Audience publique tenue le mardi 11 mars 2014, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l'affaire relative à l'Application de la convention pour la prévention e

Document Number
118-20140311-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2014/14
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Corrigé
Corrected

CR 2014/14

International Court Cour internationale

of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

YEAR 2014

Public sitting

held on Tuesday 11 March 2014, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Tomka presiding,

in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)

________________

VERBATIM RECORD
________________

ANNÉE 2014

Audience publique

tenue le mardi 11 mars 2014, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président,

en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention
et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie)

____________________

COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -

Present: President Tomka

Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade

Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari

Judges ad hoc Vukas
Kreća

Registrar Couvreur

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Tomka, président

M. Sepúlveda-Amor, vice-président
MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade

Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges

MM. Vukas
Kreća, juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur, greffier

 - 4 -

The Government of the Republic of Croatia is represented by:

Ms Vesna Crnić-Grotić, Professor of International Law, University of Rijeka,

as Agent;

H.E. Ms AndrejaMetelko-Zgombić, Ambassador, Director General for EU Law, International Law
and Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Zagreb,

Ms Jana Špero, Head of Sector, Ministry of Justice, Zagreb,

Mr. Davorin Lapaš, Professor of International Law, University of Zagreb,

as Co-Agents;

Mr. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

Mr. PhilippeSands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,

Mr. Mirjan R. Damaška, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law and Professorial Lecturer in Law,
Yale Law School, New Haven,

Mr. Keir Starmer, Q.C., Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers, London,

Ms Maja Seršić, Professor of International Law, University of Zagreb,

Ms Kate Cook, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London

Ms Anjolie Singh, Member of the Indian Bar, Delhi,

Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Luka Mišetić, Attorney at Law, Law Offices of Luka Misetic, Chicago,

Ms Helen Law, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London

Mr. Edward Craven, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Orsat Miljenić, Minister of Justice of the Republic of Croatia,

H.E. Ms Vesela Mrđen Korać, Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, The Hague,

as Members of the Delegation; - 5 -

Le Gouvernement de la République de Croatie est représenté par :

Mme Vesna Crnić-Grotić, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Rijeka,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. Mme Andreja Metelko -Zgombić, ambassadeur, directeur général de la division de droit
communautaire et international et des affaires consulaires du ministère des affaires étrangères et
des affaires européennes,

Mme Jana Špero, chef de secteur au ministère de la justice,

M. Davorin Lapaš, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Zagreb,

comme coagents ;

M. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Univers ité de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,

Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit, University College de Londres, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Mirjan R. D amaška, professeur de droit émérite de l’Université de Yale (chaire Sterling),
chargé d’enseignement à l’Université de Yale,

M. Keir Starmer, Q.C., avocat, Doughty Street Chambers (Londres),

Mme Maja Seršić, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Zagreb,

Mme Kate Cook, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

Mme Anjolie Singh, membre du barreau indien (Delhi),

Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseils et avocats ;

M. Luka Mišetić, avocat, Law Offices of Luka Misetic (Chicago),

Mme Helen Law, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Edward Craven, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseils ;

S. Exc. M. Orsat Miljenić, ministre de la justice de la République de Croatie,

S. Exc. Mme Vesela Mrđen Korać, ambassadeur de la République de Croatie auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,

comme membres de la délégation ; - 6 -

Mr. Remi Reichhold, Administrative Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,

Ms Ruth Kennedy, LL.M., Administrative Assistant, University College London,

as Advisers;

Ms Sanda Šimić Petrinjak, Head of Department, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Sedina Dubravčić, Head of Department, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Klaudia Sabljak, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Zrinka Salaj, Ministry of Justice,

Mr. Tomislav Boršić, Ministry of Justice,

Mr. Albert Graho, Ministry of Justice,

Mr. Nikica Barić, Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb,

Ms Maja Kovač, Head of Service, Ministry of Justice,

Ms Katherine O’Byrne, Doughty Street Chambers,

Mr. Rowan Nicholson, Associate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Unive rsity of
Cambridge,

as Assistants;

Ms Victoria Taylor, International Mapping, Maryland,

as Technical Assistant.

The Government of the Republic of Serbia is represented by:

Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of the Republic of Serbia in the Kingdom of

the Netherlands, former Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Agent;

Mr. William Schabas, O.C., M.R.I.A., Professor of International Law, Middlesex University
(London) and Professor of International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Leiden University,

Mr. AndreasZimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, University of
Potsdam, Director of the Potsdam Centre of Human Rights, Member of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration,

Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., Ph.D. (Cambridge), Professor of International Law, University of
Glasgow, - 7 -

M. Remi Reichhold, assistant administratif, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

Mme Ruth Kennedy, LL.M., assistante administrative, University College de Londres,

comme conseillers ;

Mme Sanda Šimić Petrinjak, chef de département au ministère de la justice,

Mme Sedina Dubravčić, chef de département au ministère de la justice,

Mme Klaudia Sabljak, ministère de la justice,

Mme Zrinka Salaj, ministère de la justice,

M. Tomislav Boršić, ministère de la justice,

M. Albert Graho, ministère de la justice,

M. Nikica Barić, Institut croate d’histoire (Zagreb),

Mme Maja Kovač, chef de département au ministère de la justice,

Mme Katherine O’Byrne, Doughty Street Chambers,

M. Rowan Nicholson, Associate au Lauterpacht Center for International Law de l’Université de
Cambridge,

comme assistants ;

Mme Victoria Taylor, International Mapping (Maryland),

comme assistante technique.

Le Gouvernement de la République de Serbie est représenté par :

M. Saša Obradović, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de la République de Serbie au Royaume des

Pays-Bas, ancien conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme agent ;

M. William Schabas, O.C., membre de la Royal Irish Academy, professeur de droit international à
la Middlesex University (Londres) et professeur de droit pénal international et des droits de
l’homme à l’Université de Leyde,

M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Université de Harvard), professeur de droit international à
l’Université de Potsdam, directeur du centre des droits de l’homme de l’Université de Potsdam,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,

M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., Ph.D. (Université de Cambridge), professeur de droit international à
l’Université de Glasgow, - 8 -

Mr. Wayne Jordash, Q.C., Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers, London, Partner at Global Rights
Compliance,

Mr. Novak Lukić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade, former President of the Association of the Defense
Counsel practising before the ICTY,

Mr. Dušan Ignjatović, LL.M. (Notre Dame), Attorney at Law, Belgrade,

as Counsel and Advocates;

H.E. Mr. Petar Vico, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Mr. Veljko Odalović, Secretary-General of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, President of
the Commission for Missing Persons,

as Members of the Delegation;

Ms Tatiana Bachvarova, LL.M . (London School of Economics and Political Science), LL.M.
(St. Kliment Ohridski), Ph.D. candidate (Middlesex University), Judge, Sofia District Court,

Bulgaria,

Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, LL.M. (Michigan), Senior Adviser at the Office of the Prosecutor for
War Crimes of the Republic of Serbia,

Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,

Mr. Marko Brkić, First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Relja Radović, LL.M. (Novi Sad), LL.M. (Leiden(candidate)),

Mr. Georgios Andriotis, LL.M. (Leiden),

as Advisers. - 9 -

M. Wayne Jordash, Q.C., avocat, Doughty Street Chambers (Londres), associé du cabinet Global
Rights Compliance,

M. Novak Lukić, avocat, Belgrade, ancien président de l’association des conseils de la défense
exerçant devant le TPIY,

M. Dušan Ignjatović, LL.M. (Université Notre Dame), avocat, Belgrade,

comme conseils et avocats ;

S. Exc. M. Petar Vico, ambassadeur de la République de Serbie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,

M. Veljko Odalović, secrétaire général du Gouvernement de la République de Serbie, président de
la commission pour les personnes disparues,

comme membres de la délégation ;

Mme Tatiana Bachvarova, LL.M. (London School of Economics and Political Science),
LL.M. (Université St. Kliment Ohridski), doctorante (Middlesex U niversity); juge au tribunal

de district de Sofia (Bulgarie),

M. Svetislav Rabrenović, LL.M. (Université du Michigan), conseiller principal au bureau du
procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la République de Serbie,

M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,

M. Marko Brkić, premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Relja Radović, LL.M. (Université de Novi Sad), LL.M. (Université de Leyde (en cours)),

M. Georgios Andriotis, LL.M. (Université de Leyde),

comme conseillers. - 10 -

The PRESIDENT: Good morning, please be seated. I declare open the sitting of the C ourt

and this morning the Court will hear the continuation of Serbia’s first round of oral argument. I

give the floor to ProfessorZimmermann to start. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. ZIMMERMANN: Thank you, Mr. President.

I.I NTRODUCTION

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as always, it is an honour to appear before the

principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Mr. President, l ast week you heard Croatia refer to

most serious violations of international humanitarian law taking place during the conflict in Croatia

in 1991 and early 1992. This week you will hear further evidence of crimes committed against

ethnic Serbs in Croatia, and I express my sympathy for all of the innocent victims on both sides of

the conflict.

2. What you will hear today by my colleague Professor Tams and myself might, compared to

these issues, at first glance, look like more technical questions. We will address questions related

to the Court’s temporal jurisdiction and the admissibility of Croatia’s case as far as events prior to

27 April 1992 are concerned, as well as issues to Croatia’s standing . These matters go however to

the very heart of Croatia’s case.

3. This was acknowledged by Professor Ivan Šimonović, Croatia’s Agent at the time, in a

statement made in 2006 to a representative of the United States E mbassy in Zagreb, which in the

meantime became publicly available. He stated that if the Court: [ start slide] “will accept

jurisdiction only beginning April 27, 1992, the date FRY was established . . . [that] would mean

[that] the worst atrocities committed on Croatian territory (i.e. Vukovar) would not be considered,
1
greatly weakening Croatia’s case” . [End slide]

4. Given this statement of the former Croatian Agent in this case, Professor Šimonović, it

was striking to now hear the current Agent of Croatia light-handedly refer to this question as “a

single remaining jurisdictional issue” 2which, in her view, was “evident” anyhow . 3

1
Cable No. 06ZAGREB366 of 17 Mar. 2006 from the US Embassy in Zagreb to the US State Department,
para. 7, available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06ZAGREB366.html.
2CR 2014/5, p. 22, para. 25 (Crnić-Grotić).
3
Ibid. - 11 -

5. As the Court will recall, all of the events to which Croatia ref erred in its oral pleadings

last week took place well before 27 April 1992  the day the respondent State, Serbia, came into

existence as a State under international law, or as Professor Šimonović himself put it, the day the

FRY was established. And all those events obviously occurred well before the Respondent became

bound by the Genocide Convention on that very same day, as determined by this Court.

6. Let me reiterate: Croatia has throughout last week not referred to any events that took

place after 27 April 1992 as allegedly constituting genocidal acts.

7. Croatia’s case is thus fully dependent, as far as the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis is

concerned, on a retroactive application of the Genocide Convention to such events.

8. Cumulatively, it also depends  as far as the admissibility of Croatia’s case is

concerned  on the possibility of attributing treaty violations to Serbia . Such alleged treaty

violations however pre-date Serbia becoming a Contracting Party of the Genocide Convention.

9. Before addressing those matters one by one in more detail, let me first deal with some

more general issues  issues which touch upon the very reas on for which Croatia brought this

genocide case in the first place.

10. [Start slide] It was again Prof essor Šimonović, Croatia’s Agent, that was quite frank

about this:

“While B[osnia] [and] H[erzgegovina] filed its case in 1993 . . . Croatia did not
file until 1999, and only then after being convinced by an American attorney that
accusations of S[erbia] a[nd] M[ontenegro’s] responsibility for genocide . . . on

Croatian territory would paralyze cases against 4roatians at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).”

Mr. President, is this a bona fide reason to bring a genocide case against another State before this

Court? I submit to you that these words, again made by Croatia’s former A gent,

Professor Šimonović in these proceedings, they tell us a lot about Croatia’s underlying motivation

to start these proceedings. [End slide]

11. What is more is that this case was brought as late as 1999  six years after Bosnia and

Herzegovina had brought its case in 1993, and more than eight years after most, if not all, of the

alleged acts had taken place.

4Cable No. 06ZAGREB 366 of 17 Mar. 2006 from the US Embassy in Zagreb to the US State Department,
para. 8, available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06ZAGREB366.html. - 12 -

12. It was submitted to the Court despite the ICTY Prosecutor never having brought any

genocide charges related to the conflict in Croatia, let alone such charges rel ated to acts that

occurred after 27 April 1992.

13. It was submitted, as shown, Croatia being fully aware that in order to even make a

plausible claim of genocide, it would necessarily and under any circumstances have to rely on acts

pre-dating 27 April 1992.

14. It is against this background that Croatia had necessarily to come up with a whole set of

arguments, which could eventually enable the Court to consider events pre -dating the critical date,

27 April 1992, so as to deal with what the current Agent for Croatia has called a small “single

remaining jurisdictional issue”. This issue constitutes a crucial and , indeed, basic question. This

issue is one the Court has to consider and decide before it concerns itself with the substance of

Croatia’s allegations relating to this period of time. And it is this issue that Professor Tams and

myself will address this morning.

15. Mr. President, let me now introduce the contents of this morning’s pleadings.

16. I will first lay out the structure and character of Serbia’sratione temporis objection. I

will then move on to the basic jurisdictional parameters of this case and, finally, I will address

issues of State succession.

17. My colleague, Professor Tams, will then continue dealing with questions relating to the

lack of retroactivity of the Genocide Convention and he will also deal with Article 10 (2) of the

International Law Commission’s Articles on State R esponsibility, to which we will refer to as the

ILC Articles.

18. I will then conclude addressing, inter alia , the issue of Croatia’s standing or, rather, the

lack of standing, as far as events pre-dating 8 October 1991 are concerned.

II. STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER OF SERBIA ’S RATIONE TEMPORIS OBJECTION

19. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me begin by outlining Serbia’s ratione temporis

objection. In your 2008 J udgment you have clarified and confirmed the two- prong character of

Serbia’s objection ratione temporis. As you stated, it relates on the one hand to - 13 -

“the Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether breaches of the Genocide Convention

were committed in the light of the facts that occurred prior to the date on which the
FRY came into existence as a separate State, capable of being a party in its own right
to the Convention” . 5

20. On the o ther hand, it relates to the admissibility of the claim in relation to facts that

occurred before Serbia even came into existence as a State under the general rules of State

responsibility .

21. Croatia, the Applicant, thus has to cumulatively establish two propositions. First, it has

to establish that the Genocide Convent ion, and in particular its Art. IX, applies retroactively, as

between the Parties, to acts prior to27 April 1992.

22. Second, provided the Court’s temporal jurisdiction were indeed of such a retroactive

character, and it is not  so, if we assume that it is the case  still, Croatia has to further establish

that such acts could then possibly be attributed to Serbia. It has to do so despite the fact that Serbia

did not even exist as a State at the time at which the alleged acts took place.

7
23. The Court will have to make a finding on each of these two issues . Let me reiterate:

even if the Court were to ever find that acts pre- dating 27 April 1992 could be attributed to the

Respondent, Croatia’s case would still fail for the Court lacking jurisdiction ratione temporis.

