PART II
ORAL STATEMENTS
PUBLIC HEARINGS
kld at the Peace Palace, The Hagzte,
frei~r4 tu21 May and on 20 July 1962,
President, M. Winiarski,Presiding
I)EIJXIEME PARTIE
AlJDIENC.ES 1'UBLIIS)U ES
Ldi$rl~:snI'atnidi:la Paix,Lu ITuyti,
d~fi.4 21 mai etIr20 juillel!~962,
soirslu#TLs~Jc:,?JCM~ . Wir~iavski,l'.vt!s*idel~S MINUTES OF THE HEARINGS HELD FROM
14 TO ZI MAY, AND ON 20 JULY 1962
TWENTY-SIXTH PUBLIC HEARING (14v 62, 10.30 a.#.)
Present:Pvesident WINIARSKI,Vice-President ALFARO,Judges
BASDEVANT BADAWI,MORENOQUINTANA,WELLINGTON KOO,
SPIROPOULOSS , IR Percy SPENDER, SIR GeraId FITZBIAURICE,
KORETSKYT , ANAKA,BUSTAMANT E RIVERO, JESSUP, MORELLI;
M. GARNIER-COIGNER T,gist~a~.
The States fiarticipafingthe oralProceedingswerere$resentas
folEow:
AuSfraZia Sir Kenneth BAILEY ,.B.E., Solicitor-
General
Canada Mr. Marcel CALIIEUX D,eputy Under-
Secretary and Legal Adviser for the
Department of External Affairs
Mr. H. C. KISGSTONB ,olicitor tthe
Department of External Affairs
IreEand Mr. Aindrias6 CAOIIIH,S.C., -4ttorney-
Gencral
RIr. Sean MORRISSEY ,.L., Legal Ad-
viser of the Department of External
Affairs
ltaZy Professor Kiccardo MONACOP , rofessor
at the University of Rome, Head of
Department for Contentious Diplo-
matic Questions, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Netherlands Professor W. RIPHAGENL , egal Adviser
to the Ministry of Foreign Afiairs
No~way bIr. Jens EVEPISEN,Director-Genersl,
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Union oiSoviei! Mr. G. 1. TUXKIN,Professor, Director
Socialist Repttblics of the Juridical-TreatyDepartment
of the Alinistry of Foreign Affairs PROCES-VERBAUX DES AUDIENCES TENUES
DU 14 AU 21 MAI ET LE 20 JUILLET 1962
VINGT-SIXIÈME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (14v 62,IOh. 30)
Présents: MM. WINIARSK Irésiden; ALFARO,vice-Présidetzt;
BASDEVANTB , ADAWI, MORENOQUINTANA W, ELLINGTONKOO,
SPIROPOUI.~~,sir Percy SPENDER, sir Gerald FITZMAURICE,
MM. KORETSKY,TANAKA,B . USTAMANTE Y RIVERO, JESSUP,
MORELLIj,uges; RI. GARNIER-COIGNEG T,efier.
Les États prenant part 2 la +rocédz~roerale sont reprcommeés
suit:
Australie Sir Kenneth BAILEY, C.B. E.,SoEicitor-
General
Canada M. MarceI CADIEUX, Sous-secrétaire
adjoint et conseiller juridiqueau
département des Affaires étrangères
M. H. C. KINGSTONE S,olicitor au dépar-
tement des Affaires étrangères
Irlande M. Aindrias O CAOIMHS , . CAttorney-
Gelzeral
M. SeAn MORRISSEY ,. L., Conseiller
juridique au ministère des Affaires
étrangères
Italie Professeur Riccardo MONACO,Profes-
seur A I'Universitéde Rome, Chef du
contentieux diplomatique au minis-
tère des Affaires étrangères
Pays-Bas Professeur W. RIPHAGEN,Conseiller
juridique au ministère des Affaires
étrangères
Norvège M. Jens EVENSEN,Directeur général,
ministère des Affaires étrangères
Union des Républiques hl.G. 1. TUNKIN ,rofesseur, Directeur
socialistes soviétiqztes du Département juridique et des
traités au ministère des Affaires
étrangères
M. A. F. SOKIRKINC , onseillerUnited Kingdom of Great The Rt. Hon. Sir Reginald MAKNING-
Britain and Northern HAM-BULLER, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-
Ireland General
Mr. Geoffrey LAWRENCE, Q.C.
Blr. F. A. VALLAT,C.M.G., Q.C.,
Foreign Office Legal Adviser
UniteS dtatesof America The Honorable Abram CHAYES,Legal
Adviser, Department of State
Mr. Stephen M. SCHWEBEL,Assistant
Legal Adviser for United Nations
Affairs at the Department of State.
The PRESIDESTopened the hearing and stated that the Court
waç sitting today to hear oral staternents in connection with a
request for an Advisory Opinion çubmitted to it by the General
Assembly of the United Nations. He regretted to say that Judge
Cordova, who was prevented by the state of his health from being
present at The Hague, would be unable to sit in the present pro-
ceedings.
The request of the General Assembly, made pursuant to a Resolu-
tion of 20 Decernber 1961, asked the opinion of the Court on the
question which was read by the Registrar.
The REGI~TRAR :
"DO the expenditures authorized in General Assembly reçolu-
tions 1583(XV) and 1590 (XV) of zo December 1960,1595(XV) of
3 April1961, 1619(XV) of21 April1961 and 1633(XVI) of 30 Octo-
ber 1961 relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo
undertaken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of
14J~ly, 22July and 9 August 1960and 21 February and 24 Novem-
ber 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20
September 1960 and 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of
15April1961, and the expenditureç authorizcd inGeneralAssembly
resolutions1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956, 1089 (XI)of 21 Decem-
ber 1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957, 1151 (XII) of 22Novem-
ber 1957.1204(XII) of 13December 1957, 1337(XIII) of 13 Decem-
ber 1958, 144r (XIV) of 5 December 1959and 1575 (XV) of 20De-
cember 1960relating to the operations of the United Nations Emer-
gency Force undertaken in pursuance of General Assembly resolu-
tions 997 (ES-1) of2 November 1956,ggS (ES-1)and 999 (ES-1)of
4November 1956, rooo (ES-1) of5 November 1956, 1001 (ES-1)of
7 November 1956, 1121 (XI) of 24 November 1956and 1263(XIII)
of 14 November 1958, constitute 'expenses of the Organization'
withinthe meaning ofArticle 17,paragraph z, ofthe Charter of the
United Nations?" AUDIENCE DU 14 MAI 1962 283
Royaztme-Uni de Grande- Le très honorable sir ReginaId MAK-
Bretagne et d'Irlande dzt NINGHAM-BULLER &,. C., M. P.,
Nord Attorney-General
M. Geoffrey LAWRENCE Q,. C.
fil.F. A. VALLAT C,. N. G., Q. C.,
Copseiller juridique, département
d'Etat
Étak-U~zis d'Anzéviqz~c: L'honorable Abram CHAYESC , onseiller
juridique, département dJEtat
M. Stephen M. SCHWEBEL ,onseiller
juridique adjoint du département
d'Etat pour les affaires des Nations
Unies.
Le PRÉSIDENT ouvre l'audience et annonce que la Cour est réunie
pour entendre les exposés oraux relatifs à la demande d'avis con-
sultatifqui lui a étéprésentéepar l'AssembléegénéraIedes Nations
Unies. Il a le regret d'annoncer que M. Cordova, empêché par son
état de santé de venir à La Haye, ne siégera pas en la présente
affaire.
La demande de l'Assemblée générale,présentée en exécution
d'une résolution du 20 décembre 1961, sollicite l'avis de la Cour sur
la question dont, à la demande du Président, le Greffier donne
lecture.
uLes dépenses autorisées par les résolutions de l'Assemblée
générale1583 (XV) et 1590 (XV) du 20 décembre1960, 1595 (XV)
du 3 avril 1961,1619(XV) du 21 avril 1961 et 1633(XVI) du 30 oc-
tobre 1961, relatives aux opérations des Nations Unies au Congo
entreprises en exécution desrésolutionsdu Conseil de Sécurité en
date des 14 juillet22 juillet et 9 août1960 et des 21 févrieret
24 novembre 1961 ainsi que des résolutionsde l'Assembléegénérale
1474 (ES-IV) du 20 septembre 1960, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) et
1601 (XV) du 15 avril 1961,et des dépenses autoriséespar les réso-
lutions de l'Assembléegénérale: 1122 (XI) du 26 novembre 1956.
1089(XI) du 21 décembre 1956, 1090 (XI) du 27 février 1957,
1151 (XII) du 22 novembre 1957,1204 (XII) du 13 décembre1957,
1337 (XIII) du 13 décembre1958, 1441 (XIV) du 5 décembrer959
et 1575(XV) du 20 décembre1960, relatives aux opérationsde la
Force d'urgence des Nations Unies entreprises en exécution des
résolutionsde l'Assembléegénérale 9:97 (ES-Idu 2novembre 1956,
998 (ES-I) et 999 (ES-1) du 4 novembre 1956, 1000 (ES-1) du
5 novembre 1956, 1001 (ES-1) du 7 novembre 1956, 1121 (XI) du
24 novembre 1956 et1263 (XIII) du 14 novembre 1958,constituent-
elletides dépensesde l'organisationIIau sens du paragraphe z de
l'article 17de la Charte des Nations Unies11
27284 HEARIXG OF 14 MAY 1962
The PRESIDEKT stated that notice of the request had been given
to all.States entitled to appear before the Court, and the Court had
received from the Secretary-General of the United Nations a dos-
sier of documents likely to throw light upon the question. Further-
more, pursuant to Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court, the States JZembers of the United Xations rtrere notified
that they were considered as likely to be able to furnish information
on the question and that the Court was prepared to receive written
statements from them within a time-lirnit fixed for that purpose.
The follou~ing States, indicated in English alphabetical order,
exercised the right thus made available to thern by transmitting to
the Court written staternents or letters,namely, Australia, Byelo-
russian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, POT-
tugal, Republic of South Africa, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Korthern Ireland,
United States of America, Upper Volta.
The Governments of Mexico and Poland had referred to the points
of view expressed by their respective representatives in the course
of thedebates within the United Nations.
The desire to be heard in the course of the present proceedings
had been expressed by the Governments of Australia, Canada,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
The Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
having been unable to be present at The Hague before the opening
of the hearings, no'general agreement could be reached as to the
order in which the representatives would speak.
This being so, the President had been informed that the speakers
who, according to alphabetical order, would first address the Court
had for reasons of persona1 convenience agreed in requesting that
the Re resentative of Canada should first be heard.
The 5resident called upon the Representative of Canada.
Mr. CADIEUX,Representative of Canada, began the speech
reproduced in the annex l.
The PRESIDENTannounced that the next hearing would take
place on Tuesday at 10.30 a.m.
(The Court rose at 12.53 p.m.)
(Signed) B. WINIARSKI,
President,
(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
Registrar.
lSee pp. 289-301. AUDIENCE DU 14 MAI 1962 . 284
Le PRÉSIDENT expose que la demande d'avis consultatif a été
notifiéeà tous les Etats admis àester en justice devant la Cour, et
que la Cour a requ du Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies un dos-
sier de documents pouvant servir à élucider la question. D'autre
part, confprmément à l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la
Cour, les Etats Membres des Nations Unies ont &téinformés qu'ils
étaient jugés susceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la
question et que la Cour était disposéeà,recevoir d'eux des exposés
écritsdans un délai fixéà cet cffet. Les Etats dont les noms suivent,
rangés dans l'ordre alphabétique anglais, ont fait usage de cette
faculté en adressant à la Cour des exposés écrits ou des lettres:
Australie, République socialiste soviétique de Biélorussie, Canada,
Tchécoslovaquie, Danemark, France, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Japon,
Pays-Bas, Portugal, République .sud-africaine, Espagne, Union
des Républiques sociülistes soviétiques, Royaume-Uni dc Grande-
Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Gtats-Unis d'Amérique, Haute-
Volta.
Les Gouvernements du Mexique et dc la Pologne se sont référés
aux points de vue exprimés par leurs représentants respectifs au
cours des débats qui ont eu lieu aux Nations Unies.
Les Gouvernements d'Australie, du Canada, d'Irlande, d'Italie,
des Pays-Bas, de Norvège, de l'Union des Républiques socialistes
soviétiques, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont
exprimé le désir de présenter des exposés oraux.
Le représentant de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviéti-
queS n'ayant pu êtreprésent a 1,s Haye avant l'ouverture des
audiences, il n'a pu intervenir d'entente généraletouchant l'ordre
dans lequel Ics représentants parleront.
Le Président a étéavisé que les premiers orateursqui, selon l'ordre
alphabétique,auraient la parole, ont, pour desraisons de convenance
personnelle, été d'accord pour souhaiter que le représentant du
Canada soit entendu en premier lieu.
Le Président donne donc la parole au représentant du Canada.
hl, CADIEUXr,eprésentant du Canada, commence l'exposé repro-
duit en annexe l.
Le PRPSIDENT annonce que la prochaine audience aura lieu le
lendemain à IO heues 30.
(L'audience est levéeà 12 heures 53.)
Le Président,
(Signé) B. WISIARSKI.
Le Greffier,
(Signé)GARNIER-COIGNET
1Voir pp.289-301TWENT'IT-SEVENTH PUBLIC HEARING (15 v 62, 10.30 a.m)
Present: [As listed for hearing of 1v 62.1
The PRESIDENT opened the hearing and called upon the Repre-
sentative of Canada.
Mr. CADIEUX concluded the speech reproduced in the annex l.
The PRESIDENT called upon the Representative of the Nether-
lands.
Mr. RIPHAGEN began the speech reproduced in the annex
(The Court rose at I p.m.)
[Signatures.]
TUTENTY-EIGHTH PUBLIC HEARING (16 v 62, 10.30 a.m.)
Present: [As listed for hearing of 1v 62.1
The PRESIDENT opened the hearing and called upon the Repre-
sentative of the Netherlands.
Mr. RIPHAGEN concluded the speech reproduced in the annex
The PRESIDENTcalled upon the Kepresentative of Italy.
M. NONACO began the speech reproduced in the annex 4.
(The Court rose at 1.04 p.m.)
[Signatures.]
TWENTY-NINTH PUBLIC HEARIKG (17v 62, 10.30 am.)
Present :[As listed for hearingof14 v 62.1
The PRESIDENT opened the hearing and called upon the Kepre-
sentative of Italy.
M. MOKACO concluded the speech reproduced in the annex 5.
The PRESIDEN Talled upon the Representative of the United
Kingdom.
Sir Reginald MANNINGHAM-BULL began the speech reproduced
in the annex 6.
(The hearing was adjourned from Ip.m. to 4 p.m.)
The PRESIDENTcalled upon the Kepresentativc of the United
Kingdom.
lSee pp.301-30s
a ,. ,, 310-314.
ri 314-321.
,, ,, 322-329.
ii 329-334.
.. 7, 335-343. AUDIENCES DES 15,16 ET 17 MAI 1962 285
VINGT-SEPTIÈME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (15v 62,IO h. 30)
Présents: [Voir audience du 14 v 62.3
Le PRÉSIDENT ouvre l'audience et donne la parole au représen-
tant du Canada.
M. CADIEUX termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe l.
Le PRÉSIDENT donne la parole au représentant des Pays-Bas.
M. RIPHAGEN commence l'exposé reproduit en annexe 2.
(L'audience est levéeà 13 heures.)
[Signatures.]
VINGT-HUITI~ME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (16 v 62, IO h. 30)
Présents: [Voir audience du 14 v 62.1
Le PRÉSIDENT ouvre l'audience et donne la parole au représen-
tant des Pays-Bas.
M. RIPHAGEN termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe 3.
Le PRÉSIDEKd Tonne la parole au représentant de l'Italie.
M. MOXACcO ommence l'exposéreproduit en annexe 4.
(L'audience est levéeA13 heures 04.)
[Signntzjres.]
VINGT-NEUVIENE AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (17 v 62,IO h. 30)
Présents :[Voir audience du 14 v 62.1
Le PRÉSIDEKT ouvre l'audieilce et donne la parole au représen-
tant de l'Italie.
M. MOKACO termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe 5.
Le PRÉSIDENT donne la parole au représentant du Royaume-Uni.
Sir Reginald MANNINGH,~J~-RUI,cL ommence l'exposéreproduit
en annexe 6.
(L'audience, suspendue à 13 heures, est reprise à 16 heures.)
Le PRÉSIDEKT donne la parole au représentant du Royaume-Uni.
Voirpp. 301-309.
ii JJ310-314,
' 1 U 314-321.
4 n a 322-329.
Z U 329-334.
* = 335343. Sir Regnald MANKINGHAM-BULLcE oncluded the speech repro-
duced in the annex l.
The PRESIDENT called upon the Representative of Nonvay.
Mr. EVENSENbegan the speech reproduced in the annex 2.
(The Court rose at 5.55 p.m.)
[Signatures.]
THIRTIETH PUBLIC HEARING (18v 62, 10.30 a.m.)
Present: [As listed for hearing of14 v 62.1
The PRESIDENT opened the hearing and called upon the Repre-
sentative of Norway.
Mr. EVENSEKcontinued the speech reproduced in the annex 3.
(The hearing waç adjourned from 12.55 p.m. to 4 p.rn.)
The PRESIDENT called upon the Representative of Nonvay.
Nr. EVENSEKconcluded the speech reproduced in the annex 4.
The PRESIDEKT called upon the Representative of Australia.
Sir Kenneth BAILEY began the speech reproduced in the annex 5.
(The Court rose at 6p.rn.1
[Signatztres.]
THIRTY-FIRST PUBLIC HEARING (19 v 62, 10.30 a.m.)
Present: [As listed for hcaring of14 v 62.1
The PRESIDESTopened the hearing and called upon the Repre-
sentative of Australia.
Sir Kenneth BAILEYconcluded the speech reproduced in the
annex
The PRESIDENTcalled upon the Representative of Ireland.
Mr. 6 CAOIRIm Hade the speech reyroduced in the annex
(The Court rose at I p.rn.1
[Signatzcres.] Sir Reginald MANNINGHAM-BULLE trmine l'exposé reproduit
en annexe l.
Le PRESIDEKT donne la parole au représentant de Norvège.
M. EVENSENcommence l'exposé reproduit en annexe 2.
(L'audience est levée à 17 neures 55.)
[Signatures.]
Présents: [Voir audience du 14 v 62.1
Le PRÉSIDENT ouvre l'audience et donne la parole au représen-
tant de Norvège.
M. EVENSENcontinue l'exposéreproduit en annexe
(L'audience, suspendue à 12 heures 55, est reprise à 16 heures.)
Le PRESIDEN Tonne la parole au représentant de Norvège.
M. EVEXSEN termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe 4.
Le PRESIDENT donne la parole au représentant de l'Australie.
Sir Kenneth BAILEYcommence l'exposé reproduit cn annexe 5.
(L'audience est levée à 18heures.)
[Signatttres.]
TRENTE-ET-UNIÈME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE
(19 v 62, IO 1230)
Présents: [Voir audience du 14 v 62.1
Le PRÉSIDEKTouvre l'audience et donne la parole au représen-
tant de l'Australie.
Sir Kenneth BAII,EYtermine l'exposé reproduit en annexe 6.
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole au représentant de l'Irlande.
M. O CAOI~IH présente l'exposé reproduit en annexe '.
(L'audience est levéeà 13 heures.)
[Signatztres]
Voir pp 343-350.
* )) 351-354.
= " >' 354-368.
il u 365-371.
n n 380-386.
' u n 357-396.THIRTY-SECOND PUBLIC HEARING (21 v 62, 10.30 a.m.)
Present :[As listed for hearing o14v 62.1
The PRESIDEN Tpened the hearing and called upon the Repre-
sentative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Mr. TUXKIN made the speech reproduced in the annex l.
(The hearing was adjourned from 1.02 p.m. to 4 p.m.)
The PRESIDEN Talled upontheRepresentativeof theUnited States.
The Honorable Abram CHAYES made the speech reproduced in
the annex 2.
The PRESIDENTthanked the Representatives of the various
States for the oral statements they had been good enough to
present before the Court and declared closed the oral proceedings.
(The Court rase at 6.16p.rn.1
fSignalziresj
THIKTY-FOURTH PUBLIC HEARING (zo YII 62, 15 p.?%.)
Present: President WIKIARSKI; Vice-P~esident ALFARO; Judges
BASDEVANT,BADAWI,MOREXOQUINTANA,WELLINGTONKOO,
SPIROPOULOS,Sir Percy SPENDER, Sir Gerald FITZAIAURICE,
KORETSKYT , ANAKAB , USTAAIANT E RIVERO, JESSUP, MORELLI;
M. GARNIER-COIGNER T,egistrar,
The PRESIDEKT opened the sitting and declared that the Court was
sitting today to deliver the Advisory Opinion, requested in accord-
ance svith the resolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations of 20 December 1961, in the matter of Certain expenses
of the United Nations (Article17, paragraph z, of the Charter).
The President read the Advisory Opinion in the French text
and asked the Registrar to read the operative provision of the Opin-
ion in English.
The REGISTRAR read the English text of the operative provision.
The PRESIDENT declared that Judge Spiropoulos had appended a
declaration to the Opinion. Judges Sir Percy Syender, Sir Gerald
Pitzmaurice and Morelli had appended to the Opinion statements of
their separate opinions The President and Judges Basdevant,
Moreno Quintana, Koretsky and Bustamante y Rivero had append-
ed to the Opinion staternents of their dissenti-g -pinion5.
(The Court rose at 4.45 p.m.)
[Signntlcres.]
See pp.397-412.
See I.C.JReports 196pp.151-308.
4ibid.pp. 182-226.
Ibid.pp.227-308. TRENTE-DEUXICME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (21 v62, IO h.30)
Présenls: [Voir audience du 14 v 62.1
Le PRÉSIDENT ouvre l'audience et donne la parole au représen-
tant de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques.
M. TUNKIN présente l'exposéreproduit en annexe l.
(L'audience, suspendue à 13 heures oz, est repriseà 16 heures.)
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole au représentant des États-unis.
L'honorable Abram CHAYES présente l'exposé reproduit en an-
, nexe 2.
Le PRÉSIDENT remercie MM.les représentants des États pour les
exposésoraux qu'ils ont bien voulu présenter devant la Cour et
déclareclose la procédure orale.
(L'audience est levée à 18 heures 16.)
[C;ignaturcs.]
TRENTE-QUATRIERIE AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (20 VII62,15 h.)
Présents: MM. WINIARSKI,Président ; ALFARO,Vice-Président ;
BASDEVANTB , ADAWI, MORENO QUINTAKA,WELLINGTON KOO,
SPIROPOULOsS ir, Percy SPENDER,sir Gerald FITZBIAURICM E,M.
KORETSKY,T..Is.~KAB , USTAMANT YE RIVERO, JESSUP, MORELLT,
juges ;M. GARXIER-COIGNEG T,rege~.
Le PRÉSIDEKT ouvre l'audience et annonce au1 la Cour se réunit
aujourd'hui pour prononcer l'avis consultatif en l'affaire de certaines
dépenses des Nations Unies (article 17,paragraphe z, de la Charte),
avis consultatif qui luia étédemandé en vertu de la résolution du
20 décembre 1961 de l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies.
Ildonne lecture du texte francais de l'avi3Pluis invite le Greffier
à donner lecture du dispositif de l'avis en langue anglaise.
Le GREFFIERlit le dispositif en anglais.
Le PRÉSIDENT annonce que M. Spiropoulos, juge, a joint à l'avis
une déclaration. Sir Percy Spender, sir Gerald Fitzmaurice et M.
Morelli, juges, ont jointà l'avis les exposés de leur opinion indivi-
duelle 4.Le Président, RIM.Basdevant, Moreno Quintana, Koretsky
et Bustamante y Rivero, juges, ont jointà l'avis les exposésde leur
oIinion dissidente 5.
(L'audience est levée à 16 heures 45.)
[Signatzires.]
a V1ir np.413-427.
a VoirC.1.J.Recueil1962pp. 151-308.
Ibid.p,p182-226.
Ibid., pp. 227-308. ANNEX TO THE MINUTES
ANNEXE AUX PROCÈS-VERBAUX
1. EXPOSÉ ORAL DE M. CADIEUX
AUX AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES DES 14 ET 15 MAI 1962
[Audience publique du 14 mai 1962, matin]
Monsieur le Président, hlessieurs les hilernbresde la Cour.
Aprés avoir étudiéles déclarations des autres États la Cour'inter-
nationaIe, nous nous proposons d'élaborer le mémoire canadien tout
d'abord par un exposé de certains faits qui se rattacheiit au fondement
juridique de l'activité dela Force d'urgence des Nations Unies et de
la Force de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo; en second lieu,
par une analyse plus détailléedes conséquences juridiques de ces faits;
et finalement par un exposé supplémentaire des méthodes de I'ONU
en matière budgétaire, du point de vue du rapport entre ces méthodes
et les comptes spéciaux de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies et
de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo, qui sont partie intégrante du
budget de l'ONU.
Et d'abord pour ce qui est des faits:laForce d'urgence des Nations
Unies entra en Egypte et y tint garnison avec le consentement écrit
des autorités du pays. Les forces dont fait partla Force de l'organi-
sation des Nations Unies au Congo sont entrées au Congo ey ont établi
garnison à la demande et avec le consentement écrit du Gouvernement
congolais, et dans des circonstances qui seront exposéesplus loin.
Les fonctions de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies ontétédéfinies
succinctement dans le rapport en date du 5 novembre 1956p ,ar lequel
le Secrétaire généralsoumettait à l'Assembléegénérale sonprojet d'une
Force d'urgencc internationale (il s'agit du document A/3302). Ce texte
est cité dans le mémoire du Royaume du Danemark (p. 157 du cahier
des déclarationsécriJes). 11en est aussi fait mention dans le rn6mdur.e
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis (p.183 du mêmedocument). Essenticlle-
ment, le rôle de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies était de se rendre
en territoire égyptien avec le consentement du Gouvernement et de S'Y
acquitter d'une double fonction: surveiller la trêveet I'évacuation des
forces armées étrangères,et assurer la paix en se déployant le long de la
ligne d'armistice et de la frontihre.
Les fonctions de la Force de l'organisation des Nations Unies au
Congo étaient et continuent d'être exécutéesnon seulement avec le
consentement explicite et écrit du Gouvernement de la République du
Congo - comme nous l'avons dit plus haut -mais en outre àla demande
expresse de ce Gouvernement.
Cette demande expresse, le président et le premier ministrede ,la
République du Congo l'ont formulée dans un télégrammeau Secrétaire
général,en date du 12 juille1960. (On en trouve le texte dans le docu-
ment des Nations Unies Sj4382.) Envoici un extrait:
(Gouvernement de la République du Congo sollicite enyoi urgent
par Organisation des Nations Unies d'une aide militaire. Notrezgo EXPOSE ORAL DE M. CADIEUX (CANADA) - 14 v 62
requéte est justifiée par envoi aü Congo de troupes métropolitaines
belges en violation traité amitié signéentre Belgique et République
du Congo le 29 juin1960. i)
Le télégrammepréciseensuite qu'aux termes de ce traité les troupes
belges ne peuvent intervenir que sur la demande expresse du Gouverne-
ment congolais et que cette demande n'a jamais étéformulée. Et il se
termine comme suit :
a Aide militaire sollicitée a pour but essentiel protection du
territoire national congoIais contre actuelle agression extérieure
qui menace paix internationale. Insistons vivement sur extrême
urgence envoi troupes ONU au Congo. i>
Par la suite, le Secrétaire général afait distribuer aux États Membres
le texte d'un accord de base avec le Gouvernement de la République
dü Congo, aux termes duquel celui-ci consentait à l'entrée des forces de
l'ONU au Congo et à leur mission (voir le document 514389, add. 5,
daté du 29 juin 1960).Cet accord stipule:
« Le Gouvernement de la République du Congo déclare que,
lorsqu'il exercera ses droits souverainsà propos de toute question
concernant la présenceet le fonctionnement de la Force des Nations
Unies au Congo, il se guidera de bonne foi sur le fait qu'il a demandé
à l'organisation des Nations Unies une assistance militaire et sur
son acceptation des résolutions du Conseil de Sécuritédes 14 et
22 juillet 1960; il déclare également qu'il assurera la liberté de
mouvement à l'intérieur du pays pour la Force et accordera les
privilèges et immunités nécessaires à tout le personnel associéaux
activités de la Force... 1)
Dans les deux cas, on a confiéau Secrétaire généralle soin d'appliquer
les résolutions pertinentes de l'Assembléegénéraleet du Conseil de Sécu-
rité. Pour ce qui est de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies, 1'Assem-
bléegénéralea créé,aux termes de la résolution 1000 en date du 5 no-
vembre 1956, le commandement de l'ONU, qui a étéplacCsous l'autorité
du chef d'état-major de l'organisation pour la surveillance de la trêve,
le major-général E. L. M. Burns. Toutefois, il ressortait clairement de ce
texte que, pour sa mission, cette Force relevait du Secrétaire général,
assisté en la matière d'une Commission consultative, où siégerait un
représentant de chacun des pays ci-après: le Brésil, leCanada, Ceylan, la
Colombie, I'Inde, la Norvège et le Pakistan. La situation est encore plus
nette dans le cas de Ia Force de 1'OKUau Congo. Pai une résolution en
date du 14 juillet 1960 (S/4387), le Conseil de Sécuritéa autorisé le
Secrétaire général
(à prendre, en consultation avec Ie Gouvernement de la République
du Congo, les mesures nécessaires en vue de iournir à ce Gouverne-
ment l'assistance militaire dont il a besoin, et ceusqu'au moment
où Ies forces nationales de sécurité, grâceaux effortsdu Gouverne-
ment congolais et avec l'assistance technique de l'organisation des
Nations Unies, seront à même,de l'opinion de ce Gouvernement, de
remplir entièrement leur tâche i).
Dans toutes les opérations relatives au Congo, les forces de l'ONU
qui s'y trouvaient sont demeurées sous les ordres du Secretaire général. Quant aux résolutions touchant les opérations de la Force d'urgence
des Nations Unies et de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo, les
passages qui comportent des décisions attribuent au Secrétaire général
les fonctions exécutives et administratives prévues; dans le cas de la
Force d'urgence des Nations Unies, il est assistéd'un Comitéconsultatif
et du commandant en chef. La partie des résolutions qui porte sur le
ocrutement des effectifs prévoyait un recrutement libre auprès des
Etats Membres; c'est là l'unique façon dont on a procédé. (Voir à ce
sujet Ie par. 16, rapport final du Secrétaire généraltouchant la mise
en Œuvre de la résolution du Conseil Sj4387, en date du 14 juillet1960,
document 5/4389 approuvé par la résolution du Conseil de Sécuritéen
. date du 22 juilletrg60 - première clause du préambule, par. 3.)
L'opération de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo ayant fait
l'objet d'une attention toute spéciale, ilnous semble utile de l'examiner
de façon encore plus détaillée. La crise congolaise s'étant déclaréeau
cours de l'étéde 1960 ,près que le pays eut acquis son indépendance de
la Belgique, le Conseil de Sécurité s'estréuni pour étudier lasituation.
La séance commença à 8 heures 30 du soir le 13 juillet 1960 et ne se
termina qu'à 3 heures 25 le matin suivant. C'est à cette séance que
remonte la résolution du 14 juillet 1960 portant création de la Force
de l'ONU et énonçant le rôlequ'on attendait d'elle.
La résolution, était-il précisé,était adoptée à la suite d'une demande
d'assistance militaire émanant du président et du premier ministre de
la République du Congo et adressée au Secrétaire général.
Le Gouvernement belge y était ensuite invité à retirer ses troupes
du territoire de Ia République congolaise. Et enfin, comme nous l'avons
rappelé, le texte autorisait le Secrétaire généralà fournir une assistance
militaire au Gouvernement congolais,
iet ce jusqu'au moment où les forces nationales de sécurité, grâce
aus efforts du Gouvernement congolais et avecl'assistance technique
de l'organisation des Nations Unies, seront a même,de l'opinion
de ce Gouvernement, de rernpIir entièrement leur tâche i).
A propos du rôle imparti aux forces de l'organisation des Nations
Unies à l'occasion de Ia séance que le Conseil de Sécuritéa tenue dans
la nuit du 13 au 14 juillet1960, le Secrétaire général (voirpp. 3 et 4,
par. 20 et subséquents des procès-verbaux officiels de la S73me séance)
a fait observer que l'intervention que l'on demandait à l'ONU consistait,
premièrement, en une assistance technique immédiate dans le domaine
administratif et, deuxièmement, en une assistance militaire.
Plus loin, dans le même discours,le Secrétaire générala.déclaré (p. 5,
par. 28) :
((Si le Conseil de Sécuritédonnait suite à ma recommandation,
je fonderais mes actes sur les principes énoncésdans le rapport
que j'ai présenté à l'Assemblée généraleau sujet des conclusions
tirées de I'expérience dans ce domaine. JI(V. Ass. gén. D. O., trei-
zième sess., Annexes, point 65 de l'ordre du jour, doc. A/3943.)
Le Secrétaire général poursuit:
((II s'ensuit que la Force des Nations Unies ne serait autorisée
à agir qu'en cas de légitime défense.IL s'ensuit aussi qu'elle ne
pourrait rien faire qui fasse d'elle une partie àdes conflits intern.)).292 EXPOSE ORAL DE M. CADIEUX (CANADA) - 14v 62
Entre le 14 et le22 juillet 1960, date à laquelle le Conseil de Sécurité a
adopté sa deuxième résolution à ce sujet, le Secrétaire général arendu
son premier rapport (doc. S/4389, add. I à 6)sur la mise en ceuvre de la
résolution du 14 juillet. Développant ses idées sur le rôle de la Force
de l'ONU au Congo, le Secrétaire général y déclare qu'elle représentait
un expédient d'urgence en attendant que, selon les termes de la résoiu-
tion du Conseil de Sécuritédu 14 juillet,
(les forces nationales de sécuritéseront à mêmede remplir entière-
ment leur tâche ».
On lit, plus loin, dans le rapport:
« La Force envoyée au Congo doit donc êtreconsidéréecomme une
force de sécuritéqui demeurera temporairement sur le territoire
de la République du Congo avec le consentement de son Gouverne-
ment pour la durée et aux fins ci-dessus indiquées.
Bien qu'aux termes de la résolution la Force des Nations Unies
soit envoyée au Congo à la demande du Gouvernement et qu'elle
soit appeléeà y demeurer avec le consentement de ce Gouvernement,
et bien qu'on puisse la considérer comme un organe mis à la dis-
position du Gouvernement pour le maintien de l'ordre etla protec-
tion des vies humaines - tâche qui incombe naturellement aux
autorités nationales et qui leur reviendra dès que, de l'avis du
Gouvernement, leur pouvoir aura étésuffisamment établi -, la
Force est placée nécessairement sousle commandement exclusif de
l'organisation des Nations Unies en la personne du Secrétaire
général,sous le controle du Conseil de Sécurité ...i)
Grâce à la résoIution adoptée par Ie Conseil de Sécuritéle 22 juillet
1960 le rôle de la Force de sécuritédes Nations Unies a étéaccru pour
lui permettre de surveiller le retrait des troupes belges. A cet égard, le
premier paragraphe de la résolution adoptée par le Conseil le 22 juillet
1960
(invite le Gouvernement belge à mettre rapidement en application
la résolution du Conseil de Sécuritéen date du 14 julllet1960,
touchant le retrait de ses troupes, et autorise le Secrétaire général
à prendre à cet effet toutes les mesures nécessaires 1).
En vertu de la résolutiondu Conseil de Sécuritéendate du g août 1960,
les attributions des forces de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Coqgo
ont de nouveau étéétendues pour permettre de faire face à la situation
critique survenue au Katanga. Par cette résolution,ilest signaléque les
Nations Unies ont étéempêchéesde mettre en Œuvre dans le Katanga
les résolutionsdu Conseil de Sécurité,et il y est reconnu (voir la sixième
clause du préambule de la résolution) que le retrait des troupes belges
de la province du Katanga serait
« une contribution positive et essentielle à la mise en Œuvre appro-
priée des résoiutions du Conseil II.
Et la résolution poursuit (par. 3):
((L'entrée de la Force des Nations Unies dans la province du
Katanga est nécessaire iila pleine mise en application de la présente
résolution. n La résolution réaffirme le caractère généraldu rôle des forces de
l'ONU au Congo et on trouve, au paragraphe 4, le passage suivant:
iLa Force des Nations Unies au Congo ne sera partie à aucun
conflit interne, constitutionnel ou autre,, elle n'interviendra en
aucune façon dans un tel conflit ou ne sera pas utilisée pour en
influencer l'issue.1)
Ce fut seulement à sa 94zme réunion, les zo et 21 février 1961 ,ue le
Conseil de Sécurité arepris l'examen de l'affaire congolaise et adopté
une résolution élargissant les fonctions des forces onusiennes au Congo,
afin de les préparer ?icombattre au besoin les dangers d'une guerre
civile. En effet, l'article A, paragraphe I,de la résolution du Conseil
((recommande instamment que les Nations Unies prennent irnrné-
diaternent toutes mesures appropriées pour empêcherle déclenche-
ment d'une guerre civile au Congo, notamment des dispositions
concernant des cessez-le-feu, la cessation de toutes opérations
militaires, la prévention de combats et le recours tila force, si
besoin est, en dernier ressort11.
Par ailleurs, le Conseil de Sécuritéa.renforcé la position des forces de
l'ONU en ce qui concerne le retrait des troupes étrangères. On lit, au
paragraphe 2 de l'articleA,
cque des mesures soient prises pour le retrait et l'évacuation
immédiate du Congo de tous les personnels militaire et paramili-
taire et conseillers poIitiques belges et d'autres nationalités ne
relevant pas du commandement des Nations Unies, ainsi que des
mercenaires i).
Dans sa résolution du 24 novembre -xg6r,le Conseil de Sécurité a
résuméle rôle des Nations Unies au Congo et confirmé, au troisième
paragraphe du préambule,
«les principes et les buts de l'organisation des Nations Unies en ce
qui concerne le Congo, à savoir:
a) maintenir l'intégritéterritoriale et l'indépendance politique de
la République du Congo;
6) aider Ie Gouvernement centra1 du Congo à rétablir et maintenir
l'ordre public ;
c) empêcher le déclenchementd'une guerre civile au Congo;
d) assurer le retrait et l'évacuation immédiate du Congo de tous
les personnels militaire et paramilitaire et conseillers d'autres
nationalités ne relevant pas du commandement des Nations
Unies, ainsi que de tous les mercenaires;
e) fournir une assistance technique I.
Le paragraphe 4 du texte a étendu 'a portée de l'action des forces
onusiennes au Congo en autorisant
cle Secrétaire général A entreprendre une action vigoureuse y
compris, le cas échéant,l'emploi de la force dans la mesure requise
pour faire immédiatement appréhender, placer en détention dans l'attente de poursuites légales ou expulser tous les personnels mili-
taire et paramilitaire et conseillers politiques étrangers ne relevant
pas du commandement des Nations Unies, ainsi que les merce-
naires...II.
On voit donc que Ie rôle des forces des Nations Unies s'est peu à peu
élargi,puisqu'au début, comme je l'ai signaléen citant le premier rapport
du Secrétaire général,en particulier le paragraphe 16 de son rapport,
elles constituaient surtout
((un organe mis à la disposition du Gouvernement pour le maintien
de l'ordre et laprotection des vies humaines ».
Le Secrétaire général a interprété avecbeaucoup de prudence le
mandat dont l'avait chargé le 14 juillet 1960 le Conseil de Sécurité,
mandat lui permettant de fournir l'assistance militaire requise.
Néanmoins, l'évolution des événements aamené le Secrétaire général
à intervenir, au besoin par la force, pour protéger l'intégritéterritoriale
et l'indépendance politique de la République congolaise, et éviter une
guerre civile.
11faut signaler cependant que le Conseil de Sécuritéet le Secrétaire
généralont veillé soigneusement à ce que toute action de l'ONU au
Congo ne puisse êtreconsidérée comme une ingérencedans les domaines
qui, selon l'article2-(7)de la Charte, relèvent essentieIlernent de la régie
interne de chaque Etat.
Le respect de ce principe exigeait comme condition préalable que
toute action de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo soit d'abord
autorisée par écrit par le Gouvernement de la République congolaise;
comme nous l'avons dit, cette autorisation fut accordée en termes fort
explicites.
Par ailleurs, il était également essentiel que toute intervention ul-
térieure de l'Organisation des Nations Unies vise uniquement à aider le
Gouvernement congolais dans les limites expressément indiquées en
premier lieu par ce Gouvernement. Pour mettre en relief la fidélitédu
Conseil de Sécuritéet du Secrétaire généralclce principe, nous voudrions
rappeler leur conduite dans ce domaine. Nous avons vu que dans son
rapport sur la mise en Œuvre de la résolution adoptée le 14 juillet1960
par le Conseil de Sécurité,le Secrétaire généralavait indiqué que le
contingent de l'ONU était, en fait, un organe mis à la disposition du
Gouvernement pour le maintien de l'ordre public et la protection des
vies humaines. Il a également déclarédans le mêmerapport (p. 7) que
c'était là
(une tâche qui incombe naturellement aux autorités nationales et
qui leur reviendra désque leurpouvoir aura été établisufisamment 1).
Il faut aussi signaler que dans sa résolution du 22 juillet 1960, le
Conseil de Sécurité a reconnunettement que
a le Conseil de Sécuritéa recommandé d'admettre la République
du Congo à l'Organisation des Nations Unies en tant qu'entité II.
Par ailleurs on lit au paragraphe 2 de la résolution:
a Le Conseil prie tous les États de s'abstenir de toute action qui
pourrait tendre à empêcherle rétablissement de l'ordre public et EXPOSE ORAL DE RI. CADIEUX (CANADA) - 14 V 62 295
l'exercice de son autorité par Ie Gouvernement congolais, et aussi
de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait saper l'intégrité terri-
toriale et l'indépendance politique de la Républiquedu Congo. 11
Dans sa résolution du 9 août 1960 (par.4), le Conseil de Sécuritéa
réaffirmé,comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué,
(que la Force des Nations Unies au Congo ne sera partie à aucun
conflit interne, constitutionnel ou autre, qu'elle n'interviendra
en aucune faqon dans un tel conflit ou ne sera pas utilisée pour
en influencer l'issu1).
En outre, le 21 février1961 ,e Conseil a exprimé sa conviction
ique la solution du problème est entre les mains du peuple congolais
lui-même,à l'abri de toute ingérence de l'extérieur, etqu'ilne peut
p avoir de solution sans conciliation!).
Dans la même résolution(par. 5 du préambule), le Conseil a affirmé
nque toute solution imposée, y compris la formation de tout gou-
vernement ne résultant pas d'une conciliation véritable, loin de
régIer aucun problème, augmenterait grandement les dangers de
conflit à l'intérieur du Congo et la menace à la paix et à la sécurité
internationalesii.
Par sa résolution du 24 novembre 1961, le Conseil de Sécurité a
déploré expressément
((toute action armée menée contre l'autorité du Gouvernement de
la République du Congo, en particulier les activités sécessionnistes
et l'action armée qui sont actuellement menéespar l'administration
provinciale du Katanga avec l'aide de ressources de l'extérieur et
de mercenaires étrangers... D.
Et, au paragraphe I de la même résolution,le Conseil de Sécurité
affirme qu'il
«réprouve énergiquement Ies activités sécessionnistes illégalement
menéespar l'administration provinciale du Katanga avec l'appui
de ressources de l'extérieur et secondées par des mercenaires
étrangers II.
Au paragraphe 8, le Conseil déclare
((que toutes Ies activités sécessionnistes dirigéescontre la Répu-
bIique du Congo sont contraires à la loi fondamentale et aux décl-
sions du Conseil de Sécuritéet exigeexpressément que les activités
de cette nature actuellement menées au Katanga cessent
immédiatement 1).
11 serait utile également de consulter la résolution 1474(ES-IV),
adoptée le 16 septembre 1960 par l'Assembléegénéraleet touchant la
situation au Congo. Au paragraphe 6 de ce texte, lJAssembléegénérale,
((sans préjudice des droits souverains de la République du Congo,
invit tus les EtatsA s'abstenir de fournir, directement ou indirecte-
ment, des armes ou autre assistance à des fins militaires au Congo
28 pendant la durée de l'assistance militaire accordée à titre tempo-
raire par l'intermédiaire des Nations Unies, sauf si les Nations Unies
le demandent, par l'entremise du Secrétaire général, pouratteindre
les objectifs de la présente résolution et des résoIutions adoptées par
le Conseil de Sécurité les r4 et22 juillet et leg août 1960 11.
On peut constater que le Conseil de Sécurité,le Secrétaire généralet
l'Assembléeont adopté une position très ferme, visant à protéger l'inté-
grité de la République du Congo; mais pour compléter ce tableau il peut
êtreutile de nous reporter brièvement à certainesdéclarations des repré-
sentants au Conseil de Sécurité.Ainsi, au cours de la nuit tragique du
13au 14 juillet1960, à l'issue de laquelle le Conseil de Sécurité aadopté
sa fameuse résolution du 14, M. Slim, le distinmé délégué de la Tunisie,
a prononcé des paroles extrêmement irnporta;tes. ~oyci un passage de
son allocution. d'après les documents officiels de la 8.-me réunion du
Conseil de sécilrit6 paragraphe 89:
(J'en viens à la situation, telle qu'elle vient d'étre évoquéepar
le Secrétaire général, et à la demande d'assistance militaire formulée
-xo1essément Dar le Gouvernement congolais.
Il appai-aitklaircniciit. à la 1iirnièiAt' ces inforn~atio~ii, que Ic
(;ou\.errierricrit coricolaidcriia~idc nus Xations 1Jnies une assis-
tance militaire lui Permettant de protéger son territoire national.
Ce sont ld les termes mêmesdu télégramme envoyépar le Gouver-
nement du Congo au Secrétaire gé,néralI.l semble donc à ma délé-
gation que, gouvernement d'un Etat indépendant et souverain,
le Gouvernement du Congo est seul juge de l'opportunité d'une telle
assistance. Il vient d'en faire officiellement la demande. Rien ne
pourrait s'opposer, selon nous, à ce que le Conseil de Sécurité, qui
en est saisi, prenne une décision permettant rapidement une telle
assistance dans les meilleurs délais possibles. 1)
Plus tard, au cours des débats, If. Ortona, le distingué représentant
de l'Italie, a touché au fond même dela situation qui confronte le Conseil
de Sécuritélorsqu'il a déclaré:
«L'indépendance et la souveraineté des États Membres est la
clef de voûte de notre Organisation, et nous sommes tous fermement
attachés à ce principe. Mais, lorsque le gouvernement d'un Etat
hlernbre demande notre appui, nous ne devons pas hésiter à lelui
accorder sous une forme qui lui permette d'affermir son indépen-
dance et de rendre sa souveraineté plus sûre et ses relations inter-
nationaIes plus harmonieuses. 11
Une autre déclaration, lourde de sens, a étéfaite par hl. Quijano,
le distingué représentant de l'Argentine, à la mêmeréunion, qui a dit
pour conclure ses observations (voir p. 32):
rLa délégation argentine est dès lors disposée à appuyer les
dispositions qui permettront au Secrétaire généralde fournir au
Congo l'assistance qu'il a demandée et, notamment, l'assistance
militaire dont ce pays aura besoin jusqu'au moment où ses forces
nationales de sécuritéseront à même,de l'avis du Gouvernement,
de s'acquitter entièrement de leur tâche. ii A la réunion du Conseil de Sécuritéqui a eu lieu le 20 février 1961,
M. Stevenson, le distingué représentant des Etats-Unis, a déclaréau
sujet du projet de résolution qui a étéadopté lors de cette réunion:
«Je conclus qu'il est entendu que l'intention et le sens du projet
de résolution, pris dans son ensemble, est d'empêcher toute in-
gérence étrangère par la fourniture d'armes ou de personnel de
quelque source que ce soit, et c'est sur cette base que les Etats-Unis
sont heureux de voter en faveur du projet de résolution. ))
Il ressort de cette discussion que l'ONU se bornait effectivement A
aider le Gouvernement de la République du Congo. Elle ne faisait rien
de plus que de mettre en Œuvre la volontéde ce Gouvernement dans son
propre territoire,à la condition expresse que cette tâche serait remise
au Gouvernement de la République du Congo dès que celui-ci serait
en mesure de s'acquitter lui-même dece rôle. Les dispositions de I'ar-
ticle 2, section 7, ont donc étérespectées. Toutefois, ce seul facteur
n'aurait pu suffire à justifier le cours d'action qu'a pris le Conseil de
Sécurité.Ce qui a amené clairement le Conseil de Sécuritéà agir, c'est
que les événements du Congo constituaient une menace pour la paix et
la sécurité internationales. Une affaire de ce genre devenait une question
qui exigeait l'attention du Conseil, si l'on considère qu'en vertu de
l'article24 de la Charte il est principalement chargé du maintien de la
paix et de la sécuritéinternationales.
