Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/15
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LAAYE THAEGUE
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 31 mai 2011, à 10 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962
en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
(Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 31 May 2011, at 10.30 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962
in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)
(Cambodia v. Thailand)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________ - 2 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vicepra,ident
KoMroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Crinçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
XuMe mes
Dojnogshue,
GuMilMu.me
jugesCot, ad hoc
Cgefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Guillaume
Cot
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires étrangères et de la
coopération internationale,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Var Kimhong, ministre d’Etat,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Long Visalo, secrétaire d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération
internationale,
S. Exc. M. Hem Saem, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume du Cambodge
auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Sarun Rithea, assistant du vice-premier ministre,
M. Hoy Pichravuth, assistant du vice-premier ministre,
comme conseillers ;
M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur de droit international à l’Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne),
sirFranklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage, professeur invité de droi t international à l’Université d’Oxford et à
l’Université de Cape Town,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Eversheds LLP (Paris),
comme conseils ;
M. Guillaume Le Floch, professeur à l’Université de Rennes 1,
Mme Amal Alamuddin, membre des barreaux d’Angleterre et de New York,
Mme Ivrea Degeaive. - 5 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E.Mr.LongVisalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Co-operation,
H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Sarun Rithea, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister,
as Advisers;
MrJ.ean-Marcorel, Professor of Internatio nal Law at the University of PariIs
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, member of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of Internationa l Law at Oxford University and the University
of Cape Town,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris , member of the NewYork Bar,
Eversheds LLP, Paris,
as Counsel;
Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes 1,
Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars,
Ms Ivrea Degeaive. - 6 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Royaume de
Thaïlande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent ;
M. Ittiporn Boonpracong, directeur général du départ ement des traités et d es affaires juridiques du
ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent adjoint ;
S. Exc. M. Kasit Piromya, ministre des affaires étrangères ;
M.Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, secrétaire auprès du ministre des affaires étrangères, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
S.Exc.M.Asda Jayanama, conseiller auprès du mi nistère des affaires étrangères, président de la
commission mixte thaïlando-cambodgienne sur la dé marcation de la frontière terrestre (partie
thaïlandaise), envoyé spécial de la Thaïlande chargé des questions relatives au Temple de
Phra Viharn,
M. Theerakun Niyom, secrétaire permanent du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Thani Thongphakdi, directeur général du département de l’information du ministère des affaires
étrangères,
le général Nopphadon Chotsiri, directeur général du service géographique royal thaïlandais,
quartier général des forces armées du Royaume de Thaïlande,
M.ChukiertRatanachaichan, secrétaire général adjoint du bureau du conseil d’Etat, cabinet du
premier ministre,
M. Chatri Archjananan, directeur de la division des affaires juridiques au département des traités et
des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeWasanaHonboonheum, directrice de la division des frontières au départ ement des traités et
des affaires juridiques du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
M.Donald McRae, professeur à l’Université d’O ttawa, titulaire de la chaire Hyman Soloway,
membre de la Commission du droit international, membre du barreau de l’Ontario, - 7 -
The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand is represented by:
H.E.Mr.VirachaiPlasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of
Thailand to the Netherlands,
as Agent;
Mr. Ittiporn Boonpracong, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
as Deputy Agent;
H.E. Mr. Kasit Piromya, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr.Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, Secretary to th e Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
H.EM. r. sdaJayanama, Adviser to the Mini stry of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the
Thai-Cambodian Joint Commission on Demarca tion for Land Boundary (Thai side), Special
Envoy of Thailand on Matters concerning the Temple of Phra Viharn,
Mr. Theerakun Niyom, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Thani Thongphakdi, Director-General, Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Lieutenant-General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director-G eneral, Royal Thai Survey Department, Royal
Thai Armed Force Headquarters,
Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy-Secretary-General, Office of the Council of State, Office of
the Prime Minister,
Mr.ChatriArchjananan, Director, Legal Affairs Division, Department of Treaties and Legal
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsWasanaHonboonheum, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties and Legal
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister,
Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Member of the International
Law Commission, Member of the Ontario Bar, - 8 -
M.Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris Ou est, Nanterre-La Défense, membre et ancien
président de la Commission du droit internatio nal, membre associé de l’Institut de droit
international,
MmeAlina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
M.Thomas Grant, membre du barreau de NewYork , maître de recherche au Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law de l’Université de Cambridge,
comme conseils. - 9 -
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor at the University ParisOuest, Nanterre-La Défense, Member and
former Chairman of the International Law Co mmission, associate member of the Institut de
droit international,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre for International Law (CEDIN), University ParisOuest,
Nanterre-La Défense,
Mr. Thomas Grant, Member of the New York Bar, Senior Research Associate, Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law, University of Cambridge,
as Counsel. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is now open and the Court meets this
morning to hear the second round of oral observations on the request for the indication of
provisional measures submitted by the Kingdom of Cambodia in the case concerning the Request
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15June1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand). This morning we shall hear the representatives of
Cambodia to whom I shall therefore give the floor. I now invite Professor Jean-Marc Sorel to take
the floor.
M. SOREL :
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie de
me donner de nouveau la parole ce matin, et je le fais cette fois-ci en premier car il me faut
rapidement et préalablement balayer les arguments présentés hier par nos contradicteurs
concernant les mesures conservatoires.
