Audience publique tenue le lundi 3 juin 2002, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président

CR 2002/28
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2002
Public sitting
held on Monday 3 June 2002, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Guillaume presiding,
in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia/Malaysia)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2002
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 3 juin 2002, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Guillaume, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan
(Indonésie/Malaisie)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
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Present: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby
Judges ad hoc Weeramantry
Franck
Registrar Couvreur
¾¾¾¾¾¾
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Présents : M. Guillaume, président
M. Shi, vice-président
MM. Oda
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Elaraby, juges
MM. Weeramantry
Franck, juges ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
¾¾¾¾¾¾
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The Government of the Republic of Indonesia is represented by:
H. E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
H. E. Mr. Abdul Irsan, Ambassador of Indonesia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Alfred H. A. Soons, Professor of Public International Law, Utrecht University,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Member of the English Bar, Member of the Institute of
International Law,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, Member of the New York Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, Member of the Rome Bar, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Charles Claypoole, Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales, Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mr. Mathias Forteau, Lecturer and Researcher at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, Researcher at
CEDIN ¾ Paris X (Nanterre)
as Counsel;
Mr. Hasyim Saleh, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, The Hague,
Dr. Rachmat Soedibyo, Director General for Oil & Natural Resources, Department of Energy &
Mining,
Major General S. N. Suwisma, Territorial Assistance to Chief of Staff for General Affairs,
Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Mr. Donnilo Anwar, Director for International Treaties for Politics, Security & Territorial Affairs,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Eddy Pratomo, Director for International Treaties for Economic, Social & Cultural Affairs,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Bey M. Rana, Director for Territorial Defence, Department of Defence,
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Le Gouvernement de la République d’Indonésie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Hassan Wirajuda, ministre des affaires étrangères,
comme agent;
S. Exc. M. Abdul Irsan, ambassadeur d’Indonésie aux Pays-Bas,
comme coagent;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Alfred A. H. Soons, professeur de droit international public à l’Université d’Utrecht,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau anglais, membre de l’Institut de droit
international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Charles Claypoole, Solicitor à la Cour suprême d’Angleterre et du Pays de Galles, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
M. Mathias Forteau, chargé de cours et chercheur à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, chercheur au
au Centre de droit international de l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre (CEDIN),
comme conseils;
M. Hasyim Saleh, chef de mission adjoint à l’ambassade d’Indonésie à La Haye,
M. Rachmat Soedibyo, directeur général pour les ressources pétrolières et naturelles, ministère de
l’énergie et des mines,
Le général de division S. N. Suwisma, assistant pour les questions territoriales auprès du chef
d’état-major pour les affaires générales, quartier général des forces armées indonésiennes,
M. Donnilo Anwar, directeur des traités internationaux pour les questions de politique, de sécurité
et de territoire au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Eddy Pratomo, directeur des traités internationaux pour les questions économiques, sociales et
culturelles au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Bey M. Rana, directeur de la défense territoriale, ministère de la défense,
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Mr. Suwarno, Director for Boundary Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs,
Mr. Subyianto, Director for Exploration & Exploitation, Department of Energy & Mining,
Mr. A. B. Lapian, Expert on Borneo History,
Mr. Kria Fahmi Pasaribu, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, The Hague,
Mr. Moenir Ari Soenanda, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Paris,
Mr. Rachmat Budiman, Department of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Abdul Havied Achmad, Head of District, East Kalimantan Province,
Mr. Adam Mulawarman T., Department of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Ibnu Wahyutomo, Department of Foreign Affairs,
Capt. Wahyudi, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Capt. Fanani Tedjakusuma, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Group Capt. Arief Budiman, Survey & Mapping, Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters,
Mr. Abdulkadir Jaelani, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, The Hague,
Mr. Daniel T. Simandjuntak, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, The Hague,
Mr. Soleman B. Ponto, Military Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, The Hague
Mr. Ishak Latuconsina, Member of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia,
Mr. Amris Hasan, Member of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia,
as Advisers;
Mr. Martin Pratt, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham,
Mr. Robert C. Rizzutti, Senior Mapping Specialist, International Mapping Associates,
Mr. Thomas Frogh, Cartographer, International Mapping Associates
as Technical Advisers.
The Government of Malaysia is represented by:
H. E. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as Agent;
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M. Suwarno, directeur des affaires frontalières, ministère de l’intérieur,
M. Subiyanto, directeur de l’exploration et de l’exploitation, ministère de l’énergie et des mines,
M. A. B. Lapian, expert sur l’histoire de Bornéo,
M. Kria Fahmi Pasaribu, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade d’Indonésie à La Haye,
M. Moenir Ari Soenanda, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade d’Indonésie à Paris,
M. Rachmat Budiman, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Abdul Havied Achmad, chef de district, province de Kalimantan est,
M. Adam Mulawarman T., ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Ibnu Wahyutomo, ministère des affaires étrangères,
Le capitaine Wahyudi, quartier général des forces armées indonésiennes,
Le capitaine Fanani Tedjakusuma, quartier général des forces armées indonésiennes,
Le colonel Arief Budiman, département de la topographie et de la cartographie, quartier général des
forces armées indonésiennes,
M. Abdulkadir Jaelani, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Indonésie à La Haye,
M. Daniel T. Simandjuntak, troisième secrétaire à l’ambassade d’Indonésie à La Haye,
M. Soleman B. Ponto, attaché militaire à l’ambassade d’Indonésie à la Haye,
M. Ishak Latuconsina, Membre de la Chambre des Représentants de la République d’Indonésie,
M. Amris Hasan, Membre de la Chambre des Représentants de la République d’Indonésie,
comme conseillers;
M. Martin Pratt, unité de recherche sur les frontières internationales de l’Université de Duhram,
M. Robert C. Rizzutti, cartographe principal, International Mapping Associates,
M. Thomas Frogh, cartographe, International Mapping Associates,
comme conseillers techniques.
Le Gouvernement de la Malaisie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, ambassadeur en mission extraordinaire, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
comme agent;
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H. E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands
as Co-Agent;
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C., C.B.E., Honorary Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the Institut de Droit International,
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot, Emeritus Professor, University of Paris-I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), Former
Minister,
Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, Member of the English and Australian Bars, Member of the Institute of
International Law,
Mr. Nico Schrijver, Professor of International Law, Free University, Amsterdam and Institute of
Social Studies, The Hague; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
as Counsel and Advocates;
Dato’ Zaitun Zawiyah Puteh, Solicitor-General of Malaysia,
Mrs. Halima Hj. Nawab Khan, Senior Legal Officer, Sabah State Attorney-General’s Chambers,
Mr. Athmat Hassan, Legal Officer, Sabah State Attorney-General’s Chambers,
Mrs. Farahana Rabidin, Federal Counsel, Attorney-General’s Chambers
as Counsel;
Datuk Dr. Nik Mohd. Zain Hj. Nik Yusof, Secretary General, Ministry of Land and Co-operative
Development,
Datuk Jaafar Ismail, Director-General, National Security Division, Prime Minister’s Department,
H. E. Ambassador Hussin Nayan, Under-Secretary, Territorial and Maritime Affairs Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Ab. Rahim Hussin, Director, Maritime Security Policy, National Security Division, Prime
Minister’s Department,
Mr. Raja Aznam Nazrin, Principal Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime Affairs Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Zulkifli Adnan, Counsellor of the Embassy of Malaysia in the Netherlands,
Ms Haznah Md. Hashim, Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime Affairs Division, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Azfar Mohamad Mustafar, Assistant Secretary, Territorial and Maritime Affairs Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as Advisers;
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S. Exc. Mme Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent;
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C., C.B.E., professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Jean-Pierre Cot, professeur émérite à l’Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne), ancien
ministre,
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre des barreaux anglais et australien, membre de l’Institut
de droit international,
M. Nico Schrijver, professeur de droit international à l’Université libre d’Amsterdam et à l’Institut
d’études sociales de La Haye, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Dato’ Zaitun Zawiyah Puteh, Solicitor General de la Malaisie,
Mme Halima Hj. Nawab Khan, juriste principale au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de l’Etat du
Sabah,
M. Athmat Hassan, juriste au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de l’Etat du Sabah,
Mme Farahana Rabidin, conseil fédéral au cabinet de l’Attorney-General,
comme conseils;
M. Datuk Dr. Nik Mohd. Zain Hj. Nik Yusof, secrétaire général du ministère de l’aménagement du
territoire et du développement coopératif,
M. Datuk Jaafar Ismail, directeur général du département de la sécurité nationale, services du
premier ministre,
S. Exc. M. Hussin Nayan, ambassadeur, sous-secrétaire au département des affaires territoriales et
maritimes du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Ab. Rahim Hussin, directeur de la politique de sécurité maritime, département de la sécurité
nationale, cabinet du premier ministre,
M. Raja Aznam Nazrin, secrétaire adjoint principal au département des affaires territoriales et
maritimes du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Zulkifli Adnan, conseiller de l’ambassade de la Malaisie aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Haznah Md. Hashim, secrétaire adjointe au département des affaires territoriales et maritimes
du ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Azfar Mohamad Mustafar, secrétaire adjoint au département des affaires territoriales et
maritimes du ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers;
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Mr. Hasan Jamil, Director of Survey, Geodetic Survey Division, Department of Survey and
Mapping,
Mr. Tan Ah Bah, Principal Assistant Director of Survey, Boundary Affairs, Department of Survey
and Mapping,
Mr. Hasnan Hussin, Senior Technical Assistant, Boundary Affairs, Department of Survey and
Mapping
as Technical Advisers.
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M. Hasan Jamil, directeur de la topographie, service des levés géodésiques, département de la
topographie et de la cartographie,
M. Tan Ah Bah, sous-directeur principal de la topographie, service des frontières, département de
la topographie et de la cartographie,
M. Hasnan Hussin, assistant technique principal du service des frontières, département de la
topographie et de la cartographie,
comme conseillers techniques.
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Le PRÉSIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. La séance est ouverte et je donne à nouveau la
parole à sir Arthur Watts.
Sir Arthur WATTS: Thank you, Mr. President. Before lunch I had explained that, in short,
the allocation of title to islands was an integral part of the 1891 Convention’s main purpose, which
was to settle all territorial disputes in the area. With that in mind, let me now turn to look at the
substantive provisions of the Convention giving effect to that purpose as defined. The full text of
the Convention is at tab 1 in the judges’ folders. The first three articles can be disposed of, for our
present purposes fairly quickly.
(b) Article I
15. Article I establishes that the boundary between the Dutch and British possessions “shall
start from 4° 10’ north latitude on the east coast of Borneo”. This was, the Court will recall, the
compromise starting point agreed during the negotiations, representing the location of Broershoek
on the mainland coast. That provision merely established the starting point for the boundary. From
there it went both ways, westwards and eastwards.
(c) Articles II and III
16. The westward boundary, going inland across the mainland of Borneo, is delimited in
Articles II and III. Those Articles are not directly relevant, and for the moment may be left on one
side ¾ although, for purposes of comparison, it will be helpful to refer to them later.
(d) Article IV
17. The boundary running eastward from its agreed starting point is of central importance for
the present case. Its delimitation is set out in Article IV of the Convention. It is on the screen now,
and, as I said, it is in the text of the Convention which is at tab 1 in the judges’ folders. It reads as
follows:
“From 4° 10’ north latitude on the east coast the boundary line shall be
continued eastward along that parallel, across the Island of Sebittik: that portion of
the island situated to the north of that parallel shall belong unreservedly to the British
North Borneo Company, and the portion south of that parallel to the Netherlands.”
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18. Indonesia’s contention as to the meaning of that Article has been briefly set out earlier.
It is that Article IV established the 4° 10’ N parallel latitude as a line of division between all British
and Dutch possessions in the area. Moreover, given the starting point at Broershoek on the coast,
the line is to be “continued eastward” ¾ the words used in Article IV ¾ so far as necessary,
including out to sea, to achieve that basic task of settling all disputes and dividing all territories.
19. The reasons which lead Indonesia to that view will be set out in full in a few moments.
First, it is necessary just to note that in attributing meaning to Article IV, the rules for the
interpretation of treaties are to be applied. Those rules are set out in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and that provision, as the Court has affirmed (recently in the
case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island1
), reflects customary international law. That case
concerned a treaty concluded in 1890, just a year earlier than the Anglo-Dutch Convention
presently in issue, and there is no doubt that the same conclusion applies to it.
20. Article 31 is well known. It requires a treaty to “be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose”.
21. It is thus not just the “ordinary meaning” of the terms of the 1891 Convention which
governs their interpretation, but that meaning in the context in which those terms are used, and in
the light of the Convention’s object and purpose.
