Audience publique tenue le mercredi 25 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Shi, président

CR 2004/5

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THHEAGUE LHAAYE

YEAR 2004

Public sitting

held on Wednesday 25 February 2004, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Shi presiding,

on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall

in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2004

Audience publique

tenue le mercredi 25 février 2004, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Shi, président,

sur les Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur
dans le Territoire palestinien occupé
(Demande d’avis consultatif soumise par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU

____________________ - 2 -

Present: Presidenit
Vice-Presidejetva

Guillauueges
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins

Parra-Aranguren
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal

Elaraby
Owada
Simma
Tomka

Couvgisurar

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Shi,président
Ricejpra,ident

GuiMllu. e
Koroma
Vereshchetin
HigMgmse

Parra-A.anguren
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal

Elaraby
Owada
Simma
juges ka,

Cgoefferr,

 - 4 -

Palestine is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Nasser Al-Kidwa, Ambassador, Perman ent Observer of Palestine to the United
Nations;

Mr. Georges Abi-Saab, Professor of Internationa l Law, Graduate Institute of International

Studies, Geneva, Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge;

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Chichele Professor of International Law, University of Oxford, Counsel
and Advocate;

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor Emeritus of Interna tional Law, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Member of the Institute of International Law, Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Pieter Bekker, Member of the Bar of New York, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Anis Kassim, Member of the Bar of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Senior Counsel;

Mr. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at law, Ramallah, Palestine, Senior Counsel;

Ms Stephanie Koury, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

Mr. Jarat Chopra, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Professor of International Law,
Brown University, Counsel;

Mr. Rami Shehadeh, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Counsel;

H.E. Mr.Yousef Habbab, Ambassador, General Delegate of Palestine to the Netherlands,
Adviser;

Mr. Muin Shreim, Counsellor, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United
Nations, Adviser;

Ms Feda Abdelhady Nasser, Counsellor, Perm anent Observer Mission of Palestine to the

United Nations, Adviser;

Mr. Michael Tarazi, Member, Negotiations Support Unit, Adviser/Media Co-ordinator;

MsKylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, University of
Cambridge;

Mr. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

Mr. Markus W. Gehring, Yale University;

Mr. Jafer Shadid, delegation of Palestine in the Netherlands. - 5 -

The Republic of South Africa is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Delegation;

H.E. MsP. Jana, Ambassador of the Repub lic of South Africa to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and diplomatic representative to the International Court of Justice;

H.E. Mr. D. S. Kumalo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the
United Nations;

Mr. M. R. W. Madlanga, S.C.;

MsJ.G.S. de Wet, Acting Chief State La w Adviser (International Law), Department of
Foreign Affairs;

Mr. A. Stemmet, Senior State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign
Affairs;

Ms T. Lujiza, State Law Adviser (International Law) Department of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. I. Mogotsi, Director, Middle East Department of Foreign Affairs.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Noureddine Djoudi, Ambassador of Algeria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Ahmed Laraba, Professor of International Law;

Mr. Mohamed Habchi, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Abdelkader Cherbal, Member of the Constitutional Council;

Mr. Merzak Bedjaoui, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New York, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Hazim Karakotly, Minister plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Sameer Aggad, First Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh;

Mr. Saud Alshawaf, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Ziyad Alsudairi, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, Professor Emeritus of International Law, Legal
Counsellor;

Mr. Khaled Althubaiti, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. David Colson, Legal Counsellor;

Mr. Brian Vohrer, Assistant Legal Counsellor. - 6 -

The People's Republic of Bangladesh is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, Ambassador of Bangladesh to the Netherlands;

Ms Naureen Ahsan, First Secretary at the Embassy of Bangladesh in The Hague.

Belize is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Bassam Freiha, Permanent Representative of Belize to Unesco;

Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor at the Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne);

Ms Mireille Cailbault.

The Republic of Cuba is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Mr. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands;

Mr. Enrique Prieto López, Minister Counsellor at the Embassy of Cuba in the Netherlands;

Mrs. Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, Official of the Multilateral Affairs Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

The Republic of Indonesia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf, Ambassador the Republic of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the

Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Ms Nuni Turnijati Djoko, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, member;

Mr. Mulya Wirana, Counsellor (Political Affairs), member;

Col. A Subandi, Defence Attaché, member;

Mrs. Kusuma N. Lubis, Counsellor (Information Affairs), member;

Mr. Sulaiman Syarif, First Secretary (Political Affairs), member;

Mr. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, Third Secretary (Political Affairs), member.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is represented by:

H.R.H. Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Head of the Delegation and Permanent

Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations, New York;

H.E. Mr. Mazen Armouti, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands;

Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Senior Legal Adviser to the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; - 7 -

Mr. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Legal Adviser to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan;

Mr. Bisher Al Khasawneh, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Samer Naber, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Ashraf Zeitoon, Political Adviser;

Ms Diana Madbak, Support Staff.

The Republic of Madagascar is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Alfred Rambeloson, Permanent Representative of Madagascar to the Office of the
United Nations at Geneva and to the Specialized Agencies, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, Inspector, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Malaysia is represented by:

H.E. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Head of Delegation;

Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, wife of the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, Secretar y-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia;

H.E. Dato’ Rastam Mohd Isa, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations;

H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassa dor of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands;

Mr. John Louis O’hara, Head, International Affairs Division, Attorney-General’s Chambers;

Professor Nico Schrijver, Professor of Interna tional Law, Free University, Amsterdam and
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration;

Professor Dr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of In ternational Law, The Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva;

Mr. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, Undersecretary, OIC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Mr. Hasnudin Hamzah, Special Officer to the Foreign Minister;

Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Netherlands;

Mr. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, Firs t Secretary, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United

Nations;

Mr. Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federa l Counsel, International Affairs Division,
Attorney-General’s Chambers. - 8 -

The Republic of Senegal is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Saliou Cissé, Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Head of Delegation;

Mr. Cheikh Niang, Minister-Counsellor, Pe rmanent Mission of Senegal to the United

Nations;

Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, Director of Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

The Republic of the Sudan is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abuelgasim A. Idris, Ambassador of the Sudan to the Netherlands;

Mr. Ali Al Sadig, Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of the Sudan in the Netherlands.

The League of Arab States is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa, Secretary General of the League of Arab States;

Mr. Michael Bothe, Professor of Law, Head of the Legal Team;

Ms Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate, Institute of
International Studies;

Mr. Yehia El Gamal, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Salah Amer, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohammed Gomaa, Legal Adviser;

Mr. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, Legal Adviser of the Secretary General, Head of the

Legal Department, League of Arab States.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secretary Ge neral of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference;

H.E. Mr. Babacar Ba, Ambassador, Permanent Ob server of the Organization of the Islamic

Conference to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva.

Ms Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Professor of Public Law, University of
Paris VII-Denis Diderot, as Counsel;

Mr. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours , University of ParisVII-DenisDiderot, as Assistant to
Counsel; - 9 -

La Palestine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Nasser Al-Kidwa, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Georges Abi-Saab, professeur de droit in ternational à l’Institut de hautes études

internationales, Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M.James Crawford, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Université de Cambridge (chaire
Whewell), conseil et avocat;

M.Vaughan Lowe, professeur de droit internat ional à l’Université d’Oxford (chaire
Chichele), conseil et avocat ;

M.Jean Salmon, professeur émérite de droit inte rnational à l’Université libre de Bruxelles,
membre de l’Institut de droit international, conseil et avocat;

M. Pieter Bekker, membre du barreau de New York, conseil principal;

M. Anis Kassim, membre du barreau du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, conseil principal;

M. Raja Aziz Shehadeh, Barrister at Law à Ramallah, Palestine, conseil principal;

Mme Stephanie Koury, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

M.Jarat Chopra, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, professeur de droit
international à la Brown University, conseil;

M. Rami Shehadeh, membre du groupe d’appui aux négociations, conseil;

S.Exc. M. Yousef Habbab, ambassadeur, dé légué général de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas,
conseiller;

M. Muin Shreim, conseiller à la mission perm anente d’observation de la Palestine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conseiller;

Mme Feda Abdelhady Nasser, conseillère à la mission permanente d’observation de la
Palestine auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Michael Tarazi, membre du groupe d’a ppui aux négociations, coordonnateur pour les

médias;

Mme Kylie Evans, Lauterpacht Research Cent re for International Law, Université de
Cambridge;

M. François Dubuisson, Centre de droit international de l’Université libre de Bruxelles;

M. Markus W. Gehring, Université de Yale;

M. Jafer Shadid, délégation de la Palestine aux Pays-Bas. - 10 -

La République sud-africaine est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Aziz Pahad, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, chef de la délégation;

S. Exc. Mme P. Jana, ambassadeur de la République sud-africaine auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

S. Exc. M.D. S. Kumalo, représentant perman ent de la République sud-africaine auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M. M.R.W. Madlanga, juge;

Mme J. G.S. de Wet, conseiller juridique en chef a.i. (droit international), ministère des
affaires étrangères;

M.A. Stemmet, conseiller juridique principa l (droit international), ministère des affaires
étrangères;

Mme T. Lujiza, conseiller juridique (droit international), ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. I. Mogotsi, directeur, direction du Moyen-Orient, ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République algérienne démocratique et populaire est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Noureddine Djoudi, ambassadeur d’Algérie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Ahmed Laraba, professeur de droit international;

M. Mohamed Habchi, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Abdelkader Cherbal, membre du conseil constitutionnel;

M. Merzak Bedjaoui, directeur des affaires juridiques au ministère des affaires étrangères.

Le Royaume d’Arabie saoudite est représenté par :

S.Exc. M. Fawzi A. Shubokshi, ambassad eur et représentant permanent du Royaume
d’Arabie saoudite auprès de l’Organisation d es NationsUnies à NewYork, chef de la
délégation;

M. Hazim Karakotly, ministre plénipotentiaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Sameer Aggad, premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères à Riyad;

M. Saud Alshawaf, conseiller juridique;

M. Ziyad Alsudairi, conseiller juridique;

M. Muhammed Omar Al-Madani, professeur émér ite de droit international, conseiller
juridique;

M. Khaled Althubaiti, conseiller juridique;

M. David Colson, conseiller juridique;

M. Brian Vohrer, conseiller juridique adjoint. - 11 -

La République populaire du Bangladesh est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Liaquat Ali Choudhury, ambassadeur du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

Mme Naureen Ahsan, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Bangladesh auprès du Royaume

des Pays-Bas.

Le Belize est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Bassam Freiha, ambassadeur délégué permanent du Belize auprès de l’Unesco;

M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur à l’Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) ;

Mme Mireille Cailbault.

La République de Cuba est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abelardo Moreno Fernández, vice-ministre des affaires étrangères;

S.Exc. M. Elio Rodríguez Perdomo, ambassad eur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire auprès

du Royaume des Pays-Bas;

M. Enrique Prieto López, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de Cuba aux Pays-Bas;

Mme Soraya E. Alvarez Núñez, fonctionnaire à la direction des affaires multilatérales du
ministère des affaires étrangères.

