Procès-verbaux des séances publiques tenues au Palais de la Paix, La Haye, du 10 au 14 juin et le 13 juillet 1954, sous la présidence de sir Arnold McNair, président

PART II

ORAL STATEMENTS
PUBLIC SITTINGS

keld al the Peace Palace, The Hague,
from June 10th to 14tJzrlrj'tli, 19.54,
the Presidint, Sir Arnold McNair, presidinf

DEUXIÈME PARTIE

EXPOSÉS ORAUX

SCANCES PUBLIQUES
teltues au Palais de la Paix, La Haye,
daIO au 14 juin et13ejuillet 1954,
sous la présidence desir Arnoldr, Président MINUTES OF THE SITTINGS HELD FROM

JUNE 10th TO 14th, AND JULY 13th, 19j4

YEAR 1954

SIXTH PUBLIC SITTING (10 VI 54, 10.30 am.)

Present :President Sir ARNOLD MCXAIR;Vice-PresidentGUERRERO;
Judges ALVAREZ H,.~CK\VORTH,'\VINIARSK I,LAESTAD B,ADA~I,READ,
HSU Mo, LEVI CARNEIROA , RMAND-UGON K,O]EV~.IKOVR ; egistrw
LOFEZOLIVAN.

Also present: . .
For the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations :

Legal Department ST;~ROPOULO PSri,ncipal Director in charge of the

For the United States of America :
The Honorable Herman PHLEGERL , egal Adviser of the Department
of State ;

For the French Rebublic :
Professor Paul REUTER,Assistant Legal Adviser to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs ;

For Greece :
Professor Jean SPIROPOULOIS .,gal Adviser to the Royal Ministry
for Foreign Affairs;

For th; United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland:
The Right Honourable Sir Reginald ~ZANNINGHAM-BULL QER,..
M.P., Solicitor-General,
assisted by:

MI. F. A. VALLATD , epnty Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office;
For the Netherlands :

Professor A. J. P. TAMMESo ,f the University of Amsterdam ;
assisted by:
Dr. W. RIPHAGEN L,egal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

as Counsel;

llr. J.J.FEKKES,of the Department of International Organizations
of the Afinistry for Foreign Affair; PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES SÉANCES TENUES
DU IO AU 14 JUIN ET LE 13 JUILLET ryj4

Présents: Sir ARNOLDMCNAIR,Président ; AI. GUERRERO.Vice-
Président; MM.ALVAREZ H,ACKWORT\H V,INIARSKIK ,LAESTAD B,AVAWI,
READ,HSU MO, LEVICARXEIRO ,RMAND-UGON K,OJEVIIIKOV l,ges ;
LoPÉZ OLIVAN,Gre@er.

Présentségalement :

Ponr le Secrétairegénéral desNations Unies :
M. Constantin ÇTAVROPOUL~D ~i,recteur principal chargé du Départe-
ment juridique ;

Pour le~ ~ ~ts-Unis d~mérioue :
L'honorable Herman PHLEGERC , onseiller juridique du Département
d'État ;

Pour la République/ra?tçaise :
M. le professeur Paul REUTER.jurisconsulte adjoint du ministère
des Affaires étrangères;

Pour la Grèce :
hf: le professeur Jean SPIROPOULOS co,nseiller juridique du ministère
royal des Affaires étrangèresde Grèce ;
Pour le Royaume- Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord :

Le trh honorable sir Reginald ~~ANXINCH.~~-B~LLE R., C.,
M. P., Solicitor-General,
assistd de:
A!. F. A. VALLATc ,onseiller juridique ajoint du Foreign Office;

Pour les Pays-Bas :
Al. le professeur A. J. P. TAMMESd ,e l'université d'Amsterdam ;

assistéde :
M. le Dr W. RIPHAGEXj,urisconsulte du ministère des Affaires étran-
gères,
comme conseil ;
31. J. J. FEKKES,de la direction des Organisations internationales
au ministère des Affaires étrangères;281 SITTIA'G OF ]USE 10th, 1954
and

Dr. C. \frVAA SASTES,Assistant Legal Adviser to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs,
as Expert Advisers.

The PRESIDENT opened the hearing and said that the Court had met
to hear the oral statements in the case concerning the Effect of Awards
of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.

Jii~lçcR:<stlcv;tnt.in ~~urjuaiiceof Article rq of the .Statiitc. cuiisidercd
tli;it hc should iiot t:ike partliijAdvisi~ryOpiiiion. :1iidthe l'resident
hnd esi)ressed to him his concurrence in tliat vie\%.:.\ccord-.alv- ludce
~asde;ant would not sit.
Judge ZoriCiC,on medical advice, had been obliged to leave The Hague
and return to his country.
By a Resolution dated Deceniber 9th. 1953, the General Assembly
of the United Nations decided to request the International Court of
Justice to give an Advisory Opinion on the Effect of Awards of Com-
pensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.
The President called upon the Registrar to read the Resolution in
question.

The REGISTRAR read the relevant text.

The PRESIDENT stated that this request for an Advisory Opinion
had been notified in the customarv manner. In r>ursuanceof Article 66.
paragraph z, of the Statute, the requeçt had'been communicated to
the Members of the United Nations and to the International Labour
Organisation.
By an Order dated January 14th. 1954. the time-limit for the deposit
ofThe Court had received a written Statement from the Secretary-
General of the United Xations, as well as the documents transmitted
by him as likely to throw light upon the question.
The Court had also received written Statements from the Inter-
national Labour Organisation arid from the following Govemments in
order of date :France, Sweden, Xetherlands, Greece, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Xorthern Ireland, United States of America,
Philippines, Bfexico, Chile, Iraq,. China, Guatemala, Turkey, Ecuador.

The followine Governnicnts had informed the Court that thev
maintained thekiews espressed by their representatives in the debatés
of théGeneral Assemblv: Canadi, Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics,
i'ugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as the following
Govemments, had notified their intention of being represented at the
hearings : United States of Ainerica, France, Xetherlands, Greece,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Xorthern Ireland. M. le Dr C. W. VAN SANTENj,urisconsulte adjoint au ministère des
Affaires étran.ères,
comme conseillers exeerts.

Le PRÉSIDENT a ouvert l'audience en rappelant que la Cour se réunit
pour entendre les exposés oraux qui seront présentés dans l'affaire
relative à l'effet de jugements du tribunal administratif des Nations
Unies accordant indemnité.
M. le juge Basdevant, & conformant à l'article 24 du Statut, estime
ne pas devoir participer A cet avis consultatif, et le Président lui fait
connaître qu'il'partageait son avis. II ne siégeradonc pas.
AI.le juge ZoriCiCa étéobligé,sur l'avis de son médecin,de quitter
La Haye et de retourner dans son pays.
Par une résolution en datedu 9 décembre1953. l'&semblée générale
des Nations Unies a décidéde demander à la Cour internationale de
Justice un avis consultatif sur l'effet de jugements du tribunal adminis-
tratif des Nations Unies accordant indemnité.
Le Président prie le Greffier de donner lecture de cette résolution.

Le GREFFIERdonne lecture de la résolution.

Le PRÉSIDENTdéclare que la requéte pour avis consultatif a fait
l'objet des notifications d'usage. Conformément à l'article 66, para-
graphe z,du Statut, elle a étécommuniquée aux Membres des Nations
Unies et A l'organisation internationale du Travail.

Par ordonnance en date du 14janvier 1954. le délai pour le dép0t
des exposésécritsa étéfixéau 15 mars 1934.
La Cour a reçu du Secrétaire généraldes Kations Unies un exposé
écrit, ainsi que la documentation qu'il lui a transmise en vue de lui
faciliter l'étude de la question.
La Cour a reçu, en outre, des observations écrites émanant de l'Orga-
nisation internationale du Travail et des Gouvernements des pays
mentionnés ci-après, par ordre de date : la France, la Suede, les Pays-
Bas, la Grèce, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du
Nord, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique,les Philippines, le Mexique, le Chili,
l'Irak, la Chine, le Guatemala, la Turquie, 1'Equateur.

Les Gouvernements des Davs.d.simésci-aurés ont fait savoir à la
Cour q11'11ss'rii ren;iic.ritaux opiiiionj cxprimi;î p:ir lciirs rçpr~seiit;iiit~
:IIIcours <lei dClatî dc I':\ssemlil<'cgCn;,r:tle, cc sont le Cnnadii,
I'Cnion tlrs Kci~ublii~ucssoci;ili~tci sovi?ti~iuc~, la \'oiicosln\.ie. la

Ont donnénotification à la Cour de leur intention de se fairereprésenter
aux audiences, le Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies, ainsi que les
Gouvernements des pays désignésci-après : les Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
la France, les Pays-Bas, la Grèce,le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne
et d'Irlande du Nord.282 SITïIXG OF JUXE 10th, 1954

The Secretary-General of the United Xations would be represented
atMr. Constantinby:A. Stavropoulos, Principal Director in charge of the
Legal Department.
The repreientatives of the Govemments at these proceedings before
the Court would be as follows :

For the United States O/ America :
The Honorable Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser of the Department
of State ;

For France :
Professor Paul Reuter, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs ;

For the Netherlands :
Professor A. J. P. Tammes, of the University of Amsterdam ;

assisted by:
Dr. W. Riphagen, Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Mr. J. J. Fekkes, of the Department of International Organizations
of the Ministry, and
Dr. C. W. van Santen, Assistant Leeal Adviser to the Winistrv.

as Exfiert Advisers;
For Greece :
Professor Jean Spiropoulos, Legal Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign
.4ffairs; t

Fw the United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland :
The Ri ht Honourable Sir Reginald hlanningham-Buller, Q.C., NP.,
Solicitor-8eneral,
assisted by:
Mr. F. A. Vallat, Deputy Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office.

The President noted the presence in Court of the representatives of
the Secretary-General and of the States mentioned.
He woiild first cal1on Mr. Stavropoulos, representative of the Secre-
tary-General, after wh'ichhe would cal1on the other representatives in
the foilowing order: The Honorable Herman Phleger, Professor Paul
Reuter, Professor Spiropoulos, The Rt. Hon. Sir Reginald Manningham-
Buller, Professor Tammes.

Before calling u on hIr Stavropoulos. the President said that he
would be obliged i! Mr. ~tavropoulos would convey to the Secretaxy-
General the appreciation of the Court for the valuable and informative
wvritten Statement which he had transmitted to the Court for the
purpose of this Opinion.
The President called upon the representative of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. SÉANCE DU 10 JUIN 1954 282

. Le Secrétaireeénéraldes Nations Unies est revrésenté à la vrocédure
orale par :
31. Constantin A. Stavropoulos, directeur principal chargé du Départe-
ment juridique.
Les Gouvernements intéressés sont représentésdevant la Cour à la
procédure orale de la manière suivante :

Les États-Unis d'Amériquepar :
~hoiiorable Herman Phleger, conseiller juridique du Département
d'Etat ;

La France par :
Le professeur Paul Reuter, jurisconsulte adjoint au ministère des
Affaires étraiigères ;

Les Pays-Bas par;
Le professeur A. J. P. Tammes, de l'université d'Amsterdam ;
assistéde :

bl. le Dr W. Riphagen, jurisconsulte du ministère des Affaires étran-
gères,
comme cortseil ;
If. J. J. Fekkes, de la direction des Organisations intemationales au
ministère, et
>f. le Dr C. \\'.van Santen, jurisconsulte adjoint au ministère,

comme conseillersexperts ;
La Grècepar :

Le professeur Jean Spiropoulos, conseiller juridique du ministère des
Affaires étrangères ;
Le Koyaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagneet d'Irlande du Nord par:

Le tres honorable sir Reginald hlanningham-Buller, Q. C., hl. P.,
Solicitor-Genernl,
assistéde :
AI. F. A. Vrillat, conseiller juridique adjoint du Foreign Office.

Le Président constate la présencedevant la Cour des représentants
du Secrétaire généralet des États ci-dessus mentionnés.
Il donne en premier lieu la parole à M. Stavropoulos, représentant du
Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies, après quoi il invitera les autres
représentants à prendre la parole dans l'ordre suivant: 31. Phleger,
AI. le professeur Reuter, 31. le professeur Spiropoulos, sir Reginald
hlanningharn-Buller, M. le professeur Tammes.
Avant de donner la parole à X. Stavropoulos, le Président lui demande
d'exprimer au Secrétaire général combienla Cour apprécie l'exposé
très documenté qu'il a bien voulu lui adresser sur cette question.

Le Président donne la parole au représentant du Secrétaire général
de l'organisation des Nations Unies. SÉANCES DES II ET 12 JUIS 1954 283

M. STAVROPOULc OoSmmence la plaidoirie reproduite à l'annexe '
(L'audience est suspendue de 12 h. 45 à 16 h.)

M. S~.4v~O~ouLostermine la plaidoirie reproduite à l'annexe '

Le PRESIDENTdonne la parole au représentant des États-Unis
d'Amérique.

L'honorable Herman PHLEGERcommence la plaidoirie reproduite
à l'annexe 3.
(L'audience est levée à 18 h. 30.)

Le Président,
(Signé)ARNOLD D. AICNAIR.

Le Greffier,
(Signé)J. LOPEZOLIVAN.

SEPTIÈME SÉANCE PUBLIQUE (II VI 54, IO h. 30)

Présents : [Voir séance du IO juin.]

Le PRESIDENT donne la parole au représentant des États-Unis d'Amé-
rique.

L'honorable Herman PHLECERcontinue l'exposéreproduit en annexe *.

(L'audience est suspendue de 12 h. 45 à 16 h.)

L'honorable Herman PHLEGER termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe

Le PRESIDENT donne la parole au représentant du Gouvernement de
la République française.

M.Paul REUTERcommence et termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe

(L'audience est levée à 18 h. 10.)
[Signatures.]

HUITIÈME SÉANCE PUBLIQUE (12 VI 54, IO h. 30)

Présents: [Voir séance du 10 juin.]

Le PRESIDENTdonne la parole au représentant du Gouvernement
hellénique.

1 Voir pp. 287-300.
r r 300-307.
3 " 308.317.
a a 317-332.
i> n 333-335.
Y u 336-344. Professor Jean SPIROPOULO mSade the statement reproduced in the
annex '.
The PRESIDENT called upon the representative of the Govemment
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland.
Sir Reginald A~ANNINCHAJ~-B~~L bLgan the statement reproduced
in the annex 1.

The Court rose at 12.45 p.m.
[Signatures.]

NIXTH PUBLIC SITTING (14 VI 54, 10.30 a. m.)
Present :[SeeSitting of June ~oth, with the exception of Xr. Phleger,
hl. Reuter and hl.Spiropoulos.]

The PRESIDENTcalled upon the representative of the Govemment
af the United Ihgdorn of Great Britain and Northem Ireland.
Sir Reginald MANNIXCHA~I-B~JLL coEncluded the statement repro-
duced in the annexa.

The PRESIDENT called upon the represcntative of the Government
of the Netherlands.
Professor A. J. P. TAMMESbegan the statement reproduced in the
annex
(The Court adjourned from 12.45 to 4 p.m.)

Professor T,IM~IESconcluded tlie statement reproduced in the annex
The PRESIDEYTstated that the Secretary-General of the United
Kations and the Governments i-epresented at the oral proceedings in
the case ~vouldbe advised in due course of the date on which the Court
would deliver its advisory opinion.
The Court rose at 5 p.m.
[Signatures.] SIïTIh'G OF JUKE 14th. 1954 zS4
N. Jean SPIROPOULOp Srononce l'exposéreproduit en annexe '.

Le PRÉSIDESTdonne la parole au représentant du Gouvernement
du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Xord.

Sir Reginald A~ASNIXGHAM-BULc LERmence l'exposéreproduit en
annexe '.
L'audience est levée à 12 h. 45.
[Sigizatures.]

XEUVIÈME SCANCE PUBLIQUE (14 VI 54, IO h. 30)

Présents: [Voir séance di1 IO juin, à l'exception deMM. Phleger,
Reuter et Spiropoulos.]
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole au représentant d" Gouvernement
du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Kord.

Sir Reginald MANNIPICHAM-BULL tEmine l'exposé reproduit en
annexe =.
Le PRÉSIDESTdonne la parole au représentant du Gouvernement des
Pays-Bas.
Le Professeur A. J. P. TAMDIE Sommence l'exposé reproduit en
annexe '.
(L'audience est suspendue de 12 heures 45 à 16 heures.)

Le Professeur A. J. P. TA~IEStermine l'exposéreproduit en annexe
Le PRÉSIDENT annonce que le Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies
et les Gouvernements représentés à la procédure orale dans l'affaire
seront avertis, le moment venu, de la date à laquelle la Cour rendra
son arrêt.
L'audience est levéeà 17 heures.
[Signatures.]

' V. . pp355-359.7.
* 359-37'.
372-373.
18 1, 373-384. 2sj SIïTISG OF JULY 13th. 1954

. ELEVENTH PUBLIC SITTING (13 vit 54, 4 p. m.)

Present : President Sir ARSOLI)&ICXAII IVice-President GUERRERO ;
JzrdgesALVAREZ H,ACKWORTH W,'ISIARSKI ,LAESTAD B,ADAWIR , EID,
Hsu Mo, LEVI CARXEIRO,ARMAND-UGOYK ,OJEVXIKOVD ; eputy-
Registrar GARNIER-COIGSET.

Also presetz:

For the LitzitedStates of America :
&Ir.J. H. SHULLAWF,irst Secretary of the Embassy of the United
States of America in the Netherlands ;
For the Frenclt Reprrblic:

Count Charles DE BARTILLAT ,ounsellor of the Embassy of France
in the Netherlands ;
For Greece :

>I. E. VERGHISC , hargéd'affaires of Greece a.;. in the Netherland;.
For the United Kingdom of Grent Britnin and Northern Ireland :
Mr. A. C. STEWARTC ,hargéd'affaires of the United Kingdom a.;. in

the Netherlands ;
For the Netherlnizds :
AIr.A. J.P. TAMMES P,rofessor of InternationalLaw at the University
of Amsterdam ;

AIr.J. J. FEKKES,of the Department of International Organizations
of the hlinistry for Foreign Affairs;
\ Dr. C. Ur. VAS SASTES,Assistant Legal Adviser to the AIinistry for.
Foreign Affairs.

The PRESIDENT opened the Sitting and said that the Court had met
to deliver the Advisory Opinion requested by the General Assembly
of the United Nations in thematter of the Effect of Awards of Compen-.
sation made by the United Xations Administrative Tribunal.

He called upon the Deputy-Registrar to read the Resolution of the.
General Assembly of December gth, 1953. requesting the Opinion.
The DEPUTY-REGISTRA read the relevant text.

The PHESIDEST said that in pursuance of Article 67 of the Statute,
notice had been given to the Secretary-General of the United Xations.
imrnediately concerned that the Advisory Opinion would be deliveredns
to-day in open Court. In accordance with Article 39 of the Statute,
the Court had decided that the English text of the Opinion should be
considered as authoritative. The President read the relevant text.
The President called upon the Deputy-Registrar to read the French.
text of the operative clause.

The DEPUTY-REGISTRArR ead the relevant text. SÉAXCE DU 13 JUILLET 1954 285

ONZIÈME ~ÉANCE PUBLIQUE (13 VII54, 16 h.)

Présents :Sir ARNOLDMCNAIR,Président; M. GUERRERO,Vice-
Président;?,{M.ALVAREH Z,ACKWORTH W,INIARSKIK , LAESTAD B,ADAWI,
READ,HSU MO,LEVICARNEIRO A,RMAND-UGON K,OIEVNIKOV j, ges;
M. GARNIER-COIGNEG T,~e@eradjoint.

Prése+ztségalement:
Pour les États-Unis d'Amérique :

M. G. H. SHULLAW p,remier secrétaire de l'ambassade des États-unis
aux Pays-Bas ;
Pour la Républiquefrançaise :

Le comte Ch. DE BARTILLATc,onseiller de l'ambassade de France
aux Pays-Bas ;
Pour la Grèce:

M. E. VEKGHISc ,hargé d'affaires de Grèce ai. aux Pays-Bas ;
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Buetagne et d'Irlande du Nord:
M. A. C.STEWARTc,hargéd'affaires bntaniuque a. i.aux Pays-Bas ;

Pour les Pays-Bas :
M. A. J.P. TAMMESp,rofesseur de droit international à l'université
d'Amsterdam ;

M. J. J. FEKKES,de la direction des Organisations internationales
au ministère des Affaires étrangères;
M. C. W. v.4~SANTENj,urisconsulte adjoint au ministère des Affaires
étrangères.

Le PRÉSIDENTdéclare l'audience ouyerte et annonce que la Cour
se réunit pour rendre l'avis consultatrf qui lui a étédemandé par
l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies sur la question de l'effet de
jugements du tribunal administratif des Nations Unies accordant
indemnité.
Il invite le Greffieradjoint de lire la résolution de l'Asgénérale
du g décembre 1953 demandant cet avis.
Le GREFFIER ADJOINT lit le texte de la résolution.

Le PRESIDENT expose que, conformément à l'article 67 du Statut,
le Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies,et les représentants des Etats
et des organisations internationales directement intéresséesont été
prévenus que l'avis serait rendu aujourd'hui en audience publique.
Conformément à l'article 39 du Statut, la Cour a décidéque le texte
anglais de l'avis ferait foi. Le Président donne lecture de ce texte.
Le Président invite le Greffier adjoint de donner lecture du dispositif
en français.

LéGREFFIER ADJOINT donne lecture du dispositif. The PRESIDENTstated that Judge Wiiiiarski, while voting in favour
of the Opinion of the Court, had availed himself of the right conferred
on him by Articles 57 and 68 of the Statute to append a statement
ofJudges Alvarez, Hackworth and Levi Carneiro had declared that
they did not share the Court's Opinion and, availing themselves of the
nght conferred on them by Articles 57 and 68 of the Statute, had
appended thereto statements of their dissenting opinions.
The authors of these opinions had informed the President that they
did not wish to read them at the sitting.

The President declared the sitting closed,
The Court rose at 5 p.m

(Sigited) ARNOLDD. MCNAIR,
President.
(Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deprity-Registrar. SÉAXCE UU 13 JUILLET Igj4 286

Le PKÉSIDENT déclare que M. Winiarski, juge, tout eu ayant voté
pour I'avis, se prévaut du droit que lui confkrent les artic57set 68
du Statut pour y joindre l'exposéde son opinion individuelle.
.MM.Alvarez, Hackworth et Levi Cameiro, juges, ne partageant pas
I'avis de la Cour, et se prévalant dudroit que leur conférentles articles 57
et 66 du Statut, y joignent l'exposéde leur opinion dissidente.

Les auteurs de ces opinions ont fait connaître qu'ils n'ont pasteu-
tion d'en donner lecture à l'audience.

Le Président déclare l'audience close.

L'audience est levée d 17 heures

Le Président,
(Signé)ARSOLDD. NCNAIR.

Le Greffier adjoint,
(Signé)GARNIER-COIGNET. 287
ANNEX TO THE MINUTES

ANNEXE AUX PROCÈS-VERBAUX

1. ORAL STATEMEXT BY ;\IR.STAVROPOULOS
(REPRESESTISG THE SECRETARY-GESERAL OF THE UNITED SATIOSS)
AT THE PUBI.IC SIïTINGS OF ]UNE 10th. Igj4

[Ptiblic siltio ngJz~n1e 0th. ~gj.$,mortzingj

Mr. President, Honorable Illembers of the Court :
1 am indeed greatly honoured that the Secretary-General has assigned
me to rewesent him before the Court. He has asked me to be aresent
during these oral hearings iii the hope that 1 may he of assistance to
the Court in respect to matters within the special knowledge and coin-
et en cof the Secretariat. Tlie Secretarv-General desired. in ~articular.

:trii#rt-p:trtld siipply iiiforiilnt~onrekitin~ tu ccrt'liii .i~1rniiii~tr3t~vt~
~.t~ii~i~ler:irioii\iv.liicliriin! tliro\i Iight oii tlic questioiis b~,furrtlic Coiirt.
1 il~oulrllikc ro riicnrio:Lfciv ooirirs ivirh rr,i>vzr to i<.liicli" iiii~lit
be able to supply information of Possible interest' to the Court.
The first point would relate to the procedure and practices of the
United Nations in reg-d tothe payment of awardsmade bythe Adminis-
trative Tribunal, and particularly the rôle of the General Assembly in
this respect.
A second point concerns the question of the reinstatement ofa termi-
nated staff member as it relates, under Article g of the Statute of the
Administrative Tribunal, to the payment or non-payment of awards
of compensation.
A third point concerns the practices of the United Xations with
respect to the budgetary powers of the General Assembly in relation to
the oblieations of the Or-anization. This oint relates to one of the
nisjur IS~IIL\vliicI~h:~s~rnerged frrjiii rlie 'cliçciisiunj aiicl st;it<~iiiriits
iii tlipr~:it:11II.,~LW0.1 tlie oiir:Iiaiit113sbeen ;rr<ue.dtli;it :\rti1;c
of tlic Cli;irtcr iiot oiilv riiei the Gcri~raI:\s,cmbla rielit to t!snniiiic
awards of ~orn~ensatiinkade by the Administratyve ~yiblinal and to
decide whether or not to give them effect by appropriating funds neces-
sary for their payment ;but in fact imposes an obligation on the Assem-
bly to do so in each case. On the other hand, it has been contended that
while the General Assembly may have the power to refuse an appropri-
ation, it does not have the riglit to do sowhere there is a legal obligatioii
of the Orgaiiization as there is in the case of an award by the Tribunal.
It,may therefore he of interest to consider the practice of the United
Nations in regard to tlie payment of contractual obligations and otlier
commitments made.
A fourth point concerns tlie practice of the United Xations, and par-
ticularly of the General Assembly, in establishing subsidiary organs and
the various characteristics of such organs. This practice might be of
interest in view of the discussions of the Administrative Tribunal as
a subsidiary organ, whicli have taken place in the General Assembly2SS STATEMEKT BY 31I. STAVROPOULOS (u.x.)-IO VI 54

and in the Written Statements t<ithe Court. In the light of this discus-
sion. it would seem vertinent to examine in varticular the vractice with
respect to the relatiÔnship of a subsidiary orgin to the GeneGalAssembly.
Finally, should Question I be answered in the affirmative, and should
the Court examine the subject of the principal grounds on which the
General Assembly might refuse to give effect toan award, a few obser-
vations might be of interest conccrning possible procedures which might
be observed in determining. in a particular case, whether such grounds
exist.
Mr. President, 1 have now outlined aii the points upon which 1 am
prepared to give information to the Court and 1 should be grateful to
you if you could indicate to me which are the points upon which the
Court would desire to hear me.
The PRESIDEST : Mr. Stavropoulos, after haring listened to the
outline of your speech, 1 feel Sun: that the Court would be glad to have
your assistance on all those points.

Mr. STAVROPOOL :OShank you, hlr. President.
-4s 1 noted in my preliminary remarks, one of the major issues which
has emerged from the discussioris and statements in the present case
relates ti) the right of the General Assembly under Article 17 of the
Charter to consider and approve the Budget of the Organization. 1
believe it miglit be of assistance to the Court in its examination of this
issue if1 mere to describe certain United Nations practices and proce-
dures involved.
In the first instance,1 should like to describe the practice foliowed
by the United Xations in the payment of awards in the past. %ce the
Administrative Tribunal was established at the end of 1949. there have
been 57 cases decided by it. In 32 of these there have been awards in
favour of tlie - -licants either of compensation for termination or of
costs.
In 1950, 16cases involving the same number of claimants were decided
in joint proceedings. The Administrative Tribunal found in favour of the
applicants and ordered their reinstatement, and this order was accepted
by the Secretary-General. The Tribunal also awarded costs to the appli-
cants amoiinting to approximately $2,000. This award was paid by the
Secretary-General from an item in the 1950Budget previously approved
by the GeneralAssembly, coverin: miscellaneousclaims and adjustments.
In 1951,there were two cases decided in favour of applicants invclving
awards of compensation amounting to $13,7jo and, in 1952, there were
two cases decided in favour of applicants involving a\vards of compensa-
tion and costs amounting to $7,:$90.These were paid by tlie Secretary-
General from the Section of the 1951and the 1952Budgets respectively,
covering Common Staff Costs. This Section in each Budget included
an account for termination indemnity to mhich tliese pnvm.nt. were
charged.
In each of these instances the money had already been appropnated
by the General Assembly in the regiilar budget prior to the consideration
of the cases by the Administrative Tribunal, and the Assembly did not
have any occasion to consider the awards.
In 1gj3, however, there were awards of compensation and costs in
eleren cases and an award of costs in one other totalling more than
$17o,ooo. The.Secretary-General submitted supplementary estinlates to the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, referring to the fact that
no money was available in the 1953Budget for the pakment of the large
àmount in\rolved.
Thus, 1 have described in brief the practice which has been follo\ved
also be ofnterest i1describe the procedures fordealingrnith thepayment
of an alvard wliich are available under the existing Financial Regula-
tions of the United Nations andother resolutions oftheGeneral Assembly.
There are. in fact. foureDarate vrocedures which mi~ht be followed.
As a tirkt thésecrétary-~eneral could, yffnnds are availa-
ble, make the paynient from monies within the appropriate section
of tlie Budget without affecting the total appropriated Budget. Under
the Financial Regulations the annual Budget estimates are divided into
parts, sections, chapters and articles.Normally, the Secretary-General
can transfer funds from one article or cha~ter to another. so lone as

and Budgetary Questions.
As noted a moment ago, the Secreta~-y-Generaldid, in 1050, 1951and
~gjz,make the payment of awards from within the appropriate section
of the Budget.
As a second procedure, if sufficient funds are not available in the
appropriate section of the Budget,the Secretary-General might make
the payment by increasing the amount in an). one section and decreasing
correspondingly the amount in another section or sections with the prior
concurrence of tlie Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget-
ary Questions. and without affecting thetotal appropriated Budget.
The Financial Regulations provide that no transfer between appropri-
ation sections may be made without authorization by the General
r\ssembly. However, the General Assembly resolution approving the
Budget each year has autborized the transfer of funds between sections
with the prior coiicurrence of the ad vis or)^Committee (for example,
while available if there are sufficient surplus funds in other sections
of the Budget, and while used on occasion for other purposes, has iiot
been employed to date for the payment of awardsmade by the Adminis-
trative Tribunal.
As a third procedure, the Secretary-General might, with the concur-
rence of the Advisory Committee, make the payment by a withdrawal
from the \Vorking Capital I'uiid provided that the awards could be
considered as unforeseen and extraordinary expenses. He would then
submit a rcvised total Budget in his supplementary estimates. Each
year the General Assembly has ap roved resolutions relating to unfore-
seen and extraordinary expenses ?for example, Resolution 787 of the
Eighth Session) and to the \Vorking Capital Fund (for example, Resolu-
tion 788 of the Eighth Session) which could authorize the Secretary-
General toenter into commitments to meet uiiforeseen and extraordinary
expenses and to advance money from the Workiiig Capital Fund for
payment. In such a case the Secretary-General must submit supple-
mentary estimates to the General Assembly with a report of al1commit-
ments and the circumstances relating thereto. The appropriation by
the General Assembly in such a case, however, is for the purpose of
replenishing the \Vorking Capital Fund and not for the purpose of
payment which would already have been made. \\'hile tbeoreticallyavailable, if the expenses are unforeseen and extraordinary, this third
method also has not been employed by the Secretary-General for the
payment of awards made by the Administrative Tribunal.
As a fourth procedure, the Secretary-Generalmight request the General
Assembly for funds for the direct payment of the awards by submitting
supplementary estimates for tliis purpose. Such estimates are first
submitted to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions.
Only in the case of this last method, which in fact has been employed
only with respect to the awards made in 1gj3, would the General
Assembly have an opportunity to consider wliether or not to appropriate
the funds necessary to give cffect to awards of compensations made
by the Administrative Tribunal. Tlius, under esisting procedures and
past practices, the opportunity of the General Assembly to consider
an appropriation for the payment of specific awards is dependent on
the fortuituus circumstance of whetlier or not funds are available in the
current budget. On the other haiid. the Assembly might, particularly
\vitIl respect to the third procedure whicli 1 have described, discuss the
matter after the payment had boen made.
Iii concluding my remarks concerning Budgetary Procedures relating
to the payment of amards, 1 should like to observe that the Statute of
the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Xations provided tliat
any compensation awarded by the Tribuiial should be chargeable to the
budget of the Administration concerned. In implementation of this
provision of the Statute, it was recommeiided in the report of the
Supervisory Commission when it proposed the Statute, that a nomiiial
ainount of one thousand francs sliould be inserted in the budgets of
the League Secretariat aiid of the Iriternational Labour Officeso as to
provide an item to whicli such comnensation could be charaed if it
escess of this nominal vote would be provided by a transfer under the
usual guarantees.

A secoiid question concerns reinstatement in relation to the payment
General Assembly concern only "ail award of compensation made by the
the Tribuiial in favour of a staff inember of the United Nations whose
coiitract of service has been tenninated witliout his assent". Never-
theless, it is impossible, in the light of Article g of the Statute, to con-
sider this question without bearing in mind the relation between rein-
statement and payment of compeiisation.
Articleg of the Statute which prescribes the right of the Tribunal
to award compensation, gives tlie Tribunal the rigtit in the first instance
to order the rescinding of the decision contested or the specific perfom-
ance of the obligation involved. Under the present wording of Article 9,
it is within the absolute discretion of the Secretary-General to decide,
in the interest of the United 'I:itions, that the applicant should be
compensated in lieu of such rescisiori or specific performance.
The drafting history of Article 9, as well as the original wording of
the Article approved by the Gencral Asseinbly in 1949, indicated that
it was at that time believed that tlie Secretarv-Gcneral would use his STATEIEST BY hlr. STAVROPOULOS (u.x.)-IO VI 54
291
cretion only if rescision or specific performance was in his opinion impos-
sible or inadvisable.
Experience over a number of years, ho~vever, showed that in many
cases it was necessary for the Secretary-General to ask that the Tribunal

aurard compensation in lieu of rescision of the terminatioii. The Secre-
tary-General, iii his report on Personnel Policy to the Eiglith Session
of the General Assembly, stated :

"Experience lias indicated that, particularly in cases invol.viiig
termination of appointment, where the Tribunal finds tliat the
application is well founded, the payrnent of compensation should
be the rule rather than the exception. It is normally not in keeping
with tlie iiiterest of good administration to reiiistate an employee
whom the Secretary-General has considered it necessary to ternii-
nate. At tlie same time. from the n ointof view 01tlie staff member.

experience arid consideratioiis indicate that the normal reaction,
in case a decision of the Secretary-General is iiot uplield by the
Admiiiistrative Tribunal, should be tlie payinent of compensat'1011.

In those circumstances. however. where the Secretarv-General
btiliçves tliat it \i.olicitIje<lisnd~:iiit:~g~~~oiiesciiiil Iiis<lecisioii.
lie shuiilil Ii:ive tlie oyt<ilt,nciiiig ~uclir~~sciuioitio tlic ;ippliciirit
in lieu of the compensation ordered?

Article g \vas amended by the General Assembly at its Eighth Session
in response to tliis suggestion of the Secretary-General. The present
text of Article 9 provides, inter alia,that if the Tribunal finds that the
application is well founded it shall order the rescinding of the decision
contested or tlie specific performance of the obligation invoked. It also
provides tliat at the same time the Tribunal shall fix the amouiit of
compensation to be paid to the applicant forthe injury sustained, sliould
the Secretary-General decide, in the interest of the Uiiited Nations,
tliat the applicaiit should bc compensated without fiirther actioii beiiig
taken.

Under this text, the same judgment of the Tribunal is to contain
both an order of reinstatemerit and the fixing of compensation. It is
then for the Secrekiry-General to decide whether, in tlie interest of the
United Nations, tlie applicant is to be compensated rather than rein-
stated. Under the former text, compensation was fised in a subsequent
judgment in lieu of reinstatement when the Secretary-Gerieral decided
that such reinstatement was impossible or inadvisable. Uiider both texts
the close relationship between reinstatement and compensation is
apparent.
Accordingly, the Secretary-General is concerned with tlie problem of
the consequences wliich refusal by the General Assembly to give effect
to an award of compeiisation might have on his right, under Article g.
to refuse reinstatement ordered by the Tribunal.
Before proceeding to a discussion of United Xations practices with
respect to biidgetary powers of the General Assembly on the one Iiand
and obligations of the Oreanization on the other. 1 should like to reriew

briefly the bases of these two concepts as they relate to the qiiestions
before the Court.292 STATE~IEST BY :,IrSTA\'ROPOULOS (u.N.)-IO VI 54

On the oiie hand, there are the budgetary powers of the General
consider and approve the Budget of the Organization. Under Article 18,
hudgetary questions are among the important questions requiring
a two-thirds majority vote in tlie General Assembly.
On the other hand, there are the legal obligations of the Organization.
The Secretary-General has already pointed out in his \\'ritten Statement
to the Court that the StaffRegulations and Staff Rules are incorporated
by refereiice in the letters of ap ointment of staff memhers. For example,
the permanent appointment orm contains the following provisions :

"You are hereby offered a permanent appointment in the Secre-
tariat of the United Nations, in accordance with the terms and
conditions as specified, as amended by or as otherwise provided
in the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, together with such amend-
andtsuch Staff Rules. A copy of the Staff Regulations and Staffns
Rules is transmitted hereivith."