22. The context of a treaty for the purpose of its interpretation can be clarified in a number of
respects. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention itself indicates in this connection that the text of the
treaty and its preamble and annexes are part of its context, as are certain agreements or instruments
made by the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. As the International Law
Commission explained in its Commentary to the draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, the context
of a term of a treaty “is not merely the article or section of the treaty in which the term occurs, but
the treaty as a whole”2
. Moreover, following several judgments of the Court cited in Indonesia’s
Counter-Memorial3
, account must also be taken of the general context of the treaty’s conclusions.

1
I.C.J. Reports 1999, Judgment of 13 December 1999, para. 18.
2Commentary to draft Art. 27, para. 12.
3Counter-Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.29.
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23. In applying these rules of interpretation to Article IV of the 1891 Convention, a number
of points stand out.
24. First, it is necessary to recall that the underlying object and purpose of the Convention
was to settle which State had sovereignty over which possessions, so that all future disputes, such
as those of which there had already been signs, would be avoided.
25. The Convention refers to delimiting boundaries between “possessions”. So far as
boundaries on land are concerned, there is no particular problem of principle which arises. But as
regards maritime possessions, there is a potential problem: any attempt to attribute by name a
myriad small islands to one party or the other is inherently unsafe where, as off the Borneo coast at
the end of the nineteenth century, there could be no assurance that all islands had been identified.
Hence it was the common practice in such circumstances to identify sovereignty over small islands
by adopting a straight line across maritime areas, and distribute sovereignty according to whichever
side of the line an island might lie. This, manifestly, is what Article IV of the 1891 Convention
did ¾ fully in line with prevailing practice, and the geographical circumstances: it was the only
way to be sure that the underlying objective of avoiding future disputes would be realized.
26. That that was the intention behind Article IV is evident from its very language. It refers
to the line, which started at 4° 10’ N on the coast, as being “continued eastward along that
parallel”. The whole notion of linear “continuation”, particularly when reinforced by the word
“along”, does not embrace a line of only limited extent with a nearby terminal point, but signifies
rather a line of indeterminate length.
27. Such a reading of the Convention ¾ i.e., one which attributes sovereignty over
islands ¾ is the only way in which its purpose ¾ dispute avoidance ¾ could be achieved. The
territorial limits of the possessions of the two parties were, as Indonesia has shown, uncertain.
Both sides wanted to settle potential disputes once and for all. Giving Article IV a meaning which
would leave undecided and still uncertain the attribution of small offshore islands must be rejected
as inconsistent with that purpose. Coverage of potentially disputed islands was not some “optional
extra” in the Convention, but an integral part of its main purpose.
28. And here it must be emphasized that Article IV is not just about the two Indonesian
islands of Sipidan and Ligitan. It establishes a rule that benefited both parties to the Convention ¾
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and still benefits both Parties to this present dispute. It is Article IV’s maritime extent in the waters
to the east of Borneo which confirmed Britain’s ¾ and now Malaysia’s ¾ title to those islands
which lie to the north of the agreed parallel. If Article IV is deprived of maritime significance, then
title to all those other offshore islands could again become an issue ¾ the very thing which the
parties wanted to avoid, in reaching a settlement of these territorial problems once and for all.
29. Moreover, it is clear that the parties to the Convention, in their negotiations, were well
aware that the line they were negotiating would be a line which would extend out to sea. As
Professor Pellet has shown, and as now shown on the screen (and it is at tab 23 in the judges’
folders), the initial British proposal was for a line running eastwards from Broershoek, on the coast
at 4° 10’ N, and then south-eastwards through the channel between the islands of Sebatik and
Nanoekan: this British line then turned east along the 4° parallel of latitude and continued for over
50 miles out to the open sea. While that particular proposed line was not in the end the line on
which the parties agreed, the fact that that line was proposed, by Great Britain (Malaysia’s
predecessor in title), shows that a maritime line separating island possessions was in the parties’
minds at the time.
30. Malaysia has argued that Article IV only takes the boundary as far east as the east coast
of the island of Sebatik mentioned in it. But this is to read into Article IV a terminal boundary
point which is not there in the text.
31. To see that this is so, one has only to compare the terms of Article IV with the language
specifying the terminal point of the land boundary running westwards from its starting point on the
east coast of Borneo. Article II described in some detail the course of the westward-running
boundary, and then the relevant part of Article III stated that the boundary runs “[f]rom the summit
of the range of mountains mentioned in Article II, to Tandjong-Datoe on the west coast of
Borneo”. Here, it is evident that, where the parties intended the boundary to terminate at a point on
the coast, they found no difficulty in saying so. “Continues to” a specified point is very different
from “continues along” a specified line. By saying, in relation to the eastern end of the line, that it
“continues along” the specified parallel the parties must be taken to have said, not only in terms but
also by comparison with what they said in Article III, precisely what they meant ¾ the line was to
“continue along” the parallel.
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32. As already noted, that “continuation” had no fixed terminal point. Given the uncertainty
over the attribution of island possessions in the area, and equally the resolve of the parties to avoid
all future disputes of this kind, this made sense.
33. Such an indefinite line is fully in accord with international practice, as Indonesia has
shown in its Counter-Memorial4
. Nor is it in any way unusual that a line of attribution should
extend so far as to dispose of sovereignty over islands some 50 miles from the relevant coast: as
Indonesia also showed in its Counter-Memorial5
, two Conventions of special relevance to this
case ¾ the United States-Spain Peace Treaty of 1898, and the 1930 Anglo-United States
Convention ¾ do precisely that, in relation to islands well over 50 miles from the nearest mainland
or even large island.
34. The lack of a fixed terminal point for the line does not, of course, mean that the line goes
on forever, following the 4° 10’ N parallel right round the earth: an indefinite line is not the same
as an endless line. Like all treaty provisions, it has to be interpreted in its context, and in the light
of the treaty’s object and purpose. Seen in that light, the line continues only so far as necessary to
settle definitively the whole problem of potentially competing Dutch and British territorial claims
in the area: it continues so far as necessary to divide islands or territories whose attribution might
give rise to future dispute. That certainly included going as far east as Ligitan ¾ and for present
purposes there is no need to consider whether there was any further particular point which the line
needed to reach.
35. Malaysia, of course, has contended that the line established by Article IV stops at the east
coast of Sebatik, and argues that that Article was only intended to deal with the fate of that
island ¾ in particular and in practice, its division.
36. That Article IV does deal with Sebatik is not denied by Indonesia. That Article IV
stipulates that the 4° 10’ N line passes “across” Sebatik, and divides that island along that line is
equally not denied by Indonesia. But that, as Malaysia maintains, Article IV provides for a line
which only deals with Sebatik, and goes no further than its east coast, is most emphatically denied

4Counter-Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.44.
5
Ibid., para. 2.14.
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by Indonesia. Nothing in the terms of that Article, nor in their context, nor in the object and
purpose of the Convention, supports such a view.
37. It is, of course, true that in negotiating the Convention the parties were very interested in
the disposition of the island of Sebatik, and in the navigation rights around it. If one starts at the
coast at 4° 10’ N and goes eastwards, which is what Article IV is about, the first island one touches
is Sebatik. So of course the parties had to deal with it there, in the immediate context of that
Article, which covered the eastward extension of the line. Neither of the two broad options open to
the parties and about which they had negotiated ¾ that is, of attributing Sebatik wholly to Great
Britain or wholly to the Netherlands ¾ was acceptable to them. Instead, they decided to divide the
island, and to use for that purpose the same parallel of latitude which they had decided would serve
their other purposes in the area ¾ and they needed to say so expressly, in order to make clear that
the two other possible options were being rejected.
38. But dealing with the island in that way, in what is a subsidiary clause in the single
sentence which constitutes Article IV, does not serve to place a limit on the principal thrust of the
text: that is that the line “continue[s] eastward along” the stipulated parallel of latitude.
39. The terms of Article IV, while undoubtedly dealing with Sebatik, are equally appropriate
for covering also other offshore islands in the area. I say “other” offshore islands for two reasons
in particular.
40. The first is that Sebatik itself is of course an island. It cannot be assimilated to the
mainland of Borneo ¾ there is a stretch of water several miles wide between it and the mainland.
That alone is enough to show that the Convention cannot be regarded as dealing only with the
mainland of Borneo.
41. The second reason is that it must not be forgotten that Article IV was dealing with both
Dutch and British islands in the area. As explained earlier, it is not just the islands lying to the
south of the 4° 10’ N line which were attributed to the Netherlands, but also those lying to the north
which were attributed to Great Britain.
42. The truth is that Sebatik was dealt with in Article IV because, moving eastwards from the
coast, it was an island of greater size and significance than others in the area, and because of its
impact on navigation rights: for both of those reasons the parties paid considerable attention to it in
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their negotiations. But there is nothing to suggest that it was their sole concern. They were settling
their potential disputes over possessions to the east of Broershoek, and while Sebatik might have
been the most immediate of their problems, the language they adopted covered also the other
offshore islands, much smaller than Sebatik, in the general area which concerned them.
43. It is also highly relevant that the 4° 10’ N line, as it continues eastwards from the coast,
crosses only one island ¾ Sebatik. That eastward continuation of the line therefore called for
special treatment for only that one island, which is an added reason for it being dealt with in the
way it was in Article IV.
44. That the 4° 10’ N line as described in Article IV is said to continue “across” the island of
Sebatik does nothing to establish that the parties’ intention was that it should stop at the east coast
of that island. “Across” is a term which, in its ordinary meaning, carries the meaning of “through
and beyond” the object being crossed. The line, in being “continued eastward along” the stipulated
parallel of latitude, does indeed cross the island. But that in no way implies that it stops there ¾
and certainly does not do so when there are many other indications, not least of which is the
parties’ evident purpose of comprehensive dispute avoidance, that in using the words “continued
eastward along” they meant exactly that. Those words are to be applied as they stand.
45. The Parties have expressed different views in their pleadings on a number of
grammatical and linguistic points arising on the language of Article IV. Some of these are
somewhat rarefied, and require careful consideration, and it is probably better to leave them as they
have been set out in the pleadings6
. At this stage only two points need be made.
46. The first is that the strictly grammatical analysis of Article IV supports Indonesia’s view
of its correct interpretation.
47. The second is that, simply on the basis of the plain structure of the text, the main clause
of Article IV consists of the proposition that “the boundary-line shall be continued eastward along
that parallel”; all the rest, about the island of Sebatik, is essentially a subsidiary part of the
sentence, filling out part of its meaning, but not distorting the clear sense of the main clause, which
takes the line out to sea along the 4° 10’ N parallel.

6
See Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.43 (g) and (h); Counter-Memorial of Indonesia, paras. 5.19-5.20, 5.23-5.26;
Reply of Indonesia, paras. 2.17-2.19.
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Explanatory memorandum map
48. While Indonesia is satisfied that the plain, ordinary, normal meaning of Article IV has
the result for which Indonesia contends ¾ namely, that the 4° 10’ N line continues out to sea so far
as necessary to fulfil the Convention’s object and purpose ¾ two matters associated with the
Convention lend compelling support to Indonesia’s view. These are the course of the debates in
the Dutch Parliament when the Convention was being ratified, and the amendment which was
introduced to the Contract of Vassalage with the Sultan of Boeloengan in order to give effect to the
Convention. Both of these matters were officially known to the British Government, which raised
no objection to either of them.
49. The Convention made special mention of the need for approval by the Dutch Parliament.
Article VIII stipulated that the Convention had to be ratified, and that it would come into force
three months after the exchange of ratifications. This exchange of ratifications was to “take place
one month, or sooner if possible, after the said Convention shall have received the approval of the
Netherland States-General”. There was no equivalent reference to approval of the Convention by
the British Parliament, so clearly particular importance attached to the need for the approval of the
Dutch Parliament. This reflected the differing requirements of the Parties’ constitutional
procedures.
50. The Dutch constitutional practice called for the Dutch Government, in seeking the
approval of the States-General, to submit to it a Bill ¾ that is, a draft law ¾ to that effect. The
Bill had to be accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum. This Memorandum had as its
purpose to explain to the States-General the significance of a proposed treaty, and why its
conclusion was in the interests of the Netherlands.
51. It was not the practice for such an Explanatory Memorandum to provide an exhaustive
analysis of the treaty approval for which was being sought. Rather, the Memorandum would
highlight those aspects of the treaty which were likely to be of principal interest to the
States-General, such as its main purpose and achievements: in that way the members of the Dutch
legislature would be made aware of what it was that they were being invited to approve. The main
purpose of the Explanatory Memorandum was thus essentially as part of the political process of
securing parliamentary approval for a treaty.
