Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
AU
CR 2009/13 (traduction)
CR 2009/13 (translation)
mardi 15 septembre 2009 à 10 heures
Tuesday 15 September 2009 at 10 a.m. - 2 -
12 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The sitting is open, and we
shall now hear further presentations in the firsround of pleadings of the Argentine Republic. I
give the floor to Professor Marcelo Kohen. You have the floor, Sir.
KMOr. EN:
VI. THE QUESTION OF SITE SELECTION IS AT THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a pleasure to appear before you once again, to
defend the rights of Argentina. This first pleading will examine one of the questions that lies at the
heart of the dispute between our two sister republics. In my presentation I shall endeavour to show
⎯ first, that the sitting of the mills is essentia l in order to assess whether the projects meet the
requirements of applicable law;
⎯ second, that Uruguay’s arguments which would ignore the presence of a riparian population
and existing uses must be rejected;
⎯ third, that it is CARU that has determined the existence of priority uses, with recreation listed
in second place;
⎯ fourth, that Uruguay has never taken the steps n ecessary to determine whether the site chosen
is appropriate, and has obstinately refused to discuss this issue with Argentina; and
⎯ fifth, that the site chosen by Botnia is not appropriate and that the arguments fabricated ex post
facto by the respondent to justify that choice are unfounded.
A. The choice of site is essential for determining whether the project
meets the requirements of applicable law
2. Uruguay contends that studies to assess alternative sites are neither obligatory nor
necessary1. That is false. For one thing, the choice of site is fundamental for assessing the
environmental impact of the project on the ecosystem. For another, the choice of site is also
13 essential for determining whether the Botnia plant, built where it is, represents an “optimum and
rational” utilization of the River Uruguay as require d under the 1975 Statute, or an “equitable and
1
Rejoinder of Uruguay (RU), paras. 5.92-5.93. CR 2006/49, para. 6 (Boyle). - 3 -
2
reasonable” utilization , which are criteria both Partie s recognize as founded in general
3
international law and reflected in the United Nations 1997 Convention .
3. Moreover, Article 7 of the 1975 Statute en ables CARU to determine “whether the plan
4
might cause significant damage to the other Party” . A Party may sustain such damage not only if
environmental requirements are not complied with but also if existing uses of the river are
threatened by plans of the other Party.
4. Uruguay incorrectly asserts that neither the 1975 Statute nor general international law
5
requires alternative sites to be assessed . The 1975 Statute refers to ge neral international law, and
international practice and instruments reflecting that law require a site assessment based on existing
6
alternative proposals .
5. Uruguay then contends that, in this case, there was no reason to asse ss alternative sites 7.
This overlooks the fact that this mill is the largest industrial installation in the entire history of the
River Uruguay. It is a project which could physica lly be built at other locations. This is not a
project which by its nature or purpose could not be built anywhere other than at the location chosen
by Botnia.
6. Lastly, Uruguay has put forward a surprising final argument: that those who apply for
building permission can carry out an environmental impact assessment only in relation to sites they
8
14 already own or control . This is evidence that everything ha d already been lined up when Botnia
2
Art.1 of the 1975Statute (Memorial of Argentina (M A), Vol.II, Ann.2; Counter-Memorial of Uruguay
(CMU), Vol.2, Ann.4); Art.5 of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (General Assembly Resolution 51/229).
3
MA, paras. 3.163-3.168; CMU, paras. 4.63-4.65; RU, paras. 5.49-5.51.
Emphasis added. MA, Vol.II, Ann.2; CMU, Vol.II, Ann. 4. French translation: “si le projet peut causer un
préjudice sensible à l’autre Partie”.
CMU, para. 6.59; RU, para. 5.93.
“Goals and Principles of Envir onmental Impact Assessment”, adopt ed by the UNEP Governing Council
(Decision 14/25, 17 June 1987), 4 (aPviilcpllee at
<http://www-penelope.drec.unilim.fr/penelope/library/Libs/Int_nal/unep/u…;); Espoo Convention, App. II, Arts. 4
and 5, and App. III, Art. 1 (b); draft articles on “Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities”,
adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001 ( Official Records of the Genera l Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session,
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10); EIA guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, DecisioV III/28, paras4., 5 (b), 5 (c), 25 (b), 27 (e), 28 and 39, Mar2.006 (available at
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-08/full/cop-08-dec-en.pdf>) (cf. MA, para.5.56, and Reply of Argentina (RA),
paras. 4.69 and 4.70 (judges’ folders, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 5).
7RU, paras. 5.91-5.92.
8
RU, para. 5.92. - 4 -
made the decision to buy the land on which to build the mill, before it had even obtained building
permission.
7. Uruguay’s assertion that there was no oblig ation to consider alternative sites is
contradicted by the most important precedent in re gard to the application of Articles 7 to 13 of the
1975Statute, namely the 1981 rejection by CARU of the Argentina-Brazil Garabí dam proposal.
That project included an evaluation of alternative sites. Here I quote from the notice of rejection
which CARU addressed to the Argentine Government [slide 1]:
“Numerous possible sites for the pr oposed works were analyzed in the
presented study. This allows presuming that the possibility of relocating the proposed
works, as well as others, to other sites along the river is not to be ruled out. This
would achieve a more harmonious result on the entire river system in order to
9
eliminate any possible sensible damage.” [End of slide 1.]
8. Moreover, in its subsequent attempts to justify the choice of site, Uruguay wound up
contending that Botnia had indeed done such comparative studies . These alleged studies were not
communicated either to CARU or to Argentina before the project was authorized to proceed.
9. At this stage, we may conclude that an ob ligation existed to consider a number of sites as
part of a genuine environmental impact assessm ent, that that assessment should have been
submitted to CARU and that Uruguay did not fulfil that obligation.
B. Uruguay’s arguments for ignoring the presence of a riparian population and
existing uses are without foundation
10. Members of the Court, if you will permit me now, I should like to draw your attention to
an important fact: neither Ñandubaysal nor Guale guaychú chose to situate itself next door to the
Botnia plant. It was Botnia that deliberately c hose to situate its plant in close proximity to the
second largest population centre on the banks of the River Uruguay— a place which, moreover,
was already home to a beach resort and major fisheries breeding grounds.
9Minutes of CARU meeting 9/81 of 18De c.1981, MA, Vol.III, Ann.3, p. 25; CMU, Vol.IV, Ann.68. “De
nombreux emplacements possibles pour les ouvrages envisagés ont été analysés dans l’étude présentée. Ceci permet de
supposer que la possibilité de relocaliser les ouvrages proposés, ainsi que d’autres, à d’autres endroits du fleuve, ne serait
pas à écarter. Ce que aboutira à un résultat plus harmoniesur l’ensemble du fleuve, dans le but d’éliminer toute
possibilité de préjudices sensibles.” (CMU, Vol. IV, Ann. 68.) (judges' folders, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 6). [Translation by the
Registry.]
1CMU, para. 4.118; RU, para. 5.90. - 5 -
15 11. Uruguay is trying to use two arguments in order to avoid examining the impact on the
presence of a riparian population and existing uses in the area where the mills were established.
The first is to assert that air pollution, visual pollution and sound pollution are not covered by the
Statute of the River Uruguay 11. Plainly, air pollution has an impact on the ecosystem of an
international watercourse. To borrow the terminology used in Article 36 of the 1975 Statute, it is a
“harmful factor in the river and the areas affected by it”. Visual pollution and sound pollution, in
the particular case before us, threaten the “optim um and rational” utilization, the “equitable and
reasonable” utilization of the river, given their inherent contradiction with existing uses of the river
at the site chosen.
C. The false dilemma put forward by Uruguay opposing “existing use”
against “equitable and reasonable utilization”
12. Uruguay’s second argument consists of asser ting that existing uses of the river have no
priority over possible new uses. As Uruguay puts it, “tourism and fishing must compete with other
equitable claims, including industrial and domestic uses resulting in higher levels of phosphorus in
the river” 1.
13. I should draw your attention to President Jiménez de Aréchaga’s position on the issue.
[Slide 2.] To sum up the quotation that you see on the screen, which may be found at tab 7 in your
folders, it may be said that treaties are in general based on respect for existing uses, and that respect
would seem to be the point of departure for any an alysis. The fundamental rule would therefore be
prior in tempore , potior in jure , without prejudice to other solutions that would always take
account of existing uses 13. So there you have the thinking of someone whose influence on his
country’s positions in matters concerning rivers need no longer be in any doubt. [End of slide 2.]
14. Mr. President, the issue is not one of choosing between “existing use” and “equitable and
16
reasonable utilization”, as Uruguay contends. To assess whether the construction of the Botnia mill
at the site where it is operating constitutes an e quitable and reasonable utilization, an optimum and
11
CMU, para. 1.23; RU, para. 1.12.
12RU, para.5.51: “le tourisme et la pêche sont concrrencés par d’autres utilisati ons équitables revendiquées,
notamment les utilisations industrielles et domestiques, qui donnent lieu à un accroissement des niveaux de phosphore
dans le fleuve”. [Translation by the Registry.]
13Jiménez de Aréchaga, Eduardo, “International Legal Rules Governing Use of Wa ters from International
Watercourses”, Inter-American Law Review, 1960, Vol. II, pp. 335-336. - 6 -
rational utilization, of the river, two relevant ci rcumstances need to be considered which Uruguay
has obstinately refused to take into account: the site chosen for the mill, and existing uses at that
site. This is what is required under th e Statute and general international law 14. Article8 of the
15
Helsinki Rules reflects international practice, and as an eminent voice in this area has said,
“without reverting to a traditional practice, which consisted of granting them the
quality of acquired rights, the uses in questi on are assumed to have priority, unless it
can be established that the reasons justif ying the continuation of those uses are less
pertinent, in the light of circumstances, than the reasons arguing in favour of a new
activity” .
D. It is CARU that identified the existence of priority uses
15. Let us look at yet another important elemen t in site evaluation. In its digest, CARU
classified the waters of the river based on their u se. [Slide 3.] You see the two relevant articles on
the screen, and in your folders at tab 10 . In Article 1, you see an initial list of “legitimate” uses of
the river’s water. In Article 2, you see a second list which sets out a classification of the waters of
the river on the basis of their legitimate and “pre dominant” uses: in that list, waters used for
recreational activities are listed as “Use 2”. [End of slide 3.]
16. From this perspective, CARU on 11 February2000 approved the so-called “zoning
scheme” of the River Uruguay, that is, the identifica tion of the zones of the river destined for the
17 four uses classified as “predominant”. You will see this at tab 11 18. The Ñandubaysal beach resort
is shown as a zone identified for Use 2. [Slide 4. ] You can see on the screen a sketch prepared by
CARU in August2003, showing the Use1 and Use 2 zones very close to the site chosen by
1Art. 6, para. 1 (e), of the 1997Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (judges' folder, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 8).
1Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, ILA, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki,
1966, London, 1967 (judges' folder, 15 September 2009, tab 9).
1Caflisch, Lucius, “Règles générales du droit des cour s d’eau internationaux” [“General rules of law of
international watercourses”], Collected courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, 1989, Vol. 219, p. 159.
1Digest, Section E3, Title2, Chap.4, Arts.1 and 2; MA, Vol.II, Ann.12, pp.276-277; CMU, Vol.IV,
Ann. 60.
1Ann.4 to Report198 of the Water Quality and Pollutio n Prevention Subcommittee, CARU, Minutes02/00 of
11 February 2000, and Resolution 3/00 of 11 February 2000, available at <http://mrecic.gov.ar/publicdocuments/ - 7 -
19
Botnia . [End of slide 4.] [Slide 5.] And it was CARU in its “zoning scheme” that established the
criterion for priority uses from Use 1 to Use 3 20. [End of slide 5.]
17. It is worth noting that in CARU’s first note to the Uruguayan Government about the pulp
mills [slide 6], the Commission explicitly expressed its concern about the existing use for tourism
purposes of the area under consideration. Urugua y reproduced this memorandum in Annex19 of
its Rejoinder, but unfortunately, shall we say, “forgot” to include the paragraph you see on the
21
screen. You will find this note in your folders at tab 14 . The Uruguayan Government has never
replied to this memorandum from CARU. It has not communicated to CARU the slightest
information on the choice of site or on any assessment of alternative sites. [End of slide 6.]
E. Uruguay never took the necessary measures to determine the suitability
of the selected sites and stubbornly refused to discuss the matter with Argentina
18. Mr.President, I am going to speak plainly: neither Botnia nor Uruguay ever did a
serious site selection study for the plant — for the simple reason that Botnia knew all along that the
plant would be built just below the General San Martín International Bridge, and knew it even
before submitting its project proposal to DINAMA on 31 March 2004. Indeed, Botnia bought the
property near the General San Martín Bridge in 2003 2. On 22 September 2004, Botnia applied to
18 the Uruguayan Government requesting authorizatio n to establish a tax-free zone on the property
23
where the plant was to be built, as well as authorization to build a port facility . All that happened
five months before the Uruguayan Government’s decision to issue a building permit.
19. Another uncontested fact is that Uruguay has systematically ignored, indeed even
rejected, Argentina’s request for information re garding the reasons underlying the choice of site
and the question of whether the possibility of alternative sites had been examined 24.
19
Judges' folder, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 12.
2Point 3.1 (a) of the proposed zoning scheme of the river, CARU, Minutes02/00 of 11February2000, and
Reports made at the Environmental Alert Office of the Municipality of Gualeguaychú to the Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), Resol3u/t0io 0n Ffer00r0y, available at
<http://mrecic.gov.ar/publicdocuments/.
21
CARU, memorandum SET-1413-UR, 17 Oct. 2002. MA, para. 2.5, and Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 12, pp. 79-82. RU,
Anns., Vol. II, Ann. R19.
2Reply by Argentina (RA), para. 3.75, and Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 43, paras. 1.4.3-1.4.5.
2CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 21, p. 2.
2RU, paras. 5.91-5.93. - 8 -
20. We had to wait until September2006, when the IFC published the final cumulative
study, to learn that Botnia had allegedly compar ed various sites before deciding to locate the mill
near the General San Martín International Bridge . [Slide 7.] If we are to believe that study, four
sites were identified as potential sites, but the fourth (LaPaloma, the only site on the Atlantic
coast) was rejected without explanation 26. [End of slide 7.] The truth is that the impact study that
Botnia submitted to DINAMA — as presented by Ur uguay in its pleadings — refers in the vaguest
27
of terms, on a single page, to a claimed evaluation of alternative sites .
21. Not one document from DINAMA or the ministry responsible indicates that Uruguay did
any sort of comparative study of potential alterna tive sites. A significant point is the fact that
Uruguayan legislation was amended in Septem ber2005 by adding a requirement concerning
project site evaluation 28. This requirement did not exist in domestic law when Uruguay authorized
construction of the ENCE mail in October2003 and the Botnia mill in Febr uary2005. The facts
are plain to see: Uruguay simply did not do a s ite selection study or examine the possibility of
alternative sites when it issued permits for the mills to be built.
19 22. [Slide8.] The Hatfield report of April 2006 regarded the information received on the
choice of site as unsatisfactory 29. [End of slide8.] It was only in its Counter-Memorial of
30
July 2007 that Uruguay sought, for the first time, to explain its position .
23. Prior to that time, Uruguay’s refusal to discuss the matter was based on its contention
that the choice of site was Uruguay’s sovereign decision. The Agent of Argentina drew your
attention yesterday to the statements by the Foreign Minister, Mr.Opertti, and the head of
Uruguay’s delegation to CARU in that regard 31.
25
MA, Vol. V, Ann. 6, p. 333. CMU, Vol. VIII, Ann. 173. (Sketch, judges' folder, 15 September 2009, tab 15.)
26CMU, Vol. VIII, Ann. 173, pp. 2.10-2.11, para. 2.3.2.
27Botnia Environmental Impact Assessment submitted to DINAMA, Chap.3, 31March2004, CMU, Vol.X,
Ann. 218.
28Decree 349/005 of 21 Sep. 2005, Chap. V, Arts. 20 (b) and 22 (CMU, Vol. II, Ann. 24).
29
Hatfield Consultants, Cumulative Impact Study ⎯ Uruguay Pulp Mills , Apr.2006, para.A23, p.18, MA,
Vol. V, Ann. 9, p. 504.
30
CMU, para. 4.118.
