think the pages are different aren’t
they, just to make life . . .
General ROSE: They’ll be different.
Ms KORNER: Yes. Alright, I’m sorry about all the bits of paper. Could you turn, please,
to your introduction; it is page 3. In the penu ltimate paragraph, did you say that you were talking
about the Bosnians pointing out that an international coalition lead by America took military action
against Iraq. And then you said this “[h]owever th e situation in Bosnia was not simply that of one
nation invading another, it was a civil war about territory, in which the Bosnian-Croats and the
Bosnian-Serbs sought to succeed from the State and join with their compatriots in neighbouring
Croatia and Serbia”.
General ROSE: That is so, and I still hold to that belief.
Ms KORNER: I just want to see if we can establish one thing about it. In the sort of
territorial war that you’re thinking of, would th is be right? If, for example, we go back to - 25 -
Napoleonic time ⎯ Napoleon invading, for example, Spain and Portugal and other countries to
acquire more territory: that is what you are calling a territorial war? Is that right?
General ROSE: Yes, then I made the paralle l here with Iraq invading Kuwait, where quite
clearly one nation had invaded another. I c ould have used the Argentines invading the
Islas Malvinas rather than that, but I thought that was bit close to home!
The PRESIDENT: That may not have been a prudent example.
Ms KORNER: But there is a difference isn’t there, between what was happening in Bosnia
and the sort of wars you are thinking about. In th at, it’s right isn’t it, that the invasion, the taking
over of territory ⎯ if one likes to put it that way ⎯ also included the removal from those territories
in one form or another ⎯ without going into methods ⎯ of a complete ethnicity?
General ROSE: It could do, but it wouldn’t always do.
Ms KORNER: But in Bosnia?
General ROSE: In Bosnia, certainly the re moval of the ethnic groupings was wholesale, the
ethnic cleansing, by the various sides against the others, and of course, as I said in my introduction,
this was happening on all three sides. You could find areas where the churches had all been
destroyed and the minarets were standing; you could find areas where the minarets had all been
destroyed and the churches were standing; and then you could find areas where one church type of
Christian church had been destroyed and the type of Christian church had been left standing and
vice versa. A highly complex affair, but undoubtedly the people, the ethnic minority groupings in
these other areas, were subject to major ethnic cleansing.
Ms KORNER: I think it was your view, howev er, when you came to testify in the case of
Galić, that by the time you got to Sarajevo, the Serbs controlled much of the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 70 per cent?
General ROSE: I felt that is correct.
Ms KORNER: And as you said earlier to the Cour t, that’s why it was in the Bosnian-Serbs’
interest to have a ceasefire.
General ROSE: That’s right.
Ms KORNER: Because they had a clear military advantage at that stage. - 26 -
General ROSE: That is correct.
Ms KORNER: You’ve described a little of what you perceived to be the relationship
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, in Bosnia. And I think you
made a few references to that in your book ⎯ again if you could just have a quick look to confirm
this. On page44, where you are describing ⎯ I think its really the aftermath of the Markale
shelling ⎯ and you say that ⎯ this is in your second paragraph ⎯ “we return to the residency in a
sombre mood, Akashi wanted me to accompany him straight away to Belgrade. He intended to put
pressure on President Milošević to get the Bosnian-Serbs to agree to an immediate ceasefire and to
withdraw their artillery from around Sarajevo.” So , is that an instance where it was certainly
perceived that it was Milošević who had the power to put pressure?
General ROSE: Absolutely. And indeed that’s what happened.
Ms KORNER: And if you go please to page 10 8, use just a couple of examples, the bottom
penultimate paragraph, again the last sentence, “13.15 hours, Viktor” ⎯ that is Viktor Andreev, is
it?
General ROSE: Sorry, I’m not with you. I’ve lost you.
Ms KORNER: If you look at page108, penu ltimate paragraph, which begins “Eleventh of
April”.
General ROSE: Yes.
Ms KORNER: The last sentence in that paragraph “at 13.15 hours, Viktor” ⎯ and I was
asking you if that was Viktor Andreev?
General ROSE: That’s correct.
Ms KORNER: “Who had been speaking to Belgrade, reported that President Miloševi ć had
personally intervened to get Karadžić to stop the shelling.”
General ROSE: That is so, that is so. And I think I gave accounts of that in my introduction
that it was possible to bring, but it wasn’t like turning a switch where you would get direct
response, you had to get all sorts of pressures brought to bear before that could happen.
Ms KORNER: On the same topic please, General Mladić, you’ve described your view of the
relationship between Mladi ć and Karadžić. Did you know a General Sir Rupert Smith? Do you
know him; I think you probably do. - 27 -
General ROSE: I know him very well.
Ms KORNER: I am just going to ask you if you would agree with some views that he
expressed. As you know, he t estified, I believe, in the Milošević case and he expressed the view,
when he was being asked about aid from the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia to Republika Srpska,
in particular in relation to the payment of officer s, he said: “The man who pays the cheque is
usually the man who is in command, eventually.” Would you agree with that as a sentiment?
General ROSE: I am not sure that I would en tirely. I think the exposure that my successor,
General Smith, had to the Pale régime was mu ch limited by the forthcoming indictment of
Karadžić and Mladi ć as war criminals. I think he did not meet him on more than a very few
occasions. And I think to say that “he who pays the money can call the tunes” is probably drawing
to the case a tighter relationship that certainly in my experience actually existed.
Ms KORNER: This goes back again to the relationship that he perceived ⎯ and I wonder if
it was one that was the same perception as you. It was this: he was asked about his view of the
relationship between Miloševi ć and Mladi ć, and again, this is his view: “I think Mladi ć had his
own place to exercise power and to do so, and only when this interfered with the business of
Mr. Milošević and Serbia did he get interfered with or controlled.”
General ROSE: I think it would certainly be true to say that Mladi ć had his own agenda and
that the régime in Belgrade may have been mora lly supporting it and materially supporting it, but
they were not controlling it in a military sense. He had his own agenda.
Ms KORNER: Did you know how often Sir Rupert Smith dealt with Belgrade?
General ROSE: I do not know at all.
Ms KORNER: You do not know. Alright. Thank you.
General ROSE: I seem to rememb er him telling me he only met Mladi ć on one or two
occasions, whereas I, of course, met him practically every week. But as I say, the international
climate had changed with the fo rthcoming indictment of Mladi ć and Karadži ć so they were not
permitted the same frequency of visits.
Ms KORNER: Finally, again one more ti me referring to your book, could you go to
page34, please. Madam President, may I say, I know that Mr. Brownlie has a copy but we have
copied the pages that I am referring to, if you want them. - 28 -
In the second paragraph you are describing meetings held by ⎯ I think he was one of your
officers, wasn’t he? Oh, your driver:
“He used these first two meetings to establish good relationships with the
bodyguard belonging to Karadžić and Mladić. Over the months he was able to glean a
lot of information from them, regarding wh at they thought about the situation and
what their bosses were doing. It was espec ially interesting to hear that Mladi ć
regularly travelled to Belgrade on Tuesday s. From this it was clear that Mladi ć at
least was receiving direct orders from the military headquarters there.”
General ROSE: That was the impression ⎯ that he would go back on a regular basis to the
headquarters of the Yugoslav army, where he would not necessarily receive direct orders. We had
no evidence of that, but he would certainly be in consultation with them.
Ms KORNER: Thank you. On the topic of control by the military, can I just put to you
something that you said in Galić, and just see whether that is still your view. I will, in a moment,
come to the shelling incidents which caused deat hs. You were asked by Mr.Ierace, who was
prosecuting, about the degree of command and contro l that the military leadership on all sides of
the warring factions exercised. You may recall that. And you said:
“Yes. The halting of the shelling and the almost but total halting of the sniping
at that time [this was when you had arranged a ceasefire] showed that there was a total
and absolute control on both sides of the military machine.”
General ROSE: That was true.
Ms KORNER: I just want to deal very briefl y with the two incidents that I think were the
first major things you had to deal with on your a rrival. The first was the shelling of an area called
Dobrijna. You obviously recall it very well. Was th is the situation: it happened, in fact, the day
before its more famous incident, the Markale ma rketplace massacre, that there was an incident
involving some mortar explosions in Dobrijna and you said:
“There were people forming up to collect United Nations rations ⎯ I think it
was in the afternoon ⎯ and four mortar shells fell in this crowd and a number of
people were killed and injured. I think six or 10 people were killed and about 28
injured.”
General ROSE: That is true.
Ms KORNER: And you were asked whether any steps had been taken to examine the crater
impact sites and to ascertain, if possible, the direct source of the fire of those four mortar shells.
You said: - 29 -
“Certainly, crater analysis was perform ed almost immediately and the evidence
from that, of course, one can’t be certain in those situations. It is a very inexact
science. The evidence pointed quite clearly that it had been the Bosnian Serb army
that fired these shells and clearly targeted the civilians queuing up for these rations.”