- 20 -
52. The Explanatory Memorandum for the 1891 Convention was of this kind. Given its
geographical impact, it was accompanied by a map ¾ which is being referred to here as the
“Explanatory Memorandum map”. It is a map which you saw earlier this morning, it is now on the
screen, and a copy is also at tab 8 in the judges’ folders.
53. As can be seen, the map depicted a number of lines. These were drawn in order to
explain to the States-General what had been agreed in the Convention, as compared with various
other proposals which had been on the table in the negotiations. Thus, as stated on the map itself,
the map showed, by a blue line, the boundary initially claimed by the Netherlands. It showed, as a
yellow line, the boundary claimed by the British North Borneo Company (BNBC). A green line
depicted the boundary suggested by the British Government. Finally, a red line showed the line
finally agreed in the Convention.
54. Five things about these lines are to be noted.
(a) First, the area of the overlapping claims of the British North Borneo Company and the
Netherlands ¾ that is, the area between the yellow and blue lines ¾ is quite extensive.
(b) Second, the compromise nature of the agreed line ¾ the red line, particularly along the
4° 10’ N parallel ¾ is evident, dividing more or less equally, as it does, the overlapping
claimed areas.
(c) Third, as already noted, the British Government’s proposed line, the green line running
south-east from Broershoek and between Sebatik and Nanoekan, is clearly shown to run out to
the open sea: a seaward-extending line was clearly in the parties’ mind at the time. In fact,
this depiction extended less far out to sea than did the British proposal itself: as can be seen
from the sketch-map already shown to the Court, and at tab 23 of the judges’ folders, the
British proposal turned east after passing south of Sebatik and then continued eastwards until
well past Sipadan.
(d) Fourth, even more clearly, the line actually agreed in the Convention ¾ the red line ¾ runs
eastwards from the coast at Broershoek, across the island of Sebatik, and continues a
considerable distance out to sea, along the 4° 10’ N parallel of latitude.
(e) Fifth, the same red line ¾ the line agreed in the Convention ¾ correctly reflects the
distinction between Articles III and IV of the Convention, to which reference has already been
- 21 -
made. While the eastern, Article IV, line extends seawards, the western, Article III, line stops
abruptly at the coast. It is the difference between a line running “to” a named place ¾
Tandjong-Datoe, at the western end ¾ and a line which is “continued eastward along” the
specified parallel ¾ 4° 10’ N ¾ at the eastern end.
55. In putting this map to the States-General the Dutch Government were clearly sensitive to
the possible charge that they had conceded too extensive an area to the British. They explained,
however, that their claimed area was not an unchallengeable claim, and that what they had
achieved was, now, “a very accurately delineated boundary” instead of a “highly uncertain
boundary”: moreover, that accurately delineated boundary which “has now been accepted . . .
obviates all difficulties in the future not only concerning the part of Borneo to which the dispute
related but also concerning the whole island”7
. The Government’s intention to deal
comprehensively with all possible sources of territorial friction in the area is apparent.
56. The red line on the Explanatory Memorandum map clearly bears out Indonesia’s
contentions in this present case. In the light of that map, it is simply impossible to maintain that the
Dutch Government ¾ and, as will be shown in a moment, the British Government ¾ intended the
agreed 4° 10’ N line to stop at the east coast of Sebatik. Article IV of the Convention referred to
the agreed line as one which “continued eastward along” the specified parallel of latitude, and the
Explanatory Memorandum map shows just that ¾ an abundantly clear illustration of what
Article IV meant.
57. The map depicted all the relevant features needed to enable the States-General to decide
upon the approval of the Convention. It did not need to show each and every feature of the area
covered by it, and in particular every single one of the many small islands offshore the coast of
Borneo. The map’s purpose was to illustrate for the States-General the general effect of the
Convention, for which there was no need for abundant cartographic detail.
58. Moreover, so far as concerns the small offshore islands, their precise location was at that
time, and for that purpose, somewhat beside the point. What mattered was the course followed by
the line of attribution at sea: islands south of that line were Dutch, and islands to the north were

7
Full quotation at Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.49.
- 22 -
British ¾ without any need to identify them. It was the location of the line which was critical
rather than the location of particular small islands, and the map depicted the location of the line
with abundant clarity.
59. The map is of great importance as a contemporary exposition of the Dutch Government’s
views as to what was agreed in Article IV of the Convention. The Explanatory Memorandum,
together with the accompanying map, was submitted to the States-General on 25 July 1891, that is
just one month after the signature of the Convention. The contemporaneity of it as evidence of the
Government’s views cannot be doubted.
60. The ratification process with which it was associated is in any event an important act in
relation to the treaty being ratified ¾ “of vital importance”, as the Court put it in the Ambatielos
case8
. This is particularly so where ratification is expressly stipulated in the treaty to be dependent
upon the approval of that party’s legislature. The map was an integral part of the Dutch
Government’s ratification process.
61. And moreover, the map was the basis on which the expressly required parliamentary
approval of the States-General was given, thereby meeting the precondition established by
Article VIII of the Convention.
62. In all, as public, contemporaneous and official evidence of what the Dutch Government
intended and believed to be the effect of Article IV of the Convention, the map is compelling in the
conclusions to be drawn from it.
63. Not only was the map known to the British Government by way of its public availability
as part of the debates in the States-General, but it was also known officially to the British
Government in the context of the 1891 Convention. The British Legation at The Hague followed
carefully the ratification debates in the Dutch Parliament, and regularly reported developments
back to the Foreign Office. Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Minister at The Hague, sent an
official despatch back to the Foreign Office on 26 January 18929
with which he sent two copies of
the map: and he drew specific attention to it. He said that it “seems to be the only interesting
feature of a document which does not otherwise call for special comment”. But while thus drawing

8
Full quotation at Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.51 (a).
9Memorial of Indonesia, Ann. 81. See also Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.54.
- 23 -
particular attention to the map, Sir Horace Rumbold, who was an active participant in the
Anglo-Dutch dealings leading to the conclusion of the Convention and would have been familiar
with the Convention’s content, made no critical comment about the lines depicted on the map.
64. That official transmission of the map back to the Foreign Office elicited no response
from the Foreign Office. There is no recorded comment on it; certainly, no indication of any
dissent from its depiction of the agreed line. All that the Foreign Office did, apparently, was
straight away to place the map in its official records, along with the Convention. In due course, in
line with normal Government practice with official archives, the Convention and map were
transferred to the Public Records Office ¾ in effect, the official depository for publicly available
State archives. And the Dutch Government did the same, and the map has been kept as part of the
Netherlands State archives in The Hague.
65. It is thus clear that the Explanatory Memorandum map, which so clearly supports the
Indonesian contentions in this case, was both officially known to the British Government at the
time and in the context of the 1891 Convention, and was in no way whatsoever objected to by the
British Government. The significance of this British official silence in the face of the Explanatory
Memorandum map and the texts associated with it can scarcely be overstated. They demonstrated
beyond question the Dutch Government’s official interpretation of the 1891 Convention.
66. The British Government’s knowledge, coupled with the absence of any indication of
dissent from the depictions on it of the lines which were the very heart of the Convention,
necessarily implies Great Britain’s concurrence in the content of the map. That in turn involves
irrefutable acquiescence in the depiction of the Convention line, such that all islands to the south of
that line ¾ and thus in particular the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan ¾ belong to the Netherlands.
67. There are strong parallels between the circumstances surrounding the Explanatory
Memorandum map, and those of the so-called “Livre Jaune” map which was in issue before the
Court in the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad)10 case.
68. There, there had been a Franco-British “Additional Declaration” of 21 March 1899: it
defined a boundary line by verbal description, but without any map being attached to the

10I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 6.
- 24 -
Declaration. A few days after the Declaration was adopted, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
published the Declaration in a “Livre Jaune”. Along with the text of the Declaration, the Ministry
also published a map in the “Livre Jaune”. That map was annexed to the official text of the
Declaration kept in the Ministry’s archives. The same map was attached to the exposé des motifs
which accompanied the draft law submitted on 27 March 1899 to the French legislature authorizing
ratification of the Declaration. The map was also published in the French press.
69. The map ¾ like the Explanatory Memorandum map ¾ was an official publication; it
was contemporaneous with the Declaration it elucidated; it was related to the parliamentary
approval process; it was publicly available. There can be no doubt that the British authorities were
aware of it, but ¾ as with the Explanatory Memorandum map ¾ no protest or other dissent from it
was made by the British Government.
70. In fact, the map differed in certain respects from the description of the boundary given in
the text of the Franco-British Declaration. Nevertheless, the Court treated the map as an
authoritative interpretation of the Declaration11. The present case is an even stronger example of a
map being authoritative, since the Explanatory Memorandum map was entirely consistent with, and
in no way different from, the text of the Convention. It shows the line agreed in the Convention
and acquiesced in by Great Britain as a correct delineation of the agreed line.
71. The course of dealings between the Dutch and British Governments with regard to the
Explanatory Memorandum map can also be seen in other, quite distinct, legally relevant ways.
Indonesia has, in its written pleadings, drawn attention to three of these.
72. First, Indonesia has shown that the course of dealings between the two Governments
involved in particular the official and contemporaneous publication of the map by the Dutch
Government as part of its ratification process, and the failure of the British Government to dissent
from the depiction of the agreed line on it, despite its knowledge of the map. Indonesia
accordingly submitted in its Counter-Memorial12 that those circumstances constituted an agreement
relating to the 1891 Convention. As such it forms part of the context of the Convention within the
meaning of Article 31, paragraph 2 (a), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

11P. 18, para. 28; p. 30, para. 58; p. 37, para. 61; and p. 34, paras. 64-65.
12Paras. 5.31-5.34.
- 25 -
73. Second, and either additionally or alternatively, as Indonesia has submitted in its
Counter-Memorial13, the Explanatory Memorandum map constituted an instrument made by one of
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the Convention ¾ namely the Dutch Government,
which made and published the map as part of the ratification process required by the Convention ¾
and was accepted by the other party as an instrument related to the treaty ¾ namely, Great Britain,
through its knowledge of the map and the circumstances of its publication, accompanied by its
failure to dissent from the depiction of the agreed line on the map. Accordingly, the map, as such
an instrument, again forms part of the context of the Convention within the meaning of Article 31,
paragraph 2 (b), of the Vienna Convention.
74. Third, the agreement between the Netherlands and Great Britain which was constituted
by the course of their dealings in connection with the map, has a further legally relevant aspect. As
shown in Indonesia’s Counter-Memorial, it is either, or both, a subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the Convention or the application of its provisions, or
subsequent practice establishing the parties’ agreement regarding its interpretation. As such, it
must, by virtue of Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Convention be taken into account in
interpreting the 1891 Convention, together with the context.
75. For all the foregoing reasons, it is apparent that the Explanatory Memorandum map is of
great significance for this case, because of its particular and compelling relevance to the meaning
of Article IV of the Convention. It fully bears out the meaning of that provision as derived from
the actual language used:
¾ it was contemporaneous with the Convention;
¾ it was publicly available;
¾ it was an official Government document;
¾ it was prepared for use in the ratification process;
¾ it was submitted to the States-General; and
¾ it was known to ¾ indeed was expressly drawn to the attention of ¾ the British Government.

13Paras. 5.35-5.36.
- 26 -
76. And the British Government did nothing to indicate, in any way, that it dissented from
the depiction on that map of the line which was stated on the face of the map to have been the line
agreed in the Convention. A clearer case of acquiescence or implied agreement is hard to imagine.
77. Yet the map’s significance does not end there. As was said at the outset, it was prepared
and submitted to the States-General as part of the ratification process of the 1891 Convention. It
was, together with the Explanatory Memorandum of which it formed part, the basis for the
parliamentary debates on the ratification of the Convention.
78. Those debates made one thing abundantly clear. The Dutch Government was
commending the Convention to the States-General, whatever niggling doubts the members of the
legislature might have about it, on the grounds of “the advantages of the arrangement come to, as
settling for good and all the entire question of the boundaries between Dutch and British protected
territory in Borneo”14: or as put by the Government in another part of the debate, the Government
had exercised its duty to ensure that “the rights in relation to local rulers both in Borneo itself and
on the neighbouring smaller islands are regulated in such a way that difficulties with other Powers
need never be feared with regard to their respective claims”15
.
79. Previous uncertainty was being replaced by certainty, across the board ¾ “for good and
all”, future “difficulties . . . need never be feared”. And that certainty was being commended to the
States-General, and was accepted by it, on the basis of the map forming part of the Explanatory
Memorandum. The Court itself has said of another boundary settlement (in the Temple of Preah
Vihear case), that it thought it
“legitimate to conclude that an important, not to say a paramount object of the
settlements of the 1904-1908 period (which brought about a comprehensive
regulation of all outstanding frontier questions between the two countries), was to put
an end to this state of tension and to achieve frontier stability on a basis of certainty
and finality”16
.