TIest clair que le Conseil de Sécuritén'a jamais perdu de vue un seul
instant cette responsabilité particulière en dirigeant les opérations au
Congo.
Ainsi, lorsqu'il a adopté sa résolution du 14 juillet 1960, le Conseil
de Sécuritéle faisait en réponse à une requête adresséepar télégramme
au Secrétaire généralpar le président et le premier ministre de la Répu-
blique du Congo, demande qui, comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué,
contenait l'affirmation suivante:
((Aide militaire sollicitéea pour but essentie1 protection du terri-
toire national congolais contre actuelle agression extérieure qui
menace paix internationale. n
Cet aspect de la question est démontréencore plus par la déclaration
significative qu'a faite, au cours de la réunion de nuit du Conseil de
Sécuritéles 13 et 14 juillet 1960, hl. José Correa,de I'Equateur, qui prési-
dait le Conseil à cette occasion. Vers lfindes débats de cette réunion, il
a résumé en ces mots la situation devant laquelle se trouvait le Conseil
de Sécurité:
((Une fois de plus, le Conseil de Sécuritéest saisi d'une grave
situation. Considéréedans son ensemble, cette situation est com-
plexe, mais si l'on se place au point de vue international, on doit
l'examiner en fonction de la présence de troupes étrangères sur le
territoire de la Républiquedu Congo contre la volonté du Gouverne-
ment congolais. Il est un fait indéniable et évident, c'estque cette
situation compromet gravement les relations internationales et que,
si elle ne venait pas à se modifier, elle mettrait sérieusement en
danger la paix et la sécuritéinternationales. 11
Comme preuve supplémentaire que le Conseil de Sécuritéa toujourseu à l'esprit la question du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité inter-
nationales,ilfaudrait citer kgalement la résolutiondu Conseil du 22juillet
1960. Dans le cinquième paragraphe du préambule de cette résolution,
il est affirméexpressément que :
((Le plein rétablissement de l'ordre public dans la République du
Congo contribuerait efficacement au maintien de la paix et de la
sécuritéinternationaIes. 11
L'intention réelle à cet égard du Conseil de Sécurité ressortencore
plus clairement d'un certain nombre de déclarations faites au cours de la
réuniondu 22 juillet 1960, pendant laquelle cette résolutiona étéadoptée.
Ainsi, M. Ortona, le distingué représentant de l'Italie, a prononcé les
paroles suivantes:
itAujourd'hui, les Nations Unies se proposent d'empêcher ce
territoire [le Congo] de devenir un champ de bataille entre pays et
entre races.Demain, les Nations Unies seront peut-être appeléesde
ce fait à assumer de nouvelles responsabilités,à ouvrir de nouvelles
voies.i)
A un autre point de sa déclaration, parlant du développement du
Congo dans la paix et l'indépendance, M. Ortona a dit:
<iTout cela, grâce à l'effort considérable déployépar les Nations
Unies et avec l'aide des Nations Unies, peut se réaliser,et se réaliser
rapidement. A une condition seulement: qu'il n'y ait aucune inter-
vention de l'extérieur.11
A une étapeultérieure dela réunion,le président du Conseil de Sécuritk,
M. José Correa, de l'Equateur, a déclaréceci, à titre de représentant de
son pays:
« L'opération des Nations Unies au Congo, exécutéesous la direc-
tion du Secrétaire généralen vertu, d'une part, des pouvoirs géné-
raux que lui confère la Charte et des pouvoirs qu'il tient des résolu-
tionsde l'Assembléegénéralesur l'assistance technique et, d'autre
part, des pouvoirs spéciaux que luia conférésle Conseil de Sécurité
par sa résolution du r4 juillet, constitue la première tentative en-
tièrement coordonnée qui ait jamais été faitepour mettre fin à une
situation de nature à compromettre la paix et Iasécuritéinterna-
tionales, non seulement en supprimant les causes immédiates et
externes de cette situation, mais aussi en s'attaquant A ses causes
profondes. Il s'agit d'un effort, en quelque sorte gigantesque,
accompli non seulement pour assainir l'atmosphère et résoudre les
problèmes immédiats, mais également pour établir des conditions
de stabilité politique, économique, sociale et administrative, de
manière à combler les vides crééspar l'état de choses actuel. 1)
Lorsque le Conseil de Sécurité s'estréuni pour examiner de nouveau
la situation au Congo le9 août 1960, il a dû faire face à d'autres situations
encore plus dramatiques que celle du Katanga.
Parlant de cette question, et en particulier des raisons qui ont obligé
les forces de l'ONU à entrer dans la province du Katanga, sir Claude
Cortale, distingué représentant de Ceylan, a déclaréque la réponseavait
étéfournie par le Secrétaire général,celui-ci ayant soulignéla nécessitéd'une telle action afin de trouver une solution àun problème qui, de fait,
soulevait l'alternative de la paix ou de la guerre, et d'une guerre qui ne
serait pas nécessairement limitée au Congo.
A nouveau, dans sa résolutiondu 21 février1961, IeConseil de Sécurité,
notant en premier lieu qu'il avait appris, avec un profond regret,
«La nouvelle du meurtre des dirigeants congolais hl. Patrice
Lumumba, M. Maurice Mpolo et RI. Joseph Okito )),
a ajouté qu'il était profondément préoccupé
«par les graves répercussions de ces crimes et par le risque d'une
guerre civile et d'effusions de sang généraliséesau Congo, ainsi que
par la menace à la paix et à la sécuritéinternationalesii.
En terminant cette première partie de mon exposé, je voudrais citer
une déclaration faite par M. Correa, le distingué représentant de
l'Equateur, au cours de la réunion du Conseil de Sécuritéqui a eu lieu
le g août 1960 C.ette dédaration, B mon avis, résume on ne peut mieux
les élémentsde fond régnant au Congo lors de l'intervention du Conseil
de Sécurité. M. Correa a dit:
(cEn autorisant le Secrétaire généralà fournir au Gouvernement
congolais l'assistance militaire dont iI aurait besoin jusqu'au moment
où les forces nationales de sécurité seraient à même d'accomplir
entièrement leurs tâches, le Conseil de Sécurité a voulucombler un
vide dans le domaine intérieur. Mais il'a fait parce que ce vide avait
provoqué l'arrivéedes troupes belges et que le Gouvernement congo-
lais éprouvant, et de ce vide et de cette arrivée, une angoisse com-
préhensible, avait appelé à son secours diverses Puissances dont la
présence au Congo, en marge de l'organisation des Nations Unies,
auraitpu causer un grave conflit internationalIlest donc indéniable
que les forces des Nations Unies ne sont pas au Congo simplement
pour se substituer aux forces congolaises, mais parce qu'elles ont à
remplir une mission plus vaste: celle de préserver la paix et la
sécurité internationales qui pourraient être en danger si l'insé-
curité interne dont le Congo souffrait vers le 13 juillet se prolongeait
ou se reproduisait ... Ce n'es$as en raison des di@c~dlté sternes du
+ays, mais bien de leurs répercussionssztrles relations internationales,
que E'aoaivedu Congo relèved'%ne action des Nalions Unies. 1)
En cette matière, la Force de l'organiçation des Nations Unies au
Congo a agi avec le consentement de 1'Etat congolais. La Force des
Nations Unies remplace en fait les forces nationales et, sous lecontrôle
du Secrétaire général, accomplit des tâches qui seraient normalement
confiéesaux forces nationales de sécurité.Or, parmi ces tâches, ilfaut
ajouter au maintien dela paix et de l'ordre le maintien de l'indépendance
politique et de l'intégrité territoriale duys. Les forces de l'ONU ayant
pour mission de remplacer la force nationale, temporairement incapable
d'agir, elles jouent un rôle normal en prenant les mesures nécessaires
pour atteindre ces objectifs.
Il est bien évident qu'en autorisant les forces de l'ONU à empêcher
la guerre civile, 1: Conseil de Sécuritén'impose pas une mesure de
contrainte à un Etat Membre, mais en se gardant bien d'intervenir
dans les controverses d'ordre purement domestique, il va au-devant de300 EXPOSÉ OR.4L DE hl. CADIEUX (CAXAUA) - 14 V 62
son désir naturel et maintes fois exprimé, d'ailleurs, de maintenir la
paix et l'ordre au sein du pays.
De plus, il faut bien tenir compte en déterminant la portée des résolu-
tions du Conseil de Sécuritéde l'hypothèse fondamentale qui a inspiré
son action depuis le début. Nous avons déjà exposé que le Conseil de
Sécurité a euconstamment le souci, dans son action au Congo, d'assurer
ou de maintenir la paix internationale, en prenant en particulier des
mesures pour permettre aux interventions étrangéres de prendre fin.
Cette intervention s'est produite sous la forme de l'envoi de mercenaires
et de matériel militaire. Le Conseil de Sécurité,dans l'optique qu'il a
adoptée au sujetde la situation congolaise, a considéréle risque de guerre
civile comme un des effets de l'intervention extérieure, et l'instruction
donnée aux forces de l'ONU d'empecher la guerre civile s'établit dans
la ligne maîtresse de son action: soutenir le gouvernement central en
accomplissant des tâches que les forces nationales ne sont pas en mesure
d'exécuter, et empêcherainsi l'intervention extérieure de se développer
et de créerun risque de conflit international.
Commenous l'avons signaléau début de notre exposé,les instructions
du Conseil de Sécuritése sont inspirées constamment du double souci
de respecter la personnalitée l'État congolais et doncde ne pasintervenir
dans ses affaires intérieures, d'une part, et d'autre part,de contribuer
directement par son action au maintien de Ia paix internationale.
J'en viens au deuxième point, c'est-à-dire aux fondements juridiques
des résolutions ayant trait aux opérations de la Force d'urgence des
Nations Unies. Ces opérations, comme je l'ai signalé, ont toujours été
poursuivies avec l'approbation du Gouvernement égyptien.
La Charte établit sans équivoque que seul le Conseil de Sécurité a
1~ pouvoir d'employer une force militaire sans le consentement des
Etats sur les territoires desquels se dérouleront les opérations; ses
articles42 à 48 stipulent en outre que lesforces armées de l'ONU ne
peuvent étre forméesqu'aux termes d'accords spéciaux et commandées
par le comitéde l'état-major militaire, sous l'autorité suprêmeduConseil.
Toutefois, les opérations de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies
ne se rangent pas dans cette catégorie; comme nous l'avons dit, elles
ont étéentreprises et poursuivies avec le consentement du Gouvernement
égyptien; elles ressortissent donc à l'Assemblée généralequi détient,
conformément à la Charte, des pouvoirs fort étendus, examinés en détail
non seulement dans l'exposé écrit du-Canada, mais encore dans les
déclarations écrites de maints autres Etats, dont le Danemark et les
Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
Il est probable que de tous les pouvoirs dont l'Assembléeest investie
les plus importants sont ceux qui ont trait à la protection de la paix et
de la sécuritéinternationales. L'article4 de la Charte confère au Conseil
de Sécuritéla responsabilité principale mais non exclusive du maintien
de la paix et de Iasécuritéinternationales, telles que les définit l'article
premier. L'Assemblée généralea sa part de responsabilités dans ce
domaine important et elle a le droit et le devoir de l'exercer conformé-
ment aux dispositions du chapitre IV de la Charte. Je me réfère iciaux
paragraphes 29 et suivants de la déclaration écritedu Canada.
Il convient de signaler que le Conseil de Sécurité a reconnu cette
responsabilité de l'Assembléeet admis que lespouvoirs de celle-ci s'éten-
dent directement aux opérations dela Force d'urgence des Nations Unies.
En effet, comme l'indique l'exposé du Canada, les opérations de la EXPOSÉ ORAL DE M. CADIEUX (CAKADA) - 75 V 62 301
Force d'urgence ont étéordonnées conformément au plan établi dans
la résolution((L'Union pour la paix ide l'Assemblée générale.
Le Conseil de Sécurité aétudiéavant l'Assemblée la crise de Suez
qui a provoqué la création de la Force d'urgence des N~tions Unies.
Entre le 30 octobreet lerernovembre, le Conseils'est réunipour examiner
l'action d'Israël,.de la Francet du Royaume-Uni en Égypte. Le rerno-
vembre, le Conseil a adoptéune résolution où ilindiquait que Ie désaccord
de ses Membres 'permanents l'avait empêché d'exercerla responsabiIité
principale qui lui incombait quant au maintien de Ia paix et de la sécurité
internationales et décidait de convoquer l'Assembléegénéraleen session
d'urgence, conformément à la résolution no 377 (V) de l'Assembléeen
date du 3 novembre 1950 ,fin de lui permettre de formuler les recom-
mandations qui s'imposaient.
De cette résolution du lernovembre 1956, il découleque la responsa-
bilité de l'Assemblée gEnéraleen ce qui concerne lemaintien de la paix
et de la sécuritéinternationales a étéofficiellement confirmée par le
Conseil; la résolution de ((L'Union pour la paix ide l'Assembléelui a
donnéà cet égard l'autorisation voulue.
On a beaucoup discuté des pouvoirs de l'Assembléeen ce qui a trait
aux opérations de Ia Force d'urgence; on pourrait peut-être indiquer,
pour compléter le tableau, que le Secrétaire général,instrument de mise
en Œuvre des résoIutions en cause, est investi de toute l'autorité voulue
par l'articl98 de la Charte. Cet articlestipule en effet:
iLe Secrétaire général agiten cette qualité à toutes les réunions
de 1'_4ssemblée générale.du Conseil de Sécurité,du Conseil écono-
mique et social et du Conseil de Tutelle. II remplit toutes autres
fonctions dont il est chargé par ces organes. i)
[Audience Pztblique du 15 mai 1962, matin]
hlonsieur le Président, Nessieurs les Membres de la Cour, hier j'ai
eu l'honneur de présenter à la Cour quelques observations sur les termes
des résolutions du Co~iseil de Sécurité relativement aux opérations
entreprises au Congo, en rapport avec l'article II,section 7,de la Charte.
J'ai aussi représentélesouci du Conseil de Sécuritéà l'égarddu maintien
de la paix et de Ia sécuritéinternationales lorsqu'il a autorisé le Secré-
taire général à fournir au Gouvernement congolais l'assistance que
celui-ci demandait. Après avoir terminé la première partie de ma présen-
tation, j'ai abordé la seconde en parlant brièvement du fondement
juridique de l'action de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies. Je poursuis
maintenant l'exposéde cette seconde partie en passant à l'examen des
bases juridiques des résolutions relatives à l'opération de la Force de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo.
L'énumération desdonnéesrelatives aux opérations des Nations Unies
au Congo fait ressortir qu'ici encore il ne s'agissait, pour le Conseil,
que de la mise en Œuvre de lois sur le plan purement interne. Sans doute,
l'ampleur des opérations a pu les faire considérer comme une interven-
tion de caractèremilitaire. Mais à la lumière des dispositions de la Charte,
il n'en reste pas moins vrai que l'action de l'organisation des Nations
Unies au Congo est exercéeavec le consentement écritdu Gouvernement
de la République du Congo. Les paragraphes IO et suivants de !adéclara-
tion font ressortir que les forces de'ONU ont pour mission principale de302 EXPOSE ORAL DE M. CADIEUX (CANADA) - 15 V 62
créer au Congo les conditions grâce auxquelles les nationaux auront
décidé eux-memes, sans pression extérieure, la forme de gouvernement
qui leur convient.
Ily faut certaines conditions préalables, notamment: l'octroi d'une
assistance technique au Gouvernement de la République du Congo,
pour préserver la paix et l'ordre public; ensuite, l'évacuation de toutes
les forces étrangèresmilitaires ou paramilitaires se trouvant en territoire
congolais, ainsi que de tous les mercenaires et conseillers politiques qui
ne relèvent pas de l'autorité des Nations Unies.
Il est essentiel de noter que, comme il est stipulé dans Ia résolution
du Conseil de Sécuritédu 9 août 1960, au paragraphe 4,
((la force des Nations Unies au Congo ne sera pas partie à aucun
conflit interne, constitutionnel ou autre, n'interviendra en aucune
façon dans un tel conflit ou ne sera pas utilisée pour en influencer
l'issueII.
Les fonctions du contingent de l'ONU étant ainsi clairement définies,
le Conseil de Sécurité ne s'est pas référéau comité d'état-major dont il
est question dans les articles 42 à 48 de la Charte et dont l'efficacité
serait nécessairement fonction d'accords militaires spéciaux, en vertu de
l'article43. fitant donné qu'il n'existe pas en ce moment d'accords de
ce genre, le Conseil de Sécuriténe saurait faire appel au comité d'état-
major.
Il s'agit donc de découvrir quels articles de la Charte justifient l'action
du Conseil. Le Conseil de Sécuritén'a pas indiqué avec précision les
articles de la Charte sur lesquels ilentendait fonder son action. Mais
il en est ainsi dans sa pratique habituelle. Il faut voir a cet effet le Képer-
toirede la pratique suivie par les organeç des Nations Unies, volume II,
pages 292 et suivantes, pages 357 et suivantes. A l'occasion le Conseil,
dans ses résolutions, a employé le langage de certains articles particu-
liers de la Charte, donnant ainsi au moins une indication au sujet de ses
intentions. Par exemple, dans sa résolution du 21 février 1961, le Conseil
de Sécuritéemploie les termes de l'article jg. A défaut d'indications
claires de la part du Conseil de Sécurité,il semble bien qu'il faille exa-
miner les articles de la Charte, et, pour sa part, le Gouvernement du
Canada croit que les articles qu'il alieu de consulter sont: les articleI
(par. 1),24 (par.r et 2),39,40, 98 et peut-étre, au besoin, les article33
a 38 inclusivement.
L'article I (par. r) indique les buts des Nations Unies qui sont les
suivants :
(Maintenir la paix et la sécuritéinternationales, et à cette fin:
prendre des mesures collectives efficaces en vue de prévenir et
d'écarter les menaces la paix et de réprimer tout acte d'agres-
sion ou autre rupture de la paix, et réaliser, par des moyens paci-
fiques, conformément aux principes de la justice et du droit inter-
national, l'ajustement ou le règlement de différendsou de situations,
de caractPre international, susceptibles de mener à une rupture de
la paix. 1)
L'article 24 (par. I)confère au Conseil de Sécuritéla responsabilité
principale du maintien de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales et
.reconnaît qu'en s'acquittant des devoirs que lui impose cette responsa- EXPOSE ORAL DE M. CADIEUX (CANADA) - 15 V 62 303
bilité,le Conseil de Sécuritéagit au nom de tous Ies Membres de I'Organi-
sation des Nations Unies.
Le deuxième paragraphe de cet article stipule que dans l'accomplisse-
ment de ces devoirs, le Conseil de Sécurité agiraconformément aux buts
et principes des Nations Unies. On trouve plus loin dans ce paragraphe
l'indication des chapitres où sont énoncés lespouvoirs spécifiques accor-
désau Conseil de Sécurité.
En somme, l'article 24 confère au Conseil de Sécuritédeux sortes de
pouvoirs afin qu'il s'acquitte dela responsabilité principale du maintien
de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales: d'abord, le pouvoir général
de prendre les mesures nécessairespour s'acquitter de ces devoirs pourvu
qu'elles n'entrent pas en conflit avec d'autres dispositions de la Charte.
On peut soutenir que ce pouvoir découle directement, ou du moins im-
plicitement, du paragraphe 2 de l'articl24,selon un avis consultatif dela
Cour rendu le II avril 1949au sujet des pouvoirs implicites de l'organi-
sation des Nations Unies. Cet avis portait sur l'indemnisation des bles-
sures subies dans le service des Nations Unies. Et, en second lieu, les
pouvoirs spécifiques énoncésdans les chapitres de la Charte dont il est
fait mention au paragraphe 2 de l'article24.
En citant l'avis consultatif du 11 avril 1949 l convient d'attirer l'at-
tention sur l'énoncéci-après qu'il renferme:
((Selon le droit international, l'organisation doitêtreconsidérée
comme possédant ces pouvoirs qui, s'ils ne sont pas expressément
énoncésdans la Charte, sont, par une conséquence nécessaire,
confërés A l'organisation en tant qu'essentiels à l'exercice des
fonctions de celle-ci.)
Les pouvoirs implicites du Conseil de Sécuritéont été considéréscomme
devant êtreadéquats pour assurer la réalisation des buts et objectifs de
Ia Charte. Ils ne sont pas limités aux pouvoirs spécifiques mentionnés
au paragraphe 2 de l'article24.A cet égard,il peut êtreutile aussi de se
référerà l'opinion exprimée par M. Sobolev, secrétaire généraladjoint
de l'organisation des Nations Unies, lors de la discussion de l'affaire du
territoire libre de Trieste le vendredIOjuin 1947:
((Le paragraphe I dc l'articl24 prévoit qu'afin d'assurer l'action
rapide et efficace de l'organisation, ses Membres confèrent au
Conseil de Sécuritéla responsabilité principale du maintien de la
paix et de la sécuritéinternationales et reconnaissent qu'en s'ac-
quittant des devoirs que lui impose cette responsabilité, le Conseil
de Sécuritéagit en leur nom. Les mots ((responsabiIité principale
du maintien de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales rapprochés
des mots «agit en leur nom » constituent en fait une délégationde
pouvoirs d'une portée suffisante pour permettre au Conseil de
Sécurité d'approuver Ies documents en question et d'assumer les
responsabilités qui en découlent.
De plus, les procès-verbaux de la conférence de San Francisco
démontrent que les pouvoirs du Conseil, découlant de l'article 24,
- ne se Iimitent pas aux attributions spécifiquesd'autorité mention-
nées aux chapitres VI, VII, VI11 et XII. Le Secrétaire général
désire en particulier attirer l'attention sur la discussion qui eut
lieuà la quatorziéme séance de la Commission 11111,à San Fran-304 EXPOSÉ ORAL DE M. CADIEUX (CANADA) - 15 V 62
cisco, au cours de laqueIle tous les représentants ont reconnu que
les pouvoirs du Conseil de Sécurité n'étaientpas limitésaux pouvoirs
spécifiquesénoncéa sux chapitres VI, VII, VI11et XII de la Charte. ii
Le Secrétaire généraladjoint a indiqué qu'il avait à l'esprit le docu-
ment 597, Comité IIIjrl30. Et il poursuit:
{iOn remarquera que cette discussion portait sur une proposition
d'amendement visant à limiter aux seules décisions prises en vertu
des pouvoirs spécifiques du Conseil, l'obligation qu'ont les Membres
d'accepter les décisions du Conseil. Au cours de cette discussion,
toutes les délégationsqui prirent la parole, à la fois en faveur de
cet amendement ou contre, reconnurent que l'autorité de ce Conseil
n'était pas limitée à ces pouvoirs spécifiques. Il fut reconnu égale-
ment que la responsabilité du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité
entraîne avec elle le pouvoir d'assumer cette responsabilité. On a
vu que ce pouvoir n'était pas illimité, mais il était soumis aux
exigences que comportent les buts et les principes de l'organisation
des Nations Unies.
Il semble que de cette discussion se dégage une conception fonda-
mentale de la Charte; en d'autres termes, que les Membres des
Nations Unies ont reconnu au Conseil de Sécuritédes pouvoirs en
rapport avec les responsabilités qui lui incombent relativement
au maintien de la. paix et de la sécurité.Les seules restrictions
ressortent des principes et des buts fondamentaux qui figurent au
chapitre premier de Ia Charte. II
Cette citation est tirée des procès-verbaux du Conseil de Sécurité pour
la deuxième année, no 3, pages 44 et 45.
Manifestement la décisiondu Eonseil de Sécuritéconcernant le Congo
ressortità ses pouvoirs générauxou, du moins, à ses pouvoirs implicites.
De plus, Ie Conseil de Sécurité apleine autorité en la matiére en vertu
de l'article 40 et peut-être mêmede l'article 39.
L'article 40 confère expressément au Conseil de Sécuritéle pouvoir
de requérir les parties intéresséesde se conformer aux mesures provi-
soires qu'il estime nécessaires ou souhaitables, avant de prendre les
mesures prévues A l'articl39. On peut sûrement affirmer que l'opération
du Congo relève précisémentde cette régle.
On pourrait dire, par ailleurs ou en outre, que la décision prise par le
Conseil de Sécurité ressortit à la première partie de l'articl39, où il est
dit que :
{iLe Conseil de Sécuritéconstate l'existence d'une menace contre
Ia paix, d'une rupture de la paix ou d'un acte d'agression et fait
des recommandations.. .ii
S'il en était autrement, il apparaitrait que l'autorité nécessaire aux
décisionsdu Conseil de Sécurité peut reposer sur les articles 33 à38 de la
Charte qui ont trait au règlement pacifique des différends de nature à
mettre en danger la paix etla sécuritéinternationales. Aux termes de
l'article33,les parties aux différendsde cette nature doivent avant tout
en rechercher la solution par certaines méthodes, dont le recours à des
dispositifs régionaux: et le Conseil de Sécurité, s'ille juge nécessaire,
doit inviter les parties à recourir à de tels moyens.En vertu de l'article
34, le Conseil de Sécuritépeut enquêter sur tout différend ou toute EXPOSÉ ORAL DE hl, CADIEUX (CANADA) - 15 V 62 305
situation qui pourrait entraîner un désaccord entre nations ou engendrer
un différend, afin de déterminer sicette situation semble devoir menacer
lemaintien de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales. D'aprésl'article 35,
tout pays, membre ou non de l'organisation, peut attirer l'attention
du Conseil de Sécurité surtoute situation pouvant compromettre la paix
et la sécuritéinternationales. Aux termes de l'article 36, Ie Conseil de
Sécuritépeut, à tout moment de l'évolution d'un différend ou d'une
situation qui, en se prolongeant, peuvent compromettre la paix et la
sécurité internationales, recommander les procédures ou méthodes
d'ajustement appropriées. Les articles 37 et 38 apportent des précisions
sur ce que le Conseil peut déciderde recommander en vue d'une solution
pacifique au conflit.
La décision prise par le Conseil de Sécuritéau sujet du Congo semble
entièrement compatible avec ces articles de la Charte.La situation congo-
laise, vraisemblablement, peut s'assimiler à un différend ou à une situa-
tion, au sens où ces expressions sont employées dans les articles 33 à 38
de la Charte; de même, les recommandations du Conseil de Sécurité
au sujet des procédures et des méthodes A prendre pour trouver une
solution relèvent clairement de l'autorité impartie au Conseil de Sécurité
aux termes du chapitre VI de la Charte.
. Bref, la nature exacte de l'autorité en vertu de lnquelle le Conseil de
Sécurité est intervenu dépassait amplement les cadres de l'opération
relativement restreinte des Forces de l'organisation des Nations Unies
au Congo, qu'ila dirigéeet qu'il dirige encore. Cetteopération repose non
pas sur une intervention directe dq Conseil de Sécurité proprement dite
mais sur l'appui bénévoleque les Etats Membres ont accordé au Secré-
taire généralen sc fondant sur Ies recommandations du Conseil de
Sécurité.
De l'avis de mon Couvernemeiit, le Conseil de Sécuritédispose, en
vertu des articleseret 24, du pouvoir généralou implicite que supposent
ses décisions relatives à l'opération des Forces de l'Organisation des
Xations Unies au Congo. Indépendamment de ce pouvoir, le Conseil de
Sécurité est manifestement investi, d'après mon Gouvernement, de
pouvoirs spécifiques prkvus par différents articles dc la Charte qui lui
permettent d'agir de la mêmefaçon. Pour les raisons que j'ai indiquées
précSdemment, mon Gouvernement estime que ce sont les articles 33
à 3s inclusivement, ainsi que les articles 39 et 40, qui justifient ample-
ment à cet égard la décisiondu Conseil.
Avant de passer à une autre partie de notre exposé,il convient peut-
être derappeler que l'autorité que le Conseil de Sécuritépossède à plus
d'un titre pour mener l'opération du Congo ne comporte pas la possi-
bilité d'invoquer les dispositions relatives à l'état-major, prévues aux
articles 42 à 46; ily a pour cela nombre de raisons, et notamment la
suivante: les arrangements en ce domaine ne sont pas encore en vigueur,
et il est manifeste aussi que le Conseil de Sécuritén'a jamais songéà se
prévaloir de ces arrangements.
On a donné à entendre, les article39 et 40 faisant intégralement partie
du cliapitreVI1 de la Charte - qui a trait aux décisionsrelatives aux
menaces contre la paix, aux ruptures de la paix et aux actes d'agression
- et ce chapitre comprenant aussi les articles 42 à 46, que les articles 39
et 40 ile pourraient êtreinvoqués qu'en rapport avec les arrangements
concernant le systéme d'état-major viséspar les articles 42 à46.
Il semble que cet argument est en fait dépourvu de tout fondement,
I306 EXPOSÉ ORAL DE M. CADIEUX (CANADA) - 15 v 62
comme suffit à le démontrer l'examen des articles en question. Une
étude des articles39 et 40 démontre qu'ils laissent au Conseil de Sécurité
la faculté d'invoquer les arrangements relatifs à l'état-major prévus
par les articles 42 46 ou de recourir à des mesures moins draconiennes.
Ainsi, le Conseil de Sécuritépeut, aux termes de l'article39, se borner à
formuler des recommandations en vue de résoudre un problème, une
fois déterminé qu'il existe effectivement une menace contre la paix,
une rupture de la paix ou un acte d'agression. D'après l'article 40, le
Conseil de Sécuritépeut, avant de prendre une décision prévue à I'ar-
ticle39,
Iinviter les parties intéresséesà se conformer aux mesures pro-
visoires qu'il estime nécessaires ou souhaitables».
Pour ces raisons il est difficile d'admettre l'argument selon lequel les
articles39 et 40 ne pourraient êtredissociésdes articles 42 à 46. Une
telle interprétation irait manifestement à l'encontre de l'objet des
articles39 et 40.
Enfin, un dernier mot sur cet aspect de la question, au sujet du statut
du Secrétaire général au regard des résolution du Conseil de Sécurité.Ces
résolutions imposent d'importantes tâches exécutives et administratives,
nécessairespour leu; mise en Œuvre, tout comme dans le cas des résolu-
tions de l'Assembléegénérale relatives aux opérations de la Force d'ur-
gence. En conformité de l'article 98 de la Charte, ces tâches ont été
confiéesau Secrétaire général,tout comme l'Assembléegénéralel'avait
fait dans le cas de la Force d'urgence.
Nous abordons maintenant la derniére partie de notre exposé avec
la question des pratiques de l'Assemblée générale en matière budgétaire.
Après une analyse de l'aspect budgétaire des résolutions de l'Assemblée
généraleet du Conseil de Sécurité relatives à la Force d'urgence et à
l'opération du Congo, la déclaration canadienne concluait qu'en vertu
des principes énoncés par les résolutions dontils'agit, la Force d'urgence
des Nations Unies et la Force de l'organisation des Nations Unies au
Congo devaient toutes deux êtrefinancées par le budget des Nations
Unies tout en précisant que les contributions libres, apportant une aide
financiérespéciale,devaient êtreappliquées de faqon à allégerle fardeau
de ceux des gouvernements qui sont le moins capables d'assuvr une
part des dépenses (voir à ce sujet les pages 214 et 215 du cahier des
déclarations écrites).
Montrons maintenant, par une revue des pratiques budgétaires de
l'Assemblée générale,que les principes établis par ces résolutions ne
souffrent aucune autre interprétation. La nécessitéd'entrer dans le
détailde ces importantes questions nous est épargnéeen bonne partie par
1'excelIent~et exhaustive étude qu'en ont faite les déclarations écritede
quelques Etats, et notamment celles des Gouvernements du Royaume
de Danemark et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Dans ces conditions, il
ne sera question ici, et brièvement, que de certains éléments-clés.
L'article17, paragraphe r et paragraphe 2,de la Charte remet à la
seule Assemblée généralele pouvoir d'adopter le budget des Nations
Unies, d'autoriçer les dépenses, d'assurer les recettes nécessaires et
d'imposer aux Etats Membres les quotes-parts jugées nécessairespour
couvrir les dépenses de l'organisation.
C'est dire que l'Assemblée généraleest le seul organe des Nations
Unies qui soit habilité à approuver ces dépenses, quelle qu'en soit la EXPOSÉ ORAL DE Il.CADIEUX (CANADA) - 15 V 62 307
nature et qu'il s'agisse de dépenses administratives ordinaires ou de
dépenses devant assurer des opérations de maintien de la paix. Si la
dépense est nécessaire du fait d'obligations contractées antérieurement
par d'autres organes des Nations Unies, comme par exemple le Conseil
de Sécurité,il se peut fort bien que l'Assembléegénéralen'ait d'autre
choix que d'y consentir.11semble que tel soit le sens de l'avis consultatif
émisle 13 juille1954 par la Cour au sujet de l'affectation des dommages-
intérêtsaccordés par le Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies (voir
à ce sujet le rappel de cette cause dans la déclarationdu Gouvernement
du Royaume de Danemark, page 150 du cahier des déclarations écrites).
Conformément au pouvoir que possède l'Assemblée généraled'ap-
prouver toutes les dépenses de l'Organisation, la pratique observée par
l'Assemblée enmatière budgétaire consiste à faire entrer dans le budget
qu'elle approuve, non seulement les dépenses afférentes aux. tâches
ordinaires, mais toutes les autres dépenses aussi bien qui retombent
sur le budget des Nations Unies, y compris, en place très importante,
les dépenses afférentes aux opérations de maintien de la paix. Plusieurs
postes du budget de 1962 se rattachent à des opérations de maintien de
la paix entreprises 2il'initiative de l'Assembléegénéraleou du Conseil
de Sécuritédans l'exercice des pouvoirs générauxqu'ils possédent pour
le maintien de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales. Il en est énuméré
un certain nombre dans la déclaration écrite du Gouvernement du Roy-
aume de Danemark aux pages 146 et 147 du cahier des déclarations
écrites.
Pour donner une idée du genre de postes comptables dont ils'agit,
un seul exemple suffit: celui des dépenses afférentes la Commission
des Nations Unies pour l'unification et le relévement de la Corée,orga-
nisme créépar l'Assembléegénérale.
D'autre part, comme l'indique la déclaration écrite du Canada,
pages 211 et212 du cahier, l'Assembléegénérale ala charge d'un certain
nombre de programmes dont le financement est assuré par des fonds ne
provenant pas du budget des Nations Unies. Il a étéétabli des comptes
spéciaux pour ces programmes extra-budgétaires dont plusieurs sont
énumérés dans la déclaration du Danemark, page 147. Y figurent notam-
ment le Programme élargi d'assistance technique et le Fonds spécial des
Nations Unies.
Comme l'a indiqué la déclaration du Canada, page 211 du cahier,
l'expression abudget des Nations Unies II,au sens de l'article 17 de
la Charte, désigne les dépensesdel'organisation autorisées par le budget
approuvé par les Nations Unies. Pour 1962, ce budget se divise en trois
sections:
première section, le budget ordinaire,
deuxiéme section, le budget de la Force d'urgence, et
troisième section, le budget de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo.
En dépit du fait que les budgets de la Force d'urgence et de la Force
de l'Organisation au Congo ont étéséparésdu budget ordinaire pour des
raisons de commodité administrative, par l'établissement de comptes
spéciaux, l'analyse des résolutions pertinentes de l'Assemblée générale
et du Conseil de Sécuritéqui,a étéfaite dans les dédarations écritesdu
Canada et de certains autres Etats révéleque les trois budgets ne consti-
tuent ni plus ni moins que des sections du budget d'ensemble des Nations
Unies au sens de l'articl17. Il serait peut-être justifiéjusqu'à un certainpoint à placer dansune catégorieextra-budgétaire la section des budgets
de la Force d'urgence et de la Force au Congo qui est assuréeseulement
par des fonds extra-budgétaires, si la structure financièrde ces budgets
avait étéédifiéesur une telle base. Or, il n'en est rien. Afin d'assurer le
financement de la Force d'urgence et de la Force de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies au Congo, on a estimé nécessaire de garantir un appoint
provenant des ressources financiPres de l'organisation des Nations Unies
m cas de déficitde ces deux opérations, déficit résultant d'une insuffi-
sance des contributions libres destinées financer les dépenses des
Nations Unies pour lesquelles on compte sur ce mode de financement.
Il y a là un élément décisif;les budgets de la Force d'urgence et de la .
Force opérant au Congo font tout autant partie intégrante du budget
d'e~isembledes Nations Unies que le budget ordinaire lui-même.
Une fois établi que les budgets de la Force d'urgence et de la Force
de l'organisation au Congo font partie du budget d'ensemble des Nations
Unies, ce que l'Assembléegénérale afait en termes précis en vertu du
mandat non moins précisque lui donne la Charte, il importe peu que les
budgets de la Forcc d'urgence et de la Force au Congo soient traités
séparément ou fassent partie du budget ordinaire des Nations Unies.
Le fait qui compte, c'est que d'excellentes raisons de com~noditéadmi-
nistrative demandent que les dépenses de la Force d'urgence et de la
Force au Congo soient distinguées de celles du budget ordinaire. Le
traitement spécial nécessitépar l'apport des contributions Iibres et
l'établissement d'une échelle spéciale de cotisation a contribué, c'est
évident, à faire prendre la décision d'établir des budgets séparés pour
ces deux opérations, ainsi que l'énoncela déclaration écrite du Dane-
mark, page 149 du cahier des déclarations écrites:
L'objet de l'article 17, sectio2, est d'établir un mode sûr et
efficace de financement des dépenses et non pas d'empêcher que
des dépenses qui sont essentiellement des dépenses dc l'organi-
sation soient financéespar des fonds recueillis de diverses manières
et notamment par le recours simultané aux contributions libres et
à la cotisation obligatoireII
Il ne faut pas perdre de vue non plus, d'autre part, que l'articlV-5.1
et l'article V, section6, sous-section 7, des règlements financiers des
Nations Unies établis par la résolution 456 de l'Assemblée générale
(16 novembre 1950) et modifiës par la résolution 450 de l'Assemblée
généralele 3 décembre 1955 et par la résolution 973, section U, du
15 décembre 1955,établissent clairement qu'il peut êtreinstituédes comp-
tes spéciaux et que, sauf disposition contraire adoptée par l'Assemblée
générale,ces comptes doivent êtrefinancés par des contributions des
États Membres selon une échelle de cotisation fixée par l'Assemblée
générale.
Indication supplémentaire de ce qu'il n'a étéfait absolument aucune *
distinction entre le traitement accord8 au budget ordinaire et le traite-
ment accordé au budget dela Force d'urgence et de la Force de l'organi-
sation au Congo, on notera que les méthodes budgétaires observéespar
l'Assemblée générale dans le cas des budgets de la Force d'urgence et de
la Force de l'ONU au Congo sont toujours les mêmesque lorsqu'il s'agit
d'approuver le budget ordinaire. Dans chacun des cas, le contrbleur
prépare, au nom du Secrétaire général,les prévisions de dépenses.
Celles-ci sont étudiées par le Comité consultatif pour les questions administratives et budgétaires; par la suite, elles sont examinées en
Cinquième Commission, puis, enfin, en séance pléniérede l'Assemblée
générale.
Pour conclure, jedirai qu'au sens de mon Gouvernement la question
dont la Cour est saisiese rattache en premier lieu aux obligations fiaan-
cières des Blembres des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne les opérations
de Ia Force d'urgence et de la Force de l'organisation des Nations Unies
au Congo.
Le Gouvernement canadien estime que ces opérations n'ont, en aucune
façon, violé les dispositions de l'article 2 (7) de la Charte, ayant été
entreprises et poursuivies à larequête et avec le consentement des Etats
dont le territoire est intéressé.
Les organes de l'Organisation des Nations Unies qui ont pris la déci-
sion d'autoriser et de soutenir ces opérations ont agi dans le cadre des
pouvoirs qui leur sont attribués par la Charte, dans le but d'atteindre
ses objectifs essentiels, et en particulier celui qui a trait au maintien de
la paix internationale.
Et, en dernier lieu, il nous semble évident que l'établissement de
budgets particuliers pour la Force d'urgence et pour la Force de l'Or-
ganisation au Congo ne peut valablement soutenir la thèse que 1'Assem-
blée générale a voulu abandonner le principe que les dépenses afférentes
à ces opérations soient assurées essentiellement par les cotisations
obligatoires, tout en tenant compte des contributions volontaires prove-
nant des Etats Membres.
En second lieu, la Cour est appelée à se prononcer indirectement sur
une question plus large. C'est-à-dire la question de savoir si les Nations
Unies, en fait, ont reçu des pouvoirs suffisants, aux termes de leur
Charte, pour s'acquitter des immenses responsabilités qui leur sont
confiées.
Mon Gouvernement croit sincèrement et avec la plus profonde convic-
tion que Ia Charte a de fait conféréaux Nations Unies les pouvoirs
nécessaires pour se bien acquitter de leurs responsabilités. Si la Cour
répond par l'affirmative a la question qui lui a étéposéeau sujet des
opérations de la Force d'urgence et de la Force au Congo, on aura
confirmé le rôle de suprême importance que les auteurs de la Charte
entendaient confier aux Nations Unies et que l'humanité leur demande
maintenant de jouer dans la recherche des solutions aux problèmes
mondiaux, dont les plus graves sont ceux que pose la recherche des
moyens Ies plus propres a préserver la paix et la sécuRtéjnternationales. 2. ORAL STATEMENT OF MR. RIPHAGEN
(REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS)
AT THE PUBLIC HEARIKGS OF 15 AND 16 MAY 1962
[Public hearingof15 May 1962, morning]
Mr. ~resident and Members of the Court:
The question of the obligations of Member States under the Charter
of the United Nations in the matter of financing the United Nations
operations in the Congo and in the Middle East has raised a great num-
ber of observations; some of them are clearly and purely of a political
nature, othershave a more or less legal nature.
The question itself, as phrased in the General Assembly Resolution
1731 (XVI), is a relatively simple one. Stripped of its numerous references
to specific resolutions, the request for an advisory opinion submits to
the Court the question whether pnrticular expenditures of the United
Nations specifically authorizeby the General Assernbly under Article17,
paragraph 1, of the Charter constitute expenses of the Organization
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of the same Article.
Now, to the uninitiated this might seem a rather simple question,
and 1must confess, Mr. President and Members of the Court, that even
after a careful study of the various learned arguments which have been
put forward in the written statements which advocate a negative reply,
1 am still inclined to think that, after all, this question is not that
complicated, and should be answered in the positive sense.
In challenging the obligations of a Rlember State to bear its share
in certain expenses of the United Nations, much has been said and
written about the legal nature of the United Nations, about the exclusive
powers of the Security Council, about thedomestic jurisdictioof States,
about the conduct of UN forces in particular situationabout the re-
sponsibility of this or that State for the situation which has occasioned
United Nations operations, about the special responsibility permanent
Members of the Security Council for measureç to maintain international
peace and security, about the relative capacity to pay of the various
Member States,and about other matters.
A full discussion of al1 the arguments advanced would, of course,
require a stepby step analysis of the situatioin the Middle East and,
later on, in the Congo, and of the various resolutions and operations of
the United Nations organs to which these situations gave rise, including,
finally, the decisions of the General Açsembly in respect of the authoriza-
tion and the apportioning of the United Nations expenses.
For reasons which, 1 hope, will be justifiby what-with the Court's
permission-I am going to Say, 1would, however, prefer to concentrate
on the fiscal power of the General Assernbly, laid down in Article 17
of the Charter, and its relationship to other powers, rights and rules
recognized in the Charter.
The fiscal power of the General Assembly, as laid down in Article 17
of the Charter, comprises-in so far as relevant here-two elernents: STATEMENT OF MT. RIPHAGEN (NETHERLANDS)- V152 311
First of all, al1 expenditures of the Organization must be authorized
by the GeneralAssembly; under Article 18 of the Charter such authori-
zations require a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting.
Second, the expenses of the Organization are covered by contributions
of the Member States, the amounts of which shall be determined by the
General Assembly ;again, undet Article18 of the Charter the determina-
tion of the share of each Member State in the coverage of the expenses
requires a two-thirds majority of the Nernbers present and voting.
NO limitation whatsoever of this fiscal power is provided for in the
text of the Charter itself.
According to some of the written statements submitted to the Court,
such limitations are, however, implied by the existence and the exercise
of other powers-powers of the Member States and powers of other
organs of the United Nations stipulated or recognized in the Charter.
One of the alleged limitations apparently relates both to the power
of authorization and to the power of apportionment. I am referring here
to the contention, put forward in the letter addressed to the Registrar
of the Court by the Directeur desAgaires politiques of the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (which is op.130of the printed document). According
to this contention, the fiscal power of the General Assembly would be
' limited to those expenses "dont le principe étafiosé9ar laCharte comme
une obligation juridique pour les États,c'est-ù-dirles dépensesadminis-
tratives".
Another of the alleged limitations of the fiscal power of the General
Assembly refers more particularly to the power to apportion expenses,
that is to the financial coverage. Thus, the view has been expreçsed-
inter alin in the written staternent submitted by the Government of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (on p. 177 of the printed document)-
the view has been expressed that "al1 measures connected with the use
of armed forces on behalf of the United Nations fall, of necessity, under
Chapter VII, and, accordingly, also the measures connected with the
material and financial coverage of armed actions fa11under this Chapter".
Presumably this would mean that the financial contribution of blember
States to cover the expenses of the Organization connected with the use
of armed forces could only be based on special agreements concluded
between such Member and the Security Council under Article 43 of
the Charter.
Finally, some written statements, submitted to the Court, allege that
the fiscal power of the General Assembiy is limited in particular with
respect to theexpenses which the General Assembly may authorize. Thus,
in support of the contention that the General Assembly resolutions,
mentioned in the request for an advisory opinion, do not create a legal
obligation of the Member States, it is alleged that certain acfivities
engaged in by the United Nations are "invalid" as contrary to the pro-
visions of the Charter, and that certain ~esolutionsin pursuance whereof
these activities were undertaken by the United Nations are "invalid"
since either the contents of those resolutions or the procedure according
to which they were passed are contrary to the provisions of the Charter.
Obviously, these contentions are based on the assumption that only
such expenses of the Organization may be authorized and apportioned
as are made in respect of operations which are both undertaken in
pursuance of "valid" resoIutions, and are in themselves in accordance
29312 STATEMENT OP MT. RIPHAGEN (KETHERLANDS)- 1562
with, or at least not contrary ta, the rules of conduct laid down or
recognized in the Charter.
In the çubmission of my Government, al1 these alleged limitations
of the fiscal power of the General Assembly, whether they relate more
particularly to authorization or to apportionment, or relateto the power
as a whole, al1these alleged limitations are in the opinion of my Govern-
ment unfounded in law. Even if one could admit, in abstracto,some
implied limitations of the kind referred to above, they could not apply
to the case before the Court or, for thatatter, to any situation which is
likely to arise in practice.
With your permission, Mr. President and hlembers of the Court, 1
would like to elaborate this two-fold submission of the Netherlands
Government .
The contentions put forward in the present case in support of a
negative answer to the question subrnitted are unsound both inprinciple
and in practice. They are, furthermore, completely unnecessary for
safeguarding the legitimate interests of Member States, while they are,
at the same time, destructive for the purposes of the world organization.
Unnecessary for safeguarding the legitimate interests of hlember
States, unpracticable and destructive for the effective functioning of
the United Nations and-1 might add also for these reasons-unsound
inlaw; these are the three points 1 may briefly comment upon.
The alleged implied limitations of the fiscal power of the General
Assembly are unnecessary for safeguarding the rights of Member States.
Indeed,what is involved here isonly the obligation of Member States to
pay their share in the expenses made bp the Organization, and nothing
more. The question submitted to the Court does not involve any other
obligation or limitation of the rights of hlember States. It does not
involve an obIigation of Member States to rnake avaiiable to the United
Nations troops or other personnel, or arms or other materials, or services
of any kind. It does not involve an obligation of Member States to
refrain from any activity which might adversely affect the United Nations
operations. Itdoes not involve an obligation of a Member State to admit
within its territory or jurisdiction any United Nations activity or, to
allow any other State to infringe its sovereignty. In fact, the question
does not involve any legal consequence at al1Save the obligation to pay
a certain amount of money to the United Nations.
And even in this respect, the legitimate interests of hfember States
are arnply safeguarded by the procedures provided for in the Charter.
It is the General Assembly, the United Nations organ in wliich every
Mernber State is equally represented, which alone can take a binding
decision in this matter. And every single decision of the General Assembly,
both in regard to authorization of any expenditure and in regard to the
apportionment between the Member States, requires a two-thirds
majority of the Members present and voting.
Now, in view of the effect of a decision of the General Assembly
under Article 17of the Charter-that is, the obligation to pay a specific
amount of money-and in view of the procedure to be followed in taking
this decision-that isa two-thirds majority of the Member States being
required both for the authorization and for the apportioning of expenses
-in view.of this effect and procedure, is it reasonable to suggest that
the fiscalpower of the General Assembly is lirnited in law to particular
types of expenditure to be determined "objectively"? Could there be 314 ST.4TEMENT OF MR. RIPHAGEN (NETHERLXNDS)-1 662
Charter. Indeed, such guidance would be of limited value, since there is
nothing in the word "administrative" which would permit to make a
sharp distinction in concretobetween the one and the other expenditure.