24. And this now brings me to the basic jurisdictional parameters of this case.

III. B ASIC JURISDICTIONAL PARAMETERS

A. Croatia’s status as a party of the Genocide Convention

25. Let me start with Croatia’s status vis-à-vis the Genocide Convention. There is agreement

between the P arties that the Applicant, Croatia itself, only became bound by the Genocide

8
Convention on 8 October 1991 .

5
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008 , p. 460, para.129; emphasis added.
6Ibid.

7Ibid.
8
See, e.g., CR 2008/10, p. 29, para. 9 (Sands). - 14 -

B. Serbia’s status as a party of the Genocide Convention

26. [Start slide] As to the status of the Respondent, Serbia, vis -à-vis the Convention the

Court has, in its 2008 Judgment in this case, confirmed that the respondent State, Serbia, only

became bound by the Genocide Convention as of 27 April 1992 when stating that, “from that date

onwards [and that means 27 April 1992] the FRY would be bound by the obligations of a party in

respect of all . . . conventions to which the SFRY had been a party” 9. [End slide]

27. The Court also referred to “the fact that the FRY only became a State and a party t o the

10
Genocide Convention on 27 April 1992” .

28. And your determination stands fully in line with the determination already made by the

Arbitration Commission for the Peace Conference on t he Former Yugoslavia, the so -called

Badinter Commission . In its O pinion No. 11, the Arbitration Commission for the Peace

Conference on the Former Yugoslavia first determined that the relevant date of succession for each

of the five successor States of the SFRY is the date at “which they became States” 11. So, the

Commission took the coming into existence as the State as the starting- point. It then continued 

Arbitration Commission  then continued in finding that such determination constitutes “a

question of facts” . Having then considered the facts, T he Arbitration Commission then

considered the facts of the dissolution of the SFRY. And in light of these facts the Arbitration

Commission then found, just like the Court  just like you  that, [start slide] “27 April 1992

must be considered the date of State succession in respect of the Federal Republic of
12
Yugoslavia” . [End slide]

29. Let me also note in passing that it was only then, as the Badinter Commission put it, that

“the relevant international ag encies . . . began to refer to ‘the former SFRY’, affirming that the

process of dissolution had been completed” 13. So it took again 27 April 1992 as a starting -point

and so did the relevant international agencies as the Commission put it.

9Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punis hment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008 , pp. 454-455, para. 117; emphasis added.
10
Ibid., p. 458, para. 124.
11Opinion, No. 11, para. 3, ILM 1993, S. 1587.

12Ibid., p. 1588, para. 7.
13
Ibid. - 15 -

30. And these relevant international agencies include the Security Council, which only after

27 April 1992, started referring to the “former Yugoslavia” . As late as in the spring of 1992 the

Security Council had still continued to refer to the “SFRY” . Indeed  as is wel l-known to the

Court  it was for the first time in September 1992 only, and thus after the determination made by

the Arbitration Commission for the Former Yugoslavia in July 1992  that the Security Council,

in September 1992, determined that the SFRY had ceased to exist.

31. Contrary to what Croatia seems to suggest, a clear picture emerges: all relevant actors

consider 27 April 1992 the date at which the Respondent came into existence as a State and the

date it became bound by the Genocide Convention. This includes th is Court, an arbitration

commission specifically tasked to deal with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the

international community at large . Let me now against this background consider the extent of the

Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae.

C. Extent of the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae

32. There is no doubt that the Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is limited to consider

violations of the Genocide Convention, given that the case was exclusively brought under

Article IX of the Convention.

33. On frequent occasions the Court has drawn a sharp distinction between treaty- based

prohibitions on the one hand, and those based on customary law on the other . This Court has laid

down this principle as early as in i ts Nicaragua Judgment, and has since then confirmed it in the

Racial Discrimination case between Georgia and the Russian Federation 1.

34. Most recently, the Court once again stressed and underlined this fundamental

distinction  which Croatia probably would call a formalistic one  but you did so, and you did

so most recently in your Belgium v. Senegal Judgment 15 which Croatia did not refer to. There, the

Court, in Belgium v. Senegal, again very carefully distinguished between violations of the

14See Rejoinder of Serbia (RS), paras. 58 et seq., referring to cases such as Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, paras. 177
and 179; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 100, para. 64.
15
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II). - 16 -

customary law prohibition of torture on the one hand, and violations of the Torture Convention on

the other.

35. The Court also reconfirmed that in cases where the Court’s jurisdiction is exclusively

based on a compromissory clause such as Art. IX of the Genocid e Convention, it is only treaty

violations that it may consider  but not violations of any parallel norm of customary law. As the

Court put it, in Belgium v. Senegal [start slide]: “the issue whether there exists an obligation for a

State . . . under customary international law . . . is clearly distinct from any question of compliance
16
with that State’s obligations under the Convention against Torture . . .” . That is what you said.

[End slide]

36. In doing so the Court emphasized, in particular, followi ng the Committee against

Torture, that, [start slide] “‘torture’ for purposes of the Convention can only mean torture that

occurs subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention” 1. [End slide]

37. This holding is even more relevant since the comprom issory clauses contained in

Article IX Genocide Convention, respectively in Art. 30 Torture Convention, are, as far as relevant,

identical in that they both encompass exclusively disputes between two or more State Parties

concerning the interpretation or application of the respective Convention.

38. In line with your holding in Belgium v. Senegal, any eventual determination, by the

Court, that Serbia is responsible for acts of genocide must therefore, given the Court’s limited

jurisdiction under Article IX Genocide Convention, necessarily relate to violations of the Genocide

Convention. Such violations, however, to paraphrase your holding in Belgium v. Senegal, “can

only mean genocide that occurs subsequent to the entry into force of the Genocide Convention as

between the parties”. It follows that in the case at hand the Court may only consider alleged acts of

genocide having occurred after 27 April 1992.

39. And it may only consider alleged violations of the Genocide Convention  and not of

the customary law prohibition of genocide. As you, Mr. President, put it already in 2008:

1Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 445, para. 54.

1Ibid., p. 457, para. 101; references omitted. - 17 -

“neither [the question] of succession into responsibility of the predecessor State nor
that of the responsibility of an entity for acts committed before it became a State 

and thus could have become a party to the Genocide Convention  f18l within the
jurisdiction of the Court under Article IX of the Genocide Convention” .

40. Serbia fully agrees. On Friday, c ounsel for Croatia has attempted to sideline this

argument when refe rring to the fact that Art icle IX of the Genocide Convention also mentions

19
issues of State responsibility . Obviously, it does, obviously. But Article IX clearly refers to State

responsibility for violations of the treaty only . This is already made abun dantly clear by the

reference, in Article IX, to Article III of the Convention. Besides, Article IX considers issues of

State responsibility to fall within the general category of disputes relating to the application,

interpretation and fulfilment of the Convention. This is confirmed, if there was need, by the use of

the term “ including” in Art icle IX of the Genocide Convention. Accordingly, the Court’s

jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention does not extend beyond the substantive

and te mporal obligations arising under the Convention itself . My colleague and friend

Professor Tams will come back to that later this morning.

41. While Serbia fully acknowledges the prohibition of genocide under customary

international law, the sole and excl usive focus of these proceedings can therefore be alleged

violations of the Genocide Convention as a matter of treaty law . Croatia has, I am afraid to say,

20
time and again, attempted to blur this crucial and most relevant distinction . Croatia has done so

in order to gloss over the deficiencies in its case specifically when it comes to events pre- dating

27 April 1992 and 8 October1991 respectively.

42. The relevance of this fundamental distinction between treaty- related violations on the

one hand, and vi olations of customary law on the other, as underlined by you, by this Court, in

Belgium v. Senegal, is obvious for our case . In a case like ours brought under a compromissory

clause, such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention, only the respective treat y is at issue. This

stands in contrast to a case brought under the Optional Clause.

18
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno(Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008; separate opinion of Judge Tomka, p. 520, para. 13.
19CR 2014/12, p. 51, para. 39 (Crawford).
20
Reply of Croatia (RC), paras. 7.5 and 7.10; CR 2008/11, para. 10 (Crawford). - 18 -

43. Accordingly, in the Nicaragua case, which had been brought under Article 36 (2), the

Court could consider violations of customary law once the Court had found that it was barred from

addressing relevant treaty violations, such as violations of the United Nations Charter.

44. In cases like the one at hand however, based on a compromissory clause, the Court is

limited to make a finding on treaty violations only . Any such determination presupposes however

that the relevant treaty was applicable, as between the P arties, at the relevant time, whatever the

customary nature of the underlying obligations.

D. Temporal scope of obligations under the Genocide Convention

45. That brings me to my next point which was again ver y forcefully clarified by your

Judgment in the Belgium v. Senegal case which Croatia failed to mention.

46. While Professor Tams will deal with the lack of retroactive effect of the Genocide

Convention more specifically let me just briefly mention that you confirmed in Belgium v. Senegal

that the Torture Convention “applies only to facts having occurred after its entry int o force for the

State concerned” 2.

47. You did so after having determined that  just like the Genocide Convention  the

Torture Convention has codified customary law andembodies rules ofjus cogens 22.

48. And you did so being well aware that the Torture Convention contains provisions which

are mutatis mutandis identical to Article I and Article XIV of the Genocide Convention 23. It is

however precisely those latter provisions on which Croatia relies in its attempt to argue in favour of

a retroactive effect of the Genocide Convention.

49. And you did so referring to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
24
which was said to reflect customary law on the matter  a provision Croatia even did not dare to

mention.

21Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradi(Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 457, para. 100.

22Ibid., p. 457, para. 99.
23
See Arts. 2 and 31 Torture Convention respectively.
24Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

2012 (II), p. 457, para. 99. - 19 -

50. Serbia thus submits that the Court’s jurisdiction in this case is limited to making findings

on violations of the Genocide Convention only . And it further submits that the Respondent only

became bound by the Convention as of 27 April 1992.

51. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Croatia, obviously being fully aware of these

limitations has, last Friday, once again referred to your 1996 Judgment in the Bosnian case, and, in

particular its paragraph 34 25. In that case, as you will recall, the Court had made a rather broad

finding as to the applicability ratione temporis of the Genocide Convention.

52. What Croatia has failed to mention, however, was that you have already addressed the

relevance  or should I rather say irrelevance  of this holding for this case in your

2008 Judgment.

53. In your 2008 Judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility, this Court unequivocally

confirmed that its holding in para graph 34 of the 1996 J udgment on jurisdiction in the Bosnian

genocide case has no bearing for the case at hand  and whatever counsel for Croatia had to say

on the matter 26cannot change your determination.

54. In your 2008 Judgment the Court not only stressed what is obvious, namely that the

1996 Judgment cannot, under Article 59 of the Court’s Statute, constitute res judicata for the

purpose of our case 27. You went further and you found that the Court [start slide] “cannot draw

from that judgment . . . [from the 1996 Judgment in the Bosnia case] any definitive conclusion as to

the temporal scope of the jurisdiction [the Court] has under the [Genocide] Convention” 28. [End

slide]

55. In line with this statement, we submit that Croatia may thus not rely on your previous

1996 statement which, as you confirmed, was not dealing with facts pre -dating the moment the

Respondent had come into existence 29.

25
CR 2014/12, p. 48, para. 32 (Crawford).
26CR 2014/12, p. 48, para. 32 (Crawford).

27Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008 , p. 428, para. 53.
28
Ibid., p. 458, para. 123.
29
Ibid. - 20 -

IV. ISSUES OF S TATE SUCCESSION

56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me conclude by addressing issues of State

succession. I will start with the alleged automatic succession of the Respondent to the Geno cide

30
Convention, which argument, somewhat suddenly, resurfaced last Friday . I can be brief on the

matter since the Court has heard extensive argument on the question on various occasions . Indeed

most of those were related to the former Yugoslavia. On none of these occasions did the Court

ever endorse the concept of automatic succession . You did not do so in your

Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Judgment. And you did neither in the Bosnian case, nor in this case .

Rather, in your 2008 Judgment you found that Serbia had unilaterally succeeded to the Genocide

31
Convention by way of what you referred to as a notification of succession .

57. But what is most telling is how you approached the matter in the Racial Discrimination

case between Georgia and Russia, which again Croatia did not refer to, the CERD case between

Georgia and Russia. As you will recall, the Soviet Union h ad ratified the International Convention

on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1969 . After gaining

independence in the early 1990s Georgia, as a successor State of the Soviet Union, did not, did not

make a notification of succession. Instead it acceded (rather than succeeded) to the Convention as

late as 1999 . In its A pplication Georgia however then not only referred to acts of racial

discrimination that were said to have occurred after 1999. Rather, Georgia also referred to

instances of racial discrimination taking place ever since the early 1990s.

58. In your J udgment in this case you confirmed that “CERD [the Racial Discrimination

Convention] [had] entered into force between the Parties on 2 July 1999” 32only  and that was

the time Georgia had ratified the Convention, had acceded to the Convention. As a matter of fact,

the Court did not even consider the idea of Georgia having automatically succeeded to the

Convention. The Court did so despite the obvious humanitarian c haracter of CERD. And the

Court did so being aware that the Racial Discrimination Convention, just like the Genocide

Convention, embodies obligations erga omnes which are of a jus cogens character. Indeed, counsel

30
CR 2014/12, pp. 39-40, paras. 6-8 (Crawford).
3Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge(Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008 , p. 455, para. 117.
32
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 81, para. 20. - 21 -

for Georgia had not even argued automati c succession which in itself is quite telling I believe.

Obviously applying the concept of automatic succession would have led to a completely different

result as to the temporal application of the Racial Discrimination Convention as between Georgia

and Russia. And yet the Court rejected such idea in Georgia v. Russia, a case Croatia has not

addressed.

33
59. Besides, the assumption of automatic succession is also contradicted by State practice .

What is more is that Croatia itself has frequently and consi stently accepted that successor States

have acceded rather than succeeded even to human rights treaties and it has done so  it has

accepted such accessions by successor States  also with regard to the Genocide Convention. And

Croatia never raised any objection to such accessions to the Genocide Convention by successor

34
States occurring after Croatia itself had become a Contracting Party of the Genocide Convention .

60. In any case, the question of how Serbia eventually succeeded to the Genocide

Convention is irrelevant since any such succession only dates back to the date of the succession .

Said date has been defined in the two 1978 and the 1983 Vienna Conventions on State succession.

Succession thus only dates back to the [start slide] “date upon which the successor State replaced

the predecessor State in the responsibility for the international relations of the territory to which the

35
succession of States relates” . [End slide] That is the definition of the two Vienna Conventions.

61. That date, however, as confirmed by the judicial practice of the Badinter Commission, is,

as far as the FRY/Serbia is concerned, 27 April 1992. Let me also note in passing, as already

outlined in more detail in Serbia’s written pleadings, that Serbia’s predecessor State , the SFRY,

was, until the spring of 1992, still very actively involved in international relations 3. This again

confirms that the relevant date of succession, namely when the FRY in turn became responsible for

the foreign relations of its territory, is indeed the critical date, 27 April 1992.

62. This concludes the first part of my pleading for this morning . Let me summarize my

arguments in two propositions:

33See Preliminary Objections of Serbia (POY), p. 58 et seq.
34
See POY, para. 3.73.
35See Art. 2 (1) lit e) of the 1978Vienna Convention on State Succession in respect of Treaties, as well as
Art. 2 (1) d) of the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.
36
See, e.g., POY, para. 4.22. - 22 -

63. Proposition 1 is, that in line with this Court’s jurisprudence, you are only called upon in

this case to make findings on violations of the Genocide Convention as a matter of treaty law. This

presupposes that the Genocide Convention was in force as between the Parties at all relevant times.

