CR 2005/5
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THAEGUE
ANNÉE 2005
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 13 avril 2005, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,
en l’affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo
(République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2005
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 13 April 2005, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Shi presiding,
in the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Shi,président
Ricepra,ident
KorMoMa.
Vereshchetin
Higgimse
Parra-A.anguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Ajbresam,
VerhoMev.en,
jugetseka, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Presienit
Vice-Presideetva
Judges Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Judges ad hoc Verhoeven
Kateka
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement de la République du Congo est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Honorius Kisimba Ngoy Ndalewe, ministre de la justice et garde des sceaux de la
République démocratique du Congo,
comme chef de la délégation;
S.Exc. M.Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza, ambassadeu r extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
coagment;
M. Tshibangu Kalala, avocat aux barreaux de Kinshasa et de Bruxelles,
comme coagent et avocat;
M. Olivier Corten, professeur de droit international à l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
M. Pierre Klein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
M. Jean Salmon, professeur émérite à l’Université lib re de Bruxelles, membre de l’Institut de droit
international et de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit, dire cteur du Centre for International Courts and
Tribunals, University College London,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Ilunga Lwanza, directeur de cabinet adjoint et conseiller juridique au cabinet du ministre de la
justice et garde des sceaux,
M. Yambu A Ngoyi, conseiller principal à la vice-présidence de la République,
M. Mutumbe Mbuya, conseiller juridique au cabinet du ministre de la justice,
M. Victor Musompo Kasongo, secrétaire particulier du ministre de la justice et garde des sceaux,
M. Nsingi-zi-Mayemba, premier conseiller d’am bassade de la République démocratique du Congo
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Marceline Masele, deuxième conseillère d’ ambassade de la République démocratique du
Congo auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
commceonseillers;
M. Mbambu wa Cizubu, avocat au barreau de Kinshasa (cabinet Tshibangu et associés),
M. François Dubuisson, chargé d’enseignement à l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
M. Kikangala Ngoie, avocat au barreau de Bruxelles, - 5 -
The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is represented by:
His Excellency Mr. Honorius Kisimba Ngoy Ndalewe, Minister of Jus tice, Keeper of the Seals of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
as Head of Delegation;
His Excellency Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza, Amb assador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Maître Tshibangu Kalala, member of the Kinshasa and Brussels Bars,
as Co-Agent and Advocate;
Mr. Olivier Corten, Professor of International Law, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Mr. Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre for International Law,
Université libre de Bruxelles,
Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor Emeritus, Université libre de Bruxelles, member of the Institut de droit
international and of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Director of the Centre for International Courts and
Tribunals, University College London,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Maître Ilunga Lwanza, Deputy Directeur de cabinet and Legal Adviser, cabinet of the Minister of
Justice, Keeper of the Seals,
Mr. Yambu A. Ngoyi, Chief Adviser to the Vice-Presidency of the Republic,
Mr. Mutumbe Mbuya, Legal Adviser, cabinet of the Minister of Justice,
Mr. Victor Musompo Kasongo, Private Secretary to the Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals,
Mr. Nsingi-zi-Mayemba, First Counsellor, Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Marceline Masele, Second Counsellor, Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Advisers;
Maître Mbambu wa Cizubu, member of the Kinshasa Bar (law firm of Tshibangu and Partners),
Mr. François Dubuisson, Lecturer, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Maître Kikangala Ngoie, member of the Brussels Bar, - 6 -
Mme Anne Lagerwal, assistante à l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
Mme Anjolie Singh, assistante à l’University College London, membre du barreau de l’Inde,
comme assistants.
Le Gouvernement de l’Ouganda est représenté par :
S. Exc. E. Khiddu Makubuya, S.C., M.P., Attorney General de la République de l’Ouganda,
comme agent, conseil et avocat;
M. Lucian Tibaruha, Solicitor General de la République de l’Ouganda,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat;
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la
Commission du droit international, professeur émérite de droit international public à
l’Université d’Oxford et ancien titulaire de la chaire Chichele , membre de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Paul S. Reichler, membre du cabinet Foley Hoag, LLP, à Washington D.C., avocat à la Cour
suprême des Etats-Unis, membre du barreau du district de Columbia,
M. Eric Suy, professeur émérite à l’Université cat holique de Leuven, ancien Secrétaire général
adjoint et conseiller juridique de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, membre de l’Institut de droit
international,
S. Exc. l’honorable Amama Mbabazi, ministre de la défense de la République de l’Ouganda,
M. Katumba Wamala, (PSC), (USA WC), général de division, inspecteur général de la police de la
République de l’Ouganda,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Theodore Christakis, professeur de droit in ternational à l’Université de Grenoble II
(Pierre Mendès France),
M. Lawrence H. Martin, membre du cabinet Foley Hoag, LLP, à Washington D.C., membre du
barreau du district de Columbia,
commceonseils;
M. Timothy Kanyogongya, capitaine des forces de défense du peuple ougandais,
comme conseiller. - 7 -
Ms Anne Lagerwal, Assistant, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Anjolie Singh, Assistant, University College London, member of the Indian Bar,
as Assistants.
The Government of Uganda is represented by:
H.E. the Honourable Mr. E. Khiddu Makubuya S.C., M.P., Attorney General of the Republic of
Uganda,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Lucian Tibaruha, Solicitor General of the Republic of Uganda,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E, Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, member of the International
Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar of the United States
Supreme Court, member of the Bar of the District of Columbia,
Mr. Eric Suy, Emeritus Professor, Catholic University of Leuven, former Under Secretary-General
and Legal Counsel of the United Nations, member of the Institut de droit international,
H.E. the Honourable Amama Mbabazi, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Uganda,
Major General Katumba Wamala, (PSC), (USA WC), Inspector General of Police of the Republic
of Uganda,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Theodore Christakis, Professor of International Law, University of Grenoble II (Pierre Mendes
France),
Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington D.C., member of the Bar of the District of
Columbia,
as Counsel;
Captain Timothy Kanyogonya, Uganda People’s Defence Forces,
as Adviser. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. I will give the floor first to
Mr. Kalala.
M. KALALA :
LE PILLAGE ET L ’EXPLOITATION ILLÉGALE DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES DE LA
R ÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU C ONGO
I. Aperçu général sur les ressources naturelles de la RDC
1. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, la République démocratique du
Congo, Etat situé au cŒur de l’Afrique, avec sa superficie de 2345000 kilomètres carrés et ses
soixantemillions d’habitants, est un véritable miracle géologique et écologique, comme vous le
os
constaterez au vu des cartes que vous trouver ez dans vos dossiers de juges aux cotes n 34 à 38.
Le Congo est en effet doté d’une biodiversité rema rquable de ressources minérales, forestières,
agricoles et écologiques qui provoquent la convoitise de certains Etats étrangers.
2. Avec ses mines de cuivre, de cobalt, d’or , de diamant, d’étain, de manganèse, etc.,
l’industrie minière congolaise est encore de nos jours le moteur de l’économie du pays. A l’est de
la RDC, ces mines sont essentiellement situées dans les provinces orientale, du Nord-Kivu, du
Sud-Kivu et de Maniema.
3. Les forêts congolaises, qui représentent 47 % des ressources forestières de l’Afrique, sont
sous-exploitées et renferment notamment des ess ences recherchées pour leur haute qualité dans
l’industrie du bois et le caoutchouc.
4. Dans la production agricole congolaise, d es produits comme le café et le thé sont des
cultures industrielles dont l’apport dans le budget du pays n’est plus à démontrer. Le café arabica
se développe essentiellement dans le Kivu tandis qu e le café robusta se cultive dans les provinces
forestières comme l’Equateur, notamment dans les zones d’Ikela, Bokungu, Bolomba, Lisala,
Budjala et Gemena, et dans la province orientale, première productrice pour le Congo avec le
district de Haut-Uélé.
5. Sur le plan écologique, la République démocratique du Congo possède dix-huit aires
protégées parmi lesquelles sept parcs nationaux dont cinq ont été déclarés patrimoine commun de
l’humanité. Etablis essentiellement dans les provinces orientale (Garamba et Maiko), du Sud-Kivu - 9 -
(parc de Virunga), du Nord-Kivu (parc de Kahuzi-Bi ega) et de l’Equateur (parc de Salongo Nord),
ces parcs servent à la conservation et à la protection des espèces protégées par les instruments
internationaux.
II. La réalité du pillage et de l’exploitation illégale des ressources
naturelles congolaises par l’Ouganda
6. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, l’occupation ougandaise a eu pour
effet, depuis août1998, de sous traire au contrôle du Gouvernem ent légal de la RDC et à la
réglementation congolaise normalement applicab le l’ensemble des ac tivités économiques se
déroulant dans la partie du territoire illégalement occupée. Ce fait, qui n’est pas fondamentalement
contesté par la Partie ougandaise, constitue une év idente violation de la souveraineté de la
République démocratique du Congo sur ses ressour ces naturelles, qui s’est traduite par des
préjudices considérables.
7. Selon de nombreux rapports internationa ux, la présence d’abondantes richesses naturelles
au Congo, surtout dans l’est du pays, a constitué l’un des principaux facteurs expliquant la
1
poursuite du conflit . Non contentes d’occuper une partie substantielle du territoire du Congo en
violation de sa souveraineté, les troupes de l’UPDF ont profité de leur présence pour se livrer au
pillage et à l’exploitation illégale des ressource s naturelles congolaises. A cet égard, il faut
souligner le fait que les troupes d’occupation se sont précisément concentrées sur les territoires du
Congo recelant les ressources naturelles les plus importa ntes, et en particulier la région aurifère de
l’Ituri.
8. L’exploitation illégale des ressources natu relles de la RDC par les forces étrangères
d’occupation, y compris l’Ouganda, a pris une ampleur telle que plusieurs organisations
internationales se sont déclarées profondément alar mées par la situation. Pour sa part, le Conseil
de sécurité des NationsUnies a institué un groupe d’experts chargé d’enquêter sur le pillage et
l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles du Congo. Le groupe d’experts de l’ONU a ainsi
1Rapport du groupe d’experts sur l’expl oitation des ressources naturelles et autres richesses de la République
démocratique du Congo, 12 avril 2001, Nations Unies, doc. S/2001/357, par. 32; réplique du Congo, annexe 69. - 10 -
2
rendu quatre rapports, dont le dernier en date a été publié le 23octobre2003 . Ces rapports
établissent, Monsieur le président, de façon in contestable, l’implication de l’UPDF dans des
activités de pillage et d’exploitation illégale de richesses naturelles congolaises, et soulignent le
défaut d’action des autorités ougandaises afin de prévenir ou de réprimer adéquatement ces
activités. Au vu de ces rapports, le président du C onseil de sécurité notait avec inquiétude que le
pillage des ressources naturelles et autres formes de richesses de la RDC puisse ainsi continuer et
3
condamnait énergiquement ces activités illégales .
9. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieu rs les juges, à la suite de la publication du
premier rapport du groupe d’experts de l’ONU en avril2001, le Conseil de sécurité des
NationsUnies, alarmé par les informations fa isant état d’importantes activités d’exploitation
illégale des ressources du Congo, a demandé in stamment aux gouvernements concernés de
4
procéder à leur propre enquête afin de se prononcer sur les allégations contenues dans le rapport .
La RDC a ainsi constitué une commission d’experts nationaux sur le pillage et l’exploitation
illégale des ressources naturelles et autres rich esses de la RDC. Cette commission a rendu un
rapport en octobre 2001 dont les conclusions confirment celles du groupe d’experts de l’ONU
quant à la responsabilité des autorités ougandaises 5.
10. De son côté, l’Ouganda a également créé une commission d’enquête nationale, mieux
connue sous le nom de «commission Porter». Ce tte commission a livré un rapport intérimaire en
octobre 2001 6, et rendu son rapport final en novembre 2002, sur lequel nous reviendrons plus loin
dans nos plaidoiries.
2 Lettre du Secrétaire général des NationsUnies, datée du 23octobre 2003, adressée au président du Conseil de
sécurité par le Secrétaire général (groupe d’experts sur l’e xploitation illégale des ressources naturelles et autres richesses
de la République démocratique du Congo), Nations Unies, doc. S/2003/1027.
3 Déclaration du président du Conseil de sécurité du 9 décembre 2001, Nations Unies, doc. S/PRST/2001/39.
4 Déclaration du président du Conseil de sécurité du 3 mai 2001, Nations Unies, doc. S/PRST/2001/13.
5
Rapport de la commission congolaise des experts nationaux sur le pillage et l’exploitation illégale des
ressources et autres richesses de la RDC , octobre 2001, par. 32, 35, 40, 48, 51, 90, 93, 101, 131 et 148, réplique du
Congo, annexe 74.
6
Judicial Commission of inquiry into allegations into illeg al exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Interim Report, October 2001. - 11 -
L’établissement des faits par des sources indépendantes, concordantes et variées
11. Dans ses écritures, l’Ouganda s’est évertué à nier toute participation de l’UPDF dans des
activités d’exploitation illégale des ressour ces naturelles et autres richesses du Congo 7 . Pour ce
faire, l’Ouganda consacre de nombreuses pages à attaquer la crédibilité du groupe d’experts de
8
l’ONU et de ses rapports, dont il prétend qu’ils ne sont fondés que sur des «ouï-dire» ou des
informations peu fiables 9. Les preuves d’activités de pillage et d’exploitation illégale des richesses
congolaises par des troupes de l’UPDF ne seraient ains i, si l’on suit l’Ouganda, que le fruit de
l’imagination de la République démocratique du Congo et de quelques experts de l’ONU, ou d’une
hallucination.
12. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieu rs de la Cour, si la réalité du pillage des
ressources congolaises par l’UPDF constituait le fru it d’une hallucination, il s’agirait alors d’une
hallucination collective et mondiale. En effet, tous les experts, je dis bien tous les experts, qui ont
analysé cette question ont abouti à une seule et même conclusion : les troupes ougandaises ont bel
et bien pris part à de multiples activités de pilla ge et d’exploitation illégale des richesses du Congo
depuis 1998. En ce sens, on trouve, bien entendu, les rapports du groupe d’experts de l’ONU, qui
constituent une source essentielle à laquelle la Cour doit avoir égard. Mais, contrairement à ce que
10
prétend l’Ouganda dans ses écritures , il ne s’agit pas, loin s’en faut, de l’unique source sur
laquelle le Congo se fonde afin d’établir la preuve de l’implication de l’Ouganda dans le pillage des
ressources congolaises. Le Congo se permet de rappele r à l’Ouganda que la réalité de ces faits est
établie par de nombreux autres rapports provenant d’organes aussi variés, indépendants et crédibles
qu’une délégation du Parlement britannique 11, des ONG de réputation internationale comme
12 13 14
Human Rights Watch , l’International Crisis Group , OXFAM ou encore d’une personnalité
7 Duplique de l’Ouganda, p. 136 et suiv.
8 Ibid., p. 139.
9 Ibid., p. 137.
10
Ibid., p. 136.
11
All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes and ge nocide prevention, «Visit to democratic Republic of
Congo 2nd-6th August 2001», réplique du Congo, annexe 4.7.
12
Human Rights Watch, «L’Ouganda dans l’est de la RDC : Une présence qui attise les conflits politiques et
ethniques», rapport de mars 2001.
13
o International Crisis Group, «L e partage du Congo: Anatomie d’ une sale guerre», ICG Afrique ⎯ Rapport
n 26, 20 décembre 2000. - 12 -
comme Aldo Ajello, représentant spécial de l’Uni on européenne pour la région des Grands Lacs,
auditionné devant une commission d’enquête parlementaire du Sénat de Belgique 15. Si besoin en
16
est, on en trouve encore confirmation dans diverses sources ou témoignages journalistiques .
13. L’ensemble de ces sources variées convergent pour aboutir à un seul constat irréfutable :
les troupes de l’UPDF ont participé activement au pillage et à l’exploitation illégale des ressources
naturelles de la RDC et ont aidé des rebelles congolais et des particuliers à mener ce type
d’activités, pendant que les autorités ougandai ses fermaient les yeux. Dans ses écritures,
l’Ouganda n’a pas pris la peine de réfuter chacune de ces sources , se contentant de s’en prendre
uniquement aux rapports du groupe d’experts de l’ONU. Lorsque l’on prend en considération
l’ensemble des sources concordantes, la position de l’Ouganda consistant à nier l’existence de toute
preuve crédible établissant l’implication de l’UPDF dans le pillage de ressources naturelles devient
pour le moins difficile à soutenir.
La confirmation des faits par la commission judiciaire d’enquête ougandaise Porter
14. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, la thèse de l’Ouganda s’effondre
définitivement à la lecture du rapport final de la commission Porter, rendu en novembre 2002 et
17
publié en mai 2003 . En effet, les conclusions de ce rapport final établissent clairement la réalité
d’une série de faits de pillage et d’exploita tion illégale des ressources naturelles congolaises par
l’UPDF, faits dont l’Ouganda prétendait pourtant da ns ses écritures qu’ils étaient démentis par des
éléments fiables. Les principales conclusi ons du rapport de la commission Porter, dont vous
trouverez les extraits pertinents dans vos dossiers de juges sous la cote n o 39, sont les suivantes :
14
Oxfam GB, «Poverty in the Midst of Wealth, The Democratic republic of Congo», 18 janvier 2002, réplique du
Congo, annexe 4.9.
15
Audition de M. Aldo Ajello, représentant spécial de l’Union européenne pour la région des Grands Lacs,
devant la commission d’enquête parlementaire «Grands Lacs», Sénat de Belgique, session ordinaire 2001-2002, vendredi
18 janvier 2002, http ://senate.be/crv/GR/gr-08html, réplique du Congo, annexe 4.8.
16
G. Willum, «Rebel leader confirms what Western donors deny: Uganda plunders Congo», Aktuelt,
22janvier2001, réplique du Congo, annexe 4.10; audition de M. François Misser, jour naliste, devant la commission
d’enquête parlementaire «Grands Lacs », Sénat de Belgique, session ordinaire 2001-2002, vendredi 22février2002,
http://senate.be/crv/GR/gr-11html, réplique du Congo, anne xe 4.8; Colette Braeckman, «Guerres sans vainqueurs en
République démocratique du Congo», Le Monde diplomatique, avril 2001, p. 16-17.
17Judicial Commission of inquiry into allegations into illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001, Final Report, November 2002,http ://www.mofa.go.ug/speeches. - 13 -
⎯ dès le début de la guerre, des hauts officiers de l’UPDF ont prévu de faire des affaires en
République démocratique du Congo et le géné ral James Kazini, commandant de l’UPDF pour
les opérations menées en RDC, en avait parfaitement connaissance et a couvert ces
comportements 18;
⎯ le général Kazini avait des intérêts dans la société Victoria 19 , qui menait des activités
d’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles congolaises dans le domaine du diamant, de
l’or et du café;
⎯ des officiers de l’UPDF et leurs soldats ont participé à l’exploitation de mines et à la perception
20 21 22
de taxes sur cette exploitation , ainsi qu’à des pillages et des opérations de contrebande ;
⎯ des avions militaires de l’UPDF et leurs soldats ont transporté vers l’Ouganda des
marchandises en provenance du Congo, pour le compte d’hommes d’affaires ougandais ou
23
congolais .
15. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, la commission Porter a pu aboutir
à ces conclusions dont je viens de donner lecture en dépit de ce qu’elle a elle-même appelé une
24
«conspiration du silence» régnant au sein de l’UPDF . Si la commission est parvenue à briser
cette conspiration du silence et à établir la respon sabilité de hauts officiers de l’UPDF en dépit de
leurs mensonges 25, c’est notamment grâce à une collaboration qui a pu s’instaurer avec le groupe
d’experts de l’ONU et la fourniture de documents par celui-ci 26. Après avoir trompé la
commission Porter à plusieurs reprises, le général Kazini a été ainsi confondu par les documents
transmis par les experts de l’ONU et forcé de faire des révélations confirmant de nombreuses
27
allégations contenues dans l es rapports des Nations Unies . Ceci montre bien, Monsieur le
18 o
Ibid., p. 18, par. 13.1; p. 29, par. 14.4, dossier des juges, doc. n 39.
19 o
Ibid., p. 124, par. 21.3.4, dossier des juges, doc. n 39.
20Ibid., p.65 et suiv., par.16.2; p.181, par.37.5 et les conclusions y afférentes, p.202-203, dossier des juges,
o
doc. n 39.
21 o
Ibid., p. 22, par. 13.4, dossier des juges, doc. n 39.
22 o
Ibid., p. 22 et suiv., par. 13.5, dossier des juges, doc. n 39.
23 o
Ibid., p. 18-19, par. 13.1; p. 30 et suiv., par. 14.6, dossier des juges, doc. n 39.
24Ibid., p. 35, dossier des juges, doc. n 39.
25Ibid., p. 18, 20, 35, 38, 40, 47, 71, 84, 122 et 190.
26Ibid., p. 192, dossier des juges, doc. n 39.
27Ibid., p. 17 et suiv., par. 13.5, dossier des juges, doc. n 39. - 14 -
président, Madame et Messieurs les juges, à quel point les critiques émises par l’Ouganda sur le
manque de crédibilité du travail du groupe d’expert s de l’ONU sont dénuées de tout fondement.
Dans sa duplique, l’Ouganda souligne tout le sérieux et la crédibilité qu’il convient de reconnaître
28
aux travaux de la commission Porter . Le Congo espère que l’Ouga nda conservera cette même
position, maintenant que les conclusions finales de la commission Porter établissent très clairement
la responsabilité de l’UPDF.
16. La Cour ne manquera pas, Monsieur le président, de saisir toute l’importance de ces
conclusions, qui lèvent absolument tout doute sur la réalité de l’implication d’organes de l’Etat
ougandais dans les activités de pillage et d’exploitation ill égale des ressources naturelles
congolaises. Participation aux activités illégales de sociétés privées, perception de taxes, transport
par vols militaires d’importantes cargaisons de café ve rs l’Ouganda, exploitation de mines, pillage,
contrebande, tel est le tableau de la présence de l’UPDF au Congo que dresse le rapport de la
commission Porter. Celle-ci a d’ailleurs souligné que «UPDF has revealed a lack of discipline
which has shamed Uganda on the International Scene» 29.
Voilà qui tranche singulièrement, Monsieur le président, avec l’image disciplinée et
désintéressée de l’UPDF que tente de faire passer l’Ouganda dans ses écritures. Il reviendra, dans
un instant, au professeur Sands d’examiner le détail de ces faits et leurs conséquences juridiques.
17. Monsieur le président, Mada me et Messieurs de la Cour, les preuves du pillage et de
l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles du Congo par les hauts responsables ougandais sont
aujourd’hui administrées par une commission d’enquête judiciaire établie par l’Etat défendeur
lui-même. Il n’y a donc pas meilleure preuve que l’aveu qui est considéré comme la reine des
preuves. La République démocra tique du Congo prie la Cour de bien vouloir accorder toute la
valeur probante qu’ils méritent aux éléments de preuve fournis par la commission Porter,
c’est-à-dire par l’Ouganda lui-même. Je remercie la Cour pour sa particulière attention et la prie de
donner la parole au professeur Sands qui exposera les règles de droit international violées par
l’Ouganda ainsi que l’étendue de sa responsabilité à la suite de ces violations. Je vous remercie.
28
Duplique de l’Ouganda, p. 170.
29Judicial Commission of inquiry into allegations into illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001, Final Report, November 2002, p. 203, dossier des juges, doc. n - 15 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Kalala. I now give the floor to Professor Sands.
SMAr.DS:
N ATURAL RESOURCES ⎯ T HE APPLICABLE LEGAL RULES
1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, to th e best of my knowledge, this is the very first
time that the Court has been called upon to addr ess the responsibilities of a State for the illegal
exploitation of natural resources which are located in the territory of another State which it
occupies. The fundamental importance ⎯ and pertinence ⎯ of the subject is plain. The
relationship between conflict and the exploitation of natural resource is the subject of great
international interest currently and action at the very highest levels. In December 2004, the Report
of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
identified the role of international law in preventin g war and the need to give greater attention to
international norms which govern what it called the sources and accelerators of conflict. The
Report emphasized in particular the inflammatory role of natural resources in conflicts, and it
referred explicitly to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It stated: “More legal
mechanisms are necessary in the area of natural resources, fights over which have often been an
obstacle to peace.”30 It is not, however, only that new rules may be needed. In our submission,
greater attention has to be given to existing rul es, and in particular to their application and
enforcement. In a world of finite resources and increasing demand it is here, in this dispute, that
the Court’s judicial function can play a vital role.
2. In its written pleadings the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided extensive
arguments as to the law and evidence whic h establishes Uganda’s involvement in ⎯ and
responsibility for ⎯ the illegal exploitation of ⎯ amongst other resources ⎯ gold, diamonds,
forestry resources, coltan and many other natural resources of the DRC. I do not propose here and
now, to repeat all of that material in the plead ings. Instead, I will focus on the law and on the new
evidentiary material which has b ecome available since the close of the written pleadings and its
implications for the legal arguments which, by re ference to the written pleadings, appear to divide
30
2 December 2004, paras. 89-93. - 16 -
the Parties. Maître Tshibangu Kalala has summa rized the context and provided some background,
in particular the extraordinarily wealthy natura l resource base of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. My presentation will be divided into two part s. In the first part, I will begin by setting out
the rules of international law that governed the conduct of Uganda in its occupation. In the second
part, I will apply the facts to the law to show the full extent of Uganda’s responsibility in
international law for the exploitation of natural resources that took place in the DRC in the period
between 1998 and 2003.
The applicable law
3. I begin then with the applicable law. This was addressed in some considerable detail by
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its written pleadings, and I refer you in particular to
Chapter 4 of the Reply 31. What did Uganda say in response to those arguments? Some 108 pages
of the Ugandan Rejoinder is devoted to the DRC’ s claim in relation to the illegal exploitation of
natural resources. Amongst those 108pages the law was addressed in just one line. What did
Uganda say? It said simply: “there is not much value in a detailed examination by Uganda of the
quality and relevance of the legal principles set forth by the DRC” 32. That is the full extent of
Uganda’s argument on these issues. I would add that the word “detailed” seems redundant, for, in
fact, Uganda chooses to say nothing at all about th e law. For Uganda, the matter can be disposed
of on the facts alone. In our submission, that silence speaks very loudly indeed.
4. Perhaps Uganda may have felt able to take that approach at the time of its written
pleadings, before the Porter Commission had published its Final Report 33. Or perhaps Uganda
believed that its own judicial enquiry would pr ovide exoneration, would conclude, as it may have
hoped, that the reports of the United Nations pane l were simply wrong, and that the opprobrium of
the world, as reflected in a number of Security Council resolutions, could simply be set aside.
Perhaps Uganda believed that Brigadier-GeneralKazi ni would be able to remain in post when he
got back from the Congo. In fact, as we now know, the Porter Commission reached a rather
31
See especially paras. 4.59-4.84.
3Rejoinder of Uganda, para. 511.
3Excerpts of the Porter Report’s findings on the illegal exploitation of natural resources can be found in the
judges’ folder, tab 39. - 17 -
different conclusion. It confirmed the essential facts upon which the DRC’s claims in relation to
natural resources was based. It concluded, in particular, that the most senior figures in the
Ugandan armed forces who were present in the DRC ⎯ the most senior figures ⎯ were directly
and personally involved in widespread exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. And more
to the point, the Porter Commission confirmed the conclusions of the reports of the United Nations
expert panel.
5. Against this background, it is, we say, impossible for Uganda to challenge the fact that its
armed forces were directly involved in the explo itation of the natural resources of the DRC. Does
that involvement give rise to the responsibility of Uganda, the occupying Power? The answer to
that question turns on the legal obligations which were incumbent upon Uganda. Uncomfortable as
it may be, Uganda must now engage with the law; legal arguments it has sought to avoid, it must
break its silence. If that silence is maintained Uganda must be considered as having accepted as
correct the totality of the DRC’s legal arguments as to what international law required, and what
the consequences of a failure to meet those requirements must mean. But curiously, as matters now
stand on the basis of what is before the Court, Uganda and the DRC do not appear to be in
disagreement as to the requirements of international law.
