Audience publique de la Chambre tenue le mardi 23 avril 1991, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Sette-Camara, président de la Chambre

C 4/CR 91/7
Cour internationale International Court
de Justice of Justice
LA HAYE THE HAGUE
YEAR 1991
Public sitting of the Chamber
held on Tuesday 23 April 1991, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
Judge Sette-Camara, President of the Chamber, presiding
in the case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute
(El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening)

VERBATIM RECORD

ANNEE l991
Audience publique de la Chambre
tenue le mardi 23 avril 1991, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Sette-Camara, président de la Chambre
en l'affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime
(El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua (intervenant))

COMPTE RENDU

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Present:
Judge Sette-Camara, President of the Chamber
Judges Sir Robert Jennings, President of the Court
Oda, Vice-President of the Court
Judges ad hoc Valticos
Torres Bernárdez
Registrar Valencia-Ospina

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Présents :
M. Sette-Camara, président de la Chambre
Sir Robert Jennings, Président de la Cour
M. Oda, Vice-Président de la Cour, juges
M. Valticos
M. Torres Bernárdez, juges ad hoc
M. Valencia-Ospina, Greffier

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The Government of El Salvador is represented by:
Dr. Alfredo Martínez Moreno,
as Agent and Counsel;
H. E. Mr. Roberto Arturo Castrillo, Ambassador,
as Co-Agent;
and
H. E. Dr. José Manuel Pacas Castro, Minister for Foreign Relations,
as Counsel and Advocate.
Lic. Berta Celina Quinteros, Director General of the Boundaries'
Office,
as Counsel;
Assisted by
Prof. Dr. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Professor of Public
International Law at the University of Uruguay, former Judge and
President of the International Court of Justice; former President
and Member of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Keith Highet, Adjunct Professor of International Law at The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Member of the Bars of
New York and the District of Columbia,
Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht C.B.E., Q.C., Director of the Research Centre
for International Law, University of Cambridge, Fellow of Trinity
College, Cambridge,
Prof. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus at the Université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
Dr. Francisco Roberto Lima, Professor of Constitutional and
Administrative Law; former Vice-President of the Republic and
former Ambassador to the United States of America.
Dr. David Escobar Galindo, Professor of Law, Vice-Rector of the
University "Dr. José Matías Delgado" (El Salvador)
as Counsel and Advocates;
and
Dr. Francisco José Chavarría,
Lic. Santiago Elías Castro,
Lic. Solange Langer,
Lic. Ana María de Martínez,
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Le Gouvernement d'El Salavador est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Alfredo Martínez Moreno
comme agent et conseil;
S. Exc. M. Roberto Arturo Castrillo, Ambassadeur,
comme coagent;
S. Exc. M. José Manuel Pacas Castro, ministre des affaires
étrangères,
comme conseil et avocat;
Mme Berta Celina Quinteros, directeur général du Bureau des
frontières,
comme conseil;
assistés de :
M. Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, professeur de droit international
public à l'Université de l'Uruguay, ancien juge et ancien
Président de la Cour internationale de Justice; ancien président
et ancien membre de la Commission du droit international,
M. Keith Highet, professeur adjoint de droit international à la
Fletcher School de droit et diplomatie et membre des barreaux de
New York et du District de Columbia,
M. Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., directeur du centre de recherche
en droit international, Université de Cambridge, Fellow de Trinity
College, Cambridge,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'Université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
M. Francisco Roberto Lima, professeur de droit constitutionnel et
administratif; ancien vice-président de la République et ancien
ambassadeur aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
M. David Escobar Galindo, professeur de droit, vice-recteur de
l'Université "Dr. José Matías Delgado" (El Salvador),
comme conseils et avocats;
ainsi que :
M. Francisco José Chavarría,
M. Santiago Elías Castro,
Mme Solange Langer,
Mme Ana María de Martínez,
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Mr. Anthony J. Oakley,
Lic. Ana Elizabeth Villata,
as Counsellors.
The Government of Honduras is represented by:
H.E. Mr. R. Valladares Soto, Ambassador of Honduras to the
Netherlands,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Pedro Pineda Madrid, Chairman of the Sovereignty and
Frontier Commission,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Daniel Bardonnet, Professor at the Université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, Whewell Professor of International Law,
University of Cambridge,
Mr. René-Jean Dupuy, Professor at the Collège de France,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the Université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
Mr. Julio González Campos, Professor of International Law,
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,
Mr. Luis Ignacio Sánchez Rodriguez, Professor of International Law,
Universidad Complutense de Madrid,
Mr. Alejandro Nieto, Professor of Public Law, Universidad
Complutense de Madrid,
Mr. Paul De Visscher, Professor Emeritus at the Université de
Louvain,
as Advocates and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Max Velásquez, Ambassador of Honduras to the United Kingdom,
Mr. Arnulfo Pineda López, Secretary-General of the Sovereignty and
Frontier Commission,
Mr. Arias de Saavedra y Muguelar, Minister, Embassy of Honduras to
the Netherlands,
Mr. Gerardo Martínez Blanco, Director of Documentation, Sovereignty
and Frontier Commission,
Mrs. Salomé Castellanos, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Honduras to
the Netherlands,
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M. Anthony J. Oakley,
Mme Ana Elizabeth Villata,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernement du Honduras est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. R. Valladares Soto, ambassadeur du Honduras à La Haye,
comme agent;
S. Exc. M. Pedro Pineda Madrid, président de la Commission de
Souveraineté et des frontières,
comme coagent;
M. Daniel Bardonnet, professeur à l'Université de droit, d'économie
et de sciences sociales de Paris,
M. Derek W. Bowett, professeur de droit international à l'Université
de Cambridge, Chaire Whewell,
M. René-Jean Dupuy, professeur au Collège de France,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l'Université de droit,
d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris,
M. Julio González Campos, professeur de droit international à
l'Université autonome de Madrid,
M. Luis Ignacio Sánchez Rodríguez, professeur de droit international
à l'Université Complutense de Madrid,
M. Alejandro Nieto, professeur de droit public à l'Université
Complutense de Madrid,
M. Paul de Visscher, professeur émérite à l'Université catholique de
Louvain,
comme avocats-conseils;
S. Exc. M. Max Velásquez, ambassadeur du Honduras à Londres,
M. Arnulfo Pineda López, secrétaire général de la Commission de
Souveraineté et de frontières,
M. Arias de Saavedra y Muguelar, ministre de l'ambassade du Honduras
à La Haye,
M. Gerardo Martínez Blanco, directeur de documentation de la
Commission de Souveraineté et de frontières,
Mme Salomé Castellanos, ministre-conseiller de l'ambassade du
Honduras à La Haye,
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Mr. Richard Meese, Legal Advisor, Partner in Frère Cholmeley, Paris,
as Counsel;
Mr. Guillermo Bustillo Lacayo,
Mrs. Olmeda Rivera,
Mr. Raul Andino,
Mr. Miguel Tosta Appel
Mr. Mario Felipe Martínez,
Mrs. Lourdes Corrales,
as Members of the Sovereignty and Frontier Commission.