The same letter of appointment also provides that a permanent
appointment may be terminated by the Secretary-Genernl in accordance
with the relevant provisions of the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules.
Similar provisions are also contaiiied in the other letters of appointment.
111 turn, the Staff Regulations provide inter aliathat the United
Nations Administrative Tribiinal shall, under conditions provided in
its Statute, hear and pass judgment on applications from staff members
alleging non-observance of the terms of their appointment including
al1 pertinent regulations and niles. Thus, as long as the present Staff
Regulations remain in force, the provision of the Administrative Tribunal
is a part of the legal relationship between the staff member and the
Organization.
Furthemore, as 1 have just iioted, the Administrative Tribunal is
authorized, in accordance with the provisions of Articleg of the Statute,
that the compensation shall be fixed hy the Tribunal and paid by theides
United Nations, or as appropriate, by the specialized agencies partici-
pating under Article 12. Article IO, paragraph z, provides that the
judgments shall be final and without appeal. These provisions are the
basis for the conclusion drawn by many Memher States that there is
a legal obligation involved witli respect to ail award made by the
Administrative Tribunal.
1should now like to examine the United Nations practice with respect
to the exercise of the hudgetary power under such circumstances.
It \r.ould seem elementary that there should be difference in the exercise
of the biidgetary power with respect, on the one hand, to future plans
and programmes where the discretion ofthe General Assembly isabsolute,
and, on the other hand, to obligations and commitments which have
been already duly made. In fact, with regard to such commitments
and obligations, the practice of the United Xations under its Financial
Regulations does not ordinanly involve consideration by the General
Assenibly.
Likewise, it may be noted that the General Assembly does not
ordinarily consider specific expcnditures even with regard to future
programmes, but deals rather with general categories. Geiieral Assembly STATEAIENT Bi' hlr. STAVROPOULO (u.s.)-IO VI 54 293

appropriations are normally made with respect to a class of espenses,
and it is for the Secretary-General, as Chief Administrative Officer, to
make the specific commitments and payments within this general
anthorization. Furthermore, as already noted, the Secretary-General,
with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Cornmittee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions, or in certain cases even without such concur-
from the It'orking Capital Fund.reseen and extraordinary expenses
. The United Nations, under Article 105 of the Charter, enjoys in the
territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfilrnent of its purposes. The detailed privileges and
immunities provided by this Article of the Charter have been defined
in the Convention on Privileges and Irnrnunities of the United Nations.
The Convention, inter alia, provides for immunity from any form of
legal process.
If the Organization were not immune, persons with respect to whom
it had obligations could go into the national courts and seck redress.
Such a course of procedure, ho~ve\~er,might be a serious handical) to
the Organization in the fulfilment of its purposes. It has therefore been
considered necessary and desirable that this immunity be maintained.
At the same time, however, the Organization has not desired that its
irnmunity should be a cause of denial of justice or a shield to avoid
payment of legal obligations. It therefore desired to provide adequate
procedures for the settlement of disputes in lieu of submission to national
courts.
This principle has heen emhodied in the Convention on Privileges
and Irnmunities adopted by the General Assembly. Section zg of .this
Convention requires the United Nations to make provisions for appro-
ria te modes of settlement with resvect to two tv~e,.of disriutes. The
iirst arc disl>iitcsnrisiny oiir uf coiitr;;cts iurotli~rdis~~i~iri\.atIn\v
chiirnctcr tu\r.liiclitlic Ciiircd Satioijs,i 11.1rt\.'.fliciecoiid ..redi.spiitci;
involvinr an\, oflici:<iftli~Ciiit~<lSntions \vliiùv rc.isoii oIiizoffisid
position-enj;?ys immunity, if immunity has not'been waived by the
Secretary-General.
With respect to the second class of disputes, no necessity has arisen
to make provision for settlement, although the Secretary-General has
on occasion waived the immunity of an official.
1 should like now to describe certain procedures which have been
established in business relations with firms and individuals outside
the Organization with whom the United Nations has contracts.
When the United Nations enters into a contract with a private firm,
for example, for the purchase of materials, a clause is inserted setting '
process. Because of the existence of this immunity, an arbitration claiise
is also generally inserted in such contracts. Th'isclause provides that
any claim or controversy arising out of a contract shall he settled by
arbitration. It also provides that both parties agree to be bound by any
arbitral award which is made.
However, it is further stated in this clause that nothing therein shall
constitute a waiver of the Organization's immunity. This means, in
effect, that any arbitral award given against the United Nations cannot
be enforced by the other side. Thus, the other party enters into the
contract knowing that in the final analysis he is ohliged to rely upon 294 STATEMEST Bi' NT. STAVROPOULOS (u.N.)-IO VI 54
the good faith of the United Nations iii paying any award made against
it. This postulation of good faith in the meeting of commitments and

légalobligations is, 1 believe, a siizcqua iioitfor the successful conduct
of the business of the Organization.
Inthe case of staff members, theorganization has provided the Admin-
istrative Tribunal for the settlenient of claims arising out of contracts.
The Supervisory Commission, \vhicti prepared the draft Statute of
the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Xations, pointed out in
its report that the international status of the League prevented officials
from bringing action in the ordinary courts to enforce the provisions
of their contracts. It then observed that it could not be considered
right that a class ofemployees, amouiiting ta several hundreds of persons
and engaged on terms which were necessarily complicated and which
might give nse to dispiites as to their legal effect, should have no means
of referring questions as to their riglits to a decision of a judicial body.
This passage of the report is quoted in the Written Statementsubmitted
by the Government of France together with observations of MI. Siraud.

In a similar vein, the Advisory Committee on a Statute for a United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, in presenting a draft Statute, said :
"The United Xations is not suable in any national court without
its consent ; nor can it be stied by an officia1in the International
Court of Justice. Tiy cre:iting a tribunal to serve as a jurisdiction
- open toits many officialsof various nationalities, the United Nations
will be acting not oiily in the iiiterest of efficient administration,
but also in the cause of justice."

In addition to the discussion with respect to the budgetary powers
of the General Assernbly, there have been issues raised concerning the
supervisory powers of the General Assetnbly in relation to the Adminis-
trative Tribunal. It has been argued tliat the Tribunal is a subsidiary
organ of the General Assembly and that, therefore, its decisions are
subject to review by the Assembly. On the basis of this argument it

would be impossible for a subsidiary organ to take a decision binding
upon the principal organ which createcl it.
On the other hand, it has been iirgued that, while the General Assem-
bly established the Adininistratioe Tribunal ancl can amend its Statute
or abolish the Tribunal altogether, it cloesnot follow that the Assenibly
can refuse to gire effect to tlie Tribunal's decisions.
It may he of interest to the Court if 1 were to review the position of
subsidiary organs in general in thcir relationship to the General Assem-
bly, and describe certain aspects and practices which may be relevant
to the consideration of this issue.
The principal organs of tlie United Nations are established and specifi-
cally enurnerated in paragraph I of Article7 of the Charter. They are :
the General Assembly. the Security Council, the Economic and Social
Council, the Trusteeship Council, tlie International Court of Justice, and
the Secretariat. Paragraph 2 of Article 7 provides that such subsidiary
organs as may be fouiid necessary may be established in accordance

witli the Charter. With respect to the General Assembly, the Charter
specifically States in Article22 th:it "The General Assembly may estab-
lish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance
of its functions." A similnr provision concerning the Security CounciL
is contained in Article zg.' STATE.\IEST BY AIT. STAVROPOULOS (u.s.)-IO VI 54 2gj

There are, in addition, a few organs which may not be characterized
as either principal or subsidiary under Article 7 of the Charter. Certain
organs which function within the orbit of the United Nations and are
supported from the United Natioiis Budget, i.e. the Permanent Central
Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body, were establislied by
treaty and not by a principal organ in accordance with the Charter.
Furthermore, the Military Staff Committee was provided directly in
Article 47 of the Charter, but is not a principal organ under Article 7.
The General Assemblv. oursuant to its Dowers under Articlc 22 of
the Charter, has establiSl,ed nearly 100 subsidiarz o;gans since it first
met in London in the early part of rq46. There 1sconsiderable clifficulty

in classifvin,,these oreans rnio a svstematic oattern. since therearealmoit
: nt v.irintiuiisuii1 II;III str;icriirr. 'iiiiictions :niid oilicr
cli:~r:~ctt.rirtics;is rlicrc 11:trct~ilhsi<lii<rvoigins ~hciitsel\~cj.
Soriir siil~îi~lisrvorr;iiij ;ire vsiahlishéd on n iicminiiciit hisis. otticrs
for an indefinite peri8d, and still others haveAbeen established for a
single session, for a specifically limited time, or for the accomplishment
ofa particular purpose of limited duration.
From the point of view of membership, there are those siibsidiary
organs whose members are States and there are others composed of
individual experts, or even represented by a single individual as in

the case of the Mediator in Palestine. Members may, on the one hand,
be appointed directly by the General Assembly either through n simple
decision or through a system of nomination and election. On the other
hand, the General Assembly may provide that their appointment should
be by the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General
or the President of the International Court of Justice.
It is particularly dificult to classify the subsidiary organs from the
point of view of function. In order to obtain an o\.er-al1 picture, 1 have
listed the foliowine urincioal cateeories : Studv Committees. Political
Commissions, ~dmynistrati've r\ssisfance OrganS, ~~erationa<~gencies,
and ludicial Bodies. Theré are of course cases where a subsidiaryorgan

maviiave functions falline within more than one of the foreeoinr cite-
gones, and there may beYsomefunctions which do not fa11GithTn any
of these groups.
The General Assemblv has established at one time or another a ereat
IIUIIIJ~ cf siil~iidinr! orc~nsior thc ourpric of cuiirlii~~tirig.ruili,.s
IIIurilcr ts, prt p:trc rlie groiiii<l~viirkfur ;i~.titli*Gciicr.il :\sîi:iiil~ly.
'l'li51:iiirliiic~:uiitiiiiticesol C;ciicr.i:\is~iiiblv ii.l.icliiirliiiiiIli,:
time that tce Assembly is in session each year of course perfok a
niajor part of this work. But the Assembly often desires to have pûrticu-
lar studies conducted between sessions and has established numerous
committees to consider and report on specific subjects. For example,

there were the Committees on International Criminal Jurisdiction, the
Suecial Committee on Admission of Xew Xembers. and the Collecti\~e
3ieasures Cornmittee. Subsidiary organs of this type are very numerous
and many more could be enumerated, but 1 belicve these will serve as
adequateillustration.
1shouldlike to note one other organ, however. The Interim Committee
of the General Assembly, first established in 1047 and placed on a296 STATEMEST BY 3IT.STAYROPOULOS (u.x.)-IO VI 54 ,

of international CO-ooeration in the oolitical field, and the ~eaceful
adjustment of situations likely to impâir the general welfare oririendly
relations among nations. Because of the very hroad sphere of actirity
of this Commitfee. there was oarticular carein the ~&t of its soonso~s
to point out that the functiois of this "Little Assembly" were'largely
confined to cqnsidenng and reporting to the General Assembly. This
function. however. covered bath the consideration of eeneral Droblems
aiid tlie coiisiderntioii of spccifiî disputes. Tlie lnterii; ~oinm~tte\r.;ij
in fact ;iiitli~,ri~crlto c-oiiductiii-~itirntion.i ..d ;ivr>uintconiiiii.;sionsof
eiiquiry.
It was also given certain other rights and functions which made it
more than a study committee. Thus, Resolution IIZ of the Second
Session. which recommended the holding of~~"e~ti~ns~in Korea for the
establishinent of an independent government, authorized the ~em~orary
Commission on Korea to consult with the Interim Committee with
resl~ectto the application of the Resolution. In 1948. by anthorization
of the General Assemhl (Resoliition 196 (III) of 3 Decemher 1948),
the Interim Committee &came the only subsidiary organ which might
request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice; and
in 1950 it was authorized to utilize the Peace Observation Commission
(Resolution 377 (V) of 3 Xovember 1950).
The primary function of each committee falling within this category
of subsidiary organs, including even the Interim Committee, is to study
and report to the General Assembly.
A second group of subsidiary organs are those having active political
functions. Political Commissions may likewise have the function of
studying and reporting to the General Assembly, particularly with
respect ta observations or investigations in the field. This was the
primary function in the case of the United Xations Special Committee
on Palestine. But this function of reporting may well be only incidental
to the performance of other functions, and may not be the primary
purpose of the organ. Assistance in estahlishing governments, as in
Lihya, in bnnging about a federation, as in Eritrea, and in supervising
elections, as in Korea in 1948,may be the principal function ofthe sub-
sidiary organ. Mediation and conciliation may in other cases be the
primary function, as in Palestine. Observation as a means of maintaining
peace may also be important, as in the Balkans, where there was first
the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, and later the
Balkan sub-commission of the I'eace Observation Commission. These
subsidiary organs whidi operate in the field must often, within their
terms of reference, take final actions and decisions.
A third category of subsidiary organs includes those which 1 have
called Administrative Assistance Organs. These organs have been
established bv the General Assemblv to assist it in carrvine out its
functions rt:latirii: to finlinrial. l>iidg&t;iry:a<liiiinistra6\~eum:ittt:rs.
7'lieyiiicludc the .Ad\,isijry('ominittrc on Administrative aiid Uudget;try
Ouestions. the Coiiiiiiittee on Coritrihiitions. the l'<oardof i\uditors. aiid
the. h'egotiating Committee for ~xtra-~ud~etary Funds.
A fewrepresentatives have suggested that the Administrative Tribunal
should also be classified as an administrative assistance organ of the
General Assembly. For reasons which 1will point out in a fewmoments,
1 have chosen, however, ta classiiy it as a judicial rather than as an
administrative organ.\Vorks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), and the
Hieh Commissioner for Refueees. 1 mav also note the Ex~anded Pro-
gramme of Technical Assistance and the responsibilities wifh respect to
this Programme of the Technical Assistance Board which is a subsidiary
orean of the ~conomi~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ù Council
ln examinntion of tlie terms of referencc of the operational subsidiary
orrans of the United Nations reveals that these orgaiis have been vested
wgh varying degrees of financial power regardingUtheprogrammes they
administer. TIie financial procedures followed with regard to these pro-
grammes differ from those applicable to the regular Budget of the
Organization. These differences are maiiifested mainly in the manner
in which the activities of these organs are financed, in the financial
regulations under which they operate, in the vestiiig ofgreater authority
to determine the disposition of tlie funds in the agency concerned, and
in the less rigid controls exercised by the General Assembly over the
disposition of the funds.
The first aspect which 1 will mention concerns the financing of these
programmes. A feature common to al1is the fact that they are financed
from voluntary contributions of governments rather than by assess-
ments uiider the reylar budget of the Organization. For this reason,
these programmes are sometimes called extra-budgetary programmes.
An exception is the administrative expenses of tlie Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees, which are paid from the regular United
Nations Budget.
A second aspect relates to the application of financial regulations.
Arrangements made by the General Assembly with respect to the finan-
cial regulations which govern the operation of the programmes have
not been unilorm. The Statute of the Officeof the High Commissioner
for Refugees provides that the administration of the Office shall be
subject to the regular Financial Replations and liules of the United
Nations. On the other hand, the Agent of the United Nations Korean
Reconstruction Agency and the Ilirector-General of the United Xations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees are authorized to
establish finaiicial regulations for tlieir respective agencies. Each was
reouired to do so in consultation with the Secretarv-General and the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and ~od~et;;~ Questions ;and
in addition, the Agent-General of ihe United Nations Korean Reconstruc-
tion Ageiicy had ?O secure tlie agreement of the Advisory Committee of
his agency. \Vith regard to the United Nations Children's Fund and
the Expanded Programnie ofTechnical Assistance, certain specifiedfinan-
cial arrangements were laid down or approve<-lby GeneralAssembly
resolutions, but no express provisions were included as to the financial
regulations which should apply to these programmes. In point of fact,
the regular Financial Replations of the United Nations are applied.
A thircl aspect of particular interest concerns the authority delegated
bv the General Assemblv for the disuosition of funds. Here again. there
ate considerable variations in the &rangements which havëbeen laid
down by the General Assembly.
With resuect to the United Nations Relief and \Vorks Aeencv for u 2
I~aleitiiic.tiie Gciier:il:\sjtnihly sets clicover-dl liriiufttir~ir'igr;~~ii~iic
for .pcvifitd perioiis. 1ii n<ltliiit,iitsl>ccifi~stlie ~iiiuuiitjforsub-pro-
grammes of direct relief for Palestine-refugees, of work projects, ind STATEhlEST BY hlr. STAVROPOULOS (u.x.)-IO YI 54 299

of reintegration. The limits set for these programmes, however, are not
rigid since the Agency is authorized to transfer funds or make other
necessary adjustments. Resolutions of the l'ourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh
and Eighth Sessions of the General Assembly have provided for such
adjustment. Perhaps the most direct authorization was that made at
the Sisth Session by the General Assembly. Paragraph g of Resolution

..?"of the Sisth Session authorized "the United Nations Relief and
\York :\gciicy to tr:iiisfer fiin(ls allocatc(l for relief to reiiitcgrntiun".
'l'tic.ltcstjlutioii n<lul>tc<alt [lie Eiglitli Sessioii eri\,isn:cd pussihle adjiist-
iiierits of tlic r<.lit!f l>ii(Ic<.tII\. tlic :\ecnc\, as rn:i\, br ;ittrit>iit~hlc tu
refugee employment onprojeks, or as may be nécessary to maintain
adequate standards.
\Vith regard to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance,
the General Assembly has determined how much should be made available
to the agencies by outright allocation, as well as the percentage to be

received bv each of the aeencies. how much should be retained for further
allocation'and liow muzh sho"ld he retained as a reserve. However,
considerable :lutlioritv has been granted to the Technical Assistance
Board in regard to théallocation of funds.
Very broad discretion with respect to disposition of funds has heen
granted by the General Assembly with respect to the United Xations
Children's Fund, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
andthe High Commissioner for Refugees. As regards the first, the power
to allocate the resources of the Fund is vested in the Executive Board

of the Fund. General Assembly Resolution 417 of the Fifth Session
provided that the Board, in accordance ivitli such principles as may be
laid down by the Economic and Social Council and the Social Commis-
sion, should formulate the policies, determine the programmes, and
allocate the resources of the Fund for the purpose of meeting, through
the provision of supplies, training and advice, emergency and long-range
needs of children and their continuine needs ~articularlv in under-
developed countries, with a vie; to strengthening wherevepthis may be
appropriate, the permanent child health and child welfare programmes
of ihëconntries rêceivingassistance. . .

The Agent-General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction
Agency, under General Assembly Resolution 410 of the Fifth Session,
is authorized to use contributions iii kind or services at his discretion
for tlic prugr;iriiiiit: of relief niid r~.Ii~I>ilitatioiiiind :idiiiinistrstive
czpciiscs coniir.ctecl ther~~\r.irli..Ar1i\dvisor!~ Curiiiiiitr~<~,onsistiiig of
tlic rei>rescnt.iti\.cuf fi\.c \~ci~ ~er St;itcs. is r~st:iblislicdto :id\.ise the
.Agciit:(;ener:il with rt~;iril tu iiinjor iii1;incinl pruciireriiçiit. distribution
:iii<i>tlierecon,miic pr~~l>lc~i~ is<.rt:iiiiiOi llis ~11.~iiiiaiiigd opcriiti<,iis.
:\ siiii11:irl>rr,:t(l~Ii~cr~ri15ivest,:d iii thc 1.1161< 1~~:~iii.i~sioncfror

I(~.fiig~càa.110,un<l,irtlic '-.t:iri.f1.i.Oiticc is .~utl.oih (1to :i<liiiiiiiiicr
ail!, fiiiiiij uiihlic or i>ri\.i~l~i;lIic rcccivej for ii~ilithllcc tu ri.fu:c1.5,
and to disiribute thém among the private and, as appropriate, public
agencies whicli he deems best qualified to administer such assistance.
He does not have this broad discretion, however, with respect to adminis-
trative expenses which are paid from the regular United Xations budget
andare subject to the same scrutiny as the rest of the budget.
The broad discretion vested in these agencies for the' disposition of
funds represeiits at the same time a less rigid set of controls by the
General Assembly. The practice of the General Assembly with regard to tlie delegation of financial powers to these subsidiary organs would
appear to indicate that the General Assembly has not considered it
necessary to pass upon the disposition of every dollar which comes
into tlie custody of the Organizalion.

[Public sittifzg of ]une ~oth, 1954, afternoon]

A final categoiy of orgaiis established by the General Assembly is
that of judicial bodies. The Assemblv lias, in addition to the Adminis-
trative Tribunal, set up a United sations Tribunal in Libya and in
Eritrea.
In accordance with the provisii>nsof the Treaty of l'eace with Italy,
the question of the disposal of the formerItalian colonies was submitted
to tlie General Assembly on ~j September 1948 by ttie Governments

of l'rance, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kirigdom
of Great Britain and Northern lreland and tlie United States of America.
As part of the settlemeiit, the General Assembly, by Resolution 388
(V) of 15 December 1950 approvecl articles oii economic and financial
provisions relating to Libya. Tlia final article provided that a United
Nations Tribunal should be set up, composed of three persans selected
bv the Secretani-General for their leeal aualifications froin the nationals
of three differeit States not directlYinterested.

The Tribunal, whose decisioii was to be based on law, \vas given the
follo\ving two functions :

First, it should give to tlie Administering Powers, the Libyan
Government after its establishmeiit. and the Italian Government,
on n:quest by those aiitliorities, sucli instructions as inight be
requircd for the purpose of giving effect to the rcsolution of the
Gëneral Assembly.
Second, it shoulcl decide al1 disputes arisiiig between the afore-
nientioned authorities concerning the interpretatioii and applica-
tion of the resolntion. The Tribunal rvould be seised of aiiy such

dispute on the unilateral request of one of those antliorities.

The Tribunal \vas authorized to determine its own proccdure. In
tlie absence of unanimity, tlie Tribiinal could take decisions by a majority
vote. Its decisions were to be final and bindinr. Xo provisioii was made
-~~ ~ ~orts~ ~ ~h~ G~neral t2ssemblv. ,, for an; revikv of its <Iecisiorisbv
the General Assembly.
At the following sessiori of tlie Genernl Assembly, a United Natioiis
Tribunal was established by Resolution 530 (VI) of 1952, in coniiection

with the economic and finnncial provisions relating to Eritrea. The terins
of refereiice of this Tribunal were similar but not i<leritical witli the
terins of reference of the Tribunal for Libya. An ad<-litiorialprovision
.ofinterest was that the United Nations Tribunal in Eritrea should have
.esclusive cornuetence on iiiatters fallinrr \vithiil its functioris. In the
.event of any Latter Ùi dispute Iieiiig rcferred to the Tribunal, it was
provided that any action pending in civil courts should be siispended.
As in the case of the United X;itioris Tribunal in Libya, iio provision
was made for reports to tlic General Assembly, or for any review by

the Assenibly. There has been consi<lerable disciission by the General Assembly of
the ~ossibilitv and desirabilitv of establishine an international criminal
cou;. As eariy as 1948 the .&sembly adopted a resolution in which it
considered "that in the course of development of the international
community, there will be an increasing need of an international judicial
organ for the trial of certain crimes under international law". Since

that time the subject has been examined by the International Law
Commission and by Committees on International Criminal Jurisdiction
established by the General Assembly which met in 1951 and 1953.
Two principal methods of establisliing sucli a court were considered.
One method was by resolution of the General Assembly, the other by a
multilateral conveiition. The 1953 Committee on International Criminal
Jurisdiction favoured the second mcthod. In the discussion, however,
there were several points raised whicli are relevant to our present

consideration.
The Report of the Coinmittee siirnin:~rizesthe views expressed in these
discussions as follows :
Some members believcd tliat the legal powers of the General Assembly
under the Charter were not sufficient to enable it to establish a court
by r:soliirioii. Cii,lcr :\rticle22 of clic C'Ii:.rr, III<.c;t:li<-inl:\;scnibl!.
mi<l.r cst:il~l~;l.oiily ?iicli ~uthidi:try urg:,i;i$11 ~Iccincilncccssary for
III<.~~~~ric~rii~:,t,itts ft~iicrior~sn,tdctry in(li\f~(l~i:il~ iiot;,friiictiot~
of tlir: :\~.;eiiibl!.I I tribirls ilrc.:irly estalilisl.cd hy rlic Gçirrr:il

.Asii:iiil>l!~\,\,liiclr \i. <irici<lcre<ly SO~L. incrnbtr, ;i-,~oir~riititing
iisrfiil rjrtct:~l,:i~ls:,Irntcrn:it~on:iIcuurl it11:cIi>. III<-Atli~iiii~strativ~
~ribunal and the United Xations Tribunals in ~ritria and Libya), were
considered by others as furnishing no adequate precedent since they were
based on provisions not applicable to the proposed crimuial court.
In favour of the power of the General Assembly to establish the court
by resolution, it was said that, under Article 22 of the Charter, the
Assembly could establish subsidiary organs to assist it in performing its
functions. Under Article II, the Assemblv mas eiven functions with

regard to the indntenaiice of internatiorcal pea& and security. The
existence of ail international crimirial jurisdiction, it was argued, rvould
be a factor in the maintenance of peice, since it would stringthen the.
moral opinion of the ivorld agairist international crimes. Therelore,
nothing in the Charter prevcnted the General .assembly from creating an
international criminal court as a siibsidiary organ. Such a subsidiary
organ, it was said, miglit wcll be entitled to do things which the General
Assembly itself could iiever perform, provided that its activity was in
the iiiterest of tlie mainteilancc of peace.

Some mcmbers fclt tlmt tlicre would be a serious ioçç of independence
and stability if the court wcre set up by a resolution, which could always
he repealed or niodificd later by tlie Geiieral Assembly. The same argu-
ment would apply, it was believcd, if the court were a subsidiary organ,
the budget of which Iiad to be deblited each year. Those who favoured
the resolution method took the view that the stability, permanence and
independence of the court would be adequately safeguarded, since the
General Assembly would ?lot reverse a decision taken on so important
a subject.

The report does not malie any reference to the question of review
of decisions by the General Assembly.302 STATEYEST BY Mr. STAVROPOULO(S u.N.)-IO \'154

In reviewing the character of the .4dministrative Tribunal it is
apparent that the tenninology in its Statute is that generally followed
with respect to judicial bodies. -4rticle 2 of its Statute refers to the
competence of the Tribunal to pass judgment on application. The tenn
judgment, clearly a judicial terni, is also used in Articles IO and 12.
It is true that in the English test the word "competencc" is used rather
than "jiirisdiction", which latter is perhaps a morc common judicial
phrase. In this connection, Iiowf:ver, it can be noted that while the
tenn "jurisdiction" is used in Artide 36 of the Statute of tlie lnter-
national Court of Justice, the title of Chapter II which iiicludes Article
36 is "Competence of the Court".
-4rticle 6 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal indicates
certain rules of procedure of a judicial character. Furthermore, several
provisions of tlie Statute appear to be borrowed from the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, or even earlier judicial
tests, via the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the League of
Nations. One of the most important of these is paragraph z of Article
IO, which provides that "The judgrnent shall be final and without
appeal." An almost identical provision was contained in Article 60 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and in
the same Article of the Statute of this Court. Paragraph 3 of Article 2
relating to the Tribunal's right to decide its own competence also
appears tibe bascd on siinilar provisionsin the Statute of the predecessor
of this Court, which willalso be found in Article 36of the present Statute.
As has been pointed out on several occasions, the General Assembly
chose to use tlie word "Tribunal" rather than "Staff Claims Board".
". the other hand, it decided to use the word "member" instead of
ludge" and "executive secretary" instead of "registrar".
1 should also like to examine certain other aspects of the relationship
of the Administrative Tribunal to the General Assemblv. It would
seem that the Tribunal has been established pursuant to the authority
of the General Assembly under Article 22 of the Charter and, therefore,
in thissense is properly designated as a subsidiary organ.
The Statute by which the Administrative Tribunal was established
was adopted by the General Assembly by Resolution 351 (IV) on
24 November 1949. The Statute, in accordance with its Article II, may.
be amended by decisions of the General Assembly. It is also generally
accepted tliat the Statute could be complctcly repealed and the Tribunal
abolished by decison of the General Assembly. It is not believed that
such action by the General Assembly would violate acquired rights of
staffmembers. This view has been supported by almost al1members of
the General Assembly who have commented on the subject and would
also seem to be supported by recent decisions of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal stated in recent judgments that while the contractual
elements of the relations between the staff members of the United
Nations cannot be changed without the agreement of the two parties,
the statutory elements, on the other hand, can always be changed at
any time though regulations established by the General Assembly, and
these changes are binding on staff members. It further defined al1
matters as contractual which affect the personal status of each staff
member, for example, the nature of Iiis contract, salary and grade.
It defined al1 matters as statutory elements which affect in general the
organization of the international. civil service, and the need for its STATENEXT BY >Ir. STAVROPOULO(S u.s.)-IO VI 54 303

proper functioning, for example, general mles that have no persona1
reference. It would certainly seem that the provision of an Adminis-
trative Tribunal falls within the statutory elements.
Another factor in the relationship of the General Assembly to the
Administrative Tribunal is provided by Article 3 of the Statute under
which members are appointcd by the General Assembly. A proposa1
that the members stiould be appointed by the International Coiirt of
Justice instead of by the General Assembly was not acccpted. On the
other hand, a member cannot be dismissed by the General Assembly
unless the other members of the Tribunal are of the unanimous opinion
that he is unsuited for further service. A close decision of the Fifth
Committee to the effect that the dismissal of a member of the Adminis-
trative Tribunal could take place merely by a two-thirds majority vote
of the General Assembly was reversed in the plenary meeting of the
General Assembly.
It may further he noted that the Statute of the Tribunal does not
provide for any report to the General Assembly or for any review of
its decisions:
1;ruiii tlic nbow siirvcy. tlic f;iit nii,it iiiiiiirdintcl!~;il>pnrcntis the
grcdt \.;iri.iriivlliilcsiits\vitIrcs1h:cttu ,iilisiiii:ir! urgniii cjt:il>liilic<l
II\,tlii. Lcncr;,l ,\~?enil>lv. riitii II diirntiuii. nieml~crshiii :ml
fGnctionshave been revie&ed in general tenns. It is Lot possiblEhithin
the scope of the present statement to attempt to analyze the minute
variations which exist in these respects from one organ to another.
Nor am 1 able to dcscribe the various other differences with respect
to such subjects as n~les of procedure, reporting requirements, place
of meeting, staff services, and other matters.
It is mnch more difficult to discover the few characteristics which
these organs have in common. Fundamentally, these appear to be that
the organs are established by the General Assembly and that their
membership, terms of reference and other particulars are defined by
the Assembly. Presumably the terms of reference could be changed or
the organ abolished by decision of the Assembly.
The requirement of a report is usual but not universal. Normally
such report is to be made to the General Assembly. However, in some
cases, as for example the Conciliation Commission for I'alestine, the
General Assembly has requested that reports he rendcred to the Secre-
tary-General for transmission to Member States. In other cases reports
are to he submitted not only to the General Assembly, but to other
organs such as the Security Council as in the case of the Collective
MeasuresCommittee and the Disrmament Commission,orthe Economic
and Social Coùncil as in the case of the High Commissionerfor Refugees.
It is my hope that this description of United Nations practices with
respect to snbsidiary organs established by the General Assembly may
Questions now before it.n its consideration of the issues raised by the

',The last Point refers to possible procedures for the application of
principal grounds" to individual cases.
Question z is only to be answered by the Court if the reply to Ques-
tion I 1sin the affirmative. 1wish to make it clear that by commenting
on the second question 1donot mean to imply any position with regard
to the answer to Question I. The comments which 1 shall make, in so304 STATEMEST BY arr. STAVROPOULO~ (u.N.)-IO VI 54

far as they relate to Question 2, wiUonly become relevant should Ques-
tion I be answered in the affirmative by the Court.
It may be noted that in the discussions in the General Assembly or
in Written Statements to the Court some governments have expressed
the view that issues in particular cases before tlie Tribunal could not
properly bc decided by a vote in the General Assembly. It was argued,
for example, by the representative of India in the Fifth Committee that
the General Assembly was not a proper forum to deal with questions
of Iaw or especially to examine individual cases from tliat viewpoint.
(India, Document 5, Fifth Committee, 425th meeting, paragraph 49.)
The representative of the Netberlands also expressed the view that the'
General Assembly could not perform judicial functions. (Netherlands,
Document z, FifthCommittee, 4ï1st meeting, paragraph 16 ; see also
Written Statemcnts, Distr. 54/17, page 85.)
The possible grounds on which the General Assembly miglit Iiave the
right to refuse to give effect to an award wliich were suggcsted during
discussions in the Fifth Committee have been collected in the Secretary-
General's Written Statement. Other proposed grounds have been set
forth in the Written Statements of Members of the United Nations
snbinitted to the Court.
Since 1 am not presuming in any way what the answer of the Court
to Question I may be, it would be most inappropriate for me to presume
any "principal grounds" which the Court might define in answer to
Question 2. However, \\+th this reservation, 1 should like to note that
among the possible grounds most frequently referred to by >lember
States are those which, in their application to particular cases, raise
certain problems of procedure. 1 may take, for example, the grounds
for revision or annulment of arbitral amards set forth by the Inter-
national Law Commissionin itsdraft Convention on Arbitral Procedure.
These embody a convenient summary of international jurisprudence on
the subjcct made by an organ of the United Xations, and have been
referred to bv several reuresentatives in discussions of the nresent case.

~ ~ ~~-
corruption on the part of a member of'the Tribunal :and third, that
there has been a serious departure [rom a fundainental rule of procedure,
including failure to state the reasons for the award. The draft also recog-
nized as a ground for revision of the award the discovery of some fact of
such ;inature as to have a decisive influenceon the award, provided that
~hen the award was rendered that fact was not known to the Tribunal
and to the party requesting revision and that such ignorance %-as not
diie to the negligence of the party requesting revision.
It is to be noted that while the International Law Commission indi-
cated these as grounds for annulment or revision, it also siiggested the
appropriate judicial procedures which it considered should be followed
in applying these grounds. In the case of possiblegrounds of annulment,
the International Law Commissiorirecommended that the question be
considered by the International Court of Justice, and if annulment was
decided, then the case should be re-submitted to a new tribunal. In

the case of possible grounds for revision, the arbitral tribunal itself, or,
should consider such revisionl, then the International Court of Justice, STATEhlENT BY Hr. STAVROPOU~OS (u.N.)-IO VI 54
305
In the report of the Commission covering the work of its fifth session,
the following observations wcrc made with particular reference to excess
of power as a ground for annulment :

"It is a fundamental-and inescapable-principle of jurisprudence
that an arbitral tribunal must have the power to determine its
competence on tlie basis of the instrument which is the source of
its jurisdiction. It is a no less fundamental principle that an award
rendered in excess of the powers conferred by that instrument is
nul1and void. The satisfactory operation of these two equally essen-
tial principles can be assurcd only by an impartial judicial authority
competent to decide whether there has taken place excess of juris-
diction."