A cet égard, et pour un bon déroulement du processus judiciaire, nous répondrons
effectivement aux arguments de la Thaïlande, alors que l’agent de cet Etat nous a prévenu hier
1
après-midi, «qu’étant donné les délais qui ont été fixés pour les audiences» , il nous faudrait
attendre ce soir pour obtenir des réponses complè tes à nos arguments présentés hier matin
auxquelles nous ne pourrons bien sûr répondre.
2. Concernant les mesures conservatoires de mandées, la Thaïlande semble nous dire qu’il
n’y a pas d’urgence, pas de préjudice irréparable, pas de risque d’aggr avation ou d’extension du
différend, ainsi qu’une absence de lien entre les me sures demandées et la requête en interprétation
au principal puisqu’il n’y aurait tout simplement pas de demande en interprétation recevable. Sur
ce dernier point mon collègue sir Franklin Berman démontrera que cet argument est dénué de tout
fondement.
3. Il ne m’appartient donc pas de reprendre tous les points développés hier, mais simplement
de revenir sur certains d’entre eux, de les compléter et de les préciser. En reprenant l’argumentaire
de la Thaïlande , donc en quelque sorte en me plaçant du point de vue de la Thaïlande, cet Etat
1
CR 2011/14, p. 21, par. 39. - 11 -
rejetterait toute intervention d’un tiers dans ce différend car le processus bilatéral serait à l’Œuvre et
garantirait de toute extension du différend et de tout préjudice grave imminent. Consécutivement,
toujours en suivant ce raisonnement, à cette absence de risque, aucune urgence n’existerait,
d’autant que les incidents qui incitent le Cam bodge à réclamer des mesures se situeraient nous dit
on, en dehors de la zone concernée par l’arrêt à interpréter. Enfin, ces mesures si elles étaient
prononcées seraient, selon la Thaïlande, un pr éjugement du fond de l’affaire. Voilà globalement
résumé ce que la Thaïlande nous dit en substance.
Il n’en est rien car nous verrons que les pr étendues négociations ne préservent pas de la
commission d’un préjudice irréparable (I), que par conséquent l’urgence subsiste(II) d’autant que
les mesures demandées se limitent bien à la zone du temple de Préah Vihéar (III), et qu’il ne s’agit
nullement d’obtenir un préjugement sur le fond (IV).
4. Mais il doit être clair que l’ensemble de ces points sont reliés les uns aux autres : tous se
rapportent au caractère urgent de la demande en raison du risque réel et imminent de préjudice
irréparable qui pèse sur le temple de Préah Vihéar et sur la population alentour.
I. Une étrange justification à l’absence de préjudice irréparable ou d’extension du différend
5. Le Cambodge doit de nouveau signaler que nous sommes dans une situation inédite. J’ai
pu indiquer hier que l’Etat qui a gagné en1962 est celui qui est obligé de porter l’affaire devant
votre juridiction. J’ajoute aujourd’hui ⎯ si l’on en croit la Thaïlande ⎯ que c’est l’Etat qui
agresse, donc le Cambodge, qui doit demander d es mesures conservatoir es. Décidément, la
Thaïlande nous donne le tournis.
En effet, la Thaïlande nous a indiqué être en état de légitime défense face aux agressions du
Cambodge, je cite les propos de l’agent 2. Soit. Le Cambodge ne fera pas l’injure à la Cour de citer
le très connu article51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, mais il rappellera quand même que l’Etat
agressé peut se défendre «jusqu’à ce que le Conseil de sécurité ait pris les mesures nécessaires pour
maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales».
Or, la Thaïlande non seulement n’a pas saisi le Conseil de sécurité, alors que le Cambodge
l’a fait en provoquant une réunion le 14févrie r2011, la Thaïlande n’a pas saisi la Cour
2
Voir, notamment, l’intervention de l’agent de la Thaïlande (CR 2011/14, p. 15). - 12 -
internationale de Justice, alors que le Cambodge l’a fait, la Thaïlande n’a pas donné pour le
moment suite au processus de médiation régionale de l’Association des nations d’Asie du Sud-Est,
alors que le Cambodge l’a fait, la Thaïlande n’ a pas souhaité donner suite à la réunion de l’Unesco
sous les auspices de sa directrice générale du 25 au 27 mai dernier, alors que le Cambodge souhaite
le faire.
Enfin, la Cour a pu se rendre compte dans le processus qui nous concerne aujourd’hui, que la
Thaïlande invoque bien des combats, des victimes , mais refuse des mesures conservatoires car elle
estime la Cour incompétente prima facie et les mesures inutiles.
6. Tous ces refus sont justifiés par une seule ligne de défense: la Thaïlande prétend
poursuivre un processus bilatéral dans lequel elle place tous ses espoirs et qui pourtant, depuis
plusieurs années, ne connaît que reports et recula des. C’est un argument avancé devant toutes les
instances internationales ou régionales pour, en quelque sorte, les faire patienter.