General ROSE: That is so.
Ms KORNER: And the next day was the notorious mass killings in the Markale
marketplace. A number of investigations have been done. Is it right to say that there is no clear
evidence as to where those shells came from?
General ROSE: That is so.
Ms KORNER: I have only got two more topics, thank you very much, Sir Michael. Firstly,
I want to ask you about this. As a British Army General, if you were operating in an area from
which you were going to withdraw, would you will ingly and voluntarily leave behind equipment
and supplies for the use of another army?
General ROSE: No, certainly not. But of course you may be compelled so to do if the
withdrawal was either interrupted or you had insufficient transport arrangements.
Ms KORNER: Yes, obviously. Finally this. And I’m sorry, Sir Michael, I am going to have
to ask you to take your book up again. On one more thing you said: the Galić case. This refers
back to the 70percent that you have been talki ng about. This is a re-examination and you were
asked:
“Did the Serb leadership, in expressing th eir desire for peace, ever suggest that
they would give up any of the 70 per cent that they had taken?”
After there was an interruption by defence counsel, you said this:
“The Serbs could never be describ ed as peacemongers. They were the
aggressors. They had taken much of Saraje vo as well as Bosnia. Their reasons for
suing for peace in 1994 and trying to develop it from the peace that occurred around
Sarajevo to a wider peace in the Balkans, was to take advantage of their military gain.
But this does not mean that they were peace mongers. They were not, equally, but the
peace agreement around Sarajevo allowed th em to withdraw their heavy weapons,
required them to withdraw their heavy weapons , which they were able to redeploy to
other places such as Goražde or Biha ć, where they were able to intensify the fighting.
So a distinction has to be made between a m ilitary desire for peace in a particular area
and the wider strategic goals, which were to maximise the territorial gains through
military victory.”
General ROSE: That was inevitably so. The Serbs by then, the summer of 1994, were
beginning to consider trading land fo r peace. All they were going to gain ⎯ 70percent of the
country ⎯ they were definitely prepared ⎯ and we’ve had discussions in Pale, Mr.Koce and - 30 -
Karadžić ⎯ about how much could be given up, they were prepared to give up in order to secure a
long term ceasefire. And I think they were prepared to reduce their holdings down to 51 per cent of
the territory. But then of course there were comp lications about the quality of the territory, which
then interrupted those peace negotiations. But ce rtainly by the summer of 1994, what you have
said is true, they had fought to their maximum, they had gained their territory; they were now into
the peace business because they were going to try and secure their political objectives. Of course,
the Bosnian Government were in a reverse situati on; they wished to now renew the fighting in
order to regain their land, and then declare a just peace, when they’d have reconquered their
territory. Always a hopeless military aspiration.
Ms KORNER: Right, in fact you said what I said. I was repeating through your words,
SirMichael. Finally, could you just look, please, at page35 of your book? And there you are
talking about ethnic cleansing.
General ROSE: Yes.
Ms KORNER:
“In this way, ethnic cleansing had spread to all parts of the country. During the
war, the Bosnian Muslims became the main victims of a deliberate and systematic
policy of ethnic cleansing and in certain areas, extermination. Although all three sides
were to some extent guilty of war crimes , genocide as defined by the United Nations
Convention on Genocide did not form part of official government policy in the way
that it so clearly did with the Serbs. Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serbs were not the sole
perpetrators of atrocities and this fact was often difficult to communicate to members
of the international community.”
General ROSE: I am no expert on international law, but that certainly was my view when I
wrote the book.
Ms KORNER: Yes. Thank you very much indeed, Sir Michael.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Mr. Brownlie, do you wish to re-examine?
Mr.BROWNLIE: Yes, I have a few short poi nts. The first is, General Rose, in the
examination-in-chief, when you were asked a bout the general performance of the Bosnian
Government, in the context of observing ceasefires, you made the remark that it was always the
Bosnian Serbs who broke the ceasefires. Isn’t it possible that there you actually meant to say
“Muslims”? - 31 -
General ROSE: I meant to say “Muslims”. Did I say “Serbs”?
Mr. BROWNLIE: Yes.
General ROSE: Oh, I meant to say Muslims. I meant to say Muslims, because that was the
tenor of my logic . . .
The PRESIDENT: Yes. I think that slip of the tongue had been understood.
General ROSE: Well, I withdraw the word “S erbs”, and insert the word “Muslims” in that
case. And I can give you the instances. It was very clear. There was one in June after there had
been meetings in Geneva between the two warring parties, under the chairmanship of Mr. Akashi,
at which Mr.Gani ć, the Vice-President ⎯ who commanded the armed forces ⎯ he went back,
having signed the agreement, and almost immediat ely launched an attack on the western side of
Sarajevo in order to break down that ceasefire.
And then of course there was technical evidence which I was able to present to
President Izetbegović, showing that it was his forces under Deli ć, that had deliberately broken the
ceasefire in September, which had actually made, transformed the life of the people in Sarajevo.
And yet it was their own Government that had smashed that ceasefire in order to create those
images of victims, of suffering which of course they needed if they were going to get the
international support they thought they required. They were two clear examples.
And of course on Mt.Igman, they were th e ones who continually attacked into the
demilitarized zone on Mt.Igman. Although the Se rbs generally held their line, on the outside of
that demilitarized zone.
Mr.BROWNLIE: Thank you. The other point was that you confirmed to counsel for
Bosnia that no documents were shown to you.
General ROSE: No.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Could you also confirm that it was at no stage suggested to you that you
would be an instrument for the introduction of documents into this testimony?
General ROSE: No.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam President. - 32 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Court w ill now retire but the Parties and the witness
should remain in the vicinity of the Great Hall of Justice. If the Court wi shes to pose questions to
the witness, it will return to the courtroom within the next 15 minutes. If the Court should not wish
to pose any questions to the witness, the Re gistry will inform the Parties and the public
accordingly. The Court now rises.
The Court adjourned from 11.05 to 11.40 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Please will you ask the witness to rejoin us?
SirMichael, there are some questions for you fro m the Bench, and I call first of all upon the
Vice-President.
The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Michael. In your introductory statement you made
the remark, which I am afraid I cannot cite verbatim but I can merrily try to rephrase. You said that
in the interest of peace, this case should not continue and you cited the fact that the leaders had died
and the historical events after the First Worl d War where heavy conditions were imposed on
Germany. Now, of course, peace is a very important consideration but there is another
consideration, namely, justice. Would you say that what happened after the Second World War ⎯
the imposition of reparations on Germany and the trial of Nazi and Japanese war criminals ⎯
should not have been undertaken and, instead, a commission on reconciliation and truth would have
done the job more effectively?
General ROSE: I think the point I was trying to make, Madam President, was that it is better
to pursue individuals for war crimes than to try and pursue States. The heavy reparations that were
imposed on Germany after the First World War caused the end of democracy in that country and
the rise of totalitarian fascist State. And, ofcourse, at the end of the Second World War, the
reparations were imposed, but they were much more limited, and at the same time the international
community was engaged in a programme of recons truction and putting the past behind them, and I
think that balance, therefore, was a better balan ce than had happened in the First World War. But
my general thesis is that if we are not going topunish successive generations of people of Serbia - 33 -
and Montenegro it would be better to continue pursuing the war criminals and not to go for States.
I think it is more constructive to pursue the path of truth and reconciliation.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. I now call upon Judge Owada.
Judge OWADA: Thank you, Madam President. I have a question to the witness.
GeneralSir Michael Rose, if I understood you accur ately, you stated something to the following
effect: no formal military command relationship ex isted between the VRS and the VJ. Now, my
question is the following: if my understanding of th at statement is accurate, is that statement based
on your impression, your inference coming from some circumstantial factors that you observed, or
some concrete evidence?
General ROSE: This was relating . . . I do no t quite understand what it was relating to. The
relationship between the military commanders in th e army of Republika Srpska and the Yugoslav
regular forces . . .
The PRESIDENT: Would you like the question put again to you?
General ROSE: I think I understand it.
Judge OWADA: The question is the following: if I understood you correctly, and of course
this was a verbal exchange, so I may not ha ve grasped what you said correctly, but my
understanding was that you said to the effect that no formal military command relationship existed
between the army of Republika Srpska and the army of Yugoslavia. Now, my question is whether
that statement of yours was based on your impression or your inference on the basis of some
circumstantial factors that you observed, or based on some concrete evidence?
General ROSE: I fully understand that, Madam President. It was an inference drawn from
the impressions that I had gained during that time. There was no concrete evidence one way or the
other, but having lived in the military for the whole of my career, I have an understanding of formal
military command relationships and my view was that they did not exist between those two
organizations. - 34 -
Judge OWADA: Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. I now call upon Judge Simma.