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M. Richard Meese, conseil juridique, associé du cabinet Frère
Cholmeley, Paris,
comme conseils;
M. Guillermo Bustillo Lacayo,
Mme Olmeda Rivera,
M. Raul Andino,
M. Miguel Tosta Appel,
M. Mario Felipe Martínez,
Mme Lourdes Corrales,
comme membres de la Commission de Souveraineté et des frontières.
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Le PRESIDENT : Please be seated. The sitting is open. Today is the turn of El Salvador to
begin this second round of hearings, and I give the floor to Professor Prosper Weil.
M. WEIL : Merci, Monsieur le Président.
L'INTERPRETATION DU COMPROMIS
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, je tiens avant toute chose à présenter à la
Chambre et à la délégation du Honduras, et plus particulièrement au Professeur Paul De Visscher,
mes excuses pour mon absence hier au moment où ce dernier a prononcé sa réplique au sujet de
l'interprétation du compromis. Je prie la Chambre, la délégation hondurienne et mon ami Paul de
Visscher de ne voir là aucun geste discourtois, mais simplement le résultat d'un empêchement,
lui-même dû à un malentendu au sujet du calendrier des plaidoiries, et que je suis, soyez-en assurés,
le tout premier à regretter. Je tiens également, si vous me le permettez, Monsieur le Président, à
souligner combien j'apprécie que nos échanges se soient déroulés au niveau élevé du droit, sans
jamais verser dans une polémique partisane contraire à l'esprit scientifique auquel doivent rester
fidèles les universitaires que nous sommes. C'est pour moi, je tiens à le dire, un réel privilège que
d'affronter un contradicteur d'une pareille qualité.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, il ne saurait être question de reprendre ici
l'ensemble du débat et de vous imposer l'épreuve d'un nouvel exposé de la position d'El Salvador. Je
ne reviendrai pas sur la différence de signification qui sépare, à première vue comme après un
examen approfondi, les concepts de délimitation et de détermination de la situation juridique, aussi
différents l'un de l'autre que le jour l'est de la nuit. Je ne reviendrai pas non plus sur l'absence de
négociations réelles, sérieuses, "qui aient un sens", au sujet de la délimitation. Je me bornerai à
relever dans la belle plaidoirie du Professeur De Visscher deux aspects seulement, dont l'un appelle
une mise au point, mais dont l'autre nécessite une contradiction de fond.
I. La mise au point concerne la question des méthodes d'interprétation du compromis. M. De
Visscher s'est insurgé contre l'idée que l'on pourrait "soumettre à deux méthodes différentes
d'interprétation les clauses d'un même compromis, selon qu'elles ont trait à la création de la
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compétence juridictionnelle ou à l'objet du différend" (c4/cr91/6, p. 12). "Pareille dichotomie" (op.
cit., p. 11), déclare-t-il, ne repose sur rien.
Je suis tout à fait désolé, Monsieur le Président, si j'ai pu donner à penser à nos adversaires, et
peut-être à la Chambre, que telle était ma thèse. Sans nul doute me suis-je mal ou insuffisamment
expliqué, pour avoir été si mal compris. Je n'ai jamais pensé que dans un compromis coexistent côte
à côte des dispositions générant la compétence juridictionnelle, qui devraient s'interpréter dans une
optique subjective selon le principe: "tout le consentement, mais rien que le consentement", et des
dispositions définissant l'objet du différend, qui devraient s'interpréter dans une optique objective, sur
la base du principe: "le texte, tout le texte, rien que le texte".
Mon observation tendait tout simplement à constater que le compromis - le compromis tout
entier, sans différenciation entre telle ou telle de ses dispositions - possède le double caractère d'un
instrument générateur de compétence et d'un traité international, et je m'étais demandé si une
contradiction ne risquait pas de surgir, dans certaines situations, entre la recherche subjective de
l'intention des Parties, qui domine l'interprétation du compromis en tant qu'acte instituant la
compétence du juge, et la démarche objective, qui domine l'interprétation des traités. Ma réflexion
m'a conduit, la Chambre s'en souvient peut-être, à écarter [toute hypothèse de contradiction ou]
toute possibilité de contradiction; et c'est à la lumière d'une approche convergente visant à établir
l'intention des Parties au travers du sens naturel et ordinaire des termes employés dans leur contexte
que j'ai essayé de conduire l'exercice d'interprétation qui m'incombait. C'est bien entendu cette même
méthode - je dis bien cette même méthode - qui gouverne l'interprétation de l'ensemble des
dispositions pertinentes du compromis, et il n'est pas question d'appliquer une méthode subjective à
certaines dispositions du compromis et une méthode objective à d'autres. Il y a, ai-je dit, parfaite
coïncidence entre la subjectivité de l'interprétation du compromis en tant qu'instrument générateur de
la compétence de la Chambre et l'objectivité de l'interprétation du compromis en tant que traité
international.