Si l’on se penche sur ce processus bilatéral dans lequel la Thaïlande place tous ses espoirs, là
encore, que de miracles depuis peu de temps . Rappelons que ce processus a été initié, comme il a
été rappelé hier, par l’accord du 14juin2000. Ce processus n’a pas pour objectif de délimiter la
frontière, mais bien de la «démarquer» et de l’«aborner». Ra ppelons que celle-ci ⎯ cette
frontière ⎯ a déjà été délimitée, ce que la Cour a pour le moins reconnu lors de son arrêt de 1962
pour placer le temple du côté du Cambodge. Car, quoi qu’on en dise, et quelles que soient les
discussions sur la distinction entre conflits terr itoriaux et conflits front aliers, chacun reconnaîtra
qu’il faut bien, à un moment donné, fixer une lim ite pour attribuer un territoire. C’est tout
simplement pour fixer précisément cette limite, autrement dit pour démarquer la frontière que
l’accord du 14 juin 2000 existe et il n’est nul besoin de citer dans ce cadre l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962
puisque les instruments juridiques cités par cet acco rd sont identiques à ceux utilisés par la Cour et
ne peuvent donc faire parvenir les Etats qu’à la même conclusion.
Selon les informations données par le professeurMcRae 3, dans le cadre de ce processus
bilatéral, l’acceptation par le parlement thaïla ndais des procès-verbaux des réunions de la
er
commission mixte des frontières de 2008-2009 se serait débloquée le 1 mai dernier, alors qu’il
3
CR 2011/14, p. 53–54, par. 38. - 13 -
faut attendre plus de trois ans pour que fina lement la cour constitutionnelle thaïlandaise ⎯ je tiens
à le préciser ⎯ décide que ces procès-verbaux ne relèvent pas de la compétence du parlement. Le
er
processus reste donc toujours incertain. Ceci s’est passé le 1 mai dernier. On peut s’en féliciter,
au même titre que le cessez-le-feu accepté le jour même du dépôt de la requête, à savoir le 28 avril.
Beaucoup d’heureux hasards pour que disparai ssent, comme par ench antement, toutes les
traces du différend.
Décidéme l’n,neau ⎯puisqu’il faut bien reprendre la fable initiée hier par la
Thaïlande ⎯ prend plaisir à se faire dévorer par le loup. Et il semble rechigner clairement
à faire
appel à l’entraide du «troupeau».
C’est décidément bien une fable.
7. Pourtant, la Thaïlande prétend être un pays pacifique imprégné des principes de paix et de
justice. Nul n’en doute, mais il est alors perm is de se demander pourquoi un Etat membre actif de
la communauté internationale ⎯ respecté ⎯ à une époque où les moyens de régler pacifiquement
les différends sont nombreux et où les dénonciati ons de tout acte d’agression peuvent être
immédiatement relayées, bref, pourquoi dans une telle situation un Etat qui se dit agressé ne
réagirait-il pas ?
Il y a là une logique qui échappe au Cambodge même si, au fond, il la comprend
parfaitement.
En revanche, c’est une sorte de théorie du comp lot qui est agitée par l’agent de la Thaïlande.
L’accusation d’attaques du Cambodge qui auraient se rvi à justifier une demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires ⎯ c’est ce que l’on nous a expliqué hier ⎯ est tout simplement saugrenue.
Il ne s’agit plus d’une fable, nous sommes proches de la malveillance. Le Cambodge est désolé de
rappeler que la requête et la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires sont bien du 28 avril,
o
comme la lettre insérée dans le dossier des juges le prouve. Vous la trouverez à l’onglet n 14.
Une simple erreur de date rapidement rectifiée ne méritait pas de mettre en branle un processus
intellectuel digne d’un roman policier.
Le filet de sécurité que la Thaïlande prétend instaurer à l’aide de cette liaison bilatérale dont
on connaît les multiples failles ou blocages ne sa urait donc, pour le Ca mbodge, constituer la - 14 -
garantie de l’absence d’un préjudice irréparable a ux droits que le Cambodge souhaite voir protéger
par la Cour.
II. Une urgence toujours présente
8. Les mesures ne seraient pas justifiées, selon nos contradicteurs, car aucun incident ne se
serait produit dans la zone du temple depuis février2011. Il n’y aurait donc pas d’urgence à
indiquer des mesures; c’est en substance ce que l’ on nous a expliqué. Il serait peut-être plus
simple de dire que, par chance, aucune victime n’est à déplorer depuis cette date dans la zone du
temple car des incidents ont bien eu lieu, comme le professeur McRae l’a lui-même indiqué en
citant un incident armé du 26 avril 2011, soit deux jo urs avant la saisine de la Cour. Le Cambodge
a d’ailleurs réagi à cet incident en signalant le j our même la violation de son espace aérien par la
Thaïlande, ainsi que des tirs d’artillerie lourde , notamment dans la région du temple de
Préah Vihéar. Et ceci est spécifié 4.
Et ce que le Cambodge a souhaité exprimer hi er, c’est que ces incidents peuvent rapidement
dégénérer, y compris dans la zone du temple, sa ns qu’il paraisse nécessaire de devoir invoquer des
incidents graves le jour même du dépôt de la demande. A cet égard, le calcul auquel s’est livré le
professeur McRae est intéressant : sept jours auraient séparé les incidents et la demande de mesures
dans l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime ent re le Cameroun et le Nigeria , alors que six
jours auraient séparé les incidents de la demande de mesures dans l’affaire opposant la Géorgie à la
5
Fédération de Russie . Le Cambodge ne souhaite nullement établir une sorte de «record» en la
matière mais est obligé de consta ter que deux jours seulement sépare nt les derniers incidents dans
la zone du temple de PréahVihéar et la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires. Au
surplus, ces incidents sont la suite d’une trop lo ngue série d’incidents et rien n’indique que la
situation ne dégénérera pas de nouveau. On nous a expliqué également hier que les mesures
sollicitées ne se situeraient pas dans la zone du temple de Préah Vihéar.