Judge SIMMA: Thank you, Madam President. Sir Michael, I can link my question to what
you just said in reply to Judge Owada’s question. You stated that according to your insight into
matters you could not establish that there was a formal relationship of command and control
between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. On th e other hand, on one of the pages of the book to
which you were referred by counsel for the App licant, you said on that page that all sides
committed atrocities and war crimes, and then you referred to genocide, and what you said was that
genocide was committed by only one side, namely, th e Serb side. Now, in the light of what you
said about the relationship between Belgrade and Pale, would you then say that if you want to
retain that statement because I am not sure what year your book was published, if you keep to that
view that genocide was committed, would you say th at genocide, according to your insight, was
then rather committed by the Bosnian Serbs or would you kind of implicate Belgrade in that?
General ROSE: No, I would not implicate Belgrade. Clearly, it was committed by the ⎯
and this is my understanding of genocide, the defi nition of genocide has obviously changed. That
book was printed, I think, in 1995. My understandi ng has improved as to what genocide consists
of, but I would not alter my view that it was the Pale régime that was committing genocide.
Whether the Belgrade régime was implicated in th at and how far they were implicated in that, I
would not be able to offer an opinion.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. That brings to an end the hearing of the witness and I thank
you, Sir Michael, for appearing before us.
General ROSE: Thank you, Madam President.
The PRESIDENT: The Court will now turn to hear the evidence of Mr. Jean-PaulSardon,
who has been called as a witness-expert by Serb ia and Montenegro, and the witness-expert may
now be brought into court.
[Witness enters and takes his place at the rostrum] - 35 -
The PRESIDENT: I call upon Mr. Sardon to make the solemn declaration set down in
Article 64, subparagraph (b), of the Rules of the Court.
M. SARDON : Je déclare sole nnellement, en tout honneur et en toute conscience, que je
dirai la vérité, toute la vérité et rien que la vérité et que mon exposé correspondra à ma conviction
sincère.
The PRESIDENT: Je vous remercie. I now give the floor to Ms Fauveau-Ivanovi ć to begin
her examination of the witness-expert.
MFmUeVEAU-IVANOVI Ć : Merci, Madame le président. Monsieur Sardon, je vous prie
de vous présenter brièvement à la Cour et d’exposer votre expérience et vos travaux principaux.
M. SARDON : Madame le président, Messieurs les juges. Excusez-moi, c’est l’émotion
d’être devant vous. Mon nom est Sardon, Jean-Paul, je suis directeur de recherche à l’Institut
national d’études démographiques à Paris, je suis également directeur de l’Observatoire
démographique européen et j’ai en partiulier la charge de produire annuellement lAnnuaire
démographique du Conseil de l’Europe . Je suis également membre fondateur d’un groupe de
recherche démographique, un réseau qui s’appelle DémoBalk, qui est spécialisé dans la
démographie…
The PRESIDENT: Could I just interrupt, I am sorry to do so earlier, but we are very anxious
to understand everything you are saying, so could you speak a little more slowly for the
interpreters.
M. SARDON: Excusez-moi, Madame le président. Je disais que suis également membre
fondateur d’un groupe de recherche démogra phique, un réseau dont le nom est DémoBalk, qui a
organisé jusqu’à maintenant trois conférences internationales sur la démographie des Balkans; la
première s’est tenue à Thessaloniquen 1996, la deuxième à Sara jevo en 2000 et la dernière,
en 2005, à Belgrade. Voici pour ma présentation. Merci, Madame le président.
MFmUe VEAU-IVANOVI Ć: Monsieur Sardon je vais vous demander de faire à la Cour
votre déclaration. - 36 -
M. SARDON: Madame le président, afin de lever toute ambiguïté au départ, je tiens à
préciser que je n’ai moi-même procédé à aucune estimation directe ou indirecte du nombre de
victimes de la guerre qui toucha la Bosnie-Herzégovine entre 1992 et 1995, ce que je vais vous
présenter ici est une analyse critique des estimations publiées en insistant plus particulièrement sur
celles qui ont été faites par les démographes de l’unité démographique du bureau du procureur du
Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie. Dans un premier temps, je m’intéresserai aux
victimes de la guerre avant d’aborder la question des réfugiés et des déplacés.
1. Les victimes de guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine (1992-1995)
L’estimation du nombre des victimes de ce conflit est un sujet si sensible si emblématique
des conflits interethniques qui ont accompagné la désintégration de l’ancienne Yougoslavie qu’elle
est plus souvent traitée d’une manière émotionnelle que comme un sujet nécessitant toute la rigueur
scientifique.
Toutes sortes de chiffres circulent, repris en fonction de la sensibilité de ceux qui les
utilisent, sans que ces derniers ne ressentent la n écessité d’en vérifier le bien-fondé ou même tout
simplement d’en contrôler l’origine.
Estimations du nombre de décès dus à la guerre pour l’ensemble de la Bosnie-Herzégovine
(1992-1995), selon l’origine et l’estimation
Sources Sources étrangères Sources locales
SIPRI (1993) 169 100
Basssiouni (1995) 200 000
Kenney (1995) 40 000-70 000
IPH (1 janvier 1996) 156 824
IPH (25 mars 1996) 278 800
Praso (1996) 329 000
Bosnjovic-Smajkic (1997) 258 000
Boyle (1998) 139 000
Thomas (1998) 25 000-60 000
Zerjavic (1998) 220 000
Bosnjovic (1999) 252 200
Tabeau-Bijak (2003) 102 622 - 37 -
C’est ainsi que l’on a vu fleurir des estimati ons du nombre de tués et disparus qui s’étagent
de vingt mille à trois cent vingt-huit mille. Soit da ns un rapport tout à fait inhabituel de un à seize.
La plupart de ces estimations circulent sans que l’ en en connaisse plus précisément la source, ni la
méthodologie ayant présidé à leur calcul, quand, to utefois, ces nombres ne sont pas nés par une
sorte de génération spontanée.
La première constatation que l’on peut fair e à l’analyse de ces estimations est que leur
niveau dépend largement de l’origine géogra phique de leurs auteurs. Celles faites en
Bosnie-Herzégovine sont toujours beaucoup plus él evées que venant de l’étranger. La moyenne
des estimations locales dépasse deux cent quarante- sept mille personnes contre moins de la moitié,
cent dix-huit mille, pour la moyenne des estimations étrangères. Il s’agit là d’un fait relativement
courant dans des situations de ce type, le cam p des victimes surestime toujours le nombre des
pertes qu’il a eu à déplorer. De plus, la plupart des constructions locales, prennent en compte
l’excès de mortalité qui est dû à la dégradation des conditions de vie pendant la guerre.
Malheureusement, que ces estimations aient été faites à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur de
l’ancienne Yougoslavie, il est assez difficile de comprendre comment les auteurs les ont obtenues.
Ce n’est généralement pas précisé dans la publica tion. Toutefois, un nombre limité de méthodes
permet de procéder à de telles estimations :
⎯ utilisation des statistiques de décès qui ont ét é fournies par l’Institut de santé publique de
Sarajevo;
⎯ comparaison entre la population attendue hér itée du dernier recensement (1991) et la
population actuelle estimée;
⎯ combinaison des deux méthodes précédentes.
Le problème principal de ces travaux est l’ absence de critique de la qualité des sources
utilisées, en particulier les données de mortalité collectées par l’Institut de santé publique, dont
nous savons qu’elles surestiment largement le nombre de décès du fait de doubles comptes.
Parmi toutes ces estimations, auxquelles nous avons pu accéder, l’une se distingue
particulièrement par sa qualité, c’est celle établie par Ewa Tabeau et Jakub Bijak, démographes - 38 -
attachés au bureau du procureur du TPIY. Dans ce travail aujourd’hui publié 1, le nombre des
victimes dues à la guerre y est estimé à cent deux mille six cent vingt-deux personnes.
Dans ce document, comme dans tous ceux pr éparés par l’unité démographique du bureau du
procureur du TPIY, les auteurs recoupent l’ensemb le des sources avant de considérer une personne
comme morte ou disparue. De plus, tous les doc uments nécessaires à la compréhension de la
manière dont sont obtenues ces estimations sont donnés et l’approche scientifique est toujours
présente, même si nous pouvons faire quelques critiques.
Pour ce travail, comme pour tous ceux qui ont été faits dans le cadre de cette unité
démographique, les auteurs ont mobilisé l’ensemb le des sources disponibles en matière de décès.
Le premier travail a donc consisté à éliminer les doubles comptes contenus dans ces différentes
listes disponibles de personnes mortes, tuées ou disparues.
Ensuite, après l’élimination des doubles comp tes, chaque enregistrement de décès a été
couplé avec les bulletins individuels du recensement de 1991 afin de contrôler l’identité de la
personne, et cela a été couplé aussi avec le registre de votants de 1997-1998 et de2000, afin de
contrôler la validité de la déclaration de décès ou de disparition.