Voilà pour le premier point, somme toute mineur.
II. Le second point mérite davantage d'attention. Dans l'espoir d'insuffler une nouvelle vie à
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l'argument hondurien de l'effet utile, M. Paul De Visscher a soutenu que le titre du Honduras est un
titre inhérent, qui existe ipso facto et ab initio, qui préexiste donc en quelque sorte à toute décision
de la Chambre, sur l'existence duquel il ne peut y avoir aucune contestation, sur lequel la Chambre
en quelque sorte n'a pas de prise, et dont la Chambre ne peut en conséquence que constater
l'existence dans un jugement déclaratoire:
"Le Honduras, a-t-il déclaré, n'a pas besoin de l'autorisation de la Cour... pour justifier
d'un titre aux espaces maritimes dans le golfe et hors du golfe. Sur base du titre qu'il possède
déjà en vertu du droit international général, le Honduras pourrait parfaitement entreprendre
l'exploration et l'exploitation de ces espaces... En définitive [c'est toujours le Professeur Paul
De Visscher qui parle], le Honduras soutient qu'il possède hic et nunc par l'effet du droit
international général, codifié par la convention de 1982, un titre sur les espaces maritimes et
que ce titre ne peut pas être remis en doute par la Partie adverse." (Op. cit., pp. 15 et 17.)
Cette argumentation se heurte à une double objection.
En premier lieu, la conception du droit inhérent et ab initio qui peut s'exercer sans un
processus juridique particulier et sans aucun acte constitutif n'est valable, est-il besoin de le dire, que
pour une seule des juridictions maritimes, le plateau continental. C'est au plateau continental que se
réfère l'article 2 de la convention de Genève de 1958 aux termes duquel "[l]es droits de l'Etat riverain
sur le plateau continental sont indépendants de l'occupation effective ou fictive, aussi bien que de
toute proclamation expresse". C'est à cette disposition que la Cour a fait référence dans le célèbre
paragraphe 19 de son arrêt de 1969 sur le Plateau continental de la mer du Nord qui énonce en des
termes qui ont été depuis repris et repris, la théorie du droit inhérent dont, dit la Cour, l'"existence
peut être constatée" mais qui "ne suppose aucun acte constitutif".
La convention des Nations Unies de 1982 reprend mot pour mot dans son article 77, qui
définit les droits de l'Etat côtier sur son plateau continental, le principe énoncé par la convention de
Genève et systématisé par la Cour en 1969. Rien de semblable, nous le savons tous, pour les autres
juridictions maritimes. Le contraste est saisissant entre la rédaction des articles 3 et 56 de la
convention de 1982 relatifs à la mer territoriale et à la zone économique exclusive et celle de
l'article 77 relatif au plateau continental. Ni pour la mer territoriale ni pour la zone économique
exclusive il n'est prévu de droit inhérent indépendant de tout acte volontariste. Certes tout Etat côtier
a un droit potentiel à une mer territoriale et à une zone économique exclusive, mais ce droit ne
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devient réel, effectif que par l'intermédiaire d'un acte de volonté juridique par lequel l'Etat en cause
proclame et revendique une mer territoriale d'une largeur donnée (qui ne saurait excéder 12 milles
marins) et une zone économique exclusive d'une largeur donnée (qui ne saurait excéder 200 milles
marins); en l'absence d'un tel acte de volonté juridique exprès, la mer territoriale et la zone
économique exclusive demeurent à l'état de virtualité parce que leur largeur reste indéterminée,
contrairement à celle du plateau continental, dont la largeur répond à des critères préexistants fixés
par le droit international coutumier et codifiés (au moins jusqu'à un certain point) dans la convention
de 1982.
Prétendre que le Honduras a un droit inhérent d'exploration et d'exploitation des eaux dans le
golfe et dans le Pacifique n'est donc pas conforme aux données du droit de la mer. Mais il y a plus
important et peut-être plus grave. Comme j'ai tenté de l'expliquer dans ma précédente plaidoirie, ce
qui est controversé dans la présente affaire, c'est précisément la question de savoir si le Honduras se
trouve dans une situation juridique telle qu'il possède des droits qui viendraient chevaucher les droits
d'El Salvador, créant ainsi une situation juridique qui appelle une délimitation. A cette question le
Honduras apporte une réponse affirmative, et El Salvador une réponse négative fondée, en ce qui
concerne le golfe sur le régime spécial du golfe de Fonseca, et en ce qui concerne le Pacifique sur le
fait que, selon El Salvador, le Honduras ne possède pas la qualité d'Etat côtier du Pacifique.
C'est ce différend que la Chambre est appelée à trancher. Soutenir, comme l'a fait
Paul De Visscher, que le Honduras pourrait proprio motu exercer les droits attachés à son titre sans
avoir "besoin de l'autorisation de la Cour" revient en quelque sorte à ignorer (au sens anglais du
terme "to ignore") la position opposée d'El Salvador et l'existence d'un différend entre les deux pays
et à ériger en axiome que les droits du Honduras ne sont sujets ni à doute ni à discussion.
Est-il besoin de rappeler que, même lorsque le droit international autorise un Etat à proclamer
ou à revendiquer unilatéralement des droits maritimes (au moyen par exemple d'une législation
interne) même dans ce cas, le principe fermement posé par la Cour dans l'affaire des Pêcheries est
que la validité de son action dans les rapports avec d'autres Etats "relève du droit international"
(C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 132).