31
MA, para. 2.26, and Anns., Vol.VII, Ann.4; “Opertti declares Uruguay does not n eed authorization to build
pulp mills”, Radio Sarandí, Uruguay, 28May2008, New Docu ments Submitted by Argentina, 30June2009, Vol.II,
Press Articles; MA, paras.2.27 and 4.21-4.22, and Anns., Vol.VII, Ann. 5; CR2009/12, pp.20-21, para.18
(Ruiz Cerutti). - 9 -
24. For my part, I should be a little more rigorous in my line of argument than Uruguay has
been, Mr.President: a State’s decision as to whet her or not to comply with its international
commitments is a sovereign decision of that State. Uruguay seems “sovereignly” to have
overlooked the requirements of the 1975 Statute.
25. Uruguay’s negotiators within the GTAN have gone even farther in refusing Argentina’s
request for information [slide 9]: “the reason the plant was located at a certain place is alien to the
Group [the GTAN] and is not one of its competences since, besides being a decision taken prior to
32
the present government, the location of the plants is a fact” . [End of slide 9.]
26. I certainly do not need to spend time on the indefensible argument under international
33
law that the choice of site was the decision of a previous government . I would also note that
Uruguay’s negative attitude in refusing to discuss the reasons underlying the choice of site has
from the outset been combined with Uruguay’ s clear intention to impose the mills as a
fait accompli.
20 27. In fact, the thesis put forward by Uruguay, invoking Uruguayan sovereignty as the sole
basis for the choice of site, provides a dazzling illustration of the “Harmon doctrine”, also known
as the “doctrine of absolute sovereignty over watercourses”, which no one would dare claim
34
today . If each party were to build projects or use the waters of the river without regard for its
neighbour’s shore opposite, and even if it claime d that the quality of the waters would not be
affected— which is not the case here— we wo uld be following a logic alien to the notion of
community of interests which this Court has embraced in characterizing the legal régime of
35
international watercourses .
32
MA, para.2.65, and Anns., Vol.IV, Ann.4: “la ra ison pour laquelle l’usine s’ est installée à un endroit
déterminé n'est pas du ressort du Groupe [le GTAN] et elle nfigure pas parmi ses compéten ces, puisque, outre le fait
qu'il s'agit d'une décision antérieure au présent gouvernement, la localisation des usines est déjà un fait”. (Judges' folder,
15 Sep. 2009, tab 16.) [Translation by the Registry.]
33Tinoco Arbitration, Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada claims (GreatBritain v. CostaRica) ,
18 October 1923, RIAA, Vol. 1, p. 377.
34
Jiménez de Aréchaga, Eduardo, “International Legal Rules Governing Use of Wa ters from International
Watercourses”, Inter-American Law Review, 1960, Vol. II, pp. 329-330; Caflisch, Lucius, “Règles générales du droit des
cours d’eau internationaux” [“General rulesof law of international watercourses”],Collected courses of The Hague
Academy of International Law, 1989, Vol. 219, pp. 48-50; McCaffrey, Stephen, The Law of International Watercourses.
Non-Navigational Uses, Oxford, OUP, 2001, p. 111.
35Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, Judgment No.16, 1929 ,
P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 23, p.27;Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment , I.C.J. Reports 1997,
p. 56, para. 85. - 10 -
F. The site chosen is not suitable
28. Professors Sands and Wheater began yest erday, and Professor Colombo will continue
tomorrow, to demonstrate that the site chosen is entirely inappropriate from the environmental
standpoint. For my part, I shall now address the fact that it is also an improper site from the
standpoint of existing tourism and recreational uses.
29. It is important to point out that both Botnia and ENCE claim to have taken account of the
need to bear in mind the existing use of tourist areas. [Slide10.] Indeed, Botnia rejected the
La Paloma site on Uruguay’s Atlantic coast precisel y for that reason! Uruguay even goes so far as
to say that Botnia ruled out other sites farthe r downstream because they were near recreational
36
areas ! The argument cited for ruling out Nueva Palmira was also its proximity to recreational and
historically significant areas situated on the Uruguayan shore 37.
30. The final cumulative impact study from EcoMetrix puts forward a whole series of
speculation as to the claimed absence of any impact from the Botnia mill on tourism. If the mill
21 had no impact on tourism, then why was the La Pa loma site rejected precisely on tourism grounds!
[End of slide10.] You will have seen that the company that owns the campground at the
Ñandubaysal beach resort brought a case against Botnia before the Argentine courts over the losses
incurred by its business as a result of the Botnia mill. In connection with that case, Argentina
transmitted letters of request to Uruguay, which Ur uguay refused to comply with citing reasons of
“security, public order and essential State intere sts”, in violation of its obligations under
38 39
international law . [Slide 11.] Press reports, of which you see an example on the screen , as well
as witness statements from campground staff, bus iness people and tourists in Ñandubaysal, are
40
eloquent testimony to the pulp mill’s impact on tourism . [End of slide 11.]
3CMU, para. 6.58. (Sketch, judges' folder, 15 September 2009, tab 15.)
37
CMU, Vol. VIII, Ann. 173, para. 2.3.2.
38
Uruguayan Ministry of Education and Culture, Note of 10Feb.2009, Uruguayan Ministry of Education and
Culture, Note of 10 Feb. 2009 (2), Presidency of Uruguay, Resolution 20/52, 9 Dec. 2008; Argentine Ministry of Foreign
Relations, International Trade and Worship, Note CGABI No.097/09, 29Apr.2009: New Documents Submitted by
Argentina, 30 June 2009, Vol. II, Refusal of Judicial Assistance under Binding Treaties.
39
“Mal olor y tensión por Botnia”, La Nación , 28 Jan. 2009,
<http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1094106> (judges’ folder, 15 September 2009, tab 17).
40
Affidavits from Lisandra Espósito, Carlos María Guidoni , María Gisela Odoná, Gisela Vanesa Rojas, Nicolás
Lorenzo Costa and Christián Ariel Ba rrere, 30Jan.2009, available at <h ttp://mrecic.gov.ar/publicdocuments/>;
affidavits from Hugo Baus, Christián Quir oz and others, 26Jan.2009, Ann.II to the Letter from the Assembly of
Gualeguaychú to the CAO ⎯ Notarial Proceedings on bad smells at Ñandubayzal, available at
<http://mrecic.gov.ar/publicdocuments/(judges’ folder, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 18). - 11 -
31. The presence of a giant pulp mill has brough t great upheaval to the lives of those living
in Gualeguaychú. The development of the town in recent years has centred on tourism, and
Gualeguaychú has chosen to follow a rigorous policy of protecting the environment by, for
41
example, setting up a model wastewater treatment system . Gentlemen, tourism and the pulp
industry cannot be reconciled. A carnival and na useating odours cannot be reconciled. Beaches,
boating and a polluted river cannot be reconciled. Algae and bath ing cannot be reconciled. And
the smoke from the Botnia mill, which drifts for kilometres, is not the b est way to conceal the
22 presence of this installation in an environment which was previously natural and pristine.
Unfortunately, the local population has been sufferi ng health problems attributable to air pollution
from the Botnia mill, and these have become a sad fact of life 4.
G. The arguments developed ex post facto to justify the choice of site are unfounded
32. Let us now look at what Uruguay refers to as the “five key factors” in the choice of the
Botnia site . The first four factors are purely economic , and there would be nothing to say about
them if these considerations were justified and were aligned not only with the company’s
commercial interests but also with the economic interest of the commun ities concerned on either
side of the river. Here are Uruguay’s five “factors”, then:
“(1) Accessibility: on a navigable river and ne ar a major [international] bridge over that
44
river”
To be sure, the river is navigable, but not only in the area of Fray Bentos/Ñandubaysal. And
there is a certain caustic humour in identifying access to the international bridge as a key criterion:
clearly, what that bridge does, in effect, is to give Botnia access to services on the Argentine side.
41
Gualeguaychú, “Wastewater treatment plant”, RA, Vol. II, Ann. 47.
4“Botnia issues apology for odours” ( El País, 22Nov.2007), RA, Vol.III, Ann. 52; “Botnia press release”
(17Aug.2007), RA, Vol.III, Ann.48; “District Attorney Enrique Viana: ‘Botnia is Inconsistent with Uruguay’s
Environmental Status’” ( Ipodagua, 20Apr.2009), New Documents Submitted by Argentina, 30June2009, Vol.II;
“Samples of the Thousands of Affidavits and Records of Patient Examination”, New Documents Submitted by Argentina,
30June2009, Vol.II; “Botnia: Fray Bentos Residents in Sad Resignation at Smells and Pollution”, New Documents
Submitted by Argentina, 30 June 2009, Vol. II; “Botnia: To sm ell, or not to smell, that is the question” (Press Release,
28 Jan. 2009), New Documents Submitted by Argentina, 30 June 2009, Vol. II; “Explosion in gas pipe at Botnia causes
alarm. Fray Bentos: Shock wave and smell reach capital of Río Negro” ( El País), New Documents Submitted by
Argentina, 30June2009, Vol.II; “Explosion at Botnia causes stink in Fray Bentos” (Clarín, 27 Feb, 2009), New
Documents Submitted by Argentina, 30 June 2009, Vol. II.
4RU, para. 5.90.
4“[L]’accessibilité: sur un fleuve navigable et proche d’un pont important [international] sur ce fleuve”
[translation by the Registry]. - 12 -
Botnia’s aim of taking advantage of the proximity of Gualeguaychú, and its quick and easy
connections to Buenos Aires, without taking account of environmental requirements or the
economic and social needs of local inhabitants, has inflamed passions.
45
“(2) Raw materials: proximity to existing plantations of eucalyptus”
This is a respectable argument, one might say, but these forests are plantations established by
Botnia itself or by its predecessors, with World Bank support, over a period dating back 20 years!
[Slide 12.] In addition, as you can see on the screen, FOSA, one of the Botnia group of companies,
23
46
owns plantations in various parts of Uruguay, not only near Fray Bentos . [End of slide 12.]
“(3) Manpower: ready availability of labour in Fray Bentos” 47
The vast majority of workers employed in Fray Bentos during the construction phase are no
longer working for Botnia, and most are now unemployed. Today, only 40inhabitants of Fray
Bentos are employed by the Finnish company. The economic and social situation has gone from
48
bad to worse . Here is what elected officials in the De partment of Río Negro, where Fray Bentos
is situated, have to say: [slide13] “After cons truction of the Botnia project was completed, we
49
wound up with the highest unemployment rate in the country” ; “Botnia has not been a cure-all
for us...lots of people said that this was a paradise being established here, but in the end that
turned out not to be the case. We have lots of unemployed people here, and we have to keep
50
fighting so that people can fish and prot ect themselves, because we’re in trouble” . The
45“[L]es matières premières : la proximité de plantations d’eucalyptus existantes” [translation by the Registry].
46Sketch, judges' folder, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 15.
47
“[L]a main d’Œuvre : la grande disponibilité du personnel à Fray Bentos” [translation by the Registry].
48
New Documents Submitted by Argentina, 30June 2009, Vol. II, Press Articles: “La planta de Botnia está que
explota”, El País, Montevideo, 28 Feb. 2009; “District Attorney Enri que Viana: ‘Botnia is Inconsistent with Uruguay’s
Environmental Status’”, 20Apr.2009; “A media máquina” [“Half speed ahead”], El País, Montevideo, 19Apr.2008,
available at <http://www.el pais.com.uy/Suple/QuePasa/08/04/19/quepasa_341882.asp>; “La pregunta del millón:
¿Cuántos fraybentinos trabajan en Botnia?”, Zona Oeste, Fray Bentos, 6 ay008, available at
<http://mrecic.gov.ar/publicdocuments/>; “Los empleos invisibles de Botnia en Río Negro: que al menos sirvan de
experiencia”, Guayubira press release, Montevideo, 28May2008, available at <http://www.guayubira.org.uy/> (judges’
folder, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 19).
49
Departmental Councillor Irma Lust, at a special session of the Río Negro Departmental Council, 21 Nov. 2008,
Minutes121, p.21, availabl e at <http://www.juntarionegro.gub.uy/Actas/Acta121.pdf> (judges’ folder, 15Sep.2009,
tab 20).
50
Departmental Councillor Marcos Gér ez, at a special session of the Río Negro Departmental Council,
27 July 2009, Minutes 143, p. 4, available at <http://www.juntar ionegro.gub.uy/Actas/Acta143.pdf (judges’ folder,
15 September 2009, tab 20). - 13 -
paramount consideration has not been sustainable development, but solely the interests of the
investor. [End of slide 13.] The statements of disappointment from the people of Fray Bentos are
there to underscore this point, as you can see al so in the articles from the Uruguayan press that you
will find at tab 19 in your folders. They also illust rate another recurring theme in Botnia’s policy:
24 lying as a means of action. Indeed, of the claimed 4023 jobs directly created by Botnia (in the mill,
in the plantations and in logistical support functions) 51, only 560 were counted by the company that
52
just bought the bulk of Botnia’s Uruguayan business .
“(4) Availability of water: it can be extracted and returned to the river without risk to
53
drinking water supply or pollution”
Our scientific experts will examine the issue of water pollution. For now, I would simply
point out that Botnia had to provide an alternativ e water supply intake for the town of Fray Bentos
in December 2007, upstream from the effluent discharge site 54.
55
“(5) Suitability: no likelihood of significant harm to the river environment or Argentina”
33. It is no accident that this factor comes last in Uruguay’s list. Later this week, we shall
come back to the damage caused to the river and th e areas affected by it, and the risks. Uruguay is
well aware that the presence of the Botnia mill is harmful to the existing uses of the river for
tourism, fishing and recreation, since it claims in its Rejoinder that it has taken measures “to
56
mitigate the impact of the Botnia plant on existing uses” . Even though it claims to have
“detailed” them fully in its Counter-Memorial 57, there is no specific information to be found in that
text.
51Information available at Botnia Fray Bentos, <http://www.botnia.com/es/default.asp?path=284,1530>.
52“UPM and Metsäliitto sign a letter of intent on ne w ownership structure of Botnia”, UPM, Helsinki,
1J5y009; available at <http://w3.upm-kymmene.com/upm/internet/cms/upmcms.nsf/%20$all/97f74953
29b69288c22575f500244019?OpenDocument&qm=menu,0,0,0 >. See also “Cayendo en la realidad. Botnia desmiente a
Botnia”, available at <http://www.guayubira.org.uy.celulosa/desmiente.html>.
53“[l]a disponibilité de l’eau : elle peut être extraite et rendue au fleuve sans risque pour la réserve d’eau potable
et sans danger de pollution” [translation by the Registry].
54RA, paras. 4.80 and 4.180; and Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 53.
55“[L]a viabilité: pas de probabilité de dommages signifi catifs à l’environnement du fleuve ou à l’Argentine”
[translation by the Registry].
56RU, para. 5.51: “pour atténuer l’impact de l’usine Botnia sur les utilisations actuelles [existantes]” [translation
by the Registry].
57
Ibid. - 14 -
34. Finally, I would add one “detail” which seems to have escaped Uruguay’s notice. As
you can see on the screen [slide 14], the point where, inter alia, some 13 tonnes of phosphorus and
25
68 tonnes of nitrogen are discharged every year is situated 237 metres from Argentina. That is less
than the distance from this room to the Javastraat. On a shared river . [End of slide 14.]
Conclusion
35. Mr.President, I shall now move on to my conclusions. The facts are simple. The
EcoMetrix report of September 2006 plainly stat es that “[e]nabling people [i.e., Botnia’s
employees] to live within the city instead of in the rural areas was an important consideration for
Botnia” 59. The focus was solely on maximum profita bility and investor convenience: these were
in fact the only real reasons why the site was c hosen, without concern for the vulnerability of the
ecosystem, existing uses or any other economic or so cial consideration in regard to the riparian
populations. And unfortunately, Uruguay caved in completely to the Finnish company’s demands.
36. Without even mentioning the many other possibilities that existed for siting a mill of this
size somewhere other than on the River Uruguay, a glance at a map of the river [slide 15] shows
that there are extensive areas on both sides of the river below Fray Bentos where there are no cities
or towns and no existing uses 60. [End of slide 15.]
37. The location of the mill therefore rema ins an open question. In your Order of
13 July 2006 6, you refer to the possibility of the mill’s be ing dismantled. In addition, the location
of the Botnia mill is listed as point A in the group of questions identified by the Parties as a basis
for the process of facilitation by the King of Spain 62.
26 38. Thank you, Mr.President, for your kind atte ntion. I would now I ask you to give the
floor to my colleague and friend, Mr.Alain Pe llet, who will begin the presentation of Uruguay’s
breaches of its procedural obligations.