Après tous ces apurements, le nombre minimum de morts et disparus s’élèverait à
cent sept mille trois cent quatre-vingt-quinze personnes dont soixante-sept mille cinq cent trente
dus à la guerre. En fait, il s’agit des personnes décl arées mortes ou disparues, dont on a retrouvé le
bulletin de recensement et qui ne figurent dans aucune liste d’électeurs. Ce nombre ne contient pas
les mille neuf cent vingt-trois personnes trouvées, à la fois dans la liste des victimes et dans la liste
électorale, et dont le destin est donc inconnu. Mais c’est là que se situe le premier problème.
En effet, l’incohérence n’est mesurée que sur les personnes enregistrées sur les listes
électorales en 1997-1998. Or, l’OSCE (Organisa tion pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe)
considère que 20% des personnes d’âge éligible ne se sont pas inscrites pour voter, c’est-à-dire
2
quelque cinq cent cinquante mille personnes . En faisant la simple hypothèse que les incohérences
1Ewa Tabeau et Jakub Bijak, «Casua lties in the 1990s War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous
Estimates and the Latest Results», communication présentée au Seminar on the Demography of Conflict and Violence,
Jevnaker, Norvège, 8-11 novembre 2003. Ce travail a été publié ultérieurement sous le titre «War-related Deaths
in 1992-1995, Armed Conflicto in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A critique of Previous Estimates and recent results» in European
Journal of Population, 2005, n 21, p. 187-215.
2((2210252/80)*100-2210252)=553013. - 39 -
affectent dans la même proportion (0,99 %) les inscrits et les non-inscrits, le nombre de décès liés à
3
la guerre aurait dû être diminué de trois cent deux .
Afin d’être plus précis, ce nombre devrait être calculé séparément pour chacune des
communautés. Ce point n’est p as sans importance, parce que les listes électorales sont utilisées
pour acquérir la certitude qu’une personne est décédée. Ainsi, une personne déclarée à tort comme
morte ne peut être retirée de la liste des personn es décédées que si elle s’était inscrite pour voter.
Si elle ne s’est pas inscrite, elle sera défin itivement considérée comme décédée. Si la proportion
des non-inscrits diffère d’une nationalité à l’au tre, l’estimation du nombre de victimes selon
l’affiliation ethnique pourra être plus éloignée de la réalité que ne le sera l’estimation du nombre
total de décès indépendamment de leur appartenance ethnique.
Quoi qu’il en soit, l’estimation du nombre minimal de décès ou de disparitions ne saurait être
largement remise en cause. L’estimation de ce nombre minimal de victimes s’élève, je le rappelle,
à cent sept mille trois cent quatre-vingt-quinze, dont soixante-sept mille cinq cent trente dus à la
guerre.
D’autre part, comme le couplage des bulle tins de décès avec les bulletins individuels du
recensement n’a pu être assuré que dans un peu plus de 81% des cas, le nombre de victimes
observées ne constitue qu’un minimum et sous-estime par conséquent le nombre total des victimes.
C’est pourquoi ces nombres minimums ont été ajustés pour tenir compte de ces couplages
impossibles.
Comme souvent, le point-clé est celui de la procédure de redressement qui permet d’estimer
le nombre total de victimes. Pour ce faire, les auteurs ont admis, comme cela se fait couramment,
que les 19% de personnes, pour lesquelles le couplag e entre le bulletin de décès et le bulletin de
recensement n’avait pu être réalisé, avaient, en moyenne, les mêmes caractéristiques que celles
pour lesquelles l’appariement des deux sources fut possible. L’hypothèse sous-jacente est que la
proportion des décès confirmés serait la même, tant pour les décédés dont on a retrouvé le bulletin
de recensement que pour ceux pour lesquels l’appariement avec un bulletin de recensement fut sans
succès. De manière implicite, cela suppose qu’auc une sélection particulière n’intervient pour
3
(67530/107395)*481. - 40 -
séparer les personnes entr e ces deux groupes, et, en particulie r, que la probabilité pour que les
bulletins de décès et de recensement puissent êt re couplés soit indépendante des caractéristiques
que l’on analyse. En clair, il ne faudrait pas que les personnes pour lesquelles le couplage n’a pu
être réalisé soient principalement des personnes qu i auraient été déclarées à tort comme décédées,
ou qui appartiendraient à une communauté particulière.
Rien ne permet de conforter cette hypothèse, qui n’est qu’une des hypothèses possibles. En
effet, nous pourrions tout aussi bien faire l’ hypothèse que les 19% ne sont pas un échantillon
aléatoire de l’ensemble des bulletins de décès, ma is qu’au contraire ils résultent d’un effet de
sélection. De ce fait, les 81 %, en dépit de leur nombre, ne sont pas nécessairement représentatifs
de l’ensemble des personnes et peuvent en donner une image biaisée, notamment pour l’affiliation
ethnique.
La faiblesse des travaux faits par les démographes du bureau du procureur du TPIY provient
du fait que s’ils ont bien apuré le fichier des bulletins de décès, ils n’ont pas procédé à un travail de
critique de la liste électorale et du recense ment, à l’exception de la suppression des doubles
comptes dans le recensement de 1991.
L’effet de ce redressement n’est pas négligeable puisqu’il permet de faire
passer le nombre de victimes de guerre de soixante-sept mille cinq cent trente à
quatre-vingt mille huit cent soixante-huit.
Afin de compléter l’estimation du nombre total de décès, les auteurs ont estimé le nombre de
civils morts enregistrés dans les registres de la Republika Srpska à la moitié des morts civils
enregistrés sur le territoire de la Fédération. En pr emière estimation, ils auraient tout aussi bien pu
faire l’hypothèse que les décès civils se répart issaient entre les communautés comme les décès
militaires. Dans ce cas, cela aurait entraîné une réduction du nombre…
The PRESIDENT: Could you pause a moment? Is everything in order? Yes. Please
continue and as slowly as you conveniently can.
Mr SARDON: I will try.
Donc, dans ce cas, et en faisant cette nouve lle hypothèse, cela aurait entraîné une réduction
du nombre de blessés de près de trois mille. Dans ces conditions, le nombre total de décès serait un - 41 -
peu inférieur à cent mille. Néanmoins, il apparaît que l’estimation faite par les démographes du
bureau du procureur est sérieuse et qu’elle doit a pprocher la réalité. Très probablement le nombre
de décès dus à la guerre devrait se situer autour de cent mille. Ce qui plaide également en faveur
de la bonne approximation de cette estimation, c’ est qu’elle est très proche de celle produite par
Mirsad Tokaca, directeur du centre de recherche et de documentation de Sarajevo. Le décompte
des victimes, civils et soldats, auquel about issait, fin février, son équipe s’élevait à
quatre-vingt-seize mille quatre cent trente-six pers onnes. Ce nombre devrait être encore affiné
d’ici la fin mars, date à laquelle devrait être publié le rapport définitif recensant l’ensemble des
personnes mortes pendant le conflit.
Cette concordance des estimations témoigne du fait que le nombre de victimes de la guerre
de 1992-1995 serait deux fois moins élevé que le chiffre couramment cité de deux cent mille
personnes.
Par-delà l’accord sur le nombre total de vic times, la répartition selon la filiation ethnique
sont assez proches. Mme Tabeau et M.Tokaca es timent tous les deux la part des Musulmans
à68%, mais elle diffère quelque peu pour les au tres: 26% de Serbes, 5% de Croates et1% de
personnes appartenant aux autres communautés pour M. Tokaca, alors que Mme Tabeau estime ces
parts respectives à 19 %, 8 % et 5 %. Il est vrai que la répartition de Mme Tabeau est calculée sur
les nombres minimums, non redressés.
II. Les réfugiés et déplacés en Bosnie-Herzégovine (1992-1995)
Si pour les décès ou disparitions il existe des bulletins, ce n’est pas le cas pour les réfugiés et
déplacés, ce qui confère une importance capitale aux procédures d’estimation. Cela est encore plus
flagrant quand on s’intéresse à une zone particulière comme c’est le cas dans la plupart des actions
judiciaires devant le TPIY, dont les travaux d’experts ont servi de base à notre analyse.
4 5
Ces travaux [rapports ou présentations de rapports ], faits par les membres de l’Unité
démographique, utilisent la même méthodologie que celle dont j’ai parlé pour Mme Tabeau. C’est
d’ailleurs dans le cadre de ces travaux que cette méthodologie avait été mise en place.
4The Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik, Submission of updated statement of Dr. Ewa Tabeau (29 May 2003) and
The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Prosecution submission of expert report of Ewa Tabeau pursuant to rule 94 bis
(28 April 2003). - 42 -
Dans la mesure où tous ces rapports recouren t à la même méthodologie et suivent la même
structure, nous allons faire dans la suite comme s’il s’agissait d’un seul document.