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Que le Honduras prétende, soutienne, allègue, qu'il possède dans le golfe ou dans le Pacifique
un titre qui entre en concurrence avec celui d'El Salvador, c'est sa prérogative d'Etat souverain.
Mais que, en présence du point de vue opposé d'un Etat tiers, en l'espèce El Salvador, et en face par
conséquent d'un différend international, le Honduras assimile d'emblée sa prétention à un droit déjà
effectivement consacré, cela n'est pas acceptable car cela revient à nier le rôle même du règlement
judiciaire international et à réduire à néant la fonction judiciaire de la Chambre.
La thèse du Honduras revient en définitive à ériger en postulat absolu et en dogme infaillible
sa prétention de litigant. Son titre sur les espaces maritimes, a affirmé M. Paul De Visscher, je l'ai
cité il y a un instant, "ne peut pas être mis en doute par la Partie adverse". A suivre cette thèse, non
seulement El Salvador n'a pas le droit de mettre en doute le titre du Honduras, non seulement tout
différend sur le titre du Honduras est nié comme une impossibilité juridique, mais la Chambre
elle-même n'a plus d'autre rôle que de rendre (je cite Paul De Visscher) "un arrêt déclaratoire ...
reconnaissant (au Honduras) sur base du droit international général son titre sur les espaces
maritimes". (Op. cit., p. 15.)
Monsieur le Président, El Salvador ne voit pas d'inconvénient à ce que la décision que la
Chambre va rendre au sujet de la situation juridique des espaces maritimes du golfe et du Pacifique
soit analysée comme un jugement déclaratoire, c'est-à-dire, pour m'inspirer des formules de l'arrêt
Haya de la Torre, comme un arrêt qui définit les rapports de droit entre les Parties sans comporter
pour celles-ci aucune injonction et en laissant aux Parties le soin d'en tirer les conséquences
appropriées (C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 79). Mais ce jugement, la Chambre le prononcera en statuant
sur un différend. La mission de la Chambre ne consiste pas à donner son estampille à un titre
axiomatique soustrait à toute discussion; sa mission consiste à décider, après examen des données de
l'affaire, si, en vertu du droit international, un tel titre, dont l'existence est contestée par l'autre
Partie, existe ou n'existe pas. On ne voit pas quelle autre signification pourrait revêtir l'article 2 du
compromis aux termes duquel : "Les Parties demandent à la Chambre ... qu'elle détermine la
situation juridique ... des espaces maritimes."
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, si je me suis autorisé à formuler de telles
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évidences, de telles banalités, c'est parce que la thèse nouvelle avancée par le Honduras dans sa
réplique orale a des implications lointaines qu'El Salvador ne pouvait pas laisser sans réponse.
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, de votre patience renouvelée, et
je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, de bien vouloir donner la parole au Président Eduardo Jiménez
de Aréchaga.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Weil and I give the floor to President Eduardo Jiménez
de Aréchaga.
Dr. JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA: Mr. President, Members of the Chamber, this is the oral
rejoinder by El Salvador on the law applicable to the land frontier dispute.
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE LAND FRONTIER DISPUTE
The first point made yesterday by Professor Nieto related to the evidentiary value of
documents.
El Salvador does not claim that the Formal Title-Deeds to Commons are the only documents
to be taken into consideration by the Chamber. Rather El Salvador contends that the Chamber, when
comparing the evidentiary value of all the documents relied on by the Parties, should recognize that
the Formal Title-Deeds to Commons on which El Salvador is relying are the best possible evidence,
the supreme means of proof in relation to the application of the principle of uti possidetis juris in
this case. In other words, El Salvador is not invoking any exclusivity for the documents upon which
it is relying: it is invoking what in other jurisdictions is called "the best evidence rule".
Professor Nieto continued to submit that the Formal Title-Deeds relied on by El Salvador are
grants of "ejidos de composición.
He made reference to a list set out in the book of Francisco de Solano entitled Tierras y
Sociedad en el Reino de Guatemala; this work indeed contains a list of "composiciones" carried
into effect in Guatemala. This list is at the disposition of the Chamber in this book which, if it is not
readily available to the Members of the Court, El Salvador will file with the Registry of the Court
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forthwith. None of the formal title-deeds relied on by El Salvador is to be found in this list. The
only Title-Deed mentioned in the course of this litigation which appears on this list as an "ejido de
composición" is the title-deed conferring private propietary rights on the Indian community of
Jocoara, a title-deed which was relied on by Professor Bardonnet to support the claim of Honduras
to Nahuaterique. The only times that the process of "composición" was applied in respect of two of
the formal title-deeds relied on by El Salvador were the "composiciones" paid for the "demasias",
that is to say the excess portion of land not covered by the formal title-deeds in the cases of Arcatao
and of La Palma. But that does not alter the fact that both these formal title-deeds granted "ejidos de
reducción" not "ejidos de composición".
For instance, the Formal Title-Deed to the Commons of La Palma (which appear in the
Annexes to the Counter-Memorial of El Salvador, Volume II, Annex III.1) was clearly an "ejido de
reducción" and not an "ejido de composición". The adjudicating authority granted to the Indian
community, represented by its municipal officers, some 40 "caballerias" as Commons. This grant
was made gratuitously without any payment being required on the basis of the Laws of the Indies
(ibid ., at p. 27 (English translation) and at p. 121 (original Spanish)).
The Formal Title-Deed itself asserts that this land settlement amounted to the grant of an
"ejido de reducción". The term "reducción" is actually employed in the text of the title-deed (ibid .,
at p. 25 (English translation) and at p. 111 (original Spanish)).
An additional number of "caballerias" were also granted as an enlargement of the Commons
and for this additional area a very moderate payment was demanded by way of "composición".