6. The legal obligations incumbent upon Uganda as an occupying Power were abundantly
clear in 1998 and they are even more clear today. They leave, in our submission, no room for
doubt. The principle of permanent sovereignty ove r natural resources, the laws of war, and the
rules of State responsibility impose very significan t constraints on an occupying Power. Respect
for these principles, laws and rules lies at the very heart of this case.
A. Permanent sovereignty over national resources
7. The detailed rules of the law of armed conflict in relation to the exploitation of natural
resources have to be considered against the background of this fundamental principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources. The acts whic h occurred while Uganda occupied large parts of
the DRC were wholly inconsistent with the General Assembly’s landmark resolution1803 of
1962 ⎯ more than 40 years ago ⎯ on permanent sovereignty ove r natural resources. That
resolution confirmed explicitly the “right of pe oples and nations to pe rmanent sovereignty over - 18 -
their natural wealth and resources”, and that the exploitation of such resour ces had to be “exercised
in the interest of... the well-being of the people of the State concerned”. These rights and
interests continue to apply at all times, including during armed conflict, including during
occupation. There is no question that an occupying State is entitled to exploit resources for its own
benefit. And nor may it permit ⎯ or fail to prevent, or turn a blind eye to ⎯ the exploitation of
resources by its armed forces for personal benefit. The principle of permanent sovereignty is an
34
“inalienable right of all States” .
8. Recognition that the principle continues to apply during times of occupation and armed
conflict goes back more than three decades. General Assembly resolution3005 (XXXVII) of
15 December 1972 ⎯ concerning Israel and the Occupied Territories ⎯ affirmed in terms “the
principle of the sovereignty of the population of the occupied territories over their natural wealth
and resources” 35. And resolution3171(XXVIII) of the following year, in 1973, expressed the
Assembly’s resolute support for States under “for eign occupation in their struggle to regain
effective control over their natural resources”.
9. The principle has also provided authority for resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council in the present conflict. The Council has repeatedly reaffirmed Uganda’s obligation to
refrain from exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC 3. On 19 December 2001 a statement
of the President of the Security Council stressed that external parties ⎯ and groups or individuals
under their control ⎯ should not “benefit from the exploitatio n of the DRC’s natural resources” or
37
“use the natural resources of the DRC to finance the conflict in the country” .
10. Mr.President, the exploitation of natural resources lies at the very heart of this terrible
conflict, a fact that has been consistently reflected in the actions of various United Nations bodies.
The events between 1998 and 2003 confirm the need to reaffirm the relevance and effectiveness
and applicability of the principle of permanent sovereignty, not only for what has happened in the
DRC in the past but also for what is happening now and for what may happen in the future.
34GA resolution 1803 (1962)
35
GA resolution 3005, para. 4.
36See, for example, Security Council resolutions 1355 (2001), 1457 (2003); 1493 (2003); 1499 (2003).
37Statement by the President of the Security Counc il, 19 December 2001, S/PRST/2001/39, Reply of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ann. 71. - 19 -
B. The laws of war and armed conflict
11. The principle of permanent sovereignty is also reflected in the 1907 Hague Regulations
and the 1949 Geneva Convention, and I turn now to the laws of war and armed conflict. These
rules have been confirmed and strengthened by the 1977 Additional Protocols. The ICRC
Commentary confirmed that the rules applicable to Uganda have achieved the status of customary
38
international law . And, of course, last year this Court’s Advisory Opinion of July2004
determined in the most authoritative way possible “that the provisions of the Hague Regulations
have become part of customary international law” 39.
12. The law of armed conflict established certa in fundamental principles which are relevant
to the exploitation of natural resources. First, the occupant does not acquire sovereignty over the
territory it occupies: it merely exercises de facto authority. Second, occupation is a provisional
situation: the rights of the occupant are transitory and are accompanied by an overriding obligation
to respect the existing laws and rules of administration. Third, in exercising its powers the
occupant must comply with two basic requirements, namely (1) the fulfilment of its military needs
and (2)respect for the interest s of the inhabitants. And fourth, the occupying Power must not
exercise its authority in order to further its ow n interests, or to meet the demands of its own
40
population . The occupying Power exercises temporary de facto control in accordance with the
defined rights and obligations under Geneva ConventionIV and the Hague Regulations, and
including in particular the specific requirement that an occupying Power shall not permit the
exploitation of natural resources other than for the benefit of the occupied State.
Substantive obligations
13. Uganda has ignored these substantive rules, both in its occupation of large parts of the
territory of the DRC and in its written pleadings in th is case; there is, in that, at least, a degree of
consistency. If Brigadier Kazini had met his res ponsibilities he would have paid acute attention to
38In 1946 the Nüremberg IMT stated with regard to the Hague Convention on land warfare of 1907: “by 1939
these rules . . . were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of
war” (reprinted in AJIL, Vol. 41, 1947, pp. 248-249). In 1948, the IMT for the Far East expressed a similar view.
39Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , Advisory Opinion of
9 July 2004, para. 89.
40See inter alia A. Cassesse, Land and Natural Resourcesin Emma Playfair (Ed.) International Law and the
Administration of Occupied Territories, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 419-442. - 20 -
41
Articles 46 and 52 to 56 of the Regulations set out in the Annex to the Hague Convention IV , and
it may be that the programme of retraining, whic h he is currently undertaking, will include an
element of retraining on these rules. The Regul ations distinguish betw een private property and
public property, and between moveable property and immoveable property.
14. As regards private property it has to be respected and it cannot be confiscated
(Art. 46 (2)), subject to very tightly constrained exceptions permitted by Article 53 (2) in relation to
munitions de guerre and transport and communication facilities. Article 52 is quite clear: private
property ⎯ and that includes gold, diamonds, minerals and other resources from privately owned
mines ⎯ may only be requisitioned if two conditions ha ve been met: first, the requisition must be
“for the needs of the army of occupation”; and second, it must be upon payment in cash or a
receipt given and payment made as soon as possible. Neither condition has been met in relation to
the taking of privately owned natural resources from the DRC under Uganda’s watch which are the
subject of enquiry by the United Nations expert panel and by the Porter Commission.
15. As regards public property ⎯ that is to say mines and other assets belonging to the State,
and that would include forests and wildlife ⎯ this is covered by Articles53(1) and 55 of the
Hague Regulations. An occupant can seize movables ⎯ that is to say cash funds, realizable
securities, depots of arms, means of transports, stores and supplies ⎯ but only if they “may be used
42
for military purposes” (Art. 53) . For immovable property ⎯ public buildings, real estate, forests,
and agricultural estates ⎯ the occupant shall be regarded “only as administrator and usufructuary”:
the occupant has the obligation to “safeguard the capital of these properties and administer them in
accordance with the rules of usufruct” (Art. 55) 4. It has been very long recognized for more than
half a century that the occupant may only use the proceeds for the purposes of the occupation itself.
The capital cannot be used to finance the conflict, and it cannot be applied to the personal benefit
of individual members of the Ugandan armed services or groups or individuals who may be
41In addition, Article 47 forbids pillage, Article 50 forbids general penalties, while Articles 48, 49 and 51 regulate
the collection of taxes, levies and contributions.
42Some commentators take the view that the expression “used for military operations” in Art.53 refers to all
goods susceptible to military use; the actual use to which the upant puts them is seen as immaterial and may be
non-military. In other words the limitation “which may be used for military operations” is only intended to identify the
class of property of which the occupy ing army can take possession. ThU.S. Manual mirrors Art.53 with regard to
movable property. See British Manual, para. 612 with respect to public movable property.
43See U.S. Manual, Art. 400 and the British Manual, paras. 609 et seq. - 21 -
supported from time to time by Uganda. This was clarified during and after the Second World
44
War, in particular by a resolution of th e London International Law Conference of 1943 and by a
judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal in 1947 45. It is also the approach taken
by national courts, for example in the Singapore Oil Stocks case 46 in the mid-1950s, which
confirmed that oil could only be used for the co sts of the occupation. Similar requirements have
long been reflected in authoritative military manuals ; I refer you in particular to the British and
United States Manuals, the earlier editions, on the laws of land warfare 47.
16. Closely related, is the additional obligation of Uganda to use due diligence to ensure that
activities that violate the rights of the DRC do not occur in areas which are under its control 48, that
of course was an obligation confirmed by this Court in the Military and Paramilitary Activities
49
case . The obligation required Uganda to take ade quate measures to ensure that members of its
military and its nationals, or groups that it controlle d, did not engage in any illegal exploitation of
the natural resources of the DRC. By December 2001 the Security Council had plainly reached the
view that Uganda was in breach of this obligation. That month, speaking through its President, the
Council urged Uganda “to take, on an urgent basis, the necessary steps to end all illegal
44 “The rights of the occupant do not include any right s to dispose of property, rights or interests for
purposes other than the maintenance of public order and safety in the occupied territory. In particular, the
occupant is not, in international law, vested with an y power to transfer a title which will be valid outside
that territory to any property rights or interests which he purports to acquire or cr eate or dispose of; this
applies whether such property, rights or interests are those of the State or of private persons or bodies.
This status of the occupant is not changed by the fa ct that he annexes by unilateral action the territory
occupied by him.”
The full text of the resolution is von Gla hn, “The Occupation of Enemy Territory”, 1957,
pp. 194-195.
45 “[Articles49 and 52], together with Article48, dealing with the expenditu re of money collected
in taxes, and Articles 53, 55 and 56 dealing with public property, make it clear that under the rules of war,
the economy of an occupied country can only be requi red to bear the expenses of the occupation, and
these should not be greater than th e economy of the country can reasonabl y be expected to bear”: see
Goering etal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunals, 1(1947),
pp. 238-239.
46
N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War Damage Commission, (1956) 51 AJIL 808.
47
See the British Manual, para.526: “the economy of an occupied country can be required to bear only the
expenses of the occupation; these must not be greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be expected to
bear”. A similar provision is at Art. 364 of the U.S. Manual (1956). Art. 402 states that “the occupant does not have the
right of sale or unqualified use of the real property of the state”, a provision echoed in the British Manual, para. 609.
48
See Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para . 4.71; R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi. “The due diligence rule
and the nature of international responsibility of States”, 1992 Germ. YBIL, 22 et seq.
49
I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 129-130, paras. 254-256. - 22 -
50
exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC, by their national or others under their control” .
Those words are important; they assume that illegal occupation was occurring and they assume
that Uganda had both the responsibility and the abili ty to prevent it. The statement goes further,
because it implies a state of fact and imposes in effect a recognition of a legal obligation on
Uganda. Of course we know that illegal exploitati on did not end, and that Uganda did not comply
with the exhortation of the Security Council through its President. As the Report of the Porter
Commission makes clear, senior members of the Ugandan military contin ued to be directly
involved in illegal exploitation of gold, diamonds and coltan on a very large-scale basis, as did
other groups under the control of Uganda.
International practice
17. International practice has further clarified the obligations of an occupying State in
relation to the exploitation of natural resources. Examples which spring to mind include Israel, the
51
West Bank and Gaza; Iraq; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo .
Israel and the Occupied Territories
18. As regards Israel and the Occupied Territories, between 1972 and 1983 a series of
General Assembly resolutions have confirmed the application of the principle of permanent
sovereignty to territories under occupation, the very limited nature of Israel’s economic rights, and
52
its responsibilities in relation to the exploitation of resources . A 1983 report by the United
Nations Secretary-General confirmed that natura l resources could not be used by the occupying
Power beyond the limits imposed by the Hague Re gulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which meant that public land could not be used beyond usufruct and the proceeds could only be
50
Statement by the President of the Security Council, 19December2001, S/PRST/2001/39, Reply of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ann. 71.
51
For other territories administered/occupied by third States including the case of Namibia and the exploitation of
its resources by SouthAfrica and othe r States and enterprises and Panama an d the administration of the canal, see
Nicolaas Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 143.
52
See General Assembly resolutions3175(1973) adopted by 90 votes to 5, with 27abstentions; 3336(1974)
adopted by 99votes to 2, with 32abstentions; 3516 (1975); 31/186(1976); 32/161(1977) adopted by 109votes to 3,
with 26abstentions; 34/136(1979) a dopted by 118votes to 2, with 21abstentions; 35/110(1980); 36/173(1981);
37/135(1982); 38/144(1983) on permanent sovereignty. The voting record on the last three resolutions remained
virtually the same with the United States and Israel votiagainst. See also resolutions 37/88C, 36/147C, 35/122C,
34/90 A, 33/113 C, 32/91 C, 31/106 C, 3525 (XXX) A, 3240 (XXIX) A and 3092 (XXVIII) B. - 23 -
53
used in connection with the costs of the occupation . The Secretary-General’s report stated that
that the principle of permanent sovereignty enhanced and reinforced the law of belligerent
occupation, which was to be “interpreted and app lied to protect to the greatest extent possible the
principle of permanent sovereignty”. The report says, no depletion of natural resources should be
54
permitted . Subsequent resolutions have reaffirmed the principle of permanent sovereignty of
peoples under foreign occupation over their natural resources 55.
Iraq
19. A consistent and similar approach is re flected in United Nations practice recently in
relation to Iraq. On 22 May 2003 the Security C ouncil adopted resolution 1483. This stressed the
right of the Iraqi people freely to control their natural resources. The resolution called on the
occupying Powers to comply fully with their obligations as such under the Hague Regulations and
56
the Geneva Conventions . The resolution explicitly directs that all proceeds from export sales of
petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas from Iraq are to be deposited into the Development
Fund for Iraq, until an internationally recognized , representative government of Iraq is properly
constituted 57. The point is very clear: the occupying Powers had no rights over any of the oil. The
same principle applies to any other resource.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
20. In the context of the conflict in the De mocratic Republic of the Congo, the Security
Council has gone out of its way to reaffirm the sovereignty of the DRC over its natural resources
and to categorically condemn th e illegal exploitation of natura l resources and other forms of
58
wealth . The Security Council in particular has underscored “the link between the illicit
53See the Report A/38/265 at
http://domino.un.org/unispalselect.nsf/0/6d55c7f840e6da06052567c9004b75…
54Ibid., para. 52. See Conclusions, paras. 50-53.