58
Judges’ folder, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 12.
59
MA, Vol. V, Ann. 6, p. 344: “perme ttre aux gens [c’est-à-dire les fonctionnaires et les employés de Botnia] de
vivre en ville plutôt que dans des endroits ruraux a été un facteur important pour Botnia” [translation by the Registry].
60Judges' folder, 15 Sep. 2009, tab 12.
61Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) , Provisional Measures , Order of 13 July 2006,
I.C.J. Reports, p.133, para.78 (citinPassage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures,
Order of 29 July 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 19, para. 31).
62Declaration of Madrid, 20 Apr. 2007 (RA, Vol. II, Ann. 38). - 15 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Tha nk you, Professor Kohen. I now give the
floor to Professor Alain Pellet.
PELr.LET:
VII. THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF CARU AND THE C OURT
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Artic les7 to 12 of the 1975Statute of the River
Uruguay establish the procedure to be followed whenever a Party “plans to construct new channels,
substantially modify or alter existing ones or carry out any other works which are liable to affect
navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters” 6. In this procedure the
Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU) ⎯ which, by the way, has important
and varied responsibilities ⎯ and the Court each have a role to play. The former, CARU, is the
structure through which the Parties must “ordinarily ” consult and keep each other informed, while
the latter ⎯ pursuant to Article 12 ⎯ has the last word where the Parties have been unable to reach
agreement within the times specified in these pr ovisions. The respective roles are therefore both
different and complementary: while CARU, despite its limited powers to make determinations and
take decisions, is essentially a framework for consul tation between the Parties, the Court is vested
with final decision-making power. But, taken as a whole, this complex mechanism aims at a single
objective: to prevent one Party from imposing its views on the other, while ensuring that a
definitive solution can be achieved within a reasonable period of time.
2. And I shall put it in the simplest terms, Mr. President: first CARU, then the Court ⎯ last,
but obviously not least! ⎯ and not only for reasons of prestige, but also because it is you, Members
of the Court, who, even within the context of Article 12 of the 1975 Statute, have⎯ or should
have . . . ⎯ the final say, a power of which you have been deprived by Uruguay. Because, in
respect of the Court, there is a crucial difference⎯ which Uruguay stubbornly continues to
deny ⎯ between its role under Article 12 of the Statut e and its role under Article 60 of the Statute.
27
I shall return to this ⎯ but first, CARU.
63
Art. 7; see also Art. 27. - 16 -
I. CARU’s role
3. Uruguay endeavours, with evident great conviction, to pay tribute (lip service would
undoubtedly be more accurate...) to the “very important” role of CARU 64, carefully describing
65
CARU’s various functions pursuant to the Statute , only then to deny CARU the powers conferred
upon it in the ChapterII procedure, more specifica lly under Articles7 to11. Yet, it is those
powers, and they alone, which concern us here. Mr. President: by circumventing CARU, Uruguay
has breached its treaty commitments. I leave asid e for the moment the question of whether the
Parties agreed not to abide by them ⎯ a question which I already mentioned yesterday morning
and to which Mr. Alan Béraud and Professor Marcelo Kohen will return in greater detail. The only
problem for the time being is to ascertain what were ⎯ what are ⎯ the Parties’ obligations in this
respect.
[Slide No. 1: Article 7, first paragraph, of the Statute.]
66
4. As Uruguay quite rightly states, “the plain text of Article 7 speaks for itself” . The first
paragraph of Article 7 now appears on the screen; it is to be found ⎯ together with all of the other
articles bearing on the procedure to be followed ⎯ at tab 21 of the judges’ folder. Let us read this
provision ⎯ it is a crucial one: the entire procedure to be followed depends upon it:
“If one Party plans to construct new ch annels, substantially modify or alter
existing ones or carry out any other works wh ich are liable to affect navigation, the
régime of the river or the quality of its waters, it shall notify the Commission, which
28 shall determine on a preliminary basis and within a maximum period of 30days
whether the plan might cause significant damage to the other Party.”
5. In the case before us:
⎯ the two planned mills ⎯ Botnia and ENCE ⎯ were inarguably “works... liable to affect
navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters” ⎯ and Uruguay does not deny
this, by the way 67. These are very big industrial projects, in fact the biggest ever planned, or in
Botnia’s case built, along the river and notification to CARU was therefore obviously
mandatory: under Article 27 of the Statute, “[t]he right of each Party to use the waters of the
64See CMU, p. 135, para. 2.191; see also: p. 139, para. 2.199, p. 170, para. 3.33; RU, p. 35, para. 2.12.
65
See CMU, pp. 133-146, paras. 2.188-1.205, and RU, p. 34-35, paras. 2.10-2.11.
66RU, p. 40, para. 2.20.
67CR2006/49, p.10, para. 2 (Boyle); CM U, pp.74-75, para.2.76, p.80, para.2.87, p. 175, para. 3.41; RU,
p. 77, para 2.83. - 17 -
river, within its jurisdiction, for . . . industria l . . . purposes shall be exercised without prejudice
to the application of the procedure laid down in Ar ticles 7 to 12 when the use is liable to affect
the régime of the river or the quality of its waters” ⎯ that plainly was the case; (I apologize for
having forgotten to include the English version of Article 27; you will therefore only be able to
find it at tab 1 from yesterday morning);
68
⎯ nor does Uruguay deny that it failed to notif y CARU in accordance with this provision
(ample proof of this is moreover seen our opponents’ zeal in arguing that the Parties agreed to
69
waive this formal requirement ).
6. Now, Mr. President, in no way is notification optional: whenever a project (or, a fortiori,
two of them) falls (fall) within the scope of th e first paragraph, the Party planning the project(s)
MUST notify the Commission (“deberá comunicarlo”); this is a legal duty. Thus, Uruguay’s first
obligation ⎯ and first violated obligation: to notify CARU. Had that been done ⎯ it was not ⎯
but if it had been, what would have or should have taken place?
7. It would then have been for the Commission to “determine” ⎯ all I am doing is reading
29 Article 7, Mr. President ⎯ to determine “on a preliminary basis and within a maximum period of
30days whether the plan might cause significant damage to the other Party”. Obviously, the
Commission was unable to determine anything at a ll because it had not been notified. But, had it
been, what it would have had to make was indeed a decision, whether or not our Uruguayan friends
70
like it ⎯ no matter that such a determination is made “on a preliminary basis”: to determine
means to take a position and in the circumstanc es the rest of the procedure should have been
conditioned by that position.
[End of slide No. 1 ⎯ slide No. 2: Article 7, second and third paragraphs, of the Statute.]
8. What is more, the second paragraph of Article7 leaves no doubt: “If the Commission
finds this to be the case or if a decision cannot be reached in that re gard, the Party concerned shall
notify the other Party of the plan through the said Commission.” Uruguay waxes indignant:
“Reading Article 7 in context, it is clear that the isolated words Argentina relies on are not meant to
68RA, p. 155, para. 2.14. See also, e.g., CMU, p. 153, para. 3.7, or RU, p. 47, para. 2.34.
69
CMU, pp. 172-195, paras. 3.35-3.73; RU, pp. 43-46, paras. 2.27-2.33 and pp. 120-168, paras. 3.8-3.71.
70RU, p. 128, para. 3.23. See also CMU, p. 144, para. 2.205. - 18 -
confer on the Commission the power to authorize or reject projects.” 71 Undoubtedly,
Mr.President! But that is not at all what Arge ntina argues... The question is not whether the
Commission has the power to authorize or reject a project: it does not; BUT it is the body that
must be notified of any plan liable to cause significant damage to the other Party and that is
empowered to determine (i.e., to decide) quickly (and initially on a preliminary basis) whether such
is the case. There is no question but that CA RU is part of the process leading up to the
authorization ⎯ or not ⎯ of a plan submitted by one of the riparian States.
9. This, Mr. President, is an obligatory step which, as I said, determines the entire remainder
of the procedure. And it falls squarely within the general spirit of the 1975Statute, which makes
the Commission the linchpin, the key body for co-ord ination between the Parties in virtually all
areas covered by the Statute. In failing to carry out this crucial step, Uruguay put itself at odds in
respect of the entire remainder of the procedure. Despite Argentina’s efforts, Uruguay never made
30
any attempt “to put CARU back in the picture” by complying with the subsequent provisions of
ChapterII, which also assign the Commission a role that cannot be reduced to that of a mere
72
letterbox .
10. What must happen ⎯ what should have happened ⎯ next? If, as was inevitable, CARU
had determined that there was a risk of the type referred to in the first paragraph of Article6,
Uruguay, as it is obliged to do under the second paragr aph of that article, would have had to notify
Argentina of the two plans “ through . . . the Commission”, by complying with the requirements of
the third paragraph ⎯ it refrained from doing so and confined itself to furnishing uninformative
documents, largely bypassing CARU in the process. My colleagues will return to this.
[End of slide No. 2.]
11. And it is through the Commission that the Party planning to carry out the works ⎯
Uruguay here ⎯ must furnish the notified Party ⎯ Argentina ⎯ with the additional documentation
necessary to enable it to make a judgment within 180days. “This period”, according to the last
paragraph of Article 8, “may be extended at the discretion of the Commission if the complexity of
the plan so requires”. That, Mr. President, is another decision that CARU may take under
71
RU, p. 38, para. 2.17.
72
RA, p. 102, para. 1.109. See also CMU, p. 82, para. 2.90; RU, pp. 40-42, paras. 2.22-2.24. - 19 -
Article 8 ⎯ and clearly it can only take it if it has been notified and if the rules governing the
provision of the required documentation have been observed.
[Slide No. 3: Article 9 of the Statute.]
12. Pursuant to Article9, it is possible that matters might go no further: the notified Party
may, either expressly or tacitly, come to the c onclusion that the building of the works should not
cause significant damage to navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters; if so, the
works may be built or the planned work authorized. But please allow me a brief pause here,
Mr. President.
73
31 13. Against all reason (but doggedly ), Uruguay contends that the obligation to notify the
Commission under Article 7 may be performed at any point provided it is “timely”. I am not going
to revisit the fact that the language itself of Article7 cannot be reconciled with such a lax
interpretation74: a “plan” is plainly something not yet realized. Moreover, the wording of Article 9
confirms that the obligation to notify must be satisfied before authorization: “If the notified Party
raises no objections or does not respond with in the period established in article 8, the other Party
may carry out or authorize the work planned”. This means ⎯ and this is unquestionable ⎯ that it
is only at the Article 9 stage at the earliest th at the authorization to build may be given, and
therefore certainly not before the information re quired under Article7 has been given. In acting
otherwise, Uruguay attempted to present CARU with a fait accompli ⎯ rather, Uruguay presented
it with nothing because it did not notify it . . .
[End of slide No. 3.]
14. By the same token, there was of course no chance of arriving at the situation described in
Article 11 of the Statute, which also requires the notified Party to inform the other Party, within the
180-day period, of its conclusion that the execution of the planned work “might significantly
impair navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters”.
15. Mr. President, it was indeed the entire m achinery for co-operation under Articles 7 to 11
of the Statute of the River Uruguay which was disabled ⎯ all the CARU-related obligations laid
down in Chapter II which were breached:
73
CMU, pp. 62-71, paras. 2.52-2.70; RU, pp. 47-59, paras. 2.34-2.52.
74
MA, pp. 157-158, paras. 4.12; RA, pp. 82-85, paras. 1.89-1.94. - 20 -
⎯ CARU was neither notified of nor furnished information on Uruguay’s plans;
⎯ as a result, it was deprived of its power to dete rmine the risk the plans posed to the river and
areas affected by it, and to Argentina of course;
32 ⎯ subsequently, it was systematically bypassed by Uruguay, which did not fulfil its obligations,
acting “through the Commission”, to notify Argentina and to provide to it the documents
required by the Statute,
⎯ even though here also the Commission could have exercised the limited, but nevertheless real,
decision-making power it holds in regard to time-limits.
16. In a few moments my colleagues will descr ibe in greater detail the procedural breaches
ascribable to Uruguay. Before turning to the role of the Court in this procedural mechanism, I
would simply like to add a general comment: one might consider these violations to be rather
trivial all in all ⎯ and Uruguay does its utmost to try to make you think so, Members of the Court;
just one example, among others, of its attempts: “With respect to both ENCE and Botnia, Uruguay
notified, exchanged information and consulted with Argentina ove r an extended period of time.
Even if these steps did not precisely track the tidy, step-wise process set forth in Articles7 to12,
there can be no honest dispute that the “régim e complet d’obligations procedurales” Argentina
describes was nonetheless fulfilled in all meaningful respects. The law can require no more.” 75 Of
course. After all, why take umbrage that the Pa rty planning to build two enormous pulp mills did
not provide the information it was its duty to give to CARU and through it, if it did so otherwise?
This reasoning is wrong, first beca use the Party planning the mills did not otherwise provide this
information, as my distinguished colleagues and frie nds are going to show. And also because, in
bypassing the Commission, Uruguay eviscerates the 1975Statute in respect of a part of its very
core ⎯ a part by which Argentina lays great store: that being that the Statute is not merely a
bilateral treaty imposing synallagm atic obligations on the Parties; it establishes an institutional
framework for extensive ongoing co-operation of which CARU is the centrepiece and key element.
33
By failing to fulfil its obligations to CARU, Uruguay calls the entire Statute into question. As the
Court observed in paragraph 81 of its Order of 13 July 2006:
75
RU, p. 388, para. 7.9. - 21 -
“the establishment of CARU, a joint me chanism with regulatory, executive,
administrative, technical and conciliatory functions, entrusted with the proper
implementation of the rules contained in the 1975 Statute governing the management
of the shared river resource; ...the Statute requires the parties to provide CARU
with the necessary resources and information essential to its operations; ...the
procedural mechanism put in place under the 1975 Statute constitutes a very important
part of that treaty régime”. ( Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)
Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 133, para. 81).
Needless to say, I could not have put it any better.
II. The roles of the Court
17. Mr. President, the Court plays an important role in this procedural mechanism, which has
been designed to allow for the harmonious, balan ced use of the shared resource of the River
Uruguay. Article12 of the 1975Statute makes the Court the final “decision-maker” where the
Parties have failed to reach agreement within 18 0days following the notification referred to in
Article11. In addition, and in much more tr aditional fashion, the Court has jurisdiction under
Article60 to settle any dispute concerning the inte rpretation or application of the Statute which
cannot be settled by direct negotiations. That is the basis on which this case has come before it ⎯
precisely because Uruguay by its conduct prevente d the case from being referred to the Court
pursuant to Article 12.
[Slide No 4: Article 12 of the Statute.]
18. I return, Mr. President, to a favourite refrain of Uruguay ⎯ which would like us to say
that the notified Party holds a veto over the other Party’s plans which it (the notified Party) feels
34 are liable to cause significant damage to navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its
76
waters . Uruguay would like this because it would be an error which Uruguay hopes would
exonerate it from responsibility. But, and I am firm in reiterating this, we are saying nothing of the
sort. What we are saying ⎯ and what follows merely from observing the sequence of Articles7
to 12 of the Statute ⎯ is that, if the Parties are not in agreem ent either at the Article 9 stage or at
the Article 11 stage, neither Party may impose its views on the other ⎯ but without this meaning
that the process grinds to a halt or that the pl an must necessarily be aban doned. But in such a
situation it is neither for Argentina nor for Urugua y to decide: all they can do is, in accordance
with the clear provisions of Article 12, follow “the procedure indicated in Chapter XV”.
76
CMU, pp. 89-90, paras. 2.110; RU, p. 80, para. 2.87. - 22 -
[End of slide No. 4 ⎯ slide No. 5: Article 60 of the Statute.]
19. Chapter XV has only one article ⎯ Article 60 ⎯ providing for a unilateral referral to the
Court in the event of dispute concerning the interpre tation or application of the Statute. But it is
clear just from the face of the article that, while Article 12 does refer to this “procedure”, Article 60
forms a separate basis of jurisdiction concerni ng a specific subject: the question (on which, by
definition in this context, the two Parties have been unable to agree) of whether or not the plan is
harmful within the meaning of Articles7 et seq. And one element proving that this is indeed a
separate basis for the Court’s juri sdiction is that, in this case, the second paragraph of Article60,
which makes reference to Articles 58 and 59, plainly does not apply.
[End of slide No. 5 ⎯ slide No. 6: paragraph 3 of the Application.]