But what is important is that no distinction or separation was made between the land granted
as an "ejido de reducción" and the excess of land, the "demasia" which was adjudicated by the
process of "composición".
All the land adjudicated on one or the other basis was submitted to exactly the same legal
régime, and that legal régime was the one applied to "ejidos de reducción". All the land was
considered as communal property: all of it was to be exploited in common and could not be
alienated in whole or in part; all of it formed part of the public domain and so was vested in the
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Municipal Council or "Cabildo", "cuyos fueron y serán" as the King said, and consequently all the
land was subject to the administrative control of the "Alcadía Mayor" of San Salvador.
The Formal Title-Deed itself expresses the unity and sole identification of the land as a whole
by stating that the "demasía" was embraced (the Spanish word used is "comprendidas", literally
meaning "comprised") within the Commons (ibid ., at p. 29 (English translation) and at p. 124
(original Spanish)).
Professor Nieto quoted certain Royal Orders, concluding that they prove that the process of
"composición" was capable of applying to some Indian communities. Of course this is true; an
Indian community could purchase an "ejido de composición", just as the Indian community of
Jocoara actually did. This is simply because the Indian communities had a right so to do if they
wished to obtain a particular piece of land or to enlarge their original Commons.
But the fundamental point is that the original "ejidos de reducción", such as those granted in
the Formal Title-Deeds relied on by El Salvador, could not be subject to the compulsory revision
which was conducted in respect of lands subject to the régime of "ejidos de composición". The
"ejidos de reducción" were exempt from that obligatory régime and this was the case from the very
beginning of the Spanish colonial period.
Professor Nieto also recalled the Law in the Recopilación which prohibited the local
authorities from modifying on their own, as he said, "la limite des provinces, une prérogative
réservée au roi d'Espagne".
However, there is a simple answer to this objection. There is a Royal Order, adopted at
El Pardo in 1591 which was annexed in the Memorial of Honduras (Cedulario Indiano No. 133,
Annexes to the Memorial of Honduras at pp. 70-71), in which the King empowers the "Real
Audiencia" of Guatemala to grant "ejidos" to the Indian communities without this delegated authority
being restricted or modified by any requirement to respect the divisions or limits of provinces and
districts within the territory governed by the "Real Audiencia" of Guatemala. For instance, the
Order of the "Juez Privativo de Tierras" Arredondo, authorizing the sub-delegate judge Jiménez
Rubio of Chalatenango to adjudicate the mountain of Tecpangüisir to the Indian community of
- 18 -
Citalá is the best possible answer to Professor Nieto's contention; this Order shows eloquently that
such an authorization, totally disregarding existing provincial boundaries, could be validly granted
by the "Real Audiencia" of Guatemala. It is important to observe that Honduras has not sought to
challenge the validity of the authorization so given.
On this sector Professor Bardonnet pointed out yesterday that it was with respect only to the
adjudication of the mountain or Tecpanguisir that the "Juez Privativo de Tierras" in Guatemala gave
authority to the sub-delegate judge Jiménez Rubio.
But what is relevant is that, once the Judge so authorized had actually adjudicated the
mountain, that area became subject to administrative and judicial control exercised from the
"población" of Citalá and was thereby placed within the boundaries of the territorial and municipal
jurisdiction of a Salvadorean "población".
It is also important to note that the Royal Order to which reference has just been made
receives a somewhat misleading translation in the Annexes to the Memorial of Honduras (at pp.
70-71). The translation into French submitted by Honduras is as follows:
"je vous confère pouvoir, mission et faculté pour que vous puissiez composer toutes les terres,
après avoir réservé en priorité ce qui vous parait nécessaire pour les places, les "ejidos", les
terrains communaux, les pâturages et les friches des lieux et conseils municipaux en prenant
en considération la situation présente et envisageant la croissance que peut connaître chacun
d'entre eux à l'avenir, et en réservant aux Indiens ce dont ils auront besoin pour leurs cultures,
travaux et élevages".
Now, the original Spanish text, on the other hand, reads:
"os doy poder, comisión y facultad para que reservando ante todas cosas lo que os pareciere
para plazas, ejidos, propios, pastos y baldíos de los lugares y consejos que están poblados, así
por lo que toca al estado presente como al porvenir del aumento y crecimiento que puede tener
cada uno, y a los Indios lo que hubieren menester para hacer sus sementeras, labores y
crianzas, todo lo demás lo podéis componer".
The final six words of the Spanish text ("todo lo demás lo podéis componer") state, when
translated into English, "everything else you can grant out by the process of 'composición'". It is
clear from the Spanish text that this Royal Order was giving the "Real Audiencia" of Guatemala
power, once all the land necessary for, inter alia, the adjudication of "ejidos de reducción" had been
reserved, to grant out everything else by the process of "composición". In other words, all the lands
needed by the Indian communities had to be reserved before any land was granted out by the process
- 19 -
of "composición". The French translation submitted by Honduras, however, transplants the final six
words of the Spanish text to the beginning of the passage cited and thus gives the impression that all
land, including that already possessed by the Indians, was prima facie available to be granted out by
the process of "composición". This suggests, quite wrongly, that the grant of "ejidos de
composición" took priority over the grant of "ejidos de reducción", whereas in reality the position
was exactly the reverse.
Professor Nieto also opposed the concept of administrative control by arguing that the
municipalities had full autonomy and were thus simply not subjected to any such control. However,
the record shows clearly that persistent control over the Indian communities was exercised by the
"Alcaldías Mayores", the "Audiencias", and ultimately by the Spanish Crown in order to make the
Indian population work, in order to avoid the sale of their lands, and in order to collect their taxes.