55See General Assembly resolutions 51/190(1996); 52/207(1997); 53/196(1998); 54/230(1999);
55/209 (2000); 56/204 (2001); 57/269 (2002); 58/229 (2003) and 59/251 (2004).
56Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), para. 5.
57Ibid, para. 20.
58
See for e.g. Security Council resolutions 1291 (2000); 1304 (2000); 1332 (2000); 1341 (2001); 1355 (2001);
1457 (2003); 1493 (2003) and 1533 (2004). - 24 -
59
exploitation and trade of natural resources in ce rtain regions and the fuelling of armed conflicts” .
I refer in particular to resolution 1565; that resolution urged States in the region to take appropriate
steps in order to end these illegal activities, incl uding if necessary through judicial means, and to
report to the Council as appropriate 60. In that regard, judicial means would include national and
international instances.
Responsibility
21. The responsibility of the occupying Power in relation to these substantive rules is equally
clear: the crucial provision is Article 3 of th e Hague Convention (IV) which states unambiguously
and clearly that “a belligerent party... shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces”. The words “all acts” are very broad indeed, and appear to admit
of no exceptions. The same language is reproduced in Article 91 of the first Additional Protocol to
the Geneva Conventions. And the ICRC Commentary confirms that the requirements of Articles 3
61
and 91 of these instruments reflect customary law . In the light of the Report of the Porter
Commission, and in particular the conclusions and findings of fact in relation to the acts committed
by UPDF Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Kazini, it is difficult ⎯ if not impossible ⎯ to see how
Uganda can possibly avoid the con sequences which flow inevitably from this strict and clear rule
of international law reflected in Articles 3 and 91.
22. This specific rule is entirely consistent with the more general rule now reflected in
Article7 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. And I remind
you that Article 7 confirms that:
“The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to
exercise elements of authority shall be considered an act of that State under
international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds
its authority or contravenes instructions.” (Emphasis added.)
59See inter alia Security Council resolution 1565(2004), para.22, which also refers to Security Council
resolutions 1493(2003), 1533(2004) and 1552(2004). See also Security Council resolution 1592(2005), para.10,
urging all States neighbouring the DRC to impede any kind ofsupport to the illegal expl oitation of Congolese natural
resources, particularly by preventing the flow of such resources through their respective territories.
60Security Council resolution 1565 (2004), para. 22.
61International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols (Geneva, 1987),
pp. 1053-1054 (ICRC Commentary). - 25 -
23. So Uganda is responsible even when the members of its armed forces exceed their
authority or contravene instructions 62. This aspect seems to have concentrated minds in
proceedings before the Porter enquiry. An exchange between Justice Porter and Brigadier General
Kazini during the Porter enquiry is rather instructive:
“Justice Porter: So the decision to assist Congolese businessmen was yours?
General Kazini: Yes it was mine.
Justice Porter: It was yours?
General Kazini: Yes.
Justice Porter: Contrary to the order of the Commander in Chief?
General Kazini: When you are given a di rective, Your Lordship, there must be
flexibility . . .
Justice Porter: It was contrary to the order of the Commander-in-Chief or it
wasn’t?
General Kazini: I didn’t contradict your Lordship. I just . . .
Justice Porter: But you were shipping Congolese businessmen . . .?
General Kazini: I was just being flexible.”
24. For present purposes, as I said, it matters not whether Brigadier General Kazini’s
“flexibility” was or was not in contravention with instructions: under Articles 3 and 91, as well as
the customary rule reflected in Article 7 of the ILC Articles, Uganda’s responsibility is engaged in
63
respect of “all” acts committed by its armed forces, whether they were lawful or not . If the
“conduct was carried out by a person cloaked with governmental authority”, in this context it is
attributable to the State 64. Brigadier General Kazini was Chief of Staff responsible for activities in
the DRC. His “flexibility” engages the responsibili ty of the Ugandan State. And, as the ILC
makes abundantly clear in its Commentary, any issue of drawing the line between unauthorized but
official conduct on the one hand and private conduct on the other does not arise where the conduct
complained of is “systematic and recurrent, su ch as the State knew or ought to have known of it
62
ILC Commentary to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001,
Commentary on Art. 7 (ILC Commentary).
63
ICRC Commentary, pp. 1053-1054.
64Petrolane Inc, v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1991), 27 Iran-USCTR 64 at p. 92. - 26 -
65
and should have taken steps to prevent it” . And its here that Security Council resolutions become
very significant against the background of a pattern of Security Council resolutions, and in
particular the statement of the President of Dece mber2001, to which I drew your attention, it is
simply unarguable for Uganda to claim that it did not know, or that it could not have known, or that
it could not have prevented the plunderous acts of Brigadier Kazini and his colleagues.
25. Responsibility also arises in respect of acts of other persons subject to the control of the
Ugandan authorities. These failures of Uganda to act to prevent the illegal exploitation of the
66
DRC’s natural resources are also attributable to Uganda . In the Corfu Channel case the Court
ruled that Albania was responsible where it knew, or must have known, of the presence of mines in
its territorial waters but did nothing to warn third States of their presence 67. In the United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, the Court concluded that the responsibility of Iran was
entailed by the “inaction” of its authorities wh ich “failed to take a ppropriate steps”, in
68
circumstances where such steps were evidently called for . Similarly, where Uganda has failed to
act with due diligence to prevent the exploitatio n of natural resources under conditions which are
known to the whole world and which are plainl y incompatible with the Hague Regulations 6, then
it must follow, as night follows day, that Uga nda is internationally responsible. Any other
conclusion is an invitation to lawlessness.
Conclusion
26. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the rules of international law concerning the
principle of permanent sovereignty and the law of armed conflict are clear and they are confirmed
by consistent practice. Three principles dominate. First, the natural resource capital of a State
cannot be depleted by the occupying Power except in accordance with the strict requirements of the
Hague Regulations. The extraction of minerals ⎯ coltan, gold, diamonds ⎯ constitutes a
depletion of capital. As Planiol put it in his Traité élémentaire de droit civil : “What is extracted
65ILC Commentary, Commentary to Art. 7.
66
ILC Commentary, Arts. 1 and 2.
67
I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 22-23.
68I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 31-32.
69ICRC Commentary, pp. 1053-1058. - 27 -
from a mine or from a quarry is not a product of the soil. It is the so il itself which is being
extracted, the ‘exploitation’ inevitably results in the exhaustion of the mine.” 70
27. Second principle: the exploitation by members of the armed forces of an Occupying
Power for private purposes is not permitted in any circumstances 71.
A2n8d. third, Uganda is required to exercise due diligence in preventing the groups and
persons which it controlled from engaging in the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
29. Mr. President, that concludes the first part of my presentation. As I have sought to show,
international rules already exist which place very considerable constraints on the exploitation of
natural resources. With your permission I turn no w to the second part of my presentation: the
application of these rules of law to the specific facts of this case.
Mr.President, I am in your hands as to whether this is an appropriate moment to break or
whether you would like me to continue for a few minutes and find an appropriate break point in,
say, about ten or 15 minutes.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorSands. I think it is time to have a break of ten
minutes, after which I will give you the floor.
The Court adjourned from 4 to 4.10 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Sands, will you please continue.
Mr. SANDS: Thank you, Mr. President
U GANDA IS INTERNATIONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATION OF ITS
OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING NATURAL RESOURCES
1. I turn now to the second part of my submissions this afternoon, in which I will apply to the
facts the law that I have just described to s how the full extent of Uganda’s international
70Traité élémentaire de droit civil , Vol.I, 3rd ed., No. 3590, p. 11d by the Arbitration Tribunal in the
ARAMCO case (Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (1958), ILR, Vol. 27 (1963), p. 157.
71The U.S. Army Field Manual (1956) notes that neither officers or sold iers of its armed forces are allowed to
make use of their position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise
legitimate. - 28 -
responsibility for violating its obligations in rela tion to natural resources which were found in the
territory of the DRC in relation to the occupation which took place between 1998 and 2003.
2. In my first presentation on Tuesday morning, I addressed evidentiary issues relating to
proof, and it may be appropriate just to recap briefly on a couple of points. First , the DRC’s
evidentiary material, we say, is of a character and quality which fully meets the requirements of the
Court’s Statute, Rules and practice; secondly, that the relevant standard of proof which the DRC
has to meet is one of “reasonable certainty” in estab lishing the relevant facts. That, we say, is the
test which needs to be kept in the forefront of our minds; and third, that the evidentiary material
establishes the relevant facts to that standard 72.
3. In our submission, the evidence before this Court is overwhelm ing in support of two
central facts. The first is the fact that military personnel of the UPDF ⎯ at the very highest level,
at the top, including Brigadier General Kazini ⎯ were present on the territory of the DRC, engaged
73
in the exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources for personal gain . The second fact is that the
UPDF turned a blind eye to the acts of these persons and to private persons ⎯ both Ugandan
nationals and persons associate d with Congolese rebel groups ⎯ which engaged in the illegal
74
exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC . We say also that other administrative agencies
of Uganda also turned a blind eye to the acts of members of the UPDF and private persons who
75
were engaged in the exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources for personal gain .
72
See first pleading of Professor Philippe Sands, Q.C., Tuesday 12 April 2005 (CR 2005/3).
73With regard to allegations of illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC by top army officials, the
Porter Report found
This Commission has found a number of areas in which the allegations of the original Panel
against General Kazini are soundly based in evidence. The main area was General Kazini’s involvement
with Khalil and Victoria, [a diamond company]... In the matter of control of his commanders in the
field, investigation, follow up and disciplinary action in relation to complaints under this officer’s area of
command were suspiciously weak . . . (P. 204, para. 43.4.)
74
The Commission found that:
“exploitation has been carried out by... businessmen ... operating through Uganda... by senior army
officers working on their own and through contacts in the [DRC]: by individual soldiers taking advantage
of their postings: by cross border trade and by individuals living in Uganda . . .” (p. 201, para. 43.1.1).
75
The Porter Report, pp.151-157 makes several critica l findings with respect to Ugandan administrative
organizations including the Registrar of Companies who “does not come well out (sic ) of its investigation”, and that it is
not doing its job;” (pp. 151-154) and the Uganda Revenue Authorit y, with regard to which the Commission states that its
“systems of controlling imports and exports are not entireleffective. In fact there are many loopholes for smuggling
products to or from one country to the other.” (Pp. 156 et seq.) See also Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Anns. 12, 14. - 29 -
4. Those facts, we say, are established without any room for doubt ⎯ no room for doubt ⎯
on the basis of the evidence before the Court. Of course we do not have time today to take you
through all the relevant documents and all their attachments and all their annexes which accompany
them. But we do invite you, in particular, with a bit more time available to you to consider with
careful attention the reports of the United Nations panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of
76
natural resources and, since the written pleadings were c oncluded, their final report presented to
the Secretary-General in October 2003 77. All of these reports point in one direction only.
5. What does Uganda say in relation to th e evidence and arguments presented by the DRC?
We have already heard that they did not have much to say about the law. What about the facts?
Uganda’s response is set out in Chapter IV of its Rejoinder. The Chapter runs to 105 pages, and it
is the longest of the Rejoinder. The Chapter was prepared prior to 6 December 2002 ⎯ the date, of
course, when the Rejoinder was filed with the C ourt. And so it cannot take account of materials
which have become available since that date. In particular ⎯ and entirely understandably ⎯ it
takes no account of the Final Report of the Porter Commission, or the Ugandan Government’s own
White Paper report responding to that Report, or the subsequent steps taken against, amongst
others, Brigadier General Kazini. These materials present Uganda with considerable difficulties ⎯
and that may be an understatement. The Final Report of the Porter Commission unambiguously
confirms the DRC’s allegations. It totally undermines the arguments put forward by Uganda in its
Rejoinder of December 2002. So, we look forward with very great interest to hearing what Uganda
will have to say about the Porter Report and all of the related evidentiary material, to which the
Court’s attention has been drawn.
6. In its Rejoinder, Uganda makes eight arguments to oppose the Democratic Republic of the
Congo’s factual claims. But perhaps the most striking aspect of the Ugandan argument in its reply
is that it never actually says that the facts desc ribed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo are
untrue. Remarkable! Uganda attacks the quality of some of the evidence, or the object or nature of
Uganda’s intervention in the DRC, or the nature of economic trade between the two countries, or
the absence of evidence to show that Uganda failed to take steps to act against illegal activity. The
76
Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, First Report, Ann. 69; Second Report, Ann. 70.
7Final Report of the United Nations panel of experts, 23 October 2003. - 30 -
closest Uganda gets to attacking the truth of the facts is to make a rather general assertion that some
specific allegations are contradicted by some of the evidence. But, of course, that claim came
before the publication of the Final Report of the Porter Commission, presumably in the mistaken
belief that you may not, as judges, have had access to all the evidence that was put before the
Porter enquiry. What is singular and striking is that there is no outright denial of the fact of illegal
exploitation of natural resources on Uganda’s watch. With that, by way of introduction, I will now
try to deal with each of Uganda’s eight arguments in turn, in the order in which they address them
in their own Rejoinder.
1. The United Nations reports are not credible
7. Uganda’s first argument is that the Unite d Nations reports on illegal exploitation may not
be relied upon because they were only intended to provide a foundation for a political solution and
78
not to establish culpability . Uganda claims that these reports were merely intended “to spur
debate in the United Nations Security Council” 79. That calls for two responses.
8. First, Uganda’s characterization of the purpose for which the United Nations reports were
commissioned is simply wrong as a matter of fact. The United Nations reports were prepared
pursuant to a request made by the Security Counc il to the United Nations Secretary-General, as
first read out in a statement by the then Security Council President Jean-David Levitte of France on
2 June 2000. According to that statement the purpo se of the report was to “collect information on
all activities of illegal exploitation of natural r esource and other forms of wealth of the DRC,
including in violation of the sovereignty of that country” 80. It is plain that the reports were
intended to establish the facts on an authoritative an d independent basis and we say that is what
they have done. They were not, as Uganda puts it, debating documents. They provide evidence for
Security Council resolutions and they led inexorably to Porter.
9. The second point is that the DRC does not rely upon the United Nations reports alone.
We do not need to, because the United Nations re ports merely confirm facts which are based upon
78
Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 332-338.