D’un point de vue méthodologique, plusieurs cr itiques peuvent être formulées tant sur les
sources que sur les hypothèses, implicites ou explicites retenues. Tout d’abord, en ce qui concerne
la critique des sources, les auteurs s’arrêtent à l’aspect comptable :
⎯ ils ne discutent aucunement la qualité de l’information donnée dans le recensement de 1991 sur
l’appartenance ethnique, pas plus que sur la complétude de ce recensement;
⎯ ils ne se posent pas non plus la question des év entuels biais de sélection qui pourraient avoir
affecté la procédure d’inscription sur les listes électorales.
Mesure et définition des réfugiés et déplacés
Une des premières critiques concerne la ma nière dont sont mesurés et donc définis les
réfugiés et les déplacés.
Ainsi, les réfugiés et les déplacés de l’intéri eur ont été mesurés par comparaison entre la
municipalité de résidence officielle au recenseme nt de1991 et celle où l’inscription sur la liste
électorale a été faite. Ainsi, tous les électeurs résidant, en1997, hors de la municipalité de
résidence officielle en Bosnie-Herzégovine déclarée en1991 sont considérés comme des réfugiés
s’ils se sont inscrits depuis l’étranger et comme déplacés si cette inscription est intervenue dans une
autre municipalité du pays.
Dans un rapport qui a été présenté dans le cadre du procès contre Slobodan Miloševi ć, les
auteurs ont écrit que les électeurs résidant à l’étranger «peuvent et doivent» être considérés comme
6
des réfugiés . Il s’agit là d’une affirmation assez surprenante et qui conduit à gonfler le nombre des
réfugiés, pour plusieurs raisons.
5
Helge Brunborg, «Contribution of Statis tical Analysis to the Investigati ons of the International Criminal
Tribunals» paper for international conference on Statistics, Development and Human Rights, Montreux,
4-8 September2000 and Helge Brunborg, Torkild Hovde Lyngs tad and Henrik Urdal, «Accounting for Genocide: How
Many Were Killed in Srebrenica?, European Journal of Population , 19: 229-248, 2003 (Presentation of results from
Helge Brunborg and Henrik Urdal, «Report on the number of Missing and Dead from Srebrenica» in The Prosecutor v.
Radislav Krstic, February 12 2000).
6 Il semble qu’il y ait une contradiction entre les pages 6 et 28 au sujet de la définition des réfugiés, page 28 il est
dit que les réfugiés sont définis parcomparaison des résidences en1991 et en 1997-98. Cela signifie-t-il que les
personnes déjà à l'étranger en 1991 n'ont pas été prises en compte ? - 43 -
En premier lieu, le fait d’inclure des personn es vivant à l’étranger pose problème. Si cette
inclusion ne modifie pas notablement la compos ition ethnique, comme les auteurs l’écrivent (p. 6,
v.SM), elle augmente, quand même, le nombre des réfugiés de 15 %...
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Sardon, I’m sorry to interrupt you once again, but I want to explain
to you we really wish to follow what you ar e saying and you will help those of us who are
following through our earphones if you can speak a little more slowly.
Mr. SARDON: I will try to do my best but you know . . .
The PRESIDENT: Please be sure that we are appreciative of your being here, and it is only
because we are interested we would like you to speak more slowly.
M. SARDON : I apologize for that. Donc, comme je le disais, le fait d’inclure les personnes
vivant à l’étranger fait augmenter le nombre des réfugiés de 15% puisque 13% des électeurs
inscrits à l’étranger étaient déjà à l’étranger en 1991. Ensuite, cela suppose non seulement que
toutes les personnes qui avaient émigré avant le recensement de 1991 ont été empêchées de revenir
du fait de la guerre, mais également que durant la guerre personne n’a quitté le pays pour des
raisons non liées à la guerre.
Enfin, cela signifie que même s’il n’y avait p as eu de guerre personne n’aurait émigré. Une
hypothèse plus réaliste aurait considéré que le taux d’émigration aurait été, en l’absence de la
guerre, très voisin de celui qui était observé dans les années précédant la guerre. L’affirmation des
auteurs est étonnante et elle est présentée sans argument sérieux à l’appui. Aussi, n’est-il pas facile
de comprendre pourquoi ces auteurs n’ont pas co nsidéré l’éventualité de la poursuite d’une
émigration de travail, même dans de telles cond itions et même si cette hypothèse aurait dû être
rejetée après analyse. De la même façon, la méthode utilisée tend à exagérer le nombre des
personnes déplacées à l’intérieur de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Utiliser cette méthode pour calculer
une première estimation était tout à fait logi que mais on pouvait s’attendre à ce que les auteurs
cherchent à se faire une idée plus précise en se demandant si, en dépit de la guerre, certains
changements de leur résidence, pendant la péri ode 1991-1997, ne pourraient pas être considérés
comme «normaux». D’autre part, ils auraient pu également se demander si, en l’absence de guerre,
l’ensemble des survivants aurait c ontinué à résider dans la même municipalité. Pour cela, comme - 44 -
pour affiner l’estimation du nombre de réfugiés, il aurait été possible de considérer que les
changements de résidence officielle auraient c ontinué à un rythme voisin de celui qui avait été
enregistré avant la guerre. Et comme vous le savez sûrement, le mariage est ainsi, notamment,
souvent l’occasion d’une migration interne pour l’un des époux, celui qui va vivre dans la résidence
de son conjoint.
Estimation du nombre total de réfugiés et déplacés
Après cette étape qui donne le nombre, défini par les auteurs comme minimal, de réfugiés et
déplacés internes, mesuré ⎯ je vous le rappelle ⎯ dans la seule population des électeurs pour
lesquels le bulletin de recensement a pu être id entifié, les auteurs ont estimé le nombre total de
personnes réfugiées et déplacées, en faisant l’hypothèse que leur proportion dans cette
sous-population devait être très pr oche de celle que l’on pourrait mesurer pour l’ensemble de la
population de la zone considérée, que ce soit une région particulière ou l’ensemble du pays.
L’hypothèse que les auteurs ont utilisée est valide à condition que l’une au moins des deux
conditions suivantes soit réalisée :
1. le sous-ensemble dans lequel est mesurée la proportion doit être suffisamment grand par rapport
à l’ensemble dans lequel on désire l’estimation, de façon à ce que la partie non observée ne
puisse remettre en cause, autrement que de manière marginale, la proportion mesurée;
2. le sous-ensemble doit constituer un échantillon al éatoire, c’est-à-dire représentatif et non biaisé
de l’ensemble de la population.
En l’occurrence, rien ne permet d’affirmer que ces conditions sont bien réalisées. En effet,
non seulement l’appariement avec les bulletins de recensement n’a pu être réalisé que pour 80%
des personnes inscrites sur la liste électorale, mais l’OSCE considère qu’au moins20% des
personnes éligibles ⎯ comme je vous l’ai dit ⎯ ne se sont pas fait inscrire sur les listes électorales
et les auteurs estiment même que la proportion de non-inscrits représenterait un quart des personnes
éligibles. Si bien qu’au total la proportion ne serait mesurée que dans un sous-ensemble d’environ
60% de la population éligible et, par conséquent , une proportion encore plus faible de la
population totale puisqu’il faut teni r compte de la population de moins de dix-huit ans, qui n’était
pas éligible. - 45 -
Ce double processus, d’inscription sur les list es électorales puis d’appariement avec les
bulletins de recensement, pourrait tout aussi bien être à l’origine de sélections, susceptibles
d’entacher de biais la proportion mesurée.
Mais avant d’analyser ces sources de biais, évoquons le problème de la mortalité entre le
recensement de 1991 et 1997-1998. En estimant le nombre de déplacés et réfugiés par application
à l’ensemble de la population recensée en 1991, de la proportion mesurée parmi les électeurs, les
auteurs semblent considérer comme négligeable le fait que quelque cent cinquante mille personnes
soient mortes pendant la guerre ⎯mort naturelle et mort de la guerre. L’hypothèse qu’ils font
n’est pas loin de la réalité car le nombre de décès, liés ou non à la guerre, représente un peu plus de
3 % de la population d’avant-guerre. Néanmoins, le s conséquences de cette surestimation sont de
même ampleur sur tous les effectifs calculés sur la base de la taille de la population en 1991.
