CASE CONCERNING THE GABCîKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT {HUNGARY/SLOVAKIA)
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
A. RÉPONSE A LA QUESTION DE M LE JUGE FLEISCHHAUER
1. La question de l'eau potable dans la plaine du Rhin en généralet le long de l'axe
fluvial en particulier a fait 1'objet de très nombreux débatsscientifiques et publics. J'ai
étéun des deux experts biologistes du Gouvernement français après la catastrophe de la
pollution Sandoz du Rhin du 1er novembre 1986. Une des questions posées alors fut :
quels sont les puits d'eau potables qu'il faut éventuellement fermer le long du Rhin? Je
suis, d'autre part, président du Conseil scientifiq_uede l'Agence publique de l'eau Rhin
Meuse, Conseil ayant assisté cet organisme dans 1'élaboration des plans de gestion de
l'eau dans le Nord-Est de la France, en application de la nouvelle loi française de janvier
1992 sur 1'eau.
2. Le public ne connaît que la pointe de l'iceberg formé par la dégradation
continuelle de la qualité des nappes phréatiques fluviales, aspect plutôt inquiétant du
futur de l'eau potable en Europe. Si d'ores et déjàon constate que la stérilitédes mâles
de 1'espèce humaine .est e.nconstante progression, c'est en partie dû aux eaux potables et
aux polluants dits xénoestrogènes. La dernière population de loutres disparut dans les
années 1960 dans un secteur très sauvage des bras latéraux du Rhin. Nous savons
aujourd'hui que la cause en était la stérilisation chimique, cette fois des femelles par les
polluants organochlorés véhiculéspar le fleuve.
3. L'axe essentiel de la réponse à la première partie de la question se trouve d'une
part dans deux schémas cartographiques montrés au cours des exposés scientifiques et,
d'autre part, dans les passages de mon deuxième exposé énonçant l'énorme inertie de la
nappe, que ces schémas illustrent (CR 97/6, pp. 50-55).
4. En premier lieu, revenons donc au schéma représentant la limite de pénétration
du tritium, polluant nucléaire de la décennie 1950, véhiculépar le Danube et inflitré à
partirdu fleuve dans les eaux souterraines du Szigetkôz (lllus No 7.10). L'on voit
qu'en 30 ans cette limite de pénétration ne dépasse que de peu celle de la plaine
alluviale active.
5. Or, la situation dans la plaine rhénane est strictement identique, remarquable
homologie, permettez-moi d'insister. Reprenons donc la carte de la pollution de la
nappe riveraine du Rhin, établie à l'aide du traceur mercure et qu'ont confirmé les
traceurs chlorures, phosphates, oxygène dissous (Illus No 4.11). L'on voit que la largeur
de la zone polluée est du mêmeordre de grandeur corespondant également à-peu-près à
la plaine alluviale active. Les zones contaminées restent donc encore limitées du fait de
l'inertie des eaux souterraines, et du caractère récent (environ 30 ans aussi) des
pollutions industriellesn cause.
6. Comment, dans ces conditions, les villes disposent-elles encore d'eau potable
dans la plaine du Rhin? Regardons à nouveau le schéma 2: les agglomérations et
captages se situent à l'extérieure la plaine alluviale active. Nous voyons sur le schéma
les villes d'Erstein et de Sélestat. Elles sont situées sur la partie préservéede la nappe.
Celle-ci dépendde la rivière Ill, dont nous avons décritla plaine inondable fonctionnelle ./
2
comme bioréacteur naturel de production d'eau souterraine propre. La plupart des
captages d'eau potable de la plaine du Rhin sont ainsi situéssuffisamment loin du
fleuve pour échapperpour le moment à lazone d'influencedu Rhin.