El Salvador has said that it accepts the legal distinction between "ejidos de reducción" and
"ejidos de composición" as stated by Professor Nieto. But he did not invent this distinction; it
emerges from the Spanish legislation and colonial practice. Professor Nieto has now confessed that
he regrets "d'avoir introduit dans ce litige les concepts de ejidos de reducción et de ejidos de
composición". He neither created these concepts nor was he responsible for their introduction into
this litigation; both are a consequence of the Spanish legislation as to Derecho Indiano. However,
although El Salvador accepted Professor Nieto's formulation of the legal distinctions between the
two different types of "ejidos", El Salvador maintains the view which it has already expressed,
namely that Professor Nieto fell into error as soon as he turned his attention to the facts of this case.
If Professor Nieto now appears to repent that he ever introduced this distinction into this
litigation, this can only be because he has now realized that the distinction which he has formulated
is fatal for the thesis adopted by Honduras. What is more, he has now repudiated the statement
which he made in the written Opinion which was presented by Honduras. He stated yesterday that
"disons d'emblée que les ejidos de reduction ne peuvent à aucun moment être considerés comme des
biens de domaine public". But in his written Opinion (Annexes to the Counter-Memorial of
Honduras, pp. 40 and 45) he stated that "the ejidos de reducción constituted lands of public domain".
- 20 -
El Salvador prefers the opinion of Professor Nieto as legal expert to the arguments of
Professor Nieto as advocate for Honduras.
In his Opinion, he adduced the correct thesis that "le titulaire de l'ejido de reducción est le
Cabildo", that is to say the municipality (ibid ., p. XX). Now the relationship created with a
municipality is one of public law and public domain because such a relationship of public domain
may be established not only vis-à-vis the State or State entities but also vis-à-vis the municipality.
Thus an "ejido de reducción" is not merely owned by the municipal authorities of the "Cabildo". It is
also governed by those authorities; it is they who exercise justice, collect taxes, punish offenders, all
these functions being carried out on a territorial and not on a purely personal basis - I myself have
found no trace whatever of the personal jurisdiction imagined yesterday by Professor Bardonnet.
More serious is the accusation of Professor Bardonnet of not having furnished "le moindre
commencement de preuve" concerning the exercise by the "alcaldes de indios" of powers of policing,
of justice, and of jurisdiction. This criticism is unjust because immediately after making this
assertion, I referred, in a passage to be found at page 47 of the official transcript of the sitting held
on 19 April last, I referred to the publication by Francisco de Solano at pages 322-326 of his
Cedulario de Tierras largely quoted by Honduras. With your permission, Mr. President, I will
quote my own words from the official transcript I referred to:
"what is called an ordenanza de buen Gobierno in Guatemala (document 163 of the
Cedulario). It is sufficient to read the title of the various chapters of that ordenanza to realize
that jurisdiction and imperium were exercised in the assigned territory by the Cabildos and by
their alcaldes de indios. The ordenanza provided for parts of the land being assigned to
support sick or indigent Indians: it provided for punishment of offenders, including corporal
punishment for those Indians who refused to work; it forbade personal service in the form of
encomiendas, similar to serfdom, punishing any authority who permitted them; it ordered the
keeping of books of account for the expenses; it forbade the sale of land except with superior
authorization, etc. There were also various measures for protection of the Indians and
obviously, the exercise of that protection required a certain degree of administrative control.
Document 219 at page 501 of the same book, Cedulario de Tierras, contains detailed
regulations concerning the most typical exercise of jurisdiction: the collection of taxes for the
King. The authorities of each población were the alcades de indios. The alcaldes de indios
were in charge of that task of collection the taxes and the regulations provided that they should
receive a 1 per cent of the amount they collected, as remuneration for their work.
Consequently, these formal title-deeds attribute jurisdiction and administrative control
to the municipal authorities of the human settlement favoured by the grant of the Commons in
question. Thus, each formal title-deed to Commons, in accordance with the principle of uti
possidetis juris, becomes a title-deed conferring territorial sovereignty in accordance with
international law."
- 21 -
In case this is not sufficient to satisfy Professor Bardonnet, I will now also cite as evidence
Document 20 at page 197 of this book by Francisco de Solano again Tierra y Sociedad en el Reino
de Guatemala. This is a Royal Decree ("Real Cédula") issued at Valladolid on 9 October 1549
directed by the Queen of Spain to the "Presidente" and "Oidores" of the "Real Audiencia de los
Confines", which until 1563 had jurisdiction over the whole of what is now Central America. This
Royal Decree ordered that:
"It would be good if they were to create and provide for ordinary mayors ('alcaldes
ordinarios'), in order that they should exercise justice in the civil cases, and also aldermen
('regidores cadañeros') and that these should be elected by the Indians themselves, who should
have the responsibility for the common good, and they should in the same manner provide for
constables ('alguaciles') and any other necessary prosecuting attorneys ('fiscales'), as was done
and is accustomed to be done in the province of Tlaxcala and in other parts."
This Royal Decree then went on to provide that each "población" should have a jail for the
delinquents and a pound belonging to the Council into which to put any cattle which caused damage
or were not adequately controlled.
These documents are some considerable distance from constituting "une projection
anachronique ou imaginaire" - the description with which my argument was favoured by
Professor Bardonnet yesterday. These documents are Royal Decrees printed in publications which
are readily available and, what is more, were referred to by Honduras in the course of its written
pleadings and were quoted as recently as yesterday by Professor Nieto. If these document have not
been fully considered by counsel for Honduras, that is not the problem of El Salvador. For my part,
I believe that I have fulfilled in this respect the onus probandi.
The pleading of Professor Bardonnet, in which he did me the honour of referring continually
to my earlier statement to the Chamber, continued to take as its point of departure as an "article de
foi" or unassailable dogma the notion that the formal title-deeds to commons relied on by
El Salvador only conferred "un droit foncier".