"Sur le plan
Actually, the French written statement itself states that:
administratif, les Nations Unies ont assumé la gestion de nombreuses
entreprises d'assistancehumanitaire ou économique;mais les obligations
financièresq~i en découlaientn'ont jamais peséque sur les États qui les
avaient acceptéeset dans la mesure oh ceux-ci les avaient acceptées."But
then, the whole construction cornes down to nothing more than the
statement that the General Assernbly, in the exercise of its fiscal power
under Article r7 of the Charter, should carefully consider, both in
authorizing and in apportioning expenses of the Organization, whether
and to what extent such expenses should be covered by voluntary
contributions or by obligatory contributions, and, in the latter case,
according to what scale of assessment.
But then the question how the General Assembly should exerciseits
power under Article 17, paragraph 2,of the Charter to apportion the
expenses of the Organization, the question how the General Assembly
should exercise its power is not before the Court in the present instance.
[Public hearing of 16 May 1962, morning]
Mr. President, hlembers of the Court, yesterday 1 had the honour to
advance that the alleged limitations of the fiscal power of the General
Assembly are not necessary for safeguarding the legitimate interests of
Member States; that they are impracticable and destructive for the
effective functioning of the United Nations; and that they are unsound
in law.
In commenting on the second point, that is that the alleged limitations
are impracticable and destructive for the effective functioning of the
world organization, 1 have referred to the written statement of the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which there should be made a
distinction between "administrative" and other expenses. I have
remarked that it is not quite clear from the French written statement
what exactly the legal consequences of this distinction are supposed to be.
Ifthe statement intends to assert that the General Assembly, in the
course of exercising its fiscal potver under Article 17 of the Charter,
should keep in mind this distinction when it is going to decide what
expenses are to be made and how they shall be covered, there might be
some practical merit in the distinction.
However, the question how the General Assembiy should exercise its
power under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and which consider-
ations might guide the General Assembly in deciding on the scale of
assessment, that question is not before the Court in the present instance.
Xow, indeed, the French written statement seems to go further and
seems to purport to state a legal rule according to which a Member State
is entitled to refuse topay its contribution to the expenses of the Organi-
zation on the ground that some of those expenses are, in the opinion
of that Member State, of a "non-administrative" character, but then it
attaches a far more important legal consequence to the distinction
between administrative and other expenses.
In that case, the distinction would not only mean to give some guid-
ance to the General Assembly, but would be the legal touchstone for STATEMENT OF MT. RIPHAGEN (NETHERLANDS)-1 V662 315
the existence or non-existence of financial obligations of Member States
and for the validity or nullity of a General Assembly resolution appor-
tioning expenses among Member States. Now surely, if one would admit
that the fiscal power of the General Assembly is limited to a certain
category of expenditures of the United Nations, the definition of that
category should be a clear-cut definition, leaving no room for reasonable
doubt on whether particular expenses are included in or excluded from
such category. Otherwise, the door would be open for al1sorts of doubts
and each Member State could then dispute the amount of its contri-
bution not only-as is indeed its right under the Charter-during the
discussions in the GeneralAssemblp on the authorization of expenditure
and on the rnethod of coverage, but also after the General Assembly,
by a two-thirds rnajority vote, has decided that the expenses may be
made and shall be covered by obligatory contributions.
Now the consequences of such a çystem would be that the authorized
expenditures could not be made before the contributions which should
cover those expenses are actually made and to the extent that they have
been made since, otherwise, the consequences of non-payment by one
hlember State would in practice have to result in an increase of the
contributions of other Member States.
Now it seems obvious that any such a $riorilegal limitation of the
fiscal power of the General Assembly would make it impossible for the
Organization effectively to exercise its functions.
The sarne objections of a practical nature apply to the other alleged
limitations of the fiscalpower of the General Assembly,inaçmuch as they
al1 tend to make the Iegal obligation of a Member State to pay contri-
bution dependent upon the political judgment of that Nember State
in respect of the United Nations operations which cause the expenses
that are to be covered by such contributions.
&Ir. President and Rlembers of the Court, 1 now arrive at the third
point 1 may briefly comment upon. The alleged limitations of the fiscal
power of the General Assembly are unsound in law.
As 1have already observed, the fiscal power of the General Assembly,
stipulated in Article 17 of the Charter, isnot expressly limited to any
particular type or category of expenses of the Organization.
If, however, it is contended that this power is lirnited in law, such
contention could only be based on the thesis that there is an irnplied
limitation, arising from the fact that the Charter stipulates, or at least
recognizes, other rights and powers which, withoul such limitation of
the fiscal power of the General Assembly, would be nullified, encroachcd
upon or frustrated.
However, the written statcments suggesting a negative answer to
the question submitted to the Court fail to indicate exactlywhich other
powers-powers of other United Nations organs or powers of Member
States-would, by implication, limit the fiscal power of the General
Assembly. They fail to indicate why these other powers would be nulli-
fied, encroached upon or frustrated by the unlimited exercise of the
fiscal power of the General Assembly, and they fail to indicatto ahal
extent this fiscal power would, therefore, have to be construed as
"limited",
To start with the last-mentioned point, it is obvious that the General
Assembly, in the exerciseof its fiscal power, maybe under a legal duty
to take into account the fact that some other organ has-within thelimits of its powers-taken a decision or acted in a way which entails
legal consequences for the United Nations. Indeed, the Court has for
example stated in the case of the Awards of the Ulzited Nations Admini-
strativeTribunal that the General Assembly is Iegally bound to honour
the financial consequences arising from such awards. In the present case,
various arguments have been put forward which tend to show that the
expenses of United Nations operations such as those in the Congo and
the Rliddle East, in view of the amounts involved or the particular
situation of certain Member States or the exceptional character of the
operations, should be put on a special account and apportioned according
to a scale of assessment different £rom that applicable to other expenses.
Now, we can leave aside whether these arguments tend to or could
possibly give sufficient basis for the assumption thatthe General Assem-
bly is legcrllybound to follow the course indicated therein. 1 think u7e
can leavethis aside since, in any case, such legal obligations of the Generai
Assembly would refer to the exerciseof its fiscalpower. The question now
submitted to the Court, however, concerns the existenceof the power
to authorize and apportion expenditures of the United Nations. Indeed,
if the United Nations expenses relating to the United Nations operations
in the Middle East and in the Congo are ?aotexpenses of the Organization
within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2,there is no sense in dis-
cussing whether and how they would have to be apportioned. And if
they are expenses of the Organization, well, then the question is answered.
New, Rlr. President and Members of the Court, we mentioned this
question of possible duties of the General Assembly in respect of the
exercise of its fiscal powerbecause, in the theory, such duties might be
the legal expression of the need to avoid contradiction and conflict
between the general fiscal power of the General Assembly and the other
rights and powers recognized or stipulated in the Charter. Indeed, one
might, in a general way, argue thatthe General Assembly in the exercise
of its fiscal powermay, and perhaps even should, take into account not
only tlie purely financial aspects of expenditure and coverage, but also
other relevant factors. But that does not mean that such other factors are
legally relevant in respect of the existenceand scope of the fiscal power,
or relevant for the Eegalco7tsequences of its exercise in a given case. In
other words, even if one maintains that in authorizing expenditures of
the Organization the General Assernbly rnay or should take into account
the decisions of other United Nations organs in the light of the applicable
Charter provisions, this would, from the legal point of view, stille a very
long way from saying that some expenditures cannot be expenditureç of
the Organization. And even if one would maintain that, in apportioning
the expenses of the Organization authorized by it, the General Assernbly
may or should take into account the rights and obligations of the Member
States in the non-financial field under the Charter, this would still be
far from admitting that the legal consequence of the apportioning-
that is the financial obligation of a Member State to pay the allotted
share-could be Eegallynullifiedby such other rights or obligations of the
Member States.
Indeed, Mr. President and Members of the Court, there is, in al1
systems of Iaw, a fundamental distinction between the question of the
directives which an authority should followin the exercise of its functions,
and the question of the scope of its powers and the legal consequences
of the exercise of those powers. STATEhlEKT OF Mr. RIPHAGEN (NETHERLANDS)- 1662
317
Now, only the latter question is, in the present case, submitted to the
Court. Now, under these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that
the arguments wliich have been adduced in favour of a negative answer
to the question put to the Court are in reality somewhat beside the point.
This goes, in the first place, for al1 the arguments which are based in
some way or another on the distinction between "administrative" and
"other" expenses. It goes also for the arguments tending to prove that
some Members of the United Nations should bear a larger share, or even
all, of tliexpenses relating to certain United Nations operations, either
in view of their position as permanent members of the Security Council
or in view of theirlleged responsibility for the situation which occasioned
such operations. These arguments are a11 arguments which. can be
invoked in the course of the discussions of the General Assembly when
it deliberates on the authorization and apportioning of.certain United
Nations expenditures. But they cannot have any legal relevance once
the General Assembly has taken decisions on both points.
The arguments which are based on the provisions of Chapter VI1 of
the Charter are, it is respectfully submitted, equally irrelevant in law
once the General Assembly has taken decisions on the authorization
and apportioning of expenses. Surely the provisions of Chapter VI1
stipulate obligations of Member States, powers of the Security Council
and even rules which might be interpreted as safeguarding certain legiti-
mate interests of individual Member States.
But it is difficult to see how and wuny of those provisions of Chapter
VI1 could be legally relevant in respect of thefinaficialobligations to
pay contributions to the United Nations.
Under Article 43 of the Charter,
"al1 Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to
make available to the Security Council, on itsal1and in accordance
with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance
and facilities, incliiding rights of passage, necessary for the purpose
of maintaining peace and security".
Now, apart frorn the fact that no such agreement has ever been con-
cIuded between the Security Council and any Member state or group of
Member States, one might Say that there is in this Article some general
sort of obligation of the Mernber States. But how could one possibly
sustain that such obligations affect in any way thefinancialobligations
topay contribution to the United Nations in order to cover its authorized
expenditures?
Apparentiy, those wlio invoke Cliapter VI1 of the Charter do nothave
in mind the obligati ofnMember States under the provisions of this
Chapter, but try to turn these provisions into tlie stipulation of right
of every Member State not to contribute anything to the maintenance of
international peace and security othenvise than under a speciaI agree-
ment concluded by that Member State. Now that is not what the pro-
visions of ChapterVI1 Say, andit isnot areasonable implication of these
provisions either. Surely, when Article43 requires a special agreement
between a Member Stateand the Security Council-an agreement subject
to ratification in accordance with constitutional proceçses-that is
because of the grave international and interna1 responsibilities involved
for a State in the fact that ifs armed forces take military action or that STATEMENT OF MT.RIPHAGEX (NETHERLANDS)-1 6 62
318
ilsterritory is made available for the passage of foreign troops taking
such action.
But nothing inany way comparable to such responçibilities is involved
for aRlember State in its financial contributions tothe expenses made by
the Organizatian aç such, whatever the operations of the United Nations,
causing such expenses, might be.
Thus, to the extent that one rnight construe the requirements of a
special agreement in Article 43 of the Charter as a provision which safe-
ards â legitimate interest ofa Member State,there is nothing in the
gcal power of the General Assembly under Article 17 which in any way
nullifies, encroaches upon or frustrates that safeguard.
Now Chapter VI1 of the Charter is invoked in another context as
well, and that is to suggest that the unlimited exercise of the fiscalpower
of the General Assembly might encroach upon the fiowers ofthe Securily
CounciEunder that Chapter.
Now here again it is extremely difficult to see how there could be,
in law, any conflict between the two powers in the case which is now
before the Court. There could of course be some contradiction if the
General Assembly, in the exercise of its fiscalpower, woulfaito author-
ize and apportion expenses of the United Nations which would result
from the implementation of Security Council resolutions, taken under
the provisioris of Chapter VII. But in the present case, we are dealing
with exactly the opposite situation. It is not the #aiEureof the General
Assembly to authorize and apportion expenditures of the United Nations,
but the decision of the General Assembly to anthorize and apportion
expenditures, which is chaUenged. But what conflict could posçibly arise
between such a @osilive decision and the power of the Security Council
under Chapter VII?
Actually, the present case deals with expenditures of the United
Nations resulting from operations which were undertaken partly in
pursuance of resolutions of the Security Council, partly in pursuance
of resolutionç of the General Assembly.
Now various written statements submitted to the Court suggest
that some or al1of these operations are,as such, contrary to the rules
of conduct laid down in the Charter. They also suggest that some of
the resolutions, in pursuance whereof the operations were undertaken,
are "invalid", since they would have been adopted by a United Nations
organ which, under the Charter, is incompetent to do so.
In the opinion of my Government, bot11these allegations are \vithout
substance in law. In its written statement,my Government has indicated
the reasons on which its opinion is based. Since some of my distinguished
colleagues here will and have already dealt with these allegations, you
will perhaps allow me, Mr. President and Members of the Court, not to
elaborate on this question at the present moment. Apart from the wish
not to abuse the privilege of addressing the Court, there is another
reason why 1 may ask the Court to remain silent on this point. Indeed,
Mr. President and Members of the Court, in the submission of my
Government the issue of the so-called "validity" of the resolutions. and
of the operations assuch is notlegally relevantfor the question submitted
to the Court in the present request for an advisory opinion.
The question submitted to the Court is lirnited in scope. It relates to
certain specified expenditures, which have beex authorized by the General
Assembly, and ta the financial obligations of Member States, resulting STATEMENT OF Mr. RIPHAGEN (NETHERLANDS)- V1662
319
from the apportioning of those expenses by decisions, which have 6een
taken by the General Assembly.
Now the fiscal power of the General Assembly is challenged on the
strength of arguments which are directed, not directly against the
authorization and apportioning of expenses, but against the activities
which entai1 those expenses, and against the resolzttionwhich underly
the activities.
Obviously, the strength of these arguments depends on the existence
and the solidity of a Iegal "link" between the fiscal powers, rights and
obligations on the one hand, and the operational powers, rights and
obligations on the other hand.
It is by no means self-evident, in any legal system, that the non-
observance of rules applicable to the operational field has any legal
consequences in the fiscal field andvice versa.On the contrary, in most
legal systems the two fields are quite distinct and, in principle, neatly
separated. This would seem also true for the legal system created by the
Charter of the United Nations. The authorization of expenditures for
United Nations activities cannot, in law, justify al1 or any of those
activities under the rules of conduct of the law of nations, including the
Charter. But no more could the fact that some of those activities were
proved to be contrary to such rules of conduct deprive the corresponding
expenditures of their legal character as "expenses of the Organization".
Iftherefore-to take an example-the written staternent of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa submits-now 1 quote from page
264 of the printed document-
"that there iç justifiable doubt as to the validity of certain activities
engaged in by the United Nations in the Congo in that they may
well have exceeded and conflicted with the terms of the relevant
resolutions and the provisions of the Charter",
it is respectfully submitted from Our part that such doubts are legally
irrelevant to the issue now before the Court.
Itmay be remarked in passing that it would be in fact impossible to
designate thaf part of the total expenditure of the United Nations
operations in the Congo which would correspond to theacts of the United
Nations forces over there which are considered by South Africa to be
"doubtful".
But, of course,such an objection is of a practical nature and would not
apply to authorized expenditures of the United Nations which would be
identifiable as relating solely and exclusively to the implementation of
specific resolutions. Now here again, Mr. President and Mernbers of
the Court, it is, from a legal po.nt of view, by no means self-evidcnt that
the alleged lack of "validity" of a resolution ~vould taint the expendi-
tures of the United Nations relating to its implementation, to the effect
that they could not qualify as "expenses of the Organization".
There are perhaps few legal expressions which cover so many totally
different things as the word "validity" in relation to a legal act. It is,
indeed, generally recognized that a legal act may be "valid" in one
respect and "invaIid" in another respect.
It iç also generally recognized that the "relativity" of the validity of
a legal act is closely related to the diversity of legal interests which are
protected by the rules governing its coming into being.320 STATEMEST OF hlr. RIPHAGEN (NETHERLANDS)- V1662
Actually one might Say that the word "validity" in relation to a
legal act is nothing more than a legal tenn of art indicating that the .
non-observance of one rule is sanctioned by the non-application of
another rule.
In the present case some of the written statements argue that the
alleged non-observance of certain rules in the course of the adoption
of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions in pursuafice
of which the United Nations has undertaken its operations should be
sanctioned by the non-application of the rules relating to the expenses
of the United Nations and the way in which they are covered.
Now surely such.sanction can never be self-evident and could only be
applied if there were some specific basis for itin the Charter itself. The
mere use of the rather ambiguous terrn "validityH-or, for that matter,
of the equally arnbiguous term "ultra vires"-cannot justify such an
extraordinary sanction.
Every Member State, by the sole fact of beinga Member of the United
Nations, accepts the obligation to bear its share in the expenses of the
Organization. It has its Say in the authorization of such expenses and it
has its Say in the determination of the scale of apportioning: each
successive year the finaldecision on both points istaken by a two-thirds
majority of the Member States.
Now it is suggested that this set of rules relating to the fiscal field
should not be applied if some completely different set of rules, relating
to the operational field, has not been observed.
Now it would seem that this suggestion not only does not find any
foundation in the text of the Charter, it a80 leads to quite unacceptable
consequences.
The suggestion that the rules relating to the fiscal field should not be
applied if some completely different set of rules, relating to the opera-
tional field, has not been observed, does not find any foundation in the
text of the Charter and would lead to unacceptable consequences.
This iç particularly clear if we look at the type of objections raised in
the present case against the operational resolutions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council. These objections are two-fold. One
is based on an interpretation of the dividing line between the powers of
the General Assembly and those of the Security Council in matters of
maintenance of international peace and security. The other is based on
an interpretation of what constitutes matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of a State.
In tlie opinion of my Government, there is no merit in either of the
two interpretations.
But even if there were some merit in the objections as such, they
would still bimmate~ial for the issue whi+ is at present before the Court.
One might perhaps argue that one or the other of the objections
raised would at least be a relevant objection, if the Court would have
to decide on the point whether a Member State were under an obligation
to admit operations of the United Nations within its territory.
Or if the question submitted to the Court would be whether specific
acts, othenvise contrary to the rules of conduct of the law of nations,
could be justified by the fact that they were committed inpursuance of
an operational i.esolution of a United Nations organ.
Or, even, ifthe Court were confronted with conflicting operational
resolutions of different United Nations organs. But the present issue is
not one of those just mentioned, nor even a comparable one. STATEhIENT OF Mi. RIPHAGEN (NETHERLANDS)-1 V662 321
The question now before the Court is only whether specific expenses
of the United Nations are to be borne by the Mernber States.
It deals, so to speak, with the minimum legal effect of the existence of
the United Nations as an organizatiosz.
If the financial obligation to pay coiitribution' could be challenbyd
a Member State, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying decision
of the General Assembly has been taken in strict accordance with the
procedural requirements laid down in Article 17 of the Charter, then the
door ~rould be open for an endless amount of litigation and the Organi-
zation would be doorned to what the French caIl "E'imnzobitisrne".
And here, Mr. President and Members of the Court, the legal arguments
join the practical arguments which 1 have had the honour to advance
before.
hlr. President and Members of the Court, in concluding my statement
1 may be allowed to stress once again that my Government, for the
reasonç set out in itswritten statement, maintains the opinion that the
resolutions of the General Asçembly and of the Security Council in
pursuance of which the United Nations untertook its operations in the
Middle East and in the Congo are, in al1 respects, "valid" resolutions
under the Charter.
Ifmy oral statement has been primarily concerned with the fiscal
power of the General Assembly, this has been done because the legal
issue raised by the request for an advisory opinion has a bearing on
more than the United Nations operations in the Middle East and in the
Congo alone. In reality itinvolves nothing less than the existence of the
United Nations as such.
For al1these reasons, my Government remain of the opinion that the
expenditures authorized by the General Assembly resolutions mentioned
in the request for an advisory opinion do constitute expenses of the
Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter of the United Nations. Thank you. 3. EXPOSE ORAL DE M. R. MONACO
[Audience publiquedu 16 mai 1962m ,atin]
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, qu'il me soit
permis de vous dire tout d'abord combien j'apprécie l'honneur et le
grand privilège qui me sont réservésaujourd'hui de comparaître de
nouveau devant vous.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Bien~bresde la Cour, Ies différents
problhmes juridiques et financiers qui se posent à l'égard de la requête
d'avis consultatif adresséA Ia Cour par l'Assemblée généraledes Nations
Unies ont étéanalysés assez profondément et sur une base très large
par les exposésécritsprésentéspar plusieurs gouvernements, ce qui nous
aide beaucoup dans notre exposé d'aujourd'hui, mais qui risque aussi
de nous éloigner unpeu denotre but fondamental qui consiste à apporter
le plus de clarté possible la question. C'est précisément causede cela
qu'il apparaît nécessaire à ce moment de délimiter soigneusement la
substance de la question poséeà la Cour.
L'Assembléegénérales'est bornéeà demander si oui ou non les dépen-
ses autorisées par plusieurs résolutions de l'Assemblée elle-mêmeet
relativesh la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies ainsi qu'aux opérations
des Nations Unies au Congo constituent des dépenses de l'organisation
au sens du paragraphe z de l'article 17 de la Charte. La demande en
elle-mêmeest très simple, bien qu'elle implique des questions d'une
importance très remarquable dans le cadre de la structure et du fonc-
tionnement de l'Organisation. Mais cette importance ne peut pas avoir
comme conséquence de fairetrancher par la Cour de Justice des problèmes
qui ne se rattachent pas directement àla substance de la demande d'avis
consultatif.
Notre point de départ, ainsi que l'objet de nos discussions, doit donc
étreexclusivement le texte dont il s'agit.
Le paragraphe z de l'article ~7 prévoit que les dépensesde l'organi-
sation sont supportées par les Etats Membres selon la répartition fixée
par l'Assemblée généraleP .ar conséquent, la question concerne exclusive-
ment les modalités d'après lesquelles les dépenses causées par les deux
opérations doivent êtrecouvertes.
C'est une réalité incontestable que les dépenses nécessaires pour
l'exécution desdites opérations ont étéordonnées par le Secrétaire
généraldans l'exercice de ses compétences. Par conséquent il n'y a
pas lieu d'avoir des doutes sur la légitimitéde la procédure financière
qui s'est dérouléeà cet égard. Cela signifie, en outre, qu'une question
de responsabilité des organes qui ont agi à cet effet est actuellement
inconcevable et qu'il ne s'agit pase faire rentrer au budget de l'organi-
sation des fonds qui en seraient sortisd'une façon abusive.
La question sur laquelleIa Cour doit se prononcer se réfèreexclusjve-
ment à la manière d'après laquelle ces dépenses doivent étre définitiye-
nient couvertes. Nous savons qu'elles ont&té couvertes à titre provisoire par des fonds provenant de plusieurs sources qui ne sont pas les sources
ordinaires des finances de l'organisation.
En d'autres termes, i1 faut voir quel est le système le meilleur pour
répartir entreles Etats Membres les dépenses dont il s'agit. Cela signifie
qu'il faut rechercher une cléde répartition appropriée, laquelle, j'insiste,
ne doit pas nécessaire-ment avoir comme conséquence de mettre à la
charge des différents Etats Membres des cotisations proportionnelles à
celles qui leur sont imposées pour ce qui concerne d'autres.dépenses.
L'article 17 laisse, en effet, tout à fait ouverte Ia question de savoir,
dans un cas donné,si tel ou tel autre syst&mede répartition des dépenses
doit être adopté. Voilà donc que, mêmesi la Cour donnera une réponse
affirmativeà la question qui lui a étéposée, ils'ensuivra que l'Assemblée
généraleaura toujours le pouvoir de fixer une proportion entre les
différentes quotes-parts qui tienne compte de la spécialitédes dépenses
encourues à cause des opérations au Moyen-Orient et au Congo.
Monsieur le Président, Messieursles Membres de la Cour, nous croyons
qu'il a été vraiment opportun de tâcher de délimiter avec exactitude la
portée de la requête d'avis consultatif adressée à la Cour, ce qui nous
facilitera dans l'accomplissement de notre tâche ultérieure.
Il s'agit donc d'une matière bien déterminée qui, en outre, tombe
dans le domaine d'application d'un seul article, plus exactement d'un
seul paragraphe d'un article de la Charte des Nations Unies. Nous en
connaissons tous le libellé. gvidemment, afin de parvenir à une inter-
prétation correcte, il faut lire et analyser le paragraphe 2 de l'article17
en connexion avec le système de la Charte, c'est-à-dire avec les autres
dispositions de la Charte qui peuvent avoir une certaine influence ou
bien qui peuvent apporter une certaine aide afin d'interprétation.
Si on lit le paragraphe 2 de l'article17 séparémentdes autres para-
graphes du mêmearticle, et même si onlit l'article tout entier, il appa-
rait, au premier abord, tellement clair qu'aucun effort d'interprétation
ne semble nécessaire.Tout de même,cette disposition est difficile à cause
du fait qu'elle est très importante et parce qu'elle seule fixe les principes
régissant le budget et les finances de l'Organisation.
Le premier paragraphe de l'article 17 n'intéresse pas immédiatement
notre question. Si l'Assemblée générale,en vertu de ce paragraphe, a
une compétence généraleet exclusive en ce qui concerne le budget de
l'organisation, cela ne donne pas encore une solution au problème qui
consiste à établir comment les dépenses déjà effectuées doivent être
réparties entre les Etats Membres.
1out revient donc au paragraphe 2 de cet article qui doit faire l'objet,
avant tout, d'une interprétation littérale, laquelle évidemment tienne
compte des mots employés par les rédacteurs de la Charte lorsqu'ils ont
formulé le paragraphe, Il s'agit de savoir si, en disant Ndépenses de
l'organisation )i,on a voulu considérer seulement certaines dépenses et
non pas n'importe quelle dépense que l'organisation peut effectuer dans
l'exercice de sesfonctions et de ses pouvoirs.
A première vue, &tant donné que le paragraphe 2 ne faitaucune dis-
tinction entre les différentes catégories de dkpenses et que la ,régie
contenue dans ce paragraphe est la seule, parmi toutes les dispositions
de la Charte, qui se réfère aux dépenses de l'organisation, on devrait
parvenir à la conclusion que n'importe quelle dépense tombe sous cette
disposition et, par conséquent, sous le pouvoirde l'Assembléegénérale
en tant que celle-ci est l'organe auquel la Charte confère la compétence324 EXPOSÉ ORAL DE M. MONACO (ITALIE) - 16 v 62
particulière de fixer la cléde répartition des dépenses et d'établir les
montants d'argent qui sont mis à la charge de chacun des Etats Membres.
On sait toutefois que le principe in claris non filinterpretatio,qui
d'ailleurs a été déjà appliqué plusieurs fois par cette Cour, doit être
utilisésurtout en fonction de l'interprétation littérale. Mais mêmequand,
sur la base de l'interprétation littérale, on obtient déjà un résultat
satisfaisant,il ne faut pas laisser de côté l'interprétation systématique.
Quelle est, à cet égard, la place et la valeur de l'article17 dans le
système de la Charte? Cet article a étéinsérésous le titre ((Fonctions et
pouvoirs de l'Assemblée 11Il est évident alors que, avec les dispositions
de l'article17,on a voulu donner à l'Assemblée unpouvoir généraldans
le domaine tout entier de la gestion budgétaire et financiPre de lJOrgani-
sation. Toutefois, l'idée de la gestion se réfèreplutbt à la fonction
attribuée à 1'.4ssemblée qu'à ses pouvoirs. Mais il faut noter aussi que
l'Assemblée elle-mêmene fonctionne pas seulement comme organe de
gestion des finances de l'organisation - tâche qu'elle accomplit par
l'intermédiaire d'un certain nombre d'organes subsidiaires -, car, en
outre, elle exerce, en vertu de l'article17, des pouvoirs de décision et
de contrôle: tel est le pouvoir d'examiner - c'est-à-dire de contrôler-
le budget et de l'approuver, c'est-à-dire de prendre Ct cet égard une
décisionqui oblige tous les États Membres. Et mêmequand elle fixe la
mesure d'?prés laquelle les dépenses doivent être supportées par les
différents Etats Membres, l'Assembléeexerce un véritable pouvoir, qui
lui est attribué directement par l'article17.
Les compétences financières et budgétaires de l'article 17 s'étendent
à tous les domaines d'action de l'Organisation. L'article 17 ne fait en
réalitéaucune distinction entre les dépenses qui sont la conséquence de
la décision ou de l'action d'un organe donné et celles qui dépendent
d'un autre organe; au contraire, il comprend toutes les dépenses, soit
qu'elles aient étécausées à la suite de l'action ou de la décision d'un
organe principal, soit qu'elles dépendent de l'action ou de la décision
d'un autre organe nouveau et subsidiaire de l'Organisation.
En tenant toujours compte du systéme de la Charte et, pIus spéciaIe-
ment, de celui du titre dont il s'agi- c'est le titre de CFonctions et
pouvoirs de l'Assemblée i-, ilfaut remarquer que, quand on a voulu
faire des distinctions entre la compétence d'un organe et celle d'un autre
organe, on l'a dit avec clarté, avec toute clarté. C'est précisémentle cas
des articles 12 et14 du mêmetitre qui visent les interférences possibles
entre la compétence de l'Assembléeet celle du Conseil de Sécurité ence
qui concerne le maintien de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales. Si
mêmeen matière budgétaire et financière on avait voulu faire une sem-
blable distinction de compétence, il aurait ététrès facile de le dire d'une
façon expresse. Le fait qu'on n'a rien dit à, l'article 17 signifie que,
mêmequand, en principe, on serait en présence de la compétence d'un
organe qui ne soit pas l'Assemblée, celle-cigarde toujours sa compétence
généraleet exclusive pour ce qui concerne la matière budgétaire et
financiére. On a très fréquemment mis en relief que les difficultésd'inter-
prétation de la question qui est poséeà la Cour dépendent du fait que les
dépenses ont été causées par l'action d'organes tels que la Force d'ur-
gence et les forces des Nations Unies au Congo qui ne figurent pas parmi
les organes normaux de l'organisation. Mais cette opinion ne peut pas
êtresuivie, car ily a des dispositions de la Charte qui donnent elles-
mêmesla réponse Acette objection. Il faut rappeler qu'en vertu des articles 7 et 22 de la Charte'peuvent
étre crééstous les organes subsidiaires qui apparaissent nécessaires afin
de réaliser les buts de l'organisation. C'est surtout I'article7 qui est
important à cet égard, car ilse réféAen'importe quel organe de caractère
subsidiaire,destiné à agir n'importe en quel domaine, et qui, évidemment,
comprend tous les organes ayant ce caracthre et qui sont émanation des
organes principaux de l'Organisation.
La conséquence en est que même les dépenses causéespar ces organes
subsidiaires doivent êtrequalifiées comme dépensesde l'organisation au
sens de l'article17,paragraplie 2.
Tels sont donc les résultats auxquels on doit parvenir sur la base de
l'interprétation littérale et systématique de la disposition dont il s'agit.
Mais afin que notre analyse apparaisse plus complète, on peut encore
avoir recours à l'histoire de l'artic17,c'est-à-dire aux travaux prépara-
toires, ainsi qu'aux autres élémentshistoriques qui peuvent démontrer
quelle a été lavolonté des rédacteurs de la Charte. NOUSsavons que
l'importance qu'on peut attacher aux travaux préparatoires aux fins
d'interprétation n'est pas décisive; dans plusieurs occasions la Cour
s'est prononcéeà cet égard. Mais on doit quand mêmereconnaitre qu'on
ne peut pas négliger les travaux préparatoires quand ils contiennent des
déments qui peuvent clarifier le sens et la portée d'une règle donnée.
Nous ne voulons pas prendre trop de temps à la Cour en exposant
l'histoire complète à travers laquelle on est parvenu à la rédaction
actuelle de l'articl17. Elle adéjà étéprésentéepar certains des exposés
écrits que M. Ie Président et MM. les Membres de la Cour connaissent
très bien. C'est pour cela qu'on peut renvoyer à ce qu'on a déj.àdit:
nous nous référons surtout aux élémentsvraiment complets qu~ sont
dûs au Gouvernement du Danemark et qu'on peut retrouver aux pages
151 et suivantes du livre jaune réunissant les exposésécritsde différents
gouvernements.
On voit là que, à-partir des premières propositions formulées par le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis lorsque celui-ci présenta aux Gouverne-
ments de la Chine, du Royaume-Uni et de l'Union soviétique,les (Telz-
tutivePro~osals for a Generul International Organization ii,en vue de la
préparation de la conférence de Dumbarton Oaks, on a toujours consi-
dérél'Assemblée générale commele seul organe compétent à exercer les
pouvoirs et les fonctions financiéres budgétaires de l'Organisation. En
effet, au pointII, B, 2 f, desdites propositions on peut lire que l'Assem-
blée a le pouvoir d'approuver le budget des organes et de l'organisation
et des institutions de l'organisation elle-meme, d'établir en outre une
base de répartition des dépenses entre les États Membres ainsi qu'une
procédure pour telle répartition, et en outre qu'elle a le pouvoir de
contrôler, de faire des recommandations et d'adopter des mesures à
l'égarddes budgets des institutions spécialisées.
La conférence de Dumbarton Oaks a confirméd'une façon très nette
le principe d'après lequel la compétence budgétaire et financière de
l'organisation appartient exclusivement à l'Assemblée générale. 11
suffit de lire le cinquiéme chapitre, sectionB, paragraphe 5, des propo-
sitions finales adoptées par ladite conférence pour pouvoir le constater:
l'Assemblée généraled , 'après sesproppsitions, est compétente prerniere-
ment Lrépartir les dépenses entre lesEtatslilembres - ilfaut remarquer,
il faut souligner que lacompétence qui avant tout est prise en considé-
ration est celle qui implique ce qu'on appelle le pouvoir fiscal dergan1-sation, c'est-à-dire le pouvoir de faire cette répartition de dépenses et
qu'elle peut en outre approuver le budget de l'organisation.
Aucune modification qui soit digne d'êtresignalée n'a étéintroduite
dans les textes de Dumbarton Oaks par les amendements qui furent
demandés avant la conférencede San Francisco par les différentsÉtats.
Et la conférence de San Francisco elle-mêmene changea en rien la subs-
tance des propositions antérieures. Les questions financières furent
comprises parmi les questions importantes ?îl'égard desquelles les déci-
sions de l'Assembléedoivent êtreadoptées à la majorité des deux tiers.
On marqua seulement d'une façon plus nette l'obligation des États
Membres de faire face au paiement de montants d'argent mis à leur
charge par l'Assemblée, endisant que les dé$ensesserozt sup$ortéespar
les ÉtatsMembres.
L'histoire de la formulation de l'article17 de la Charte est donc assez
claire eten même temps assez simple. Il n'y a jamais eu une volonté,
quelle qu'elle soit, tendant à soustraire à l'Assembléegénéralela pléni-
tude de la compétence en matière budgétaire et financiére. On peut
affirmer, au contraire, que le soi-disant pouvoir fiscal de l'organisation
a étésouligné davantage avec la formule que nous avons dernièrement
évoquée.
Voilà donc que mêmeles travaux préparatoires contribuent à l'inter-
prétation de l'article17 qui est sans doute la plus claire et la plus simple
et qui, d'autre part, correspond aussi à un critère logique, c'est-à-dire
à celui d'attribuer la compétence, dans une matière donnée, à un seul
organe, précisément parce que celui-ci est l'organe souverain de l'organi-
sation et celui qui est douéde la compétence la plus vaste.
Interprétation littérale, interprétation systématique, recours aux
travaux préparatoires, c'est-à-dire reconstruction de la volonté des
parties, nous amènent à la mêmeconclusion. Par conséquent, pour ce
qui est du problème d'interprétation, on pourrait mêmes'arrêterici.
11faut toutefois, Monsieur lePrésident, Messieurs les Membres de la
Cour, rappeler un principe général d'interprétation auquel la jurispru-
dence de la Cour internationale de Justice ainsi que celle de la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale se réfèrent dans ces certains cas.
C'est précisémentle principe d'après lequel les dispositions d'un traité
et par conséquent aussi celies d'un acte institutif d'une organisation
internationale peuvent êtreinterprétéesà la lumière de la pratique suc-
cessive mise en Œuvre par les parties contractantes ou par l'organisa-
tion elle-même. On peut mentionner en ce sens, par exemple, l'avis
consultatif rendu par la Cour le3 mars 1950 ,n ce qui concerne l'Admis-
sion de nouveaux Membres aztxNations Unies: dans son avis la Cour
a tenu compte de Ia manière dlaprès.laquelle le Conseil de Sécuritéet
l'Assembléegénéraleavaient constamment interprété le texte de l'ar-
ticle 4 de la Charte. Ce qui a donné au regretté sir Hersch Lauterpacht
l'occasion de dire, dans ce livre intitu«The DeveEopment ofIntevnational
Law by the InternationalCourt Idans lequel la jurisprudence de la Cour
dans sa fonction créatricedu droit international apparaît souvent comme
une réalité vivante, que la Cour avait de cette façon ramené à l'idéede
la conduite successive la pratique uniforme poursuivie par les organes
des Natibns Unies et toujours acceptée par ces derniers.
Voyons donc quelle a été lapratique de l'Assembléegénérale en ce qui
concerne les matihres budgétaires et financières. A cetégard nous ne croyons pas qu'il soit indispensable de nous pen-
cher sur le problème si cette pratique, étant donné son développement
uniforme, étant donnésa longue durée, a fait surgir ou non de véritables
règles de droit coutumier à l'intérieur de l'organisation. La preuve de
l'existence d'une règle de droit coutumier est toujours très difficile.
Mais ici à notre avis il n'est pas nécessaire d'apporter cette preuve.
Il suffit de constater qu'un certain usage s'est développéet, ce qui im-
porte le plus, que les Etats Membres l'ont accepté. De la pratique de
l'Assembléegénérale onpeut déduire avant tout que le budget de l'Or-
ganisation tel qu'il est prévu par l'artic17, paragraphe r,de Ia Charte,
n'a pas étélimité aux dépenses relatives aux pouvoirs et aux fonctions
administratifs ainsi qu'à l'accomplissement des autres tâches ordinaires
de l'organisation, à l'exclusion donc des opérations ayant trait au main-
tien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Au contraire, on peut
retrouver au sein du budget ordinaire de l'organisation une séried'ins-
criptions qui se réfèrent précisémentà certaines opérations pour le
maintien de la paix qui ont été ordonnées par l'Assembléegénéraleou
mêmepar le Conseil de Sécuritédans l'exercice des pouvoirs qui leur
appartiennent relativement au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité
internationales.
Par exemple dans Ie budget actuel de 1962 on peut retrouver les ins-
criptions suivantes :
Premièrement, celle relative à l'organisation pour le contrôle de l'ar-
mistice en Palestine qui a étéinstituée en vertu de la résolution 5-1876
adoptée par le Conseil de Sécuritéle II août 1949;
Deuxièmement, l'inscription qui se réfèreà la Commission de conci-
liation des Nations Unies pour la Palestine crééepar l'Assembléegéné-
rale avec sa résolution 194 de la troisième assemblée en date du II dé-
cembre 1948;
Troisiémement, l'inscription qui se réfèreau groupe d'observateurs
militaires des Nations Unies aux Indes et.au Pakistan qui a étéinstitué
par le Conseil de Sécuritéen vertu de sa résoIution S-1469 du 14 mai
1950;
Et encore une autre inscription relative à l'agent des Nations Unies
pour les Indes et le.Pakistan nornniésur la base de la mêmerésolution
du Conseil de Sécurité;
On peut encore citer l'inscription relative à la Commission des Nations
Unies pour l'unification et Ie relèvement de la Corée, instituée par
l'Assembléegénérale, résolution 376 du 7 octobre 1950;
Et finalement encore l'inscription se référantau Comitépour l'Afrique
du Sud-Ouest, qui est plus récente et qui a étécréépar l'Assemblée
généraleen vertu de sa résolution 1568 adoptée le 18 décembre 1960.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, à part les
exemples que nous avons cités tout à l'heure, il faut en outre rappeler
que dans les budgets précédents de l'organisation on peut retrouver des
inscriptions relatives à des opérations toutà fait semblables à celles que
nous avons évoquées.
Voilà donc que la pratique des Nations Unies a une signification très
claire: c'est-à-dire que dèsl'institution des Nations Unies, on a toujours
considéré commeune procédure de caractére normal celle qui conduit
à inclure dans le budget ordinaire les opérations qui sont financéesconfor;
mément aux dispositions de l'article 17, paragraphe z,, c'est-à-direen
vertu de cotisations obligatoires mises à la charge des Etats Membres.Naturellement, tout ne s'est pas passésans difficulté au sein de 1'Assem-
blée:en plusieurs occasionsil y a eu des Etats qui ont contesté I'incIusion
dans le budget de telle ou telle autre inscription. Mais l'Assemblée
générale, avec des délibérations tout à fait valables, a toujours repoussé
ces objections. Et, ce qui est très important au point de vue juridique et
même en lignede fait, les Etats qui avaient protesté ont fini par accepter
les décisions de l'Assemblée et ont payé leurs contributions conformé-
ment ?+la base de répartition établie par application de l'article 17,
paragraphe z.
Tl est vrai que certaines dépenses, à cause de leur nature particulière,
n'ont pas été inscrites au budget ordinaire. En effet, l'Assemblée a
décidéd'ouvrir des comptes spéciaux dans tous les cas où elle a estimé
que le financement ne devrait pas être effectué par des cotisations obli-
gatoires mises àla charge desEtats Membres, mais par d'autres méthodes.
Il suffit de rappeler le cas, par exemple, du Fonds des Nations Unies pour
les enfants, du Fonds spécial des Nations Unies et encore celui du Pro-
gramme élargi d'assistance technique et d'autres institutions similaires,
qui ont étéfinancéespar des contributions volontaires des Etats Xembres.
On comprend très aisément alors pourquoi dans ces cas le système prévu
à l'article17 n'a pas étéutilisé, car il serait vraimerit inutile d'itnposer
aux Etats Membrcs des cotisations obligatoires lorsque leur contribution
dépend exclusivement de leur propre volonté. Il n'existe pas, dans cette
hppotlièse, une véritable obligation financière qui s'impose aux Etats
Membres.
En ce qui concerne la Force d'urgence des Xations Unies et les forces
des Nations Unies au Congo, on a eu recours, à titre provisoire, àdes
contributions volontaires à l'égard desquelles des comptes spCciaux
ont été ouverts, mais cela n'apporte aucune preuve en faveur de la thèse
qui tend à démontrer que, dans ce cas, on s'est éloignédu système prévu
par l'article17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte.
En effet, l'organe spécial de l'Assemblée généralequi est chargé de
demander aux gouvernements de s'engager à des contributions volon-
taires, c'est-à-dire le Comité de négociation pour les fonds estra-budgé-
tnires, n'apas étésaisi afin qu'il pût inclure danle domaine de scçactivi-
tés les comptabilités spéciales de la Force d'urgence et des forces des
Nations Unies au Congo. D'autre part, si on analyse le texte des résolu-
tions que l'Assembléegénéralea adoptées à ces fins, on constate aisément
qu'elles ne considèrent pas que le financement des opérations doive
êtreassuré par des contributions volontaires, mais au contraire, et dans
une niesure prépondérante, par des montants d'argent mis à la charge
des Etats Nembres.
La pratique budgétaire de l'Assemblée généralenous apporte donc
la démonstration que l'article 17, paragraphe 2, a toujours étéappliqué
d'une façon uniforme et sur la base [lu principe qu'à l'Assemblée appar-
tient la compétence exclusive dans ce domaine.
Nous croyons avoir contribué, avec ce qui précède,à l'interprétation
la meilleure et la plus logique de l'article 17, paragraphe 2, ou, pour
mieux dire, d'avoir mis en relief la seule interprétation possible dudit
article.
Monsieur Ie Président, hlessieurs les Membrcs de' la Cour, le Gouverne-
ment italien, toujours convaincu que dans cette question on peut aboutir
à des bons résultats seulement si on tâche de séparer très nettement le
côtébudgétaire et financier de la question elle-mêmedu côté militaire etpolitique, croit qu'on peut s'inspirer à cet égard de certaines idées
générales. Les considérations qui précèdent ont fait ressortir l'idéequ'à
côté des autre? obligations qui, dJapr&sIes dispositions de la Charte, in-
combent aux Etats Membres, on peut concevoir comme otiligation ayant
des caractères particuliers et autonomes, l'obligation financière. Les
dispositions de la Charte obligent les Etats Membres à accomplir cer-
taines actions, à s'abstenir d'autres actions, à collaborer avec I'Organi-
sation. Elle pose a la charge des Etats Membres, avant tout, des obli-
gations de caractère politique; ce sont là les obligations qui, par préfé-
rence, attirent l'attention de l'opinion publique sur l'organisation. Mais
les obligations relatives à la coopération sociale et économique entre
Etats Membres et avec d'autres organisations internationales n'ont pas
une moindre importance. 11suffit de se référer,par exemple, aux obli-
gations découlant des programmes trPs \cariésqui visent le développe-
ment 6conomique et social des nouveaux Etats Membres; l'exécution de
ces programmes ü des conséquences financières et budgétaires de la plus
grande importance dans le système lui-même des Nations Unies.
[Audience flubliqzie dr7 mai 1962, mutin]
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, hier, à la
fin de nion exposé, j'ai tâcliéd'expliquer pourquoi on ne peut pas mettre
sur le mêmeplan les différentes catégories d'obligations qui sont mises
à la charge des Etats Membres par les dispositions de la Charte. II faut
en effet faire certaines distinctions.
Une des distinctions les plus importantes, j'estime, est celle d'après
laquelle on sépare d'un côté l'ensemble des obligations de fond des États
Membres des obIigations qui ont seulement un caractére budgétaire ou
financier. En effet, en face de buts tellement variés que l'Organisation
des Nations Unies possède et des conséquences financières également
variées qui s'y rattachent, c'est une nécessitéde séparer la gestion des
intérêts qui touchent au fond de l'action de l'organisation des intérêts
qui, au contraire, ont un caractére instrumentaire, dans le seiis qu'ils se
bornent à fournir à l'Organisation des moyens financiers pour atteindre
ses buts.
Les intérèts de caractère fondamental, qui sont essentiels pour la vie
et pour le fonctionnement de l'organisation, priment tous les autres
intérêts.Le résultat en est que lorsqu'on doit pourvoir à ces intérêts,on
pense tout d'abord Q mettre en Œuvre l'action nécessaire cette fin, en
laissant de côté pour le moment les problèmes relatifs aux conséquences .
qui en peuvent dbcouler. Cela s'explique assez aisément ct cela arrive
aussi dans les systèmes juridiques étatiques quand 011 doit faire facei
des nécessités imprkvisibles et urgentes. Ide gouvernement prend les
mesures nkcessaires sans kvidemment savoir au préalable comment les
dépenses extraordinaires qui en découleront seront couvertes. Tout cela
signifie que le côté financier de l'action des institutions publiques, si
important qu'il puisse apparaître, ne peut pas empêcher celles-ci de
poursuivre toiit d'abord les tâches qui leur sont imposées par les règles
juridiques qui régissent leur action. Ce n'est pas seulement une nécessité,
mais aussi, très souvent, une obligation de caractère constitutionnel,
c'est-5.-dire de caractère primaire dans lahiérarchie des obligations qui
incombent aux organes publics. Il en est de mêmeévidemment aussi pour
les systèmes des organisations internationales.330 EXPOSE ORAL DE hl. MONACO (ITALIE) - 17 V 62
Les obligations de caractère financier et budgétaire ont donc une
autonomie qui leur appartient par rapport aux obligations de fond qui
sont imposées par des règles juridiques aux organes ayant la respon-
sabilité de décider la conduite d'un État, ou bien, le cas échéant,d'une
organisation internationale. De telles obligations, tout en ayant leur
source dans les actions du gouvernement de l'État ou de l'organisation
internationale dont il s'agit, possèdent leur propre autonomie parce
qu'elles obéissentàdes règlesparticulières, surtout en ce qui concerne pré-
cisément la façon d'après laquelleIes obligati~ns de fond sont exécutées.
Tout cela explique très bien pourquoi un btat Membre peut êtreun
sujet de droit qui exécute très précisémentles obligritions de fond et
qui au contraire n'obéit pas aux obligations d'un caractère financier.
11se peut au contraire qu'un État ne se conforme pas à ses obfigations
de fond, tandis qu'il remplit exactement ses obligations financières à
l'égardde l'Organisation.
D'autre part, sion regarde d'un peu plus près le système des Kations
Unies, on constate que les obligations firiaricièresont un régimeautonome
auquel l'Org,znisation a donné une réglementation particulière en ins-
taurant plusieurs organes auxiliaires et en émanant toute une sériede
règlesqui s'appliquent exclusivement au domaine budgétaire et financier.