64. Proposition 2 is , that your 2008 Judgment on jurisdiction, as well as the practice of the

Badinter Commission and that of the international community at large , confirm that 27 April 1992

is the date at which the Respondent succeeded to the Genocide Convention.

65. Mr. President, I would now kindly request you to call upon Professor Tams to take the

floor. He will first demonstrate in more detail that both the Genocide Convention generally, and its

Article IX specifically, cannot be applied retroactively.

66. Thank you for your kind attention.

The PRE SIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Zimmermann and I now call on

Professor Tams. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. TAMS:

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour and a privilege to address you for the

first time, on behalf of the Republic of Serbia, and to do so in a case of such relevance. My

presentation this morning continues the Respondent ’s argument relating to conduct pre -dating

27 April 1992. Professor Zimmermann has just introduced the main features of Serbia’ s position.

As he has indicated, conduct pre-dating that date cannot form the basis of a judgment in the present

case: it took place when the Respondent did not exist as a State and was not bound by the

Genocide Convention.

2. My purpose this morning is to develop two aspects of this argument. First , I will speak

about questions of retroactivity and I will show that the acts on which Croatia relies are not

governed by the Genocide Convention ratione temporis. The second part of my presentation will

introduce Serbia’s argument relating to Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility,

which Croatia relies on magically to “transfer” responsibility, for conduct occurring during 1991

and early 1992, to the State of Serbia. - 23 -

3. Serbia’s position on these two questions is based on well -established principles of

international law and on the jurisprudence of this Court . Serbia asks you to follow your recent

jurisprudence in cases such as Belgium v. Senegal and Georgia v. Russia, two cases that counse l

for Croatia seemed to ignore in their pleadings but that we submit are highly instructive. And our

submission proceeds from a central holding of your 2008 Judgment in the present case, namely the

statement referred to already by Professor Zimmermannthat [screen on]: “from that date onwards

[27 April 1992] the FRY would be bound by the obligations of a party in respect of all the

multilateral conventions to which the SFRY had been a party at the time of its dissolution” 37.

4. Mr. President, it may be worth noting that that holding was not what Serbia had hoped for

in 2008. As you will recall, during the preliminary objections stage in this case , Serbia had

disputed that the Declaration of 27 April 1992 amounted to a notification of succession . But of

course it accepts the Court ’s holding and it accepts its two central implications. First, Serbia did

succeed to the Genocide Convention. And second, i t succeeded with effect from 27 April 1992.

“[F]rom that date onwards” , Mr. President  the terms are clear . They mean : bound by the

Genocide Convention from 27 April 1992, but not prior to 27April 1992. [Screen off]

5. And because this is so, because Serbia joined the Genocide Convention in April 1992,

responsibility for breaches of the Genocide Conv ention pre-dating that date needs to be explained;

Croatia needs to establish some link between conduct pre-dating April 1992 on the one hand, and

the Genocide Convention (and not customary rules on genocide) on the other.

B. RETROACTIVITY

6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, “succession to responsibility” might have been one

such link. After all, this case is about responsibility . And much of Croatia ’s diplomacy in the

1990s was an attempt to convince the international community that the FRY had su cceeded the

SFRY  and it was a successful attempt. Perhaps this case, if looked at properly, is really one of

succession to responsibility . But Croatia carefully avoids the language of succession to

responsibility.

3Application of the Convention on t he Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 454-455, para. 117; emphasis added. - 24 -

7. Mr. President, “retroactivity” might then be another angle . Serbia became bound in

April 1992 but, of course, the Genocide Convention could provide for its retroactive application.

But again, Croatia remains curiously circumspect on this point. To be sure , it applies the

Convention to events of 1991 and early 1992  it has done so for a whole week . Yet Croatia

thinks this can be achieved without mentioning retroactivity . In fact, Professor Crawford tells us

38
arguments about retroactivity are “misleading” .

8. Instead of arguing openly for retroactivity, Croatia uses a range of avoidance techniques .

We are told that to apply the Genocide Convention to events of 1991 would not be a question of 

39
to quote the Reply  “retroactivity properly so -called” . Apparently this would be some lesser

form of retroactivity  not properly so-called.

9. What is more, Croatia wants to have us believe that this lesser form of retroactivity can be

presumed. Or how else should we understand Croatia ’s insistence that there is “no . . . temporal

limitation” that would restrict the scope of the Genocide Convention, and that therefore the

40
Convention governed the events of 1991?

10. Finally, Croatia insists that Article IX  the compromissory clause applicable in the

present case  covers events pre- dating April 1992. And again, miraculously, this is not a

question of retroactivity. Mr. President, Croatia seems afraid of retroactivity.

11. In response to Croatia ’s avoidance strategies, permit me to restate Serbia’ s position in

three propositions.

 First, notwithstanding its circumspect language, Croatia’ s argument depends on a claim of

retroactivity  and that is, “retroactivity properly so called”.

 Second, the Genocide Convention as a treaty does not apply retroactively.

 And third, no other result follows from Article IX of the Convention.

I will address these three propositions in turn.

38
CR 2014/12, p. 41, para. 12 (Crawford).
39Reply of Croatia (RC), para. 7.13.
40
CR 2014/12, p. 43,para. 17 (Crawford); similarly RC, para. 7.2. - 25 -

I. Croatia’s argument as based on the retroactive application
of the Genocide Convention

12. Mr. President, my first remark is prompted by Croatia ’s distinction between

“retroactivity properly so called” and “lesser forms of retroactivity ”. [ Screen on] In its Reply,

Croatia says the real question the Court  and you will see it in front of you on the screen  is,

“whether the Convention applies to the enforcement of responsibility in relation to genocide

whenever occurring, or only in relation to genocide occurring after the entry into force of the
41
Convention for the State concerned” .

13. This question, Croatia states, cannot be answered , “by reference to the pr esumption

against retroactivity of treaties” . And why not ? Since , Croatia argues, since, “neither

interpretation involves retroactivity properly so- called: [that is] the State is still only responsible

for breach of an obligation in force for it at the time, and only for conduct attributable to it under

42
international law” .

14. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is a central passage of Croatia’ s argument.

And yet it is one that entirely mischaracterizes the principles governing the temporal scop e of

treaty obligations. [Screen off] These principles, Serbia submits, can be taken from Article 28 of

the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which  as this Court clarified in the recent

Belgium v. Senegal case 43  reflects customary international law . As that case makes clear,

Article 28 not only establishes a pre sumption against retroactivity  and that is a point I will

address shortly. More fundamentally, Article 28 also clarifies what international law means by

retroactivity. [Screen on] This is what Article 28 says  you see it on the screen.

15. And you see immediately that there is no t the slightest hint in Article 28 of Croatia ’s

distinction between retroactivity proper and lesser forms of retroactivity. Article 28 formulates one

concept of retroactivity. It asks whether a treaty obligation , “bind[s] a party in relation to acts or

facts . . . which took place before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that

party”. If a treaty does this , then this, Mr. President, is retroactivity . Or , for the avoidance of

doubt: this is retroactivity properly so-called.

41
RC, para. 7.13.
42RC, para. 7.13.
43
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2012 (II), p. 457, para. 100. - 26 -

16. Mr. President, Members of the Court, if we return to the facts of the present case, it is

obvious that Croatia argues for precisely this form of ret roactivity. As your 2008 Judgment

clarifies, Serbia succeeded t o the Genocide Convention on 27 April : this, in the words of

Article 28, is “the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party ”, Serbia. Yet

for one week, you have he ard Croatia rely on acts or facts  to use the language of Article 28 

that took place in 1991.

17. Mr. President, Members of the Court , I hesitate to state the obvious, the year 1991 and

the first 117 days of the year 1992  that is, the period betw een 1 January and 26 April 1992 

precede the critical date . Conduct during 1991 and earl y 1992, in the words of Article 28, “took

place before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to ” Serbia. So what is it,

Mr. President, Members of the Court, that Croatia asks for  if not for the retroactive application

of a treaty? [Screen off]

18. Now, Mr. President, Croatia says it is not retroactivity properly so-called because Serbia,

“is still only responsible for breach of an obligation in force for it at the time, and only for conduct

attributable to it under international law” 4.

19. Yet this  as well as Professor Crawford’s variation on the theme last week  are but

smokescreens. Of course, Serbia has been bound by the Genocide Convention since April 1992.

How else could this case have proceeded to the merits? How else, incidentally, could Serbia have

brought a counter -claim? And of course Serbia cannot be held responsible for conduct not

attributable to it. Not even counsel for Cr oatia claim that. But this is not what retroactivity is

about: As Article 28 makes clear, retroactivity denotes the application of a treaty to “acts or

facts . . . which took place before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to tha t

party”. In so far as Croatia relies on conduct preceding 27 April 1992  as it has done for a whole

week  its argument depends on retroactivity  and no amount of evasion, and no false

distinction between “proper” and “lesser” retroactivity, can obscure that important fact.

4RC, para. 7.13. - 27 -

II. The Genocide Convention as such does not apply retroactively

20. Mr. President, M embers of the Court, permit me to move on to Serbia ’s second

proposition and discuss the temporal application of the Genocide Convention : d oes th at

Convention bind Serbia in relation to conduct that occurred in 1991, or in the first months of 1992?

This is the main substantive issue on which the P arties disagree. Serbia’s position is firmly

anchored in Article 28, which Croatia wants us to think has nothing to do with our case . The text

of that provision again is on the slide. [Screen on]

21. Mr. President, from the text, it is clear that international law is based on a presumption

against retroactivity. That is why Article 28 begins in the negative  “unless a different intention

appears from the treaty or is otherwise established ”. T hat is why it is entitled in the negative,

“Non-retroactivity of treaties”. And this is why Article 28 tells us how parties, exceptionally, can

provide for retroactivity. So the presumption against retroactivity can be rebutted  it is but a

presumption. But it is not rebutted easily . [Screen off] In fact, the ILC was quite clear about this.

In its commentary to what was to become Article 28, it noted: “The general rule. . . is that a treaty

is not to be regarded as intended to have retroactive effects unless such an intention is expressed in

45
the treaty or is clearly to be implied from its terms.”

22. In his Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had made the same

point when he stated: “It is clear that only express terms or an absolutely necessary inference can

46
produce such a result. The presumption must always be against retroactivity.”

23. Since 1969, this approach has been reg ularly endorsed, including in your J udgment in

Belgium v. Senegal, in which you inquired whether anything , “in the Convention against Torture

[the applicable treaty then] reveal[ed] an intention to require a State party to [take action in respect

of] acts of torture that took place prior to its entry into force for that State” 47.

24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Croatia ’s pleading ignores all this . Croatia asks

whether “temporal limitations” are written into the Genocide Convention: and as it thinks there are

none, it applies the Convention to events that took place in 1991. But i n response, all that is

45
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (YILC), 1966, Vol. II, p. 211, para. 1.
46Sir G. Fitzmaurice, 4th Report on the Law of Treaties, YILC, 1959, Vol. II, p. 74, para. 122; emphasis added.
47
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradi te (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2012 (II), p. 457, para. 100. - 28 -

required is to recite Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice: “The presumption must always be against
48
retroactivity.” Or indeed recite your Belgium v. Senegal Judgment inquiring whether anything in

the Torture Convention “reveal[ed] an intention” to provide for retroactivity 4. Temporal

limitations do not have to be written into a treaty  quite the opposite: retroactivity needs to be

provided for.

25. And, Mr. President, this is so for a reason . Non-retroactivity is not a nuisance, not an

obstacle. It is an important tool to ensure the operation of the law . States and the international

community want clarity about the temporal scope of obligations ; and non-retroactivity facilitates

this. It provides for a clear point in time from which onwards a treaty binds a State . Because

treaties typically apply non -retroactively, States can join treaty régimes without worrying whether

at any point in the past, they may have breached the treaty. And this is important . Of course, as

Professor Crawford says, States can decide to do things differently ; they can draw up treaties that

regulate the past and the future . And we can discuss whether the Genocide Convention is such a

treaty  and I will discuss that in a minute. But I do not think we can seriously discuss that where

the law is silent, it is non -retroactive. As a general rule, whatever we may think of the genocide,

non-retroactivity is eminently sensible, an d t his is why Article 28 requires retroactivity to be

provided for.

26. Mr. President, Members of the Court, so let us move on to the Genocide Convention

then. Serbia submits that if we apply th e test formulated by Article 28, Croatia’s argument in

favour of retroactivity falls apart . The drafters of the Genocide Convention simply did not intend

the treaty to apply retroactively . No such intention was  in the words of the ILC  “expressed

in the treaty”. None of the 19 Articles of the Convention bears out Croatia’s claim. So Croatia and

Serbia agree on the principle; treaties can provide for retroactivity. To do so would have been

possible. But the Genocide Convention does not do so. In other treaties, and the comparison

makes this clear, States expressly provide for the obligations to govern past and future.

4Sir G. Fitzmaurice, 4th Report on the Law of Treaties, YILC, 1959, Vol. II, p. 74, para. 122.

4Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2012 (II), p. 457, para. 100. - 29 -

27. And to illustrate how such express retroactivity clauses look like, let me refer you to

another treaty, the Convention on the Non- Applicability of Statutes of Limitations to War Crimes

50
and Crimes Against Humanity . As the title is pretty forbidding I will refer to it as the

“Limitations Convention”. This Convention, agreed in 1968, is meant to facilitate the prosecution

of grave crimes, and it does this by excluding statutory limitation s. It is an important document,

which, incidentally, applies not only to war crimes, but also to genocide. And yet the difference

between the two Conventions is striking . While the Genocide Convention is silent on the matter,

Article I of the Limitation s Convention explicitly provides for retroactivity . [ Screen on] Its first

article runs as follows: “No statutory limitations shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of

the date of their commission.” And then follows the list of crimes covered by the Convention.

This, Mr. President, is how a treaty can provide for retroactivity : unequivocally, clearly. The

Genocide Convention does not include any clause remotely resembling Article I of the Limitations

Convention. The drafters decided not to include one, and they did so deliberately. [Screen off]

28. Mr. President, instead, a careful reading suggests that the Genocide Convention should

bind parties only with respect to future conduct. And in fact, the Convention’s preamble, on which

Professor Crawford relied, indicates as much : it gives expression to the parties ’ intention to

“liberate mankind from such an odious scourge”, that is, genocide. To liberate means “to set

free” 5, with the clear implication that the Convention was meant to bring about a change for the

future.

29. And, Mr. President, the same focus is clear from Article I, which emphasizes the duty to

prevent genocide  which you addressed in the 2007 Judgment in the Bosnia case 52. I n that

Judgment, at the merits stage of course, unlike here, questions of retroactivity did not come into

play. And yet, the way you described the temporal scope of the duty to prevent is surely indicative.

[Screen on] You clarified, and it is on the screen, that

50
754 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS)73.
51See New Oxford Dictionary of English (second edition, revised, 2005): entry “liberate”.
52
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 43 (hereafter Bosnia). - 30 -

“a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant
that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious
risk that genocide will be committed” .53

30. Mr. President, on Friday Professor Crawford said this duty “is capa ble of encompassing

54
genocide whenever occurring” . Well, everything is possible . B ut let us pause and reflect

whether what Professor Crawford suggests, to apply the duty of prevention of Article I to past

events, is at all plausible? Not possible, plaus ible. Can we really, as Croatia wants the Court to

believe, accept that a State joining the Genocide Convention should thereby accept a duty to

stop  or rather : to have stopped  others from having committed genocide in the past,

irrespective of where t hat crime was committed , and whenever a serious risk might have existed ?