L’inscription sur le registre des votants de l’OSCE
Examinons maintenant les possibles effets de sélection qui ont pu intervenir dans la
constitution du registre des votants. Pour détermin er si les listes électorales peuvent être utilisées
pour estimer les nombres de personnes mortes ou dispar ues, et leur répartition selon les principales
communautés, il est essentiel de savoir si les personnes enregistrées forment véritablement un
échantillon représentatif de la population de Bosn ie-Herzégovine, ainsi que de chacune de ses
composantes, ou si certains groupes ont refusé de pr endre part au vote, en proportions un peu plus
grandes pour les uns que pour les autres
Le premier facteur de doute est la compos ition des nouveaux inscrits de 1998, dont on sait
qu’ils ont été fondus en un registre unique avec ceux de 1997. Ces nouveaux électeurs, qui sont au
nombre de cent cinquante mille, sont en effet deux fois plus nombre ux que les seules nouvelles
personnes éligibles entre 1997 et 1998, c’est-à-dire celles qui n’avaient pas encore atteint en 1997
l’âge minimum légal. Cela signifie donc, qu’en plus de ces personnes nées en 1980 qui ont atteint
l’âge minimum en 1998, d’autres personnes qui au raient pu s’inscrire dès 1997 ne l’ont fait
qu’en1998. Ainsi, si les in scrits de 1998 ne sont pas repr ésentatifs de ceux qui auraient dû
s’inscrire cette année-là, cela signifie peut -être que les inscrits de 1997 n’étaient pas
nécessairement représentatifs de l’ensemble des éligib les. D’autre part, rien ne permet de dire que - 46 -
le registre unique, découlant de la fusion des lis tes de 1997 et de 1998, aurait une plus grande
représentativité.
De plus, si les auteurs reconnaissent que le regi stre ne peut être utilisé pour estimer l’effectif
total de la population (c’est l’évidence dans la mesure où la population de moins de dix-huit ans
n’y sont pas enregistrés), ils précisent que le registre peut être utilisé pour analyser la composition
ethnique, et estimer le nombre de déplacés et réfugiés. Ainsi, confrontés au sous-enregistrement de
la liste électorale, les auteurs ont décidé d’augm enter l’effectif des communautés en appliquant un
coefficient égal au sous-enregistrement estimé par l’OSCE. Faisant cela, ils font l’hypothèse
implicite que le sous-enregistrement est indépendant de la situa tion ou de l’appartenance ethnique.
Il est très étrange de voir que les auteurs ne se posent pas la question d’un éventuel biais de
sélection dans le registre électoral. Alors que l’on peut imaginer que quelques nationalités
pourraient, en plus grande proportion que d’autres, ne pas s’être inscrites sur les listes électorales.
Mais même si nous admettons, en suivant les auteurs, que le sous-enregistrement est en
moyenne indépendant de l’appartenance ethnique du fait d’éventuelles compensations, cette
hypothèse est d’autant moins réaliste qu’elle s’appl ique à des zones plus petites, et ce, quelle que
soit la nationalité. Ainsi, pouvons-nous penser que les membres des minorités pourraient avoir
hésité à se faire inscrire sur les listes électorales dans les zones où les relations avec la communauté
majoritaire étaient conflictuelles. Dans les régi ons où les Serbes sont majoritaires, des Musulmans
auraient pu éviter de s’inscrire pour ne pas ravi ver les tensions, de même pour des Serbes vivant,
très minoritaires, dans des régions musulmanes.
C’est pourquoi, si la liste électorale cons titue bien un large échantillon de la population
vivant dans le pays en 1997-1998, il est difficile d’admettre, sans investigation supplémentaire, que
cet échantillon est bien représentatif, tant de l’ensemble de chacune des catégories ou
communautés, la proportion de non-inscrits pouvant notablement varier selon ces communautés et
selon les zones géographiques.
Le couplage de la liste électorale avec les bulletins de recensement
Le couplage de la liste électorale avec les bu lletins de recensement est lui aussi susceptible
d’introduire de nouveaux biais. En effet, pour un cinquième des personnes, soit cinq cent - 47 -
cinquante mille électeurs, le couplage n’a pas pu être possible. Le fait de ne pas avoir été capable
de prendre en compte un tel nombre pose une nouvell e question sur la représentativité non plus des
personnes inscrites sur la liste électorale, mais de celles pour lesquelles l’appariement avec les
données du recensement a été couronné de succès.
En effet, sans information sur les caractéris tiques des personnes dont l’appariement n’a pas
réussi, il est impossible d’éliminer l’hypothèse d’un biais de sélection. Ainsi les experts soulignent
que certains couplages n’ont pu être réalisés du fa it d’«erreurs d’orthographe», la question se pose
ainsi de savoir si ces «erreurs d’orthographe» ne pou rraient pas être plus fréquentes pour certaines
communautés.
Quand les auteurs corrigent le nombre de cas observés pour livrer une estimation d’ensemble
pour la zone étudiée, ils fournissent un nombre à l’unité près, donnant ainsi l’illusion d’une
estimation très précise, voire d’un nombre observé . Ne donner ce nombre qu’en milliers aurait été
largement suffisant et aurait rendu plus explicite le st atut de cette estimation. En effet, la précision
apparente du nombre estimé ne doit pas occulter l’ incertitude des coefficients de correction qui
permettent d’augmenter de 50 % le nombre de personnes encore certainement en vie.
On peut apprécier, avec le taux de sondage de 60 % auquel on aboutit avec l’utilisation de la
liste électorale, combien élevés pourraient être les éventuels biais, quand, non seulement, seuls
60 % de l’ensemble de la population sont pris en compte, mais, encore, quand aucune information
n’est disponible sur les 40% manquants. Ce prob lème est naturellement encore plus sérieux
lorsque l’on étudie des zones particulières, car dans ce cas, les éventuelles compensations que l’on
peut évoquer pour le pays dans s on ensemble, n’existent pas; et ce, d’autant plus que le taux de
sondage réel, dans certaines zones, doit être inférieur à la moyenne nationale de 60 %.
Le recensement de 1991
Le premier problème que pose l’utilisation du recensement de 1991 est celui de la définition
de la population légale, qui suit le concept de population de jure, c’est-à-dire que le recensement
dénombre non seulement les personnes vivant dans le pays à leur résidence officielle, mais
également les citoyens vivant à l’étranger 7. Ainsi, l’effectif total de la population recensée en 1991
7En 1991, comme dans les recensemen ts précédents, le recensement depersonnes vivant à l’étranger a été
organisé dans les consulats et les ambassades. - 48 -
surestime la population effectivement présente sur le territoire de la Bosnie-Herzégovine le jour du
recensement et donc à la veille de la guerre. Pa r symétrie, cela peut conduire à surestimer l’écart
entre les nombres de personnes inscrites sur listes électorales et par conséquent le nombre de
«disparus» entre 1991 et 1998. Nous ne savons pas si les personnes vivant à l’étranger, d’ailleurs,
se sont fait enregistrer pour voter dans la même proportion qu’elles s’étaient fait recenser.
Le second problème qui se pose est celui de l’affiliation ethnique déclarée au moment du
recensement.
Les démographes du bureau du procureur ont l’air de considérer comme robuste la
déclaration sur l’appartenance ethnique, ce qui n’est pas nécessairement vrai. Dans toute
l’ancienne Yougoslavie, l’appartenance ethnique est un concept pas toujours facile à définir pour la
totalité de la population. La déclaration peutchanger au fil du temps du fait de l’émergence de
nouvelles catégories (comme l’apparition des Musu lmans ou l’apparition des Yougoslaves). Elle
peut changer sous l’influence de contingences politiques, qui peuvent engendrer des tensions entre
communautés, de nouvelles alliances politiques ou des pressions exercées sur les minorités.
Afin de s’en convaincre, il suffit d’examiner l’évolution de la population des différentes
communautés nationales (ainsi que du groupe des «nationalités inconnues») au fil des
recensements.
The PRESIDENT: You are speaking at an admirable pace but I need to interrupt once more.
Ms Fauveau-Ivanović, the Court was advised that the oral testimony and your examination would
take 30 minutes. We are clearly into an overrun. Could we please be advised as to how long it is
likely that the witness will speak?
MFmAUVEAU-IVANOVI Ć: Madame le président, je crois que cela prendra encore
cinq minutes. Je vous prie de nous accorder cinq minutes supplémentaires.
The PRESIDENT: Yes, I will do so and I’ll take the opportunity to assure Bosnia and
Herzegovina that equal time will be afforded to th em and the Court will sit as late as is necessary
both for that to happen and for proper consideration to be given as to any questions they might like. - 49 -
Ms KORNER: May I insist, Madam President, this is such highly technical information, that
there is no conceivable way we can conduct a proper cross-examination based on what is
happening. So, the cross-examination will be limited to a few general points.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Please continue.
M. SARDON: Ainsi, quand on voit que pour l’ensemble de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, le
nombre des Yougoslaves a été divisé par 6,3 entr e 1961 et 1971, puis multiplié par 5,5 entre 1971
et 1981, on se rend compte que le changement de la taille ou de la part des nationalités ne résulte
pas seulement de l’accroissement naturel ou du solde migratoire de ces groupes, mais qu’il existe
également une sorte de mobilité entre ces groupes.