4
Note de protestation du ministre des affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale,
n° 744 MFA-IC/CL4, 26 avril 2011.
5CR 2011/14, p. 52, par.32. - 15 -
III. Les mesures sollicitées se situent dans la zone du temple de Préah Vihéar
9. Concernant ces incidents qui se situeraien t donc en dehors de la zone du temple,
l’impression étrange cette fois-ci est que les plaidoiries du Cambodge hier matin n’ont pas été
écoutées. Il a en effet été clairement rappelé que ces incidents en dehors de la zone du temple,
notamment ceux se situant, bien réels, dans d’autres endroits de la frontière à 150kilomètres à
l’ouest, ne constituent nullement l’objet des mesures demandées à votre Cour. Il a simplement été
précisé que les faits constituent un ensemble et qu’ils sont liés ⎯ en clair, que la Thaïlande lance
une sorte de vaste offensive pour contester militairement l’ensemble de la frontière ⎯, mais que le
Cambodge ne demande des mesures que dans la zone du temple.
Les droits dont le Cambodge demande la protecti on se situent bien dans la zone du temple et
concernent bien le patrimoine culturel et spirituel que représente le temple, ainsi que le préjudice
que pourrait subir le Cambodge à travers les atteintes à sa souveraineté, son intégrité territoriale et
la survie de sa population.
Le Cambodge ne sait comment l’exprimer plus simplement et plus clairement. Enfin on
nous affirme que les mesures conservatoires seraie nt une forme de préjugement du fond, argument
somme toute assez classique.
IV Les mesures conservatoires comme préjugement du fond
10. Les mesures conservatoires seraient, selon la Thaïlande, le moyen d’obtenir ce que le
Cambodge ne pourrait obtenir au fond en préjugeant ce que votre juridiction va dire. D’une part,
c’est faire peu de cas du travail de votre juridic tion et supposer qu’elle tomberait ainsi dans une
sorte de «piège», d’autre part, les mesures demandées par le Cambodge ont strictement pour
objectif de protéger ses droits en attendant que la Cour se prononce au fond. Le Cambodge ne
cherche pas à obtenir un jugement provisionnel lu i adjugeant une partie des conclusions de sa
requête 6. Dans le cadre de sa demande en indicatio n de mesures conservatoires, le Cambodge ne
demande que le retrait des troupes et l’arrêt des hostilités, autrement dit préserver ses droits en
attendant que la Cour tranche au fond la contestation qui l’oppose à la Thaïlande sur
l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962. Il est clair, pour le Cambodge, que ces demandes sont bien liées
6Affaire relative à l’ Usine de Chorzów (indemnités) (mes ures conservatoir es), ordonnance du
21 novembre 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n, p. 9 et suiv. - 16 -
à l’instance principale comme ceci fut amplement démontré hier ⎯ il ne me semble pas nécessaire
à l’instant d’y revenir ⎯, mais il est tout aussi clair que le Cambodge souhaite simplement protéger
ses droits pour que la Cour se prononce dans la sé rénité, sans nullement préjuger le fond. Le
Cambodge le voudrait-il qu’il lui serait bien difficile d’obtenir un tel résultat.
Voilà brièvement résumées, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de
la Cour, quelques remarques en réponse aux arguments présentés hier après-midi par nos
contradicteurs. Je vous remercie de votre attention et je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien
vouloir donner la parole à mon collègue, sir Franklin Berman.
The PRESIDENT: I thank you, ProfessorJean-MarcSorel, for your presentation. I now
invite Sir Franklin Berman to the floor.
BMEr.MAN:
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, these proceedings are on a request for the indication
of provisional measures of protection, and ProfessorSorel has just laid out for the Court exactly
why the present circumstances both justify and require the measures Cambodia has requested. Our
opponents, however, have not stopped at questioning those measures ⎯ which is of course, their
right to do ⎯ but have tried to convince the Court that it has no competence at all even to consider
those measures, because Cambodia’s underlying Request for interpretation is manifestly
ill-founded, and it is that claim that I must now address.
Cambodia’s rights derive from a judgment
2. The Court has rightly limited the time allowed to each Party for its reply, so I will make
matters as simple as I can. I can’t respond, Mr.President, on every point to the torrent of
argumentation with which the Court was deluged yesterday, and indeed there is no call for me to do
so, given how deeply our opponents tried to delve into the merits ⎯ without much obvious regard
for the injunction in Practice Direction XI of which you reminded us, Mr.President. I will not
follow them down that route, but confine myself st rictly to the principle that an applicant for
provisional measures is not required to establish the s ubstantive merits of its case at that stage, but
only to show that the rights that are affected are “plausible” ⎯ or, as JudgeGreenwood put it in - 17 -
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua “arguable” ⎯ in other words that there are sufficient indications that such
rights exist, even though the opposing Party may challenge them. Our opponents were all too
prone yesterday to brush aside the fact that Cambodia’s rights derive from a judgment of the Court;
of course they do, this is a request for interpretation and I make no apology for insisting on that. A
request for interpretation is based on a judgment. And a judgment of the Court establishes rights
for the successful Party; that is its whole point. There is no room left for argument as to whether
Cambodia’s rights exist, only as to whether there is a real dispute over their interpretation.