7. Mais il y a plus, et c'est là que cesse l'homologie avec le Szigetkoz.
L'environnement géographiquede la plaine du Rhin supérieurdiffèretotalement de la
petite plaine slovaco-hongroisepar la présencedes montagnes bordières.Les Vosges, la
Forêt-Noire,reçoivent 1.5 à 2 mètres de précipitationspar an et constituent donc de
vrais châteaux d'eau. Aussi, des villes, comme Freiburg en Allemagne, Mulhouse et
Colmar en Alsace, béneficient-ellesdes apports d'eau souterraine en provenance des
deux chaînes de montagnes. Citons aussi les villes à l'aval du secteur canalisé
(Karlsruhe), qui bénéficientà la fois des apports d'eau de la montagne et des effets
épurateursde la plaine alluviale restéeactive.
8. La ville de Strasbourg où j'ai enseignépendant 25 ans l'écologiedes pollutions,
présenteun cas intéressant:un des groupes de captages se trouvant à proximitéde la
zone d'influence des infiltrations du Rhin, a donnédes signes progressifs d'altération.
L'on a dû approfondir les puits contaminésd'environ 40-80 mètres, solution bien
évidemmentprovisoire, à partir des années80, ou recourir a des mélangesavec des
captages situésplus à l'Ouest.
9. Le Szigetkoz, quant à lui, ne bénéficiantnullement de la proximité de
montagnes, dépend de ce fait totalement, comme la majeure partie de la Hongrie, de
1'eau du Danube. Sa vulnérabilitéen est décuplée.De plus, nombre de captages,
contrairement à la plaine du Rhin, sont situésdans la plaine alluviale influencéepar la
Danube. Je vous suis reconnaissant, Monsieur le Président,Messieurs les Juges, de
1'occasionqui_m'a.été.donné de~~pporte pr.cieisnsupplémentaires.···-·
1O. La deuxième partie de la question demande: que faut-il faire? Il y a plusieurs
réponsespossibles.
11. Une solution qui, elle, est irréalisable,est de purifier une nappe souterraine. Une
autre solution, trèssouvent proposéeaujourd'hui, est de traiter l'eau pour extraire les
polluants. Les technologies actuelles trèssophistiquéespermettent, en effet, de rendre
potable la plus détestabledes eaux d'égout,mais avec quelle sécuriet à quel prix! Un
prix assurémentexorbitant. Permettez-moi d'évoquercet enjeu financier. Le prix de
l'eau potable payépar le public grimpe rapidement, tendance, hélas!trèsgénérale, ui a
donnélieu, par exemple, dans a valléedu Rhône canalisé,aux eaux très dégradées,à
beaucoupde discussions.
12. Par contre, une solution alternative consiste : ou à conserver ou à restaurer les
usines naturelles de purification et de recharge que sont les plaines alluviales
fonctionnelles. Ainsi, dans la plaine du Rhin, en regard de la raréfactionrapide de la
ressource, le recours futur au potentiel représentépar la nappe riveraine du Rhin
apparaît essentiel. En effet, dans la plaine d'Alsace un quart environ des puits de
captage d'eau ne sont plus conformes aux normes européennes,à cause de multiples
sourcesde pollution agricoles, industrielles et aussi des densitésde population. Les
inquiétudessur l'avenir de la nappe sont considérables. D'où le regard portévers le
potentiel abondant offert par la nappe riveraine du Rhin. Toutefois, ce recours ne sera
possible qu'à deux conditions: d'une part une protection énergiquedes eaux du fleuve
contre les pollutions, telle que prévuepar le plan internationaldit "action Rhin", d'autre
part et surtout des efforts considérablesde restauration des plaines alluviales actives,
notamment par la reconstitution des zones inondables, opération également
coûteuse,tout le longe son cours. 3
13. Si nous continuons à gaspiller des potentiels d'une aussi grande valeur que les
nappes alluviales des grands fleuves, ce seront nos petits-enfants qui payeront la note,
vu l'énormeinertie dont je vous ai entretenus.