The Governrneiit of thc Netherlands in its IVritten Statement to the
Court, after referring to tlie grounds enurnerated in the Draft Con-
vention of the International Law Commission, stated :

"But there would be littlc poiiit in recognizing these grounds if
not at the same timc rriacliinery would be provided in order to
decide whether or not in a certain case these grounds are invoked
rightly; leaving this to either party would deprive the award of
its binding and final character." (1,C.J. Distr54/17.page 85.)
1 might also note that the present Statute of the Administrative
Tribunal of the lnternational Labour Organization, as amended in 1946,
provides that tlie Governing Body of the International Labour Office

or the Administrative Board of the Pensions Fund may challenge a
decision of the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction, or may question
the validity of the decision ori the grounds that it is vitiated by funda-
mental fault in the procedure followed. However, the Statute also
provides that the Governing Body must submit the question of the
validity of the decision to the lnternational Court of Justice for an
Advisory Opinion, and the opinion given by the Court is binding.
The article provi~lingfor this challenge and reference to the Court \vas
adopted in October 1946, following the decision of the Assembly of
the League of Nations not to pay certain awards which had heen made
hy the Tribunal which had served both the League of Xations and the
International Labour Orgnnization.
The examples 1 gave suggest procedures which might be open to tlie
General Assembly with regard to the application of principal grouiids to
particular cases. III the first place, it might be possible that the Assembly
could order that the case be sent back to the Administrative Tribunal
for reconsideration. Thc procedure of revision is well-established in inter-
national practicc iii thc case of discovery of a new material fact. Such
proceduri for rcvision would not seem to be inconsistent with a provision
that a judgment is final and witliout appeal. Article 60 of tlie Statute
of the Iiitcrnatioiial Court of Justice provides that its judgments are

final and witbout alilieal. The following Article of the Statute permits
an application for revision when it is based upon the discovery of some
fact of such a naturc as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the
judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also tothe party claiming
revision, always provided tliat such ignorance was not due to negligence.
\Vhat is the possibility of reconsideration of a case by the Adminis-
trative Tribunal ? The Secretary-Gerieral in his \Witten Staternent to306 STATE~IENT BY MT. <TAVROPOULOS (u.N.)-IO VI 54 l
the Court described the action in the case of Miss Jane Reed. In that
case, Counsel for the SecretaryGeneral applied for the revision of an
award based on the correction of an error of fact. The Tribunal, in
fixing the compensation, had based its computation on the age of
MissReed and the time remaining beforeshe would have been eligible for
retirement had shenot been terminated. It was subsequently discovered
that there was an error in the age and the fact was recognized by both
parties.
The Tribunal, in correcting the award, stated tliat it was entitled
to rectify figures computed on the basis of a date submitted by both
parties and recognized by both after the judgment as erroneous. As
noted in the \Vritten Statement, other questions relating to the power
of the Administrative Tribunal to reconsider a case or revise a judgment
are as yet undetermined by the Tribunal. The Statute of the Tribunal
is silent on the subject.
\\'liile the procedure of revision is normally limited to the discovery
of migtake or of new material facts. it would appcar possible that a
similar procedure could be considered for the re-esamination of a case on
other possible grounds, should the Court findthat there areany grounds
which would justify the Assembly in refusiog to give effect to an award.
On the other hand, as noted above in reference to the Statute of
the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization,
ancl t r the drxft Convention on Arbitral Procedure pxepared by the
International Law Commission, there is precedent for a procedure pro-
viding for a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court
of Justice in order to obtain a determination of the legal questions
involved. The General Assembly might, in fact, providefor botli methods
and, if ttie Assembly were still dissatisfied, reference to the Court.,
Perhaps othe~ procedures, such, for example, as reference to a special
committee of the Assembly, miglit also be considered for the examina-
tion of issues of this kind in particular cases.
I'resumably the procedures which 1have rnentioned could he provided
by the Geiieral Assembly by amendment of the Statute of the Tribunal
under Article II. It is not my intention to discuss whether or uot they
coulà be applied without amendirig the present Statute. Such discussion
would involve consideration of whether or not there are "any grounds"
under the present Statute of the Admiiiistrative Tribunal and other
relevant iiistruments on wliich the General Assembly could refuse to
give effect to an award of compensation made by the Tribunal. As 1
have already emphasized, 1 did not intend, in discussing these proce-
dural aspects, to imply any position with respect to the answer to Ques-
tion I.
In closing 1 should like to refer to another possible ground which
has been frequently mentioned by representatives in their discussion
of this matter. This possible ground is that of an unreasonably large
award of compeiisation. The question of reasonableness of compensation
\vas undoubtedly of concern to the General Assembly. At its Eighth
Session it dealt with the problem by an amendment to Article g of the
Statute of the Administrative Tribunal. This Article was amended for
the purpose intear lia of placing a ceiling on the amount of compensation
which might be awarded. STATEhlENT BY hlr.STAVROPOULOS (u.N.)-IO VI 54 307

Under the amended Article 9,compensation is not ta esceed the equiv-
alent of two years' net base salary of the applicant. The Article further
provides, however, that the Tribunal may, in exceptional cases, when
it considers it justified, order the payment of a higher indemnity. A
statement of the reasons for the Tribunal's decision is to accompany
each such order.
\Vith respect ta this possible ground, it will thus be seen tliat the
General Assembly has acted in its legislaiive capacity in order to mini-
mize the possibility of what it might consider an excessively large award. 2. ORAL STATERIENT BY MI. PHLEGER
(REPKESEKTING THE GOVEHNMENT OF THE UNITEI) STATES OF AMERICA)
AT THE PUBLIC SITTINGS OF ]UNE 10th AND Ilth, 1954

[Public sitling of June rolh, 1954. ullernoon]

MI. President and Honourable Members of the Court :

May it please tlie Court,
The events giving rise ta the request for an advisory opinion of this
Court mav be brieflv summarized as foilo~s ~ :
Ilvtiv-:cil~eceiiit)ér1952niid 11:~):iijjjtlicSecrcrnr!.-Geiier:il diiriiis-
srd rlt:\.a~st;~ifiiieinbers ufilii1lriitc.dSntioiis. 'l'liis:icti\vas II~FC~
on tlieir refusal ta answer questions put ta them by an investigating
comrnittee of the United States Senate. These questions related ta mem-
bership in the Cornmunist Party or subversive activities against the
United States. The refusals to auswer were based upon a plea of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United .States upon the
ground that the answers might tend to incriininate the witnesses.
The discharged staff members filed applications with the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, aileging non-performance or non-
observance of the terms of their contracts.
TheAdministrativeTribunal rendered judgments in their favour, and
awarded compensation to the eleven in the total amount of one hundred
and seventy ~thousand dollars ($17o,ooo)-an average of more than
$xj,ooo per employee. The highest single award was $40,000 ;the lowest,
$4,700.
The Secretary-General included this amount of S170,oooin his budget
report to the General Assembly on Supplementary Estimates for the
Financial Year 1953, and proposed a supplementary appropriation of
S17g.ooofor Section 17 of the United Nations Budget to pay the awards
including compensation, adjusted salary ta date of termination, and
legal costs.
Some Members of the Assenibly objected to the appropriation. Debate
tlien ensued botli in favour of aiid against payrnent. Some members.
took the position that the Assembly had no power to refuse ta give
effect ta the awards : that they were irrevocable and binding on the
Assembly, which had no choice but to pay them. Others took the position
that the Assembly not only had the power but the cluty to examine
auards of the Tribunal, and that these particular awards should not be
paid. Still otliers took intermediate positions.
In the course of the debate it was proposed that, before the Assembly

acted on the request for appropriation, the opinion of this Court should
be sought ;and on December g, 1gj3, the General Assembly adopted by
41 votes ta 6, with 13 abstentions, a Resolution submitting two ques-
tions to this Court for its advisory opinion. Tliese questions are :
"(1) Having regard to the Statute of the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal and to any other relevant instruments and
ta the relevent records, has the General Assembly the right on any grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of com-
pensation made by that Tribunal in favour of a staff memher

of theUnited Nationswhose contract of service has been termi-
nated without liis assent ?
(2)If the answer given by the Court to question (1) is in the
affirmative, what are tlie principal grounds upon which the
General Assembly coiild lawfully exercise such a right ?"

In the view of the United States Government, the argument that the
Assembly has no right to review the awards, and must automatically
pay them, cannot be sustained. \\le think the Asseinbly has not only
the right, but the duty as well; to examine requests for appropriations,
and has the right to refuse appropriations to pay awards of the Admin-
istrative Tribunal in those cases where it belieres tliat the relevant
considerations so require. \\'e think the grounds to support such action

are found in the Charter provisions defining the budgetary and regula-
tory responsibilities of the t\ssembly, its relationship to subsidiaryorgans
such as the Administrative Tribunal, the function of tlie Secretary-
General as the chief administrative officer of the Orzanization, and in
the Charter pro\.isions regarding interpretation and jüdicial power.
Whether the General Assemblv should decide, in a riven case, to
refuse an appropriation must dePend on its judgment of many factors
which are proper for the Assembly's consideration. The weighing of
these factors adds up to n judgment of a legislative character, to be
made by the highest United Nations body in which al1 Members are
represented. The Charter basis and limitations of Assembly action
can and should be stated as a matter of law. The reasons and motivations
of Assembly decision to vote or refuse an appropriation in a particular
situation are othenvise to be left to the judgment of thc Assembly, as
the United Xations orgaii with immediate responsibility in the matter.

1 will state briefly the propositions for which we shall contend in
the course of argument.
First, the questions put to this Court by the General Assembly are
legal questions, concerniiig the Assembly's right and power to vote
funds, or to refuse to vote them. The questions do not relate to policy
considerations of what the Assembly should or should not do.
2. The Charter reqiiires n two-thirds vote of the General Assembly
before United Nations funds can be spent. Article 17 requires that ail
expenditure be co~zsideredby the Assembly. ,The Assembly cannot be
compeiled to make an automatic appropriation without consideration
and deliberate approval.
3.The General Assembly has not voted any appropriation to pay

the Tribunal's awards, either in advance or alter they were made.
4. There is no basis in the Charter for any delegation by the General
Assembly, to any other body, of the Assembly's duty to examine and
pass upon all requests for funds. In fact, the Assembly has not sought
-in the Staff Regulations or the Statute of the Administrative Tribu-
nal-to make any sucli delegation of responsibility.
5. The Administrative Tribunal is a subsidiary organ of the General
Assembly under the Charter. The Tribunal's judgments cannot bind the
Assembly nor can their status be superior to that of authoritative
expressions by this Court, whicli is the principal judickil organ of theUnited Nations, on matters referred to the Court by the Assembly.
Even in such cases the Court's opinions are advisory only.
6. The one precedent, bearin upon the relationship of the Assembly
to the Tribunal and staff mem%ersin the matter of awards, is to the
effect that the Assembly may refuse to give effect to Tribunal awards.
Such was the decision of the League of Nations in 1946.
7. The contract between a staff member and the United Nations
Secretariat may not infringe the Charter responsibility and powers
of such principal organs as the Secretary-General and the General
Assembly. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer,
The terms of a staff member's contract are siibject to these responsi-.
bilities and powers.

on a staff member by the General Assembly. He has no vested or acquired
right to this resort, and the Assembly may abolish the Tribunal.
Similarly, he has no vested or acquired right to any award given by the
Tribunal during a period when the Assembly permits such resort.
Awards. of necessitv. remain subiect to the Charter Dowersof ~rincii~al
United Nations orians.
g. In discharge of its Charter responsibilities for the United Nations
budget,and for the control of its suhsidiary organs, the GeneralAssemhly
may examine any award rendered hy the Administrative Tribunal, and
may refuse to give it effect on aiiy Charter grounds. Thus, it might do
so on grounds relating to the criteria set forth in Article 101, para-
grnph 3,for selection of staff, on financial grounds, on groundsrelating to
the proper functioning of the Tribunal, among others. The considerations
and reasons leading the Assembly to pay an award or to refuse payment,
on auy grounds, are not questions of law but of policy ; they are as
broad and varied as are the bases for action by any legislative body.

Let us now turn to a detailed consicleration of these propositions.
The questions which the General Assembly addressed to this Court
are strictly legal in character and intentionally limited in scope. They
and tlie Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Articlens,
96 of the Charter excludes policy questions from reference for advisory
opinion.
These considerations were recognized by the United Kingdom when,
in introducine the draft resolution Drovidine for reference to this Court.

to the kraft-r/solution, proposed by France and desi&ed to submit
to this Court the merits of the awards and commit the Assembly to the
result, were rejected. Written Statements 178-79.
Tlius, the Gcneral Assembly did not intend to shift its responsibilities
to this Court. It souglit advice, ;iiid only legal advice, on its own legal
autliority with respect to Tribunal awards. It did not ask what it should
decide as to payment. Nor did it make any advance provision to pay
the awards. It considered and rejected proposais to such ends. It simply
asked if it had the right to refuse effect to awards on any grounds at
all, and, ifso, on what principal grounds. STATEMENT BY m. PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-IO VI 54 311

"Kight", in the context of a question addressed to this Court, must
mean legal right. This is emphasized in the United Kingdom Written
Statement, where it is said :"The questions before the Court are solely
questions of law." Written Statements 103. M'hen we.speak of the right
power, and its exercise in a fashion consistent with the authority and
responsibility of the Assembly under the Charter.
\Ve do not mean moral, or ethical, or political right. Such matters
are, in tlieir nature, not properly the subject of a request for an advisory
opinion. They are to be weighed and decided by the responsible political
body, here the General Assembly, which we must assume will give due
weight to al1 such considerations in the discharge of its responsibility
under the Charter.
Question two speaks of the "principal grounds" upon which the
Assembly could la~~fwllryefuse to give effect to an award of the Tribunal.
The presencc of the word "lawfully" is sigiiificant. It emphasizes again
that the questions suhmitted are legalincharacter and that the "grouiids"
for refusal involve questions of power, and not of ethics or mornls.
\IThat are the "principal grounds" ? Does the question ask this Court
to declare what in the applicable law, and basically in the Charter,
bears upon the Assembly's right to tliscuss and decide ? Does it ask,
what are the relevant provisions and what is their legal meaning ?
\f7e think the Court is asked these questioris.
But is this Court asked to declare how the Assembly shall weigh
its lawful concerns in the light of given or hypothetical fact? The last
question, we submit, must be put aside, since it would not be this
Court's rôle to anticipate Assembly policy or to substitute this Court's
judgment for the political judgment of another principal organ of the
United Nations in deciding amongst lawful alternatives.
Tlic United Kingdom is correct iii saying of the two questions asked
the Court: "these two questions are closely related to one aiiother".
Wrilten Stntements 102.The truth is, that the "principal grounds" are
the legal reasons why an affirmative ariswer must be given to question
one. A reasoned determination that the General Assembly has the legal
cipal legal groun<ls for any such refusal. They are the principal legaln-
bases of Assembly authority,and the principal legal provisions governing
its esercise.
Mr. President. what is the authority and the responsibility of the
General Assembly under the Charter?
The questions submitted raise issues concerning the nature and
constitutional structure of the United Nations. This is not a simple
case of a iuridical entitv-such as a nrivate nerson, a coruoration. or
cven a nat'ionalgoverndent-which hks a contract r&lationihip with an
individual. An individual's rirhts under a contract with a private person,
corporation, or national g&ernment are determined- according to
municipal law made by the sovereign. In this case, however, rights and
obligations must be determined in accordance with the disposition of a
treaty entered into by sixty sovereigns-the Charter of the United
Xations.
In the United Xations Organization, power is not centralized in one
organ, as it is in theegislature of Great Britain or France, for esample.
The commitments which may be undertaken by, and enforced against. STATEhlENT BY hlr. PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-IO VI 54
313
precisely for this reason that the matter com'esbefore the Fifth
Committee. For at the very outset there is posed the vital question
-wliether the award of a tribunal set up by its authority, or

whether any other outside authority can or shoulcl override the
power of appropriation and its free exercise, without which no
sovereign body may continue effectively to exercise its functions.
However, it has been suggested by some delegations tliat the
Assembly lias no option but to make the necessary appropriations
to meet witliout questioii the awards of the Administrative Tribunal.
That is iiot a position with which my delegation can associate
itself. It is Our view that the Assembly has the authority to decline
to accept findiiigs of the Tribunal and has also the unquestionable
authority to accept the findings of the Triburial but to Vary the
awards the Tribuiial has made.
The coiistitutioiial instrument of the United Nations is the

Charter, whicli has established the Geiieral Assembly and the
Secretariat as principal organs of the United Natioiis aiid which
kas markcd out the powers of both. Neither has the power to
extend or derogate from a power which the Charter lias reposed
in the other-or for that matter, in itself."

Further, Sir I'ercy said :
"ti'hen we corne to an award of compensation, the exercise by
the Assembly of its appropriation power becomes a real issue.

An awarcl of the Tribunal mav cal1 not for ~assive acauiesceiice
un tlicpart oftlie :\ssciiil~ly, h;it for thc cxcrckc ;ipo6itivc ivay
uf its :ilq>rol>riiitioiipo\i1sritto bc ssscrted tli;tt ilic i\ssc:inbly,
iii;tiuul:.tiiiriilie Stntiitc of tlic I'ribiiiiil tliit tlic Ui~itedSations
sliall~~ay cohpensation awarded, has foregone pro tanto its appro-
priation power? If so, by what authority did the Assembly strip
itself of a power which the Charter has placed upoii it ? In the
opiriion of iny Delegation there is no warrant for any such suggestion.
\tTc feel that the Assemblv would have everv iustification for
dccliniiig to exercise its appropriation power in >i<y case iii which
it appearecl to it that the Tribunal had acted unreasonably or
improperly."

Articles 17 and 18, then, establish a basic procedure, aiid a guaranty
of minority rights wliich the General Assembly is powerless to curtail
or deny. The Charter requires a two-thirds vote for an appropriation of
money. The Assembly, aiid the Assembly itself, must coiisider, and it

must approve. Every member of the Secretariat, when he enters the
employ of the United Xations, is bound to know and to respect the
Charter, whicli becomes a part of his contract of employment. He caiinot,
therefore, properly assert a right to any appropriation whicli the Assem-
bly, in the discharge of its lawful responsibility, has considered and
refused to make.
\Ve have noted already the general acceptance of the proposition
that an Assembly appropriation is essential to effect payment of any
award. It seems important to stress here that no appropriation has
been made for the payment of the awards which give rise to these
questions, and that the General Assembly has deliberately refrained
from an authorization for automatic payment of Tribunal awards.

22 \\:tien the General Asserriblycitohlihed the .A(lministrnti\.c'Tribunal
in 10.40.IIsccms clcar that itlli(lnoi conceive of itsulf:isthcn corisidt-riiiu
and-Gproving payment of the present awards, handed down four yea;
later. The Assembly might have been asked to appropriate a fund in
awards. Such action, about which doubts have been expressed in theribunal
Assembly, would have required a two-thirds plcnary vote expressing
uneqiiivocally the Assembly's intent. There was no siich action by the
Assembly in 1949 or in any subsequent year. .
In fact, in 1953 Argentina iiitroduced in the I7ifth Committee a
proposa1 to request tlie Secretary-General to study and report on the
possibility of establishing a special fund to be used for the payment of
awards. The Committee did not act fonnally on this proposal, but
decided that the Committee's report to the General Assembly should
state that the Secretary-General shoiild preseiit such a report at the
Ninth Session. Also in 1953, the General Assembly rejecteda proposa1to
authorizc payment of the very awards which gave rise to these questions,
in the eveiit that this Court should advise that the Assembly did not
haThis course of conduct on the part of the General Assembly
indicates the Assembly'sconservativeapproach to the matter of advance
authorization.
The French Government. in its Written Statcment, has argued the
contrary, citing Section 17 of the United Natioiis Budget, which covers
common staff costs. But tliis Section, while providing some latitude
to meet specified types of contingent expenses, makes no mention of
Tribunal awards. And the General Assembly has not continued the
practice of the League of Nations of voting a nominal annual approria-
tion to pay awards.
Thus, consistently since Ig4i the General Assembly has left the
procedural situation in such a status that possible questions conceming
pay them. [Vhether or not tlie Assembly might have provided differently,o
and with what effects, the fact is, it did not do so. In our view, even an
advance authorization of paymeiit by the General Assembly would not
have put the appropriated funds beyond the recall of a subsequent
session of the Asscmbly, prior to actual payment: but such is not the
situation here.
1 turn now to the provisions governing the appointment and regula-
tiori of the staff.
Articles 97 and 101 of the Charter are important, for here are found
the provisions dealing with the staff, authority over the staff, and the
nature of the legal relations that may be established between the staff
and the United Nations.
trative officerof the United Xations. It reads a: the chief adminis-

"The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such
staff as the Or-anization mav .eaii.re. The Secretarv-General shall
IJÇ:ip~~ointe~bly tlic Genenl As.ii.nibly upoii the r~cc~iiitii~nd;iiioii
of the 5ecurity C'ouncil.Ili.;li;iILe ttic chief n~lniinistrati\.cnilicer
of the Organiiation."316 STATEMEIÏT BY nrr. PHLECER (U.S.A.)- IO VI 54

In 1949, after four years of experience, the Assembly established the
Administrative Tribunal to assist in discharging any review functions
of the tlssembly in cases where a staff member alleged non-observance
of his contract by the Secretary-General. Could it be said that the

General Assembly possessed the implied power under the Charter to
preclude itself from reviewing the validity and propriety of action by
the Tribunal, to deprive itself of its legal authority to exercise powers
exclusively vested in it hy the Charter ? 1s this "necessary" or "essen-
tial" to any of the "four importarit principles" stated at San Francisco
and embodied in the Charter ?
The Netherlands and Mexico Iiûve contended that the General Assem-

bly possesses an implied power to delegate to a subsidiary body a power
of decision in a matter involving finances and administration that will
bind the Assembly. Written State~nents 77 (Netherlauds), 240 (Mexico).
In the case of the Netherlands nosition. it is interestine to note that tlic
IIIIIII I I III ili~ I'iirlt(~i~iiiiiitt,~I I I l II rlic
:\jat,~~iI>lI~tcIkJ JII(~~~:Ipn\v< I; 11.i..ct01irt.1.11151CI~L,~ IIIIIIVI~rt~ri:l~
\\rirr<n 5i:iftiii~iit III iiiiiir~r.>i111t:!it,\rrl..itiii.~IiIc.r.~t~t.I i.t,\ig.r
is possible here, for one &hot delegate wliût one lacks. ~U Written'state-

ments 14. In any event, to sustain the existence of such an implied power
of delegation, two conditions must be inet. Pirst, the power to delegate
must be consistent with the other provisions of the Charter and must
not be precluded by them. Second, the power to delegate miist be neces-
sary or essential to the performance of the duties and functions of the
General Assembly.
France and Guatemala have arhwed that the Charter iniplies a capa-

city in the Assembly to assign or i-enounce certain powers of the United
Nations Organization i~ifavour of the Administrative Tribunal witliout
possibility of Assembly revieur. 14'rittenStatements 13-15 (France), 252
(Guatemala). The same testsmust be applied to this theory. 1sthe power,
sought to be iinplied, consistent with Charter provisions, and is it neces-
sary in order to make them effective ?
As we have already observed, the budgetary provisions in Articles 17

and 15 constitute a bar to the implication that such a power of delega-
tion or renunciation exists under the circumstances nresented here.
In addition, there are other barriers in the Charter to t'he existence of
suc11an implication. These are Articles 7, 22, 92 and 96 and associated
.provisions, ihich will be discussecl later:
But even if these obstacles to the existence of an implied power of
delegation did not exist, the second test would not be met. The authority

and independence of the Secretary-General, the efficiency, competence
and integrity of the staff, the regulatory power of the General Assembly,
the principlc of geographical distribution, al1these fundamental princi-
ples must be considered together. They are in truth better served by
the Assenibly's autliority to review Tribunal action than they could
possiùly he by an implied power to create a rigid legal bar in whole or
in part to the exercise of such a power of review. Indeed, even looking

but to one aspect, the fact is that the protection of the staff against
arbitrary action by the Secretary-General does not require that the
Assembly deprive itself of its rigl~t of action, especially when one con-
siders some action to be necessary to discharge its own duties under the
Charter. STATEXEXT BY III'.PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-II \'I54 3I7
If there is any conclusion to be based upon necessity, it must be the

other way. A tribunal can act-trihunals have acted-in excessof their
power. They can be biased, or badly mistaken, in giving effect tothe
real intent of the law they administer. If this happens, tlie integrity of
tlie system established by the Asseinbly requires power in the Assembly
to maintain it. And the General Assembly needs an uriimpaired choice
of the best means to this end. The case mnst be envisaged whcrc it can-
not-in good conscience or good sense-permit error to stand, andan
innocent party to he injurecl or a party at fault to be rewarded.
If the Assembly concludcd that tlie Tribunal hacl committed grave
error in denying compensation to astaffmemberwhohad been discharged,
would it be argued that the Assembly waç without legal right to correct
tlie error by authorizing a payment ? And if the failure of the Tribunal
to make the award had been caused by the Tribunal's misconstruction
of the Charter or Regulations, would it be argued that the Assembly

did not have the legal right to correct the mistake ?
The Assembly has ample power to achieve its legitimate erids in
building strong morale and avoiding proceedings vexations to its
Committees. It is a discretionary power. It is based on the exercise
of political judgment. It includes the power to abide by the policy of
not interfering with an award unless strong reasons m;ike remedial
steps essential.
It is upon the judicious use of such power, and upon the political
wisdom of the Assembly, r:itlier tlian upon inflexible, artificial-aiid,
in this instance, unconstitutional-self-denying ordinances, that a
sound and balanced international administration must be based. Justice
to staff and administration requires maintenance and wise ilse, not
auto-liquidation, of Assembly porver. And, ivhen another organ ol the
United Xatioiis, such as tliis Court, considers the future esercise of
power by the Assembly, it must presuine that the Assembly will he
guided iii its action by the wisdom and by the principles of equity and

honour hy which the principal legislativc body of tlie United N at'ons
sliould be guided.

hlay it please tlie Court.
As we concludcd ycsterclay, 1 was, pointing out tliat the Charter
iinplies no power in the Assembly to delegate, witliout possibility of
review, any of its responsibilities for regulatior~ of ttic staff. I3efore
leaving Articles 97 and 101, another point sliould be noted. Tliese
Articles, thus far, have been viewed primarily as they relate to the
powers of the Assembly. They also, of course, relate just as directly to

the pomers of the Secretary-General.
Indeed, as chief admiiiistrative officer and tlie persoii vested with
tlie appointive power, it is tlie Secretary-General aho, on a day-to-diy
basis, is most immediately concerned in discharging the responsibilities
and achieving the standards set by the Charter for tlie Secretariat. His
is a joint respoiisibility with tlic Assembly. Neitlier can disregard the
rights and duties of tlie otlierIfthey cannot do so (lirectly. tliey cannot
do so indirectly.318 STATEIIENT BY hlr. PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-II VI 54
The Assembly cannot lawfully require the Secretary-General to act
in a fashion inconsistent with the maintenance of the highest standards

of efficiency, competence and inti!grity of the Secretariat. If an organ
is created by the Assembly, the Assembly cannot authorize it to do
something it could not do itself. For example, to empomverthe Tribunal
to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary-General in matters
involving the esercise of liis power to employ and manage the Secretariat,
and thus his responsibility foi the staff and its discipline, would bc a
serious infringemerit of tlic Secri:tary-Gencral's constitutioiial powers
uiider the Charter.
The Assembly necessarily retains tlie right-indeed, it is its diity-to
vacate, rcvise or refuse effect ti,a Tribunal decision impairing the
Charter oowers and riahts of the Secretarv-General. Recause of the
presumpfion of legalit? in favour of Assembly action, the Assembly
should not he held to have inteniled that the Administrative Tribunal

should have unconstitutional powers.
The General Assembly can, of course, empower a subordinate body to
render opinions as to the proper application of the Staff liegulations
and make decisions for the correction of legal errors believed to have
been made hy the Secretary-General-through arbitrary action or action
outside his authority.But no such body may revise acts of the Secretary-
General clone within the scope of his authority, for this would violate
the Charter. A subordinate body may not be allowed to decide irrevo-
cably whether action of the Secretary-General was authoriïed or not, in
the discharge of his Charter respc~nsibilities.
Examiiiation of the record in the present cases, we believe, would

demoustrate that tlie Tribunal lias attempted to reverse the Secretary-
General in respect of matters within his Charter authority and beyond
the authority of the Tribunal. However that may be, the very possi-
bility of such a developmeiit-whatever the cases in which it sh8uld
be found to arise-indicates that the Charter does not merely allow,
but requires,the existence of power to review and to set aside Tribunal
action as void where-it runs counter to the Charter.
From these considerations, the conclusion would appear to follow
that an implied power of the General Assembly to establish an adminis-
trative tribunal may he both necessary and essential : but that an
imolied oower in addition. to imoose leeal limitations uoon the General
~siembfi's (or the secretary-Géneral'S) omi express Charter powers,

is not necessary or esseiitial, and not legally admissible.
We suhmit that the Administrative Tribunal is a subsidiary organ
of the General Assemblv, within the meanina of the Charter.
Ifone asks to be shown the express autho2ty for the Administrative
Tribunal, the only provisions of the Charter which can be pointed to
in answer are Articles 7 and 22.
They read :

"Article 7. (1)There are established as the principal organs of
the United Nations : a General Assembly, a Security Council, an
Economic and Social Couni:il, a Trusteeship Council. an Inter-
national Court of Justice, aiid a Secretariat.

(2)Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be
estahlished in accordance with the present Charter." STATEJIEST BY hlr. PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-II VI 54 3'9

"Article zz. The General Assembly may establish such subsid-
'iary organs as it deerns necessary for the performance of its
functions."
There is very substantial agreement that the Administrative Tribunal
of the United Nations was established under Article 22. The French,
Mexican and Philippine statements are clear on this point. Wvitten
Statements 14-15, 240, 232. The United Kingdoin docs not contcst it.
Written Statements 104-105.
It follows, it is submitted, that the Tribunal was established as a
subsidiary organ by the General Assembly to meet a need for a subsid-
iary organ for the performance of certain functions of the General
Assembly-in short, to help it in its work. It was not and could not
have been established to be some other kind of orean. s-ch as a non-
su1)sidi;irvurgtiii or:IIorg:in iieces;tiry for Ille perft>rm:inccof liii~ctions
no1 :al>l>cflniriiiito the Asscin1,ly.
'1'Rcrciiiight ~io.<sib11;ivcbceii soiiic doubt uiitliis poinifAriicli:22
rcxd as wxi ~~rul~u;e il:iilrnft referrcd tuilirCu-urdiiiation Cuiiiriiitrec
:it $:in Fr.~iicisco.This dralt ~~rovid~!t1I1:ittlic (.;:ncr;~I~\s~~!iii~:ivm
create such bodies and agencies as it may deem necessary for ihe pei-
formance of its functions". But Article 22, as adoptcd, pro\zides only
for "subsidiary organs".
Subsidiary in what sensc ? ':Subsidiary" in relation to "principal",
as Article 7 shows. Subsidiary, then, to the principal organs or to one
or more of the principal organs.
The Charter language is clear sithout reference to the legislative
history. But when one does examine the legislative history, one finds
that the Advisory Committee of Junsts at San Fraiicisco dealt precisely
with this problem. It took account of the meaning of principal and
subsidiary in Article 7. It made the language of Articles 22 and 29
conform to the basic intention. The creation of organs not subsidiary
to principal organs was not authorized. Elimination of the broad terms
originally proposed-namely, "such bodies and agencies", and the use
of the precise term "subsidiary organs", removed any possible linguistic
ambiguity.
"Subsidiary" as used in 1945 clearly meant subordinatc to, ancillary
to, and not controllin on And by the time the Administrative Tribunal
was set up in 1949, four.years later, the General Assembly had spoken
with authority and virtual unanimity on this very point. when, in 1947,
Committee. The Soviet Union opposed the establishment of an Interim
Committee, asserting that it must be tmly subsidiary and that it would
not be, but would encroach upon the powers of the Security Council.
Blr. John Foster Dulles, then a Delegate of the United States to the
General Assembly, met the argument in this way. He said :

"The test must be to define what is meant by 'subsidiary' and
then to apply that definition to the actual proposal before you.
There could, of course, be differences of opinion as to how to define
the word 'subsidiary'. However,we have available here a definition
by &Ir.Vyshinsky which is good enough for present purposes. In
the debate before the First Committee be stated with regard to the
subsidiary organs that :'They are such as will help the Assembly
to carry out its functions ...Their functions'-that is, the functions Article 92 : "The International Court of Justice shail be the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations."
Article 96 (1): "The General Assembly or the Security Council may
request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion
on any legal question."
The independence of United Nations organs, one from another, in

regard to regal questions was contemplafed at the Sa11 Francisco
Conference. Cominittee IV/z, on Legal Problems, reported as follows :
"In the course of the operations from day to day of the various
organs of the Organization, it is inevitablc that each organ will
interpret such parts of the Charter asare applicable toits particular

functions. This process is inherent in the functioning of any body
which operates under an instrument defining its functions and
powers. It will be manifested in the functioning of such a body
as the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the International
Court of Justice. Accordingly, it is not necessary to include in the
Charter a provision either authorizing or approving the normal
operation of this principle.
Difficulties may conceivably arise in the event that there should
be a difference of opinion among the organs of the Organization
concerning the correct interpretation of a provision of the Charter.