Can we plausibly accept, to illustrate the implication of Croatia’s construction , that Nigeria, when

it acceded to the Convention in 2009, thereby accepted a duty to act against seri ous risks of

genocide, say in the 1960s ? Or let us think of another State? Did the United States, when it

ratified the Genocide Convention in 1988, accept a duty to stop others  or rather: to have

stopped others  from committing genocide in the 1950s or 1940s ? If we try, Mr. President, we

can perhaps agree with Professor Crawford that the duty to prevent is “ capable of encompassing

[past] genocide[s]”. But Serbia submits that this is an absolutely implausible construction . Croatia

stretches the Genocide Convention  if I may be permitted to adapt a term used by the Court 

55
“well beyond breaking point” . [Screen off]

31. Mr. President, similar points can be made with respect to other provisions, which Croatia

chooses to ignore: Article VIII of the Genocide Convention encourages treaty parties to call upon

the competent United Nations organs to take appropriate action to prevent or suppress genocide 

was this plausibly meant to apply retroactively when the Convention entered into force for the first

time in 1950/1951? Article IV formulates a duty to punish “ génocidaires”, and deliberately uses

the present tense: it speaks of persons committing genocide, not persons having committed

genocide. As these provisions make clear, nothing in the text sugg ests that the Convention should

bind parties with a view to past events.

53
Bosnia, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 222, para. 431.
5CR 2014/12, p. 45, para. 23 (Crawford).
55
Cf. Bosnia, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 210, para. 406. - 31 -

32. Mr. President, Members of the Court, under the scheme of Article 28, even in the

absence of express clauses, treaties can of course apply retroactively if an intention to do so is, as

Article 28 puts it “otherwise established”. This is what Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had in mind when

56
speaking of an “ an absolutely necessary inference” . And some further guidance on when it

would be “absolutely necessary” to draw such an inference is provided in the ILC’s commentary.

According to the Commission, commenting on what would become Article 28, retroactivity could

be inferred if

“the very nature of the treaty rather than its specific provisions indicates that it [the
57
treaty] is intended to have certain retroactive effects” .

33. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this second exception, implied retroactiv ity, is a

narrow one. The test is not whether retroactivity can somehow be read into a treaty, or whether it

would be convenient to have a treaty applied retroactively. And given Croatia ’s insistence on the

declaratory nature of the Convention, I would add that the test is most certainly not whether the

treaty codified existing customary international law  you clarified precisely that p oint in

Belgium v. Senegal. Instead, “the very nature of the treaty ” has to mandate the treaty’s retroactive

application.

34. And Mr. President, the Commission’s commentary provides us with some guidance as to

which treaties are “ by their very nature ” retroactive. The commentary states that retroactivity

could be inferred where a treaty regulates an earlier legal situation . And by way of example,

commentary refers to Protocol XII to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which was at stake in the

Mavrommatis litigation. In that case, Mavrommatis, the PCIJ analysed Protocol XII and it said this

Protocol had been

“drawn up in order to fix the conditions governing the recognition and treatment by

the contracting Parties of certain concess58ns granted by the Ott oman authorities
before the conclusion of the protocol” .

So Protocol XII was concluded to regulate the past . And so, by its “very nature”, it applied

retroactively.

56
Sir G. Fitzmaurice, 4th Report on the Law of Treaties, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (YILC),
1959, Vol. II, p. 74, para. 122.
57YILC, 1966, Vol. II, pp. 212-213, para. 4.
58
Mavrommatis Concessions, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 34; emphasis added. - 32 -

35. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Genocide Convention was not drawn up to

regulate the past. It did not regulate the Holocaust ; it was drawn up to prevent future holocausts .

It codifies, as Croatia reminds us, an existing crime. But its focus is on prevention; on creating an

international régime against genocide; and on allowing the States of the world, whatever their past,

to join that régime. Croatia’s construction of the Genocide Convention ignores all this.

36. And in fact, Croatia is very open about this . In its written pleadings, it expressly states

59
that the Convention would apply to World War II génocidaires . I note that Professor Crawford

did not reiterate that point when he spoke last week but it is made in the pleadings and, indeed, it

seems to follow from Croatia ’s approach to retroactivity. But, if the Convention applies to World

War II génocidaires, where would one stop? It would probably govern events during World War I

as well  or indeed during the process of colonization. And while Croatia never says so expressly,

presumably all this could be litigated before this Court  as could be questions relating to the duty

to prevent genocide , which is capable, says Professor Crawford, of encompassing past events.

Dismissing Serbia’s concerns as “formalistic”, Croatia advances an argument that would permit

decade-old and century-old conflicts to be brought before this Court . Now, whether this would be

desirable, I do not know and it does not matter. But it is most certainly not what the drafters of the

Convention had in mind. Nothing in “the very nature of the treaty”  la nature même du traité 

requires the Convention to be applied retroactively.

37. Mr. President, Croatia makes a separate argument . It emphasizes the importance of the

international r égime against genocide. And Professor Crawford on Thurs day, I think, was

emphatic on this point  on Friday, it is, I apologize: if my count is correct, he used “ erga

omnes” eight times to describe the obligations owed under the Genocide Convention. Serbia

agrees: the core obligations imposed by the Convent ion are owed to the international community

as a whole. In the coming days, Serbia will revert to the matter when presenting its counter -claim.

However, for present purposes, I would want to make a separate point, and it is this : there is no

automatic l ink between importance, or between erga omnes status for that matter, and

retroactivity  just as erga omnes status does not , as such, create jurisdiction, as you clarified in

59RC, para. 7.11. - 33 -

60
East Timor . Erga omnes status is crucial for many things but it does not chang e the temporal

scope of a treaty obligation . This follows without any doubt from your recent jurisprudence, and

again it is Belgium v. Senegal  the case that Croatia would not mention.

38. Mr. President, in Belgium v. Senegal, just as in the pres ent ca se, the Applicant

emphasized the importance of the r égime against torture, with a view to extending the temporal

scope of the treaty. In your Judgment of 20 July 2012, less than two years ago, you dealt with the

matter in some detail, and you rejected the Applicant’s claim. And you rejected it precisely

because there is no automatic link between the importance of treaty obligation s and their temporal

scope. Y ou made clear that “the prohibition of torture . . . has become a peremptory norm (jus

cogens)” 61, and you recognized its erga omnes or erga omnes partes status.

39. However, this did not affect the question of retroactivity . So having summariz ed

evidence supporting the jus cogens status of the rules against torture, you went on to note that

“nothing in the Convention against Torture reveals an intention to require a State party to [take

62
action in respect of] acts of torture that took place prior to its entry into force for that State” .

40. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the proceedings betw een Belgium and Senegal did

not concern the Genocide Convention, but a very similar treaty, another public order treaty : the

Convention against Torture. And the Court’s analysis  in a recent case concerning a very similar

treaty, and in response to a similar argument clarifies that the importance, or, if you want, the

“public policy” implication of an obligation, does not, as such, trigger retroactive effects. This,

precisely, is Serbia’s position.

41. Mr. President, before I conclude on this point, let me add that, of cou rse, the question

dividing the P arties in the present case has been discussed before . Leading commentators have

analysed whether the Genocide Convention should apply retroactively ; and States have expressed

their views on the matter. And tellingly, for them, matters are straightforward.

42. By way of illustration, permit me to refer you to Nehemiah Robinson’ s pioneering study

on the Genocide Convention, first published in 1949, then republished in 1960: To Robinson, “it

60
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90.
61Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belv. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2012 (II), p. 457, para. 99.
62
Ibid., para. 100. - 34 -

could hardly be contended that the [Genocide] Convention binds the signatories to punish offenders

63
for acts committed previous to its coming into force for the given country” .

43. Fifty years later, my colleague, Professor WilliamSchabas, in his book on g enocide,

agreed: “There is nothing in the Genocide Convention to suggest ‘ a different intention ’ [in the

sense of Article 28 VCLT] . . . ‘The simple fact is that the Genocide Convention is not applicable

to acts committed before its effective date.’” 64

44. Mr. President, the views of Robinson and Schabas are shared by State parties . I will

merely refer you to one example, but it is recent, and it is unequivocal : in 2010, the German

Government said this, in the German Parliament  you see it on the screen: [screen on]

“The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of 9 December 1948 has entered into force on 12 January 1951. For the Federal

Republic of Germany it has entered into force on 22 February 1955.65And here comes
the crucial passage] It does not possess retroactive effect.”

45. Mr. President, Members of the Court, could it be clearer ? And, to return to the point I

made earlier, were it otherwise, would Germany have ratified the Convention without a temporal

reservation? Would other States responsible or accused of past atrocities have ratified the

Convention? As the Court said in 1951, the drafters and the General Assembly wanted the

Convention to be “definitely universal in scope”  “as many States as possible [said this Court]

should participate ” 66. Profe ssor Crawford on Friday emphasiz ed the Convention’ s object and

purpose. But the argument he put forward would undermine the drafters ’ vision of a treaty

“definitely universal in scope”. And it runs counter to generally -accepted principles governing the

temporal scope of treaties  agreed in the ILC and at Vienna, applied since 1969 and regularly

endorsed by this Court. Croatia’s retroactivity claim must fail.

63Robinson, The Genocide Convention, 1960, p. 114.

64W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2008, p. 643; footnote omitted.
65
See Deutscher Bundestag [German Federal Parliament] doc. N o. 17/1956 (2010), p. 5; emphasis added. The
German original reads: “Die Konvention über die Verhütung und Bestrafung des Völkermordes vom 9. Dezember 1948
ist am 12. Januar 1951 in Kraft getreten. Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist sie seit dem 22. Februar 1955 in Kraft.
Sie gilt nicht rückwirkend.”
66
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 24. - 35 -

III. Article IX of the Convention does not extend the Convention’s temporal scope
of application to events predating 27 April 1992

46. Mr. President, M embers of the Court, I come to my third proposition: j ust as the

Convention as such does not apply to events predating 27 April 1992, so there is nothing in its

compromissory clause  Article IX  to change that result . What is true for the Convention’ s

substantive obligations is true for its enforcement mechanism.

47. Croatia disagrees. In its Reply, it suggests that Article IX could be looked at separat ely.

Jurisdictional provisions, says Croatia, are “subject to an autonomous interpretation” 67 ; they are

governed by what Professor Crawford called on Friday “principles of treaty interpretation of
68
particular relevance to compromissory clauses” .

48. But this, Mr. President, is contradicted by your jurisprud ence and by the text of

Article IX. To begin with the latter: Article IX establishes the Court’s jurisdiction for disputes

“between the parties” . Yet, that could not be, as Professor Zimmermann has explored, prior to

27 April 1992, a dispute between the parties about the interpretation, application or fulfilment of

the Convention. The compromissory clause is not autonomous, it is part and parcel of the treaty. It

shares its temporal scope.

49. Croatia ignores this . Instead, it invokes  again  Mavrommatis, which

69
Professor Crawford says provides “strong support ” for Croatia ’s view . Mr. President,

Mavrommatis is Croatia’s favourite case. But even Mavrommatis only takes you so far. Serbia has

addressed Croatia’s argument at length in the Rejoinder . I will here merely make two very brief

remarks.

50. The first concerns the special nature of the treaty applied in Mavrommatis, that is,

Protocol XII. As I have mentioned earlier, Mavrommatis, exceptionally, concerned a treaty that 

by its very nature  was retroactive. The Court said expressly that Protocol XII was meant to

“extend to legal situations dating from a time previous to its own existence” 70. It was a treaty

purposefully drafted to reg ulate the past . Its substantive obligations, as the Court said, were

67RC, para. 7.21.
68
CR 2014/12, p. 47, para. 28 (Crawford).
69Ibid.
70
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 34. - 36 -

backward-looking. That made it exceptional  and that was a key factor in interpreting the

jurisdictional clause. Because why should a jurisdictional clause have precluded the purpose of the

treaty  to regulate the past ? That is the context  narrow and unusual  of the Mavrommatis

pronouncement on which Croatia relies . But the present case is different  the Genocide

Convention is not a treaty to regulate the past . So can the Mavro mmatis statement on which

Croatia relied really provide relevant guidance? Serbia submits that it cannot.

51. My second remark relates to the more immediate context of the Mavrommatis statement

relied upon by Croatia. And again the point has been explored in the written pleadings . [Screen

on] Mr. President, to recall, this, in essence, is the passage that Croatia referred to in support of its

broad construction of compromissory clauses:

“in cases of doubt, jurisdiction based on an interna71onal agre ement embraces all
disputes referred to it after its establishment . . .”

52. But before jumping to conclusions, let us look at the three little dots : they are shown on

the slide and let us see what they hide. So this, Mr. President, is the sentence im mediately

following  not cited by Croatia. The sentence runs as follows:

“In the present case [Mavrommatis], this interpretation [the one relied upon by
Croatia] appears to be indicated by the terms of Article 26 itself [the jurisdictional
clause at stake] where it is laid down that ‘any dispute whatsoever . . . which may
72
arise’ shall be submitted to the Court.”

53. In other words, for the Permanent Court, the retroactive effect of the compromissory

clause flowed from its specific wording . In the words of Article 28 (of the Vienna Convention), a

different intention “appear[ed] from the treaty” . This narrow rationale was crucial ; and again it

suggests that Mavrommatis does not stand for any general proposition. It is of dubious relevance at

best. [Screen off]

54. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is another reason not to place too much

emphasis on Mavrommatis, Croatia’s favourite case. And it is this : in the 90 years that have

passed since Mavrommatis, the particular statement quoted by Croatia  even if it supported

Croatia’s claim, which we say it does not  the particular statement has been overruled. And to

appreciate how decisively it has been overruled, we need look no further than to the

7Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 35.

7Ibid. - 37 -

Georgian-Russian dispute about racial disc rimination — the second case in the list of recent

precedents that were notably absent from Croatia ’s pleadings. In that case, too, the Applicant

relied on what might be called a “ public order treaty ”, CERD (International Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ). Th e public order treaty contained a

compromissory clause permitting the sei sing of the Court for disputes between the parties

(Article 22 CERD). In that case, too, questions of jurisdiction ratione temporis arose, as one of the

parties (Georgia), had only become bound in 1999, but wanted to rely on facts pre-dating 1999.

55. The Court therefore had to deal with a very similar situation, and its approach, we

submit, is instructive. So what did the Court in Georgia v. Russia decide? Mr. President, in

interpreting the scope of Article 22 CERD, the applicable compromissory clause, you were very

clear. You said that before Georgia became bound by CERD in 1999, there could perhaps have

been disputes about racial discrimin ation generally  but not about the interpretation and

application of CERD. In order for you to have jurisdiction, both parties had to be bound by CERD

when the disputed conduct took place  and not, as Croatia argues, when the case was brought .

And you made this very clear. [Screen on] Even if before 1999, you said, there had been a dispute

between Georgiaand Russia about questions of racial discrimination generally, and I quote:

“such dispute, though about racial discrimination, could not have been a dispute with
respect to the interpretation or application of CERD, the only kind of dispute in
respect of which the Court is given jurisdiction by Article 22 of that Convention” . 73

56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in Serbia ’s submission, the same standard should

be applied in the present case. So even if there existed a dispute between Croatia and Serbia about

questions of genocide prior to April 1992, this would be insufficient for the purposes of Article IX .