79Rejoinder of Uganda, para. 323.
80Document S/PRST/2000/20, Security Council Press Release SC/6871, Memorial of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Ann. 19. - 31 -
evidence arising from numerous other sources. Fo r example, Uganda has not challenged the way
in which the Porter Commission carried out its task s, it has not rejected the Report of the Porter
Commission that was made available to the Government of Uganda inJanuary2003. To the
contrary, as Maître Tshibangu Kalala mentioned, Uga nda treats Porter, in terms of its process, as
legitimate and probative, and it relies extensively in its written pleadings on extracts of transcripts
relating to hearings before the Porter Commission 81, although it does so rather selectively. Uganda
does not say that the Porter processes or its Report are not credible. For the most part the United
Nations reports and the final Porter Report are c onsistent on the key facts: there is between these
documents, to take an expression used in judgments of this Court, a concordance ⎯ a
concordance ⎯ in the material before the Court. Concordance between Porter and the United
Nations reports confirms the credibility of the latter. It establishes the facts beyond any reasonable
doubt. As the Court said in the Corfu Channel case, indirect evidence “must be regarded as of
special weight when it is based on a series of fact s linked together and leading logically to a single
82
conclusion” . The United Nations reports, the Security Council resolutions, the Final Report of
the Porter Commission, the evidence before the Port er enquiry and all the other material before the
Court lead inevitably and inexorably to a “single conclusion”.
2. The United Nations reports have been universally discredited
3. The inherent defects of the United Nati ons reports undermine the allegations against
Uganda
10. Uganda’s second argument is that the United Nations reports ha ve been universally
discredited 8. Its third argument is that the inherent defects of the United Nations reports
84
undermine the allegations against Uganda . I think it is safe to take these two points together.
11. Even if it was true that the United Nations reports had been “universally discredited” ⎯
which is not the case ⎯ the DRC would have ample other evidence upon which to base its claim.
Unfortunately for Uganda the claim concerning its exploitation of natural resources is not based on
8Rejoinder of Uganda, inter alia Anns. 58-67, 78.
82
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4.
8Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 339-379.
8Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 380-405. - 32 -
some one-legged rhinoceros which collapses when its remaining leg ⎯ the evidence contained in
the United Nations reports ⎯ is kicked away. Uganda is confronted by what my son would call a
“many-legged rhinoceros”, a multitude of other in dependent sources, not the least the material
upon which the Porter Commission based its damning report, the report of the Belgian Senate’s
Commission of Enquiry 85, the report of the British Parliament’s All Party Parliamentary Group,
which concluded in terms that commanders from the Ugandan army and their political and business
86
associates had established a system of military commercialization in their zones of influence , and
the independent reports produced by authoritative entities such as Oxfam, again referring to the
87
concept of “military commercialism” , Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group,
many other NGOs and many independent press statements 88⎯ without even mentioning the Porter
Report.
12. In any event, the United Nations reports have not been discredited, universally or at all.
Quite the contrary. The DRC accepts . . .
The PRESIDENT: Professor Sands, would you speak slightly more slowly.
Mr. SANDS: With pleasure, Mr. President. Thank you for that guidance.
The DRC accepts that there may be points of difference between the Porter Report and the
United Nations reports, for example with regard to the case study on the Dara Forest, which was set
out in the First United Nations Report. In the course of further investigation, the company
concerned was indeed found to have complied w ith the relevant laws, and this was then
acknowledged in the Second United Nations Report 89. The Porter Report itself acknowledges this
reconsideration. But the matters upon which ther e may be differences are not material to the
85See inter alia Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ann. 76.
86
See Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, para.4.47. In its Reply, the DRC referred to the interim
report of the APPG, Ann. 75. In November 2002 the AP PG published its Final Report “Cursed with Riches: Who
Benefits from Resource Exploitation in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo” which wa s independently commissioned
after the publication of the Final United Nations Report: available at: www.appggreatlakes.org/downloads/riches.pdf.
87
Oxfam’s observations concur with the broad findings of the United Nations panel of experts report released in
April 2001, and the largely corroborative Addendum report re leased in November 2001. See Oxfam, “Poverty in the
Midst of Wealth”, Oxfam GB 18January 2002, Oxfam briefing paper 12, Reply of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Ann. 77.
88See Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ann. 92; and Reply of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, para. 4.11 and Ann. 83.
89Second United Nations Report, paras. 72-73. - 33 -
DRC’s case in these proceedings. To a very great extent the Porter Report and the United Nations
reports are concordant. Indeed, the Final Report of the Porter Commission includes a section
which is entitled “Agreement in General”; and it says:
“Nevertheless, leaving aside details and personalities, in general this
Commission and the Final Panel are not so far apart... There is agreement that
officers at a very senior level, and men of the UPDF have conducted themselves in the
90
DRC in a manner unbecoming.”
13. For conduct in a “manner unbecoming” one might substitute the words in a “manner
engaging in illegal exploitation of natural resources”. Chapter3 of the Porter Report does not
mince words. It is entitled “Illega l Exploitation of Natural Resources” 91. The Chapter begins by
addressing the role and activities of BrigadierGene ralKazini. The Porter Report confirms the
co-operation it received from the United Nations pane l, prompting a recall of General Kazini for a
third time. The Report of the Porter Enquiry st ates that BrigadierGeneralKazini’s evidence
confirms “some of the allegations made by the First United Nations Panel” 92. Specifically, the
93
Porter Report confirms that UPDF officers were conducting business , as the United Nations
report alleged; the Porter Report confirms that “t op officers of the UPDF were planning ... to do
business in Congo”; the Porter Report confirms that UPDF Commanders “in business partnership
with Ugandans were trading in the Congo”; the Porter Report confirms that Ugandan military
94
aircraft were misused for carrying businessmen and cargo . And the Porter Report even more
unambiguously states that its findings corroborate “m any of the original Panel’s allegations in
95
respect of officers of the UPDF” .
14. There is an equally concordant set of c onclusions in relation to the DRC’s claims, for
example, on gold mining 96, or on the use of intelligence and security funding 97, or on looting , or
90
Porter, p. 198. See also e.g. Porter Pins Kazini, Saleh, New Vision (Kampala) 18 February 2003.
91Porter, pp. 17-128, judges’ folder, tab 39 sets out some extracts.
92Porter, p. 17.
93Porter, pp. 17 et seq., para. 13.1.
94
Porter, pp.18-19. The Report states “military aircraft were carrying Congolese businessman... and carrying
items” and Kazini had “given directions to assist Congolese businessman to travel back and forth... and even allowed
them to carry goods...”. See al so Additional Documents submitted by the DRC to the Court, January 2005,
Documents 6, 7, 9 and 10.
95Porter, pp. 20 et seq.
96Porter, pp. 20 et seq., para. 13.2.
97
Porter, p. 21, para. 13.3. - 34 -
on smuggling 99. The Porter Report states that evidence relating to BrigadierGeneralKazini
confirmed that “many of the allegations of misc onduct of the UPDF were the same as that which
reached the original Panel” 100. And for good measure the Report of the Porter Commission of
Enquiry adds:
“The picture that emerges is that of a deliberate and persistent indiscipline by
the commanders in the field, tolerated and even encouraged and covered by
GeneralKazini, as shown by the incompetence or total lack of inquiry and failure to
deal effectively with breaches of discipline at senior levels.” 101
I emphasize the words “deliberate” and “persistent”. “Misconduct”, “indiscipline”,
“incompetence”, “lack of inquiry”, one could go on. Do we associate these words with an army
and a State which is meeting its obligations of due diligence?
15. The Report of the Porter Commission makes many findings of fact consistent with the
First United Nations Report. For example, with regard to allegations against the most senior
echelons of the UPDF, it confirms that “some UP DF officers were excited about the possibility of
102
self-enrichment in the DRC” . It confirms the involvement in looting of individual UPDF
103
soldiers, to quite a senior level and with the support of senior officers . It confirms that the
allegations of UPDF soldiers im posing gold taxes were so poorly investigated that “the whole
question of inquiry into complaints against the officers of the UPDF needs to be looked at
104
carefully” . The Porter Report finds as a matter of fact that with regard to allegations of
systematic and systemic exploitation of natural resources, a number of UPDF officials who
105
presented evidence before th e Commission were lying . It finds as a matter of fact that
General Salim Saleh, half-brother of the President of Uganda, purported to change his shareholding
in an air company so as to circumvent the President’s directive forbidding army officers from doing
98
Porter, p. 22, para. 13.4. [See also Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ann. 24].
99
Porter, p. 22, para. 13.5
100Porter, p. 22
101Porter, p. 23
102Porter, pp. 29 et seq., para. 14.4.
103
Porter, inter alia p.72. See the Commission’s finding that theallegation in the First United Nations Report
regarding individual UPDF colonels collecting/demanding tax “is supported”, pp. 79-80. The fact that individual soldiers
were “lining their pockets” is also acknowledged at p. 134.
104Porter, p. 72.
105
Porter, see inter alia pp. 67, 69, 70 etc. - 35 -
business in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whilst at the same time actually maintaining a
106
controlling interest in the company which continued to do business in the DRC . It finds as fact
that BrigadierGeneralKazini “gave specific instructions to UPDF Commanders... to allow
Victoria (a privately owned company created to facilitate illegal activities 107) to do business
108
uninterrupted in the areas under their command” . And it finds as fact that
BrigadierGeneralKazini took steps “to facilitate the interests of Victoria which were above and
beyond the call of duty, and further, inappropria te to the UPDF’s role in providing security” 109.
For Uganda there can be no escape from those words.
16. The Porter Report focuses on three individuals who were identified as “key actors” by
110
the First United Nations Report. They are Major General Salim Saleh , his wife
Jovial Akandwanaho 111 and Brigadier General Kazini, the Chief of Staff of the UPDF 112. In
respect of the activities of these individuals the Porter Report concludes that several of the
allegations of the First United Nations Report re lating to resource exploitation were “supportable”
and “true”, and recommended that these cases be pursued for appropriate action 113. Indeed, after
the publication of the Porter Report, it was re ported that senior military officers and business
people in Uganda were to be prosecuted for thei r role in the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources of the DRC 114. It was also reported that Presiden t Museveni had issued instructions to
the Ministry of Defence to investigate Lt. Gen Saleh and Brigadier General Kazini 115.
10Porter, pp. 82-83, paras. 18.3-18.4.
107
First United Nations Report, para.79 makes allegations regarding such co mpanies; para.80 names Victoria.
See also Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annex 21 and Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Annex 92, and Additional Documents submitted by the DRC to the Court, January 2005, document 4.
10Porter, p. 84.
109
Porter, p. 84.
110
Porter, pp. 88-90, para. 20.1. The Porter Commission noted inter alia his attempt to circumvent the President’s
directive not to engage in commerce in the DRC. It noted “the unsatisfactory registration and irregular handling” of his
airlines; his failure to declare his assets and the possibility of his involvement with Tr inity. It was reported that
General Saleh resigned from the UPDF in November 2003, soon after the publication of the final United Nations Report.
See Uganda: Army to Replace Gen. Saleh next week, The Monitor, Kampala, 18 January 2004 (Lexis).
11Porter, p. 90, para. 20.2. The Commission has evidence linking her with Victoria and diamond smuggling.
11Porter, pp.90-94, para.20.3. This refers to Kazini’s connections with Victoria and Diamond smuggling,
misbehaviour of senior UPDF officers, lying to the Commission and others. See also the “Kazini revelations” pp. 17-24.
11Porter, pp. 89 and 205.
114
See inter alia Uganda Plans looting charges, BBC web edition, 15 May 2003.
115
CID to Take up Kazini, Saleh Case on Congo Looting, 18 May 2003 from http;//allafrica.com. - 36 -
InJune2003, a few months after the Porter Report was handed to the Government, Brigadier
General Kazini was removed as Chief of Staff of the UPDF. An army spokesman stated that the
removal from office was not as a result of the Unite d Nations and Porter Reports but that General
116
Kazini had been sent for “further training” . The link is clear. And one might well ask: has
anyone been prosecuted in Uganda for this gross misconduct and illegality? We look forward to an
answer to that question from Uganda later this week or next.
17. On the role of the UPDF in exploitin g natural resources, the views of the Porter
117
Commission of Enquiry are scathing . Of particular concern to this judicial Commission is the
UPDF’s failure to investigate allegations of expl oitation and looting. The Porter Report finds as
fact that “the Military Intelligence’s investiga tions are not good enough, nor concentrated on
misbehaviour of officers and soldiers in the field” 11. The Report finds as fact that “certain cases
were not even reported to Headquarters” 119. It finds as fact that investigations were wholly
inadequate: it cites what I found to be one of th e most remarkable examples of an allegation made
against a named senior army officer and a named junior army officer where “[t]he local UPDF
Commander asked the senior army officer to investigate himself and report to him” 120. We have to
ask ourselves, when a State allows an alleged miscreant to investigate himself, is it meeting the
standard of due diligence? The Porter Report finds as fact that “all an officer has to do is to deny
121
an incident for the investigation to be dropped” . It expresses dissatisfaction with the conduct of
many of the UPDF officers who gave evidence, not least “because when they started to be asked
awkward questions they resorted to a conspiracy of silence, or in the case of one very senior
122
officer, levity and disrespect of the civil process” . The Porter Report provides many specific
examples of poor investigations; for example th e allegation in paragraph62 of the First United
Nations Report that in August2000 UPDF Col. Mugenyi and a crew of his soldiers were
116
Top Ugandan Army Officer sacked , BBC Online, J6une003 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/africa/2970426.stm. See also Museveni purges Ugandan Military, BBC Online 2December2003 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3256160.stm.
117
Porter, pp. 108-110.
118
Porter, p. 109.
119
Porter, p. 109.
120Porter, p. 109.
121Porter, p. 109.
122
Porter, p. 109. - 37 -
discovered “with [no less than] 800 kg of elepha nt tusks in their car near Garambwa Park” 123. The
allegation was not investigated until nine months after the incident, by which time, according to the
Porter Report, it was too late to ascertain the truth.
