Audience publique tenue le mercredi 21 septembre 2016, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix, sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président, en l'affaire relative à la délimitation maritime dans l'océan Indie

Corrigé
Corrected

CR 2016/12

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

THE HAGUE LA HAYE

YEAR 2016

Public sitting

held on Wednesday 21 September 2016, at 4.30 p.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Abraham presiding,

in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean
(Somalia v. Kenya)

Preliminary Objections

____________________

VERBATIM RECORD
____________________

ANNÉE 2016

Audience publique

tenue le mercredi 21 septembre 2016, à 16 h 30, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,

en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l’océan Indien
(Somalie c. Kenya)

Exceptions préliminaires

________________

COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -

Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf

Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue

Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian

Registrar Couvreur

 - 3 -

Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président

MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue

M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian, juges

M. Couvreur, greffier

 - 4 -

The Government of Somalia is represented by:

H.E. Mr. Ali Said Faqi, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the Kingdom of
Belgium,

as Co-Agent;

Ms Mona Al-Sharmani, Attorney-at-Law, Senior Legal Adviser to the President of the Federal
Republic of Somalia,

as Deputy-Agent;

Mr. Paul S. Reichler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United States
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia,

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, former Member
and former Chairman of the International Law Commission, member of the Institut de droit
international,

Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of International Law at University College London, Barrister
at Matrix Chambers, London,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Mr. Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the United
States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

Ms Alina Miron, Professor of International Law at the University of Angers,

Mr. Edward Craven, Barrister at Matrix Chambers, London,

Mr. Nicholas M. Renzler, Attorney-at-Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the State of New York,

as Counsel;

Ms Lea Main-Klingst, Matrix Chambers, London,

as Junior Counsel;

Mr. Mohamed Omar, Senior Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia,

Mr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia,

H.E. Mr. Yusuf Garaad Omar, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic

of Somalia to the United Nations, New York,

Admiral Farah Ahmed Omar, former Admiral of the Somali Navy and the Chairman of Research
Institute for Ocean Affairs, Mogadishu, - 5 -

Mr. Daud Awes, Spokesperson of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia,

Mr. Abubakar Mohamed Abubakar, Director, Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Advisers.

Ms Kathryn Kalinowski, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC,

Ms Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington, DC,

as Assistants. - 6 -

Le Gouvernement de la Somalie est représenté par :

S. Exc. M. Ali Said Faqi, ambassadeur de la République fédérale de Somalie auprès du Royaume
de Belgique,

comme coagent ;

Mme Mona Al-Sharmani, avocate, conseillère juridique principale auprès du président de la
République fédérale de Somalie,

comme agent adjoint ;

M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour suprême
des Etats-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,

M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, ancien membre et
ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre de l’Institut de droit
international,

M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit international au University College de Londres,
avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseils et avocats ;

M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de la Cour
suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, du district de Columbia et du Commonwealth du
Massachusetts,

Mme Alina Miron, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Angers,

M. Edward Craven, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Nicholas M. Renzler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’Etat de New York,

comme conseils ;

Mme Lea Main-Klingst, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

comme conseil auxiliaire ;

M. Mohamed Omar, conseiller principal auprès du président de la République fédérale de Somalie,

M. Ahmed Ali Dahir, Attorney-General de la République fédérale de Somalie,

S. Exc. M. l’ambassadeur Yusuf Garaad Omar, représentant permanent de la République fédérale
de Somalie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (New York),

Amiral Farah Ahmed Omar, ancien amiral de la marine somalienne et président de l’Institut de
recherche sur les affaires maritimes de Mogadiscio, - 7 -

M. Daud Awes, porte-parole du président de la République fédérale de Somalie,

M. Abubakar Mohamed Abubakar, directeur des affaires maritimes au ministère des affaires
étrangères,

comme conseillers ;

Mme Kathryn Kalinowski, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington,

Mme Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP, Washington,

comme assistants. - 8 -

The Government of Kenya is represented by:

Professor Githu Muigai, E.G.H., S.C., Attorney-General of the Republic of Kenya,

as Agent;

H.E. Ms Rose Makena Muchiri, Ambassador of the Republic of Kenya to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
University of Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M. S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University,
member of the State Bar of New York and of the Law Society of Upper Canada, member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration,

Mr. Mathias Forteau, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, member of

the International Law Commission,

Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the
English Bar,

Mr. Karim A. A. Khan, Q.C., member of the English Bar,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,

Ms Philippa Webb, Reader in Public International Law, King’s College, London, member of the
English Bar and of the New York Bar,

Mr. Eirik Bjorge, Junior Research Fellow in Law at the University of Oxford,

as Counsel;

Hon. Senator Amos Wako, Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights,

Hon. Samuel Chepkonga, Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs,

Ms Juster Nkoroi, E.B.S., Head, Kenya International Boundaries Office,

Mr. Michael Guchayo Gikuhi, Director, Kenya International Boundaries Office,

Ms Njeri Wachira, Head, International Law Division, Office of the Attorney-General and
Department of Justice,

Ms Stella Munyi, Director, Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ms Stella Orina, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Rotiken Kaitikei, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, - 9 -

Le Gouvernement du Kenya est représenté par :

M. Githu Muigai, professeur, E.G.H., S.C., Attorney General de la République du Kenya,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. Mme Rose Makena Muchiri, ambassadeur de la République du Kenya auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,

comme coagent ;

M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international,

M. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D (Harvard), professeur de droit international à
l’Université McGill, membre du barreau de l’Etat de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,

M. Mathias Forteau, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, membre de la

Commission du droit international,

M. Alan Boyle, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d’Angleterre,

M. Karim A. A. Khan, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre,

comme conseils et avocats ;

Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,

Mme Philippa Webb, maître de conférences en droit international public au King’s College
(Londres), membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du barreau de New York,

M. Eirik Bjorge, assistant de recherche en droit à l’Université d’Oxford,

comme conseils ;

M. Amos Wako, sénateur, président de la commission permanente du Sénat chargée des affaires
juridiques et des droits de l’homme,

M. Samuel Chepkonga, président de la commission parlementaire de la justice et des affaires
juridiques,

Mme Juster Nkoroi, E.B.S., chef du service des frontières internationales du Kenya,

M. Michael Guchayo Gikuhi, directeur au service des frontières internationales du Kenya,

Mme Njeri Wachira, directrice de la division du droit international, bureau de l’Attorney General et
ministère de la justice,

Mme Stella Munyi, directrice de la division juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères,

Mme Stella Orina, directrice ajointe, ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Rotiken Kaitikei, diplomate, ministère des affaires étrangères, - 10 -

Ms Pauline Mcharo, Senior Principal State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and
Department of Justice,

Ms Wanjiku Wakogi, Governance Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of
Justice,

Mr. Samuel Kaumba, State Counsel, Office of the Attorney-General and Department of Justice,

Mr. Hudson Andambi, Minstry of Energy,

as Advisers. - 11 -

Mme Pauline Mcharo, Senior Principal State Counsel, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère
de la justice,

Mme Wanjiku Wakogi, conseillère en gouvernance, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère de
la justice,

M. Samuel Kaumba, State Counsel, bureau de l’Attorney General et ministère de la justice,

M. Hudson Andambi, ministère de l’énergie,

comme conseillers. - 12 -

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit

aujourd’hui pour entendre le second tour de plaidoiries du Kenya. Je donne tout de suite la parole

au professeur Akhavan.

Mr. AKHAVAN:

GENERAL O BSERVATIONS ON SOMALIA ’SS UBMISSIONS

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. I am pleased to begin Kenya’s second

round with some general observations on Somalia’s first round of oral pleadings. I will be

followed by Professor Forteau, who will address the interpretation of the MOU; Professor Boyle,

who will address Article 282 of UNCLOS; and Professor Lowe, who will address Kenya’s

Optional Clause declaration in light of the Court’s jurisprudence. The Agent of Kenya will then

make the concluding submissions.

2. Mr. President, yesterday, counsel for Somalia completely avoided the simple question that

is before the Court: namely, does the penultimate paragraph of the MOU mean something, or does

it mean nothing? Professor Pellet spoke at some length about everything except the plain text of

the paragraph that is at issue. He disagreed with Kenya’s interpretation of that provision, but

1
offered no alternative explanation as to what else that text could possibly mean . The sole purpose
2
of the MOU, he insisted, is “no objection” to CLCS submissions . Why, then, did the Parties insert

that paragraph on dispute settlement? The answer is obvious. It does not require a seminar on the

law of treaties. The Parties inserted that paragraph because it was part of the agreement expressed

in the MOU. Their intention was to give that text practical legal effect.

3. Mr. President, it is said that “you cannot judge a book by its cover”; but Professor Pellet

would have you believe that you should judge a treaty by its title! His argument may be

summarized as follows: read the title of the MOU and then delete the paragraph that is

inconvenient for Somalia’s case. That cannot be right.