La République d’Indonésie est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Mohammad Jusuf, ambassadeu r de la République d’Indonésie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation;

Mme Nuni Turnijati Djoko, ministre, chef de mission adjoint, délégué;

M. Mulya Wirana, conseiller (affaires politiques), délégué;

Le colonel A. Subandi, attaché de défense, délégué;

Mme Kusuma N. Lubis, conseiller (affaires de presse), délégué;

M. Sulaiman Syarif, premier secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué;

M. Daniel T. S. Simanjuntak, troisième secrétaire (affaires politiques), délégué.

Le Royaume hachémite de Jordanie est représenté par :

S. A. R. Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, ambassadeur, chef de la délégation, représentant

permanent du Royaume hachémite de Jo rdanie auprès de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies;

S. Exc. M. Mazen Armouti, ambassadeur du Royaume hachémite de Jordanie aux du

Royaume des Pays-Bas;

Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., conse iller juridique principal du Gouvernement du
Royaume hachémite de Jordanie; - 12 -

M.Guy Goodwin-Gill, conseiller juridique du Gouvernement du Royaume hachémite de
Jordanie;

M. Bisher Al Khasawneh, conseiller juridique;

M. Mahmoud Al-Hmoud, conseiller juridique;

M. Samer Naber, conseiller juridique;

M. Ashraf Zeitoon, conseiller politique;

Mme Diana Madbak, personnel administratif.

La République de Madagascar est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Alfred Rambeloson, représentant permanent de Madagascar auprès de l’Office
des Nations Unies et des institutions spécialisées à Genève, chef de délégation;

M. Odon Prosper Rambatoson, inspecteur au ministère des affaires étrangères.

La Malaisie est représentée par :

S. Exc. Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, chef
de la délégation;

Mme Datin Seri Sharifah Aziah Syed Zainal Abidin, épouse du ministre des affaires
étrangères;

S. Exc. Tan sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, se crétaire général du ministère des affaires

étrangères;

S. Exc. Dato’ Rastam Mohd. Isa, représentant permanent de la Malaisie auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

S. Exc.Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas;

M. John Louis O’hara, directeur de la divi sion des affaires internationales, bureau de
l’Attorney-General;

M. Nico Schrijver, professeur de droit international à l’Université libre d’Amsterdam et à
l’Institut d’études sociales de La Haye, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage;

M. Marcelo G.Kohen, professeur de droit inte rnational à l’Institut universitaire de hautes

études internationales, Genève;

M. Ku Jaafar Ku Shaari, sous-secrétaire à la division de l’Organisation de la Conférence
islamique, ministère des affaires étrangères;

M. Hasnudin Hamzah, conseiller spécial auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères;
M. Zulkifli Adnan, conseiller de l’ambassade de la Malaisie aux Pays-Bas;

M. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim, premier secrétaire de la mission permanente de la Malaisie auprès
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies; - 13 -

M.Mohd. Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conseil (Federal Counsel) , division des affaires
internationales, bureau de l’Attorney-General.

La République du Sénégal est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Saliou Cissé, ambassadeur du Sénégal aux Pays-Bas, chef de la délégation ;

M.Cheikh Niang, ministre-conseiller à la mission permanente du Sénégal auprès de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies;

M.Cheikh Tidiane Thiam, directeur des affaires juridiques et consulaires au ministère des
affaires étrangères.

La République du Soudan est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abuelgasim A. Idris, ambassadeur du Soudan aux Pays-Bas ;

M. Ali Al Sadig, chef de mission adjoint à l’ambassade du Soudan aux Pays-Bas.

La Ligue des Etats arabes est représentée par :

S.Exc. M. Amre Moussa, Secrétaire général de la Ligue des Etats arabes;

M. Michael Bothe, professeur de droit, chef de l’équipe juridique;

Mme Vera Gowlland-Debbas, professeur de dro it international, Institut de hautes études
internationales;

M. Yehia El Gamal, conseiller juridique;

M. Salah Amer, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohammed Gomaa, conseiller juridique;

M. Mohamed Redouane Benkhadra, conseiller juridique du Secrétaire général, chef du
département des affaires juridiques de la Ligue des Etats arabes.

L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique est représentée par :

S. Exc. M. Abdelouahed Belkeziz, Secrétaire général de l’Organisation de la Conférence

islamique;

S. Exc. M. Babacar Ba, ambassadeur, obser vateur permanent de l’Organisation de la
Conférence islamique auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à Genève.

Mme Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, professeur de droit public à l’Université
Paris VII - Denis Diderot, conseil;

M. Willy Jackson, chargé de cours à l’Univer sité Paris VII – Denis Diderot, assistant du
conseil; - 14 -

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open. Judge Kooijmans is unable to

be present during today’s sitting for reasons that have been duly explained to the Court.

The Court meets this morning to hear the following participants on the question submitted to

the Court: the Sudan, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. I

shall therefore now give the floor to His Excellency Mr.Idris, Ambassador of the Sudan to the

Netherlands.

Mr. IDRIS: Mr. President, honourable Members of the Court:

1. It is indeed a great pleasure and honour for me to address the honourable Court, on behalf

of the Government of the Sudan, on these oral proceedings concerning a matter of such high

importance. The question before the Court for its advisory opinion is of utmost significance both

for the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and indeed for the whole world.

The community of nations, and all those aspiring for a world that is truly built on justice and the

rule of law, await the decisive action by this Court in the fulfilment of its noble responsibilities.

2. At the outset, we would like to associate ourselves with the Written Statements submitted

to this Court by both the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC),

and we fully endorse their legal arguments, opini ons and conclusions on the matter. We also

subscribe to the views and legal arguments prese nted by Palestine and by other delegations

appearing before this Court.

3. Having to make our presentation at this later stage has both its advantages and

disadvantages. The arguments we intended to ma ke have mostly been covered by previous

contributions, making it necessary at some instances to repeat some of them, with the indulgence of

the Court, but at the same time made it easier for us to focus on fewer questions. As thus, our

contribution would be confined to three main points:

(a)The competence of the Court to grant an advisory opinion as requested by the General

Assembly of the United Nations.

(b) The applicability of the law governing occupati on on the question of the construction of the

Wall, including principles of international hum anitarian law and international human rights

law. - 15 -

(c) The legality of the construction of the Wall, and whether the action violates international law

and its consequences.

As has been already spelled out in our brief Written Statement, the Government of the Sudan

objects to the construction of the Wall being built by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including in and around Jerusalem, because in the fi rst place it is in clear violation of general

principles of international law and of the oblig ations and responsibilities of an Occupying Power

under international humanitarian law. It is also in defiance of the will and desire of peace-loving

nations.

4. We further believe that the honourable Court should be able to uphold not only its

competence to give an advisory opinion on th e question of “The legal consequences of the

construction of the Wall”, but also to the violation of international law by such action.

In this regard this oral statement argues that the Court is “competent” to give an advisory

opinion and that there are no compelling reasons for it not to do so.

It is also the opinion of the Government of the Sudan that the action of the construction of

the Wall defies and violates international law, and is a wrongful act that should cease immediately,

that the status quo ante be restored and adequate reparations be paid to the aggrieved.

A. On the competence of the Court

5. On the competence of the Court, Article 92 of the United Nations Charter designated the

Court as the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”, and Article 96, paragraph 1, stipulates

that the General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to

give an advisory opinion on any legal question. The Statute of the Court (Article 65) further

stipulates that the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of

whatever body may be authorized by or in acco rdance with the Charter of the United Nations to

make such a request. There are no limitations, provi sos or restrictions in those Articles, once the

organs are requesting opinions on a question of law.

6. The General Assembly, as authorized by the United Nations Charter has made such a

request to the Court via its resolution ES-10/14 adopted on 8 December 2003 to urgently render an

advisory opinion on the question of: - 16 -

“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall
being built by Israel, the Occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

including in and around Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General,
considering the rules and principles of intern ational law, including the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949, and relevant S ecurity Council and General Assembly
resolutions?”

This request has come from a duly authorized organ (the United Nations General Assembly) as

stipulated by the United Nations Charter and th e Statute, and on a question of law (the legal

consequences of the construction of the Wall within the rules and principles of international law).

Arguments to the contrary do not hold, as the Court itself has proved through time. In its Advisory

Opinions of 28 May 1948 and 3 March 1950 on Admission of States to the United Nations , the

Court declared that it could give an opinion on any legal question and that there was no provision

which prohibited it from exercising “an interpretiv e function falling within the normal exercise of

its judicial powers”.

The Court further pointed out in its Opini on of 3March1950 that it could not attribute a

political character to a request “which, framed in abstract terms, invited it to undertake an

essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treat y provision”. It is also a known fact that the

majority of international law issues are typically part of a wider political context.

7. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence

of South Africa in Namibia of 21 June 1971, the President of the Court declared on the question of

political pressure, and as a matter of judicial propriety, that the Court as the principal judicial organ

of the United Nations, and in that capacity “would act only on the basis of law, independently of all

outside influences or interventions whatsoever”.

8. The competence of the Court was again emphasized on considering the Western Sahara

Advisory Opinion request in October 1975. The Court stated that

“under Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the Court may give an advisory opinion,

on any legal question at the request of any duly authorized body. The Court notes that
the General Assembly of the United Nations is suitably authorized by Article 96,
paragraph 1, of the Charter and that the two questions submitted to it are framed in
terms of law and raise problems of internati onal law. They are in principle questions

of a legal character, even if they also embody questions of fact, and even if they do not
call upon the Court to pronounce on existing rights and obligations. The Court is
accordingly competent to entertain the request.”

The Court also, in the WHO and Egypt Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980, stated that

“it does not have to deal with the motives, whic h may have inspired the request once a submitted - 17 -

request falls within the normal exercise of its j udicial process”. The Court affirmed this position

further in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of 6 July 1996.

9. The Court thus has consistently taken the position, that as the principal judicial organ of

the United Nations, it has to shoulder its judici al interpretive responsibilities, and only decline

giving opinions when there are compelling reasons, and when the question is not of law. As a

matter of fact this Court has never failed to asser t its competence to give advisory opinions on

cases referred to it by duly au thorized organs of the United Nations, and which has competence to

do so on the specified issue. In this respect th e Court summarized its practice in granting advisory

opinions in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, when

it stated: “In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court, only ‘compelling reasons’ could lead

it to such a refusal . . . there has been no refusal, based on the discretionary power of the Court, to

act upon a request for advisory opinion in the history of the present Court.”

B. On the applicability of international law on the Israeli action

10. Mr.President, honourable Members of the Court, once the Court ascertains its

competence in dealing with the request, then we believe the question of the legal consequences of

the construction of the Wall within international law entails the consideration of a number of

issues. Our contribution will focus on a limited number of these issues.