18. With regard to the exploitation of minerals , the Porter Report also makes findings of fact
which confirm the United Nations reports. It finds as fact that diamonds were being smuggled and
124
falsely declared as sourced in Uganda , and that the people named in connection to the Victoria
company were “quite clearly engaged in smuggling diamonds through Uganda” 125. It finds as fact
that the Ugandan military air base was “bei ng used to smuggle diamonds across Uganda,
126
sometimes with military transport” . It finds as fact that these diamond smuggling operations had
127
been set up with “UPDF assistance” . It finds as fact that Brigadier General Kazini was
connected with Victoria and with diamond smuggling 128. It finds as fact that he deliberately lied in
129
giving evidence . It finds as fact that Brigadier Gene ral Kazini gave instructions to his
commanders to allow the Victoria Company “to do business in coffee, gold and diamonds in their
areas, that taxes were to be paid to the rebel group [ Mouvement de Libération Congolais
(Congolese Liberation Movement)], and that the comma nders should ‘let Victoria do its business
130
uninterrupted by anybody’” . In summary, the Porter Report concludes, that it could only come
to one conclusion:
“General Kazini had more interest in Victoria’s operations than he was prepared
to admit: and that conclusion supports many of the allegations of the original [United
Nations] panel in respect of General Kazini. 131
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
These conclusions put General Kazini at the beginning of a chain as an active
supporter in the [DRC] of Victoria, an organization engaged in smuggling diamonds
123
Porter, p. 109.
124
Porter, p. 116.
125
Porter, p. 119.
12Porter, p. 121.
12Porter, p. 121.
12Porter, pp. 121 et seq.
129
Porter, p. 122.
130
Porter, p. 122. See also Additional Documents subm itted by the DRC to the Court, January 2005, documents
4, 6 and 7.
131
Porter, p. 123. - 38 -
through Uganda: and it is difficult to believe that he was not profiting for himself
from the operation.” 132
19. Mr.President, I could go on ⎯ there is a lot more. These are not the conclusions of a
partisan non-governmental organization or an indivi dual with a grudge. They are the conclusions
of a Ugandan judicial enquiry. In the face of this material, how can Uganda claim that the material
facts concerning smuggling and exploitation of natural resources which are identified in the United
Nations reports are, to use his words, discred ited? We say that it is established beyond any
reasonable doubt that personnel of the UPDF were directly engaged in these illegal activities. We
say that the Ugandan Government itself has reco gnized this, in undertaking to take steps to
implement the Porter Report recommendations. Presi dent Museveni himself, in a BBC interview
given in September2004, accepted that the Port er Commission had upheld some of the United
133
Nations expert panel’s findings . And he stated that Uganda was following up the Porter
Commission Report, that those found guilty would be charged 134. This constitutes acceptance ⎯ at
the very highest level of the Ugandan State ⎯ of findings of fact in the Porter Report, findings
which concord with the conclusions of the United Nations reports.
4. The nature of the Congo’s intervention in the DRC was inconsistent with exploitation
20. Uganda’s fourth argument is that the nature of its intervention i
n the DRC was
135
inconsistent with exploitation . In our submission this argument collapses completely in the face
of the evidence before the Court. Even if th e Court were to accept that the presence of UPDF
136
troops in eastern Congo was solely motivated by “security concerns” ⎯ which we say was
plainly not the case ⎯ that fact would not be sufficient for Uganda to avoid its international
responsibility. Whatever Uganda’s motivations may have been, the fact is that natural resources ⎯
gold, diamonds, elephant tusks, forestry timbers and so on ⎯ were exploited by members of the
UPDF and by other persons acting with the support or under the protection of the UPDF.
13Porter, p. 124.
133
See Uganda: Museveni on BBC, New Vision, 21 September 2004.
134
Ibid.
13Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 406-413.
13Rejoinder of Uganda, para. 406. - 39 -
21. Whatever the reasons for which Brigadier General Kazini happened to find himself in
eastern Congo, the fact is that he was there as Chie f of Staff of the UPDF and that he was engaged
in the systematic and illegal exploitation of C ongolese natural resources, in some cases thousands
of kilometres from the Ugandan border. It is si mply not a defence for those acts to say that his
presence in the DRC was formally fo r another purpose. The claim ⎯ this fourth claim ⎯ is
implausible. It is hopeless, we would say.
5.The first United Nations report inaccura tely construes the context of Uganda’s
intervention in the Congo
22. The same may be said of Uganda’s fifth argument, that the First United Nations Report
(on which the DRC’s case is said by Uganda to rest) inaccurately construes what is called the
context of Uganda’s intervention in the Congo 137.
23. I have already explained that the DRC does not rest its case on the First United Nations
Report. That should be clear from the written pleadings and abundantly clear from the
presentations we have made over the course of this week. The DRC’s case is based in part on the
concordance between numerous Un ited Nations reports and the Port er Report, as well as certain
other independent and authoritative reports, on Secu rity Council resolutions and their findings of
fact, and on the actions ⎯ and inactions ⎯ of Uganda to investigate and discipline some of those
individuals who were responsible for illegal acts. The DRC’s case is based on the totality of the
evidence which is before this Court and which supports these facts.
24. Uganda argues that the “context” of its intervention in the Congo has been
misunderstood. With great respect, the “context” is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether
Uganda is internationally responsible for the ex ploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by its
military officers. The Court needs to be satisfied of two facts only in this respect: were natural
resources exploited during Uganda’s occupation of the DRC otherwise than in accordance with the
applicable law of the DRC and international law? The answer to that question is plainly “yes”.
And was that exploitation in fact carried out by members of the UPDF or by other persons acting
137
Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 414-429. - 40 -
with the support or under the protection of the UPDF? The answer to that question is also plainly
“yes”.
25. With these two affirmative answers it is difficult to see how an argument about context
can get Uganda off the hook. Once this Court accepts that Brigadier General Kazini and his
colleagues engaged in or turned a blind eye to the illegal exploitation of the natural resources in the
DRC then the responsibility of Uganda is engaged. That fact is established by the United Nations
reports. By the Report of the Porter Commission. By the testimony of witnesses before the Porter
Commission. By resolutions of the Security Council which make findings of fact. Short of
Uganda bringing new evidence to the Court to sh ow that the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s
natural resources was overseen not by Brigadier General Kazini but by some imaginary battalion of
white rhinoceroses, I simply do not see how “c ontext” can provide any assistance to Uganda.
When lawyers talk about context in this way they enter the realm of fiction. This is the Ugandan
Peoples’ Defence Force in Congo. It is not Tintin in Congo.
6. Trade between Uganda and Congo is benign and legitimate
26. Uganda derives no more assistance from its sixth argument, to the effect that trade
138
between Uganda and Congo is benign and legitimate . Again, this argument is directed not at the
DRC’s pleadings but at the United Nations reports. And the argument appears to be based on a
confusion between the concept of exploitation of resources and international trade in those
resources. Exploitation and trade are different things.
27. It may indeed be the case, as Uganda put s it, that “the residents of eastern Congo and
Uganda have been trading with each other since time immemorial” 13. But that fact, even if it were
true, is not a defence to the evidence which estab lishes beyond any doubt that diamonds, gold and
other natural resources were exploited during Uganda’s occupation of the DRC by or for the
benefit of members of the UPDF or by other persons acting with the support or under the protection
of the UPDF. Some trade between the two countri es may indeed have been legitimate. But the
cross-border trading activities in diamonds of Br igadier General Kazini and his colleagues and
138
Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 430-455.
13Rejoinder of Uganda, para. 430. - 41 -
friends were not legitimate. And the fact th at some diamond trading activity may have been
legitimate cannot legitimate his illegal acts. The e xploitation described in the evidence before the
Court plainly did not take place in accordance w ith Congolese law. Nor did it take place in
accordance with the defined rights and obligations under Geneva Convention IV and the Hague
Regulations which I described earlier in my presentation. The trading cannot be said to have taken
place for the benefit of the occupied State.
28. Uganda makes a further argument under this head. It claims that the trade which the
DRC has placed at the heart of these proceedings w as essential to the survival of the population of
eastern Congo 14. Mr.President, this goes into the category of legal arguments which may be
entitled “grossly cynical”. Is it really being ar gued, by Uganda, that Brigadier GeneralKazini
engaged in his activities for the benefit of the p opulation of eastern Congo? Did General Kazini,
Jovial Akanwanaho, and possibly Salim Saleh, secretly facilitate ⎯ as the Porter Report puts it ⎯
141
the Victoria and Trinity companies in order to assist the population of eastern Congo to survive ?
Were “diamonds... smuggled through Uganda, a nd declared [as the Porter Report puts it] as
sourced in Uganda by the smugglers on arrival in Antwerp” 142to feed the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo? I think not.
29. Uganda is asking the judges to suspend disbelief. The illegal activities were widespread,
long lasting and notorious. The activities caused numerous Security Council resolutions to be
adopted 143, they led to an international outcry, they led to steps being taken to limit the activities of
those who benefited most directly. Nowhere and ne ver has it been claimed or suggested that these
activities were to the benefit of the occupied State.
7. The specific allegations are contradicted by sworn testimony and documentary evidence
30. Uganda’s seventh argument is that the specific allegations are contradicted by sworn
144
testimony and documentary evidence . With the greatest respect to my learned friends on the
140
Rejoinder of Uganda, para. 442.
141
Porter, p. 150.
14Porter, p. 165.
14See, for example, Security Council resolutions 1291 (2000); 1304 (2000); 1332 (2000); 1341 (2001);
1355 (2001); 1457 (2003); and 1493 (2003).
14Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 456-494. - 42 -
other side of this room, this argument is simply unarguable in the face of the evidence before you,
much of which Uganda would presumably had hoped you would not have had sight of.
31. To give Uganda its credit ⎯ and credit really is due ⎯ it is true that the argument was
prepared before the Porter Commission published it s final report. And it is also true that the
interim report of the Porter Commission may have provided some hopeful indications to Uganda
and her counsel. But now that the Porter Report has reported, the facts are incontrovertible.
32. In its Rejoinder, Uganda goes to some lengths to defend Brigadier General Kazini and
145
his reputation . What does the Report say?
“[H]aving watched General Kazini gi ving evidence, this Commission is fully
satisfied that it was a deliberate lie by Uganda’s Acting Army Commander, displaying
an arrogance and contempt of civil authorit y... General Kazini’s comments were
actually instructions to his Commanders, pointing out that La Société Victoria had
been granted permission to do business in coffee, gold and diamonds in their areas,
that taxes were to be paid to MLC, and that t146Commanders should ‘let Victoria to do
its business uninterrupted by anybody’.”
33. Similarly unsustainable are Uganda’s clai ms that the DRC relies on what it calls “vague
147
generalities and unfounded alle gations that have [says Uganda] no probative value” . The
148
documents before you speak for themselves . The Porter Commission is the product of an
independent judicial enquiry. Its probative value, as well as those of its conclusions, is
overwhelming.
34. The documentary evidence and testimony be fore this Court provides compelling support
for the DRC’s claim in respect of natural resources.
8. No evidence that Uganda failed to act against illegal activity
35. Finally, Uganda’s eighth head of argument ⎯ the last of its arguments, and there are no
others ⎯ is that there is no evidence that Uganda failed to act against illegal activity while it was
149
occurring . In support of that argument, Uganda re lies, amongst other materials, on a message
sent by PresidentMuseveni to the effect that it should be ensured that no officer or man of the
14See e.g. paras. 460, 462 and 463.
146
Porter, p. 122.
147
Rejoinder of Uganda, para. 465.
14See Additional Documents submitted by the DRC to the Court, January 2005, documents 2 and 4-12.
14Rejoinder of Uganda, paras. 495-503. - 43 -
UPDF in the Congo should engage in business, and that other public servants who engaged in
150
business should be reported to him . Whilst referring to this message, the Porter Report confirms
that officers at the very highest level and men of the UPDF did indeed, in violation of this directive,
engage in extensive commercial activities, and that they were unpunished. As the Porter
Commission put it: “the Military Intelligence Investigations are not good enough, nor concentrated
151
on misbehaviour of officers and soldiers in the field” . As I have mentioned, Porter concluded
that “all an officer has to do is to deny an incident for the investigation to be dropped” 152. If
President Museveni has identified an objective, th e United Nations and Porter reports describe the
reality of measures actually taken, or not taken, to prevent officers engaging in natural resource
activities.
36. There is another aspect of PresidentMusev eni’s message to his tr oops. He encouraged
them to assist Ugandan businessmen “to do business in Congo to alleviate the acute needs of the
population and also to establish links for the future”. For our part, we find it difficult to see how
this entreaty can be squared with the obligati ons of Uganda under international law, and in
particular the obligations to ensure the natural resource capital of a State is not depleted by the
occupying Power, except in accordance with the strict requirements of the Hague Regulations, and
to exercise due diligence in preventing persons which it controls from engaging in the illegal
exploitation of natural resources.
Summary
37. Mr.President, Members of the Court, be fore I turn to summarize and conclude, one
aspect must by now be evident. None of the eight arguments of Uganda ⎯ for that is all there is ⎯
actually denies that the acts alleged by the DRC, and now confirmed by the United Nations and
Porter reports, ever occurred. The totality of Ug anda’s arguments goes to matters of evidence and
proof, to the nature and quality of the material be fore you, to the inferences to be drawn relating to
the context of the invasion, historical matters, and so forth. That, presumably, was Uganda’s
litigation strategy. It now has to live with the consequences of that strategy in the face of the
15Rejoinder of Uganda, para. 502; ibid., Ann. 31.
151
Porter, p. 109.
15Porter, p. 109. - 44 -
material that is before you. In the light of the Porter Report, which the Ugandan Government has
received and accepted and undertaken to act upon, we invite Uganda to now confirm that it accepts
the facts concordantly identified in the United Nations and Porter reports.
38. In our view, they have no other option. The evidence before you from these authoritative
and independent sources is compelling. It demonstrates that not one of these eight Ugandan
arguments has a shred of merit to support it. It demonstrates, in particular, the concordant
conclusions of the United Nations reports and the Porter Report on two key following points. First,
the personnel of the UPDF were directly involved in the exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that such involvement reached to the very highest level of
military authority amongst the occupying troops; and second, the UPDF itself was complicit in the
activities of groups and private persons active in the DRC, including members of the Ugandan
business community, by
⎯ supporting illegal exploitation of natural resources;
⎯ failing to take action against persons found to be acting illegally; and
⎯ allowing weaknesses ⎯ weaknesses ⎯ in its administrative system to permit illegal
exploitation ⎯ diamond smuggling, for example; the use of military aircraft for private
purposes, for example ⎯ without investigation or other preventive act.