4. The MOU sets out a coherent three-step method of settlement: first, “no objection” to

CLCS submissions; second, CLCS review; and, third, a final agreement covering all maritime

1CR 2016/11, p. 16, para. 1 (Pellet).

2CR 2016/11, p. 21, para. 13 (Pellet). - 13 -

areas in dispute. The term “shall agree” after CLCS review is unambiguous. Professor Sands

3
dismissed it as “boiler-plate language” from UNCLOS Articles 74 (1) and 83 (1) . Those

provisions stipulate that delimitation of maritime boundaries “shall be effected by agreement” . 4

His only argument was that the MOU has no “exclusionary language” in regard to the Court’s

5
jurisdiction . But that point is obviously irrelevant. Kenya’s reservation applies to any agreed

procedure other than recourse to the Court . Nothing more is required. The Court’s jurisprudence

gives strict effect to reservations . Professor Sands completely ignored this interpretive rule in the

pleadings. Instead, he created his own novel requirement of “deliberate, clear, unambiguous

exclusion” in Optional Clause declarations . This new standard defies logic. If the MOU had to

specifically exclude recourse to the Court, then Kenya’s reservation would become redundant; by

this curious logic, unilateral reservations would be subject to the consent of other States. The same

logic would then apply to the 34 other States with similar reservations, depriving them of all effect.

In fact, Professor Sands quoted the President of the Court, confirming in 2010 that pursuant to such

reservations “any other mechanism of dispute settlement as agreed between the parties will prevail

over the general jurisdiction of the Court”. The point is clear. Nothing more needs to be said.

5. In regard to Part XV procedures, Professor Sands, with characteristic understatement,

9
referred to Kenya’s submissions as “manifestly hopeless” . But his only argument was that under

Article 282, the Court’s jurisdiction takes precedence where there is what he called “matching

convergent overlapping Optional Clause declarations” . But this is not the case in the instant

3
CR 2016/11, p. 54, para. 13 (Sands).
4
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Art. 74 (1): “The delimitation of the exclusive
economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an
equitable solution”; Art. 83 (1): “The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”

CR 2016/11, p. 54, para. 13 (Sands).

Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 240.

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 452–53,
para. 44; Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000 pp. 29–31,
paras. 36–42; POK, Vol. I, para. 144.

CR 2016/11, p. 52, para. 8 (Sands).

CR 2016/11, p. 66, para. 48 (Sands).
10
CR 2016/11, p. 61, para. 29 (Sands). - 14 -

proceedings. Here is the declaration of Somalia and here is the declaration of Kenya. They are not

matching. They are not convergent. Article 282 does not apply. Part XV clearly applies; it is the

procedural lex specialis 11 between the Parties regarding UNCLOS. Nonetheless, the Court need

not make a decision of wider application based on Part XV procedures. As a bilateral agreement

with an agreed procedure, the MOU is sufficient to exclude jurisdiction in this case.

6. Mr. President, Somalia made some factual assertions that require brief consideration.

First, Professor Pellet suggested that the method of settlement in the penultimate paragraph of the

MOU has what he called “perverse practical effects” because Somalia’s CLCS submission would

12
not be reviewed until 2033 , that was his calculation. He ignored the fact that there are objections

to at least 16 earlier submissions . That is about half of all submissions. He also ignored the fact

that the CLCS now meets for between 21 and 26 weeks per year and has significantly expedited its

14 15
procedures . Kenya’s case was scheduled for 2022 but came in the queue in 2014 . In any event,

maritime delimitation agreements require several years to negotiate, and there is no urgent need for

an immediate settlement given the circumstances. In fact, if Somalia was so concerned with

expeditious settlement, it would not have objected to Kenya’s CLCS submission. Somalia’s

alarmist theory on prolonged CLCS review scarcely withstands scrutiny.

11
See e.g., Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 44 (“a particular
practice must prevail over any general rules”); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 25 (“falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis”); Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 177–178,
para. 105; Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v Chile) (1977) p. 93, 144, para. 39 (“the rule generalia specialibus
non derogant, on which basis . . . generalia would give way to . . .specialia”); Décision du 27 juin 1955 (1955) 12 RIAA
p. 88 («il est un principe juridique universel, en matière d’interprétation, qu’en cas de conflit entre un texte général et un
texte spécial, c’est le dernier qui doit l’emporter»).

1CR 2016/11, p. 30, paras. 29, 30 (Pellet).

1See e.g. the Philippines objecting to the submission of Palau (Note dated 4 Aug. 2009); Argentina objecting to
the submission of the United Kingdom in respect of, e.g., the Falklands (Note dated 20 Aug. 2009); Iceland objecting to
the submission of Denmark in respect of the Faroe–Rockall Plateau Region (Note dated 5 Apr. 2011); Venezuela
objecting to the submission of Guyana (Note dated 9 Mar. 2012); Japan objecting to the submission of China in respect

of part of the East China Sea (Note dated 13 Aug. 2013); Japan objecting to the submission of the Republic of Korea
(Note dated 28 Aug. 2013); Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica objecting to the submission of Nicaragua in the south-
western part of the Caribbean Sea (Notes dated 23 Sept. 2013 & 5 Feb. 2014); the Democratic Republic of Congo
objecting to the submission of Angola (Note dated 11 Apr. 2014); France objecting to the submission of Canada (Note
dated 17 Dec. 2014); the USA objecting to the submission of The Bahamas (Note dated 12 Nov. 2014); Canada
objecting to the submission of France in respect of St-Pierre-et-Miquelon (Note dated 3 Sept. 2014).

1Decision regarding the Workload of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 21st meeting,
doc. SPLOS/229, 16 June 2011.
15
Progress of work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS): Statement by the Chair,
18 Apr. 2016, CLCS/93, at para. 42. - 15 -

7. Second, Mr. Reichler went to great lengths to present what he characterized as “evidence”

of “subsequent conduct” regarding the MOU. You were told that because the Parties discussed

maritime delimitation during a preliminary four-month period, this is conclusive proof that there

was no prior requirement of CLCS review; and this during a period when Somalia objected to

Kenya’s CLCS submission. How does one respond to such an argument? It is rather obvious that

the Parties are free to conclude a boundary agreement whenever they want, based on mutual

consent. But without such mutual consent, the agreed procedure of prior CLCS review under the

MOU continues to apply. It is as simple as that.

8. Quite apart from this clutching at straws, the documents that Mr. Reichler invoked in fact

confirm Kenya’s consistent understanding that the method of settlement under the MOU was

negotiation. I will go through these documents briefly and refer to the tab numbers in Somalia’s

own judges’ folder. Kenya’s statement to the CLCS in 2009 at tab 9 was produced to argue that the

16
MOU was exclusively limited to “no objection” . In the very next sentence, however, the Kenyan

representative, Ms Nkoroi, confirmed that, pursuant to the MOU, “at an appropriate time, a

mechanism will be established to finalize the maritime boundary negotiations with Somalia”.

Another example is Kenya’s CLCS submission of 2009 at tab 10. It refers to the MOU and the

immediately preceding sentence refers to section 4 (4) of the 1989 Maritime Zones Act of Kenya,

providing that “the exclusive economic zone boundary between Kenya and Somalia shall be

delimited . . . pursuant to an agreement . . . on the basis of international law” . 17 The Joint

Statement of 2013 at tab 11 further indicates that the Parties agreed on “the need to work on a

framework of modalities for embarking on maritime demarcation” and, in the next paragraph,

18
refers to “MOUs signed between Kenya and Somalia, and their level of implementation” .

Another example is tab 20, whereby Kenya confirms that under the MOU, the Parties “shall agree”

on maritime delimitation and reiterates its commitment to a “bilateral agreement,” including a

willingness to expeditiously resolve Somalia’s objection to Kenya’s CLCS submission . Despite 19

16
Memorial of Somalia (MS), Vol. III, Ann. 61; CR 2016/11, p. 39, para. 21 (Reichler).
1MS, Vol. III, Ann. 59; CR 2016/11, p. 39, para. 22 (Reichler).
18
Preliminary Objections of Kenya (POK), Vol. II, Ann. 31; CR 2016/11, p. 41, para. 27 (Reichler).
19
MS, Vol. III, Ann. 50; CR 2016/11, p. 49, para. 50 (Reichler). - 16 -

Somalia’s breach of the MOU, Kenya consistently maintained the view that maritime boundary

delimitation would be effected by agreement.

9. Mr. President, counsel for Somalia repeatedly used the alleged exhaustion of negotiations

as a means of persuading you that without your exercise of jurisdiction, the Parties will never agree

on maritime delimitation. Mr. Reichler referred unconvincingly to the MOU method of settlement

as “an agreement not to agree”; he referred to it as a “bar either to negotiation or to an expeditious

agreement” . Professor Sands referred to “intractable deadlock” . Professor Pellet said that he

was “puzzled” at what he called an “impoverished” African nation “slowing things down” by not

consenting to adjudication by the Court . For the record, the World Bank considers Kenya a

“middle income” country. Leaving that aside, even if we accept Somalia’s contention that the

procedure under the MOU will not succeed in achieving an agreement after CLCS review, there

would be no perpetual limbo, because the Part XV procedures would still apply. There would be a

further method of settlement even if the MOU procedure is exhausted, at some point in the not too

distant future. Professor Sands’ apocalyptic prediction of “dire implications”, “radical

consequences”, “startling outcomes”, and other calamities for the Court is an acute episode of

23
rhetorical flourish — but fortunately one that may be cured by a healthy dosage of objective facts .