Si les obligations financières sontonc autonomes, bien que connexes,
par rapport aux autres obligations des Etats Membres des Nations Unies,
cela ne signifie pas que ces obligations soient douéesd'une autorité infé-
rieure ou bien d'une moindre efficacitéà l'égarddesdits États. Il suffit de
rappeler, par esemple, que l'article 19 de la Charte établit des sanctions
directes à la charge de l'État Membre qui ne remplit pas ses obligations
financières à l'égardde l'organisation, pour constater que mêmede ces
obligationsdécoulent des possibilitésde contrainte, ou bien des sanctions,
semblables à celles qui sont applicables pour obtenir l'euécutio~id'autres
obligations. C'est pour cela que les obligations financières doivent être
exécutéesavec la même efficacité que les obligationsde fond.
Nonobstant les arguments que nous avons exposés jusqu'ici et qui
sont partagés par la plupart des gouvernements qui ont participé à ce
débat ou qui vont y participer, on doit reconnaître qu'on entend toujours
répétées certainesidéesqui avaient été déjà exposéespar quelques-uns
des déléguéa su sein de l'Assemblée généraleC. 'est-à-dire que l'Assemblée,
en mettant lesquotes-parts des depenses à la charge desÉtats Membres,
a dépasséles limites de sa compétence et qu'elle a envahi, par ce fait
même,la compétence du Conseil de Sécurité.
Nous nous bornerons à répondre à cet argument en utilisant les obser-
vations très justes d'ailleurs qui ontétéfaites par le Gouvernement du
Danemark dans son exposé écrit (voir la page rgr dl1cahier jaune qui
contient les mémoires des différentsÉtats).
Quel que soit l'organe des Nations Unies compétent pour adopter une
décisionde fond, les conséquences financièresd'une telle décisiontombent
sous la compétence de l'Assembléegénérale.gtant donné qu'aucun autre
organe n'a de compétence en matière budgétaire, dans la mesure où
l'Assembléese conforme à une décision de fond adoptée par un autre
organe, eIledemeure tout à fait libre de réaliser telle ou telle autre solution
du problème budgétaire découlant de ladite d6cisioii. Si, par exemple, le
Conseil de Sécuritéadopte une décisionrentrant dans les limites de sa
compétence, l'Assemblée généralene pourrait jamais rendre inefficace
une telle décisionen refusant d'apporter au budget de l'orgaiiisation les EXPOSE ORAL DE hl, hlONACO (ITALIE) - I7 V 62 331
modifications correspondantes. D'autre part, le Conseiln'a aucun pouvoir
d'empiéter sur la compétence de l'Assembléegénéraleen ce qui concerne
les solutions que celle-ci estime donner aux aspects financiers de la
décisiondu Conseil lui-même.
Les aIlusions fréquentes qu'on fait à la compétence ou bien à l'iri-
compétence de l'Assembléegénéralepar rapport aux résolutions concer-
nant l'institution et le financement de la Forced'urgence et des Forces des
Nations Unies ailCongo posent encore un autre problème. Un problème
sur lequel peut-être on n'a pas encore sufisamment réfléchi.Il s'agit du
problème de savoir quelles seraient les conséquences au point de vue
budgétaire et financier si on pouvait prouver que lesdites résolutions
sont dépourvues de validité.
La doctrine et la pratique se sont jusqu'ici très peu penchées sur
la validité ou l'invalidité des actes juridiques internationaux. Il faut
remarquer - en tout état de cause- que les précédentsquiexistent et les
contributions doctrinales correspondantes se réfèrent seulement aux
actes juridiques de caractère classique soit bilatéraux soit unilatéraux.
Au contraire, on n'a presque jamais pris en examen à cet effet les actes
émanant des organes des institutions internationales.
Nonobstant cela, tâchons d'étendre les principes régissant la validité
des actes juridiques internationaux ailx actes des Nations Unies qui font
l'objetde la demande d'avis consultatif. Nous croyons avoir démontré
que les résolutions de l'Assemblée généralesont pleinement valables;
supposons, au contraire, qu'il s'agisse d'actes non valables parce qu'ils
auraient 6téadoptks par un organe incompétent. Quelles en seraient alors
les conséquences?
On dit que la validité d'un acte juridique international se réalise
lorsqu'il réunit quatre conditions, c'est-à-dire: l'existence d'un sujet
capable - dans notre cas dès qu'il s'agit d'une organisation internationa-
le, ce serait pliitôt un organe compétent à l'intérieur de l'organisation
et non donc un sujet indépendant (le droit. Deuxième condition, un objet
approprié. En outre, il faut une volonté réelleet dépourvue de vices et
enfin des formes convenables. Voilà les quatre conditions.
Dans le cas qui nous occupe, étant donnéque nous croyons que toutes
les autres conditions sont remplies, iln'y a pas lieu de faire une analyse à
cet égard, car il s'agirait par hypothèse du manque éventuel de la con-
dition consistant dans la compétence de l'organe.
Personne ne pourrait démontrer l'inexistence des résolutions de l'As-
sembléegénérale,affirmer en d'autres termes la première conséquencede
la nullité d'un acte qui consiste, dans les cas les plus graves, dans l'in-
existence de l'acte lui-même.En effet, ici on ne peut pas dire qu'il y a
inexistence des résolutions qui sont à la base des opérations au Moyen-
Orient et au Congo pour le simple fait qu'entre autres elles ont été
régulièrement exécutées.On pourrait alors au maximum affirmer que de
telles résolutions sont nulles et non pas inexistantes. Mais ceci étant, il
faut reconnaître que d'après la pratique et la doctrine l'acte nul a besoin
d'êtreconstatédans une déclaration constitutive de sa nullité. En d'autres
termes, il doit êtredéclarénon valable par un org,zne autorisé à cet effet
par le droit international. C'est là l'opinion de la doctrine. Je me bornerai
a citer l'étude très approfondie du professeur Guggenheim, intitulée
((La validité et la nullité des actes juridiques internationaux », et qui
figure dans le Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit international, 1949,
I~~ volume, et surtout les pages 108 et suivantes. La raison de tout celaen est que tout en étant prescrite par une règle objective de droit inter-
national, la non-validité de l'acte ne devient effective qu'après avoir été
constatée par l'organecompétent. Par conséquent, l'acte nul, pour autant
qu'il n'est pas déclarénon valable, déploie ses effets. Dans l'hypothèse
dont il s'agit, comme dans tous les cas où I'aniiulation d'un acte non
valable survient longtemps après que l'acte nul s'est produif, on est plutôt
en présence d'une nullité relative - pas absolue - gui comme telle
prend effet ex nunc et non ex tzlnc. Cela signifie que les effets qui se sont
produits la suite des résolutions de l'Assembléegénéraledemeureraient
intacts.
Continuons donc dans notre hypothèse. Étant donné que l'annulation
de l'acte ne se produit pas automatiquement, mais qu'il faut qu'un
organe intervienne pour déclarer cette annulation, quel serait cet organe
dans le système des Nations Unies? Il faut préalablement remarquer
qu'on ne se trouve pas ici dans un système juridique étatique, ni même
dans cesnouveauxsystèmes juridiques des communautéssupranationales.
Dans ces dernières un controle juridictionnel est organisé pour établir la
validité ou la non-validité des actes des différentsorganes. De sorte que,
en ce dernier cas, il existe un juge qui peut en déclarerl'annulation. Dans
le s~~stèmedes Nations Unies le seul organe qui pourrait êtresaisi pour
réparer ies conséquences d'une résolution entachée de nullité relative est
l'Assemblée elle-même. Mais, comme le fait remarquer très exactement
l'exposé&rit du Gouvernement du Japon (voir page 225 du livre jaune),
l'Assembléea déjà étésaisie des objections contre les résolutions qui ont
institué et financé laForce d'urgence et les opération des Nations Unies
au Congo et les a déjà repoussées.
Ceci étant, on ne pourrait pas concevoir à l'égard des résolutions de
l'Assembléedes Nations Unies d'autres voies de recours, c'est-à-dire des
solutionscontentieuses, précisémentparce qu'il s'agitd'actes qui émanent
d'une organisation ipternationale et qui, par ce fait même,expriment la
volonté de tous les Etats h,fembres,mêmede ceux qui, lorsque ces actes
ont étéformés,ont manifesté une volonté contraire.
C'est précisément pour cela qu'un avis consultatif a été demandéà la
Cour, en mettant en Œuvre le seul moyen légitime prévu par la Charte
en ce qui concerne les désaccords entre Etats Membres sur la valeur et
la portée d'un acte émanant d'une institution de l'organisation.
D'autre part, les Etats qui ne sont pas d'accord avec les résolutions
de l'Assembléegénérale ne pourraient pas réagir contre ces actes par un
refus de reconnaissance. Nous savons que la non;reconnaissance est la
sanctioii Ia plus simple et la plus immédiate que les Etats peuvent adopter
contre les actes juridiques internationaux qu'ils estiment entachés de
nullité; mais ce qui se passe dans le domaine des actes bilatéraux iiepeut
pas être appliqué aux actes des institutions internationales pour les
raisons que nous avons indiquées tout à l'heure.
Voilà donc que, à ce stade de la procédure, toute référenceà la doctrine
de l'invalidité d'un acte émanant d'un organe des Nations Unies se
révèledépourvue de toute efficacité,et en tout état de cause elle ne peut
pas apporter des solutions utiles en l'espèce. C'est pour cela que nous
estimons que sur ce point on ne doit pas retenir davantage l'attention
de la Cour.
Notre référenceà l'idéede l'incompétence de l'Assemblée générale et,
par conséquent, de la non-validité des résolutions de celle-ci, était pure-
ment hypothétique. Au contraire, il existe de nombreux arguments qui EXPOSE ORAL DE AI. MONACO (ITALIE) - 17 v 62 333
nous amènent à reconnaître que l'Assembléeétait tout àfait compétente.
Cette compétence, comme nous l'avons déjàdit, est fondéesur l'article 17
de la Charte. Nous savons qu'il s'agit là de la seule disposition de la
Charte qui a pour objet la gestion financière de l'organisation. Il faut
encore remarquer que mêmeIes dispositions des règlements - les dis-
positions secondaires - ne visent la compétence d'aucun autre organe
des Nations Unies. En effet, le règlement de l'Assembléegénéralespécifie
les compétences de l'AssembléeeIle-mêmedans ce domaine comme suit:
(L'Assembléegénéralearrêtele règlement relatif a la gestion des finances
de l'organisation II(art. 153). D'autre part, l'article suivan- I'article
154 - confirme que toutes dépenses doivent étre approuvées par
liAsseinblécgénéraIe.Cette dernière a donc tous les pouvoirs en matière
budgétaire, y compris le pouvoir de nommer des organes auxiliaires
comme le Comiti!consultatif pour les questionsadministratives et budgé-
taires et le Comitétechnique descontributions. Cesont là des organes qui
sont entièrement subordonnés dans leur activité à 1'AssernbIée générale.
La formule employéeau paragraphe premier, comme nqus l'avons vu,
indique clairement que toute décisionobligatoire pour les Etats Membres
en ce qui concerne le budget de l'Organisation relève de la compétence
de l'Assemblée générale. A vrai dire, quand on a voulu attribuer à
l'Assemblée une compétence d'une autre nature, dépourvue toutefois
d'efficacitb décisoire, on l'a dit d'une façon expresse. Tel est lcas du
paragraphe 3 dudit article 17, qui donne à l'Assemblée le pouvoir de
faire aux institutions spécialiséesde simples recommandations sur leurs
budgets administratifs. Le paragraphe z de l'article 17 confirme sans
possibilité de doute que I'Asscmbléegénéraleest compétente à fixer
l'échelle descontributions aux dépensesde l'organisation. Dans l'espèce,
1:Assembléea exercéce pouvoir, car elle a dérogCen faveur de certains
Etats Membres au barème ordinaire établipour les dépensesde l'organi-
sation. 11suffit de rappeler un paragraphe d'une résolution récente, la
résolution Ij83 de la XVmeAssemblée,dans laquelle l'Assembléegénérale :
iiDécide que les cpntributions bénévoles déjà annoncées seront
employées lorsque 1'Etat Membre intéresséen aura fait la deniande
avant le 31 mars 1961, à réduire de 50 pour IOO au maximum:
a) la contribution que les Etats Membres admis pendant la quin-
zièmesession de l'Assemblée généraIedoivent acquitter pour l'exer-
cice 1960, conformément à la résolution 1552 (XV) de l'Assemblée
généraleen date du 18décembre 1960;
b) la contribution de tous les autres États hlembres bénéficiant
en 1960 d'une assistance au titre du programme élargid'assistance
technique, cn commençant par les Etats dont la quote-part est fixée
au minimum de 0,04 pour IOO ct en continuant, successivement, par
les Etats versant une quote-part supérieure, jusqu'à ce que le total
des contributions bénévolesait été entièrement employé. JJ
Il nous apparaît que cet exemple explique très bien le pouvoir d'adap-
tation que l'Assembléegénéralepossède dans la matière.
11 faut souligner en outre que la compétence de l'ilssemblée générale
en matière budgétaire est non pas seulement générale - c'est-à-dire
consistant à examiner età approuver le budget de l'organisation - mais
aussi exclusive. Aucun article, en effet, ne confère un organe autre que
l'Assemblée généralele pouvoir de prendre des décisions en matikre
budgétaire, mêmelorsqu'il s'agit de questions tout a fait particulières. 4. ORAL STATEMENT OF SIR REGINALD
RIANNI NGHARI-BULLER
(REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM)
AT THE PUBLIC HEARINGS OF 17MAY 1962
[Public hearin of17 May 1962, morning]
May it please the Court:
1 should Iike at the commencement of my address to express my
gratitude to the Court for their kindness in allowing me to addressthern
today and my thanks to my distinguished colleagues for agreeing to my
doing W.
Itis my misfortune that, owing to other duties1 have to perform,
1shaII not be able to hear the addresses of those who speak aftcr me.
1 do hope that they wiII not tliink, and that theCourt will not think,
that my absence is in any scnse discourteous. 1 should like to hear
their speeches-even tl-iough1 rnigfit disagree with some of them. 1
am only prevented from doing lioby a form offorcemajeure.
The Court in this case has the advantage of having before it the written
statements expressing the views of many nations. The United Kingdom
has submitted such a statement which expresses Our views on the (lues-
tion before the Court and which we hope willbe helpful to the Court.
Itis not, 1 feel, necessary for me, therefore, to traverse the whole
ground covered bv our written statement.I propose tomake my address
as short as 1can, for, wliile it may be true that man? lawyers are usually
long-winded and it is certainly true,1 fear, that some lawyers enjoy
making long speeches, it is certainly apt to be tedious and tiring to listen
to a whole seriesofspeeches dealing with one rather narrow question.
It is rny regret that 1 have not rnyself had the advantaof hearing
the arguments so ably advanced by my distinguished colleagues in the
course of the lastew days. 1 have read what they said, and my Iearned
friends who appear for the United Kingdom with me, and who heard tlieir
addresses, have considered thern carefully with me. And 1 hope it \vil1
not be thought discourteous ome to say that, having read al1the written
statements and the speeclies so far delivered, our confidence in the argu-
ments respectfully submitted in our written statement is not reduced or
undermined but enhanced.
Now, Sir, the first important question it seems to me that this Court
Iias to determine is thescope of the question submitted to the Court.
That question is clearly phrased and, in mv submission, limited in extent,
and the Court is not asked to express an opinion defrning the rneaning of
the expression "expenses of the Organization" nor is it asked to say
whether or not the General Assembly has exclusive fiscal power. It is
only asked.to decide whether particiilar expenses constitute expenses of
the Organizat'on.
And the particular expenses are, first, expendituresazlthorizineif
Gcneral AssembIy resolutions relating to the United Nations operations
in the Congo lindertaken in pursuance of the Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions and, secondly, expenditures azithoriicd
in General Assembly resolutinns relating to the operations of the UnitedNations Emergency Force undertaken in pursuance of General Assembly
resolut ions.
The terms of the question state-and it cannot be disputed-that the
expenditure was in relation to United Kations operations in the Congo
and operations of the United Nations Emergency Force, and the terms
of the question stress the fact that in each case the expenditure in ques-
tion was authorized by the General Assembly.
The Court is not, therefore, in my submission inrrited to express an
opinion on the question whether it uras within the power of the General
Assembly to authorize such expenditure. Tlie General Assembly, who
have submitted the question to this Court, have not asked this Court to
pronounce upon the validity or legality of any of the resolutions it has
passed. It has only asked for the opinion of this honourable Court on the
question whetlier certain expcnditures it has authorized corne urithin the
meaning of the phrase in Article 17 (2)"expenses of the Organization".
In rny submission, the terms of the question make this absolutely
clear. Indeed, it would be surprising, 1 suggest, if the General Assernbly
now called into question the valirlity of a number of resolutions, adopted
over a period of some five years by the majorities prescribed by the Char-
ter-in some cases without asingle contrary vote-in relation to opera-
tions of such importance as those in the Middle East and the Congo.
If the General Assembly had intended or desired to cal1into question
the validity of its own rcsolutions, one would have expected it to do so
in the clearest terrns. It has not done but, on the contrary, the precisely
phrased question ~ubmitted, in my submission, shows that the General
Assembly did not intend or desire this Court to pronounce upon the
validity of its own resolutions. And if any confirmation of that is re-
quired-and in my submission it is not necessary-the confirmation is
to be found in the fact that, wlien the reçolution for seeking the opinion
of this Court was before the Assembly, an amendment was moved which
would have raised the question of the vaIidity of the resolutions and that
amendment Ras rejected by a vote of 47 against, 5 in favour, with 38
abstentions. (That is to be found in the provisional Verbatirn Record of
the 1086th Plenary Meeting-A/PV 1086,at pp. 67-70.)
Now, Sir, an argument has, 1 understand, been advanced before this
Court to the effect that, even if action wasaken by the General Assembly
or the Security CounciI in excess of their powers under the Charter, none
the less, under Article17 (2),the General Assembly lias power to appor-
tion the expenses of sucl-iultra vi.vesaction between the Members.
Mr. President and hlembers of the Court, to tliat argument 11cannot
subscribe. \l'hile one woiild not readily assume ttiat the General Assembly
or the Security Council would act in excess of thcir powers, if they did
so the General Assembly in my suhrnission could not apportion the ex-
penses involved under Article 17 (2).For expenses of the Organization in
that Article must by necessary implication mean evpenses validly
incurred,
Chapter IV gives tlie General Assernbl~ certain powers and Article 17,
which is in Chapter IV, is "rnandatory". The General Assembly shall
consider and approve the Budget. The.e>tpensesof the Organization shall
be borne hy the Menlbers as apportioned by the General Assembly. That
clearly imposes a duty to apportion çuch expenses of the Organization
as are not met by voluntary contributions and, again in paragraph 3 of
Article 17, we find a further duty placed on the General Assembly. In my submission, it is not the case that by means of a mere financial
resolution the General Assembly can create an obligation on Member
States to make contributions in respect of expenses incurred in further-
ance of a manifestly invalid resolution; for instance, a resolution re-
commending a contravention of a prohibition in the Charter. But, in so
faras a resolution is clearly designed to fulfiI the paramount purposes of
the Charter and in pursuance of such a resolution expenses are duly
incurred, forexample by the Secretary-General under an authority con-
ferred on him under ArticIe 98, these expenseç, then, are expenses of the
Organization and when made the subject of a financial resolution of the
General Assembly do create on apportionment a binding obligation on
Member Statesto pay tlie assessed contribution.
hlr. President, having said this in answer to the argument advanced,
1 repeat that in my submission this Court is not asked to enquire into
the validity of the rcsolutions referred to in the question and should
proceed to consider the question submitted on the baçis that the resolu-
tions referred to in the question are valid.
Now, bearing in mind the fact that this Court in its Advisory Opinion
of S June 1960 on the Constitz~tiorzfthe Maritime Safety Cornmiltee O#the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Orgawization stressed (I.C.J.
Re$o~ts1960, p. 153 )
"the Court as a judicial body is ...bound, in the exercise of its
advisory functions, to remain faithful to the requirements of its
judicial character",
and in its Advisory Opinion of 7 June 1955 on South West Ajrica, Voting
Procedure(I.C.J. Re$orts 1955 ,p 71-72) said :
"lt istherefore essential that the Court should keep within the
bounds of the question put to it by the General Assembly",
bearing those statements in nlind, 1 apprehend that the Court will follow
that course in thiç instance. While, of course, some consideration must
be given to the meaning of the expression "expenses of the Org,znization"
in Article 17 (2)in order to determine whether the expenditurcs in ques-
tion fa11within it,the Court will not, 1 assume, seek to dehne the meaning
of thrit phrase; and further will not regard the question submitted to it
as asking it to pronounce upon the validity of the resolutions passed by
the General Assembly and Security Council.
The fact that the arguments deployed in the written statements
submitted in the present case have ranged far and wide over the legal,
quasi-Iegal and political fields cannot enlarge the scope of the question
submitted and should not be allowed to distract attention from the
essentially rcstricted nature of that question.
In my submission, al1tliat the Court is asked to do is to say whether
certain espentlitures authorized by the General Assembly constiti~te
"espenscs of the Organization" within Article 17 (2);and in my suhmis-
sion, for the reasons1am about to advance, the answer to that question
is in the affirmative.
"Expenses of the Organization" in Article 17 (2),in my submission,
means expenses of the United Natioi-is Organization; indeed that is
obvious and, 1 suggest, cannot be disputed. And Article 7 prescribes
that the principal organs ofthe United Nations are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship
Council, the International Court of Justice and a Secretariat. Power is
given by that Article to establish in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary.
And the phrase "expenses of the Organization", 1 submit, covers the
expenses of al1 these principal organs of the United Nations and of the
subsidiary organs it has been found necessary to establish. The expenses
of al1 these organs of the United Nations are "expenses of the Organi-
zationU-that is, of course, if they act in accordance with their powers,
And it isnot perliaps uniriteresti~lg to note that an organ is not defined.
The power given by Article 7 (2)is unlimited. Any subsidiaryorgan that
rnay be found necessary may be established in accordance with the
Charter and once established its expenses form part of the expenses of
the Organization.
That phrase "expenses of the Organization" means, in my submission,
expenses incurred by the Organization. Article 17 (2) is specifically
directed to the discharge of the liabilities of the Organization, but the
budget ~vliichthe General Assembly has to consider and approve under
Article 17 (1)makes provision for the future, for future known liabilities,
and it would therefore, in rny submission, be right as a matter of con-
struction to treat the phrase "expenses of the Organization" as meaning
expenscs incurred and to be incurred by the Organization.
The generality and width of Article 17 (2)is, I suggest, significant.
Itdoes not say "expenses approved in the budget". It is not confined to
administrative expenses or to normal expenses. It is deliberately general,
for it is obviously necessary to make provision for the discharge of al1
the expenses of the Organization, however they may be labelled, and
whether or not they are included in the budget.
In mp country we have an annual budget, and after the passing of
that budget it may become necessary to incur expenditure not contem-
plated in the budget. And expenditure so incurred is still expenditure
of the United Kingdom.
So, in rny, submission, with the United Nations; there can be no
doubt that expenditure included in the budget is expenditure of the
Organization, but it does not follow that expenditure not included in
the budget is not expenditure of the Organization.
In the written statement of the Government of the Soviet Union, it
is contended that "Article 17 ...provides for appropriations and the
manner of their reimbursement only in the regular budget". (1 have
quoted the words which appear in that statement.) But tlie word
"regular" does not appear in the Article. It is true that Article17 (1)
rnakes provision for a budget, but Article 17 (2)does not refer expressly
or by implication to the budget. What 17 (2) is directed to al1expenses
of the Organization. It would have been easy to Say, if it had been
desired, "l'he expenses of the Organizatiori approved in the budget shali
be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."
That was not said, and not said, in my submission, for obvious reasons.
And really such a limitation is putting an unwarrantable gloss on the
. Article. Tt would go far to stultify the Organization, for it would mean
that the United Nations would not be able to incur expense to maintain
international peace and security-its primary object-unless provision
for that expense was made in the budget.
Now in its Advisory Opinion on the Eoect ofAwards ofcomperzsation STATE3IENT SIR R. MASKINGHAM-BULLEK (u.K.)-17 V 62 339
made by the United Nations Administrative TribztnaE(I.C.J. Reports
1gj4, ai p. 59), this Court said:
"The function of approving the budget does not mean that the
General Assembly has an absolute power to approve or disapprove
the expenditures proposed to it; for some part of that expenditure
arises out of obligations already incurred by the Organization, and I
to this estent the General Assembly fias no alternative but to
Ilonour thesc engagements."
\ITherean obligation is incurred by the Organizatioii, and no provisioii
has been made in the, last budget for the expenditure to meet that
obligation, because no one had foreseen or could foresee that the obligation
would have to be incurred, the Charter docs not stipulate, nor is there
any reason why it should, that the Gcneral Assembly-to adopt the
expression used in the passage 1 have cited from the Opinion of this
Court-that the General Assemhly should honour its engagement after
the next budget, after inclusion of this expcnditure in the next budget.
That is not provided by Article 17.
As the General Assembly have no alternative but to honour such an
engagement, as expenditure incurred by any organ of the Organiz t' a ion
is expenditure of the Organization, the General Assembly can, under
Article 17 (z), proceed to apportion that expense and the Members will
have to pay the sums apportioned to them, so that that obligation is in
fact honoured.
The expenditure under consideration in this case has of course been
authorized by the Gcneral Assembly, by the two-thirds rnajority pre-
scribed by Article 18 (2)-the General Assembly which is the first of the
organs rnentioned in Article 7; and the organ deült with in Chapter IV
when the Security CounciI is dealt with in Chapter V.
And now it is contended that expenditure approved and authorized
by this principal organ of the United Nations is not an expense of the
Organization on the ground that it is not provided for in the regular
budget.
In my subrnission, the character of the expense does not depend on
tvlietlier or not is provided for in the budget. If it is an expense of the
Organization, it does not cease to be one on account of omission from
the budget, and it will not cease to be an expense of the Organization
merely bccause the Ceneral Assembly in their wisdom decjde to deal with
it outside the budget.
Itmay be that the decision is made to meet some part of the expense
by voluntary contributions. But the fact that some contributions are
voluntary and that some may be involuntary cannot affect thecharacter
of the expense. In so far as there are voluntary contributions, $ru tanto
is the amount reduced whicli is to be the subject of apportionment. But
the character ofthe expense does not change on account of the manner
in which it is sought to rneet it. That, 1 submit, is the fallacy in the
argument sought to be based on the fact that there may be voluntary
contributions to this expenditure.
A short time ago 1 drew attention to the generality and the width of
Article 17 (2)and pointed out that it did not Say "expenses approved in
the budget". 1 also said it .was not confined to administrative expenses
or to normal expenses. And 1submitted that it was deliberately general. The argument has been put forward before this Court that only
administrative expenses can be treated as expenses of the Organization
and that other expenses, whether they be described as operational or
substantive espenses or in some other way, cannot be treated as expenses
of the Organization.
Wiih the greatest respect to those who put illis argument forward,
1 must subrnit that it is cornpletely misconceived.
In the first place, it means restricting the generality of the expression
"expenses of the Organization" in Article 17 (2).
Secondly, it proceeds on tlie assumption that the only espense that
any organ of the United Nations can legitimately incur is what is called
an administrative expeiise.
It may not be easy to define what is covered by those words "admini-
strative expenses", and 1 donot propose totake up the time of this Court
in considering that.
But acceptance of this argument would mean that the po\trers of the
United Nations to richieve its primary purpose prescribed in Article I
(the maintenance of international peace and security) would be severely
limited. However great the need might be for action, if this argument
was right the United Nations could only incur administrative expenses. If
there was urgent need to incur expense on some action, and the expense
could not be described as administrative, the United Nations would be
unabte to act unlcss they were able to secure tliat tlie expense wouid be
met by voluntary contributions. If tliose contributions were not forth-
coming-and considerable delay might occur in finding out whcther they
could be securcd-if this argument was right, the United Nations would
be powerless to act howevcr great the need.
I shall be referring to Article 43 in more detail laterin rny speech.
But for the purpose of considering this argument, let me assume that,
under that Article, a special agreement is made with a Alember State
for the provision of armed forces. The Article is silent about the terms
which such an agreement will contain.
In my submission it is deliberately so, and the Security Council has
complete and unfettered discretion as to the terms of an agreement it
makes undcr Article 43.
1 submit it would be open to the Security Council to agree to yay
the whole or part of the costs of the armed forces made available under
that Article. If it did so, the expense could not be described as "adrnini-
strative", but it cannot be doubted that it would be an expense of the
Organization.
Now 1 have referred to this as, 1 silbmit, Article 43 drives another
nail in the coffin of this argument. It is pointed out that a number of
activities in the economic and social field-for example, UNICEF,
UNRRA, the Higli Commissioner for Refugees and so on, have been
whollp financed escept for administrative purposes by voluntary contri-
butions, and it is suggested that tIiis shows that only administrative
expenses can conle within Article 17 (2).
1 have already pointed out that the character of an expense is iiot
changed by the manner in which the espense is met, and the fact that
voluntary contributions have been made to the expenses of a subsidiary
organ does not affect the iact that those cxpenses were eupenses of that
organ and so expenses of the Organization.
1 do not propose to sny any more in repIy to this argument Savetl-iis. STATEMENT SIR R. MANXINGHAhI-BULLER (u.K.)-17 V 62 341
Even if it was well-founded with regard to tlie economic and social
activities of the Organization for the purpose .of achieving its purposes
as defined in Article I (z), (3) and (4)-7 need not rernind the Court of
the terrns of those paragraphs-it does not follotv that it ayplies to
activities in relation to ArticleI,paragraph 1.
Zn rny submission, "expenses of the Organization" rnust be given its
ordinary natural meaning, anci no limitation or restriction of its natural
meaning is permissibIe.
As we pointed out in Our written statement, this Court said in its
Advisory Opinion on the Compelence of the General Assembly for the
Admission of a Stizte to the United iziatiotzs(I.C.J. Refiorts Igjû, p. 8)
that the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and
apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavour to give effect to thern in
their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur,
and (1 quote),
"wlien the Court can givc effect to a provision of a treaty by giving
the words used in it tlieir natiiral and ordinary meaning it may not
interpret the words by seeking to give them some other meaning".
And in its Advisory Opinion on Conditio~zsof admission of a State to
Membership in the United Natio~rs(Article 4 of theChurter)(r.C.J. Reports
1948, at p. 63), the Court, when interprcting part of the Charter, ssid
that the natural meaning of tlie words used led to a certain conclusion,
which it adopted as correct. It also said, at page 63:
"The Court considers that tlie text is sufficicntly clear: conse-
quentIy, it does not feel that it should deviate from the consistent
practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according
to which there is no occasioii to resort to preparatory work if the
text of a convention is sufficiently cleainitself."
NOWin my submission, the text of Article 17 (2) is clear. The Court
can give effect to the words used in it in tlieir natural and ordinary
meaningin the context in which they appear. niere is, Isubmit, here no
reason to deviate from the consistent practice of this Court not to resort
to preparatory work if the text of tlie treaty is sufficicntly clertr; thougli
if such dcviation is perrnissible, 1 would submit that for the reasons
indicated in the written statement submitted by the Government of
Australia, an examination of the travaz4xflré+aratoiresdiscloscs nothing
to displace the riatur-al meaning of the words in Article17 (2).
Espenses of the Organization =areexpenses incurred by the organs of
the Organization. ,4nd there can be no dispute that the expenditures
in question here were incurred by the General Assembly and Security
Council acting through the Secretary-General. So, under Article 17 (z),
the General Assembly has power-and the duty-to apportion among
the hlembers, and the Members are under a dutp to pap the sums
apportioned among them.
1 think it would be convcnient now to refer to some other arguments
that have been advancecl. In their written statement the Governnlent
of the Soviet Union say:
"According to the United Kations Charter al1questions involving
actions for maintaining international peace and sccurity-which
includes the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force as
well-corne under the competence of the Security Council alone."342 STATEMEST SIR R. hIAh'NIKGHAM-BULLEK (u.K.)-17 V 62
And, with tlie greatest respect to my distinguished colleague, 1 must
say 1 find this an astonishing assertion. 1 ask the Court to note the
language used :
"al1 questions involving actions for maintaining international peace
and security come under the competence of the Security Council
alone".
"Actions" means any kind of action, calling a conference, making
recommendations to the parties involved, appointing a commission to
enquire into the position, police action for the maintenance of peace,
al1 questions involving actions for the maintenance of international
peace and security come undcr the competence of the Security Council
alone. That is the assertion ofthe Soviet Union.
One ha5 only to look at the Charter itself to see, in my submission,
that itis not justified.
The first purpose of the United Nations-and it is expressed to be of
the United Kations, not the Security Coilncil-is:
"To maintain international peace and security and, to that end,
to take effective collective measurcs for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace,and for the suppression of acts ofaggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means and in conformity with the principles of justice and inter-
national law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situationswhich might lead to a breach of the peace."
That is declaredto bethe purpose of the United Nations, of the Organi-
zation as a wliole.
And yet tlie Soviet Union say that the General Assembly with 104
sovereign States cannot consider any question involving action of any
character for maintaining peace. That, it is said, has to be left to the
II Members of the Security Council alorie.
Article 24 provides tliat in order to ensure prompt and effective action
by the United Nations, .its Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
seciirity.Iask the Court to note that the word is "primary", not "ex-
clusive". If the contention of the Soviet Union was right one would
espect the Article would Saynot "primary responsibility" but "exclusive
responsibility". The use of the words "primary responsibility" clearly
indicates that other organs of the United Nations also have responsibility
for the maintenance of peace.
And the first principal organ mentioncd in Article 7 is the General
Açsembly. Further, Articles IO and II do not support the view of the
Soviet Union. If that view was right, one would not onljr expect the first
purpose stated in Article r to be stated to be the purpose of the Security
Council-not of the United Nations-one would expect Article 24 to
refer to "exclu~ive" and not "primary" responsibility, and one would
expect the General Assembly to be prohibited from discussing and frorn
considering questions involving actions for maintaining international
peace-and no such restriction is to be found in ArticlesIO and 11. In
my submission to this Court 1 feel bound to submit that this assertion
of the Soviet Union is not warranted.
NOW,Sir, the contention has also been put forward, but not 1 think by
the Soviet Union, that where action is taken by the Security Council STATE1,IEXT SIR R. JIAKKINGHAM-BULLER (u.K.)-17 V 62 343
urider Article43 the expenses of the forces or assistance made available
cannot be expenses of the Organization. Now, Sir, I would liketo Say a
little about that contention; butI think it would probably be convenierit
now for an interpretation to be made of what 1 have already said and
for me to start dealing with that after the adjournment.
[Public heariqzgof17 May 1962, ajternoon]
May it please the Court: 1 now want to Say something about the con-
tention to which I referred just before tlie Court rose-tcontention that
where action is taken by the Security Council under Article 43, the
expenses of the forces or assistance made availabIe cannot be expenses
of the Organization. Under Article 43 al1hlembers of the United Nations,
in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its
cal1 and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed
forces,assistance and facilities including rightof passage necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
Now, it is to be noted that this Article is not limited to securing the
provision of arrned forces, but extends to otl-ier forms of assistance and
to facilities. Its also indicated that the assistance, whatever form it
takes, is to be in accordance with a special agreement or agreements.
It is arguecl that in the light of ArticIe 43 the expenses of peace-
keeping activities of the Security Council fa11to be borne by individual
blembers under a special agreement or agreements, and are not expenses
of the Organization. The terms of the specialagreement or agreementsare
not prescribed. The argument assumes that the expenses will be borne by
the Member States concerned. But why should that be assumed? Why
should the agreements not provide that the expenses should in whole or
in part be borne by the United Nations?
lt really could not be suggested that it would be beyond the compe-
tence of the Security Council to make such an agreement. .
If it did, the expense would clearly, in my subrnission, be an expense
of the Organization which would fa11 for apportionment under
Article 17 (g). -
Now, no one has sugge~ted that the Security Council acted-they
certainly did not purport to do so-under Article 43, and 1 have only
referrcd to that Article because of the argument that has been based
upon it-an argument which clepends upon the assumption, for which
there is no justification, that the special agreement could not incliidea
provision wl~erebv the Securitv Council, and so the United Nations,
Ùndertooli to me& some part O; al1 the cbst of the assistance, whatever
forrn it might take, that was required.
Now, Sir, 1want to turn to Article 98. Under that ArticIe the functions
of the Secretary-General are prescribed. Heis to actas Secretary-General
in al1meetings of the GeneraI Assembly, of the Security Council, of the
Economic and Social Council and of the Trusteeship Coimcil, and the
Article provides that he is to perform such other functions as are en-
trusted to Iiim by these organs.
As a matter of coiistruction of the Article, the words in that Article
"such other functions" rnean functions in addition to those particularly
described. Tfiere is no definition or limitation of the "such other func-
31344 STATEMENT SIR R. 31ANKINGHAhl-BULLER (u.K.)-17 V 62
tions" that can be entrusted to him. They can he entrusted to him by the
General Assembly and by the Security Council.
When one looks at Chapters IV and 1'of the Charter, which deal with
the functions and powers of the General Assembly and Secririty Council
respectively, and indeed when one looks elsewhere in thc Charter, one
does not find any express provision authorizing either organ to entrust
functions to the Secretarp-General or any express provision restricting
their powers to do so. It is, 1 submit, a necessary implication from the
wording of Article 98 that both these organs, the General Assernbly and
the Security Council, have power to entrust functions to the Secretary-
General. It is also,1 submit, a necessary implication from Article 95
that they can entrust such functions as they think fit to him, with the
object of achieving the purposes mentioned in Article I-and provided,
of course, that the functions entrusted to hirn do not conflict witli a
prohibitioii on the actions of the United Nations, such asthat contaiiied
in Article2 (7).
Now, the expenditures authorized by the Genernl Assembly to which
the question submitted to this Court relates are expenditures incurred
in the discharge of the functions entrusted to the Secretary-General.
They were authorized by the General Assernbly aiid they are in my sub-
mission beyond any shadow of doubt expenses of the Organization.
1 now want to turn,if 1may, tothe steps taken by the General Rssem-
bly in regard to the financing of the UNEF and Congo operations, and
1 will, i1 may, deal with them in that order.
The first refcrence tothe financing of UNEF is to befound in paragraph
15 of the Secretary-General's second and final report of G November
1956 (document A/3302), and that paragraph reads as follows:
"The question of how the Force should be financed likewise
requires further study.A basic rule which at least could be applied
provisionally would be that a nation providing a unit would be
responsible for al1 costs of equipment and salaries, while ail other
costs should be financed outside the normal budget of the United
Nations. It is obviously impossible to make any estimate of the
costs withouta knowledge of the size of the Corps and the length of
its assignment."
And if 1 may interpolate thcre, I suggest that the Secretary-Geiieral
is givingthat as the reason forfinancing outside the normal budget. He
went on to Say:
"The only practical course, thercfore, would he for the Gcneral
Assembly to vote a. general authorization for the cost of tlie Force
on the basis of general principles such as those here suggested."
On the follo\z7ingday, the General Assembly adopted Resolution
1001 (ES-1),the fifth operative paragraph of which approved provision-
alIy the basic rule laid down itheparagraph of the Secretary-General's
report which I have just quoted to the Court.
The next step was the adoption by the General Assembly on 26 No-
vember 1956, by a vote of 52 in favour and nine against with 13 absten-
tions, of Resolution1122 (XI).So far as relevant, that Resolution read as
follows:
"The General Assembly ...
Having considered and provisionalIy approved the recommen- dations made by the Secretary-General in paragraph 15 of his
report of6 Kovember 1956,
r. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations
Emergency Force Special Account to whicl-ifunds received by the
United Nations, outside the regular budget, for the purpose of
meeting the expenses of the Force shall be credited and from which
payments for this purpose shall be made ..."
Now immediately before the adoption of this Resolution by the General
Assembly, the Secretary-General made a statement in the plenary meet-
ing in the course of which he said (and 1 quote from the Oficial Record
of the 596th Plenary Meeting, para. 225) :
"...1 wish to make it equally clear that while funds received and
payments made with respect to the Force are to be considered as
coming outside the regular budget of the Organization, the.operation
is essentially a United Nations responsibility, andthe special account
to be established must, therefore, be construed as coming within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Charter."
That was the Secretary-General's clear expression of his opinion.
It is,1submit, entitled to great respect, and there really cannot have been
any doubt in the minds of those who voted for the Resolution imme-
diately after he made that statement that the expenses to be met from
the special account for which the Resolution provided were "expenses of
the Organization" within Article 17.
And the Court is, 1 submit, entitled to conclude that the Resolution
was adopted on that basis.
NOW, jl/2years later, there are those who seek to establish that the
Secretary-General was wrong-and that despite what he said, despite
the passage of this Resolution immediately after his statement, the
expenses of this United Nations operation were not expenses of the
United Nations.
A month Iater, on 21 December 1956, the General Assembly, by a
vote of 62 in favour and 8 againstwith 7 abstentions,adopted Resolution
1089 (XI). The first operativeparagraph of this ResoIution decided that :
I
"1. ...tlie eupenses of the ...Force, other than for such pay,
equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished without
charge by the Member Governments, shall be borne by the United
Nations and shall be apportioned among the Member States, to the
extent of $IO millions, in accordance with the scale of assessments
adopted by the GeneraI Assembly for the financial year 1957."
Now the Court will note the close correspondence between the language
used in this Resolution and that of -4rticle 17 (2).There really can beno
doubt that when the General Assembly said that expenses of the Force,
other than for items provided without charge, "shall be borne by the
United Nations and shall be apportioned among the Member States", it
was treating those expenses as "expenses of the Organization" within the
meaning of Article 17 (2).
The next resolution to which 1 desire to refer is liesolution 1090 (XI)
of 27 February 1957. After noting that the expense of the Force already
approved represented "a sizeable increase in assessments placed on
hlember States", it invited voluntary contributions to meet further ex-346 STATEMEST SIR R. JIANNIKGHARI-BULLER (u.K.)-17 V 62
penditures of $6.5 millions authorized in addition to the $10 millions
which had been apportioned under Kesolution 1089.
And these two Resolutions 1089 and 1090 set the pattern for the
subsequent General Assembly resolutions on the financing of the Force
which are referred to in the request to the Court.need not refer to them
in any detajl.
The 1957 and 1958 Resolutions used language virtually the same as
thnt of the operative paragraph I have quoted from Resojution 1089.
The 1959 and 1960 Resolutions used sliglitlv different language. The
decision was "to assess" so many million dollars "against al1 Members
on the basis of the regular scale ofassessn-ients", and they provided for
the use of voiuntary contributions to reduce the financial burden on
States with least capacity to pay.
But these differences of language were not such as to indicate an in-
tention on the part of the General Assembly to treat the expenditures
in question otherwise than as "expenses of the Organization".
Throughout, in my submission, the General Assembly has treated the
expenditures involved as "espenses of the Organization". Admittedly,
it has provided for part of those expenditures to be met by voluntary
contributions and not by apportionrilent, but that does not, 1 submit,
affect the cliaracter of the expenditure.
Tliere are, 1 suggest, no grounds for supposing that the General
AssembIy had any doubts about the character of the expenditures. Its
clear intention was just to ease the financial burden on tlie membership
as a whole.
Admittedly too, the General Assembly did not include the expenses
of UNEF in the regular budget of the Organization. Its reasons for not
including them were ones of convenience and not of principle, and tliat
is made clear by paragraph 108 of the Secretary-General's Summary
S tudy of the experience derived from the establishment and operatioil
of the Force (document A/3943).
Inow corne to the resolutions deaIing with the expenses of the Congo
operations. The first "financing" resolution adopted by the General
Assembly was Resolution I583 (XV) of 20 Uecember 1960. This Resolu-
tion, adopted by a vote of 46 in favour and 17 against, with 24 absten-
tions, containcd a preambular paragraph recognizing that
"the expenses involved in the United Nations operations in the
Congo for 1960 constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the
meaning of Article 17,paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter
and that the asçessment thereof against Mernber States creates
binding legal obligations on such States to pay their assessed
shares...".
It went on to decide, first, to establish an ad hoc account for the
expenses of the United Nations in the Congo and, secondly, that the
amount of $48.5 millions
"shal1 be apportioned among the Member States on the basis of the
regular scale of assessment..."
subject to provisions for the use of voluntary contributions to reduce
the burden on the States with leaçt capzcity to pay.
Now the Court will note that the General Assembly in this Resolution
has placed 011 record its view that the expeirses involved constituted
"expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17 (2). STATEMENT SIR R. IIANNINGHAV-BULLER (u.K.)-17 V 62 347
And further the Court will note that the General Assembly could
only have made the apportionment made by this Resolution in the exer-
cise of its power under Article17 (2)and on the basis that the expenses in
question were expenses of the Organization.
Now 1 corne to what I may cal1the important Kesolution 1619 (XV) of
21 April 1961. This Resolution, adopted by a vote of 54 in favour and
Ij against, with 23 abstentions, included the following preambular
paragraph :
"Bearing in mind that the extraordinary expenses for the United
Nations operations in the Congo are essentially different in nature
from the espenses of the Org-,znizationunder the regular budget and
that therefore a procedure different from that applied in the case
of the regular budget is required for meeting these extraordinary
expenses..."
In the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly decided, ilzter
alia, to open an ad hoc account for the expenses of the Congo operation
for 1961, to appropriate $100 millions for those expenses from IJanuary
to 31 October 1961, and to apportion as expenses of the Organization the
amount of $100 millions among the hlernher States in accordance with
the scale of assessment for the regular budget, subject to provisions for
the use of voluntary contributions to reduce the burden on States with
the least capacity to pay.
Again, there arc two points here to which Ishould like to invite atten-
tion. The first is that the Ianguage of the preambular paragraph, wl-iichI
read to the Court, is the same as that of a preambular paragraph in a
later resolution, not referred to in the request to the Court, which is
quoted on page273 ofthe written statementsubmitted by the Government
of the Soviet Union as showing that the General Assembly did not con-
sider the expenses of the Congooperation as expenses of the Organization
within the meaiiing of Article 17 (2).The suggestion is presumably that,
in describing the expenses of the Congo operation as "extraordinary"
and as "essentially different in nature from the expenses of the Organi-
zation under the regular budget", the GeneraI Assembly was intending to
exclude those expenses from the category of "expenses of the Organiza-
tion". In rny submission, it wasdoing nothing of the kind. The references
to the extraordinarynature of the expenses of the Congo operation were,
1 submit, clearly included by the General Assembly, not to show that
those expenses were something other than "expenses of the Organiza-
tion", but to explain why it intended to adopt a different procedure to
meet tfiem from that applied in the regular budget. That it did in fact
regard them as "expenses of the Organization" is, 1 venture to think,
put beyond doubt by the subsequent operative paragraph in which, it
apportioned the amount of $100 millions among the Member States as
expenses of the Organization", for unless itregarded that amount as
expenses of the Organization, it llad no power to apportion under Article
17 (2).The resolution from which the quotation in the Soviet written
statcment is taken also contained an operative paragraph apportioning
the amount concerned among the Member States "as expenses of the
Organization".
Before leaving this point,1 shouldlike to remind the Court of a passage
in a staterncnt made by the Secretary-GeneraI in the course of the debatesin the Fifth Committee which led up to the adoption of Resolution 1619.
He said-and 1quote from paragraph 17 of document AIC.51864:
"Several of the representatives have naturally laid emphasis on
the size of the Congo expenditures and on their 'extraordinary'
character.But how, from a legal and constitutional point of view,
can these factors lead to a conclusion that they are not expenses of
the Organization? The fact that these expenses have been sub-
stantial and unusual...cannot mean that the Charter provision must
now be disregarded. Nor would there appear to be any practical
necessity to do so. For, under Article17,the Assembly has a broad
discretion to deal with the apportionment of expenses; it may
provide-and in fact it has provided-for different methods of
apportionmeiit to meet the necessities in particular cases. Certainly
it is free to take into account ...special considerations ... and to
ensure a just and equitable distributionof the burdens assumed by
the Organization in maintaining international peace and security.
This can be done with full respect for the legal principles prescribed
in the Charter and without departing from the clear and specific
rule that the costs constitute expenses of the Organization within
the meaning of the Charter."
Now 1 have ventured to cite this long quotation because 1 think it
expresses very well the real point here; that is, that the fact that certain
expenseç are of an extraordinary nature may be very relevant to the
question of what arrangements the General Assembly should make to
rneet them-how they should be apportioned, and so on; it does not,
however, make them any the less "expenses of the Organization".
hlr. Presidcnt and hlernbers of the Courtmy submission to you isthat
the terms of the resolutions on the financing of the Congo operation
referred to in the request, like those on the financing oUNEF, demon-
strated a clear opinion on the part of the General Assembly that the
expenses of the operation were "expenses of the Organization" within
Article 17 (2).