Population selon la nationalité, aux divers recensements 1961-1991
Effectif Distribution en pourcent
Nationalité 1961 1971 1981 1991 19117189191
Croates 711 665 772 491 758 140 760 852 21,7 20,6 18,4 17,4
Musulmans 842 248 1 482 430 1 630 033 1 902 956 25,7 39,6 39,5 43,5
Serbes 1 406 057 1 393 148 1 320 738 1 366 104 42,9 37,2 32,0 31,2
Yougoslaves 275 883 43 796 326 316 242 682 8,4 1,2 7,9 5,6
Albanais 3642 3764 4396 4925 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Tziganes 588 1456 7251 8864 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,2
Ukrainiens 5333 4502 3929 0,2 0,1 0,1
Autres 35 169 25 011 27 408 18 874 1,1 0,7 0,7 0,4
Non déclaration 8482 17 950 14 585 0,2 0,4 0,3
Inconnus 1885 9598 26 576 35 670 0,1 0,3 0,7 0,8
TOTAL 3 277 948 3 746 111 4 124 256 4 377 033 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Si on ne peut refuser de partir du recenseme nt de 1991 pour estimer le nombre de disparus,
déplacés et réfugiés, il apparaît un peu troublant dne pas se poser la question de la qualité des
informations auto-déclarées et de ne pas s’inte rroger sur l’acceptabilité de la taille du biais auquel
la reconnaissance de la pertinence de la déclar ation sur l’appartenance ethnique pourrait conduire. - 50 -
Le rapprochement des réponses données lors des de rniers recensements pas des personnes, nées à
la même date et résidant dans la même municipalité, aurait pu fournir des éléments intéressants
d’information sur la relative perméabilité, dans certains cas, des déclarations d’appartenance
ethnique. En effet, la probabilité pour que deux personnes, habitant le même village, soient nées le
même jour est très faible, si du moins l’effectif de la population de la communauté n’est pas très
élevé. Un appariement de ce type a été effect ué en Macédoine, naturelle ment dans un contexte
totalement différent; il a cependant montré que si, au niveau de l’ensemble du pays, environ 4%
des personnes avaient changé de déclaration en tre deux recensements successifs, cette proportion
montait à 60 % dans certaines municipalités.
8
Un des problèmes les plus importants aussi concerne ce groupe de «Yougoslaves» , que j’ai
évoqué tout à l’heure. Ce groupe se compose en effet de tous ceux qui refusent le jeu des
appartenances ethniques et qui considèrent qu’ils sont, avant tout, citoyens d’un même pays, quelle
que soit leur origine. Sous cette appellation, doivent notamment figurer les personnes issues de
couples mixtes.
Ainsi existe-t-il un recoupement objectif en tre ces «Yougoslaves» et les groupes auxquels
s’intéressent les auteurs, croates, serbes et musulm ans. Si l’on ne peut sérieusement envisager des
échanges entre Serbes et Musulmans, sauf peut-être dans le cas d’enfants de couples mixtes, il est à
peu près sûr que les frontières entre chacun des groupes et celui des Yougoslaves ne sont pas
hermétiques et que des échanges avec des minorité s partageant la même religion sont hautement
probables.
Enfin, à tous ces problèmes que nous venons d’évoquer, se rajoutent par ailleurs, les
problèmes de couverture du recensement ou de la variabilité de cette dernière selon la communauté
ou la région.
Conclusion
Si au niveau national l’estimation du nombre de personnes mortes ou disparues ne peut être
critiquée que de manière marginale, au niveau régional, les estimations faites par les mêmes
8Les groupes «Appartenance ethnique non déclarée» et«Inconnu» pourrait être additions aux «Yougoslaves»
parce que le premier suit une évolution parallèle à e des «Yougoslaves», ce qui pourrait indiquer une attitude
commune, et la très rapide augmentation du groupe des «inconnus » semble liée au rejet de plus en plus fojeude ce
ethnique. - 51 -
personnes sont beaucoup plus sujettes à la critique , en particulier celles du nombre de déplacés et
réfugiés. En effet, pour estimer le nombre total de la zone sous observation à partir du nombre
minimal observé, ils s’appuient sur une hypothèse imp licite, dont rien n’assure qu’elle se vérifie.
Cette hypothèse sous-jacente, commune à l’ensemble des analyses qu’elles soient nationales ou
régionales, est que la liste électorale est un éantillon aléatoire de lapopulation totale d’âge
éligible. Si, au niveau national, cette hypothèse pe ut être plus ou moins acceptable, pour des zones
spécifiques, et même pire, pour les comparaisons entre groupes nationaux, il est à peu près sûr que
les résultats soient entachés d’une certaine incertit ude. En effet, au niveau local, de nombreuses
choses peuvent interférer et dans ce cas on ne peut pas compter sur des compensations avec
d’autres régions, comme cela peut se produire à l’échelon national. Parmi les groupes ethniques à
l’échelon régional c’est bien pire, car l’hypothèse d’indépendance doit être vraie pour chacune des
communautés. C’est le point faible de l’analyse, qui ne tient pas directement à la qualité de la liste
électorale mais à la manière dont elle a été utilisée.
Je vous remercie de votre patience, Madame le président, et Messieurs les juges.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Sardon. You have the floor,
Ms Fauveau-Ivanović.
MFmAeUVEAU-IVANOVI Ć: Madame le président, je n’ai pas de question pour
M. Sardon mais j’aimerais vous demander encore une fois de nous excuser pour le dépassement du
temps.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Ms Korner.
Ms KORNER: Mr.Sardon, so this is very technical information, isn’t it? I see you’re
nodding. You have to say “yes” or “no”.
M. SARDON : Oui.
Ms KORNER: And it’s a criticism, is it, of the paper which is written by Ewa Tabeau and
her collaborator Mr.JakubBijak called “War rela ted deaths in the 1992-1995 armed conflicts in
Bosnia and Herzegovina”? You didn’t mention the paper you were criticizing. - 52 -
M. SARDON : Oui, c’est vrai, j’ aurais dû le citer. Il est dans une note de bas de page dans
mes notes et j’ai oublié de le mentionner; je pen sais que tout le monde le connaissait. Je vous prie
de m’excuser.
Ms KORNER: Would you agree that on the EwaTabeau and JakubBijak are the persons
who have done the most detailed and consistent research into the demography of the conflict?
M. SARDON: Mais je crois l’avoir dit dans mon intervention. C’était le travail le plus
sérieux et c’était pour cela que je m’étais intéressé surtout à celui-là, puisque d’autres avançaient
des chiffres de manière tout à fait imprécise.
Ms KORNER: Have you communicated any of the lengthy and detailed criticisms you have
made of her methodology? Of their methodology? To either of them, either in a written paper or
privately?
M. SARDON : Non. Je ne l’ai pas fait pour un e simple raison, c’est que ce travail m’avait
été demandé dans le cadre de cette action devant la Cour et donc je pensais que je ne devais pas en
révéler la substance avant. Mais si vous me l’ autorisez, j’aurais des échanges volontiers avec mes
collègues sur ce thème.
Ms KORNER: You don’t think it might assist the Court in arriving at a decision, if they
have to, if you and Ms Tabeau were to get together and discuss the criticism ?
M. SARDON: Peut-être, mais permettez-moi d’insister sur une chose qui est que lorsque
l’on s’intéresse au nombre de victimes, c’est-à-dire aux tués ou aux disparitions dus à la guerre, j’ai
indiqué que les quelques critiques et les conséquences en termes numériques sont très réduites.
Donc c’est pour cela que j’ai dit que cette estimation de cent mille personnes était sans doute tout à
fait réaliste. Et donc, l’avantage d’avoir une discussion avec MmeTabeau n’éclairerait pas
beaucoup parce que l’on pourrait tomber d’accord s sur un chiffre qui s’écartera de quelques
centaines uniquement. Mais l’ordre de grandeur restera toujours le même…
MsKORNER: I am not at the moment discussing what figures people arrived at. I am
discussing your criticism of her methodology for arriving at those figures. Do you think it would
be of assistance if you discussed that with her?
M. SARDON: L’utilité pourrait être non pas dans ce cas précis mais peut-être pour des
utilisations ultérieures de méthodologie voisine, dans d’autres situations . Vous savez, c’est - 53 -
toujours facile d’être le critique de service parce que on n’a pas fait le travail soi-même, on n’a pas
été entrainé dans les difficultés, parce que le trava il qu’ils ont fait, c’est un travail considérable.
Donc, on peut toujours critiquer des hypothèses. Ils ont pris les hypothèses les plus simples, celles
qui sont les plus couramment admises dans n’im porte quelle situation et moi, j’ai simplement
souligné des incertitudes que l’on pouvait avoir à la validité des hypothèses sous-jacentes et c’est
tout.
MsKORNER: Am I right in thinking that you have only actually published one paper on
demographic change in the Balkans since the end of the 1980s, published in 2001?