11. The question of the occupation of Israel of Palestinian and other Arab territories is

beyond contention. This is ascertained in rele vant United Nations Security Council and United

Nations General Assembly resolutions. For example United Nations Security Council

resolution242 of 1967, referred to “territories oc cupied in the recent conflict”. The Occupied

Palestinian Territories terminology has been used in numerous resolutions including the recent

United Nations General Assembly resolutions of which ES-10/14 requested the urgent advisory

opinion from this Court. The International Commit tee of the Red Cross in a statement before the

conference of High Contracting Parties to the Four th Geneva Convention, convened in Geneva on

5 December 2001, stated that it has always “affirmed the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva

Convention to the territories occupied since 1967 by the State of Israel, including East Jerusalem”.

The International Committee of the Red Cross further stated: - 18 -

“the Convention, ratified by Israel in 1951 remains fully applicable and relevant in the
current context of violence. As an occupying power, Israel is also bound by other

customary rules relating to occupation expr essed in the regulations annexed to the
Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war of 18th October 1907.”

The High Contracting Parties have twice affirm ed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva

Convention on the Occupied Palestinian Territory on 15 July 1999, and on 5 December 2001 in the

Geneva special sessions, respectively. United Nations resolution A/58/155 of 15July2003 has

affirmed the same.

12. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human

Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel  and this is its title  since 1967,

reportA/57/366 dated 29 August 2002, quoted the United Nations Secretary-General, speaking to

the Security Council on 12 March 2002, as calling upon Israel to end its “illegal occupation” of the

Palestinian Territory.

Asked why he used the term “illegal”, he re plied that the Security Council and the General

Assembly have both on various occasions declared aspects of Israeli occupation as illegal. The

comments of the Secretary-General  stated the Special Rapporteur  “underscore the fact that it

is by the law of occupation that Israel’s conduct must be judged and that many of its practices

violate basic principles of that governing law”.

13. The applicability of the Convention and other customary rules of international

humanitarian law oblige the occupyi ng power to refrain from certain acts that are in violation of

them. Common ArticleI of the Convention oblig es the High Contracting Parties to undertake to

respect and to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances. The construction of the

Wall, as stated in resolutionES-10/13, which demanded that Israel stop and reverse its

construction; this construction is in contradiction to the relevant provisions of international law.

Also, the construction of the Wall and the whole régime of measures relating to the Wall entails

confiscation of lands, serious hardship to the o ccupied population, including displacement, other

demographic effects and undue restriction of move ment and mobility, as enumerated in the United

Nations Secretary-General’s report ES-10/248 of 24November2003 pursuant to United Nations

General Assembly resolution ES-10/13, and in addition to prejudice to territorial status, all being in

violation of international law. - 19 -

14. The Wall also violates international human rights law. It places undue suffering on the

occupied Palestinian population and infringes on their basic human rights as stipulated in the two

human rights covenants and other relevant inst ruments, which are blinding on Israel. The

Secretary-General’s report clearly establish es this fact. The Court can rely on the

Secretary-General’s fact analysis in giving its opinion, as the text of the Assembly’s request makes

clear. The Wall will affect the lives of some 17, 000 Palestinians in the West Bank and 220,000 in

East Jerusalem. As the Secretary-General put it, “Palestinians will live in enclaves, areas where the

Barrier almost completely encircles communities and tracts of land. The planned route

incorporates nearly 320,000 settlers, including approximately 178,000 in Occupied East

Jerusalem.”

The humanitarian and socio-economic im pact was further illuminated by the

Secretary-General’s report. “Recent reports by th e World Bank and the United Nations show that

construction has dramatically increased such dama ge in communities along its route, primarily

through the loss, or severely limited access to land, jobs, and markets.”

The Wall, as the report informs, restricts movement of the population, isolated towns,

affected health services, curtailed agricultural output and increased food insecurity in the region, all

in violation of human rights law.

C. On the legal consequences of the Wall

15. The continuous construction and the presence of the Wall along the route which it

follows defy the will of the international commun ity. The Secretary-General’s report clearly states

that Israel has not complied with the demand of the United Nations General Assembly in its

resolutionES-10/13 to stop or reverse the ongoi ng construction of the barrier. The report’s

observations included the following: “In keeping with the request of th e General Assembly in

resolution ES-10/13, I have concluded that Israel is not in compliance with the Assembly’s demand

that it ‘stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.”

In his recent statement to the Court of 19January2004, the Secretary-General further

concludes that the update of the report “finds that the Government of Israel has continued with

ongoing construction of the barrier along the route approved by the Israeli cabinet on

1 October 2003 in Decision 883”. - 20 -

16. The Wall built in Occupied Palestinian Terr itory complicates efforts for reaching a final

settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli problem, wh ich has remained a highly threatening issue for

international peace and security.

As the United Nations Secretary-General concluded in his report prepared pursuant to

General Assembly resolution ES-10/13, the Wall is of serious concern and has implications for the

future. As he put it,

“In the midst of the roadmap process, when each party should be making
good-faith confidence-building gestures, the Ba rrier’s construction in the West Bank
cannot in this regard, be seen as anything but a deeply counter productive act. The
placing of most of the structure on Occupied Palestinian Land could impair further

negotiations.”

The Wall, hence, is a contradiction to international law  being built in the Occupied

Territory  and can only be seen as intended to prejudge and complicate the final solution. The

Secretary-General’s report further concludes “the Wall could change the longer-term prospects for

peace by making the creation of an independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian State more

difficult, or that increases suffering among the Palestinian People”.

It is therefore our contention that an advisory opinion pronouncing the legal consequences of

the construction of the Wall shall benefit the prospects for peace by clarifying the law and

discouraging unilateral negative actions.

17. It is a breach of international obligations by a State when an act of that State is not in

conformity with what is requested of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character: this

is found in Article 12 of the Draft Law on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law

Commission in 2001 and of which the United Nations General Assembly took note in

resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001.

The construction of the Wall is to be cons idered an internationally wrongful act, as it

constitutes a breach of international law within the meaning of these Articles.

It follows that Israel should continue the duty to perform the obligation breached including

termination and cessation of the wrongful act, restitution and reparation.

18. Furthermore, the construction of the Wall and its planned route, which deviates from the

Armistice Line, and consumes al most 16.6per cent of the entire West Bank, as reported by the

United Nations Secretary-General, clearly violates the status of Palestine and infringes on the right - 21 -

of the Palestinian people to self-determination. It also violates a fundamental principle of

international law that is the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. The Court, as

the guardian of international law, has the duty to gi ve guidance when international law is violated:

as the Court has stressed in its Advisory Opinion on the South Africa in Namibia case of June 1971,

on the question of legal consequences, “an illegal situation can not remain without consequences”.

The construction of the Wall by Israel entails undesirable consequences if left unchecked.

19. Mr.President, honourable Members of the C ourt, in conclusion, the Government of the

Sudan is of the opinion that:

(a) the Court is competent and has jurisdiction to grant an advisory opinion on the legal question

submitted to it by the United Nations General Assembly, and that there are no compelling

reasons preventing it from doing so; and

(b)that the construction of the Wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is in

contradiction of international law, and that it should comply with the United Nations General

Assembly’s resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003 to stop and reverse the construction of the

Wall in the Occupied Palestinia n Territory including in and around East Jerusalem. It should

also be obliged to make adequate reparati ons for the damages caused by the construction

action.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Idris. I now give the floor to Professor Bothe,

who will speak on behalf of the League of Arab States.

Mr.BOTHE: Mr.President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to appear

today before this Court on behalf of the League of Arab States.

It is witnessed by the presence of the Secretar y-General at the opening of these oral hearings

that the League of Arab States attaches a high importance to the present proceedings. In a press

release issued on Monday, the Secretary-General stated:

“The construction of that Wall is an unprecedented evil tactic aimed at
disturbing many established facts and deeds, and at creating more uncertainties. That
unilateral action devours more than 40 per cent of the West Bank. - 22 -

The effects of the Wall are many; but they are all negative. The Wall is an
affront to international law, it adds to th e suffering of the Palestinian people and

affects the future of any settlement of the Palestinian cause.

Therefore, it requires no less than the International Court of Justice to declare to
us what legal consequences this Wall can have.

We hope to draw from this inspiratio n on how this painful situation can be
redressed.

The Wall being constructed in the Pal estinian occupied territories presents
separation, leads to discrimination, reflect s the worst of policies of expansion and
destroys the real prospects for a fair and lasting peace.

Does not all this bring back to the present the Berlin Wall episode, which was

dubbed ‘the wall of shame’?”

The League of Arab States has already had a chance to furnish the Court information relating

to the request for its advisory opinion in the form of a Written Statement. It has concluded and

submitted that the Court has jurisdiction, and that there are no compelling reasons for it not to give

the requested opinion. On substance, it has foun d that the construction of the Wall constitutes an

internationally wrongful act as it violates a number of fundamental rules and principles of

international law. These wrongful acts engage the international responsibility of the State of Israel.

Today, the League of Arab States wishes to respond to some objections and claims made in

the course of the present proceedings.

Mr.President, Members of the Court, this is an historic case. The issue of Palestine is the

longest-lived problem on the agenda of the United Na tions. It is worth recalling that the first case

before this Court concerned Count Bernadotte, a person who, in the service of the United Nations,

had tried to mediate between the parties and who was killed in the service for peace. The

background of that case was the responsibility of Isr ael to pay compensation for this tragic loss.

But never before was this Court given the opportunity to pronounce itself on some of the

substantive issues of the problem. The current request means that the General Assembly has

recognized the importance of the role of law in the solution of the problem  a recognition which

has met resistance, as one can observe in the attitu de of certain States in respect of the present

proceedings. The international community should stand firm against this challenge. This

statement, Mr. President, Members of the Court, wants to make a contribution towards facing this

challenge. - 23 -

Putting into question the role of law in rela tion to the problem of Palestine has taken two

different forms: it appears in the form of pr ocedural objections against the Court rendering the

opinion. On the level of substance, this failure to recognize the role and the rule of law is

expressed by an approach which fails to recogni ze the balance which international law strikes

between the various interests at stake, by a pe rspective which emphasizes only one interest, the

interest of one State, of Israel, as the Occupying Power, and disregards all other interests of the

international community and the victims of the conflict  as we will show, a fundamental

misconception of international law.

We will, thus, first address some important procedural aspects and then summarize the key

issues of substance.

The competence of the General Assembly to make the request, and the jurisdiction of the

Court to give an answer to the question put to it, cannot be seriously questioned. However, a lot of

emphasis has been laid, in a number of Written St atements, on the issue of propriety, questioning

whether it is proper for the Court to pronounce it self on this legal question. We have great

sympathy for the position, expressed for instance by the French Republic, to leave it to the wisdom

of the Court. We certainly trust this wisdom, but we feel that some of the arguments put forward

under the cover of a concern for judicial propriety are of a nature that they need a forceful

rejoinder.