20. Under Article 12, the Court is called upon to authorize or refuse to authorize the carrying
out of a project planned by one of the Parties an d considered by the other to pose a threat to
navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters. That is not the case here:
⎯ Argentina has seised the Court on the basis of Ar ticle 60, not Article 12, as expressly stated in
paragraph 3 of the Application, now on the screen;
35 ⎯ As Uruguay completely disregarded the Chapter II procedure, no such procedure can be put to
an end by referral to the Court under Article 12: a procedure never begun cannot be ended . . .
⎯ Finally ⎯ and perhaps most importantly ⎯ it would be ludicrous for the Court now to confine
itself to determining whether a plan is potentia lly harmful for the purpose of either allowing or
forbidding its execution, meaning the construction or authorization to build (the only object of
Article12), whereas the authorizations were issued (unlawfully), on 9October2003 for the
ENCE mill and on 15 February 2005 for Botnia, the construction work on the latter was carried
out in haste from April2005 and the mill has been in service (when it sees fit to operate...)
since 9 November 2007.
21. But Uruguay persists and, in the rather obscure passage of the Rejoinder devoted to the
77
role of the Court , it tries to mislead us into believing that, notwithstanding the unambiguous terms
of the Application, the Court has been seised on th e basis of Article12. As evidence of this, the
77
RU, pp. 109-113, paras. 111-113. - 23 -
78
only evidence , it cites a diplomatic note of 14December2005 in which the Argentine Secretary
for Foreign Affairs concluded that, given the Parti es’ failure to reach agre ement, “as specified by
Article12 of the River Uruguay Statute, this paves the way for the procedure provided for in
ChapterXV of the said Statute” 79. The facts nevertheless remain, Mr.President, that the note of
14December2005 “corrects itself” and at the end cites Article60 of the Statute as the basis for
jurisdiction in the case then being contemplated for submission to the Court, and that Argentina did
not rely in its Application on Article12; it ⎯ properly ⎯ founded the Court’s jurisdiction on
Article 60 of the Statute.
[End of slide No. 6.]
22. Does this matter, Mr.President? Unsu rprisingly, Uruguay strives to minimize the
importance of this: “That is not to say that th e Court lacks the competence to render a decision
concerning the meaning of Articles7 to12, or wh ether either of the Parties has violated those
36 procedural provisions.” 80 So acknowledged . . . But three comments all the same:
⎯ first, in so recognizing, Uruguay (rightly) relies, expressly, on Article 60 of the Statute, not
Article 12;
⎯ secondly, Uruguay itself is no longer sure whether the Court does or does not need to rule on
the question of whether the ENCE plant was lia ble to cause, and whether the Botnia plant
causes and is liable to cause, “significant damage to the other Party” or “affect . . . the régime
81
of the river or the quality of its wate rs”, because sometimes it gives one answer and
sometimes the other 82; citations to the chapters in th e Rejoinder will be found in the written
verbatim record... Actually, Mr. President, th ere can be no doubt that the answer is in the
affirmative: of course, the Court needs to rule on this point! But, while the only effect of the
Court’s decision had it been rendered under Article 12 would have been to authorize or not the
building of the disputed mills, in the present case it is for the Court to find that Uruguay has
78See RU, p. 110, para. 2.134.
79MA, Ann. 27.
80
RU, p. 111, para. 2.136.
81RU, p. 109, para. 2.132.
82RU, p. 399, para. 7.24. - 24 -
incurred responsibility for all of its violations the 1975Statute, as I said yesterday, and to
draw the inferences from that; and it is in order to avert this that,
⎯ thirdly, Uruguay nevertheless returns again to Article12 later on in the same paragraph ⎯
namely, paragraph 2.136 of its Rejoinder:
“Yet, the fact that the case has come to the Court through Article 12 nonetheless
has important implications for the issue of remedies” since “if the Court finds that a
project will not cause significant harm, the situation should be no different than it
37 would have been if, as under Article9, the notified State had come to the conclusion
that the project did not threaten harm; i.e., the initiating State may proceed with its
project without any further procedural obligations.”3
23. Perhaps that would be true, Mr.President, if we were in the “Article12” phase of the
procedure described in Chapter II of the Statute. Bu t the point is that we are not! In attempting to
confront Argentina and the Court with a fait accompli, Uruguay has kept the procedure from
operating as it should and, even leaving aside the “substantive” violations of the Statute represented
by the construction and commissioning of the Botnia plant, Uruguay must answer for the complete
disregard of the Chapter II procedure, which in itself is a violation giving rise to its responsibility
and calling for appropriate reparation.
24. Members of the Court, I have now comp leted this “introduction to the procedural
violations committed by Uruguay”. I thank you for your attention and ask you, Mr.President, to
give the floor to the Mr.AlanBéraud, who will point out the many contradictions characterizing
Uruguay’s arguments.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Mr. Pellet; I now give the floor to
Mr. Béraud. Mr. Béraud, you have the floor.
VIII. U RUGUAY S MANY CONTRADICTIONS
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a real privilege and honour for me to appear
before the Court for the first time to defend the rights of Argentina, my country.
2. Throughout this case, Uruguay has given us c ontradictory versions of its attitude to the
1975 Statute. This tactic makes it difficult to determine what the argument is which Uruguay seeks
to invoke against Argentina.
83
RU, p. 111, para. 2.136. - 25 -
3. I would like to draw the Court’s attenti on to the various different arguments given by
Uruguay with respect to its position on Articles7 to 12 of the 1975Statute, as well as on its
desperate attempts to try and conceal the decisi on announced in 2003 by the Minister for Foreign
38 Affairs, Mr. Opertti, before his country’s senate : to proceed at all cost and without let up with the
construction of the pulp mills on the left bank of the River Uruguay without any concern for the
1975 Statute.
First version: Uruguay claims that it has fully complied with the obligations laid down by
Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute, in particul ar the obligation to notify CARU and Argentina
laid down by Article 7
[Slide 1.]
4. In the hearing concerning Argentina’s re quest for the indication of provisional measures,
Uruguay stated that “It is already apparent prima facie that Uruguay has complied with its
85
international obligations under the Statute.” Uruguay reiterated this in its Rejoinder (text at
tab22 in your folders): “It has fully satisfied the obligations incumbent on it under Articles 7-12
86
with respect to the Botnia plant, as well as the ENCE plant.”
5. In particular, Uruguay has stressed the fact that it allegedly notified CARU and Argentina
of the pulp mill projects “Both CARU and Argent ina were notified before construction began on
87
the plants, and far in advance of the time when any irreversible steps were taken.” Alas, this has
not been the case. Uruguay has never explained wh en or how it satisfied its obligations under
Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute. It has never notified CARU.
[End of Slide 1.]
39 Second version. Uruguay notified neither CARU nor Argentina but claims that it was able to
postpone the notification until the commissionin g of the plants, so has not breached the
1975 Statute
[Slide 2.]
8See infra, footnote 24.
85
CR2006/47, p. 43, para. 28 (Condorelli).
86
RU, para. 1.10.
8CMU, para. 1.32. - 26 -
6. This version highlights the fact that Ur uguay is systemically seeking to reinterpret as it
chooses the scope of the obligations laid down by Articles7 to 12 of the Statute in order to
minimize its violations. The key expression in its Rejoinder on this subject is “implementation of a
project”. For Uruguay, “the implementation of a project must be the initiation of activities that are
capable of harming to the river. In this case, that is not the construction of the ENCE and Botnia
plants . . . but only their operation”88. It adds (the text may also be found at tab 22 in your folders)
“Uruguay was not obligated to notify the Commission or await its ‘summary
determination’ under Article7 before issui ng initial environmental authorisations to
either ENCE or Botnia, or proceeding with the implementation of the Botnia project.
Thus, Uruguay did not violate Article 7.” 89
Uruguay seeks to empty the obligations laid dow n by Articles7 to 12 of the Statute of any
substance and real meaning by replacing them with the obligation to conduct post-operational
monitoring, as laid down in the Statute, to check for pollution 9. Uruguay is trying to shift its
position from the claim that it has notified CARU a nd Argentina about the Botnia project to the
contrary version: “we did not notify, but we have not breached the Statute”.
[End of Slide 2.]
Third version. According to Uruguay, it did not notify because the mere knowledge of the
mill projects by CARU and Argentina satisfied th e obligation to notify laid down by the
1975 Statute
[Slide 3.]
40 7. Uruguay seeks to reduce the obligation to notify to a simple informal exercise of
informing, as though the mere fact that CARU and Argentina knew of the projects sufficed for
Uruguay to have complied with the obligation laid down by the Article 7 of the Statute. Uruguay
states that (the text is at tab 22)
“Argentina was aware of the Botnia project beginning in or around
November2003, and by April2004 (10 mont hs before the AAP was issued) CARU
had taken cognizance of the project. In othe r words, . . . both Argentina and CARU
were well informed about the Botnia project.” 91
[End of slide 3. Slide 4.]
8RU, para. 2.121; original italics. See also CMU, para. 2.181.
89
RU, para. 3.5.
90
RU, para. 1.2.
9CMU, para. 3.62. - 27 -
8. For Uruguay, the mere knowledge of the exis tence of the mill projects planned by foreign
companies was supposed to suffice for CARU and Ar gentina, for both of them, to consider that
they had been notified, in accordance with Article 7 of the Statute. But it also denies what it has
said:
“It must also be pointed out that, as a matter of logic, the Article 7 notification
cannot occur at the earliest moments of pl anning because there will not be sufficient
information at that stage to enable CARU to render an opinion a92ut whether or not
the project will cause significant harm to the other State.”
Mere knowledge is therefore insufficient and, from the formal standpoint, let us remember that it is
the President of the Uruguayan delegation to CARU who denies this version before the Senate of
her own country: “according to Article 7, it is the State which must make the submission” 93. Mere
knowledge of the mills planned cannot take the pl ace of compliance with the obligations in the
Statute.
41 [End of slide 4. Slide 5.]
9. Uruguay goes even further. It states that this mere knowledge had a twofold effect: not
only did it replace the obligation to notify, it also sufficed for Argentina to have accepted “the
construction” of tw o mills in 2003/2004 ⎯ in the plural, as Uruguay is fond of repeating ⎯ :
“first, in 2003/2004, when the Parties’ Foreign Mi nisters agreed that the plants would be built” 94.
But in view of the information Uruguay had on 9October2003, the date the meeting of the
Presidents and Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Anchorena and the date the initial environmental
authorization ⎯ AAP ⎯ was issued for the ENCE plant, that country was not in a position to
authorize “construction”, not even in accordance with its own internal law. It is Uruguay which
states that “Uruguay granted Botnia its AAP on 14 February 2005. Botnia’s AAP was merely the
first stage in the permitting process and did not, itsel f, allow Botnia to engage in any construction,
95
or related activities” . Mere knowledge of this was also ma nifestly inadequate for Argentina to
give its assent to the “construction” of th e plants in full knowledge of the facts ⎯ which it did not
92CMU, para. 2.53.
93
See above, footnote 25, MA, Anns., Vol. VII, ann. 5, p. 88. See also, MA, p. 38, para. 2.27.
94
CMU, para. 3.85.
95RU, para. 4.10. - 28 -
possess ⎯ and for it to abandon its claims regarding the application of the Statute and the impact of
the mills on the River Uruguay and its ecosystem.
[End of slide 5.]
Fourth version. Uruguay claims that it has complied with its obligations under the Statute ⎯
in Articles 7-12 ⎯ unilaterally and outside the Statute
[Slide 6.]
10. According to Uruguay, as Professor Alain Pellet pointed out (you will find the text at
tab.22 in your folders) “With respect to both ENCE and Botnia, Uruguay notified, exchanged of
42 information and consulted with Argentina over an ex tended period of time. Even if these steps did
not precisely track the tidy, step-wise process set forth in articles 7-12” 96. Uruguay endeavours to
show that it allegedly set itself up as guardian and judge of the significant harm which the two
immense plants might cause to the river and its ecosystem.
[End of slide 6. Slide 7.]
But while Uruguay was not unaware that
“[i]n order to ensure that each Party’s right to make optimum use of the river is not
unfairly impaired by the other, the Statute creates a system of notification, information
sharing, consultation... when one Party is planning a project of sufficient scope to
affect the river and thus potentially harm it or the other State” 97,
it boasts that it acted purely unilaterally.
[End of slide 7. Slide 8.]
In fact, “Uruguay has authorized these plants, and approved the operation of the Botnia
plant, only because it is convinced that they po se no risk of harm to the Uruguay river or the
aquatic environment. And the evidence,... fully supports Uruguay’s decisions.” 98 It adds, with
respect to the Botnia plant and Argentina that: “[i]n the absence of any significant risk to
Argentina, when authorizing a site for the plant Uruguay is fully entitled to rely on its sovereign
43
99
right. . . ” . By itself, Uruguay also “decides” the risks and harm for Argentina.
[End of Slide 8. Slide 9.]
96RU, para. 7.9.
97CMU, para. 1.27.
98
RU, para. 2.131.
99CMU, para. 4.61. - 29 -
11. After unilaterally making these assessments, Uruguay seeks to have us believe that it was
under no obligation to inform Argentina and that it transmitted information, but outside the Statute.
It also considered that information adequate a nd even if it should prove inadequate, too bad for
Argentina! Uruguay confirms this: “But Argen tina cannot simultaneously argue both (i)that it
lacked sufficient information to assess the plants’ effects and (ii) that they will ‘manifestly’ cause
significant harm.” 100 Uruguay also seeks to spirit away any obligation to consult, as openly
101
admitted by Minister Opertti: “national constructi on work . . . there is no obligation to consult” .
Only to inform, but it is for Uruguay to decide, how and on what.
[End of slide 9.]
Fifth version. Uruguay did not notify or cons ult in accordance with the Statute because the
Parties had agreed to set aside the application of the Statute
[Slide 10.]
12. To dispense with the Statute, Uruguay do es what it can to try and reduce the case to an
agreement reached in 2003/2004 10. For Uruguay (see texts at tab 22):
“the question of exactly when notice is due to CARU under Article7 is largely
academic in the circumstances of this case. Whenever that notice might have been
due, the fact is that the Parties specifically agreed to dispense with that step here.
There is thus no need for the Court to resolve what is largely an abstract debate.” 103
44 So, Uruguay unambiguously admits that from now on it is not going to submit the projects to
CARU “the fact that Uruguay never subseque ntly submitted the projects to CARU for a
104
preliminary determination under Artic le 7 of the 1975 Statute . . .” . Even if there was no
notification, it does not matter.
[End of slide 10. Slide 11.]
13. Without the slightest embarrassment, Uruguay also maintains that, following that
claimed agreement, it is no longer obliged to c onsult Argentina in accordance with the Statute
100CMU, para. 3.106.
101See infra footnote 27.
102
See supra footnote 11.
103RU, para. 2.34.
104RU, para. 3.95. - 30 -
(tab6 in your folder) “Since Argentina had previous ly agreed that the plant would be built...
105
Uruguay was under no obligation to participate in additional consultations under the Statute.”
[End of slide 11. Slide 12.]
However, referring to the same stated approach , Uruguay blithely proclaims the precise opposite
before the Court:
“there is no serious argument that the ability of CARU or Argentina to review the
projects and have their concerns considered and addressed was impaired in any way
when the AAPs to ENCE and Botnia were issued in October 2003 and February 2005,
respectively... There was still more th an enough time for CARU to review the
project and for Argentina’s concerns to be addressed before the projects were carried
106
out.”
45 My colleague and friend Professor Kohen will come back to the real significance of the 2003/2004
arrangements later.
[End of slide 12.]
14. Mr. President, the circle of contradictor y versions is closed. Had Uruguay immediately
complied in full with its obligations under Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute, why would it have needed
to conclude an agreement with Argentina in orde r to circumvent CARU? Either it complied with
its obligations or it circumvented them. Uruguay cannot rely on both at the same time. If Uruguay
had not breached the obligations laid down by Articl es 7 to 12 of the Statute, it would have had no
need to come up with other versions. It had to modify its versions of the case for the purposes of
the present proceedings, as though one could choose the most “fitting” version regardless of the
reality. But no, Mr. President, Members of the Court, the reality cannot be ignored. I now come to
the question of the decision taken by Uruguay, but perhaps it is a suitable moment for the coffee
break, or shall I continue?
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: No, Mr. Béraud, you may continue. I think you
still have 15 minutes at the most; it would be best if you finished your presentation, after which the
Court will take the break.