The same is true of the 1891 Convention.

14Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.56.
15Ibid., para. 5.61.
16I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 34-35. For the full quotation see Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.59; and also
para. 5.60.
- 27 -
Amended Contract of Vassalage
80. The Explanatory Memorandum does not stand alone as contemporaneous evidence of the
Netherlands understanding of what the 1891 Convention, and in particular Article IV, meant. That
Convention entered into force in 1892. In 1893 the Dutch authorities secured an amendment to the
Contracts of Vassalage of 1850 and 1878, setting out the territorial extent of Boeloengan. Just one
year after the entry into force of the Convention, the definition was amended to read, so far as
relevant, as follows:
“the islands of Tarakan and Nanoekan, and that portion of the Island of Sebitik,
situated to the south of the above boundary-line described in [a certain way] . . .
belong to Boeloengan, as well as the small islands belonging to the above islands, so
far as they are situated to the south of the boundary-line . . .”17
.
The final words of this text ¾ the reference to islands “so far as they are situated to the south of the
boundary-line” ¾ show that the Dutch Government regarded the effect of the 1891 Convention as
being to establish, in relation to islands, a line of territorial attribution extending out to sea.
81. This new text was officially communicated to the British Government on
26 February 1895. The text, with its clear implication as just stated, was in no way challenged by
the British Government. Once more, it confirmed ¾ by further silence ¾ the acquiescence in the
Explanatory Memorandum map which it had demonstrated by its initial silence.
1915 and 1928 Anglo-Dutch agreements
82. The 1891 Convention, of central importance though it is, is not the only Anglo-Dutch
treaty relevant to their common boundary in Borneo, and a brief word needs to be said about two
other treaties in this context ¾ particularly in so far as they relate to boundary maps. What follows
will only be “brief” because, for the reasons which Indonesia has explained fully in its written
pleadings18, the two treaties are essentially irrelevant to the issues arising in this case.
83. By way of background, it is to be noted that the 1891 Convention itself envisaged, in
Article V, that it might be necessary to determine with exactitude the boundary line described in
Articles I to IV of the Convention. This is in no way surprising: Articles I to IV are very brief ¾
just five sentences altogether ¾ but they describe a boundary stretching for something over

17Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.62.
18See Memorial of Indonesia, para. 5.65; Counter-Memorial of Indonesia, paras. 5.97-5.118; Reply of Indonesia,
paras. 2.37-2.50.
- 28 -
1,200 km overland, through mountainous and heavily forested terrain about which the parties
admitted that they knew very little.
84. Accordingly, pursuant to that provision, in 1915 and 1928 the parties concluded further
agreements, specifying the land boundary in particular areas. Each of those agreements annexed
maps, delineating the more exact boundary lines determined in the area covered by the agreement
in question. The 1915 agreement covered the island of Sebatik and a short distance into the
mainland of Borneo; the 1928 agreement covered a short distance much further in the interior.
85. These two stretches are indicated by the sketch-map now on the screen, and at tab 28 in
the judges’ folders: it is a sketch-map which was included in Indonesia’s Counter-Memorial as
Annex 26. As can readily be seen, the two agreements dealt with only a very small part of the total
land boundary between the Dutch and British territories in Borneo ¾ in fact, only about
20 per cent of the boundary.
86. This shows clearly the very limited extent of those two agreements. They, and their
annexed maps, are very relevant to those limited stretches of land boundary. They say nothing
whatsoever about the other stretches of the line agreed in the 1891 Convention.
87. Malaysia has sought to argue that the fact that the 1915 agreement and its map do not
show a line extending out to sea to the east of Sebatik means that no such eastward and seaward
extension of that line was agreed in Article IV of the 1891 Convention. But this is manifestly not
correct. The 1915 and 1928 agreements and their maps did not cover some 80 per cent of the land
boundary, but that does not mean that the line established by the Convention did not continue
across that other 80 per cent: of course it did. The correct position is that the maps annexed to the
1915 and 1928 agreements are wholly irrelevant to any other stretches of the Convention line,
whether to the west or the east of the limited stretches those agreements were dealing with.
88. Moreover, one must ask what a Commission charged with what was essentially a task of
demarcation could do in the way of demarcating a line at sea, as prescribed by Article IV? There is
neither a practical possibility of such a physical demarcation at sea nor, more importantly, any need
for it ¾ by establishing that the line followed a parallel of latitude, Article IV of the Convention
said all that was needed: that parallel can easily be identified at sea; nothing else is needed.
- 29 -
89. Those two later agreements simply do not address the issue which is at the centre of this
case. They do not say anything about the seaward extension of the particular parallel of latitude
prescribed by Article IV of the Convention ¾ which, the Court will recall, requires that the line be
“continued eastward along that parallel”, crossing as it does so the island of Sebatik. The maps
annexed to those two agreements are similarly silent on that issue. As agreed maps, they had an
immediate binding force which the Explanatory Memorandum map only acquired by virtue of its
publication and Great Britian’s subsequent acquiescence; but in no sense can they be said to
prevail over the Explanatory Memorandum map, and the agreement to which it gave rise, in
relation to stretches of the Convention line which were beyond the reach of the 1915 and 1928
agreements.
90. That Explanatory Memorandum map, for all the reasons which have been explained both
this afternoon and in Indonesia’s written pleadings, is compelling supporting evidence for
Indonesia’s interpretation of Article IV of the 1891 Convention. That interpretation follows both
from the text of that Article and from the object and purpose which the parties had in mind, namely
the wish to deal comprehensively with territorial issues in the area of their mutual concern so as to
put an end, once and for all, to all potential sources of territorial friction, whether on the mainland
or offshore.
91. Mr. President, and Members of the tribunal, that brings me to the end of my presentation
of Indonesia’s arguments concerning the meaning and significance of the 1891 Convention. I am
grateful to the Court for the courtesy and patience with which it has heard me. I now invite you,
Mr. President, to give the floor to Professor Soons, to begin Indonesia’s presentation of events
occurring after the 1891 Convention. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup, sir Arthur Watts. Je donne maintenant la
parole au professeur Alfred Soons.
Mr. SOONS:
- 30 -
Confirmation of Dutch title to the islands post 1891
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my task this afternoon will be to show that the title
to Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan, allocated to the Kingdom of the Netherlands by the 1891
Anglo-Dutch Convention, as just explained by Sir Arthur Watts, was confirmed in the subsequent
years by acts by both parties to the Convention. These acts involve: (1) the publication of maps by
the BNBC, and (2) naval patrols around the islands by the Dutch, including one highly significant
operation by the destroyer Lynx and its seaplane, involving even landing on the island of Sipadan.
In addition, I will deal with the significance of the internal Dutch deliberations in the 1920s on the
delimitation of the territorial sea off Sebatik Island, an issue which had been raised by Malaysia in
its Counter-Memorial and which Indonesia will be happy to address since it only underscores the
Indonesian position with respect to the nature of the 1891 Convention line.
Maps issued by Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, the BNBC’s official cartographer
2. First, I will address the maps issued by Stanford’s Geographical Establishment in London.
Shortly after the conclusion of the 1891 Convention, in the period 1894-1904, Stanford published
three maps which clearly indicate that the British viewed the 1891 Convention line as extending
offshore, thus leaving islands situated to the north of the line to the State of North Borneo and those
to the south of the line to the colony of the Dutch East Indies. Before discussing these maps,
however, I want to say a few words on the status of Stanford’s Establishment as the official
cartographer of the BNBC. Some of the maps issued by Stanford’s can incontestably be regarded
as official maps issued on behalf of the State of North Borneo, and as a consequence they have a
particular value in establishing the views of one of the parties to the Convention.
3. Already in 1888 Stanford had prepared two maps of the BNBC territory specifically for
the company. These maps were used by the British in formulating their positions advanced during
the negotiations for the 1891 Convention. Indonesia has quoted in its Memorial from a letter from
the British North Borneo Company to the British Foreign Office dated 8 March 1889. With this
letter, the BNBC provided at the request of the Foreign Office: “two copies of a Map carefully
prepared under the direction of the Court of Directors, showing, so far as possible in the present
state of geographical knowledge, the limits which they claim in Borneo” (emphasis added)
- 31 -
(Memorial of Indonesia, Vol. 2, Ann. 46). The two copies referred to in this letter have been
included in Indonesia’s Map Atlas, as maps 3 and 4, and they were shown this morning by
Professor Pellet. As you can see from the title of the map now shown on the screen, which is
map 3 of our Map Atlas, it was prepared by Stanford for the BNBC in 1888, as an extract from an
already existing basemap. The map shown is included in the judges’ folders, under tab 25; that
probably makes it easier to read the title.
4. As Indonesia has mentioned in its Memorial (para. 6.55), British archival sources show
that, following the conclusion of the 1891 Convention, Stanford’s Geographical Establishment
continued to act as the official cartographer of the BNBC, the Government of the State of North
Borneo. On 26 April 1892, for example, the Governor’s Office of the BNBC in Sandakan sent
correspondence to BNBC Headquarters in London enclosing two sets of plans regarding the
mapping of portions of the BNBC territory with the request that these plans be forwarded to
Stanford for their maps (Memorial of Indonesia, Vol. 3, Ann. 91). On 8 July 1898, the BNBC
Commissioner of Land in Sandakan sent correspondence to London indicating the results of further
surveys of the BNBC’s territory. I quote from the Commissioner’s letter, which you will find in
the judges’ folders under tab 29: “I hope these 3 tracings and map will be sent to Stanford to place
the details on our Territorial Map” (Memorial of Indonesia, Vol. 3, Ann. 92).
5. From this correspondence it is quite clear that the BNBC looked to Stanford for preparing
their official maps. This is not disputed by Malaysia in its written pleadings.
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now turn to the maps published by Stanford
shortly after the conclusion of the 1891 Convention. Clear confirmation that the British viewed the
1891 line as extending offshore, leaving Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan on the Dutch side of the
line, is provided by a map entitled “Borneo” published by Stanford in 1903. As can be seen from
this map, included in your folders under tab 30, the legend of the map explains that the provinces of
the BNBC are separated by red lines on the map. The boundaries of the BNBC’s provinces can be
seen to extend seaward, thus including various offshore islands. You can now see this in more
detail. In particular, the southern offshore boundary of the Elphinstone province continues into the
sea and coincides with the course of the 1891 line, leaving the island of Sipadan to the south, on the
Dutch side of the boundary. To the east of Sipadan the map shows another feature, unnamed,
- 32 -
which Malaysia alleges represents Ligitan (Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 5.10). The
feature is located just to the north of the line. We do not know if this was indeed intended to
represent Ligitan. Given the limited geographical knowledge of the area at that time it is very well
possible that Ligitan was incorrectly situated on the map. But that matters very little for our
purposes: what matters is the presence of the line at sea, and the fact that it follows the 4º 10’ N
parallel of latitude.
7. The 1903 Stanford map is direct evidence of what the BNBC considered the limits of its
territory following the conclusion of the 1891 Convention. Stanford’s status as effectively the
official cartographer for the BNBC underscores the important evidentiary value of the map.
8. Apart from this particular map there were other maps published by Stanford shortly after
the conclusion of the 1891 Convention which, not surprisingly given Stanford’s status as just
explained, show the function of the 1891 Convention line. The first was a map in Stanford’s
London Atlas of Universal Geography, edition of 1894. It was the first map of the region published
by Stanford after the conclusion of the 1891 Convention, and clearly took account of what was
agreed in that Convention. I will show you first the 1887 edition of the map, to illustrate the
difference. It is in the judges’ folders at tab 31. No lines extending beyond the coast are here to be
seen. Now you see the 1894 edition of the same map. We focus on the relevant area of the map.
You will find a copy in your folders at tab 32. It is significant that the southern limits of British
North Borneo can now be seen to extend out to sea from the island of Sibetik along the 4° 10’ N
line of latitude to a point well to the east of Sipadan and Ligitan. There can be no other explanation
for this southern limit than the fact that it reflected the territorial allocation between British North
Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies agreed upon in the 1891 Convention. British possessions
were clearly seen to be limited to areas lying to the north of 4° 10’ N latitude.
9. The 1904 edition of Stanford’s London Atlas of Universal Geography contains a map of
the region which is similar to the 1894 map. This map is included in Indonesia’s Reply, Volume 2,
Annex 26.
10. In conclusion: The maps published by Stanford clearly show the same line as the one on
the Explanatory Memorandum map; the BNBC recognized that the southern limits of its territory
east of the island of Sebatik coincided with the prolongation of the 4° 10’ N parallel of latitude
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established by the 1891 Convention to a point lying well east of Sipadan and Ligitan. Both islands
were clearly recognized as belonging to Dutch Borneo.