What is really improper, Mr.President, Member s of the Court, is not the advisory opinion

requested from the Court, it is the public relations battle launched outside this courtroom, trying to

intimidate the Court, to demean its role  and by the same token that of international law.

The Court should render the requested opinion as there are no compelling reasons for the
Court to refuse the request

Let me analyse some of the objections put forward against the propriety of the Court

rendering the opinion.

The argument of “a pending dispute” or “circumvention”

It has been claimed by Israel, and a few other States, that the request concerns a contentious

matter in respect of which Israel has not given its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court, and that it - 24 -

was, therefore, improper for the Court to render the requested opinion. Otherwise, the principle

that a State is not obliged to a llow disputes to be submitted to the Court without its consent would

be circumvented . 1

Such consideration of propriety, however, c ould only apply where the essential content of a

dispute was a mere bilateral matter between tw o States arising independently of the United

Nations. But, is the problem which the Court is requested to address a dispute of an essentially

bilateral character?

No it is not. The issue put before the Court has to be determined in light of the terms of the

question put to it. The question relates to an en lightenment of the General Assembly on the legal

consequences of a specific circumstance: the construction of the Wall.

Israel could not, validly, object to the General Assembly’s exercise of its powers to deal

with, and to seek an opinion on, th e violations of fundamental principles of the Charter, including

the right to self-determination, the violations of international humanitarian law, where there is an

obligation on all parties to the Geneva Conventio ns “to respect and to en sure respect” of their

provisions, and the violations of fundamental human rights law, all of which constitute erga omnes

obligations “owed to the international community as a whole” 2. In addition, many of the norms

violated by Israel constitute peremptory norms of international law: ius cogens.

Tohtte,tres  not only Palestine  may “take lawful measures” against Israel “to

ensure the cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the

beneficiaries of the obligation breached” 3  I am quoting the ILC Draft ; in this case the

“interest” of Palestine and the Palestinians affected by the Wall.

Clearly, there is in this case a controversy, but one which has its fons et origo in a larger one,

which arose within the ranks of the League of Nations and was later inherited by the United

Nations, and today remains in its custody. It is a controversy over matters in which the General

Assembly is directly involved. There are so many United Nations resolutions on Israel’s illegal

1
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 32.
2
Article 48 (1) (b), ILC Draft.
3Article 54, ILC Draft. - 25 -

occupation of the territories in which the Wall is being constructed. The controversy did not arise

4
independently in bilateral relations .

The object of the request is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the General Assembly

deems of assistance for the proper exercise of its functions concerning Palestine. The legal

questions involved in the request are located in a broader frame of reference than the settlement of

a particular bilateral dispute. They embrace a br oad range of questions re lating to the functioning

of the United Nations and the legal order in general.

Why should it be “improper” for the Court to address these questions?

The alleged “absence of an essential factual context”

By pretending that it was not going to address the substance  while it has indeed  Israel

is trying to mislead the Court into a decision not to answer the request because it has not before it

the factual and legal issues essential to any proper assessment of the substance of the request, to

which it alone, it boasts, can contribute. And, accord ingly, it is alleged, th e Court would have to

base its pronouncement on facts which are not well established, and, thus, on “speculation”.

This is in itself a very speculative argument. It is part of the judicial function to deal with

situations where the facts are controversial. It is part of the judicial function to determine what

facts are relevant for a certain conclusion on the legal situation, in this case: whether the Wall is in

violation of certain rules of international law or whether its construction can be justified.

Actually, the Court is already in possession of sufficient information and evidence furnished

by independent sources, including the United Nations, its organs, Rapporteurs and other

international organizations, as well as by States. It does not need such information from Israel

alone. Yet, Israel too has furnished extensive information and evidence through its official

declarations and through its Written Statement, toge ther with its annexes, of which the Court will

undoubtedly avail itself. Israel cannot now compla in that the Court does not have facts that it

would have, otherwise, furnished. It was invited to do so but chose not to furnish more. A State

which declines to give certain information to the Court is certainly precluded from raising an

4Cf. Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 25, para. 34. - 26 -

alleged lack of information of the Court as a basis for challenging the propriety of the Court

pronouncing itself on the issue.

Yet, there is no real uncertainty concerning the facts. Probably, the only disagreement is

over the issue of when and for how long the gates of the Wall are open!

Does the uncertainty about the facts make it “improper” for the Court to render the requested

opinion?

The alleged violation of procedural justice

Israel claims that the way in which the ques tion is asked violates principles of procedural

justice, it argues, the question arbitrarily sel ects only one specific aspect of the problem and

neglects all others. Thus, a fundamental issue of procedural justice arises, Israel argues.

One could simply respond that it is up to th e General Assembly to choose the question on

which it wants to have the advice of the Court, a nd that it is not for the Court to second-guess this

wish. The entire argument, however, is a gross di stortion of the true situation. Israel’s main

concern, the alleged security threat, is clearly put before the Court. Israel has had ample

opportunities to argue this before the Court, and it has, for all practical purposes, done so in its

Written Statement. It might have been helpful if Israel had put more concrete arguments before the

Court. But Israel certainly cannot claim that it was not granted procedural equality.

The requirements of procedural justice cannot make it improper for the Court to render this

opinion.

The alleged absence of a useful purpose

It has been argued, wrongly relying on certain dicta of the Court, that it should not answer

the question because that answer could not serve an y useful purpose. The authors of this argument

seem to think that in the light of the determina tions which competent organs of the United Nations

have already made, a determination by the Court could not have any added value.

The General Assembly has indeed made a dete rmination as to the illegality of the Wall, and

has also declared one essential c onsequence of this illegality, name ly that the construction should

cease and that the parts of the Wall already built must be demolished. Yet, also in this respect, it is - 27 -

up to the General Assembly to choose the issue wh ere it wants further guidance by the Court. But

beyond this formal argument: it will, inter alia, be useful for the General Assembly

 to have its declarations confirmed by the Court, in particular as the views expressed by the

General Assembly and by other United Nations bodies are contested by Israel;

 to gain clarity on a number of grounds of illegality;

 to gain clarity on a number of legal conseque nces which have not been comprehensively

addressed by the General Assembly.

It is of course not for the Court to instruct the General Assembly as to what further action it

should take in the light of the Court’s pronoun cement. The General Assembly will certainly

remain seised with the issue of Palestine. Its role has been that of formulating principles and goals

which govern or should govern the international community and of promoting political processes to

further these goals. This role will certainly be insp ired by the pronouncement of the Court. And if

further measures of implementation are needed, the General Assembly could also address a

recommendation to the Security Council  and it will then be appropria te for the Council to take

as a basis for its decision the legal situation as clarified by the Court.

The opinion will serve a useful purpose  and it is proper for the Court to render it.

Last procedural point, the alleged detrimental character of the request.

The alleged detrimental character of the request

It is argued that an answer which might be given by the Court would be detrimental for the

peace process between Israel and Palestine. Th is process, so the argument goes on, should be

governed by the Road Map, which emphasizes ne gotiations between the parties as the essential

means of solving the dispute and provides for the se ttlement of certain status issues in the final

phaseIII. The argument, with due respect, is some what difficult to understand. We are loath to

accept that a clarification of the law could put an obstacle to a negotiated settlement. Whatever the

Court will declare the legal situation to be, this will not prevent the parties from agreeing on a

compromise solution striking a balance between conflicting interests. Quite to the contrary: There

have been many cases before this Court where the clarification of the law proved helpful for the

parties to find a compromise on that basis. - 28 -

An opinion given by the Court does not have the effect of barring parties from agreeing on

issues which should be negotiated according to th e “Road Map” and other basic documents and

principles of the peace process. What stands in the way of such negotiations, however, is, inter

alia, the existence of the Wall. It has been pointed out in particular by Palestine, but also by many

reports submitted by organs of the United Nations system, that the Wall is profoundly affecting the

living conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It leads to migrations, to the displacement

of major parts of the Palestinian population, to a consolidation of the unlawful Israeli settlements.

This de facto effect of the Wall is bound to have an impact on the respective bargaining power of

the parties. It is the Wall which is an obstacle to a freely negotiated solution according to the Road

Map, not the opinion given by the Court. Quite to the contrary: the opinion is necessary to redress

the imbalance between the positions of the parties created by the Wall. Thus, the opinion indeed

facilitates and promotes a negotiated settlement as provided by the Road Map.

Also in this respect, it is certainly proper for the Court to render the requested opinion.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me now address the substantive issues. The Court

should clearly declare the grounds for the illegality of the Wall.

The Court should clearly declare the reason for the illegality of the Wall

While Israel has emphatically repeated in its Written Statement that it was not going to

address the substance, it has indeed entered into the merits of the advisory opinion by making

certain defences on substance.

Put succinctly, there are two fundamental i ssues involved in the cas e which have been

developed at length in our Written Statement: first, the status of Palestine as a self-determination

unit, and secondly, the rights of the population of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The first

problem involves fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the

prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-d etermination. From the latter flows respect for

territorial integrity and permanent sovereignty over natural resources  national wealth and land

and water resources. The second one relates to international humanitarian law, in particular the law

of belligerent occupation, as well as to international law of human rights, in particular the Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the

Convention on the Rights of the Child. - 29 -

The fundamental objection raised by Israel in the current proceedings is based on the

misconception that these rules of international law fail to adequately take into account legitimate

security interests. Indeed, this is a misconcepti on. Each of these different areas of international

law provides for a balance between conflicting State and community interests. Each of them does

so in a specific, sophisticated way. Security c oncerns are not a catch-all, sweeping consideration

which excludes the application of all these fundament al standards. Security concerns are taken

care of in specific and precise rules concerning excep tions and limitations to the application of the

general protective rule. It is to these specifics th at we now would like to invite you, Mr. President,

Members of the Court, to turn your attention.

Fundamental rules and principles of the Charter

Fundamental principles of the Charter: the essential point is that the construction of the Wall

fundamentally affects the demographic structure of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It leads to

a fragmentation of the Palestinian space, which has rightly been called Bantustanization. It makes

Palestinian life burdensome, even impossible, and forces Palestinians to leave their homes, while

fostering the position of the unlawful Israeli settleme nts. Israel denies this effect by calling the

“fence” a temporary security measure. But this claim veils the true situation. It is public notice

that major parts of the Wall are built in a very solid way, concrete structures, ditches, and so on. In

today’s newspaper you can read the latest statemen t of Prime Minister Sharon: “We will build the

security fence and complete it.” That does not soun d temporary. The Wall will incite Palestinians

to move out of the encircled places, in particular in what is called the “Seam Area”, and Israelis to

stay in or to come to the settlements fortified by the Wall. That is why the Wall profoundly affects

the right of the Palestinian people to self-determina tion, which includes the right to remain in the

place where the people has lived since many centuries, that is why it constitutes a change in status,

a de facto annexation which is contrary to the prohibition of acquiring territory by force.