Thus, two organs may conceivably hold and may express or even
act upon different views. Under unitary forms of national govern-
ment the final determination of such a question may be vested in
the liighest court or in some other national authority. However,
the nature of the Organization and of its operation would not seem
to be such as to invite the inclusion in the Charter of any provision
of this nature. If two illember States are at variance concerning
the correct interpretation of the Charter, they are of course free
to submit the dispute to the Iriternational Court of Justice as in

the case of any otber treaty. Similarly, it would always be open
to the General Assembly or to the Security Council, in appropriate
circumstances, to ask the International Court of Justice for an
advisory opinion concerning the meaning of a provision of the
Chartcr. Should the General Assembly or the Security Council
prefer another course, an ad hoc committee of jurists rnight he set
up to examine the question and report its views, or recourse might
be had to a joint confcrence. In hrief, the members or the organs
of the Organization might have recourse to various expedients in

order to obtain an appropriate intcrpretation. It would appear
neithcr necessarv nor desirable to list or to descrihe in the Charter
the various possible expedients.
It is to be understood, of course, that if an interpretation made
by any organ of the Organization or by a commitfee of jurists is
not gencrally acceptable it will be without hinding force. In such
circumstances, or in cases where it is desired to establish an authori-
tative internretation as a rlrccedent for the futiire. it mav he
ii~.~t~..iiv1,;rnih><i! tiiv iii;~i~~iii:iiii>iii.iii.,iii..i..1iilvti>rlic

I i . I I 1 1 .iIivt\.;l~t:.~:~t~ii~~~list~1~1.rt.,.our,c:1,) Ilcc
\>i,>r?J~ir~y-r>~I,Ic~ .,n~~ntin~,~i)!.Ij t.S<:lO [.),O-;b,,-;lo.
This report was approved and adopted by Commission IV of the Confer-
ence. 13 UXCIO Doc. 68. The practice of independence among the orgnns is too familiar to
reqnire elaborat'ion.
hlutual independence among United Nations organs means in the
present case, among other tliings, that the General Assembly lacks the
right to bind the Secretary-General as heacl of the Secretariat by Assem-
bly interpretations of tlie Charter. Could it achieve this result through
the device of establishing a subsidiary organ with quasi-judicial
functions ?
Under tlie Charter, an opinion of this Court sought by the General
Assenibly is advisory only. The Assembly may accept and act upon it or

not, as the Assembly sees fit. Since this is triie of opinions rendered
bv the Court. is it reasonable 10 sunoose tl. . determinations bv a
.~iil~si(linii,otly of rlic (;t.ricrai :\;scinbIy coiil~ili;~vegrc3tt:r forcc, ind
upcr:ite IO I>iiittlie ,\ssciiil>ly' flic resiilt \i.oiilib,: :iiioni;tlou.if the
;iiitlioritv of rlie i>rin. .iaIiudicinl orrctn uf thc I;riiterl S;ltioii.i \,is..i-\.is
tlic :\si~~~iiibWy&L. lcsj t1i:iii tlir ;iiitEiirity:isecoii<lnry<~ii:isi-]iiiJici:il
i>rg:iiiivliicli \vas subsiili:ir\. ro [lit: (;viivr;il Asjcmhly.
l'lie i1;itu.i of ttiis Coiirr as itorri~cibul iuclicial orciii <ifIli? Ciiitt.il
S,iti~~iisiiiust rcin:~ii:II~niirationon ,111y,.A(Iministr~ri\~eTritniii;tl !vI~icli
rlit c;cnf:r;~l :\j;criihly m:iy citrihli;li. TIit: :\sjcnibl\ cuulrl follo\i. -1

i)r:iriicc <J;Iicccurinc tlic 'l'ribiiii;1cc:iliiir(:r~>rct:~tionsIJiir 1l.e:\sicni-
bly could not ~ffec~vely reiiounce its"right ti seek an advisory opinion
of this Court on the same questions which had been passcd on by the
Tribunal.
IVe submit that it follows froiu the Charter provisions on advisory
opinions, from the principle of inutual independence of the principal
organs in matters of Charter interpretation, and from the position of
this Court as the principal judicial organ, that a subsidiary organ of
the General Assembly must remain subsidiary to the General Assembly
and secondary to tliis Court on questions of law.
\Ve have not indicated what we believe the Charter permits, and

what it requires, concerning the relationsliip between the General Assem-
bly and the Administrative Tribunal. \Ve have also pointed out that
the Assembly's intention should be construed as being consistent with
the Charter provisions, since the Assembly must be presumed to have
intended to act in a constitutional manner. ~ - ~ ~rom these conside~-~ ~
ations, we believe the Staff Regulations and the Statute of the ~dminis-
trative Tribunal were desiened in contemulatiori of a rizht of rev-ew
by the Assembly.
The Tribuiial was established in 1949 to discliarge a function which
otherwise the General Assembly would have to perform. The Tribunal

wasset up to protect staff members, asthe \Vritten Statement of hfexico
so well expresses it,."against any arbitrary action by the chief officers
of the international administrative service". TYriltenSlatements 239. The .
Tribunal was also set up to ensure proper application of the Staff Regula-
tions. It \vas net established to fetter and disable the Assembly, but as
a subsidiary organ to aid and assist the General Assembly in the per-
formance of the Assembly's duty of seeing tliat its regulations governing
employment were properly applied by the Secretary-General.
The experience of the League of Nations with its Tribunal is relevant
to an understanding of the General Assembly's intention in establishing

the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. STATEhlENT BY BIT. PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-11 VI 54 , 323

\Vhen the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations was
"final and witliont appeal" (Art. VI) and that compensation awarded be
by the Tribunal should "be chargeable to the budget of the administra-
tion concerned" (Art. X 17)).The Statute contained no ~rovision for
review or revisiofi of jndgments of the Tribunal. Advance budgetary
provision for payment of awards was recommended by the Supervisory
Commission, in.d contingent appropriations of nominal amounts were
iii fact contained in the budgets of both the League and the International
Labour Ofice. IVrittenStntemenls35, 38.
Until 1931 the question of the right and power of the League Assem-
bly to refuse to pay a Tribunal award was not an issue. It became so
when world depression caused reconsideration of League salary scales.
Could the rate of Dav in outstandine em~lovment contracts be scaled
down without the Consent of the officersc'oncerned ?If so scaled down,
could an oficial secure redress from the Administrative Tribunal ? If
he won a iudement. could the Assemblv refuse to eive it effect ?
~:ollowii;~cngtli\. :ti~diiiconclusive ;lehate. Il~e'r\ssciiibly'~I'oiirtli
Cornniittrt: soiight rlie ad\.iiof a Comiiiittee of liirists. 'flic Juriatj
r.s;iiniiicd rhv ci>ntr:ictsarid fduiii~1i.isisfur :i reductii,ii iii the rntc
of pay without an official'sconsent. They examined the Tribunal's Stat-
ute, and the budgetary practice of the League, and advised that the
riehts of the staff were not intended to be subiect to the "budee-arv"A
authority of the Assembly.
The result was that the Assemblv. in al1 contracts made thereafter,
specifically reserved its power of révisionand did not act unilaterally
to modify existing contracts. Thus the issue of the right of the Assembly
to review a Tribunal award did not arise.
The League Assembly was not faced with that issue until 1946. Nor
is this surprising, since the Administrative Tribunal of the League, prior
cases, and had awarded compensation in only two cases.dered only 24
The 1946precedent has been discussed in our own Written Statement.
IYritten Statements I~I-161. Further details are presented in the Inter-
national Labour Organization's Statement. Written Statements 39-53,
60-70. It is discussedin a number of other Statements.
In brief, the League in 1939, by a resolution meeting a budgetary
and organizational crisis, dismisseda large number of oficials, with a
shorter period of notice than that originally prescribed in the Staff
Regulations.Although such action could not be challenged by empLoyees
whose contracts had been made expressly subject to subsequent revi-
sion, it was challenged by somewith older contracts. The Administrative
Tribunal in 1946 rendered decisions in their favour, holding that the
Assembly lacked the right ta alter the contracts without the consent of
the staff member, and, further, that since the Assembly did not by
express words in the 1939 Resolution state that old contracts were to
be affected,the Assembly must have intended the contrary.
The question of the conclusiveness of the Tribunal awards on the
Assembly, or its right ta refuse to give them effect, was referred to a
sub-committee of the Second (Finance) Committee of the League Assem-
bly. The sub-committee concluded that it was within the powers of the
Assembly ta withbold payment of the awardsand recommended against
payment.324 STATEYEST BY AIT .IXLEGER (U.S.A.)-II VI 54

After debate, the Second (Finance) Committee of the Assembly, by
a vote of 16 to 8, withj abstentions, adopted the sub-committee report
by the Assembly.use to giveeffecto the awards. This position was adopted
Many of the arguments made in the present case against the position
taken by the United States are similar to arguments advanced by the
minority in the League in 1946. See Written Statements 48-49 (IL0
Statement's quotation fromleague Finance Committee.Report.)
Thus. by the spring of 1946, the issue as to which iio provision had
been inserted in the Statute of tlie League Tribunal had been squarely
met and definite action taken. Apparently, among those submitting
Written Statements here, only the Government of the Netherlands
would ask this Court to treat the decision of the Leaguc Assembly in
1946 as invalid. TVritle~Statements 89.
Attempts have been made in some of the Statements filed with this
Court to distinguish and eliminate as a precedent here the League's
refusal to give effect to awards of the League of Xations Tribunal in
1946. It is sought to distinguish the League case upon the ground that
therethe League Tribunal, in making the awards, disregarded a resolu-
tion of the League Assembly. It is suggested that the League Assembly's
refusal to give effect to such awards is a very different matter from
refusal of the General Assembly here to give effect to an award where
the United Nations Tribunal-so the argument runs-has disregarded
~zoAssembly resolution.
We submit that this last suggestion begs the question. The question
is precisely whether the United Nations Tribunal has followed the
Statute that created it, whether it has properly applied the General
Assembly's Staff Regulations, and whether it has acted in accordance
with the Charter.
If the Tribunal here has acted ultra vires, or has failed to foilow and
give effect to the Statute that created it or the Staff Regulations, bow
would that differ from the failure of the League Tribunal to follow the
resolution of the League Assembly ? In botb cases the Tribunal would
be gwity of acting ultra vires, of acting beyond its authority, of failing
to follow the governing Statute ;in both cases the governing body, the
Assembly. would have not only the right, but also the duty, to caU the
TrIn the General Assembly, questions have been raised as to whethers.
certain United Nations Tribunal awards confonn ~6th Assembly resolu-
tions and the Charter. Together with various other governments, the
United States has contended therc:that the Administrative Tribunal has
disregarded or misapplied both Assembly resolutions and Charter pro-
visions. These questions are not, however, before this Court, and have
not yet been decided in the Asseinbly. Ultimately, the relevance of the
League precedent must depcnd on how Member Govcrnments answer
these questions and act on their :inswers in the General Assembly.
The subsequent experience of the International Labour Office with
the League Tribunal is also of interest. The League of Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal remained in existence after the dissolution of the
League, to continue servicing the ILO. The relationship of the IL0 to
this Tribiinal is enlighteniug. First, the IL0 foliowed the Assembly's
1946 decision, and did not pay the two awards which the Tribunal had
rendered in favour of IL0 staff members. Then, on October 9th. 1946. the IL0 madc dt.filiitv pro\.ision for rcvic\i of ;iii.;irdsijfilic Trihiinal.
This it did I,\, nriit:iidiiigrhc St:ittiteni tu peniiit rhe ILO's Goiwning
i3od\ror rhr :\dminisrraiivr: Roard of thé I'ensiorisI'iind tu illace Ixfore
mental procedural fault. It was further provided that the Court'sor funda-
would be binding. Wrillen Slnlenzents52-54.
opiGy 1949, when the General Assembly adopted the Statute of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, that Statute had been consi-
dered with care by governments, delegates, experts and United Nations
officials who nere familiar with the League and the IL0 actions that
have just been related. In 1946, the United States, at the outset of
General Assembly consideration ofthe proposa1toestablish the Tribunal,
pointed to the then recent League and IL0 experience, as evidence that
the Tribunal might at some time invade the Charter powers of a prin-
cipal organ. In 1949the IL0 precedent existed forauthorizing an appeal
from the Tribunal to the International Coiirt of Justice, but it was not
followed. The conclusion seems inescapable that the General Assembly,
not having provided in advance a procedure for dealing ivith challenged
awards, left the matter tu be dealt with under the Assembly's ordinary
procedure when and if the question should arise.
So much for the relevant history of the Administrative Tribunals.
It remains to consider the Statute in the light of this history. 1 shall
first outline briefly the position of my Goi~ernment.
May it please the Court.
The Administrative Tribunal is a subsidiary organ deriving its
authority from a General Assembly Resolution, subject to rescission or
amendment by the General Assembly. Its Statute regulates the compo-
sition, servicing and operations of the Tribunal and leaves its financing
to annual action by the General Assembly. As with most subsidiary
organs, the Members are chosen by the General Assembly itself for
limited terms.
The Tribunal's jurisdiction is set forth in the Statute of the Tribunal,
which grants it authority to decide disputes as to its competence arising
in cases before the Tribunal. This conforms with i~ractice. for almost
3111rlI~tln;il11:tvt.iirisdic~ioiniri:iIl),lu ~it:t,:nrilr:icO!VLI~~iri~dictio~~
\I.II~IIclinllcn~~d. 15iit of coiirse this cannot me:in ttiiir ;isul~sidi:iry
hodi. like tlic 'l'ril,iilns the iind desisiun uii tlie a.or>cuf;iiiirisilicti~ii
whiCh bas been conferred by a parent body-in this'case, ihe General
Assembly.
The parties before the AdministrativeTribunal are the Administration,
headed by the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer,
andthe members of the staff. This point was adverted to by the Counsel
for the League of Nations before its Administrative Tribunal in the
Mayras case, in a reply dated April zgth, 1940, in the following terms
(in translation) :

"This Tribunal, as its name indicates, is an Administrative
Tribunal, that is to Say, a Tribunal intended to pass on claims
asserted by staff members against acts of the Administration. It
existing in certain countries, and especially in imitation of the
French Council of State. The latter deals with appeals against the
acts of the administrative authority, but not with appeals that it326 STATE~IEXT BY arr.PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-II VI 54

issought ta make against the acts ofsomeother authority (legislative'
or judicial).
It is against administrative abuses that it has been intended ta
give the staff member a guaranty establishing an appeal to this
Tribunal."
No right of appeal is given to the parties from the decisions of the
Tribunal. These are final in the sense that no fiirther remedies are
accorded to either party by the Statute or by the IZegiilations.
In writing the Tribunal's Stalute, the General Assembly recognized
that it must not infringe upon the Charter powers of the Secretary-
General. This is made clear, for example, by the provision in Article g
giving the Secretary-Generaloption of the refusiiig specific performance
of a judginent of reinstatement or rescission of his action. This provision
isa clear recognition that the Secretary-General, and only the Secretary-
General, has authority under the Charter to appoint the staff.
In the same way, we submit, the General Assembly did not attempt,
nor did it intend, by the Statute, to limit the Assembly's own Charter
power and responsibility with respect to its subsidiary organ, the
Tribunal. As the IL0 has done, the Assembly could, if it so desired,
provide for some form of judicial review of tribunal awards. It could
do this in respect of future awards or awards alrcady made. It could
also undertake review in some other manner decided on by it.
Now, 1 would like to relate these gencral observations to the legal
texts, and to note some of the agreements and disagrcemcnts with
our position which are expressed in the other written statements that
have been submitted in this matter.
ArticleII. paragraph 2, of the Staff Regulations provides :

"The United Nations Administrative Tribunal shall, under
conditions prescribed in its Statute, hear and pass judgment upon
terms of appointment,ff mincluding al1 pertinent regulations andr
rules."

There is no doubt that this provision gives the staff member a right
of access tothe Tribunal. But evt:nsuch strongadherents ta the doctrine
of acquired rights as France aiid the Xetherlands have not asserted
that such access to the Tribiinal was an "acquired right" which could
not be taken awav bv amendinent of the Staff Ke~ulations or the
Statute of the ~ribinac Written Statements 22 (France), 66(Netherlands).
Indeecl,the record of debate iri the Fifth Committee in 1953 indicates
that a number of Member States reco~nizedthe nower of the Assemblv
to repeal the Statute, and hence to &minate tliêright of access to thé
Tribunal by the staff member under Regulation 1i.2. This position was
taken by the Xetlierlands, Urupay, Xew Zealand. Syria, the Soviet
Union, Lebanon and hlesico, as is shown in the Statement of the Secre-
tary-General. I.VrilteitStalentents18s. The United Kingdom's Statement
isexplicit to this effect. VVritlenStatemests 108.09. If the Tribunal can
be abolished by the Assembly after a wrongful discharge has occurred,
but before an application for redress has been made to the Tribunal,
it is difficult to see why the Asseinbly cannot take the same action, if
itbelieves it is right and in the interest of the United mitions so to do.
wliile the Tribunal has the application under consideration. STATEAI BEYSTir. PHLECER (U.S.A.)-II VI j4
327
But it is asserted that the making O/ an award by the Tribunal creates
an acquired riglit ; that this event-occurring after access-uests some-
thing in a staff member, of the fruits of which he cannot be deprived.
Such an argument does not seem valid, when the very point at issue

may be the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to niake the award or some other
point going to its validity.
It is worth noting here tliat nowhere in the Tribunal's Statute is
there any mention of iiccluired rights, even in the Article on ûmendment.
This is unlike the Staff liegulations, which provide that any ainendment
shall be without prejuclice to acquired rights (Regulation 12.1). The
latter provision follows immediately on Regulation 11.2, which confers
the right of access to the Tribunal. But we have already seen that
access is not asserted to be ail acquired right.
The theory of acquired rights isabstract and difficiilt. To the estent
that it has validity, it appears ta apply to substantiverightsof contract,
rather than to any particular procedures. It is wortli iioting that the
United Kingdom takes the position that an award must be paid zrirless
the Regf~latzonsor Statute are amended. bvritteiz Statetnettts 10s-09.
CIIons
\\'e are left, then, with the proposition that under the Regul. t'
the Statute is part of the staff memberk contract, mhicli would be true
even in the absence of a liegulation 11.2 from the Staff Regulations.
The question'remains, what is the effect of the Statute ?
Article z of the Statute of the Tribunal concerns its conipetence,
and, so far as pertinent, reads :
"Article 2. (1) The Tribunal shall be competent to Iiear and
pass judgment upoii applications alleging non-observance of

contracts of employment of staff members of the Secretariat of
the United Nations or of the terms of appointment of such staff
members. The words 'contracts' and 'tesms of auuointinent' include
al1 pertinent regulations and rules in force at tiie tinie of alleged
non-ohser\~ance, including the staff pension regulations.

.........................
(3) In the evenf of a dispiite as to whether the Tribunal, has
competence, the niatter sliall be settled by the decision of the
Tribunal."

It seems generally to be admitted that the Tribunal h$s a competence
-a jurisdiction-which is limited by Article z and other relevant
~~rovisionsof the Statute and governing law. This is borne out by the
specific provision that, in the event of a dispute as to competence, the , ,
Tribunal shall decide.the dispute. In the view of my Governmeut, this
nieans that, as is the general practice among United Nations organs,
the initial decision on competence, and hence a decisioii permitting
the case ta go ta hearing, is to be made bythe organ itself. 130thprincipal
and subsidiary organs usually make initial determiiiations of tlieir own
competence, but it is subniitted that principal organs must reserve the

power to reject such decisions of their own subsidiary organs.
As is shown in the statement of the Secretary-Geiieral, Article 2.
paragraph 3, was adopted by the Assembly almost uiianiniously. after
Canada and the Soviet Union had been assured that al1 it implied was
that "a long-established principle" was being followed. TYrittenStatements
213.~14. That long-establislied principle could scarcely have been the32s STATEIIENT BY Ifr.PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-II VI 54

renunciation by the General Assembly of its ultimate right to reject
Tribunal decisions on competence grounds where the Tribunal had no
competence.
Belgium contended (cited by Secretary-General, Written Statements 214).
that a political organ should decide the competence of a judicial organ,
is merely to beg the question, for the Tribunal is not a court-a judicial
organ independent of and CO-oriiinatewith the Assembly-but is an
administrative tribunal and a siibsidiary organ of the Assembly.
The Soviet Union and Canada had favoured some chanee in Article z
which would have resulted in thc reference of competenc: questions to
the Assenibly. The representative of Sweden pointed out that this would
necessitate iettin~: uÜ comi>licated machinefv which had not vet been
needed. Written .%atêments'zr4A . n extreme Giewin the other direction
was put fonvard by the representative of Belgium, who suggested that
the Assemhly should be completely incapable of considering or rejecting
decisions of the Tribunal on its own competence. Messrs. Aghnides and
Feller took an intemediate position and emphasized the impractica-
bility of continuous reference to the Assembly. They pointed out the
"established rule that al1 the organs of the United Nations should
decide on their own competence in the first instance". Written State-
ments 214.
The Nctherlands maintains that if any organ is to have the right to
challenge or refuse effect to a Tribunal decision on grounds of compe-
tence, specific provision to that effect must be found in the Statute,
"or other relevant instruments". 'Tosupport this conclusion, the Xether-
lands cites the example of the International Labour Office Tribunal
Statute. Writteit Statements 76. But it seems clear that the IL0 example
supports the contrary conclusion.
The meaning of the IL0 Statute had been established by the 1946
action of the League Asseinbly, when it refused to give effect to the
thirteen awards of the Tribunal. Written Statements 39-50 ; 151-161.
When this action was taken, the i-epresentative of Belgium characterized
the Assembly's action as "a precedent", and expressed forma1 reserva-
tions. Wrilten Statements 49, 160. He stated that he spoke on behalf of
the Netherlands Government and others, as well as his own. Written
Statentei~ls4
The IL0 ?~llowed the Assembly decisiori and did not pay the two
awards which the Tribunal had made in favour of IL0 staff members.
Instead, the IL0 then wrote two new provisions into the Statute. The
first provided that questions of the Tribunal's jurisdiction or funda-
mental procedural fault could be submitted to the lntcrnational Court
of Justice by the Governing Body for an advisory opinion. The second
provided that the opinion of the Court would be "binding". Express
words were used to grant a power of review to organs other than the
Governing Body or Conference. Express words were also used to make
the Court's opinion "binding". So far, then, express words are needed,
not to preserve the exclusive and final right of the Governing Board or
Conference to review or refuse effect, but to establish some othermethod
of rtvicii,. Il'rilte~iSlrrtemînls jj.
Iridccd, the Setlirrl:inds in irs \\'rittcri Ststciiiciit iticll ruiiiiniis tlie
coiicliisiuii ttiat ~xprc\v<irdsart: rc.qiiirt:ilto li[tirI,ca.cr<ifrcvienof the Governing Board, Conference, or General Assembly. It says of
the IL0 Tribunal :
"Other intergovernmental organizations, according to the
Annex to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the Inter-
national Labour Organization, may recognize the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal subject to some adjiistments including one with
regard to Article XII which, in cases affecting any one of these
organizations, is then mutatis mutandis applicable without the
addition of paragraph z. Thus, in these cases, and apart from any
specific provisions to the contrary, it is not the International Court

of Tustice which has the last word in matters of iurisdiction and

men@ 76-77,
In short, it would follow that, absent express provision tothecontrary,
"the last word in matters of jurisdiction and fundamental faults in the
orocedure" lies with the Executive Board of the international orean-
"
ization concerned.
This is essentially the position which the United States talces here on
the construction of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the
United Nations. The analogy of the IL0 Tribunal confirms that in the
absence of express provision to the contrary, the principal organ con-
cerned witli budget and administration-here the General Assembly-
retains the last word.
What has just been said is applicablc to the interpretation of the
Statute and of the intention of the Assembly in adopting it. But, even
if the Assembly were clearly to indicate its intention of providing some
other method of review than hy tlie Assembly itself, and even if it were
to provide that this method was exclusive and final, we submit that
this could not deprive the Assembly of its constitutional power to review
and perhaps reject the decision of its subordinate organ. However, that
issue is not presented here, for the .4ssembly has made no provision for
such a disposition.
May it please the Court.
The view of other governments on z~ltra'uireawards is of interest.

The United States is not alone in recogiiizing that Article z. paragraph 3,
does not in its present form purport or operate to deprive the General
Assembly of the right to refuse to give effect to an award if the Assem-
bly finds the Tribunal exceeded its granted powers. The Statement of
the Secretary-General shows that in various ways, in the course of debate
in the Fifth Committee, no less than sixteen members, including some
who favoured payment of the awards in the present cases, admitted or
intimated that the Assemhly's right to refuse to give effect to the awards
would exist in some cases. Among the sixteen were Mexico, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Iudia and Uruguay. Writteu Statements 191-198.
An examination of the written statements presented to this Court
shows that, with the single exception of the Netherlands, no government
has specifically discussed and rejected the proposition that the Organi-
zation or its General Assembly is notrequired to give effect to Adminis-
trative Tribunal awards where the Tribunal has acted ultra viresWhile
it is true that a number of governments urge a negative answer to ques-
tion one, it is submitted that they must do so on the assumption that

23330 ST.~TE>IEST BU xr. PIILEGER (u.s..A.)-II VI 54

this Court can be induced to examine the merits of the awards and
approve them,or by ignoring the words "on any grounds" which appear
in the first question.
Indeed, in statements which do refer to the problem of îdtra vires
awards, there is language in some instances plainly stating, in others
strongly implying, that such awards are not binding on the General
Assembly. The Utiited I<ingdom is clear on that point, saying :

".... although the Asseinbly has the power to refuse to give effect
right to do so are those in which it is evident that the TribunaL

i.e. has acted zdtra tires, or has been guilty of misconduct, e.g. in
alloxvingitself to be influenced by considerations of a venal charac-
ter, or of conduct which amounts to a deiiial of justice." Written
Stalemetrts~oj.

France assures tliis Court that the problem of escess of power is
not before it. Writleiz Statements 16.
The Philippines limit the dut)' of the General Assembly to sustain
decisions of the Administrative Tribunal to cases where "the Tribunal
has legitiinately acted within the authority delegateclto it by the General
.4ssembly". TVrittenStatements 234.
The Statement of Guatemala, in attempting to distinguish the
1946League precedent, appears t<iimply some such qualifications. In the.
present situation, Guatemala argues, "there is no resolution of the
General Assembly amending the Statute, nor any patent defect in the
Tribunal's judgment awarding compensation". I,VrittenStatements 253-
The Assembly's right to refuse to give effect to Tribunal awards is
expressly supported by China, Chile, Ecuador, Greece, Iraq, Turkey,
and the United States. Written Statemettts 242, 249. 97, 247, III.
The Statement of Sweden relies on a claimed analogy between a
staff member's contract and the United Kations Headquarters Agree-
ment, in order to reach its conclusion. that the United Xations can
irrevocably grant to a staff member the right to an award and irrevocably
divest itself of the right to refuse payment of such an award. But in
international law an arbitral award that is in excess of the power of
the tribunal may be treated as nul1and void.
The Swedish Statement says that the United Nations must pay
awards of tlie Tribunal "so long as the Tribuiial remains within the
bounds of its competence". Written Stateme~zts 72. Thus it appears to
admit that the Assembly would have a right to refuse payment when.
the Tribunal exceeded its competence. Sweden contends, however, that
the Tribunal was within its competence in the eleven cases giving nse
to the present proceeding, becaiise the Tribunal decided the issue of
whether the Secretary-General had violated the terms of staff members'
contracts.
In its Statement, the Government of Mexicodoes not answer specific-
ally the question of the effect of ultra rires awards. It does insist that
the General .bsembly must respect "vested rights". Written Statements
238.40. It is difficult to assume that tlie Government of Mexico would
contend that there is a vested or ayuueà right to the benefit of an ultra
vives awürd. ST.ATEYEST BY >Ir.FHLEGER (o.s..~.)-II VI j4 33'
\\le have covered tliirteen written statements, incliiding the Sether-
lands. The other communications contained in the printed record
indicate no change in previously-expressed views : Canada thinks

cornpetence is for the Tribunal to decide ; the Soviet Unioii, Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia apparently do not believe the right exists
in the Assembly to refuse to give effect to the awards, although it is
not entirely clear'whether they reason from an assumption that the
awards are in fact infra zlires.
Upon analysis, then, the weight of reasoned opinion appears to
support Our conclusion that Article 2, sub-paragraph 3, of the Tribunal
Statute cannot be construed to prevent the General Assembly from
refusing to give effect to awards.
\Ve submit that the provision of the Statute on finality does not
conclude the Assembly. Article IO, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal's
Statute covers finality ancl appeal. It reads : "The judgments shall be
final and without appeal." It is Our position that Article 10 (2) means

that neither of the parties, the Secretary-General or the claimant staff
member, is given any rightof appeal from decisions of the Tribunal.
It shows the intent of the Assembly that neither of the parties shall
have the right to a review of an award. But it does not Say, and, indeed,
we submit it could not validly provide, that the Assembly may not
inquire into the actions of the Tribunal and, in appropriate cases,
refuse to give them effect. Appeal by a party is a very diffcrent thing
from review by a principal organ of the actions of its subordinate,
performing a delegated function.
Light on the meaning of "final and kthout appeal" is cast by the
provisions of Article g. This Article provides that the Secretary-General
may review a decision and cause it to be modified in one respect. He can
refuse to rescind his action or reinstate a staff member. Thus, the Tribu-
nal's decision is not "final" in the sense of being unalterable. It is simply

final in the sense that neither party has the right to further contentious
proceedings. .
There appears to be substantial agreement with the substance of this
view. France agrees that the General Assembly is not a "party" to the
proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal. Wriltcn Statements 7.
The Representativeof Australia said in the Fifth Committee :

"1 should like to point out to the Committee that the final opera-
tive words of Article IO (2) are a composite phrase and must he
read accordingly. It is quite clear in my mind that on the ordinary
principles of legal construction. the intention of the words 'final
and without appeal' was that the judgment should be final in the
sense that there should be no appeal therefrom. Review by the
i\ssembly cannot in any sense be regarded as an appeal. \Ve are
not hearing any appellant-and indeed the Secretary-General him-

self has not sought any reduction in the awards, while none of the
dismissed personnel are or could be before us. 1 therefore consider,
Xr. Chairman, that Article IO (2)does nothing to preclude a review
of the awards." .

The Representative of Argentina agreed that Article IO (2) could not
be constmed as foreclosing Assembly consideration of the substance, as
well as the form, of a proposal to pay the awards ; China, Cuba, Liberia [Public sitting of June r~th, 1954. aflernoo?~]

May it please the Court.

Perhaps the best synthesis of the opposing view will be found in the
17-22. As we have noted already, the French Statement, read iii itsetne~zls
entirety, implies that the asserted obligation to pay Tribunal awards is
conditional on the awards being intra viresThus, the French argument
based on Article g is subject to that overriding condition.
The French argument asserts that one item under Section 17 of the
United Xations budget covers payment of Tribunal awards, and that it
happens only "accidentally" that insufficient funds are available under
that Section to pay particular awards. IV~itteizStatements 19.\Vc do
not consider that Section 17 authorizes or appropriates any funds to
pay awards. Section 17 appropriates S51,ooofor certain "compcnsatory
payments", namely, social security liabilities (estimated at S50,ooo)
and "claims" involving "compensatory payments" for "damage or loss
of erso on al~ronertv" festimated at S1.ooo). Failure to consider or
opPose some'pr&r ;se if these funds by'the'Secretary-Gte oneayal
Tribunal awards would not appear to prevent prescnt coiisideration niid
opposition to proposed paymënt-evën out of these funds.
Biit, beyoiid tliis, it would indeed be a novel idea in budgetary matters
that exhaustion of available funds-if, indeed, any are "available"
-results only "accidentally" in secousse to the appropriating body for
more funds. Certainly, £rom the point of view of the average budget
committee, a lirnit on authorized expenditures has for its precisc purpose
the requirement that further expenditures be considerecl before they
arc made.
There can be no disagreement with the other theme of the Frcncli
argument-that a valid debt owed by tlie United Nations to aiiyone,
staff mcmber or,otherwise, is inconsistent with a right in the Orgnni-
zation or Assembly vis-à-vis the creditor to yefuse pnyment witfiout
tlie crcditor's consent. The principle that there is no right unilatcrally
to avoid a contract obligation is common ground to al1 stntcmcnts.
However, no amount of repetition or variation on tliis tlicmc can obscure
issue is precisely whether thereoiswany obligation at all. The point at
In conclusion the United States submits that questioii one should be
answered "yes", and that question two should be aiiswered by reference
to the relevant goveming dispositions of the Charter.
For the most part, statements before this Court, or in the record,
in support of a negative answer to question one, are found to be express-
ly or impliedly qualified in some such \vords as these : The Assembly
does not have a right to refuse to give effect to Tribunal awards ifthe
awards were reached in the proper exercise of the Tribunal's compe-
tence ; or: The Assembly does not have the right in such cases as the
present cases, where-it is contended or assumed-the awards are
valid and proper.
An affirmative answer to question one is not and need not be premised
on a contention that the General Assembly is infallible. In reviewing a
Tribunal judgment, the Assembly could reach a result which another
body-such as this Court-might consider to be in derogation, or in334 STATEYEST BY AIT.PHLEGER (u.s..*.)-II VI j4

excess, of a staff member's rights. The point to be emphasized here is
that, under the Charter and the Statute and the existing contracts, the
Administrative Tribunal is a protection against errors by the Adminis-
tration, the Assembly is a guarantv against Tribunal error, and the good
faith and judginent of tlie hfembers of the United Nations-assisted hy
the availability, for example, of advisory opinions from this Court on
legal questions-is the ultimate guarantee agaiiist Assembly error.
There are aspects of question two on which 1have touched previously
and which warrant re-emphasis. This Court has been asked to advise
the General Assembly what are the pri?tcipal grounds upon which the
a\v;ird. could lawfullv exercise its riyh- to refuse to -ve effect to an
Quesrion rwo might I)eread a, im1,lying tlintrliiGeiieral :lsseiiiblii
likç niinl>l)éllatcoiirt heforc whii:h an apl)ell:,nt inujt :ille;iiirpru\.c
certain t\.i>r.sof crror i~rescril~in tliç St:atiite esrahli~tiiiirrilie court
or as defined in pre\-iok decisions. \\'ben so read, it is w6ngly read,
as every gooernment which has taken exception to the capacities of the
Assembly in judicial matters would surely agree. \\le have seen that
there is no appeal. There is no appellant. The Assembly has not estab-
lished a limited appellate jurisdiction, for itself or any other body. It
has reserved, or more accurately, has not and could not foreclose, its
ultimate responsibility for review of actions of its subsidiary.
This Court has not been asked to substitutc itsclf for the General
Assembly and mal) out an optium and even a minimum appellate system.
The methods by whicli the General Assembly shall deal with such a
problem have been left open by and for the Assembly. IVith more
experience and growing maturity of the United Kations administrative
system, the General Assembly may wbh to provide some sort of judicial
review of the legal aspects of Administrative Tribunal awards. Perhaps
the Assembly will wish to adopt other procedures to review other
aspects :and it may come to formulate specific standards relevant to
the different aspects of awards, where their validity or propriety are
subject to challenge. Under the Charter and on the present facts, we
submit, these matters remain for the principal political organ to deter-
mine.
When asked about the "principal grounds", this Court is asked about
principal legul grounds ;it is not. asked in what circumstances or for
what particular rcasons the Assembly would, under the relevant Charter
provisions, be justified in refusing to give effect to a Tribunal aivard.
To decide about such circumstances or reasons is to exercise political
aloiie-conveniencellyto the Assembly, respectful bestowal of the benefit
of doubt upon the Tribunal, and other possible advaiitages-against
the possible disadvantages-injustices to a party, damage to the Organi-
zation, impairment of the powers of the Secretary-General, and other
possible disadvantages. Obviously this is the type of policy decision
the Assembly itself-not the Coiut-must make. The Assembly could
be called upon to make such a decision when confronted with any one
of inany possible situations, such, for example, as :
Mistaken reliance hy the Tribunal upon false representations of a
party in a case :
Interpretation and application of Regulations estahlished by the
General Assembly witli effect contrary to tlie express or reiterated intent STXTEIIEKT BY &Ir.PHLEGER (U.S.A.)-II VI j4 333

and object of the General Assembly, such as : awards made in flagrant
disregard of the Statute or Rules, to the prejudice of eitber party ;
ultra vires awards ;
Decisions premised on serious misconstruction of the Charter, partic-
ularly in regard to the powers and responsibilities of the principal organs,
such as :.a decision invading Charter pourers or discretion of the Secre-
tary-General, or a decision violative of Article IOI (3) of the Charter ;
A decision contrary to an advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice ;
Awards arbitrary or unreasonahle on their face ;
Important and inconsistent decisions giving rise to serious uncer-
tainties in the administration of the Secretariat ;
Awards entailing impossible financial consequences for the Organi-
zation ;
Duress exercised upon the Tribunal ;
Co,uption of the Tribunal ;
Action evidcncing prejudice and improper motives of any of the
:members of the Tribunal.

In response to question two, then, we believe the Court shouldreaffirm,
for the Assembly and the Member Xations, the necessity that the
Assembly abide by its constitutional instrument-the Charter-in
considering awards given by the Administrative Tribunal. In our view
this means that it should base its consideration on the grounds provided
in the Charter. These include the consideration and approval, from
every point of view, of the United Xations budget ; the very real need
for supervision of a subsidiary organ to ensure its proper functioning ;
respect for the authority of the Secretary-General as the chtef adminis-
trative officerof the Organization :and final1 and of basic importance,
the criteria set forth in the third paragraph or~rticle IOI of the Charter.
The opening sentence of that paragraph States the guiding principle :

"The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff
and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the
necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, compe-
tence, and integrity."

Mr. President and Honourable AIembersof the Court, 1wish to thank
the Court for its close attention. 3. EXPOSÉ ORAL DE 11. LE PROFESSEUII REUTER
(KEPR~SBNTANT DU GOUVER~.E&IENT FRANÇAIS)
A L>\S~I\NCE I'UHLIQUE DU II ]UIX 1954, APR~S-MIDI

Monsieur le l'résident, Messieursde la Cour.