Mr. BERAUD: Thank you, Mr. President, I will continue then.
105
CMU, para. 3.71.
10CMU, para. 3.13. - 31 -
The reality is the decision taken by Uruguay not to comply with the obligations laid down by
the 1975 Statute
15. Uruguay’s successive, contradictory versions have only one purpose: to seek to conceal
the decision expressed by the then Minister for Fore ign Affairs, Mr.Opertti, before his country’s
Senate on 26November 2003 (you will find this quotation on the screen and at tab23 in your
folders):
[Slide 13.]
“it is natural that the Government of Uruguay is not required to place that issue within
the Commission’s jurisdiction that would involve waiving jurisdiction which the
46 107
Government of the Republic is not disposed to waive: it is as simple as that” .
Mr. Opertti is clear: for Uruguay the question of the pulp mills fell solely within Uruguayan
sovereignty and would not be submitted to CARU or to the Statute.
[End of slide 13. Slide 14.]
16. The President of the Uruguay delegation to CARU, MsMarthaPetrocelli, confirmed
before the Environment Committee of her country’s senate, two years later, on 12 December 2005,
her country’s desire to deliberately evade s ubmitting the mill projects to CARU. (You will find
this statement at tab24.) Indeed, the President of the senate committee noted Uruguay’s “ruse”:
“One of the arguments put forward is that if c onsultations had taken place, the answer would have
been no.” And lastly, he asks Ms Petrocelli:
⎯ “What would have happened if the answer had been no?”
108
⎯ Ms Petrocelli: “The works would not have been carried out.”
This is stating the obvious. Since then, Urugua y has unhesitatingly and unwaveringly acted in
accordance with this strategy.
[End of slide 14. Slide 15.]
17. This decision to place the construction of the pulp mills on the River Uruguay outside the
ambit of CARU and the 1975Statute was confirme d by the President of Uruguay, in May2006
(you will find the text at tab 25):
10Senate of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Foregn Affairs Committee, meeting of 26November2003.
Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.DidOpertti, MA, Anns., Vol.VII, Ann.4, p.74 and RA, p.69,
para. 1.73. See also MA, p. 37, para. 2.26 and RA, p. 148, para. 2.4.
10Senate of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Environm ent Committee, meeting of 12 Dec. 2005, statement by
the Uruguayan delegates to CARU, MA, Anns., Vol. VII, Ann. 5, p. 89. See also MA, p. 39, para. 2.27. - 32 -
“The Estatuto further establishes a proce dure... to ensure that each party is
47
informed by the other party about the works it intends to carry out and that each party
has the opportunity to make observations. Uruguay met this obligation … however it
did not do so by means of the procedure established in the Estatuto.” 109
[End of slide 15. Slide 16.]
18. In March2008, Mr.Opertti again confir med that Uruguay had never intended to hold
consultations with Argentina under the pretext th at there was no obligation to do so, these being
national projects carried out in national territory (tab 26):
“According to Opertti, all this time, information has been misconstrued as
consultation . . . Opertti emphasized that, insofar they [the celullose plants] are
Uruguayan national constructio110orks, carried out within Uruguayan territory, there
is no obligation to consult.”
[End of slide 16. Slide 17.]
19. Mr. Luis Hierro, Vice-President of Uruguay when this decision was taken in 2003, stated
on 2June2009 that Mr.Vázquez, President of Uruguay, had not kept his word to the Argentine
President that the pulp mill would not be built (see tab 27):
“Mr. Hierro maintained that President Vázquez did not keep his word to former
Argentine President Néstor Kirchner, sin ce he had promised not to build cellulose
plants. He said so all throughout 2004... Anyway, he subsequently changed his
111
mind and that turned Argentina against Uruguay.”
48 [End of slide 17.]
20. Minister Opertti’s words do actually reflect Uruguay’s position ⎯ the other statements
confirm them ⎯ since the case has developed in accordance w ith this decision from the outset: no
statute, no notification, no consultations, evading any negative reply to CARU and, on Argentina’s
part, following a wholly and exclusively Uruguayan decision-making process, conforming solely to
its own sovereignty and setting aside the obligations of international law, even if the River Uruguay
is a watercourse shared with Argentina and even if this river is governed by a special régime under
international law ⎯ the 1975 Statute. Uruguay knew perfectly well that its pharaonic projects were
“liable” to affect the river and the areas affect ed by it and to cause significant harm to Argentina
109
Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Presidency, Uruguay gave information on construction of pulp mills,
29 May 2006, MA, Anns., Vol. VI, Ann. 13, p. 79. See also RA, para. 2.3.
11Radio Sarandi, Interview given by Former Uruguayan Forei gn Affairs Minister Didier Opertti: “Opertti stated
that Uruguay needs no permission to establish cellulose plants”, 28 Mar. 2008. New Documents submitted by Argentina,
Vol. II Other Documents, Press Articles. Uruguayan Officials’ Acknowledgements.
11Espectador.com, “Hierro criticized Uruguay’s Foreign Policy” (2 June 2009). New Documents submitted by
Argentina, Vol. II Other Documents, Press Articles. Uruguayan Officials’ Acknowledgements. - 33 -
and to the ecosystem. But Uruguay preferred to ta ke risks and bear all the consequences of them.
This country preferred to ensure the foreign in vestment in the Botnia plant on the precise site
chosen by the latter, spurning the rights and interest s of the riverine populations concerned, even if
they are the principal beneficiaries of the régime of protection and preservation of the river, placed
by the Statute under the responsibility of the two riparian States and CARU.
[Slide 18.]
21. Uruguay’s effort ⎯ utterly vain in fact ⎯ to try and avoid, before the Court, the
inescapable reality of its decisions must be saluted if it is accepted that “the Botnia plant necessary
falls within the notification and information-shar ing obligations laid down by the 1975Statute”
(tab 28):
“In his 26November2003 remarks, Minister Opertti articulated his view that
the ENCE plant did not fall within the competencies of CARU . . . As Uruguay stated
on the record at the oral hearings on Argentina’s provisional measures request, the
ENCE plant (and the Botnia plant) do fall within the notification and
49
information-sharing obligations of the 1975 statute. This is not in dispute in these
proceedings.” 112
This admission speaks for itself.
[End of slide 18.]
Conclusion
22. First, Uruguay decided from 2003 onwards that th e pulp mills planned on the left bank
of the River Uruguay would be built without referen ce to the machinery in the Statute of the River
Uruguay. Mr. Opertti, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said as much in his country’s Senate: “it is as
simple as that”. The President of the Uruguaya n delegation to CARU, Ms Petrocelli, gave the
reason for this: “the works would not have been carried out”. This decision of 2003 fixed
ne varietur the single, unwavering line of conduct followed since then by Uruguay.
Second, once the Argentine Application had been s ubmitted to the Court, Uruguay sought to
conceal this decision by stating ⎯ solely for the purposes of this case ⎯ that the ENCE and Botnia
plants on the River Uruguay “do fall” within the scope of application of the Statute. Ex post and as
the proceedings developed, Uruguay concocted the various contradictory versions I have just
112
CMU, para. 3.41 ; original italics. - 34 -
described to you. First, it claimed that it had fully complied with the obligations laid down by
Articles7 to12 of the Statute, in particular w ith the obligation to notify CARU and Argentina of
the pulp mill projects. Then it admits that it did not make that notification. But it claims that that
does not constitute a breach of th e Statute because it could comply with that obligation later or
because mere knowledge of the projects would have been sufficient for CARU and Argentina to
consider themselves notified. Then it claims that it complied with its statutory obligations, but this
time outside the Statute. Lastly, it seeks to have us believe that the question of compliance with the
Statute does not have the slightest importance becau se it had agreed with Argentina not to use the
machinery of the Statute.
Third, all these versions are mutually exclusive. There is no question of choosing one of
50 them. The contradictory and indefensible arguments cannot obscure the fact that Uruguay’s actions
resoundingly confirm its decision not to submit the projects to construct the gigantic ENCE and
Botnia plants to CARU and not to comply with its obligations of information, notification,
consultation and prior agreement laid down by the Statute. Responsibility and its legal
consequences follow therefrom; and
Fourth, Uruguay’s attempts to minimize its breaches of the rules of the Statute and to reduce
the case solely to the obligation of post- operational monitoring of the Botnia plant ⎯ which,
moreover, it did not comply with ⎯ merely seek to divert the Court’s attention from the real issues
raised by this case.
23. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, for your attention. May I,
MPrr.esident, ask you to give the floor to my colleague, Professor
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, after the coffee break perhaps? Thank you.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Minister, for your oral argument.
The time has come for us to take our traditional coffee break, of 15 minutes this time. The meeting
is suspended.
The Court adjourned from 11.40 a.m. to 11.55 a.m. - 35 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: The hearing is resumed and I give the floor to
Professor Laurence Boisson de Chazournes. You have the floor, Professor.
Ms BOISSON de CHAZOURNES:
IX. U RUGUAY HAS BREACHED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO NOTIFY
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, you have just heard my colleague Alan Béraud
describe and enumerate to you the various strategies deployed by Uruguay in an attempt to justify
its breaches. The description of these various st rategies may perhaps have reminded you of dance
steps, perhaps even of a tango. But these strategic steps ⎯ or dance steps ⎯ tango steps, must not
obscure the fact that Uruguay has breached its oblig ations to notify as set out in Articles 7 and 8 of
the Statute.
51 2. Moreover, Uruguay is well aware of the c onsequences of failure to comply with these
obligations since it stated that: “The non-comp liance with the rules stated in those provisions
113
plainly gives rise to international responsibility.” It could not be put better and applies
absolutely to our case.
3. I will show:
(1) that Uruguay was under an obligation to inform CARU and to notify Argentina of the ENCE
and Botnia mill projects through CARU, which it did not do;
(2) that Uruguay was under an obligation to provide the Party notified with complete
documentation prior to of any authorization to construct, which it did not do;
(3) and that informal contacts can in no event serve as a substitute for informing CARU and
notifying Argentina of the projects through CARU;
(4) by failing to comply with its obligations to notify, Uruguay has breached the object and
purpose of the Statute.
113
DU, para. 2.72. - 36 -
(1) Uruguay should have informed CARU and no tified Argentina of the for the ENCE and
Botnia mill projects through CARU
4. Mr.President, the ENCE and Botnia pulp mills are projects “which are liable to affect
114
navigation, the régime of the river or the quality of its waters” . Argentina should therefore have
been notified of them through CARU under the terms of Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute. Moreover,
Uruguay itself does not deny that the two projects are works which “might affect” the quality of the
115
river’s water and fall within the scope of application of Articles 7 et seq. of the Statute .
5. Uruguay also accepts that the obligations to notify did apply since, during the 2006
52 hearings, a counsel stated that “Uruguay has discharged the obligations imposed upon it by
Articles 7 et seq. in good faith” 11.
6. The ENCE and Botnia projects should theref ore indeed have been submitted to CARU.
The quibbles of Uruguay’s then Minister for Fo reign Affairs, Mr.Opertti, some of whose
comments have already been referred to, before the Uruguayan Senate in 2003 to the effect that, as
the pulp mill projects were not bi-national and did no t entail joint use of a sh ared natural resource,
they should be submitted “exclusively to Uruguayan legislation” 117, are, if I may say so, completely
irrelevant to the Statute of the River Uruguay.
7. The application of the Statute of the Rive r Uruguay has absolutely nothing to do with the
national or bi-national character of an activ ity, to borrow Mr.Opertti’s terminology. The
application of the Statute relates to the object a nd purpose of the Statute, namely, the management
and protection of the River Uruguay and the areas aff ected by it. In this case, the planned mills
were situated on the left bank of the River Urugua y and used its waters. The river and the areas
affected by it were liable to suffer significant harm caused by the plants. Compliance with the
Statute was therefore at issue and still is.
8. To claim, as Mr. Opertti does, that the only competent body for deciding whether the pulp
mills posed a threat to the quality of the wate rs of the river was Uruguay’s Ministry of the
114
Art. 7, para. 1, of the Statute.
11CMU, para. 2.87.
11CR 2006/47, para.15 (Condorelli). See also CR 2006/49, p.10, para.2 (Boyle) and p.20, para.11
(Condorelli). See also CMU, para. 3.4; DU, para. 1.10.
11Minutes, statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.Didier Opertti, to the Uruguayan Senate
(November 2003), MA, Anns., Vol. VII, Ann. 4, p. 71, tab 3. - 37 -
118
Environment is equally incorrect . This interpretation, in flag rant breach of the 1975 Statute,
seeks to circumvent the rules laid down by Articles7 and 8 of the Statute. This desire to
circumvent the rules of the Statute is even more clearly apparent in another remark by the same
Mr.Opertti, when he said: “Recognizing that th e Commission has specific competence at this
stage in the procedure would amount to acknowledging the presumption that Articles7 and 8
119
apply.”
53 9. Here is the admission. Articles7 and 8 of the 1975 Statute were to be set aside if the
ENCE and Botnia plants were to be built. Moreover, the same Mr.Opertti, confirmed his
120
comments in an interview given in May 2008 .
10. The comments by Ms Petrocelli, which have also already been referred to, and who is the
former President of Uruguay’s delegation to CARU , are similar in tone. Before the Environment
Committee of the Uruguayan Senate, MsPetrocelli acknowledged that the pulp mill projects had
been neither communicated to CARU nor notified to Argentina 121.
11. Members of the Court, the obligation to inform CARU and notify Argentina of the
ENCE and Botnia projects should have been complied with. This obligation stems from both
Articles 7 and 27 of the Statute. Article 7 applies to “works which are liable to affect navigation,
the régime of the river or the quality of its waters ” and Article 27 concerns the uses of the water of
the River Uruguay. According to Article 27, a Part y envisaging the use of the waters for industrial
purposes “when the use is liable to affect the régi me of the river or the quality of its waters” ⎯ I
122
would point out that Botnia extracts no less than 60million cubic metres of water per year ⎯
must inform CARU and notify the affected Party of such use. Uruguay has not done so.
118Ibid., tab 3 of the judges’folders.
119RA, para. 1.73.
120
Radio Sarandi, Interview given by former Uruguayan Mini ster Didier Opertti: “Opertti stated that Uruguay
needs to permission to establish cellulose plants” (28May 2008). New documents submitted by Argentina,
30 June 2009, Vol. II.
121Minutes, speech by the President of the Uruguayan de legation to CARU, MsMarthapetrocelli, to the
Uruguayn Senate (12 September 2005), MA, Anns., Vol. VII, Ann. 5, p. 7, tab. 4.
122
Resolution by the Uruguayan Minister for Transportand Public Works (12September2006), MA, Anns.,
Vol. VII, Ann. 16, p. 381. - 38 -
12. Uruguay cannot allege that Article27 of the Statute grants it a claimed right to “the
discharge of potentially harmful substances” 123 into the River Uruguay, a natural resource, I would
point out, shared by Argentina and Uruguay. The ENCE and Botnia projects entailed sufficiently
large uses “liable to affect the régime of the ri ver and the quality of its wa ters” and thus prompted
the application of Article27 as well as ChapterII of the Statute. There was no provision in the
Statute permitting Uruguay to exonerate itself from the application of the obligations to inform
54
124
CARU and notify the Party affected . There was no provision in the Statute which gave Uruguay
a licence to pollute or a right to pollute the Ri ver Uruguay. It should have complied with these
obligations.
13. Uruguay has also sought to evade its obligations by claiming that Argentina did not
require compliance with the obligations to notif y laid down by the 1975 Statute as regards the
125
ENCE and Botnia projects . This is obviously wrong. The authorization issued to ENCE on
9 October 2003 was given despite the fact that CA RU had already requested information about the
126
project on 17October2002 and 21April2003 . The information transmitted by DINAMA to
CARU on 14May2003 only contained information already known to the public at large, which
certainly did not meet the requirements of Article 7 and 8 of this Statute 127.
14. At the extraordinary meeting of CARU on 17October2003, scarcely eight days after
Uruguay had given ENCE authorization, the Ar gentine delegation to CARU also called for
compliance with Article7 of the Statute. The President of CARU, the Argentine Ambassador,
GarcíaMoritán, made the following declaration ⎯ the text may be consulted in your folders at
tab 24: “The Argentine delegation had been surprised precisely because all the previous statements
up to then had underlined the fact that, before a decision was taken, the question would be referred
to CARU for consideration. The delegation did not see how this resolution by [the Ministry of
Environmental Affairs of Uruguay] . . ., authorizing the construction of the pulp mill at M’Bopicuá,
12CMU, para. 4.10.