10. In this regard, how should one address the accusation that Kenya is “hostile” to the Court

because its case on the merits would “most likely fail” and its intention therefore is “prolonging its

24
own unilateral conduct” — those were the words of Professor Sands . It bears mentioning here

that Somalia’s pleadings, both written and oral, have completely ignored Kenya’s need for

maritime enforcement against Al-Shabaab terrorists. Somalia has produced no contrary evidence,

and no contrary arguments, that border insecurity is a fundamental threat to Kenya. It is an

inconvenient truth for Somalia that hundreds of Kenyan civilians have been massacred by terrorist

attacks and that, as Kenya has repeatedly stated, interdiction of Al-Shabaab in the maritime areas in

dispute is an existential necessity for Kenya. This is not a maritime dispute between Norway and

20
CR 2016/11, p. 48, para. 48; p. 49, para. 51 (Reichler).
21CR 2016/11, p. 57, para. 17 (Sands).

22CR 2016/11, p. 33, para. 39 (Pellet).
23
CR 2016/11, p. 56-57, paras. 14 and 16 (Sands).
24CR 2016/11, p. 51, para. 4 (Sands). - 17 -

Sweden. The context is one of serious insecurity, a still fragile situation in Somalia that directly

impacts Kenya. Somalia does not deny that the Kenyan navy has patrolled these waters for several

years now as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia, endorsed by the United Nations

Security Council. Under such complex circumstances, is Kenya to be blamed for wanting a

negotiated settlement under the MOU’s agreed procedure?

11. Mr. President, one final point merits brief attention. The Deputy Agent referred to

25
Kenya’s “misguided attitude” regarding the maritime areas in dispute . She suggested that

Kenya’s objection is motivated by the fact that it does not have “a serious case on the merits” . 26

Kenya in fact has a strong case on the merits but that has no bearing on jurisdiction. The Court

made this clear in Fisheries Jurisdiction . 27 The merits also have no bearing on Kenya’s

motivations for insisting on a negotiated settlement in accordance with the MOU. The point here is

only that what Somalia decries as Kenya’s unilateral acts must be seen in a proper historical

context. Kenya has exercised uncontested jurisdiction in this maritime area since 1979. The

Deputy Agent said that “Somalia does not agree” ; but there is not a shred of evidence in the

Memorial suggesting otherwise, not a single protest for 30 years until the MOU was concluded in

2009. As already stated, the parallel of latitude reflects earlier Anglo–Italian colonial practice in

regard to the territorial sea. Under such circumstances, what is reasonable conduct on the part of

Kenya? If a State exercises uncontested jurisdiction for 30 years, and a neighbouring State then

suddenly asserts a maritime boundary dispute, should all exploratory activities immediately cease?

This applies especially to activities of a purely transient nature — and even those activities have

been suspended. Kenya has invited Somalia to enter into practical measures of a provisional

character as required by Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of UNCLOS. Is it fair to fault Kenya in such

circumstances, and to accuse it of improper conduct? We would submit that Kenya has behaved in

an exemplary fashion. There is simply no basis for the false narrative that Somalia has raised in

25
CR 2016/11, p. 11, para. 9 (Al-Sharmani).
2CR 2016/11, p. 14, para. 25 (Al-Sharmani).
27
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 452.
28
CR 2016/11, p. 11, para. 9 (Al-Sharmani). - 18 -

this proceeding to persuade the Court to exercise jurisdiction in plain disregard of Kenya’s

reservation.

12. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. That brings to a conclusion my

presentation. It has been a great honour to appear before you in this hearing. I would now ask that

you invite Professor Forteau to the podium.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur, je donne la parole à M. le professeur

Forteau.

M. FORTEAU :

L’ INTERPRÉTATION DU MÉMORANDUM D ’ACCORD DE 2009

1. Merci Monsieur le président. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, il

m’incombe cet après-midi de revenir sur l’interprétation du mémorandum d’accord de 2009.

Rassurez-vous, Monsieur le président, je ne me livrerai pas à une conférence académique sur les

règles applicables à l’interprétation des traités. Je me contenterai de les appliquer au cas d’espèce,

en les confrontant fidèlement  ce que la Somalie s’est abstenue de faire  aux éléments du

dossier. Cela me conduira à revenir successivement, en réponse aux arguments de nos

contradicteurs, sur le contexte de conclusion de l’accord (I), sur son champ d’application (II) puis

sur les engagements qu’il contient (III)  étant entendu que, contrairement à ce que suggère mon

très cher ami le professeur Alain Pellet , le «MoU» constitue de manière évidente un traité.

I. Le contexte de conclusion de l’accord

2. Commençons donc par le contexte de conclusion de l’accord, et, plus spécifiquement, par

ses travaux préparatoires, entendus au sens propre. Comme c’est souvent le cas pour les accords

bilatéraux, par opposition aux traités multilatéraux, les travaux préparatoires de l’accord de 2009 ne

sont pas très volumineux . Votre Cour a considéré en 1995 dans l’affaire Qatar c. Bahrein que,

dans une telle situation, lorsque le matériau est «fragmentaire», «quelles qu’aient pu être les

motivations de chacune des Parties, la Cour ne peut que s’en tenir aux termes mêmes d[e l’accord]

2CR 2016/11, p. 17-18, par. 6 (Pellet).

3Voir les exceptions préliminaires du Kenya (EPK), annexes 6 à 10. - 19 -

traduisant leur commune intention…» . Cela nous renvoie donc au texte du traité, que j’aborderai

dans un instant.

3. Cela étant dit, il existe tout de même deux éléments décisifs dans les travaux préparatoires

de l’accord de 2009, éléments dont la Somalie ne tient aucun compte :

 premièrement, l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord qui est consacré à la délimitation figurait

déjà dans les versions antérieures du projet d’accord ; en lisant ce paragraphe, les Parties n’ont

pas pu se méprendre sur son sens et sa portée, et pourtant aucune d’entre elles n’a exigé son

retrait du projet d’accord ; ceci est tout à fait significatif ;

 deuxièmement, dans la deuxième version du projet d’accord, l’avant-dernier paragraphe visait

32
the «area under dispute», au singulier ; dans la version finale de l’accord, la décision a été

prise de mentionner les «areas under dispute». Ce passage du singulier au pluriel a

nécessairement une signification juridique.

e
4. De son côté, M Reichler n’a cité aucun élément des travaux préparatoires qui

démentiraient le contenu de l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord. Il s’est contenté de vagues

références au soi-disant contexte de conclusion de l’accord, en proposant une lecture déformée de

certains documents , comme le professeur Akhavan l’a montré il y a un instant. M Reichler s’este

bien gardé en revanche,

 d’une part, de répondre aux éléments mentionnés par le Kenya dans son premier tour de

plaidoiries qui montrent que les circonstances précises dans lesquelles le «MoU» a été conclu

confirment l’interprétation du Kenya , 34

 d’autre part, il s’est également abstenu de faire état des éléments qui attestent que l’accord

de 2009 a été conclu, non pas seulement aux fins de la délinéation, mais aussi aux fins de la

délimitation. Dans sa note verbale du 17 août 2011, par exemple, la Norvège a dressé un lien

explicite entre la délimitation des espaces maritimes entre les Parties et la conclusion de

31 Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), compétence et
recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1995, p. 21-22, par. 41.

32Voir la lettre du Greffe de la Cour en date du 23 mars 2016, annexant la lettre de la Norvège du 21 mars 2016.
33
CR 2016/11, p. 34 et suiv., par. 5 et suiv. (Reichler).
34Voir CR 2016/10, p. 43-45, par. 30-34 (Forteau). - 20 -

35
l’accord de 2009 . De même, dans son mémoire, la Somalie a présenté cet accord dans le

contexte des «efforts des Parties visant à négocier un accord sur la frontière maritime» . Par 36

ailleurs, M Reichler a de nouveau été incapable de citer le moindre document qui établirait de

manière probante que le «MoU» était censé n’avoir aucun lien du tout avec la délimitation.

II. Le champ d’application de l’accord

5. J’en viens, Monsieur le président, au champ d’application de l’accord de 2009. Son

avant-dernier paragraphe, on le sait, utilise un double pluriel : il vise «the delimitation of maritime

boundaries in the areas under dispute». Selon Alain Pellet, ce double pluriel n’aurait toutefois

aucun effet juridique car le singulier et le pluriel pourraient être utilisés dans un traité «de manière

37 38
interchangeable» . Voilà, pour un juriste ami de Racine et de Baudelaire , une bien curieuse

manière d’interpréter le texte d’un traité !