Iam not seeking, of course, to suggest that the views and practice of
the General Assembly are in any way conclusive of the question before
the Court. If it was conclusive, there would not be the request from the
General Assembly to this Court. Rut it iç1 submit,relevant for the Court
to know on what basis the General Assembly has throughout the years.
acted in these matters.
If the expenses were not expenses of the Organization, they have,
throughout these years, acted wrongly. The Secretary-General has been
wrong and they have been wrong.
That, of course, is the contention of certain States. my submission,
it is a contention that this Court should unequivocally reject.
Mr. President and Mcmbers of the Court, I am now glad to be able
to tellyou that 1 have almost concluded my submissions. At the com-
mencement of my speech 1 submitted that the General Assembly had
not requested this Court to express its opinion or to pronounce upon the
validity and legality of actions taken by the Assembly itself and the
Security Council in relation to UNEF and the Congo.
1do not propose to repeat the reasons for that submission. Having
made it, 1 merely wish to add this: Ifthe General Assembly had wanted
this Court to pronounce upon the legality of its resolutions and actions, the question to this Court would have been very differently phrased. And
the question can be answered without going into those rnatters. In my
submission it should be answered without going into them and, holding
that opinion as we do verystrongly, 1 do not propose to deploy arguments
in support of the validity of the actions in relation to UNEF and the
Congo of the General Assembly and Security Counciljust because certain
of iny colleagues wish to challenge their legality. No doubt such arguments
could be deployed, but I do not propose to add to the length of an
already long speech by putting them forward. 1 will rnereIy content
myself by saying in other words what we say in our written statement,
in paragraph 8, that in so far as the resolutions and actions of these two
organs were within the purpose stated in Article I,paragraph I-and no
one in this Court has suggested that they were not for that purpose-we
siiyport their validity.
The action taken was with the consent of the Governments of the
countries affected. The action taken for the maintenance of international
peace and security with the consent of the Governments concerned was
regarded as essential. If the United Nations could not take the action it
did, if its action was invalid or illegal, the United Nations would be
indeed a defective instrument for the preservation of peace, and the
hopes and aspirations of many millions of people would be disappointed.
Xr. President, it might pcrhaps be to the convenience of the Court if
1 werc, in conelusion, to summarize my submissions to the Court:
I. That the scope of the qucstion submitted for the consideration
of this Court ia very narrow one, namely, to decide whether certain
expenditures authorized by the General Assembly were "expenses
of the Organization" within the meaning of that expression in
Article 17 (2) of the Charter.
2. That as the expenditures iinder consideration are stated in the
question to have been authorized by resolutions of the General
Assembly, the Court should proceed upon that basis and should
accept as a fact that they were so authorized.
3. That the Court is not asked by the General Assembly to consider
the validity and legality of any of the resolutions referred to in the
question and shoiild not emhark upon that task. The scope of the
question put tothe Court cannot be enlarged by argumentsadvanced
by certain States,and 1ask the Court to make it clear in its decision
that as itis not asked by the General Asscrnbly to do so it does not
pronounce upon the validity of resolutions passed by the General
Assetnbly itself and by the Security Council.
4. That if, contrary to my submission, the Court is of the opinion
that they are asked to consider the validity and legality of the
authorization for tlie cspenditures in question, Article 17, which
entrusts the duty of apyroving the budget to the General Assembly
and the duty to approve any financial arrangements with specialized
agencies, clearly implies that the General Assembly can authorize
cxpenditure.
j. That it shoiild be recognized that the General Assembly as well
as the Security Council has responsibility for the maintenance of STATEMENT SIR R. MANNINGHAM-BULLER (u.K.)-17 V 62
350
international peace and security; has power to, and is entitIed to
discuss and consider questions involving action for the maintenance
of peace and can entrust to the Sec-retary-General functions in
addition to the functions particularlymentioned in Article 98 and
that the Security Council has similar powers under Article 98.
6.That the exercise by the General Assembly and by thc Security
Council of the powers to which 1have just referred rnust bc for one
or more of the purposcs statcd in ArticleI and must not conflict
with any prohibition contained in the Charter,uch as that contained
inArticle 2 (7).
7.That the expenditures in question, incurred on the authority of
the General Assembly and the Security Council, are expenses of
thc Organization.
Mr. President, 1would like tothank you and the Honourable Members
of this Court for listening me so patiently and courteously. Welawyers
from the United Kingdom are accustomed to having questions puttous,
in the course of our argument, by the Court, to elucidate and to test the
arguments we advance. It isan unusual experience-and I would Say
an enjoyabIe one-to speak for so long without a question from the Court.
1 hope that 1have made my submissions to the Court clear and 1would
like to conclude by reyeating my expression of thanks to the Court. 5. ORAL STATEMENT OF MR. SENS EVENSEN
(KEPRESENTI'JG THE SORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT)
AT THE PUBLIC HEARINGS OF 17 AND 18MAY 1962
(Public hearing oj17 May 1962, afternootz]
Mr. President, Mernl~ersof the Court:
The legal questions placed before this Court arerectly affecting the
Norwegian Government, as it affects al1 Member Governments of the
United Nations, because the questions have far-reaching implications for
the present and the future of therganization and thus for our troubled
world.
The Korwegian Government has not filed any written pleadings or
statements in the procedure but, in view of the importance of the
problerns involved, my Government desires to present its views orally.
At the meeting of the United Nations Fifth Committee on14April1961,
the representative of India stated:
"Thc problem has to be solved for the sake not only.of t$
success of the Congo undertaking, but for the future financial mtcgri-
ty of the United Nations itself." (DocA/C51863,p. 1.)
My Governmcnt fully agrees. And the facts supporting thisstatement
are easily ascertaincd from the United Nations budget estimates. The
printed estimates for the year 1962 show that the assessments for the
regular United Nations budget for 1961 is some $6g,ooo,ooo, while the
UNEF and the Congo assessments for the same year are some
$167,5oo,ooo. Thus, the assessments for these two peace-preserving
actions are almost 2% times higher than the regular United Nations
budget. (Doc. A/4770, p. VII.)
As to the arrears due for these two actions, the last figures available
show that as of 31 March 1962 the arrears of theUNEF assessments for
the period 1957to 1961 are some U;24,ooo,ooo.The arrears for 1962 with
regard to UNEF were some $7,500,000. Arrears for the UNOC assess-
rnents were for the period 1960-1961some $j1,5oo,ooo and for 1962 alone
some S66,5oo,ooo. (ST/ADM/SEK. B/I 57.)
Total arrearsup to and including 1961thus arnount to some $76,000,000
for these two actions alone. In addition hereto the expected arrearfor
1962 must be taken into account. At present they amount to $74,000,,000
for 1962 alone. But it is expected that this last figure will be siibstantialIy
reduced during the financial year.
These figures corroborate the information given by the Secretary-
General on II Decernher 1961 to the effect that the United Kations will
have plungcd into a debt of some $170,000,000 as of 30 June 1962, and
he further statcs that the United Nations arc facing imminent bankruptcy
and, further, that itsfuture a peace-preserving instrument will possibly
be doomed, unlcss a satisfactory solution is found to the questions now
placed before the Court. (A/C 5/907,pp. 3 and 4.)
The questions puttothe Court bythe Request of the General Asscmbly
are, as stateby the Uritish representative, clearly defincd and restricted.352 STATEhZENT OP MT. EVEKSEN (NORW-4~)-17 V 62
The Request concernstwo specific actions only, iianlelthe UNEF action
and the Congo action. The Request does not pertain to the various legal
implications of these events but isexpresslyconfined to one special aspect
thereof, namelv the question concerning the financing of the expenditures
incurred. The Request is further confined to specific items of expenditures
enumerated in the Kequest. And finally, it is confined to the relationship
between these expenditures and Article 17,paragraph z, of the Charter.
The Court has not been asked to give an Advisory Opinion on the
question of the validity or the legality of the basic decisionç of the
General Assembly or the Security Council. But the Governrnent of
Korway shares the view expressed by the Governrnent of Denmark in
the written statement, pages 153-154 t,at these basic decisions of the
United Nations might theoretically have been so patently illegal that
the Court would have been forced to declare the ensuing financial
resolutions in question nul1 and void.
Here,it must be borne in mind, however, that it is a principle embedded
in the United Nations Charter that each of the main organs shall judge
their own cornpetence. This rule is expressly Iaid down in Article 36,
paragraph 6, of the Statute of the Court where the jurisdiction of the
Court is concerned. The principle is equally inherent in the activities of
the other main organç, and especially the General Assembly and the
Security Council.
It cannot be presumed that a main organ of the United Nations is
acting in an illegal manner or in illegal capacities. Those who want to
make such extraordinary contentions must have a vcry difficult position
legally. As a matter of fact, in an ordinary case they surely would have
been considered to have the full burden of proof for such an extravagant
contention. The Norwegian Governrnent strongly feels that the facts of
the present situation ieave no doubt that the basic decisions of the
General Assembly and of the Security Council are valid and binding.
It follows clearly from the Request that the Court has not been asked
to express any opinion on the possible scale for assessing each nation
its share of the expenses. Nor has the Court beenasked to express itself
on the wisdom or expediency of the steps taken in Egypt or in the Congo
or on the size of the expenditures incurred.
In its Request, the General Assembly has defined the subject-matter
in such a manner as to leave for the Court's decision legal questions in
accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and 65 of the Statute of the
Court. No doubt can possjbly cxistas to the Court's jurisdiction to deal
with and render an Advisory Opinion in compliance with the Request
of zo December 1961.
Mr. President, before I enter into an examination of the contents of
Article 17 of the Charter,1 shall dwell upon certain aspects concerning
the legality of the underlying United Nations actions. These questions
have been dealt with in detail in various written statement~. The dis-
tinguished delegatc from Canada has furthermore made a thorough
review of it in hls oral address to the Court. 1 fully share his views in the
matter. I am also in agreement with the viem7sexpressed by Professor
Kiphagen that these issues in principle are irrelevant and irnmaterial.
Conçequently, 1 shall merely stress certainpoints which may be of
a more specific interest to the application of Article 17 to the present
prohlems.
I shall start with certain aspects of tUNEF operations in Egypt. STATERIEXT OF MT. EVEKSEN (NORWAY)-17 V 62 353
The United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East was created
under the stress of an extremely grave situation. In rny submission, it
is not an over-statement to maintain that the peace of the world may have
hinged on immediate and effective actions by the United Nations in
this case.
The United Nations and its Members may with pride register the
fact that this action was eminently successful aster dcvelopments have
demonstrated.
The highlights of the dramatic events were: On 29 October 1gj6 and
the following dayç, armed forces advanced into Egyptian territory
and large-scale hostilities broke out. The situation was immediately
considered by the Security Council in four meetings held between
30 October and I November 1956, and by the General Assembly in an
emergency session lasting from I November to IO November.
Due to the effective intervention by the Organization and to the
consent given by Egypt to the effcct that United Nations troops could
enter its territory and remain there, the hostilities ceased during the
night of 6 November and 7 November. On 15 November the first UNEF
forces arrived in Egypt and the withdrawal of French and British forces
comrnenced. The withdrawal of foreign troops was terminated in March
1957,andasearly as8hlarch the Secretary-General could report that peace
prevailed along the whole of the demarcation line.
This was no small achievement, and the United Nations had proved
to the world that it was able to fulfil its main task as a peace preserving
organization. Peace was effectively restored by comparatively simple
means. Should really Members of the United Nations be allowed to
shirk their obligations to contribute hnancially to this noble endeavaur?
Of great importance for the present problems are the circumstances
leading up to the Security Council Resolution of r November 1956.
Recause of the veto laid down by France and the United Kingdom, it
soon became apparent that the Security Council would not be able to
take effective measures in this grave conflict. Consequently, Yugoslavia
submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on31 October 1956,
proposing an emergency session ofthe General Asçembly in accordance
with the Uniting for Peace Resolution of Igjû. This proposa1was adopted
on I November 1956, with 7 votes for it, including the votes of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Repubiics and the United States.
In my opinion, it may be of paramount importance for the correct
solution of the pending problems to be aware of the fact that the Soviet
Union by voting for tkis resolution not onIy agreedto cal1an emergency
session but expressly adhered to the principles of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution. The Rcsolution of I November 1956 is very outspoken on
this po6'.. It sayç:
lhe Security Council, considering that a grave situation has
been crcated by the action taken against Egypt,
Taking into account that the rack of unanirnity of its permanent
mcmbers at the 749th and 750th meetings of the Security Council
has Frevexted it #rom exeïcising itsprimary resportsibilityfor the
maintenance of international peace and security,
Decides to cal1 an emergency special session of the Gcneral
Assembly as provided in the Gcneral Asscmbly's Resolution 377 A
(Y) of 3 Kovember Igjû in order to make appropriate recommen-
dations." (Printedin extensop. 25 of the written statement.) In addition to using the procedure prescribed in the Uniting for Peace
Resolution, and to sorne extent even using the direct wording of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, this 1956 Resolution of the Security
Council expressly refcrs to the Unitinfor Peace Resolution, SectionA,
in its last paragraph. Sectioir A of the Uniting for Peace Resolution,
approved in this manner by the Soviet Union, as applicable in the pre-
vailing situation, expressly includes among the peace-preservinrecom-
mendations of the General Assembly "the use of armed forces when
necessary to maintain or restorc international peace and sccurity".
The stand taken by the Soviet Union in 1956 immensely helped the
re-establishment of yeace in theworld. Rut 1 respectfully subrnit that
this stand is irrcconcilable with any contention to the effect that the
General Assembly's resotutions are invalid as infringing upon basic
provisions of the Charter concerning the division of power between the
Security Council and the General Assernbly.
Another fact which it is essential to bear in mind is that in accordance
with the stand taken in the Security Council, the Soviet Union did
participate in themergency session of the General Assembly, and it did
not vote against the basic resolutions of the Assernbly. On the contrary,
it votcd for Resolution997 of 2 Novernber 1956,aiming at a cease-fire
and the withdrawal of armed forces behind the armistice lines.
With regard to the thrcc General Assembly Resolutions creating the
UNEF forces, namely the Resolution of 4 November 1956, the Reso-
lution of 5 Kovembcr 19j6 and the main Resolution of 7 November
1956, the Soviet Union did not vote against them but abstained from
voting. France and the United Kingdom likewise abstained from voting
on these Resolutions of 4 Fovember and 5November, but voted for the
main Kesolution of 7 November 1956. Kor did Egypt or Israel vote
against these vanous resolutions.
(Publicheariag of18 May 1962, movning]
Mr. President, illembers of the Court, 1 shall, with the Court's per-
mission, continue with my esposé concerning certain legal aspects of the
basic UNEF operations.
France has, in its writtenstatement, made certain observations as to
the legality of the UNEF actions. For political reasons, France used its
veto power in the Security Council. It also voted against the calling of an
ernergency session. France did not vote against, but abstained from
voting on the General Assembly's'Keçolutions of 4 November and 5 NO-
vember. But it voted for the main General Assembly Resolution of
7 November, establishing the UNEF forces. And France is one of the
draftsmen and a CO-sponsor of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of
3 November 1950.
In the light of these facts, it seems rather difficult to maintain in one
form or the other tliat the steps taken by the General Assembly are
iIlegal as violating main provisions otheCharter and that for such or
similar reasons this peace-preserving action should not be financed under
Article 17of the Charter.
Another crucial point is the fact that tUNEF opcrations were put
into action with the consent of al1 the parties directly concerned. The
General Assernbly's Resolution of 7 Kovember 1956 expressly adopts STXTEMEKT OF MT. EVESÇEK (NORWAY)-18 V 62 355
this principle, which was Iaid down in paragraph 9 of the Secretary-
General's report of6 November 1956 (A/3302) as follouzs:
"Functionjng, as it would, on the basis of a decision reached
under the terrns of the resolution 'Uniting for Peace', the force,
if established, would be Iimited in its operations the extent that
the consent of the parties concerned is required under generally
recognized internationalaw. While the General Assembly is enabled
to establish the forcc with the consent ofthosepartieswhichcontrihute
units to the force, it could not requcst the force to be stationed or
operate on the territory ofa given country without the consent of
the Government of that country. This does not exclude the possi-
bility that the Security Council could use such a force within the
wider margins provided under Chapter VI1 of the United Nations
Charter."
Accordingly al1 troop contingents used served on a voluntary basis.
None ofthe States participating were ordered to doso or could have been
ordered to do so by the General AssernbIy. And by the same token
Egypt was not ordered, as it could not have been ordered by the Gencral
Assembly, to accept the UNEF forceson its territory. Egypt expressly
consented to the use of UNEF hy a cablegram to the Secretary-General
on 5 November 1936. Later and on 8 February 1957 a status agreement
concerning the use of the UNEF forccs was concluded between Egypt
and the United Nations by its Secretary-General. (See doc. Aj3526.j
Due to lack of consent on the part of IsraelUNEF forces were never
stationed in Israel. On the other Iiand, both Israel, United Kingdom and
France agreed to the withdrawal of their troops and tothe use ofUNEF
as an international firc brigade. It follows from these facts that ille UNEF
operation never was an action taken under Chaptcr VI1 of the Charter.
Especially it never was an action undertaken according to Articles42
and 43 of the Charter.
It was an action of quitc anotker nature. The comerstone of this
actiori was the consent of al1 parties concerned. The UNEF opcrated
under the direction of the General Assembly as a subsidiary organ
according to Article 22 of the Charter. This has been repeatedly recog-
nized. Thus, in the agreement of 8 February 1957 (see doc. Aj3526)
between Egypt and the United Nations, it is stated that the United
Nations Emergency Force is "an organ of the General Assembly of the '
United Nations established in accordance with Article22of the Charter".
And, in paragraph 23 of the same agreement, it is repeated that the
United Nations Emergency Force is "a subsidiary organ of the United
Nations established by the General Assembly". This agreement was
formally recognized by the General Assembly in Resolution No.1126 (XI)
of 22 February 1957.
In this connection 1may also refer to an article written by the French
professor Chaumont in Annuaire fran~ais de Droit international,1958,
pages 399 et sqq. In this thorough analysis of the legal status ofthe
UNEF forces there seems to exist no doubt in his mind as ta the con-
clusion as follows (andthisis from p.403) :
"Il s'agit donc ici de I'applicatidezL'articl22 de la Charte qui
autorise L'AssembléegélzéralÙ créerles organes subsidiaires qu'elle
j.tigenécessairesà l'exercicesesfonctions." Even ifsome doubts nevertheless should euist asto whether theUNEF
forces could be considered a subsidiary organ within the rneaning of
Article22 of the Charter, it is the subrnission of the Norwegian Govern-
ment that the UNEF operations lie well within the express or implied
powers conferred upon the General Assembly under the Charter. Article
24 of the Charter confers on the Security Council the primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but not
the exclusive responsibility. On the contrary, time and again the General
Assernbly has taken the necessary steps within the confines of the Charter,
with a view to preserving international peace and securityOr, as stated
by Professor Chaumont, with special reference to the UNEF (and 1
quote from p. 404 of the same article):
"L'action sntre#ïise pur k Secrétairegénéraldès le 4 nooenzbrc
1956 s'estdonc situéedans laflers$ectivetleslimites des fiouvoirs de
recommandation de I'Assembléegénérale."
As tothe events in connection with theUNOC operations in the Congo,
the following points may have a specific bearing on the questions ive
have before us.
The legal basis for the UNOC operations was not only the consent
of the Congolese Government, but the express request for assistance
made by the proper authorities in a telegram of 12 July 1960. The
teIegram stated amongst others:
"The Government of the Republic of Congo requests urgent
dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance",
and further that the situation in the Congo was so grave as to be a
"threat to international peace".(Uoc. S/4352.)
The situation was immediately considered by the Security Council,
which in its 873rd meeting on 13 July1960 w,ith8 votes to none, adopted
a Kesolution (514387)deciding, inter alia, to authorize
"the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation
with the Governrnent of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the
Government with such military assistance as may be necessary".
Among the S votes cast for this Resolution were the two permanent
Rlembers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Further-
more, ilrgentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, Italy, Poland and Tunisia voted for
the Kesolution.
Aside from the important fact that the Soviet Union voted for this
procedure, a fact which, in my submission, would make it rather difiïcult
to maintain that the Congo operations should be unconstitutional under
thc Charter, the following four points of the Resolution may have a
bearing upon the (luestions befqreus.
First, that the Security Council expressly authorized the Secretary-
General to take the necessary steps.
Secondly, that by the express terrns of the ResoIution such steps
required the consent of the Governrnent of the Republic of the Congo.
And tl-iirdly, the very important fact that the Kesolution expressly
authorized the Secretary-General to render "military assistance". How
can it now possibly be said that the military assistance rendered in the
Congo, in cornpliance with the terms of this Resolution, be illegai and
thuç not financially binding for Member States? STATEMENT OF Mr. EVENSEN (SORWAY)-18 V 62 357
And finally the contents of the said Resolution clearly demonstrate
that the steps prescribed therein were not thetype of mandatory actions
provided for in Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter. For the following
reasons :
The Resolution delegated to the Secretary-General the authority
to take the necessary steps without even defining in detail what steps
for him to take. In rny subrnission, it is impossible to assume that the
authority conferred upon the Security Council by Articles 42 and 43,
involving the right to give binding orders to governrnents, could' be
delegated to the Secretary-General, at least not in such unspecified and
general rnanner as in the Resolution of14 July. The delegatioii of power
to the Secretarv-General in this Resolution is in and of itself proof
enough to the fact that these steps do not belong to the catego;y of
actions provided for in Articles42 and 43, but are steps of a much less
serious character.
Furthermore, actions taken under Articles 42 and 43 are not depen-
dent upon consent from the State or States involved, while the Resolu-
tion expressly puts down the consent of the Republic of the Congo as a
prerequisite for theUNOC actions.
Finally,it is equally clear that the Resolution does not purport to
order hlember States to participatein joint rnililary actions.On the
contrary, the forces constituting the UNOC forces were pIaced at the
disposa1 of the United Nations voluntarily by certain States.
In a new Resolution of 22 July 1960 (Sj4405) the Security Council
unanimously commendcd the Secretary-General for "the prompt action
he had takcn to carry out" the former Resolution, and in the said
Resolution the Security Council further votcd that "the arriva1 of the
troops O£ the United Nations force in Leopoldville had already had a
salutary effect". Not one word is found in this Resolution indicating that
the UKOC measures taken by the Secretary-General were illegal and
vjolating the provisions of the Charter. On the contrary, the Resolution,
with the approval of France and the Soviet Union, endorsed the said
steps and commended the Secretary-General for thc actions taken.
The Security Council Resolution of g August 1960(514426) confirmed
the authority given to the Secretary-General by the two previous Izeso-
lutions and further called upon hlember States, in accordance with
Articles25 and 49 of the Charter, to afford mutua1 assistance in carrying
out the neccssary measures. But the said Resolution failed to mention
Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter. The Soviet Union voted for this
Resolution, while France abstained. The representative of the Soviet
Union explained his stand as follows-and I quote from the Security
Council Oficial Recordsfor August 8 to 9, 1960p ,. 53:
"'The USSR delegation voted in favour of the text because it
enables the Security Council to cary out its most important task,
namely to ensure that Belgium would immediately and uncondition-
aIly withdraw its troops from the entire territory of the Kepublic
of the Congo, including the province of Katanga.
Our vote was also determined by the consideration that the
adoption of this Resolution, which confirms the broad authority
given to the Secretary-General by the Council in the two earlier
Resolutions, once again emphasizes, and emphasizes unanimously,
that the Secretary-General has the obligation to take decisive meas-358 Sl'ilTESIEKT OF Mr. 13VEP;SEN (XORWAY \)612s
ures, without hesitating to use any means to that end, to remove
the Belgian troops from the territory of the Congo and to put an
end to acts directed against the territorial integriof the Republic
of the Congo." (OficialRecordsof theSecurityCoztncil,886th meeting,
P 53.)
It seems clear from this staternent that the Soviet Union here again
endorsed the implementation by the Secretary-Cenerat of the 14 July
Resolution.
Again, on 21February 1961, the Security Council reaffirmed its former
Kesolutions (see doc. 514741) with the Soviet Union and France abstain-
ing. But again on 24 November 1961 the Security Council adopted a
Kesolution (S/~OOZ) reaffirming the former Resolutions, and authorizing
"the Secretary-General to take vigorous actions, including the use of
requisite meaçures of force" and urged al1 Member States to lend their
support to these steps. The Soviet Union voted for this Rerolution, while
France and United Ringdom abstained.
In view of tiiis voting record, how can it now be maintained in the
printcd statement of the Soviet Union, page 271 at the bottom, that:
"The Security Council's Resolution SI4387of 14 July 1960 scrved
as a basis for the United Nations operation in Congo. However, that
Kecolution has been implemented in violation of the provisions of
the United Nations Charter"?
Let us, in spite of this record, for a minute theoretical1y acsumc that
the Secretary-General had really implemented the Resolutions in question
in an illegal rnanner. IVho else should be responsible for the financing
of these stcps but the Organization? The only theoretical alternative
would be to rnake the Secretaq-General #erso.izallliable. But no-one
can seriously maintain that such a result would be possible in practice
or IegaIIy sound under the Charter.
Allo~v me finally in connection with the UNOC operations to make
one remark conccrning a statement set forth by the South Alricm
Government at pages 265-266 of the printed document. It is here alleged
that the UNOC actions are in violation of the provisions of Article 2 (7)
of the Charter, thc Article relating to the domestic jurisdiction issues.
It is respectfully submitted that this line of argument is untenable. AS
long as the said operations are conducted in cornpliancc witli the urgent
request and with the consent of the proper Congolese autliorities, how
can possibly these actions violate the provisions of Article 2 (7) of the
Charter?
Mr. President, 1 shall now with the Court's permission proceed to an
interpretation of Article17, paragraph 2,of the Charter. But, in view of
the very detailed examination given in previous oral çtatements, Ishall
be brief on at leaçt certain of the main points.
It isthe submission of the Nonvegian Government that the General
Assembly has the right and the obligation under Article 17,paragraph 2,
to obtain the necessary funds for these tu70 actions in question from
Member States.
The stand taken by the General Assembly in the various resolutions
mentioned in the Kequest is therefore fiillv in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and with the çcope and purpose of the
Organization. STATEJIENT OF Mi". EVENSEN (KORWAY)-18 V 61 359
First, the wording of Article17, paragraph 2,supports this conclusion.
Itis not necesçary once more to quote the suh-paragraph, but it should
he borne in mind that these broad terms were not accidentally includcd
in the Charter. On the contrary, and as mentioned in the written state-
ment of the United States, page 194,the First Committee of Commission II
at the San Francisco Conference amended slightly the original Dumbarton
Oakç proposais on this point for the following reasons-and 1 quote
from the Committee's records :
"In taking this action the Committee considered the view of the
Advisory Committee of Jlirists that a clear statement of the obli-
gation of the Members to meet the eupenses of the Organization
should be found in the Charter."
Thus the present wording of Article 17,paragraph 2, has been carefully
phrased and adopted in order to avoid the difficulties and the doubts
which faced the League of Kations during its first years. The Covenant
of tlie League of Nations actually had to be amended in 1924, in order
to make it clear that the Aççembly possessed the sole authority with
regard to the budgetary and financial qiiestions ofthe League.
Article17 of the Charter expressly states that the Charter confers upon
tlic General Assembly the same authority to consider and approve the
budget under paragraph I thereof, and to apportion the "expenses of
the Organizatiori" to the Members under paragraph 2 thereof. Actually,
the paragraph is so clear that, in my submission, it is unwarranted
according to the prevailing rules of international law and the practice
of this Court to resort to yreparatory documents for its interpretation.
But, as has been stated by the Italian delegate, even the preparatory
documents support the clear text of Article 17.
In his treatise on the United Nations Bz~dgetProcess, Professor
J, D. Singer euplains the principle laid down in Article 17,as follows,on
page 173:
"The Charter made it quite clear that ultimate budgetary author-
ity lay with the Assembly, and that this body would have the power
to approve al1 proposed expenditures and decide upon a scale of
apportionment. The Covennnt, by omitting this delineation of power,
made it necessary for the Assembly to struggle for severnl years
with the Council before gaining fiscal control."
Allow me further to refer to the treatise bu Russel and Muther on the
History oj the United Nations Charter, page 377, whcre it is stated:
"Financial and budgetary provisions for the new organization
were even less controversial than administrative questions ...the
Staff Charter returned to the traditional system of having the
Conference alone vote the budgets and approve the financial regu-
lations of the institution, on the ground that al1 members had to
share the obligation and shouId therefore share the decisions..."
And, on pages 862 to 863 of the same work, it isIikewise stressed as
follows:
"There was complete agreement that the General Assembly should
apportion the expenses of the Organization among the members and
32 should have authority to approve the budget, as provided in the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The only issue was whether the Charter
should specify methods of apportionment and of budgetary prepa-
ration and examination. There were a few arnendments to these
ends, but the consensus in each case was that they involved details
that were too technical for decision by the Confer-eiice riird that
should not be rigidly formalized by being included in the Charter.
It \vas therefore agreed that the Assembiy should make its own
rules on these matters."
An examination of the provisions of Article 17, paragraph z, also
shows that it is all-inclusive and mandatory.
First, paragraph 2 applies the words "the expenses of the Organization"
in general. The French and Spanish texts contai11the equivalent thereof
-"Les dépenses de l'Organisation". The Russian text is identical with the
Spanish-"ee rasxodbiU-"its expenses", referring to the Organization.
The wording is thus general. It does not expressly or implicitly diç-
tinguish between ordinary expenses and extraordinary expenses. In the
written document, page 123, even Upper Volta, in principie opposing the
right to apply Article 17, feeIs compelled to admit that:
"C'est regrettableque la Charte ne prévoitpas dediscrimixaiion entre
les dépeîzses'ordinaires' et 'extraordinaires'."
In addition thcre is no distinction between expcnses included as an
item of the regular budget or expenses carried on separate accounts.
In view of these clear provisions, now can it possibly be alleged that
the expcnses incurred by the Organization in pursuit of the very purpose
for which it has been created, namely the maintenance of world peace,
are not covered by Article 17? To interpret Article 17 in such a manner
as to leave these main expenscs of the Organization unaccounted for in
the Charter irrould be unwarranted and dangerous, to say the least.
Allow me next to dwell briefly on certain basic provisions of the
Charter concerning the task entrusted to the United Bations.
In the Preamble it is impressed upon us that one of the main purposes
of the United Nations is :
d i
to Save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".
The United Nations was created in the midst of a worId war for this
very purpose. And, to the same end, the Preamble provides that the
peoples of the United Nations shall "u.nite our strength to maintain inter-
national peace and security".
Itis readily admittecl that the Preamble does not contain enforceable
provisions. But it has legal force and effect from the interpretational
standpoint. Here I beg to refer to an article on the law and the procedure
of the International Court of Justice in the British Yeaïbook of Inter-
national Law 1957. It is written by an international jurist whose name
it is unnecessary to'introduce to this Court. On page 229 it is stated:
"The Prearnble to a treaty is not onIy ail integral part of the
treaty, but is also, within the limits of its proper functions-particu-
larly its interpretational functions-as binding in character as ai>.
0th part of the treaty; it merely does not contain, or does not
usually contain, directly operative provisions." STATEMEKT OF MT, EVENSEN (NORWAY)-18 1'62 361
Rut other stipulations in the Charter do contain enforceabIe provisions
to the same effect. Article r, paragrapli I,of the Charter emphasizes as
the firstpurpose of the Organization:
"To maintain internaticrnal peace and security and, to that end,
to take eflectivecollectioemeusures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace."
The obligation is pIaced upon the hlembers to take "effective collective
measures". Along the çame Iines, paragraph 4 of ArticleI provides that
the United Nations shall
"be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment
of tliese common ends".
Can we, under the present circurnstances, devise any better way totake
"effective collective measures" and to harmonize the actions of the
nations than by the two peace-preserving actions now up for questioning
in connection with the application of Article 17, paragraph z?
Allow me to proceed with Article z of the Charter. Paragraph 2
thereof provides that :
"Al1 Members, in order to ensure to al1 of them the rights and
benefits resulting frorn membership, shall fulfil in good faith the
obligations assurned by them in accordance with the present
Charter."
.4nd paragraph 5 thereof provides that
"Al1 2iIemberç shall give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter."
The obligation to give every assistance necessary obviously includes
the obIigation to render econornic assistance by meeting assessed finan-
cial obligations according to Article 17,paragraph 2, of the Charter.
And, is to take a stand xvhereby the United Nations is threatened by
imminent bankruptcy "fulfilling one's obligations in good faith"?
1s a stand, whereby effective peace-preserving actions in the future
would be made almost impossible and whereby the whole existence of
the United Nations is threatened, in conformity with the obligations
tindertaken by Pilember Nations according to Articles I and z of the
Charter?
Onc basic principle of treaty intcrpretation is the principle of inte-
gration, rneaning that treaty provisions are to be interpreted in their
natural and ordinary rneaning "i~ the context in which they occur", as
stated by this Court in the Second Advisory Opinion on the Admission
of New ilfenzbers(See I.C.J. Ke$orts1950, p. 8.)
'Io preserve peace is the main obligation of the United Nations l\iIern-
bers and the noblest purpose of this Organization. The broad terms
applied by Article 17, paragraph 2, cannot possibly be interyreted in
such a manner as to leave this main purpose of the Organization without
the necessary financial backing. Such a result would be just the opposite
of interpreting treaty provisions in their proper context in accordance
with the natural and ordinary meaning of the words rised.
Certain Members of the United Nations have maintaincd that in spite
of the general wording of Article 17, paragraph z, it refers to ordinary362 STATEMEST OF MT. EVEKSEN (SORWAY)-18 V 62
expenses only, while so-called extraordinary activitieshould fa11outsidc
the scope of this paragraph. In answer to such contentions I venture to
present an additional observation. How is it possible to regard the main
purpose of the United Nations, namely the maintenance of international
peace and security, as an extraordinary activity?
Actually, the Charter has no other provisions than Article 17 concern-
ing the preparation of the budget and the financing of the necessary
expenseç of the Organization.
In the opinion of the Korwegian Government, the provisions of Article
17 obviously cover al1 expcnditures incurred in fulfilling the main tasks
of the Organization. Otherwise, the Organization and its organs wouId
be left completcly helpless.
This conclusion is supported by anothcr major principle of treaty inter-
pretation repeatedly resorted to hy the International Court of Justice
and its predecessor, nameiy, the principle of effectivenesIn this connec-
tion, it seems appropriate to quote afew sentences from thelatesirMersch
Lauterpacht on The Developme9ztof International Law by theInternational
Court. Part IV of this book is dcvotedto "The Effcctiveness of the Law".
On page 267 Sir Hersch statcs as follows:
"The general tcndency to secure the effectiveness of treaties has
guided the Court in the interpretation of another branch of modem
international law, namely that reiating to international instittitions
and organizations."
And on pages 274-275he makes the following observations:
"In general, in relation to the interprctation of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Court has repeatedly and on a large scale acted
upon the principle of effectiveness-on a scale so large as to bring its
pronounccments on the suhject within the category. of judicial
legislation."
Judge Laiiterpacht refers here to the Advisory Opinion rendered
on 11 April 1949 concerning Xeparations for Ilzjtiries szifleintheservice
O# the United Nations. In this Opinion the Court stated, inter alia, that:
"Under international law the Organization rnust be dcemed to
have those powers which, though not expressly proviclcd in the
Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as heing
essential to the performance of ils duties." (I.C.J. Refiorts 1949,
p. 182.)
In the present case, thcre is no need for the Court to resort to judicial
legislation. The text of Article17,paragraph z, is sufficiently clear. The
principle of effectiveness merely serves to corroborate the primary
principle of interpretation "to give effect to the words uscd in the~r
natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur".
1shall now proceed to a brief examination of the prcvious practice of
the Organization in financial rnatters. This examination dernonçtrates,
in the submission of the Norwegian Government, that the apportionment
of the expenses incurred in the peace-preserving actions in Gaza and in
the Congo to the various Members of the United Nations is not an inno-
vation of the General Assembly. There already existed an established
practice of the United Kations to the effect that expenses iiicurred in STATEMENT OF MT. EVESSEN (NOREVAY)-18 V 62 363
peace-preserving operations, whether initiated by the Security Council
or the General Assembly, are to be apportioned by the General Assembly
according to the provisions contained in Article17,paragraph 2. These
appropriations have yearly constituted a considerable part of the United
Nations budget.
The distinguished Delegate from Italy mentioned the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine established in accordance
with the Security Council Resolution of II August 1949. This mission
hashad yearly expenses of more thanSI+ million. It figures in the United
Nations budget for 1962 with $1,560,000. The ncccssary appropriations
have always been made hy the General Assernbly under Article 17,yara-
grayh 2.
Likewise, the United Sations Conciliation Commission for Palestine,
established bp the Gencral Assembly Resolution of rI Deccmber 1948.
The expenses of this Commission have varied bctween $40,000 and
$75,00o. It figures in t1962 budget with $75,500.
The United Nations Military Group in India and Pakistan was estab-
lished in accordance bvith Security Council Resolution of 14 March 1950,
in connection with the cease-fire agreement between these two countries.
The yearly expenses of this Group arnount to sorne $~~o.ooo.The figure
given in the 1962 budget is $426,000.
Mention may also be made of the United Nations representative in
India and Pakistan, which was established by the Security Council
Resolution of 14 March 1950. The amounts are here rather small. It is
S33,ooo a year.
The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea was established on 7 October 19jo'by a General Assembly
Resolution. This Commission superscded the United Nations Commission
of ICorea established in1947 .he expenses of this Commission have fi-
gured in the budget at an average of sorne $150,000 a year. The figure
given in the 1962 budget is$181,000.
The United Nations Advisory Council for Somaliland under Italian
administration was established in accordance with a General Assembly
Resolution of 21 November 1949. Tt figured in the budget of the Organ-
ization up to 1960 with a yearly average of $r5o,ooo.
The United Nations Field Serviceestablished by the General Assembly
in May 1949 may likewise serve asan interesting example. This service
figures in the1962 budget with an estimate of $1,366,000 Of its per-
sonne1 67 members are currently assigned toUNEF and 84members are
assigned toUNOC. These expenses are borne by the Members as appor-
tioned by the General Assembly according to Article 17, paragraph 2.
Furthermore, I beg to draw attention to the expenses included in the
budget pertaining to the MiIitary Staff Cornmittee. According to Arti-
cle47 of the Charter this Committee shall advise and assist the Security
Council in all questions relating to military efforts required for the rnain-
tenance of international peace and security. Naturally,the expenses of
this peace-preserving body, varying between $IOO,OOO and $200,000
per year, have been included in the budget and assessed according to
Article r7,paragraph z.
Perhaps the most interesting parallel is the so-called UNOGIL mission
established in Lebanon. Upon the request of Lebanon, the Security
Council, on II June 1958, decided "to dispatch urgently an observation364 STATEMENT OF hIr. EVEXSEK (NORWAY)-18 V 62
group to proceed to Lebanon" and "authorizes the Secretary-Gencral
to take the neccssary steps to that end". (S/4023.)
An observation group consisting of scveral hundred military personnel
was eçtablished bythe Secretary-General. Thegroup was called UNOGIL.
Subscquent to the stationing of American troops in Lebanon and
British troopç in Jordan in 1958, an additional resolution was passed
by the General Assembly on 7 August 1955, requesting the Sccretary-
General
"to make forthwith, in consultation with the governments concerned
and in accordance with the Charter..uch practicalarrangements as
would adequately help in upholding the purposes and .principles of
the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present
circumstances and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the.
foreign troops from the two countries". (A/3gog, Resolution 1237-
ES rrr.)
However, Jordan refused to accept the stationing of a United Sations
force in Jordan and a non-military observation group was therefore
eçtablished in that country.(SeeA/3934/Rev. 1,September 1958, p. 29.)
Eut UNOGIL operated successfully in Lebanon and the expenses of
this corps were included in the ordinary budget and apportioned ac-
cording to the provisions of Article 17, paragraph2.
In the falI of 1958 the UNOGIL forces consisted of Goo military
personnel.
To cover the costs of this action, the United Nations Advisory Com-
mittee recommended that (and 1 quote from p. 7 of a document of
28November 1958, A/~oI~):
"A supplementary credit of $3,Goo,ooo should be approved
under Chaptcr 1 of a new section4 (a) of the1958 budget in respect
of the UNOGIL.
A supplementary credit of $.roo,ooo should be approvcd under
Chapter II.
An additional appropriation of $~OO,OOO should be included ina
new section 4(a) of the1959 budget in respect of the expenses of the
UNOGIL."
These were no small amounts. On 13 December 1958 the General
Assembly appropriated the suppIcmentary amount of $3,7oo,ooo for the
budgetary year of 1958 with 59 votes for,IO abstentions and no votes
opposing it. (Resolution r334-XIII.)
The additional appropriations for the financial yedr of1959 in the
amount of $~OO,OOw Oere likewise adoptcd in the General Assembly
with 66 votes for, XI abstentions and no votes against. (Resolution
1338-XIII.)
How can the assessments to Member States for expenses incurred
by UNOGIL be in conformity with the Charter while it is irreconcilable
with the same Charter to assess the expenses incurreby the UNEF and
theUNOC actions inthe same rnanner?
The UNOGIL example is especialIy interesting for several rcasons. It
bears a striking sirnilarity to the task of tUNEF mission. It was a
rather large scale operation iiivolving cubstantial expenses and a. fairly
large number of militarp personnel.Itsclearly peace-preserving purpose did not prevent the expenses from being assessed according to Article 17,
paragraph 2.Furthermore, tlic fact that its existence and authority was
based on a remlution by the Security Council made no difference in
respect io the applicability of Articl17, paragraph z.
1 might cite a host of other examples. Suflice it here to refer to the
follo~~~ing:the United Nations Special Committee on the Ealkans,
established by Kesolution of tlie General AssembIy of 21 October 1947;
tlie United Nations Commission for Indonesia, established by the Security
Council on 21 January 1949 to assist the Government of the Netherlands
and the Government of Indonesia to settle their disputes. Mention may
also be made of the proposed establishment of the Administration of
the 17ree Territory of Trieste by the Security Council Resolution of
IO January 1947.
These commissions and bodies were entrusted with the task of pre-
serving the peace. They were established either by the Security Council
or by the General Assembly. They were financed in accordance with
the provisions, of Article17,paragraph 2.
1 may conclude my exaniination on this practice with a quotation
from page ZII of the arficle mentioned in British Yearbook oj'Inter-
national Law I957. It ishere stated, as to the principle of subsequent
practice :
"In interpreting a text, recourse to the subsequent conduct and
practice of the parties in relation to the treaty is permissible, and
may be desirable, as affording the best and rnost reliable evidence,
derived from liow the treaty h,zç heen interpreted in practice, as
to what its correct interpretation is."
I shall now, with the Court's permission, present certain additional
observations with regard to various statements in the printed documents.
Allow me first to make a few coniments on certain observations
set forth on pages 123-124 of the printed documents. First, as 1 have
already mentioned, the Government of Upper Volta here adrnits that
Article 17 in its text makes no distinction between ordinary and extra-
ordinary expenses. However, certain observations are made with regard
to the temporary character of the two organs in question. It is respect-
fullg7subrnitted that the fact that the UNEF and the UNOC are "tem-
porary organs" has no bearing upon the applicability of Article 17 (2).
On the contrary, as practice shows, the inclusion of a host of such
transitory cornmittees and organs in the budget of the United Nations
isan established practice.
On page 124, the Governrnent of Upper Volta further invokes Article
z (4) as an argument against the assessrnent of espenscs under Article
17 (2).Paragraph 4of Article 2 provides:
"Al1 hlembers shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other ma.nner incon-
sistent with the purpose of the United Nations."
To regard the UNEF and the UNOC operations as manifestations
of power politics of hIernber States is a misconception. On tlie contrary,
as amply demonstrated hy the Canadian delegate, these actions were
taken in conformity with the scope and the purposes of the Organization;366 STATEMEKT OF MT. EVENSES (NORWAY)-18 V 62
they were taken in accordance with the principIes contained in the
Preamble and the first two articles of the Cliarter to the end that the
Members shall unite their peace-preserving çtrength in and througli the
United Nations Organization in order to "ensure by the acceptance of
principles and the institution of methods that armed forces shall not be
used save in common interest". The actions now inquestion are steps
directed towards the attainment of these common goals.
Allow me nent to make a few remarks on certain observations made
on page 133 of the printed document by the French Government, and 1
refer to page 133, paragrapli 3 (1 use the English translation):
"In 1945 the States hlernbers of the United Nations did not
agree to anytliing other than to enabling the General Assembly
to authorize and reasonably estirnate al1the expenses the principle
of which was laid down by the Charter as a Iegal obligation on
States, that is to Say, the administrative expenses of the United
Nations."
For reasons already explained, 1 venture,to propose that this line
of argument is not tenable. No such restrictionsare found in the test
of Article 17,nor in the preparatory documents.
The practices of the United Nations are clearly formulated along
other liiies. Eacli budget contains a number of items which do not belong
to the category "administrative expenses". And it would be a critical
state of affairsifthe only explicit provisions in the Charter concerning
'finances should refer to strictly administrative expenses,ile the main
tasks of the Organization are left to be financed with alms from more or
less willing contributors.
To leave the financing of the main tasks of the Organization, namely
.its peace-promoting functions, to voluntary contributionswould, in the
submission of the Korwegian Government, be an extremely dangerous
road to follow.And furthermore, it would be contrary to the clear pro-
visions of the Charter.
It is difficult to believe that the main tasks of the Organization could
possibly be fulfilled properly if the financing thereof should be Ieft to
voluntary contributions. First, as shown in Egypt and in the Congo,
such grave conflicts arise so suddenly and immediate actions by the
United Nations are so paramount that any delays caused by financial
difliculties or protracted negotiations with Member States would easily
prove disastrous.
SecondIy, if such actions were to be financed by voluntary contribu-
tions, the resultrnight easily be that it was the rich and the mighty
States u71-icould take care of these aspects. The consequence might be
that to the world tlie steps taken wouId easily be considered as steps
faken by a single State or a single group of States and riot as steps
taken bÿ the United Nations under the Charter. An interpretation of
Article 17 (2)leading to such undesirable results cannot be legally sound.
On page 134 of the printed dociiments, the French Government gives
vent to the fear that by applying Article 17 too much power would be
vested inthe General Assembly. It would confer on this organ the powers
of a world government ("unpozcvoirlégislatifmondial"!.
Allow me first, Mr. President, to draw attentioto the fact that such
fear was not expressed in 1930 when tlie ITrench Government uras one
of the main sponsors of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of3 November STATEMENT OF RIT. EVENSEX (FORWAY)-18 V 62
367
1950. France actually took part in the drafting of the text of that Reso-
lution. In a meeting of the General Assembly on r Novernber 1g5o the
French delcgate, Mr. Chauvel, in a brilliant speech made the following
statements recommending the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolu-
tion-and Iqiiote from page 301 of the General AssembIy Elfth Session
plenary meetings :
"France, 1 repeat, stands for the Charter and for the whole
Charter. Its policy is founded on the rights and the guarantees
laid down in the Charter and also on the obligations it entails. It
appears inconceivable to my delegation that those rights and gua-
rantees, those obligations, the very Charter itself, should lapse into
impotence and ineffectiveness ... It is unthinkable that this entire
machinery designed to safeguard the peace and security of the worId
should remain inactive wlien there is a threat to peace and security.
And if, as 1 have shown to be the fact, there is a real danger of such
inactivity, then we must revise our customs, Our methods, oitr rules
and our interpretations."
And :
"It is with tliat desire, to ensure the effective application of the
Charter, that my delegation CO-operated in drafting the proposal
u71iichis now subrnitted to the General Asçembly. My delegation
feltin so doing that it was unnecessary to revise the Charter whicli
itself afforded the means of ensuring that its principles should be
applied. Itconsidered that it would be sufficient in some respects to
adjust our customs and rules, in others to augment the means laid
down fromyear to year by which the United Nations couId meet its
obIigations."
My Government subscribes to these words and it does not share tlie
fears now expressed that giving the General Assembly the budgetary
role entrusted to it by the clear text of the Charter would he to confer
upon the said organ a world legislative power.
On the same page of the written document, namely page 134, it is
concluded that-and I quote from the English translation:
"It is to be feared that tl-ieremay be a temptation to deduce the
existence for the General Assembly of a discretionary and unlimited
budgetary power."
The Norwegian Government does not share these views. The General
Assembly does not have a discretionary and unlimited budgetary power
under the Charter.
Here one must not overlook the findings of this high tribunal in its
previous Advisory Opinion rendered on 13 July 1954 concerning the
Eoect of Awards of Compensutionmade by the United Nations Admini-
strativeSuibunuJ.
The question then placed before the Court was, of course, not quite
analogous to the questions now under cliscussion. Rut the said Opinion
is highly interesting in.the light of these present contentions.It is clear
from the Court's findings that the Court did not consider the budgetary
role assigned to the General Assembly under Article 17as unlimited and
discretionary. On the contrary, the Court held, on page 59: "The function of approving the budget does not mean that the
Gencral Assembly has an absolute power to approve or disapprove
the expenditure proposed to it; for some part of expenditure arises
out of obligations already incurred by the Organization and to this
extent the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour
thesc engagements."