124
MA, para. 4.64.
125
RU, paras. 38.85-3.90.
12Notes SET-10413-UR of 17 October 2002 and SET-10617-UR of 21 April 2003, MA, Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 12,
p. 81 and Ann. 16, p. 99.
12Note SET-10706-UR of 15 August 2003, MA, Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 18, p. 109. - 39 -
128
could be in accordance with the provisions of Article7 of the Statute of the River Uruguay.”
55 The statement by AmbassadorGarcíaMoritán conf irms that the authorization to construct the
ENCE plant was granted without CARU being info rmed and without Argentina being given prior
notification of this project through CARU.
15. The reply by the President of the Uruguayan delegation to CARU at the same
extraordinary meeting in October 2003 also says a lot about the circumvention of the rules of the
Statute of the River Uruguay. The President of the Uruguayan delegation to CARU admits not
being “in a position to put forward or express any other kind of views” 129. He also says: “This
130
plan had not arrived here yet” . Members of the Court, there is really nothing to add: Uruguay
has displayed admirable consistency in seeking to exonerate itself from the obligations arising from
Article 7 of the Statute.
16. In 2005, a similar situation to the one I have just described arose relating to the
authorization issued on 14February2005 by the Uruguayan Ministry of the Environment for the
Botnia pulp mill project. Argentina, which had l earned of this authorization through the media,
sought, through its delegation to CARU, to bri ng the matter before the Commission to achieve
compliance with the obligations stemming from Chapter II of the Statute.
17. At the meeting of CARU on 11March 2005, the Vice-President of the Argentine
delegation to CARU, Mr.Rodríguez, made the st atement which you will find in your folder at
tab 25: “[the] delegation had learned unofficia lly through the media . . . that Uruguay had granted
initial environmental authorization to the Finnish company Botnia for the construction of a pulp
mill in the vicinity of Fray Bentos” 131and that “there were precedents in this respect” 132. As in the
56 case of the ENCE plant, the Uruguayan delegation to CARU said that it did not have any
information on the Botnia mill project. On a proposal from the Uruguayan delegation, CARU
submitted a further request for information to DI NAMA, the Uruguayan institution responsible for
12CARU, Minutes 11/03, 17 October 2003, MA, Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 5, p. 36, tab 24 in the judges’ folders.
12Ibid., p. 39, tab 24 in the judges’ folder.
130
Ibid., tab 24 in the judges’ folder.
131
CARU, Minutes 3/05, 11 March 2005. MA, Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 31, p. 257, tab 25 in the judges’ folder.
13Ibid., tab 25 of the judges’ folder. - 40 -
protection of the environment ⎯ this time in relation to the Botnia project ⎯ a request which
elicited no response from Uruguay 133.
18. Subsequently, Uruguay behaved in an unlaw ful way similar to what it had done in the
case of the ENCE and Botnia mills, authorizing th e construction of the Botnia port terminal on
5July2005 without first informing CARU or notifying Argentina of this project 134. Again,
Argentina learned of this project through the Uruguayan media. Whereupon, Argentina again
formally called upon Uruguay to comply with its obligations under Article 7 of the 1975 Statute, by
a Note dated 27June2005, in other words, be fore Uruguay had given authorization for the port
135
terminal . Once this authorization had been granted by Uruguay, the Argentine request was twice
made again formally in CARU, this request by Ar gentina even being coupled with the request for
the suspension of the works until CARU had made a decision on the project 136. Nothing happened.
19. Pursuing its systematic policy of unilateral authorization, Uruguay on
12September2006 authorized Botnia to extract a nd use the waters of the river for industrial
137
purposes for the production of pulp . On 16November2007, Uruguay further authorized the
138
commissioning of the Ontur port terminal at Nueva Palmira . Members of the Court, these
authorizations for facilities associated with the Botnia plant were all given in breach of the
procedure of Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute.
20. Showing great imagination, Uruguay uses yet another diversion by claiming that the
practice of Argentina and Uruguay with respect to Article7 of the 1975Statute showed that the
139
57 authorizations had been notified to CARU “after the fact” . This does not conform either to the
requirements of the 1975 Statute or the practice of the two States.
133
Ibid., pp 257-258, tab 25 in the judges’ folder.
134
Resolution TO 39/2005 by the Uruguayan Ministry of Tr ansport and Public Works (5 July 2005), MA, Anns.,
Vol. VII, Ann. 6, p. 101.
135
Note MREU 165/05 from the Argentine Embassy of Uruguay to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay of
27 June 2005, MA, Anns., Vol. II, Ann. 7, p. 145.
136
CARU, Minutes 08/05 and 09/05, MA, Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 34, pp. 302-303 and Ann. 35, pp. 315-316.
13Resolution by the Ministry of Transport and Public Works of 12September2006, MA, Anns., Vol.VII,
Ann. 16.
13Note CARU-ROU 069/07 (16 Nov. 2007), RA, Anns., Vol. II, Ann. 34.
13RU, para. 2.42. - 41 -
21. The practice followed by the Parties is illuminating however. In 2001, CARU adopted a
decision concerning the M’Bopicuá port, which explicitly refers to Articles 7 et seq. of the Statute
stating that the two Parties undertook “to prepare the necessary documents on the project, in
140
accordance with the provisions of Article 7 et seq. of the Statute of the River Uruguay” . In 2004,
Uruguay submitted the project for the development of the Nueva Palmira port installations. CARU
141
approved it on 27 January 2006 in application of the requirements of the 1975 Statute . Argentina
was notified by Uruguay of these much smaller-s cale projects than the pulp mills through CARU,
even before any authorization had been given.
22. Recent practice relating to the Cartisur port terminal project confirms the scope and
meaning of the obligations laid down in Articl es7 and 8 of the 1975 Statute. At the CARU
meeting of 19December2008, the Uruguayan delegation communicated information on the
Cartisur project under Article 7 of the 1975 Statute 14. Subsequently, by a note of 22 January 2009,
143
Uruguay notified Argentina of this project through CARU . Then, by a note of 18 February 2009,
the Argentine delegation to CARU announced that, under Article8 of the 1975 Statute, it
considered that the information provided by Uruguay was incomplete 14. And again, through
CARU on 30April2009, Uruguay provided Argen tina with additional information on this
project 145. Mr.President, Members of the Court, an examination of the practice followed by the
States ⎯ the two States, Argentina and Uruguay ⎯ confirms the interpretation given by Argentina
of Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute. In no event is it possible to speak of any “modifying”, or even
58
“abrogative” practice, even were such practices to exis t in international law. It is a practice which
confirms compliance with the treaty and the interpretation of it given by Argentina.
23. In order to justify its breaches of the obligation to inform CARU of the ENCE and
Botnia plant projects, Uruguay also submitted a list of some 170 small-scale industrial projects,
140
CARU, Minutes 4/2001, 27 Apr. 2001, MA, Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 2, p. 13.
141
CARU, Minutes 1/2006, 27 Jan. 2006, RA, Anns., Vol. II, Ann. 12.
142CARU, Minutes 15/08, 19 Dec. 2008, new documents submitted by Argentina, 30 June 2009, Vol. II.
143Note CARU-ROU 002/09 of 22 Jan. 2009, Minute 02/ 09, 23 Jan. 2009, new documents submitted by
Argentina, 30 June 2009, Vol. II.
144Note CARU 57/09 of 18 Feb. 2009, Minute 3/09, 20 Fe b. 2009, new documents submitted by Argentina,
30 June 2009, Vol. II.
145Note CARU-ROU 059/09 of 7 May 2009, Minute 06/ 09, 22 May 2009, new documents submitted by
Argentina, 30 June 2009, Vol. II. - 42 -
which Argentina had allegedly authorized, wit hout communicating them to CARU or notifying
146
Uruguay of them via the Commission . Members of the Court, these projects were not large
enough to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters within the meaning of Article 27
of the Statute and did not constitute a use of the waters of the river liable to affect the régime of the
river or the quality of its waters within the m eaning of Article27 of the Statute. Moreover,
Uruguay has never claimed in CARU that these were violations of the 1975Statute. The ENCE
and the Botnia projects are in no way comparable with the projects listed by Uruguay in the above-
mentioned documents. The two mills which concern us are obviously projects covered by
Articles 7 and 27 of the Statute and should therefore be notified.
(2) Uruguay did not transmit complete docume ntation on the projects to Argentina through
CARU
24. The strategies deployed by Uruguay to circumvent compliance with its obligations do not
stop at what I have just described. Uruguay also uses a plethora of arguments to undermine the
scope of the obligation to notify CARU and in order to empty the decision-making power conferred
on it under the 1975 Statute of all meaning. Hence, after saying that “Uruguay... has fully
satisfied the obligations incumbent on it under Articl es 7 to 12 with respect to the Botnia plant, as
147
well as the ENCE plant” , Uruguay stated that “Uruguay was not obligated to notify the
59 commission or await its ‘summary determinati on’ under Article7 before issuing [initial
environmental authorizations] to either ENCE or Botnia, or proceeding with implementation of the
Botnia project” 14. Uruguay appears to forget its obligation under Article 7. The obligation under
Article7 is to supply Argentina with complete documentation through the Commission of the
River Uruguay prior to any authorization.
25. In point of fact, the Statute requires complete documentation to be given not only to
CARU but also to the Party notified through CARU. All the information envisaged in Article 7(3)
of the Statute is indispensable to enable the State notified to evaluate the possibility of harm to the
river and the areas affected by it. However, Mr . President, none of the information relating to the
146CMU, Vol. X, Ann. 224.
147
DU, para. 1.10.
148DU, para. 3.5. - 43 -
essential aspects of the ENCE and Botnia works w as ever notified to Argentina through CARU in
application of the 1975 Statute. None . . .
26. An environmental impact study (EIS) also indicates the necessary information supposed
to be transmitted. Of course, this presupposed that the EIS had been properly conducted, so as to
enable the assessment within the meaning of Article 7 of the 1975 Statute to be made. This is an
aspect I will come back to.
(3) Informal contacts can in no event serve as a substitute for informing CARU and notifying
Argentina of the projects through CARU
27. Uruguay also attempts to reinterpret the content of the obligations to notify by asserting
that “Argentina was aware of the Botnia project at least as early as November2003 when its
officials met with corporate representatives from Botnia, and CARU itself had taken cognizance of
the project as early as April 2004 when it first met representatives of the company” 149. Members of
the Court, this assertion has nothing to do with the obligation to notif y laid down by the
1975Statute. It is for the State planning a work on the River Uruguay to transmit the project
60 through CARU to the other Party and provide it with complete documentation as part of the
notification. The fact that a project is run by private companies does not absolve the competent
State from officially communicating the project to th e other State by means of the notification. In
no event can contact made by a private company replace the obligation to officially communicate
the complete documentation through CARU. Mr. González Lapeyre, who negotiated the Statute
for Uruguay and was Uruguay’s representative on CARU, did indeed emphasize this important
aspect of a formal communication between two States, noting that Article7 “is very clear” in
laying down “a procedure under which each country must communicate [any project of any size] to
the Commission” 150
28. The former president of the Urugua yan delegation to CARU, Ms Petrocelli,
acknowledged this fact in the clearest possible wa y in her statement to the Uruguayan Senate on
12December2005. MsPetrocelli said: “According to Article7, it is the State which must make
the submission . . . The party ⎯ diplomatically speaking ⎯ is the one which must make the
149
DU, para. 3.66.
150
CARU, minute 8/81, 13 Nov. 1981, para. 2.4, p. 450. MA, Anns., Vol. III, Ann. 7, p. 57 (italics added). - 44 -
submission and give notification that it is going to carry out a work ⎯ private or public ⎯ and
151
announce it in sufficient good time.” Contacts between Botnia and members of CARU cannot in
any event not be a substitute for Uruguay’s obligation to inform CARU and notify Argentina.
29. Members of the Court, the information on the ENCE and Botnia plant projects
transmitted by informal contacts and by the press cannot be taken into account for the purposes of
the application of Articles7 and 8 of the Statute. In the context of the case concerning Certain
Questions on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters , your Court pointed out that even if Djibouti
had come by certain information through the press and had learned of the relevant documents many
months later, that situation did not meet the requirements laid down by the 1986 Convention
152
between France and Djibouti . The same is true in this case.
61 4. By failing to comply with its obligations to notify, Uruguay has breached the object and
purpose of the Statute
30. Lastly, allow me to point out that Uruguay’s many strategies and quibbles aimed at
distorting the scope of Articles7 and 8 breach the object and purpose of the co-operation
machinery put in place by the Statute.
31. The purpose of the co-operation procedure described in detail by ProfessorPellet is to
prevent the possibility of significant harm arising to navigation, the régime of the river or the
quality of its waters. To this end, any project for a work liable to affect the latter (Art. 7), or which
presupposes use of the waters liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters
(Art. 27) must be notified to CARU and the other party in advance.
32. Not notifying anything or notifying a project after the authorization for construction has
been issued nullifies the raison d’être of the obligations laid down by the 1975 Statute. This means
that the State which is planning to construct a wo rk should itself determine the harm caused or the
harm liable to be caused by a project, before CARU has been able to make a determination, before
the procedure laid down is able to produce its ef fects as regards protecting the environment of the
River Uruguay and the areas affected by it.
151
Minute, statement by the president of the Uruguayandelegation to CARU, MsMartha Petrocelli, to the
Uruguayan Senate (12 September 2005), MA, Anns., Vol. VII, Ann. 5, p. 79.
15Case concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assi stance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France),
4 June 2008, paras. 150-151. - 45 -
33. If the Botnia project had been notifie d, as it was supposed to be, the serious
environmental problems caused by the plant woul d have been detected. The questions of the
particular geomorphology of the river and weak currents during the summer months, the serious
problems of the eutrophication of the river and air pollution, as well as the question of the use of
polluting substances nevertheless prohibited by th e international community could have been
153
identified .
Conclusion
34. Members of the Court, allow me, if you will, to point out by way of conclusion that the
obligations to notify incumbent upon Uruguay have been breached. Despite the announcement of
154
the relocation of the ENCE plant away from the region of the river and the areas affected by it ,
Uruguay, by authorizing the construction of the ENCE plant on 9October2003 breached the
1975 Statute and committed an internationally wro ngful act. The authorization given by Uruguay
for the construction of the Botnia plant in 2005 al so constitutes a further breach of the obligations
62
to notify laid down by the 1975 Statute.
35. The authorizations given for the facilities a ssociated with the Botnia plant also constitute
breaches of the requirements of Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute.
36. The commissioning of the Botnia plant clearly also constitute breaches of the Statute.
37. Members of the Court, thank you for your attention. Mr.President, may I ask you to
give the floor to my colleague, Professor Philippe Sands.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Th ank you for your statement, Madam. Je
donne maintenant la parole à M. Sands.
M. SANDS :
153
CR 2009/12, pp. 45-50, paras. 19-27 (Sands).
15RA, paras. 0.13 and 2.10. - 46 -
X. L’U RUGUAY A VIOLÉ SES OBLIGATIONS DE CONSULTATION
(ARTICLES 9-12 DU STATUT )
1. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, un ancien éminent président de la Cour
mentionnait, dans un écrit assez récent, l’importa nce croissante de ce qu’elle appelait «le droit
procédural de la coopération» et l’extraordin aire «entrelacs» qu’il forme avec les normes de
fond155. Cette observation reflétait une réalité importante : face aux difficultés croissantes des Etats
et parties à des accords internationaux à s’entendre su r la nature et la teneur d’obligations de fond,
il devient de plus en plus nécessaire aux parties concernées de s’appuyer sur les obligations
procédurales pour pouvoir exprimer officiellement leur point de vue sur les normes requises. Et au
cŒur même de ces obligations procédurales figure l’ obligation de consultation, qui est étroitement
liée à l’obligation de notification dont vient de vous parler mon amie le professeur Boisson de
Chazournes, et la complète.
2. L’obligation de consulter est à l’heur e actuelle l’un des pivots du système moderne
d’obligations internationales. Elle trouve son expression dans un grand nombre d’accords
internationaux, ainsi que dans d’autres instruments, tels que le principe 19 de la déclaration de Rio
63 sur l’environnement et le développement 156et l’article9 des articles de la Commission du droit
international sur la prévention des dommages tran sfrontières. L’importa nce de l’obligation de
consultation a été affirmée à plus ieurs reprises par la Cour da ns plusieurs grandes affaires ⎯ je
songe notamment aux affaires de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries, dans le cadre desquelles
la Cour a affirmé avec force l’existence d’une obl igation générale incombant aux Etats de «tenir
pleinement compte de leurs dro its réciproques» (affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries
(Royaume-Uni c. Islande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 31).