6. De toute évidence et quoi qu’en dise le professeur Sands , l’emploi de ce double pluriel a

une signification juridique : il entend indiquer que l’engagement pris dans l’avant-dernier

paragraphe de l’accord couvre la délimitation de l’ensemble des espaces marins des deux Parties.

C’est au demeurant une interprétation qui est confirmée par d’autres éléments.

7. Il se trouve tout d’abord que la revendication somalienne sur le plateau continental a été

présentée par la Somalie comme étant indissociable de sa revendication sur la mer territoriale et sur

les espaces s’étendant jusqu’à 200 milles marins. La loi somalienne de 1972 sur la mer territoriale

fusionne en effet dans un seul et même ensemble, comme s’il s’agissait d’un espace maritime

unique, tous les espaces jusqu’à 200 milles marins en considérant qu’ils relèvent tous de sa mer

40
territoriale .

35 EPK, annexe 4, p. 24-25.
36
Mémoire de la Somalie (MS), par. 3.36 et suiv.
37
CR 2016/11, p. 24, par. 18 2) (Pellet).
38 CR 2016/11, p. 16, par. 2 (Pellet).

39 CR 2016/11, p. 55, 4) (Sands).

40 Voir MS, annexe 9. - 21 -

8. La Somalie s’est bien gardée d’évoquer cette loi de 1972 devant vous, se contentant de

suggérer dans son mémoire qu’elle aurait été abrogée en 1988 . Mais trois éléments plaident en

sens inverse :

 en 2011, la Norvège a cité cette loi de 1972 pour souligner qu’elle devait être mise en

conformité avec le droit international, ce qui signifie qu’elle était apparemment encore en

42
vigueur à cette date ;

 dans sa communication préliminaire à la Commission des limites du plateau continental

soumise sept jours après la conclusion du «MoU», la Somalie a elle-même cité sa loi

de 1972 ;43

 et lorsqu’en juin 2013, quatre ans après la conclusion du «MoU», la Somalie a refusé d’entrer

en négociation avec le Kenya sur la délimitation maritime, la Somalie a fait valoir, en relation

explicite avec le «MoU», que «the government’s position» en la matière «is» la loi de 1972,

44
laquelle «defines Somali territorial sea as 200 nautical miles and continental shelf» .

9. Il est bien connu par ailleurs que, dans le droit international contemporain, les différents

espaces maritimes sont «liés entre eux» en ce qui concerne leur délimitation, comme vous l’avez

45
souligné à plusieurs occasions . C’est particulièrement vrai lorsque, comme c’est le cas en

l’espèce, une ligne unique de délimitation est revendiquée, laquelle part de la côte des Parties pour

s’étendre jusqu’au plateau continental étendu. Dans un tel cas, il est manifeste que les différentes

parties de la délimitation sont interdépendantes et doivent par conséquent être menées ensemble . 46

Dans son exposé écrit, la Somalie a d’ailleurs admis qu’il n’était pas envisageable de dissocier les

47
différentes composantes de la délimitation .

10. Dans ces circonstances, il est évident que l’engagement qui figure dans l’avant-dernier

paragraphe de l’accord de 2009 couvre, en ce qui concerne les zones objet du différend entre les

41MS, par. 3.3.

42EPK, annexe 4, p. 23.
43
Voir MS, annexe 66, point 3.
44
EPK, annexe 33.
45 Voir notamment Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria ;

Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 441, par. 287.
46Voir CR 2016/10, p. 39, par. 19 (Forteau).

47EES, par. 3.70 ; voir également MS, vol. III, annexe 51, p. 2. - 22 -

Parties, la délimitation de l’ensemble de leurs espaces maritimes. C’est ce que vient confirmer,

expressément, l’usage du double pluriel.

III. Les engagements souscrits au titre de l’accord

11. J’en viens, Monsieur le président, aux engagements souscrits dans l’accord de 2009.

Selon le professeur Pellet, l’interprétation d’un traité suppose «de ne pas détacher les uns des autres

les quatre éléments clefs énumérés à l’article 31 [de la convention de Vienne] : texte, objet et but,

48
contexte, et pratique ultérieure» . Le problème est que la Somalie détache elle-même le plus

important de ces quatre éléments, à savoir le texte du traité !

12. Pour y parvenir, la Somalie se livre à une manœuvre qui ne trompera pas la Cour. La

Somalie commence par postuler que l’accord de 2009 n’aurait qu’un seul et unique but et objet, à
49
savoir la délinéation ; sur la base de ce postulat, elle s’efforce ensuite de dissoudre l’avant-dernier

paragraphe de l’accord de 2009, au simple prétexte que celui-ci concerne la délimitation et non la

délinéation.

13. Ce pseudo-raisonnement juridique est bien entendu vicié.

14. Sur le plan de ses conséquences tout d’abord, le raisonnement de la Somalie conduit non

pas à interpréter, mais à priver d’effet une disposition du traité au simple prétexte qu’elle ne

rentrerait pas dans l’objet et le but du traité tels que la Somalie les définit, ce que le droit de

l’interprétation des traités interdit bien entendu de faire.

15. Sur le plan de la méthode ensuite, il est manifeste que, pour reconstituer l’objet et le but

du traité, il ne suffit pas de piocher à son bon plaisir dans le texte du traité, en insistant sur certaines

formulations pour mieux en écarter d’autres, de manière sélective, comme l’a fait hier le professeur

Alain Pellet. Ce que le droit international commande est de lire l’accord fidèlement et

intégralement.

16. Avant de me livrer brièvement à cet exercice, je souhaiterais formuler une remarque

préliminaire. Il semble qu’entre son exposé écrit et ses plaidoiries, la Somalie a changé de stratégie

interprétative. Dans son exposé écrit, elle défendait la position intenable selon laquelle l’accord

48CR 2016/11, p. 19, par. 8 (Pellet).

49CR 2016/11, p. 13, par. 21 (agent adjoint) ; p. 55, 2) (Sands) ; EES, par. 1.7-1.8. - 23 -

de 2009 n’aurait rien à voir avec la délimitation . Désormais, la position de la Somalie semble

plus nuancée : «Assurément», a reconnu le professeur Pellet, l’accord contient une disposition sur

la délimitation . De fait, il était difficile de le nier. La conséquence en est que, quelle que soit la

définition que la Somalie cherchera à donner à l’objet et au but du traité, elle butera toujours sur le

même obstacle : l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord existe, et, dès lors que pacta sunt servanda,

il n’y aucun moyen, et il n’y a aucune raison, de le priver de son effet juridique.

17. La nouvelle thèse de la Somalie serait que le seul effet de l’accord sur la délimitation

serait que la délinéation serait «sans préjudice de la délimitation» . Cette nouvelle lecture de

l’accord est cependant en contradiction flagrante avec son texte.

18. Pour rappel, l’accord de 2009, qui est reproduit à l’onglet n 2 de votre dossier, se

compose de sept paragraphes.

19. Vous remarquerez tout d’abord que l’accord présente la particularité de commencer et de

se terminer par une clause sur la délimitation. Dans le second paragraphe de l’accord, les Parties

conviennent de considérer qu’il existe un différend sur la délimitation ; dans le sixième paragraphe,

elles établissent la procédure à suivre pour la délimitation, et cela en lien avec la délinéation. C’est

un élément important, qui montre que les engagements pris en matière de délinéation sont liés aux

questions de délimitation. Par ailleurs, il est évident que c’est parce que les Parties constatent, dans

le second paragraphe, qu’il y a un différend sur la délimitation, qu’elles organisent, dans le sixième

paragraphe, une procédure pour le règlement de la délimitation. La structure de l’accord confirme

ainsi qu’il porte autant sur la délimitation que sur la délinéation.

o
Projection n 1 : paragraphe 3 de l’accord de 2009 («The two coastal States…»)

20. Dans le troisième paragraphe de l’accord, les Parties commencent, dans la première

phrase, par reprendre la formulation de l’article 76, paragraphe 10, de la convention de

Montego Bay, à savoir que la délinéation est sans préjudice de la délimitation. Selon la Somalie,

50EES, par. 1.7-1.8.
51
CR 2016/11, p. 22, par. 13 (Pellet).
52
CR 2016/11, p. 25, par. 20 in fine (Pellet). - 24 -

l’examen devrait s’arrêter là : tels seraient l’objet et le but exclusifs du «MoU» : de dire,
53
uniquement, que la délinéation est «sans préjudice de la délimitation» .