And, at the bottom of the same page, the Court concludes
"The Court therefore considers that the assignment of the budget-
ary functions to the General Assembly cannot be regarded as
conferring upon it the right to refuse to give effect to the obligation
arising out of an award of the Administrative Tribunal."
The Court's findings are the firmly established practice of the United
Nations. Tlie Administrative Tribunal was a subsidiary organ of the
United Nations established by the General Assembly. It goes without
saying, these basic findingsof the Court appl~ even more so uritfi regard
to thc main organs, like the Security Council. Thus, one lm no reason
to fear that the General Assembly's role as the budgetary and financial
organ is urilimited and discretioriary.
[Public hearing of 18hfay 1962, afternoon]
Mr. ~resident, Members of the Court, 1 shall continue with a few
observatio~is in connection with the statement set fort11on pages 227-229
by the Portuguese Government. It is, as 1have already stated, clear that
the budgetary and financial powers of the General Assembly also com-
prise the activities of the Security Council. The stand taken by the
Portuguese Government to the opposite effect is not only irreconcilable
with the system Iaid clownin the Charter but also irreconcilable with the.
firmly established practice of the Organization.
A special objection is raised by the Portuguese Government on page
228 of the printed documents, and 1 will read from the English trans-
lation. It is clearly allegeby the Portuguese Government that
"any other interpretation would indeed mean tliat the Assembly
would exercise a domination over the Council that would be con-
trary to the letter and to the spirit of thc Charter".
In the view of the Noru~egianGovernment, this statement, this stand,
is untenable, and itissufficientin this connection to refer to the quotation
1 have already made from the Advisory Opinion of 1954. Furthermore,
no one denies that the General Assembly has the financial power, at
least concerning the administrative expenses of the Security Council.
The argument of Portugal should obviously be equally applicable to th15
aspect of the GeneraI Assembly's budgetary power.
On page 228, paragrapli 6, it is furtherstated, and 1 use the English
translation :
"As the Assembly does not esercise a potver of control on the
Specialized Agencies, it has not the potver to approve their budget,
but only the pou7er of making recommenrlations that have no
obligatory force (Article 17, paragraph 3). On what grounds could
ithave a more far-reaching power in respect of operations dccided
upon by the Security Council?" STATEDIEKT OF 13r. ËVENSEN (XORWAY)-18 V 62 369
It is respectfully submittcd that this argumentation is based or1 a
misconception of the system applied by the Charter as to the Specializcd
Agencies.
As the narne indicates, tliese Specialized Agencies are specific and
more or less autonomous organizations, many of them existing before
the creation of the United Nations. Examples are the International
Labour Organisation, the Universal Postal Union and the Inter-
national Telecornmunication Union. It was, however, decided at San
Francisco to bring such organizations intorelationship with the United
Xations as expressly stated in Article 57 of the Charter.
Special agreements have consequently been concluded with these
organizations, according to Article63 of the Charter. But they are not
organs of tlie United Nations, They have their special and independent
fields of activities, their own organs, finances, budgets and so forth.
lio parallel whatsoevercan be drawn between these Specialized Agen-
cies and the Security Council. And the very purpose and scope of Article
17, paragraph 3, was to have such Specialized Organizations in reality
outside the financial power of the General Assembly, even though the
General Assembly could examine their budgets as a matter of form. Thus,
Article 17, paragraph 3, clearly stands as an exception to the main
priricipIe concerning the budgetary and financial powers of the General
Assembly laid down in the two preceding paragraphs of Article 17.
Finally, on pages 228-229 certain conclusions are drawn from Article 19
of the Charter. Article19 provides that the failvre to comply with one's
financial obligations may deprive a Member State of its right to vote in
the General Assembly, while nothing is said in Article 19 about the loss
of voting rights in the Security Council. In the opinion of the Portuguese
Government, this should indicate that the General Assembly are not
concerned with the finailcial aspects of the activities of the Security
Council.
This line of argument has no basis in the facts leading up to the for-
mulation of Article 19.Suffice it here to quote the following passage from
the work by Professor J. D. Singer, FigzancialInternatiotzalOrganization
(mhich I have referred to previously), pages 7-8:
"As indicated earlier, a fifth item came before Committee 1111
when several delegates criticized the Dumbarton Oaks Proposa1
as being hardly sufficient in the matter of prompt and regular
payment of national contributions. Noting the omission in the
Covenant on tl-iisscore, the Norwegian delegate concluded that the
'helplessness of the League in this respect undoubtedly tended to
lower its prestige', he therefore proposed a Charter Clause retracting
al1 rights and privileges of membership from any State falling
behind in payments. The Dutch went even further, suggesting
that the seat of any Member on the Security Council (apparently
either permanent or temporary) would be forfeited if it fell behind
on dues; that suggestion closed with a terse comment that 'a rule
of this nature would tend to minimize the accumulation of arrears'.
-4 less stringent compromise, initiated by Australia, called only for
disqualificrttion from voting the non-permanent seats inthe Security
Council. After weighing the several penalties put forth, the Commit-
tee accepted tlie loss of voting privilein theAssembly as the most
suitable." 370 ST.4TEMENT OF MT. EVENSEN (NORWAY)-18 V 62
It takeç no further explanation to show that this result was the most
happy one for obvious political reasons. It had nothing to do with the
question of the extent of the General Assembly's budgetary authority
with regard to the Security Council.
Allow me finally to make certain additional observations in connection
with the Czechoslovak statement, printed at pages 177-179, and the
staternent by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of April 1962,
printed as a separate document. Theçe statementsset forth the following
main Iines of argumentation.
Firstlyit is contended that the UNEF action and the UNOC action
were illegal as violating Article 24 and ChapterVI1 of the Charter.
Secondly it is maintained that the financing of such peace-preserving
actions is lying outside the çcope of Article 17. They could only be
financed through special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter.
Ido not deem it necessary to revert to the first question. It kas been
fully covered in what has been said hereinbefore.
JVith regard to the second question, the view of the Government of
Norway k also stated hereinbefore. The UNEF operation was an opera-
tion undertaken by the General Assembly, well within the limits of its
authority as laid down in Chapter IV of the Charter. It is crystal clcar
to the Norwegian Government that the financing thereof falls under the
provisions laid down in Article 17, paragraph 2. This result cannot
encroach upon the rights and authorities conferred upon the Security
Council in Article24 and Chapter VI1 of the Charter.
With regard to the UNOC action, it haç also been amply demonstrated
that the authority to undertake these steps falls under the express or
implied authority conferred upon the Security Council under Chapter VI
or under Article 39 of the Charter. And further, that the situation never
reached the stage where enforcement actions available to the Security
Council under Articles 42 and 43 were decided on and used.
Coi~sequei~tly,the principal stand of the Government of Norway is
that the Court does not need to consider thiç çubsidiary question raised
in the statements of the USSR and Czechoslovakia as to whether tlie
financing of enforcement actions under Articles 42 et sqqis covered b~-
Article17, paragraph 2,or not. The provisions in Article 43 concerning
the conclusion of special agreements do not enter into the picture at all.
The UNOC action must be financed under the ordiiiary rules of Artic17,
paragraph 2.It does not in principle differ from theUNEF action, the
UNOGIL action and similar actions where the question of financing is
concerned.
Subsidiarily andfrom a purely theoretical point of view, 1 shall briefly
revert to the question as to whether 0th and materially different rules
govern the question of financing of enforcemeilt actions undertaken in
compliance with Articles 42 etsgq. The starting-point for a discussion
- here is that Article 43 of the Charter places upon the Members the
express obligation to comply with the orders of the Security Council
with regard to joint enforcement actions. Such orderç may involve the
duty to place at the disposa1 of the Security Council armed forces and to
make other forms of assistance and facilities available to the Council,
again as a matter of duty. From the practical point of view it 1sself-
evident that such orders cannot be put into effective operation without
specific agreements as to the contents and details of the obligations
concerned. It must be borne in mind in this connection, as is also cIearIy STATEhlErjT OF hli.EVENSES (KORW~\Y)-18 V 62 371
stated in paragraph 2 of Article 43, that the said agreements are sup-
posed to settle such practical questions as the number and the types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, the question of
replacement of personnel and equipment, the question of military bases,
the question of right of passage, and so on. But the reference in Art43le
to "armed forces, assistance and facilities" does not,in the submission
of the Nonvegian Government, intend to regulate the general questions
of financing with al1 Member States. These questions have been much
better taken care oby the provisions of Articl17,paragraph 2.And, from
a practical point of view, it would be impossible to arrange the question
of the general distribution of expenses for such action tlirough bilateral
or multilateral agreements between the Organization and al1 Member
States. Here 1 may refer to the statement by Professor Riphagen in his
oral address, where he stated:
"As to the extent one might construe the requirements of a
special agreement in Article 43 of the Charter as a provision which
safeguards a legitimate interest of a Member State, there is nothing
in the fiscalower.of the General Assembly under Article 17 wliich
in any way nullifies, encroaches upon and frustrates that safeguard."
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 have corne to the end of my
statement. 1 should onIy Iike to make one final observation.
A certain confusion seems to reign among those contending that
Article 17 is not applicable to the present questions.
Some of them seem to advocate that the line sIiouId be drawn between
ordinary expenses, where Article 17 applies, and extraordinary expenses,
but they are not prepared to give us a clear definition of the distinction.
And what are the main characteristics of ordinary expenses versus
extraordinary expenses in the life of the United Nations? Others want
to draw a distinction between administrative expenses and non-admini-
strative expenses. Nor can they give us a satisfactory definition of this
distinction, and they cannot explain why the practice of the United
Nations should be illegal. Others, again, seem to distinguish between
exyenses incurred in the activities of the General Assemblyand expenses
incurred by the activities of the Security Council, and others want to
draw the Iine between expenses incurred under Chapter VI1 of the
Charter, especially Articles42 and 43, and other expenses. And there
may be other opinions and variations as well.
Eut one fact emerge'sclearly from these varying positions. They offer
us no adequate solution, but they offer us sheer confusion where the
United Nations and the world necd clarity. They offer us vaguesugges-
tions or no suggestions at all, where the Charter lays down a clear and
workable principle as to the financing of the tasks ofthe Organization.
My Government strongly feels that such a stand is legally unsound
and politically disastrous.
Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. 6, ORALSTATEMENT OF SIR KENNETH BAILEY
[Pzcblichearing O/18May 1962, afternoo?~]
Mr. President and hiembers of the Court:
1 confess the trepidation and the pleasurable escitement with which1
approach the task of addressing this august iribunal for thefirst time.
It isnatural thaI should be sensible also, being sixth in the list to address
you, of the law of diminishing returns.
The Government of Australia has already stated to the Court in
writing its reasons for submitting that the question upon which the
Court's opinion has been asked should he answercd 'yes': that is to
Say, that the expenses incurred by the United Nations in the UNEF
and in the Congo operations do constitute "expenses of the Organization"
within the meaning ofArticle 17,paragraph 2, of the Charter-with the
consequence that by virtue of that paragraph each hlemher of the
Organization is under a legaI obligation topay itsshare of those exyenses
as apportioned among the Members by the General Assernbly, and with
the further consequence that by virtue of Articl19 a hlember declining
to pay its share may therehy, if it ailows its arrears to reach the amount
referred to in that Article, disqualify itself from voting in the Gencral
Assembly.
I shall not merely repeat orally what is contained in the written
statement of the Government ofAustralia. Moreover, in order to avoid
repetition,1 shall not repeat the arguments that have been adduced in
support of the same conclusion by the distinguished representatives
who have preceded me from Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, the United
Kingdom and Norway respectively. In the broad, if not indced in every
detail,1 am respectfully content to adopt and support the submissions
they have made.
1 have been asked, Mr. President, and perhaps 3Iembers of the Court
have asked themselves, what has led the Government of Australia, in
view of the factorsinvolvedin distance, time and expense, to participate
in these oral hearings. The answer lies partly in the greatness of the issue
raised, and the importance to cvery hlember of the United Nations, in
our view, of the answer that the Court wilIgive tothe question submitted l
for advice. A negative answer would, in our submission, threaten the
immediate financial solvency of the Organization; it would threaten the
ability of the United Nations to bring these two grcat current peace- ~
keepiiig operations to their propcr conclusion; it would threaten the
ability of the Organization to deal with similar problems of peace and
security in the future,and indeed would entirely change the character
of the Organization.Such an issue, in our judgment, challenges hlernbers
of the United Nations to offer whatever assistance lies in their power in
clarifying the matters on which this Advisory Opinion is sought. The ' STATEMEST OF SIR K. BAILEY (AUSTRALIA)-18 V 62 373
Government of Australia feels itself to have a great, indeed a vital, in-
vestment in the maintenance of an effective international organization.
In addition, Mr. President, thc Government of Australia has a more
specificconcern in connection with the contentions to be considered by
the Court. hiot only in the debate in the General Assembly out of which
these proceedings have grown but in some of the written statements
submitted to the Court, the history of certain proposed Australian
amendments, moved at the United Nations Conferencc on International
Organization in 1945. in relation to what is now Article19of the Charter,
has been used in support of a proposition that according to the under-
standing and intention ofthe founders and draftsmen of the Charter the
expenses of military operations undertakcn in pursuance of Sccurity
Council resolutions were not to be regarded as "expenses of the Organ-
ization", for the purposes of Article 17 of the Charter (or, by conse-
quence, for the purpose of Article 19 either).
That certainly was neither the understanding nor the intention of
the Australian delegation at San Francisco, which indeed put forward
the relevant amendments alio intuitu altogether. Primarily therefore
I propose, Mr. President, insthis oral statcment, to explain why and
how thehistory of these Aüstralian amendments at San Francisco cannot
correctly be uscd in the manner suggested, and why and how that history
does not in any way warrant an answer in the negative to the question
now submitted for the Court's advice.
Discussions at San Francisco as to the provisions which now stand
as Articles49 and 50 of the Charter have aIso been used, in some of
the written statemcnts submitted to the Court in the present matter,
in support of a contention that the expenses of enforcement action
strictly so called, or even more generally the expenses of al1operations
under Chapter VTI of the Charter, are not included in the category of
"expenses of the Organization" for the purposes of ArticIe 17. 1 shall
deal, Mr.President, with this aspect too of the San Francisco discussions,
and shall give reasons for holding that, seen in true perspective, they
likewise afford no warrant for giving to the terms of Article 17 the
restricted meaning suggested.
Considerations of that kind, hlr. President, plainly lead to questions
even wider. 1 mean in particular one of the basic questions in the inter-
pretation of international treaties,that is to Say whether there is any
room or justification for resorting to the preparatory work in order to
determine the meaning of the established text. The Government of
Australia will submit firmly, on that point, that in this instance the text
is so clearas to exclude al1 possibility of contradiction or modification
from the preparatory work. Rut at this initial stage of my argument,
it is perhaps unnecessary to Say more than that, unless sorne authorita-
tive limitation could be spelt out €rom the travaux$réparatoires ,t scems
quite hopeless, on the text of the Charter as it stands, to deny to the
expenses aiithorized by the resolutions now under consideration bjr the
Court the character of "expenses of the Organization". The Charter so
plainly contcmplates in its express terms, not t~o budgetary systems,
one under the authority of the General Assembly and one not, but only
one exclusive budgetary system, vested in the membership of the Organ-
ization acting through the required majority in the General Assembly.
Ishall address myself, Mr, President, as briefly as1 rnay, in turn to
each of the three matters which I mentioned in opening the argument:374 STT"'IX31EXT OF SIR K. BAILEY (AUSTRXI-1~)-18 V 62
First, therefore, the bearing, if any, upon the interpretation of Art17,e
paragraph 2,ofthe Charter of certain proposed.Australian amendments
at San Francisco.
What is said about these proposed amendments, in the documents for
consideration by the Court, will be found in quite a number of places.
1hope that it will be convenient for the Court if 1 supply the references.
1 have set them out in the text before me,a copy of which 1 have handed
in, and 1 hope they can be taken into the transcript from that text with-
out my wearying the Court by reading a list of them now. There arc from
the General Assembly, statements bj7 the representative of Mexico (made
at the 837th meeting of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on
13 April 1961, recorded in document 13 in the dossier of these proceed-
ings); by the late Secretary-General (made at the 83gth meeting of the
same Cornmittce on 17 ApriI 1961, recorded in document Ij of the dos-
sier) ; and by the representative of Australia (made at the same meeting,
recorded also in document ~5). There are, in the written statements
submitted to the Court and contained in the Court's printed volume,
statements by the Government of the United States (at PI) .07-209);
the Government of Australia (at pp. 235-238) ; the Government of South
Africa (at pp. 260 and 262) ;and the Governrnent of the Soviet Union
(at p. 273of the English text of that Government's written statement).
On the history of these AustraIian arnendments, the representative
of Mexico, in the Gcneral Assemhly in April rgGr, based the statement
that
"expenscs resulting fromoperations involving the use of armed for-
ces, as inthc case of the Congo operations, were deliberately and
interitionally excluded by thc San Francisco Conference from the
application of the penalty provided for in Article 19". (Dossier,
document 13, p. 33,)
A similar statement is made hy the Government of the Soviet Union,
at pagc 273 of the English text. If statcmcnts of that character coiild bc
supported on the records, the point would, of course, have some import-
ance. But in truth the records altogether disprove tliepoint.
The Government of Australia thinks it has demonstrated this in its
written statement, at pages 235-238. Eut examination both of the San
Francisco Conferencc records and of Our own governmental records,
since the written statement was filed, makes it possible to offer some
further clarification in point of detail. Our general answer, howevcr,
to the Mexican contention and to those who have since adoptcd it, is
not changed. What we Say is that the Australian amendments did not
in terms Say anything about costs or expenses, and were not directed
at al1against faiiure to meet financial commitments. They were directed,
and were thoroughly understood at the time to be directed, towards pro-
viding a sanction, by los~of voting rights in the General Assembly, for
failure to perform the military obligations laid down hy what is now
Article 43 of the Charter-that is to say, initially and in the first instance,
to negotiate through the illilitary Staff Committee a special agreement to
supply armed forces and other assistance on cal1by the Security Council,
and in the second place, to carry out enforcement action, if required, in
accordance with the special agreement so entcred iiito.
There Ras indeed, Mr. President, another Australian amcndment
which (along with proposais from India, from the Netherlands and from STATEhlENT OF SIR K. BAILEY (AUTRALIA)-18 V 62 375
Nom~ay)supplied the idea that now finds expression in Article 19 of the
Charter-the idea, that is, that Members who fa11into arrcars with their
contributions sliould lose voting rights in the GeneraI Assembly. Rut the
Court does not for prescnt purposes need to concern itself in any way
with that amendment. The amcndments now in question were put
forward, certainly, in the same complex of proposals and in the same
document. Riit they had an entirely different object in view, as is made
clear, not only in the written statement of the Governincnt of Austraiia,
but alço in the written staternent of the Government of the United States
at page 20s of the Court's printed volume.
Let me now give to the Court, Mr. President, the text of the two
proposed amendments that are relevant for present purposes. The text
is not, 1 think, included in the note supplied as document 194 in the
dossier on the history of the drafting of ArticIe 17, and 1am not sure
that the text is altogether clearly set out inthe Australian written state-
ment (pp. 236-237) The basic proposa1 was to include in the Dumbarton
Oaks text on the composition of the Security Council the following new
paragraph (San Francisco documents, Vol. 3, p. 550):
"(4) No member shall be eligible for election to a non-permanent
seat unless it has, within two years of the coming into force of this
Charter, or such period as the Security Council may deem reasonable,
entered into a special agreement in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph (5) of Section (B) of Chapter VIII" (that is to say
present Article43). I
Now, correlative to that Security Council eligibility proposal, the
Australiail delegation proposed, asan additional sanction, to insert in the
Chapter dcaling with voting rights in the General Assembly, on the
assumption that the Security Council proposa1 that I have just quoted
would be adopted in the Third Commission, the following text (San
Francisco documents, Vol. 3, p. 546):
"A Member of the United Nations shall be disqualified for voting
in the elcction to fil1 the non-permanent seats in the Security
Council if-
(a) under paragraph (4) of Section (A) of Chapter VI"-that is the
paragraph that 1 have just read-"it is itself ineligible for election
to the Security Council."
What 1 have called the Security Council eligibility proposa1 was of
course a matter for Commission III in San Francisco. On 16 May 1945,
Corninittee I of that Commission rejected the Australian Security Council
ameiidment (San Francisco documents, Vol. II, p. 298). That .rejection
plainly left without legal foundation the General Assembly voting rights
proposa1 which 1 read second, because that proposa1 only operated, and
could only operate, if the Charter should embody the Security Council
eligibility proposal, that is to say, because it could only operate on
Members ïvhich were under the proposed new paragraph ineligible for
election, and the proposed new paragraph had itseIf been rejected. TWO
days Iater, however, on the 18th of May, notwithçtanding the rejection
of the Security Council eligibility proposal, the Assembly "voting rights"
proposa1 was called on on the business paper of Committee I of Com-
33376 STATEhfEIVT OF SIR K. BAlLEY (AUSTR.~I.IA)-18 V 62
mission PI (the General Assembly Commission). The agenda of the
Committee set the proposa1out, with an accompanying note, the proposa1
being of course set out in its original and only form, which referred
across to the Security Council amendment. The point 1 make, hlr. Presi-
dent, is that on that agenda paper nobody could have thought that the
Australian amendment had anything whatever to do with financial
obligations. The records show plainly, up to that point, that the Australian
proposa1 had been concerned, and concerned only, with the negotiation
of special agreements for the purposes of what is now Article 43. The
notes on the agenda, which were supplied for the information of members
of the Committee, most carefully distinguish between the two distinct
questions tliat had to be considered by the Comrnittee that day-whether,
that is, there should be a penalty of loss of voting rights, firçt, for non-
payment of expenses (which was oneproposal) and second, for ineligibility
for electian to the Security Council (through failure, that is, to negotiate
a special inilitary agreement) on the other hand (that was another pro-
posai). The two things, though taken at the same meeting, had nothing
to do with each other. (This agenda paper may be found in the San
Francisco documents, Vol. 8, p. 259.)
Tlie available records do not show in detail what happened at that
meeting of Committee II (1) on the 18th of May 1945. But obviously
enough, the Australian representative in that Committee, in order $0
keep his proposa1 alive at all, in view of the rejection of the Security
Council eligibility proposal, must have foreshadowed an amending text
along broader lines, and he did foreshadow an amending text along
broader lines. Many Members of the Court, Rlr. President, will perhaps
at this stage evoke persona1 recollections of the difficulty there was at
the San Francisco Conference of keeping the documentation in one
Committee in step with what was happening so quickly in other Com-
mittees.
The surnmary record of the Committee meeting of the 18th of May
1945 does, however, sufficiently indicate what the new linesof the
Australian proposa1 tvould be. (SanFrancisco documents, Vol. 8, pp. 364-
365.) The new proposal evidently was to deprive a illember of voting
nghts in the General Assembly for failure to perform its obligations as
contemplated under what is now Article 43-to perform its obligations
generally under Article 43. But the proposa1 itself was at that meeting
postponed until the appropriate Technical Committee had settled the
Security Council text which would settle and define the obligations,
before which of course no Australian draftsman could properly settle the
terms of his proposed "voting rights" amendment. In fact, 110 new
Australian text was placed on the business paper until the meeting of
the Committee calIed for the8th of June 1945. (SanFrancisco documents,
Vol. 8, p.365; Vol. 12,pp. 469-470.) lt "as along the lines foreshadowed,
and the text was this:
"A Member shall have no vote if it has not carried out its obli-
gations as set forth in ChapterVIII, Section B, paragraph 5." (That
is to say, Article43 of the Charter.)
The proposal encountered strong opposition and was withdrawn
(San Francisco documents, Vol. 12, p.476). The fact that Article 43 has
never been implemented by the making of special agreements gives, or
may give, rise to some speculation as to what wouId have been the STATEMENT OF SIR K. BAILEI' (AUSTRALIA)-18 V 62 377
history of the United Nations if that particular Australian amendment
had in fact been aclopted. But that is not a question, Mr. President, that
the Court has to answer. It is sufficient for my purposes to point out
that, though in its wider and ultimate form the Australian amendment
would no doubt have covered failure to carry out enforcement action on
cal1 as well as prior failure'to negotiate a special agreement-and only
the latter was covered in the original form-even in the wider form the
amendment had nothing whatever to Say about the expenses of enforce-
ment action, either about who should bear them or as to how and by
whom, if shared, they should be apportioned. Viewedin proper perspective
against the records, the proposed Australian "voting rights" arnendments
at San Francisco afford therefore.no reason for denying to the expençes
of theUNEF and the Congo operations the character of "expenses of
the Organization" for the purposes of Article 17. Indeed, in Our sub-
mission, the proposed Australian amendments contribute nothing what-
ever to the elucidation of the question presently before the Court. They
were, in our submission, put in issue in these proceedings only through
a complete misconception of their object and effect, +nd, in Our submis-
sion, should be eliminated from consideration-should and must be
eliminated from consideration altogether.
1 turn now, Mr. President, to the second portion of the San Francisco
discussions, which has been put forward in some of the papers for the
Court's consideration as supporting by implication the exclusion from
the scope of Article 17'of the Charter of al1expenses incurred in main-
taining international peace and security. The relevant portion here is
what now forms Articles49 and 50, the text of which is as follows and
which, in the Dumbarton Oaks text, appeared as paragraphs IO and II
respectiveIy of Chapter VIII, Section B.
Article 49, Dumbarton Oaks text paragraph IO:
"The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording
mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by
the Security Council."
Article 50, Dumbarton Oaks paragraph II:
"If preventive or enforcement measures against any State are
taken by the Security Council, any other State, whether a Member
of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with
special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those
measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with
regard to a solution of those problems."
Several references may be found in the Court's documentation to the
discussion that took place in San Francisco on these provisions. The
matter was touched on by the Government of Portugal in its written
statement (p. 228 of the Court's printed volume); by the Government
ofCzechoslovakia (pp.181-182 )ythe Government of Australia (pp. 233-
235); and by the Government of South Africa (p. 262,al1 in the same
volume).
The suggestion here, as 1 understand it,hlr. President, is that the
discussions in San Francisco in the Commission dealing with the Security
Council-Commission III (+show an intention that a duty to share in
the expenses of maintaining international peace and security coufd not378 STATEMEKT OF SIR K. BAILEY (AUSTRAT.IA)-18 5' 62
fa11on any hlember of the United Nations otherwise than by agreement,
and that by arrangement with the Security Council.
In our submiçsion, Mr. President, this proposition rests on a funda-
mental misconception of the San Francisco discussions-a misconception
aided perhaps by records which, though they served their contem~iorary
purpose well, seem now, to us who study tliem witli hindsight, sornewhat
lacking aitimes in analytical precision, An obvious difficulty with the
records in this particularmatter arises from the fact that so very few
delegations-indeed lessthan a handful in ail-participated from one end
to the other of the discussion. In such circumstances, inferences as to
the views of the great but silent majority can be drawn only precariously,
if at all.
Clearly enough, as has been said, thebrief discussion ofcosts by the
few participants in Committee III (3)at San Francisco centred on the
costs of enforcement action in pursuance of Article 43. But in the course
of that discussion, though the term "costs" or "expenses" is frecluently
used, no overt, no clear, distinction was drawn between tlic costs of the
actioa nnd the costs of the Organizutio orbetween the expenses of the
adio?t and tl-ic expenses of the Organization. Yet, hir. President, for
purposes of the Court in thiç matter, involving as those purposes do the
interpretation of the resoliitions cited in tlie question for advice, that
distinction between costs of the Organization and costs of the individual
Members is obviously vital.
The reason for inattention to this basic distinction does not appear on
the record, and cannot be readily perceived. Tliere may of course have
been more thrin one reason. Those delegations, those iew delegations, that
contributed to the discussion seern to me to have assumed, in some cases
at anyrate, that in the ordinary course Ilie Security Council would insist,
when it made a special agreement with an individual Mernber or group
of Members, that the Member or Members concerned would themselves
bear, in their entirety,the costs of the forces or material or facilities
which they agreed to make available to the Security Council on call. But
whether the large silent majority accepted that assumption or whether,
for that matter, it acted on the completely contrary assumptionthat the
expenses of enforcement action by the Security Council would ordinarily
be apportioned by the General Assembly like anjr other expenses of the
Organization,does not anywhere appear.Thevery issue was never brought
out into the open.
The only amendment proposed to what is now Articles 49 and 50, the
only amenciment proposed that dealt with the costs of enforcement
action, was proposed by the Union of South Africa. (Text in San Fran-
cisco documents, Vol. 3, p. 478; discussion, Vol.12, pp. 392-393.) The
proposed amendment was heavily defeated. The summary record is quite
short, Mr. President, and perhaps it rnay be convenient for the Court if
1 read it, for the transcript. The heading is:
"Discussi:oC nostsof E?zprcernentActio~z
The Delegate of the Union of South Africa supported liis Govern-
ment's amendment adding to paragraph IO,Section B, Chapter VI11
[that is ArticIe 491, a sentence specifying that aggressor nations
should pay the costs of enforcement action taken against them
poc. 2, G/14 (d) (z) ,. 11 . e explained that his Government
believed this wouId be an additional deterrent to aggression. STATEDIENT OF SIR K. BAILEY (ACSTRALIA)-18 V 62 379
The Delegate of Iran seconded the South African amendment. The
Delegate of the United States opposed the South African amendment.
He foresaw a further obstacle to the satisfactory operation of the
enforcernent machinery of the Security Council. He pointed out that
paragraph II,Section U, Chapter VI11 [that is Article 501, already
provided for the relief of econornic hardship which might be incurred
by some Statcs as a'result of thcir participation in enforcement
mcasures.
The Delegate of the Union of South Africa pointed out that
parngraph II[Article501 concerned only special economic difficulties
and not the heavy costs of enforcement actions. The Delegate of
Iran said that, while great nations might be fully able to bear tlie
costs of enforcement action, it miglit be very difficult for a srnall
nation to do so. However, he expressed his Delegation's satisfaction
witIi the explanation of the Delegatc of the United States."
That is the end of the summary record of the discussion.
On the basis of that discussion and of the Committee's vote on the
South African amendment, the Rapporteur's report (Vol. 12, p. 513)
was made, made by no less a person than M. PaulLBoncour. At the
risk of excessive quotation, I cite this also in full. It again is quite short:
"Economic Problems of E?zfoïcement Actiotz
In conclusion, having heard various explanations on the subject
of mutual assistance between States in the application of the
measures determined by the Security Council and having noted
the legitimateconcern expressed by South Africa tliat the expenses
of enforccnient action carried out against a guilty State should
fall upon that State, the Cornmittee declared itself satisfied with
the provisions of paragrriplisIO and II. [Articles49 and 50.1
A desire moreover was expressed that the Organization should,
in the future, seek to promote a system aiming at the fairesfiossible
distributi [onnd tliose words are underlined in the original] of
expenses incurred as a result of enforcement action.
Having duIy noted the explanations and suggestions given, the
Committee unanimously adoptcd, without change, paragraphs IO
and II of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals."
That is the end of the Rapporteur's report.
hluch to the same effect is a comment on that passage in the Kap-
porteur's report by the representative of Canada, which appears at
pages 435 and 443 of the same Volume 12 of the San Francisco papers,
and which I think completes the San Francisco record. The text is
as follows:
"The Canadian Delegate said that he felt that the records of
the Committee should show that some consideration had been
given to the question of the payment of the costs of enforcement
action. The only discussion so far had been with respect to the
defeated amendment proposed by the Delegate of the Union of
South Africa. He thought that it was not possible to draft a text
which could Iay down definite ruIes for application in al1 the types
of cases which might arise. He was of the opinion that the language of paragraphs ro and rr taken together would permit arrangements
to be made for sharing the costs of enforcement action among the
Nembers if this proved to be desirable. Otherwise an inequitable
financial burden might be placed on certain Members who were
acting on behalf of the Organization. If this interpretation was
not opposed by one of the sponsoring governments, he would be
satisfied to have it placed upon the record without further dis-
cussion. The Secretary observed that the Sumrnary Report of
the fifteenth meeting of the Cornmittee [Doc. 6491already included
the explanation of the United States Delegate of paragraph II in
which he accepted this principle."
That is the end of the statement of the representative of Canada.
At the adjournment yesterday, Mr. President, I had just finished
reading to the Court the records of the discussions at San Francisco on
the provisions that now appear as Articles 49 and 50 of the Charter. I
pass now to consider how far, ifat all, those discussions disclose a general
and accepted understanding at San Francisco that the expenses of en-
forcement action would not be apportionable among the Members of the
United Nations by the General Assembly as expenses of the Organization.
What does clearly emerge from tliese records, which 1 read yesterday,
is that the delegations that spoke were concerned about problems which
included, but which certainly went far beyond, the question of distribut-
ing or apportioning the expenses incurred in enforcement measures.
Significance attaches, in our submission, to the wide, and apt, title used
for this section of his report by the Rapporteur-"Eco~zomic ProbEems of
Enfnrcemsnt Action". Some delegations may, for example, have had in
mind the possibility of economic embargoes (Art. 41 of the Charter), the
adoption of which might greatly disrupt the economy of some Aiembers,
though without necessarily involving "expenses" in any ordinary sense
at all. There is, in any event, no hint, throughout these records, thatthe
special arrangements contemplated as possible under ArticIes 49 and 50
were to operate in derogation from, or as an exception to, still iess as an
alternative to, the ordinary budgetary and financial system of the Organ-
ization.It occurs to me, MT.President, that the solution contemplated by
Article50 for the "special economic problems" confronting an individual
State as arising out of enforcement measures, though that solution could
take the form of some financial adjustment, would more likely be of an
administrative, or even what might be called a political, character. In
consideration of the economic difficulties being experienced by a particu-
lar State, the Security Council might, for example, in the exercise of its
discretion under Article 48, excuse that Afember altogether from partici-
pation in the particular enforcement action concerned, or, forthat mat-
ter, clecideto cal1upon it to fulfil only a part of its agreed commitments.
Bg' every route, Mr. President, one gets further and further away, in Our
submission, from any idea that these particular Charter provisions
should be understood as carrying any budgetary implications. We
perhaps do best justice to the discussions at San Francisco if we regard
Articles 49 and jo as inserted in order to ensiire siifficient flexibility to
meet al1kinds of enforcement cases-even cases that could adequatelj- bc STATEMENT OF SIR K. BAILEY (AUSTRALIA)-19 V 62
381
dealt with by the ordinary budgetary and financial procedure, or,
paradoxically, cases that might actually ariçe out of the ordinary
budgetary procedure-as forexample the General Assembly in the Congo
resolutions made speciaI provision for caseswhere the ordinary budgetary
procedure worked fiardshipor was thought possibly to work hardship-
to individual States. Properly understood, the San Francisco discussions
are entirely consistent with the viehv-as the Government of Australia
has submitted at page 234 in its written statement-that unless some
other arrangements are made the expenses of enforcement action would
be apportionable under the or di na^fiscal procedure of the Organization.
To the estent, Mr. President, to which the assumption was made at
San Francisco that under the systern of special military agreements
the Member concerned would ordinarily have to bear the financial costs
of the forces supplied,it must, in our submission, be insisted that there
is in the Charter no legal foundation whatever for any sucli assumption.
In the Korean operation, which perliaps cornes nearest in principle to the
operations envisaged in Articles42-48, the costs of the enforcement action
tvere in fact wholly borne by the individual Memhers which acted on
behalf of the Organization. But even under the régimeof special agree-
ments strictly so called there is nothing whatever in the provisions of the
Charter-Articles 42 to 50 inclusive-which could reasonably be inter-
preted as requiring such an arrangement, or as precluding the Security
Council from making a military agreement with a Member under which
the Organization would itçelf bear, in part or even in whole, the expenses
of the forces or facilitics to be provided on cal1by the Member. The vital
provisions are in Article 43, which does not from one end to the other so
much as mention costsor expenses, and which leaves the Security Conncil
with a completelp unfettered discretion as to the conditions on which it
will make a special agreement.
What, in our submission, is true of the Security Council in its treaty
preparations for possible enforcement action under Chapter VI1 is, in
our submission, equally true in relation to the Secretary-General when,
in pursuance of Article 98 of the Charter, he is entrusted by the relevant
organ of the United Nations with the function of organizing military
forces for the maintenance of international peace and security. He, like al1
other organs of the United Nations, may have to work-indeed will have
to work-within a budget fixed by the General Assembly. But within that
budget he will be able to accept financial responsibility, in whole or in
part, on behalf of the United Nations, and the charges so accepted tvill
thereby become "expenses of the Organization".
In a case, Mr. President, where by virtue of special agreement the
relevant expenses of enforcement action are borne wholly by the Member
concerned, there would of course be no "expenses of the Organization"
to be apportioned under Article 17 of the Charter. On the other hand,
to the extent to which part of the expenses of enforcement action are
borne-but only Part-bj~ the individual Member or Members concerned,
there \vil1be expenses remaining to be apportioned as "espenses ofthe
Organization", but a lesser quantum. The resolutions currently under
consider,ztion by the Court neatly illustrate that proposition. 1 refer
in that regard to the Australian written statement at page 181, and to
what has been said by others in the course of the oral proceedings, in
particiilarby the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.
What would be the legal position, it may be asked, in relation tothe expenses of enforcement action strictly so called, if, to the contrary
of the cases 1 have just been considering, the special agreement con-
cerned omitted altogether to deal with the question of liability for the
expenses involvecl? For present purposes the question is of course
hypothetical, because on no view arethe UNEF or the Congo operations
to be regarded as enforcement action. There would seem to be strong
grounds for the vie\v-and in our submission it is the correct view-
that in such a case the United Nations itself would be responsible and
the expenses would be "expenses of the Organization". The action
contemplated in Chapter VI1 is definitcly that of the United Nations
(Charter, Article 45); action is to be taken by the Security Council
itself "when it has decidedu-and 1 emphasize it has decided-"to use
force". and the Military Staff Cornmittee, itselfan organ of the United
Nations established by the Charter, is to be
"responsible for the strategic direction of any arrned forces placed
at the disposal of the Security Council". (Articles 42-47.)
On tliat view, the expenses of enforcement action ~vould properly
answer thc description of "expenses of the Organization" and would
thus be wholly apportionable under Article 17, paragraph 2. As the
Government of hustralia contended in its written statenient at pag234,
there was nothing really inconsistent with that view in the discussions
at San Francisco.
The observations of the learned cornmentators on the Charter, Dr.
Goodrich and Dr. Hambro, to which I myself like so many others owe
a great debt of gratitude, inust, in our submision, be understood in the
Iight of the analysis of the San Francisco discuçsions that 1 ventured
to put formard. So underztood, there is little to which we would wish
to talre exception. If the assumption were correct that under Chapter
VI1 of the Charter tiie costs of "enforcement action" would ordinarily
faIl upon the Members concerned, and not on the Organization, then it
would follow, obviously enough, as the learned authors ray sçummarily
in a footnotc, that such costs would not be included in the "expenses of
the Organization" to which Article 17 refers;and that, in our submission,
is precisely the assumption that the learned authors must be regarded
as having niade. Rut there is, in the submission of the Government of
Australia, nothing in what Dr. Goodrich aiid Dr. Hambro say to war-
rant the inference that in their opinion the expenses of enforcement
action cotild not be "expenses of the Organization" for the purposes of
Article 17. Still Iess is there any reason to suppose tkiat they, Dr. Good-
rich ,and Dr. Hambro, woiiId have denied the character of "expenses of
the Organization" to the expenses under consideration in these pro-
ceedings, for these expenses do not on any view fa11within the category
of "costs of enforcement sction".
My final comment on the San Francisco record, hlr. President, is to
submit that, even if the records could be regarded as showing as a
matter of fact that those illembers which participated in the discussion
were acting on an assumption that, siibject to adjusting action mediated
by the Security Council, the costs of enforcement action under Chapter
VI1 of the Charter must be borne by thoçe Members who will agree to
bear them, and coiild not be apportioned obligatorily among the
Mernbcrs by the General Assembly, such an assumption could not, as
a matter of law, in view of the express provisions of the Charter, beallowed io control or restrict the interpretation of Chapter VI and
Chapter VI1 themselves. StiIl les could the existence of such an assump-
tion suffice to read artificial and unnecessary restrictions and exceptions
into the plain, wide and specific words of Article 17, paragraph z. \\rl~at
1 have said is, in our submission, n fortiori true of an assumption at
San Francisco that cannot in any sense be treated as having been
gc~ierallyaccepted.
1 subrnit for consideration in this regard by the Court an illustration
hy way of analogy, drawn from the constitutional law of Australia.
The Constitution in that country is federal, the federal legislature
having power to make laws with respect only to specifiedsubject-matters.
Onc of these matters is nurnher xiii:
"Banking, other than State banking; also State banking extend-
ing beyond the limits of the State concerned, the incorporation
of banks and the issue of paper money."
In purstiance of that power, the Parliament in 1947 made a law
dcsigned to "nationalize" hanking, that is to Say to vest in an existing
baiiking corporation estahlished by the Parliament the exclusive power
to carry on banking business. The Act was chaIlenged in the courts on
a number of grounds, and it was ultimately hcld invalid. One of the
grounds of challenge, however,was that the foundersof the Constitution
could ncver have contemplated a Iaw which prohibited the carrying on
of business by the whole of the estabLished system of private trading
banks, tIiat the power to make laws must be read as necessarity requiring
the continuance of a private banking system, and must therefore be
regarded as limited to the regulation of that system. On that point,
however, the challenge failed, and the law was held to he within powcr.
The prcscnt Chief Justice of Australia, Mr. Justice Dixon as he then
was, said this ((1948) 76 Commo~wealth Law Xepouts at p. 332) :
"it well may be that the framers of the Australian Constitution
instinctively assumed that banking would not form a subject of
prohibition, that it would be carried on by trading banks and that
the reIation of banker and customer would remain consensual. The
assumption perhaps accounts for the form and content of paragraph
(xiii)"-the paragraph which I read-."But thc assumytions made
in framing a power and the restrictive intentions which it expresses
are two very different things."
I apply precisely to the present problem, Mr. President, not of course
as authority biit as an acceptable statement of legal principle, the con-
cluding sentence of the passage that 1 have just read. It may be that,
at theSan Francisco Conference, it was assumed by some that the Organ-
ization would never (though there is no suggestion in the records that
it coztldnot) accept responsibility, through the General Assernbly in the
exercise of its budgetary powers, for the cxpenses of military action for
the maintenance of international peace and security. In the resolutions
now before the Court, however, it has rcpeatedly and unequivocally
done so, and accepted financial responsibility on the part of the Organi-
zation. In the submission of the Australian Government, the Court
should not so restrict the scopc of Article 17, paragraph z, as to hold
that it was not competent to do so. In the words of Mr. Justice Dixon:384 STATEMEKT OF SIR K. BAILEY (AUSTRALIA)~~~ V 62
"the assumptions niade in framing a power and the restrictive
intentions ahich it expressest'-that is to Say which its wordç ex-
press-"are two very different things".
In our submission, the San Francisco discussions offerno warrant, even
on the assumption stated, for dcnying to the expenses authorized by
the resoiutions now before the Court the character of "expenses of the
Organization" within the express words of Article 17, paragraph 2.
In approaching, Mr. President, the concluding section of my argument,
1 mention hriefly one or two n~atters about which 1 do not propose to
speak-not because the Government of Australia has no views on these
matters, but because they have already in these proceedings been
examined so fully by others, and because we are content to adopt as our
own thc arguments theyhave put fonvard. In particular,I do not propose
to add anything to what has been said by others on the question of the
validity of the resolutio~ls authorizing theUNEF and the Congo oper-
ations. Like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, we do not think
that, in order to answer the question submitted for advice, the Court is
required to pronounce upon the consistency with the Charter of these
resolutions, and indeed in our own written statement we did not discuss
that question at al]. In sufar as the pointis thought material,however,
the Governrnent of Australia regards the resolutionas entirely consistent
with the Charter, and submits that their validity has been fully estahlish-
ed by the arguments submitted in particular by the Governments of
Denmark, of Canada, of Norway and of the United States.
1 shall offer no argument, also, Mr. President, uponthe fiscalpractice
of the United Nations and its relevance to the question upon which
the Court is asked to advise. On that point, the Government of Australia
submits, for the reasons already adduced by others, that the require-
ments of Article 17 have in all respects been correctly observed and
applicd in relation to the expenses of the operation now under con-
çideration.
1return, therefore, Mr. President, to the remaining (thethird) question
which 1 posed in opening-namely, whether there is any justification in
this instance for resorting to the preparatory work of the Charter for
the purpose of determining the rneaning of its established text. 1have
indeed myself discussed at some length the relevant preparatory work
at the San Francisco Conference-partly in order that the matter may
be fiiIly considered by the Court, partly in order to remove, for the
record, certain misconceptions as to the San Francisco discussions which,
in our siibmission, have found expression in some of the documents
submitted for consideration by the Court. 1 am thankful for the patience
with which my exposition has been received. It has been rny submission
that the records of those discussions disclose nothing to displace or
modify, or even throw doubt upon, the prima facie rneaning of the
Charter text itself. But1 wish now to go furtherand to submit that even
if the matter were otherwise, and it could be established that at San
Francisco the understanding expressed in the relevant cornmittee had
been that the expenses of peace-keeping operations of the United
Nations would not he apportionable by the General Assembly, this
would nevertheless be an absolutely classic case for rejecting thtravazkx
#ré~nnrtoires.
The rules or canons of interpretation, after all, are but experienced generalizations about the way in which men think and write, and the
way in which legal texts are brought into existence. The principles are
familiar, and in that regard, the jurisprudence of this Court is clear as
well as consistent and authoritative. 1 do not wish or need to repeat or
add to the refercnces given in our own written statement and amplified
in the course of the oral hearings by others. But in this field there is
nothing exceptional or esoteric about the position in international law,
and there are substantially identical rules to be found in the juris-
prudence of al1 developed legal systems. I permit myself therefore, Mr.
President, to cite by way of additional formulation a formulation of the
basic rule for the interpretation of legal textç which has found wide
acceptance in the jurisprudence of my own country. It is this:
"In the interpretation of acompletely self-governing Constitution
founded upon a written organic instrument ...if the tcxt is explicit,
the text is conclusive, alike in what it directs and what it forbids."
The reference is to the Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide
Steamship Company in 1920 (28 CommonwealthLaw Reports, at p. 150).
That statement of principle is, in our submission, MT. President,
completely in accord with what this Court itself has said, as for instance
in the Ambatielos case ("where the text is clear..."), and if accepted is
completely decisive, also, in respect of the question submitted for the
Court's advice in thcse proceedings.
In the nature of things there can be no test capable of mechanical
or automatic application, to determine when and whether a text is so
clear as to preclude a court of law from attributing to it, by reference
to any other material, any other than its ordinary and natural meaning.
One must of course look to context and seewhether there are elsewhere
in the instrument any limitations expressed or necessarily irnplied. Here
there are, in our submission, none, and indeed their very absence is
striking and significant in an instrument which establishes no less than
six principal organs of the United Nations, yet vests fiscal competence
in only one of them. And nothing could be more simple and explicit
than the text of Article 17,paragraph 2,itself: "The expenses", that is
to say al1expenses, "of the Organization shall be borne by the Members",
that is to Sayby al1Members, "as apportioned by the General Assembly."
In dealing with such a text it would, in Our submission, be a wise
rule of practical experience that declared that there is here "no occasion
to resort to preparatory work". The San Francisco records that 1have
placed before the Court for examination illustrate perfectly the diffi-
cutties into which the interpreter is so often ylunged when, where he
is faced with an arnbiguous text, he is driven to attempt to resolve
obçcurities by reference to the prcparatory work and to assumptions
and ideas accepted beforehand. The relevant records here are brief, not
to Say skimpy. It is impossible to deduce from them with any pretence
at exactitude what assumptions were made, and still more what were
generally agreed, as to the Rays in which enforcement expenses might
be sharcd or distributed. Disagreeing with the legal assumptions of a
member of a cornmittee with whose conclusions one nevertheless agrees
is an exercise so graceless that fortunately in busy deliberative bodies
it is seldom carried out, and it is small wonder that the San Francisco
records are so difficult to draw inferences from. But one thing that
does emerge plainly from thosc records is that nobody at San Francisco386 STrlTEMBST OF SIR K. B.4ILEY (AUSTRALIA)-1 V9 62
foreshadowed even the possibility of peace-keeping activitiessuch as
those authorized by the resolutions now before the Court. Another is
the uncontested and incontestablefact thatthe San Francisco Conference
adopted without qualification the plain text of Articl17. There could
he no clcarcr or stronger case than this one, in our submission, Mr.
President, for rejectingresortto the preparatory work as an aid in the
interpretation of the wholly explicit provisions of Article 17,paragraph-2.
For these reaçons the Government of Australia submits tliat the
question for advice should be answered 'Yes'.