3. La logique sous-tendant l’obligation de consultation est claire : dans un monde toujours
plus complexe, la c onsultation constitue le moyen pour les Etats de communiquer entreeux,
partager leurs vues et affiner leurs positions, afin ⎯dans le meilleur des cas ⎯ de trouver une
manière de résoudre, à leur satisfaction mutuelle , les questions les opposant. Sans l’échange de
vues approfondi et de bonne foi que suppose toute consultation, sans ce moyen pour un Etat de
155
Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process (OUP, 1994), p. 136.
156Le principe19 prévoit que «[l]es Etats doivent prévenir suffisamment à l’avance les Etats susceptibles d’être
affectés et leur communiquer toutes informations pertinentes sur les activités qui peuvent avoir des effets transfrontières
sérieusement nocifs sur l’environnement et mener des consultations avec ces Etats rapidement et de bonne foi». - 47 -
prendre connaissance des préocc upations d’un autre, sans cette possibilité donnée à chacun de
modifier sa position pour prendre en co mpte les inquiétudes légitimes de l’autre ⎯ sans tout cela,
le dialogue international est voué à l’échec.
4. Et c’est pourquoi, dans leur sagesse, les auteurs du statut de 1975 ont placé l’obligation de
consultation au cŒur même de cet instrument ⎯ essentiellement à l’article 9, mais également dans
le cadre des articles 10 et 11. Les Parties ont e xhaustivement traité de ce s dispositions dans leurs
157
écritures ⎯ je ne répéterai donc pas tout ce qui a déjà été dit sur l’article 9. Ce qui est clair, c’est
que des divergences de vue considérables subsis tent entre les Parties quant aux obligations
imposées par l’article9 et les dispositions connexes ⎯et c’est ce sur quoi je vais me pencher à
présent. C’est à la Cour qu’il échet de donner une interprétation autorisée de ces articles, puis
d’appliquer ceux-ci aux faits. Nous l’invitons à conclure que les articles 9, 10 et 11 ⎯ et, ainsi que
MmeBoisson de Chazournes l’a dit, les articles7 et 8 ⎯ étaient applicables au projet Botnia;
qu’ils imposaient des obligations spécifiques que l’Uruguay n’a pas respectées ; et que l’Uruguay a
commis une grave erreur du point de vue juridique en procédant à la délivrance d’une autorisation
de construction, et à la mise en service de l’usine, sans avoir observé ces dispositions ⎯ autant de
raisons pour lesquelles les conséquences de ses actes engagent à présent sa responsabilité
internationale. Et, affirmons-nous ⎯ à la suite de Mme Boisson de Chazournes ⎯, si l’obligation
64 de consultation avait été honorée comme il se devait, les caractéristiques du fleuve auraient pu être
débrouillées, et comprises, et des leçons auraient pu en être tirées, et le type de situations dont je
vous ai montré hier des images évité.
5. M. Pellet a déjà résumé l’ensemble des dispositions pertinentes du statut. Mais je ne doute
pas que vous brûliez d’en savoir plus sur cet instrument. Vous pouvez donc voir projeté à nouveau,
sur vos écrans, le libellé de l’article9. Comme vous pouvez le constater, l’article9 (lu
conjointement avec l’article 8) laissait à l’Argentine ⎯ après la notification requise ⎯ un délai de
180jours, à compter du jour où elle aurait r eçu la documentation complète, pour répondre à
l’Uruguay. Or, l’Uruguay n’a pas informé l’Argen tine par l’intermédiaire de la CARU, il ne lui a
pas davantage transmis la documentation complète au moment où le processus de délivrance de
157
MA, par.3.62-3.70, 3.80-3.93, 3.94-3.100, 4.80-4.89; CMU, par.2.166-2.187 et 3.108-3.127; RA,
par. 1.132-1.155 et chap. 2, notamment par. 2.44-2.70 ; DU, par. 2.86-2.124. - 48 -
l’autorisation était en cours, et l’Argentine n’a t oujours pas, à ce jour, reçu cette documentation.
L’Uruguay ne nous a toujours pas fait savoir, par exemple, sur quelle base il avait conclu que le
fleuve s’écoulait constamment d’amont en aval et que l’inversion du courant était un phénomène
rare. Il ne nous a pas indiqué avec précision les quantités de polluants toxiques ⎯ dont certains ont
été mentionnés hier et dont nous parlerons plus en détail demain ⎯ qu’il était prévu d’employer, ni
les quantités effectivement utilisées. Sur tous ces points, l’Uruguay a refusé de coopérer.
6. Le délai de 180jours n’a jamais commen cé à courir. Si l’Uruguay avait fourni les
informations requises et si l’Argentine n’avait pas formulé d’objections ni omis de répondre, alors
⎯ et alors seulement ⎯ l’Uruguay aurait été fondé, en droit, à «construire ou autoriser la
construction de l’ouvrage projeté» . Le texte de l’article9 ne souffre aucune ambiguïté: si
l’Argentine avait reçu la documentation complè te et avait soulevé des objections, l’Uruguay
n’aurait pas pu «construire ou autoriser la constr uction de l’ouvrage projeté». Cette disposition ne
peut tout simplement se lire d’aucune autre manière. En ce sens, le droit de procéder aux travaux,
ou d’autoriser ceux-ci, peut être considéré comme subordonné à la communication préalable
d’informations que prévoit le statut. La formul e est claire: pas d’informations, pas de droit
d’engager les travaux. C’est aussi simple que cela, n’en déplaise à l’Uruguay, qui déploie des
efforts herculéens pour faire dire autre chose au lib ellé exprès de l’article9. Dès lors, l’Uruguay
n’ayant pas fourni les informations requises et, partant, ayant dénié à l’Argentine toute possibilité
de répondre conformément au statut, nous affirmon s que l’Uruguay n’avait nullement le droit de
procéder aux travaux. Si l’on suit la logique de l’Uruguay, il suffit à une partie, pour échapper à
ses obligations, de ne pas procéder à la notificati on, et là voilà alors, comme par magie, dispensée
de tous ses autres engagements. Pour dire les choses autrement, l’Uruguay revendique de fait le
droit de se prévaloir de ses propres manquements pour se soustraire à l’importante obligation de
consultation. La lecture que donne l’Uruguay de l’ar ticle 9 prive celui-ci de toute valeur pratique,
65 faisant du mécanisme établi par les articles9 à 11 une coquille vide, sans pertinence aucune. Je
suppose que la Cour est libre d’adopter cette inte rprétation, mais une telle interprétation, si ⎯ par
extraordinaire ⎯ elle était en effet adoptée, aurait pour conséquence de vider de leur sens toutes les
obligations internationales de consultation prévues dans tous les accords internationaux ⎯ et
chacun d’entre nous, dans cette salle, a bien con science du nombre d’accords qui traitent de cours - 49 -
d’eau internationaux communs et autres aspects pour lesquels l’obligation de consultation est, de
façon tout à fait justifiée, absolument cruciale. [Fin de la projection de l’article 9.]
7. [Article 10 à l’écran.] L’article10 traite des droits d’inspection, dans la situation telle
qu’elle aurait été si l’Argentine avait été notifiée et ne s’était pas opposée au projet. Dans ces
conditions, l’Argentine aurait été fondée à «inspect er les ouvrages en construction pour vérifier
s’ils sont conformes au projet présenté». Ce tte disposition n’a bien évidemment jamais été
appliquée, parce qu’il n’y a pas eu de notification ni de consultation. Selon l’interprétation de
l’Uruguay, l’absence de notification et de cons ultation signifie que la construction pouvait avoir
lieu et que l’Argentine n’aurait aucun droit à faire va loir en vertu de l’article10. La manière de
procéder de l’Uruguay a selon nous de très fâch euses conséquences: il ne peut être juste que
l’Argentine soit, par suite d’une absence de notification de l’Uruguay, dans une situation pire que si
l’Uruguay avait suivi la procédure prévue par le statut. Ce serait là ce que les tribunaux anglais
appellent une «conclusion perverse», parce que cela incite une par tie à éviter de se conformer au
texte en vigueur. [Fin de la projection de l’article 10.]
8. [Article 11 à l’écran.] Si les droits que confère le statut à l’Argentine avaient été respectés
et si celle-ci avait eu l’occasion de présenter une obj ection en application de l’article11, je peux
vous assurer qu’une telle objection aurait très ce rtainement été présentée, compte tenu de
l’insuffisance manifeste de l’évaluation environnementale faite par l’Uruguay et des informations
qui auraient été communiquées à l’Argentine, en par ticulier en ce qui concerne le débit du fleuve.
Les éléments qui vous ont été présentés ne la issent aucun doute: nous savons à présent que
l’Uruguay a mal compris le phénomène de l’inversion du courant, nous savons qu’il n’a pas tenu
compte des conditions éoliennes et nous savons à pr ésent, depuis que la procédure écrite est close,
qu’il rejette de grandes quantités de nutriments et d’autres polluants, bien que nous ignorions
lesquels au juste ⎯ tout cela dans un fleuve qui, de son propre aveu, est gravement menacé par une
détérioration de l’environnement. Dans ces c onditions, il est remarquable que Botnia ait tout
récemment confirmé sur son site internet que «les rejets de phos phore au cours des premiers mois
66 d’exploitation [de l’usine] sont supérieurs …à ceux des usines de Botnia en Finlande» 158.
158
Botnia, Monitoring results of mill’s efflent from start-up toApril 2009 , http://www.botnia.com/
en/default.asp?path=204;1490;2203;2229;2230. - 50 -
Assurément, comme l’a bien précisé hier M.Wheat er, aucune usine de Botnia en Finlande ne
rejette ne serait-ce qu’une fracti on des quantités massives de phosphore ⎯ quelque 13 tonnes ⎯
qui sont continuellement déversées dans le fleuve Uruguay. Il est important de relever le libellé de
l’article 11 ⎯les termes: «peut causer un préjudice sensible» sont utilisés, et non «causerait un
préjudice sensible». Ainsi, l’obligation et le droit d’objection qui lui correspond comportent un
élément de précaution intégré. Dans ces conditions , l’Argentine a le droit de notifier à l’autre
partie ses préoccupations, répét ons-le dans un délai de 180jours, par l’intermédiaire de la
commission. Et cette notification ne peut être d’ordre général, elle doit préciser la source de
préoccupation, ainsi que «les modifications [que la partie considérée] suggère d’apporter au projet
ou au programme d’opérations». C’aurait été pour les Parties l’occasion de dialoguer sur le fond,
par exemple sur les questions relatives au débit du fleuve. Bien sûr, cela n’a jamais pu avoir lieu.
Mais pendant cette période ⎯ et ensuite, le cas échéant ⎯ la construction et l’ exploitation ne sont
pas autorisées. L’autre interprétation, que défend l’Uruguay 159, est tout simplement incompatible
avec le droit conditionnel, défini à l’article9, de construire ou d’autori ser la construction de
l’ouvrage projeté, comme je viens de l’exposer. [Fin de la projection de l’article 11.]
9. Tel est le mécanisme prudent envisagé par les rédacteurs de ce statut particulier, et il a très
manifestement été violé par l’Uruguay, qui a procédé à la construction et à l’ exploitation du projet
au mépris des dispositions pertinentes. Les cons ultations requises en vertu de l’article9 et des
dispositions suivantes n’ont pas été engagées (et encore moins menées à bonne fin), en ce qui
concerne tant l’usine ENCE que l’usine Botnia, av ant que la construction de ces deux usines et la
mise en service de la seconde soient autorisées. L’Uruguay a émis un permis d’exploitation pour
l’usine Botnia le 8 novembre 2007 en violation flagrante de ces dispositions.
10. Il semble que les autorités uruguayennes avaient pris conscience des difficultés qui se
seraient présentées si elles avaient honoré leur ob ligation prévue par le statut d’engager des
consultations, comme l’ont ra ppelé nombre de mes collègues et nous pourrions parler du
15septembre comme du «jour Petrocelli». Mme Petrocelli était, pendant cette période, la
67 présidente de la délégation de l’Uruguay à la CA RU. Le 12décembre2005, elle a présenté des
159
CMU, par. 2.174-188 et 3.108-127 ; DU, par. 2.94-1.119. - 51 -
éléments à la commission de l’environnement du Sé nat uruguayen. Elle a clairement indiqué que
son gouvernement avait cherché délibérément à ne pas porter la question des usines de pâte à
papier devant la CARU afin de se soustraire au processus de consultation prévu par le statut.
[Planche IX-2 à l’écran ⎯ texte du dialogue.] Le président de la commission lui a posé la question
suivante :
«L’un des arguments évoqués est que s’il avait été consulté on lui aurait dit non.
C’est une astuce. Que serait-il arrivé si on lui avait dit non ?»
La réponse de Mme Petrocelli est édifiante :
«On n’aurait pas fait les ouvrages. Nous aurions dû saisir un tribunal
international [la Cour] pour connaître quel préjudice entraînait un refus
160
d’arbitrage.»
11. Ce sont là des mots assez révélateurs : «On n’aurait pas fait les ouvrages.» En tant que
présidente de la délégation de l’Uruguay à la CA RU, MmePetrocelli savait de quoi elle parlait.
Elle savait qu’il s’agissait d’une «astuce», et elle a confirmé deux points fondamentaux : 1) il n’y a
pas eu de consultations, et 2)s’il y en avait eu , et si l’Argentine avait émis des objections, la
question aurait dû être portée devant la Cour av ant qu’aucun ouvrage ne soit réalisé. L’Uruguay
n’a absolument rien à répondre à cela. Mme Petrocelli et son gouvernement avaient compris que la
tenue des consultations requise par le statut aura it empêché l’Uruguay de délivrer des autorisations
pour les deux usines et de permettre la poursuite de leur installation ou leur exploitation, face à une
opposition de l’Argentine. MmePetrocelli et s on gouvernement avaient compris que l’obligation
de consulter prévue par le statut n’est pas une simple formalité. C’est au contraire un élément
central du mécanisme créé par le statut pour sauvegarder les intérêts des deux parties lorsque l’une
d’elles estime qu’un projet suscite des préoccupations. La tenue de consultations est déterminante
pour atteindre l’objectif de l’utilisation rationne lle et optimale du fleuve, selon les termes de
l’articlepremier du statut. C’est pourquoi l’ Uruguay a délibérément pris l’initiative de se
soustraire aux dispositions du statut. [Fin de la projection de la planche IX-2.]
12. C’est également la raison pour laquelle M. DidierOpertti, alors ministre des affaires
étrangères de l’Uruguay, a indiqué à la co mmission des affaires étrangères du Sénat, en
160MA, par.2.27; Sénat de la Ré publique orientale de l’Uruguay, commi ssion de l’environnement, séance du
12 décembre 2005, déclaration du délégué uruguayen à la CARU, p.4 du texte epagnol original, annexes, vol.VII,
annexe 5. - 52 -
novembre 2003, que les projets d’usines ne seraient pas soumis à la CARU au motif qu’ils étaient
68 «exclusivement assujetti[s] à l’ordre juridique urugua yen» et ne constituaient pas un risque pour la
161
qualité des eaux du fleuve . Tout comme MmePetrocelli, M.Opertti savait que, si les
consultations prévues par le statut avaient lieu, et si l’Argentine soulevait des objections, la saisine
de la Cour était inévitable.
13. Face à cette réalité, l’Uruguay affirme à présent que cette manière de concevoir le
mécanisme de consultation prévu aux articles9 à 11 revient à enfermer celui-ci dans ce qu’il
162
appelle «un cadre rigide qui ne souffre aucune dérogation» . C’est tout simplement faux, et
l’article 12 prévoit des dispositions à cet effet, comme l’a reconnu Mme Petrocelli et comme l’a dit
M.Pellet. Les articles9 à11 reflètent l’appli cation spécifique d’un principe général de droit
international imposant à deux Etats de mener de bonne foi les consultations prévues par le statut.
Ces Etats ne sont pas, toutefois, tenus de parvenir à tel ou tel résultat et, s’ils ne parviennent pas à
un accord, c’est à la Cour qu’il revient en dernier ressort de trancher.
14. Permettez-moi à présent d’aborder brièvement certains points sur lesquels les Parties
s’entendent ou sont en désaccord.