Roland Carbiener
B. ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF JUDGE VERESHCHETIN
On 6 March 1997 Judge Vereshchetin posed the following question to Hungary:
"This moming, the counsel for Hungary mentioned that in November 1989,
Hungary had handed over to Czechoslovak.ia a preliminary draft treaty on the
completion of the project without Nagymaros. My question is the following: In
1990-1992, the period preceding the termination of the Treaty by Hungary, did
Hungary formally reiterate this proposai or propose new concrete modifications
to the 1977 Treaty and to the project itself which, if accepted by the other Party,
would have met Hungary's environmental, political and economie concems and
permitted to preserve the integrated character of the project?"
Answer:
1. ln the years 1990-1992 Hungary did not reiterate its proposai of November 1989
on the completion of the Project without Nagymaros, nor did Czechoslovak.ia ever mak.e
an equivalent offer.
2. On 30 November 1989 Hungary submitted its proposai for the amendment of the
1977 Treaty. In the next month the "velvet revolution" took place in Czechoslovak.ia. A
new Govemment was formed in Prague under the leadership of Marian Calfa. The
President of the Czechoslovak Republic became then Vaclav Havel. The Hungarian
Govemment of this period of political transformation believed that the new
Czechoslovak. Govemment would pursue a different policy regarding the Barrage
System. That is why on l0 January the Hungarian Prime Minister wrote to Prime
Minister Calfa:
"We completely understand the fact that during the last few weeks, during this
period of a change for modem Czechoslovak.ia the new Govemment you lead
was not able to consider the amendment of the [1977] Treaty to be of prime
importance." 1
He added that-
"history at the present time offers us the opportunity to reassess the Barrage
System in depth, governed by natural sciences, technical and economie
considerations, freed from the fetters of the earlier political decisions made by
our Govemments. "2
The Prime Minister proposed that joint investigations of the various problems should be
extended to the Original Project as a whole. These investigations could be carried out in
HM, vol. 4, annex 32.
2 Ibid. 4
the first half of 1990, then, in the second half of the year, "negotiations as to the
modification of the [1977] Treaty" could commence. Hungary would suspend work on
the Project for this period and he recorrimended that Czechoslovakia do the same.3
3. In Hungary's view it would have been inappropriate to propose any specifie
"concrete modification" without a full and effective joint investigation, involving
appropriatinternatiobodies. Thus it kept reiteraits proposai for the
reassessment of the whole Project, pending which construction should not proceed.
4. On 15 February 1990 Prime Minister Calfa responded to the letter of the
HungarianPrime Minister. He accepted the proposai for negotiations but made no
reference to any joint investigations.4
5. On 6 March 1990 the Hungarian Prime Minister reiterated his proposai with
regard to joint scientific-environmental investigations and recommended that after the
forthcoming parliamentary elections in both countries the new governments should
make their decision on the fate of the Project.s
6. Elections were held in Hungary on 25 March 1990 and in Czechoslovakia on 8
June 1990.
7. On 5 September 1990 the Environment Ministers met. The Czechoslovak
Minister handed over a listven alternatives which could be investigated by the
parties.6 The first one was the completionect according to the Original Plan,
the last was the restoration of the constrstatus quo anThe list also
contained what became Variant spite of the reference to Variant C, at that time the
Ij~:!_ f()gY~iIJ~tl~.l~,~::1hst:~çi)Q~ _lQgYy~mm W~t_QŒ~ri JD g
investigation of all possible alternatives. The Environment Ministers continued their
negotiations.
8. The Plenipotentiaries also met but did not reach any conclusions. Their first
meeting subsequent to the Hungarian proposai on the amendmentty took
placeon 31 May 1990 when the Hungarian Plenipotentiary handed over the relevant
sectionf the Hungarian National Renewal Programme calling for a renegotiation of the
1977 Trea.1
9. The Plenipotentiaries met twice more in 1990, on 6 September and on 17-18
October. The Hungarian Plenipotentiary confirmed the Hungarian position regarding
renegotiation, while his Czechoslovak colleague elaborated planned research
was to become Varia8t C.
1O. The Hungarian Prime Minister drew the conclusion in a letter to his counterpart
dated 14 December990 that the bilateral negotiations between the Plenipotentiaries
3
Ibid.