Dutch exercises of State functions: the activities of the Royal Netherlands Navy
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now turn to the evidence available from the
practice of the Netherlands to the effect that, subsequent to the conclusion of the 1891 Convention,
it regarded Sipadan and Ligitan as part of the colony of the Netherlands East Indies. One of the
most authoritative instances of evidence of confirmation of sovereignty over territory is the
undisputed conduct of policing activities in the territory. Such evidence is indeed available in this
case. A highly relevant example of such practice subsequent to the conclusion of the 1891
Convention is provided by the policing activities carried out in the area around Sipadan and Ligitan
by a ship of the Royal Netherlands Navy for the purpose of protecting the coastal population
against acts of piracy and robbery by people originating from the Sulu archipelago.
12. Indonesia has in its Counter-Memorial shown that the Dutch Navy, since the end of the
nineteenth century, periodically patrolled the seas around the islands located off the north-east
Borneo coast which were considered to be under Dutch sovereignty (Counter-Memorial of
Indonesia, para. 7.47). Indonesia submitted a list of Dutch warships which over the years had been
present off the coast of north-eastern Borneo, which shows that the Dutch Government cared about
the security of this part of its possessions (Counter-Memorial of Indonesia, Vol. 2, Ann. 32). We
mentioned the example of HNLMS Koetei, which was present in the area in 1910. This ship’s
logbook contains an entry for 30 September 1910 specifically mentioning cruising near Sipadan
and Ligitan (Counter-Memorial of Indonesia, Vol. 2, Ann. 33). The Malaysian dismissive response
to this evidence is perplexing (Reply of Malaysia, para. 3.25). It refers to irrelevant occurrences
like that the ship three days earlier near Sibetik Island had arrived at the territorial sea boundary
with North Borneo, and later paid a visit to Lahad Datu, a town in North Borneo. The important
point, however, is that the ship did not stay close to the mainland coast and Sibetik, but that it
continued to Sipadan and Ligitan: those islands too were of interest to the Dutch warship. It sailed
close to Sipadan: the logbook mentions a distance of two miles. The ship was not surveying, but
patrolling.
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13. Another governmental activity carried out in this area by the Dutch is hydrographic
surveying. The Dutch Government has always extended its surveying activities to the area around
Sipadan and Ligitan, as evidenced by the ship Macasser. As mentioned in our Memorial, in
October and November 1903 this ship surveyed the waters around Sipadan and Ligitan (Memorial
of Indonesia, para. 5.40). Malaysia also mentions this activity in its Memorial (Memorial of
Malaysia, para. 7.14), but its interpretation of the report of the commanding officer of the
Macasser, namely that he appeared to treat all islands mentioned (including Sipadan and Ligitan)
as being part of British North Borneo, is unfounded. For surveying purposes it is normal to treat all
maritime features in a purely geographical, and politically neutral, way. Rather, the real
significance of this report is, again, that it shows Dutch activities in the area, demonstrating that the
Dutch had interests there: the Dutch warship was there because of the need to survey the waters
surrounding Dutch islands. This survey of the Macasser resulted in the publication in 1905 of
chart No. 59 by the Netherlands Hydrographic Office. Updated editions of this chart have
subsequently been issued several times, based on new data collected by the Dutch Navy. This
shows that the Dutch Government continued to regard it as its responsibility to ensure the safety of
navigation in this area by maintaining updated nautical charts.
14. Again, the Malaysian response does not convince. In its Reply, at paragraph 3.24, it
refers to the charts produced by the Dutch Hydrographic Office as “maps”. Perhaps that explains
why it remarks that the Dutch-British boundary line on this chart stops at the east coast of Sebatik.
Nautical charts, however, do not identify the State to which islands belong. An extended allocation
line into the sea could thus not have been expected here.
15. But, Mr. President and Members of the Court, the most striking example of Dutch acts of
sovereignty is provided in the detailed and indeed fascinating account by the commander of the
destroyer HNLMS Lynx, Lt. Cdr. Smit. This warship, carrying a seaplane aboard, highly
effectively patrolled the area in November and December 1921. Indonesia has submitted an
excerpt of the report by the ship’s commander to the vice-admiral commanding the naval forces in
the Netherlands East Indies (Memorial of Indonesia, Vol. 4, Ann. 120), who had provided the
instructions to the commander. From this report, which you will find in your folder under tab 33, it
can be seen that the Dutch authorities considered both Sipadan and Ligitan to be islands under
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Dutch sovereignty, whereas other islands situated north of the 1891 Convention line were
considered to be British.
16. I will first briefly go through the report of the commander of the Lynx. Thereafter I will
deal with the views expressed by Malaysia in its written pleadings. In the meantime you see
behind me on the screen a picture of the Lynx with its seaplane hoisted on its stern during one of its
patrols in the Netherlands East Indies. The second picture shows the Lynx, close to shore, with the
seaplane next to it in the water.
17. In essence, the Lynx commander’s report shows that he carefully avoided venturing
within the three-nautical-mile territorial sea limit of islands under British sovereignty, such as
Si Amil, which lay north of the 4º 10’ N latitude line, the 1891 Convention line. But because
Sipadan and Ligitan both lay to the south of that line, the Lynx and the seaplane did visit them.
Moreover, as we shall see the BNBC authorities were aware of the activities of the Lynx. The
ship’s commander immediately informed the BNBC authorities of his observations concerning the
whereabouts of the pirate fleet. The BNBC authorities did not raise any objection to the activities
of the Lynx.
Mr. President, I was wondering whether, since the next section of our presentation would
take somewhat more time, this would be an appropriate natural breaking point. Otherwise I would
like to continue for about seven or eight more minutes.
The PRESIDENT: Professor Soons, I think you may finish with the Lynx operations for the
further seven, eight minutes you mentioned.
Mr. SOONS: Thank you very much.
18. The Lynx stayed in the area from 20 November till 5 December 1921. It operated out of
the oil port of Tarakan. The first days it patrolled along the coast, in the various river estuaries, up
to the territorial sea boundary off Sebatik. Thereafter it made some patrols further offshore: and
these are most significant for us.
19. The report of the commander contains the following highly relevant entries:
(i) “25 November 1921: HNLMS Lynx then weighed anchor at 1800 hrs and steamed away.
After passing the lightship the lights were doused and we set sail for the island of
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Sipadan. We did not meet any proas during the night of 25 to 26 November and arrived
at Sipadan at 0600 hrs. Sipadan lies approximately 20 miles from Si Amil. An armed
sloop was sent ashore for information, but returned empty-handed.”
The map now on the screen shows this patrol of the Lynx to Sipadan, which included the sending of
an armed sloop ashore.
(ii) From the report of the commander of the Lynx: “The plane was launched at 1000 hrs and
took off easily. The plane flew via Sipadan to the 3-mile limit off Si Amil.”
The map now on the screen shows this reconnaissance flight of the seaplane. The dark blue area
around the North Borneo island of Si Amil is the 3-mile-limit of its territorial sea, which the plane
clearly respected. But on its return it traversed the airspace of Sipadan.
(iii) “On Sunday, 27 November at 1830 hrs I received your encoded wireless telegram sent on
25 November at 0940 hrs which reads after decoding: ‘With reference to your wireless
telegram, English authorities will be warned without delay. Keep fleet under
surveillance. As soon as they leave English territorial waters, seize them and take the
Raja’s proa to Tarakan for investigation of the incident responsible for Lynx’s
presence’. . .”
(iv) “28 November 1921: Lynx left the roads of Tarakan to sail to Si Amil to try to catch Raja
Panglina Djumang of Sulu outside British territorial waters.”
(v) “The plane made another flight to Si Amil that afternoon, where it discovered the pirate
fleet of 40 proas under the leadership of Raja Panglima Djuwang. The plane landed
outside the 3-mile limit . . .”
This map shows this second flight by the seaplane. Again, it respected the territorial sea limit of
the island belonging to North Borneo.
(vi) “30 November 1921: Weighed anchor at 2330 hrs, and steamed to Sipadan where no
proas were seen. Sailed from there on 1 December to the 3-mile limit on the east coast of
Si Amil, where we found 40 proas fishing on the reef. It is gradually becoming clear that
they have formed a settlement on Si Amil. Steamed away from Si Amil again in a
southerly direction and sailed from Ligitan to South Sibetik.”
The map now shows the second patrol of the Lynx, respecting the territorial sea of Si Amil.
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(vii) “We launched the plane on 1 December at 0900 hrs., after which it made a tour to Ligitan
heading to south Sibetik . . .”
(viii) “The plane then flew on from Ahus to the east of Mandul and from there directly to the
island of Sipadan and the nearby Si Amil, where the fleet of 40 proas were still fishing.
Received a wireless telegram at 1100 hrs through Tarakan from the Resident in
Banjermasin as follows: ‘Regarding your signal yesterday, if pirates outside our territory
and no threat to settlements expected, no further measures from Lynx needed’”.
This map, finally, shows the third flight of the seaplane. It flew over Ligitan and Sipadan, but
respected the territorial sea of Si Amil. All five maps just shown are included in the judges’
folders, under tabs 34 and 35.
20. The operations of the Lynx and its seaplane make it abundantly clear that Pulau Sipadan
and Pulau Ligitan were considered to be under Dutch sovereignty. The warship entered the
territorial sea of Sipadan twice, and an armed patrol even went ashore. The seaplane flew over
Sipadan and Ligitan. Since there does not exist, and did not exist at that time, a right of overflight
within the territorial sea of a foreign State, the seaplane could only have entered the airspace over
the islands if it considered them Dutch territory. These actions should be contrasted with those of
the Lynx and its seaplane when near islands north of the 1891 Convention line: their territorial seas
were scrupulously respected. In Indonesia’s view, these operations could serve as a classroom
example of how territorial sea limits are respected during maritime law enforcement operations.
This may be, then, an appropriate break time. Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup. La Cour va suspendre pour une dizaine de
minutes.
L’audience est suspendue de 16 h 30 à 16 h 40.
Le PRÉSIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’áudience est reprise et je donne la parole au
professeur Soons.
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Mr. SOONS: Thank you, Mr. President. After having described in some detail the
operations of the Lynx and its seaplane before the break, I now turn to Malaysia’s treatment of the
Lynx operations.
21. Malaysia, in its Counter-Memorial and Reply, shows its embarrassment with this crystal
clear display of the Dutch views on the extent of its territorial possessions based on the
1891 Convention. It simply dismisses the significance of the Lynx expedition. It does not answer
the Indonesian arguments, but merely states that the incident has nothing to do with Dutch
territorial jurisdiction over any islands whatsoever. Presumably because the Lynx was engaged in
combating piracy, as stated in paragraph 3.26 of Malaysia’s Reply. Apparently Malaysia is of the
view that a warship may anchor in a foreign territorial sea and put a boat ashore on a foreign island,
to seek information of the whereabouts of suspected pirates, without prior permission from the
coastal State’s authorities. A foreign warplane may fly over islands also without prior permission.
Perhaps Malaysia will better explain its views later this week. Indonesia submits that also at that
time colonial powers were jealous of their territorial jurisdiction. Especially in border areas they
would be alert. The BNBC authorities would certainly have protested if they had been of the
opinion that the Dutch operations had trespassed on their territory.
22. Finally, Malaysia dismisses the Lynx incident as insignificant because it was the only
such reported case of display of Dutch policing activities in the area. It is true that the report of the
commander of the Lynx is the only such report that Indonesia has been able to retrieve from the
colonial archives in the Netherlands or, for that matter, Indonesia. The problem here is that such
reports normally would never have reached the archives in the Netherlands. These reports are
routine matters. They stayed in the East Indies, where they were kept in the archives of the
Commander Naval Forces, Netherlands East Indies. These archives, at least for this period, do not
exist anymore; they were in all probability destroyed in March 1942 during the invasion of the
Dutch East Indies. The only reason why this particular report, as an exception, was available in the
archives in the Netherlands is that it was sent to The Hague by the Governor-General of the
Netherlands East Indies in December 1922 as an annex to a letter dealing with the issue of the
delimitation of the territorial sea between the Netherlands East Indies and the State of North
Borneo off Sebatik island, a matter which I will discuss in a moment (see Counter-Memorial of
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Malaysia, Vol. 2, Ann. 4). But at this point I should already stress that it appears from the record
of these internal deliberations in the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies during the 1920s
that not a single Dutch official involved questioned the correctness of the Lynx commander’s
actions during the patrol in November/December 1921.