15. Je commencerai par certains aspects assez simples sur lesquels ⎯ vous serez heureux de
l’apprendre ⎯ les Parties s’entendent. Premièrement, l’Uruguay admet à présent que
Mme Petrocelli et M. Opertti avaient tort, et que le chapitre II du statut, et notamment les articles 7
à12, s’applique bien à l’usine Botnia: au pa ragraphe2.87 du contre-mém oire, l’Uruguay affirme
sans ambages avoir «désormais indiqué de manière pa rfaitement claire que, pour lui, les articles 7
163
à12 du statut s’appliquent effectivement … [à l’]usine … Botnia» . Nous saluons donc ce
retournement et prions la Cour d’en prendre acte. Deuxièmement, l’Uruguay admet que ces
164
dispositions «imposent aux deux Parties l’oblig ation d’entrer en consultations directes» , et de le
faire de bonne foi 16. Troisièmement, l’Uruguay semble avoir également reconnu, à présent, que
161
MA, par. 2.26.
162
DU, par. 2.5.
163Voir, par exemple, CMU, par.2.87 et exposés prés entés lors des audiences consacrées à la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires ( CR2006/47, p.38-41 (Condorelli), CR2006/49, p.10, par.2 (Boyle) et p.20,
par. 11 (Condorelli)).
164CMU, par. 2.166.
165Ibid., par. 2.174-2.178. - 53 -
ces obligations n’avaient pas été honorées s’agissant des autorisations délivrées dans le cas des
deux usines 166.
16. L’Uruguay a donc, semble-t-il, renoncé à soutenir que ces dispositions n’étaient pas
applicables à l’usine Botnia. Au lieu de quoi il présente maintenant ⎯ et en cascade ⎯ une série
69
d’arguments ex post facto puisés nul ne sait trop où, et franchement toujours plus difficiles à suivre,
en vue de résoudre les réelles ⎯ réelles ⎯ difficultés auxquelles il se trouve à présent confronté en
ce qui concerne la question des consultations: premièrement, il soutient que ces dispositions ont
une portée et un effet plus limités que ceux que l’Argentine leur prête 167; deuxièmement, il avance
que, au fil du temps, les Parties en sont venues à cesser de se conformer strictement aux
prescriptions du statut; et, troisièmement, il fait valoir que les Parties ont été amenées à convenir
de traiter la question de l’usine ENCE ⎯ au moins (et peut-être également de l’autre usine) ⎯ en
dehors du cadre consultatif prévu, celui de la CARU 168. L’Uruguay a tout bonnement tort sur
chacun de ces trois points. Je me pencherai maintena nt sur le premier et le deuxième d’entre eux.
M.Kohen examinera demain le troisième ⎯l’argument fallacieux selon lequel le processus du
GTAN en serait venu à se substituer à l’obligation de consultation et à la participation de la CARU
prescrites par le statut.
1) La portée et l’effet des articles 9 à 11
17. J’examinerai pour commencer la portée et l’effet des articles 9 à 11. L’Uruguay convient
que les consultations permettent à l’Etat ayant reçu notification d’apprécier l’effet probable du
projet et que de telles négociations doivent être menées de bonne foi; le désaccord porte sur la
question de savoir si l’Etat qui est à l’origine du projet peut le poursuivre durant les processus de
consultation et de règlement du différend devant la Cour 169.
18. L’Argentine estime que les consultations pr évues aux articles9 à11 n’ont pas eu lieu.
Supposons, a contrario, qu’elles aient eu lieu. L’Uruguay aurait-il pu construire et exploiter
l’usine alors qu’il avait connaissance des objections de l’Argentine? La question de l’existence
166DU, par. 2.2-2.4.
167
CMU, chap. 3.
168
Ibid., par. 3.35.
169CMU, par. 2.187. - 54 -
d’un droit d’entamer la construction d’un ouvrage se pose à différents moments. Permettez-moi de
les énumérer: premièrement, avant que la notification ne soit faite; deuxièmement, si aucune
objection n’est formulée, après la notification prévue à l’article 8 ; troisièmement, si une objection
est formulée, après la notification prévue à l’article 8, mais dans le délai de 180 jours prévu pour
les négociations; quatrièmement, si une objection est formulée par l’Argentine, après la
notification prévue à l’article8 et l’expirati on du délai de 180jours pr évu pour les négociations,
mais avant le déclenchement ou la fin de la procédure prévue à l’article 12 ; et, cinquièmement, si
une objection est formulée, après le déclenchement de la procédure prévue à l’article 12. Tels sont
70 donc les différents stades auxquels la question de la construction et de la mise en service peut se
poser. Ainsi que cela ressort clairement des écritures de l’Argentine (voir réplique,
par.1.132-1.155), la seule hypothèse ⎯ la seule ⎯ dans laquelle l’Urugua y aurait, aux termes du
statut, été fondé à autoriser ou mettre en Œuvre le projet est la deuxième, à savoir si l’Argentine
avait soit expressément indiqué qu’elle ne s’opposait pas aux travaux soit n’avait pas répondu dans
le délai prescrit de 180 jours à une notification dûment faite en vertu de l’article 8. Autrement dit
⎯cela vous surprendra peut-être ⎯, nous souscrivons à la position de MmePetrocelli, président
de la délégation uruguayenne auprès de la CA RU, position selon laquelle l’usine ne pouvait être
construite. Cela découle de l’ article9 du statut, lequel est clairement formulé; du contexte de
l’article9, y compris des articles11 et12, qui énonce la procédure à suivre lorsque l’Etat ayant
reçu notification formule effectivement des objections à l’égard des travaux ; et, enfin, de l’objet et
du but du statut dans son ensemble ⎯de sa raison d’être ⎯, à savoir d’établir les mécanismes
communs nécessaires à l’utilisation rationnelle et optimale du fleuve Uruguay et de promouvoir la
gestion commune de cette ressource naturelle partagée et fragile. L’Uruguay est donc en désaccord
avec son propre représentant, Mme Petrocelli, ce qui explique qu’il l’ait écartée.
19. L’interprétation de l’Argentine ⎯ et celle de Mme Petrocelli ⎯ est totalement conforme
à l’approche adoptée dans le cadre de la convention de 1997 sur le droit relatif aux utilisations des
cours d’eau internationaux à des fins autres que la navigation, dont les articles 14, point b), et 17,
paragraphe3, interdisent expressément à l’Etat ay ant notifié un projet envisagé de mettre celui-ci
en Œuvre alors que des consultations et des négoc iations sont en cours. Certes, l’Argentine
reconnaît, et accepte, que, en vertu de la conven tion de1997, la règle de «non-construction», - 55 -
comme on pourrait la désigner, ne s’applique que pendant une période limitée, mais cela est
uniquement dû au fait que ladite convention ne prévoit pas de procédure équivalente ou analogue à
celle, mentionnée à l’article 12 du statut de 1975, qu i ménage la possibilité d’obtenir le règlement
précoce et contraignant d’un litige. La règl e de «non-construction» est intimement liée à
l’engagement d’assurer une utilisation équitable du fleuve. Comme le précisait la CDI dans son
commentaire du projet d’article 14 du texte qui devint ultérieurement la convention de 1997 :
«Si l’Etat auteur de la notification devait procéder à la mise en Œuvre avant que
l’Etat à qui a été adressée la notification ait eu la possibilité d’évaluer les effets
éventuels des mesures projetées et d’informer l’Etat auteur de la notification de ses
conclusions, ce dernier n’aurait pas à sa di sposition toutes les informations dont il a
170
besoin pour être à même de se conformer aux articles 5 à 7.»
71 Vous constatez la sagesse de cette position. La CDI reconnaît que ces obligations procédurales
sont intimement liées aux obligations de fond . La logique sous-jacente à la règle de
«non-construction» prévue par le statut de 1975 est également liée à celle qui sous-tend l’obligation
de consultation. MmePetrocelli l’a bien compris, et c’est pour cette rais on qu’elle et M.Opertti
ont tenté de contourner l’application du statut. Un éminent exégète a ainsi résumé la logique
sous-jacente au raisonnement de MmePetrocelli: «les consultations et négociations qui doivent
être menées de bonne foi ne constituent pas une simple formalité mais une véritable tentative visant
à ménager, dans la solution finalement adoptée, une place raisonnable aux intérêts des autres
171
[parties]» [traduction du Greffe] . A ce jour, l’Uruguay n’a toujours pas expliqué en quoi son
approche ⎯ qui a consisté tout d’abord à contourner l’intervention de la CARU, puis à commencer
la construction des usines ⎯«ménage[ait]…une place raisonnable aux intérêts des autres
[parties]» ⎯ en l’occurrence à l’«intérêt raisonnable» de l’Argentine. Nous attendons avec intérêt
de voir comment le conseil de l’Uruguay expli quera la semaine prochaine en quoi l’approche
adoptée par ce pays peut être qualifiée de conforme à l’obligation d’agir de bonne foi et d’assurer
l’utilisation équitable du fleuve de manière à r especter les intérêts des deux Parties en présence
dans cette salle.
170
Ce commentaire peut être consulté à l’adresse suivan te : http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/francais/
commentaires/8_3_1994_francais.pdf.
171P. Birnie, A. Boyle, C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3 éd. (2009), p. 569. - 56 -
20. L’Uruguay déclare maintenant que Mme Petrocelli a tort et que le statut serait en quelque
sorte «silencieux» sur la question de l’exécution du projet au cours de la période suivant l’objection
de l’Etat ayant reçu notification (DU, par. 2.97). Pourtant, la façon dont l’Argentine interprète les
dispositions en question est la seule qui préserve l’intégrité de ce régime procédural dans sa
globalité en permettant aux cons ultations de suivre leur cours pour aboutir à un règlement et
d’assurer l’équilibre requis à l’articlepremier du statut. L’article9 signifie clairement que
l’ouvrage projeté ne pourra être mis à exécution ou autorisé que si, et seulement si, l’autre partie
n’a pas élevé d’objection. C’est ainsi que nous le comprenons, et c’est ainsi que Mme Petrocelli le
comprenait déjà en 2005. Face à la réalité de la présente instance, l’Uruguay a maintenant changé
son fusil d’épaule. Son interprétation ne tient aucun compte du fait que le statut de1975 ne
contient rien de semblable ⎯absolument rien—à ce qui est écrit au paragraphe3 de l’article17
de la convention de1 997, qui limite expressément la période de «non-exécution» à sixmois, ou
encore au paragraphe 1 de l’ar ticle19, qui fait primer le dr oit d’exécution en cas d’«extrême
urgence». C’est en cela que le statut de 1975 est différent de la convention de 1997.
72 21. L’Uruguay avance un autre argument qui ne trouve aucun fondement dans le texte même
de l’article9: il affirme que le libellé de cet article n’interdit pas les «travaux préparatoires» 17.
Telle n’est pas la signification manifeste de l’ar ticle9, ni même l’intention apparente de ses
auteurs, cet article permettant de «construire ou autoriser la cons truction de l’ouvrage projeté».
L’expression «ouvrage projeté» utilisée dans le texte est générale, illimitée et elle recouvre
assurément le projet en cause. Elle englobe a priori tous les aspects de cet «ouvrage» et pas
uniquement les travaux qui dépassent le stade pouvan t être qualifié de «préparatoire». La seule
lecture raisonnable de l’article9, en l’absence de termes restrictifs, est que celui-ci s’applique à
tous les ouvrages de cette ampleur qui sont «projet és». Si l’on veut que le but de ces dispositions
ait un sens, que de véritables consultations puissen t avoir lieu, alors toute activité, qu’elle soit
préparatoire ou non, irait à l’encontre de ce but. Du reste, il serait réellement difficile de faire la
distinction entre les travaux «préparatoires» et ceux qui dépassent ce stade. Voilà les raisons pour
lesquelles nous invitons la Cour à rejeter cet argument avancé par l’Uruguay.
172
CMU, par. 1.30, 2.181, 3.109-3.118 et DU, par. 2.120-2.124. - 57 -
2) Le comportement de l’Argentine est compatible avec la pratique passée
22. Second point: apparemment en désespoi r de cause, supposant que tous les autres
arguments seraient rejetés, l’Uruguay a tardiv ement pris refuge dans le vieux mensonge selon
lequel, au fil des ans, de par la conduite qu’elles avaient adoptée, les Parties s’étaient écartées de la
173
procédure prescrite dans le statut . Cela est factuellement inexact. L’Argentine est toutefois
reconnaissante à l’Uruguay d’avoir soulevé ce point , en ce qu’il souligne le fossé qui sépare la
réalité du produit de l’imagination juridique fertile de l’Uruguay. Combien d’usines de pâte à
papier, peut-on se demander, ou autres projets polluants de ce type ont-ils été proposés par l’une ou
l’autre des Parties à cet endroit du fleuve Uruguay ? Il s’avère qu’il n’y en a eu aucun. Le projet
du barrage de Garabí, qui fut envisagé entre l’Arge ntine et le Brésil sur le fleuve Uruguay et
examiné par les deux Parties, est peut-être pertin ent. Celui-ci fut dûment soumis à la CARU
en1981. La CARU identifia d’éventuels effets nocifs sur le fleuve. En1990, il semble que
l’Uruguay ait soulevé des objections. Néanmoin s, selon l’Uruguay dans son contre-mémoire,
«l’Argentine alla de l’avant (et continue à le faire) dans la mise en Œuvre du projet avec le
73 Brésil» 17. Ce projet a commencé il y a 28 ans, et on pe ut se poser la question : eh bien, en 28 ans,
qu’a-t-il été construit? La réponse est rien. Il est tout simplement difficile de voir comment on
peut «aller de l’avant» dans la mi se en Œuvre d’un projet alors que rien n’a été construit en 28 ans.
En réalité, le projet fut soumis à la CARU conf ormément aux dispositions envisagées par le statut,
il y eut notification et tenue de consultations. L’Uruguay, qui en avait le droit, insista sur
l’application en bonne et due forme des articles7 à12 du statut, ces mêmes principes qui ont
inspiré Mme Petrocelli.
23. Et encore plus récemment, il y eut le cas de l’usine de pâte à papier Traspapel, proposée
par l’Uruguay en 1995, de taille beaucoup plus modeste que l’usine Botnia, avec une production de
300 000 tonnes par an, soit trois fois moins que celle-c i. Les Parties suivirent la bonne procédure,
dont l’importance avait été soulignée par M.Lapeyre, qui à l’époque, en 1996, était le chef de la
délégation uruguayenne auprès de la CARU. M. Lapeyre avait déclaré ce qui suit :
173
CMU, par. 2.58-70 et 2.140-155 ; DU, par. 2.41.
174
Ibid., par. 2.155. - 58 -
«Lorsqu’on parle d’une installation indust rielle qui peut affecter la qualité des
eaux il est nécessaire d’être très prudent dans la gestion de la question et [de] se
175
conformer aux obligations prévues aux articles 7 à 13 du Statut du fleuve Uruguay.»
L’Uruguay suivit ces recommandations à la lettre et da ns leur esprit, et le projet fut abandonné.
Sur cette question au moins, M. Lapeyre avait saisi l’importance d’être constant !
24. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, la question d’une pratique inconstante ne se
pose pas ici. Les articles 9 à 11 ayant défini une procédure qui ne convenait pas à l’Uruguay,
celui-ci a simplement pris la décision politique de contourner le statut. La Cour ne peut éluder ce
fait. Les dispositions du statut sont claires. Elles imposent une obligation de consultation et
exigent qu’il n’y ait pas de construction tant que la procédure prévue à l’article 12, et à l’égard de
laquelle la Cour est compétente en vertu de l’article 60, n’a pas été menée à terme. Vous n’êtes pas
obligés de me croire. Nous vous invitons à «êtr e très prudent» et à suivre ainsi la démarche à
laquelle M. Lapeyre était tant attaché en 1996. Les choses sont claires : point de notification, point
de consultation ; point de consultation, point de construction.
25. Monsieur le président, ainsi s’achève le de rnier exposé de l’Argentine pour aujourd’hui.
Demain matin, M.Kohen se penchera sur l’argum ent plutôt curieux de l’Uruguay selon lequel,
d’une certaine manière, les Parties étaient convenues de ne pas tenir compte des prescriptions du
statut de 1975. Je vous remercie.
Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président: Je remercie M.Sands pour son
74
exposé. La séance est levée et les audiences reprendront demain à 10 heures.
L’audience est levée à 13 heures.
___________
175
MA, par. 3.118.
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