M. SARDON : Oui, j’ai publié cet article dans une revue française. J’en ai publié d’autres.
J’en ai publié dans une autre, je ne me souvien s plus laquelle, à quelle re vue vous faites référence,
mais j’avais présenté un article qui lui ressemblait beaucoup dans une revue française qui s’appelle
Espace population société, qui était toujours consacrée à l’é volution démographique de l’ensemble
des pays des Balkans au cours de la décennie quatre-vingt-dix ou dans les périodes antérieures.
Ms KORNER: I am going to ask you about a couple of things in an article, and I only have
the English, that you wrote ⎯ no doubt that you have given it to the other side ⎯ in 2001, and I am
not clear, oh, a journal called JSTOR. What? Sorry, I did not hear that. The subtitle appears to be
“Population and English Selection”. I can hear all sorts of people muttering but I am not sure what
the problem is. Is there a problem in the interpretation?
M. SARDON: Non, non, je vous entends très bien. J’ai essayé de voir à quel article vous
faisiez référence et en fait, c’est la revue dans laquelle je publie assez souvent, qui est la revue de
mon Institution, c’est une revue française qui mainte nant est devenue bilingue et, dans une période
intérimaire, traduisait un certain nombre d’articles parus dans l’année en anglais.
Ms KORNER: Thank you. That was very help ful. I just want to ask you about two things
that you wrote. Did you write: “[t]he wars that accompanied the break up of the former
Yugoslavia” ⎯ and then you list them ⎯ “[p]rovoked hundreds of thousands of deaths, 200,000 to
300,000 deaths in Bosnia and Herzegovina representing between 5 and 7percent of the
population”?
M. SARDON: Si vous le lisez, c’est que je l’avais écrit à l’époque, mais quand j’ai écrit
cette information c’était sur la foi du peu d’élém ents qui étaient disponibles à l’époque, et en - 54 -
particulier, à l’époque je n’avais aucun d es documents publiés par l’Unité démographique du
bureau du procureur et si je l’ai écrit, c’est une e rreur; et si j’écrivais cet article aujourd’hui, il est
sûr que je remplacerai ce chiffre par cent mille.
Ms KORNER: Yes. In fact, Mr. Sardon, it is not a criticism of you, it is merely to put the
fact. It has been very difficult since the end of the conflict to obtain reliable estimates of how many
people were killed, how many displaced and all the like.
M. SARDON : Je crois que c’était le cas avant que les démographes du bureau du procureur
ne fassent leur travail, et aussi peut-être maintenant, je suis encore un peu plus sûr de la validité des
résultats par le fait que M. Tokaca arrive à un d écompte qui se trouve très proche de celui auquel
Mme Tabeau est arrivée. Donc, je crois que maintenant on ne peut plus dire que nous ne disposons
pas d’analyses sérieuses sur le nombre de vi ctimes de cette guerre qui a touché la
Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Ms KORNER: Yes, as I said. But you felt in 2001, publishing an academic paper, that you
were entitled to quote that figure of those deaths. Is that right?
M. SARDON : Oui, c’est peut-être une lé gèreté de ma part parce que vous savez ⎯ comme
vous avez lu cet article ⎯ cet article s’intéresse à tous les pays de la région. N’ayant pas
d’information particulière sur le nombre de pe rsonnes qui avaient été tuées durant ces conflits, je
n’ai fait que reprendre les chiffres qui circulaient à droite, à gauche sur cette estimation. Donc,
c’est vrai que j’ai peut-être agi avec légèreté à l’ époque, mais je n’avais rien d’autre, alors il aurait
fallu que je mette, autrement, un grand point d’in terrogation ou plusieurs points d’interrogation sur
le nombre de victimes.
MsKORNER: It is all right, Mr.Sardon. As I said, it is not a criticism but for reasons
which I need not trouble you with, it is important to bring that out. You mention ⎯ virtually the
only note I was able to take: did you say that there were no figures on refugees and displaced
persons? Is that what you said in your paper to the Court?
M. SARDON : Non, ce n’est pas tout à fait ce que j’ai dit. J’ai dit qu’il n’y avait pas de liste
nominative, à ma connaissance, de réfugiés et de déplacés. C’est tout ce que j’ai voulu dire. Il y a
des estimations qui ont été données, il y en a eu une que le HCR a donné, pl usieurs organisations.
Les démographes du bureau du procureur du TPIY ont aussi donné des estimations, mais je ne me - 55 -
suis pas intéressé aux nombres. Je me suis in téressé simplement à la manière dont ces nombres
étaient calculés et à mon sens, comme je l’ai dit je crois, si ces nombres peuvent être considérés
comme un ordre de grandeur tout à fait acceptable au niveau national, quand on descend dans des
zones géographiques particulières ou quand on s’in téresse à des communautés particulières, la
validité des hypothèses sous-jacentes est encore plus sujette à caution qu’au niveau national. C’est
tout ce que j’ai dit.
Ms KORNER: Now, I want to ask just about two other matters and see if you can assist us.
In deciding whether a person killed was a civilian or a soldier for the purposes of these records, is it
right that you would look to see whether at the time ⎯ if you were deciding that he is a soldier ⎯
he was listed as a serving soldier in the records of the army or whatever the family said?
M. SARDON : Je dois dire que personnellement, je n’ai pas regardé cela, je me suis intéressé
au nombre de personnes mortes du fait de la guerre, indépendamment de leur statut militaire ou
civil. Mais je sais qu’il y a des difficultés pour faire cette distinction entre les civils et les militaires
parce que dans certains cas beau coup de personnes qui sont mortes ⎯tout au moins c’est ce que
j’ai lu ⎯ étaient considérées comme des militaires alors que rien ne prouvait, qu’effectivement, ils
étaient militaires. Donc je crois, je ne me suis pas intéressé vraiment à cette distinction parce que
pour moi, je pense que ce n’est pas la chose la plus prioritaire. La chose la plus prioritaire, c’est de
savoir en gros quel est le nombre de victimes qui a été faites par la guerre et non pas de savoir si
ces victimes étaient vraiment des militaires ou étaien t des civils et dans quelles proportions, même
si cela a une importance effectivement pour les ge ns qui sont concernés par cela. Mais cela
n’affecte pas le nombre total. C’est seulement leur répartition.
Ms KORNER: I am sorry, Sir, I should have made it clear. This was a general question
using your expertise as a demographer. The classi fication of a person as a soldier only relates to
what he was actually registered as being at the ti me. It does not show the circumstances in which
he died, does it?
M. SARDON : Oui.
Ms KORNER: And so to take a very silly example, if an off-duty soldier had the weekend at
home and during the course of the weekend his village was shelled and he was killed, he would still - 56 -
be registered as a military person, even though at th e time he was not involved in fighting. That is
right, isn’t it?
M. SARDON: Je crois, je sais pas trop comment sont faites ces statistiques mais il y a de
bonnes chances que ce soit son statut, civil ou militair e, qui le fasse rentrer dans une classification
ou dans une autre. Mais bon, je crois qu’il faudrait, dans un cas comme cela… Il faut toujours
chercher à voir ce qu’il y a derrière les statistiques pour savoir si cette statistique est pertinente ou
non. Si vous cherchez à déterminer le nombre de soldats qui sont morts au combat et si
effectivement vous incorporez des gens qui ont été tués dans des circonstances qui ne sont pas liées
directement à leur fonction, effectivement, là, on commet une erreur mais je ne pense pas que ce
soit le point le plus important.
Ms KORNER: I understand that you are concerned with how you arrive at overall figures as
opposed to the category into which they fall. But that’s the situation, isn’t it?
M. SARDON : Pas tout à fait, pas totalement.
Ms KORNER: What do you mean by “not totally”?
M. SARDON : Eh bien, c’est-à-dire que je ne me désintéresse pas de savoir si les gens qui
ont été tués sont des civils ou des militaires, s’ils ont été victimes de faits de guerre ou de combats
directs du fait de leur uniforme ou non. C’est vrai que c’est un sujet important, mais ce n’est pas
celui que j’ai cherché à analyser. Mais je ne m’en désintéresse pas parce que c’est important pour
toutes les personnes qui sont concernées.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. I would ask Mrs. Fauveau-Ivanovi ć if there is
any re-examination?
MFmUeVEAU-IVANOVI Ć : Non, Madame le président. Je n’ai pas d’autre question.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Court will now retire but the Parties and the
witness-expert should remain in the vicinity of the Great Hall of Justice. If the Court wishes to
pose questions to the witness-expert, it will return to the courtroom within the next 15 minutes and
will sit late for that purpose. If the Court does not wish to put any questions to the witness-expert, - 57 -
it will not return to the courtroom and the Re gistry will inform the Parties and the public
accordingly. The Court now rises.
The Court rose at 12.55 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le vendredi 24 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président