23. In connection with the Malaysian remark on the paucity of Dutch acts of sovereignty
over Sipadan and Ligitan, such as the Lynx operations, it should be stressed that the nature and
intensity of the control over territory required from a State by international law for it to uphold its
sovereignty in the face of possibly competing claims varies according to the nature of the territory
in question. We have referred to pronouncements to this effect in international arbitral and judicial
decisions in paragraph 7.52 of our Counter-Memorial. The Dutch activities with respect to these
very small, remote and uninhabited islands must be considered more than sufficient for this
purpose.
24. In conclusion, the operations of the Lynx show that its commander, following his
instructions from the highest naval authority in the Netherlands East Indies, scrupulously respected
the 1891 Convention line as allocating territorial sovereignty over the offshore islands in the area.
In particular, the landing on Sipadan of armed Dutch naval personnel, the visit to the vicinity of
Ligitan and its repeated overflying by the seaplane constituted acts par excellence of the exercise of
governmental authority with respect to the islands. Is law enforcement not the clearest display of
State functions? These actions therefore confirm the title to Sipadan and Ligitan vested in the
Netherlands by virtue of the 1891 Convention.
Significance of the internal Dutch deliberations on territorial sea delimitation
25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now come to my third and last point to be
addressed in this presentation. Another issue which Malaysia and Indonesia have been discussing
in the written pleadings concerns the significance of the internal deliberations within the Dutch
Government in the 1920s relating to the possible delimitation of the territorial sea on the east coast
of Sebatik island. These discussions and their outcome are in full conformity with the views
expressed by Indonesia about the meaning of the 1891 Convention line. In dealing with this
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matter, Malaysia has been confusing the question of delimitation of the territorial sea, which is not
the subject of the present dispute, with the question of title to territory.
26. Indonesia was fully aware of the file in the Dutch archives dealing with this issue since,
as I just mentioned, the report of the commander of the Lynx was part of that file. But it is
essentially irrelevant for our case, as I will explain. Contrary to what Malaysia seems to imply,
Indonesia has not suggested that the 1891 Convention line was from the outset intended also to be,
or in effect was, a maritime boundary in the sea area east of the island of Sebatik. Rather, as
submitted by Indonesia in its Memorial and Counter-Memorial, the line was considered to be an
allocation line: land areas, including islands, located to the north of 4º 10’ N latitude were
henceforth considered to be British, and those lying to the south were Dutch. That such land
territory and islands generate a territorial sea which may require delimitation is another matter.
27. At the time of the conclusion of the 1891 Convention and the internal Dutch
deliberations during the 1920s, the only maritime jurisdictional zone that was generated by
sovereignty over land was the territorial sea, extending to a maximum breadth of three or possibly
four nautical miles measured from the baselines of the coastal State. In cases of adjacent coastal
States, and of opposite coastal States where the distance between their respective coasts was less
than 6 nautical miles, a delimitation of the respective territorial seas would in principle be called
for. This was the case of the area east of Sebatik island, where, as the result of the
1891 Convention, the land boundary met the sea on the eastern shore of the island and thus the
question arose how exactly the territorial sea boundary east of that point should be drawn. In
addition, depending upon the course of this boundary, the delimitation with the territorial sea of the
opposite mainland — Batoe Tinagat — might have come into play since Cowie Bay, the local area,
is less than 6 miles wide.
28. The internal Dutch discussions are accurately described in Malaysia’s Counter-Memorial
(Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, paras. 4.10-4.18). The discussions focused on the various options
available in these particular circumstances. One option was to consider the 1891 Convention as
also constituting offshore ¾ that is, up to 3 nautical miles ¾ a territorial sea boundary. The other
option was to apply the applicable rule of general international law: that would prescribe a line
drawn perpendicular to the coast at the terminus of the land boundary.
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29. On the screen you can see now a sketch which was used in the internal Dutch debates; it
was included by Malaysia in its Counter-Memorial, as insert 5 at page 76. Malaysia also produced
its own sketch, as insert 6 at page 77, which perhaps is clearer: it is now shown on the screen, and
is included in the judges’ folder under tab 36. I need to point out here that the legend of this sketch
mixes up the two lines; the red and black colours in the legend, or on the sketch, should be
reversed. The black line on the sketch ¾ A-D ¾ is obviously not the prolonged land boundary,
but a line perpendicular to the coast. The red line ¾ A-B ¾ corresponds to the prolonged land
boundary. Incidentally, when you look at this sketch you will notice how negligible the area
involved in fact was; it was truly a very minor issue.
30. The internal Dutch discussions reveal that differing views were expressed by various
government officials on the preferred option, but the final view expressed in September 1926 by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had the final authority in such matters, was that the
perpendicular line should apply and that it was not opportune to raise the matter with the British
Government. And so it was decided. The matter was never raised with the British by the Dutch
Government.
31. According to Malaysia, the discussions during 1922-1926 show that “the Dutch colonial
officers themselves did not at the time think a maritime boundary had been established by the
1891 Convention”. That conclusion is correct, and is entirely consistent with Indonesia’s view that
the 1891 Convention line, extending to the east of Sebatik Island, was an allocation line. It should
be stressed here again that any maritime boundary at the time could only have been a territorial sea
boundary extending no more than 3 miles from the coast. But the 1891 line east of Sebatik had a
different purpose. It represented a line separating territorial possessions, and because there were no
insular possessions lying within 3 miles of the coast of Sebatik the 1891 line of attribution was
represented as a straight line along the 4° 10’ N parallel of latitude. Consequently, there is nothing
incompatible between the 1891 Convention line and the Dutch internal discussions as Malaysia
tries in vain to imply.
32. It is also important to point out that the internal Dutch discussions of 1922-1926 were
entirely restricted to the territorial sea boundary off Sebatik Island and did not involve the islands
of Sipadan and Ligitan. This can easily be explained by the fact that in the case of those two
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islands no territorial sea delimitation questions arose since they are located at distances of more
than 6 miles from the nearest North Borneo islands of Kapalai and Dinawan.
33. In conclusion: the internal Dutch debates on the territorial sea delimitation off Sebatik
Island do not contradict the position taken by Indonesia in the written pleadings in this case about
the nature and significance of the Convention line, which is that it allocates title to islands located
beyond Sebatik: to the north of the line, title belonged to North Borneo, and to the south, to the
Netherlands.
34 Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you again for your attention. Mr. President,
may I ask you to call on my colleague, Mr. Bundy, who will continue Indonesia’s presentation.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne maintenant la parole à
M. Rodman R. Bundy.
Mr. BUNDY: Merci, Monsieur le président. Mr. President, Members of the Court:
THE DEFECTS IN MALAYSIA’S TREATY-BASED CHAIN OF TITLE
1. It is, as always, a great honour to appear before this distinguished Court on behalf of the
Republic of Indonesia in this important case. Before turning to the substance of my remarks,
Mr. President, I would also like to pay tribute to a close friend and colleague, Keith Highet, who
was a member of Indonesia’s team when this case was started, and would have handled the
materials and the part of the case that I shall address this afternoon. Sadly, Mr. Highet is not with
us today.
A. Introduction
2. Up to this point, Indonesia’s presentation has focused on the events of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries on which its title to Ligitan and Sipadan is based. My task this
afternoon is to shift the focus from these considerations to the elements of Malaysia’s case. Now,
as the Court will be aware, Malaysia’s claim to Ligitan and Sipadan is based on two separate, but
by no means consistent, strands of argument.
3. The first ¾ the so-called “treaty-based” argument ¾ is grounded on the proposition that
Malaysia acquired title to Ligitan and Sipadan by virtue of a series of legal grants from each of its
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predecessors in interest. Those predecessors in interest, in chronological order, were the Sultan of
Sulu, Spain, the United States and Great Britain (Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 2.2 and
Reply of Malaysia, para. 5.1).
4. The second Malaysian thesis is based on the contention that, regardless of where the
treaty-based title lies, Malaysia still possesses sovereignty over the islands as a result of what is
claimed to be a long-standing administration of the islands.
5. I shall be addressing the first of these arguments ¾ the treaty-based claim and tomorrow
my colleague and friend, Professor Pellet, will rebut the Malaysian argument based on alleged
British and Malaysian administration over the islands. As Indonesia will show, neither of
Malaysia’s arguments are well-founded. And neither, particularly when viewed in the light of the
1891 Convention and the mutual conduct of the Parties, can displace what was Dutch, and what is
presently Indonesian, title over the islands.
B. Malaysia’s claim that title passed from the Sultan of Sulu to Spain, thence to the
United States, thence to Great Britain and finally to Malaysia
6. With that introduction, let me turn directly to the gist of Malaysia’s treaty-based claim. In
summing up the essence of this part of Malaysia’s case, I can do no better than the words of
Malaysia’s own Counter-Memorial where the position was put in the following terms:
“Malaysia’s claim is based on acquisition by Spain of the possessions of the
Sultan of Sulu. The islands adjacent to North Borneo which were situated beyond the
three maritime league limit of the 1878 Sulu grant, Ligitan and Sipadan among them,
remained under Spanish sovereignty. These possessions were transferred to the
United States by the Treaty of 7 November 1900. The United States in turn
transferred them to Great Britain by the Treaty of 2 January 1930.”
(Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 2.2.)
7. The Court will appreciate that, in order for this thesis to succeed, Malaysia bears the
burden of proving that each of the links of its chain of title is sound: in other words, that each of
the relevant entities ¾ be it the Sultan of Sulu, Spain, Great Britain or the United States ¾
possessed a demonstrably valid title to both islands which could be passed on to its successor. If
even one of these links fails, then the legal foundation for Malaysia’s case collapses. Obviously,
none of the entities listed in the chain of title could pass on title to the islands which it did not
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possess itself (nemo dat quod non habet). And if there was no title to pass on or if the chain was
broken, then there was no title for Malaysia to inherit by means of State succession.
8. My remarks, Mr. President, will be directed at showing that at each stage of the process,
Malaysia’s thesis breaks down. In particular, I shall show that:
(i) There is no evidence that the Sultan of Sulu ever possessed, or even thought that he
possessed, sovereignty over Ligitan or Sipadan. The Philippines Application for
Permission to Intervene last year has reinforced this point. I’ll come back to that.
(ii) There is likewise no evidence that Spain considered that it held title to the islands. Spain
was utterly indifferent to islands lying so far south and west of its possessions in the
Philippines.
(iii) There is also no evidence to suggest that the United States considered that it inherited the
islands from Spain at the end of the Spanish-American War. While there may have been
some initial uncertainty on the part of the United States Navy shortly after the
1900 Treaty was signed, the United States itself never laid claim to the islands and the
State Department knew full well that they lay to the south of any possessions the United
States had inherited from Spain.
(iv) Accordingly, there was no title to the islands that the United States could have ceded to
Great Britain under the 1930 Anglo-American Treaty even if the United States had
wanted to. Of course, the 1930 Treaty was not a treaty of cession, as I shall show. But
the important point is that the United States had no interests in Ligitan and Sipadan prior
to 1930, the 1930 Treaty did not deal with them, and thereby the islands were not
transferred to Great Britain pursuant to that Treaty.
(v) And finally, if Great Britain had no title to the islands that had been ceded to it by the
United States, it follows that Malaysia could not have inherited title upon achieving
independence.
9. The end result is that not simply is one of the links in Malaysia’s chain broken; each and
every one of them is fatally flawed. This being the case, Malaysia cannot base a claim to either
Ligitan or Sipadan on the theory that it inherited title as a consequence of a series of legal transfers
from each of its predecessors in interest.
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1. The Sultan of Sulu did not possess sovereignty over Ligitan or Sipadan
10. Let me turn first to the position of the Sultan of Sulu. As Professor Pellet has shown,
Malaysia has introduced absolutely no evidence demonstrating that the Sultan of Sulu ever
exercised any sovereign rights over either Ligitan or Sipadan. There was no Sulu presence on the
islands, no Sulu jurisdiction exercised over them and no attempt by the Sultan to advance any kind
of claim to either of the islands.
11. It is this total lack of evidence of an original Sulu title that led Indonesia to observe in its
written pleadings that Ligitan and Sipadan never formed part of the Sulu Archipelago or of the
Sultan’s North Borneo possessions (Memorial of Indonesia, para. 7.25). Malaysia agrees with the
first part of that statement. Indeed, Malaysia’s own Counter-Memorial expressly concedes that
Ligitan and Sipadan were not considered to be part of the Sulu Archipelago (Counter-Memorial of
Malaysia, para. 3.14).
12. Where the Parties differ is over the question whether Ligitan and Sipadan were
nonetheless part of the Sultan of Sulu’s North Borneo possessions. Malaysia claims that they were
(Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 3.14). But this assertion, as I shall show, is contradicted by
the record.