21. Mais il convient bien entendu de lire la suite du texte, qui contient d’importants ajouts et

précisions, dont la Somalie ne tient aucun compte. Un peu plus loin dans le même paragraphe, les

Parties introduisent un deuxième élément : «the establishment of the outer limits of the continental

shelf beyond 200 nautical miles» is «without prejudice to the future delimitation of the continental

shelf». Cette précision fait écho à la procédure agréée dans l’avant-dernier paragraphe, à savoir

que les Parties ont décidé de procéder à une certaine articulation temporelle des procédures. Il se

déduit par ailleurs de la deuxième phrase du même paragraphe que la priorité, en termes d’intérêt,

pour les Parties au moment où elles concluent le «MoU» était la délinéation plutôt que la

délimitation. Cet élément explique du même coup l’ordre de priorité retenu dans la procédure qui a

été agréée dans l’avant-dernier paragraphe de l’accord.

o
Projection n 2 : paragraphe 4 de l’accord de 2009 («Before 13 May 2009…»)

22. Dans le quatrième paragraphe, le même élément est repris, et il y est même précisé : il y

est dit dans l’avant-dernière phrase que la «submission» de la Somalie à la Commission des limites

sera «without prejudice to the future delimitation of maritime boundaries». De nouveau et cette

fois-ci en ce qui concerne la «submission» de la Somalie, on trouve cet élément d’articulation

temporelle des étapes du processus de délinéation et de délimitation.

o
Projection n 3 : paragraphe 5 de l’accord de 2009 («The two coastal States agree…»)

23. Le paragraphe 5 poursuit ce crescendo : il dispose dans sa dernière phrase que non

seulement les «submissions» des Parties, mais également «the recommandations approved by the

Commission … shall be without prejudice to the future maritime delimitation of maritime

boundaries…». Ce paragraphe signifie nécessairement que la délimitation est conçue comme

devant intervenir après l’approbation desdites recommandations.

24. Tout ceci montre que les cinq premiers paragraphes de l’accord préfigurent l’engagement

qui est pris dans son avant-dernier paragraphe. Cela montre par là-même que, contrairement à ce

53CR 2016/11, p. 22-23, par. 15, premier tiret (Pellet). - 25 -

54
qu’affirment nos contradicteurs , tous les paragraphes de l’accord sont solidaires les uns des autres

et vont dans la même direction : l’objet et le but de l’accord est d’organiser, de manière ordonnée,

les procédures de délinéation et de délimitation.

Projection n 4 : paragraphe 6 de l’accord de 2009 («The delimitation…»)

25. A la lumière de ce contexte, le sixième paragraphe de l’accord ne constitue nullement

une surprise ; il découle des paragraphes qui précèdent, et il le fait en des termes qui ne méritent

aucune interprétation tant leur libellé est clair. Il ne dit pas que la délimitation «should be agreed»,

ou qu’elle devrait être «settled». Il dit qu’elle «shall be agreed»  et il n’y a aucun différend entre

les Parties quant au fait que cela signifie que la méthode choisie pour la délimitation est la

négociation.

26. Le sixième paragraphe de l’accord ne dit pas davantage que la délinéation est sans

préjudice de la délimitation  ceci a été déjà dit dans la première phrase du troisième paragraphe

et cela n’avait donc pas besoin d’être répété à nouveau dans le sixième paragraphe. Ce sixième

paragraphe a un objet différent, déjà présent sous une forme différente dans les paragraphes 3, 4

et 5 : il contient un engagement juridique au terme duquel la délimitation «shall be agreed … after»

l’adoption des recommandations de la Commission des limites. Autrement dit, l’accord prévoit,

d’une part, que la délinéation est sans préjudice de la délimitation, d’autre part et sur le plan

procédural, que la délimitation est conditionnée à la délinéation préalable. On peut être en

désaccord avec cette manière de procéder ; mais en droit, la question n’est pas celle-ci : le fait est

que les Parties ont décidé, par le biais d’un accord juridiquement contraignant, de suivre cette

procédure.

27. Le professeur Pellet a vainement tenté d’argumenter que cela n’empêcherait pas les

Parties de conclure un accord avant les recommandations de la Commission ni même de vous

55
saisir . Il est bien entendu que ce qu’un accord a fait, un autre peut le défaire. Mais à ce jour,

aucun accord ne s’est substitué au «MoU» et il convient par conséquent de lui donner effet car il

fait droit entre les Parties. Par ailleurs et quoi qu’il en soit, une délimitation par voie d’«accord»

54CR 2016/11, p. 23, par. 16 (Pellet).

55CR 2016/11, p. 27, par. 24 (Pellet). - 26 -

n’est certainement pas la même chose qu’une délimitation judiciaire. De ce point de vue, le

«MoU» exclut nécessairement votre compétence puisque la procédure agréée est de recourir aux

négociations. Au surplus, l’accord à conclure doit intervenir après les recommandations de la

Commission des limites  c’est ce qui le distingue, par exemple, de la procédure agréée en

56
février 2009 par le Ghana et la Côte d’Ivoire, qui, n’en déplaise à nos contradicteurs , n’est donc
57
pas un précédent pertinent dans le cas d’espèce . Cette condition temporelle est une condition

juridique, à laquelle il convient également de donner effet.

28. Le professeur Pellet en est finalement venu à soutenir que le seul objet de ce sixième

paragraphe serait la finalisation de la délimitation en ce qui concerne uniquement le point extrême

58
de la frontière maritime . Cela constitue, de la part de la Somalie, une révision pure et simple de

l’accord de 2009 car celui-ci ne dit absolument rien de tel. Celui-ci ne se limite pas au point

extrême de la frontière maritime  ce qu’il aurait pu dire, mais ce qu’il ne dit pas. Son

avant-dernier paragraphe dispose expressément que la procédure qu’il organise concerne «the

delimitation of maritime boundaries in the areas under dispute, including the delimitation of the

continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles». Selon les termes explicites de l’accord, c’est donc

bel et bien l’ensemble de la délimitation maritime qui est couverte par la procédure particulière

agréée en 2009 par le Kenya et la Somalie.

29. Ceci, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, conclut ma plaidoirie. Je

vous remercie de votre attention, et je vous serais très reconnaissant, Monsieur le président, de bien

vouloir appeler maintenant à cette barre le professeur Alan Boyle.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci. Je donne la parole à M. le professeur Boyle. Monsieur le

professeur, s’il vous plaît.

56CR 2016/11, p. 35, par. 8 (Reichler).

57Voir Submission by the Republic of Ghana to the CLCS. Executive Summary, par. 5.2 (disponible à l’adresse :
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_gha_2…).
58
CR 2016/11, p. 26-29, par. 23-28 (Pellet). - 27 -

Mr. BOYLE:

UNCLOS A RTICLE 282 DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE C OURT

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a pleasure to appear before you again, and to

respond to my good friend Professor Sands. He has spent far too much time reading my work

recently, but I can be brief and I will focus mainly on Article 282.

2. Professor Sands claimed yesterday that Kenya’s interpretation of its Optional Clause

reservation would “undermine the potential role of the Court” in settling maritime boundary

59
disputes . Mr. President, Kenya is not remotely hostile to the Court, nor is it seeking to undermine

its role in maritime boundary disputes. Somalia’s argument ignores — and risks destroying — the

complex and successful system for settling UNCLOS disputes set out in Part XV of the

Convention. It assumes what the States who negotiated that system sought to avoid: making the

ICJ the default option for the settlement of UNCLOS disputes. The ICJ is an important part of that

system but not in the way that Somalia would have you believe.

3. Part XV creates what has been described, and I didn’t invent this term, as a “cafeteria” of

dispute settlement options from which States are free to choose the forum that they consider most

appropriate for their particular dispute . The co-chairman of the committee that created this

system was a Kenyan diplomat, and I believe that he is responsible for the “cafeteria”.

Adjudication by the ICJ is only one of the options available under Part XV, and in this context

references made yesterday to UN General Assembly resolutions calling for disputes to be referred

to the ICJ are plainly out of place. There is a role in international relations for specialized dispute

settlement systems, and States adopt those specialised systems for very good reasons. Part XV is

an integral and essential part of the Convention and Somalia, like Kenya, was part of the consensus

which negotiated that Convention and adopted it in 1982 . 61

4. The only truly compulsory procedures under Part XV are those set out in Articles 287

and 298 (1) and in essence, after  but only after  the section 1 procedures and agreed

5CR 2016/11, p. 53, para. 10 (Sands).
60
Article 287.
6UN, The Law of the Sea: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York, 1983), ‘Introduction’, pp. xx–xii;
UNCLOS III, Rules of Procedure, UN doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.3 (1974), and Final Act, part V,

UN doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982). - 28 -

time-limits are exhausted, the parties to an UNCLOS maritime boundary dispute have to accept the

system for dispute settlement set out in section 2 of Part XV.