And t o paraphrase your “Russian G eorgian” Judgment , prior to April 1992, a dispute about

genocide — and I am adapting the terms, but no more than a change of the treaty names is

necessary — a dispute about genocide

“could not have been a dispute with respect to the interpretation or appl ication of [the
Genocide Convention], the only kind of dispute in r74pect of which the Court is given
jurisdiction by Article [IX] of that Convention” .

7Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 100, para. 64.

7Cf. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 100, para. 64. - 38 -

57. If the Georgian-Russian case, comparable to the present one in so many respects, yields

one lesson, then it is this: compromissory clauses do not extend the Court’s jurisdiction backwards

in time . Your Georgia v. Russia ruling is recent, it is crystal clear, and it concerns the

compromissory clause of a public order treaty of major importance. Serbia submits it should guide

you in your interpretation of Article IX. [Screen off]

58. Mr. President, Members of the Court, permit me to sum up and reiterate the three

propositions Serbia puts to you:

 First, Croatia’s claims, to the extent that they draw on evidence on acts and facts pre-dating

27 April 1992, presuppose the retroactive application of the Genocide Convention:

retroactivity proper, even though Croatia is afraid of the term.

 Second, nothing in the Genocide Convention reveals an intention of the parties to bind

themselves with a view to acts or facts pre- dating the entry into force of the Convention for a

particular State.

 Third, Article IX of the Genocide Convention does not contradict that result . The

Convention’s compromissory clause is intended to facilitate ICJ litigation between parties . It

does not introduce retroactivity through the back door.

59. Mr. President, this brings me to an end of my discussion of retroactivity. In the second

part of my presentation, I intend to address a second weakness of Croatia ’s claim, namely its

reliance on Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. But, before doing so,

perhaps you might consider whether this would be a convenient time for the usual coffee break.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Indeed, it is planned in your “Fahrplan” and you

are following it as a German “Schnellzug” and so this is the moment for a 15 -minute break. The

hearing is suspended.

The Court adjourned from 11.20 a.m. to 11.35 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and Professor Tams, you can

continue, please. - 39 -

Mr. TAMS: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court , before the

break I was discussing questions of retroactivity, hopefully not too much, Mr. President, in the

nature of the German “S chnellzug” (fast train). With the Court’s permission, I will now move on

to a second aspect, a second weakness of Croatia’s claim, namely Croatia’s reliance on Article 10,

paragraph 2, of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Before I begin, let me reiterate that while,

as Professor Zimmerman said earlier this morning, by the very nature today’s presentations concern

technical aspects of law, this does not take, in any way, away from our profound respect for t he

victims on all sides of the conflict. Yet, as ProfessoZimmerman also said, in proceedings based

on such grave allegations  and that is a point made by the Serbian Agent yesterday  the

fundamental principles governing the Court’s jurisdiction need t o be observed carefully. And in

this light, I propose to now begin my discussion of Article 10 (2) of the Articles on State

Responsibility.

C. R ESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT PRE -DATING 27 APRIL 1992 CANNOT BE

TRANSFERRED TO S ERBIA

60. Mr. President, M embers of the Court, Croatia seeks to “by-pass” problems ratione

temporis by arguing that responsibility incurred prior to April 1992 could be transferred to Serbia .

In its written pleadings, it insists that, “responsibility is not limited to acts or omissions occurring

only after the formal establishment of a state, but may also extend to conduct prior to that date” .

61. In the present instance, Croatia has relied on such a broad principle of  if I may call it

that way  “responsibility by transfer ” to ju stify that conduct pre -dating April 1992 would

establish the responsibility of Serbia: not existing at the time as a State, not bound at the time by

the Genocide Convention as the applicable treaty, but having responsibility transferred to it upon

emergence as a State.

62. Mr. President, it is worth recalling the point I made earlier this morning : Croatia ’s

argument for a transfer of responsibility is not presented as an argument about State successionto

responsibility. In Professor Crawford’s argument last week, succession mattered a lot  but even

though the transition from the SFRY to the FRY is a case of State succession as we now know, for

75Written Statement of Croatia (WSC), para. 3.18. - 40 -

Croatia this is without relevance for questions of responsibility. Instead, Croatia points us to what

it sees as a short cut  and no doubt a convenient short cut: a n alternative “transfer rule”, which

Croatia says can be derived from Article 10 (2) of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility.

63. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Article 10 (2) is not only of dubious status; but on

the face of it, does not fit our case. It is a rule of attribution, which does not transfer

responsibility and which mostcertainly does not entail the retroactive application of a treaty that

otherwise would not apply. All this is in fact is clear from the text of the provision, which runs as

follows: [ Screen on] “The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in

establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre- existing State or in a territo ry under its

76
administration shall be considered an act of the new State under international law.”

64. Mr. President, I will come back to details of that provision shortly. At this stage, let me

make a preliminary point. And it is this. Mr. President, a moment’s reflection is sufficient to

realize that  however we interpret it  this is a highly unusual provision. Conduct that took

place before a State existed is attributed to the new State once emerged . And unlike in the case of

Article 11 of the ILC’s text, this attribution does not depend on the State’s adoption of the conduct,

or acknowledgement. In the scheme of the ILC ’s text, which throughout is carefully tailored to

address State conduct, and which accepts the public/private divide , Article 10 (2) is an “odd one

out”, that is justified only because of the unusual setting of insurgencies or struggles for national

liberation. Yet in Croatia’s argument, this odd and narrow rule effectively acts as a principle of

automatic succession to responsibility and tojurisdiction. [Screen off]

65. Mr. President, this is a truly astonishing construction of a provision that, throughout the

long ILC drafting process, received limited attention and that, but for Croatia, everyone emphasizes

is highly exceptional. In Serbia’s submission, Croatia’s argument based on Article 10 (2) is to be

rejected for three reasons:

 First, as of 1991 and early 1992  the critical time for our purposes, for the purposes of this

case  the rule now set out in Article 10 (2) did not reflect customary international law.

7Annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83, 12 Dec . 2001. - 41 -

 Second, even if it applied as a matter of principle, the present case does not fit Article 10 (2) of

the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The conditions set out in that provision simply are

not met: in particular, there was no “movement” that struggled with the predecessor State and

that succeeded in establishing a new State.

 And third, even if Article 10 (2) applied and even if its conditions were met, this could still not

establish Serbia ’s responsibilit y for violations of the Genocide Convention. As a rule of

attribution, all Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles can achieve is to attribute to Serbia conduct,

by a movement, that took place before its emergence. What it surely cannot do, even if it

applied, is to turn such conduct  movement conduct  into a breach, by Serbia, of the

Genocide Convention.

66. Mr. President, of these three arguments, which are alternative arguments, each of them

individually able to undermine Croatia’s claim, I will address the first two. Professor Zimmermann

will deal with the third one.

I. The content of Article 10 (2) ILC Articles did not, as of 1992,
represent customary international law

67. Mr. President, the first point to make is that Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles does not

reflect customary international law as it stood at the relevant time, in 1991- 1992. At that time, of

course, Article 10 (2) did not exist : what existed was a draft provision wit h an uncertain future,

draft Article 15 (2), provisionally adop ted by the ILC in 1975, very much work in progress . It

existed as one of two provisions dealing with the conduct of insurrectional movements : draft

Article 15 (1) looked at insurgencies that overthrew the government within existing State

structures; dra ft A rticle 15 (2) looked at the case that may be pertinent here, it looked at

insurgencies that established a new State . In its written pleadings, Serbia set out in detail why the

second of these provisions  draft Article 15 (2)  in 1991 did not reflect custom. There was

simply no practice. In the most detailed study on the matter, published in 2006, that is well after

the completion of the ILC ’s responsibility project, Dumberry rightly describes it as “more a

doctrinal construction than one based on a ctual state practice” 7. Even t he ILC’s Commentary

7Patrick Dumberry, “New State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts by an Insurrectional
Movement”, 17 European Journal of International Law (E JIL), 2006, p. 612. - 42 -

issued in 2001 reflects this. It describes Article 10 (2) as a “special case” that runs counter to the

“general principle”, “ampl[y] support[ed]” by practice, pursuant to which normally “acts of

unsuccessful insurrectional movements are not attributable to the State”; and the Commentary also

accepted that the special rule would apply in “exceptional circumstances” only 78. Last year,

Professor Crawford  that is 2013, 12 years after the completion of the I LC’s project 

Professor Crawford  when writing, not pleading  last year Professor Crawford said State

practice was “relatively sparse” 79. In Serbia’s submission, what was true for post -2001, is beyond

doubt for 1991. This is a rule of attribution without a solid basis in practice.

68. On Thursday, Professor Crawford dismissed Serbia ’s arguments and said we had not

80
read the ILC’s Commentary . So what did he have to offer? He referred us to three decisions by

mixed claims commissions: French Company of Venezuelan Railroads, 1902, the Bolivar Railway

Company, 1903, and the Pinson claim of 1928 8. But we only need to look a little more closely to

realize that none of them provides support for Croatia’s principle of transferred attribution. The

three claims concerned two insurrections : the first two claims, French Company of Venezuelan

Railroads and Bolivar Railway Company concerned the Venezuelan revolution of 1899; the third

claim, the Pinson claim went back to the Mexican revolution of 1910. So what is their relevance

here? All three claims concerned insurgencies within a State, not insurgencies that created a new

State. The rebellion of 1899 brought a new government to power in Venezuela  but the State

remained the same. Mexico was shaken by the revolution of the 1910s  but the State continued

to exist. In the present proceedings, we are not dealing with insurgencies within a State ; not with

draft Article 15, paragraph 1. We are dealing, in Croatia’s own claims, with a new State situation,

draft Article 15, paragraph 2. So Professor Crawford’s evidence is irrelevant for our case, in which

the existing State was not preserved. And, with due respect, I would add that this follows from the

ILC Commentary.

78
YILC, 2001, p. 50, paras. 1, 4 and 3 of the Commentary to Article 10.
7James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, Cambridge University Press(CUP), 2013, p. 176.

8CR 2014/10, p. 40, para. 20 (Crawford).
81
Ibid. - 43 -

69. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is a second, equally important point. Even if

we assume that the principle underlying draft A rticle 15 , paragraph 2, reflected custom in 1991,

we need to be mindful of its limitations . It is, in the words of the ILC, an “exceptional” rule after

all; and it is useful to look at the scope of the purported exception. In this respect, Serbia ’s

argument is that, if it existed at all, it was a rule covering insurrectional movements only . Croatia,

throughout its pleadings, has emphasi zed that A rticle 10 ( 2) adopted in 2001 referred to

“insurrectional or other movements ”. On Thursday, Professor Crawford said this distinguished

82
Article 10, paragraph2, from Article 10, paragraph 1  and that the distinction was deliberate .

70. But Mr. President, let us look, again, more closely. True, Article 10, paragraph2, speaks

of “other movements”. But let us not forget that for our purposes, the critical date is 1991, not

2001, not 2014; the critical provision is Article 15, paragraph 2, adopted provisionally by the ILC

on first reading. So what types of movements did draft A rticle 15 , paragraph 2, cover? [Screen

on] You see it on the slide  and you will see immediately that the reference is to “insurrectional

movements” only. “The act of an insurrectional movement whose action results in the formation of

a new State in part of the territory of a pre- existing State or in a territory under its administration

shall be considered as an act of the new State. ” Insurrectional movements  no “other

movements”: this is how the ILC saw it during the first reading . This is where we stood in 1991.

[Screen off]

71. So, let us move to 1998, seven years on, when Professor Crawford considered the matter

in his First Report on State Responsibility as a Special Rapporteur. As is clear from the ILC

Yearbook, and as a considerable number of you will recall from personal experience, the second

reading of the State responsibility text provided an opportunity to simplify some of the provisions

put forward by, or shaped by , Roberto Ago. And Professor Crawford did propose a simplified

version of the proposed rule, the exceptional rule on attribution. And this is what, in 1998, he said

should be the simplified rule codifying customary international law : [Screen on] “The conduct of

an organ of an insurrectional movement whose action results in the formation of a new State shall
83
be considered an act of the new State under international law.”

8CR 2014/10, pp. 39-40, para. 19 (Crawford).

8YILC, 1998, Vol. II (1), p. 57. - 44 -

72. Mr. President, again: “ insurrectional movements”  no “other movement” in sight.

This is 1998. This is Professor Crawford describing the state of the law as he perceived it in 1998.

And when the Commission discussed Professor Crawford’s first report , all the attention again

focused on insurrections : w ould the term insurrectional movements cover national liberation

movements? That was the biggest question. Or did they need a special rule? Should the status of

insurgents be addressed , or was that beyond the scope of the Commission’s work? At no point

before the matter was ref erred to the ILC Drafting Committee in 1998 did the proposed rule of

attribution cover anything other than insurrectional movements : not in Ago’s draft Article 15 (2),

not in Ago’s report I may add, not in draft Article 15 (2), not in Professor Crawford’s First Report,

and not in the ILC debates of 1998. The term “other movements” on which Croatia places so much

emphasis now was added in the Drafting Committee . And as Professor Crawford described it in
84
2013 in his book on State Responsibility, it was  his words  a “generic addition” , not a

substantive change  I should be precise, “generic addition” is the term he uses  I would draw

from that that it is not a substantive change. The term “other movements” was added to preserve

the neutrality of the text. Neutral language not intended to change draft A rticle 15 (2) as adopted

on first reading; but to make sure the text would be acceptable to members who felt one ought to

distinguish insurrectional and national liberation movements. [Screen off]

73. And, Mr. President, as even counsel for Croatia will not dispute, this addition  “other

movements”  could only be “ generic”, as international practice in one respect is very clear .

Whatever you make of the practice in this field  which Professor Crawford says is “ relatively

sparse” and which we say is insufficient as of 1991  whatever you make of that practice : surely

it is practice relating to insurgencies and national liberation struggles only . The hypothetical

discussion of the American Civil War in Ago’s reports  an insurgency. The FLN and Algeria ,

relied on by Croatia in its pleadings  an insurgency. Mr. President, if practice on insurrectional

and other movements as such is, as Professor Crawford says, “ relatively sparse”, it is non-existent

as regards other movements that are not insurrectional and not national liberation movements.

8Crawford, State Responsibility. The General Part, CUP, 2013, p. 173. - 45 -

74. Mr. President, Members of the Court, to conclude on this point, in its attempt to construe

some broad “ transfer principle ”, Croatia overstretches an excep tional, narrow and unusual

provision that is “ more doctrinal construction than based on practice ”. The rule was dubious at

best in 1991. If it existed at all, the ILC ’s first reading text and Professor Crawford’s First Report

and the ILC’s discussion make clear that it was a special rule addressing insurrections and national

liberation struggles.

II. The conditions for the application of Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles are not fulfilled

75. Mr. President, this brings me to my second point . Even if we accepted Croatia ’s

argument and applied Article 10, paragraph 2  including the “other movement”, that is  the

provision still would not transfer responsibility to Serbia . The conditions set out in Article 10,

paragraph 2, the conditions making it a n arrow and exceptional provision, simply are not met .

Serbia has addressed this point in detail in the written pleadings, so I will limit myself to two

observations here. First, there was no “ movement” in the sense of Article 10 , paragraph 2 

certainly n o insurrectional movement, but no “ other movement ” either. And second, if there

existed a movement, it did not succeed in establishing a new State.

76. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Article 10 (2)  even if taken at face value  is

based on the i dea that there is a “ movement” which over time establishes a new State. This

movement can be labelled  insurrectional, rebel, revolutionary ; it can be a national liberation

movement; and for the sake of the argument, we may even accept that it could be an “other”

movement, “non-insurrectional” as it were. But a movement there has to be. And as the ILC

Commentary makes abundantly clear, as a movement, it must have “structures and [an]

85
organisation” that are “independent of those of the [predecessor] St ate” . And not only that,

Mr. President: equally importantly, the movement must be directed against the predecessor

State  this is the rationale for the exceptional rule of attribution. Roberto Ago said so expressly :

he felt the need for a special rul e to cover instances in which an insurrectional movement was 

86
and I quote Ago’s Fourth Report  was “working against the territorial State ”  dirigé contre

8YILC, 2001, p. 50, para 4.

8Ago, Fourth Report, YILC, 1972, p. 129, para. 151; emphasis added. - 46 -

l’état territorial. If that was not clear enough, perhaps we can turn to Professor Crawford’s views

on the matter, as they appear in his 2013 book  State Responsibility. The General Part .

Discussing Article 10, and having stated the general rule that States are normally not responsible

for acts of insurgents, Professor Crawford notes, and Serbia wo uld submit, notes perceptively:

“such a movement cannot be [normally] considered to be aligned to the interests of the State

against which it is fighting” 87.

77. Mr. President, a movement with distinct structures, fighting a State  this is the essence

of Article 10 (2)  if we accept it governs our case. And t hrough years of pleadings, Croatia has

been unable to tell us how the conditions of this purposefully narrow rule could be met .

Sometimes, it simply ignored the problem. So, for example, in its written pleadings, Croatia stated

that Article 10 (2) covered all “unconstitutional or irregular activity aimed at the separation or the

dissolution of the State” 88. So “activity” was the test  and that was no doubt convenient, because

this allowed Croatia to add everything together: the JNA, Mr. Šešelj, paramilitaries, etc. But that

is doomed to fail : Article 10 (2) simply is not a catch -all provision covering “ activities”, it is a

narrow rule even if we accept Article 10 (2), requiring the conduct of a movement with distinct

structures and an independent organization.

78. Mr. President, Members of the Court, tomorrow my colleagues, Mr. Lukic and

Mr. Ignjatović, will refute Croatia’s allegations in detail . They will show that, what Croatia

describes as a coherent “ Greater Serbia movement ” really was anything but homogeneous, and

possessed no distinct structures. Today, I will limit myself to making a separate point  and it is

this: even if Croatia could identify a movement with distinct structures, this movement would still
89
have to be  as Ago put it  “working against the territorial State ” . This, was essential; this is

the rationale for the exceptional rule on attribution.

79. So if we apply this test, we would expect counsel for Croatia presen t evidence of the

alleged Greater Serbia movement fighting the SFRY. Yet what is it that Croatia has presented this

Court with last week? Throughout last week, Croatia was at pains to emphasi ze the links between

87
Crawford, State Responsibility. The General Part, CUP, 2013, 170.
88RC, para. 7.59; emphasis added.
89
Ago, Fourth Report, YILC, 1972, p. 129, para. 151. - 47 -

the alleged Greater Serbia movement and th e SFRY. Upon Croatia’s own pleading, t he Greater

Serbia movement, if it existed, did not struggle against the predecessor State  quite the opposite.

On Monday, Professor Crawford emphasized the “alignment” between the alleged Greater Serbia

movement andthe SFRY  and he used that very term, “alignment” 9. So it may be useful to cite

again how, writing about State responsibility in 2013, Professor Crawford described the essence of

Article 10. He he said that Article 10 is an exception because normally, “a movement cannot be

considered to be aligned to the interests of the State against which it is fighting” 91.

80. And Serbia says precisely that: Article 10 (2) is not intended to cover instances in which

the movement and the predecessor State are aligned . It is an exception that covers struggles, as

Roberto Ago said, between a movement and a State. Croatia is trying to show alignment in order

to establish Serbia’s responsibility for conduct that can otherwise not be attributed. But precisely

that logic defeats its claim based on Article 10 (2). The alleged Greater Serbia movement was not

a movement in the sense of Article 10 (2): not an insurgency, not a revolutionary force, not an

“other movement” fighting a State.

81. Mr. President, Members of the Court, during the break -up of Yugoslavia, many factions

fought for different aims; many wanted to break up the SFRY  and ultimately succeeded; many

wars were fought on many fronts, with horrible results that we have heard about in the past week,

and that we will hear about in the coming days . The history has been covered in detail . But

Croatia’s own pleading undermines the idea that there would have been a fight between the alleged

Greater Serbia movement and the SFRY. In its attempt to establish some “responsibility by

transfer”, Croatia ignores the conditions under which the ILC, in 2001, was prepared to admit a

narrow and exceptional rule of attribution for “non-State conduct”. And it is forced to re -write

history.

82. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this brings me to my last point on Article 10 (2). It

relates to another important condition set out in the provision, which again goes to its heart : in

order, exceptionally, for movement conduct to be attributed to the State, the movement must

have  and I quote Article 10 (2)  “succeed[ed] in establishing a new State”  parvient à créer

9CR 2014/5, p. 46, para. 10 (Crawford).

9Crawford, State Responsibility. The General Part, CUP, 2013, 170; emphasis added. - 48 -

un nouvel Etat. If the movement does not succeed in doing so, even the most ardent supporters of

the principle underlying Article10 (2) agree there is no basis of attribution. From the beginning of

the ILC’s discussion, this has been treated as a crucial aspect ; and we have a very clear idea of

what the Commission had in mind. For Roberto Ago  writing in 1972, introducing the draft

provision  a rule was desirable because where the movement had  his words  “triumphed”,

92
the predecessor State was displaced and the rule of attribution was needed. The ILC ’s

commentary  in the context of paragraph 1, admittedly, but in a passage of general validity for

Article 10  speaks of a movement “having triumphed” 93  this is the 2001 commentary. And,

this is not an accident; this is the rationale for having an exceptional rule in the first place.

83. Against that background, Mr. President, we may be permitted to a sk: where is that

“triumph”? Where is this triumphant movement that had fought the SFRY with a view to breaking

away from it? Again, Croatia is curiously quiet on this : perhaps it thinks of the Serbian leaders

who, for a decade, claimed identity with t he SFRY. But can you succeed in establishing a new

State  as Article 10 requires  without desiring to do so? Can you triumph over a predecessor

State while claiming to be identical with it ? Or, if we focus on the alleged Greater Serbia

movement: where is its triumph ? Where is the new State that that movement had successfully

established, fighting the predecessor State? A quick glance at the map is sufficient to see that the

alleged Greater Serbia movement has not been successful in creating a new St ate. In fact, few

movements in recent European history can have been as unsuccessful, few movements can have

failed as spectacularly . Professor Crawford on Thursday was firm that “[t]he Court must take

account of realities, not [of] fictions” 94. But if w e look at the map, and if we take for fact what

Croatia considers to be ambitions of the Greater Serbia movement : Where is the triumph , of that

movement? Where is reality,and where is fiction? Croatia’s argument on Article 10 (2) is difficult

to square with any, even any plausible, assessment of history.

92
Ago, Fourth Report, YILC, 1972, p. 131, para. 157.
9YILC, 2001, p. 51, para. 7.
94
CR 2014/10, p. 42, para. 24 (Crawford). - 49 -

D.C ONCLUDING COMMENTS

84. Mr. President, Members of the Court, to conclude on this aspect, none of the essential

requirements set out in Article(2) are met . In its quest for some principle tting the

transfer of responsibility, Croatia overstretches a narrow rule of. Croatia can neither

point to a movement which sought separation from the SFRY, nor can it show how such a

movement may have been successful . In other words, even if we assume that the rule set out in

Article 10 (2) can be applied to the present case, which Serbia submits it cannot because, as of

1991, there was insufficient support for it and all the support that may have existed referred to

insurrectional movements: but, even if we apply Article 10 (2) as it stands , then, Mr. President,

Members of the Court, the text of that provision needs to be taken ser. And Croatia’s

construction simply does not do th just as, if I may come back to the first part ofym

presentation  Croatia does not seriously engage with the legal rules governing the temporal scope

of treaties.

85. Mr. President, Members of the Courthis concludes my presentation this morning . I

thank you for your kind attention. May I now ask you, Mr. President, to give the floor to

Professor Zimmermann who will complete the Serbian argument on Article 10 (2).

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Tams and I invite

Professor Zimmermann to take the floor and to continue. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. ZIMMERMANN: Monsieur le président, merci. J’espère bien ne pas apparaître comme

un TGV quand je commence maintenant la deuxième partie de mon argument.

A. ART . 10 (OF THE ILCA RTICLES ON STATE R ESPONSIBILITY CANNOT PROVIDE FOR
SERBIA’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE G ENOCIDE C ONVENTION NOR CAN IT
ENDOW THE C OURT WITH JURISDICTION AS TO ACTS PRE -DATING A PRIL27, 1992
UNDER A RT. IXOF THE G ENOCIDE C ONVENTION

I. Introduction

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Professor Tam s has already demonstrated that the

rule underlying Art icle 10 (2) of the ILC Artas it stands, does not constitute customary

international law, or at least did not at the relevant time in 1991/1992. - 50 -

2. Besides, he has also shown that the dissolut ion of the SFRY does not match t he scenario

contemplated in Article 10 (2).

3. This alone lays Cr oatia’s arguments based on Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles to rest.

And yet, there is an even more fundamental weakness in Croatia’s reliance on Article 10 (2) of the

ILC Articles that I will now address . This will further illustrate why the Court is not in a position

to consider any acts that occurred prior to 27 April 1992 when exercising its jurisdiction based

exclusively on Article IX of theGenocide Convention, in the case at hand.

4. In particular, I will demonstrate why, first and in any case, the rule contained in

Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles cannot provide for Serbia’s responsibility for violations of the

Genocide Convention when it comes to acts pre-dating 27 April 1992. Second, I will show why

Article 10 (2) can neither serve to overcome the jurisdictional hurdles inherent in the temporal

limitations of Article IX of the Genocide Convention.

II. Art. 10 (2) of the ILC Articles State Responsibility cannot provide for Serbia’s

responsibility for violations of the Genocide Convention allegedly committed prior to
27 April 1992

5. Mr. President, as previously mentioned, there is no doubt that genocide is prohibited under

customary international law. Yet, as confirmed by this Court in Belgium v. Senegal to which I

have already made reference, in the case at hand it is  to reiterate the obvious  only violations

of the Genocide Convention as such that the Court can consider and decide upon. This is due to the

jurisdictional basis under which this case has been brought by Croatia itself.

6. The point I will now address is whether the principle of Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles,

if ever it were applicable, may provide for Serbia’s responsibil ity for violations of the Genocide

Convention as to acts pre -dating April 1992 and that despite the lack of retroactivity of the

Genocide Convention demonstrated by Professor Tams. And to provide you with the short answer:

this, Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles  even if it were applicable  cannot do. Article 10 (2) is

not a magical key. - 51 -

95
7. In its written pleadings, Serbia has already quite extensively addressed the matter . In its

oral presentation Croatia has attempted to reply to those arguments 96 but, as I will show, was

misrepresenting the function and effect of Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles.

8. At the very least, there seems to be agreement now between the Parties that Article 10 (2)

of the ILC Articles is a mere rule of attributi on, and indeed an extraordinary, special, limited one.

As counsel for Croatia put it: [start slide] “Article 10 [ILC Articles] is a special rule of attribution

dealing with a specific situation, which explains its placement after Article 9, another such special

rule [of attribution].”97 [End slide]

9. I could not agree more. Accordingly, the question whether a violation has been

committed is to be answered by the respective primary rule which itself also defines its

applicability ratione temporis.

10. In our case, it is thus the Genocide Convention, the relevant treaty only, rather than the

norm on attribution, that defines the point in time, after which a violation of that very treaty could

have been committed.

11. Let me provide you with an example which will make this obvious.

12. Let us assume that State A ratifies the Genocide Convention. Accordingly, under

Article XIII of the Convention, State A only becomes bound by the Convention 90days later.

13. Let us further assume that during this 90- day period  pending the entry into force of

the Convention for State A  the Convention is not yet in force for State A  in this period, the

army of State A commits acts of genocide. Obviously the army i s an organ of State A under

Article 4 of the ILC Articles.

14. I take it that we all agree that no violation of the Genocide Convention has taken place

for which State A could then be held responsible, since State A was not yet bound by the

Convention during that period. State A could be only held responsible for a violation of the

Genocide Convention if , indeed, the Convention were to apply retroactively . Yet, as shown by

Professor Tams, it does not.

95
Counter-Memorial of Serbia (CMS), paras. 320-350; Rejoinder of Serbia (RS), paras. 180- 184.
96CR 2014/ 12, pp. 42-44, paras. 13-17 (Crawford).
97
CR 2008/12, pp. 46-46, para. 25 (Crawford); emphasis added. - 52 -

15. The same would be true for acts of genocide committed by persons acting under the

direction or effective co ntrol of State A during that same period. Again, we assume the treaty is

not yet in force, we are within that 90- day period. Article 8 of the ILC Articles, again a norm on

attribution, can neither extend backwards the applicability of the Genocide Convention, nor indeed

that of any other treaty. Attribution simply cannot do that.

16. And the same principle then also applies to all other norms on attribution. And, as you

will recall, counsel for Croatia agrees that Article 10 (2) indeed constitutes a norm on attribution 98.

Article 10 (2) [ILC Articles] can thus neither provide for a retroactive effect of the Genocide

Convention. Indeed, Croatia has not come up with any arg ument why Article 10 (2)  as yet

another norm on attribution  should be treated differently from, let us say, Article 4 or Article 8

of the ILC Articles.

17. Obviously, State A could be held responsible , in my example, for violations of the

parallel customary-law-based prohibition of genocide even before the Genocide Convention has

entered into force for State A: that is obvious. But, as shown earlier this morning, issues of State

responsibility for violations of customary law are not before the Court in this case, in a case

brought under Article IX of a treaty, of the Genocide Convention. As you have confirmed in your

jurisprudence, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider violations of customary law in a case brought

exclusively under a co mpromissory clause such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention. And

you did so as late as in Belgium v. Senegal.

18. And this result is confirmed by the very specific system of the 1977 Additional Protocol I

to the Geneva Conventions . Said Protocol specifically provides for the possibility that certain

insurrectional movements, national liberation movements, may subject themselves to specific treaty

obligations by way of a unilateral declaration. By that they make treaty obligations applicable even

before a new State is being created and itself becomes a contracting party of the Protocol.

19. Mr. President, counsel for Croatia has attempted to show that Article 10 (2) ILC Articles

was meant by the ILC to also apply were the State concerned was not yet bound by the respective
99
primary rule  in our case the Genocide Convention.

9CR 2008/12, pp. 46-46, para. 25 (Crawford).