4 HM, vol. 4, annex 33.
5 HM, vol. 4, annex 35.
6
HM, para 3.123.
7 HM, para 3.111.
8 HM, vol. 4, annex 37. 5
had "reached a standstill", however, the meeting of the Environment Ministers "seem
promising". He wrote that:
"during these negotiations, a principle agreement was concluded conceming a
joint intergovemmental committee to prepare an amendment of the Treaty...
The work of the committee could be assisted by the experts of the European
Communities according to our agreement with EC Commissioner Ripa de
Meana. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian section of the committee will
9
separately submit their proposais for their govemments."
11. However, the negotiations of the Environment Ministers did not reach a result.
By that time Slovakia was, as has now become clear, working hard on the preparation of
Variant C. Thus it opposed any compromise that could be reached by the federal
Govemment. In December 1990 and January 1991 the Slovak Govemment completed
and approved design details of the construction of Variant C.1o
12. The Plenipotentiaries next met on 9 January 1991. They informed each other
about the decisions of their respective governments. The Hungarian party handed over
new assessments of the environmental risks of the Project. The Czechoslovak party
confirmed that their Govemment was ready to examine the questions within the
framework of the 1977 Treaty, that is, according to the Original Project.ll
13. On 13-14 February 1991the experts of the Hungarian and the Slovak Academies
of Sciences met. They agreed that the ecological risks had to be investigated on a
"strictly scientific basis, without political consideration". They decided to elaborate in
the first half of the year a common program regarding joint investigations, and, in the
second half of 1991, to set up joint expert teams. In the third stage, by the end of 1992,
these teams would prepare short term programs, and, in the fourth stage, by 1995, a long
term program regarding the environmental problems of the Barrage System. However,
at the end of the meeting, the experts of the Slovak Academy informed their Hungarian
colleagues of the "technical details and ecological aspects of Variant C, approved by the
Slovak Govemment".l2
14. On the following day, on 15 February 1991, the Hungarian Plenipotentiary sent
to his counterpart a draft agreement on the joint termination of the 1977 Treaty.13Two
days later the Slovak Govemment gave instructions for the implementation of Variant
C.14
15. On 22 April 1991 the first intergovemmental meeting was held in Budapest.
Hungary proposed to terminate the Treaty and to investigate what might be done with
the existing constructions. It proposed entering into a formai agreement dealing with
1
alterations to the Project and also with compensation. 5 Czechoslovakia did not accept
the Hungarian proposais.
9 HM, vol.4, annex 40.
10 HR, Annexes, vol. 4, annexes 66 and 68.
Il
HM, Annexes, vol. 4, annex 41.
12 HM, vol. 4, annex 43.
13 HM, vol. 4, annex 45 pt93.
14 HR, Annexes, vol.3, annex 70.
15 HM, Annexes, vol. 4, annexes 41, 45, 48, 49. 6
16. The last meeting of the Plenipotentiaries was held on 10 July 1991. They
discussed matters related to the construction of the Project but did not try to reach an
agreement on those questions which were on the agenda of the intergovemmental
negotiations. The Joint Operational Group held 5 meetings in 1990 and 8 meetings in
1991. Its last meeting was held between 3 and 7 February 1992. 16
17. Minister Vavrousek retumed to the alternatives as late 9 November 1991, when
he said in front of Hungarian Parliamentary Committees that "I believe that we should
reach an agreement as to a method, that could lead to a solutionof this situation. As late
as in the second period I regard as possible to discuss which of the variants is the least
bad."l7 Hungary agreed, but by that stage Variant C was weil underway and no joint
investigation was possible.
C. ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF JUDGE RANJEV A
On 7 March Judge Ranjeva put the following question to Hungary:
"Can Hungary draw up a table calling to mind:
(1) the financial commitments announced by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
(2) the fulfilment ofthose commitments by the USSR; and
(3)-- -tn.impact of tnacrulfilmenron the -përfoii:nance orthe GabCikovo-~
Nagymaros Project?"
The answer is as follows.