5. So the core question under Part XV is whether Kenya has accepted ICJ jurisdiction in the

present case. It is not disputed on our side at all that parties to an UNCLOS dispute which have

clearly accepted ICJ jurisdiction in matching Optional Clause declarations are covered by

Article 282 and that Article will then give that choice priority over all other procedures in

Section 2. That entirely obvious point is made by all of the authors cited by Professor Sands

yesterday. But none of those authors  not one, not including me  addresses the point at issue

in this case: and that point is whether Article 282 applies to an Optional Clause declaration that

contains the kind of reservation in favour of other agreed procedures that is found in Kenya’s

declaration. Let me emphasize that. None of the literature cited by Professor Sands even mentions

the point. Perhaps, like me, they thought the answer was so obviously negative that the matter

simply required no elaboration. But to give you a flavour, Judge Treves says simply that

“[a]ccording to Article 282, the jurisdictional priority given to the Court over the Tribunal on the

Law of the Sea, as between states that have accepted the Optional Clause, applies to all cases of
62
compulsory jurisdiction ‘provided for’ in Part XV of the Convention” . Yes, but that simply begs

the question at issue; it certainly does not answer it.

6. Somalia says that only a deliberate and unambiguous exclusion will oust the jurisdiction

of the Court when an Article 36 (2) declaration is made. It argues that Kenya could and should

have excluded maritime boundary disputes expressly in its reservation . And because Kenya did

not do so expressly, Somalia says that the reservation therefore does not cover a maritime boundary

dispute, does not apply in this case. And that lack of specificity in its view makes the Optional

Clause and Article 282 applicable and gives you jurisdiction.

6T. Treves, “Conflicts between the ITLOS and the ICJ”, 31 NYU Journal of Int Law & Pol (1999) p. 812.

6CR 2016/11, p. 54, para. 14 (Sands). - 29 -

7. But Mr. President and Members of the Court, this argument is not consistent with your

64
own jurisprudence on Article 36 (2) . And where would the argument for greater specificity stop?

Suppose Somalia and Kenya had a dispute under a WTO-covered agreement: if Somalia’s

approach to interpreting Kenya’s reservation is correct, then Kenya’s Article 36 (2) declaration has

conferred compulsory jurisdiction over WTO disputes on the ICJ, even though the WTO has an

elaborate and specialized dispute settlement system of its own. Is Somalia really suggesting that

the ICJ Optional Clause prevails unless States make far more detailed and specific reservations to

their Article 36 (2) reservations? No court has ever taken that view.

8. Consider alternatively a dispute between two States about activities on the deep seabed.

Now this should fall within the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber under Part XI of

65
UNCLOS . But will it? On Somalia’s argument, Kenya’s ICJ jurisdiction would confer

compulsory jurisdiction over such a dispute on the ICJ simply because it does not specifically

exclude it. That would certainly surprise the parties to UNCLOS.

9. Somalia then talks about a double renvoi between the Optional Clause reservation and

66
Article 282, where each instrument allegedly extinguishes the other . Now that might be

entertaining. But, as my colleagues have already observed, in its relationship to the ICJ Statute,

UNCLOS Part XV has the character of a lex specialis. As the International Law Commission

noted in its report on the Fragmentation of International Law that: “The idea that special enjoys

priority over general has a long pedigree in international jurisprudence . . .” They cite Grotius in

offering two reasons for this: they say “A special rule is more to the point . . . than a general one

64
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 454, para. 49: a declaration including a
reservation must be interpreted “in a natural and reasonable way, having due regard to the intention of the State
concerned at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court”, and p. 453, para. 44: conditions or
reservations “do not by their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already given. Rather, they operate to define the
parameters of the State’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. There is thus no reason to interpret
them restrictively.” See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 39, para. 88;
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v.
Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 125, para. 131; Aerial Incident Case
(Pakistan v. India), I.C.J. Reports 2000, p.31, para. 42, and POK Vol. I, para. 144.
65
Article 187 (a).
66
CR 2016/11, p. 64, para. 43 (Sands). - 30 -

and it regulates the matter more effectively . . . than general rules. This could also be expressed by

67
saying that special rules are better able to take account of particular circumstances.”

10. Grotius, if I may say so, expressed perfectly, almost four centuries ago, the underlying

rationale behind Part XV of UNCLOS. It does not extinguish the ICJ Statute, far from it. There is

a coherent role for the Court within the architecture of Part XV. But Part XV does create an

alternative and more specialized and more diverse dispute settlement system for all the various

types of UNCLOS disputes. As such it falls fairly and squarely within the ordinary meaning of the

reservation to Kenya’s Optional Clause declaration. And that reservation has to be taken at face

value, on its own terms: it excludes and was meant to exclude “disputes in regard to which the

parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method or methods

of dispute settlement”. That reservation in these terms recognizes the significant role of alternative

68
and more specialized dispute settlement systems and procedures .

11. If UNCLOS Part XV manifestly provides alternative more specialized methods of

dispute settlement, why would it fall outside Kenya’s Article 36 (2) reservation? There simply is

no reason. It cannot be said that the reservation refers only to agreements in existence in 1965,

when the declaration was made. Look at the wording: it says “have agreed or shall agree” — so it

covers future agreements, such as UNCLOS. It cannot be said that the wording is not apt to cover

the whole range of Part XV dispute settlement procedures, and when the declaration refers to

“some other procedure or procedures” it plainly means “other than the ICJ”. There is no double

renvoi as Professor Sands put it. The only renvoi in Article 282 is to Optional Clause declarations

or other agreements that clearly and unambiguously confer jurisdiction on the Court in UNCLOS

disputes, and which Article 282 was intended to preserve.

67ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of

International Law, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, para 60. See also Right of Passage over Indian Territory (“Portugal v.
India) Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 44 (“a particular practice must prevail over any general rules”); Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 25 (“falls to be
determined by the applicable lex specialis”); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 177–178, para. 105; Beagle Channel Arbitration
(Argentina v. Chile) (1977) 52 International Law Report (ILR), p. 144, para. 39 (“the rule generalia specialibus non
derogant, on which basis . . . generalia would give way to . . . specialia”); Décision du 27 juin 1955 (1955) 12, United
Nations, Report of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), p. 388 (“il est un principe juridique universel, en matière
d’interpretation, qu’en cas de conflit entre un texte général et un texte spécial, c’est le dernier qui doit l’emporter”).
68
M. Wood, The United Kingdom’s Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court’ in
O.K. Fauchald, H. Jakhelln, and A. Syse (eds.), Festschrift Carl August Fleischer (2006), 621, 637; Preliminary
Objections of Kenya (POK), para. 143. - 31 -

12. So that leaves only the previous argument, that Kenya’s reservation is simply not specific

enough to exclude your jurisdiction. That it does not mention maritime boundaries. But why stop

there? Why not argue that it does not mention the outer continental shelf? Or the territorial sea?

Or coral reefs? Or scientific whaling? What degree of specificity would satisfy Professor Sands?

This is not a serious argument among international lawyers. A general phrase can cover many

specificities. It is unnecessary to spell out everything. Nor is it necessary to emulate the Australian

declaration, which he quotes.

13. Kenya’s position is thus that its Optional Clause declaration, drafted long before

UNCLOS was agreed and in very different circumstances, was never intended to cover disputes

that fall plainly and squarely within the more specialized cafeteria of procedures established by

Part XV, and that its clear and unambiguous wording does not do so now.

14. I might note in conclusion that Australia and Japan have both made Article 36 (2)

declarations but they nevertheless did not take the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case to the ICJ . This

may not necessarily have been a wise choice on Australia’s part, but it no doubt reflects the fact

that Australia’s ICJ declaration contains the same reservation as Kenya’s, while Japan’s declaration

excludes disputes subject to binding arbitration or judicial settlement. Even these two States,

which are otherwise among the Court’s strongest supporters, recognize that there is a place for

specialized dispute settlement régimes. Kenya takes the same view with respect to the adjudication

of this dispute by the ICJ.

15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, unless there are any questions, that concludes my

part in these proceedings for today and I would now ask you to call on Professor Lowe.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne la parole à M. le professeur

Lowe.

Mr. LOWE:

6Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), XXIII RIAA I, 4 August 2000. - 32 -

SUMMARY

1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. My task is again to summarize and

close Kenya’s submissions.

2. In the first round, Somalia made two points.

3. One point was that, according to Professor Sands, the effect of UNCLOS Article 282 is to

preclude the application of UNCLOS Part XV to this dispute and to permit the Parties’ Optional

Clause declarations to “trump” Part XV, thus giving the Court jurisdiction over this dispute.

4. The second point was that the MOU is nothing more than an agreement between Kenya

and Somalia not to object to each other’s CLCS filings. Mr. Reichler told you that it was not

70
understood as an agreement on the means for the settlement of the boundary dispute .

5. I shall address each point of those points and close with a response to Somalia’s

arguments that, as a matter of policy, the Court should find that it has jurisdiction in this case in

order to secure future business.