13. In the first place, Sipadan and Ligitan both lie more than nine miles from the mainland
coast, and that point is not disputed by the Parties. So the islands could not have been part of the
Sultan of Sulu’s North Borneo possessions that were transferred to Messrs. Dent and Overbeck in
1878, no matter how one wants to characterize that grant.
14. Secondly, if there is one country which should have a first-hand appreciation as to
whether the Sultan of Sulu ever claimed or exercised sovereignty over a particular territory, it is the
Philippines. After all, the Philippines is the successor to the Sultan of Sulu’s domains. As we
heard during the oral proceedings on the Philippines Application to intervene, the Philippines claim
to a portion of North Borneo is based on the historic rights of the Sultan of Sulu. Moreover, as we
were also informed, the Philippines considers that its national territory comprises all territories over
which the Philippines has an historic right or legal title (CR 2001/1, pp. 33-34).
15. Obviously, we are not here today to debate the merits of the Philippine claim to a portion
of Sabah. Indonesia took no position on that point a year ago, and it takes no position today. What
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is important, however, is that the Philippines has expressly disavowed having any claim ¾ any
territorial interest whatsoever ¾ over Ligitan and Sipadan. This was made clear by the Diplomatic
Note sent by the Philippines to Indonesia on 5 April 2001 and it was reaffirmed during the oral
proceedings on the intervention last year (see Judgment of 23 October 2001, para. 45). As the
5 April 2001 Diplomatic Note stated, and you can find this at tab 37 of the judges’ folders: “[T]he
Government of the Republic of the Philippines wishes to reassure the Government of the Republic
of Indonesia that it does not have any territorial interest on Sipadan and Ligitan islands.”
16. The inescapable conclusion is that the Philippines does not consider Ligitan or Sipadan
ever to have formed part of the Sultan of Sulu’s historical possessions. In so far as the Philippines,
as the successor in interest to the Sultan of Sulu, does not maintain that either Ligitan or Sipadan
ever formed part of the Sultan’s possessions, then it is impossible to see how Malaysia can suggest
that the islands were once within the Sultan’s domains. They were not.
2. Spain never possessed title to the islands
17. I turn now to the question whether there is any evidence that Spain had title to the
islands. This is the second link in the Malaysian chain, and here I will deal with two aspects of the
matter. First, I shall examine the legal instruments pursuant to which Spain succeeded to the rights
of the Sultan of Sulu. These were the 1836 Capitulation between Spain and the Sultan and the
1851 Renewed Act of Submission. Also relevant is the 1885 Protocol between Spain, Great Britain
and Germany. Secondly, I will consider the issue whether, apart from these legal instruments,
there is any independent evidence of Spanish sovereignty over either Sipadan or Ligitan.
(a) The 1836 Capitulation between Spain and Sulu
18. Turning first to the 1836 Capitulation, that Capitulation between the Sultan of Sulu and
Spain. Pursuant to that Capitulation Spain offered the Sultan its protection over islands within the
limits of Spanish jurisdiction (Memorial of Malaysia, Ann. 1). The jurisdiction of Spain was
defined in the 1836 Capitulation as extending “from the western point of Mindanao to Borneo and
the [island of] Paragua (Palawan), with the exception of Sandakan and the other countries tributary
to the Sultan on the continent of Borneo”.
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19. That language, standing alone, in no way supports the notion that Spanish possessions
included Sipadan and Ligitan. Let us examine the map, if we may. The 1836 Capitulation refers to
Spanish jurisdiction spanning the area from the western point of Mindanao to Borneo and to
Palawan Island. That does not suggest, even on a prima facie basis, Spanish jurisdiction over
islands such as Sipadan and Ligitan which lay far to the south.
(b) The 1851 Act of Submission
20. The 1851 Act of Submission is equally of no help to Malaysia’s case. (Memorial of
Malaysia, Ann. 4.) It simply recorded the Sultan’s agreement to the establishment of Spanish
sovereignty over the island of Sooloo with all its dependencies, which were thereby incorporated
into the Philippines Archipelago.
21. Once again, it is instructive to refer to the map; the island of Sooloo is now being
highlighted on the map. Clearly that island, together with its dependencies, could not and did not
include Sipadan and Ligitan which lie over 100 nautical miles away. Indeed, Malaysia itself is on
record in this case as admitting that Sipadan and Ligitan did not form part of the Sulu Archipelago.
(Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 3.14.) So the 1851 Act of Submission can hardly be said to
be evidence of Spanish sovereignty over the disputed islands.
(c) The 1885 Protocol
22. If we turn to the 1885 Protocol, it too does nothing to advance the Malaysian thesis
(Memorial of Malaysia, Ann. 15).
23. The 1885 Protocol was concluded between Great Britain, Spain and Germany. Its
purpose was to ensure commercial freedom for German and British vessels trading in the Sulu
Archipelago and to obtain a renunciation by Spain of any claim to sovereignty over the Sultan of
Sulu’s North Borneo possessions which had formed the basis of the 1878 grant to the BNBC.
Pursuant to Article I, the Protocol provided as follows:
“The Governments of Great Britain and of Germany recognise the sovereignty
of Spain over places effectively occupied, as well as over those places not yet
occupied, of the Archipelago of Sulu (Jolo), of which the limits are laid down in
Article II.”
24. Article II then repeated the formula that had appeared in the 1836 Capitulation. It stated:
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“The Archipelago of Sulu (Jolo), comprises all the islands which are found
between the western extremity of the island of Mindanao on the one side, and the
continent of Borneo and the island of Paragua (Palawan) on the other side, with the
exception of those which are indicated in Article III.”
25. In Article III, Spain renounced in favour of Great Britain all claims of sovereignty on the
continent of Borneo, which then belonged or had belonged to the Sultan of Sulu, including all
islands within a zone of 3 marine leagues (or 9 miles) from the coast. And as I have said, the
Parties agree in this case that Ligitan and Sipadan were not covered by this arrangement given that
they lay more than 3 marine leagues (or 9 miles) from the coast.
26. The 1885 Protocol also stipulated that if Spain were to occupy any other islands in the
Sulu Archipelago other than those that it then occupied, it would notify Great Britain and Germany
accordingly.
27. As of 1885, Spain did not occupy either Ligitan or Sipadan. Nor did Spain ever do so
afterwards. In these circumstances, it is impossible to see how any of the instruments mentioned in
Malaysia’s pleadings ¾ be they the 1836 and 1851 Capitulations or the 1885 Protocol ¾ establish
the existence of Spanish sovereignty over Ligitan and Sipadan.
28. If, Mr. President and Members of the Court, there are no legal instruments which show
Spanish title to the islands, what about other kinds of evidence? Is there any anecdotal evidence
that Spain, nonetheless, considered itself to be sovereign over the islands? Perhaps the best way to
answer this question is to quote Malaysia’s own written pleadings and to see what Malaysia has to
say about the issue. Here is a sample of what Malaysia has to say:
¾ First, from Malaysia’s Reply: “There is no evidence that Spain paid any attention
to the islands off the Borneo coast, whether within or outside the nine nautical
mile line. Indeed, all the evidence is to the contrary.” (Reply of Malaysia,
para. 2.19.)
¾ Next, “Spain appears to have been quite indifferent”. (Memorial of Malaysia,
para. 5.19.)
¾ Further, “So far as those islands were concerned, the remaining question
concerned the identification of which islands belonged to Britain because they
were within three marine leagues of the Borneo coast, and which belonged to
Spain . . . But in fact that question was not raised even by Spain.” (Memorial of
Malaysia, para. 5.20 (c).)
¾ And fourth, “The Spanish have never claimed or exercised any sovereign rights
over them [meaning the islands] as far as I know.” (Memorial of Malaysia,
para. 5.30, quoting a local BNBC official in North Borneo.)
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29. Mr. President, Members of the Court, these kinds of admissions by Malaysia are an
extraordinary basis on which to try to construct a theory that Spain held title to Ligitan and
Sipadan. It is in the light of the complete absence of any evidence of Spanish title over the islands
that Malaysia’s very pertinent observation made in its Counter-Memorial deserves to be recalled.
There Malaysia stated: “Evidently, if Spain had no rights over Sipadan and Ligitan in 1898, there
was nothing it could have transferred to the United States by the Treaties of 1898 and 1900.”
(Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 3.17.) That, Mr. President, is a statement which Indonesia
fully agrees with.
30. These same considerations dispose of Malaysia’s argument that, even if the 1891
Convention had been intended to allocate Ligitan and Sipadan to the Netherlands, this would have
been impossible because Great Britain had no title to cede given that the islands are said to have
been Spanish at the time. (Reply of Malaysia, paras. 1.8 (4) and 1.14.) But this proposition simply
begs the question which Malaysia has to prove. The fact of the matter is that Spain neither
possessed sovereignty over the islands nor acted as if it did. There was, therefore, no impediment
whatsoever to Great Britain and the Netherlands agreeing in the 1891 Convention that the 4° 10’ N
latitude would serve as the line separating their respective possessions in the area. Not
surprisingly, Spain, just as Great Britain, saw no reason to protest the Dutch Explanatory
Memorandum map depicting this line, to which Sir Arthur has referred.
3. The lack of any United States claim over the islands
31. Having dealt with the first two links in Malaysia’s treaty-based chain of title, I can now
turn to the position of the United States. Malaysia not only contends that the United States
received the islands from Spain at the end of the Spanish-American War, but also that the United
States independently claimed them afterwards. (Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 3.1 (d).)
32. Such confident assertions may not be surprising given the nature of Malaysia’s case, but
as I shall show, they are advanced at the expense of mischaracterizing, and in some cases ignoring,
the key evidence. Since this part of Malaysia’s claim really lies at the heart of its case, I hope,
Mr. President, the Court will indulge me while I examine the evidence in some detail.
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(a) The 1898 and 1900 Spanish-United States Treaties
33. In 1898, following the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded to the United States under
the Treaty of Peace of Paris the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands including the islands
lying within the line that now appears in red on the screen. (Memorial of Indonesia, Ann. 93.)
34. Pursuant to Article III of that Treaty, those possessions were limited on the south along a
line drawn across the 4° 45’ N latitude. The Parties agree that neither Ligitan nor Sipadan were
included within this cession, and that can clearly be seen from the map (Counter-Memorial of
Malaysia, para. 3.19).
35. Two years later, on 7 November 1900, the United States and Spain entered into a further
agreement for the cession of additional islands lying outside the limits set by the 1898 Treaty
(Memorial of Indonesia, Ann. 94). The 1900 Convention contained one substantive provision
which reads as follows ¾ and you can find in tab 38 of the judges’ folders:
“Spain relinquishes to the United States all title and claim of title, which she
may have had at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and
all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in
Article III of that Treaty and particularly to the islands of Cagayan Sulu and Sibutu
and their dependencies, and agrees that all such islands shall be comprehended in the
cession of the Archipelago as fully as if they had been expressly included within those
lines.”
36. The Court will see on the screen ¾ now being highlighted ¾ the islands of Cagayan
Sulu and Sibutu to which particular reference was made in the 1900 Treaty. The fact that neither of
these islands, nor their dependencies, lies in the vicinity of Ligitan or Sipadan reinforces the
position that the United States inherited no sovereignty over these two islands from Spain even
under the 1900 Treaty. Spanish possessions transferred to the United States simply did not extend
that far to the south-west.
37. But notwithstanding this, Malaysia argues that the 1900 Treaty was understood as
covering Ligitan and Sipadan (Memorial of Malaysia, para. 5.25). The principal basis on which
Malaysia advances this contention centres upon a voyage that a United States naval vessel, the
Quiros, made to the region in the summer of 1903 and a provisional map that was thereafter issued
by the United States Department of the Navy. It is this portion of Malaysia’s case which suffers
from a highly selective recitation of the facts. Let me go through them with the Court’s
indulgence.
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(b) The voyage of the “Quiros” and the 1903 United States provisional map
38. Indonesia does not dispute the fact that in June 1903 a United States naval vessel, the
Quiros, undertook a fact-finding mission in the course of which it visited a number of islands lying
more than nine miles off the mainland coast of Borneo. The logbook of the Quiros’s captain ¾
Lt. Boughter was his name ¾ indicates that Sipadan was amongst the islands visited although
Ligitan was not.
39. What Indonesia does dispute is Malaysia’s claim that Lt. Boughter’s actions evidence a
claim by the United States of sovereignty over the islands. It is true, it is true that Lt. Boughter
purported to claim the islands on behalf of the United States. But the important point, passed over
in silence by our colleagues, is that the State Department, which was responsible for deciding on
United States claims in the region, completely disassociated itself from Lt. Boughter’s actions and
did not advance any claim to Ligitan or Sipadan based on the voyage of the Quiros ¾ or on any
other basis, for that matter.