3. I propose to organize my remarks, then, around three simple questions:
A. Is there a dispute?
B. Is it about the meaning and scope of the Judgment?
C. Can the issue be raised now?
1. Is there a dispute?
4. I start with the existence of a dispute. The thrust of Thailand’s argument on jurisdiction is
that there is no dispute. You were told: “no dispute, no jurisdiction”. What emerges from
Thailand’s own pleadings, however, is in fact confirmation that a dispute over the meaning and
scope of the 1962 Judgment does exist. Let me give you one concrete example out of many.
Professor Pellet says that the second paragraph of the dispositif of the Judgment, the paragraph
requiring the withdrawal of Thai forces from the area around the Temple, “impose[] à la Thaïlande
7
des obligations ponctuelles et instantanées ” . But, Mr.President, Cambodia, in its Request, asks
the Court to say whether this obligation to withdraw is in fact continuous and permanent because it
is the consequence of the fact that a State should not violate the territorial sovereignty of another
State. In Thailand’s view, and again I’m citing from the transcript, “il suffit de lire le texte de ce
paragraphe pour se convaincre que c’est bien d’une obligation immédiate et instantanée qu’il
s’agit”8. Well, Cambodia argues the opposite, and Thailand then complains that: “L’Etat
demandeur . . . transform[e] l’obligation instantanée résultant pour la Thaïlande du paragraphe 2 du
dispositif en une obligation continue” 9. There, you have, Mr. President, Members of the Court, a
7
CR 2011/14, p. 24, para. 7 (Pellet).
8
Ibid., p. 25, para. 11 (Pellet).
9Ibid. - 18 -
clear divergence of views as to the meaning and scope of what the Court has decided with binding
force in its dispositif, and it is based on what the Respondent party has itself put forward in
argument before the Court. This more than satis fies the jurisdictional showing required of us at
this stage. And of course, at the substantive level, the fallacy behind ProfessorPellet’s “simple”
reading of the dispositif is that it would allow Thailand to w ithdraw its troops the day after the
Judgment and move them back in again a week later. The point is obvious, but it is one for
determination at the merits stage, and not now.
5. What then, Mr.President, are the serious grounds on which Thailand says there is no
dispute? The two arguments offered are:
(i) because the two States have been in agreement for at least 40 years as to the interpretation
of the Judgment and its implementation by Thailand;
(ii) because a new bilateral process was set in train by a Memorandum of Understanding
concluded between the two States in the year 2000.
That these two arguments stand in plain contradiction to one another is something I have no time to
develop now. Let me rather look at each of the arguments on its own demerits.
There is no dispute because there has been an agreement over the last 40 years as to interpretation
of the Judgment?
6. According to Thailand, Cambodia specifica lly accepted the Thai interpretation. I quote
from what the Agent said yesterday: “Le Cambodge a par ailleurs formellement accepté
l’interprétation thaïlandaise selon la quelle la frontière dans la régi on du temple de [Preah Vihear]
n’est pas res judicata selon l’arrêt de 1962, et doit être donc déterminée conjointement par les deux
10
pays conformément au droit international.” Really? That is pure assertion by the Agent of
Thailand, without a shred of evidence being put forward to back it up. On the contrary, he tells the
Court in the very next paragraph that it was a meeting of the Thai Council of Ministers on
10 July 1962 that “détermina l’étendue de l’emprise du temple [‘emprise du temple’ is a new term
to me, which I do not find anywhere in the Judgment ⎯ il détermina l’étendue de l’emprise du
11
temple] aux fins de l’exécution de l’arrêt” . Note, Mr.President, that that resolution, of the
10
CR 2011/14, p. 12, para. 8 (Plasai).
1Ibid., para. 9 (Plasai); emphasis added. - 19 -
Council of Ministers, has never been produced, not even now, not even to the Court, so that we,
Cambodia, and you, the Court, can see what it is and what it says. All that we had in its place was
some photographs, photographs of a group of presuma bly Thai officials standing in front of some
barbed wire ⎯ some barbed wire which is no longer there today ⎯ and a notice proclaiming “from
this point lies the vicinity of the Temple”. But note the implication in the Agent’s assertion,
Mr.President: the implication that the effect a nd consequence of a Judgment of your Court is to
confer on the losing Party the exclusive right to pr oceed to an entirely unilateral interpretation of
the effects of the Judgment and to rest on that contra mundum ! But the unilateral nature aside,
what is that, Mr.President, other than an interpretation placed on the “meaning and scope of the
Judgment”. Cambodia did not agree with that interpretation then, and does not now; and, again,
you could hardly have a more perfect example of the kind of dispute that enters directly within the
province of Article 60 of the Statute as it has been consistently interpreted by the Court.
There is no dispute because a bilateral pro cess was set in train by a Memorandum of
Understanding?