UNCLOS Article 282

6. First, the UNCLOS Article 282 argument. Professor Boyle has addressed the Somali

argument that “Part XV of UNCLOS does not and cannot affect the binding agreement established

by Kenya’s and Somalia’s matching Optional Clause declarations” . 71

7. The short answer to it is that the two declarations are not matching. In 1965, Kenya

excluded disputes in respect of which the Parties already had agreed, or would in future agree, to

have recourse to “some other method or methods of settlement”  that is, a method “other than”

the ICJ. Somalia did not exclude them. In 1989, when they each ratified UNCLOS, Somalia and

Kenya agreed that maritime boundary disputes would be subject to UNCLOS Part XV. Neither

State having chosen the ICJ as the forum for dispute settlement under UNCLOS Article 287, the

two States have, accordingly, agreed that maritime boundary disputes should go to other Part XV

procedures  that is, to methods of settlement “other than” the ICJ. This dispute thus falls inside

Somalia’s Optional Clause declaration but outside Kenya’s. There is nothing complicated about

that.

7CR 2016/11, pp. 10-15, paras. 5–25 (Reichler).

7CR 2016/11, p. 61, para. 29 (Sands). - 33 -

8. Of course, if the dispute did fall within both States’ declarations, UNCLOS Article 282

might preserve the jurisdiction of the ICJ. And that is the point made by the writers quoted by

Professor Sands. But the dispute does not fall within both declarations. Kenya has excluded a

category of disputes which Somalia has not.

9. Professor Sands tried (in paragraph 42 of his speech) to use Article 282 in order to remove

the reservation in Kenya’s declaration  to nullify, or “trump” it . He wants to say that Kenya’s

declaration indeed directs the dispute to the “other agreed method of settlement” in UNCLOS

Part XV, but that Article 282 of UNCLOS Part XV then directs it back to the ICJ because of what

he says are the “convergent” Optional Clause declarations of Kenya and Somalia.

10. And Somalia resolves the endless renvoi by asserting that “the jurisdiction established by

convergent Optional Clause declarations takes precedence over the dispute resolution procedures

contained in Part XV of UNCLOS” . But why does it? Why is the lex specialis principle, firmly

74
established in international law, displaced ? Why does a dispute over the interpretation or

application of UNCLOS Articles on delimitation not fall under the comprehensive provisions of the

UNCLOS dispute settlement procedure, to which Kenya and Somalia agreed decades after the

making of their ICJ declarations  UNCLOS is not only the lex specialis, but also the later of the

successive treaties, in terms of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?

11. Somalia offers no answer  no principles; no precedents; nor even any policy

arguments, apart from the threat that Kenya’s view may lead to a loss of business for the Court  a

point to which I shall return shortly.

12. But in fact, in our submission the Court does not need to decide this point, because the

obvious and primary reason why it lacks jurisdiction is that the Parties have agreed to settle the

72
CR 2016/11, p. 63, para. 42 (Sands).
73CR 2016/11, p. 61, para. 32 (Sands).

74Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 44 (“a
particular practice must prevail over any general rules”); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 240, para. 25 (“falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis”); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
2004, p. 177–178, para. 105; Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile) (1977) 52 International Law Review
(I.L.R.), p. 144, para. 39 (“the rule generalia specialibus non derogant, on which basis . . . generalia would give way
to . . . specialia”); Décision du 27 juin 1955 (1955) 12 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), p. 388 («il est
un principe juridique universel, en matière d’interprétation, qu’en cas de conflit entre un texte général et un texte spécial,

c’est le dernier qui doit l’emporter»). - 34 -

maritime boundary dispute not by adjudication, but by negotiation. That is what they agreed in the

MOU.

The nature of the MOU

13. And so I turn to Somalia’s second main point. In its Memorial, at paragraphs 3.38

to 3.42, Somalia discussed the MOU and set out the text of paragraph 6  the paragraph that

stipulates that the maritime boundaries between Kenya and Somalia shall be agreed between the

two States after the CLCS has made its recommendations on their respective submissions. Somalia

made no suggestion that paragraph 6 is superfluous, or alien to the purpose of the MOU, or carries

anything other than its plain meaning.

14. In its Memorial, Somalia’s objection to the MOU was based on the fact that Somalia

“decided against its ratification” and regarded it as “non-actionable”, by which Somalia seems to

have meant that the existence of the MOU could, as a matter of international law, be ignored.

15. Somalia has now abandoned that position. It now says that the MOU, whose legal

effectiveness is apparently conceded, is  in Mr. Reichler’s words  “solely . . . an agreement on

non-objection to the Parties’ respective submissions to the CLCS” . He and Professor Pellet told

you that this was “the object and purpose” of the MOU.

16. Neither of them addressed the possibility that the MOU might have more than one object

and purpose, as treaties typically do. Neither of them explained why, if the MOU was a simple

non-objection agreement, its drafters did not stop at paragraph 5, but went on to include the text of

paragraph 6. Neither of them offered a reason for not giving paragraph 6 its natural meaning —

that the maritime boundaries between Kenya and Somalia shall be agreed between the two States

after the CLCS has made its recommendations. For Somalia, paragraph 6 is the elephant in the

room: its inexplicable presence in the MOU a puzzle at which we can only stare, and scratch our

heads in uncomprehending wonder.

17. But as Professor Forteau noted, paragraph 6 was included in preliminary drafts of the

MOU, and was the subject of amendments during the drafting process. It cannot be claimed that

the Parties were ignorant of it, or regarded it as immaterial, or unworthy of their attention. Nor is it

75CR 2016/11, p. 40, para. 23 (Reichler). - 35 -

complicated or obscure. Indeed, the entire MOU is short, simple and clear. There is no reason to

suppose that the Parties were ignorant of the obligations to which they were signing up in that

provision, or that they could have misunderstood their obligation to settle maritime boundaries, not

by reference to the ICJ but by agreement, after the CLCS had made its recommendations.

18. The MOU requires the Parties to seek to agree upon their maritime boundaries. In

Kenya’s submission, a State cannot terminate a legally binding obligation to negotiate simply by

declaring that it regards the negotiations as deadlocked, or further negotiation as futile. Indeed,

Somalia wishes to go further and, by having a binding decision of the Court on delimitation, to

pre-empt the possibility of a negotiated delimitation in future. Such a self-judging approach would

enable States to terminate legal obligations to negotiate at will.

19. Professor Sands said that even if negotiations were required by the MOU, they were

exhausted . But that position does not fit with the facts. Somalia says that the bilateral meetings

were not “technical” and “preliminary”. But the joint report of the first, March 2014, meeting

records what was the very first meeting between the teams and the first explanation by each side of

its views on delimitation matters, and it refers to it in the first paragraph as a meeting “at the

technical level”. You will find it in tab 10 of today’s judges’ folder. The second, July 2014

meeting, the joint report notes that the two national representatives appeared in their capacities as

heads of their respective Technical Teams. That is at tab 11.

20. Yes: Ministers were present at the July meeting, in order to build confidence. But think

about that. There is no suggestion that in the days between that meeting on 28–29 July 2014 and

the filing of Somalia’s Application on 28 August, either Minister took the matter back to her

Government in order to decide the Government’s position  let alone its final position  on the

boundary dispute, or that either Government communicated on the matter with the other at the

political level. On the contrary, the evidence is quite different.

21. The report of the July meeting records that the Parties would reconvene on 25 and

26 August in Mogadishu “in an attempt to bridge the gaps between the two parties’ positions”.

Kenya’s internal note, dated 8 August, at tab 12 of your folders, records that “it was agreed that in

7CR 2016/11, pp. 57-59, paras. 16–22 (Sands). - 36 -

order to move forward the meetings needed to be structured”, and that “it was further agreed that

the next meeting would be used to develop principles that would guide the negotiations”.

Evidently, as of 25 August  72 hours before Somalia filed its Application  the Parties were still

operating on the basis that there were bridgeable gaps between them, which they were about to

address. Or, at least, Kenya was operating on that basis. Professor Sands and Mr. Reichler both

quoted a comment by the Somali Foreign Minister dated 5 August 2014 to the effect that these
77
were “discussions without any possible solution” : but that view of the hopelessness of the

position was not communicated to Kenya.

22. Somalia makes much of Kenya’s unexplained failure to turn up at the August meeting.

Our Co-Agent gave you the reason: specific and serious security concerns leading to a last-minute

internal order not to travel to Mogadishu  an order that carries rather more resonance than an

order not to travel to The Hague, for example. Should Kenya have explained its absence? Yes. Its

failure to do so in the 72 hours prior to the filing of the Application is regrettable, even if the failure

to do so afterwards might be accepted as a reflection of the state of the bilateral relations that

Somalia had so abruptly changed. Should Somalia have asked what had happened to the Kenyan

delegation? Perhaps. But none of this can alter the fact that there was room for further

negotiations and the Parties were preparing to try to bridge the gaps between them.

23. Objectively, there is no evidence that the discussions had reached deadlock.

Subjectively, Kenya remained open to discussions on the maritime boundaries in 2014, and

remains open today.

24. In the MOU, Somalia made a legally binding commitment to settle its maritime

boundaries with Kenya by agreement. It cannot simply ignore that commitment  as, indeed, it

should not have ignored its commitment not to object to Kenya’s CLCS submission. Somalia

appears to feel free to disregard both commitments in the MOU — to treat them both as

“non-actionable” from its point of view.