One thing should be made crystal clear: Palestine is not a kind of no-man’s land subject to

appropriation by Israel. It is a self-determination unit in the borders drawn by the armistice lines of

1949. This has been recognized by the Secur ity Council and the General Assembly in binding

determinations  and by Israel itself. This is the lex lata, whatever the parties may freely agree

upon in the future. - 30 -

But does the alleged security threat not justif y these measures? Is the inherent right of

self-defence not recognized by the Charter? Sel f-defence is an act necessary to protect a State

against an armed attack. As such, it is by n ecessity a temporary measure. A lasting change in

status cannot conceivably be necessary for such protection. This is why the prohibition of

acquisition of territory through the use of force, confirmed by Security Council resolution 242 and

formulated in the well-known Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970, does not provide for an

exception in the case of self-defence. A de facto change of status does not provide any additional

security. The Wall cannot be justified as self-defence.

International humanitarian law

Its application cannot be denied. This has ag ain been made clear by all the States which

have addressed the issue in their written stat ements, including France, Ireland and Switzerland,

guardian of the Geneva Conventions, and it has been convincingly pleaded the course of the

present oral hearings. The essential point is the dut y of an occupying power not to destroy private

property and to provide for a decent existence of the civilian population, an obligation which is

violated in many respects.

But does the security threat not justify these measu res? The right of a party to a conflict to

take measures for the protection of its own population living on its territory is certainly recognized.

But, as the ICRC has clearly put it in a recent de claration which deserves to be re-emphasized,

although it has already been quoted to the Court:

“[T]he West Bank Barrier, in as far as its route deviates from the ‘Green Line’
into occupied territory, is contrary to in ternational humanitarian law. The problems

affecting the Palestinian population in their daily lives clearly demonstrate that it runs
counter to Israel’s obligation under inte rnational humanitarian law to ensure the
humane treatment and well-being of the civilian population living under its
occupation. The measures taken by the Israeli authorities linked to the construction of

the Barrier in occupied territory go far be yond what is permissible for an occupying
power under international humanitarian law.”

Human rights

The applicability of international human rights treaties as well as the corresponding rules of

customary international law has once again been affirmed in the present proceedings. This was

clearly stated by a number of States, including France, Ireland and Switzerland. The latter drew - 31 -

your attention to the fact that you held, in the Nuclear Weapons case, that a concurrent application

of international human rights and international humanitarian law was indeed required.

International human rights guarantees are violat ed in a number of respects which we have

developed in our Written Statement. In addition to the rights related to the unbearable deterioration

of the living conditions of the Pa lestinian population, one further aspect of these violations has to

be stressed: freedom of religion of Christians and Muslims, as the Wall also bars access to the

Holy Places of these religions.

But does the alleged security threat not justify these measures? The extent to which security

considerations may serve as a reason for limiting human rights is determined by the limitation

clauses associated with a number of guarantees. They are summarized under the heading of

proportionality.

This means the measure must serve a legitimat e purpose. The security of the population is

such legitimate purpose, but the protection of th e Israeli settlements is not. These settlements, as

has been repeatedly explained before you, are th emselves a violation of international law. A

situation created by a violation of internati onal law cannot serve as a legitimate purpose for

limiting human rights: “Ex iniuria ius non oritur”.

A second condition: the measure must be nece ssary for achieving its purpose. But, as even

Israel admits in its Written Statement, the security situation has not changed since the construction

of the Wall. The attacks complained of by Israel have not diminished. It was very convincingly

pleaded yesterday: the security to be provided by the Wall is just an illusion. A measure which is

incapable of achieving its objective is a useless, and therefore unjustifiable infringement on human

rights. Therefore, it has to be stressed that the true purpose of the Wall is different (and not

legitimate): it is a means to change the legal status quo of the occupied territory.

Finally, the limitation of a human right must not be excessive in relation to the advantage it

is designed to achieve. Making the life of an entire population unbearable is an infringement of

human rights grossly disproportionate to the real scope of the threat perceived by Israel.

Thus, the security argument fails in respect of any limitation of human rights which are

imposed on the Palestinians by reason of the construction of the Wall. - 32 -

To sum up, Mr. President, Members of the Court: the Wall does not stand between terrorists

and potential victims. It stands between the fa rmer and his land, between the employee and the

employer, between the merchant and the client , between the child and its school, between the

patient and the doctor, between families who want to unite, between the faithful and his or her Holy

Places. As a matter of international law, it does not belong there at all!

The Court should clearly state the consequences which these violations of applicable
international law entail for various actors

Mr.President, Members of the Court, in the Namibia Opinion, you held  and this was

already quoted by the preceding speaker  that “a binding determination made by a competent

organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without

consequence” . 5

Consequences for Israel: under the law of State responsibility, there is, first, a duty to cease

the unlawful act. The construction must be stopped immediately. Secondly, there is a duty of

reparation in the form of restitution: the Wall must be demolished, land taken from Palestinian

owners for the purpose of constructing the Wall must be given back, regulatory instruments related

to the construction of the Wall are null and void and must be rescinded. Damages going beyond

the loss of land, which has to be given back, mu st be compensated. In addition, appropriate

assurances of non-repetition have to be given.

Consequences for third States: the rul es which have been violated constitute erga omnes

obligations. Other States are thus entitled to take appropriate measures to ensure that the breach

ceases and that reparation is provided. As to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it provides that all

States parties are obliged to respect and ensure resp ect of its provisions. Thus, violations trigger

the right and duty of all States parties to take meas ures to ensure compliance with this treaty. In

addition, the ICRC has a responsibility in this resp ect, and it has fulfilled the duty in an exemplary

fashion.

Furthermore, these breaches constitute violations of peremptory norms of international law,

of ius cogens. This entails additional duties to take measures to redress the situation.

I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 52. - 33 -

And one aspect must be emphasized which is of particular importance for any future

settlement: no State may recognize the de facto situation unlawfully brought about by the

construction of the Wall.

Finally, consequences as to personal criminal liability: in various respects, the construction

of the Wall constitutes a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention. All States are, thus,

obliged to prosecute offenders which happen to find themselves in their power, or to extradite them

to a State willing to prosecute them.

Consequences for the United Nations and the Sp ecialized Agencies: The General Assembly

is a guardian of the Palestinian right to self-deter mination. The Security Council has addressed the

situation according to its primary responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of international

peace and security. In the exercise of these re sponsibilities, both organs will have to pay due

respect to the determination made by the Court. They are under a duty not only to continue, but

also to reinforce their efforts to achieve a lasting and peaceful solution for the question of Palestine

based on the rule of law. It is the duty of all Members of the United Nations system to assist,

within their respective fields of competence, the work of these political organs.

The League of Arab States respectfully asks the Court to clearly declare these consequences

in its opinion. This would not only be for the benefit of the General Assembly which has requested

this opinion, but for the benefit of the internationa l community at large. By clearly stating the law

as it is, the Court will contribute to a peace process based on the rule of law.

Concluding remarks: the responsibility of the Court in the present proceedings

The Arab League would thus like to concl ude by expressing its confidence that the Court

will fulfil the singular responsibility imposed upon it by exercising its role as the principal judicial

organ of the United Nations. This reference in Article 96 of the Charter is loaded with meaning.

The Court an organ of the United Nations  this means that it is an integral part of the

United Nations system and hence one element of th e system of maintenance of international peace

and security established by the Charter. And as such its case law has particip ated in the reduction

of world tensions. The Charter’s purposes and prin ciples have come to reflect the global values of

the international community and it is widely accepted today that, in addition to aggression, - 34 -

violations of core human rights, including the right to self-determination, as well as grave breaches

of international humanitarian law, constitute the main threats to international peace and security.

As an organ of the United Nations, the Court has as its lodestar the purposes and principles

for which the Organization exists  these purposes and principles underlie the question of

Palestine: self-determination, prohibition of the use of force, human rights and humanitarian law in

its broadest sense. There is now an unprecedente d unanimity on the part of the Members of the

United Nations, its principal and subsidiary or gans and its Specialized Agencies, that the

construction of the Wall violates these purposes and pr inciples. The Court has in the past always

worked in the same direction as the other organs of the United Nations in upholding these purposes

and principles. It has also promoted the work of the Organization against restrictive assertions of

sovereignty by Member States. It has confir med the normative activity of the United Nations

organs, in particular the General Assembly, by uph olding the fundamental role of its resolutions in

the customary law process (Namibia, Nicaragua, East Timor cases), its general responsibility in the

maintenance of international peace and security ( Expenses case), and its primary responsibility

towards mandates, trust and non-self-governing territories (Namibia, Western Sahara, East Timor).

The Court a judicial organ of the United Nations  this has led the Court to underline the

complementarity of its judicial function with th e functions of the political organs of the United

Nations, insisting on the “functional parallelism” which exists between it and the General

Assembly and the Security Council. It has rej ected the view that there are intrinsically legal

questions, on the one hand, and, on the other, intrinsically political questions which are not

amenable to legal and judicial scrutiny.

The Court a principal organ of the United Nations  this means today that it is the court of

the world community and hence the legal guardian of community values and interests. The Court

has been aware of this mission. On a number of occasions it has juxtaposed the traditional

bilateralist structure of international law with the notion of “collective” interest. The Court has

made reference to the concept of international co mmunity which it has seen as personified in the

United Nations. The Court has affirmed not only that every State has a legal interest in the respect

of obligations owed to itself individually, but that each State had a duty to react to certain situations

of objective illegality  Namibia Opinion. - 35 -

Palestine, as a former Mandate, is the bene ficiary of the sacred trust of civilization  the

main purpose of the Mandate system. This means today that the world community has a

responsibility for the attainment of the right to self-determination by the Palestinian people,

including the two-State solution and in the protection of its territorial integrity, that is the whole

territory under occupation. As a court of the worl d community, the Court has its role to play in the

attainment of these objectives. It now has the opportunity to pronounce on the legal consequences

of the construction of a wall. To warn, as so me States have done, that a pronouncement of the

Court would be unhelpful or hinder negotiations, is a far-fetched presumption which has nothing to

do with reality. What is very real, however, is the prospect that the silence of the Court would have

dire consequences for the future emergence of Pal estine as a viable and fully sovereign State. The

Court, thus, must not abdicate its judicial function in the face of this Palestinian tragedy.