Uganda’s responsibility
39. With your permission, I will now conclude with some preliminary observations on the
relationship between these facts I have outlined and the question of Uganda ’s responsibility for the
illegal exploitation of natural resources, a subject to which ProfessorSalmon will return
immediately after me.
40. Uganda has been silent on its responsibiliti es in respect of the obligations set forth by
international humanitarian law in regard to the expl oitation of natural resources. In its pleadings it
has said nothing about the applicable law on this issue. But we say the rules are very clear.
Uganda simply exercised temporary de facto control over those parts of the territory which it
occupied in the eastern Democratic Republic of th e Congo. We say that it was subject to the
defined rights and obligations under Geneva Convention IV and the Hague Regulations, and - 45 -
customary international law. We say that Uganda was obliged, in international law, to ensure that
natural resources were not depleted, and we say that Uganda was obliged under international law to
ensure that the members of the UPDF did not exploit the natural resources of the DRC for private
purposes under any circumstances whatsoever. And we say that Uganda was required to exercise
due diligence in preventing the groups and persons which it controlled from engaging in the illegal
exploitation of natural resources.
41. The facts before you show clearly that Uganda has failed in these obligations. As
regards the acts of its armed forces, the a pplicable standard is a very strict one ⎯ and rightly so ⎯
both in respect of the acts which were carried out and the failure to prevent the acts of third persons
under their control. The standard set forth in Article3 of the Hague Convention(IV) is
unambiguous: Uganda “shall be res ponsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its
armed forces”.
42. The UPDF plainly were empowered to exerci se elements of authority, and the acts of its
officers ⎯ including but not only Brigadier General Kazini ⎯ were undoubtedly “acts of
authority”. It is plain from the rule reflected in Article 7 of the International Law Commission’s
Articles that the acts of Brigadier General Kazini and colleagues are attributable to Uganda, even if
they were acts which exceeded authority or cont ravened instructions. Messages of the kind I have
drawn your attention to from President Museven i provide no defence to Uganda, no means to
escape the attribution of those acts to the State. The approach set forth by the International Law
153
Commission in its Article 7 was based on established international jurisprudence .
43. It refers, for example, to the Caire claim 154 of 1929, in which Mexican officers exceeded
their authority and murdered a French national. It refers to the judgment of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, in the case of Velasquez Rodriguez, which established precisely the same
155
point in respect of acts of military officers of Honduras .
153
“The State cannot take refuge behind the notion that, according to the provisions of its internal law or to
instructions which may have been given to its organs or agents, their actions or omissions ought not to have occurred or
ought to have taken a different form.” J. Crawford (edThe ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text
and Commentaries (2002), p. 106.
154
United Nations RIAA, Vol. 5, p. 516 (1929).
15595 ILR 259, at 296. - 46 -
44. These two cases are directly analogous to the case before you. The evidence shows
compellingly that the conduct of the highest members of the UPDF was obviously “cloaked with
governmental authority” 15. The evidence shows also that illegal acts of exploitation cannot be
said to be, as the ILC Commentary puts it, “isolated instances of outrageous conduct on the part of
persons who are officials” 157. The acts we have described to you during the course of this week
were systematic, they were part of a pattern of behaviour which took place over many years, over a
massive geographic area, and involving a very large number of people employed by the Ugandan
State. This is not a case about isolated incidents. If it was, I am sure we would not be here before
you today. The Security Council would not have adopted resolutions about isolated incidents. The
exploitation of Congo’s natural resources is widely documented and broadly regarded as one of the
very worst excesses of war in modern times.
45. It is simply not good enough for Uganda to say that it did not order the acts which
occurred, or that those acts were not part of the governmental policy of Uganda. The acts of
natural resource exploitation occurred under Uganda’s watch. The acts were undertaken by
Ugandan army officers. The acts were systematic. They were extensive. They are notorious and
Uganda must take its international responsibilities.
46. Mr.President, Members of the Court, you have the material before you. In our
submission Uganda cannot be perm itted to avoid its responsibility unde r international law on this
most fundamental of issues. Thank you very much for your attention. I ask you, Mr. President, to
please invite Professor Salmon to the Bar.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Sands. I now give the floor to Professor Salmon.
M. SALMON : Merci, Monsieur le président.
PROBLEMES DE RESPONSABILITE INTERNATIONALE
1. Monsieur le président, Madame et Messi eurs de la Cour, ce dernier exposé du premier
tour de plaidoiries de la République démocratique du Congo souhaite attirer l’attention de la Cour
156
See Petrolane v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1991) 27 Iran-US CTR 64 at 292.
15ILC Commentary, p. 108. - 47 -
sur quelques problèmes relatifs à la responsabilité internationale à propos desquels les vues des
Parties semblent irréductiblement opposées.
L’Ouganda a défendu, à propos des questions de responsabilité internationale, des thèses, il
faut bien le dire, assez confuses 158. Ici, l’Ouganda soutient qu ’il n’y aurait de responsabilité
internationale que lorsqu’il y a une détermination faite expressément à cet égard. A l’appui de
cette thèse, il soutient que les constatations pa r le Conseil de sécurité de violations du droit
international n’emporteraient responsabilité que dans l’hypothèse où le Conseil prévoirait
159
expressément la réparation du dommage . Il s’agit là d’une conception étrangement réductrice du
mécanisme de la responsabilité en droit international.
Là, l’Ouganda reproche aux écritures de la République démocratique du Congo de ne pas
faire la distinction entre responsabilité et réparation 160. Ce que pourtant, la République
démocratique du Congo croyait avoir fait clairement.
Comme, lorsque les étudiants n’ont pas compris, il y va souvent de la faute du professeur,
c’est de bonne grâce que nous reprendrons le raisonnement dans l’ordre. La Cour me pardonnera si
l’on trouvera ici quelques répétitions avec ce qu’ont dit certains de mes collègues. Il s‘agit ici de
faire la synthèse des questions de responsabilité da ns la présente affaire. Nous examinerons donc
d’abord les conditions d’existence de la res ponsabilité et ensuite les conséquences de la
responsabilité.
I. Les conditions d’existence de la responsabilité
2. La Partie ougandaise n’est pas sans ignorer l’article premier des articles de la Commission
du droit international sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite 161 : «Tout
fait internationalement illicite de l’Etat engage sa responsabilité internationale.» Et selon l’article 2
du même texte :
«Il y a fait internationalement illicite de l’Etat lorsqu’un comportement
consistant en une action ou une omission
158
Ceci apparaît dès le contre-mémoire de l’Ouganda, par. 170-183 et 204 et suiv., et est poursuivi dans la
réplique, p. 10-11, par. 30 à 32.
159
Contre-mémoire de l’Ouganda, p. 119-120, par. 205-206.
160Duplique de l’Ouganda, p. 10-11, par. 30-32.
161Annexe à la résolution de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, AG Res. 56/83 du 12 décembre 2001. - 48 -
a) est attribuable à l’Etat en vertu du droit international; et
b) constitue une violation d’une obligation internationale de l’Etat.»
La responsabilité internationale de l’Etat occupant
3. Au stade actuel de la procédure, le souci de la République démocratique du Congo est
bien d’établir que l’Ouganda est internationa lement responsable d’un certain nombre de faits
illicites qui sont imputables aux forces armées ou aux agents ougandais par actions ou omissions
sur le territoire occupé.
4. La situation de responsabilité internationa le de l’occupant illégal est classique en droit
international.
Comme l’écrit excellemment mon collègue et vieil ami IanBrownlie dans son ouvrage
classique System of the Law of Nations ⎯ State Responsibility : «Thus liability may be generated
by the activities of forces lawfully present on foreign territory and e qually by the unlawful
162
activities of an army of occupation.» On ne peut mieux dire.
La Cour internationale de Justice a été amenée, à plusieurs reprises, à affirmer le principe de
la responsabilité internationale de l’Etat occupant. Elle l’a fa it dans son avis consultatif du
26 janvier 1971, Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afriqu
e du
Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité .
Elle y avait relevé notamment :
«Le fait que l’Afrique du Sud n’a plus aucun titre juridique l’habilitant à
administrer le territoire ne la libère pas des obligations et responsabilités que le droit
international lui impose envers d’autres Etats et qui sont liées à l’exercice de ses
pouvoirs dans ce territoire. C’est l’autorité effective sur un territoire, et non la
souveraineté ou la légitimité du titre, qui constitue le fondement de la responsabilité de
163
l’Etat en raison d’actes concernant d’autres Etats.»
Dans son avis consu ltatif du 9 juillet 2004, Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un
mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé, la Cour a déclaré :
«La Cour ayant constaté que l’édificati on du mur dans le territoire palestinien
occupé, y compris à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour de Jérusalem-Est, et le régime qui lui
est associé, étaient contraires à diverses oblig ations internationales d’Israël, il s’ensuit
que la responsabilité de cet Etat est engagée selon le droit international.» 164
162Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 183.
163
C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 54, par. 118.
164Avis du 9 juillet 2004, par. 147. - 49 -
5. Pour établir cette responsabilité de l’Etat occupant, le Congo doit établir qu’un certain
nombre de faits illicites accomplis en territoire congolais occupé sont imputables aux forces
armées ou aux agents ougandais par actions ou omissions.
A. Les faits illicites
6. En ce qui concerne la détermination des faits illicites , le Congo espère que la Cour sera
convaincue par ses écritures et par les présentes plai doiries. Il demande à la Cour, dans ses trois
premières conclusions de constate r ces faits illicites. Dans la c onclusion 1, les violations liées à
l’invasion et l’occupation du territo ire; dans la conclusion 2, les violations liées au pillage des
ressources naturelles et dans la conclusion 3, les violations liées aux exactions contre la population
civile.
B. L’imputabilité
7. Les problèmes relatifs à l’ imputabilité appellent certains éclaircissements tenant au fait
qu’il s’agit de faits qui se sont produits dans le cadre d’un conflit armé et d’une occupation
belligérante.
Plusieurs cas de figure se présentent.
8. Premier cas de figure: l’imputabilité des faits illicites des forces armées. L’imputabilité
des actes et omissions des forces armées à l’Etat belligérant est une disposition classique du droit
des conflits armés.
Selon l’article 3 de la convention IV de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 concernant les lois et
coutumes de la guerre sur terre :
«La partie belligérante qui violerait l es dispositions dudit règlement [règlement
concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre annexé à la présente convention]
sera tenue à indemnité s’il y a lieu. Elle sera responsable de tous actes commis par les
personnes faisant partie de sa force armée.»
L’article 91 du protocole additionnel aux conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la
protection des victimes des conflits armés internat ionaux (protocole I du 8 juin 1977) énonce une
règle similaire : - 50 -
«Responsabilité
La partie au conflit qui violerait les dispositions des conventions ou du présent
protocole sera tenue à indemnité s’il y a lieu. Elle sera responsable de tous actes
commis par les personnes faisant partie de ses forces armées.»
On inclut traditionnellement dans les forces ar mées les organes civils chargés de tâches
administratives par l’occupant dans le territoire occupé.
A cet égard, comme le relevait hier mon collè gue le professeur Philippe Sands, le fait que la
commission Porter ait cru bon de déclarer que les pillages n’étaient pas attribuables au président
Museveni en personne, est sans pertinence quant à la responsabilité de l’Etat ougandais pour faits
de pillage ou autres exactions. L’imputabilité ne do it pas se rapporter au chef d’Etat pour engager
l’Etat, même si le pouvoir est personnalisé. La r esponsabilité de l’Etat est engagée par les actes et
omissions de n’importe quel organe de l’Etat. Les actes de pillage ou les violations des droits de
l’homme sont ici imputables à des fonctionnaires de l’Etat ougandais agissant en tant qu’organes
sur le territoire occupé du Congo.
Le fait que ces fonctionnaires auraient agi en dehors de l’exercice de leurs fonctions est
pareillement sans pertinence. Co mme l’a déclaré la Commission du droit international dans son
projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite, à l’article 7
«Le comportement d’un organe de l’Etat ou d’une personne ou entité habilit
ée à
l’exercice de prérogatives de puissance publique est considéré comme un fait de l’Etat
d’après le droit international si cet organe , cette personne ou cette entité agit en cette
qualité, même s’il outrepasse sa compétence ou contrevient à ses instructions.»
9. Deuxième cas de figure : l’imputabilité des fa its illicites des bandes rebelles qui, quoique
n’ayant pas fait partie organiquement des forces armées ougandaises, agissaient, en l’occurrence,
sous le contrôle effectif de l’Ouganda.
Cette situation a été prévue explicitement pa r l’article 8 des articles de la Commission du
droit international sur la responsabilité internationale des Etats :
«Le comportement d’une personne ou d’un groupe de personnes est considéré
comme un fait de l’Etat d’après le droit international si cette personne ou ce groupe de
personnes, en adoptant ce comportement, ag it en fait sur les instructions ou les
directives ou sous le contrôle de cet Etat.» - 51 -
Cette hypothèse fut envisagée par la Cour dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et
paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) lorsqu’elle a
déclaré :
«Pour que la responsabilité juridiqu e de ces derniers [il s’agissait des
Etats-Unis] soit engagée, il devrait en princi pe être établi qu’ils avaient le contrôle
effectif des opérations militaire165u paramilitaires au cours desquelles les violations en
question se seraient produites.»
La République démocratique du Congo pense avoir démontré que telle était bien la situation dans
la présente affaire.
10. Une troisième hypothèse est à envisager du fait des règles de fond qui régissent les
devoirs de vigilance que la puissance occupante do it remplir à l’égard des faits se produisant sur le
territoire occupé.
Le principe a été énoncé en termes clairs par le Tribunal arbitral ge rmano-portugais dans sa
sentence du 30 juin 1930 relative aux Réclamations portugaises contre l’Allemagne , selon
laquelle : «la responsabilité de l’Etat occupant est engagée par tout acte contraire au droit des gens
ordonné ou toléré par les autorités militaires ou civiles en territoire occupé» 16. En dépit de son
ancienneté, ce texte reste particulièrement utile.