Thus, the whole elegant construction of the pleading of Professor Bardonnet is entirely based
on Professor Nieto's distinction between the two types of "ejidos" and his unproven and wholly
wrong assertion that the formal title-deeds relied on by El Salvador granted only "ejidos de
- 22 -
composición" or "un droit de propriété foncière".
The leitmotif of the thesis of Professor Bardonnet is the distinction between "limites de
jurisdictions et limites de terres". But the formal title-deeds relied on by El Salvador indicate the
limits of the jurisdictions of townships and "poblaciones", not "limites de terres". The latter are
established by the type of title-deeds conferring private proprietary rights on which Honduras is
relying.
Professor Nieto and, after him, Professor Bardonnet, have contended that the Indians were not
organized on any geographical or territorial basis but rather "conformément à des critères personnels
strictement tribaux". This was simply not the case. The whole process of granting "ejidos de
reducción" was designed to concentrate the Indians in towns or "poblaciones" with the spiritual
objective of giving them Christian instruction and the equally important material objective of making
it easier to collect their taxes. The Cacique, who often also became the "Alcalde", did not exercise
his powers on a personal basis but rather on a territorial basis. Professor Bardonnet asserted that the
"Alcalde de Indios" did not exercise his functions vis-à-vis the Spanish settlers. This is indeed
correct but this was simply because such Spanish settlers were absolutely prohibited from residing in
the Indian "poblaciones" (see Francisco de Solano, Tierra y Sociedad en el Reino de Guatemala,
Document No. 91 at p. 337). The title of this "Real Cédula" "prohibiendo los Españoles, mestizos y
mulatos vivir entre los Indios aunque hayan comprado tierras en sus pueblos" - Royal Order
prohibiting the Spaniards, "mestizos y mulatos" to live among the Indians even if they have
purchased land in their "poblaciones".
So far as concerns the disputed sector of Goascorán, to which Professor Bardonnet made a
number of references, I regret that I cannot answer him, not out of any wish to be discourteous to
him but for the simple reason that I am not going to be dealing with that particular sector, which will
be dealt with by the Agent of El Salvador, Dr. Martínez Moreno. I am, however, informed that the
lands of Joateca and Massala, to which he referred, belong to a sector the line of whose boundary
has already been settled and which is, for that reason, not before the Chamber. I understand that the
problem there is one of demarcation rather than of delimitation.
- 23 -
So far as concerns the disputed sector of Nahuaterique, the issues are much more complicated
than their description by Professor Bardonnet suggested. Here again I would prefer to reserve the
arguments of El Salvador until after we have had the opportunity of listening to
Professor González Campos. I hope that Professor Bardonnet will not interpret this silence as a lack
either of responsiveness or of the courtesy which I have for him.
So far as concerns the Viteri letter, relied on repeatedly by Professor Bardonnet, a great deal
of water has flowed under the bridges of the rivers of Central America since that letter was written,
not just the Cruz-Letona Treaty but also the General Treaty of Peace of 1980 which defined a
different and proper application of the principle of uti possidetis juris.
Professor Bardonnet did, however, recognize that, in the case concerning the Arbitration
Award of the King of Spain, Honduras in order to establish as against Nicaragua the area of the
Sitio de Teotecacinte had relied on a measurement carried out in 1720. Professor Bardonnet further
agreed that the International Court of Justice had taken that measurement into account in its
Judgment. It is interesting, Mr. President, to recall this passage, or incident, in the case of the
validity of the Award of the King of Spain. One of the arguments which had been advanced by
Nicaragua was that the Award was not capable of execution by reason of its omissions,
contradictions and obscurities. So the Court, in order to pronounce on the validity of the Award had
to go into this question.
On this question, Honduras invoked, in support of its position as to the validity and lack of
obscurities of the Award, what is called "la démarcation du Sitio, terrain de Teotecacinte, d'après le
bornage effectué en 1720 pour aboutir au Portillo de Teotecacinte". In other words, Honduras
invoked a title similar to those El Salvador is invoking in this case. And Honduras said "Le seul
document qui puisse être pris en considération est le procès-verbal du bornage effectué en 1720. Ce
document est reproduit en annexe à la présente réplique." And the Reply of Honduras in that case
annexes what it called "procès-verbal du bornage du Sitio de Teotecacinte" (page 742 of the first
volume of the Pleadings in that case).
Now if the Chamber would care to look at this procès-verbal it would recognize the same
- 24 -
features which appear in the titles invoked by El Salvador. The private judge gives authority to a
delegate judge, the delegate judge appoints a surveyor, the surveyor proceeds to measure the land
with the same system of cords and defines the limits of this place. Now, it is said that Honduras
invoked this document called the "demarcation" but really it is a title similar to those of El Salvador,
and not only the King of Spain accepted this demarcation as a basis of delimitation, I will read to
you what he said. Mr. Bardonnet tried to explain away this case by referring to a passage in the
Award of the Arbitrator in which it is stated that the southern part of the Sitio of Teotecacinte
"appertained to the jurisdiction of the city of New Segovia." This is only by the way of an
illustration of a "población" attracting the jurisdiction of an area of land defined in the formal
title-deed. But what is important is the final part of the Award, in which the King of Spain ruled that
"the line will follow the line which corresponds to the demarcation of the site of Teotecacinte in
accordance with the demarcation made in 1720". So the King of Spain, by speaking of
demarcation, meant the formal title-deed describing the course of the measurement, which is similar
to the formal title-deeds being relied on by El Salvador in these proceedings. It is important, I think,
that none other than the King of Spain applied this formal title-deed, which Professor Bardonnet
would undoubtedly describe as a title-deed, as a document establishing only a "limite de terres".
However, it was not only the King of Spain but also the International Court of Justice which
confirmed and applied the formal title-deed in this way.