Ultimately, it was the breakthrough pronouncements in the Namibia case, not the silence of the

Court in the contentious South West Africa case, that contributed to the exercise of

self-determination and full independence of that other Mandate inherited by the United Nations

from its predecessor.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your kind attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, ProfessorBothe. I now give the floor to HisExcellency

Dr. Belkeziz, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

M. BELKEZIZ: Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, il est apparu

indispensable à l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique, au nom de laquelle je m’exprime ici, de

présenter des observations écrites aussi bien qu’ora les devant la Cour à l’occasion de la demande

d’avis consultatif portant sur les conséquences en droit de l’édification du mur qu’Israël, puissance

occupante, est en train de construire sur le Terr itoire palestinien occupé, y compris à l’intérieur et

sur le pourtour de Jérusalem-Est.

C’est cette décision qui me vaut l’honneur de me présenter devant vous pour vous indiquer

les raisons très précises qui motivent l’Organisation que je représente à s’impliquer fortement dans

cette affaire et la confiance que nous avons en votre haute juridiction pour qu’elle fasse toute la - 36 -

lumière sur la question posée et apporte ainsi à l’As semblée générale l’appui dont cette dernière a

besoin dans sa tâche.

L’Organisation de la Conférence islamique, créée à la fin des années soixante, regroupe

actuellement cinquante-sept Etats membres. Parm i les objectifs qu’elle poursuit, l’on trouve à

l’article II de sa charte fondatrice :

« prendre les mesures nécessaires pour conso lider la paix et la sécurité mondiale

fondée sur la justice;…

 créer l’atmosphère propre à promouvoir la coopération et la compréhension entre
les Etats membres et les autres;…

 coordonner l’action pour sauvegarder les Li eux Saints, soutenir la lutte du peuple
palestinien et l’aider à recouvrer ses droits et à libérer ses territoires».

Si je sélectionne ces énoncés, c’est parce qu’ils éclairent sur nos motivations. D’une part,

notre organisation est fortement préoccupée par la pa ix et la coopération, d’autre part, compte tenu

de sa composition, elle est particulièrement atten tive au juste combat du peuple palestinien et à

toutes les entraves qui peuvent rendre chaque jour la paix plus incertaine sur la terre de Palestine.

La dernière réunion au sommet de notre Organisation s’est tenue en Malaisie en

octobre2003. Des divers documents qui en sont issus, je retiendrai ici deux résolutions qu’il me

paraît important de porter à la connaissance de la Cour.

Celle sur la cause de la Palestine et le conflit arabo-israélien s’inscrit tout à fait dans le cadre

juridique invoqué largement devant la Cour et elle invoque les résolutions 242 et 338 du Conseil de

sécurité comme base du processus de paix, de même qu’elle demande au comité des Quatre

d’Œuvrer de nouveau à l’instauratio n de la feuille de route. Elle incite Israël à stopper la

construction du mur, condamne cet Etat pour l’en semble des agissements illégaux perpétrés et

réaffirme la responsabilité constante et avér ée des NationsUnies à l’égard de la cause

palestinienne.

Notre récent sommet a été aussi l’occasion de rappeler la préoccupation de nos Etats

membres à l’égard du terrorisme in ternational. La convention de l’Organisation de la Conférence

islamique (OCI) pour combattre ce fléau est entrée en vigueur et nous dénonçons toutes les actions

qui s’inscrivent dans cette barbarie qu’il faut c ondamner sans détours. Mais nous avons demandé

que les NationsUnies organisent une conférence internationale pour définir le concept de - 37 -

terrorisme et faire la distinction entre le terrorism e et la lutte de libération nationale des peuples.

En effet, les actions violentes atteignant des pe rsonnes innocentes en provoquant la terreur pour

parvenir à certaines fins peuvent être le cas de mouvements clandestins ou même de personnes

dispersées, mais aussi être de véritables politiques d’Etat ayant pour but d’entraver toute possibilité

pour un peuple d’accéder à son in dépendance nationale. Combattre sans relâche le terrorisme est

un impératif global, mais sauver un peuple abandonné à la violence en est un autre qu’on ne doit

pas négliger pour autant.

Ce sont là les enjeux de la question qui vous est posée. Votre tâche est de l’examiner en

droit. Notre conseil, Mme Chemillier-Gendreau, à qui je vais maintenant passer la parole, vous

exposera les aspects juridiques sur lesquels l’OCI pense pouvoi r apporter encore quelques

éclaircissements. Je vous remercie.

The PRESIDENT : Thank you, Your Excellency. I now give the floor to

Professor Chemillier-Gendreau.

Mme CHEMILLIER-GENDREAU : Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs les juges

de la Cour, c’est pour moi un honneur que de me présenter à nouveau devant votre haute juridiction

et d’y exposer le point de vue de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique sur la très grave affaire

dont la Cour est actuellement saisie.

Mais nous arrivons à la fin de la procédure. Sans reprendre ce qui est exposé dans notre

document écrit, je vais tenter de mettre en lumière les lignes de synthèse du dossier.

Et si je m’interroge sur ce que je puis dire d’utile à la Cour, j’en viens inévitablement au

constat suivant : les Etats ou orga nisations qui se sont exprimés, sont en désaccord sur la nécessité

pour la Cour de donner cet avis. Mais parmi ceux qui invitent la Cour à ne pas se prononcer,

l’accent est mis de manière inégale sur les différentes raisons qu’elle aurait de refuser l’avis

demandé. Je reverrai donc rapidement chacune de ces raisons pour conclure comme la Cour le fera

sans doute elle-même, qu’aucun argument ne lui ba rre la route de l’exercice de sa compétence

consultative.

Au-delà de la compétence, le fond divise b eaucoup moins les Etats. Si quatre-vingt-dix

d’entre eux ont soutenu la demande d’avis, ils étaient cent quarante-quatre à condamner la - 38 -

construction de ce mur. Est-ce à dire que tout soit clair sur le fondement de cette illégalité et sur

ses conséquences ? Sûrement pas et la Cour dans sa sagesse et son expérience trouvera son propre

chemin pour qualifier les faits et en tirer les conséquences de droit. Pour ma part, en clôture de ces

audiences, je me permettrai d’attirer l’atten tion de la Cour sur certaines données du contexte

d’illégalité et je reviendrai pour terminer sur l’ argument de la sécurité et sur cette soi-disant

nécessité militaire invoquée pour protéger en réalité une prise de terres illégale.

Sur la compétence, bien des voix susurrent à la Cour de renoncer à donner l’avis demandé et

s’appuient pour cela sur les termes de l’article 65 du Statut et sur l’emploi qui a été fait à l’occasion

de certaines affaires du mot discrétionnaire pour qualifier la liberté qu’aur ait la Cour de refuser de

répondre quelles que soient les conditions.

Mais la Cour elle-même a c onstruit le cadre (emprunté à sa fonction judiciaire) dans lequel

elle apprécie son pouvoir éventuel de refuser un avis. Et ce cadre est étroit. On voit mal pourquoi

la Cour en modifierait les contours aujourd’hui. Po ur rester dans la logique jusqu’ici respectée en

matière d’appréciation de compétence, il faudrait que des raisons décisives militent en faveur d’un

renoncement de la Cour. C’est l’expression em ployée dès1956 dans l’avis sur les jugements du

Tribunal administratif de l’OIT. Ici, tous les arguments oeuvrent en faveur de la compétence :

1. La question est proprement juridique.

2. Y répondre est une nécessité pour la paix.

3. L’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies avait pleine compétence pour poser la question.

4. Il n’y a pas trace ici d’un différend relevant de la fonction contentieuse auquel on tenterait

d’imposer une issue judiciaire au mépris de la règle du consentement des Etats.

5. Enfin la Cour a les éléments de fait suffisants pour donner l’avis demandé.

Quelques arguments confirment chacun de ces points.

1. La question posée à la Cour est à l’évidence ju ridique au sens de l’article 96 de la Charte

et d’ailleurs les avis précédents ont mis en lumièr e qu’il n’y a pas de question purement juridique.

Il y a plutôt des traitements juridiques de certa ines questions. On remarquera au passage combien

il est paradoxal de mettre en avant comme le font certains Etats le caractère politique de la question

posée pour conseiller à la Cour de renoncer à se prononcer et de dire dans le même temps que

répondre ne serait pas «opportun politiquement». C’est attirer la Cour sur le terrain politique où - 39 -

l’on prétend précisément qu’elle ne doit pas s’av enturer. Tentons maintenant d’identifier la

différence toujours délicate entre ce qui est politique et ce qui est juridique.

Le politique, c’est la confrontation des subjec tivités des différents acteurs sociaux dans un

processus direct qui révèle un rapport de forces que rien ne vient atténuer. Le juridique est le

transfert de ce heurt des subjectivités en référence à un standard préalablement établi, la norme de

droit, et devant une instance tierce offrant des ga ranties d’objectivité. La confrontation à la norme

de référence effectuée par un tiers impartial introduit cet espace d’objectivité qui permet de corriger

la situation de fait. La nature du juridique se ré vèle là dans l’accomplisse ment formalisé de cette

recherche d’objectivité.

La répartition des pouvoirs au sein des Nations Unies est telle que c’est à la Cour qu’est

confiée l’autorité pour dire le droit, c’est-à-dir e pour confronter une situation de fait à une norme

ou à un ensemble de normes reconnues comme applicab les aux acteurs en cause. Le schéma tel

qu’il s’est déroulé en l’espèce est donc le suivan t: l’Assemblée générale, organe politique, se

prononce politiquement sur le mur et demande à Is raël de «revenir sur ce projet». Israël

n’obtempère pas et bien au contraire poursuit la construction contestée. L’organe politique se

tourne alors vers l’organe judiciaire et l’interro ge sur les aspects juridiques du problème. Il attend

de cette démarche une confirmati on en termes de droit de la condamnation portée sur une action

précise avec la déclinaison des conséquences juri diques pouvant en découler. Il lui sera alors

possible de prendre des mesures fondées en droit. La démarche est irréprochable. On ne peut que

regretter que trop d’Etats ne s’y associent pas.

2. Ils avaient d’autant plus de raisons de le faire qu’il s’agit d’une nécessité pour la paix.

C’est le deuxième argument en faveur d’un prononcé de compétence. La justice internationale est

actuellement à un moment sensible de son évolution. Les exceptions préliminaires encombrent son

prétoire. Mais quels que soient les arguments avancés pour contester la compétence de la Cour,

celle-ci doit se positionner et elle ne manque aucune occasion de le faire par rapport à un objectif

supérieur, qui est la raison d’être de l’organisation à laquelle elle appartient, le maintien de la paix.

L’approche de la justice en termes d’objectifs est plus importante pour la Cour internationale que

pour toute autre juridiction interne. Nous connai ssons la formule consacrée utilisée par la plupart

des juges nationaux. Ils jugent au nom du peuple souverain. Rendre la justice est l’exercice d’un - 40 -

pouvoir supérieur. Répondre à la question «au nom de qui?» permet dans l’ordre interne de

confirmer la légitimité du juge et d’asseoir l’auto rité de son jugement. Pour la Cour que vous

composez, Monsieur le président, Madame et Mess ieurs les juges, la question «au nom de qui?»

doit être complétée par celle «au nom de quoi ?», car la Cour est mandatée pour rendre la justice et

dire le droit par une association d’Etats, ceux qui composent l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Il

n’y a pas derrière cette organisation un peuple souverain, mais une di versité de peuples dont les

représentants peuvent être en désaccord entre e ux. Le trait d’union est un objectif, un intérêt

supérieur qui les transcende, celui de la paix.