7. Now, Mr. President, as to the alterna tive argument that everything changed in the
year2000 because the two States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and
Demarcation of Land Boundary and, says the Agent proudly, it covers the entire frontier, including
the sector at the Temple, and it does not even refe r to the Court’s Judgment. I can only invite the
Court to look at this document ⎯ we did put it in ourselves, Mr. President; it is at Annex 6 to our
Request for interpretation ⎯ and to form its own view. The Mo U, as its title suggests, deals with
demarcation, the placing of boundary markers, not the establishment of a frontier; it was agreed
before Thailand’s aberrant interpretation of the Judgment emerged and was unveiled in 2007-2008;
it does not refer to the Judgment, but it does refer to all of the formal treaty documents and the
maps on which the Court based its Judgment. And, Mr. President, is it remotely conceivable that
Cambodia would, in a Memorandum of Unders tanding, signed at Departmental level, abandon the
Judgment or the formal Treaty settlement on which the Judgment was based? We say no. - 20 -
2. The dispute relates to the meaning and force of the Judgment
8. I move rapidly now on to the second section of my exposé: Is the dispute about the
meaning and scope of the Judgment? And this w as the subject of an immense amount of argument
by counsel for Thailand, all aimed at establishi ng that the Court in 1962 had decided nothing more
than that the Temple alone belonged to Thaila nd, and indeed had formally disabled itself from
anything wider than that. I select a few out of many remarks to that effect: according to
Professor Crawford, for example, “the dispute was to settle the question, and only the question, to
which State a particular cultural property, the Temp le, pertained”. Again the reference is in our
12
written text, Mr.President . And elsewhere ProfessorCrawford makes a similar remark: “In
1962, you [that is you, the Court] didn’t decide on a boundary at all; you simply decided that the
13
Temple was in Cambodia. But that is not now in dispute.” All of that is simply wrong. It
ignores the Court’s own definition of the dispute that it was deciding: “a dispute about territorial
sovereignty” and it ignores the second point of the dispositif pursuant to which Thailand was
obliged to withdraw its forces and personnel not only from the Temple, but also from Cambodian
territory in its vicinity.
9. Moreover, Mr. President, Members of the Cour t, all of this argument by Thailand simply
misses the point, and that for a whole series of reasons, which I have to go into one by one, because
the issue is so central to the case:
(i)firstly, because the interpretation Cambodi a has requested does bear directly and in
explicit terms on the dispositif of the Judgment and on the uncertainties in its meaning
raised precisely by Thailand’s conduct assertedly in giving effect to the Judgment’s
14
meaning ;
(ii) secondly, because there is no room for doubt ⎯ there really is no room for doubt ⎯ that
the reasoning of the Court can be part of the process of interpreting how the dispositif
12
CR 2011/14, p. 35, para. 7 (Crawford).
13Ibid., p. 33, para. 2 (Crawford).
14Cambodia’s Request explicitly relates to the terms of the dispositive itself. It requests interpretation of:
“The obligation incumbent upon Thailand to ‘wit hdraw any military or police forces, or other
guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory’ (point 2 of the
operative clause [of the Judgment rendered by the Court in 1962]) is a particular consequence of the
general and continuing obligation to respect the integity of the territory Cambodia, that territory
having been delimited in the area of the Temple a nd its vicinity by the line on the map [referred to on
page 21 of the Judgment], on which [the latter] is based.” - 21 -
should be understood, so long as the reasoning is inseparable from the dispositif, which is
what the Court laid down in the interpretation phase of the Cameroon v. Nigeria case. It
appeared yesterday as if counsel for Thailand was relying entirely on one paragraph in the
1962 Judgment, at page36, in which the C ourt declined to accept the new and enlarged
formulation of Cambodia’s formal Submissions in the case. But the Court did
emphatically not decline, even in that paragra ph, to entertain these further Submissions, it
merely said they could in the circumstances be entertained only as giving expression to
grounds for the Court’s decision, and that is exactly the link between reasons and
operative part on which Cambodia relies in its Request for interpretation presently before
the Court. Counsel’s reading of that paragra ph at page36, in isolation, ignores entirely
those parts of the 1962 Judgment that do not suit his argument: notably the paragraph at
page 14 of the Judgment which we cited in extenso in our Request for interpretation and in
my pleading yesterday, the passage in which the Court repeats what it said the previous
year on jurisdiction, that Cambodia alleged violations of its territorial sovereignty over the
region of the Temple, that Thailand replied that the area in question lay on the Thai
side ⎯ on the Thai side of what? ⎯ of the common frontier between the two countries ,
and it was in that context that the Court described the dispute as being one “abou
t
territorial sovereignty”; but most of all, Mr.President, Members of the Court, this
disjointed reading of the Judgment ignores entirely the key passage at pages 16-17 where
the Court, having begun its analysis of the Treaty settlement between France and Siam,
points out that the operative articles make no mention of Preah Vihear as such and the
Court then goes on to say “[i]t is for this reason that the Court can only give a decision as
to the sovereignty over the Temple area after having examined what the frontier line is ”
(emphasis added) ⎯ can only give its decision after that examination. Could anything be
clearer than that? It certainly puts paid at a stroke to ProfessorsCrawford and Pellet’s
theory that the Court was deciding nothing but sovereignty over the Temple. But more
than that, here we have the Court itself saying directly: “the reasons that are about to
follow are inseparable from the formal decision to which they will lead”. And that is
Cambodia’s submission precisely. And it explai ns why, at page32 of the Judgment, the - 22 -
Court states as its “conclusions” ⎯ the Court’s own word, not “arguments”, not
“reasons”, but “conclusions” ⎯ inter alia that acceptance of the Annex I map by the
Parties caused the map to enter the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of it.