La procédure écriteet orale a permis de soumettre à la Cour une
informatioii etendue et une argumentation abondante et variée. Le
Gouvernement de la République n'abusera pas de la bienveillance de
la Cour; sa communication se bornera ?I évoquer quelques questions
de principe fondamentales.
Le Gouvernement de la République fera abstraction de toutes les
considérations d'opportunité ou de conveiiance qui pourraient étre
présentées à propos du statut des fonctionnaires des Xations Unies ;
il se réserve,bien entendu, de les faire valoir si la question est discutée
par les organismes compétents.
La question posée à la Cour porte sur les compétencesde l'Assemblée.
Il n'est pas demandé à la Cour d'y répondre i la seule lumière des
articles de la Charte, mais suivant le istatut du Tribunal administratif
et de tous autres instruments et textes pertineiits u.Cette formule vise
la Charte des Nations Unies, le statut du Tribuiial administratif et
éoentuellemeiit d'autres résolutions de 1'AsseiiibKe.
La Cour se trouve ainsi amenée à interpréter la signification d'un
régime juridique qui est fonction des propres décisionsde l'Assemblée ;
elle doit préciserce que l'Assemblée a décidé; il ne lui est pas demandé
de dire ce que l'Assemblée aurait pz~ou potrrrail décideet qui ne dépend
que du texte de la Charte. Il est tcbutefoisévidentque les dispositions de
la Charte ont une importance particulière et doivent étre considérées
en elles-mêmes ;elles servent en effet de guide pour l'interprétation des
résolutionsde l'Assemblée,et de toute manièreelles permettent d'établir
les limites des actioiis que celle<i pourrait entreprendre.
Deux theses sont en présencedans cette affaire : suivant la première,
en instituant le Tribunal administratif, l'Assembléea institué un véri-
table tribunal et elleest liéepar ses décisions,qui bcnéficientdel'autorité
de la chose jugée comme les décisionsde tous les tribunaux ; suivant
la deuxièniethèse, I'Asscmbléen'est pas liéepar les décisionsde l'organe
dénommé :Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies.
Le Gouvernement français est favorable à la première thèse. Il estime
inutile de revenir sur l'argumentation qu'il a dévelopl~ép eour justifier
cette préférence ; tous les termes du statut établissent prima facie qu'il
s'agit d'un véritable tribunal dont les décisions sont obligatoires au
sein des Nations Unies.
La seconde thèse ne peut se foiider que sur des arguments qui, dans
leur diversité même,ont tous un caractère commun : ils cherchent à
détruireles conclusions qui découlentdes formules trèsclaires du Statut.
De nombreux arguments ont étéexposés à cet effetavec beaucoup de
talent ; quatre parmi eux vont êtrediscutés en raison de leur intérêt
juridique.
Un premier argument peut se présenter de la manière suivante :
quelLeque soit la nature du Tribunal administratif, quelles que soient EXPOSÉ DE 11.REUTER (FRANCE) - II VI j4
337
les formules employées par le statut, les jugements du Tribunal ne
sauraient lierl'Assemblée: le Tribunal tire son existence d'une rfsolution
de l'Assembléeet celle-ci ne saurait se lier sans renoncer à sa compétence
d'Assemblée souveraine. Ce raisonnement présente sous sa forme
extrêmela thèse hostile au caractère définitif desjugements du Tribunal ;
il appelle les plus vives critiques.
La Charte iie contient pas d'articles déclarant l'Assembléesouveraine.
On ne saisit pas l'intérêtqu'il y a au point de vue juridique àqualifier

l'Assemblée de souveraine. Les compétences des organes de toutes les
organisations internationales sont définies par les textes qui les ont
fondées. Sans doute, les compétences de l'Assemblée doivent-elles être
interprétées d'une manière assez libérale, si l'on veut tenir compte des
buts généraux des Nations Unies et du caractère universel de cette
organisation ; mais s'il s'agit d'établir que l'Assemblée peut ne pas
exécuter les décisionsdu Tribunal administratif, il estnécessaired'indi-
quer quels textes lui donnent ce droit.
A lire les formules employées dans certains documents soumis à la
Cour. on ~ourrait veut-être craindre aue ne fût imvliaué le vrinciue
qu'a"cune'souveraiheté n'est liéepar 1é droit, princi;e tePous& dep;is
lon~temps pour les Etats, mais qu'il serait paradoxal de voir revendiqué
~oÜrune ~Îeanisation internationale.

tif de la Sociétédes Nations. Sans AoUte ce rapport n'est-il pas fondé
sur le droit, mais sur une équité unilatéralement définieet imposéedans
une ambiance de liquidation générale. Il n'en déclare pas moins, par
exemple, que là où les voies de droit pour défendre le droit font défaut,

le droit disparaît. De pareilles affirmations, mêmeparées du prestige
d'une formule latine consomment la ruine de tout ordre international

élevésoit son raue - soitén toute circonstance et vàr nrincine maîtresse
de ne tenir aucun~ompte de sespropres décisions.Ên ;cartant des hypo-
thèses sans lien avec la question qui est voséeà la Cour, il est nécessaire
d'en examiner une sur Ûn plan général:Elle nous permet d'introduire
une distinction entre les règles généraleset les décisions individuelles
qui, à notre sens, domine tout le débat. Supposons un organisme qui
soit compétent pour prendre dans une matière déterminée à la fois des
décisions individuelles et des décisions générales fixant les conditions
dans lesquelles il prendra lui-mêmedes décisions individuelles. Cette
hypothèse est particulièrement fréquente en droit administratif. Ce sera
par exemple la situation d'un maire qui délivre des autorisations quel-
conques et en mêmetemps prend un arrêté,définissant à quelles condi-
tions générales ellesseront délivrées.L'organisme qui se trouve dans
cette situation doit respecter la règle généralequ'il a établie quand il
prend des décisions individuelles. Tant qu'il n'a pas abrogé sa décision
générale,il est liépar elle. Cette solution dont on pourrait montrer la

consécration dans tous les systèmes juridiques se justifie pleinement. En
prenant une décision générale, cet organisme a arrêtéet proclamé son
intention de procéder d'une manière déterminéedans les affaires indivi-
duelles ; il ne saurait, sans entrer en contradiction avec lui-même,main-
tenir sa décision généraleet ne pas la respecter ; d'autre part, toutedkisioii fién&raleest cl'iine nature juridique supCrieurc aux d;.cisioiis
iiidi\~idiiellésquieiifont npplic;<iii,n.C'ectIiiiv;.rital>lcprincipe gi'iil:r;il
rlii droit oui est dais uiis\,it;nit- iuridioiie I:Itransvoiitioii du i>riiic:ii>e
de non-côntradiction ;si lu rejette ce principe, il ie peut plus'y aviir
d'ordre juridique.
Aussi, en supposant (hypothèse qui, on le verra dans un instant, est
inexacte) que 1 Assembléesoit à l;rfois compétente pour déterminer elle-
mêmeles règlesselon lesquelles sont résolus les litigesentre les Nations
Unies et leurs agents, d'une part, et pour juger elle-mêmeces litiges,
d'autre part, elleserait tenue par les règlesgbnéralesqu'elle aurait posées
tant qu'elle ne les aurait pas modifiées.
Aussi, après l'examen de cette première argumentation, la position
de principe qui est défendue par le Gouvernement français semble
intacte : tant que le statut instituant le Tribunal administratif existe,
l'Assembléeest tenue de le respecter.
Suivant un cleuxièmeargument, malgréles termes formels du statut,
il faudrait écaiter I'inter~rétation qui ferait du Tribunal administratif
un véritable tribunal ;celte interpr&ation, dit-oii, conduirait à conclure
Nations, et notamment aux articles 7 etbunal 22trelatifsaux organes subsi-s
diaires. Le Tribunal administratif serait un organe subsidiaire au sens
de I'article22 de la Charte, et les rapports qui doivent exister entre
un organc subsidiaire et l'organe principal qui l'a institué interdiraient
de faire de cet organe subsidiaire un tribunal ;en effet, dit-on, l'organe
subsidiaire ne peut exercer que les compétences de l'organe principal,
mais il ne Deut pas lier à ce titre l'.,eane.~rinci.al.-Oue vaut. de l'avis
dii (;oii\,cr;ieiii&it frnii;lii;. cette ;~rgumeiit?tLathcoric d;s urgiinei
~iibsi(Ii~ir<;ans la Lli:irtc estn5n.z cunfusc. er I:idixriptioii r~I>lrcti\,e
faite par notre très honorable collègue, le représentant-du Secdtariat
général (les Nations Unies, nous a confirmés dans la pensée que la
pratique des Xations Unies permettait difficilement d'élaborer un
concevt défini et incontestable de l'oreane subsidiaire. L'idée d'une
délégjtioii de pouvoirs que l'on discute également à ce propos n'est
pas non plus, en droit international public, une notion qui soit parfaite-
ment clGre.
Aussi, nous pensons qu'il n'est pas nécessaire d'examiner ici sous
tous ses aspects la théorie des orZanes subsidiaires, et ceci en vertu de
trois consid6ratioiis.
Première considération : Pour que l'argumentation fondée sur une
théorie des organes subsidiaires soit valable, il est nécessaire que le
soit aussi strict que l'on l'affirme. Cette preuve, semble-t-il, n'a pas été
faite. L'article 92 de la Charte déclare que la Cour internationale de
Justice estl'organe judiciaire $rinci$aL des Nations Unies. Ceciimplique
clairement qu'il y a place pour d'autres organes judiciaires. Or, d'après
la théorieque iiouscritiquons, lacréation de tout tribunal seraitcontraire
à la Charte.
Deuxième considération :A supposer même soit interdit par la
Charte à un organeprincipal de déléguer sespropres fonctions de manière
à êtreliévar les décisionsde l'oreane subsidiaire. l'Assembléen'a nulle-
ment délé'gus bes propres fonctions au Tribunal idministratif, mais elle
lui a confiédes fonctions qui ii'étaient exercéespar aucun organe de la
Charte. ESPOSÉ DE XI.REUTER (FRASCE) - II TI 34
339
Troisième considération : Il n'est pas nécessaire de recourir aux
articles 7 et 22 de la Charte pour justifier la création du Tribunal
administratif, I'article ror y suffit pleinement.
Ces deux dernières considérations appellent une démonstration. Elle
peut êtreeffectuéesur la base de l'article 101.
Aux termes de l'article 101 de la Charte, a le personnel est nommé
par le Secrétaire général, conformémentaux règles fixéespar l'Assem-
bléegénérale u.Ce texte n'envisage ici que la nomination ; mais l'alinéa
3 du même article mentionne «les conditions d'emploi ii;la nomination
étant l'acte le plus important de la carrière d'un fonctionnaire, les prin-
cipes établis à son sujet doivent êtreétendus à l'ensemble des mesures
qui peuvent intéresser le personnel. Ainsi l'a, dès l'origine, interprété

la pratique.
En 1946, l'Assemblée,par une résolutiondu 13 février, fixait les prin-
cipes générauxrelatifs à l'organisation du Secrétariat. Cette résolutioii
contenait une annexe II fixant le statut provisoire du personnel (Provi-
sional Staf Regulations). Ce texte, conformément à l'articleIOI de la
Charte, fixait des principes et réservait au Secrétaire général lesoiri de
prendre toutes les mesures individuelles d'application. On notera que
par la régle29 le Secrétaire généralétait habilité à prendre des règle-
ments d'exécutiondans le cadre de ce statut, mais à charge d'en rendre
compte annuellement à l'Assemblée,ce qui confirme en l'assouplissant
le principe posépar l'article 101. En exécution de cette disposition. le
Secrétairegénérala élaboré unRèglement provisoire du personnel (Stnfl
Rules) dont les niodifications ont étérégulièrementpubliéessous forme
de circulaires. Le premier rapport du Secrétaire général à l'Assemblée
se trouve dans le document A/43j du 30 octobre 1947.
.Les compétences respectives du Secrétaire généralet de l'Assemblée
ont touiours été scru~uleusement res~ectées. Le statut actuel résulte
d'une résolution de ~'Âssembléedu 2 hier 1952 lqui applique rigou-
reusement etsans ambiauitél'article IOI dela Charte. lamais l'Assemblée
n'a pris aucune décisionindividuelle concernant un agent placé sous
l'autorité du Secrétairegénéral.
Il ressort donc de l'article IOI deux conséquencescapitales qui sont.
de l'avis du Gouvernement français, la clef des probl&messoulevéspar
la question soumise à la Cour.
Premièrement, d'une manière positive, l'Assemblée est, en ce qui
concerne la fonction publique internationale, compétente pour fixer des
règles.
Deuxièmement. d'une manière né~ative.l'Assembléen'est pas com-
..
~>Cti:iircpuiir pr~iidrc dei inelires indi\,idueIIi:s, iiiditrrmir;er d'uiic
ni;iiii?rc iiidi\.irIiii:llel:~iitiintion <It.sfoiictiçnii:CIII<I'l)cndeiit <III
>riritaire gCii&r-,l.Cctl,. cuniC<liieiiccr?siilte ,11teztr niciiic dg:I;irti-
cle [or. Cc tcsre r;<jv[\C Icir~olnini~tioi~aiu .j~<:rC:t:iiigrt~ii.1.1n~iiiic
rai;onncnieiir qui permis <I't:tciidrcIn curii~>;.tr.iicr;.gl<-niçiitiirc dc
I':\sjcmblée dc 1.1iiominiirioii ;itous les :icies qui con;titiicnt le:%t;itut
<lxla fonction piibliqii~,iii~ern:~tiiiiin.oit riser\.,::II5tcrl:tniic gcriér:il
1~ cumldteiice Irliir tourçj les ilCc:cisiunisndi!.idur.llci qui ~mrtcrirsur Ic
mCme i>l>jct.Ce qui rcnforcc cctre concliision, c'csr le fait que la Clinrte
pri:\.oit espressénicnt Irs Iiypotli;scs esce~~tioiiiicllcj dans lésquellés
I':\ssémblc'epeut prçndrc i I'cgxrd d'uii m~.iiil)redii Sccri[ariat iine

' [&S. Ge". Doc. off. 6' session, suppl.no 20 (A/Xl?~ig, p. SI).]340 EXPOSÉ DE ar. REUTER (FR~SCE) - II i.1j4

dr'<.isi(>iiiiidii~iilui: tiiiisi cr\.i.rti<lel'article 9: ,!IIce qui concrriic
la noniiiinrioii du Secrirnirc gc'nCial.
I;aur-il fiiinlificr 1.1coriii>~renccdr l':\sseiiibl;e dc comiUtciice 1t:~rsLi-
tir.? hien fiiiccc terme riz;uit p;is eiiipl<~yip.;ir I:Cliarte Si l'on ci;tcn(l
pn. ,crri. c.vl>rcjiiun uiic coiiil~<t~:iicclenu,. (1,:~~rucr:dcrp:ir cntL:gurics
xci.r;il~, sins r,r~:riilr(:de <ICcisiuiciii<lii.idii<-ll.iiIILIII:iccei>tcrcctte
~erminologie. Elle présente cependant des inconvénieRts.Dans be;iucoup
de pays l'expression ccompétence législative iévoque un pouvoir bcau-
coup plus vaste, parfois illimité, parce qu'il tend à n'êtreassujetti qu'à
des conditions de forme. L'exposé écritdu Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni contient à cet égard, dans son paragraphe 6, des observations tout

à fait pertinentes, et il semble, d'après les communications qui ont été
adressées à la Cour, que tous les gouvernements reconnaissent que les
compétences des organes des Nations Unies doivent être interprétées
d'une manière stricte, notammerit dans leurs rapports mutuels. C:est
pourquoi il est préférable de parler d'une compétence réglementazre;
dans le cadre des limites que l'on vient de définiret de celles poséespar
l'article 101, dans son alinéa 3, cette compétence réglementaire s'étend
à toutes les règles nécessaires pour établir un statut satisfaisant de la
fonction publique.
Si I':\s<cnihl& cst iiicon~liéteriii:cn mnti;.rr il,, iiirsiiru indi\~idiielle~.

il cri r;.siiltc iiiic irnport:iiitc cùiis;~liic,31r;.%liiiionccriic Ic 'l'ribtiii:il
n~1iiiini;trntif. I.L.Tril~unal ;,diniiiijtritii'c,jnullcnieiit cr,riii>2tciitIioiir
fixer des règles et des principes, il l'est seulement pour appfiquer a des
espèces individuelles les règles poséespar l'Assemblée.En instituant le
Tribunal administratif, 1'Asscmbléen'a donc pas déléguéune coinpé-
tence qui lui appartiendrait. Si les organes subsidiaires sont des organes
exerçant des compétences déléguéep sar un organe principal, Ic Tribunal
administratif n'est nullement un organe subsidiaire au sens de l'article 22,
si on l'interprète ainsi. Le Tribunal administratif exerce une fonction
qui n'est exercée par aucun organc des Xations Unies : trancher en droit
avec toutes les garanties requises des litiges portant sur la carrière des

fonctionnaires. Si certaines compétences sont modifiéespar l'institution
du Tribunal administratif, ce sont celles du Secrétaire généralet non
celles de l'Assemblée.C'est pourquoi la création du Tribunal admink-
tratif tire sa justification juridique non de l'article zz, mais des termes
fort clairs de l'article IOI qui autorisent l'Assembléeà limiter les compé-
tences du Secrétairegénéralen lui imposant des règles. L'Assemblée,en
créant le Tribunal administratif, a posé des règles qui conditionnent
l'exercice des compétences du Secrétaire général; on ne saurait être
plus fidèle à la Charte. Tels sont les motifs pour lesquels ce deuxième
argument n'a pas paru convaincant au Gouverneinent français.
Le troisième argument de la thèse qui met en doute le carüctere

définitif des jugements du Tribunal administratif abandonne le terrain
des fonctions administratives vour se lacer sur celui des i>ouvoirs
biid~+t.iir~~ iic I':\.;senil~lLc.Oii'ioiiricnt;I~~'.tutrc CI, ~';~rticlc'i~de I:i
Cli.~rte I'.\jjcnihl(~ peut. par 1'e:;ercice de sa curiiliércncc hiiilgL't.iirc.
refiiicr I'tïs&cutioii clcs dicisions dii Tribiinïl ndiiiinijtrarif.
Comme on l'a déjà fait remarquer, il faut distinguer à titre prélimi-
naire pouvoir de fait et pouvoir de droit.
La question poséeà la Cour n'est Das de savoir si en fait l'Assemblée
1v11tniat>riL.l~c;rirntfaire échec:lus d~cisions dii Trii>unai :i<iniinisir;itif.
S6anmoiiis. il n'est pas saiis intGrjt de niontrcr ci>nilric.is ies POIIVUI~S de EXPOSÉ DE ar.REUTER (FRAXCE) - II VI 54 34 1

fait seraient limités et quel pauvre instrument se trouverait aux mains
de l'Assemblée, à moins - ce qu'elle pourrait faire - que celle-ci
renonce ail fonctionnement normal des institutions financières pour faire
,ouer.. ses comi~.tencesbudgétaires un r61enour lesauelles elles ne sont
II.,'[:ufcl.. i:orisirlc:r.ic.i~iiiiii~rIc (>r«l>l;;iirir IL-,- ~~r~ifi~~~i~~rn~iif.
L"csi lc:Sccr5t~tirzgc;iiCr~I,o~I>.,:i rcs~~u~~s~l~ill~ jrt<,yr~,,,11ist cIi:!r:5
~1'~s;ciir~ri 1;ifois 1~:s]iigeiiir.iitsdii ï'rihiin:,l ~drniiiistrrtiIc 1>1i<I<ct
arrctc p:ir I':\js~iiil>lcc. Pi~iir<ILI=Ic 3ccr;i:tirt: g<~iii.r:ilsuil i.ni1iiclii

d'i:.xC~.urtrCS di!cisioii<IIIl'ril~~in;il;iiliiiinijtratilf:i~itqii'il ric rroii\.c
dans Ic ~~I~L'CIiiiicilncr;tlit disi~oniblh cct ~.fft~I):iiis iin Lu~lcctiioniinl.
il existe desucréditsqui sont afféctésd'une manière suffisammGt générale
à des i~aiements de cette nature, de sorte que le Secrétaire ~énéral
uourraii effectuer les uaiements ordonnés r~aÎ un iuoement. ~zns un
budget nomal, Ics au<orisations budgétaireS devraiin; êtreaccordéesà
i'avance: donc elles devraient êtreaccordées à un moment où les déci-
sions duTrihuiial administratif ne sont mêmeDas connues. Telle était
bicn jiisqu'à ces derniers temps la sitiintion. E: i'Assernbléea dû être
saisie dans les nffaires qui sont à l'origine de la demande d'avis, cil
raison des montants assez élevésdes indemnités à uaver et de la demande

faire, mais elle s&aTt obligéede bouleverser les règlesexistanies qui ont
étésoigneusement établies pour assurer des paiements rapides par une
procédure souple ;par exemple, elle serait obligée 1) de créer, dans le
budget, une division spécialeaffectée au paiement des indemnités dues
à la suite des jugements du Tribunal ; 2) de n'affecter, à cette division,
aucun crédit tlour que I'on soit obligéde venir lui demander des crédits
et qu'à cette bccashn elle ait la après examen des sentences
du Tribunal. de les rcfuser.
D'autre r~:irt,litsolution envisagée d'uii contrôle Dar la voie budgétaire

ne répond;ait qu'imparfaitement au but très rakonnable que pou se
propose, qui est de reméùier à des jugements défectueux du Tribunal
administratif et non pas de réaliser quelques économies. I'our le com-
prendre, il faut rappeler quels sont en général,aux termes de l'article g
du statut actuel du Tribunal administratif, les dispositifs de ces juge-
ments. I'our respecter les intérêts des Xations Unies, les jugements
ouvrent une option au Secrétaire généraldans le cas où la requéte des
fonctioiiiiaires est reconnue justifiée ; ou bien, le Secrétaire gériéral
acceDte l'annulation dela décisionuroiioncécvar le Tribunal ou l'exécu-
tion <leI'<~l~lifi:i~~i~~i~\.it~<lciUIIIII~II,ICS ~nliuii. 1'1111>VIr:~r~ii1 ,111
funztiui.ii:iirc IL:?iii. i~.tl~~iiiLt,111IC 'ï'ril~~iiisi, rl:insicoii I~~~L~IIICI~~,
le montant.

L'Assemblée serait absolument désarméedans le cas où le Secr6tairï
général, seul juge de l'intérêtdu service, accepterait d'exécuter la
décisiondu Tribunal enannulant les mesures incriminéesou en exécutant
l'obligation invoquée. Or, le Secrétaire général, encore que l'hypothèse
soit rare, peut estimer qu'il est de l'intérêtdes Xations Unies de choisir
cette soluiion et de ne pas verser une indemnité compensatrice. Si I'on
voulait que l'Assembléepuisse exercer clans tous les cas son contràle,
il faudrait que le Secrétaire généralrenonce i cette option et choisisse
toujours de verser une somme d'argent pour donner à l'Assemblée
I'occasioii de refuser les crédits nécessaires. Ces considérations montreiit342 ESPOSÉ DE Y. REUTER (FRASCE) - II VI j4

à quelles piteuses conséquenceson se trouverait amenési l'Assemblée
voulait instituer, par les voies budgétaires, un contrôle des jugements
du Tribunal. Cette constatatioii est d'ailleurs secondaire, car elle est de
pur fait. Elle ne nous perniet que de conclure i une présomption :il
y a peu de cbances que ces pouvoirs de pur fait recouvrent des pouvoirs
de droit. et c'est ce qu'il faut1n:rintenant examiner.
La plupart des fonctions assuniéespar les Nations Unies supposent le
plus souvent pour leur mise enŒuvrel'exerciced'une double compétence.
Premièrement, il faut que I'orgaiiisme désignépar la Charte ait décidé,
dans le cadre de sa compétence, d'agir. Deuxièmement, il faut que
l'Assembléelui ait accordéles créditsnécessairespour qu'il dispose des
moyens financiers indispensables à l'exercice de sa compétence.
Ceci pose inévitablement la question de savoir si l'Assembléea le
droit de limiter l'exercice de la compétence d'lin organe des Xations
Uiiies en le soumettant à des restrictions financières.
Le problème est ample et n'a Das à êtrediscuté ici dans sa totalité.
Une ciistinction générdepermet de dégager lesélémentsd'une solution
en ce qui concerne l'avis demandé à la Cour.
Les compétencesdes organes des Nations Unies sont soit des compé-
tentes discrétionnaires. soit des compétences liées ; cette distinction,
qu'il faut poser d'abord, a d'importaites conséquencessur les pouvoirs
budgétaires de l'Assemblée.
Sont des compétences discrétionnaires celles que les organes des
Xations Unies sont libres d'exercer ou non, sans êtretenus par une
obligation juridique précise.Par exemple, il existe dans le budget des
Xations Unies des crédits ~our Dermettre des ~ublications. En rèele
gënt;rait.iln'!. a pas ~~'Ub11~itij;lllri(~i~conr ICPOrgiill~iresl)onsat>i;:,
dc proch1r.r:aics public;itionj. ils Icsdt'iident d':ipdes sunsidr:rstii,iiî
d'opportunité.
Sont des compétences liées les compétences que les organes des
Nations Unies sont tenus d'exercer en vertu d'une obligation juridique.
Par exemple, aux termes de l'article 102 de la Charte, le Secrétaire
g-iéral doit publier les traités. II n'est pas libre d'y renoncer, et l'ins-
cription d'un crédit à cet effet au budget est la stricte exécutiond'une
obligation juridique.

II est facile, dès lors, de préciser au moins sur un point le rôle de
l'Assembléeen fonction de cette distinction :l'Assembléene saurait,
en aucun cas, disposer à l'égardde la dépense de plus de liberté que
l'organe dépensier n'en dispose lui-même.
Pour les dépensesqui correspondent à la mise en Œuvre d'une compé-
tence discrétionnaire. l'Assembléepeut examiner les demandes de crédit,
en proposer la diminution ou mêmela suppression. En principe,. les
modifications qu'elle apporte au budget ne doivent êtrefondéesque sur
des considérations de gestion financière, et l'Assembléene pourrait pas,
soiis couleur de gestion financière, se substituerà un autre organe des
Xations Unies ou empêcher coniplètement son fonctionnement ; mais
il est certain que l'usage lui adonnédans ce cadre un pouvoir général
très large et souvent redoutable.
Mais pour les dépensesqui sont la mise en Œuvre d'une compétence
liée des services dépensiers, l'Assemblée ne peut que respecter les
obligations du service dépensier et accorder le crédit. Sinon les compé-
tences budgétaires serviraient à nullifier des règlesjuridiques et mème EXPOSÉDE ar.REUTER (FR.~SCE) - II VI j4 343,

des dispositions de la Charte, et mettraient obstacle à l'exécution
d'obligations indiscutables.
Xations Unies dont la source se trouve dans des actes devenus définitifs :
le Tribunal administratif a une compétence liée,il apprécie en droit ;
le Secrétaire généralest liépar le jugement du Tribunal ; l'Assemblée.
n'a aucune compétence juridique pour annuler les dettes des Nations.
Unies.
Reste un dernier et quatrième argument. En admettant que les
décisions du Tribunal administratif s'imposent à l'Assemblée, encore.
faut-il qu'il s'agisse de jugements réguliers. Des jugements frappés.
d'une cause de nullité ne pourraient s'imposer à aucun organe des.
Nations Unies.
Tclle est la thèsc. C'estde tous les arguments celui qui méritel'examen
le plus attentif. II n'est d'ailleurs soumisà la Cour que dans le cadre
d'une question abstraite, car aucune allégation précisen'a étéclairement
exprimée à l'encontre des jugements qui sont à l'origine de la présente
procédure.
Il est évident qu'en posant ce problème de la nullité des jugements
et de l'excèsde pouvoir du Tribunal administratif, les esprits subissent
l'attraction de la théoriede l'excèsde pouvoir de l'arbitre et de la nullité
de la sentence arbitrale en droit international. Rlais, dira-t-on, les.
rapports entre les agents des Xations Unies et l'organisation, ne sont-
ils pas précisément régip sar le droit international ?
Il ne s'agit pas ici d'une querelle d'école, maisd'une.question qui a,.
pour l'objet du présent avis, une importance considérable.
Les règles qui définissent les rapports entre les agents des Nations
Unies et les Nations Unies sont issues de la Charte et constituent le
droit intérieur il'une organisation internationale; en ce sens elles relè-
vent d'une certaine manière du droit international, mais d'une certaine
manièreseiilement, car à vrai dire il s'agit du droit interne d'une organi-
sation internationale. Maisquelle quesoit la t,erminologieque l'onadopte,.
ails rapports entre les Nations Unies et leurs agents, et ceci est le cas.
notamment de la théorie deja nullité des sentences arbitrales. Celle-ci,.
dans les rapports entre les Etats, résulte d'une sériede précédentsqui
sont lc support d'une coutume limitée et imparfaite. La coutume a bien
ou déterminer les cas dans lesauels nue sentence est nulle. mais elle n'a.
bas pu déterminerles procédésSatisfaisants pour remédier cette nullité.
Cette situation est le résultat du caractere inorga-isé de la société
internationale.
Les caractères tout différents des rapports des Nations Unies et de
leurs agents interdisent d'y transposer les solutions imparfaitesconsa-
créesdans les rapports entre Etats. La société des Etats n'a pas de légis-.
lateur organiquement constitué, les Xations Unies, en ce qui concerne
Ira rapports des fonctionnaires et des Nations Unies, en ont un qui est.
l'Assemblée.La sociétédes États ne peut résoudrequ'imparfaitement
les conflitsméme juridiques qui naissent en son sein, car les procédures
de règlement ne peuvent étre que consenties par ceux auxquels elles
s'appliquent ; les conflits qui naissent eu matière de fonction publique
au sein des Nations Unies peuvent étre résolussans difficulté,car il y
existe une autorité réglementaire compétente pour organiser toutes les
procédures.En un mot, la sociétédes Etats est une sociétéoù il n'esiste344 EXPOSÉ DE ai. REUTER (FRASCE) - II VI j4
pas d'autorité commune : les rai)ports entre les Xations Unies et leurs
..
iSciits cun~tirucnt :lu coiirrnirc iiiisyjtCiiic ]iiricIiqiis orgniiisï, rl:ii
beniicoiil~~l':iii:ili,gi~i. c~.rrains8:;ir;i\.tiiiisyitcinv Ct;btiquc..
Or It.5s\.sr?iiici et.iiitiiii:j coiin;iii;ent Ic nr\il>l;-I:iiiiillit<Ici-
décisions déjustice ; maii aucune place n'est iaite à une cause de nullité
salis qu'en mêmetemps ne soit prévue la procédure qui doit permettre
d'y porter remède ; toute autre solution serait la négation de l'ordre
juridique et serait injustifiable puisqu'il existe uii législateur capable
de résoudre le problènie posé.
Il en est de même<-lailsles ri:lations internes des Nations Unies et
de leurs agents. L'Assemblée peut parfaitement. par l'exercice de son
pouvoir réglementaire, définir lescas de nullité et prévoir les~rocédures
pour la constatation de ces cas ile nullité.
Seule l'autorité chargée de régler l'ensemble des rapports juridiques

.entre les fonctionnaires et les Nations Unies peut déterminer les causes
de nullité et les procédures destinées à y remédier. Seule l'Assemblée
est habilitée à le faire ; elle ne peut le faire toutefois qu'en fixant [les
règles. L'état de la réglementation applicable, y compris le statut du
Tribunal administratif, doniie la réponse à la question de savoir s'il
y a des cas de nullité reconnus et s'il y a une procédure pour y remédier.
Dans une société organisée,dans laquelle il n'y a pas de rapports juri-
diques qui soieiit placésliors la loi, seule l'autorité chargée de fixer les
règles peut résoudre cette question.
Le fait que daris le système actuel il subsiste uri risque de voir appli-
quer des décisions juridi<luement. irrégulières n'est pas un arguiiient,
car quoi que fasse l'Assemblée, ce risque subsistera toujours; il n'est
point nécessaire pour s'en convaincre d'écouter les doléances des plai-
deurs ;ilne dépenden tout cas que de l'Assembléeque ce,risque dimiiiue.

C'est donc à l'Assemblée qu'il appartient de porter remède aux
jugements qui seraient frappés de quelque défaut. Elle seule peut le
faire, et elle ne peut le faire qu'en fixant des règles.
Sans doute tous les problèmes qui se posent ne sont-ils pas résolus
par cette conclusioii, mais elle répond aux questions poséesà laCour ;
en discutant devant la Cour les options concrètes qui s'ouvrent à
l'Assemblée, on dépasserait le cadre de la demande d'avis adressée à
la Cour.
En modifiaiit le statut à la date du g décembre 1gj3, l'Assemblée a
suivi la voie que l'on vient d'indiquer ; aux yeux du Gouvernement
français il n'en est pas d'autre, car, si le Tribunal administratif n'est
pas rendu obligatoire par la Charte des Wations Unies, celle-ci a placé
les fonctionnaires des Nations Uiiies sous la garantie suprème des règles

généraleset impersoniielles que l'Assemblée ale devoir d'établir.
La réponse aux questioiis posiies à la Cour semble donc très simple.
En l'état actuel des rbsolutions de YAssemblée, les jugemeiits du
Tribunal administratif s'iniposerità l'Assembléecomme nu Secrétaire
ebnkrnl~
Il .app:irti:nt:,l':\s~cniI~1~cp:irvtjic!cl=nicsuxcs g/.iiCr,iI~.set imper-
suiiiicllcs<Iidl:ci(Icr (I:IIIS~IIIL.h:ypotlit;eit:t d:iiis qiiclles coiidilion;
les d;lc.ctiissii~i 2\,çntucllei, ili.' lugcmciir<IIIï'rit~iii~xlarlniiniitrntif
pourraient être constatées et amendées.
Xous remercions la Cour de l'attention qu'elle a bien voulu prêter
à notre exposé.4. EXPOSÉ ORAL DE M. LE PROFESSEUII SPIROPOULOS
(REPRÉSEKTAN DTU GOUVERNEMEKT HELLÉKIQUE)
A 1.A SEANCE PUBLIQUE DU 12 JUIN 1954, MATIK

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges,

Qu'il me soit permis, avant d'aborder mon sujet, de transmettre
la Cour les salutations de mon Gouvernement et de vous assurer des
sentiments de confiance dont le Gouvernement hellénique s'inspire
envers ce haut organe judiciaire international.
La question qui se trouve devant vous a soulevé-vous le savez
d'ailleurs- de graves controverses à l'Assembléegénérale desNations
Unies de l'année dernière,et c'est avec raison que l'Assembléen'a pas
voulu nrendre de décision définitive en cette matière sans avoir au
préalable pris connaissance de l'avis de l'organe le plus compétent en
matière de droit international du monde.
MonGouvernement est persuadéque la sagesse qui a toujours illuminé
vos délibérationsne manquera pas de vous permettre d'émettre un
avis qui sera accepté par l'opinion juridique mondiale.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, lc point de vue de mon
Gouvernement sur la question portée devant vous a étéexposédans nos
observations écrites.Aussi, dans l'exposéque j'aurai l'honneur de faire,
je voudrais laisser de côtétoutes les questions de détail,ces questions
techniques, ces questions secondaires, et me borner à examiner les
principes fondamentaux qui sont à la base du problème que nous
examinons.
Les arguments secondaires ont certainement leur importailce, et
nous devons êtrereconnaissants aux Gouvernements qui les ont soumis
à la Cour ; je pense à tous les Gouvernements, commençant par le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, le Gouvernement français,
le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas,
mais, lorsqu'on veut prendre une décision,il faut tâcher dc se dégager,
il faut tâcher d'écarter toutes ces questions de détail pour n'examiner
que les problèmes principaux, afin de pouvoir trouver le nŒud du
problème :c'est uniquement en remontant au principe fondamental qui
régit un problème qu'on arrive à trouver sa solution. C'est dans cet
ordLes questions poséespar l'Assembléegénérale eàpla Cour sont connues,
vous les avez lues danstoute observation écrite, vous les avez entendues
encore hier et avant-hier. Je crois donc qu'il est de mon devoir de ne
pas vous fatiguer en lisant de nouveau ces questions.
Abordant maintenant mon sujet, je désire examinertout d'abord une
première question, la question de la condition juridique du Tribunal
administratif. Ce Tribunal - tout le monde le sait, et la Cour,et les
représentants des Gouvernements - a étécréépar une résolution de
l'Assembléegénérale :il s'agit de la résolution 351(IV) du 24 novembre
1949. Cette résolution contient le statut du Tribunal et elle nous dit
quelle est la compétencede cet organe judiciaire. Voici un premier problème qui se pose pour moi. Étant donné que
ce Tribunal a étécréépar une résolution de l'Assembléegénérale, sa
création doit nécessairement étrefondéesurune disposition de la Charte.
Si vous voulez bien, je vous donnerai lecture du texte que j'avais
rédigéavant de quitter mon pays-.t que i.ava.s l'intention de communi-
quei à la Cour. -
J'y dis : eLorsqu'on fait abstractio~i de I'article 7 de la Charte, il
n'existe dans la Charte qu'un si:ul article prévoyant pour l'Assemblée
généralele droit de créer des organes, c'est l'article zz. Celui-ci permet
à 1'Asseinbléegénéralede créei-les organes subsidiaires qu'elle juge

nécessaires à l'exercice de ses fonctions. Le Tribunal administratif des
Kations Unies est donc. pour ce aui est de sa condition iuridiaue. un . .
organe subsidiaire des Na'tions [~nies. ,,
Mais, Messieurs les Jiiges, j'ai eu hier une surprise : mon éminent
collègue, le représentant de la France, daiis un exposé détaillé,
et qu'il a développé devant la Cour avec l'éloqiience traditionnelle
française, nous a dit : ce n'est pas l'article 22, mais c'est l'article ror
qu'il faut appliquer en l'occurrence. Après avoir entendu cette asser-
tion, je ne l'avais pas entendue auparavant - il se peut bien que je
n'aie pas lu assez attentivement les observations écrites des gouver-
nements ou que je n'aie pas fait assez attention à certains passages
de ces observations - j'ai commencé cematin à lire de nouveau l'exposé
français et j'ai coiistaté que le Gouveriiernent français a un peu -

je dis : un peii - changé d'avis, car dans les observations françaises,
tout en faisant allusion à l'article 101, on admet que c'est l'article zz
qui s'applique en l'occurrence. Permettez-moi de vous donner lecture
de ce texte, bien que je craigne de vous fatiguer. Mais c'est un passage
important, et il me paraît nécessaire de vous en donner lecture. Voilà
ce qui y est dit à la page 14 (j'ai devaiit moi le texte français du
dociiment contenant les observations du Gouvernement) :

«Le Gouvernement de la République française estime injustifié
de donner un sens trop étroit au concept d'uorgane subsidiaire 1,
tel qu'il est prévu aux articles 7, paragraphe z, et zz de la Charte.
II n'est nulle part dit dans la Charte qu'un organe subsidiaire ne
peut exercer qu'une compétence déjà possédéepar l'organe prin-
cipal qui l'a créé. Car c'estde la Charte que l'organe subsidiaire
tient sa légitimité.Le mode de création est unc chose, la nature
de l'organe en est une autre. L'AssemblEe, le Conseil de Sécurité
et le Conseil économique et social peuvent créerdes organes subsi-

diaires. La seule condition apportée par la Charte à leur création
est qu'ils soient jugés N nécessaires à l'exercice des fonctions 1)de
l'organe principal fondateur ....L'Assemblée généralepeut vala-
blement créer un organe subsidiaire [j'attire votre attention sur
cette phrase1 aui exerce une fonction iudiciaire. cette création ne
proveiant &'d'une délégationde cohpétence,mais de l'exercice
du pouvoir reconnu à l'Assembléegénéralepar la Cliarte de créer
toui organe nécessaire à son bon 7onctioiii;ement. ii

Et je voudrais ajouter uii autre passage, qui se trouve à la page
suivante (p. ~j), où il est dit :

«Aucune disposition de la Cliarte n'a interdit à L'Assemblée
généralede créerun tribunal pour trancher des difficultésconten- tieuses pouvant résulter de l'activité du Secrétariat. L'essentiel
est de constater que cette création s'est révélée irnécessaire »,pour
reprendre l'expression de l'article 7 [on se réfèredonc de nouveau
à l'article 71, en particulier pour l'application de l'article 101....»

Donc, il s'agit de l'application de l'article 7 comme base de création
du Tribunal administratif.
Eh bien, Messieurs, à mon avis, et c'est aussi l'avis du Gouvernement
français, tel qu'il est exprimé dans ses observations écrites, ce sont les
articles 7 et 22 sur lesquels est basée la création du Tribunal adminis-
tratif des Nations Unies et non pas l'article 101, qui traite d'autres
questions. Lisons l'article 101. 11dit ceci :

<iLe personnel [ce sont les paragraphes qui nous intéressent]
est nommé par le Secrétaire général conformément aux règles
fixéespar l'Assembléegénérale. 11

Donc, il y est dit tout simplement que le personnel est nommé par
le Secrétaire général, c'est tout. Ensuite, le paragraphe 3, dont on a
fait état, dit ceci :

La considération dominante dans le recrutement et la fixation.
des conditions d'emploi du personnel doit êtrela nécessitéd'assurer
à l'organisation ...»