Et la Cour a montré à l’occasion de récentes affaires qu’elle y était très attentive

(Yougoslavie c.Etats-Unis d’Amérique , 2 juin 1999 ou République démocratique du Congo

c. Rwanda, 10juillet2002). Elle est allée jusqu’à se soucier de la paix entre les protagonistes en

les exhortant à la négociation même lorsqu’elle ét ait contrainte de conclu re à son incompétence,

c’est l’affaire Pakistan c.Inde , du 21 juin 2000. Ce faisant, votre haute juridiction rejoint la

préoccupation majeure du Secrétaire général de l’ Organisation telle qu’elle est exprimée dans son

rapport du 2 septembre 2003 sur l’application de la déclaration du millénaire (A/56/323). Son

analyse est pessimiste, et il est vrai que la paix est menacée en de multiples régions du monde. Elle

l’est particulièrement en Palestine. Depuis quel ques mois, la provocation a ux allures concrètes et

massives que représente l’édification du mur de séparation constitue bien en soi l’aggravation

d’une situation de rupture de la paix. Morts, expulsions, destructions de maisons, de commerces,

de plantations, expropriations sommaires, im plantations illégales de population étrangère,

assassinats ciblés, encerclements de villes et de villages par des chars, combats avec blindés

comme à Jénine, bombardements comme celui de la Moukata à Ramallah ou en de nombreux

points à Gaza, attentats suicides en réponse par d es éléments désespérés et incontrôlables de la

population attaquée, tels sont les ingrédients de la situation de guerre permanente que connaît la

Palestine. Et l’on objecterait à la Cour : «ne vous déclarez pas compétente. Nous veillons à la paix

et avons réactivé un processus de négociation. A vous prononcer, vous le mettriez en péril» ? Il y

a là une étrange et inacceptable inversion de sens. Il n’y a aucune chance pour aucune négociation

lorsque l’un des partenaires poursuit sans cont rainte des actes illégaux dont les premières - 41 -

manifestations ont été à l’origine de la situation de menace à la paix ou de r upture de celle-ci et du

souci de négociations que des tiers tentent de parrainer.

Certains documents présentés à la Cour dans le sens de l’inopportunité de cet avis, celui du

Gouvernement des Etats-Unis par exemple, sont étonnants par la distance où ils se tiennent par

rapport à la situation réelle. Les négociations ouvertes il y a plus de dix ans sont décrites comme

un long fleuve tranquille, dont il n’y aurait qu’à le laisser suivre son cours jusqu’à l’océan de la

paix qu’il ne tarderait pas à rencontrer. L’initia tive intitulée la feuille de route mise en place au

printemps 2003 sous l’égide du Quartet et cautionn ée par le Conseil de sécurité, comme d’autres

initiatives de paix, se heurtent sur le terrain a ux actions de l’armée d’occupation étrangère.

L’édification du mur rend ces entreprises de paix illuso ires. Avec le mur, il n’y a plus de Palestine

viable, donc pas de paix entre deux Etats. Un e condamnation de principe comme l’a prononcée

l’Assemblée générale il y a quatre mois n’a été suivie d’aucun résu ltat. Rouvrir les possibilités de

paix réelle (et non fantasmatiques) exige de sout enir la demande d’avis de la Cour pour que

l’Assemblée générale soit mieux armée pour la suite.

3. Il le faut, car le peuple palestinien est actuellement un peuple abandonné à la dérive

militaire et expansionniste d’une puissance surarmée. Il n’a pas d’autre protection que celle que

peut lui accorder l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies.

Aider l’Assemblée générale à prendre toutes ses responsabilit és est la troisième raison pour

la Cour d’assumer sa compétence. Or, certains Etats contestent la compétence de l’Assemblée

générale qui serait intervenue indû ment dans une affaire traitée par le Conseil de sécurité. Mais

tout au contraire, l’Assemblée générale est inves tie ici d’une haute et particulière responsabilité.

Au-delà de la validité formelle de la résoluti on par laquelle la Cour a été saisie et qui a été

soulignée, deux fondements justifient la compét ence de l’Assemblée générale et, par voie de

conséquence, celle de la Cour.

Le premier tient à sa part de responsabilité da ns le maintien de la paix, aux côtés du Conseil

de sécurité comme cela ressort notamment de l’article 11, paragraphe 2, de la Charte. Et elle peut

en application de la résolution 377, Union pour le maintien de la paix, se saisir dès lors que le

Conseil de sécurité manque à s’acquitter de sa tâch e. C’est l’Assemblée générale qui apprécie ce

manquement du Conseil. Ici, le manquement n’est p as discutable : le Conseil, saisi de la question - 42 -

du mur comme menace supplémentaire à la paix, n’ a pu statuer en raison d’un veto. Ainsi la

menace à la paix persiste comme un obstacle infranchissable à l’avancée des négociations.

Mais il y a un second fondement à la compét ence de l’Assemblée générale avec sa

responsabilité spécifique à l’égard du peuple palestin ien. Celui-ci a été un peuple sous mandat et

l’issue de ce mandat a été gérée par l’Assemblée gé nérale sans qu’elle puisse empêcher l’ouverture

d’une crise qui s’est prolongée jusqu’à nos jours. Dans cette crise, un certain nombre de principes

ont fait naufrage. Le peuple palestinien avait été placé sous mandat britannique dans le cadre de la

Société des Nations et ce mandat fut effectif à partir du 29 septembre 1923. Il relevait de la logique

alors émergente, celle du droit des peuples à di sposer d’eux-mêmes devant déboucher à terme sur

leur pleine indépendance. La déclaration Balfour introduisit au cŒur même du mandat le projet de

Foyer national juif. Mais le rappor t démographique entre Juifs et Arabes en 1923 et le contexte de

respect des peuples sans hypothèque sur leur avenir ne conduisirent à aucune formulation remettant

en cause clairement le potentiel d’autodétermina tion du peuple palestinien. L’accélération du

changement démographique par la suite, les événements tragiques qui marquèrent la

secondeguerre mondiale à travers la persécution des Juifs, l’écho rencontré alors par le projet

sioniste érodèrent politiquement les garanties acco rdées aux Arabes de Palestine dans le mandat.

Mais elles ne les détruisirent pas juridiqueme nt. Tout au contraire, l’Organisation des

Nations Unies s’est prononcée clairement sur le dr oit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et a mis

à son actif la marche vers la décolonisation. La Cour a eu à se pencher sur le mécanisme de

transmission de la protection de certains peuples de la Société des Nations aux Nations Unies à

l’occasion de l’affaire du Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain . Elle a rappelé alors dans son

avis de1950 les deux principes d’importance pr imordiale, celui de non-annexion et celui de

développement des peuples comme mission sacrée de civilisation ( avis consultatif,

C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p.131). Des obligations juridiques av aient été créées que la disparition de la

Société des Nations ne pouvait engloutir. C’est do nc l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies qui

se trouvait investie de la supervision des territoires concernés.

Je reviendrai plus loin sur la résolution 181 et la manière dont elle a tenté de résoudre la

question. Il me suffit de constater ici que la recommandation de l’Assemblée dite de partage n’a

pas permis de régler le sort du peuple palestinie n en accord avec les principes posés à l’origine des - 43 -

mandats. Non seulement ce peuple n’a pas accédé à la souveraineté sur le territoire amputé qui lui

a été proposé, mais ce territoire même a été par vagues successives occupé, annexé, colonisé, et

aujourd’hui marqué par un instrument lourd de division durable : le mur.

L’Assemblée générale, à toutes les étapes de cette longue et douloureuse histoire, n’a cessé

de manifester sa préoccupation. Sans jamais reveni r, cela va de soi, sur l’existence d’Israël dont

elle avait proposé la création, l’Assemblée a dû assumer les conséquences du refus de la

résolution181 par les Etats arabes et les Palestin iens eux-mêmes pendant lo ngtemps. Mais elle a

aussi été confrontée à la continuelle violation de cette résolution par Israël à travers un appétit de

territoires mis en Œuvre par la force militaire et le soutien économique à la colonisation.

C’est donc parce que la gestion mandataire de la Grande-Bretagne ne s’est pas achevée dans

l’indépendance et la souverainet é palestiniennes que l’Assemblée générale porte la responsabilité

du sort de ce peuple. Elle est alors parfaitement en droit de demander un avis à la Cour et celle-ci

ne pourrait pas lui refuser en arguant d’un défaut de compétence de l’Assemblée.

4. Les éléments d’analyse qui viennent de s outenir la troisième raison qu’a la Cour de se

déclarer compétente vont être utiles pour argumente r sur la quatrième raison. Il n’y a ici aucun

contentieux déguisé en procédure consultative qui contournerait indûment la liberté d’un Etat de ne

pas accepter la juridiction de la Cour. Israël insiste pourtant sur ce point. Mais Israël ne peut pas à

la fois toujours refuser et différer de reconnaître la Palestine comme un Etat souverain et prétendre

qu’il y aurait un différend interétatique. Le refus obs tiné exprimé par Israël à l’encontre du projet

national palestinien a fait de la qu estion de la Palestine, de la pr otection de son peuple et de la

nécessaire application des conventions de Genève relatives à l’occupation militaire, des questions

de responsabilité erga omnes revenant à toute la communauté des Etats. D’ailleurs, si le mur est

bien un acte perpétré par Israël, il l’est sur un territoire étranger à Israël. Rien de ce qui est dit et

fait par l’Assemblée générale à ce sujet ne concer ne la souveraineté d’Isr aël, mais seulement la

protection du peuple palestinien. La fonction consultative est bien caractérisée et, en adhérant aux

Nations Unies, Israël a accepté que la Cour exerce cette fonction.

5. Le dernier argument en faveur de la compét ence de la Cour est relatif aux données de fait.

Celles-ci, on l’a beaucoup dit, sont parfaitement accessibles à travers les documents des - 44 -

NationsUnies comme à travers toutes les inform ations que peuvent fournir les intéressés

eux-mêmes, à savoir les Palestiniens.

Quelques Etats, parmi lesquels Israël, ont sout enu que la Cour serait dans l’impossibilité de

rendre son avis faute d’un accès satisfaisant aux faits concrets. Parallèlement, Israël absent de ce

prétoire n’a argumenté à l’écrit que sur la compét ence et non pas sur le fond. Cette réticence à

collaborer avec la justice internationale est sans doute regrettable, mais elle n’entrave pas la

compétence de la Cour qui reste fondée sur toutes les raisons invoquées ci-dessus.