Mr.President, I pause here for the briefest of moments to refer to the case of
PrinceDamrong, about which ProfessorCrawfo rd seems to be so mesmerised, no doubt
because it relates to a visit to the Temple alone. I observe simply that this little incident
occupies perhaps two paragraphs in the Judgment, by contrast with the nine pages which
the Court devotes to a minute analysis of nothing other than the frontier line, after which it
adds in Prince Damrong, as a sort of supplementary confirmation of the conclusions it had
already reached as to the status of the Annex I map. But the element that was missing
from Professor Crawford’s argument was that if, as he says, the Court held
PrinceDamrong’s actions to amount to an estoppel, that must constitute res judicata ;
Thailand cannot now claim that she was not estopped. But does the estoppel appear in the
dispositif? Certainly not; it appears in the Court’ s conclusions on the way to its formal
decision in the operative part of the Judgment. Could one have a clearer illustration that
res judicata can, in appropriate circumstances, be found in the reasoning, in the motifs, of
a Judgment of the Court?
(iii) my third point, Mr. President, is that it is firmly established in the Court’s jurisprudence,
and we heard citations yesterday from the interpretation phase of Chorzów Factory and
from the Tunisia/Libya case; I do not have to repeat those citations today. It is firmly
established that a dispute over whether something has or has not been established with
binding force does enter within the scope of interpretation under Article 60. That is
established. Counsel for Thailand did not ev en address this, even though it now appears
to be exactly the present situation in this case. Cambodia says that a proper understanding
of the res judicata in the dispositif requires one to interpret the dispositif in the light of the
reasoning. In particular the acceptance of the Annex I map as marking the line between
the two countries in the area of the Temple;
Cambodia relies on the Court’s own statement that it can “only” decide on the Temple’s
sovereignty after having examined where the fr ontier line is and, indeed, that is nothing - 23 -
more than simple logic. But Thailand says no; you can only look at the bare words of the
dispositif, you are not allowed to interpret them in context. So we have a classic case of a
dispute between the Parties over what has, or has not, been decided with binding force,
and that is exactly what the Permanent Court and then the present Court had in mind in the
two Judgments cited.
10. I come finally to an aspect I am somewhat reluctant to raise, Mr. President, but it has to
be done. The slide which ProfessorPellet project ed on the screen yesterday, the slide which
purported to show the dispositif of the 1962Judgment incorporated a distortion. One must hope
that it was accidental but it was a distortion all the same. It was there and its effect was serious.
The slide omitted entirely the phrase “in conseque nce”, which the Court employed to link the
second and third paragraphs of the dispositif to its first paragraph. The phrase is there and it must
have been deliberate on the part of the Court. It shows that the second paragraph and the third
paragraph derive from the principal finding in th e first paragraph. They are not independent
decisions in their own right but consequences th at flow from the principal finding, which is a
finding about territory. It follows automatically that it cannot be right to interpret these paragraphs
in isolation, as counsel for Thailand would have the Court do.
Can the issue be raised now?
11. Mr. President, time moves on and I must also move on to the third part of my pleading:
Granted the existence of a dispute and a dispute over the meaning or scope of the Judgment, can
the issue be raised now?
12. It is not entirely easy to understand what our opponents’ argument is over the question of
timing. It seems to be composed of three parts: first, that the passage of time shows that Cambodia
is seeking enforcement of the Judgment, not its interp retation; and then that there is some sort of
an implicit time-limit in Article 60 of the Statute as a safeguard against abuse; and then that a party
may not ask the Court, in incidental proceedings of this kind, to base itself on facts dating from
after the judgment was pronounced.
13. Well, as to the first of these, enforcement versus interpretation, I need go no further than
to recall to the Court that paragraph 31 of the Request ⎯ the Request for interpretation ⎯ contains - 24 -
the clearest possible disclaimer that Cambodia is seeking anything other than interpretation.
Cambodia stands by that disclaimer, and I repeat it now. In addition, the question posed to the
Court is plainly one of the meaning to be given to the dispositif, it says so in terms. In these
preliminary proceedings, which are on interim measur es, there is no warrant for going behind that.
But of course it stands to reason, Mr.President, that any State applying to the Court for
interpretation is not simply seeking a piece of pape r, but an authoritative ruling which it intends to
use on the diplomatic plane towards the settlement of an actual dispute. If that were to be ruled out
as amounting to enforcement, there would be nothing left of interpretation, nothing at all.
14. I come next, Mr.President, to the question of implicit time-limit. Thailand tries to
import one, to read one into the terms of Article 60 of the Statute, but fails entirely to confront the
fact that no time-limit is to be found there. It fails even to suggest that the omission was an
unfortunate accident on the part of the drafters of the Statute of the PCIJ, which their successors
failed inexplicably to correct when framing the present Statute of the present Court. There is not a
single word either about the clear statement in th e Opinion of JudgeBuergenthal, of very recent
date, that there is no time-limit to a request for interpretation under Article 60. Mr. President, the
contrast, the textural contrast with the very next Article in the Statute, dealing with revision, is
striking. Article 61 contains not just one time-limit, but two: six months from the discovery of the
new fact, and then an overall limit of ten years. Well, the reasons for the limits in the one case and
the absence of any limit in the other are fairly o bvious, and they have been set out in Cambodia’s
Request, at paragraph28. I add simply that the Court does not need a fixed time-limit as a
protection against abuse; the Court is perfectly capable of deciding ⎯ in the circumstances of
particular cases ⎯ whether a request is genuinely one for interpretation ⎯ as it is in this case ⎯ or
is an abuse of the statutory provision. But, in any case, any question as to implying into Article 60
a time-limit is clearly one for the merits and not one for decision at the preliminary stage of
provisional measures.