Donc, dans l'expression «....la fixation des conditions d'emploi ....1,
on a voulu faire entrer la faculté de l'Assembléede créer le Tribunal
administratif. Cette phrase dit simplement «la fixation des conditions
d'emploi ». On nous dit : c'est aussi une icondition >n,Darce au'elle

est prévue dans les contrats par lesquels on a engagéies fonction-
naires.-Mais, laissant de côté toute autre corisidération, cet article ne
dit nulle part que l'Assemblée peut ou doit créerun Tribunal admi-
nistratif. 11 faut lire le paragraphe 3 en mêmetemps que le para-
graphe premier. Le paragraphe premier nous parle des fonctions et
des attributions du Secrétaire général. C'estdonc le Secrétaire général
qui doit prendre en considération ces coiiditions, etc., et non pas l'As-
semblée générale.
Donc, je crois qu'on ne peut pas avoir de doute que l'article IOI se
prêtetrès mal pour justifier le pouvoir de l'Assemblée généralede créer
le Tribunal administratif.

J'ai insisté sur cette question plus que je ne devais le faire, mais, hier,
quand j'ai entendu notre coilègue de France se référerà cet article, je
me suis adressé à mon collègue hollandais et il m'a répondu que lui
aussi - si je me trompe, je le prie de me corriger - se référeraà l'arti-
cle ror, et dans un entretien que j'ai eu avec mon coilèguedu Royaume-
Uni, lui aussi va se référer - si je ne me trompe - à cet article. Mais,
si je me trompe, je présente d'avance mes excuses.

The PRESIDEXT : Professor Spiropoulos, before we come to your next
point, 1 think we shall liave the translation.

al. SPIROPOULOS [trunslation] : Illr. President, may 1 ask you a
persona1 favour. IVhen 1 came here, my manuscript was only composed
of twelve pages and 1 had divided this document in three parts, so 1
would have developed the first four pages and then the second four. and so on. But in the ineantinie, after the discussion that lias takeii
place in this Court, 1 have added a considerable number of other items.
So my document is now much longer ;it is longer, anyhow, than twelve

pages. So 1 would submit to you whether you would be so kind as to
intermpt me any time you think that my statement is toolong, because
1cannot judge it myself, and when 1 heard the translation now, 1 \vas
astonished at the length of what 1 Iiad said.

The PRESIDENT : Professor Spii-opoulos, 1 will do my best to discliarge
the heavy responsibility that you place upon me, but 1 venture to
suggest to you another way in which you might be able to achieve the
object that you Iiave in mind, and that is that from time to time it
may be possible for you to Say that you can adopt the argument on
this point of one of the speakers wbo,have preceded you.

M. SPIROPOULO : Thank you very much, Mr. President.
IIonsieur le Président, j'ai eu l'honneur d'expliquer à la Cour que, de
l'avis de mon Gouvernement, c'est l'article 22 qui est h la base de la
création du Tribunal administratif. Alais je suis très accommodant et
je voudrais méme accepter de façon hypothétique que ce soit I'arti-
cle 101. Pour nous, ceci n'a aucune importance. Qu'on base la création
du Tribunal administratif sur 1';irticle 22 ou 7 ou sur l'article 101, ceci
n'a aucune signification.
.4cceptons quece soit l'article 101.Je répète :je ne vois pas comrnerit
on pourrait crter un tribunal sur la base de l'article 101, ruais acceptons
pour un instant que ce soit l'article 101. Quelle serait la condition du
tribunal en question ? Certes, cc iie serait pas un tribunal subsidiaire

des Nations Unies, tel qu'il est définipar l'article 22 ou par l'article 7
de la Charte, puisque l'article IOI n'en parle pas, mais toutde mémece
sera un organe secondaire des Nations Unies. La Cliarte énumèreles
organes principaux des Kations Unies :L'Assembléegénérale,le Conseil
de Sécurité,la Cour, etc. Donc, tous les autres organes, qu'ils soient
~ré~ ~ ~t sur la base de I'articli: 22. soit sur la base de n'im~orte auel
;irticlz do la (:h:~rte.sunt forcr'mcntiles urpnci ici~iicl:iirçclesS:itiuiis
I,'iiit:i.Or, i':iccel,ic d,: ci,iisiil<:r~:Irr.'l'rihiirial;~rliidesiiSntioiis
Uiiies commeun 'organesecondaire, qu'il soit créésur la base de I'arti-
cle 22 OU sur la base de l'article 101, ou de n'importe quel autre
article de la Charte. Pour la solution de notre problème il existera
toujours un rapport entre l'organe principal et l'organe secondaire, que
ce dernier soit qualifiéde subsidiaire ou de secondaire - car l'orgarie
subsidiaire est aussiun organe secondaire des Nations Unies. Donc,
qu'on le considèrecomme organo secondaire ou organe subsidiaire, cela
revient exactement h la mêmeciiose : les organes subsidiaires eux aussi
ne sont que des organes secondaires. Donc, acceptons, pour le moment,
que le Tribunal administratif soit un organe secondaire des Nations
,Unies. Je trouve que la tâche d'lin représentant qui plaide devant cette
Cour n'est pas de créer des difficultés,mais bien de simplifier les pro-
blèmeset de faire tout son possible pour pouvoir s'entendre avec sescollè-
gues. Je me permets d'exprimer l'espoir que l'effort que je viens de faire
sera considérécomme un essai de iious mettre d'accord sur le caractère
du Tribunal administratif des Xations Unies. Donc. considérons le
Tril,uri:il adininisrrarif comine iiiiurg:inc izcuiiil;~ire.Criis qiii voudroiir

lt!~~~,nsi~I~c ~oricnrme lin orginc suh~i(lI~Ir~C, ~II'IlIeSk~sscnt,iiiaiitiCiiit. ESPOSÉ DE 31. SPIROPOULOS (GKÈCE) - 12 VI 54 349

dans ce cas-là ce sera un organe secondaire par rapport à l'Assemblée
générale,le Conseil de Securité, etc.
La constatation que l'organe en question - le Tribunal adminis-
tratif- est un organe secondaire des Nations Uiiies a certainement
une certaine importance. Je dis une certaine importance, car il iie faut
pasexagérer cette importance. La Cour verra plus tard que je peux mtme
renoncer à faire état de ce rapport entre l'organe secondaire et l'organe
principal, car on peut très bien se baser sur d'autres principes pour
arriver à la solution de notre problème, et peut-êtrefaut-il le faire en
dernière analyse.
Cette constatation faite, passons maintenant à une question qui ne
présente pas beaucoup d'intérêt pournotre problème, mais qu'il est
utile d'avoir touchée,c'est celle de savoir si les jugements du Tribu-
nal administratif peuvent êtrerevisés par l'Assembléegénérale.
Je ne veux pas trop insister sur cette question :elle ne présentepas
d'intérêten l'occurrence, et je me conforme au conseil du Président.
Evidemmeiit, I'Asseinbléegénéralepeut introduire la revision des juge-
étécréépar une résolution. L'Assembléegénéralepeut toujours adopterratif a
une nouvelle résolution, et celle-ci abolira la résolutiondéjà existante,
ce qui peut avoir comme conséquence que les jugements-du Tribunal
peuvent êtrerevisés et mêmedisparaître complètement. Donc, aucun
doute que l'Assemblée générale,par une nouvelle résolution, peut
reriser les jugements du Tribunal administratif. Reste à savoir si cette
revision peut se faire uniquement à l'égard des jugements qui n'ont
pas encore étérendus, mais aussi à l'égardde jugements déjà rendus.
C'est là une question très importante, une question qui se rattache h
notre problème. car s'il y a un jugement déjàrendu, il y aura des droits
acquis, etc. Mais je ne veux pas examiner cette question, me conformant
au désirdu Président d'abrégerautant que possible mon exposé.
Monsieur le Président, suivant votre conseil, je veux laisser de côté
quelques développements qui se trouvent dans mon manuscrit et je
veux passer maintenant à l'examen d'une question qui est d'une
importancecapitale pour notre sujet: L'article 9 du statut du Tribunal
administratif prévoit que lorsqu'il y a lieu à indemnité celle-ci est fixée
par le Tribunal et verséepar l'organisation des Nations Unies. Eh bien,
on ne saurait imaginer un texte plus clair; le Tribunal nous dit quelle
est l'indemnité et l'organisation des Nations Unies verse la somme. Le
texte est parfaitement clair ;or, en pratique ou, au moins, dans le cas
qui s'est présenté à l'Assembléegénérale,pour que les Xations Uiiies
puissent exécutercette obligation - obligation prévuepar l'article 9 -
il faudra que l'Assembléegénéraleapprouve les montants inscrits dans
le budget de l'organisation et destinés aux indemnités fixéespar le
Ar..i-n.-.
Or, du moment que l'Assembléegénéralea institué par une résolution
le Tribunal, du moment qu'elle a dit dans l'article g de son statut que
l'organisation va verser les sommes <lue le Tribunal a accordéesaux
fonctionnaires, il existe pour les Xations Unies l'obligation de verser ces
sonimes. Je ne vois pas par quel argument oii pourrait éviter pareille
conciusion. ?daisj'ai eu ici une surprise, que je n'aurais pas éprouvée si
i'avais lu ~lus attentivement le ra~~ort du Secrétaire eénéral.Le distin-
gué direcieur principal du ~erricé'juridique des ~atyons Unies nous a
dit avant-hier: «oui,dans ce cas particulier, ces sommes étaientinscri-350 ESPOS~ DE ai.SPIROPOULOS (GRÈCE) - 12 1'1 54

tes dans le budget ; mais il arrive qu'on inscrive dans le budget - et
ceci se trouve aussi dans les observations écrites du Gouvernement
français -, il arrive qu'on inscrive d'avance dans le budget des som-
mes pour les indemnités que le Tribunal reconnaîtrait le cas échéant
aux fonctionnaires dans l'avenir, et dans ce cas l'Assembléegénérale
n'aura pas d'occasion de voter siir ces sommes parce qu'elles ne seraient
pas déterminées d'avance par le budget ,n.
Je ne vous cache pas, Messieurs les Juges, qii'au commencement j'ai
étéun peu bouleversé, parce que je me suis dit qu'on se trouve en pré-
sence d'lin problème délicat, mais, en réfléchissant bien, j'ai réussi à
voir quelle était en réalitéla situation. Je veux répondre à la question
posée par un exemple: Prenons le code de procédure criminelle; il

prévoit qu'en cas d'assassinat, l'assassin sera traduit devant un tribunal
et jugé. Mais lorsqu'on iie découvre pas l'assassin, lorsqu'on ne saitpas
qui est l'assassin, est-ce que le tribunal va juger, est-ce qu'il peut
juger ? II ne le pourra pas.
Et dans notre cas, quelle est la question qui a étéposéepar I'Assem-
bléegénérale, quelleest cette question ? L'Assembléegénéraledemande
à la Cour de dire si elle a le droit, pour une raison quelconque, de
refuser d'exécuter un jugement du Tribunal administratif. Eh bien, si
le Secrétaire générala déjà donné l'argent aux fonctionnaires, il n'y a
pas de problème ; ils auront eu leur argent. Comment I'Assemblée
générale peut-elle lie pas exécuter ce jugement yiiisqii'il aura été déjà
exécutb? Pour I'Assemblée générale, aucun prohlèine ne se posera
parce qii'elle ne peut pas ne pas exécuter uii jugement déjà exécuté.
Mais le problème qui se trouve devant nous est celui qiii s'est pré-
senté aux Nations Unies. C'est un problème concret.

II y a eu un jugement et ce jugement n'a pas étéexécuté.Le Secré-
taire générals'est vu dans l'obligation d'iiiscrire ilne certaine somme
dans le budget et alors l'Assembléegénérale s'esttrouvée devant cette
alternative :IIdoit-elle approuver ces sonimes oti ne doit-elle pas les
approuver ,? Voilà le problème tel qu'il se pose à nous ; c'est unique-
ment dans ces circonstances, dans cette hypothèse-là que le problème
s'est posé, car si le jugement avait étédéjà exécuté par le paiement
de l'argent aux fonctionnaires, il n'existerait Ilas de problème. L'As-
semblée généralepourra peut-être tâcher, je nc sais pas par quels ,mo-
yens, de récupérer l'argeiit payé, mais c'est là une autre question ;
si le jugenient avait été exécuté, la questioii qii'oii pose à la Cour
n'aurait aucun objet. Notre question n'a de seiis que si le jugement
n'a pas étéexécuté.La questioii devant nous est donc celle de savoir
si l'Assembléegénéralea les pouvoirs de ne pas exécuter un jugement
et non pas celle de savoir ce qu'elle aurait pu f:iire sile jugement avait

étédéjà exéciité.
La question qui se trouve devant la Cour est celle de savoir si, malgré
l'obligation constatée plus haut des Xations Unies de respecter les
décisioiis du Tribunal administratif, il n'existe pas pour l'Assemblée
généralede possibilité juridique de ne pas exécuter un jugement. Et
ceci pour uii motif quelconque. En pure tliéorie, I'Assembléegénérale
possède la faculté de iie pas exécuter des jugemerits de ses organes
subsidiaires ou secoiidaires et, par conséquent, aussi du Tribunal admi-
nistratif. Elle possède cette faculté, car elle est libre de faire ce qu'elle
veut. Seulement, cela est une questioii de fait, et ceci a étérelevé hier
avec hcaucoul~ de pertinence par mon collègiic, Ic représentant de laFrance, et auparavant par le représentant des Nations Unies. hlais.
dans notre cas, où l'Assembléegénéra!es'est liéepar une résolution par
laquelle elle dit expressément qu'elle va verser aux fonctionnaires I'iu-
demnité accordéepar le Tribunal, ne pas se conformer à cette résolution
- et cela sans raison sérieuse -, seiait un acte arbitraire, un acte qui
ne serait pas conforme à la bonne foi.
Vous savez tous que la Charte mentionne le principe de la bonne
foi. Elle lementionne en ce qui concernelesobligationsdesmembres, mais
ce qui est vrai pour les membres est aussi vrai pour l'organisation

comme telle et pour tous ses organes. Donc, si I'Assembléegénérale a
accepté de verser l'argent accordé par le Tribunal, du moment qii'elle
a crééelle-méme ce Tribunal. qu'elle a dit elle-même qu'elle vaverser
l'argent, elle agirait de façon arbitraire et violerait le principe de la
bonne foi, si elle ne se conformait pas à ses engagements.
Monsieur le l'résident, Messieurs les Juges, le fait qu'il existe pour
l'Assembléegénérale,je l'ai répété plusieurs fois, l'obligation d'esécuter
les iueements du Tribunal administratif. est-ce aue ce fait sirriifie nu'il
n'eiis'ic aucuiie possibilité pour l'Assembléegéné;alede ne p& exécker
un jugement du Tribbnal administratif? Nous n'hésitons pas à donner
uni Ïéponse affirmative. Oui, l'Assemblée généralepeut, dans cer-

taines conditioiis, s'écarter des obligatioiis qu'elle s'est imposées à elle-
même.Si, malgré l'existence de l'obligation de I'Assembléegénérale -
c'est une espèce d'auto-obligation, si vous voulez d'auto-limitation,
de l'Assemblée générale, car c'est elle-méme qui s'est imposé cette
obligation par l'adoption de la résolution qui a institué le Tribunal -,
si, malgré cette obligation il y a des raisons sérieuses permettant de
considérer le refus de l'Assemblée générale d'esécuter un jugement
du Tribuiial comme justifié, son refus d'esécuter un jugement du Tri-
bunal - dans notre cas particulier le refus d'approuver les sommes
prévues pour l'esécution du jugement du Tribuiial - paraît légitime.

Voilà. eii deus mots, la thèse du Gouvernement hellénique.
Ceus qui ne partagent pas cet avis se basent, entre autre, sur le
caractère du Tribunal administratif qu'ils caractérisent de véritable
(1tribunal 1)sur u l'autorité de la chose jugée » des jugements de ce Tri-
bunal, aiiisi que sur le caractère des droits des particuliers, qu'ils carac-
térisent de iidroits acquis », au sens propre du mot, tel que ce terme
est compris dans le droit administratif. Certes, ce sont des arguments
très sérieus qu'il faut prendre sérieusement en considération. Alais,
lorsqu'oii les esamiiie de plus près, oii colistate qu'il n'y a aucun rap-
port entre ces qualifications : «tribuiialin,K droits acquis n, c autorité
de la cliose jugée Iet le droit de l'Assemblée généralede ne pas exé-

cuter les jugemeiits du Tribunal administratif.
Cecia eé relevéde façon excellente l'autre jour par l'honorable représen-
tant des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.Les pouvoirs de l'Assemblée générale en
matière de budget, pour préciser, l'étendue de ses pouvoirs, ne sauraient
dépendre que de la Charte des Nations Unies qui est la constitution de
notre Organisation. Or, la Charte ne pose aucune restriction aux pouvoirs
de l'Assembléeen cette matière. Elle se borne à dire, en ce qui concerne
l'approbation du budget, quel'Assembléegénérale «examine et approuve u
le budget de l'organisation. Certes, I'Assembléegénérale,en adoptant
la fameuse résolution par laquelle elle a crééle Tribunal, a posé des
restrictions à soli pouvoir discrétionnaire en cette matière. L'Assemblée

générale,qui est un organe politique, s'est posé desrestrictions, je diraimhc, poiir Ctre plus es;~ct,cllea abandon116soli I)OU\-OIIcli~~r;lt~u~i~i~i~re
cn ce qui coiiceriie Icsjugements <III'l'rihii~ildiiiiriisir;itif, c:~rc'est clle-
ni;nii!<lui a cr;& le Tril,iin:il. (:'elle-m;.mc uiii s'est i>us&ct:s ré:tric-
tions, c'est elle-même qui a abandonné tout pouvoir d'appréciation dis-
crétionnaire en cette matière. *us, est-ce que l'Assembléegénérale,en
se liant elle-même lesmains, en se posant les restrictions que je viens
de mentionner, s'est imposé l'obligationde suivre le Tribunal partout,
quoi qu'il fasse, même lorsqu'on setrouve en 1)résenced'un jugement,
ce (Iirii, sc~~i~rl:iI?xIl pciLtv :a\,t,ir,par S:xcini,lc,unc c:orriii,ti~n.'Tout
est ~~ojsiblc.i,:rtes. cc c:ÿ:iicjc pr?iciitera pnî eii rkiliti:. 1.cï'ril~iiii:al
a<liiiiiiijtr;iest soi15I:L~.r&idcncçrl'iinr:personne polir Inc~iiclle]':ille
plus profond estime, et pour ses capacitésde juristeet I>our'sesqualités
personnelles. Lahaute morale de la présidentedu Tribunal est une garan-
tie contre un jugement scandaleux. Pas de doute sur ce point, mais des
cas d'excès de pouvoir ne sauraient être exclus. Le Tribunal pourrait
aussi commettre une erreur grave. Il peut par exemple s'arroger une
juridiction qu'il ne possède pas. C'esthumain, tout le monde peut com-
mettre cette erreur. Dans un cas pareil, lorsqu'or! se trouve devant un
jugement qui ne tient pas debout, que l'opinion mondiale ne reconnaît
pas comme juste, est-ce qu'on doit dire que l'Assembléegénérale,en
adoptant la résolutioii ?TI, etc.. en disant uue le Tribunal fixerait les
indémnitésq , u'elleva veGrI'argent, est-ce qii'êlles'est liéepour toujours
et dans toutes les conditions ?
hIessieurs les Juges, une conception pareille serait contraire à la
réalité.
D'abord, le Tribunal administratif, parrapport àl'Assembléegénérale,
est un organe secondaire - je ne dis plus a subsidiaireii.Ce serait.une
conception, à mon avis, étrange quede penser que l'organe principal, à
savoir l'Assembléegénérale, nepossèdeaucun pouvoir, mêmedans des
cas extrêmes,de se soustraire aux obligations que cet organe s'est im-
poséesde son propre gré. J'ai dit dans des cas extrêmesii, mais,
MessieurslesJuges, nous nous trctuvons en effetdevant un cas extrême.
Pendant la vie de la Société desXations - pendant vingt ans, une
seule fois un cas s'est présentéoù l'on a examiné la validité d'un
jugement du Tribunal administratif, et quant aux Xations Unies, c'est
le premier cas qui donne lieu à des controverses sérieuses. Lorsqu'on
lit les observations des gouvernements, lorsqu'oii entend les plaidoiries,
on pourrait croire que ces cas se présentent continiiellement et que
l'Assemblée générald eoit continiiellement décidersi ellepeut ne pas exé-
cuter ces jugements. C'est uneerreur! Vous savez que nous nous trou-
vons devant un cas exceptionnel, un cas qui s'est présenté l'année
dernière et qui peut-être ne se présentera plus jamais. Et pour vous
dire tout franchement, mon Gouvernement, s'il m'a demandéde venir
ici pour exposer son point de vue, ce n'est pas parce qu'il pense qu'il
s'agit d'une question qui pourrait avoir une importance pratique dans
l'avenir, mais uniquement parce qu'il s'agit d'interpréter la Charte,
car l'avis que vous allez émettre forcémentcomprendra l'interprétation
de la Charte en ce qui concerne les pouvoirs de l'Assembléegénérale,
et ce problème est en effet important. C'est donc le problème à la fois
théorique et politique qui a de l'importance; pas le cas présent. Dans
le cas présent, si considérables que soient les sommes allouées aux
fonctionnaires des Xations Unies, elles ne sont pas importantes par
rapport aux sommes prévuespar le budget des Nations Unies. Mais leprincipe comme tel est important. Est-ce que l'Assembléegéiiérale a
le dernier mot dans ces questions-là ou est-ce qu'elle n'a pas le dernier
mot. Est-ce que des organes secondaires ont le dernier mot ? Iroili la
raison pour laquelle mon Gouvernement m'a demandé de venir plaider
devant cette Cour.
Mais, comme j'ai dit auparavant, je ne veux pas trop insister sur le
caractère du Tribunal administratif et lesrapports existantentre I'tlssem-
bléegénéraleet ce Tribunal. Laissons cela de côté. Les pouvoirs de
l'Assembléegénérale peuvent ètre déduits de la Charte même,de la
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~-- ~uvoirs. Xous n'av~ns~oas besoin d'examiner sile Tribunal
est un organé, subsidiaire ou un organe secondaire, ou n'importe quel
autreorrane desXations Unies.Ce quinous intéresse,cesont lespouvoirs
de l'i\s&mblée générale,et l'analjse de ces pouvoirs nous pimettra
de donner la réponse à notre problème. L'Assembléegénérale estlin
corps souverain, un corps politique. C'est, à l'instar du Conseil de
Sécuritél,ecorps suprêmedes Xations Unies. L'Organisation des Nations
Unies connaît aiissi d'autres organes, elle connait la Cour. Un organe

devant lequel on doit s'incliner. Il y a aussi d'autres organes: le Coli-
seil économique et social, le Secrétariat, etc., mais l'Assemblée générale
est l'organe politique des Nations Unies, organe politique par excel-
lente à l'instar naturellement du Conseil de Sécurité.
Si L'onn'admettait pas le pouvoir de l'Assemblée générale dd eire
le dernier mot dans des questions du genre de celles qui sont devant
nous, eh bien, on méconnaitrait le caractère de l'AssembléegénPrale
comme organe suprêmedes Nations Unies. On a critiquéla qiialification
de l'Assemblée générale commo ergane souverain. On a dit: ~orgüne
souverain 1)mais où est-ce que cela est dit? La Charte ne dit pas que
l'Assembléegénéraleest un organe souverain. Eh bieii, est-ce que les
constitutions de tous ces EtaLsreprésentésaujourd'hui ici, est-ce qu'elles
disent que la France est un Efat souverain ou que le Royaume-Uni est
on Etat souverain, que les Etats-Unis, la Hollande, etc., sont des
Etats souverains? Mais cela ne se dit pas! La souveraineté, c'est ilne
qualité qui ressort des compétences exercéespar rapport au droit iiiter-
national. des ~ouvoi<s. exercés par un Etat. var ravi~ort au droit
international. ~onc, si i'on dit q& l'Assemblée&énéralé'esu tn organe
souverain. on déduit ceci des ~ouvoirs au'elle exerce. D'ailleurs. ie me
suis poséla question suivante :f~ssembléegénéraleest composéed22t:its
souverains, et je me s9is dit: est-ce possible que l'organe, dans lequel
sont représentésdes Etats souverains, qui est composéd'États souve-
rains, qui est un organe politique et non pas un organe administratif,

ne soit pas lui-mêmesouverain? hlais, comme j'ai dit au commence-
ment de mon exposé,je suis très conciliant. Je n'attache pas beaucoup
d'importance à cette qualification. Je voudrais êtred'accord avec mes
collègues qui ne partagent pas le mêmepoint de vue que moi. Laissons
de cOtécette question de souveraineté,laissons-la de côté,et esaminons
plutôt les pouvoirs de l'Assemblée.Xous constaterons que c'est I'organe
suprême des Xations Unies, que c'est l'organe qui est comparable à un
corps législatif.Je répète,c'est I'organesuprêmedes Xations Unies, qui
est composéd'Etats souverains, c'est l'organequi décidedes questions
concernant la paix et la guerre, c'est I'organe qui a une compétence
générale.Jetez un coup d'Œil sur l'article IO de la Charte, qui dit: L'Assembléegénéralepeut discuter toutes questions ou affaires
rentrant dans le cadre de la présente Charte ...a

C'est aussi la guerre et la paix. Cet organe politique, cet organe qui
peut décider - plus ou moins - de tout ce qui est le plus important
pour l'humanité, eh bien, je me demande si cet organe ne possède pas
le pouvoir de ne pas exécuter un jugement <-luTribunal administratif
lorsqu'il trouve que la justice l'exige, que l'intérêtgénéral l'exige.
Voilà la question devant laquelle nous nous trouvons et à laquelle je
réponds de façon affirmative.
Monsieur le Président, l'heure avance, il est maintenant midi. J'arais
l'intention de parler pendant 4j minutes, peut-être 50 minutes, et je
vais abréger mon esposé pour ne pas fatiguer les membres de la Cour.
D'ailleurs. j'ai déjà dit l'essentiel sur la question.
La question qui se pose maintenant est celle de savoir comment

trouver les motifs permettant à l'Assembléegénéralede se libérerde ses
obligations. Car c'est bien de cela qu'il s'agit, de se libérerdes obligations
qu'elle s'est imposées en adoptant la résolution créant le Tribunal
administratif. Eh bien. ceci n'est pas facile. Il n'est pas facile de définir
ces <[motifs IDces iraisonsii. La première question poséeà la Cour parle de
« raisons >Bla seconde parle de amotifs ».Je ne sais pas si cela a étéfait
intentionnellement, mais cela n'a aucune importance. Donc - je le
répète - il est clifficilede définir,peut-êtremêmedc façon abstraite, ces
motifs. De façon générale,on pourrait dire que l'Assemblée générale
peut sesoustraire àses obligations en matière de jugements du Tribunal
administratif chaque fois - c'est une définition très générale - que
l'intérêt généraIl'esige. Je vais mentionner quelques cas. Lorsqu'il y

a des motifs sérieux, l'Assembléegénéralepeut s'écarter des obligations
qu'elle a prises sur la base de la résolution que j'ai mentionnée plusieurs
fois. Ce qu'on peut demander à l'Assemblée générale, c'est qu'elle
exécute ses obligations de bonne foi, qu'elle n'agisse pas de façon
arbitraire - n'oublions pas que nous avons affaire à un organe politique.
Si des motifs sérieux font paraître à l'Assembléegénéralel'inexécution
de jugements comme s'imposant, dans ce cas-li il n'y a pas violation
du principe de la bonne foi et I'a,pissement de l'Assembléegénéralene
saurait jamais être qualifié d'arbitraire, il sera légitime.
Messieurs les Juges, je ne voudrais pas vo11sfatiguer trop, mais il
me vient à l'instant une idée.JI: ne sais pas si elle est bonne ou non.
Vous allez en juger vous-mémes. Elle m'est venue en lisant les deux
testes que l'Assemblée générale vous asoumis: je parle des deus

questions devant vous. J'ai lu beaucoup de fois - je ne sais pas com-
bien de fois - ces deux textes, et j'ai constaté quelque chose qui m'a
frappé et qui pourrait peut-être avoir une certaine influence sur la
décision que vous allez prendre. Que dit la question ne 2 ? En cas de
réoonse affirmative à la auestion susmentioiinée. auels .ont les orinci-
p:Ns in<~tifssur leiqiiels 1'Aiii.inbli.cgéii5ralepi:ibe fonder pur ez~icc.i
1t:gitimeiii~:iitcc droitI n jc iut- $lcmsiide :8,Ir'gitiineinrnn ce (Iroit ?
Est-cc ~ILICI'e~~:rcice,I'i~droit n'est t~~illoilrslcciti~~~e l.'ext:r~.ice
d'un droit, c'est un droit, et son exeicice es<certaikent <légitime ».
011 pourrait donc avoir l'impression qu'il s'agit là d'un pléonasme,d'une
erreur de rédaction. D'ailleurs. il ne faut Das s'étonner. ceus aui savent
comment on a rédigé cesdeux textes, ceuk qui savent ce qui s'est passé
pour arriver h ce compromis de textes, ne seront pas étonnés.Hélas, EXPOSÉ DE ai. SPIROPOULOS (CREC E) 12 VI 54 335

on n'a pas envoyéce texte à la Commission juridique, ce qu'on aurait
pu faire, d'après une résolutionadoptéepar l'Assembléegénéraleil y a
deux ou trois ans. Ce texte a étérédigépar la Commission budgétaire.
Eh bien, on pourrait penser qu'une erreur s'est glisséedans le texte. Mais
on pourrait penser aussi que le mot clégitimenest à sa place, car on peut
posséder un droit, mais les conditions de son exercice n'existent pas.
En effet, I'exercice d'un droit, lorsque les conditions de son exercice
n'existent pas. n'est pas rlégitime n.
Mais lorsqu'on lit notre texte, en même temps que la première
question on se rend compte qu'il ne s'agit pas de cela, car dans le pre-
mier texte il est dit: ul'Assembléegénérale a-t-elle ledroit pour une
raison quelconque de refuser inetc. On devrait donc dire, dans ledeux-
ième texte : u en cas de réponse affirmative à la question susmentioii-
née, quels sont les priiicipaux motifs permettant à l'Assemblée géné-
rale de ne pas exécuter le jugement P. Je me demande - c'est une
question que je me pose et, si vous me le permettez, Messieurs les Juges,
je voudrais bien vous la soumettre -, je me demande, quant à ce mot
«légitime », si dans le subconscient de celui qui a rédigéce texte et
peut-être aussi dans \c subconscient de ceux qui ont adoptéce texte, il
n'y avait pas une autre idée. Ce texte parle de CIdroit», le droit de
l'Assembléed'exécuter ou de ne pas exécuter.Maisla notion de <droit »
a étédévelov~éevar le droit interne. le droit civil. On sait ce flue c'est,
le droità ui;eAalikentation, on sait ce que c'est, le droàtune piestation,
etc. Mais lorsqu'on parle de l'Assembléegénérale,d'un organe politique,
on pense àdeSi, n.II y a dans ceipouvoirs certainement l'aspect
juridique, l'aspect de légalité,et je me demande si, en rédigeantce texte.
on n'a pas eu dans le subcoiiscient la légalité »de I'exercice des n pou-
voirs ),de I'..\ssembléegénérale.On pourra donc, si l'on accepte l'idée
qui m'est venue - je ne suis pas moi-mêmecertain s'il faut y insister
trop - se demander si l'Assembléegénérale exercedes droits au sens
vrovre du mot. comme on l'entend en droit interne. ou s'il ne s'agit
pas'plutbt de l'&ercice de iipouvoirs » qui peuvent êtie ou «légitim.a
ou «arbitraires ».lSxercice légitimede pouvoirs ou exercice arbitraire
de pouvoirs. C'est uii aspect du problème que je me suis permis de
soumettre à la Cour sans cependant y insister trop.
Monsieur le Président, je voudrais abréger mon exposéautant que
possible. Je voudrais dire seulement deux mots sur les motifs qui pour-
raient servir de justification pour l'Assembléegénéralepour ne pas
exécuter un jugement du Tribunal administratif. J'ai déjà dit qu'il est
difficil...vour ne vas dire im~ossible. de les définir de facon méme
abstraitc. tout au 'plus pourrah-on mentionner quelques cas typiques
permettant à l'Assembléegénéralede s'écarter de ses obligations. .
Tene uarle vas de «vrinFivntix »motifs. car en lisant de nouveau le

. .
les principau< motifs sur lesquels ~'Àssembléegénéralepeut se fonder
pour exercer légitimement ce droit ?»
Les «principaux motifs in.Comment interpréter cette expression
«principaux motifs i? A mon avis, le sens de cette expression est qu'il
s'agit de motifs plut6t «typiques », de motifs classiques B.et non pas
de motifs rprincipaux ».Tous les motifs sont principaux », il ne petit
pas y avoir des motifs qui sont moinsprincipaux et des motifs plus350 EXPOSE IIE AI.SPIKOPOULOS (GRECE) - 12 VI 54

principaux. Ou bien uii motif est sérieux,ou il n'est pas sérieux.S'ilest
sérieux, sipeu sérieux qu'il soit. l'Assembléegénéralepourra s'écarter
de ses obligations. II ne faut pas interpréter notre texte d'aprés sa lettre,
et je ne reproche rien au comitéqui l'a rédigé. iiPrincipaux motifs » ne
veut pas dire des motifs qui sont plus importants que d'autres. Tous les
motifs, lorsqu'ils sont sérieux, sont importants, ils ont tous la mème
importance, on en déduit les niémes conséquences: c'est-à-dire que
l'Assemblée pourra refuser d'exécuter un jugement. Donc, c'est dans
ce sens qu'il faut interpréter. ?Lmon humble avis, l'expression tprinci-
paux motifs u. Ce sont donc qui:lques cas typiques qui peuvent se
présenter dans la pratique internationale.
Quels sont maintenant ces cas ? El1bien, Monsieur le Président,je ne

veux pas y insister trop. On les a Gnuméréd sans les observations écrites
des gouvernements. C'est surtout le cas d'un jugement défectueux. Par
ce terme on entend en général un jugementoù le juge a outrepassé les
limites de sa compétence, etc. 011 peut penser aussi à un jugement où
le tribunal a appliqué le droit di: façon, je dirai presque, impossible.
Voilà quelques cas ; oii pourrait en citer d'autres. Je dirai de façon
générale : tout motif qui est sérieux,quelle que soit son origine, queue
que soit sa nature, justifie l'Assembléegénérale à se soustraire à
ses o~~-eations.
hlons~eurl~~résideiit, Blessieuis les Juges, je suis arrivé à la fin de
mon ex~osé.Késumaiit nos conclusionsouant au g ou voirde l'Assemblée
général;de ne pas doniier suite à un jugement si référant à des indem-
nités- je répètele texte qui se trouve dans la première questioii :i~àdes
indemnités accordéespar le Tribunal administratif à uii foiictionnaire
des Natioris Unies d l'engagement duquel il a étkmis fin sans I'assen-
timent de l'intéressé lniious pouirons dire que le refus'éventuel de l'As-
sembléegénérale d'exécuterdes jugements doit étre considéré comme
légitime,chaque fois que la décisionen question de l'Assembléegénérale
se fondesur des motifs sérieux,et ne parait pas comme une méconnais-
sance arbitraire du principe de la bonne foi, et, si vous .voulez, je pour-
rais ajouter et du respect des droits acquis par les fonctionnaires.
Nous avons dit que l'Assembléegénéraled , ans des cas pareils, lorsqu'il
y a des motifs sérieux, n'a pas besoin d'exécuter les jugements du
Tribunal administratif. Dans ce qui précède,j'ai dit qu'elle n'approuve-
rait pas les parties en question du budget. Mais ceci n'est qu'un cas

particulier, car si vous lisez la questionn" I,il y est dit simplement que
iquelles sont les raisons pour lesquelles elle peut refuser d'esécuter
le jugement » ?