1 thank you, Mr. President and the Mernberç of the Court. 7. ORAL STATEMENT OF MK. 6 CAOIMH
Rlr. President and hlembers of the Court:
At this stage of the proccedings before the Court on a request for an
Advisory Opinion, ïvhen the representatives of several States Iiave made
oral subrnissionstothe Court, it is aImost inevitabIe that much of what
I have to Say will already have been touched on by sonie one or more
of these representativcs.Tiie question before the Court is limited in
its nature, and it is understandable if the opinions and quotations,
whicli I have seIected as being likeIy to be of somc assistance to the
Court, have also been regardecl as of some concequence by other rep-
resentatives who have already addressed the Court. I would, therefore,
ask the Court to bear with me if i~irny subrnissions1should touch on
matters ïvhich have already been the subject of çubmissions by others.
In their svritten statement to the Court of 20 February 1962, ay
Government have respectfully requested the Court to answer in the
affirmative the question put to it by tlic Gcneral Assembly at its 1086th
meeting and as respects whicli T have today the honour of addressing
the Court. In the course of that Statement it was subrnitted that the
Court could not reasonably corne to anp conclusion other than that the
expenses authorized by the Rcçolutions referred to in the Kequest
coristitute expenses of the Organization within the rneaning of Art17,e
paragrnph 2, of the Charter of the United IJat'~onc.
At the outset 1 feel that 1 must stress that, although whnthas been
requested by the General Assembly is an Advisory Opinion of tlie Court,
the decision may have far more significant repercussions on what my
Government conrider to be fiindamental functioris of the United Nations
than the settlement of the money issues involved, altkough, of course,
the rettlement of tl-ieseissues is vital to the solvency of the Organization.
My first submission will concern the question of what precisely 1s
the problcni or1 which the Court has been requested by the General
Assernbly to give an Adviçory Opinion. Jt is evident from the written
statements aIready before the Court that certain States areunder the
impression that the Court has been requested to advise on the question
of tIie validitof tlie action talren by the General Assembly and the
Security Council in relation to the Middle East and the Congo. Indeed
the Court has been asked in the written submission of one State to
determine
"whethcr and to wllat extent activjiiesengagcdin in the Congo
wverevalid bot11 interms of valid resolutions and the terrns of the
Charter".
This approach to the question is, in my subrnissioii, based on a
misapprehension. What the General Assembly lias asked to be advised385 STATEMEKT OF alr.6 CAOIMH (IRELAND)-19 V 62
on is whether certain expenditure incurred by the Secretdry-General in
pursuance of authorizations of the General Assembly and the Security
Council are espenses of the Organization under Article 17 (2) of the
Charter. There is no reference in the question to the vaIidity of the
resolutionsestablishing UNEF and UNOC nor was it, in rny submission,
the desire ofthe General Assembly that the Court should investigate the
legality of these resolutions. The proceedings in the Fift h Committee
and the General Assembly which preceded the Request to the Court
for an Advisory Opinion have been discussed in the written and oral
submissions of several Member States, and Ido not propose to review
those proceedings in any detail. 1should, however, like to quote for the
Court the views espressed, by way of explanation of vote, in the General
Assqmbly on 20 Decemher rg61 by the delegates of El Salvador and the
Ivory Coast. (1 am quoting from the English translation.) First, the
delegate of El Salvador said:
"My delegation wishes to explain very briefly why it voted against
the amendment (AJL. 378) submitted hy the delegation of France
and in favour of the draft resolution given at the end of the Fifth
Cornmittee's report (A/506z).
Under the terms of the French amendment, the GeneralAssembly,
instead of merely requesting the International Court of Justice to
give an Advisory Opinion on whether the expenditures authorized
in the resolutions settingup the United Nations Emergency Force
in tlie Middle East in1956 and the Force responsible for the United
Nations operations in the Congo constitute expenses of the Organi-
zationwithin the meaning of paragraph 2of Article17 of the Charter,
u~ouldfirst ask the Court whether those expenditures were decided on
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. That is obviously
tantamount to considering the legal validity of the remlutions
adopted bv the Security Council and by the General Assembly.
For us there is no doubt at al1 that both the General Assembly
and the Security Council were acting in legitimate esercise of their
powers-and, indeed, urere discharging obligations specifically im-
posed upon them by the Charter with respect to the maintenance
of international peace and security-in adopting those resolutions
and arranging for the financing of the two operations.
The only thing we are doubtful about is the method of financing,
or, in other words, the distribution of costs among the different
Mernber States. That is why we voted in favour of the proposal to
consult thc International Court of Justice in accordance with the
terms of the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee
in its report. The first preambular paragraph of the resolution
adopted a few moments ago reads as foliows:
'Recognizing the need of the General Assembly for authoritative
legal guidance as to obligations of United Nations Members under
the Charter in tlie matter of financing United Nations operations
in the Congo and in the Middle East.'
The wording of this part of the preamble seems to us to be suffi-
ciently clear to limit the scope of the Advisory Opinion to the purely
legal issue, without introducing any implications of a lega1 nature
and certainly without casting doubt on the validity of the reso- lutions adopted in both cases hy the Security Council and the
General Assembly."
That is the end of the quotation from the explanation given by the
distinguished delegate ofEl Salvador. He was followed by the delegate
of the lvory Coast who said (and again 1 quote from the translation):
"The delegation of the Ivory Coast would like to state briefly
the reasons which led it to vote in favour of the resolution sub-
mitted to us. In the first place, it conciders that the primary role
of the United Nations is to maintain peace. Emergency forces are
established to intervene wherever peace is disturbed and therefore
to restore peace. Ive are al1 aware that in such circumstances
emergency forces entai1 budgetary expenses which must be met.
The subject of our discussion is whether such expenses constitute
regular eupenses for which each of our delegations is obliged tpay,
or whether they are evtraordinary expenses. My delegation there-
fore considers it appropriate to put the question to the International
Court of Justice in order that we may have a definitive opinion.
That is why my delegation voted in favour of the resolution.
It opposed the amendment submitted by France because it
considers that the amendment raisesa political issue, the question
of the legality of action taken by the General Assembly in im-
plernentation of decisions of the Security Council. Itis afact that
in taking al1 those decisions the Security Council was aware. that
they had budgetary implications. Consequently the General Assem-
bly is bound by the decision of the Security Council and must take
al1 steps which will enable it to put them into effect."
My Government respectfuI1y submit, Mr. President and Members of
the Court, that the question should be approached in the spirit of these
t~o statements which 1have quoted, and that the Court is not compelled
to concern itself with the question of validity and can answer the question
on which advice is sought without investigating thii issue.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, in the course of my Govern-
ment's written statement, it was argued (p. 249of the written statement)
that paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of Article 17 of the Charter read 'together
clearly indicate that it is, flviwzajacie, for the General Assembly alone
to determine what expenditures constitute expenses of the Organization.
The statement continues:
"Tt may validly be contended that 'expenses of the Organization'
are such expenditures duly incurred as the Assembly in exercise of
its mandatory budgetary powers may decide are to be apportioned
among the Members. By authorizing the expenditures and appor-
tioning them among the Members, the AssernbIy exercises these
powers, and the expenditures in question may therefore be said to
constitute 'expenses of the Organization'."
Itis not suggested that the General Assembly is unlihted in its power
of dealing with budgetary matters. Its position has already been clari-
fted by the Court in the Advisory Opinion in connection with the Egect
of Awards of Com+ensation made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal (I.C.J.RePorts 1954, p. 59):390 STTTTMIEST OF hlr. O CAOIRIH (IRELAND)-19 V 62
"Rut the function of approving the budget does not mean that
tiie General Assembly has an absolute power to approve or dis-
approve the expenditure proposed to it; for some part of that
cxpenditure arises out of obligations already incurred by the Or-
ganization and, to this extent, the General Assembly hüs no alter-
native but to honour these engagements."
Subject to such limitation as should be inferred frorn the advice
referred to, the General Assembly, 1submit, has the special role assigned
to it under the Charter of deterrnining what constitute expenses of tlie
Organization and of apportioning such expcnses among the Members.
Before a determination of the General Assembly, acting in that special
role, could be called in question, it would, in my submission, require the
clearest possible evidence demonstrating that under no circumstances
could the expenses incIuded in the determination be regarded as expenses
of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2,of
the Charter.
It has, I submit, been demonstrated beyoird doubt in the written
statements submittecl to the Court that the resolutions of the Generai
Asscmbly in connection with the expenses of UNEF and ONUC were
intended to corne within the arnbit of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter. (1 refer, in particularto the staternent of the Government of
the Kingdom of Denmark.) Indeed, the Secretary-General at the 596th
Plenary Meeting of the Assembly made tlie position quite clear when he
said (inconnection with UXEF) :
"1 wisl-ito make it equally clear that while funds received and
payrnents made with respect to the Force are to be considered as
coming outside the regulnr budget of the Organization, the operation
is essentially a United Nations responsibility and the Special Account
to be established must, thercfore, be construed as coming within
the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter."
The intentions of the General Assembly in this regard are further
emphasized in later resolutions which took into account the fact that
certain Mernber States had a Iesser capacity to mect the assessments
made on them in the ordinary process in connection with the operations
of the Force. In so far ONUC is concerned, the case needs no argument.
The very first resolution dealing with the financial implications of the
operations in the Congo (1583 (XV)) contains the following recital:
"Kecognizing that the expenses involved in the United Nations
operations in the Congo for 1960 constitute 'expenseç of the Organi-
zation' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Char-
ter of the United Nations and that the assessment thereof against
Member States creates binding legal obligations on such States to
pay their assessed çhares."
In my respectful submission it has been clearly demonstrated that
the General Assembly intended that the expenses involved in the opcr-
ationsin the Middle East and in the Congoshould corne under Article 17,
paragraph 2.
It seerns unnecessary to riegative at length tlie argument that because
special accounts were established in respect of the operations ofUNEF STATEhIENT OF &Ir. O CAOIMH (IRELAND)-19 V 62 391
and OYUC it follows that expenses incurred in connection with those
operations do not fa11to be assessed in the ordinara. way under Articl17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter. Such, certainly, was not the view of the
Secretary-General in connection with UNEF (cf. statement at 596th
plenary meeting of the General AssernbIy, which 1have already quoted).
Furthermore, although special accounts have been established, there is
no reason why any special legal significance should attach to that fact
in relation tothe question of assessments. In fact, it is submitted titis
perfectly evident, from the resolution andthe statement of the Secretary-
General already referred to, that thestablishment of the special accounts
was not intended, in any way, to indicate that the expenses in question
should not come under Article 17,paragraph 2.
In the Ivritten statement of my Government it was submitted that in
construing the expression "expenses of the Organization" one must
have regzrd to the purposes of the Organization. At the riskof appearing
repetitious,1 will read once again what isthe very first purpose of the
United Nations, as stipulated in the Charter. Chapter 1, Article I,
paragraph I:
"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
totake effective collectivc measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and inter-
national Iaw, adjustment or settlcment of international disputes or
situatioiis which might lead to a breach of the peace."
It can hardly be çeriously contended that the operations ofUNEF and
ONUC (whateverdisputes may exist as to the precise legal basis for the
existence of those bodies under the Charter) do not come within the
Article 1 have just quoted. Prima facie,therefore, expenses incurred in
connection with the operations of UNEF and ONUC would appear to
be expenses of the Organization, since such expenses were incurred in
pursuance of the very first purpose of the Charter. Has any evidence
been produced to rebut the presumption that the expenses in question
constitufe expenses of the Organization wittiin the meaning of Article
17, paragraph 27 In my respectful submission to the Court, no such
evidence exists, and, for the reason that itwould be necessary to show
that the expenses were incurred for a purpose ozttszdethe Charter which,
we Say, the purpose under consideration ciearly is not.
Various reasons have been put forward as to why the expenses in-
curred sIiould not be regarded as expenses of the Organization. It lias
been suggested, for exampIe, that the expression "expenses of the Or-
ganization" must only relate to the ordinary administrative outgoings
of the Organization and that it cannot be held to embrace large-scale
operations of the type under consideration.
FVhileit is true that expenditure on operations of the United Nations
in the Middle East and Congo differs from the ordinary expenses of the
Organization from the point of view of the arnount involved, no valid
reason has been produced to demonstrate that the cost of such operations
does not come witliin the expression "expenses of the Organization" as
it is used in Article17,paragraph 2, of the Charter. On the contrary, it
has bccn çhown that the practice belies any such argument, for the
ordinary budget includes expenses for operations of a similar nature,392 STATEMEYT OF Mï. O CAOlnIH (IRELAXD)-19 V 62
initiated by the General Assembly or the Security Council. This has been
admirably dernonstrated in the written statement of the Government
of the Kingdom of Denmark, and in the oral subrnissions on behalf of
other States. Furthermore, the magnitude of ttie expenses irivolved
constitutes no legal irnpecliment against regarding such expeiises as
expenses of the Orginization.
This view has been that of the Secretary-General as espressed in
the Fifth Committee at its 839th meeting whcn he said:
". .Several of the representatives have naturally laid einphasis on
the size of the Congo expenditures and their 'extraordinary' cliarac-
ter. But how, froq a legal and constitutiorlal point of view, can these
Iactors lead to a conclusion tliat they are not expenscsof the Or-
ganization? The fact that these expenses have been substantial and
unusual-indeed, unforeseeable at the time of San Francisco-
cannot mean that the Charter provisions must now be disregarded.
Kor would there appear to be any practical necessity to do so."
(A/C.5/864.)
It is of significance that no distinction is mainbudgetary practice
between UNEF and ONUC and the so-called "regular budget", that
is tsay, the estimates are prepared by the Secretary-General, considered
by an Advisory Comrnittee, the Fifth Committee and by the General
Assernbly which authorizes financial comrnitments, appropriations of
funds and rnakes the assessments on Afernbei-sto obtain the necessary
revenues; in no sense areUNEF and ONUCclassified as "extra-budget-
ary". It should be noted furthermore that the Secretary-General is
authorized to spend funds against the "regular budget" appropriations
irrespective of any shortfail in contributions.A similar authorization
appiiesto UNEF and ONUC. An essential difference betwcen the extra-
budgetary accounts and the "regular budget", UNEF and ONUC is
that programmes of the former are mainly determined by the financial
resources available whiIe the programmes of the latter determine the
contributions, thus the working capitalfund provides funds for UNEF,
ONUC and the "regular budget", but not for the extra-budgetary funds.
A furtlier point to be stressed, in sofar as budgetary practice isconcerned,
is that the Secretary-General is authorized to borrow frorn extra-budget-
ary funds in his custody to provide working capital for the "regular
budget", UNEF and ONUC, but he is not authorized to borrow funds
for extra-budgetary programmes.
It is submitted that the expression "extraordinary expenses" in
relation to tlie United Nations operations in the Congo,liere it occurs
in the third recital of Resolution 1619 of the General Assembly, has
reference only to the method of apportioning the expenses. The use
of this phrase means only that a method for apportioning the expenses
different frorn the normal scale of assessrnents should be used. This
construction is completely borne outby the operative part of the Kesolu-
tion in question-in paragraph 4 of which the Assembly decided to
apportion as expenses of the Organization the arnount of $100 million
among the Member States in accordance with the scale of assessrnent
for the regular budget, subject to provisions not material in detail to
the present consideration.
The question might well beasked, as it \vasasked by the represent-
ative of Ireland at the Sj~st meeting of the Fifth Committee, if theexpenses in question are not "expenses of the Organization", what arc
they? And, if thcy do not come under Article 17 of the Charter, which
article do they come under? Sorne States argue that the answer is to be
found in Article 43 of the Charter; that the costs of operations under
Article43 of the Charter are to be met by means of special agreements.
In the course of their writtensubmission, my Government have already
contended that Article 43 is not relevant to the question ai issue.It has
been pointcd out time and again that the provisions of Article 43 have
remained inoperative because of the failurc to agree on the principles
upon which agreements under that Article should be based. However,
even if Article 43 had been invoked, there is nothing inthe Charter to
suggest that the operation of that Article must necessarily precIude
espenses arising thereunder being considered as "expenses of the Or-
gaiiization" within the ineaning of Article 17, paragraph 2. 1 rnay be
permitted to quote the views of the Secretary-General in this regard.
He said :
"No one can question the right of the Security Council to take
decisions in pursuance of Article 43 or 48 or any other provisions
under which it has competence. Howcver, once the Council has
taken a valid decision which imposes responsibilities on the Organi-
zation and requires impIementation by the Secretary-General, then
the costs which are invoIved are clearly expenses of the Organization
within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter and
therefore must be apportioned by the GeneraI Assembly. Truc, the
Council retains the right to rcvoke or change its decisions, but, as
long as the decisions require expenditures by the Organization,
then Article 17, paragrapli 2, must be considered applicable."
(AIPV 977.)
Quite apart from the fact that Article 43 could not in fnct.have been
irnplemented in the existing circurnstances, it seems manifest frorn the
documentation available that it was never the intention to operate
under that Article. It is not open to doubt that the operations of the
United Nations both in relation to the Middle East and the Congo were
carried out with the consent of the Governments of the territories
conccrned. There was at no time any question of enforcement action
as envisaged by Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter. In so far asUNEF is
concerned, this was made quite clear by the second report of the Secre-
tary-General of 6 November 1956 on the plan for an emergencjr inter-
national United Nations Force, in the course of which he said, in para-
graph 9:
"IVhile the General Assembly is enabled to establish the force
witl-i the consent of those parties which contribute units to the
force, it could not request the force to be stationed or operate on
the territory ofa given country without the consent of tlic Govern-
ment of that country. This does not esclude the possibility that the
Security CounciI could use such a force within the wide margins
provided under Chapter VI1 of the United Nations Charter. I would
not for the present consider it necessary to elaborate this point
iurther, since no use of force under Chapter VII, with the rights
in relation to Member countries that this would entail, has been
envisaged."394 STATEMENT OF MT. O CAOIRIH (IRELAND)-19 V 62
On tlie following day,7 November 1956, the General Assernbly adopted
Resolution 1001, in the course of which the Assembly noted with appre-
ciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan
for an ernergency international United Nations Force and expressed its
approval
"of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of
the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded
in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-Gencral's report".
1 respectfully submit, Mr. President and Members of the Court, that ,
no further argument is required to show that the General Assembiy
at no time considered in relation to UNEF that the action taken was of
the nature contemplated in Article 43 of the Charter.
Mr. President and Mernbers of the Couart,if one examines the actions
in relation to the Congo a similar pattern of intention emerges. Altliougi~
in the case of the Congo it was the Security Council and not the General .
Assembly that made the necessary decisions, at no time was it considered
that the Council was taking mcasurcs which would engage Article 43
of tlie Charter. That such was the view of the Secretary-General is
borne out by his first statement to the Fifth Committee of the United
Nations on 17 April1g61 (Uoc. A/C.5/864) when he said:
"...The function of the United Nations Force-as stated initially
-was to assist in maintaining law and order; this was later expanded
by the Security Council Resolution of 21 February to include the
objective of preventing civil war. The Security Council considered
these measures necessary to counteract the threat to international
peace, but the nreasures thernselves did not constitute 'sanctions'
or enforcement action directed against a State as conternplated by
Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter.
The records oi the Security Council leave no doubt about tliis.
No one ever suggested that its decisions regarding the Congo were
in any way related to Article 43 of the Charter, and no proposai
was made that agreements for this purpose should be concluded
between the Security Council and Members as contemplated by
that Article. Even more significant is the fact that no single member
of the Security Council and indeed not a single member who took
part in the debates in the Security Council or the Generai Assernbly
on this subject stated, or even intimated that the Council had acted
on the basis of Article43.
On the contrary, it was explicitly stated in the Security Council
that the resolutions did not constitute an enforcement measure in
the sense referred to in Article42 of the Charter."
Further argument that Article 43 of thc Charter is irrelcvant seems
unnecessary.
In the course of rny Government's writtcn statement it was pointed
out that the only provision of the Charter for meeting expenditure is
contained in Article 17.It was indicated that the only powers given to
the Assembly to talie decisions on exyenditure are to be found in that
Article. The Assembly has never purported to act under any ,other
article, and none of the other principal organs of the United Nations
has claimed for itself the right to take decisions on questions of ex-
penditure or suggested that other provisions of the Charter gave it STATEhlENT OF I\.lO. CAOIMH IREL LA^-u)-I~ V 62
395
power to do so. In my respectful subniission, the wording of Article17
(2)must be given its natural and ordinary meaning in the context iii
which it occiirs, and the natural and ordinary meaning of the "expenses
of the Organization" is al2 the expenses of the Organization. There is
no limitation in Article 17, paragraph 2, the terms of which are quite
clear. So distinction is made between "administrative" and "other"
exp,nses.
1 had intcnded at this stage of my submission to deal hriefly with
the inference ahich the written statements of the Governrnents of the
Soviet Union and of South Africa seek to draw from the withclrawal of
an Australian amendment at the San Francisco Conference. Having
hcard the exhaustive review of the Iiistory of that amendment in the
oral submission of the representative of the Government of Australia,
1 do not find it necessary to take up the time of the Court witti this
point, since the learned representative of Australia has so ably demon-
strated that the inference which was sought to be drawn is quite un-
siistainable. In any event, it has, 1 submit, clearly been demonstrated
that Article 43 has no relcvance to the operations of the Unitcd Kations
in the hIiddle East and the Congo.
In the course of my siibmiçsion, 1 have endeavourcd, consistently
with my opening remarks, to avoid the question of the validity of the
operations of the United Nations in .the Middle East and the Congo.
There would, 1 believe, be little difficulty in demonstrating the validity
of such operations, but the question of their vaIidity is unIikeIy to be
considered in detail by the Court. With the Court's permission, however,
1 wiIl aIlow myself one observation which relates to the powers which
must be implied to any organization of the nature of the United Nations.
In the course of my Government's written submission, advertence was
already made to the Court's observation in the course of its Advisory
Opinion concerning Reparation for Injuries szlfered in the Service O/the
Ulzited Natiotzs when it said:
"Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to
have those powers u7hich,though not expressly provided for in the
Charter, arc conferred upon it by necessary implication as being
essential to its duties. This principle of law was applied by the
Permanent Court of International Justice to the International
Labour Organisation in its advisory opinion No. 13 of July 23rd
1926 (Series R, No. 13, p. 181, and must be applied to the United
Nations."
This principle of Iawso well enunciated by the Court finds its countei-
part in the domestic laws of Member States. It proceeds basically from
the acceptance of the fact that not everything can be reduced to writing
and incorporated in a Charter or other fundamenta1 law of a body such
as the United Nations. In cornmon Iaw countries a maxim cxists which
expresses the same idea in relation to public bodics; it reads:
"Ubi aliquid conceditwu,concedituv etiam id sine quo res ipsa non
essepotest"
We are told that "One ofthe first principles of law with regard to the
effect of an enabling act is that if the legislature enahles something to
be done, it gives pohver, at the çame aime, by necessary implication
to do everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying outthe purpose in view". (1 quote from Craies StatuteLaw, Fifth Edition,
P If3this psinciple is acceptable both in the milnicipal and in the inter-
national field,as 1 subrnit it rnust be under the authorities, it will be
apparent that powers of the United Nations to effect the operations in
the Middle East and the Congo must be impIied of necessity if it should
be considercd that the articles relied on in thc submissions of other
States arc not inthemselves sufficient to authorize the operations referred
to.
It is submitted that in a case such as this, wherc thcre is no conflict
betu-een the organs of the United Nations, the Court need not be too
assiduous in seeking yrecise and express aiithority for the action taken.
It is undcrstood, of course, that if there should be a confiict between
two such organs, the Court might, in seeking to resolve the difference,
have to apply strict rules of construction. Here thereis no such conflict.
In the case ofUNEF, the matter was transferred by the Security Council
to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. In
the case of UNOC, the effective resolutions were those of the Security
Council, but the action taken was approved by the General Assembly.
1shoiild like to recall that the resolution of the General Assembly
establishing UNEF was carried without a single dissentient vote, and
that there was no serious challenge to the authority of the United
Nations regarding either UNEF or UNOC in the appropriate political
organizations at the time when the operations were undertaken. It seems
strange to my Govemment that States which did not avail themselves
of their right to oppose the basic resolutions, or stranger stilvotedfor
such resolutions, should seek to maintain that the action taken on foot
of them was ultra vires.
Finally,I should like to Say that my presence here today, representing
as 1 do my Government, indicates the very real concern which my
Governrnent feel regrirding theoutcorne of these proceedings. As 1 in-
dicated in my opening remarks, the fact that the matters at issue relate
to the mannes in which liability for large sums of money is to he ap-
portioned is, of course,of great importance. What my Government are
particularly concerncd with, however, is the survival of the United
Nations as a healthy and solvent Organization equilqied with the
necessary yower to discharge its functions, the most important of which
is to play a full and effective part in relicving tension and preserving
international yeace and security.
In this submission to the Court,1 have touched on only a few of the
points which could be discussed: others have covered the ground con-
vincingly, and it is unnecessary to recapitulate their arguments. In
conclusion, 1 respectfuily submit to thc Court that in the written sub-
missions before the Court and in the oral submissions made and to be
made here, the Court will find compelling reasons for giving an affirmative
answer to the question upon which its Advisory Opinion is sought.
I thank you for your kindness, Mr. Prcsident and Members of the
Court. 8. ORAL STATEMENT OF MR. TUNKIN
hlr. President, Memhers of the Court:
The position of the Soviet Union withregard to financing the operations
of the United Nations Emergcncy Force in the Niddle East and the
United Nations Operationsin the Congo has been set forth in the 3femo-
randum suhmittedby the Soviet Government in reply to a request by the
International Court of Justice.
The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the operations of the
United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, as well as the
United Nations Operations in the Congo, impose no financial oblig t'ions
on the Membcrs of the United Xations both for the reason that these
operations are not carried out in accordance with the requirements of
the United Nations Charter and because the expenses of these operations
are not the expenses referred to in Articl17, paragraph z,of the Charter.
The Resolution of the General Assembly of 20 Decernber 1961 poses
before the International Court of Justice the question whether the
expenses involved in the operations in the Congo and in the Middle
East are "the expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of
Article 17, paragraph z, of the Charter.
It is universally recognized in international law that none of the parties
to a treaty is obliged to bear more responsibility than was assumed by
it according to this treaty. Fothe States Members of the United Nations
such a treaty is the Charter within the Iimits of which they bear their
rcsponsibility. Therefore, in order to answer the question put to the
International Court of Justice. it iç firstof al1 necessary to establish
whether the operations that caused tlie financial consecluences corre-
spond to the retluirements of the United Nations Charter.
15'eshall first consider in this connection the question of the United
Nations Emergency Force.
The representatives of the Western Powers who have preceded me
at this rostrum repeatcd one after another that the General Assembly
resolution establishing this Emergency Force was yerfectly legitimate
andthat no one could doubt it.
An old maxim says: "yefietitioestmaterstztdiorz~m".And 1believe that
my collcagties will remember for a long time al1 they have said 011 this
subject. But the repetition nf one and the same assertion does not yet
prove its validity.
1 lvould like to statc briefly the position of the Sovict Union on this
cluestion.
From the very moment when the United Nations Emergency Force
in the Middle East \vas cstablished the Soviet Government considered,
and continues to consider, that thc resolution of the General Assembly
on the creation of this Force contradicts the United Nations Charter. Iwould like to remind you of the statement of the Soviet delegation,
which clearly indicatcs the position of the Soviet Government held at
the moment of the crcation of the United Nations Emergency Force
and held consistently since then.
1 will quote the statement made by Mr. Kouznetzov, the Hcad of
the Soviet delegation, at the 567th meeting of thc First Extraordinary
Session of the General Assembly oii 4 November 1956:
"As regards the creation and stationing on Egyptian territory of
an international police force, the Soviet delegation is obliged to
point out that this force is being created in violatioii of the United
Nations Charter.
The General Assembly resolution on the basis of which it is now
proposed to form this force is inconsistent with the Charter. Chap-
ter VI1 of the Charter empowers the Security Council, and tlie
Security Couiicil only, not the General Açsembly, to set up an inter-
national arrned force and to take such action as it may dcem
necessary, includi~ig the use of such a force, to maintain or restore
international yeace and security.
The resolution on the creation of an international armed force
is also inconsistent with the purposes for which the United Nations
Charter permits the creation and use of an international force.
The Charter envisages the use of such a force to help a State victim
of aggression trirepel the aggressor and to defencl such a State
against the aggressor.
But the resolution 1000 of 5 November 1956 and the plan for
its implcmentation, which is contained in the resolution just
adopted provide for the use.of an iiiternationai force for quite
another purposc than that of repclling aggression against Egypt.
The plan provides for the introduction of the international force
into Egyptian territory and the transfer of a large part of that
territory, including the Suez Canal Zone, to its control.
For these reasnns, thc Soviet dclegation regards the proposa1
for the establishment by the General Assembly of an international
force to be stationcd on Egyptian territory, a proposa1 which by-
passes the Sccurity Council, as contrary to the United Nations
Charter.
However, in view of the fact that in this instance the victim of
aggression has been compelled to agree to the introduction of the
international force, in the hope that this rnay prevent any further
extension of the aggression, the Soviet delegation did not vote
against the draft resolution, but abstained."
This quotation from the statement of the Sovict delegation may also
show how groundless was the assertion of the distinguished representa-
tive of Norway that the establishing of the Emergency Force allegedly
not only did not raise any objections on the part of the Soviet Union
but was almost approved by it.
As is clear from the above-mentioned statement of the Soviet dele- .
gation such an assertion does not correspond to the facts.
1 am also bound, Mr. Yrcsident, to invite the attention of the Court
to the wrong interpretation of the Soviet Government'ç view on the
question of the Emergency Force that waç given by the representative
of the United Kingdom in his statement of r7 May 1962. STATEIIIENT OF Mi'.TUNKIN (u.s.s.R.)-21 V 62 399
The distinguished reprcsentative of the United Kingdom said:
"Aridyet the Soviet Union says that the General Assembly with
104 sovereign States cannot consider any question involving action
of any character for maintaining peace. That, itis said, has to be
left to theIr Members of the Security Council alone."
1must Say that the Soviet Union has never asserted that the General
Assembly is not competent to discuss any question relating to the
maintenance of internationai peace and security. What we have asserted
and continue to assert is that it is not within the cornpetence of the
General Assembly to take decisions regarding questions requiring action
to maintain international peace and security. Such are the provisions of
the Charter.
The Memorandum of the Soviet Government to which the British
delegate Ras referring states as follows:
"According to the United Nations Charter al1questions involving
action for maintaining international peace and. security-which
includes the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force as
well-corne iinder the cornpetence of the Security Council alone."
In order to justify the ~inlawful actions of the General Assembly
references are made to the fact that by adopting the Resolution for the
estabIishment of the Emergency Force in the Middle East the General
Assembly was allegedly acting on the request of the Security Council
and in accordance with the General Assembly's Reçolution 377 A of
3 November 1950.
In the Security Council's Resolution (S/3721) there is indeed a refer-
ence to the Kesolution 377 A of 3 Kovemher 1950, but the Security
CounciI did not ask the General Assembly to take action for maintaining
peace and security, which undcr the Charter the Security Council alone
is competent to take.
1 shall quote the Security Council's decision (S/3721). The Seciirity
Council
"Decides to cal1 an emergency special session of the General
Assembly as provided in the General Assembly's Resolution 377
A of 3 November 1950, in order to rnakc appropriate recommen-
dations."
The General Assembly may under the provisions of the Charter make
recommendations with regard to the questions relating to maintenance
of international peace and security. The problem is, what kind of recom-
mendations?
The hlernorandum of the Soviet Government states on this question
the following :
"In so far as the General Assembly is concerned, it mayconsidcr"-
and here the Rlemorandum uses the language of Article II of the
Charter-"the general principles of CO-operationin the maintenance
of international peace and security; may discuss any questions
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security;
may make recommendations with regard to any such questions t~
the State or States concerned orto the Security Councilor to both. ' .4nd I continue the 31emorandurn of the Soviet Government:
"But the General Assembly is not competent to takc decisions
on the carrying out of any action to maintain international peace
and security."
Article 11, paragraph 2,of the Charter reads:
"Any siich qiiestion on which action is necessary shall be referred
to the Security Council hy the Gencral Assembly either beforc or
after discussion."
Such was, and still is, the position of the Soviet Government in regard
to the validity of the Gencral Assembly Resolution under which the
United Nations Emcrgency Force in the Middle East had been created.
The attitude of the Soviet Government tothe financing of these armed
forces follows from the above-mentioned basic position.
Thus, as the Emergency Force for the Middle East was set up in
violatio~i of the United Bations Charter, circumventing the Security
Coiincil,the financing of that Force cannot be regardcd as an obligation
incumhent upon the Member States of the United Nations under the
Charter.
Now 1 wish to draw your attention to the question of the United
Nations Operations in the Congo.
The Soviet Gooernment considers that the Security Cauncil's Reso-
lution SI4387 of 14 JuIy 1960, which served as a basis for the United
Nations Operation in the Congo, was implemented in violation of the
provisions of the United Nations Charter.
Under tlie United Nations Charter the Security Council, and not the
General Assembly, determines whicll blember States are to participate
in carrying out its decisions involving the maintenance of internationd
peace and security.
Article 48, paragraph I,reads :
"The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
shnll be taken by al! the Members of the United Nations or by some
of them, as the Security Council may determine."
From this provision of the Charter it foltows that the Security Council
alone can determine ivhich of the illembers of the United Nations must
participate in actions for maintaining international peace and security.
The Charter does noi invest any other body with such rights.
The United Nations Charter defines also tlie conditioiis under which
&lemberStates participate inthe implerrientation of the Security Council's
decisions for maintaining international. peace and security.
These conditioris are laid clown in Article 43 of the Charter. These
provisions of tlic Charter have also not been observed with regard to
the United Nations Operations in the Congo.
Wliat did really take place?
The Secretary-General and not the Security Council, as is provided
by Article 48 of the Charter, determined the list of States which were
invited to participate with their arnied forcesor otherwise inthe United
Nations Operations in the Congo. The Security Council has in fact been
debarred from directing the Unitcd Nations Operations in the Congo. STATEMEST OF TUEKIF (u.s.s.R.)-21 v 62 401
The United Nations Operations in the Congo have been directed by the
Çccretary-General alone.
The question of technical and financial assistancc for the United
Nations Operations in the Congo also was solved in violation of the
Charter.
Disregarding the Security Council, the Secretary-General applied to
the General Assembly for appropriations to defray the espenses involved
in the United Kations Operations in the Congo; and the General Assem-
bly, in its turn, without being so entitled by the Charter, adopted a
resolution on appropriations for those operations.
Itiç precisely due to these violations of the Charter that the Soviet
Govern~nent refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the resolutions
adopted by the Gcneral AsscmbIy on the appropriations for the United
Nations Operations in the Congo and declared that it would not considcr
itself committed to any extent by such unlawiul resolutions.
Now, Mr. President, 1 would Iilceto say a fcw words witli reference to
the interpretation of Chapter VI1 of the Charter in relation to the
United Nations Operations in the Congo, that was ~iroposed by the
representative of Canada in his statement here on 15 May.
The distinguished representative of Canada asserted that Articles
42-46 of the Charter, prescribing the procedure and conditions under
which the Security Council can use armed forces for maintaining inter-
national peace and security, have nothing to do with the United Nations
Operations in the Congo, and tl-iat, in this case, the Security Council has
been acting in accordance with Articles33-38 and also Articles39 and 40
of the Charter.
Such an interpretation of the United Nations Charter witl-iregard to
the United Nations Operations in the Congo is astonishing, if 1 may use
the language of my distinguislted colleague from Great Britain.
.Articles33-38 corne under Chapter VI of the Charter "Peaceful settle-
ment of disputes".
1sit possible to describe the United Nations Operations in the Congo,
involving the useof armed forces, as a "peaceful settlement of disputes"?
My subrnission of course isit is not possible.
The present case is concerned with the measures involving the use of
armed forces that theSecurity Council may undcrtake only in accordance
with Chapter VI1 of the Charter.
The representative of Canada referred to Articles 39 and 40, Chapter
VII. He asserted that Articles 42-46 of the same Chaptcr have nothing
to do with the United Nations Operations in the Congo.
This assertion is essentially wrong.
\trhat then do Articles39 and 40,to which the Canadian representative
proposed to restrict the application of ChapterVI1 of the Charter in the
matter of the United Nations Operations in the Congo, provide?
Article 39 reads :
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
tothe peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recornrnendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in ac-
cordance with Articles41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security."
Thus, Article 39 refers to Articles41 and 42 of the Charter, stating
that the Security Council tindertakes measures for the maintenance orrestoration of international peace and security in accordance witli the
provisions of Articles41 and 42 of the Charter.
Other Articles of Chapter VII, and ArticIes 43 and 48 in particillar,
stipulate tl-ic circumstances and co~iditions under which States may
participate in implementing the Security Council's decision.
A detailed analysis of these Articles is given in the hlemorandum of the
Soviet Government, and 1shaU not repeat it.
The only thing 1 would like to mention, in this respect, is that Article
43 requires the concIusion of an agreement, or agreements, between the
Securitp CounciI and Nember States and the ratification of such agree-
ments by the signatory States in accordance with tlieir constitutional
procedures. This, in my opinion, rnay constitute, to some extent, a
guarantee that each Member State would assume only those obligations
which it can fulfil and that a State will not be subjected to obligations
that go beyond its possibilities and are not in cornpliance witti the
Charter.
One more observation with regard to the problem 1 am discussing.
111the written memoranda of the Governments and oral statements of
the majority of the representativesof the Western States, it is asserted
that any expenses incurred by the organs of the United Nations constitute
"the expençes of the Organization" within the meaning of ilrticlc 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter, regardless of the legality of the resolutions
and measures that caused the expençes.
Thus, an attempt is being made to separate the question of financial
obligations of Members of the United Nations from the question of the
character and legality of the actions involving corresponding expendi-
tures.
This attempt would be esplained by the fact that the creation of the
United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United
Nations Operations in the Congo, the alIocations in paymerit of wliich
constitute the matter of the present discussion, were undertaken or con-
ducted, or both, in violation of the United Nations Charter.
For my submission, it is beyond any shadow of doubt that the problem
of financial obligations is closely connectcd with that of the legalityof
corresponding measures under the terms of tlie Charter of the United
Nations. 1 note with satisfaction that the United Kingdom representative
expressed the same opinion. Here is what he has stated;
"\%'hile one would not readily assume that the General Assembly
or the Security Council would act in excess of their powers, if they
did so the General Assembly, in my submission, could not ap-
portion the expenses involvcd under Articlc 17, paragraph 2. For
expenses of the Organization in that Article must by necessary im-
plication mean expenses validly incurred."
The conclusion to be dralvn from the considerations Thave presented
is that the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the
United Nations Operations in the Congo do not impose financial obli-
gations on the Rlember States.
Now, Xr. Presidcnt and Members of the Court, 1corne to the second
part of my statement rclating to the scope of Article 17, paragraph 2,
of the Charter.
The question formulated in the Kesolution of the General Assembly
1731 of 20 December 1961 is as follows:Do certain expenditures, and1 quote, "constitute 'expenses of the Organization' ïvithin the meaning
of Article 17, paragraph z, of the Charter of the United Kations?"
Let us discuss this problem after we have deaIt with the question of
the legitimacy of the activities for which the expenditures are required.
One argument in favour of an affirmative answer to this question
advanced by some representatives here relates to the cornpetence of the
General Assembly with regard to financial matters.
Proceeding from the assumption that the General Assembly is the
sole organ of the United Nations vested with cornpetence in financial
matters, tliese representatives have inferred that the powers of the
General Assembly in this field are unlimited. In my submission this
assertion is untenable.
The United Kingdom representative had to admit that not only the
General Assembly but also the Secilrity Council had some competence
in financial matters.
But even if the General AssembIy were the sole organ having financial
authority, that would not, indeed that could not, mean that its power
is unlimited.
The competence of each organ of the United Nations is determined by
the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Charter is a treaty
concluded hetween States, and no organ of the United Nations can arnend
it except according to the provisions described by the Charter itself.
To suggest that the States &lembersof the United Nations have given
to the General Assembly unlimited power to impose upon them financial
obligations would arnount to an assertion that a supranational financial
authority has been created. This is certainly too sweeping an assumption
which finds no confirmation in the provisions of the Charter.
The financial competence of the Cieneral Assembly rests on the pro-
visions of Article 17 of the Charter, the relevant yaragraphs of whick
read as follows:
"First, the General AsscmbIy shall consider and approve the budget
of the Organization.
Second, the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."
Here again it has been suggested that inasmuch as the language of
Article 17 is general and contains no limitations, this Article relates not
only to the regular budget of the Organization but also to such extraor-
dinary expenditures as those for the United Nations Emergency Force
and the United Nations Operations in the Congo.
It is however clear that a correct conclusion with regard to the actual
province of Article 17 of the Charter must bc drawn not from the analysis
of this single Article, but from the analysis of the relevant provisions of
the Charter as a whole. The reason for this is that a general rule does
not exclude the possibility of a particular rule or rules relating to specific
situations.
Such particular rules do exist, and the United Kingdom representative
has been forced tu admit ii. 1 have in mind Article 43 of the Charter,
the relevant provisions of which read as follows:
"First, al1Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute
to the maintenance of international peacc and security, undertake
to make available to the Security Council, on its cal1and in accord- ance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance
and facilities, iiicIuding rights of passage, necessary for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security.
Second, such agreement or agreements shall govern the nun~bers
and types of forces, their degree ofreadiness and general location,
and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided."
Syeaking of Article 43, the distinguished representative of Italy and
also the distinguished representative of Norway endeavoured to create
an impression that it had no bearing on financial problems. However,
the language they used was evasive. They cautiously avoided being
specific and that in my opinion is significant.
The United Kingdom representative ventured, however, to express
the opinion that Article43 of the Charter covered also financial questions
and that agreements between the Security Council and the Member
States concluded under this Article might include financial arrangements.
The analysis of the relevant provisions of the Charter leaves no doubt
that while Article 17 lays down a general rule, Article 43 contains a
particular rule, alex sfiecialis, which relates to expenditures for certain
actions for the puryose of maintaining international peace and security.
Such actions may be undertaken in pursuanceof adecision of the Security
Council. If actions of the United Nations Emergency Force and the
United Nations Operations in the Congo were undertaken and carried
out in cornpliance with the provisions of the Charter, they would un-
doubtedly fall within the category of actions conternplated in Article43
of the Charter.
The reason why al1arrangements for çuch actions as the use of armed
forces have been put into a separate category is not difficult to see.
Such measures have an extraordinary character and they may affect
vital interests of States, including their national economy.
Noiv, Nr. Presidcnt, I corne to the question of United Nations practice
with regard to appropriations for the United Nations Emergency Force
and the United Nations Operations in the Congo.
The statements of some Governments Say that the General Assernbly
resolutions concerning the financing of the United Kations Emergency
Force in the Middle East andthe United Nations Operations in the Congo
use the language of Article 17 of the United Nations Charter and that
this allegedly demonstrates the intention of the General AssembIy to
act under this Article.
An analysis of the circumstances in which the General Assembly
resolutions concerning the financing of the above-mentioned United
Nations Operations were adoptcd and also an analysis of the texts of
those resolutions lead us to an entirely different conclusion.
The General Assembly l-iasnever, either directly or indirectly, regarded
the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East
as "the expenses of the Organization" within the rneaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter.
As far asthe United Nations Operationç in the Congo are concerned,
the General Assembly's Resolution of 20 December 1961 is in quite the
opposite sense.
1should like to remind you bricfly of the history of the adoption by
the General Assembly of the resolutions concerning the financing of
the United Nations Operations in the Middle East and in the Congo. Let us consider first the resolutions of the General Assembly or, more
precisely, the relevant paragraphs of these resolutions concerning the
financing of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.
'I'hefirst mention of the financing of the United Nations armed forces
in the Middle East is found in the General Assernbly Resolution Ioor
(E-1)-document A/Res./39j of 6'November 1956.
Paragrapk 5 of this Resolution reads:
"Approvcs prcivisionnally the hasic rule concerning the financing
of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's
report."
The basic procedure relating to the financial allocations for the armed
forces, that was approved by the General Asscmbly as a $roaisionaL
measure, consisted of the following:
"A basic rule which, at Ieast, could be applied yrovisionally, would
be that a nation providing a unit would bc responsible for al1costs
foreqiii~irrientand salaries, wliile al1otlicr costs should be fiiianced
outside the normal bildget of thc United Nations."
1have quoted paragraph Ij of the Secretary-General's report, docu-
ment Aj3302, relating to thc plan for establishing the United Nations
Emcrgency Force, the very paragraph that was approved as a provi-
sional measure hy the General Assembly as a basic proccdure for the
financing of the United Nations Emergency Force.
What has it in common with Article 17? Where is the language of
Article 17 of the Charter?
The basic procedure for financing the United Nations Emergency
Force proposed by the Secretary-General and approved as a provisional
measure by the General Assembly embodies the suggestion that a State
providing a unit would be responsible for all costs, for equipment and
salaries, wkile al1 other costs should be financed outside the normal
budget of the United Nations.
This procedure seems to stress even more strongly that the expenses
needed to mect the maintenance costs of thc United Nations armed
forces have nothing in common with the ordinary expenses withiii the
meaning of Article 17, paragraph z,of the Uniteci Nations Charter.
This thesis has also been definitely statcd in the subsequent United
Nations resolutions concerning the financing of the United Nations
Emergency Force and in the resolutions rcgarding the Secretary-
General's proposals on the subject.
In his reports and oral strttements the Secretary-General more than
once made recommendations to the GeneraI Assembly to consider the
expenses of the Emergericy Force as "the exyenses of the Organization"
within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2. But not one of these
rccomrnendations was approved by the General Assembly.
I should like to refer, for instance, to the Secretary-General's report
on "the administrative and budgetary measures relating to the United
Nations Emergency ForceJ' (document A/3383), submitted to the
XIth Session of the Gencral Assembly. In paragraph 5 of this report
the Secretary-General recomrnended that
"... the General AssernbIy decide at an early date on the methods
of allocating to Rlember States the costs of the Force to be financed
by the United Nations". This recommendation by the Secretary-General was not approved.
The General Assembly refused to consider the question of allotting to
States Alembers contributions to meet the costs of the Emergency Force
as had been recomrnended by the Secretary-General in paragraph 5 of
his report.
In its Resoliition1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956, the General Assem-
bly repeated the essence of paragraph 5 of its Resolution Ioor (E-1) of
6 November 1956 and requested the Pifth Committee and, as appro-
priate, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions, to consider and, as soon as possible, to report on further
arrangements that necd to be adopted regarding the costs of main-
taining the Force.
If the General Assembly, in making allocations in respect of the
Emergency Force, intended to act under Article 17 of the Charter, 1
wonder what was the reason for requesting the Fifth Committee and
the Administrative and Budgetary Committee to consider and present a
specific report relating to the furthermeasures that must be taken iri
regard to the maintenance costs of the Emergency Force.
There can be no doubt that the General Assernbly did not iiitend to
considcr the financing cxpcnses of the United Nations Emergency Force
as "the expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17
of the Charter, and it is precisely for that reason that the General
Assembly requested its Administrative and Budgetary Committce to
consider the question of measures for financing the above-mentioned
operations.
The intention of the General AssembIy not to equatc cxpenditures
on the financing of the United Nations Emergcncy Forces with the
expenscs of the Organization within the limits of Articl17, paragraph 2,
is more obvioiisly expressed in the General Assemtily Resolution 1089
of 21 Uecember 1gj6 which was adopted with regard to the Secretary-
General's report (document A133891 and in the following paragraph of
the Prcamble in particular:
"Considering that the Secretary-General, in his reports dated
21 November and 3 Decenlber 1956, has recommended that the
expenses relating to the Forces should be apportioned in the same
manncr as the espenses of the Organization, considering further
that several divergent views, not yet reconciled, have been held by
various Member States on contributions or on the method suggested
by the Secretary-Ge~ieral for obtaining such contributions ..."
1shoufd like you to note that in the extract just cited from General
Assembly Resolution 1089 it was said that thc Secretary-General
"has recommended that the expcnses relating to the Force should
be apportioned in the same manner as the exlienses of the Organi-
zation".
1 stress the words "the expenses of the Organization", meaning the
expenses provided for in Article 17,paragraph 2.
Had the General Assembly considered the emergency expenscs as
"the expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2, it would have approved the Secretary-General's recom-
mendations. Rut the General Assembly did not do that and setup a STrlTEhfEh'T OF RIT. TUKKIN (u.s.s.R.)-21 V 62 407
Special Committee for studying the question of financing the United
Kations Emergency Force.
Itseems to be quite clear that the language of the resolutions of the
General Assembly does not suggest the intention of the General Assembly
to act under Article 17 in regard to thc financing of the Emergency
Force, but on the contrary these resolutions distinctly differentiate the
expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force from the expenses of
the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2.