15. The most difficult element to understand, however, MP r.resident, is
ProfessorCrawford’s confusing argumentation about s ubsequent facts. So far as we were able to
follow it, though, this theory comes to grief in that it embodies a complete confusion between three
kinds of facts: the facts which the Court took into account in framing a judgment; the facts put - 25 -
forward by an applicant for interpretation to dem onstrate the existence of a relevant dispute over
the interpretation of a judgment; and the facts a dduced in support of an urgent request for the
indication of provisional measures of protection ⎯ including, as here and in the Avena case, on the
interpretation of a judgment. It is the first of these ⎯ the facts relied upon by the Court in framing
a judgment ⎯ and only the first of these ⎯ that the Permanent Court had in mind in the passage
from the Chorzów Factory Interpretation decision that Professor Crawford cited to you. The facts
that go into the making of a judgment are of course fixed ⎯ they are fixed by the judgment
itself ⎯ and of course it is not admissible to ask the Court thereafter to accept new facts; that
would amount to revision, not interpretation, and it is governed by Article61. There has never
been any question of that in this case. When it comes to interpretation, though, it is simply
impossible for an applicant State to come to the Court for the interpretation of a judgment without
producing facts apt to demonstrate that there exists a dispute in that regard. That is exactly what
Thailand has been demanding of us in this courtroom. But by definition facts of that kind have to
post-date the Judgment. You cannot interpret a judgment until after it has been delivered, and still
less can you establish a dispute over interpretation until after two conflicting interpretations have
come into the open. Obviously, all that has to happen after the judgment has been handed down,
and on occasion it may take some considerable time ⎯ as here. Finally, the last kind of facts ⎯
the facts justifying an application for provisional measures ⎯ well, they have, by their very nature,
to be facts arising or existing at the point at which the application for provisional measures is made.
Again, that is just what our opponents have been demanding of us, to establish the necessary
urgency ⎯ urgency as of now. So this entire theory about subsequent facts looks more and more
like a house of cards that tumbles to the ground at th e very first breath of rational analysis. If the
“subsequent facts” theory held, a losing party could purchase itself impunity by claiming to accept
the judgment today, then conditioning its accepta nce by an unacceptable interpretation tomorrow,
put the unacceptable interpretation into practice the day after that, and then claim that the Court
was disabled from exercising its power of interpretation because ⎯why? ⎯ because that would
depend on asking the Court to make an assessment of subsequent facts.
16. Mr.President, I summarize my argument briefly before concluding. The summary can
be drawn together under the general rubric of “pla usibility”, or “the establishment of a prima facie - 26 -
case”. It is Thailand, not Cambodia, that asks the Court to resign its statutory power to indicate
provisional measures of protection and on the basis that Cambodia will not be able, in the merits
phase on its Request for interpretation, to establish the existence of the rights for which it claims
protection today. In response, Cambodia is under no requirement to establish those rights today;
that would be to enter prematurely into the merits and is excluded by the Court’s consistent line of
decisions. Practice Direction XI warns us that we should not go into the merits except so far as is
absolutely necessary. All that Ca mbodia has to do is to show that the existence of such rights is
reasonably arguable. We submit that that thres hold test has been amply fulfilled: because the
rights Cambodia invokes are laid down in a judgm ent of the Court; because Thailand has placed
those rights in issue by an invalid interpretation of the same judgment; because there plainly is a
dispute between the two States entailing at the very least a difference between them over what the
Court did decide with binding force; because it is only recently that the nature and extent of that
dispute began to emerge; and because neither the wording of the Statute nor the ratio legis
incorporates a time-limit on the Court’s “duty” or “o bligation” to interpret its judgments on receipt
of a valid request to that effect, such as Cambodia’s Request dated 28 April 2011.
Mr.President, that concludes my pleading. May I now respectfully ask you to invite the
Agent for Cambodia to read out Cambodia’s formal submissions.
The PRESIDENT: I thank you, SirFranklin Berman, for your pleadings. Now I invite the
Agent of Cambodia, HisExcellency Mr.HorNam hong, VicePrimeMinister of the Kingdom of
Cambodia, to the floor.
M. HOR : Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, au vu de l’ensemble des
exposés écrits et oraux présentés par le Cambodge, et sans préjuger de l’interprétation de la Cour
sur le fond du différend, le Cambodge prie la Cour de bien vouloir indiquer les mesures
conservatoires suivantes jusqu’au prononcé de l’arrêt de la Cour :
⎯ Un retrait immédiat et inconditionnel de toutes les forces thaïlandaises des parties du territoire
cambodgien dans la zone du temple de Préah Vihéar.
⎯ L’interdiction de toute activité militaire de la Thaïlande dans la zone du temple de
Préah Vihéar. - 27 -
⎯ L’abstention de tout acte ou action de la part de la Thaïlande qui pourrait entraver les droits du
Cambodge ou aggraver le différend dans l’instance au principal.
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président et Mesdames et Messieurs les juges. Merci.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His ExcellencyHoNr amhong, VicePrimeMinister of
Cambodia, for his statement of the conclusion of Cambodia. Now that ends the second round of
oral observations of Cambodia. The Court will m eet again this afternoon at 5p.m. to hear the
second round of oral observations of Thailand. The Court now rises.
The Court rose at 11.30 a.m.
___________
Audience publique tenue le mardi 31 mai 2011, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Owada, président, en l'affaire relative à la Demande en interprétation de l'arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l'affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)