Ce texte ne fait pas de distirictioii. Il ne dit pas qu'il faut approuver
ou ne pas approuver le budget. L'Assembléegénéraleveut une réponse
générale à la première question. Quels sont les motifs permettant B
l'Assemblée généralede ne pas ,rexécuter le jugement ii? Comment
va-t-elle ne pas exécuterle jugement, c'est une question qui la regarde.
Elle peut par exemple ne pas approuver le budget, c'est le cas qui
s'est présentéen I'occurreiice. Mais la question n" I n'a pas étépré-
sentée d'une façon spécifique, elle a un sens très large. l.'Assemblée
généralepeut, par exemple, établir une nouvelle procédurede revision.
Elle peut mème renvoyer la question à la Cour, et demander à la
Cour si le Tribunal a agi dans les limites de sa compétence et poser
aussi à la Cour d'autres questions connexes à la question de fond. Donc,la réponseque demande l'Assembléegénéraledoit forcémentêtredonnée
de façon générale. Ellene doit pas parler seulement de la possibilité
qu'on n'approuve pas les parties du budget. C'est un cas particulier.
C'est le cas qui se trouve devant l'Assembléegénéraleen ce moment-ci,
car c'est de cette façon-là que le problème s'estposé. Maisil y a tant de
possibilités pour l'Assembléegénéralede ne pas exécuterle jugement.
Monsieur le Président, alessieurs les Juges, nous avons terminé notre
ex~osé. Te m'excuse si i'ai étéloue. En arrivant ici. mon texte était
plis restreint, mais aprks avoir entendu les éloquents exposésde mes
dire.-la,ciitiaue de Certains arhmentsseavec lesauels mon Gouverne-insi
ment n'était 'pas d'accord. -
Xous avons, ainsi que nous l'avons annoncéau coinmencement, évité
d'entrer dans les auestions de détail. Ces auestions de détai...aui ont
certainement leur importance et qu'il faut avoir étudiées,si l'on pousse
trop loin leur examen, on s'expose au risque de perdre de vue les
principes générauxqui sont B la base du probléme qui nous.occupe.
Notre avis est que c'est uniquement en remontant aux principes qui
sont à la base des pouvoirs de 1'Asseinbléegénéralequ'on trouve la
solution du probl&me.
uestions qu'elle vous a posées nesaurait avoirqu'un caractère général.
t 'està une question préjudicielle que vous allez répondre. Votre avis
ne tranchera pas la question de fond qui se trouve devant les Nations
Unies. Aussi. la thèse aue mon Gouvernement défendici. par l'inter-
médiaire de ma personne, ne saurait, en aucuii cas, préjugersa position
quant à la question de fond qui sera résoluepar l'Assembléegénérale
ëlle-même. '
Il ne me reste, hlonsieur le Président, hlessieurs les Juges, qu'à
remercier les éminentshjembres de cette Cour de l'honneur qu'ils m'out
fait en suivant avec patience mon exposé,que j'avais pensé êtreassez
je ne m'attendais pas. Je m'en excuse.pris une ampleur à laquelle 5. ORAL STATEMENT BY

SIR REGINALD &IilNNINGHAI\I-BULLElii-BULLEIt
(REPRP:SENTING THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT)

AT THE PUBLIC SITTIKGS OF JUKE 12th AND 14th. 1954

[l'ziblisittirqof Jwnc ~zth,1954, monziiq]

AIayit please the Court.
1. The Court has now listened to four speeches on the two questions
on which it has been asked to express an advisory opinion, and it is
consequeiitly with some degree of difidence tliat 1 approach the task
of making a further speech on the cornparatively narrow legal issues
raised by the questions, though it is true to say that these narrow legal

issues have led to discussion here of greater issues affecting, or which
may affect, the whole future of the United Nations and its constitution.
The Court has also Iiad the advantage of having placed before it a
mass of ititeresting and informative material. 1 do not feel that at this
stage it ~vouldbe helpful tothe Court if1were to embark on any analysis
of the written material in any detail, or if1 were to repeat and to seek
to embellish the arguments that have already been advanced. In par-
ticular, 1 do iiot propose to discu~swhether the Tribunal is fouuded on
-4rticle22 or ArticleIOI of the Charter: 1propose toconfinemy observa-
tions to what appear to me to be the major issues bearing upon the
questions on which the Court bas been requested to express an advisory
ooinion. And 1submit that reallv the maior issues can be se~arated into
1ko <:i>inp;irrliieaiid tlinr r~nl'l!rlie tirs1 rn;i)or ijuc is tlw I>UE~-
tiun :.ni1Iiir~clionsof the (;ciier.îl :\;st!iiibly iin<lc1;.\vil1rtgir~l

10 :IIi:tbilicv iiic~irrc~ltn, :iiiotIi~~ir)rincil~n111~L'nireil S~tioiis :
and that i< 1 suggest, the first major fssue,>ot the position and func-
tions of the General Assembly generally, but the position and functions
of the General Assembly under Article 17 with regard to a liability
incurred by aiiotlier principal orgaii of the United Nations. And 1submit
that the second major issueis as to the jurisdictiori ofie Administrative
Tribunal of the United Nations, Iiaving regard to the fact that it was
created by a principal organ, namely, the General tissembly.
But before, &Ir.President, 1 begin to expound my argument, may 1
Say that Her Ilajesty's Government believe that tlie answer to the first
question is that the Assembly bas no right on any ground to interfere
with or to refuse to give effect to a decisioii of the Tribunal, and con-
sequently that the second question put to this Court does not require
an answer. 1 would add that if it were evident that tlie decision of the
Tribunal was really a iiullity, eittier on account of the Tribunal acting

in escess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it, that is to Say, acting
rrltrvires,or on account of serious miscoiiduct on the part of the Tri-
bunal, as, for esample, allowing iiself to be influenced by considerations
of a venal cliaracter, or on account of conduct which amouuts to a
denial of justice, as, for instatice, refusiug to hcar onc,of the parties to
the dispute, tlicn thc correct view. in my submissioii, would be that such STATEJIEST BY SIR R. JIASSISGHAJI-BULLER (u.K.)-14 TI 54 359

an award was a nullity and of no effect, and that consequently no obli-
gation arose to comply with the decision of the Tribunal.
In such a case there-would be iio need for the General Assembly to
interferc with or to review the award, for, as 1 have said, the award
should be trcated as a nullity.
Sow in none of the cases which Iiave given rise to the opinion of
this Court being requested has it, 1 think, been suggested that the Tri-
bunal acted iiltrnvires in the sense in which 1have used that expression.
My learned friend Alr. Phleger has in his speech suggested that certain
of the decisions of the Tribunal were wrong. But a wrong decision is not
necessarily ultra vires and 1 do not think that it has becn seriously sug-

gested that the Tribunal acted in excess of the jurisdiction given to it.
The argument has been that its decisions are not binding on the Asscm-
bly. Xor has it been suggested that the Tribunalwas guilty of misconduct
of the sort to which 1 have refcrred. 1 do not thùik, therefore, that it is
necessary for me to consider further what would be the position if i6llrn
vires action or misconduct on the part of the Tribunal was evident. 1
consequently propose to address my argument to the question whether
the Assembly lias any right on aiiy ground to refuse to give effect to a
valid nward of the Tribunal-valicl in the sense that it is intra vires aiid
not vitiated by misconduct on the part of the Tribunal.
As 1 have indicated, the view of Her Rlajesty's Government is that
the answer to this question is in the negative.

[Pzrblic sitting oj rzaiter~th, rgj4, rnornirig]

Xlay it please the Court.

When the Court adjoumed on Friday, 1 said that 1 proposed to
address my argument to the question whether the Assembly had ariy
right on any ground to refuse to give effect to a valid award of the
Tribunal, valid in the sense that it is intrn vires and not vitiated by
misconduct on the part of the Tribunal. And in considering this question,
1submit that one must have in mind the character of the United Xations
Organization and its constitution. The United Sations Organization
is not composed of several independent organizations : it is one organi-
zation, of which the Gencral Assembly aiid the Secretariat are two of the

principal organs-that is provided by Article 7 of the Charter. Each
organ has its own functions to perform on behalf of the Organization.
Each is responsible in its own field, but each acts not on its own behalf
but on belialf of the organization of which it forms part. Eacli organ is,
so to speak, in my submission, the ageiit within its sphere of the United
Nations, and it is, 1 submit, most important to bear in mind that the
General Assembly, although its membership consists of al1the countries
belongiiig to the United Xations, is not the United Nations itself. It is
just one of the principal organs of the Organization. And while 1naturally
do not seek to suu-est that it is not one of suureme imuortance, it is
\vruiig, 1~IILII~It~,rqt~rd ita.; s~~vercigiit,od<, in IIIt;,) iliy lc:uricd
fricnd .\Ir. Spiroyoulus siifige~tcd Article 10 ~I;o~Istlixt 111scoiitc~it~on
iiitliis resvcct is iiot iusriticd. fur :\rticIO ilecl3rc.i rli;~t tlic Gcncr:il
Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters ivithin the scope

of the present Charter, or relating to the powers and functions of any
organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in STATEMENT BY SIR R. SIANNINGHAM-BULLER @.K.)-14 VI 54 361

General Assembly has any legal right to refuse to recognize that obliga-
tion ? The answer surely must be "No".
And before 1 come to consider a liability which results from a judicial
determination, it is, 1 think, important to have regard to the position
where there is no dispute as to the liability and consequently no judicial
determination.
The Secretariat, in the proper discharge of its functions, may incur
a liability. It incurs it on behalf of the Organization, the United Nations.
It is a liability of the United Nations. Mr. Spiropoulos in his interesting
argument accepted that the United Nations could incur obligations.
In my submission the Assembly has no legal right to refuse to give
effect to obligations entered into by the United Nations, and no legal
right to repudiate a liability incurred by another principal organ in the
proper discharge of its functions. 1 say "legal right", for this Court is
concerned with legal and not with moral or political questions, and it
was, 1 submit, to emphasize that the questions put to this Court are
legal questions that the word "lawfully" appears in the second question.

II. IVhat, then, is the function of the General Assembly with regard
to a liability incurredby the United Nations ?As is pointed out in the

Written Statement of Her Majesty's Government, a clear distinction
must be drawn between the powers of the General Assembly and its
legal rights. Ry Article17 of the Charter, the Assembly is charged with
the duty of considering and approving the Budget of the Organization.
In performing that duty it is acting not for itself, but on behalf of the
United Nations as a whole.
One purpose of a budget is to make provision for expenditure that is
going to be made in the current year. In drawing up a budget, regard
must be had to commitments involving expenditure which have already
been entered into and, of course, to contemplated expenditure in rela-
tion to which there is no present commitment.
It is of course within the power of the Assembly to omit any par-
ticular item from its Budget. If it does so, there is no appeal from its
decision. It has power to omit to make any provision for payment of a
particular liability, but it does not follow from that, from the possession
of tbis power, that it has the legal right to repudiate a liability of the
United Nations, whether incurred by the Secretariat or by any other
organ of the United Nations in the exercise of its functions.
To take, if 1 may, a simple illustration, let me assume that in my
country a particular liabilityfalls upon the Crown. When the Budget is
drawn up, let us assume that no provision is made in the Budget to
meet that liability. That does not mean that those responsible for drawirig
up the Budee- have the leca- rirb- to deny the debt, to repudiate lia-
bility.
To take another simple illustration, the directors of a public Company
may decide not to pay a debt, may decide ~iot to niake provision,for
it in their annual budget. They have power to make such a decision.
But it does not follow, and it is not the case, that because they have
that power, they have any legal right to refuse payment. If directors
took such a course. under the munici~ai law there would be means of
enforcing payment. The fact that Chere is no method of enforcing
pavment arainst the United Nations does not mean that the Assembly
pisesses aÏegal rigbt to refuse payment. It has no inore right to refuse

25362 STATEIlENT BY SIR R. IlASSISGHAIl-BULLER (u.K.)-14 VI 54
payment of a liability incurred hy the Secretariat than it has to refuse
to make financial provision for this Court. It has the power to omit
to make financial provision for this Court in the Budget, as it has power
to omit to make financial provision for any liability, but as1have said,
possession of that power is a very different thing from possession of a
right, a legal right, to refuse payment.
1 have spent some time on Article 17 of the Charter becanse it is
upon this Article that a great part of the case put forward on the other
side depends.
In my submission, those who take the contrary view to that 1 am
putting forward attach far too rnuch weight to the word "Budget" in
Article 17 and misinterpret that Article in consequence.

III. So far 1 have been syeaking of a liability incurred by one of the.
principal organs of the United Xations on its behalf, a liability about.
which there is no dispute, with regard either to the manner in which
the liability arose, oas to its estent.
To summarize my argument so far, 1 suhmit that under the constitu-
tion of the United Nations, the General Assembly has no legal right to.
refuse to meet such a liability, though it has the power to omit to make
provision for it in its Budget.
Now 1 come to the position wherc the liability has been disputed.
And in my submission, it makes no differencewhether or not the liability
on the part of the United Nations arises in consequence of a judicial.
determiiiation. If the Assembly has the right to refuse payment of a
liability incurred by another principal organ as a result of a judicial
determination, it must surely have the right to do so when liability is
admitted by that organ. Equally, ifit has not, as we suhmit it has not,
the right in the one case, it also has not the right in the other.
In three types of case, the question of the liability of the United.
Nations or its organs can become justiciable, and in considering the
effect of a decision of the Administrative Tribunal, regard should be
had to the other two types of case.
The Headquarters Agreement made between the United Nations and
21efor aiiy dispute hetween the United Nations and the United States.
concerning the interpretation or application of the Agreement to be
referred for (and 1 quote the words) "final decision" to a Tribunal of
three arbitrators.
Section zr also provides that the Secretary-General of the United
Nations may ask the General Assembly to request of this Court an.
advisory opinion on any legal question arising in the course of such
proceedings. Pending the receipt of the opinion of the Court, an interim.
decision of the Arbitral Tribunal is to be observed by both parties..
Thereafter the Arbitral Tribunal is to render a final decision, having,
regard to the opinion of the Court.
No doubt if there was a case for arbitration under this Agreement,
the case on behalf of the United Nations would he submitted to the
arbitrators by the Secretaq7-General. 1 suggest that it is clear beyond
ail doubt that the award ofthe Arbitral Tribunal, whether asan interim
decision or as a final decision, would he bindin on the United Nations.
Organization and not merely on the Secretary- 8 eneral, and binding not.STATEIIENT BY SIR R. DIANNIXGHA~I-BULLER (u.K.)-14 VI 54 363
only on the United Nations Organization but alsoon the principal and
subsidiaryorgans of the United Nations, including the General Assembly.
The General Assembly might, it is true, fail to make provision for
meeting theaward of the Arbitral Tribunal, but in my submission the
award would clearly be legallybinding, though it might be unenforceable.
The General Assembly would have no legal right to repudiate the award,
no legal right to refuse payment, though it would have power to omit
to make provision for payment. The final decision of the Arbitral
Tribunal is final, just asis the decision of the Administrative Tribunal.
Now the second type of case, where the question of liability of the
United Nations may become justiciable, arises under the General
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Section z of that Convention provides that the United Nations sball
enjoy immunity from every form of legal process,,except, in so far as in
any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. As 1 have
indicated, the United Nations has power to enter into a contract. A
dispute may arise between the United Nations and the other party to
the contract. The latter may make a claim for damages against the
United Nations. Immunity might be waived. Judgment might be given
agaThe successful party would, however, be unable to enforce his judg-
ment. for Section z of the Convention provides that no waiver of immu-
nity shall extend to any measure of execution.
None the less, it could hardly be disputed that in such circumstances
the United Nations was under a legal obligation to satisfy the judgment,
but again, the Assembly might not make provision for doing so in the
Budget. In mv submission. the .4ssemblv would have no leaal ripht to
repuYdiatèthejndgment, no legal right to refuse to make privisio~, but
,rather a dutv which it might not, and has power not to, discharge, of
satisfying thé judgment. -
In my submission the position is precisely the same whether the
decision be that of the Arbitral Tribunal under the Headquarters
Agreement, or that of a court of one of the hlembers of the United
Nations, or that of the Administrati\~e Tribunal created by the Statute
of the United Nations. In none of these cases has the General Assembly
any legal right to repudiate the liability.

IV. 1 now come, Mr. President, to the position of the Administrative
Tribunal in relation to the General Assembly and to consider the effect
of a decision of that Tribunal. A great deal of argument has been
devoted to the question whether or not the.Tribuna1 is a subsidiary
oneasense it may be that it is subsidiarycre:tin the same sense it may
perbaps be said that the Arbitral Tribunal set up under the Headquarters
Agreement is subsidiary, but in my submission the Administrative
Tribunal is not subsidiary in the sense in which that word is used hy
those who take a contrary view to that which 1 am submitting.
Their argument runs as follows : the General Assembly, it is said,
is a principal organ of the United Nations. It has certain functions to
perform. It may create subsidiary bodies to assist it in the performance
of its functions. but it cannot divest itself of itsonsibility. It cannot
dclcgnrc to n s;ibjidiary body po\ver tu discli;~rgcfiinction<euercis:ible
oiilyhy itsïlf. The Trihunnl c3ii advise :it cm ninkc rccuiiirnendations364 STATEnIEST BY SIR R. MANSINGHAiIl-BULI.ER (u.K.)-14 VI 54

to the Assembly, but it cannot make a decision binding on the Assembly.
.So mns the argument. And the argument goes on, if the Statute of the
Tribunal gives it wider powers than this, and gives it power to make
decisions which are binding on tlie Assembly and the United Nations,
then the General Assembly in passing a Statute with this effect was
acting ultra vires.
1 now propose to reply to this argument. In the first place, Article22
of the Charter gives the Assembly pou7er to create such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Aly
leamed friend, r Phleger, attached importance to the difference
between the draft at SanFrancisco, which referred to bodies and agencies,
submission, there is no importance to be attached to that difference iny
wording. Bodies and agencies created by the General Assembly would
be siibsidiary organs.
What is important is that the draft and the Article both say-and
1 quote-"as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions".
It is to be noted that the Article does not read "as it dccms necessary
to assist it in the performance of its functions". If the Charter had said
that, then clearlv the function of a subsidiarv bodv could onlv have
been advisory. 1; fact,the Article does not sa? that; and tlie f&t that
it does not do so is significant.
The Article is uride enoueh in its terms to enable the Assemblv to
delegate the performance of sorne of its functions to a body it'has
created. The fact that its terms are so \ide is sufficient to counter the
contention that it was ultra vires for the Assembly to create a Tribunal
with power of final decision and to delegate to the Tribunal functions
which are initially vested in the General Assembly.
To establish that the Tribunal is subsidiary to the Assembly is not
sufficient. To argue that,because it is subsidiary, it cannot give a final
decision with which the Assembly has no right to interfere is a ?LOI&
seqr~itzrr. hat one must have regard to is to the powers and authority
giiren to the subsidiary body and to the task it is required to perform.
Theii, and only then, can onedetermine whether it is merely an advisory
body or a body to which complete power ~vithina certain field has been
delegated. M. Stavropoulos, for the Secretary-General, has already
shown the wide variety of bodies created by the United Nations, bodies
which may be subsidiary, and he has established that it cannot be said
in relation to al1 those bodies that their primary function is advisory.
His speech reinforces my contention that one must look at the powers
and authority given to the body and to the task it is required to perform.
Now, what was the problem with which the Administrative Tribunal
was created to deal ? Article Ior, sub-section 3, of thc Charter States
that the paramount consideration in the employnent of the staff and
the determination of tlie conditions of service shall be the necessity of
securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.
That was the paramount consideration to which the General Assembly
had to have regard in establishing staff regulations. But the highest
standards of efficiency, competence and integrity are not likely to be
achieved unless the individual who enters the employ of the United
Nations is able to feel that in a dispute with his employers, tlie matter
can besubmitted to adjudication by a tribunal or body which isimpartial,
fair and independent. Unless that can be secured, the best individuals arenot likely to be attracted to the service. They know that they cannot
brine before the Court of anv countrv in which thev are. a disuute with
the Ünited Nations as to tfieir teks of employmént.
%me machinery had to be devised, just as it had to be devised in the
days of the League of Nations, to secure that staff employed by the
United Nations could have recourse toan impartial and independent tri-
bunal which could adjudicate a dispute as to their terms of employment.
It was to this encl, 1 submit, that the Administrative Tribunal waç
created, as part ofthe essential machinery ifstaff of the highest efficiency,
competence and integrity iirereto be secured.
This contention is supported by the wording of the Statute, Article2
(1)of which states that the Tribunal shall be competent to hear and
pass judgment upon applications alleging non-performance of contracts
of employment of staff members, and Article IO (2)of which states that
"The judgments shall be final and without appeal". The use of the
words "judgment" iiiid "judgments" is in my submission quite incon-
sistent with the theory that the only function of the Tribunal is to
assist the Assembly by advice and recommendations. If that theory was
well-founded, would you not have had "advisory opini. . instead of
"judgment" ?
Unless it is the deciding body, it does not meet the need for an inde-

Assembly must be, but it is the General Assembly which establishes theeral
Staff Regulations. If the General Assembly is the deciding body, the
Tribunal is no substitute for the courts to which an ordinarv citizen can
have recourse in the event of a disputewith his employer as-to the terms
of his service.
In my submission, this Tribunal was created to be, and is for the
employee of the United Xations, what the courts of a country are for
the ordinary employee. It is a very vital feature for protecting the
rights of members of the Secretariat. In the opinion of Her hlajesty's
Government, the existence of the Administrative Tribunal, its power to
hear complaints that a staff meinber has been wrongfuily treated or
dismissed, its power to order financial compensation in certain cases
if it considers the complaint well-founded, constitutes part of the basis
on which persons join the Secretariat, or having joined it, remain in it.
If, as 1 have submitted, the United Nations can be bound by the
decision of an arbitral tribunal, set up under the Headquarters Agree-
ment, to the creation of whicli it has assented, if it can be bound by the
judgment of a national court when it has waived its immunity, there
is no reason why it should not erluiilly be bound by the awatd,of a tri-
bunal not created by agreement with any State, but created by its
own act.
As 1 have said, unless it can create such a tribunal, unless it has
created such a tribunal, an essential piece of machinery for the protec-
tion of its employees is lacking.
The contrary view is tliat the Assembly is not, that the United Nations
are not, bound by the clecisionsof this Tribunal, but that it is open to
the Assembly to set them aside, to repudiate them entirely or to reduce,
or indeed increase, the compensation awarded. If this is right, on what
pnnciples is the Assembly to act ? The Charter does not state them.
If it is open to the Assembly to do this, it must be open to the Assembly366 STATEJIENT BY SIR R. AIASSISGHAII-BULLE Ru.K.)-14 VI 54

to do so if it considers, the award to be erroneous, or un\\.ise or politi-
caüy undesirable.
hïr. Spiropoulos contended that the Assembly was entitled to do so
on-and 1 quote his words-"serious grounds". He made great play
with the use of the words " rincipal grounds" in the second question.
No one would suggest that t!e Assembly would act in a spirit of levity.
To say that it could take that action on serious grounds is to say that
the Assembly is perfectly free to repudiate any decision of the Tribunal
bouud to say that tliat ground uras serious.ate on any ground it would he
hfr. Spiroponlos recognized the existence of an obligation on the
General .4ssembly as a result of an award by the Tribunal. For liim to
go on and say that such a legal obligation can be repudiated on any
grouud the Assembly considers serious is to deny the existence of the
legal obligation. \Vith the greatest respect to him 1 submit that his
argument is inconsistent. If lie says, as 1 submit he says rightly, that
a legal obligation on the Assembly arises from the award of the Tribunal.
he cannot be right in saying tliat the Assembly has complete discretion
to repudiate the obligation on any ground it considers serious. .
If the Assembly is legally entitled to repudiate an award of the
Tribunal, why does the Statute speak of "judgments" ? \\'hy is a
Tribunal created ?\Vhy not just a committee or advisory commission-
not to give decisions or pass judgments, but merely to tender advice
that can be accepted or rejected at wili ?
The real employer of the stalT is the United Nations. Refore the
Tribunal it is of course represeiited by the Secretary-General. I3ut it
is because in reality the United Nations is the other party to a dispute
brought by an employee before the Tribunal that you find the express
provision in the Statute that the Tribunal shall order the payment of
compensation and that the compi:nsation awarded shall be-and here 1
quote-"paid by the United h'ations". How can it really be said that
a judgment shall be finaland without appeal, a judgment in substance
against the United Nations, ifthe Assemblyhave any right toreview that
judgment ; if it is entitled to Say, "\\le do not like this deci;we do
not agree with it ;we have the legal right to refuse to implement it
and we esercise that right" ?

V. 1 said a little time ago that some machinery had to be devised,
iust as it had to be devised in the davs of the Leaeue of Nations. to
Securethat staff employed by the ~ea~ie of Nations Guld have reco"rse
to an independent and iml~artial tribunal to adiudicate upon disputes
betweenkhem and their emvlovers.
hegins, and is, indeed, founded, on the Report made by the Rapporteurs
of the Supervisory Commission in 1925A .s the Memorandum by the
International Labour Officeshows at pages 31 and 32 of the booklet, the
concept of the Rapporteur was of a jundical tribunal which would
ensure to officials(here1 quote) "the firm conviction of safety and secu-
nty emanating from justice." The Statutecreatingthat Tribunal would,
so the Rapporteur said, provide (and again 1 quote) "a judge for every
dispute" and prevent one of the parties from being (again 1 quote)
"a judge in his own case". Its judgments would be final. "An advisory
body", the Report stated, "dependent or independent, may be useful STATEMENT BY SIR R. MANNINGHAM-BULLER (u.K.)-14 VI 54 367

but can never replace a body empowered to give final decisions." That
was in 1925.
The Siipervisory Commissionof the League in 1927submitted a Report
including a draftstatnte and this was the basis of the Statute ultimately
adopted by the Assembly of the League. That Report throws much light
on the character of the Tribunal established by the League of Nations
and on the effect of its awards. It pointed out that officials could not
ments a;tthat disputes might arise as to the exact legal effect of the tems
of their appointment,and that it was not satisfactory that officials-
and here again 1quot+"should have no possibility ofbringing questions
as to their rights to thedecision of a judicial body".
Similar, indeed, precisely similar, observations might have been
made-and 1 think were made-with regard to the staff of the United
Nations before the creation of the Administrative Tribunal.
The Report of the 1927Snpervisory Commission of the League said
in terms that the proposed tribunal was-1 quote again-"to be exclu-
sively a judicial body set up to determine the legal rights of officialson
strictly legal grounds", and that it was to pronounce finally upon any
allegation that the Administration had refused to give any officia1treat-
ment to which he was legally entitled or had treated him in a manner
which constituted a violation of his legal rights. No provision was made
for the review or alteration of the judgments of the Tribunal and, in
the words of the Memorandum submitted to this Court by the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, the Report (1 quote) "made clear that it
was not envisaged that awards of the Tribunal would be subject to
review in the exerciseof budgetary authority".
Theaward ofthe Tribunal was clearly intended to be final and binding,
not only on the administration but also on the League, or, as the case
might be, on the International Labour Organization.
Mr. President, 1 do not propose to take up time in companng the
Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations and
that of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations. Comparison
of the two, in my submission, clearly establishes that the latter Statute
submission, is the same; both are intended to deal with precisely the
same problem.
The Court has heard a most interesting and able argument on the
Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal by those arguing
on the other side. It is not without interest to reflect that a precisely
similar ar$um-t could have been put forwardwith regard to the Statute
of the A ministrative Tribunal of the Leagiie of Nations. It could
equally have been said that the League could not have delegated its
functions to a Tribunal. It could equally have been argued that the
League could revise and review.
But such arguments, if the had been put forward and if they had
prevailed, would have entir& defeated the object and purpose for '
which that Tribunal was created. The Reports to which 1have referred
show that.
The arguments to which tbis Court has listened would, if they pre-
vailed, also entirely defeat theobject and purpose forwhich the Adminis-
trative Tribunal of the United Nations was created.368 STATEJIEST BY SIR R. JIAS'IISGHA~I-BULLER (u.K.)-14 \'Ij4

The Report of the 1927 Supervisory Commission of the League said
it was unsatisfactory for the Administration to be both judge and party
in any dispute as tothe legal rights of officials.If there were no provision
for any reference to a Tribunal, the Administration would be judge in
its own cause. Claims by officials against the Administration arise out
of the acts or omissions of the Administration. If thelast word rested
with the Administration it ~vouldbe jodge in itsowncause.TheAdminis-
tration does not act in uaczro.It acts on behalf of the Organization, so
that its cause is also the cause of the Organization.
MI. President, 1willingly concede that the view may be taken by
a viewthatan1ecan support, nor is it, 1think, a viewwhich many employeesot
would support. - ~
The need for a "fair hearing body" (tliat was the expression used by
Air. Phleger), the need for a "fair hearing body" in any administration
is recognized. It is, 1submit, quite inconsistent with that that it should
be open to the employer to Cepudiate or to amend the conclusion to
which such a "fair hearing body" has impartially and independently
arrived. Yet that is what those who take the contrary view seek to
assert in this case.
It isbecause the Administration acts for the Organization that an
award in favour of a clainiant before the 1-eagueof Nations' Tribunal
was made chargeable tothe League. Similarly, it is because the Secretary-
General acts for the United Nations in his relations with staff that one
finds the provision that awards by the Tribunal shall be paid by the
United Nations.

1'1. 1now come, Alr.President, tothe decision in 1946of the Assembly
of the League, which it is said affords a precedent for saying that the
General Assembly of the United Nations has the right to refuse to pay
an award of the Tribunal.
Examination of this alleged precedent shows that it is realiy not
entitled to be so described. The -4dministratioe Tribunal of the League
of Nations had under consideration a resoliition of the Assembly of the
League, and by itsaward the Tribunalsought to set aside the Assembly's
legislative act, and having come to the conclusion that the legislative
act in question was an infririgement of the rights of the staff, to attrihute
a particolar intention to that act. Thus it can be said that the Tribunal
acted in excess of its powers in refusing to recognize the validity of a
decision of the Assembly of the League, and in refusing to recognize the
intent behind that decision.
Similarly, 1do not suggest for onemoment that if the General Assem-
blyamended their Staff Regulations and thereby affected the rights of the
staff, it would be open to the Administrative Tribunal of the United
Nations to declare such amendments invalid, or that it would be open
to the Tribunal to attribute to such amendments an intent which they
did not bear. 1 do not suggest for one moment that it is within the
competence of the Administrative Tribunal to rule that a legislative
act of the Assembly is nuIl and void and of no effect, but to Say this does
not mean that the decision of the Tribunalmade in the exercise of juris-
diction which, at the time of the decision, isvested in it, can be challenged
or reviewed by the General Assernbly.STATEIIEST BY SIR R. II:\NSINGHA51-BULLER (u.K.)-14 VI 54 369
It \vas because, in this instance, the Tribunal of the League had
clearly acted in escess of its powers that Sir Hartley Shaivcross of the
United Kingdom, who was Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee which

had to consider the awards of the Tribunal, and upoii whose Report
the decision of the League \vas based, said that he approached the matter
on the broad basis ofwhat was politic and right rather than on the basis
on what might be strictly in accordance with the law.
1am not suggesting that the decision of the Assembly of the League
was wrong. 1 am not suggesting that the decision of the A<lministrati\re
Tribunal of the League was right. \Vhat 1 am sayiiig is this-that that
wüs a decision of the Tribunal which was really in escess of tlieir powers,
and the fact tliat that decision in excess otheir powers was repudiated
by the Assembly is no support for the proposition that an award by
that Tribunal whicli was i?ztrziues, not in excess of its powers, could
also be 1:iwfully repudiated or amended by tlie Assembly.
1 want to mnke it clear that my contention that the Adriiinistrative
Tribunal of the United Nations was expressly given power to deliver
final judgments binding on the United Nations does not mcan tlie
supremacy of that Tribunal over the General Assembly. The Assembly
can, if it wishes, abolis11the Tribunal. It can, if it wishes, amend tlie
Statute, but while that Statute is in existence, in its present form, the
Assembly as ail organ of the United Xatioiis is bouiid by its terms.
The Tribunal would not be competent to reverse decisioiis of the

Assembly ; it ~vouldnot be acting within its po\vers if it refused to give
effcct to Resolutions of the General Assembly modifying the Staff
Rules and Regulations ; but so long as the Tribunal esists under this
present Statute, it is given power by the General A~embly to detefinine
in certain circumstances whether or not any obligation to aiiy l~articular
member of the staff rests upon the United Xations.
Under the constitutioii in my country, the Crown may be bound by
the terms of a particular Statute. A Statute to be effective requires the
Royal assent and while it is open to Parliament, with the consent of Her
Majesty, to repeal or to amend any Act, so long as an Act which is
inteiided to apply to the Crown is in force, the Crown is bound by tliat
Act just as niuch as nny ordinary individi~al.
This, 1 submit, is a close analogy to the position of the United Nations
and Genernl Assembly with regard to a Statute passe(1 by the General
Assembly. In my submission. a Statute passed by the Generril Assembly
may \%.el1ffect, while the Statute is in force, the powers of the General
Assembly in a particular field. Indeed, it may be desigiied and intended
to that end. Iii this case, in my submission, it was clearly designed and
intended to that encl in order to secure that the Assembly sliould not
be a judge in its own cause, and to secure that disputes between the
United Nations and its employees, disputes which were not amenahle

to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, should be determined by an
independent and judicial tribunal.
\\'hile that Statute is in force, in my submission, the General Assembly
is bound by its terms.
1 desire to reiterate that 1 am not suggesting that the Tribunal can
override the Assembly ; if the Assembly decides to abolish the Tribunal
it can do so. If it decides to trim its \\rings, again it can do so. But while
it has delegated these powers to the Tribunal, it is obligatory upon the 370 ST.4TEJIEST BY SIR R. J1.4SSISGH.4JI-BULLER (u.K.)-14 VI j4

Assembly to have regard to and to observe and comply with the deci-
sions of the Tribunal to which such powers are delegated.

has really fallen into two distinct sections, the first of which is as to
the position and functions of the General Assembly. It has been argued
that it is not possible for the General Assembly to delegate any of its
functions and to divest itself of the performance of the functions
. imposed upon it by the Charter.
1 have already dealt with tliis argument. In my submission it is
unsound. 1 have sought to show tliat it is within the sphere and it may
be part of the functions of a principal organ of the United Nations to
incur a liability on behalf of the United Xations. If such a liability is
incurred, then, under Article 17, the question of making provision for
meeting that liability arises for consideration of the Assembly.
1 have sought to show that it is incorrect to Say that it is open to
the General Assembly to repudiate the liability incurred by any principal
organ acting within its sphere on hehalf of the United Nations.
The second line of argument uhich has been advanced is that the
, Tribunal is subsidiary to and, if 1 may use the expression, a creature of
the Assembly. 1think 1havedealt with this line of argument siifficiently.
1 would only summarize my reply to it by saying, as has already hecn
said in this Court, that siibsidiary organs may take many forms and a
subsidiary organ may have delegated to it by the principal organ exccii-
tive powers in such a fashion asto exclude interference with the actions
of that organ by the Gencral Assembly.
1 cannot help but feel that a great deal of the argument that 1 have
tomeet is due to treating the word "power" as synonymous with a right ;
that the Assembly has power to onut to make provision for any linbility,
whether or not liability determined by a judicial tribunal, 1 concede.
But while it lies withiii the power of the Assembly to omit to make
provision for any liability. it is quite a different thing to assert that
under Article 17 the Assembly has a legal right to repudiate a liability.
It is upon the distinction between a power and a right that this
~ufficien~l~~ap~reciatedtappears to me to be the substantial fallacy inen
the arguments 1 have to meet.
If 1 mav iust eive oiie simule illustration of the distinction :a man
may liave'the p&er to drivé a motorcar; it may be lawful for him
to do so ;he may have passed the necessary driving tests, obtained the
necessary licences, certificates of insurance, etc., it may not be possible
to dispute that in law he has power to drive a motor car on the highway
-but the possession of this power does not mean that he has any legal
right to drive recklessly or dangerously. The possession by the Assembly
of the pottrer to omit ail item from its Budget does not mean that the
Assembly has any legal right to repudiate any liability properly incurred
by any principal organ of the Assembly or a liability which, after a
dispute has arisen, has either beeii determined by the Administrative
Tribunal or by the court of.any country, immunity having been waived,
as a liability resting upon the United Nations.
AIr.President, 1would add that if the Assembly deliberately omitted
to make provision formeeting an award bindingupon the United Nations.
it might well be regarded as a breach of faith on the part of the UnitedSTATEMENT BI' SIR R. IIANNIXGHAII-BULLER (u.K.)-14 VI 54 371

Xations ; no machinery exists at present for enforcing a legal judgment
against the United Nations.
1 do not suggest that it is not within the power of the Assembly to
be guilty of a breach of faith, if it so decides, but w1ado say is that
such a power does not impiy any legal right either to refuse payment
of an award or to repudiate a liability.
1 would sayin conclusion, speaking as1 am on behalf of Her hlajesty's
Govemment, that we feelconsiderable regret that there should be such
this issue.of opinion between hlembers of tlie United Xations upon
At the same time, 1should like to make it clear that Her hlajesty's
Government regard it as an issue of very considerable importance, for
upon the existeiice of an independent and impartial Tribunal \+,hich
can adjudicate in the event of disputes between members of tlie staff
and their employers, the United Nations, aiid whiclr can give a final
decision upon such disputes, lar ely depends the possibility of securing
for the United Natioiisn staffOf tlie highest efficiency,competerice and
integrity. 6. ORAL STATEaIENT BI' PROFESSOR T.kM31ES
(REPRESENTIN THE NETHERLANDS GOVERN~IENT)
AT TH13 PUBLIC SITTINGS OF ]UNE 14th, Igj4

hlr. Prcsidciit, Honourable hlembers of tlie Court.
Important and difficultquestions Iiavebeen put before the Court, ques-
tions involving the rights of pcrsons in the service of the United Nations.
Only a feu. years ago the advisory opinion of the Court was requested
oii questions of a differeiit character but likewise coniiected with the
position of persons in tlie service of the United Xations. Thismay impress
us mith the imnortance of the erouu of international officials whose
iiiinibcriiii~crc~:;siiiniilt;ineousl\vit11the cro\i.lli
ilic ~>liciiumciiuii
iifintc~rn~tioi,:ilorgaiii~;itii>n. Sou.a~l:ivi tlii,u.;aii,ls :tiicl rliousaii<l, of
ueoule are in the Üeculiar uosition of 'international civil servants aiid
modern internation'al CO-opératioiiwould be unthinkablc witliout tlieir
devoted work. It is for this reason that the Xetherlands Governinent
Iias from the beeinnine taken n snecial interest in uroblems relati-e to
the personnel ofYinte6atioiial sehretariats, partic;larly of the League
of Nations and of the United Nations. And therefore we wclcome tlic
oL Artunitvd.f uresentine an oral esuosition in addition to oiir written
statement on the qucstiGs regarding' the effect of awards of compeiisa-
tion made bv the United Nations Administrative Tribun;il. However.
after the ex5ensive information which has been giveii and after the
maiiy arguments set out so skilfiilly and eloquently, 1 beg the Court
to permit me to concentrate on a few main issues which liave the special
attention of my Government. These issues may be groupecl under two
headings which can be considered separately : the nature of the United

Xations Administrative Tribunal and the budgetary power of tlie
General Assembly. The complexes of problems, indicated in tliis way,
can he considered separately, for even if the nature ancl tlius the powers
and competence of the Administrative Tribunal were completely clear,
the General Assemhlv. in the exercise of its budee-arv f2nc~~~-~~mieht
be regarded as havingits own indcpendent and dominant responSibil;fy.
As to the nature of the Tribunal 1 first wish to statethatmv Govern-
ment completely agrees with those who have considered t~ie.~rovision
of the Statute that "the judgments shall be final and without nppeal"
(Article 10, paragraph 2) suflicieiitly clcar and expressing the true inten-
tion of the Asscmbly in setting up the Tribunal. To prove this, maiiy
arguments taken particularly froni the legislative history of the Statute
have been put forward and 1will refrain from repeating tliem. In any
case, we have found it difficult to imagine a conception of a procedure
of review or reconsideration without any regulation of its application.

of the conditions for invoking it and of its limits and effects.
1 will have to dwell at some length, however, upon the nature of the
Tribunal as far as it is laid\vn iii Article 2, paragraph3 : "in the event
of a dispute as to wliether the Tribunalhas cornpetence, the matter shall
be settled by the decisioii of tlie Tribunal". This, of course, Iias partic- STATEJIENT BY MT. TAHMES (KETHERLANDS)-1 VI 54
373
ular reference to preliminary objections as to the competence of the
Tribunal to take cognizance of the case ratione persona and ratione

materia. It is an established principle of jurisprudence, laid down in
many national and international legal texts, that a tribunal generally
must have the power to detemirie its competence on the basis of the
instrument which is the source of its jurisdiction. But, taking into consid-
eration the clause that judgments are final and without appeal, and
the absence of any provision regulating a procedure of challenging the
final judgments, 1 think that the provision making the Tribunal the

judge of its own competence means more. It also means that in case
there snould be some obiection to the effect that the Tribunal. bv its
ri11:iIclwisi.~~~~\,oulcl II,IY,< XC:~~~~o~ rIII~,:,II.II'IIl:113 < ~~111~~~1ciic~~.
f i III~III~J 1 11 l'ribi~i~:~1 i C I I I ti. i11tslillr~~rii.iiii
il 1: I I 11 111%iii;itt,-rIrii i ii,,ll-kl,\i.Iiictrli;itt1.c<liitiiiitiiiii

to term'inate at any timëa temporary appointment if, in his op'inion,
such action would be in the interest of the United Xations. The objection
mav be made-and has been made-from some auarters that theTribu-
nal: in deciding so,has exceeded or misconstruedAits competence because
it has given an opinion on matters reserved to the opiriioii of another
authority, has encroached upon the discretionary power of that author-
ity, and has substituted its judgment for that of the Secretary-General.