40. To appreciate the true position, it is necessary to refer to another element which is central
to Malaysia’s case. And that is a map which is chart 2117, issued by the United States
Hydrographic Office at the request of the Navy in June 1903, and you will find a copy of this map
at tab 39 of the folders.
41. Mr. President, the Court, I trust, will readily see why Malaysia is so attached to this map.
Malaysia has highlighted the caption indicating “boundary line” on the map ¾ a line which
conveniently encompasses both Sipadan and Ligitan. Malaysia has also highlighted the caption
indicating that the features enclosed by this line are “under the sovereignty of the United States of
America”. In Malaysia’s view, “[t]his map represented a public assertion by the United States of
its sovereignty over the additional islands ceded to it by the 1900 Treaty, an assertion which
occasioned no reaction from The Netherlands” (Memorial of Malaysia, para. 5.26).
42. From a reading of Malaysia’s pleadings, one might be forgiven for having the impression
that this was the end of the story. A United States naval officer claimed Sipadan and Ligitan for
the United States and a map illustrating the claim was issued shortly thereafter. But the facts are
otherwise.
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43. Take the map, for example ¾ the map on the screen. Malaysia acts as if it represented a
definitive assertion of United States sovereignty over the islands. But what Malaysia has neglected
to inform the Court is that the map showing the so-called “boundary line” encompassing Ligitan
and Sipadan was subsequently forwarded by the War Department to the United States Secretary of
State with a request to the State Department to confirm whether that boundary line was correct or
an error (Reply of Indonesia, Ann. 8). And you will find that request in the document at tab 40.
44. The Secretary of State responded on 23 October 1903 (Memorial of Indonesia,
Ann. 104). Despite the fact that Indonesia referred to this crucial document in both its Memorial
and in its Counter-Memorial and annexed a copy, Malaysia has persisted in ignoring its existence
in all of its written pleadings. We have included it, for the Court’s convenience, at tab 41. Here
are some of its relevant passages, and I quote from the letter of the Secretary of State, in response
to the map:
¾ “This department [in other words the State Department] did not undertake to trace
the line demarking the respective jurisdictions of Great Britain and Spain to which
latter the United States has succeeded in toto. We are not in a position to apply on
the charts the line described in general terms by the conventions entered into by
Spain and Great Britain and Germany.”
The letter continued:
¾ “Any line drawn by either party in interest for itself alone would necessarily be
tentative unless assented to by the other party.”
The letter continued:
¾ “Under these circumstances this department is unable to either confirm or alter the
line drawn ex parte upon the chart you have received from the Hydrographic
Office of the Navy Department.”
The letter did remark, however, that:
¾ “The prolongation of the red tracing from the eastward of Sibutu to and around
Sipadan Island and thence northwardly to Darvel Bay would probably require to
be supported by evidence that Sipadan and the included keys and rocks had been
recognized as lying within the dominions of Sulu described in the conventions
between Spain on the one hand and Great Britain and Germany on the other. This
is a question of fact which the Department of State has no means of determining
and considering which an opinion would be mainly ex parte.”
The letter then added the following very important observation:
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¾ “The Treaty of Nov. 7, 1900, by expressly including the Island of Sibutu may
have intended such inclusion as exceptional and as a limit to the claims of Spanish
dominion to the southwest of the Sulu group.”
45. Again, it may be useful to place a map of the area covered by the 1900 Treaty on the
screen in order to understand the implications of what the Secretary of State was saying in this
letter. The important point referred to by the Secretary was that the limit of Spanish possessions
relinquished to the United States in 1900 in the south-west was in all likelihood restricted to Sibutu
Island and its immediate dependencies ¾ features which lie well to the north and east of Ligitan
and Sipadan. As will be seen, this continued to be the United States position in subsequent
negotiations with Great Britain culminating in the signature of the 1930 Anglo-United States
Treaty. Throughout this period, from October 1903 to 1930, the United States never advanced
claims to any islands lying to the south-west of Sibutu and its dependencies.
46. The Secretary of State’s letter of 23 October 1903 concluded with the following
recommendations:
“Under all the circumstances I am not prepared to advise the insertion of the red
and black boundary lines upon the copies of the War Department’s official map of the
Philippine Islands. Instead of doing so, I suggest that a note be printed either in the
general legend of the map or in brackets in situ to the effect that by a treaty signed
November 7, 1900 Spain relinquished to the United States all title to islands belonging
to the Philippine Archipelago and lying outside the lines described in the Treaty of
Peace of December 10, 1898, and in particular to Cagayan-Sulu and Sibutu and their
dependencies.”
47. As a result of this letter, Mr. President, instructions were given to the United States
Hydrographic Office to delete the “boundary line” that had been drawn around Ligitan and Sipadan
on the map which Malaysia has relied on (Reply of Indonesia, Ann. 9). A new map was
accordingly prepared in accordance with the Secretary of State’s directions. A copy of that map is
now shown on the screen and is also included at tab 42. Perhaps Malaysia will explain in its oral
presentation why it did not see fit to disclose this map.
48. As the Court will observe, this map is the second edition, replacing the provisional map
that was relied on by Malaysia. There is no boundary line around Ligitan and Sipadan and no
caption saying that the islands are under United States sovereignty. Instead, in accordance with the
Secretary of State’s instructions, the wording from the 1900 Treaty is reproduced at the bottom of
the map. In short, Mr. President, Malaysia’s map ¾ or, at least the boundary line on that map ¾
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disappeared! That puts to rest Malaysia’s argument that ¾ and I am quoting from Malaysia’s
pleading ¾ “whatever definition might be given to the ‘Sulu Archipelago’, the United States did in
fact claim all these islands, as the 1903 map shows” (Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 3.20;
see also, Reply of Malaysia, para. 2.25). It also disposes of Malaysia’s criticism that the
Netherlands should have reacted to the map. Quite simply, there was nothing to react to since the
boundary line had been deleted.
49. If any further evidence is required demonstrating that the United States did not endorse
Lt. Boughter’s rather zealous claim of sovereignty over islands such as Ligitan and Sipadan lying
south of Sibutu Island, it is provided by the letter that the Secretary of the Navy sent to the
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet on 11 March 1904; the Commander of the
Asiatic Fleet would, I imagine, have been Lt. Boughter’s superior (Memorial of Indonesia,
Ann. 107). A copy of this letter may be found at tab 43. It stated:
“The subject of the sovereignty of the islands off Borneo is now under
discussion. You will therefore, in order to avoid complications, refrain from any
assertion of United States sovereignty or any act of possession of those islands off
Borneo while the subject is under discussion.”
50. As a result of these developments, and bearing in mind the Secretary of State’s view that
Sibutu Island and its immediate dependencies represented the southernmost limits of the
possessions acquired from Spain under the 1900 Treaty, the United States issued a new map
illustrating the extent of its jurisdiction in the Philippines. That map is being placed on the screen
and a copy appears at tab 44 of the folder.
51. The Court will see that the blue line on this map represented the limits of United States
possessions acquired under the 1898 Treaty with Spain. The red line represented the view taken by
the United States as to the extent of the possessions it had acquired pursuant to the 1900 Treaty
with Spain.
52. If we enlarge the relevant area of the map, it can clearly be seen that the United States
did not consider that it had acquired sovereignty over Ligitan or Sipadan from Spain under the
1900 Treaty. The red line falls well to the north of both islands. This is another map which
Malaysia neglected to produce with its pleadings. As can be seen, it fundamentally contradicts
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Malaysia’s theory that the United States possessed sovereignty over the disputed islands which it
could have passed on to Great Britain in 1930.
(c) The 1903 Confirmation of Cession also supports Indonesia’s case
53. Mr. President, there is another development which took place in 1903 which, although it
was embraced by Malaysia in its initial Memorial, has now turned out to be something of an
embarrassment for our distinguished opponents. This was the Confirmation of Cession signed by
the Sultan of Sulu on 22 April 1903, a copy of which is at tab 45.
54. This is a very peculiar document. It stated that the Sultan, of his own free will, was
pleased to cede to the Government of North Borneo “all the islands in the neighbourhood of the
mainland of North Borneo from the Island of Bangii to Sibuku Bay”. It then listed the islands in
question. I will not attempt to read out these islands, but they are in the document and on the
screen.
“These are their names: Mulayangin, Mulayangin Kechil, Malawali, Tigabu,
Bilian, Tagapil, Langkayan, Boan, Lahiman, Baguan, Mantanbuan, Gaya, Omadal,
Siamil, Mabul, Kapalai, Dinawan, and other islands near, or round, or lying between
these said islands named above.”
The Confirmation then concluded:
“The reason why the names of the islands are not mentioned in the agreement
made with Baron de Overbeck and Mr. [now Sir] Alfred Dent on the 19th Muharram
1295, corresponding to the 22nd January 1878, is because it was known and mutually
understood that these islands [the ones listed there] were included in the grant of the
countries and islands mentioned in the Agreement above referred to.”
55. The Court will note that neither Ligitan or Sipadan were mentioned in this document. It
may assist the Court if the location of each of the features that were named in the confirmation are
identified on a map; you can also see this at tab 46 of your folders. Here they are, together with an
indication of the 3-marine-league ¾ or 9-mile ¾ limit of the BNBC’s jurisdiction.
56. It is quite clear that the whole purpose of the 1903 Confirmation was to enable the
BNBC artificially and after the fact to claim title to islands lying more than 9 miles from the
coast ¾ in other words, to islands which were not covered by the original 1878 grant to the BNBC
or the 1885 Protocol. As such, it was a trumped-up document. Even Malaysia concedes that the
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British Government did not view the Confirmation as having any legal validity whatsoever
(Memorial of Malaysia, para. 5.35, and Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, para. 3.16).
57. Nonetheless, Malaysia persists in maintaining that the Confirmation was intended to
encompass Ligitan and Sipadan even though they were not referred to in the document itself
(Memorial of Malaysia, para. 5.34). For as Indonesia pointed out in its Counter-Memorial, this
presents our colleagues on the other side of the Bar with something of a dilemma.
58. If the Confirmation was meant to cover Ligitan and Sipadan as Malaysia suggests, then
its effect would have been to vest title to the islands in the BNBC. However, Malaysia’s principal
argument ¾ its main argument ¾ is that in 1903 title vested in the United States. How could title
vest and lie in two different entities simultaneously? That is a question Malaysia has not bothered
to answer.
59. Be that as it may, the true position is that title vested neither in the BNBC nor in the
United States at the time. The BNBC had no title because the islands, by Malaysia’s own
admission, were not within the Sultan of Sulu’s 1878 grant to the BNBC or within the
1885 Protocol. The United States had no title for the reasons that I have explained a few moments
ago.
60. Moreover, regardless of its legal defects, the fact remains that the 1903 Confirmation did
not name Ligitan and Sipadan as islands that were being ceded to British North Borneo even
though it would have been perfectly possible to have done so had the intention been to include
them. Other very small islands were named in painstaking detail: why not Sipadan and Ligitan?
The answer lies in the fact that it was well known to the BNBC in 1903 that Ligitan and Sipadan
did not belong to North Borneo. With the Court’s indulgence, let us return to the map.
61. It is no accident that all of the islands named in the 1903 Confirmation lie to the north of
the 4° 10’ N latitude which was agreed in 1891. The BNBC had no hesitation in claiming those
islands as long as the Sultan of Sulu would go along with the arrangement. But islands lying south
of the 4° 10’ line such as Ligitan and Sipadan were another matter since these had been allocated to
the Netherlands by the 1891 Convention. They were thus not covered by, and not named in, the
1903 Confirmation.
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62. This position was confirmed by the map of the area that Stanfords published for the
BNBC just four months after the 1903 Confirmation was entered into ¾ a map which was referred
to earlier this afternoon by Professor Soons.
63. Here is that map once again. Note, if you would, Mr. President and Members of the
Court, that all of the islands named in the 1903 Confirmation fall within the limits of the BNBC’s
territorial domains which lie to the north of the 4° 10’ line of latitude. Sipadan and Ligitan fall to
the south of that line, and hence on the Dutch side of the boundary. And that explains why they
were not named in the Confirmation.
64. At the end of the day, the 1903 Confirmation of Cession adds nothing to Malaysia’s case.
If anything, it provides further evidence that Ligitan and Sipadan were considered to be Dutch by
virtue of the fact that they lay to the south of the 4° 10’ N latitude.
Mr. President, with your permission I would suggest that that might be an appropriate point
to break for the afternoon.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup, Monsieur Bundy. Nous allons effectivement
nous arrêter là. La séance est levée. La prochaine séance aura lieu demain matin à 10 heures.
L’audience est levée à 18 heures.
___________