Si j’en viens maintenant à toutes les facettes de l’illégalité qui caractérise cette construction,

c’est seulement pour attirer l’attention de la Cour sur quelques éléments clefs.

Il a été dit suffisamment pour ne pas y revenir qu’il s’agit d’une fortification massive, qu’elle

occupe en soi d’importantes surfaces de terres palestiniennes confisquées selon des procédures

expéditives, qu’elle traverse la partie du terr itoire de la Palestine sur laquelle il n’y a

internationalement aucun doute rela tivement aux droits qu’y exercent les Palestiniens et au fait

qu’Israël n’y est présent que comme puissance m ilitaire occupante, qu’Israël doit à ce titre

respecter les conventions de Genève et que le mur est contraire aux dispositions de ces textes. Il a

été abondamment démontré devant la Cour que cet énorme ouvrage militaire entraîne de massives

violations des droits de l’homme reconnus aux Palestiniens comme à tous les humains. Il a été fait

remarquer que le tracé de ce mur ne correspond p as à un souci de protection contre d’éventuels

attentats, mais bien plutôt à une extension de la juridiction complète d’Israël sur les territoires

palestiniens où sont implantées notamment les colonies de peuplement israéliennes. Israël dans ses

écritures en convient (exposé écrit d’Israël, par. 3.49). De même Israël laisse percer son

expansionnisme illimité en contestant toute valeur à la ligne d’armistice de 1949. Repoussant des

accords de paix esquissés sur cette base et sans cesse entravés, Israël indique qu’il escompte encore

quelque empiètement territorial. Jérusalem est la pris e la plus lourde de sens. Piétinant les droits

des Palestiniens sur cette ville, faisant fi du souha it exprimé en 1947 d’un statut international, les

Israéliens ne pensent le futur de cette ville emblématique ni en term es de restitution, ni en termes

de partage, mais en termes de fortification militaire. Certains Etats ont semblé accorder du crédit à

l’affirmation selon laquelle il s’agirait d’une constr uction provisoire. Le dossier palestinien et ses

annexes fournissent à la Cour tous les éléments po ur apprécier cette hypothèse. Elle aura tout à - 45 -

loisir de constater qu’il s’agit d’ apporter une profonde modification à la situation territoriale. Or

cette situation territoriale en ce qui concerne la Pa lestine, comme en ce qui concerne l’Etat d’Israël

lui-même, est d’une grande complexité juridique en raison des circonstances de l’origine.

Il est vrai qu’une fraction seulement du projet de mur est accomplie pour le moment et que

des incertitudes pèsent encore sur son tracé définitif . Pourtant, je voudrais convaincre la Cour que

nul tracé ne rendrait cet édifice acceptable du point de vue du droit international. Ce mur est une

immense erreur de la part de ce ux qui en ont conçu l’idée car, au-delà des violations du droit qu’il

engendre, il révèle que la stabilité juridique d’Israël lui-même passe par la paix à conclure avec la

Palestine. Il faut ici distinguer selon les parties de la Palestine mandataire d’origine.

Le premier élément territorial est formé des espaces aujourd’hui désignés comme territoires

occupés palestiniens. Il s’agit de 22% environ de la Palestine historique. L’armée israélienne y

déploie son contrôle et protège ses colonies depu is 1967. Israël tente d’imposer la formule

«territoires disputés» pour qualifier cet espace, laissa nt ainsi percer ses arrière-pensées. Mais la

qualification juridique ne fait aucun doute. Au rega rd du droit international, il s’agit de territoires

sous occupation militaire après usage illégal de la fo rce. Et d’ailleurs le mur ne délimite pas cet

espace. Il le traverse. Ce n’est pas un ouvrage m ilitaire défensif. C’est un élément d’une stratégie

offensive.

Mais il faut aller plus loin pour mettre l’accen t sur la nécessité d’une paix formalisée pour

les deux peuples. Si les supputations des stratèges israéliens lorsqu’ils travaillent à l’implantation

de cet ouvrage militaire les conduisaient à faire coïn cider le tracé du mur avec celui de la ligne

d’armistice de 1949, qu’y aurait-il à y redire du point de vue du droit international ? Et si le mur

était en retrait par rapport à cette ligne et s’enfon çait dans les espaces gagnés par Israël au cours de

la guerre de 1948-1949 ? Cela obligerait à faire re tour sur l’exacte qualification de ces territoires.

Il faudrait bien rappeler qu’Israël se les est appropriés sans titre et les contrôle en conséquence d’un

usage illégal de la force. Avec le passage du temps, la protestation internationale s’est faite moins

forte et la Palestine a envoyé un certain nombre de signaux indiquant que la ligne d’armistice de

1949 pourrait être transformée en frontière internatio nale par un accord de pa ix. Mais rien de tel

n’a été formellement conclu. Il découle des conventions d’armistice passées en 1949 entre Israël et

l’Egypte, le Liban, la Jordanie et la Syrie qu’au cun droit concernant les territoires occupés pendant - 46 -

les hostilités de 1948 n’est reconnu au profit d’Israël . Et ce n’est pas parce que le Conseil de

sécurité a en 1967 ordonné à Israël le retrait des territoires occupés alors (retrait jamais effectué)

qu’il a cautionné pour autant les acquisitions précédentes obtenues par la conquête militaire. Ainsi,

un déploiement du mur sur la ligne de 1949 ou à l’ intérieur des territoires alors conquis n’en ferait

pas une construction licite. Le mur resterait fra ppé d’illégalité parce qu’édifié sur une acquisition

non valide, ni validée.

On en vient ainsi au territoire alloué à Is raël dans la recommandation181 de l’Assemblée

générale. On sait que le 29 no vembre 1947, par trente-quatre voix pour avec treize votes contre et

dix abstentions, un plan de partage de la Pales tine proposait la création d’un Etat juif sur 56,47 %

du territoire. D’où vient aujourd’hui le fondement du titre juridique d’Israël sur cet espace? La

résolution de l’Assemblée générale a été immédiatement contestée par les détenteurs potentiels de

la souveraineté sur l’intégralité du territoire du mandat, à savoir les Palestiniens, comme par les

Etats arabes de la région. Elle reste pourtant , cette recommandation, la base de légitimité à

l’existence de l’Etat d’Israël, mais elle n’en constitue pas un titre juridi que achevé. L’effectivité

incontestable de l’Etat israélien ainsi que les reconnaissances dont il a bénéficié viennent certes

conforter des origines chaotiques. Mais il manque encore une pièce essentielle : l’accord du peuple

palestinien. Celui-ci doit acter son renoncemen t à une part importante du territoire du mandat sur

lequel la communauté internationale s’était engagée à le mener à son indépendance.

Tant que cet accord n’est pas intervenu, Israël n’est pas dans une situation stabilisée du point

de vue du droit international. Il n’y a là, votre haute juridiction l’a compris, aucune contestation à

l’existence légitime d’Israël. Il y a une analyse fondée sur les principes juridiques contemporains

qui conduit à une constatation de bon sens: Israël n’a besoin d’aucun mur pour vivre en paix.

Israël a besoin de conclure au plus vite un accord avec la Palestine.

Dire cela, est-ce négliger la question de la sécurité d’Israël? L’Organisation de la

Conférence islamique s’est montrée récemment très préoccupée par la question du terrorisme et il

n’est pas question de tenir les attentats dont Isr aël est victime pour une c hose négligeable. Mais

Israël impute sans preuve la responsabilité de ces actes criminels à l’Autorité palestinienne, et parle

de «ceux qui opèrent sous l’ombrelle protectrice de la Palestine». Mais la Cour n’est pas une

enceinte politique où l’on procède par insinuation. Le droit et la mise en jeu des responsabilités - 47 -

qu’il opère requièrent des preuves. Aucune pr euve n’a été apportée dans ce sens. On fera

remarquer d’ailleurs qu’avec l’extrême contrôle militaire exercé sur la Palestine par Israël, cet Etat

ne parvient pas à mettre un terme aux attentats. Comment les responsables palestiniens confinés

dans des bâtiments parfois attaqu és par l’armée israélienne, mis dans l’incapacité d’exercer leurs

pouvoirs, le pourraient-ils? Les attentats suicid es perpétrés contre la population israélienne ne

peuvent pas être analysés et condamnés isolément, sa ns mise en perspective. Ils doivent être reliés

à la terreur autrement sanglante qu’Israël fait régne r contre les Palestiniens depuis sa création. Il

faut souligner l’impossibilité dans laquelle se tr ouve le peuple palestin ien d’exercer son droit

légitime de résistance contre une occupation étra ngère, droit découlant des termes mêmes de la

résolution 2625 de l’Assemblée générale. Is raël doit comprendre que sa sécurité est liée

étroitement à la mise en Œuvre de la liberté et de la souveraineté de la Palestine. Condamner le

mur, c’est ouvrir la voie dans cette direction. Car le mur, réponse disproportionnée à des attaques

elles-mêmes inacceptables, est la plus mauvaise ré ponse car il est à son tour source de violation

massive des droits.

La communauté internationale est actuelle ment dans l’urgente obligation de créer les

conditions de la paix, c’est-à-dire de faire cesser la violence produite par Israël sur des territoires

qui ne relèvent pas de sa souveraineté.

Monsieur le président, Madame et Messieurs le s juges, l’ensemble d’arguments que je viens

de vous présenter m’amènent à conclure au nom de l’Organisation de la Conférence islamique :

 la Cour ne rencontre aucune ra ison décisive qui pourrait l’amener à refuser l’avis qui lui est

demandé par l’Assemblée générale;

 le mur construit par Israël en Territoire pal estinien occupé est un acte frappé d’illégalité qui

entraîne des violations des principes généraux du droit international, des résolutions des

Nations Unies, des conventions de Genève et des droits fondamentaux des Palestiniens;

 les conséquences en droit sont nécessairement une condamnation de l’Etat responsable de cette

mesure, l’obligation qui doit lui être rappelée de détruire ce qui a été édifié et de réparer

l’ensemble des violations commises;

 les Etats tiers doivent reconnaître les illégalités soulignées et faire en sorte de n’y contribuer

d’aucune manière directe ou indirecte. - 48 -

Je vous remercie.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor.

Now, this concludes the oral proceedings on the request for advisory opinion submitted by

the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of the Legal Consequences of the

Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory . As these proceedings come to a

close, I should like to convey the Court’s thanks to the delegations who have addressed it in the

course of these three days, as well as to the participants in the written proceedings. I would ask the

representatives of all participants to remain at the disposal of the Court in case the Court should

require any further information or explanations from them.

The Court will now retire for deliberation. The Registrar will in due course inform all

participants in these advisory proceedings of the date and time when the Court is to announce its

ruling.

As the Court has no other business before it, I declare that this sitting is closed.

The Court rose at 11.55 a.m.

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