The Tribunal, on its part, will find that it is competent to interpret its
own Statute, that it has rightly concluded froni this Statute to be
competent to interpret the Staff Regulations, and that it is completely
within its competence to corne to an interpretation leading to the con-
ceotion of misuse of a discretionarv Dower. Obvioiislv. it has been the

preting its cornpetence,including the cornpetenceto interpret the Staff
Regulations.

[Public sitting of June rqth, 1954, ajternoolz]

\Vhat I attempted to set out this morning was that it is typical of

a judicial body, being the judge of its own competence-maître de sa
compétence-to possess the widest powers to interpret the instrument
which is the source of its jurisdiction and to construe the law to which
this instrument refers. This being so, an exception to this rule may not
be supposed. If the legislator iiad intended to make such exception, he
would and should have expressly provided to this effect. Sliis becomes
the more clear when it is noticed that in the case of some other inter-
11;111onu ~r.l:$lii?al~un~IIh I~~qi~I~il:~icrliia~i11is~ ~ ~ ~ o ~91, .ltY:1lr~tc1\~

iiiilic:itiiig, c~ifoirr111~ liiiiiruf Ili?t,.\ccptit,ii 2nd th;iiitl~~~iir\ili1~11
(lccid~>i~i \:AS<tlw <.ulii\>ctvn:~,#f ilte~ril~n~~~ ItlcII~,IIs~II<e~:tI.t.r IJV
wav of a ureliminarv obiection or. after the indement. on tlie round
of a fundakenta1 fauit in t'hemaniier in which the d'écision of the ~hbunal
has been reached. A provision of this type is inserted in the Statute
of the AdministrativeTribunal of the Intërnational Labour Organization, Article XII. This is also in force, miitatis mrrlairdis, in respect of tliose
international oreanizations. like the UNESCO. which recoenize the
jurisdiction of this ~ribunal, aiid as appears from the ~~emo~ndumof
the International Labour Office: "this Article [Article XII1 was desirned
to set nt rest the perpleving difficulty th& confronted the ~ea~ue
Asseinbly in 19.46....The signific:liiceof the Article lies in tlie fact that
such cliallenee is made to su~erior iudicial authoritv and is not left to
the decision Of a repesentatibe body." Asa matter of fact, in the cases
of 1946 the Secretary-General had contested the competence of the
Adm'inistrativeTribunal bv wavof a~reliminarv obiectionrThe Assemblv.
fur itj part, Iixi clia1lcn:cd thc jii<ibmcntsoc th: Tribuiial hccnuse, III
tlic ol)iiii$,<ifth,! m:iluriry i~fthf: :Isseinbl\,, th<:'i'ribiiiinlh:id c:sc~.c~Ie(l
its p&ers by puttingits authority above the authority of the Assembly.

In order to deal with a similar siiuation ancl to do this, if 1 may Say so,
in a more elegant manner, the International Labour Organizatioii, iii
takiii.Aover the Administrative Tribunal mon the dissolution of the
I.e;igut:iri1946,;icld<dtlir iicw i\rticlc nic.iiti;,ii?iti~ tlie uld St:<tutc.
~loirc.\~cr,the (;riicrnl ;\~seiiibly of thc [.'nit4 Satii.iis, dijcujsing in
IC,~L n simiLr St;Ltii~i.for :iricw i\c\mini;tr;ili!~e Tribiiiinl. cunsciousl\~
did'~iot create an exception to tlie normal rule that a tribunal is thé
judge of its own competence. Twice duriiig the discussions in connection
with Article II, paragraph 3-first by the U.S.S.R. and afterwards by
the Canadian Representative-the suggestion was made that decisions
as to the competence of the Tribunal should be taken by the General
Assemblv rather than bv the Tribunal itsell. These sueeestio..vwere
ol~l>use<l'l> thye LIi;iirin~inof tlie :\(l\,isnry Cuininittvc on :\dministr:iti\.e
ancl Rodgetary Qiir.stii>ri.a.ii(1by other mciiibcrs of thil 1.iftliCoiiiriiillec,
anclthe poiiit \vasiioi prcssed. Thi:Committee. iiide:iling \rit11clicniattcr
of compctciice in coiincction \vitIfilic~>ropujcd\vording of p;ir;tgr:il>ti3
of Article II. Iia<lesl>ccinllyin iiiiiid tlic case of pre1iinin;iryoh]r.ctions.
Se~~e--~~~-~-.-ns \vas :ilrt,a(lv the~c~iic~~~-~~~~~t1.c S~~tlicrl~nci\s\'ritten
Statement, page 83, from the analysiç of the discussion of this point-
the repeated contrasting of the Tribunal as the judicial body witli the
Assembly as the political body inakes it clear that on the whole the
Committee did not consider the Assembly fit for a judicial function,
either in respect of settling preliininary disputes as to the competence

of the Tribunal, or as regards revie\liing final decisions of the Tribunal
because of alleged lack of competence. This had been the established
opinion since the days when, in the League of Nations, the Council as .
a political organ for settlingdisputes between the Organization and the
individual staff members had been replaced by an Administrative Tri-
bunal. 1 have felt obliged to refer again to this piece oflegislative history
of the Statute because the learned Representative of the United States
in his statement the other day reached-what he called-the "inescap-
able" coiiclusion "that the General Assembly, not having provided in
advance a ~rocedure for dealing with challenged awardsU-that is to
Say a procedure on the model of the IL0 precedent-"left the matter
to be dealt with under the Assernbly's ordinary procedure when and if
the question should arise". It is submitted that this conclusioii is not
justified by the relevant records to which 1 have referred.
It is evident that willingness to recognize grounds for challenging
the final decisions of the Tribunal, although such grounds are nowhere
mentioned in the relevant texts of the United Kations, is inspired by a comparison with the practice of international arbitration, but the
analogy, however instructive, should be applied with great carc. My
colleague from France, in his statement here, already has given a lucid
exuosition of the urohlem. and 1 can onlv add a few observations in
order to support Gs opinion as to the fundamental difierence between
international arbitration and judicial settlement of disputes within
the system of an international organization.
It is generally accepted that a decision cootrary to the powers

conferred on the Tribunal is nuIl and void. However, in instruments
concerning international arbitration. there is normally no provision
for another impartial authority above the Tribunal to declare the
nullity, that is to Say, to annul. Mostly in international negotiations,
it is already difficult to create only one instance for deciding certain
disputes or certain categories of disputes. Now one party may consider
the awards nuIl and void, the other party may consider them perfectly
valid, and a tribunal, hy implication, is convinced that it haç acted
regularly and within its powers. In the absence of a regular procedure
for solving the conflict, whose standpoint shall prevail ? International
society, admittedly imperfect, has a typical solution for the dilemma :
the conflict will be solved on the basis of the right of the strongest.
The party which is feeling strong enough politically and morally will
ignore the award, declaring it nul1 and void and in practice its opinion
will prevail. The award simply will have no effect and it will besaid that
the party-the State-bas resumed its inherent sovereignty in the
fact of evident nullity. A deplorablemass of Statepractice isconstructed
on one-sided declarations of nullity on such grounds as lack of jurisdic-
tion, excess of jurisdiction, failure to apply the law prescribed by the
compromis, and other grounds. It might be said that the parties under-
takine to have recourse to arbitration im~lied these wavs of escane in
giving their consent.
Thc situation is different in the event of the creation of a special
leeal order within the loose svstem of eeneral international law. Such
legal order-in this case anainternational organization-normally is
provided with a legislative body like the General Assembly of the
United Nations. Thns, the legislative machinery is much more highly
developed than the comparatively primitive process of law-creation
in the unorganized international society. It should not easily be supposed,
therefore, that the legislator, in creating a system forthe judicial settle-
ment of certain disputes within the Organization, had in mind, without at
the same time expressly providing so, an additional means of challenging

the judgments. The ways of escape which so often have rendered
ineffective the legal obligation of a final settlement of a dispute through
arbitration do not fom part of an internal system of judicial settlement
within an international organization based on law. This becomes the
more clear when it is consiaered that in connection with administrative
adjudication in international organizations, the factor State sovereignty
doés not play the same part as inconnection with international arbitra-
tion. The protection of sovereignty by way of a narrow interpretation
of the powers conferred on the Tribunal may-in the case of internal
arbitration of an administrative tribunal-be left out of consideration.
It is submitted thatthe administrative tribunals of internationalorganiza-
lions do no&belongta the chapterof international arbitrationbut ore a
form of specialized administrative adfudication withia an international.376 STATEYENT BY hW. TAAlnlES (XETHERLANDS)-14 VI 54
fra~ne-nnmely, the trame of an inlertcatiotcalorganizatioft. This is the
conclusion to which a comparison of both systems of impartial settle-
ment of disputes, international arbitration and administrative adjudi-
cation, must lead. In both systcms certain grounds of nullity of final

decisions may be acceptcd in principle. The practice of international
arbitration shows a primitive way of declaring the nullity, namely, by
one-sided statements by a State-part),-making the a\vard ineffective.
If, however, on the other hand, neither the procedure to be followed,
uor the grounds for challenging th<:decisions of an administrative tribunal
are indicated in the legislation of an international organization, there
is no uossibiiitv of nullification. Nullitv which cannot be declared does
not esist.
These observations may sound a little theoretical. Nevertheless, 1think
that they have a bearing on what has been said before the Court during
the last few days. The Honorable Rcpresentative of the United Kingdom
has stated in his opening words (this volume, page 7j) that he did
not consider it necessary to deal with the problem of decisions heing a
nullity because of the Tribunal having acted, inler alia, ullravires, that
is to Say, in excess of power. 1qiiote : "In such a case there would beno
need for the Gencral Assembly to interfere with or to review the award,
for .... tlie award should he treated as a nullity. Now in none of the
cases which have given rise to the opinion of this Court being requested,
lias it heen suggested tliat tlie Tribunal acted tlltru viucs." The distin-

guished Representative of the Uiiited States, in his speech, however, has
reaffirmed the opinion of his Government that the Tribunal has dis-
rcgarded or misapplied botli Assembly rcsolutions and Charter provi-
sioiis. And a little earlier he made clear that disregard or misapplication
of Asscmbly resolutions like the Staff Regulations and the Statute and
of the Charter was deemed by liim as acting tcllravires or beyoud au-
thority, a ground on which the Assembly-and 1 quote him-"would
have not oiily the right biit also the duty to cal1the Tribunal to account
by refusing to give effect to its iii\lalid aivards" (this volume, p. 40).
In view of thcse remarks, 1cannot take Sir Rcginald's position of refrain-
ing from any attention to the gn>und of ultra vires, of escess of power.
On the contrary, 1 am prepared to regard it as a principal issue, and as
a highly practical one. Some otlier grounds which have been mentioned
from time to time like serious niisconduct or curruption are not of a
practical nature, and. in this sense, are no princil~algrounds. But escess
of power is, so to speak, a classic $round on which final decisions always
have beeri challenged, in international la\\. as well as in organized legal
systems like the State. It was the argument on which, in 1946,the Asscm-
bly of the League of Xations refused to give effect to thirteen judgments

of the Administrative Tribunal of the League, coiisidering-in the mords
of the reporting committee-1 quote : "that tlie awards made by the
Tribunal are invalid and are of no effect both because thev soueht to
set aside the Assembly's legislative act and because of thek miGaken
conclusion as to the intention of that act".
1 think al1 this comes down only to one ground, namely, that the
Tribunal, by giving a certain interpretation to a legislative act of the
Assembly, had not given to that act the effect which the Assembly had
desired. Now the onlv observation whicli can be made in this resDect
-as set out more elaborately iii the Netherlands Written Statement
{pp. 89 f.)-is that the Assembly shoiild have made its intention clearer STATEIIEKT BY Mï. TAMMES (NETHERLANDS)-14 VI 54 377
from the outset and should not have come forward with a sort of retro- .
active interpretation after the final interpretation by the Tribunal. To
recognize the ground referred to by the League Assembly in 1946 as a
ground for the General Assembly of the United Kations to refuse to

give effect to awards of compensation made by the Administrative
Tribunal, would be contrary to the express words of Article z of the
present Statute ; under that provision the Tribunal is competent to
hear and pass judgment upon applications alleging non-observance of
contracts or terms of appointment including "al1 pertinent regulations
and rules in force at the time of alleged non-observance". It was the
considered opinion of the Netherlands Government already in the 1946
case that the major*? of the League Assembly was wrong, mayhe not
in the substance of its interpretation of its own Resolution, but in
putting its interpretation above that of the Tribunal. For it was the
specific function of the Tribunal, as of al1fribunals. to decide on conflicts
of interpretation held by various interested quarters, including the
Assembly. Professor Georges Scelle has called the 1946 decision of the
League Assembly a regrettable "excès de pouvoir", "méconnaissance
du principe le plus élémentaire de la technique juridique : l'autorité
de la chose jugée", in his Cours de droit international public, 1948,
page 568.
As appears from the memorandum of the International Labour Office
(p. 50 of the Written Statements), the decision of the League Assembly
was also sharply criticized in the Goveming Body of the International
Labour Office and in its Finance Committee. In view of this strong

opposition, there is the more reason to consider the full consequences
of recognizing the argument of 1946-that is essentially theultra vires
round-as one of the grounds for refusing the compensations awarded.
&ying that the League ilssembly in 1946 was right, as has been stated
during the present hearings, would mean that one of the grounds for
refusa1 to give awards would be the ground that the Tribunal had inter-
preted the Staff Regulations and its amendments in a manner which the
Assembly does not accept. That would be the consequence.
There are, however, no signs pointing the way of repetition of the
1946 precedcnt. On the contrary, the General Assembly in 1952, facing
a problem which from a legal point of view was, in Our opinion, of the
same character, reacted differently from the League Assembly's reaction
in 1946. It was clear that the Secretary-General &idnot agree with the
Tribunal's interpretation (Judgment No. 4 in the case of Howraoi and
four others, 14 September 1951, AT/DEC/4) of the intention of the
General Assembly, wlien in the Provisional Staff Regulations it gave the
Secretary-General the right to terminate temporary appointments.
Apparently the Chaiman of the Advisory Committee and some Dele-
gations agreed with the implied opinion of the Secretary-General that
the Tribunal had given an erroncous interpretation to the Assembly's
intention. Nevertheless, during the whole discussion of the item of the

Permanent Staff Regulations in the Fifth Committee, no suggestion was
made to put the Assembly's interpretation of its own intention above
the interpretation of the Tribunal. On the contrary, several speakers
in the debate felt the need of expressly confirrning the unassailable
authority of the Tribunal in interpreting the texts. And the only thing
that happened-as it should happen in such a situation-was that ,an
amendment to the texts was proposed in order to make the intention
26of the legislators as clear as possible. But the General Assembly did not
take the decision of the League Assembly as a precedent for its own
conduct.
One of the main issues regarding the nature of the Administrative
Tribunal of the United Xations has been the auestion whether or not~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~
the Tribunal is a subsidiary organ of the Geneial r\ssembly and, if so,
wliether tliis would encroach won the Tribunal's inde~endence as it
rnight otherwise be deduced frorh the text of the Statut; and its legis-
lative history. Relating to this question, the distinguished Kepresent-
ative of the Secretarv-General has uresented to the Court an illuminat-
ing nrid. ns IIscenij. &hniistivc ~..~~O'sitio oifith,. syteiii of III.:Clinrter-
or 1:ickof systtin-rcgardiiig urg.inj of tlic Liiiiccl Sntioiis. ..ifter Ii:iviiig
IlStciled Io tiiis. tkicliiiI\1hiric 1 cnii <lunou is to trv tu rlr;i\r. ;ifclv

conclusions froh the injormaGon he has given.
It seeins justified, then, to conclude that the Charter does not bring
into existence a narrow and rigid system of categories of organs and
does not intend to limit the creation of new organs and types of orgaiis.
011tlie contrary, the Charter recognizes various kinds of organs. soine
of which are iieither principal nor subsidiary. Further, the Charter does
not exclude the possibility of new organs being established by a principal
organ in the performance of its functions "in accordance with the
Charter" (Article VIT, paragraph z), but without special authorization
by the Charter (as in Articles XXII and XXIX). Latitude for progres-
sive development and adaptation to new needs and conditions is entirely
in keeping with tlie purpose of international organization. This will be
the case as long as the evolution does not come into conflict with the
basic instrument. the Charter, being at the same time atreaty, reserving
a field of sovereignty to Alember States, and a constitution, declariiig
certain fundamental principles and general purposes and dividing
powers between the various organs. It is submitted that, in keeping
with the principles, purposes and obligations of the Organization,
further, that within the constitutional framework and outside the
reserved rights of Member States, an organ of an international organiza-
tion generally will be free to take measures, not only essential to, but
desirable for, the better exercise of the function conferred on it by the
Constitution. And the General Assembly of the United Xations, held
by the Charter under Article 10s. paragraph 1,to make regulations for
the appointment of the staff by the Secretary-General, will be free to
create a machinery for promoting the observance of the terms ofappoint-
ment. Now that the General Assembly has acted according to this
principle and has established the Administrative Tribunal, it is iiot
admissible to argue that the Assembly for the performance of its func-
tions coiild only establish subsidiary organs, that the Tribunal therefore
cannot be anything else but a subsidiary organ and that certain qualitles.
implied in that notion adliere to the Tribunal and limit its powers.

Such an argument would be a petitp iroiizcip Fori.it is clear that the
Assembly in setting up the Tritiunal never intended to create a sub-
sidiarv,oraa- in the sense of a de~endent orran. but in the sense of
-~iippo~iiigune\roul<l stick tu tlir,tcrin "subsidi;ir\ org;in"-;III <,rfi;iiito
fulnl ,itypic;il j~idici:ilt:~k for i~hiclitlic .Adscml>lyits~lf:isn 1cgijl:iting
and ~ulitical body did iiut feel tir. l'lie Tribiiiinl is<iiilvoii+of the v:irious
tsl)& of orgaiis \<hich 111ïOrg:ini~:it~oii frtiithe niit<;t or in thc condiict
of its biisiness lias neaileJ fur II: bcttcr fuiictioiiing. ;i\ariéty of urgans STATEJlENT BY MT. TAhlllES (XETHERLAXDS)-14 VI 54 379

of which the Charter itself shows some examples apart from the simple
distinction between principal organs and subsidiary organs. The Assem-
bly, in regulating the position of the staff in accordance with the Charter,
%irasentirely wjthin its powers to create such a specialized body. It is
not permissible by denying these powers of the Assembly to arrive at a
narrow and artificial constructionand qualification of the position of the
Tribunal contrary to the Assembly's intention as it appears from the
text of the Statute and its legislative history.
The power of the General Assembly to set up a judicial body like
the Administrative Tribunal becomes the more clear when it is taken
into consideration that the Assembly is the appropriate legislative organ
within the Organization. From the moment when, within the United
Nations, an Administrative Tribunal was deemed desirable, it was a
matter of course that it should be established by the .hssembly. It is
significant that during the preparatory stages of the Statute, the Assem-
bly, its comniittees and sub-committees never considered the question
whether they had the power to establish a judicial body of that scope

and on what article of the Charter that power was based. There was
never any discussion, as far as the records go, of the question whether
or not the Tribunal would be a suhsidiary organ. Resolution 351 (IV),
by which the General Assembly finally adopted the Statute of the
Tribunal, is silent as to these questions and so is the covering Report.
The Assembly of the League of Nations as the legislative organ of that
Organization established a similar Administrative Tribunal without
proving its competence to do so. The remarkable thing is that the
Covenant of the League did not grant to the Assembly any special
powers as to the staff of the Secretariat, nor did it empower the Assem-
bly to establish "subsidiary organs", a term unknown to the Covenant.
Only in paragraph 2 of .4rticlV did the Covenant provide that "al1
matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly ....including the
appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be
regulated by the Assembly". It is clear that the establishment of an
Administrative Tribunal, whatever the nature of such organ might be,
certainly was not "the appointment of a committee to investigate
certain matters" as it was intended in the Covenant. Apparently the
Assembly has acted in a self-evident and uncontested general legislative

capacity. The GeneralAssembly of the United Nations having a similar
fzcnctionwithin the United Nations has the power tu establish a similar
independentjudicial body, and evenmore su becausethe GeneralAssembly
is especially entrusted by the Charterwith regulating the positionoj the
staf7.
If the term "subsidiary organ" should be maintained also in the
case of the Administrative Tribunal, it should be taken in the general
sense of Article VII, paragraph 2, referring to such subsidiary organs
as may be found necessary to be established in accordance with the
Charter, that is to Say, any organs which may assist the Organization
in the performance of its functions, apart from the assistance to the
particnlar functions of the establishing organs. Although established
by the General Assembly, the Administrative Tribunal of the United
Nations, as it is established now, is no more related to the Assembly
than to any otlier organ ; it is an orgaii in the service of the United
Nations as a whole and, according to Article 12 of the Statute, it can
even be an organ in the service of a specialized agency. STATEhlENT BY hlr.TAMDlES (NETHERLANDS)-1 V4I54
380
Now, suppose that tlie conception of the Tribunal as a subsidiary
organ of the General Assembly of the United Nations were accepted,
together with the conclusion drawn from that conception, namely, that
the Assembly in the perfomaiice of its budgetary power could on

certain grounds reconsider the final judgments of the Tribunal. \Vhat
would be the position of the Tribunal in relation to the agency which
would have accepted the Tribunal's jurisdiction ? In that capacity, of
course, the Tribunal would becoine an organ of the agency in question,
but would it be a "subsidiary organ", and, if so, subsidiary to what
organ of the agency ? This, of course, is very difficult to be determined,
because the whole argument of the distinction between principal and
subsidiary organs is based on the use of certain words in the Charter
of the United Xations. The argument will not apply to the statute of
the specialized agency. Neverttieless, suppose that the organ which
has the budgetary power in the specialized agency would consider itself
to be in the same sovereigii position as the position whicli, according
to some, the United Nations Assembly is occupying. Suppose the
budgetary organ of the specialized agency would consider to refuse

to give effect to an award of compensation made by the Tribunal in
favour of a staff member of the agency whose contract of service has
been terminated without his cotisent. \2'ould this really be in keeping
with the provision to be inserted in tlie special agreement concluded
by the agency ? This provision, even more categorically than Article
IX of the Statute ("the amount awarded shall be tixed by the Tribunal
and paid by the United Kations, or, as appropriate, by the specialized
agency participating under Article rz"), but .4rticle IX more clearly
prescribes "that the agency concerned shall be bound by the judgments
of the Tribunal and be responsible for the paymeiit of any compensation
awarded by theTribunalW. Shall bebound by the judgments and responsi-
ble for the payments. Now, if an organization is bound by an award
and, moreover, has confirmed tliis binditig character of the award by
special agreement freely entered upon, can theii an organ of the Organi-
zation-probably the representaiive organ whicli finally had to approve

the agreement-legally repudiate the commitment 2 This certainly
cannot be the intention of the express words of Article XII of the
Statute. The conclusion is iuevitable tliat the Statute can never be
interpreted in such a way as to bring the Tribunal in a subsidiary or
any subordinate position in relation to any organ of the specialized
agency. The Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, thus
conceived, can find no place in a specialized agency brought into relation-
ship with the United Nations. But can it then have been the intention
of the Statute to give the Tribunal that subordinate place within the
United Natioiis itself ? It would be an absurd supposition. And the only
clear and acceptable construction rationally following from the Statute
as a whole is that of an independent, judicial body at the disposal of the
United Nations as well as of tliose specialized agencies which accept
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as an equally independent organ.
A second group of problems relates to the budgetary power of the

General Assembly (Article 17 of the Charter). For it has been stated
again during these hearings that the Assembly, in the exercise of the
budgetary power, is a sovereign body having its own responsibilities,
not restricted nor to be restncted by the decisions of any organ of
the United Nations, whatever tbeir nature. Two questions, therefore, STATEMENT BY MT. TAAIMES (NETHERLBNDS)-1 VI 54
381
arise in this respect:can the Assembly generally be hound, and, if so,
is the Assembly actually bound in any way by decisions of the Tribunal ?
The contention that the General Assembly cannot be restricted in
the exercise of its constitutionalDowersuresents a certain analozv to
the doctrine of the sovereignty Ôf parl&ments-parliamentum &nia
9otest. 1 think Professor Spiropoulos eloquently has stated to this effect.
However, sovereign parlkmënts and, indeed, sovereigns in general,
inspite of their sovereignty, remain bound by general principles of law.
In the same manner and even a foutiori, the main representative organ
of an international oreanization. based on law. can leeallv ~erform its

ative organ & the performance of its-budgetary powërnot to finstrate
any financial implications of the agreement. This apparently is a correct
statement of the law in the event of the agreement being in the nature
of a treaty. For it follows from estahlished judicial opinion that, in
international proceedings, a constitutional obstacle of the sort mentioned
-budgetary discretion-would not be recognized so that a State would
be released of its valid international obligations. In that respect an
international organization is in exactly the same position as if, within
the limitations of its contractual capacity, it had concluded agreements
organizations. For, as this Court, in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation
for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations (I.C.J. Reports
1949, p. 179) has said with regard to the United Nations, after having
referred to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Xations, to which the United Nations is a party :

" ...the Court has came to the conclusion that the Organization
is an international persan. That is not the rame thing as saying
that it is a State. which it certainlv is not...What it does mean
is that it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing
international ri~hts and duties,and thatit has capacity to maintain
its rights by hr'inginginternational claims."
It may be concluded, therefore, that, for instance, in this case of
the United Nations, the provision of the Charter regarding the discre-
tionary power of the General Assembly to consider and approve the
Budget of the Organization should be interpreted restrictively as far
as international obligations of the Organization are involved. It does
not lie with a tribunal of international law to give such restrictive inter-
pretation of a national constitution, municipal laws being merely facts
from the standpoint of the tribunal (P.C.I.J., A.7, p. 19-Polish Upper
Silesia case). But in the event of a constitution in the nature of an
international instrument like the Charter of the United Nations beine

to give that restRctive interpretation. So we have herë a clear example
of the General Assembly by a principle of law being bound in the
. exercise of its discretion to consider and apyrove the Budget of the
Organization. And the example will be the more convincing when it is382 STATEbIENT BY hW. TAhlXlES (KETHERLANDS)-1 V4I 54

realized th;it usually it will have been tlie Assembly itself which has
approved the agreement from wliich the international rights and duties
of the Organization as a whole ciriginate. It may then rightly be said
that the Assembly would Iiave bound itself. The principle pacta sunt
seruaizda would equally bind the Assembly if the agreement, instead
of being international, should bc of an interna1 or private character,
in the service of the United Nations aiid the Organization itself;ons
The General Assembly of the United Nations, further, in the perform-
ance of its budgetary fuiictions. will be bound by an obligation of tlie
Organization as an international person to niake reparation in the event
of the breach of an engagement entered into by the Organization in its
recognized contractual capacity. 1.1i1ts Advisory Opinion on Reparation
for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Xations-already
auoted from-the ixesent Court Iias said that tlie Oreanization has tlie

iiot only iritei.iationrighlsbut also internationalduiies,can be broughr
and prosecuted before an interriatioiial tribunal ? Actually, iii some
international agreements to mliich the United Xations is a party, the
jurisdiction of an international tribiinal is recogiiized as to differences
arising out of the interpretation or application of the agreement. And,
as the l'ermaneiit Court of International Justice lias said in the Chorzou,
Factory (Jurisdiction) case (P.C.I.J., Series A, Ko. g, p. 21) :

"Differences relating to reparatioiis, which may be due by reason
of failure to apply a convention, are differences relating to its
application."
Reference in this connection has already been made by the Honourable
Representative of the United Kingdom in his speech this morning to
Article VIII, Section 30, of tlie General Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, making this Court competent to
decide differeiices as to interpretatioii and application in the form of
a binding Advisory Opinion ;furtlier, to Article Vlll, Section 21, of
the Heaclauarters Aereement betiveen the United Xations and the

~-~~~
to Article 13 of tlie~A$eenient on tlie Ariana Site with Switzerland.
Al1these compromissory claiises refer to the jurisdiction of this Court
or of an arbitral tribunal ad ILOC.
More esamples might be found, but enough lias been said to prove
that in its discretion to approve the Budget, the General r\ssemhly is
bound by general priiiciples of I;iu. aiid Iias not the riglit to refuse to
give effect to the financial obligations of the Organization ex cor~trnctu,
ex delictoand particularly to the finaiicial obligations folluwiiig from
the final decisions of arbitral or iudicial tribunals whose iurisdiction
has been accepted by the ~r~aii~zatioii.
Now,is the t\ssembly actually l>ouridbythe decisionsof the Tribunal?
The effect of the oblieations of a iuristic Derson as a whole on the dis-
cretionary powers of rts org:iiis is:1 tliiiik, a general problem, and the
question wlietlier or not tlie Geiieral Assembly of the United Natioiis,in the exercise of its budgetary power, is bound by awards of compen-
sation of the Administrative Tribunal, relates only to a special case of
this general problem. As in the cases previously mentioned, final decision
of administrative disputes forms an integral part of an agreement.

Obviously the terms of appointment and the contracts of employment
between staff members and the United Nations. re~resented bv the
Secretary-General, are not of an international clia;acter,beca;se a
staff member is devoid of international persoiiality. Nevertheless, they
are agreements in so far as they cannoi be unilaterally renounced or
modified, except as provided by the agreement itself.
Now the special feature of the agreement between the United Nations
and a staff member is that it contains an important element which is
subject to unilateral modification by the United Nations, thus altering
-and entirely lawfully so-the position of the staff member as existing
at the time of appointment. But as long as amendments have not been
made, the staff member may rely on the fact that his legal position is
still the same as at the time of his appointment. The staff member at
his appointment knows from the Staff Regulations that an Administrative
Tribunal is open to him, but he also knows that the Tribunal may

be abolished by the General Assembly aiid that the Statute may be
amended. Nevertheless, as long as it has not happened, and as long as
the Tribunalstands, its competenceundiminished, the staff member may
rely on it as one of the guarantees of his legal position according to the
terms of appointment. Saying that the staff member may rely on that
guarantee is saying in other words that the United Nations is under
the obligation to keep the guarantee effective and, as in the cases
previously mentioned, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in
the exercise of its budgetary power, is bound by that obligation of
the Organization as a whole.
It follows from this statement that we can find no grounds on which
a right of the General Assembly to refuse to give effect to aivards of
compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal might be based.
The nature of the Tribunal as an independent judicial body delivering
binding judgments in the last instance has been clearly expressed in
the relevant .tests, in accordance with the intention of the legislator.
This interpretation is not contradicted by the subsequent practice of

the organs concerned. No procedure for revision, reconsideration or
challenging the final judgments having been provided for, snch proce-
dure cannot arbitrarily be constructed and iinprovized. Staff members
are in the service of the United Nations ; there is a contractual relation-
ship between them and the Organization as a juristic person. Therefore
disputes following from this relationship, adjudication of those disputes
and awards of compensation impose obligations on the Organization as
a whole, and, consequently, bind the organs thereof, even restricting
the exercise of their discretionary powers. The General Assembly cannot
lawfully refuse to give effect to awards of compensation which. in the
words of the Statute of the Administrative Trihiinal, "shall be paid by
the United Nations".
In denying any groiinds referred to in question I, ive have not
attempted to deal with absurd situations, supposing, for instance, that
the Tribunal would have considered certain cases to be so evidently
outside the scope of its Statute that there can be no uncertainty as

to the interpretalioii thereof. It is obvious that decisions of the Tribunal384 STATEMENT BY \Ir.TAXl>IES ('~ETHERL~\SDS)-1 4I j4

which oiily to outward appearance would present themselves as such,
but which would have no real connection with the Statute, would not
exist from a legal point of view. Being non-existent, they can have no
effect, and therefore we have considered them falling outside the scope
of the questions laid before the Court. Problems arising from absurd
supposition certainly fa11outside the scope of question 2 referring to
@incipal grounds.
Our conclusion remains that where no higher rcsort is provided for,
no grouiids to challenge final decisions should be admitted. In this
respect, the words of Grotius stiU hold good. Although, says Hugo de
Groot, municipal law in some cases has provided that it shall be lawful
to appéal from arbitrators and to complain of injustice, nevertheless,
such a procedure cannot become applicable in relations (to kings and
peoples) where there is no higher power which can either hold fast or
loosen the bond of the promise. And now 1 quote him literally:"Under
such conditions, therefore, the decision of arbitrators, whether just or
unjust,must stand absolutely ...It is in fact one thing to make enquiry
conceming the duty of the arbitrator, and another to enquire concerning
the obligation of those who promise."
Mr. President, Honourable Menibers of the Court, 1wish to thank the
Court for its close attention.