Question 1:
1. The financial commitments announced by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics were provided for in the Agreement between the Government of the
Hungarian People's Republic and the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics on
Co-operation in the Construction of the Nagymaros Barrage on the River Danube as a
Part ofthe Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System, concluded on 30 November 1977.18
The Agreement provided for assistance in the form of delivery of certain goods and the
provision of certain services. The value of these goods and services was not specified
but was expressed solely in physical terms. At this period assistance between socialist
states did not usually take the form of loans but of additional goods to be supplied
beyond normal arrangements for barter trade.
2. Asto goods, the Agreement provided for the delivery of (1) six generator-turbine
units, together with auxiliary equipment; (2) large capacity cranes; and (3) specialised
machines and tools. As to services, the Agreement obliged the Soviet Union to (1)
!6 Closing Report on the Work of the Joint Operational Group. OVIBER, Budapest, 10 December
1992.
17
SM, vol. 4, annex 97.
18 HM, Annexes, Annex 23. 7
participate in the elaboration of the plans of the Barrage System; (2) send trained staff
assisting in the mounting of the machinery and providing technical help; and (3) consult
with Hungarian experts, as required. The delivery of the turbine-generator units was
planned for the years 1985 to 1987. These units were to be installed in the Nagymaros
Power Station. The cranes, machines and tools were to assist in the construction of the
Barrage.
3. There are severa}ways in which an approximate value of these items may be
estimated. One is by reference from Hungary's loan request to the USSR. Another is
by reference from the amount eventually loaned by Austrian banks.
4. In 1974 Hungary and Czechoslovakia submitted a a joint proposai to the USSR
for external financing of the project, requesting that they be provided with an amount no
less than 150 million transferable roubles.19 The official transferable rouble/US dollar
exchange rate was then approximately 111.06. 20 In the pre-Treaty period, the total cost
to Hungary of constructing the Nagymaros Barrage and associated works was estimated
at 12,286 million Hungarian forints (HUF). Depending on the HUF/US dollar exchange
rate (which was fixed, depending on the purpose, at between 30 and 70 HUF to the
dollar), that would have amounted to something in the range ofUS$175-350 million. In
other words, the financing requested from the USSR amounted to something in the
range of 25-45% of the cost of construction at Nagymaros.
5. The Austrian loan initially offered and agreed was in the amount of 5750 million
Austrian Schillings, approximately $US 321 million, which was again to cover the costs
of construction at Nagymaros.
Question 2:
6. Due to financial constraints, none of the commitrnents were fulfilled by the
USSR, with the exception ofthose relating to planning and consultations.
Question 3:
7. When the USSR's loan did not materialize, Hungary faced a serious resource
shortage; in particular it was not able to manufacture the necessary turbine-generator
units, which would have to be acquired with hard currency. Eventually, on 28 May
1986, Hungary concluded a loan agreement with a consortium of Austrian banks in the
amount of 5750 million Austrian Schillings, approximately $US 321 million. As
repayment, Hungary commiried itself to supplying an agreed amount of electricity to
Austria over a 20 year period from 1996 to 2015, with Austria paying any difference
between the value of the loan installments and the value of the electricity. This
commitment significantly affected the long-term financial viability ofthe Project.
15April 1997
19
See HM, Annexes, Vol. 4, Annex 7.
20 On the difficulties of equating currencies under the exchange rate system operating in the region at
the time seeR, para 1.93, note 248./
Groundwater Flow Rath in the Szigetkôz
30-year travel time
Limit of Danube recharge
--
,.._- ~
\
\
'
...._
l
Source: HC-M, vol 2, Figure 3.?a _jLe mercure dans les eaux souterrain
de la plaine du Rhin indiquépar les
mousses des eaux de drainage
N
t
• 1
~,.<
JI',
'IJAJ f
...,,
·\.'\
' Hg mg/kg
/ t:!l)
, ~
,/
/1 0,1-0,2
> 0,2
Source: Roeck et al, 1991
Illustration No. ·.;
Réponses de la Hongrie aux questions posées par des Membres de la Cour