11. En ce qui concerne les bandes armées n’agissant pas pour le compte de l’Ouganda qui
ont accompli des faits illicites ⎯ et c’est là une différence notable par rapport à l’affaire Nicaragua
c. Etats-Unis , car les Etats-Unis n’avaient pas ét é une puissance occupante au Nicaragua ⎯
certaines bandes armées opéraient dans la zone de contrôle de l’Ouganda. Il appartenait, comme
on vient de l’exposer, à la puissance occupante de faire régner l’ordre dans le territoire qu’elle
occupait, qu’elle contrôlait et d’empêch er toute exaction. C’était là une obligation de vigilance à
laquelle cette puissance occupante ne pouvait échappe r. L’Ouganda est donc responsable des
violations du droit international humanitaire ou des pillages que ces bandes ont accomplis
impunément dans le territoire soumis à son c ontrôle. Dans l’hypothèse examinée ici, la
responsabilité de l’Ouganda n’est pas fondée sur le fait que les bandes armées se seraient
comportées comme agents de cet Etat, mais sur le fait que ces entités agissaient dans des zones sur
165
C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 65, par. 115.
16RSA, vol. II, p. 1040. - 52 -
lesquelles l’Ouganda exerçait son contrôle et devait faire régner l’ordre en tant que puissance
occupante. Dans ce cas, la responsabilité de l’ Ouganda repose sur son absence de vigilance dans
son devoir de contrôle comme puissance occupante.
12. On peut donc résumer cette partie du présent exposé en disant que la République
démocratique du Congo estime l’Ouga nda internationalement responsable d’un certain nombre de
faits illicites imputables à ses forces armées. Cette première requête de la République
démocratique du Congo correspond en quelque sort e à une mission traditionnelle de la Cour
lorsqu’il lui est demandé de se prononcer sur «la réalité de tout fait qui, s’il était établi,
constituerait la violation d’un engagement international» (art. 36, par.2, al. c), du Statut de la
Cour).
13. Le contre-mémoire de l’ Ouganda fait donc preuve d’un dé faut de perception lorsqu’il
167
soutient que la République démocratique du Congo propose de postposer la détermination du
montant du préjudice («quantum of damage») , alors qu’elle ne prouverait pas l’existence du fait
illicite («violations of legal obligations») . Tel n’est pas le cas ici. La preuve de faits illicites, et
même de ceux que l’on peut qualifier de viola tions graves d’obligations découlant de normes
impératives du droit international général, imputables à l’Ouganda, est entièrement rapportée, à la
fois dans les pièces écrites produites par le Congo da ns le cadre de la présen te instance et dans les
exposés oraux qui ont été présentés au nom du Congo cette semaine.
Ce faisant, la République démocra tique du Congo distingue donc correctement
l’établissement des conditions de la responsabilité (faits illicites et imputabilité) des conséquences
de celle-ci. Le préjudice n’est pas une condition de la responsabilité mais une conséquence
possible de celle-ci.
II. Les conséquences de la responsabilité
14. Envisageons maintenant les conséquences de la responsabilité. On se trouve ici encore
une fois dans un domaine classique.
167
Contre-mémoire de l’Ouganda, p. 102-104, par. 170-174. - 53 -
A. La cessation de l’acte illicite
La responsabilité peut entraîner d’autres c onséquences juridiques qu’une réparation pour
préjudice, ainsi, une action en cessation.
Cette conséquence de la responsabilité d’un occupant illégal a été soulignée à plusieurs
reprises par la Cour. Ainsi, dans s on avis consultatif du 26 janvier 1971, Conséquences juridiques
pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie . Dans ce cas, le
paragraphe 118 déclarait :
«L’Afrique du Sud…a…l’obligation de retirer son administration du
territoire de la Namibie. Tant qu’elle laisse subsister cette situation illégale et occupe
le territoire sans titre, l’Afrique du Sud encourt des responsab ilités internationales
168
pour violation persistante d’une obligation internationale.»
La Cour s’est encore exprimée de la manière suivante sur ce point dans son avis consultatif
du 9 juillet 2004, Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien
occupé :
«La Cour observe qu’Israël a également l’obligation de mettre un terme à la
violation de ses obligations internationales, telle qu’elle résulte de la construction du
mur en territoire palestinien occupé. L’ obligation d’un Etat responsable d’un fait
internationalement illicite de mettre fin à celui-ci est bien fondée en droit international
général et la Cour a, à diverses reprises, confirmé l’existence de cette obligation
(Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.
Etats-Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986 , p. 149; Personnel
diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran, arrêt, C.I.J. Recuei
l 1980 , p. 44,
par. 95; Haya de la Torre, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 82).» 169
C’est ce qui motivait la conclusion 4 du premie r tiret de la réplique de la République
démocratique du Congo qui demandait à la Cour de dire que l’Ouganda était tenu
«de cesser immédiatement tout fait internationalement illicite qui se poursuit de façon
continue et en particulier son occupation du territoire congolais, son soutien aux forces
irrégulières opérant en République démocr atique du Congo et son exploitation des
ressources naturelles et des richesses congolaises».
L’occupation du territoire sans l’accord de la Républ ique démocratique du Congo ayant désormais
cessé, cette conclusion sera reformulée pour ne plus viser que le soutien aux forces irrégulières et
l’exploitation des ressources naturelles.
168
C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 54, par. 118.
169Avis du 9 juillet 2004, par. 150. - 54 -
B. Les garanties et assurances spécifiques de non-répétition
15. Ainsi encore, la demande que l’Ouganda fournisse des garanties et assurances
spécifiques de non-répétition des faits illicites dénoncés, demeure justifiée par les menaces qui ont
accompagné le retrait des troupes en mai 2003, menaces auxquelles il a été fait allusion à plusieurs
reprises dans nos écritures et au cours des présentes plaidoiries.
C. La réparation des préjudices subis
16. Le second souci de la RDC est d’obtenir réparation des préjudices causés par les
violations graves du droit international dénoncées plus haut.
Que ces années d’invasion, d’occupation, de vi olations des droits humains fondamentaux et
de pillages de ressources naturelles aient entraîné des dommages de guerre d’une grande magnitude
est une évidence. Et c’est pourquoi la République démocratique du Congo demande à la Cour de
dire et juger que ces faits illicites engagent la responsabilité internationale de l’Ouganda et
entraînent par conséquent l’obligation de réparer tout préjudice causé par ces faits illicites.
17. Il n’y a là rien d’innovant. Le concept de dommages de guerre est une notion classique
du droit international commun. Chaque fois qu’i l a été déterminé qu’un Etat s’était comporté
comme un agresseur, son obligation de réparer les dommages résultant de son agression et de son
occupation illicite du territoire étranger a été proclamée.
De nombreux extraits d’instruments conventionnels relatifs au règlement des réparations à la
suite des deux guerres mondiales en témoignent.
Ainsi, l’article 231 du traité de Versailles :
«l’Allemagne et ses alliés sont responsables, pour les avoir causés, de toutes les pertes
et de tous les dommages subis par les gouve rnements alliés et associés et leurs
nationaux en conséquence de la guerre, qui leur a été imposée par l’agression de
l’Allemagne et de ses alliés».
L’article 232 du même traité imposait à l’Allemagne de réparer «tous les dommages causés à
la population civile de chacune des Puissances alliées et associées et à ses biens, pendant la période
où cette Puissance a été en état de belligérance avec l’Allemagne, par ladite agression…».
La pratique a enregistré d’autres formules comme «Germany must pay in kind for the losses
caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war» (traité de Yalta); l’accord de Paris du
21décembre 1945 envisageait les créances des Etats a lliés et de leurs ressortissants «issues de la - 55 -
guerre»; les traités de paix de Paris en 1947 prévoyaient l’obligation d’indemniser les Etats
créanciers «des pertes causées du fait des opérati ons militaires et de l’occupation» de leurs
territoires.
Dans le traité de paix avec l’Italie, on évoquait les «pertes et dommages résultant de faits de
guerre, y compris les mesures prises à la faveur de l’occupation de leur territoire, imputables à
l’Italie, et survenues en dehors du territoire ita lien» (art. 80). Les commissions de conciliation
défendirent une interprétation large, mettant l’accent sur une «cause and effect relation between the
170
war and the damage» .
Le traité de San Francisco avec le Japon du 8 septembre 1951, spécifiait que «le Japon
devrait payer aux Puissances alliées la réparation des dommages et des s ouffrances qu’il a causés
171
pendant la guerre» .
Plus récemment, le précédent de l’Irak va dans le même se ns, le Conseil de sécurité
reconnaissant dans sa résolution 687 (1991) la responsabilité de l’Irak pour
«toute perte, tout dommage ⎯y compris les atteintes à l’environnement et la
destruction des ressources naturelles ⎯ et de tous les autres préjudices directs subis
par des Etats étrangers et des personnes physiques et sociétés étrangères du fait de son
invasion et de son occupation illicites du Koweït» (par. 16).
En dépit de la mention du caractère «direct» du préjudice, l’expression soulignée a été
interprétée de façon très large, une décisi on administrative précisant qu’elle s’étendait aux
préjudices subis à la suite :
«⎯ des opérations militaires ou des menac es d’action militaires des deux parties au
cours de la période du 2 août 1990 au 2 mars 1991…;
⎯ des actions commises par des fonctionna ires, des salariés ou des agents du
Gouvernement iraquien ou d’entités placées sous son contrôle pendant cette
période ou à l’occasion de l’invasion ou de l’occupation;
⎯ de la rupture de l’ordre civil au Koweït ou en Iraq au cours de cette période; ou
172
⎯ d’une prise en otage ou toute autre forme de détention illégale» .
170
RSA, XIV, p. 210.
171
RTNU, vol. 136, p. 47.
172Citée par Pierre d’Argent, «Les réparations de guerre en droit international public», LGDJ - Bruylant,
Paris-Bruxelles, 2002, p. 381. - 56 -
18. Ainsi, une fois qu’un Etat est reconnu co mme agresseur et occupant, il doit réparer tous
les dommages qu’il a causés à l’occasion de son occ upation. Peu importe que, par ailleurs, ces
dommages résultent en outre de violations de règles spécifiques du droit de la guerre ou d’autres
règles de droit international. Le simple fait qu’ ils soient la conséquence de l’occupation suffit,
conformément aux principes généraux de la responsabilité internationale rappelés plus haut, à
obliger l’Etat occupant à les réparer.
19. C’est dans cette optique que, dans ses conclusions, la Républiq ue démocratique du
Congo demande à la Cour de dire et juger
«que la République d’Ouganda est tenue envers la République démocratique du
Congo de l’obligation de réparer tout préj udice causé à celle-ci par la violation des
obligations imposées par le droit internationa l et énumérées dans les conclusions 1, 2
et 3 ci-dessus».
Déterminer «la nature ou l’étendue de la ré paration due pour la rupture d’un engagement
international» est aussi une des missions traditi onnelles de la Cour (art. 36, par. 2, al. d), du Statut
de la Cour).
Toujours dans son avis du 9 juillet 2004, la Cour rappelait les modalités essentielles de la
réparation en droit coutumier formulées par sa devancière, la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale dans l’affaire de l’ Usine de Chorzow ⎯c’est dire que ces conditions sont bien
anciennes :
«Le principe essentiel, qui découle de la notion même d’acte illicite et qui
semble se dégager de la pratique interna tionale, notamment de la jurisprudence des
tribunaux arbitraux, est que la réparation do it, autant que possible, effacer toutes les
conséquences de l’acte illicite et rétablir l’état qui aurait vraisemblablement existé si
ledit acte n’avait pas été commis. Restitution en nature, ou, si elle n’est pas possible,
paiement d’une somme correspondant à la va leur qu’aurait la restitution en nature;
allocation, s’il y a lieu, de dommages-intérê ts pour les pertes subies et qui ne seraient
pas couvertes par la restitution en nature ou le paiement qui en prend la place; tels sont
les principes desquels doit s’inspirer la détermination du montant de l’indemnité due à
cause d’un fait contraire au droit international.» (Usine de Chorzów, fond, arrêt n 13, o
o 173
1928, C.P.J.I. série A n 17, p. 47.) .
20. La République démocratique du Congo ne c onteste pas que pour déterminer l’étendue de
la réparation, il lui appartiendra de spécifier la nature du préjudice et d’établir le lien causal avec
l’acte illicite initial. C’est cette phase de la procédure que la Républi que démocratique du Congo
sollicite la Cour de postposer en lui demandant par la conclusion suivante de dire et juger : «que la
173
Avis du 9 juillet 2004, par. 152. - 57 -
nature, les formes et le montant de la réparation seront déterminées par la Cour, au cas où les
Parties ne pourraient se mettre d’accord à ce sujet, et qu’elle réserve à cet effet la suite de la
procédure».
Dlansaire Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis , la Cour avait accédé à une demande similaire. Elle
n’a pas agi autrement dans l’affaire du Mur précitée. La RDC est à fortiori en position de formuler
une telle demande dès lors que son territoire faisait encore ré cemment l’objet de l’occupation
ougandaise et qu’elle n’est pas encore en mesure de mettre sur pied les commissions d’enquête en
vue de préciser l’ampleur et les détails des préjudices subis.
Ainsi se termine mon intervention de ce jour, relative aux violations des principes les plus
fondamentaux du droit internationa l par l’Ouganda et à la responsabilité internationale qui en
découle pour cet Etat.
Le présent exposé oral met un terme au pr emier tour de plaidoi ries de la République
démocratique du Congo.
Je remercie la Cour de sa bienveillante attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Salmon.
This marks the end of today’s sitting, and also the end of the first round of oral argument of
the Congo on its own claims. The Court will meet ag ain, starting on Friday 15 April at 10 o’clock,
to hear the first round of oral argument of Uganda , both on the claims of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and on the counter-claims of Uganda. On Friday 22April at 10a.m., following
Uganda’s presentation, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will conclude its first round of oral
argument with respect to the counter-claims. Thank you. The Court is adjourned.
The Court rose at 5.45 p.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mercredi 13 avril 2005, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Shi, président