9CR 2014/12, pp. 42-44, paras. 13-17 (Crawford). - 53 -

20. Let me therefore, subsequent to our written pleadings, take you through the work of the

ILC. Contrary to what counsel for Croatia argued 100, the ILC’s work confirms that Art icle 10 (2)

ILC Articles, even if taken at face value, presupposes that the relevant primary obligations, and that

in our case can only be obligations under the Genocide Convention, were in force for the State

concerned at the time the alleged treaty violations were committed. [Screen on]

21. As early as 1972, Special Rapporteur Ago stressed the mere attributive function of what

was to become Article 1 0 (2): he stated that, “references are often made to international

responsibility of the State for the wrongful acts of a successful insurrectional movement, whereas

what is in fact involved is the attribution of those acts to the State . . .”101[Screen off]

22. In 1998, Special Rapporteur Crawford confirmed this view when stating that indeed, and

these are his words, a “distinction . . . had to be made between attribution and violation of

obligation” 102.

23. Mr. President, again, I could not agree more . Yet, on the one hand the alleged “ greater

Serbia nationalist movement ”, as a non- State entity, and as the movement allegedly covered by

Article 10 (2), could not have become bound and was not bound by the Genocide Convention, the

only relevant norm for our purposes . Obviously, the Genocide Convention is only open for

ratification by States.

24. What is more, the Genocide Conven tion was not yet applicable vis -à-vis Serbia prior to

27 April 1992. I ndeed, how could it be otherwise since Serbia only came into existence by

April 1992, and as was confirmed by this Court in 2008, following O pinion No. 11 of the

Arbitration Commission for the Former Yugoslavia, Serbia only became bound by the Genocide

Convention by that very date.

25. Yet, if the only relevant primary norm at stake  the Genocide Convention  was at the

relevant time in force neither for the alleged movement nor for the State concerned  how can

then alleged violations of the treaty  which was not in force for anybody, neither for Serbia, nor

for the movement  be attributed to the Respondent?

100
CR 2014/12, pp. 42-44, paras. 13-17 (Crawford).
10Fourth Report on State Responsibility, Special Rapporteur Ago, YILC , 1972, Vol. II, p. 145, para. 196.
102
Summary Records, YILC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 248, para. 50 (Crawford). - 54 -

26. Accordingly, Article 10 (2) ILC Articles presupposes that a violation of international law

was committed by the movement which is then attributed to the State that later comes into

existence. However, such violations may then accordingly only consist of violations of customary

international law in force prior to the creation of the new State . This, as mentioned, is confirmed

by the very special case of Art icle 1 (2) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions .

There, a national liberation movement itself may enter into treaty commitments, violations of

which would then eventually have to be attributed to the new State under Art icle 10 (2). Yet, said

specific system, as an exception, proves the rule.

27. Indeed, this understanding of Article 10 (2) ILC Articles supposing the applicability of

the relevant primary rule at the time the violation is being committed was already underlined by

one member of the ILC, now a member of the B ench. As Judge Bennouna most aptly stated in

1998: “ C’est le problème de la succession de responsabilité: the problem was one of the

succession of responsibility.” 103

28. Yet, this requires that responsibility has been incurred in the first place. That in turn

presupposes that the primary rule was in force at the relevant time. And for the purpose of these

proceedings the only relevant primary rule is the Genocide Convention. Yet, even if ever there has

been a relevant movement in our case, it could have nev er been, and never has been, a Contracting

Party of the Convention and could thus not commit violations thereof . Nor has the Convention

been in force for the Respondent at the relevant time either.

29. In 1998, Special Rapporteur Crawford  unlike today it seems to me  still shared this

view  and indeed the position taken by Serbia on the matter  when stating that he , “was very

104
close to Mr. Bennouna” , since, and then he continues, [screen on] “the article [draft Article 15 as

it then stood , as you will recall ] was concerned with the general problem of the attribution of

responsibility and not with the question of the primary rules which the State or the insurrectional

105
movement might have broken” . [Screen off] That has to be decided by the primary rule.

103
Summary Records, YILC, 1998, Vol. I, p. 252, para. 19 (Bennouna).
10Ibid., p. 253, para. 36 (Crawford).
105
Ibid. - 55 -

30. Accordingly,there was agreement in the ILC that Article 10 (2) was not meant to extend

responsibility backwards in time.

31. That allows me to address Croatia’s general argument as to the alleged technical and

106
formalistic character of Serbia’s approach on the matter .

32. In short, Croatia argues tha t Serbia’s understanding of Article 10 (2) would lead to a

situation where a seceding State could never be held responsible for acts of genocide, committed by

the eventually successful insurrectional movement in the wake of secession.

33. Members of the Court, I am afraid to say that Croatia must have gotten it wrong . As the

Court has confirmed, and rightly so, genocide is prohibited under customar y international law 10.

This prohibition is obviously not only binding upon States but also upon non- State actors such as

insurrectional movements and besides, this customary law provision is also applicable at all

relevant times. The issue of retroactivet y does not come up. Accordingly, provided a movement

commits acts of genocide, and if we assume for a minute that Art icle 10 (2) ILC Articles is to be

indeed considered a codification of customary law , the State that comes out of such a movement is

then responsible for violations of international law committed by such movement since their acts

would then be attributed to the newly created State.

34. And such responsibility could then be implemented through the regular mechanisms of

State responsibility . Obviously, proceedings before this Court are an efficient and important

method of enforcing such obligations. But, as Part III of the ILC Articles and general international

law confirms there are also other ways of implementing State responsibility throug h States or the

international community at large, including the recourse to counter-measures.

35. And besides, this of course does not preclude the ICJ, provided the Court has jurisdiction

for example under Article 36 (2) under the optional clause , to also judge upon such responsibility

for violations of customary law , for violations of the customary law prohibition of genocide

committed by the movement and attributed to the new State  if we assume in the first place that

the Article 10 (2) is customary law, anyhow.

10CR 2008/13, para. 28 (Crawford).

10Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 110, para. 161. - 56 -

36. In our case, however, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited, under Article IX, to determining

violations of a certain treaty only, namely the Genocide Convention. Accordingly the Court  as

confirmed in Belgium v. Senegal  may not consider possible violations of customary law, as

serious as they might have been.

37. Indeed, and let us not get that wrong, w hat Croatia, in guis e of its arguments based on

Article 10 (2), thus wants the Court to do is to set aside the fundamental principle tha t the Court’s

jurisdiction is consent based. Croatia portrays such reliance by Serbia on State consent as the

fundamental basis of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction as being formalistic in nature.

38. And, a s you are aware, the Court has stressed, ti me and again, that substantive

international law on the one hand, and the Court’s jurisdiction on the other, are clearly two

different matters. As the Court has put it:

“there is a fundamental distinction between the question of the acceptance by States o f

the Court’s jurisdiction and the conformity of their acts with international law.
Whether or not States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, they are required to
fulfil their obligations under . . . international law, including international
humanitarian and human rights law, and they [States] remain responsible for acts
attributable to them which are contrary to international law.” 108

39. And, Mr. President, i t is simply this fundamental principle, and this fundamental

principle only, that Serbia is asking the Court to apply in the case at hand.

40. This scope of application of the principle underlying Article 10 (2) I have just outlined is

confirmed by the fact that State practice and decisions by arbitral tribunals on which both, the

ILC’s work, which led to Article 10 (2), as well as relevant academic writing, have been based,

refer exclusively to situations where violations of customary law had been committed . Treaty

violations committed prior to the creation of the State concerned by such in surrectional

movements, to be then attributed to a State, were never considered, and indeed how could it be

otherwise.

41. It is also this understanding of Article 10 (2) that is fully in line with the general set- up,

structure and content of the overall ILC Articles on State Responsibility.

10Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, pp. 52 -53, para. 127. - 57 -

42. For one, it is this understanding that is in line with the parallel case of Article 11, which,

similar to Art icle 10 (2), also covers a case of ex post facto attribution. With regard to what

became Article 11, then Special Rapporteur Crawford stated in 1998: [start slide]

“It should be stressed that the proposed rule is one of attribution only . In
respect of conduct which has been adopted, it will always be necessary to consider
whether the conduct contravenes the international obligations of the adopting State at
109
the relevant time.”

And, that is the time the conduct took place . And the same principle applies to Article 10 (2).

[End slide]

43. And, it is also this understanding of Article 10 (2) that is in line with the intertemporal

law principle which the ILC has embraced from the very beginning of its work on State
110
responsibility  a principle now reflected in Article 13. It is also telling that Article 10 (2) was

not listed as an exception to this rule  neither by the then Special Rapporteur on the matter and

counsel for Croatia in his recent book on State responsibility, nor by the ILC in its commentary on

Article 13.

44. Accordingly, Article 10 (2) cannot provide for Serbia’s responsibility for viol ations of

the Genocide Convention  the only relevant primary obligations at issue  committed prior to

27 April 1992. And, that holds true, even if we were to assume arguendo that Article 10 (2) has

codified customary law and is applicable in our case.

III. Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility cannot endow the Court
with jurisdiction as to acts pre-dating 27 April 27 1992
under Article IX Genocide Convention

45. Mr. President, with your permission, I will now move on to the relati onship between

Article 10 (2) and the Court’s jurisdiction under Article IX. As I will show, Article 10 (2) which

serves only to attribute the behaviour of a given group of persons to a State, cannot  even if it

were applicable  stretch the Court’s jurisdiction backwards in time.

10First Report on State Responsibility, Special Rapporteur Crawford, , 1998, p. 55, para. 282emphasis
added.

11J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, CUP, 2013, p. 244. - 58 -

46. Indeed, what Croatia is attempting to do, and wants the Court to believe, is that you can

convert a norm on attribution, that is, a secondary norm of the law of State responsibility, into a

compromissory clause of its own.

47. Yet, as the titles of both the General List entry and the 2008 Judgment indicate, the case
111
at hand concerns exclusively the application of the Genocide Convention . In order to fall within

the ambit of Article IX, the dispute must accordingly be about the interpretation or application of

the Genocide Convention by Contracting Parties to it  that is alleged violations of the Genocide

Convention by Serbia after it came into existence in April 1992. This case, as indicated, is not

about the application of the Genocide Convention by the SFRY, or by a movement which was not

yet a State party to the Convention prior to this date, and indeed not even a State 11.

48. Croatia thus perceives Article 10 (2) as a magic key that widely opens the Court’s

jurisdictional gates, which otherwise only open once a State comes into existence, and to the extent

only that it accepts a given compromissory clause such as Article IX.

49. If indeed we were to take Croatia’s approach seriously, it would have major

repercussions for the Court’s jurisdictional scheme. In Croatia’s view it would serve to overcome

deliberate restrictions in jurisdictional provisions . To t est that argument, we can look at a

hypothetical case  but one that could very well arise in this Great Hall of Justice.

50. Mr. President, Members of the Court, assume a new State  perhaps South Sudan 

upon independence, accepts the Court’s jurisdiction under the O ptional Clause of Article 36 (2).

But, let us further assume South Sudan does so with respect to future conflicts only  its optional

clause deliberately is not retroactive, it contains a reservation in this regard. This would be a case

which, in Serbia’s submission, is relatively close to the present one. Could the new State 

South Sudan  now be brought before this Court for violations of international law committed

during its insurrectional struggle for violations of international law committed by the insurrectional

movement that brought about the creation of South Sudan?

11Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of t he Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008; separate opinion of Judge Tomka, p. 520, para. 12.

11Ibid. - 59 -

51. It seems obvious t hat in such a scenario the Court would lack jurisdiction ratione

temporis. The Court would lack jurisdiction because the title of jurisdiction had no retroactive

effect given the limitation to that effect in South Sudan’s Article 36 (2) declaration. It also seems

obvious that Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles cannot alter this result . Article 10 (2) cannot serve

as a magic key to overcome the limitation as to the Court’s temporal jurisdiction contained in

South Sudan’s declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction.

52. In the very logic of Croatia’s argument, however, the Court should indeed be in a

position to nevertheless exercise jurisdiction vis- à-vis South Sudan. It should do so despite the

temporal limitation contained in South Sudan’s declarati on. The Court should simply do so by

virtue of the principle underlying Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles. To paraphrase Croatia

pleadings: “the only question is whether their conduct [ that is, of the officials of South Sudan in

113
statu nascendi] is attributable to [South Sudan]” .

53. Indeed, in Croatia’s view, it would suffice “that the conduct . . . was already governed by

international law” 114. This would suffice in Croatia’s view to overcome the temporal limitation

contained in South Sudan’s Article36 (2) declaration.

54. Serbia submits that Article 10 (2) cannot overcome a temporal reservation in an

Article 36 (2) declaration. If that is true, however, it must follow that Article 10 (2) of the

ILC Articles can neither overcome a similar temporal limitation inherent in a compromissory

clause, such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention. Croatia has to rely on retroactivity of

Article IX of the Genocide Convention.

55. At best, the principle underlying Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles, if ever it has codified

customary law on the matter and if ever it was applicable to the case at hand, might provide for

some limited substance-matter responsibility for violations of customary law . But it cannot expand

the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis.

56. What accordingly is brought out is that Article 10 (2), as a simple rule of attribution, can

neither expand backwards the applicability of the Genocide Convention, nor can it broaden the

Court’s temporal jurisdiction.

11See, mutatis mutandis, RC, para. 7.65.

11Ibid. - 60 -

57. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me now move on to Croatia’s argument based

on the declaration adopted on 27 April 1992 which, contrary to Croatia’s contention, can neither

provide for a transfer of State responsibility from the SFRY to Serbia nor for the Court’s

jurisdiction when it comes to events prior to the critical date.

B. T HE 27 A PRIL 1992 DECLARATION CANNOT EFFECT A TRANSFER OF S TATE
RESPONSIBILITY FROM THE SFRY TO THE FRY/S ERBIA

58. It was for the first time in 2010 that Croatia, in an unveiled attempt to construe the

Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of its claim concerning facts pre -dating the critical date,

came up with the catch -all idea that a declaration adopted on that day by parliamentarians of the

SFRY, and of its constituent Republics of Serbia a nd of Montenegro, could bring about the State

responsibility of the FRY/Serbia for each and every alleged violation of international law that had

occurred before that date, and involving organs of its predecessor State, the SFRY.

59. This was 11 years aft er Croatia had brought the case, and 18 years after the declaration

had been made. That alone is telling.

60. In its written pleadings, Serbia has already quite extensively addressed this argument

based on the 27 April declaration 115. Let me thus, at this juncture, first reiterate that any such

reliance on the declaration, when it comes to matters of State responsibility, stands in sharp

contrast to the Court’s own understanding of the declaration  your understanding of the

116
declaration, as laid down in your 2008 Judgment .

61. More specifically, the Court limited the effect of the declaration  I quote from your

2008 Judgment  “as having had the effects of a notification of succession to treaties” 11.

62. Accordingly, the Court found, that, by virtue of t he declaration, Serbia only became

bound by the respective treaty ad futurum but not as, by the same token, also assuming State

responsibility for alleged treaty violations of its predecessor State that had occurred allegedly in the

past.

115
RS, paras. 201 et seq.
116See RS, paras. 206-211.
117
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008 , p. 451, para. 111; emphasis added. - 61 -

63. The Court stated that it attributes to the declaration [start slide] “the effect that . . . from

that date onwards the FRY would be bound by the obligations of a party in respect of all the

multilateral conventions to which the SFRY had been a party at the time of its dissolution . . .” . 118

64. Had the Court, as claimed by Croatia, really wanted to interpret the declaration in such

an overbroad manner, as Croatia claims, it would not have specifically referred to the FRY as being

bound “by the obligations of a party” 119  yet that is what the Judgment stated.