What is most significant about this precedent is not only that Honduras cited, its support of
the validity of the Award, the fact that the boundary had been fixed exactly on the basis of the area
traversed in the course of the measurement of the Sitio, and that, in particular, the formal title-deed
had placed the final boundary marker of the Sitio at Cruz sin Brazo so that it was as from this point,
in accordance with the intention clearly expressed by the Arbitrator, that the line of demarcation
should be established. Honduras also added that the clear intention of the Arbitrator had been that
the line of the frontier should coincide with the entire measurement of the Sitio (see I.C.J. Pleadings,
Vol. I, at p. 543). It is interesting in this connection to look at the arguments of
Professor Guggenheim, who was then Advocate for Honduras (I.C.J. Pleadings, Vol. II, at pp. 196
- 25 -
et seq.). Then in the oral argument of Honduras one of its advocates, Professor Briggs, said (ibid .,
at pp. 209-210):
"The Award, therefore, delimited a frontier line ... with a detour to follow the demarcation of
the Sitio.
the last point mentioned by the surveyor is the south-western extremity of El Sitio.
the point of departure for the Portillo should be Cruz sin Brazo simply because the surveyor
stated that he completed plotting the Sitio at that point".
So this form of interpreting the formal title-deed and the measurement recorded therein was
indeed accepted by the International Court of Justice, which ratified the decision of the King of Spain
as Arbitrator and, consequently, the Court not only reproduced in page 216 of its Judgment this
phrase:
"the line will follow the direction which corresponds to the demarcation of the Sitio of
Teotecacinte in accordance with the demarcation made in 1720 to terminate at the Portillo de
Teotecacinte (I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 216; see also UNRIAA, Vol. XI at p. 117).
Not only did the Court say that, but the Court concluded:
"the Court does not consider the Award is incapable of execution by reason of any omissions,
contradiction and obscurities".
So the Court relies, in making this pronouncement, on a title of the nature of those which we are
invoking in this case.
The Court ratified the decision of the King of Spain as Arbitrator and, consequently, ratified
his manner of reading and interpreting these formal title-deeds in a manner which coincides with the
arguments produced in this litigation by El Salvador.
So far as concerns the various Arbitration Awards mentioned by Professor Bardonnet, which I
also cited in my earlier statement, I do not see any point of disagreement between us.
El Salvador has stated that it accepts the concept contained in Article 5 of the Treaty between
Per# and Bolivia as to rejecting any possession of fact against "contraire au titre". I therefore do not
think that it is relevant in this case to embark on a detailed study of different clauses found in past
Special Agreements. Each Special Agreement is special to the case to which it applies. These
- 26 -
provisions show, however, that in each of these instances the Parties felt obliged to spell out the
equitable relief or other adjustments which could be made to the basic principle of uti possidetis
juris. The only observation which I wish to make in this respect is that the Treaty of 1930 which
gave rise to the Tribunal of Arbitration presided by Hughes demanded that that Tribunal, before
exercising its exceptional powers, should first determine whether it could establish the line of uti
possidetis juris or whether it was impossible to do so because of the absence of the necessary titles.
Thus, the Tribunal had to carry out a two-stage operation. At the risk of stating the obvious, the
notion of administrative control would not in any event have been able to operate in those areas
where the Tribunal did not succeed in finding the existence of uti possidetis juris.
Professor Bardonnet gave numerous examples of what he believes to be the indications of
provincial boundaries. The issues in each sector are much more complex than his description
suggests. Questions as to the validity and nature of each title-deed may need to be considered; also
questions such as the reliability of statements by witnesses presented by one of the Parties. For these
reasons, El Salvador believes that any discussion at this stage of these different examples produced
by Professor Bardonnet would be premature. El Salvador now proposes to bring to an end this
discussion on the general principles of law which are applicable to the land frontier dispute and does
not propose to discuss the precise individual boundaries of each disputed sector at this stage. This is
not out of any desire to avoid a debate or to escape from the law to the facts: El Salvador simply
believes that such discussions should take place at the proper stage of these proceedings in the
manner which has already been agreed.
When comparing the present case with other arbitrations where the principle of uti possidetis
juris has been applied, it is necessary to take into consideration the specific features of the dispute,
as well as the differences between it and other arbitrations which have been referred to.
This land dispute concerns a few small isolated mountainous areas, which were during the
colonial period inhabited only by Indian communities. It is not a dispute over the establishment of
the entire line of the boundary between two countries or even over substantial tracts of land. These
factors explain why in this case the formal title-deeds granting "ejidos de reducción" to the Indian
- 27 -
communities which were the sole inhabitants of the sectors in dispute have become of supreme
importance and should be utilized as the best or perhaps the only remaining testimony which makes
it possible to establish today what was happening in those areas over more than 150 years ago.
By way of my final conclusion to this statement, it seems wholly appropriate and in order to
reflect briefly on the significance of the content of my observations. The purpose of applying the
principle of uti possidetis juris to colonial territories is to apply the best tests which are available of
actual historical administration and control to a given situation, in this case that prior to 1821. What
could possibly constitute a better test than the elements which I have described? In a part of Central
America inhabited largely by Indian communities, the acid test must clearly be the manner in which
those Indians were governed by the responsible authorities.
No better evidence of the fulfilment of obligations towards the Indian populations exists than
that provided by the institution of the "ejido de reducción" in the part of Central America with which
these proceedings are concerned. As such, it must occupy a key, if not conclusive, position in the
application of any rule of historic titles.
I wish to thank you Mr. President for your attention and having given this second opportunity
to address you.
The PRESIDENT: I thank President Jiménez de Aréchaga. His presentation concludes this
second round of oral pleadings and tomorrow we will start the hearings concerning the different
sectors of the land boundary, Honduras being the first delegation to address the Chamber. The
sitting is adjourned until tomorrow at 10.00 a.m.
The Chamber rose at 11.05 a.m.
___________