Moreover, the Kesolutions of the General Assembly in the most un-
ambiguous manner associate the formula "expenses of the Organization",
rnentioned in Article 17, paragraph z, with the ordinary budget of the
Organization and stress the quite different character of the expenses for
the financing of the Emergency Force.
Under the pressure of some States the General AssembIy more than
once resumed the discussion of the question of procedure and sourccs
for the financing of the United Xations Ernergency Forces.
The Administrative and Budgetary Committee was entrusted with
the study of this question. il special committee was set up. The result
was always the same-different points of view were statcd, but it was
invariably confirmed that the expenses of the Emergency Force differ
from the expenses of the ordinary budget, and the idea was rejected
that the cspenses of the Unitcd Nations Ernergency Force are the same
as the expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter.
1 wish to refer to the report of the Committee set up by the General
Asseml~ly (Resolution 108g of 21 December 1956) for the discussion of
the question of financing the United Nations Emergency Force (Docii-
ment A/C. 5/707). The relevant part of this report reads as follows:
"The draft rcsolution presented by the representative of the
Unitcd States, on which subsequent disciission in the Committee
was largely focussed..",
and I continiie to quoie:
"By way of a preamble to this draft resolution, it was proposed
that, in addition to calling attention to Resolutions1122 and 1089
already adapted hy the General Assembly on 26 November and
21 Decembcr 1956, the view should bc recorded that Force expenses
constitute United Nations expenditure within the general scope and
intcnt of Article 17 of the Charter. and that çuch exvenses are
therefoie subject in principle to apportionment amon; Mernber
States. in accordance with the scale of assessrnent ado~ted in Reso-
lution.108~ by the Assembly for contributions to the &nual budget
of the United Nations."
Rut the report of the Cornmittee continues:
"ln the course of the ensuing discussion, the opinion wasexpressed
that the proposed preambular paragraph, referred toabove, served
no essential purpose and that its inclusion in any draft resolution
to be submitted tothe Fifth Committee could only result in needless
debate on an issue of principle concerning which Member Govern-
rnents had already made their positions clear. Some Members,
ïvhile accepting the view that the Force expenditures were a United Nations responsibility, did not consider that they could properly
be regarded as sul~ject10the provisions of Article 17 of the Charter.
Others maintained the position previously expressed in the Fifth
Committee to the effect that such costs as might be incurred u7ere
solely and exclusively the responsibility of the Governments of
Israel, France and the United Kingdom and not of the United
Nations membership as a whole. Still other members of the Commit-
tee held to the view that thc provisions of Article 17 were in fact
applicable."
The above-mentioned extract from the Special Cornmittee's report
clearly indicates that in the question of the financing of the United
Nations Emergency Force there was no agreement between Member
States.
It was yrecisely because of this that the Special Committee coiild no1
submit to the General Assembly definite recommendations, but limited
itself to explaining the different opinions expressed by tlie &lembers of
the Committee on this subject.
The last resoliltion of the General Assembly relating to the procedure
of financing the Emergency Force has been adopted at the XITIth
Session (Resolution 1337).
The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General
"to consult with the Governments of Mernber States with respect
to their views concerning the manner of financing the Force in the
future, and to submit a report together with the replies to the
General Assembly at itçXIVth Session".
Such a report has been presented by the Secretary-General to the
XIVth Session of the General Assembly.
The replies of the Governments did not indicate much change in the
conflicting positions that had been previously expressed. They failed
to come to any generai agreement when this question was discussed at
the XIVth Session of the General Assembly. The XIVth Session of the
General Assembly was once more unable to come to any dccision on the
report of the Secretary-General.
Besides,I would like to state that none of the resolutions were adopted
by the General Assembly unanimously. On each occasion a number of
Member States expressed their objections of principle against these
resolutions, objections grounded on the Charter of the United Nations,
and refused to take part in the frnancing of these operations. In actual
fact more than 50% of the Menibers of the United Nations do not take
part in financing the Emergency Force.
Now 1 wish to invite your attention to the practice of the U~iited
Nations with rt:gard to the financing of the United Nations Operations
in the Congo. IIIthe Resolution of the General Assernbly 1732 (20 Decern-
ber 1961) it is stated that
"...the extraordinary expenses for the United Nations Operations
in the Congo are essentially different in nature from the expenses
of the Orgiinization under the regular budget and that, therefore,
a procedure different from that applied in the case of the regular
budget is required for meeting these extraordinary expenses". A number of Latin-Arnerican countries, and Venezuela and Nexico
in particular, were the authors of the draft of this paragraph.
1 would refer to the statement of thc reprcscntative of Mexicoin which
it is directly pointed out that the object of this paragraph is to emphasizc
that the expenses of the United Nations Operations in the Congo cannot
be considered as the expenses of the Organization within the meaning of
Article 17,paragraph 2 :
"AS 1 said in my statement of 3 April 1g61, supporting the
staternent made earlier that same day by the Venezuelan represent-
ative when he formally introduced the eighteen-Power draft reso-
lution, the proposa1 is based on a premise which the sponsors regard
as axiomatic. This premise is stated in the second preambular
paragraph, which affirms that the character of the extraordinary
expenses of these operations"-that is to say, of the United Nations
Operations in tlie Congo-"is fundamentally different from that
of the other expenses of the Organization included in the regular
budget. In other words, my deIegation believcs that these expenses
cannot be considered as 'expenses of the Organization' within the
meaning of Article 17,paragraph 2,of the Charter."
However, to be precise I must indicate that the first Resolution of
the General Assembly (Kesolution 1585) relating to the financing of
the United Nations Operations in the Congo included a paragraph to the
effect that the expenses of the United Nations Operations in the Congo
were "the expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph z.
Rut the fact is that this Ianguage has been excluded from the subse-
quent resolutions on the financing of the United Nations Operations in
&e Congo and substituted by a p&-agraph of an opposite meking which
1 have quoted earlier.
Such are the facts concerning the resolutions of the General Assembly
on the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and the United
Nations Operations in the Congo. They confirm our conclusion that the
General Assembly has never, either directIy or indirectly, considered
the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East
as the expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2.
With regard to the financing of the United Nations Operations in the
Congo, the practice has not been consistent. However, in the last re-
solution the General Assembly has distinctly pointed out that these
expenses "are essentially different in nature from the expenses of the
Organization under the regular budget" and that therefore for meeting
them "a procedure different from that applied in the case of the regular
budget is required".
1 now corne, Mr. President, to the final part of my statement. It has
frequently been said here that the existing situation with regard to the
financing of the United Nations Operations in the Congo and the United
Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East has in itself much danger
for the United Nations Organization, and that a negative answer to the
question now before the Court may create a threat to the very existence
of the United Nations. The most pathetic statement in this respect was the one by the rep-
resentative of Australia. Here is what the distinguished representative
of Australia has said:
"A negative answer wouId, in our submission, threaten the i~n-
mediatc financial solvency of the Organization; it would threaten
the ability of the United Nations to bring these two great currcnt
peace-keeping operations to their proper conclusion; it would
threaten the ability of the Organization to deal with similar problems
of peace and security in the future,and indeed would entirclychange
the character of the Organization."
One question does arise inevitably. IVhy do representatives of those
States, who claim to bc the advocates of tliestrengthening of the United
Nations Organization, keep silence about the genuine causes of the
present situation, about those who have undermined the very foun-
dations of the United Nations, who flagrantly violated the most im-
portant principles of the United Nations Charter and who by such actions
brought the Organization to its present financial position?
What was the position of those States at the moment when the British,
French and Israelian aggression was taking place?
Some of the States represented here have themselves taken part in
that aggression. Undoubtedly the States who started the aggression
against Egypt knew beforehand that the attitudes of other Western
States-their alliesin aggressivc rnilitary pacts at least-would not be
unfavourahle to them.
I recall the statement of President Eisenhower, made in connection
with the aggression against Egypt in 19j6. The President of the Unitcd
States declared that Great Britain and France, of course, had the right
to use force against Egypt, but he simply considered the course they had
adopted was not a reasonable one. And such a statement which in fact
legally justified the British, French and Israelian aggrcssion, was made
despite the fact that the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of
force and even the threat of force against the territorial integrity or
political independencc of any State (Article 2, yaragraph 4, of the United
Xations Charter).
Ifthe States represented here were so anxious concerning the interests
of the United Nations, the question arises why then did they not think
of thoçe interests at that tirne.If they had taken another stand at that
timc, there would have been no aggrcssion against Egypt, and conse-
quently no United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.
Let us take now the United Nations Operations in the Congo. If there
had been no Belgian aggression supported by Belgium's partners in the
NATO against the Young Congolese Repubiic, there would bc no United
Nations Operations in the Congo. And this aggression would not have
been undertaken if Belgium had not known beforehand that her partners
in the NATO would stand up for the aggressor. At all events, this aggrcs-
sion would have been stopped at the very beginning ifthe Soviet Union's
proposals, directed against aggression, had been accepted and imyle- 1
mented and if the Iliestern Powers had not been thwarting the steps
directed against this aggression. Ifthe United Nations Operations in the
Congo had been conducted in full cornpliance with the requirements of
the United Nations Charter and if the Western Powers had been honestly I
supporting these actions, the blood of thc great Congolese patriot
I Lumumba and many other fighters for the independence of the Congo
would not have been shed and the foreign merccnaries and the Belgian
puppet Tshornbe would long aga have been expelled from the coiintry
and the Congolese people woilld have been peacefiilly constructing their
new life.
One may Say, of course, "Let bygones be bygones-why should onc
recall thisnow? The financial position of the United Nations Organization
is very serious, and we must find the way out immediately."
That is not the correct approach, Mr. President and Members of thc
Court. 'I'hefacts 1 Iiave been referring to are not merely a n-iatter of
history. They arc of great importance in determining the correct approach
to the question under discussion, and in our opinion they should be taken
into consideration.
From the historicat point of view, the question of the financing of the
United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the United
Nations Opcrations in the Congo might be no more than an episode in
the life of the international Organization.
We should not sacrifice the principles of the United Nations Charter,
on which depends the very existence and the future of the Organization,
even though by that sacrifice we might reach a more simple solution of
this or that currcnt problcm.
In this connection, blr. President and Members of the Court, Iwould
lilceto invite your attention to a vcry dangcrous tendency which can be
seen throughout the written replies of some Governments and also the
statements of the representatives wliich have been made in this Hall.
This tendency consists of opposing the so-called effectiveness of the
Unitcd Xations to the provisions of its Charter. Roughly speaking,
according to this conception, it is necessary to strive for the so-called
effectiveness of the United Nations, disregarding the provisions of its
Charter and in accordance with the principle: "The end justifies the
means".
The above-mentioned tendency emanates from a conception that is
usually callcd "realistic". This so-called realistic conception reflects the
main features of the "position of strength" policy and it is an attenipt
to provide a theoretical justification of that policy.
1 do not propose to dwcIl upon the content of this conception-it is
well-known.
1 would only like to state that the abovc-mcntioned realistic con-
ception is full of a nihilistic attitude to thinternational Iaw and in its
extreme manifestation regardsinternational law as a legal "strait-jacket"
for diplornacy and calls to remove this legal strait-jacket.
The opposing of the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization
to the principles of its Charter is in fact nothing else than the mani-
festation of these nihilistic tendeilcies irrespective of the motives by
which the supporters of such an opposition are impellcd.
The opposing of the cffectivcness of the United Nations Organization
to the observance of the principles of the U~iited Nations Charter is
Icgally groiindless and dangerous. It is clear to everyone that the ob-
servance of the principlcs of thc United Nations Charter is the necessary
condition of the effectiveness of the United Nations. The expericnce of
the United Nations clearly shows that only on the basis of the strict
observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter can the
Organization become an effective instrument for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security and the development of friendly relations
among States.
Moreoever, the very existence of the United Nations as a world
organization depends on the observance by the States of the fundamental
principles ofthe Charter.
And obviously, Mr. President, in resolving the question under dis-
cussion the Court should be guided by the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations. .
The Governrnent of the Soviet Union subrnits that, in accordance
with the United Nations Charter; the operations of the United Nations
Emergency Force in the Middle East, as weH as the United Nations
Operations in the Congo, impose no financial obligations on the United
Nations Members both for the reason these operations were carried out
not in cornpliance with the requirements of the United Nations Charter,
and because the expenses of these operations are not the expenses re-
ferred to in Article17, paragrapb z, of the Charter.
Thank you, &Ir.President and Members of the Court. 9. ORAL STATEMENT OF &IR. CHAYES
(REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
.-iT THEPUBLIC HEARING OF 21 M,4Y 1962, AFTERNOON
May it please the Court:
The issue before the Court is whether the United Nations has legal
authority to raise funds for the accomplishment of its paramount pur-
pose, the maintenance of international peace.and security.
It has been rightly said here that the question upon which the General
Assembly has asked your advice is a precise and limited one. Nevertheless,
its answer requires a consideration of fundamental questions of the
distribution of powers within the United Nations. It has profound im-
plications for the capacity of the Organization to survive and to realize
its aims. In the view of the Government of the United States, no more
important question has ever been before the International Court.
The importance of the case is witnessed by the number of Governments
that have taken advantage of the opportunity under the Statute of the
Court to submit views in writing and orally on the questions at issue.
The Court has had the benefit of written statements on both sides of the
question from 18 Governments and haç, in the Iast IO days, heard oral
arguments, also, 1 am glad to say, on both sides of the question, from
8 Governments. c
At this stage, there is little to be added by way of detailed esegesis
to what distinguished Counsel have already said. Certain remarks have
been made in the course of the argument before you calling into queston
the conduct and the good faith of Governments represented here (in-
cIuding my own) and of some that are not. 1 reject those remarks, but
1 do not propose to respond to thern. This is not a place where political
recriminations, unfortunateIy common in other forums, should properiy
be rehashed. And such remarks are, of course, wholly irrelevant to the
issues in this case. What may be useful now is to restate the essential
structure of the case for an affirmativeanswer tothe AssembIv'squestion, I Ll '
and to respond to the major thrusts that have been made agakt that
case. n - y
The argument for an affirmative answer iç straightforward:'There is
only one article in the Charter dealing with financial obligations of
Members, Article 17, paragraph 2. It provides: "The expenses of the
Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the 03
General Assembly." It vests in the Organization the power, by resolut~on ' t
of the General Assembly apportioning and assessing expenses, to require I
. hlember States to pay charges lawfully incurred. This is the meaning, .J' I
and the whole meaning, of Article 17.Tt is the plain meaning of the test;
' !
it coincides with the intention of the framers of the Charter evidenced
in the preparatory work; it is reinforced by the unbroken practice of the
Organization under the Charter. It reflects, as a Committee of Jurists
said in construing the parallel article of the League of Nations Covenant, f..
4I4 STATEMENT OF RIr. CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62
"the general principle, a principle applicable to al1 associntions, that
legally incurred expenses of an association must be borne by al1 its
Members in commori". (Contribution ofdkeStateojSalvador totheEnpenses
.c-'k ' of theLengue, A. 128. rgzz. V, p. 193.)
The contention has been advanced that the term "expenscs", despite
its generality, must be read to rnean soma expenses rather than al1
expenses, "administrative" expenses as opposed to "operational"' ex-
penses, "normal" expenses in contrast with "extraordinary" expenses.
These distinctions cannot be sustained. They are without support in
the text of the Charter, in the San Francisco discussions, or in the ex-
perience of the United Nations. Tliey cannot be applied coherently in
practice. If adoyted, they would lead to doubt and confusion about the
financial obligations of Members, a field in which, more than most,
clarity and certainty are needed for the effective functioning of the
Organization. These points have been developed persuasively and in
detail by others. May I simpIy add to the references already before the
Court the Note ofthe Controlter in the dossier prepared by the Secrctary-
General. This Note shows, arnong other things, that the MrorkingCapital
Fund of ille United Nations, though not a part of the "regular" budget
and though used to meet "extraordinary" expenditures, notably those
for yeacekeeping "operations", has been consiçtently provided for by
assessment against the hlembers under Article 17. (Note bythe Controller
orcRudgetary aîzd Fi?zancialPractice of the United Nations, pp. 41, 55.)
The meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, then, is this: The United
Nations has the power, by resolution of the General Assembly nppor-
tioning and assessing expenses, to require the Member States to pay for
expcnditures lawfuly made. 1 think there can be no doubt that that
potver was exercised in the resolutions levying asseçsments to cover the
expenditures for the Middle East and Congo Forces. It is true that, on
occasion, these expenditures were characterized as "extraordinary", that
assessments to cover thern were not made in the regular budget, that
they were charged agninst an ad hoc or special account. On the basis of
these factors, it has been suggested to the Court that the General
Assembly was not acting to impose the obligation of payrnent upon
blember States for the assessments made in the resolutions.
Direct expressjons to the contrary are many and weighty and have
been cited to the Court. But put these aside. Kead the financing reso-
lutions together, one after the other. Read especially the operative
portions rather tllan the preambular material. Consider the form in lvhich
they are stated,the sharpneçs of the distinction they make between the
voluntary contribution they solicit and the assessments they exact. Sec
the concern they show for the burden upon poorer Members causcd by
the financial obligations impoçed. hl1 this is utterly at odds with the
notion that the Assernbiy did not intend to exercise its power to impose
binding assessments. On the other hand, al1of the circumstances adduced
in support of that notion can be, and have been, explained in termç that
aie fully consistent tvith the intention of the Assernbly to exercise its
power to bind.
Ifthe Assembly has ponrer under Article 17 to impose binding financial
obligations for al1 expenditures lawfully incurred, and if it is granteci
that the Assernbly intendcd to exercise that power, then the only argu-
ment that remains against the binding character of the assessments is
that they were not levied to cover expenditures lawfully incurred. STATE31EXT OF MT. CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62 4I5
A review of the written and oral arguments for a negative ansiver to
the question before the Court reveals tliat the main thrust of theçe sub-
missions is indeed directed at the legality of the expenditures themseIves;
the legality, that is, of the activities giving rise to them.
To what extent, if any, is this question of lawfulness open, assumii~g,
as1 think cveryone does, that there is no doubt about the forma1 regu-
larity of the assessing resolutions?
A number of my colIeagues have taken the position that the Court
need not and should not inquire into the validit- of the underlying
resolutions establishing and regulating the Congo and Middle Eaçt
Forces, except, perhaps, to assure itself that these resolutions are not
"nianifestly invalid"They point to the language of the Resolution put-
ting the question to the Court, and to the debates preceding its adoption,
as showing an intention that the Court's inquiry should confine itself to
the legal effcct of the assessing resolutions alone.
The United States is in full agreement with this position. Certainly,
the Assembly had no desire to cast doubt on the validity of itsOWII
actions over a five year period. The Court can, in my view, decide this
case without an investigation into the power of the Assembly and the
Security Council, under the Charter, to üdopt the resoIutions establishing
and governing the Congo and Middle East Forces. If it can do so, itis
bound to do SO,both by the terms of the Resolution putting the question
and on general principles of constitutional adjudication which preçcribe
that issues of constitutional power should be passed upon only when that
is essential to the decision of the case.
The first way by which to avoid considering the validity of the under-
lping resolutions is simply to assume that thcy are valid. The Assembly
has the right todefine its question as it chooses, so long as the limitation
does not stultify the Court's processes. If it does not wish its actions
called in question, itmay ask the Court to consider the effect of the
assessing resolutions on theassumption that the underlping resolutions
are valid. The Court should accept that assumption, at least where it
does not do violence to cornmon sense or to the Court's own senseof the
requirements of adjudication. In this case, the assumption of validity
is far from beingabsurd or far-fetched or patently untenable. Quite the
reverse. It is the argument against vrilidity which is fine-spun, and relies
on subtle and attenuated argumentation, elaborating limitations, sup-
posedly implied or inherent, upon poivers expressly granted. In these
circumstances, the Court need not review the i2sçembly'sown considered
judgment that its actions were lawful, a judgment expressed initially
when the forces were constituted, a judgmcnt reiterated as questions of
their mission or financial support came before the Assembly, anda judg-
ment stated finally by the precision with which the Assembly formulated
its question to tlie Court.
Secondly, in n sense, the question of vaIidity is logically irrelevant
to the decision the Court must make. Suppose, for the sake of argument,
that this Court, or some other authoritative organ, were now to dcter-
mine that the resolutions establishing UFEF and ONUC were "un-
constitutional".The decision could not erase the fact that UNEF and
ONUC had existed. They existed by virtue of resolutions adopted without
dissenting votes. These resolutions are thcmselves interpretations of the
Charter holding that the actions taken are within the powcrs grai-ited
to the organ adopting the Resolution. Until they areauthoritatively setaside, persons or States dealing with the Organization in respect of mat-
ters covered by the Resolutions were entitled to regard them as valid and
effective, at.least in the absence of an important irregularity in the
procedure by which they were adopted or a substantive invalidity ço
patent as to amount to a manifest usurpation. If, acting pursuant to
such resolutions, the Secretary-General entered into obligations com-
mitting the United Nations to pay for goods or services furnished by
Rlember States or private personç, those obligations are binding in law
upoii the United Nations as an organization. It was legally obliged to
repay them. And this Court has said, as to expenditures arising out of
"obligations already incurred by the Organization" :
"the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these
engagements".
1 refer to the caseThe Egect of Awards of Coînpensation made by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal (I.C.J. Reports 1954,pp. 47, 59).
On this line of reasoning, 1 beIieve the Court may give an affirmative
answer to the question put to it by the General Assembly without
examining the substantive validity of the resolutions by which the Congo
and Middle East forces were created, at least inso far as those assess-
ments are required to cover existing contractual obligations of the
Organization to pay money for goods and services furnished. Since the
United Nations deficit is estimated ai $170 million as of 30 June 1962,
while the arrearages on assessments levied under the resolutions before
the Court are at most only $150 million, this analysis wouldlead to an
affirmative answer as to al1 past assessing resolutions.
As I understand them, the subrnissions of the Governments of the
Ketherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland upon this point do not
differ substantially from the arguments 1 have 'ust made.
Let me repeat. In the words of the Attorney- Cieneral of Ireland,
"the Court is not compelled to concern itself with the question of
validity and can answer the question on which, advice is sought
without inveçtigating this issue".
1 submit that it should do so.
But if the Court itself should conclude that it must examine the
validity of the underlying resolutions in order to arrive at an answer to
the question put by the Assembly, then, in my view, the Resolution
putting the question does not preclude such an inquiry. The written
statement of the Government of France seems to Say otherwise-I quote
from page 130 of the booklet of printed staternents:
"... the question put to the Court does not enable the latter to gike
aclear-cut opinion on the juridical basis for the financial obligations
ofMember States or on the United Xations constitutional problems
underlying them".
And the statement concludes, at pages 134-1351
"To sum up, the Government of the French RepubIic considers
that the circurnstances in which the Court has been consulted are
not such as to make it possible to obtain the legal opinion which is
considered necessary." STATEMENT OF h1r.CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62 417
This, in my submission, cannot be so. The Assembly wanted advice
on its question. It did not mean to put to the Court a question which
it could not answer, or to pIace conditions upon the Court which would
prevent it from answering. This was expressly stated in the debates
before the adoption of the Resolution. The representative of the United
States said in the Fifth Cornmittee consideration of the Resolution-and
1 quote now from the OficilaE Records, General Assembly, 16th Session,
Fifth Committee, 879th Meeting, pages 292-293:
"It wns the sponsors' intention that the Court should consider
the question exhaustively and in al1its aspects."
The representative of the United Kingdom added in PIenary Session
of the Assembly-again 1 quote from the 16th Session of the General
Assemblj-, Provisional Vevbatiw Record, 1086 Plenary Meeting, A/PV/
1086, at page 62:
"... the International Court, in considering the question which was
formulated in the draft resolution recornrnended by the Fifth
Committee, will undoubtedly be able to take into consideration
al1relative provisions of the Charter. Furthermore, it will of course
be open, under the Statute of the Court, toany Member State that
xvishesto do so to submit to the Court its views on the conformity
with the Charter of the decisions taken in regard ta the expenditures
referred toin the draft resolution.."
On this basis, the Assembly accepted the resolution as reported from
the Fifth Committee and rejected a French amendment that would have
broadened the statement of the question.
From this it follows that, if the Court should differ tvith the views,
advanced by the Governments of the United States, the United King-
dom, Australia, Ireland and others, that the issues can properly be
limited so as to avoid passing upon the validity of the underlying reso-
Iutions, then it is free to inquire into these broader questions.
Kow rnay 1 digress here for a moment to deal with another challenge
to the Court's cornpetence. The South African Government contends
that, and 1 quote from page 269 of the printed volume,
"the whole question submitted for an advisory opinion could only
be answered if the Court is fully informed as to the causa of the
espenditures authorized by the relative General AssembIy reso-
lutions".
Thc short answer to this is that the question put to the Court deals
only with "expenditures agthorized in the General Assembly reso-
lutions..". Those resolutions cannot be taken to have authorized ex-
penditures for activities outside the terrns of the basic resolutions
establishing and governing the Forces.
Since there may be circumstances in which the validity of the under-
lying resolutions might be considered by this Court, and since certain
Governments have argued the matter at length, let me address myself
to their principal contentions. t
These are two. According to the first, the United Nations is debarred
from organizing any international force, escept by the means provide$ in :
Article 43 of the Charter-that is, special agreements negotiated on 418 STATEMEKT OF Mr. CHA'I'ES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62
the initiative of ille Security Council" to be "concluded between the
Security Council and Members ... or groups of R.1ernbers".And the United
Nations may not deploy any international force except as provided in
Articles 44 through 48 of the Charter; that is, at the direction of the
Security Council and with the assistance of the Military Staff Comrnittee.
The second argument is that, even if the United Nations can raise
an international forcc apart from Article 43 by voluntary contribution
of troops and equipment, it must limit itself to voluntary financial
contributions to support such a force.
Let mc take up each of these arguments in turn.
Tlie staternent of the Government of the Czechoslovalr Socialist
Kepublic says :
"The pertinent provisions of the Charter, in particular Article43
and 48, provide the basis for assistance to be made available by
1 &lember:States in ail operations taken in the name of the Orgarii-
I zation...
Any other way of undertaking actions hy the Organization with
the use ofarmed iorces goes beyond the principles of international
CO-operationin the efforts for the preservation of peace and security,
enunciated by the United Nations Charter, and can in no way
establish Iegal obligations binding the Mernber States under Arti-
cle2, paragraphs 2 and 5,of the Charter." (That is at p. 178 of
the printed booklet.)
In the çtaternent of the Government of the Union of'soviet Socialist
Republics the same point is made:
"...Chapter VI1 of the Charter envisagea that it was the Security
Council alone and not the General Assembly that rnay set up inter-
national armed forces and take such action as rnight be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security, including
the use of such armed forces." (That is at p. 271 of the Soviet
çtatement.)
Thus, according to the Soviet Union, the Middle East Force,authorized
by the General Assembly, was unlawful ab initio.The United Nations
operations in the Congo, although authorized by the Sccurity Council,
are also invalid, it says, becausc the procedural provisions of Articles 43
) und 48 iuere not cornplied with.
The text of Article 43 dernonstrates that these assertions are unsound.
On its face, the Article merely establishes a procedurey which Members
are
"to make available to the Security Council,op8iitcal...armed forces,
assistance, andfacilitie...necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security".
With the implernentation of that procedure, the Security Council
.i would not have to depend on volunteers, but could have required that
military force be furnished toit.There is no suggestion in the text of the
Article that it provides the exclusive method for raising armed forces.
On the contrary, it addresses itself to a very special case, the use of
armed forces without the contemporaneous consent of the JIember
State furnishing them. STATEMENT OF Ili. CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62 4I9
This conclusion is reinforced by the context in which Article 43 is
placeci in the Charter. The subject-matter of Chapter VI1 is "Actio11
with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breachesof the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression". Article 39opens the Chapter by providing that the Secur-
ity Council shall determine the existence of suck eventand shall make
recommendations or takc decisions to deal with them. Article 40 de-
scribes provisional measures; Article41 provides for sanctions short of
the use of force. Qnly when lesser measures are considercd inadequate
may the Security Council take action by military force "as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".
IVhat action is contemplated? 1quote the Article:
"...demonstrationç, blockade, and other operations by air, çea,
or Iand forces.",
that is, the commitment of UN military forces to battle.
It was to provide forces that could be requisitioned for this purpos-,
plated. Because such forces were suhject to heing committed to actionm-
by mandatory decision of the Security Council,an advance agreement
ratified accordingto the constitutionalprocesses of the Mernber States
was required.
All this is underscored by the subsequent provisions of the Charter.
According to Article 44, when the Security Council "has decided to use
force" it must invite participation in its deliberationsby a Member I
before summoning its armed forces under an Article 43 agreement.
Article45 dealç with "urgent military measures"; Article46 with "plans
for the application of armed force"; Article 47 provides for a hlilitary
Staff Cornmittee, responsiblc for "strategic direction of any armed
forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council", under Article 43;
and, finally, Articl48provides that the Security Council shall designate
the nlember States to take "action" required to carry ouits"decisio~is".
Thus it is seen thatthe purpose of Cha ter VI1 is to providc for the7
most far-reaching of the responsibilitieho the United Nations ,
-that of taking decisions binding on the Mernbers to bring international
force to bear, through active militaryhostilities if need be, against the
will of the a6greg.o~-indeed, to break his will.
The occasions for the excrcise of such powers will be rare-they will
be moments of supreme çrisis. Given the magnitude of the .powers
envisioned, it was appropriate that they be surrounded with the elaborate
procedural safeguards of ChapterV11 :Security Council veto, the necessity
of prior special agreements ratified by Alember States, provisions for
qualified membership in the Security Council, and a requirement forthe
exhaustion of Iesser remedies. Ali these restrictions and safeguards are
unnecessary for the more usual range of peace-keeying activities author-
ized by ArticlesII and 24,even when the instrumentality employed rnay
be men of the arsd forces of hlember nations. 1
Activities outside the pi~rview of Chapter VI1 involvc no "action"
to cary out "decisions" binding on illember States. 1 use those terms
"action" and "decision" in the special sense they have in Chapter VII. ,'
The States concerned, when action is taken outside Chapter VII, would
have to consent to those activities in each particular case, either by
supl~lying forces oby adrnitting them to their territoryThis safeguard
of contemporaneous consent is adequate to the case.420 ÇTATE3IEST OF hm. CHXYES (U.S.A.)-SI V 62
The special and unique possibility provided in Chapter VI1 for taking
bitiding decisions for action, including military action, against an aggres-
sor was thought to be the salient advantage correcting the salient
weakness that had doomed the League of Nations to ineffectiveiiess.
Spcaking in plenary session at San Francisco, the Rapporteur of the
Cornmittee on Enforcement hleaçures, M. Paul-Boncour, made this
clear (and 1 quote at some length from his statement, which is to be
found in Vol. 1 of WNCIO, at p. 688. The emphasis in the quotation is
the Rapporteur's) :
"When everything possible has been done to maintain peace,
ifthe aggressor persists in his purpose, there is only one way to
oppose him, and that is by force.But the Covenant of the League
rnerely provided for the recommendation of rnilitary sanctions
involving air, sea, or land forces, and consequently left the nations
the option of backing out.
Today this flaw has been elirninated. In the Charter sanctipned
by this plenary assembly ...the obligatiotfor al1 Nember Statesto
help in suppressing aggression is plainly established. An inter-
national force is to be formed and placed at the disposa1 of the
Security Council in order to insure respect for its decisions. This
force will consist of national contingentsarranged for in advance
by special agreements negotiated on the initiative of the Security
Council. These special agreements will determine the composition
of this force, its strength, degree of preparedness, and location.If
called upon to do so by the Security Council, the entire force will
march against a State convicted of aggression, in accordance with
the provisions for enforcement as laid down by the Security
Council."
In the event, of course, it has not turned out that way. The Security
Council has never taken a binding decision to use force under Article 42
and has never negotiated an agreement under Article 43. But the Charter
meant to add loand reinforcethe peace-keeping powers of the League,
not to subtract from thern. There was no desire to withdraw the power of
recommendation of military sanctions involving land, sea or air forces.
There was no puryose to shackle these other peace-keeping enterprises
with limitations and restrictions designed solely for the terrible even-
tuality of a war against aggression. It was San Francisco's intention to
eliminate the "option of backing out" that M. Paul-Eoncour described
in the League Covenant, not the option of corning in.
Now, 1 shouId like to recall to the Court that voluntary peace-keeping
operations not unlike those here under consideration were undertaken
by the League of Nations from its earliest days.
In 1920, a dispute involving considerable fighting broke out bctween
Poland and Lithuania over possession of the city of Vilna. The League
Councilproposed, and Lithuania and Poland agreed, that the inhabitants
of Vilna and its province shouId themselves decide whether to belong to
Poland or to Lithuania. The vote was to be organized by the League.
Polish troops, rvhich had occupied Vilna, ivere to be replaced b~7an
international force acting under the orders of the League Council. A
number of Rlembers of theLeague were invited to contribute a cornpany
each to the proposed international force, and nine countries agreed. The
international force, consistingof some 1,500 men, did not actually enter upon the disputed territory, but preparations for its organization and
dispatch aerc far advanced and considerable expenses were incurred on
the strength of the Council's resolutions. 1 should Say that the reason
the force did not enter upon the disputed territory was the objection of
a neighboring nation-a factor not present in the Middle East and Congo
operations. How were the expenses incurred in the preparation of the
force borne? The budget submitted to the League Assembly indicateç
that the expenses of the force, in the amount of 422,260 gold francs, were
borne not by the States contributing the troops, but by the League.
(Chapter 3 of the Budget for 1924, League of Nations Document A.4 (2). .
1923.X, at 11.6;Item: "Reimbursement of expenses incurred by Den- ,
mark, Norway and Sweden in 1920 for the establishment of an inter-
national force for the conducting of the proposed plebiscite in Vilna".)
The history of the League of Nations also provides an example of a
voluntary international force that was not only proposed and incurred
expenses, but actually discharged its duties in full. You will recall that
in 1935 a plebiscite was held to determine whether or not the Saar should
rejoin Germany. The League CounciI decided that an international force
was needed to ensure order during the plebiscite period. Accordingly,
at the end of1934, an International Forcc of 3,300 men was established.
Its entry into the Saar was with the agreement of the Governments of
Germany and France. Contingents were voluntarily contributed by
Rritain, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. Thesc facts appear from
the Resolutioii of the League Council of 8 December 1934. (O@cial
Journal, 1934, p. 1730.) Like the Council Resolution establishing the
ViIna force, this Resolution made no reference to the sole article of the
Covenant, Article 16, that provided for recommendations on the use of
armed force. The Resolutions in both cases were of course approved
unanimously by the Council Members. The expenses of the Saar force,
over and above the normal costs of the troops already provided for in the
national budgets of the Governments contributing them, were not met
by those Governrnents, but were charged to the fund for expenditure in
connection with the pIebiscite. (Ibid., pp. 1762-1763, 1841-1842.) The
international force for the Saar performed its duties with conspicuous
success.
The possibility of voluntary contribution of military force was not
only sanctioned by the practice of the League, it was recognized in
discuçsions of the United Nations alrnost from the beginning. You will
recall the construction of the. Charter put forward by the Secretary-
General in the Trieste case in 1947, already read to the Court by M.
Cadieux. (Security Council, Oficial Records, 2nd year, g~st Meeting,
pp. 44-45.) There the Secretary-Ceneral maintained that, in the light
of its broad responsibilitieç under Article 24, the Security Council was,
not restricted to powers specifically enumerated in tlie Charter. The
Council, acting on this construction, accepted the Trieste instruments
lhere in question by a vote of 10-0 with one abstention, on the under-
standing, as expressed by the Secretary-General, that the powers
enumerated in the Charter
"do not vest the Council with sufficient authority to undertake the
responsibilities irnposed by the instrume'nts in question".
Thus the Council must have acted on the view of its implied powers
set forth by the Secretary-General. 42- ÇTXTEhIENT OF hlr. CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62
A year later, when the Palestine partition plan was under discussion,
the Secretary-General explicitly applied this view of the Security Coun-
cil's powers to the question of raising armed forcesI refer to a working
paper prepared by the Secretariat for the United Nations Palestine
Commission covering, among other things, the question of providing an
international force to implement the partition plan. In it, the Secretary-
General addressed this issue :
"Under what conditions the Security Council may empIoy an
international armed force."
The paper recognizes that :
"The Security Council might employ an international force in the
Palestine case ... in virtue of Arti42eof the Charter..."
To do so, it çays, the Council should find as a precondition "the
existence in Palestine ofa threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or
an act of aggression". But it couldalsoraise an international forcespart
from Chapter VII, The General Assembly "had requested the Security
Council, inter alia, to take necessary measures as provided for in the plan
for its implementation". And this aspect of the Assembly's resolution,
taken in conjunction with Article 24 of the Cliarter, would authorize the
i
, referred expressly to the interpretationtain the Trieste case, that this
course would be followed by the Security Council only "after previously
having reaclied the conclusion that riothreat to the peace, breach of the
peacc oract of aggressionhad occurred"-that is to say, when the neces-
sary precondition for action under Chaptcr VI1 was absent.
"An international armed force set up on this basis", said the
Secretary-General, "would not be one in the sense of Chayter VI1
of the Charter. It would have the cliaracter of an international
police force for the maintenance of Iaw and order in a territory for .
wliich the internationalsociety is still responsible." (The document
is A.AC. 21/13, 9 February 1948, pp.8-11.)
Again, in 1948, after the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the
Secretary-General proposed the establishment of a United Nations Guard.
The Guard was to be directly recruited and equipped by the Secretarp-
General, was to serve under his instructions, and was to be financed out
of the regular United Nations budget. Although the United Kations
Guard itself did not materialize, the United Nations Field Service, so
recruited, so directed, and so financed, was derived from this conception.
It is in action today with UNEF and ONWC, as well as on other UN
'missions.
Finally,the Uniting for Peace Resolution, adopted in 1950 by a vote
of 52-5, with 2 abstentions, foresaw the establishment of international
forces on a voluntary basis and outside the scope of Article 43.Indeed
agreement on a procedure for establishing such forces was one of the
prime purposes motivating that resolution.
ln al1 this, 1 have the feeling1 have been belabouring the obvious.
For certainly a sovereign State may volunteer its armed forces for any
purpose whatever, so long as it does not trench upon the right of any
other sovereign and so long as it obtains the consent of those through or STATEMENT OF MK, CKAYES (U.S.A.)-BI v 62 423
upon whose territory the forces operate. A State, or group of States,
would be free, if the necessary consents were obtained, to use its forces
to maintain the peace, as the Middle East and Congo forces are now
being used. The United Nations Charter does not limit that right. And
surely what States might band together to do outside the United Nations,
it is not forbidden that they do through the mechanism of that Organi-
zation whose primary purpose is the maintenance of international peace
and security. 1
1 shall not devote much time to the question whether, once we are
satisfied that the procedures of Article43 are not themselves exclusive,
the Security Council nevertheless has the sole right to maintain armed
forces forpeace-keeping operations to the exclusion of the GeneraI As-
sembly. The Charter provisions are plain. The Security Council's re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of peace and security is "primary", not
exclusive. The General Assembly, under Articles IO and II, has full
authority to make recommendations on questions relating to the main-
tenance of international peace and security. There are only two ex-
ceptions.It may not consider such questions while the Security Council
is itself so engaged and it must refer to the Council those questions on
which "action" is required-that iç to Say, action pursuant to decisions
binding the hlembers, which the Security Council alone can take. Neither
of these exceptions applies to recommendations for the contribution of
forces and for their use with the consent of the States concerned, where,
as with UNEF, the Security Council is not seized of the matter at the
time the resolution is adopted.
For the establishment of an armed force at the cal1 of the Security i
Council, in accordance with itsbinding decisions, Article 43 provides
the only procedure, true. But the Court wiIl search the Charter in vain
to find any prohibition against voluntary use of armed force upon the
recommendation of either the Council or the Assembly, and with the
consent or at the request of nations whose security is threatened. And
the Court will be slow to rule that, in adding to the arsenal of powers
available to the United Nations the supreme power to order mandatory
application of rnilitary force, the frarners of the Charter withdrew or
restricted weI1-known powers of a lesser character based on the consent
of alI interested parties.
This leads us to the second argument against the validity of the
underlying resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council
estabtishing the forces in question-an argument, on the surface, less
sweeping than the one we have just considered. The argument grants
that the United Nations could, either through the Security Council or
the General Assembly, recornmend that Member States contribute
forces for the use of the Organization. But how, it asks, can the Organ-
ization compel a Mcmber to pay for the expenses of forces that it
could not compel that Member to contribute? Voluntary forces, it
concludes, must be financed by voluntary contributions.
This is basically the argument put forth in the letter to the Court
from the Government of the French Republic. Quoting its representative
in the General Assembly debate on the Advisory Opinion Resolution,
the letter says:
"Firstly, the General Assembly has not the right, merely by vot-
ing on a budget, to extend the competence of the United Nations; ...
36 .44 STATEhlESr OF NT. CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62
Secondly, in the case of any United Nations organ, the power
to make recommendations to Member States is not sufficient to
impose upon theni any form of obligation.
Thirdly, the legal power to make recommendations to Mernber
States does not include permission to create, by the circuitous
method of a direction addressed to the Secretary General ...any
obligations for the States." (P. 75.)
Rut the argument proves too much. Carried to its logical conclusion,
it would mean that the Organization could not compeI its Alembers
to pay for anything, except expenditures flowlng from binding decisions
of the Security Council. With the exception of such decisions, al1actions
of the Orgaiiization are either recommendations to the hlernber States
or directions to the Secretary-General or other subsidiary organs; and,
in the French view, these cannot give rise to binding firiancial obli-
gations. The French submission recognizes that such a conclusion is
untenable. Thus, it isled to assert the distinction bctween administrative
and operational expenses which, as appears elscwhere, is unwarranted
in thc language or history of the Charter and would be unworkable in
practice.
More fundamentally, in my view, the French argument puts the case
the wrong way. The United Nations can pay for what it is empowered
to do. If it can accept volunteers, it can defray the financial obligations
generated by the activities of those volunteers.
In the case before the Court, the fact that the United Nations could
not compel Mcrnbers to contribute contingents to an international force
is bcside the point. It was irot obliged to appeal to States for such con-
tingents. This was a convcnient way to proceed, but not the only way.
The Assembly might have chosen to raise the force by direct recruitment.
To do so, it might have needed the consent of individual States to
pursue recniiting activitics on their soil, orwith respect to their nationals;
and it would have needed the consent of the States on whose soi1the
recruits were to be housed, trained or used. But if those conscntç were
obtained, it is hard to see what would prohibit the Organization from
raising such a force and, if it did so, from paying for it by assessment.
Indeed, just this process was contemplated for the establishment of the
proposed United Nations Giiard to which I have referred.
Member States do not find their protection against such action-if
protection is needed-in legal strictures of the Charter, but in the
politica1,requirement of a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly
both to initiate the action and to make the necessary financial arrange-
ments. If these majorities can be mustered; if the activities engaged in
are imrnediateIy related to the express purposes of the United Kations;
if they are approved in due course according to the regular procedures
of one of its organs having cornpetence over the subjcct-matter; if they
do not contravene any prohibition of the Charter nor invade the sover-
eign powcrs of individual States-if conditions such as these are satis-
fied,1 can perceive no reason why the United Nations should be pro-
hibited from levying assessments to pay for goods and services needed
for those activities. The goods and services may be furnished by States
Mernbers. Often they will be furnishedby private agencieç or individuals.
In neither case could the United Nations require that they be made
available. But 1 do not see why, in either case, this should militate STATEZIENT OF MF. CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 V 62 425
against the Organization's power to raise money by assessrnent to pay
for them.
Thus, in my view, the French argument falls to the ground.It may
have a certain plausibility to say that, if the Organization cannot compel
a State to contribute forces, it cannot compel it to pay for forces contri-
buted by others. But it would be equally plausible and equally erroneous
to Say that, since a national government cannot compel one of its citizens
to work on a dam, it cannot tax hirn to pay for the work of others.
If any inquiry at al1is to be permitted into the validity of the under-
lying resolutions establishingUNEF and ONUC, it must be directed
to the substantive question: what can the United Nations do? What it
can do, it can finance undcr the provisions of Article17.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, the framers of the Charter and
the people of the nations adopting it reçolved together "to savc suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war". They named the first
object of their efforts: to maintain international peace and security.
This Court in deciding this case will also decide, in large measure, whether
they succeeded.
hlr. Justice Oliver Wendel1 Holmes said in a great case on tlie treaty
power under the United States Constitution:
"...when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent
act, like the Constitutionf the United States, we must realize that
they have called into lifea being the development of which could
iiot have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its beget-
ters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had
created an org,znism... Tlie case before us must be considered in
the light of Our whole experience and not merely in tïiat of what
was said a hundred years ago ..."(Missouri v. Nollnnd, 252 U.S.
430, 433 (19201.)
The question before the Court must be addressed in the light of the
whole experience of the United Nations Organization. What is that
experience!
The innovation of the Charter, the power of the Organization acting
through the Security Council to compel ttie contribution of military
forces for military action against aggressors, this innovation was sti1l-
born. If it had been tlie only method available to the Organization for
using armed forces to meet threats to the peace, it may be said with
some confidence that the worst of such threats would have remained
unmet, and the Organization might now be in the same state as was the
League of Nations fifteen years after its establishment.
Instead, however,a power that was available to the League, the power
to take voluntary collc:ctive measures using troops of Rlember States
as instruments in appropriate cases, that power took on a new vitality
in dealing with the kind of threats to the peace we have had in the
post-war world. By discriminating but imaginative use of this power,
through 15 years and under three Secretaries-General, the Organization
has been able to carry out itç first purpose, to kecp the peInePalestine
and Kashmir, on the Gaza strip, in Lebanon, and now in the Congo,
armed contingents, contributed voluntarily by their own Governments
and acting with the consent of al1 States concerned, have operated
successfully under the flagand the command of the United Xations to 426 STATEhlEKT OF RIT.CHAYES (U.S.A.)-21 P 62
safeguard international peace and security. In KoaeUnited Nations
force of national contingents, furniswithout the compulsion of a
Security Council decision, fought successfuI1yto restore the siasation
it existed before hostilities began.
method by which experience has shown the United Nations can effectively
surnmon military forces to deal with threats of aggression and breaches
of the peace. The Soviet argument would reject this method out of hand.
. It would confine the Organization exclusively to the Chapter VI1 pro-
cedures which experience so far has çhown to be sterile and useless.
The French submission would accomplish the same result, not by pro-
hibiting entirely the establishment and operationf United Nations
forces outside the purview of ChaptVII, but by cutting off the pos-
s1çaid a moment ago that what the United Nations can do, it can pay
for. The converse is alsorue-what it cannot pay forit cannot do.
The French position, equally with the Soviet, would bring to an end the
r use of United Nations forces for peace-keeping missions.
Mr. President,embers of the Court, if 1 may be permitted to refer
again to the cour1know best, the Supreme Court ofrny own country,
itis, like this one, a custodian of a great granting and allocating
poOne of the early historic cases to come before that Court was
AfcCzdloch v. Maryland. That case tocsconcerned the fiscalpower granted
by the Constitutionto the entitywhich it had created. The question
Waswhether the Federal Government had power to incorporate a central
bank-to establish a subsidiary organ-when neither the power to in-
corporate nor the power to engage in banking were expressly granted
in the words of the Constitut~on.
in that case. He said:all, the first great Chief Justicthedecision
"A constitution, to contain an accuratc detail of al1 the sub-
divisions of which its great powers will admit, and al1of the means
by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of a
prolixity oa legal code, and could scarcelbe embraced by the
human mind. Itwould, probably, never by understood by the public,
its nature, therefore, requithat only its great outlines should
gredients which composethose objects be deduced from the nature
of the objects thernselv.sIn considering this question, then, we
must never forget, that it is constitutiowe are expounding."
(3 Wheafon406 (1819).)
This injunction-we must never forget it is a Constitution weare
expounding-is classic in American jurisprudenclt is, indeed, as the
of law recognized by civilized nations. The principle found expressione
in the jurisprudence of this Court when it said:
"Under international law, thOrganization must be deemed to
have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the
Charter, are conferred .upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties."(Reparalionfor Inj~ries
suflered in the Servic oj the United iVations,1.C.J. Reports 1949,
pp. 174, 182.)
The' Court needs no reminder that it is dealing with a constitutive
instrument, regulating, within its scope, important relations among men
and nations, meant to endure for many years, deslgned to promote
great ends and intended to grant powers adequate to serve the purposes
for which it was established. The constitution we are expounding here
rnust contain within it the aiithority to mount and support the actions
by which, in the years since its adoption, the United Nations has suc-
cessfully defended a precarious peace.
It remains only tothank you, Mr. President and Members of the Court,
for rnyself and,if 1 may, on behalf of my colleagues, for the patience
and courtesy with which you have heard us.
Procès-verbaux des audiences publiques tenues au Palais de la Paix, La Haye, du 14 au 21 mai et le 20 juillet 1962, sous la présidence de M. Winiarski, président