65. Put otherwise, the J udgment did not state that the FRY would be bound by the

obligations of the SFRY in toto  in general  including obligations under applicable rules of

State responsibility . Had that really been the case  as now claimed by Croatia , the Court

would have certainly referred to the FRY as having become bound by the obligations of the SFRY

as such  at large. Yet, this is not what your Judgment said and what your Judgment meant.

66. What is m ore, the Court limited the effects of the declaration to the FRY becoming

120
bound by the Genocide Convention “ from that date onwards ” only. There is no hint in the

Judgment whatsoever that the Court wanted to endow the declaration with some kind of retroactive

effect. Nor is there any hint of the Court’s understanding that the FRY had wanted to assume ex

post facto obligations under the law of State responsibility, the SFRY , its predecessor State, had

eventually previously incurred. [End slide]

67. Finally, if Croatia’s simplistic “one- fits-all” understanding of the 1992 declaration was

correct  if that was a correct understanding of the declaration  it would be hard to understand,

to say the least, why the Court in 2008, after a ten -page discussion of the legal effects of the

declaration 12, still found that it would need to have more elements before it 122 before it would be

able to decide the question whether Serbia can be held responsible for acts that occurred prior to

April 1992.

118
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008 , pp. 454-455, para. 117; emphasis added.
119
Ibid.
120Ibid.
121
Ibid., pp. 446-455, paras. 98-117.
122
Ibid., p. 460, para.129. - 62 -

68. Rather, provided Croatia’s novel and disingenuous interpretation of the legal effects of

the declaration was correct, the Court could have  and indeed should have  in 2008, simply

rejected Serbia’s third preliminary objection. Serbia would have then been bound; Serbia would

have assumed State responsibility . That would have been the end of the matter. Yet, this is not

what the Court did in 2008 and that is why, I am afraid to say, Croatia’s interpretation of the legal

effects of the 1992 declaration is simply not compatible with the very logic of your 2008 J udgment

in the case.

69. Indeed, it is only an understanding of the 1992 declaration in line with your

2008 Judgment as amounting  at most  to a declaration of succession with regard to the

Genocide Convention that is in line with the Court’s entire series of decisions since 1993 , dealing

with the former Yugoslavia. As early as 1996, the Court stated that the intention underlying the

declaration was to express a willingness to remain a contracting party of the tr eaties of the

SFRY  but the 1996 Judgment did not elaborate on other matters . As the Court put it then 

and as acknowledged by Croatia itself 123, the declaration expressed [start slide] the “intention . . .

by Yugoslavia [was] to remain bound by the inter national treaties to which the former Yugoslavia
124
was party“ . [End slide] The Court then confirmed this limited understanding of the declaration

in its 2007 Judgment in the Bosnia case 125.

70. And it was exactly in the same vein that the Court in 2008  as mentioned 

interpreted the effect of the declaration solely “as having had the effects of a notification of

126
succession to treaties” only. Accordingly “from that date onwards” rather than retroactively 

as claimed by Croatia  Serbia“would be bound by the obligations of a party” 127 in respect of ,

inter alia, the Genocide Convention.

123
Reply of Croatia (RC), para. 7.74.
124Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 610, para. 17;emphasis
added.

125Application of the Conventi on on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 93, para. 121.
126
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (C roatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 451, para. 111.
127
Ibid., p. 455, para.117; emphasis added. - 63 -

71. Mr. President, what is more is that , in light of your jurisprudence and the work of the

ILC on the matter , the said declaration for several reaso ns does not amount t o a legally-binding,

128
unilateral declaration with the content Croatia claims .

72. For one, under the Court’s jurisprudence, for a unilateral declaration to be binding it

129
must emanate from a head of State, a head of Government or a minister for foreign aff airs or, at

least, by some member of government with a technical portfolio within the purview of their

130
respective ministry . This is  to state the obvious  not the case: the declaration was adopted

by a group of parliamentarians of a State that was on the verge of dissolving, and those of two of its

sub-entities.

73. Besides, second, any such declaration must, to use the words of the ILC, “[i]n the case of

doubt as to the scope of the obligations resulting from suc h a declaration . . . be interpreted in a

131
restrictive manner” . And this is true, to again quote the ILC, “in particular when the unilateral

declaration has no specific addressee” 132. And, besides, one must also take into account  this is

again the ILC  you must take “account . . . [of] all the circumstances in which the act

133
occurred” .

74. Yet, it seems far -fetched to assume that the authors of the declaration had wanted to

formally acknowledge State responsibility of Serbia /FRY, for acts that had occurred prior to the

adoption of the declaration, and prior to the creation of the FRY.

12See also RS, paras. 201 et seq.

12Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, paras. 49 -51; Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),
Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 621-622, para. 44; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 21, para. 53; see also Legal Status of Eastern

Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, p. 71.
13Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the C ongo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 27, para. 46.

13Principle 7 of the ILC Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating
legal obligations, UN doc. A/61/10, p. 368.

13ILC Commentary to Principle 7 of the ILC Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States
capable of creating legal obligations, UN doc. A/61/10, p. 377, para. 2.
133
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986 , p. 574, para. 40; see also
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I .C.J. Reports 2006, p. 29, para. 53; and Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France; New
Zealand v. France), I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51, and p. 474, para. 53. - 64 -

75. Finally, third, in order to evaluate the legal effects of a unilateral declaration, it is

134
necessary to take “account of the reactions to which they gave rise” and whether the State
135
relying on it took “cognizance of [the] commitments undertaken” .

76. Croatia, however, from the very time the declaration had been adopted, continuously and

uniformly took the position that it did not entail legal consequences, and that it could not even

make the FRY a contracting party to the treaties the SFRY had entered into.

77. How can Croatia , then, now argue that it relied bona fide on the FRY incurring State

responsibility for alleged violations of such treaties  and even for those pre --dating the time the

declaration was made?

78. Mr. President, I am afraid to say that this adds to the artificial character of Croatia’s

jurisdictional case to which I had referred in the very beginning of my pleading this morning :

11 years after bringing the case before the Cour t and 18 years after the declaration was adopted,

Croatia suddenly  and for obvious reasons  ascribes the declaration both the character of a

legally binding unilateral declaration and a far-reaching and almost unlimited content.

79. Accordingly, the declaration can neither be attributed with the legal effects Croatia wants

it to have . As in the case of Art icle 10 (2), the declaration neither amounts to a magic key that

could unlock the jurisdictional gates of the Peace Palace.

80. Mr. President, let me now say a couple of sen tences on the issue of alleged “ continuous

violations”.

C. ALLEGED “CONTINUOUS VIOLATIONS ” UNDER THE G ENOCIDE C ONVENTION
136
81. Contrary to what counsel for Croatia has pleaded , Serbia has alread y fully addressed

the issue of “ continuous violations” in its written pleadings 13, in particular when it comes to the

obligation to prevent and punish genocide. I can thus be brief.

134
Principle 3 of the ILC Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating
legal obligations, UN doc. A/61/10, p. 368.
13ILC Commentary to Principle 3 of the ILC Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States
capable of creating legal obligations, UN doc. A/61/10, p. 372, para. 3.

13CR 2014/12, p. 47, para. 26 (Crawford).
137
RS, paras. 230 et seq. - 65 -

82. For one, the obligation of Serbia to prosecute, put on trial and eventually punish, persons

allegedly havi ng committed genocide only encompasses acts of genocide committed in Serbia
138
itself . Croatia does not make that claim.

83. Besides, States under Article VI of the Genocide Convention only have to co- operate

139
with the ICTY to the extent the person concerne d is accused of genocide . Mr. President , as

everybody is aware in this room , nobody has ever been indicted for genocide in Croatia by the

ICTY.

84. Finally, this Court confirmed in its Bosnia Judgment that the obligation to prevent

genocide is not gover ned by Article 14 (2) of the ILC Articles, but instead is governed by

140
Article 14 (3) : it is simply not a continuing violation.

85. What is more is that the Court, again in your Belgium v. Senegal Judgment, which

Croatia did not refer to, had a chance to confirm that, “nothing in the Convention against Torture

reveals an intention to require a State party to criminalize . . . acts of torture that took place prior to

141
its entry into force for that State, or to establish its jurisdiction over such acts . . .”.

86. Why should this then be different for the Genocide Convention? And finally,

Mr. President, the Court in Belgium v. Senegal did not even find it necessary to discuss the issue

whether this obligations to punish torture possesses a continuous character.

87. That brings me to my last issue, namely that of Croatia’s standing.

D. C ROATIA ’S LACK OF STANDING CONCERNING ACTS PRE DATING 8 O CTOBER 1991

88. Both in its written and oral pleadings, Croatia has on frequent occasions alleged

violations of the Genocide Convention by Serbia not only for a time period pre -dating Serbia’s

becoming a party thereof . Croatia also has referred to acts pre- dating Croatia itself becoming a

party of the Genocide Convention, i.e. acts pre-dating 8 October 1991. This includes inter alia the

138
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno(Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 226, para. 442.
13Ibid., p. 227, para. 443.

14Ibid., p. 222, para. 431.
141
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment ,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 457, para. 100; emphasis added. - 66 -

events in Eastern Slavonia in the summer and early fall of 1991 142 of which we have heard last

week.

89. This raises the obvious question of Croatia’s standing . Last Friday, we listened very

carefully and with great interest when couns el for Croatia addressed the matter but were surprised

that counsel again did not deal at all with your most recent and most relevant holding on the issue:

it is again your 2012 Belgiumv. Senegal Judgment.

90. There, as the Court is obviously aware, whi le making specific reference to the Genocide

Convention and to the Court’s 1951 Advisory Opinion 143, the Court first found that the prohibition

of torture  just like the prohibition of genocide  forms, “part of customary international law

and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens)” 144 entailing obligations erga omnes partes

145
within the meaning of your famous Barcelona Traction jurisprudence .

91. Notwithstanding in Belgium v. Senegal, the Court still found that a contracting party is

only, [screen on]  and you see it on the screen  “entitled, with effect from . . . the date when it

became party to the Convention, to request the Court to rule on . . . compliance with . . .

146
obligation[s arising under the Convention]” . [Screen off]

92. Mr. President, C roatia is disregarding your most recent jurisprudence on the matter

where you have further elaborated the concept of erga omnes partes obligations.

93. In line with this jurisprud ence, Croatia, having become a p arty to the Genocide

Convention as of 8 October 1991, only has standing to request the Court to rule on Serbia’s

compliance with its obligations under the Genocide Convention from that date onwards  and that

is 8 October 1991. Indeed, given that Croatia  unlike Belgium in Belgium v. Senegal  only

came into existence as a State by that date, the Court’s considerations in Belgium v. Senegal must

even apply a fortiori.

94. Or, as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice put it much more eloquently in Northern Cameroons:

142
See, e.g., CR 2014/8, pp. 15 et seq., paras. 15 et seq. (Ní Ghrálaigh).
143Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 449, para. 68.
144Ibid., p. 457, para. 99.
145
Ibid., p. 449, para. 68.
146
Ibid., p. 458, para. 104; emphasis added. - 67 -

“[S]ince the Applicant State did not exist as such at the date of these acts or
events, these could not have constituted, in relation to it, an international wrong, nor
have caused it an international injury . An act which did not, in relation to the party

complaining of it, constitu147a wrong at t he time it took place, obviously cannot
ex post facto become one.”

95. Mr. President, I have nothing to add to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s statement.

96. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me end this part of my presentation w ith

148
addressing the alleged time gap that is said to arise if one were to follow Serbia’s approach .

E. T HE SO -CALLED “TIME GAP ” ARGUMENT

149
97. For one, as already mentioned by one Member of this Court , it is Serbia’s predecessor

State, the SFRY as a contracting party of the Geno cide Convention, that eventually incurred

responsibility for violations of the G enocide Convention by its organs as long as it existed  and

provided such violations took place in the first place. It is then for the specific rules of State

succession to r esponsibility, as lex specialis, to provide for a transfer of these obligations to the

respective successor State.

98. And it is those obligations of the SFRY  succeeded by a given successor State  that

may then be implemented and enforced by the regular mechanisms of international law.

99. What is more, assuming arguendo that Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles would apply to

the case at hand  and it does not, as shown by Professor Tams  and, if indeed, Article 10 (2)

were applicable, it would lead to the attribution of violations of customary law  including

obviously also violations of the customary law prohibition of genocide  committed by an

insurrectional movement and attributable to the new State to be created . A successor State could

thus, even with regard to events during transitional periods, be held responsible.

100. And it seems obvious that the Court could then decide upon those two issues 

succession to responsibility, and attribution under Article 10 (2) if applicable  the Court could

decide those issues, provided it has jurisdiction inter alia under Art icle 36 (2) of the Court’s

Statute. Yet, even if eventually the Court might not be in a position to exercise jurisdiction for lack

147
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963; s eparate opinion of
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 129.
14CR 2014/12, pp. 37-38, paras. 1-3 (Crawford).
149
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genoc ide (Croatia v. Serbia),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008; separate opinion of Judge Tomka, pp. 518-519. - 68 -

of consent by the Parties, the Parties still remain bound by their obligations under international law

as the Court itself has pointed out on frequent occasions, and as I have mentioned previously.

101. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there simply is no time gap in protection vis-à-vis

acts of genocide even in times of transition, contrary to what Croatia pleaded.

F.C ONCLUSION

102. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this brings me to the end of our presentation of

today. We have shown that  for a whole set of reasons  the Court, acting on the basis of

Article IX, is not in a position to judge upon events that occurred before 27 April 1992 or, at least

before 8 October 1991  and there is no need to repeat them one by one.

103. What is important to note, however, is that this case was brought m ore than four years

after the conflict in Croatia had ended ; it was brought eight years after the worst atrocities had

taken place.

104. It was brought as a case concerning an armed conflict that, by now, has ended almost

20 years ago.

105. It was broug ht on the basis of Art icle IX of the Genocide Convention as the sole

jurisdictional basis  a treaty which only entered into force, as between the Parties, as this Court

has determined, on 27 April 1992.

106. It was brought, Mr. President, Members of the Court, by Croatia, in order to have the

Court rewrite and reverse the jurisprudence of both, that of international crimi nal tribunals, as

shown by Professor Schabas, and it was brought, more importantly, in order to have you rewrite

your jurisprudence on the crime of genocide developed in your landmark J udgment in the Bosnian

case.

107. And in order to reach this goal, Croatia also wants you to rewrite and reverse your

jurisprudence on the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of claims most recently confirmed in

your Judgments in Georgia v. Russia and in Belgium v. Senegal.

108. If that attempt by Croatia was to be successful both, on substance, but more specifically

with regard to issues of jurisdiction and admissibility, the gates of the Peace Palace would be

pushed wide open, inviting claims to be brought concerning events that date back a long time ago. - 69 -

109. Let me again quote Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in Northern Cameroons, who, in a similar

context, noted that if such an attempt were ever to be successful , “there would be no limit to the

antiquity of the matters in respect of which claims could constantly be made, and perpetually be

150
liable to be re -opened” . Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court , for your kind

attention.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, and this brings to an end to this presentation by

Serbia. The Court will meet again tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. to hear the continuation of

Serbia’s first round of oral argument. Thank you.

The Court is adjourned.

The Court rose at 1 p.m.

___________

15Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963;
separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 130.

Document Long Title

Audience publique tenue le mardi 11 mars 2014, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président, en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie)

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