77CR 2016/11, p. 59, para. 22 (Sands); CR 2016/11, p. 47, para. 44 (Reichler). - 37 -

Dispute settlement architecture

25. Finally, Mr. President, let me address another strand of Somalia’s submissions. It sought

to reinforce its case by predicting “dire implications” and “radical consequences that surely were

79
not anticipated” if its interpretation of the facts and law is not accepted. It predicts that the Court

would be deprived of jurisdiction over many cases.

26. While we do not suppose for one moment that the Court’s decision would be influenced

by a desire to increase its jurisdiction or its business, that submission does merit a response.

27. The first point is that not all disputes can be put equally effectively and efficiently before

each and every procedure for the settlement of disputes. Any particular dispute will be more suited

to some dispute settlement procedures than to others.

28. A dispute over the adequacy or appropriateness of anti-pollution measures or fishery

conservation measures may be better put to a tribunal that is not made up exclusively of lawyers,

but contains scientists and technical experts, such as is provided for in UNCLOS Annex VIII. A

maritime boundary dispute that involves not only the question of the location of the boundary line

but also the question of cross-boundary policing arrangements might be better handled by

negotiation than by reference to an international judicial tribunal.

29. That is why UNCLOS, for example, allows States parties to choose among different

mechanisms for the handling of different categories of disputes arising under that Convention 

what Professor Boyle called the “cafeteria system”. You will find the relevant provisions in

Articles 279 to 287 and 297 to 299 of UNCLOS, which provide for access to arbitration, special

“technical” arbitration, voluntary or compulsory conciliation, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, or this

Court, among other procedures.

30. So it is in this Court, where a State may decide in advance that all categories, all disputes

in a certain category may be referred to the Court if any party to the dispute so wishes. It can do

that by an Optional Clause declaration or by acceding to a compromissory clause in a convention.

Or a State can, by making reservations to an Optional Clause declaration and by not signing up to

particular treaties, decide that no disputes in a certain category may be submitted to this Court. Or

7CR 2016/11, p. 57, para. 16 (Sands).

7CR 2016/11, p. 56, para. 14 (Sands). - 38 -

it can decide case by case, making no Optional Clause declaration at all. Or it can attach

conditions, such as temporal limitations, to its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.

31. It is for each State to decide which disputes go where. And we note that over the past

century far more maritime boundaries have been settled by negotiation than by adjudication — an

indication, no doubt, of what States find the most appropriate and satisfactory way of settling their

maritime boundaries. At a time when most of the legal world is seeking to promote non-judicial

settlement procedures as an alternative to litigation, Somalia seems to be swimming in the opposite

direction.

32. As for Professor Sands’s point 80 that the MOU language is “boilerplate”, and that if it

displaces ICJ jurisdiction the obligation in UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 to effect maritime

delimitation by agreement would equally displace ICJ jurisdiction in all cases, the answer is that it

would not. If it becomes apparent that an agreed delimitation is impossible, the parties are free

under Articles 74 and 83 to turn to another method of settlement: indeed, UNCLOS Article 283 (2)

requires them to consider that possibility. The MOU stipulated a method  agreement  and a

time  after the CLCS recommendations  for delimitation. That time has not yet arrived; and

negotiations have not been given a fair chance. That is the difference between the MOU and

UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83.

33. The second point is that it is for each State to decide on precisely how far it will consent

to the jurisdiction of international tribunals. This right is fundamental to the Court’s jurisdiction.

In the words of the Court’s own Handbook on accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court

of Justice,

“Given that the nature of the jurisdiction of the Court is strictly consensual,

States are free to include reservations in their declarations. . . . They protect the
declaring State against undesired involvement in judicial proceedings to the extent
specified.”81

34. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that, as it put it in the Georgia v Russia case,

quoting its earlier Judgment in the Armed Activities case, “any conditions to which such consent is

8CR 2016/11, p. 54, para. 13 (Sands)

8http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/963&referer=/en…, p. 10. - 39 -

subject must be regarded as constituting the limits thereon” . And that is why, as you said in the

83
Fisheries Jurisdiction case, there is no reason to interpret reservations restrictively . Reservations

do not derogate from a wider acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction: they define the parameters of

a State’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and the Court “must seek the

interpretation which is in harmony with a natural and reasonable way of reading the text”, having

“due regard to the intention of the State concerned at the time when it accepted the compulsory

jurisdiction of the Court” .84

35. There is a solemn pact between States and the Court: the Court respects the limits of the

consent of each State to accept the Court’s jurisdiction; and within those limits, the State respects

the powers of the Court and the State’s obligations under the Court’s Statute. As Somalia’s

Deputy-Agent rightly put it, the ICJ “do[es] justice in accordance with international law” , and 85

the limits of States’ consent to its jurisdiction are an integral part of international law.

36. Somalia wishes you to upset this balance, and to assert jurisdiction over a dispute that

Kenya has, by agreement with Somalia, in the MOU and in UNCLOS, previously decided should

be settled by methods other than a reference to this Court. It shows no disrespect for this

institution, the ultimate protector of the Rule of Law in international society, to ask that Somalia be

kept to the agreements that it made and that effect be given to the terms of Kenya’s declaration of

its acceptance of the jurisdiction of this Court.

37. Mr. President, Members of the Court, unless I can assist you further, that concludes my

submission on behalf of the Republic of Kenya; and I would ask that you now invite the

Honourable Agent for Kenya to the lectern.

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne la parole à S. Exc. M. Muigai,

l’agent de la République du Kenya. Vous avez la parole.

82Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 39, para. 88; Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 125, para. 131.

83Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 452,
para. 44; POK, Vol. I, para. 144.
84
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 454,
paras. 47, 49.
85CR 2016/11, p. 10, para. 2 (Al-Sharmani). - 40 -

Mr. MUIGAI:

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. It is an honour to address you again

in these proceedings to make Kenya’s concluding submissions.

2. As I indicated in my opening statement on Monday, Kenya holds the Court in the highest

regard and is committed to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.

In this instance, however, Kenya and Somalia have agreed to other methods of settlement, which

brings the dispute within Kenya’s reservation to the Court’s jurisdiction. Kenya’s Preliminary

Objections are founded on the performance of international agreements in good faith, and

respecting the limits of the State consent to the jurisdiction of the Court.

3. This maritime boundary dispute arises in a delicate political context. Somalia has only

recently begun to emerge from a long period of instability caused by civil war, humanitarian

disaster and widespread terrorism. In particular, Somalia has no maritime enforcement capacity.

Kenya is deeply concerned about maritime security in the region. Al-Shabaab terrorists, who

exploit the sea for their operations, are an ongoing threat to Kenya and its neighbours. Kenya has

already lost many soldiers fighting Al-Shabaab forces, and we have paid the price in the loss of

hundreds of civilians as well. The maritime boundary delimitation between Kenya and Somalia

requires sensitive bilateral negotiations that can encompass not just strictly legal issues, but also

our very real political and security concerns, as well as practical arrangements to address them.

After a volatile transitional period in Somalia, we began these preliminary discussions in 2014 at

the technical level, but they were cut short by Somalia’s Application to this Court.

4. Kenya does not want deadlock or perpetual uncertainty. We want a permanent solution

that will contribute to regional peace and security. We believe that this solution will come from a

gradual, flexible, and multifaceted process. Kenya was open to discussions on the maritime

boundary in 2014, and we remain ready to continue these negotiations in good faith. We remain

confident that goodwill of the Parties will arrive to an agreement over time.

5. Mr. President, Kenya has voluntarily suspended its transitory exploratory activities in the

disputed area as an expression of its good faith. In May, we invited Somalia to enter into

provisional arrangements pending an agreement on the maritime boundary. We remain open to

discussing these arrangements with Somalia. This dispute is a test for a new era in our bilateral - 41 -

relations and our commitment to bilateral agreements. I remain confident that the Parties will reach

an amicable solution consistent with their obligations contained in the MOU of 2009.

Final Submissions

6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will now read Kenya’s final submissions.

“The Republic of Kenya respectfully requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that:

The case brought by Somalia against Kenya is not within the
jurisdiction of the Court and is inadmissible, and is accordingly
dismissed.”

7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I sincerely thank the Court for its patience and very

careful attention to this case. I thank the Registrar and his staff for the highly professional conduct

of these proceedings and the Court’s interpreters, transcribers and translators for their excellent

work. I unfortunately must return to Kenya tonight for some other urgent State matters. However,

Kenya’s Co-Agent, Ambassador Rose Makena Muchiri, will be present for the final hearing on

Friday. Thank you for your understanding and my sincere apologies to the Court and to the Somali

delegation.

8. Mr. President, that concludes Kenya’s case and I thank you.

LE PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur l’agent. La Cour prend acte des conclusions finales dont

vous venez de donner lecture au nom du Kenya. La Somalie présentera son second tour de

plaidoiries le vendredi 23 septembre à 10 heures. L’audience est levée.

L’audience est levée à 17 h 55.

___________